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MODERN EGYPT AND THE NEW (TURCO-EGYPTIAN) ARISTOCRACY

by
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A B S T R A C T

MODERN EGYPT AND THE NEW (TURCO-EGYPTIAN) ARISTOCRACY

by

Samuel B. Grant, Jr.

Co-Chairmen: Richard Mitchell, Trevor LeGassick

In the many studies of Egypt under Muhammad Ali and his successors the "Turk" has been a figure most observers have been unable to ignore. Few, however, have attempted to limit or define in a clear way either the meaning of the word "Turk" in its Egyptian context or the nature of the aristocracy with which the term is generally associated. It will be the aim of this thesis to establish the relationship of the one to the other and give to both a more precise and historically relevant meaning.

PART I: INTRODUCTION. Identification of the Turco-Egyptian element. The inquiry will be broader in scope than a genealogical history. The term "Turk" as it applies to Egypt will be discussed through a cultural as well as racial and linguistic frame of reference.

PART II: PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS. A brief outline of the period as a whole, i.e. from Muhammad Ali to the overthrow of King Faruk. It will trace in chronological order the main political incidents involving the emergence and evolution of this important element within Egyptian life and environment. The social conditions linking these incidents will be analyzed more thoroughly in Part III.

PART III: MEANING OF THE FACTS. An examination of the dominant cultural and functional traits of the Turco-Egyptians to show that they may be treated as a meaningful entity with its own beginning, end, and unified theme of development. Since these characteristics cannot be measured quantitatively (although numerous individual examples will be cited), evidence will be largely inferred from a study of selected institutions, trends and problems (such as military and administrative organization, land tenure, social habits and attitudes, etc.) that arose during this century-and-a-half of Egyptian history.

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS. It is not the purpose of this study to establish or verify a general theory of upper class power and authority. Our concern with the term "Turk", the concept "aristocracy", and the relationship between them is limited to the particular setting of 19th- and early 20th-century Egypt. Within this context the "Turks" greatly influenced the course of Egyptian history; first as the most important military, administrative and economic entity in the country, later as a conservative element that shared an underlying identity of interests with both the indigenous members of an expanding aristocracy and the British occupation forces, and finally, even after their distinct cultural traits and their monopoly over various social functions had all but disappeared, as a symbolic and emotional force.

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TRANSLITERATION OF ARABIC TERMS AND NAMES

Well established terms (e.g., Sultan, Khedive, Pasha) and names (e.g., Muhammad Ali, Ismail) are rendered in their most widely accepted English form. It is felt by the author that diacritical marks, such as those adopted by the Library of Congress Cataloging Service for the ain (ع), hamza (ء) and long vowel (-) are generally unnecessary in works dealing with modern history. Consequently they have been utilized only in the bibliography in order to clarify lesser known Arabic names and titles.

CHAPTER I

IDENTIFICATION OF THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN ELEMENT

> He (Ismail) was a Turk surrounded by Turks .... and he had ruled Egypt like a Turk.[1]

The statement above may seem strange since it deals with a man who was born and bred in Egypt, yet it reflects an idea that is present in nearly every study of that country under Muhammad Ali and his successors. From early travelers and government officials to present-day historians and social scientists the "Turk" has been a figure of Egyptian history few western observers have been able to ignore. A well-known explorer, James A. St. John, travelled the length and breadth of the Nile Valley less than twenty years after the rise of Muhammad Ali, and his two volume work is sprinkled with remarks--usually uncomplimentary--about the "Turks" and their influence in Egypt.[2] Edward W. Lane, a more informed contemporary of the new sovereign, noted numerous differences between the life of the Turkish officers who governed the country and that of the local inhabitants.[3] Forty years later nearly every commentary on the 'Urabi revolt held up the "alien caste of Turks and Circassians" as one of the principal disputants. Lord

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[1]Tom Little, Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 75.

[2]James A. St. John, Egypt and Mohammed Ali (London: Longman, 1834).

[3]Edward W. Lane, Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (London: J. M. Dent, 1954).

Cromer in defining the various categories of Egyptian Muslims at the time of the British occupation spoke of a "body of Turco-Egyptians who occupied the principal places under government; who were the chief landowners of the country",[4] while Gaetano Mosca in his monumental work on The Ruling Class first published in 1896 noted that "today in Egypt upper class families are in the main of Turkish, Circassian and Albanian descent."[5] Similarly P. Vatikiotis in his more recent study of the military in Egypt speaks frequently of the role played by the "Turkish ruling caste".[6] These are only a few of the western writers who have felt compelled to generalize about the Turkish element in Egyptian society. Nevertheless, as an important minority in the development of modern Egypt, the "Turks" have gone almost unstudied by western historians. Few have attempted to limit or define in a clear way either the meaning of the word "Turk" in its Egyptian context or the nature of the aristocracy to which it is loosely connected.[7] It is felt that by giving to both a more precise and historically relevant meaning we can provide insights of considerable importance to many of the events that have taken place in

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[4]Evelyn Baring Cromer, Modern Egypt (New York: Macmillan, 1916), II, 171.

[5]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, Trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), pp. 436-437.

[6]P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), passim.

[7]Two studies dealing with some of the problems posed in this thesis were discovered during the course of my research. The first, a paper by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod entitled "The Transformation of the Egyptian Elite: Prelude to the 'Urabi Revolt", Middle East Journal, XXI, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), 325-44, stresses the transfer of power and influence from the Turks to an indigenous aristocracy culminating in the "critical decade" of the 1870's. The second, a Master's thesis submitted in 1960 at Cairo University by Muhammad Salah al-Din Hilmi entitled Hayyah al-Atrak al-Ijtima'iyah fi Misr fi al-Nasf al-Awwal min al-Qarn al-Tasi' Ashr deals primarily with the social habits of the Turks during the early part of the 19th century.

Egypt since the rise of Muhammad Ali. It should be added, however, that because this interpretation is based on incomplete data some of its trends and conclusions must for the present remain in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, it is firmly believed that they will increase in soundness as the sources that factors of politics, finances and time made unavailable to this researcher are gradually brought to light.

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Undoubtedly the lack of studies pertaining to the "Turk" of Egypt may be partly explained by the difficulty of defining the term. Whereas some have used it to indicate linguistic or racial uniformity, others have found it a convenient classificatory reference for a cultural type. To complicate matters still further, the term has occasionally been treated as a religious expression to be used interchangeably with the word "Muslim". Finally it has been used as a catch-all kind of term--frequently surrounded with pejorative overtones--to indicate the class that throughout much of the 19th century was politically and economically the most significant element in Egypt. Although linguistic, racial, cultural, religious and class groupings are all proper entities of history, they should not be thought of as congruent. In our attempt to define the word more precisely, each of these usages will be examined to determine which, if any, applies to the "Turks" of Egypt.

In at least two of the instances referred to above the use of the term "Turk" was a product of 19th-century thinking that bears little relation to our present study except as it affects the gathering of data. The word "race" connotes a group of people who have certain biological characteristics in common--skin-color, hair, stature, head-shape, etc.--and among the Turks

of Egypt no such uniformity existed. The Turks who arrived in Egypt prior to the 19th century were not of pure stock, many having more Albanian, Slavic, Thracian and Circassian blood in their veins than they had Turkic. As will be shown in a later part of this chapter, the same may be said of the emigrants and exiles who came to Egypt in the early part of the 19th century. Thus the history of the Turks in Egypt is not the history of a race. Nevertheless, most 19th-century Europeans treated them as such. Moreover, many of these Europeans believed that race determined the character of a people. Consequently a great deal of the information used in our study of the social and cultural characteristics of the Turks has come down to us as habits and traits of race.[8]

Similarly it was the practice among many Europeans during the 19th century to treat the term "Turk" as a synonym for "Muslim". Thus when British Consul-General Salt reported in 1824 that Colonel Sève had been elevated to the rank of Bey "on turning Turk", he obviously intended to give the word religious significance.[9] Although in instances such as this the term causes little confusion, we must be more cautious when dealing with references to such things as "Turkish dress", "le quartier Turc, exclusivement habité par les Turcs", "Turkish officials", etc., for the author may well mean "Muslim dress", "the Muslim quarter inhabited exclusively by Muslims", and "Muslim officials". Confusion at this point could significantly affect a

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[8]For specific examples and further ramifications of this aspect of the term "Turk", see Chapter 1, pp.

[9]Salt, Jan. 20, 1824, FO 78/126. Numerous other examples appear in the dispatches of later Consuls-General, e.g. Barker to Bidwell, Oct. 20, 1828, FO 78/170; Campbell, Oct. 9, 1834, FO 78/247. For similar usage at a much later date see Edwin de Leon, The Khedive's Egypt (London: Sampson and Low, 1877), p. 106.

study of the social customs of the Turks in Egypt. Nevertheless, there was a fundamental religious unity among the Turkish element. Their identity, however, cannot be established on this criterion alone for they shared their Muslim conformity with numerous other elements of the Egyptian population--the fellah, the bedouins, the Nubians, etc.--who neither defined themselves nor were defined by others as a part of the Turkish population.

But if we cannot regard the Turks as a distinct racial or religious entity, their uniqueness can be traced at least in part to linguistic uniformity. Thus the term "Turk" may be meaningfully applied to those people who spoke the Turkish language, and this factor has such relevance in defining the Turks of Egypt that nearly an entire chapter has been devoted to it in a later part of this study. It is sufficient to observe at this point that although some observers have tended to view the Turks on this level alone, it was only one of several common cultural antecedents that set them apart from others and gave them a sense of identity. Indeed it is within the context of social and cultural similarities that the term may best be explained, for solidarity--which is confirmed by lineage in smaller social units--was provided by cultural ties among the Turks of Egypt. When used without reference to common cultural patterns the term is an artificial creation with little meaningful content. When used within this frame of reference it sums up much that existed in the way of social organization, economy, polity, language, etc., within the Turkish element. In the remainder of this study we will try to determine more precisely the nature of these ties and to establish to what extent they enabled the Turks to influence the course of Egyptian history; first as the most important military, administrative, and economic entity in the country, later as a conservative element that shared

an underlying identity of interests with both the indigenous members of an expanding aristocracy and the British occupation forces, and finally, even after their distinct cultural traits and their monopoly over various social functions had all but disappeared, as a symbolic and emotional force.

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For Egypt the years between the departure of the French and the death of Muhammad Ali in 1848 were a time of unusual demographic change. They were not only years of a greatly increased birth-rate, but also of considerable immigration.[10] Soon after his rise to power, Muhammad Ali set out to establish a ruling structure that would fortify his position internally as well as help to withstand both the menace of the West and the desire of the Ottoman Sultan to reimpose his actual as well as nominal suzerainty over Egypt. This required the establishment of a capable ruling body unable or unlikely to question the viceroy's autocratic lead and willing to implement changes affecting many aspects of Egyptian life. The instruments at his disposal were limited, for men familiar with the skills of which Muhammad Ali was most in need (primarily administrative and military experience) were at a premium. For technological purposes the new sovereign frequently found it necessary to turn to European advisors. For the administrative and military structure, however, he attracted followers from throughout the Mediterranean world. It would be difficult to exaggerate the role played by these immigrants, exiles, and refugees who fused with the remnants of Egypt's previously crushed ruling element--the Mamluks and Turkish Pashas--

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[10] M. Darwish and H. Amzi, "A Note on the Population of Egypt", Population, I (February, 1934), 43; Hamed Azmi, "The Growth of Population as Related to Some Economic Aspects of Egypt's National Development", L'Egypte Contemporaine, XXVIII (Fév.-Mars, 1937), 268.

to form a class that was to leave its mark on over a hundred years of Egyptian history. Origins, however, are almost always elusive and those of a majority of the Turks who came to Egypt at this time would be difficult if not impossible to trace with certainty. But in addition to specific biographical data on some of the more prominent members of this newly created elite, clues as to the origins of even larger numbers may be obtained from the observations of contemporary writers, early demographic studies, and even names which at times suggest place of origin.

In the works of al-Jabarti, Ali Mubarak, Zaki Mujahid, Ilyas Zakhurah and others who have compiled information on the leading personalities of 19th and 20-century Egypt, one finds an unusual number with non-Egyptian origins. Some were from families that had been established in the country for generations (e.g., Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, one of the leaders of the 'Urabi revolt, was a descendant of Circassian Mamluks who had been in Egypt for over six hundred years), but a majority were immigrants of the early part of the 19th century. Any number of biographies in the collections cited above might begin, "He was . . . by origin, his family having come to Egypt in the time of Muhammad Ali Pasha."[11] Similarly the biography of a third generation Turk might well contain the line, "His grandfather . . . arrived in Egypt at the time of the late Muhammad Ali Pasha."[12] A few of the names that fit into this category include Uthman Nur al-Din and Ahmad Pasha al-Minikli, two of the most trusted advisors and military officers of Muhammad Ali; Muhammad Sharif Pasha, Prime Minister on three separate occasions under

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[11]See, for example, the biography of 'Umar Lutfi in Zaki Mujahid, al-'Alam al-Sharqiyah (Cairo: 1963), III, 48.

[12]From the biography of Husayn Ramzi in Ilyas Zakhurah, Mir'ah al-'Asr (Cairo: 1897), I, 517.

the Khedives Ismail and Tawfiq; Mustafa Fahmi Pasha, Prime Minister for over fourteen years during the early part of the British occupation; Husayn Rushdi Pasha, Prime Minister throughout World War One. These represent only a fraction of the prominent personalities in all walks of life that we encounter in Egyptian history because either they or their ancestors came to Egypt during the reign of Muhammad Ali from such distant places as Algeria, Greece, Anatolia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, Syria, and Crete. Consequently as late as the 1930's when Turks still constituted a significant segment of Egypt's upper class, few were more than one or two generations removed from forebears who belonged to what was a predominantly Ottoman-oriented culture group.

Of the periodic attempts to establish official estimates of Egypt's population during this period, only those following the British occupation may be said to have been made both under favourable conditions and by using modern demographic methods. Similarly, they are the only ones in which attempts were made to break the totals into racial, linguistic or national components. Lacking official statistics for the first part of the 19th century, we must rely heavily on the estimates of contemporary observers to give us some indication of the number and distribution of the thousands of nameless Turks that conquest and immigration brought to the valley of the Nile. A compilation of some of the more important of these estimates is given in Table I on the following page.

TABLE I

Source	Total Population	Turks	Mamluks	Location Cairo	Alex
Jomard[1] (1798)	2,488,950	--12,400--			
Barker[2] (1828)		20,000			
Boislecomte[3] (1833)	3,000,000 (approx.)	20-30 thous.	4-5 thous.		
Lane[4] (1836)	2,000,000 (approx.)	10,000			
Mengin[5] (1839)		8,000 (32,000 with families)	2,000[6]	5,000	
Clot Bey[7] (1840)	3,000,000 (approx.)	12,000			
Campbell[8] (1840)	2,235,000	15,000	4,000		
Bowring[9] (1840)	2,250,000 (approx.)	18-20 thous.	2,000[10]	5,000	2,000
McCoan[11] (1877)	5,500,000 (approx.)	10,000		5,000	2,000
Dufferin[12] (1882)	5,000,000[13]	100,000[14]			

[1]E. Jomard, "Mémoire sur la population comparée de l'Égypte ancienne et moderne", Description de l'Egypte, (Paris: C.L.F. Panckoucke, 1820-30), IX, 123-128.

[2]Barker to Adam, May 21, 1828, enclosed in Barker to Dudley, May 22, 1828, FO 78/170.

[3]Georges Douin (ed.), La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte: L'Égypte et la Syrie en 1833 (Caire: Impr. de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1927), p. 110

[4]Lane, p. 23. We may get some idea of the accuracy of these early estimates by noting that Lane's figure of 2,000,000 for the total population is over a million below what demographists now estimate Egypt's population to have been at that time.

[5]Félix Mengin, Histoire Sommaire de l'Égypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly (Paris: Firmen Didot, 1839), pp. 156-157.

[6]In addition to the two thousand male Mamluks, Mengin speaks of "trois mille esclaves géorgiennes, circassiennes et mingreliennes". Ibid., p. 157.

[7]Antoine B. Clot, Apercu général sur l'Égypte (Paris: Fortin, Masson et Cie., 1840), I, 167.

[8]Campbell to Palmerston, "Report on Egypt", July 6, 1840, FO 78/408B

[9]John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia", Parliamentary Papers (Commons), XXI, (1840).

[10]Bowring, like Mengin, speaks of 3,000 Georgean, Circassian, and Mingrelian female slaves. Ibid.

[11]James McCoan, Egypt as It Is. (New York: P.F. Collier, 1902), pp. 41, 47.

[12]Dufferin to Granville, Nov. 18, 1882, FO 78/3454.

[13]We may again test the accuracy of these unofficial estimates by comparing Dufferin's figure with the 6,806,381 arrived at in the official census of 1882, the results of which were not published until 1884. Egypt, Ministère de l'Intérieur. Direction du Recensement, Recensement général de l'Égypte, 1882 (Le Caire: Imprimerie Nationale, 1884).

[14]It should be noted that the figure 100,000 used by Dufferin was also reported in a study published in England a few months earlier. Intelligence Branch, War Office, Report on Egypt (London: Harrison & Sons, 1882), p. 62. Dufferin's 100,000, however, was revised to "some thousands" when reprinted in Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. 46), Cmd. 3529, Feb. 6, 1883, "Reorganization in Egypt".

Statistically the Turkish factor was not impressive. Thus there seems to have been general agreement that the number of "Turks" in Egypt during the first half of the 19th century was between fifteen and twenty thousand, or less than one percent of the total population. It is also interesting to note that aside from occasional distinctions between "Turks" and "Mamluks" few observers endeavored to break their estimates into component parts. Even in the eyes of his contemporary the Turk was an elusive character and for those who attempted to face the question of to whom the term should apply there was a near infinity of answers. Three with a more experienced knowledge than most included the following, although without any estimate of their numbers.

Barker (1829)[13]	Clot Bey (1840)[14]	Hamont (1843)[15]
Albanians & Arnouts	Albanians	Albanians
	Mamluks	Mamluks
Candiates & Moreates		Greek renegades
Stambolines	Constantinopolitians	
		Caramanians

All three, however, left room for the inclusion of numerous others by adding such vague or all-inclusive categories as "every Mohamedan not born in Egypt" (Barker), "Turcs d'Europe" and "Ottomans Asiatiques" (Clot Bey), "les Mohametans qui descendent des conquérants Ottomans" and "les habitants de l'Anatolie" (Hamont). In the remainder of this chapter each will be examined

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[13]Barker to Malcolm July 8, 1829, FO 78/184.

[14]Clot Bey, II, 120.

[15]P.N. Hamont, L'Égypte sous Mehemet-Ali (Paris: Leautey et Lecointe, 1843), I, 383.

in some detail in order to determine what, if anything, they had in common. Only after such an analysis may we go on to identify the traits--aside from their alien origin--that unified these various elements under the term "Turk" and establish whether or not the term itself is applicable to a class or aristocracy.

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Undoubtedly the most unusual event to occur during the long rule of Muhammad Ali was the massacre of the Mamluks at the Citadel on March 1, 1811. Highlighted in nearly every account of modern Egypt (and vividly portrayed by such artists as Horace Vernet and Alexandre Bida), one is left with the impression that Egypt's ruling elite of over five hundred years not only disappeared from history as a governing power, but was totally annihilated. In reality many of these Turkish-speaking Caucasians were still to be found scattered throughout the country, and although the Mamluk hierarchy was replaced by that of a new aristocracy, many individual Mamluks were to fill key positions within its institutions.

As might well be expected, the number of Mamluks in Egypt at the time of the massacre is difficult to determine with any degree of certainty. There are indications, however, that their number had started to dwindle during the years preceding that inglorious event, for the advances of Czarist Russia into the Caucasus during the latter part of the 18th century had made it increasingly difficult to replace by importation the many who died during the turbulent rule of Ali Bey al-Kabir (1763-1773) and his successors, as well as during the French occupation. Thus whereas Volney estimated their total in 1783 as 8,500, and W. G. Browne in the 1790's from 10,000 to 12,000, al-Jabarti states that their number

amounted to more than 2,000 in 1805.[16] Lacking more verifiable data, we must accept at least the trend (a decrease) indicated by these sources if not the exact numbers. Figures for the further reduction due to the events of March 1811 are equally difficult to confirm. Mengin estimated that four hundred and seventy Mamluks were killed at the Citadel, while at least 1,000 more died during the ensuing months in Cairo and the provinces following Muhammad Ali's order to his provincial commanders to arrest and put to death all Mamluks within their areas of jurisdiction.[17] Many, however, saved themselves by fleeing to Nubia where they found temporary safety until dislodged by the forces of Ibrahim in 1811-1812. Moving still farther southward the survivors are reported to have established bandit states in the Argo and Dongola areas of the Sudan, but by this time they probably numbered no more than three hundred fighting men plus wives and slaves.[18] Eventually even these were forced

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[16]Constantin Volney, Voyage en Égypte et en Syrie (Paris: Mouton, 1959), p. 101. W.G. Browne, Travels in Africa, Egypt and Syria from the Year 1792 to 1798 (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1806), p. 76. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, 'Aja'ib al-'Athar fi al-Tarajim wa al-'Akhbar (Cairo: 1904), IV, 36. The decrease during the years between Volney's estimate and that of al-Jabarti is noted in an important article on the Mamluks by David Ayalon, "Studies in al-Jabarti", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, III, Part II (August, 1960), 148-174. See especially footnote 1, pp. 161-65.

[17]Félix Mengin, Histoire de l'Égypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammad-Aly (Paris: A. Bertrand, 1823), I, 362-63, 367; al-Jabarti, IV, 139. Numerous other estimates are given for the number killed in the Citadel, e.g., J.H. Kramers, "Muhammad 'Ali Pasha", Encyclopaedia of Islam, III, No. 47 (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1933), 682, says "about three hundred", while a contemporary writing from Cairo on the very day on which the event occurred reported that "six or seven hundred are already killed". R. Walpole, Memoirs relating to European and Asiatic Turkey (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, etc., 1817), p. 32.

[18]Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 8.

to continue their flight, for Muhammad Ali used their presence in the Sudan as the alleged reason for his invasion of that territory in 1820-1821.

For the number of Mamluks who remained in Egypt, we must again rely primarily on the reports of European observers, including Boislecomte's estimate in 1833 of from 4,000 to 5,000 and Campbell's figure of 4,000 in 1840.[19] A great many of these, however, and perhaps even a majority, were female slaves in the service of the Turkish "Grandees".[20] Nevertheless, it would appear from these numbers that the total of 2,000 given by al-Jabarti for 1805 was somewhat low, for at least half that many were killed during the massacre and it is doubtful whether Muhammad Ali encouraged the importation of many new recruits during the remainder of his rule. In later years the continued advance of imperial Russia into the Caucasus apparently did cause several tribal groups to move southward into Ottoman territory, but a majority of these 19th-century migrants settled in Turkey, Syria and Jordan--where even today they form a distinct community--rather than in Egypt.[21] Indeed the only member of the Khedival family who may have actively resumed their importation was Abbas, who by the time of his death in 1854 is reported to have had in his entourage five hundred Mamluks, many of whom were promoted to positions of considerable importance.[22]

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[19]See Table I, p. 12.

[20]R. R. Madden, Egypt and Mohammed Ali (London: Hamilton, Adams, 1841), p. 83.

[21]George H. Weightman, "The Circassians", Middle East Forum, XXXVII (December, 1961), 26.

[22]Bruce to Clarendon, August 2 and August 13, 1854, FO 78/1036.

Although our information with regard to the number of Mamluks who remained in Egypt is far from satisfactory, there is ample evidence that many rose to positions of the greatest importance in the military and administrative institutions established by Muhammad Ali, while their descendants were to reach equal heights in those of his successors. With regard to the former, nearly every source dealing with the schools that trained officers for Muhammad Ali's new army--better known as the Nizam Jadid--stresses Mamluk participation. For example, many of the eighty students in the first of these schools, opened in 1816 at the Citadel under Hasan Efendi al-Darwish al-Mawsili, were young Mamluks.[23] Even more significant was the role they played in the school opened in 1820 at Isna (but moved the following year to Aswan) under the supervision of Colonel Sève. Attended by from three to five hundred Mamluks, the school was praised by contemporary observers who were greatly impressed by the progress shown by the Mamluks within a very short time.[24] Similar reports of Mamluk participation in the cavalry school opened at Gizah in 1831,[25] the infantry school at al-Khankah in 1832,[26] etc., confirm a continued reliance upon Mamluks to form the backbone of the army officer corps, while the major naval school at Alexandria also relied primarily on Mamluks for its officer recruits.[27] A majority of those attending

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[23]al-Jabarti, IV, 272-273.

[24]George Douin (ed.), Une Mission Militaire Française auprès de Mohamed Aly (Cairo: 1923), p. xiii. Salt to Planta, Oct. 10, 1821, FO 78/103. Salt, Jan. 20, 1824, enclosed in Salt, Feb. 8, 1824, FO 78/126.

[25]Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte, p. 136.

[26]Hamont, II, 165.

[27]René Cattaui, Le Règne de Mohammed Aly d'après les Archives Russes en Égypte, (Caire: L'Institut Français d'archéologie orientale du Caire, 1931), II, Part I, 90.

these schools were young Mamluks who, having been spared during the massacre of 1811, were either attached to the entourage of the Pasha or became guards and servants in the homes of prominent Turkish families. As explained by Clot Bey, "Mehemet-Ali fournit à M. Sève cinq cents de ses mameluks, pour les faire instruire au maniement des armes aux écoles du bataillon et du peloton. Tous les grands du pays furent obligés de donner leur contingent, ce qui porta à mille le nombre de ces jeunes gens. Ces mameluks devaient être le noyau de l'armée."[28] Although it is doubtful whether Clot Bey meant that all of these received training under Colonel Sève at Isna and Aswan, the total of 1,000 shows the degree to which the Pasha was dependent upon these former slaves to officer his ever-growing military forces.

Among individual Circassians who became influential men of their time, the careers of Muhammad Thabit and Muhammad Ratib indicate not only the high positions that they and others like them were to attain, but also their assimilation into the fabric of the new aristocracy. The biographical material available on Muhammad Thabit indicates that although he was born after the massacre of 1811, he began his career as a slave attached to the court of Muhammad Ali.[29] Having won the favor of his master, he attended the famous "School of Princes" or Maktab al-'Ali established a few miles north of Cairo at al-Khankah for the training of Muhammad Ali's sons and other court favorites. Although his studies

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[28]Clot Bey, II, 202.

[29]For more complete biographical data on Muhammad Thabit consult Mujahid, I, 102; al-Hilal, Feb. 1, 1902, 287-288; Amin Sami, Taqwim al-Nil (Cairo, 1928), III, Part III, passim.

were primarily military in content, they also included courses in Turkish as well as Arabic and French. Shortly after leaving al-Khankah, he was again honored by the Pasha who permitted him to marry one of his nieces. Although originally attached to the royal entourage, he was to hold numerous important administrative posts as well, including those of Mudir of Gizah (1849) and Kalyubiyah (1854-1855), Muhafiz of Cairo (1865-1866), Minister of Education and Waqfs in the 1879 Cabinet of Sharif Pasha, Minister of Interior in the 1884 Cabinet of Nubar Pasha, and finally president of the Khedival Divan during the latter part of the reign of Tawfiq as well as under Abbas II.

Muhammad Ratib, who was also of Circassian origin, is reported by most sources to have been one of Said's "Mamluks".[30] Selected by the young Prince to attend the elite Madrasat al-Mafruzah, he was later sent to France with the mission of 1855 to continue his study of military science. Upon his return he was attached to the Egyptian army, but following a dispute with Said fled to Constantinople and returned to Egypt only after the death of his former master. During the reign of Ismail he rose in rank until appointed Sirdar of the Egyptian army in 1867, a position he held until 1876 which was considerably longer than most such appointments. As Sirdar, it was he who led the disastrous campaign against Abyssinia in 1875. The incompetence of the commanding officers in this war is said to have greatly embittered the fellahin officers against their Turkish and Circassian superiors, and as such

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[30]For biographical material on Muhammad Ratib, see 'Umar Tusun, Ba'that al-'ilmiyah fi 'ahd Muhammad 'Ali (Alexandria: Matba'at Salah al-Din, 1934), pp. 515-518; Zakhurah, II, 454-455; Mujahid, II, 46.

contributed to the outbreak of the 'Urabi revolt. Ratib, however, was able to remain in the good graces of the Khedive, and in 1878 became Minister of War in the Cabinet of Nubar Pasha. With the deposition of Ismail the following year, he accompanied the Khedive into exile, returning only in 1882 when he was accused of instigating the famous "Circassian Plot" against the government of Mahmud Sami al-Barudi and in particular his Minister of War, Ahmad 'Urabi. During his more than fifty years of government service, generous gifts of both money and land were bestowed upon Muhammad Ratib, especially by Ismail,[31] and up to the middle of the present century his waqf near al-Mahalla al-Kubra exceeded 1,500 feddans.[32]

Although the level of prominence to which these two rose makes it difficult to regard their careers as typical, their biographies do indicate that in education, marriage, promotion, wealth, closeness to the Khedive, etc., the Circassian--whether through merit or favoritism--had access to the same institutions and sinecures that sustained other elements of Egypt's Turkish minority.

