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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF VARIATIONS AMONG CONCEPTS OF PERSUASION AND CONVICTION

by

Melvin Willard Donaho

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A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF VARIATIONS AMONG CONCEPTS OF PERSUASION AND CONVICTION

by Melvin Willard Donaho

The purpose of this study is to analyze variations among conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction in rhetorical theory. Investigation of these approaches necessitated an analysis of definitions of the terms central to the concepts, development of a modelistic approach as a tool for the conceptual analysis, and analysis and comparison of specific conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Finally, a modern unified concept of persuasion is derived from the analysis.

The major hypothesis is that significant variations exist among the definitions of persuasion and conviction and among the conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction. The major hypothesis divides into five sub-hypotheses:

1. Concepts of persuasion and conviction can be studied through a modelistic approach. This hypothesis serves as a mediational hypothesis in that the models serve a tool function in the investigation of the problem. Such a tool is necessary to condense the great body of material into a practical mode for analysis and illustration. (Hypothesis accepted.)

2. There are inconsistencies within an individual author's work as well as among authors in attempts to define the terms "persuasion" and "conviction." Persuasion is defined as an all-inclusive monistic process

which utilizes logical, emotional, and ethical proofs as means within the process. Persuasion is also defined to mean non-logical proofs or else emotional proofs, i.e., a means within the process. Thus, persuasion is defined both as a process and as a means within that process, often by the same writer at different points in a given work.

Conviction is defined both as a means synonymous with logical proof and also to mean deep-seated beliefs. (Hypothesis accepted.)

3. There are inconsistencies among authors in their treatments of persuasion and conviction. Writers influenced by a faculty-type psychology treat persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy in which emotional and logical proofs are mutually exclusive tenets. Authors writing in the absence of or in overt opposition to a faculty-type psychology treat persuasion and conviction as: (1) a monism which treats persuasion as a process in which logical, emotional, and ethical proofs are fused; (2) a monism which emphasizes emotional or logical proofs; (3) a duality which treats both logical and emotional proofs but which denies any distinctions between them in either theory or in the communicative act; and (4) a theory-practice duality which admits distinctions between logical and emotional proofs for pedagogical reasons but denies such distinctions as valid in the actual communicative act. (Hypothesis accepted.)

4. The numerous treatments of persuasion and conviction collapse into a few basic isolated conceptual approaches upon investigation. There are three broad approaches to consider: monistic, dichotomistic, and dualistic. Within the monistic and dualistic approaches are several sub-approaches. However, these major approaches and sub-approaches collapse into two major conceptual points of view designated as dichotomistic and theory-practice duality concepts. (Hypothesis accepted.)

5. The basic similarities among isolated conceptual approaches can be integrated into one unified concept. The dichotomistic conceptual approach influenced by faculty psychology is invalid in modern rhetorical theory, while the theory-practice duality is compatible with modern knowledge. However, since both of these conflicting conceptual approaches do exist, the dichotomistic and duality approaches cannot be unified. (Hypothesis rejected.)

However, a unified concept drawing upon the broad persuasion monistic approach, the pure duality approach, the theory-practice duality approach, and upon modern findings in sociology, psychology, and social psychology is advanced in Chapter VII of this study. This unified concept eliminates the dichotomistic approach as invalid.

PREFACE

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the faculty of the Department of Speech, The University of Michigan, who answered questions and offered suggestions throughout the development of this study.

The encouragement and guidance came primarily from Dr. Kenneth E. Andersen and Dr. William M. Sattler. Their cooperation, sympathetic attitude, and helpful suggestions are deeply appreciated.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Ruth Donaho, who typed this work in its entirety and whose encouragement and devotion have contributed to the completion of this study.

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CHAPTER I

THE STUDY, ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE

Rhetorical theorists have long maintained distinctions between two forms of appeal, usually designated as emotional proof and logical proof. However, these distinctions clearly reveal a failure among the various conceptual approaches to maintain consistent meanings of specific terms involved. Such inconsistencies among definitions and among conceptual points of view lead to contradictions and to controversy.

An example of the inconsistency among meanings of specific terminology will help to clarify the purpose of this study. In the field of speech concepts of argumentation and persuasion exist in which persuasion plus conviction are said to represent persuasion. In this context persuasion refers to the psychological aspects of rhetoric usually expressed as emotional proof, whereas conviction concerns the logical aspects of rhetoric or logical proof. As a unit, however, emotional proofs and logical proofs constitute persuasion, with still a third form called ethical proof subsumed under the classification of persuasion.

Essentially, authors present diverse views of persuasion in which persuasion is treated as an emotional means to an end by some authors; as an end in itself by other authors; and, as both a means and as an end by a few authors. Similarly, conviction is treated as a logical means to an end and/or as the holding of "deep-seated beliefs." A goal of this study is to analyze such confusing and often conflicting definitions

of persuasion and conviction. Throughout the various approaches to persuasion and conviction is the recurrent question: "Do we persuade or do we convince?" Then, we must also ask, do we first persuade and then convince? Is the converse true? Do we persuade and convince simultaneously? May we only persuade? May we only convince? Or, if we persuade and convince, to what degree do we do either?

The relationship between persuasion and conviction has been a problem in speech theory for the last one hundred seventy-five years. Historically, the problem's roots lie with the initial theorizing on rhetoric and communication theory. Currently, its offshoots appear in every text on argumentation and persuasion, providing issues to confuse the communication theorist, student, or practitioner. The significance of this study, then, lies in the attempt to analyze such conflicting views of persuasion and conviction as well as in analyzing similarities and differences between persuasion and conviction per se.

There is no question that various concepts of persuasion and conviction do exist. The function of this study is to analyze these concepts with particular attention to the definition, delineation, and interrelationships of the terms and concepts involved.

The Nature of the Study

There are two broad areas which depict the nature of the study. First, since a major area of investigation and analysis concerns definition, discussion of basic definitions helps to clarify and describe the nature of the study. Secondly, a brief explanation and discussion of the various conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction are vital for understanding the broad aspects of the study.

The Problem of Definition

Definition of *persuasion* and *conviction* is of such significance that Chapter III is devoted to a more thorough analysis of the problem of definition. However, a preliminary discussion of definitions is necessary for a better understanding of the nature of this study.

Definitions of *persuasion* are more complex than are those of *conviction*. In addition, there is less agreement among the definitions of *persuasion*. The inconsistencies among definitions and usage of *persuasion* are of major significance since they contribute to the need for the study in which isolation of the various treatments is a key goal.

Although numerous authors have written definitions of persuasion, a few definitions will serve to illustrate the complexity of the problem.

Robert T. Oliver, one of the earlier and more prominent authors of a modern text book devoted to persuasion, first defined persuasion as ". . . the art of motivation by non-logical means."[1] In this context *persuasion* embodies both emotional proof and ethical proof, but not logical proof.[2] Fifteen years later Oliver redefined persuasion as ". . . any form of discourse that influences thought, feelings, or conduct."[3] This latter definition is essentially Aristotelian since Aristotle defines persuasion as utilizing "all available means": logical, emotional

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[1]Robert T. Oliver, *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech* (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1942), p. 10.

[2]Classically there have been three forms of proof: logical proof (*logos*), emotional proof (*pathos*), and ethical proof (*ethos*).

[3]Robert T. Oliver, *The Psychology of Persuasive Speech* (2nd ed.; New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1957), p. 7.

and ethical proofs. Thus, within the works by one author, two conflicting definitions of persuasion emerge. In the earlier example from Oliver persuasion is defined as a means to an end while in the latter work persuasion is defined as an end result or as a form of discourse which ". . . appeals through [the means of] facts, logic, emotions, and rationalization."[4]

Thus, persuasion is defined in two wholly different contexts within separate works by the same author. Such inconsistencies are also found among definitions of persuasion by various other authors. Wayne C. Minnick defines persuasion as an end result designed to win "belief or stimulate action by employing all the factors that determine human behavior."[5] Minnick's definition of persuasion is all-inclusive and encompasses logical, emotional, and ethical proofs as does Aristotle's.

However, other authors express definitions of persuasion which differ greatly from those of Minnick, Oliver, and Aristotle. Matthew Hope, influenced by Faculty Psychology, describes persuasion as those emotional means which appeal to the will.[6] William Trufant Foster equates persuasion with emotional proof but does not advance a Faculty Psychology rationale as does Hope.[7] Edward Everett Hale, Jr., defines persuasion as depending upon the emotions and then forcefully rejects

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[4]Ibid., p. 9.

[5]Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 33.

[6]Matthew B. Hope, The Princeton Text Book in Rhetoric (Princeton, New Jersey: John T. Robinson, 1859), pp. 1-2.

[7]William T. Foster, Argumentation and Debating (Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945), p. v.

persuasion as a part of rhetoric.[8]

A major aspect of this study is the problem inherent in conflicting definitions which describe persuasion as: "all-inclusive and encompassing logical, emotional and ethical proofs"; as a means to an end result; as embodying solely emotional proof; as synonymous with conviction; or, as having no role in rhetoric.

The definitions of conviction are not as confusing as are those of persuasion. There are two conflicting definitions of conviction to consider. The more common definition among rhetorical works is that conviction encompasses logical proof. As such, conviction is usually dichotomous with persuasion in which context persuasion would be defined as encompassing non-logical proofs.

Probably, the more common definition in general language usage is that conviction means "deep-seated beliefs." In the former definition (logical proofs) one might say, "Use conviction or logical proof to convince the jury," while in the latter definition one might say, "The convictions or deep-seated beliefs of the jury cannot easily be changed."

Historically and currently the definitions of persuasion and conviction have been confusing. Some of the vital related issues which reflect the problem of definition as well as the nature of this study are:

1. Does persuasion encompass all forms of proof or only emotional proof?
2. Is persuasion a means to an end result or the end result itself? Or, can the single term persuasion represent both the means as well as an end result?

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[8]Edward Everett Hale, Jr., Constructive Rhetoric (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1896), pp. 321-322.

3. Are persuasion and conviction synonymous?
4. Are persuasion and conviction dichotomous?
5. Are persuasion and conviction by definition interrelated in various degrees throughout a communicative message? That is, does one first "persuade," then "convince," and then "persuade" and, if so, to what degree?

The Problem of Variations Within or Among Concepts of Persuasion and Conviction

The problem of variations within or among concepts of persuasion and conviction illustrates a second important dimension of this study. Three basic concepts of persuasion and conviction are isolated in this study. Brief explanations of these concepts will serve to clarify the individual concepts and the nature of this study.

A. The Monistic Concepts. Conceptual treatments are defined as monistic if they meet any one of the following criteria:
   1. The concept strongly emphasizes either logical or emotional proof as the clearly dominant force.
   2. The concept omits completely any treatment of either emotional proof or logical proof and treats solely the remaining form of proof.
   3. The concept recognizes the attributes of persuasion and conviction as synonymous and, as such, utilizes only one term to describe them. Since only one term is expressed, the second term is omitted entirely.

B. The Dichotomistic Concepts. Conceptual treatments are defined as dichotomies when emotional proof and logical proof are treated as mutually exclusive dimensions.

C. The Duality Concepts. Two separate conceptual treatments of dualities are distinguishable:

1. The Pure Duality views persuasion and conviction as complementary and indistinguishable with no distinctions between persuasion and conviction either in theory or practice. A "pure duality" differs from a monism in that the pure duality recognizes both dimensions but denies that they may be differentiated. A monism utilizes only one of the two dimensions (either persuasion or conviction) to encompass the attributes of both; the second or "missing" term is never expressed.
2. The Theory-Practice Duality views emotional proof and logical proof as distinguishable artificially in theory for pedagogical reasons but not distinguishable in the actual practice of communication.

Scholarly writings pertaining to persuasion and conviction have expressed one or more of the above conceptual approaches, but they have largely compounded the problem rather than clarifying or defining it. Many writers such as Yost and Woolbert have raised questions as to whether speakers persuade or convince or do both. These authors in seeking clarification ask whether persuasion employs solely emotional proofs; conviction, logical proofs; or whether there are no distinctions between persuasion and conviction.

Dean Yost, one of the earlier modern authors to pursue the problem, seeks to resolve the issue by advancing a monistic conceptual approach centered in sociology. Within her sociological monism, Dean Yost states that the means utilized to persuade man cannot be

distinguished. Why man is persuaded, she believes, can only be explained by analyzing his sociological environment. While advancing her monistic view grounded in sociology, Dean Yost explicitly denies the validity of explaining man's actions through concepts of persuasion and conviction.[9]

In also establishing a monistic position, Woolbert agrees with Dean Yost's basic analysis of the invalidity of distinguishing between persuasion and conviction; however, Woolbert differs from Yost in that he believes man's actions are better explained from the point of view of psychology: "My thesis is that any division of appeal and speech into conviction and persuasion is unsound from the point of view of psychology and unnecessary from the point of view of rhetorical theory."[10] Essentially, Dean Yost and Woolbert recognize that rhetorical theories which explain why men act or believe as they do by distinguishing among elements of emotional and logical proofs are not satisfactory. Yet, each probes a different field of knowledge to seek an answer for man's actions. Since Dean Yost's and Woolbert's concepts were expressed, writers have mentioned sociological and psychological factors as affecting man's actions or beliefs but have typically continued to advance concepts expressed in terms of persuasion and conviction.

In current textbooks in public speaking, persuasion, and argumentation and debate, most rhetoricians and speech teachers appear to accept the broad thesis that action or belief may be the ultimate end of

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[9]Mary Yost, "Argument from the Point-of-View of Sociology," The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (April, 1917), 115.

[10]Charles H. Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 249.

of any general speech purpose or that action or belief may be achieved through any one of various appeals. However, there still exist several conflicting views of persuasion and conviction as well as conflicting definitions of persuasion and conviction per se. These conflicting views, as defined earlier, are expressed in monistic, dualistic, and dichotomistic conceptual approaches.

In addition there are several varying attitudes toward the interrelationship of persuasion and conviction. Some writers feel that man first convinces using logical proofs and then persuades using emotional proofs. Some writers feel that persuasion and conviction cannot be differentiated and are simultaneously expressed. Others feel that rather than writing in terms of persuasion and conviction one should express the means to evoke action or belief in terms of argumentation and persuasion, reason and emotion, belief and action, or conviction and conversion.

In a brief treatment of "motivation" Glen E. Mills presents another view, namely, that of popular persuasion versus formal argument. Mills somewhat contradictorily states that there is no dichotomy between logos, pathos, and ethos; yet, he further states that ethos and pathos are more properly found in popular persuasion while logos is better treated in argumentative discourse.[11] Mills' position is reinforced by Austin J. Freeley:

> Both classical and modern principles are presented as parts of the dynamic whole of argumentation and are considered in the context of their usefulness to the contemporary advocate. No dichotomy is found between discussion and debate, persuasion and argumentation,

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[11]Glen E. Mills, Reason in Controversy (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 156-158.

> or Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian reasoning. Rather, it is found that valuable percepts may be drawn from all of these disciplines and blended together to serve the end of rational decision making.[12]

Yet, Freeley dichotomizes persuasion and argumentation and also persuasion and conviction before concluding his first chapter.[13]

One of the anomalies of the field of speech today is that there is no one concept of persuasion and conviction. As various viewpoints are considered, the question arises as to whether some authors treat concepts of persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy in theory for ease of explanation on the written page and, then, hold the concepts of persuasion and conviction to be a duality when used in practice.

Indeed, the persuasion and conviction problem is a complex one. It is for this reason that this study seeks to isolate elements of the problem and the basic dimensions of the various concepts. The modelistic method selected for such analysis is presented in Chapter II.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study are to analyze various concepts of persuasion and conviction from antiquity to the present; to investigate significant variations among these concepts; and to derive an integrated view of persuasion and conviction from them. From these broad goals the major hypothesis and sub-hypotheses are derived.

Major Hypothesis: Significant variations exist among the definitions of persuasion and conviction and among the conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction.

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[12]Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate (San Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1961), p. vii.

[13]Ibid., p. 7.

Sub-Hypotheses:

1. Concepts of persuasion and conviction can be studied through a modelistic approach.
2. There are inconsistencies within an individual author's work as well as among authors in attempts to define the terms persuasion and conviction.
3. There are inconsistencies among authors in their treatments of persuasion and conviction.
4. The numerous treatments of persuasion and conviction collapse into a few basic isolated conceptual approaches upon investigation.
5. The basic similarities among isolated conceptual approaches can be integrated into one unified concept.

Methodology

Any problem area with a history as broad as that of the persuasion and conviction duality must by its very nature be treated selectively. Various approaches were considered in the attempt to isolate a method of treatment which would best lend itself to the goals of this study. A chronological approach, utilizing individual rhetoricians, i.e., beginning with earliest figures of antiquity and continuing to those of present time, was judged not only to be far too lengthy but also impracticable since such an approach would involve needless duplication of material.

Therefore, the materials bearing upon persuasion and conviction were read and analyzed and from this analysis three major conceptual approaches emerged. Since the purpose of this study is to consider the variations among these conceptual approaches, only those sources

necessary to develop these approaches are utilized in the study.

Since differences among concepts of persuasion and conviction are to be analyzed, a modelistic approach is adopted for this purpose.[14] Chapter II is devoted to further definition, discussion, and development of the modelistic approach to be used.

Survey of Previous Studies

Although persuasion and conviction have been a perplexing problem for well over a century, only two scholars, Rowell and Griffin, are found who have attempted a relatively definitive study of the problem. Several scholars such as Yost, Woolbert, Graham, Brigance, and Oliver have recognized the problem and have advanced their own concepts but have not undertaken detailed studies to present viewpoints of others.

Edward Z. Rowell and Robert S. Griffin not only recognize the problem but also present historical overviews of conflicting ideas about persuasion and conviction.

Edward Z. Rowell

The most comprehensive treatment of persuasion and conviction is that by Rowell. His study, presented in a series of four articles, entitled "Prolegomena to Argumentation" provides an historical perspective of the problem.[15]

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[14]Essentially, a model is composed of one or more symbols which describe major factors involved in a concept. As such, a model is an analogy which provides a visual description of the particular concept to be described.

[15]Edward Z. Rowell, "Prolegomena to Argumentation (Part I)," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVIII (February, 1932), 1-13; Part II, (April, 1932), 224-248; Part III, (June, 1932), 381-405; Part IV, (November, 1932), 585-606.

The purpose of Rowell's writing his "Prolegomena" was two-fold: (1) to present a broad historical overview of the problem; and (2) to challenge other scholars to analyze and, possibly, to resolve the problem through further investigation. Rowell does not explicitly state his purpose but the conclusion to his first article illustrates the tenor of his scholarly pursuits:

> This is just a hint of the serious social significance of our problem. Perhaps none of us teachers of argumentation have the ability to carry the solution of that problem very far. However that may be, we cannot but feel that it is as much our problem as it is the problem of philosophy and the social sciences, and that we have the greatest possible motivation for attempting to solve it in the painful confusion and distress of our contemporary society.[16]

In advancing his "Prolegomena" Rowell is concerned with discussing historical perspectives on persuasion and conviction as they relate to argumentation. Rowell, himself, does not attempt to investigate specific dimensions of individual concepts, nor does he attempt to make critical comparisons of these concepts. He does advance his own dualistic concept of persuasion and conviction in a fifth article. At the beginning of his fifth article Rowell summarizes his purpose in writing his "Prolegomena":

> The problems selected were those which had been under discussion for a decade and a half and which had arisen out of the published belief of some teachers of speech that our theory of argumentation ought to be fundamentally revised. My attitude in the matter was that the issues thus raised were so important that they constituted a crucial challenge to the scholarship in our profession. I felt, as I feel now, that the questions before us should be dealt with assiduously and persistently until all the facts relating to them are brought to light and until all unsolved problems receive at least sound technical formulation.[17]

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[16] Ibid., Part I, p. 13.

[17] Edward Z. Rowell, "The Conviction-Persuasion Duality," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XX (November, 1934), 469-482.

Rowell's study, then, differs from the present investigation in that Rowell attempts to bring the persuasion and conviction problem into the open where it can then be investigated, whereas this study attempts to examine the conflicting concepts of persuasion and conviction in greater detail and to determine whether there are significant variations among concepts. Briefly, this study attempts to meet the challenge which Rowell's investigation provides.

Robert S. Griffin

Griffin's is the only doctoral dissertation focusing upon the persuasion and conviction problem.[18] Although chronologically it follows Rowell's "Prolegomena," Griffin's study presents again a general overview of the persuasion and conviction problem but does not attempt to differentiate among the various concepts of persuasion and conviction.

Griffin's dissertation differs from the present study in that Griffin presents a general historical review of the persuasion and conviction problem, whereas this study is an attempt to analyze basic concepts and the dimensions of those concepts underlying the persuasion and conviction problem. This study also utilizes a modelistic approach for the visualization of concepts, whereas Griffin and Rowell depended wholly upon verbal explanations.

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter I has set forth the nature and significance of the problem and the scope and methodology of the study. Chapter II develops the

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[18]Robert S. Griffin, "A Historical and Psychological Study of the Conviction-Persuasion Concept in Public Speaking," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Speech, The University of Southern California, 1941).

theoretical basis for the modelistic approach which is employed in analysis of the material. This chapter also surveys the role of the model in theory construction, the uses and limitation of models, and develops the working models to be used in presentation of the material.

Since the aspect of definition plays such a major role in this study, Chapter III treats solely of the problem of definition.

Chapters IV, V, and VI are devoted to the analysis of basic concepts of persuasion and conviction. Concepts of persuasion and conviction were isolated as representative of major contributions to rhetorical theory. In the analysis of the historical data each of these basic concepts is presented in a modelistic form.

Chapter VII compares the concepts of persuasion and conviction. Chapter VIII summarizes the study, amplifies the conclusions, and sets forth suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MODELISTIC APPROACH

This study identifies the variations among concepts of persuasion and conviction through the use of formal models. The purpose of this chapter is to develop a rationale for and an explanation of the models to be used in the description and analysis of the various conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction.

Preliminary investigation revealed three broad conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction which constitute the roots for the models developed:

A. Monistic Concepts. There are four monistic approaches to persuasion and conviction:

1. A monism in which persuasion encompasses all forms of proof.[1]
2. A monism rooted in either psychology or sociology in which other conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction are considered but rejected as invalid.
3. A monism in which conviction meaning logical proof is recognized while persuasion meaning non-logical proof is either

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[1]In this first approach persuasion is an all-inclusive term which represents the end result of a communicative act. In the fourth approach persuasion encompasses only emotional proof and represents a means within a communicative act. This variation in the definition of persuasion illustrates one of the conditions contributing to the confusion surrounding the problem of the relation of persuasion and conviction.

not treated, mentioned but rejected, or else held as subservient to conviction.

4. A monism in which persuasion meaning emotional proof is recognized while conviction meaning logical proof is either not treated or else mentioned but held as governed by emotions rather than by reason.

B. Dichotomistic Concepts. The dichotomistic approaches view persuasion and conviction as complementary in achieving an end result but define emotional proof and logical proof as mutually exclusive dimensions within this process.

C. Dualistic Concepts. There are two dualistic conceptual approaches:

1. The Pure Duality recognizes both persuasion and conviction but holds that they may not be distinguished from each other in theory nor in the actual communicative act.

2. A second form of duality advocates that persuasion and conviction may be tentatively distinguished from each other in theory but may not be so distinguished in the practice of communication.[2]

These three categories provide the basis for the models developed.

A modelistic approach has utility in that it permits a concept expressed in an individual contribution, such as that in Aristotle's Rhetoric, to be visualized and described as a generalized theoretical model.

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[2]For convenience and clarity this form of duality is labeled as a Theory-Practice Duality throughout this study.

In presenting the rationale for and method employed in the modelistic approach, this chapter is organized into the following divisions: Definition of Models, The Use of Models in Theory Construction, Development of the Models, and Summary of the Chapter.

