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~ submit an event ~ upcoming events ~ past events ~ complete (calendar) ~ complete (event types) ~ 1997/1998 Visiting Scholars Program Welfare Reform and Social Justice Welfare Reform And Social Services: Myth And Reality Lecture Transcription The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 promised to radically transform “welfare as we know it.” It eliminated the federal guarantee of cash assistance to needy families, imposed a lifetime five-year limit on receipt of aid, and set tough work requirements. As a result, states have had to scramble to restructure their AFDC programs. It is within this context that the place of social services, long marginal within the AFDC program, is being re-examined. By social services I mean not only the availability and accessibility of employment and social services welfare recipients might need in order to become self-sufficient, but equally important, an orientation toward the recipients that is embedded in social work values and practice principles. At the core of this orientation is: a) a belief system which ascribes high moral worth to the clients; b) a service technology that is individualized and tailors the services to the specific needs and attributes of the clients; and c) staff-client relations that are based on a high degree of mutual trust, and are as intensive as required by the client’s needs. The main thrust of my argument is that the relationship between welfare and social services is very problematic, and that in the encounter between the two the social service orientation is more likely to lose out, being forced to compromise its basic tenets. I begin by briefly reviewing the historical record, showing that the inherent tension between the two was already set in the early days of the “mothers’ pension” programs. I then go on to describe the key provisions of PRWORA and why I believe it is a highly flawed policy. I will examine the accumulated evidence about welfare-to-work programs, where social services are most likely to be integrated, and show that their effects are modest at best. I will then explore the idea that welfare departments can be transformed into social service agencies, arguing that a social service orientation becomes compromised and corrupted in such a setting. I’ll also raise the question whether a social service orientation, when included in PRWORA, functions as symbol to endorse and legitimize such a policy, deflecting attention from its erroneous assumptions about welfare recipients and the causes of poverty. Finally, I will explore some alternative models for employment and social services in addressing the needs of poor people. Historical Ambivalence: Social Work and Welfare Historically, social work, carrying the torch of a social services orientation, has found itself in a morally ambiguous relationship with welfare. To be sure, social workers fought for equality, championed the needs of the poor, and advocated for services to meet their needs. However, to be successful they often had to embrace the dominant moral frame of the time, including its conceptions of the poor as deviant. Even when they challenged some key aspects of this frame the actual services, once instituted, tended to reinforce the dominant moral conceptions about the poor. This was particularly the case when the prevailing moral standards were threatened by gender, class, and ethnic differences that characterize the poor (Mink, 1995). Social work leaders objected to the Mother’s Pension programs, the precursors to AFDC, because they were afraid that providing cash assistance without distinguishing between “fit” and “unfit” mothers would erode the moral foundations of the family and harm the children (Bell, 1965). Once in place, welfare workers used their discretion to establish criteria of “fit and deserving,” which meant excluding most mothers who did not conform to the “gilt-edged widow” stereotype, namely white widows who stayed home and provided what the workers judged to be “morally sound” care of their children. Of course, social workers soon came to recognize that the locally administered programs were woefully inadequate, forcing the mothers to work, thus risking losing custody of their children. During the Depression, social workers were again caught in a moral dilemma. On the one hand, they recognized the devastating effects of unemployment and the value of work and earned income over charity. On the other hand, they helped design and implement work relief programs that were consonant with the prevailing capitalist ideology, resulting in programs that fell far short of their ideals (Bremer, 1975). Social work leaders such as Lilian Wald and Harry Hopkins advocated strongly for work programs over direct relief because they rightfully saw the latter as demoralizing and stigmatizing. Nonetheless, they ended up endorsing the Work Progress Administration (WPA) over the Civil Work Administration (CWA). In contrast to CWA, WPA was means-tested, and intruded into the unemployed persons’ lives in order to determine and verify eligibility. To avoid competition with the market economy, WPA was made less attractive than private employment. While prevailing wages were maintained, limits were imposed on total monthly earnings, and the work projects failed to offer “real” work or to eliminate the stigma attached to them. Indeed, social work critics faulted WPA for providing jobs that poorly matched and even ignored the skills of the unemployed; that the earnings limit kept the workers destitute and idle; and that many felt demoralized nonetheless. Moreover, since the program was inadequately funded, only one-third of the jobless could be employed and most remained dependent on direct relief (Bremer, 1975, p. 648). Again, white males received the most and the best assignments. Women in low-skilled jobs and African Americans were “undeserving”(Handler & Hasenfeld, 1991). The Depression also led to the enactment of Aid to Dependent Children. Similar to the Mothers’ Pension programs, the professional community, such as the American Public Welfare Association and officials of the Children’s Bureau, endorsed the concept of a “suitable home,” even though the Social Security Act did not require it (Bell, 1965). Because the legislation granted considerable discretion to local welfare departments, the interpretation and enforcement of a “suitable home” resulted in a highly discriminatory administration of ADC, especially against African Americans and Mexican Americans. It was also clear that mothers and welfare workers had very different conceptions of what it meant to maintain a suitable home. Moreover, welfare departments used the concept as well as its the “substitute parent” policy to deny assistance to many families. In Wayne County the mother had to sign an affidavit stating that “I will not have any male callers coming to my home nor meeting me elsewhere under improper conditions” (Bell, 1965, p. 48). The search for the elusive man in the home became a major preoccupation of the welfare workers. To be