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When Muhammad Ali was reprimanded by the Western Powers in 1840 for recruiting troops in Albania to fight against the Ottoman Sultan, the Pasha is reputed to have answered, "Tous les ans . . . il vient ici des Albanais, parce que mon Gouvernement ne m'a point interdit de

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[31]Sami, III, Part II, pp. 491, 497, 853.

[32]Gabriel Baer, A History of Landownership in Modern Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 49.

recruter ces troupes; j'en ai 40,000 en Égypte et en Syrie; j'en suis un moi-même."[33] Although it is difficult to establish whether Muhammad Ali was actually an Albanian himself or whether there were ever as many as 40,000 Albanians in the service of the Pasha, there seems to have been unanimous agreement among contemporary observers that the Albanians were an integral part of Egypt's Turkish community.

Having arrived in Egypt as an officer in a corps of Albanians, Muhammad Ali was regarded by most of his contemporaries--as well as by most present-day historians--to have been of Albanian descent, a belief which the Pasha himself seems not to have dispelled. Although the question of his origin need not overly concern us, it is significant to note that some of his own descendants point to the Anatolian origin of his forebears. Thus Emine Foat Tugay, whose grandfather was the Khedive Ismail, cites an early 19th-century text which states that Muhammad Ali's grandfather was a Turk who had migrated from Konya in Anatolia to Kavala in Macedonia and that his grandmother was the sister of a Janissary who was the military commandant of Kavala.[34] What is more important, however, is that as the person who occupied the highest point of integration within Egypt's ruling element, Muhammad Ali represented Turkish rather than Albanian influence, a point which will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

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[33]Athanese Politis, Le Conflit Turco-Égyptién de 1838-1841 (Cairo: 1931), p. lxxxv.

[34]Emine Foat Tugay, Three Centuries: Family Chronicles of Turkey and Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 72, 75. While at least one modern historian, Richard Hill, has wholeheartedly accepted the Turkish origins of Muhammad Ali, most continue to defend his Albanian descent. Compare Hill, p. 4 with Mahmud Zayid, Egypt's Struggle for Independence (Beirut: Khayat's, 1965), p. 4.

Despite the fact that the Albanians--or Arnauts as they were frequently referred to by contemporary European writers--had helped Muhammad Ali to solidify his position as Pasha of Egypt during his early struggles with the Mamluk Beys and Turkish Pashas, they proved to be too unruly an element to retain as a nucleus of his military establishment, for it was the Albanians who most vigorously objected when in 1815 Muhammad Ali first attempted to remodel his army on the basis of European standards and discipline. Consequently, those Albanians who were not killed during the costly campaigns in Arabia (1811-1819) and the Sudan (1820-1822) were either disbanded or retained only as irregular troops (primarily cavalry) to be used as frontier guards or gens d'armes in such newly-acquired provinces as Syria and Crete, or occasionally as support for the Nizam Jadid. Even while performing these functions, however, they proved difficult to discipline. In 1829 when Muhammad Ali recalled 2,000 Albanians previously sent to Cyprus at the bidding of the Porte, a majority refused to return when they learned that they would have to submit to the "new discipline" of the Pasha's Nizam regiments.[35] Similarly in 1833 the lawlessness of the Albanian irregulars stationed on Crete was reported as one of the principal reasons for Cretan dissatisfaction with Egyptian rule.[36] In the same year disorders that had broken out in the Yemen compelled the Pasha to send a special expedition to "destroy his revolted Albanian troops".[37]

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[35]Barker to Gorden, Jan. 18, 1830, FO 78/192.

[36]Campbell, Oct. 16, 1833, FO 78/228.

[37]Cattaui, I, 559, 561-562; Campbell to Palmerston, April 16, 1833, FO 78/228.

Although we find few contemporary references to the actual number of Albanians in the Pasha's service, Campbell reported in 1834 that 2,100 Albanians were stationed on the island of Candia (Crete). They are the only Albanians he mentions, however, in a break-down of the 85,000 regular and irregular troops in the Pasha's army.[38] Four years later both the Russian and Greek Consuls-General indicated that all Albanians stationed on Crete had been ordered to depart for service in Syria, but whereas the former stated that they amounted to 3,000 irregular troops the latter reported a figure of twice that number.[39]

It would appear that there was also a sprinkling of Albanians among the students recruited for Muhammad Ali's special officer training schools and that an occasional Albanian (e.g., Mustapha Pasha, the Governor of Candia) did rise to positions of considerable influence in the Pasha's entourage,[40] but as a whole they seem to have remained somewhat removed from the other elements that constituted the "Turkish" population of Egypt. During the reign of Abbas they regained for a brief moment some of the influence they had once enjoyed under Muhammad Ali as the new ruler flooded the army with a reported 6,000 Albanian troops, many of whom were retained as a special detachment to be used as Abbas's body-guard.[41] His successors, however, were as wary of

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[38]Campbell, Feb. 3, 1834, Inclosure No. 3, FO 78/245.

[39]Cattaui, IV, 93-94; Polites, pp. 3, 5. No matter what the exact number of Albanians in Egypt, the total was considerable. Clot Bey went so far as to state that "La plupart des Turcs qui se trouvent en Égypte sont Albanais ou d'origine européenne." Clot Bey, II, 121.

[40]Cattaui, II, Part I, 333 and Part III, 268. Other Albanians to attain positions of importance included Amin Pasha al-Arnawuti, Zakhurah, I, 20, and Muhammad Bey 'Izzat al-Arnawuti, 'Umar Tusun, Safha min Ta'rikh Misr (Cairo: 1940), p. 152.

[41]Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, 'Asr Isma'il (Cairo: 1948), I, 17-18.

Albanians as Muhammad Ali, and once again they were used primarily for garrison duty in distant posts or as police officers in various provincial capitals.[42] In the disorder that followed the collapse of the 'Urabi revolt, groups of Albanians were again recruited from the mountain villages of Epirus (in what is now a part of north-west Greece) to serve in Egypt as police officers, and a battalion of Albanians was formed to meet the growing threat of the Mahdi in the Sudan.[43] But following the protest of more knowledgeable colonial officials the former were rapidly replaced, while the Albanian battalion mutinied a few weeks after its formation and was disbanded shortly thereafter. As a result of this checkered history the Albanians were regarded as somewhat inferior to other elements of the ruling class, yet the relative ease of mobility within the ruling establishment assured individual Albanians of the opportunity to achieve positions of importance. Thus it is not at all surprising that the name al-Arnawuti belonged to some of the more influential families in Egypt as late as the 1950's.[44]

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With the conquest of Egypt in 1517, the Turkish Sultan, Salim, stationed six corps of Ottoman troops throughout the Nile Valley to secure this valuable addition to his expanding Empire. But as was generally the case, the Turks regarded Egypt as an area to be ruled rather than

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[42]Colquhoun to Russell, May 27, 1865, FO 78/1871.

[43]Dufferin to Granville, Dec. 12, 1882, FO 78/3454 and Dufferin to Granville, January 3, 1883, FO 78/3565. See also Cromer, II, 476.

[44]An article in al-Ahram, Nov. 11, 1953, includes the names of six Egyptians with the nisba al-Arnawuti whose bank accounts were frozen following the revolution of 1952 because they were related by marriage to the reigning family.

settled. Thus although the establishment of military garrisons was followed by an influx of governmental administrators, there was no migration of large numbers of Turkish pastoral people from Anatolia or the surrounding provinces.[45] Nevertheless, the 12,000 Turks who made up the six Ottoman corps were eventually--through a process of intermarriage and absorption into the local economy--so well integrated with the Egyptian population that the Mamluks had little difficulty in replacing them as the most effective fighting force in the country. Consequently by the 19th century Hamont's "Mahometans qui descendent des conquérants Ottomans" were for all practical purposes nearly indistinguishable from Egyptians of purely local origin. Yet within twenty years after the rise of Muhammad Ali there were once again substantial numbers of Turkish troops (chiefly Anatolian) attached to the Egyptian army. Although the figures reported by contemporary observers are somewhat conflicting, there seems to have been general agreement that most of these Turks--like the Albanians--were used as irregular cavalry,[46]

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[45]One of the few reports of such resettlement was made by Vivian in 1878. "About 600 Mussulman fugitives from Turkey, coming I believe principally from Bulgaria, have arrived here with the intention of settling in Egypt." Vivian to Derby, March 3, 1878, FO 78/2853.

[46]Campbell, Feb. 3, 1834, FO 78/245, speaks of 4,750 irregular Turks stationed primarily in Syria and the Hijaz, while Clot Bey, II, 218-220 indicates that 27,115 irregular Turkish troops were scattered throughout Muhammad Ali's newly acquired territories. The comments of Lord Cromer on the composition of the Egyptian army at the time of the second invasion of Anatolia are also significant. "Of the regular troops, the bulk of the infantry was nominally composed of fellaheen, but the system under which they were recruited leaves little doubt that there was a considerable foreign element in the ranks. Not only the officers, but also a large proportion of the non-commissioned officers were Turks, Albanians, etc.... During the early years of the British occupation there were still many living who could remember that a large proportion of the rank and file of the cavalry were Turks and Circassians, whilst in the artillery the proportion of the latter was still greater. It is to be remembered that when, in 1826, Sultan Mahmoud ordered the massacre of the Janissaries, a large number of the survivors fled to Egypt, where they accepted service in the newly organized army." Cromer, II, 468-469.

although a large percentage of those employed in the artillery were also of Turkish origin.[47] But many others who were both racially and culturally Turks established themselves as even more important members of the governing class. Some came directly from Constantinople, frequently at the request of the Pasha who looked to that city as a source both of young men to enter his service and of teachers to instruct them.[48] Others, having followed in the wake of the Ottoman army, arrived from widely scattered parts of the Empire. For example, when the French occupied Algeria in 1830, they found that many of the more prominent families were of Turkish origin. Compelled by the French to leave, some--including the father of Mustafa Fahmi Pasha--migrated to Egypt.[49]

Finally a great many of those labelled "Turks" by western observers were in reality Ottomanized Greeks, Cretans, Kurds, etc., who, possessing skills needed by the Pasha, were quickly incorporated into the framework of the new aristocracy. From Greece came Sami Pasha, Muhammad Ali's bash mu'awin or "chef du Cabinet Vice-Royal" who was called by one observer "le plus cultivé et le plus capable de ses officiers supérieurs";[50] Uthman Nur al-Din, described as "le bras droit du Pasha",[51] who was born on the island of Mitilini (Lesbos); Ismail Raghib Pasha, a Sciote

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[47]Barnett to Aberdeen, Sept. 18, 1841, Inclosure No. 1, FO 78/451.

[48]Sami, II, 326. Similar recruitment was carried out by Muhammad Ali's successors. Thus as late as the reign of Ismail we find evidence of numerous young men from Constantinople having adopted Egypt as their home land. Malet to Granville, April 25, 1882, Inclosure, FO 78/3436.

[49]Mujahid, I, 121.

[50]Polites, p. 104.

[51]Cattaui, II, Part I, 5, 33.

Greek who arrived in Egypt by way of Anatolia in 1846 and by 1882 was appointed Prime Minister. Still others were brought as captives to Egypt where, upon turning "Turk", they were either sent to school in preparation for positions in the administrative and military hierarchy or put to work in the homes of Turkish officials.[52] Thus Sarhank Bey al-Kabir, Captain and bash mu'awin to Muhammad Ali's Minister of the Navy was brought to Egypt by Ibrahim Pasha along with many other young captives from the island of Crete.[53] Among the Kurds were Shahin Pasha Kanj, who arrived in Egypt with his father during the reign of Muhammad Ali and by 1882 had risen to the position of Minister of War; Mahu Urfali, a Commander of Egyptian troops in the Sudan in the 1820's, whose descendants even today are well known members of Egypt's upper class;[54] and Ismail Haqqi Abu Jabal, Governor-General of the Sudan in the 1850's and hero of the Crimean War.[55]

These then constitute the major types that it is possible to differentiate in the "Turkish" population of Egypt. The numerous elements involved make it obvious why the term "Turk" within the context of 19th-

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[52]Salt, July 12, 1824, FO 78/160 and Barker to Dudley, May 17, 1828, FO 78/170. In the latter the British Consul-General estimated that from fifteen to twenty thousand "slaves" were brought to Alexandria following the commencement of the Greek revolution, including several thousand captives from Candia. Many, however, later returned to Greece, and Mengin writing in 1839 speaks of only three hundred apostate Greeks working in the homes of Turkish officials. Mengin, p. 157.

[53]Mujahid, II, 27-28.

[54]For additional information on Mahu, which is the Kurdish word for the name Muhammad, see Ali Mubarak, al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyah al-Jadidah (Cairo: 1888), XVI, 54-55.

[55]Abd al-Rahman Zaki, A'lam al-Jaysh wa al-Bahriyah fi Misr athna'a al-Qarn al-Tasi' 'Ashr (Cairo: Matba'at al-Risalah, 1947), pp. 45-49.

century Egypt must be understood as representing a composite whose various parts were fused together by some element other than racial affinity. But before investigating more thoroughly the common characteristics which distinguished this new ruling body from other strata of Egyptian society, a few additional remarks on the occurrence of the word "Turk" in its Egyptian context are appropriate. First it should be noted that among Egyptians the application of the term was not limited to the 19th century. The Mamluks who ruled over Egypt from 1250 to 1517 were generally referred to in Arabic sources as "Turks", undoubtedly a result of their having been recruited from Turkish-speaking countries. Similarly after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 the ruling structure, which was made up of both Mamluks and Turks between whom little distinction was made, was normally referred to as the "Turkish" or "Ottoman" government.[56] This does not mean, however, that other terms were not also used to indicate the Mamluk and Turkish governing classes. The term "al-Ghuzz" (الغز), i.e., the tribe from whom the Turks traditionally trace their descent, was used on occasion by al-Jabarti and his contemporaries in reference to the Mamluks, and by later Egyptians when referring to the Turks of the 19th century.[57] Similarly the term "al-Dhawat" (Pronounced al-Zawat in colloquial Egyptian), meaning "notables" or "prominent people" was applied in the later part of the 19th century almost exclusively to the powerful class of Turkish landowners.[58] "Al-A'yan", on the other hand, which also means "notables",

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[56]See, for example, al-Jabarti, I-III, passim. Even Gamal Abdel Nasser, in his book Falsafat al-Thawrah (Cairo: 195-), p. 54, states that in the days of the Mamluks a common saying among Egyptians was "Ya Rabb, Ya Mutajalli! Ihlik al-'Uthmanli." ("O God, the Self-Revealing! Annihilate the Ottoman.")

[57]See Mahmud al-Sharqawi, Misr fi al-Qarn al-Thamin 'Ashr (Cairo: 1956-57), III, 183 and Husayn Fawzi al-Najjar, Lutfi al-Sayyid (Cairo: Maktab al-Qahirah, 1963), pp. 63, 105.

[58]Donald M. Wallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question (London: Macmillan, 1883), pp. 213-213 and al-Najjar, pp. 100-101.

was generally used to indicate those people of Egyptian origin who as Shaykhs and Umdahs were the leading village personalities.[59] This distinction should be kept in mind when reference is made in western works to the "Notables" appointed to the advisory council (al-Majlis al-Mashwarah) established during the reign of Muhammad Ali as well as those elected to the Assembly of Delegates (Majlis Shura' al-Nuwwab) created by the Khedive Ismail in 1866. In both cases it was the "al-A'yan" rather than the "al-Zawat" that were primarily involved. Finally it was common practice among Egyptians during the 'Urabi revolt to refer to the Turks as "al-Sharakisah" (the Circassians) and "al-Mamalik" (the Mamluks).[60] Undoubtedly one reason that the followers of 'Urabi used these terms was to avoid the accusation that the revolt was directed against either the Khedival family or the Ottoman Sultan, by implying that their actions were directed against the high ranking military officers, many of whom were of Circassian origin.

Among western observers the terms most frequently used in reference to members of Egypt's ruling element of the 19th century have been "Osmanli", "Turco-Circassian" and "Turco-Egyptian", in addition, of course, to "Turk". The term "Osmanli", which was used interchangeably

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[59] al-Najjar, pp. 100-101.

[60] The use of these two terms at this time is brought to our attention in several dispatches sent by British representatives in Egypt. For the prevalence of the term "Circassian" see a memorandum from Colvin enclosed in Malet to Granville, Nov. 7, 1881, FO 78/3326 and also Dufferin to Granville, Dec. 12, 1882, FO 78/3454. In the latter Dufferin writes, "The sentiments of the Ministers are probably shared by the entire ruling class of Turkish, or as it is called here, Circassian origin...." For the use of the term "Mamluk" see the petition submitted to French Consul-General Baron de Ring enclosed in Malet to Granville, Feb. 2, 1881, FO 78/3321.

with "Turk" by many observers during the early part of the century, correctly indicated the cultural orientation of the ruling element, for although all Muslims in the Empire were considered Ottoman subjects, not all were Ottomanized and it was this latter characteristic or process that best defined both the concept and content of the new aristocracy. "Turco-Circassian", on the other hand, was prevalent during the period of the 'Urabi revolt for reasons already discussed, while "Turco-Egyptian" appeared with increasing frequency toward the turn of the century and reflected the development of a new synthesis as the Turks were gradually assimilated into Egyptian life and culture. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms "Turk" and "Turco-Egyptian" will both be used, although the former with more regularity in those sections pertaining to Egypt up to the time of the British occupation and the latter in those parts dealing with subsequent events. But the term "Turco-Egyptian" itself indicates change and thus a third expression, "Egyptian of Turkish descent", will appear in connection with contemporary times, for today little more than lineage remains to distinguish the Turks from other Egyptians.

PART II

THE POLITICAL FACTS

CHAPTER II

THE TURKS IN EGYPT, 1800-1952: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY

A frequently-expressed "historical truth" concerning modern Egypt informs us that under the dynasty of Muhammad Ali and his successors the Nile Valley was exploited by a foreign, oppressive and corrupt administration of Turco-Egyptians. As proof we are told that we need look no further than the more important of Egypt's political crises during the past century-and-a-half, i.e., the 'Urabi revolt, the British occupation, the "Revolt of 1919" and the Revolution of 1952. In each the elimination of the Turkish element was included among the more publicized goals of those seeking change in Egypt's social and political identity. Although it may be questioned whether the Turks exercised a significant influence over any but the first of these events (i.e., the 'Urabi revolt), each deserves examination as a watershed in the evolution of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy. As must be the case in a study covering so long a period of history, this survey will be partial and selective, examining only the most important political conditions surrounding each of the above-mentioned crises.[1] In later chapters the

[1]Because it is not the purpose of this thesis to explain these crises except as they relate to the Turkish question, the reader should consult the bibliography for more comprehensive studies of each of these events.

social conditions linking these incidents will be more thoroughly investigated, for although social values and institutions cannot in themselves explain political developments, they are nevertheless crucial to the political process.

It is an interesting fact that the emergence of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy owes its initial impetus to a source that entered Egypt under the guise of liberating Egyptians from the alien rule of Circassian Mamluks and Turkish Pashas. In a proclamation issued on the day of the French invasion in 1798, Napoleon stated:

> For a long time these hordes of Mamluks drawn from Abaza and Circassia have tyrannized Egypt, one of the fairest spots of the world. But the Lord of the Worlds, whose power extends everywhere, has ordained the termination of their power. Egyptians! You have been told that I have come here with the design to overthrow your religion, but this is a gross falsehood. Do not believe it. Answer the slanderers that I have come to restore your rights which have been invaded by usurpers. I worship God far more than the Mamluks, and respect his Prophet and the noble Koran....
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> Wherever there is fertile land, it belongs to the Mamluks. If Egypt has been leased to them by God, let them show the title deed that God has given to them. But God is merciful and just, and henceforth all will be able to attain the most elevated posts. Henceforth the most intelligent, virtuous and learned will direct public affairs, and in this way the people will be happy....[2]

The French had come, then, as bearers of European civilization, and by adopting its principles indigenous Egyptians would be able to restore Egypt to the greatness that was rightfully hers. The theme was repeated on several occasions, including still another proclamation issued in

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[2]al-Jabarti, III, 4-5.

Cairo at the time of the establishment of the great Diwan.[3] The Egyptians, however, resisted the French and rejected their ideologies, as indicated by uprisings in Cairo on October 21, 1798 and again following the defeat of the French in Syria.

Although the French were forced to withdraw from Egypt in 1801, the blow dealt by Napoleon to the Mamluks left a vacuum within which Muhammad Ali was able to establish himself as Egypt's dominant power. Having used various Turkish elements to assist him in the elimination of potential rivals, the new viceroy merged the survivors of the contending factions with his Turkish and Albanian forces to form the nucleus of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy. For the most part the Egyptians continued their history of political quiescence, and only occasionally were the Turks called upon for coercive action. But Muhammad Ali's interests stretched beyond the borders of Egypt, and as his army grew to a peak of approximately 250,000 troops, the Turks found themselves elevated to positions of considerable importance in both the army and the higher offices of state. In general the members of this aristocracy were forced to act through the institutions of autocratic despotism. But since the institutions themselves were largely dependent on the Turks, it is not surprising that their needs and interests were given precedence by the Pasha. As will be seen in succeeding chapters, the Turks retained their position as the most significant political element in the country--aside from the viceroy himself--throughout the reigns of Muhammad Ali's immediate successors. Abbas nearly isolated himself from the Egyptian community behind a body of Albanian, Circassian and Turkish retainers. Although

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[3] Ibid., p. 23.

Said (1854-1863) adopted a more positive attitude toward the rights of Egyptians, Ismail (1863-1879) returned to what was generally regarded as a pro-Turkish policy. It was not until the reign of Tawfiq, however, that resentment between Turks and Egyptians erupted as one aspect of the crisis generally referred to as the 'Urabi revolt.

Several divergent interpretations have developed about the nature of the 'Urabi revolt, the governing factor having been described as military insurrection, constitutionalism, and an attempt to repel foreign (i.e., European) domination. Although it now seems clear that each played a significant role, it is equally evident that behind the interrelated events and forces lay the rivalry between Turks and Egyptians that was such an important fact of 19th-century Egypt. The first--and only--manifestation of this rivalry to reach violent proportions occurred in the army.

Although demobilization of the Egyptian army following the Abyssinian campaign reduced the number of troops to less than 18,000, the cadre of commissioned and non-commissioned officers was for a time kept up for the army of much larger size allowed by the Ottoman ferman of 1873. However, the demoralization of the officers resulting from the failure of the campaign was soon compounded by sharp curtailments in the military budget necessitated by the financial crisis that overtook the Egyptian government in the late 1870's. Resentment over early retirements as well as reductions and arrears in pay eventually led to organized protest, climaxing in a demonstration of over 2,000 officers on February 18, 1879 that forced the resignation of Nubar Pasha as Prime Minister. Although the Khedive Ismail was soon thereafter replaced by

Tawfiq, economic problems persisted as did resentment within the military. The latter was further intensified by the plan of the new Prime Minister, Mustafa Riaz, to reduce military service from five years to four, a move that in the opinion of the native officers would provide too little time for Egyptians, most of whom were promoted from the ranks, to qualify as officers. Events reached the critical stage on January 15, 1881 when a petition was addressed to Riaz requesting that an inquiry be held into the qualifications of all newly promoted officers, and that Uthman Rifqi, generally regarded as prejudiced against Egyptian officers, be relieved of his post as Minister of War.[4]

On February 1, 1881,'Urabi and his collaborators were summoned to the Ministry of War at Qasr al-Nil and arrested. Having been warned in advance, the colonels were freed within hours by their own troops whose loyalty to their officers demonstrated the powerlessness of both Khedive and Turks over the army. At the insistence of the Egyptian officers, Mahmud Sami al-Barudi replaced Rifqi as Minister of War and the arrested colonels were allowed to retain their commands. Shorn of any power capable of containing the rebellious officers, the Khedive made a public declaration that "no difference shall be shown in the treatment of Turks, Circassians and Arabs",[5] and that a commission would be appointed to

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[4]The petition presented to Riaz read in part, "When the portfolio of the Ministry of War was conferred on Osman Pasha Rifky, His Excellency commenced by unjustly treating the native officers and doing his utmost to prevent their promotion, as if they were his enemies, or that God had sent him to venge his wrath upon the Egyptians." (Enclosed in Malet to Granville, March 28, 1881, FO 78/3322). Born in the Caucases in 1839, Rifqi arrived in Egypt soon afterward and attended the elite Madrasat al-Mafruzah. Rising rapidly in rank and influence, he was one of the important commanders in the war against Abyssinia. Although the Egyptian army was defeated, Rifqi emerged with his reputation intact and by 1877 was promoted to the rank of Fariq (General). Shortly thereafter he was appointed under-Secretary of War and then Minister of War in the Riaz Ministry of 1879.

[5]Malet to Granville (Political No. 50), February 9, 1881, FO 78/3321.

prepare a law to regulate appointments, promotions, retirements and dismissals of officers. Among the proposals later submitted by the commission was one stipulating that the colonel of a regiment be allowed to nominate the whole of the officers of his command, and that the army be increased to 18,000 men so as to provide positions for unemployed officers and those on half pay.[6] But conditions remained unsettled, at least from the point of view of the Egyptian officers. al-Barudi was replaced as Minister of War by Dawud Yeghen and the Egyptians again felt themselves threatened by their Turkish superiors.

On September 9, 1881, 'Urabi and his fellow officers were given assignments outside of Cairo, and for a second time they rallied the support of the army for a demonstration, this time at Abdin Palace. Fresh demands were made upon the government, including the dismissal of the Riaz Ministry, the convening of the Chamber of Notables, and the raising of the army to 18,000. Helpless without the support of troops, the Khedive relented. Sharif Pasha was appointed Prime Minister with al-Barudi as Minister of War, and in January, 1882, 'Urabi himself was brought into the government as under-Secretary of War. The new Prime Minister found it impossible to agree with the Chamber over budgetary problems, and on February 2, he resigned. On the following day al-Barudi formed a new government which included 'Urabi as Minister of War and several other Egyptians in important ministerial posts. The power of the Turks, then, had been dissipated. The new administration, frequently referred to as the "Fellah Ministry", was under the control

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[6] Although many officers had been transferred to the civil service, there were still more officers unemployed--a reported 1045 in April, 1881--than there were on the active list. Malet to Granville, April 22, 1881, FO 78/3322.

of al-Barudi and 'Urabi; the army, whose higher echelon was rapidly changing complexion with the promotion of numerous Egyptians, gave the government military backing;[7] the Chamber of Notables, composed almost entirely of wealthy Egyptians, was driven almost completely under the influence of the military as the issues moved from those of political reform to those of national defense.

But the specter of Turkish power lingered and the events of the following months were clouded by the so-called "Circassian Plot" in which the government arrested several Turkish officers, including Rifqi Pasha, and charged them with conspiring against the life of 'Urabi. Tried by court martial, they were condemned to dismissal from the army and banishment to the White Nile. When Tawfiq alienated the officers by commuting the banishment to exile from Egypt (most sought refuse in Constantinople), the break between the Khedive and Ministry reached the impass that paved the way for European intervention. As ships from the British navy arrived off the coast of Alexandria, numerous Turkish families began to flee the country in anticipation of events to come.[8]

But the 'Urabi revolt was not merely a military conspiracy totally devoid of popular or intellectual support. Even Malet, the British Consul-General who denied the forces of 'Urabi any but the narrowest ambitions, conceded that they were backed by a majority of the fellahin.[9]

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[7]Malet reported that 560 officers, almost all of whom were Egyptians, were promoted by the new Ministry. Malet to Granville, April 18, 1882, FO 78/3436.

