72-14,957

NIGHTINGALE, Donald Victor, 1944-
CORRELATES AND DETERMINANTS OF NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY.

The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1971
Psychology, industrial

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

CORRELATES AND DETERMINANTS OF NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by
Donald Victor Nightingale

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Psychology)
in The University of Michigan
1971

Doctoral Committee:

Professor B. S. Georgopoulos, Co-chairman
Professor A. S. Tannenbaum, Co-chairman
Professor R. Heine
Professor L. Kish
Professor S. E. Seashore

PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was made possible by a large number of persons--to all of whom I would like to extend my sincerest appreciation. The five principal investigators of the larger study provided their data to me. They are: A. S. Tannenbaum, B. Kavcic, M. Rosner, M. Vianello and G. Weiser.

The value of my learning experience in completing the dissertation is due to the five committee members who provided the understanding and support which are necessary in such an endeavor. L. Kish contributed his statistical expertise; R. Heine offered a theoretical perspective different from that of other committee members; B. S. Georgopoulos gave unselfishly of his time throughout all phases of the thesis, and, indeed, without his encouragement, the thesis might not have been undertaken; A. S. Tannenbaum provided the insight and support for which he is so well known; and S. E. Seashore kindly agreed to stand in (on short notice) for an absent committee member at the oral examination.

David Warren served as a consultant on certain computer problems which arose during the analysis. Rebecka Andress typed the proposals, drafts and final copy and handled the details of preparation and submission of the thesis. To Rebecka and David, I offer a special thanks.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS		ii
LIST OF TABLES		v
CHAPTER		
1	INTRODUCTION	1
	Definition of Social Norms	
	Definition of Normative Structure	
	Dimensions of Normative Structure	
	Normative Consensus	
	Normative Complementarity	
	Normative Consistency	
	Properties of Normative Structure	
	Concepts Investigated in this Study	
	Summary	
2	RESEARCH DESIGN	14
	Countries	
	Organizations	
	Individuals	
	Work Groups	
	Questionnaire	
3	HYPOTHESES	26
	Normative Consensus	
	Normative Complementarity	
	Normative Consistency	
4	OPERATIONAL MEASURES	40
	Operational Definitions	
	Normative Consensus	
	Normative Complementarity	
	Normative Consistency	

CHAPTER Page

5 PRELIMINARY ANALYSES 57

Testing Major Dimensions of the Design
Results of Analysis of Variance
Country Effects
Technology Effects
Size Effects
Interactions
Interrelationships between Normative Structure Variables

6 RESULTS 68

Normative Consensus Results
Normative Complementarity Results
Normative Consistency Results

7 EVALUATION AND INTEGRATION OF RESULTS 134

Effects of Research Design
Nature of Normative Structure
Integration of Normative Structure
Summary of Results for each Hypothesis in each Country

8 CONCLUSION 142

Theoretical and Methodological Shortcomings
Implications of Results
Comparative Research
Theories of Organization
Applied Questions and Social Issues
Future Research

APPENDIX

A SELECTED INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 152

Interview
Questionnaire

B EVALUATION OF PARTIAL CORRELATIONS IN NORMATIVE CONSENSUS ANALYSIS 174

C TABLES FOR ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES 179

D TABLES FOR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTORS AND NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES 214

BIBLIOGRAPHY 305

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		Page
1	Number of Employees in Small and Large Plants.....	17
2	Number of Respondents at Different Levels in Small and Large Plants.....	19
3	Number of Work Groups with One or More Subordinates at Different Hierarchical Levels	21
4	Number of Work Groups with Two or More Subordinates at Different Hierarchical Levels.....	22
5	Number of Work Groups of Each Size	24
6	Percent of Significant Correlations between Normative Structure Variables in Each Country	65
7	Average Intercorrelations between Each Normative Consensus Measure and All Others in the Five Countries	69
8	Correlations between Hierarchical Position of Work Group and Normative Consensus	71
9	Correlations between Size of Work-Group and Normative Consensus in Each Country	74
10	Average Correlations between Work-Group Heterogeneity Measures and Normative Consensus in Each Country	75
11	Average Correlations between Plant and Job Seniority and Normative Consensus in Each Country	77
12	Correlations between Index of Mobility Aspirations and Normative Consensus in Each Country	79
13	Correlations between Participativeness of Superior and Normative Consensus in Each Country	80
14	Correlations between Supportiveness of Superior and Normative Consensus in Each Country	82
15	Average Correlations between Attitude toward Superior Indices and Normative Consensus in Each Country	81

TABLE		Page
16	Average Correlations between Bases of Power and Normative Consensus in Each Country	84
17	Average Correlations between Sources of Information and Normative Consensus in Each Country	86
18	Correlations between Mental Health Index and Normative Consensus in Each Country	89
19	Average Intercorrelations of Each Normative Complementarity Measure with all Others in Each Country	91
20	Correlations between Hierarchical Level and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	93
21	Correlations between Size of Work-Group and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	94
22	Average Correlations between Measures of Superior-Subordinate Differences and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	95
23	Correlations between Communication with Superior and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	97
24	Correlations between Communication with Peers and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	99
25	Correlations between Peer-Superior Communication and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	101
26	Average Correlations between Sources of Information and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	102
27	Correlations between Participativeness of Superior and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	104
28	Correlations between Supportiveness of Superior and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	106
29	Average Correlations between Attitude toward Superior Indices and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	107
30	Correlations between Sensitivity to Criticism and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	109
31	Average Correlations between Felt Responsibility and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	110

TABLE		Page
32	Correlations between Mobility Aspiration Index and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	112
33	Correlations between Bases of Advancement and Normative Complementarity in Each Country.....	113
34	Correlations between Personal Influence and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	118
35	Correlations between Discrepancy between Ideal and Actual Personal Influence and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	119
36	Average Correlations between Measures of Mental Health and Normative Complementarity in Each Country	121
37	Average Intercorrelations of Each Normative Consistency Measure with all Others in Each Country	123
38	Correlations between Hierarchical Level and Normative Consistency in Each Country	125
39	Average Correlations of Personal Influence and Normative Consistency in Each Country	126
40	Correlations between Participativeness of Superior and Normative Consistency in Each Country	128
41	Correlations between Supportiveness of Superior and Normative Consistency in Each Country	129
42	Average Correlations between Attitude toward Superior Indices and Normative Consistency in Each Country ..	130
43	Correlations between Mobility Aspiration Index and Normative Consistency in Each Country	132
44	Average Correlations between Bases of Power and Normative Consistency in Each Country	133
45	The Predicted and Actual Pattern of Relationships between Correlates and Normative Structure Variables	137
46	Summary of Results for Each Hypothesis in Each Country	140
B-1	Correlations between Mean and Sample Size and Standard Deviation Measures of Normative Consensus in U.S.A. and Italy	175

TABLE		Page
B-2	Zero Order and Partial Correlations for Selected Questionnaire Items in U.S.A.	177
B-2	_____, Italy	178
C-1	Scores on Normative Consensus Measures: Country X Technology	180
C-2	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consensus: Effects of Country, Technology, and Country X Technology	181
C-3	Scores on Normative Consensus Measures: Country X Size	182
C-4	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consensus: Effects of Country, Size, and Country X Size	183
C-5	Scores for Normative Consensus Measures: Technology X Size	184
C-6	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consensus: Effects of Technology, Size, and Technology X Size	185
C-7	Scores on Normative Complementarity Measures: Country X Technology	186
C-8	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Complementarity: Effects of Country, Technology, and Country X Technology	187
C-9	Scores on Normative Complementarity Measures: Country X Size	188
C-10	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Complementarity: Effects of Country, Size, and Country X Size	189
C-11	Scores on Normative Complementarity Measures: Technology X Size	190
C-12	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Complementarity: Effects of Technology, Size, and Technology X Size	191
C-13	Scores on Normative Consistency Measures: Country X Size	192
C-14	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consistency: Effects of Country, Technology, and Country X Technology	193

TABLE		Page
C-15	Scores on Normative Consistency Measures: Country X Size	194
C-16	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consistency: Effects of Country, Size, and Country X Size	195
C-17	Scores on Normative Consistency Measures: Technology X Size	196
C-18	F-Ratios for Measures of Normative Consistency: Effects of Technology, Size, and Technology X Size	197
C-19	Correlations between Measures of Normative Complementarity and Normative Consensus in Austria	199
C-20	_____, Israel	200
C-21	_____, Italy	201
C-22	_____, U.S.A.	202
C-23	_____, Yugoslavia	203
C-24	Correlations between Measures of Normative Consensus and Normative Consistency in Austria	204
C-25	_____ Israel	205
C-26	_____ Italy	206
C-27	_____ U.S.A.	207
C-28	_____ Yugoslavia	208
C-29	Correlations between Measures of Normative Complementarity and Normative Consistency in Austria	209
C-30	_____ Israel	210
C-31	_____ Italy	211
C-32	_____ U.S.A.	212
C-33	_____ Yugoslavia	213
D-1	Intercorrelations of Normative Consensus Measures in Austria	216
D-2	_____ Israel	217

TABLE		Page
D-3	_____ Italy	218
D-4	_____ U.S.A.	219
D-5	_____ Yugoslavia	220
D-6	Correlations between Work-Group Heterogeneity and Normative Consensus in Austria	221
D-7	_____ Israel	222
D-8	_____ Italy	223
D-9	_____ U.S.A.	224
D-10	_____ Yugoslavia	225
D-11	Correlations between Plant and Job Seniority and Normative Consensus in Each Country	226
D-12	Correlations between Mobility Aspirations and Normative Consensus in Austria	227
D-13	_____ Israel	227
D-14	_____ Italy	228
D-15	_____ U.S.A.	228
D-16	_____ Yugoslavia	229
D-17	Correlations between Attitude Toward Superior Indices and Normative Consensus in Austria	230
D-18	_____ Israel	230
D-19	_____ Italy	231
D-20	_____ U.S.A.	231
D-21	_____ Yugoslavia	232
D-22	Correlations between Bases of Power and Normative Consensus in Austria	233
D-23	_____ Israel	234
D-24	_____ Italy	235
D-25	_____ U.S.A.	236
D-26	_____ Yugoslavia	237

TABLE		Page
D-27	Correlations between Communication with Peers and Normative Consensus in Austria	238
D-28	_____ Israel	239
D-29	_____ Italy	240
D-30	_____ U.S.A.	241
D-31	_____ Yugoslavia	242
D-32	Correlations between Communication with Superior and Normative Consensus in Austria	243
D-33	_____ Israel	244
D-34	_____ Italy	245
D-35	_____ U.S.A.	246
D-36	_____ Yugoslavia	247
D-37	Correlations between Sources of Information and Normative Consensus in Austria	248
D-38	_____ Israel	249
D-39	_____ Italy	250
D-40	_____ U.S.A.	251
D-41	_____ Yugoslavia	252
D-42	Correlations between Mental Health and Normative Consensus in Austria	253
D-43	_____ Israel	254
D-44	_____ Italy	255
D-45	_____ U.S.A.	256
D-46	_____ Yugoslavia	257
D-47	Intercorrelations Among Normative Complementary Measures in Austria	259
D-48	_____ Israel	260
D-49	_____ Italy	261
D-50	_____ U.S.A.	262

TABLE		Page
D-51	_____ Yugoslavia	263
D-52	Correlations between Measures of Superior-Subordinate Similarity and Normative Complementarity in Austria	264
D-53	_____ Israel	265
D-54	_____ Italy	266
D-55	_____ U.S.A.	267
D-56	_____ Yugoslavia	268
D-57	Correlations between Sources of Information and Normative Complementarity in Austria	269
D-58	_____ Israel	270
D-59	_____ Italy	271
D-60	_____ U.S.A.	272
D-61	_____ Yugoslavia	273
D-62	Correlations between Attitude toward Superior Indices and Normative Complementarity in Austria	274
D-63	_____ Israel	274
D-64	_____ Italy	275
D-65	_____ U.S.A.	275
D-66	_____ Yugoslavia	276
D-67	Correlations between Felt Responsibility and Normative Complementarity in Austria	277
D-68	_____ Israel	277
D-69	_____ Italy	278
D-70	_____ U.S.A.	278
D-71	_____ Yugoslavia	279
D-72	Correlations between Bases of Power and Normative Complementarity in Austria	280
D-73	_____ Israel	281

TABLE		Page
D-74	_____ Italy	282
D-75	_____ U.S.A.	283
D-76	_____ Yugoslavia	284
D-77	Correlations between Measures of Mental Health and Normative Complementarity in Austria	285
D-78	_____ Israel	286
D-79	_____ Italy	287
D-80	_____ U.S.A.	288
D-81	_____ Yugoslavia	289
D-82	Intercorrelations of Normative Consistency Measures in Austria	291
D-83	_____ Israel	292
D-84	_____ Italy	293
D-85	_____ U.S.A.	294
D-86	_____ Yugoslavia	295
D-87	Correlations between Personal Influence and Normative Consistency in Each Country	296
D-88	Correlations between Attitude Toward Superior Indices and Normative Consistency in Austria	297
D-89	_____ Israel	297
D-90	_____ Italy	298
D-91	_____ U.S.A.	298
D-92	_____ Yugoslavia	299
D-93	Correlations between Bases of Power and Normative Consistency in Austria	300
D-94	_____ Israel	301
D-95	_____ Italy	302
D-96	_____ U.S.A.	303
D-97	_____ Yugoslavia	304

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although the study of group norms has had a long and venerable history in social psychology, our understanding of the patterning and correlates of norms in organizations remains incomplete. Small group researchers using laboratory experiments have appropriated the study of group norms as being in their domain of interest, and organizational psychologists, despite their frequent use of the term in theory, have not extensively studied the concept.

The arrogation of the concept of social norm by the small group researchers has not been without its consequences. One important consequence is that the concept is rarely anchored in a concrete reality which has more than marginal interest for participants. A second consequence is that, since the concept of social norm is studied in a temporary small group situation, no attempt has been made (in recent years) to provide an overarching theoretical model which describes the interrelationships among norms as they exist in large social systems.

The research reported here examines this patterning of norms in social systems and proposes the use of the concept of normative structure (Georpopoulos, 1957, 1965). The concept of normative structure offers a unique perspective on the patterning of norms in organizations and provides the conceptual framework with which to examine the implications of varying attitudes, patterns of interaction and organizational structures for organizational norms.

Interest in certain normative structure variables (although they were not labeled as such) and in the patterning of social behavior definitional to social organization is not new. The notion that social systems are anchored in the perceptions, values, beliefs and expectations of their members is now considered axiomatic by organizational theorists. The "psychological cement" (to use Katz and Kahn's (1966) metaphor) which binds members to the organization has, despite its frequent use in theory, remained an elusive and relatively ill-defined concept. The importance of a shared set of values or norms in the functioning and survival of an organization was recognized by Parsons (1951)(pp. 198-99):

> That a system of value-orientation held in common by the members of a social system can serve as the main point of reference for analyzing structure and process in the social system itself may be regarded as a major tenet of modern sociological theory. Values in this sense are the commitments of individual persons to pursue and support certain directions or types of action for the collectivity as a system and hence derivatively for their own roles in the collectivity. For sociological purposes, values are deliberately defined at a level of generality higher than that of goals--they are directions of action rather than specific objectives, the latter depending on the particular character of the situation in which the system is placed as well as on its values and its structure as a system.

Definition of Social Norms

Before proceeding to an analysis of the concept of normative structure, it is necessary to examine the concept of social norm. Although few authors agree concerning the precise definition of social norm, a sampling of definitions reveals a number of common themes or ideas. Katz and Kahn (1966) define norms as "the general expectations of a demand character for all role incumbents of a system or subsystem" (pp. 37) and consider norms (along with roles and values) as a major

component of social systems. Newcomb (1950) defines social norms as "a more or less fixed frame of reference" and as "shared frames of reference which result from communication and which make communication possible" (pp. 266-267). Georgopoulos (1957) defines social norms as "the prevailing pattern (distribution) of expectations, attitudes, and behaviors which emerges from the active and continuous orientations of the actors of a given social system toward the same discriminable object, or end, and toward each other." (pp. 19).

This sampling does not, of course, cover the diversity of uses to which the concept of social norm has been put, but it does represent a generally accepted and current definition of the concept, and reveals some commonality among the different definitions.

The most important commonality among the above definitions is the notion of sharedness, commonality, and mutual (common) acceptance. A social norm, by definition, then, represents some minimum of agreement or acceptance among members of the social system. What this basic minimum is, or can be, has not been studied. Several investigators (Jackson, 1966; and Mann, 1970) have employed a cut-off level, e.g., if 50% or 75% of system members agree about a particular rule or expectation, then a social norm is defined as existing regarding that rule or expectation. Although the amount of agreement necessary for a norm to exist may be entirely arbitrary, there is nevertheless the assumption that some minimum level of agreement must exist. (One of the major dimensions of normative structure is normative consensus, a concept which considers the extent of agreement regarding a norm as a variable quantity).

A second commonality in the definitions of social norm is that the concept has meaning only with regard to a given social system. The content or substance of a norm has meaning, importance or salience for the members of a particular social collectivity. The norms of a particular social system may be a collection from many different sources (e.g., the norms of the larger society may be salient for the members of an industrial plant within the society) but they are defined and interpreted in ways that are peculiar to the given social system.

A third commonality is that the referent and content of the norm are defined in the broadest possible manner. A norm may refer to a a behavior, or an object, an end or goal; and it may be either functional or dysfunctional for the system of which it is a part. The referent may be highly abstract or concrete; the referent might be system-wide in its application or acceptance or it may be appropriate for a sub-system only.

Definition of Normative Structure

Normative structure of a social system is defined as the set of norms, their interrelationships and patternings within the social system (after Georgopoulos, 1965). A number of important characteristics of normative structure follow from the concept of social norm presented earlier. Firstly, normative structure consists of several different kinds of norm. This represents an important theoretical advantage for the concept of normative structure. Being content-free, the concept can be applied to any social organization and can, as well, take on several meanings or values within the same social system. One might, for example, define a particular patterning of norms regarding organizationally dysfunctional norms which exists in the informal sub-system

of the organization, and, at the same time, define another pattern of norms regarding organizationally functional norms. The full potentiality of the content-free aspect of normative structure will become clearer after its components are described.

A second aspect of normative structure is that it is, at the same time, a system-level (collectivity-level) concept and a sub-system-level (group-level) concept. The patterning of norms at the system-level may be entirely different from the patterning of the same norms at the sub-system-level. Thus, while the concept of normative structure can provide an integrated measure of the overall patterning of norms within the system, it can also provide a differentiated perspective on the sub-systems within the collectivity.

A third significant aspect of normative structure which follows from the definition of the concept is that it concerns a patterning or ordering of norms. As such, it must have some degree of internal consistency and interdependence. In other words the concept must be characterized by a number of dimensions which describe its nature. This thesis represents an attempt to identify the correlates of several of the dimensions defined by Georgopoulos (1957, 1965).

Dimensions of Normative Structure

Georgopoulos (1965) has defined five major dimensions or aspects of normative structure. They are: (1) normative consistency, (2) normative consensus, (3) normative complementarity, (4) normative congruence, and (5) normative member-activeness. This study focuses on the first three dimensions of normative structure. The fourth dimension--normative congruence--is not investigated here because of the lack of appropriate

measures in the data. Normative congruence is the extent of similarity between the "generalized" and the corresponding "individual" aspects of social norms. The fifth dimension of normative structure--normative member-activeness--is not investigated because the concept differs theoretically from the first four and should be separated conceptually from them. Normative member-activeness is defined as the degree to which group members can influence norms. The first four dimensions of normative structure (as will be made clear later) concern characteristics of social norms per se, and not external dynamics or conditions which create, modify or eliminate the norms. Geogopoulos' model is thus modified slightly--the revised model considering member-activeness not as a dimension of normative structure, but rather as a correlate or determinant of normative structure. Since member-activeness or control exists in all social systems, and since it is an area where highly elaborate norms are likely to evolve, it is also considered appropriate to examine member-activeness as a substantive content-area of social norms.

It should be pointed out here that the number of dimensions of normative structure is virtually unlimited. As research accumulates, and as our understanding of social norms and their interrelationships increases, there will be a corresponding increase in the number of dimensions of normative structure.

The three dimensions of normative structure which will be investigated here are normative consensus, normative complementarity and normative consistency. These three aspects are the central dimensions of normative structure, and their investigation will provide some

insight into the theoretical usefulness of the concept of normative structure. Each of the three dimensions are defined below.

Normative Consensus

Normative consensus is defined as the extent of agreement among social system members regarding social norms.

The study of normative consensus and its importance to our understanding of organizational behavior needs little justification. Interest in the dynamics of uniformities in social settings has accelerated since Allport's (1934) early attempt to measure uniformity with the J-curve of conformity. Since that time, uniformities of perception, value, and attitude have been variously described in terms of balance theory (Cartwright and Harary, 1956; Newcomb, 1953, 1959) and in terms of entropy and information (Tannenbaum and Kahn, 1958, Georgopoulos, 1970).

The concept of normative consensus is roughly equivalent to a number of concepts which are currently popular in the field of organizational psychology. They include Likert's concept of shared understandings, the concepts of integration, unity, cohesiveness and crystallization. The concept of normative consensus represents more than another addition to a long list of conceptual synonyms. It is part of a larger theoretical model (and not merely an isolated concept) and has been demonstrated to have linkages with other organizational concepts (Georpopoulos, 1965).

Although the definition of normative consensus appears simple enough, there are a number of complexities associated with the concept. The first concerns members' awareness of normative consensus. Can normative consensus be said to exist if members agree with one another, but

are not aware of their agreement? In other words, when asked, "To what extent do people in this plant see eye to eye on the operation of this plant?" respondents indicate that there is little agreement, yet a statistical measure of the dispersion of scores in the plant indicates considerable agreement exists. The two measures are equally valid, but tap different aspects of the concept. The former is called "perceived" consensus, and the latter "actual" consensus.

A second complexity associated with the concept concerns the meaning of "agreement" in the definition. Organization members can agree to disagree or can agree while being indifferent to a particular norm. In the first instance there would be agreement among members regarding a norm concerning tolerance for different viewpoints, but there would be no agreement regarding the content of the given norm. In the second case, agreement would simply be a result of a lack of salience of the particular content of the norm.

Normative Complementarity

Normative complementarity, in its broadest meaning, is defined as the extent to which the expectations of interacting groups about norms that involve their relationships are complementary. In this study, normative complementarity refers to the discrepancy in expectations between a superior and his immediate subordinates. The concept of normative complementarity concerns "agreements" as does the concept of normative consensus, but concerns agreements across adjacent levels of the organization hierarchy.

The degree of normative complementarity has important implications for social system integration. Organization norms must be shared by groups at different hierarchical levels if the organization is to

function at all. Directives and communications from upper hierarchical levels require an acceptance of certain norms, values and frames of reference if they are to be understood and obeyed by those at lower hierarchical levels.

It can be considered as axiomatic that there will not be complete normative complementarity across hierarchical levels. The interests, experiences, and values of those at upper hierarchical levels will differ from those at lower hierarchical levels (Michels, 1962). Normative complementarity will thus rarely be perfect. On the other hand, some minimum amount of normative complementarity must be present if the organization is to survive. Even a social system bound together through coercive force, such as a prison, can be characterized as having some degree of normative complementarity between prison officials and inmates.

Normative Consistency

Normative consistency is defined as the extent of similarity between prevailing and corresponding desired norms. The measurement of discrepancy between actual and ideal conditions is as old as the field of social psychology itself. However, the discrepancy between actual and desired norms has not been extensively investigated. There may exist high levels of normative complementarity across hierarchical levels, while there also exist low levels of normative consistency at one of the levels. Normative consistency is unlike normative consensus and normative complementarity in that each individual can be assigned a score, while an individual's score must be related to his superior's or to his peers' for normative complementarity and consensus. Normative consensus and complementarity are also unlike normative consistency in

that they concern "agreements" among peers or with one's superior while normative consistency concerns the individual's satisfaction with organization norms.

Properties of Normative Structure

Having described in some detail the nature of the normative structure variables to be studied here, we turn now to a discussion of the importance of normative structure as an integrative concept in the conceptualization of organizational behavior. As the passage from Parsons in the introduction indicates, the importance of norms as an integrative concept has not gone unrecognized. Others including Katz and Kahn (1966) have made the concept of social norms a major component of their theories. What most theorists have neglected, however, is the patterning and interrelationships among social norms--including the incongruities, and inconsistencies among the norms, and the varying degrees of acceptance of these norms by members in different subsystems of the organization.

A number of interesting questions about normative structure immediately suggest themselves. Can an organization be meaningfully characterized in terms of the levels or quality of normative structure variables? Likert, for example, utilizes a number of dimensions such as leadership, climate and quality of interpersonal relationships to form a profile of an organization. It seems entirely possible, that the dimensions of normative structure could be used in a similar manner to describe the human side of organizations. It is not now known, however, how the dimensions of normative structure relate to each other. Before normative structure has use as an integrative concept, it must

be demonstrated that its various dimensions cohere into a stable and consistent pattern. An organization high on normative consensus, for example, would be expected to score highly on normative complementarity and normative consistency as well. However, in some circumstances, an organization might score highly on one or more dimensions, yet lowly on others--and herein lies the elegance of the concept of normative structure. The interrelationships among the dimensions depends upon the normative content--which can be changed or improved at will without requiring a total revamping of the overall theory.

An important question to answer, then, is: are the interrelationships among the normative structure variables tied to specific content areas, or are they generalized across different areas? In other words, are the concepts unitary or multi-dimensional?

Other questions can be asked which concern the relationship between normative structure and other theoretical concepts. Can the dimensions of normative structure be tied empirically and theoretically to concepts now popular in the literature? Will the nature of normative structure relate to (1) the technology employed by the organization; (2) the cultural and political environment of the organization; and (3) leadership styles and other social-psychological concepts? If the concept of normative structure is to have descriptive and theoretical utility, it must display some sensitivity to the above conditions.

This study is undertaken as a first attempt to answer the above questions. (Others, which are suggested by the following analysis and which should guide future research efforts are presented in Chapter 8.) In the next section are presented those concepts which have been selected for study in this paper.

Concepts Investigated in this Study

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine a number of the correlates and determinants of three dimensions of normative structure. Theoretically, it is possible to examine the correlates of normative structure at three levels of analysis--the individual, group and collectivity levels. This analysis focuses primarily on the group level of analysis--that is, it considers normative structure as being applicable to work-groups within organizations and it examines a number of correlates which are also at the group-level, e.g., levels of communication within the group, leadership styles within the group, size of work group, etc.

The specific correlates examined in this study are presented in Chapter 3. Each of the three normative structure variables is related to a set of correlates. An attempt is made to examine a number of the same correlates for each normative structure variable. In this way, we can determine the extent to which each dimension of normative structure is affected by the same variables.

A related question concerns the degree of integration of the normative structure variables. Is a group high on normative complementarity also high on normative consensus and normative consistency? The correlations between each of the normative structure variables (two at a time) provide a second measure of the extent of integration of the normative structure.

This study also attempts to determine the sensitivity of the normative structure variables to the major dimensions of the research design. The effects of country, technology and size of plant on the normative structure variables are examined, as well as the interactions between each dimension taken two at a time.

Summary

The following analysis is an exploratory study of selected determinants and correlates of three normative structure variables. The variables are normative consensus, normative complementarity and normative consistency. The objectives of the study include (1) an exploration of the descriptive utility of the normative structure variables--i.e., do the scores on the normative structure variables differ with differing environmental, structual and technological conditions?; (2) a determination of the interrelationships among diverse content areas for each of the normative structure variables; (3) an analysis of the interrelationships among the three normative structure variables; and (4) an investigation of the association of several group-level variables with each of the normative structure variables. A synthesis of the different analyses will then be offered.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this chapter, the research design of the larger study is outlined. The design is described in terms of the countries, plants, work-groups and respondents which constitute the units of study. In addition a brief description of the questionnaire is presented.

Countries

The following analysis is based on data from a five-nation study of organizational hierarchy.* The five countries--Austria, Israel, Italy, the United States and Yugoslavia--contain organizations (1) with differing ideologies regarding the exercise of authority, and (2) with differing formal systems of employee participation.

Organizations in Israeli Kibbutzim are the most participative, in the formal sense, of the organizations in the sample. An equalitarian ethic is supported by a number of institutionalized procedures, including the election and periodic replacement of all managerial and supervisory personnel, the remuneration of employees according to need, rather than according to formal organizational role, and the direct participation of all employees--"one man, one vote"--in the formulation of organizational policy.

---

*The study is sponsored by the National Science Foundation and by the Ford Foundation. The principal investigators are A. S. Tannenbaum, B. Kavcic, M. Rosner, M. Vianello and G. Weiser.

The organizations studied in Yugoslavia are also formally participative. Unlike the system of direct participation in Kibbutzim, however, Yugoslav organizations rely upon a system of indirect participation (Lammers, 1967). As outlined by Zupanov and Tannenbaum (1968), the distinguishing characteristic of Yugoslav industrial organizations is the workers' council system of self-management. A workers' council is a body of elected employees whose primary responsibility is the determination of general organizational policy. The council may include as many as 120 members, its size depending on the size of the organization. A managing board, consisting of the general manager and three to eleven elected employees, is formally responsible to the workers' council. A second authority structure, consisting of the general manager followed in order by department heads, supervisors and workers, is parallel to the workers' council and managing board, but is concerned with the implementation of policy--the technical and administrative functions which arise in the day-to-day operation of the enterprise.

The formal systems of authority in the remaining three countries differ significantly from those in Israeli Kibbutzim and in Yugoslavia. Authority is concentrated at upper hierarchical levels and decreases with hierarchical descent. Italian organizations are typically family owned, tradition-bound and relatively paternalistic. Austrian organizations follow the bureaucratic model--as do most American organizations--with relatively narrow span of control, accountability to superior, and the scalar flow or communications, directives and authority. The sampling of countries thus spans much of the spectrum of formal patterns of authority, as they are presently understood, and provides a unique

opportunity to explore factors associated with normative structure in widely differing systems.

Organizations

Within each of the five countries, 10 industrial organizations are examined.* The plants were selected as being representative exemplars of industrial enterprises in their respective countries (except in Israel where industrial plants in Kibbutzim were selected). This "judgment sample" (Kish, 1965) is based on the priori judgment of the research staff in each country. A preliminary analysis by Tannenbaum indicates that organizations in the five countries do indeed differ predictably in the distribution of authority and in levels of participation.

The 10 plants in each country were matched, in so far as possible, with the 10 plants in each of the other countries on dimensions such as major outputs, size and technology. In each country the sample includes two furniture plants (one large, i.e., with more than 150 members, and one small, i.e., with fewer than 150 members), two non-ferrous foundaries, two plastics manufacturing plants, two metal machining plants, and two canning plants. The 10 plants in Israel do not fit the design perfectly, because of the unavailability of certain types of research sites. Some indication of the plant matching is given in Table 1.

---

*Eleven in Austria and in the United States, where an extra large foundry was sampled.

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN SMALL AND LARGE PLANTS

	Austria	Kibbutz	Italy	United States	Yugoslavia
Small Plants					
Plastics	43	42,43,62,76	83	48	57
Foundry	34	46,75	62	80	62
Canning	107	33	88	47	62
Metal works	30	38,41	111	66	127
Furniture	41	59	76	58	110
Average	51	52	84	60	84
Large Plants					
Plastics	242		343	215	167
Foundry	1133,225		1081	1354,404	1496
Canning	405		650	499	164
Metal works	668		529	362	324
Furniture	299		540	590	576
Average	495		629	570	545

Individuals

Within each plant, a sample of thirty-five persons was obtained. The sampling procedure called for sampling organization members from all levels of the organization hierarchy such that (1) the number of uninterrupted hierarchical chains from the top to the bottom of the organization is maximized, and (2) the number of persons drawn from each hierarchical level is equalized as much as possible.

Those persons selected in each plant form a hierarchical, clustered, non-probability sample. The top manager is selected with certainty in each plant, and because of the pyramidal shape characteristic of organizations, the probability of selecting subordinates at successively lower hierarchical levels becomes progressively less. The intent of the sampling design is to allow the comparison of the reactions and adjustments of persons at different hierarchical levels within each plant. Consequently persons in those hierarchical chains of command which extend through the most levels are more likely to be sampled than persons in relatively short chains. Typically, this means that more persons in the production areas of the organization are sampled than in other areas. Although this reflects the greater number of organization members usually found in the production sector of an organization, the sample of respondents within a plant cannot be considered representative of plant employees as a whole. Table 2 indicates the number of respondents at each hierarchical level in the five countries.

It should be mentioned here that the clustered nature of the sample makes the usual statistical interpretation of the data impossible. Significance levels for correlations are typically based upon

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS IN SMALL AND LARGE PLANTS

Level	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia	Total N
			Small Plants[1]			
1 (top)	5	10	5	5	5	30
2	17	59	9	21	13	119
3	44	160	52	32	61	349
4	71	78	80	61	35	325
5	55	99	22	54	61	151
6	-	-	6	-	-	6
Average Level	3.4	3.0	3.7	3.8	3.8	
Total N	142	316	174	173	175	980
			Large Plants[2]			
1 (top)	5		5	6	4	20
2	26		8	41	11	86
3	48		19	53	33	153
4	40		44	53	66	203
5	53		56	39	50	198
6	9		31	13	9	62
7	12		13	5	2	32
Average Level	3.9		4.6	3.8	4.0	
Total N	193[5]		176[3]	210[4]	175	754

[1]Ten small plants are included from Kibbutzim and five are included from each of the other countries.

[2]Due to an error in sampling, respondents were selected exclusively from the production department of the large foundry in Yugoslavia; personnel from administrative, sales, and research departments having been excluded along with the director.

[3]Due to a sampling error, an extra case is included in Italy.

[4]Includes an extra foundry.

[5]Includes an extra foundry.

the assumption of random sampling, and where samples are clustered, the standard error is greater, making a higher correlation necessary for significance at a given level. L. Kish, who has some familiarity with these data, estimates that the design effect (see Kish, 1967, pg. 162) in this study is roughly 1.3. This clustering effect will not alter the significance levels based on the random sampling assumption appreciably. It is worth noting that the clusters have a built-in heterogeneity since they are composed of organization members from all levels in the organization hierarchy. This heterogeneity will tend to lessen the effects of clustering.

Work-groups

A subsample of work-groups was formed from among the original 35 respondents in each plant. A work-group is defined as a superior and his immediate subordinates. The work-groups in this sample vary in size from two (one superior and one subordinate) to 24. The number and size of the work-groups vary from organization to organization, as does the hierarchical position of the work-groups. Table 3 indicates the number of work-groups of one or more subordinates at each hierarchical level and Table 4 indicates the number of work-groups of two or more subordinates at each hierarchical level. The analysis for normative consensus was performed only with groups where two or more subordinates were sampled. This was necessary because of the operational definition of the concept (see Chapter 4). The analyses for normative consistency and normative complementarity were carried out on groups where one or more subordinates were sampled.

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF WORK GROUPS WITH ONE OR MORE SUBORDINATES AT DIFFERENT HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

Levels Above	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia	Total N
			All Plants			
1	10	9	9	11	9	48
2	38	39	17	49	24	167
3	39	20	37	66	42	204
4	17	3	47	32	38	137
5	8	-	21	7	8	44
6	7	-	13	5	2	27
7	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total N	120	71	144	170	123	628
			Small Plants			
1	5	9	4	5	5	28
2	12	39	9	17	13	90
3	12	20	16	27	12	87
4	1	3	14	13	11	42
5	-	-	2	2	-	4
6	-	-	-	5	-	5
Total N	30	71	45	69	41	256
			Large Plants			
1	5		5	6	4	20
2	26		8	32	11	77
3	27		21	39	30	117
4	16		33	19	27	95
5	8		19	5	8	40
6	7		13	-	2	22
7	1		-	-	-	1
Total N	40		99	101	82	372

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF WORK GROUPS WITH TWO OR MORE SUBORDINATES AT DIFFERENT HIERARCHICAL LEVELS

Levels Above	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia	Total N
			All Plants			
1	10	9	3	10	4	36
2	21	31	13	17	17	99
3	20	14	28	19	30	111
4	8	3	23	21	16	71
5	1	-	8	5	1	15
6	2	-	-	-	-	2
Total N	62	57	75	72	68	334
			Small Plants			
1	5	9	2	4	2	22
2	10	31	8	7	10	66
3	11	14	15	11	10	61
4	1	3	12	10	7	33
5	-	-	2	-	-	2
Total N	27	57	39	32	29	184
			Large Plants			
1	5		1	6	2	14
2	11		5	10	7	33
3	9		13	8	20	50
4	7		11	11	9	38
5	1		6	5	1	13
6	2		-	-	-	2
Total N	35		36	40	39	150

An advantage of the sampling design is our ability to examine, within the same plant, the work-groups consisting of the top man and his immediate subordinates as well as work-groups at the rank-and-file level. The sampling maximizes heterogeneity of group and individual characteristics and assures sufficient variability of group characteristics to permit exploration of the causes and correlates of normative structure. Table 5 presents the distribution of work-groups of different size in each of the five countries.

