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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WELFARE COUNCILS.

The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1967
Sociology, general

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WELFARE COUNCILS

by

John Elmer Tropman

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Michigan
1967

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WELFARE COUNCILS

By John E. Tropman

In this study, we have investigated the structure and functioning of 154 Welfare Councils, or Councils of Social Agencies, in the United States. We found that, in certain respects, these organizations had common problems, to which they found common structural solutions. For this reason, the large majority tend to be rather similar from community to community, despite the fact that they are relatively small. A few of the largest Councils (with 10 or more staff) were found to be similar neither to the large majority of Councils, nor to each other.

The Council, as an organization, is in a unique and problematic position in the local community, in that it has an unclear authority and a vague mission and role. While the Council is supposed to engage in "planning and coordination" at the local level, there is no agreement on their authorization for this task, or even what the specifics of the task might be. For these reasons, the Council attempts to involve top community leaders and business professionals, as well as people from the health and welfare fields to help provide local legitimacy. The Council relies primarily on the profession of social work as the source of its definition of mission and role.

In carrying out the study, new techniques of data analysis were used in order to handle the large amount of Council data. "Facet" analysis of correlation matrices, developed by Louis Guttman, of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and a new computer program, "The Multivariate Analysis of Continuities," developed by James Lingoes of The University of Michigan, were employed.

PREFACE

This research, as all research, is the joint product of many efforts. It is thus proper and appropriate that the author note with thanks the numerous supports which have made the final product possible.

Financial Support

During this last year, the candidate was the recipient of a National Institutes of Health Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, which enabled him to spend virtually full time on the project. In addition, the candidate received a grant from the National Science Foundation (GS-1407) to help defray the technical expenses of coding, and computer programming and processing. The expense of some coding was shared with the Center for Urban Studies, Sarah Lawrence College, and some initial coding was performed by the United Community Funds and Councils of America.

Data

The data was graciously provided through the Research and Statistics Division of the United Community Funds and Councils of America in New York. Mr. Arthur Jette, Associate Director of that Division, deserves special thanks for his consistently knowledgeable advice and assistance. The original questionnaire used here was prepared by the Research and Statistics Division, with the consultation of Professor Morris Janowitz, of The University of Chicago, and Professor Mayer Zald, of Vanderbilt University.

Consultation

Many people participated in discussing with the candidate various aspects of the research. Professor Mayhew provided criticism and encouragement. Up-

on him fell the onerous task of reading the first drafts of chapters. His acute observations were cogent and reasoned, and never failed to improve the work. Professor Collver provided expert guidance in difficult and complex methodological problems, especially in the area of organization-community relationships. Professor Meyer, along with Professor Eugene Litwak, provided a theoretical framework on which this study is (loosely) based. Professor Rothman's knowledge of Councils kept the study focused on the Council as a unique organization.

In addition to members of the committee, others participated in helping the candidate. Robert E. Marrone provided expert help in computer programming. Professor James C. Lingoes, of The University of Michigan, provided the computer program on which the analysis in Chapter VIII is based, and, in addition, much helpful consultation. Special thanks are due to Professor Shimon Spiro of The Hebrew University and Professor Darrel Vorwaller of The University of Chicago. Long discussions with them helped to clarify and focus the research problem. I should also mention Mr. Elmer J. Tropman. A Council executive himself, he has been consistently unwilling to settle for "what everyone knows" about Councils, and provided the candidate with the benefit of his long experience with them. Finally, I must mention Penelope Tropman. She read every tedious word many times, and her criticism was always correct, and often painful; her support was unfailing.

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INTRODUCTION

This study is a comparative analysis of 154 Welfare Councils or Councils of Social Agencies in the United States. Although these Councils exist in every major American city, our ignorance about them represents an important lacuna in substantive organizational knowledge. While mental hospitals, public assistance agencies, and even the Community Chest have been studied more or less intensively, the Council has not received such attention.* This study is an attempt to fill this gap, and additionally, to contribute to the literature on comparative organizational analysis and interorganizational analysis.

The overall approach starts from the notion that the Council is an institution. As such, it is part of a web of interrelationships which includes the matrix of local interactions plus those national organizational and professional interests which are especially relevant to it. It is something which is valued and evaluated and thus has a place in the "Structure of Social Action." It is an important organization, if a controversial one, in the modern community. The implications of this view for the study of organizations are best expressed by Selznick:

When we say that...(an organization)...is to be studied as an institution we usually mean that we are going to pay some attention to its history and the way it has been influenced by its social environment. Thus we may be interested to know how an organization adapts itself to existing centers of power in the community...;from what strata of society its leadership is drawn and how this affects its policies;...We may ask what underlying need in the larger community - not necessarily recognized or expressed by the people involved - is filled by the organization and some of its practices.**

*On mental hospitals, see Alfred H. Stanton, M. D., and Morris S. Schwartz, The Mental Hospital (New York: Basic Books, 1954); for public assistance agencies, see Peter Blau and W. R. Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964); for community chests, see John R. Seeley, et. al., Community Chest (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1954).

**Phillip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper, Row, 1957), p. 6.

In other words, there is an interaction between the internal structure of the organization, its mission and role, and elements of the community in which it lives. This point of view has implications which have not always been explored by students of organization. To "understand" (even in the Weberian sense) the nature of an organization, it is necessary to appreciate this interaction between internal and external systems. It is not possible, for example, to understand the structure of the Public Assistance agency without taking into account the immense public hostility toward the client group of poor people which it serves. A similar point could be made for studies of mental hospitals. The questions Selznick posed, in sensitizing us to this point, serve as a guide to this inquiry.

More specifically, we are interested in the overall structure and nature of a formal organization called the Welfare Council, especially as its structure is in effect a formalized solution to "problems" which it finds in its environment.* A second goal is to assess the extent to which any specific Council is responsive to or affected by problems, needs, or other characteristics of its specific community. The full achievement of this second goal is inhibited by the absence of data on other organizations in that specific community. Thus, only a beginning analysis of Council-community relations will be undertaken here, but one which will, hopefully, permit the identification of gross patterns of interaction and point the direction for future research.

*James Thompson and W. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and the Environment" in A. Etzioni, Ed., Complex Organizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1962); B. Clark, "Organizational Adaptation to Precarious Values," in Ibid.; J. Gusfield, "Social Structure and Moral Reform," American Journal of Sociology, LXI, 3 (Nov., 1958); Phillip Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1953); A. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," in J. March, Ed., The Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

Summary

In this monograph, therefore, we have several goals. One is to develop an understanding, in empirical terms, of the Welfare Council. However, as is implied in the foregoing, we do not wish to end with the Council. Nothing is as limited as a study of a single organization. Thus, a second goal of the research is to relate the findings and analysis to the area of organizational studies generally speaking, and especially to the relatively "under-developed area" of organization-environment relationships. In short, we hope to move beyond a simple description of the Council to some statements of how the Council, and correlatively, organizations like the Council, are structured and how they relate to their environment.

A third goal of the study is to contribute to the area of comparative organizational analysis, as such. A sample of 154 organizations is large from this perspective, and we hope to explore new means for batch-analysis of organizational data of this sort. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, the technique of "facet analysis" developed by Louis Guttman seems appropriate here, and we shall experiment with a new computer program developed by Professor James C. Lingoes, which compares many individual organizations on a variety of dimensions and ascertains whether or not there are distinct "types" of organizations.

Chapter I introduces appropriate conceptual materials and ends with a description of a "typical" Council, to orient the reader to the empirical dimensions of the specific organization under study. Chapter II will present a discussion of methodology, and end with a brief summary before we begin to discuss the actual data.

CHAPTER I

THE WELFARE COUNCIL

To develop an understanding of the Welfare Council, we need to differentiate it from the many other organizations which exist in the local community. As a point of departure, the work of Blau and Scott is contemporary and suggestive. They advocate a typology of organizations according to the organization's prime benefactor.* One class of organization has, as the prime benefactor, "The Public," and organizations in that class are called commonweal organizations. The Welfare Council would qualify as one of the large group of commonweal organizations.

Types of Organizations

Commonweal organizations, according to Blau and Scott, present a problem of democratic control since the public is not always able to exercise meaningful control over them. The same problem, phrased from the point of view of the organization itself, relates to the degree of organizational receptivity to environmental influence. Such receptivity or openness is a crucial issue for commonweal organizations, and one would expect that there would be some variation among them in the degree of receptivity or openness they manifest. The Red Cross, for example, has a routinized pattern for dealing with disaster relief which varies little from community to community, often annoying local groups.** On the other hand, some commonweal organizations are likely to be highly sensitized to local needs and pressures. It appears useful, therefore, to further differentiate the class of commonweal

*Blau and Scott, Formal Organizations, op. cit. pp. 43 ff.

**Wm. Form and S. Nosow, Community in Disaster (New York: Harper Bros., 1958).

organizations according to their openness to public influence. Two key variables seem useful here—the location of resources and the type of authorization.

Location of Resources

If an organization receives its major resources from the local community, then it is likely to be influenced by that community. Conversely, organizations which have financial (and other) resources outside the local community, and which are thus only marginally dependent upon it, have a great deal of latitude in their actions. Again, the Red Cross can afford to pursue a course which is obnoxious to a particular community because it can put into that local organization resources raised elsewhere. And while it cannot alienate every community, it is safe to say that the Red Cross, as an organization, is more independent of the local community than the Community Chest.*

Nature of Authorization (Power)

Aside from the availability of outside resources, there is another variable which affects the organization's receptivity to local pressures—its source of authority. If an organization has a legal mandate, or legal authority to do a job, and this mandate has been authoritatively accepted, either over time or through the courts, or both, then it is more independent of local preferences than an organization which has to develop its mandate as part of its ongoing task. Schools, for example, have such a mandate. So do the fire and police departments. In the case of the police, the nature of the mandate has recently undergone legal revision and limitation by the Supreme Court, and it is currently the subject of considerable debate. But

*Rein and Morris have recently made a similar point. See: M. Rein and R. Morris, "Goals, Structures, and Strategies for Community Change," Social Work Practice - 1962 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963) pp. 127-145.

all of these organizations, despite dispute, have authority in law to do what they do.

On the other hand, there are many organizations, or departments or bureaus within organizations, which do not have such authoritative guidance. The Welfare Council, for example, is an organization which has no specific grant of authority from any legitimating source.* And while the absence of such authoritative direction gives the organization a freedom to interpret its role in a way not enjoyed by other organizations, it also leaves the organization in a very vulnerable position, because these interpretations can be attacked by almost anyone, especially if other competing organizations are going to be disadvantaged or threatened by an interpretation. This vulnerability however, is precisely vulnerability to local pressures. Thus we would expect that those organizations which do not have authoritative power would be more sensitive to the local community than organizations which have an authoritative power base. These considerations are summarized in Figure 1.1.

FIGURE 1.1. A TYPOLOGY OF COMMONWEAL ORGANIZATIONS—THEIR RECEPTIVITY TO LOCAL INFLUENCE AS PREDICTED BY SOURCE OF POWER AND SOURCE OF MAJOR RESOURCES.

Nature of Authorization (Power)	Source of Major Resources	
	Nonlocal	Local
Authoritative	<u>Low Receptivity</u> Field Office Type e.g.: Red Cross Army	<u>Moderate Receptivity</u> Public Type e.g.: schools, police
	<u>Moderate Receptivity</u> Cause Type e.g.: Planned Parenthood	<u>High Receptivity</u> Broker Type e.g.: Welfare Council Council of Churches Health Planning Council Housing Planning Group
Nonauthoritative		

*Seeley, et al., Community Chest, op. cit., p. 241 ff.

As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the class of organization least sensitive to local pressures is the field office organization. Those organizations with the greatest potential for articulation with the local community are the broker organizations, the classification to which the Council belongs.

The Broker Organization

Broker organizations, as a subclass of organizations, have many points in common. To understand the broker organization generally is to understand the Council in many crucial ways. In general, broker organizations are "agents which assemble goods and services from a variety of sources and deliver them to a particular buyer, or user."* The local community center might be one kind of example. More generally, the Council gathers legitimacy, influence, and other resources from diverse local suppliers and uses them as tools in the solutions of specific community problems. The immediate beneficiary might be a particular agency, or interagency network, with the total community seen as the ultimate beneficiary.

Characteristics of the Broker Organization

While there will doubtless be differences as between particular organizations, broker organizations in general have several common characteristics. First, the broker organization is usually seen as a control organization in some functional area—health, health and welfare combined, housing, race relations and/or civil rights, and so on.** It has "members" which are either interested individuals from the community, or organizations which are working in the functional area, or, more than likely, both. The task of the broker

*I am indebted to Professor Collver for this phrase.

**Sayre and Kaufman refer to the welfare council as the "peak" organization of health and welfare organizations. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage, 1960), p. 258.

organization is usually assumed to be one of "planning and coordination" for the functional area, and of representing this sector at intersector meetings. The exact nature of this charge is very difficult to interpret in programmatic terms. The Council has no "authority" to coordinate, or see that its "plans" are accepted, or implemented. Thus, Banfield and Wilson comment that the civic association (or broker organization)"...is held together largely, or even entirely, by general, non-material inducements... Having no specific inducements the organization cannot put its members under strict discipline."*

Thus, this "central" position has important limitations. The degree to which the Community Council of Greater New York can effectively speak for, and coordinate the activities of, the health and welfare agencies of that community is problematic. Politically, one might describe the position of the Council as analogous to the Federal Government under the Articles of Confederation. Broker organizations, including the Council, are regularly unable to compete with the organizational self-interest of their member organizations and those in the functional area.** In their discussion of nongovernmental groups, Sayre and Kaufman note that "... on the whole, they (civic associations) tend to act autonomously with respect to one another, even when their positions on particular issues coincide." "Nevertheless," the authors add, "coordinative machinery of a limited kind does exist."***

A second characteristic of the broker organization is that it has a heavy input of volunteers, both on the board of directors and on various committees.**** This influx of laity is not motivated by financial gain on the

*Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 251.

**In the literature, this tendency has been called "subsystem identification" by Selznick and "Autonomy" by Gouldner. See: P. Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grass Roots, op. cit., and A. Gouldner, "Autonomy and Reciprocity in Sociological Analysis" in L. Gross, Symposium in Sociological Theory. (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1959).

***Sayre and Kaufman, op. cit., p. 496.

****Actually, this use of volunteers varies. It is certainly true of the Council and may be more or less true of other broker organizations.

part of the volunteer, but by the feeling that he or she is contributing to the community, and, from the organizational side, by its need to have citizen involvement as a part of the legitimizing process, thus helping it to define and carry out its mandate. If the lay people come too frequently from the functional area of speciality, the broker organization will lose a certain community wide legitimacy which lay people provide. Thus, Welfare Councils, in 1963, had only 11% of their boards made up of persons from the health and welfare professions (see Table 1.1).

Third, the broker organization, because of its dependence on local funding, tends to become identified with its major source of financial support. Thus over-time, it may lose some of its middleman status. Councils of Churches are known as "church organizations," Chambers of Commerce are known as "business organizations," and the Welfare Council is known as a private social work organization. Indeed, in the Council field this identification reaches its logical conclusion in those communities where the Council is organizationally merged with the Chest/Fund. This is the case, for example, in Ann Arbor, Michigan. And in general, many people do not know whether or not their local Council is different from the Community Chest. Such over-identification motivates the Council, and we would presume, other broker organizations, to seek a diversified source of funding wherever possible.

Fourth, because the broker organization generally, and the Welfare Council specifically is charged with "planning and coordination," it does not have a mission and role which is easy to interpret.* Indeed, the charge remains on the level of rhetoric in many instances. The problem lies in the multiplicity of possible interpretations as to exactly what specific actions are mandated

*There is, of course, some variation in the specificity of mission and role. Hospital planning Councils and Chambers of Commerce have a somewhat more specific task.

by "planning and coordination." Already vulnerable because of the lack of an authoritative allocation of power, the broker organization is further aggravated over the vague charge and expectations surrounding the notions of planning and coordination. Usually everyone is for coordination, as long as they themselves are not involved. Often, when the United Nations wishes to consider a matter, the nations involved declare it to be a purely internal matter; agencies and other organizations take the same course when the Council is interested in some of their activities. Because of this vagueness of program, the Council, and other broker organizations, can be expected to provide a small number of "common services" which would generally be regarded as helpful in the community and which would focus and concretize the organization somewhat.*

Finally, and due in main part to the items we have just been discussing, the broker organization finds itself with a case of "role conflict." On the one hand, people expect it to "do something," to prove itself; to act with boldness and courage. On the other hand, it is dependent upon limited local resources; it has no authoritative mandate; it has members of various stripes who must be consulted about any action; and it has no way to enforce its will, once it has made that will public. Should it begin to "act with boldness and courage" it might soon find itself acting alone, and then not acting at all. Indeed, the very names of broker organizations—Welfare Councils, Councils of Churches—suggest deliberation rather than action. The paradoxical demand from the community that the coordinating agencies "do something" and its simultaneous unwillingness to provide either the stature or the authority with which something might be done is one of the continual agonies of the broker organization.

*Common services would be statistical services, or referral services, or general publicity, etc.

Implications: The previous discussion has identified and discussed five key characteristics of the Welfare Councils. From these considerations it is possible to develop certain hypotheses about the nature of the Council, which will be tested with available data.

1. The broker organization, because of its fundamental problem of legitimacy, lives an organizational life of very great uncertainty. We expect to find that the organization tries to prepare itself insofar as possible to cope with this uncertainty.
2. One pattern of response to the legitimacy/uncertainty problem will be an attempt to tie into the local power structure in some manner, most typically through the board of directors.
3. Another type of response will be an attempt to widen the base of financial support so as to become less identified with the primary funding source, in this case, the Chest/Fund.*
4. A third attempt will involve establishing an organizational structure which was not preprogrammed into divisions or other fixed units, but which leaves personnel relatively free to respond to local community demands.
5. Of a somewhat different genre, the broker organization will try to overcome the legitimacy/uncertainty problem by "selling" the community its own idea of its mission and role; in short, to somehow coopt the community through providing Council definitions which are accepted by the community. This is possible if the community is not sure what the Council should do anyway, and is thus receptive to someone who has a specific program of activity.

*The Chamber of Commerce, for example, receives money from many different business and industrial concerns.

6. This cooperation might be attempted through the use of a profession in the Council. Professional inputs bring with them the society-wide legitimacy of the profession itself, and do not depend upon the sanctioning of the local community.

The Council, then, as a broker organization, will in some way move to cope with these problems of uncertainty. We would expect that to see at least the mechanisms just noted, although there may indeed be more "coping traits" uncovered. In sum, the broker organization goes about its business sensitive to a particular set of organizational problems it must continually face. We should be able to interpret many of the patterns of organizational action as attempts to come to terms with these problems.

The Organizational Structure of the Welfare Council

We have located the Council in a position vis a vis the other organizations in the local community, and we have considered some of the structural implications of that position. We now need to conceptualize the structure of the organization itself. Broker organizations, or any other type, are functioning systems of interrelated parts and elements, which functioning is more or less organized and directed by organizational goals and policy. Scott says that "...organizations are defined as collectivities (in Parsons' [1950] sense of the term) that have been established for the pursuit of objectives on a more or less continuous basis."* Considered as a directed system, then, the organization has "needs" which must be met if the organization is to survive. Three broad groupings of "needs" seem to be important and serve as a way of conceptualizing the Council: 1. resources, or the materials the organization needs to operate at all; 2. the need for internal structuring, or a format

*W. P. Scott, "Theory of Organizations" in Robert E. L. Faris, Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 488.

to process resources for task accomplishment; and 3. the need for some program activities, or "output," or "product." This tripartite scheme not only has a certain functional unity to recommend it. It also has isolated groups of variables—those at the boundary of the organization in resources and program activities—which are most likely to be influenced by the community. As a test of this hypothesis, we would expect that the internal structural variables would be more highly correlated with each other than would be the case with resource variables or program activity variables.* The particular variables chosen as fitting into each category can be seen in Figure 1.2.

FIGURE 1.2. A CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE WELFARE COUNCIL ORGANIZATION.

I. Resources

- A. Size of Staff
 - 1. Regular (2)**
 - 2. Special Project (4)
- B. Income
 - 1. Total Income (108)
 - 2. Financial Structure (98)-(107)
- C. The Board of Directors
 - 1. Occupational Distribution (111)-(119)
 - 2. Power (122)

II. Organization Structure

- A. Task Structure (6)-(13)
- B. Training Structure (15)-(23)
- C. Divisional Structure (72)
- D. Independence Structure (63)

III. Activities

- A. Agency Assessment and Change (128)
- B. Services to Special Groups (127)
- C. Chronic Illness (125)
- D. Rehabilitation Services (126)
- E. Services to Indigent (124)
- F. Legislative Activity (129)
- G. Relationship to Agency Budgeting
 - 1. Private Agencies (81)
 - 2. Public Agencies (89)
- H. Programs Under other Auspices (62)

*See Tables 6.1a-6.1d, for a partial confirmation of this hypothesis.

**The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of the specific variable to be used. The reader is referred to the questionnaire in Appendix I for the actual measure.

Resources

Every organization needs resources with which to operate. Without them, the organization comes to a halt. Money is needed for salaries and routine supplies. In addition, an organization needs support from the community, or at least from some elements of it. Neither the organization, nor the individual person, can exist in a completely hostile environment.

Income and Staff

One major resource, then, is money. This can be measured through the total income of the Council. Further, we are interested in the "mix" of funds, or the various sources of dollar inputs. A second major resource, purchased with money, is staff. The number of regular "professional" full time equivalent personnel is an important feature of an organization. The word "professional" is placed in quotes because it refers to those people who have professional responsibilities in the organization, and not to secretaries and clerks. In addition, it is important to know the number of equivalent full time special project people the organization has on its staff.

The Board of Directors*

A third and important grouping of resources is the board of directors. The board, seen by Parsons as serving an institutional function for the organization, is especially important for broker organizations.** Because of its lack of authoritative power, the broker organization needs to legitimize itself through the cooptation of community leaders. That is why it is so important for the Council to have a prestigious and influential board. In fact, so important is this function of the board that one writer suggests

*For a discussion of boards of Welfare Agencies, see Sandford L. Kravitz, "Sources of Leadership Input for Social Welfare Planning, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Brandeis University, 1963.

**Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

that Council staffs work to create top leadership so that they can subsequently use it. Norton Long comments:

The staff man at...the Red Feather Agency cannot proceed on his own; he must have the legitimizing sponsorship of top influentials. His task may be self-assigned, and his perception of the problem and its solution his own, but he cannot gain acceptance without mobilizing the top influentials. For the success of his game, he must assist in creating the game of top leadership.*

In short, the board provides, and in fact is itself, the legitimacy for the Council to act. And, in addition, the board is the route through which the Council makes connections with other segments of the community, such as labor, media, etc., from which it may need on occasion, specific support.

Operationally, there are two measures of the board of directors available. One is the occupational location of the individual board member in one of nine industry segments; these are: business and industry, elected public officials, religious, labor, media, "professional," public administration, welfare and health, and higher education. Assessing the kinds of callings pursued by the board members should provide some notions of the kind of legitimacy and support the Council is seeking in a particular community.

The other measure is a rating. Each board member was rated by the Council executive as to whether he or she was a "top community leader." In a gross sense, this is an attempt to measure the "power" of the board. And while the reputational method thus invoked does leave something to be desired, it does, on the other hand, provide us with some sense of the variability of boards along the power dimension.

*Norton Long, The Polity (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), p. 150. (Actually this book is just a reprint of Long's older essays. This quote comes from his classic piece, "The Community as an Ecology of Games." Doubtless it is also true that "top leadership" seeks in part to create the "Council game," so that it can have a proving ground for junior executives.)

However, one might ask if it is appropriate to conceive of the board of directors as a "resource." A somewhat fugitive, but growing literature supports this contention. First, there is the Parsons analysis, which provides implicit support.* Then, there is the analysis of community elites by Auerbach, who notes the connection between the powerful Mellon interests in Pittsburgh and the success of local community projects.** (Indeed, so pervasive is the Mellon influence in Pittsburgh that some knowledgeable sophisticates refer to Pittsburgh as "The Mellon Patch.") Vaughn Blakenmanship, authoring one chapter in Presthus' Men at the Top, notes the connection between the success of hospital planning activity and the support of power leaders.*** Most recently, William Gamson, writing on "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics," explicitly makes this connection.****

These four resources, then, money, staff, board membership, and power are needed by the Council—or any broker organization—to carry out its work.***** Deficiencies in any one may lead to deficiencies in the others, creating a downward spiral of organizational malnutrition.

Internal Structure

The internal structure of the organization has four aspects which are of interest here: Task Structure; Training Structure; Divisional Structure; and Independence.

*Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, op. cit.

**Arnold J. Auerbach, "Power and Progress in Pittsburgh," Transaction, 2,6 (September/October, 1965), p. 15.

***R. Presthus, Men at the Top (New York: Oxford, 1964), Ch. 11.

****William Gamson, "Reputation and Resources in Community Politics," American Journal of Sociology LXXII,2 (September, 1966).

*****In the Council field, some people may not distinguish the "Council" from the "board," feeling that the staff and the board together form the Council. We take the view that the board is a part of the Council, but does not define it.

Task Structure

The Welfare Council is what one might call a horizontally bureaucratized organization.* It has a flat structure with a fairly wide span of control. Supervision is accomplished indirectly through professional training (or in-service training) rather than through hierarchy. The task structure itself is a set of task categories over which, or into which, staff may be deployed.

The following categories are conventionally used by welfare councils:

(1) executive, administrative, and planning; (2) information and referral; (3) volunteer bureau; (4) social service exchange; (5) research; (6) budget analysis; and (7) public relations. Apart from the special projects undertaken by the Council, these are the major bureaus in the Council "bureaucracy." That they are differentially staffed reflects the difference in importance they hold in terms of Council policy and goals. We can measure the number of persons in each category.

Training Structure**

Little attention has been paid to the educational and professional backgrounds of staff as a feature of organizational analysis. Perhaps students of organization consider it an obvious feature of the organization. In any case, the style and patterning of recruitment to an organization may tell much about the organization's conception of its mission and role. The Council hires people with the following kinds of training backgrounds: (1) Ph.D.; (2) Ph.D.—M.S.W.; (3) D.S.W.; (4) M.S.W.; (5) A.M.; (6) A.B.; (7) one year of Social Work; (8) non-A.B. Thus, the number of people with different kinds

*This kind of structure is relatively typical of most organizations which have to be prepared to deal with non-routine events. Litwak calls them "human relations organizations." Eugene Litwak, "Models of Bureaucracy Which Permit Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, LXVII, 2 (September, 1961).

**Alternatively, one might call this staff composition. We have used the term "structure" because the Council controls the input of types of staff. Thus, it is not a random assortment of people, but a grouping which has, as we shall see, some internal logic to it.

of educational and professional backgrounds is a variable.

Divisional Structure

When the Councils were set up in the early part of this century, they were organized into divisions, commonly including family and child welfare; health; and group and recreation activities. This internal division of labor, which refers to the planning staff, by and large mirrored the division of labor in the private welfare system as a whole. Indeed, the existence of this articulation between internal organizational structure and community organizational structure is empirical support for the line of argument presented earlier in this chapter. Over the years, however, the social welfare system changed, and the Council found itself with an internal structure which hampered, rather than helped, its relationships with the total welfare system. Rather than have divisions—an organizational style which approached social problems from the viewpoint of the services and agencies which dealt with them—councils began to favor a structure of ad hoc committees, which would start with the problem itself, and investigate all aspects of the community which impinged upon it. Such an approach would certainly be more swift to spot lacunae in the service system, something which did not exist according to agencies. In 1957, 77.6% of the Councils reporting to the United Community Funds and Councils of America had divisions; in 1963, this proportion had decreased to 34.4%.* It is important, then, to assess the presence or absence of divisions as a feature of Council internal structure.

*See: Facts on Community Welfare Councils, 1957, Bulletin No. 204 (New York: The United Community Funds and Councils of America, 1958), Table 9, p. 8. This is only data for the 1957 proportion. The data for 1963 comes from the present study.

Independence

Structurally speaking the Council can occupy three positions vis a vis the Chest/Fund. One possibility is complete corporate independence, with separate executives, separate offices, etc. The second possibility is that it is quasi-merged. Here, the Council is part of the Chest/Fund but there is a separate executive in charge of community planning. Finally, the Council can be completely merged with the Chest/Fund.* In this case, the two organizations have the same executive, who oversees two departments—fund raising (Chest) and planning (Council). It is almost axiomatic in the trade that the closer, structurally, a Council gets to the Chest, the more the Council planning and coordination function recedes in the face of the fund raising activities. We shall assess this opinion, looking at the resources and program activities of councils as they become more closely associated with the chest.

Program Activities

Every organization needs to engage in some kind of activity. It produces something, it sells something, it offers some kind of service. The "activities" of an organization might also be called its "task" or "goal" in another context. For the Council, the program in which it engages constitutes its activities. Because of the possibility of terminological confusion, which might equate activities with organizational structure generally conceived, we shall use the term "program activities" to refer to the area of organizational behavior defined above. Several types of Welfare Council program activities are available for analysis. These include:

- (A) Family and Child Welfare Services;
- (B) Health Services;

*There are a very few (3%) "other" types of arrangements.

(C) Recreation and Group Services.*

As a group, these three areas contain a total of 24 separate program areas into which the Council may move. In addition, there are other areas of program activity:

(D) Legislative Activities

The Council may engage in various kinds of legislative activity, from providing information about a bill to trying to influence its passage or defeat. The degree of activity can be measured.

(E) Budget Participation

The Council may participate in the budget hearings of private and public agencies, although the former is more common than the latter. Whether or not they participated can be ascertained.

(F) Projects Typically Under other Auspices

Often, the Council will run or participate in program activities which most frequently are located under other auspices—such as housing and urban development, delinquency and drop-out problems, and multi problem families. The number of such programs they undertook can be measured.

Types of programs is one dimension; however, we are also interested in the degree of involvement which a Council has in a program. For the majority of cases (A)-(D) above we can make some assessment of the major phases of organizational activity. These major phases are three: (1) general education activity; (2) problem consideration; and (4)* action to implement recommendations. The first kind of activity is the mildest. It makes available literature on the issue, brings it to public attention, etc. Problem con-

*This grouping of program activities is the one used in the questionnaire. It is not the grouping which we ultimately used. See Appendix I.

**The phases are numbered 1, 2, and 4 because the numbers serve as the basis of a geometric coding scheme.

sideration is the phase where the Council has appointed a committee to consider the issue. This committee will produce recommendations for improvements. "Action to implement recommendations" implies that the Council, having studied the problem and having arrived at some recommendations, moves to get its program accepted. This latter activity moves the Council from the fact-finding arena into the action arena.

Implications

At this juncture, there are some hypothetical conclusions which can be drawn about the overall relationships of variables in the tripartite scheme.

1. That the variables which we have picked are, in fact, central ones in terms of the Council organization.

2. That, because the internal structural variables are those over which the organization has greatest control, they will show the highest degree of cohesion and intragroup relationship; conversely, that because organizational resources and organizational program activities are not as tightly controlled by the organization, they will show less intragroup cohesion. For example, the presence of one resource may or may not be related to another resource, independently of what the Council would wish in the matter.

3. That, because the organization resources and organizational program activities are boundary functions, having contact with the outside, they will show less intragroup cohesion than the internal structural variables.

These hypotheses serve to outline the major structural relationships among the variable set which we would expect. They provide a point of departure for analysis, and guide our expectations.

A Description of the Council

As a conclusion to this chapter, and as a precursor to a discussion of the empirical material, a description of the current dimensions of the Council effort would be in order.* Such a description would orient the reader to the scope and nature of the present Council organization.

The first Council was founded in 1908 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.** Its original function was to maintain a central listing of clients who were receiving financial relief from various agencies in the city to prevent any duplication of service, and the client from receiving more than he "deserved." In addition, it brought together the directors and staff of the various social work agencies for periodic conferences.

The Council of today is at the nexus of a welfare domain which is real but has somewhat fuzzy boundaries. Its function is "...to organize community resources to meet community (welfare) needs."***

Overall, the dimensions of the Council can be seen in Tables 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. The 154 Councils in this study had, in 1963, a collective budget of \$12,945,632. Of this amount, approximately 9 million (70%) comes from the general operating funds of the local Community Chest or United Fund. That, overall, the Council receives 70% of all its monies from the local Chest/

*Welfare councils have been discussed at various places in the sociological literature. See: John R. Seeley, et al., Community Chest, op. cit.; Roland Warren, The Community in America (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), esp. pp. 203-204 and 332-333; Harold Wilensky and Charles Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social Welfare (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1958), and Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

**F. J. Ferris, "Correspondence," Social Service Review, xxxvi, 1 (March 1962). There is debate about the location of the first Council, but Ferris' opinion is generally accepted.

***This phrase is from the famous "Lane Report" of 1939. See: Russell Kurtz, Ed., Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work, 1939 (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1940), pp. 495-511. See also Monna Heath and Arthur Dunham, Trends in Community Organization (Chicago: The School of Social Service Administration, The University of Chicago, 1963).

Fund lends some support to the popular identification of the Council with the Chest/Fund.

TABLE 1.1
A DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF COUNCIL RESOURCE VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Item	Mean	S.D.
<u>Council Size</u>		
(2) Total, Regular Executive*	3.62	6.19 persons
(4) Total, Special Project	0.91	4.25 persons
<u>Income</u>		
(108) Total, 1963	\$84,063.00	\$150,354.00
(98) Chest, General Operating	58,012.00	92,969.00
(99)-(107) Other	26,051.00	± 3,000.00

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Service Board

(111) Welfare and Health	11.55%	10.40%
(112) Public Administration	7.77%	6.34%
(113) Higher Education	3.97%	5.78%
(114) Religious	4.66%	3.37%

Entrepeneurial Board

(115) Business and Industry	34.00%	15.66%
(116) Labor	2.15%	2.78%
(117) Professional	22.24%	9.96%
(118) Media	2.35%	2.72%
(119) Elected Public Official	1.78%	3.10%
	91.47%**	

Power of the Board

(120) Percent Top Community Leader	36.94%	21.10%
(123) Percent Male on Board	71.98%	19.21%
(64) Size of Board	30.06 persons	11.00 persons

*Every variable used in this study has a separate number. The reader may refer to the questionnaire code book in Appendix I to see the particular variable. In the case that we have constructed a variable by combining several variables from the questionnaire, the new variable has its own identification number, and the variables which compose it are listed in Appendix I.

**The total percent is less than 100% because there was no occupational information given in about 9% of the cases.

TABLE 1.2

A DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF COUNCIL INTERNAL STRUCTURAL
VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Mean	S.D.
<u>Task Structure</u>		
(6) Exec., Admin., and Planning	2.29 persons	3.15 persons
(7) Information and Referral	.29	.07
(10) Research	.43	1.00
(8) Volunteer Bureau	.24	.59
(12) Public Relations	.01	.03
(11) Budget Analysis	.01	.03
(9) Social Service Exchange	.004	.18
<u>Training Structure</u>		
(18) Masters of Social Work	2.11	2.94
(21) College Graduate (AB)	.75	1.54
(19) Masters of Arts (AM)	.60	1.05
(20) One year of Social Work	.27	.92
(22) Non-college Graduate (Non-AB)	.25	.68
(15) Doctor of Social Work (DSW)	.005	.22
(16) Doctor of Philosophy— Masters of Social Work (PhD-MSW)	.002	.16
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	.005	.26

TABLE 1.3

A DESCRIPTIVE PROFILE OF COUNCIL PROGRAM ACTIVITY
VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Activity Area	0*	1-3	4-7	Total
(124) Indigent				
N	37	84	33	154
%	24	55	21	100%
(125) Chronic Illness				
N	38	94	22	154
%	24	62	14	100%
(126) Rehabilitation Services				
N	29	84	41	154
%	18	56	26	100%
(127) Service for Special Groups				
N	31	102	21	154
%	20	67	13	100%
(128) Agency Services				
N	44	74	36	154
%	28	49	23	100%

*The columns represent degrees of effort in an activity;
see Chapter 5 for a complete explanation.

The 154 Councils had, collectively, 4,770 board members, of whom 72% were male. In terms of staffing, they had a total of 558 persons employed on the regular professional staff, and another 139 engaged in special projects of some sort. In 1963 there were 364 Councils in the United States; of this number, our sample of 154 is just under half. Most of the Councils in the larger cities are represented, and smaller proportions from the smaller communities are represented. To give an overview of the Council, one might think in terms of the average Council. This Council, like the unicorn, is something of a mythical beast. Yet thinking in average terms does give a sense of dimensionality to the organization.*

The average Council is 25 years old.** It is small, having a total of 3.6 professional staff on a regular basis, and one person working on special projects. It has an income of \$84,000 per year. It has a variety of callings represented on the board of directors. However, people from business and industry are most prominent, making up 34% of the board, with a loose "professional" category following closely with 22%, and health and welfare third with 11%. The remaining board members are scattered among 6 other occupational groupings. The board is heavily male (72%) and has about 30 members. About 36% of the board members might be rated as a "top community leader."

The staff itself is heavily social work oriented. On the average, 2 of every 3.6 staff people have social work degrees, and the others are most likely to have a college degree or an A.M. In terms of task assignment, the staff works primarily from one large task category, the one called executive,

*The reader is cautioned that there are important diversities in the Councils, as the standard deviations suggest. The "average" Council is a creation for purposes of the most general introduction only.

**Age of Council was originally included as a variable, but it was a rather unfertile one, so it was not used.

planning, and administration. About one person divides his time between volunteer bureau, information and referral service, and research, with about half time spent in research. In one case out of three, the Council will have a divisional structure; in one out of two it will be merged with the Chest/Fund. In terms of program activities, the Council works in a number of substantive problem areas, but to a moderate degree. Such areas include those noted previously in the discussion of Council activities.

This final summary of a "typical" Council, then, gives us a sense of the organization. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, there are many senses in which there is no such thing as a typical Council, but, if nothing else, casting the analysis in this light provides a useful point of departure.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In this study, there are three general areas of methodological concern, each quite distinct from the other. Initial concern centers on the nature and adequacy of the Welfare Council data. Are the available measurements of its resources, structure, and activities sufficient for the task at hand? The fact that this study is a secondary analysis using data from a questionnaire which the author did not construct poses special problems in this regard.

Secondly, the notion that the Council lives in a community and is influenced by it requires the development of a community data set, if the notion is to be tested in an empirical manner. The development of this data set is not an easy task. It involves, on the one hand, the theoretical difficulties of defining "The Community," and on the other hand, the assembling of data for the area theoretically defined.

Finally, the overall design of analysis is a matter for careful attention. This study uses a relatively new form of data analysis—sometimes called "molar correlational analysis," or "pattern" analysis, and its dimensions need to be carefully explored. This chapter attends to these three areas.

Council Data

The data on Welfare Councils were collected through the administration of a questionnaire during 1963, mailed to the men who were executives of the

Councils in that year.* The collection was under the auspices of, and at the the direction of, the Research and Statistics Division of The United Community Funds and Councils of America. (This organization is headquartered in New York City, and virtually all the Councils and Chests in The United States are members of it.) The questionnaire was prepared by the staff of that division, with the advice and assistance of Professor Morris Janowitz of the Department of Sociology, The University of Chicago, and Professor Mayer Zald, of the Department of Sociology, Vanderbilt University.

An Organizational Inventory

In effect, the data are, and should be considered as, an organizational inventory. Often such inventories are narrowly conceived and partially executed, producing data patently inadequate for sociological analysis. In this case, however, the questionnaire was a very thorough one. The combined efforts of persons with intimate knowledge of the Council and two sociologists with experience in organizational analysis resulted in a questionnaire of exceptional scope and depth, eminently suited to "secondary analysis," if indeed that term is appropriate here.

The Executive as Informant

The questionnaire was completed either by the executive personally, or under his direction and responsibility. Normally, he would be considered as the "respondent" in survey research, but here it seems more appropriate to consider him as a knowledgeable "informant" on his organization. He was not "responding" to personal questions about himself, his opinions or actions, but to impersonal questions about the resources, structure, and activities of his organization.

*The questionnaire and code book is reprinted in full in Appendix I.

In only one case—the rating of the board members as "top community leaders"—was his "opinion" tapped in any significant sense. Here, leaving the role of "informant" creates special problems. The executive was asked to decide whether each board member was a "top community leader" or not. Since no definition was provided for the concept of "top community leader," each man was required to develop his own denotation of that term. Whether or not each one understood it in the same way is difficult to say, but it is certainly unlikely. In this case, then a certain lack of uniformity is introduced into the response set. Further, it is quite possible that there would be a tendency for the executive to "overrate" his board, as there is a certain "second order" prestige in having prestigious people on the board. Certain external checks tend to validate the responses overall, and the gross mean percent of board members rated as "top community leaders"—about 30%—does not suggest any wholesale overinclusion.

Year of Collection

The data were collected in, and with reference to, the calendar year of 1963. That this particular year was used has some advantages and disadvantages for us. It was just before the heavy influx of Federal planning money through the President's Commissions on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, and later, The Office of Economic Opportunity. Welfare Councils have been variously involved in both these programs. As the last year before these programs became truly operational, 1963 is a good year for benchmark data. On the other hand, precisely because of these programs (and for other reasons too), many Councils have undergone important changes since 1963, a fact which constitutes an important limitation on generalization of the findings reported here to the current scene.

The Sample

In the United States in 1963 there were 364 welfare councils affiliated with the National organization, and listed in its directory.* All of these organizations received questionnaires, and 154 of the questionnaires were returned.** The distribution of returned questionnaires is somewhat biased by community size. The distribution is shown in Table 2.1. From a total sample perspective, a 40% return is not especially good. However, note that the proportions of returns vary greatly. In fact, if the very low proportion (14%) from communities under 100,000 population is excluded, the return rate is not at all unacceptable. This group will deserve special attention throughout the analysis. Further, though this response pattern is very skewed, it is not an idiosyncratic one, in that it closely resembles the response pattern to the 1957 Council questionnaire.***

TABLE 2.1

DISTRIBUTION OF RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Councils	Size of Community						Total
	Less Than 100,000	100,000- 199,999	200,000- 399,999	400,000- 999,999	1,000,000+	N.A.	
<u>Total</u>							
Number	147	89	59	43	21	5	364
Percent	41%	25%	14%	12%	6%	1%	100%
<u>Returned Q</u>							
Number	21	39	41	33	20	0	154
% Returned	13%	25%	28%	21%	13%	0%	100%
<u>Returnees as</u>							
Percent of	21/147	39/89	41/59	33/43	20/21		154/364
Total in	14%	43%	60%	77%	95%	0%	40%
Size Group							

*1963 Directory (New York: United Community Funds and Councils of America, 1963). The Directory lists a total of 468 rather than the 364 we counted. In personal conversation with the UCFCFA staff, we ascertained that the organization carries on its books as "Councils" departments of Chests which exist in name only. Thus, the appropriate total for us here is the actual count of 364.

