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~ submit an event ~ upcoming events ~ past events ~ complete (calendar) ~ complete (event types) ~ 1997/1998 Visiting Scholars Program Welfare Reform and Social Justice Economic Globalization and the Future of the Welfare State Introduction The modern welfare state and the profession of social work emerged from an awkward synthesis of capitalist and socialist ideologies (George & Wilding, 1994; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989). Although welfare states developed largely within the context of capitalist economies, they were strongly influenced by the presence of socialism as a countervailing ideology and alternative model of political-economic organization and social provision. Particularly in the developing world, the concepts of socialism, social development, social welfare, and social work have been closely interrelated (Midgley, 1997). In the wake of the collapse of socialist governments in the former Soviet bloc and the spread of market-driven ideologies and systems throughout the world—a phenomenon often referred to as economic globalization—the question arises as to what the future of the welfare state will be in a world without the presence of socialism as a political and ideological counterweight to increasingly powerful marketplace forces (Reisch, 1993; Stoesz, 1992). This question becomes more significant as the interdependence of the world economy blurs the distinction between national and international issues. The growing global economic recession, the impact of immigration, the spread of AIDS, and the degradation of the physical environment are just four examples of issues that cross national boundaries. The debate over alternative solutions to such problems cannot, therefore, be confined to local, regional, or even national institutions, despite the contradictory political intent of devolution in the United States. In this lecture I will discuss the impact of economic globalization on welfare state policies in the United States, other industrialized nations, and the developing world. I will attempt to address, within the limits of the time allotted, how globalization and its attendant political and social consequences—in combination with major demographic and social changes—affect (1) the focus and nature of social provision, as reflected in social policies; (2) the roles of the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors in the social welfare nexus; (3) the impact of these policy and role changes on the relationship between social welfare and social justice (i.e., redistribution); and (4) the future of U.S. social policy and social work in this changing context. The Concept of the Welfare State The welfare state evolved as a historically specific purposive phenomenon which differed considerably among industrialized nations because of the distinct circumstances in which it emerged. Critical factors included the presence or absence of powerful socialist or trade union movements, the motivations of elites, the influence of external threats, the degree of social homogeneity or heterogeneity, the extent of stability or turmoil in the immediate historical context, and the cultural values and traditions of the nation (Midgley, 1997). For example, in 1880s Germany, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, in his own words, “stole the thunder of the socialists” to weaken their revolutionary impulses (Taylor, 1955). In Great Britain, after the near catastrophe at Dunkirk in 1940, the need for common sacrifice in the face of a common threat led even The Times of London to call for social justice, the abolition of privilege, and the creation of a more equitable distribution of income and wealth through welfare state provision (de Schweinitz, 1943). In the United States, the modest reforms of the New Deal were, in part, a calculated response to the fear of more radical upheavals and, in part, the by-product of social movements that forced compromises to occur in the development of policy responses to the Depression. The emergence of a welfare state protected the capitalist system without fundamentally altering its structure, values, and goals. After World War II, a form of welfare capitalism appeared. It consisted of policies designed to shore up consumption, such as Social Security, that simultaneously reinforced the prevailing ideology of the socioeconomic system around concepts such as work and dependency (Gorz, 1967). In the context of the Cold War, welfare capitalism also served as a bulwark against socialism and a means of distracting attention from broader internal and external issues and political goals (Stoesz & Karger, 1998). Different Types of Welfare States The different origins of 20th century welfare states produced varied patterns of policy development among industrialized nations. In some countries, particularly those in Western Europe, the state played a critical role (Midgley, 1997; Chatterjee, 1996). Elsewhere, policies resembling those of European welfare states emerged through other means and other sectors of society. In Japan, the private sector played a critical role in social provision. In the United States, the nonprofit sector played an important role both as a funder and provider of services. Both in the United States and Japan, occupational social welfare (albeit in very different forms) enhanced the quality of welfare provision. Consequently, some analysts assert that the United States is only slightly less developed as a welfare state than European nations (Gilbert, 1989). Even in Western Europe there are considerable differences. In France, there is a more centralized public sector, arising out of the strong tradition of etatisme and, as in Japan, powerful interlocking elites in the public and private sectors. In both countries, the nonprofit sector plays a limited role due to different historical traditions and different conceptions of private philanthropy. By contrast, in Germany there is a more decentralized administrative approach, emerging in part out of the strong role of provincial governments and the fear of totalitarianism. At the same time, the third sector is more integrated into policy making (Seibel, 1996; Estes, 1998). In contrast to Western Europe, no national network of services emerged in the United States, nor did a fully integrated income maintenance and service system develop. The history of social welfare in the United States is largely one of state, not federal, intervention through categorical programs in which the voluntary, nonprofit sector played a unique role in service provision (Reisch & Wenocur, 1982; Gilbert, 1983). Types of Welfare States Nearly as many typologies to classify welfare states