sure, professional social workers spoke out against such practices and the damaging effects of the carry-over Mothers’ Pension philosophy, but to little avail. Even more ironic was the understanding that to maintain a “suitable home,” individualized social services, i.e., social casework, would be needed. The 1956 Social Security Amendment explicitly added social services to the purpose of ADC, and provided a 50% federal match of the administrative costs. State plans reflected this emphasis by embracing the language and symbols of social casework. In a few states, several experiments were initiated to provide individualized social services, including homemaking, day care, medical services, and vocational training. Nonetheless, Bell (1965, p.158) concluded that social services were “grossly insufficient, their content uncertain, and their quality inconsistent and certainly unprofessional.” Finally, we come to the 1962 Social Security Amendment and the last major national attempt to combine welfare with social services prior to the recent reforms. The “rediscovery” of poverty in America (i.e., Michael Harrington’s book) and the ascendancy to political power of liberal advocacy groups, including professional social workers, coupled with the continued rise in the welfare caseloads and costs prompted, at the federal level, a reexamination of the strategy toward welfare. In the search for family independence and self-sufficiency, rehabilitation through social casework was advocated and enacted in the 1962 amendment that increased federal matching to 75% for the administrative costs (Derthick, 1970, pp.129-138). However, the triumph of the social casework ideology proved elusive to implement. The new mandate, while not increasing the actual services welfare recipients obtained, greatly expanded the paper work for the workers who had to document how each contact with the client constituted a “unit of service” so that the department would qualify for the federal match. A study of six welfare offices in Wisconsin by Handler and Hollings-worth (1971, p.126) showed that “For the vast majority of AFDC families, social service means a caseworker’s visit [sic] a little more than once every three months for a little less than forty minutes per visit, with an occasional client’s call to her caseworker.” The backlash against the oversold and poorly implemented social service orientation in the face of increasing AFDC rolls was soon to followed by the 1967 Social Security Amendment mandating welfare recipients to work through WIN. Although WIN and later JOBS offered the promise of education, training, and employment services, only a small fraction of welfare recipients actually benefited from them, and these programs turned out to be mostly an exercise in myth and ceremony (Handler and Hasenfeld, 1991). There are several important lessons to be learned from this brief overview that could help us understand the likely outcomes of the renewed emphasis on social services in the current state welfare reform initiatives under PRWORA. First, all too often the social service orientation is exploited as a symbol to justify punitive, restrictive, and discriminatory welfare policies toward the poor. Moreover, when the social service orientation clashes with dominant moral values toward the poor, especially those separating between the “deserving” and “undeserving,” it is likely to be compromised. Second, a social service orientation requires a considerable investment of resources that the polity is sel-dom willing to commit, certainly not for a sustained period of time. Third, a social service orientation grants local welfare officials considerable discretion. When the administration of welfare is highly localized, such discretion can be turned against the poor, especially those with attributes deemed to be at odds with the community’s dominant standards. Fourth, the social service orientation becomes overwhelmed when welfare departments are preoccupied with eligibility determination and verification, and the administration of cash assistance. Finally, a social service orientation is inherently difficult to implement because of its indeterminate nature, and because its effects are so difficult to assess. Therefore, it tends to be crowded out by more rou-tine bureaucratic practices so typical of welfare departments. PRWORA As a Flawed Social Policy1 Now we come to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. It repeals AFDC, JOBS, and the Emergency Assistance program and replaces it with a block grant giving the states the fundamental responsibility, coupled with extensive discretion, to assist needy families. While most attention has been paid to Title I—Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), it is important to emphasize that the bill also includes important reforms in Food Stamps, SSI, Medicaid, child care, and child support enforcement that have major effects on the well-being of poor families. Indeed, most of the initial projected savings—$55 billion over five years—would have come from reductions in programs other than AFDC, especially in food stamps, SSI, and assistance to legal immigrants. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 restored SSI benefits to certain legal aliens, eased some of the draconian food stamps restrictions on single adults, and added funds for welfare-to-work programs. As a result, the estimated savings have been reduced to about $30 billion (CBO, December 1997). Under the bill, the block grant is capped at about $16.4 billion per year till 2001. Some additional contingency funds will be available as a loan to states experiencing an above average rise in welfare cases. Basically, the allocation formula of the block grant to the states is based on their 1994 caseload. Since the caseloads have been declining dramatically since 1994—18% nationwide—states have been receiving excess funding.2 Under TANF, needy families are no longer entitled to assistance. States are allowed to deny aid to any poor family, although to receive full funding, the states must spend at least 80% of their “historic State expenditures” on eligible families. Moreover, the states are allowed to use up to 30% of the grant for other state programs under Title XX or the Child Care Block grant. The legislation sets two time limits on the receipt of aid. First, there is a life-time five-year limit. States can exempt some families but no more than 20% of their caseload. Second, a parent must work after receiving aid for two years. Unless the state opts out, the recipient must do community service after two months on aid. States risk fiscal penalties unless 25% of all families receiving aid in 1997 are “engaged in work” for at least 20 hours per week. For all families the required hours increase to 25 by 1999 and to 30 hours by the year 2000.3 By the year 2002, 50% of the families on aid will have to engage in work. For two parent families the participation rates are set at 75% in 1999 and rising to 90% in 2002. The required participation rates are reduced by each percent reduction in the state’s