Questionnaire

The data for this study are taken from a multiple choice questionnaire which was self-administered and which required roughly forty-five minutes to complete. A brief five minute interview accompanied the questionnaire administration and served to introduce the study to the respondent and to obtain certain background information on the respondent. Those questions on the interview and questionnaire which were used in this thesis are presented in Appendix A. The order and question numbers are the same as those in the original questionnaire.

The questionnaire was translated into each of the five foreign languages, then translated back to English by a second translator and then re-translated into the foreign language. This procedure assured that the content of the final questionnaire items were comparable across countries.

There are three questionnaire forms--one for the top man in each plant, one for organization members who do not have subordinates, and one for members with both superiors and subordinates. The three forms are identical, except that the form for the top man contains no

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF WORK GROUPS OF EACH SIZE

Number of Subordinates in Work Group	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia	Total N
			All Plants			
1	58	14	69	98	55	294
2	21	13	31	30	28	123
3	14	10	14	14	10	62
4	9	11	15	7	8	50
5	4	3	3	7	9	26
6	3	5	5	6	4	23
7-23	11	15	7	8	9	50
Total N	120	71	144	170	123	628
			Small Plants			
1	3	14	6	37	12	72
2	6	13	11	6	7	43
3	8	10	10	7	4	39
4	4	11	10	5	4	34
5	2	3	-	5	4	14
6	2	5	4	4	2	17
7-23	5	15	4	5	8	37
Total N	30	71	45	69	41	256
			Large Plants			
1	55		63	61	43	222
2	15		20	24	21	80
3	6		4	7	6	23
4	5		5	2	4	16
5	2		3	2	5	12
6	1		1	2	2	6
7-13	6		3	3	1	13
Total N	90		99	101	82	372

questions regarding superiors, the form for respondents without subordinates contains no questions about subordinates and the form for the others contains questions about both superiors and subordinates.

CHAPTER 3

HYPOTHESES

Having outlined the theoretical justification for this study and having described the research design, we turn now to the presentation of hypotheses concerning the predictors and correlates of normative structure. The hypotheses for normative consensus will be presented first, followed by those for normative complementarity and normative consistency.

Normative Consensus

Hypothesis I The degree of normative consensus increases with hierarchical ascent. Factors which lead to high levels of consensus in upper level work-groups include the more stringent selection and subsequent socialization of members in upper level work-groups, (Etzioni, 1964) and the high levels of communication among and activity of upper-level group members. While there is some theoretical and empirical justification for the above hypothesis (viz. Homans, 1950; Merei, 1949; Tannenbaum and Bachman, 1966), others including Dittes and Kelly (1956), Hollander (1958) and Blau (1960) suggest the opposite.

Hypothesis II The greater the size of the work-group, the less the normative consensus. Opportunities for interaction, communication and socialization are less in large groups, with a corresponding decrease in normative consensus. In small face-to-face work-groups, each member interacts more closely with each of the other

members in the group and consequently has more occasions to influence, and be influenced by other group members.

Hypothesis III The more heterogeneous the backgrounds of work-group members, the less the normative consensus in the work-group.

It is now a commonly accepted proposition that internal organizational processes are influenced by non-organizational conditions. One such condition is the values and beliefs which individuals acquire outside the organization and which subsequently influence behavior within the organization. As Becker and Geer (1960) state it, "people take culture with them." Among important external conditions are the backgrounds of each organization member. Characteristics such as age, sex, seniority, educational level, income, prior work experience and union membership are likely to have implications for organizational functioning. Thompson (1960) considers heterogeneity of personal backgrounds among organization members as one of the three major sources of organizational conflict and adaptability (the other two being administrative allocations of scarce resources and the relationship between an organization and its environment).

Empirical studies which have considered human heterogeneity include Dalton (1959), Thompson (1960), Dutton and Walton (1966) and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). Dalton and Thompson found that personal dissimilarities such as age, values, education and social patterns among members of interacting units decreased the probability of inter-unit collaboration. Dutton and Walton found that conflict among departmental representatives increased as the difference in rank orderings on various status dimensions (such as age, education, ethnicity, esteem, length of service and income) increased. Lawrence and Lorsch discovered that organizations with high internal differentiation have a higher

potential for conflict than organizations with low internal differentiation. Dimensions of differentiation included personal orientations toward the environment and interpersonal relations.

Hypothesis IV The longer the experience of organization members with a group, the higher will be the levels of normative consensus. Levenson (1961), Carlson (1961) and Corwin (1969) have found that the influx of new group members can disrupt group functioning and can cause conflict and turnover. This effect may be mediated by lowered levels of consensus.

Hypothesis V The greater the advancement aspirations of individual work-group members, the lower the level of normative consensus. Strauss (1962) found that the blocking of status aspirations in purchasing agents led to inter-unit conflict. Dalton (1959) found the same result in his study of staff-line conflicts. High advancement aspirations (and expectations) of group members is expected to increase the competitiveness among group members and thereby reduce the amount of normative consensus.

Hypothesis VI The more participative the superior, the greater the degree of normative consensus in his work-group.

Likert (1961) offers evidence which suggests that the joint determination and enforcement of organizational policies leads to a clear understanding and wide acceptance of organizational norms and practices. A participative system will not necessarily be conflict-free, but it will be free of conflicts centering on value and ideological issues. Warren (1969) and Corwin (1969) present evidence, however, which suggests that

Likert's analysis may not be entirely correct. In a study of elementary schools, Warren found that participation by teachers in the decision-making process was associated with high levels of conflict among teachers. Corwin found that nine of his ten indices of conflict were positively correlated with participation. It may well be that participation provides more occasions for conflict as well as more occasions for cooperation. Nevertheless the association between participation and normative consensus remains unexplored.

Hypothesis VII The more supportive the superior, the greater is the degree of normative consensus in his work group. Supportive supervision is a critical element in Likert's theory and leads to high levels of member commitment and integration. However, the association between supportiveness and the statistical measure of normative consensus remains unexplored.

Hypothesis VIII The more favorable the attitude of work-group members toward their superior, the higher will be the levels of normative consensus. This hypothesis follows from the importance which Likert places upon leadership style in determining levels of work-group cohesiveness and loyalty.

Hypothesis IX Normative consensus is positively related to the extent of reliance upon expert, referent and "law of the situation" bases of power, while the extent of reliance upon reward, coercive and legitimate bases of power is not related to normative consensus. French and Raven (1960) have described five bases of power which an agent O (a superior in this case) can exert over a person P

(or subordinate): (1) Reward power, based on P's perception of O's ability to reward him; (2) coercive power, based on P's perception that O can punish him; (3) legitimate power, based on P's perception that O has a legitimate or officially sanctioned right to command obedience; (4) referent power, based on P's identification with O; and (5) expert power, based on P's perception that O has special knowledge or expertness. A sixth base of power was added to this study. It is called "law of the situation" (after Mary Parker Follett) power and is based on P's perception that he must obey O if the organization is to function properly.

A superior who is obeyed by his subordinates because of his acknowledged expertise, because of the respect and liking of subordinates for him or because of subordinates' commitment to commonly shared organizational goals is likely to encourage the open communication and favorable attitudes which lead to high levels of normative consensus.

Hypothesis X The greater the amount of communication among work-group members about work-relevant issues, the higher is the degree of normative consensus. Although the above hypothesis seems obvious enough, some evidence exists which suggests the opposite. Walton, Dutton and Cafferty (1969) found higher levels of conflict between departments which had more knowledge of each other's activities than between those with less knowledge (more knowledge presumably arising from more communication). Schelling (1961) suggests that ignorance (and derivatively, low levels of communication) may reduce conflict by forcing agreement on obvious solutions and by preventing real disagreements from becoming obvious or salient.

Communication problems may be related to differences in background of organization members. Strauss (1964) found that differences in the training of engineers and purchasing agents and corresponding semantic difficulties impeded cooperative relations.

Work-relevant communication is predicted to correlate more highly with the normative consensus measures than does non-work-relevant communication for two reasons. Firstly, the substantive content of the norms concerns work-related issues. Secondly, some empirical evidence exists for this assertion. Corwin (1969) found a strong positive correlation between amount of informal interaction and his ten indices of conflict. His finding seems consistent with Gamson's (1966) suggestion that informal channels of communication can increase conflict among peers in the same manner as formal channels.

Hypothesis XI Communication with superiors is unrelated to normative consensus. Interaction among peers, and not superiors, is predicted to lead to normative consensus.

Hypothesis XII Work-group normative consensus varies with the source of communication. Communication with coworkers is expected to correlate most highly with normative consensus, and communication with the union, superiors and persons outside the plant is not expected to correlate with normative consensus.

Hypothesis XIII The higher the average mental health of work-group members, the higher the normative consensus. The dimensions of mental health which are relevant here include powerlessness, alienation, isolation and normlessness. Studies by French and Kahn

(1962) have linked the mental health of group members to certain aspects of group dynamics. When group members are valued, needed and rewarded by the group and in turn value their memberships in the group, and when the quality of interpersonal relations in the group is high, members tend to score high on mental health indices. Normative consensus would also be a product of valued group membership and high quality interpersonal relations.

Normative Complementarity

Hypothesis I Normative complementarity increases with hierarchical ascent. Subordinates at upper hierarchical levels are more likely to accept existing organizational policy and existing institutional arrangements as they are profferred by their superiors than are subordinates at lower hierarchical levels.

Hypothesis II The greater the span of control of the superior, the less will be the normative complementarity between himself and his immediate subordinates. The greater the size of the work-group, the fewer opportunities a superior has to interact with and influence his subordinates.

Hypothesis III The more similar a superior is to his subordinates on certain dimensions, such as (1) income, (2) educational level, (3) age, and (4) seniority, the greater will be the normative complementarity. Normative complementarity is expected to vary with a number of factors, some systemic, such as patterns of leadership, climate and control within the organization and some linked more losely to the work-group. The individual characteristics of work-group members

are also expected to correlate with normative complementarity. This hypothesis suggests a number of individualized demographic characteristics which are expected to be related to normative complementarity.

Hypothesis IV The more the communication between a superior and his immediate subordinates, the greater is the normative complementarity. The more the communication focuses on work-relevant as opposed to non-work-relevant communication, the greater is the normative complementarity.

Hypothesis V Normative complementarity is unaffected by the amount of communication among work-group peers. Normative complementarity (as used in this thesis) is a concept which focuses on the vertical dimension of an organization and is not expected to differ predictably with factors or dynamics which concern the horizontal dimension of the organization.

Hypothesis VI Normative complementarity increases when subordinates' main sources of communication are management and superiors and decreases when subordinates' main sources of information are coworkers, the union and persons outside the plant.

Hypothesis VII The more participative the superior, as perceived by work-group members, the greater is the normative complementarity. The rationale comes from Likert's theory. Participation and the process of shaping organization policy lead to a greater sharedness of beliefs and values and to mutual understanding among organization members at different hierarchical levels.

Hypothesis VIII The more supportive the superior, the greater the normative complementarity. In Likert's theory, the principle of supportive relations is a critical tenet, and is believed to link persons at different hierarchical levels together into a cohesive whole. A supportive leader is one who develops a climate of mutual confidence and trust with his subordinates and who is never punitive. Likert has demonstrated that coordination of organizational activities, productivity, and peer-group loyalty are linked to the superior's supportive behavior.

Hypothesis IX The more favorable the attitude of subordinates toward their superior, the greater will be the normative complementarity. Favorable attitudes toward a superior follow from supportive supervision in Likert's theory and consequently are also expected to be associated with high levels of normative complementarity.

Hypothesis X Normative complementarity increases with increasing sensitivity of subordinates to criticism from their superior and normative complementarity is unrelated to subordinates' sensitivity to peer criticism. Concern for criticism from a superior indicates an upward orientation and sensitivity to directives from above. This sensitivity will be reflected in a greater willingness to accept the norms and values of superiors. In those work-groups where subordinates indicate a strong concern for peer criticism, there is a lateral sensitivity which will be manifested in high levels of normative consensus rather than in high levels of normative complementarity.

Hypothesis XI The greater the responsibility that subordinates feel for their work-group, their department and the plant, the greater will be the normative complementarity. Subordinates who express high levels of responsibility are organization members who have been socialized to accept the major goals of the organization and are committed to sharing in the task of achieving these goals.

Hypothesis XII The greater are the mobility aspirations of subordinates, the greater will be the normative complementarity between superiors and subordinates. Subordinates who aspire to higher level positions are more likely, because of an upward orientation and a sensitivity to the norms and values profferred by those at upper hierarchical levels, to be in agreement with their superior. Acceptance of the values and ideals of a superior is frequently a condition for promotion and those who aim for promotions are sensitive to this precondition. (Note that this relationship is predicted to differ from that between mobility aspirations and normative consensus.)

Hypothesis XIII When work-group members endorse organizationally functional criteria for advancement, normative complementarity will be higher than when work-group members endorse organizationally dysfunctional criteria for advancement. Endorsement of functional criteria for promotion indicates a trust in and acceptance of the fairness and legitimacy of a basic organizational norm. Subordinates who endorse functional criteria are consequently more likely to be in agreement with superiors, who, having been promoted, or at least having some responsibility in the organization, are likely to endorse functional criteria.

Hypothesis XIV Normative complementarity increases as the extent to which a superior relies upon expert, referent and "law of the situation" bases of power increases. Normative complementarity decreases as the extent to which a superior relies upon reward, coercive and legitimate bases of power increases. The latter three bases of power differ from the first three in that compliance or conformity elicited from subordinates will be limited to matters explicitly backed by the superior's power. However, when a superior relies upon referent, expert and "law of the situation" bases of power, the compliance of subordinates will be deeper, and they will find the exercise of power less alienating. Since normative complementarity, as the name suggests, concerns norms or rules, it is expected to increase with those bases of power which encourage the internalization of organization norms.

Hypothesis XV The more control work-group members perceive themselves as having in the plant, the greater will be the normative complementarity between a superior and his immediate subordinates.

Hypothesis XVI The smaller the average discrepancy between the ideal and actual personal influence exercised by group members, the greater will be the normative complementarity between a superior and his immediate subordinates.

This hypothesis predicts an association between normative complementarity and the personal power measure of normative consistency. The relationship between all the measures of normative consistency and normative complementarity is described more fully in Chapter 7.

Hypothesis XVII The better the mental health of work-group members, the greater will be the normative complementarity between a superior and his subordinates. Measures of mental health which are predicted to be associated with normative complementarity are alienation, isolation, powerlessness, meaninglessness, self-alienation and normlessness.

Normative Consistency

Hypothesis I Normative consistency increases with hierarchical ascent. The discrepancy between ideal and prevailing conditions will be less at upper hierarchical levels where a disproportionate share of organizational rewards (such as status, income, responsibility) accrue, and where organization members are more acceptant of existing values, norms and procedures.

Hypothesis II The greater the personal influence of work-group members, the greater will be the normative consistency among group members. The more group members feel that they can influence organizational events, the more likely are they to be acceptant of existing norms and procedures. Those who feel they exercise little control within the organization are likely to be alienated and dissatisfied with important organizational norms and policies.

Hypothesis III The more participative the superior, the greater will be the normative consistency among his subordinates. Likert makes a strong case for the critical role of leadership in determining the reactions, feelings, and productivity of subordinates. Satisfaction of subordinates with important organizational norms and

procedures such as promotion bases, and rewards and sanctions is likely to be associated with participative superivision.

Hypothesis IV The more supportive the superior, the greater will be the normative consistency among his subordinates.

Hypothesis V The more favorable the attitudes of subordinates toward their superior, the greater will be the normative consistency.

Hypothesis VI The higher the mobility aspirations of group members the greater is the normative consistency. Individuals who aspire to move up the hierarchy are more acceptant of their station in the organization and are more acceptant of the organization in general.

Hypothesis VII The more a superior relies upon expert, referent, and "law of the situation" bases of power, the higher will be the levels of normative consistency among his subordinates. Normative consistency is not related to reward, coercive or legitimate bases of power. Subordinates are more likely to accept (and internalize) important organizational norms when their superior draws upon bases of power which are consistent with System 4 (Likert, 1961).

An examination of the individual hypotheses concerning the three normative structure variables reveals that a similar pattern of relationships is predicted between the variables and the correlates in all but two cases (mobility aspirations and communication for normative consensus and normative complementarity). The resulting pattern of relationships

will indicate the extent to which the three normative structure variables form an integrated unit. This question is dealt with in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 4

OPERATIONAL MEASURES

In this chapter are presented the operational definitions of the normative structure variables and the operational predictions for the hypotheses just outlined.

Operational Definitions

Normative consensus may be measured in two ways. The first, called "perceived" consensus, refers to the extent to which organization members feel a community of interests with members at different hierarchical levels. The second, called "actual" consensus refers to the extent of agreement among work-group members regarding organization norms and salient aspects of work-group functioning. Actual consensus is measured by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to selected questions. No questions in this study are appropriate for measuring perceived consensus, and consequently this thesis will focus on actual consensus only.

Actual consensus is measured by the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the questions below:

Q26. (d) How much influence do (you personally) actually have on what happens in this plant?

Q27. (d) In your opinion, how much influence should (you personally) have on what happens in this plant?

Q36. Do workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?

Q24. Do you think the responsible people have a real interest in the welfare of those who work here?

Q32. What are the attitudes of the company members toward plant management?

Q37. Should workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?

Q20. How adequate are the technical and professional skills of your immediate superior?

Q25. Do the responsible people in this plant improve working conditions only when forced to?

Q30. Suppose your immediate superior told you that you did some job badly. How much would it bother you?

Q31. Suppose some of your co-workers told you that you did some job badly. How much would it bother you?

The above 10 questions tap a variety of dimensions and cover part of the spectrum of organization and work-group norms. Question 26(d) is based on a personal and idiosyncratic perception or reaction of each work-group member. Questions 24 and 32, on the other hand, deal with a more generalized and diffuse reaction on the part of the respondent. Question 20 is similar to one used by Georgopoulos (1965) and deals with the technical aspect of organizational functioning. Questions 30 and 31 concern individualized reactions, but are related to the work-group as a unit. Questions 27(d) and 37 concern desired conditions, and questions 36 and 25 deal with attitudes and perceptions of groups at the bottom and top of the organizational hierarchy respectively.

Preliminary analyses indicated that the standard deviation measures of normative consensus are related to sample size and the mean

response of the work-group (see Appendix B). Analyses controlling for (1) sample size, (2) mean, and (3) both sample size and mean, indicate that the correlations remain essentially unchanged from the zero-order correlations. Consequently, the hypotheses concerning normative consensus are tested using zero-order correlations.

Normative complementarity is operationalized as the difference between the superior's score and the corresponding average score of his subordinates on the pairs of questions below:

Q63.	(for superiors)	In your kind of job, is it usually better if your subordinates let you worry about introducing better or faster ways of doing the work?
Q6.	(for subordinates)	In your kind of job, is it usually better to let your superior worry about introducing better or faster ways of doing the work?
Q62.	(for superiors)	Do you make your immediate subordinates free to bring their complaints to you?
Q44.	(for subordinates)	Does your immediate superior make people under him feel free to take their complaints to him?
Q64.	(for superiors)	When your immediate subordinates do what you request them to do on the job, why do they do it? a. They respect my competence and judgment b. I can give special help and benefits c. I'm a nice guy d. I can penalize or otherwise disadvantage them e. It is their duty f. It is necessary if the organization is to function properly

Q47. (for subordinates) When you do what your immediate superior requests you to do on the job, why do you do it?
a. I respect his competence and judgment
b. He can give special help and benefits
c. He's a nice guy
d. He can penalize or otherwise disadvantage me
e. It is my duty
f. It is necessary if the organization is to function properly

Q24. (for superiors and subordinates) Do you think the responsible people here have a real interest in the welfare of those who work here?

Q33. (for superiors and subordinates) What do workers communicate to their superiors?

Q35. (for superiors and subordinates) Should workers participate in making important decisions related to their work?

Q37. (for superiors and subordinates) Should workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?

Q39. (for superiors and subordinates) When decisions are being made, are the people affected asked for their opinions and suggestions?

Normative consistency is measured by first taking the absolute value of the difference between desired and corresponding actual scores on a given question for each work-group member and then averaging for all persons in the group. The absolute value of the difference between ideal and actual norms does not make a distinction between too much and too little of a particular norm--i.e., the measure is not directional. The measure is a pure discrepancy measure and fits the theoretical meaning of normative consistency better than does the directional difference measure.

This measure differs from Georgopoulos' (1965). Georgopoulos used a five-by-five scattergram formed by the 5 response alternatives to each of the actual and desired questions and used the correlation between actual and desired responses as the measure of normative consistency. The small size of many of the work groups in this sample (see Table 2) make this measure less desirable than the mean discrepancy score.

Questions measuring normative consistency are given below:

Q26. How much influence do the following groups or persons actually have on what happens in this plant?

a. Plant manager and his executive board
b. All other managerial or supervisory personnel
c. The workers as a group
d. You, personally.

Q27. In your opinion, how much influence <u>should</u> the following groups or persons have on what happens in this plant?

a. Plant manager and his executive board
b. All other managerial or supervisory personnel
c. The workers as a group
d. You, personally.

Another measure of normative consistency, called the "authority index" is measured by the average discrepancy between the two actual questions and the two ideal questions below:

Q1g. In your work, to what extent can you have authority over other people?

Q26d. How much influence do (you personally) actually have on what happens in this plant?

Q2g. In your work, to what extent <u>would you like to</u> have authority over other people?

Q27d. In your opinion, how much influence <u>should</u> (you personally) have on what happens in this plant?

An index of normative consistency called the "opportunity index" is constructed from the actual and ideal questions below:

Q1. In your work, to what extent can you:

a. Learn new things?
b. Use your own ideas?
c. Do interesting work?
d. Use your skills, knowledge and abilities?
e. Talk with other people during work time?
f. Decide your own pace of work?
g. Have authority over other people?

Q2. In your work, to what extent would you like to:

a. Learn new things?
b. Use your own ideas?
c. Do interesting work?
d. Use your skills, knowledge and abilities?
e. Talk with other people during work time?
f. Decide your own pace of work?
g. Have authority over other people?

The index consists of the average discrepancy of the seven aspects of job opportunities.

A third index of normative consistency is labelled "total control index" and is measured by the mean discrepancy between questions 27a and 26a, 27b and 26b, 27c and 26c, and 27d and 26d.

A fourth index of normative consistency, called the "slope index" is measured by the mean discrepancy of question [27a - 27c] - [26a - 26c].

A fifth index of normative consistency is labelled the "decision-making" index and is measured by the average discrepancy of the three pairs of questions below:

Q34. Do workers participate in making important decisions related to their work?

Q35. Should workers participate in making important decisions related to their work?

Q36. Do workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?

Q37. Should workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?

Q39. When decisions are being made, are the people affected asked for their opinions and suggestions?

Q40. In your opinion, when decisions are being made should the people affected be asked for their opinions and suggestions?

Normative Consensus

Prediction I. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is positively correlated with the number of hierarchical levels above the work group, and negatively correlated with the number of hierarchical levels below the work group.

Prediction II. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is positively correlated with the size of the work-group.

Prediction III. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is positively correlated with the standard deviation of the scores of work-group members on the following dimensions: (1) age, (2) sex, (3) plant seniority, (4) job seniority, (5) educational level, (6) income, and (7) union membership.

Prediction IV(a). The greater the average job seniority of work-group members, the less is the standard deviation of responses of group members to the normative consensus questions.

Prediction IV(b). The same relationship holds for plant seniority, but the correlation is expected to be less.

Prediction V. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions correlates positively with the average mobility aspirations (an index based on the willingness of respondents to tolerate certain difficulties, entailed in higher level jobs--see question 48) of group members.

Prediction VI. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively correlated with the participativeness score of the superior. A superior's participativeness score is measured by the average of his subordinates' responses to questions 41 and 42.

Prediction VII. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively correlated with the supportiveness score of the superior. A superior's supportiveness score is obtained from an index based on the average responses of his subordinates to questions 43 and 46.

Prediction VIII. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions correlates positively with index 1 and index 3, and negatively with index 2 and 4. Index 1 is constructed by taking the mean of work group members' responses to questions 18, 21 and 22. Index 2 is similarly constructed from questions 19, 26, and 24; index 3 from questions 18, 21, 22 and 45; and index 4 from questions 19, 20, 24, and 46.

Prediction IX. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively correlated with the average extent to which group members perceive their superior as relying on (1) expert, (2) referent and (3) "law of the situation" bases of power and correlates positively with the average extent to which the superior relies upon (1) reward, (2) coercive and (3) legitimate bases of power.

Prediction X(a). The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively related to the average level of communication with peers about work-

relevant issues. The correlations are predicted to be positive between communication with peers about work-relevant issues and normative consensus. Communication with peers about work-relevant issues is measured by question 60b.

Prediction X(b). The measures of normative consensus are uncorrelated with communication among peers about non-work-relevant issues. Non-work-relevant communication is measured by question 61b.

Prediction X(c). The correlations between the standard deviation measures of normative consensus and a variable which measures the extent to which work-relevant communication among peers exceeds non-work-relevant communication are predicted to be negative.

Prediction XI. The same tests of hypothesis XI are carried out as for hypothesis X. The measures of normative consensus are correlated with (1) an index of communication with superiors, obtained by averaging responses to questions 60a and 61a; (2) with work-relevant communication with the superior (question 60a); (3) with non-work-relevant communication with the superior (question 61a); and (4) with the extent to which work-relevant communication with the superior exceeds non-work-relevant communication (question 60a - question 61a).

Prediction XII. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively correlated with the proportion of work-group members who indicate that co-workers are one of the two most important sources of information. The greater the proportion of group members who indicate that the important sources of information are (1) the union, (2) superiors and (3) persons outside the plant, the greater will be the standard deviation of group members' responses.

Prediction XIII. The standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to the normative consensus questions is negatively correlated with (1) an overall mental health index of group members and (2) the alienation, isolation and normlessness dimensions of mental health. The measures of mental health are taken from questions 49 and 52. Alienation is measured by taking the mean of questions 52a to 52j; isolation by the mean of questions 52a and 52b; powerlessness by questions 52c and 52d; meaninglessness by 52e and 52f; self-alienation by 52g and 52h; and normlessness by 52i and 52j. An index called "mental health" is constructed by taking the mean of questions 49a, 49b, 49d, 49f, 49g, 49h, 49j and 49k.

Normative Complementarity

Prediction I. The size of the discrepancy between a superior's score and the average scores of his immediate subordinates on the normative complementarity measures correlates positively with the number of levels above the work group in the hierarchical chain of command.

Prediction II(a). Span of control of a superior correlates positively with the size of the discrepancy between the superior and his subordinates on the normative complementarity measures.

Prediction II(b). Since the effect of group size on normative complementarity is believed to be mediated by the amount of communication between superiors and subordinates, it is further predicted that span of control of a superior correlates negatively with the amount of vertical communication.

Prediction III. The smaller the differential between the score of a superior and the average scores of his immediate subordinates, on the dimensions of (1) income, (2) educational level, (3) age, (4) sex, (5) plant seniority, and (6) job seniority, the smaller will be the discrepancy between the score of a superior and the average scores of his subordinates on the normative complementarity measures.

Prediction IV(a). The more subordinates indicate that they communicate with their superior (about work-relevant and non-work-relevant matters) the less will be the discrepancy between their average score and the score of their immediate superior on the normative complementarity measures.

Prediction IV(b). The more subordinates indicate that they communicate with their superior about work-relevant as opposed to non-work-relevant matters the less will be the discrepancy between the average scores of the subordinates and the superior on the normative complementarity measures. The extent to which work-relevant communication exceeds non-work-relevant is measured by taking the average difference of questions 60c and 61c.

Prediction V. The discrepancy between superior and subordinate scores is uncorrelated with the average communication scores of subordinates with each other (about work-relevant and non-work-relevant matters). The same correlations are calculated for communication with peers as were calculated for communication with superior.

Prediction VI. The discrepancy between a superior's score and his subordinates' average score on the normative complementarity questions correlates (1) negatively with the percentage of subordinates

who indicate that management or their superior is a major source of information and (2) positively with the percentage of subordinates who indicate that coworkers, the union, and persons outside the plant are the major sources of information.

Prediction VII. The discrepancy between a superior's and his subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions decreases as the participativeness score of the superior increases. A superior's participativeness score is obtained from his immediate subordinates and represents the extent to which the superior asks for his subordinates' opinions when problems arise (question 41) and the extent to which the superior is inclined to take account of his subordinates' opinions and suggestions (question 42).

Prediction VIII. The discrepancy between a superior's and his immediate subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions decreases as the supportiveness score of the superior increases. A superior's supportiveness score represents the extent to which his subordinates perceive the superior as being friendly and easily approached (question 43) and the extent to which they have trust in their superior (question 46).

Prediction IX. The discrepancy between a superior's and his immediate subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions decreases as the scores of four indices of attitude toward superior become more favorable. The indices concern the technical and professional skills of the superior, liking of the superior as a person, the ability of the superior to organize his work, the ability

of the superior to reconcile different group interests, an overall evaluation of the superior, trust in the superior and desire to have the superior changed. Index 1 is based on questions 18, 21 and 22 and index 3 is based on questions 18, 21, 22 and 45. Index 2 is based on questions 19, 20 and 24 and index 4 is based on questions 19, 20, 24 and 46.

Prediction X(a). The discrepancy between a superior's and his subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions will decrease with increases in the average score of subordinates to the question--"Suppose your immediate superior told you that you did some job badly. How much would it bother you?"

Prediction X(b). The discrepancy between a superior's and his subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions is unrelated to the average score of subordinates on the question--"Suppose some of your coworkers told you that you did some job badly. How much would this bother you?"

Prediction XI. The discrepancy between a superior's and his subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions decreases with increases in the average score of subordinates on responsibility for (1) the work-group, (2) the department and (3) the plant. Question 11 measures the extent of responsibility felt for the work-group, the department and the plant.

Prediction XII. The discrepancy between a superior's score and the average score of his subordinates on normative complementarity questions is positively correlated with the average mobility aspirations of

subordinates. An index of mobility aspirations is constructed from question 48 which measures the extent to which the respondent will tolerate certain problems such as greater responsibility, "problem" employees and new training which would accompany promotion.

Prediction XIII(a). The discrepancy between a superior's score and the average score of his subordinates on the normative complementarity questions correlates negatively with the degree to which work-group members endorse organizationally functional norms for advancement.

Prediction XIII(b). The discrepancy between a superior's score and the average score of his subordinates on the normative complementarity questions correlates positively with the degree to which work-group members endorse organizationally dysfunctional norms for advancement.

Three indices of criteria for advancement were constructed. Index 1 consists of the mean responses to questions 16a, 16b, 16e, and 16j--which deal with quality and quantity of work done, creativity and ability to work with people. Index 2 consists of the mean response to questions 16c, 16d, 16h, 16i and 16k--which deal with the superior's opinion, dependability, professional knowledge, initiative and loyalty. A third index is constructed from the mean response to questions 16g, 16l, and 16n--which deal with having friends in higher management, political and religious considerations and elbowing to get ahead.

Prediction XIV. The size of the discrepancy between a superior's and his subordinates' scores on normative complementarity questions will be negatively correlated with each of referent, expert and "law of the situation" bases of power, and will be positively correlated with reward, coercive and legitimate bases of power. Each superior is

assigned a score on the six bases of power. The scores for a given superior may all be high or low, and are obtained by averaging the responses of his immediate subordinates to the question: "When you do what your immediate superior requests you to do on the job, why do you do it?

Prediction XV. The average score of work-group members on the question--"How much influence do (you personally) actually have on what happens in this plant?" and on an index consisting of the above question and the question--"In your work, to what extent can you have authority over other people?"--will be negatively correlated with the size of the discrepancy between a superior's and his immediate subordinates' scores on the normative complementarity questions.

Prediction XVI. The average discrepancy score between the amount of influence work-group members perceive themselves as exercising and the amount of influence they would ideally like to exercise is positively correlated with the size of the discrepancy between a superior and his subordinates on the normative complementarity questions.

Prediction XVII. The discrepancy between a superior's score and the average scores of his immediate subordinates on the normative complementarity questions correlates negatively with (1) an index of mental health of work-group members and (2) the alienation, isolation, powerlessness, meaninglessness, self-alienation and normlessness dimensions of mental health. The mental health index is constructed from questions 49a, 49b, 49d, 49f, 49g, 49h, 49j and 49k. The mental health sub-dimensions were constructed as follows: alienation from the mean

of questions 52a - 52j; isolation from the mean of questions 52a and 52b; powerlessness from the mean of questions 52c and 52d; meaninglessness from the mean of questions 52e and 52f; self-alienation from the mean of questions 52g and 52h; and normlessness from the mean of questions 52i and 52j.

Normative Consistency

Prediction I. The average discrepancy across work-group members between ideal and actual conditions will correlate negatively with the number of levels in the hierarchy above the work-group.

Prediction II. The average discrepancy across work-group members between ideal and actual conditions correlates negatively with the average amount of personal influence felt to be exercised by work-group members.

Prediction III. The participative score of a superior will correlate negatively with the average discrepancy scores of subordinates on ideal and actual conditions. Participativeness of superior is measured by an index based on the mean responses to questions 41 and 42.

Prediction IV. The supportiveness score of a superior will correlate negatively with the average discrepancy scores of subordinates on ideal and actual conditions. Supportiveness of superior is measured by an index based on the mean responses to questions 43 and 46.

Prediction V. The size of the discrepancy scores of ideal and actual conditions for work-group members will correlate negatively with the favorability of subordinates' attitudes toward their superior.

Attitude toward superior is measured with 4 indices based on questions 18-23, 45 and 46.

Prediction VI. The size of the discrepancy scores of ideal and actual conditions for work-group members will correlate negatively with the average mobility aspiration scores of the group members.

Prediction VII. The discrepancy between subordinates' ideal and actual scores on the normative consistency questions correlates negatively with the extent to which subordinates feel that their superior relies upon expert, referent, and "law of the situation" bases of power. The discrepancy scores are uncorrelated with reward, coercive and legitimate bases of power.

CHAPTER 5

PRELIMINARY ANALYSES

Testing Major Dimensions of the Design

The first step in the overall analysis plan was to test the effects of the major dimensions of the research design on the three normative structure variables.* This step involves testing the effect of (1) country, (2) size of plant, and (3) technology on selected questions for each of the normative structure variables. An analysis of variance will permit the testing of the individual effects of the five countries, the two categories of plant size and the five technologies represented in the sample, and in addition, will allow the testing of interactions among the dimensions, two at a time. The great interest of sociologists and psychologists in technology and organizational structure as determinants of individual and group reactions and adjustments makes this analysis a theoretically important one.

Three measures of normative consensus, four measures of normative complementarity and five measures of normative consistency were selected for this analysis. The measures were selected on the a priori belief that they represent different content areas of each of the normative structure variables. The analysis was limited to twelve measures for reasons of economy. The measures selected for normative consensus are the standard deviations of questions 25, 26d and 37. The normative complementarity measures are question 62 - question 44, question 63 - question 6, question 64c - question 47c and question 24

*Analyses were performed on an IBM model 360-40 computer, using the programs available through the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.

(for superiors) - question 24 for subordinates). The normative consistency measures are an authority index, a total control index, a slope index, a decision-making index and an opportunity index. The indices are described later in this chapter.

The following analysis was performed firstly to determine if the normative structure variables are sensitive to the dimensions of the research design (i.e., to test the purely descriptive utility of the variables) and secondly to indicate appropriate strategies for the subsequent analysis.

The countries in the sample represent diverse positions on a scale of political and cultural values. It was anticipated, then, that if any of the analyses of variance indicated significant differences those concerning country would be significant. The five technologies represented in the sample were employed primarily for matching organizations in the respective countries and were not selected on the basis of their being diverse or important representatives of the concept. Similarly, plant size was used as a matching device. Consequently, these two dimensions of the design are not optimally measured by the plants in this study and were not, as a result, expected to yield significant differences. There is no theoretical reason to expect any interactions to be significant.

Results of Analysis of Variance

The results of three two-way analyses of variance for each of the three normative structure variables are presented in Tables C-1 to C-18. For each normative structure variable F-ratios are computed for the main effects of (1) country, (2) plant size and (3) technology

and for the three two-way interactions (country x size, country x technology and size x technology). These analyses of variance test the effects of the major dimensions of the overall research design.*

Country Effects

For each normative structure variable, the main effect of country is tested in two tables--one table testing the effects of country and size, and the second table testing the effects of country and technology. There are consequently six F-ratios for normative consensus (three measures, in two tables), eight for normative complementarity and ten for normative consistency. For normative consensus all six of the country F-ratios are significant beyond the .05 level and of these, four are significant at the .01 level. For normative complementarity, six of the eight country F-ratios are significant at the .01 level. The two F-ratios for the Q64c - Q47c measures of normative complementarity are not significant. For normative consistency, all ten of the country F-ratios are significant at the .01 level.