exist as there are welfare states (Midgley, 1997; Chatterjee, 1996). Essentially, however, there are four dominant schools of thought on the purposes of the welfare state. One is a socialist or social democratic school that believed an unjust capitalist system would be replaced by a rational order planned and directed by the state. Its focus would be the elimination of poverty (Marshall, 1965; Antonnen, 1991; Titmuss, 1968). According to this view, the welfare state emerged as a corrective to the “diswelfares” of modern, industrial society (Titmuss, 1958). Titmuss’ tripartite conception of the social division of welfare assumed “that man is not wholly responsible for his dependency and accepted the societal obligation for meeting certain dependent needs of the individual and family” (p. 53). A key question is: How has economic globalization changed this conception of societal responsibility? A second perspective is represented by liberals, the group George and Wilding (1985) classify as “reluctant collectivists.” They assert that while capitalism produced unintended socioeconomic problems, planned state intervention could modify or ameliorate some of them without fundamentally altering the structure or values of the market system. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, stated that the purpose of the New Deal was “not to hamper individualism, but to protect it” (McElvaine, 1993). This emphasis on individualism reinforced the nation’s prevailing conservative social ethos. The U.S. welfare state that emerged from this perspective was pragmatic, experimental, action-oriented, and—in its image—non-ideological, assuming that state intervention and capitalism could coexist. This view dominated U.S. social welfare until the 1980s (Axinn & Levin, 1997; Trattner, 1995). A more critical version of this view was expressed by Howe (1982), who regarded the welfare state as a phase in the development of modern capitalist society, shaped in part by social unrest and democratic political activity, especially by labor. The welfare state made the economy somewhat more rational, even as it sustained the domination of capitalism by regulating politically the power of property owners to run their businesses. In short, the welfare state saved capitalism from its own self-destructive excesses. A third view is expressed by conservatives who attack state intervention as anti-freedom and believe in the self-correcting mechanisms of the market system. This view, best articulated by Hayek, Friedman, and Popper, argues that the welfare state was established too quickly and on too broad a scale (Hayek, 1949; Friedman, 1962; Popper, 1997). By focusing on the goal of social equality, its policies produced economically and morally harmful consequences. According to this perspective, the attempt at state-directed redistribution of wealth endangers the social well-being of a nation because it discourages entrepreneurship, innovation, and risk; reduces the role of the voluntary sector and diminishes civil society; increases dependency; and expands state power to the point where it creates a potential threat to liberty (Gilder, 1981; Murray, 1984). These views gained currency in the 1950s, strongly influenced policies in the 1980s, and today form the prevailing ideology of economic globalization. Radical critics of the welfare state like Galper (1976) and Piven and Cloward (1995) argue that the welfare state is primarily a means of social and political control. “[It] represents a historically specific form of social organization that has emerged as a result of the continuing ability of capitalist institutions to mold and transform human needs and social struggles within the logic of capitalist requirements” (pp. 22-23, Galper, 1976). It is part of the “social reproduction” function of capitalism described by Gorz (1967). O’Connor (1973) argued that the welfare state evolved to abet both the accumulation and legitimization functions of capitalism. In their conceptions of the welfare state, however, O’Connor and Gorz both assumed that national governments would use economic and social policies to moderate the effects of national economies. It is questionable whether their assumptions are still valid in the global political economic system emerging in the late 20th century.
In sum, conceptions of the welfare state assumed its concurrent existence with a particular type of capitalism, one whose market excesses could be controlled through the courts, social protections, and a moderately progressive tax system (Thoenes, 1966). Its defining features include:
Economic Globalization and its Consequences The current pattern of economic globalization emerged clearly in the early 1970s, although its origins lie in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 and the immediate post-World War II era. For 25 years (roughly 1945–1970) the combined effects of a global marketplace and the welfare state produced a “golden era” for the United States and other industrialized nations. Income inequality declined and most groups saw their standards of living improve as a consequence of economic growth, a moderately progressive income tax, and the expansion of income transfer programs (Sawhill, 1996; Danziger & Weinberg, 1994). Even in the developing world, poverty and unemployment declined. Since 1973, this picture has changed. Economists have linked the growing inequality of income and wealth, both in the United States and throughout the world, to such factors as gaps in educational and job skill levels, new technologies, the decline in the power of unions, the emphasis on foreign trade, changes in the wage scale and occupational structure of societies, the reorganization and transformation of work, the spread of regressive modes of taxation, and the stagnation or contraction of welfare benefits (Madrick, 1995; Danziger & Weinberg, 1994; Wilson, 1996). All of these factors are directly or indirectly related to the phenomenon termed globalization. The Nature of Economic Globalization To understand the implications of economic globalization, it is important to distinguish it from the internationalism of commerce and trade, which has existed for thousands of years. The key features of economic globalization are the rapid mobility and liquidity of capital, the short-term nature of investments, the interlocking connections of national currency systems, the speed of both capital and information transfer (and its effects on policy planning and analytic processes, as well as the emphasis on short-term gains, rather than long-term economic development), the growing power of multinational corporations, the promotion of specialization of production and knowledge, and the relative absence of