[8]Cartwright to Granville, June 29, 1882, FO 78/3438.

[9]Malet to Granville, July 16, 1882, FO 78/3439. Sir Charles Wilson was likewise impressed by the unanimous support received by 'Urabi from the native population. See his memorandum enclosed in Malet to Granville, October 21, 1882, FO 78/3442.

In addition, they shared certain aims with--and acquired the tentative support of--the "liberal Pashas", or as they were perhaps more generally known, the "constitutionalists". When in August 1878 Ismail agreed to a limited form of constitutional rule, and more especially after his deposition the following year, the personal power of the Khedive was weakened enough to allow other forms of political influence to exert themselves. It was natural, therefore, for the Turks to attempt to establish a political base by which to preserve if not increase their traditional power. But the conservatism of the Turks allowed for a wide range of variation, from the most narrow-minded absolutism to some kind of enlightened constitutionalism. Men like Mustafa Riaz, to whom authoritarian government was normal, inclined toward absolute rule at the expense of constitutional experiments. Others more influenced by western ideas, e.g., Sharif Pasha, Ismail Raghib and Shahin Pasha, were joined by the more enlightened Egyptian notables such as Sultan Pasha and Ali Mubarak in seeking constitutional reform. The 'Urabists too saw advantages in constitutional reform, and from 1879 onward worked more or less in co-operation with the Pashas to limit the power of the Khedive. But in substance if not always in words the two sought fundamentally opposite goals. Whereas the 'Urabists were primarily concerned with changes that would "Egyptianize" the state and in particular the army, the "reforming Pashas" regarded constitutional government as a base for stability under the control of an expanded ruling element. As the possibility of foreign intervention increased, the Pashas were temporarily driven closer to the might of the 'Urabists. But no predominant social class will willingly surrender its power, and ultimately the Pashas compromised their ideas for the support of the Khedive and, through him, the British.

It is wrong, however, to attempt to correlate the actions of all Turks with their conservative backgrounds. Men such as Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, Rashid Husni and Yaqub Sami, all three of whom were Turks "by birth", continued to defy both established order and the society to which they were culturally bound even after the resignation of Sharif Pasha on February 2, 1882, the date that marked for most Turks--including the constitutionalists--the final break with the 'Urabists.

Born in 1840 into a Circassian family of long residence in Egypt, Mahmud Sami al-Barudi graduated from military school in 1855 and travelled soon afterward to Constantinople where he remained for seven years as an employee in the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Returning to Egypt during the reign of Ismail, he entered the army and rose quickly to the rank of Liwa. He then held the posts of Mudir of Sharqasiyah and Muhafiz of Cairo before joining the Sharif Ministry in 1879 as Minister of Waqfs. But al-Barudi was more than a soldier and public servant--he was a poet of distinction in both Arabic and Turkish and was related by marriage to one of the most distinguished Turkish families of Egypt.[10] Yet whereas his roots would seem to have placed him in the same school of thought as men such as Sharif Pasha--and indeed al-Barudi was one of the early constitutionalists--their paths were to take different directions. Thus it was al-Barudi who warned 'Urabi and his fellow officers of their impending arrest prior to the Qasr al-Nil incident, who replaced Rifqi Pasha as Minister of War at the insistence of the rebellious officers, who headed the "Fellah Ministry" that succeeded the more conservative government of Sharif Pasha, and who was court martialed

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[10] al-Barudi's wife was the sister of Mansur Yeghen.

following the defeat at Tel al-Kabir, had his property confiscated, and was exiled to Ceylon with 'Urabi.

Rashid Husni, who was born in the Caucasus in 1842, came to Egypt in the early 1850's after having spent several years in Constantinople. In Cairo he attended the elite Madrasat al-Mafruzah before joining a mission group in France where he continued his studies of military science. Upon his return to Egypt he entered the army and by 1876 attained the rank of Farik. Subsequently he was appointed commander of the Khedival guard as well as aide-de-camp to Ismail. During the reign of Tawfiq he became the Khedive's chief aide-de-camp and in 1881 was made a member of the committee formed to look into the complaints of the fellah officers following the Qasr al-Nil incident. The next year he was selected to preside over the trial of the officers involved in the "Circassian Plot", and when the country was invaded, he participated in the battle against the British for which he was later arrested and court martialed. His actions during the revolt later earned him the praise of Mustafa Kamil, while most of his biographers refer to him as a sincere Egyptian patriot in spite of his Circassian origin.[11]

In broad outline, the background and career of Yaqub Sami, a Muslim of Greek origin, paralleled those of al-Barudi and Rashid Husni.[12] But

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[11]Mustafa Kamil, al-Masalah al-Sharqiyah (Cairo, 1898), p. 252. See also Mujahid, II, 7-8; Zaki Fahmi, Safwah al-'Asr (Cairo, 1926), pp. 240, 243; Zaki, pp. 73-79.

[12]As president of the Council of Cairo, Yaqub Sami was responsible for much of the assistance given to 'Urabi during the critical months of July and August, 1882.

individuals cannot be entirely explained by the facts of their lives, and whether their revolutionary ardor was fed by zeal for further constitutional reform, sympathy with Egyptian patriotic aspirations, or personal ambition, all three exhibited significantly different types of political behavior than might have been expected from what we presently know of their backgrounds, i.e., all three followed a course that separated them from the main body of Turco-Egyptian thought and action during the 'Urabi crisis.

As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, the revolt and the subsequent British occupation did not represent the final stage in the expulsion of the Turks. But the failure of the constitutionalists and the support given by the army to the rebellious officers forewarned of things to come. As a political entity the Turks had proven themselves unable to capitalize on the weakness of the Khedive to acquire additional power for themselves, while in losing control of the army they showed that they were no longer able to fulfill one of the functions through which they had risen to power.

British policy in Egypt following the occupation seems to have been determined by varying combinations of altruism and self-interest, and both affected the status of the Turks. One justification given by the British for the protracted occupation was the difficulty in establishing a liberal native government. Within months of the victory at Tel al-Kabir Lord Dufferin, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, arrived in Egypt to make recommendations for its future administration. One of his main objectives, he was to state, was "to erect some sort of barrier,

however feeble, against the intolerable tyranny of the Turks."[13] Lord Cromer, the most authoritative advocate of British policy in Egypt for the next twenty years, was to add,

> It was natural and praiseworthy that public opinion in England should have been opposed to handing the Egyptian over to the uncontrolled rule of the Turkish Pashas, but it was characteristic of the want of consistency, which so often distinguished English politics, that the same people who cried out most loudly for control over the Pashas, were also those who most strenuously opposed the adoption of the only method by which Pashas could be effectively controlled. They wished to withdraw the British troops....[14]

Unrestrained Turkish rule, then, would mean intrigue, corruption, and administrative and financial confusion, and it was up to the British to remedy the defects that had developed during so many years of Turkish rule. Consequently, British withdrawal was to be postponed until Egyptians rather than Turks were prepared to administer the country. Cromer like Napoleon could not help but reflect the self-confident attitudes of the society to which he belonged, and both were convinced that one aspect of their mission was to liberate Egypt from Turkish misrule. Unfortunately--at least from the Egyptian point of view--the same reasoning continued to be applied by the British for the next forty years. Thus Lord Balfour was to declare in the House of Commons shortly after the "Revolt of 1919",

> British supremacy exists (in Egypt), British supremacy is going to be maintained, and let nobody either in Egypt or out of Egypt make any mistake upon that cardinal principle of His Majesty's Government. But I think the Egyptian population may rest assured, and those who feel with them, that our desire is to associate

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[13] Cromer, I, 274.

[14] Ibid., p. 333.

> them as far as is possible with the work of administration in Egypt, and that, unlike their Turkish masters who in Egypt at this moment still affect to be pro-Egyptian, we shall do something, we shall steadily pursue the policy of amelioration which has made the Egypt of the early part of the twentieth century an utterly different place for all its inhabitants, and most of all for its native inhabitants, from what it was when it was still under Turkish rule.[15]

Yet it often occurs that altruism and self-interest demand diametrically opposed policies, and as might be expected the British generally followed the dictates of the latter. It was without question the desire of Britain to influence events in Egypt with as little direct involvement as possible. Indeed it was only after she had failed to obtain "controlled" Ottoman intervention that Britain agreed to enter Egypt herself.[16] Thereafter her desire to influence events indirectly, a policy to which Britain subscribed in nearly all of her African colonies and which led her to support numerous ancient regimes, turned Britain to the Turks. Although depicted as devoid of political morality, the Turks were regarded as the only people in Egypt with the habit and capacity of command, and therefore the only element capable of supporting a stable government. Perhaps even more important, the Turks constituted that element most likely to form a government willing to co-operate with British purposes. Although on the verbal level it would not always seem to have been the case, the political and economic aspirations of the Turks were not wholly at odds with those of the British. By 1882 the Turks had identified themselves with Egypt, but not entirely with

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[15]Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CXXI (1919), 771.

[16]France, fearing increased pan-Islamic resistance to her North African hegemony if Turkey entered Egypt, had strongly opposed Ottoman intervention.

the Egyptians, and their actions continued to be directed toward maintaining the existing state of society as nearly as possible. Sir Wilfred Blunt felt that this identity of interests was incorporated by Lord Cromer in a policy of "Egypt for the Turks", and quotes the British Consul-General as having said, "What Egypt wants is peace and order, not another revolution. We have restored the Khedive and the Circassians to power, and I shall do my best to keep them there."[17] But if the British momentarily stabilized the position of the Turks by using them as instruments of government, the foundations upon which the aristocracy rested continued to wither. By preventing the Khedive from fully restoring his authority and prestige, the British deprived the Turks of their single most important prop. Although this was temporarily replaced by the backing of Lord Cromer, the gradual withdrawal of British influence was to leave the Turks with greatly weakened autocratic support. Moreover, as an administrative class their identity was to be kept intact by a comparative handful of men of the highest rank, i.e., by ministers and members of the Khedive's own household. Similarly their hold over the army was not re-established under British control. Finally, although their property rights were generally undisturbed by British land policies, their economic standing was to be undermined by the changing economic situation. Thus although socially the Turks still made up some of the leading families of Cairo,[18] they were little more than a symbol of the

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[17]Blunt to Hamilton enclosed in Granville to Baring, October 23, 1883, FO 663/7. Blunt's observation is occasionally echoed in Cromer's own autobiography. In the early pages of Modern Egypt he writes,"In the first place, one alien race, the English, have had to control and guide a second alien race, the Turks, by whom they are disliked, in the government of a third race, the Egyptians." (Cromer, I, 5).

[18]A number of short but interesting biographies of some of the "prominent residents of Cairo" during the early 20th century--many of whom were of Turkish descent--are included in A. Wright, 20th Century Impressions of Egypt (London: 1908).

old aristocracy. In the long run, then, occupation meant that power continued to shift away from the Turks, even if to outward appearances the traditional submissiveness to Turkish Pashadom seemed to have returned after Tel al-Kabir.

The struggles within Egypt following the British occupation were primarily "national" and "class", the former attaining its most violent stage in the "Revolt of 1919" and the latter culminating in the Revolution of 1952. But in both instances ethnic issues, real and symbolic, clouded and influenced the central question. In post-World-War-I Egypt the nationalist campaign was led by Sa'd Zaghlul, embodied in the Wafd, and championed primarily by upper-class Egyptians who had merged at least economically with the Turkish aristocracy. But Turks continued to preside over the ministries that legally represented the Egyptian people.[19] And just as many Turks had been "moderate constitutionalists" at the time of the Urabi crisis, most were "moderate nationalists" in the post-World-War-I era. They were, to be sure, sincere patriots, and as such not entirely antagonistic to Zaghlul's nationalist aims. But by background and wealth they tended to be conservative, while in possessing the amenities and responsibilities of office they were naturally alarmed by the tendency of more extreme nationalists to undermine the props of legal authority--the Sultan, the British and even the Egyptian government. Thus as a moderate class ruling in a not very moderate era,

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[19]For example, in the ministry of Adli Yeghen (March-December, 1921), who made several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate independence for Egypt in the post-war period, the Prime Minister and seven of his ministers were of Turkish descent. These included Husayn Rushdi, Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, Ja'far Wali, Muhammad Shafiq, Midhat Yeghan, Ahmad Ziwar and Ismail Sidqi, all of whom were to play important roles in post-war Egypt.

they found it difficult to work for a protracted--and in their minds orderly--transition from Protectorate to independence. Caught short by the uncompromising views of the Wafd, the Turks were a politically suspect enclave who seemed primarily interested in securing their own interests and power in a moderate settlement that would substitute for the Protectorate some other nexus with the British Empire. It is not surprising, then, that of the seven post-war governments that preceded the appointment of Zaghlul as Prime Minister in January 1924, none lasted as long as a year. Starting with the "revolt" of March 1919 which caused the collapse of the Rushdi Ministry by demanding that it recognize the Wafd as the legal voice of the nation, the forces controlled by Zaghlul made it impossible for any ministry either to negotiate with the British or to rely on them to sustain the power of the government. Finally Zaghlul, when forming his ministry after a sweeping victory in the elections of 1923, chose his ministers "from the people". Not one of his ministers was of Turkish origin. "The most important results of the revolution", he was to say some time later,

> have been the egyptianization of the Egyptian economy, the abandonment of the veil by women, their participation in the national movement, the destruction of the class of pashas, the seizure of power by the fellahin, the disappearance of the Turkish element from Egyptian politics--and independence has no value unless there is also an internal liberation.[20]

As events of the 1930's were to show, "internal liberation" was not yet complete. With the support of the King several Egyptians of Turkish descent--and most notably Ismail Sidqi Pasha--were to attain the position of Prime Minister. Yet the elevation of Zaghlul to the office

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[20]Qadri Qal'anji, Sa'd Zaghlul (Beirut: 1948), p. 96. The italics are those of the author of this thesis.

of Prime Minister, as well as the repeated victories of the Wafd at the polls, was as much a symbol of the egyptianization of the administration as the Urabi revolt had symbolized the egyptianization of the army. Consequently the Turks, having survived insurrection and colonialism, found it increasingly difficult to survive within the framework of national independence.

But the Turks were to remain captives of their past, and as late as 1952 the revolutionary officers were able to tap the emotional responsiveness of Egyptians toward them to further their political and economic programs. Thus when King Faruk was deposed, the contrast between the Egyptian origin of the revolutionary officers and the Turkish origin of the Muhammad Ali family was given wide publicity. Moreover, by merging legend with fact the leaders of the revolution were able to vilify the Turks as usurpers of Egyptian property, and this image was frequently projected in support of the new land reform program. President Nasser was well received when he stated on December 26, 1953,

> The Turks seized control of Egypt and exploited her resources in the name of religion and brotherhood until eventually they had possession of the country. They then established a spurious throne on the rubble of the divided nation, plundered the land of the native inhabitants, and snatched food from the mouths of true Egyptians until they had made themselves masters and the people their slaves.[21]

In reality, of course, the largest landowners--outside of the Muhammad Ali family--were by then Egyptians rather than Turks. But shored by the testimony of both history and myth, the nationalization of large

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[21]Gamal Abd al-Nassir, Majmu'at Khutab wa Tasrihat wa Bayanat al-Ra'is Gamal Abd al-Nassir (Cairo: 1966), I, 93-94.

landholdings was made to appear as the final collapse of Turkish hegemony as well as of class tyranny. For although the Turks had not survived the early years of the 20th century as a viable political and economic entity, they did endure as a name and influence, and even today they are occasionally resurrected as a symbol of the decadent past.

CHAPTER III

THE TURKS AS A MILITARY ENTITY

In addition to the word "Turco-Egyptian", a second term with which we are concerned is "aristocracy", for within the context of 19th-century Egypt it assumed characteristics not necessarily applicable to other times and places. Thus there was no official system of stratification such as a series of "estates" that delimited and defined the Turk's distinctive position. Even the titles "Bey" and "Pasha", although in the early part of the century granted primarily to Turkish officials, conferred no legal status and belonged only to those upon whom they were directly bestowed. Moreover, although we cannot entirely deny the significance of racial differences in identifying the ruling element, it was not an entity whose essential nature may be determined by gathering genealogical information about numerous individuals. It was rather in the sense of performing specific social functions as well as sharing similar cultural traditions that the Turks constituted a meaningful social phenomenon. Thus although it is hoped that a number of genealogies of some of the leading families of 19th- and 20th-century Egypt will emerge as a useful by-product of this thesis, questions of landownership, language and the like will necessarily take precedence over those of name and place of origin. In dealing with these matters in this and subsequent chapters, data will be divided into two primary categories covering "functional" and "cultural" characteristics. By "functional"

is meant the areas of power over which the Turks shared a common pre-eminence and through which they bolstered their rule over Egyptian society. By "cultural" is meant conventional manners and customs, i.e., the basic patterns of social behavior by which the Turks identified themselves and were in turn identified by others. Since some of our material could easily fit into either category, it may appear that this is an artificial dichotomy used to create "indices" by which to identify an otherwise abstract entity. It is felt by this writer, however, that behind many of the events described in Part II of this study lay a cultural rivalry between Turks and Egyptians and the functions monopolized by the former in order to perpetuate their hegemony. Consequently the two-fold division described above should be a meaningful method of defining both the concept and content of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy while showing that it was in reality an entity with its own beginning, end and unified theme of development.

Certainly basic Ottoman political philosophy excluded the formation of a powerful aristocracy. Under the principles of absolutism and autocracy upon which Ottoman political structure was based, society was governed by a single ruler whose power over all major decisions remained unchecked by either intra-governmental or non-governmental forces. Such power was achieved by entrusting administrative and military functions to slaves whose sole loyalty was to the sovereign, and by ensuring that religious institutions were also incorporated into the monolithic power structure of the state.[1] But even within the Ottoman political system

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[1]For a short but thoughtful discussion of Ottoman political theory, see Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society", Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, ed. Robert E. Ward and Dankward Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 42-63.

the concept of absolute and unlimited power was more often than not an idealization, while in Egypt the ruler was never entirely free to act without restraint. In the early part of the 19th century this limitation was perhaps no more than the nominal sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan. Yet even though the "will" of Muhammad Ali was paramount to that of both Turks and Egyptians, the former, if for no other reason than their proximity to the Pasha, had more means of influencing that "will" than the latter. Furthermore, by concentrating in their hands various types of power, the most important of which were initially military and administrative, the Turks were gradually able to increase their influence over political decision. Eventually they established themselves as a landowning class as well, a development that provided them with the permanent wealth and income needed to perpetuate their status through hereditary means. Although it would be some time before the uneven balance between Khedive and aristocracy took a significant shift in favor of the latter, the Turks remained the primary internal check on Khedival power for much of the 19th century, i.e., until the emergence of an expanded landowning class comprised of both Turks and Egyptians, and later the entrance of foreign revenue collectors, the international tribunals, and the British occupation forces. With regard to the first of these checks, i.e., the Turkish aristocracy, there is conflicting opinion and evidence as to whether it was the intention of Muhammad Ali to establish such a class. Yet no matter what his aims and expectations, the consequences for Egypt were significant.

As has already been noted, the ever-increasing demand for skilled personnel in the military and administrative services prompted Muhammad

Ali to recruit assistance from throughout the Ottoman Empire. Yet if at times Egypt's new ruler seemed to rely primarily upon Turks, he never completely dispensed with the services of others. Even Christians, i.e., Armenians and Copts, were called upon in the continuing effort to raise the standard of administrative efficiency. Indeed it was not unusual for Christians to be honored with the title "Bey", an act almost unknown in the Ottoman dominions prior to that time.[2] Egyptian Muslims were also elevated to subordinate positions of responsibility, and by the end of the 1820's several European observers had concluded that it was the aim of the Pasha to decrease if not entirely eliminate the influence of the Turkish element. Thus the dispatches of British Consul-General Barker made frequent referrals to the "well known policy" of Muhammad Ali to diminish by all possible means the power and number of Turks in Egypt.[3] In one instance Barker considered this to have been the primary reason for the dismissal of from seven to eight hundred Turkish officers and men from the Egyptian navy as well as nearly two thousand Turkish artillerymen.[4] Moreover, the policy was said to have been pursued not only in times of crises with the Porte when the fidelity of the Turks may have been in question,[5] but also in times of peace when the Pasha

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[2]Bowring, Appendix C.,p. 4.

[3]Barker to Gorden, August 1, 1829, enclosed in Barker to Bidwell, August 18, 1829, FO 78/184. See also Barker to Adam, May 21, 1828, enclosed in Barker to Dudley, May 22, 1828, FO 78/170; Barker to Malcolm, July 8, 1829, FO 78/184.

[4]Barker to Gorden, August 1, 1829, enclosed in Barker to Bidwell, August 15, 1829, FO 78/184.

[5]Barker to Malcolm, Sept. 26, 1829, FO 78/184; Barker to Canning, Jan. 8, 1832, FO 78/213. In both instances the Consul-General states that it was only the high pay offered by the Pasha to his Turkish officers that prompted them to identify with Egypt. Thus Barker looked upon all Turks in Egypt as mercenaries who in their hearts considered themselves Ottomans rather than Egyptians. Also see Barker to Canning, March 29, 1832, FO 78/213 in which it is stated that twenty thousand of Egypt's "ancient Turk soldiery" were prepared to act in any popular insurrection against the Pasha.

might have been expected to look to the Turks to expedite political decisions and broaden his base of power. In a dispatch forwarded to his government by Baron de Boislecomte in 1833, the Pasha himself is reported to have stated that although he was obliged to recognize the superior martial capabilities of the Turks in selecting officers, he had no intention of allowing them to acquire any permanent influence over the indigenous population.

> Je n'ai fait autre chose en Égypte que ce que les Anglais ont fait aux Indes. Ils ont une armée de soldats indons commandés par des officiers anglais; j'ai une armée de soldats arabes commandés par des officiers Turcs, et vous-mêmes si vous tenez à Alger des régiments arabes vous m'imiterez et vous y placerez des officiers français. Le Turc est plus propre à la fois à la guerre et au commandement, il se sent fait pour exercer le pouvoir et l'Arabe en sa présence sent aussi que c'est au Turc à commander....Tout mon art a donc été de m'attirer des officiers Turcs; pour cela j'ai dû puiser aux mêmes sources que le Sultan; heureusement qu'il donnait de faibles appointements; j'en ai donné de plus considérable et les officiers sont venu chez moi; il a fallu ensuite m'assurer de leur fidélité; j'en ai trouvé le moyen en leur prodiguant l'argent et les présents; mais en les empêchant de devenir propriétaires et de se créer eux-mêmes une influence personnelle sur la population.[6]

Observations similar to those of Barker and Boislecomte were made by the English traveler James A. St. John in 1834 and the French Consul-General in 1841,[7] while Clot Bey, although less emphatic about

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[6]Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte, pp. 110-111.

[7]St. John, II, 456; Edouard Driault, L'Égypte et l'Europe; la Crise de 1839-1841 (Caire;L'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1930), V, 18. In the latter the French Consul-General reported that "various indications, unperceived by those who do not know the secret of the old Pasha, would tend to prove that the Arab element is being made to dominate."

Muhammad Ali's plans to eliminate the Turks and more realistic about his dependence on their talents, credited the Pasha with having been the first of Egypt's many alien rulers to actively encourage the promotion of Egyptians to positions of responsibility.[8] Finally a somewhat later observer, James McCoan, expressed the belief that it was not only Muhammad Ali who sought to diminish the influence of the Turks, but his successors as well.[9]

The apparent contradiction between such reports and a major premise of this study may perhaps best be explained by a disparity between ostensible aim and accomplished fact. In his attempt to emulate the monolithic structure of the Ottoman government, Muhammad Ali undoubtedly sought to prevent the establishment of an aristocracy with sufficient power to challenge the autocratic nature of his regime. Thus during the early part of the century when proven service to the Pasha was the primary criterion for advancement, those who entered the inner circle of Muhammad Ali's entourage found few fixed offices with clearly defined powers. This, coupled with the instability of the times and a constant interchange of personnel from one position to another, made it difficult for any individual or group to consolidate delegated functions. Nevertheless, there did develop a close relationship between the Turks and several important areas of power. At first the Turks were undifferentiated

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[8] Clot Bey, I, 332.

[9] "Nor was the position of this Ottoman aristocracy at all retrieved by the revolution effected by Mehemet Ali, who, only half a Turk himself, had few sympathies with it. His obvious aim, too, being to refound an Arab empire, his policy was to employ rather the native Egyptian than the Osmanli element in both the military and civil services; and whether or not his successors have inherited his ambition, they have at least followed the same rule." McCoan, p. 47.

in the performance of functions related to these powers since both military and administrative tasks were frequently combined in a single person. But in time, and especially after the Turks established themselves as an economic (landowning) class, there developed a multiplicity of elites, each with specific interests and objectives that its members sought to protect and promote. These sub-groups of military officers, administrative officials and large landowners continued, however, to form a single entity held together by the bonds of cultural homogeneity. In our attempt to establish the nature of this aristocracy it is with regard to these three areas of power that our investigation will be primarily concerned. Underpinning the inquiry will be the thesis that in the acquisition and loss of power in each of these categories lay the most important reason for the rise and decline of the Turks in modern Egypt.

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To a Muslim conqueror the army was regarded as the principal instrument of government, and therefore it is not surprising that the most striking evidence of Turkish presence in Egypt was the pre-eminence of the Turks within the military establishment. Yet unlike the Mamluks who based their military strength on an army of Turkish, Kurdish and Circassian mercenaries organized along the lines of military feudalism, Muhammad Ali built up a fellah army that was only officered by Turks. This army, moreover, was structured largely along European rather than Ottoman lines, conforming closely to the French system of training and operations, ranks and promotions, equipment and even music, all within a framework of French military and maritime law. Indeed if it had not

been for the use of Turkish drill calls and modified Turkish uniforms, the similarity between the French and Egyptian armies would--at least on the surface--have been nearly complete. With the support of these troops Muhammad Ali not only reorganized the country centrally and carried out a vigorous program of internal reform, but embarked on an ambitious policy of external expansion. The state, then, was primarily a war machine and at its top was a military aristocracy of Turks whose power was second only to that of the viceroy and whose well-being and position depended to a large degree on their ability to monopolize the primary sources of officer recruitment.

Pursuant to the need of obtaining officers for his rapidly expanding army, Muhammad Ali initially turned to the Turks who had accompanied him to Egypt as well as to the many others who came to join him both during and after his successful rise to power. To further supplement these sources, he later established a number of schools and institutions for the express purpose of training military and administrative officials. A majority of those selected to attend were also drawn from the Turkish community, for the Egyptian, with virtually no history of military training, was generally regarded as incapable of assuming positions of command. Descriptions of many of these institutions have been included in Heyworth-Dunne's history of education in modern Egypt in which the author emphasizes the predominance of the Turks in nearly every phase of military education. And although Heyworth-Dunne notes that in the latter part of Muhammad Ali's reign significant numbers of Egyptians were also permitted to receive advanced schooling, he indicates that they were generally trained only as junior officers.[10] For primary sources we,

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[10]James Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac, 1938), pp. 104-121.

as Heyworth-Dunne, must rely heavily on the reports of western observers. Fortunately several (e.g., Planta, Clot Bey) were employed by the Pasha to supervise military instruction and consequently their observations may be regarded as fairly reliable. Reference has already been made to their accounts of the numerous Mamluks enrolled at Isna, Gizah and al-Khankah,[11] but other Turks are also mentioned as being among the primary beneficiaries of the Pasha's bold experiment in military education. Thus Planta remarked that the students at the Madrasat al-Jihadiyah established at Qasr al-'Ayni in 1825 were drawn entirely from the Turkish, Greek and Armenian communities, while Baron de Boislecomte pointed out that partiality continued to be shown to the Turks at this institution even after Egyptians were granted admission by noting that the allowance received by the Turks was almost a third more than that received by native Egyptians.[12] Similarly, as late as 1833 the Cavalry School at Gizah was reported to have had only thirty Egyptian as compared to 220 Turkish and Mamluk students, and all of the former were training to become trumpeters.[13] Admission to the Madrasat Arkan al-Harb at al-Khankah, which also was originally open only to Turks, was later eased to include Egyptians, but they were not permitted to sit for examinations or given rank upon graduation.[14] In a few instances such observations, of which these are only a random sample, may be substantiated by local

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[11]See Chapter 1, pp. 15-16.