caseload. Thus, states have a strong incentive to terminate recipients from welfare as a cheap way to meet the work requirements. Activities that can be counted as “work” include employment, work experience, community service, on-the-job training, job search and job readiness assistance for only 6 weeks, and vocational education for no more than 12 months.4 The bill does not allow states to count in the 20 hours per week work participation many educational activities such as high school or GED completion, ESL, or postsecondary education. The bill also includes various “family values” provisions. Federal funds cannot be used to support teen parents not in school or not living in an adult-supervised setting. Families who do not cooperate in efforts to establish paternity lose 25% of their grant, and states have the option to eliminate cash assistance altogether. States can deny aid to children born to parents on aid (“family cap”); sanction families if children do not attend school; set the aid for newcomers at the level they would have received in their former state for up to one year; deny aid to legal immigrants; and deny aid for life to persons convicted of a drug related felony. Although the states are currently experiencing excess funding because of a declining caseload, the long-term fiscal consequences of the bill are far from certain. No one really knows the impact of the five-year limit. Initial conservative estimates by the Urban Institute (Zelewski, Clark, Meier, & Watson, 1996) suggest that when the program is fully implemented, 2.6 million more persons would fall below the poverty line, including 1.1 million children. Some of these adverse effects have been slightly muted by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Still, more ominous are the changes in the food stamp program. When fully implemented, food stamp benefits will be cut by 20%, and children will be the most affected because two thirds of the reductions will be borne by families with children. The poorest of the poor—those with income below half the poverty line—will absorb 50% of the cut. There are also reductions in child nutrition programs, and funding for Title XX was reduced by 15 percent. Finally, the unprecedented discretion given to the states to implement and administer TANF is potentially troublesome. The historical record of many states in caring for their poor is quite dismal. General Assistance, wholly administered by state and local communities, is by far one of the stingiest and most punitive cash assistance program for poor adults without children. It is the first to be cut or even eliminated when states experience fiscal difficulties, and with little regard to the consequences on the recipients (Halter, 1996; Henly & Danziger, 1996). Even under the old AFDC program, states already enjoyed considerable discretion, which they used to reduce AFDC grants when the caseloads were rising. From 1970 to 1996 the maximum benefit for a family of three, in constant dollars, was reduced by 51% for the median AFDC state (1996 Green Book, p. 442). There are already certain ominous early signs of the possible consequences of the devolution of responsibility from the federal government to the states. CalWORKs, for example, reduces the grant amount for a single parent with 2 children working half time by 15%. A recent survey by the New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance found that only about a third of the cases who dropped off the welfare rolls had any appreciable earnings ($100 or more) in the following three months.5 A study by the Center on Hunger and Poverty (1998) compared the likely effects of the new state welfare policies on the income security of poor families with the prior law. Its overall conclusion is that the majority of the states are implementing welfare policies that will ultimately worsen the economic situation of poor families. It found that about half of the states have developed welfare-to-work programs that would provide less assistance in achieving job readiness and obtaining a job than was provided in the previous policy. The only good news, in an otherwise bleak picture, is that all the states have maintained or increased their spending on child care assistance. Still, TANF no longer guarantees child care assistance, although it protects recipients from sanctions for not working if child care is unavailable. While half the states guarantee subsidized child care, subject to availability of funds, half eliminated the child care guarantee (Welfare Reform Watch, 1998). While currently the states enjoy an unusual combination of a robust economy, declining welfare rolls, and excess funding, one can envision what might happen when these conditions are reversed. A “race to the bottom” among the states is not an unlikely scenario. Myth and Reality about Welfare Recipients The underlying premises of TANF about welfare recipients, their life circumstances, and why they rely on aid are driven more by stereotypic conceptions than by empirical research. The stereotype, of course, is of the inner city black or Latino young woman who is sexually promiscuous, has babies in order to qualify for aid, refuses to work and take good care of her children, and squanders her welfare check on drugs. There is a pervasive assumption that poor single mothers are responsible for their predicament because they lack a work ethic and proper moral and family values, and that reliance on aid further corrodes their willingness to work, and reinforces intergenerational dependency on welfare. Therefore, the mothers must be weaned from aid as quickly as possible, and if necessary be coerced to work at any job so long as no great harm is done to their children. Moreover, it is assumed that once the mother works, even in a lousy job, surely her life circumstances will ultimately improve. There is a begrudging recognition that some mothers might suffer from serious problems that may require additional services or exemption from work. As always, the sub-text of the legislation is about gender relations, family structure, class and ethnicity. In reality, of course, welfare recipients are a highly heterogeneous population with diverse circumstances and predicaments. The welfare population is very dynamic. Not only do people go on and off welfare, a significant fraction (about one-third) have more than one spell. It is estimated that half the recipients exit AFDC within one year and about three-quarters within two years (Pavetti, 1993). However, many women who leave welfare very rapidly also return within the first year. The longer a woman can stay off welfare, the lower the probability of return. Counting multiple spells, 30% are still on welfare less than 2 years, and 50% are less than 4 years. About 35% will to be on welfare for more than 5 cumulative years, and they are most likely to be affected by the five-year life-time limit. The most powerful predictor of long-term welfare receipt is the young, never-married mother. She is usually disadvantaged at least threefold: no high school diploma, no significant employment