Definition of Models

The function of models is to present a visual portrayal through analogy of the concepts under examination. In a general sense, a model is a miniature, i.e., a reduction in size of the original but a reduction which retains certain traits of the original. Thus, plot layouts show how a completed housing development will appear. Architects design a model which shows the streets with white paint on plywood instead of asphalt or concrete; trees of papier-mache'; churches, schools, and houses of cardboard and glue; and even small scale shopping centers of balsawood instead of brick. This model by the architects is convenient to manipulate and to use as a basic tool for illustration and description. It obviously does not retain the realistic features of the original, but its minute size does permit interested parties to view in perspective the essential dimensions and relationships of the completed development.

Although similar to the model proposed in this paper, the architects' model is static and comparatively free of abstract terminology. Since the models employed in this study concern a process, they must provide a dynamic consideration of relatively abstract concepts which have been formulated by human minds and as such must possess non-static as well as interrelated static parts.

A model, as defined for this study, is an analogy consisting of a separate system, which brings to bear an external organization of ideas

and relationships upon the hypothetical propositions of the theory it encompasses. Operationally, each model, then, is a diagram of an aspect of a particular concept of persuasion and conviction. These concepts have in turn been derived from the treatments of the persuasion and conviction problem by various rhetoricians. The visual representations of the three major viewpoints found among the rhetoricians thus become the working models through which concepts are analyzed and contrasted with one another.

The Use of Models in Theory Construction

A current trend in the field of speech is to treat specific problems through empirical approaches. Such approaches would be excellent methods for treating the persuasion and conviction problem except for the complexity of the underlying interrelationships and presuppositions. These interrelationships are of such a basic nature that empirical techniques may follow only when the theoretical dimensions are clarified and terms defined in ways that may be "operationalized." The analysis of these theoretical dimensions should provide a foundation upon which a common theory or series of premises may be based.[3]

Melvin H. Marx notes that all theory tends to be both a tool and a goal.[4] A modelistic approach should lend itself to the development

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[3]The author believes that the field of speech is in need of new approaches to such theory construction. In terms of the persuasion and conviction problem, he does not mean to infer that his is the only answer or resolution of this problem. Rather, it is intended that this analysis should treat of an old problem in a new way and provide a basis for its resolution.

[4]Melvin H. Marx, "The General Nature of Theory Construction," Theories in Contemporary Psychology, ed. Melvin H. Marx (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 5.

of a new theory of the persuasion and conviction problem for, as Roy Lachman states, "This external organization or model contributes to the construction, application, and interpretation of the theory."[5] Therefore, the models herein developed should be useful as essential aids in directing this investigation (the tool function) and may also serve as objectives in their own right (the goal function).

It should be understood that models are not only applied to directly accessible facts or data but also to inaccessible and often hypothetical concepts of theory. The primary role that the models play in this study is to provide a pictorial representation of the essential aspects of the concepts described, thus clarifying the theoretical dimensions.[6]

Since 1949 numerous communication models have been developed in the fields of communication research, sociology, mathematics, and speech.[7] These models have been quite valuable for illustration and are being utilized in the teaching of communication. Karl W. Deutsch aptly

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[5]Roy Lachman, "The Model in Theory Construction," Theories in Contemporary Psychology, ed. Melvin H. Marx (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 79.

[6]Often the successful theorist's hypothetical interpretation does play a significant role in the drawing of the initial analogy between the data of interest and the separate concepts of persuasion and conviction.

[7]For examples of such models see: George A. Miller, Language and Communication (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951), p. 609; Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1949), p. 5.; Wendell Johnson, "The Communication Process and General Semantic Principles," Mass Communication, ed. Wilbur Schramm (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1955), pp. 3-26; and Melvin L. DeFleur and Otto N. Larsen, The Flow of Information (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 9.

explains the value of the communication model:

> If we can map the pathways by which information is communicated between different parts of an organization and by which it is applied to the behavior of the organization in relation to the outside world, we will have gone far toward an understanding of that organization. This will be true of an organization composed of cells in an organism, or of machines in an automatic communications network, or of human beings in a social organization. The fundamental processes of communication and control in all these types of organization follow at least some fundamental regularities.[8]

The most popular communications model developed by the mathematicians is that of Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver.[9] This model was originally designed to meet technical problems of transmitting symbols with accuracy, but Weaver further amplified the model to make it more generally useful to students of communication. Essentially, the Shannon-Weaver model (Figure 1) is useful in that it visualizes the major




Fig. 1.--Schematic diagram of a general communication system

problem areas involved when an information source selects a desired message and transmits it to a destination.[10]

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[8]Karl W. Deutsch, "On Communication Models in the Social Sciences," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Fall, 1952), 367.

[9]Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1949), p. 5.

[10]This model is useful in that it can illustrate by analogy numerous problems such as source bias, outside noises, semantic noise, and

Two specific limitations are relevant to this study: several modelistic approaches are possible for any one problem, and no one model is necessarily the best description of a particular dimension of a problem. Furthermore, models developed by one person cannot exhaustively represent a concept expressed several centuries earlier by another person. There is no way of stating precisely that this is Aristotle's concept of persuasion. However, there are numerous English translations and interpretations of specific concepts whose dimensions can be represented.

Thus, the models developed in this study should be useful modes for:

1. the definition and explanation of terminology utilized in the selected concepts
2. the visual comparison of various approaches
3. the selection of premises for a unified concept of persuasion and conviction
4. the visual and explanatory development of the derived concept
5. the comparison of the derived concept with the other approaches

Development of the Models

The relevant materials on the persuasion and conviction problem were subjected to the following techniques which served as the basis for the models:

1. a deductive analysis for clarification and definition of the

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[10]bias of the destination. Another important contribution of the Shannon-Weaver Communication Model is their description and explanation which accompanies the model (see Ibid., pp. 3-6). Often such description and interpretation are more important than the actual model itself.

approaches used by authors in treating the concepts

2. an analysis of the component parts of each particular concept

3. a comparison of the various conceptual approaches

Initially, the basic material for derivation of the working models was found in the definition of specific terms, such as persuasion, conviction, monism, dichotomy, and duality. Through the processes of inference and interpretation of these definitions, the bases for the models developed in this study were established. These models were further developed through the utilization of deductive logic. This approach was useful since its syllogistic techniques provide principles and rules for analysis which clarify the logical structure of the terms defined.

There are four Aristotelian forms of perfect (pure) categorical propositions[11] by which definitions of conviction could be stated:

1. Universal Affirmative: "All conviction is logical"
2. Universal Negative: "No conviction is logical"
3. Particular Affirmative: "Some conviction is logical"
4. Particular Negative: "Some conviction is non-logical"

These four forms provide the basis by which a term can be examined. Obviously, not all forms are useful at the same time. The universal affirmative that all "conviction" is logical could be the view of a dichotomist toward that dimension. It could also represent the view of a conviction monist. However, the universal affirmative which infers that conviction embodies only logical proof would be rejected by the dualist who holds that logical and emotional proofs cannot be distinguished from

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
[11]Richard B. Angell, Reasoning and Logic (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1964), p. 66.

each other.

Pure persuasion follows a corresponding pattern:

1. All persuasion is emotional in nature
2. No persuasion is emotional in nature
3. Some persuasion is emotional
4. Some persuasion is non-emotional

The above eight pattern sequences illustrate the definitions of conviction and persuasion as each of the terms exists in dichotomistic conceptual approaches. These patterns may be illustrated in modular forms. In these models (Figure 2) the only relationships under examination are the inclusion, exclusion, or identity of the circles used. If one circle is "included" within the encompass of another, the words "is" and "are" may be interpreted. If the circles are separate entities, i.e., stand apart from each other, then the words "not," "non," or "no" may be interpreted. A circle with a broken circumference indicates "some" part of the whole. There is no relationship between the size of



Form 1 Form 2 Forms 3 and 4

Fig. 2.--Models illustrating four forms of categorical propositions. Explanation of Symbols: L = Logic; C = Conviction; a solid circumference = all; a broken circumference = some part of the whole; circumscribed circles are related by is or are (i.e., Form 1 would read that all Conviction is Logical); two circles standing apart are related by no, not, or non (i.e., Form 3 which includes two forms would read that some conviction is Logical and some Conviction is not Logical).

any two circles.[12]

In Figure 2 the models represent the four forms of perfect categorical expression noted previously.

The Pure Models[13]

Monistic Conceptual Approaches of Persuasion and Conviction.--As noted in Chapter I, there are four possible monistic approaches to the problem of persuasion and conviction. The first treats persuasion as being an all-inclusive term which embodies all forms of proof and defines persuasion as the end result of the communication process. Furthermore, this end result is achieved through one process.[14] This concept yields the following premises which are expressed in Figure 3:

1. All persuasion is persuasion.
2. All persuasion embodies all available forms of proof.
3. No one proof form can be distinguished from any other proof form; i.e., logical proof cannot be distinguished from emotional proof.

A second possible monistic approach is based on knowledge fundamental to a field of study other than rhetoric. These treatments are based on the belief that man's acts or beliefs can only be explained

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[12]In working with broad general definitions, it is impossible to interpret an exact degree of "someness." Moreover, the writings of various authors who employ the same general approach seem to vary in amount of "someness" from a part to almost total identity.

[13]A pure model is a visualization of a hypothetical concept. The pure model with its concisely defined dimensions is then useful as a tool for the description and analysis of the actual conceptual approaches under investigation.

[14]The persuasion monist does not differentiate among the various forms of proof and often criticizes distinctions drawn by other authors as being artificial and unnecessary.




Fig. 3.--Monistic Conceptual Approach in which Persuasion is Defined as embodying all available forms of Proof

through principles inherent in the disciplines of sociology and psychology, respectively. Thus, it is essential to develop a hypothetical model which depicts these important points of view. This second monistic approach yields the following premises which are expressed in Figure 4:

1. Persuasion (all-inclusive) cannot be explained in terms of persuasion (pathetic proof) and conviction (logical proof).
2. All persuasion is grounded in sociology [one point of view].
3. All persuasion is grounded in psychology [a second point of view].

The remaining two monistic approaches in which either persuasion (emotional proof) or conviction (logical proof) is the determining factor for man's actions or beliefs yield the following premises:




Fig. 4.--Monistic Conceptual Approaches Grounded in Sociology and Psychology

Persuasion Monist

1. All persuasion is emotional
2. All persuasion is non-logical
3. All conviction is either (a) rejected, (b) subservient to persuasion, or (c) is not mentioned.

Conviction Monist

1. All conviction is logical
2. All conviction is non-emotional
3. All persuasion is either (a) rejected as emotional, (b) subservient to logic, or (c) not mentioned.

Some rhetoricians advocate monistic conceptual positions emphasizing either emotional proof (pathos) or else logical proof (logos) and do not treat the remaining form. Therefore, it is interpreted that the omitted tenet is rejected through such omission. These monistic concepts

take the following forms when expressed in models:




Fig. 5.--Monistic Conceptual Approaches Grounded in Either Emotional Proof or Logical Proof. Shading indicates that the dimension shaded is rejected or not treated.

Dichotomistic Conceptual Approaches.--A "pure" dichotomistic treatment of persuasion and conviction recognizes the two elements of emotional proof and logical proof as mutually exclusive dimensions. They are also complementary to each other in terms of being means to a similar end. Within such a treatment persuasion is defined as only those forces which appeal to the emotions of the auditor. Conviction is defined as only those logical forces which appeal to the intellect of the auditor.


These definitions illustrate a dichotomy in which persuasion and conviction are distinctly different and exist as separate entities. Furthermore, it is implied that either dimension could be employed independently of the other, equally with the other, or in varying proportions. Conceivably, one could use only persuasion or only conviction in

a particular message. One might also first use persuasion and then conviction or an infinite combination of the two dimensions.


A "pure" dichotomy of the persuasion and conviction problem as described above is defined in the following series of premises:

1. All conviction is logical and all persuasion is emotional.
2. All conviction is non-emotional and all persuasion is non-logical.
3. All conviction is non-persuasion and all persuasion is non-conviction.


These three sets are described in the form of models in Figure 6 which illustrates the broad distinctions between persuasion and conviction existing as a dichotomy.




"All conviction is logical"




"All persuasion is emotional"




"All conviction is non-emotional"



"All persuasion is non-logical"



"All conviction is non-persuasion"



"All persuasion is non-conviction"

Fig. 6.--Models Expressing a Persuasion and Conviction Dichotomy

Duality Conceptual Approaches of Persuasion and Conviction.--Hypothetically, the duality approach to persuasion and conviction may be divided into two distinct sub-approaches which can be treated independently. The first is a Pure Duality which recognizes both persuasion and conviction but states that there are no real distinctions between the two dimensions and that any distinctions made are artificial. This pure duality differs from the monism concept discussed previously in that it recognizes the existence of both persuasion and conviction while denying their separation into distinct entities in either theory or practice. As defined previously, the monism approach may treat only of persuasion or else only of conviction while denying any need for the other term.[15] The pure duality concept (Figure 7) yields the following major premises:

1. Persuasion and conviction coexist as a dual force and are mutually related
2. Conviction and persuasion coexist as a dual force and are mutually related
3. Some persuasion is conviction
4. Some conviction is persuasion
5. No persuasion is non-conviction
6. No conviction is non-persuasion
7. Any premise such as some conviction is non-persuasion is

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[15]In both duality concepts pure persuasion is defined as emotional proof and pure conviction is defined as logical proof. A third form of classical proof, ethos, is often classified by theorists as a dimension of the persuasion process. However, ethos, although important, is not a critical factor in the development of the working models of persuasion and conviction. An analysis of ethos is a very real theoretical problem in itself.

contradictory and rejected

The second of the duality concepts is classified as a Theory-Practice Duality (Figure 8). In this broad concept the duality appears as a dichotomy in theory but as a duality in practice. Neither dimension is a pure one. The following major premises are drawn from this theory-practice duality:

I. In theory:

1. The totality of all persuasion cannot be distinguished from the totality of all conviction
2. All conviction cannot be distinguished from all persuasion
3. Some persuasion is distinguished from all conviction
4. Some conviction is distinguished from all persuasion
5. Some persuasion is distinguished from some conviction
6. Some conviction is distinguished from some persuasion
7. Some persuasion is not distinguished from all conviction
8. Some conviction is not distinguished from all persuasion
9. Some persuasion is not distinguished from some conviction
10. Some conviction is not distinguished from some persuasion

II. In practice:

1. No persuasion can be distinguished from conviction
2. No conviction can be distinguished from persuasion

The duality concepts are the most complex forms of the persuasion and conviction problem. These forms take the shape of working models as expressed in Figures 7 and 8.

The pure duality is distinct from the theory-practice duality in that the pure duality is constant in both theory and practice. However, the theory-practice duality is treated as a dichotomy in theory for





Fig. 7.--Pure Duality Concept

Theory Dimension



Practice Dimension



Fig. 8.--Theory-Practice Duality Concept. (The number beneath each model denotes the respective premise stated earlier in the text.)

convenience of explanation but as a duality in practice.

A comparison of the model in the theory-practice concept expressing "some persuasion is distinguished from all conviction" with one representing the pure duality expressed as "persuasion and conviction coexist as a dual force and are mutually related" reveals an important distinction between these two concepts as expressed in Figure 9.




Fig. 9.--Two Dimensions of Contrasting Duality Concepts

In Figure 9, Model A, it is apparent that some persuasion is not distinguished from conviction; however, it is also apparent that there is latitude for further distinction between persuasion and conviction. In Model B, inasmuch as persuasion and conviction mutually coexist, no distinctions may be drawn other than the separate definitions of the two broad concepts. That is to say, emotional proof and logical proof are admitted to be present but cannot be distinguished one from the other.

Time Line Variations on Pure Models.--A time line lends itself well in depicting certain relationships within an approach or among approaches to persuasion and conviction. For example, some treatments raise the question: Does one first convince and then persuade? To note the different positions taken relative to this question, an integrated model is used which combines the idea of a continuum with the idea of

the schematic diagram.[16]

An example of a hypothetical model resulting from this union is illustrated in Figure 10. In this model which traces a dichotomistic approach, the source of communication transmits a message in which he first persuades, to gain the "good will of the receiver"; then he convinces using logical proofs; and, finally, persuades utilizing emotional proofs in order to get his receiver (listener) to act or to carry out the effect sought in the message.




Fig. 10.--Linear Delineation of One Variation of a Persuasion and Conviction Dichotomy

Summary

(1). A model is defined as a visual portrayal of a particular concept under examination through analogy. This chapter developed such models to express hypothetically "pure" descriptions of monistic, dichotomistic, and dualistic conceptual approaches of persuasion and conviction.

(2). There are four possible monistic approaches to persuasion and conviction. The first monistic treatment describes persuasion as a fusion of all forms of proof. The second treatment expresses a monism rooted possibly either in psychology or else in sociology. The third

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[16]For an example see the Shannon and Weaver model, Supra, p. 21.

conception expresses a monism in which conviction, meaning logical proof, is recognized while persuasion, meaning non-logical proof, is either not treated, mentioned but rejected, or else held as subservient to conviction. The fourth point of view concerns a monism in which persuasion, meaning emotional proof, is recognized while conviction, meaning logical proof, is either not treated or else mentioned but held as governed by emotions rather than reason.

(3). A dichotomistic conceptual approach to persuasion and conviction treats emotional and logical proofs as mutually exclusive dimensions. In addition, emotional proof or logical proof may exist in pure states by themselves or in some degree of relationship with each other to achieve a mutual end result.

(4). There are two dualistic conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. The first, named a "pure duality," recognizes both emotional proof and logical proof but holds that they may not be distinguished from each other--neither in theory nor in the actual communicative act. The second, named a "theory-practice duality," distinguishes between emotional proof and logical proof for convenience of theory but claims there are no clear distinctions between the two proof forms in the actual communicative act.

(5). This chapter illustrates that models are useful for the graphic presentation of the above conceptual approaches to the persuasion and conviction problem. As the concepts expressed by major contributors are examined in later chapters, the definitions of broad general terms within pure conceptual approaches should meet the criteria of inclusiveness and exclusiveness expressed in the models herein developed. These models describe the dimensions of pure persuasion and

conviction and also express the broad definition of a particular term such as "persuasion." Figure 11 summarizes the relationships among the conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Some of the contributors under study fall into one of the broad model formats described in Figure 11; others state theories which are much more complex. In the latter cases, new dimensions will be considered and described in the appropriate context in Chapters IV-VI. The basic tools developed in this chapter permit such expansion and thus serve as a basis for this critical analysis of variations among concepts of persuasion and conviction.

Concept 1. A Persuasion and Conviction Monism



"All conviction is conviction" or "All persuasion is persuasion"

"All conviction is non-persuasion since persuasion is denied as a dimension" or "All persuasion is non-conviction"


Concept 2. A Persuasion and Conviction Dichotomy



"All conviction is not persuasion" "All persuasion is not conviction"
Note: In this concept the definition of persuasion is illustrated as emotional (Pathos) in nature and conviction as logical (L) in nature.

Concept 3. The Persuasion and Conviction Dualities

A. Pure Duality



"Persuasion and conviction co-exist as a dual force and are mutually related."

"Conviction and persuasion co-exist as a dual force and are mutually related."

B. Theory-Practice Duality



"In theory some conviction is distinguished from all persuasion."

"In practice some conviction is not distinguished from all persuasion."



"In theory some persuasion is distinguished from all conviction."

"In practice some persuasion is not distinguished from all conviction."

Fig. 11.--A Summary of the Pure Concepts of Persuasion and Conviction

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

In order to provide a better understanding of the various theories of persuasion and conviction to be discussed in later chapters, definitions of the major terms used in the theories will now be presented. The material concerning definition is not only extensive but also basic to the study. The first part of this chapter offers selected definitions from the writings of the various rhetoricians examined; the second part presents a brief survey of current dictionary definitions of persuasion and conviction; the third part presents models which summarize the significant differences among definitions.

Definitions by Rhetoricians

Persuasion and conviction are defined in diverse ways. During nearly any period of rhetorical theory, conflicting and/or widely varying definitions of persuasion and conviction are found. Although this study as a whole is concerned with variations among conceptual approaches, and not with a chronological survey of the specific conceptual treatments, the following discussion of definitions does proceed chronologically.

The purpose of such a chronological development of definitions is simply to illustrate the differences among definitions of persuasion and conviction. No clear trend or evolution of definitions is revealed by

the chronological approach.[1]

Ancients

One of the earliest and most significant discussions of persuasion is that by Aristotle. Aristotle defines rhetoric as: ". . . the faculty [power] of discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion."[2] Aristotle's "available means of persuasion" are summarized in Cooper's analysis of Book I: "The essence of persuasion lies in the arguments or proofs; these have been neglected by writers of text-books, who lay undue stress upon the emotions. But to excite emotion in the hearer is to warp his judgment."[3] The essence of Aristotle's treatment is that he believes primarily in the all-inclusiveness of the term persuasion and extends it to include all proofs--logical, emotional, and ethical. He further believed that persuasion is a sort of demonstration since people are most fully persuaded when they believe a statement to have been demonstrated as true by logical, emotional, and ethical means.

Cicero's definition of persuasion is similar to that of Aristotle: ". . . for the purposes of persuasion the art of speaking relies wholly upon three things; the proof of our allegations, the winning of our hearers' favour, and the rousing of their feeling to whatever impulse

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[1]A few basic definitions are here presented chronologically for illustration and explanation of the problem of definition. Definitions by other contributors to the persuasion and conviction problem will be discussed as they arise within concepts in later chapters.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1.2.

[3]Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. xxxvii.

our case may require."[4] Aristotle would probably agree with the first two parts of Cicero's definition; however, he might disagree with Cicero's "rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse required." Aristotle's treatment of persuasion emphasizes logical proof, although he does realize the necessity of the emotional and the ethical dimensions. Cicero's treatment emphasizes the emotional proofs, while recognizing the value of logical and ethical proofs.

The chief differences among the ancient rhetoricians' definitions of persuasion seem to be one of degree. Aristotle encourages the logical dimension while playing down the emotional; Cicero recognizes the logical but emphasizes the emotional; and Quintilian recognizes the logical while emphasizing the emotional possibly even more than did Cicero. Quintilian appears to diverge from previous definitions of persuasion. He prefers omitting the term by saying: "There are also three aims which the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move and charm his hearers."[5]

Bacon

Francis Bacon presents a somewhat different definition of rhetoric: "The duty and office of Rhetoric is to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the will."[6] Karl Wallace states that Bacon looks at an individual as a composite of "faculties":

> . . . regarding the mental life, the psychological activities, within the human organism. As a consequence, the mind is held to be in

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[4]Cicero De Oratore ii. 27. 114-117.

[5]Quintilian Inst. iii. 5. 1-3.

[6]Francis Bacon, Adv. of Learning, Works, III, p. 409.

> a constant state of flux; the human being is at all times active. Bacon goes beyond this, however. He postulates, not an isolated individual, but a social being whose life and actions are inextricably bound up with his fellow beings. The social being, moreover, is no static creature; rather he is constantly in action, capable by his activities of influencing the movements of others and in turn of being influenced by their actions. Bacon's world, in other words, is dynamic; in social intercourse the end, either immediate or ultimate, is action.[7]

Thus, for Bacon, all rhetorical address seeks to influence action. To say that rhetoric recommends reason to the imagination for the better moving of the will is synonymous with saying that the end of public address is the persuasion of men to action. Within Bacon's definition are implied the principal methods of proof or support which he recognizes as legitimate. Bacon, as did Aristotle, feels that reason is "the soul of discourse."[8] Bacon recognizes the emotional aspect of persuasion; however, he believes that if the passions are to be aroused, they must work toward a good end governed by the understanding and reason. "Imaginative proof" then may be interpreted in part as ideas whose content incites emotions and, in part, as a style of expression which transcribes emotionless reason into vivid terms.[9] Bacon also recognizes a third type of proof which has previously been discussed as ethos. It appears that Bacon's conceptual approach is basically synonymous with Aristotle's, although there are subtle differences between their positions which will become more distinct in later chapters.

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[7]Karl Wallace, Francis Bacon on Communication & Rhetoric (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943), p. 28.

[8]Francis Bacon, De augmentis, vi. 1, Works, IV, p. 439.

[9]Wallace, pp. 34-35.