The effect of country is thus consistently powerful for all three normative structure variables. An analysis of Table C-1 indicates that the order of countries, from highest to lowest on normative consensus is: Israel, the United States, Yugoslavia and Austria and Italy (roughly even). Table C-3 reveals that the order is the United States, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia.

---

*The significance levels for the analyses of variance are as follows:

	.05 level	.01 level
D.F. = 1	3.84	6.63
D.F. = 3	2.60	3.78
D.F. = 4	2.37	3.32
D.F. = 16	1.67	2.04

For normative complementarity (from Table C-7) the average rank order (from high to low) is: the United States, Yugoslavia and Austria (roughly equal) Israel and Italy. From Table C-9, the order is: the United States, Yugoslavia, Austria and Italy.

The rank ordering from high to low for normative consistency is: the United States, Israel, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Italy (Table C-13) and the United States, Austria, Yugoslavia and Italy (Table C-15).

Technology Effects

As with country effects there are two tests for the main effects of technology for each normative structure variable. For normative consensus, one F-ratio is significant at the .01 level and two are significant at the .05 level. The Q37 measure of normative consensus is significant in both tables. The results are not consistent, however. With Q37 (from Table C-3), the lowest normative consensus occurs in furniture and canning plants, and the highest occurs in metal works plants, with plastics plants and foundries roughly equal. With Q 37 (from Table C-1) the lowest normative consensus occurs in metal work plants and the highest occurs in furniture and canning. The findings concerning technology do not fit the regular pattern displayed by the country dimension. Just why contradictory results obtain with the technology dimension is not clear. The reason may lie in the imprecise nature of the dimenion as used in this study. Technology is defined here in terms of the end product of the organization, i.e., plastics, canning, metal works. Researchers who have studied technology and its impact on the reactions of organization members have focused on the character of operations entailed in producing the end product (Woodward, 1965; Perrow, 1970).

It happens that organizations classified differently here could be classified similarly in another typology. It is the author's judgment that the organizations in this sample cannot be categorized in terms of Woodward's or Perrow's typology. This is due to the fact that (1) there is not an adequate representation in this sample of the types of technologies employed by the above authors, and (2) many of the organizations in the sample can be categorized in several technologies simultaneously.

For normative complementarity and normative consistency, no F-ratios for technology are significant.

Size Effects

For normative consensus, three F-ratios are significant at the .05 level and two are significant at the .01 level. The Q37 measure is significant at the .01 level in both tables and the Q26d measure is significant at the .05 level in both tables.

All five of the significant measures of actual consensus indicate that work-groups in large organizations have higher levels of normative consensus than do work-groups in small organizations. This finding violates the usual assumption that smallness makes for greater agreement. The significance of the F-ratios indicates that plant size (and not work-group size) is an important determinant of normative consensus. It may be that work-group members in large organizations "face inward" to the work-group when surrounded by a large number of unknown organization members. In small plants, however, the relatively small number of organization members may make contacts outside the work-group more desirable or frequent.

It is probable, however, that the significant results are due to an artifact of the samples in the large and small plants. The large plants have a greater number of managerial and supervisory personnel in the sample than do the small plants. The higher levels of normative consensus may be due to the different samples in the large and small plants. Result I for normative consensus in Chapter 6 indicates that higher levels of normative consensus exist in upper-level work-groups than in lower level work-groups.

For normative complementarity and normative consistency, no F-ratios for size are significant.

Interactions

There are three possible two-way interactions between each of the major dimensions of the design. For normative consensus: none of the two-way interactions are significant.

For normative complementarity, no interactions are significant.

For normative consistency, no interactions between country and size are significant but the opportunity index is significant at the .05 level for the country x technology and technology x size interactions.

The country x technology interaction indicates that there are three groups of countries for each of which the effects of technology are quite different. For Israel, the United States and Italy, the rank ordering of normative consistency scores (from highest to lowest) is: canning, furniture, metal works, foundry and plastics. For Austria the rank ordering is: metal works, foundry and plastics. For Yugoslavia, the rank ordering is: plastics, canning, foundry, furniture and metal

works. The technology x size interaction indicates that the highest normative consistency scores occur in large canning and large metal works plants while the lowest scores occur in small canning and metal works plants. The slope and decision-making indices are also significant for the country x technology interactions.

For the slope index, the country x technology interaction indicates that there are three clusters of countries in each of which a different relationship between technology and normative consensus obtains. For Austria and Israel, the rank ordering of technologies on normative consistency (from high to low) is: metal works, foundry, plastics and canning (the four being roughly equal) and furniture. For Italy, the rank ordering is: canning, plastics, furniture, foundry and metal works. For Yugoslavia and the United States, the order is: furniture, canning and plastics, foundry and metal works. For the decision-making index, a different pattern of interaction emerges. For Israel, Italy and Yugoslavia, the rank ordering of technologies on normative consistency is: metal works, canning, furniture, foundry and plastics. For Austria the rank ordering is: metal works, plastics, foundry, furniture and canning. For the United States the rank ordering is: foundry, canning, metal works, furniture and plastics.

There is a total of forty-five F-ratios involving interactions. Four of the forty-five are significant. (Three would be expected to be significant by chance.) The significant interactions do not follow a systematic pattern which lends itself to interpretation.

Interrelationships between
Normative Structure Variables

A second preliminary analysis concerns the relationships between the normative structure variables. The concept of normative structure was initially conceptualized as being composed of five dimensions--although, as pointed out in the introduction, the concept can, in principle, encompass any number of dimensions. It is important to determine whether normative structure is a unitary concept or whether it encompasses dimensions which are independent of each other. In other words, is a work-group which scores highly on one normative structure variable likely to score highly on the other dimensions as well? Although this specific question has not been researched, evidence from Likert (1961, 1967) would suggest that the constellation of attitudes, perceptions and beliefs (which forms the substance of organizational norms) would tend to be either favorable or unfavorable. If a group scored highly on normative consistency (i.e., had a small discrepancy between actual and ideal conditions), it would be predicted that the group would also score highly on normative complementarity (i.e., would have a small discrepancy between perceptions of superior and subordinates).

With the prediction that at least some degree of positive association exists among the normative structure variables, the three dimensions were intercorrelated. The correlations are presented in Tables C-19 to C-33.* The three matrices for each country present the normative

*Mention was made in Chapter 2 of the statistical difficulties involved with the cluster sample. Because the standard error is increased (by an unknown amount), the size of correlations required for significance at given levels will be higher than those calculated with the usual

consensus-normative complementarity, normative consensus-normative consistency and normative complementarity-normative consistency correlations.

The most striking finding in the tables is that the three normative structure variables do not correlate consistently with each other across the domain of content represented in this study. In other words, the relationship between the normative structure variables could be dependent of the content of the norm in question. The low average correlations in the tables, combined with the large number of significant correlations attest to the differentiated nature of the normative structure variables.

The percent of correlations significant beyond the .05 level (in the predicted direction) are given in Table 6 below.

TABLE 6

PERCENT OF SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES IN EACH COUNTRY

	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia	Average
Consensus-complementarity	9	20	11	16	15	14
Consensus-consistency	22	3	3	6	0	7
Complementarity-consistency	10	2	8	9	2	6

random sampling assumption. The strategy employed in the following analysis is to report the number of correlations significant at the .05 and .01 levels using the random sampling assumption while, at the same time, recognizing that more correlations will be reported as being significant than actually are. The interpretation of the following data is thus necessarily somewhat imprecise and impressionistic. General trends as well as the number of significant correlations are employed in interpreting the data.

Fourteen percent of the consensus-complementarity correlations are significant, seven percent of the consensus-consistency correlations are significant and six percent of the complementarity-consistency correlations are significant. This finding is not surprising when the nature of the concepts is considered. Normative consensus and normative complementarity concern "agreements" among work-group members. Although the concepts differ markedly in terms of their operationalization, they are rather close conceptually. Both normative consensus and normative complementarity have meaning only vis-a-vis others (work-group members or superiors) whereas normative consistency can have relevance and meaning for isolated individuals.

Although the number of significant correlations between normative consensus and normative complementarity is greater than that expected by chance, the proportion of significant correlations will seem disappointingly low to those who expected normative structure to be a unitary concept. The result, however, is an interesting one, and suggests that one should be careful not to generalize across normative structure variables which concern different content areas or norms.

Although the questions employed in this study to measure the normative structure variables concern (for the most part) power and influence, there are differences among the questions, and these differences may account for the low average correlations. One measure of normative consensus is based on the same question (Q37) as a measure of normative complementarity. If the precise content of the normative structure variables is important, and if the normative structure variables are related, then the correlations between the variables derived from the same question will be high. The correlations between normative

consensus measured by the standard deviation of responses to question 37 and normative complementarity measured by question 37 are: .57 in Austria; .37 in Israel; .34 in Italy; .32 in the United States; and .57 in Yugoslavia. These correlations provide some support for the notion that normative consensus and normative complementarity are related when both are measured with the same questions.

Another test can be made with the decision-making index of normative consistency. This index is constructed from questions 34, 36 and 39 and provides some overlap with normative consensus (question 36) and some overlap with normative complementarity (question 39). These correlations are of a much lower order of magnitude. (It should be pointed out, however, that the normative complementarity-normative consistency correlations in general are non-significant.) The content-boundedness hypothesis cannot be adequately investigated in this thesis because of insufficient overlap in content of the three normative structure variables.

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Normative Consensus Results

Intercorrelations of Normative Consensus Measures. The ten measures of normative consensus consist of the standard deviation of the responses of work-group members to questions 26d, 27d, 36, 24, 32, 37, 20, 25, 30 and 31. The intercorrelations are presented in Tables D-1 to D-5.

The average intercorrelations are presented in Table 7.

Several things are worth noting in the above analysis. First, most measures of normative consensus intercorrelate either at the .05 level or approach the .05 level of significance. Second, the measures intercorrelate most highly in Austria, with the United States, Yugoslavia, Israel and Italy following in that order. Third, the measures of normative consensus form a relatively integrated set. That is, work-groups which are characterized by high levels of normative consensus regarding one norm or content area are also likely to be characterized by high levels of normative consensus on the other normative areas represented here. The integrated nature of the normative consensus measures contrasts with the pattern of the normative complementarity and normative consistency measures (to be described later).

One could ask whether the high intercorrelations for normative consensus are due to the nature of the concept per se or are due to the similarity of the questions which measure the concept. It will be

TABLE 7

AVERAGE INTERCORRELATIONS BETWEEN EACH NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURE AND ALL OTHERS IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES*

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria	.33**	.38**	.35**	.35**	.44**	.31**	.27*	.38**	.33**	.41**
Israel	.26*	.13	.14	.26*	.25*	.28*	.26*	.26*	.16	.21
Italy	.15	.20*	.17	.22*	.20*	.28**	.21*	.20*	.32**	.26*
U.S.A.	.30**	.34**	.33**	.27*	.32**	.26*	.33**	.32**	.09	.32**
Yugoslavia	.22*	.21*	.22*	.24*	.34**	.21*	.22*	.23*	.25*	.29**

*See page 215 for significance levels for normative consensus correlations.

recalled that a deliberate attempt was made to select diverse measures for each of the normative structure variables (as diverse as the given questionnaire allowed) and thus the intercorrelations were not expected to be exceedingly high.

Result I. The correlations between ten measures of normative consensus and hierarchical position of the work-group are presented in Table 8. Correlations for both levels above the work-group and levels below the work-group are given. Levels above and levels below correlate negatively, but because chains of command differ in length, there is not a perfect negative correlation. For example, a work-group in a 3-level chain might have 1 level above and 1 level below while a work group at the same level in a 6-level chain would have 1 level above and 4 levels below. The correlation between levels above and levels below will be greater in long chains than in short chains. Levels above and levels below correlate -.24 in Austria, -.15 in Israel, -.30 in Italy, -.26 in U.S.A. and -.56 in Yugoslavia. The correlations between levels above and levels below and the dependent variable measures need not be (1) both significant, nor (2) of opposite sign. (Controlling for length of chain would provide a better test of the hypothesis.)

The hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between levels above and the standard deviation measures of normative consensus. The correlations between levels below and the standard deviation measures of normative consensus are predicted to be negative. As Table 8 indicates, strongest support for the hypothesis is offered by Austria and the United States, the former having four correlations significant at the .01 level and four correlations significant at the .05 level and the latter having three correlations significant at the .01 level and three correlations

TABLE 8

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HIERARCHICAL POSITION OF WORK-GROUP AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria										
Levels above	-.05	.07	.27*	-.07	.23	.16	-.05	.14	.36**	.05
Levels below	-.17	-.24*	-.24*	-.07	-.31**	-.34**	-.22*	-.33**	-.08	-.13
Israel										
Levels above	-.20	-.16	.01	-.13	.00	-.23	-.17	-.08	-.14	-.05
Levels below	-.15	-.17	-.13	-.37**	-.09	-.03	-.14	-.21	-.15	-.17
Italy										
Levels above	-.09	-.06	-.19	-.34††	.02	-.26†	-.10	-.07	-.19	-.27†
Levels below	.01	-.01	.03	-.02	-.32**	-.10	-.21	-.24*	.01	-.08
U.S.A.										
Levels above	.07	.11	-.02	.19	-.06	.08	-.03	.07	.03	.25*
Levels below	-.41**	-.20	-.19	-.04	-.21	-.32**	-.36**	-.09	-.13	-.28*
Yugoslavia										
Levels above	.16	.21*	.02	.04	.15	.04	.03	.19	-.18	-.33††
Levels below	-.13	-.19	-.06	.18	-.16	-.01	-.11	-.02	.24*	.15

significant at the .05 level. The correlations for Italy are not entirely consistent. Five of the measures correlate significantly (beyond the .05 level) and negatively with both levels above and levels below. The pattern of correlations for Israel is similar to that in Italy, but in an attenuated form. Yugoslavia offers no consistent support either for or against the hypothesis. (As the example above illustrates, the correlations may not be meaningful in Israel where all organizations have relatively few hierarchical levels.)

No particular normative consensus measure is significantly related to hierarchical level in all countries. This is also true (as will be demonstrated later) for the normative complementarity and consistency measures as well. Different norms or content areas are of differing importance or salience in each country. An interesting question (dealt with in Chapter 8) concerns the importance of certain normative areas in the 5 countries: are certain measures always the most important (i.e., most highly correlated with the correlates in this study) in a given country?

It is also interesting to note that, although most of the standard deviation measures are significantly intercorrelated, not all measures are significantly correlated with hierarchical level. (The normative complementarity and normative consistency measures also behave in this manner.) Consequently, it is necessary to seek patterns of significant relationships in the correlation matrices and to infer meaningful relationships when the number of significant correlations in the matrices exceeds the number expected by chance.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is supported in Austria and the United States with no support offered in Yugoslavia. In Israel and Italy,

normative consensus appears to increase both with levels above and with levels below.

Result II. The correlations between size of work-group and normative consensus are given in Table 9. The correlations are hypothesized to be positive. Two correlations in Table 9 are significant at the .01 level and two are significant at the .05 level. All four of these correlations are negative. Five correlations in Italy approach significance at the .05 level and all five are positive. Italy, then, is the only country which offers (moderate) support for the hypothesis. The Austrian, Israeli and American correlations (in that order) are in the direction opposite to that predicted. The Yugoslav correlations are uniformly low and offer no support either for or against the hypothesis.

Conclusion: Although no firm conclusions can be drawn, there is a tendency for high normative consensus to be associated with small work-groups in Italy, and for high normative consensus to be associated with large work-groups in Austria, Israel and the United States. The Yugoslav data neither support nor disprove the hypothesis.

Result III. The correlations between the seven measures of work-group heterogeneity and normative consensus in each country are presented in Tables D-6 to D-10. The average correlations are presented in Table 10. Age, education, plant seniority and job seniority are the four most important dimensions of heterogeneity of those studied here. Salary, sex and union membership are not statistically significant correlates of normative consensus. Salary, sex and union membership are three dimensions of work-group heterogeneity where group members would not differ markedly from one another and the correlations with normative consensus would, as a

TABLE 9

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SIZE OF WORK-GROUP AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

Size of Group	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria	-.18	-.25	-.35††	-.16	-.08	.09	-.15	.08	-.06	-.27†
Israel	-.40††	-.17	-.01	.13	.06	-.12	.12	-.17	-.08	-.14
Italy	.17	.22*	.08	.17	.20	.18	-.11	.09	.13	.12
U.S.A.	-.21	.01	.04	.08	.01	-.07	-.30†	.02	-.10	-.06
Yugoslavia	.11	.03	-.13	-.03	-.09	-.03	-.12	.01	-.14	-.15

TABLE 10

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY MEASURES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Plant Seniority	Job Seniority	Salary	Sex	Age	Education	Union Membership
Austria	.32**	.29*	-.08	.21	.25*	.13	.25*
Israel	.17	.16	- [1]	.18	.11	.28*	- [1]
Italy	.23*	.11	.07	-.01	.22*	.31**	.07
U.S.A.	.12	.11	.05	.27*	.26*	.23*	-.03
Yugoslavia	.22*	.29**	-.02	.05	.28**	.32**	.19

[1]Kibbutz members do not receive salaries and are not union members.

result, not be high.

The average relationship between work-group heterogeneity and normative consensus approaches significance at the .05 level in Austria (.20), Israel (.18), Yugoslavia (.19), Italy (.14) and the United States (.14). The average correlations do not differ significantly across countries.

Interesting patterns of significant relationships are found in each country. In Austria, heterogeneity on plant seniority, job seniority, union membership and age correlate most highly with normative consensus (average correlations beyond the .05 level of significance), with sex and education of lesser importance. The correlation between heterogeneity of union membership and normative consensus is highest in Austria and the correlation between heterogeneity of educational level of work-group members and normative consensus is lowest in Austria. In Israel, heterogeneity of educational level is the highest correlate of normative consensus (significant at the .01 level) with no other correlate achieving significance. The highest correlations in Italy are between the dimensions of plant seniority, age, and education and normative consensus. In the United States, the highest correlates are sex, age and education, with sex being the dominant correlate. In Yugoslavia all correlates except salary and sex approach significance or are significant at the .05 level.

Conclusion: Hypothesis III is confirmed in all countries. The greater the heterogeneity of work-group members on certain demographic dimensions, the less the normative consensus within the work-group. Although the pattern of significant relationships differs from country to country, overall, the important dimensions of work-group heterogeneity

are plant seniority, job seniority, age and education.

Result IV. The correlations between plant and job seniority and normative consensus are presented in Table D-11. The average correlations are presented in Table 11 below. On the whole, the data offer only moderate support for the hypothesis. Three correlations are significant at the .01 level (in the predicted direction) and eight are significant at the .05 level. Austria and the United States provide the strongest support for the hypothesis, with Yugoslavia providing some support as well.

TABLE 11

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PLANT AND JOB SENIORITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Plant Seniority	Job Seniority
Austria	-.11	-.01
Israel	.02	.00
Italy	.02	.06
U.S.A.	-.13	.01
Yugoslavia	-.05	-.06

Normative consensus appears to correlate more highly with plant seniority than with job seniority. The former has nine significant correlations beyond the .05 level with normative consensus and the latter has two. It may be that job seniority (question #2 on interview form) does not measure the extent to which members have been part of their work-group. Individuals may be performing the same job in new work-groups or may have new jobs in the same work-group. Apparently, plant seniority provides the interaction, socialization or acculturation necessary for high levels of work-group normative consensus.

As is the case in the preceeding results, no particular measure of normative consensus correlates with the predictors in all countries.

Conclusion: Although the average correlations are not high, moderate support for Hypothesis IV is given in Austria, the United States and Yugoslavia. Plant seniority correlates more highly with normative consensus than does job seniority.

Result V. The correlations between normative consensus and the individual items measuring mobility aspirations are presented in Tables D-12 to D-16 and the correlations with the index of mobility aspirations are given in Table 12. All correlations in the tables are predicted to be positive. As the tables in the Appendix indicate, strongest support for the hypothesis dealing with normative consensus occurs in Austria (six correlations are significant at the .05 level and 3 at the .01 level) and in Italy (nine correlations significant at the .05 level). No support is given in Israel and Yugoslavia and moderate support is given in the United States. A similar pattern emerges with the index of mobility aspirations in Table 12.

Conclusion: Austria, Italy, and to a lesser extent, the United States offer support for the hypothesis, while Israel and Yugoslavia do not.

ior and normative consensus are given in Table 13. The correlations are predicted to be negative. Six correlations are significant beyond the .05 level. The relationship is most marked in Austria and the United States.

Conclusion: Participativeness of superior is related to normative consensus in Austria and the United States and is unrelated to normative consensus in the other countries.

TABLE 12

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEX OF MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria index	.11	.08	.26*	.05	.12	.10	.17	.13	.13	.08
Israel index	-.05	.15	.02	-.10	.12	-.16	-.05	.16	.12	.09
Italy index	-.15	.12	-.08	.03	.22*	.29**	.00	.19	.21*	-.02
U.S.A. index	.08	.18	.02	.10	.03	.13	.15	.08	-.05	.18
Yugoslavia index	.00	-.15	.17	.06	.08	.02	.06	-.36††	-.04	-.03

TABLE 13

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria	.01	-.16	-.24*	-.14	-.17	-.09	-.04	-.15	-.04	-.21
Israel	.11	-.05	-.31**	-.12	.03	.10	-.05	.00	-.04	.03
Italy	.09	.15	-.07	.21	-.07	.03	-.04	-.01	.10	.05
U.S.A.	-.29**	-.20*	.11	-.15	.00	-.20*	-.18	-.06	-.07	-.17
Yugoslavia	-.02	-.11	-.13	.09	.03	-.21*	-.02	.05	.07	.07

Result VII. Table 14 presents the correlations between supportiveness of superior and normative consensus. The correlations are predicted to be negative. Three correlations are significant at the .05 level and no consistent patterns are evident.

Conclusion: Supportiveness of superior is not related to normative consensus in any of the countries.

Result VIII. The correlations between attitude toward superior indices and normative consensus are given in Tables D-17 to D-21. The average correlations for each of the indices are given in Table 15 below. The indices are constructed such that a favorable response is checked toward the low end of the five-point scale for index 1 and index 3 and toward the high end of the scale for index 2 and index 4. The correlations between index 1 and 3 and the measures of normative consensus are hypothesized to be positive. The hypothesized pattern for index 2 and index 4 is precisely the opposite.

TABLE 15

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Index 1	Index 2	Index 3	Index 4
Austria	-.08	-.04	-.06	-.04
Israel	-.11	-.01	-.09	-.05
Italy	.02	-.02	.00	-.01
U.S.A.	-.08	.02	-.06	.01
Yugoslavia	.04	-.09	.03	-.11

The relationship between attitude toward superior and normative consensus is inconsistent. As Table 15 above shows, the average correlations are low and no strong differences between countries emerge.

TABLE 14

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUPPORTIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria	.12	.04	-.05	-.19	.13	.10	.06	.01	-.12	-.26*
Israel	.04	-.09	-.22*	-.13	.13	-.17	-.12	-.01	-.05	-.01
Italy	.17	.10	.03	.06	.06	.02	-.13	-.15	.06	.11
U.S.A.	-.15	-.04	-.03	.02	.09	-.10	-.07	.14	-.02	.00
Yugoslavia	.09	-.07	-.16	-.18	.12	-.06	-.05	-.03	-.18	-.23*

Of the fifteen significant correlations (.05 level) in Tables D-17 to D-21, seven support the hypothesis and eight do not. In the majority of instances, highly favorable attitudes toward a superior are associated with low levels of work-group normative consensus. This pattern, found mainly in Israel, but also to some extent in Austria and the United States may indicate that favorable attitudes toward a superior could coincide with a "safe" environment where diverse attitudes and opinions are tolerated.

The pattern of correlations in Yugoslavia come closest to supporting the hypothesis. Four of the five significant correlations are in the predicted direction. In Israel, five of the six correlations are in the non-predicted direction.

Conclusion: Favorable attitudes toward superior are associated with high normative consensus in Yugoslavia, and with low normative consensus in Israel but are not consistently related to normative consensus in the remaining countries.

Result IX. The correlations between bases of power and normative consensus are presented in Tables D-22 to D-26. The average correlations across all normative consensus measures are given in Table 16 below. The correlations between the first three bases of power and the measures of normative consensus are predicted to be negative and the correlations between the last three bases of power and the measures are predicted to be positive.

Across all five countries, there are thirty-eight correlations significant beyond the .05 level (Tables D-22 to D-26). Of the thirty-eight, ten are in the non-predicted direction. The relationship between

TABLE 16

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND WORK-GROUP NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Expert	Referent	Law of Sit.	Reward	Coercive	Legitimate
Austria	-.05	.15	-.01	.09	.14	.01
Israel	-.05	.08	.11	.14	.10	.11
Italy	-.03	-.03	-.09	.08	.00	-.09
U.S.A.	.07	.14	.04	.09	-.02	-.04
Yugoslavia	-.10	-.09	-.06	-.12	-.08	-.07

bases of power and normative consensus is weakest in Israel, and the United States, and is strongest in Italy.

It should be noted that there is a large number of significant correlations in the non-predicted direction in each country. These correlations do not seem to follow any consistent pattern.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is not supported, except in Italy. In the other four countries, there is no consistent relationship between the extent of reliance on certain bases of power and normative consensus.

Result X. The correlations between communication with peers and normative consensus are presented in Tables D-27 to D-31. The correlations are predicted to be negative. Across all countries, there is a total of nineteen significant correlations at the .05 level. The relationship between communication with peers and normative consensus is strongest in the United States (eleven significant correlations beyond the .05 level) and weakest in Austria and Israel (zero and three significant correlations respectively).

Conclusion: In the United States, the more the communication among peers, and the more this communication centers on work-relevant

issues, the greater the normative consensus. There is no association between normative consensus and communication in the remaining countries.

Result XI. The correlations between communication with superior and normative consensus are presented in Tables D-32 to D-36. The correlations are hypothesized to be zero. Those correlations indicated as being significant are significant with a two-tailed test.

With the exception of the correlations in Italy and Yugoslavia, the pattern of significant correlations indicates that the more the communication with the superior, and the more this communication centers on work-relevant issues, then the greater the normative consensus. There are seventeen correlations significant beyond the .05 level in the direction of increased consensus with increasing communication. This relationship is stronger than that for peer communication.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is not supported. In Italy and Yugoslavia, the greater the communication with superiors, and the more this communication centers on work-relevant issues, the greater is the normative consensus. In Austria, Israel, and the United States, the greater the communication with superiors, the less the normative consensus. This finding may be explained by the fact that there is a limit on the amount of time available to talk with others at the work place, and the more time that is spent in talking with the superior, the less the time available to talk with peers and consequently, the fewer the occasions to influence peers and the less the normative consensus.

Result XII. The correlations between sources of communication and normative consensus are given in Tables D-37 to D-41. The average correlations are presented in Table 17. The hypothesis predicts no

TABLE 17

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Superiors	Subordinates	Management	Written Communication	Management Assembly	Union Assembly	Workers Council	Coworkers	Persons Outside Plant
Austria	-.05	-.06	-.03	-.03	.02	.17	-	-.05	-.01
Israel	-.09	-.11	-.06	.07	.04	-	-	.01	.10
Italy	.05	-.14	.06	-.05	.00	-.02	-	.12	.02
U.S.A.	.09	-.18	-.01	-.08	.00	-.07	-	.12	-.01
Yugoslavia	.04	.18	-.08	-.08	.17	-	.05	-.06	.04

correlation between normative consensus and communication with superior, subordinates, management, management assemblies, written communication, unions, and persons outside the plant. The hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between co-worker communication and normative consensus.

The correlations between co-workers as a source of communication and normative consensus do not support the hypothesis. The highest correlations occur in Italy and the United States and are in the non-predicted direction. In these two countries, the more important co-workers are as a source of communication, the less the normative consensus.

Other interesting patterns emerge with the remaining sources of communication. In all countries except Yugoslavia (where the pattern is reversed) communication with subordinates correlates positively with normative consensus. This finding may be due to the fact that rank-and-file work groups are excluded from this correlation and as Result I indicates, there is a positive correlation between levels below and work-group normative consensus in all countries except Yugoslavia.

In Austria, communication from union meetings correlates negatively with normative consensus. In Israel, there is a tendency for communication with persons outside the plant to correlate negatively with normative consensus.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is not supported. Communication with superior tends to increase normative consensus; communication with persons outside the plant tends to decrease normative consensus; communication with co-workers tends to decrease normative consensus.

Result XIII. The correlations between the six measures of mental health and normative consensus are presented in Tables D-42 to D-46.

The correlations with the index of mental health are presented in Table 18. The association between mental health and normative consensus differs among the five countries. The relationship is strongest, and as predicted, in Austria, the United States and Israel, with Italy and Yugoslavia providing no clear evidence either for or against the hypothesis. In Austria, nineteen correlations are significant beyond the .05 level, in the United States sixteen are significant and in Israel, the number is ten. Of the seven significant correlations in Yugoslavia, four are in the non-predicted direction. Three of the four concern question 25: "Do the responsible people in this plant improve working conditions only when forced to?" The higher the average mental health of work-group members, the more disagreement there is among members concerning this question.

It is interesting to note that question 25 appears to be significantly related to the mental health measures in Austria and Israel as well, although in the predicted direction.

Each country has a particular dimension of mental health which correlates highly with the measures of normative consensus. One dimension which stands out in those countries where the relationships are strong is "isolation". This dimension correlates most highly in Israel and the United States and third highest in Austria.

Conclusion: The dimensions of mental health correlate as predicted with normative consensus in Austria, the United States and Israel.

Summary: The results for the normative consensus hypotheses indicate that the data do not consistently conform to expectation, but display a highly differentiated pattern across the five countries. Hypothesis VII (concerning supportiveness of superior and normative consensus)

TABLE 18

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH INDEX AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria index	-.08	-.01	-.24*	-.17	-.17	-.18	-.29*	-.15	-.21	.02
Israel index	-.07	.05	-.16	-.09	-.08	.04	-.04	.00	-.06	-.30**
Italy index	.18	.21	.01	.14	-.20*	.15	-.11	-.19	-.09	.11
U.S.A. index	-.30*	-.32**	-.20*	-.13	-.05	-.12	-.20*	-.07	-.14	-.25†
Yugoslavia index	-.13	-.10	.05	-.04	-.07	.10	-.10	-.22*	-.02	.09

is the only hypothesis with no support in all countries, Hypothesis III (concerning work-group heterogeneity) is the only hypothesis accepted in all countries, and Hypotheses XI and XII (concerning communication) are the only hypotheses with results in the non-predicted direction in all countries. These patterns of results will be treated more fully in the summary to Chapter 7.

Normative Complementarity Results

Intercorrelations of Normative Complementarity Measures. The twelve measures of normative complementarity were selected because they represent different content areas and consequently allow the testing of hypotheses across a large domain of organizational norms. The correlations are presented in Tables D-47 to D-51. The average intercorrelations of the twelve measures are given in Table 19. Although the content areas differ, it was expected that the measures would be highly correlated. The expectation was that a work-group which displays high normative complementarity regarding one norm would tend also to display high normative complementarity regarding other norms. However, this is not the case. The degree of agreement between a superior and his subordinates appears to be highly differentiated and particular to a given content area.

The average intercorrelations for the six bases of power measures are also low: Austria, .12; Israel, -.04; Italy, .08; the United States, .08; and Yugoslavia, .03. The intercorrelations between questions 35 and 37 which concern ideal participation are somewhat higher: .35 in Austria; -.04 in Israel; .14 in Italy, .14 in the United States; and .20 in Yugoslavia.

TABLE 19

AVERAGE INTERCORRELATIONS OF EACH NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURE WITH ALL OTHERS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	.12	.03	.13	.09	.10	.10	.07	.11	.11	.07	.06	.07	.13
Israel	.03	.03	-.06	.05	-.01	-.02	-.12	-.07	.06	.06	-.03	-.01	.05
Italy	.09	.08	.05	.06	.06	.06	.01	.07	.05	-.02	-.01	.01	.07
U.S.A.	.06	.07	.08	.06	.06	.04	.02	.12	.08	.07	.09	-.02	-.01
Yugoslavia	-.01	.10	.04	.01	-.01	.05	.01	.00	.06	.04	.06	.07	.06

*See page 258 for significance levels for normative complementarity correlations.

Result I. The correlations between hierarchical level and normative complementarity are presented in Table 20. Across all five countries there are twenty-five significant correlations beyond the .05 level. Sixteen of the twenty-five significant correlations are with levels below. This result indicates that the distance of the work-group from the bottom or rank-and-file level of the organization is a more significant determinant of normative complementarity than is the distance of the work-groups to the top of the organization.

The effect of hierarchical level on normative complementarity is greatest in the United States (10 correlations are significant beyond the .05 level) and is weakest in Italy (three correlations are significant). No particular measure of normative complementarity is significantly correlated with hierarchical level in each country. However, Q 62 - Q 44 and Q 63 - Q 6 produce the highest correlations.

Conclusion: Normative complementarity increases as the organizational hierarchy is scaled.

Result II. The correlations between size of work-group and normative complementarity are presented in Table 21. The correlations in the table are predicted to be positive. Seven correlations in the table are significant beyond the .05 level and of these, three occur in the United States. These data do not offer strong support for the hypothesis. The relationship between size of work-group and normative complementarity is expected to be mediated by the amount of communication between peers and subordinates. This relationship is more or less substantiated. The correlations between amount of communication with superior and size of the work group are: -.05 in Austria, -.22 in Israel, -.40 in Italy, -.27 in the United States and -.12 in Yugoslavia.

TABLE 20

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HIERARCHICAL LEVEL AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
Levels above	-.08	.08	.05	-.06	-.06	-.03	-.05	.09	-.10	-.05	-.18	-.12	.00
Levels below	-.20*	-.16*	-.15*	-.20*	.10	-.04	.02	-.02	-.11	.06	-.10	.05	-.27**
Israel													
Levels above	-.08	.22*	.01	.11	-.10	.06	-.18	.04	.05	.01	.02	-.01	.01
Levels below	-.05	-.33**	-.02	-.14	.05	-.07	.40	-.11	-.21*	-.16	.02	-.02	-.01
Italy													
Levels above	.15*	-.06	-.01	.16*	-.15	-.01	.07	.10	.07	.00	.05	.08	-.03
Levels below	-.12	.00	-.01	-.08	.05	.14	.05	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.13	-.15*	.03
U.S.A.													
Levels above	.11	.16*	.11	.07	-.06	.14*	.00	.06	.21**	.17*	.09	.12	-.01
Levels below	-.16*	-.28**	-.10	-.12	-.10	-.14*	-.10	-.16*	-.16*	-.08	-.09	-.19**	-.01
Yugoslavia													
Levels above	-.07	-.12	.08	.04	-.17	-.05	.17*	.11	.11	.17*	-.03	.08	-.07
Levels below	-.01	.14	.01	.05	.10	.03	-.17*	-.21**	.06	.01	.05	-.08	-.01

TABLE 21

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SIZE OF WORK-GROUP AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	.12	.15*	.09	.12	-.11	.05	.01	.10	.10	.02	-.01	-.04	.06
Israel	.02	-.11	.00	.08	.04	.14	-.04	-.13	.08	.27*	-.09	-.03	.09
Italy	.08	.04	.16*	.12	.08	-.02	.04	.12	.04	.02	-.03	.16*	-.01
U.S.A.	.22**	.19**	.02	.01	-.04	.07	-.03	-.06	-.03	.06	.13*	.08	.11
Yugoslavia	.10	-.19	.08	-.12	-.14	.05	.11	-.05	.04	-.13	-.09	.04	-.05

Conclusion: The hypothesis is supported only in the United States.

Result III. The correlations between measures of superior-subordinate differences on six demographic variables and normative complementarity are given in Tables D-52 to D-56. The average correlations are presented in Table 22 below. All correlations in the matrices are predicted to be positive. In Tables D-52 to D-56, a total of thirty-six correlations are significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction. Although the differences among countries are not great, there are more significant correlations in Austria (10), Italy (11) and the United States (8) than in Israel (5) and Yugoslavia (4).