**This total excludes Canadian Councils.

***Facts on Community Welfare Councils, 1957, op. cit., p. 2.

Special Problems in Data Collection—Merged Councils

One special problem in data collection here deserves mention. In the case of the Welfare Council which is merged with the local Chest/Fund, the question of which categories of response properly refer to the Council and which to the Chest/Fund becomes an important consideration. The designers of the schedule were cognizant of this problem, and provided an entire sheet of separate instructions for the merged Councils. For one example, Councils merged with the Chest/Fund were instructed to report as "total income" only that total which applied to their part of the organization. For a second example, the board of directors provides a case in point. The instructions asked that the merged Councils report on that group which "exercises fairly immediate control over community health and welfare planning activities..." "In most instances," the directions add, "where community planning is set up in a separate division, the board will be known as the division steering committee, or by some similar title."* In short, what is reported as the "board" of the Council is not in all cases the "board" of the organization; it may be a smaller group of less influence which directs the Council operation in a merged venture.

To people unfamiliar with the Council, it may seem like a fruitless and possibly misdirected task to separate out part of an organization and include it for analysis with other, independent organizations. In this case, however, the Welfare Council and its functions are fairly well understood in the field, so that even merged, it has an important degree of independence. Indeed, it provides us with an interesting opportunity for analysis, for we can assess and compare the independent and the merged organizations.

*See the questionnaire, Appendix I.

Coding and Data Preparation

The questionnaire data, with the exception of the 4,770 members of the boards of directors, were coded by the Research Staff of The United Community Funds and Councils of America, using codes developed jointly by that office and the author. The coding scheme was designed to be consistent with the fullest representation of information. Since this study was more descriptive than analytic in orientation, there was no theoretical basis for excluding any particular piece of data. Further, the coding scheme was designed to be consistent with and facilitate the use of computer data processing methods. Check coding proved the coding to be highly accurate.*

Coding the occupations of the board members proved to be something of a different problem. There were a large number of occupations to be coded (4,770). Further, the members had various characteristics: some men, some women, some retired, etc. (In most cases, the woman reported her husband's occupation.) The status level of the occupations was visibly high, and coding on a more or less general "prestige scale" of some sort would have proved insufficiently precise, in that all would be at one end of the scale. Since we already knew that the board members were of high status compared to the population at large, the relatively small differences which would be detected by use of such a prestige scale seemed like an exercise in overscrupulous analysis.

The status of the Welfare Council as a "broker organization" suggested on theoretical grounds a more relevant coding scheme would tap the various "occupational sectors" or "sectors of community interest" from which the board members came.** A Rabbi, for example, is considered to "represent" the

*By "check coding" we mean that, a sample of the board members was coded independently by two judges (coders). These two assessments were then compared.

**Professor Mayhew made the original suggestion for such a scheme.

Jewish community; a labor union official to represent the point of view of "labor," etc. (This notion does not apply to businessmen. They are so "legitimate" they just represent themselves!) In fact, it is from the board of directors that the Council receives much of its local legitimacy. Ascertaining the occupations which are heavily and weakly represented can tell us much about the kind of legitimacy enjoyed by the Council. As we will argue in the next chapter, for example, the legitimacy brought by a group of businessmen is likely to be different from that brought by a group of welfare executives, although both groups might be similarly ranked on a gross measure of occupational prestige. Indeed, the fact that every ranking scheme produced to date has ignored the factor of "sectoring" of occupations at the same level of prestige is a point worthy of consideration by those who use these scales in the analysis of status structures. Horizontal as well as vertical positions may play an important role in determining attitudes and behaviors.

It was from this general line of consideration, then, that the 9-category "occupational sector coding profile" was developed. This scheme, which was discussed in the previous chapter, worked quite well as a coding device. Coders were able to classify over 90% of the occupations reported (there was a problem of inadequate reporting of some occupations) and had a high rate of intercoder reliability (around 85%).*

Missing Data

Needless to say, the executives did not answer completely each and every question. Of the variables we used (Figure 1.2), all but two or three of the Councils answered every question, with two exceptions. The first exception

*The coding was done through the coding section of the Institute for Social Research.

is for training structure. About 20 Councils did not completely answer questions, although most gave some report on the educational backgrounds of their staff.

Because the missing data was not systematically located in one group of Councils, it was impossible to exclude all Councils with some missing information and maintain the integrity of the sample. Since the correlation program would not "work" with missing data codes in the cards, it seemed reasonable to develop a set of cards in which the gross mean score on each variable was substituted for the missing data. This procedure gives the same effect as a computer program for computing correlation coefficients with missing data. The grand mean was used to avoid making any assumptions about the importance of different variables in advance of the analysis.

Reduction of the Data Set

The 108 variable set which comprised the main portion of the organizational inventory (exclusive of measurements of the board) is too large to yield to much meaningful analysis. Any reduction, however, should not be arbitrary, but consistent with some notion of the importance of certain variables from the point of view of the particular research effort. The reduced set is mentioned in Chapter 1 (Figure 1.2). The variables listed there were initially selected according to some notions about their cruciality, and then were coded into the tripartite scheme.

There is always a question, however, of the sagacity of anyone's judgment in these matters. Some type of test of the selection seemed in order which would provide empirical assurance of the integrity of the reduced data set. Since, ideally at least, theoretical and empirical procedures should yield the same results, it was decided that a factor analysis could serve a testing function. A factor analysis was performed on the 108 variable data

set. The hypothesis was that those variables with high loadings on the factors should be the same variables which had already been picked on a theoretical basis. Since a list of hypothesized crucial variables was prepared previous to the factor analysis, it served as a mechanism for testing, not of selecting.

The results were quite satisfactory. The factor analysis produced a series of 17 factors. Of the 17, 13 matched the variable clusters we had selected. In terms of particular variables, those with high loadings matched those we had picked in advance. This procedure provided a partial validity check on the original selection of variables and variable clusters.*

Community Data

Since a portion of the research was aimed at ascertaining what influence, if any, the local community had upon the Council, there was thus a need to develop a data set for the local community through which an attempt could be made to test out this notion. This need presented an unexpected problem—that of defining the actual "domain" of the Council. It is perfectly fine to allude to the influence of the "local community" until one has to establish actual data. Then it becomes quite clear that no one knows exactly what "the local community," or the "organizational environment," etc., is, no less how to measure it.

From a legalistic point of view, one might argue that the proper unit over which data is to be tabulated should be the exact geographical area which is served. This definition produces a set of varied domains for the Councils, from a six-county area in Kansas City, Missouri, to the city limits in many other communities. On the other hand, one might argue that the "en-

*The factor analysis appears in Appendix II.

vironment" of the Welfare Council should not be narrowly construed as a precise geographical area served at a particular moment in time. After all, this area has changed in the past and doubtless will change again in the future. And the Welfare Council is perhaps more influenced by where it has been and where it is going than where it is at a particular moment.

Both approaches present severe and critical problems for actual data collection. On the one hand, the first approach requires that similar data be tabulated from many different units. The "generalized community approach," on the other hand, specifies no unit at all over which data may be tabulated.

In part, these considerations become problematic only to the degree that data tabulated on the basis of different units in a local community—the city, the county, etc.—will be fundamentally different from one another. If this were not the case, if city data and county data could be shown to have approximately the same values, then a local unit which had reasonably complete data available for it could be selected and used. In fact, the similarity of selected variables across the city, the county, and the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) has just been shown in a recent study.

Hadden and Borgatta, in their book, American Cities, persuasively argue that the unit on which the local community data is actually tabulated is not especially significant.* In Appendix III of their book, entitled "The Stability of Classification When Alternate Definitions of Urban Units are Employed," they show that the correlations between major community variables are very high between units. On the basis of their analysis, then, it does not appear that the choice of a unit would materially affect the values of the various community variables. Thus, on the basis of their research, it does not seem to be of crucial importance for the purposes of data collection

*Jeffery K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, American Cities, Their Social Characteristics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

that the "domains" of the Councils vary. And since it is most frequently the case that the boundaries of Welfare Council domains are coterminous with political boundaries, the force of the Hadden-Borgatta finding bears directly on us. Regardless of what the precise domain is in fact, the use of one or another political unit as a basis for data tabulation should not materially affect the values of the variables tabulated.

In the same volume, Hadden and Borgatta present a set of decilized scores for all political cities in the United States on "selected" variables. The availability of this data and the fact that it had already been processed, making data reduction unnecessary, made it ideal as a source of data for us. Thus, political cities are the unit of tabulation for most variables. Where this varies, it is noted.

There were, however, seven cities for which we had Council data but for which there were no reported Hadden-Borgatta scores, because the cities were too small.* For these cities, the average score for all cities in their state was used as a substitute. The state mean score, rather than the national mean score, was used because of the powerful influence of region on social data of various kinds.

The Design of Analysis

Notwithstanding the reduction in number of variables, the final data set is still large. Further, the network of interrelationships is complex, and we wished to use this complexity, rather than reject it. Finally, specific hypotheses were not being tested, but rather a more descriptive analysis was the goal. These considerations were the initial ones which the de-

*These communities were: Greenwich, Conn., Rochester, Pa. (Beaver County); Doylestown, Pa. (Bucks County); Red Bank, N.J. (Mommouth Co.); Garden City, N.J.; Plattsburgh, N. Y.; Neenah-Menasha, Wis.

sign of analysis had to take into account.

One possibility, of course, is the use of simple tabular presentations. Such an approach seemed appropriate for a smaller number of variables and a larger sample than obtained here. A total N of 154, while large in terms of comparative organizational analysis, is small in terms of a contingency table. Once a few controls are added, the number of cases in the cells rapidly decrease. Further, a very large number of such tables would be required if any use was to be made of the large number of variables available for analysis.

A second possibility—the use of some mode of correlational analysis—seemed both more inviting and more appropriate. It is parsimonious; it is easy to add or control for the influence of other variables (multiple and partial correlation); and the form of the output—the correlation matrix—shows the relationships of each variable to all other variables. However, for this data, there was one problem in using correlational analysis—the data were both metric and nonmetric. Such variation did not prove to be an overly serious problem, from the viewpoint of interpretation of the data at least. General understanding, as well as a test of our own, reveals that there is not any substantial difference between the results of correlation coefficients produced by Pearsonian product-moment methods and the various forms of nonmetric correlation. Thus if a Pearsonian product-moment computer program is available, it can be used even on data with such a mixture of metric, as long as one does not then "accidentally" wander into the arena of statistical inference. Pearsonian coefficients will be used in this research, but for purposes of interpretation and understanding of the data, rather than for conventional hypothesis testing.

If one eliminates the use of statistical inference as a mode of analysis of correlation coefficients, options are limited. A factor analytic approach

is possible, but the atheoritic nature of this method weighs against it. Alternatively, a mode of analysis which would encourage inspection of the matrix as such seemed appropriate. An early statement of this approach was given by Louis Guttman in his paper, "A New Approach to Factor Analysis—The Radex."* More recently, James C. Lingo^s has commented upon this style of analysis:

...the point to be made here is that there is much more to a correlation matrix than its correlations; that is, the form or pattern existing among them, an aspect largely ignored by the factor analytic technique.**

Lingo^s calls this approach to correlation matrix analysis "molar correlation analysis," after Jones.*** According to Lingo^s, "...the molar analyst looks for some organizing principle which would account not only for the pattern of intercorrelations, but would also organically relate the factors among themselves, by such concepts as complexity (Guttman), accumulation, inclusion, similarity, etc."**** Guttman's introduction of the simplex, the circumplex, and the radex are particular forms of such analysis.

It might be useful to comment briefly upon the simplex structure advanced by Guttman, both to give the reader a notion of the style of analysis, and because the patterning developed in this research varies from that pattern. A simplex structure in a correlation matrix is revealed by a variable order such that the intercorrelations decrease in value as one proceeds away from the main diagonal, and as one moves from left to right in the table, across the rows. This pattern is achieved by ordering the variables such that the variable with the highest "relational fertility" in the set (as meas-

*Louis Guttman, "A New Approach to Factor Analysis—The Radex" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Ed., Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences (The Free Press; Glencoe, 1954).

**James C. Lingo^s, "New Computer Developments in Pattern Analysis and Non-Metric Techniques" (Ann Arbor: The Computing Center, The University of Michigan, 1964) (Ditto), p. 2.

***M. E. Jones, "Practice is a Process of Simplification" (Pensacola: U.S. Naval School of Aviation Medicine, 1960) (Mimeo).

****Lingo^s, "New Computer Developments..." op. cit., p. 3.

ured by the gross sum of that variable's correlations with each other variable in the set) is placed in the middle row and column, with the next most "fertile" variables being placed on either side and so on until all the variables in the set are exhausted. If one has five variables, 1-5, 1 being the most fertile, 2 and 3 being the next most fertile, and 4 and 5 being the least fertile, the order would be as follows: 4, 2, 1, 3, and 5. Ordering the variables in this way will produce a simplex structure. This particular pattern is illustrated in Table 2.2.

TABLE 2.2

AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PERFECT SIMPLEX STRUCTURE
OF A CORRELATION MATRIX, AFTER GUTTMAN*

	4	2	1	3	5
4	<u>1.00</u>	.60	.36	.21	.13
2	.60	<u>1.00</u>	.60	.36	.21
1	.36	.60	<u>1.00</u>	.60	.36
3	.21	.36	.60	<u>1.00</u>	.60
5	.13	.21	.36	.60	<u>1.00</u>
Total**	2.30	2.77	2.92	2.77	2.30

*Table adapted from Guttman, "A New Approach..." op. cit., Table 2, p. 271.

**The relational fertility of the correlations in any matrix may be tested by summing them in the manner indicated here.

All orderings, however, will not produce the simplex structure, although they may produce an interpretable structure. Guttman used the hypothesis of complexity of mental tests to organize his data. This hypothesis is appropriate to mental test data. In looking at a number of variables relating to an organization, however, notions of the importance to the organization of the item measured by a particular variable, or, differently put, the relevance

of the item, seem to be more appropriate hypotheses for ranking. One might thus speak of the "dominance" of a particular item in affecting organization structure and functioning.

Normally an ecological term, "dominance" has been defined as follows:

In urban ecology, dominance denotes the coordinating and orienting function exerted from a place, usually a central city...*

Or, from plant ecology:

...the dominant is the species whose functions are such that they regulate the conditions essential to the functions of associate species.**

In short, notions of primacy or cruciality are being developed in these definitions. Implicit in them is the notion of superordination/subordination; the dominant is superordinate, the subdominant is subordinate. Nothing suggested so far, however, necessitates that there be only two units. Indeed, in an ecosystem, there are likely to be many species of plants and animals, each of which could be placed relative to the others in terms of dominance.

These considerations point to the direction in which the concept may be used with variables. Variables are merely operationalized ways of measuring aspects, dimensions, facets, or functions of a total unit, perhaps an ecosystem, but in this case, a formal organization. It follows, then, that some functions or dimensions would be more dominant than others in orienting and determining the structure of organizational life. Dominance may thus be defined here as the degree to which the function (or dimension, or facet) measured by a variable sets the pace and tone of organizational life by affecting organizational resources and organizational structure, and by directing organizational activities. A dominance hierarchy is a ranking of variables according to dominance.

*Amos H. Hawley, "Dominance," in Julius Gould and William Kolb, Eds., A Dictionary of Social Science (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 208.

**Ibid., Hawley has reported the definition of W. B. McDougall in Plant Ecology (Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1931).

Dominance is, however, a substantively empty term. One must ascertain, for each of the variables in any given cluster, the dominance pattern by considering the substantive nature of the variable, and the function it measures, with reference to the overall system in which it operates. According to such substantive assessment, a hypothesized dominance hierarchy can be developed. We will here use dominance to refer only to the dominance hierarchy, or the hierarchy as theoretically developed, or hypothesized. The dominance hierarchy essentially predicts the arrangement of the variables in the matrix. The test is the structure of the correlation matrix itself, and will shortly be described.

However, when we look at the empirical performance of the variables in a matrix we need a term separate from the theoretically defined "dominance." Such a term is the "power" of a variable. We will use the term power to refer to the strength of a variable in a correlation matrix (or, to its relational fertility, or predictive power). Presumably, if the dominance hierarchy is to be validated, the most dominant variable will also be the most powerful, etc., to the point where the least dominant variable will be the least powerful. Since reality is always somewhat discrepant from theory, however, it is likely that there will be some variations from the exact theoretically predicted structure; that in fact, there will not be a perfect partial simplex. Thus it may be that a variable's power, in a particular case, is greater than that predicted by its dominance. The two terms have been introduced precisely to avoid confusion over the theoretical and empirical status of the variable.

An alternative notion, then, is that one might order variables according to the imputed dominance in the organization of the item which the variable measures. Two tests of the integrity of this ordering are possible.

The first test is that this ordering is simultaneously the ordering of variables according to their power, or relational fertility. For example, if, according to the hypothesis (or metahypothesis) of dominance, a ranking of variables is produced from most dominant to least dominant in the form 1,2,3,4,5, that order should be the same order produced by ranking them according to their power.

A second test is the style of order in the matrix itself, a style partially coerced by the ranking according to the relational fertility values. This pattern is recognized as follows: like the simplex, correlations in the matrix decrease as one moves across rows, from left to right; unlike the simplex, they increase as one moves up from the diagonal. Thus the correlation coefficient immediately to the right of the main diagonal will be the highest in its row but the lowest in its column, looking at only half of the matrix. An example of this ordering is seen in Table 2.3.

TABLE 2.3

CORRELATION MATRIX STRUCTURE AFTER VARIABLES HAD
BEEN ORDERED ACCORDING TO DOMINANCE

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	<u>1.00</u>	.73	.78	.65	.61	.61	.21
2	.73	<u>1.00</u>	.80	.60	.50	.41	.43
3	.78	.80	<u>1.00</u>	.50	.49	.38	.43
4	.65	.60	.50	<u>1.00</u>	.64	.61	.07
5	.61	.50	.49	.64	<u>1.00</u>	.38	.06
6	.61	.41	.38	.61	.38	<u>1.00</u>	-.01
7	.21	.43	.43	.07	.06	-.01	<u>1.00</u>
Total	4.59	4.47	4.38	4.07	3.68	3.39	2.21

The difference between the simplex structure of Table 2.2 and the structure represented here—called a "partial simplex" is quickly apparent, and is the direct result of different ordering of the variables. Table 2.3 could be rearranged in such a manner as to produce a simplex structure, and Table 2.2 could be reordered to produce this structure. In other words, the differences are not crucial; they represent different rationales for ordering.

This form of analysis, then, whether it be called pattern analysis, or molar correlation analysis, or whatever, seeks to develop an understandable order in the correlation matrix. It differs from simple factor analysis in that theoretical notions are the basis of the ordering, or grouping, or patterning; it is deductive rather than inductive.

Two particular kinds of theoretizing are called for in molar correlation analysis. The first involves the development of a set of assumptions concerning the nature of the patterning, or, to put it somewhat differently, a set of decision rules which tell the observer whether or not there is a pattern in the matrix. The second type of theoretizing is more substantive in nature, and is in the form of hypotheses which organize the data in a particular way and which are tested according to the previously developed assumptions about the order of the data.

The hypotheses will be introduced as each substantive section is discussed. Since the assumptions are in the form of generalized decision rules, they can and should be stated here. The key assumptions are as follows:

1. That those variables representing the most dominant aspects of organizational structure will have the greatest relational fertility; conversely those variables which represent the least crucial aspects of organizational structure will have the lowest relational fertility.

2. Variables which measure similar aspects of organizational structure will be positively correlated; variables which measure dissimilar aspects of

organizational structure will be negatively correlated; or, shifting to a different scale, either all positive or all negative, variables which measure similar aspects of organizational structure will have a strong relationship; variables which measure dissimilar aspects of organizational structure will be weakly correlated. (Similar and dissimilar may be interpreted in spatial terms as "close" and "far.")

3. Variables which are similar will relate to other variables similarly.

4. That groupings of variables may be established by showing that the mean intracluster correlations are greater than the mean intercluster correlation; or that the mean intracluster correlations are positive and the mean intercluster correlation is negative.*

The Lingo's Analysis

A final note should be entered here about a special computer analysis of a subset of the Council data. A program developed by Professor James Lingo's was used, and it is discussed in detail in Chapter VIII. Nonetheless, it is based upon the notions of distance, order, pattern, etc., reviewed here, and may be considered a computerized extension of these concepts and approaches.

Summary

In sum, then, we will use molar correlation analysis as the primary analytic tool in this research. Although the approach is quite new, and currently under development and extension, extant literature suggests its appropriateness for precisely the kind of situation faced here, viz., a large number of variables, a complex variable interrelationship structure, a mixture of metric and nonmetric data which make conventional procedures of statistical inference unavailable, and a notion that the factor analytic approach can be

*It is noted that the sign may be a result of the coding scheme.

improved upon. In addition, it is appropriate where there is a large data set even after initial reduction, and additional exclusion of variables from this reduced set is not warranted theoretically, and when in fact the researcher might wish to venture into the complex interrelationship structure. Initial work in this area has been noted, largely that of Guttman and Lingoes. The Guttman simplex model was discussed, and certain differences in the approach taken here were noted, differences which in fact result in a deviation from the simplex pattern. With this methodological background in mind, it is appropriate to begin substantive discussion.

In the next chapter, we begin a series of "data chapters." The empirical findings of the study are presented, explored, considered and discussed in some detail. Following the theoretical outline of Council variables, there will be a chapter each on the Welfare Council resources, the Welfare Council internal structure, and the Welfare Council program activities. In Chapter VI, there is a discussion of the interrelationships of these three groupings of variables. Chapter VII discusses the community system and its relationship to the Welfare Council. Chapter VIII presents the special Lingoes analysis, and the summary and conclusions are presented in Chapter IX.

This brief introduction to the structure of the task before us is presented so that the reader may have some idea of what to expect in terms of the presentation of data. Since it is impossible to consider all questions at once, it is hoped that in this orderly manner of presentation the most important bases may be touched.

CHAPTER III

WELFARE COUNCIL RESOURCES

Introduction

Organizational resources in general, and thus the resources of the Welfare Council, may be defined as those people, supplies, and that equipment which permit the organization to go about its job or task. The function of this chapter is to describe, analyze, and interpret those resources which are most crucial to Council existence. In the literature on formal organizations, resources as such have largely been ignored. A certain preoccupation with the internal structure of formal organizations has led most writers, though not all, to treat resources as given.* Such consideration as resources have had in the literature suggests the following questions:**

1. Which particular resources are the most crucial to organizational functioning?
2. How are different organizational resources related to each other?
3. How does the organization avoid complete cooptation by the input source?
4. Once a pattern of resource inputs has been established, how is the organization able to engage in any innovation which does not threaten the established resource structure?

These questions will guide our analysis of Council resource structure.

*Parsons deals directly with resources. See Talcott Parsons, "A Sociological Approach to the Analysis of Organization" in Amati Etzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1962), especially the section entitled, "The Mobilization of Fluid Resources."

**These questions are general, and flow from no particular source or sources.

The reader will recall that four major types of variables were selected as representing crucial organizational resources: (1) the number of professional people employed by the Council (Council size); (2) the amount of money at the disposal of the organization (Council income, 1963); (3) the proportions of board members of various occupational groups; and (4) the power of the board (the proportion of board members rated as "top community leaders").* These variables and their intercorrelations are presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.** The correlations are between numbers of persons and amounts of money, except in the case of the board members' occupations, where proportions are used. The format of analysis is to discuss each major variable grouping—size, income, board structure and power—in sequence.

Table 3.4 contains the means and standard deviations of the variables used here. It is presented last because the variables are grouped in a manner which requires explanation. However, the reader may wish to glance at that table first, to develop an overall sense of the values of the variables.

Number of Council Staff
(Organization Size)

The number of staff people employed by the Council is an important variable. It is one good measure of organizational size as such. The size of the staff, however, represents more than simple bigness or smallness of a Council. One of the characteristics of the Council in particular, and broker

*The size of the board was not used because it was not an especially fruitful variable. And, apart from its unspectacular behavior in the correlation matrix, it is difficult to know what a simple increase in number means theoretically.

**For obvious reasons of tabular unity, it is necessary to present the correlation matrix all at once. The relevant matrices here and in subsequent chapters appear at the end of the chapter. Reference within the text is made by table number.

organizations generally, is that they are "people using" organizations. This importance of people applies to professional staff as much as to board members and lay advisors. What Councils have to offer the community is the people who work for them, their collective skills, experience, and relationships, guided by some general notions of planning and coordination. Indeed, the Council has little "capital" in the conventional economic sense. Often, it does not even own a building. The Council's capital is its people, and thus organization size is especially important.

The Council employs two kinds of professional staff.* First and most important is the regular professional staff. The second group—special project staff—is usually of lesser importance to the Council. Special project staff are also considered professional staff, but they are added to perform a set of tasks for a specific period of time.

The numbers of staff in these two categories correlate with each other +.28 (Table 3.1). This is somewhat surprising, as one would suppose that, as the regular staff component increased, the special project staff would increase as well.** It will be recalled, however, that only 1 in 4 Council staff people are special project staff. This correlation value is a product of a relatively flat curve depicting the rise of special project staff, and a relatively steep curve depicting the rise of regular professional staff. What is interesting and significant about it is the clear implication that as the Council becomes larger, it has apparently not sought, on any meaningful scale, to enter the fields of "special projects." The reasons for

*Professional refers to all nonsecretarial and nonclerical staff. It does not, as used here, refer to the holder of any specific degree.

**On the other hand, one might argue that smaller Councils would attempt to supplement a meager staff through special project staff. In a sense, this happens. Councils in smaller communities have a greater proportion of their staff as special project personnel, even though the absolute number becomes very small (Table 7.2).

eschewing this area, in our judgement, comes from the Council's inability to seek successfully the special project funds required for the staff. This point will be subsequently considered in more detail.*

Council Income

The total income of the Council in 1963 is the sum of all monies which were in its budget for that year. The average Council income for 1963 was around \$84,000. This variable correlates very highly (+.93) with total regular professional staff.

The high correlation between income and regular professional staff reveals much about how the Council spends its money—viz., most goes for salaries of regular and special project staff. For every increment of financial input, there is an increment of staff, something which would not obtain if the Council were using important amounts of this money for other purposes. This finding lends empirical support to the contention just advanced, that people, and especially staff people, are crucial to the Council.

Sources of Fiscal Input

Frequently, sociological analyses of organizations stop at the point we have just reached, and do not inquire further into the components of total income. Often, these sources are quite varied, and analysis of them might reveal much about organizational commitments and orientations.

We have available for analysis, 10 categories of financial input.

These are:

*It is also the case that some Councils do not feel that it is their role to seek special projects, or to enter the special projects field at all as a special function.

(1) Community Chest, G.O.F.*; (2) Community Chest, S.P.F.; (3) Public (Tax) Funds, G.O.F.; (4) Public (Tax) Funds, S.P.F.; (5) Public (Tax) Funds, Fees for Services; (6) Foundations, G.O.F.; (7) Foundations, S.P.F.; (8) "Other," G.O.F.; (9) "Other," S.P.F.; (10) "Other" Fees for Services.

What becomes important about the inputs is (1) "their relative fiscal primacy," or the degree of importance they have in funding the organization, and (2) the kind of "interest" which these funds represent. These two facets of the funding structure seemed to be the most crucial, and, therefore, it seemed appropriate to develop clusters which would reflect them.

Primary and Secondary.—The first facet is fiscal primacy. Some organizations operate with a relatively equal balance of funds from various or many sources; others, like the Council and most broker organizations, receive the large majority of funds from one source, and supplement these funds on occasion with grants from other sources. Thus, a two-cluster "primary vs. secondary" distinction is appropriate here. Historically and currently, the Council has had the majority of its money come from the local Community Chest or United Fund. In 1963, an average of 70% of the Council's money came from this source. On the other hand, the Public-Foundation sources play definitely a secondary role in terms of total amount.

Social Work vs. Community Interests.—The division established on the basis of fiscal primacy is also meaningful in terms of "interests" or "constituencies" which the money "represents." The Chest/Fund is essentially the pocketbook for the private, local social agencies. (Also, it sometimes has affiliations with the field offices of private national health and welfare agencies.) This function clearly commits the Chest to a subsystem identification with the goals of and the success of the private social work system in any community. Conversely, tax supported (public) organizations, and

*G.O.F. stands for "General Operating Funds"; S.P.F. stands for Special Project Funds.

local foundations are interested in, and often speak for, the total community,* and it is unlikely that they would become the advocate for any particular subsystem. Thus, a division into local chest vs. public-foundation income sources is at once a division between the social work and community-wide interests and constituencies.**

The actual groupings are as follows:

Primary Chest (Social Work) Support	Secondary, Public/Foundation (Community Wide) Support
1. Chest inputs	1. Foundation inputs
2. "Other" inputs	2. Public (tax) inputs

Findings.—The clusters developed theoretically receive empirical support, in that they meet the test for clusters, viz., the mean intracluster correlations for the primary (.35) and secondary (.32) clusters are higher than the mean intercluster correlation (.22) (Table 3.3). This simply means that, on the average, the variables within the cluster relate to each other more strongly than they do to variables outside the cluster. However, though supported, this finding must be considered circumspectly, because the strength of the relationships is far from overwhelming.

The Hierarchy of Inputs

The assignment of fiscal variables to a cluster does not automatically place them in any kind of order. These variables, as just mentioned, can be

*The foundations represented here have no clear identification—they could be "local" or "national" in orientation. However consultation with people knowledgeable in the area of local welfare financing—among them, Professor Robert D. Vinter, Associate Dean, The University of Michigan School of Social Work—reveals that the very great likelihood is that these are local.

**The "other" category has been placed with the Chest inputs. This category represents a small dollar amount, which would suggest that it be placed with the Public-Foundation cluster. However, placing it with the Chest did not harm the dominance of that item, and prevented any muddying of the "interests" clustered in the secondary grouping.

ordered in terms of the dominance of particular financial inputs.* Dominance is assessed independently for each cluster, so that the position of a variable in one cluster might be quite different from the position of a very similar variable in the other cluster.

The ranking was informed by the theoretical notions which led to the original clustering. It seemed reasonable to assume that, within the primary, Chest support cluster, general operating funds would be most dominant, and special project funds would be subdominant. Just the reverse would obtain in the secondary, public/foundation cluster, viz., that special project funds would be dominant, and general operating funds would be subdominant. In short, when the Council thinks of primary resources, it thinks of general operating funds; conversely, when it thinks of supplementary funds, it thinks of special project funds. Fees would occupy a "swing" position. The dominance hierarchies are as follows (the means and standard deviations are included for the reader's reference):

Primary Chest (Social Work) Income			Secondary Local Public and Foundation (Community) Income		
Source of Funds	Mean In- come from Source	S.D.	Source of Funds	Mean In- come from Source	S.D.
1. Chest, G.O.F.	1	1	1. Public, S.P.F.	1	2
2. "Other," G.O.F.	2	2	2. Foundation, S.P.F.	2	3
3. "Other," Fees	5	4	3. Public, G.O.F.	4	4
4. "Other," S.P.F.	4	5	4. Public, Fees	3	1
5. Chest, S.P.F.	3	3	5. Foundation, G.O.F.	5	5

Findings.—The data are displayed in Table 3.1. The patterning of the intercorrelations for both clusters approximates the partial simplex pattern required to validate the hypothesized orderings; the correlation values decrease as one moves from left to right across the matrix, and with a reversal

*It will be recalled that the concepts of dominance and dominance hierarchy were introduced in Chapter 2.

in the last column for both clusters, increases as one moves up from the diagonal. On the basis of the findings, it appears that meaningful ranking has been achieved. Put differently, we now know, to some degree of accuracy, the relative dominance of the various Council inputs.

Discussion

Despite the overall support, the exceptions cannot be ignored. Especially deserving of some attention is the relatively high correlation between public fees and Foundation, general operating funds (.58). One would suspect that the amounts of money represented in these categories both rise as the size of the community in which the Council resides increases. It is certainly from the larger community that the larger inputs of public fees come, and that may be the case as well with Foundation general operating funds. Advancing the discussion somewhat, we can test this hypothesis by inspecting the correlation between the size of the community and these two variables. Such inspection clearly supports the hypothesis. The correlation between community size (in 1,000's) and the amount of money received by the Council from fees from public agencies is +.71; the same value for the relationship of community size to foundation general operating funds is +.62 (Table 3.1). A more detailed discussion of the size of community is withheld until Chapter VII.*

Another point of interest is whether or not the ranking is sufficiently powerful to produce a monotonic decreasing pattern of correlation values on variables external to the matrix. The answer is a qualified yes. The data are displayed in Table 3.1. The ordering in the primary social work support cluster (variables (2) and (4) with (98), (105), (107), (106) and (99)) shows

*As can be seen from Table 3.1, the relationships of community size to public fees and foundation G.O.F. funds is substantially greater than the relationships of Council size to these variables. This is because these two income variables are more closely dependent upon large cities than is Council size, as such.

monotonic decreasing values in its relationship to regular and special project staff size, with a small reversal for special project size. Such monotonicity is not at all as clear in the relationship of the secondary funding cluster to regular and special project size (variables (2) and (4), with (101), (104), (100), (102), and (103)).

These results are quite satisfactory, if the clustering and the ranking are taken into account. The primary funding cluster has great power, but only for the regular staff. The converse obtains for the secondary funding cluster—viz., its power is very great, but only for the special project staff. The relationships between the kinds of financial inputs and the kinds of staff provides an external support for the clustering.

A similar pattern is discovered in the relationships of the clusters to total income. The relationship of the primary cluster to total income evidences a monotonic decreasing pattern. The secondary cluster produces a rougher, partial ordering. Again, one would expect that, since the primary cluster is indeed primary, it would have the greatest power with total income. On the other hand, the secondary cluster, which has less power, would be expected to vary somewhat from Council to Council. Thus, the clustering and ordering can organize variables outside the cluster, with relationships being the strongest for those variables which are "closest" to each other in some substantive way.

In sum, the above findings show several points clearly. First, there is no question that the Council uses two staffs, regular and special project. The relatively low correlation between the numbers of these two staffs shows it to be the case.* Secondly, the data show that the Council has two main

*It may of course be the case that special projects divert regular staff. However, the high correlations between special project funding and special project staff (Table 3.1) argue for the notion of two relatively separate staffs.

kinds of financial input—a primary and a secondary. Third, the data show that the Council pays for much of the special project staff from the secondary, Public-Foundation funding. Thus, one can infer that the Council has an on-going program, paid for from funds from the primary cluster, and staffed by regular staff, as well as a program supplemented by various kinds of special projects, run by special staff and paid for with special funds.

In more detail, we know that the various funding inputs are of varying importance to the Council. Specifically, the Council receives the large proportion of its money from the local Chest/Fund, and the amount of money received here turns out to be a powerful variable in the matrix. In addition, the Public and Foundation special projects grants exercise a powerful influence. What apparently happens is that the Council negotiates for funds from a variety of sources to augment that received from the Chest. Such augmentation rests mainly in the special project area, but not completely so. The fact remains that the Council is heavily dependent upon the Chest. This dependence seems to pose a problem for the Council in terms of organizational freedom and ability to innovate.*

Implications

In order to cope with the development of the modern metropolis in programmatic terms, it seems the Council—perhaps more than most organizations—needs to be an innovator. With the multiplicity of local welfare organizations, the infusion of field offices from state and national welfare organizations, the problems of slums, the racial discrimination problem, and so

*Selznick has shown how crucial the freedom of the TVA from the conventional government fiscal and personnel policies was to its success: See TVA and the Grass Roots, op. cit. Whyte talks about the difference in personnel policies which large corporations use between their research and development divisions and their "line" staff. Wm. H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1957).

forth, it seems that if we need anything, we need new patterns for approaches to the urban condition. Yet the Councils have not, by and large, responded to this challenge, and taken up the role of community experimenter and innovator. The reasons for this aloofness are partially related to the funding structure.

First, and perhaps most important, the dominance of the Chest/Fund inputs implies a traditionism, if not a conservatism, in Council activities.* The Chest/Fund would not want to be "responsible," through the Council, for supporting anything which smacked of controversy, something quite likely to distinguish any meaningful innovative practices. Controversy might harm the Chest/Fund's ability to raise money, and it is militantly protective of its fund raising posture. Special project, foundation, and public monies, all smack of the new, the different, and the Chest/Fund is quite likely to resist it. (The median correlation of Chest/Fund inputs with all public inputs is .26; with all special project inputs (including its own!) it is .355.) Within such a general framework of Chest/Fund dominance, other impediments to innovation become even more serious.

Second, there is the press of daily events, as implied in the correlation of regular staff and the primary income cluster. The Council has an ongoing job to do, and it does that job, using regular staff to do it, and paying the staff from local Chest/Funds. It seems likely that, if the Council wishes to be innovative, it must have a staff with no routine assignments, or a special project staff.

To secure such a staff, the Council must apply for supplementary financ-

*Councils in small cities receive a larger proportion of Chest monies than Councils in larger cities. Thus, generally speaking, as Council size increases, secondary financing also increases (Table 7.2).

ing from public or foundation sources.* This notion is supported by the high correlation between special project staff and 3 of 5 variables in the secondary cluster (median: +.68). To go to an outside organization for special funds is a time consuming and expensive process, as many of us know. To divert regular staff from the ongoing tasks to the application process is an allocation the Council may be unwilling or unable to make.

Third, even if application is made, the dominance of the Chest identifies the Council with the narrow, private social work agency sector of the community welfare system. As we previously discussed, public and foundation sources are likely to take a community-wide view, and would hesitate to allocate grant monies to a partisan advocate of private social work.

The fourth point, and perhaps the sum of the above, is that the Council cannot move with celerity and flexibility to support innovations. It apparently has little spare money with which it can support innovation on its own. It must apply to special sources, and go through the justificatory process that involves. Its regular staff, occupied with ongoing work, are unlikely to innovate. Overall, there is the negative cast of the Chest/Fund dominance. With these conditions operative, the Council is not likely to be too innovative.

Finally, stemming from the Council's lack of authoritative mandate, it is questionable whether it has the authority and legitimacy in the community to withstand the numerous failures which accompany innovative activity. It is questionable whether it has the authority and legitimacy in the community sufficient to win support for, and to participate in innovative practices such that they are given a reasonable chance of success. That the mandate is

*In other words, we are arguing that the main source of salary for special project staff is special project grants. If the Council is not successful in getting those grants, it will have a very limited special project staff.

questionable suggests further limitation on innovative activity.

The above discussion suggests the following propositions for future research:

1. Organizations which are dominated by a single funding source, and that source is a formal organization with functional responsibilities in the community, are not likely to be innovative.
2. For an organization to be innovative, it must have access to unfettered funds which can be obtained with a minimum of organizational energy, or be able to secure funds earned for innovative practices.
3. For an organization to be innovative, it must have sufficient prestige and legitimacy to withstand failures in the performance of innovative roles, and to command community respect and support for innovative role performance.

The Board of Directors

The Board of Directors of any organization is a very important link to the outside world, and this is especially true of the broker organization. For the broker organization, and for the Council, it is mainly the board that provides local legitimacy and sanction for organization activities. These activities can be challenged insofar as one can or wishes to challenge the board that authorized them. Hence, it would not be surprising to find that the board is at once a statement of and a reflection of the mission and role of the organization.*

*There is a problem in "who chooses whom" in the Board-Council relationship. A Council may present a particular posture because it is the posture that the Council wishes to be presented, or because it is the posture the Board wishes to be presented. Whether the Board "makes the Council into its image" or the Council "makes the board into its image," is difficult to say; suffice it to note that each has a certain effect upon the other.

Types of Boards

Councils have, in recent years, extended themselves in two main directions—one more traditional, the other more novel and venturesome. In some communities, Councils have identified themselves with the social work system, comprised of the private social agencies, and, often secondarily (in the view of the public agencies) the public social work agencies. This orientation, especially with its tinge of emphasis upon voluntary social work agencies, has been the historical location of the Council; coordination, planning, "progress" go on within this system. The Council sees its responsibility as an intrasystem function.

On the other hand, Councils in other communities have sought to play a community-wide planning and coordinating role, seeing themselves (or hoping to be) the conductor for an orchestra of community services (as opposed, in the more traditional role set, to first violin). These two roles, at least as "ideal types," are quite different from one another, and their relative propriety for Council functioning has generated considerable controversy. If they are to be manifest in reality at all, they must have leadership and legitimation from the board. Thus, we should be able to find board groupings which reflect each modal stance.

Two groupings of board occupations are suggested by this line of thought, one which contains those people who would be of service to and encouragement to a Council oriented to the social work system; a second cluster primarily functioning to aid the Council in the development of community-wide influence. For the first cluster, appropriate people would be those from the system that the Council was seeking to influence, plus others with a professional-service orientation. Coordination and planning within a membership system (or, to

use Hawley's phrase, within a categoric group)* must be based upon "professional" standards in order to be convincing to fellow professionals.** A board with a heavy component of people with professional training would be appropriate here. On the other hand, for the Council which wished to pursue a course of community-wide planning and coordination, members of the board should be men and women who could bring legitimacy to the Council for this kind of effort. These kinds of people would seem to be influential locals, rather than trained professionals.

As this distinction between modal identities which the Council might seek in a board evolves, it seems that we are perhaps restating the classic "cosmopolitan vs. local" distinction of Gouldner.*** The cosmopolitan board would have a relatively heavy input of professional types of people, doubtless of limited local influence, but of relatively heavy intrasystem influence (i.e., the social work system). The local board would have, or try to have, local notables as members, people who have important local reputations and community-wide influence.****

Of the nine occupational categories, four appeared to have a "cosmopolitan" orientation under this definition; these are: health and welfare, public ad-

*Amos H. Hawley, Human Ecology (New York: The Ronald Press, 1950).

**This line of thinking historically applied to the staff as well as the board. Somewhat earlier in its career, but still today to a degree, the Council developed the practice of hiring, as staff members, very senior staff from the private social agencies in town. This practice assured the Council of a good relationship with the system it was coordinating. Today, this is not as much the case.

***Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals - I," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2,3 (December, 1957) and "Cosmopolitans and Locals - II," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2,4 (March, 1958).

****For purposes here, we will assume that the occupational characteristic is the salient feature of a board member. It is realized, of course, that there may be influential types which cross boundaries, or who have no current occupation. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the available data, a constraint which, by the way, is not excessively unfortunate. Occupational classification has been used to measure many things, especially "status," and has a long history as an operational definition, so its use here as an indicator of certain characteristics of the board member is not inappropriate.

ministration, higher education, and religious.* Each of these "occupations" is also a profession, requiring long training of each entrant. Each has an orientation which predisposes the incumbent to think in national-professional terms rather than in strictly local terms.