Pre-Moderns

Many pre-modern rhetoricians continued to express conflicting definitions of persuasion in which persuasion is defined not only as an all-encompassing term (including logical, emotional, and ethical proofs) but also as one dimension of a multi-dimensional concept (with ethical proof and/or logical proof as other important dimensions). In contrast, Hope's Princeton Text Book in Rhetoric provides one of the clearest definitions of a dichotomy in which conviction and persuasion are distinctly separate and coequal.

> The phenomena which it is the object of Rhetoric to account for, and thus enable men to reproduce at will, are 1. CONVICTION, and 2. PERSUASION. The difference between conviction and persuasion is, that the former, (conviction) is an effect upon the understanding,--the intellectual or logical faculties,--the latter, (persuasion) is an effect upon the will, producing a change either of character, or conduct; according as the effect is either, 1 static and permanent; or 2, dynamic and transient;--having for its object an effect, only for the time being, on the will or conduct of the hearer.[10]

George Pierce Baker defines persuasion and conviction almost identically with Hope in that he also finds persuasion and conviction mutually exclusive and of relatively equal importance.[11]

Definitions apparently influenced by faculty psychology are given by Rev. J. F. X. O'Conor:

> Conviction is convincing the intellect of a truth by means of an argument.
>
> An argument is a reason brought forward to show the truth of our proposition or statement.
>
> Persuasion is the movement of the will which consents to accept as good the truth presented, and to act in accordance with that consent. . . .
>
> The whole art of persuasion consists in either quieting or

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[10]Matthew Hope, The Princeton Text Book in Rhetoric (Princeton, New Jersey: John T. Robinson, 1859), pp. 1-2.

[11]George Pierce Baker, Principles of Argumentation (Chicago: Ginn & Company, 1905), p. 7.

> silencing the passions, so that the will may be influenced by the voice of reason only; or, better still (and this properly is persuasion) in making passion side with reason.[12]

Rev. O'Conor's definitions describe persuasion and conviction as separate. Yet, his treatment is unique in that persuasion is subservient to conviction and has a distinct role in aiding conviction.

Moderns

Often, modern rhetoricians attempt to utilize concepts or terminology formulated in other fields. Rhetoricians writing in 1917 bear witness to this fact. Mary Yost defined persuasion from the point of view of sociology;[13] Charles Woolbert from that of psychology;[14] and James Winans from the point of view of attention--a term utilized in both rhetoric and psychology.[15] Within these original approaches are seen familiar definitions of persuasion and conviction.

The problem of definition still persists currently. Robert T. Oliver, one of the most influential writers of persuasion theory, first defined persuasion as: ". . . the art of motivation by non-logical means."[16] However, fifteen years later he redefines persuasion as "any form of discourse that influences thought, feelings, or conduct."[17]

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[12]Rev. J. F. X. O'Conor, Rhetoric and Oratory (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1898), pp. 1, 41.

[13]Yost, The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (April, 1917), pp. 109-124.

[14]Woolbert, The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 249-264.

[15]James Winans, Public Speaking (rev. ed.; New York: The Century Co., 1917), Chapters 2, 4, 8, and 9.

[16]Oliver, 1942, p. 10.

[17]Oliver, 1957, p. 7.

Within the latter work Oliver also defines persuasion as:

> . . . the process of devising the means of making clear and emphatic the particular elements of a situation which will induce the listeners to note and recall as "the trigger of action" precisely those factors that will lead them to the conclusion desired by the speaker.[18]

It appears that Oliver's definitions of persuasion are not harmonious. In the earlier definition persuasion is a means to an end result which excludes logic, while in the latter definition persuasion utilizes logical means as well as non-logical forces. In the latter work Oliver modifies the importance of the logical dimension by advising the persuader to prove as little as possible:

> It is logic as used not by the rigorous logician, but by the advocate who knows his success depends basically upon proving as little as possible and refuting as little as possible. Rather than to build up arguments, his task is to build up agreements. [Italics are Oliver's.][19]

Although Brembeck and Howell cite Oliver's definition of persuasion, they redefine persuasion as: ". . . the conscious attempt to modify thought and action by manipulating the motives of men toward predetermined ends."[20] The treatment of persuasion by Brembeck and Howell is one of the most thorough found among modern textbooks.

Wayne C. Minnick defines persuasion as: "Persuasion . . . is discourse, written or oral, that is designed to win belief or stimulate action by employing all the factors that determine human behavior."[21]

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[18]Ibid., p. 116.

[19]Ibid., p. 229.

[20]Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952), p. 24.

[21]Minnick, p. 33.

The primary emphasis of Minnick's work is upon the emotional aspects of persuasion although he does relate the process of persuasion to argumentation.

McBurney and Mills in their text, Argumentation and Debate, reject the validity of using only emotional proof in argumentation. To them, argumentative discourse "always has a thread of reasoning running through it."[22] Emotional proofs (which they treat as suggestion and motivation) are acceptable if primary attention is given to analysis, evidence, and close reasoning.[23] Thus, it is clear that McBurney and Mills have emphases similar to Aristotle's approach written more than 2000 years earlier.

Usually modern works define persuasion either as encompassing "all available means" or as synonymous with emotional proof. Some works, such as that by Clevenger, allude to the "process of persuasion" but neither define nor develop such a process.[24] Within some current works are found a combination of influences from either earlier works or from other disciplines. Clevenger discusses intrinsic and extrinsic pressures which are brought to bear upon individuals by anyone desiring to persuade the masses.[25] In this context intrinsic pressures represent psychological means such as emotional proofs while extrinsic pressures refer to sociological factors such as environmental pressures

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[22]James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pp. 2-3.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Theodore Clevenger, Jr., Audience Analysis (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 102-103.

[25]Ibid., p. 115.

which might force an individual to conform to the desires of a particular group.

Definitions of conviction are less frequently found currently. Such definitions were much more common when rhetoric was influenced by faculty psychology or, at least, a faculty-type psychology. The definition of conviction by William Trufant Foster reflects such an approach:

> A reasoning process as cold as a demonstration in Geometry is pure conviction. But even men with trained minds find it difficult to act in accord with convictions when emotions pull the other way. . . . All persons are more likely to feel their way to their convictions, than to think their way to their passions. That is why it is often more important to get an emotion into a man's heart than to get an idea into his head. . . .[26]

Clearly, Foster defines conviction as similar to logical proof. Conviction is rarely defined in this manner currently although Capp and Capp state that "conviction results in part from logical reasoning."[27]

Oliver refers to the "sincerity of conviction."[28] Later, he uses conviction as synonymous with attitudes or deep-seated beliefs.[29] Interestingly, Oliver also uses conviction to refer to a type of speech ("conviction speech") which may utilize only facts in its development; or, facts intermingled with emotional appeals; or, only strong emotional appeals.[30]

Many modern writers such as Minnick, Baird, and Brembeck and

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[26]William Trufant Foster, Argumentation and Debating (Chicago: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1945), pp. 231-232.

[27]Glenn R. Capp and Thelma R. Capp, Principles of Argumentation and Debate (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 122.

[28]Oliver, 1957, p. 32.

[29]Ibid., p. 226.

[30]Ibid., p. 389.

Howell do not use the term conviction. Other writers such as Freeley, Kruger, and Miller and Nilsen utilize "argumentation" to emphasize proof obtained through logical means.

Conviction and persuasion are occasionally still defined as dichotomies in modern rhetoric. Eugene R. Moulton writing in 1966 implies that conviction embodies evidence (logical proofs) while persuasion embodies motivation (emotional proofs) when he writes:

> In preparing his arguments for debate, the speaker should ask two questions about the materials available as evidence: (1) Does the evidence (fact, illustration, statement by authority) have the power to convince--is it clear, pertinent, inescapable? (2) Does the evidence have the strength to motivate--is the listener willing to accept it as a course of action? Apart from these general questions there are other tests of evidence which will be discussed later in this chapter. It is important, however, for the speaker to keep in mind that evidence must be chosen not only for its inherent logical value, but for its potential persuasive force on the audience.[31]

In review, modern writers variously define persuasion as (1) all-inclusive and as embodying logical, emotional, and ethical proofs; (2) as synonymous with emotional proof; (3) as employing all non-logical forms of proof; and (4) as encompassing the varied forces commonly mentioned in the fields of sociology and psychology.

Conviction is most often defined to mean deep-seated beliefs--a sense divergent from the historical use of the term in relation to persuasion and conviction. However, some rhetoricians still define the term to mean logical proofs. Other rhetoricians disregard the term and tend to refer to argumentation as including reasoning through logical means.

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[31]Eugene R. Moulton, The Dynamics of Debate (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), p. 75.

Definitions by Dictionaries

Although there is wide divergence among definitions of persuasion and conviction among rhetoricians, there is a concert of agreement among dictionary definitions.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "persuasion" as: "an act or the action of influencing the mind by arguments or reasons offered or by anything that moves the mind or passions or inclines the will to a determination."[32] The same work defines "conviction" as: "A strong persuasion or belief," and as "a state of being convinced."[33] The American College Dictionary is similar in that it defines convince as: "to persuade by argument or proof; cause to believe in the truth of what is alleged."[34] Within these two works the similarity between persuasion and conviction is clear. A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage reinforces the synonymous state of the two terms: "to convince is to persuade by argument."[35] These definitions seem to define persuasion as the all-inclusive term and conviction as a special form of persuasion.

The clearest distinctions between persuade and convince are drawn by The American College Dictionary and The World Book Encyclopedia Dictionary. The American defines persuade as: "to induce to believe;

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[32]"Persuasion," Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, ed. Philip B. Gove (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1964), p. 1688.

[33]"Conviction," Ibid., p. 499. Thus, conviction is not defined in the sense it is normally employed by writers discussing the persuasion and conviction problem.

[34]"Convince," The American College Dictionary (1962), p. 266.

[35]"Convince," A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage, eds. Bergen Evans and Cornelia Evans (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 118.

convince."[36] However, it extends this definition to state:

> Persuade, induce, convince imply influencing someone's thoughts or actions. . . . They differ in that persuade suggests appealing more to the reason and understanding. . . induce emphasizes only the idea of successful influence, whether achieved by argument or by promise of reward. . . . Convince means to satisfy the understanding of a person with regard to a truth or a statement.[37]

In the World Book Dictionary the term persuade is defined to include appeals to the feelings:

> persuade 1. to win over to do or believe; make willing or sure by urging, arguing, etc. 2. to convince--Syn. 1. Persuade, convince mean to get someone to do or believe something. Persuade emphasizes winning a person over to a desired belief or action by strong urging, arguing, advising, and appealing to his feelings as well as to his mind. Convince emphasizes overcoming a person's objections or disbelief by proof or arguments appealing to his reason and understanding; I have convinced her that she needs a vacation, but cannot persuade her to go.[38]

Although convince is included within the broad definition of persuade in the World Book Dictionary, the latter distinctions between the two terms illustrate the dichotomy which has been present since antiquity. The example, "I have convinced her that she needs a vacation, but cannot persuade her to go," depicts the classical concept that one can convince (using logical proofs) but can fail to persuade (using emotional proofs) i.e., to obtain commitment to action. Technically, one can "persuade" without "convincing" and can do either deliberately or accidentally.

Current dictionary definitions support the all-inclusiveness of the term persuasion and the inclusion of conviction as relatively

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[36]"Persuade," The American College Dictionary, p. 905.

[37]Ibid.

[38]"Persuade," The World Book Encyclopedia Dictionary, II (1963), pp. 1449-1450.

synonymous.[39] Rarely is the term conviction used in the dichotomous form to mean belief resulting solely from logical proof.

Modelistic Analysis

A survey of current dictionaries discloses that conviction is usually confined to the legal sense of "convicting a law breaker" and that its meaning of "logical proofs" is becoming archaic. This latter distinction (conviction meaning logical proofs) has been included under the heading of the broader term persuasion. The resulting position is summarized by The American College Dictionary's definition of persuade, meaning: "1. to prevail on (a person) by advice, urging, reasons, inducements, etc., to do something. 2. to induce to believe; convince."[40]

Within this latter broad definition the union of conviction with persuasion and persuasion's emerging as the all-inclusive term is readily seen. This development is increasingly paralleled in the uses of the terms in rhetoric as well. Figure 12 illustrates the composite definition of persuasion as described in the various dictionaries.

Within the broad encompass of persuasion (the larger solid circle in Figure 12) lie the dimensions of both persuade and convince. These terms are nearly synonymous as is signified by their overlapping circles. However, since some distinctions are drawn between them in extended dictionary definitions, latitude has been made for such distinctions.

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[39]It is interesting to note that in 1917 James Winans found a similar trend in the dictionary treatment of persuasion and conviction. However, the distinctions (persuasion contains emotional proof; conviction, logical) were more prevalent then than in today's modern dictionaries. See Winans, pp. 185-186.

[40]The American College Dictionary, p. 905.




Fig. 12.--Model of Dictionary Definition of Persuasion

Since ethos plays no direct role in dictionary definitions, it has no integral part within this model of persuasion.

As shown in Figure 12 Aristotle defines persuasion as all-inclusive. However, within this broad term he further distinguished three separate types of proof. Whereas emotional proof (Pa) and logical proof (L) are not separate entities in the former dictionary definition (see Figure 12); it is not known whether they are or are not (as




Fig. 13.--Aristotle's Definition of Persuasion
Note: The short lines connecting the three forms of proof indicate that it cannot be ascertained whether Aristotle treats logos, pathos, and ethos as separate entities or as interrelated.

indicated by the line linking each proof form) in Aristotle's. Furthermore, whereas ethos (E) is not discussed in the former, it becomes a vital aspect of Aristotle's concept of persuasion.

Models representing Cicero's and Quintilian's definitions of persuasion would be similar to that depicting Aristotle's definition. The major difference would be that Pa (emotional proof) would be an "all" concept (represented by a solid circumference) rather than a "some" concept (a broken circumference) as recognized by Aristotle.

Francis Bacon's definition is also similar to Aristotle's as distinguished earlier in this chapter. However, a visual comparison of Bacon's definition (Figure 14) with Aristotle's (Figure 13) portrays the basic differences.




Fig. 14.--Bacon's Definition of Persuasion

Finally, two quite different definitions of persuasion and conviction lend themselves to graphic presentation. Hope's dichotomistic definition and McBurney and Mills' monistic one are contrasted in Figure 15. The latter two authors do not use the term conviction, but they do define pure persuasion to mean non-logical proofs and argumentation to

encompass logical proofs.




Fig. 15.--Model A: Hope's Definition of Persuasion and Conviction
Model B: McBurney and Mills' Definition of Argumentation

Summary

In the writings of rhetoricians there are differences in the definitions of persuasion and conviction which are advanced. Aristotle defines persuasion to include all forms of proof--logos, ethos, and pathos. He does not use the term conviction within his Rhetoric. In this regard, his definition of persuasion is similar to the concert of agreement among current dictionary definitions.

Francis Bacon's definition of persuasion is similar to Aristotle's; however, Bacon recognizes logical proof and emotional proof as being mutually exclusive forms which unite to lead to action. Aristotle treats them as dimensions of an all-inclusive concept of persuasion.

Modern definitions differ significantly from either Aristotle's or Bacon's. Foster defines persuasion to include emotional proof and conviction to include logical proof and contends that they are part of the same continuum which motivates all our actions. Yost and Woolbert both believe that such definitions as that exemplified by Foster are

invalid and present monistic views based upon sociology and psychology respectively.

There are numerous distinctions and variations among definitions of persuasion and conviction. These differences are visually depicted by the use of models within this chapter. The distinctions and variations are of such significance that they play a major role in the analysis of the various theories of persuasion and conviction discussed in Chapters IV, V, and VI. The unified concept of persuasion to be developed should attempt to resolve the problem of definition.

CHAPTER IV

MONISTIC CONCEPTS OF PERSUASION AND CONVICTION

Approaches to persuasion and conviction which may be labeled as monistic are varied and, therefore, the concept is not easily reduced to a single, simple definition. In its generic use "monism" is the doctrine that reality is one unitary, organic whole, with no independent parts. This chapter discusses four widely divergent monistic treatments of persuasion and conviction in which the term persuasion is defined in two wholly incompatible ways.

In one treatment persuasion is a monism which utilizes three possible interrelated means to achieve its goal. However, these three means, namely, logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, are not independent but fused to represent a unitary, organic whole. Thus, within this conceptual approach, persuasion is an all-inclusive term which represents an end result.

Contrasted with the above definition of persuasion as an end result is a monistic conceptual approach in which only one force, emotional proof, is utilized to achieve an end result. In this latter sense, persuasion is synonymous with emotional proof and is a means to an end rather than the end result as in the earlier definition.

In order to avoid the confusion inherent in such double usage of persuasion, this chapter will use the term persuasion to mean the fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs into one unitary, organic whole. When a conceptual approach under examination uses persuasion to

mean emotional (or sometimes non-logical) proofs, such usage will be denoted by the terms pathos or emotional proof.

In light of the above distinctions among definitions of persuasion, there are four possible monistic treatments of persuasion and conviction. The first treatment emphasizes a theoretical fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs into one unitary, organic whole. The second treatment emphasizes a monism rooted in either sociology or else in psychology.[1] The third treatment emphasizes a monism in which conviction meaning logical proof is recognized while persuasion meaning non-logical proof is either not treated, mentioned but rejected, or else held to be subservient to conviction. The fourth treatment emphasizes a monism in which persuasion meaning emotional proof (pathos) is recognized while conviction meaning logical proof is either not treated or else mentioned but held to be governed by the motivational forces rather than by reason.

The classification of a writer as a monist is determined by his meeting one or more of the criteria established:

1. The work represents a fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs into one unitary, organic whole in both theory and

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[1]A monism rooted in sociology would represent a theoretical fusion of sociological forces, i.e., environmental factors, which contribute to man's acting or believing as he does. In this sense, if one understands sociology and the implications of sociology, then he can persuade others by relating his appeals to those sociological factors which immediately affect his auditors. A monism rooted in psychology would be similar to that rooted in sociology, but it would be interpreted from the point of view of psychology. Although both Dean Yost and Woolbert advance concepts rooted in sociology and psychology, respectively, neither are classified as monists since each clearly advances a duality in theory. As such, their positions are discussed in Chapter VI. No pure monistic concepts rooted in either sociology or in psychology are found, although many writers in persuasion overtly draw upon sociology and psychology in discussing the methods of proof.

practice of the communicative act.

2. The work advances a monistic theory of persuasion rooted in either sociology or else in psychology.
3. The work treats only of emotional proof.
4. The work treats only of logical proof.

Chapter II discussed hypothetical monistic concepts of persuasion and conviction as each would exist if found in "pure" form. In reality the monistic concepts are not found in such pure form, although some rhetoricians can be classified as essentially monistic in their individual treatments. Each of the four conceptual approaches are discussed separately in the remainder of this chapter.[2]

Analysis: Monistic Tenets of a Broad Conception of Persuasion

Within rhetorical theory persuasion is often defined as a process or as a fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs. In this sense persuasion represents an end result and is monistic in nature. Investigation of the works of Plato, Aristotle, and Brembeck and Howell, for example, reveals such a monistic conceptual approach.

Plato and Aristotle

A closer investigation of Plato's and Aristotle's monistic conceptual approach illustrates how the three proof forms interrelate and fuse together to achieve the end result, persuasion. In his work, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, W. Rhys Roberts states:

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[2]The essential symbols used in this chapter are: P (persuasion--all-inclusive); C (conviction); Pa (pathos or emotional proof); L (logos or logical proof); and E (ethos or ethical proof).

> . . . it is the argumentative (rather than the emotional) modes of persuasion that Aristotle stresses from the start. His very first words are, 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic'; or, in other words, there is a close, though not an exact, correspondence between the art of public speaking and the art of logical discussion. 'Persuasion is,' he says, 'a sort of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been demonstrated. The orator's demonstration is the enthymeme, and this is, in general, the most effective of the modes of persuasion.'[3]

This analysis may be reinforced by citations from Aristotle's Rhetoric:

> Strict justice, of course, would lead us, in speaking, to seek no more [of an emotional effect] than that we should avoid paining the hearer without alluring him; the case should, in justice, be fought on the strength of the facts alone, so that all else besides demonstration of fact is superfluous. Never-the-less, as we have said, external matters do count for much, because of the sorry nature of an audience.[4]

Aristotle is more emphatic in his support of the logical dimension of persuasion when he criticizes writers who "say nothing of enthymemes, the very body and substance of persuasion, and are concerned in the main with matters external to the direct issue."[5] He concludes his criticism by declaring that the arousing of emotional feelings does not concern the facts but does have some regard to those who judge.

The preference Aristotle suggests is that the speaker should rely primarily on logical proofs. However, Aristotle, as does Plato, knows that the "sorry nature of an audience" opens the door to the full sway of emotional proof. In addition, the able orator should have an excellent ethos. Therefore, since orators will use emotional proof, they should temper such emotional appeals with logical appeals in light of

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[3]William Rhys Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1928), pp. 23-24.

[4]Aristotle Rhetoric iii. 1. [Brackets are Cooper's.]

[5]Ibid., i. 1.1.

their character. In Plato's Protagoras Socrates asks Protagoras if he thinks that:

> . . . knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?
>
> I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.
>
> Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.[6]

Both Plato and Aristotle appear to believe that in an ideal world logical proofs should prevail. At the same time, of course, a strong character is also imperative. In treating emotional proof both believe that the use of such non-logical proofs may in part be a result of ignorance on the part of the speakers since some have not taken the effort to know the truth or the necessary facts to win their cases properly.

A. E. Taylor in his work, Socrates, reinforces the point that emotional proof is relatively fused with logical proof as he briefly summarizes Socrates' discussion of "virtue" in the Protagoras:

> We see now what is meant by saying that all the virtues are one thing, and that thing knowledge. . . . True virtue is an affair of intense conviction, personal knowledge of the true moral "values." . . . This is the real point of the argument in Plato's Protagoras, where Socrates appears at first sight to be talking Hedonism. He wants to prove to the "many" that, even on their own theory that good and pleasure are the same thing, it is not a paradox to identify the courage of the virtuous man with knowledge. . . .[7]

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[6]Plato, Protagoras: The Portable Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), pp. 103-104.

[7]A. E. Taylor, Socrates ("Doubleday Anchor Books"; Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1954), pp. 143-144.

It is inferred from Plato's works that his concept of persuasion also fuses logos, pathos, and ethos. In order for Plato's orator to utilize emotional proofs he must know the character of man and be able to select his arguments to fit the situation and the audience. This theory takes the monistic form expressed in Figure 16. In both Models, A and B, persuasion is all-inclusive. Within persuasion's broad encompass is logical proof. All persuasion should contain logical proof.




Fig. 16.--Conceptual Models of Plato's Theory of Persuasion

Furthermore, persuasion may utilize ethical proof and/or some emotional proof with logical proof; but, ideally, no such proofs are recognized as desirable without a sound logical foundation. Ideally (as expressed in Model A), Plato's theory would omit all non-logical proofs except good character. However, Plato feels the orator must cope with reality and utilize some non-logical proofs. Such an orator would reason and choose carefully in selecting such extraneous proofs.

An examination of Plato's Phaedrus provides a basis for further analysis and insight into his monistic tenets of persuasion. This dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus is the most thorough discussion of

Plato's theory of persuasion available. It is through Socrates that the dimensions of this theory are learned. In a discussion of good and evil Socrates states:

> But perhaps rhetoric has been too roughly abused by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense you are talking! As if I insisted that ignorance of the truth is indispensable to one who is learning to speak! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then take me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth, without my help, will not give you the art of persuasion. . . . Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there neither is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth.[8]

The knowledge of truth must be accompanied with knowledge (of the subject about which the truth is stated) in depth. Furthermore, such a statement of a truth must be supported by sound arguments and firm reasoning. It is this depth of understanding and use of logic that rhetoric blends to make truth persuasive.