countervailing political forces to direct or control economic impulses. Other features include the shift of both manufacturing and service industries overseas; the increasing use of high technology in work; the need for fewer workers with higher skills or for fewer hours of work; a decline in the gender distinctions of work (which has an impact on family and work relations); and a widening and rigidifying gap in income, wealth, education, skills, and status between classes and races (Bluestone, 1994; Economic Policy Institute, 1996; Federman, et al., 1996; Greider, 1997; Head 1996; Rifkin, 1995; Madrick, 1995; Mishel, Bernstein, & Schmitt, 1996; Sasson, 1994; Soros, 1997; Wilson, 1996). Economic globalization is based on the assumption that capitalist institutions, ideology, and behaviors pervade the world economy. This translates into the dominance of the market system, market values, and market mechanisms (Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994). The reality of the world economy, however, is much more complex. Certain countries still operate under socialist or mixed economies. Other nations, such as South Africa, are more protectionist in nature due to their stage of economic development or, like Japan, a historical reluctance to open up their society to free markets. Countries as varied as France, Malaysia, Mexico, and Russia reflect different forms of capitalism, the consequence of differences in their pace of institutional development, the pervasiveness of technology, local political issues, and distinct cultural factors. Despite these differences, since 1950 total international trade has expanded by 6% per year, more than 50% faster than the growth in the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The United States has been a leader in this regard. Between 1970 and 1995, trade as a percentage of the domestic economy grew from 10% to 24%. Most of this trade (70%) occurs with other highly developed countries. But, future growth appears to lie in increasing the consumption capacity of untapped or under-exploited markets in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia (International Monetary Fund, 1998). There are several implications of these trends. First, the domestic market will become less significant in the decades ahead. This will affect welfare state policies created to maintain a floor on consumption. Second, the lure of foreign markets, cheap foreign labor, and less restrictive labor and environmental policies means that employers can more easily carry out their threats to move production sites abroad or to other regions. This has the effect of weakening union organizing drives, promoting labor-management negotiations focused on “give backs,” productivity, and job security. In the United States, this may also fragment state welfare policies by promoting inter-state (even intra-state) competition at a time of greater policy devolution. It also diminishes the likelihood of maintaining the level of social provision welfare states provide (Barlow & Clarke, 1998; Bluestone, 1994). Third, economic globalization has changed the nature of property and property relations, and of work that was created by industrialization and the rise of industrial capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Property itself is changing from money and other tangible commodities to credits. Consequently, trade agreements are now primarily about the protection of the property rights of investors (Danaher, 1994; Barlow & Clarke, 1998). More and more, the efficiency of the private sector is predicated upon lowering the costs of production, especially wages and benefits, and shifting the social costs of production on to the “inefficient” and increasingly cash-strapped public sector (Kapp, 1971; Bello, 1994). The implication is that even under economic globalization the social costs of production are an indispensable aspect of a market economy and cannot be eliminated without a major revision of the system itself. All corrective measures to ameliorate the impact of these social costs (e.g., through welfare state policies and programs) do not address this fundamental issue. In fact, in today’s economy, the short-term logic of the market system argues against even the implementation of these corrective measures (Caufield, 1996). Proponents of globalization argue that the transfer of national resources from production for domestic use to production for export is required to promote economic development and to maintain competitiveness in the global market. Critics of globalizaton argue, however, that an emphasis on foreign trade, especially if overly reliant on foreign capital, results in the destabilization of long-standing institutions and communities, particularly in regions with established, subsistence-model economies. Consequences of this shift include the destruction of local enterprises by transnational corporations, the privatization of unique national resources (at bargain prices as in Eastern Europe), the restriction of social spending, heavy debt burdens (with long-term consequences regarding fiscal austerity), and the overall shredding of safety nets (Chossudovsky, 1997; Caufield, 1996; Danaher, 1994; Estes, 1998). Thus, economic policy making in the industrialized world reflects the logic of maintaining a system of global capitalism. Since the 1980s, monetarists have played a dominant role and used their influence to promote private-sector solutions to social and economic ills. In their view, the role of government is to provide a suitable environment for investment by regulating interest rates, keeping inflation in check, regulating the money supply, insuring international stability in currency exchanges, and eliminating barriers to the movement of capital, labor, goods, and technology (Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Barlow & Clarke, 1998). They ignore the perspectives of both liberal and radical Keynesians, who assert that business cycles respond to the growth of domestic markets and to the multiplier effects of local investment in development and human capital infrastructure. Proponents of free trade promote unrestricted capital flow and imply that economic efficiency will reach optimal levels when each area of the world produces those goods that the region can produce most cheaply (Bello, 1994; Caufield, 1996). Large multinational corporations, major banks, and international finance organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank support this approach and frequently employ its logic to extract political and social concessions from developing countries in need of credits and foreign investment. Under economic globalization, the shift of national resources from production for domestic