On the other hand, the remaining five occupational categories seemed "local" in their orientation. They were more or less focused upon and dependent upon the local community. These are: business and industry, labor, misc. professional, communications media, and elected public officials.**

Cosmopolitan vs. local is not the only underlying distinction between these two clusters. The nature of the occupation, along certain lines, is an important dimension. Cosmopolitan occupations have a "service" cast to them, in the sense of "nonprofit." On the other hand, the local board occupations have an "entrepreneurial" cast to them. By "entrepreneurial" we refer to individualistic achievement rather than "profit."*** We thus hypothesize that there is a cosmopolitan-service board and a local-entrepreneurial board. The groupings are as follows:

<u>Cosmopolitan-Service</u>	<u>Local-Entrepreneurial</u>
Welfare and Health	Business and Industry
Public Administration	Labor
Higher Education	"Misc." Professional
Religious	Communications Media
	Elected Public Officials

*It is recognized that the fit is not a perfect one.

**Recall that the occupations of the board members was discussed in Chapter I.

***Professor Andrew Collver has suggested that there may be a corresponding difference in personal motivations for membership on the board. Service oriented types may see board membership as an opportunity to be of community service, or as a part of the general ethos of their job. Entrepreneurial types, on the other hand, may see board membership as a mechanism for personal aggrandizement. We do not have the data to test this intriguing hypothesis, but it should certainly be included in future research.

Findings.—The intercorrelation matrix can be seen in Table 3.2. Generally speaking, it supports this division. The intracluster correlations are predominantly positive; the intercluster correlations are predominantly negative. On an average basis (Table 3.3), the mean intracluster correlation for the cosmopolitan service board is $+.07$; the mean intracluster correlation for the local entrepreneurial board is $+.04$; the mean intercluster correlation is $-.09$.^{*} These correlations are certainly not strong, and, on an individual basis, would be disregarded. But, seen in a pattern developed theoretically, they become more meaningful.

Ideal Type.—These board constructs represent ideal types in the sense of Max Weber's bureaucracy analysis. Their function is more a heuristic one than a statement of empirical reality. And indeed, there is only limited support for the clustering in the data. We should not expect, therefore, to find Councils which have only one or the other type of board. Rather, we might expect variations in emphasis within the overall structure.^{**} This should not be surprising, however. A board is a very unique item which reflects in part the special nature of the local community, and the low correlations among the proportions of various occupations support this notion of uniqueness. However, that there is even a minimal tendency to develop cosmo-

^{*}Here, and throughout, means are calculated by summing the correlations in the matrix and dividing by the total number of items. If there are positive and negative correlations present, the negative are subtracted from the positive. Unless specifically noted, sign is taken into account in all instances.

^{**}As we discuss in Chapters VI and VII, it appears that there is an overall similarity to the proportions of occupations of board members. Business and industry is highest, followed by misc. professionals, welfare, and health, public administration and the others. This appears to reflect a Council style of tapping the power structure. However, within this pattern, there is definite variation. Proportions of entrepreneurial types decrease, and proportions of service types increase. In short, the Council constructs a unique board within some general framework of occupational types.

politan or local boards is finding of importance. Additionally, this typology provides a point of departure for analysis, and a mechanism for organizing the data which is understandable and theoretically relevant to Council functioning.

The Hierarchy of Occupations

The occupations just presented were ranked within each cluster in the order of their dominance. For a Council which wishes to concentrate its efforts in the social work system as such, the presence of people from that system, or near it, would set the pace and tone. In this cluster, dominance is reflected in the degree to which the occupations are from welfare-relevant areas, or are themselves involved in one or another ways in the work of the Council. By this measure, the Health and Welfare group becomes most dominant. Public Administration, higher education, and religious are so ranked because each moves a step further away from "social work relevant" occupations. Public Administration includes city managers, and key city, state, and federal executives located in the city. Their tasks frequently bring them into the social work arena, and their professional status makes them ideologically similar to some of the welfare professionals on the board. Higher education is one step further removed, because it does not have functioning responsibility for welfare activities in the community. However, some social work relevant people are included here, especially the Deans and faculties from schools of social work. Finally, there are the clergy. With the exception of Catholic priests who are also the directors of the local Catholic Charities, the clergy, as such, is not involved in organized social welfare. This does not mean that the religious institution is not involved. Religious expression comes through the sectarian agencies. Their executives show up under the general health and welfare category.

A somewhat different calculus of dominance obtains for the local-entrepreneurial board. This board is developed by and should reflect those Councils which have a community-wide mission and role. Dominant occupations are those with influence and prestige which can be borrowed by the Council. First, of course, would be the business and industry group. Men and women in this group have an historic prestige in American communities. Second would be labor, to "balance" the business group, although not necessarily in equal numbers. Miscellaneous professionals would occupy third position. Especially the lawyers in this group often have high prestige, but the admixture of occupations makes precise identification. Fourth would be the representatives from the communications media, local press and T.V. Potentially of great help, it is often difficult to utilize this relationship for organizational gain. Thus, because their great legitimizing and supportive potential is often thwarted, and never a "sure thing," they rank fourth. Elected public officials come last. Councils with community-wide planning and coordinating interests are often ambivalent about such persons, because often community-wide planning is just what the government wants to do. In fact, to the extent that the Councils becomes involved on the determination of community priorities, it intersects the responsibility of local government. Too, public officials often operate on a different priorities calculus from others in the Council; they are sensitive to ethnic and other interest groups, and they thus do not fit, in the same way that public administrators do, into the middle class "good government" conceptions of the Council.*

The data presented in Table 3.2 provide general support for the ranking. There is a rough partial simplex in each of the two intracluster matrices.

*Banfield and Wilson discuss in some detail the difference between public administrators and elected public officials along this dimension. Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics, op. cit.

The dominance hierarchy predicted the power of the variables. Additionally, the correlation between the proportion of people in health and welfare occupations with the proportion of those in business and industry is -0.39 , which is the highest negative inter-correlation. At least, then, the key occupations in each cluster are the most opposite.

In addition, the groupings and orderings organize and predict other relationships. The correlations with the two measures of size may be seen in Table 3.2. The cosmopolitan-service board shows consistently negative correlations to regular total size, and the local-entrepreneurial board shows consistently positive correlations to it.* Further, this relationship is reversed in relationship to special project staff. Apparently, as we move from smaller to larger organizations, the composition of the board changes its view from "cosmopolitan" to local. At first, the progression may seem exactly the reverse of what one would expect. But the reader might bear in mind the problems of the broker organization in the larger community. Chicago, New York, Milwaukee, are vast megapolises, with thousands of competing interests at play in the territorial area. To exist at all, the Council cannot take a narrow view of its functioning. It must secure people who are locally influential and knowledgeable and who will support the Council. In short, the greater the degree of specialization and differentiation within the community in which the Council lives, the greater the need for local influentials on the board. As the number of "interests" and "systems" increase, the more it becomes impossible to have them represented on the board of directors, and have the board be anything of manageable size. This is in the nature of the inter-organizational scheme. In the smaller communities, it is not unlikely that

*Especially interesting are public administration and size vs. elected public officials and size and labor and size.

the totality of welfare activities is also small, and representatives can be invited onto the board, so that coordination is handled informally.*

Board Power

The final resource is the "power of the board," measured by the proportion of board members rated as "top community leaders" by the Council executive. The data relevant to the "power of the board" are present in Table 3.2.

The display of correlations supports the contention that the local-entrepreneurial boards would be strong in local influence. With the exception of one zero correlation, the power of the board correlates positively with the local-entrepreneurial occupational cluster, and (again with one exception, health and welfare) correlates negatively with the cosmopolitan-service board. It seems quite clear that the local board is the one with the "top community leaders" on it. Validation of the contention through an external measure can increase our confidence in the construct.

Another finding worthy of note is that power evidences its highest correlation with the business and industry occupational group. This of course, does not mean that business and industry people have those ratings necessarily, but only that they are in relatively greater abundance on boards where powerful people are. In fact, since the boards are not large, a good guess would be that they are in fact the ones who are rated as "top community leaders." This is especially interesting in the light of the work on community power

*Implicitly this line of discussion poses the questions "Under what constellation of community and other conditions is one likely to see the existence of a welfare Council at all." This question is considered by Litwak and Hylton. See Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis: An Hypothesis on Coordinating Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly, 6,4 (March, 1962).

which gives high marks to "economic dominants."* People from business and industry do seem to have the weight of the ratings; to what extent their reputation is backed by action is another question.

Summary and Discussion

It seems clear from the above findings on the board and on power that the board serves the Council as a legitimating instrument. Indeed, several kinds of legitimacy are apparent. One is the legitimacy of having high status people on the board. There are virtually no people of less than upper middle class status on any board. Another kind of legitimacy is the legitimacy of "representation." One wants to have "representatives" from various important segments present—a Jew, a Catholic, a business executive, etc. While in fact such people do not represent anything, their presence gives a bi-partisan, or more correctly, multi-partisan, cast to Council activities. Finally, there is the legitimacy of power, represented by the presence of "top community leaders."

Evidence for the board as a legitimating mechanism also comes from the overall low level of the intercorrelations among the proportions of board members of a particular occupation. It is quite likely that the occupation, though a relevant criterion, is too gross to capture the nuances of local status structures. Departures will commonly be expected to account for community peculiarities.

In using the board to legitimate its activities, however, the Council must be sure to preserve its autonomy and flexibility. The Council does not want to become captured by a single "interest" any more than necessary. Thus,

*Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (New York: Anchor, 1963). He also suggests that Councils themselves may subscribe to notions of a "power elite."

although we have developed from the data two polar types of boards, it is quite unlikely, as previously mentioned, that the Council would have either one or the other only. The existence of some positive correlations within the intercluster matrix, and some negative ones in the intracluster matrix, suggests that there is cross-ruffing of board members, which prevents the Council from becoming completely identified with either the social agencies or the community as a whole. The unwillingness to completely specify a domain, even by implication, helps the Council to maintain flexibility and autonomy.* We shall see in the next chapter, that a concern for autonomy and flexibility also informs the deployment of staff.

As evidence for the key role that the board plays as a legitimating mechanism, we can note the low relationships that board structure has with the funding structure, i.e., the income variables. The relationships are small.** The mean relationship of the cosmopolitan board to the income variables is $-.03$; the mean relationship of the local entrepreneurial board is $.04$ (Table 3.3). From this evidence, it does not appear that the board structure has an important effect on income, at least directly. The absence of the board's relationship to income may be construed as a "negative concurrence" with the notion that its main importance lies in the cultural and legitimacy area. As we shall see in Chapter V, there are some definite patterns of relationship where the legitimacy aspect becomes a factor.

*Another way to put this would be in terms of social distance. The Council wants to maintain a moderate social distance between itself and the board, close enough to benefit from the board's prestige, and distant enough so that the board is not "running the show." This problem has been treated in Eugene Litwak and Henry J. Meyer. "A Balance Theory of Coordinating Mechanisms." (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan School of Social Work, 1964) Mimeo.

**Actually, the overall low degree of interrelationships leads us to suggest, in Chapter VI, the existence of two types of resources—fluid and non-fluid. These considerations will be developed in detail there.

Implications

The implications of this discussion center heavily around the second variable originally used to develop a typology of commonweal organizations—the degree of authoritative mandate. The development of a particular board of directors, and the attempt to enlist the support of the people who are "top community leaders" reflects the problem of legitimacy faced by the Council and other broker organizations. Surprisingly enough, the issue has largely been ignored by writers on formal organizations, with the exception of Weber.

We can say, with Weber, that the development of organizational legitimacy is a crucial organizational task. We differ from his original formulation in noting that such legitimacy does not always have a legal base. While legal authorization is perhaps the clearest and most unequivocal legitimating mechanism, we should not forget that many organizations—including the Council—must be content with less than this. Sociologically then, the question is the manner in which organizations seek to develop legitimacy. Several mechanisms are of course used. Staff and program are two examples, and will be discussed later. Thus far we know at least that the board of directors plays an important part in this process.

TABLE 3.1

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF RESOURCE VARIABLES, ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE,
AMOUNT AND SOURCES OF INCOME, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	(4)	(108)	(98)	(105)	(107)	(106)	(99)	(101)	(104)	(100)	(102)	(103)
<u>Size of Council</u>												
(1) Community	.17	.80	.72	.73	.53	.22	.23	.31	.27	.26	.71	.62
(2) Regular Staff*	.28	.93	.96	.72	.65	.33	.22	.36	.56	.30	.36	.38
(4) Special Project Staff		.49	.29	.08	.07	.11	.08	.83	.84	.68	.04	.08
<u>Income</u>												
(108) Total, 1963			.93	.73	.59	.34	.28	.59	.69	.42	.48	.47
<u>Primary, Chest</u>												
(98) Chest, G.O.F.**				.64	.65	.36	.29	.35	.57	.26	.26	.31
(105) Other, G.O.F.					.62	.26	.12	.25	.25	.32	.60	.55
(107) Fees, Nonpublic						.15	.26	.10	.20	.21	.12	.41
(106) Other, S.P.F.***							.12	.09	.31	.03	.01	.02
(99) Chest, S.P.F.								.13	.08	.05	.00	.11
<u>Secondary, Local, and Foundation</u>												
(101) Public, S.P.F.									.71	.57	.23	.09
(104) Foundation, S.P.F.										.55	.02	.09
(100) Public, G.O.F.											.03	.19
(102) Fees, Public												.58
(103) Foundation, G.O.F.												

*Staff size refers to professional staff only. Clerical and secretarial is not included.

**G.O.F. stands for "General Operating Funds."

***S.P.F. stands for "Special Project Funds."

TABLE 3.2

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF RESOURCE VARIABLES, ORGANIZATION SIZE, AND TOTAL INCOME
WITH THE PROPORTIONS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND THE PROPORTION OF RATED "TOP COMMUNITY LEADERS" (POWER)
ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	(111)	(112)	(113)	(114)	(115)	(116)	(117)	(118)	(119)	(122)
<u>Size of Council</u>										
(2) Regular Staff	-.02	-.20	-.03	-.08	.06	.24	.10	.09	.17	.09
(4) Special Project Staff	.06	-.02	.03	.06	-.08	.01	.01	-.04	-.03	.00
<u>Income</u>										
(108) Total, 1963	.02	-.18	-.04	-.02	.02	.20	.06	.07	.16	.07
<u>Board of Directors</u>										
(120) <u>Cosmopolitan-Service*</u>	.45	.80	.30	.54	-.44	-.21	-.20	-.01	-.08	-.13
(111) Welfare and Health		.16	.11	.07	-.39	-.16	-.22	-.07	-.01	+.06
(112) Public Administration			-.01	.10	-.26	-.13	-.01	+.06	-.07	-.05
(113) Higher Education				-.02	-.12	-.11	-.18	+.05	-.05	-.06
(114) Religious					-.12	-.04	+.08	+.08	-.01	-.05
(121) <u>Local-Entrepreneurial*</u>	-.19	-.45	-.05	-.23	.82	.33	.55	.18	.16	.18
(115) <u>Business and Industry</u>					.20	.20	.05	.05	-.05	.28
(116) <u>Labor</u>							.03	.02	.11	.10
(117) <u>Professional</u>								.03	.09	.19
(118) <u>Communications Media</u>									-.08	.10
(119) <u>Elected Public Official</u>										.00
(122) <u>Power of the Board</u>										

*The correlations in these rows each represent the total board category correlated with each component, of both dimensions.

TABLE 3.3

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF RESOURCE VARIABLES AND AVERAGED CATEGORIES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	(4)	(108)	(109)	(110)	(120)	(121)	(122)
<u>Size of Council</u>							
(2) Regular Staff	.28	.93	.58	.39	-.08	.13	.09
(4) Special Project Staff		.49	.12	.49	.03	-.03	.00
<u>Income</u>							
(108) Total, 1963			.57	.53	-.06	.10	.07
(109) Primary, Chest			<u>.35</u>	.22	-.06	.09	.11
(110) Secondary, Local, and Foundation				.32	.05	.02	.02
<u>Board of Directors</u>							
(120) Cosmopolitan Service					<u>.07</u>	-.09	-.03
(121) Local Entrepreneurial						<u>.04</u>	.13
<u>(122) Power</u>							

TABLE 3.4

THE MEAN VALUES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE
RESOURCE VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Mean	Standard Deviation
<u>Size of Council</u>		
(2) Regular staff	3.6 persons	6.2 persons
(4) Special project staff	0.9 persons	4.25 persons
<u>Income</u>		
(108) Total, 1963	\$84,063	\$150,354
<u>Primary, Chest</u>		
(98) Chest, G.O.F.	\$58,012	\$ 92,969
(105) Other, G.O.F.	2,220	9,616
(107) Fees, Nonpublic	897	4,903
(106) Other, S.P.F.	920	3,599
(99) Chest, S.P.F.	1,801	6,052
<u>Secondary, Public and Foundation</u>		
(101) Public, S.P.F.	\$ 8,222	\$ 25,258
(104) Foundation, S.P.F.	6,190	24,171
(100) Public, G.O.F.	1,512	8,339
(102) Fees, Public	3,462	30,248
(103) Foundation, G.O.F.	797	3,572
<u>Board</u>		
(111) Welfare and Health	11.55%	10.40%
(112) Public Administration	7.77%	6.34%
(113) Higher Education	3.97%	5.78%
(114) Religious	4.66%	3.37%
(115) Business and Industry	34.00%	15.66%
(116) Labor	2.15%	2.78%
(117) Professional	22.25%	9.96%
(118) Media	2.35%	2.72%
(119) Elected Public Official	1.78%	3.10%

CHAPTER IV
THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE WELFARE COUNCIL

Introduction

Once the organization has successfully negotiated in the environment for resources of one or another kind, these resources must be processed through the organization. Money must be spent; and particularly, staff people must be hired and assigned to work roles. At any moment in time, the distribution of tasks, the kind of staff, and the nature of the organizational commitments may be regarded as substructures of the total organization structure, through which the organization operates. These substructures may be interpreted as surrogates for organizational policy. Instead of asking the executive and staff, "What is your task?," and "How do you go about it?," we can derive a sense of the mission and role of the organization from an analysis of the tools set up to pursue and achieve it—the key substructures of the organization.

If we know, for example, how the staff is assigned in terms of tasks, then we also know what the organization thinks is important. If we know the educational background of the staff, then we may possibly infer something of the problems the organization is trying to attack, and also something about how the organization is likely to define those problems. The analysis of organizational structures then, is a means of understanding aspects of organizational policy and attitude. Indeed, it may be considered to be simply the concrete expression of such policies and attitudes.

In the organizational literature, one most often sees reference to an undifferentiated "organizational structure." Such singular rhetoric might

be sufficient, and indeed, appropriate, for abstract analysis, but as one actually begins to inspect data it becomes quickly apparent that the overall "organization structure" needs to be decomposed into various substructures, and we have already referred to several types of structure. To be specific, the notion of the Council as a "broker organization" does not tell us as much as we would like to know about its internal structure. Indeed, there is no single phrase which could describe any organization in depth. Having established the general type of organization, it is necessary to then identify certain crucial facets or dimensions.

In analyzing the Council, four substructures seemed to be crucial. First, is the internal structure which has two main aspects. One is the task structure. People are assigned to various work roles in the organization. To understand this helps us to understand how the Council has interpreted its mission and role. Second, there is the training background of the staff, or training structure. It is through this background that the Council activities are filtered. Weber's emphasis upon the "office" as an important feature of formal organizations has led us to ignore the distribution of skills of the incumbents.* Indeed, the cross-ruffing of personal and "official" structures may be one of the prime causes of intraorganizational conflict. Third is the degree of division of labor within the professional staff—

*It has not been completely ignored. There is Lasswell's work on the psychological characteristics of certain governmental officials, and Merton's "bureaucratic personality." However, this is still at the psychological level of analysis, and does not consider the structure of personal qualification in organizations. Even the social-psychological study of small groups in the formal organization does not come fully to grips with the intermeshing of personnel structures and training and task structures. Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking, 1960). Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958)

does the Council have functional divisions, or not.* Finally there is the Council's corporate relationship to the local funding body—the Community Chest or United Fund.** That the Council may be independent from it or merged with it appears to be a variable of considerable theoretical importance.

These substructures, of course, are not the only ones which might be considered. However, for the Council, they seem to be the important ones. In sum, they are: (1) Task Structure; (2) Training Structure; (3) Division of Labor, and (4) Relationship to the Chest/Fund.

The Structure of Tasks

Every organization has a set of bureaus, offices, and tasks to which it assigns its staff. The substantive nature of these tasks can provide a beginning point for the analysis of internal organization structure. In studying them, and their interaction with each other, we can develop a sense of the kinds of goals the organization is seeking to pursue, and some of the problems it encounters in that pursuit. The fact, for example, that many police departments have something like a "bureau of internal investigations" suggests the problem of maintaining normative control is one that continually plagues police departments.

For the Welfare Council, the executives were asked to distribute their total regular staff across a set of task categories conventional in Council

*The divisional structure differs from the task structure in that it becomes, in effect, a question of whether or not the Council has specified roles for the large group called executive, administrative, and planning staff. As we shall see, about 64% of the Council staff is in this category. For Councils, the question is whether to leave them "free floating," in an "ad hoc" structure, or to assign them to "functional divisions, or work groups developed on the basis of divisions of the social welfare system.

**One might also wish to think of this variable as the Council's external structure, since it refers to a Council relationship with another organization.

work* These variables, as listed in the questionnaire are:

(1) Executive, Administration, and Planning; (2) Information and Referral Service; (3) Volunteer Bureau; (4) Social Service Exchange (SSX); (5) Budget Analysis; (6) Research; (7) Public Relations; and (8) Other.

The relative completeness of the category scheme is demonstrated in the scant use of the "other" category. In an overall staff of 3.6 persons, only .20 persons, or 5%, were assigned to that category. For this reason, in addition to the fact that it has no substantive content, it was dropped from further analysis.

A Dominance Hierarchy of Task Assignments

An initial understanding of the task structure can be obtained by ordering the tasks according to their dominance. Recall that this procedure was discussed in Chapter II, and used in our analysis of the resource variables. Dominance here can be ascertained by considering the task structure as reflecting the goals and problems of a broker organization as it goes about its work.

In setting up a task structure, the Council, or any broker organization, is painfully aware of three factors. First, its mission and role—planning and coordination—is a nonspecific, changing mandate which is difficult to concretize in terms of specific tasks, and thus provides little guidance on how to structure the job. Second, the moment the Council does make a decision, its lack of legitimacy leaves that decision open to immediate challenge. Thus, it is likely that the Council will seek to avoid specifying tasks in substantive areas to which other organizations might take offense. Finally, the Council needs to be structurally able to receive and act upon suggestions from its various constituencies.

*The assignment was made on the basis of full time equivalent staff. The correlations were developed using the numbers of staff in the various task assignments.

A task structure which is substantively fixed is likely to reject those job requests which are not within its domain, or to modify them to fit available work roles and conceptions. Each of these considerations point to a hesitancy on the part of the Council in becoming too specific about its structure. Yet, it must organize itself in some way. It therefore seems likely that the Council develops task assignments and assigns people to them in inverse relationship to the specificity of the task. Put another way, the Council will develop the most general and unspecific work roles first, and proceed subsequently on a continuum of increasing specificity, in order to preserve the flexibility of the organization.*

According to this notion of the dominance of the general assignments over the specific ones, the Executive, Administrative, and Planning category should come first. Completely unspecific, this general task assignment leaves staff free to pursue work in any substantive area. Second would come the Information and Referral Service. Relatively broad-gauged, this service keeps in contact with agencies and the general public, and provides liaison between them. In particular, people with personal problems who do not know where to go are referred to the appropriate agency. But in carrying out this function, the service is also charged with disseminating information on a range of topics to the public and the agencies, to develop relationships with the agencies, and to report to the Council any lacunae in the service system it perceives, etc. Third is research. A misnomer from an academic point of view, the research function is typically one of community fact-gathering, demographic analysis, etc. Its functions are somewhat more specific than the information and referral service, yet the broad range of substantive

*For a discussion of the principle of generality as a fundamental social characteristic, see Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service, Evolution and Culture (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1960), especially "The Law of Cultural Dominance," pp. 69-92.

issues over which such "research" may occur provides a certain generality. Public relations, occupying fourth place, is a more substantively specific category, than the ones mentioned so far, but still more flexible than the volunteer bureau, the budget analysis, and social service exchange.

Fifth and sixth positions would be occupied by the volunteer bureau and the budget specialist. The volunteer bureau is a unit which keeps track of the volunteer help desired by social and charitable agencies, and matches their needs with those people in the community who wish to offer their time in this way. It is quite specific in its function, and is often run as an adjunct to the information and referral service. The budget analyst provides a specialist in budget as an aid to the Council itself, and/or to the public and private agencies in the community. Though both useful, both these functions are somewhat esoteric. Much articulation between potential volunteers and needy organizations occurs privately, and it is difficult for the Council to establish preeminence in the area. Many of the organizations have their own budget specialists, and neither need nor trust one from the Council. Finally, in last place, and most specific, is the Social Service Exchange. The SSX is, or was, a central registry of persons served by the various local agencies. Its original purpose was to prevent persons from receiving money grants from more than one agency. As the financial support function came to be centered in public agencies, the need for the exchange declined rapidly, and it is now a moribund function.

Thus, on the basis of the above considerations, the dominance hierarchy is:

1. Executive, Administrative, and Planning
2. Information and Referral Service
3. Research
4. Public Relations
5. Volunteer Bureau
6. Budget Analysis
7. Social Service Exchange

Findings.—The relevant data are displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Overall, they support the contentions just advanced. Of the total mean staff of 3.6 persons, 2.3 or 64%, are assigned to the executive, administrative, and planning category (Table 4.2). This clearly supports the contention that the Council will seek to have a heavy complement of staff in the most general task category, one which does not specify the substantive content of work roles. Indeed, the fact that 64% of the staff are assigned to one category makes the ordering of the remaining task categories subject to a certain fluctuation.

Table 4.1 presents the relevant correlation matrices (rows: (6)-(9); columns: (7)-(9)). The structure of the matrix produced by the dominance hierarchy moderately supports that hierarchy. A generalized partial simplex is observable, although there are some minor deviations, due in part, to the fact that such a heavy proportion of staff is concentrated in the first, and most dominant category. Two other kinds of support are evident for the ranking, and are displayed in Table 4.2. If we assume that dominance is related to the number of people assigned to any work role, then there is additional support for the dominance hierarchy, as it is quite close to one developed simply on the basis of persons assigned to any task.

Alternatively, we can look at the problem as one of the Council adding tasks to the task structure, rather than adding people to previously vacant task categories. Thus, we may assume that those Councils which have no staff in a particular task category do not have that task. As can be seen from the table, there is a monotonic increase in the proportions of Councils who do not have particular tasks as we descend the dominance hierarchy. Only 8% of the Councils have no staff in the executive, administrative and planning category, while 92% report no staff for the social service exchange. From

these pieces of evidence, it is clear that the dominance hierarchy is fairly relevant to actual Council practice.

However, a caution must be entered. The hierarchy was developed on the basis of an external assessment of the degree of specificity or generality inherent in any of the particular tasks categories. And while it is the case that this assessment seems to be generally a correct one, such confirmation should not be interpreted to mean that every Council would have the same substantive notions about the specificity of the task. It is possible that a particular Council would give wide latitude to the social service exchange, and tightly specify what the planning staff was to do. It is unlikely, but possible, and certainly less extreme cases than this are in fact quite probable. Thus there is more than ample room for fluctuation here, and the establishment of as much regularity and patterning as we did find is thus to be taken somewhat gingerly. Indeed, this caveat would apply to all orderings which we perform.

The Structure of Training

A second structure of importance to the Council, and indeed, to any organization, is the structure of training, or the structure of skills brought to the organization by its employees. Since the organization usually sets its personnel requirements in order to enhance organizational progress toward its goal, the training structure reflects and is an influence upon the organization mission and role. It is thus critical to an understanding of organization structure. The staff were listed as to their training background. The possible categories, as listed in the questionnaire, are as follows: (1) Doctor of Social Work (DSW); (2) Doctor of Philosophy and Masters of Social Work

(PhD+MSW); (3) Doctor of Philosophy (PhD); (4) Masters of Social Work (MSW); (5) Master of Arts (AM); (6) One year of Social Work School (One year SWS); (7) College Graduate (Grad.); (8) Not a College Graduate (Non-graduate).

The Hierarchy of Training

Several criteria enter into the eventual employment of a particular person in a particular organization. Such employment is the result of the interaction of the hiring organization and the preferences of the candidate, the availability of positions, and the relationship of the training to the mission and role of the organization. We can summarize these several interactions with the notion of the "desirability/availability ratio" of an occupation. Not a ratio in the mathematical sense, it is rather an assessment of a particular kind of training category on these two criteria. The training which is the most desirable and the most available will be dominant.

The Masters of Social Work category would come first in the hierarchy. Long known as a social work organization, the Council can be expected to hire predominantly people who are social work professionals. On a relative basis, these people are available to the Council, and should account for the largest proportion of employees. Second is likely to be the college graduate category. While untrained in any professional sense, the college graduate is quite available, and as a positive note, does not have any other training which would interfere with the development of loyalty to the Council. On-the-job training can be provided. Third will be the Master of Arts category. Often intermediate degrees in the social science area, these people have limited training in their discipline, and thus have a negligible future in college and university life. They wish to do something at least half-way academic, and the Council can often use their skills in research, while paying them less than they would have to pay a Ph.D. Not only are they rela-

tively available to the Council, but there is less chance of losing them to a university.

Fourth and fifth place would be occupied by two "dropout" categories—"one year of social work school" and "non-college graduate." Fourth place goes to the social work category, because of the relative importance of social work training to the Council, and hence, the relatively greater desirability of such a person. People who have not graduated from college are usually of limited utility to the Council in a professional capacity, unless they have some particular skill of use of the Council.* Finally, the last group of places—sixth, seventh, and eighth—are occupied by doctoral level people. Often Councils feel ambivalent about such persons (or such training). They are not sure what role the doctoral level person can or should perform. Often, emphasis is therefore placed upon his alleged methodological training, and he is assigned to research (which, as organized in the Council, is often not to his liking). Trained in a discipline (which is true even of DSW's), he often has rather different ideas about program and activity. In certain respects, however, the question becomes an "academic" one. These people are quickly hired by Colleges and Universities, and are thus relatively unavailable. Hence, they are ordered according to their "closeness" to social work. Thus we have DSW, Ph.D.-MSW, and Ph.D. In sum, the dominance hierarchy is hypothesized as follows:

1. Masters of Social Work (MSW)
2. College Graduate (Grad.)
3. Master of Arts (AM)
4. One year of social work school (One year SWS)
5. Noncollege Graduate (Nongrad.)
6. Doctor of Social Work (DSW)

*It should not be interpreted that these are all "dropouts." Some may be young people finishing their education and working too. The Council, however, is often unwilling to permit such combined efforts, and the more typical case is that they are people who, for one or another reasons, did not finish. Having not finished gives them a somewhat negative cast.

7. Doctor of Philosophy-Masters of Social Work (Ph.D.-MSW)
8. Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Findings.—The data are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The demonstrated power of the variables is consistent with the dominance hierarchy. There is a generalized partial simplex structure in evidence, Table 4.1, rows: (18)-(17); columns: (21)-(17).

The same two points may be made about the training structure that were made about the task structure. First, it is the case that the dominance hierarchy is also approximately a hierarchy by mean number of persons possessing such a training. Second, the dominance hierarchy is also inversely related to the proportion of Councils which have no people of a given training. And again, the most dominant category is quite dominant. Social work training accounts for a heavy percentage of staff (2.1/3.9, or 52%).* Here too, such a heavy reliance on one category introduces a not inconsiderable potential for variance into the remaining categories. And finally, the same methodological caveat should be entered concerning the ranking procedures. The availability/desirability ratio is assigned on the basis of imputed, categorical characteristics. This is not, of course, to say that all Councils see it in exactly this way, or that all individuals are able to be so characterized. Nonetheless, the overall ranking seems to have been supported.

Discussion

Thus far, the dominance hierarchy of both the training structure and the task structure have received some empirical support. The theoretical notions with which the respective hierarchies were developed—work roles of

*Proportionalizing the Training structure is difficult, because part time people, insofar as their education was concerned, were reported as whole people, even though they may work less than full time. Thus, the total N of the training structure is greater than that of the total staff, because of the use of whole people. This is an unfortunate limitation of the questionnaire.

increasing specificity for the task structure, and a position on a continuum of desirability/availability for the training structure have, by implication, been supported. However, viewing each in isolation is not sufficient.

The Interaction of Task and Training Structure and Selected Resources.—

Although this matter is considered in detail in Chapter VI, some limited consideration seemed appropriate here—viz., the relationship of the task and training hierarchies to organizational size and income. The data are presented in Table 4.1. Note that for the dominance hierarchies of task and training each show decreasing relationships to income and size as we proceed across the row, from most to least dominant. That the hierarchies can produce order in variables external to the matrix is additional support for their integrity. In addition, the display of correlations provides some understanding of how increases in income are utilized by the organization. Two trends are implicit. One is that all task units, even the least dominant ones, become larger. But, and this is the second trend, task units do not all grow at the same rate. Indeed, they seem to grow in proportion to their dominance. This is true both of the training hierarchy and the task hierarchy. That is, the most dominant gain the most.*

The Interaction of Task and Training Structures

The two structures do not exist independently in the organization. On the contrary, they must be closely articulated with each other. The training structure must produce people relevant for the task structure, and the task structure must be defined in such a way as to welcome people from the training structure. One might expect, therefore, that the individual dominance

*A tabular presentation, by community size, is available in Table 6.3.

hierarchies should and would predict to each other. The data are seen in Table 4.1, and it is clear from an inspection of this intercluster matrix that the hierarchies do predict. The variables in the task hierarchy have generally decreasing relationships as we follow their correlations across the training hierarchy, and vice versa. The trend of this pattern can clearly be seen in the shift of median correlation values between the first and the last rows (.52 to .24) and the first and the last columns (.70 to .38).^{*} The correlation between the most dominant Task variable and the most dominant Training variable is an impressive +.86; the correlation between the least dominant variables is a negligible -.05. But the structural articulation has a substantive as well as statistical aspect.

The Council as a Nonbureaucratic, Social Work, Organization

The Council is a nonbureaucratic organization with little division of labor.^{**} This conclusion is supported by fact that the Council assigns 64% of its staff to one general task category.^{***} There is little question, as well, that the Council is a social work organization, at least in terms of staff background. Approximately 52% of its staff have social work degrees, and another 6% have a social work degree plus something else, or at least one

^{*}As we move down the rows, we move from the most dominant to the least dominant training variable; as we move across the columns, we move from the most dominant to the least dominant training variable.

^{**}Indeed, as we shall see momentarily, such differentiation as was manifest in the old divisional structure has been discarded by the Council in recent years for a more "flexible" structure.

^{***}The absence of bureaucratization in a formalized way does not imply the absence of interpersonal dominance and status networks which may have the same effect as bureaucratization. Also, there are social mechanisms used by the Council, like assigning much business to committees, which has the same hindering effect as bureaucratization, but is a substantially different mechanism. Indeed, a relatively small organization may need to develop mechanisms for slowing and retarding the progress of decisions in order to enjoy the same protection provided to larger organizations by bureaucratization.

year of social work school. The correlation between the size of the executive, administrative, and planning category and the size of the social work component on the staff is .86, the highest in the intercluster matrix (Table 4.1). What happens is clear—it is essentially people with social work training who are staffing this general category.

The substantive elements of structural articulation are now becoming clear. A professional person is unlikely to accept a work role which is too delimited. Professionals presumably have their own competence and make their own decisions.* Indeed, one may regard a profession in the sense given by the verb form—"to profess"—that is, to set forth as a set of policy statements and procedural statements (or goal statements and means statements) which define and structure a given area of social behavior. From this perspective, it seems reasonable to assume that the Council, unable to completely or precisely define its task, has turned to the social work profession for at least a portion of this definition, and the Council implicitly agrees to use the problem definitions and intervention strategies developed by the profession.** What is it to do planning and coordination? It is often simply to do that which one has been trained to do by the profession.

Apart from the function of defining an ambiguous mandate, the use of social work professionals fulfills two other functions for the Council. First, the Council is able to borrow and use whatever legitimacy the profession has,

*This becomes a problem when a formal organization using professionals needs to deploy them. Such deployment often appears to the professional as unwarranted infringement on his perogatives, and he resists. See, for example, M.E.W. Goss, Physicians in Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Professional Pressures on Organizational Roles. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1959, and M.E.W. Goss, "Patterns of Bureaucracy Among Hospital Staff Physicians" in E. Freidson, Ed., The Hospital in Modern Society (New York: The Free Press, 1963).

**In certain respects, referring to "the Council" apart from the profession is only a mental exercise. However, for analytical purposes, we might refer to the "Council movement" as an entity, sui generis.

to bolster its own weak position. To use the concepts of French and Raven, the Council attempts to invoke "expert power" in the face of tenuous "legitimate power."* Use of the professional is a master-stroke in this regard. It asserts that the phenomena is too complicated for the average layman, and thus becomes a mechanism for maintaining a certain social distance between the organization and the board of directors; and it is one kind of authority that social agencies, staffed by professionals, are willing to accept and cooperate with. The latter function helps the Council relate (and perhaps over-relate!) to the social agency system. After all, agency people are themselves social workers, and all share some limited bond of fellow professionalism.

Implications

Two implications suggested by the foregoing discussion deserve to be briefly noted. First, the profession is quite likely to be the major vehicle of social control in the Council organization. The mission and role are too ill defined to permit the application of classical Weberian "rational authority," as we have seen. But this is not to say that behavior is ungoverned; only that the internalized mechanism of professional training is likely to be the dominant force. It is likely that untrained people, through the association with trained professionals, will be inculcated with relevant norms.

The second implication is in the realm of organizational identification. It is actually unclear whether or not the Council realizes the full extent of its articulation with the professional social worker. Recent attempts on the part of the Council to become a community-wide planning and coordinating body suggest that it perceives itself as a community generalist, rather than

*J.R.P. French and B. Raven, "The Bases of Social Power" in D. Cartwright and A. Zander, Eds., Group Dynamics, 2nd edition (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1960).

a functional specialist. In our view, it is unlikely that other elements of the community accept this new self-image, if in fact it exists. One piece of empirical evidence on this point is the definite subdominance of non-social work sources of funding, discussed in Chapter III. In any case, despite Council aspirations, and despite structural changes (to be discussed in the next section) designed to facilitate Council entrance into this community-wide role, it seems that the clear dominance of the social work profession in the training hierarchy will mitigate against success in this endeavor. And, in the years since 1963, the clear preference of local and Federal granting agencies to set up independent community planning bodies supports this view.

In sum, the following propositions might be considered:

1. The more imprecise an organization's mission and role is, the greater will be the generality of the task structure it develops.
2. The more imprecise an organization's mandate is, the more likely it is that an organization will use a profession to help define and clarify its mission and role.
3. The more dependent an organization is on a particular profession, the more it becomes identified with that profession in the public mind, and the more the public expects it to perform the special functions attributed to that profession.
4. The more dependent an organization is on a particular profession, the less likely it is to be bureaucratic, unless it is very large.

Divisional Structure*

Selznick has pointed out that the less specific the goals of an organi-

*Divisional structure typically refers to the division of labor among the Administrative, Executive, and Planning staff.

zation are, the more likely it is that the organization will be influenced by its environment.* The very existence of a divisional structure in many Councils represented just such an influence, as we noted in Chapter I. When we speak of a Council having divisions, we mean that the Council has specified its functioning into a number of functional areas (three or four were usual), areas which typically represented the major "divisions" of social work practice. Although not exclusively, these divisions tended to be (1) family and child welfare; (2) health; (3) group work and recreation; and (4) sundry others, perhaps aging, etc.

Each division acted, in fact, like a "little Council of social agencies" for the agencies in its area. Each division had an "executive committee" of people not employed by the Council which decided upon the work to be performed by that division, and performed a liaison function to the overall board of directors. Often this executive committee was composed of "representatives" from the social agencies within the functional areas. Not infrequently, they developed, in Selznick's phrase, "subsystem identification," and adopted a very narrow view of Council functioning; in addition, they were quite resistant to direction from the Council executive.** While they were originally designed to facilitate interaction with the social agencies, they had, it was asserted, become rather a bottleneck, and a serious impediment to Council function in the larger community.

Specifically, divisions were defined in the questionnaire as follows:

Definition: For purposes of this report, a functional division is considered a (sic) program unit with responsibility for a broad content area, such as family and child welfare, health, group work recreation or aging. An essential feature is that the unit have

*Phillip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit., p. 16.

**The phrase "subsystem identification" was developed by Selznick in reference to the tendency for parts of an organization to develop their own concept of mission and role, often at variance with overall policy. Phillip Selznick, T.V.A. and the Grass Roots, op. cit.

an executive committee or similar body which acts as an administrative link between the council board and the committee of the division, so that the division executive committee or chairman normally appoints (the) division committees, and that the (division) executive committee normally passes on reports developed by the division committees prior to submitting them to the council board for approval.

The divisional structure, especially with the executive committee feature, served most Councils as a source of programme and legitimacy. The divisional committees were typically permanent, and any item which the Council wished to consider and pursue had to be referred to the appropriate divisional executive committee. Naturally, if the Council wished to pursue an item which fell into no jurisdiction, it was likely to create serious organizational problems; hence, many agenda items came to be reinterpreted in a rhetoric which would permit their processing by the extant structure. Thus, in practice, the Council program tended to become limited to those areas for which it had divisions. In turn, the divisions provided a high degree of articulation with the private, voluntary agency system in the community.

It is understandable that the Council was eager to move to a somewhat different organizational structure, one which emphasized ad hoc committees, appointed to consider a specific problem, and which would be lodged under the board.* It was not misunderstood by the division executive committee and the partisans of that divisional structure that such organizational change represented in fact a fundamental realignment of the Council, a realignment in which they lost control and influence. In Selznick's terms, it was a change in the Council's institutional structure. Despite the obvious difficulties many Councils made the shift. In 1957, 77.6% of the Councils reporting to the United Community Funds and Councils of America had such divisions; in

*These two characteristics, the ad hoc approach and the lodging of the committee under the board were designed to redress the two main complaints about division executive committees and their offspring, viz., that they were permanent committees, and that they were narrowly conceived in terms of mission and role.

1962, this proportion had decreased to 34.4%.* Not only were they changing, they were changing fast!

Findings.—The data are displayed in Table 4.1. The relationships are not promising. Within the internal structure variable group, the median correlation value is +.16; the range is from +.26 to +.02.** Inspection of the entire 108 variable matrix does not reveal any substantial departure from this level of relationship. Therefore, despite the theoretical importance of the divisional structure, in practice it relates only moderately well.

Discussion

The fact that the divisional structure is so infertile deserves some attention, if not explanation, especially when there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that it should be quite powerful. The solution to the problem turns on the fact that divisional structure as the operational definition for this kind of Council posture rests upon two interrelated assumptions:

1. That the division executive committees have a "rules committee" function, and pass on all business before it reaches the overall board. Thus, they themselves become the locus of power.