TABLE 22

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE DIFFERENCES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Plant Seniority	Job Seniority	Salary	Sex	Education	Age
Austria	.02	.06	-.07	.01	.04	-.04
Israel	.05	.00	--	.09	.02	.01
Italy	.05	.07	.02	.04	-.03	.05
U.S.A.	.00	.01	.02	.02	.10	.02
Yugoslavia	.00	.06	-.06	-.04	.01	.05

The average correlations in Table 22 are disappointingly low. This results primarily from the fact that the normative complementarity measures do not intercorrelate highly. A given correlate or predictor may correlate highly with one particular measure of normative complementarity but will not correlate at all, or may even correlate negatively with other measures of normative complementarity. For this reason, more

emphasis will be put on the full tables of correlations in the Appendix than on the tables of average correlations in the text.

Certain superior-subordinate differences seem to be of particular importance in each country. In Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia, job seniority correlates highest with normative complementarity; in Israel sex differences correlate highest; and in the United States educational level correlates highest.

No particular measure of normative complementarity correlates consistently with the measures of superior-subordinate differences. There are a number of significant correlations in the non-predicted direction, but they follow no consistent pattern. There does seem to be a tendency, however, for Q 64e - Q 47e in Austria and Israel to correlate negatively with the superior-subordinate differences. Apparently, the greater the differences between a superior and his subordinates, the higher the normative complementarity regarding the superior's use of the "legitimate" base of power. There is also a tendency in Austria and Yugoslavia for differences in salary to be negatively correlated with normative complementarity.

Conclusion: Superior-subordinate differences are associated with low levels of normative complementarity in Austria, Israel, and the United States. The correlations are not all uniformly high--a result that might be caused either by a low association between the variables or by the fact that normative complementarity seems to be a highly differentiated concept--each measure having a differing degree of association with the particular correlate.

Result IV. The correlations between communication with superior and normative complementarity are presented in Table 23. The correlations

TABLE 23

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
Superior	.03	.02	.08	-.08	.09	.06	.07	.04	.10	-.05	-.02	.05	.00
Superior wk-nonwk	-.08	-.05	.11	.06	-.03	.02	.08	.07	-.06	.07	-.02	-.02	.07
Israel													
Superior	-.29**	.06	-.25*	-.05	.17	-.11	.07	-.23*	-.12	-.11	.24	-.11	-.25*
Superior wk-nonwk	.02	-.07	.07	-.06	.26	.00	.12	-.10	-.08	-.10	-.14	-.15	-.08
Italy													
Superior	-.27**	.07	-.10	-.05	.11	.03	-.04	-.14*	-.10	-.13	-.03	-.18*	-.03
Superior wk-nonwk	-.14*	-.01	-.07	.06	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.17*	-.13	-.04	.08	.08	.02
U.S.A.													
Superior	-.17*	-.34**	.01	-.04	.09	-.02	.03	-.15*	-.05	-.04	-.10	-.14*	-.11
Superior wk-nonwk	-.11	-.16*	-.15	.15	.00	-.06	-.01	.12	.00	-.08	-.03	.01	.09
Yugoslavia													
Superior	.07	.16	.02	.11	.12	.20	-.18*	-.22**	-.02	-.05	-.03	-.09	-.08
Superior wk-nonwk	-.04	-.29**	-.23**	-.02	-.02	-.11	-.11	.00	-.11	.04	-.04	-.05	-.07

are predicted to be negative. Fifteen of the non-content correlations are significant beyond the .05 level. The average correlations in each country are low (as are the other average correlations with normative complementarity): Austria, .03; Israel, -.08; Italy, -.07; the United States, -.08; and Yugoslavia, .00. As the average correlations and the number of significant correlations indicate, the effect of communication with superior is weakest in Austria and roughly equal in the remaining four countries.

The Q 64F - Q 47f measure of normative complementarity (i.e., that dealing with the superior's use of "law of the situation" base of power) is significantly related to communication with superior in four of the five countries. The more the communication, the greater the normative complementarity regarding the exercise of "law of the situation" base of power.

Five correlations between the extent to which work-relevant communication with superior exceeds non-work-relevant communication and normative complementarity are significant beyond the .05 level (four are expected by chance). The evidence does not support this hypothesis.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is partially supported. The more the communication with the superior, the greater the normative complementarity. The content (work-relevant as opposed to non-work-relevant) of the communication is not related to normative complementarity.

Result V. The correlations between communication with peers and normative complementarity are presented in Table 24. The correlations are predicted to be zero. There are fifteen significant correlations beyond the .05 level across all countries. Nine are negative and six are positive.

TABLE 24

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
Peers	.23†	.06	.14	.09	.08	.06	.07	.06	.00	-.15†	-.04	-.02	-.04
Peers, wk-nonwk	.12	.29††	-.01	-.02	-.04	.06	.00	.05	.06	-.17	.02	-.33††	-.03
Israel													
Peers	-.07	-.15	-.34††	.03	-.01	-.06	-.11	-.28†	-.20	-.16	.13	.01	-.07
Peers, wk-nonwk	-.07	-.12	.35††	-.08	-.02	-.10	-.22	-.02	-.10	-.08	-.27†	-.04	.10
Italy													
Peers	.04	.02	.01	-.06	-.03	-.01	-.06	.09	.05	-.18†	-.05	-.18†	-.13
Peers, wk-nonwk	-.17†	-.05	-.13	.11	-.08	-.03	-.01	-.03	-.07	-.12	-.04	.00	.10
U.S.A.													
Peers	-.04	-.06	-.04	.04	.01	-.10	-.07	-.03	-.02	-.05	-.07	.10	-.14
Peers, wk-nonwk	-.08	-.20††	-.30††	-.07	-.13	-.13	.06	-.14	-.11	.03	.08	-.07	.06
Yugoslavia													
Peers	-.08	.35††	.21†	.18†	.13†	.09	-.04	-.02	-.06	.16†	-.11	-.05	-.05
Peers, wk-nonwk	-.05	-.09	-.09	-.08	.07	.03	.01	-.01	.07	-.04	-.07	-.08	-.13

The correlations between the content of the communication with peers and normative complementarity indicate that the only consistent relationship occurs in the United States where high levels of communication with peers concerning work-relevant as opposed to non-work relevant issues are correlated with high levels of normative complementarity.

In order to clarify the relationship between peer and superior communication and normative complementarity, another analysis was performed. Table 25 correlates normative complementarity and the extent to which group members communicate with peers more than with superior. The correlations in the table are predicted to be positive. Twelve correlations are significant beyond the .05 level. This analysis indicates that communication with superior is a critical factor in predicting levels of normative complementarity.

Conclusion: These data support the trends indicated in the first analysis: normative complementarity increases as communication with superior increases, but is not related to communication with peers.

Result VI. The correlations between sources of information and normative complementarity presented in Tables D-57 to D-61 shed further light on the association between communication and normative complementarity. The average correlations are presented in Table 26. The correlations for superior communication are predicted to be negative, and those for union assembly, co-workers and persons outside the plant are expected to be zero.

Across all countries, eleven correlations with superior communication are significant beyond the .05 level (five of these are significant beyond the .01 level). No correlations in Yugoslavia are significant.

TABLE 25

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PEER-SUPERIOR COMMUNICATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	.10	.07	.03	.14	-.03	.02	.00	.03	-.09	-.02	.06	-.07	.03
Israel	.21*	-.12	-.06	.04	-.18	.04	-.21	-.04	.04	-.07	-.27	.23*	.30*
Italy	.27**	-.03	.08	.00	-.12	.04	-.01	.17*	.12	-.02	-.01	.03	-.07
U.S.A.	.12	.23**	-.03	.04	-.09	-.11	-.10	.10	.06	-.01	.01	.22**	.03
Yugoslavia	-.11	.20**	.22**	.04	-.02	-.15	.16*	.18**	-.04	.21**	-.09	.01	.04

TABLE 26

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Superiors	Subordinates	Management	Written Communication	Management Assembly	Union Assembly	Workers Council	Coworkers	Persons Outside Plant
Austria	-.10	.00	-.04	-.06	.12	.08	-	.00	.04
Israel	.02	-.08	-.05	-.07	.07	-	-	.06	-.01
Italy	-.08	.00	.01	-.01	.02	.02	-	.07	.03
U.S.A.	-.06	-.04	.01	.05	.02	.08	-	.00	.04
Yugoslavia	.04	.02	-.04	.02	-.03	-	-.03	.06	-.02

The remaining sources of information are evaluated with a two-tailed test, since a zero correlation was predicted. For communication with co-workers (peers) six of the seven significant correlations (at .05 level) are positive, indicating that high levels of communication with peers are associated with low levels of normative complementarity. Three correlations between normative complementarity and communication with persons outside the plant indicate a significant association with low levels of normative complementarity. Similarly, ten correlations dealing with communication from union assemblies are significant and all ten indicate low levels of normative complementarity are associated with high levels of communication from the union. The low average correlations in Tables 25 and 26 indicate that although certain aspects of normative complementarity correlate highly with communication, the average correlations across all aspects of normative complementarity are low.

Conclusion: High levels of communication with superiors are associated with high levels of normative complementarity. There is also a trend for high levels of communication with peers (co-workers) and with the union to be associated with low levels of normative complementarity. The content of the communication is not related to normative complementarity.

Result VII. The correlations between participativeness of superior and normative complementarity are presented in Table 27. The correlations in the table are predicted to be negative. Fifteen correlations are significant beyond the .05 level in the predicted direction and nine of these are significant at the .01 level. None of the correlations are significant in Yugoslavia. The Q 62 - Q 44 measure of normative complementarity correlates highest of all measures with participativeness of superior.

Conclusion: The more participative the superior, the greater is the normative complementarity in all countries except Yugoslavia.

TABLE 27

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	-.26**	-.27**	-.01	.15	.23†	-.02	-.04	-.07	-.22**	-.17*	-.13	.07	-.16*
Israel	-.37**	-.06	-.38**	-.05	.27†	-.12	.17	-.02	-.06	-.15	-.11	-.08	-.20
Italy	-.36**	.00	-.11	.02	.05	.01	.00	-.22**	-.12	-.09	-.16*	-.17*	.01
U.S.A.	-.43**	-.29**	-.06	-.04	.11	-.03	.08	-.05	-.16*	-.16*	.02	.08	-.02
Yugoslavia	-.03	.02	.10	.13	.10	.09	-.09	-.14	.08	.02	.10	-.05	.07

Result VIII. The correlations between supportiveness of superior and normative complementarity are presented in Table 28. As with participativeness of superior, the correlations in the table are predicted to be negative. Twelve correlations are significant at the .05 level and nine of these are significant at the .01 level. None of the correlations are significant in Yugoslavia.

The pattern of relationships with supportiveness of superior is very much like that with participativeness of superior. This is not surprising since participativeness and supportiveness of superior correlate .40 in Austria, .54 in Israel, .54 in Italy, .59 in the United States, and .55 in Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that the Q 64c - Q 47c measure of normative complementarity correlates in a direction opposite to that predicted in all countries. What this indicates is that the more participative and supportive a superior is, the less the normative consensus regarding his use of referent ("nice guy") power. In Israel, the same relationship also holds for the superior's use of legitimate power.

Conclusion: The more supportive the superior, the greater the normative complementarity in all countries except Yugoslavia.

Result IX. The correlations between attitude toward superior indices and normative complementarity are presented in Tables D-62 to D-66. The average correlations are presented in Table 29 below. The correlations for index 1 and index 3 are predicted to be positive and the correlations for index 2 and index 4 are predicted to be negative (because of reversed scales).

TABLE 28

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUPPORTIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	-.24**	-.13	-.02	.05	.12	.01	-.04	.06	-.22**	-.13	-.04	.23†	-.13
Israel	-.41**	-.17	-.28*	.04	.22	-.02	.19	-.21*	.00	-.30**	-.14	.04	-.09
Italy	-.59**	.00	-.20**	.08	.06	-.02	.13	-.27**	-.21**	-.12	.18†	-.04	-.04
U.S.A.	-.59**	-.08	-.14*	.00	.22††	.05	.00	-.18**	-.12	-.06	-.01	.08	.05
Yugoslavia	-.11	-.12	.11	.08	.28††	.15	-.01	.01	-.07	-.09	.03	-.09	.03

TABLE 29

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Index 1	Index 2	Index 3	Index 4
Austria	-.01	-.02	-.02	-.02
Israel	.00	.00	.00	-.02
Italy	.05	-.04	.07	-.05
U.S.A.	.04	-.03	.04	-.04
Yugoslavia	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.01

The correlations in Tables D-62 to D-66 underscore the point made earlier about the differentiated and individualized character of the measures of normative complementarity. Normative complementarity is not a unitary concept (as are normative consensus, and normative consistency) with similar patterns of relationship across different measures of the concept.

There is a total of thirty-seven significant correlations at the .05 level across all countries and all correlations fall into regular patterns in each country. Using hind-sight, one might predict that those measures of normative complementarity which deal with the superior will be most highly correlated with the attitude toward superior indices. Of the eight measures which consistently (within a country) correlate highly with attitude toward superior, all but two (Q 24 in Austria and Italy) concern the superior. It should be pointed out that, in Israel, Q 35 and Q 39 which do not concern the superior approach significance.

Evidence for the differentiated nature of normative complementarity comes from a number of significant (two-tailed test) correlations opposite to the direction predicted. The Q 37 measure of normative

complementarity which concerns ideal participation of workers in decisions relating to general plant problems correlates in the non-predicted direction in Austria and the United States, and the Q 35 measure, which deals with ideal participation of workers in decisions relating to their work correlates in the non-predicted direction in Austria and Italy.

The other pattern of correlations in the non-predicted direction concern the Q 64b - Q 47b, Q 64c - Q 47c, Q 64d - Q 47d, and Q 64e - Q 47e measures of normative complementarity. These measures deal with reward, referent, coercive and legitimate power bases respectively. The (inverse) relationship between these measures and the attitude toward superior indices is strongest in Israel and weakest in Austria. It is interesting to note that a similar pattern for the Q 64c - Q 47c measure of normative complementarity emerges for participativeness and supportiveness of superior (Result V and VI). This is a puzzling result. What it means is that the more participative, supportive, and well-liked the superior is, the less the normative complementarity regarding the superior's use of referent ("nice guy") power.

Conclusion: Attitude toward superior correlates significantly with certain measures of normative complementarity. The average correlations across all measures are low. For most measures the more favorable the attitude toward the superior, the greater the normative complementarity. For a certain number of measures dealing with bases of power, the more favorable the attitude toward the superior, the less the normative complementarity.

Result X. The correlations between sensitivity to criticism and normative complementarity are presented in Table 30. The correlations in the table are predicted to be positive for sensitivity to subordinate criticism and negative for sensitivity to superior criticism. Ten

TABLE 30

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
1	.04	.04	.07	.16*	.24**	-.03	.01	-.01	-.06	.01	.19*	.07	-.01
2	.12	.05	.03	.07	.22†	.08	.05	-.02	.08	-.04	.07	.03	-.07
Israel													
1	-.15	-.43††	.07	-.13	-.23	.09	.03	.19	.11	.03	.02	-.04	.02
2	-.14	-.33**	.19	-.26*	-.14	-.06	.01	-.13	-.11	.05	.23	-.09	-.01
Italy													
1	-.17†	-.13	-.04	-.18††	.02	-.08	-.03	.02	.06	-.15	.04	.16*	-.10
2	-.20**	-.04	-.01	-.05	-.03	-.14*	-.09	-.07	-.01	.02	.05	.09	-.07
U.S.A.													
1	.00	.02	-.03	.09	.12	-.02	-.05	.06	-.11	-.02	-.03	.01	.02
2	-.16*	-.06	-.09	.05	.16†	.12	-.10	-.05	-.03	-.11	-.11	.00	.08
Yugoslavia													
1	-.05	-.05	-.01	-.06	.14	-.08	.00	-.18†	.01	-.10	-.15	.09	-.13
2	-.11	.03	.04	-.01	.05	.10	-.05	-.16*	.09	.02	-.14	.08	-.13

1 = Subordinate criticism
2 = Superior criticism

correlations are significant beyond the .05 level in the predicted direction. Six correlations are significant in the non-predicted direction. With the exception of Austria, most of the large correlations in the table are negative, indicating that sensitivity to either peer or superior criticism tends to increase normative complementarity.

No particular measure of normative complementarity relates to sensitivity to criticism in all countries. However, the Q 64c - Q 47c measure of normative complementarity tends to correlate in a direction opposite to that of the other measures in Austria and the United States, but correlates like other measures in Israel.

Conclusion: Normative complementarity is unrelated to sensitivity to peer and superior criticism.

Result XI. The correlations between felt responsibility and and normative complementarity are given in Tables D-67 to D-71. The average correlations are given below in Table 31. The correlations are predicted to be negative.

TABLE 31

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Responsibility for Work Group	Responsibility for Department	Responsibility for Plant
Austria	-.03	-.01	.01
Israel	-.07	-.09	-.04
Italy	-.02	-.05	-.03
U.S.A.	-.09	-.06	-.02
Yugoslavia	.05	.00	-.04

Twenty-seven of the correlations in Tables D-67 to D-71 are significant beyond the .05 level and ten of these are significant beyond the .01 level. Eleven of the significant correlations occur with the Q 62 - Q 44 and Q 63 - Q 6 measures of normative complementarity. There are no consistent differences among the three responsibility variables.

As is the case with a number of previous hypotheses, there is a tendency for several of the bases of power measures of normative complementarity to correlate in the non-predicted direction. This is the case here with Q 62c - Q 47c in Austria, Q 62e - Q 47e in Israel and Q 62d-Q 47d in Yugoslavia.

Conclusion: In all countries except Austria and Yugoslavia, the greater the responsibility felt for the work-group, the department and the plant, the greater is the normative complementarity.

Result XII. The correlations between the mobility aspiration index and normative complementarity are presented in Table 32. The correlations in the table are predicted to be positive. Fifteen correlations are significant beyond the .05 level and of these six are significant at the .01 level. The association between mobility aspirations and normative complementarity is strongest in Austria and the United States and weakest in Israel and Yugoslavia.

Conclusion: The greater the mobility aspirations of work-group members, the greater the normative complementarity.

Result XIII. The correlations between bases of advancement and normative complementarity are presented in Table 33. The correlations are predicted to be negative for index 1 and index 2 and positive for index 3. Across all countries, thirty-two correlations are significant beyond the .05 level and seventeen of these are significant at the .01

TABLE 32

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATION INDEX AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a.	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	.16*	.21**	.17*	.28**	.19*	.11	-.03	.11	-.02	.06	.13	.04	.11
Israel	-.01	.35**	.16	-.16	.01	-.22	.12	.20	-.11	-.12	-.14	-.04	-.08
Italy	-.02	.01	.12	-.05	.10	-.04	.17*	.16*	.07	.05	.06	-.04	-.09
U.S.A.	-.05	.03	-.02	.04	.15*	.03	.19**	.26**	-.10	.05	.13*	.15*	-.11
Yugoslavia	-.04	-.03	-.03	-.11	.15*	.21**	.08	.10	-.19	-.09	.04	-.07	.08

TABLE 33

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF ADVANCEMENT AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-A 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
Index 1	-.01	.07	-.01	.07	.12	.01	-.14	-.10	-.20*	-.21**	.09	.04	-.14
Index 2	-.12	.02	-.06	-.06	.09	-.09	-.04	.13	-.18*	-.12	.04	.03	.00
Index 3	.24**	-.07	-.01	-.18†	-.21†	-.16	.07	.02	.14	.11	-.03	.04	.06
Israel													
Index 1	-.15	.09	.08	-.24*	-.17	-.13	-.07	.06	-.06	.18	-.03	-.14	-.02
Index 2	-.03	.12	-.19	-.25*	-.17	-.17	-.04	.11	-.33**	-.01	-.16	-.07	-.16
Index 3	-.03	-.04	.11	-.09	-.06	.12	.04	-.17	.22*	.19	.10	.16	.09
Italy													
Index 1	-.17*	.04	-.14*	.25††	.10	.07	.09	-.23**	.05	-.06	.03	.01	.12
Index 2	-.30**	.02	-.15*	.27††	.04	.07	.11	-.17*	-.01	-.13	.03	.04	.09
Index 3	.24**	.07	-.01	.09	-.26††	.11	-.06	-.08	.17*	.01	-.17	-.07	.02
U.S.A.													
Index 1	-.20**	-.18**	-.11	-.01	-.01	.11	.15	-.23**	-.18**	-.02	-.03	-.23**	.01
Index 2	-.25**	-.18**	-.19**	.08	-.04	.10	.12	-.20**	-.17*	-.13*	.00	-.12	-.01
Index 3	.05	.32**	.02	-.03	-.05	-.07	-.12	-.07	.12	.16*	.01	.08	.01
Yugoslavia													
Index 1	.03	.16	-.05	-.02	.33††	.06	-.13	.08	-.08	.05	.02	-.12	-.01
Index 2	-.09	.10	-.07	.05	.29††	.06	.00	.11	-.09	.05	-.10	-.16	.02
Index 3	.04	-.11	-.06	.10	-.12	.08	.05	.26**	-.06	.18*	-.09	-.12	.18*

level. The relationship is strongest in the United States and weakest in Yugoslavia.

The correlations seem to be high with the Q 24 measure of normative complementarity in all countries. This measure concerns the interest which responsible people in the plant have for the welfare of employees. There is a tendency in a number of countries for the bases of power measures of normative complementarity to correlate in the non-predicted direction. The Q 62c - Q 47c measure correlates in the non-predicted direction in Austria and Italy; the Q 62b - Q 47b measure correlates in a similar manner in Italy, as do Q 62d - Q 47d and Q 62e - Q 47e in the United States. In Yugoslavia, there is also a tendency for the Q 63 - Q 6 measure to correlate in the non-predicted direction.

Conclusion: The more legitimate and organizationally functional bases of advancement are endorsed by work-group members, the greater is the normative complementarity. The more organizationally dysfunctional bases of advancement are endorsed, the less is the normative complementarity.

Result XIV. The correlations between bases of power and normative complementarity are presented in Tables D-72 to D-76. The correlations in the first three rows of each table are predicted to be negative, and the correlations in the last three rows are predicted to be positive.

The data in Tables D-72 to D-76 are complex and do not lend themselves to easy interpretation. The overall trends will be examined first. Fifteen correlations are significant (at .05 level) and in the predicted direction in Austria. There are twelve significant correlations in the United States and eleven in each of the remaining three countries. These data alone would seem to offer strong support for the hypothesis.

However an examination of the table will reveal a large number of significant correlations in the non-predicted direction. There are three such significant correlations (using a one-tailed test) in Austria, seven in Israel, four in Italy, six in the United States, and nine in Yugoslavia.

An examination of the individual bases of power sheds some light on the relationship with normative complementarity. The expert base of power has a total of three significant reversals across all countries, but also has seven significant correlations in the predicted direction. The coercive base of power has four significant reversals but also has eight significant correlations in the predicted direction. The law of the situation base of power has three significant reversals and seven significant correlations in the predicted direction. This pattern of correlations lends some support to the original hypothesis.

The referent base of power has seven significant reversals and three significant correlations in the predicted direction. The reward power base has five significant reversals and three correlations in the predicted direction. For the legitimate power base, there are three reversals and three correlations in the predicted direction. These data do not lend support to the hypothesis. The large number of significant correlations of either sign may in part be a manifestation of the differentiated nature of the normative complementarity concept.

An interesting finding in Tables D-72 to D-76 concerns the superior's use of a particular power base and the normative complementarity regarding that same power base. The appropriate correlations are underlined in the tables. Three of the five correlations between the superior's use of the expert power base and normative complementarity

are significant and indicate that the more a superior uses the expert power base, the greater the normative complementarity concerning this power base. The correlation in the United States is not significant and the correlation in Yugoslavia is significant at the .05 level, but opposite in size to those in Austria, Israel, and Italy.

Three of the five correlations between referent power and the corresponding normative complementarity measure are significant and negative. The significant correlations occur in Israel, the United States and Yugoslavia.

Four of the five correlations between the superior's use of law of the situation base of power and the corresponding normative complementarity measure are significant and negative. Only in the United States is the correlation non-significant.

The correlation between the use of reward power and the corresponding measure of normative complementarity is significantly positive (two-tailed) in Israel and in the United States and is non-significant in the remaining countries. Positive correlations were not expected.

All five of the coercive power base correlations are significant and positive. This same pattern was obtained with the reward power base. What these data mean is that the more a superior relies upon reward or coercive power, the less is the normative complementarity regarding this power base.

The legitimate power base correlations follow the same pattern as the referent power base correlations. In Israel, the United States and Yugoslavia the correlations are significant and negative.

Conclusion: Normative complementarity is positively related to the use of expert power and is negatively related to the use of coercive

power. Normative complementarity is unrelated to the use of reward, referent, law of the situation and legitimate bases of power.

Result XV. The correlations between personal influence and normative complementarity are presented in Table 34. The correlations in the table are predicted to be negative. Eighteen correlations are significant beyond the .05 level and ten of these are significant at the .01 level. The relationship is strongest in the United States (seven significant correlations, five at the .01 level) and weakest in Yugoslavia (no correlations significant).

The Q 64c - Q 47c measure of normative complementarity correlates in the non-predicted direction with personal influence in Austria and Yugoslavia, and the Q 64e - Q 47e measure correlates in the non-predicted direction in Israel and the United States.

Conclusion: The greater the personal influence of work-group members, the greater the normative complementarity.

Result XVI. The correlations between the discrepancy between ideal and actual personal influence and normative complementarity are presented in Table 35. The correlations are predicted to be positive. Six correlations are significant beyond the .05 level. The significant correlations occur in Austria and Yugoslavia and concern different measures of normative complementarity.

equivalent to intercorrelating the personal influence measure of normative consistency and all the measures of normative complementarity. The question of the interrelationships among the normative structure variables was dealt with in Chapter 5.

Conclusion: The discrepancy between ideal and actual personal control is related to normative complementarity only in Austria and Yugoslavia.

TABLE 34

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERSONAL INFLUENCE AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria													
Personal infl.	-.06	-.23**	-.05	-.07	.23†	.08	.03	.05	-.09	.00	.05	.04	-.08
Influence index	-.12	-.27**	-.09	-.08	.27††	-.02	.00	-.04	-.12	.00	.09	.14	-.14
Israel													
Personal infl.	-.15	-.28**	-.06	.01	.08	-.03	.17	-.09	-.17	.02	.08	-.13	-.13
Influence index	-.14	-.36**	-.05	.02	.03	-.01	.17	-.10	-.24*	.06	.06	-.05	-.13
Italy													
Personal infl.	-.14*	.13	-.13	.06	-.03	.05	.01	-.23**	-.01	.08	-.07	-.09	.13
Influence index	-.19*	.08	-.20**	.02	-.05	.13	-.04	-.27**	-.03	.00	-.09	-.16*	.05
U.S.A.													
Personal infl.	-.23**	-.31**	-.15**	-.08	.09	.07	.15†	-.04	-.12	-.03	.16†	-.04	-.02
Influence index	-.23**	-.40**	-.17*	-.02	.05	-.04	.07	-.11	-.20**	-.10	-.03	-.11	-.09
Yugoslavia													
Personal infl.	-.06	.13	-.11	.09	.08	.13	.06	.03	-.04	.06	.05	-.04	-.03
Influence index	-.06	.10	-.11	.12	.21†	.01	.03	-.07	-.03	.04	-.03	-.15	-.09

TABLE 35

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISCREPANCY BETWEEN IDEAL AND ACTUAL PERSONAL INFLUENCE AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Austria	.01	.02	-.03	.16*	.23**	-.13	-.05	-.15	-.05	.01	.24**	.16*	-.02
Israel	.15	-.05	-.01	-.12	.00	-.02	.16	-.12	-.21	-.06	.11	.14	-.04
Italy	.04	.13	-.06	.04	-.01	-.03	-.11	-.05	.06	.13	-.04	-.09	.06
U.S.A.	.08	-.06	-.15	.00	.00	-.01	-.04	-.12	-.08	.07	.06	-.09	.11
Yugoslavia	-.07	-.10	.20*	-.18	-.06	.01	.05	.20*	.06	-.11	.09	.10	-.07

Result XVII. The correlations between the measures of mental health and normative complementarity are presented in Tables D-77 to D-81. The average correlations are presented in Table 36. The correlations in the table are predicted to be negative.

The number of significant correlations beyond the .05 level and the .01 level in each country are: Austria, 29 and 12; Israel, 21 and 5; Italy, 12 and 5; U.S.A., 28 and 12; and Yugoslavia, 4 and 0.

The overall pattern of correlations indicates strong support for the hypothesis in all countries except Yugoslavia. As with other results, some measures of normative complementarity stand out as being important in each country. For example, the Q 64d - Q 47d and the Q 63 - Q 6 measures of normative complementarity stand out in Austria, while the Q 33 and Q 63 - Q 6 measures stand out in the United States.

Only certain dimensions correlate with mental health in each country, but once a measure correlates significantly with one dimension of mental health, it is likely to do so for other dimensions as well. The significant correlations in the tables appear to run in columns instead of rows, indicating that one measure of mental health is as good as another for predicting normative complementarity.

Conclusion: The greater the mental health of work-group members, the greater will be the normative complementarity. This relationship holds in all countries except Yugoslavia.

Summary: As with normative consensus, there are few consistent findings across the five countries for normative complementarity. Those hypotheses supported in all countries are IV (concerning communication with superior), IX (concerning attitudes toward superior), XII (concerning mobility aspirations), and XIII (concerning endorsement of functional

TABLE 36

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Mental Health	Alienation	Isolation	Powerlessness	Meaninglessness	Self-Alienation	Normlessness
Austria	-.07	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.02	-.05	-.06
Israel	-.05	-.09	-.09	-.08	-.10	-.07	-.05
Italy	-.05	-.01	.00	-.01	.01	-.06	.03
U.S.A.	-.09	-.06	-.07	-.05	-.04	-.02	-.07
Yugoslavia	.01	.01	.04	.02	.00	-.03	.01

and dysfunctional criteria for advancement). Hypothesis I (concerning sensitivity to criticism) is given no support in any country.

The pattern of results will be dealt with more fully in the summary to Chapter 7.

Normative Consistency Results

Intercorrelations of Normative Consistency Measures. The intercorrelations of the normative consistency measures in each country are given in Tables D-82 to D-86. The average intercorrelations of each measure are given in Table 37. On the average, the normative consistency measures intercorrelate more highly than the normative complementarity measures, but not as highly as the normative consensus measures. The five indices of normative consistency intercorrelate highly (.29 in Austria, .25 in Israel, .24 in Italy, .23 in the United States and .26 in Yugoslavia), but do not correlate highly with the influence measures (.05 in Austria, .07 in Israel, .09 in Italy, -.11 in the United States, .06 in Yugoslavia). The average intercorrelations are the same in all countries except the United States where the negative correlation between the single items and the indices produces a low average intercorrelation. The indices intercorrelate more highly with all measures than do the single items.

The single items do not intercorrelate highly: .09 in Austria, .04 in Israel, .06 in Italy, .08 in the United States, and .10 in Yugoslavia. The main conclusion, then, from this analysis is that the indices of normative consistency form an integrated set and do not correlate highly with the single item measures of normative consistency. The indices may be more reliable than the single items, and this fact may account for the higher correlations.

TABLE 37

AVERAGE INTERCORRELATIONS OF EACH NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURE WITH ALL OTHERS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria	.07	.03	.07	.06	.17	.13	.15	.11	.12
Israel	.10	.00	.12	-.02	.14	.09	.07	.20	.20
Italy	.05	.08	.10	.06	.16	.13	.10	.19	.16
U.S.A.	-.01	-.06	-.04	-.01	.09	.07	-.02	.06	.04
Yugoslavia	.09	.02	.12	.06	.18	.12	.12	.18	.11

*See page 290 for significance levels for normative consistency correlations.

Result I. The correlations between levels above and levels below and the measures of normative consistency are presented in Table 38. The hypothesis predicts a positive correlation between levels above and normative consistency and a negative correlation between levels below and normative consistency. Of the forty-five correlations between levels above and normative consistency, eight are significant (in the predicted direction) at the .05 level and three are significant in the non-predicted direction. Of the forty-five correlations between levels below and normative consistency, twelve are significant (in the predicted direction) at the .05 level and two are significant in the non-predicted direction. Of the five significant correlations in the non-predicted direction, three occur with Q 27d - Q 26d--the normative consistency of personal control. The discrepancy between actual and ideal personal control increases as the organizational hierarchy is scaled.

The decision-making index is significantly related to levels above and levels below in all countries except Yugoslavia. Normative consistency regarding the organization's processes of decision making is particularly sensitive to hierarchical position.

Conclusion: Normative consistency is related to hierarchical level as predicted in all countries except Yugoslavia. Normative consistency regarding personal control behaves in a manner opposite to that predicted.

Result II. The correlations between personal influence and normative consistency are presented in Table D-87. The average correlations are given in Table 39 below. As with other hypotheses, the correlations are not all significant (or non-significant) for the

TABLE 38

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN HIERARCHICAL LEVEL AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 27c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria									
Levels above	-.16	-.05	.10	-.07	.10	-.05	.28**	.07	.16*
Levels below	-.07	.05	-.01	-.03	-.28**	-.22**	-.11	-.13	-.17*
Israel									
Levels above	-.08	.00	.06	-.26†	.10	.30**	.17	.19*	.25*
Levels below	-.07	.17	-.14	.25†	-.08	-.16	-.23*	-.09	-.20*
Italy									
Levels above	.00	.05	-.06	-.14	-.15	-.06	.11	-.07	.16*
Levels below	-.05	-.09	.09	.08	.09	.08	-.15*	-.02	-.23**
U.S.A.									
Levels above	.05	-.09	-.06	-.15†	.08	.06	.14*	.09	.17*
Levels below	-.02	.08	.21††	.08	-.23**	-.17*	-.21**	-.10	-.22**
Yugoslavia									
Levels above	-.01	.14	.12	.08	-.15	-.23††	-.11	-.03	-.01
Levels below	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.23**	-.02	.00	.04	.01	-.04

measures of normative consistency. The average correlations in Table 39 indicate non-significant trends in the predicted direction. However, seven correlations in Table D-87 are significant (at the .05 level) in Austria, five in Israel, none in Italy, six in the United States and seven in Yugoslavia. The correlations indicate that the more personal control a work-group member experiences, the greater is the normative consistency in that work-group. This finding is not surprising since most measures of normative consistency deal with control and influence exercised within the organization.

TABLE 39

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27d - Q 26d	Authority Index
Austria	-.08	-.11
Israel	-.08	-.12
Italy	-.02	.00
U.S.A.	.02	-.06
Yugoslavia	-.10	-.11

In the United States four correlations between personal influence and normative consistency are positive and significant beyond the .05 level. The measures deal with worker influence and personal influence. The correlation with the personal influence measure is inconsistent with the authority index of normative consistency which correlates negatively with the authority index.

Conclusion: The more personal control a work-group member exercises, the higher is the normative consistency in the work-group. This relationship holds most strongly in Austria, Israel and Yugoslavia, with

no relationship in Italy and inconsistent relationships in the United States.

Result III. The correlations between participativeness of superior and normative consistency are presented in Table 40. The average correlations are -.04 in Austria, -.02 in Israel, -.03 in Italy, -.02 in the United States and -.03 in Yugoslavia. Two correlations (of forty-five) are significant at the .05 level. Both occur in Italy.

Conclusion: There is no association between normative consistency and participativeness of superior, except in Italy.

Result IV. The correlations between supportiveness of superior and normative consistency are presented in Table 41. As is the case with participativeness of superior, the average correlations are low: -.02 in Austria, -.03 in Israel, -.01 in Italy, .00 in the United States and -.06 in Yugoslavia. Five correlations among the forty-five are significant at the .05 level.

Conclusion: Supportiveness of superior is not related to normative consistency.

Result V. The correlations between attitude toward superior and normative consistency are given in Tables D-88 to D-92. The average correlations are presented in Table 42. The correlations for index 1 and 3 are predicted to be positive and the correlations for index 2 and 4 are predicted to be negative. In all countries combined, nine correlations are significant at the .01 level and eleven are significant at the .05 level. Most support for the hypothesis occurs in Austria, Israel and Yugoslavia.

TABLE 40

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria	-.06	.04	-.09	.05	.04	-.04	-.11	-.08	-.13
Israel	-.05	.08	.05	-.07	-.05	-.06	-.14	.09	-.08
Italy	-.15*	.01	.08	.08	.11	-.01	-.12	-.12	-.14*
U.S.A.	-.08	.05	.05	.08	-.04	.00	-.10	-.10	-.06
Yugoslavia	-.13	-.06	-.02	-.07	.01	-.03	.03	.04	-.04

TABLE 41

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUPPORTIVENESS OF SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria	-.01	-.09	-.09	.01	.10	.01	.06	-.14*	.01
Israel	-.14	.26†	-.04	-.04	-.04	.09	-.21*	-.08	-.10
Italy	.01	.14	.02	.09	.03	.00	-.07	-.10	.00
U.S.A.	.00	.14	.08	.03	-.05	-.07	-.09	.03	-.09
Yugoslavia	.01	-.08	.07	.00	-.19*	-.15*	-.16*	.03	-.04

TABLE 42

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Index 1	Index 2	Index 3	Index 4
Austria	-.01	-.03	-.06	-.02
Israel	.11	-.05	.11	-.05
Italy	-.04	.04	-.02	.03
U.S.A.	.01	-.02	.02	-.02
Yugoslavia	.08	-.05	.05	-.04

In Italy and the United States, the correlations between normative consistency and Q 27b - Q 26b (manager and superior control) are in a direction opposite to that predicted. Apparently, in Italy and the United States the more favorable the attitude of subordinates toward superiors, the less the normative consistency concerning managerial and supervisory control.