[12]Planta, p. 362; Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte, p. 136.

[13]Douin, Ibid.; J.A. St. John, II, 399, who travelled to Egypt at about the same time as Boislecomte, also remarked that the School at Gizah was limited to Turkish, Georgian and Circassian students.

[14]Heyworth-Dunne, p. 119.

Egyptian sources. Thus the contemporary historian al-Jabarti commented frequently on the reliance placed upon Mamluks in the various military institutions,[15] while in a few instances original records have been preserved stipulating that officer candidates in certain schools should be entirely of Turkish descent. For example, an order issued on May 24, 1823, directed Ibrahim Pasha to enroll only Turks as officers in an Artillery unit to be trained at the military establishment called al-Nakhilah.[16]

The partiality shown to Turks in the schools and institutions established within Egypt was maintained in the selection of students sent to Europe for advanced military training. Unfortunately the names and origins of the approximately twenty-eight students sent between 1809 and 1826 are impossible to trace with certainty. Nevertheless, all available evidence indicates that a majority were Turks.[17] Fortunately, more complete records are available on the forty-four students sent in 1826 in what is generally referred to as the first real mission group. From articles written by contemporary observers we know that at least nineteen were born outside of Egypt--four in Constantinople, four in Circassia, three in Georgia, two in Cavala, and one each in Abazia, Sebastia, Trebizond, Armenia, Greece and an unknown town in Turkey.[18] Among the remainder seventeen were born in Cairo, but even among them the mother tongue of a majority was Turkish. Indeed one of the first

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[15]See Chapter 1, p. 15.

[16]Sami, II, 307; Heyworth-Dunne, p. 113.

[17]Heyworth-Dunne, p. 106, states that there were no Egyptians among them.

[18]M. Jomard, "École Égyptienne de Paris", Journal Asiatique, (1828), 96-116; Hamont, II, 188.

tasks of many students upon their return to Egypt was the translation of books from French into Turkish for use as texts in Muhammad Ali's elite academies.[19] Between the 1826 mission and the death of Muhammad Ali more than three hundred additional students left for Europe, with a definite increase in the percentage of native Egyptians in each successive mission. But whereas the Turks continued to pursue studies in preparation for a military career, many of the Egyptians were compelled to undertake training that would benefit Egypt's non-military (i.e., industrial, agricultural and educational) needs.[20]

The predominance of the Turk in the military schools and mission groups throughout the reign of Muhammad Ali reflected the still greater cleavage between Turks and Egyptians within the army itself in which officers were drawn almost exclusively from Turkish families.[21] Unfortunately it is difficult to determine when Egyptians first rose above the rank of non-commissioned officer or the exact policy of promotion adopted by Muhammad Ali and his successors. Most western observers have accepted the theory that Said was the first to use fellah officers, up to and including the rank of Captain, while Ismail is generally credited with

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[19]Hamont, II, 192-93; Artin, p. 73.

[20]Heyworth-Dunne, p. 176.

[21]See, for example, Barker to Gorden, August 1, 1829, enclosed in Barker to Bidwell, August 15,1829, FO 78/184; Georges Douin (ed.), La Première Guerre de Syrie, (Caire: L'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1931), I, 42. In the former the British Consul-General states: "But it must be observed, that in all the regiments the petty officers only are Arabs [Egyptians], the rest are Turks, whom he [Muhammad Ali] pays most liberally, particularly the General officers."

having authorized the promotion of Egyptians to the rank of Colonel.[22] Yet the literature on which these conclusions are based is limited, while sufficient evidence is available to indicate that there were occasional exceptions. In 1833 Baron de Boislecomte reported: "...un Arab [Egyptian] ne peut s'élever au-dessus du grade de Capitaine et il n'en est même qu'un petit nombre qu'on laisse parvenir à ce grade."[23] That Egyptians were occasionally elevated to the rank of Captain prior to the reign of Said was also reported by the French Consul-General in 1837,[24] while Clot Bey indicated that Muhammad Ali permitted a limited number of Egyptians to reach the rank of Battalion Commander (Major).[25] But if the promotion of Egyptians on occasion preceded the generally accepted calendar of advancement, the numbers involved were small. Having once encouraged the development of a military elite composed almost entirely of Turks, both Muhammad Ali and Abbas remained dependent upon it throughout their careers. Said, who actively supported the promotion of native Egyptians and more than doubled the salary of both enlisted men and officers,[26]

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[22]Wallace, p. 438; Cromer, II, 471; Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan (London: John Murray, 1955), p. 21. Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 29, was the only authority encountered by this researcher to state that it was Said who first promoted Egyptians to the rank of Colonel. Issawi was undoubtedly referring to Ahmad 'Urabi who was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel in 1860, but 'Urabi was certainly one of the very few Egyptians to achieve that rank prior to the rule of Ismail.

[23]Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte, p. 100.

[24]Cattaui, II, Part II, 396.

[25]"Le vice-roi a donné dans son administration un grand nombre d'emplois aux Egyptiens indigènes....il a choisi parmi eux la plupart des chefs des départements (les Mamours), et presque tous les officiers de ses armées jusqu'au grade de Chef de bataillon." Clot Bey, I, 262.

[26]Karl Malortie, Egypt: Native Ruler and Foreign Influence (London: William Ridgway, 1882), p. 178.

and Ismail, under whom both the number and rank of native officials continued to increase, gradually altered the uneven balance between Turkish and Egyptian officers. Nevertheless, nearly all top field-grade appointments continued to be given to Turks, as was the Ministry of War.[27] Thus the power of the Turks remained sufficiently operative to direct the army in the war against Abyssinia in 1876. Indeed the failure of leadership in this short but disastrous campaign helps to explain the events that followed,[28] for within five years a military establishment composed almost entirely of native officers successfully challenged Turkish domination of the army and became for a short time the single most important political fact within the country. Unfortunately a careful analysis of the composition of the officer corps at the time of the 'Urabi revolt is impossible without access to portions of the Egyptian National Archives that were not open to this researcher. Nevertheless, some figures are available on the relative number of Turkish and Egyptian officers in the years immediately preceding the British occupation. On February 1, 1881, i.e., at the time of the Qasr al-Nil incident and approximately a year before the formation of the "rebel ministry" under Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, there were a reported four hundred Turkish officers as compared to two thousand officers of Egyptian descent.[29]

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[27] Although there is no single list containing the names of all those who held the Ministry of War, an examination of the numerous Ministerial appointments to be found in Amin Sami's Taqwin al-Nil clearly demonstrates that none but Turks held this important position.

[28] William Dye, Moselm Egypt and Christian Abyssinia (New York: Atkin and Prout, 1880), p. 483. It is interesting to note that Dye, one of several American officers who came to Egypt in 1869 to help organize the Egyptian General Staff, felt that many of the most effective officers in this campaign were of Egyptian descent.

[29] Borg to Malet, Feb. 1, 1881, enclosed in Malet to Granville, Feb. 2, 1881, FO 78/3321.

In April of the following year, i.e., at the height of 'Urabi's power, the number of Turkish officers was reported by one observer to have dwindled to two hundred,[30] and by a second to only slightly more than eighty.[31] No matter what the exact figures, it is obvious that with the appointment of Ahmad 'Urabi as Minister of War on February 4, 1882, the innovation started by Muhammad Ali when he conscripted native Egyptians into the armed forces had run its course. By any standard, numerical or otherwise, control of the army--and,even more important, allegiance of the troops--had shifted from Turkish to Egyptian officers. The victory, however, was short-lived. Stripped of many of its most qualified (i.e., Turkish) leaders, the Egyptian army was soon put to rout by the forces of Great Britain.[32] And on September 19, 1882, only six days after the battle of Tel al-Kabir, an order issued in the name of the Khedive completely disbanded the Egyptian army in preparation for its reorganization under British control.

Although it was announced that the Egyptian army would be re-established on the basis of merit rather than the old ethnic criterion, the implementation of such a program proved more difficult than its declaration. The urgent need for a small but experienced force to reassert Khedival authority and maintain order in the provinces could

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[30]Malet to Granville, April 18, 1882, FO 78/3436.

[31]Wilfrid S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1922), p. 193. In a letter that Blunt received from Muhammad Abdu dated April 25, 1882, the latter stated: "The Circassians in the army number in all eighty-one persons, and no one in his senses need be alarmed at the chance of so small a number of men succeeding against the government."

[32]Although a few Turks were praised by the 'Urabists for supporting the "fellah administration", the most notable perhaps being Ismail Kamil and Rashid Husni, the majority remained loyal to the Khedive.

not await the creation of an entirely new army. Consequently the question of Turkish participation became a problem of immediate concern, and within a few years was further underscored by the growing threat of the Mahdi in the Sudan. From the professional point of view strong arguments could be presented for the recruitment of officers and men throughout the Ottoman Empire as well as for the reinstatement of those Turks who had been purged from the army during the 'Urabi revolt. Politically, however, the case was less tenable, for it was felt by many that such acts would only succeed in arousing Egyptian resentment and perhaps even trigger a second revolt. Extensive correspondence between Cairo and London reflected the conflicting ideas that characterized the British approach to the problem. One plan, widely attributed to General Barker, called for the immediate recruitment of Bosnians, Turks and Albanians,[33] and as early as October 17, 1882, it was reported that over two hundred Albanians had already arrived in Egypt.[34] A dispatch of November 3 indicated that recruitment in Albania on a still larger scale was to take place at the insistence of the Egyptian Minister of War.[35] So great, however, was the protest against such a move that General Barker was obliged to announce that the Albanians were being assigned to the police and not the army, and

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[33]Memo by Wilson enclosed in Malet to Granville, Oct. 10, 1882, FO 78/3442; "Rapport Préliminaire sur la Réorganisation de l'armée Egyptienne" by General Barker enclosed in Malet to Granville, Oct. 20, 1882, FO 78/3442; Memo by Archibald Alison enclosed in Malet to Granville, Nov. 4, 1882, FO 78/3443.

[34]Report by Herbert Chermside enclosed in Malet to Granville, Oct. 17, 1882, FO 78/3442.

[35]Memo by Wilson enclosed in Malet to Granville, Nov. 6, 1882, No. 798, FO 78/3443.

that under no circumstances would he sanction recruitment in Ottoman Turkey.[36] He added, however, that Turks with long ties to Egypt should not be prevented from entering military service. Typical of the reports supporting this position was that of Lord Dufferin in which he stated:

> [Although] the foreign janissary element should be rigorously excluded, whether recruited from Albania, Anatolia, or elsewhere, it does not follow that the Turco-Egyptian aspirant to military honours need be driven from the service. On the contrary, it would be wise to introduce a certain amount of professional back-bone into the invertebrate ranks of the fellaheen soldiery by the admission amongst them of the descendants of those hardy warriors who carried the standards of Mehemet Ali from Cairo to Konieh.[37]

Ultimately this was the course adopted by Sir Evelyn Wood, the first British "sirdar" or Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army. Men of both Turkish and fellah extraction were admitted to positions of command, and although on at least one occasion Lord Cromer was to express concern that the Turco-Egyptian Minister of War might "manipulate" promotions in a manner calculated to favor the Turkish element,[38] for all intents

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[36]Malet to Granville, Nov. 6, 1882, No. 800, FO 78/3443. Two months later the number of Albanians recruited for police work was reported to have risen to nine hundred. Dufferin to Granville, Jan. 12, 1883, FO 78/3565.

[37]Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. 46), Cmd. 3529, Feb. 6, 1883.

[38]Baring to Salisbury, May 15, 1891, FO 78/4385. As will be noted in a later part of this study, a majority of the Ministers during the years in which Lord Cromer served as Consul-General were members of the Turkish community. The Minister in question, Yusuf Shuhdi, who was of Circassian descent, had taken a strong anti-'Urabi position to the revolt.

and purposes the old ethnic basis of the military elite was destroyed, while the subsequent development of an officer corps drawn primarily from the middle and lower classes meant the separation of the military from the political and economic elites. In summary, if the events of 1882 did not represent the final stage in the expulsion of the Turk as the most important element in Egypt's ruling class, they did curtail his ability to fulfill one of his characteristic (i.e., military) functions, while at the same time nullifying the overall significance of an institution through which he had risen to power by subordinating the military to outside (i.e., British) aims and purposes.

CHAPTER IV

THE TURKS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ENTITY

During the first half of the 19th century, the Turks constituted by far the most important element within Egypt's administrative community. From Minister of War and Provincial Governor to factory manager and local police officer, government posts were monopolized almost entirely by Turks. Whereas a Turkish youth could look forward to a long life of government service, an Egyptian of fellah birth could scarcely contemplate such a career. The well-known educator Ali Mubarak, recalling his childhood during the 1830's, was to write many years later, "I believed that only Turks could become government officials as was the custom in those days."[1] Nevertheless, in the early years of Muhammad Ali's reign, the personal power of the Pasha prevented the Turks from ruling through

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[1] Mubarak, IX, 39. The author went on to explain how he was surprised and encouraged to discover that an early benefactor of non-Turkish, i.e., Abyssinian, origin had been able to rise to the position of district officer in the government's cotton program. Eventually Mubarak himself gained admission to the Qasr al-'Ayni Preparatory School where the student body was composed almost entirely of Turks. He also travelled to Europe with an early mission group and later studied Turkish for several months in Constantinople. Thereafter his rise in government circles was swift if uneven, and he became one of the first Egyptians of fellah descent to head a bureaucratic department. In spite of--or perhaps because of--his early success, Mubarak never allied himself with those seeking to eliminate Turkish control. Even during the 'Urabi revolt he identified himself with the Turco-Egyptian element rather than with the "rebels" attempting to gain control of the Khedive's government. Ibid., pp. 57-58. For additional remarks on Mubarak's attitude toward the Khedival family and the Turkish element, see Chapter 7, pages 159-160.

the positions they held. The government in reality meant the Pasha, and although numerous Turks held rank it would be some time before many held power.

Unfortunately there is no good description of Egypt's administrative structure in the 19th century, and therefore it is difficult to establish with certainty the framework within which Turkish officials functioned.[2] But were such a study available, it would still be impossible to identify those institutions that were truly operational. Under Muhammad Ali there were few offices with clearly defined powers and functions. Constant experimentation with departments and councils in an attempt to meet the needs of an expanding state meant that the organization through which the Pasha ruled was never completely institutionalized. Moreover, those Turks who managed to remain as top advisors and administrators over a period of years were constantly moved from one position to another, due not only to the ferment of the times but also to the lack of trained personnel. It was only in later years that positions became stabilized and more closely reflected their occupant's influence and value to the state.

Although all matters were ultimately controlled by the Pasha, the formal work of the administration was carried out by one or more

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[2]Such a study is far too vast to be undertaken in this thesis, and therefore I will only attempt to give force to known data by bringing together details concerning the Turks that others have considered singly. For a useful introduction to Egypt's administrative institutions of the early 19th century, see Jean Deny, Sommaire des Archives Turques du Caire (Caire: Impr. de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1930), pp. 90-143; Rivlin, pp. 75 ff.; al-Rafi'i, Asr Muhammad Ali (Cairo: 1951), pp. 606-638.

deliberative councils and several bureaucratic departments. Throughout most of Muhammad Ali's reign there were six of the latter.[3]

Diwan al-Iradat	(Finance)
Diwan al-Khidiwi	(Interior)
Diwan al-Jihadiyah	(War)
Diwan al-Bahr	(Marine)
Diwan al-Madaris	(Education and Public Works)
Diwan al-Tijarah al-Misriyah wa al-Umur al-Ifrankiyah	(Commerce and Foreign Affairs)
Diwan al-Fawriqat	(Industry)

Each diwan was headed by a nazir whose assistants were recruited in the government schools from which they graduated with the rank of second lieutenant (mulazim thani), promotion in the administrative establishment being based on the same ranks as used in the army. As might be expected, the importance of the financial department's functions gave it preponderance over all other diwans, while among its top officials were some of the most influential Turks of the times. In 1807 its chief officer or daftardar was Muhammad Ali's son, Ibrahim, who was succeeded in 1813 by the Pasha's son-in-law, Muhammad Efendi. As with all departments, the financial administration was subject to periodic reorganization until finally in 1844 the Diwan al-Iradat was abolished and its functions delegated to the newly established Diwan al-Maliyah al-Misriyah. A chronological list of the ministers of finance from that point until the 1920's can serve to summarize the history of the Turkish

[3]Deny, pp. 105-106.

element in the administrative hierarchy and provide a background for the closer examination of a few of its most influential members.[4]

	Name	Title	Date of Appointment
1)	Muhammad Sharif	Mudir al-Maliyah	1841 (approx.)
2)	Abu Bakr Ratib	"	June 21, 1849
3)	Ahmad Rashid	"	June 10, 1850
4)	Muhammad Salim	"	June 18, 1852
5)	Ali Dhu al-Fiqar	"	September 23, 1854
6)	Abd Allah Izzat al-Arnawuti	Nazir al-Maliyah	June 21, 1857
7)	Muhammad Mukhtar	"	February 17, 1858
8)	Mahmud Nami	"	July 27, 1858
9)	Ismail Raghib	"	April 16, 1859
10)	Ahmad Rashid	"	January 10, 1861
11)	Muhammad Hafiz	"	October 4, 1864
12)	Ismail Raghib	"	September 17, 1867
13)	Ismail Siddiq	"	April 1, 1868
14)	Husayn Kamil	"	November 9, 1876
15)	Mustafa Riaz (provisional)	"	September 1, 1878
16)	Sir Rivers Wilson	"	September 1, 1878
17)	Ismail Raghib	"	April 9, 1879
18)	Ismail Ayyub	"	July 2, 1879
19)	Ali Haydar Yeghen	"	August 18, 1879
20)	Mustafa Riaz	"	September 21, 1879

[4]The following list is based primarily on data supplied in al-Muqtataf, LX (January, 1922), No. 1, 27-30. A list of Foreign Ministers covering approximately the same years appears in al-Muqtataf, LXII, (May, 1923), No. 5, 476-77. Similar lists for other departments may be compiled from the nearly complete data provided in Sami, I, II and III.

21)	Ali Haydar Yeghen	Nazir al-Maliyah	September 14, 1881
22)	Ali Sadiq	"	February 4, 1882
23)	Abd al-Rahman Rushdi	"	June 20, 1882
24)	Ali Haydar Yeghen	"	August 28, 1882
25)	Mustafa Fahmi	"	January 10, 1884
26)	Muhammad Zaki	"	March 10, 1887
27)	Mustafa Riaz	"	June 11, 1888
28)	Abd al-Rahman Rushdi	"	May 14, 1891
29)	Butrus Ghali	"	January 15, 1893
30)	Ahmad Madhlum	"	April 16, 1894
31)	Ahmad Hishmat	"	November 12, 1908
32)	Yusuf Saba	"	February 23, 1910
33)	Ahmad Hilmi	"	April 5, 1912
34)	Said Dhu al-Fiqar	"	November 20, 1913
35)	Yusuf Wahba	Minister of Finance	April 5, 1914
36)	Mahmud Fakhri	"	May 22, 1920
37)	Ismail Sidqi	"	March 17, 1921

A majority of the ministers listed above were members of the Turkish community, and whether of Maltese (Abd al-Rahman Rushdi), Greek (Ismail Raghib), Bosnian (Muhammad Hafiz), Circassian (Mahmud Fakhri), Turkish (Mustafa Fahmi) or Syrian (Yusuf Saba) descent, were prepared for government service within the framework of the ruling aristocracy.[5] Although two--Husayn Kamil and Ali Haydar Yeghen--were related to the ruling dynasty,[6] this is somewhat less than in other administrative

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[5]Four of the ministers, i.e., Ismail Siddiq and Ahmad Hishmat as well as the Copts Yusuf Wahba and Butrus Ghali, were of pure Egyptian descent.

[6]Husayn Kamil, the son of the Khedive Ismail, became Sultan of Egypt on December 19, 1914, but died shortly thereafter. Ali Haydar Yeghen was the grandson of Muhammad Ali's sister.

departments over which members of the Muhammad Ali family were frequently appointed at least titular head. Others among the ministers listed above were related to one another, e.g., Ali Dhu al-Fiqar and Said Dhu al-Fiqar were father and son, while Muhammad Zaki was the uncle of Mustafa Fahmi, which illustrates still another means by which positions of leadership were acquired within the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy. Most of the ministers are said by their biographers to have spoken or at least studied Turkish, including Yusuf Saba and Said Dhu al-Fiqar who did not attain the post until shortly before the First World War. Finally, nearly all held numerous other administrative posts during a lifetime of government service, and seven eventually rose to the office of Prime Minister. These then represent a few of the patterns associated with members of Egypt's administrative establishment during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Other regularities may perhaps be better illustrated by a closer look at the career of one of the ministers.

Although Mahmud Fakhri was not as eminent a figure as several other ministers of finance, the recurrence of his family name over several generations in the service of Egypt's administrative establishment, as well as his training and career, lend themselves to the types of patterns with which we are presently concerned. Ja'far Agha, the grandfather of Mahmud Fakhri, was a Circassian by origin and a soldier by profession. Having participated with distinction in Muhammad Ali's first Syrian campaign, he rose through the ranks of the army until obtaining the rank of liwa--as well as the laqab Sadiq ("Reliable"). In 1842 he, like many of the officers of his time, was appointed to a post in the administrative service, first as "mufattish" or inspector of a chiflik and later

as mudir of several provinces. Eventually he became Muhafiz of Suez and in 1879 President of the Majlis al-Ahkam. His son, Husayn Fakhri, was born in Cairo in 1845 and as befitted the child of a prominent Turkish official, entered government service immediately upon completing his formal education--first as a ma'mur (assistant) in the Muhafiz of Cairo and later as an employee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His work in the latter carried him to Paris where he took up the study of law, and upon his return to Cairo he was given a post in the Ministry of Justice through which he advanced until appointed Minister of Justice in 1879. With the outbreak of the 'Urabi revolt Husayn Pasha resigned his position and remained aloof from the political arena until once again heading the Ministry of Justice in the Sharif Cabinet of 1882. Between then and his retirement in 1908 he held ministerial posts in four different governments, and in the latter year was mentioned by Gorst as a likely successor to Mustafa Fahmi as Prime Minister. Significantly enough the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, felt that the appointment of Butrus Ghali who was a "pure Egyptian" would be more popular than that of a "Circassian".[7] Yet as a Turco-Egyptian and a successful minister, Husayn Fakhri was a suitable suitor for Fawqiyah, the daughter of Prince (later King) Fuad I, and she bore him a son whom they named Mahmud. Unlike his grandfather who had been reared in the military, or his father who had studied in government schools and abroad, Mahmud was educated in a Jesuit school and later entered the Law Faculty of Cairo. Several years after graduating, he was appointed Lord Chamberlain by Sultan Husayn Kamil, and from there moved on to other government posts before becoming Minister of Finance in 1920.

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[7]Gorst to Grey, Nov. 10, 1908, FO 37/452.

The 19th century was a time of change for Egyptian society, and as we will shortly see, many of the indices that we have chosen to identify the Turco-Egyptian underwent modification. Thus like many who came to Egypt during the reign of Muhammad Ali, Ja'far Sadiq held positions both in the army and the civil administration, for at that time the functions of the two frequently overlapped while a scarcity of trained personnel meant that the government was forced to rely on a relatively small number of officials to fulfill the needs of the state. In later years, however, there developed a separation of functions as study abroad or in foreign schools in Egypt meant increased numbers of officials as well as increased specialization. Nevertheless, throughout the century one of the commonest phrases to appear in the biographies of prominent members of the Turkish community was, "He spent most of his life in government service."

On the provincial level the administrative hierarchy was subject to the reshaping and reorganization that characterized the development of most institutions during the early years of Muhammad Ali's rule. Yet, by the mid-1820's it was clear that the success of Egypt's expanding commitments would depend to a large degree on a more efficient use of the human and economic resources of the interior. The decision to establish an army composed of Egyptian recruits had tied ever-increasing manpower needs to the regular conscription of Egyptian fellahin, while the multiplying expenditures of the state necessitated maximum efficiency in agricultural production and the collection of taxes. To meet these demands a system of provincial administration was adopted in 1824 which, although subservient to the overall control of a centralized authority,

created a hierarchy of administrative personnel with the power to ensure close local supervision.

Administrative Unit	Official
Mudiriyah	Mudir
Ma'muriyah	Ma'mur
Qism	Nazir
Khutt	Hakim al-Khutt
Nahiyah	Qa'immaqam
Village	Shaykh al-balad

Although the units of government outlined above were occasionally altered,[8] the basic structure--as well as the basic functions and procedures of the various officials--remained constant throughout the rest of the century. But if the structure of provincial government remained the same, its composition did not, and it is the influence of various social groups within this structure rather than the structure itself with which we are primarily concerned.

From the evidence available it is clear that in 1826 provincial officials from Mudir to Hakim al-Khutt were selected almost exclusively from among members of the Turkish community, which also provided at least a majority of the Qa'immaqams. Whether this dependence on the Turk is to be explained by the absence of qualified personnel among indigenous Egyptians (a majority of whom were unable to speak the

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[8] It was not until 1826 that the Mudiriyah was added as the highest unit of local government and some years later that the Muhafizah or special city governorship was created. Similarly, the number of departments in each category was subject to expansion or contraction. Thus while in 1826 the number of qisms was reported to have been twenty-four, there were more than sixty by 1840. Mengin, Histoire Sommaire de l'Égypte, p. 263; Campbell to Palmerston, "Report on Egypt", July 6, 1840, FO 78/408B.

language of the administration), an attempt on the part of Muhammad Ali to strengthen his position by the establishment of an administrative hierarchy composed entirely of Turks, or merely because of the belief that work requiring energy and intelligence could not be entrusted to Egyptians, there is little doubt that the policy itself promoted the prestige and influence of the Turkish element. For over fifty years Turks were to play a major role in the political life of the provincial regions, and this, coupled with increased participation in its economic life and continued influence in the military, resulted in the consolidation of the various types of power required of any group desirous of converting itself from a coterie of assistants dependent upon the good will of the ruler to a dominant class with its own sources of power. However, the history of provincial administration during most of these years was not characterized solely by expanding influence on the part of the Turks. Within a relatively short time their monopoly over local administration was broken by the actions of Muhammad Ali himself, and for the remainder of the century their influence as measured in terms of the number of provincial offices held underwent an uneven but gradual transformation.

As early as 1826 the British Consul-General reported with some alarm that the viceroy was being encouraged to dismiss his Turkish Qa'immaqams and Kashifs (Nazirs) and replace them with village shaykhs.[9] Although the suggestion was not adopted at the time, it was only seven years later that the first "awlad al-Arab" were appointed to the position of Nazir al-Qism.[10] During a tour of the Delta in 1833,

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[9]Salt to Planta, April 4, 1826, FO 78/147.

[10]Mubarak, XIV, 38.

Muhammad Ali realized that the system of provincial government was once again in need of reform, and upon his return to Cairo he outlined to a gathering of shaykhs a plan by which Turkish authorities were to be replaced by indigenous Egyptians who would thenceforth communicate directly with the viceroy without the interference of "foreign" intermediaries.[11] As explained several years later by Clot Bey, the change was undertaken for the following reason. "Ce qui a porté le viceroi à confier à des Arabes cette fonction, c'est qu'il a pensé que des hommes qui connaissent bien le pays et l'agriculture, qui, mieux que personne, peuvent apprécier la position, les besoins et les ressources de leur compatriotes, administreraient avec plus de sagesse, de sureté et de justice que des étrangers imbus quelquefois de préventions de race."[12] Expressed in somewhat less diplomatic terms, the move was undoubtedly undertaken to eliminate the corruption that prevailed under many of the Turkish officials and thereby increase the revenue of the central government. In any event, Egyptians were soon being appointed to the office of Ma'mur as well as Nazir al-Qism, but unfortunately the change did little to increase revenue and nothing to alleviate the hardships of the fellahin. Nearly every contemporary observer (e.g., Lane, Hamont, Bowring, Colonel Duhamel and Clot Bey himself) reported that the Egyptian shaykh, who knew from experience every "dodge and stratagem" used by the fellah to avoid the payment of taxes, was far more ruthless than the Turk who despite his penchant for extortion retained at least a semblance of dignity in his relations with the fellahin.[13] Thus it

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[11]Campbell to Palmerston, June 13, 1833, FO 78/227; Campbell to Palmerston, October 26, 1833, FO 78/228; Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte, p. 140.