experience, and a very young child. She probably is also a minority. But even among this group, no more than a third will be on welfare for as long as 10 years. “Long-term welfare is still very much the exception” (Bane & Ellwood, 1994, p. 51). What about their work ethic? In fact, the work experience of welfare recipients is substantial. Spalter-Roth, et al., (1995) found that over a two and a half year period, 43% of single mothers who ever received welfare were engaged in substantial hours of work. The women averaged 1800 hours over the two years—which is about the average number of hours of all working mothers—either by combining work with welfare or by cycling between work and welfare. They held an average of 1.7 jobs over that period, and 44% held two or more jobs, for about 54 weeks. The women worked an average of 34 hours per week suggesting that they held “sporadic full-time jobs rather than steady part-time jobs.” They averaged about 4 months either being laid off or looking for work. Among those who worked, one group cycled in and out, and another combined welfare with work. Most of the jobs, however, were unstable, in unskilled occupations (e.g., maids, cashiers, child care workers, nurse aides, and waitresses), paid poorly, and lacked health benefits. Spalter-Roth found no evidence that changing jobs improved the wages, length of employment, or duration of the jobs. The picture is one of intermittent, low-wage jobs. Even if the mothers worked full time at these kind of jobs, they were unlikely to escape from poverty or improve their chances to move to better jobs (Pavetti, 1997a; Burtless, 1994). Edin and Lein (1997) have shown that while on welfare, at least half of the women they studied augmented their income by working, because welfare benefits (AFDC, food stamps, SSI) covered only about 64% of their monthly expenses. Almost half of the extra money needed to live was earned but not reported. Jobs varied. Some held regular jobs under another name and earned $5 per hour. Others worked off-the-books (e.g., bartending, catering, babysitting, sewing) earning an average of $3 per hour. Anywhere from 50 to 69% of women ever receiving welfare exit via work (Pavetti, 1993, Harris, 1993). The problem is that about 40% of the women return to welfare within three years, and 2/3 return within five years. That is, the problem of welfare recipients is not the work ethic, but the nature of the jobs they are able to obtain, given their level of educational attainment and job skills. Pavetti found that 45% of welfare recipients did not complete high school as compared to only 10% of non-recipients, and that more than half scored on the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) at the bottom quartile (Pavetti, 1997b). Therefore, their ability to obtain jobs that offer decent wages and stable employment is very limited. In other words, many single mothers use welfare as an income packaging strategy. For those who cycle between welfare and work, welfare is a form of unemployment insurance. It helps them out when they lose their jobs or cannot work for a variety of personal crises such as poor health, having to care for a sick family member, or breakdown in child care or transportation. For another significant group of single mothers, combining welfare with work is the only way in which they can survive, and offers some of them a chance to obtain additional education and training. To quote Edin and Lein (1997, p.86) “The essence of this ‘welfare trap’ is not that public aid warps women’s personalities or make them pathologically dependent, although that may occasionally happen. Rather it is that low-wage jobs usually make single mothers even worse off than they were on welfare.” The “problem” of welfare dependency is not the recipients, their work ethic, or family values. Rather, it is the job market and the conditions of work facing low-skilled workers. In addition to low wages and unsteady, increasingly part-time work, there is the lack of benefits, especially critical health insurance, and the difficulties of child care. In the research that Julia Henly, Handler and I are conducting on the work experiences of welfare recipients, we found that two-thirds of our unemployed respondents stated that they lost their jobs due to job-related factors (Henly, Hasenfeld, and Handler, 1997). They included changing business conditions, inflexible work hours, and employers’ inability to accommodate to family emergencies, in addition to low wages and lack of benefits (see also Rangarajan, 1996). For low-wage workers, the crisis in child care is especially troublesome (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1997). Because of the risks of mediocre child care, the developmental and health needs of millions of children are at risk. Quality child care is in short supply and expensive. Lack of affordable, accessible, and stable child care reduces the likelihood that single mothers will find and keep a job (IWPR, 1997). In our study (Henly, Hasenfeld, and Handler, 1997), concerns about cost, safety, and reliability of child care were all frequently mentioned as barriers to employment. Working-poor families spend about a third of their household income on child care, and they are most likely to use informal care by relatives or acquaintances because of their lower costs and inaccessibility of formal care. Time-limits and work requirements as set by TANF miscast the problems facing the majority of welfare recipients. Most importantly, it offers no remedies or corrections to job market conditions, the lousy jobs and low wages welfare recipients encounter, and the lack of opportunities for advancement. Moreover, by treating most welfare recipients as being of the same mold and by insisting on “work first,” TANF ignores the great diversity among them, and grossly undervalues the importance of human capital investments in improving their economic opportunities. By setting rigid time limits, it also ignores the substantial minority of welfare recipients who encounter serious health and mental health problems, domestic violence, and other personal difficulties. Pavetti (1997b) estimated that by age 27, less than half of the recipients not completing high school would be employed steadily. Indeed, it is estimated that over half of the women on AFDC have very low basic skills and face health, mental health, and substance abuse problems (Olson & Pavetti, 1996). Yet, TANF ignores the needs of these women and their difficulties in getting and keeping a job. It fails to recognize that a substantial fraction of welfare recipients will need income assistance for long periods of time whether they are working or not. The Effectiveness of Welfare-to-Work Programs Nowhere is the misconception of the problems facing poor single mothers more apparent than in the states’ welfare-to-work programs. At the heart of all state programs is the transformation of the welfare department into an employment agency, where receipt of aid is contingent on seeking employment, participating in job clubs and job search, and accepting any job. Sanctions