Once an orator has learned to analyze human nature in depth he will be able to analyze those auditors in any situation with which he is likely to cope and will be able to say to himself:

> 'This is the man, this is the character, whom I formerly heard discussed'--the man being now present in the flesh--'and in order to persuade him to <u>this</u> course, I ought to use <u>these</u> arguments in <u>this</u> way'; when he is proficient in all this . . . then, but not till then, can it be said that the art has been finished and perfected.[9]

Through Socrates, Plato lays down stringent rules for his orator--an orator well-grounded in logic and the appeals to conviction, <u>i.e.</u>, a philosopher and rhetorician. Socrates well summarizes Plato's position in a statement aimed specifically at Lysias (a Greek logographer):

> For not to know the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and not to be able to distinguish the dream from the reality,

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[8]Plato <u>Phaedrus</u>. 260 d, e.

[9]<u>Ibid</u>., 272 a.

> cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world.[10]

The Rhetoric of Aristotle contains a more complete theory of persuasion than is found in Plato's extant works. Essentially, Aristotle's tenets are similar to those which Plato expresses (see Figure 16, Model B). Probably, Aristotle would agree with Plato's idealistic concept but does not state such a position in his works. Investigation of the Rhetoric reveals the dimensions of Aristotle's position:

> Of the means of persuasion supplied by the speech itself there are three kinds. The first kind reside in the character [ethos] of the speaker; the second consist in producing a certain [the right] attitude in the hearer; the third appertain to the argument proper, in so far as it actually or seemingly demonstrates.[11]

Each of these three tenets is treated thoroughly by Aristotle. In fact, a major portion of Book II of the Rhetoric is devoted to emotional proof. The important point in considering Aristotle's treatment of ethos, logos, and pathos is that "obviously the speaker must draw his arguments from these sources."[12] Furthermore, although Aristotle discusses ethos and pathos at length, it is logos which receives major emphasis and, in the final analysis, it is a fusion of the three which leads to persuasion. Following his discussion of types of emotional appeals, Aristotle states that his foregoing treatment of anger and mildness, friendship and hatred, and other emotions "will furnish the speaker with means of persuasion subsidiary to logical arguments."[13]

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[10] Ibid., 277 e.

[11] Aristotle Rhetoric i. 2. [Brackets are Cooper's.]

[12] Ibid., ii. 7.

[13] Ibid., ii. 11-12.

> . . . persuasion is effected by the arguments, when we demonstrate the truth, real or apparent, by such means as inhere in particular cases.
>
> Such being the instruments of persuasion, to master all three [ethos, pathos, logos] obviously calls for a man who can reason logically, can analyze the types of human character, along with the virtues, and, thirdly, can analyze the emotions--the nature and quality of each several emotion, with the means by which, and the manner in which, it is excited.[14]

Aristotle's theory of persuasion may also be represented by Figure 16, Model B which depicts Plato's monistic tenets.

Brembeck and Howell

A modern source which provides further treatment of a broad conceptual approach to persuasion is Brembeck and Howell's Persuasion: A Means of Social Control. Brembeck and Howell's work is not the first modern text in persuasion, but it is one of the most thorough. Their treatment of persuasion is quite broad and can be classified as a monistic approach which fuses logical, emotional, and ethical appeals to achieve the end result, persuasion:

> It [persuasion] is defined as the conscious attempt to modify thought and action by manipulating the motives of men toward predetermined ends.
>
> Depending on the motives operative within the persuadee(s) and the urgency of the situation, persuasion may employ (1) a system of emotional appeals, (2) a maximum of fact and logical reasoning, or (3) varying combinations of (1) and (2). In any given case, the persuader's analysis of his purpose, audience occasion, and himself must determine the methods of persuasion. The process of persuasion which seeks its response predominantly by means of evidence and logical reasoning, and in a less immediate manner may be called argumentation. . . .
>
> Persuasion as a means of social control is often supplemented by discussion in the investigation of problems common to the group. Discussion involves the co-operative deliberation of interested participants, usually under the direction of a leader. Ideally discussion is free of the intentional advocacy of the persuader.[15]

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[14] Ibid., i. 2.

[15] Brembeck and Howell, p. 24.

It becomes apparent that Brembeck and Howell believe persuasion is the broad discipline which includes logical reasoning, a system of emotional appeals, public speaking, discussion, and also propaganda and debate.

Within their work Brembeck and Howell utilize ideas drawn from the areas of psychology, sociology, philosophy, and other related areas. The core of their treatment of persuasion is the appeal to motives or desires--concepts derived from social psychology. Even in describing the process of persuasion Brembeck and Howell's treatment reveals an emphasis upon motives or desires:

> An analysis of the basic process of persuasion reveals four general steps or stages which may occur in the following order: (A) Gain and maintain attention; (B) arouse desires useful to the persuader's purpose; (C) demonstrate how these desires can be satisfied by acceptance of the persuader's proposition; and (D) produce the specific response desired. These steps are often telescoped and interrelated.[16]

Within Brembeck and Howell's process of persuasion (see Figure 17) one desiring to persuade others must know the motives and desires of his




Fig. 17.--Brembeck and Howell's "The Process of Persuasion"

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[16]Ibid., p. 26.

audience. Certainly those persons to be persuaded will attend that which they desire to attend. In this respect a unified concept of persuasion must be audience-centered--i.e., grounded in the beliefs, motives, or desires of the audience and not just the speaker's.

Brembeck and Howell also analyze the role of reasoning and argument from the point of view of human behavior:

> Where do reasoning and argument enter the picture? Do they play an important part in human behavior? They do indeed. Obviously most people desire to know the truth, to detect chicanery, to avoid gullibility, and to live in the main a rational life. To satisfy such desires intelligent people must resort to reason. . . . Reason, in other words, is the instrument for solving our problems for satisfying our desires, for climbing upward toward the higher values of life. Argument (which is simply reason set forth in print or speech), then, has a fundamental place in this scheme of things. To be sure we cannot argue someone into wanting something he does not want, but we can through argument enable ourselves and others to solve problems and to advance toward attaining the desires. In short, we can show people how to get what they want.[17]

As Brembeck and Howell view reason in the framework of their definition of persuasion, they state that ". . . reasoned discourse may be viewed as a motive appeal."[18] Furthermore, they believe that controlling this motive-behavior is the goal of persuasion and see reasoned discourse as a means to effect that control. They also believe that persuasion should utilize sound reasoning because of the motivating power of reason. In summary, Brembeck and Howell believe that:

> A weakness rests in the fact that much human conduct is non-logical. Choices are made frequently on bases other than those of evidence and reason, which though involved, are not deciding factors.
>
> The cult of reason evangelist fails to recognize the need for supplementing his scientific method with known behavior tendencies

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[17] Ibid., p. 125.

[18] Ibid., p. 127.

derived from psychology, sociology, philosophy, and other studies dealing with non-logical conduct.[19]

Persuasion: A Means of Social Control also provides the basis for determining the field of persuasion. Figure 18 illustrates that within a broad theory of persuasion, Brembeck and Howell would include informative speaking, persuasive speaking, group discussion, and propaganda.




Fig. 18.--The Field of Persuasion as derived from Brembeck and Howell

An all-inclusive concept of persuasion and conviction must fuse logical, ethical, and emotional proof and be based upon all known behavioral tendencies derived from other disciplines. Figure 19 illustrates Brembeck and Howell's monistic conceptual approach of persuasion. Within this monistic model persuasion, an end result, is all-inclusive. All means of persuasion are appeals to human motives. In appealing to motives an orator fuses reasoning (R), emotional proof (Pa), and ethical proof (E). Brembeck and Howell do not draw clear distinctions among the

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[19]Ibid., p. 449.

forms of proof; however, they do reject any spurious reasoning or excessive appeals to the emotions.




Fig. 19.--Brembeck and Howell's Concept of Persuasion

Analysis: Monistic Tenets of Logical Proof

An historical survey supports the hypothesis that some rhetoricians advocated monistic tenets of conviction. Within this classification writers treat primarily of logical proof but omit or reject emotional proof within their work.[20]

Edward Hale, Jr., is emphatic in his monistic position. In his discussion in the 1896 text, Constructive Rhetoric, persuasion is nearly equated with emotional proof and dismissed as wholly irrelevant.[21] Hale is unlike Aristotle and Plato in that he separates rhetoric and persuasion. To Hale rhetoric is all-inclusive, encompassing the study of

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[20]For the purpose of this study Hale and Mills are classified as representatives of this concept. Any such classification is arbitrary and must be based on interpretation of and inferences from each contributor's representative works.

[21]Edward Everett Hale, Jr., Constructive Rhetoric (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1896), pp. 16, 321-322.

grammar, organization, and reasoning. He identifies "persuasion" as consisting of appeals to the emotions and concludes by stating: ". . . despite the example of Aristotle it seems impossible to include in Rhetoric a study of the human emotions."[22] Hale's is an isolated monistic position which serves to illustrate the diversity among treatments of persuasion and conviction.

With the advent of collegiate debate, college curricula have come to include separate courses in persuasion and argumentation and debate. One current author, Glen E. Mills, in his textbook for an argumentation course treats argumentation as a specific form of persuasion and defines it ". . . as a critical apparatus and as a deliberative method which employs reasoned discourse."[23] He further believes that the broad encompassing reach of persuasion is a "popular" one; that is, popular persuasion appeals to the less discriminating and less critical masses.[24] Mills' concern is not with a popular persuasion appealing to the general masses; his concern is with argumentation, which specifically appeals to the intellectually informed and critical audience which he believes capable of reaching decisions based on reason rather than on emotional bent.

A survey of Mills' work reveals his philosophy of persuasion. At the outset of his work, Reason in Controversy, he states that ethos and

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[22]Ibid. Although Aristotle discusses the emotional dimension as Hale claims, Aristotle advocates the use of only those emotional proofs which have been arrived at through logical analysis. Hence, his "emotional" proofs have a logical basis.

[23]Mills, Reason in Controversy, p. 149. It is interesting to note that Mills writing with McBurney expresses a clear theory-practice duality in their work, Argumentation and Debate, also published in 1964.

[24]Ibid.

pathos are not core concepts in argumentation as they are in the broader field of persuasion.[25] "Emotional proof including appeals to values and goals as well as to the familiar emotional states, is likewise more clearly identified with the theory of persuasion than with that of argumentation."[26] These forms of support must be considered, however, since he views argumentation as a part of the broad scope of persuasion.

It is in Chapter VII, "Ancillary Forms of Support," that Mills' concept becomes monistic in emphasis. Mills states specifically:

> Separate treatments of reasoning and motivation in this book do not imply mutual exclusiveness. No strict dichotomy of reason and emotion is intended. In other words, thoughtful and emotional reactions are interrelated and occur in varying proportions in different situations. It is a matter of emphasis or central tendency, not one of all this or all that.[27]

It would seem from this statement that Mills is advancing a theory-practice duality; however, further investigation reveals that his treatment of the emotional dimension of persuasion leads to a basically monistic conception.

> Not all speeches of advocacy require motivational support. There are instances in which the communicator's main concern is with material and logical validity, regardless of the desires of some listeners or readers. A less extreme case is one in which the communicator gives some consideration to his audience, but only to the extent of seeking a thoughtful response from the critical listeners or readers.[28]

How does one gain such "a thoughtful response from the critical listeners or readers"? Mills refers to motivation (instead of emotional proof or pathos) as the process of "inducing or of modifying a response

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[25] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid., pp. 155-156.

[28] Ibid.

by supplying attractive reasons for the desired behavior."[29] To Mills motivation is selective in that it lowers the threshold of stimulation for one appeal while raising it for competing appeals.[30]

From the foregoing discussion it is inferred that Mills believes that motivational arguments are selected through previous reasoning and analysis of such factors as the purpose of the address and the type of audience. Mills, Plato, and Aristotle appear to agree that all proofs must be carefully selected--through careful choice of appeals and analysis and not by chance or impromptu choice. Also, emotional proofs should be subservient to logical reasoning and used to reinforce logical argument with reassuring evidence of a majority opinion.[31] The major difference between Mills' and Aristotle's positions is in Mills' emphasis upon argumentation--a dimension not prevalent during Aristotle's period.

Figure 20 serves for illustration and comparison of Mills and Aristotle's positions and as a summary of the monistic theory of persuasion (represented in Figure 20, A) which emphasizes the logical dimension.


In conclusion, apart from Hale's limited view of rhetoric, no "pure" concept expressing a monistic position which emphasizes conviction is found. However, works such as Hale's theories are presented in which the logical dimension is given dominant emphasis.

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.



A. Mills B. Aristotle

Fig. 20.--A Conceptual Comparison of Mills and Aristotle's Monistic Tenets of Persuasion. In Mills' concept two forms of persuasion are present. Ar is Argumentation, a form of persuasion appealing to informed intellect. Ar appears identical with Aristotle's tenets expressed in B. P is "popular" persuasion--a form (which appeals to the uninformed masses) outside the dimensions of argumentation.

Analysis: Monistic Tenets of Emotional Proof

> Modern advertisers, however, have learned the secret. They never argue; they seldom reason. They seek to build the picture in our minds. We know what to reach for "instead of a sweet;" we have learned how to "say it with flowers;" we are familiar with automobile tires that are "geared to the road;" we remember that insurance company which is "the Rock of Gibraltar;" and we grow disturbed over the insidious danger of which "your best friend won't tell you." Why? Certainly not because we have been argued into belief.[32]

It is noteworthy that Brigance, one of the most respected scholars in the speech field, advocates a monistic concept which places tradition and appeals to human motives as superior in effectiveness to reasoned discourse. Although other rhetoricians, including Cicero, advocated

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[32]William Norwood Brigance, "A Genetic Approach to Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XVII (June, 1931), 336.

similar monistic positions long before he did, Brigance's tenets of persuasion serve well as a basis for analyzing this approach.[33]

Brigance views persuasion as being closer to the practical aspect of human affairs than to the philosophy of older scholars. The forces of persuasion, as he recognizes them, are not rambling or incoherent but ordered and systematized, having their roots in mankind's development.[34] Yet, the position taken by Brigance is not a "pure" concept of persuasion which emphasizes solely pathos, even though he stresses emotional proofs to a greater extent than reason or logical proofs.

Reason is recognized by Brigance but is called the weakest form of proof--in fact, he claims that reason plays a distinctly minor role in the life of the average person, even in our civilized society.[35] Brigance does agree with Young and quotes him as saying: "Arguments and reasoned statements can appeal to minds of highly cultured individuals and to them alone. When addressed to the crowd they defeat their purpose."[36] The common man is treated as just one of the masses, and, as such, modern advertisers ". . . have practically eliminated Reason from advertising intended for the average person."[37] Brigance feels that the common man often leans upon the most superficial and fallacious reasoning which permits him to justify a position already held. The full

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[33]Brigance's tenets are presented initially since they serve to combine the essential elements of the earlier writers with knowledge gained from psychology and modern research.

[34]Brigance, p. 330.

[35]Ibid., p. 337.

[36]Brigance, quoting K. Young, Source Book for Social Psychology, p. 572.

[37]Ibid., pp. 338-339.

dimensions of Brigance's monistic concept are revealed in the summary to his article:

> 1. The tools of persuasion are best understood and most effectively used if we view them in the order of their origin and development in the race [of man].
> 2. The acceptance of ideas borrowed and ready-made, which we call Authority, is the oldest mode of persuasion in the human race. . . . To use persuasion at this level, the speaker seeks to establish a Personal Prestige; or if this be inadequate, to identify himself with some institution, or organization (political, religious, etc.) or recognized Authority. Thus fortified, he may rely upon Assertion and Suggestion--he may indeed speak with the Voice of a Prophet.
> 3. The second mode of persuasion acquired in the human race was the acceptance of ideas that fit into organized and ordered Experience. It is potent at all levels of society. To use persuasion at this level, the speaker assembles his picture with materials familiar to the hearer--by colorful words and effective phrases, by figures of speech and interrogation, by illustration and comparison. While the picture is builded [sic], he cements attention by the devices of activity and suspense.
> 4. The most recently acquired mode of persuasion in the race is Reason. It is newest, therefore weakest. It is ineffective among primitive peoples; almost equally ineffective among the lowest stratum of civilized peoples. It is safe for the common man only upon familiar ground. To use persuasion at this level, the speaker will judiciously mix it with Authority and Experience, except in addressing persons of the highest intellectual level. [Italics are Brigance's.][38]

The basic tenets expressed in the above summary essentially stress emotional means. In Figure 21 persuasion is depicted as being all-inclusive. This assumption is made in that Brigance includes emotional dimensions as well as reason within the broad encompass of persuasion. Inasmuch as "authority" is used to establish personal prestige and is further utilized with appeals to strong motivational factors (such as political and religious appeals), Brigance is classified as emphasizing the emotional aspect of persuasion. In a later article Brigance maintains his monistic position but does recognize logic (reasoning) and

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[38]Ibid., pp. 338-339.

desire (emotional proofs) as separate to a degree.[39]




Fig. 21.--Brigance's Monistic Tenets of Persuasion. Appeals to motives (M) includes use of authority (not necessarily justified by fact); personal prestige (E); identification with meaningful motives; acceptance of agreeable ideas; and Reason (R) when mixed with other emotional dimensions (Pa).

In several aspects Brigance is similar to Cicero. Both are practitioners of the art of persuasion. Cicero relies upon his experience before audiences in formulating his concepts of persuasion. In this respect Cicero gives much greater emphasis in his writings to emotional proof and its eloquent presentation than to logical proof. A review of Cicero's De Oratore reveals his emphasis of the emotional dimension:

> By one and the same power of eloquence the deceitful among mankind are brought to destruction, and the righteous to deliverance. Who more passionately than the orator can encourage to virtuous conduct, or more zealously than he reclaim from vicious courses? Who can more austerely censure the wicked, or more gracefully praise men of worth? Whose invective can more forcibly subdue the power

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[39]William Norwood Brigance, "Can We Redefine the James-Winans Theory of Persuasion?" The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI (February, 1935), 19-26.

of lawless desire? Whose comfortable words can soothe grief more tenderly?[40]

Through the words of Antonius, the principal speaker in De Oratore, Cicero adds that there are three chief principles underlying the whole rhetorical system: ". . . first the winning of men's favour, secondly their enlightenment, thirdly their excitement. Of these three the first calls for gentleness of style, the second for acuteness, the third for energy."[41] As Cicero's theory is unfolded, there is little doubt as to the major emphasis of the emotional dimension:

> Now nothing in oratory, Catulus, is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgement or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute.[42]

The emotional dimension is not only discussed in theory within De Oratore, it is also revealed in practical examples. Probably the most famous of Cicero's examples is that spoken by Antonius:

> I was myself overcome by compassion before I tried to excite it in others. Assuredly I felt that the Court was deeply affected when I called forward my unhappy old client, in his garb of woe, and when I did those things approved by yourself, Crassus--not by way of technique, as to which I know not what to say, but under stress of deep emotion and indignation--I mean my tearing open his tunic and exposing his scars. . . . I so managed the whole of that case as to seem most passionate when reviving hatred of Caepio, and mildest when describing my conduct towards my own connexions. So, Sulpicius, it was rather by working upon, than by informing, the minds of the tribunal, that I beat your prosecution on that occasion.[43]

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[40]Cicero De Oratore ii. 9. 35.

[41]Ibid., ii. 29. 128-129.

[42]Ibid., ii. 42. 178-179.

[43]Ibid., ii. 47. 195-196, ii. 49. 201.

Cicero's tenets of persuasion are summarized in Figure 22. His monistic position is represented in that "persuasion" is all-inclusive.




Fig. 22.--Cicero's Monistic Tenets of Persuasion

Within this all-inclusiveness pathos is the dominant form. However, since Cicero recognizes that some emotional style does not serve the process of persuasion, this dimension is represented by a broken circumference. Also within the broad encompass of persuasion are found conviction (logos) and ethos. Cicero's emphasis of these latter forms cannot be fully determined. It can only be stated that in his theory of oratory both tenets are present but not to the extent that pathos is.

Although Brigance and Cicero serve as examples of rhetoricians advocating a monistic position which emphasizes the emotional dimension of persuasion, other writers also support this position.

In 1902 Esenwein expresses an extreme position which admits that:

> Sometimes, however, all address to reason is discarded, and a purely emotional appeal is made, likewise with intent to bring about action. Persuasion may even go so far as to disregard truth, and strive to carry the citadel of the will by assault, marshalling

prejudice, imagination, and emotion to accomplish the result.[44]

Esenwein also recognizes the importance of logical proof--he does not omit it altogether. To him, the strongest presentation is that which skillfully unites emotional proof with logical proof. However, his chief emphasis is upon a theory of persuasion which utilizes primarily pathos.[45]

Perhaps, the best examples of an advocate of a "pure" concept of persuasion as being strictly emotional in nature is that found in Macpherson's The Psychology of Persuasion. He defines the fundamental character of persuasion as:

> . . . a process that aims at modifying conduct and inducing action, . . . it is an emotional process. In this respect, again, it differs from the process of rational logic, which should have no tincture of emotion, or so little, and of such a character, as having exercised no diverting influence on the course of the reasoning and on the conclusion ultimately reached, may be considered negligible.[46]

Rational logic plays no role in Macpherson's text other than this brief mention. His philosophy is not a dichotomy since logic is treated as a separate discipline and completely apart from persuasion. This exclusiveness of persuasion's being devoid of any logical tincture is emphasized when Macpherson states:

> In persuasion the attitude of the subject is exclusive and one-sided: all his judgments assign value to objects, persons, and actions only in so far as they tend towards the satisfaction of the emotions, sentiments, or passions underlying the initial belief or wish.[47]

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[44]J. Berg Esenwein, How To Attract and Hold an Audience (New York: Hinds, Noble & Eldredge, Publishers, 1902), pp. 28-29.

[45]Ibid.

[46]William Macpherson, The Psychology of Persuasion (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1920), p. 16.

[47]Ibid., p. 18.

Two recent works serve as final illustrations of monistic positions emphasizing emotional proof. Muehl's The Road to Persuasion emphasizes a theory of persuasion which is nearly devoid of any mention of the logical dimension. It is significant that Muehl interprets "reason" not from the point of view of logic "but as an attribute of the speaker's personality."[48] Thus, reason and personality are inseparably combined in his theory but both receive little emphasis in his work--the major emphasis is upon the emotional dimension. Muehl defines the basis for persuasion as: "The listener is shown that something he needs or wants is available or threatened. Then he is offered the means for obtaining or protecting it."[49] Muehl's position is summarized in the following passages:

> The speaker who sets out to influence the attitudes of his listeners does not begin with an audience at dead center. He steps into the tensions about which we have been speaking. His aim is not to pick the individual up bodily, so to speak, and carry him from one conviction to another, rather, it is to weaken the pull that is drawing him one way and strengthen the pull that is drawing him another. . . . In the short run the only effective assault upon deeply embedded assumptions is emotional. Branch Rickey, the baseball authority, is credited with having said, "All the sermons ever preached could not do as much to improve the lot of the Negro as a home run by Jackie Robinson in the last half of the ninth with two men on."[50]

Abernathy, writing in 1964, also writes that contrary to popular opinion, people are not motivated primarily by reason and that ". . . any attempt to explain what they do in rational terms is doomed to

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[48]William Muehl, The Road to Persuasion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 117.

[49]Ibid., p. 98.

[50]Ibid., pp. 102, 114-115.

failure."[51]

Abernathy's emphasis of the emotional dimension rather than the logical is illustrated when he writes:

> People are not gears that move mechanically. They are changeable, volatile, suggestible, moved by emotions and causes of which they are totally unaware. Virtually all important decisions are made, and actions taken, by human beings in response to other than the motivation of reason. Their choices of husbands or wives are more apt to be based on tender emotions than on clear, cold analysis.[52]

Monistic concepts of persuasion which stress emotional proof and which de-emphasize logical proof do exist. In the analysis presented, similar theories seem to be discussed. However, Cicero arrived at his monistic position in describing the techniques of an orator; Brigance, in explaining general principles of rhetoric; Macpherson, in writing a psychology of persuasion; and Muehl and Abernathy, in writing guides for persuading.

Summary

Chapter IV analyzed four possible monistic treatments of persuasion and conviction:

1. A conceptual approach in which persuasion represents a theoretical fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs into one unitary, organic whole.
2. A conceptual approach rooted in either sociology or else in psychology.
3. A conceptual approach in which conviction meaning logical proof is recognized while persuasion meaning non-logical proof is

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[51] Elton Abernathy, The Advocate: A Manual of Persuasion (New York: David McKay, Inc., 1964), pp. 131-132.