use to production for export is regarded as a necessary precondition for economic development and the establishment of international competitiveness, particularly in developing nations. These ideas are reflected in the IMF and World Bank’s “Structural Adjustment Policies.” In the United States, the Republican Party and, to some extent, the Clinton administration have promoted similar views (Greider, 1997; Soros, 1997). The Role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank The role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has been to promote policies in developing nations that conform to the requirements of a global capitalist economy. In the social welfare field, this has been primarily through the control of public spending and the promotion of the growth of nonprofit (or non-governmental) organizations as an alternative to state provision. Often this has occurred in countries with little or no tradition of non-governmental (i.e., voluntary sector) activity. The World Bank and IMF wield enormous power through the conditions attached to the loans they provide developing nations and the sheer volume of debt carried by these economies. The debt burden of developing countries now stands at $1.7 trillion, of which 17% ($278 million) is owed to the World Bank and IMF. Debt-service ratios worsened in the 1980s as the influence of these institutions grew, resulting in the further contraction of welfare provisions even as the economic plight of people in the developing worsened. For example, Africa’s external debt is now over $300 billion—about two-and-one-half times more than in 1980 (World Bank, 1997; International Monetary Fund, 1998). In 1997, the World Bank alone took in about $20 billion from poor countries in repayments and interest, $4 billion more than it loaned. Both the IMF and the World Bank have refused to write off debt and have added conditions attached to their loans. About 20% of the World Bank’s loans go to structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which include economic reforms upon which loans are contingent. These conditions include currency devaluation, promotion of export-oriented production, cuts in social spending, privatization of state industries, deregulation of the economy, and wage suppression. There is little evidence, however, that such SAP’s promote economic growth. They certainly do not promote a more equitable distribution of resources (Caufield, 1996; Danaher, 1994). The Impact of Economic Globalization Economic globalization and its attendant policy shifts have already had a sweeping impact on human well-being, particularly in the developing world, and on the ability of nations to respond to socioeconomic problems through government or private-sector provision. On a worldwide scale, economic globalization has already produced a growing gap in income and wealth; a decline in assets held by the majority of people, especially vulnerable populations; increased domestic migration and emigration with their accompanying social, economic, and political consequences; a rise in negative social indicators; the destabilization of cultures (with growing conflict); environmental degradation; loss of confidence in government institutions and political systems; and growing alienation and despair (Chossudovsky, 1997; Bello, 1994; Bluestone, 1994). In addition, globalization has revealed the anachronistic structure of political institutions and social welfare organizations and the declining significance of political boundaries and allegiances, particularly in regard to their span of control and speed in responding to economic, political, and social problems. Ironically, this has occurred in an era in which the increased mobility of capital and information has affected the rapidity with which problems emerge and our perception of these problems. In turn, new technologies promoted by globalization influence the development of social goals and the formation of institutional relationships needed to assess and resolve social problems. The effects of globalization are also closely linked to demographic shifts (search for work, political conflict), a decline in class consciousness, and the growth of ethnic and religious conflict. They have produced greater regional economic competition over resource development (e.g., in Southwest Europe and Central Asia around oil field development and between states in the United States). Globalization has also had an impact on the nations’ ability to develop economically, particularly in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. It has diminished their ability to establish economic self-sufficiency (e.g., around food production) to create social policies that are essential to human well-being, and to invest in human capital development (Caufield, 1996). Economic globalization has also weakened the role of organized labor through its influence on the nature of work and the level of wages. Particularly in the industrialized world, real wages have declined and work has become less stable. As a consequence of economic globalization, the workplace is being transformed by “lean production,” a range of techniques aimed at expanding productivity and reducing labor costs. These include the simplification of production, the replacement of skilled workers with unskilled workers, and the introduction of “outsourcing” (where corporations farm out production or support services to non-unionized firms with lower labor costs). This idea has spread to the service sector, resulting in the displacement of many lower-level workers and middle-level managers. The introduction of managed care has produced the identical effect among hospital social service workers and social workers employed in mental health settings (Head, 1996). The consequences of these trends are felt particularly in the developing world, where the need to maintain high interest rates to attract capital investment has had deleterious effects on the growth of domestic business (especially small business), the creation of markets of domestic consumption (which has ripple effects in the advanced industrialized nations), the amount of resources available to invest in human capital infrastructure, and the need to reduce fiscal deficits (particularly social welfare spending). For example, in South Africa the interest rates are two to three times higher than in the United States (World Bank, 1997). Work, Unemployment, and the Welfare State A major and well-documented consequence of economic globalization is the growth in unemployment and underemployment among workers in industrialized nations as industries relocate in search of cheaper labor. At the same time, workers in the developing world are chronically exploited