As with other normative structure variable measures, certain measures of normative consistency correlate highly with attitude toward superior in different countries. In Austria, Q 27c - Q 26c produces the highest correlations, in Israel Q 27a - Q 26a and the total control index are the best correlating measures while Q 27b - Q 26b are the best measures in Italy, the United States and Yugoslavia. The authority index is also important in Yugoslavia.

Conclusion: There is a general trend in Austria, Israel and Yugoslavia for favorable attitudes toward superior to be correlated with high normative consistency. In Italy and the United States for the Q 27b - Q 26b measure of normative consistency, more favorable attitudes toward the superior are associated with low levels of normative consistency.

Result VI. The correlations between the mobility aspiration index and the normative consistency measures in each country are presented in Table 43. Seven of the forty-five correlations are significant in the predicted direction beyond the .05 level. Three of the seven significant correlations occur in the United States, where the association between mobility aspirations and normative consistency is strongest. In Italy there is a trend for high mobility aspirations to be associated with low normative consistency. The correlations in Austria, Israel and Yugoslavia neither support nor counter the hypothesis.

Conclusion: The hypothesis is supported only in the United States.

Result VII. The correlations between bases of power and normative consistency are given in Tables D-93 to D-97. The average correlations are given below in Table 44. As shown in the tables in the Appendix, twenty-three correlations are significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction. Five correlations are significant at the .05 level in the non-predicted direction. The evidence supports the hypothesis. The average correlations, however, are uniformly low since the effect of many of the significant correlations are countered by other significant correlations of opposite sign.

Conclusion: The hypothesis that normative consistency is related to the superior's bases of power is supported in Austria, Yugoslavia, and Israel, and is not supported in Italy and the United States.

Summary. None of the normative consistency hypotheses are accepted or rejected in all countries. The differentiated nature of the normative consistency results parallels those of normative consensus

TABLE 43

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATION INDEX AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 27c	Q 37d-Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria	-.11	-.20*	.01	.09	.12	.26††	.12	.04	.08
Israel	-.11	-.29**	.19	-.03	-.19*	.05	.23†	-.12	-.02
Italy	.21††	.11	.12	.01	-.06	.04	-.02	.14	.17†
U.S.A.	-.21**	.04	.02	-.20**	-.04	-.15*	.00	.01	.00
Yugoslavia	-.09	.10	-.18*	-.10	-.01	.13	-.03	.06	.15

TABLE 44

AVERAGE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Expert	Referent	Law of Situation	Reward	Coercive	Legitimate
Austria	-.03	.02	-.01	.01	.08	.04
Israel	.00	.06	.04	-.06	-.03	.09
Italy	.00	.05	-.01	.00	.00	.03
U.S.A.	-.01	.00	.01	-.02	.01	.03
Yugoslavia	.00	.01	-.09	.00	-.05	-.03

and normative complementarity. Strongest support is offered for Hypothesis I (concerning hierarchical level) and Hypothesis V (concerning attitudes toward superior). Weakest support is offered for Hypothesis IV (concerning supportiveness of superior). See the summary to Chapter 7 for the overall pattern of normative consistency results.

CHAPTER 7

EVALUATION AND INTEGRATION OF RESULTS

In Chapter 6 the results for the individual hypotheses were presented. In this chapter, these separate findings will be brought together in an effort to identify commonalities among the three normative structure variables. The process of integrating the separate results will also help to evaluate the theoretical usefulness of the concept of normative structure and to identify avenues for further research.

Effects of the Research Design

Although the major thrust of this study was to examine a number of determinants and correlates of three normative structure variables, we may use the variables to test the effects of the major dimensions of the research design. The major dimensions of the design include country, plant size and plant technology. Plant size and technology were not systematically manipulated but were used for matching the plants in the different countries. Because these two dimensions were not systematically varied, their effects could not be optimally tested. It is not surprising, then, that most of the normative structure variables do not differ systematically across plant sizes or plant technologies.

The countries represented in this sample, however, represent different political and economic ideologies, and were believed, a priori, to differ from one another. The analyses of variance using the three normative structure variables bear out this expectation. The degree of

similarity among the five questions was commented upon in Chapter 5. It is also interesting to examine the degree of similarity among the countries on the basis of the relationship between the correlates and the normative structure variables in each country.

Although there are many exceptions and although the judgment is largely impressionistic, it can be said that the pattern of the relationships are most similar in Austria and the United States, with the relationships in Italy being somewhat different, but closer to Austria and the United States than to any other country. Israel seems to exhibit yet a different pattern of relationships and Yugoslavia displays relationships that differ from those in the other four countries.

Nature of Normative Structure

The intercorrelations among the measures of each of the three normative structure variables suggest, on the surface, that the three variables behave quite differently. The measures of normative consensus intercorrelate highly, the measures of normative complementarity do not intercorrelate, and the measures of normative consistency correlate moderately (many at the .05 level of significance).

Does this pattern of relationships indicate that normative consensus is a more unitary concept than either normative complementarity or normative consistency or are there other explanations for the differences? The size of the average correlations is expected to be a function of the diversity of content areas sampled by the measures. Although the differences are not great, there appears to be a greater diversity among the normative complementarity measures than among the normative consensus and normative consistency measures. The normative complementarity

measures concern communication, freedom to express complaints and methods of improving the job as well as the authority and influence areas tapped by the normative consensus and consistency measures.

A second reason for the low intercorrelations among the normative complementarity measures may concern differences in reliability. It is interesting to note that the normative consistency measures which are indices correlate more highly with each other than do the measures which are based on single items. The normative consensus measures may be more reliable than the normative complementarity and consistency measures because they are based on the scores of at least two group members, whereas roughly one half of the normative complementarity and consistency correlations are based on the responses of only one subordinate or one superior-subordinate pair.

Integration of Normative Structure

The three sets of hypotheses presented in Chapter 6 concern the correlates of each of the normative structure variables taken individually. It is also possible to consider the normative structure variables as an integrated set and to examine particular correlates in relation to the set. Those correlates which are common to two or more of the normative structure variables are presented in Table 45.

Of the thirty-three predicted relationships, twenty-one are supported, and twelve are not supported.

Of the five correlates for which a similar relationship is predicted across the three normative structure variables, two do have similar relationships. The two are hierarchical level and attitude toward superior.

TABLE 45

THE PREDICTED AND ACTUAL PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CORRELATES AND NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES

	Normative Consensus		Normative Complementarity		Normative Consistency	
	Predicted	Actual*	Predicted	Actual	Predicted	Actual
Hierarchical level	+	+	+	+	+	+
Size of work group	-	0	-	0		
Heterogeneity	-	-	-	-		
Participativeness of superior	+	0	+	+	+	0
Supportiveness of superiors	+	0	+	+	+	0
Attitude toward superior	+	0	+	+	+	+
Personal control			+	+	+	+
Bases of power						
a) referent, expert law of situation	+	0	+	+	+	+
b) reward, coercive legitimate	-	0	-	-	-	-
Communication						
a) superior	0	+	+	+		
b) peers	+	0	0	0		
Mobility aspirations	-	-	+	+	+	0
Mental health	+	+	+	+		

*If the data in three or more of the five countries support the hypothesis, it is considered as confirmed in this table.

The three normative structure variables studied here are quite different from one another operationally, although they have close theoretical linkages. It is rather interesting, then, that the three variables have as many common correlates as this analysis indicates. Many social-psychological concepts such as those popularized by Likert suffer from the problem of "halo-effects"--that is, a respondent who is relatively satisfied with his superior is also likely to enjoy his job, feel he is getting a fair break in the organization and to be relatively well-adjusted. Consequently, concepts such as leadership, organizational climate, job satisfaction, etc., will all correlate with each other and with the same predictors and correlates. The correlations are partly due to a tendency of respondents to answer either favorably or unfavorably to a series of questionnaire items. This same argument cannot explain the relationships among the normative structure variables, however, because the measures are derived statistically from respondents' scores (as with normative consensus) or must be related to another score (as with normative complementarity).

Despite the low intercorrelations between the measures of normative complementarity, twelve of the thirteen predicted relationships in Table 45 are confirmed, while only four of twelve are confirmed for normative consensus and five of eight are confirmed for normative consistency. (This pattern of results may be due to the fact that the reliability of the normative complementarity measures is greater than the reliability of the measures of the other two normative structure variables [see page 136].) The pattern of significant relationships in Table 45 should not be interpreted as indicating that normative complementarity is the central or most critical of the normative structure variables studied here.

Considering only those predictors and correlates in this thesis, one would reach this conclusion, but it must be remembered that another group of predictors might relate quite differently to the three normative structure variables.

Summary of Results for each Hypothesis in each Country

Table 46 summarizes the results for each hypothesis in each of the five countries. Two plus signs (++) indicate strong support for the hypothesis, one plus indicates moderate (and perhaps inconsistent) support, a zero (0) indicates no support, one minus (-) indicates evidence which moderately counters the hypothesis, and two minuses (--) indicate strong evidence against the hypothesis. Overall, one hundred and eighty-five predictions were made (thirty-seven hypotheses in each of the five countries). The data strongly support the hypothesis in sixty-five cases, and moderately support the hypothesis in thirty-one cases. There are seventy-three cases of no support, eight cases with moderate support against the hypotheses, and eight cases with strong support against the hypotheses. Five of the eight cases with strong support against the hypotheses occur with the correlations between communication with superior and normative consensus.

The degree of support for the hypotheses in the different countries is interesting. Twenty-two hypotheses are lacking support in Yugoslavia, while there are thirteen in Austria, fourteen in Israel, fourteen in Italy and ten in the United States. It is the author's impression that the unreliability of the data in Yugoslavia is in large measure responsible for the general lack of support. The correlations in this country fluctuate more than do those in the other four countries.

TABLE 46

SUMMARY OF RESULTS FOR EACH HYPOTHESIS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Consensus Hypotheses					
I	++	+	+	++	0
II	-	-	+	-	0
III	++	++	++	++	++
IV	+	0	0	+	+
V	++	0	++	+	0
VI	+	0	0	+	0
VII	0	0	0	0	0
VIII	0	--	0	0	++
IX	0	0	++	0	0
X	0	0	0	++	0
XI	--	--	--	--	--
XII	-	-	-	-	-
XIII	++	++	0	++	0
Complementarity Hypotheses					
I	+	+	+	++	+
II	0	0	0	++	0
III	++	0	++	++	0
IV	0	++	++	++	++
V	0	0	0	--	0
VI	+	+	+	+	0
VII	++	++	++	++	0
VIII	++	++	++	++	0
IX	+	+	+	+	+
X	0	0	0	0	0
XI	0	++	++	++	0
XII	++	+	++	++	+
XIII	++	++	++	++	+
XIV	+	+	+	+	0
XV	0	++	++	++	0
XVI	++	0	0	0	++
XVII	++	++	++	++	0
Consistency Hypotheses					
I	++	++	++	++	0
II	++	++	0	0	++
III	0	0	++	0	0
IV	0	0	0	0	++
V	++	++	0	0	++
VI	0	0	--	++	0
VII	++	+	0	0	+

Seventeen of the hypotheses are strongly supported in the United States, fifteen in Austria, fourteen in Italy, twelve in Israel, and seven in Yugoslavia.

The pattern of results in Table 46 indicates that there is greater consistency horizontally along the rows than there is vertically along the columns. This means that the relationships between the predictors and the normative structure variables are more uniform across the five countries than they are within any given country. The implications of these results are discussed in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis was undertaken in an attempt to further clarify and extend the concept of normative structure proposed by Georgopoulos (1957, 1965). Three dimensions of normative structure are examined--normative consensus, normative complementarity and normative consistency. Data from a cross-national study of industrial organizations provide a unique opportunity to examine a number of determinants and correlates of normative structure. In theory, the dimensions of normative structure can be defined at the group and collectivity levels of analysis, and some normative structure variables can be defined at the individual level of analysis as well. This analysis focuses on normative structure variables defined at the group level. The scores of all work-groups in each country were correlated with certain structural and social-psychological variables also defined at the group level.

The analysis indicates that the measures of normative consensus used in this study intercorrelate highly (roughly one half of the average intercorrelations are significant at the .05 level) and the normative complementarity (and normative consistency) measures do not intercorrelate as highly. The interpretation offered in Chapter 7 suggests that the low average intercorrelations are due to the different content areas tapped by the different measures. Contributing factors might also include (1) the imperfect reliabilities of the measures, with a resultant instability of relationships; and (2) the groups in each of the countries are

so heterogeneous that the average relationships are attenuated. Dimensions on which the groups differ include plant (and the technology employed in the plant), hierarchical level within the plant, size and nature of the organizational subsystem of which they are a part.

The normative structure variables were found to differ significantly in the five countries, with the United States and Israel having the most favorable scores on the normative structure variables (i.e., high normative consensus, complementarity and consistency) and with Italy having the least favorable scores. The normative structure variables were not found to differ consistently with the five technologies and the two categories of plant size represented in the sample. The two-way interactions among country, size of plant, and technology indicate no consistent patterns.

The main body of the paper reports the association between each of the normative structure variables and a number of hypothesized predictors and correlates. The results indicate that normative consensus is associated with hierarchical level, homogeneity of work-group members' backgrounds, personal control, communication with superior mobility aspirations and mental health. Normative consensus is not related to size of the work-group, participativeness of superior, supportiveness of superior, attitude toward superior, bases of power and communication with peers.

Normative complementarity is found to relate to hierarchical level, superior-subordinate differences, participativeness and supportiveness of superior, attitude toward superior, personal control, bases of power, communication with superior, mobility aspirations and mental health. Normative complementarity is not related to size of work-group

and communication with peers.

Normative consistency relates to hierarchical level, attitude toward superior, personal control, and bases of power. Normative consistency is unrelated to participativeness and supportiveness of superior and mobility aspirations.

Theoretical and Methodological Shortcomings

Because of the exploratory nature of this study, the results are not offered as firm conclusions, but rather as tentative findings which require further refinement and elaboration. It is important to consider here a number of factors that preclude our making firm statements about the three normative structure variables.

In Chapter 3, a series of hypotheses were presented which outline the predicted relationships between each of the normative structure variables and selected correlates and predictors. Each hypothesis was stated in general theoretical terms, and no differential predictions were made for the five countries. Preliminary analyses indicated that the normative structure variables differ in the five countries, yet there are no theoretical reasons for expecting different relationships between the correlates and the normative structure variables. It is difficult to make precise statements about why the countries differ. Although it is commonly understood that the socialist and the capitalist societies studied here differ in values and ideology concerning the exercise of authority and differ in certain formal organizational mechanisms and structures through which authority is exercised, the researcher cannot consult any creed or charter which might allow him to make differential predictions in the five countries. Comparative organizational research is in its infancy and differential predictions must wait for both a

refinement of our theoretical models and a better understanding of how the cultural norms in different countries influence organizational dynamics.

Although the hypotheses were stated in general terms, the results were computed and interpreted separately for each of the five countries. This strategy follows from the differences in normative structure variables obtained in the five countries. The theoretical model might just as well have been tested by pooling all the data together and ignoring country differences. It is important, however, to determine the extent to which the theoretical model is applicable to different cultures. The emphasis in this thesis has not been to focus on the country differences per se, or to suggest why the relationships differ in some of the countries, but rather to test the normative structure model in different cultures and to determine the extent of its applicability in these different cultures.

The results indicate that the overall level of the normative structure variables does not seem to follow the socialist-capitalist distinction as anticipated. The highest levels of normative consensus, complementarity and consistency are found in the United States and Israel and the lowest levels of the three normative structure variables are found in Italy. There are apparently more subtle factors influencing the strength of normative structure variables in the five countries.

As Table 46 in Chapter 7 shows, the relationships between the correlates and the normative structure variables are similar, although not identical, in the five countries. If the relationships were compared in the five countries, Austria, Italy and the United States would form one cluster, with Israel displaying a different pattern, and

Yugoslavia displaying yet another pattern.

It was mentioned in Chapter 7 that the normative complementarity hypotheses received the greatest support in this thesis. The hypotheses, however, concern selected predictors and correlates of normative structure and do not necessarily represent the most important predictors. Because the hypotheses concern a selected subset of predictors and because the universe of possible predictors is not known, an unrepresentative impression may have been created in this thesis. Further research is required before firm statements about the relative importance of the normative structure variables can be made.

The findings in this thesis may also be a function of the specific measures of the normative structure variables used here. The content-boundedness of the results was mentioned earlier as a possible interpretation for the great variability in the size of the correlations between the various measures of a normative structure variable and a given predictor. Unfortunately, there is not sufficient comparability of content in the three normative structure variables to put the content-boundedness hypothesis to test. The reader may have noticed that many of the average correlations (summed across all measures of a normative structure variable) given in the text are non-significant. All measures do not correlate highly with a given predictor, although several measures will. No particular measures are consistently significant within a given country, but, as the hypotheses concerning bases of power indicate, some measures are important in all countries and others are not important in all countries. Future research should explore the content issue in greater depth to determine if it is as important as suggested here.

Implications of Results

Comparative Research

The pattern of results indicates that there may be significant uniformities in organizational dynamics in a variety of cultures. Although the predicted relationships are confirmed more often in Austria, Italy and the United States than in Israel and Yugoslavia, the results show more commonality across the five countries than inconsistencies. Assuming that our measurements are sensitive to cultural differences, we can conclude that the relationships between normative structure variables and selected predictors are relatively uniform in a variety of cultures. These results might suggest that other theories or models might find support in cultures other than the North American.

Theories of Organization

The intent of this thesis is to explore the theoretical usefulness of the normative structure model of organizations. The research reported here does not directly support or contradict any of the major theories of organizations. The failure of supportiveness and participativeness of superior and attitude toward superior to relate to all three of the normative structure variables might cause concern among the advocates of Likert's theory, but other variables from Likert's theory do find support in this thesis.

Although the Katz and Kahn theory of organization is quite separate from the normative structure model of organization, the concept of norm is a key element in both theories. It will be recalled that the major integrating concepts in Katz and Kahn's theory are roles, norms, and values. The research reported in this thesis reveals the complex interactions between different organizational norms and the differentiated

interplay between the normative structure variables. The normative structure model allows the researcher to examine the constellation of norms which combine to produce overarching and general values. Although the content of the norms studied in this thesis is not sufficiently broad to plan the linkages between clusters of norms and organizational values, the normative structure model can nevertheless perform such a function. The model holds promise as an inductive approach to theory building--as new dimensions and norms are added, the complexities of organizational norms and values pointed out by Katz and Kahn will become more clearly understood.

Applied Questions and Social Issues

Although the focus of this thesis has been the exploration of the usefulness of the normative structure model, research on norms and sharedness of perceptions and attitudes has implications for issues of freedom, conformity and conflict. Research of the sort reported here cannot provide satisfying answers to the perennial questions concerning these social issues, but the researcher should address himself to these issues. In the discussion of norms and normative structure, words such as "sharedness," "commonality" and "uniformity" were mentioned--but implicit in these concepts are others, such as "conformity," "loss of identity," "loss of individualism." It is the author's belief, however, that mutuality, shared understandings, recriprocal perceptions and values do not necessarily imply the spectre of the organization man. Research indicates that if our large social systems are to survive and are to function effectively, then there must be organizational norms which are broadly shared and accepted.

Before this statement is interpreted as nothing more than an apology for uniformity in our social systems, it is important to consider (1) uniformity concerning which norms? and (2) uniformity arrived at in which manner? Considering the second question first, we can ask: Do subordinates' attitudes move to become uniform with those of their superiors, or do the attitudes of superiors change, or is there joint movement? This question is not addressed here, but the results suggest that some sort of joint movement occurs. The results in Table 45 show that high levels of normative complementarity correlate with favorable attitudes toward superior, high personal control and high supportiveness and participativeness of superior. These correlations would not prevail if movement or accommodation were one-sided since forced compliance would breed resentment, conflict and unfavorable attitudes. This interpretation of the data is speculative since no distinction was made between forced compliance to norms (where no alternatives are provided) and the internalization of norms.

The first question--uniformity concerning which norms?--concerns the content of the norm. High normative consensus and complementarity does not necessarily imply group tyranny, since the consensus may concern a norm of freedom of expression or a norm which states that differences should be encouraged. There should, of course, be consensus on the overall purpose or objectives of the organization, but there need not be total agreement about every day-to-day activity and sub-goal of the organization.

Future Research

The research presented in this paper concerns normative structure variables defined at the group level of analysis. It is conceivable, however, to consider normative structure variables defined at the collectivity level of analysis. Just as a system can be defined in terms of the total amount of control exercised within it, the slope of the control curve, and a score on the Likert System, so too can an organization be characterized in terms of normative structure variables. A plant or system score on normative consensus, for example, might be derived from the average normative consensus scores of all groups within the plant. There are, of course, certain complexities associated with the averaging of the scores of groups within plants which differ in hierarchical level within the plant and in the nature of the sub-system of the plant of which they are a part. It is also possible to develop questions, the content of which measures normative structure variables at the plant level.

The levels of analysis question has other implications for the study of normative structure. Of the five normative structure variables defined by Georgopoulos (1957) normative consistency, and normative congruence can be measured at the individual level of analysis. In other words an isolated individual can provide scores for himself on these two normative structure variables. Normative consensus and normative complementarity, however, are group-level concepts, since an individual's score must be related to others' scores (peers or superior). It would be interesting to determine the extent to which the normative structure variables differ simply on the basis of their being measured at different levels of analysis. Also, it would be interesting to determine the

extent of correspondence between normative structure variables defined at the plant level and at the group level. Such an analysis would require a probability sample of organization members.

Another avenue for further research concerns the content area or organization norms. A systematic exploration of the content domain of organization norms is required. The content of the norms in this study was restricted to the general area of power and influence (an exception is the opportunity index of normative consistency), and although considerable variety of relationships was evident, it is not clear whether or not the differences in content were responsible for this variability.

APPENDIX A

SELECTED INTERVIEW AND QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS

Respondent No. _____

INTERVIEW

1. How long have you worked in this plant?
(Circle one number)

   1 Less than six months

   2 Between six months and a year

   3 Between a year and two years

   4 Between two and three years

   5 Between three and five years

   6 Between five and ten years

   7 Between ten and twenty years

   8 Over twenty years

2. How long have you worked in your present job within this plant?
(Circle one number)

   1 Less than six months

   2 Between six months and a year

   3 Between a year and two years

   4 Between two and three years

   5 Between three and five years

   6 Between five and ten years

   7 Between ten and twenty years

   8 Over twenty years

4. What is your average monthly wage before taxes?

_____ per month

(Please note that we must establish the identity of the respondent's immediate superior. We agreed to use essentially the same procedure as in the pretest.)

7. Sex? (to be coded by interviewer)

1 Male

2 Female

Respondent No. _____

QUESTIONNAIRE

As you know, this research concerns the life of people in industry. We begin by asking you some questions about your work.

1. In your work, to what extent can you:
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Not at all	A little	Some-what	Quite a bit	Very much
a) Learn new things?	1	2	3	4	5
b) Use your own ideas?	1	2	3	4	5
c) Do interesting work?	1	2	3	4	5
d) Use your skills, knowledge and abilities?	1	2	3	4	5
e) Talk with other people during work time?	1	2	3	4	5
f) Decide your own pace of work?	1	2	3	4	5
g) Have authority over other people?	1	2	3	4	5

We have just asked questions about certain characteristics of your work. Now we would like to know something about your aspirations concerning these characteristics.

2. In your work, to what extent would you like to:
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Not at all	A little	Some-what	Quite a bit	Very much
a) Learn new things?	1	2	3	4	5
b) Use your own ideas?	1	2	3	4	5
c) Do interesting work?	1	2	3	4	5
d) Use your skills, knowledge and abilities	1	2	3	4	5
e) Talk with other people during work time?	1	2	3	4	5
f) Decide your own pace of work?	1	2	3	4	5
g) Have authority over other people?	1	2	3	4	5

4. Are there real possibilities for people like you to advance in this plant?
(Circle one number)

1 no possibilities at all

2 few possibilities

3 some possibilities

4 many possibilities

5 very many possibilities

5. Do you think that at some time in the future you will have a position in this plant higher than your present position? (Circle one number)

   1 Not at all probable

   2. Slightly probable

   3 Somewhat probable

   4 Very probable

   5 Almost certain

6. In your kind of job, is it usually better to let your superiors worry about introducing better or faster ways of doing the work? (Circle one number)

   1 Strongly agree

   2 Agree

   3 Uncertain

   4 Disagree

   5 Strongly disagree

11. To what extent do you feel really responsible for the success of: (Circle one number on each line across.)

	Not at all	A little	Some-what	Quite a bit	Very much
Your own work group	1	2	3	4	5
Your department	1	2	3	4	5
The whole plant	1	2	3	4	5

16. How important are each of the following factors for getting ahead in this company?
(Circle one number on each line across)

		Not at all	Slight	Moderate	Great	Very great
a)	Quality of work done	1	2	3	4	5
b)	Quantity of work done	1	2	3	4	5
c)	His supervisor's opinion of him	1	2	3	4	5
d)	Dependability	1	2	3	4	5
e)	Creativeness, inventiveness	1	2	3	4	5
f)	Seniority in the plant	1	2	3	4	5
g)	Having friends in higher management	1	2	3	4	5
h)	Having good professional knowledge	1	2	3	4	5
i)	Taking initiative	1	2	3	4	5
j)	Having outstanding ability to work with people	1	2	3	4	5
k)	Loyalty to the company	1	2	3	4	5
l)	Recommendations of a political or religious nature	1	2	3	4	5
m)	Elbowing one's way to get ahead	1	2	3	4	5

17. How important should each of the following factors be for getting ahead in this company?
(Circle one number on each line across)

		Not at all	Slight	Moderate	Great	Very great
a)	Quality of work done	1	2	3	4	5
b)	Quantity of work done	1	2	3	4	5
c)	His supervisor's opinion of him	1	2	3	4	5
d)	Dependability	1	2	3	4	5
e)	Creativeness, inventiveness	1	2	3	4	5
f)	Seniority in the plant	1	2	3	4	5
g)	Having friends in higher management	1	2	3	4	5
h)	Having good professional knowledge	1	2	3	4	5
i)	Taking initiative	1	2	3	4	5
j)	Having outstanding ability to work with people	1	2	3	4	5
k)	Loyalty to the company	1	2	3	4	5
l)	Recommendations of a political or religious nature	1	2	3	4	5
m)	Elbowing one's way to get ahead	1	2	3	4	5

18. How good is your immediate superior in his relations with the people he supervises?
(Circle one number)

1 He is very good at this.

2 He is good at this.

3 He is fairly good at this.

4 He is not good at this.

5 He is poor at this.

19. How good is your immediate superior in organizing the work of your group?
(Circle one number)

1 He is very poor

2 Poor

3 Fair

4 Good

5 Very good

20. How adequate are the technical and professional skills of your immediate superior?
(Circle one number)

1 Poor

2 Fair

3 Good

4 Very good

5 Excellent

21. Do you like your immediate superior as a person?
(Circle one number)

1 Very much

2 Quite a bit

3 Somewhat

4 A little

5 Not at all

22. How well does your immediate superior do in reconciling the interests of your work group with that of other work groups in the plant?

1 He is very good at this.

2 He is good at this.

3 He is fairly good at this.

4 He is not good at this.

5 He is poor at this.

23. All in all, does your immediate superior do a good job as a superior?
(Circle one number)

1 He does a poor job.

2 He does a fair job.

3 He does a good job.

4 He does a very good job.

5 He does an excellent job.

24. Do you think the responsible people here have a real interest in the welfare of those who work here?
(Circle one number)

1 They have no interest at all.

2 They have a little interest.

3 They have some interest.

3

4 They have quite a bit of interest.

5 They have a very great interest.

25. Do the responsible people in this plant improve working conditions only when forced to?
(Circle one number)

1 They improve working conditions only when they are forced to.

2 They seldom try to improve working conditions without being forced to.

3 Sometimes they try to improve working conditions without being forced to.

4 Often they try to improve working conditions without being forced to.

5 They always try to improve working conditions without being forced to.

26. How much influence do the following groups or persons actually have on what happens in this plant?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Very little influence	Little influence	Some influence	Quite a lot of influence	A very great deal of influence
a) Plant manager and his executive board	1	2	3	4	5
b) All other managerial or supervisory personnel	1	2	3	4	5
c) The workers as a group	1	2	3	4	5
d) You, personally	1	2	3	4	5

27. In your opinion, how much influence <u>should</u> the following groups or persons have on what happens in this plant?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Very little influence	Little influence	Some influence	Quite a lot of influence	A very great deal of influence
a) Plant manager and his executive board	1	2	3	4	5
b) All other managerial or supervisory personnel	1	2	3	4	5
c) The workers as a group	1	2	3	4	5
d) You, personally	1	2	3	4	5

30. Suppose your immediate superior told you that you did some job badly. How much would it bother you?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 A little

3 Somewhat

4 Quite a bit

5 Very much

31. Suppose some of your coworkers told you that you did some job badly. How much would this bother you?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 A little

3 Somewhat

4 Quite a bit

5 Very much

32. What are the attitudes of the company members toward plant managers?
(Circle one number)

1 Attitudes are strongly opposed to the management.

2 Attitudes are somewhat opposed to the management.

3 Attitudes support the management.

4 Attitudes strongly support the management.

33. What do workers communicate to their superiors?
(Circle one number)

1 They communicate all relevant information accurately.

2 They communicate mainly what their superiors like to hear.

3 They communicate only what their superiors like to hear.

4 They distort all information.

34. Do workers participate in making important decisions related to their work?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 They never participate but they are sometimes asked for their opinions and suggestions.

3 They jointly decide about many important things concerning their work.

4 They jointly decide about all important things concerning their work.

35. Should workers participate in making important decisions related to their work?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 They should never participate but they should sometimes be asked for their opinions and suggestions.

3 They should jointly decide about many important things concerning their work.

4 They should jointly decide about all important things concerning their work.

36. Do workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 They never participate but they are sometimes asked for their opinions and suggestions.

3 They jointly decide about many important things concerning general plant problems.

4 They jointly decide about all important things concerning general plant problems.

37. Should workers participate in making important decisions related to general plant problems?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 They should never participate but they should sometimes be asked for their opinions and suggestions.

3 They should jointly decide about many important things concerning general plant problems.

4 They should jointly decide about all important things concerning general plant problems.

38. In this plant, are decisions made by the persons who have the most adequate and accurate information?
(Circle one number)

1 Rarely

2 Sometimes

3 Often

4 Always

39. When decisions are being made, are the people affected asked for their opinions and suggestions?
(Circle one number)

1 They are almost never asked for their opinions and suggestions.

2 They are sometimes asked.

3 They are usually asked.

4 They are almost always asked for their opinions and suggestions.

40. In your opinion, when decisions are being made <u>should</u> the people affected be asked for their opinions and suggestions?
(Circle one number)

1 They should never be asked for their opinions and suggestions.

2 They should sometimes be asked.

3 They should usually be asked.

4 They should almost always be asked for their opinions and suggestions.

41. Does your immediate superior ask your opinion when a problem comes up that involves your work?
(Circle one number)

1 He always asks my opinion

2 Often asks

3 Sometimes asks

4 Seldom asks

5 He never asks my opinion

42. Is your immediate superior inclined to take into account your opinions and suggestions?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 A little

3 Somewhat

4 Quite a bit

5 Very much

43. Is your immediate superior friendly and easily approached if there are problems?
(Circle one number)

1 Not at all

2 To a very little extent

3 To some extent

4 To a considerable extent

5 To a very great extent

44. Does your immediate superior make people under him feel free to take their complaints to him?
(Circle one number)

1 He makes them feel completely free

2 Quite free

3 Fairly free

4 Not too free

5 Not at all free

45. Would you want to have your immediate superior changed?
(Circle one number)

1 I am definitely opposed to having him changed.

2 Somewhat opposed

3 Indifferent

4 Somewhat for having him changed

5 Definitely for having him changed

46. Do you have trust in your immediate superior?
(Circle one number)

1 Never

2 Rarely

3 Sometimes

4 Almost always

5 Always

47. When you do what your immediate superior requests you to do on the job, why do you do it?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Not at all	To a very little extent	To some extent	To a considerable extent	To a very great extent
Because:					
a) I respect his competence and judgment	1	2	3	4	5
b) He can give special help and benefits	1	2	3	4	5
c) He's a nice guy	1	2	3	4	5
d) He can penalize or otherwise disadvantage me	1	2	3	4	5
e) It is my duty	1	2	3	4	5
f) It is necessary if the organization is to function properly	1	2	3	4	5

48. Imagine you were offered the following possibilities within this plant. Would you accept them or not?
(Circle one number on each line)

	Yes	No
a) Move to a higher level position that has considerably more obligations and responsibilities for you.	1	2
b) Move to a higher level position that requires training that entails many sacrifices on your part	1	2
c) Move to a higher level position where you may be frequently criticized	1	2
d) Move to a higher level position in which you would have a group of "problem" employees working for you	1	2
e) Move to a higher level position in which there are more worries than you now have connected with the work	1	2

49. How true are the following statements?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Very true	Some-what true	Neither true nor untrue	Some-what untrue	Very untrue
a) I feel depressed	1	2	3	4	5
b) Other people are always more lucky than I	1	2	3	4	5
c) I usually do a good job	1	2	3	4	5
d) I often feel bored	1	2	3	4	5
e) I seem not to get what is coming to me	1	2	3	4	5
f) Usually everything I try seems to fail	1	2	3	4	5
g) Things seem hopeless	1	2	3	4	5
h) I feel resentful	1	2	3	4	5
i) Almost every week I see someone I dislike	1	2	3	4	5
j) I sometimes feel that my life is not very useful	1	2	3	4	5
k) It seems to me that I am a failure	1	2	3	4	5
l) When I do a job, I do it well	1	2	3	4	5

52. How true are the following statements?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Very true	Somewhat true	Neither true nor untrue	Somewhat untrue	Very untrue
a) It is not possible to rely on others	1	2	3	4	5
b) Today it is practically impossible to find real friends because everyone thinks only of himself	1	2	3	4	5
c) Men like me cannot influence the course of events; only men in high positions can have such influence	1	2	3	4	5
d) I have never had the influence over others that I would have liked	1	2	3	4	5
e) Public affairs are so complicated that one cannot help but be confused by them.	1	2	3	4	5
f) Despite the many advances science has made, life today is too complicated	1	2	3	4	5
g) I can never do what I really like because circumstances require that I do otherwise	1	2	3	4	5
h) Life is so routinized that I do not have a chance to use my true abilities	1	2	3	4	5
i) Life seems to be moving on without rules or order	1	2	3	4	5
j) Nowadays it is hard to know right from wrong	1	2	3	4	5

54. By which of the following ways do you get information about what is going on concerning the functioning of the plant? (Please choose the two most important and place the number 1 before the first most important, and 2 before the second most important.)

____ From my immediate superior

____ From my subordinates

____ From the management

____ From written announcements

____ From worker meetings called by the management

____ From meetings called by the union

____ From my coworkers

____ From persons not working in the plant

____ Other (write in) _____

56. What is the year of your birth?
(write in)

_____

57. How many years of school did you finish?
(Circle one number)

1 Less than four years

2 Four to six years

3 Six to eight years

4 Eight to ten years

5 Ten to twelve years

6 More than twelve years

58. Have you ever been a union officer or member of a union committee in this plant?
(Circle one number)

1 Yes

2 No

60. How frequently do you speak to the following groups about work matters?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Always
a) Your immediate subordi-nates	1	2	3	4	5
b) Your peers	1	2	3	4	5
c) Your superiors	1	2	3	4	5

61. How frequently do you speak to persons in the following groups about non-work matters?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Never	Rarely	Some-times	Often	Always
a) Your immediate subordi-nates	1	2	3	4	5
b) Your peers	1	2	3	4	5
c) Your superiors	1	2	3	4	5

62. Do you make your immediate subordinates feel free to bring their complaints to you?
(Circle one number)

I make them feel:

1 Completely free

2 Quite free

3 Fairly free

4 Not too free

5 Not at all free

63. In your kind of job, is it usually better if your subordinates let you worry about introducing better or faster ways of doing the work?
(Circle one number)

1 Strongly agree

2 Agree

3 Uncertain

4 Disagree

5 Strongly disagree

64. When your immediate subordinates do what you request them to do on the job, why do they do it?
(Circle one number on each line across)

	Not at all	To a very little extent	To some extent	To a considerable extent	To a very great extent
Because:					
a) They respect my competence and judgment	1	2	3	4	5
b) I can give special help and benefits	1	2	3	4	5
c) I'm a nice guy	1	2	3	4	5
d) I can penalize or otherwise disadvantage them	1	2	3	4	5
e) It is their duty	1	2	3	4	5
f) It is necessary if the organization is to function properly	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX B

EVALUATION OF PARTIAL CORRELATIONS IN NORMATIVE CONSENSUS ANALYSIS

The standard deviations of work-group responses were found, on the basis of some preliminary analyses, to be significantly correlated with sample size and with the sample mean (or more precisely, with the absolute value of the deviation of the mean from the mid-point of the scale). Correlations of six of the standard deviation measures with the mean and sample size for the United States and Italy are given in Table B-1 below.

