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TOWARD A THEORY OF BAROQUE LYRIC METAPHOR

by
Allan Roy Zoll

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Doctoral Committee:

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ABSTRACT

TOWARD A THEORY OF BAROQUE LYRIC METAPHOR

by
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The theory of metaphor that this study seeks to approximate is one that gives regard to Renaissance and seventeenth-century ideas of epistemology, metaphysics, and the functions of language. The study identifies the conceptual basis of metaphor in historical terms so as to provide more nearly precise means of distinguishing the style of the Metaphysical poets from that of the High Baroque poets. The focus is on the metaphor, because its importance as a device of style had been recognized since Aristotle and because modern studies continue to find it a crucial feature in the poetry of this period.

The metaphor is both a structure of thought and a device of stylistic. As an intellectual construct it belongs to the science of logic; as an element of style it pertains to the art of rhetoric. The logical basis of the metaphor, or the conceit, was recognized by seventeenth-century writers, who, following Aristotle, treated it as an analogical construct. Until the late eighteenth century, the ten Aristotelian categories or predicaments of being provided the concepts by which things were identified and related to each other metaphysically and ontologically. As a proposition of being, therefore, analogy is an expression of one or more of these predicaments. Contemporary logics, notably that of Ramus, do not, however, treat analogy as a concept at all, but tend to lose it in the topoi of Comparison and Similitude, where it becomes a quantitative method

of argumentative analysis instead of a qualitative concept of relative being. Formal analytics are required to determine the significance of the analogical subject of a metaphor; formal rhetoric determines only how that signification is used in a composition.

Metaphoric function in rhetoric reflects the traditional dichotomy between "matter" and "manner" which was prevalent in this period. The metaphor could either be used to express the subject of its context, or it could be used to "decorate" that subject. In terms of signification, the question of function comes to be a matter of relationship: if the metaphor be used to define or at least to illustrate the meaning of the subject matter, then it will appear in a central relationship to its context. If it be used to "amplify" the affective qualities of its contextual subject, it will have a peripheral or incidental relationship to that subject.

Centrality of relationship for purposes of definition or illustration is a mark of the metaphor in the Plain style. Peripheral relationship for purposes of ornamentation is the chief character of the High style, which cultivates the ornatus as the technique of treating traditional subjects in the lyric. High Baroque poetry is in the tradition of the High style, and the subject tends to disappear behind its ornamentation. The Metaphysical style belongs in the tradition of the rhetorical Plain style, and its most distinctive feature is the use of metaphor to define the essential, metaphysical nature of the contextual subject.

The use of metaphoric analogy as a vehicle of definition in Metaphysical poetry leads even to the appearance of the Thomistic

Analogy of Proportionality in the lyrics of Herbert and Donne. The customary structure of metaphor from Aristotle onward is the Analogy of Inequality, which provides the basis of metaphoric analogy both in the Metaphysical definitory metaphors of Marvell and Vaughan and in the High Baroque decorative metaphors of Crashaw, Góngora, and Marino.

PREFACE

The initial impetus to this study was provided by Spain's foremost student of Gongorism, Dámaso Alonso. In one of his characteristically stimulating articles, "Poesía arábigoandaluza y poesía gongorina," which first appeared in Escorial for February, 1943, Don Dámaso demonstrated the similarities in function that the metaphoric structure performs in the poetically stylized worlds of Góngora and the Hispano-Arabic poets of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He found that the metaphor served as one of the chief means of reducing the nearly infinite variety of phenomena in the real world to a relatively few, basic conceptions of the imagination or intellect.

How this reduction of real phenomena to imaginary notions is accomplished conceptually was suggested by Professor Rosemond Tuve in her book Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (1947), which claims that the basis of metaphoric formation is, in some sense, ultimately logical; and by Elizabeth Lewis Wiggins' article "Logic in the Poetry of John Donne," which had appeared in Studies in Philology, XLII (1945), and which showed the use of various principles of contemporary logical method in the verse of the English poet. In examining this matter of logic in the metaphor, however, it was found that the logics of the Renaissance and the earlier seventeenth century seemed unable to explain even in contemporary terms just what happens conceptually in the creation of metaphor. I am indebted to Father Walter J. Ong, S.J., for pointing out the limitations of these

contemporary "quantified" logics in his Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (1958), and for suggesting, if only indirectly, that the earlier traditions of Aristotelian analytics might provide more certain bases of conceptual reference, particularly as regards the concept of metaphor as analogy. Generally speaking, the Renaissance logics do not reflect the qualitative forms or patterns of order in the conceptualization of things so much as the relationships obtaining in the statements made about such things. The assumption underlying this study is simply that thought can modify thought, in historical terms, that a given structure of thought can and does modify other structures of thought in certain definable ways. What we shall be concerned with is to see how the metaphor as a structure of thought is related to other general or specific structures of thought.

In embarking on an investigation of seventeenth-century metaphor on the basis of a theory of analogy, one is struck by the scarcity of materials dealing with metaphor in these terms. Joseph A. Mazzeo has pointed out the connection between metaphor and analogy in the seventeenth century in his "Modern Theories of Metaphysical Poetry" (Modern Philology, L [1952]) and more recently in "Universal Analogy and the Culture of the Renaissance" (Journal of the History of Ideas, XV [1954]), but in both cases the notion of analogy upon which he bases his observations is neo-Platonic, and does not take into consideration the extensive, if perhaps less conspicuous, influence of the neo-Aristotelian conception of analogy. The following study, therefore, offers itself as an exploratory endeavor to formulate an analytical theory of Baroque metaphor that will take account of these two conceptions of analogy and their re-

lationship to the idea of metaphor as an analogical construct.

This study will not be a descriptive catalogue of conceits, but rather will be a critical analysis of certain key poems in the Baroque tradition in which the conceptual problems posed by the Aristotelian idea of metaphor as an analogical structure of thought seem both central and most clearly revealed. The results of our study should be threefold: first, we should be able more clearly to distinguish between the Metaphysical practice and the mannerist poets of the High Baroque, on one hand, and between such nominally non-Baroque, or even anti-Baroque, poets like Jonson and Lope de Vega on the other. From this should follow certain modifications in the traditional catalogue of Metaphysical poets, most notably in the removal of Richard Crashaw (and likely Giles Fletcher also) from the Metaphysical to the English High Baroque, where Ruth Wallerstein's Richard Crashaw (1935) and Austin Warren's Crashaw (1939) years ago had suggested he rightly belonged.

As a third and final consequence of our study, we should perhaps more fully appreciate the qualitative distance that separates the twentieth century from the mind of the Renaissance and seventeenth century. Since the epoch of Kant and the "transcendental aesthetic," it has become difficult to grasp the sense of form involved in the notion of concepts as being essentially static, logically ordered structures, particularly in respect to the concept of analogy as a structure of thought. In the past language function was thought of in just such terms of intellectual structures, propositions; the communication of beauty was achieved through the linguistic expression of thoughts whose principles were themselves

essentially logical. Our study will examine the analytical principles by which formal complexity is attained in the language of lyric poetry in the seventeenth century. We should not be surprised, however, to discover that these principles, involved though they be in Renaissance and Baroque poetic, do become of increasingly less utility and relevance in the poetry of subsequent centuries.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The discussion that follows is in a certain sense an exercise in intellectual history. In it we propose to examine the nature and function of the conceit in some typical examples of Baroque lyric poetry with regard to assumptions about the intellect that were current in the seventeenth century. We seek to formulate a method of analysis that will tell us something about the conceptual basis of this poetry in contemporary terms, and that will account for the quite sensible differences in stylistic between such poets as Donne and Góngora, for example.

To account for stylistic differences in a strictly historical framework means that consideration must be given to some of the chief notions about logic, dialectic, and rhetoric that underlay the poets' own sense of what they were doing with metaphor in the composition of lyric verse. This is not, therefore, a study of metaphor qua metaphor, but of metaphor in the context of Renaissance and seventeenth-century poetic. For the purposes of our investigation, contemporary assumptions about language and thought will be accepted as valid in their historical matrix, and our approach to the study of the conceit will be made in terms of this context.

The examination of the conceit in seventeenth-century Baroque lyric poetry must begin with two distinct though necessarily related questions: the first concerns the formal identity of the conceit, and the second pertains to its function in poetry. These two aspects

of the conceit--what it *is* and what it *does*--are the two necessary complements of any formulation of a theory of the conceit in the period with which we are concerned. As its very name implies, the conceit is in some manner a "thought," a structure of the mind which is understood to perform some significatory function in poetic discourse.

As a *forma mentis* the conceptual identity of the conceit pertains to the general realm of logic, the science that deals with the forms and processes of reasoning, and has as a consequence certain implications regarding epistemology and metaphysics. As a structure operating in the context of poetic discourse, however, the identity of the conceit is determined by considerations of purpose or intention relevant to poetry as a whole and to its role as an element of the poetic context, and these considerations are ones that properly belong to the art of rhetoric. On one hand, therefore, the conceit is a structure whose essential or formal nature is conceptual; on the other it is a stylistic device that is used in the expression or modification of thought.

The logical and rhetorical, the conceptual and functional, identities of the conceit must be considered together when one is dealing historically with the problem of the conceit in poetry, for if one assume intelligibility in discourse, then one must as a consequence give regard to the underlying conception of thought as well as to the method or manner of presenting that thought. To treat the conceit wholly as a device of rhetoric, therefore, is to overlook the conceptual nature of this device; and conversely, to treat it solely in terms of its conceptual nature is to ignore its stylistic function.

We shall find the term "conceit" in the seventeenth century to be another expression for metaphor, and one which attempts most clearly to indicate the conceptual basis of metaphor and its analogical form. Since ancient times the metaphor had been given an almost purely rhetorical definition, and its conceptual nature had been quite ignored or misunderstood. This study will seek to define the conceptual basis of metaphor so that the functional aspect of its signification may be more properly understood when it appears as a device of stylistic in poetry.

Metaphor and the Problem of Logic

Since Samuel Johnson, discussions of the conceit as a form of thought have tended to view it as a kind of contradictio--or even as a conflagratio--oppositorum, much as Johnson himself saw it when he called the conceit a discordia concors.[1] Accordingly, studies of the conceit typically have begun by marking the character of heterogeneity in the elements composing it and have ended by stressing the effect of their enforced conjunction. By way of illustration, one may take the recent definition of the conceit offered by the eminent scholar and editor of Donne, Dame Helen Gardner, who offers the following:

> A conceit is a comparison whose ingenuity is more striking than its justness, or, at least is more immediately striking. All comparisons discover likeness in things unlike: a comparison becomes a conceit when we are made to concede likeness while being strongly conscious of unlikeness. A brief comparison can be a conceit if two things patently unlike, or which we should never think of together, are shown to be alike in a single point in such a way, or in such a context, that we feel their incongruity. Here a conceit is like a spark made by striking two stones together. After the flash the stones are just two stones.[2]

This seems to be a representative modern definition of the conceit, and it illustrates some of the dangers into which such

definitions, from Johnson onwards, have tended to fall. Overlooking the rather faulty analogy of the two stones (which are not, after all, heterogeneous), one still may ask that if a "striking quality" be the sole, or be at least the most important effect of the conceit, then just how is it striking, and to whom? It is possible, given a historical perspective, that it may be the very "justness" of the comparison that is in fact the striking thing about it. Furthermore, the matter of heterogeneity in the components of the conceit really involves questions of metaphysics, and if the conceit is to be viewed as a distinctive device of the poetry of the seventeenth century, then the analysis of this device will have to take account of some of the contemporary concerns in the study of metaphysics.

"Striking ingenuity," therefore, is a most uncertain guide for dealing with the problem of the conceit. We are not, for example, particularly conscious of ingenuity, as such, in Shelley's

> Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
> Stains the white radiance of Eternity

nor in the multiple imagery of

> My soul is an enchanted boat,
> Which, like a sleeping swan, doth float
> Upon the silver waves of thy sweet singing[3]

Yet were we to pause to examine these figures logically instead of accepting them aesthetically, as presumably we are supposed to do, we should likely find that in one way or another a considerable degree of "wit" or ingenuity is involved in their formation. The yoking together of Life--by any definition--with glass, and the equation of Soul with boat are matters of considerable heterogeneity indeed;

but we do not customarily think of these metaphors as examples of the Johnsonian discordia concors. On the other hand, our attention is indeed likely to be arrested by such figures as Donne's celebrated compasses in his "Valediction: forbidding Mourning," perhaps by the wine-press metaphor in Herbert's "The Agonie," and by the notorious "green thought in a green shade" of Marvell's "Garden." Clearly these figures from the earlier poets demand something more than the intellectual acquiescence called for by mere aesthetic acceptability.

One recognizes at the outset that the intention of the Shelleyan conceit is different from that of the Baroque conceit in general: in reading the Romantic poets one may assume that he is not supposed to pause for the logical analysis of an image. It seems to be a characteristic of Romantic poetic to seek to lull the analytical faculty and to suspend logic as well as disbelief. Baroque poetic, however, appears to rely on the idea of a necessary logical exegesis in order to achieve intelligibility.[4] The seventeenth-century Continental theorists of the conceit seem in fact to have thought of this device as essentially a logical construct formed by the power of analogy, by the power of "wit" (agudeza or acutezza), which "discovered" certain similarities in things apparently or superficially dissimilar.[5] Indeed, these writers considered the term "conceit" as a synonym for metaphor itself.[6] Our investigation will reveal that an adequate definition of the conceit is provided by Aristotle in his analysis of metaphor in the Poetics, an analysis which, moreover, gives special attention to the analogical basis of the metaphoric structure. Since analogy is a formal structure capable of treatment by the principles of analytics, Aristotle's definition of the metaphor will be found to lend itself readily to use as a means of treating logically the form and function of the conceit in

the poetry of the Renaissance and seventeenth century.

In treating this rhetorical device in terms of its logical character rather than in terms of its aesthetic effects, as previous studies have tended to do, we should be able more precisely to determine the role that metaphoric signification--the intrinsic conceptual meaning a metaphor has--plays with regard to its context. Formalizing analytically the nature and function of the metaphor should provide some fairly concrete, demonstrable terms for describing some of the chief poetic styles in the seventeenth century and perhaps also for distinguishing, if only somewhat indirectly, the patterns of thought that set some of the poets of the period apart from each other.

The logical analysis of the conceit will be made in contemporary terms, that is, it will be governed by certain generally held ideas about the operations of the intellect--ideas which are prior to and necessary for the relatively secondary matters of how these intellectual operations may be expressed in the patterns of formal rhetoric. Lyric poetry has been chosen as the object of study because it is both the genre in which Metaphysical and Baroque qualities are generally held to be the most conspicuous, and because it is the least rigidly defined of the poetic genres and offers a greater variety of themes and methods of treatment.

Establishing the logical nature of the conceit in seventeenth-century poetry with a proper regard for historical perspective, however, presents special difficulties. Of the many studies that have attempted to deal with the conceit, Miss Rosemond Tuve's Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery is one that argues most convincingly for its logical basis, but at the same time it raises the very important question of just what logic it is that is basic to the formation of

the conceit.[7] For logic in the technical sense of analytics had become lost in the confusion of dialectic with rhetoric in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.

Generally speaking, the logics of the Renaissance and seventeenth century are intended as textbooks in the methods of dialectic rather than in the principles of scientific analysis.[8] The principles underlying the methodology of these logics derive mainly from Aristotle's Topics and not from his treatises on analytics. The Topics is not concerned with philosophical investigation so much as with the practical procedures of argumentation, which utilize the topoi, or "commonplaces," of argumentative investigation, proof, and refutation--procedures that are the same for rhetoric as well as dialectic.[9]

The Scholastic logics of the Renaissance, like Agricola's De Inventione Dialectica (1515), follow the general organizing principle of the Aristotelian Topics by dividing themselves into the two basic procedures of Inventio and Iudicium, respectively the methods of analyzing debatable propositions and of framing discourses. Each of these methods has its list of appropriate topoi, but those of Inventio tend to receive the greater attention. Subsequent handbooks of logic in this period reflect a tendency towards an even more "rhetorical" conception of the art in that the emphasis on the topics of Inventio has this faculty virtually taking over the entire field of logic--as may be seen in one of the more conspicuous of these later treatises, the Dialecticae Partitiones (1543) of the French Protestant, Peter Ramus. As a consequence of this preoccupation with Inventio, therefore, one finds in these later logics that not only has analytics become buried under dialectic, but that dialectic itself has in turn become thoroughly confused with rhetoric.[10]

Miss Tuve's study is perhaps the most notable of several recent attempts to find in Ramistic logic the basis of the Metaphysical conceit. All of these attempts, however, seem to be less than conclusive, for the fundamentally rhetorical or topical basis of Ramistic logic prevents one from making analytical distinctions that can have a philosophical, or indeed a metaphysical, validity. Logical analysis undertaken with essentially rhetorical instruments ends up demonstrating really only rhetorical conclusions. As we have suggested, the use of a given conceit in a poetic composition may indeed be determined by rhetorical principles, but the following discussion will demonstrate that the formation and signification of this conceit is preeminently a matter of analytics, and topical logics can tell us little about how the conceit is indeed conceived.[11] It seems necessary, then, that the distinction between logic as analytics and rhetoric as expression, between scientific demonstration and persuasion, be kept quite clear, for the purpose of each is obviously different. To maintain this distinction, especially as regards our investigation of the logic of analogy, we shall refer to the Analytics and Metaphysics of Aristotle rather than to the logical handbooks of the Renaissance.

Grounding the principles of logic in an epistemologically derived system of analysis is especially important when one is dealing with the concept of analogy, a concept fundamental to the ordering of thought, and, specifically, to the formation of metaphor, since it is the intellectual construct that simultaneously harmonizes unity with diversity and similarity with difference and gives value to the orders of being. Indeed, a good starting point for a test of philosophical sufficiency in a system of logic is to see what is done with analogy.

Generally speaking, in the logics of the period with which we are concerned little at all is done with analogy: Renaissance logics do not carry analogy beyond the general notion of superficial likeness that characterizes the definitions of "similitude" that one finds in the contemporary handbooks of rhetoric.[12] One must refer to the theologians, notably to the thirteenth-century theologians St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Bonaventura, to find analogy treated philosophically.

The philosophical importance of analogy in the Renaissance ought to be obvious, since it figures in all relations dealing with the Macrocosm and the Microcosm, and since it also provides a general formal structure for such literary types as the emblem and the allegory. Analogy is thus a basic structure of conceptualization--whether the particular conception be of the universe and man, the sea and an infinity of troubles, or merely of a diamond and a tear. Accordingly, we shall examine the intellectual structure of analogy mainly in terms of its being a form of thought, and then shall turn to examine some typical examples of its function in certain kinds of lyric poetry in the period.

Metaphor and the Discrimination of Styles

While having an obvious intellectual piquancy and charm, the metaphor is at the same time uniquely suited for the concise communication of meaning. Since ancient times the aesthetic and significatory virtues of the metaphor had been recognized as the source of its great value as a device of style. Aristotle's attempt to balance these two complementary aspects of metaphor in his Rhetoric and Poetics was unavailing in view of a persisting tendency to separate significatory and aesthetic functions throughout language as a whole. On one hand language was seen to serve as the generally colorless medium of the philosopher and the teacher,

as a medium in which the informative function was the paramount, if not the exclusive, concern. On the other hand, language could serve as the ornate, emotionalized vehicle of self-display for poets and orators.[13]

Although today we may indeed cavil at this perhaps too facile division in language function, the notion of a fundamental dichotomy in language lies at the heart of much of the dispute about stylistic in the Renaissance, particularly in such questions as the relative importance of "matter" and "manner," and the kind of "wit," or faculty of discovery, involved in each. Following the lines of this linguistic dichotomy, the seventeenth century found two primary purposes in the operation of wit: the finding of truth, and the discovery of beauty. These two functions of wit, which reflect the two functions of language in general, are often translated as the opposition of dialectic and oratory, as one finds in Baltasar Gracián's Agudeza y Arte de Ingenio (1642, 1648). In Gracián's treatise the inventive faculty connected with the finding of truth is the "perspicacious wit" (agudeza de perspicacia); it is "useful" and instructional, as are the discoveries of dialectical invention in general. Stylistically its expression is akin to the "clear, naked way of speaking" advocated by England's Royal Academy. Conversely, the wit involved in the discovery of beauty is the "wit of artifice" (agudeza del artificio); this idea of wit has "delight" as its end, and its manner of expression is accordingly aesthetic.[14]

The stylistic of the "wit of artifice" relies on the adornment--the amplification, ornamentation, or "garnishing"--of thought to achieve aesthetic effect, and it is commonly described in terms of "decorating" or "clothing" the basic substance of thought. The English-

man Thomas Wilson, for example, says in his Arte of Rhetorique (1560) that: "Elocution getteth words to set forth inuention, and with such beautie commendeth the matter, that reason semeth to be clad in Purple, walking afore both bare and naked." This inventive "clothing" or decorating of the matter of intellect is accomplished by the various devices of stylistic: tropes and other figures, says Wilson, "beautifie the sentence [i.e., thought], as precious stones are set in a ring to commende the gold."[15] Gracián has the same idea in mind when he compares the "matter" of thought to the firmness or substance of a building, and the "manner" of stylistic expression to the building's ornamentation.[16]

The notion of style as the adornment of thought is of ancient vintage. Classical antiquity recognized three levels of style, which, generally speaking, reflected the various degrees of ornamentation of discourse, according to whether one wanted to "move" an audience, to "delight" it, or simply to teach it. When rhetoric ceased to have a public function in the later Roman empire and became more or less an academic exercise, the separation of the High and Middle styles--the general styles of Demonstrative and of Judicial oratory--ceased to exist in practice. The distinction between "moving" and "delighting" an audience--a distinction which appears never to have been too firm--became blurred even further; and rhetoric, the underpinning of oratory fell into an almost exclusive preoccupation with elocutio, or style, which itself became a largely mechanical technique of decorative elaboration.

The stylistic preoccupation in rhetoric extended to poetry, which subsequently became conceived of as "versified rhetoric," according to the Poetria nova (c. 1210) of Geoffrey of Vinsauf.[17]

By the fourteenth century, if indeed not sooner, there were really only two clearly defined general levels of style: the Plain, used for instruction, letter-writing, contemplation, and for such literary genres as satire, comedy, and the epigram; and a so-called "Eloquent" style that included elements of the classical High and Middle styles, and which was used for tragedy, epic poetry, and for the courtly lyric.

In poetry the Plain style seems to have been assiduously cultivated for didactic and contemplative purposes in the later medieval and the Renaissance periods side by side with the mellifluous style of the courtly lyric. The tradition of the Plain style seems to have been especially strong in England. The sense of "eloquence" that one finds in this notion of plainness is one of a qualification of thought or content rather than with its ornamentation or embellishment, the latter of which was artfully disdained by Sir Philip Sidney, for example, as an "Enamelling with pied flowers . . . thoughts of gold."[18] Using Sidney's own metaphor, one might say that the idea of eloquence in the Plain style had more to do with burnishing the gold than with decorating it. In any case, a contemporary definition of this sense of eloquence can be found in Roger Ascham's The Scholemaster (1570), where it appears as the "plaine and sensible vtterance for the best and de[e]pest reasons . . . in which two pointes standeth perfite eloquence, one of the fairest and rarest gifts that God doth geue to man." Ascham's emphasis is clearly on "matter"; earlier he had said that "All soch Authors, as be fullest of good matter and right iudgement in doctrine, be likewise alwayes, most proper in wordes, most apte in sentence, most plaine and pure in vttering the same."[19]

The emphasis in this idea of the Plain style clearly falls on

docere, not on delectare, and the function of the metaphor in this sense of style will tend to be expositional. The metaphor will be concerned with conveying thought or with illustrating it for purposes of clarity or definition. Consequently it will have little to do with decorating thought, with making it more "sensuous," splendid, or otherwise aesthetically effective. Because of its notoriety, Donne's compass figure may be taken as one of the more conspicuous instances of the metaphor performing as an analytical exemplum in the Plain style.

We have at this point briefly pointed out two broad historical distinctions in the nature and function of the metaphor, or conceit, in terms of general stylistic. These stylistic distinctions in metaphoric function reflect fundamental notions about the relationship of the conceit to the "argument," "sentence," or thematic material of its context. In the Eloquent style, which reflects a general poetic of adornment, the conceit may be expected to appear in a typically peripheral or even in an appliqué relationship to the central thought of its context. Conversely, in the Plain style, which reflects in its turn a poetic of exposition, the metaphor ought to be found having a more central and intimate connection with its thematic context.

These differences in the relationship of metaphor to its context were illustrated some time ago by Frank J. Warnke in an article in which he compared a passage from Marino's "La bruna Pastorella" with the second stanza of Donne's "The Broken Heart." We shall briefly summarize Warnke's discussion in order to illustrate the two primary relationships of the conceit. In the Italian poem, the dark or black complexion of the shepherdess is compared to the ink in which Love writes the sentence of the Poet's "sweet and fortunate death":

Quel notturno colore
scolora l'alba e move invidia al giorno;
quel vostro smalto oscuro
al zaffiro fa scorna, ingiuria a l'oro;
quel brun, quel negro vostro
è puro e vivo inchiostro,
onde con l'aureo strale
scrive Amor la sentenza
de la mia dolce e fortunata morte.

The second stanza of Donne's poem reads as follows:

Ah, what a trifle is a heart
If once into Love's hands it come!
All other griefs allow a part
To other griefs, and ask themselves but some;
They come to us, but us Love draws;
He swallows us and never chaws;
By him, as by chain'd shot, whole ranks do die;
He is the tyrant pike, our hearts the fry.

Warnke finds that the difference between the styles of the two poets is indicated by the difference in their use of metaphor: "Marino's lines," he says, "describe the girl's beauty and express the speaker's passion, [sic] by a series of images which are unrelated except as they are derived from blackness. The ink figure surpasses [the other figures in the passage] in ingenuity and development, but its function is no more important and no more central to the poem. Donne's metaphorical description of love as 'chain'd shot' and as 'the tyrant pike', on the other hand, is relevant to the poem's intellectual theme--love as a destructive force. The metaphors take their origin in an intellectual observation rather than, like Marino's, in a physical observation. Their relation to the whole poem is logical rather than tangential."[20]

The comparison of metaphoric function in the poems by Marino and Donne that Warnke offers here seems to demonstrate clearly the two basic functions of the conceit. Although his terms "tangential" and "logical" may be a little misleading--since all conceits will be found to be logically derived--he does point out the fact that the signification

of the Marinistic conceit is not one that refers directly to the paradoxical nature of Love, nor indeed even quite to love as a power whose agent is the girl's beauty. The signification of all Donne's conceits, however, is related to the notion of love as being by definition a destructive power. Marino's conceits are based essentially on the logical predicament of Qualitas, the quality of the "notturno colore" of the shepherdess. Donne's conceits are based on the predicament of Actio, the realization of potency, which more precisely defines love as a power in terms of its effects or objects; the stanza in fact closes with a metaphoric definition of love in terms of active subject ("tyrant pike") and object of effect ("hearts"--"fry").

The functions of decoration and exposition are not of course quite so mutually exclusive as the above comparison may seem to have suggested. Marino's metaphors do, after all, communicate some sense of the power of love working through the dark beauty of the shepherdess, and Donne's conceits do elaborate his theme by concretizing it in several discrete metaphorical units. In the first instance, however, the functional intention remains primarily one of elaboration or embellishment, and in the second that of exposition or illustration. Having once determined the analytical form of the conceit, it will be the logical terms of just this relationship of form to its context or theme that we shall be exploring in order to discover the differences in style and thought that distinguish the lyrics of Donne and Herbert, for example, from those of Marino, Góngora, and Crashaw; for these differences provide the means of differentiating the Metaphysical from the High Baroque.

The terms "Metaphysical," "Baroque," and "High Baroque" are

notoriously troublesome. However, since our discussion is going to be dealing with differences of style in a historical period and with some of the philosophical implications of these differences, such terms of reference are not only convenient but are indeed necessary. Before proceeding in our study, therefore, we should pause to clarify our use of these terms.

The problems of typology and periodicity that arise when one attempts to give these terms a critically precise definition have been ably reviewed by René Wellek in his well known and valuable article, "The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship."[21] We propose to consider the terms "Baroque," "High Baroque," and "Metaphysical" in much the same way that Mario Praz considers the term "Romanticism"; that is, each is an "approximation" or a "serviceable makeshift" that is useful in keeping the historical frame of reference clear, while indicating that we are concerned with matters of stylistic difference rather than with those of similarity.[22] Accordingly, we shall use as a general formulation of "Baroque" and its subsidiary styles of "Metaphysical" and "High Baroque" the definition offered by Warnke in the Introduction to his European Metaphysical Poetry:

> [The term "baroque"] can most profitably be used as a generic designation for the style of the whole period which falls between the Renaissance and the neoclassical era; most modern readers agree in finding a period quality in the literature of the late sixteenth century and the first two-thirds of the seventeenth, and "baroque" suggests this quality better than "seventeenth century" or "late Renaissance." As the description of a period, "baroque" refers not to a precisely definable style but to a cluster of related styles. One of these is the Metaphysical; another is that curious phenomenon . . . known as préciosité. One is left with that group of poets most often called simply "baroque"—Giles Fletcher, Marino, Góngora . . .—practitioners of a style marked by sensuous imagery, exclamatory syntax, and an attempt to

> achieve the stupefying and marvelous, a style which is more a hyperextension of Renaissance techniques than a revolt against these techniques. Such poets adhere to a precisely definable style . . . and their style deserves a name. One might use the term "High Baroque."[23]

Because of some implicit connections with the development of stylistic itself, especially as regards the Metaphysical and the High Baroque, Warnke's classification has a certain historical justification. Earlier we had occasion to mention the classical tripartite division of styles into the High, Middle, and Low or Plain styles, a division that subsequently coalesced into the medieval dichotomy of the Plain and Eloquent. Just as on one hand the Metaphysical style reflects a contemporary development of the medieval notion of the Plain style and its didactic spirit, so likewise Warnke's description of the High Baroque reflects a seventeenth-century development of the classical High style, the style of epideictic or demonstrative oratory.

The concern of this study will be with the two most contrastive styles in Warnke's "cluster of related styles," the Metaphysical and the High Baroque. The <u>précieux</u> must be excluded here for practical reasons, since there seems to be even less agreement about what constitutes <u>préciosité</u> than there is about Metaphysical or Baroque in general, and, according to one student of the subject, <u>préciosité</u> does not offer a particularly distinctive use of the metaphor that would permit us to place this style in the context of comparison and contrast upon which the following examination will be based.[24] The Metaphysical and the High Baroque styles, reflecting their historical antecedents in classical and medieval rhetoric, are characterized by two quite different practices in the use of metaphor. One might be even more precise and

say that these styles are characterized by two different strategies of metaphor, particularly as concerns the matter of their relation to the thought or thematic matter of their contexts.

In order to identify these distinctive styles in the general category of the Baroque and to do so in the more precisely qualitative terms of differences in metaphoric formation and function, we shall perforce concentrate on a few key lyric poems that appear central to and representative of the Metaphysical and High Baroque. The body of lyric poetry in each of these traditions is of course extensive, especially so in the case of the High Baroque. Our choice of poems for examination has been both guided and to some extent facilitated by the persistent recurrence of certain "images" or certain poems as loci critici in studies of the chief poets in these traditions and their conventions of style. Although Marino appears to have been "Marinistic" from the beginning, for Gongorism the references for definition are ultimately reduced to the Panegírico al Duque de Lerma, the Polifemo, and the Soledades. Likewise, although Donne wrote Metaphysical poetry from the beginning, certain poems, like his "Exstasie" and the "Valediction: forbidding Mourning" continue to be touchstones in discussions of the Metaphysical manner.

With respect to our investigation, however, some of these poems seem more clearly to reveal the broad, basic issues of metaphoric form and function that we wish to lay out than do others. Accordingly, our choice of specimens for demonstration has finally been determined by instances in which these issues are most generally defined. One recognizes that the matter of signification and significatory relevance has subtle refinements that go beyond the broad, immediate distinctions

raised in this study. For practical reasons, however, the problems of metaphor in, for example, the clearly exclamatory or ejaculatory poetry of Crashaw, Giles Fletcher, and the American colonist Edward Taylor, and mimetic metaphor in poems like Crashaw's "Musicks Duell" --have by necessity been deferred to a later and more extensive investigation.

In proposing a theory of metaphor phrased in contemporary terms, we seek to offer a general conceptual basis for stylistic, a basis that will aid in the analytical solution to some of the intellectual, rather than the purely aesthetic, problems presented by the stylistic conventions of the Metaphysical and the High Baroque. Our first task is to define the formal structure of the metaphor itself, and this involves a consideration of the ontology or metaphysics of the objects in it and what is done to or with them in forming the metaphor. Here of course the question of heterogeneity becomes relevant, and we propose that by a recourse to Aristotle we can give this question an analytical reference. Having once identified the formal structure of the metaphor, however, there follows the second problem of determining the relationship of this structure to its context, and this relationship will be treated in terms of its significatory relevance. We shall then turn to examine specimens of the High Baroque lyric and note how this structure functions as a means of decorative periphrasis. Our final concern will be with the Metaphysical metaphor, and here we shall see that in this poetry the metaphor typically serves as a vehicle of analytical definition.

We open our discussion with an examination of Aristotle's formulation of the metaphor in his Poetics and shall give special

regard to the analytical and analogical bases of his formulation. We shall see how this theory contrasts with the topical theory of metaphor that the Renaissance inherited from the Roman rhetoricians, and how this latter theory proves inadequate to deal with the significatory function metaphor performs.

II. THE METAPHOR AND ANALOGY

Historically there were two basic formulations of the metaphor available to the Renaissance. The earlier of the two is the analytical or logical definition found in Aristotle's Poetics. The later formulation of metaphor, and the one that appears in handbooks of rhetoric throughout the Renaissance, is found in the writings of the orators and rhetoricians of the late Roman republic and early empire, of which the Institutes of Quintilian offers the most detailed explanation. Although Aristotle's definition of the metaphor is not the one that predominated in the Renaissance and early seventeenth century, it is based none the less on the same system of logic and metaphysics that provided the foundation for theological speculation throughout the period, and the survival of this system to the time of Kant seems to justify an examination of seventeenth-century metaphoric structure in terms of its principles. Such an examination is further justified by the fact that around the middle of the century Continental theorists of the conceit, notably Gracián in Spain and Tesauro in Italy, were themselves investigating the conceit in terms of its being a construct of analogy, and Tesauro explicitly grounded his theory of the metaphor on Cajetan's classification of the types of analogy and on Aristotle's classification of the categories of being.[1]

Aristotle and the Logical Formulation of Metaphor

Aristotle's definition of the metaphor is found in the twenty-

first chapter of his Poetics, and because of its importance to our study, his analysis will be given here in full:

> Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either [1] from genus to species, or [2] from species to genus, or [3] from species to species, or [4] on grounds of analogy. That from genus to species is exemplified in 'Here stands my ship'; for lying at anchor is the 'standing' of a particular kind of thing. That from species to genus in 'Truly ten thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought'; where 'ten thousand', which is a particularly large number, is put in place of the generic 'a large number'. That from species to species in 'Drawing the life with the bronze', and in 'Severing with the enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever' and 'sever' in that of 'draw', both words meaning to 'take away' something. That from analogy is possible whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D. Now and then, too, they qualify the metaphor by adding on to it that to which the word it supplants is relative. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). The cup accordingly will be metaphorically described as the 'shield of Dionysus' (D + A), and the shield as the 'cup of Ares' (B + C). Or to take another instance: As old age (D) is to life (C), so is evening (B) to day (A). One will accordingly describe evening (B) as the 'old age of the day' (D + A) . . . and old age (D) as the 'evening' or 'sunset of life' (B + C). It may be that some of the terms thus related have no special name of their own, but for all that they will be metaphorically described in just the same way [4a]. Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called 'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special name. This nameless act (B), however, stands in just the same relation to its object, sunlight (A), as sowing (D) to the seed-corn (C). Hence the expression . . . 'sowing around a god-created flame' (D + A). There is also another form of qualified metaphor. Having given the thing an alien name, one may by a negative addition deny of it one of the attributes naturally associated with its new name [4b]. An instance of this would be to call the shield not the 'cup of Ares', as in the former case, but a 'cup that holds no wine'. . . .[2]

We may summarize Aristotle's analysis in the following manner: there are four kinds of metaphor, three of which are formed by direct nominative substitution, according to whether the objects involved are related to each other in a generic class (types 1 and 2), or are specifically equivalent within the same genus (type 3). We may call

these three kinds of metaphor simply transferential metaphors, although they are all ultimately based on analogy, since the genus-species relationship is one of analogical similitude. The fourth type of metaphor is explicitly analogical; it differs from the preceeding metaphors most obviously in the matter of structure, for it has four substantive elements instead of only two, and these elements may well involve different classes of beings, flame and seed-grain, as examples. All four classes of metaphor are formed on the basis of a certain similarity in a characteristic or ratio of being. These characteristics are expressed in terms of the categories of being. The "standing"-"lying at anchor" circumstance predicated of a ship is an instance of the category Situs, or Posture; the metaphoric expression of Ulysses' deeds is based on the predicament of Quantity (Quantitas); the metaphor involving the "shield" of Dionysus and the "cup" of Ares, on the predicament Relatio; and the (rather baroque) expression of the "god-created flame" is formed on the predicament of Action (Actio), although the relation of flame and seed-corn to each other, both being objects of action, is Passio.