are applied to those recipients who fail to cooperate. The model is the welfare-to-work experiment at Riverside, CA—the most successful program among the various welfare-to-work experiments (Riccio, Friedlander, & Freedman, 1994). Most states have made a variant of this model the centerpiece of their program. Riverside emphasizes job search and quick job placement. There is little emphasis on education and training. The assumption is that any job is better than no job, and that even a lousy job is a first rung in the occupational ladder. The staff are evaluated on the basis of their job placement record. Most importantly, Riverside hired job developers who actively seek employers and encourage them to use the program to fill vacancies. The Riverside model offers little in the form of social services although it does provide for some post-placement case-management. For difficult cases that fail to comply, Riverside resorts to sanctions. But how good is Riverside? When we look at monthly differences in year three of the experiment, the Riverside recipients who worked averaged only $84 more per month in earnings than the controls, or less than $20 more per week.6 Moreover, this average increase came about because more recipients began to work and for longer hours, rather than because of an improvement in wages. The gain in employment between the experimentals and controls was only about 9%. In fact, Riverside may be only getting the experimentals to switch from the informal to the formal economy. In any event, the benefits to the recipients are very modest. In addition, there were reductions in welfare grants—not only AFDC, but other programs, such as food stamps, as well. When the reductions are calculated, then the difference in economic well-being between the experimentals and the controls is even smaller. In the last quarter of year three, experimentals were $77 better off than the controls (or $26 per month), and only 19% of the experi-mentals as compared to 16% of the controls had a total income above the poverty line, in year three (Riccio, et al., 1994, pp. 156-160). Still, about two-thirds of the experi-mentals were not working by the end of year three, and about a third never worked during the entire three-year period. Of course, little is known about the effects of the welfare-to-work program on the children or the quality-of-life of the families. From the taxpayer’s point of view Riverside is clearly cost-effective, returning $2.84 for every $1.00 invested, mostly due to the low costs of the program, little investment in education and training, and the resulting reduction in welfare payments. At the other end of the spectrum we find Utah which does attempt to combine job placement with social services (Pavetti & Duke, 1995). The Utah experience is particularly valuable because that program has specifically focused attention on long-term, multiple-problem families. Although the ultimate aim of the program is to increase paid employment, participation is broadly defined. For example, participation includes education, training, part-time employment, mental health counseling, and substance abuse treatment. The staff are encouraged to develop strategies to engage recipients with multiple employment barriers. The assumption is that with appropriate help, multiple problem families can eventually become self-sufficient. Families applying for welfare for the first time meet with a “self-sufficiency” worker to develop a self-sufficiency plan. AFDC families who do find unsubsidized employment have $100 per month plus 50% of earned income disregarded in calculating benefits. There is no time limit on Transitional Child Care as long as the family is financially eligible. Transitional Medicaid is increased from 4 to 24 months as long as the family has earned income. Transitional Supportive Services (case management) are also available for one year after leaving AFDC. In the one county that was evaluated, after 30 months, there was a 12% decline in caseloads of experimentals over controls, although only a 2% decline in grant expenditures. A quarter of the recipients found jobs. The rest participated in education/training (26%), job search (11%), job readiness (6%), assessment (20%), counseling (8%), or were “temporarily excused” (5%). The weekly wages of those who found jobs were about $5.16 per hour; the average hours worked per week was 30. One of the principal findings of the Utah study was the difficulties that the staff encountered in trying to deal with long-term, multiple-barrier families. Despite allocating considerable time, energy, and resources, including hiring special staff with smaller caseloads (30 to 35 cases), providing home visits, one-on-one counseling, and conducting regular reviews, the staff felt that they are still in “uncharted territory, often having to rely on trial and error to identify the best strategy for helping a family overcome their barriers to employment.” (Pavetti, 1995, p.12). What the state has found is that there is no proven method for dealing with the long-term dependent. These cases are complex and difficult. What is required is experimentation, and above all, patience. And, of course, all of this requires commitment and resources on the part of the state. The important points to note about the Utah experience are that: 1) despite a very tight labor market, only a quarter of the caseload was in paid employment; 2) the bulk of the recipients were in various training, assessment, and job preparation programs; 3) there was almost no difference (2%) in welfare savings between the experimentals and the controls; and 4) there was no cheap, quick fix for those families facing multiple employment barriers. The impatience of the Utah’s legislature can be seen in the recently enacted time limit of 36 months, with exceptions for 15% of the caseload. One can readily understand why welfare-to-work programs, especially those that push for “work first,” produce such limited results. They are based on a faulty assumption that welfare recipients lack a work ethic. They fail to consider the low wage labor market the recipients encounter, and the difficult life circumstances that create barriers to steady employment. As a result, these programs do little to change labor market conditions, to provide the income support needed to survive in such a market, to invest in improving the human capital of the recipients, or to provide resources to help recipients mitigate the difficult life circumstances they experience. One can also see why most states are adopting Riverside’s rather than Utah’s model. Pushing welfare recipients to work is good symbolic politics. It is also far less costly and it produces welfare savings. Bureaucratically, it is easier to implement because the complexity and diversity presented by the recipients are simplified by reframing their problems as lack of job search skills and motivation. And because working with difficult cases can be very frustrating and time consuming, it is easier to apply tough sanctions and try to push them off the rolls. Can the Welfare