2. That the division executive committee is comprised mainly of social work agency professionals.

If these assumptions were met, then the divisional structure would be likely to mean what we had thought. In point of fact, neither of them turned out to be correct.

*Facts on Community Welfare Councils, 1957, op. cit., Table 9, p. 8. This is for the 1957 proportion. The data for 1963 comes from this study.

**The correlations are based upon the number of divisions. "No divisions" was scored zero, 1 division, 1, etc. Thus, we are measuring the relationship of an increase in divisions to other variables.

By the first assumption, we suggest that the divisional structure and its executive committee cannot have an overwhelming influence on Council business unless they have exclusive control of that business. Such business is the establishment and charging of committees, and the receiving of reports from committees, which may or may not be passed along to the board. In fact, of the 53 Councils which had divisions, only one had committees which reported only to the division executive committee. In short, Councils which retained the divisional structure bypassed it by developing committees attached directly to the overall board of directors. Such committees would be relatively free from influence of the division executive committee.

The second assumption is that the membership of the division executive committee would have a heavy component of social agency professionals on it, and hence, would be a committee which would take a "social agency" view of intervention possibilities. They would, furthermore, encourage reports and opinions which would reflect and support their efforts. In fact, it turns out that, on the average, only 38.7% of the division executive committee members are agency professionals. This proportion is considerably more than the 11% on the overall board of directors, a difference which clearly shows the benefits of assigning a committee to the overall board. The 38.7%, however, is less than a total swamping. It is likely that, on many occasions, other interests from those strictly limited to social work agencies come to the fore in such a committee. In short, the Council, by one or another means, has been able to keep a relatively reduced proportion of agency professionals on the executive committee of the division, and, thereby, has made complete prominence of agency goals quite unlikely.

In effect, what has happened is that the vast majority of Councils have ceased to be structurally constrained by the divisional organization. Some

have abandoned it altogether. Others, which were not able to eliminate the structure, have worked out methods, either by having committees report to the board directly, or by loosening up the social work control of the division executive committees, to assure Council flexibility in meeting the new social problems of today.

Independence Structure

As previously noted in Chapter I, the Council may occupy several positions vis a vis the local Chest/Fund. It may be independent from it completely; it may be "quasi-independent" in the sense of being merged, but having a separate executive; it may be completely merged; or, finally, it may have an "other" status (there are only four of these). In our data, about 53% are "independent," 23% are "quasi-independent," 21% are "merged," and 3% are "other." Needless to say, this variable seems like an important one.

Findings.—As in the case of the divisional structure, the findings are disappointing relative to the assumed theoretical importance of the variable. Its median intercorrelation with the internal structure variables is +.14; the range is from +.29 to +.04.*

Relationship to Community Size

It has often been said that the independence is closely related to community size. By implication, this relationship might have some considerable bearing on the disappointing results found here. Thus, it seems appropriate to advance our discussion somewhat, and consider the influence of community size at this crucial point.

*The correlation analysis was performed on the basis of scores assigned as follows: 1 = independent; 2 = quasi-independent; 3 = merged, and 4 = other ("other" were only 3%). A feature of this scoring system is that the directionality points toward merger. Since it seemed more intelligible to talk of the increasing independence of the Council, we reversed the signs.


The thinking runs as one might expect, viz., that in smaller communities the Council will be merged, and in large communities it will be independent. The quasi-merged status—sometimes called a United Community Services—is characteristic of the middle sized community. Sociologically, of course, this is simply the argument that as size increases so does specialization and differentiation.

Overall, the correlation between independence and community size is +.27 (Table 7.8a). (The correlation of independence to total, regular organizational staff is +.28; to total income it is +.22.) This result too is a rather disappointing one, in view of the strength of the assertions. For a more detailed examination of the relationship, the distribution of Council independence status by community size is presented in Table 4.3. It is clear from this table that there is an overwhelming tendency (85%) for Councils in larger cities (1,000,000+) to be independent, while the tendency for Councils in the smallest cities (less than 100,000) to be independent is less strong (24%). There is no question of the relationship to the size of the community. Yet, in fact, the relationship is curvilinear.* This curve may be seen on Figure 4.1, displayed on the following page. It explains the relatively low correlation when a process is used which assumes linearity. In the two smallest community size groups there is a tendency toward merger. After that, however, there is an "elbow" in the distribution, and it flattens out. In short, independence is the preferred status, and Councils move to it as quickly as they can.**

*It is curvilinear not in the sense of a "U" but in the sense of an elbow.

**This finding is not unique to this data, however. One would find it wherever there is a preferred status with a relatively low upper limit. For example, the relationship between income and car ownership would begin to flatten out at perhaps 3 cars, regardless of how high the income was.

FIGURE 4.1. THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEAN INDEPENDENCE SCORE BY COMMUNITY SIZE GROUP.*



*The Code was as follows: 1 = Independent; 2 = Quasi-Merged; 3 = Merged with Chest/Fund; 4 = Other. Only 4 Communities had a score of 4 from an N of 154.

Discussion

The questionnaire data did not present the chance to explore in greater detail why this variable did not have greater weight than we expected. It seems likely that a similar pattern occurs here as occurs with divisional structure. First, a majority of Councils are independent to begin with, as a majority of Councils were free of the divisional structure. Secondly, it seems likely that those Councils which are merged or quasi-merged have found some way to partially circumvent the limitations of a merged structure. Especially in the quasi-independent group, the Council has its own executive to look after its interests, and it is quite likely that he does so.*

Summary and Discussion

These dry statistics on Council structure, when considered together, present an intriguing picture. They suggest that the Council, faced as it is with vague goals and unsure legitimacy, moves to set up a structure which deals directly with these problems, and insures the integrity of organizational life. The Councils appear to tread a line between organizational anarchy and extinction, on the one hand, and absorption by funding organizations on the other. The Council seeks to preserve its flexibility and autonomy, as noted in the end of Chapter III. It hesitates to assign its staff to any fixed work role. It uses independent professionals on its staff. It seems to resist domination by the social work agencies, as seen through the maneuvering out of the divisional structure,** and to resist absorption by

*What is suggested here is that a crucial element may be the personal relationships of Council and Chest/Fund professionals. Thus, in future research, it would be important to develop a subset of social psychological data in order to assess the point.

**This change was so drastic that according to the executive of one of the first Councils to formally reject divisions, his colleagues in other cities were betting that he would be fired within a year. That was in 1957. He is still there.

the Chest/Fund, as seen in the strain toward independence, and the lack of overall difference its position vis a vis the Chest/Fund seems to make. It seems legitimate to conclude the following:

1. That the less precise an organization's mission and role is, the more it will actively seek to preserve flexibility of posture, personnel, and programme.

An organization has a variable amount of control over itself and its structure. Some areas, like the training and task structures, are relatively easy for the organization to control—the executive can set up the assignment of work roles, and hire whom he likes. On the other hand, some aspects of structure may not be quite as easy to control. In this case, the divisional structure has become "institutionalized," and no executive would change it without considerable trepidation. The Chest/Fund relationship is the same. To achieve independence, one must produce not only the resources, but a willingness on the part of the Chest that the Council should be independent.

The lack of control over certain aspects of organizational structure makes them no less constraining, however. As we have seen, the organization seeks to circumvent the limitations imposed by these structures. Thus:

2. An organization with a vague mission and role will seek to limit and otherwise circumvent formalized arrangements which limit its flexibility and autonomy.

This is not to say, of course, that every Council, or broker organization will succeed in neutralizing such hampering arrangements, or even that many will succeed. It does say that they will try. Proof that Councils are constantly striving to maintain flexibility is the drastic decline in the proportion of Councils with divisions between 1957 and 1963. However, it seems that a great amount of organizational energy goes into maintaining at least the posture of "flexible response." One might wonder if it does not

detract from the ability of the organization to achieve in other areas. Indeed, the continual effort to achieve flexibility and maintain autonomy may have the net result of producing a less innovative Council. We might hypothesize, therefore:

3. That the organizational energy required to maintain a flexible and an autonomous posture reduces resources available to the broker organization for innovative purposes, and thus, reduces the ability and willingness to undertake innovation.

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF INTERNAL STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
PLUS REGULAR STAFF SIZE AND TOTAL INCOME,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

[illegible]

TABLE 4.2

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, TASK, AND TRAINING STRUCTURES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Mean	S.D.	Percent with No Staff	Percent N.A.
<u>Task Structure</u>				
(6) Exec., Administrative, and Planning	2.290	3.15	08	00
(7) Information and Referral	.290	.09	66	00
(10) Research	.430	1.00	73	00
(8) Public Relations	.010	.59	85	00
(12) Volunteer Bureau	.240	.03	78	00
(11) Budget	.010	.03	90	00
(9) Social Service Exchange	.004	.18	92	00
(13) Other	.200	1.34	xx	xx
<u>Training Structure</u>				
(18) Masters of Social Work	2.110	2.94	24	11
(21) College Graduate	.750	1.54	59	11
(19) Master of Arts	.600	1.05	61	11
(20) One year of Social Work	.270	.92	71	11
(22) Non-college Graduate	.250	.68	72	11
(15) Doctor of Social Work	.005	.22	83	11
(16) Doctor of Philosophy-- Masters of Social Work	.002	.16	85	11
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	.005	.26	83	11

TABLE 4.3

THE RELATIONSHIPS OF COUNCILS TO LOCAL COMMUNITY CHESTS AND FUNDS,
BY THE SIZE OF THE COMMUNITY, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Independence Status of Council (63)	Size of Community					Total
	Less Than 99,999	100,000- 199,999	200,000- 499,999	100,000- 999,999	1,000,000+	
Independent	24%	36%	49%	76%	85%	53%
Quasi-Inde- pendent	19%	23%	34%	18%	15%	23%
Merged	57%	38%	10%	6%	0%	21%
Other	0%	3%	7%	0%	0%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	21	29	41	33	21	154

CHAPTER V

THE PROGRAM ACTIVITIES OF THE WELFARE COUNCIL

Introduction

Every organization does something, has some function, output, or product. The Welfare Council's product, if the term is even appropriate, is—to paraphrase Robert Lane—"an organization of community resources which meets community needs." More specifically, the Council is loosely charged with coordinating the private social work service system, insuring that these social work organizations are performing reasonably well, that community resources are being allocated to locally relevant areas, and that a person is actually helped with his problem as he winds his way through the maze of social agencies. Needless to say, the expression of this somewhat vague mandate takes a variety of concrete forms.

Operationally, the questionnaire sought information on Council involvement in a number of substantive areas, and the depth of that involvement. These variables, mentioned in Figure 2 of Chapter I are: (1) Agency Development and Change; (2) Services to Special Groups; (3) Chronic Illness; (4) Mental and Physical Rehabilitation; (5) Services to the Indigent; (6) Legislative Activity; (7) Participation in the Budgeting of Private Agencies; (8) Participation in the Budgeting of Public Agencies; and (9) Participation in Programs Under Other Auspices. The specific content of these activities will be clarified as we proceed.*

*It should be noted that, even with the large number of questions about various Council activities, the questionnaire tapped a selected, if informed, sample of all Council activities.

Two Kinds of Council Activities

One way in which the Council operates, and thus a crucial activity of the Council, is to undertake, with the cooperation of citizens and agency professionals, periodic planning in a number of areas of service. Often, these areas of service, defined in a functional way, crosscut the specific agencies designed to deal with specific problems.*

Another way in which the Council goes about its business, and thus a second kind of activity, is to develop relationships of confidence and trust with organizations of importance and consequence in the local community—for example, private and public social agencies, the school system, the political structure. The purpose is to enable the Council to have a fund of good will and mutual appreciation in reserve which it can draw upon if it ever wishes to make requests of these organizations. Conversely, the Council hopes that the organization will "remember" the Council if it wants something done of a community-wide nature.

Such a distinction appears to be implicit in the questionnaire itself, although it was never specifically stated. In one large question, the executive was asked to rate the degree of Council activity in each of 22 separate program areas—such as child and family welfare, health, and group work and recreation. (These 22 were clustered into the first 5 activities mentioned on the preceding page.) They definitely have a problem-focus and, in addition, they form a single question unit.

On the other hand, some activities reported upon in the questionnaire appear to have an organizational focus to them, such as participation in

*Indeed, it was just for this reason that the Council wanted to divest itself of the divisional structure, which tended to define social problems according to the agencies which served them. Woe to the person whose problem had no agency!

public and private agency budgeting, and engaging in legislative activities. Thus, there seems to be some justice in dividing Council activities into two clusters—problem-focused activities and organization-focused activities. Thus, the following clustering is hypothesized:*

Problem-Focused

Indigent
Chronic Illness
Rehabilitation
Services for Special Groups
Agency Development and Change

Organization-Focused

Participation in Public Budgeting
Legislative Activity
Participation in Private Budgeting
Programs under other Auspices

Data are displayed in Table 5.1. The mean within-group correlations (.23 and .24) exceed the mean between-group correlation (.18), providing very modest support for the hypothesized groupings. It should be noted here, however, as it will be noted elsewhere in this chapter, that these results are not particularly strong. However, this low intercorrelation is not too surprising, in that we do not expect that the two kinds of activities are necessarily mutually exclusive. It resembles the situation encountered in the board of directors clusters—some support, yet not overwhelming support, for two clusters. Rather than regard the empirical findings as "supporting" the clustering, let us simply consider that the results are in the hypothesized direction. The construct needs to be more completely tested in future research, with data designed from the outset to make such a test, but it does provide a means of looking at the large range of activities.

*Two points should be underscored concerning the hypothesized grouping. First, there is a recognized lack of task specificity in the organization-focused activities. The indeterminate nature simply emphasizes the aspect of relationship-building which we just mentioned. The second point deals with the location of agency development activities under the problem-focused category. This activity deals with the creation or relocation of agencies, and is typically undertaken in connection with an overall realignment of community services. Further, the focus is more typically direct and task-oriented, rather than diffuse and relationship oriented. The list of specific activities included in this subcluster is found on page 109.

Problem-Focused Activities

As we have just mentioned, there is a long list (though doubtless an incomplete one) of problem-focused activities which may be undertaken by the Council. In practice, when the Council begins to work in a problem area, it first looks itself into the situation locally; sees what it can do; discovers what, if any, national standards and experience are applicable; circulates relevant information about the problem; etc. As a second phase, it may appoint, through the board of directors, a lay committee of local citizens (with some agency professionals, perhaps in an advisory capacity) to pursue "problem consideration." This committee, with the aid of staff from the Council, looks at the problem area, delimits it, focuses it, specifies it, and develops a Council role in relation to it. The committee often calls for data on local conditions (the provision of which is a function of the Council research staff), and the committee members often talk with numbers of local people to ascertain their perspective on the issue under study. As the committee finishes its considerations, it prepares a report which is sent to the Council board, listing the action steps which the committee thinks should be taken, and specifying especially those steps which it thinks fall within the Council's authority to take.

Often, much of the Council activity stops at the committee report phase. However, as the Council has developed in political sophistication it has come to realize that "wishing won't make it so!" and that the presentation of a report, and its acceptance by the Council board, does nothing to insure the implementation of the recommendations. To preserve its prestige and secure the integrity of its efforts, the Council is interested that its recommendations be implemented. Thus currently, either the committee which made the original recommendations, or a new committee, often has the explicit charge of implementing the recommendations.

We have taken a moment to describe the Council program process because it forms the basis of the reporting scheme which was used for the problem-focused activities. For each of the 22 program areas the executive could check one of three degrees of effort (or all three): (1) General Education Activity, which refers to the holding of conferences, the distribution of literature, etc.; (2) Problem Consideration, which refers to the appointment of a committee; and (4) Action to Implement Recommendations, which refers to the process just discussed.* The levels were scored 1, 2, and 4, respectively; and, since the Council could report undertaking none, one, or all of the activities, the scores were added together to form the final score. (The range was 0-7).** The correlation analysis was performed on the basis of the final score. Though it is a nonmetric scheme, it does articulate with the actual progression of Council effort. Put in other words, as the score increases, so does Council effort on a particular problem.

The Clustering of Problem-Focused Activities

The 22 problem-focused activities taken together are too numerous to be dealt with effectively. We are thus provided with an ideal opportunity for clustering. Inspection of the content of the items suggests five substantive areas: (1) programs in the area of services to indigent persons; (2) programs in the area of chronic illness; (3) programs in the area of mental and physical rehabilitation; (4) programs in the area of services for special groups; and (5) programs in the area of agency assessment and change. The 22 program

*These items are defined in detail in the questionnaire.

**Additional discussion of the scoring scheme is presented in the first footnote to Table 5.2.

areas were grouped as follows:*

(1) Programs for the Indigent

Medical Care—Poor
Hospital Care
Financial Assistance
Family Disorganization

(2) Chronic Illness

Chronic Illness
Home Care
Nursing Home
Public Health Dept. Services
Nursing Services

(3) Mental and Physical Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation Services
Mental Retardation
Mental Health and Illness
Alcoholism

(4) Services for Special Groups

Day and After School Care
Unmarried Parents
Foster Care
Resident Camping
Services for Special Groups
Public Recreation

(5) Agency Assessment and Change

Geographical Redistribution,
Relocation, or Extension of Services
Determination of Need and/or
Realignment or Modification of Services
Establishment of New Agencies

The groupings were developed in the following manner. First is a cluster of poverty-related services entitled "Programs for the Indigent." Medical care (for the) Poor and Financial Services definitely belong here. "Family Disorganization" often refers to programs for the poverty-stricken, multi-problem family, and thus can be included. Hospital care, though not always, often refers to hospital care for the poor.**

The next two clusters are in the area of health, a large and crucial area

*In each of these substantive areas, the actual Council activity is of the kind we previously discussed—studying the issue, disseminating information, forming a committee, attending to the recommendations of that committee. The reader will note that the "content" of some of these activities is quite inclusive, so that the Council which undertook a program in that area would not be limited in the agencies and services which it might take into account.

In the original list of items in question 6 there was one—fee charging—which was not included because it was an exceptionally unfruitful item.

**One example of a Council working in this area can be seen in the case description by Banfield, "The Branch Hospital Dispute," in Edward Banfield, Political Influence, op. cit.

in today's community. Two types of health areas distinguish themselves. One is the area of chronic illness. The focus here is upon programs for people who need relatively constant attention and help, but something less than constant hospital care. The chronic illness item itself, plus nursing services and nursing home programs seem to fit exactly. Home care is certainly appropriate. Public health services actually cover a gamut of services, many of which are in the area of chronic illness. Mental and physical rehabilitation programs are those designed not to manage disability, but to help people improve themselves and recover, insofar as is possible. Essentially the mental health component is important.

The last two clusters represent somewhat more traditional Council activities, at least in the sense of their long historical presence. Services to special groups is a cluster of programs designed to improve services for special user groups—except the poor as such, who have already been discussed. The content of the items speaks for itself, in such programs as foster parents, unmarried parents, etc. Finally, there is the cluster of items representing agency assessment and change. Here are the programs which revolve around helping agencies to have relevant, needed programs in the local community, and to bring their program up-to-date if it is not current.

Findings.—The test for clusters provides a mechanism for testing the integrity of this set of assignments. The data are displayed in Table 5.1. This set of clusters meets the test. The mean within-cluster correlations (shown underlined on the diagonal) are larger than the intercluster correlations. In other words, the structure of the matrix supports the notion that, on the average, the variables within each cluster relate to each other more strongly than they relate to variables external to the cluster. Such support permits us to now consider the cluster itself as the variable, and thus reduce the number of variables to five.

It should also be underscored here as well that the interrelationships among problem-focused activities are not strong. The range of mean, intra-cluster relationships ranges from +.27 to +.37. Although these are higher than any of the intercluster correlations, they are certainly less strong than one would like. This suggests a direction of interpretation which we shall have some occasion to explore at the end of the chapter, viz., that activities have a definite degree of independence from one another.

The Hierarchy of Problem-Focused Activity Variables

The five clusters were ranked in a dominance hierarchy, using the notion of risk. It seemed reasonable to hypothesize that an activity would be dominant in proportion to the degree of "risk" involved to the Council in undertaking programs in the particular area. By "risk," for problem-focused variables, we mean to suggest the notion of Council vulnerability to criticism and attack; and, thus, a greater chance that the Council would be unsuccessful in the undertaking. When the Council ventures into an area of relatively high risk, it invites criticism and attack from agencies and organizations already in that area. And, given the Balkanized state of the welfare system in most communities, there is a good chance that the Council will not be successful in attempts at coordination and planning if there is opposition of this sort. It is thus in the embarrassing position of having made claims which it cannot make good.*

From this perspective, the most risky cluster of programs would be the field of programs for the indigent. The very large number of organizations

*To make the point in "Goffmanesque" fashion, organizations, like people, make a "presentation of self." As a person would, an organization hesitates to undertake something which looks very dubious, or has a very uncertain outcome. Indeed, one way to consider "power" is to see it as the ability to implement one's claims. And while most organizations can tolerate a few failures, many failures are likely to destroy it. Irving Goffman The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Double Day-Anchor, 1957).

involved make it problematic that any single organization could be a successful coordinator. Next would come the two health categories—chronic illness and rehabilitation. Although the medical field is a highly organized one, there are certain lacunae in the medical service system, especially in the area of para-medical problems like chronic illness and mental-physical rehabilitation. The Council contribution in these areas does not, of course, come in the actual provision of medical service, but in establishing and coordinating the interprofessional teams which do provide it. The risk in these two areas is somewhat less than in the poverty area, because the Council has a relatively more clarified role in relationship to the major profession, medicine.

Services for special groups occupies fourth place. This arena is relatively safe, since not infrequently the groups themselves have asked for service. Also, the role of the Council as a coordinator within this more limited arena is more focused and distinct. Finally, and least risky from the Council viewpoint, is the area of agency assessment and change. This function has long been accepted as one which the Council can and should perform (often at the request of the Chest) and involves little organizational risk.* The role and routine which the Council performs in these instances is quite well defined. Thus we have a hypothesized dominance hierarchy as follows:

1. Programs for the Indigent
2. Chronic Illness
3. Mental and Physical Rehabilitation
4. Services for Special Groups
5. Agency Assessment and Change

Findings.—The data are displayed in Table 5.1. A rough partial simplex is observed, but there are two exceptions to the pattern. Thus, there is only

*By little risk we mean relative to the other activities. On an absolute basis, organizational assessment of this sort obviously involves some risk.

qualified support for the ranking. And, in addition, it should be pointed out that the relationships are actually very close together, differing at times only by a point or so. The fact that some degree of order obtains should not obscure the fact that the relationships are mild and unexceptional.

Another approach to the data is found in the distribution of means displayed in Table 5.2. Under the hypothesis of organizational "risk" we would assume that Councils undertake activities in inverse proportion to their risk. If we consider the array of means (the range of possible scores is 0-7), a halting progression from lower score to higher score is visible, as we proceed from the most risky to the least risky activity. There is only the most halting progression in the hypothesized direction.

Neither of these tests support in any substantial way, a dominance hierarchy. There is the somewhat misted possibility of such a hierarchy, but in this case all we can say is that a direction for further research is suggested, using the notion of risk.

Organization-Focused Activities

Four Council activities have been placed in the classification which we have called organization-focused activities: participation in the budgeting of public, and of private social agencies, engaging in legislative activities, and participating in programs under other auspices. These activities are of a somewhat different genre from problem-focused activities. In general, they are aimed more at developing a relationship with and influencing a particular organization, and they are less time-limited, in the sense that they have a long range focus. Finally, and specific to this data, the measurements used for them do not form a scale, in the sense that the measurements of problem-focused activities did. Of the four organization-focused variables, two are

measured by the simple presence or absence of the activity (participation in public and private agency budgeting). For the legislative activities variable, there is a progression of sorts, but it proceeds from the local to the Federal level of government. For participation in programs under other auspices, we simply coded the number of such programs that the Council participated in (0-7), a scheme which does not record increases in effort (although increases in the number of programs is a kind of measure of effort). In sum, the theoretical reasons for making the distinction are, for these data, supported by the specific nature of the coding scheme used.

The Hierarchy of Organization-Focused Activities

Using the same notion of organizational risk, it seemed possible to order the organization-focused activities, again under the assumption that the most risky would be the most dominant, and the most powerful variable in the matrix. For organization-focused variables, however, the notion of risk has a slightly different connotation. Controversiality, rather than potential failure, is implied. When a Council becomes involved in the budgeting process of a public and/or private agency, the success or failure of the effort is not as much at issue as the appropriateness of the behavior, as a Council activity.* The same question of appropriateness obtains in relationship to the Council's participation in programs under other auspices, and any involvement in legislative activity.

The most controversial of the organization-focused activities is participation in the process of public agency budgeting. Even if such participation is mild in nature, such budgeting is a governmental process, and many board members are likely to feel that the maximum social distance should exist between the Council and governmental activity of any sort. The anti-

*By participation in budgeting, we include a range of activities from attendance at budget hearings to actually having control of the budget.

pathy of some board members to "governmental interventionism" does not help the matter. And, in addition to the board, the Community Chest, which is the dominant funding source, can and will raise objections in many instances.

Second in controversiality would be Council participation in legislative activities.* In this instance, as well as in public budgeting, participation in the governmental process is likely to be sharply challenged by some members of the Council's constituency, especially because of the possible intrusion of a partisan element which is at variance with the Council's typically neutral posture on political questions in their partisan aspects. However, there is a relatively wide range of procedures through which participation in the political process may occur; and some of them are relatively innocuous, so that the activity is, overall, less risky than open participation in public budgeting.

In the third place comes participation in the budgetary processes of private agencies. The budgets of private agencies are most frequently decided upon by a budget committee of a local Chest or Fund. Since this is the same organization which is dominant in Council funding, the Council has some influence with it, and is often invited by the Chest/Fund to sit in. Sometimes, where the Chest/Fund has some question about a particular agency, it asks for a Council study of the agency. Thus, this activity is not only less

*The measure of legislative activity presented here is as follows: The Councils would rate their legislative activity on one of three levels of government—local (=1), State (=2), and Federal (=4). The results were added, so that a Council which participated on all three levels could receive a top score of 7. In terms of directionality, a top score represents a heavy amount of such activity, with some at each level.

The Council reported this degree of involvement for each of three kinds of activity—(A) dissemination of information; (B) formal action (of the board) in support of opposition; (C) representation at hearings. Thus, each Council had some score (0-7) on each of three kinds of activities (A, B, C). For purposes here, the scores on A, B, and C have been averaged, so we are presenting a measure of the mean level of legislative activity, regardless of type.

risky than the others, but it has come to be an accepted part of Council operations.

Finally there is Council participation in "programs under other auspices." Although these programs are frequently under auspices other than the Council, on occasion they may be run by the Council itself. Actually, these represent a set of substantive problems, such as housing, urban renewal, race relations, etc., which typically have their own organizations in the local community; and it is these organizations which invite Council participation. As a substantive set of programs, one might wonder why they were not placed with the "problem-focused" cluster. They were located here because, in 1963 at least, it was more likely that they involved the Council participating with other organizations, rather than having the program for itself. Such participation with fellow professionals around the solution to common problems is to many the most crucial aspect of the Council's mission and role. It not only lacks substantial risk, it is expected.*

Findings.—Inspection of the intracluster correlation matrix of organization-focused variables in Table 5.1 mildly supports the ordering. A partial simplex is observed, with one exception. And the exception, the fact that the two low risk programs correlate with each other (.26) is quite understandable.

In terms of frequency, Councils should undertake organization-focused activities in inverse proportion to the risk. That this obtains can be seen from the frequency distribution in Table 5.2. The Council assumption of activities is as follows: Participation in Budgeting for Public Agencies—36%; undertaking any legislative activity—75%; participation in budgeting for private agencies—85%; undertaking any programs under other auspices—

*The risk in these programs often comes at their inception, when it is not clear who will be the dominant force. The Council may wish to fight for first place, and that creates conflict.

93%. Thus, more of the Councils undertake greater activity as the risk declines.

Summary and Discussion

Overall, there is only moderate intercorrelation among all the activity variables, and this is perhaps the most significant point which can be made about them.* On the average, they correlate with each other .21, with a range from .40 to .80.** It should be clear to the reader that, although some mild patterning has been developed, there is a heavy ad hoc element in the manner in which the Council undertakes activity. Even those programs which seemed close enough to group together (the diagonal of the problem-centered activity variables, 124/124, etc.), though higher than other correlations in the matrix, did not achieve any notable strength.

In certain respects, this finding is not surprising. We have argued that the Council lacks a clear mission and role, and needs to develop it in the local community. It is almost redundant to point out that the lack of a clear mission and role is in fact a lack of a specific set of tasks and services which it performs. Thus, the lack of an apparently cohesive activity system validates the notion advanced earlier. And further, the overall low interrelationships suggest that the Council picks up activities where and when it can—moving perhaps in several directions in the same community, and certainly in various directions in different communities. In this respect,

*It should also be emphasized that the tentative conclusion must be related to this particular data set, and the nature of the questionnaire which produced it.

**It should be noted, however, that there is a limitation in the degree to which the intercorrelations would become very high. To undertake one kind of activity is, for an organization with limited resources, not to undertake another.

activities resemble the board of directors in the overall low interrelationships. The mildly stronger correlations among the clusters of problem-centered variables suggest only the possibility of the development of an organizational experience, in a particular functional area.

In sum, we have shown that the activities of the Council, as measured by the available data, have a mild order to them. In this respect, we know something more than when we began. However as we pointed out, that order is not overwhelming. The slight strain toward consistency is somewhat overbalanced by other influences.

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF ACTIVITY VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

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TABLE 5.2

PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF COUNCIL ACTIVITIES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Score*							
	0	1-3	4-7	Total, %	N	Mean	S.D.	
<u>Problem-Focused</u>								
(124) Indigent	24	54	22	100	154	1.94	1.05	
(125) Chronic Illness	24	62	14	100	154	1.75	.91	
(126) Rehabilitation	18	56	26	100	154	2.44	1.44	
(127) Services for Special Groups	20	67	13	100	154	1.84	.89	
(128) Agency Change	28	49	23	100	154	2.09	1.27	
<u>Number of Programs**</u>								
	0	1-3	4-7	Total, %	N	Mean	S.D.	
<u>Organization-Focused</u>								
(62) Programs Under Other Auspices	7	44	49	100	154	3.44	2.46	
(129) Legislative (mean)***	25	31	44	100	154	2.43	3.33	
<u>Participation</u>								
	Yes	No	NR	Total, %	N	Mean	S.D.	
(89) Budget—Public	36	62	2	100	154	1.67	1.61	
(81) Budget—Private	85	14	1	100	154	1.64	.48	

*The scoring system was as follows: 1 = "General Education Activity"; 2 = "Problem Consideration"; 4 = "Action to Implement Recommendations."

The respondent could check one or all; the codes were added to give the final score. Note that this is a geometric code, so that each numerical score represents a particular combination of items. The proportions represented here are averaged from the specific activities contained in each of the 5 program groups. For the specific activities, see text and the questionnaire.

**The Council could participate in up to 7 such activities. See question 8e of the questionnaire.

***The code, similar to the first footnote, is as follows: 1 = Local 2 = State 4 = Federal. Thus, as we increase in number, the Council is increasing the scope of its activity in the legislative arena.

CHAPTER VI

THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF COUNCIL RESOURCES, STRUCTURE, AND ACTIVITIES


Introduction

Up to this point, we have focused upon each of the main clusters of Council variables—Resources, Structure, and Activities—in a relatively independent fashion. There have only been occasional attempts to consider the interdependencies among and between these clusters. Yet one is sure that each influences and draws upon the others. The function of this chapter is to explore these interrelationships. We shall proceed, after a brief discussion of the nature of cause and effect among the clusters, to a consideration of the overall interrelationships, and some features of each combination.

Reciprocal Cause and Effect

It would be tempting to assume that a causal chain ordered the clusters, so that resources cause structures, which in turn cause activities. Such a model is not appropriate here, however, because a cause must come clearly before an effect, and the three analytic divisions do not stand in a clear time order in relationship to one another. (And this is most certainly true of the variables which make up the clusters.) Thus, the causal influence does not, in this case, flow only in one direction, but rather is a reciprocal relationship, as seen in Figure 6.1.

FIGURE 6.1. THE FLOW OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BETWEEN THE CLUSTERS.



Overview

Overall, the relationships between the three clusters—resources, structure, and activities—is varied. There seems to be quite a close interconnection between resources and structure, and especially between the "hard" resources of men and money and the task and training structure. In part, this is because the task and training structures are simply components of total size. However, we shall argue that it is the regularity with which increments of size are used which produces the strong correlations.

On the other hand, the board of directors and Council power do not show particularly strong correlations. Knowing the proportion of this or that occupation on the board does not tell much about the number of staff, or the kinds of activities, which the Council will be undertaking. This low fertility of board and power variables will receive some explicit attention in the following pages.

Finally, the relationships between divisional structure and independence and activities has some interest. Though not as important as one would think, there is a slight tendency for Council independence to be more important than divisional structure in relationship to activities, though neither of the two relationships shows much strength.

Resources, Structure, and Activities—The Overall Relationship

The initial step in assessing the overall relationships of the clusters to each other would be to inspect the mean or median intracluster and inter-cluster correlations. These data are presented in Tables 6.1a and 6.1b.

Two sets of interrelationships should be noted. One is the set of relationships on the diagonal, which describes the mean (or median) relationships of variables within the cluster to each other (RR, SS, AA). The other

is the set of intercluster relationships, which provides the mean correlation of the variables in one cluster to the variables in another cluster (RS, RA, AS).

The intracluster relationships, or diagonal set, should be the highest in each row, because we would expect that the variables in any cluster would relate more strongly to other variables in the same cluster, on the average, than to variables in any other cluster. Should this test be met, it would provide some confirmation of the original set of decisions which assigned variables to clusters.

Of the three intracluster correlations (RR, SS, AA), two—internal structure and activities—meet this criterion. The variables in each of those clusters relate, on the average, more strongly to themselves than to the variables in other clusters. On the other hand, the mean intracluster relationship among resource variables is lower (.185) than the relationship of resources to structure (.272). The relatively low intracluster correlation of resource variables is due to the distinct difference between the behavior of the size and the income variables, on the one hand, and the board of directors and power variables on the other. Nonetheless, the finding provides some support for the original clustering.

Two Kinds of Resources

Inspection of the relationship of resources to structure shows immediately that there are two resource subclusters which behave quite differently from each other (Table 6.2). On the one hand, there are the variables measuring the size and income of the Council, which have a rather strong interrelationship (Median: .310), and a strong relationship to structure (Median: .460). On the other hand, there are the board of directors variables, and power, which have a very low interrelationship (Median: .05), and a weak re-

relationship to structure (Median: .06). Because these two clusters form relatively distinct subsets in their behavior in the matrix, it seemed reasonable to think of two kinds of resources—fluid resources, like size and income, and nonfluid resources, like the board of directors and power. The overall medians are presented in Tables 6.1c and 6.1d.

The differences in their behavior are not hard to understand. Money and staff are "hardware" which can be readily put to use. They are malleable, at least to the extent that money will serve any purpose, and staff will serve many purposes. In short, they are easy to consume. Consumption or utilization is not as easy with boards of directors and power. In the first place, there is typically a status differential which operates to the disadvantage of the Council executive and staff. While an executive can tell a staff person what to do, it is less easy to achieve the same authority with a board member. In short, the fact that authority does not flow up a status hierarchy makes utilization of the board difficult for the Council. A similar point could be made for power. There are many further complications. Board members and power leaders have a schedule of their own, which often makes them unavailable for mobilization by the Council. And, in addition, there is not infrequently some value difference between the board and the Council, a difference which makes progress very slow. This distinction between fluid and nonfluid resources becomes quite important, as the two kinds of resources relate to other variables at quite different levels of strength.

*It should be noted that the low median (or mean) correlations between board variables and other variables are not the result of the fact that we are using proportions of board members in an occupational class. The use of proportions puts a constraint upon the data—all relationships cannot increase. It is thus possible to have a median of 0 which reflects a high positive and a high negative relationship. This is not the case with the board variables—they never become very strong.

The Structure of Interrelationships

In considering the intercluster relationships, the notion of space (or property space) comes to mind. One might expect that the highest mean correlations between clusters will occur between adjacent variables, under the notion that the closer variables are to each other the more highly correlated, on the average, they will be. To a limited extent, this notion is sustained by the data. Overall, the relationship between resources and structure (.272) is higher than the relationship between resources and activities (.130). And, overall, the mean relationship between structure and activities (.153) is similar to the one between resources and activities (.130).

In overall shape, the matrix of mean intercorrelations (Table 6.1a) or of median intercorrelations (Table 6.1b) is a simplex, as defined by Guttman, or a structure which exhibits decreasing relationship as one proceeds out from the center.* Such a structure implies the dominance of the internal structural variable. What becomes important in understanding the Council, then, is less its gross size in numbers of persons or money, but the fact that it has a common way of using the resources it gets. The larger Council (until we reach the 10 or so most large) is not, essentially, a different Council—it is just a bigger Council. As we shall argue in Chapter VIII, the Council must reach a relatively large size before important differentiation occurs.

The Interrelationship of Resources and Structure

Fluid Resources

Perhaps the most striking interrelationship between resources and struc-

*The simplex structure is discussed in Chapter II.

ture has been noted—the fact that there are two sets of resource relationships to structure—that of fluid resources and that of nonfluid resources. The fluid resources of mean and money relate to the task and training structure with particular strength. Total size has median relationships to the task and training structures of .73 and .64, respectively, as opposed to total income's relationships of .67 and .68, respectively. These correlation values obviously indicate that increments in total size and/or total income are related to increments in task and training structures. One would expect nothing else. Yet the influence of size, it seems, must be seen in relation to the systematic way such increments are used.

In order to establish this point more firmly, we must be able to show the following: (1) that the task and training hierarchy have a patterned relationship to size which is monotonically related to the hierarchy itself; (2) that the high correlations are not simply the result of a "repeating correlation" of a variable with parts of itself; and (3) that the patterns hold across various community size groups.

A Patterned Relationship to Size

First, let us consider the data in Table 6.2, the gross intercorrelation matrix of resource variables with internal structural variables. It will be noted that the correlations between total size and total income to task and training variables are monotonically decreasing over the dominance hierarchy. That is, the highest correlations of total size and income are to the most dominant of the task and training variables (executive and planning staff, and M.S.W.), and the correlations decrease in stepwise fashion until the end of both lists.

This kind of correlation pattern supports the integrity of the proposed dominance hierarchies for task and training structure, and gives us some no-

tion about how the Council uses increments in size, viz., they are used mostly to add to the executive and planning staff, and select people who have an M.S.W. degree. The Council appoints the fewest people to the Social Service Exchange, and is very unlikely to hire a Ph.D. Thus, a patterned relationship to size serves to interpret size increments for us.

A Repeating Correlation

One might object, however, that we are simply correlating the size variables with itself; viz., total size with the size of this task category or that training category. Thus, one might conclude that a high correlation should be expected. This objection needs to be considered, because it is misleading. It is true that the number of persons in the various categories of task and training are being correlated to each other and to total size, and, as one increases, the others must increase. But the very high correlations are not, therefore, constrained to appear, but come rather from the patterned regularity of the increment.

The Council could assign people to tasks, and hire people according to several calculi. One possible calculus, which forms the null hypothesis we seek to reject, is that the hiring and assignment is essentially random. Should such a randomized process be operative, the correlations to total size and to each other would be lower, and should hover around zero, because increments in one category would be in no way systematically related to increments in another category. Further, no category would then be dominant.

Alternatively, there might be a number of "types" of Councils, each of which would have a within-type rationale for task and training preferences, a rationale which would not extend to other groups. Should this situation be "reality," then the overall correlations would be again low, rising only when they were computed within the type. Thus, it is the regular, definite incre-

ment which has a wide use in Councils, which produces the high correlation. The fact that we were able to establish a dominance hierarchy is indicative that an overall calculus does exist. It is the fact that a large number of Councils behave in the same way in terms of task and training which produces systematic increments, reflected in the regular high correlations.

Consistency Within Size Groups

Finally, we need to be able to show that the consistency of which we speak is fairly general across Councils. It seemed reasonable to use community size as a control, and inspect the degree to which there is or is not a similar task and training structure within these groupings. If the argument about the consistency in the manner in which personnel are hired and utilized is correct, then it should be reflected to some degree within the community size groups, as well as within the total group. The data are displayed in Table 6.3. Specifically, this table presents the mean number of persons within each task and training category for each community size group.

We can consider the mean number of persons in each of the task and training categories, within the community size group, as some measure of the degree of consistency of the appointment of staff. The data are in the direction of the hypothesis. The dominance hierarchy of the task structure is, with two exceptions, the hierarchy of persons employed. In other words, the mean number of persons employed generally decreases as we proceed from the most to the least dominant task categories. The exceptions are the categories of research and volunteer bureau. Each has, on the average, a different position in the ranking of persons employed than it has on the domi-

nance hierarchy.* For the training structure, the decreases are monotonic over the dominance hierarchy. Thus, we can generally replicate the pattern established on an overall basis within community size groups, except perhaps for the smallest sizes of communities (less than 100,000).

Summary.—The three pieces of evidence just discussed demonstrate the power of the task and training dominance hierarchies. They are not just the result of an increase in size. In fact, the utilization of increments can be predicted according to the implicit calculus of appointment they contain. It does not seem unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that the training and task hierarchies are two of the most significant features of the Council.

The Board and Independence

Finally, a point of considerable interest is the negative correlation ($-.11$) between the service board and independence.** It will be recalled that, when the Council is merged with the Chest/Fund, it has an advisory committee which it uses like a board. We would assume that in such cases the main part of the organization—the Chest/Fund—would have the most powerful people in the community, and the less prestigious types would be reserved for the Council advisory committee. Apparently, this happens—at least from the Council point of view. The negative correlation between service board and independence suggests the converse, that is, a positive relationship between service board and merged status. And, we already know that the service

*These reversals suggest that, overall, the dominance hierarchy is not simply a function of the mean proportion of staff accounted for by a particular task category. The correlation coefficient also reflects the regularity of the increments. Both research and volunteer bureaus have relatively large standard deviations, which means that the number of staff vary considerably from Council to Council. Even though their total number may be large, the increase is not systematic.

**Controlling for the size of the community, the relationship between service board and independence is $-.10$.

board tends to be composed of the less powerful people. It is possible to conclude, then, that the merged Council does have less influential people at its disposal. Not only is it constrained by proximity to the Chest/Fund, but it does not have the legitimating resources of top community leaders.

The Interrelationship of Resources and Activities

Overall, the relationships between resources and activities are not strong, as can be seen in Table 6.1a (Mean: .13). As in the relationships between resources and structure, there is a distinct difference between the performance of fluid and nonfluid resources. Fluid resources are associated with an increase in activities on an average basis (.20), a pattern which is not evident with nonfluid resources (.04). Indeed, nonfluid resources appear to have overall very low relationships to very little effect.