while the bases of subsistence economies are undermined. Policies are promoted that emphasize economic growth and expanded international trade, yet data from the past 50 years reveal that growth alone is not correlated with the elimination of poverty or the more equal distribution of income. In fact, in both developed and developing countries, there are numerous examples of poverty increasing even in years of aggregate prosperity (United Nations Development Program, 1998). Thus, the role of the welfare state becomes more significant even as policies undermine its foundation. According to a recent report by the International Labor Organization (ILO) (1998), a record 1 billion persons—one third of the global workforce—are unemployed or underemployed. The Asian economic crisis threatens to throw millions more out of work. The ILO’s 1998 report indicates that the East Asian financial crisis has already increased joblessness by 10 million persons directly and 20 million indirectly. This raised the number of persons formally unemployed—mainly in industrialized nations—to 150 million (up from 120 million in the mid-1990s). There are also an estimated 900 million persons “underemployed” (i.e., those who want to work more or are employed but unable to earn a living wage). In South Korea, unemployment jumped during the past year from 2.6% to 7%. The ensuing increase in the country’s suicide rate produced a macabre social phenomenon known as “recession orphans.” In Thailand, the rate increased from 1 to 2% (2 years ago) to 6%. Even in China, about 3.5 million workers were laid off due to the “restructuring” of state enterprises. The effects of the current global recession have been felt outside of Asia. In Central and Eastern Europe, unemployment has gone from near zero in 1989 to over 9%. This has been accompanied by a decline in real wages and greater income inequality. In Russia, for example, real wages are less than 60% of their 1989 level. Even in better-off Eastern European nations such as Hungary and the Czech Republic, real wages are still lower than they were before the collapse of communism in 1989 (Estes, 1998; ILO, 1998). Growing unemployment would increase the levels of poverty and inequality all over the world. In Indonesia, for example, the unemployment rate soared recently from 4% to12%, boosting the number of those in poverty from 22 million to 80 million. Already, 20% of all people live in absolute poverty, including 1/3 of the people in the global south, an increase of 40% since 1980. More than 1 billion workers earn less than a $1 per day, and more than 800 million people are unemployed or underemployed (ILO, 1998). Technology and a growing worldwide recession will exacerbate these statistics in the short-term future. More than 840 million adults are still illiterate; nearly as many lack access to health services; and more than 1.2 billion lack access to safe water. Poverty and resource deprivation afflict women and children to a greater extent, all around the world. The Impact on Industrialized Nations The effects of globalization, even in times of relative prosperity—as the United States has enjoyed during the 1990s—are felt in industrialized nations as well. They include:
Only in Western Europe (where there is a great deal of accumulated wealth, a political system in which labor and social democrats still have some influence, a long-standing commitment to the values of the welfare state, and a sociocultural environment that tolerates high levels of unemployment and state subsidies) does the welfare state, in more or less its classic form, still exist. Even there, the pressure of high levels of chronic unemployment (particularly among youth), high interest rates, declining rates of economic productivity, and the influx of large numbers of immigrants are threatening support for welfare state measures and creating political pressure to contract welfare state programs. Another major consequence of globalization is the exacerbation of the global north/global south dichotomy. Four to 5.5 billion people live in the global south and share only 1/5 of the world’s wealth. According to the United Nations, the richest 1/5 of the world’s population produces nearly 85% of the world Gross National Product (GNP), while the poorest 1/5 produces only 1.4% The ratio of income in the top 1/5 to that poorest 1/5 has grown from 30:1 in 1960 to nearly 80:1 today (United Nations Development Program, 1997; World Bank, 1997). This dichotomy is reflected in the United States as well. The United States is now the most unequal of all industrialized nations, and more unequal than at any time since 1945 (Office of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1996). Despite years of unparalleled aggregate prosperity, 13.3% of the U.S. population still lives below the poverty line (Office of Management and Budget, 1998; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1995). In comparison with some less prosperous countries, our state of human well-being lags behind (Estes, 1998). For example, the United States still ranks 21st in infant mortality; 50% of adults are at risk in terms of literacy and educational proficiency. In Mexico, 90% of all children under five are immunized; in some U.S. cities, the rate is below 50% (Children’s Defense Fund, 1998). One-sixth of the U.S. population lacks health insurance, an increase of 1.7 million people in 1997 (Larin, 1997). At the same time, inflation-adjusted earnings of the median American worker in 1997 were 3.1% lower than in 1989. Since 1989, real hourly wages either stagnated or fell for most of the bottom 60% of the population. Even with improvements in 1997—the median income rose 1.9%—levels only reach those of 1989 (Economic Policy Institute, 1998; U.S. Department of Labor, 1998). The Growth of Nonprofit Organizations In the United States and elsewhere, there has been a proliferation and promotion of non-governmental, nonprofit organizations as a response to the withdrawal of the state in welfare intervention. This has produced major changes in the roles, responsibilities, expectations, and outcomes of nonprofits, even in those countries in which the nonprofit sector has had vastly different histories, roles, contexts, and motives for formation. This development has serious implications for the future of social welfare, particularly in terms of changing societal goals, the structure of public, private, and nonprofit agencies, and the interrelationship of the three sectors. One noticeable effect has been the growing influence of market ideas on the culture of public and nonprofit programs. It has affected their vocabulary, the structure of their services, the nature of staffing patterns, the organization of work, and