These predicaments, or categories, of being are not only the lines along which comparisons of objects may be made, but they are in a more general sense the lines along which objects themselves become known, the lines along which the mind orders its apprehension of reality. It is important that this be understood, for until the epoch of Kant the Aristotelian categories provided virtually the only catalogue of being by which things could be conceived to have existence. The categories provide the Gestalt, so to speak, of apperception into which any object could be placed to achieve identity. There has been

of course some dispute through the years as to the nature of the categories, particularly as to whether they were properly enumerated and discriminated, and whether the enumeration itself was exhaustive; but until the time of Kant there was no fundamental change in the doctrine of the categories that appears to have had any great consequence.[3]

The doctrine of the categories was accepted by both of the opposing schools of philosophy in the later medieval period and the Renaissance, by neo-Platonists like St. Bonaventura, and by neo-Aristotelians like St. Thomas--though to be sure there remained sharp and profound disagreement between them as to the metaphysical implications of the categories. The concept of the categories, therefore, provides the primary basis that sets apart analytic logic with its metaphysical implications from the "topical logics" of the Sophistic tradition, the basis of which is ultimately rhetorical rather than analytical.

To begin with, the categories are not a classification of things or even of being in general. They are, technically, a generic list of the kinds of things one attributes to or urges against the subject of an enunciation; they are the universal attributes of substance as it appears as the subject of an enunciation.[4] It is understood, however, that these attributes have a metaphysical implication, since they are in present-day terms something akin to the mental recognition of <u>aspects of being</u> itself.

Aristotle's two complete enumerations of the predicaments are found in his <u>Categories</u> (4. 1b-2a) and the <u>Topics</u> (I. 9. 103b). The ten predicaments are composed of the single concept of <u>substance</u> and nine concepts of <u>accident</u>. The concept of substance is the concept of

a thing as having something essential about it, something without which it could not be what it is, could not indeed be at all.[5] Accident, on the other hand, is the attribute which is not formally essential to a thing's being in nature. The predicaments, therefore, have a reference that is ultimately metaphysical and goes beyond that of the purely mental, terminological relationships expressed through the "predicables"; the predicaments are understood to apply in some manner to things as they really exist and not just in the way they exist in the mind as elements in a proposition. Although the ten predicaments are discussed at various lengths in the logical treatises, Aristotle and subsequent commentators tend to rely on examples to identify these concepts of being. The following list is adapted from Sir David Ross's summary of Aristotle's own illustrations in the Categories.[6]

Substantia	Substance	"man"
Quantitas	Quantity	"two cubits long"
Qualitas	Quality	"white"
Relatio	Relation	"double"
Ubi	Place-Where	"in the Lyceum"
Quando	Time-When	"yesterday"
Situs	Posture	"sits"
Habitus	Possession-Condition	"is shod"
Actio	Action	"cuts"
Passio	Passivity-Recipient of Action	"is cut"

Functionally, these categories are the instruments by which one attains a knowledge of reality; they are the instruments of apprehension in logic, of order in metaphysics.[7] The predicables, on the other hand, are distinguished from the predicaments or categories, with which they were often confused in subsequent logics, in that the former provide the purely logical terms for the analysis of the objects of experience, as these objects appear in dialectical propositions concerning their

epistemological identity. Both the predicables and the predicaments are, in their different spheres, attempts to reduce the contents of knowledge to supreme classes; the predicables, however, are limited to showing the different logical relations a predicate may have with regard to its subject in a dialectical, rather than in a metaphysical or ontological, framework of a proposition. The frames of reference for the two are, accordingly, quite different; dialectically the proposition "Man is a rational animal" involves only a statement of species, genus, and the differentia distinguishing the two. Metaphysically, however, this proposition directly and immediately involves the essential characteristics of man, animal, and reason.

Medieval and Renaissance logics recognized five predicables or "common words" by which one could determine the nature of a statement or proposition. They are genus, species, difference, property, and accident.[8] Because of the dual aspect of Substantia as an ens rationis and an ens realia, these five predicables may be conveniently reduced to a basic three: essence, property, and accidence. The proposition "Man is a rational animal" predicates something essential about the nature of man as an animal, and is thus a definition. A property is a predicate that "does not indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that thing alone," i.e., necessarily, and Aristotle (Topics I. 4. 102a) cites the ability to learn grammar as a property of man, since only man can learn grammar but the learning of grammar is not essential to the being of man. An accident is something that may or may not belong to a thing necessarily in a given instance: thus, "A man sits" is a proposition of accident, since he may also not sit. When an accident is necessarily connected to something in a particular

situation, it becomes what the later logics called a "temporary property." The distinction between a "temporary property" and a real or "true" property may be illustrated by the following example from physics: solidity is a "temporary property" of water, since it only exists when water is in a frozen state; solidity, however, is a "permanent property" of ice, for it is always and everywhere connected with ice. Generally speaking, then, solidity would be an accident of water, a property of ice.

Although the predicables are important for logical demonstration, they remain tied to the grammatical sentence. The signification of the analogical structure tends to ignore the difference between property and accidence, since, as we shall see, the concept of the genus of similitude tends naturally to abolish the distinction between the two, and makes all accidents either real or temporary properties of the identities involved in the analogical situation: matters of solidity and liquidness become merely two aspects of the form Qualitas predicated of the concept water, for example. An analysis of Aristotle's metaphoric example "sowing around a god-created flame" performed by means of the predicables will be ultimately inconclusive, since sowing grain is an accident of man, who nominally does the sowing, but casting-forth flame is a property of the sun. On the basis of the predicables, the only correlative relation between the two is one of non-essentiality, and on this basis one thing can be analogated with anything else, and the analogy need not have a necessary significance.

One must, therefore, refer himself to the metaphysical references offered by the categories in order to retain the essential nature of the identities involved in analogical signification. The categories are

on one hand more general than the predicables in that they have metaphysical implications; but at the same time they are more specific, since they deal with particular aspects of <u>being</u> and not merely with logical relations. The situation between the two is summed up by Aristotle, who says that: "The accident and genus and property and definition of anything will always be in one of these categories [of being]" (<u>Topics</u> I. 9. 103b). We shall accordingly read analogical propositions as propositions of predicaments, not of predicables. An expression like "lips as red as cherries," for example, will be taken as a statement of <u>Qualitas</u> rather than as one of <u>property</u>. In our discussion we shall from time to time use the conventional term "adjunct" to refer to things "adjoined"--property and accident--but only as a guide to analysis, not as a term limiting the analysis itself. The analogating predicaments of being remain our chief concern.

There still remains the question as to the nature of meaning expressed in the analogical proposition. Does an analogical predicament indicate in some manner a "real" condition of being between two substances, or is it merely an operation of the intellect that has no necessary real implication? In either case it seems that what is done to the substantive elements in the analogy is of crucial concern. The question is especially important in our consideration of metaphoric analogy; for when Donne, for example, compares the souls of two lovers with "stiffe twin compasses" inscribing a circle, we do, in some manner, seem to discover more about the essential nature of souls than we do in his earlier comparison of them with "gold to ayery thinnesse beate."[9] We must, therefore, determine how the predication of a common category of being makes two things "similar," makes them, in the structure of

the analogical circumstance, metaphysically equivalent in the sense that one is found to be participating in the being of the other. Answering this will involve an examination of the theories of predication in analytical logic, and to this we shall now briefly turn.

Analogy and Predication

Knowledge may be considered a matter of predication: to know a thing is to apprehend its "articulable meaning" (logos), or what can be said about it. The thing about which something is said or predicated is the subject (it "undergoes" or "is subjected to" the enunciation). Predication thus involves subjecting a perceived substantive to one or more of the nine modes of existence comprising the categories of accidence, for they tell what happens (accidit) to the subject. It is only through accidents, according to the Aristotelian epistemology, that one can know substances, for although "accidents and motions and privations have little or no being; nevertheless they are better known to us than the substances of things, because they are nearer to the senses."[10]

Poetry is of course but one of many possible ways of talking about things; it is compelled to observe the laws of predication that govern all articulable forms of meaning, and therefore poetry has a direct, if perhaps slightly distant, connection with the science of logic. The aesthetic intention of poetry is what removes it from a more immediate connection with the science of logic, since poetry is permitted a greater latitude with regard to propriety in predication, particularly in regard to the use of "improper accidents" for the formation of metaphor.[11] St. Thomas, therefore, unhesitatingly subordinates poetry to analytics, declaring that poetry reflects the

logic of "as-if," i.e., when judgment leads to one of the two parts of a contradiction because of the manner of presentation.[12]

Although predication does subject a substance to a certain mode of existence in the mind, predication is nevertheless understood to reflect in some manner something about the essential nature of the substance as it exists in nature. The precise manner of the correspondence of the mental intention with the external fact is very much at the heart of the concept of predication itself, and, consequently, is at the heart of metaphoric signification likewise. One may illustrate this idea by taking as an example the accident Qualitas, specifically the quality of redness, and considering it as it appears in rubies and in a glowing ember. In one sense the quality of color is the same for each; in another it is quite different. The redness of a glowing ember and of a ruby clearly "inheres" in the subject in both cases, but in each case it is also not quite the same kind of redness, especially in view of the fact that the color of the gem exists independently of the quality of heat, whereas the color of the ember does not, and is indeed a function of the degree of heat involved. We thus have the problem of a simultaneous conception of similarity and difference in the notion of redness when it is predicated of two differing substances. This problem hinges on the question of how one goes about "naming" things, be it the quality of redness or anything else, and the answer to the question depends upon how one conceives the act of predication itself.

There are three ways in which things may be named: univocally, equivocally, and analogically. The first two kinds of predication had been identified as early as Aristotle; the third category of predication, however, is a later development in the theory and derives mainly

from St. Thomas. Things named univocally will possess a common characteristic or ratio: the term of designation will mean the same thing when predicated of different things. If one call an oak a tree and an elm a tree, the word "tree" designates an intrinsic formal constituent of both the elm and the oak that each equally possesses and by which they are the same, though for other reasons they may differ. Univocally then, "redness" will designate the same thing formally when predicated of a ruby or of a glowing ember. Things named equivocally, on the other hand, will have a common name, but that is all they will have in common, for the rationes will differ: a writing pen is different from an animal pen; a red stone is different from a red coal. Univocity thus seems to imply an essential formal sameness in predication, equivocity an equally fundamental sense of difference.

The third mode of predication, however, attempts to recognize both these aspects of similarity and difference, and this mode involves the concept of analogical predication. Analogical terms have a meaning that is neither entirely the same nor entirely different when predicated of diverse objects. Thus one can have a "good" dinner and can wear "good" shoes: the term "good," however, does not signify any common constituent or conception of dinner and shoes. It does indicate that there is a similarity in the characteristics of the objects, in that it designates that the relation between the dinner and what a dinner ought to be, on one hand, is similar to the relation between shoes and what shoes ought to be on the other. Proportionately speaking, therefore, both dinner and shoes may thus be called "good."[13] Referring to our example of the ruby and the glowing ember, analogical predi-

cation would indicate that the relation between "redness" and the ruby is analogous to that obtaining between "redness" and the ember.

Returning to the metaphor, we find in Aristotle's formulation that the transferential metaphors, the metaphors based on specific and generic relationships, involve operations with things that have essential sameness. From his examples of transferential metaphor, one can see the sense of translatio in definitions of metaphor like the following from the influential handbook, the Rhetorica ad Herennium of the first century B.C.: "Metaphor occurs when a word applying to one thing is transferred to another because the similarity seems to justify this transference."[14]

In every case of transferential metaphor, Aristotle's example deals with an accident of being and not with a substance, with an "adjunct" rather than with a subject. Indeed, in each of the three cases of transferential metaphor, the accidents concerned are related to the same substance. One can easily transfer accidents because they all have the same essence, namely, dependent being; this is especially true, of course, in any case of genus-species relationship, since the concept of genus derives from the notion of common formal characteristics or rationes. Transference is not so easy, however, when substantial identities are analogated. In the Biblical expression of Christ as the "Lion of the tribe of Juda" (Revelation 5: 5), for example, the question of accidence is clearly dependent upon the conceptions of the vastly differing identities Christ and lion, for there is no scientifically predetermined general class of substance that will contain both the concept "lion" and the concept "Christ."

The characteristics of Christ and the lion do have this in common, however, that they are conceived to exercise lordship or imperium, since the lion is understood to be supreme in the animal kingdom. This common formal ratio provides the basis of the comparison between them. Imperium thus becomes formally the generic conception of similitude within which the concepts "Christ" and "lion" both have a specific relative being. Christ realizes imperium to a far greater degree than does the lion, but within the genus Imperium the difference is merely relative, since this formal character is predicated univocally to both of them. Imperium thus in effect becomes the "adjunct" (technically, a "permanent property") of Christ and the lion, and this permits the analogy to proceed in the normal manner through the adjuncts of the subject, the accidents of the essence, since it is the Imperium of Christ that is going to be compared with the imperium of the lion.[15] Accordingly then, we shall have an analogy predicated univocally on the category of Relatio. Since of course Juda is a patronym of the Jews, we shall have the following analogy: On the basis of Imperium, the lion is to the animal kingdom as Christ is to the kingdom (tribe) of the Jews, i.e., "King of the Jews" (Matthew 2: 2).

Similarly, Aristotle's example of "sowing around a god-created flame" relies on Casting-forth as a generic conception of similitude within which the acts of sowing grain and of emitting flame are viewed as being specific equivalents. Flame is related to sun as seed is related to one sowing it; hence by univocal predication of Actio ("Casting-forth"), one can analogate the two objects.

Aristotle's examples reflect his (and the Platonic) sense of

the logic of analogy as being essentially a relation that is ordered in generally mathematical or geometric terms, and hence the univocity of predication throughout.[16] His example of the cup of Dionysus-shield of Ares reflects this sense of Relatio quite clearly, in that the cup is the adjunct of Dionysus in just the same way (i.e., Habitus) that the shield is the adjunct of Ares. Also, since old age is related to life in the same way that evening is related to the day (Relatio: part to whole), the adjuncts "old age" and "evening" become transferrable.

The univocal predication of the character Imperium to the objects in the Biblical example implies that there is an a-priori concept or form of lordship within which Christ and the lion participate in degrees reflecting the relative difference of their kingdoms, and, superficially at least, this predication is logically sufficient. If, however, one give regard to the ontological implications of the conceptions of these identities, certain questions arise concerning the metaphysical sufficiency of the logic; for Christ's mode of existence transcends that of the lion not only in degree but in kind, and hence His exercise of imperium ought also to differ in kind as well as in degree. Univocal predication of any aspect of being would seem to be therefore inadequate as a metaphysical designator of real being. This problem extends, of course, to genus and species concepts regarding the phenomena of the created world, as may be illustrated by the following example from St. Thomas. The notion signified by the term "animal" is "animate sensitive substance"; in this genus both man and horse are species that are equally animals, but man and the horse are not equal animals[17]--unless one can somehow demonstrate that they equally possess or equally lack the fundamental differentiating property of reason.

The question at issue seems ultimately to be one of opposing conceptions of form. Either form exists apart from matter in an absolute ideal realm as a generative archetype, as Plato and the neo-Platonists maintained it did, or else it is inherent in matter or is at least a potential of matter, as contended by Aristotle and his followers. The conception of form as existing apart from matter implies that it is an a-priori cause of knowledge as well as a cause of being, and the apparent diversity of phenomena can be reduced to an essential formal unity. However, if form be conceived not to exist apart from matter, then it is a cause of knowledge only after the fact of being, and will therefore reflect in some manner essential differences in the modes of being.

These two opposing conceptions of form thus have important implications for the concept of analogy, whether analogy be functioning as a structure of dialectic or as one governed by rhetorical concerns. Analogy is a structure of definition, since in effect one thing is defined by means of another, as Christ is defined as a lion in terms of Relatio. If the predicaments forming the analogy be predicated univocally, then the idea of similitude involved in the analogues is one that implies an essential, a formal likeness, and the apparent differences between them are merely matters of the relative degree of material imperfection that each has with regard to the generic form within which both are conceived to participate. One has in this case an Analogy of Inequality, an analogy predicated on equality in the concept of being (i.e., the form) but inequality in the realization of it. On the other hand, if the predication of similitude be understood to allow for differences not only in the degree of formal realization but in the mode or manner of

realization of being, then one has modal analogy, or the Analogy of Proportionality.

Since the Analogy of Proportionality is pre-eminently a device of dialectic, and since its concern is with modes of difference in the predicate of essential likeness between its subjects, we may expect that metaphors formed on the logic of this analogy will be restricted to the Plain style, the style of dialectic and, in the seventeenth century, of Metaphysical poetry. Generally speaking, such an analogy will function much less to decorate or elaborate a contextual subject as to communicate or exemplify its significance. Hence the signification of the metaphoric Analogy of Proportionality ought to be centrally related or even integrated with the theme or thesis of its context. The structure and function of this type of analogy will be examined in greater detail in our discussion of the Metaphysical style in chapter V.

The metaphor structured on the logic of the Analogy of Inequality is much less limited in its use. Since univocal predication assumes a formal similarity in the subjects analogated, the relationship of this metaphor to its context is one of the degree of relevancy: it may function, therefore, either as a definitory, or exemplary, conveyance of meaning or as an aesthetic elaboration, or decoration, of meaning. Its relationship to context may be either central or peripheral, and accordingly it may function in both the High style of the High Baroque as well as in the Plain style of the Metaphysical.

Because of the greater versatility of this latter metaphor, and because it is by all odds the most common form of metaphor in

poetry, we shall use the metaphoric Analogy of Inequality as the vehicle to describe how metaphor in general signifies and how that signification is related to context. We shall leave the discussion of metaphoric Analogy of Proportionality to the chapter on Metaphysical poetry, where it will be seen to function in a strictly definitory and illustrative manner.

In concluding our examination of some of the technical aspects of predication in the logic of analogy, we wish to emphasize in particular two important points about the nature of this conceptual structure. First, as our discussion sought to make clear, analogy is a conceptual structure that signifies. By whichever theory of predication an analogy be formed, it is a self-contained structure of thought that needs no external logical reference to provide its proper or intrinsic meaning. The elements in the analogates are always more strictly related to their analogues than they may be to anything else outside the analogical context. The logical means by which this significatory relationship is established are the categories of being, which in effect define the analogous relationships. From this follows the second point of our discussion: the import of the analogous relationships is always itself definitory. One thing is defined in terms of something else, or both are defined in terms of a generic conception within which the two analogues are specific participants: "The object signified by proper [i.e., non-metaphorical] terms," says Tesauro, "imparts nothing but itself; but that signified through metaphor [analogy] imparts two objects at one time, one within the other."[18] Both logically and epistemologically, therefore, analogy is a formal conceptualization that is quite literally a conceit. In the contexts of philosophical and pedagogical discourse,

it is a structure governed by the principles of dialectic; in poetry and oratory it is a trope, a "figure of thought" and a device of stylistic, which is governed by the rules of rhetoric, and here it is called metaphor.

Before considering examples of typical logical relationships in metaphoric analogy, we may pause to examine briefly the topical formulation of metaphor that was derived from the Roman rhetoricians, so that we may point out some of the more important shortcomings of this formulation as a means of practical analysis.

Quintilian and the Topical Formulation of Metaphor

The most common description of metaphor that one encounters in the Roman rhetoricians is grammatical, that is, metaphor tends to be defined as a comparison that is either a shortened simile or is a simile contracted into one word.[19] Regarding the process of metaphoric comparison, Cicero, for example, gives the standard caution that the things compared must have, in some manner, a "real resemblance,"[20] but when it comes to a precise identification of what constitutes this resemblance, Cicero, Quintilian, and the anonymous author of the early Ad Herennium are all silent.

Quintilian's Insituto Oratoria (VIII. vi. 5-6, 9-13) offers the most detailed analysis of metaphor in the texts of the Roman rhetoricians. Quintilian finds that the transference of terms (translatio) can come about through the comparison of objects in four general ways: (1) by the substitution of one animate thing for another animate thing, as steersman for "chariot driver"; (2) by the substitution of an inanimate for another inanimate thing, as in "gave his fleet the rein";[21] (3) by the substitution of an inanimate thing for an animate thing, as "the

enemy" called a sword; (4) by the substitution of an animate thing for an inanimate thing, as "the brow of the mountain."

Apparently included in the fourth class of metaphor is personification ("giving inanimate objects life and action"), which is singled out as an especially "bold and almost hazardous" use of metaphor. These four primary classes of metaphor are further subdivided into a number of species, among the more notable of which is the transference based on the idea of rationality, such as that proceeding from rational beings to other rational beings, from rational beings to irrational, from irrational to rational, and finally from irrational to other irrational beings. Quintilian's idea of metaphoric formation is followed rather faithfully in subsequent treatises and handbooks on rhetoric, like Donatus' Ars Grammatica (c. 353), Matthieu de Vendôme's Ars Versificatoria (1175); it appears in Erasmus' influential De Copia (1512), xvi-xvii, and not surprisingly in Richard Sherry's A Treatise of Schemes & Tropes (1550).[22]

This treatment of metaphor obviously has only a superficial regard for the essential nature of the identities involved in the transference of names; indeed, the second of Quintilian's examples suggests that there may have been some uncertainty about the idea of "naming" itself. The classification is not, strictly speaking, logical at all, and tends to ignore, if not in fact to misrepresent, the conceptual function that metaphor performs. Quintilian's formulation of the metaphor quite misses the point in our example of Christ as the "lion of the tribe of Juda," since this expression is not at all concerned with the fact that the lion is not a rational creature and that Christ is eminently so, nor with the fact that they both are "animate" beings, though--and this of course is important--they are

"animate" in completely different ways. The concepts animate and rational do not have any significance in and for the analogical circumstance involving Christ and the lion.

The inadequacies of this idea of metaphor are especially demonstrated in the case of analogy itself. In the Instituto Oratoria the figure of analogy is buried in the general topos or "argument" of Similitudo (V. xi. 34), where it will remain throughout the centuries. It may be a little surprising, however, to discover that the simile, which even then was customarily defined in grammatical terms as the explicit comparison of two things "nearly equal," includes what we should now think of as the full-fledged argument by analogy. This topical conception of analogy as argument filters into logic as the source of the persistent confusion of concept with argument that underlies topical logics in general, and most notably Ramistic logic.[23]

Both metaphor and analogy were understood to be based in some way on similarity, but the Roman rhetoricians were not concerned to determine just how this similarity came to exist, apparently being content to leave this problem to philosophers, and were inclined to accept the identities in a metaphor as things given, to assume them as things more or less generally understood. Their reasoning, accordingly, tends to be topological, to rely on common conceptions of identity as the elements of knowledge and on "commonplaces" as principles of reference in the reasoning process. Indeed, the Romans seem to have resisted impulses to analysis that sought to go beyond such common conceptions. Regarding the matter of similitude, for example, Quintilian objects to attempts to carry analysis beyond the general distinctions he has marked out, and he complains about those writers "who have shown pe-

dantic zeal [inani diligentia] in making a minute classification of similes, and have pointed out that there is a lesser similitude . . . a greater similitude . . . a similitude in things dissimilar . . . [and] dissimilitude in things similar . . . I cannot see," he concludes, "that such distinctions have any real bearing on the subject under discussion" (V. xi. 30-31). In one respect of course Quintilian is quite right: when one starts thinking topically, quantitatively, rather than analytically, one finds himself multiplying distinctions instead of reducing them to the increasingly generalized principles that characterize scientific logic.

Topical thought deals with the appearance of things. The difference between topical and analytical conceptualization is concisely described by Walter J. Ong at one point in his examination of the medieval and Renaissance logical tradition in the following manner:

> The manner of conceptualizing is different for the categories and the places: relation (relatio) is a category, related items (relata) a place: likeness (similitudo) falls under the categories, like items or like things (similia) are among the places. The topics are thus more concrete conceptualizations than the categories.[24]

Admittedly, superficial or "proximate" truth is indeed the concern of the orator, and not scientific or probable truth, which belongs to the logicians and dialecticians respectively. None the less, when one is dealing with metaphor and analogy, he is involved with matters of signification, and these imply analytics. Quintilian's definition of the metaphor in effect denies its significatory function and leaves it with only a decorative utility, leaves it mainly as a device of stylistic with a corresponding loss as a vehicle of intellection. His method of descriptive analysis, which relies on topical points of reference, reflects an attitude that will come to dominate logic and dialectic in

the following centuries, an attitude that may be summarized by Agricola, who, it is said, did not care how one thing applied to another, provided only that it was understood to apply and that the application be teachable.[25] Perhaps one may best illustrate the loss of the analytical dimension here by considering what Quintilian does with Aristotle's categories of being. Quintilian takes his list of the predicaments from Aristotle's Topics, not from the Categories, and views the first four categories (essence [i.e., substance], quality, quantity, relation) simply as legal situations, "bases" for contention; the remainder are explicitly and erroneously designated as "topics for argument" (Instituto Oratoria III. vi. 23-28).

Translating the highly conceptual categories into merely procedural elements of forensic oratory most effectively undermines their analytical, scientific utility, and clearly reveals the limitation of conceptual reference to the concrete and common. This limitation in effect achieves a "rhetorization" of logic, translates logica into dialectica, and leaves analytics, as understood by Aristotle, as an orphan to be later adopted by the good Lady Theology. Quintilian's approach to the categories is a significant indication of the fact that historically Aristotle's Organon is going to be read mainly in terms of the Topics, an essentially rhetorical treatise that already Cicero had claimed to have "simplified." As a consequence, through the centuries and particularly in the Renaissance, much "inani diligentia" was to be devoted to hair-splitting in order to try to make quantitative topical logic perform the function of analytics. These efforts

naturally would prove fruitless, for the conceptualization of the topos ultimately begs the question of epistemology.


One cannot solve the problem of likeness that is involved in metaphoric formation and in formal analogy by treating Similitudo as a topos and then invoking the additional topoi of Greater and Lesser, Difference, Antitheses, and the like, to define it. The more topical distinctions one makes, the more he finds need to be made. Handbooks of rhetoric and logic in the Renaissance are regularly constrained to distinguish Comparison from Similitude and both from Contraries, and then further to subdivide each of these.[26] Through the centuries, therefore, all sorts of conceptions that seem to have some analytical utility will come to be added to the topological catalogue of Inventio, and the catalogue itself will in turn come virtually to define the Ars Logica of the Renaissance.[27]

As one might expect, there was a marked lack of agreement on the number and kinds of commonplaces one ought to have in a perfected logic.[28] Generally speaking, the novelty of a new logic in the Renaissance lay in its revision of the commonplace catalogue; and the confusion this habit of revision led to is indicated by Richard Sherry, who complained about the commonplaces being difficult to talk about because "the varietie of authors hath made the handlynge of them sumwhat darke, because amonge them selues they can not wel agre, neyther of the names, neyther of the number, neyther of the order."[29] Even today, some four-hundred years after Sherry wrote his complaint, one finds himself rather hard put to obtain a representative index of the number and kinds of topoi in the Renaissance.[30]

We may conclude our examination of the Roman rhetoricians' formu-

lation of metaphor and its connection with topical thought by noting that, just as their notion of the metaphor avoids or even misrepresents the question of signification, so likewise does their idea of analogy as a vaguely defined argument by example ignore the question of how the example obtains in the "cause" with which it is compared. We have seen that the conceptual frames of reference in topical thought are not adequate to answer questions of signification, since ultimately the topoi, the "commonplaces," lack a metaphysical reference.

If the sense of similitude or equivalence in the relationship of objects in a metaphorical or analogical situation be assumed to have significance, these objects must have an articulable identity, and the epistemology involved in the definition or "naming" of things presupposes, as Aristotle had seen, a metaphysics of being itself. Historically, therefore, the ten metaphysical categories of being, and not the innumerable commonplaces, offer the most nearly sufficient determinants of identity.



III. GENERAL FORM AND FUNCTION OF METAPHORIC ANALOGY

The preceeding discussion sought to identify the conception of analogy as a self-sufficient formal structure that has an intrinsic meaning based on the principles of Aristotelian analytics. We shall find below in examples of analogy drawn from Aristotle himself, and from such diverse poets as Homer, Petrarch, Spenser, and Góngora, that the ideal of formal integrity in signification still holds when the function of this structure is governed by rhetorical rather than by strictly dialectical principles. As in grammar, where a reciprocal relation between a subject and the elements of its predicate produces a meaningful content in the sentence, so the mutual relationships between the subjects of an analogy and their adjuncts and objects produce, in terms of the predicated categorical relation, the intrinsic signification of the analogical structure.

The old issue of adornment versus meaning, of rhetorical effect as opposed to dialectical truth in the use of figurative language, may justly be viewed perhaps as being basically a question of the relevance of particular meaning to general import. With regard to metaphor, the question of relevancy in function becomes one of the <u>degree of integration</u> of the intrinsic signification of the particular metaphoric unit with the general meaning of its context. The question is crucial for the metaphor formed explicitly on the four-fold structure of analogy (Aristotle's fourth type), since the formal nature of this figure allows, as we shall see below, for a greater degree of complexity and

comprehensiveness than is possible with the merely transferential metaphor (Aristotle's first three types), or, for that matter, with any other device of rhetoric.

The question of contextual function cannot, however, be posed in terms of a strict distinction between either adornment or meaning: any metaphor by its very non-literal nature adds a certain aesthetic quality to its context, while at the same time it conveys some sort of meaningful modification of that context. Meaningful relevance, therefore, is more a matter of determining whether the signification of the given metaphor be central to the contextual signification or be incidental to it, and this determination will appear in terms of relative degree. In general, however, one may say that a metaphor which conveys the central thought of its context in itself, or either summarizes or exemplifies that thought, will have a significatory relationship that is central, and, as a consequence, will have a function that is primarily, though not exclusively, one of communication. Conversely, a metaphor that is periphrastic and serves to enhance the emotional impress of its context will virtually always be related tangentially or incidentally to the main line of thought in the context as a whole, and its function will be largely decorative.

In the discussion that follows we shall examine specimens of metaphoric analogy drawn from various sources to define more clearly the formal nature of this device, and to see how it permits certain complexities to occur in the logic of analogy within its basic four-fold structure. From this examination of structural complexities, we shall next turn to consider how this structure functions in central and peripheral relationships with its contexts.

Metaphoric Structure: Predication and the Genus of Similitude

We recall that in his definition of metaphor, quoted at the beginning of the preceeding chapter, Aristotle used the example of the relation of Dionysus' cup and Ares' shield to illustrate his idea of the proportional or analogous metaphor. This relation can be expressed in the following manner:

Dionysus (A) : Cup (B) = Ares (C) : Shield (D)

On the basis of the common predicament of Relatio, then, either the cup and the shield, on one hand, or Dionysus and Ares, on the other, can be treated as logical equivalents and be substituted for each other in a manner similar to the way in which one would customarily handle a mathematical equation of proportionate quantity:

Shield + Dionysus (D + A) = Cup + Ares (B + C)

--which is to say with Aristotle that the cup may be metaphorized as the "shield of Dionysus" and the shield as the "cup of Ares."

It was also observed that in Aristotle's definition Relatio seemed to have been the only predicament by which he viewed analogy as it operated in a metaphoric fashion, though elsewhere he does cite Actio as best for producing "graphic" and "lively" effects.[1] One finds that other categories do indeed become involved in the structuring of metaphoric analogy, among the more important of which is Qualitas. With the possibility of other categories of accidence appearing in an analogical situation--and often more than one of them at the same time--the relationships among the various identities in the analogy can become extremely complex indeed, and we shall see examples of just how complex they can become in the following pages. To make the logical ordering of these relationships as clear as possible and to point out the precise categories of being involved in the analogical process, we shall make use of

a schematic form of presentation that will be rather different from the more conventional notation that we have just used in illustrating the example from Aristotle. In the schema to be used in the remainder of our discussion, Aristotle's example of the proportional metaphor would appear as shown below.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Type of Comparison
Subject	Dionysus		Ares	Species-Species
Predicate	is to	Relatio	is to	- - -
Object	cup		shield	Species-Species

Fig. 1.--Aristotle: "Dionysus' Shield"-"Ares' Cup" Analogy

The Analogates designate each of the two sequences of subjects and their objects of relationship that are in various ways different, but which are compared or juxtaposed for the purpose of discovering similitude in terms of a category or predicament of being (P) that is predicated univocally for both. Our discussion of the Analogy of Inequality pointed out that univocity in predication necessarily implies an essential, formal equivalence in the things predicated, at least from the standpoint of purely logical considerations. The schema illustrates this sense of equivalence by opposing the specific subjects, the god of wine and the god of war, and their specific objects of relationship, respectively the cup and the shield. Being logically equivalent in terms of Relatio, they are transferrable; and one finally ends with a simple case of transferential metaphor--in this case the transference of species to species (type 3 in Aristotle)--the transference being one involving either the specific subjects (Dionysus, Ares) or the specific objects (cup, shield).

The substantial elements in an analogical metaphor are not of course limited only to four, nor are the subjects and the objects in either of the parallel series of analogates always to be found to have only a specific relationship to their counterparts in the other analogate. The following example from the Iliad (xi. 292-295) is formed on the category Actio. It contains six substantial elements and demonstrates a genus to species relationship in the subject analogues. Homer's metaphor reads as follows:

> And even as when a huntsman sets his white-toothed hounds upon a wild boar or a lion, so upon the Achaeans did Hector, son of Priam, peer of Ares, the bane of mortals, set the great-souled Trojans.

Omitting the honorific epithets, the form of this simile would appear as in the following schema.[2]

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Genus of Similitude	Type of Comparison
Subject	huntsman		Hector	Huntsman	Genus-Species
Predicate	sets upon	Actio	did set upon	- - -	
Instrumental Object	hounds		Trojans	(Hunting-Animal)	Species-Species
Object of Action	boar, lion		Achaeans	(Prey)	Species-Species

Fig. 2.--Homer: Hector-Huntsman Analogy

Several important observations about the formal nature of signification in the analogical metaphor can be drawn from this relatively straightforward example from Homer. First, and perhaps most important, the generic classes of similitude in the identities involved in the analogy provide the key to the interpretation of the metaphor. Both Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology agree that with regard to the

relation of universals to particulars, the former offer the greater extent of knowledge. Such universals are, in strictly Aristotelian terms, "second substances," and it is through them that one comes to know specific identities or "primary substances." In Homer's analogy "huntsman" is in a generic class that contains both any given hunter and Prince Hector. The concept Huntsman involves action in the way Homer's huntsman acts; but the huntsman--any huntsman--exists also as a primary substance, a real being, and this means that the concept of a huntsman is capable of formal definition. Prince Hector, on the other hand, can exist here only as a primary substance. In terms of the predicament of action, then, Hector as a particular being is known through the definition of Huntsman as a being of action.[3]

It happens here that in the Subject analogues one of them is at first hand already in a generic relationship to the other. This is not the case for the corresponding Instrumental Objects and the Objects of Action. Between these objects in the two analogous series are differences in kind--that is, the differentia dividing "hounds" from "Trojans" and a "boar and lion" from "Achaeans" is more essential than that which divides Hector the man from a man who is a hunter. When such differences of substantial nature occur, one must move to a higher, more comprehensive generic concept that will include both the differing beings in terms of their predicate of similitude, which is here that of active being (Actio).