This overall low performance of board variables has one exception—the relationship of Council power to participation in private agency budgeting. This relationship, at .16, is the highest of any resource variable to this activity variable. And the second highest correlation is to a board variable—the entrepreneurial board (.10). We can provisionally conclude that the board has a moderate influence in at least this one area (see Table 6.4).

These findings should not be too surprising, however. For one thing, resources, and especially fluid resources, can be used in a variety of ways; unless there is some special activity implied in the granting of a resource—such as in the special project staffs or funds. (And, there is some indication that special project funds and staff lead the Council into the area of programs for the indigent. If we inspect Table 6.4, we see that the special project staff has its highest correlation in the problem-focused activities area to programs for the indigent, .23.)

Thus increments in fluid resources can be applied directly to increasing the Councils' involvements and commitments. Power, on the other hand, or the occupational distribution of the board of directors, seems to serve more as a legitimating force than a directing one. We shall have more to say on this point in a moment; suffice it to point out here that there are much greater limitations in using a "top community leader" than in using extra money, or an extra staff person.

The Interrelationship of Structure and Activities

Task and Training Structure

One might expect that the patterning and strength which the task and training variables showed in relationship to size would be manifest in relationship to activities. These relationships, displayed in Table 6.5, are disappointing from this perspective. The mean interrelationship of .15 suggests this. There are only a few specific relationships which deserve comment.

There are moderate correlations between the addition of information and referral staff and the undertaking of increased participation in public budgeting (.40) and legislative activities (.33). It is apparently the case that as a Council comes to be large enough to add staff in this second category of persons it also becomes more venturesome, in part because some of the executive and planning staff are now freed for other tasks. Or, alternatively, one might reason that as a Council becomes more engaged in these activities, it adds staff to fill the somewhat more routine functions.

One might raise the point that we should look at and compare the planning category with the M.S.W. category, since each of these occupies the major

proportion of their group. These results may be seen in Table 6.6. The relationships reveal that increments in these two categories behave in almost the same manner. In addition, there is a curvilinear relationship between increase in them and program—both the most risky and the least risky programs have the highest correlations. It appears that, overall, as the planning and social work components grow, the Council broadens its base of accepted activities and also increase its risky activities. This finding suggests that an organization may need to reach a certain size before it is ready to assume too many risks. This implication, only suggested by the above finding, should be investigated in further research.

Divisional Structure and Independence

Finally we might discuss momentarily the relationship between divisional structure and Council independence, and Council activities. These relationships are displayed in Table 6.5, rows 72 and 63. It will be recalled that neither of these variables had the relational fertility which was expected on theoretical grounds, because the Council had found ways to circumvent the limitations and structures they implied. Despite a certain degree of obfuscation, however, they do show some interesting patterns here.

First, it might be noted that of the two structural variables, independence (from merger with the local Chest/Fund) seems to be the more powerful. In seven of nine possible cases, the correlation between Council independence and Council activity is stronger than between the divisional structure and Council activity. Thus, in terms of influence on activities, we may conclude that independence is somewhat more salient.

As we have previously noted, however, independence is positively correlated with organizational size, .27.* Although this relationship is not an

*The correlation to community size is also .27.

overwhelming one, it would be well to partial out the effects of size so that a clearer picture of the operation of independence may be obtained. This can be done on an averaging basis, using mean correlations. On the average, the relationship between independence and problem-focused activities, controlling for organization size ($r_{i/pfa.os}$), is .14; the relationship between independence and organization-focused activities, controlling for organization size ($r_{i/ofa.os}$), is .01. These partials suggest that independence is relatively more important to a Council in terms of undertaking increased degrees of problem-focused activity than for organization-focused activity. This finding makes sense, especially in light of the scoring system used for problem-focused activity. An increase in the score reflected a more venturesome stand on the part of the Council. It thus appears that as Councils become independent from the Chest/Fund, they are more likely to take such venturesome stands. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, when a Council is merged or quasi-merged with the Chest/Fund, the Chest/Fund would discourage any activity of a controversial nature, because controversy would harm its fund raising potential. There seems to be little question that a merger is a definite inhibiting factor to Council activity in the problem-focused area. It is doubtless the case that staff in merged Councils have developed means for neutralizing some of the Chest/Fund influence, and thus the variable is less dominant than it otherwise might be.

Summary and Discussion

Overall, certain clear relationships among resources, structure, and activities emerge from this analysis. First, we have been able to demonstrate a distinction between fluid and nonfluid resources, and the differential handling of each by the Council. Second, and a related point, is that we

have been able to show that fluid resources (size and income), while powerful, achieve some of their very power from the fact that the Council applies them in a rationalized and consistent manner, one which we have described as the dominance of task and training. This consistency is relatively independent of community size, because the integrity of the relationships is preserved within community size groups.

Beyond these findings, two points deserve further attention. One relates to the board of directors and the particularly low relationships it displays, and the second relates to the intercluster interaction, the influence that the presence or absence of organizational control has on that interaction. This latter point will set the stage for a discussion of community influence on the Council, which follows in Chapter VII.

The Board of Directors.*—Considering the generally low power of board variables, it appears safe to conclude what was intimated earlier—that the board of directors, at least as measured by occupation, exerts little influence on the Council. Such a conclusion may seem very surprising, especially given the importance that the board has in Council rhetoric. That it has limited influence on other resources, and on structure and activities, however, does not mean that it is not important. Indeed, it is of crucial importance. But it is of such importance that its influence can be kept to a minimum inside the organization.

The Council is in a dilemma. It wants and needs local community support and legitimacy. It wants to be responsive to local community needs. But it

*At this point one might raise the question as to the relationship of the board in the actual conceptualization of the Council. Is the Council to be seen as the staff and the board, together, or as the staff, with the board being a local adjunct. In this effort we lean toward the latter view. Essentially, the Council is thought of as the staff and the program, with the board being, in a certain sense, a local addition. Professor Rothman has pointed out that there is not unanimity among the Council executives on this point, some feeling that the board is intrinsic to the definition of a Council, while others feel that one can speak of the Council and the board.

does not want to be so responsive to community pressures that its essential mission and role are destroyed, and it is "no longer a Council." And its responsiveness to the community is likely to rest more on the Council professional's judgement than the lay person. In other words, the Council—as a movement—has a notion of what it should do, of the tasks and activities it should perform. It seeks local support for this conception of the task; and, to this end, one often hears discussion about "educating" the board—presumably to Council notions. The board, therefore, is asked to support the Council without interfering too much, and its agreement to basic Council policy is secured through screening prior to appointment, and through long tenure.

One further point about the board is of interest. It is, in a political sense, significant that the Council—which is a social welfare agency with welfare objectives—has as the main proportion of people on its board people from that bastion of free enterprise, business and industry. And it seems to us that, over the years, there has been a change in the motivation for such elite participation. In the first part of the century, elite participation could be secured by capitalizing upon the notion of "the middle class mission to the poor," a motivation which grew out of religious and charitable orientations. Today, it appears that the dominant motivating force for business participation in welfare activities, aside from the tax shelter feature of charitable giving, is an anti-government ideology. Elites of business and industry seem to feel that they had better support the private welfare sector, or the "government" will come in and take over. Such an overall conservative orientation appears occasionally, as in the negative relationship between board power (elites) and the Council participation in public budgeting. The Council is, as it were, forced to seek support from the enemy camp, and must always be careful about how it is used.

Environmental Parameters on Cluster Cohesion.—The overall notion behind the tripartite clustering of the Council variables was one of organizational process—in some general way material comes into the organization in the form of resources, it is structured by the organization, and leaves or flows out in the form of activities. This schema implies that, at two junctures, the organization makes contact with the environment—when material comes into the organization in the form of resources, and when it leaves in the form of activities. Both these clusters, therefore, are boundary clusters—an entrance and an exit for organizational materials. It might be expected that, at the boundaries of an organization, a number of forces come into play, forces over which the organization has little or no control. Alternatively, the Council would have relatively greater control over some aspects of its internal structure. Thus, for example, although a Council may not be able, unilaterally, to decide how many staff it will have, it has relatively greater influence over where to place the staff it has already. In terms of correlation analysis, we can expect to find greater control manifested in higher average intercorrelations. In short, we assume here that there is a rational and systematic approach to organizational activities, something which is lessened as organizational activity moves closer to the "outside world." There is some support for this notion in the data (Table 6.1). The mean intracluster correlation among structural variables is .39, which is the highest in the matrix.*

It is possible to go a step further. Despite the similarity of the two boundary clusters in terms of their marginal status, there are certain dif-

*This pattern is changed somewhat if we consider fluid resources only. However, as we pointed out earlier, the high correlation between structure and resources is more a product of the monotonic regularity of resource utilization than the dominance of resources. However, for this reason, we should regard these findings with great caution.

ferences between them, viz., that resources have their origin outside the organization while activities have their origin inside. One might guess that, of the two, the Council would have relatively greater control of the activities, since they have their origin within the Council itself. To the extent that this notion is tested by the strength of the mean intercorrelation, it is mildly supported. The mean intercorrelation among activity variables is slightly higher than the mean intercorrelation among all resources (.21 vs. .185). Such a small difference should be regarded as a tendency only, but a tendency which goes in the hypothesized direction.

This finding, tentative though it is, can serve as an introduction to the next chapter, which deals with the relationship of community influences to the Council resources, structure, and programme. One might first question whether there is any influence. It seems that the lower interrelationships of the two marginal clusters suggests that some influence, external to the Council, is at play. Our hope is that we can specify it somewhat in the next chapter.

TABLE 6.1a

THE MEAN INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG RESOURCE, STRUCTURAL,
AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Resources (R)	Structure (S)	Activity (A)
Resources (R)	<u>.185</u>	.272	.130
Structure (S)		<u>.390</u>	.153
Activity (A)			<u>.210</u>

TABLE 6.1b

THE MEDIAN INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG RESOURCE, STRUCTURAL,
AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Resources (R)	Structure (S)	Activity (A)
Resources (R)	<u>.175</u>	.215	.130
Structure (S)		<u>.380</u>	.170
Activity (A)			<u>.190</u>

TABLE 6.1c

THE MEDIAN INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG FLUID (FINANCIAL AND SIZE)
RESOURCE VARIABLES, STRUCTURAL, AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Fluid Resources (FR)	Structure (S)	Activity (A)
Fluid Resources (FR)	<u>.310</u>	.460	.200
Structure (S)		<u>.380</u>	.170
Activity (A)			<u>.190</u>

TABLE 6.1d

THE MEDIAN INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NONFLUID (BOARD OCCUPATION AND POWER)
RESOURCE VARIABLES, STRUCTURAL, AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Nonfluid Resources (NFR)	Structure (S)	Activity (A)
Nonfluid Resources (NFR)	<u>.050</u>	.060	.040
Structure (S)		<u>.380</u>	.170
Activity (A)			<u>.190</u>

TABLE 6.2

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF RESOURCE AND INTERNAL STRUCTURAL VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Structure	Size		Income			Board		
	Regular (2)	Special Project (4)	Total (108)	Primary (109)	Secondary (110)	Service (120)	Entre. (121)	Power (122)
<u>Task Structure</u>								
(6) Executive	.92	.24	.82	.47	.33	-.08	.13	.07
(7) Information and Referral	.86	.32	.86	.53	.45	-.06	.13	.07
(10) Research	.87	.27	.85	.51	.42	-.07	.15	.11
(8) Public Relations	.73	.30	.67	.46	.23	-.06	.09	.09
(12) Volunteer Bureau	.71	.08	.55	.40	.12	-.08	.14	.03
(11) Budget Analysis	.55	.22	.50	.28	.13	-.07	.11	.18
(9) Social Service Exchange	.34	.06	.43	.23	.36	+.01	.07	.06
<u>Training Structure</u>								
(18) Masters of Social Work	.93	.24	.87	.58	.32	-.08	.12	.03
(21) College Graduate	.80	.10	.68	.47	.17	-.08	.11	.15
(19) Master of Arts	.70	.25	.71	.36	.35	-.03	.08	.03
(20) One year of Social Work	.63	.29	.69	.46	.46	+.01	.04	.00
(22) Noncollege Graduate	.65	.31	.68	.43	.43	+.01	.09	.18
(15) Doctor of Social Work	.60	.08	.53	.18	.18	-.05	.06	.06
(16) Doctor of Philosophy-								
Masters of Social Work	.46	.02	.41	.33	.16	-.07	-.01	-.10
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	.45	.58	.49	.21	.31	+.01	-.01	.01
(72) <u>Divisional Structure</u>	.23	.09	.25	.12	.14	+.06	.06	.09
(63) <u>Independence</u>	+.28	+.03	+.22	+.08	+.10	-.11	+.08	+.09

TABLE 6.3

THE MEAN NUMBER OF PERSONS IN EACH CATEGORY OF TASK AND TRAINING STRUCTURE,
THE PROPORTION WITHOUT DIVISIONS AND THE PROPORTION INDEPENDENT, BY COMMUNITY
SIZE, 154 COUNCILS, 1963 AND 154 COMMUNITIES, 1963

Task Structure	Less than 100,000	299,999 100,000	499,999 200,000	999,999- 500,000	1,000,000+
(6) Executive	0.51	0.83	1.47	3.16	7.15
(7) Information and Referral	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.40	1.41
(10) Research	0.00	0.005	0.09	0.60	2.07
(8) Public Relations	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.45
(12) Volunteer Bureau	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.50	0.80
(11) Budget Analysis	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.18	0.30
(9) Social Service Exchange	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.10
Training Structure					
(18) Masters of Social Work	1.04	0.82	1.17	2.50	7.00
(21) College Graduate	0.30	0.25	0.40	0.84	2.70
(19) Master of Arts	0.33	0.23	0.20	0.81	2.05
(20) One year Social Work	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.48	1.10
(22) Noncollege Graduate	0.09	0.05	0.14	0.39	0.85
(15) Doctor of Social Work	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.30
(16) Doctor of Philosophy- Masters of Social Work	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.20
(72) Divisions					
Percent Without Divisions	57	69	78	54	60
(63) Independence					
Percent Independent	24	36	49	71	85

TABLE 6.4

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF RESOURCE AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Activities	Size		Income			Board		
	Regular (2)	Special Project (4)	Total (108)	Primary (109)	Secondary (110)	Service (120)	Entre. (121)	Power (122)
<u>Program-Focused</u>								
(124) Indigent	.28	.23	.31	.17	.18	-.07	.11	.13
(125) Chronic Illness	.24	.12	.21	.13	.13	-.02	.09	-.04
(126) Rehabilitation	.16	.10	.14	.08	.06	-.03	.07	.01
(127) Service for Special Groups	.20	.19	.26	.13	.12	-.01	.06	-.01
(128) Agency Change	.24	.20	.24	.13	.11	-.03	.08	.04
<u>Organization-Focused</u>								
(89) Budgeting—Public Agencies	+.34	+.20	+.35	+.21	+.21	-.04	+.10	-.02
(129) Legislative Activity	.28	.29	.36	.15	.24	+.03	.05	.04
(81) Budgeting—Private Agencies	+.07	+.07	+.09	+.03	+.02	-.07	+.10	+.16
(62) Programs Under Other Auspices	.33	.22	.35	.20	.15	-.03	+.07	.16

TABLE 6.5

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF STRUCTURAL AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Structures	Problem-Focused Activities					Organization-Focused Activities			
	Indigent (124)	Chronic Illness (125)	Rehabilitation (126)	Serv. Spe. Grps. (127)	Agency Services (128)	Part. Pub. Bud. (89)	Legislative Act. (129)	Part. Priv. Bud. (81)	Progs. Under Other Auspices (62)
Task Structure									
(6) Executive	.25	.17	.16	.22	.21	.29	.23	.07	.32
(7) Information and Referral	.28	.17	.13	.21	.18	.40	.33	.07	.27
(10) Research	.28	.23	.15	.23	.23	.33	.23	.05	.32
(8) Public Relations	.16	.12	.08	.21	.17	.27	.13	.00	.24
(12) Volunteer Bureau	.24	.24	.16	.27	.15	.23	.14	.08	.21
(11) Budget Analysis	.03	.00	.08	.10	.12	.12	.03	.01	.20
(9) Social Service Exchange	.12	.12	.03	.05	.04	.07	.16	.09	.00
Training Structure									
(18) Masters of Social Work	.24	.17	.15	.22	.23	.34	.26	.10	.34
(21) College Graduate	.14	.10	.09	.17	.18	.22	.14	.01	.29
(19) Master of Arts	.31	.15	.22	.35	.19	.25	.23	.08	.27
(20) One year Social Work School	.22	.04	.17	.17	.07	.20	.30	.08	.14
(22) Noncollege Graduate	.21	.03	.17	.18	.11	.25	.21	.02	.17
(15) Doctor of Social Work	.12	.11	.04	.11	.10	.07	.06	.01	.12
(16) Doctor of Philosophy- Masters of Social Work	.06	.03	.08	.05	.01	.22	.08	-.09	.17
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	.17	.10	.14	.17	.19	.10	.23	.02	.18
(72) Divisional Structure	.01	.03	.09	.09	.13	+.06	.10	+.06	.19
(63) Independence	.13	.11	.15	.11	.16	+.12	.13	.00	.10

TABLE 6.6

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF STRUCTURAL AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
MOST DOMINANT VS. OTHER, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Problem-Focused Activities					Organization-Focused Activities				
	Indigent (124)	Chronic Illness (125)	Rehabilitation (126)	Serv. Spe. Grps. (127)	Agency Services (128)	Part. Pub. Bud. (89)	Legislative Act. (129)	Part. Priv. Bud. (81)	Prgs. Under Other Auspices (62)	
(6) Planning	.25	.17	.16	.22	.21	.29	.23	.07	.32	
(18) Masters of Social Work	.24	.17	.15	.22	.23	.34	.26	.10	.34	
Other Task (Median)	.20	.15	.10	.21	.16	.25	.15	.06	.22	
Other Training (Median)	.17	.10	.14	.17	.11	.22	.21	.02	.17	

CHAPTER VII

THE WELFARE COUNCIL AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

Introduction

Organizations do not exist within a vacuum. Like other social structures, formal organizations exist within a social network which influences their development.* As yet, however, the literature on organization-community relationships is a sparse one. While everyone "knows" that organizations are influenced by external conditions, a detailed specification of the elements of such influence has yet to be accomplished. Thus, this chapter will touch only on some beginning portions of the organization-community relationship.

Some discussion of organization-community relationships is appropriate and even necessary for this particular study. First, the Welfare Councils themselves argue that they are responsive to the local community. One automatically becomes interested in the degree to which such assertions are rhetoric or reality. Second, some interest is generated by the nature of the theoretical scheme used here. The Council was defined as an organization dependent upon largely local resources. One would thus expect that some local influence would follow the local support. Thirdly, as we pointed out at the end of the last chapter, the resources and activities variables, as boundary variables, draw one's attention to the influence that the community structure might have upon their structure. And, because these two sets of variables seem the most relevant for a beginning analysis of community influence, we shall confine our discussion to them.

*See A. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations," op. cit.

Limiting Features in the Analysis

That we shall devote only one chapter to an analysis of community forces acting upon the Council is itself a limiting feature. However, there are some more specific limitations which should be understood from the outset, as each is likely to mute the strength of community-Council relationships, and to obfuscate and confound possible interpretations.

The Number of Variables

The "community" in which the Council lives is made up of thousands of dimensions and facets, each of which is a potential independent variable. The interaction among the components of such a vast variable-set is likely to depress any particular relationship we observe, and make us somewhat unsure about the independence of the "independent" variable. Further, selection of a certain set of community dimensions for analysis in no way precludes the importance of other dimensions.

Organizational Interpretation

The relationship between the Council and the community is in part a construct which we impose on "reality." We make certain assumptions about the nature of the constraints which certain community characteristics may have upon the Council. Suffice it to say that the Council in a particular community may interpret the situation differently, or there may be other factors of which we are unaware which lead the Council to act differently from what we would "expect." The fact is that our expectations will only be supported when our interpretation of the direction of local "needs" and that of the Council are in agreement.

The Presence of Other Coordinating Agencies

One very important "other factor" is the existence of various agencies

in the community which perform tasks similar to the Council. One executive comments that, "...Metropolitan communities like Pittsburgh and Philadelphia have anywhere from 25 to 50 different organizations in planning that affect the health and welfare field, and this does not include governmental and voluntary organizations at the state and Federal level whose planning has an impact on the local community."* When we inspect the direct relationship between a measure of community composition, and a Council resource or activity, we cannot control for this crucial element. We may or may not see a Council response to a particular item, depending upon what the responses of other organizations in the community have been.

Absence of Direct Service Function

We should reemphasize that the Council is not a direct service agency.** "Community planning" and "community problem solving" are designed to improve the service delivery systems, but are not in themselves delivery systems. Thus, we cannot think of the Council as responding directly to community characteristics which indicate one or another "needs" in the community. The Council response is once-removed from the direct meeting of needs, although there are some specific exceptions to this. As a result, Council responses to community characteristics are less sharp and clear.

The Uniqueness of Local Social Organization

The manner in which many variables become combined in each community to form that community's pattern of social organization is undoubtedly quite distinct. Our measures here are in fact quite gross. Such items as size,

*Elmer J. Tropman, "The Future Role of Councils" (Pittsburgh: The Health and Welfare Association of Allegheny County, 1966), Mimeo, p. 1.

**By direct service agency we mean an agency which is a primary supplier of services to visible and identifiable client groups.

median income, growth, "lower classness," median age, and whether or not a community is a college town, assess elements of the composition or morphology of the community, but little more. As gross characteristics, they do not provide refined measures of the particular and close forces which act on the Council.

Summary

In sum, then, our expectations about changes in Council characteristics should be modest. Almost surely, for the reasons we have mentioned, the relationships will be muted. The Council and the community characteristics do not stand in one-to-one relationship. In fact, it appears to be the case that a large variation in community characteristics may be associated with only a small change in the Council. Evidently there are many forces which make the association between community and Council weaker than one might expect.

Overview

In this chapter, we shall look at the relationships between community characteristics and Council resources and activities. Overall, only the size of the community has a very profound effect, if not a very discriminatory one. As community size increases, so do the resources and activities. The board of directors seems to be more oriented to business and industry occupations in the large communities, even though there is a slight decrease in the proportion of people from business and industrial occupations in the very largest communities.

The Council responds in small ways to other community characteristics. Cities which are "college towns" have a very high proportion of persons from higher education on the board. When there is a strong "lower class" com-

ponent in the community, the Council shows a slight increase in programs in the area of the indigent. Where communities are experiencing rapid growth, the Council has less resources, and fewer activities, than in communities which are more stable in their composition. As we shall see, however, these changes and adjustments occur within a basically stable framework.

One point should be especially noted. Because the relationships between community composition variables and Council characteristics are overall, rather weak, those selected for discussion in the text are often not much different from those not discussed, but some selection had to be made. Thus, in this chapter, we attempt only to present the most general overview to Council-community relationships, rather than attempting to come to detailed conclusions about particular variables.

Selected Community Variables

Community Size

Perhaps the most crucial problem for a brief essay of this sort into organization-community relationships is the actual choice of community variables. They should be variables which represent important facets or dimensions of community structure, and, in addition, which can be thought to have some relevance to Council activity. Size of community, of course, is one which comes immediately to mind, and some attention has been given to this variable already. The size measure we shall use is the one reported as the "population served" by the Council in 1963.

Community Composition

Apart from size, we need some measures of the composition of the community. Fortunately, some recent work of Professors Hadden and Borgatta pro-

duced a set of variables which can be used for this purpose, and indeed, appear to be ideal.* In brief, Hadden and Borgatta performed a factor analysis on a large number of variables measuring various dimensions of community structure (largely those reported in the City County Data Book, 1962). For purposes of developing a community profile, they took those variables with high loadings on the most important factors and gave them decilized scores. Thus, we have available for the Councils in which the communities are located, a score from 0-9 on the following variables: median income; median age; percent nonwhite; percent foreign-born; percent population increase, 1950-60 (growth); percent same house, 1955-60; percent single dwelling unit, and density. There are two index variables which have been constructed by the authors. One, deprivation index, refers to the "lower classness of the community." The other, educational center index, measures the degree to which a community is a college town.**

Grouping of the Community Composition Variables

To maximize our ability to understand the influence of these dimensions on the Council, a first step would be to inspect their correlations with each other. Despite the fact that they are supposed to represent independent "factors," it seems unlikely that they would be completely independent. It turns out that some can be clustered together, in the following manner:

Size

Median Income

Maturity

Percent Foreign Born
Median Age
Percent Same House, 1955-60
Density

*Hadden and Borgatta, American Cities—Their Social Characteristics, op. cit. See also Chapter II of this study.

**Personal conversation with Professor Borgatta.

Lower Class

Deprivation Index (Dep. Index)
Percent Nonwhite

Growth

Percent Migrants
Percent Pop. Increase, 1950-60
(Percent Growth)
Percent Single Dwelling Unit

Educational Center

The data may be seen in Table 7.1a. Three variables remain alone—size, median income, and educational center—either because of their importance (size) or because they have no clearly patterned relationship to any other variable (median income and educational center). The remaining variables do cluster. Deprivation index and percent nonwhite are highly correlated (.68) and seem to reflect an underlying dimension of "lower classness." Foreign-born median age, percent same house, 1955-60, and density are intercorrelated (Mean: +.42) and seem to reflect the age and residential stability of the community. On the other hand, percent migrants, percent growth, and percent single dwelling unit seem to reflect the dimension of growth, and they are positively intercorrelated (Mean: .50). To a degree, there is some antipathy between the dimensions of maturity and growth. Every correlation in the intercluster matrix is negative; they range from -.17 to -.80, with a mean of -.42. And, as one might expect, the variables which define maturity and growth behave similarly in their relationship to Council variables. For the sake of manageability, therefore, we will refer, on occasion, to the dimensions of maturity and growth rather than the individual variables, although where there is a relationship of special interest it will be noted.*

*The data which follow are presented in correlation and mean form. For the display of means, we picked the dominant variable from the maturity and growth clusters, median age and percent population increase, 1950-60, respectively. For the lower class cluster we picked deprivation index as the more general. The other variables—size, median income, and educational center—are individually presented.

Community Composition and Community Size


It is useful to discuss briefly the relationship between the composition variables and community size, as size is typically a powerful and pervasive variable. Mean values of the composition variables by size categories are presented in Table 7.1b and Figure 7.1. The effect of size as revealed here is definite but not overwhelming. One reaches the same conclusion by inspecting the correlations of size to the composition variables in Table 7.1a. (And, in the bottom half of that matrix, the partial correlations among the composition variables are presented with community size removed.) The correlations between community size and the composition variables range from +.26 to -.26. One pattern which emerges is that size correlates positively with the lower class and maturity variables, and negatively with the growth variables. This systematic relationship will be kept in mind as we proceed with the analysis.

Community Welfare Status

Some interest attaches to the amount of public and private money spent for welfare in the communities under study. Indeed, the per capita private welfare contribution once formed part of Robert C. Angell's index of "moral integration."* For reasons of space, we cannot provide here the treatment these variables deserve. Because of interest in them however, we have included measures of welfare status in the tables. Specifically, they are: (1) per capita Chest/Fund contributions, 1964; (2) total Chest/Fund contributions, 1964, and (3) the per capita public welfare expenditure for the

*R. C. Angell, "The Moral Integration of American Cities" in P. K. Hatt and A. J. Reiss, Jr., Eds., Cities and Society, Rev. Ed. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

FIGURE 7.1. THE MEAN SCORE OF THE HADDEN-BORGATTA COMMUNITY INDEX VARIABLES BY COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960.*



*This figure is based on the material in Table 7.1b for a discussion of the Hadden-Borgatta variables, see the discussion of community composition at the beginning of this chapter.

County containing the city, 1960.*

Community Composition and Council Resources

Fluid Resources

The size of the community exerts the predominant influence on the size of the Council fluid resources (men, money). Differentiating the Councils by the size of the community (Table 7.2) produces markedly different mean numbers of staff, from .05 persons in the smallest community group to 13.8 persons in Cities over 1 million. Similar differences are found in respect to total income, which ranges from \$17,353 in the smallest communities to \$325,139 in the largest. Also, the size of the community appears to make the critical difference in the degree to which the Council relies upon the Chest/Fund income. In the smallest communities, 96% of the money, on the average, comes from the Chest, while in the largest communities, 79% of the funds have this source. It is clear that, for Councils in larger communities, the Chest/Fund provides an increasing total, but a decreasing proportion, of Council funds.

Other dimensions of community structure have an effect upon the Council's fluid resources, but a less pronounced effect than size. Indeed, the more striking observation is the muted effect of these other dimensions, as compared with that of size. The means are displayed in Table 7.4.** Increases

*Private Welfare data came from, 1965 Directory, United Community Funds and Councils of America, op. cit.; Public Welfare Data came from U.S. Government, Bureau of the Census, Local Government Finances and Employment in Relationship to Population—State and Local Government Special Studies No. 45.

**In tables presenting means, each composition variable has been divided into three categories: low, medium, and high, and within Council means computed for each. In the text, the mean Council score for each group is given, so we will generally present three means—the mean score on the variable for Councils in communities with low scores on the composition variable, with medium scores, and with high scores.

in the lower classness and maturity of a community (both related to size) are associated with moderate increases in Council income (from \$34,000 and \$39,000 in the cities with low index scores to \$118,000 and \$134,000 in communities with a strong lower class component and a strong maturity dimension). Median income is related to Council size in a mildly curvilinear fashion, with the highest average Council size occurring in the middle range of community income (from 2.3 to 4.3 to 3.8).^{*} Conversely, growth is related negatively to income (from \$129,000 in slowest-growing communities, to \$45,000 in the most rapidly growing ones); and to size of Council staff (from 5.2 to 2.4 to 2.3 persons as we go from low to high growth).

Overall, it might be noted (Table 7.3a) that each of the growth variables is negatively related to every single measure of fluid resources. The consistent patterning of this relationship suggests a need for further investigation, and especially the removal of the influence of size, which is negatively correlated with growth. The mean correlation between fluid resources and the growth variables is $-.17$. Removing the influence of size, we have, on the average, the partial $r_{g/fr.os} = -.04$. While $-.04$ is not a strong correlation at all, it has a moderate significance in that size has been removed.**

Discussion

From the data, then, we might conclude that the larger, more mature communities, as well as those with a heavier lower class component, have larger Councils in terms of fluid resources. In a way, this finding makes sense. These are the communities which have a greater "need" for the kind of co-

^{*}See second footnote on page 153.

^{**}A complete set of partials, with community size removed, is displayed in Tables 7.3b, 7.5b, and 7.8b. The set of partials does not include the Welfare Status variables, because these variables are of secondary interest here.

ordination and planning which the Council does, especially in that they have a large number of social agencies which need to be "coordinated."

On the other hand, those communities which are growing rapidly are less likely to have such a full complement of agencies, and thus one portion of work which the Council does is reduced. This is not only because the community is smaller, but also because the community which is growing rapidly may require a deployment of community resources which does not, as yet, include the Council.*

On the basis of this discussion, however, one should not be led to the conclusion that the larger communities have Councils "because they can afford them." Larger communities are not always wealthy, and there are many claims to such wealth as they do have. For example, we can see in Table 7.1b that, while the largest communities (1,000,000+) have the second highest average median income, they also have the largest mean proportion of lower class population. Put another way, the correlation between size and median income is .04, while it is .18 and .26, respectively between size and the two variables defining lower classness, deprivation index and percent nonwhite. And while it is true that, in absolute terms, the largest cities have the largest absolute amount of money given to the Chest/Fund (Mean: \$8,000,000) they also have one of the lowest per capita contributions (\$4.35).** In short, the Council has to compete as hard for funds here as in the smaller communities. The greater absolute amount of money reflects greater demands. Pro-

*Typically, the raising of money for welfare purposes comes before the development of a Council. There are, for example, many more communities which have some kind of Community Chest or United Fund than there are which have Councils.

**An exception to this generalization is the middle size group of cities, population 200,000 to 499,999. Councils here have the lowest per capita contribution, at \$4.27. Actually, the differences between Councils in different city size groups are quite small, and should be considered as a direction of the data, rather than a "finding."

visionally, we might conclude that community priorities shift as between growing and mature communities. Communities where high growth occurs are almost by definition developing and progressing. Intuitively one has the sense that, for good or ill, coordination and planning would not be as important to that community as it would be to the more mature community. The more mature community may have a somewhat greater focus on the integration of those organizations which already exist, making adjustments, and only marginal innovations. This of course is speculative, but may provide some direction for future research.


Nonfluid Resources

It would seem that community influence on the Council would be especially visible in the area of nonfluid resources. Different dimensions of community structure would, one would think, "produce" varying kinds of boards of directors, and varying amounts of board power. The distribution of means is displayed by size in Table 7.2 and by selected community characteristics in Table 7.4; correlational data may be seen in Table 7.5. Perhaps most useful are the two illustrations, Figures 7.2 and 7.3.

Overall Regularity


The clearest pattern which emerges from the data displayed in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 is the degree of consistency with which the general proportions of occupation types are maintained over any division of the community we have made. Differently put, though there is variation in the proportions of people in various occupations, the variation is not wide. Business and industrial occupations, for example, comprise approximately 27%-37% of the boards of directors, whether we discriminate by size, by growth, by maturity,

FIGURE 7.2. THE DISTRIBUTION OF BOARD OCCUPATIONS AND POWER BY COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963 AND 154 COMMUNITIES, 1963.*



*This figure is based upon the data in Table 7.2.

FIGURE 7.3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED BOARD OCCUPATIONS BY SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION, 154 COUNCILS, 1963 AND 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960.*



*This figure is based upon data in Table 7.6.

etc. (Figures 7.2 and 7.3). Thus, the actual differences which do exist must be seen within this framework of consistency. Apparently, the Council responds to local differences in a marginal way, viz., by adjusting one or two or three members on the board. Nothing, however, leads us to suspect that there are community facets which force the abandonment of the predominance of businessmen, or the subdominant, but constant, role of health and welfare professionals.

Size of Community*

Within this framework of consistency, size exerts a definite effect. Particularly interesting is the curvilinear relationship which the business and industry and misc. professional categories exhibit in relationship to community size (Figure 7.2). As community size decreases, both occupational groups increase the proportions, and then decline to a point lower than their one at which they began, an effect which is sharper for the business and industry group than for the misc. professional group. In the smallest communities, these two groups have their lowest proportions.

On the other hand, the welfare and health category, and public administration category tend to increase as size decreases. The welfare and health group has a progression much like a step, i.e., flat, then a step rise, then flat. On the other hand, public administration shows a more or less continuous and gentle increase (Figure 7.2). Apart from these relationships, the other categories seem to fluctuate between 0 and 6%, with a mild tendency for entrepreneurial board occupations to decrease as size decreases, and for service

*The reader should be aware that these data are synchronic, that is, they were all collected at once. Thus, we have different communities of different sizes at a given moment in time. Whether or not Councils in smaller communities would be like the Councils in larger communities when their smaller communities become larger is difficult to say. Thus, when we speak of size increasing, the reader should understand that we are moving from category-to-category, rather than that the same community is growing.

board occupations to increase as size decreases.

In sum, business and industry, and misc. professional, after an initial increase, decline in proportion as community size decreases; welfare and health and public administration generally increase as community size decreases. However, these changes are relative in that, despite them, each board occupation retains the same position relative to the others in the smallest community as in the largest.

Community Composition

The effect of selected dimensions of community composition on board membership is plotted in Figure 7.3 and shown in Table 7.6. Again, within an overall pattern of consistency, there is some variation, although less than that seen with community size. Initially, we can note that percent media, percent elected public official, and percent religious vary only slightly according to different community characteristics. In the other groups, there are some interesting shifts.

Educational Center.—One of the most interesting and most dramatic of these shifts is the rise in the proportions of persons in higher education as the educational center index increases, from a mean of 1.4% in cities with a low score on the index to a mean of 6% in cities with a high score on the index. In correlation terms, the correlation is .35, the highest of any social composition variable to any board of directors proportion.

This relationship is an especially nice example of the response/constraint notion we just mentioned. It is quite obvious, both from an analysis of means and from the correlation coefficient, that Councils in "educational centers" recognize this fact by having additional people from higher education on the board. However, the overall proportion of persons in higher education is 3.9% (S.D.: 5.7%). Thus the Council response to the

educational center facet is definite, but moderate on an overall basis.*

Median Income.—As median income increases in a community, the proportion of people from business and industry decreases (from 35.8% to 35.0% to 27.0%), and the proportion of people from labor increases and then decreases slightly (from 0.9% to 2.9% to 2.2%) (Figure 7.3 and Table 7.6). On the other hand, the proportions of health and welfare people increase (from 10.1% to 11.5% to 14.0%) as do the proportions of public administrators (from 6.6% to 8.0% to 9.5%) (Figure 7.3). There is, apparently, a tendency for the richer community to also be small (Figure 7.1) and we just spoke of the tendency for the smaller community to show increases in the service board component, in terms of these two occupations at least. Thus, there seems to emerge a picture of a smaller, richer community which has a more service oriented board of directors.**

Maturity and Growth.—Finally, we might mention the effects of maturity (measured by median age) and growth (measured by percent population increase, 1950-60) on the Council board. Generally speaking, they have opposite effects, as can be seen in Figure 7.3 or Table 7.6. In relationship to the business and industrial group, growth tends to be associated with increasing proportions (from 31.5% to 36.4% to 35.0%) while maturity tends to be associated with decreasing proportions (from 37.9% to 35.6% to 29.1%). Interestingly enough, the same pattern seems to hold for misc. professionals. Increases in a community's growth are associated with increases in misc. professionals (from 21.2% to 21.2% to 28.1%) while maturity is associated with

*In one place however, the proportion of persons in higher education reached a high of 44%.

**An additional point in this complex net of interrelationships is the fact that richer communities are more likely to have a merged Council (correlation between median income and independence: $-.09$) as are smaller communities (correlation between community size and independence: $+.27$). We already know that merged Councils tend to have higher proportions of service board occupations.

a decrease (from 24.1% to 22.0% to 21.4%). Alternatively, maturity is associated with an increase in welfare and health people (from 8.0% to 8.9% to 14.9%) whereas growth is not (from 12.7% to 9.8% to 12.6%).

Lower Classness.—Increases in lower classness tend to be associated with increases in business and industry occupations on the board (from 31.8% to 32.5% to 36.2%) and misc. professional (from 20.4% to 23.3% to 22.0%) as well as with decreases in welfare and health (from 12.7% to 12.0% to 10.6%) and decreases in public administrators (from 11.0% to 8.1% to 6.7%). Not only is this effect similar to the one produced by size, it is also similar to the one produced by growth, within which neither size nor lower classness is correlated.

Summary and Discussion

Such complicated interrelationships might tolerate a brief summation:

1. Overall, there is a consistency in the proportion of various occupations represented on Council boards.
2. This consistency is especially evident with those occupations which have minor board representation—media, elected public official, labor, and religious.
3. Size of community is a very important component in such variation as does exist. Increases in community size produce an increase in the proportion of people in the business and industry and misc. professional groups, although in the very large communities there is a slight drop-off.
4. The composition variables produce some definite, but small effects; specifically, growth and lower classness, which are negatively correlated with each other, are similarly associated with increases in business and in-

dustury and misc. professional groups on the board; conversely, maturity seems to be more related to increments in welfare and health and public administration groups.

5. As a community becomes more of a college town, the Council increases moderately the proportions of people on the board from higher education occupations.

With the exception of point no. 4, these findings are not surprising. However, the fact that increments in growth and increments in lower classness tend to produce similar boards when they themselves are not related deserves some attention. Several interlinked features may provide an interpretation.

One might speculate that the communities with a high component of "lower classness" might also have, as board members, people who work in the community but live elsewhere. This interpretation has some plausibility, given the very high socio-economic status of board members overall. Growth, however, refers to the growth of residents. Communities which are high on the growth dimension are possibly growing in the area of business and industry types, and local professionals which show an increase here.* In this case, the Council can secure residents to serve as board members. In short, we hypothesize that serving on a board in a city with a high deprivation index may be related to work and corporation motives, and also may have a "keep the government out" flavor. In a growing community there may be more overall community identification and a wish to participate in the community where one lives. We must emphasize, however, that this interpretation is hypothetical. We do not know anything about the motives of the board members, or where they

*Community growth apparently has two components. Of three growth variables, two, percent migrants and percent population increase, are positively correlated to median income (.08, .17) implying an increase in relatively wealthier people. On the other hand, there is a small (+.10) correlation between percent nonwhite and percent single dwelling units, which suggests that this is a mild, but present element of growth.

live. It is a notion which a more through investigation of board membership might attempt to ascertain.

The other side of the coin, however, is that the maturity variables which are related to size (Median: .21) tend to be associated with increases in service board occupations. This relationship is the opposite of the one produced by increasing size. One possible interpretation here, and again, one which is only hypothetical, relates to the proportions of males and females on the board because women are more likely to have service board occupations and especially welfare and health.* On an average basis (Table 7.5) lower class and growth components correlate with the proportion of males on the board .16 and .04, respectively. On the other hand, the maturity variables correlate -.10 with the proportion male, which means that there are a few more females on the board. These correlations are of course quite low, and simply suggestive. It may be, however, that in the more mature community, with more persons who are older, that there are relatively more women willing and able to serve in a community capacity. Conversely, in a community with a higher level of lower classness, there might be available relatively fewer of the kind of middle class women who usually serve on these boards. In the community characterized by higher growth, and also by younger people, there also might be fewer women available for such community roles, being perhaps more occupied with child-centered activities. Again, we should emphasize that these conclusions are only suggestive. There is a mild tendency in the data which leads us in this direction, but specific study of the relative availability of "woman power" in different communities needs to be made.

*The correlation between percent male on the board of directors and welfare and health occupations and public administration occupations is -.24 and -.04, respectively; between percent male and business and industry it is +.52; and between percent male and misc. professionals, it is +.47 (see Table 7.5a).

Community Composition and Council Activities

The second major focus of this chapter is to explore the influence of community structure on the activities which the Council undertakes. Presumably, the nature of the community would exert some influence—that communities would have different "needs" or "characteristics" to which the Council would respond. However, this expectation is only minimally supported.

Overview

There is a marked consistency in the behavior of activity variables in relationship to community variables, with the exception of size. Dividing the community into groups according to different dimensions of social organization does not, with certain exceptions, make a great deal of difference in terms of Council activities. For this reason, only variables of particular interest were graphed in Figure 7.4 (see Tables 7.2 and 7.9).


One interesting difference between the effect of size and the effect of the composition variables may be noted here. Size has a relationship that is very linear; most of the relationships between social composition variables and Council activities are curved in one or another ways. This curvature seems to demonstrate the point made earlier, that the relationships would not be clean and neat, and would doubtless be compounded by a number of other interaction factors.