[52] Ibid.

either not treated, mentioned but rejected, or else held as subservient to conviction.

4. A conceptual approach in which persuasion meaning emotional proof is recognized while conviction is either not treated or else mentioned but held as governed by the motivational forces rather than by reason.

An overview of the chapter reveals that three of the four possible conceptual approaches do exist. Monistic treatments are found in which persuasion represents a fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs; in which conviction is recognized while persuasion meaning emotional proof is either not treated or else held subservient to logical proof; and, in which persuasion meaning emotional proof is recognized while conviction is either not treated or else held as subservient to emotional forces. No monistic treatments were found to be rooted totally in either sociology or psychology. Conceptual treatments based on sociology or psychology were found but were analyzed as dualities and, as such, will be discussed in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER V

THE DICHOTOMIST CONCEPT

> Appeals to the people and to pity can be important rhetorical devices, for in these ways effective speakers are able to arouse desired emotions. Unfortunately, effective speakers are not always effective thinkers, and only too often people have been led by demagogues who were effective persuaders but bad reasoners. Some [speakers] . . . arouse reactions, not thought. But the method of persuasion and the method of reasoning must always be clearly differentiated.[1]

This chapter treats primarily of rhetorical works which "clearly differentiate" between emotional proof and logical proof. Within a theory expressed as a dichotomy, persuasion is defined specifically as the use of emotional proof and includes all forms of pathos. Conviction is defined as the use of logical proof, facts, reasoning, and rational thinking, and appeals to the mentality of the auditors by other than emotional means.

Ethos, a third important concept, lacks a clear position in dichotomistic theories.[2] Ethos, when considered as significant in persuasion and/or conviction, is usually classified as a separate dimension

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[1]Bernard F. Huppe' and Jack Kaminsky, Logic and Language (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), p. 198.

[2]Ethos is defined variously in rhetorical theory as "the good man speaking" or as the auditors' "image" of the speaker. For fuller treatment of ethos see William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Speech, Northwestern University, 1941) and Kenneth E. Andersen "An Experimental Study of the Interaction of Artistic and Non-Artistic Ethos in Persuasion" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Speech, University of Wisconsin, 1961).

(ethos, pathos, logos) or as an aspect of pathos. Since this study considers variations among concepts of persuasion and conviction, ethos is treated as a contributing factor to "persuasion" and is not discussed within the scope of "conviction" in accord with general practice in the sources studied.

The Rationale for the Dichotomist Concept

Dichotomistic concepts are found in numerous works. These concepts are classified as dichotomistic in that the works provide no evidence that the authors might believe otherwise. It is conceivable that authors might believe in a monism or duality in practice but have presented a dichotomy in theory for pedagogical convenience. However, based upon the available written evidence, the concepts analyzed in this chapter do reveal a dichotomistic position concerning persuasion and conviction.

Some rhetoricians such as Woolbert believe that the key to understanding the problem concerning persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy lies within a faculty psychology. Viewed according to faculty psychology, persuasion is related only to emotional appeals and to the faculties governing the emotions. Similarly, conviction is related to logic and the "logical" faculties. Within this position ethos is not considered since there is no pure faculty governing it.

An initial difficulty with the attempt to relate the persuasion and conviction dichotomy to faculty psychology is that the dichotomy existed long before the advent of a formal faculty psychology. As a formal discipline, faculty psychology was originated by Gall and Spurzheim between 1808 and 1819. Their theories have persisted ever since, although these theories are generally rejected by modern psychologists

employing scientific research.[3]

Clearly a "faculty type psychology" existed as a basis for Bacon as early as 1605: "Although, according to Bacon, we may know very little concerning the substance of the mind, with its faculties we are well acquainted: they comprise the 'understanding, reason, imagination, memory, appetite, will; in short, all with which the logical and ethical sciences deal.'"[4]

Not only did a faculty type of psychology exist which can be interpreted as a basis for the persuasion and conviction dichotomy, but there also was a period in which logic, rhetoric, and grammar were divided into mutually exclusive compartments. Such compartmentalism is found in the works of Cox in 1530, Wilson in 1533, and especially in Ramus in 1634.[5]

One could thus infer that the persuasion and conviction dichotomy has its roots in the works just mentioned as well as in a formal faculty psychology. Some rhetorics such as Hope's The Princeton Text Book in Rhetoric (1859) do reflect the influence of faculty psychology. However, the persuasion and conviction dichotomy can be inferred from works in antiquity, traced through the period of the dominance of faculty psychology (perhaps, reinforced by it), and continues to the present.

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[3]Maude Muse, A Textbook of Psychology (4th ed. rev.; Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1942), p. 60.

[4]Karl R. Wallace, "Bacon's Conception of Rhetoric," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 115.

[5]See Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1961), Chapters 2 and 4 for a fuller discussion of Cox, Wilson, and Ramus.

Unlike the monistic concepts discussed in Chapter III, "pure" conceptual approaches expressing persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy are found in rhetorical theory. Alexander Bain presents a pure dichotomy in his two volume work entitled English Rhetoric and Composition.[6] The first volume treats almost entirely of conviction or elements of style that concern the understanding, while the second volume treats wholly of the emotional qualities. Bain's concept takes the form expressed in Figure 23. Within Bain's concept, as expressed in his Volume I, all forms of conviction (appeals to the understanding) are included.




Fig. 23.--Bain's Dichotomistic Concept of Persuasion and Conviction

His treatment also includes emphasis upon composition and such techniques as fundamentals of grammar and organization. In Bain's theory conviction precedes persuasion; i.e., one first appeals to the understanding of his auditor or reader and then reinforces these appeals with appeals to the emotions or passions. Bain believes that some emotional appeals are artificial and these should be avoided. When such strong and

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[6]Alexander Bain, English Rhetoric and Composition (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1890), Vols. I, II.

well-organized appeals to the understanding are reinforced with appeals to the emotions, auditors may be persuaded to take action or to accept a desired belief.

Treatments by Ancients

Not all dichotomies are as simply expressed as Bain's. One of the earliest and most thorough treatments of persuasion and conviction which can be classified within the context of a dichotomy is found in Quintilian's Institutes. Passages from The Institutio Oratoria express the essential dimensions of his concept:

> I [Quintilian] hold that the difference . . . is this: in our opening any preliminary appeal to the compassion of the judge must be made sparingly and with restraint, while in the peroration we may give full rein to our emotions, place fictitious speeches in the mouths of our characters, call the dead to life, and produce the wife and children of the accused in court.[7]

In this passage Quintilian's strong emphasis on emotional proof (pathos) is clearly inferred. The Institutio is written from a practical rather than from a formal theoretical point of view. As such, it treats of logos but not as thoroughly as it does of other forms of proof. However, logos is a significant tenet of Quintilian's theory and is clearly differentiated from pathos. Quintilian believes that in using logos a powerful effect may be created if to the actual facts of the case we add a plausible picture of what occurred, such as will make our audience feel as if they were actual eyewitnesses of the scene.[8]

Although pathos receives the most extensive treatment by Quintilian, it does not always receive the greatest emphasis. ". . . What

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[7]Quintilian Inst. iv. 1. 28-29.

[8]Ibid., iv. 2. 123.

really carries greatest weight in deliberative speeches is the authority of the speaker [ethos]."[9] Deliberative speeches, speeches before legislative groups, require both logos and ethos and permit only a minimum of pathos. Forensic speeches, speeches before juries or judges, permit full exploitation of emotional proofs. From Quintilian's work three major dimensions existing as separate entities can be stated: logos (conviction), pathos (emotional proof), and ethos (character).[10] Each of these three aspects exist separately but may all be utilized in order to gain the goal desired. For clarification, Quintilian's concept is expressed as a continuum in Figure 24.




Fig. 24.--Continuum Expressing Quintilian's Tenets of Persuasion and Conviction

Quintilian is referred to as being one of the first rhetoricians to maintain a "middle" position between factual and emotional appeals:

> I am consequently surprised that there should be a violent dispute between the leaders of two opposite schools as to whether . . . the judge should be instructed in the facts before any appeal is made to his feelings (the latter being the view of Appolodorus), as though no middle course were possible and no regard were to be had

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[9] Ibid., iii. 8. 12-13.

[10] A "dichotomy" exists between logos and pathos. Ethos, though important, is not vital to the persuasion and conviction controversy.

to the exigencies of the case itself.[11]

This point of view expressed out of context seems to be representative of the duality concept explained in Chapter II and to be developed fully in Chapter VI. However, upon further investigation these dimensions (factual and emotional proofs) are not developed as dualistic or monistic but are treated as mutually exclusive or dichotomistic. Based on available evidence, it is inferred that Quintilian treats factual and emotional proof separately but does indicate that they reinforce each other in practice. He does not write that logos and pathos are fused nor does he define persuasion in the broad sense that Aristotle does.

A second work expressing a dichotomy is that of Longinus. Within his treatise, On the Sublime, Longinus emphasizes a "natural faculty of expression" but continues by stating that of the genuine sources of the sublime: "The first and most powerful is the command of full-blooded ideas . . . and the second is the inspiration of vehement emotion."[12] For overall effect Longinus believes "that nothing makes so much for grandeur as genuine emotion in the right place."[13]

A new term, imagination, is expressed in Longinus' work. It is necessary to consider the use of imagination in context to grasp its meaning as Longinus intended:

> . . . besides developing his technical argument the orator uses his imagination and consequently his conception far exceeds the limits of mere persuasion. In all such cases the stronger accents seem naturally to catch our ears, so that our attention is drawn from the

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[11]Ibid., v. 13. 59-60.

[12]Longinus On the Sublime 8. 1-2.

[13]Ibid.

> reasoning to the enthralling effect of the imagination, and the technique is concealed in a halo of brilliance. And this effect on us is natural enough; set up two forces side by side and the stronger always borrows the virtues of the other.[14]

"Imagination" as Longinus uses it means the arranging of the technical argument or the manner in which the speaker uses his ingenuity (intelligence) in order to convince his audience. In his discussion of the "sublime," logical proof (full-blooded ideas presented with imagination) and emotional proof are treated as separate dimensions--"two forces set side by side."

Treatments by the Pre-Moderns

Campbell, Blair, and Whately, three of the most important of the pre-modern writers, also support concepts which can be described as dichotomies. To George Campbell, persuasion is an all-inclusive term. Within its broad encompass are emotional proof and logical proof existing as mutually exclusive dimensions although a judicious use of both produces persuasion.

> . . . let it be observed that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is to satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. These incorporated together (as was observed in the first chapter) constitute that vehemence of contention, to which the greatest exploits of eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed. Here then is the principal scope for argument, but not the only scope, as will appear in the sequel. When the first end alone is attained, that pathetic without the rational, the passions are indeed aroused from a disagreeable languor by the help

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[14] Ibid., 15. 10-11.

> of the imagination, and the mind is thrown into a state which, though accompanied with some painful emotions, rarely fails, upon the whole, to affect it with pleasure. But if the hearers are judicious, no practical effect is produced. They cannot by such declamation be influenced to a particular action, because [they are] not convinced.[15]

Campbell's position is similar to that of Bain's discussed earlier. The major difference is that Bain sees conviction and emotional proof as separate entities which are combined to yield persuasion. Campbell believes, as does Aristotle, that the total process is persuasion, but that within its encompass conviction and pathos are mutually exclusive. In reality this is more of a semantic than a critical difference. Campbell also advocates that:

> In order to evince the truth considered by itself, conclusive arguments alone are requisite; but in order to convince me by these arguments, it is moreover requisite that they be understood, that they be attended to, that they be remembered by me; and in order to persuade me by them to any particular action or conduct, it is further requisite that by interesting me in the subject, they may, as it were, be felt. It is not therefore the understanding alone that is here concerned. If the orator would prove successful, it is necessary that he engage in his service all these different powers of the mind, the imagination, the memory, and the passions.[16]

In viewing these "powers of the mind" Campbell believes that man is endowed with understanding, has the ability to reason and to remember, and that man is also endowed with emotion.[17] Campbell's analysis of the mind provides the basis for the visualization of his concept of persuasion as seen in Figure 25.

Inasmuch as Figure 25 visualizes persuasion as all-inclusive, one

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[15]George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, ed. Lloyd F. Bitzer (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 72-78.

[16]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[17]Ibid., pp. 72-78.

might reason that Campbell is a monist. However, it is the relationship between emotional proof and logical proof which establishes Campbell as a dichotomist. Unfortunately, ambiguity exists between "persuasion" meaning an end result achieved by means of logos, pathos, and




Fig. 25.--Campbell's Concept of Persuasion

ethos, and "persuade" meaning the use of pathos, emotional proof. Campbell appears to be influenced by a faculty-type psychology and, as such, dichotomizes appeals to the mind and to the passions. Aristotle also treats of logos, pathos, and ethos within the framework of persuasion as a process; however, he does not advance any one of the proof forms as being a separate entity. Instead the three forms fuse to achieve a monistic type persuasion. Within Campbell's work, appeals to the desires or passions may be used separately to excite the auditors (to gain their attention) and appeals to the judgments may follow in order to convince the auditors.

Although persuasion is all-inclusive, Campbell's concept is a dichotomy inasmuch as the two major tenets under investigation, logical proof and emotional proof, are treated as being mutually exclusive within this broad encompass. Regardless of the orator's position regarding

an issue, Campbell believes that there are two things that must be carefully studied by him. The orator should "excite in his hearers that desire or passion which favours his design" and "satisfy their judgments that there is a connexion between the conduct to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites."[18]

Hugh Blair also advocates a similar dichotomy but views "the power of eloquence" as all-inclusive with conviction and persuasion within its scope. Blair is one of the earliest authors to utilize the specific terms persuasion and conviction as being mutually exclusive. Until this period authors used such terms as emotional proof or pathos, and logos, appeals to reason or logical proof, where Blair uses "persuasion" and "conviction" respectively. A persuasion and conviction dichotomy can be inferred from other works, such as Campbell's, but it is implicitly stated by Blair:

> It follows clearly, that, in order to persuade, the most essential requisites are, solid argument, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the Speaker, joined with such graces of style and utterance as shall draw our attention to what he says. Good sense is the foundation of all. . . . In order to persuade a man of sense, you must first convince him; which is only to be done, by satisfying his understanding of the reasonableness of what you propose to him. . . . Conviction affects the understanding only; persuasion, the will and the practice. It is the business of the philosopher to convince me of truth; it is the business of the orator to persuade me to act agreeably to it, by engaging my affections on its side. Conviction and persuasion do not always go together. They ought, indeed, to go together; and would do so, if our inclination regularly followed the dictates of our understanding. But as our nature is constituted, I may be convinced that virtue, justice, or public spirit, are laudable while at the same time, I am not persuaded to act according to them.[19]

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[18]Ibid., pp. 274-275.

[19]Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Twelfth ed.; London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1812), vol. 2, pp. 161-162.

Both "persuasion" (pathos) and "conviction" are allness terms within Blair's concept as represented in Figure 26. It is indicated in




Fig. 26.--Blair's Concept of Persuasion. C and Pa may go together, occur separately, or either may be used in isolation. They are herein expressed ideally.

this figure that Blair believes that conviction must be sought first by the orator since "no persuasion is likely to be stable which is not founded on conviction."[20]

Whately's definition of rhetoric is different from that of Blair's in that he rejects the inclusion of literature or prose. As Wayland Maxfield Parrish states: "Instead of accepting the traditional or the current definition of the term, he uses 'rhetoric' arbitrarily to cover the particular activity in which he is most interested."[21] At the beginning of his treatise Whately proposes:

> . . . to treat, first and principally, of the Discovery of ARGUMENTS, and of their Arrangement; secondly, to lay down some Rules respecting the excitement and management of what are commonly called the Passions, (including every kind of Feeling, Sentiment, or Emotion,) with a view to the attainment of any object proposed,--principally,

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[20]Ibid.

[21]Wayland Maxfield Parrish, "Whately and His Rhetoric," Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, ed. Raymond F. Howes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 171-172.

> Persuasion, in the strict sense, i.e., the influencing of the Will.[22]

Herein is the basis for classifying Whately as a dichotomist, inasmuch as he treats the discovery of arguments and persuasion as being mutually exclusive. Whately is not consistent in his treatment. First, he defines "persuasion" and "conviction" as being mutually exclusive; however, later he writes: "Conviction of the understanding is an essential part of Persuasion."[23] Hence, two conflicting concepts arise--probably as an outgrowth of the two different meanings attributed to the term persuasion. Essentially, Whately develops a dichotomistic concept since he consistently treats the two elements as being mutually exclusive.

Treatments by Moderns

Charles Woolbert[24] and other writers credit Winans as a major contributor to their own "monistic" or "dualistic" positions. In spite of Winans' influence on monistic or dualistic views, no justification is found to classify him as either a monist or a dualist. Winans' Public Speaking clearly expresses a dichotomy. Winans describes the purposes of the speaker as: "to interest, to inform, to convince, and to persuade."[25] Within these broad purposes Winans recognizes the three

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[22]Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric, ed. Douglas Ehninger (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), p. 6.

[23]Ibid., p. 175.

[24]Charles Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (July, 1917), 252-253.

[25]James Albert Winans, Public Speaking (rev. ed.; New York: The Century Co., 1917), p. 14.

classical dimensions of logos, pathos, and ethos although he uses terminology other than the Greek. Perhaps, the reason Winans is classified as a contributor to monist and dualist positions is found in the following passage:

> There is a conventional theory of persuasion, so interwoven with the literature of this subject that we should note it briefly before proceeding. This theory is based upon the conception, not now in favor, that our minds are divided into three parts, intellect, emotion, will. To persuade, we are told, one must satisfy, or overpower, the intellect; then arouse the emotion, which in turn will move the will. "We first know, then feel, then act," says a text on argumentation. "Emotion is conditioned on apprehension, volition on emotion, action on volition." This theory is artificial and leads to certain errors in practice which we shall note further on; but still it may be well enough harmonized with the theory we shall work with: To satisfy the intellect is to bring to attention reasons for the desired conduct, and to remove objections from attention; and arousal of emotion in regard to an action is a sure way to win attention to it.[26]

Attention is a key term in Winans' concept and it is this term which Woolbert and others utilize as the basis for their "monistic" or "dualistic" positions.

Although Winans provided the stimulus for a "new" concept, further analysis reveals that his concept is expressed as a dichotomy. Winans outlines early in his text the scope of his work to include ". . . in later chapters the necessity for command of thought and feeling."[27] Winans is aware of the persuasion and conviction controversy and of the difficulty involved in the definition of terms. In his treatment of the emotional dimension he attempts to clarify the use of emotion:

> Perhaps a better word to express the thing objected to is sentimentality. Emotion is a constant factor in our mental states, unless we reach absolute indifference. . . . It makes no difference

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[26]Ibid., p. 195.

[27]Ibid., p. 14.

> that we may call our emotion a reason or a motive. Even the man who prides himself most on living the life of reason must, if he be a true philosopher, be led by one master emotion,--love of truth. We should fix in our minds the fact that emotion, as such, is neither good nor bad; that a particular emotion may be good or bad. Also, emotions may be violent, moderate, or weak in their expression.[28]

This passage, besides defining emotion, contains the germ of a persuasion and conviction dichotomy which is amplified when Winans discusses his psychology for winning an audience:

> The surer way is to win by sound argument. On the other hand, even when the first business is conviction, the time comes when the deliberative mood must give way and the audience be brought into community of feeling; assuming that united action is desired. There are times, too, when there is no time for argument; when it is suggestion or nothing. And there are some people with whom argument at any time is impossible.[29]

In summation Winans does express a dichotomistic concept of persuasion. Within his concept either persuasion or conviction may exist separately, together, or not at all depending upon the audience addressed.

A rather recent development in the field of speech is the teaching of formal courses in debate, argumentation, and persuasion. Authors writing in these areas recognize the lack of clarity in the relationship between persuasion and conviction but do little to resolve it. The more common practice is for an author to write a text about the specific area of his interest and to disregard any other dimension.

Within some specific texts are found concepts advocating dichotomistic tenets of persuasion and conviction. Edwin D. Shurter expresses such tenets in his The Science and Art of Effective Debating:

> That part of debating which wins the disposition of the hearers, directs motives, arouses emotions, and touches the springs of action

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[28] Ibid., pp. 97-98.

[29] Ibid., p. 233.

> is called persuasion. The importance of persuasion in debate cannot be overestimated, for it is the climax of all argument proper. . . . And yet, unlike the processes of pure conviction, the sources of persuasion are too ill defined and elusive for any systematic treatment. All reasonable men reason substantially alike. But men act from different motives; and in the use of persuasion in debate much must depend upon the individual debater's tact in appreciating the particular motives that appertain to a particular audience.[30]

Within his concept Shurter believes that one first uses logical proofs which can be studied systematically and then cap the process of argument proper with persuasion. While Shurter does not fully interrelate persuasion with argumentation, he does present sufficient evidence for classifying him as a dichotomist.

Nichols and Baccus are more outspoken in their treatment of persuasion. Like Plato, they believe that advocates who rely solely upon emotional proofs are practitioners of sophistry. Yet, they believe that once conviction has been established that any type of emotional appeal is justifiable. Nichols and Baccus summarize their position:

> The authors hold that persuasive appeal should not be used to arrive at convictions. They deny the dual function of persuasion as the orthodox writers set it forth. Conviction should always be based on reason and judgment, upon conclusions arrived at because of evidence and proof, and never because of prejudice and emotional reaction. Belief based upon appeal to emotion, sentiments, tastes, prejudices, and the like are not usually sound beliefs, and to gain conviction by such means is to indulge in pure sophistry. Most people resent such appeals to gain belief as an insult to their intelligence. They require that beliefs be based upon facts, evidence, proof, truth; and these things are the specific grounds of argumentation. . . .
>
> Persuasion begins where argument leaves off--with conviction that is established by the evidence. When conviction is established, there is nothing reprehensible in making every appeal one can make.[31]

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[30]Edwin DuBois Shurter, The Science and Art of Effective Debating (New York: Noble and Noble, Publishers, 1925), pp. 207-208.

[31]Egbert R. Nichols and Joseph H. Baccus, Modern Debating (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1936), pp. 10-11.

Out of the dichotomistic concepts studied arises a significant question. Granted that persuasion and conviction are mutually exclusive, how are they interrelated? Four views exist. First, some authors, such as Shurter and Nichols and Baccus, feel that one must first employ logical proof and then emotional proof. This point of view is expressed lineally in Figure 27, A. Figure 27, B represents the view that one




Fig. 27.--Interrelationships of Dichotomistic Concepts

must first gain the good will or the attention of his auditor; then convince him with logical proofs; and, lastly persuade him with emotional proofs. Figure 27, C represents the belief that both are mutually exclusive but are used throughout a presentation in such a way as to reinforce each other.

The fourth view, an eclectic one, is best represented by A. Craig Baird:

> What about the order of emotional and of logical proofs? Should argument come first and persuasion follow? It is impossible to

> answer without understanding of each audience (and the requirements of the same group will vary from meeting to meeting). Sometimes you will first present ideas that strongly align themselves with the hopes, desires, and beliefs of the hearers. But you will couple these emotional drives or follow them with such arguments as you can muster. Thus your auditor will not only receive strong emotional stimulus to follow your bent but will be quickened to rational appeals that confirm and make permanent the program to which you have committed him. Your procedure here takes account of the auditor's interest in being rational.
>
> Sometimes the emotional (motivative or persuasive) proofs will come first.[32]

Probably the most elaborate statement of the process of persuasion and conviction is that of Hollingworth. Both Baird and Hollingworth believe that the end of argument is affecting belief and conduct. To attain such action Hollingworth suggests that one should do so by (1) gaining the attention of his auditor, (2) holding his interest by effective selection and presentation of ideas, (3) convincing him through logical argument and evidence, (4) persuading him through materials selected to motivate, and (5) securing from him definite action.[33]

The Psychology of Persuasive Speech by Robert T. Oliver specifically differentiates between persuasion and argument.[34] In a separate article Oliver treats not of a dichotomy but of a trichotomy by developing mutually exclusive tenets of intellectuality, emotionality, and rationalization.[35] Oliver presents a dichotomy in his text not only

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[32]A. Craig Baird, Argumentation, Discussion and Debate (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1950), p. 228.