In the Homeric analogy the predicament Actio is given as sufficient for the beings compared, and one need only seek a generic concept that will harmonize the differing beings in the classes of Instrumental Objects and the Objects of Action. In the case of the former, the two beings are harmonized in the generic concept Hunting-Animal, and with the Objects of Action the concept Prey appears to be adequate

as a generic concept containing the boar and lion and the Achaeans.[4]

One tends perhaps automatically to follow just this procedure in reading a lucid, "judicious" metaphor like this one; yet we shall find that the apparent obscurantism of the Baroque metaphor is largely the product of a deliberate attempt to forestall the automatic nature of this response and to compel the reader to perform a conscious analysis.

This matter of the genus of similitude regarding the ordering of the various subjects and objects in analogical situations needs to be emphasized, because it seems to be ignored by virtually every post-Romantic commentator on metaphor, and because it is in fact just what is often required for the understanding of metaphoric analogy when it appears in High Baroque poetry, indeed, in any poetry of the period in which univocal predication is structuring metaphor. We may take as a general principle, then, that when the analogated identities are not the same kind of beings--are not of the same genus --one must perforce find a generic class that will include them on the basis of their given predicate of relationship in order to determine both the metaphor's proper or intrinsic significance as well as its meaning in terms of its relation to the larger context of which it is a part.

Determining the inclusive, generic class-concept on the basis of the analogical predicament of being is of particular importance in working out the logical aspects of metaphor, and it is the logic in the metaphor that forms the basis of its signification. In the Analogy of Inequality, which is by all odds the most common kind of metaphoric analogy, the given predicaments are taken always to be the sufficient categories of definition, just as is the case with Relatio

in the example from Aristotle, and Actio in the one from Homer.[5] Therefore, as the ruby and the glowing ember of our discussion in chapter II become one in the predicament Qualitas ("redness"), so the boar-plus-lion of the first Analogate in the metaphor from the Iliad and the Achaeans of the second Analogate become one in the predicament Actio. Logically, or epistemologically, what happens in Homer's metaphor is simply that Hector becomes named a "huntsman," the Trojans are named as "hunting-animals," and the hapless Achaeans in turn become their "prey."

If one have this principle of the generic class-concept of similitude well in mind, he need not become unduly concerned by tense-shifts in the verbal predicates of the analogous subjects, especially if one of the tenses applies to a generic situation in one of the subjects.[6] Concerning the verbal predicates of Hector and huntsman in the Homeric metaphor, there is a shift in tense between the predicate of huntsman ("sets upon"), a present tense, and the past tense of the verbal predicate of Hector ("did set upon"). The first predicate is really nothing more than the generic present, the generic "When" that together with the generic "Where" always apply absolutely in any genus definition. A hunter at any time and in any place may be supposed to act as Homer's huntsman acts. The past tense in the second Analogate is simply the narrative past and serves merely to give a temporal perspective to Hector's actions in the poem. The shift in tenses in this analogy is therefore of no special consequence to the signification of the analogy itself, and such tense shifts will not be consequential unless the predicament Quando is itself involved in the formation of the analogy.

As a final observation concerning this metaphor from the Iliad,

we may note that the homogeneous ordering of the various substantial elements in the two Analogates extends even to number and to the adjuncts in the Instrumental Objects. As the huntsman is singular, so is Hector an individual; the hounds are plural and so are the Trojans compared with them; and, finally, to the plural Achaeans corresponds the plural analogue of boar-plus-lion. The strict parallelism between the Instrumental Objects, the hounds and Trojans, is further marked by the correspondence of the attribute "white-toothed" with the implicit "armed" attributive of the Trojans. This detailed parallelism between analogated objects seems to be fairly characteristic of the classical or "decorous" metaphor, which is responding to the twofold stylistic requirements of clarity and decorativeness. The Homeric example we have discussed here may be taken, therefore, as representative of the general form of metaphoric analogy in its "purest" aspect.

Metaphoric Structure: Multiple Predicaments

The two examples of metaphor we have examined thus far have been formed on a single predicament of being and have been marked by a careful symmetry in the things being compared in terms of this predicament. Such formal simplicity is not always found in metaphor, for a measure of the intellectual importance of metaphor in a poem is the degree of complication one finds in the predicaments of comparison between its various analogues. Single predicament comparisons are simple and are not likely to be interesting; an expression like "ruby lips," for example, was probably an instant cliché whenever it was first formed. On the other hand, having to derive a genus of similitude in metaphoric situations in which multiple predicaments

occur between the Analogates presents something of an intellectual challenge. The more "far-fetched" or heterogeneous the identities in an analogy seem to be, the more surely complexities in predication will be found.

We may begin by examining the analogical structure as it appears in some more or less conventional metaphors in sixteenth-century poetry. A convenient catalogue is offered by Edmund Spenser at one point in his Epithalamion (1595).[7] The metaphors describe the beauty of the Bride as she enters the rustic, nuptial "temple." Since we shall have occasion to refer to this series of metaphors later on, the stanza in which they occur will be given in full.

Tell me ye merchants daughters did ye see
So fayre a creature in your towne before,
So sweet, so louely, and so mild as she,
Adornd with beautyes grace and vertues store,
Her goodly eyes lyke Saphyres shining bright,
Her forehead yuory white,
Her cheekes lyke apples which the sun hath rudded,
Her lips lyke cherryes charming men to byte,
Her brest like to a bowle of creame vncrudded,
Her paps lyke lyllies budded,
Her snowie necke lyke to a marble towre;
And all her body like a pallace fayre,
Ascending vppe with many a stately stayre,
To honors seat and chastities sweet bowre.
Why stand ye still ye virgins in amaze,
Vpon her so to gaze,
Whiles ye forget your former lay to sing,
To which the woods did answer and your eccho ring.

What this exercise in effictio does, of course is to itemize what is contained in "beautyes grace and vertues store"; the logical principle structuring each of the comparisons is univocal predication. Examining first the analogy formed in the "ivory-white forehead" comparison (l. 172), we find a simple metaphor structured on the predicament Qualitas:

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
Subject	ivory		forehead
Predicate	(is)		(is)
Adjunct	white	Qualitas	(white)

Fig. 3.--Spenser: Ivory-White Forehead Analogy

Turning back to the first metaphor in the catalogue, however, one finds that the comparison of eyes to sapphires requires, implicitly at least, that one know fully the analogue "sapphire" in order to make the comparison really complete. Just as we found in the Homeric example, where one had to know what a hunter was in order to determine just how like a hunter Hector was, so here in Spenser's metaphor of the "sapphire eyes" one has to know that blueness as well as the explicit luminescence are involved in the analogy.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
Subject	sapphires		eyes
Predicate 1	(are)		(are)
Adjunct 1	(blue)	1. Qualitas	(blue)
Predicate 2	shining[8]	2. Actio	(shining)
Adjunctive Mode	bright		(brightly)

Fig. 4.--Spenser: Sapphires-Eyes Analogy

In Spenser's comparison of eyes to sapphires, therefore, we have not one, but two predicaments of being involved, one of which, it will be noted, is implicit. Here the fact that the quality of "blueness" is not given explicitly causes no particular difficulty; but in the

High Baroque and Metaphysical metaphor we shall find much implicit predication--particularly multiple implicit predication--of the categories to be a primary source of obscurity. An indication of the possibilities of logical complexity that multiple predication offers is provided by Spenser's comparison of lips and cherries in line 174 of the passage quoted above. And here again a crucial predicament is left implicit.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Genus of Similitude	Causeative Sequence
Subject	cherries		lips		Efficient
Predicate 1	(are)		(are)		- - -
Adjunct 1	(red)	Qualitas	(red)		Formal
Adjunct 2	(soft)		(soft)		
Adjunct 3	(sweet)		(sweet)		
Predicate 2	charming	Actio	charming		- - -
Object	men		men		Material
Object Predicate	to bite	Actio	(to kiss)	Taste or "Prove"	Final[9]

Fig. 5.--Spenser: Cherries-Lips Analogy

The comparison of lips to cherries "charming men to bite" requires a definition of cherries that includes the qualities of softness and sweetness as well as the obvious one of redness. The quality of sweetness is especially important, because it provides the most immediate cause of the lips's power of attraction. Predicating these aspects of Qualitas univocally to lips gives rise to the cause and effect relationship between the subjects and the common objects in the analogy, a relationship that complicates the structure of the logical process to a degree that may seem rather surprising in view of the conventional nature

of this figure.

It is likely of course that a reader of the sixteenth century, like the reader of today, would have interpreted the preceeding analogy more or less automatically as an expression of the redness and desirability of the Bride's lips; almost certainly he would not have felt constrained to perform a logical exegesis to have rendered it comprehensible. It is the function of a conventionalized lexicon to make familiar what was perhaps originally uncommon and novel, and to move the more purely logical considerations into the background, so that cleverness or intellectual subtlety is subordinated to the more immediate rhetorical purpose, which is here clearly one of decoration, of descriptive embellishment.

The importance implicit predication may have in complicating and obscuring the immediate signification of a metaphor is well demonstrated in the following example from Góngora's Polifemo (1613),[10] in which all the predicaments of similitude are left implicit. This particular metaphor occurs at the point in the poem in which the shipwrecked hero, Acis, comes upon the nymph Galatea, who is sleeping by a spring. Acis gazes at the nymph while he kneels to drink, and Góngora expresses the simultaneous actions of his looking and drinking this way:

> su boca dió--y sus ojos, cuanto pudo,
> al sonoro cristal--al cristal mudo. (ll. 191-192)

The "wit" here lies in the use of the term "cristal" to give a name to things whose difference from each other is indicated only by the properties sonoro and mudo and by the different objects (boca and ojos) that are directed to them. It seems certain that no reader is going to read through this expression and interpret it automatically; the metaphor demands that the reader pause to analyze it in order to make it intelli-

gible.

Sonoro and mudo are "temporary properties" of the water and the nymph, respectively, but they are not properties of cristal. Analysis is thus complicated by the fact that these two irrelevant properties are being used anyhow to distinguish two different ideas of cristal. One is obligated, therefore, to find some generic definition of "cristal" that will subsume the two apparently different crystals of Góngora's metaphor, and to which the differentiae of "sonorous" and "mute" will apply.

Any definition of crystal will have to include the qualities of translucence or luminescent clarity, of brilliancy, and likely of purity as well.[11] These are qualities considered as being among the "permanent properties" that differentiate or "divide" crystal in general from other substances in general. In Góngora's analogy these properties are of course left deliberately implicit, yet as specific forms of the predicament Qualitas they must provide the lines of similitude between the Arcadian spring, to which Acis "gave his mouth," and the sleeping nymph, to which he "gave his eyes." Indeed, what the poet seems to have done here is first to have found a comparison between the nymph and the spring and then found a generic conception that would permit him to metaphorize both by means of a simple genus-species transference. Accordingly, the analysis of Góngora's metaphor will appear as in the schema on the following page.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Genus of Similitude
Subject	(water)		(nymph)	Crystal
Predicate	(is)		(is)	- - -
Adjuncts	1. (clear)	Qualitas	1. (clear)	Clear
	2. (shining)		2. (shining)	Shining
	3. (pure)		3. (pure)	Pure
	4. sonorous		4. silent	[Differentiae]

Fig. 6.--Góngora: Water-Nymph Analogy

The specific, explicit adjuncts sonoro and mudo apply only to the literal or "real" specific subjects of the analogates and thus function logically as, technically, the differentiae that separate or "divide" the species from the genus, the water and the nymph from the generic Crystal. The implicit adjuncts of clarity, brightness, purity (and doubtless others), can, however, be predicated univocally of water, nymph, and crystal; and these are the common forms of the category Qualitas, the rationes which are being given as sufficient to unite these three differing substances in the single concept designated by the term "crystal." Some logical back-tracking may have been involved in the choice of these differentiae, in that if water equals "crystal," bubbling water could be called "sonorous crystal"; and if Galatea is also equivalent to "crystal," then a sleeping Galatea may logically be called a "mute" or a "silent crystal."[12]

We see in this example from Góngora a clear instance of how logic can be put to the service of aesthetic. His metaphor is a rather clever instance of the rhetorical method of auxesis that has moved to the point of hyperbole, since in analogating properties of

crystal to Galatea, the poet has enhanced or "augmented" the sense of the nymph's beauty, and, indeed, has in a way compelled the reader to discover her beauty for himself. After all, a crystalline nymph is more precious, more estimable, and more beautiful than a mere nymph.

In our discussion of the structure of metaphoric analogy, we have been primarily concerned with pointing out some of the basic means by which the metaphor achieves its intrinsic signification. Since analogy is a self-sufficient structure of thought, the essential nature of its signification can be clearly seen to be definitory: a relation is predicated in which one thing is defined in terms of something else. Prince Hector is defined in terms of a hunter's actions, eyes are defined in terms of the qualities of sapphires, lips in terms of cherries, and a nymph's beauty in terms of the qualities of crystal. The means of definition, therefore, are the particular categories of being that in the analogical framework are taken to be the sufficient determinants of identity. Since contemporary epistemology claimed the concept of the genus as the most general class of meaning, we have sought to stress the importance of the genus of similitude as the prime concept in determining the signification of metaphor.

Metaphoric analogy, however, is analogy that is governed by rhetorical intentions: it is a formal device that is being used in a certain manner with regard to its context. The question its relationship to context poses is whether the signification of the metaphor be serving primarily to "amplify" or embellish the context, or be serving to convey the basic thought of that context; and to this question we now shall turn our attention.

Contextual Functions of Metaphor

The logical relationships in the analogical metaphor provide its particular, intrinsic significance; they do not, however, determine the full extent of its contextual significance. The larger meaning of metaphoric analogy, as with any other more or less self-contained unit of meaning, is the result of its function within a particular context. The reciprocal relationship between a unit of signification and its context that one finds in grammatical situations, for example, applies also to the rhetorical and logical circumstances governing the analogical metaphor. A unit of signification both modifies its context and is modified by it at the same time. The context of Góngora's crystal metaphor largely determines what elements of Qualitas are going to be relevant to the analogy of the spring and the nymph in terms of their common "crystalline" nature (hardness, also typical of crystals is excluded, for example). Likewise these relevant qualities will in some measure contribute intellectual or decorative elements to the context so as to add to its total import.

It should be remarked, however, that as in grammatical situations, where the influence of any one element of meaning lessens with the increase of contextual extension, so likewise any particular metaphor will exercise correspondingly less modification of its context the more extensive that context becomes. Any metaphor, even a highly complex metaphor, will less influence the total context of composition in a poem like the Iliad or the Polifemo than in a short lyric like the sonnet.

If the example from Homer be taken as having its signifi-

catory functions contributing to the import of the epic battle the poet is describing, and, if at the same time its aesthetic aspects serve to heighten or intensify this import, then in terms of the immediate context of Hector's heroism and the discomfiture of the Achaeans the Hector-huntsman comparison may be allowed to claim a more or less equally decorative and informative function.

On the other hand, the following analogy from Spenser seems to serve mainly in an expository capacity and thereby to stress informative content over decoration. In his Hymn of Beautie (1596),[13] Spenser addresses the "fair Dames" of the world, the ladies who are the "liuely images of heauens light" (ll. 162-163), and he writes:

> But gentle Loue, that loiall is and trew,
> Will more illumine your resplendent ray,
> And adde more brightnesse to your goodly hew,
> From light of his pure fire, which by like way
> Kindled of yours, your likenesse doth display,
> Like as two mirrours by opposd reflexion,
> Doe both expresse the faces first impression.
> (ll. 176-182)

The example of the opposed mirrors is the "known" half of an analogy that seeks to explain the action of Love's fire described in the preceeding lines. The mirrors provide the known analogue in the comparison, if for no other reason than they have been defined in terms of action by the poet himself. The logical basis of the comparison ultimately derives itself from the initial definition of the "fair Dames" as images of heaven's light--in Platonic terms, the analogue of form and matter nearest to the principal cause, pure form itself--a light which is, in this case, the light of Eros.

This light, in good Platonic fashion, is manifested in matter as beauty, and beauty in turn evokes love in its beholders and con-

sequently redounds to enhance the initial beauty (the "impression" of light) of the fair ladies. There is thus a reciprocal cause and effect relationship involved here in this analogy, love and beauty being the formal and efficient causes of each other, and this relationship is presented by Spenser in terms of the _expression_ of beauty,[14] for which the idea of the opposed mirrors furnishes the definable analogue. The signification of the comparison of the light of Love with reflected images in mirrors is directly related to the thought of its context, and is indeed rather centrally related to the thesis of the _Hymn_ as a whole.

Even though the _Hymn of Beauty_ be ostensibly a celebration of the power of Love and Beauty, the intentional focus is generally didactic, for the thesis is essentially one that says that, since Love is so powerful and ennobling, beautiful women ought to live in accordance with the laws of virtuous love. The particular context in which the analogy with the mirrors occurs is part of a larger admonitory passage in which the poet urges his "fair Dames" to shun the "foule blot" of "Disloiall lust,..... / Which will the garland of [their] glorie marre, / And quench the light of [their] bright shyning starre" (ll. 169-175). Regarding the thought in the _immediate_ context--in rhetorical terms the _hypothesis_--the mirror figure aids in making the point that a beautiful woman evokes love and in effect becomes more beautiful thereby. Regarding the general theme or _thesis_ of the poem, the analogy is a specific statement of the general virtue of Love.[15] The signification of this analogy is thus complementary to that of the poem as a whole, and is therefore essential in its immediate context.

Spenser's catalogue of similes describing the beauty of the Bride in his Epithalamion, on the other hand, is primarily ornamentive in its intention; none of the analogies he uses is especially essential to the meaning of the passage in which they appear or to the poem as a whole. They simply expand upon the "beautyes grace and vertues store" with which the Bride is explicitly "adorned." As far as signification is concerned, all of the metaphors could be summarized and replaced by the simple generic notion "Woman Beautiful," and there would be little appreciable loss in logical or meaningful import. The significance of the relationship of the Bride's eyes to sapphires, or of her lips to cherries, alters neither the intellectual significance of the immediate hypothesis nor that of the general thesis. These metaphors do function, however, quite clearly to add a degree of aesthetic impress to these contexts by selecting and emphasizing particular qualitative elements of beauty in the Bride that complement the general aura of beauty in the idyllic marriage ceremony--which is, after all, what the poem is concerned to celebrate.

From the point of view of signification, therefore, the catalogue of beauties in the Epithalamion can be considered as incidental or peripheral to the central line of thought in the poem, whereas the signification of the analogy with mirrors in the Hymn of Beauty is much more centrally related to the poem's "argument" or general line of thought. The question of the relative degree of integration of metaphoric signification with the thought of its context is the measure of whether a given analogy be serving mainly as a device of information or as one

of decoration. Analogy operating in a literary or oratorical situation will not of course be either wholly dialectical or entirely rhetorical in function. It is, however, going to be more nearly one than the other in its meaningful relation with its context. Spenser's mirror analogy is more nearly dialectical in its contextual function than is his catalogue of similes.

We have discussed two fairly clear-cut instances of the basic difference in metaphorical function. In one case we found Spenser's metaphors operating in a primarily decorative manner, the relationship to their context being essentially tangential or peripheral; in the second example we found the metaphor to be mainly informative and hence central in its relationship to contextual meaning. We have also suggested that these two basic operations of metaphor are not wholly exclusive of each other at any one time: the decorative metaphor does modify the meaning of its context to some extent, and the dialectical metaphor does ornament its context to a certain degree, but these contributions are secondary. The matter of functional primacy of metaphor in the poetry of the time reflects of course the historical dichotomy in language between manner and matter, style and content, rhetoric and dialectic. The main endeavor of the classical humanists had been, in theory at least, to reconcile these two really complementary functions of language so as to produce meaningful and engaging--eloquent--discourse. With regard to the metaphor, this would mean that its primary functions ought to be in such a balance that its contextual relationship would always tend to be central. The drift of the rhetorical tradition through the medieval period and the Renaissance, however, was against such a balance,

and one finds the general tendency of metaphoric function continuing to be either one or the other of the two basic types we have discussed.

There were occasions, however, in which the humanists' ideal was more or less perfectly realized. One such instance is the following poem in which ornamental metaphor goes beyond hypothetical centrality in relationship and achieves a virtual integration with its context. The poem is a sonnet from Petrarch's Rime of the late fourteenth century.[16]

Quando 'l pianeta che distingue l'ore
ad albergar col Tauro si ritorna
cade vertù da l'infiammate corna
che veste il mondo di novel colore;

e non pur quel che s'apre a noi di fore,
le rive e i colli di fioretti adorna,
ma dentro, dove già mai non s'aggiorna,
gravido fa di sé il terrestro umore,

onde tal frutto e simile si colga;
così costei, ch'è tra le donne un Sole,
in me, movendo de' begli occhi i rai,

cria d'amor penseri, atti e parole:
ma come ch'ella gli governi o volga,
primavera per me pur non è mai.

Before considering how the various analogies in the poem carry the thought, we may pause to consider how the decorative device of chronographia in the first three lines sets up the sequence of thought that is developed in the succeeding eleven lines. To begin with, the chronographia is indeed ornamental, since it is merely a periphrastic expression for "springtime" that makes use of figures of astrology. The "planet that marks the hours," of course, is simply the sun, which, having returned to its annual place in the "house" or constellation of Taurus (i.e., in late April-early May),

"inflames" the horns of the astral bull. The virtue or influence of the sun's radiation then causes the condition of spring, the effects of which are the flowers and the gravid "humour" of earth. The horns of the bull are naturally conceived of as being "inflamed" because the sun is *in* the bull and imparts luminescence to it.[17]

But this metaphor that gives the periphrastic expression of the *Quando* of the sun's effects is linked most importantly to two other elements in the poem. On the basis of a relationship of comparative degree (*Relatio*) and of space (*Ubi*), analogous correspondences are set up to carry the argument of the sonnet. The predicament *Relatio* appears in line 10, where the Lady is called a "Sun among women," and this establishes an analogous relation between the Lady and other women and the sun and other planets, and, ultimately, between the Poet and the earth. This correspondence is especially significant, for it means that the spring-making power (*vertù*) is analogously the same for the Lady and for the sun, with respect to the earth and the Poet. However, these analogous causes of spring do not have analogous effects, and this is due to an essential *differentia* that is quite explicitly set apart from the analogy of *Relatio*.

The Lady is indeed similar to the sun in comparative degree, but she remains unlike the sun in the way that women in general remain unlike planets in general: women are inconstant, planets are not. This "permanent property" of inconstancy, of fickleness, is of course traditional in definitions of Woman. Here the notion of inconstancy provides the *differentia* that sets

apart, or "divides," the Lady and women from the sun and planets, and this necessarily gives rise to differences in the consequences of their respective "virtues"; and thus the category of Qualitas becomes implicitly involved here to destroy, finally, the analogy. In Petrarch's poem, therefore, one finds that whereas the sun and the planets in general are constant in their motions and effects, the Lady and women in general are not. The failure in the analogy of effects between the sun's vertù and the Lady's eyes is dependent upon this fundamental distinction between the otherwise similar beings of the Lady and the sun. Analogy is thus used here to demonstrate similitude: the Lady ought to be analogous to the sun in her effects upon the Poet, but she is really only similar to the sun, since one cannot predicate the quality of constancy for both. The poem thus forms an argument of similar causes having differing effects, and the cause of this difference, inconstancy, provides the indictment of the Lady.

A second relationship that the chronographic section establishes concerns the Ubi of the spring-making process of the sun and the Lady. This relationship occurs through the syntactically ambiguous in me of line 11. The Lady has been equated with the sun as a causative agent; she is now given a further correspondence on the basis of the location of her effects, since the Poet is in this line explicitly analogated with the earth that "flowers" and "becomes gravid" in springtime. As the sun is "in" Taurus, so is the Lady "in" the Poet's heart or thoughts, from whence she exercises her influence.[18] This idea of the Ubi of the Lady involves the familiar conception of the mind as the tabula raza upon which the Lady is "impressed" through the power of

her beauty.

This analogy of location seems supported by the bilateral syntactical relations of the phrase in me, which--to the extent it can be trusted--is punctuated apart from both what preceeds and from what follows it, and yet which seems to relate to both. The phrase in me could be understood as

così costei, ch'è tra le donne un Sole in me (i.e., per me)

or as

(Ella) movendo (in me) i rai de' begli occhi cria in me penseri

The first reading allows the similitude of the Lady and the sun to be more fully developed, thus tying-in even more strongly the initial chronographia. The second reading, however, seems more essential to the dialectical progression of thought in the poem. Generally speaking, the thought is that the Lady should ideally be fully analogous to the sun instead of merely similar to it in the exercise of her power of beauty; and since the virtue of the sun at one time of year always produces spring for the world, so the virtue of the Lady, who is always in the Poet's thoughts, should always produce "fruition" for the Poet. But, since the Lady is essentially changeable, unlike the sun, she never really produces spring for him. In the logical contrast between "always" and "never" here, one sees the differentia of constancy-inconstancy carried into the temporal category (Quando).

The argument of the poem is therefore found to be structured on two series of causes and effects by subjects that are hypothetically analogous, but which, because of an essential difference between them, turn out to be quite different things and are not really analogous at all. The argument has all four of the Aristotelian causes of change:

formal, efficient, material, and final, and each of these causes can be seen to correspond to real or hypothetical metaphoric analogies. In outline the causative sequence would appear as in the following schema.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Causative Sequence
Subject	virtue		rays	Formal
Genitive Object	of sun's rays		of Lady's eyes	Efficient
Predicate 1	dresses on	Actio	[Lacking]	- - -
Predicate 2	makes pregnant in		creates in	
Instrumental Object	world		Poet	Material
Object of Action	spring		[Lacking]	Final

Fig. 7.--Petrarch: Causative Sequence in Sonnet "Quando 'l pianeta che distingue l'ore"

We can see how the analogical parallelism breaks down at the creation of spring, and the whole point of the argument of the poem is that it is meant to break down.[20]

The fundamental difference in the quality (constancy-inconstancy) of the efficient causes of spring (the sun's rays and the Lady's eyes) is reflected in different consequences with regard to the creation of spring. Petrarch has explicitly defined spring in terms of its composition: something happens to the exterior of the world (di fore) and something happens within it (dentro), which together are required to make up the composition of primavera. For spring to occur for the Poet, therefore, something ought to happen for him externally as well as inwardly, but because of the Lady's inconstancy there are only

internal effects, and these internal potentials (penseri) do not become actualized in the "flowering" of atti e parole. The di fore-dentro distinction in the composition of the condition (Habitus) primavera thus has a causative analogue in Relatio (i.e., as potential to actual). The complex sequence of analogies in Petrarch's sonnet comes to be as in figure 8.




Fig. 8.--Petrarch: Analogical Sequence in Sonnet "Quando 'l pianeta che distingue l'ore"

The above analysis emphasizes one point in particular: all the metaphors have their significatory function centrally and necessarily related to the thesis of the poem; yet this relationship is not achieved by a sacrifice of ornament. The metaphors, especially those of the chronographia, ornament as well as inform, for they "heighten the effect" of the very thesis that they themselves convey and make the entire poem an effectively periphrastic statement of spiritual desolation.

Of the comparisons that structure the logical or dialectical progression of the poem, only one remains at the level of similitudo; the others are either proper or hypothetical analogies. The crucial comparison of similitude pertains of course to the Genitive Objects. There are two fairly explicit categories involved in this would-be analogy of the Lady and the sun, Relatio and Qualitas. Univocal predication of Relatio quite properly makes her a "Sun among women"; one cannot, however, predicate the quality of constancy for both the sun and the Lady, so, on the basis of Qualitas in the Adjunct, the analogy breaks down and remains merely a case of similitudo, a likeness between things different in kind, and the difference turns out to be more important than the similarity, since it destroys the hypothetical analogy of cause and effect by which the Poet would have his "springtime." This "Sun-like" Lady is accordingly being charged with inconstancy in terms of her "unjustness" in the way she "governs" her eyes. The poem is an accusation, an indictment that makes use of the topics of the Confirmatory Proof section of the classical Forensic oration, and hence the careful balance between emotive appeal (pathos) and embellishment, and the dialectic of argumentation that one finds in this poem.[22]

Petrarch's sonnet is a further example of logic enlisted in the service of rhetoric and aesthetic. This short poem may be taken as generally indicative of the complementary function of decoration and exposition, which is the sense of the Ciceronian theory of Eloquentia; for here the dialectical order of the poem has been carefully concealed by the "colors of rhetoric" so as to make the argument more impressive, more effective. It is, therefore, neither quite an exercise in argument nor wholly an excuse for the ornatus. One sees a foreshadowing of Donne in the subtle and careful dialectical structure of this sonnet, and there are of course clear anticipations of the High Baroque manner in the decorative effect of the poem's metaphors and the trope of chronographia.

In our examination of the general structure and functions of metaphoric analogy, we have found predication to be the crucial factor in the formation of metaphor. The predicaments may be explicit or implicit, but they must be taken as the sufficient means of the definition of likeness that the analogy provides, and they must be predicable, moreover, of both subjects in the analogy equally. If the categories of Relatio and Qualitas be taken as the sufficient means of defining Petrarch's Lady as a "Sun," then they both must be equally predicable of sun and Lady, and Qualitas is not, since as we have seen, the concept of Lady involves the property of inconstancy, which the sun meaningfully does not share. Qualitas is, on the other hand, a sufficient category equally predicable of Góngora's nymph and the water of the Arcadian spring, and of the lips and the cherries in the Spenserian example.

Complications in structure presented by analogical predication,

especially by implicit predication, are not necessarily an indication of the contextual function of a given metaphor. The addition of the category Actio in the attribute of "charming" given to the Bride's lips in Spenser's metaphor complicates the analogy somewhat, but makes it no less descriptive in its primary intention. This is even more the case of course with Góngora's "crystalline nymph" riddle. Petrarch's metaphors, however, are formed relatively simply, but are highly significant with regard to their context, for they reach outside themselves to establish logical connections for the process of argument. Something similar may be said of Spenser's mirrors in the Hymn, except that the mirror analogy does not convey an argument so much as illustrate and summarize it.

The question thus remains essentially one of determining as completely as is possible the logical whole of a metaphor's intrinsic signification, and then seeing whether it be related centrally to the context of meaning, or be incidental to it and be functioning thereby as a device of decoration. We found Spenser's catalogue of "beauties" to be ornamental and peripheral to its context, his mirror image to be central and expositional, and Petrarch's sonnet to offer the best example of the integration of these two functions of metaphor.

The High Baroque typically exploits the logic of analogy for the purpose of embellishment. Philosophically it seems that the High Baroque poets would have life imitate art, for in their fundamentally Platonic universe the Beauty they are busy celebrating will seek to impress itself on the souls of their readers for the readers' benefit. A Golden Age is recreated, and, in a manner of speaking, poets like Marino, Góngora, and Crashaw undertake to celebrate it.

IV. THE HIGH BAROQUE METAPHOR AND THE LOGIC OF PERIPHRASIS

We remarked earlier that Warnke's description of the High Baroque style in his European Metaphysical Poetry is virtually a description of the seventeenth-century's version of the classical High style that characterized the Demonstrative oration. This style is described in the pre-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad Herennium, a handbook that exercised considerable influence on the medieval and Renaissance conceptions of rhetoric. The Ad Herennium describes the Grand or High style (Gravis) in the following manner:

> A discourse will be composed in the Grand style if to each idea are applied the most ornate words that can be found for it, whether literal [propria] or figurative [extranea]; if impressive thoughts [graves sententiae] are chosen, such as are used in Amplification and Appeal to Pity; and if we employ figures of thought and figures of diction which have grandeur [exornationes sententiarum aut verborum quae gravitatem habebunt]. . . . .[1]

This is the essence of style in the demonstrative mode of oratory, the mode that Quintilian called the genus ostentationi, which both orators and poets cultivate, the latter with even greater freedom than the former (Instituto Oratoria XI. i. 28).

The subjects of the demonstrative genre are praise and blame, and the motif of praise is perhaps the most strikingly predominant one in the High Baroque lyric. The beauty of shepherdesses, nymphs, noble ladies and men, the glory of religious artifacts and persons--the subjects, in short, of both secular and religious pastoralism--are all quite literally celebrated and made splendid and marvelous. To praise or celebrate something is to magnify its importance,

and the ostentatious manner requires that this magnification be accomplished by means of the ornatus, by the cultivation of embellishment for the purpose of aesthetic effect. Magnification of importance through decoration of thought means that poetic statement will likely move beyond mere verbal auxesis to tropic hyperbole. Rhetorically, the subjects of praise (or blame) are commonplace: nymphs and mistresses, for example, are commonly taken as beautiful and fickle or hard-hearted, and love is taken to be painful. The art of treating these subjects lies in the technique of their elevation, in the means by which they are given their "proof of superiority."[2]

Proving superiority by means of magnification would seem naturally to involve a great reliance on trope, especially on the trope of metaphor, since this device had been designated since Aristotle as providing the most "graphic" and "lively" effects, the most effective means of achieving enargia. Indeed, according to S. L. Bethell, Tesauro enlarges on Aristotle in calling this device "the most witty and acute, the most strange and wonderful, the most cheerful and useful, the most eloquent and prolific offspring of the human intellect. . . . [Because] it expresses one concept by means of another very different one."[3] None of this is new, of course: what Warnke found as the "hyperextension of Renaissance techniques" in the High Baroque lyric is really an exploitation of practices that had been in the genre since the poets of Provence, if not indeed since the poetry of Ovid, according to Ernst R. Curtius.[4] What does seem to be rather new in the High Baroque treatment of the lyric is a hyperextension of the principle of complexity in the formation of the analogical metaphor, and a tendency to view poetic subjects almost solely in terms of their properties or

attributes.

In the discussion of Góngora's "crystal" metaphor, we also suggested that in working through the logic of the analogy one would come to appreciate the beauty of the nymph to a greater degree than would be the case had the analogy been more obvious and less complicated. This notion of the sense of aesthetic appreciation as being intensified by complexity seems to underlie the theory of "stylistic wit" (ingegno) and relies in turn on the aesthetics of intellectual involvement or challenge that had been perceived by Aristotle, Cicero, and others, as furnishing one of the principal "charms" (lepores) of the metaphor. As Gracián says:

> El entendimiento . . . como primera y principal potencia [intencional del alma], álzase con la prima del artificio, con lo extremo del primor, en todas sus diferencias de objectos. . . . De aquí se saca con evidencia, que el concepto . . . consiste también en artificio, y el superlativo de todos. . . .[5]

One may well expect, therefore, that in Dr. Johnson's words, "nature and art [will be] ransacked for illustrations, comparisons, and allusions," since the various genera of similitude may involve apparently uncommon and superficially unlike identities.[6] One finds rather frequently that High Baroque lyrics do indeed appear to be exercises in analogy, exercises in discovering all, or at least some, of the different things that a given object can be analogically, and this of course leads to a multiplication of analogical structures in a poem.