Size of Community*

As can be seen in Figure 7.4, the influence of size is sharp and strong, and produces a pattern markedly different from that of other community vari-

*For the correlations between size and the Council activity variables, see Table 7.8; for the distribution of mean activity scores, see Table 7.2.

FIGURE 7.4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED MEAN SCORES OF ACTIVITY VARIABLES, BY SOCIAL COMPOSITION VARIABLES, AND COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 COUNCILS, 1963 AND 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960.



*This figure is based upon data in Table 7.9.

**This figure is based upon data in Table 7.2.

ables. With increasing size, the Council has more men and money with which to pursue activities whether we measure it in terms of community size, or organizational size, or organizational income. In addition, community size is related to participation in public and private budgeting. Both kinds of participation increase as community size increases, but the increase is stronger for participation in the budgeting of public agencies because virtually all Councils are involved in participation in private budgeting.*

One point might be made about the influence of size. Looking at the distribution of mean scores on Table 7.2, we note that the influence of size becomes increasingly important as it becomes larger. The increments in the activity score become progressively larger as size increases. It may well be, as we shall suggest in the next chapter, that certain levels of size are important.

Community Composition

The relationship between selected composition variables and selected Council activities is plotted in Figure 7.4. The data are displayed in correlation form in Table 7.8, and in mean form in Table 7.9. Overall, there is little variation in these activities. The data in Table 7.9 show only modest variation in means for the majority of activities. However, as can be seen from the graph, rehabilitation activities stand out as distinctly higher, on the average, than other activities, and participation in programs under other auspices is distinctly higher still. In both cases the pattern of relationship to community variables follows that set by the board of directors relationships—the two activities vary moderately within the score range, rather than exhibiting large, startling variations.

*These two activities were not graphed because they are "yes or no" questions.

Median Income.—Median income has a very slight relationship to Council activities, with the exception of rehabilitation services.* There, we can observe a convex pattern of means as income increases (from 2.4% to 2.6% to 1.0%). Rehabilitation services, it is recalled are primarily mental health services. It may be that, as income increases, there is a greater propensity for the residents to provide their own services. Thus, the Council might be less likely to become active in this area. Alternatively, there may be mental health planning explicitly funded in a community with high median income, and thus the Council would not enter the area.

Lower Class.—As the lower class dimension of the community increases, so does Council programs in the area of the indigent, but the increase is a moderate one, from 1.7% to 2.3%. From another perspective, the correlations of the two lower class variables—deprivation index and percent nonwhite—to programs for the indigent (.14 and .22, respectively) are close to the correlation of community size to programs for the indigent (.24), which shows that the lower classness of the community exerts a relatively strong influence in this area. There is definite, but moderate Council response to community structure. In addition, a high deprivation index is positively related to Council participation in programs under other auspices. This likely reflects the larger number of such programs in cities with a heavy lower class component.

Maturity and Growth.—Maturity and growth operate in opposite directions, as was the case with the board. An increase in the growth of a community is associated with a decrease the level of Council activity; just the reverse is true for increments in maturity. There are, however, two excep-

*However, the reader will also notice that rehabilitation services does not have relationships which are markedly different from other variables. All of the relationships are low.

tions to this general pattern. One reversal is in the area of programs for indigent. Here, increases in growth have almost no effect on programs for the indigent (from 1.9% to 1.9% to 2.0%) while maturity increments are associated with a decrease in such programs (from 2.1% to 2.0% to 1.8%). The other exception is rehabilitation services, which has a curved relationship to growth—a slight increase, and then a decline (from 2.3% to 2.7% to 2.4%).

Summary and Discussion

In summary, we might make the following points about the relationship between the Council resources and activities and the community:

1. Community size exerts a definite and substantial effect on the Council; as community size increases, so do Council resources and activities.
2. Overall, the composition variables exert a definite, but mild effect on the Council variables; specifically, the Council response to variations in community composition appears to remain to within an overall pattern.
3. Two composition variables—community maturity and community growth—are negatively correlated even with size partialled out, and tend to behave in opposite ways in their effects on Council variables; while community growth seems to be associated with a more restricted Council effort, community maturity appears to be associated with a more extensive Council effort.
4. One other composition variable—lower classness—shows a mild positive relationship to Council programs in the area of the indigent.

Within limits, then, the Council is influenced by the Community in which it lives. Overall, however, one has more the sense of the lack of influence, rather than its presence. Two points might be made in this connection.

First, the cautions introduced at the beginning of the chapter are recalled. There are several reasons why the relationships would be expected

to be low. Given this initial expectation, the small differences seem a little more acceptable.

The second point is a more general one. We have picked variables which are only the most general measures of community composition. They do not, as such, measure the community social organization. In fact, each dimension or facet which we have used interacts with all other dimensions in a particular community to produce a relatively unique situation.* In this respect, the very complexity of community structure makes it difficult for the Council to interpret how it should respond. High proportions of lower class people in one community may be associated with high income people as well (e.g., "The Gold Coast and the Slum" effect), something which may not be generally true. Hence, it seems likely that there are two major influences on Council activities.

1. The first set of influences are highly idiosyncratic ones, which relate to particularistic elements of community and Council history locally. This influence was mentioned at the conclusion of the Chapter on activities. Carried to extremes, this force would produce Councils as different as the communities are different.

2. The other force is the internal definition of mission and role, which comes from the "Council movement" and from the social work profession. This influence is a countervailing one to the localistic influence, and, we suspect, the more powerful because of the concentration and focus with which it can be applied. The extent to which this kind of influence operates is the subject of the next chapter.

*The communities, at least the ones in this sample, are quite unique. On the hunch that there might be some uniformity in community structure we performed a Lingoes cluster analyses on the community variables. There was no clustering at all. The reader will learn in some detail about the Lingoes procedure in Chapter VIII.

TABLE 7.1a

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960*

	Zero-Order Correlations**													
	(1)	(130)	(131)	(132)	(133)	(134)	(135)	(136)	(137)	(138)	(139)	(140)		
(1) <u>Community Size</u>		.04	.18	.26	.22	.20	.03	.31	-.18	-.20	-.26	-.05		
(130) <u>Median Income</u>			-.70	-.45	.49	.02	.06	.12	.08	.17	-.17	.03		
<u>Lower Class</u>														
(131) <u>Deprivation Index</u>		-.72		.68	-.18	.15	.13	.15	-.35	-.27	-.06	-.19		
(132) <u>Percent Nonwhite</u>		-.48	.67		-.34	-.13	.10	.09	-.03	-.03	+.10	-.04		
<u>Maturity</u>														
(133) <u>Percent Foreign Born</u>		.49	-.23	-.42		.45	.38	.39	-.26	-.22	-.56	-.17		
(134) <u>Median Age</u>		.01	.12	-.19	.43		.57	.41	-.51	-.57	-.47	-.22		
(135) <u>Percent Same House, 1955-60</u>		.06	.13	-.24	.38	.58		.36	-.80	-.58	-.29	-.42		
(136) <u>Density</u>		.11	.11	.01	.35	.37	.37		-.43	-.55	-.55	-.17		
<u>Growth</u>														
(137) <u>Percent Migrants</u>		.09	-.33	.02	.28	-.49	-.80	-.41		.65	.34	.60		
(138) <u>Percent Growth, 1950-60</u>		.18	-.23	.04	.18	-.54	-.60	.51	.63		.51	.24		
(139) <u>Percent Single Dwelling Unit</u>		.18	-.02	.18	.56	-.17	-.31	-.53	-.06	.33		-.05		
(140) <u>Educational Center</u>		.03	-.19	-.03	-.16	-.22	-.45	-.17	.60	.24	-.05			
† Partial Correlations—Community Size Removed														
(141) <u>Total Private Welfare Dollars, 1964</u>	.80	.03	.20	.32	.21	.21	.02	.37	-.25	-.26	-.28	-.10		
(142) <u>Per Capita Private Welfare, 1964</u>	-.03	.14	-.02	.03	.10	.10	.20	.15	-.30	-.21	-.18	-.08		
(143) <u>Per Capita County Welfare Dollars, 1960</u>	.17	-.26	-.17	-.27	.39	.17	.06	.24	.01	-.16	-.26	.06		

*By "community" here we refer to the political city data provided by the Hadden-Borgatta volume, and discussed in Chapter II, except for the welfare data. The private welfare data refers to the community over which it was collected; the public welfare data refers to the county containing the central city. In those cases where the Council spread into more than one county, the rates were averaged.

**The upper half of the matrix provides the zero-order correlations; the lower half presents the first-order partial, with the influence of community size removed.

TABLE 7.1b

MEAN VALUES OF SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
BY COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960

Community Structure	Community Size Group					
	Less than 100,000	100,000- 199,999	200,000 499,999	500,000 999,999	1,000,000+	Total
(1) Size, in 1,000's	69	138	281	592	2,115	521
(130) Median Income*	5.8	3.6	3.4	3.7	4.2	3.9
<u>Lower Class</u>						
(131) Deprivation Index*	3.2	5.1	6.2	6.3	6.4	5.5
(132) Percent Nonwhite*	3.5	5.4	6.2	6.9	7.3	5.9
<u>Maturity</u>						
(133) Percent Foreign Born*	5.1	4.2	4.6	4.4	6.1	4.7
(134) Median Age*	4.7	4.4	5.0	4.9	5.8	4.8
(135) Percent Same Houses, 1955-60*	5.0	4.7	5.3	4.0	4.1	4.7
(136) Density*	4.0	4.3	5.5	5.7	6.8	5.2
<u>Growth</u>						
(137) Percent Migrants*	4.6	4.3	3.2	4.1	3.5	3.9
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60*	4.2	3.7	3.0	3.5	2.7	3.4
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit*	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.2	1.7	3.4
(140) Educational Center*	5.2	5.4	5.2	5.5	5.4	5.3
<u>Welfare Status</u>						
(141) Total Private Dollars Raised, 1964	.3 mil.	15 mil.	1.1 mil.	2.5 mil.	8 mil.	2 mil.
(142) Per Capita Private Dollars, 1964	4.39	4.42	4.27	4.48	4.35	4.13
	2.12	1.34	1.32	1.81	1.85	1.64
(143) Per Capita County Public Wel- fare Expenditure, 1960	11.36	8.04	6.48	11.03	12.22	9.26
	9.00	8.69	6.47	12.01	11.40	9.69

*These are the Hadden-Borgatta variables; their score range is 0-9.

TABLE 7.2

MEAN VALUES AND PROPORTIONS OF COUNCIL RESOURCE AND ACTIVITY VARIABLES,
BY COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Council Resources and Activity	Community Size Group					Total
	Less Than 100,000	100,000 199,999	200,000 499,999	500,000- 999,999	1,000,000+	
<u>Council Size</u>						
(2) Regular Staff	0.5	0.90	1.8	5.0	13.8	3.6
(4) Special Project Staff	0.2	0.07	0.4	2.1	2.1	0.9
<u>Council Income</u>						
(108) Total	\$17,353	\$17,625	\$38,369	\$106,239	\$325,139	\$84,063
(109p) Primary, %	96.0	90.0	88.0	85.0	79.0	88.0
(110p) Secondary, %	4.0	10.0	12.0	15.0	21.0	12.0
<u>Council Board</u>						
<u>Service</u>						
(111) Health and Welfare, %	13.2	14.5	9.2	9.8	11.7	11.5
(112) Public Administration, %	13.1	9.1	6.4	6.3	4.2	7.7
(113) Higher Education, %	4.6	5.0	3.6	3.4	2.9	3.9
(114) Religious, %	6.3	4.2	4.7	3.9	5.1	4.7
<u>Entrepreneurial</u>						
(115) Business and Industry, %	24.2	30.7	39.7	37.2	33.2	34.0
(116) Labor, %	1.0	1.5	2.0	3.0	3.3	2.2
(117) Misc. Professional, %	18.0	19.7	22.9	25.6	24.5	22.2
(118) Media, %	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.2	3.5	2.4
(119) Elected Public Official, %	1.3	0.8	2.4	1.7	3.0	1.7
N.A., %	15.0	12.0	7.0	6.0	8.0	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<u>Power</u>	29.8	35.0	36.4	43.6	38.1	36.9
<u>Activities</u>						
<u>Problem-Focused</u>						
(124) Indigent (0-7)	1.00	1.41	1.85	2.36	3.50	1.94
(125) Chronic Illness (0-7)	0.09	1.46	1.68	1.90	3.10	1.75
(126) Rehabilitation (0-7)	1.76	1.94	2.48	2.75	3.40	2.44
(127) Service to Special Groups (0-7)	1.04	1.71	2.17	2.24	2.90	1.84
(128) Agency Service (0-7)	1.04	1.71	2.17	2.24	3.50	2.09
<u>Organization-Focused</u>						
(89) Part. Public Budget (1=yes, 2=no)	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.66
(129) Legislative Activity (0-7)	1.28	1.70	1.90	3.12	3.00	2.06
(81) Part. Private Budget (1=yes, 4=no)	2.2	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.64
(82) Programs Under Other Auspices (0-7)	2.95	2.84	3.14	4.06	4.75	3.44

TABLE 7.3a

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF COUNCIL RESOURCE VARIABLES
AND SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Measures of Community Structure	Welfare Council Fluid Resources						
	Original Size		Income		Board		
	Total (2)	Special Project (4)	Total (108)	Primary (109)	Secondary (110)	Service (120)	Entre. (121)
(1) Size	.76	.17	.80	.53	.31	-.02	.11
(130) Median Income	.05	.11	.09	.06	.07	.08	.02
<u>Lower Class</u>							
(131) Deprivation Index	.19	.04	.18	.11	.08	-.12	.05
(132) Percent Nonwhite	.27	.09	.25	.14	.15	-.16	.04
<u>Maturity</u>							
(133) Percent Foreign Born	.23	.17	.29	.16	.21	-.13	-.01
(134) Median Age	.15	.15	.09	.09	.16	-.06	.01
(135) Percent Same House, 1955-60	.01	-.05	.05	.05	.02	-.07	-.04
(136) Density	.37	.18	.36	.21	.19	-.13	.01
<u>Growth</u>							
(137) Percent Migrants	-.17	-.02	-.20	-.21	-.10	-.02	-.09
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60	-.22	-.12	-.26	-.16	-.16	-.02	-.05
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit	-.26	-.17	-.30	-.13	-.19	+.06	-.02
(140) Educational Center	-.06	.08	-.20	-.13	.01	-.02	.05
<u>Welfare Status</u>							
(141) Total Private Dollars Raised, 1964	.86	.19	.82	.58	.26	-.07	.11
(142) Per Capita Private Dollars, 1964	.19	.01	.17	.12	-.03	-.09	.10
(143) Per Capita Public Welfare, County, 1964	.20	.22	.26	.00	.20	+.03	-.02
							-.15

TABLE 7.3b

FIRST ORDER PARTIAL INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION
AND FLUID RESOURCES, WITH COMMUNITY SIZE CONTROLLED,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Size		Income	
	Regular (2)	Special Project (4)	Total, 1963 (108)	Primary (109) Secondary (110)
(130) <u>Median Income</u>	.03	.10	-.03	.02 .05
<u>Lower Class</u>				
(131) Deprivation Index	.08	.01	.06	.07 .00
(132) Percent Nonwhite	.10	.04	.11	.04 .01
<u>Maturity</u>				
(133) Percent Foreign Born	.10	.14	-.02	.05 .05
(134) Median Age	.00	.12	.05	.01 .02
(135) Percent Same House, 1955-60	-.02	-.05	-.02	.05 .04
(136) Density	.22	.14	.04	.07 .05
<u>Growth</u>				
(137) Percent Migrants	-.07	.02	-.03	-.13 .00
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60	-.06	-.08	.01	-.05 .12
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit	-.11	-.14	.03	-.14 -.06
(140) <u>Educational Center</u>	-.02	.09	.00	-.12 .06

TABLE 7.4

THE MEAN VALUES OF COUNCIL FLUID RESOURCES, BY SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Size		Total, 1963 (108)	Income	
	Regular (2)	Special Project (4)		Primary, % (109p)	Secondary, % (110p)
<u>(130) Median Income</u>					
Low*	2.30	0.35	\$ 42,713	89.3	10.7
Medium	4.35	0.68	98,018	87.3	12.7
High	3.77	2.74	112,164	85.9	14.1
<u>(131) Deprivation Index**</u>					
Low	1.76	0.37	34,750	92.7	7.3
Medium	2.69	1.25	65,515	86.7	13.3
High	5.29	0.81	118,752	86.5	13.5
<u>(134) Median Age***</u>					
Low	2.16	0.45	39,947	89.2	10.8
Medium	3.03	0.51	69,400	87.0	13.0
High	5.59	1.82	134,848	87.8	12.2
<u>(138) Growth****</u>					
Low	5.22	1.59	129,657	86.3	13.7
Medium	2.42	0.30	47,889	87.8	12.2
High	2.30	0.47	44,788	91.5	8.5
<u>(140) Educational Center</u>					
Low	3.72	0.37	90,191	87.5	12.5
Medium	3.94	0.68	88,048	90.5	9.5
High	3.29	1.42	112,164	84.4	15.5

*The ranges of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2; Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

*The ranges of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2; Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

**Deprivation index represents "lower classness."

***Median age represents "maturity of a community."

****Growth represents the dimension of growth.

TABLE 7.5a

THE INTERCORRELATION OF COUNCIL BOARD OF DIRECTORS VARIABLES AND SELECTED MEASURES
OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION, 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Service				Entrepreneurial						
	Welfare and Health (111)	Public Admin- istration (112)	Higher Edu- cation (113)	Religious (114)	Business and Industry (115)	Labor (116)	Misc. Pro- fessional (117)	Media (118)	Elected Public Officials (119)	Percent Male (123)	
(1) Size	-.01	-.19	-.03	.00	-.01	.16	.00	.11	.21	--	
(130) Median Income	.09	.17	-.01	.08	-.15	.21	.04	.02	-.10	-.06	
Lower Class											
(131) Deprivation Index	-.13	-.29	-.06	-.11	.15	-.07	.05	-.02	.10	.12	
(132) Percent Nonwhite	-.15	-.25	-.03	-.18	.21	-.02	.10	-.04	.04	.20	
Maturity											
(133) Percent Foreign Born	.15	.02	.07	.10	-.24	.10	-.01	-.03	.02	-.07	
(134) Median Age	.18	-.05	-.21	-.08	-.24	.08	-.09	.01	.11	-.18	
(135) Percent Same House, 1955-60	-.04	.01	-.21	-.10	-.05	.18	-.16	-.04	.05	-.09	
(136) Density	.06	-.11	.10	.08	-.07	.16	-.01	.01	.13	.03	
Growth											
(137) Percent Migrants	.03	-.06	.21	-.09	.00	-.19	.08	-.10	-.09	-.03	
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60	-.07	.05	-.02	-.02	.14	-.13	.17	-.05	-.14	.05	
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Units	-.20	.13	-.16	.00	.27	-.02	.06	-.06	-.11	.10	
(140) Educational Center	.02	-.06	.35	-.06	.05	-.12	.01	-.11	.05	.10	
Welfare Status											
(141) Total Private Dollar Raised, 1964	-.07	-.05	-.08	-.24	.10	.25	.08	.15	.11	--	
(142) Per Capita Private Dollar, 1964	-.05	-.15	+.03	-.13	.14	.22	.10	.04	.00	--	
(143) Per Capita County Public Welfare Expenditure, 1960	-.04	.02	.06	.04	-.20	.05	.04	-.15	-.02	--	
(123) Percent Male on Board	-.24	-.04	.03	.14	.52	.35	.47	.17	.15	--	

TABLE 7.5b

THE FIRST-ORDER PARTIAL INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION
AND BOARD OF DIRECTORS VARIABLES, WITH COMMUNITY SIZE CONTROLLED,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 COUNCILS, 1963

	Service					Entrepreneurial				
	Welfare and Health (111)	Public Admin- istration (112)	Higher Education (113)	Religious (114)	Business and Industry (118)	Labor (116)	Misc. Pro- fessional (117)	Media (118)	Elected Public Officials (119)	Power (122)
(130) <u>Median Income</u>	.09	.18	.00	.08	-.15	.20	.04	.02	-.11	-.05
<u>Lower Class</u>										
(131) Deprivation Index	-.13	-.26	-.06	-.11	.15	-.11	.05	-.04	.07	.10
(132) Percent Nonwhite	-.15	-.20	.04	-.19	.22	-.07	.10	-.07	-.02	.24
<u>Maturity</u>										
(133) Percent Foreign Born	.16	.06	-.07	.11	-.24	.07	-.01	-.05	-.02	-.08
(134) Median Age	.18	-.02	-.21	.08	-.24	.04	-.09	-.02	.07	-.11
(135) Percent Same House, 1955-60	-.04	.01	-.21	.10	-.05	.18	-.16	-.04	.04	-.13
(136) Density	.07	-.06	.12	.08	-.07	.12	-.01	-.03	.08	-.11
<u>Growth</u>										
(137) Percent Migrants	.02	.06	.21	-.09	.00	-.17	.05	-.08	-.06	.01
(138) Growth, 1950-60	-.07	.00	-.03	-.02	.14	-.09	.08	-.02	-.09	.07
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit	-.22	.08	-.18	.00	.28	.03	.06	-.03	-.06	.01
(140) <u>Educational Center</u>	.17	-.07	.35	-.06	.05	-.12	-.01	-.10	.06	-.02

TABLE 7.6

THE MEAN VALUES OF COUNCIL NONFLUID RESOURCES, BY SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Service					Entrepreneurial			
	Health and Welfare (111)	Public Administration (112)	Higher Education (113)	Religious (114)	Business and Industry (115)	Labor (116)	Misc. Professional (117)	Media (118)	Elected Public Official (119)
<u>(130) Median Income</u>									
Low*	10.1	6.6	3.9	4.4	35.8	0.9	21.0	2.4	1.9
Medium	11.5	8.0	4.8	4.7	35.0	2.9	23.0	3.0	1.9
High	14.0	9.5	3.7	5.5	27.0	2.2	22.0	3.3	1.2
<u>(131) Deprivation Index</u>									
Low	12.7	11.0	5.6	5.4	31.8	1.9	20.4	2.3	1.7
Medium	12.0	8.1	3.2	4.7	32.5	2.6	23.3	2.2	1.2
High	10.6	6.7	4.0	4.3	36.2	1.9	22.0	2.6	2.3
<u>(134) Median Age</u>									
Low	8.9	9.5	6.3	4.6	37.9	1.6	24.1	2.3	1.5
Medium	10.5	6.8	3.3	4.6	35.6	2.4	22.0	2.4	2.6
High	14.9	8.3	3.3	4.9	29.1	2.1	21.4	2.3	2.2
<u>(138) Growth</u>									
Low	12.7	7.9	3.8	4.7	31.5	2.5	21.2	2.4	2.1
Medium	9.8	8.5	4.6	4.8	36.4	2.0	21.2	1.6	1.8
High	12.6	8.0	2.8	4.3	35.0	1.3	28.1	2.7	0.8
<u>(140) Educational Center</u>									
Low	11.4	8.7	1.4	4.8	33.2	2.7	21.7	2.4	2.0
Medium	11.5	8.3	3.3	4.7	32.9	2.1	23.0	2.8	1.5
High	11.6	6.7	6.0	4.5	35.7	1.9	21.5	1.8	2.1

*The ranges of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2; Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

*The ranges of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2; Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

TABLE 7.7

THE MEAN VALUES OF COUNCIL BOARD POWER, DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE
AND INDEPENDENCE STRUCTURE, BY SELECTED MEASURES OF
COMMUNITY COMPOSITION, 154 COMMUNITIES, 1960
AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Board Power (% Top Leader) (122)	Divisional Structure 0-8 Divisions (72)	Independence 1=Free; 3= Merged (63)
(130) <u>Median Income</u>			
Low*	36.8	0.98	1.64
Medium	37.5	1.18	1.75
High	35.5	1.67	1.88
(131) <u>Deprivation Index</u>			
Low	31.8	1.22	2.26
Medium	37.6	1.13	1.72
High	38.5	1.09	1.55
(134) <u>Median Age</u>			
Low	36.0	0.93	1.80
Medium	38.2	1.20	1.83
High	38.6	1.35	1.56
(136) <u>Growth</u>			
Low	36.0	1.28	1.71
Medium	38.2	1.20	1.83
High	37.9	1.22	1.52
(140) <u>Educational Center</u>			
Low	36.3	1.08	1.73
Medium	38.9	1.17	1.71
High	34.8	1.28	1.71

*The range of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2;
Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

TABLE 7.8a

THE INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF ACTIVITY VARIABLES, DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE AND
INDEPENDENCE STRUCTURE, BY SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Problem-Focused Activities						Organizational-Focused Activities				
	Indigent (124)	Chronic Illness (125)	Rehabilitation (126)	Serv. Sp. Grps. (127)	Agency Services (128)	Part. Pub. Bud. (89)	Legislative Act. (129)	Part. Priv. Bud. (81)	Progs. Under Other Auspices (62)	Divisions (72)	Independence (63)
(1) Size	.24	.17	.08	.18	.28	.28	.26	.08	.18	.22	.27
(130) Median Income	-.09	-.01	-.04	-.04	.01	.08	.10	.01	.11	.12	-.09
<u>Lower Class</u>											
(131) Deprivation Index	.14	.05	.02	.08	.12	.04	.03	.08	.05	-.07	.25
(132) Percent Nonwhite	.22	.02	.06	.09	.13	.00	.00	.21	.16	.01	.28
<u>Maturity</u>											
(133) Percent Foreign Born	-.03	.06	.02	.09	.12	.29	.29	.04	.23	.02	.07
(134) Median Age	-.09	.07	.00	.09	.12	.18	.19	.00	.13	.06	.08
(135) Percent Same Houses, 1955-60	-.06	.03	-.02	.00	-.02	.11	.06	.01	.05	-.11	-.07
(136) Density	.04	.12	.01	.15	.14	.17	.21	.17	.24	.10	.05
<u>Growth</u>											
(137) Percent Migrants	-.01	-.15	-.01	-.02	+.06	-.14	-.11	-.03	-.13	-.01	.05
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60	.03	-.10	+.03	-.04	-.05	-.14	-.14	-.16	-.08	.03	.01
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit	.06	-.12	+.04	-.06	-.13	-.19	-.25	-.08	-.17	-.06	-.07
(140) Educational Center	-.07	-.06	.00	.02	-.05	.00	-.07	.06	.01	.04	.05
<u>Welfare Status</u>											
(141) Total Private Dollars Raised, 1964	.22	.18	.12	.21	.24	.31	.23	.09	.29	-.10	.28
(142) Per Capita Private Dollars, 1964	.00	.09	.07	.07	.04	.17	.13	.20	.18	.13	-.06
(143) Per Capita County Public Welfare Expenditure, 1960	-.01	.13	.07	.09	.11	.15	.16	-.07	.26	.03	.12

TABLE 7.8b

THE FIRST-ORDER PARTIAL INTERCORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION
AND COUNCIL ACTIVITY AND STRUCTURE, WITH COMMUNITY SIZE CONTROLLED,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	Problem-Focused Activities					Organizational-Focused Activities					
	Indigent (124)	Chronic Illness (125)	Rehabilitation (126)	Serv. Spe. Grps. (127)	Agency Services (128)	Part. Pub. Bud. (89)	Legislative Act. (129)	Part. Priv. Bud. (81)	Progs. Under Other Auspices (62)	Divisions (72)	Independence (63)
(130) <u>Median Income</u>	-.12	-.03	-.06	-.09	.04	.08	.12	.00	.11	.11	-.10
<u>Lower Class</u>											
(131) Deprivation Index-	.13	.02	-.01	-.09	.08	-.01	-.08	.07	.02	-.14	.21
(132) Percent Nonwhite	.22	-.06	.06	.10	.12	-.08	-.08	.20	.12	-.06	.23
<u>Maturity</u>											
(133) Percent Foreign Born	-.13	.03	-.01	.08	.14	.25	.26	.03	.19	-.03	.01
(134) Median Age	-.17	.08	-.03	.09	.13	.13	.13	-.01	.09	-.02	.03
(135) Percent Same House, 1955-60	-.17	.08	-.05	-.02	-.02	.11	.06	.00	.04	-.12	.08
(136) Density	-.04	.09	-.02	.17	.12	.09	.12	.16	.20	-.04	.04
<u>Growth</u>											
(137) Percent Migrants	.08	-.20	.03	-.01	-.02	-.09	-.02	-.01	-.10	.03	.11
(138) Percent Growth, 1950-60	.15	-.10	.07	-.07	-.03	-.06	.03	-.14	-.03	.08	.08
(139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit	.20	-.12	.07	-.08	-.11	.13	-.11	-.14	-.08	-.08	.13
(140) <u>Educational Center</u>	-.08	-.09	.01	.10	.07	.13	-.07	.06	.02	.05	.06

TABLE 7.9
MEAN VALUES OF COUNCIL ACTIVITY VARIABLES BY SELECTED MEASURES OF COMMUNITY COMPOSITION,
154 COMMUNITIES, 1960 AND 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

	(124) Indigent (0-7)	(125) Chronic Ill. (0-7)	(126) Rehabilitation (0-7)	(127) Serv. Spe. Grps. (0-7)	(128) Agency Service (0-7)	(89) Part. Pub. Budg. (1=Yes; 2=No)	(129) Legis. Act. (0-7)	(81) Part. Pub. Budg. (1=Yes; 4=No)	(62) Progs. Under Other Auspices (0-7)
(130) Median Income									
Low*	2.1	1.6	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.2	1.7	1.3
Medium	1.8	1.8	2.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.6	3.7
High	2.2	1.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.7	3.5
(131) Deprivation Index									
Low	1.7	1.6	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	3.1
Medium	1.6	1.6	2.3	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.8	3.5
High	2.3	2.0	2.6	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.6	1.5	3.6
(134) Median Age									
Low	2.1	1.3	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.1	1.8	2.7
Medium	2.0	1.9	2.5	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.5	3.6
High	1.8	1.9	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.9	1.8	3.6
(138) Growth									
Low	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.4	1.6	1.7	1.5	3.6
Medium	1.9	1.8	2.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.8	3.3
High	2.0	1.1	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.3	2.0	3.4
(140) Educational Center									
Low	2.1	2.0	2.6	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.8	1.8	3.0
Medium	2.0	1.9	2.5	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.7	1.6	3.7
High	1.8	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.0	1.7	1.5	1.7	3.1

*The ranges of the Hadden-Borgatta variables are as follows: Low = 0-2; Medium = 3-6; High = 7-9.

CHAPTER VIII

STRUCTURAL UNIFORMITY IN WELFARE COUNCIL ORGANIZATION

Introduction

Thus far, we have looked at differentiation among elements of the Councils; we have not attempted to differentiate among the Councils themselves, as total entities. Specifically, we might consider whether Councils could be classified into groups or types. Perhaps there are two or three separate groups of Councils which are relatively separate and distinct from one another. Such a test for groupings was performed, and the results and their implications become the subject matter of this chapter.

Overview

Two analyses of a subgroup of 99 Councils were done using a special computer program—the Multivariate Analyses of Contingencies II Program (MAC-II)—designed by Professor James Lingoes of The University of Michigan.* Both analyses produced essentially the same findings, viz., that there is a great deal of uniformity in Council structure in general, and in small Councils in particular. The MAC-II program tested for similarity by grouping together Councils which were similar to each other in a variety of ways. Specifically, in the first analysis (Run A) the program produced a large group of 79 Councils as similar to each other; in the second analysis (Run B), a still larger cluster of 90 Councils was produced. In other words, of the 20 Councils which remained unclustered on the first run, 11 were ultimately clustered on the second run. It is also important to note, as a

*As we shall discuss in a moment, limitations of the program required that we use only 99 of the total 154 Councils in the analyses.

second general finding, that the Councils which did not fall into the giant cluster did not, among themselves, form a subcluster, but remained separate, each from the other.

Methodology: "Nonmetric Cluster Analysis"

In order that the reader understand the nature of the MAC-II program, and the notion of "clustering," we must briefly discuss the nature of the special methodology used in this chapter.* By way of introduction, a quote from Professor Lingoes will serve:

The task...is one of mapping types (individuals having the same profile over a set of variables or items) into a Euclidian space with minimal dimensionality. Types are represented as points in this space, and each item is a partition of the space into non-overlapping regions.**

The particular program which was used here—MAC-II—compares all the subjects (Councils) on each input variable. The program interprets the code scores as points in space (e.g., Lazarsfeld's notion of "property space"). Each subject therefore has a position in space vis a vis any other subject on a given variable. Since the program permits a maximum of 50 variables (or scores for 50 separate characteristics of any subject) to be entered, each subject can have as many as 50 locations in space. As we are interested in the subject, rather than the characteristic, we wish to have an overall meas-

*Some of the most recent literature in the field is as follows: James C. Lingoes, "New Computer Developments in Pattern Analyses and Non-Metric Techniques," op. cit.; James C. Lingoes, "Multivariate Analysis of Contingencies: An I.B.M. 7090 Program for Analyzing Linear/Non-Linear or Metric/Non-Metric Data" (The Computing Center, The University of Michigan, Computation Report No. 2, June 15, 1963, revised Aug. 15, 1966), Ditto; James C. Lingoes, "Recent Computational Advances in Non-Metric Methodology in Behavioral Sciences" (The Computing Center, The University of Michigan, no date), Ditto; James C. Lingoes and Steven G. Vradenberg, "A Non-Metric Analyses of Twin Data Based on a Multifaceted Design" (Louisville Twin Study, the University of Louisville, Report No. 17, April 1966).
 **Lingoes, "Recent Computational Advances..." op. cit., p. 23.

ure of the location of any given subject vis a vis any other given subject. The program locates each Council in relationship to every other Council (a mean distance of the total distances of each characteristic) in Euclidian space. Every set of two subjects (Councils) has a Euclidian distance score, which ranges from 0 (very close) to approximately 1.0 (very far), reflecting relative "closeness" or "distance." On the basis of these distance values, the program proceeds through 12 iterations of clustering, and for each iteration, the distance criterion for inclusion in the cluster is incremented by a small amount. The goal of the clustering is to maximize the mean intercluster distance, and minimize the mean intracluster distance. Within reason, those subjects included in a cluster may be considered a "type." The number of clusters that the program ultimately produces depends upon the initial similarity or difference of the subjects (and of the range of scores on the measures of the various characteristics). There may be, as in this case, one cluster which contains many subjects, and many clusters with one subject each. Alternatively, one may observe no clustering.

Limitations of the Program

At the present time, the Lingoes MAC-II program has two limitations which are important for our analysis. First, the total N of subjects (Councils) is limited to 99. In order to insure that there would be representation from a range of Councils, a stratified random sample was taken. Two-thirds of the Councils from each of the five community size groups were selected using a table of random numbers. The resulting sample of 99 Councils provides the basis for the analysis discussed in this chapter.

The second limitation is that the number of variables or characteristics of each subject is limited to 50. Since our complete data set contains 118

variables, some selection had to be made.* In Run A, the maximum of 50 variables was used. In order to maximize the independence of the inputs, variables which had high loadings on factors in the factor analysis, plus selected other variables, were used. In Run B, 45 variables were used. Some were new, and had not been included in the original factor analysis (e.g., the board of directors variables); some were collapsed categories of variables, and others were ones we had not been able to include on Run A. In total, of the 95 variables used in both runs, 16 were exactly the same. The reader may compare the two sets of variables in Table 8.1.

In both Run A and Run B, the program proceeded through identical procedures, the only difference being that the Council characteristics were somewhat different. We do not know, of course, whether we would have achieved the same results in terms of clustering had all 118 characteristics been used, for 154 Councils. However, a 2/3 sample is a good sample size, and one would certainly not expect substantial deviation. Also, the fact that two runs using different Council characteristics in some degree produced essentially similar results can give us more confidence. Nonetheless, these two limitations should be kept in mind during the remaining discussion.

Findings

1. "Closeness" of Councils.—Overall, the Councils appear to be rather similar to one another. For Run A, the mean intercouncil Euclidian distance is .181; for Run B this distance is .184 (Table 8.2).

*The figure of 118 comes from 108 variables on the questionnaire plus 9 occupational categories for the board of directors and the board power rating for each Council.

2. Types of Councils.—There do not appear to be "types" of Councils but rather one type, and some mavericks. On Run A, 70 of 99 Councils were grouped together in one large cluster by level 12; in Run B, 90 of 99 Councils were so grouped. Additionally, and something which was true of both runs, is that there never was an important minority cluster. The one large cluster developed early (level 1 or 2) and remained dominant throughout the iterations. The clusterings at each level, for each run, may be seen in Table 8.3.

3. Maverick Councils.—The Councils which did not fall into the large cluster by the twelfth iteration did not cluster among themselves either. They remained in clusters of one Council each. Thus, it appears that there is not a subdominant type, but rather a small group of "deviant" Councils.

4. Size and Clustering.—The Councils which remained individually clustered and did not fall into the larger cluster were, without exception, the larger Councils. The 9 which remained unclustered at the end of Run B had a mean regular staff size of 22.6 persons, compared to an overall mean of 3.6. They ranged from 10 to 34.5 persons.

5. The Variability of Small Units.—Typically, one would expect that many small units would differ among themselves more than larger units would, if only because the chance for variation is greater. However, the reverse obtains here, as implied in point no. 4 above. If we consider the matrix of Euclidian distances for the first 10 and last 11 Councils (on the average, these are the largest and smallest Councils) we note the following: that among the large Councils, the mean distance was .34 and .42 on Runs A and B, respectively; for the small Councils, the distances were .10 and .11 on Runs A and B. Thus, it appears that the large Councils are more different from each other than the small Councils are different from each other. The matrix of distances is displayed in Table 8.2.

Potential Limitations on the Findings

The MAC-II program, as any program, can work only with the data fed to it. In this case, there are some features of the data set which should be clearly understood by the reader as he assesses the results. One of these features is the possibility that the findings are in part a result of negative concurrence. A second problem is with the original sample.

Negative Concurrence

Negative concurrence could occur if we included characteristics of the Council for which there was little variation in response. For example, we might ask a question to which a heavy proportion of the Councils and especially the smaller Councils responded "no, we do not have this resource, or that activity." Were such the case, the program would identify many Councils as similar only because they all did not have a particular item. Two points are necessary in assessing this problem. The first is to establish whether or not there was a heavy proportion of negative, or similar responses, and whether or not there was any relationship to the size of the Council in the responses. The second point is to assess whether or not the item is an appropriate one. The value of such lumped responses depends upon the importance of the item.

Data Assessment.—The distribution of zeros for selected variables, by community size group, is displayed in Table 8.4. It is evident from that table that there is a large number of similar negative responses (0 was a code for the absence of an item). Further, there is a size bias in the response distribution, viz., that the negative responses increase as size decreases. Thus, the smaller Councils would have, on the average, more zeros in their data set than would the large Councils. Unquestionably, they are a factor

in the similarity of the small Councils. However, since all but a few of the very largest Councils ultimately clustered, we cannot regard the overall similarity as simply a product of negative concurrence.

Relevance.—The relevance, or importance of a question becomes an issue when there is a lumping in the distribution of responses. Such a situation might occur, for example, if one were to ask a sample of high schools whether or not they had a nuclear reactor, and then point out that the schools were similar because none of them had that particular piece of equipment. We do not, however, regard the questions asked here as of that sort. They were designed by people at The United Funds and Councils of America, who have had experience with Councils and their characteristics. Also, there is no necessity that the distribution developed the way it did. The lack of Ph.D. trained people in smaller Councils is something easy enough to interpret ex post facto, but one which would have been difficult to guess in advance. In short, one can regard the presence of negative replies as a finding rather than an inconvenience. This is perhaps, in the end, a question of judgment. "Did the question provide us with something we wish to know?" We answer in the affirmative.

Sample Bias

One other element which may relate to Council similarity is the nature of the sample, viz., that the deviant cases were the ones which did not reply, and we were left with more similar ones as respondents. This might be especially true of the smaller Councils. It will be recalled that the response rate of Councils from larger communities was rather good, and the rate from Councils in smaller communities was rather bad. There is no available means by which this possibility can be checked. It should, however, be born in

mind as a possible confounding factor.*

Summary

The limitations noted above are real and important ones to consider. Nonetheless, we do not feel that, overall, they would alter our basic conclusion—viz., that most Councils are quite similar to one another, and that there is a small group which are mavericks. It might be that the proportions of "similars" and "mavericks" would be altered; it might be that the particular Councils included in one or another group would be changed; it might be that in fact smaller Councils would have a somewhat greater distance score than is reported here, but it does not seem that these limitations would controvert the basic overall finding.

Discussion

Perhaps the most striking point about the findings just presented is their deviation from expectation. Normally, one would expect that the introduction of many small units would introduce considerable variation into the distribution, and that they would vary more than larger units, especially among themselves. Thus, we should be able to account not only for the heavy similarity among the Councils, but also for those which are different.

The Convergence of Characteristics

Because the convergence of Council characteristics is more spectacular than the divergence, we shall consider the former first. However, as we

*However, the reader will note that with such a large clustering of Councils, the response would have had to be very skewed. And while we did have a poor return from Councils in cities of less than 100,000 population, other returns were quite acceptable, as was discussed in Chapter II.

shall shortly see, some of the same forces which produce similarity in small Councils can also produce dissimilarity in larger ones.

Common Identity

Councils identify themselves as Councils. They see that they have a common mission and role to play in the local community, even if the specifics of this role are not completely spelled out. At a very general level, they have the common goals of local planning and coordination. Such commonalities in organizational ideology are likely to manifest themselves in a degree of structural similarity.

Vague Mandate

Despite the degree of agreement upon ends (or goals) of planning and coordination, there is no authoritative mandate as to the specifics of this role. Who or what is to be coordinated? Around what goals is planning to occur? This vague mandate to "coordinate" means that either each Council will have to work out its own particularistic solution to the problem of organizational ambiguity, or it will have to accept some common definition. The fact that Councils are small organizations means that they do not have the resources to come to an independent solution. Structurally, therefore, there is a tendency in the direction of accepting such a common solution to problems of organizational action. To the extent that they do accept such a common definition of mission and role is the extent to which they will be similar. And, there are two social mechanisms which help provide such a common definition—a national association and a common profession.

A National Association

Councils and Chests have banded together in what Hawley called a categorical group—The United Community Funds and Councils of America. It has a

national field staff, which periodically visits Funds and Councils, and gives advice and consultation to the local staff. Additionally, it will, on occasion, make a special study of a local effort and recommend a general overhaul. Needless to say, the recommendations made by this organization are consonant with its own conception of the mission and role of the Council.

It plays a similar helping function for communities which do not have a Council, but wish to establish one. Such communities can begin their effort with the recommendations and staff aid from U.C.F.C.A. Again, the influence of the national organization is one which provides a common definition of tasks across communities.