[12]Clot Bey, II, 174.

[13]Ibid.; Lane, pp. 129, 293; Cattaui, II, Part II, 372.

was not long before the Pasha's enthusiasm waned and the promotion of Egyptians to provincial posts slackened. Eventually such appointments stopped almost completely and once again the positions of Ma'mur, Nazir and Hakim became the prerogative of the Turks while Egyptians held sway as village shaykhs.

A similar policy prevailed during the reign of Abbas for although he was suspicious of many of the members of the Muhammad Ali family and their Turkish supporters, it was nevertheless to the Turk--and especially the Circassian and Mamluk--that he turned to fill a majority of the provincial positions.[14] This did not, however, condition the policy of his successor, for under Said the fortunes of the Egyptian were revitalized, and thereafter his rise in provincial government was not to be reversed.

The first and most significant step stemmed from the year 1856 when orders similar to that cited below were issued to the Mudirs of all provinces. Their importance to the Egyptian is self-evident, for even when shorn of official rhetoric they committed the government to a policy of promoting the interests of Egypt's indigenous population. To the historian they also demonstrate how completely the reforms adopted by Muhammad Ali in 1833 had been abandoned during the latter part of his reign and that of his successor, Abbas I.

> It occurred to us to appoint a number of Arab umdahs who had shown themselves reliable in religious and civil matters to the position of Hakim in the Mudiriyahs together with Turks, and this on a trial basis in order that they might demonstrate whether or not they possessed the desired personal qualities. In this manner it could be established by clear proof if their promotion should be undertaken.

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[14] Bruce to Clarendon, August 13, 1854, FO 78/1036.

> We began the test with the appointment of two umdahs from the Mudiriyah of al-Minya and Bani Mazar as Nazir al-Qism.[15] We also ordered the Mudir of the above mentioned region to appoint a number of umdahs as Hakims al-Khutt. It is now our wish to extend this to the remaining regions. For this reason we have issued decrees to all Mudirs, and to you, to select from among experienced Arab umdahs characterized by integrity and diplomacy those suitable for advancement to government positions, and to assign them as one-third of the Nazirs in your province; that is, so that two Nazirs shall be Turks to every one Arab, while among the Hakims al-Khutt there shall be three Turks to every one Arab. Prior to their appointment you will submit to us a list of their names, villages, qisms and khutts so that with the approval of their appointment they may be advised that if they pursue an honest course and direct all of their efforts toward achieving results in accordance with our desire for complete welfare and justice among the people, the cessation of complaints, and immediate action upon them, they will truly merit the honor which they shall receive which is pride in the advancement to be granted to all others like them.[16]

That this decree was almost immediately implemented may be gathered from still another order directed two weeks later to the Mudir of Daqahliyah containing the names of five umdahs to be promoted to the office of Nazir al-Qism and seven to the office of Hakim al-Khutt.[17] Shortly thereafter, the break with tradition was made complete by the appointment of Egyptians to the position of Mudir, including among the first Hasan Shuray'i as Mudir of Daqahliyah in 1858, and Muhammad Sultan Bey as Mudir of Bani Suef in 1860.[18]

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[15]Hasan Efendi Shuray'i as Nasir of Qalwisna and Muhammad Sultan who succeeded him as Nazir of the same qism shortly thereafter. Sami, III, Part I, 185-86; Mujahid, I, 157-58.

[16]Sami, III, Part I, 189.

[17]Ibid., pp. 192-193.

[18]Ibid., pp. 234, 333. Assuming that the dates given by Amin Sami are correct, the first such promotion--that of al-Sayyid Abaza as Mudir of Buhayrah--actually preceded (by several months) the decree cited on the previous page. Ibid., p. 130.

Although the foundations for Egyptian participation in all categories of provincial administration were laid during the rule of Said, the actual number of those participating was small, and it was not until the rule of Ismail who succeeded his uncle in 1863 that the number was large enough to give the Egyptian a significant voice in provincial affairs. Indeed, from that year onward their promotion moved so rapidly that by 1869 Egyptians held the office of Mudir in a majority of the provinces, although it is interesting to note that as yet they had not broken the monopoly held by Turks over the more important office of Muhafiz.[19]

Although numerous factors contributed to this sudden increase, perhaps the most immediate must be attributed to the actions of a singularly unusual figure in modern Egyptian history, Ismail Pasha Siddiq. A fellah by birth, Ismail rose with unprecedented speed to the position of "Mufattish" or inspector general of Lower Egypt in 1866, and Minister of Finance as well as Mufattish of Upper and Lower Egypt in 1868.[20] To contemporary Europeans his name stood for corruption and economic irresponsibility, for not only did he acquire great personal wealth during his years of government service, but it was he who arranged for some of the largest loans from Ismail's European creditors and instigated the ill-fated Muqabala Law of 1871. To the contemporary Egyptians, however, he stood for something quite different. As will be shown, the Muqabala Law was extremely beneficial to wealthy landowners, Egyptian as well as Turkish. Furthermore, as the man to whom "every Mudir and deputy Mudir, Muhafiz and deputy Muhafiz, Ma'mur and Nazir al-Qism

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[19]See the periodic lists of appointments to government positions given in Sami, III, Parts I, II, and III, as well as the complete list of the Muhafizes of Cairo in al-Muqtataf, July, 1920, pp. 44-45.

[20]For a detailed chronology of Ismail Siddiq's rise to power, see Sami, III, Part III, 1450-51.

was subservient," it was under Siddiq's patronage that favoritism was shown to Egyptians rather than Turks in obtaining provincial offices--as long as the proper price was paid.[21] As reported by Amin Sami, this could amount to from two to three thousand Egyptian pounds for a Mudir, one to one-and-a-half thousand pounds for a deputy Mudir, five hundred to seven hundred and fifty pounds for a Nazir, etc.[22] Nevertheless, his preference for Egyptians was pronounced and by 1869 they filled a large majority of the above-mentioned posts, a percentage that was to drop considerably following his "accidental" death in 1876.[23] Thus among those appointed to the post of Mudir in 1879, no more than one or two were of Egyptian origin. It is not surprising, then, that Ahmad 'Urabi and his associates regarded Siddiq as a champion of Egyptian rights, and attributed his downfall to the enmity he created among members of the Turkish community.[24]

The explanation for the increase of Egyptian influence in provincial government cannot, however, be attributed solely to the patronage of

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[21] Ibid., p. 1452.

[22] Ibid.,

[23] It was undoubtedly the unusually large number of promotions made under Siddiq that prompted James McCoan, whose history of modern Egypt was first published in 1877, to state that "Egyptians have supplanted Turks in almost every branch of the administration", and that the Turks "were of little either social or political influence." McCoan, p. 47. D. M. Wallace, whose study was published in 1883, was able to give a more balanced account by indicating that although there was a steadily increasing number of Egyptians involved in provincial government, the Turkish element continued to provide a significant proportion. Wallace, pp. 147-153.

[24] Malet to Granville, Cairo, Nov. 7, 1881, FO 78/3326, containing a memorandum from Colvin on a talk with Ahmad 'Urabi.

Ismail Siddiq. For a clear understanding of the events outlined in the preceding pages, more needs to be said about still other contributing factors. Although there is some disagreement concerning the extent to which either Said or Ismail promoted the advancement of Egyptians, there is considerably more scepticism attached to the motives of Ismail than to those of Said, the latter generally being credited with at least some feeling of identity with the Egyptian while the former is not. Indicative of this attitude is the tale told about Ismail in which, following a state function attended by numerous Mudirs, the Khedive is said to have remarked with some sarcasm, "I'm delighted to see that most of the Mudirs have the brown skin of pure Egyptians.", to which Ali Mubarak replied, "I am Egyptian like them and brown like them, but I also know how to read and write."[25] While the voice of Ismail apparently indicated reservations about the large number of Egyptians being appointed to high government positions, the words of Ali Mubarak reflected a concern for the many who were able to achieve such status without meeting even the literacy requirements established by Muhammad Ali. Said, on the other hand, seems to have been on much better terms with the non-Turkish community. We find frequent referrals to the mutual esteem existing between Said and Ahmad 'Urabi, a relationship that led to the latter's promotion in rank and appointment as Said's aide-de-camp. A similar relationship is said to have existed between the viceroy and Hasan al-Shuray'i, the first Egyptian to be appointed to the office of Nazir al-Qism in accordance with the decree of 1856. At one time al-Shuray'i was even accused by Abbas of being in league

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[25]Sami, III, Part III, 1452.

with Said to overthrow his rule.[26] But no matter what the motives of the two rulers or which did the most to benefit the Egyptian vis-a-vis the Turk, the fact remains that during the reigns of both Said and Ismail a class of Egyptians drawing on many of the same sources of power that sustained the Turks was in the process of development. The changes in provincial administration outlined in the preceding pages are of importance primarily as evidence of this gradual social transformation, for it was on the local level that the indigenous Egyptian first became a member of the political community. Although administrative positions within the provinces frequently involved more prestige than responsibility--as is inevitable in a centralized state--the advancement of Egyptians in both the administrative and military hierarchy indicates that there was an ever increasing number of Egyptians with the status, education and wealth to demand that positions hitherto reserved for Turks be opened to them.

Even in the early 19th century when the administrative services were primarily Turkish in composition, at least at the higher levels, they were by no means exclusively so. Under Muhammad Ali's program of internal centralization and external expansion there were rarely enough capable officials to fill the needs of the state. As a result, members of Egypt's many non-Muslim communities were frequently able to rise to positions of considerable importance, while at lower administrative levels they were employed in even greater numbers. Among the several communities involved, it was generally Armenians who attained the highest ranks and the greatest influence. Indeed several contemporaries of

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[26]Mujahid, III, 26; Zakhurah, II, 258-59.

Muhammad Ali spoke of an "Armenian Party" that competed for influence within the Pasha's court.[27] Yet at most the "party" could only have consisted of a handful of men, while its power undoubtedly amounted to little more than the personal influence of Boghus Pasha, who as Muhammad Ali's chief interpreter and later Minister of Commerce and Foreign Affairs was for over thirty years probably closer to the Pasha than any other of his contemporaries. Names such as Artin Efendi Sikyas, Estefan Pasha, Hekekyan Pasha, Nubar Pasha and Tigrane Pasha indicate the continued importance of Armenians within the administrative hierarchy throughout the 19th century, yet they like Boghus undoubtedly achieved their influence through personal merit and favoritism rather than as representatives of a powerful minority group.

It was not until later in the century that individual members of a second non-Muslim community, the Copts, began to achieve political influence equivalent to that of Armenians,[28] yet from the very beginning of Muhammad Ali's rule they seem to have held a monopoly over several important administrative functions at the lower levels. Thus most of the routine financial activities of the government were carried out by members of the Coptic community, while as scribes they were ubiquitous figures throughout the judicial system. As Sir John Bowring wrote in 1839, "They are the surveyors, the scribes, the arithmeticians, the measurers, the clerks--they are to the counting house and the pen what the fellah is to the field and the plough."[29]

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[27]Cattaui, II, Part II, 267-68.

[28]Probably the first Copt to hold a ministerial post was Butrus Ghali who in 1893 became Minister of Finance.

[29]John Bowring, "Report on Egypt and Candia", Parliamentary Papers (Commons), XXI, (1840).

Opportunities in government service were also open to Syrians and Jews, while nearly the whole of the retail trade was run by members of these and other minority groups. But if the administrative and commercial classes included many non-Muslim elements, they were never really absorbed into the inner core of the ruling aristocracy. As we have previously noted, the Turks constituted an entity primarily in the sense of sharing similar cultural traditions and performing specific social functions. As separate and somewhat isolated communities that assiduously cultivated their own social and cultural traditions, the Armenians and Copts rarely possessed the cultural prerequisites for membership in the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy. Neither by religion nor language did the Armenians resemble the Turks, while many of the social traits of the Copts were closer to those of Egyptian society than to those of the ruling aristocracy. Indeed both Armenians and Copts maintained their own educational systems through which they cultivated their cultural traditions. Thus it was the Armenians who established the first private schools to be set up during the rule of Muhammad Ali, while the unusual attention given to arithmetic and book-keeping in the Coptic schools undoubtedly gave them an edge over others as financial officials. Moreover, there were certain functions carried out by the Turks in which the role of non-Muslims was almost non-existent. Thus although Armenians and Copts frequently rose to high administrative positions, they rarely rendered equivalent functions (or acquired equivalent positions) in the army, which was one of the primary sources of Turco-Egyptian influence. Finally, and perhaps most important, as non-Muslims neither the Armenians nor Copts were accorded the respect given to the Turks, for it was the tradition in Egypt as well as in

other Near Eastern countries that none but Muslims be recognized as full members of the national community. Even as the secular egalitarian ideas of the French began to gain influence among Egyptian nationalists, the suspicion that minority groups might support the western powers frequently deprived non-Muslims of recognition as full members of the Egyptian community.

As we have indicated, it was the Turks who most effectively used the institutions of autocratic despotism, i.e., the army, the bureaucracy, etc., to exercise and bolster their influence. For although under Muhammad Ali and his immediate successors Egypt was a country in which personal rule was paramount, at no time during the early 19th century was the autocratic system of government so strong as to prevent all other forms of political influence from exerting themselves. At a somewhat later date the Khedive's power was further checked by increased foreign financial intervention, foreign diplomatic supervision and finally by foreign political control, the last of which provided a continued if limited umbrella of protection for Turco-Egyptian interests. But contact with the West also led to the gradual adoption of Western patterns of government, e.g., parliamentary institutions and political parties, and it was through these that still another element of the Egyptian population was able to exert administrative and political influence. For over the years it was a new socio-economic elite comprised primarily of Egyptian notables that used the institutions of representative government to undermine and displace the power of both the Turkish aristocracy and the Khedive.

Under Muhammad Ali the formal work of the administration was carried out by one or more deliberative councils as well as by bureaucratic departments. By 1824-25 two principal councils had been established, al-Majlis al-'Ali al-Malaki for civil affairs and the Majlis al-Jihadiyah for military affairs. Whereas these institutions were little more than administrative councils whose members were responsible to no one but the Pasha, in 1829 a somewhat larger and more representative body called the Majlis al-Mashwara was established. Although it too had only consultative functions and delegates were appointed by the Pasha, its membership included ninety-nine village notables as well as thirty-three high ranking state officials and Ulema and twenty-four provincial officials. It was the former, or village notables, who represented the first group of indigenous Egyptians to subject the Khedive to pressures from outside the dynastic and aristocratic framework.

After the death of Muhammad Ali the Majlis al-Mashwara was no longer convened and it was not until 1866 that this inchoate national assembly was revived by Ismail under the name Majlis Shura al-Nuwwab. Like its predecessor, it had no legislative powers. Rather it assembled once a year to consider and advise on proposed fiscal changes, new public works and other administrative matters. Balloting was indirect, i.e., the general public chose electors who in turn elected the members of the Assembly. The delegates, however, were restricted by statute to men who had been born in Egypt and were in no way connected with either the army or the civil administration. Consequently a majority represented neither the Turks--the most important of whom could not meet the conditions

of eligibility--nor the fellahin, but rather the umdahs and shaykhs who were the most significant landed proprietors among the purely Egyptian population.[30]

Although over the years the growing self-assertion of the assembly was spearheaded by a relative handful of its members, the decisions of the assembly on certain key issues indicate a unanimity of interests on matters of basic importance. As might be expected, a great many of these stemmed from Egypt's perennial financial problems and the Khedive's persistent demands for additional funds with which to modernize the country. By 1871 conditions had reached the point where Ismail was willing to grant absolute property rights and exemption from one-half of all future land tax levies to those paying six years taxes in advance. Despite the difficulties of meeting such payments, the long term advantages to the propertied class were obvious. But for the purposes of this study, the ability of the assembly in 1874 to prevent the Khedive from repealing this ill-famed Muqabala law was even more important than his acceptance of it three years earlier, for by this action it was demonstrated that the assembly provided the Egyptians with an institution through which they could channel sufficient influence to affect legislative decisions.

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[30]The composition of this new indigenous elite as well as its influence over legislative decision has been emphasized by Abu-Lughod, op.cit., pp. 339-342. Although the contributions of his study are considerable, I cannot help but feel that like many original scholars, Abu-Lughod has gone too far. In his desire to equate the "critical decade" preceding the 'Urabi revolt with a "fused generation" of Turks and Egyptians, he has equated an identity of interests with assimilation. The Turkish element, although gradually disappearing, still neither wholly accepted nor was wholly accepted by the Egyptian community. Thus although both the Turks and the Egyptian notables sought power through constitutional reform, it is still too early to speak of the "obliteration of the ethnic factor as a significant variable in [Egypt's] social and political life." Ibid., p. 331.

Thereafter the delegates' demands for an enlargement of their powers increased with each passing year. On one occasion Mahmud al-Attar and Abd al-Salam al-Muwailihi, two of the most militant leaders, asserted that no matter concerning the people of Egypt should be undertaken without prior consultation with the Assembly.[31] It is not surprising, then, that these demands were eventually coupled with those of the intellectuals for a new constitution enlarging the powers of the Assembly and legitimizing its influence over the executive. In May, 1879, the Prime Minister and recognized leader of the constitutionalists, Muhammad Sharif, presented a plan encompassing a more powerful assembly and new electoral laws . Although with the deposition of Ismail the proposal was temporarily shelved, the plan was later resubmitted to the new Khedive Tawfiq. When Sharif pressed for its promulgation Tawfiq procrastinated, probably in hopes of first obtaining the support of the British and French. Soon thereafter the Prime Minister resigned and the more conservative Riaz Pasha was called upon to form a ministry. During the nearly two years that Riaz headed the government (Sept. 21, 1879 to Sept. 13, 1881), the constitutionalists, the army and the new Egyptian elite joined still closer in the fight against the arbitrary powers of the Khedive. But if they demonstrated a community of aims, each nevertheless looked upon the constitution as an institutional device through which to further their own interests. As described in chapter two, the dominant role fell more and more into the hands of the army, especially as the struggle with the Khedive moved inexorably toward conflict with the European powers. On September 9, 1881, the army succeeded in ousting the Riaz

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[31]Jacob Landau, Parties and Parliaments in Egypt, 1866-1924 (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 24.

Ministry. Sharif was once again appointed Prime Minister and a new assembly was convened. But Sharif like most of the Turco-Egyptians was unwilling to go along either with the sweeping powers demanded by the Assembly--which would have rendered his Ministry responsible to that body--or the militancy of the army. On February 3, 1882, Sami al-Barudi was named to head a new government with the army as his principal support. Within a week the Khedive had granted a new constitution, but by then agitation had turned to military dictation and the Assembly like the army was to be deprived of its newly won powers following the British occupation. As a result, political activity in post-revolutionary Egypt was to shift from the Legislative Council and General Assembly that were created by the British and whose powers were greatly curtailed by them, to political formations generally referred to as parties.

Because during the early part of the 19th century independent political and economic power was limited, individual status and influence were generally determined by proximity to the ruler. Consequently the underlying cause for division was more often personal ambition than ideology or a rivalry of political and economic formations. It is difficult, however, to analyze the nuances of infighting between individuals and cliques competing for political favor, and thus our discussion of political formations prior to the British occupation will be directed primarily toward a few of the trends that set the stage for the later development of political parties.

Throughout much of the 19th century divisions occurred between those favorable and those inimical to foreign influence. Thus under Muhammad Ali, one clique consisted primarily of mission students who,

because of their youth and European education, were regarded with suspicion by older members of the aristocracy. The most serious repercussions seem to have occurred in 1836 when a group of mission students sought to establish a Council of Public Instruction distinct from the Diwan al-Jihadiyah which until that time had held the primary responsibility for public education. When the Diwan al-Madaris was established the following year, it was looked upon by members of other Diwans as a rallying point for ideas and men that might threaten their advancement and rival their influence.[32] A second "party" contending for the favor and confidence of the Pasha was composed of Turks who followed Ibrahim Pasha and had been placed in their positions through his influence. As might be expected, such factions were to grow up around nearly all potential successors to the vice-regency. Abbas was continually concerned about those he suspected of seeking to overthrow his rule, while Professor Landau has suggested that Prince Halim, the oldest surviving member of the Muhammad Ali family in the 1870's, hoped to succeed Ismail through association with the "National Party", that group of notables, Turks and army officers seeking constitutional reforms prior to the 'Urabi revolt.[33]

Yet despite these and other divisions, the Turks had a consciousness of an overriding unity. Thus in addition to being described as a "caste", "coterie", "class", "oligarchy" and "aristocracy", it is not surprising that they were also occasionally referred to as a "party".[34] But the

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[32]Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 169, 192, 227; Hamont, II, 195.

[33]Landau, pp. 77-78.

[34]See for example, Malet to Granville, Sept. 21, 1881, FO 78/3324; Cartwright to Granville, June 20, 1882, FO 78/3438; Cromer to Rosebery, Dec. 18, 1892, FO 78/4453.

so-called "Turkish party" was never really a political formation, for the Turks failed to channel their power and unity into an organized political force. Perhaps a more accurate term for the feeling of unity among Turco-Egyptians is conveyed by the expression "Khedival party", for it indicates that in the long run the interests of the Turks were best served by a strong sovereign, and indeed there were few occasions when they attempted to revolt against his leadership. Only the Mamluks and Albanians in the early part of the century were disposed of as potential military rivals. As the Turks strengthened their own areas of influence they undoubtedly hoped to shift additional power from Khedive to aristocracy, yet they at no time wanted that institution to fall. Perhaps their greatest weakness was that they had no real ideological identification by which to rationalize their power and position. By the time of the 'Urabi revolt theirs was a politics of defense, i.e., the politics of a people primarily interested in retaining privileges and positions that were fast slipping away. And even this goal, although undoubtedly felt, was not always vigorously pursued. Undoubtedly the closest we get to an image of the world some Turks, at least, may have desired is in the works of Wali al-Din Yeghen who wrote at the turn of the century.[35] But in calling for identification with Ottoman culture and the Ottoman Sultan in a time of growing Egyptian nationalism, he failed to appeal to a minority which although not totally submerged into Egyptian society was more closely attached to Egypt than to the land of their forefathers.

Following the 'Urabi revolt, those Turks who had not been assimilated were too isolated to establish a party that would win support among a

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[35] See Chapter 7, pages 169-171 for a more thorough discussion of Wali al-Din's thoughts and writings.

gradually awakening electorate. As Egyptians they appealed to the populace as patriots seeking Egyptian independence, but because of their conservative interests and backgrounds they sought it in co-operation with the British. Thus at most they only succeeded in splintering the edges of the more extreme nationalist element of its moderate members. Among the parties that members of the Turco-Egyptian element helped to establish were the Party of Constitutional Reform, founded in 1907 by Shaykh Ali Yusuf; the Party of Notables, formed in 1908 by members who broke with Mustafa Kamil's al-Hizb al-Watani; and Adli Yeghen's "Liberal Constitutional Party", composed primarily of men who broke with the Wafd in 1922. These and other moderate parties, all of which evoked some support from among Egypt's indigenous population as well as from those of Turkish descent, in general supported the Khedive's authority and urged co-operation with the British. But none were parties of real consequence or longevity. Prior to World War I the Hizb al-Watani of Mustafa Kamil was the only "party" to attract considerable public attention, while the Wafd of Sa'd Zaghlul was the first political formation to actually function as a political party, and like al-Hizb al-Watani its goals were too extreme for such stalwarts of the Turco-Egyptian community as Ismail Sidqi Pasha.

But if on the administrative and political levels Turks and Egyptians were clearly divided for much of the 19th century, this did not mean that the two were completely isolated from one another or that the Turks monopolized all functions of state and society. Both Turks and Egyptians professed the Islamic religion, and for the most part the latter retained the positions in the religious hierarchy that they had

occupied under Mamluk control. Mamluk resentment against Turkish qadis representing Ottoman interests had led to the appointment of a considerable number of judges from among the Ulema of Egypt, especially during the latter part of the 18th century.[36] Neither the French, who relied on the Ulema to implement their interests, nor Muhammad Ali, who like the Mamluks was opposed to Ottoman power in Egypt, impeded the trend. Consequently even under Muhammad Ali a majority of the qadis in the towns and villages outside of Cairo were native Egyptians rather than Ottoman Turks.[37] Yet by incorporating the major religious institutions into the monolithic structure of the state, Muhammad Ali brought within the confines of bureaucratic control the one group of Egyptians that may have been capable of exerting independent power. Nearly all Waqf funds and properties were confiscated and put in the hands of government departments, thereby making religious institutions economically dependent upon the state. Nevertheless, a few of the symbols and instruments of Ottoman religious authority did remain intact. Justice continued to be administered in the name of the Sultan, and every year a new Grand Qadi arrived from Constantinople where he had received his appointment.[38] Usually neither he nor his deputy had any knowledge of Arabic, their main qualification being that they were Osmanlis of the Hanafite school. It was not until the rule of Said that the viceroy--rather than the Grand Qadi--officially acquired the right to appoint his own judges, a concession that gave to the Muhammad Ali dynasty still greater control over religious

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[36]Husayn Afandi, Ottoman Egypt in the Age of the French Revolution, ed. and trans. Stanford Shaw (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 28-29, 98-99.

[37]Lane, p. 121.

[38]The father of Muhammad Sharif, Prime Minister on three separate occasions under Ismail and Tawfiq, arrived in Cairo in this capacity.

institutions. Thereafter Egyptians were selected as qadis in large urban areas as well as in the villages. A further development resulting from this concession was that many qadis changed from the Malikite and Shafi'ite schools, to which a majority of Egyptians belonged, to the Hanifite rite, for with increased numbers of Egyptians being selected as judges it was advantageous to be a member of the official rite. Further concessions granted to Ismail, including the right to nominate the Grand Qadi, gave the Khedive complete control over appointments, and meant that judgeships were now given almost entirely to local Egyptians.[39] It is not surprising, then, that by 1880 a committee formed to look into the educational needs of the country recommended that the teaching of Turkish in the School of Law be discontinued since its usefulness for judicial purposes was nearly non-existent.[40]

But Muhammad Ali's control over the Egyptian Ulema was not limited to regulating charitable trusts and the appointment of qadis, for he was also responsible for undermining their traditional monopoly over the country's educational needs. Whereas mosque schools and village kuttabs had for centuries comprised the primary educational facilities of the country, under Muhammad Ali far less funds were made available for religious instruction. Moreover, by occasionally drawing on mosque schools for military recruitment, he frightened many students away from village kuttabs which they now regarded as being connected with military conscription.[41] It was not until the time of Ismail that mosque schools began to recover, but even then they were unable to regain the position

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[39] Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. 46), Cmd. 3529, Feb. 6, 1883.

[40] Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 433-35.

[41] Ibid., p. 153.

they had once held within the educational framework. With the establishment of state schools and--even more important--the adoption of Western methods of education and thought, Muhammad Ali had introduced Egypt to a much improved quality of education, and in the long run it was western influences rather than the control and regulation of waqfs and justice that caused the permanent decline in the power and influence of the Egyptian Ulema.

Finally even al-Azhar, which by tradition was under a member of the Shafi'ite school, was from the early 19th century onward filled by appointment rather than by election. Since the Pasha chose men who were generally favorable to his innovations, his task of working independently of the Ulema was still further eased. In conjunction with this it is interesting to note that in 1881 a Hanafite, Shaykh al-Abbasi, who at the time was head of al-Azhar, was forced to resign in favor of Shaykh al-Inbali, an Ulema of the Shafi'ite school. Although the latter appears to have been well qualified for the post, it has been suggested that the pressure to remove al-Abbasi arose as much from political as religious considerations. According to the British Consul-General, who perhaps exaggerated the anti-Turk aspect of the 'Urabi revolt, the agitation among the Ulema for the removal of al-Abbasi was undertaken in full understanding with 'Urabi and with the object of obtaining a Shaykh al-Azhar who "belonged to the rite of the Arabs rather than to the rite of the Turk."[42]

It would seem reasonable to conclude from this brief outline that for much of the 19th century Egypt's religious hierarchy, although far from being in league with the ruling element, was left without the independent sources of wealth and power with which to challenge

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[42]Malet to Granville, Dec. 12, 1881, FO 78/3326.

bureaucratic rule. Even though by the time of the British occupation nearly all positions within the religious hierarchy were held by native Egyptians--as was the case to a somewhat lesser extent in most administrative levels--it was in the various national assemblies and later the political parties that Egyptians were first able to exert the influence they were acquiring as an administrative, military and landed class in their own right. The evolution of this class was a discontinuous process, with sudden lapses into stagnation. Yet as shown in our study of the administrative and legislative process, it was one of the chief phenomena of 19th-century Egypt.