Department Be Transformed into an Employment and Social Service Agency? Therefore, the idea that the welfare department can be transformed into an employment and social service agency strikes me as fanciful. First, there is vast incompatibility between administering welfare—determining income eligibility, setting a grant amount and monitoring for cheating—and providing employment services—identifying client needs, locating appropriate services, and helping clients change their behavior. Second, as long as welfare is made contingent on participation in a work program, the work program becomes mired in the same bureaucratic rules and regulations that characterize cash assistance. Third and related, when compliance is achieved through sanctions, the principles of a social service orientation are compromised. When work participation is tightly coupled with income assistance, it is subject to a complex set of rules and regulations to ensure that “deservingness” is enforced. Welfare workers must determine who is eligible, ascertain that recipients only get the allowable grant amount, that they maintain their eligibility and do not cheat, that they comply with the work participation requirements, and that they are sanctioned when they fail to do so. There is a powerful bureaucratic imperative to enforce these rules because in the political economy of welfare departments, organizational survival is based on instituting a culture of eligibility and compliance with rules. This is because performance is measured by how well eligibility criteria are enforced and cheating purged, by how quickly recipients are moved off the rolls and into work, and by how much welfare costs are reduced. These performance measures seldom take into account the great variability among the recipients or the complexities of their circumstances. In most urban welfare offices, workers have large caseloads and they are under a great burden to get the work out correctly. There is great pressure to routinize the work and handle all cases the same. There are few rewards for time spent counseling clients, or for helping them obtain needed services. Indeed, clients with problems become problem clients. Most importantly, because the provision of social services is a costly undertaking and with uncertain success, states and local communities are quite reluctant to invest more than symbolic resources. In the competition for limited resources, welfare recipients tend to be on the losing end. Evelyn Brodkin showed what happened to the work program when Illinois tried to reduce costs while maximizing federal reimbursement (Brodkin, 1995). Shifting to a mandatory program emphasizing job search, the workers constructed their own conception of the “welfare contract” which “excluded a client’s right to help in job-finding and denied a state obligation to assure that decent job opportunities existed or could be found,” (p. 15). During assessment of the client’s needs, the workers were motivated to fit the client into available slots and, therefore, ignored information about service needs they could not respond to. Not infrequently, caseworkers sent clients to job searches even though they did not meet the required level of education or literacy proficiency. Typical of street-level bureaucracies, workers made judgements about favored clients in allocating precious resources such as education or vocational training. Clients who tried to assert their rights were either threatened with sanctions, or were given a “choice,” but without much assistance from the caseworker. Because job search was limited by federal regulations to eight weeks per year, the caseworkers needed other alternatives to keep their clients in this low cost activity. They created a new service category called “job readiness,” and when it proved to consume too much time, they resorted to deferrals. In a broader sense, the findings by Brodkin are not surprising and are replicated in many other instances (Seefeldt, Sandfort, and Danziger, 1998). This is because when a welfare department undertakes to implement a work program, a process of structural isomorphism takes place in which the work program acquires the same structural attributes as its parent organization. There are reasons for such isomorphism. First, the very same political and economic forces that produce the highly bureaucratic structure in the welfare department exist when it implements the work program. Second, the same ideologies that define welfare recipients as morally deficient and undeserving and pervade the welfare department are transferred to the work program. More important, the bureaucratic structure used to determine eligibility crowds out the professional structure needed to provide employment and social services. Welfare eligibility is (and should be) based on a service technology in which the decision rules are explicit and highly standardized, interaction with clients is brief and limited to eliciting information needed to determine eligibility, and worker’s interest is limited to only those client attributes that affect eligibility. The organizational structure best suited to implement such a technology is based on a rational bureaucracy. In contrast, the provision of social services, such as employment services, is based on a technology that follows a professional model in which service decisions are based on assessment of the particular attributes and problems presented by each client, and judgement of the most effective way to respond to them. Interaction with clients is continuous and extensive, and the worker is interested in many of the clients’ attributes that might affect their well-being. The effectiveness of the worker is based on problem-solving skills learned through extensive training, and is contingent on developing a sustained trusting relationship with the clients. Organizationally, such a technology requires a professional structure in which staff are given considerable autonomy. The incongruity between these two different technologies is exemplified in the One-Stop Career Centers in Massachusetts (Kirby, et al., 1997). To provide employment services, the state embarked on an innovative, one-stop, service center that is universally available to all, provides integrated information on employment, training, and education services, is designed by the consumers who use it, and is measured by consumer satisfaction. What happens when the Department of Temporary Aid turns to these centers to provide job search and job assistance to its welfare recipients? According to Kirby, et al., (1997, p.19) “The customer-centered approach of the Career Centers conflicts with the requirement that welfare recipients work within 60 days because this forces the Centers to treat welfare recipients differently from other users. The preferred employment strategy for customers with low education and no skills, by Career Center standards, is a referral to an education or training program, but employment is the only option for welfare recipients.” Invariably when the two functions, income eligibility and provision of services, are