[33]H. L. Hollingworth, The Psychology of the Audience (New York: American Book Company, 1935), pp. 12-13.

[34]Oliver, 1957, pp. 9-11, 43-44, 47-48, 225.

[35]Robert T. Oliver, "Human Motivation: Intellectuality, Emotionality, and Rationalization," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXII (February, 1936), 67-77. Since the latter tenet, rationalization, is not found anywhere else, it is not considered critical to the present study.

through theory but also through selected speech models; i.e., he selects passages from speeches which exemplify the use of predominantly logical proof and other passages which exemplify predominantly emotional proof.[36]

Offshoots of the persuasion and conviction controversy are prevalent in current texts as dichotomistic concepts. One of the latest texts, Principles of Argumentation and Debate by Capp and Capp, while treating almost entirely of principles of argumentation and logical proof, continues to differentiate specifically between emotional and logical proof:

> Emotional proof: the appeals to the basic drives, motives, and desires of man that help the debater persuade his listeners.
> Logical proof: the argument itself, based on the reasons and evidence that help the debater convince an audience.
> (a) Evidence: the facts and opinions used to support an argument.
> (b) Reason: the inferences drawn from the evidence.[37]

Capp and Capp's further treatment of emotional proof and logical proof reveals a dichotomistic position.

Summary

Dichotomistic treatments of persuasion and conviction do exist. Within such treatments persuasion and conviction are mutually exclusive. Often such dichotomistic treatments of persuasion and conviction appear to be grounded in a "faculty-type psychology." The division in which persuasion embodies the use of emotional appeals and conviction the use of logical appeals does reflect a faculty psychology. However, the

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[36]Oliver, 1957, pp. 227-230, 255-256, 259-260.

[37]Glenn R. Capp and Thelma R. Capp, Principles of Argumentation and Debate (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 103.

broad problem concerning persuasion and conviction antedates a formal faculty psychology.

In reviewing the dichotomistic concepts in light of a faculty psychology the question arises whether the mind distinguishes between emotional and logical proofs according to the "faculties" of the mind, or whether emotional and logical proofs can be distinguished in and of themselves without regard to a faculty approach. No clear answer is found to this question although modern psychology rejects such a "faculty" approach.

Numerous works such as Bain's, Campbell's, Blair's, Hollingworth's, and Oliver's express concepts which treat persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy although the treatments are often internally inconsistent. Such inconsistent treatments of persuasion and conviction helped to create the problem under investigation and reflect the lack of agreement among various authors in their treatments of emotional and logical proofs.

CHAPTER VI

THE DUALITY CONCEPTS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze concepts of persuasion and conviction expressed as dualities by their authors. These authors fall into at least two classifications: pure dualists and theory-practice dualists.

Pure dualists are those rhetoricians who make no distinctions in either theory or practice between tenets of persuasion and of conviction. In fact, "pure" dualists contend that distinctions between persuasion and conviction are artificial and unsound. In the pure duality concept, tenets of persuasion and conviction are held to be complementary and indistinguishable.

The pure dualist is so classified because he overtly denies a differentiation among the means of proof to achieve a unified end result. He emphasizes the means as an interrelationship of emotional proof and logical proof in which neither proof form can be distinguished from the other. Indeed, emotional proof and logical proof are treated as the "warp and woof" of persuasion.

In contrast, the broad persuasion monist does not treat the question of the relationship of emotional proof with logical proof. He does discuss both proof forms. However, he neither claims they are inseparable nor does he claim they are mutually exclusive as does the dichotomist. Instead, the persuasion monist advances a concept in which the end result, persuasion, is monistic.

Briefly stated, the pure dualist is so classified in view of the dualistic means he discusses; the broad persuasion monist is so classified in view of the monistic end result advanced without regard to the means.

Theory-practice dualists believe that in practice tenets of persuasion and conviction are complementary and reinforce each other throughout a message. In this respect their position is similar to that held by the pure dualists. However, for convenience they distinguish among modes of persuasion and conviction in theory.

The theory-practice position resembles that of the dichotomists to a degree. The main difference is that these dualists believe that in practice--in the reality of actual presentation--no distinctions which are universal or consistent may be made between that which is emotional and that which is logical. The dichotomists believe that a conscious distinction can be made by the practitioner even while in the act of speaking. The dichotomists would admit that either emotional or logical proof could be utilized separately, together, in varying degrees, and either intentionally or accidentally. The dualists believe that artificial distinctions may be made in theory but that in reality one cannot state where emotional proof ends and logical begins--indeed, they often feel one cannot even distinguish what is or is not emotional or logical during actual presentation.

The first part of this chapter treats of the pure duality concept; the latter, with the theory-practice concept.

Analysis: Pure Duality Concepts

A recent approach to persuasion and conviction is the belief that no distinctions can be drawn between the two terms and that emotional

and logical proofs represent a duality in both theory and practice. Historically, the advocates of pure duality concepts are influenced by two significant factors: (1) James Winans' Public Speaking and his treatments of James-Lange theory of emotion; and (2) a rejection of faculty psychology as a basis for interpreting persuasion and conviction.

Influence of Winans

Winans' Public Speaking, published in 1915, serves as a transitional work in rhetorical theory. Winans develops two significant ideas in his text which contribute greatly to the dualistic tenets as advanced by Mary Yost, Charles Woolbert, and others. The first contribution is his utilization of the James-Lange theory of emotion.[1] Although the James-Lange theory had been prominent for about twenty years prior to Winans' work, Winans was one of the first writers to relate it to rhetorical theory. This theory is best explained in the words of James:

> Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. . . . The more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble.[2]

Winans states that ". . . the James-Lange theory has not been generally accepted in its entirety, though most psychologists admit it contains a large measure of truth.[3] The important point raised by Winans is that the James-Lange theory does contain an important suggestion for the speech field. This point is that if we have some control over our

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[1]James Albert Winans, Public Speaking (rev. ed.; New York: The Century Co., 1917), p. 101.

[2]William James, Psychology, Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1892), p. 375.

[3]Winans, p. 102.

feelings in a physical way, perhaps we can at least anticipate and utilize them.[4] Although Winans explicitly states that he does not accept this theory fully, he does extend some of its implications:

> Action and expression increase emotion. Act bold and we shall tend to feel bold; act interested and we shall tend to feel interested. But perhaps the most valuable lesson we can draw from our consideration of the relation of action and bearing to emotion, is just this: By means largely physical one can bring himself out of indifference and establish a mood of alertness and responsiveness to the emotions of one's speech.[5]

The significant contributions of both the James-Lange theory and of Winans' work are the suggestions each makes for further consideration by rhetoricians. James and Lange advance the term action which is utilized by some writers as the specific end of rhetoric embodying both persuasion and conviction--a dualistic position. Winans emphasizes such terms as association and attention.[6] As he states: "'What holds attention determines action.' To do an act, then, give it exclusive attention."[7]

Although Winans does not develop a dualistic position, he contributed significantly to the dualistic tenets developed by such writers as Yost, Woolbert, O'Neill and Weaver.

Yost and Woolbert are classified as dualists and not as monists in that they discuss both persuasion and conviction in denying the validity of a dichotomistic position and in supporting the hypothesis that persuasion and conviction cannot be distinguished either in theory or

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[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 103.

[6] Ibid., pp. 109-175.

[7] Ibid., p. 192.

in practice. In Chapter IV writers were classified as monists inasmuch as each advanced either tenets of persuasion or else of conviction without denying or even mentioning the dichotomistic position and without claiming persuasion and conviction as being mutually inclusive or exclusive. Some writers in Chapter IV were also classified as monists since they advanced concepts in which conviction and persuasion are treated as synonymous terms. The dualists differ in that they do recognize the tenets of both persuasion and conviction and also in that they do not hold the two terms as synonymous.

Influence of Faculty Psychology

The second contributing force to prompt authors to tender dualistic tenets was the rejection of faculty psychology. Mary Yost specifically criticizes faculty psychology and its influence upon persuasion:

> In such a study, moreover, the technical vocabulary usually found when the theory of argument is discussed can be avoided with advantage. These terms for example, conviction and persuasion, have so long been associated with an outworn psychology [faculty psychology] that no amount of redefinition can do away entirely with the old connotations.[8]

Although the persuasion and conviction problem antedated formalization of faculty psychology by several centuries,[9] Miss Yost justifiably associates it with the tenets of faculty psychology. In rejecting the persuasion and conviction dichotomy Miss Yost advances a dualistic position which she explains in terms of sociology:

> If then, the genesis of argument is in the social situation described . . . what are the characteristics of the social situation in which we find the outcome of argument? Argument arises, as we have

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[8]Mary Yost, "Argument from the Point-of-View of Sociology," The Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking, III (April, 1917), 113.

[9]Supra, pp. 82-83.

> seen, when the normal working of the social group has been interrupted, checked in a certain way. When argument is successful, we find the social group again able to develop through the cooperative efforts of audience and speaker in a direction in harmony with the speaker's initial conception of the needs of the group. . . .[10]
>
> The problem of the form of argument becomes, then, subordinate to the problem of function. The question of how to attract the audience's attention and eventually to focus this on the subject, of how to present the idea so that there is no chance of being misunderstood, of the choosing from the evidence found trustworthy just that which will touch the audience's experience most closely, of the translation of the subject in terms of the audience's interests, of making specific suggestions as to how the ideas finally dominating the audience's attention can express themselves in action which will further the interest of the group, all these problems must be faced by the student as problems of a real situation. The question of how much conviction--or appeal to the reason, or how much persuasion--or appeal to the emotion, is never raised--at least in the form in which it is raised in the current text-books.[11]

In light of her discussion Dean Yost's concept is a duality in that she makes no attempt to distinguish between persuasion and conviction. Her position stated from the point-of-view of sociology is expressed visually in Figure 28.

Although Miss Yost avoids using the usual terminology of persuasion and conviction, her concept can be interpreted in light of such terminology as used in this study. Her dualistic position is similar to the classical one held by Aristotle in which he defines rhetoric as all available means of persuasion.[12] All available means of persuasion must arise from the social environment out of which the argument being advanced also arose. One can claim that the technical form of argument should be subordinated to function; however, sooner or later form has to be analyzed and used in order to help achieve the function (or end) of

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[10]Yost, p. 115.

[11]Ibid., p. 123.

[12]Aristotle Rhetoric i. 1.2.

argument, namely, to resolve disruption or blocking of the social group.




Fig. 28.--Yost's Dualistic Tenets from the Point-of-View of Sociology

Dean Yost's discussion contains the general basis for deriving a modular form more common to the hypothetical models of the pure duality as expressed in Chapter II, page 32. "Argument from the Point-of-View of Sociology" was a fresh approach to the persuasion and conviction problem, but it did not resolve the problem. Its chief contributions were that it called attention to the problem, condemned the persuasion and conviction dichotomy as being as fallacious as the tenets of faculty psychology, and attempted to present a more useful concept of argument (which most current writers call a special form of persuasion) which interprets and utilizes the total social environment.

Woolbert.--Winans' book and Dean Yost's article almost immediately evoked several other books and articles which treat of persuasion and

conviction as a duality. One of the most prolific of such authors is Charles Woolbert. Professor Woolbert asks: "Are conviction and persuasion two separate and distinct things?"[13] Although Woolbert does not directly refute such a division nor set forth a scientifically stated concept, he does reject such a dichotomy in advancing his own dualistic position.

Woolbert begins by complimenting Dean Yost's articles and her sociological approach. In addition Woolbert advances a dualistic concept of persuasion based upon "some citations and conclusions from modern psychology."[14] His specific thesis is:

> . . . that any division of appeal and speech into conviction and persuasion is unsound from the point of view of psychology and unnecessary from the point of view of rhetorical theory.[15]

In setting forth his dualistic position Woolbert believes that:

> . . . speaking and appeal can be completely described in terms of any of the complex mental processes, such as association, perception, attention, emotion, or will. Winans has shown that it can be done in terms of attention. It seems to me, however, that action, and particularly response, is the fundamental concept. What the speaker is seeking when he makes a speech is a certain response from his hearers. As a description of this response, attention is only incidental, only a way station. Still more strictly, attention is only one way of describing and picturing the configurations and patterns of unitary responses which are sometimes multitudinous in number. A theory of persuasion based upon action as response, is the next step in the progress of science.[16]

Essentially, Woolbert's concept of persuasion is expressed in terms of a stimulus-response duality rather than in the usual terms of persuasion and conviction. The essence of his total concept of

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[13]Woolbert, "Some Considerations of Theory," p. 249.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 254.

persuasion is best stated in the following passage:

> . . . in all matters of human experience, whatever events can be brought under the term response must be conceived as also belonging to the term action; any classification that denies this must thereby ignore the organic nature of mind, and can be only a loose and meaningless manipulation of words. Response, and response of all possible kinds, must be conceived of as action, or else the term action is entirely useless for purposes of theory and practice. . . .
>
> But somewhere here is an important difference, on that all seem agreed. Where is it to be found? How can we state it?
>
> Evidently something that looks like a dichotomy into action and not-action has got itself mistaken for the real thing; what is this interloper and where is it to be found? The answer is clear; the error of the conviction-persuasion, emotion-intellect, thought-action duality is found in the fact that we discuss this issue, not in terms of what the responder actually does, but in terms of what the observer perceives him doing. What we have been talking about for ages in our rhetorical theory is not what the actor does, but what a spectator can detect by eye and ear. It is a difference, not between acting and thinking, but between one kind of action that happens also to be perceivable movement and another kind of action in which the movement is invisible and unperceivable. But this is not a difference between action and not-action.[17]

Although Woolbert's statement of his position is rather complex, it is apparent that he does advocate a pure duality concept of persuasion. Figure 29 describes the tenets of his concept.

In regard to persuasion and conviction, Woolbert frequently states that much of our motionless activity is highly emotional and that much of our most strenuous activites are clearly intellectual.[18] Because of the "warp and woof" relationship between persuasion and conviction, Woolbert believes no finite distinctions can be drawn and that we must find some other method for analyzing our theory of persuasion. He believes the method is found in light of modern psychology.

In concluding his first article Woolbert clearly states his dualistic position:

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[17] Ibid., pp. 257-258.

[18] Ibid., p. 260.




Fig. 29.--Woolbert's Stimulus-Response Duality

> I agree emphatically with Winans in calling the process by one name persuasion; because it deals with only one entity, and of all terms possible persuasion is the largest and most inclusive. Moreover, it is traditionally associated with the appeal for action, and if action is the sole object of speech, then persuasion is the fitting term to use. Argumentation means nothing in popular parlance; it is a made-up term of limited significance; it has a sound purely formal; and is used only in an academic and doctrinaire sense. Persuasion covers the whole ground, suggests efforts worthy of the best in a man, and still has meaning in everyday usage.[19]

In a later article Woolbert appears to change his position. Instead of advancing a dualistic position treating persuasion in light of psychology as a stimulus-response duality, he advocates a seemingly new concept:

> Everyone is familiar with the division of beliefs and actions into rational versus non-rational, logical versus non-logical. This paper will try to show that such a division, like that into conviction versus persuasion, resolves itself into a division between hidden versus overt processes, and only that. In other words, logic operates not only in the open, by means of words, but also perchance

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[19] Ibid., pp. 262-263.

> under cover, through processes that may use words, yet more often are entirely wordless.[20]

In the article from which the former passage is taken Woolbert maintains a dualistic position in that he still believes that logic and emotional proof are non-separable and that persuasion is all-inclusive. However, the concept which he develops in the later article clearly treats persuasion as being all-inclusive and holds that: "In general logical rigor must be in direct proportion to the tension that exists between the speaker and his hearers."[21] Further amplified, Woolbert's position is that logical rigor is maintained at two levels--hidden and overt. If logical rigor is examined at the hidden level, it can be inferred that all emotional proof is related to hidden logical appeals which are in direct proportion to the tension that exists between the speaker and his hearers. In the article being discussed Woolbert does not treat the emotional dimension. In fact, the specific title "The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion" specifies only the logical tenet.

Woolbert's analysis of the place of logic in a system of persuasion reveals a conviction monist position even though he specifically advances a pure duality concept in his earlier article.[22] The depth of his emphasis upon logical rigor is clearly implied in the following passage:

> Where there is strain, doubt, disbelief, a problem to solve,

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[20]Charles Woolbert, "The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV (January, 1918), 20.

[21]Ibid., p. 31.

[22]Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," pp. 249-264.

> ignorance, darkness to dispel, the logical links must be brought out into the light and revealed with care and frankness. Where the tension is greatest, criticism unrelenting, opposition unyielding, joints must be obvious in the extreme and so logical rigor most complete. Yet at bottom the process involved is the same as that which goes on down in the hidden places where we make most of the additions to our thinking. The virtue in logical rigor is that in a social situation we escape the charge of prejudice and faulty observation. This level of inference can readily be given the name of Reasoning.[23]

Within his treatment of persuasion Woolbert is inconsistent as has been demonstrated. He does maintain a pure duality position for the most part. Viewed objectively, Woolbert's works as a whole seem to maintain a dualistic position throughout although there are various emphases within specific articles. In the first of a later series of three articles Woolbert returns to his original position that response is the end of persuasion.[24] His final position is best summarized in his own words:

> It is now permissible to state that the most emotional act is of the same pattern as the most intellectual act in that it involves the acceptance of propositions which bear a logical relation to each other. The intellectual act in its turn is of the same stuff as emotional acts in that it involves a tonicity and tension of muscles, and so represents a consequent change in the physical arrangement of the action mechanism of the man so moved; it is thus truly action.[25]

Woolbert influenced numerous other rhetoricians through his scholarly writings and his teaching. Collins and Morris in their work Persuasion and Debate reflect Woolbert's influence as their advisor:

> "Reason" and "feeling" are appealed to, in influencing human conduct, not separately, but together. "Persuasion" as the word is used in this text includes both forms of appeal. There is a

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[23]Woolbert, "The Place of Logic in a System of Persuasion," p. 31.

[24]Charles Woolbert, "Persuasion: Principles and Methods," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, V (January, 1919), 14.

[25]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

> practical utility in distinguishing between explicit and implicit methods, as the text will show, but their proper combination and interweaving is the important consideration. . . .[26]

> The knowledge of the principles, methods, and rules of persuasion is of no value in itself; that knowledge is valuable only as it is applied in the actual practice of the art--in persuading.[27]

O'Neill and Weaver.--One final illustration serves to demonstrate tenets of a pure duality concept. O'Neill and Weaver, both modern scholars of rhetorical theory, advance a pure duality concept of persuasion in their text, The Elements of Speech:

> All this discussion of the will-to-believe and emotional reinforcement of beliefs brings us back to the point from which we started, namely, that intellectual and emotional responses are always associated and that the emotional are generally in control of the situation.[28]

> As we are using the term "mental," it properly includes both emotional behavior and intellectual behavior.[29]

O'Neill and Weaver's work is the most thorough development found of the duality position. Their thesis is that the business of the speaker is to get the members of his audience to want to do what he wants them to do.[30] With this thesis as their goal O'Neill and Weaver advocate a broad concept of persuasion.

In relationship to the persuasion and conviction problem under investigation, O'Neill and Weaver add new light to an old problem. Like Winans, Yost, and Woolbert, O'Neill and Weaver utilize contemporary

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[26]George R. Collins and John S. Morris, Persuasion and Debate (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1927), p. ix.

[27]Ibid., p. 3.

[28]James M. O'Neill and Andrew T. Weaver, The Elements of Speech (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1926), pp. 318-319.

[29]Ibid., p. 45.

[30]Ibid., pp. 312-313.

works in both speech and psychology as a basis for their concepts. They also bring to their work the experience of several years of teaching and observing persuasion. Basically, they are influenced by the writings of James, Winans, and Woolbert.

Both logical and emotional proofs are vital aspects of their dualistic concept. They hold that:

> Nothing in the world is more important for a speaker than the ability to understand the feelings of others by observing their behavior. This is the foundation of tact in dealing with other people. Nothing should matter to the speaker quite so much as the responses of those to whom he speaks, and he should be quick to adjust himself to their emotional behavior.[31]

O'Neill and Weaver's concept of persuasion is audience-centered; i.e., they construct their tenets with the needs and desires of the audience in mind--not just the speaker's. Their law of visible action is specifically audience-oriented and also emphasizes their concern with communicating meaning.

Within their dualistic position O'Neill and Weaver give greater emphasis to the role of passions (emotional proof) than to that of reason. They agree with President Woodrow Wilson whom they quote as stating:

> "We speak of this as an age in which mind is monarch, but I take it for granted that, if that is true, mind is one of those modern monarchs who reign but do not govern. As a matter of fact, the world is governed in every generation by a great House of Commons made up of the passions; and we can only be careful to see to it that the handsome passions are in the majority."[32]

These authors believe that emotions save mankind from being relatively simple mechanisms whose reactions can be predicted with great

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[31] Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[32] Ibid., pp. 312-313.

certainty.[33] They agree with James and Woolbert that "What holds attention determines action."[34] However, O'Neill and Weaver do not divorce emotional proof from logical proof.

> . . . we do not mean to assert that the speaker should not concern himself with good evidence, credible testimony, logical arrangement of material, etc. He should make the fullest and most efficient possible use of all these. However, unless he can actually find the words which touch off emotionally reinforced response tendencies, all of his skill in argument is likely to avail him little. . . . They [logical arguments] are clearly an essential part of any attempt to build up and organize permanent and satisfactory beliefs, and they make both reasoning and rationalizing easier.[35]

In this study of the conviction and persuasion problem, O'Neill and Weaver are among the few authors encountered who utilized the term "conviction" in the same sense as defined in the current dictionary usage. To O'Neill and Weaver, "convictions" are "pet notions," "prejudices," or deep-seated beliefs.[36]

> Students should be open-minded but willing to act upon the best hypotheses which they can formulate on the evidence they have. Some convictions arise from the fact that we realize the incompleteness of our experience and do the best we can to fill in the gaps in such a way as to make for consistency among the elements which we have. . .
>
> In our beliefs, as in our emotions, we must always recognize the influence of the social group. Speech is always a social matter.[37]

Their concept is stated visually in Figure 30. Summarized, O'Neill and Weaver hold a dualistic concept which treats persuasion (though not explicitly stated) as the all-inclusive term. The process of persuasion

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[33] Ibid., pp. 316-317.

[34] Ibid., p. 321.

[35] Ibid., pp. 62-63.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.




Fig. 30.--O'Neill and Weaver's Duality Concept

utilizes current principles of psychology and sociology. Their concept advances the idea that a speaker is trained within and is a product of his social environment. As for the relationship of emotional and logical proof, the authors believe that man is first a completely emotional being as a child and gradually learns to control his total self intellectually. As adults men are both emotional and rational beings.

O'Neill and Weaver's work also comes close to exemplifying the current dictionary definitions of persuasion and conviction.[38] It defines persuasion as all-inclusive and conviction as pet notions, prejudices, or deep-seated beliefs.

Analysis: Theory-Practice Duality Concepts

Scholars studying the history of persuasion and encountering the

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[38]See Chapter III for a discussion of dictionary definitions of persuasion.

conflicting concepts regarding persuasion have reacted in a variety of ways. Some have chosen to support the monistic position as discussed in Chapter IV; others, the dichotomistic position as discussed in Chapter V; and still others, the dualistic concepts as discussed in this chapter. It is possible that the theory-practice dualists were trying to arrive at a practical solution to the problem and to advance an acceptable concept for all.

For clarification, a theory-practice dualist is one who believes in a duality. He believes that distinctions between persuasion and conviction in practice are artificial and cannot be drawn in the reality of the actual persuasive communication, but feels that analytical distinctions can be made for the purpose of teaching.