their relationship with clients. Concurrently, there has been a significant change in the historic relationship between the public and nonprofit sector around the identification of social issues and the development and implementation of social policies and programs. Earlier, nonprofits worked in areas which lacked public provision. They often brought social problems to the attention of the public sector. Later, in the 1960s and 1970s, they became the vehicle for implementing public policies through government contracting. Today, nonprofits are again being asked to fill the gaps created by devolution as in the case of welfare reform. Many scholars and policy analysts have questioned the ability of this sector either to fill the gaps created by the decline in government-supported social provision or to emulate the practices of the for-profit sector (Gil, 1998). Social Welfare and Social Justice in the 21st Century In the evolution of the modern concept of social justice, there is a clear, unbroken connection between the ideals of the American and French revolutions, the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the ethical imperative in the NASW Code of Ethics (1996) that social workers work for social justice. The effects of economic globalization, however, have serious implications for the social justice goals of all social welfare systems. The conflict between justice and charitable perspectives that shaped the evolution of U.S. social work and the modern welfare state has reemerged in a different context. Since the 1930s, debates over social policies have been largely over their use to establish social rights and provide forms of institutionalized redistribution, compensation, or redress (Towle, 1945; Titmuss, 1958). Recent attacks on the concept of entitlement, at the heart of efforts to “reform” welfare, reduce Medicare and Medicaid, and privatize Social Security reflect this ongoing debate. Throughout the 20th century, fundamental principles of social work practice, such as client self-determination, respect for human dignity, and appreciation of diversity, have been constructed from a social justice foundation. A social justice framework pays particular attention to “the distribution of benefits and burdens throughout a society...with such matters as the regulation of wages...the protection of persons’ rights through the legal system, the allocation of housing, medicine, welfare benefits, etc.” (Miller, 1976, p. 22). It reflects the concept of “fairness” in the assignment of fundamental rights and duties, economic opportunities, and social conditions. In Rawls’s principle of redress, “The idea is to redress the balance of contingencies in the direction of equality” (Rawls, 1971, p. 100). Rather than being in competition, the preservation of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of social justice are thus conceived as the products of social cooperation, trust, and mutuality (Held, 1984). Finally, an emphasis on social justice recognizes that neither the human condition nor social reality is fixed, but are the consequences of socioeconomic relationships and the ideological frameworks that rationalize them (Campbell, 1989). Implications for Social Policy A social justice framework would have the following implications for U.S. social policy in the 21st century. First, it would hold the most vulnerable populations harmless in the distribution of societal resources, particularly when those resources are finite. Unequal distribution of resources would be justified only if it served to advance the least advantaged groups in the community (Rawls, 1995). Second, it would emphasize preventive programs on grounds of both service effectiveness and long-term cost efficiency. Third, it would define access to existing services broadly and develop service models that reflect clients’ definition of their problems. Fourth, it would incorporate a multidimensional integration of ethnically conscious services at the community level, along with regional dialogues among service providers from all sectors to allocate responsibility, coordinate service delivery, and design programs to fill existing gaps. It would acknowledge public responsibility for the basic material needs of people and recognize that these needs may vary among people due to differences in demographic characteristics and environmental circumstances (Skocpol, 1995). A social justice approach to social welfare would also acknowledge the connection in the design and delivery of social services between peoples’ needs for the economic supports provided by social policies and the psychosocial supports provided by social service programs (Reynolds, 1963, p. 271). This would require a reorientation of the relationship between workers and clients to one based upon greater equality and mutuality, rather than professional expertise and dominance. Its primary focus would be the satisfaction of the client’s needs, not the maintenance of the agency’s or worker’s authority. This view of practice would emphasize prevention and education, rather than cure (Freire, 1972). It implies that client self-determination is an integral part of the helping process itself, not merely a value outside of that process (Reynolds, 1934, 1951). Economic Globalization and the Future of the Social Work Profession The consequences of economic globalization will have a lasting impact on the development of social work in the United States for several reasons. First, social work emerged as an organized occupation during a period of unprecedented industrial growth that dramatically transformed U.S. society (Patterson, 1994; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989). Second, the growth of the social work profession coincided with periods of increasing government intervention to counteract the effects of the marketplace on the distribution of employment, the economic benefits of work, the conditions of the workplace, and workers’ political rights (Rose, 1997; Bernstein, 1985; Alexander & Speizman, 1980). Third, through its focus on the importance of the social environment, social work practice incorporated an understanding of economic factors into its conceptual frameworks and program interventions. This distinguished it from other mental health professions which, with few exceptions, ignored the impact of such issues as workplace pressures, economic insecurity, and unemployment on their clients (Reisch, 1987; Addams, 1895). From social work’s origins in the late 19th century through the construction of the limited U.S. welfare state from the 1930s through the early 1970s, therefore, social workers have addressed the economic, social, and psychological needs of industrial workers (Brandes, 1976; Popple, 