It should be pointed out, however, that such exercises in analogical definition are not necessarily merely mechanical, merely rhetorical exercises, though too often they are little more than just that, since exercises in comparatio were nothing new in the

Renaissance.[7] Behind this practice there is an ancient theory of the poet's mind as a simulacrum Dei, the poet's "wit," according to Tesauro again, being a "vestige of the Deity in the human mind."[8] Accordingly, the Poet as Maker reflects in his work, and analogously, the poesis of Divine creation. The correspondence is Platonic, and the poet's intellect functions in terms of Platonic epistemology: the poet perceives the essential metaphysical unity in creation, since the Platonic correspondence between formal existence and knowledge has this corollary, that a relation perceived by the mind is a metaphysical relation that really exists.[9] There is, for example, a form of Qualitas within which crystal, water, and a Gongorist nymph all do participate to different degrees. In effect, then, the ornamentive manner of the High Baroque involves the exploration and identification of the possibilities of existence that things may have, and this exploration implies a cultivation of metaphoric analogy beyond that required of mere mechanical exercise.

There are, therefore, two principal aspects of the High Baroque for our consideration here. The first involves the multiplication of objects in the descriptive embellishment of an attribute of an object. Since this embellishment is metaphorical rather than simply verbal, the multiplication of objects in the metaphor will increase the number and kind of logical relationships within the metaphoric structure. Obscurity in metaphors of this kind will be seen to arise from the fact that the elements in the metaphor are more significantly related to each other than to the subject which the metaphor as a whole is seeking to modify.

The second aspect of the High Baroque metaphor involves complexity in the logical order of the objects in the metaphoric ex-

pression. Here the obscurity in signification comes about through complications in the conceptual reference, and this requires the identification of the subject of the analogy and the logical relationship to that subject of the other elements in the analogy.

Complexity in the Multiplication of Metaphoric Elements

Notable examples of lyrics structured entirely on a sequence of metaphoric analogies are offered by Richard Crashaw's poems celebrating Mary Magdalen's tears of contrition, "The Weeper" and "The Teare," two poems appearing in his Steps to the Temple (1646). The shorter poem, "The Teare," will be examined here. Its text is as follows.

1 What bright soft thing is this?
Sweet Mary thy faire Eyes espence?
A moist sparke it is,
A watry Diamond; from whence
The very Terme, I think, was found
The water of a Diamond.

2 O 'tis not a Teare,
'Tis a starre about to drop
From thine eye its spheare;
The Sunne will stoope and take it up,
Proud will his sister be to weare
This thine eyes Iewell in her Eare.

3 O 'tis a Teare,
Too true a Teare; for no sad eyne,
How sad so e're
Raine so true a Teare as thine;
Each Drop leaving a place so deare,
Weeps for it selfe, is its owne Teare.

4 Such a Pearle as this is,
(Slipt from Aurora's dewy Brest)
The Rose buds sweet lip kisses;
And such the Rose it selfe when vext
With ungentle flames, does shed,
Sweating in too warme a Bed.

5 Such the Maiden Gemme
By the wanton Spring put on,
Peeps from her Parent stemme,

And blushes on the manly Sun:
This watry Blossome of thy Eyne
Ripe, will make the richer Wine.

6 Faire Drop, why quak'st thou so?
'Cause thou streight must lay thy Head
In the Dust? 8 no;
The Dust shall never bee thy Bed:
A pillow for thee will I bring,
Stuft with Downe of Angels wing.

7 Thus carryed up on high,
(For to Heaven thou must goe)
Sweetly shalt thou lye,
And in soft slumbers bath thy woe;
Till the singing Orbes awake thee,
And one of their bright Chorus make thee.

8 There thy selfe shalt bee
An eye, but not a weeping one,
Yet I doubt of thee,
Whither th'hadst rather there have shone
An eye of Heaven; or still shine here
In th'Heaven of Mary's eye, a Teare.
10

The poem poses a problem of definition; but the definition is not derived logically, that is in terms of the predicables and statements of essence, but rhetorically in terms of a series of "comparisons," analogies. Logically, the definition does not go in fact beyond the distinction of genus and species. The generic "thing" of line 1 is limited only by the specific appositive "Eyes expence" of line 2, and by the "moist sparke" and "watry Diamond" of lines 3-4; but the appositive is itself a periphrasis for tear, which is finally affirmed as the "thing" in question in stanza 3. It is the periphrasis, rather than the actual tear, that becomes the immediate subject of definition, so much so in fact that in the third stanza "Teare" is felt at first to be almost metaphorical and does indeed become personified. What we have here is not a metaphysical definition of a substance, nor indeed even a purely logical one, but

rather a rhetorical definition performed by means of tropic descriptio.

To handle the various metaphoric correspondences of substance that the poem proposes as specific definitions of "Eyes expence," one must turn again to deriving a generic class of similitude; and the terms of its conceptual extension are indicated by the seemingly paradoxical nature of the first two substances offered as specific equivalents for the generalized "Eyes expence," moist sparke and watry Diamond. Not only are these substances quite different things, but each seems to suffer from "improper predication," in that a spark cannot properly be said to have moistness or a diamond to be watery. These two differing substances, however, are obligated to correlate with the adjuncts of "brightness" and "softness" in the first line of the poem, which are the predicates of Qualitas given to the generic thing that is being taken to include "Eyes expence."

The necessary genus of similitude of course is suggested in the line that concludes the first stanza, "The water of a Diamond," what Crashaw explicitly calls a "Terme" of reference, and this is nothing more than the Liquid-Crystal concept that we have already encountered in Góngora.[11] In the general conception of "Liquid-Crystal" as a shining, translucent, and precious substance, the adjuncts of brightness, moistness, and softness (i.e., meaning "not rigid") all become proper predicates. With the first stanza having provided Liquid-Crystal as the genus of similitude, the next three stanzas proceed to explore the possibilities of specific analogical correlations.

We find in stanzas 2-5 that the concept of "Liquid-Crystal" is treated equivocally. The two terms are variously considered as subjects and as adjuncts of each other. In stanza 2, in the analogy of

crystal with star and jewel, it is "crystal" that is being treated as the subject or substance and "liquid" as the adjunct or accident. In the following analogy with the drop of dew, "liquid" becomes the analogating substance and "crystal" the adjunct, just as it does again with the rain-drop metaphor in stanza 3. Stanza 4 then picks up the analogy between "crystal" and "jewell" to form a further analogy with "pearl," which, with the re-introduction of "liquid" as the subject, leads to a further analogy with "dew"--the whole complex of these analogies then being summarized by a pun as old as Cicero, the equivocal "Gemme" in the first line of stanza 5, which also starts another analogical series involving grape and rose buds.[12]

We may see more precisely how the equivocal nature of the genus of similitude governs the logic of analogy in this poem by examining the metaphors of stanza 2 in detail. In this stanza the generic Liquid-Crystal is given three specific equivalents: the implicit "tear" and "star about to drop," based on the predicament of Situs (Posture or Position), and "tear" and "jewel" on the specific predicament Ubi. The implicit "tear" in the second case is further metaphorized by a third analogy with an implicit drop of dew on the basis of Actio (the tear and the dew-drop do fall to earth) and Passio (they are carried back to their respective "spheres"). We therefore have four analogies in this sequence. In the first two, Qualitas appears as the common predicament in both; in the second two, Substantia. We thus have the following scheme of analogies; stanza 2 is repeated for convenience.

O 'tis not a Teare,
'Tis a starre about to drop
From thine eye its spheare;
The Sunne will stoope and take it up,

Proud will his sister be to weare
This thine eyes Iewell in her Eare.




Fig. 9.--Crashaw: "Crystal-Liquid" Analogies in "The Teare"

The bracketed elements in the first Analogate indicate the cumulative aggregation of analogical identities for which the predicaments of "tear" may be univocally predicated. The key to all this analogizing of course is that it is an implicit tear (Analogate II) that is being talked about, and it is being treated in terms of the equivocal Crystal-Liquid notion. At one time this concept determines the category Qualitas (Analogates I-III), elsewhere it determines Substantia (Analogates I-II, IV). This equivocity in the Genus of Similitude makes the notion of tear equivocal too, of course. The analogical sequence in this stanza is further obscured by involving Apollo and Diana in the third and fourth analogical situations: as the sun evaporates the dew-drop-tear

and returns it to the sphere of the moon from whence it came, so Apollo will take up the star-jewel and return it to Diana.[13]

The equivocity in the conception of "Liquid-Crystal" is of course responsible for much of the "wit" in Crashaw's poem, for in effect it involves metonomy of subject and adjunct in the various analogical situations. In the analysis of stanza 2, we see in the "A" mode of the Genus of Similitude that Crystal provides the generic subject, Liquid the generic adjunct. In the "B" mode the situation is reversed: Liquid is the subject, Crystal the generic adjunct. The two most important situations of equivocity concern the notions of "moist sparke" and "watry Diamond" of stanza 1, which are the first instances of analogical definition of tear in the poem. Since equivocity in the genus may logically extend to its species, one can read "moist sparke" as sparkling moistness and "watry Diamond" as diamond-like (i.e., shining and precious) water. The particular reading will depend upon whether Liquid or Crystal be functioning as the generic subject or the generic adjunct in a given case.

The immediate subject of definition, it will be recalled, is "Eyes expence" of stanza 1, but in fact it is not until the third stanza that this subject receives anything like a logically proper definition, an explicit definition of substance in terms of causation ("sad eyne"), which with the affirmation of "Too true a Teare," finally gives it a specific identity. Tear itself, however, remains equivocal throughout this poem: its ambiguous nature is signaled by the denial and affirmation of identity in stanzas 2 and 3 ("O 'tis not a Teare. . . . / O 'tis a Teare, / Too true a Teare. . . .").

In the analysis of stanza 2, above, and indeed throughout

the poem as a whole, tear is implicitly correlated with the equivocal "Liquid-Crystal," which we have seen to be the generic definition of "Eyes expence"; we therefore have the following equation of substances: "Liquid-Crystal" = "Eyes expence" = "Tear." It will be observed that each of these substances stands in a more general relationship to the substance that follows it; therefore, the equivocity in "Liquid-Crystal" imposes a similar equivocity on the two more specifically equivalent substances that follow it with regard to subject and adjunct, substance and accident. The distinction with regard to tear itself is one of "tear" as adjunct and "tear of contrition" as the substantial subject.

We have looked at the general conceptual basis of the first few stanzas of Crashaw's poem so that we may better be able to appreciate the rhetorical function of its logical structures, for the logical relations in the poem are being govered by essentially rhetorical purposes. The poem is concerned only with an adjunct (tear) of its subject, not with the subject (contrition) itself. Scientifically, we are told only that the tear is something caused in the eye by sadness and that its substance is "crystal-liquid"; the poem does not, however, seek to explore the nature of the sadness that gave rise to the tear, far less to examine the nature of contrition, which would seem to be but one of many possible forms sadness might take. Dialectically, the poem is celebrating a presumed cause (contrition) in terms of an effect (a tear); it is celebrating, in short, a subject only in terms of its adjunct. Rhetorically, the poem is using the logical implications of metaphor to "magnify" the emotional or aesthetic impress of this emblematic

sign of contrition and thereby to celebrate obliquely contrition itself.

This oblique manner is characteristic of the High Baroque method of treating a subject poetically; what seems to have escaped attention heretofore is the conceptual basis of this treatment. To deal with a subject in terms of an adjunct of that subject, or to treat anything in terms of a property the thing may have, necessarily implies that the treatment will be oblique to the subject itself; it will be peripheral, and, in the neutral sense of the word, superficial.

In regard to its argument or dialectic, Crashaw's poem may be viewed as an elaborate case of ignoratio elenchi; its whole development is peripheral, often incidental, to the subject of contrition, and its rhetorical procedure is periphrastic and hyperbolic. Crashaw's celebration of Mary Magdalen's tear is rather close to the way subjects were handled in demonstrative oratory. The Demonstrative oration is not concerned to determine the essential nature of its subjects, Virtue for example, but only to magnify or celebrate those concrete cases in which the commonly accepted qualities of virtue are generally accepted as having appeared. Similarly "The Teare" indicates no interest in the nature of contrition, but seizes upon a specific tear as a commonly recognized manifestation of contrition, and, by means of amplification and appeal to pity (pathos), seeks to enhance its emotional or aesthetic significance. As concerns the traditional dichotomy of language between intellectual "matter" and artistic "manner," Crashaw's poem is clearly on the side of language as an aesthetic vehicle, since what it communicates is not a subject

so much as an attitude towards that subject.

"The Teare" may, it seems, stand as a fair example of the High Baroque dialectic and rhetoric: the subject is treated in terms of its adjuncts, and the rhetoric is one of embellishment and tropic hyperbole. And it is this very peripheral nature of High Baroque dialectic, moreover, that permits the distinctive multiplication of conceits and the extraordinary complication of their formal structure. Starting from the basis of an adjunct or a property, one may spin out conceit upon conceit and complicate their form, because the attention to the subject is minimal, and because the relations between the conceits or between the conceits and the adjunctive property upon which they are based will always be necessarily nearer and more direct than those relations that may obtain between the conceits and the logical subject itself.

A lyric passage that we have already looked at may be recalled here as providing a less complex demonstration of the High Baroque treatment of subject via an extended treatment of adjunct. The passage is from Marino's eclogue, "La bruna Pastorella," that Warnke adduced to illustrate his ideas on "tangential" metaphor that we considered in chapter I. We shall be concerned here with the same passage that Warnke dealt with, but to make the procedure of our analysis more evident, we shall include some of the lines immediately preceeding the passage in question.

LIDIO

. . . . . .

O luci tenebrose,
tenebre luminose, occhi divini,
dal brillar de' cui giri

ne l'Indo orientale
qualunque gemma piú pregiata e chiara [5]
a scintillare impara;
vostre brune pupille
sembran carboni spenti,
ma vostri vaghi sguardi son faville
vigorose e concenti. [10]
Quel notturno colore
scolora l'alba e move invidia al giorno;
quel vostro smalto oscuro
al zaffiro fa scorna, ingiuria a l'oro;
quel brun, quel negro vostro [15]
è puro e vivo inchiostro,
onde con l'aureo strale
scrive Amor la sentenza
de la mia dolce e fortunata morte.[14] [19]

The immediate or contextual subject is not the "occhi divini" of the "bruna" shepherdess, but really "quel colore" of bruno in the shepherdess, who is a "bella mora." We know there is going to be a fundamental equivocation with regard to light and dark in this passage because of the oxymoronic "luci tenebrose"-"tenebre luminose" of lines 1-2, and indeed this proves to be the case. Regarding lines 11-19, which are our particular concern, we find bruno colore clearly equivocal, for bruno can signify either a "dark" color or a "burnished" color, the appearance of something that has been burnished to a sparkling brightness, as in the "brune pupille" of line 7. This equivocation is specifically indicated by the distinction of bruno from negro in line 15 and of course by the oxymoron of the first two lines. Dark-Bright Color thus becomes the generic base for the treatment of the shepherdess' eyes (and, implicitly, her complexion) in Lidio's speech. Equivocally too, of course, Dark-Brightness may be read as Bright-Darkness.

Dark alone seems to provide the basis for the first conceit in lines 11-19, the hyperbolic enthymeme of lines 11-12:

Darkness is the "color" of night.
Night "discolors" the dawn and makes the day "envious."
Thus: darkness "discolors" the dawn and makes the day "envious."

Dark-Brightness (or Bright-Darkness), however, is the conceptual basis for the clever analogy with "smalto oscuro" that follows. Smalto may refer generally to any bright surface, but especially to surfaces of enameled or polished metal. Thus, when Marino defines the color of the shepherdess' eyes in terms of a "smalto oscuro," he is in effect defining a specific form of Qualitas, a predicament of being that inheres in the surface of an object; and this of course is precisely where the shining blackness and the burnished or enameled quality resides in the eyes and in the plaque or piece of metal respectively. Here the "dark brightness" of the shepherdess' eyes "scorns" the dark brightness of the sapphire and "mocks" the shining brightness of gold. The last of the three conceits in the passage involves an analogy of "quel color" with ink on the basis of the qualities of bruno and negro, which, in terms of the generic Dark-Brightness, will correlate with "vivo" and "puro" of the ink. The effects of the shepherdess' dark-eyed beauty are thus described in terms of a cause and effect analogy with Amor writing with a golden pen, a sequence here that is reminiscent of Spenser's description of his Bride's lips as cherries causing "men to bite." The metaphors in the sequence of causation in the analogy of bruno-negro with ink appear in figure 10 on the following page.

Genus of Similitude: "Dark-Brightness"

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Causative Sequence
Subject Adjunct 1	quel brun	Qualitas	(quel) vivo	Formal
Subject Adjunct 2	quel negro		(quel) puro	
Subject	quel color	Substantia	(quel) inchiostro	Material
Instrumental Object	(by which Beauty)	Substantia [Essentia]	onde . . . Amor	Efficient
Object Predicate	(causes)	Actio	scrive	- - -
Object of Action	(suffering of love)	Passio	sentenza di morte	Final

Fig. 10.--Marino: "Quel Color"-"Inchiostro" Analogy

Marino's treatment of the shepherdess is similar to what would have happened if Spenser had chosen to describe the beauty of his Bride in the Epithalamion solely in terms of her red and sweet lips and had proceeded to have "invented" conceits based on the qualities of sweetness and redness alone. The fact that when Spenser extolls the beauty of the Bride, he does remember the Bride, whereas Marino seems willing to forget about the shepherdess in his concern with the color of her eyes and, somewhat remotely, of her complexion, suggests an important distinction between the more traditional treatment of a poetic subject in the eloquent vein and the High Baroque treatment of it. And it is a distinction that needs emphasis.

In Marino's poem the whole has disappeared behind the treatment

of the part. The subject has disappeared behind the adjunct, just as in Crashaw's poem the subject of contrition disappears behind the eulogy of the tear and the tear itself behind the exploitation of its attributes of brightness and liquidity. The characteristically peripheral nature of the High Baroque technique leads most frequently to such a rhetorical autonomy of the adjunct.

This rhetorical autonomy of the adjunct or attribute permits its magnification to proceed in virtual disregard of the subject to which it belongs. When the subject is disregarded, the logical structures involved in the elaboration of the adjunct themselves tend to achieve a certain independence in signification, their external relations being directed more to other elements in the elaborative scheme than to the primary subject of the poem, or even, in many cases, to the immediate subject in the hypothesis which they are ostensibly modifying. An example of this digressive irrelevance even from the immediate subjects seems to appear in the sixth stanza of Crashaw's "The Teare":

> Faire Drop, why quak'st thou so?
> 'Cause thou streight must lay thy Head
> In the Dust? ô no;
> The Dust shall never bee thy Bed:
> A pillow for thee will I bring,
> Stuft with Downe of Angels wing.
>
> Thus carryed up on high,
> (For to Heaven thou must goe)
> Sweetly shalt thou lye,
> And in soft slumbers bath thy woe;
> . . . . . .

By this point the "Faire Drop" has become so many things that the particular logical connections with Mary's tear may have become well obscured. Apparently the drop is here being considered mainly as a precious gem; the Poet intrudes to rescue it from the profanation

and mortality of the "Dust," and we have the business of the pillow "Stuft with Downe of Angels wing" upon which it is presumably going to rest while it is carried up to heaven. The focus of attention is at best only obliquely on the "Faire Drop" as a tear; and the whole matter of the "quaking drop" and the "downy pillow" seems, in its context, really quite irrelevant to the tear as a tear of contrition. This artistic divorce of adjunct from its subject involves, as we have suggested, a subordination of logic to rhetoric, with the consequences in regard to intellectual significance and aesthetic effect that this subordination entails.

Aesthetic effect is sought through the general mode of hyperbole, and it is the nature of hyperbole to be logically absurd, to transgress the normative logical relations, particularly as regards cause and effect. It is one thing to say with Marino that a nocturnal color discolors the dawn and makes the day envious, and something else again to say that it is the nocturnal color of a shepherdess that is doing all this. Marino's technique clearly necessitates the functional divorce of adjunct from its subject.

The peripheral elaboration which the emphasis on adjunct permits gives rise to the rapid-fire multiplication of conceits that is a special feature of Gongorism. In peripheral elaboration, however, one always runs the risk that the technique will run away with itself, since the intellectual subject-matter is exercising a minimum of influence and restraint. This danger appears in Crashaw's digression with the "downy pillow," but it is Góngora who seems most to make a virtue out of digression. In the following example from Góngora's Soledad primera, we have a case in which the sequential elaboration is so rapidly tangential that the subject of the original metaphoric

comparison--an Arcadian bride and the Phoenix--flies right out of the poem. The scene is another pastoral wedding.

> Del himno culto dió el último acento
> fin mudo al baile, al tiempo que seguida
> la novia sale de villanas ciento
> a la verde florida palizada
> cual nueva fénix en flamantes plumas
> matutinos del sol rayos vestida,

So far, so good: surrounded by her hundred rustic maidens, the bride is conceived to be as beautiful and as resplendent as a newborn Phoenix surrounded by its cortege of brightly colored birds. But now, however, the refulgent Phoenix takes control of things:

> de cuanta surca el aire acompañada
> monarquía canora;
> y, vadeando nubes, las espumas
> del rey corona de los otros ríos:
> en cuya orilla el viento hereda ahora
> pequeños no vacíos
> de funerales bárbaros trofeos
> que el Egipto erigió a sus Ptolomeos.

All of this business of the Nile and the pyramids is, of course, quite irrelevant to the bride herself. The following lines do, however, take us back to the object towards which the bride was moving before the Phoenix flew away with her, the "verde florida palizada," which becomes now more concretely specified as the "umbroso coliseo," where games are to be held:

> Los árboles que el bosque habían fingido,
> umbroso coliseo ya formando,
> despejan el ejido,
> olímpica palestra
> de valientes desnudos labradores.

And finally she arrives.

> Llegó la desposada apenas, cuando
> feroz ardiente muestra
> hicieron dos robustos luchadores. . . .[15]

From this point on attention is devoted more or less consistently to

the festive games, the "olímpica palestra."

We have seen that lines 950-957 retrace the route the Phoenix, accompanied by the "monarquía canora," takes to the headwaters of the Nile, where it dies and is reborn from its own ashes; but even this digressive flight, it will be noticed, is not allowed to proceed in a rectilinear manner, but turns aside at the shores of the Nile to glance at the pyramids. The original comparison, which in its complete form is one that compares the bride dressed in "flaming plumage" and her hundred rustic maidens to the Phoenix and its court of birds, tends to disappear in the logically superfluous--but rhetorically effective--multiplication of details in the Phoenix's flight above the clouds and the waters of the Nile, along the shores of which the wind has now "inherited" only the great empty spaces of the pyramids.

The function of the metaphor is obviously descriptive, but its application to the beauty of the bride promptly disappears in its own elaboration. The subject again has been ignored in the magnification of attribute. Indeed, as concerns the narrative movement of the poem, which in the immediate context means the progress of the bride to the arena where the nuptial games are to be held, this movement is not recaptured until line 963. The reader's focus of interest is gradually returned to the affairs of the bride by means of the "shady coliseum," which follows from the "florida palizada" of line 947. Góngora has perhaps exploited the peripheral nature of the High Baroque technique to the greatest extent possible while still claiming intelligibility.

The peripheral elaboration of the adjunct is the basis by which the ornamental aspects of stylistic are exercised, and per-

haps it provides the justification for practicing adorno almost for its own sake. In reading poems written in the High Baroque manner, one may often have the feeling that a subject has merely provided an excuse for an exercise of technique, and that the subject may indeed be a very small nugget of gold that has, in Donne's phrase, been beaten out to an "airy thinness" in order to fill the expanse of a poem.

The minimal influence the subject exercises on its treatment in the High Baroque practice not only permits the metaphoric tangentiality that we have seen in Góngora's Phoenix-bride conceit, but also allows, as we have suggested, for a greater degree of looseness in the logical relationships of the conceits to each other and to their subjects. Góngora's bride is quite properly analogated with the Phoenix by means of the predicaments Habitus and Relatio, but the analogy ceases with the intrusion of the category Actio, since of course one cannot predicate the act of flying both to the Phoenix and to the bride. Looking at the various elements in this elaborative sequence, therefore, we find that they become increasingly more remote from their subject: the Phoenix is significantly related to the bride by the logic of analogy, but the Nile is related only to the Phoenix and the pyramids are related only to the Nile.

What the example from Góngora suggests is that the autonomy of the adjunct in poetic treatment may lead to the near-autonomy of the decorative element to the extent that it may fail even to achieve any relevance with other elements in the ornamental context. Tangential digressiveness in the progression of thought, and logical looseness in the relation of thought to context, may conspire to

have elements introduced into the context that are not only intrusive, but perhaps even disruptive. An example of such disruptive intrusiveness is found with Amor and his golden chains in the following sonnet from Marino's La Lira, III (1614).

DONNA CHE SI PETTINA

Onde dorate, e l'onde eran capelli,
navicella d'avorio un dì fendea;
una man pur d'avorio la reggea
per questi errori preziosi e quelli;
e, mentre i flutti tremolanti e belli
con drittissimo solco dividea,
l'òr de le rotte fila Amor cogliea,
per formarne catene a' suoi rubelli.
Per l'aureo mar, che rincrespando apria
il procelloso suo biondo tesoro,
agitato il mio core a morte gìa.
Ricco naufragio, in cui sommerso io moro,
poich'almen fûr, ne la tempesta mia,
di diamante lo scoglio e 'l golfo d'oro!

16

The first line is a simple equation of "golden waves" with "hair" on the basis of the predicament Qualitas. The metaphorical value of the line is perhaps only really felt, however, with the appearance of the "little ship of ivory" in the following verse; this causes the reader to re-define "golden waves" and so more precisely to metaphorize "hair" to "sea." The analogy that results from this is formed on the category of Relatio, that is, the literally golden hair containing a real ivory comb, and the metaphoric "sea" containing a metaphorical "ship." We then have the details of the pilot-hand guiding the ship-comb, which enrich the ornamentation and seem indeed to glance outside the poem to the Lady herself through an indirect hyperbole (the hand "truly of ivory") to suggest her enameled beauty and her preciousness.[17]

The conjunctive time-clause introduces the second section of the poem (lines 5-8), and the initial correlation of "hair" and "sea"

is interrupted by having the god of Love pull threads from a literal head of hair in order to fashion figurative chains to bind those who rebel against him, of whom, presumably the Poet would be one. The third section of the sonnet (lines 9-10) returns to the sea metaphor, and the sea is "agitating" the Poet to death: implicitly here, then, the Poet's core has been metaphorized to the rather conventionalized storm-tossed ship. The final four lines carry the analogy of the sea and ship to the inevitable shipwreck of love. The following schema may make the analogical sequence in the poem more evident; it will reveal just how intrusive the god of Love and his golden chains come to be in the progression of thought in the poem.

Lines	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
1-6	waves of gold	Qualitas	hair of gold
	ship of ivory	Qualitas Relatio	comb of ivory
	cleaves divides	Actio	cleaves divides
	pilot of ivory	Qualitas	hand of ivory
	guides-supports	Actio	guides-supports
7-8	Amor makes chains from hair		
9-10	ship (of ivory)	(Qualitas)	comb (of ivory)
	opens	Actio	opens
	sea of gold	(Qualitas)	hair of gold
11-14	tumbling sea	Substantia	tumbling hair
	agitates	Actio	agitates
	ship to wreck	Passio	heart to death

Fig. 11.--Marino: Metaphoric Sequence in Sonnet "Donna che si Pettina"

With the figure of the god of Love, it seems that Marino may have been attempting to evoke a "witty" reference to the common notion that as Beauty in general binds a lover, so also does a particular beauty--in this case the Lady's golden hair--put a lover in bondage.[18] If this be indeed the case, then the shipwreck of line 12, which involves the metaphorization of core into the analogical structure of the comb-ship, might appear to make somewhat better sense, for there seems to be a greater degree of logical consistency in the analogical sequence. The Poet's "heart" or "soul" is bound to the sea of the Lady's beauteous hair much the way a ship is bound to the sea by (presumably here) its anchor chain, and by the fact that it cannot go anywhere else. Thus the Poet's core ought to be able to join the series of "ship" and "comb" analogies. Predicated on the category Passio, we then would find the analogical series to be much like the following: as a ship breaks, so a comb breaks, so a heart breaks. This seems to imply that the "diamante scoglio," the reef which breaks the Poet's heart, is in turn the Lady's core--and if this be the case, then both the comb and the ivory ship need a metaphorical "reef" for a shipwreck too. One would dislike to think that this reef might be a growth on the Lady's skull.

The logic here does not really hold. The intrusive god of Love ultimately causes more difficulties than even the loose logical matrix of this poem can assimilate. The bond that holds a lover in thrall to Beauty is not even analogously akin to the bond that really holds a ship to the sea; it is even less like the "bond" that may hold a comb to hair--even to the extent that a comb used per pettinare can be said to be held or "bound" to hair at all. Even if one were

to view the analogical sequence in terms of Relatio, he would be little better off: the relation of the comb to the hair is indeed analogous to that of a ship to the sea, but this analogy fails too when core also becomes a "ship" that must be related to hair as well as to sea, or to Beauty, in order for one to have the "ship-wreck" that concludes the analogical sequence.[19]

We have dwelt on the logical aspects of Marino's sonnet to illustrate the remarkable lack of integration among conceptual elements that the High Baroque manner is capable of achieving. The extent of this lack of integration may be best appreciated by comparing Marino's sonnet with that of Petrarch that we discussed earlier. The persistently vague, and possibly contradictory logic in Marino's poem is perhaps the best example we have seen of the subordination of logic to rhetorical intention in the High Baroque peripheral treatment of subject.

Perhaps more than any other of the poems we have thus far examined does Marino's sonnet demonstrate the disregard of intellectual substance for aesthetic effect. The poem, it seems, must be read as a frank, albeit perhaps a somewhat clumsy, exercise in rhetoric. The troublesome "chains of love" expression, which refuses a logical integration in the poem, perhaps ought to be viewed as a metaphor of sight: the vision of the Lady's beautiful hair captivates the Poet and holds him in thrall; is soul is drawn to and engulfed in the sea of beauty of the golden tresses. Both the god of Love and the "ship-wreck," accordingly, would take their base from the sea of hair, but then would move outside the poem to involve the Poet, and would thus function more effectively, perhaps, to communicate the Poet's attitude to the beauty of the hair rather than to that of Beauty

itself. This, however, would still seem to leave open the question of whether the subject of the poem be that of the beauty of the Lady or that of the Poet's response to that beauty. The sense of subject matter in the poem is weak enough to allow for more than one possibility.

The troublesome features of the expression of the chains of Love and the shipwreck of the Poet arise from the specificity of their details, details that fail to correlate logically with other elements in the structure of the poem's thought. A tendency towards the multiplication of details in metaphoric statement seems encouraged by the periphrastic nature of High Baroque rhetoric. The peripheral adjunctive elaboration of the High Baroque treatment of subject requires the multiplication of decorative devices in order to fulfill its function of copious ornamentation. It does not seem necessary, however, that any one of these devices be logically related to any other particular device nor even necessarily to the immediate subject at hand. Multiplying the identities within the metaphoric structure expands the metaphor, offers additional possibilities for logical predication, and contributes directly to copia, the doctrine that perhaps is ultimately the philosophical basis for the rhetoric of periphrasis: "La uniformidad limita," says Gracián, "la variedad dilata; y tanto es más sublime, cuanto más nobles perfecciones multiplica."[20]

All examples of the High Baroque metaphor that we have examined so far reveal complication in signification by means of multiplication of identities within the metaphor. This has been especially notable in Crashaw's "The Teare," in Marino's sonnet, and in Góngora's Phoenix-bride metaphor. The latter two cases also point out most

clearly the possibilities of logical irrelevance the signification of these elements of metaphoric elaboration may have.

Complexity in the Order of Predication: Góngora

In addition to multiplying elements in metaphoric structures, however, Góngora is especially notable for the conciseness of his metaphors of complexity, for his remarkable ability to complicate the conceptual form of analogy in a small compass. Complicating the logic in the metaphorical unit, as we saw in regard to his crystalline nymph analogy, is a particularly effective means of enhancing the subject within the metaphorical unit itself. Crashaw's description of the tear as a star-jewel, for example, is fairly expansive; its complexity comes from the relatively large number of specific identities that are related within the equivocal genus of "Crystal-Liquid." Góngora's metaphor of Acis drinking and Galatea sleeping, on the other hand, relies on a complication in the order of predication between the two identities of water and nymph.

Góngora also achieves obscurity in the manner of presenting the statement of metaphor itself. Since this often relies on merely verbal devices, the schemes of traditional rhetoric, it may be well to identify what is perhaps his most typical device of verbal complexity and then to set it aside, for it is really not central to our discussion. Góngora's use of the figure of hyperbaton may be conveniently illustrated by the following lines that conclude the description of Polyphemus' cave in the sixth stanza of the Polifemo:

> De este, pues, formidable de la tierra
> bostezo, el melancólico vacío
> a Polifemo, horror de aquella sierra,
> bárbara choza es. . . .

--which in a normal syntactical order would say something like the following: "The melancholy emptiness of this formidible yawn(-ing cavern) of the earth serves Polyphemus, the horror of that mountain, as a rude hovel." We mention this device of hyperbaton here because it will appear to some extent in virtually all our examples from the Spanish poet in the following pages. Its effect is to disrupt the normal progression of the apprehension of units of thought in any given statement. It physically complicates, so to speak, something that may well be already conceptually complicated. Since our concern is with conceptual matters in metaphor, we shall ignore the imposition of hyperbation and purely verbal devices on the metaphoric structure in Góngora.[21]

We noted that in Spenser's comparison of lips to cherries in his description of the Bride in his Epithalamion there was an appreciable degree of logical complexity in the structure of the comparison, particularly in view of the fact that there was multiple predication involving a cause and effect sequence in the analogy. The logical complexity was not, however, of such a kind as to be conspicuous or to intrude upon the apprehension of the metaphor's signification. By way of appreciating the distance from Spenser in the Gongorist sense of the aesthetic of complexity, we may set against the former's catalogue of the beauties of his Bride the following list proposed by the Spanish poet for his bride in the epithalamium of the Soledad primera:

CORO II

Ven, Himeneo, donde entre arreboles
de honesto rosicler, previene el día
--aurora de sus ojos soberanos--
virgen tan bella, que hacer podría
tórrida la Noruega con dos soles,
y blanca la Etiopia con dos manos.

Claveles del abril, rubíes tempranos,
cuantos engasta el oro del cabello,
cuantas--del uno ya del otro cuello
cadenas--la concordia engaza rosas,
de sus mejillas, siempre vergonzosas, 790
purpúreo son trofeo.
Ven, Himeneo, ven; ven, Himeneo.

The sequence of description in the stanza is as follows: the maiden's eyes are described in lines 781-784; her hands in line 785; cheeks in 786-791; and hair, 787-789. We shall take for examination the metaphor of lines 783-785, which simultaneously defines the beauty of the maiden's eyes and her hands in terms of a sequence of cause and effect. The other metaphors, conventionally enough, merely describe hair and cheeks by qualitative analogies with gold and flowers.

The "wit" of lines 783-785 seems to lie in the discovery or "invention" of two similar agents acting upon contrary qualities in two objects which themselves are only similar to each other. Norway is properly white and cold; Ethiopia is black and hot. Because of the strategic position of "hacer podría," there is no doubt that univocity in Actio is intended. Regardless of this univocity in predication, however, manos is not an efficient cause in the same way that soles is, or indeed, in the same way that ojos, the literal designate of "soles," is an efficient cause. It would seem that the specific, literal subject manos should have been perhaps metaphorized in the same way that ojos was metaphorized to "soles."