George Pierce Baker.--This theory-practice duality is explicit in George Pierce Baker's Principles of Argumentation:

> . . . [a writer] can hardly forget that conviction and persuasion are not independent but complementary.
>
> For purposes of instruction it will, however, be convenient to treat first the principles which underlie successful conviction and then those which make for effective persuasion; but a reader should never forget that this separation is artificial and made wholly for pedagogic reasons.[39]

Baker first discusses such argumentative tenets as the use and tests of evidence, techniques of analysis, and techniques for emphasis and clarity. Then, under the term "persuasion," he explains the importance of audience analysis--knowing wants, desires, motives, and needs. Even though this distinction is made in his presentation, he reiterates frequently that such distinctions are not apparent in the ideal argumentative address: "In ideal argumentation, evidently, each part should

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[39]Baker, Principles of Argumentation, p. 11.

not count simply for conviction or persuasion, but for both."[40]

The theory-practice position as advanced by Baker is represented in Figure 31. This Figure illustrates that Baker uses persuasion as the




Fig. 31.--Baker's Theory-Practice Duality Concept

all-inclusive term and also to mean emotional proof.

Baker presents his definitions and material so clearly and explicitly that he could support a pure dichotomy except for the stress he places upon the purely "artificial" separation. In fact, his treatment of "pure" definitions for each term, persuasion and conviction, serves for explanation of the pure dichotomy position. Charles Woolbert criticized Baker's work as being inconsistent in supporting an artificial dichotomy.[41] However, Baker is justifiably classified as one of the earliest proponents of a theory-practice duality concept, a position in

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[40]Ibid., p. 314.

[41]Woolbert, "Conviction and Persuasion: Some Considerations of Theory," pp. 249-250.

which he is consistent.

Arthur P. Stone.--Arthur P. Stone defends Baker as expressing a duality and then advances his own dualistic position in support of Baker's.[42] Stone's explanation of his dualistic position is strongly stated and permits little possibility for misunderstanding:

> No one ever claimed that the classes [of persuasion and conviction] were inclusive as far as I have been able to discover. When we say that they are combined indissolubly, that they must exist together, that they are warp and woof of argument, do we not admit that there must come a time when in a single sentence, or possibly in a single word, or a single act, you cannot tell whether there is more conviction than persuasion, or more persuasion than conviction. Why is it necessary in order to use these terms and use them rightly, that we should have inclusive classes? Who asks for inclusive classes? Not the lawyer who in his dealings with humanity recognizes only too well that life offers him a confused hash in which he is lucky to recognize both vegetable and meat without inquiring too closely as to how much vegetable and how much meat there is in the composition.[43]

Stone admits that his article was prompted by the fact that Charles Woolbert had quoted his position out of context and had classified both him and Garrison, his co-author, and Baker as dichotomists. Thus, he believed it necessary to state his dualistic position as strongly as he did.[44]

Although the theory-practice duality is found in a "pure" form as expressed in Chapter II of this study, writers frequently express a belief in a theory-practice duality but then compose textbooks which treat

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[42]Arthur P. Stone, "Novelties, Real and Fancied, in the Teaching of Argument," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, IV (May, 1918), pp. 251-252.

[43]Ibid., p. 255.

[44]Woolbert's article, "Persuasion and Conviction: Some Considerations of Theory," prompted several articles which state conflicting positions. Woolbert's position advances a pure duality (no distinction between persuasion and conviction); Stone's article expresses a strong theory-practice duality; others, such as Rowell's, support a dichotomy.

of only one aspect--such as argumentation and debate. In 1915 Edwin DuBois Shurter wrote a textbook in which he expresses his dualistic belief but continues to describe separately the specific qualities of oratorical style:

> In noting the distinctive qualities of style in oratory let us consider separately (although in actual practice appeals to reason and to feeling are inseparable) some of the ways, first, of securing conviction, and, secondly, of effecting persuasion.[45]

This trend continues to the present time; McBurney and Mills, for example, state their dualistic position but devote most of their work to principles of argumentation and debate:

> Although we [McBurney and Mills] distinguish between motivation and reasoning, we do not regard these categories as mutually exclusive or discrete. The reason-emotion dichotomy, for example, is considered unsound as a psychological classification. The ways of reacting which we call thoughtful and emotional are not distinct units motivating particular instances of behavior, but exist in varying proportions in the different situations. We know that emotional behavior comes increasingly into play when goals are sought with unusual tenacity and vigor. In fact, it is obvious that all behavior has its motives, be they strong or weak. Thus an argument may have logical validity and emotional appeal. In other words, a case which is adapted to the interests, wants, values, and understanding of the listeners or readers is not necessarily less cogent intellectually. . . Finally, with respect to the relative emphasis upon the logical and psychological ingredients in persuasive communication, it should be noted that the ratio varies with circumstances, and that a persuasive message is not simply a "logica" [sic], one with some "emotional appeals" added like frosting to a cake.[46]

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[45]Edwin DuBois Shurter, The Rhetoric of Oratory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915), p. 98.

[46]James H. McBurney and Glen E. Mills, Argumentation and Debate (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pp. 165-167. The question of degree or how much emotion and how much logic is again raised in McBurney and Mills' work. The answer to this question is evasive and poses a possible area for research beyond the encompass of this study. The main point is that concepts supporting a theory-practice duality are found in rhetorical theory.

Summary


Both pure duality concepts which reject all distinctions between persuasion and conviction and theory-practice dualities are found. Pure dualities are supported by Mary Yost, who bases persuasion upon sociology with no distinction between persuasion and conviction, and by Charles Woolbert, who finds all distinctions artificial and who believes that principles of psychology are the only basis for analyzing tenets of persuasion.[47]

The theory-practice duality position is stated explicitly in such works as those by Baker, Stone, Shurter, and McBurney and Mills. Each states his belief that no distinctions may be made between persuasion and conviction in practice; but that useful distinctions may be made for purposes of explanation in teaching. Each of these men is interested in a particular aspect of the persuasion area and each has written a text specifically for his area of specialty. McBurney and Mills are experienced in debate and thus write a text stressing principles of debate--which is recognized historically as emphasizing logical proofs. They do not reject emotional proof; they recognize its importance as a significant dimension of the total persuasion process and admit that in practice logical and emotional proofs are interrelated as a duality. Figure 32 summarizes both duality positions visually for comparison and amplification.

Inconsistencies within works by the same author are also found.

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[47]Yost and Woolbert are classified as dualists and not as monists in that they discuss both persuasion and conviction but deny the validity of a dichotomistic position and support the hypothesis that persuasion and conviction cannot be distinguished either in theory or in practice.



A. Pure Duality B. Theory-Practice Duality

Fig. 32.--A Visual Comparison of "Pure" Duality and Theory-Practice Duality Concepts

Shurter supports a dichotomy in his The Science and Art of Effective Debating, but a theory-practice duality in his earlier work, The Rhetoric of Oratory. Mills presents a conviction monist position in his work, Reason in Controversy, but a theory-practice duality in his work, Argumentation and Debate, co-authored with McBurney.

CHAPTER VII

A UNIFIED THEORY OF PERSUASION

At the outset of this study two significant approaches to the persuasion and conviction controversy were delineated; i.e., the problem of definition of the terms persuasion and conviction, per se, and, secondly, the inconsistencies among conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Chapter III discusses the various specific definitions of persuasion and conviction while Chapters IV, V, and VI analyze the specific conceptual approaches. This chapter serves for further comparison and visualization of the data presented in the previous chapters with particular emphasis upon the similarities and differences among definitions and conceptual approaches.

The similarities and differences revealed through such comparisons and visualizations lend themselves, in turn, to the development of a unified theory of persuasion. By analyzing and comparing the conceptual approaches depicted earlier in the study, those pertinent aspects which have perpetrated the persuasion and conviction controversy can be identified and clarified for an attempted resolution of this controversy.

Analysis and Comparison of Definitions

One of the most significant areas of conflict contributing to the persuasion and conviction controversy lies in the definition of persuasion. Historically, persuasion is defined as both an end result and as a means to an end result. Persuasion, as an end result, includes

logical, emotional, and ethical proofs as interacting means to affect that end result.[1]

But, definitions also emerged in which persuasion is defined to mean the use of non-logical forms of proof. Furthermore, it appears as if the latter definitions of persuasion, i.e., as a means to an end result, are an outgrowth of either faculty psychology or else of philosophies which are influenced by faculty-type psychology. Definitions in which persuasion is defined as a means to an end, perhaps, are rooted in Francis Bacon's Advancement of Learning in which an individual is viewed as a composite of "faculties."[2]

This conflict among definitions of persuasion has continued to the present. Currently, persuasion is defined to include all forms of proof or else to mean the use of non-logical appeals. It appears as if a significant contributing factor to this dilemma lies in the usage of the verb form, to persuade. Typical terminology expresses persuasion, the noun, as being all-inclusive and as a process or end result; however, in describing the three forms of proof within the total process, the verb, to persuade, is often defined to mean the use of emotional proof or else to mean the use of non-logical proofs. In describing logical proof, the other major proof form involved in this study, rhetoricians often use the verb, to convince. In this respect, to persuade and to convince are dichotomous. Again, ethical proof, the third form, is not vital to the inherent controversy.

Thus, it appears as if the verb, to persuade, meaning the use of

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[1] For a fuller discussion of definitions see Chapter III.

[2] cf. Bacon, p. 40.

emotional or non-logical proofs persisted and then reverted back to influence the noun form, persuasion, to mean also the use of emotional or of non-logical proofs. With the advent of a formal faculty psychology which depicted man as a composite of individual faculties, persuasion and to persuade came to mean clearly those emotional means which appeal to the "will" while conviction came to be defined as those logical means which appeal to the faculty governing reason.

With the development of modern psychology, faculty psychology was rejected as spurious, as having no scientific basis. However, the two conflicting meanings of persuasion continued in rhetorical theories. The question arises: "Why?" There is no clear answer; one can only hypothesize from available evidence. It is obvious that scholars in the field are unhappy with the conflict among the conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Yost, Woolbert, Rowell, Oliver, Zelko, and recently Rosenthal have shown concern over the relationship of persuasion and conviction. Yet, none of these scholars attacks the roots of the controversy. Instead, each advances his own position without analyzing the specific dimensions within the prevailing conflict.

What, then, are the dimensions for which a specific solution is needed? Essentially, there are four: (1) to divorce the influence of faculty psychology; (2) to resolve the double meaning of persuasion as both a means to an end and as the end itself; (3) to clarify the meaning of the verbs, to persuade and to convince; and (4) to clarify the roles of persuasion within the scope of modern rhetoric.

The first area appears simple to resolve. Inasmuch as modern psychology has proven the tenets of faculty psychology fallacious, then all that is necessary is to reject the tenets of faculty psychology and

to recognize that man is not a composite of individual faculties but one who reaches his beliefs, decisions, or actions through a highly integrated set of physical and mental reactions to various stimuli. Most scholars are agreed that man is monistic in his thought processes and in his ability to reach decisions.

However, at present, as illustrated in Chapter V of this study, some contemporary approaches still define persuasion and conviction as the use of emotional means and logical means, respectively. Persuasion is further defined in other dichotomistic concepts as an end result in the Aristotelian sense. But, even within this broader meaning, the "means" of persuasion are often treated as mutually exclusive.

The second area, the problem of the double meanings of persuasion, should also be simple to resolve. In light of the findings of psychology and in view of the prevailing confusion among definitions of persuasion, modern rhetoricians should be willing to reject the double usage of persuasion and to define persuasion in the Aristotelian sense as an end result. However, there should be a concert of effort to utilize and to clarify current terminology within the discipline of rhetoric rather than to introduce additional terminology from other disciplines simply because such terminology is a novel way to view an old problem.[3]

The third area, the clarification of the verbs to persuade and to convince poses a difficult challenge. Although the main controversy centers around the definitions of persuasion and conviction, it is

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[3]The definitions of persuasion meaning emotional proof and conviction meaning logical proof are clarified in a later section of this chapter devoted to the comparison and visualization of the conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction.

probable that the usage of the verb forms has perpetuated the controversy. In current idiom one might say, "I convinced them that smoking is harmful, but I could not persuade them to stop." In this context Webster's New World Dictionary defines convince to mean "to persuade by argument of evidence"[4] and further defines persuade to mean "to cause (someone) to do or believe something, especially by reasoning, urging, etc.; induce."[5] Thus, persuade can be used synonymously with convince or to mean something quite unrelated to convince.

In colloquial usage to persuade has emotional overtones while to convince implies the use of facts, evidence, and sound reasoning. There is little hope for changing the meanings of these verb forms since they are so firmly entrenched in common usage. Furthermore, the colloquial use of the two terms is generalized outside the specialized field of rhetoric. It is the confusion existing in rhetorical theory among meanings of persuasion and conviction which is need of clarification. The questions which must be answered are: "Which conceptual approach to persuasion and conviction is most consistent with modern rhetorical theory, and which best serves the goals of modern rhetoric?"

The fourth dimension which must be considered is a clarification of the roles of persuasion within modern rhetoric. Currently persuasion is used in several contexts: (1) persuasion meaning either an end result or a process in which logical, emotional, and ethical proofs are utilized as means within the process; (2) persuasion, as a noun, meaning emotional or non-logical proofs; and (3) "Persuasion" as the title of a course of

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[4]Webster's New World Dictionary (pocket-size ed.; New York: "Popular Library," The World Publishing Company, 1959), p. 123.

[5]Ibid., p. 404.

study.

Actually, persuasion defined as an end result or process is compatible with "Persuasion" meaning the title of a course of study. In either case the term persuasion has similar dimensions--particularly, the three forms of proof. However, for clarity and as an essential step to resolving the persuasion and conviction controvesy, rhetorical theorists must cease using persuasion to mean the use of emotional proof and conviction to mean the use of logical proof.

In the first place, using persuasion and conviction as synonymous with emotional proof and logical proof, respectively, results in redundancy as well as in giving persuasion a duplicity of meaning. Secondly, there is a concert of understanding among members of the speech profession as to the meaning of emotional proof and logical proof. Since the terminology "emotional proof" and "logical proof" are well understood, there is no justifiable reason for substituting controversial terminology when the original terminology is relatively simple and clearly understood in and of itself.

In view of the above discussion it is believed that the problem of definition must be and can be resolved. Therefore, as basic to the unified theory of persuasion developed in this chapter, persuasion is defined as: an act or action which attempts to influence the mind of an auditor by arguments or reasons offered or by any appeal that moves the auditor to act and/or believe as the speaker desires. In this sense, persuasion may be viewed either as a process (i.e., the process of persuasion) or as a fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs which bring about a desired end result, i.e., persuaded. Since there are courses of study within the field of speech which specialize in teaching

the process of persuasion, then "Persuasion" will also be retained to denote such courses of study.[6] Operationally, persuasion is further defined:

1. Persuasion is all-inclusive and includes the classical tenets of logos, pathos, and ethos.
2. Persuasion may be intentional or accidental.
3. Persuasion involves the motives or desires of an auditor in light of the total speaker-auditor environment.
4. Persuasion involves an understanding of social, psychological, logical, and ethical factors.
5. Persuasion includes all forms of logical, emotional, and ethical appeals--both "good" and "bad."
6. Persuasion may be direct or indirect, ethical or non-ethical, and be aimed for immediate or long-range action or beliefs.
7. Persuasion, as a discipline within the field of speech, is an all-encompassing concept which includes (1) all the principles of argumentation and debate; (2) principles in common with group discussion; and (3) principles drawn from psychology, sociology, and social psychology.[7]

In view of the fact that conviction is usually defined to mean the use of logical proof or else to mean the holding of deep-seated beliefs, it is suggested that the term conviction is of questionable value to

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[6]This study is concerned with oral persuasion. It is recognized that written persuasion may also be considered.

[7]The principles drawn from psychology, sociology, and social psychology are fundamental to a course of study entitled "Persuasion." Although this course of study is well established and is understood within the designation of the term "Persuasion," it would be desirable to develop a separate designation for maximum clarity.

rhetorical theory. Retention of the term conviction to mean the use of logical proof would only perpetuate the persuasion and conviction controversy. Therefore, it appears that only the terminology "logical proof" should be utilized and that "conviction" be deleted in future rhetorical theory.

Comparison and Analysis of the Conceptual Approaches to Persuasion and Conviction

Based upon earlier discussion of monistic, dichotomistic, and dualistic conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction, there is clearly a wide divergence in the points of view expressed by various authors. However, comparison of these conceptual approaches reveals significant differences leading to major conflict only when theories influenced by either faculty psychology or else by a faculty-type psychology are contrasted with the other conceptual approaches. For further amplification of the similarities and differences among conceptual approaches:

A. A monistic approach in which conviction meaning logical proof is recognized while persuasion meaning non-logical proof is either not treated, mentioned but rejected, or else held as subservient to conviction.

and

B. A monistic approach in which persuasion meaning emotional proof is recognized while conviction meaning logical proof is either not treated or else mentioned but held as governed by emotions rather than by reason.

are compared with

C. A dichotomistic approach in which persuasion meaning emotional

or non-logical proof and <u>conviction</u> meaning only logical proofs are treated as mutually exclusive dimensions which are complementary in achieving an end result.[8]

An overview of these three approaches reveals that the first, stressing only conviction, and the second, stressing only persuasion as emotional proof, represent an emphasis upon the logical and emotional aspects, respectively, of the dichotomistic approach. Figure 33 illustrates the basic relationships among these approaches. Figure 33, A is the converse of Figure 33, B. Each represents one dimension of a dichotomy as illustrated in Figure 33, C. In reviewing works emphasizing




Fig. 33.--A Comparison of Two Monistic Conceptual Approaches to Persuasion and Conviction with a Dichotomistic Conceptual Approach

each of these points of view, it becomes apparent that each concept could be an outgrowth of faculty psychology or else a faculty-type psychology. Edward Hale, Jr., who advances a strong conviction monist position,[9] and William Macpherson, who advocates a strong persuasion monist

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[8]The two monistic approaches being discussed are more fully treated as isolated concepts in Chapter IV of this study while the dichotomistic conceptual approach is treated in Chapter V.

[9]cf. Chapter IV, p. 67.

position,[10] could have been influenced by the faculty psychology prevalent during their era. Writers such as Alexander Bain, whose work expresses a nearly pure dichotomy, are admittedly influenced by faculty psychology.[11]

Based upon available evidence, it is inferred that the monistic concepts depicted in Figure 33, A and B represent the faculty psychology approach to persuasion and conviction--an approach which literally compartmentalizes emotional and logical proofs into separate theoretical divisions. However, the dichotomistic concept represented in Figure 33, C treats emotional and logical proofs as being mutually exclusive but within the same theoretical approach.

The significant difference among these three conceptual approaches is in the point of view expressed. The conviction monist holds emotional proof as spurious and believes that logical proof is the only ethical means through which man should be persuaded. The conviction monist realizes that man is highly subjective and easily influenced through emotional appeals; however, his work emphasizes logic and reason as the principal means of appeal. If any emotional appeal is used, it is as a result of logical choice and careful reasoning and not due to accident or as a result of non-logical means.

The persuasion monist, who defines persuasion as an emotional process, usually recognizes that there is also a logical dimension. However, he believes that the emotional dimension lies within the scope of rhetoric, his specialty, while the logical dimension is best treated

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[10]cf. Chapter IV, p. 72.

[11]cf. Chapter V, p. 84.

within the scope of logic.

Finally, the dichotomist views both emotional proof and logical proof as within the legitimate province of rhetoric. In essence, then, the conviction monist, the persuasion monist, and the dichotomist are similar within a broad conceptual approach probably influenced by a faculty-type psychology.

Figure 33, B and C also point up the crux of the persuasion controversy. Although Figure 33, C represents a dichotomy, it still depicts logical proof and emotional proof as means within a process labeled persuasion. At the same time, Figure 33, B depicts persuasion to mean emotional proof (although Pa, pathos, is used for clarity) and also to represent the end result or process. Thus, persuasion, through the apparent influence of faculty psychology, has two conflicting meanings within similar conceptual approaches.

Since all three of the above conceptions reflect a faculty psychology, they have little if any value for a modern unified theory. In fact, it is because of such "faculty" type approaches that a unified concept is justified.

A Comparison of the Broad Persuasion Monistic Conceptual Approach with the Duality Conceptual Approaches

To illustrate the similarities and differences among (1) the broad persuasion monistic conceptual approach, (2) the pure duality conceptual approach, and (3) the theory-practice duality conceptual approach, an example of each type is given. Figure 34, A depicts an Aristotelian monistic approach[12]; Figure 34, B, a pure dualistic approach exemplified

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[12]cf. Chapter IV, pp. 57-58.

by O'Neill and Weaver[13]; and Figure 34, C, a theory-practice duality approach as exemplified by Baker.[14]




Fig. 34.--A Comparison of Three Conceptual Approaches to Persuasion and Conviction

At the outset it becomes obvious that the pure duality concept visualized in Figure 34, B is nearly identical with the practice dimension of the theory-practice duality expressed in Figure 34, C. The pure duality and the theory-practice duality differ only in theory and this difference is one of point of view rather than a major structural difference in actual theory. It is significant to recall that the conceptual approaches depicted in modular form are inferred from available textual evidence. It is through such written materials that the

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[13]cf. Chapter VI, pp. 113-116.

[14]cf. Chapter VI, p. 118.

persuasion and conviction controversy has been perpetrated. However, it is probable that concert of agreement could be reached among authors holding either of the two duality points of view or the broad monistic point of view.

Most authors expressing a pure duality conceptual approach seem to be adamant in their rejection of the influence of faculty psychology. Authors such as Yost and Woolbert[15] explicitly reject faculty psychology and deliberately develop conceptual approaches in which any distinctions between emotional proof and logical proof are rejected as valid. Yet, Yost and Woolbert, as well as O'Neill and Weaver and most other modern authors, are cognizant of the findings of sociology, psychology, and social psychology. In this light they were undoubtedly aware of both the logical and the emotional nature of man and that man's ability to think, to act, or to believe is a monistic mental and physical function influenced by a dualistic process labeled <u>persuasion</u>--a process which encompasses logical, emotional, and ethical proofs. It appears to be the compartmentalizing of the mental "faculties" that these authors were really attacking. This attack also came to include logical and emotional proofs since such proofs were paralleled with the mental "faculties." However, as illustrated by the Aristotelian conceptual approach depicted in Figure 34, A, rhetoricians have recognized at least some distinctions among logical, emotional, and ethical proofs in rhetorical theory for over 2,000 years. Certainly, modern writers recognize such distinctions for pedagogical purposes as witnessed in specific textbooks about logic, argumentation, persuasion, and public speaking.

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[15]cf. pp. 105-111 for discussion of the conceptual approaches of Yost and Woolbert.

The broad monistic conceptual approach depicted in Figure 34, A is also similar to the theory dimension illustrated in Figure 34, C. The major difference between the two points of view is that the broad persuasion monist emphasizes persuasion as an all-inclusive process or end result and then discusses deductively those means inherent within such a process as necessary to achieve the desired end result. The theory-practice dualist emphasizes the three forms of proof interrelated in the process of persuasion as means necessary to achieve a desired end result, rather than the monistic nature of the total process. The persuasion monist discusses all three forms of proof as shown in Figure 34, A; however, typically he does not differentiate among the three forms nor does he draw finite relationships among them. Some authors, such as Aristotle, do emphasize the desirability of the logical means of persuasion over the emotional means.

The persuasion monist, as exemplified by Aristotle, does not state whether there are or are not distinctions among the means of persuasion. In view of this fact, Aristotle is not classified as a dualist who intricately interrelates the means of persuasion nor as a dichotomist who clearly distinguishes among the proof forms. For this reason, the three forms of proof are interlinked in Figure 34, A to show that they may or may not be differentiated.

For the purpose of this study, it is hypothesized that if the persuasion monists, pure dualists, and theory-practice dualists were brought together that the point of view expressed in the theory-practice duality depicted in Figure 34, C would prevail. In view of modern rhetorical theory and the related theories rooted in sociology, psychology, and social psychology, the tenets of the theory-practice duality best

exemplify the tenets of a unified theory of persuasion compatible with current knowledge and needs.