1981; Wenocur & Reisch, 1989; Karger, 1988; Rose, 1989; Sherraden, 1985; Straussner & Phillips, 1988). In the 21st century, social work will be shaped by the new global economy and the growing gap between high and low, age, and permanent and temporary employment (Reich, 1991; Rifkin, 1995; U.S. Department of Labor, 1995). The Growing Neglect of Poverty One issue of ongoing concern for social workers in the next century will be the persistence of poverty and inequality, even in times of unprecedented aggregate prosperity. Yet, the global economy and the political and ideological perspectives it produces may make it increasingly difficult to build public support for anti-poverty policies. In the United States and abroad, the needs of the poor are increasingly neglected in the face of the market imperatives of globalization. Before the 1930s, it was easy for U.S. elites to ignore the problems of the urban poor. In the 1930s and again in the 1960s they acquired a “double vision” of the poor. They did not abandon the idea that the poor were largely responsible for their poverty, but they felt compelled to take limited action in the face of economic necessity and political pressure (Reisch, 1996). The social welfare policies that emerged, however, retained the traditional American emphasis on individualism and failed to address the linkages between structural inequalities, poverty, and their consequences. They also contributed to the growing marginalization and neglect of low-income people, especially persons of color (Wilson, 1989). Unfortunately, there is little on today’s U.S. political horizon that offers a constructive solution for these systemic problems. Why don’t Americans seem to care that the urban poor are getting poorer or that the modest gains produced by social welfare programs since the 1930s are eroding? Briefly, there are several possible explanations. First, the perception that urban poverty is a factor of race and culture, rather than economic transformation, social stratification, and policy choices, has prevented the formation of class-based coalitions among urban residents to influence public policy. Second, the shift in political power to the suburbs coupled with the precipitous decline in electoral participation by low-income populations in the cities has created a form of “political apartheid” in the United States with results that favor non-urban elites (Reisch, 1997). Third, the most effective means of reducing urban poverty—welfare state provisions such as public sector employment and government income transfers, unionization of the workforce, and antidiscrimination policies which affect private sector employment patterns—are under growing attack because they are now considered obstacles to success in the global economy. Since these moderately effective means are excluded from policy debates, and because urban poverty has acquired a chronicity that appears to belie solutions, a sort of policy bankruptcy prevails among political elites (Barlett & Steele, 1992; Friedman, 1989; Hornbeck & Salamon, 1991; Wagner, 1995). The Welfare State of the Future Certain normative assumptions guide the following views regarding the parameters of the future welfare state. Broader workforce participation is an essential ingredient in the elimination of poverty and the stabilization of families and communities. Policy reforms are necessary, but insufficient to produce the desired results. The provision of a living wage is an essential component to the attainment of economic and social self-sufficiency. Without active societal intervention to arrest the problem, joblessness and its consequences becomes a self-perpetuating phenomena exacerbating existing problems within the community and the family. Finally, the value of work that is regarded as socially useful has meaning beyond the income it provides (Reisch & Gorin, 1999). Whatever normative arguments shape the welfare state of the next century, there is widespread agreement that our society must address the following issues in the decades ahead: (1) the growing role of workforce participation in shaping individual, family, and community well-being; (2) the need to provide increased employment opportunities for elements of the population that traditionally have been denied access to the workforce such as women, people of color, and individuals with physical and mental disabilities; (3) a growing need for ongoing worker education, staff development, and training; (4) a dramatic alteration in traditional patterns of employment due to corporate restructuring (including “downsizing”), the growth of small firms, the use of “outsourcing” by large companies, the decline of unionization, and the spread of automation, computerization, and robotization; (5) the loss of stable employment for many workers and its social consequences; (6) an increase in the number of workers with no health insurance or retirement benefits (now estimated at 40% of all workers and rising); and (7) an increase in the number of workers over 65 who remain in the workforce for economic, social, and psychological reasons, a trend which will likely be exacerbated by changes in the retirement age and alterations in Social Security and Medicare benefits (U.S. Department of Labor, 1995; United Way of America, 1988). Thus, in the context of economic globalization and welfare devolution, the overarching social policy questions for the 21st century are:
For social workers, these broad issues necessitate reexamination of the extent and nature of policy efforts to redistribute societal resources. Alternatives to the Welfare State In Radical Principles: Reflections of an Unreconstructed Democrat (1980), Walzer argued that the problem with the welfare state is not, as conservatives argue, the provision of benefits, per se, but the growth in the power of a bureaucratic state and the loss of popular democracy. In taking over services previously provided in traditional and industrial market societies by families, kin, friends, neighbors, and local charitable institutions, the welfare state produced new kinds of dependency and substituted centralized, bureaucratized, depersonalized administration for effective, caring help in time of need. Walzer proposed a new synthesis in which the state guarantees aid and largely finances the provision of services but delegates their delivery to the 3rd and 4th sectors. This would create greater participation of clients in the implementation of social policies. Eisenberg (1998) concurs that communities must be involved in the integration of funding with community-based organizations. This would require communities to play a more active role in defining needs and evaluating standards, and for greater monitoring