The problem really comes again to be one of defining a genus of similitude, or of finding a generic concept that might include both "dos soles" and "dos manos" as causative agents, for the metaphor does, after all, make some sense. Both "sun" and "hand" are traditional metaphors of power, but the real question is not so much to correlate these subjects in Góngora's analogy as it is to correlate their adjunctive

modes. Making use of the cliché of sun and eyes, Góngora is seeking to set up an analogy between suns-eyes and hands on the basis of Quantitas ("two") and a particular active mode of Qualitas in the following manner:

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
Subject Adjunct	two	Quantitas	two
Subject	sun-eyes	Substantia	hands
Predicate	(are)		(are)
Adjunct	bright	Qualitas	white

Fig. 12.--Góngora: Preliminary Analogy of Suns-Eyes and Hands

The notion of "brightness" in the first analogate is a notion of an active quality, "shining," especially when it is predicated of suns and eyes, just as it was with Laura (presumably) in Petrarch's sonnet. "Whiteness," however, is an affective quality that merely inheres in its subject. The genus of similitude in this case, which we may designate as Power or Vertù, thus comes to focus on the adjunctive quality "whiteness" and make it a causative agent--and this in turn involves the category Actio in the analogy as a complement to the predicament Qualitas. "Whiteness" and "brightness," therefore, are the specific forms the concept Vertù takes, and they become the formal agents of change in the metaphor. Since hands and suns-eyes are the immediate sources of change in the geographical objects, they become the efficient causes, for they are the particular substances in which the beauty of the maiden manifests itself. Thus

we have here again, but in a small compass, a particularly revealing instance of the High Baroque emphasis on the adjunctive treatment of a subject.

In its complete form Góngora's analogy defining the beauty of his Arcadian bride by means of the effects of her beauty would appear as in the following analysis.

> virgen tan bella, que hacer podría
> tórrida la Noruega con dos soles,
> y blanca la Etiopia con dos manos.

Genus of Similitude: "Vertù"				
	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	Causative Sequence
Subject	(el brillo)	Qualitas (= Actio)	(la blancura)	Formal
Genitive Object	(de) dos ojos-soles	Quantitas Substantia	(de) dos manos	Efficient
Predicate	hacer podría	Actio	hacer podría	- - -
Object of Action	Noruega	(Substantia)	Etiopia	Material
Adjunct 1	(blanca)	Qualitas	(negra)	[Differentiae]
Adjunct 2	(fría)		(tórrida)	
Object of Causation	tórrida	Qualitas	blanca	Final

Fig. 13.--Góngora: Complete Analogy of Suns-Eyes and Hands

Logically, changing the properties forming the essential differentia of any two objects, or substances, changes their identities. Here Góngora's metaphoric expression of the beauty of the maiden's eyes and hands is a proposition that claims a synthesizing power for beauty, and this is an important demonstration of the metaphysics of

Platonic beauty and its power of creating unity. One will note that in making Norway white and hot and Ethiopia white and hot likewise, the power of the maiden's beauty has effectively destroyed the distinctions between the two lands and has made them one thing. The treatment of subjects, adjuncts, and objects in this metaphor has provided a good example of what Gracián calls the agudeza mixta, that "monstruo del concepto," which utilizes both the topical "wit of correspondence," or similitude (agudeza de correspondencia) and the "wit of contrariety" (agudeza de contrariedad) to construct the logical harmony that is the mark of ingenio.[22]

The complexity of the "virgen tan bella" metaphor came in the identities and the order of sequence in the analogy of causes; conceptually of course the order of predication had to be unraveled in order to determine the governing Genus of Similitude. The following expression of the "Clicie del viento," also from the Soledad primera, relies on metonomy (material for its product), on apparent mythological personification (Clytia for the heliotrope), and on a relatively mild use of hyperbaton to obscure the rather simple analogy between the way the flower follows the direction of the sun and the way a sail follows the direction of the wind.

> surcó, labrador fiero, 370
> el campo undoso en mal nacido pino,
> vaga Clicie del viento,
> en telas hecho--antes que en flor--el lino?
> Más armas introdujo este marino
> monstruo, escamado de robustos hayas,
> a las que tanto mar divide playas,
> que confusión y fuego
> al frigio muro el otro leño griego. 378

The metaphor "Clicie del viento" of lines 372-373 involves two analogical situations. The first is a somewhat extensive one

predicated on Actio.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
Subject	Clytia		flax
Predicate 1	(becomes)	Actio	becomes
Object 1	flower		sailcloth
Predicate 2	(follows)	Actio	(follows)
Object 2	(sun)		wind

Fig. 14.--Góngora: Clytia-Flax Analogy

The crucial reference here is the identification of Clytia as the heliotrope, and this of course requires that the reader know the Ovidian myth (Metamorphoses IV. 205-270). Once this identification is made, however, a further analogy will provide the logic for the ship's sail becoming the "Clytia of the wind":

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II
Subject	Clytia		(sail)
Predicate	is to	Relatio	is to
Object	(sun)		wind

Fig. 15.--Góngora: Clytia-Sail Analogy

Clytia is thus made equivalent to "sail" and is substituted for it. The interjected technical touch "antes que en flor," which produces the hyperbaton, serves logically to expand the analogy. Properly speaking, whereas the heliotrope is a flower that follows

the sun, flax is turned into sailcloth before ("antes que") it blossoms; this is what provides the basis for the analogy of cause and effect between the Subjects and the Primary Objects (i.e, Clytia-flower, and flax-sailcloth) in the first analogical situation. Were Clytia to be taken simply as a synonym for "heliotrope," the analogy would fail; Clytia, therefore, comes to represent not personification, but metonomy.

It may be noted that this metaphor of the sail stands as an appositive to the phrase "mal nacido pino." Technically pino is a case of species to genus synecdoche ("pine"="wood"), from which it comes to serve as a commonplace metonomy of material again (wood) for thing made (ship). The "vaga Clicie del viento" is thus also a metaphor of metonomy, being the wandering ship itself of the "labrador fiero," the "marino monstruo," who, motivated by avarice, stands accused of bringing more trouble to the world than the Greeks brought to Troy. What we wish to point out here is that the entire treatment of the mariner's ship is via the technique of metonomy, by means of the adjunct again, especially in regard to the sail of the ship. The elaborate treatment of the ship's sail as a "Clytia of the wind" is clearly peripheral to the matter of the ship itself.

The oblique treatment of subject extends, as we may expect, to the contextual functions of these metaphors of the sail and the "mal nacido pino." They are part of the formal peroration of a 136-line demonstrative oration against avarice (codicia) that is delivered by an ancient shepherd. The thesis of this oration is given in the last five lines of the selection and points to the ills caused by the "marino monstruo." The elaborate logic, or per-

haps one ought better to say subtle logic, of the sail metaphor and the reference of signification of this metaphor are quite remote from the subject of avarice. Yet they do function admirably to embellish the immediate topic of sailing the seas in search of wealth.

In describing the logical functions involved in the formation of the High Baroque metaphor, we have in effect described the logic of periphrastic descriptio itself as it appears in a stylistic in which adornment, the "invention" of beauty, is quite nearly pursued for its own sake. The aesthetic of this stylistic is of course emotional in its foundation rather than intellectual, but the emotional impress is effected through structures of logical formation. In the High Baroque manner, logic as analytics is turned towards the analysis and synthesis of the affective, emotional, aspects of poetic identities. In practice their "magnification," through the enhancing of their aesthetic properties, involves the assumption of a subject for whatever it is commonly considered to be and then the devoting of logical effort to analysis of the "adjuncts" or properties of this subject, rather than to analysis of the subject itself. The periphrastic rhetorical technique has, therefore, a corresponding peripheral application of logic.

We shall see that the stylistic distinction between the High Baroque and the Metaphysical has an important difference in this matter of logical application. We shall find the basis of the Metaphysical stylistic to be a concern with the analysis of subject, with the identification of substance. Metaphysical poems are quite often exercises in definition, rather than in description, and accordingly

the center of intellectual concern will fall on the subject itself, as it exists as a bare, "naked" concept.

V. THE METAPHYSICAL METAPHOR AND THE LOGIC OF DEFINITION

In our discussion of the High Baroque technique, we suggested that this style reflects the general characteristics of the High style of ancient demonstrative oratory as it came down through the centuries. Like the Demonstrative genus of the oration, the High Baroque lyric takes as its subjects things whose identity is considered to be generally known, and devotes itself to embellishing the attributes commonly ascribed to these subjects. The resulting profusion of metaphors and other descriptive devices often seems to lead to a virtual disappearance of the subject. High Baroque composition thus comes to be a studied periphrasis in which conceptual devices like the metaphor and the enthymeme are only incidentally related to their subjects. Considered logically, this peripheral relationship is occasioned by the preoccupation with the "adjuncts" of a subject instead of with its essential nature.

Whereas the primary impulse in the High Baroque handling of subject is towards the examination of its more or less superficial characteristics, the Metaphysical impulse is quite in the other direction, towards the analysis of the subject itself. The remarks of early critics like Drummond of Hawthornden, who complained of the Metaphysical poets' endeavors "to abstract [poetry] to metaphysical ideas and scholastic quiddities," and Dryden, who accused Donne of "affecting the metaphysics" and perplexing the minds of the fair sex, are observations that go beyond a reaction to style alone.[1]

Substantial analysis in anything like a philosophical sense implies metaphysics, and the early critics were quick to recognize this in Donne's "Scholasticism." The markedly dialectical character that modern students continue to find in Donne's verse is a sign of his reluctance to allow any subject, no matter how conventional, to pass unexamined. The subject of love, for example, receives in Donne an acute and persistent analysis in terms of its essence and function. The recurring question that Donne's love poems ask is what is love and how is it realized? and the neo-Platonic (and Petrarchan) postulate of love as a state of suffering is challenged and found to be inadequate to define the complexities of human love and its desire for permanence.

Analysis of subject instead of elaboration of subject has some profound implications for stylistic, for by its very nature the analytical treatment of subject, either as a general thesis or in a particular hypothesis, will tend to emphasize the primacy of matter to manner. Rhetorical "figures" will in this case be much more likely to appear as means of exposition than as devices of decoration. Considered in view of the ancient dichotomy of language, the analytical and expository intention in Metaphysical poetry would naturally tend to place Metaphysical stylistic on the side of dialectic and the Plain style.

There are two traditions of the Plain style, the "Classical" and the "Medieval," and both are involved in the composition of Metaphysical poetry. The "Classical" Plain style (Subtile) is, generally speaking, the "Attic" style described at some length by Cicero in his Orator (xxiii. 75-xxiv. 90). Briefly, this style is

restrained and plain, and it imitates the manner of ordinary speech while still keeping a certain artificial distance from it. From our point of view, its most important feature is the lack of ornamentation: Cicero says that "All noticeable ornament . . . will be excluded; not even curling-irons [calamistri] will be used; all cosmetics, artificial white and red, will be rejected; only elegance and neatness will remain" (xxiii. 79). The sense of the Plain style that Donne and Herbert received from earlier didactic and contemplative lyric practices is, on the other hand, the Adtenuata, the "popular" or "vulgar" style that is described in the older Rhetorica ad Herennium. This is not the Subtile of Cicero, Quintilian, and Horace, which, though informal remains somewhat above the idiomatic simplicity of the "Medieval" Plain style; it is, however, the Subtile that forms the stylistic basis of Donne's contemporary, Ben Jonson, and of such nominally Metaphysical poets as Vaughan and Marvell.[2]

The Ad Herennium describes the Plain or Simple style as the use of the "most current idiom of standard speech" (IV. vii. 11), and illustrates this idea by narration, which is taken as the statement of facts or deeds (I. iii. 4). The Adtenuata will have the qualities of brevity, clarity, and plausibility (I. ix. 14); and it will be characterized by a "conversational tone" (sermo), which involves "varied intonations . . . so that we seem to recount everything just as it took place" (III. xiii. 23-xiv. 24). The colloquialism and sense of immediacy that marks the poems of Donne and Herbert reflect this notion of the sermo. The broad sense of idiomatic and conversational "plainness" provides a common ground between the language of dialectic the the probative "office" of oratory,[3] and

offers itself as a vehicle for the exercise of wit (acutezza) in the finding of truth instead of beauty. The analytical endeavor and the stylistic vehicle are therefore naturally adapted to the presentation of thought or matter rather than to the "garnishing" of thought; and consequently the tropic structures will have to be more centrally related to subject matter than we have found them to be in the High style of the High Baroque.

Since it is a structure formed by analytics, the signification of the analogical metaphor may be expected not only to function as a rhetorical vehicle of communication, but indeed even as an instrument of analysis. Our discussion of analogy sought to stress the fact that its intrinsic significance is always definitory, since one thing is defined in terms of another thing within the conception of a given metaphysical circumstance, category of being. In the Metaphysical poets, in Donne and Herbert especially, these metaphysical circumstances themselves are not assumed, but are examined. To explore the implications of meaning, Donne will use the conceit to analyze and to illustrate the concept, and Herbert often will use the emblem to analyze and illustrate the emblem.

Both by training and by inclination Donne was a logician.[4] His self-confessed "Hydroptique immoderate desire of humane learning" urged him to go behind the appearances of things, to analyze them, and search out the reality of their being.[5] For this purpose the superficial appearances that form the references of topical thought are notably inadequate, and Ramism perhaps the least adequate of all. The functions of "imagery," which Miss Tuve finds common to Ramistic conceptions of thought and to Metaphysical poetry,

are precisely those of dialectic and the Plain style in general--except that neither Donne nor the science of analytics shares the confusion between "argument" and "concept" that marks Ramism and topical logics as a whole.[6]

As the following pages will indicate, Donne was a much better Aristotelian than he might have been a Ramist; indeed, there are definite indications that Donne's Aristotelianism owed much to St. Thomas. He appears to have accepted the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul-body relationship and the theory of cognition developed by St. Thomas.[7] Finally, of the poets of the period, John Donne is conspicuous by his ability to structure analogies, or conceits, on the principle of the Thomistic Analogy of Proportionality.

The dialectical function of metaphor in the Plain style imposes a more central relationship with regard to its subject and a greater degree of integration of signification with the signification of its context than we have found to be the case with the metaphor in the High Baroque practice. In the following discussion we shall seek to demonstrate by a choice of fairly representative poems that in Donne and Herbert, the two chief figures in the Metaphysical stylistic tradition in England, this centrality of relationship is paramount, and that analogical metaphor in the Metaphysical style functions both to explain thought and actually to convey the essential thought itself. And in these functions the chief characteristic of metaphoric analogy will be found to be that of <u>definition</u>.

<u>Centrality of Relationship in the Metaphysical Metaphor</u>

The chiefly expository function of the Metaphysical conceit is

revealed by its persistent centrality of signification in both its immediate and general contexts. Even when emblematic elements enter the context, they are treated in terms of their intellectual content or signification rather than in terms of their emotional content or aesthetic potential, as one finds in Crashaw for example. The Metaphysical treatment of emblematic analogy may be illustrated by Donne's use of the circle in his poem "Upon the Annunciation and Passion falling upon one day. 1608."[8]

> Tamely fraile body'abstaine to day; to day
> My soule eates twice, Christ hither and away.
> Shee sees him man, so like God made in this,
> That of them both a circle embleme is,
> Whose first and last concurre; . . . (ll. 1-5)

The idea of perfection is univocally predicated of Christ and the circle, as is typical in the logical formation of the emblem. Donne's immediate concern with the figure, however, is not with the idea of perfection that the geometric circle represents, but only with the fact that it has no discernible beginning or end, or as he sees it, the beginning and end of the circle are coincidental. The idea of perfection has relevance to the general context of the poem, but the specific fact of the coincidence of beginning and end is the matter of immediate significance in regard to the holy day.

The concurrence of "first and last" is the "one period" cited later in line 38 of the poem; it is an equivocal designation that refers to the geometric point of a circle as well as to the temporal cycle represented by the holy day as the epitome of the Christian cycle. The holy day, however, has been designated in line 20 as the "Abridgement of Christs story"; and although one may univocally predicate <u>coincidence</u> with regard to the holy day as a day and to the point of a circle, one cannot predicate the idea of <u>abridgment</u>

univocally to both. The relationship of the geometric point of a circle to the circle itself is one of quality (Qualitas, a consequent on form); the relationship of the holy day to the Christian cycle as an abridgment of that cycle is a relationship of quantity (Quantitas, a part representing the whole).[9] The question one asks is whether the coterminous point of the circle of perfection be an essential element in the idea of "abridgment" that the day represents. It is not, of course, since Donne is not interested in exploring the geometry of the coincidence of the "Angels Ave,' and Consummatum est" (l. 22), but rather to elucidate the paradoxes of the Christian situation that the paradox of the concurrence of beginning and ending suggests. Hence the circle and its point is logically set apart as an exemplum (Donne calls it an "emblem") of the holy day, and does not function as a conceptual element in the definition of that holy day. The emblematic circle is thus an illustration of perfection, not a definition of perfection, and the geometric coincidence of beginning and end is an illustration of the concurrence of the two holy days on one day and is not a definition of it.

Since the general concept of perfection itself abolishes categorical distinctions of being--since these distinctions are in effect conceptual limitations of being--"perfection" provides the conceptual basis for the subsequent paradoxes involving different discrete predicaments of being and different modes of categorical realization. One has, for example, the contradictory predicaments of Actio and Passio in "Her Maker [Actio] put to making [Passio]" of line 9; of Mary as "At once receiver [Passio] and the legacie [Actio]" (l. 18), and "Death [Passio] and conception [Actio] in mankinde is one" (l. 34).

And there are contradictory modes of realization in a given category, like Habitus: "Not fully a mother, Shee's in Orbitie" (l. 17), i.e., Mary is in mourning for her lost Son.[10]

With regard to emblematic material, the contrast with Crashaw's technique in "The Teare" seems evident. Both poets have made use of the predicament Qualitas as a basis for analogy, but in Donne's poem this category has been subjected to a more critically philosophical examination than it has in Crashaw's poem. Whereas in the latter poet the generic concept "Crystal-Liquid" is treated in terms of what Aristotle called an affective quality (Categories VIII. 9a. 38-9b. 9), in Donne Qualitas has been given a more technically metaphysical sense as a differentiator of substance, and this differentia compels a continual regard for the subject under examination.

The impulse to critical analysis of the metaphysical implications of designations of being is characteristic of Donne. He may indeed use analogical metaphor in a descriptive or incidental manner, just as will any other poet; but when it comes to defining things metaphorically or to illustrating a definition, his conceits typically reveal this tendency towards the making of distinctions in being rather than towards the predicating of community in states of being. His use of metaphor as a descriptive device and as a vehicle of meaning are both shown in his well known poem, "The Exstasie."[11] The whole of this poem is an analytical exercise in the definition of the unity of two souls in a state of "pure" love.

Briefly summarized, "The Exstasie" argues that since Love had "unperplexed" the two individual souls of the lovers in a larger,

unified and harmonious synthesis of an "abler soul," and that since souls must operate through the bodies, this greater soul, the "great Prince" of line 68, should have its material analogue in the union of the lovers' bodies. There are two crucial points in Donne's development of this idea in his argument, and they form the propositions upon which the deductive demonstration of the necessity of physical union rests.

In the major premise Donne gives the metaphysical condition of the souls in the ecstatic state of mystic, Erotic love. He begins by describing the meeting of the lovers' souls in a realm intermediate to their two quiescent bodies:

> As 'twixt two equal Armies, Fate
> Suspends uncertaine victorie,
> Our soules, (which to advance their state,
> Were gone out,) hung 'twixt her, and mee.
>
> And whil'st our soules negotiate there,
> Wee like sepulchrall statues lay; (ll. 13-18)

Having described the location of the souls with respect to their bodies, Donne then turns to consider the <u>nature</u> of the two souls in this state of ecstasy, and in so doing he defines in effect the nature of analogy itself, for he invokes the Platonic concept of Eros as the analogy-making power or <u>mesothesis</u>.[12]

> But as all severall soules containe
> Mixture of things, they know not what,
> Love, these mixt soules, doth mixe againe,
> And makes both one, each this and that. (ll. 33-36)

The two souls thus are not just two distinct entities "negotiating" on some middle ground between the statue-like lovers' bodies; they have in effect inter-flowed and have become two-in-one, an intermediate state of synthetic unity. This simultaneous ordering of differ-

ence and similarity is of course precisely what analogy does. The identities in the analogical situation lose part of their proper identity and participate in the identity of their analogues. The "mixt soules" are thus a true mesothesis, intellectual substances in an intellectually perceived state of being. The two souls are differentiated from each other by sex, and this differentia seems to be what they are "negotiating," for the point of the argument ultimately comes to be that the Erotic ecstasy removes this essential difference in effecting a larger, hermaphroditic soul, which is the "one neutrall thing" to which "both sexes fit":[13]

> This Exstasie doth unperplex
> (We said) and tell us what we love,
> Wee see by this, it was not sexe,
> Wee see, we saw not what did move: (ll. 29-32)

This unifying "mixing" of the souls results in a more potent, more aware kind of soul, a point that is illustrated by an analogy with a transplanted violet:

> A single violet transplant,
> The strength, the colour, and the size,
> (All which before was poore, and scant,)
> Redoubles still, and multiplies.
>
> When love, with one another so
> Interinanimates two soules,
> That abler soule, which thence doth flow,
> Defects of lonelinesse controules.
>
> Wee then, who are this new soule, know,
> Of what we are compos'd, and made,
> For, th'Atomies of which we grow,
> Are soules, whom no change can invade. (ll. 37-48)

Donne has neatly put his finger on the hypostatic nature of analogy in its power to harmonize similarity with difference to form a larger, autonomous unity. The "abler soul" contains both "this and that," essential difference yet within the analogical unity. By

having this greater perfection of unity, however, it overcomes the limitations or defects inherent in separate singularity ("lonelinesse"); its properties therefore become augmented, just as the violet becomes stronger, more floribund, and prolific by being transplanted. The violet, we should note, remains here only an illustrative analogue, since its own differentia, a vegetable soul, cannot participate analogically in the conception of the lovers' "interinanimated" rational souls. The essence of the vegetable soul is only quantitative growth; that of the rational soul is a qualitative self-awareness--the awareness of the singularity of separate being ("Atomies") as well as the increased awareness of unity in the "new soule." The "redoubling" and "multiplying" of the vegetable-souled violet falls univocally within the conception of "Enabling," a generic predication proper to the souls of the lovers and to the violet, well enough; but since the predication of "interinanimation" cannot also be given univocally to the two identities, the violet remains only an illustrative analogue and not part of the vehicle of definition itself.

Donne now turns to the second premise of his argument, and this deals with the relation of the souls of the lovers to their bodies. He has identified the essentially hermaphroditic nature of the souls in ecstasy; now he must consider the bodies of the lovers, since soul is form and is claimed to be incapable of realization without the material body.

> But O alas, so long, so farre
> Our bodies why doe wee forbeare?
> They'are ours, though they'are not wee, Wee are
> Th'intelligences, they the spheare[s].[14]

We owe them thankes, because they thus,
Did us, to us, at first convay,
Yeelded their forces, sense, to us,
Nor are drosse to us, but allay. (ll. 49-56)

The idea here is basically Aristotelian and not Platonic. Donne's statement of the relation of soul to body seems most akin to the Aristotelian notion of the realization of form only in matter by means of what Donne calls the alloy of the two. In the Aristotelian viewpoint, form has no real separate existence. Form and matter are mutually dependent; they can be considered separate things only by an act of the intellect which abstracts form and gives it being, but only as a strictly mental concept. This is contrary to the Platonic notion of autonomous form, which impresses ("imprints" in line 58) itself on matter ("dross").[15] For the Aristotelians and for Donne, therefore, the soul, although being indeed the essential determinant of identity, must of necessity rely on the sensual "forces" of the body--the "affections" and "faculties" of line 66--to furnish the data of experience to the soul. Borrowing an idea from astronomy, Donne seeks to describe this soul-body relationship by means of an analogy with the celestial spheres, which are "moved" or driven by souls or "intelligences." The souls of the lovers owe their bodies thanks because the sensual powers of each body first made the souls aware of each other.

Donne's dialectical procedure has thus been to move from a consideration of essence (form) to a consideration of substance (form plus matter) to structure the logical necessity of the lovers' physical union. However, so that the point of his second proposition concerning substance will not be lost, he restates it in the more nearly Platonic terms of exemplary form working through the

intermediary of air to effect its influence:

> On man heavens influence workes not so,
> But that it first imprints the ayre,
> Soe soule into the soule may flow,
> Though it to body first repaire. (ll. 57-60)

If form "works" to become realized in matter through the medium of quasi-substantial air, so Love, or the souls of lovers, must "repair" to the bodies to effect the realization of their essential love. The inter-flowing of the two soul-breaths of line 59 is a somewhat more specific restatement of the idea of "interinanimation" of line 42, and relies on the traditional idea of the soul as spiritus.

The conclusion of the argument of "The Exstasie" draws together both the generally Aristotelian and Platonic conceptions of the soul-body relationship by involving the idea of spiritus in notions of contemporary physiology, specifically the idea of "spirits" as being the "subtile vapours" that serve as the quasi-substantial medium (a mesothesis again) that holds the soul and body together in their "alloyed" union.[16]

> As our blood labours to beget
> Spirits, as like soules as it can,
> Because such fingers need to knit
> That subtile knot, which makes us man:
>
> So must pure lovers soules descend
> T'affections, and to faculties,
> That sense may reach and apprehend,
> Else a great Prince in prison lies. (ll. 61-68)

The conclusion ends up being basically Aristotelian: since the awareness of each lover's soul is dependent upon the individual body, so the awareness of the "abler soul," the "great Prince," must need a physical union, or else as form this greater soul will be "imprisoned" as only a potential, and will not achieve actualization, for

Loves mysteries in soules doe grow,
But yet the body is his booke. (ll. 71-72)

Donne's argument has defined the spiritual union of the lovers, related soul to body, and has concluded by claiming the logical necessity of a physical union to complement and to actualize the spiritual union.

In "The Exstasie" analogy functions both centrally and incidentally, and in the central function it both defines and illustrates, as we have see. The initial simile comparing a "Pregnant banke" with a "pillow on a bed" is simply a brief topothesis to set the static, pastoral context of the poem:

Where, like a pillow on a bed,
A Pregnant banke swel'd up, to rest
The violets reclining head,
Sat we two, one anothers best; (ll. 1-4)

This obviously has no significant relationship to the thesis of the poem. Likewise, although the metaphor of the "sepulchrall statues" (l. 18) does specify the notion of Situs in the analogy with the lover's quiescent bodies, the analogical specification of posture is given explicitly in line 19, and the "statues" merely illustrate this idea. Hence the analogy illustrates the significance of its immediate context, or hypothesis, but in terms of the general thesis of the poem it is merely descriptive.

On the other hand, the "equal Armies" metaphor of line 13 and the transplanted violet analogy of line 37 are both involved in the statement of the major premise defining the state of the souls in the union of ecstasy. In the first instance the suspension of victory illustrates or particularizes the ex-corporeal state of the enamored souls, of their suspension "'twixt her, and mee," a pre-

dicament of Habitus that defines the ecstatic state.[17] Similarly, we have noted that the transplanted violet merely illustrates the idea of the increased powers of the hermaphroditic soul of the mystic union. In neither case do these analogies define the proposition or hypothesis with which they are involved, since in one case the idea of suspension has already been given a literal statement and in the other case the violet does not participate in the ratio of spiritual "interinanimation."

We have, however, seen two examples of definitory analogy operating in the statement of the second premise and in the conclusion of Donne's argument. The analogy of the souls and bodies with the "intelligences" and the "spheres" seems definitory in that it identifies the concept of substance as the necessary composite of form and matter upon which the thesis of the poem rests. The analogy involving the physiological "spirits" likewise functions to state the proposition that the union of the lovers' bodies is essential to knit the even more "subtile knot" of their essential hermaphroditic identity as "pure" lovers.[18] These analogies appear just where definitive literal statements and definitory analogies in a syllogism need to appear, in premises and conclusion. The major premise is a relatively literal, dialectical definition of the ecstatic state of the lovers' souls; the minor premise, however, is a metaphorical definition of the relation of souls to bodies, and the conclusion is an analogical definition of the complementary function of the bodies to the souls in the actualization of "refin'd" love. "The Exstasie" is in effect and extended analysis of the analogical nature of love, and it defines love in predominantly

Aristotelian terms and utilizes metaphoric analogies instead of simple "names" as designators of conceptual elements.

Donne's Aristotelianism has, so to speak, allowed him to go beyond more or less simple Platonic idealism to related the concept of love to the reality of experience: love is found to be more than a state of mind, or even a state of spirit; it is a state of body also, a state for which the conventional attitude of suffering, a generic Passio, is quite inadequate. The Platonic Eros is accepted, true enough, but it is given an analysis that reveals important active, sensual components.

Definitory function in the use of metaphoric Analogy of Inequality occurs again in the notorious "green thought in a green shade" of Andrew Marvell's "The Garden." We cannot here discuss the entire poem, but we should like to point out that this troublesome metaphor appears at the point in the poem in which the metaphysical significance of the garden is defined; indeed, stanza VI, in which the metaphor occurs, is in certain respects nearly a synopsis of Platonic epistemology.

> Mean while the Mind, from pleasure less,
> Withdraws into its happiness:
> The Mind, that Ocean where each kind
> Does streight its own resemblance find;
> Yet it creates, transcending these,
> Far other Worlds, and other Seas;
> Annihilating all that's made
> To a green Thought in a green Shade.[19] (ll. 41-48)

The meaning of the "green thought" expression hinges on the meaning of the analogy that related the mind to an ocean. The particular idea behind this analogy seems generally accepted as being that the animals of the land have counterparts in the sea.[20] The analogy thus signifies the analogical relationship of the mind to

the external world: all things in nature have a prior and corresponding form in the mind, the form by which they become known by the mind. This correspondence is one of diametric complementation and reflection, and "streight" is more likely to signify the rectilinear directness of correspondence than the temporal immediacy of the expression "at once" (as in "straight away" or "directly") and, least of all, than Empson's guess of "packed together."[21] The mind, however, is not merely a passive mirror, or in a more common terms, an inert tabula raza; it has an active faculty, the imagination, which creates new forms, synthesizes, and imitates in its sphere the Divine poesis--as, for example, pastoral poets like Marino and Góngora have done in their ideal Arcadias. Such an ideal, transcendental universe, it seems, is Marvell's own garden.

The created world, according to contemporary Platonism, is a shadow of the ideal world of intellectual Form. All things that are "made" are therefore "shadows" or "shades" of their formal archetype, which only the Mind can perceive. If the form of a garden-world is the same when predicated of a real garden as when predicated of the concept of a garden; and if, as is indeed the case, the conception of a thing is the thought or intention of a thing, then logically the adjunct of the thing--in this case the quality of greenness--will univocally correspond in both the concept and in the thing itself. The green garden has its conceptual analogue in a green thought of a garden, and the created garden being a "shade" of the conceived garden will give rise to the metaphysical analogue of a green shade. The annihilation of phenomena to concepts thus states the priority of formal essence and the dominance of the imagination as the active

power of the mind. Whatever the garden may be taken to signify in theological, moral, or in other contexts, its intrinsic signification, its essential nature, must be derived from the metaphysics of analogy.[22]

Definition is likewise the function of the pair of similes that open Henry Vaughan's "The World" from his Silex Scintillans, I (1650):[23]

> I saw Eternity the other night
> Like a great Ring of pure and endless light,
> All calm, as it was bright,
> And round beneath it, Time in hours, days, years
> Driv'n by the spheres
> Like a vast shadow mov'd, In which the world
> And all her train were hurl'd; (ll. 1-7)

In this pair of metaphors we find eternity defined as being in some way like a ring of light, and time as being by analogy a moving vast shadow. Each metaphor provides a definition of one of two complementary concepts, immutability and perfection in the conception of eternity on one hand, and the opposite notion of imperfection, limitation, and mutability of the temporal world on the other. These two definitions provide the basis for an analysis of comparative degree, for the conception of the real world as determined vis-à-vis the formal concept of Perfection.

The ring of light is equivocal in both its elements, since "ring" can refer to the form of a circle as well as to the substance of a ring; and both meanings are involved in the poem--as in the "sad Ecclipses" of line 19, the "Ring" (sphere) of line 47, into which the blessed souls escape; the "orb" of the sun in line 55, and finally the "ring" of the Bridegroom of line 59. "Light" of course has reference to the generally Platonic tradition in metaphysics and epistemology, since it is an analogue of being as well as of knowledge. Here of course occur the comparisons with the complementary, and also equivocal, analogues of "night" and the

"vast shadow" of time, for these too have ontological and epistemological notions connected with them. The significance of the comparison is the usual one that points to the conception of night as the privation of light, and hence as the privation of being and knowledge.

These basic implications of the metaphors of the "ring of light" and the "shadow of time" are brought together in the fourth and concluding stanza of Vaughan's poem. In a passage reminiscent of Plato's Allegory of the Cave (Republic VII), the comparative values of eternity and time are brought together to form antitheses in the contrast of "dark night" and "true light":

> . . . . . .
> O fools (said I,) thus to prefer dark night
> Before true light,
> To live in grots, and caves, and hate the day
> Because it shews the way,
> The way which from this dead and dark abode
> Leads up to God,
> A way where you might tread the Sun, and be
> More bright than he.
> But as I did their madnes so discusse
> One whisper'd thus,
> This Ring the Bride-groome did for none provide
> But for his bride. (ll. 49-60)

We see that the two metaphoric analogies have established the basis for an analysis of the world in terms of comparative, qualitative degree; the concept of eternity is sufficiently defined by the analogy of form with the ring of light, and the world is equally defined relative to the light of eternity by the metaphor of the "shadow" of time. The intention of the poem as a whole is simply to perform the analysis that the comparative definitions pose and to elucidate and evaluate the objects so defined.[24]

Both Marvell's "The Garden" and Vaughan's "The World" are written in the general manner of the "Classical" Plain style, and in

them metaphoric analogy functions in just the same way that it does in Donne, who writes in the "Medieval" Plain style. In all the cases we have examined, centrality of relationship in metaphoric signification is of utmost importance, for such signification is working to define or to illustrate a given proposition in the poem. The distinctive feature of the Metaphysical manner as opposed to the High Baroque technique is its use of metaphor in just this way. The crucial importance of analogy as a structure of definition is perhaps best realized in Donne, however. Although equivocity in predication is often involved in analogy, in Donne particularly it forms the basis for modality in predication, which gives rise to metaphoric Analogy of Proportionality.

Modal Predication: Analogy of Proportionality

Donne's habit of analyzing concepts extends even to the concepts of the categories themselves. An awareness of substantial differences seems to have imposed an awareness of insufficiency in the purely logical, univocal, predication of categorical similitude often in cases where analogy is being used to define a concept. The distinctively "Metaphysical" conceit as it appears in Donne and Herbert seems to reflect a sense of substantial difference between the analogues for which a category of similitude is being predicated. This difference is seen to be not just a matter of degree of heterogeneity, as such, but also of the ways in which the predicate is realized in each of the heterogeneous subjects. Accordingly, in certain situations of definition, the predicated category will imply modality rather than uniformity in the analogical participation, and metaphysical distinctions in modes of predication will come to be implied in the analogical structure

itself.

We may illustrate this sense of modality in predication by examining Donne's use of emblematic expressions of color in the following poem from his "Holy Sonnets" (1633).

> Oh my blacke Soule! now thou art summoned
> By sicknesse, deaths herald, and champion;
> Thou art like a pilgrim, which abroad hath done
> Treason, and durst not turne to whence hee is fled,
> Or like a thiefe, which till deaths doome be read,
> Wisheth himselfe delivered from prison;
> But damn'd and hal'd to execution,
> Wisheth that still he might be imprisoned;
> Yet grace, if thou repent, thou canst not lacke;
> But who shall give thee that grace to beginne?
> Oh make thy selfe with holy mourning blacke,
> And red with blushing, as thou art with sinne;
> Or wash thee in Christs blood, which hath this might
> That being red, it dyes red soules to white.[25]

The "black soul" is explicitly analogated with pilgrim and with thief on the basis of the common predicament Habitus, since iconographically both a pilgrim and a condemned thief would be represented as dressed ("habited") in black.[26] The appellation "black" is thus an expression of a condition of being and not one of a quality (i.e., color) of being. With respect to soul it metaphysically denotes a state of privation, since "blackness" seems to have been considered a lack of light much as "blindness" was conceived of as a lack of sight.[27] In a theological context this privative term is a general designator of mourning, sickness, negation, and death; in the poem it is also privation of grace (l. 9).[28] The form that Habitus takes here is thus one of privation, and the analogy of the black soul with the pilgrim and the thief serves to determine the specific aspects of privation relevant to the soul.