TABLE B-1

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEAN AND SAMPLE SIZE AND STANDARD DEVIATION MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A. AND ITALY

	Q 24	Q 26d	Q 32	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 37
U.S.A.						
Deviation from mid-point	-.39	-.33	-.06	-.14	-.17	-.10
Sample size	.18	.23	.34	.22	.30	.30
Italy						
Deviation from mid-point	-.50	-.40	-.51	-.26	-.44	-.40
Sample size	.38	.38	.25	.33	.39	.40

Other analyses were run to determine the effect of the mean and sample size on correlations of the standard deviation measures with other variables. The results are presented in Tables B-2 and B-3.

Of the 576 pairs of correlations, 9 differences are significant at the .05 level. Four of the significant correlations are between the

standard deviation of actual personal influence and levels above and levels below. The zero-order correlations are the more conservative of the four types of correlation. Three of the significant correlations are between the standard deviation of member attitudes toward management and the standard deviation on the question: "Do the responsible people in this plant improve working conditions only when forced to?" In this case, the zero-order correlations are the highest of the four.

These data indicate that the zero-order correlations are, for all practical purposes, identical to the partial correlations. Consequently, the zero-order correlations are used for the normative consensus analysis. They have the advantage of not artificially altering group scores by statistical controls, but leave the reality of the real-life situation unaltered.

TABLE B-2

ZERO ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS FOR SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS IN U.S.A.

	s.d. Q27d	Mean Q32	s.d. Q25	s.d. Q4	Mean Q4	Span of Control	Mean Q26d	Levels Above	Levels Below	Attitude Toward Superior	Mean Q47a	Mean Q47b	Mean Q47c	Mean Q60b	Mean Q60c	Average (of absolute values)
Correlations of s.d. Q 24 with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	.15	.08	.19	-.04	-.26	.08	-.22	.33	-.26	.00	.06	-.06	.13	-.25	.00	.14
Size only controlled	.33	-.03	.37	-.05	-.27	-.11	-.39	.34	-.30	.08	-.04	-.11	.10	-.29	-.10	.19
Mean only controlled	.37	.19	.33		-.16	-.10	-.24	.14	-.09	.06	.08	-.04	.18	-.20	-.02	.15
Zero order	.35	.00	.39	.00	-.25	-.12	-.37	.23	-.21	.05	.01	-.08	.10	-.28	-.11	.16
Correlations of s.d. Q 26d with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	.55	.13*	.18	-.08	-.43	.24	-.20	.37	-.46	-.01	-.08	.04	.25	-.40	-.38	.29
Size only controlled	.59	.15*	.18	.03	-.30	.20	-.05	.21	-.32	-.00	-.08	.05	.16	-.27	-.32	.24
Mean only controlled	.59	.23*	.23	.04	-.28	.24	-.14	.14	-.32	.00	-.03	.08	.21	-.34	-.36	.28
Zero order	.61	.23*	.24	.10	-.27	.18	-.03	.09	-.21	-.03	-.02	.07	.16	-.26	-.32	.23
Correlations of s.d. Q 32 with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	.02	.02	.24	-.15	-.19	.17	-.05	.04	-.17	-.03	.05	.04	-.03	-.09	-.03	.09
Size only controlled	.19	.05	.43	-.04	-.24	-.21	-.08	.17	-.34	-.08	.18	.16	.03	.00	-.05	.16
Mean only controlled	.26	.13	.50	.06	-.19	.16	-.04	.00	-.16	-.15	.27	.19	.07	.00	.06	.15
Zero order	.26	.13	.50	.07	-.19	.16	-.05	.00	-.16	-.14	.26	.19	.04	.00	-.17	.15

*Correlations are for Q 32 s.d.

**Controlling for size and mean

TABLE B-3

ZERO-ORDER AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS FOR SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS IN ITALY

	s.d. Q27d	Mean Q32	s.d. Q25	s.d. Q4	Mean Q4	Span of Control	Mean Q26d	Levels Above	Levels Below	Attitude Toward Superior	Mean Q47a	Mean Q47b	Mean Q47c	Mean Q60b	Mean Q60c	Average (of absolute values)
Correlations of s.d. Q 24 with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	.18	.08	.39	.10	-.23	.03	-.21	.05	-.23	.08	-.18	.02	.00	-.08	-.15	.13
Size only controlled	.20	.17	.46	.20	-.27	.11	-.19	.17	-.27	.07	-.17	.08	.09	-.02	-.17	.17
Mean only controlled	.30	.05	.45	.27	-.20	.03	-.21	-.01	-.20	.10	-.15	.03	-.01	-.01	-.10	.13
Zero order	.30	.09	.50	.31	-.21	.10	-.19	-.01	-.19	.10	-.14	.08	.08	-.03	-.08	.16
Correlations of s.d. Q 26d with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	.45	.11	.06	-.04	-.36	.09	-.14	.44	-.42	.03	.00	.23	.05	-.13	-.23	.22
Size only controlled	.47	.07	.09	.06	-.22	-.05	.22	.35	-.19	-.07	.10	.20	.11	-.04	.02	.19
Mean only controlled	.55	0.3	.26	.15	-.35	.10	-.21	.28	-.39	.08	.00	.28	.08	-.11	-.14	.24
Zero order	.54	.00	.18	.19	-.16	-.05	.20	.13	-.12	-.03	.11	.19	.10	-.04	.08	.18
Correlations of s.d. Q 32 with Other Measures																
Size and mean controlled	-.07	.06	.04	-.21	-.18	.08	-.10	.23	-.21	.00	-.02	.08	.07	-.03	-.28	.11
Size only controlled	.14	.14	.34	-.10	-.38	.12	-.15	.28	-.40	.02	-.02	.27	.10	0.7	-.27	.19
Mean only controlled	.27	.19	.24	.12	-.23	.21	-.11	.06	-.21	.00	-.09	.21	.05	.02	-.13	.15
Zero order	.21	.04	.38	.00	-.34	.12	-.15	.14	-.34	.04	-.01	.27	.09	.06	-.21	.17

APPENDIX C

TABLES FOR ANALYSES OF VARIANCE AND CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES

TABLE C-1

SCORES ON NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES:
COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

Technology	Country				
	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Furniture					
Q 25	.91	.60	.62	.71	.99
Q 26d	.60	.58	.62	.85	1.07
Q 37	.69	.38	.65	.57	.55
Metal					
Q 25	.75	.70	.89	.46	.74
Q 26d	.60	.72	.44	.64	.81
Q 37	.51	.38	.62	.32	.42
Foundry					
Q 25	.60	.59	.70	.48	.84
Q 26d	.70	.44	.66	.68	.49
Q 37	.43	.42	.61	.40	.52
Plastics					
Q 25	.78	.88	.82	.47	.61
Q 26d	1.05	.57	.71	.90	.69
Q 37	.58	.43	.44	.49	.41
Canning					
Q 25	1.04	.80	.88	.65	.91
Q 26d	.86	.70	.43	.82	1.03
Q 37	.82	.38	.66	.46	.49

TABLE C-2

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS:
EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect			
Country			
Q 25	3.59	4	P < .01
Q 26d	3.60	4	P < .01
Q 37	3.37	4	P < .01
Main Effect			
Technology			
Q 25	1.70	4	N.S.
Q 26d	1.02	4	N.S.
Q 37	2.71	4	P < .05
Interaction			
Country X Technology			
Q 25	0.95	16	N.S.
Q 26d	1.21	16	N.S.
Q 37	0.91	16	N.S.

TABLE C-3

SCORES ON NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES:
COUNTRY X SIZE

Size	Country			
	Austria	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Large				
Q 25	.69	.73	.55	.73
Q 26d	.66	.54	.66	.74
Q 37	.55	.60	.36	.36
Small				
Q 25	.91	.87	.54	.83
Q 26d	.85	.58	.94	.82
Q 37	.60	.59	.56	.57

TABLE C-4

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS:
EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, SIZE, AND COUNTRY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect Country			
Q 25	4.70	3	P < .01
Q 26d	2.99	3	P < .05
Q 37	3.08	3	P < .05
Main Effect Size			
Q 25	3.91	1	P < .05
Q 26d	4.84	1	P < .05
Q 37	9.14	1	P < .01
Interaction Country X Size			
Q 25	0.64	3	N.S.
Q 26d	0.75	3	N.S.
Q 37	2.02	3	N.S.

TABLE C-5

SCORES FOR NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES:
TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

Size	Technology				
	Furniture	Metal Works	Foundry	Plastics	Canning
Large					
Q 25	.75	.75	.60	.62	.88
Q 26d	.71	.55	.57	.71	.64
Q 37	.52	.44	.37	.44	.53
Small					
Q 25	.80	.69	.71	.75	.89
Q 26d	.85	.65	.69	.85	.75
Q 37	.59	.47	.56	.50	.68

TABLE C-6

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS:
EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY, SIZE, AND TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect Technology			
Q 25	2.26	4	N.S.
Q 26d	1.68	4	N.S.
Q 37	2.83	4	$P < .05$
Main Effect Size			
Q 25	0.99	1	N.S.
Q 26d	3.50	1	$P < .05$
Q 37	6.87	1	$P < .01$
Interaction Technology X Size			
Q 25	0.43	4	N.S.
Q 26d	0.02	4	N.S.
Q 37	0.84	4	N.S.

TABLE C-7

SCORES ON NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES:
COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

Technology	Country				
	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Furniture					
Q 62 - Q 44	0.93	1.06	1.41	0.82	1.25
Q 63 - Q 6	1.38	1.27	0.94	1.35	1.02
Q 64c - Q 47c	0.85	1.69	1.12	1.59	1.17
Q 24	1.44	0.62	1.46	1.07	0.90
Metal Works					
Q 63 - Q 44	0.80	0.78	1.48	0.93	1.47
Q 63 - Q 6	1.20	1.53	1.41	0.91	1.19
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.50	1.44	1.24	1.32	1.08
Q 24	1.05	1.01	1.43	0.94	0.86
Technology					
Q 62 - Q 44	0.85	1.06	1.11	0.96	1.09
Q 63 - Q 6	0.95	1.45	1.54	1.06	1.24
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.32	1.39	0.92	1.31	1.26
Q 24	0.90	0.94	1.31	1.15	1.09
Plastics					
Q 62 - Q 44	1.16	1.04	1.03	0.99	1.41
Q 63 - Q 6	0.67	1.36	1.61	0.88	1.24
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.28	1.51	1.40	1.39	1.32
Q 24	1.11	0.86	1.37	0.66	0.66
Canning					
Q 63 - Q 44	1.24	0.88	1.33	0.58	1.26
Q 63 - Q 6	1.10	1.25	1.21	0.83	1.07
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.18	2.80	1.49	1.73	0.92
Q 24	1.23	0.68	1.37	0.89	0.96

TABLE C-8

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect Country			
Q 62 - Q 44	5.97	4	P < .01
Q 63 - Q 6	4.31	4	P < .01
Q 64c - Q 47c	2.16	4	N.S.
Q 24	9.16	4	P < .01
Main Effect Technology			
Q 62 - Q 44	0.60	4	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	0.60	4	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	0.90	4	N.S.
Q 24	1.04	4	N.S.
Interaction Country x Technology			
Q 62 - Q 44	1.16	16	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	1.28	16	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.08	16	N.S.
Q 24	1.06	16	N.S.

TABLE C-9

SCORES ON NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES:
COUNTRY X SIZE

Size	Country			
	Austria	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Large				
Q 62 - Q 44	0.87	1.20	0.90	1.28
Q 63 - Q 6	0.93	1.36	1.00	1.13
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.21	1.15	1.41	1.11
Q 24	1.10	1.41	0.96	0.99
Small				
Q 62 - Q 44	1.18	1.39	0.84	1.22
Q 63 - Q 6	1.47	1.40	1.01	1.24
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.43	1.36	1.43	1.34
Q 24	1.11	1.33	1.04	0.81

TABLE C-10

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, SIZE, AND COUNTRY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect Country			
Q 62 - Q 44	7.60	3	P < .01
Q 63 - Q 6	4.23	3	P < .01
Q 64c - Q 47c	2.06	3	N.S.
Q 24	9.60	3	P < .01
Main Effect Size			
Q 62 - Q 44	1.23	1	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	3.35	1	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	2.86	1	N.S.
Q 24	0.25	1	N.S.
Interaction Country x Size			
Q 62 - Q 44	1.19	3	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	1.72	3	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	0.38	3	N.S.
Q 24	0.63	3	N.S.

TABLE C-11

SCORES ON NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES:
TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

Size	Technology				
	Furniture	Metal Works	Foundry	Plastics	Canning
Large					
Q 62 - Q 44	1.16	1.15	1.03	1.03	0.88
Q 63 - Q 6	1.10	1.08	1.19	1.17	0.88
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.11	1.24	1.22	1.38	1.30
Q 24	1.22	1.05	1.15	0.93	1.17
Small					
Q 62 - Q 44	1.05	1.18	0.91	1.25	1.40
Q 63 - Q 6	1.29	1.33	1.16	1.20	1.36
Q 64c - Q 47c	1.43	1.40	1.25	1.33	1.64
Q 24	1.20	1.16	1.01	1.07	0.96

TABLE C-12

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY: EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY, SIZE, AND TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect Technology			
Q 62 - Q 44	0.65	4	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	0.43	4	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	0.72	4	N.S.
Q 24	0.88	4	N.S.
Main Effect Size			
Q 62 - Q 44	1.19	1	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	3.27	1	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	2.84	1	N.S.
Q 24	0.24	1	N.S.
Interaction Technology X size			
Q 62 - Q 44	1.75	4	N.S.
Q 63 - Q 6	1.02	4	N.S.
Q 64c - Q 47c	0.62	4	N.S.
Q 24	0.78	4	N.S.

TABLE C-13

SCORES ON NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES:
COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

Technology	Country				
	Austria	Israel	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Furniture					
Auth. index	.81	.63	.54	.26	.66
Total control	.63	.47	.67	.24	.50
Slope	1.44	1.08	1.20	.26	.82
Decision making index	1.19	.66	.81	.51	.65
Oppor. index	.74	.43	.45	.22	.36
Metal works					
Auth. index	.38	.72	.49	.45	.65
Total control	.34	.47	.47	.52	.67
Slope	.68	.67	1.39	.68	1.05
Decision making index	.65	.10	.84	.50	.61
Oppor. index	.27	.52	.54	.27	.60
Foundry					
Auth. index	.56	.62	.45	.34	.60
Total control	.58	.62	.64	.31	.70
Slope	.88	.88	1.31	.59	1.10
Decision making index	.74	.49	1.03	.33	.78
Oppor. index	.38	.41	.69	.32	.39
Plastics					
Auth. index	.14	.77	.61	.40	.79
Total control	.20	.59	.57	.46	.59
Slope	.43	1.00	1.03	.64	.89
Decision making index	.71	.51	1.15	.52	.89
Oppor. index	.33	.38	.54	.30	.57
Canning					
Auth. index	.71	.50	.48	.22	.36
Total control	.81	.40	.50	.25	.57
Slope	1.25	.50	.75	.62	1.00
Decision making index	1.27	.25	.89	.37	.60
Oppor index	.53	.41	.43	.19	.32

TABLE C-14

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND COUNTRY X TECHNOLOGY

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect			
Country			
Authority index	6.44	4	P < .01
Total control	8.51	4	P < .01
Slope	8.64	4	P < .01
Decision making index	23.80	4	P < .01
Opportunity index	8.13	4	P < .01
Main Effect			
Technology			
Authority index	0.94	4	N.S.
Total control	0.86	4	N.S.
Slope	0.18	4	N.S.
Decision making index	2.26	4	N.S.
Opportunity index	0.32	4	N.S.
Interaction			
Country x Technology			
Authority index	1.61	16	N.S.
Total control	1.62	16	N.S.
Slope	1.75	16	P < .05
Decision making index	2.40	16	P < .01
Opportunity index	2.00	16	P < .05

TABLE C-15

SCORES ON NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES:
COUNTRY X SIZE

Size	Country			
	Austria	Italy	U.S.A.	Yugoslavia
Large				
Auth. index	.52	.52	.30	.57
Total control	.54	.58	.30	.56
Slope	.94	1.03	.62	.97
Decision making index	.93	.89	.41	.67
Oppor. index	.39	.52	.27	.42
Small				
Auth. index	.59	.51	.44	.73
Total control	.54	.54	.35	.71
Slope	.94	1.47	.50	1.03
Decision making index	.76	1.08	.41	.84
Oppor. index	.51	.58	.29	.50

TABLE C-16

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY: EFFECTS OF COUNTRY, SIZE, AND COUNTRY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect			
Country			
Authority index	6.55	3	P < .01
Total control	11.11	3	P < .01
Slope	10.87	3	P < .01
Decision making index	24.79	3	P < .01
Opportunity index	10.25	3	P < .01
Main Effect			
Size			
Authority index	3.19	1	N.S.
Total control	1.27	1	N.S.
Slope	1.59	1	N.S.
Decision making index	1.52	1	N.S.
Opportunity index	2.94	1	N.S.
Interaction			
Country x Size			
Authority index	0.51	3	N.S.
Total control	1.27	3	N.S.
Slope	2.07	3	N.S.
Decision making index	2.05	3	N.S.
Opportunity index	0.22	3	N.S.

TABLE C-17

SCORES ON NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES:
TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

Size	Technology				
	Furniture	Metal Works	Foundry	Plastics	Canning
Large					
Auth. index	.54	.42	.43	.59	.39
Total control	.52	.36	.51	.54	.50
Slope	.90	.78	.93	.78	.90
Decision making index	.81	.57	.65	.87	.78
Oppor. index	.45	.34	.42	.44	.29
Small					
Auth. index	.59	.60	.60	.40	.59
Total control	.49	.57	.58	.40	.61
Slope	1.00	1.28	.84	.82	.93
Decision making index	.65	.81	.72	.83	.86
Oppor. index	.33	.54	.42	.45	.53

TABLE C-18

F-RATIOS FOR MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY: EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY, SIZE, AND TECHNOLOGY X SIZE

	F-Ratio	D.F.	Significance
Main Effect			
Technology			
Authority index	0.43	4	N.S.
Total control	0.40	4	N.S.
Slope	2.12	4	N.S.
Decision making index	0.86	4	N.S.
Opportunity index	0.35	4	N.S.
Main Effect			
Size			
Authority index	3.11	1	N.S.
Total control	1.44	1	N.S.
Slope	1.42	1	N.S.
Decision making index	1.20	1	N.S.
Opportunity index	2.83	1	N.S.
Interaction			
Technology x Size			
Authority index	1.79	4	N.S.
Total control	1.55	4	N.S.
Slope	1.22	4	N.S.
Decision making index	1.48	4	N.S.
Opportunity index	2.44	4	$P < .05$

The normative complementarity scores in the tables are discrepancy scores between superior and subordinates. The normative consistency scores are discrepancy scores between actual and ideal conditions. The normative consensus scores are standard deviations--the larger the deviations, the less the consensus. Consequently, correlations between normative complementarity and normative consistency are predicted to be positive; correlations between normative consensus and normative complementarity and consistency are predicted to be positive.

The significance levels for the following correlations in each country are as follows:

	one-tailed		two-tailed	
	.05	.01	.05	.01
Austria	.22	.31	.26	.33
Israel	.22	.31	.26	.33
Italy	.20	.28	.23	.30
U.S.A.	.20	.28	.24	.31
Yugoslavia	.20	.28	.25	.31

A correlation significant at the .05 level is marked with one asterisk (*).
A correlation significant at the .01 level is marked with two asterists (**).
A correlation significant at the .05 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with one cross (†).
A correlation significant at the .01 level on the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with two crosses (††).

These significance levels apply to Tables C-19 to C-33.

TABLE C-19

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 62 - Q 44	.12	.10	-.11	.05	.12	-.01	.11	.25*	-.05	-.04
Q 63 - Q 6	-.07	-.08	.17	.08	.05	.17	.05	.12	.15	.27*
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.20	-.14	-.24	.18	.10	-.21	-.17	-.04	.10	-.02
Q 64b - Q 47b	.03	.04	.03	.09	.10	.04	-.14	.09	-.07	.08
Q 64c - Q 47c	.18	-.05	-.16	.08	-.03	-.05	.12	-.05	-.32†	-.25
Q 64d - Q 47d	.02	-.13	-.05	.13	-.02	.10	-.03	.11	.12	.17
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.17	-.12	-.25	-.37††	-.19	-.09	-.07	-.31†	-.07	-.08
Q 64f - Q 47f	.04	.05	-.11	.02	.08	.05	.16	-.04	.01	.13
Q 24	.05	.07	.13	.18	.15	.10	.10	.10	.18	.18
Q 33	-.02	-.05	.10	.12	.21	.38**	.14	.03	.27*	.12
Q 35	-.02	-.05	.12	.10	-.14	.03	-.14	-.08	.09	.23*
Q 37	.23*	.08	.26*	.08	.25*	.57**	.24*	.17	.18	.13
Q 39	.03	.00	.26*	.25*	.12	.21	-.07	.19	.17	.14

TABLE C-20

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 62 - Q 44	-.20	.05	.28*	.09	.11	.02	.05	.11	.12	-.11
Q 63 - Q 6	-.21	.13	.06	.07	.23*	-.03	.03	.17	.20	.17
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.05	.13	.27*	-.14	-.10	.10	.05	.04	.10	.06
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.01	-.06	.04	.03	.23*	-.06	-.08	-.10	.07	-.04
Q 64c - Q 47c	.35**	.10	-.01	.23*	.24*	.03	-.10	-.16	.40**	.04
Q 64d - Q 47d	.14	.03	.30*	.09	.17	.10	-.11	.04	.21	.16
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.11	.01	-.20	-.30†	-.15	-.27†	.10	-.23	-.20	-.09
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.24	.20	-.27†	.05	.10	-.24	-.20	-.03	-.21	-.25
Q 24	-.02	-.20	.36**	.66**	.03	.29*	.39**	.03	-.11	.05
Q 33	-.03	-.11	.31**	.09	-.02	.31**	.24*	.19	-.11	-.14
Q 35	.03	-.14	.25*	.05	-.16	.22*	.22*	-.22	.15	.04
Q 37	-.07	-.15	.09	.34**	.09	.37**	.31**	.02	.16	.24*
Q 39	-.18	-.18	.25*	.27*	.09	.37**	.13	.18	.08	.04

TABLE C-21

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 62 - Q 44	-.19	-.02	.06	-.04	.09	.02	.19	.06	.03	-.11
Q 63 - Q 6	.09	.09	-.12	.02	.20*	.12	.08	.08	-.02	.03
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.06	.00	.09	.15	-.07	.12	-.03	.15	.01	-.06
Q 64b - Q 47b	.04	.08	.05	.19	.23**	.08	.00	-.04	.10	.14
Q 64c - Q 47c	.12	-.04	.00	.32**	.20*	.16	.01	.13	.11	.06
Q 64d - Q 47d	-.07	.14	.07	.16	.17	.13	.14	-.08	.19	.06
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.09	-.11	.01	-.04	-.01	-.11	.07	-.11	-.01	-.07
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.10	.06	-.11	-.01	.21*	.19	.01	.13	.14	.02
Q 24	-.06	.03	.08	.41**	.07	.22*	.21*	.25**	.12	.13
Q 33	.07	.26*	-.04	.11	-.06	.28**	.03	.12	.11	.28**
Q 35	.03	.09	.00	.02	.01	.23*	.10	-.12	.09	.02
Q 37	-.01	.05	-.10	.15	.08	.34**	.09	.07	.09	.14
Q 39	.00	.10	.12	.17	-.08	.16	-.04	.09	.05	.06

TABLE C-22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 62 - Q 44	-.05	-.09	-.07	-.28†	-.16	-.26†	-.03	-.06	-.02	.00
Q 63 - Q 6	-.04	-.06	-.05	.25*	.05	-.05	.09	.26*	.15	.07
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.01	-.02	-.11	.28**	.04	-.10	.04	-.23	.20*	-.15
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.02	-.02	-.06	.02	.08	.03	.13	.06	.10	.09
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.19	-.11	-.14	.13	-.15	.02	-.05	.11	.06	.02
Q 64d - Q 47d	.04	.24*	.06	.05	.27*	.20*	.20*	.16	.09	.13
Q 64e - Q 47e	.07	.17	.03	.34**	.21*	.18	.30**	.12	-.02	-.02
Q 64f - Q 47f	.03	.11	.32**	.07	.02	-.05	.02	.03	-.15	.10
Q 24	-.11	.10	.04	.56**	.22*	-.16	.09	.32**	.30**	.11
Q 33	-.07	.14	-.18	.16	-.06	-.12	-.07	-.13	-.19	-.08
Q 35	-.15	-.01	.05	.29**	-.02	-.02	-.01	.17	-.05	.08
Q 37	-.11	.03	.21*	-.06	.07	.32**	-.04	.29**	.00	.01
Q 39	-.12	-.25†	-.04	.21	.19	.19	-.08	.28**	.04	.13

TABLE C-23

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 62 - Q 44	.18	.06	.00	-.37††	-.15	.02	-.04	-.19	-.14	.05
Q 63 - Q 6	.22*	-.07	.02	.17	.02	.18	.00	-.06	.30**	.11
Q 64a - Q 47a	.07	.10	.09	.04	.05	-.03	.26*	.30**	-.05	.02
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.08	-.04	.09	.03	.17	-.20	-.12	.16	.09	-.09
Q 64c - Q 47c	.12	.18	.14	-.02	.12	.05	.04	.12	.03	.22*
Q 64d - Q 47d	.02	.16	-.03	.00	.22*	-.15	.20*	.27*	.15	.22*
Q 64e - Q 47e	.16	.18	.00	.00	.00	.01	.04	-.08	.03	.11
Q 64f - Q 47f	.01	.16	.20*	.13	.02	.00	.05	.02	-.01	-.07
Q 24	.08	.17	-.10	.27*	-.08	.08	.16	.04	.37**	.04
Q 33	.30**	.40**	-.03	-.01	.12	.06	.12	.12	-.05	.25*
Q 35	-.04	-.04	.00	-.18	-.18	.23*	.01	.08	.01	-.06
Q 37	-.03	-.15	.05	-.05	-.04	.56**	.08	.06	-.02	-.07
Q 39	-.28†	.00	.17	.34**	.24*	.04	.18	.21*	.08	.03

TABLE C-24

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 26d	.05	.17	.12	.04	-.11	.20	-.07	.06	.04
Q 27d	.25*	-.03	-.03	-.01	-.02	.18	.03	.24*	.11
Q 36	-.03	.12	.00	-.21	.13	.12	.38**	.28*	.22*
Q 24	.05	-.07	.17	-.06	.02	.16	-.01	.05	.15
Q 32	.08	.11	.30*	.17	.24*	.16	.18	.19	.35**
Q 37	.17	.13	.30*	.10	.30*	.24*	.42**	.32**	.43**
Q 20	.03	-.07	.34**	.25*	-.07	.13	-.01	.20	.15
Q 25	.02	-.06	.18	-.13	.01	.11	.23*	.04	.18
Q 30	.04	-.01	-.04	-.02	.05	.01	.22*	.11	.10
Q 31	.23*	-.02	-.01	-.04	.10	.05	.12	.36**	.12

TABLE C-25

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ISRAEL

	Q 27a–Q 26a	Q 27b–Q 26b	Q 27c–Q 26c	Q 27d–Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 26d	-.06	.07	.15	-.38†	.00	.03	.11	-.03	.01
Q 27d	-.08	.10	-.02	-.05	-.04	.10	-.10	-.04	-.07
Q 36	-.22	-.13	-.07	-.09	-.03	-.13	-.06	-.36††	-.17
Q 24	-.01	-.02	-.05	-.26†	.07	.08	-.02	-.14	-.15
Q 32	-.26†	-.06	-.14	-.26†	-.20	.19	.06	-.06	.15
Q 37	-.01	.11	.07	-.01	-.09	-.01	-.09	.02	-.03
Q 20	-.23	-.05	-.06	-.04	.04	.06	-.17	-.17	-.18
Q 25	-.13	-.01	-.07	-.26†	-.06	.09	.14	.14	.09
Q 30	-.11	-.21	.24*	.36**	-.11	-.20	.08	-.18	-.10
Q 31	-.07	-.26†	.12	.24*	.03	-.03	.06	-.11	-.06

TABLE C-26

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ITALY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 26d	-.03	.15	.20*	-.10	.07	-.04	.21*	.01	.04
Q 27d	.11	.10	.12	.04	.01	.05	-.02	.15	-.01
Q 36	-.10	-.15	-.10	-.10	.08	.01	.03	-.12	-.13
Q 24	-.18	-.03	.02	.08	.13	.09	-.09	-.14	.04
Q 32	.02	.02	-.18	-.19	-.07	.09	.02	-.05	.21*
Q 37	-.04	.06	.18	-.17	-.01	.12	-.10	.08	.03
Q 20	-.13	-.09	-.11	-.01	.04	.13	-.04	-.03	.05
Q 25	-.06	-.01	-.06	-.10	-.07	-.09	.05	.07	.01
Q 30	-.20	-.08	.13	.01	-.02	.03	-.03	.11	-.08
Q 31	-.13	.06	.16	.12	.02	.01	.16	-.02	.03

TABLE C-27

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN U.S.A.

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26d	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 26d	.05	-.02	.24*	.02	-.20	-.03	-.12	-.13	-.09
Q 27d	.03	.06	.18	.19	-.16	-.11	-.13	-.04	-.08
Q 36	-.61††	.01	-.03	.11	.15	-.07	.10	-.11	.03
Q 24	-.08	-.09	.01	-.07	-.02	-.02	-.07	-.07	-.15
Q 32	-.21	.04	.10	-.07	-.14	-.08	-.15	-.12	.00
Q 37	.02	.13	.20*	.09	-.18	-.09	.09	.11	.18
Q 20	-.15	-.32††	.08	.10	.08	-.03	.01	-.18	-.04
Q 25	-.08	-.02	.23*	.13	.01	.06	.05	.09	-.06
Q 30	-.06	-.04	.09	.03	-.15	.05	.06	-.05	.09
Q 31	.01	-.01	.24*	.08	.09	.26*	.23*	.07	.11

TABLE C-28

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 26d	-.01	.19	.09	.03	-.13	-.11	-.10	-.06	.05
Q 27d	.10	-.02	.10	.05	-.12	-.09	-.04	.03	-.09
Q 36	-.23	.04	.04	.15	-.09	.05	-.10	-.14	.12
Q 24	.02	-.09	-.12	.19	-.03	-.06	.02	.02	-.14
Q 32	-.11	-.04	-.18	.13	.03	-.13	-.15	-.29†	.12
Q 37	.00	.02	-.06	.03	-.08	-.05	-.09	-.03	.09
Q 20	-.27†	-.09	-.15	.05	.01	-.03	.09	-.12	-.06
Q 25	-.13	.05	.04	.13	-.19	-.17	.06	-.02	.21
Q 30	-.08	.12	-.14	.09	-.05	-.31††	-.06	-.10	.06
Q 31	-.22	-.09	-.08	-.19	.04	-.09	.16	-.05	.20

TABLE C-29

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 62 - Q 44	.12	-.03	.17	-.06	-.28†	-.09	-.13	-.24	.08
Q 63 - Q 6	.19	.09	-.12	.05	.18	.14	.25*	.12	.10
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.04	-.24	.02	-.11	.17	-.01	-.04	-.03	.16
Q 64b - Q 47b	.03	.00	-.04	-.01	-.01	-.15	-.05	.03	-.22
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.11	-.08	.05	.35**	-.14	-.04	-.10	-.01	-.27†
Q 64d - Q 47d	.05	-.09	.02	-.08	-.15	-.27†	-.19	-.11	-.12
Q 64e - Q 47e	.25*	.08	-.10	.05	.10	.05	-.08	.18	.02
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.07	-.32†	.12	-.03	.12	.20	.05	-.04	-.01
Q 24	.13	-.05	.09	-.04	.09	-.01	-.06	.22*	.14
Q 33	.18	.12	.03	.26*	.13	-.01	.33**	.31**	.31**
Q 35	.05	.07	-.19	.07	-.07	-.04	.09	.20	-.04
Q 37	.01	.24*	.02	.14	.30	.31**	.47**	.11	.42**
Q 39	.13	-.04	.17	-.06	.09	-.18	.06	.12	.00

TABLE C-30

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ISRAEL

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 62 - Q 44	-.29†	-.16	-.02	.09	-.08	-.10	.00	-.20	-.10
Q 63 - Q 6	-.52††	-.31†	.00	-.02	-.07	-.15	.23*	-.32†	-.05
Q 64a - Q 47a	.03	.05	.09	-.09	-.17	-.06	.01	-.13	-.18
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.15	-.28†	-.10	-.02	-.15	-.15	.01	-.11	.02
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.37††	.03	.19	.03	-.06	-.06	-.03	-.23	-.12
Q 64d - Q 47d	-.30†	-.24	-.21	.20	.02	.02	.12	-.22	.00
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.11	.11	-.06	.14	-.05	-.23	-.13	-.15	-.09
Q 64f - Q 47f	.29*	.04	-.28†	.05	-.03	-.16	-.14	.00	.05
Q 24	.00	-.04	.14	-.15	.05	.12	-.05	-.12	-.02
Q 33	.15	-.11	.19	.05	.08	.06	-.19	.00	.04
Q 35	.07	.02	.07	-.04	.09	-.16	-.13	-.10	.04
Q 37	-.10	-.08	.31**	.16	-.14	.08	.02	-.03	-.07
Q 39	-.22	-.13	.00	-.05	-.17	.01	.06	.00	-.03

TABLE C-31

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ITALY

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 62 - Q 44	.01	-.13	.03	.02	-.19	-.04	.02	.08	.08
Q 63 - Q 6	.02	-.08	.10	.16	-.01	-.06	.03	-.06	.13
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.01	-.04	-.04	.01	-.04	-.04	.02	-.12	-.15
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.05	-.03	.03	.07	-.02	.06	.11	-.04	.32**
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.12	.02	.00	.04	-.05	.03	-.03	-.23†	.02
Q 64d - Q 47d	-.07	-.16	.11	.04	-.06	.14	.02	.16	.21*
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.14	.06	-.10	.02	-.01	-.13	-.13	-.15	-.08
Q 64f - Q 47f	.15	-.02	.04	-.02	-.08	.08	.05	.23*	.27**
Q 24	.06	.00	.08	-.05	.05	.14	.18	.03	.32**
Q 33	-.03	.01	.39**	.08	.05	.18	.10	.25*	.22*
Q 35	.13	.01	.03	-.02	-.02	.08	.05	.08	.17
Q 37	.03	.02	.22*	.01	-.15	.09	.10	.10	.20
Q 39	-.15	-.20	-.02	.05	.01	.02	.12	-.06	-.17

TABLE C-32

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN U.S.A.