mixed income eligibility takes over. As noted by Gordon Hamilton (1962) over thirty years ago, “The money function disables or overwhelms the social services.” In a welfare department oriented toward welfare eligibility, income verification, dispensation of cash aid and prevention of fraud, and close monitoring of eligibility and disbursement errors, it is hard to see how social services can occupy but a marginal position. There is an analogous experience with the history of the public employment exchange system both in Britain and the U.S. In both countries, the function of the employment exchange, i.e., linking job seekers with job opportunities, was coupled with the work test required for eligibility for unemployment benefits (King, 1995 ). Once the two functions were coupled, they had long term and irreversible effects on the employment services. In effect, the employment exchange became subordinate to the work test function. Because of the primacy of the work test, the employment services were unable to attract either job seekers with skills or employers with good jobs. Consequently, the employment services became identified as serving the least skilled workers and for providing a pool of cheap labor to employers. As King demonstrates, in both countries, the record of the employment services in placing job seekers in jobs was quite dismal. Worse yet, once the coupling between these two functions was institutionalized, it became almost impossible to separate them, except for brief periods of time when pro-labor and civil rights coalitions ascended to power. Can a Social Service Orientation Exist in a Mandatory Program? Equally important, a social service orientation cannot flourish when embedded in a mandatory program. Advocates of mandatory participation argue that it is necessary in order to force long-term welfare recipients to participate. But this is clearly not a persuasive argument. While enforcing mandatory participation and sanctions for non-compliance may increase participation rates, there is little evidence to suggest that the work program becomes more effective (Riccio & Hasenfeld, 1996). Voluntary programs that provide real job and training opportunities never fail to attract more welfare recipients than they can accommodate, as the example of the Employment and Training program in Massachusetts in the 1970s demonstrated (Handler and Hasenfeld, 1997). While the threat of sanctions may motivate some welfare recipients to participate more actively, in most instances those who are sanctioned are the more difficult cases, i.e., those with less than a high school education, with limited skills and work experience, and with personal problems. A review of sanctioned cases in Minnesota found that “they were four times more likely to report chemical dependency, twice as likely to report a mental health problem, twice as likely to report family violence, and three times as likely to report a family health problem as all active cases” (Pavetti, Olson, Nightingale, Duke, & Isaacs, 1997, p. 8). Since work programs are less successful with such recipients, sanctions only make their already difficult life circumstances more miserable without much of an apparent benefit. Indeed, many of these families experience substantial loss of income, and only few can replace it with earnings (Pavetti, et al., 1997). There is also a concern of a high error rate in administering sanctions (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997). The pre-occupation with the difficult cases and the use of sanctions to enforce compliance creates an organizational climate that displaces the social service orientation. It requires the program to establish a costly system of rule enforcement that tends to dominate case management activities. In a comparative study of four welfare-to-work programs in California, we (Hasenfeld & Weaver, 1996) found that in the programs emphasizing mandatoriness, the case managers were preoccupied in enforcing the rules with recalcitrant participants, and became mired with the paper work needed to document rule infractions, warn the participants, determine cause, set up informal and formal conciliation, and impose sanctions. Considerably less time was available to working closely with the participants in helping them overcome problems affecting their participation. A kind of a Gresham’s Law took place in which preoccupation with rule enforcement and paper work crowded out effective relations between the case-managers and participants. As a result, the goals of the welfare-to-work program become displaced. Instead of helping the participants obtain and use the educational and employment services they need, the emphasis is on processing paper work, and determining and validating the participant’s formal status in the program. One of the reasons for such a displacement is that case managers are evaluated less on their ability to assist the participant than on the timeliness and accuracy of their paper work and adherence to the rules. There is an inherent incompatibility between the emphasis on mandatory participation and compliance through threats of sanctions and the importance of getting the participants to effectively use the educational, employment, and supportive services provided by the program. The success of any program that aims to change the behavior of its clients depends, first and foremost, on the development of a trusting relationship between the staff and the clients. To do so requires such things as close and frequent contact with the clients; establishment of an empathic relationship between staff and clients; active participation of the clients in the decisions about their treatment; assisting the clients in getting the resources they need; advocating on their behalf with various service providers; and providing them with personal counseling and support when they are in crisis. We know from research on compliance that the threat of sanctions fosters distrustful and evasive relationships (e.g., Gamson, 1968, Tedeschi, 1970). Mandatory participation legitimates a “blaming the victim” ideology. It is a convenient way to shift the onus of responsibility from the worker to the recipient. If the recipient refuses to participate it is not because the program cannot offer a decent job, or because the educational component is of poor quality. Rather, it is because the recipient is unmotivated, or afflicted by a welfare dependency mentality. Put differently, failure need not be attributed to the worker or the program but rather to the recipient. It is not surprising that inevitably, in programs that emphasize mandatoriness and sanctions, staff also tend to uphold negative images of their clients. These negative images not only justify the use of sanctions, but also “rationalize” failures as a consequence of recalcitrant clients. In such programs, the workers need not reach out and invest themselves in developing a trusting relationship. At the same time, workers lose the intrinsic rewards that are inherent in a trusting relationship. Not surprisingly, participants are least satisfied