The pilgrim and the thief set the terms of antecedence and potential consequence between which the circumstance of Habitus occurs.

Theft, like treason, was considered a capital offense at the time and would continue to be so until the nineteenth century. These two subjects have an antecedent of action in the general conception "Capital Offense," the potential consequence of course being death itself. This consequence the pilgrim prefers to avoid by remaining in exile and the thief by imprisonment. The issue is one of preference for a lesser privation--loss of country and loss of freedom--to the ultimate privation, loss of life. Since these are both specific aspects of the general category of Habitus, they are both relevant to the condition of the soul.

A condemned thief, however, is not quite the same thing as a treasonous exile, and neither of course is the same as a soul. Yet both a thief and a traitor as material beings are species of Felon; and since they are "black" because of their offenses, the soul, which is "black" because of its offense, its sin, must also be a kind of felon. The soul is therefore a species within a genus that is "black" because by definition it is "damn'd." The generic formal concept Felon derives as usual from the correspondence of the adjunct "blackness" that is attributed to all three subjects, and in the case of the thief is given explicitly the designation "damn'd," a circumstance shared de facto by the other near analogue, the pilgrim.[29] Together with the general notion of Capital Offense, the genus of similitude, "Felon," serves to define the idea of Habitus in which the soul as the third offender participates, as we may see in the schema on the following page.

	Analogate I	P	Analogate II	P	Analogate III	Genus of Similitude
Subject	soul		pilgrim		thief	Felon
Predicate 1	(is)		(is)		(is)	- - -
Adjunct	black	Habitus	(black)	Habitus	(black)= damned	Condemned
	[because]		[because]		[because]	
Predicate 2	(has done)	Actio	has done	Actio	(has done)	- - -
[Antecedent]	[sin]		treason		(theft)	Capital Offense
Predicate 3	[prefers]		(prefers)	Actio	wishes	- - -
Object 1	[present life]		(exile)	Passio	imprisonment	Present State of Privation
Object 2	[to death]		(to death)	Passio	(to death)	Ultimate Privation

Fig. 16.--Donne: Soul-Pilgrim-Thief Analogy

Although the various concomitants of the genus "Felon" serve to define the specific subject soul, there remains an important difference. The most important difference between the generic felon and the specific soul in terms of the predicament Habitus lies in the fact that "condemned" does not mean the same thing when predicated of each. For the treasonous pilgrim and the thief, death means a cessation of temporal existence; for the soul, however, death is really an extension of exile into eternity and the total withdrawal of God's grace, of participation in God's essence. The terrestrial existence of the soul is traditionally

conceived of as being already an "imprisonment" in corrupt matter and as, hopefully, a temporary exile from the kingdom of heaven. These are in their turn but different aspects or modes of privation of formal esse, since the realization of form in matter is always imperfect, and the "blackness" of the sickness of sin limits this perfection even more. The soul, like the thief, wishes for freedom, but will choose the present imperfection of terrestrial life to the "doom" of spiritual death.

The octet of this sonnet defines not only the state of the "black" soul, but defines evil as an act, a "doing" of treason and theft, which, as capital offenses, would seem to suggest that the soul is guilty of a Deadly Sin or a violation of one or more of the Commandmants. What the specific offenses of the soul may have been is not the poem's particular concern;[30] it is enough that the soul be guilty of a mortally sinful act, and that this act, which caused the blackness of the soul, can only receive pardon by the act of repentance, the "holy mourning" of line 11. This is an act that creates a new and positive state of Habitus or "blackness" for the soul.[31] The modes of equivocity in the term "black" as an expression of the various aspects of Condition relevant to the soul are thus distinguished emblematically and analogically.

Similar distinctions occur of course with the signification of "red" in the last three lines of the poem. There is an important difference here, however, in that equivocity in the term extends to the denomination of the categories themselves, rather than just to modes of being within a single category. Applied to the sinful soul in line 12, "red" designates the positive condition of blushing and

the privative condition of sin; applied to the blood of Christ in line 13, however, "red" designates the predicament Qualitas (consequent on form), by which its essential nature acts as a causative agent on the soul to transform the "blackness" of damnation and the "redness" of sin to the "whiteness" of the condition of health, purity, and salvation. The paradox of red acting on red to produce white in the last lines of the poem is thus a matter of categorical equivocation.

The "argument" of Donne's sonnet is perhaps more obvious than our analysis might seem to suggest, for it soes not seem to be an especially difficult poem. His use of the terms "black," "red," and "white" is, after all, quite conventional, and the theme of sin and remorse is commonplace. We have used this sonnet, however, to demonstrate the metaphysics behind the more or less self-evident use of conventional materials, and, in particular, to point out the logical function of the analogies in the first eight lines of the poem. We are later going to look more closely at the kind of metaphysics involved in the analogues of the soul, but for the moment we are concerned only to emphasize the logical function of these analogies in their contexts.

In defining the soul vis-à-vis a treasonous exile and a condemned thief, the analogies have logically defined the "black soul" as a type of felon in immanent danger of death. Since the black soul is the subject of the poem, the significance of the analogies that define its nature are obviously essential to the meaning of the context. As structures of meaning, moreover, their relationship to the context is not only central but is indeed one of integration with

the context, since they define the terms of meaning the general context is going to acquire as the poem proceeds. These analogies do not merely illustrate the contextual significance by offering themeselves as _exempla_, as does the circle in Donne's poem on the Annunciation and Passion; they function as essential definition.

Essential definition is likewise the function of the wine-press metaphor in the following poem from George Herbert's _The Temple_ (1633), "The Agonie":

> Philosophers have measur'd mountains,
> Fathom'd the depths of seas, of states, and kings,
> Walk'd with a staffe to heav'n, and traced fountains:
> But there are two vast, spacious things,
> The which to measure it doth more behove:
> Yet few there are that sound them; Sinne and Love.
>
> Who would know Sinne, let him repair
> Unto Mount Olivet; there he shall see
> A man so wrung with pains, that all his hair,
> His skinne, his garments bloudie be.
> Sinne is that presse and vice, which forceth pain
> To hunt his cruell food through ev'ry vein.
>
> Who knows not Love, let him assay
> And taste that juice, which on the crosse a pike
> Did set again abroach; then let him say
> If ever he did taste the like.
> Love is that liquor sweet and most divine,
> Which my God feels as bloud; but I, as wine.[32]

The first stanza is a statement of the limitations of human, quantitative knowledge, since philosophy itself is viewed as being but quantitative in nature and is hence limited to matter. _Sin_ and _Love_, as more proper objects of knowledge, are also given in terms of spatial extension, but their extension is immeasurable; they are, therefore, beyond philosophy and, since they are qualitative things, must be defined analogically. The "press" metaphor that Herbert uses to define and distinguish these two concepts is rather complicated, for it relies on liturgical materials and, like Donne's metaphor

of "blackness," makes use of equivocity in predication.

As Miss Tuve has recently shown, the metaphor of the "press and vice" that defines Sin in line 11 is closely connected with the typology of Christ as the Bunch of Grapes representing the inheritance of the Chosen People crossing Jordan into the Promised Land.[33] Associated with this ancient symbol of the Bunch of Grapes are the metaphors of Christ in the wine-press of the Cross and Christ as the saving drink of Wine or the precious Tun of Wine. The notion of the press, therefore, has two primary significations in the context of Herbert's poem: the first pertains to Christ as man, "wrung with pains" and "bloudie," and the second to the idea of Christ as the Grapes pressed for the Wine of Salvation. On one hand press refers to an engine of torture, a "vice, which forceth pain / To hunt his cruell food through ev'ry vein,"[34] and on the other hand to the machine used to crush grapes to produce the "juice . . . that liquor sweet and most divine."

The two different notions of press correlate with the dual nature of Christ as man and Christ as the Grapes of Salvation, and with the dual nature of blood as blood and blood as wine, the second of which correlatives is given in the last line of the poem. Christ as the Bunch of Grapes may be identified as the Christ of Love, for the essential nature of the Blood-Wine is redemptive love. Therefore the wine-press becomes in effect the "press of Love," involving the predicament Actio, since it expresses the willing giving-forth of love to redeem mankind (Matthew 26: 28); it is the means by which this love is realized in terms of human limitation (i.e., as wine). Since the notions of Love, Redemption, and Blood-Wine, and the Wine-

Press of Love are all finally subsumed under the concept Christ, the idea of the "press of Sin," involving the predicament Passio, is finally left as something extra- or non-Christian, and as a cause of suffering in the human sphere. The "press" of Sin remains a terrestrial, human agency, although Christ does not, for the Incarnation is only a mode of Christ's being and is not an essential difference in being.

The equivocal nature of press in Herbert's poem thus drawns together two sets of analogies, one of torture and one of wine-making, to define two fundamental concepts in the Christian tradition, the nature of Sin and Love. The contextual relevance of this metaphor is obvious; its equivocity in signification is essential to the determination of contextual meaning, and indeed, its very equivocity structures the dialect of the poem. The equivocity of press, however, is not the kind that designates by a common term two formally different beings, as pen may designate a writing instrument or an animal enclosure. Press points to two modes of being of the same thing. The engine of torture and the press for the making of wine are metaphysically related to each other as Christ-as-man is related to Christ-as-Love: for each designation of press is both necessarily and causally related to the concept Christ.[35] The two "presses" are thus themselves modal agents, and imply the theological idea of Sin as ultimately being instrumental in fulfilling God's will. The equivocity of press here is quite similar to that of blackness in Donne's sonnet on the condition of the soul, for in both cases only different modes of being are implied, and not different beings. As the sense of death differs when applied to the soul and to the other two felons in Donne's poem, so also do the senses of treason, theft, exile, and imprisonment; either as designations of Habitus or as objects of Actio, these terms, or rather concepts, do not

refer to different things when predicated of the felonious analogues, but to different ways of realizing the same general concepts of blackness and Capital Offense. The ways in which these general concepts are realized by the analogated beings is proportionate to the being the analogates have ontologically.

Predication of categorical modality rather than categorical identity is what distinguishes the Thomistic Analogy of Proportionality from the conventional and Platonic Analogy of Inequality. The difference between the two conceptions of analogy is clearly shown by a comparison of two well known metaphors from Donne's "A Valediction: forbidding Mourning":[36] the compasses and the beaten gold. The poem is another love poem, and its "argument" against mourning at the separation of the lovers rests on the notion again of the unity of the lovers' souls, the same idea "proved" in "The Exstasie." The conclusion of "The Valediction" is as follows:

> Our two soules therefore, which are one,
> Though I must goe, endure not yet
> A breach, but an expansion,
> Like gold to ayery thinnesse beate.
>
> If they be two, they are two so
> As stiffe twin compasses are two,
> Thy soule the fist foot, makes no show
> To move, but doth, if the'other doe.
>
> And though it in the center sit,
> Yet when the other far doth rome,
> It leanes, and hearkens after it,
> And growes erect, as it comes home.
>
> Such wilt thou be to mee, who must
> Like th'other foot, obliquely runne;
> Thy firmnes makes my circle just,
> And makes me end, where I begunne.

With the compasses we have an analogy of form (souls) with form and substance (the circle and compasses), for the latter two are connected productively and must be treated together as one analogue.

Central fixity, radial movement, and the inscription of a circle are proper characteristics of a pair of compasses; they are not the characteristics of a soul or even of a "pair" of souls. Obviously the two souls are not going to be "joined" in anything like the way the feet of the compasses are joined by the legs. The sense of "joining" or unifying will have to be taken relative to the kinds of beings involved, and the unity of the compasses must therefore be understood to be only proportionate to the unity of the souls. The subjects of the analogy being thus only proportionately related, their specific predicates of rest and movement will only be proportionate also. Indeed, when we examine the specific predicates of movement--"leaning," "hearkening," and "growing erect" especially--we find that they cannot at all be univocally applied to the two analogues. Between the feet of the compasses themselves in lines 31-32, for example, the extension of the radius is a predicate of Actio, true enough, but the consequent with regard to the fixed foot of the compasses is not Actio, but is Situs or Posture, since the fixed foot "leans."

Likewise the idea of radius itself, predicated of the compasses together, might seem to indicate the notion of quantitative distance when applied to the two lovers, but distance already has been defined in conditional terms (Habitus) previously (line 15) as absence, which is proper to the concept of souls. Absence may be indeed a consequence of distance, but is not itself really distance. The problem of predication seems most clearly demonstrated by the predicate given to the fixed-foot and the fixed-soul of lines 30-32. The predicate "leaning," as we have said, is a form of Situs, since its inclination

from the perpendicular increases with the increase of radius, and since increase of radius (Actio and Quantitas) and inclination are necessarily related. But this compass leg cannot properly be said to "hearken" (Actio) after the radial leg, because it has no faculties to permit it to "await" or "listen for" something. On the other hand, the soul, lacking dimensiveness, cannot properly "lean," though it may indeed "hearken" after its beloved.

A similar situation obtains with respect to the predicate of "growing erect," since the soul cannot become verticle any more than it can incline, and the matter of righteousness, for which spiritus erectus is the common expression, is not to the point here. We thus have a splitting in the sense of the specific predications. With respect to the inscription of a circle, however, the feet of a compass are in a reciprocal cause and effect relationship with each other: the radial foot causes the movement and inclination of the pivotal foot, and the fixity of the pivotal foot causes the "justness" of the radial foot's movement in inscribing a circle. The relationship between the two is thus the intermediate between Actio and Passio, or Habitus, the "condition" of unity, which is what the compass analogy is seeking to define.

Reviewing the series of analogies as we have them listed above, one sees various predicaments obtaining between the feet of the compasses and between the souls of the lovers and the compasses. The relation between the feet of the compass is a necessary relation, between the feet and a circle a productive relation. These relations obtain analogously for the souls with respect to each other and with respect to the absence occasioned by the journey the Poet is taking. Habitus then is the general category of the analogy between the souls

and the compasses, and its formal nature expresses the idea of unity through distance. If the specific predications were to be taken univocally instead of proportionately, the lovers would still be separated by radial distance after the Poet had returned home, for the idea of a "just" circle requires the constant separation of the pivotal and radial feet.

As a final remark on the analogy of the compasses, we may observe that as the two feet, one radial and one pivotal, are parts of the single instrument of the compasses, and as the compasses themseves are the instrumental cause (efficient cause) of the perfection of unity represented by the circle, so in a proportionate manner in a proportionately higher spehere of being are the lovers' two souls joined in the larger unity of Love. This unity is itself instrumental in obtaining the perfection that transcends distance (radius). Love thus unites the two souls in a manner analogous to the way the compass unites the two feet of the compass, and, as a circle remains a circle regardless of the radius, so will the lovers remain one regardless of the distance separating them.

We have seen that the compass analogy seeks to define the idea of two lovers' essential unity in separation; this is precisely the notion that the metaphor of beaten gold also seeks to illustrate in the same poem:

> Our two soules therefore, which are one,
> Though I must goe, endure not yet
> A breach, but an expansion,
> Like gold to ayery thinnesse beate (ll. 21-24)

The analogical predicament again is Habitus, the Condition of unity sustained by the gold-souls through absence. The analogy seems to state that the lovers' souls maintain their unity is space just as

an ingot of gold maintains its substantial unity though it be beaten out over a greater lateral area as an "airy thin" sheet of foil. analogating gold and souls involves an analogy of substance and essence for which Donne has offered the genus of similitude in the concept of "Expansion" in line 23. However, that metaphysically one might not be able to say that souls "expand" the same way that gold "expands" is not pertinent in this analogy. "Expansion" in the context of this analogy is but a form of the predicament Habitus, and Habitus is predicated univocally for both gold and souls. Univocity is determined by the fact that the nature of the analogated beings--essence and substance--is really not at issue here: the only metaphysical concern is the fact that each being is superior in degree in its own sphere of being. Soul is a superior form in the scale of created perfection; gold is the superior form in the scale of metals: the analogy is accordingly one involving the degree of participation, not the kind of participation, in the concept of expansion. The metaphor is produced by the familiar Analogy of Inequality, and its principles are the same as those analogating lips to cherries in Spenser, or a nymph and a spring in Góngora.

In regard to the dialectic of "A Valediction: forbidding Mourning," the beaten gold analogy is less sufficiently a definition of the complex idea of the unity of two-in-one that maintains its integrity through distance than is the analogy with the compasses. Donne often illustrates an idea before he defines the idea; we found this to occur in "The Exstasie," and it is the case here. The beaten gold analogy illustrates the idea of the unity of the lovers in their absence from each other. The analogy of the compasses defines this idea.

From the Aristotelian-Thomistic point of view, this Analogy of Inequality may be logically valid, but metaphysically it is insufficient, since it overlooks the important distinction between form and substance, and in effect treats both souls and gold as analogies of essence (form). All that is logically required in a univocal predication of analogy is that the analogated beings be recognized in their relative degrees of being. Conventional or "Petrarchan" metaphors do just this, and High Baroque metaphors follow the same philosophy in "elevating" the value of one or the other of the analogues. All the analogues of the Magdalen's tear in Crashaw's poem are things that are high on the scale of perfection in their own spheres or genera of being; their degree of perfection elevates the degree of estimation of the tear and makes it more "precious." The premise of Platonic metaphysics, we recall, is one that holds that there is indeed essential unity in form and that difference is only a matter of degree of perfection or of participation in the analogical predicate; and for this premise the logic of formal univocity is considered a sufficient metaphysical designator of being.

Donne, however, is typically more concerned with essential or substantial difference in being. With regard to the Analogy of Inequality that structures the beaten gold metaphor, he appears to have been interested only in a logical illustration of his contention of spiritual unity through distance, and reserved the crucial metaphysical definition of this unity for the more analytical compass analogy that follows to summarize his argument. Indeed, the circle in the latter analogy is metaphysically more properly the conception of analogous "expansion" than is the gold, for a circle may expand

indefinitely and still retain the essential form of a circle and the perfection of a circle, but an ingot of gold beaten to a thin foil must at least change its substantial form. And finally, the compasses do contain the basic idea of two-in-one, whereas the gold is, after all, just a single substance.

The Analogy of Proportionality, on the other hand, retains the idea of essential difference in its analogues by means of the conception of modality in the analogating predicament: beings differ in kind as well as in degree, and a predication of similitude in the Analogy of Proportionality is a predication of a perfection within which two beings participate, but do so not only in different degrees but in different modes as well. The identities in the analogy are wholly reduced to form, not wholly lost, in the analogical proposition.

The identity of the holy day as the "abridgment" of the Christian story is not lost in the notion of the coterminous beginning and end of a circle in Donne's poem on the Annunciation and Passion. Nor, more especially, is the identity of the "black soul" wholly submerged in the generic idea of the "Black Felon" in his sonnet: as the soul remains qualitatively different from the other felons in the genus, so the soul will suffer death in a way different from them also. Suffer it will--this predicament it does indeed share with the other felons--but it will realize suffering not only differently in degree but in the way or mode in which it will undergo the suffering. The soul is not <u>equal</u> to the thief and the traitor in the notion of capital offense and damnation, as an Analogy of Inequality would have had it; the soul is only <u>pro-</u>

portionate to them. The soul, the thief, and the treasonous pilgrim are all equally felons, but they are not equal felons, for the soul is essential and immortal, not mortal and substantial. Hence the analogical predication of similitude is, technically speaking, only analogical itself; it is a modal predication, and it retains the notion of the fundamental differences of the identities in the circumstance of similitude.

To summarize the nature and the function of the Metaphysical metaphor briefly, we may say that in general it tends to be centrally related to its context. Its signification will most typically be found either to illustrate or to define the central point of the thesis, or at least of the hypothesis, of the context in which it occurs. When this conceit functions to define the central point of its context, it will quite likely be found to reflect an awareness of the difference in the ways in which the analogical predicament is realized by the analogous identities--at least when Donne, and perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent, Herbert, are using it as a means of analysis and identification; and this means that one will have an instance of the Thomistic Analogy of Proportionality.

Donne appears to have been fascinated by the concept of analogy with its power of intellectually unifying separateness. Whether he be worrying a problem in religion or in love, he seems always in his lyrics to be seeking to establish the identities of things and to find the limits of separateness. One may suggest here that Donne's interest in alchemy may have been motivated by its claims to transform substances into things different both in kind and degree of perfection. The analysis of identity appears in virtually all of Donne's poetry,

and perhaps reached its highest and most complex moment in his two Anniversaries (1611, 1612), the first of which is an avowed anatomy of the world. Because of these metaphysical preoccupations in his poetry, Donne's dialectical center is more logical than rhetorical, more concerned with the finding of truth than with the finding of beauty. He is concerned to find matter or thought, so to speak, and less to embellish or decorate commonplace. Later and lesser minds will blunt the keen tool of analysis provided by the Metaphysical conceit, and it will, as is usual in such cases, become merely a device of superficial cleverness, as it is in the lyrics of John Cleveland.

VI. CONCLUSION

The metaphor has a twofold frame of reference: on one hand it is a particularly efficacious resource of language as the means of communicating or evoking aesthetic effect and emotional response; on the other hand, however, the metaphor is intimately involved in the nature of language as a medium of verbal conceptualization and the communication of meaning. In the preceeding chapters we have sought to stress the conceptual basis of the metaphor, since this is prior to and essential for an understanding of its contextual application.

The use or application of the metaphor is governed by the principles of rhetoric, but these principles can tell us only how metaphor ought to be used in a particular type of composition; they cannot tell us what the metaphor is in terms of its being a significant form. The applications of metaphor in verbal composition had been defined by Aristotle and refined by the rhetoricians of Rome, but only the Greek philosopher seemed to have realized that the device metaphora was really only the rhetorical guise of the conceptual form analogia, whose basis was analytical and hence metaphysical. The later rhetoricians, limited by the fundamentally rhetorical formulation of metaphor, failed to see its conceptual nature and viewed it only as a trope of style; and when the arts of language in the late Roman period were all given a generally rhetorical foundation, logic, the science most proper to deal with questions of metaphoric signification, also received an essentially rhetorical foundation and lost

its capability to deal with propositions that transcended grammatical literality.[1]

It is for this reason that we have had to refer to some of the general principles of Aristotelian analytics in determining the conceptual basis of the metaphor in the Renaissance and seventeenth century. Contemporary logics in England and the Continent are reasonably capable of treating a literal proposition like "Juliet is a lady," but they cannot handle Romeo's metaphorical proposition that "Juliet is the sun"--except by adducing some of the multitudinous varieties of Comparatio, all of which ignore the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of both Juliet and sun. We have sought to stress the fundamentally analytical structure of the metaphor, since metaphor is only the rhetorical aspect of analogy, and since only the Aristotelian concepts of the categories are competent to handle analogy in terms intelligible in the period with which we are concerned.

Metaphoric signification is obtained in terms of the categories. The predication of the concepts of sweetness and redness to lips and to cherries, to refer again to the example from Spenser's Epithalamion, discussed in chapter III, is a predication of Qualitas, that is, the qualities of being of redness and sweetness are what the analogical comparison signifies intrinsically. Phrased somewhat differently, one could say that the lips are defined in terms of the properties associated with or possessed by cherries, Qualitas being the relevant category of definition. Like any other element of signification, the noun or "name," and the sentence itself, for examples, the construct of analogy must be taken to have a proper meaning that is prior to and independent of contextual implications; and this intrinsic signification is a matter of analytics or logic.

The intrinsic signification of the analogical or metaphoric element exercises a meaningful influence on the context in which it appears, and questions of centrality or peripherality, of logical necessity or nonnecessity of the relationship with the contextual subject, will have to devote themselves to indicating whether this unit of signification be modifying the context essentially in a logical or a rhetorical manner. One may predicate Qualitas of a subject as in the proposition "Socrates is white." Here the quality of whiteness is conceived of as a "permanent property" of Socrates, and hence is necessarily related to Socrates logically, since any other predication, Qualitas or otherwise, will change significantly the conception of Socrates as given. However, if one say "Socrates is snow-white," he has merely offered an intensification of the apparent degree of whiteness predicated of Socrates, but has not changed the essential conception of Socrates, nor indeed of whiteness itself; and accordingly the term "snow" is in a logically adjunctive relationship both to its immediate subject white and to its general subject Socrates is white.

Spenser's cherry-lips metaphor functions, we have seen, very like the term "snow" functions with regard to its context in the preceeding proposition. The cherry-lips do not serve to define the beauty of the Bride so much as they intensify the notion of beauty as it appears in the Bride, for the implicit general proposition is that the Bride is beautiful or has beauty. The red lips, of course, are part of the catalogue of "beautyes grace and vertues store" with which she is "adornd," but the analogy with cherries involves matters of sweetness and desirability in addition to redness--all of which contribute to enhancing

the affective qualities of the lips in particular and the Bride's beauty in general.

On the other hand, we have found the analogical metaphor to define and to illustrate various conceptions, and this involves a higher degree of necessity in the logical relationship of the metaphor with its contextual subject, for here the metaphor deals with the essential significance of its subject. In Spenser's Hymn of Beauty, we observed that the analogy of the mirrors concretized the general conception of the reciprocal nature of love and beauty, illustrating thereby the intellectual significance of this reciprocity rather than the aesthetic potentials of its conception. The severest relationship of significatory element to context is offered of course by definition, which predicates something about the essence of a subject and is convertible with it; and we found this relationship represented most clearly in Donne, as, for example, in the compass analogy at the conclusion of "A Valediction: forbidding mourning," which defines the essential nature of the concept of two-in-oneness sustained through spatial extension.

These two broadly differentiated contextual relations of metaphor, peripheral and central, reflect the ancient distinctions in language between aesthetic and informative intentions. These relations serve also to distinguish the logical basis of the High Baroque use of metaphor from that which is characteristic of the Metaphysical. The use of linguistic units of meaning is governed by rhetoric, and purpose in composition is reflected in the principles of style. The intrinsic formal significance of metaphor may be derived logically, but its practical application in a context of gener-

al meaning will be conditioned by whether the composition as a whole be conceived primarily to serve an aesthetic or an intellectual end.

In discussing Marino, Crashaw, and Góngora, we observed that the use of metaphoric significance was conditioned by the principles of the rhetorical High style, which derived ultimately from Demonstrative oratory. The most distinctive and definitive character of this style is essentially the one of substantial embellishment of its subject, and to this all other concerns are subordinated. Practically, then, we find the High Baroque metaphor in a context of periphrasis with regard to the logical relation with its subject; it is typically descriptive and decorative and stresses the affective properties of its subject, and this requires the logic of its formation to be based almost wholly on the adjuncts of the subject rather than upon the essential nature of the subject, indeed, to the extent that the subject may virtually disappear behind the elaboration of its properties. The purpose of the High Baroque metaphor may be said to express the affective properties of the subject intellectually, thus permitting the extraordinary complications in predication that we found to mark the technique of Góngora.

The definitive characteristic of the Metaphysical metaphor, however, is its use as a means of substantial analysis, indeed, even as a means of essential analysis in certain circumstances. Rhetorically, the Metaphysical metaphor is embedded in the tradition of the Plain style, both the "vulgar" colloquial style represented in the seventeenth century by Donne and Herbert chiefly, and the somewhat more elevated and artificial Ciceronian idea of the Plain style that appears in Marvell, Vaughan, and in such non-Metaphysical Baroque poets as Ben

Jonson and Lope de Vega.

The Plain style is marked, we recall, not by the absence of metaphor altogether but only by the absence of ornamentive metaphor. The chief functions of metaphor in this style remain those of definition and exemplification, both of which involve a central and, in varying degrees, a necessary relationship to the contextual subject. Definition and exemplification are obviously not quite the same thing: and since, moreover, the Plain style does include such nominally non-Metaphysical poets as Jonson and Lope, a further specification in the Metaphysical conceit has seemed necessary.

We suggested in our discussion of the Metaphysical metaphor that its most distinctive feature was its appearance in context of definition in which analogy was performing most like a device of dialectic. In regard to Donne, Marvell, and Vaughan in particular, we noted that at crucial moments in the progress of their poems the subject was forced to a point of definition, and that the conceptual or abstract nature of the subject required the use of analogy, sometimes, as was the case with Donne, the use of the Thomistic Analogy of Proportionality. It was further apparent that the dialectical process of these poems hinged upon this point of definition; other analogical structures, particularly exemplary or illustrative analogies, might appear in the poem, but their most important reference point was that provided by the significance of the definitory analogy.

This reliance on analogical definition contrasts with the technique of the non-Metaphysical practitioners of the Plain style, who prefer a sententious or otherwise literal statement of definition, where it is necessary, and for which metaphors are used almost en-

tirely to supply specific, illustrative examples. The signification of such metaphors is naturally subordinate to the literal statement of the proposition governing them. An example of this technique is provided in a sonnet from Lope de Vega's Triunfos Divinos (1625); it is a poem that is especially useful for our discussion here, since it poses a broadly metaphysical problem, but treats the problem in a non-Metaphysical manner.

DIOS, CENTRO DEL ALMA

Si fuera de mi amor verdad el fuego,
él caminara a tu divina esfera;
pero es cometa que corrió ligera
con resplandor que se deshizo luego.

¡Qué deseoso de tus brazos llego [5]
cuando el temor mis culpas considera!
Mas si mi amor en ti no persevera,
¿en qué centro mortal tendrá sosiego?

Voy a buscarte, y cuanto más te encuentro,
menos reparo en ti, Cordero manso, [10]
aunque me buscas tú del alma adentro.

Pero dime, Señor: si hallar descanso
no puede al alma fuera de su centro,
y estoy fuera de ti, ¿cómo descanso?[2]

The signification of the analogy between the fire of love and the flame of a comet appears to rely on two contemporary notions about the nature and behavior of comets. The first, ultimately based on the

Meteorologica of Aristotle, considers comets as a product of the hot and dry "exhalation" or "vapor" of the earth. This vapor, which is essentially like fire, is drawn by the sun to the uppermost region of the air, where it is ignited by the heat of the orb of fire and the friction of the rotating celestial spheres. The various "centros" in Lope's sonnet suggest, however, that in this metaphor there may also be a second and much later theory of the comets involved; and this is the idea of Brahe and Kepler that the comet is an independent celestial body that follows its own orbit around the sun, always facing the sun (since its long "hair," coma, always flows away from the sun) but never approaching it.[3]

These two theories of comets are not compatible, since among other things, the modern theory of the comet as an orbiting body also did away with the notion of the sublunary sphere of fire. This incompatibility, however, is irrelevant to the function of the comet metaphor in the poem, which is to illustrate the predicaments of Qualitas and Relatio in the soul's relation to God. The two separate predicaments are necessary in the metaphor, because the poem is dealing with two different, though closely related, problems--inconstancy in devotion and frustration in the search for certainty and peace. Had Lope been merely interested in the subject of inconstancy alone, a metaphor based on the idea of "squibs" or other forms of the ignis fatuus might have done just as well; but his use of the comet concretizes and illustrates both the two problems the soul faces in the sonnet.

The "fire" of love is of course a commonplace term in religious contexts to express the active movement of the soul upwards towards

God; what is important here is that this flame of the soul's love for God burns itself out ("se deshace") because it is inconstant. This idea of inconstancy, however, is given an explicit statement in line 7: "mi amor en ti no persevera." Since the comet of the soul does not reach the sphere of God, the Primum Mobile, it must remain sublunary in the "mortal" center of the medieval Ptolemaic universe, earth. The analogy of the fire of the soul's love with the self-consuming flame of a comet thus illustrates the fugitive quality of the soul's love; it does not, however modify the essential significance of the idea of inconstant love with respect to God or Christ that is presented in the literal statement.

To find the desired constancy, permanence and calm in devotion, the soul must achieve a union with the "center" of God, rather than remain in the troubled "center" of mortality. The problem is again given an explicit statement, but here the predicament involved is that of Relatio, in the concluding three lines of the poem: addressing El Señor, the poet asks that if the soul cannot find tranquility outside the "center" of God, yet by its very predicament of being must remain outside this Center, how can tranquility, the reward of love, be found? The soul has its centro mortal which is "outside" the Divine center of the divine sphere; the movement of the soul, we have been told, is not directly towards this divina esfera, but is in some manner tangential to it, since, as the poet says, "cuanto más te encuentro, menos reparo en ti" (l. 10). The tangential movement would seem to end up being orbital, for while the soul is seeking Christ, being drawn to Him as fire is drawn to the sun, Christ is also actively seeking the soul: we thus seem to have expressed

in generally theological terms the idea that historically will lead to the theory of gravity, and for which the conception of an orbiting comet provides an exemplary analogue.

Lope's sonnet, written in the more or less "Classical" Plain style, illustrates the use of metaphoric analogy to illustrate propositions that receive generally literal statement. Here the propositions regarding the quality of perseverence and the relation of the soul's mortal center to the divine center of God have been given explicit formulation; the analogy of the fugacious fire of the soul's love with the short-lived fire of a comet's passage serves to join the two propositions in an exemplary figure.

We may suggest, then, that the distinctive test of the Metaphysical metaphor is not that of heterogeneity in the elements composing it, nor that of complexity in the manner or number of categories involved in the predication of similitude among these elements, but that of whether the metaphor be functioning as primarily a dialectical means of essential or substantial definition. Of the two quite disparate styles of Baroque poetry that we have chosen for a comparative analysis, the High Baroque is marked by the persistent use of metaphor for substantial ornamentation, whereas the Metaphysical style most clearly shows itself in the use of metaphor for substantial or essential definition.

The Metaphysical metaphor is metaphysical in that it seeks to define conceptions of states of being. Since analogy must simultaneously cope with both similarity and difference at once, the question comes to be whether difference can be reconciled with similarity so as to be only a matter of relative degree of being, or

whether difference remains irreducibly a matter of mode of being as well. In the former case one assumes a formal correspondence between the mind and the universal forms in the world it perceives, and one predicates formal identity in a category of likeness between the subjects of an analogy. The Analogy of Inequality that results from such a predication of formal likeness is of course virtually the only analogy involved in the ornamentive High Baroque metaphor, but as we indicated in our brief discussion of Marvell, this analogy can function equally well as a form of definition. Obscurity in the conception of the metaphoric Analogy of Inequality is resolved by determining the generic class concept of similitude that will contain the specific differences involved in the analogous subjects.

In the second form of analogy, in which differences in being cannot be reduced simply to differences in degree by means of a generic class-concept, the predication of similitude involves matters of modality in the realization of the formal character or category applied to the two analogous subjects. Such differences remain essential differences, and the analogated beings are conceived to retain fundamental differences in the ways in which they actualize the formal character predicated of them. The Analogy of Proportionality which results from modal predications is most commonly signalled by what is crudely, and perhaps quite inaccurately, called a "pun" or an "ambiguity" in the term of predication, but which is really a specific case of equivocation, and which is the basis of the obscurity in the analogy. This type of analogy, dealing as it does with the essential natures of things, is perforce limited to functions of definition, and remains thereby dialectical and never ornamentive.