CHAPTER V

THE TURKS AS AN ECONOMIC ENTITY

There are two questions with which we shall be primarily concerned in this part of our study. Did the Turks of Egypt have a distinct economic identity? If so, what was the relationship between this identity and their political and social status?

Whether economic historians answer the first of these questions affirmatively or not, we need only go back as far as 1952 to discover the answer of contemporary Egyptians. The image of Muhammad Ali, his descendants and close followers as alien landowners who unlawfully appropriated property belonging to the Egyptian people was frequently evoked in justification of the land reform program initiated by Gamal Abdul Nasser soon after his rise to power. In November, 1953, an article in the newspaper al-Ahram stated:

> Muhammad Ali, his children, his grandchildren and the other members of his family humiliated the Egyptian people, robbed them of their lands, property and wealth, squandered their resources, and left them to endure poverty, hunger, sickness and ignorance after making Egypt a private estate, her people their serfs, and her resources their produce. Then God sent to the Egyptians revolutionaries from among their own people who sensed their feelings, gave expression to their sentiments and rescued them from their oppressors.[1]

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[1] al-Ahram, November 21, 1953, p. 6.

In order to understand these and similar charges we must review economic developments in Egypt from the beginning of the 19th century, concentrating on the events most closely related to the economic activities of the Turks. In so doing, we shall be concerned primarily with property and its ownership, for until recent times it was the tradition in Egypt for economic power to derive from control of land. Social and political power, in turn, generally reflected both the form and extent of this control.

As has been noted in previous chapters, the characteristic feature of the Turkish element in the early part of the 19th century was not wealth or property ownership, but control of the military forces and the administration. Indeed the economic policies pursued by Muhammad Ali during the first two to three decades of his rule indicate that he had no intention of allowing the incipient Turkish aristocracy to become a propertied class.[2] The reasons for this decision were undoubtedly numerous, but two seem to have dominated. First, land had always been Egypt's chief source of production and wealth, and in order to achieve his ambitious objectives Muhammad Ali needed to insure that all revenues derived from agriculture were channeled into expanding state expenditures rather than toward the formation of private estates. Secondly, the long history of feuding Mamluk beys made powerful by immense land holdings undoubtedly forewarned the Pasha of the dangers

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[2] A few observers have felt that Muhammad Ali did actually seek to establish a Turkish landed aristocracy, perhaps to induce the Turks to identify themselves more closely with Egypt and the Pasha's government. See, for example, Yaqub Artin, The Right of Landed Property in Egypt, trans. E.W. van Dyck (London: Wyman, 1885), pp. 96-97; Wallace, 214. Others, who have made more extensive studies of Muhammad Ali's land policies, indicate that this was not the case. Rivlin, pp. 60-61; Baer, p. 45.

involved in establishing still another semi-feudal aristocracy with the power to challenge the central state. Consequently, with the completion of the cadastre of 1812-1814, the tax farms (multizams) that had developed in Egypt since the 16th century were not handed over to Muhammad Ali's Turkish supporters but abolished and the land put under direct state control. Subsequently much of the land in Lower Egypt was divided into fixed plots of from three to five feddans and alloted to peasants in what amounted to permanent inheritable leaseholds. Although by law the cultivator had only usufruct rights and the right of inheritance did not exist, in practice the heirs of the deceased obtained the right to cultivate his land. In Upper Egypt, where floods led to seasonal variations in cultivable land, communal ownership was maintained, land being periodically redistributed among the peasants in accordance with their ability to cultivate it. Thus although it was the state that held title to almost all of Egypt's land, it was the fellah rather than the Turk who first acquired its leasehold as well as limited customary rights resembling private ownership In return, however, he had not only to pay taxes directly to the state, but deliver his agricultural produce to the government at fixed prices.

Perhaps the first steps toward the formation of the large estates that were to remain so characteristic of Egypt up to the time of the 1952 revolution were taken in 1829 when small plots of uncultivated (ab'adiyah) land were granted to private individuals, evidently in an attempt to encourage the growth of acacia and other trees along the

Mahmudiyah Canal.[3] In the years that followed more extensive ab'adiyahs were granted to followers of the Pasha, in part as a reward for service but also to increase the reclamation of still larger tracts of uncultivated land. Although the recipients generally received only usufruct rights, the land itself was exempt from taxes, for as wasteland it was not included in the ordinary land registers.

In 1836 it was decreed that ab'adiyahs might be inherited by eldest sons, while in 1842 the sale or transfer of such land was authorized by any legal means. Undoubtedly these laws coincided with a growing interest among the Turks to establish themselves as a class in the economic sense of the word, i.e., as an entity whose wealth derived from property and its transmission from generation to generation. Private ownership, however, was not yet extensive enough to form the basis of a class with the power and influence to force the hand of Muhammad Ali. Thus the laws by which ownership rights were transferred to private individuals stemmed more from political and economic considerations than from pressure on the part of the Turks. Among these were the world economic crisis of 1836 and the abandonment of land by peasants fleeing high taxes and conscription, both of which prompted Muhammad Ali to decrease government expenditures by increasing land grants and holding the recipients responsible for administering villages included within their estates. Similarly, the defeat of Muhammad Ali's plans for military expansion following the second Syrian War and the subsequent collapse of his system of monopolies turned the attention of the viceregal family

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[3] Rivlin, p. 61. For much of the material in this chapter I am indebted to the works of Gabriel Baer, Anne Rivlin and Yaqub Artin, all three of whom have made significant contributions to our knowledge of economic conditions in modern Egypt.

and influential officials to the immediate gains to be made through the accumulation of land. Most of the estates formed at this time were of two types. Some, known as chifliks, were made up of either reclaimed ab'adiyah land or state land seized from villagers unable to pay their taxes. Such estates, granted solely to members of the viceroy's family, were held in full ownership. The second type, known as 'uhdahs, frequently included entire villages in arrears and more often than not were literally forced upon reluctant officials who were obliged to pay both back and current taxes. In these instances, however, the recipients were little more than tax farmers (muta'ahhids), for estates held by such tenure were revocable and the land itself remained in cadastral registers under the name of the fellahin. Thus by the end of Muhammad Ali's reign the estates that for the next hundred years were to fill such an important role in Egypt's economic life took at least three different forms: ab'adiyahs, which by 1844 comprised approximately 723,559 feddans, chifliks, 371,000 feddans, and 'uhdahs, 1,576,559 feddans.[4] In the case of both chifliks and 'uhdahs the holdings included some of the best land in Egypt. Located almost entirely in the Delta where the transition to perennial irrigation was furthest advanced, the land was far more suitable for cotton cultivation than that of Middle and Upper Egypt where basin irrigation still predominated. When compared to the total number of feddans whose title remained in the hands of the state, the formation of private estates was still in its infancy. But the basis for their development had been laid, while the economic standing of the Turks, who at all times during this period of land redistribution were the primary beneficiaries, had been markedly strengthened.

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[4]Barnett to Aberdeen, Dec. 12, 1844, FO 78/583; Rivlin, pp. 256-257.

Unfortunately there is no detailed study of economic development in Egypt during the second half of the 19th century. Yet the evidence available would seem to indicate that Abbas, the first of his grandfather's successors, reversed at least temporarily the trend toward private ownership that characterized the last fifteen to twenty years of Muhammad Ali's rule. Although Abbas was undoubtedly more strongly attached to Ottoman Turkey than had been his predecessor, he was convinced that both his power and position were threatened by other members of the vice-royal family. Consequently much of his attention was directed toward combating conspiracies, both real and imaginary, and undoubtedly this carried over into his relations with the officials who had risen to power during the reign of Muhammad Ali. As a result, many of Abbas's most intimate associates were Mamluks and Albanians whom he thought less likely to scheme against him than other elements of the Turkish population. For the same reason he increased the number of Albanian officers in the army, while in an apparent attempt to weaken the Beys and Pashas who as large landowners and a potential landed aristocracy might also constitute a threat to his rule, he withdrew a majority of the concessions previously granted to them as 'uhdahs.[5] Yet within five years after his rise to power the new viceroy was dead, and during the relatively few years that he ruled, he was unable to alter the trends in land distribution that had started under Muhammad Ali and were to become even more firmly entrenched under Said.

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[5]Artin, The Right of Landed Property..., p. 82; Baer, p. 14; Wallace, pp. 302-303.

The most important innovations in land tenure during the reign of Said were those decreed in 1855 and 1858. In the case of the former the trend toward private ownership was not only restored but extended to cultivators of state land (kharadj) by granting male heirs the legal right to take possession of a deceased tenant's leasehold, while in 1858 the same right of succession was granted to female heirs. The 1858 law, moreover, granted absolute rights of possession to holders of kharadj land after five years regular payment of taxes, as well as to cultivators on whose land buildings or water-pumps had been erected or trees had been planted. In addition, the cultivator received all attendant rights of sale, lease and mortgage, although no provisions as yet were made for the establishment of waqfs on kharadj land or for just compensation should the land be requisitioned for public use. Nevertheless, in both 1855 and 1858 the fellah rather than the Turk was the primary beneficiary, for whereas the latter had already achieved certain rights of ownership over ab'adiyahs and chifliks, this was the first time that ownership rights were extended to cultivators of state land. What is more, Said had put an end to the tax-free status of the ab'adiyahs and chifliks by imposing a tithe (ushr) on both in 1854. It would appear, then, that the Turks were to be treated less as a privileged class, and indeed it may have been the plan of Said to limit the power of the large landowners and to encourage the development of a small peasantry.

But in the long run, the removal of the remaining restrictions on private ownership of land gave an opportunity to certain rural groups--primarily the village umdahs and shaykhs--to enrich themselves, and it was this stimulation to economic differentiation among the village

population that was to lead to the development of a "rural aristocracy". As early as 1854 we hear of large tracts of land in the possession of various wealthy shaykhs,[6] but it was not until the passage of the Muqabala Law of 1871 that much of this land was converted into private property. In that year Ismail's financial embarrassments led him to grant full official property rights to all those paying six years' taxes in advance. The extent to which indigenous Egyptians were able to take advantage of this offer is made clear by such contemporary observers as Mackenzie Wallace. Writing in 1883, he indicated that numerous village shaykhs and umdahs were known to own over 1,000 acres,[7] while at one point he stated:

> The men who can afford to give the highest price for land put to auction are neither foreigners nor the Turco-Circassian Pashas, but the native Omdehs and Sheikhs-el-beled, that is to say, the richer class of peasants. It is this class which seems destined to become in the immediate future the great land proprietors of Egypt.[8]

Wallace's evaluation concurred with that of Lord Dufferin who in the same year wrote in a dispatch to England that a majority of the large landed proprietors were "pure Egyptians".[9] Although acknowledging

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[6]See, for example, Bruce to Clarendon, June 1, 1854, FO 78/1035.

[7]Wallace, pp. 17-18, 191.

[8]Ibid., pp. 476-77.

[9]Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. 46), Cmd. 3529, Feb. 6, 1883, "Reorganization in Egypt". In the same dispatch he went on to report that "the individuals of Turkish extraction left in the country form a very small minority; they do not stand in the relation of landlords to the peasantry, a few hundred thousand feddans out of five million approximately representing the extent of their possessions." Ibid.

that a lack of information dividing the owners of land into ethnological categories made it impossible to state the exact distribution of land among the various sections of its inhabitants, Dufferin gave as a typical example an analysis of the way in which land was held in the village of Raymaniyah in the Delta. Of the 4,366 feddans involved, only 259 were held by an owner of Turkish descent, while over 3,700 were held by large and small fellahin proprietors.[10] Finally the validity of such statements would seem to be confirmed by the more recent findings of Gabrief Baer who in his study of land conditions in Egypt reports that through the reign of Ismail the property rights of village notables had grown to considerable proportions.[11]

At the time of the British occupation there seem to have been two landed aristocracies. On the one hand the "zawats" or largely urban-based proprietors of Turkish descent,[12] and on the other the "rural aristocracy" of wealthy native Egyptians. Both, moreover, had been at least partially successful in transforming their landed holdings into political power. We have already noted in Chapter Four the power displayed by the Egyptian notables in preventing Ismail from repealing the Muqabala law in 1874, while the recurrence of certain family names in the roster of political services generation after generation indicates

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[10] Ibid., Cmd. 3696, April 13, 1883.

[11] Baer, pp. 50-56, 70.

[12] See Wallace, pp. 213-214, 311-312, for a discussion of the term "zawat". Although precise statistical data on land held by individual members of the Turkish aristocracy will not be known until the records housed in Abdin Palace have been thoroughly investigated, scattered accounts of specific holdings are available in the works of Ali Mubarak and Amin Sami, as well as in the Dictionnaire Géographique de l'Égypte and several of the biographical studies listed in the bibliography of this work. In addition, the detailed study of land conditions in Egypt undertaken by Gabriel Baer includes a discussion of some of these holdings, see especially Baer, pp. 45-49.

the political influence of various landed proprietors of Turkish descent. Thus whereas during the early part of the 19th century the size of a man's estate had been almost entirely the function of his standing vis-a-vis the ruling member of the Muhammad Ali family, by the time of the British occupation a man's place in society had become more a function of the size of his estate.

Under the stability brought to the country by British rule the hand of the landed proprietors was further strengthened, for although the British gave official encouragement to peasant (i.e., small) landholdings, an ever-increasing percentage of the land, including much of the nearly one million feddans that comprised the Daira and Domain lands once held by the Khedive and members of his family, found its way into the hands of the large landowners. There is little wonder, then, why they found it prudent to collaborate with the occupying power. As has been noted by Baer, from the 1880's onward a class of native "urban rich" began to acquire considerable landholdings as well, and it was during this stage that the Turkish and Egyptian landed classes began to merge and form the "Pasha Class" that was to remain the dominant landowning group up to the time of the revolution of 1952. Thus although it has been stated by several authors that it was only the great wartime profits acquired by native Egyptians during the First World War that allowed them to overcome "the absolute predominance" enjoyed by the Turks,[13] it would seem that economically speaking the predominance of the Turks had been dissipated some years before.

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[13]See, for example, Little, p. 130.

By the time of the 1952 revolution the issues at stake were class as well as foreign intervention, and since stratification in Egypt was still closely related to land ownership, those who seized power were quite naturally concerned with agrarian reform. In September, 1952, the revolutionary government announced the promulgation of a sweeping land reform bill, and on November 9, 1953, a committee formed to "reclaim the wealth and property of the Egyptian people" released the first of many progress reports that for the next several months were to receive wide coverage in the newspapers and periodicals of Cairo. But because the struggle within Egypt had for years been ethnic and national rather than class, it is not surprising that the revolutionists chose to give momentum to the land reform program by linking social stratification with ethnicity and alien domination. Thus in addition to cataloging the vast holdings of the royal family and those closely associated with it, the committee reported that some property owners had lived for years in Turkey and Europe without having set foot in Egypt,[14] and that others although living in Egypt could not even speak the Arabic language.[15] Resentment was kept at a peak by such headlines as "Members of the Muhammad Ali Family Accused of Smuggling Millions of Pounds out of Egypt",[16] while justice to the Egyptian was assured by indicating that among the first to receive reclaimed land would be the heirs of Ahmad 'Urabi whose estate had been confiscated after the abortive revolt of 1882.[17] Finally, much publicity was given to the fact that the income from many waqf

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[14] al-Musawwar, Dec. 4, 1953, p. 27.

[15] Ibid., Nov. 20, 1953, p. 33; al-Ahram, Nov. 13, 1953, p. 11.

[16] al-Ahram, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 1.

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

endowments had been going to Turkish rather than Egyptian institutions.[18] By thus equating Egypt's landowning class with the Turco-Egyptian element, the new government capitalized on a traditional as well as revolutionary psychology identifying "outsiders" as a primary threat to the well-being of the country. In reality, of course, the Turks--aside from the royal family--had ceased to be the most important group of landowners in Egypt. But if there were only a few remaining prototypes for the Turks as vilified in the press, there was little chance of repudiating an identity that had been lodged in the minds of the Egyptian people for so many years.[19] Thus no matter how irrelevant the addition of ethnic overtones to the struggle taking place in Egypt, it helped to forge a powerful weapon for the use of those favoring radical social change.

As we have seen, the process by which ownership rights were transferred to private individuals was the result of numerous laws and events. These, however, should not draw our attention away from the overall trends that help to explain the evolution of the Turco-Egyptians as a landed aristocracy. The formation of Egypt's ruling aristocracy did not begin with the acquisition of economic powers. Yet as is frequently the case in societies that are predominantly agricultural, there arose within the dominant families a desire to establish themselves as a landowning class in order to perpetuate their wealth and social standing through hereditary means. But in the early part of the century

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[18] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1954.

[19] A brief analysis of the treatment of the Turk in the Egyptian press at the time of the land reform program appears in Gabriel Baer, "Egyptian Attitudes toward Land Reform, 1922-1955", The Middle East in Transition, ed. Walter Laqueur (New York: Praeger, 1958). For a more detailed discussion of the image of the Turk in Egyptian literature and folklore, see Chapter 7 of this thesis.

there was only bureaucratic landlordism and thus property could not serve as a basis for independent power. Even the holders of ab'adiyahs and 'uhdahs--who under Muhammad Ali were almost entirely Turks--were kept insecure, undoubtedly so as to obviate any possibility of their developing into an autonomous political force. Nevertheless, the different economic base of Turks and Egyptians provided one reason why so little borrowing took place between the two cultures. During the last years of Muhammad Ali's rule additional property advantages granted to the Turks further widened the gulf between the two. But following the death of the Pasha, and especially under the "enlightened" policies of Said when property rights were recognized in the existing occupiers of land, the trend toward private ownership rapidly accelerated. In the short run Said's policy undoubtedly resulted in the general enrichment of the population, but in the long run it only increased social differentiation. Fluctuating markets and exorbitant interest rates frequently forced the fellahin to mortgage their land, which in turn meant that extended properties gradually fell into the hands of a few. As a result the process by which land ownership rights were transferred to private individuals--especially under the Muqabala law of 1871--had a substantial effect on the distribution of social and political power by creating a new landowning class composed primarily of village umdahs and shaykhs with economic advantages similar to those of the Turks, i.e., with similar amounts of wealth and property and similar sources of income. It was not, however, until sometime after the 1880's when this "rural aristocracy" was joined by still another group of propertied urban Egyptians that Turks and Egyptians merged to form a single privileged

group frequently referred to as the Pasha Class. As will be shown in the following chapter, it was at this stage that the cultural identity of the Turks was largely displaced by an identity of class.

But if the Turks rapidly emerged as a landed aristocracy, it may not be said that they developed simultaneously as a mercantile class. Indeed, neither Turks nor native Egyptians took much of a part in commercial activities. Aside from the ephemeral attempts of Muhammad Ali and Ismail, there was no important business or industrial undertaking conducted by Turks or Egyptians during the 19th century. Almost all that was essential in industry, finance and external trade fell into the hands of foreigners, while a considerable amount of the internal trade and even handicrafts were monopolized by Copts, Jews, Syrians and Greeks residing in Egypt. It is reported that in Cairo in 1840 there were no more than sixty-three small merchants who were Turks or Egyptians.[20] Even those responsible for government policy in these fields were normally non-Muslims, e.g., Yusuf Boghus, Mudir of the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs during much of the rule of Muhammad Ali, and his successor Artin Sikyas al-Armani.

It may be claimed that this was due to the capitulations that conferred a privileged position upon foreigners in Egypt, but this cannot be the entire explanation. In an age when the landed aristocracy could avoid the obligation of sharing its wealth with the fellahin, industry, finance and even commerce must have seemed unnecessary. Indeed the Turks seem to have acquired a disdain for the latter and a conviction

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[20] M. Fahmi, La Révolution de l'Industrie en Égypte et ses Conséquences Sociales au 19ème Siècle (Lieden, 1954), pp. 96-97.

that success could only come from the possession of a great deal of land. Actually throughout most of the 19th century the Turks could afford to remain inactive in business, for the merchants and bankers of foreign extraction never played a large political role. But if the Turks thereby avoided the hatred that frequently goes to an alien merchant class, this was slight compensation when they found themselves incapable of monopolizing the new wealth of the 1920's and 1930's when an Egyptian business class began to emerge.

CHAPTER VI

THE TURKS AS A CULTURAL ENTITY

The distinctive traits of the Turks of Egypt are to be observed not only in their occupational or functional record, but in their conventional manners and customs as well. Like most other residents of 19th-century Egypt, the Turks were subjects of the Ottoman Sultan and professed the Islamic faith. But any more detailed investigation into their social habits and behavior reveals the very tangible boundaries that separated them from other elements of Egyptian society. Fortunately considerable material for such an inquiry is available in various collections of biographies of important personalities of the 19th and 20th centuries. Although a majority are brief and impersonal, they frequently record significant data on such things as education, positions held, languages spoken and honors received. When this is added to our knowledge of their marriage customs and place of residence, food and dress, ceremonial observances and other aspects of domestic and public life, we have sufficient information to reconstruct--at least in broad outline--the basic patterns of Turco-Egyptian life.

Ethnic associations and ethnic identity were significant to the Turks of Egypt because the Ottoman way of life was represented and maintained by meaningful cultural institutions. But before describing some of these cultural continuatives, it should be noted that the Turks of 19th-century Egypt never formed the unified hierarchy that developed in

Ottoman Turkey under the strenuous and lengthy training of the "kul" system, or in 17th-century Egypt among the Mamluks who, although a mixed group of Circassians, Abkaziens, Mingreliens, Georgians, etc., were educated and trained in accordance with elaborate tradition. Under the modern Turco-Egyptian aristocracy no comparable system was developed, and consequently marked differences must be recognized as an attribute of Turco-Egyptian society. But if internally the Turks of Egypt were never completely homogeneous, the distinctions were rarely acknowledged by those not in intimate contact with them, while their many common characteristics and interests set them further apart from the indigenous community than their differences did from each other. Finally it has been held by some that common physical peculiarities further helped to distinguish the Turks.[1] It is more likely, however, that the trait that made them distinctive in appearance was frequently no more than dress, augmented upon voice contact by differences in speech. Language and clothing, then, are two of the ways in which the uniqueness of the Turks was manifest, and it is with these and other general cultural traits that we will deal before attempting to illustrate with biographical data the manner in which specific patterns in Turco-Egyptian life developed over the course of several generations.

Whereas the ordinary Egyptian apparel of the lower and middle class was the long black robe and white turban, the clothing of the upper-class Turk was little if at all different from that worn by Turkish officials in most parts of the Ottoman Empire. In both Constantinople

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[1]The Turk is traditionally regarded as lighter-skinned and taller than the average Egyptian. For additional remarks on the distinctive appearance of the Turk, see Chapter 7, pages 184-185.

and Cairo the dress was the red fez, the semi-European Turkish jacket called the Stambouline (a single-breasted coat buttoned to the throat that closely resembled the cassock of the English clergy), a vest, and black baggy trousers. Yet in the 19th century the native Egyptian also frequently donned the fez, especially when desirous of giving himself a more official appearance. Language, therefore, was the means by which a Turk could more easily be recognized (especially by an Egyptian) as being distinct from members of Egypt's indigenous population. Indeed many observers instead of defining the Turks by a general cultural criterion, picked a precise one, i.e., language, as the most useful method of identifying members of Egypt's ruling aristocracy.[2]

When Muhammad Ali established his dynasty in Egypt, neither Turkish nor Arabic could be considered a "national" language. The former was the language of an Empire, and Osmanlı, the most cultivated of the Turkish dialects, was spoken not only by the ruling class in Constantinople but by members of the aristocracy throughout the Ottoman Near East. Arabic, on the other hand, was the language of a ruling religion, indeed of a civilization, and was clung to by Arabs with almost fanatic devotion. Thus the language of both Turks and Egyptians assumed a high position on the scale of values and some sort of linguistic confrontation would seem to have been inevitable. Yet in general linguistic developments were to keep in step with those of the socio-political realm. Just as a rather clear and rigid distinction developed between Turkish and Egyptian communities in the early part of the 19th century, the two

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[2] For an example of the Turk's distinctive characteristic when speaking Arabic, see page 196, footnote 79.

languages tended to exist side by side. But as the century progressed and the importance of the Turk in Egyptian society began to decline, a similar fate beset the Turkish language. Moreover, because the two communities had not been in contact under conditions favorable to linguistic borrowings, traces of Turkish transmitted to later generations of Arabic-speaking Egyptians were limited to a narrowly-defined number of words, idioms and suffixes. The reasons for the early dualism, the role played by each language, the most significant influences of one upon the other and the ultimate decline of Turkish will be the subject of much of the present chapter. In as much as it is socio-cultural phenomena with which we are primarily concerned, emphasis will be given throughout to external or extra-linguistic explanations for these developments rather than to internal or structural factors.

As implied above, Turkish functioned as a symbol of Ottoman supremacy, and it was this prestige differential rather than any structural excellence that best explains the lack of any deep interest in Arabic on the part of the Turks of Egypt. Turkish was important, then, because it was spoken by influential people, and for much of the 19th century this included members of the vice-regal family and the court as well as administrative and military circles where it was used for nearly all official purposes. With regard to the ruling family, Muhammad Ali himself is reported to have despised the language of his subjects, considering it as fit only for slaves. As such, Arabic was a language of which he had only an imperfect knowledge, did not learn to read until he was over forty, could never write and always spoke with a Turkish accent.[3] While

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[3]Donald Cameron, Egypt in the 19th Century (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1898), p. 207; Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte..., p. 100; Cromer, II, 530.

his son Ibrahim is reported by one European observer to have favored Arabic, which he intended to "rehabilitate" as a part of a program to kindle the flames of Arab nationalism, it may be questioned not only whether such a movement would have had significance among a people as yet untouched by national identification, but whether this was indeed Ibrahim's objective at all.[4] In any event his mother tongue was Turkish while his early death cut short any opportunity he may have had to put such plans into operation. Less than a year after Muhammad Ali gave up the reins of state it was Abbas who ascended to the seat of power, and like his grandfather he felt more at home in an Ottomanized environment using his excellent command of Turkish than among Arabic-speaking Egyptians.[5] The efforts of his successors to master the language of those over whom they ruled were apparently equally remiss. Harry Boyle in a memorandum on the background of the Khedival family was no more critical than most Egyptians when he wrote, "Said and Ismail spoke at best only a sort of broken Arabic jargon; Abbas II did not get beyond a style of speech acquired from the native servants in the harem; and King Ahmed Fouad, sorely tried the gravity of his subjects when he addressed them in Arabic on any but trifling matters."[6] Indeed it would appear that King Faruk was the first of Egypt's sovereigns in the Muhammad Ali line to have had somewhat more than an average knowledge of literary Arabic.

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[4]Boislecomte's claim that Ibrahim favored the Arabic language, Douin, La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte..., p. 256, is denied by Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 286-87.

[5]Nassau Senior, Conversation and Journals in Egypt and Malta (London: 1882), II, 178.

[6]Clara Boyle, Boyle of Cairo (Highgate: Titus Wilson, 1965), p. 32.

For as long as Turkish survived as the language of the reigning family it continued to be used extensively within the harem and at court, as well as among the aristocracy. With regard to the harem, Emmeline Lott, an English matron who lived in Egypt for many years as governess to Ismail's son, describes the incessant chattering of "two hundred women and children, jabbering away like monkeys--some in Arabic, others in Turkish."[7] Cameron informs us, moreover, that Turkish was spoken at court when he traveled to Egypt in 1898,[8] and many members of the aristocracy are known to have continued to use Turkish as the common language of intercourse down to the First World War. As observed earlier, a majority of the non-Europeans gathered by Muhammad Ali to provide military and administrative leadership had been members of the ruling element in all parts of the Ottoman Empire. Having come to Cairo as adults, few had ties to the country of their adoption. It was natural, then, that they brought with them a preference for the Ottoman tongue and continued to identify themselves by the speech community to which they belonged. The large number of their descendants who included Turkish in their school programs throughout the late-19th and early-20th centuries indicates that Turkish continued to have importance--at the very least as a status symbol--long after their forebears had passed away.[9] But if Turkish was to spread beyond the limits of the

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[7]Emmeline Lott, Harem Life in Egypt and Constantinople (London: Richard Bentley, 1865), I, 215. See also II, 79.