Finally, we might note that the influence of this organization is felt more strongly by smaller Councils than by larger. Smaller Councils are often newer ones, and even if not, they are less able to resist the pressures of the national organization. The smaller Councils are, it is recalled, also the ones which clustered.

Thus, the national organization not only serves to promote the common identity and common goals on an ideological level, but through its recommendations and consultation, has the tendency to encourage commonality among Councils. And the Councils, with little or no direction to begin with, are often only too glad to receive this kind of advice and guidance.

Common Profession

Apart from the national organization, we must not forget that the Council staff, and especially Council executives, have social work training. Specifically, such training is often in the method of community organization, which, until recently, has had as almost its sole focus the preparation of professionals for Council work. Thus, before a person even comes to the job, the mission and role of the Council has been discussed and studied,

and the social worker typically has some notions of a professional sort about the proper activity for such Councils. Common professionalism, then, is a second source of definition for the Council, and one which they also are eager to have.

We should not think, either, that the concepts of the profession and of the national organization are necessarily in contradiction. Typically, U.C.F.C.A. maintains close liaison with the community organization faculty at schools of social work. While this is not to say that there is complete agreement on the mission and role of the Council, there are many areas of such agreement.

Community Indifference

We have discussed four mechanisms which actively encourage similarity among small Councils at least, and doubtless to some degree among all Councils. Essentially, we have argued that the Council in a local community accepts some of its definition of mission and role from sources external to the local community. We must inquire about the communities' willingness to accept this kind of "definition of the situation." In general, it would seem that ego can win acceptance of the situation only if alter does not care. If alter does care, he is likely to dispute ego's definition of the situation.

It seems fair to conclude that communities are, in general, relatively neutral toward the structure and activities of the Welfare Councils as long as they remain noncontroversial. The policies and activities of the Welfare Council do not touch on the crucial interests of the community, as do issues like the bussing of children and open housing. Doubtless the leaders of the community believe in "planning and coordination" but do not have a strong involvement in the mechanism of such activity, except perhaps

an anti-government bias. Thus, they would be willing to accept the definition of the situation offered by the Welfare Council.

The Minority Divergence—The Maverick Councils

Having offered some hypotheses to account for the great similarity among Councils does not explain those few Councils which did not cluster on either Runs A or Run B. Apparently, these Councils combine their resources, activities and structure in such a way as to be relatively unique, different from the majority of Councils and from each other. What might account for these deviant cases?

Size and Differentiation

These Councils, it is recalled, had a mean regular staff size of about 22 persons, with a range from 10 to 35 persons. They are without question the largest in the sample. Apparently, therefore, the Council must become quite large, relatively, before important differentiation sets in. It may be that the level of 10 to 12 persons is a critical one for a Council.* Growth may occur up to this point with relatively little differentiation; beyond this point, important differentiation occurs. It is not, therefore, growth alone which produces a division of labor within a unit. What is also important is the degree to which the tasks performed by the organization can be standardized. Because there is a vagueness about the mission and role of the Council, only a very few of the largest Councils have the resources to develop their own definition of mission and role. Most Councils borrow one from the national association, or the profession.

*There were no Councils of this size or larger in the main large cluster.

An Interorganizational Theory of Specialization and Differentiation

Providing an interpretation of why some Councils are more differentiated than others does not explain why they are relatively unique in that differentiation. What seems reasonable to hypothesize is that a broker organization, or any organization, for that matter, once it has reached a size sufficient to become more specialized, plays its specialized role in relationship to the nature of the division of labor in the particular community. Further, the internal specialization of the organization, or its differentiation will be such as to take into account the unique community conditions. For broker organizations, the most relevant system is that of the interorganizational system, or other organizations, and especially other planning organizations. Thus, the role and structure of the more specialized Council is to a degree community specific and unique, because it was guided in its specialization and differentiation by the conditions in the local community. And, as we shall discuss momentarily, in general, the specialization of any part of the system must be seen in relationship to the overall division of labor in that system.

For example, in some communities, a Council may be combined with a hospital planning Council. However, if such an organization exists independent of the Council, then it is likely that the Council would play less of a role in hospital planning than would otherwise be the case. In short, the specialized and differentiated Council, as a case in point, tries to fit into a niche in its local habitat appropriate to that habitat. Since Councils of this type are the larger ones, the proposition implies that, as Councils become larger, they become more responsive to the local community.

This hypothesis of size responsiveness is supported in a small way by the fact that the larger Councils have the greater proportions of local

entrepreneurial board members. It is recalled that these people are needed especially for local legitimacy. It appears that, as such legitimacy becomes more important for the Council, the Council is moving to play a more community specific role. Apart from this thread of evidence, however, it is not possible to test the notion of an interorganizational theory of specialization with these data. It would, nonetheless, provide an interesting point of departure for future research.

The following points are suggested by the foregoing analysis:

1. For specialization and differentiation of a Council to occur, it must reach a certain size, apparently around 10 to 12 regular staff members.
2. In absolute terms, the level of size required for specialization and differentiation will vary depending upon the facility with which the organization's task can be routinized. As a general proposition, we hypothesize that the more readily the task can be routinized, the smaller the absolute level of size required for specialization and differentiation.
3. Given the minimum size for specialization, the Council will specialize in a way that articulates with the overall division of labor in the community in which it exists. Thus, the roles that large Councils play will differ somewhat from community-to-community, as the particular division of labor differs from community-to-community.
4. Small Councils are less variable because they have not as yet reached a size sufficient for specialization and differentiation.
5. Community indifference to the Council (which is not the same as Council indifference to the community) permits either a borrowed and common, or self-developed and unique, conception of the Council role.

Summary

Because of the vagueness of their mandate, Councils have a desire to specify and define it if possible. Some Councils, especially the smaller ones, tend to rely on the profession of social work and the national organization of Councils to provide direction and guidance for them. In general, they have a restricted notion of their role, and one which tends to limit them to the domain of social work agencies. Hence, the older name for Councils, "Council of Social Agencies." Being small, they do not have the resources themselves to do much more than this, and apparently provide only the most rudimentary kind of overall community planning.

On the other hand, some Councils, when they become large as Councils go, become specialized and differentiated members of the local community system. They are different in structure from their brother Councils, and tend to take the position that they should serve the whole community, and make a point to have a good representation of the "power structure" on their board if they can. The role they play necessarily is one which articulates with the local community, and, in particular, with the other planning and coordinating organizations. This explains in part the lethargic reaction of Council variables to community variables—there are no data on the crucial aspects of other organizations, and what they are doing.

In a way, we do have two types of Councils.

General Implications*

Social action is itself the process whereby an actor takes account of relevant others and adjusts his action accordingly. It thus is a joint pro-

*Professor Y. Hasenfeld of The University of Michigan School of Social Work provided some helpful comments for this section.

duct of the actor and of the system taken into account by the actor. As actors in a social system, organizations follow this prescription, as suggested in the interorganizational theory of specialization. Given that organizational action is in fact such a joint product, one is led to wonder about the crucial features of the organization and the environment which produce it.

Organizational Differentiation.—For the organization, one of the most important elements in determining organizational action would be the degree of differentiation. The greater the differentiation, the more able the organization will be to receive and process information about the environment, and the more able will the organization be to act on the information.

Complexity of the Salient Interorganizational System.—Many writers on organizations classify everything outside the organization as the "environment." There is little discrimination either among types of environments, or the nature of the organization of the various environments.* However, environments are not just "there." They are simple or complex, heterogeneous or homogeneous, integrated or not. Thus, it is a particular system that the organization needs to take into account. For our purposes, since we are interested in the relative differentiation of the organization and the system, we shall consider the degree to which the relevant interorganizational system is differentiated and integrated as the important variable.

The Interaction Between Differentiation and Complexity

There are, therefore, two variables involved—the complexity of the broader system and the differentiation of the organization. The interorganizational theory of specialization and differentiation would suggest

*A recent advance has been made in this area by Thompson. See, James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

that an undifferentiated organization would be found in a simple system, and a differentiated organization would be found in a complex system. However, the development of complexity in a system and of differentiation in the organization take time, and, at any given point in time, an organization may find itself relatively overdifferentiated in relationship to a simple environment, or relatively underdifferentiated in a complex environment. Each position results in a different kind of organizational action in relationship to the environment generally. These possible modes of action are summarized in Figure 8.1.

FIGURE 8.1. MODAL STYLES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION, AS REPORTED BY ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION AND INTERORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY.

<u>Differentiation of the Organization</u>	<u>Interorganizational Complexity</u>	
	<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
Low	Cooperation Accommodation	Coalition, Merger
High	Cooptation Dominance	Complementarity Competition Bargaining

Optimal Styles of Organizational Action*

In Figure 8.1, we have predicted the optimal style of organizational action in the system from the relative relationships of organizational differentiation and system complexity. Substantively, these styles are as follows:

Limited Cooperation: Occurs when an undifferentiated organization exists in a relatively uncomplex interorganizational system. Generally, this organization has nothing to lose by cooperating with other organizations. The lack of complexity of its own system suggests little competition.

Coalition: Occurs when an organization possesses an undifferentiated structure itself and must exist in a highly complex system. For example, neighborhood action groups facing city hall must band together if any

*These "styles" are adapted from Thompson and McEwen, "Organizational Goals and the Environment," op. cit.

of them are to get anything; the current crisis in the civil rights movement is a crisis of coalition.

Cooptation: Occurs when an organization finds itself overdifferentiated in relationship to its environment. In such a case, the environment is helpless, and can be coopted, neutralized, or dominated.

Complementarity:

Bargaining, Competition: Any of these may occur when a differentiated organization exists in a complex environment. The interorganizational theory of differentiation suggests that complementarity will occur; bargaining and competition are means by which the organization establishes domains, and claims. Cooperation is unlikely because (a) the organizations are strong enough to compete, and (b) resources are very limited.

We do not, in this study, have the data to test the styles in an empirical manner, but it could provide a starting point for further research.

Archtypical Organizations

Given that we have established an optimal mechanism for organizational action, we might see if there are organizations which are characterized by this style in a general way. The list is presented in Figure 8.2

FIGURE 8.2. ARCHTYPICAL ORGANIZATIONS CLASSIFIED
ACCORDING TO DOMINANT MODE OF ACTION.

<u>Limited Cooperation</u>	<u>Coalition</u>
Small Councils	Civil Rights Organizations
Boy Scouts	Neighborhood Action Groups
Red Cross	Adult Education
Army—Line	P.T.A.
<u>Cooptation</u>	<u>Complementarity, etc.</u>
T.V.A.	Large Councils
School—Neighborhood	National Foundation
Welfare Dept.— Client	Hull House
United Fund— Contributor	
Army—Staff	
General Motors	

Organizations which evidence limited cooperation typically operate their programs with little regard for the interorganizational system, because that system does not affect them. There are no serious competitors to the Boy

Scouts or the Red Cross. Each has a program which it offers, and it simply goes about its business in the community or area. However, when cooperation will not hinder the program, and there are many instances where this will be so, the organization will cooperate with other organizations in the system.

Organizations which use a coalition mode of action are ones which are, generally speaking, disadvantaged themselves relative to the system. Neighborhood action organizations are the best examples; these are often "just barely" organizations, with the primary group influence still prominent. Their lack of differentiation makes it very difficult for them to cope with their environment, especially if that environment is hostile. Indeed, this situation obtains regardless of size. Some very large neighborhood organizations (Alinsky calls them "mass organizations") simply do not have the structure to deal effectively with city government. Typically, they will be interested in merging with other organizations, to increase differentiation.*

Occasionally, although perhaps more frequently today, an organization is specialized in advance of the interorganizational system. Thus, it is very well equipped to dominate the system. Large, complex organizations are typical here, but an organization need not be large. A small, but crucial organization, can do the same thing. For example, in the Federal Government, the Bureau of the Budget is relatively smaller than any of the Cabinet departments, yet it manages to dominate the scene. This of course is because of implicit Presidential power, but does demonstrate that size alone is not the absolute criteria.

*Organizational differentiation is not a product of organizational size as such. Thompson comments, "One thing seems obvious: size alone does not result in complexity. So long as the organization employs simple technologies and faces simple task environments, it can be large and employ a relatively simple structure." Thompson, Organizations in Action, op. cit., p. 74.

Finally, there are organizations which use a strategy of complementarity often combined with bargaining and competition. The large Council is an example here, as well as the National Foundation (March of Dimes). Both make an attempt to perform functions which complement the roles already being performed in the system, yet do not hesitate, on occasion, to compete with the other organizations in the system for funds and support. In fact, they must compete with the other organizations because there are only limited resources. Because of the importance of competition, these organizations need to become differentiated so that they have various products to offer and so that they can compete effectively.

Summary

We have argued that the relative interaction of organizational differentiation and interorganizational complexity can produce particularistic organizational styles, and further, we have been able to identify some organizations which can be considered as typical examples of the use of the style. It might be possible, though not here, to carry the implications of these thoughts beyond organizations, to regimes and societies. However, our focus at present is on formal organizations and the relevant interorganizational system. Understanding the interaction between differentiation and complexity is perhaps a small start toward a more general theory of interorganizational relations.

TABLE 8.1

A SYSTEMATIC COMPARISON OF THE COUNCIL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN
RUN A AND RUN B OF THE LINGOES PROGRAM, 99 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Q No.*	Run A	Q No.*	Run B
(1)	Size of Community	(2)	Total Regular Size
(2)	Total Regular Size	(4)	Special Project Size
(4)	Special Project Size		
(108)	Total Income	(108)	Total Income
(98)	Chest, G.O.F.	(109)	Primary, Social Work Funds (Sum: 98,105,107,106,99)
(99)	Chest, S.P.F.	(110)	Secondary, Community-Wide Funds (Sum: 104,101,100,103,102)
(100)	Public, G.O.F.		
(101)	Public, S.P.F.		
(102)	Public, Fees		
(103)	Foundation, G.O.F.		
(104)	Foundation, S.P.F.		
(105)	Other, G.O.F.		
(106)	Other, S.P.F.		
(107)	Other, Fees		
			<u>Board of Directors</u>
		(111)	Percent Welfare and Health
		(112)	Percent Public Administration
		(113)	Percent Higher Education
		(114)	Percent Religious
		(115)	Percent Business and Industry
		(116)	Percent Labor
		(117)	Percent Misc. Professional
		(118)	Percent Media
		(119)	Percent Elected Public Official
		(120)	Percent Top Community Leader
	<u>Task Structure</u>		<u>Task Structure</u>
(6)	Exec., Admin., and Planning	(6)	Exec., Admin., and Planning
(7)	Information and Referral	(7)	Information and Referral
(10)	Research	(10)	Research
(12)	Public Relations	(12)	Public Relations
		(8)	Volunteer Bureau
(11)	Budget Specialist	(11)	Budget Specialist
(9)	Social Service Exchange	(9)	Social Service Exchange
(13)	Other		
(14)	Executive Vacancies		
	<u>Training Structure</u>		<u>Training Structure</u>
(18)	Masters of Social Work	(18)	Masters of Social Work
(21)	College Graduate	(21)	College Graduate
(19)	Master of Arts	(19)	Master of Arts
		(20)	One year of Social Work School
		(22)	Noncollege Graduate

TABLE 8.1 (Concluded)

Q No.*	Run A	Q No.*	Run B
			<u>Training Structure</u>
		(15)	Doctor of Social Work
		(16)	Doctor of Philosophy- Masters of Social Work
		(17)	Doctor of Philosophy
(23)	Level of Executives' Education		
(24)	Number of Consultants		
(72)	Divisions	(72)	Divisions
(63)	Independence	(63)	Independence
	<u>Activities</u>		<u>Activities</u>
(26)	Day Care	(124)	Indigent (Sum: 35,36,28,32)
(38)	Chronic Illness	(125)	Chronic Illness (Sum: 38,37,39 27,33,40)
(42)	Rehabilitation	(126)	Rehabilitation (Sum: 42,30,34, 41)
(44)	Determination of Needs	(127)	Service to Special Groups (Sum: 26,29,31,46,49,48)
(45)	Establishment of New Agencies	(128)	Agency Change (Sum: 44,43,45,50)
(49)	Services to Special Groups	(52)	Legislative—Information
(50)	Studies of Agencies	(53)	Legislative—Take Position
(51)	Fact Finding Activities	(54)	Legislative—Attend Hearings
(52)	Legislative—Information		
(53)	Legislative—Take Position		
(54)	Legislative—Attend Hearings		
(57)	Special Service Exchange, I & R Service		
(58)	Christmans Bureau, and Volunteer Bureau		
(61)	Multi-Problem Family Programs	(64)	Programs Under Other Auspices
(66)	Mean Board Attendance		
(78)	Location of Project Comm.		
(81)	Relation to Chest/Fund Budgeting	(81)	Relation to Chest/Fund Budgeting
(82)	Council has some Responsibility		
(84)	Council Staff Attends Hearings		
(86)	Council Does Budget Studies	(89)	Relation to Public Budgeting
		(96)	Relationship to the Board of Education
		(97)	Percent of time toward Public Agency
<u>50 Variables</u>		<u>45 Variables</u>	

*Q No. refers to the number of the variable in the questionnaire, which is included in the appendix.

TABLE 8.2

THE MATRIX OF EUCLIDIAN DISTANCES BETWEEN TEN LARGE AND ELEVEN SMALL COUNCILS,
AS CALCULATED IN TWO SEPARATE RUNS OF THE LINGOES MAC-II PROGRAM,
99 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Run A*		Run B*										
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Large Councils	1		.27	.28	.41	.39	.40	.24	.28	.32	.44	
	2	.22		.19	.42	.30	.31	.12	.28	.16	.38	
	3	.18	.10		.41	.35	.37	.17	.36	.26	.39	
	4	.54	.51	.51		.44	.37	.40	.44	.44	.35	
	5	.50	.45	.48	.64		.25	.32	.40	.34	.44	
	6	.53	.49	.48	.69	.63		.32	.42	.31	.46	
	7	.20	.13	.12	.53	.46	.50		.29	.17	.35	
	8	.20	.29	.27	.55	.53	.57	.32		.33	.43	
	9	.21	.09	.11	.51	.47	.48	.12	.31		.39	
	10	.53	.50	.51	.66	.68	.70	.49	.54	.51		
		89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99
Small Councils	89		.09	.05	.05	.12	.12	.07	.13	.08	.06	.07
	90	.11		.11	.11	.13	.07	.09	.09	.12	.10	.07
	91	.08	.12		.06	.13	.13	.09	.12	.07	.06	.08
	92	.09	.13	.10		.11	.14	.07	.14	.09	.05	.07
	93	.07	.09	.06	.09		.13	.08	.15	.14	.11	.08
	94	.12	.10	.09	.12	.09		.11	.08	.14	.12	.09
	95	.21	.18	.18	.19	.18	.18		.13	.09	.08	.05
	96	.13	.15	.12	.13	.12	.10	.24		.13	.12	.10
	97	.07	.12	.04	.09	.05	.09	.19	.11		.08	.10
	98	.09	.10	.08	.05	.07	.09	.17	.10	.07		.06
99	.07	.11	.04	.10	.05	.08	.18	.09	.05	.08		
Mean: 1-10, Run A = .34						Mean: 89-99, Run A = .10						
Mean: 1-10, Run B = .42						Mean: 89-99, Run B = .11						
Grand Mean Distance, Run A = .181												
Grand Mean Distance, Run B = .184												

*The figures in the top half of each matrix are the values calculated in Run A, those in the bottom half of the matrix, were calculated in Run B. There was some difference in the variables used in each case.

TABLE 8.3

A DISPLAY OF THE CLUSTER CONSTELLATION FOR EACH OF TWELVE ITERATIONS,
FROM THE LINGOES MAC-II PROGRAM (CLUSTERS OF TWO OR MORE COUNCILS
ONLY ARE REPORTED), 99 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Run A	Run B
<u>Level 1-94 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 1-51 Clusters</u>
2 of 3 Councils	1 of 32 Councils (Mean = .05)*
1 of 5 Councils (Mean = .06)	1 of 8 Councils (Mean = .08)
	2 of 4 Councils (Mean = .07 each)
	1 of 2 Councils
Mean = .188; S.D. = .089**	Mean = .262; S.D. = .148**
<u>Level 2-80 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 2-35 Clusters</u>
1 of 12 Councils (Mean = .07)	1 of 61 Councils (Mean = .06)
1 of 5 Councils (Mean = .06)	1 of 4 Councils (Mean = .10)
1 of 3 Councils	1 of 2 Councils
1 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .198; S.D. = .089	Mean = .318; S.D. = .140
<u>Level 3-66 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 3-29 Clusters</u>
1 of 17 Councils (Mean = .06)	1 of 70 Councils (Mean = .07)
1 of 16 Councils (Mean = .07)	
2 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .216; S.D. = .088	Mean = .351; S.D. = .146
<u>Level 4-54 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 4-24 Clusters</u>
1 of 41 Councils (Mean = .07)	1 of 75 Councils (Mean = .07)
3 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .230; S.D. = .089	Mean = .386; S.D. = .140
<u>Level 5-44 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 5-23 Clusters</u>
1 of 48 Councils (Mean = .07)	1 of 75 Councils (Mean = .07)
2 of 3 Councils	1 of 3 Councils
3 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .240; S.D. = .089	Mean = .393; S.D. = .139

*The mean given in two decimal places, in parentheses, always refers to the intracluster relationship.

**The mean given in 3 decimal places always refers to the average between cluster relationship.

TABLE 8.3 (Concluded)

Run A	Run B
<u>Level 6-37 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 6-19 Clusters</u>
1 of 50 Councils (Mean = .07)	1 of 81 Councils (Mean = .07)
1 of 7 Councils (Mean = .09)	
2 of 3 Councils	
3 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .266; S.D. = .088	Mean = .429; S.D. = .131
<u>Level 7-28 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 7-18 Clusters</u>
1 of 62 Councils (Mean = .08)	1 of 82 Councils (Mean = .07)
1 of 5 Councils (Mean = .11)	
1 of 4 Councils (Mean = .12)	
1 of 3 Councils	
1 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .290; S.D. = .080	Mean = .441; S.D. = .128
<u>Level 8-25 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 8-17 Clusters</u>
1 of 72 Councils (Mean = .07)	1 of 83 Councils (Mean = .08)
1 of 3 Councils	
1 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .306; S.D. = .078	Mean = .448; S.D. = .125
<u>Level 9-23 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 9-15 Clusters</u>
1 of 75 Councils (Mean = .08)	1 of 83 Councils (Mean = .08)
1 of 3 Councils	
1 of 2 Councils	
Mean = .306; S.D. = .076	Mean = .470; S.D. = .122
<u>Level 10-22 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 10-13 Clusters</u>
1 of 76 Councils (Mean = .08)	1 of 87 Councils (Mean = .08)
1 of 3 Councils	
Mean = .319; S.D. = .075	Mean = .497; S.D. = .113
<u>Level 11-20 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 11-12 Clusters</u>
1 of 78 Councils (Mean = .09)	1 of 88 Councils (Mean = .08)
1 of 3 Councils	
Mean = .331; S.D. = .075	Mean = .511; S.D. = .110
<u>Level 12-19 Clusters</u>	<u>Level 12-10 Clusters</u>
1 of 79 Councils (Mean = .09)	1 of 90 Councils (Mean = .09)
1 of 3 Councils	
Mean = .337; S.D. = .067	Mean = .545; S.D. = .097

TABLE 8.4

PERCENT ZEROS IN THE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF SELECTED COUNCIL QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES,
BY COMMUNITY SIZE, 154 WELFARE COUNCILS, 1963

Variables	Community Size						Total
	Less than 100,000	100,000 199,999	200,000 499,999	500,000- 999,999	1,000,000+		
<u>Size</u>							
(2) Total Regular	33	15	02	03	00	09	
(4) Special	71	92	75	60	10	67	
(108) <u>Total Income</u>	00	00	00	00	00	00	
(109) <u>Primary</u>	00	00	02	00	00	00	
(110) <u>Secondary</u>	85	58	65	42	00	53	
<u>Board</u>							
(111) Welfare and Health	19	15	14	27	05	16	
(112) Public Administration	14	12	14	15	15	14	
(113) Higher Education	57	35	46	39	20	40	
(114) Religious	09	33	17	24	00	14	
(115) Business and Industry	04	07	02	00	00	03	
(116) Labor	76	69	58	27	00	49	
(117) Misc. Professional	04	07	02	00	00	03	
(118) Media	57	56	53	42	30	49	
(119) Elected Public Official	71	84	60	67	45	67	
<u>Task Structure</u>							
(6) Exec., Admin. and Planning	25	15	02	03	00	08	
(7) Information and Referral	95	100	75	54	25	73	
(10) Research	90	97	80	54	20	73	
(12) Public Relations	95	89	87	81	60	85	
(8) Volunteer Bureau	95	94	87	54	50	90	
(11) Budget	95	97	90	81	85	92	
(9) Social Service Exchange	95	97	87	96	80	92	

TABLE 8.4 (Concluded)

Variables	Community Size						DK*
	Less than 100,000	100,000 199,999	200,000 499,999	500,000- 999,999	1,000,000+	Total	
<u>Training Structure</u>							
(18) Masters of Social Work	28	38	19	09	00	24	11
(21) College Graduate	61	76	68	42	30	59	11
(19) Master of Arts	66	79	80	39	25	61	11
(20) One year Social Work	66	79	80	57	65	71	11
(22) Noncollege Graduate	57	79	82	64	65	72	11
(15) Doctor of Social Work	66	84	95	84	70	83	11
(16) Doctor of Philosophy-							
Masters of Social Work	66	82	97	84	90	85	11
(17) Doctor of Philosophy	66	84	95	78	80	83	11
<u>Selected Activities</u>							
(124) Indigent Services	42	43	14	12	05	24	
(125) Chronic Illness	42	28	19	24	10	24	
(126) Rehabilitation	33	25	12	18	05	18	
(127) Service for Special Groups	33	25	19	18	00	20	
(128) Agency Service	42	41	31	12	10	28	
(52) Legislative (Give Information)	42	46	39	18	05	32	
(53) Legislative (Take Position)	42	48	46	21	20	37	
(54) Legislative (Attend Hearings)	52	57	49	42	25	45	
(62) Programs Under Other Auspices	14	10	07	03	00	06	

*The DK's were assigned the grand mean as a value.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Recapitulation

When we originally defined the broker organization, we used as one of the important variables the degree of authoritative mandate which the organization possessed.* It appears, however, that there are two dimensions to this variable which we might separate for purposes of interpreting the results. The authority dimension is legitimacy, and the mandate dimension is mission and role, or task. Often interrelated, the dimensions can be separated. There can be legitimation for an unclear task, as when Congress instructs the President to "insure the economic stability of the Country..." On the other hand, the mission and role of an organization may be quite explicit even if it has no legitimacy at all, as obtains with organized crime in the United States.

Typically, the system will provide an organization with one or the other. Thus, when an organization is asked to undertake a task which is vague and unclear, it often has clear and unquestionable legitimacy, as have the courts in dispensing "justice," and the schools in "education." Colleges and Universities, for example have little guide to the "proper" curriculum to produce the "educated man." However, they have the legitimacy to develop their own educational programme, a legitimacy which has itself become institutionalized in norms of "tenure" and "academic freedom." Councils, on the other hand, are relatively unique in that they must cope with both questionable legitimacy and a vague mission and role.

*See Chapter I.

In the first chapter of this report, we argued that the Council would live a life of organizational uncertainty because of the questionable legitimacy and problematic mission and role. We predicted that an essential characteristic of the Council would be its attempt to (1) prepare itself, insofar as possible, for this uncertainty. Additionally, we expected that the Council would: (2) attempt to tie into the local power structure; (3) widen the base of financial support beyond the Chest; (4) develop a flexible organizational structure; (5) try to "sell" to the community a conception of mission and role developed by the Council itself; and (6) use a profession as a means of defining mission and role.*

Throughout the study, we have been able to show a patterning and uniformity, a pattern which confirms each of these expectations. Underlying these and other expectations, and hence, underlying the organization of Council structure, resources, and activities, are the notions of the degree of legitimacy and the specificity of mission and role. Councils must continually face the task of developing their legitimacy, and specifying their mission and role. A review of the mechanisms used for this purpose provides a framework upon which to hang the specific findings of this study.

Mechanisms for Developing Legitimacy

Funding

In America, if you can get paid for doing something, then it is probably "worth doing." "Worth" comes from the implicit assumption of competition for funds, and the implicit assumption that a payment of funds represents a positive evaluation by the purchaser. Hence, funding is not only an important fluid resource, but serves a legitimating function as well.

*The five expectations are listed on pages 11-12.

Council funds are supplied from two main sources (Tables 3.1 and 3.4). The first, and primary source, is the local Chest/Fund. Overall, the Councils represented in this study received 88% of their total income in 1963 from the Chest/Fund. (Table 7.2) With such great financial dependence upon the Chest/Fund, one might expect that the Council would be closely identified with it. At least in a structural sense, this is the case, because 47% of the Councils were either merged or partially merged with the local Chest/Fund (Table 4.3).

The secondary and subdominant source of income, but of importance for wider legitimacy, is the money from local public and foundation sources. Amounting to 12% overall, this support varies by the size of the community. In communities under 100,000 Councils receive only 4% of their funds from this source; in communities over 1,000,000, 25% of the income comes from this source. It appears therefore that Councils in the larger communities have a somewhat wider legitimacy, as implied by their relatively greater success in obtaining funds from sources other than the Chest/Fund. On the other hand, Councils in the smaller communities have a narrower legitimacy focused on the Chest/Fund.

The Board of Directors

Perhaps more important for purposes of legitimacy development than funding is the board of directors. The board is a "nonfluid" resource which brings the prestige and status of community leaders to the Council. There is an overall consistency to the occupational distribution of board members which suggests that the Council uses some common guidelines in their appointment. People from business and industrial occupations have the highest representation (35%). Next come local professionals (24%), welfare and health (11%), and people from public administration (7%) (Table 1.1). Data

manipulations with various community characteristics fail to substantially alter this distribution (Figure 7.3; Tables 7.5a, 7.5b, and 7.6).

Among the occupational classifications themselves, however, two clusters appeared with relative distinction. In one cluster were business and industry, labor, media, local professionals, and elected public officials. In the other cluster were welfare and health occupations, public administration, higher education, and religious. When the proportions of one cluster increased, the proportions of occupations in the other cluster decreased, but the changes were not sufficient to alter the overall common format. Board power, or the proportion of top community leaders, was associated with the business and industry ("entrepreneurial board") cluster as opposed to the welfare and health ("service board") cluster (Table 3.2).

Overall, it is clear that the Council seeks community-wide legitimacy through the involvement of prestigious locals. Business people and local professionals are especially important. However, as a welfare organization, the Council needs to have people from that area on the board as well. Some Councils have relatively more professional legitimation, while others have relatively more local business leader legitimation. All have some of each.

The Profession of Social Work

Professions typically have two important dimensions to their structure. One dimension is methods and skills. A second dimension is their domain, or substantive area of interest. In this particular case, the Council uses the method aspect to develop legitimacy, and the substantive aspect to define mission and role.

The Council relies heavily on the social work profession as a source of staff. Approximately 2/3 of the overall staff, and 80% of the executive directors, have the Masters of Social Work Degree. That portion of the

social work profession which generally staffs Councils is called community organization. There are some specific aspects about community organization technology which help the Council cope with the problems of dubious legitimacy.

Consensus Methodology.—Community organization as used in Councils tends to emphasize a consensus and integrative approach, rather than a conflict-oriented approach. Given the methodology, Councils are more likely to undertake programs where there is a greater possibility of securing agreement, and less likely to undertake controversial programs. In short, if we rank activities by their degree of risk, we should find that the Council undertakes them in roughly inverse proportion to the risk (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). We can establish a risk hierarchy, and find mild support for the inverse pattern of activity assumption. Thus the Council is restricted by the methodology to certain activity areas where it will work. This means that the Council remains away from highly contested areas, except as a peacemaker. The role of a noncontroversial mediator almost always has some degree of legitimacy.

Citizen Participation.—Community organization technology instructs that citizens should be involved in planning and coordination which affects them. One level of involvement is, of course, the board of directors. However, the Council also involves people on a less exalted level. In 1963, those Councils which kept records (N=80) of their total committee participation (unduplicated count) reported an average of 285 persons serving in this capacity.* This kind of citizen involvement and ratification provides legitimacy.

*This finding was not reported in the text because of the low N of response on this particular question. It can suffice here as an illustrative figure, however, even though it could not have been included in the correlation analysis.

Voluntary Compliance.—Once a course of action has been decided upon, and recommendations made, the Council relies on the good will of the people affected by the recommendation as a motive force for implementation. Typically, some of the most important people involved would have been members of the citizens' committee structure just mentioned. Community organization technology argues that their participation in the study process builds commitment over time, and will produce agreement on a common set of recommendations, and a willingness to implement them in their own sphere.

It is perhaps because of the reliance on voluntary compliance that the Council apparently does not move in a strong way to implement its recommendations. Overall, 22% of the Councils reported that they had taken "action to implement recommendations" (or more) steps for the problem-focused activities (Table 5.2). The Council thinks that implementation occurs on an individual basis. Unfortunately, too often nothing happens, and the Council develops a reputation for lack of effectiveness.

Still, voluntary compliance is a mechanism for developing legitimacy. The voluntary aspect, like citizen participation and consensus, produces the legitimacy of assent. People can hardly complain about a program if they have participated in planning it. Further, this methodology prevents attack from external organizations. If the Council moves to implement itself, it becomes the target of criticism.

The Selection of Council Activities*

The mechanisms of legitimacy development mentioned so far are general ones, which pertain to the whole organization, and cut across any and all activities. However, as the Council charts a course of organizational action

*Some mechanisms, and especially those in the area of activities, serve at once to develop legitimacy and define mission and role. In this respect, they could be located under either set of mechanisms.

in the community, it must be especially aware of the problems of legitimacy in relationship to the types and nature of the specific activities it selects. While there are doubtless many demands for the Council to do this or that, it has no clear authority to work in any specific area. Hence, as we look at the activities, we can see how they are designed to protect the Council from attack and build legitimacy, as well as to give service.

Common Services.—One kind of activity pursued by the Council is the so-called "common service" to local social agencies. The Information and Referral Service, the Volunteer Bureau, and the Social Service Exchange are all examples. These are certainly not the primary activities of the Council, and they occupy a subdominant position on the task hierarchy (Table 4.1). And, there is a serious question, especially with the Social Service Exchange, whether or not the agencies want the service. The Exchange occupies the lowest position in the task hierarchy, which means that it has very few people assigned to it. Nonetheless, the strategy of common service is one of legitimacy development. It involves being helpful, and ideally at least, providing information which no single agency alone could possess.

The Study Request.*—A second very important strategy that the Council uses in developing its activities is "the request." Another organization will request the Council to become involved or participate in a study of some other activity. Since the request comes from outside the organization, the Council can feel that it is responding to "legitimate demands." For example, the Chest frequently invites the Council to participate in the budgeting process for the private agencies, and 85% of the Councils enjoy such participation. Less frequently the Council is invited to participate in the budgeting process of public agencies, and 36% of the Councils do this

*The notion of the "study request" is based on the researcher's general knowledge of the Council, and, as can be seen, is only tangentially supported by available data, since they were not designed to look at the request mechanism.

(Table 5.2). In the program area of "problem-focused activities," we can assume that many of the actual programs were carried out on the basis of a request of the Council by some other organization, although we do have specific data on the ratio of request projects to Council initiated ones.

The request mechanism is logical, however, when viewed in tandem with the large proportion of staff assigned to a general, nonspecific task category. It is through this mechanism that the community can, if it wishes, guide the Council's program, since the planning staff are not locked into any particular functional area (Chapter IV). Thus, it is at once a mechanism for developing legitimacy and specifying mission and role.

The Style of Definition: "Problem-Focused Activities.—One important area of concern for Councils is the nature of the domains of other organizations in the community. Because of its ambiguous status, the Council wishes to avoid confrontations with other organizations over problems of domain, as the Council is not unlikely to lose such engagements. When the Council is requested to make a study of a particular area of service, or initiates such a study itself, it often attempts to "define the problem" in such a way as to crosscut the domains of extant agencies. Typically, a short term rather than a long term project is undertaken. Because of the partial relationship of any particular agency to the problem, and because of the short term nature of Council involvement, it is difficult for opposition to arise.* And, if the study process actually results in an improvement, then some of the credit goes to the Council. It was in fact, in order to be free to engage in this type of activity, that Council wished to divest itself of the divisional structure (Chapter IV) and, for Councils which still have the divisional structure, the reason why they evade it.

*Disagreement is not unlikely in the initial stages, as various organizations vie for the prestige of being "requested" to do a particular task.

The data revealed a substantive clustering of programs which appeared to avoid any specific organizational domain.* The areas were: Indigent, Chronic Illness, Mental and Physical Rehabilitation, Services for Special Groups, and Agency Development. All except the last are substantive areas which are the clear domain of no particular organization. Indigent has many different types of organizations in it. Rehabilitation and Chronic Illness require many different types of medical and paramedical organizations to treat. Agency Development is the study of particular agencies, and, as such, does not crosscut agencies. But the domain belongs to no special organization. In short, the Council develops legitimacy by using a certain definition of mission and role, viz., to work in interstitial areas. This kind of mission and role carries legitimacy with it, and relatively few risks of controversy, compared with working directly in the domain of another organization.

Organizational Relationships.—A final strategy used by the Council in its search for legitimacy is to develop relationships over time with other organizations. Such relationships are not unlikely to produce "study requests" from time to time. And the relationship itself is often one which builds mutual respect. To this end, Councils cooperate with other organizations—93% participate in some program under other auspices, and 49% participate in 4 or more such programs** (Table 5.2). Councils participate in the budgetary process of both public and private agencies, although they are more extensively involved in the latter than the former. They engage in

*The clustering was of course based upon the original set of activity categories in the questionnaire. However, their organization in the questionnaire, different from the one here, does not suggest this interstitial aspect, but merely the traditional Council-type coding. As a result of the analysis of the matrix, we arrived at a new dimension of these activities.

**Though "typically" under other auspices, on occasion such programs may be under the leadership of the Council itself.

legislative activities (often, this activity is more through the executive department than the actual legislature). The Council hopes that the reputation it builds in these activities will help to solidify its position in the community.

Mechanisms for Defining Mission and Role

The development of organizational legitimacy does not, per se, provide substantive direction for the Council, although it may help. The Council must seek to define its area of interest in some substantive way. There is not only internal pressure from Council staff for such definition, but other organizations desire it of the Council, so that they can locate the Council somewhere in their own calculus. In short, the Council needs to specify, for itself and the community, what it is going to do when it goes about "planning and coordination." Like the development of legitimacy, the development of a clarified mission and role is an ongoing job for the Council. It employs several mechanisms.

The Profession of Social Work (Chapter IV)

The profession is useful here in its substantive, rather than its technological aspect. Generally speaking, the Council uses the substantive interests of the profession to broadly define its domain. Certainly the domain includes social work agencies, and places which employ social workers as adjunct staff. In addition, it includes the broad area of "social problems" to which welfare types of services have been traditionally relevant—delinquency, unmarried mothers, etc., etc. However, within this broad area there is still considerable flexibility.

Organizational Generalization

In the assignment of personnel to tasks, the Council uses a rule of generality. The most persons are assigned to the least specific task category, and so on, with the fewest persons being assigned to the most specific task category. The Council seeks in a structural way to leave itself open to receive "requests for studies" from various external agencies (Chapter IV). However, the mechanism is not a general one, because the staff are professional social workers, and so the "freedom" of assignment has at least a professional constraint upon it. Further, in Councils with very small staffs, this structural arrangement is not likely to be too efficacious, because of the limited amount of work a small staff can handle. Nonetheless, the structural freedom to take on diverse tasks is one way of specifying mission and role.

Local Organizational Experience.—There is some indication in the data, though mild, that the Councils are a little more likely to develop programs in areas in which they already have programs than in other areas (Table 5.1, Chapter V). The fact that the large number (22) of problem-focused activities clustered into five main "types" implies this. This should not be unexpected, however. When the Council is structurally open, it will receive a variety of requests. Over time, it will doubtless come to be identified in particular areas, and will receive and act upon more requests in that particular area. This process of specification might be a conscious one on the part of the Council, or it might occur spontaneously, without manipulation by the Council. In either case, it is a means by which the mission and role may be specified.

Colleague Guidance—The National Association*

A special analysis of a subsample of 99 Councils (Chapter VIII) which compares the Councils to each other as total units reveals that the large majority of Councils are quite similar to each other, with a small group, perhaps 10-20%, being different from the main group and from each other. Such overall similarity suggests that the Council must receive guidance from some common source. The most likely source, at this moment, is the United Community Funds and Councils of America, the national association of Councils. This organization can help the individual Council specify its mission and role through reporting to it what other Councils have done in the past and are doing at the moment. For an organization in an uncertain situation, such guidance may be very helpful, and, indeed, it appears that many Councils follow it.

Two Role Styles

When we first defined the Council as a broker organization, we predicted that it would be highly receptive to the local community. On the basis of the evidence reviewed, we must now specify that prediction somewhat more precisely. We might call these styles categoric and corporate.** Their rela-

*Specifically, the United Community Funds and Councils provides a large amount of information. The Social Work library at The University of Michigan School of Social Work had, in 1967, 53 separate titles published by this organization. And to underscore the more or less "official" nature of these publications, it should be noted that none of them have any specific author, other than The United Community Funds and Councils of America. Hence the publication is clearly an expression of corporate, rather than individual, opinion. The titles cover many subjects. For example, there are manuals on budgeting, accounting, forming a Chest/Council in a small community. One publication, entitled "Miracles Every Other Tuesday" provides answers to the question "What do community Welfare Councils do?" One should not, however, take the title of the publication as itself a definition of Council activity.

**The terms originated with Hawley. See Amos H. Hawley, Human Ecology, op. cit.

tionship to legitimacy and mission and role may be seen in Figure 9.1.

FIGURE 9.1. COUNCIL ARTICULATION WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY, IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE LOCAL OR NONLOCAL SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY AND LOCAL OR NONLOCAL DEFINITION OF MISSION AND ROLE.

<u>Source of Legitimacy</u>	<u>Definition of Mission and Role</u>	
	<u>Local</u>	<u>Nonlocal</u>
Local	<u>Corporate</u> Large Council (10+ Staff)	<u>Categoric</u> Small Council (less than 10 Staff)
Nonlocal	X	X

The categoric mode of articulation is the one evidenced by the majority of Councils. Generally speaking, the Councils are quite similar from community-to-community, despite community differences. We have concluded that they must receive a definition of mission and role from extra-community sources, in this case, the national association and the social work profession. Still, they must be locally legitimated, and for this reason we see some adjustments in the mechanisms of legitimacy, chiefly in the board of directors. But even here, the adjustment is somewhat less than one would expect. The term categoric is used because these different organizations all fall into the same category.