Therefore, whereas the metaphoric Analogy of Inequality may appear in both High Baroque and Metaphysical poetry--as definition, exemplary illustration, or as description--the metaphoric Analogy of Proportionality can appear only in Metaphysical poetry, and there only as definition. Stylistically, since metaphoric Analogy of Proportionality retains its fundamentally dialectical function of definition, it is by necessity limited to the Plain style, whereas the metaphor based on the Analogy of Inequality, which can perform all the functions of metaphor, may appear in both the High style of composition as well as the Plain style. The High style of the High Baroque, however, will use this device chiefly as a means of ornamentation and rarely as one of definition, since it deals with the affective appearances of things whose essential natures are assumed to be already known. We may quickly summarize our general conclusions by means of the following figure:

Style	Historical Origin	Rhetorical Function	Contextual Relationship	Logical Basis	Subject
High Baroque	Classical High Style	Primarily Ornamentive	Peripheral	Analogy of Inequality	Appearances of Things
Metaphysical	Classical Plain Style and Medieval Plain Style	Primarily Definitory	Central	Analogy of Proportionality and Analogy of Inequality	Concepts or Essances of Things

Fig. 17.--Summary of High Baroque and Metaphysical Distinctions of Metaphor

In our discussion we have sought to establish on a conceptual

basis a general typology of metaphoric formation and function to provide more nearly objective criteria for distinguishing stylistic techniques in Baroque lyric poetry than have hitherto been offered by purely stylistic approaches or by recourse to contemporary logics alone. We have chosen what appear to be the two most extreme techniques, the High Baroque and the Metaphysical, to furnish a reasonably clear-cut foundation for comparison and contrast.

However conceptions of stylistic may have changed throughout this and later periods, the fact that the conception of the nature of analogy as an intellectual structure formed on the basis of the Aristotelian categories did remain generally constant until the eighteenth century does seem to offer a substantial basis for further treatment of Renaissance and seventeenth-century poetry that will have the virtue of being relatively uncontaminated by post-Kantian notions of the mind and of the intuitional correspondence of analogy as a process of being and of thought. For although the continuity of human experience may be indeed a cardinal tenet of the humanistic spirit, the interpretations of that experience does vary through the ages, and one seems better to know the past by trying to approach the mind of the past than by translating it to suit the mind of the present.

APPENDIX: TWO NOTES ON THE METAPHYSICS OF ANALOGY.

In our discussion of the nature of predication and the problem of similitude in chapter II, above, we noted the crucial importance of the concept of form as the basis of metaphysical implication. Metaphysics and epistemology are intimately related, and it is difficult to separate the two in order to assign priorities, since each ultimately presupposes the other in the relationship of the human mind to the extra-mental world. With regard to form, the question is one of whether form have an autonomous metaphysical existence which the mind directly, if somewhat distantly, perceives, or whether it have a purely mental existence and be something the mind abstracts from or imposes on the materials of experience.

The relevance of form to the mental concept of it has important implications for the predication of analogical similitude: if form be a cause of being as well as a cause of knowledge, then a formal conception of a thing will answer directly to the being of that thing in the extra-mental world, the only difference being in the degree of material realization of the concept. If the form of redness, for example have in an ideal realm an autonomous existence and the mind perceive this archetype, then one may predict formal redness of such diverse objects as rubies, cherries, lips, fire, and the like, and claim a valid metaphysical basis for doing so, for the only difference among them with respect to this formal character will be that of the relative degrees of redness

in each. If, on the other hand, form be conceived not to have an independent existence and must always be bound up with matter, then the formal conception of the mind will imply not only difference in the degree of realization of the character predicated of the differing objects but differences as well in the nature of the character as it is realized in the objects. In the first case, then, the structures of the mind are understood to reflect directly the metaphysical structures of being; in the second case this reflection is in some manner indirect.

Analogy is the predication of similitude in some aspect of being between objects that are at first hand apparantly dissimilar; the two objects become unified on the basis of the character of formal unity predicated of them. The metaphysical implications or references of analogy accordingly rely on the concept of form. We propose in the following pages to examine briefly the nature of this "unifying" quality of analogy--since as a mental construct it too falls under the question of formal being--and then to examine the question of separable or autonomous form itself, for it is this question that persistently differentiates the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions in epistemology and metaphysics.

Plato and the Mesothesis: Eros

The concept of analogy seems originally to have pertained almost exclusively to mathematics, where it was used to refer to ideas of "distance" between numbers and to the proportional relationships of various couples to each other. These mathematical or geometrical characteristics of the concept of analogy assumed philosophical implications when Plato applied the concept to an

explanation of how creation is held together and to demonstrate the relative values of differing spheres of knowledge. The most significant uses of analogy in a metaphysical context occur in the Timaeus and in books VI and VII of the Republic.

In the Timaeus Plato wishes to explain how the four antipathetic elements of the universe--earth, air, fire, and water--are held in a stable and harmonious equillibrium:

> . . . God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be rightly put together without a third; there must be some bond of union between them. And the fairest bond is that which makes the most complete fusion of itself and the things which it combines; and proportion [analogia] is best adapted to effect such a union. For whenever in any three numbers, whether cube or square, there is a mean, which is to the last term what the first term is to it; and again, when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean,--then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, they will all of them of necessity come to be the same, and having become the same with one another will all be one. . . . As the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth) . . . and for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created, and it was harmonized by proportion, and therefore has the spirit of friendship; and having been reconciled to itself, it was indissoluble by the hand of any other than its framer.[1]

In accordance with Plato's idea of a fixed, geometrical universe, the ideal of analogy appearing in the Timaeus seems equally static; it exists as the means of elemental equipoise.

Analogy involving the notion of varying degrees of proportionality appears more clearly in the discussion of knowledge in the Republic. Here again a basically geometric sense of analogy is involved, but there are implications of extreme importance to its later development in Christian cosmology. In book VI of the Republic

Plato--or Socrates--is confronted with the problem of defining the Good. There is no word for the Good that does not imply a limitation of being. Socrates is compelled therefore to resort to an analogical description of the Good; and here the mediatory nature of analogy goes beyond that of physical creation, being invoked to hold in juxtaposition the quite different spheres of concrete and abstract reality. And in the process the concept elucidates a hierarchy of values.

The focus of the problem is of course epistemological. Plato differentiates "being" into two main realms, the realm of true being --the world of ideas, in which the Good resides--and the visible, material world of becoming, in which being is really illusory. Material things, being mutable, imperfect copies of the ideal archetype, can only be objects of perception. True knowledge is possible only of eternal ideas. Corresponding interrelations thus obtain between the different forms of being and knowledge, and this correspondence is analogical.

The terms of the correspondence are provided by the comparison of the sun in the material world to the Good in the ideal. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Good is supreme in relation to both worlds; accordingly, the relation must be established on the basis of analogous effects, and it appears as follows:

> . . . The sun is not sight, but the cause of sight and is seen by sight itself. . . . This [the sun], the offspring of the good which the good begat, is in relation to the good itself an analogy, and what the good effects, by its influence, in the region of the mind, towards mind and things thought, this the sun effects, in the region of seeing, towards sight and things seen. . . .
>
> Then that which provides their truth to the things known, and gives the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea or principle of the good, and you must conceive it as

> being the cause of understanding and of truth in so far as known; and thus while knowledge and truth as we know them are both beautiful, you will be right in thinking that it is something different, something still more beautiful than these. As for knowledge and truth, just as we said before that it was right to consider light and sight to be sunlike, but wrong to think them to be the sun; so here it is right to consider both these to be goodlike, but wrong to think either of them to be the good--the eternal nature of the good must be allowed a yet higher value. . . .
>
> . . . The sun provides not only the power of being seen for things seen, but . . . also their generation and growth and nurture, although it is not itself generation. . . . Similarly with things known, you will agree that the good is not only the cause of their becoming known, but the cause that knowledge exists and of the state of knowledge, although the good is not itself a state of knowledge but something transcending far beyond it in dignity and power.[2]

What is important here is that that there clearly seems to be an adumbration of the Analogy of Proportionality later to be developed by St. Thomas. In the Timaeus the proportion of the analogical elements of air and water are relative to the proportion of fire and earth in the universe, and the proportions are fixed according to the relative degree of density of each of the elements. Such a linear, or more properly, geometrical proportionality does not obtain, however, with respect to the degree of clarity between the spheres of knowledge in the passage from the Republic. Although the spheres of belief and understanding may be taken to be equal, the respective spheres of opinion and knowledge implicit here are not equal. Belief is only analogously equal to understanding, since they are two different things not only qualitatively and functionally, but, ultimately, in fundamental being as well, as we see in the recapitulation of this discussion, which follows the Allegory of the Cave episode in book VII. Here the elements of correspondence in the analogy of knowledge are given and explicit order of value according to the objects of knowledge:

> We are content, then . . . to call the first part [of knowledge] science, and the second understanding, and the third belief, and the fourth conjecture: these last two together we may call opinion, and the first two the exercise of reason. Opinion is concerned with becoming, and exercise of reason with being; and what being is to becoming, that exercise of reason is to opinion, and what exercise of reason is to opinion, that science is to belief, and understanding to conjecture. . . . If a man cannot distinguish by reasoning and isolate the idea of the good from all other things, you will declare that he does not know the real good at all. . . . And he lives the present life sleeping and dreaming, never awakening in this world, until he comes to the house of Hades for his long, eternal sleep.[3]

The objects, therefore, ultimately determine the value of the respective areas of knowledge; but the objects themselves are esteemed by their relative position in an order of being. Metaphysically, this order is determined by the superiority of cause (Good) to effect (the thing or things "begotten" by the Good). Since any effect, however, is itself capable of becoming a cause of another effect, an ontological order is evolved that consists of a series of causes and effects, a series which becomes increasingly remote from the First Cause, the Good. The <u>degree</u> of nearness or remoteness from the Good accordingly determines the relative worth of the being in question. In the medieval neo-Platonic cosmos, this hierarchical order is expanded to include both vertical and horizontal series.[4]

Matters of "nearness," "remoteness," "likeness," and such on this ontological scale are to be understood analogically here too. A certain difference between cause and effect is necessary to account for multiformity; but at the same time a certain similarity is required to preserve intelligibility. Any given cause is understood to transmit its character or form to its effect in a lesser degree of likeness; the form remains the same, only it is less perfect, and the transmission is thus analogical. Analogy is therefore

conceived to be the mean between cause and effect: it is the tertium quid that holds or joins cause with effect and allows difference to exist with similarity.

The neo-Platonic ordering of the universe was given perhaps its most distinctive cast by St. Augustine. In his order the origin of all created things is predictably God, and creation is seen to have imperfectly that which God has perfectly, namely, absolute, undifferentiated being.[5] The cosmological hierarchy is graded on the different degrees of participation beings have in the esse of God: material things, which have mere existence, are the lowest in the order of creation; but since man--or more properly, the soul of man--is most like the esse of God, man is highest in the scale for his spiritual character allows a fuller degree of participation.

There is an additional principle to be observed in this hierarchical cosmology, and that is that there is movement both up and down the structure, although the structure itself remains static and immutable. Movement downward is obvious in the progression of cause and effect, of the descent of form to matter, and in the movement of unity to ever-increasing multiplicity. But effects have a "desire" to return to their causes or origins: multiplicity seeks a return to unity and unification. As the soul, for example, retains a trace or memory (i.e., a form) of its original pure state, so it aspires to return to that state. In the material world this aspiration is revealed by the impetus of the soul towards truth, beauty, and knowledge--all prime characteristics of the Good or of God.

We have noted the appearance of analogy as a mesothesis in the Timaeus, where it appears as the generally hypostatic structure

that "harmonizes by proportion" the four elements of creation. This static, rather geometrical conception of analogy seems to have been modified almost at the outset by a figure from the Pantheon, Eros, who is himself a mean between all sorts of extremes. Socrates' report of Diotima's description of Eros in the Symposium is pertinent here in pointing to the medial character of Love:

> Love . . . is not good and not beautiful, . . . but do not imagine for that reason any the more that he must be ugly and bad, but [is] something between the two. . . . [He is] between mortal and immortal. . . . A great spirit, Socrates; for all the spiritual is between divine and mortal. . . . Then since Love is the son of Plenty and Poverty he gets his fortunes from them. . . . He was born neither mortal nor immortal; but on the same day, sometimes he is blooming and alive, when he has plenty, sometimes he is dying; then again he gets new life through his father's nature; but what he procures in plenty always trickles away, so that Love is not in want nor in wealth, and again he is between wisdom and ignorance. . . .

Having the identity of a mean, Love's powers accordingly are those of a mediator:

> [Love has the power] to interpret and to ferry across to the gods things given by men, and to men things from the gods, from men petitions and sacrifices, from the gods commands and requittals in return; and being in the middle it completes them and binds all together into a whole.[6]

The analogical nature of Love could not be more explicit: he does precisely what analogy does in the Timaeus and the Republic, uniting not only the things of the real world, but binding the real world to the world of the gods. However, analogy as Eros appears less as the consequence of relations existing in the universe--and analogy is consequential in the Timaeus--but rather more as the cause of these relations. In effect Love here is involved in Proclus' idea of analogy as a power creating unity in the universe, an idea of course which informs the concept of the erotic ecstasy, as

we found in the poem by Donne.[7]

Because of a certain confusion between the Christian and pagan ideas of the nature of love and its proper objects, the identity and function of Eros in Renaissance thought is not always consistent and clear--indeed, already in Plato Eros has encroached upon the duties traditionally ascribed to Hermes. Our concern here, however, is only with Eros as a figure of analogy, and in this function there seems to be a general consistency, for analogy appears to have been fundamental to the concept of Eros whenever he appears in a metaphysical context. A good illustration of the notion of Eros as a power creating harmony is offered by Spenser in his Hymne of Love (1596):

> The earth, the ayre, the water, and the fyre,
> Then gan to raunge them selues in huge array,
> And with contrary forces to conspyre
> Each against other, by all meanes they may,
> Threatning their owne confusion and decay:
> Ayre hated earth, and water hated fyre,
> Till Loue relented their rebellious yre.
>
> He then them tooke, and tempering goodly well
> Their contrary dislikes with loued meanes,
> Did place them all in order, and compell
> To keepe them selues within their sundrie raines,
> Together linkt with Adamantine chaines;
> Yet so, as that in euery liuing wight
> They mixe themselues, and shew their kindly might.
>
> So euer since they firmely haue remained,
> And duly well obserued his beheast;
> Through which now all these things that are contained
> Within this goodly cope, both most and least
> Their being haue, and dayly are increast,
> Through secret sparks of his infused fyre,
> Which in the barraine cold he doth inspire.[8]

This is basically the creation myth of the Timaeus, but the changes are significant. Analogy in the persona of Eros has here lost that essentially passive form of proportionality that is a consequence of logical, or geometric, necessity, and seems to have be-

come instead an active principle of causative form. For Love not only "relents" and "tempers" the antipathetic four elements and puts them in harmony with each other, but he is a cause of generation as well, for he creates new forms in the orders of being. There is a considerable difference between the concept of analogy as an intellectual construct that orders the chain of being through the progression of cause and effect, and analogy as Eros creating the progression of beings itself. The resulting order in either case, however, would seem to be the same, although the initial impetus might be rather different. The blending of the two modes of analogy may be ultimately reducible to a confusion that seems somewhat characteristic of Platonism in general, that is, the taking of a cause of knowledge (analogy) as a cause of being (Eros).

A desire to rectify this confusion between causes of knowledge and causes of being, and to give such intellectual forms as analogy a basis in analytics seems to have been one of the primary motives of Aristotle's criticism of Plato, and, subsequently, of Aquinas' criticism of neo-Platonic epistemology.

Predication and the Problem of Separable Form

Generally speaking, analogy seems to have had two aspects, one active, the other passive. In the Timaeus analogy is the consequent, the created form; in Spenser it is the antecedent, the creating form. The question is where is the source of this form, where does it exist? Does analogy enjoy an a-priori extra-mental existence that impresses itself on the mind as a concept of order and on matter as a configuration of identity, or is it a construct of the mind itself working as a means of intelligibility? In answering these questions, Platonism

and Aristotelianism propose two quite different theories of knowledge; and these theories have considerable implications for the faculty of Invention in poetry, for in one case a poet will "discover" a formal relationship between two things which really obtains metaphysically, and in the other case the relationship will claim only a proportionate similitude to the metaphysical circumstance.

The Christian neo-Platonists followed Plato in assigning archetypal form to the realm of the Ideal; the Good, however, became identified with God, and the forms were, generally speaking, considered to be generated in the mind of God. The human mind--that is, the rational soul--as a simulacrum or vestigia Dei--retains vestigial memories of transcendental concepts like "Truth," "Justice," "Beauty," and the like, from its prior existence in the Ideal, Divine realm. The cognitive powers of the rational soul are of course limited by the imperfection of the material it informs, the "dross" of the earthly body; for the soul is itself a formal essence that has been impressed on matter to give particularization. Being a separate entity from the body, the soul's knowledge is intuitional and, broadly speaking, passive; for its primary function is the recognition of pre-existing universals. The mind is thus akin to a dimly lit mirror, one somewhat distorted, in which universal forms are "imaged" more or less as they exist; the mind reflects these forms when it predicates the imaged forms of being to things in the material world. The perception of form and the predication of form is thus the same with respect to the predicated character.[9]

Limited by the material body, the soul's knowledge, moreover, is infinitely less in degree than is God's knowledge, or even the knowledge possessed by angels. Yet since the soul, angels, and the mind of God are all essences, one may predicate the concept knowledge to all three, and it will mean the same thing formally, though it will be realized in each to a degree correspondent with its hierarchical degree of being, its position on the ontological scale, its degree of participation in the Divine esse; and predication is therefore univocal in nature. With respect to the logic of analogy, Platonism had early adopted the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories, and these provided the most general lines of predication for the dialectical treatment of formal propositions. When Qualitas is predicated of two objects in order to reflect an analogical correspondence, the signification reflects the idea that as regards the specific form of Qualitas predicated of the objects (such as the form "redness," for example), the two objects are not only alike in some general way, but are in fact and with respect to that specific form identical.[10] And this is why two objects can be contained "one within the other" in metaphor, for they both participate in the same formal predicament.

Analogy always expresses a relationship, but the category Relatio is by itself only one of the ten possible kinds of being a thing may have vis-à-vis something else. The relation of analogy is not that involved in the relationship of the subject and the object of a proposition to each other, but rather in the relation of two pairs of subjects and objects to each other. The relationship between Dionysus and his wine cup and between Ares and his shield in the example from Aristotle, chapter II, above, is categorically one

of Habitus; the relationship of the analogical predicament Relatio is one that relates the relationship of Dionysus and his wine-cup to the relationship of Ares and his shield, that is, that relates the two propositions of Habitus together. This sense of the analogical relationship, however, really expresses nothing more than the sense of geometric proportionality that is involved in the creation myth of the Timaeus, and is accordingly limited by its very quantitative nature, by the fact that it must deal with objects (effects) and can do little in the way of considering causes (forms). The two attempts to get around this limitation reflect the efforts of the two schools of medieval philosophy, the neo-Platonists and the neo-Aristotelians, for which we may take as representatives St. Bonaventura (1221-1274) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), respectively.

St. Bonaventura gets around the problem of causation in a manner quite different from the one St. Thomas was to adopt to discredit the sufficiency of univocity in predication. Instead of abjuring univocity, St. Bonaventura was constrained to develop the Platonic notion of exemplarism in order to give univocity a more profound philosophical dimension. Exemplarism is the causal relation of two beings in which one plays the part of a generative model and the other that of its copy. One finds, accordingly, that there is a special class of beings, Images, whose distinctive character is to be engendered by way of imitation, the resemblance being derived from the act of engendering itself. This kind of analogy is much "closer" in Platonic terms than is the analogy of proportion (here, the Analogy of Inequality), for the sense of similarity in exemplaristic analogy approaches unity of form through causation itself. A son is the image of his father,

but one egg, for example, is not the image of another egg, since the relation of resemblance between the eggs is not one of causal connection. The degree of the approach to formal identity between the model and its copy is only conditioned by the relative intractability of the matter which goes into the composition of the copy. Exemplaristic analogy is particularly relevant to the question of knowledge: at the moment when the intelligence knows, it engenders, "conceives," the representation of its object; the image that is received is a copy formed by the intelligence in imitation of the object, and is, so to speak, its double. A copy is said to express its model; that is, it gives or causes knowledge of the form of its model, its formal cause.[11]

From this one can see how the concept of separable form rectifies the structure of the universe and does in effect permit the univocal predication of the universal characters of being throughout. The analogy of light-vision reappears in Bonaventura's notion of the three degrees of proximity and remoteness in the way that creatures represent the Creator. At the highest level, one will naturally have the Image, which is near and distinct and which is restricted to spiritual creatures only. There follows the Vestige, which is distant and distinct and is possessed by both spiritual and material creatures. At the lowest level there is the Shadow; this is distant and confused and is also possessed by spiritual and material creatures.[12]

The Image, the "nearest" analogy, is that analogy which the engendering form imprints upon the thing it has generated; it is quite literally a conformity, a resemblance both in quality and configuration. Shadows and Vestiges, the more distant analogies, are distinct because they cannot subsist separately and provide the substance of beings in

themselves. Form here is thus akin to the generic "second substance" of Aristotelian epistemology, with the important difference being that the neo-Platonists conceive form to have independent being, if only in and ideal or abstract sense.

The doctrine of exemplarist correspondence was popularized, so to speak, and given a broader and less strictly theological formulation by the Florentine Academy, notably by Ficino, who seems to have anticipated Bruno in insisting upon a real correspondence between the images of thought and the things of the real world--a correspondence that became for him and later neo-Platonists quite explicitly "symbols." According to P. O. Kristeller, in Ficino:

> La relazione dell' immagine col pensiero non è stata soltanto fissata dall' intelletto, ma è anche fondata su un rapporto reale delle cose esistenti. . . . [Nelle] connessione esteriore dei concetti si nasconde un simbolismo interiore delle cose.
>
> Quindi per simbolo intendiamo il fatto di un oggetto reale che in virtù d'un' uguaglianza de essenza indica un altro oggetto reale; e pertanto il simbolismo è il rapporto interiore del simbolo all' oggetto da questo significato. . . . [E] poiché la relazione fra immagine e pensiero si trasforma in un rapporto reale di oggetti reali, ne deriva che in questo rapporto si manifesta una connessione nascosta fra le membra separate del mondo.[13]

This rapporto reale di oggetti reali is a logical consequence of the doctrine of the mind as a simulacrum Dei and the concept of separable form. The human mind is a copy of the mind of God, and if a formal relation be perceived between things, then the corollary of separable or autonomous form requires that this relationship be itself a copy of a relation that really exists. Form is thus a cause of being as well as a cause of knowledge.

In contrast to St. Bonaventura, St. Thomas maintains with Aristotle that the differing modes of existence that a being has in reality and has in the mind must be distinguished and kept separate.[14] The

basis of this distinction is the relation of soul to body. St. Thomas rejects the Platonic and Augustinian idea of the soul as a forma corporeitatis in favor of the compositum: there is but one substantial form in man, the rational soul, and this is the cause of all human activities on the sensitive, the intellectual, and even the vegetative levels. Donne has called the relation of the soul to the body an alloy, and this is perhaps as good an idea of the meaning of the Aristotelian-Thomistic compositum as any. As a consequence of this notion of the soul-body relationship, the mind is considered to have no "innate" ideas or memories, but must rely on sensual percepts in the initial stages of its knowledge.[15] The only direct knowledge the mind can have is of phenomena, and this, once generalized from the percept, must depend upon the ten predicaments of being, since substance can only be known through its accidents. We thus "name" as we know. The naming of things permits knowledge in ways other than by direct apprehension, for names signify things as they are known, though not immediately and directly as they exist. A name is clearly not itself the thing it points to; it signifies via a conception of the mind.[16]

The conception that is immediately and directly signified by a name is given the technical designation of a ratio. A ratio is something that happens to a thing insofar as it is conceived by the intellect; it is a relation following on one's mode of knowing. The important difference here with Plato lies in the postulate that the mental concept does not exist in external reality, but that something in reality does, however, answer to the concept as the signified does to the sign. Therefore, when one is dealing with the nature of some-

thing signified by the word as ratio, he is considering things not as they exist as rerum natura, but from the point of view of the relations they assume as known by us. The object of sense is the sensible particular; the intellect comes to know by abstracting the intelligible species from the individualizing matter, and thus comes to have a direct knowledge of universals.[17] Knowledge is thus on the order of an a-posteriori intellection of form.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic position contrasts with the neo-Platonic position in regard to the matter of the logical and real orders of being, in that the latter wants something real to respond as such to the intentions that the mind forms in knowing. The consequence of the Platonists' position, as the Aristotelians saw it, is that if there be a concept of man representing a nature common to many individuals, for example, and if this concept be postulated as enjoying autonomous existence, then there must also be an Idea, Man in himself, that exists apart from and by participation in which particular men are. If the universals described can be postulated as having separate existence, the Aristotelian claims that the Platonist must be forced to admit that there are separate genera as well, and the World of Ideas soon becomes more densely populated than the world of singulars it is meant to explain.[18]

St. Thomas' development of the Aristotelian idea of equivocal predication attempts to cope with this problem of different modes of being in the formal character as well as the different degree of being which this character realizes. The Analogy of Proportionality considers both analogy of concept and analogy of being, and does so at once. The concept "redness" exists in the mind and it exists in some manner in nature; when redness is predicated of rubies and lips, the mental and

real modes of existence are modified by the degrees of realization of redness in both the mental and the real beings. The sense of proportionality involved in the predication of this concept involves, therefore, both modality and degree together.

We may illustrate this idea of proportionality further by turning again to the question of the predication of knowledge to essentially different beings. We may use our previous example of predicating knowledge to men, to angels, and to God. In the Thomistic scheme, this is metaphysically a case of equivocal signification; logically however it is univocal predication. Considered logically for the moment, knowledge here would seem to mean the same thing for all the diverse beings named, and the analogy would be again simply one of differing degree. Metaphysically, however, it is seen that since the esse, the modes of being, of each of the three beings named differs fundamentally from the others, "knowledge" can no more signify the same for each than "pen" can signify the same thing when predicated of a writing instrument as when given to an enclosure for animals--and accordingly no relationship between the beings on the basis of knowledge would seem to obtain.

The way in which men know, however, is proportionate to the being that men have, and this likewise is the case for angels and for God. Logic can accord with metaphysics here by effecting a proportion of proportions that takes account of the modes of existence that the beings named have. The different modes of existence, the different kinds of participation in esse, exercised by the different beings in the world system is what St. Thomas claims is ignored in the univocal signification of what he called the Analogy of In-

equality, which is the basis of the Platonic world-order.

The ultimate basis of the Analogy of Proportionality, Thomistic analogy, is that proportion existing between the essence and the existence of every being that is. It is this sense of proportionality that structures the chain of being; and it follows from this that every metaphysical concept and every metaphysical term is of its very nature analogical--any term expressing an metaphysical or transcendental object of thought never has a fixed, exact meaning, but is always proportionate to the nature of the being of which it is said.[19]

In this brief and general resumé of the two opposing conceptions of pre-Kantian analogy, we have emphasized the conceptual nature of analogy itself and its metaphysical implications. Furthermore, in considering the metaphysical implications of this concept, we wished to indicate the neo-Platonic view of the formal unity of the mind with the phenomena of creation, a unity that implies the direct correspondence of intellectual process with things in the real world. Thus, in the generally neo-Platonic scheme of metaphysics and epistemology, logic and metaphysics are complementary: when Góngora predicates a crystalline quality to a nymph, therefore, the nymph is to be understood as having in fact a metaphysically crystalline identity.

On the other hand, we have also wished to point out the metaphysical implications of modal predication in analogy, for the Thomistic sense of analogy is particularly regardful of the persistent, essential differences among things, and for which logical method is only an indirect, and itself analogical, sign of relationship. When a poet like Donne is concerned about the different ways in which

various beings can suffer "blackness" or the ways in which two souls can remain one soul while separated by distance, his analogies reflect his awareness of these essential differences in both the identities of the beings involved and in his conception of them; and the signification of his analogies is to be taken as being itself only analogically related to the real circumstances of the analogated beings.

NOTES

Notes to Pages 1 to 5

I. Introduction

1. Samuel Johnson, "The Life of Cowley," Lives of the English Poets (London: J. M. Dent, 1955), I, p. 11. Dámaso Alonso says in regard to motives in the Baroque style (i.e., the "High Baroque" in our nomenclature) that: ". . . La inquietud y la inestabilidad son los rasgos del barroco, que oscila entre ser una mera coincidentia oppositorum y una verdadera contradictio o conflagratio oppositorum" ("Estudio preliminar," Góngora y el "Polifemo" [Madrid: Gredos, 1961], I, p. 75).

2. Helen Gardner (ed.), "Introduction," The Metaphysical Poets (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 19.

3. Shelley, Adonais, lii; Prometheus Unbound, II. v. 72-74. Shelley's boat of course is an enchanted boat, which perforce breaks down the traditional categories of objects; the question of heterogeneity ought not, presumably, to apply here, since the predicaments of objective identity would be ostensibly denied by the "enchantment."

4. Cf. Johnson, I, p. 12: "[The metaphysical poets'] attempts were always analytic; they broke every image into fragments; and could no more represent by their slender conceits and laboured particularities, the prospects of nature, or the scenes of life, than he who dissects a sunbeam with a prism can exhibit the wide effulgence of a summer noon."

5. The problem of wit is of course complicated by the inadequacy of the English term to differentiate between an act of insight and an act of expression. Generally speaking, acutezza, to use the Italian form, pertains to the intellectual perception or discovery of correspondences between things (cf. the English "acute," "acumen" from the Latin acutus, which has to do with the "keenness" of insight or analysis); accordingly, acutezza pertains to the faculty of Invention. Ingegno, on the other hand, is the stylistically proper and effective expression of acutezza and therefore belongs to the domain of elocutio. According to W. G. Crane, Wit and Rhetoric in the Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 3, this latter sense of wit derives from the Ciceronian idea of ingenium that is involved in the cultivation of eloquence.

6. Joseph A. Mazzeo, "Modern Theories of Metaphysical Poetry," Discussions of John Donne, ed. by Frank Kermode (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1962), p. 122. Cf. the letter of Pedro de Valencia to Góngora in 1613: "Lo metafórico es generalmente muy bueno en V.m., algunas veces atrevido y que no guardia la analogía y correspondencia que se requiere. .

. ." (Luis de Góngora y Argote, Obras completas, ed. by Juan Millé y Giménez and Isabel Millé y Giménez [Madrid: Aguilar, 1961], p. 1086). (Emphasis mine.)

7. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947), p. 264: ". . . The formal defining element in any conceit . . . seems to me to be [the] use of multiple logical bases, upon all of which the comparison obtains." Other recent studies concerned with this problem are Elizabeth Lewis Wiggins, "Logic in the Poetry of John Donne, SP, XLII, 1 (1945), 41-60; J. V. Cunningham, "Logic and Lyric," MP, LI, 1 (1953), 33-41.

8. Thomas Wilson, for example, explicitly equates logic with dialectic, and then defines logic as the art which "professeth to teache truely, orderly, and plainly" (The Rule of Reason . . . . [London, 1552], fols. B3r, B5v). This equation of logic and dialectic seems ultimately to derive from Cicero. See Orator xxxii. 113-115.

9. In Aristotle logic (analytics) is the method of demonstrating strict scientific truth; dialectic is that branch of logic that reasons from opinions commonly accepted (Topics I. 100a). The line between the demonstration of scientific truth and probable truth is not always easily observed, particularly when the two are thought to share similar processes in Invention and Judgment. Accordingly, the blending of logic and dialectic would seem to have been almost inevitable. Logical Invention easily became confused with rhetorical Invention, and both came to rely on the topoi or "commonplaces" for procedures of investigation. The "commonplace" may be most generally defined as "a conception of procedure." Cicero (Topics II. 8) calls the commonplace the "region of an argument, and an argument [is] a course of reasoning which firmly establishes a matter about which there is some doubt." Quintilian (Instituto Oratoria V. x. 20) calls the topoi the "secret places [sedes argumentorum] where arguments reside, and from which they must be drawn forth." An extensive discussion of the commonplace tradition in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance is furnished by Sister Joan Marie Lechner in her Renaissance Concepts of the Commonplaces (New York: Pageant Press, 1962). For a comparison of the conceptual nature of the commonplace vis-à-vis the categories of analytics, see below, p. 41.

10. This discussion of the organization of Renaissance logics is based generally on Wilbur Samuel Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 15-17. A complete bibliography of Ramism is provided by Father Walter J. Ong's Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), supplemented by his important study of the medieval and Renaissance logical tradition, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). A concise and incisive study of the relation of Ramistic logic to rhetoric is found in Norman E. Nelson, Peter Ramus and the Confusion of Logic, Rhetoric and Poetry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1947). A convenient reprint of the first English version of Talon's synopsis of Ramus' Dialectic and his Rhetoric, Dudley Fenner's The Artes of Logike and Rethorike (Middleburg, The Netherlands, 1584), can be found in Four Tudor Books on Education, ed. by Robert D. Pepper (Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars' Fac-

similes and Reprints, 1966).

11. The term "topical logics" is taken from Ong's Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. The general distinctions between analytical and topical thought will be discussed in chapter II.

12. Renaissance logics commonly do not list analogy as analogy at all. The notion of analogy almost universally follows Quintilian's idea of it as similitudo, that is, as an argument by example (Instituto Oratoria V. ix). Wilson defines "similitude" as occurring when two or more things are compared together on the basis of a likeness or property (Rule of Reason, fols. 102r-103r; cf. also fols. K3v-K4r). In Fenner's translation of Talon's Ramus, similitude is identified merely as the comparison of things of the same quality (Pepper ed., p. 156).

13. G. L. Hendrickson, "The Origin and Meaning of the Ancient Characters of Style," AJP, XXVI, 3 (1905), 255. Cf. Wilson's disdinction between logic and rhetoric in the Rule of Reason, fol. B5r. Although Aristotle hints at this distinction between the functions of language in his Rhetoric, according to Hendrickson the earliest explicit statement of this dichotomy seems to belong to Ammonius of Alexandria, who said that: "Language is divided into two types, according to the philosopher Theophrastus, the one having reference to the hearers, the other to the matter concerning which the speaker aims to convince his audience. To the division with reference to the hearers belong poetry and rhetoric. Therefore its function is to choose the more stately words . . . to the end that . . . the listener shall be charmed and moved, and with respect to intellectual persuasion, overmastered. The division looking to the matter will be the especial concern of the philosopher, refuting the false and setting forth the true" (In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarii . . . , ed. by Busse [Berol, 1897], pp. 65, 31), cited and translated by Hendrickson, 255-256. Hendrickson also notes Cicero's remark in De Partitione Oratoria XIII. 46: "There are two kinds of ratiocination [argumentandi], one of which aims directly at convincing and the other devotes itself to exciting feeling"; cf. also Brutus lv. 201.

14. Lorenzo Gracián [Baltasar Gracián y Morales], Agudeza y Arte de Ingenio (Huesca, 1648), Obras completas, ed. by Arturo del Hoyo (Madrid: Aguilar, 1960), Discurso III, pp. 241-242: "La primera distinction sea entre la agudeza de perspicacia y la del artificio; y ésta es el asunto de nuestra arte. Aquélla tiende a dar alcance a las dificultosas verdades. . . . Ésta . . . afecta la hermosura sutil." Gracián's treatise was originally published in Madrid in 1642 as Arte de Ingenio, Tratado de la Agudeza. The distinction between informative argument and adornment that we noted above had become a commonplace in the Renaissance and seventeenth century. See, for example, Richard Rainolde, A Booke called the Foundacion of Rhetorike (London, 1563), ed. by Francis R. Johnson (New York: Edwards Brothers, 1945), fols Lr-Lv.

15. Wilson's Arte of Rhetorique, 1560, ed. by G. H. Mair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), pp. 160, 165.

16. Gracián, Discurso II, p. 239: "No se contenta el ingenio con sola la verdad, como el juicio, sino que aspira a la hermosura. Poco fuera en la arquitectura asegurar firmeza, si no atendiera al ornato.