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 27c	Q 27d- Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 62 - Q 44	.03	-.09	.02	.05	.12	.06	.07	.10	.14
Q 63 - Q 6	-.08	.05	-.07	-.07	-.07	.12	.00	.05	.13
Q 64a - Q 47a	.21*	.01	-.01	-.07	-.28†	.01	-.20	.08	-.03
Q 64b - Q 47b	.08	.08	.21*	-.20	-.11	.07	-.12	.25*	.07
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.06	-.08	.36**	-.05	-.03	.43**	.24*	.37**	.11
Q 64d - Q 47d	-.10	-.06	.15	.03	-.05	.02	.13	.03	-.03
Q 64e - Q 47e	.01	.08	.17	.06	-.20	.00	.04	.18	-.10
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.15	-.10	.05	.14	.03	-.09	.15	-.17	-.18
Q 24	.01	-.02	-.06	-.13	.02	-.05	.00	.00	-.09
Q 33	-.14	.04	-.14	-.23	-.01	.06	-.13	-.17	-.14
Q 35	-.08	-.09	.00	.15	.06	.03	.02	.03	-.03
Q 37	-.02	.17	.31**	.03	.15	.06	.30**	.32**	.09
Q 39	-.01	-.04	-.02	-.12	.04	.07	-.04	.06	-.07

TABLE C-33

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 62 - Q 44	.01	-.16	-.07	-.13	.08	.04	.04	.00	.11
Q 63 - Q 6	.00	-.06	-.03	-.07	.06	-.03	.18	.21*	.10
Q 64a - Q 47a	.01	-.22	-.03	-.10	-.12	-.13	.13	.10	.30**
Q 64b - Q 47b	.09	.07	-.01	.11	-.18	-.20	-.11	-.14	.16
Q 64c - Q 47c	.19	-.11	-.02	-.09	-.02	-.14	.05	.10	.24*
Q 64d - Q 47d	-.06	-.11	-.10	-.10	-.03	-.20	.16	.03	.19
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.10	.09	.00	-.24	.16	-.25†	.16	-.01	.01
Q 64f - Q 47f	.12	-.21	-.16	-.05	-.02	.03	.18	.09	.08
Q 24	-.06	-.02	.03	-.04	-.13	-.21	.08	.04	.10
Q 33	.10	.05	.14	-.02	-.08	-.16	-.07	.00	.18
Q 35	.00	.18	.01	-.05	-.01	-.05	-.03	.08	.18
Q 37	-.06	.10	-.07	.02	.06	-.19	.00	-.00	.19
Q 39	.06	-.17	-.34††	.05	-.14	.12	-.06	-.14	-.13

APPENDIX D

TABLES FOR CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PREDICTORS AND NORMATIVE STRUCTURE VARIABLES

The significance levels for the normative consensus correlations in each country are as follows:

	one-tailed		two-tailed	
	.05	.01	.05	.01
Austria	.22	.31	.26	.33
Israel	.22	.31	.26	.33
Italy	.20	.28	.23	.30
U.S.A.	.20	.28	.24	.31
Yugoslavia	.20	.28	.25	.31

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction is marked with one asterisk (*).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the predicted direction is marked with two asterisks(**).

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with one cross (†).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with two crosses (††).

TABLE D-1

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30
s.d. Q 26d									
s.d. Q 27d	.56**								
s.d. Q 36	.16	.44**							
s.d. Q 24	.37**	.26*	.25*						
s.d. Q 32	.52**	.53**	.49**	.39**					
s.d. Q 37	.13	.19	.50**	.31*	.39**				
s.d. Q 20	.43**	.28**	.07	.26*	.48*	.23			
s.d. Q 25	.30*	.26*	.43**	.58**	.41**	.50**	.23		
s.d. Q 30	.19	.35**	.38**	.35**	.32**	.25*	.16	.36**	
s.d. Q 31	.33**	.51**	.49**	.49**	.37**	.30*	.28*	.33**	.58**

TABLE D-2

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30
s.d. Q 26d									
s.d. Q 27d	.23								
s.d. Q 36	.13	-.15							
s.d. Q 24	.30*	.10	.22						
s.d. Q 32	.35**	.32*	.20	.31*					
s.d. Q 37	.20	.21	.38**	.40**	.16				
s.d. Q 20	.18	.07	.32*	.43**	.26*	.48**			
s.d. Q 25	.33*	.27*	.09	.38**	.45**	.39**	.29*		
s.d. Q 30	.21	.05	.00	-.02	.10	.17	.10	-.11	
s.d. Q 31	.39**	.05	.04	.19	.09	.09	.22	.06	.72**

TABLE D-3

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30
s.d. Q 26d									
s.d. Q 27d	.45**								
s.d. Q 36	.23*	.14							
s.d. Q 24	.10	.15	.22						
s.d. Q 32	.21	.12	.11	.06					
s.d. Q 37	.18	.21	.06	.39**	.20				
s.d. Q 20	-.07	.14	.23*	.29*	.36**	.19			
s.d. Q 25	-.01	-.03	-.03	.38**	.28**	.45**	.19		
s.d. Q 30	.01	.34**	.28*	.25*	.34**	.47**	.41**	.30**	
s.d. Q 31	.25*	.28*	.25*	.17	.12	.39**	.13	.24*	.52**

TABLE D-4

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30
s.d. Q 26d									
s.d. Q 27d	.61**								
s.d. Q 36	.29*	.40**							
s.d. Q 24	.04	.36**	.26*						
s.d. Q 32	.23*	.25*	.43**	.42**					
s.d. Q 37	.30**	.21	.44**	.31**	.16				
s.d. Q 20	.37**	.35**	.36**	.27*	.51**	.33**			
s.d. Q 25	.24*	.37**	.35**	.38**	.49**	.21	.46**		
s.d. Q 30	.02	-.08	.10	.10	.10	.11	.06	-.01	
s.d. O 31	.56**	.45**	.32**	.18	.25*	.24*	.27*	.34**	.30**

TABLE D-5

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSENSUS MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30
s.d. Q 26d									
s.d. Q 27d	.49**								
s.d. Q 36	.05	.19							
s.d. Q 24	.12	.15	.26*						
s.d. Q 32	.36**	.34**	.47**	.30**					
s.d. Q 37	.22	.28*	.29*	.03	.29*				
s.d. Q 20	.33**	.27*	.16	.17	.33**	.06			
s.d. Q 25	.12	.30**	.17	.48**	.29*	.34**	.11		
s.d. Q 30	.17	.17	.12	.29*	.31**	.13	.36**	.01	
s.d. Q 31	.17	.16	.32**	.36**	.24*	.25*	.21	.24*	.65**

TABLE D-6

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

s.d. of Work Group Members on:	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Plant seniority	.33**	.31**	.25*	.40**	.36**	.23*	.29*	.37**	.23*	.41**
Job seniority	.25*	.30*	.17	.29*	.45**	.20	.28*	.38**	.22*	.34**
Salary	.13	.02	-.23	.05	-.19	-.29†	-.08	-.18	.01	-.08
Sex	.23*	.20	.16	.36**	.20	.27*	.25*	.12	.03	.23*
Age	.34**	.26*	.12	.18	.11	.16	.29*	.26*	.27*	.52**
Education	.28*	.13	.03	.11	.14	.30*	.09	.12	.11	.01
Union membership	.20	.39**	.41**	.08	.17	.15	.22*	.13	.37**	.35**

TABLE D-7

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY
AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

s.d. of Work Group Members on:	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Plant seniority	.29*	-.02	.30*	.17	.11	.03	.11	-.07	.37**	.36**
Job seniority	.42**	-.06	.33**	.18	.12	.08	.12	.09	.16	.20
Salary										
Sex	.10	.09	.11	.24*	.27*	.18	.27*	.22*	.29*	.07
Age	-.19	.35**	-.16	.34**	.23*	.27*	.23*	.20	-.10	-.07
Education	.48**	.08	.20	.17	.30*	.23*	.30*	.60**	.15	.27*
Union Membership										

TABLE D-8

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY
AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

s.d. of Work Group Members on:	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Plant seniority	.29**	.39**	.03	.30**	.34**	.21*	.24*	.12	.23*	.16
Job seniority	-.03	.04	.19	.27*	.09	.18	.11	-.10	.17	.13
Salary	.16	.14	.07	.25*	-.09	.01	.02	-.02	.00	.14
Sex	-.07	-.03	.01	-.21	.24*	-.08	.27*	-.08	.07	.00
Age	.23*	.21*	.21*	.04	.32**	.27*	.16	.15	.23*	.34**
Education	.27*	.31**	.22*	.24*	.31**	.18	.30**	.42**	.40**	.45**
Union membership	.10	.18	.11	.04	-.10	.07	.02	-.05	.11	.21*

TABLE D- 9

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY
AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

s.d. of Work Group Members on:	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Plant seniority	.12	.06	.24*	.03	.18	.02	.09	.31**	.10	.06
Job seniority	.01	.02	.13	.04	.17	.03	.20*	.24*	.21*	.05
Salary	.12	.04	-.02	-.01	.07	.17	.12	.02	.03	-.01
Sex	.57**	.45**	.32**	.12	.20*	.32**	.26*	.32**	-.06	.15
Age	.25*	.24*	.40**	.17	.36**	.32**	.49**	.28**	-.06	.14
Education	.17	.28**	.42**	.05	.20*	.19	.28**	.36**	.05	.34**
Union Membership	.06	-.12	.07	-.11	-.01	.05	-.16	.04	-.14	.07

TABLE D-10

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN WORK-GROUP HETEROGENEITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

s.d. of Work Group Members on:	Q26d	Q27d	Q36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Plant seniority	.19	.04	.04	.17	.27*	.06	.43**	.24*	.38**	.33*
Job seniority	.19	.20*	.14	.14	.32**	.42**	.30**	.24*	.48**	.46**
Salary	-.07	-.05	.00	-.02	.02	-.19	.10	-.20	.22*	-.04
Sex	.11	.36**	.06	-.20	.04	.05	.08	.14	-.04	-.07
Age	.24*	.21*	.09	.27*	.38**	.21*	.33*	.31**	.44**	.32**
Education	.40**	.39**	.21*	.22*	.41**	.23*	.37**	.43**	.23*	.31**
Union membership	.32**	.38**	.31**	.07	.15	.28**	.17	.11	-.08	.15

TABLE D-11

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PLANT AND JOB SENIORITY AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Austria										
1	-.03	.01	-.06	-.18	-.21	-.21	-.18	-.23*	.04	-.06
2	.07	.07	.02	-.05	-.09	-.16	-.06	-.18	.18	.06
Israel										
1	.24	-.06	.05	-.05	.01	.01	.08	-.02	-.14	.04
2	.14	.01	.03	.12	-.01	-.02	.03	.02	-.26*	-.10
Italy										
1	-.02	.08	.16	.06	-.25*	.02	.03	-.08	.05	.19
2	-.06	.12	-.12	.12	.01	.11	.06	.16	.03	.18
U.S.A.										
1	-.23*	-.14	-.08	-.22*	.15	-.22*	-.19	-.10	-.28**	-.25*
2	-.06	-.07	.11	-.16	.05	.02	-.07	.10	.22	-.01
Yugoslavia										
1	.14	.01	-.05	.13	.00	-.01	-.33**	.06	-.17	-.23*
2	.00	-.01	.01	.11	-.02	-.10	-.31**	-.02	-.09	-.14

1 = plant seniority
2 = job seniority

TABLE D-12

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND
NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 48A	.14	.12	.13	-.04	.22*	-.04	.25*	.11	.12	.07
Q 48B	-.05	-.01	.14	-.02	-.03	.18	-.03	.13	-.04	-.03
Q 48C	.14	.04	.24*	.15	.06	.10	.05	.33**	.20	.11
Q 48D	-.09	-.01	.09	.18	.04	.02	-.03	-.09	.13	.03
Q 48E	.26*	.25*	.37**	-.01	.27*	.15	.31**	.05	.09	.15

TABLE D-13

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND
AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 48A	.11	.01	.00	.04	.12	-.13	.06	.15	.13	.23*
Q 48B	-.11	.07	.13	.04	.07	-.16	-.01	.16	.20	.09
Q 48C	-.03	.27*	.16	-.23	-.03	-.03	-.25	.05	-.11	-.16
Q 48D	-.07	.01	-.21	-.07	.00	-.11	-.20	-.09	.16	-.05
Q 48E	-.08	.04	-.16	-.13	.03	-.27	.08	.09	.08	.07

TABLE D-14

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 48A	-.22	.02	-.07	.15	.12	.27	.03	.19	.24*	-.09
Q 48B	-.11	.24*	-.06	.14	.09	.22*	-.12	-.02	.12	-.07
Q 48C	-.08	.06	-.16	-.09	.18	.21*	.07	.22*	.17	.14
Q 48D	-.05	.15	.00	-.15	.27*	.27*	.00	.17	.15	.05
Q 48E	-.10	.02	-.04	.09	.26*	.17	.08	.19	.08	-.11

TABLE D-15

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 48A	.05	.17	.02	.12	.10	.07	.10	.09	.00	.27*
Q 48B	.00	.17	-.09	.10	.01	.07	.11	.08	-.11	.23*
Q 48C	.16	.23*	.04	.09	.07	-.06	.10	.12	.03	.13
Q 48D	.11	.08	.07	-.02	.07	.16	.17	.02	-.03	.10
Q 48E	.22*	.11	.12	.04	.04	.19	.12	.02	.02	.25*

TABLE D-16

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Q 48A	-.12	-.08	-.24	.04	.20*	-.05	.16	-.20	.06	-.12
Q 48B	.08	-.06	.12	.09	.08	.09	-.08	-.16	.11	.01
Q 48C	.00	-.22	-.02	-.07	-.13	.10	-.11	-.33††	-.12	.05
Q 48D	-.07	-.15	.19	.05	-.08	.00	.04	-.04	-.27†	-.18
Q 48E	.03	-.10	.12	.09	.15	.12	.00	-.31††	.06	.03

TABLE D-17

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Index 1	-.08	-.10	-.15	.02	-.23	-.18	-.05	-.17	.06	.11
Index 2	.03	.13	.10	-.03	.18	.12	.03	.16	-.19	-.15
Index 3	-.11	-.10	-.09	-.03	-.23	-.16	-.07	-.14	.12	.13
Index 4	.05	.13	.13	-.08	.20	.12	.04	.15	-.19	-.17

TABLE D-18

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Index 1	-.30	-.10	.12	.12	-.31	.00	-.25	-.25	-.05	-.08
Index 2	.03	.30	-.21	-.13	.17	-.10	-.02	.07	-.13	-.11
Index 3	-.21	-.02	.16	-.11	-.34	.00	-.20	-.29	.05	.02
Index 4	.02	.23	-.25*	-.13	.15	-.16	-.09	.02	-.15	-.18

TABLE D-19

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSES IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Index 1	-.14	.11	.03	-.04	-.01	-.09	.16	.11	.01	.02
Index 2	.13	-.16	-.04	-.02	.08	.04	-.04	-.10	-.02	-.02
Index 3	-.13	.13	.00	-.06	.02	-.07	.12	.11	-.10	.02
Index 4	.13	-.10	-.03	-.02	.07	.05	-.10	-.11	.01	.00

TABLE D-20

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICIES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Index 1	-.01	-.20	-.14	.05	-.14	.05	.07	-.27	-.07	-.10
Index 2	.00	.04	.08	-.05	.05	-.04	-.23*	.14	.10	.11
Index 3	-.04	-.18	-.09	.06	-.09	.05	.08	-.24	-.04	-.13
Index 4	-.02	.01	.05	-.06	.06	-.04	-.20*	.14	.05	.07

TABLE D-21

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICIES AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Index 1	-.18	-.01	.16	.06	-.03	.09	.06	-.09	.17	.21*
Index 2	.04	-.05	-.07	-.10	-.13	-.32**	-.12	-.16	.09	-.09
Index 3	-.27	-.03	.16	.08	-.04	.00	.08	-.13	.16	.20*
Index 4	.01	-.06	-.10	-.15	-.05	-.27*	-.12	-.14	.02	-.14

TABLE D-22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Expert	.01	.07	-.02	-.27*	.06	.08	.05	.00	-.21	-.29*
Referent	.25	.04	.20	.11	.25	.23	.26	.30	.03	-.13
Law of sit.	.00	.05	.01	-.08	.01	.02	.01	.04	-.03	-.14
Reward	.10	.07	.07	-.07	.27*	.14	.24*	.28*	.07	-.23
Coercive	.17	.15	.12	.14	.10	.16	.17	.19	.08	.14
Legitimate	.04	.04	.12	-.15	.04	-.04	-.06	.06	-.20	-.15

TABLE D-23

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Expert	.00	.06	-.21	.06	.08	-.13	-.07	-.07	-.14	-.09
Referent	-.16	-.02	-.01	.15	.31	-.04	-.06	.08	.05	-.04
Law of sit.	.13	-.09	.14	.07	.16	.23	.17	.15	.05	.13
Reward	-.10	-.17	.14	.12	.14	.04	.11	-.07	.19	.01
Coercive	-.08	-.06	.27*	.16	.11	.20	.04	.05	.01	.10
Legitimate	.08	.10	.00	.35**	.07	.24*	.04	.11	.06	.05

TABLE D-24

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Expert	.14	-.07	-.01	-.13	-.02	.00	-.27*	-.11	.05	.14
Referent	.03	.03	.07	-.06	.00	-.24*	-.07	-.09	.01	-.01
Law of sit.	.18	.00	.08	-.06	-.13	-.22*	-.19	-.27*	-.19	-.13
Reward	.16	.21*	.09	-.03	.24*	-.04	-.10	-.02	.23*	.04
Coercive	-.14	-.02	.20*	.12	.05	-.16	.26*	-.14	.00	-.19
Legitimate	.01	.11	-.21	-.13	.03	-.15	-.14	-.03	-.18	-.14

TABLE D-25

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Expert	-.04	-.03	-.14	.02	.26	.01	.06	.29	.13	.14
Referent	.13	.27	.28	.11	.05	.24	.01	.07	.08	.17
Law of sit.	-.07	.08	.02	.03	.20	.01	.02	.09	.04	-.03
Reward	.05	.15	.20*	-.08	.19	.04	-.04	.16	.10	.21*
Coercive	-.01	.10	.04	.05	.02	-.07	-.09	-.01	.21*	-.01
Legitimate	-.21	-.09	.06	.05	.08	-.01	-.06	-.02	.02	-.23

TABLE D-26

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND
NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 35	Q 30	Q 31
Expert	.11	.03	-.29**	-.01	.03	-.19	-.29**	.03	-.26*	-.16
Referent	.11	-.08	-.15	-.14	.02	-.15	-.14	-.07	-.20*	-.13
Law of sit.	.15	.09	-.29**	-.03	-.04	-.21*	.08	-.14	.06	-.22*
Reward	-.09	-.11	-.05	-.13	-.14	-.26	-.10	-.04	-.19	-.05
Coercive	.08	-.04	-.12	-.02	-.11	-.25	.16	-.14	-.12	-.14
Legitimate	.06	-.01	-.25	-.03	-.06	-.22	.04	-.13	.01	-.06

TABLE D-27

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work peers	-.15*	-.08	.17	.01	.16	-.04	-.03	.16	.05	-.02
Non-work peers	-.08	.05	.11	-.01	.18	-.03	.07	.21	.12	-.02
Peers index	-.13	-.03	.18	.03	.18	-.04	.01	.24	.09	-.01
Peers work-nonwork	-.06	-.13	.05	.03	-.01	-.04	-.08	-.05	-.05	.00

TABLE D-28

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work peers	.16	-.18	-.17	-.20	-.19	-.10	-.14	-.09	-.02	.13
Non-work peers	.14	.11	-.09	-.24*	.02	-.10	-.13	-.05	.09	.07
Peers index	.15	-.05	-.17	-.30**	-.12	-.14	-.19	-.12	.02	.10
Peers work-nonwork	.00	-.22*	-.05	.05	-.18	.00	.00	-.02	-.12	.03

TABLE D-29

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work peers	-.13	.04	-.21**	-.03	.01	-.18*	.15	.11	.00	-.01
Non-work peers	-.12	-.13	.02	-.22**	-.11	-.18*	.04	.18	.08	.11
Peers index	-.17	-.07	-.12	-.17*	-.07	-.23**	.12	.18	.06	.06
Peers work-nonwork	.01	.14	-.20**	.15	.10	-.01	.08	-.05	-.08	-.11

TABLE D-30

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work peers	-.27	-.18	-.14	-.28**	.01	-.44**	-.14	.10	-.14	.00
non-work peers	-.25	-.12	-.23	.06	.03	-.41**	-.14	.12	-.23*	.04
Peers index	-.30**	-.17	-.22*	-.12	.02	-.50**	-.16	.13	-.18	.02
Peers work-nonwork	.02	-.02	.09	-.36**	-.01	-.01	-.05	-.03	-.03	-.01

TABLE D-31

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH PEERS AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	QQ 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work peers	.11	-.09	-.09	.04	-.17	-.20*	.13	-.04	-.08	-.08
Non-work peers	-.04	-.13	-.02	.05	-.14	.02	.14	-.13	-.04	.10
Peers index	.07	-.13	-.05	.06	-.17	-.14	.18	-.15	-.07	.01
Peers work-nonwork	.14	.06	-.09	.00	-.02	-.17	-.02	.01	-.01	-.15

TABLE D-32

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work superior	-.01	-.07	-.27†	-.15	-.08	-.08	.03	-.21	-.20	.04
Non-work superior	.03	-.12	-.31†	-.28†	-.11	-.11	.10	-.27†	-.15	-.05
Superior index	.01	-.10	-.28†	-.21	-.09	-.10	.06	-.24	-.18	.02
Superior work-nonwork	-.10	.06	.03	.13	.08	.02	-.06	.04	-.03	.14

TABLE D-33

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work superior	.15	-.05	-.27†	-.30†	-.09	-.10	-.10	-.04	-.08	.04
Non-work superior	.23	-.02	.09	-.29†	-.06	.00	.13	-.05	.03	.15
Superior index	.23	-.04	-.09	-.33††	-.09	-.06	.04	-.06	-.02	.11
Superior work-nonwork	-.09	-.03	-.37†	.01	.00	-.11	-.26†	.03	-.11	-.12

TABLE D-34

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work superior	.20	.39††	.10	.07	-.17	-.04	-.13	-.15	.04	.09
Non-work superior	.29†	.06	.21	.04	-.14	-.14	-.13	-.09	-.01	.12
Superior index	.27†	.25	.15	.06	-.18	-.09	-.16	-.14	.02	.10
Superior work-nonwork	-.03	.48††	-.05	.04	-.09	.04	-.03	-.10	.05	.04

TABLE D-35

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work superior	-.33††	-.07	-.03	-.11	-.07	-.15	-.32†	-.05	-.18	-.20
Non-work superior	-.34††	-.03	-.05	.05	.04	-.26†	-.03	.00	-.18	-.12
Superior index	-.40††	-.06	-.05	-.03	-.01	-.24†	-.20	-.03	-.22	-.19
Superior work-nonwork	.00	-.04	.02	-.17	-.12	.09	-.29†	-.05	.10	-.07

TABLE D-36

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATION WITH SUPERIOR AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Work superior	.18	.16	-.01	-.23	-.03	.00	.12	.05	-.01	-.01
Non-work superior	-.06	-.24	-.12	.03	-.04	-.22	-.22	.18	-.12	-.07
Superior index	.01	-.10	-.07	-.16	-.10	-.19	-.08	.13	-.08	-.04
Superior work-nonwork	.24	.32††	.07	-.22	.03	.16	.29†	-.11	.10	.06

TABLE D-37

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Superiors	.09	.06	-.13	-.23	-.08	.09	-.02	-.32	-.08	.10
Subordinates	-.10	.05	-.03	.00	-.11	-.15	-.02	-.14	-.08	-.05
Management	.03	.03	-.07	-.11	-.08	-.14	.09	.07	-.01	-.12
Written comm.	-.25	-.14	.02	.01	.03	-.01	-.03	.04	.22	-.17
Management assem.	.05	-.14	.10	.08	-.09	.11	-.10	.15	.06	-.03
Union assembly	.09	.10	.40††	.06	.27†	.32†	.13	.10	.06	.12
Coworkers	-.01	-.09	-.20	-.11	-.10	-.20	.11	-.01	-.11	-.01
Outside plant	-.04	.06	.06	-.07	.10	-.04	.07	.04	-.14	-.12

TABLE D-38

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Superiors	.02	-.17	-.04	-.18	-.03	-.09	-.12	-.18	.02	-.08
Subordinates	-.14	-.12	-.04	-.26†	-.15	-.09	.17	-.22	-.08	-.13
Management	.00	.02	-.11	-.03	.04	-.28†	-.12	-.22	.16	-.05
Written comm.	.10	.24	-.13	.03	.04	.03	.08	.10	-.03	.22
Management assem.	-.07	.07	.15	.09	.04	.16	-.11	.05	-.02	.05
Coworkers	-.13	-.09	.11	.21	.05	.03	.14	.22	-.14	-.08
Outside plant	.08	.04	.01	.00	.10	.24	.13	.22	.10	.06

TABLE D-39

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Superiors	.19	.24†	.10	.09	-.12	-.08	-.12	.08	-.03	.12
Subordinates	-.12	-.22	.06	-.02	-.42††	-.05	-.19	-.28†	-.16	-.04
Management	.07	.21	.19	.17	-.01	-.17	.15	-.15	.12	-.02
Written comm.	.11	-.15	-.19	-.08	.08	.12	-.13	-.03	-.18	-.02
Management assem.	.12	-.14	-.13	-.02	.17	.03	-.07	.10	-.02	-.05
Union assembly	-.14	.07	.09	-.31††	-.16	-.02	.19	-.09	.10	.12
Coworkers	.06	-.01	.02	.32††	.16	.23†	.06	.27†	.12	-.04
Outside plant	.03	-.06	.07	.02	.15	.27†	.04	.05	-.03	-.05

TABLE D-40

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Superiors	-.07	.18	.15	.08	.14	.18	-.01	.14	.00	.06
Subordinates	-.13	-.16	-.27†	-.20	-.09	-.45	-.07	-.26†	-.03	-.15
Management	-.07	.14	.12	-.13	-.05	-.01	-.05	.05	-.15	.07
Written comm.	.09	-.24†	-.12	-.11	-.04	.11	-.17	-.04	-.15	-.08
Management assem.	-.05	-.03	-.02	.14	.06	-.07	.14	.08	-.20	-.08
Union assem.	-.05	-.15	.07	-.12	-.25†	.01	-.10	-.13	.22	-.18
Coworkers	.21	.10	-.05	.11	.09	-.04	.18	.01	.29†	.28†
Outside plant	-.02	.00	.08	.00	-.09	.09	.10	-.14	-.03	-.07

TABLE D-41

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Superiors	.07	.17	-.02	-.13	-.01	.22	-.12	.12	-.07	.10
Subordinates	.28†	.05	.22	.15	.32††	-.09	.34††	.00	.23	.24
Management	-.18	-.04	.09	-.13	-.06	-.04	-.06	.04	-.24	-.24
Written comm.	-.06	-.03	-.14	.10	-.15	-.29†	-.07	-.32††	-.05	-.07
Management assem.	-.01	-.09	.13	.31††	.13	.13	.24	.15	.38††	.35††
Workers council	-.16	.02	.05	-.11	-.12	.04	-.03	.09	-.09	-.22
Coworkers	-.19	-.10	.03	.11	-.18	.01	-.19	-.06	.00	.01
Outside plant	.23	.07	.04	.03	-.11	.16	-.12	-.11	.02	.13

TABLE D-42

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN AUSTRIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Alienation	-.08	.03	-.37**	-.22*	-.10	-.20	-.14	-.34**	-.29*	-.16
Isolation	-.14	.10	-.17	-.36**	-.17	-.13	-.17	-.24*	-.24*	-.23*
Power-lessness	.03	.10	-.20	-.13	-.15	-.18	-.10	-.30*	-.18	-.07
Meaning-lessness	.05	-.02	-.33**	-.06	.07	-.01	-.02	-.14	-.21	-.16
Self-alienation	-.11	-.12	-.39**	-.18	-.14	-.29*	-.23*	-.29*	-.32**	-.24*
Normlessness	-.11	.06	-.36**	-.13	.02	-.15	-.05	-.29*	-.26*	.01

TABLE D-43

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Alienation	-.03	.11	-.15	-.16	-.19	.00	-.20	-.37**	.00	-.08
Isolation	-.08	-.08	-.21	-.27*	-.08	-.06	-.19	-.27*	.01	-.26*
Power-lessness	.07	.09	-.14	-.08	-.16	-.05	-.19	-.30*	-.06	-.07
Meaning-lessness	.00	.05	-.17	.01	-.20	.05	-.08	-.27*	-.07	-.05
Self-alienation	.06	.14	-.06	-.16	-.18	-.03	-.27**	-.30**	-.08	.01
Normlessness	-.03	.24	-.03	-.27*	-.12	.03	-.10	-.28*	-.01	-.04

TABLE D-44

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN ITALY

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Alienation	.10	.08	-.02	.10	-.11	.04	.03	.02	-.02	.16
Isolation	.10	.17	-.07	.01	-.03	.04	-.01	.03	.02	.16
Power-lessness	.04	-.02	.08	.07	-.15	.21	.04	-.01	.04	.18
Meaning-lessness	.08	.10	-.03	.16	.01	-.08	.20	.20	-.03	.08
Self-alienation	.04	-.10	-.07	.13	-.04	.01	.04	.06	-.05	.17
Normlessness	.11	.13	.05	.03	-.17	-.02	-.08	-.16	-.02	.06

TABLE D-45

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN U.S.A.

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Alienation	-.23*	-.17	-.19	-.19	-.03	-.26*	-.11	.01	-.17	-.16
Isolation	-.23*	-.23*	-.05	-.23*	-.03	-.14	-.09	.04	-.24*	-.16
Power-lessness	-.26*	-.06	-.25*	-.15	.10	-.32**	-.08	.03	-.09	-.19
Meaning-lessness	-.20*	-.17	-.22*	-.11	-.11	-.29**	-.13	-.01	-.01	-.12
Self-alienation	-.26*	-.30**	-.17	-.02	.07	-.12	-.09	.01	-.03	-.20*
Normlessness	-.16	-.07	-.19	.01	-.03	-.21*	-.19	.00	.01	-.04

TABLE D-46

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE CONSENSUS IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 26d	Q 27d	Q 36	Q 24	Q 32	Q 37	Q 20	Q 25	Q 30	Q 31
Alienation	-.21*	-.05	.12	.09	.04	-.01	-.15	.31††	-.13	-.12
Isolation	-.24*	-.03	.07	.27†	.08	-.11	-.33**	.04	-.16	-.14
Power-lessness	-.09	-.02	.13	.02	.00	-.06	-.05	.28†	-.17	-.08
Meaning-lessness	-.08	.03	.12	.15	.22	.08	-.01	.39††	-.05	-.02
Self-alienation	-.16	-.12	.09	.08	-.06	-.08	-.15	.17	-.08	-.12
Normlessness	-.16	-.10	.07	.03	-.09	-.03	-.12	.20	-.14	-.13

The significance levels for the normative complementarity measures in each country are as follows:

	one-tailed		two-tailed	
	.05	.01	.05	.01
Austria	.15	.21	.18	.24
Israel	.21	.29	.24	.32
Italy	.14	.20	.17	.22
U.S.A.	.13	.18	.15	.20
Yugoslavia	.15	.21	.18	.24

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction is marked with one asterisk (*).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the predicted direction is marked with two asterists (**).

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with one cross (†).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with two crosses (††).

TABLE D-47

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Q 62 - Q 44	-												
Q 63 - Q 6	.15*	-											
Q 64a - Q 47a	.21**	.13	-										
Q 64b - Q 47b	.15*	.06	.35**	-									
Q 64c - Q 47c	.16*	.01	.18*	.39**	-								
Q 64d - Q 47d	.27**	.19*	.06	-.03	.16*	-							
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.08	-.15	.02	.00	-.10	.06	-						
Q 64f - Q 47f	.09	-.10	.10	.04	.06	.13	.33**	-					
Q 24	.33**	.18*	.23**	-.01	-.05	.17*	.10	.11	-				
Q 33	-.01	.06	.00	-.14	-.04	.04	.21**	.10	.00	-			
Q 35	.03	.05	.00	.16*	.20*	.00	.03	-.14	.07	-.04	-		
Q 37	.01	-.18	.02	.05	.16*	-.03	.14	.10	-.17	.18*	.35**	-	
Q 39	.10	-.03	.25**	.10	.04	.14	.29**	.18*	.25**	.16*	.00	.05	-

TABLE D-48

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Q 62 - Q 44	-												
Q 63 - Q 6	.23*	-											
Q 64a - Q 47a	.01	-.07	-										
Q 64b - Q 47b	.05	.11	-.28†	-									
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.03	.23*	-.36††	.28*	-								
Q 64d - Q 47d	.12	.10	-.05	.40**	-.16	-							
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.20	-.09	.11	-.11	-.24†	-.03	-						
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.05	-.05	.00	.08	-.22	-.14	.07	-					
Q 24	-.07	.16	-.03	.07	.33**	-.14	-.09	-.06	-				
Q 33	.12	-.07	.03	.11	.12	.02	-.30†	-.06	.17	-			
Q 35	-.03	-.05	-.01	-.11	.08	-.18	-.13	-.15	-.01	.26*	-		
Q 37	.01	-.13	-.05	-.06	-.02	-.15	-.19	-.13	-.15	-.19	-.04	-	
Q 39	.24*	.03	.02	.07	-.08	.02	-.19	-.09	.27*	.07	.03	.26*	-

TABLE D-49

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Q 62 - Q 44	-												
Q 63 - Q 6	.10	-											
Q 64a - Q 47a	.18*	-.05	-										
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.03	.22**	.00	-									
Q 64c - Q 47c	.01	.10	.05	.00	-								
Q 64d - Q 47d	.12	.19*	-.11	.14*	.18*	-							
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.04	-.14	.13	.08	.19*	.13	-						
Q 64f - Q 47f	.22**	.01	.15*	.06	.05	.04	.18*	-					
Q 24	.14*	.08	.19*	.04	.09	.04	-.09	.00	-				
Q 33	.13	-.04	-.10	-.05	-.08	-.02	-.07	.00	.09	-			
Q 35	-.12	.11	-.05	.08	-.04	-.01	-.07	.02	-.10	.01	-		
Q 37	.04	-.13	.17*	-.04	.06	-.19†	-.16	.01	.06	.04	.14*	-	
Q 39	.10	.08	.04	.24**	-.03	.19*	-.05	.03	.10	-.07	-.11	.03	-

TABLE D-50

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Q 62 - Q 44	-												
Q 63 - Q 6	.12	-											
Q 64a - Q 47a	.18**	.02	-										
Q 64b - Q 47b	.03	.01	.07	-									
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.11	.05	-.05	.26**	-								
Q 64d - Q 47d	.02	.06	-.07	.18**	.19**	-							
Q 64e - Q 64e	.00	-.13	.09	.01	.08	-.01	-						
Q 64f - Q 64f	.18**	.16*	.20**	.00	.08	-.02	.23**	-					
Q 24	.00	.10	.14*	.21**	.09	.13*	-.04	.15*	-				
Q 33	.13*	.13*	.15*	.03	-.07	.10	.01	.14*	.08	-			
Q 35	.13*	.00	.08	.05	-.03	.00	.16*	.25**	-.01	.21**	-		
Q 37	-.14	.20**	.01	.00	.07	-.09	.00	.11	.07	-.11	.14*	-	
Q 39	.06	.10	-.03	.01	-.01	-.02	-.21††	-.05	.07	-.05	.04	-.03	-

TABLE D-51

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Q 62 - Q 44	-												
Q 63 - Q 6	.03	-											
Q 64a - Q 47a	-.10	.13	-										
Q 64b - Q 47b	-.12	.09	.14	-									
Q 64c - Q 47c	-.29††	.33**	.11	.09	-								
Q 64d - Q 47d	.08	.20*	-.06	.01	.09	-							
Q 64e - Q 47e	-.23†	-.09	.18*	.18*	.00	-.11	-						
Q 64f - Q 47f	-.14	-.03	.01	-.07	-.05	-.30††	.34**	-					
Q 24	.07	.16*	.06	-.17	-.06	.27**	-.05	-.02	-				
Q 33	-.03	.02	.09	.11	-.08	-.06	-.05	.01	.03	-			
Q 35	.18*	.12	.00	-.12	-.09	.12	-.18†	-.18†	.14	.15*	-		
Q 37	.04	.06	-.02	-.04	-.07	.20*	.06	-.04	.19*	-.02	.20*	-	
Q 39	.07	.02	-.07	.06	-.07	.11	-.09	-.02	.05	.27**	.10	.32**	-

TABLE D-52

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE SIMILARITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Plant seniority	.06	.06	-.07	.19*	.02	.07	-.03	-.02	.05	.01	-.01	.02	-.07
Job seniority	.26**	.05	-.02	.24**	.22**	.04	-.14	-.07	.01	.03	.10	.16*	-.13
Salary	.11	-.16	-.14	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.07	-.05	-.08	-.02	-.23†	-.02	-.06
Sex	.20*	.15*	.04	.17*	-.01	-.09	-.25††	.10	.06	-.09	-.15	-.02	.05
Education	-.04	.30**	-.03	.02	.11	.12	-.05	-.05	.01	.25**	-.06	-.06	-.01
Age	.09	.04	-.08	-.09	-.07	-.08	-.16	-.16	-.10	-.04	.00	-.05	-.05