[8]Cameron, p. 207

[9]In the biographies of Ilyas Zakhurah, for example, we find that almost all important and even many lesser figures of the ruling elite included Turkish in their school curriculum. The same may even be said for some native Egyptians who by the 1870's had become an important element in the ruling aristocracy.

court and aristocracy, it would have to be through such institutions as the administration, the military and the schools, for most Turks did not venture outside of Cairo and Alexandria and relatively few Egyptians had close or continuous contact with members of the ruling element.

As the language of the government, Turkish may be considered to have remained the official language until at least the reign of Said. Under Muhammad Ali circulars and orders addressed to the governors of districts, and almost all laws, regulations and other forms of official business were communicated in Turkish (although frequently accompanied by Arabic translations), a fact attested to by contemporary travellers and Consular officials and by studies of contemporary documents such as that of Jean Deny.[10] So too in the military official documents were drawn up in Turkish, while the army itself was drilled in Turkish and a large portion of military terminology was based on the language of the ruling class. In fact, military vocables were to become the most lasting Turkish contribution to the Arabic language. Words of command remained Turkish until after World War One,[11] while the Turkish terms of rank--which are even today commonly used in colloquial Egyptian--were not officially replaced until 1959. One explanation for the longevity of Turkish military terminology, aside from the special position held by the Turks in the army, is that Turkish for a long period of time was an important language in many of the schools established for the training of army officers. Thus Turkish was used in numerous courses

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[10] St. John, I, 190; Barker, Oct. 20, 1832, FO 78/214; Jean Deny, Sommaire des Archives Turques du Caire (Cairo: 1930), p. 158.

[11] Amir Boktor, School and Society in the Valley of the Nile (Cairo: Elias Press, 1936), pp. 89-90; Thomas Russell, Egyptian Service, 1902-1946 (London: John Murray, 1949), p. 15; Wingate, p. 21.

as a medium of instruction, often by teachers brought from Constantinople to work in Egyptian schools.[12] Programs in Turkish, moreover, were frequently included in the curriculum for the benefit of Turks unable to read or write their native tongue as well as for non-Turkish students, for Muhammad Ali placed considerable importance on literacy in Turkish. An extensive list of institutions in which one or more of these conditions prevailed may be compiled from Heyworth-Dunne's study of education in Egypt.[13]

Following the settlements imposed on Egypt in 1840, the school system established by Muhammad Ali began to crumble and by the time Abbas came to power in 1848 only a few remained in operation. Nevertheless, when the schools began to re-open under Ismail, Turkish was again included as a part of the curriculum in most of the institutions oriented toward military and government needs. Thus a survey taken in 1875 shows that twenty-seven government and Waqf primary schools taught courses in Turkish, only six less than the number teaching Arabic. In contrast, only one foreign school out of a total of two hundred and ten offered courses in Turkish whereas sixty-two gave instruction in Arabic, forty-four in French, thirty-four in Italian, and thirty-three in English.[14] This rather dramatic difference indicates not only the hold that tradition had on government-controlled schools, but also (as pointed out by Heyworth-Dunne) that whereas the aim of government schools was to turn

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[12] See, for example, Sami, II, 288.

[13] Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 107, 111, 117, 120, 133, 136, 138.

[14] Ibid., p. 423.

out officials and officers for government service, foreign schools often represented commercial interests for which a knowledge of French, Italian or English was more important than Turkish.

Before turning our attention to the decline of Turkish in Egypt and to specific Turkish linguistic forms that have survived in Egyptian Arabic, we will follow the use of Turkish as a medium of communication in one other aspect of cultural life. The first printing facilities to be established in Egypt were brought by Napoleon from Rome and placed under the directorship of J.J. Marcel. It is known that he had type available for the printing of works in Turkish as well as Arabic, Persian, Greek and several other European languages. When the French withdrew from Egypt, however, the press was taken back to Europe and Egypt was left without printing facilities until 1821 when a press was established in Bulaq where it remains to this day as the official government organ. Between 1822 and 1842 the Bulaq press turned out 243 works of which 125 were in Turkish, 111 in Arabic, 6 in Persian and 1 in Italian.[15] A great many of these books were translations from European languages, for although Turkish was the primary means of official communication, the regulations and procedures adopted by Egyptian military and educational establishments were patterned after European (largely French) models.

A detailed study of these works by M. Reinaud permits us to ascertain some of the habits of the reading public. Thus we may go beyond the fact that Turkish was the language of over half of the works published to establish the language preferred in various fields of

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[15] James Heyworth-Dunne, "Printing and Translations under Muhammad Ali of Egypt", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (July, 1940), p. 307.

specialization. Of the forty-eight works on military subjects, thirty-nine were in Turkish, including such titles as "Principles for the Discipline and Conduct of Troops". Those in Arabic, on the other hand, were more apt to bear such titles as "Service of the Corporal" and "Service of the Sergeant".[16] Similarly, because mathematics and mechanics were generally adopted for instruction in the military schools, ten out of sixteen such works were in Turkish. There are also indications that for at least a short time Turkish was more popular than Arabic as the literary language. Thus out of the twenty-six collections of poetry printed at Bulaq, twenty-two were in Turkish, while in the field of history a majority of the works (thirteen out of sixteen) were also in Turkish. Several of these works, however, probably reflected the reading preferences of the Pasha as much as those of the Turkish community at large, while still others were intended for export to Constantinople as well as for local consumption. Finally, it should also be pointed out that the early issues of the official government journal al-Waqa'i al-Misriyah, first published by the Bulaq press on December 3, 1828, were in Turkish as well as Arabic. As originally issued, each page was divided into two columns, that on the right in Turkish and that on the left in Arabic. The Arabic section, moreover, was often no more than a loose translation of the original Turkish, the latter frequently carrying details not included in the former.

By the middle of the 19th century, then, the Turks had established themselves as the dominant members of society and Turkish was accepted

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[16] M. Reinaud, "Notice des Ouvrages Arabes, Persans et Turcs Imprimés en Égypte", Journal Asiatique (1831), p. 340.

as the primary language of both the ruling elite and its major institutions Nevertheless, Turkish never threatened to replace Arabic as the popular language, and during the second half of the century it began to lose its unique position in government circles. One reason for the persistence of Arabic was the unusual relationship between it and the Koran A second was the rather clear and rigid distinction between the Turkish and Egyptian communities which throughout the first half of the century not only prevented a great deal of bilingualism through inter-marriage, but, by discouraging hope of identification with the Turks, kept Arabic-speaking Egyptians from adopting Turkish as a means of social or political advancement.

The reasons for the decline of Turkish during the second half of the century are somewhat more complex. As we have seen, continued exposure to the West had made Western education increasingly important and a knowledge of Western languages increasingly common--usually at the expense of Turkish It was a trend both encouraged and imitated by the successors of Abbas, for Said, who had received a good French education and is reported to have spoken excellent French and English, could hardly read Turkish at all [17] But even more important was the failure of the Turks to provide sufficient leadership during a period of great political, economic and social change Ever since Muhammad Ali began to replace the Turks in the lower echelons of the civil administration with Egyptians there had been a gradual substitution of Arabic as the administrative language of the country, and by the time of the 'Urabi revolt Egyptians constituted a greater part of the bureaucratic

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[17] Senior, II, 178; Heyworth-Dunne, p 313

and military classes.[18] Ultimately the government itself was forced to recognize the limitations of Turkish as the language of official communications. It was Said who first bowed to the inevitable and made Arabic the official language of the government, although being aware of the complications that would ensue in a number of diwans he provided for a period of transition during which both Arabic and Turkish would continue side by side. The final step was taken by Ismail who in 1869 made Arabic the official language of the country.[19] Thereafter only communications to the Khedive and the Ministries of Finance and War--each a citadel of early Turkish power--could be made in Turkish. Other moves made during the reign of Ismail indicating that Turkish was no longer essential for the conduct of government business were its suspension in the official al-Waqa'i al-Misriyah as well as the adoption of Arabic as the language of deliberation in both the constitutional assembly and the Council of Ministers. In the proceedings of the latter, however, French was also frequently employed, primarily to suit the convenience of Egyptian Ministers (mostly Armenians) who were not well acquainted with Arabic.[20] But perhaps the clearest indication of the decline of the importance of Turkish was reflected in the report of a commission established in 1880 to advise on the future of education

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[18]It is reported that 'Urabi himself had no knowledge of Turkish. The Observer, July 23, 1882, enclosed in Malet to Granville, July 25, 1882, FO 78/3439.

[19]For additional information on the decrees of both Said and Ismail, see Sami, III, Part I, 282-85 and Part II, 847-49.

[20]It is interesting to note that Nubar Pasha, in preparing for an administrative career, had been urged by Boghus Bey to perfect his Turkish as well as add English, Italian and Greek to his knowledge of French. Boghus neglected, however, to recommend that Nubar learn Arabic, a language that the latter was never able to speak with facility.

in Egypt. Among its recommendations the following were made with regard to the study of Turkish: (1) The study of Turkish in the School of Law should be abolished on the grounds that it was no longer of value for judicial purposes. (2) The study of Turkish in the School of Languages should be made optional because (a) only Turkish students found the course useful and (b) Arabic, French and English were deemed more important. (3) The study of Turkish in the Primary Schools and in the Preparatory classes in the provincial schools should be made optional because Egyptian students forgot Turkish as soon as they left school.[21]

The same extra-linguistic factors that discouraged the use of Turkish among Egyptians was instrumental in preventing the absorption of many Turkish loanwords outside of certain well-defined categories and a scattering of idioms and suffixes that became especially prevalent in the language of the townspeople. Moreover, it was only in one or two instances that the borrowings were "naturalized" and transmitted to subsequent generations. Undoubtedly the most important of these was in the case of military commands and rank where the use of Turkish was not a chance coincidence but imposed to achieve maximum communicative efficiency between Turkish-speaking officers and Arabic-speaking enlisted men. Thus although the army was being westernized in organization and training, drill and tactics, etc., it was very nearly "Ottomanized" in terminology. Military works translated from Turkish or Western languages into Arabic relied almost exclusively on Turkish for military terms. Most of the vocabulary items had been used earlier by the Mamluks, but inasmuch as the army at that time had been composed almost entirely of

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[21]Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 433-35.

non-Egyptians, the terms had not always been used by the indigenous population. It was only after Muhammad Ali formed the bulk of the army out of Egyptian recruits that the words assumed an important place in the life of the Egyptian people. From the synchronic point of view, then, it was only after the rise of Muhammad Ali that the terms became Arabic, that is were completely assimilated into the Arabic language.

As was stated earlier, one of the most striking examples of vocabulary-borrowing involved terms of rank. In the following list, the terms employed for officers at the time of Muhammad Ali are accompanied by the official revisions announced by the Egyptian government in 1958 and their approximate equivalents in English.

Turkish Terms	Terms Adopted[22] in 1958	English
Mulazim Sani	Mulazim	Second Lieutenant
Mulazim Awal	Mulazim Awal	First Lieutenant
Yuzbashi	Naqib	Captain
Sagh	Ra'id	Adjutant-Major
Bikbashi	Muqaddim	Major
Kaymakam	'Aqid	Lieutenant-Colonel
Amir al-Ay	'Amid	Colonel
Liwa	Liwa	Major-General
Farik	Farik	General
Mushir	Mushir	Field Marshal

[22] al-Akhbar, May 23, 1958. For a tentative announcement made in February 1958 during President Nasser's trip to the northern section of the United Arab Republic, see Ibid., Feb. 26, 1958. For the official announcement see al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyah October 18, 1959.

Just as Turkish titles of rank reflected the importance of the Turks in the army, other deference gestures mirrored their importance in the upper strata as a whole. Thus the honorific terms "Bey" and "Pasha" continued to be used under the new Turco-Egyptian aristocracy just as they had under the Mamluks, while the honorific forms "Dawletlu", "Sa'adetlu", "Izzetlu", and "Ref'atlu" (composed of Arabic substantives in the feminine and the Turkish suffix "lu") were also retained throughout most of the 19th century.[23] It is only in the present century that the suffix has been replaced by the Arabic word "sahib" ("possessor of") placed in front of the abstract noun, i.e., "Sahib al-Dawla", etc.

A second structural similarity between Turkish and Arabic appears in words using the Turkish suffix "gi" (جي) denoting "occupation" or "profession". But whereas in 19th-century texts a significant number of such constructions might be found (e.g., "sir tashrifatgi", "ta'limgi", etc.), in more recent works the suffix in these and most other words has been replaced by a structurally comparable Arabic element. Moreover, those words in which the suffix remains (e.g., "sufragi", "makhzangi", etc.) generally represent the borrowing of an entire word rather than just a form. Morphologically, then, the suffix must be considered as a part of a loan word and not as a structural borrowing.

This short examination of language usage and influence has been intended to be representative rather than complete, the purpose having been to demonstrate an historical theory in light of data provided by

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[23] See, for example, the index of Zakhurah, I, pp. 561-564. Published in 1897, it includes such entries as "Dawletlu Mustafa Pasha Riaz", "Atufetlu Mustafa Pasha Fahmi", and "Sa'adetlu Butrus Pasha Ghalib".

language. Thus the obvious correlation between language and the evolution of society would seem to confirm some of our previous observations concerning the Turks of Egypt. During the first half of the 19th century both the Turks and Turkish reigned supreme in nearly every aspect of ruling-class life. Then, under the successors of Muhammad Ali, Turkish was gradually replaced by Arabic just as the Turks began to yield to the Egyptians. The pace, however, was uneven. At court and in the army, which were two of the most important sources of the Turk's power, Turkish remained the dominant language considerably longer than in other fields. In the army, moreover, where conditions favorable to vocabulary diffusion were at a maximum, significant numbers of vocabulary borrowings occurred. In most other fields, however, contact between Turks and Egyptians was more limited, and adoptions seem to have resulted primarily from chance coincidence. Thus although today in Egypt nearly every pedestrian when speaking to a policeman will address him "Yaa Gawush" (the Turkish word for sergeant), those who speak Turkish itself are limited to a few (primarily female) descendants of the old Turco-Egyptian aristocracy, while the total number of Turkish vocabulary and structural borrowings give little indication of the position that the Turks once held in Egyptian society.

Clothing and language, then, were two of the more conspicuous symbols of the Turks' distinctive way of life. But if Egypt's Turkish element was to retain a meaningful identity, it had to maintain still other features of Ottoman culture. Some, like clothing, were not vitally important. They may be thought of as diagnostic features that helped to distinguish between the culture of the Turks and that of the

Egyptians. Others, like language, were much more relevant to the life of the Turks. They were determinant features that helped to perpetuate the new aristocracy. Among the former or diagnostic traits may also be included the artistic endeavors of the Turco-Egyptians. Unlike the Mamluks, who fostered a remarkable development of the arts, the Turco-Egyptians seem to have had little need or desire for artistic expression. Few real architectural momuments were erected in the 19th century, and even those built during the reign of Muhammad Ali were generally related to public utilities such as irrigation canals and dams. Nevertheless, a definite Turkish influence did show itself in a few new buildings, particularly the mosque of Muhammad Ali located in the citadel. With its dome as the central feature and surrounded by slender, unadorned "pencil-like" minarets, it was obviously designed after the Turkish fashion. But it was in other artistic pursuits that the presence of the Turks was more noticeable. Although we cannot trace the entire history of Turkish influence upon Egyptian music, it is clear that the latter was exposed to Turkish forms long before the 19th century. This was especially true in the case of instrumental music, for whereas the Arabs had traditionally held a preference for vocal compositions, from the 10th century onward the instrumental forms of the Turks had come to the fore. Native Egyptian music, however, retained its own rules and spirit, and Ismail, who found the Turkish art more pleasing to the ear, sent his court minstrel Abd al-Hamuli to Constantinople to become better acquainted with Turkish music. He later returned with an entire orchestra and in time such forms as Turkish melodic and rhythmic modes became institutionalized as types of Egyptian music. It has been reported in one study that these forms

were adopted by some of Egypt's most famous musicians, e.g., the singer Muhammad Uthman, the psalterist Muhammad al-Aqqad, the lutenist Ahmad al-Laithi, the violinist Ibrahim Sahalun, and the flautist Amin Buzari.[24]

Even eating habits are a part of a people's culture, and here again the researcher finds indications that a preference for Ottoman etiquette and food was retained by the Turks of Egypt. "Banquets! I'm the one who knows. I'm the one who was brought up in the homes of Pashas and knows about Ottoman food." These are the words of an irate--although fictional--Turco-Egyptian to her Egyptian husband when he admonishes her for not having the proper food to serve to his guests.[25] The meal, it might be added, included chicken and doves served with "tarbiyah", "sharkasiyah" and "yalanji dolma", all three of which are basically Turkish rather than Egyptian dishes.

Another indication of the Turks' distinctiveness is revealed in the literature of the times. We have already noted that a majority of the literary works (e.g., poetry and history) published by the Bulaq Press during the early part of the 19th century were in Turkish. Even Shaykh Rifa'ah Tahtawi's well-known Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Talkhis Paris, in which the author (a native Egyptian) described his impressions of Europe during a sojourn there in 1826, had a wider circulation in Turkish than in the original Arabic. In a similar vein, the popular shadow plays of the early part of the century were modeled on the Turkish

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[24] H.G.F(armer), "Egyptian Music", Grove's Dictionary of Music and Musicians, ed. Eric Blom (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), p. 895.

[25] Tawfiq al-Hakim, Awdat al-Ruh (Cairo: 1964), II, 48. The many insights into Turco-Egyptian life revealed in this superb novel will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 7.

pattern and performed in the Turkish language. The missionary Haussman, who attended a number of these shows in Cairo in the 1860's, reported that all that he saw were given in Turkish.[26] In contrast, there was little in the way of Arabic theater at that time, primarily because the language of the court, which was nearly the only institution to support such endeavors, was Turkish rather than Arabic. But as the century progressed, the flow of literary works in Turkish turned to a trickle, far too few to indicate a vigorous interest in Turkish literature. Except for the works of a relative handful of literary figures (e.g., Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, Hasan Husni al-Tuwayrani, Wali al-Din Yeghen) who wrote in both Arabic and Turkish,[27] there was little literature produced locally aimed specifically at the Turkish community. The press also adjusted to the changing times, and although newspapers throughout the century disseminated the aristocratic philosophy of the Turco-Egyptians, they generally did so in Arabic rather than Turkish.[28] After the official journal al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyah discontinued its Turkish column during the reign of Ismail, only an occasional paper put out issues in both Arabic and Turkish. Undoubtedly one of the last was al-Qanun al-Asasi published by Muhammad Qadri near the turn of the century.[29]

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[26]Jacob Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater and Cinema (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 29-30, 56.

[27]Hasan Husni al-Tuwayrani, 1850-1897. A well known journalist, poet and prose writer, he was born in Egypt of Turkish descent. For a list of his works in Arabic and Turkish, see Dagher, pp. 580-81. For additional information on Wali al-Din Yeghen, see Chapter 7, pages 166-171.

[28]Thus the newspaper al-Mu'ayyad, which toward the end of the 19th century was known for the importance it placed on preserving the authority of the Ottoman Sultan and increasing his power in Egypt, was described by Salamah Musa as being read by the "scions of the Turkish families". Salamah Musa, Tarbiyat Salamah Musa (Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Khanji, 1962), p. 30.

[29]al-Muqtataf, April 1, 1921, p. 376.

As long as the Turks' patterns of association largely followed ethnic lines, these and other features of Ottoman culture were likely to be transmitted from generation to generation. Thus for many years the Turks' distinctive way of life was supported by marital alliances. "Il est très rare qu'ils [the Turks] s'unissent a des femmes égyptiennes.", reported Clot Bey in 1840.[30] This exclusive view of marriage applied particularly to members of the court and the Khedival family for whom marriage with first or second cousins, the children of eminent members of the Turkish community, or at times relatives of the Ottoman Sultan was preferred. Muhammad Ali's son, Ismail, married the sister of Cairo's Turkish Qadi, while one of the Pasha's daughters, Princess Tawfidah, married Muharram Bey, the commander of the Egyptian fleet during the war with Greece.[31] Similar marriages were arranged for the viceroy's other children, including those of royal consorts who were recognized as legal heirs. Indeed the only sons of Ibrahim Pasha to survive infancy were born to Circassian concubines, and one, Ismail, was later to become Khedive.[32]

Within the royal family the pattern of Turk marrying Turk was to continue throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. For example, Princess Fayzah, King Faruk's sister, married Ali Rauf, a wealthy Turkish

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[30]Clot Bey, II, 115.

[31]Muharram Bey, like his father-in-law, was born in Cavalla.

[32]One of Ismail's granddaughters, Emine Foat Tugay, has recently written a personal narrative that includes numerous insights into Turkish life in 19th- and 20th-century Egypt. She is the daughter of Princess Nimet and Mahmud Mukhtar, the son of the Ottoman High Commissioner to Egypt from 1883 to 1906. See Emine Foat Tugay, Three Centuries: Family Chronicles of Turkey and Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

landowner with whom she went to live in Turkey. At times, however, such marriages aroused considerable resentment. Thus the wife of a recent Turkish Ambassador to Egypt, Princess Amina Mukhtar, who was related by marriage to the Muhammad Ali family, was severely criticised by the Egyptian press for maintaining that property belonging to her--and valued at some ten million Egyptian pounds--was not liable to expropriation under Egypt's land reform program since she was a Turkish citizen.[33]

It was perhaps natural that racial and cultural differences stood for many years as an impediment to intermarriage, especially since the Turks considered Egyptians a conquered people. Yet as the economic gap between the Turks and Egyptian notables narrowed, the barriers to marriage began to crumble. This turn of events may perhaps have been anticipated for even Clot Bey added to his words cited above, "Ceux [Turks] qui occupent des grades inférieurs sont-ils les seuls à consentir à de pareilles alliances; ils ne les contractent d'ailleurs qu'avec les familles indigènes des villes qui se distinguent par leur position sociale et leur moyen pecuniaires."[34] As the century progressed, the instances of intermarriage rapidly increased and these in turn broke down still other cultural barriers as the couples, their children and their families entered into social relations with members of the indigenous population.

Although no statistics are available on the instances of intermarriage, it would appear that to the Egyptian male marriage with a Turk also began to be looked upon with increased favor--primarily

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[33] al-Ahram, November 21, 1953, p. 6.

[34] Clot Bey, II, 115.

as an indication of improved status.[35] Such was the case in Tawfiq al-Hakim's memorable novel 'Awdat al-Ruh in which the father improves his social standing--although not his happiness--by taking a Turkish bride. Among Turkish women, on the other hand, it was also considered advantageous to marry an aspiring government employee of Egyptian birth, and this was undoubtedly the case with Tawfiq's own mother. Although she came from a relatively well to do Turkish family, her husband seemed well on the way to a successful government career at the time of their marriage.

In addition to marital alliances, the distinctiveness of the Turks was further re-enforced by spatial isolation. From the information cited on page nine of this study, it is apparent that the Turks were an urban community, living almost exclusively in Cairo and Alexandria. Mengin, Bowring, and McCoan all state that only about 3,000 Turks (approximately fifteen percent) were scattered throughout the provinces of Upper and Lower Egypt, and many of these lived in the provincial capitals. Others, as was the case on some of the estates granted by Muhammad Ali where significant numbers of Turks, Albanians and Circassians could be found among the inhabitants, formed settlements of their own.[36] Relatively speaking, then, only a handful of Turks were scattered among the Egyptian population where they were exposed to the assimilative processes to which widely dispersed immigrants are subject. "From two to three in every village, from twelve to twenty in every town", wrote

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[35]Turkish women may also have had an added appeal for Egyptians merely because they were foreign born. A biographer of the well-known author Ibrahim al-Mazini reports that the latter's father had a "special craving" for Turkish women and that two of his four wives--although not the mother of Ibrahim--were Turks. Na'mat Ahmad Fu'ad, Adab al-Mazini (Cairo: 1961), p. 41.

[36]Abbas M. Ammar, The People of Sharqiyah (Cairo: 1944), pp. 42-43.

Bowring toward the middle of the century,[37] and he found them engaged both in agriculture and as artisans, shopkeepers and petty officials. But it is not these rural elements with which we are primarily concerned, for it was the Turks who established themselves in the urban areas that made up the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy. Cairo was the center from which their language, habits and power sprang, and behind Cairo stood the cultural pre-eminence of Constantinople. It was to the latter city that each viceroy was obliged to go to receive his investiture, to which wealthy Turco-Egyptians traveled on vacation, and to which Khedives and members of the royal family and court fled when deposed or out of favor

Still another means of supporting the maintenance and continuity of cultural traits is through education, a process that stamps a great many of the customary acts of life. In view of the emphasis given to military education throughout much of Muhammad Ali's reign it is not surprising that the most thoroughly Ottomanized youths of the time were those attending the many military institutions established during the early years of the 19th century. Although almost all used Turkish as a medium of instruction and employed Turks as instructors, undoubtedly the school that instilled its students most completely with Ottoman traditions was the Maktab al-'Ali, or as it was frequently called, École des Princes. Opened sometime before 1826 at al-Khankah a few miles north of Cairo, it was attended primarily by the sons of Muhammad Ali and other members of the viceregal family, as well as by the children of important Turkish officials. Among its graduates we find such names as Muhammad Sharif, Ali Haydar Yeghen, Muhammad Thabit and

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[37] See Bowring, pp. 8-9, as well as Mengin, p. 157 and McCoan, p. 47.

Hassan Aflatun, all of whom went on to positions of considerable importance. Although the Maktab al-'Ali like many other of Muhammad Ali's schools was closed by Abbas, a similar institution called Madrasat al-Mafruzah was opened in 1849. And just as the biographies of many important Turks educated during the rule of Muhammad Ali speak of the Maktab al-'Ali, those of a later generation of officers and government officials frequently refer to the Madrasat al-Mafruzah. "A Circassian by birth and a Turk by education" continued to be an apt phrase by which to describe members of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy, as men such as Uthman Ghalib and Muhammad Ratib attest. Unfortunately under Said a drastic cut in educational expenditures led to the closure of many state schools, including the Madrasat al-Mafruzah. As a result the Ottoman training previously received in so many schools was either discontinued or replaced by Western-oriented foreign schools, of which there was a marked increase during the reign of Said, or by the Kuttabs which maintained their traditional and more Arabic-oriented teaching.

It should not be thought, however, that the entire educational system during the first half of the century was geared to Turkish students or that the Turkish language and Turkish instructors predominated in all schools. An apparent lack of interest on the part of most Turks in the acquisition of practical skills made them resistant to many of the tasks of modernization. The most revealing manifestation of this attitude was their disdain for such fields of study as medicine, pharmacy and agriculture. To the Turk ultimate success came through a career in the military, and perhaps in the possession of a great deal of land. Consequently it was Egyptians who comprised a majority of the students

in the schools of Medicine and Agriculture,[38] while the media of instruction in such schools was Arabic rather than Turkish.

One of the early acts of Ismail was to re-establish the Diwan al-Midaris previously abolished by Said and to re-open many of the educational institutions, both military and civil. Although Turkish was still included in the curricula of most schools, and many of them continued to employ Turkish instructors, Arabic was generally given much greater emphasis.[39] The primary purpose of educational establishments was still to supply the government with trained officials. Yet by the middle of Ismail's reign the use of Turkish in government circles had declined to such an extent that instruction in Turkish was for the most part superfluous, as attested to by the recommendations of the commission of 1880.

Whether observing the functional record of the Turks or their cultural characteristics, we find that most of the features by which we have chosen to identify the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy underwent modifications throughout the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Indeed the changes make it obvious that by the time of the First World War we are no longer dealing with the same ruling element or at least not with a distinct cultural group. Actually the Turks were never a completely self-contained society. They had always shared certain ideas about religion and social organization with the Egyptians. But with the passing of time these common attitudes and beliefs began to encompass features that had previously set the two apart. In many ways

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[38]Heyworth-Dunne, pp. 124-25; Amin, II, 472.