A Comparison of a Persuasion and Conviction Dichotomy with a Theory-Practice Duality

Based upon the first group of comparisons presented in this chapter, it was concluded that the two types of monisms stressing either conviction or else persuasion (as an emotional means) represent essentially a compartmentalizing of a persuasion and conviction dichotomy. Similarly, it was also concluded earlier that probably the conceptual approach labeled as a theory-practice duality is compatible with both the broad monistic conceptual approach and the pure duality conceptual approach. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to compare and to analyze the dichotomistic approach with the theory-practice duality position.

These two major conceptual views, visualized in Figure 35, A and B, are significantly different. In fact, they represent the crux of the persuasion and conviction controversy. Whether or not the persuasion and conviction dichotomy is an outgrowth of faculty psychology or a faculty-type psychology is irrelevant. The point is that the persuasion and conviction dichotomy perpetrates a conceptual approach which treats emotional proof and logical proof as clearly separate forces which appeal to distinctly separate human functions, the human ability to feel or to know emotions and the ability to reason logically. Modern psychology has rejected such a fragmentation of man's mind. Both psychology and medical science have proven man's physical and mental reactions are intricately interrelated and interdependent and that man is monistic in his action, either physical or mental.




Fig. 35.--A Comparison of a Persuasion and Conviction Dichotomy with a Theory-Practice Duality

Figure 35, A clearly differentiates emotional proof from logical proof. All emotional proof is emotional proof and all logical proof is logical proof. Furthermore, no emotional proof is logical proof and no logical proof is emotional proof. Works presenting dichotomistic theories[16] advance conceptual approaches in which emotional proof may be used solely without any mention of logical proof; in which logical proof may be used solely; or, in which either may be used in the same communication. In the latter case, one may first persuade using emotional proof, then convince using logical proof, and then persuade using emotional proof--or, he may use the two proof forms in other time line

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[16]Chapter V of this study is devoted to the discussion of specific works.

variations.[17]

Once the dichotomistic conceptual approach was refuted by such authors as Yost, Woolbert, Winans, and O'Neill and Weaver, the theory-practice duality conceptual position gained impetus, although very few authors wrote in terms of the theory and practice duality.

Both conceptual approaches described in Figure 35 treat persuasion as an all-encompassing end result or process. However, here the similarity ends. The major distinctions are among the emphasis given to the means of persuasion, namely, the three forms of proof. Figure 35, A depicts only emotional proof and logical proof--separate appeals to separate faculties. There was no faculty governing ethos so ethos never gained a vital role in the main controversy between the relationship of emotional proof with logical proof. Since there was no faculty governing ethos, the dichotomists either omitted it entirely or else described the communicator himself as being desirous of a good reputation and character without advancing ethos as a separate proof form.

Figure 35, A is the converse of Figure 35, B. Whereas emotional proof and logical proof are entirely separate in Figure 35, A, they are distinguished for pedagogical purposes in theory but depicted as a duality in practice within Figure 35, B.

In developing a modern conceptual approach to persuasion and conviction, it is recommended that the fragmenting of emotional and logical proof must be rejected. It is further believed that the conceptual position described as a theory-practice duality serves as a basis for a modern unified theory of persuasion.

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[17]For an example of three such time line variations, see Chapter V, pp. 84, 86, 92 of this study.

Development of a Unified Theory of Persuasion

This section is devoted to the development of a conceptual approach to persuasion and conviction based upon the previous comparison and analysis of earlier conceptual positions and upon modern findings in the related areas of psychology, sociology, and social psychology.

With the previous conceptual approaches and sources in mind, a modern unified theory of persuasion should meet the following criteria:

1. The theory should define persuasion as a process or end result.
2. The theory should treat logical, emotional, and ethical proofs as means within the persuasion process.
3. The theory should permit distinctions in theory among logical, emotional, and ethical proofs for pedagogical purposes.
4. The theory should allow for a greater emphasis upon one or more of the forms of proof to meet the needs of a specific subject area such as argumentation.
5. The theory should treat the forms of proof as a monistic fusion in practice; i.e., recognize that in actual communication distinctions among logical, emotional, and ethical proofs cannot be clearly established.
6. The theory should show an awareness of human behavioral tendencies derived from other disciplines such as sociology and psychology.
7. The theory should have as its core appeals to human motives.
8. The theory should reject any attempt to treat emotional proof or ethical proof as mutually exclusive tenets.
9. The theory should reject the term conviction to mean logical proof and any other influence of a faculty-type psychology.

The above criteria clearly indicate that the unified theory of persuasion herein developed is a broad process. In developing the tenets of the unified theory, it is first desirable to consider the total communicative act and its environment. Figure 36 describes the three major elements in the communicative act, namely, the source, the medium of communication, and the listener, as effected/affected by the communicative environment.




Fig. 36.--The Environmental Field of a Communicative Act

The process of persuasion does not operate in a vacuum. It is a dynamic process which requires an awareness of numerous factors as suggested in Figure 36. In light of Figure 36 a full theory of persuasion must consider the source of the persuasive message, the message, the medium to convey the message, the situation, and the listener who is to be persuaded. Inasmuch as the process of persuasion utilizes emotional, logical, and ethical proofs to achieve its end result, Figure 36

illustrates the intricate nature of the communicative process to which these proof forms are adapted. The "source" and the "listener" are influenced by pressures of their environment as represented by the various internal and external forces such as love, ambitions, and social forces indicated on the outside perimeter.[18] However, the arrows pointing outwardly from the source and the listener indicate that they also influence and interpret their environment as well as each other. The communicative process in which a theory of persuasion functions is a mass of interactions. The environment effects/affects the source who in turn interprets his environment. The source also interprets the needs of his listener who is also a part of the environment and who, in turn, interprets that environment, perhaps quite differently than does the source.

The source develops his message to meet what he considers to be the needs of his listener. Within the source's communicative act is a composite of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs--proofs which are integrated and not readily distinguished from each other. The resulting message is transmitted vocally and, perhaps, understood and interpreted by the listener as the source desires. It is the listener who determines "what" he heard and what the persuasive message means to him and whether or not he agrees with the message. If so, he may do, act or believe as the source desired. The cycle of persuasion would then be completed and successful.

A modern unified theory of persuasion must be considered in light of the above environment of the communicative act. If it is so developed,

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[18]The environment of the communicative act is considered herein only briefly in order to point up the dualistic nature of the persuasive process and the interrelationships of the means to achieve that process.

it will recognize the monistic nature of man. It will recognize that man is not a composite of mental "faculties" but a highly intricate system of nervous impulses which react together and not as separate entities.

The tenets of the theory-practice duality conceptual approach serve equally well for a unified modern theory of persuasion. Figure 37 reviews this approach which meets the criteria established earlier in this section of this study. Figure 37 defines persuasion as an all-inclusive process in the Aristotelian sense. However, it clarifies the interrelationships of emotional, logical, and ethical proof. The three




Fig. 37.--A Unified Theory of Persuasion

proof forms may be distinguished to a degree in theory for pedagogical purposes; however, they may not be so distinguished in practice but interact in a dualistic fusion to achieve a mutual end result.

Summary

This chapter compares the various conceptual approaches and presents a modern unified theory of persuasion. It is concluded that monistic conceptual positions stressing only logical proof or else only

emotional proof are similar to the dichotomistic approach which stresses both logical proof and emotional proof as mutually exclusive tenets.

It is also concluded that there could be interpreted a concert of agreement among the broad monistic conceptual approach, the pure duality and the theory-practice duality positions. It is also determined that the broad monistic conceptual approach emphasizes the total process of persuasion or the end result rather than the differences or similarities among individual means (logical, emotional, and ethical proofs) necessary to achieve the end result. Conversely, the duality approaches stress the dualistic nature of the three forms of proof rather than the monistic nature of the total process. Thus, it is concluded that there are no significant differences among the broad monistic or the two dualistic conceptual approaches which could not be resolved within a modern unified theory of persuasion.

Finally, the dichotomistic approach is compared with the theory-practice duality approach. These two approaches appear to be incompatible. The dichotomistic approach which treats logical proof and emotional proof as mutually exclusive tenets is clearly influenced by a faculty-type psychology which compartmentalizes man's mind into separate faculties such as the faculty to reason and the will. The theory-practice duality reflects a modern approach to psychology in that it recognizes man as monistic in nature and as an intricate system of interrelated physical and mental responses. Furthermore, the theory-practice dualist believes that the tenets of the process of persuasion can be distinguished in theory to a degree but only for pedagogical purposes and that the logical, emotional, and ethical tenets may not be distinguished in actual communicative practice.

Lastly, based upon the previous comparisons, a unified theory similar to the theory-practice duality conceptual approach is developed. The influence of faculty psychology is rejected and all dichotomistic conceptual approaches are held to be fallacious. The modern unified theory of persuasion recognizes the findings of related fields of knowledge and functions within this knowledge. It also recognizes the complexity of the communicative environment within which the persuasion process must function. Finally, it recognizes that logical, emotional, and ethical proofs can be distinguished to a degree for teaching purposes but that they are too intricately interrelated to be differentiated in the actual communicative act.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

AND

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study analyzed various conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction in rhetorical theory. Investigation of these approaches necessitated an analysis of definitions of the various terms; development of a modelistic approach as a tool for the conceptual analysis; and, analysis and comparison of isolated conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Finally, a unified concept of persuasion, based upon comparison and analysis of the specific conceptual approaches, was derived.

This chapter summarizes the basic hypotheses of the study, the conceptual approaches isolated for modelistic investigation, the unified theory of persuasion developed, the basic findings derived from the study, and concludes with with suggestions for future research.

Hypotheses

Major Hypothesis.--The major hypothesis was that significant variations exist among the definitions of persuasion and conviction and among the conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction. The major hypothesis was divided into five sub-hypotheses:

1. Concepts of persuasion and conviction can be studied through a

modelistic approach. This hypothesis serves as a mediational hypothesis in that the models serve a tool function in the investigation of the problem. Such a tool was necessary in order to condense the great body of material into a practical mode for analysis. Furthermore, the emphasis of this investigation was upon conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction rather than upon the numerous specific contributions within each conceptual approach. The basis and rationale for such a modelistic tool is developed in Chapter II of this study. The above mediational hypothesis is accepted in that the modelistic approach served effectively and efficiently for the analysis and description of the concepts involved.

2. There are inconsistencies within an individual author's work as well as among authors in attempts to define the terms "persuasion" and "conviction." Chapter III which is devoted to the problem of definition clearly supports this hypothesis. Some works were found in which persuasion was defined as an all-inclusive process in which logical, emotional, and ethical proofs were means utilized within the process. At the same time and within these same works persuasion was defined as meaning non-logical proofs or else as emotional proof--means to an end result. Thus, persuasion was defined both as a process and as a means within the process by the same author. When works by various authors were compared, similar inconsistencies emerged.

Although the major problem of definition involved the term persuasion, confusion among definitions of conviction was also found. Conviction was more commonly defined as a means synonymous with logical proof. It was also defined quite differently to mean deep-seated beliefs.

The primary problem among definitions seemed to center on the

influence of a faculty-type psychology in which the means within the broad process of persuasion came to be defined as appeals to the faculty governing reason or conviction (logical proofs) and appeals to the faculty governing emotion or persuasion (emotional or non-logical proofs).

Within all broad conceptual approaches investigated, inconsistencies among definitions of persuasion and conviction were found. This hypothesis is accepted in light of the numerous inconsistencies found.

3. There are inconsistencies among authors in their treatments of persuasion and conviction.[1] Historically, numerous inconsistencies among authors in their treatments of persuasion and conviction exist. The most flagrant variations were between rhetoricians writing from the point of view of a faculty-type psychology and those writing from a point of view opposite to that of a faculty-type psychology. The former writers treated persuasion and conviction as a dichotomy in which persuasion and conviction are mutually exclusive tenets. Authors writing conversely to a faculty-type psychology treated persuasion and conviction as: (1) a monism in which persuasion was treated as a process encompassing logical, emotional, and ethical proofs; (2) a duality such as that expressed by Yost and Woolbert in which both logical and emotional proofs are recognized but in which any distinctions either in theory or practice are rejected as valid; or (3) a theory-practice duality in which some distinctions are recognized between logical and emotional proofs for pedagogical purposes but denied as valid in the actual communicative act. In view of such conflicting points of view this

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[1] For fuller discussion of the specific treatments of persuasion and conviction Chapter IV of this study discusses monistic conceptual approaches; Chapter V, dichotomistic conceptual approaches; and, Chapter VI, dualistic conceptual approaches.

hypothesis is also accepted.

4. The numerous treatments of persuasion and conviction collapse into a few basic isolated conceptual approaches upon investigation. As explained above, there were three broad conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction. Within the monistic and dualistic conceptual approaches there were additional sub-approaches as discussed respectively in Chapters IV and VI of this study. However, when compared in Chapter VII, these major approaches and sub-approaches collapsed into two major conceptual approaches.

Chapter VII advances the conclusion that monistic approaches rooted in either emotional proof or else in logical proof, respectively, are closely related to the dichotomistic conceptual approach. Furthermore, it concluded that the broad monistic approach which treats persuasion as a process encompassing logical, emotional, and ethical proofs is compatible with both the pure duality and with the theory-practice duality conceptual approaches. Thus, two major conceptual approaches evolved: (1) dichotomistic and (2) theory-practice duality. This hypothesis is accepted.

5. The basic similarities among isolated conceptual approaches can be integrated into one unified concept. Findings directly related to this hypothesis are discussed more fully later in this chapter. Briefly, the conceptual approaches upon comparison divided into two broad approaches: (1) a dichotomistic approach influenced by faculty-type psychology in which persuasion meaning emotional or non-logical proof and conviction meaning logical proof are treated as mutually exclusive tenets; and (2) a theory-practice duality approach in which some distinctions between logical proof and emotional proof are permitted for

pedagogical purposes in theory but are rejected as valid in actual communicative practice.

In view of modern scientific knowledge which rejects the absolute division of the mind into "faculties," the dichotomistic conceptual approach is rejected as being invalid in modern rhetorical theory. The theory-practice duality is compatible with modern knowledge. However, since both of these broad conflicting conceptual approaches do exist, this hypothesis is not accepted since the dichotomistic and duality approaches cannot be unified.

A unified concept drawing upon the broad persuasion monistic approach, the pure duality approach, the theory-practice duality approach, and upon modern findings in sociology, psychology, and social psychology, was advanced in Chapter VII of this study.

Summary of the Conceptual Approaches Isolated for Investigation

Four broad monistic conceptual approaches, one dichotomistic approach, and two duality approaches were isolated in this study.

Chapter IV is devoted to analysis of the monistic approaches. Three of the four monistic points of view stressed persuasion as a monistic means to an end result whereas the fourth treated persuasion as a monistic process or end result in which logical, emotional, and ethical proofs were fused as means to achieve that end result.

Several conceptual approaches were found in which persuasion was treated as a monistic process. The most significant example is that found in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Aristotle treats persuasion as an all-encompassing process which includes logical, emotional, and ethical proofs. However, as exemplary of the broad persuasion monist, Aristotle

does not treat the three forms of proof as mutually exclusive. Therefore, his conceptual approach cannot be classified as dichotomistic. Neither does Aristotle develop specific relationships among the three forms of proof which might establish him as a dualist. His conceptual approach does emphasize persuasion as a monistic process in which all forms of proof are fused to achieve a common goal.

A second possible monistic conceptual approach rooted in psychology or else in sociology was theoretically possible. However, no such approach was found to exist.

The last two monistic conceptual approaches appeared related to the dichotomistic concept in which logical proof and emotional proof were mutually exclusive dimensions. Within one monistic approach, designated a "conviction monist," only logical proof was treated while no mention was made of emotional proof. However, at least one author was found who explicitly rejected emotional proof as invalid and advanced logical proof as the only valid form of appeal. A second approach, designated a "persuasion monist," stressed only non-logical proofs or else only emotional proofs while omitting any mention of logical proofs.

Chapter V is devoted to the analysis of the dichotomistic approaches. Numerous concepts were found in which logical proof (often called <u>conviction</u>) and emotional proof (often called <u>persuasion</u>) were treated as mutually exclusive dimensions. It was concluded that dichotomistic conceptual approaches were influenced by a belief in a faculty-type psychology. <u>Persuasion</u> meaning only emotional proof would be the appeal to man's faculty governing emotion, often labeled the will. <u>Conviction</u> meaning only logical proof would be the appeal to man's faculty governing reason. Chapter VII of this study rejected the

dichotomistic approach as being invalid.

Chapter VI analyzed the pure duality and theory-practice duality approaches. It was concluded that some writers rejecting the dichotomistic approach rooted in a faculty-type psychology advanced pure duality approaches in which any distinctions between emotional proof and logical proof were rejected as invalid. Yost advanced a dualistic concept rooted in sociology while Woolbert advanced a duality rooted in psychology. Both of these writers sought to advance a dualistic concept in which no distinctions between emotional proof and logical proof could be made.

The theory-practice duality represented a compromise between the pure duality approaches such as Yost's and Woolbert's and modern knowledge gained from such sources as sociology and psychology. In this context some distinctions between logical and emotional proof were found useful for teaching purposes. The theory-practice dualist recognized that modern rhetoric is divided into related subject areas. He further recognized that the emphasis within these subject areas overlap. The course entitled Argumentation stresses the primary use of logical proof and reasoning with the process of argument. The course entitled Public Speaking stresses the importance of audience analysis in which any one of the three forms of proof may be dominant. However, none of the proof forms is mutually exclusive in theory and all are intricately interrelated in actual practice.

A Modern Unified Theory of Persuasion

Quite recently several works and articles were published in which the persuasion and conviction problem was manifest. Gary Cronkite suggested ". . . the use of two new terms [cognition and activation] in

order to avoid the distracting associations which have formed around the terms "logic" and "emotion."[2] Further analysis of Cronkhite's article revealed the concession that faculty psychology had given way to a psychology of factors.[3] He then justified such labeling of "factors" and documented his arguments. However, in the final analysis, his use of new terminology, cognition and activation, illustrated little difference from the dichotomistic conceptual approach in which logical proof and emotional proof, respectively, were used.

In an article by Paul Rosenthal the confusion existing among the relationship of logical proof, emotional proof, and ethical proof was also quite apparent. Rosenthal's ambivalence is discernible in the following passages:

> . . . a fusion of unitary physiological reaction does not alter the fact that it is possible to distinguish them [emotional and logical responses] by their physiological differences, and these may serve as the defining characteristics of logic and emotion.[4]

> . . . it is unnecessary for our purposes that we be able to delineate exactly where the nonemotional state ceases and the emotional response begins. What is important is the recognition that the total reaction is a fusion of these two basic subtypes and that these are the only discernible elements of the speaker-listener interaction.[5]

> The thesis we now advance is that ethos, properly considered, is not a basic element of the persuasive process but an end product of the combined logical and emotional responses--that is, a specific type of persuasion, in toto.[6]

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[2]Gary Lynn Cronkhite, "Logic, Emotion, and the Paradigm of Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, L (February, 1964), 13.

[3]Ibid., p. 14.

[4]Paul I. Rosenthal, "The Concept of Ethos and the Structure of Persuasion," Speech Monographs, XXXIII (June, 1966), 116.

[5]Ibid., p. 116.

[6]Ibid., p. 117.

Rosenthal's work points up the need for empirical research in the area of persuasion. However, before such empirical research can be achieved, there must be a synthesis of the problem and some direction defined which research can follow.

Based upon the various conceptual approaches defined in Chapters IV, V, and VI of this study and upon findings of modern science, a tentative unified concept of persuasion was evolved in Chapter VII.

It was concluded that the conviction and persuasion monisms are similar to the persuasion and conviction dichotomy conceptual approach. Furthermore, in light of current findings in the areas of physiology and psychology, such dichotomizing of emotional and logical proof as appeals to separate mental faculties was rejected. Since modern science has explicitly disproven faculty psychology, there is no justifiable reason to continue drawing finite distinctions between logical and emotional proofs as mental functions.

The vast majority of rhetorical scholars were found to express either broad monistic conceptual approaches or else theory-practice conceptual approaches. It was concluded that these two approaches are compatible since the former stresses the totality of the process and the latter stresses the relationships of the means within the process.

In theory, for pedagogical purposes, it is useful to distinguish among the means of persuasion. Such tentative distinctions do not indicate that man reaches decisions through a composite of mental faculties. It is recognized that man's action is a monistic reaction to intricately related physiological responses--responses which cannot be finitely distinguished during an actual reaction to a given stimulus.

However, the means within the process of persuasion can be

distinguished in theory for pedagogical purposes. Logical, emotional, and ethical proofs are recognized tools which the persuader utilizes to get his listeners to do, act, or believe as he desires. The usefulness of such distinctions among the three forms of proof is readily visible in the present course structure within departments of speech. Courses in argumentation while recognizing the dualistic nature of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs in an actual argumentative message find it useful to emphasize the logical dimension for pedagogical purposes. Courses labeled Persuasion often find it useful to emphasize the non-logical forms of proof in theory but recognize the monistic nature of the total process which includes logical as well as non-logical proofs in the communicative act.

A modern theory of persuasion, as developed in Chapter VII, recognizes scientific knowledge verified in related fields such as sociology or psychology. Such a theory must be plastic in nature and capable of adapting to new knowledge gained through empirical means. The theory-practice duality recognizes knowledge gained historically from the field of rhetoric and its related areas, and it represents a composite of the writings of established scholars in the field. Such a composite has proven useful for pedagogical purposes for many years.

Basic Findings of the Study

The major hypothesis that significant variations exist among definitions of persuasion and conviction and among the conceptual treatments of persuasion and conviction was accepted. Analysis of the major hypothesis and of its sub-hypotheses as summarized earlier in this chapter contributed the following conclusions:

1. A modelistic approach lends itself to the analysis and illustration of the persuasion and conviction problem.
2. Persuasion has been defined as both a process which represented a fusion of logical, emotional, and ethical proofs and as a means (emotional or non-logical proof) within the process.
3. Conviction has been defined as synonymous with logical proof by rhetoricians influenced by a faculty-type psychology.
4. Monistic treatments of persuasion exist which treat persuasion as being all-inclusive and as a monistic fusion of all forms of proof.
5. Monistic treatments exist which treat primarily logical proof with little reference to non-logical forms of proof.
6. Monistic treatments exist which treat primarily emotional proof with little reference to other forms of proof.
7. Dichotomistic concepts of persuasion and conviction exist which distinguish between emotional and logical proofs and which recognize them as being mutually exclusive.
8. Dichotomistic conceptual approaches appear to be influenced by a faculty-type psychology.
9. Pure duality concepts of persuasion were found which deny any distinctions between emotional and logical proofs in either theory or practice.
10. Some concepts of persuasion designated as theory-practice dualities recognized limited distinctions between emotional and logical proofs for pedagogical purposes but rejected such distinctions in actual practice.
11. The unified concept developed is a theory-practice duality.

Major Contributions of the Study.--This study makes six significant contributions to the field of speech:

1. A comprehensive summary and comparison of conceptual approaches to persuasion and conviction.
2. An analysis and clarification of the various conceptual approaches to the problem of persuasion and conviction.
3. An analysis of the critical definitions involved in the study and a clarification of these definitions.
4. The development of a modelistic approach which serves for analysis of this problem and for future teaching purposes.
5. An analysis of the negative influence of a faculty-type psychology upon the definitions of persuasion and conviction and upon some conceptual approaches to the problem.
6. A resolving of the persuasion and conviction problem into a unified concept which is compatible with current speech theory and knowledge established in related fields of study.

Suggestions for Future Research

An analysis of this study suggests both directly and indirectly the following areas of need for future research:

1. There is a need for experimental investigation to determine whether differences among ethical, emotional, and logical proofs exist and whether such distinctions are critical to the speech field or to specific subject areas within the field.
2. There is a need to test empirically the validity and practicality of the theory-practice duality advanced in this study.
3. There is a need to study the interrelationships and differences among such course offerings as public speaking, persuasion,

group discussion, and argumentation and debate.

4. There is a need to study the role of emotional and ethical proof in argumentation and debate as well as in academic debate.
5. There is a need for further development and refinement of the modelistic approach for pedagogical purposes.

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