at the local level. Recent welfare reform legislation offers one opportunity to address these issues in a concrete, socially useful way. Since this legislation places such emphasis on its mandatory work component and shifts responsibility for social provision to local governments and the private sector, including faith-based organizations, it would be instructive to use this opportunity to initiate a serious debate as to what constitutes “work” in a post-industrial global economy. An analysis of the nature of work in our society would include an examination of such issues as the number of hours per week individuals are expected to work in order to be considered “productive” and to earn a living wage, the types of activities deemed useful or productive, the question of what is considered adequate compensation for labor, and the recognition of the social supports necessary for individuals to participate as workers to their fullest potential. Many of these issues have long been concerns of social workers and should once again be placed at the forefront of our advocacy and research agendas. The Role of Social Work Education in a Global Economy If the social work profession retains its historic commitment to social justice and continues to emphasize service to disadvantaged and oppressed populations, the current generation of students will be working with clients whose economic plight will be increasingly desperate. As racial and class divisions widen and rigidify, they will affect the daily interactions of workers and clients, students, and instructors (Jarman-Rohde, McFall, & Kolar, 1997; Fabricant & Burghardt, 1992). To educate students to be effective practitioners in this environment, social work educators need to take the following steps (at a minimum):
In part, schools of social work can address the implications of economic globalization by incorporating content into their curricula on macroeconomics, the social implications of the shifting labor market, the legal and regulatory framework for employment, the philosophical and psychosocial dimensions of work in our society, and ethical issues for practice in this new environment. These recommendations emphasize a dual focus of providing increased access to the workforce among those in need of employment, and improving the quality of work, family, and community life of workers. Another implication is the need to teach students how to address the symptoms of work-related stress such as alcoholism and drug abuse, physical health problems, depression, and family and community violence. Again, it is ironic that among many accreditation requirements, there is none that prompts schools to teach theoretical or practice-focused content on the nature of work and its significance for human development and family well-being (Commission on Educational Policy, 1995). Nor do most doctoral programs address the theoretical, research, policy, or practice implications of these phenomena. To prepare students for the global economy of the future, Root (1997) suggests that social work education emphasize content areas such as organizational behavior and program innovation, the structure and dynamics of the labor market, assessment and response to the special needs of workers, skills in cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis, understanding of ethical issues involved in meeting conflicting demands, and legal issues that affect employment practices. Other authors (Lewis, 1997) have suggested such curricular enhancements as the development of practice skills to work with youth in school-to-work type programs and with older workers in vocational rehabilitation and training programs, skills in evaluative research methods, and the ability to design and implement research projects and program interventions that reflect sensitivity to the different needs of different elements of the workplace (e.g., women, persons of color, individuals with disabilities). Another important addition to students’ education would be increased content on the different models of occupational social work (Straussner, 1990) and the development of skills in assessing their relative effectiveness. Content in the human behavior and social environment sequence on the individual, familial, and societal significance of work would also be useful, particularly if presented in a multicultural context. Of equal value would be philosophical material on the meaning of economic and social justice for social work practitioners in a world without work. Conclusion: The Future of Social Work in a Global Economy A great Puerto Rican teacher and activist, Carmen Rivera de Alvarado (1973), remarked 25 years ago: “...Attitudes don’t change magically, but only through a difficult growing process. [Yet] old attitudes must change because the profession needs a new type of social worker, committed to its client population and in pursuit of a socioeconomic system that facilitates equal distribution of material goods and spiritual development of the human being.” How can we as social workers assist in this transformation? One way is through engaging in public education in the broadest sense. We need to play a major role in shaping the language of public policy debates and reaching out with a message about the primacy of social justice. We have to acknowledge that by denying the political basis of our practice we accept the political vocabulary and problem definitions of those who do not share our values or social concerns. In Bertha Reynolds’s words, “The best preparation for adapting to the social work of the future...is to see it now, without illusion, as a part of our own time, and to face what we have with an active determination to be flexible enough...so that we do not hold back its growth into something else. While change is inevitable, change for the better is not unless we...aid what is socially useful and try to inhibit forces that are destructive to human well-being” (Reynolds, 1942, p. 4). Michael Harrington, author of The Other America, outlined some social justice-based proposals that he considered critical to transform U.S. society. This transformation would increase people’s control over the economic and social conditions that shape so much of our lives. It would be a movement, he argued, not to save souls, but to create “an environment in which perhaps men and women will be able to find their best selves, and culture recover its depths” (1989). At the end of two decades of government-sponsored war on the poor, social work could craft no finer description of the welfare state of the 21st century, nor could we articulate a clearer rationale for our profession’s purpose in the critical years ahead.
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