in work programs that emphasize rule enforcement and sanctions. So why the insistence on mandatory participation and use of sanctions? Somehow, it is incumbent on politicians to “send a message,” to demonstrate that the work ethic and family values are being upheld. It also diverts attention from the real problems that beset poor single mothers, particularly the conditions of the low-wage labor market. Social Services as Myth and Ceremony In a similar way we need to raise the question as to whether the incorporation of a social service orientation into welfare-to-work programs also serves primarily a symbolic purpose and is actually an exercise in myth and ceremony. As in the past, policy makers, often with the enthusiastic support of social work advocates, incorporate the provision of social services in their state welfare plans. Yet, in many instances, it is an exercise in myth setting aimed to demonstrate the humaneness of the program, and justify the harsh effects of the policy. Social services component are seldom allocated sufficient resources to make a real difference, and are first to be cut when the fiscal crunch arrives. Their provision is highly constrained and circumscribed by complex welfare regulations, and are available to few recipients. And they are provided by staff who normally lack adequate professional training, yet carry large caseloads. In other words, the inclusion of social services is often used to legitimate the flawed social policy. By including a social service orientation, the myth is perpetuated that the problems facing welfare recipients are personal pathologies rather than structural having to do with low wage work and lack of income support. The inability of recipients to become self-sufficient can be, then, attributed to their own failings to take advantage of the services available to them. The ceremony is the token provision of social services to some, and the testimonials by selected recipients and welfare officials about their efficacy. To be sure, recipients who encounter personal difficulties could benefit from social services and some do, but generally not in a coercive environment that is pre-occupied with meeting work participation quotas and time-limits. Is There an Alternative? There are alternative programs that show promise in enabling poor people to becoming gainfully employed. They all have three common characteristics: they are voluntary, they are available to all poor people, and they exist outside the domain of the welfare department. The first example is New Hope Project in Milwaukee. What is unique to New Hope is the combination of employment and income support. Participation in the program is voluntary and is based on income eligibility. Participants receive three core services: a) help in obtaining a job, including a time-limited minimum-wage community service job if full-time employment is not available; b) a monthly earning supplement that combined with EITC brings the participants’ income above the poverty line; and c) subsidized health insurance and child care which phase out as earnings rise (Brock, Doolittle, Fellerbath, & Wiseman, 1997). A second example is the Center for Employment Training (CET), located in San Jose, California. Its uniqueness lies in the integration of education, training, and job development. CET represents a relatively effective employment training program for poor women who face the greatest barriers to employment, especially women with very young children, without recent work experience, and on welfare (Gordon & Burghardt, 1990). Women are trained for jobs that have been developed for them in the private sector, and they make up for educational deficiencies as they are trained for the job. Thus, by integrating into one program skill training, remedial education, job development, child care, and supportive services, CET is able to attain impressive results. A third example is Project Match (Olson & Herr, 1989) which serves residents of the Cabrini-Green public housing projects in Chicago. The uniqueness of this program is an unwavering commitment to a social service orientation. It is voluntary and community-based, and enrollment is open to every one in the community. The program employs an intensive and long-term case management approach that links the participants to jobs and training programs in the private sector. The emphasis is on the development of a trusting relationship between workers and clients. Progress is defined in a very flexible manner and is measured against realistic, incremental milestones tailored to the specific circumstances of each participant. Participants are followed and counseled after they are placed in a job, and the program develops jobs for the participants. Still, we need to keep in mind that these relatively small innovative programs are not easily replicated on a broad scale, especially when they require visionary and committed leadership. Working with the hard-to-employ is difficult and frustrating, success is very modest, and failure is frequent. Inevitably, disappointment sets in, and policy makers push for harsh and punitive measures, as we have seen in the case of Utah. Conclusion Social services should be made available and accessible to poor single mothers, including welfare recipients. But, as the examples point out, they can best be provided when they are free of welfare rules and regulations, when their use is not made contingent on participation in a mandatory work program, and when they are not confined to serving only welfare recipients. They should be voluntary and free of sanctions, and most importantly, they should provide services that address concrete and real needs. Still, we must be very realistic and modest about what social services can accomplish. At best, they can provide poor families with desperately needed resources to cope with difficult life circumstances. For some, they may even spell the difference between living in misery or escaping poverty. But for most, they will seldom lift them out of poverty. What the majority of the poor need is not welfare reform but a reform of low wage work.
Footnotes 1 This section is based on Greenberg (1997); Greenberg & Savner (1996); Super, Parrott, Steinmetz, & Mann (1996) . 2 Most of the decline can be attributed to economic growth and not welfare reform. See Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, & Connolly (1997). 3 For two-parent families, the required work hours per week are 35. For single parents with children under the age of 6, the work requirement is reduced to 20 hours per week. 4 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 sets a limit that 30% of the cases counted toward the work participation rate can be in vocational training. 5 As reported by Raymond Hernandez in “Most Dropped from Welfare Don’t Get Jobs.” The New York Times, March, 23, 1998, p.A1 6 In Year 3, the experimentals earned $1010 more than the controls (an increase of 40%). In Year 1, the difference was $920 and in Year 2, $1183 (see Riccio, et al., 1994, Table 1).
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