TABLE D-53

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE SIMILARITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Plant seniority	.13	.15	-.20	.15	.12	.11	-.13	.01	.18	.12	-.10	.02	.04
Job seniority	.10	.09	-.02	-.19	.00	-.08	-.17	-.30†	.01	.11	.12	.16	.13
Salary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sex	.07	.27*	.09	.35**	-.01	.23*	-.06	.22*	.17	-.21	-.05	-.04	.09
Education	.18	.30**	.11	-.15	.00	-.06	-.12	-.04	.08	-.06	-.02	-.04	.03
Age	.03	.13	.00	.02	.08	.11	.12	-.30†	-.01	-.13	-.05	.14	-.04

TABLE D-54

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE SIMILARITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Plant seniority	.03	.02	.04	.11	.07	-.11	.12	.19*	-.03	-.04	.04	.17*	-.02
Job seniority	.08	-.03	-.02	.07	.01	.02	.12	.04	.05	.09	.18*	.18*	.09
Salary	-.04	.09	.00	.05	.14*	.08	.14*	.07	-.08	.04	-.10	-.12	.02
Sex	.05	-.16	.19*	-.09	.08	-.09	.16*	.19*	-.05	.08	.07	.13	-.10
Education	-.03	-.15	-.04	.06	-.10	.02	-.06	-.08	-.10	-.03	.07	.04	-.03
Age	-.02	.20**	-.04	.19*	.08	.08	-.02	.01	.13	.01	-.06	.11	-.04

TABLE D-55

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE SIMILARITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Plant seniority	-.01	.05	-.02	-.12	.13*	-.14	.07	.03	.01	-.02	.01	.14*	-.14
Job seniority	-.03	-.05	.00	.00	.06	-.17†	.06	-.01	.04	.11	.12	-.01	-.07
Salary	.06	.08	.01	.02	.04	.11	.10	.05	.04	.02	-.12	-.13	-.01
Sex	.01	.14*	.05	.08	.04	-.11	-.04	.05	-.02	.10	.03	-.05	.01
Education	.15*	.03	.12	.09	.09	.16*	.01	.20**	.07	.02	.09	.19**	.01
Age	.03	.06	.01	.06	-.02	-.09	.00	-.09	.12	-.06	.13*	.05	-.01

TABLE D-56

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE SIMILARITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Plant seniority	-.16	-.03	.04	.13	-.07	-.13	.08	.10	.01	.09	.02	-.06	.01
Job seniority	-.26††	.04	.15*	.04	.05	.12	.02	.08	.16*	.09	.21**	.09	-.02
Salary	-.02	-.08	-.12	-.07	.04	.00	-.16	-.09	-.05	-.08	-.03	-.20	.01
Sex	.11	-.08	-.02	.06	-.18	-.06	-.05	.02	.00	-.08	-.08	-.11	-.06
Education	-.11	-.04	-.06	.15*	.11	.01	.07	-.07	-.03	.00	.10	-.04	.06
Age	-.09	.13	.08	.11	.03	.03	.13	-.08	-.04	.11	.02	.03	.04

TABLE D-57

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Superiors	-.28**	-.12	-.09	-.08	.00	-.12	-.08	-.03	-.16*	-.06	-.07	.14	-.21**
Subordinates	-.15	-.13	-.06	.01	.12	-.01	.10	-.04	-.11	.00	.13	.24†	-.06
Management	-.01	.09	-.18*	-.18*	.02	-.03	.01	-.07	.05	-.10	.11	-.16	-.10
Written comm.	-.21†	-.09	.01	-.04	.09	-.03	-.13	-.02	-.13	.12	-.22†	-.13	.06
Management assembly	.16	-.12	.23†	.09	.09	.05	.26††	.24††	.03	.14	.00	.07	.18†
Union assembly	.02	.06	.07	.19†	.03	.04	.03	.06	.14	.09	.16	-.06	.04
Coworkers	.22†	.06	-.01	.04	-.24††	.06	-.01	-.06	.04	-.06	-.06	-.09	.14
Outside plant	.04	-.01	.11	-.03	-.07	-.04	.10	.10	.22†	.05	-.03	-.01	.10

TABLE D-58

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 30
Superiors	-.10	.21	-.27†	.11	.24†	-.10	.16	.04	.14	-.22†	.07	.03	-.02
Subordinates	-.04	-.25†	-.04	-.08	-.12	-.07	-.33††	-.06	-.19	-.11	-.11	-.12	-.15
Management	-.10	-.35**	-.01	-.01	.21	-.13	-.03	.09	-.15	-.07	-.05	-.02	-.16
Written comm.	-.02	-.02	.13	-.21	-.30†	-.05	-.16	-.20	-.21	-.06	-.01	.16	-.19
Management assembly	-.01	.17	.08	.08	-.01	.22	-.14	.09	.11	.18	-.02	.01	.11
Coworkers	.19	.18	-.01	.00	-.06	.09	.03	.20	.28†	.05	-.09	-.18	.16
Outside plant	-.01	-.08	-.07	.19	.06	-.07	-.10	-.15	-.13	.10	.00	.00	.12

TABLE D-59

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Superiors	-.12	-.16*	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.14*	-.02	-.22**	-.07	-.02	.02	.03	-.10
Subordinates	-.10	.02	.05	.06	.04	.13	.12	.02	-.09	.02	-.08	-.14	-.01
Management	.02	.00	.11	-.12	-.07	.02	-.02	-.01	-.02	.06	-.02	-.12	.25††
Written comm.	.00	.04	-.18††	-.05	.07	-.05	.09	.06	.04	.02	.06	-.05	-.11
Management assembly	.01	.13	.00	.16	.04	.09	.02	-.07	-.05	-.05	-.05	.00	.04
Union assembly	.17†	.03	-.09	-.06	-.05	.06	-.14	.04	.22††	-.01	-.11	.03	.09
Coworkers	.09	.01	.22††	.10	.17†	-.08	.02	.09	.10	.13	.11	.05	-.09
Outside plant	-.06	.14	-.06	.12	.00	-.05	.00	-.04	-.14	-.08	.21†	.15	.16

TABLE D-60

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Superiors	-.15*	-.20**	-.05	.11	-.04	.02	-.20**	-.06	-.10	-.08	.02	-.03	.02
Subordinates	.14	.02	.03	-.05	-.02	.14	.02	-.01	.14	-.01	-.08	-.26††	.04
Management	-.01	.00	.01	.08	.07	.07	-.14	.00	-.04	-.01	.06	-.05	.04
Written comm.	-.01	.05	.09	.08	-.06	.10	.20††	.07	-.04	.06	.06	.02	-.04
Management assembly	.15†	.00	-.11	-.04	-.04	.03	-.10	.07	.00	.02	.09	.07	.08
Union assembly	.10	.08	.16†	.11	-.05	-.11	.10	.15††	.30††	-.05	.02	.17†	-.06
Coworkers	.16†	.05	.04	-.09	-.04	-.05	.00	.05	.04	.07	-.13	-.04	-.04
Outside plant	.17†	.05	.12	.00	-.01	.10	-.08	.09	.04	-.03	-.02	-.01	.06

TABLE D-61

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Superiors	.04	.05	.08	.06	.03	.11	.06	-.01	-.02	.07	-.02	-.07	.14
Subordinates	.09	-.09	.10	-.09	-.04	.05	.19†	.13	.14	-.09	.00	-.02	-.14
Management	-.27**	.15	-.14	.06	.04	-.09	-.08	.08	-.13	.02	-.04	-.01	-.02
Written comm.	.20†	-.07	.17	-.12	-.16	-.09	.04	-.12	.04	.11	.06	-.01	.03
Management assembly	-.12	-.03	.05	.21†	.10	.09	-.01	-.05	-.04	.06	-.13	-.22**	-.10
Workers council	.11	-.06	-.16	.09	-.02	-.19†	-.16	.02	-.06	.01	.20†	.04	-.14
Coworkers	.12	.02	-.02	-.17	.01	.09	.07	.06	.20†	.11	.07	.04	.17
Outside plant	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.08	.03	-.03	-.02	-.06	-.03	.10	-.09	.07	-.03

TABLE D-62

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Index 1	.06	.00	.06	-.07	-.06	-.10	.00	.05	.24**	-.02	-.07	-.27††	.08
Index 2	-.05	-.01	-.02	-.04	.03	-.05	-.01	-.05	-.21**	-.02	.07	.16	-.09
Index 3	.02	-.03	.04	-.05	-.08	-.09	.02	.03	.19*	-.02	-.07	-.26††	.08
Index 4	-.06	-.02	-.02	-.02	.03	-.04	-.01	-.04	-.21**	-.03	.05	.18†	-.10

TABLE D-63

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 66e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Index 1	.19	.14	.30**	-.24†	-.37††	-.14	-.14	.16	-.14	.09	.13	-.05	.03
Index 2	.00	.06	-.43**	.31†	.29†	.27†	.20	.02	-.05	-.11	-.22*	-.05	-.28*
Index 3	.24*	.10	.41**	-.23	-.43††	-.08	-.12	.09	-.15	.05	.16	-.11	.03
Index 4	-.08	.02	-.43**	.28†	.32††	.23	.22	-.01	-.05	-.20	-.26*	-.02	-.31**

TABLE D-64

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Index 1	.41**	.04	.20**	-.11	-.07	.09	-.12	.01	.29**	.02	-.11	-.02	.02
Index 2	-.35**	-.04	-.31**	.03	.05	.00	.16	-.04	-.22*	-.06	.22††	.13	-.07
Index 3	.46**	.04	.19*	-.08	-.07	.06	.08	.08	.26*	.04	-.11	-.04	.01
Index 4	-.44*	-.05	-.30**	.03	.05	.00	.18†	-.09	-.23*	-.07	.23††	.12	-.05

TABLE D-65

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Index 1	.54**	.07	.11	-.04	-.20††	-.12	-.08	.19**	.07	.05	.08	-.10	.00
Index 2	-.41**	-.10	-.01	.06	.26††	.08	.03	-.17*	-.06	-.06	.02	.00	.02
Index 3	.56**	.10	.14	-.05	-.22††	-.10	-.07	.21**	.09	.04	.03	-.13	-.02
Index 4	-.47**	-.12	-.06	.04	.26††	.08	.03	-.18**	-.07	-.05	.01	.02	.03

TABLE D-66

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Index 1	.00	.16*	-.02	-.10	-.12	-.20†	-.04	-.02	.07	.04	-.05	.07	-.09
Index 2	-.01	-.24**	.07	.00	.09	.16	-.13	-.12	-.05	-.03	.04	-.06	.09
Index 3	.02	.17*	-.05	-.07	-.18†	-.18†	.00	-.02	.12	.07	-.04	.08	-.08
Index 4	-.03	-.23**	.09	.02	.13	.17	-.12	-.09	-.05	-.04	.06	-.06	.10

TABLE D-67

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Work group	.01	-.06	-.12	.00	.18†	-.11	-.01	-.16*	.02	-.04	.02	.09	-.22**
Department	-.09	-.03	-.04	-.04	.23†	-.09	-.03	-.15*	-.13	.07	.14	.17	-.13
Plant	-.01	-.05	-.06	-.06	.11	.05	.04	-.02	-.07	.10	.07	.06	-.07

TABLE D-68

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Work group	-.21*	-.20	.03	.04	-.18	-.06	.02	-.02	-.18	.00	-.14	.09	-.15
Department	-.29**	-.15	.05	-.15	-.20	-.17	.16	.13	-.15	-.30**	-.16	.01	-.12
Plant	-.35**	-.28*	-.04	.15	.01	.12	.19	-.09	-.09	-.13	-.04	.08	-.06

TABLE D-69

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Work group	-.15*	.03	.07	.01	.03	.06	.03	-.17*	.12	-.08	-.09	-.13	.06
Department	-.13	-.05	-.01	-.11	.07	.06	-.09	-.21**	.06	.02	-.13	-.17*	.03
Plant	-.15*	-.06	.03	-.10	.07	.01	.09	-.19*	.11	-.04	-.10	-.18*	.06

TABLE D-70

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Work group	-.19**	-.34**	-.08	.00	.03	.02	-.02	-.03	-.19**	-.06	-.13*	-.06	-.12
Department	-.16*	-.35**	-.05	-.01	.04	.03	.09	-.01	-.08	-.06	.03	-.14*	-.04
Plant	-.04	-.24**	-.07	-.00	.08	.10	.12	.12	-.10	-.03	.04	-.04	-.16*

TABLE D-71

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FELT RESPONSIBILITY AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Work group	.05	.10	-.08	.20†	.07	.16	-.11	-.17*	.12	.09	.05	-.07	-.07
Department	.11	.13	-.03	.07	.13	.15	-.11	-.08	-.10	-.12	.04	-.04	-.15*
Plant	.00	.01	-.09	.07	.08	.14	-.10	-.09	-.13	-.12	-.02	-.08	-.20*

TABLE D-72

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Expert	-.38**	-.09	-.23**	-.10	-.04	-.07	.02	-.02	-.24**	-.04	-.06	-.04	-.18*
Referent	-.04	.04	-.06	-.13	.04	.18†	-.20*	.05	-.23**	.09	.02	.08	.08
Law of sit.	-.06	.00	.04	.03	-.01	.02	.16	-.40**	-.06	.15	.08	.09	.03
Reward	-.05	.09	-.06	-.13	-.11	.15*	-.08	.00	-.07	.10	-.09	.10	.20*
Coercive	.17*	.01	-.09	-.20†	.00	.48**	.05	.26**	-.06	.22**	.08	-.03	.17*
Legitimate	.07	.05	.17*	.01	.14	.10	-.13	-.18†	-.06	.11	.03	-.10	.09

TABLE D-73

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Expert	-.07	.01	-.86**	.25†	.42††	.12	-.07	-.10	.06	-.05	-.19	.12	-.07
Referent	.07	.24†	-.55**	.34††	.46††	-.03	-.30**	-.05	.20	.02	.12	.06	.10
Law of sit.	-.04	.02	.14	-.18	.00	-.05	.01	-.35**	.10	.01	.17	.05	.24†
Reward	.15	.08	-.15	.60**	.16	.49**	-.23	-.02	.20	.24*	-.02	.03	.06
Coercive	.02	.16	-.06	.37**	.07	.65**	-.16	-.03	.24*	.19	-.07	-.06	-.11
Legitimate	-.09	.09	-.17	-.15	.02	-.20	-.52††	.10	.08	-.04	.11	.23*	.14

TABLE D-74

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Expert	-.34**	.04	-.65**	.04	.10	.08	-.02	.18†	-.02	-.02	.09	-.06	.07
Referent	-.27**	.00	-.20**	-.02	-.05	-.01	-.04	-.19*	.14	.08	.03	-.09	-.09
Law of sit.	-.31**	.04	-.10	-.08	-.06	.19†	.03	-.39**	-.10	-.08	.14	-.24**	.01
Reward	-.05	.03	-.28††	-.05	.09	.13	-.08	-.09	.11	.08	.06	-.07	.04
Coercive	.21**	.10	-.18†	.05	.09	.38**	.02	.04	.09	-.08	.11	-.12	.16*
Legitimate	.02	.13	-.07	-.01	-.11	.03	-.03	.00	-.07	.01	.08	-.10	.07

TABLE D-75

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Expert	-.31**	-.01	-.01	.11	.20††	.03	.05	-.06	-.06	-.14*	.01	.08	.09
Referent	-.27**	.06	-.21**	.17†	.43††	.03	.11	.01	-.05	.00	.13	.12	.11
Law of sit.	-.20**	-.02	-.04	.06	.17†	.02	-.08	-.09	-.20**	-.08	.04	.03	.12
Reward	-.20††	-.05	-.13	.18*	.19*	.12	.06	.04	-.08	.11	.06	-.06	.00
Coercive	.09	.21**	-.04	.07	.06	.24**	-.09	.02	.10	.16*	.12	-.09	-.04
Legitimate	-.02	.05	.01	.01	.01	-.02	-.32††	-.01	.03	.02	-.05	-.07	.06

TABLE D-76

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Expert	-.18*	-.14	.19†	.11	.14	.20†	-.01	-.02	-.04	.05	-.03	.02	.09
Referent	-.06	-.07	.10	.13	.25††	.19†	.13	-.09	-.09	.06	.05	.05	-.03
Law of sit.	-.05	-.03	.12	.21†	.21†	.15	-.16*	-.29**	-.15*	.07	.02	-.15*	.02
Reward	-.02	-.11	-.03	.03	.21**	-.05	.03	.20*	-.08	.01	-.13	-.12	.04
Coercive	.17*	.09	-.06	-.07	-.06	.52**	-.09	-.12	.11	-.01	.03	-.04	.11
Legitimate	-.01	.09	.07	.14	.18*	.25**	-.27††	-.32††	-.18†	.04	.10	-.12	-.02

TABLE D-77

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Mental health	-.22**	-.02	-.05	.14	.10	-.16*	.00	.00	-.14	-.20*	-.06	-.07	-.18*
Alienation	-.18*	-.30**	-.03	.13	.25††	-.29**	.04	-.04	-.16*	-.16*	-.08	.10	-.19*
Isolation	-.10	-.24**	-.11	.02	.04	-.28**	.12	.10	-.01	.18†	-.04	.02	.05
Powerlessness	-.25**	-.30**	-.06	.08	.27††	-.24**	.04	-.07	-.17*	-.10	-.02	.15	.22**
Meaninglessness	.07	-.15*	.07	.22†	.21†	-.16*	-.05	-.08	-.17*	-.13	-.11	.13	-.12
Self-alienation	-.16*	-.29**	.05	.17	.31††	-.20*	.03	-.09	-.17*	-.19*	.00	.10	-.16*
Normlessness	-.12	-.17*	-.04	.05	.20†	-.28**	.00	-.01	-.07	-.07	-.12	.02	-.22**

TABLE D-78

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ISRAEL

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Mental health	-.10	-.11	-.31**	-.06	.24†	-.19	.18	.03	.00	-.15	-.11	.06	-.14
Alienation	-.19	.00	-.23**	-.12	.07	.04	.15	-.11	-.26**	-.28**	.13	-.27*	-.30*
Isolation	-.06	-.13	-.14	.01	.08	-.08	.05	-.11	-.22*	-.24*	.17	-.21*	-.26*
Powerlessness	-.15	.16	-.31**	.08	.18	.10	.14	-.16	-.26*	-.22*	-.01	-.21*	-.38**
Meaninglessness	-.07	-.06	-.07	-.21*	-.14	-.05	.15	-.18	-.24*	-.21*	.10	-.14	-.15
Self-alienation	-.22*	-.09	-.20	-.10	.10	.02	.17	.00	-.13	-.23*	-.06	-.09	-.13
Normlessness	-.15	.07	-.11	-.16	.05	.11	.05	.02	-.09	-.20	.17	-.33**	-.13

TABLE D-79

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN ITALY

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Mental health	-.29**	.07	-.12	.05	-.01	.11	.01	-.24**	-.09	-.06	-.03	-.16*	.06
Alienation	-.09	.14	-.04	.09	.04	.03	-.10	-.14*	.05	.09	-.17*	-.11	.03
Isolation	-.06	.22††	-.03	.11	-.02	-.08	-.07	-.07	.06	.21†	-.16*	-.17*	.02
Powerlessness	-.11	.06	.05	-.03	.03	-.04	-.11	-.05	.15	.09	-.20**	-.03	.06
Meaninglessness	.11	.11	.05	-.05	.09	.10	-.09	-.03	.12	.04	-.20**	-.11	-.03
Self-alienation	-.14*	-.07	-.08	-.03	.03	-.06	.02	-.12	-.14*	.06	-.11	-.01	-.06
Normlessness	.10	.16	-.11	.26††	.04	.16	-.11	-.21**	-.01	-.05	.04	-.07	.14

TABLE D-80

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN U.S.A.

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Mental health	-.21**	-.20**	-.16*	.00	.02	-.05	-.04	-.15*	-.20**	-.13*	.02	-.04	.02
Alienation	-.15*	-.23**	.02	.05	.04	-.02	-.03	-.14*	-.15*	-.15*	-.04	.05	-.04
Isolation	-.20**	-.16*	-.14*	.07	.03	.01	-.03	-.18**	-.20**	-.13*	.05	.12	-.09
Powerlessness	-.13*	-.30**	.02	-.09	.00	-.02	.19†	-.05	-.15*	-.18**	-.01	.13	-.06
Meaninglessness	-.08	-.11	-.01	.11	.04	.07	-.11	-.20**	.02	-.16*	-.13*	-.01	.05
Self-alienation	-.11	-.15*	.08	.05	.04	-.01	.00	-.11	-.13*	-.10	.02	.09	.13
Normlessness	-.05	-.21**	.11	.06	.03	-.11	-.12	-.03	-.03	-.11	-.18**	-.06	-.15*

TABLE D-81

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF MENTAL HEALTH AND NORMATIVE COMPLEMENTARITY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 62-Q 44	Q 63-Q 6	Q 64a-Q 47a	Q 64b-Q 47b	Q 64c-Q 47c	Q 64d-Q 47d	Q 64e-Q 47e	Q 64f-Q 47f	Q 24	Q 33	Q 35	Q 37	Q 39
Mental health	.02	.11	-.04	.13	-.05	-.01	.06	.01	-.05	-.01	-.01	-.08	.05
Alienation	-.03	.17	.10	.09	-.01	-.08	.06	-.09	.04	-.10	.04	.05	-.12
Isolation	.03	.04	.16	.03	-.06	-.08	.06	.04	.07	.10	.09	.07	-.02
Powerlessness	-.03	.21†	.10	.09	.10	.00	-.08	-.09	-.04	-.02	.11	.01	-.08
Meaninglessness	-.04	.06	.06	.05	-.11	-.13	.08	-.05	.05	-.08	-.03	.09	.03
Self-alienation	.02	.13	.07	-.06	-.06	-.11	-.04	-.12	.07	-.18*	.03	-.02	-.19*
Normlessness	-.07	.17	.00	.21†	.07	.03	.17	-.15*	-.02	-.10	.02	-.04	-.16*

The significance levels for the normative consistency measures in each country are as follows:

	one-tailed		two-tailed	
	.05	.01	.05	.01
Austria	.14	.20	.17	.22
Israel	.19	.27	.23	.29
Italy	.14	.19	.16	.21
U.S.A.	.13	.18	.15	.19
Yugoslavia	.15	.21	.18	.23

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the predicted direction is marked with one asterisk (*).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the predicted direction is marked with two asterisks (**).

A correlation significant at the .05 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with one cross (†).

A correlation significant at the .01 level in the non-predicted direction (two-tailed test) is marked with two crosses (††).

The significance levels for the normative consistency correlations differ slightly from those for normative complementarity. This is due to the greater number of missing cases for the normative complementarity measures. To be counted in the analysis, the score of a superior and the corresponding scores of his subordinates are necessary to create the normative complementarity measure. The actual and ideal scores of subordinates only are necessary to create the normative consistency measures.

TABLE D-82

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES IN AUSTRIA

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Opport. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 27a-- Q 26a	-								
Q 27b - Q 26b	.21**	-							
Q 27c - Q 26c	-.04	-.05	-						
Q 27d - Q 26d	.13	.09	.20**	-					
Auth. index	.07	-.10	.16*	.23**	-				
Opport. index	.04	-.05	.07	.02	.40**	-			
Total control	-.10	.07	.07	-.02	.25**	.26**	-		
Slope	.29**	-.04	.25**	-.04	.21**	.23**	.42**	-	
Decision making index	.04	.03	-.01	-.08	.29**	.22**	.41**	.23**	-

TABLE D-83

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES IN ISRAEL

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 27a - Q 26a	-								
Q 27b - Q 26b	.14	--							
Q 27c - Q 26c	.05	-.05	-						
Q 27d - Q 26d	.04	-.03	.07	-					
Auth. index	.15	.18	.03	.20*	-				
Oppor. index	.01	.08	.13	-.29††	.23*	-			
Total control	-.10	-.37††	.38**	-.09	.12	.15	-		
Slope	.39**	.02	.12	-.06	.28**	.31**	.25*	-	
Decision making index	.24*	.01	.35**	-.01	.10	.21*	.38**	.48**	-

TABLE D-84

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES IN ITALY

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 27a - Q 26a	-								
Q 27b - Q 26b	.14*	-							
Q 27c - Q 26c	-.16†	.06	-						
Q 27d - Q 26d	.09	.06	.16*	-					
Auth. index	.03	.03	.21**	.18*	-				
Oppor. index	-.06	.00	.11	-.05	.51**	-			
Total control	-.09	.21**	-.06	-.04	.15*	.22*	-		
Slope	.28**	-.03	.51**	.03	.30**	.21**	.16*	-	
Decision making index	.18*	.23**	.07	.08	.07	.24**	.33**	.22**	-

TABLE D-85

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES IN U.S.A.

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26c	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 27a - Q 26a	-								
Q 27b - Q 26b	.11	-							
Q 27c - Q 26c	-.14	.11	-						
Q 27d - Q 26d	.11	.19**	.12	-					
Auth. index	-.06	-.23††	-.08	-.11	-				
Oppor. index	.06	-.15†	.00	-.09	.48**	-			
Total control	-.25††	-.30††	-.27††	-.26††	.36**	.22**	-		
Slope	.15*	-.13	.07	-.16†	.14*	.16*	.33**	-	
Decision making index	-.05	-.16†	-.14	.09	.31**	-.04	.34**	.01	-

TABLE D-86

INTERCORRELATIONS OF NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY MEASURES IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Q 27a - Q 26a	-								
Q 27b - Q 26b	.07	-							
Q 27c - Q 26c	.23**	.12	-						
Q 27d - Q 26d	.12	-.05	.18*						
Auth. index	.09	-.03	.13	.10	-				
Oppor. index	.08	-.03	.06	-.06	.44**	-			
Total control	-.07	-.18†	.13	.07	.35**	.25**	-		
Slope	.29**	.22**	.30**	.05	.21**	.18*	.19*	-	
Decision making index	-.02	.10	-.09	.01	.26**	.18*	.30**	.22**	-

TABLE 87

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERSONAL INFLUENCE AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN EACH COUNTRY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q]6d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Austria									
Personal control	.04	-.02	-.17*	.05	-.26**	-.14*	-.10	-.09	-.06
Index	.04	.05	-.12	.04	-.27**	-.20**	-.16*	-.13	-.21**
Israel									
Personal control	-.03	-.03	-.03	.13	-.20*	-.20*	-.24*	.02	-.11
Index	-.09	.02	-.15	.06	-.24*	-.12	-.32**	-.07	-.17
Italy									
Personal control	-.02	-.06	.02	-.02	.10	-.09	.04	-.08	-.03
Index	-.05	-.07	.05	.02	.11	.02	-.02	.04	-.09
U.S.A.									
Personal control	-.07	.04	.23††	.16†	-.05	.01	-.20**	-.14*	-.02
Index	-.04	.05	.16†	.16†	-.19**	-.10	-.26**	-.15*	-.13*
Yugoslavia									
Personal control	.00	-.07	.00	-.20*	-.16*	-.08	-.10	-.20*	-.16*
Index	-.07	-.07	.02	-.23**	-.19*	-.05	-.08	-.12	-.21**

TABLE D-88

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Index 1	-.03	.01	.15*	-.03	-.13	-.09	-.10	.07	.05
Index 2	.03	.00	-.28**	-.02	.00	.05	.04	-.12	.05
Index 3	-.05	.00	.15*	-.05	-.15	-.09	-.13	.05	-.04
Index 4	.03	.00	-.27**	-.02	.03	.06	.07	-.13	.06

TABLE D-89

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ISRAEL

	Q 27a- Q 26a	Q 27b- Q 26b	Q 27c- Q 26c	Q 27d- Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Index 1	.31**	-.18	.17	.00	.03	-.03	.42**	.07	.23*
Index 2	-.24*	-.10	.07	.12	-.06	.08	-.06	-.16	.03
Index 3	.28**	-.11	.14	.07	.12	-.06	.40**	.03	.17
Index 4	-.21*	-.04	.05	.11	-.09	.05	-.16	-.17	-.02

TABLE D-90

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ITALY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Index 1	.06	-.28††	-.06	-.02	-.08	-.05	-.01	.12	-.02
Index 2	-.04	.14	.04	-.03	.05	.09	.03	-.03	.07
Index 3	.09	-.23††	-.08	.00	-.07	-.04	.03	.11	.00
Index 4	-.05	.14	.07	-.01	.04	.06	.02	-.04	.05

TABLE D-91

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN U.S.A.

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Index 1	.01	-.08	-.08	-.01	.01	.08	.10	.07	.01
Index 2	.04	.13	.09	.01	-.07	-.12	-.17*	-.08	-.05
Index 3	.02	-.08	-.08	.03	.03	.10	.10	.04	.00
Index 4	.04	.15†	.09	.03	-.07	-.11	-.15*	-.07	-.08

TABLE D-92

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ATTITUDE TOWARD SUPERIOR INDICES AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 27a-Q226a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Index 1	.13	.18*	.04	.06	.20*	.02	.10	-.05	-.01
Index 2	-.05	-.22**	-.10	.08	-.05	-.04	-.01	.01	-.04
Index 3	.07	.18*	-.03	.04	.21**	.06	.08	-.06	-.01
Index 4	.09	-.07	.15	.01	-.21**	-.12	-.15*	.13	-.03

TABLE D-93

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN AUSTRIA

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Expert	-.06	-.02	-.20**	.00	.08	-.05	.02	-.08	.08
Referent	-.07	-.18*	.02	.06	.12	.02	.08	.01	.14
Law of sit.	.09	.02	-.06	.07	-.14*	-.17*	.02	-.04	.10
Reward	.09	-.16	-.03	.07	.19*	.11	.04	-.02	.06
Coercive	.12	-.07	.02	-.02	.01	.10	.16*	.22**	.17*
Legitimate	.13	.01	-.07	.08	.00	-.04	.09	.03	.15*

TABLE D-94

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ISRAEL

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Expert	-.05	.06	.06	-.04	-.01	.12	-.22*	.01	.10
Referent	.00	.03	.12	-.09	-.03	.02	.05	.17	.27†
Law of sit.	-.21*	-.22*	.11	.12	.01	-.05	.27†	.17	.12
Reward	-.17	.00	-.04	-.14	-.14	.01	-.10	-.11	.13
Coercive	.02	.13	-.13	-.21	-.09	-.04	-.12	-.06	.25*
Legitimate	.11	.03	-.04	.05	.26*	.09	.17	.01	.09

TABLE D-95

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN ITALY

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 27d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Expert	-.01	.05	-.01	-.07	.05	.08	.00	-.02	-.03
Referent	-.03	.21†	-.07	-.01	.11	.10	.02	-.03	.12
Law of sit.	.04	-.02	.04	-.09	.00	.03	-.04	.01	-.03
Reward	-.04	-.06	.00	.02	.03	-.07	.07	.00	.04
Coercive	-.02	-.13	-.02	.08	-.05	.09	-.02	.06	-.03
Legitimate	.14*	.08	.08	-.08	-.10	-.03	.02	.11	.05

TABLE D-96

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN U.S.A.

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Expert	-.01	.06	-.05	-.05	.00	-.06	.00	.07	-.07
Referent	-.05	.11	-.04	.09	.04	-.05	.01	-.16*	.07
Law of sit.	.07	.09	-.13*	.01	.08	.03	-.07	.04	-.07
Reward	.01	-.02	.01	-.05	.02	.02	-.07	-.16†	.05
Coercive	-.06	.09	-.06	-.07	.11	.06	-.01	-.07	.11
Legitimate	-.01	.08	-.03	-.10	.09	.07	.08	.06	-.01

TABLE D-97

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BASES OF POWER AND NORMATIVE CONSISTENCY IN YUGOSLAVIA

	Q 27a-Q 26a	Q 27b-Q 26b	Q 27c-Q 26c	Q 27d-Q 26d	Auth. Index	Oppor. Index	Total Control	Slope	Decision Making Index
Expert	.07	-.01	.18	.10	-.18*	-.15*	-.08	.14	-.09
Referent	-.03	.02	.16	.03	-.08	.09	-.16*	.15	-.11
Law of sit.	.06	-.05	.00	-.15*	-.21**	-.12	-.26**	.02	-.12
Reward	.00	-.14	.10	.01	.03	.07	.02	-.01	-.10
Coercive	-.01	-.05	-.03	-.11	.07	.10	-.10	-.19†	-.12
Legitimate	.02	-.01	.05	-.07	-.03	-.16	-.12	.09	-.06

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allport, F. H. The J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior. J. soc. Psychol., 1934, 5, 141-183.

Becker, H., and Blanche Geer. Talent culture: A research note. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1960, 5, 304-313.

Blau, P. Patterns of deviation in work groups. Sociometry, 1960, 23, 245-261.

Carlson, R. O. Executive succession and organizational change: Place-bound and career-bound superintendents of schools. Chicago: Midwest Administration Centre, The University of Chicago, 1961.

Cartwright, D., and F. Harary. Structural balance: A generalization of Heider's theory. Psychol. Rev., 1956, 63, 277-293.

Corwin, R. G. Patterns of organizational conflict. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1969, 14, 507-520.

Dalton, M. Men who manage. New York: Wiley, 1959.

Dittes, A., and H. Kelley. Effects of different conditions of acceptance upon conformity to group norms. J. abnorm. soc. Psychol., 1956, 53, 100-107.

Dutton, J. M., and R. E. Walton. Interdepartmental conflict and cooperation: Two contrasting studies. Human Org., 1966, 25, 207-220.

Etzioni, A. Modern organizations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.

French, J. R. P., Jr., and B. Raven. The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds.) Group dynamics, New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

French, J. R. P., Jr., and Raven, B. The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright and A. Zander (Eds.) Group dynamics, New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Georgopoulos, B. S. The normative structure of social systems: A study of organizational effectiveness. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan, 1957.

Georgopoulos, B. S. Normative structure variables and organizational behavior: A comparative study. Human Relat., 1969, 18, 155-169.

Georgopoulos, B. S. An open system theory model for organizational research. In Organizational Behavior Models (ed. by Negandhi, A. R., and Schwitter, J. P.) Kent, Ohio: Kent State University, 1970.

Hollander, E. P. Conformity, status and idiosyncracy credit. Psychol. Rev., 1958, 65, 117-127.

Homans, G. C. The human group. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950.

Jackson, J. A conceptual and measurement model for norms and roles. Pacific Sociol. Rev., 1966, 9, 35-47.

Katz, D., and R. L. Kahn. The social psychology of organizations. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Kish, L. Survey Sampling. New York: Wiley, 1967.

Lammers, C. J. Power and participation in decision-making in formal organizations. Amer. J. Sociol., 1967, 73, 201-216.

Lawrence, P. R., and J. W. Lorsch. Organization and environment: Managing differentiation and integration. Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1967.

Levenson, B. Bureaucratic succession. In A. Etzioni (Ed.) Complex Organizations: A sociological reader. New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1961, 262-275.

Likert, R. New patterns of management. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

Likert, R. The human organization: Its management and value. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.

Mann, M. The social cohesion of liberal democracy. Amer. soc. Rev., 1970, 35, 423-439.

Merei, F. Group leadership and institutionalization. Human Relat., 1949, 2, 23-39.

Michels, R. Political Parties. New York: The Free Press, 1962.

Newcomb, T. M. Social psychology. New York: The Dryden Press, 1950.

Newcomb, T. M. An approach to the study of communicative acts. Psychol. Rev., 1953, 60, 393-404.

Newcomb, T. M. Individual systems of orientation. In S. Koch (Ed.) Psychology: A study of a science. Study I. Conceptual and systematic. Vol. 3. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Parsons, T. The Social System. New York: Free Press, 1951.

Perrow, C. Organizational analysis: A sociological view. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1970.

Schelling, T. C. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

Strauss, G. Tactics of lateral relationship: The purchasing agent. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1962, 7, 161-186.

Strauss, G. Work-flow frictions, interfunctional rivalry and professionalism: case study of purchasing agents. Human Org., 1964, 23, 137-.49.

Tannenbaum, A. S., and R. L. Kahn. Organizational control structure. Human Relat., 1957, 10, 127-140.

Tannenbaum, A. S., and J. G. Bachman. Attitude uniformity and role in a voluntary organization. Human Relat., 1966, 19, 309-322.

Thompson, J. D. Organizational management of conflict. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1960, 4, 389-409.

Walton, R. E., J. M. Dutton, and T. P. Cafferty. Organizational context and interdepartmental conflict. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1969, 14, 522-542.

Warren, D. I. The effects of power bases and peer groups on conformity in formal organizations. Admin. Sci. Quart., 1969, 14, 544-556.

Woodward, J. Industrial organization. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965.

Zupanov, J., and A. S. Tannenbaum. The distribution of control in some Yugoslav industrial organizations as perceived by members. In A. S. Tannenbaum (Ed.) Control in Organizations, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.