Alternatively a few Councils, those with more than 10 staff, exhibit a corporate adjustment to the community. They are not only locally legitimated, but also receive much of their definition of mission and role from the local situation. Each has a unique combination of Council characteristics, a combination which we can only assume is articulated with the local situation. We have hypothesized (Chapter VIII) that their uniqueness derives from the fact that their internal organization is designed to facilitate and reflect the specialized role they play in the local community division of labor.

This hypothesis cannot be tested without data on other organizations in the local community, and some measures of the degree and kind of division of labor among them.

In sum, the larger Council is able to articulate itself in various ways with the local community division of labor. The smaller Council finds this role a difficult one to play, and borrows a definition of mission and role from the national definition and applies it locally. Despite local adjustments, many Councils wind up looking quite similar. Thus, community receptivity is high only if the Council receives both legitimacy and mission and role from local sources. If there are alternative sources of mission and role definition, the smaller organization is likely to find this source more appealing, especially as it does not have a staff of sufficient size to really develop a unique community articulation.

Continuities in Organizational Analysis

Sociological studies are rarely exactly the same. This fact, however, does not prevent the accumulation of findings and theories over time, as concepts and variables are tested from a variety of perspectives. It is incumbent upon the researcher, however, to make some of the relevant connections. Having developed an intensive analysis of the Council permits us to make some comment on related efforts in the field of organizational analysis.

Importance of Early Commitments.—In Leadership in Administration, Selznick emphasizes the importance of the early commitments which organizations make.* These commitments are organizational transactions, in which the formal organization assumes a certain posture of policy and selects a certain staff in exchange for a certain support. The Council was developed by the

*Selznick, Leadership in Administration, op. cit.

private social agencies in this country early in the century. Our data reveal that today it remains dominated by the social work profession, and has a decided preference for dealing with private agencies, as opposed to public agencies. We thus support Selznick's line of argument.*

The Nature of Organizational Goals.—There has recently been some debate in the literature concerning the efficacy and importance of goals to an organization. Some writers prefer to use goals as a point of departure in organizational analyses, like Parsons and Sills.** Others argue that goals are varied, and difficult to work with, like Etzioni and Perrow.*** This study of Welfare Councils and communities suggests two points. The first is that the notion of organizational goal (or mission and role, to be more precise) is an essential one to organizational analysis. One cannot really talk about an organization as a system apart from the ends of that system. Etzioni's attempt to finesse the notion of goals provides a nice illustration of the point. Dismissing organizational goals, he substitutes a "system model," and urges analysts to look for the "optimal organization of the system."**** One must then ask, "Optimal for what?"

The second point is that the debate around organizational goals has missed one crucial dimension. Analysts have discussed manifest and latent goals, system and personal goals, task and maintenance goals, etc., apparently with the assumptions that these goals were an invariant unit. This

*This does not deny, of course, that changes do and have occurred over time in the Council. The movement away from the divisional structure which we mentioned earlier is just one case in point.

**Talcott Parsons, "Some Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations" in Etzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit.; David Sills, "The Succession of Goals," ibid.

***Amati Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis..." Administrative Science Quarterly 5,2 (September, 1960); Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," American Sociological Review, 26,6 (December, 1961).

***Etzioni, "Two Approaches..." op. cit.

study suggests, on the contrary, that goals should be seen on a continuum from very specific to very vague. If the Council behavior is any indicator, organizations with vague goals spend a considerable amount of time attempting to specify them more concretely. Thus, specificity of mission and role is an important dimension of goal analysis.

"Precarious Values."*—In his article on "Organizational Adaptation to Precarious Values," Burton Clark argues that the lack of community support for adult education led it into an "enrollment economy." An enrollment economy is one in which the community people choose or direct the organization through enrolling, or "signing up" for various organizational activities. This study suggests some additions to Clark's work. We can now see that "precarious values" may be more specifically defined as a case of questionable legitimacy or a lack of specificity of mission and role. Further, the notion of an "enrollment economy," similar to the Council mechanism of voluntary compliance, is doubtless but one of the mechanisms used by the adult education program to protect itself. We can, however, confirm the central notion implicit in Clark's argument—that a questionable legitimacy and/or vague mission and role results in the adoption, by the organization, of specific mechanisms to help the organization preserve itself under conditions of uncertainty.

Implications for Further Research

For ease in presentation and comprehension, these implications are best displayed in propositional form:

*Clark, "Organizational Adaptation..." in Etzioni, Complex Organizations, op. cit.

Legitimacy and Mission and Role (Mandate)

1. The more questionable the legitimacy of an organization, the less differentiated will be the organization's structure.
2. The less specific the organization's mandate, the less differentiated will be the organization's structure.
3. In general, organizations with value mandates and questionable legitimacy will require a larger absolute size before internal differentiation occurs than organizations with a specific mandate, or clear legitimacy, or both.
4. The less specific the mandate, the less precise will be the technology available to the organization, regardless of legitimacy.
5. The more questionable the legitimacy, and the less specific the mandate, the more likely the organization will be to hire "professionals," either formally or conventionally qualified.
6. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mandate, the more likely the organization will be to adopt some prepackaged interpretation of the mandate.
7. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mission and role, the more likely the organization will be to involve citizen and client groups in a participant/advisory capacity (the classic case of this is democracy itself).
8. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mission and role, the more likely the organization is to avoid risky activities.
9. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mandate, the more likely the organization is to develop a consensus methodology.

10. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mandate, the more likely the organization will be to work in interstitial areas, which are not explicitly claimed by other organizations.

11. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mandate, the more likely the organization will be to evidence concern about providing structured means of access to the organization.

12. The more questionable the legitimacy and the less specific the mission and role, the more the organization is likely to be coopted by key financial sources.

The Broker Organization

13. Organizations with neither clear legitimacy nor specific mandate tend to develop into "broker organizations," amassing power, legitimacy and role specificity over time from generalized sources and applying them to the solution of specific problems as these problems are brought to the attention of the organization.

14. Small broker organizations in the same general class (e.g., Welfare Councils, or Councils of Churches) are likely to be similar; larger broker organizations are likely to be unique.

15. As a broker organization becomes larger and more specialized and differentiated, it will seek a special niche in the community which articulates with the local interorganizational division of labor; and specifically its own internal division of labor will be such as to facilitate this role.

16. Since a broker organization acts as a generalized "power bank" it helps create the top leadership game, in order to enhance its own functioning.

17. If a broker organization comes into conflict with an organization of greater legitimacy or more specific mandate, it is likely to lose.

Implications for Policy

As we draw general conclusions from the study, those in the employ of local broker organizations generally, and Councils particularly, will doubtless be interested in the implications relevant to their particular tasks. In providing a brief comment in this area, we urge that two explicit cautions be kept in mind. First, this study was not approached from the viewpoint of shedding light on policy questions as such. Hence, policy implications are tenuous and, as always, judgmental in character. Second, we appreciate the fact that, in a brief conclusion, we cannot do justice to the complexity of events as seen from the viewpoint of practitioners. The conclusions are merely general ones, which will serve a heuristic, rather than a definitive, function.

The Modes of Local Welfare Coordination

There is little question that there is a place and a need in today's community for local coordinative and planning efforts. Roland Warren has pointed out how the vertical, or external, influences on communities tend to overshadow the local internal, or horizontal, influences. One may indeed wonder if the community is not fast becoming merely a locus for hundreds of field offices for national and business concerns.* Indeed, the Council itself appears to be heavily influenced by extracommunity organizations. Thus, the potential role that a local organization could play, in terms of local coordination and planning, is potentially a great one. As

*Indeed, so vast is the Federal Government effort in local communities that no one knows even the possible Federal programs available, no less what the Federal Government may actually be undertaking in a particular community. On the notion of a local vs. external influence, see Roland Warren, The Community in America, op. cit.

local communities seem to be quite unique in the manner in which the various community characteristics combine together, an organization which can sense the nature of local uniqueness and help to articulate the efforts of public service agencies with it fulfills an important function. There is not, however, only one organizational model appropriate to this kind of functioning. In this study we have implicitly identified two possible models at least—the functional specialist and the community generalist.

The Functional Specialist

This organizational model takes as its point of departure some substantive area in which it has substantive knowledge—like race relations, urban renewal, health, etc. The organization focuses on planning and coordination on an intrasystem basis, that is, within the group of organizations in its substantive area. It may come to be regarded as the "peak" and "spokesman" organization for the particular subsystem. Typically, it will be staffed by "professionals" who know the substantive area. Its financial support is likely to come from enrollment, in that agencies and organizations in its field pay dues or memberships to it. The criteria of evaluation which it uses is professional competence. Its legitimacy is derived from its member organizations, and its mission and role is to professionalize and upgrade the functional subsystem with particular reference to local community conditions. These organizations are likely to be similar from community-to-community.

The Community Generalist

An organization which follows the community generalist pattern differs in important respects from the functional specialist pattern. It offers no particular functional or substantive identification. Its forte is "organi-

zation," or the ability to bring many different types of people together around common problems. Typically, it focuses upon intersystem planning and coordination, using an interdisciplinary staff. Its clientele is the community-at-large, rather than a particular functional subsystem. As such, the community generalist organization is likely to be quite unique in each community. It is supported by the community in general, and is " beholden " to no single funding source. Its criteria of success is a local one—the proportion of projects which it has successfully completed.

The Council

This study would suggest that most Councils play the functional specialist role, while a minority play the community generalist role. Even the Council names are different. The former may still be called a "Council of Social Agencies" while the latter may be simply called a "Community Council." However, the central issue before the Councils today is not where they have been, but where they are going. On the one hand, they can remain identified with the social work profession, and with social work agencies. In this case, the Council would be playing the role of functional specialist. This role is likely to decline in prestige in the community as the field of social welfare continues to expand in non-social work arenas. On the other hand, the Council may move in the direction of Community generalist.*

*Professor Rothman has suggested that there may be two continua which define Council work—one moves from coordinating to planning, and the second moves from narrow to broad scope. These two variables would yield the following four fold table:

	<u>Coordinating</u>	<u>Planning</u>
<u>Narrow Scope</u>	Functional Specialist	
<u>Broad Scope</u>		Community Generalist

In this scheme, the two "types" we have suggested appear as optimal types, and it points out two possible deviant types as well.

There is no way of deciding which role the Council should prefer. Part of the decision for any particular Council will depend on what else has developed in that particular community. It may be that there is already an organization which plays a generalist role, in which case it would be a difficult role for the Council to assume. Some people in the Council field would argue that this role is not the Council "as we knew it," and they are right. It is larger, more diversified in staff, less focused on social work agencies, and receives money from a variety of local sources. It is a new Council.

In the opinion of this researcher, the generalist role is the appropriate one. When Councils first developed, private social agencies were the only agencies in the field, and the Council had a relatively preeminent position among them. Today, as the public agencies and the public funds come to dominate the welfare field, the voluntary agencies are taking an unaccustomed back seat, and the Council is no longer in a central position. Some Councils have tried to move with the changing situation and changing structure, by changing themselves. Others have generally retained the traditional Council of Social Agencies mode of orientation. The traditional role will be increasingly difficult for the small Council to maintain, as it becomes increasingly difficult for the small private agency to "coordinate" a multi-million dollar public agency. However, the voluntary agency can, and in our opinion should, play the role of community generalist. The question now is, "Can Councils free themselves sufficiently from their past to make the change?"

APPENDIX I

THE QUESTIONNAIRE AND CODE BOOK, WITH EXTRA VARIABLES SEPARATELY NUMBERED

COMMUNITY HEALTH AND WELFARE COUNCILS
Annual Report, Calendar Year 1963

Deck 1 - Blank

2-4 - Study I.D.

5 - Deck 1

6 - Size group

7-8 - Community I.D.

A. Identifying Information

Community: _____ State or Province: _____

Name of Council: _____ Executive: _____

(1)* 9-12# Estimated population of Council area (midyear 1963) (to nearest 1000): _____

Area covered: Please list below, as precisely as possible, the geographical area covered by your Council. The intent here is to permit accurate examination of census data applying to your area, so your description if possible should be in terms of units—whole counties, various political subdivisions of counties, or whole counties minus various political subdivisions—which can be identified by census reports.

B. Staff (as of October 1, 1963)

1. Number of staff and staff positions (excluding special consultants, who are to be reported in item 4.).

Return to Research and Statistics Division, United Community Funds
and Councils of America by May 15, 1964

#Plain numbers refer to columns on the IBM cards.

*Numbers in () refer to variable numbers. They run from 1-108 on the questionnaire.

Regular staff complement refers to those staff who fill permanent positions and who would continue to be employed in the absence of special projects, even though they may be utilized currently on special projects. Special project augmentation refers to staff added in order to carry out special projects.

For each staff level "persons" refers to the number of different persons actually employed as of October 1. "Equivalent full-time," under "actually employed," represents a conversion of the figure reported under "persons" so that, for example, two employees, each of whom devoted half time to the Council, would be counted together as one full-time staff. "Vacancies—equivalent full-time" refers to staff positions authorized but not filled as of October 1, converted to equivalent full-time to permit addition to the corresponding figure for staff actually employed.

Only individuals carrying executive and professional responsibility should be reported as executive and professional. This distinction may be relevant, for example, in some central services such as the social service exchange, where, depending upon the community, the position may require either professional or high grade clerical performance.

			<u>Actually employed</u>		<u>Vacancies</u>
			<u>Persons</u>	<u>Equivalent full-time</u>	<u>equivalent full-time</u>
a. Regular staff complement					
(2) 13-15	(1) Executive and professional		X	0.0	0.0
(3) 16-17	(2) Secretarial and clerical		X	X	X
	(3) Other		X	X	X
b. Special project augmentation					
(4) 18-20	(1) Executive and professional		X	0.0	0.0
(5) 21-22	(2) Secretarial and clerical		X	X	X
	(3) Other		X	X	X

2. Regular executive and professional staff assignments

This applies only to staff and staff positions reported in 1a (1) above. "Actually employed" and "vacancies" are to be reported separately, both being reported on an equivalent full-time basis so the column totals are to the same as the entries in the second and third columns of line a (1) of item 1 above.

"Budget specialists" should be reported as such only if they devote at least half time to the budgeting process throughout the year. Otherwise their budgeting activity would be included under "executive, administrative, and planning."

An individual whose time is distributed among several categories, e.g., "information and referral" and "social service exchange," should be divided among the appropriate categories on the basis of a reasonable estimate.

			<u>Equivalent full-time</u>	
			<u>Actually</u>	<u>Vacancies</u>
			<u>employed</u>	
(6)	23-25	(1) Executive, administrative, and planning	0.0	→ 41-42 (14)
(7)	26-27	(2) Information and referral	0.0	X
(8)	28-29	(3) Volunteer bureau	0.0	X
(9)	30-31	(4) Social service exchange	0.0	X
(10)	32-33	(5) Research	0.0	X
(11)	34-35	(6) Budget specialists	0.0	X
(12)	36-37	(7) Public relations	0.0	X
(13)	38-40	(8) Other (specify)	0.0	X
(14)	41-42			
Total			X	X

3. a. Formal education of regular executive and professional staff actually employed.

This applies only to staff reported on line a (1) of item 1. Each staff member should be reported only in the "number of persons" column, according to the highest formal educational category he attained. "Number of persons" should be converted to "equivalent full time" in the second column. The column totals should agree with the entries in the first and second columns of line a (1) of item 1.

			<u>Number of</u>	<u>Equivalent</u>
			<u>persons</u>	<u>full-time</u>
(15)	43	(1) Doctorate in social work	X	0-9
(16)	44	(2) Other doctorate, and master's in social work	X	0-9
(17)	45	(3) Other doctorate, no master's in social work	X	0-9
(18)	46-47	(4) Master's in social work	X	00-99
(19)	48	(5) Other master's degree	X	0-9
(20)	49	(6) At least one year graduate study in social work	X	0-9
(21)	50-51	(7) College graduate	X	00-99
(22)	52	(8) Not college graduate	X	0-9
Total			X	X

b. Indicate the formal education level of the council executive by entering in this space, (23) 53, the figure (1 to 8) which appears before the appropriate category in the listing above.

c. Enter below the number of persons on your staff, reported in item 3a above, who hold either a master's degree or a doctorate in public health.

	<u>Number</u>
Doctorate in public health	X
Master's but no doctorate	X

4. Special consultants during 1963.

For this report a special consultant is considered an individual employed by the council to provide technical advice and assistance in a specialized content area, usually in connection with a survey or a special project, and frequently on a per-day basis for compensation. Consultation provided without charge, for example by UCFA or other agencies such as the Child Welfare League of America, or by local agency executives, should not be counted.

The number of persons actually utilized as such consultants during the calendar year 1963, and an estimate of the total number of days consultation provided during 1963 by all these consultants taken together, should be reported:

(24)	54	Number of individual consultants	_____
(25)	55-56	Number of days of consultation	_____

C. Council Budget

5. Income for 1963

List actual income by source, for the calendar year 1963 below:

(Use estimates if necessary, if fiscal year does not coincide with the calendar year.)

Deck 1 - Blank
 2-4 - Study I.D.
 5 - Deck 3
 6-8 - City I.D.

		<u>Amount</u>
a. From Chest or United Fund		
(98)	9-14 (1) For general operating purposes	\$000,000
(99)	15-19 (2) For special projects or research	00,000
b. From public (tax) funds		
(100)	20-24 (1) For general operating expenses	00,000
(101)	25-30 (2) For special projects or research	000,000
(102)	31-36 (3) Fees for service (e.g., social service exchange)	000,000

Amount

c. From foundations

(103)	37-41	(1) For general operating purposes	\$ 00,000
(104)	42-47	(2) For special projects or research	000,000

d. From all other sources (specify kind of source)

(105)	48-52	(1) For general operating purposes	00,000
(106)	53-57	(2) For special projects or research	00,000
(107)	58-62	(3) Fees for service	00,000
(108)	63-68	Total	000,000

End of Deck 3

D. Council Program Activity

6. Planning and action in selected program areas

Report council activity during the year, for each of the subjects listed, by placing a check mark in each appropriate column. If a single council project covers more than one program subject, check each subject for which there was a major focus. Place checks in all appropriate columns. Activities sponsored jointly by the council and another agency or organization should be reported only if staffed by the council.

Note that the topics below do not include all problems with which councils may deal. In particular, do not include preparation of financial or service data for budget committees, priorities studies, or strictly administrative studies of agencies. These will be covered in subsequent sections.

The following definitions of activity apply:

General education activity: This includes forums, educational events, talks to community groups, distribution of literature, newspaper articles, radio or TV programs, and similar activity, where the purpose is primarily to further public interest in and increase public knowledge about a topic rather than to mobilize support for a specific course of action. Instances where the topic was merely alluded to or diffused with other topics should not be included.

Problem consideration: This includes staff or committee activity aimed toward (1) examination or definition of a problem with a view to attempting to work out an appropriate solution, and/or (2) efforts to develop a solution to the problem. To be included here the topic must have been accepted, by the board, executive committee, or similar body, or by an administrative decision, as a focus of Council problem-solving activity. Mere exploration prior to such acceptance is not sufficient. The crucial point is that the Council expects to act on the problem, once it has been defined and a proper solution worked out.

Action to implement recommendations: This includes negotiation and persuasion to bring about administrative or program changes, legislative activities, and other implementing activities going beyond mere reporting of recommendations. It would also include special education efforts aimed at putting into effect recommendations of the Council and/or its committees. Check this column also if agency decisions to modify program resulted from their participation on problem-solving committees.

			General education activity <u>1</u>	Problem consideration <u>2</u>	Action to implement recommendations <u>4</u>
		<u>Program area</u>			
		FAMILY AND CHILD WELFARE			
		To code combinations, add the numbers			
(26)	57	(1) Day care and after-school care	_____	_____	_____
(27)	58	(2) Homemaker and housekeeper service	_____	_____	_____
(28)	59	(3) Financial assistance	_____	_____	_____
(29)	60	(4) Unmarried parents	_____	_____	_____
(30)	61	(5) Mental retardation	_____	_____	_____
(31)	62	(6) Foster care	_____	_____	_____
(32)		(7) Family disorganization	_____	_____	_____
		HEALTH			
(33)	64	(1) Public health department services	_____	_____	_____
(34)	65	(2) Mental health and illness	_____	_____	_____
(35)	66	(3) Medical care for indigents	_____	_____	_____
(36)	67	(4) Hospitals	_____	_____	_____
(37)	68	(5) Home care	_____	_____	_____
(38)	69	(6) Chronic illness	_____	_____	_____
(39)	70	(7) Nursing and convalescent homes	_____	_____	_____
(40)	71	(8) Nursing services	_____	_____	_____
(41)	72	(9) Alcoholism	_____	_____	_____
(42)	73	(10) Rehabilitation services	_____	_____	_____

<u>Program area</u>			General education activity <u>1</u>	Problem consideration <u>2</u>	Action to implement recommendations <u>4</u>
RECREATION AND GROUP SERVICES					
(<u>43</u>)	74	(1) Geographical redistribution, relocation or extension of services	_____	_____	_____
(<u>44</u>)	75	(2) Determination of needs, and/or re-alignment or modification of services	_____	_____	_____
(<u>45</u>)	76	(3) Establishment of new agencies	_____	_____	_____
(<u>46</u>)	77	(4) Resident or day camping	_____	_____	_____
(<u>47</u>)	78	(5) Fees or membership dues	_____	_____	_____
(<u>48</u>)	79	(6) Public recreation	_____	_____	_____
(<u>49</u>)	80	(7) Services for special groups	_____	_____	_____

7. For any item checked in 6 above under either "problem consideration" or "action to implement recommendations," was the major focus on problems as they relate to the aging population? Yes X; No X.

If "yes," list most important areas: _____

8. Selected Council Activities. Check each of the following engaged in by the Council during the year.

Deck 1 - Blank

2-4 - Study I.D.

5 - Deck 2

6-8 - City I.D.

a. Selected fact-finding activities (check).

- (50) 9-10 1 _____ Studies of individual agencies. State number completed during year: _____.
- (51) 11 2 _____ Priorities study (a "priorities study" is a study aimed at establishment of community priorities for financing of different fields or areas of service).
- 4 _____ Agency service and/or financial data for budgeting groups.

b. Legislative activities (regarding local ordinances or state or federal legislation). (Place checks in appropriate columns.)

			Local 1	State 2	Federal 4
(52)	12	(1) Dissemination of information	_____	_____	_____
(53)	13	(2) Formal action in support or opposition	_____	_____	_____
(54)	14	(3) Representation at hearings	_____	_____	_____
(55)	15	(4) Other (describe): _____			

c. Interagency teamwork (check).

- 1 _____ Case conference (Council-sponsored meetings on individual cases where thinking of several agencies is needed)
- (56) 16 2 _____ Formal interagency agreements prepared under council auspices
- 4 _____ Area or district-focused joint planning

d. Operation of common services (check).

- (57) 17 1 _____ Social service exchange Code 3 for both, 0 for neither, 9 for NR
- 2 _____ Information and referral service
- (58) 18 _____ Christmas bureau Code 3 for both, 0 for neither, 9 for NR
- _____ Volunteer bureau

e. Health and welfare projects frequency under other auspices

Check any of the following areas in which the council played an active role during 1963, whether or not the activity in question was under council auspices.

- 1 _____ Housing, urban renewal and redevelopment
- (59) 19 2 _____ Adult vocational counseling and employment programs
- 4 _____ Juvenile delinquency projects
- (60) 1 _____ Special programs for school dropouts
- 2 _____ Long-range community health and welfare planning
- (61) 21 1 _____ Multi-problem family projects
- 2 _____ Human relations commissions, or other special activities to improve relations between racial or ethnic groups
- (62) 22 _____ Code total number of checks under e, 0-7, 9 if all NR

E. Organization and Structure

9. Relationship of council executive to executive of federated fund-raising organization (check one):

- 1 ☐ Independent (executive of council is not responsible to executive of fund-raising group)
- 2 ☐ Quasi-independent (associate executive is responsible to council program, but under the overall authority of an executive who is also responsible for federated fund-raising)
- 3 ☐ Joint (same individual is actively executive of both council program and federated fund-raising)
- 4 ☐ Other (describe) _____
- _____
- _____
- _____

(63) 23

Deck 4

10. Board of directors and executive committee

Board coded
on separate
Deck 4, oc-
cupations,
etc.

a. For each board member please fill in the following information on page 10.

- A. Name: last name, first initial.
- B. Executive committee: Check if he was a member of the executive or steering committee last year or at any time previously.
- C. Officer: Check if he was an officer of your board last year or at any time previously.
- D. Occupation: Write in his occupation, e.g., lawyer, doctor, welfare official, proprietor of factory. (If proprietor or manager, write in approximate number of people employed, e.g., 200. If a manager write in his title. If a woman, write in her occupation and her husband's; e.g., housewife/proprietor lumber yard [50 emp.].
- E. Other board and agency membership: Check if board member serves on board of (1) a private agency, (2) school system, or (3) a governmental body.
- F. If you think the member is one of the top community leaders, write in "1." All others record as "2."
- G. How active was the board member in your council last year?

Write in: 1, if very active
2, fairly active
3, some activity
4, no activity

COUNCIL BOARD LIST

A Name	B Executive Committee	C Officer	D Occupation	E Member- ship	F Communi- ty Leader	G Activ- ity Level
1.						
2.						
3.						
4.						
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						
16.						
17.						
18.						
19.						
20.						

b. Council board attendance—calendar year 1963

- (64) 24-25 (1) How many members has the board? _____
- (65) 26-27 (2) How many board meetings were held during the year? _____
- (66) 28-29 (3) What was the average attendance? _____

c. Is there any restriction as to the number or participation of agency executives on the Board?

1 _____ Yes (describe): _____

(67) 30 _____

2 _____ No

9 _____ NR

d. Council Executive Committee

- (1) Does the council have an executive committee in addition to (or as part of) the board described above? (For purposes of this question an executive committee is defined as a smaller group that acts in an interim or emergency capacity for the board as a whole. A so-called "executive committee" with full ongoing responsibility is considered a "board" in the sense this term is used in 10a and reported on in 10a through 10c.)

(68) 31

Yes 1 ; No 2 ; 9 NR

- (3) If answer to d (1) is "Yes":

- (a) Who constitutes the executive committee (which officers, committee chairmen, etc.)?

DID NOT CODE

- (69) 32-33 (b) How many members has the executive committee? _____
- (70) 34-35 (c) How many meetings did it hold during the calendar year 1963? _____
- (71) 36-37 (d) What was the average attendance at these meetings? _____

11. Committee structure and functioning.

a. Does the council have functional divisions? (See definition below.)

(72) 38

Definition: For purposes of this report a functional division is considered a program unit with responsibility for a broad content area such as family and child welfare, health, group work and recreation, of the aging. An essential feature is that the unit have an executive committee or similar body which acts as an administrative link between the council board and committees of the division, so that the division executive committee or chairman normally appoints division committees and the executive committee normally passes on reports developed by division committees prior to submitting them to the council board for approval.

(72) 38

b. List functional divisions below.

0 = No in 11a;
 Code: If yes,
 1-6 in b—the
 no. of divi-
 sions
 8 = yes in
 11a, no list-
 ing in b
 9 = NR

- (1) _____
 (2) _____
 (3) _____
 (4) _____
 (5) _____
 (6) _____

c. What functions are served by the division executive committees? (Check one or more)

- 1 _____ Decide on division projects (some or all)
 (73) 39 2 _____ Recommend projects (some or all) to be undertaken, to the board,
 or to a priority determining group
 4 _____ Appoint committees to carryout projects
 1 _____ Recommend members for project committees under the board
 (74) 40 2 _____ Review findings of its own project committees
 4 _____ Modify reports of project committees within the division
 _____ Make recommendations to the board
 (75) 41 _____ Other (describe): _____

(76) 42-44

d. What proportion of the division executive committees is made up of agency professionals? _____?
 Code % 00.0

12. Project committees.

A project committee, for purposes of this study, is a committee assigned to a specific problem or service area (e.g., day care services, rehabilitation services, juvenile delinquency) or project (joint promotion of camping), with responsibility to develop a solution and/or take action to implement recommendations.

a. Are project committees to be found (check one or more)

- 1 _____ Under the board
 (77) 45 2 _____ Under the divisions
 4 _____ Elsewhere (specify): _____

b. Do agency professionals serve on project committees:

1 Yes, as fullfledged members

(78)

46

2 Yes, but in an advisory capacity (no vote)4 No

9 = NR

c. If agency professionals are restricted in their participation on project committees or on division executive committees, describe any devices used to insure agency communication with these committees or the board.

13. Total participation on committees.

How many different persons participated as committee members in any part of the total council program, including committees of the board, divisions, departments, etc., during the year?

NOTE: Since some councils may not maintain a master file of participants, this question is optional. Because of the value of this information, councils are urged, if they have not already done so, to set up such a master file.

Number

(79) 47-49

Employees of health and welfare organizations

(80) 50-53

Others

Total

XX

F. Budgeting

14. Relationship to United Fund or chest budgeting.

a. Does the council have any relationship to the committee or committees concerned with United Fund or chest agencies?

(81)

54

 YesCode No

1. "yes" in a; "all" in b
2. "yes" in a; "some" in b
3. "yes" in a; NR in b
4. "no" in a;

b. To what agencies does this relationship apply?

- (81) 54 ☐ All UF or chest agencies
- ☐ Some but not all agencies (list major exclusions):
- _____
- _____

c. Indicate actual budget participation during 1963, by checking one or more of the items below. Code: 1 if checked; 0 if not checked

- (82) 55 ☐ Council had complete responsibility, although financial limitations may have been imposed or negotiated with fund-raising group.
- (83) 56 ☐ Staff member responsible for budgets and allocations (e.g., Budget Director or Budget Secretary) was a member of council staff.
- (84) 57 ☐ At least one member of the council staff regularly attended committee conferences.
- (85) 58 ☐ Council prepared factual material for committee.
- ☐ Council conducted studies (agency, field of service, etc.) for the budget committee.
- 1 ☐ At request of committee
- (86) 59 2 ☐ On initiative of council itself.
- 3 ☐ Both 1,2
- 4 ☐ If yes, but NR in 1,2
- ☐ Council participated in selection of budget committee members.
- 1 ☐ By actual selection of some of the members.
- (87) 60 2 ☐ By selection of some of the members of the committee that nominated the budget committee.
- 3 ☐ Both 1,2
- 4 ☐ Yes, but manner not indicated
- (88) 61 ☐ Other staff services or council participation (describe):

1 = check
0 = no check

15. Council role in the budgeting of public agencies. 1 = yes; 2 = no

a. Did the council participate during 1963 in the budgeting of public agencies?

____ (Please answer b below.)

(89) 62

____ No (see b below for possible types of participation before checking this alternative).

b. If answer to "a" above was "yes," please check one or more types of participation below:

			1	2	3
			<u>regularly*</u>	<u>on special occasions</u>	<u>both</u>
(90)	63	(1) Participation in public hearings on budgets of public agencies	_____	_____	_____
(91)	64	(2) Conferences with public officials on public agency budgets	_____	_____	_____
(92)	65	(3) Line-by-line review similar to review of UF or chest member agency budgets	_____	_____	_____
(93)	66	(4) Preparing factual material for public officials or bodies, in connection with budgeting of public agencies	_____	_____	_____
(94)	67	(5) Conducting studies (agency, field of service, etc.) for public officials or bodies, in connection with budgeting or public agencies	_____	_____	_____
(95)	68	(6) Other (describe) _____	_____	_____	_____
		_____	_____	_____	_____
		_____	_____	_____	_____

Code

- 1 - Regularly
- 2 - On special occasions
- 3 - Both
- 0 - None
- 9 - NR
- 8 - No in 15a

*E.g., if this form of participation occurs each year.

Special Supplement

1. List below, in order of importance, up to five of your major projects which were either completed or well under way during 1963.

On a separate sheet for each project, describe the project in reasonable detail, including information as to how it started, other sponsors, if any, kinds of organizations, agencies and services involved, duration or expected duration, project goals, sources and amounts of any special financing, accomplishments and/or failures to date, and significant costs beyond those met through the ordinary operating funds of the council, as well as any other information you consider relevant.

Please submit two copies (original plus one) of each narrative with this report.

Project 1 _____

Project 2 _____

Project 3 _____

Project 4 _____

Project 5 _____

2. Describe, on a separate page, the two most important achievements of the council during 1963. For each indicate the significance of the achievement to the community, and show concretely what role the council played in bringing about the achievement. Reference may be made to projects reported under 1 above if appropriate. Please submit two copies of each narrative with this report.
3. Describe on a separate sheet (two copies to be submitted) any important relationships to the local boards(s) of education during 1963. If there were no such important relationships during 1963, check here ____.
- (96) 69
- (97) 70-71 4. What proportion of your total program which is directed toward agencies or services do you estimate is directed toward public agencies and services? _____; toward voluntary agencies and services? xxxxx. The two figures combined should add to 100%.

Code % of service to public agencies.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR "COMBINED" ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDING
BOTH COMMUNITY PLANNING AND FEDERATED FUND-RAISING
(for Council 1963 Annual Report)

B. Staff

For an organization which engages in both federated fund raising and health and welfare planning, only those staff which perform activities typical of separate councils should be reported. These activities go beyond the usual functions of a social planning division to include research, social service exchange, volunteer bureau, and information and referral service, among others. Budgeting, however, if carried on by a separate department or if done by fund-raising staff, should not be included, although the budget participation of planning division staff would be counted.

For a "chest-council" which carries budget responsibility, often for local agencies only, but no responsibility for fund-raising, the budgeting function should be included, the chest-council being considered a separate council for purposes of this report.

C. Council Budget

Income should be reported corresponding to all the activities described as applicable under "staff." A reasonable estimate should be made of the approximate council share where expenses (and therefore income to cover expenses) are applicable to the organization as a whole, such as rent, utilities, etc.

E. Organization and Structure

10. Board of directors and executive committee.

The "board" referred to here is that body which is close to and exercises fairly immediate control over community health and welfare planning activities as a whole, even though some of its decisions may require ratification by, or in some instances, it may be required to submit recommendations to, an overall board which governs both planning and fund-raising activities. In most instances where community planning is set up in a separate division, this board will be known as the division steering committee or by some similar title. If there is no such steering committee, or if the overall board of the organization plays a very active role with respect to community planning activities, the overall board of directors would be considered as the "board."

F. Budgeting

If budgeting is carried on by a department separate from the social planning division, or by staff who are primarily related to fund-raising, the "council" in this section would be considered the social planning unit or staff, and relationships between this unit or staff and the budgeting unit or staff should be reported.

In the case of a chest-council which carries the budgeting function but does not have fund-raising responsibility, the council is considered to carry complete responsibility for budgeting, even though its responsibility may be for local agencies only.

Variable No.	Special Variables Separately Numbered*
(109)	Primary, Chest (Social Work) Financing (Sum of 98, 105, 107, 99) [109p represents the percent]
(110)	Secondary, Local Public and Foundation (Community Wide) Financing (Sum of 101, 104, 100, 102, 103) [110p represents the percent]

The Board Variables

Cosmopolitan-Service Board

(111)	Percent in Welfare and Health Occupations
(112)	Percent in Public Administration Occupations
(113)	Percent in Higher Education Occupations
(114)	Percent in Religious Occupations

Local-Entrepreneurial Board

(115)	Percent in Business and Industrial Occupations
(116)	Percent in Labor Unions
(117)	Percent in Misc. Professional Occupations
(118)	Percent in Media (Radio, T.V., Newspapers)
(119)	Percent Elected Public Officials
(120)	Cosmopolitan-Service Board (Sum of 111, 112, 113, 114)
(121)	Local Entrepreneurial Board (Sum of 115, 116, 117, 118, 119)
(122)	Board Power (Percent Top Community Leaders)
(123)	Percent Male on Board

Activity Variables

(124)	Services to the Indigent (Combination of 35, 36, 28, 32)
(125)	Chronic Illness (Combination of 38, 37, 39, 27, 33, 40)
(126)	Services in Rehabilitation (Combination of 42, 30, 39, 41)
(127)	Services to Special Groups (Combination of 26, 29, 31, 46, 49, 48)

*These variables are ones which were specially coded or which are combinations of variables from the original text.

- (128) Agency Services (Combination of 44, 43, 45)
- (129) Legislative Activities (Combination of 52, 53, 54)

Community Variables*

- (1) Size of Community (page 1 of the questionnaire)
- (130) Median Income
- Lower Classness
- (131) Deprivation Index
- (132) Percent Nonwhite
- Maturity
- (133) Percent Foreign Born
- (134) Median Age
- (135) Percent Same House, 1955-60
- (136) Density
- Growth
- (137) Percent Migrants
- (138) Percent Growth, 1950-60
- (139) Percent Single Dwelling Unit
- (140) Educational Center

Community Welfare Status**

- (141) Total Private Welfare Contributions to the local Chest/
Fund, 1964
- (142) Per Capita Contributions to the Local Chest/Fund, 1964.
(The "capita" is the area served by the Chest/Fund)
- (143) Per Capita County Welfare Expenditure, 1960

*These are the Hadden-Borgatta Index Variables.

**The source of the Welfare Status Variables is explained in Chapter VII.

APPENDIX II
A FACTOR ANALYSIS OF COUNCIL VARIABLES

Early in the analysis of the Council data, we performed a factor analysis of the 108 Council variables.* The function of this analysis was to test the importance of the variable clusters we had displayed in Figure 1.2. We used the factor analysis as a testing device; that is, we expected that it would produce as factors generally similar clusters to the ones we had selected. We did not intend, nor did we use, the analysis as an explicit guide to particular variables.

The results of this process are presented in the following pages. The factor analysis produced 17 factors, of which two were not usable (nos. 15 and 16). Of the remaining 15 factors, we could code 13 with ease into the array of variable grouping previously identified. The two which remained—number of vacancies and consultation, were not previously identified as theoretically meaningful, and were not included.**

In sum, the results of the factor analysis were very successful. In a general way, they confirmed empirically the variable clusters which we had selected as theoretically important dimensions of the Council. Having received this confirmation, no more was done with the factor analysis.

The Relationship of the Factors to the Conceptual Scheme

I. Resources

- A. Size of Staff
 - 1. Regular
 - 2. Special Project
- B. Income
 - 1. Total Income
 - 2. Financial Structure

*This factor analysis does not include the occupations of board members.

**In other words, the factor analysis produced two variable clusters which were not included in our Figure 1.2. We had not included them originally because we did not have a theoretical reason to include them. Their presence as "factors" was not sufficient to make us alter our original conclusion.

- C. The Board of Directors
 - 1. Occupational Distribution
 - 2. Power

II. Organization Structure

- A. Task Structure
- B. Training Structure
- C. Divisional Structure
- D. Independence

III. Activities

- A. Agency Assessment and Change
- B. Services to Special Groups
- C. Chronic Illness
- D. Rehabilitation Services
- E. Services to Indigent
- F. Legislative Activity
- G. Relationship to Agency Budgeting
 - 1. Private Agencies
 - 2. Public Agencies
- H. Programs Under other Auspices

1. Size and Staff	I-A,II-A,II-B
2. Chronic Illness	III-C
3. Secondary Income	I-B2
4. Special Projects— Special Funds	I-A2,I-B2
5. Participation in Agency Budgeting	III-G
6. Programs Under Other Auspices	III-H
7. Vacancies	- - -
8. Discretionary Resources	I-B2
9. Consultation	- - -
10. Board Membership	I-C
11. Legislative Activities	III-F
12. Divisional Structure	II-C
13. Independence	II-D
14. General Activities	III-A,B,E
17. Mental and Physical Rehabilitation	III-D

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Variable No.</u>	<u>Loading*</u>
1. Size and Staff		
Size of Council	(2)	.95
Money from Chest	(98)	.95
Masters of Social Work	(18)	.92
Exec. Admin. and Planning Staff	(6)	.90
College Graduate	(21)	.85
Total Income	(108)	.84
Research Staff	(10)	.78
Public Relations Staff	(12)	.77
Information and Referral Staff	(7)	.75
Volunteer Bureau Staff	(8)	.72
2. Chronic Illness		
Health—Chronic Illness	(38)	.69
Health—Home Care	(37)	.61
Health—Nursing Home	(39)	.54
Homemaker Service	(27)	.49
3. Secondary Income		
Tax Money for Service (e.g., SSX)	(102)	.91
Number of Agency Studies	(50)	.82
Social Service Exchange (SSX)	(9)	.75
Foundation Money	(103)	.65
Size of Community	(1)	.62
One year of Social Work School	(20)	.62
4. Special Projects—Special Funds		
Special Project Staff	(4)	.91
Tax Funds for Special Projects	(101)	.80
Foundation Funds for Special Projects	(104)	.77
5. Participation in Agency Budgeting		
Relationship to Chest Budgeting	(81)	.68
Do Studies for Budget Committee	(86)	.60
Member Attends Budget Meeting	(84)	.51
Council Prepares Factual Material	(85)	.51

*We have not selected among loadings. Those reported here are inclusive—that is, every loading above the lowest one in this list is report. Further, in every case, there were several points between the lowest one we reported here and the next lowest in the overall list. Hence, we used a natural breaking point in the data as the place to stop reporting variables.

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Variable No.</u>	<u>Loading</u>
6. Programs Under Other Auspices		
Total, Projects Under Other Auspices	(62)	.89
Multi-Problem Family; Human Relations Comm.	(61)	.72
Housing, Urban Renewal, Juvenile Del.	(59)	.69
School Dropouts, Long Range Planning	(60)	.54
7. Vacancies		
Executive and Professional Staff	(14)	.78
Total Staff	(3)	.77
8. Discretionary Resources		
"Other Funds"	(106)	.65
Other Staff Disbursements	(13)	.60
9. Consultation		
Number of Individual Consultants	(24)	.76
Number of Days of Consultation	(25)	.64
10. Board Membership		
Board Attendance	(66)	.82
Total Membership	(64)	.78
11. Legislative Activities		
Supportive Action	(53)	.63
Information	(52)	.57
Representation at Hearings	(54)	.50
Budgeting of Public Agencies	(89)	.50
12. Divisional Structure		
Location of Project Committee	(77)	.66
Divisional Structure	(72)	.52
13. Independence		
Relationship to Chest/Fund	(63)	.37

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Variable No.</u>	<u>Loading</u>
14. General Activities		
Determination of Need	(44)	.54
Services for Special Groups	(49)	.43
Foster Care	(31)	.42
Financial Assistance	(28)	.38
Family Disorganization	(32)	.37
Medical Care for Indigents	(35)	.35
Unmarried Parents	(29)	.33
Resident Camping	(26)	.30
17. Mental and Physical Rehabilitation*		
Establishment of New Agencies	(45)	.47
Rehabilitation Service	(42)	.34
Mental Health and Illness	(34)	.31

*Clusters 16 and 15 were not usable, as they could not be interpreted.

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