17. Cf. Cicero De Oratore I. xvi. 70 and III. xxvi. 104, in the latter of which he states that amplification by ornamentation is the "highest distinction of eloquence." Quintilian echoes the same idea in the Instituto Oratoria X. 1. 65-72. Ernst R. Curtius says that "The dominating point of view in all this [concern with the rhetorical division elocutio] is that discourse must be 'decorated.' The 'ornatus' . . . is the great desideratum, and it remains so into the eighteenth century" (European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. by Willard R. Trask [New York: Pantheon Books, 1953], p. 71). Cf. also Donald Lemen Clark, Rhetoric and Poetry in the Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1922), pp. 47-55; and especially J. W. H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Medieval Phase (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1961), pp. 184-185, 200-203.

18. Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, iii, 4.

19. Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster (London, 1570), quoted by Douglas L. Peterson, The English Lyric from Wyatt to Donne (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 49-50.

20. Frank J. Warnke, "Marino and the English Metaphysicals," SRen, II (1955), 162-163. Marino's poem is discussed in detail in chapter IV.

21. JAAC, V, 2 (1946-1947), 77-109.

22. Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony, trans. by Angus Davidson (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 1. Praz subsequently adds that: "The sole object of these formulas [i.e., romantic, baroque, etc.] is to keep in mind the character of the period in which [a] work was produced, in such a way as to avoid the danger of a combination of words, sounds, colours or forms becoming invested with ideas which are aroused in the mind of the interpreter, but which certainly did not exist in the mind of the artist" (p. 3). This seems a worthwhile caution in view of some recent tendencies towards "romanticizing" the Metaphysical poets.

Perhaps two of the more notable examples of this tendency are T. S. Eliot's celebrated theory of the "dissociation of sensibility" ("The Metaphysical Poets," Selected Essays [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950], pp. 241-250) and William Empson's theory of ambiguity (Seven Types of Ambiguity [London: Chatto and Windus, 1930]). Eliot's vaguely defined "sensibility" has at least a historical reference; Empson's dubious psychologism and his lack of historicity, however, give rise to some egregious misreadings of the poetry of this period, as, for example, Herbert's "Sacrifice," which is trenchantly answered by Miss

Tuve in A Reading of George Herbert (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

23. Frank J. Warnke (ed.), "Introduction," European Metaphysical Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 3.

24. Odette de Mourgues, Metaphysical, Baroque, and Précieux Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 130: "Précieux poetry does not differ from metaphysical or [high] baroque poetry by its imagery or its rhetorical devices, but by the use it makes of that imagery and those figures of speech." Cf. also R. A. Sayce, "The use of the Term Baroque in French Literary History," CL, X, 3 (1958), 246-253.

II. The Metaphor and Analogy

1. See Gracián, Discursos II-V; Conte D. Emanuele Tesauro, Il Cannochiale Aristotelico (Venice, 1654). Since Tesauro's work has not been reprinted in a modern edition and is almost impossible to obtain, all references to Tesauro in the following pages will be directed to the summary and translations offered by S. L. Bethell in his article "The Nature of Metaphysical Wit," Discussions of John Donne, ed. by Frank Kermode (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1962), pp. 136-149. Tesauro's first three types of metaphor--Proportion, Attribution, and Equivocation (Bethell, p. 142)--reflect the classification of analogical predication in the De Nominum Analogia (1498) of Cardinal Cajetan, who is of considerable inmprtance in the transmission of Thought to the later Renaissance. See Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, The Analogy of Names and The Concept of Being, trans. by E. A. Bushinski and H. J. Koren (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953).

2. Poetics XXI. 1457b.

3. M. Marina Scheu, The Categories of Being in Aristotle and St. Thomas (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), pp. 38-45.

4. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, pp. 106-107. Scheu, p. 6, finds that Aristotle refers to the categories variously as "divisions" (Topics 120b), "primary classes" (Metaphysics 1034b), as "summa genera" (De Anima 402a), but most frequently as either "kinds of predicates" (Topics 103b, 107a) or "kinds of being" (Metaphysics 1024b, 1028a; Physics 201a).

5. I. M. Bocheński (A History of Formal Logic, trans. by Ivo Thomas [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1961], p. 53) points to the ambiguity between Essence listed in Aristotle's Topics as the first category of being and Substance listed in the Categories. According to Bocheński, Aristotle seems to have been thinking of Essence in two ways: (1) as equal to substance itself (i.e., as form plus matter), (2) as denoting an intrinsic nature (i.e., form alone) that is found in every category. In terms of later developments in Aristotle's

thought, especially in the Metaphysics, Substance seems best to clarify the thought here.

6. Sir David Ross, Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 21. In the Organon Aristotle seems to consider the illustration of each of the categories, excepting those of Substance, Quantity, Relation, and Quality, to be sufficient to make their meaning clear. For our discussion, however, the categories Substantia and Habitus will need further comment.

Habitus seems generally to have been taken to denote a circumstance for which the examples of "being clothed" or "being armed" (Categories IX. 11b) are not precise enough, since they indicate only a relation of possessor to thing possessed, or, as St. Thomas phrased it, a "habitude of clothing to the one clothed" (Scheu, p. 90), and for which the genitive is the chief syntactical construction. St. Thomas, according to Scheu (p. 91), found the whole notion of Habitus vague enough to require additional analysis, and he concluded that this predicament of being is something that is analogously intermediate to Doing (Actio) and Suffering (Passio), and is not quite either one. Habitus thus appears to be quasi action and passion, an intermediate state for which the term "condition" seems to offer the designation of greatest clarity. In the following discussion, therefore, something that occurs between antecedent and consequence, or between cause and effect, will be treated as a condition of being and will be designated as Habitus.

Substance is composed of form plus matter; the particular way in which form is related to matter was an important point of contention between the Aristotelian and Platonic school of philosophy, and is discussed briefly in the Appendix. We may note here, however, that Platonic analogy (the "Analogy of Inequality") tends to reduce substance to essence (form) when two substances appear as analogues of each other, whereas Aristotelian analogy tends to rely on the idea of similitude in the accidents of being to correlate the two analogues. The concept of Substantia has two aspects or modes of being: it is an ens realia (a "primary substance") and an ens rationis (a "secondary substance"). The primary substance is the concrete, particular being that is apprehended by the senses; the secondary substance is comprised of the species and genera in which first substances are included as they are known. For instance, if one see a child and report "This child is pretty," the perception is of a child outside the mind existing as pretty; but once one has made the statement about the child, then the child also exists in his mind as pretty. The child, therefore, has two orders of being, two modes of existence: it is a being in nature (an ens realia), where it is its own subject of existence; and it is a being in a mind (an ens rationis), where it exists as the subject of a proposition. See John of St. Thomas: Outlines of Formal Logic [i.e., the Ars Logica (Alcalá, 1631-1632)], trans. by Francis C. Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955), p. 8. For later developments of the categories in Aristotle, see especially his Metaphysics V. 1013a-1025a.

7. Scheu, p. 47.

8. Howell, p. 17; cf. Scheu, pp. 14, 72. Aristotle's origi-

nal classification of the predicables (Topics I. iv. 101b) did not include differentia as a distinct predicable; this was added in the third century by Porphyry. Howell (loc. cit.) offers an example of the predicables as they appear in the analysis of a proposition the commonplace definition of man, which he cites from Wilson's Rule of Reason. In the definition "Man is a living creature endowed with reason and having the aptness of speech," the species "man" is associated with its genus "animal," and then is differentiated from other members of that genus by the endowment of reason. Man is then given a "true" or "common" property, the "aptness of speech." If the definition had, as is usual, included "whiteness" as a predicate of man, one would have additionally a case of a "temporary property," since whiteness is not common to all men. Specification involves the "addition of differences" to the genus, which "divides out" the species. An interesting example of "dividing out" the species from the genus by the means of adding differentiae occurs in Shakespeare's sonnet 130 ("My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun"), in which the Poet's mistress is differentiated from the generic Poetic Mistress.

9. "A Valediction: forbidding Mourning," 21-36; these lines and their analogies are discussed in detail in chapter V.

10. Scheu, p. 67.

11. "Improper accidents" are technically the result of illogical or unscientific predication. "Improper predication" therefore is the attribution of something to an object that cannot properly be said to have it, as the "brow of a mountain" (Aeneid II. 307).

12. According to Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, p. 101, St. Thomas distinguished the various logics according to their degrees of certitude in the following way: (1) analytics, a logic of strict scientific demonstration, what would be simply logic today; (2) dialectic, a logic of probability or of the more probable, as used in debate; (3) rhetoric, another logic of probability, sufficient only to lead to a practical decision or to action; (4) poetry, a logic of even less probability than rhetoric, being the logic of "as-if"; (5) sophistic, a logic of bogus probability.

13. This summary of the three kinds of predication is taken from Gerald B. Phelan, Saint Thomas and Analogy (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1941), pp. 14-15.

14. Rhetorica ad Herennium IV. xxxiv. 45. (Emphasis mine.)

15. The Genus of Similitude is derived through the logical adjuncts of the analogated subjects, that is, the analogical context determines which of the many possible characteristics or rationes of the subjects are being shared as analogical "common-denominators," so to speak. Thus "Christ" is the adjunct of the logical subject tribe of the Jews; "lion" is likewise the adjunct of the subject kingdom of the animals. "Tribe" and "kingdom" are also in turn the adjuncts of Jews and animals, respectively; but since they are also synonyms, the

analysis need not go this far. The common adjunct "kingdom," therefore, provides the particular form by which the ratio of imperium is conceived or realized in the analogical situation, and by which it is predicated univocally of both Christ and the lion. Relatio thus structures the analogy as a relation of substance in terms of a relation of their accidents: Christ : lion = Imperium--Jews : Imperium--animals.

16. Hampus Lyttkens, The Analogy Between God and the World, Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, I, v (1953), p. 38, notes that in describing his "new science," metaphysics, Aristotle used mathematics as his prototype (cf. Metaphysics VI. 1. 1026a). According to Lyttkens, science is generally patterned on mathematics, and Aristotle's logical and metaphysical works are filled with mathematical examples. The syllogism (and by implication, the enthymeme) is conceived of in terms of a mathematical analogy, and when scientific knowledge is said to be built on certain unprovable principles, these principles are modelled on the mathematical axioms. For an account of the Platonic sense of analogy, see the Appendix.

17. Cited in Ralph M. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), p. 111.

18. Bethell, p. 142.

19. Cf. Cicero De Oratore III. xxxix; Quintilian Instituto Oratoria VIII. vi. 8-9.

20. Cicero loc. cit.; cf. Aristotle Rhetoric III. xi. 1412a.

21. Quintilian's example is from Virgil (Aeneid VI. 1): "Classique immittit habenas." His treatment of this metaphor is doubtful, since of course one "gives rein" to a horse. This nicely points up the confusion that may result when logic is confused with rhetoric, for here it is not the nouns that are metaphorized but the verbs, and consequently the question of "animate" or "inanimate" is not really pertinent. In Aristotle's terms this metaphor would be a case of species to species transference on the basis of the category Actio, since "giving rein" is equivalent to the literal "setting sail," both of which are specific instances of a generic "Allowing to Go" or "Causing to Move." The problems Quintilian's use of this example illustrates are endemic to topical thought, since when one is unable to define the nature of similitude, one may well end up missing the point of a similitude.

22. Donatus and Vendôme cited in Christine Brooke-Rose, A Grammar of Metaphor (London: Secker and Warburg, 1958), p. 5.

23. Cf. below, chapter V, n. 6.

24. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, pp. 104-105.

25. Ibid., p. 106.

26. Comparison, Similitude, and Contraries pertain to the division of deductive reasoning that draws from sources which bear resemblance to the terms of the argumentative proposition. Comparison involves likeness between things of the same kind, and takes the form of lower to higher, higher to lower, and like to like. Similitude pertains to likeness between things different in kind. Contraries are invoked to explain varieties of unlikeness, which are classified as Contradictories, Opposites, and Repugnancies (Crane, pp. 51-52). Peacham in The Garden of Eloquence (London, 1577) lists twenty-one forms of the topos Comparison.

27. Ong writes (Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, p. 104): "The topical tradition is omnivorous in its selection . . . and tends to assimilate and adapt any and all sorts of classifications with which its users are likely to be familiar and which thus are likely to be serviceable. Thus, even before Aristotle's Topics, and from then on, serviceable bits of the general philosophical apparatus, including the well-known Aristotelian categories . . . and the related 'predicables' . . . were more or less incorporated into the classificatory finding-apparatus [of Inventio] among the 'places."

28. This lack of agreement, so to speak, is found even in Aristotle. In the Rhetoric when he is considering the topoi as the "constituent elements of argument," he lists only four; shortly thereafter, however, he introduces a new set of twenty-eight commonplaces drawn from the Topics and offers these as "common lines of argument" (Rhetoric II. 19. 1392a-1393a; II. 23. 1397a ff). Cicero's treatise on the topics, which is supposedly based on Aristotle, offers only seventeen commonplaces. Agricola's De Inventione Dialectica offers the same twenty-four topoi that Wilson incorporated in his Rule of Reason. For a comparison of Cicero's and Agricola's catalogues of the topoi and Wilson's treatment of the latter, see Crane, pp. 53-54.

29. Richard Sherry, A Treatise of Schemes & Tropes (London, 1550), fol. F4v.

30. Crane, pp. 57-60, offers a list of the more common topoi in the rhetorics of the Renaissance.

III. General Form and Function of Metaphoric Analogy

1. Aristotle Rhetoric III. xi. 1411b.

2. Unlike rhetorical formulations, there is no logical distinction between a simile and a metaphor. As Aristotle observes (Rhetoric III. 4. 1407a): "All these ideas [i.e., comparisons] may be expressed either as similes or as metaphors; those which succeed as metaphors will obviously do well also as similes, and similes, with the [grammatical] explanation omitted, will appear as metaphors."

3. Each of the Analogates in the analogical structure is really a proposition, and the Subjects and Objects have a certain definable relation to each other. Dialectically, each of the Analogates

in both the examples from Aristotle and the example from Homer seems to reflect propositions of circumstance, propositions in which the Subjects and Objects are connected accidentally. Substantial relationships ultimately involve the categories, and therefore logically the relationship of the wine-cup to Dionysus is a predicament of Habitus, since it involves the thing possessed to the one possessing it. In the Homeric example, the relation of Hector to the Trojans is Relatio, that of the Achaeans to the Trojans is Passio. The correspondence between the two Analogates is thus seen to be a relation of relations. Since our concern is with the relationships obtaining between analogous substances, we shall not deal explicitly with propositional relations within the Analogates.

4. Technically speaking, "hounds" is probably also in a generic relation to "Trojans," since hound likely referred to any hunting dog.

5. The demands of context exercise a certain control on the particular categories involved in an analogy. Implicit or explicit, these categories must have logical sufficiency, however.

6. Cf. the discussion of this question of time in Lowry Nelson, Jr., Baroque Lyric Poetry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 32-52.

7. Spenser's Minor Poems, ed. by Ernest de Sélincourt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 422-434.

8. "Shining," "glowing," and other such expressions of radiancy will be treated in terms of Actio in accordance with the physics of the period, rather than as things more nearly akin to Qualitas, as we commonly tend to think of them today. For a brief history of this idea of radiancy, particularly with regard to visual rays, see John Arthos, The Language of Natural Description in Eighteenth-Century Poetry (New York: Octagon Books, 1966), pp. 285-290.

9. Aristotle (Physics II. 3. 194b-195a) defines the four principles of causation as follows: (1) Material Cause: "that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, . . . e.g. the bronze of the statue. . . ."; (2) Formal Cause" "the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence and its genera. . . ."; (3) Efficient Cause: "the primary source of the change or coming to rest . . . what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed"; (4) Final Cause: "'that for the sake of which' a thing is done."

10. Góngora y el "Polifemo", ed. by Dámaso Alonso (4th ed.; Madrid: Edit. Gredos, 1961), II, stanza xxiv. All references to the Polifemo will be to this edition.

11. "Crystal" in this period was applied to a variety of objects,

to water, ice, glass, and the diamond, among others. When Góngora applies the notion crystal to a lady, a nymph, or a shepherdess, he seems to be primarily interested in the quality of white and bright luminescence, like the patina of silver with which "cristal tan claro" is equated in the fourth line of the following sonnet (Obras completas, ed. Millé y Giménez, p. 449):

> ¿Cuál del Ganges marfil, o cuál de Paro
> blanco mármol, cuál ébano luciente,
> cuál ámbar rubio o cuál oro excelente,
> cuál fina plata o cuál cristal tan claro . . . ?

The idea of purity is also involved in the predication of crystal to things, as in the following from Crashaw's poem "Wishes. To his (supposed) Mistresse" (The Poems, English, Latin, and Greek of Richard Crashaw, ed. by L. C. Martin [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957], p. 195):

> Till that Divine
> Idaea, take a shrine
> Of Chrystall flesh, through which to shine; . . .
> (ll. 10-12)

12. The same analogical process occurs of course with crystal elsewhere in Góngora's poetry, as, for example, in the Soledades when a shepherdess kneels to drink from a stream, and, using her hand, she:

> Juntaba el cristal líquido al humano
> Por el arcaduz bello de una mano
> Que al uno menosprecia, al otro iguala
> (Soledad primera, 244-246)

13. Minor Poems, pp. 446-454.

14. Spenser's "expresse" is another term from neo-Platonic metaphysics. See the Appendix, pp. 173-174.

15. Quintilian (Instituto Oratoria III. v. 5-11) defines theses as indefinite in regard to persons, time, place, and the like; hypotheses are definite in regard to these matters. Hence theses are matters of the general context; hypotheses are matters of the immediate context.

16. Le Rime, ix, ed. by Ferdinando Neri, Rime, Trionfi e Poesie Latine, ed. by F. Neri, et al. (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1951), p. 11.

17. Cf. Góngora, Soledad primera, 1-6.

18. Cf. Petrarch's "Amor, che nel penser mio vive e regna" (Rime, cxl), or in Wyatt's translation, "The longe love, that in my thought doth harbar / And in myn hert doeth kepe his residence." This idea also appears in Sidney's "'Fool,' said my Muse to me, 'looke in thy heart and write'" (Astrophil and Stella, i).

19. I rai are considered here as a specific form of vertù, and as being essentially the same thing as virtue itself. This is a commonplace emblematic representation of power, similar to the flames or the aureole of the sun. In religious iconography the aureole of the sun appears as the emblem of supreme power; the ray, of particular power. See George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), s.vv. "Aureole," "Halo."

20. The dialectic of the poem is based on a destructive hypothetical syllogism:

If it be spring, there are external and internal effects.
There are no external effects.
Therefore, there is no spring.

21. Qualitas here has two aspects, one of similarity, another of difference. The sun and the Lady are similar in the quality of brightness (vertù); they have an essential difference in regard to the quality of constancy. These aspects of quality related to aspects of time in the following way: since the sun is constant, spring always comes to the earth; since the Lady is inconstant, spring never (mai) comes for the Poet.

22. See Cicero De Partitione Oratoria XII. 41-43; De Inventione I. xxvi-xxvii.

IV. The High Baroque Metaphor and the Logic of Periphrasis

1. Ad Herennium IV. viii. 11. See also chapter I, n. 17.

2. Aristotle Rhetoric I. 9. 1368a: "It is only natural that methods of 'heightening the effect' should be attached particularly to the speeches of praise; they aim at proving superiority over others, and any such superiority is a form of nobleness. . . . Of the lines of argument which are common to all speeches, this 'heightening of effect' is most suitable for declamations, where we take our hero's actions as admitted facts, and our business is simply to invest these with dignity and nobility."

3. Bethell, p. 141.

4. Curtius, p. 66.

5. Gracián, Discurso II, p. 238.

6. Johnson, I, p. 11. It should be emphasized again that the matter of unlikeness may be only a question of appearance. As our discussion of analogy pointed out, likeness and unlikeness is a matter of metaphysical definition: Hector may be like a hunter on the basis of Actio, but be quite unlike a hunter on the basis of Qualitas, for example. Catalogues of conceits in Baroque poets tend to end up revealing the very conventional nature of the materials used in the formation of the conceits; the "wit" really lies in predication. See for examples: W. R. Moses, The Metaphysical Conceit in the Poems of John Donne (Nashville: Joint University Libraries, 1941); Eunice Joiner Gates, The Metaphors of Luis de Góngora (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1933); W. Pabst, La Creación Gongorina en los Poemas "Polifemo" y "Soledades" (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1966).

7. Comparatio (by which was really meant analogy) is a frequent topos of composition ("argument") in this period. Epigraphs by the editors of such sixteenth-century collections as Tottle's Songs and Sonnets (London, 1557) and Robinson's Handful of Pleasant Delights

(London, 1584) often serve to point this out to the reader.

8. Bethell, p. 140. It cannot be determined here whether Tesauro be thinking of "vestige" in the technical sense of neo-Platonic metaphysics or not. The meanings of "vestige," "shadow," and "image" are noted in the Appendix.

9. Mazzeo, "Modern Theories of Metaphysical Poetry," p. 118, remarks: "One of the cardinal tenets of the [seventeenth-century] critics of the conceit is that the conceit itself is the expression of a correspondence which actually obtains between objects and that, since the universe is a network of universal correspondences or analogies which unite all the apparently heterogeneous elements of experience, the most heterogeneous metaphors are justifiable." See Kristeller's remarks on Ficino, Appendix, p. 175, below.

10. The Poems, English, Latin, and Greek, ed. by L. C. Martin (2nd. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 84-85. All references to Crashaw will be to this edition.

11. See Arthos, s.vv. "Crystal humor," "Crystal water," "Tears," and "Water" for examples of the various ways in which the equivocal concept "Liquid-Crystal" appears in the literature of the period.

12. Both Cicero (Orator xxiv. 81) and Quintilian (Instituto Oratoria VIII. vi. 6) call attention to gemma as a common metaphor for vinebud. Cf. also Marino's metaphor of the rose bud as the "gemma di primavera" in L'Adone (Paris, 1623), III, clviii.

13. For the connection of dew with the moon, with rain, and the weeping of Aurora and the formation of pearls, see S. K. Heninger, Jr., A Handbook of Renaissance Meteorology (Durham: Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 64-69.

14. "La bruna Pastorella" first appeared in Marino's La Sampogna (Paris, 1620). The present excerpt is from the Poesie varie, ed. by Benedetto Croce (Bari: Laterza, 1913), pp. 13-14.

15. Luis de Góngora [y Argote], Las Soledades, ed. by Dámaso Alonso (3rd. ed.; Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1956). All references to the Soledades will be to this edition.

16. La Lira, Parte terza (Venice, 1614), Marino e i Marinisti, ed. by Giuseppe Guido Ferrero (Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1954), p. 383.

17. The Lady, known by her hand pur d'avorio becomes implicitly ivory herself, just as Góngora's nymph, Galatea, becomes crystal. In a similar manner the tear of Crashaw's Magdalen becomes translated into a diamond and a pearl. This tendency to translate poetic subjects into precious objects seems a characteristic of the High Baroque.

18. Cf. Spenser, Amoretti, xxxvii, in which golden tresses are metaphorized as a "golden snare," which entraps the Poet. The idea

seems to have been a commonplace.

19. Lord Herbert of Cherbury in his more diffuse version of this poem, "A Vision," solves the problem by simply having the Lady throw away the comb.

20. Gracián, Discurso III, p. 240.

21. The best and most exhaustive study of hyperbaton, vocabulary, and other devices of language in Góngora is Dámaso Alonso's La Lengua Poética de Góngora (3rd. ed.; Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1961).

22. Gracián, ibid., p. 244.

V. The Metaphysical Metaphor and the Logic of Definition

1. Drummond's remark occurs in an undated letter of around 1630; Dryden's in his Discourse on Satire (London, 1693). The relevant excerpts from Drummond and Dryden may be conveniently found in J. William Hebel and Hoyt H. Hudson (eds.), Poetry of the English Renaissance (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929), p. 906.

2. The most recent study of the basis of the Jonsonian stylistic is Wesley Trimpi, Ben Jonson's Poems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962). The important thing in our somewhat broad distinction between the High style of the High Baroque and the generally Plain style of the Metaphysical has to do with the use of trope. Neither the "Classical" nor the "Medieval" Plain style is identified by a lack of trope, but rather by the avoidance of decorative trope. Cf. Herbert's description of his own style as such an avoidance of decorative "fictions" in his two "Jordan" poems, in the second of which his expression of "Curling with metaphors a plain intention" seems clearly to echo Cicero's idea of the calamistri; the idea is the same in any case.

3. The three "offices" of the orator (the officia oratoris) are described by Cicero (Orator xxi. 69) as to prove (probare), to please or delight (delectare), and to sway or persuade (flectere); to these offices correspond respectively the Plain style (Subtile), the Middle style (Modicum), and the Vigorous or Grand style (Vehemens).

4. Donne's early training was as a Roman Catholic, and he received strict Jesuit instruction. His attendance at Oxford, and perhaps also at Cambridge, occurred in the late 1580's, when both universities required a rigorous five-term course in logic.

5. Donne's description of his thirst for learning appears in a letter to his friend Sir Henry Goodyer of September, 1608 (The Life and Letters of John Donne, ed. by Sir Edmund Gosse [London: Heinemann, 1899], I, p. 191).

6. Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery, p. 350. An argument is a demonstration, a dialectical structure; a concept is a mental intention, an intellectual structure. The confusion between the two is a further indication of the predominantly rhetorical basis of Ramistic and other topical logics; analogy is in any given instance a conceptual structure; it may be used for rhetorical purposes of persuasion. In all cases, however, Ramistic logic had to treat this relationship in just the same way that the rhetoricians treated it, that is, as an argument by example, and this can never be the case in contexts of definition.

7. A. J. Smith, "The Metaphysic of Love," RES, n.s., IX, 36 (1958), 362-375. Cf. also Sam L. Hynes' remarks on Thomistic aesthetic in Donne's The First Anniversary in "A Note on Donne and Aquinas," MLR, XLVIII, 2 (1953), 179-181.

8. John Donne: The Divine Poems, ed. by Helen Gardner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 29-30. The two holy days coincided on March 25, 1608.

9. This is given as the first of the four meanings of Qualitas in Aristotle's Metaphysics V. xiv. 1020a-b: "'Quality' means . . . the differentia of the essence . . . a circle is a figure of particular quality becsuse it is without angles--which shows that the essential differentia is a quality." This is an advance in metaphysical precision over the definition of Qualitas given in Categories VIII. 10a, which pertains merely to "the shape and figure" that belongs to things.

10. Proportionate analogy is probably implicit in the sequence of paradoxes in the poem, for the coincidence of the point of a circle is not quite the same thing as the coincidence of temporal events, for Christ's "history" is measurable in time--as Donne indeed does measure it with the ages of "scarce fifteen" and "almost fiftie" said of Mary (l. 4)--nor is the coincidence the same with regard to the coterminous creation and destruction of the world (ll. 37-38), which for its part is immeasurable, or at least is nonmeasurable.

11. John Donne: The Elegies and The Songs and Sonnets, ed. by Helen Gardner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 59-61.

12. Love in Donne is frequently conceived of as a "controlling power"; cf. "The Good-Morrow," ll. 8-14. For the concept of Eros as a mesothesis and a power creating unity, see the Appendix.

13. Smith, p. 364, cites Sperone Speroni's description of lovers in the state of perfect love in his Dialogo di Amore (Opere [1740], I, 3), which is that the lovers are joined so completely that they lose their proper identities and become a third species, neither male nor female, but one resembling a hermaphrodite. This hermaphroditic "neutral thing" that evolves from the analogical state of ecstasy appears also in Donne's "The Canonization," ll. 23-25. Cf. also Tesauro's idea of the signification of the metaphor

(Bethell, p. 142): the object signified through metaphor "imparts two objects at one time, one within the other." (Italics mine.)

14. The reading "spheares" of John Hayward's edition and the early printed editions has been adopted in preference to "spheare" of the Grierson and Gardner editions, and for much the same reasons as was given by Hayward in his note to this line in his John Donne: Complete Poetry and Selected Prose (London: Nonesuch Library, 1955), p. 764. The main argument for the adoption of the reading "spheares" has been one of rhyme, but, as Hayward points out, the singular-plural rhymes are not infrequent in Donne; and, moreover, the sense of the passage requires the plural "spheares," since the union of the bodies, for which Donne is arguing, has not yet been achieved.

15. Cf. Smith, p. 367: "The vital Thomist denial of the position that the body is dross is grounded precisely in the Aristotelian affirmation of the absolute interdependence of soul and body. . . . An intellect without a body would be impotent, cut off from the sensible world, and in order to communicate with matter must 'descend, so to speak, into the material plane." Although Aquinas substitutes immortal souls for the Aristotelian intellects, the same principle of interdependency still obtains.

16. The idea of the subtilis vapor appears to derive from Paracelsus and Melancthon. Grierson in his note to these lines (The Poems of John Donne [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912], II, 45) cites Richard Burton's description of these spirits from his Anatomy of Melancholy (London, 1638) and Donne's analysis of them as being "of middle nature, between soul and body." Donne's description points to their essentially analogical nature. See Lawrence Babb, The Elizabethan Malady (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1951), pp. 8-9, 132-133.

17. The analogy imposes a correspondence between the (two) souls and uncertaine victorie; the quantitative relation seems to support Smith's suggestion (p. 371) of the Homeric and emblematic scales of Fate. The two souls are suspended by Love as the pans of the scales are suspended by Fate. Since Love cannot triumph and his victory become certain until the bodies are joined, the state of suspension remains "uncertain" and "negotiable" by the two sexes. The analogy thus seems to illustrate by particularization not only the idea of suspension and inconclusiveness in its immediate context, but specifies the basis of the poem's thesis itself.

18. The "great Prince" expression is obviously a metaphor of privation (see note 15, above); it gives a negative sense to the idea of potentiality that is involved in the merely spiritual union of the lovers, which has previously been defined as only a suspension. Since, however, the soul-body relationship has already been defined, and since the "great Prince" metaphor only qualifies the general idea of Habitus, i.e., potentiality, it is not considered a definitory metaphor.

19. The Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. by Hugh Macdonald (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 51-53. "The Garden" first appeared in the posthumous Miscellaneous Poems of 1681.

20. Cf. Macdonald's note, p. 173, to Sir Thomas Browne's Pseudodoxia Epidemica (London, 1646).

21. William Empson, Some Versions of Pastoral (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1960), p. 120.

22. For various aspects of the garden as emblem and the motif of the Solitude, see Frank Kermode, "The Argument of Marvell's 'Garden'," Seventeenth-Century English Poetry, ed. by William R. Keast (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 290-304. Since the motif of the Solitude has obvious affinities with the Soledades of Góngora, a further and more extensive examination of this genre might prove rewarding.

23. The Complete Poetry of Henry Vaughan, ed. by French Fogle (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 231-233.

24. In Vaughan's other most celebrated poem, "The Night" (Fogle ed., pp. 323-325), the oxymoron of the "deep, but dazzling darkness" performs the same definitory function with regard to ontology and epistemology and the antithesis of light and darkness in the poem that the two metaphors for time and eternity do in "The World."

25. Divine Poems, p. 7.

26. In this connection "pilgrim" ought to be taken in the general sense indicated in the OED as referring to any alien or wanderer, and not to one on a journey of worship.

27. Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics V. xxii, s.v. "Privation," where privation is considered in terms of degree.

28. Ferguson, p. 151, s.v. "Colors." In Donne's poem the idea of sickness in the general concept "blackness" is established at the outset by the metaphor of the physical condition as representing the "herald and champion" of death. Analogously the soul is "sick" with sin.

29. The "nearness" of analogates is meant in a metaphysical, not a rhetorical sense. Metaphysically the thief and the pilgrim are both substantial beings, and thus are "nearer" each other than either is to the soul, which is a formal or essential being. Rhetorically, the pilgrim would appear to be the nearer analogue to the soul because it is the one most fully detailed. The significance of "blackness," however, is derived from metaphysical considerations, not from rhetorical techniques.

30. Since treason and theft are specific forms of Capital Crimes, the analogues for the soul would have to be specific also, and this is too much a matter of biographical inquiry for consideration here. The specific offenses are, in any case, not really the concern of the poem, for it is enough to know that the soul is guilty of them, just as all souls are likely to be guilty of them.

31. The sequence of causation involving repentance in Donne's sonnet reflects equivocation in the notion of "grace," and appears to be as follows:

Formal Cause - Will
Material Cause - Soul
Efficient Cause - Grace
Final Cause - Grace

On one hand grace is the usual idea of Divine influence to impart strength and to give mercy; on the other hand, however, there is the implication of a delay or an immunity from a penalty (in this case, death) for a period of time. Although the OED gives the earliest use of this second meaning as 1711, it seems clearly involved here because of the legalistic circumstances of the analogues pilgrim and thief as kinds of Felon. The soul is being summoned by sickness, the herald of death, and needs a period of grace to appeal for Grace.

For the relationship of this poem's dialectic to the psychology of meditation, see Louis L. Martz, The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), especially pp. 26-39.

32. The Works of George Herbert, ed. by F. E. Hutchinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945), p. 37.

33. A Reading of George Herbert, pp. 112-113.

34. Mary Ellen Rickey's note of the pun on "vice" (Utmost Art [Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966], p. 73) seems quite relevant here, since "vice" as sin or evil is left as specifically pertinent to the human sphere.

35. They are related both necessarily--as antecedent and consequence--and productively, as cause and effect. Christ causes the wine of Love; Sin causes the pains of suffering.

36. The Elegies and The Songs and Sonnets, pp. 62-64.

VI. Conclusion

1. Sir David Ross, p. 20, calls attention to the fact that the term logica cannot be traced farther back than the time of Cicero, and that even then it meant dialectic. Aristotle's term for the study of reasoning is "analytics."

2. Lope de Vega: Antología lírica, ed. by Luis Guarner (Madrid: Aguilar, 1964), p. 94.

3. This discussion of comets is based on Heninger, pp. 41-45, and 87-91.

Appendix: Two Notes on the Metaphysics of Analogy

1. Timaeus, The Dialogues of Plato, trans. by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), II, p. 15.

2. The Republic, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse, Great Dialogues of Plato, ed. by Eric H. Warmington and Philip G. Rouse (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 307-308.

3. Ibid., pp. 333-334.

4. Cf. Lyttkens, pp. 66-67.

5. Lyttkens, p. 111.

6. Symposium, trans. by W. H. D. Rouse, op. cit., pp. 97-99.

7. Above, pp. 119-120. For Proclus, see Lyttkens, p. 80.

8. Minor Poems, pp. 437-445.

9. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. II: Mediaeval Philosophy (Garden City: Image Books, 1962), Part I, pp. 289-292, 308ff. For the doctrines of the priority of the soul and vestigial memory, see Plato Laws X. 896-897, and Phaedo 72-77.

10. An image is the correspondence of form between two things. A mirror contains only images because it reflects the forms of the objects presented to it but not the matter of the objects. In rhetoric this idea of the correspondence of form lies behind the various definitions of comparison, the simile, and of course the icon. Cf. the definition of simile as imago in the Ad Herennium (IV. xlix. 62): "Imago est formae cum forma cum quadam similitudine conlatio."

11. Étienne H. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, trans. by Dom Illtyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 145. The relationship of the copy to its model is imitatory, that of the model to its copy is exemplary.

12. Ibid., pp. 211-212, 515.

13. P. O. Kristeller, Il Pensiero Filosofico di Marsilio Ficino (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1953), pp. 88-89. (Emphasis mine.)

14. Virtually all commentators dealing with this problem call attention to St. Thomas' assertion that "Logic considers the mode of predicating, and not the existence of the thing" (Scheu, p. 94; McInerny, p. 63).

15. Copleston, Part II, p. 102. Cf. Aristotle De Anima II. 1. 412a-413a.

16. McInerny, pp. 61-63.

17. Copleston, Part II, pp. 109-113.

18. McInerny, pp. 46-47. This over-population of the World of Ideas seems indeed to have happened: see the discussion of Socrates and the logoi in Plotinus Enneads V. vii. 1 (Plotinus, ed. by A. H. Armstrong [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953], pp. 81-82).

19. Phelan, p. 25.

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