[39]Heyworth-Dunne, p. 395.

the question of how long the Turks remained an identifiable entity is closely related to the question of class. Although the cultural stratification of the Turks never exactly approximated class stratification, it was when Egyptian notables began to fulfill the same functions as the Turks--and thus began to share the same political and economic interests and objectives--that the cultural traits peculiar to Turco-Egyptian society, e.g., the exclusive use of Turkish as the language of government, began to disappear. There is probably no precise moment in social development when changes in degree become changes in kind, but certainly a majority of the Turks were well on their way to becoming Egyptians when their cultural identity was superseded by an identity of class. This may perhaps best be understood by combining the functional and cultural record of the aristocracy and briefly tracing its evolution through various stages of development that elapsed between the establishment of the Khedival dynasty at the beginning of the 19th century and Egyptian "independence" in 1924. In some instances relevant features and patterns will be illustrated through short biographical studies of important individuals. In other cases these developments will only be indicated through "group profiles", for a lack of ample records makes it difficult to trace the careers of more than a handful of the most prominent personalities.

Perhaps the main problem involved in using biographical data in such a study lies in the difficulty of determining with certainty whether a specific person or family is actually of Turkish descent. Unfortunately this information is not always available, and it is only in a few instances that a decision may be made on the basis of name alone.

Occasionally help comes from names containing a nisba pointing to some Turkish element (generally the place of origin) in the individual's background. The nisba may even include the Turkish suffix "li" (لي) meaning "characterized by" or "possessing" whatever the original noun represents. Among the several examples cited below appear some of the most distinguished family names in the history of modern Egypt. But as useful as such names may be, they can only be relied upon to give assistance in a limited number of cases, for more often than not a Turk bore the same name as a native Egyptian. Moreover, in some instances place-nisbas of this type may be misleading, for they may have been obtained for reasons other than place of origin.

al-Manastirli (المناستر لي): Manastir, a town in Macedonia near the city of Salonica, remained under Ottoman rule from the 15th century until the Balkan War of 1912-1913. Hasan al-Manastir took an active part in the Egyptian invasion of Syria, leading troops into Sur, Saida, Beirut and Trablos Subsequently he was to become a large landowner with holdings in Gizah as well as an izbah in Buhairah. The family waqf continued to grow after his death and by the middle of the present century totalled some 2,500 feddans in the provinces of Gizah, Minyah and Qalyubiyah.

al-Daramalli (الدراملي): Drama, seventy miles northeast of Salonica, was also a part of the Ottoman Empire for over four hundred years. Ahmad Pasha al-Daramalli, a distinguished General under Ibrahim's command during the Syrian campaign, later held numerous civil posts of considerable importance, including that of Muhafiz of Cairo from 1849 to 1852, a position later filled by his son on three separate occasions.

Other nisbas to be found among prominent 19th- and 20th-century families include Marashli (مرعشلي), Murali (مرعلي), Qawali (قوالي), Karidli (كريدلي) and al-Arna'uti (الارناؤطي). Among these are several, e.g., al-Karidli and al-Arna'uti, whose origins in Egypt not only date back to the time of Muhammad Ali, but who because of intermarriage with descendants of the ruling family retained their position among Egypt's upper class until the revolution of 1952.

The initial stage in the evolution of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy corresponds roughly to the reign of Muhammad Ali. During these early years the ruling structure was composed primarily of men collected by the Pasha to prepare the country for rapid development and--even more important--for war. Names such as Ahmad al-Minikli, Sami Bey, Ahmad Yeghen, Uthman Nur al-Din and Muhammad Khurshid immediately come to mind, and it was just such men who made up the "warrior class" around which so much of Egyptian folklore concerning the Turk was to develop. As long as Muhammad Ali's military considerations prevailed, these youthful immigrants monopolized positions in the administrative as well as military structure, the two functions frequently being combined under one man. The ruling structure was not, however, limited to a few safely entrenched families. Rank, position and individual influence were derived almost entirely from the Pasha rather than from more durable criteria such as wealth and property. As a result, the social scale within the governing class was generally fluid. Among the many who were able to rise almost overnight to positions of power, perhaps no single man symbolized so well the relevant features and patterns of the times as Uthman Nur al-Din. A Turk by birth, Nur al-Din came to

Egypt with his father soon after the turn of the century from the island of Lesbos (Mitilini) where he was born in 1794.[40] Because his father was an attendant in the service of the Pasha, Uthman was permitted to attend military school and later was sent to Italy to pursue his study of military sciences. Upon his return to Egypt in 1817, he almost immediately became engaged in many of the innovations being imposed by Muhammad Ali in his attempt to modernize the country. Thus in addition to rising through military rank to the position of Major-General by 1823, Nur al-Din was also at one time or another director of the Muhandis Khanah (Madrasat al-Handasah), founder of the famous officer school at Qasr al-'Ayni, member of a co-ordinating "Commission d'Instruction" established in 1826 to bring centralized control over the expanding number of military schools, commander of the Egyptian fleet, head of a committee charged with establishing a new system of accounting, and governor of the island of Candia. Having partaken in so many of the innovations (both military and administrative) introduced by Muhammad Ali, it is little wonder that numerous decorations and titles (including that of Pasha) were bestowed on Nur al-Din, or that Muhammad Ali further honored him by allowing him to marry a woman from the royal harem. Yet despite his many accomplishments, Uthman was unable to establish any real autonomous power, and indeed he was eventually forced to flee to Constantinople, apparently following a dispute regarding the treatment of prisoners taken during a revolt on the island of Candia in 1832.[41]

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[40]Located in the Aegean Sea some ten miles off the coast of Asia Minor, Lesbos was under Ottoman rule from 1462 until 1913.

[41]Cattaui, II, Part I, 5-6.

It was men such as Uthman Nur al-Din who helped to establish and maintain many of the traits and institutions described in this and preceding chapters. Uprooted from their homeland, it was natural that they should seek a feeling of belonging in their Ottoman culture. And as long as a majority of these characteristics did not radically change or disappear, we are safe in assuming that we are still dealing with the same culture. But even though many of these traits and organizational forms were to move across the generation gaps, the conditions within which the aristocracy functioned following the collapse of Muhammad Ali's military projects and his death soon afterward changed sufficiently to propel the Turks into a second stage of development. For example, those Turks who reached maturity during the second half of the century, and in particular up to the time of the British occupation, experienced considerable change in their education and occupational opportunities. Having been influenced by the ideas of European culture, their education was frequently broader and more scientific than that of their predecessors. Moreover, with greater numbers of trained personnel available, the government was no longer compelled to rely on a few key men. As a result, the dual (administrative and military) function of many members of the aristocracy evolved into a separation of functions, and thus the occupational range of the individual Turk became increasingly limited. Secondly the closing of many schools during the last few years of Muhammad Ali's rule as well as under Abbas meant that there were fewer provisions for the recruitment, training and elevation of Turks from lower levels into the ruling structure. And since there is a natural tendency for government officials to perpetuate themselves, it is not surprising that

the administrative and military functionaries began to establish an hereditary and therefore less mobile officialdom.

Such generalizations, however, do not do justice to individual personalities, a number of whom were to demonstrate that the aristocracy was still not completely rigid. Typical of this group was Mustafa Riaz, a self-made man who rose from obscurity to the office of Prime Minister. Although among his contemporaries there was considerable uncertainty as to Mustafa Riaz's origins,[42] he was a Turk by "character, education and sympathy". Born in 1834 in Cairo, he attended al-Mafruzah before entering a life-time of government service as a clerk in the Ministry of Finance. Within several years he had entered the entourage of Abbas and under the latter's patronage advanced from one important post to another (Keeper of the Seals, Mudir of Gizah, president of the Khedival Diwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs), until he eventually became Prime Minister, a position he was to hold on three separate occasions. As in the case of Riaz, it should be noted that following the death of Muhammad Ali it was no longer the Turks in the military who formed the dominant element within the aristocracy. As military considerations lessened, leadership passed from the "warrior class" to those concerned with economic and administrative affairs. Muhammad Sharif, Mustafa Fahmi, Mansur Yeghen and Ahmad Khayri were typical representatives of this group, and although they all received early military training

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[42]While Arab writers frequently speak of Riaz's Egyptian origins (e.g., al-Najjar, p. 25; al-Rafi'i, al-Thawrah al-'Urabiyah, p. 38; Mujahid, I, 119), most European as well as several Egyptian sources speak of his Circassian or Anatolian descent from Jewish parents. See for example Bell, p. 122; Milner, p. 126; Wallace, p. 115; Malet to Granville, Feb. 27, 1881, FO 78/3321; al-Muqtataf, XXXIX (August, 1911), 105-112. One writer, undoubtedly perplexed by conflicting reports, described Riaz as "A Moslem of Jewish race belonging to the Turkish party who had the confidence of the British." Young, p. 104.

and even served for a time in the army, their most productive years were spent as civil administrators. But if they were no longer groomed under wartime expediencies, their belief in authoritarian government was scarcely less forceful. Thus although by the time of his retirement in 1888 Riaz had acquired the reputation of being a reformer, he was guided more by pragmatic politics than humanitarian sentiment. As such, he believed in an absolute form of government which through its arbitrary but paternal powers could maintain order as well as instigate reforms. Finally it should also be noted that upward mobile Turks such as Riaz were more likely to retain the cultural and functional features characteristic of the Turkish minority longer than those who remained frozen in the lower levels where they were more rapidly assimilated into the indigenous culture.

Following the British occupation the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy once again began to undergo changes that would propel it into a third stage of development, a stage in which the remaining meaningful cultural and functional differences between Turks and Egyptians were to disappear. Whereas the greatest challenge to the Turks during the second stage of evolution took the form of a military revolt, that of the third stage was rooted in further changes in the political and economic structure. As we have seen, the more influential Turkish families, although increasingly isolated from the sources of power, had not yet been detached from its external symbols. Following the failure of the 'Urabi revolt it was primarily through British intervention and the support of the Khedive that Turks retained a monopoly over top ministerial posts. But with the withdrawal of the firm hand of Lord Cromer in 1906 and

the new strength and direction of the nationalist movement, it was indigenous Egyptians who took over the sinews of the political hierarchy. And with the rise of Sa'd Zaghlul to the office of Prime Minister in 1924, indigenous Egyptians began to fill many of the top political offices. Thereafter Turco-Egyptians, e.g., Ismail Sidqi Pasha, might occupy the position of Prime Minister, but in general they represented the same interests as upper class Egyptians. For by then the economic base of upper class Turks and Egyptians had merged, and it was at this point that the cultural identity of the Turks was largely displaced by an identity of class.

In those instances where economic interests had failed to displace the cultural interests of the Turks, the intrusion of Western ideas frequently succeeded. By the end of the 19th century it was in Europe (as well as in European schools in Egypt) rather than in the "step-mother" country that wealthy Turco-Egyptians received much of their education. Adli Yeghen, for example, attended a series of foreign schools in Cairo, including the German school, the Jesuit school and St. Cyl. Husayn Rushdi and Ahmad Ziwar, on the other hand, obtained advanced degrees in Paris. As the cultural formation of both Turks and Egyptians took place more and more in Egypt and Europe, it is little wonder that the Ottoman way of life was represented in many areas by only the merest token. Members of the "Pasha class" were still generally aware of which families were of Turkish origin--an awareness that remains to this day--but the old complex of factors that had permitted the Turks to perpetuate a distinctive culture and way of life

was no longer operative. As we shall see in the final chapter, it was only in the minds of Egyptians (and in their folklore and popular literature) that the predominance of the Turks still lingered.

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Having observed many of the most prominent characteristics of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy and some of the ways in which it affected the political and economic destiny of Egypt, a few additional words should be added concerning the extent to which the Turks influenced the social and cultural base of Egyptian society. What institutional traits that were distinctively Ottoman became dominant throughout 19th-century Egypt? How appreciably did the Turkish minority influence the Egyptian majority in matters of fashion, food, etc.? What is distinctively Ottoman about Egypt today?

Unfortunately the limits of this thesis prevent us from going back to the beginning of the contact process to determine to what extent Egypt was Ottomanized prior to the 19th century. Consequently it is difficult to establish whether a particular influence first became operative before or after the rise of Muhammad Ali. Nevertheless, there are those who believe that the years of most intense Ottomanization in Egypt coincided with the rule of Muhammad Ali.[43] Working on the assumption that the Turks did not have an opportunity to impose their organizational forms and traditions on Egypt between the years 1517 and

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[43]This idea has been suggested, although never thoroughly examined, by several students of Egyptian history. See, for example, J.H. Kramers. "Mamluks", Encyclopaedia of Islam, III, No. 40, (1929), 219, as well as his article "Muhammad Ali Pasha", Ibid., III, No. 47 (1933), 683. Also see Heyworth-Dunne, "Printing and Translations under Muhammad Ali...", p. 325.

1798, and that the Mamluks--who were the de facto rulers of Egypt during most of that period--developed institutions and patterns of life that were substantially different from those in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, it has been maintained by these writers that the power, prestige, and influence of Egypt's Turkish element only reached its apogee in the 19th century. Yet it is paradoxical that the century in which the power of the Turks reached such heights in Egypt was the same century in which European influence first strongly penetrated into the Nile Valley. Thus it was the Western world that was responsible for the spread of many of the social and political ideas current in 19th-century Egypt, while it also inspired many new social customs as well. European innovations in dress and domestic habits, art forms and language, were adopted--at least superficially--by almost the entire ruling class, which became in many ways not Ottoman in structure but a synthesis of European, Egyptian, and Turkish patterns.

Moreover, as has been argued by at least one student of Egyptian history, Muhammad Ali, as a mere commander of local levies, had no real experience in Ottoman administration before his arrival in Egypt.[44] Thus although he adopted various features of Ottoman administrative organization, he was not too set in his ways to ignore organizational forms of the Western world. For reasons already stated it must be left for others to break down the ruling system into its Ottoman, European and Egyptian sources in order to assess more precisely the extent of Turkish influence both before and after the beginning of the 19th century. A few additional

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[44]Hill, pp. 6-7.

words may be said, however, in explanation of why the Turks failed to pass on their cultural traditions to the indigenous population.

The "revolution" begun by Muhammad Ali destroyed the political, economic and social structure of Mamluk society. But a majority of the population were fellahin in origin and character, and it was they and not the Mamluks who determined the culture of the Egyptian people. Since the influence of the Turks, like that of their predecessors the Mamluks, was mostly urban, it had little effect on a nation that had taken form as a cultural unit long before their arrival, or on a people whose lives continued to be tied to the soil. As long as the values and aspirations of the Turks did not represent those of Egyptian society as a whole, there was little pressure on the part of most Egyptians for amalgamation with the Turkish element. Even when new roles and opportunities became available to a limited number of Egyptians, the desire to adopt the characteristics of Ottoman society extended chiefly to the military, political and economic spheres rather than to social behavior. And by then the more lasting influence of Western society had been brought to bear on Egypt's ruling society. Thus today, aside from a few Turks who still belong to an identifiable group and a few minor legacies in architecture, language, music, etc., nearly every trace of the Turk's presence has disappeared from Egyptian life, and it is only as a symbolic and emotional force that they continue to have any significant effect on Egyptian life.

CHAPTER VII

EGYPTIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN ELEMENT

Up to this point we have tried to identify and assess aspects of Egyptian society that affected and were affected by the Turco-Egyptians. In the present chapter we shall attempt to determine how the indigenous population reacted to these events. What ideas, notions and images did the Egyptians have of the Turks? Generally speaking the ways of thinking and feeling that provide a basis for differentiation between cultures are difficult to assess. Because they are often reflected in the distinct institutions of a particular society, a large portion of this thesis has been devoted to institutional features. At times, however, by observing some of the characteristics commonly ascribed in the literature of a society to its various members we are able to discern patterns of thought that are equally revealing. What material does the analyst of popular attitudes have by which to view the Turk through the eyes of a 19th- and 20th-century Egyptian? The following will give us some insight.

1. The observations of non-Egyptians, e.g., Western travelers, colonial officials and historians.

2. The observations of Egyptians.
   A. Historians, e.g., Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, Ali Mubarak and Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i.

B. Intellectuals and leaders in the Egyptian nationalist movement, e.g., Muhammad Abduh, Mustafa Kamil, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid.

C. Members of minority groups, e.g., the Copts.

3. As valuable as the above may be, they do not give an adequate picture of how the average Egyptian reacted to Turks and Turkish influence. A more accurate index of ordinary human feeling frequently appears in folk-lore and literature, theater and movies, and even jokes and proverbs which preserve considerable information about popular attitudes and emotions not recorded elsewhere. Based more on perceptions and feelings than fact, such sources are often non-objective. But even when filled with imaginary history they usually make sense in relation to the state of mind of the general public. As such they remain a useful guide to the collective structure of the Egyptian personality.

4. Finally by means of discussion and interviews it is possible to obtain some idea of how present-day Egyptians feel about the Turkish element and to determine whether a residue of prejudice still lingers after the Turks have been assimilated for most practical purposes into Egyptian life.

Recognition that the indigenous elements of the Egyptian population have for long been held together by an awareness of collective identity--an identity created as much by the existence of foreign ruling classes as by any positive national cohesion--may be found in any number of works by present-day Western historians. Although few seem to have made use of Arabic sources, it is not difficult to locate the type of material from which they have drawn their conclusions. In addition to the observations of the many travelers to the Nile Valley, the findings of various missions sent to report on conditions in Egypt as well as periodic remarks in the dispatches of Western Consuls-General provide ample reference to the manner in which Egypt's Turkish minority and indigenous majority related to one another. As such, these sources should help us to determine the attitude of the Egyptian toward the Turk.

During the first half of the 19th century it was not unusual for Western observers to devote entire chapters or substantial parts thereof to the "Turks" and their special status in Egypt. Thus the works of two distinguished Frenchmen, Antoine Clot Bey and P.N. Hamont, both of whom were employed in Egypt for many years, contain long sections on "Les Turcs d'Égypte", while lengthy discussions of the same subject may be found in the dispatches and reports of men such as George Boilescomte, Colonel Duhamel and John Bowring.[1] In the second half of the century references to the Turk continued to appear, although they were generally reduced to a few pages, paragraphs or even remarks scattered throughout

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[1]Clot Bey, II, 114-122., Hamont, I, 383-424., Douin, La Mission..., pp. 100-104., Cattaui, II, Part II, 352., Bowring, pp. 6-9.

a work. A majority, of course, dealt with the 'Urabi revolt,[2] but even after the British occupation attention was occasionally drawn to lingering hostility between the two elements.[3] Unfortunately much of what was reported cannot be related to our present study, for all too frequently the observer fell back on generalization and sentiments influenced more by traditional Western bias toward Turks and Egyptians than by the specific situation in 19th-century Egypt. Thus remarks pertaining to the Turk--of whom historically the Western world was more aware--were at times strikingly similar to the image of the Turk reflected in Western literature as early as the 16th century.[4] A second factor limiting the value of such reports is that relations between the two elements as viewed by the Western world--and especially Great Britain--were frequently colored by conceptions concerning their own mission in that part of the Near East. A final characteristic of such observations was the primacy given in many to factors of race. Thus in describing class formation in 19th-century Egypt, importance was frequently attributed to qualities said to be inherent in each of the two "races". For the Turk the most common were "courage", "perserverance", "dignity", and "the habit and air of command", as well as "arrogance", "self-indulgence", "corruption" and

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[2]See especially the dispatches of British Consul-General Malet for 1881 and 1882 as well as Wilfrid Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1922), passim.

[3]Dufferin to Granville, No. 7, Nov. 18, 1882, FO 78/3454., Dufferin to Granville, No. 48, Dec. 12, 1882, FO 78/3454., Baring to Salisbury, No. 118, May 15, 1891, FO 78/4385., and Baring to Goschen, No. 515, Dec. 28, 1891, FO 633/5 .

[4]Clarence Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature: 1520-1660 (Paris: Boivin, 1941) and Warner G. Rice, "Turk, Moor and Persian in English Literature from 1550 to 1600" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1927).

"lack of a sense of duty".[5] With regard to the Egyptian the qualities most generally cited were "inferiority", "submission", "obedience", or all "les vices et les défauts des peuples longtemps asservis". Emphasis, then, was given to habits and traits of dominance on the one hand and subservience on the other, characteristics which today we would be more likely to say were culturally rather than racially determined.[6] Nevertheless, as we will see in a later part of this chapter, these same traits were frequently attributed to the two elements in Egyptian literature of the 19th century.

As I have suggested, the observations may loosely be divided into three chronologically distinct groups. (1) The long but rarely apprehensive descriptions of the first half of the century. (2) The dramatic references to "racial antagonism" during the hectic days of the 'Urabi revolt. (3) The sporadic, frequently contradictory observations of Lord Cromer and others after the British occupation. The following excerpt from a dispatch of the Russian Consul-General Colonel Duhamel dated July 6, 1837 reflects the two primary themes, variously expressed,

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[5] A classic example is Lord Cromer's remark on the "energy" of the Turk. "Go where you will in Egypt, if any bit of administrative work requiring a certain amount of energy has been well done by a native official, it will certainly be found that the official in question is a Circassian or a Turco-Egyptian, who is probably more Turk than Egyptian." Cromer, II, 173.

[6] Throughout much of the 19th century biological determinism or a racial explanation of events was popular in the Western world. Many of the theories of class and class formation were written in reply to Marxist socialism, and it is not surprising that one which gained prominence claimed that classes do not rest on economic criteria but upon the conquest of a relatively unwarlike race by an aggressive one. The victors, in order to ensure lasting dominance, establish a permanent organization based on racial criteria known as the state. Ludwig Gumplowicz, La Lutte des Races, trans. C. Baye (Paris: Guillaumin, 1893).

of most observers during the first half of the century, i.e., a Turkish monopoly over government positions and the suppressed animosity of the Egyptian toward that element.

> Les Turcs forment une classe privilégiée et pour ainsi dire l'aristocratie du pays, ils remplissent tout les emplois du Governement et traitent les Arabes avec beaucoup de hauteur. Le dernier Turc se croit en droit de dicter des ordres et sait se faire obéir. Il règne une haine et une animosité profonde entre ces deux races. Mais la crainte empêche les Arabes de rebiffer, et il n'est pas rare de voir un seul Turc mettre la population de tout un village en fuite.[7]

By the 1850's the Westerner found less cause for singling out for special comment either the Turk or relations between the two communities. Thus improved relations were generally indicated by silence rather than positive confirmation, although as we have previously noted, at least one observer, J.C. McCoan, who travelled in Egypt during the 1870's, went so far as to completely disregard the Turks as a significant factor in the political and social life of Egypt. (See note 23, page 78.) It was the 'Urabi revolt, then, which brought prominence once again to Egypt's Turkish element. Two of the most vocal Westerners in Egypt at the time were British Consul-General Malet and Wilfrid Blunt. Malet's reports are significant, both because it was he who kept the British government in touch with events in Egypt, and because his dispatches continue to form the basis of numerous historical studies of the revolt. Blunt, on the other hand, was the West's most vehement supporter of the 'Urabi "nationalist movement". Both regarded the expulsion of the Turks as the governing aim of those participating in the revolt. To Malet,

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[7]Cattaui, II, Part II, 352.

however, it was not a national movement, but primarily a military revolt reflecting personal and professional grievances against the ruling circle of Turks and Circassians.

> Racial antagonism is destined to be one of the most difficult questions of the world. In the present case it was one of the most difficult questions in our little spot on earth. For years the army had been officered by Circassians. Then Said Pacha, the predecessor of Ismail Pacha, began to favor officers of native Egyptian birth. Little by little the fellah officers...began to feel that they were a power in themselves and the Circassian officers also began to be aware of it; by degrees it became a question whether the Circassians were to be allowed to continue their supremacy. That was the question which led to the demonstrations of the 1st of February, 1881; that was the question, and no other, which led to the more formidable demonstration of the 9th of the following September, when the Khedive was compelled by the fellah Colonels to dismiss the Riaz Ministry.[8]

Blunt also pointed to the primacy of "class" and "race" among the various causes of the revolt, but he extended these feelings to nearly all elements of Egyptian society.[9] Few books describe so vividly--and perhaps at times inaccurately--the intense hostility felt by the Egyptian for the Turk and Circassian as his Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt. Indeed the author needs merely to identify a person as a "Circassian" to brand him with every conceivable reactionary quality.

Allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration on the part of both Malet and Blunt, it would still seem evident that the attitude of the

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[8]Edward Malet, Egypt, 1879-1883 (London: John Murray, 1909), pp. 128-129. The italics are those of the author.

[9]In comparing the 'Urabi "movement" with the reform movement taking place at al-Azhar, Blunt says, "Arabi's was essentially a race movement and as such far more distinctly national and destined to be far more popular." Blunt, p. 100. See page 110 for similar remarks.

Egyptian toward the Turk had passed from resigned hostility in the first part of the century to something quite different at the time of the revolt. Most communities can absorb internal animosities, but hostility, abetted by the obvious weakness of the Turks, had turned to hate--at least on the part of the Egyptian officers. This was not a consequence of many years of worsening conditions, but rather of a gradual amelioration followed by the sudden reversals of 1879 and 1880 for which blame was put on the Turks and Circassians.

From the time of the British occupation onward observations with regard to the Turk were both sporadic and conflicting. On two occasions Lord Dufferin, who had been commissioned by the British government to report on conditions in Egypt soon after the battle of Tel al-Kabir, spoke of his intention to delve into the "relations of the dominant race, of Turkish origin, to the autochthonous fellaheen."[10] Although he did occasionally refer to the problem, he failed to document in any way--or even come to grips with--either the position of the Turks in Egyptian society or the nature of relations between them and the indigenous population. The statements that he did make were usually so encircled with "ifs" and "buts" as to make them all but meaningless, while in his final report of February 6, 1883, he passed the question on to future Consuls-General with words such as, "If, on the other hand, the prestige of the notabilities of Turkish extraction is still more considerable than a political philosopher might desire, we must accept it as the unavoidable outcome of the irrevocable past, and as in some measure

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[10]Dufferin to Granville, No. 7, Nov. 18, 1882, FO 78/3454, and Dufferin to Granville, No. 48, Dec. 12, 1882, FO 78/3454.

justified by the superior education, ability and energy of a vigorous race."[11] Others, however, were to follow Malet in interpreting developments in Egypt almost exclusively in terms of the "sharply defined line" separating Turks in Egyptians,[12] and even Lord Cromer on occasion saw Turkish-Egyptian animosity as a key to political behavior.

> In the first place I do not think His Highness is nearly so convinced as I am that the anti-Turk feeling amongst the Egyptians is in reality the most important feature in the local political situation He looks only to the present moment and sees that everything is quiet. He fails, as it appears to me, to notice the under-current of native opinion or to appreciate sufficiently the fact that if at any time the British army should withdraw, the dislike of the Egyptians to the dominant race might again give rise to a great deal of trouble.[13]

It is the last sentence which perhaps best explains Cromer's periodic mention of hostility between the two elements. Although subservient and dominant roles--and there would still seem to have been some validity to them--could lead to a perceptible amount of animosity, evidence would not seem to justify statements such as that quoted above It would appear that reports of this type were tailored not only to reflect the anti-Turk bias of many of those who read them, but also to justify the prolongation of the occupation, just as Malet had used them to justify intervention and Blunt to justify the revolt. Nevertheless, spaced over a period of well over fifty years and supported by

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[11]Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LXXXIII (Accounts and Papers, Vol. 46), Cmd. 3529, Feb. 6, 1883, "Reorganization in Egypt", p. 42.

[12]See Moore to Dufferin, Jan. 13, 1883, FO 78/3565. Moore at the time was attached to Dufferin's mission in Egypt

[13]Cromer to Salisbury, No. 118, May 15, 1891, FO 78/4385.

numerous reports of a similar nature, the statements we have encountered in this brief survey would seem to leave little doubt that there was not only a considerable feeling of "separateness" and "self-identification" among both Egyptians and Turks, but that a predominant attitude of each toward the other throughout much of the 19th century was one of hostility. Even in the periods during which open hostility nearly vanished, popular sentiment still contained a residue of ill-will toward the Turco-Egyptian Our evidence, however, would have to be considered far from conclusive if left unsupported by the testimony of Egyptians themselves

Although opinions expressed in historical interpretation may exist in only one mind, they often reflect or report the mood of still larger segments of a community. As such, the historical text becomes a useful source for a study of attitudes. From among the numerous Egyptians who have written histories dealing with modern Egypt, four have been selected on the basis of chronological distribution and--at least in the case of three--the impact their opinions have had on Egyptian historiography. But before taking up the works of these four authors, it may be useful to examine briefly some attitudes expressed in the literature of the Arabs prior to the 19th century.

The fact that Egyptains have lived for centuries in symbiosis with alien elements does not necessarily indicate that many--especially among the fellahin--have had a distinct idea of the world outside of Egypt Yet if 19th-century Egyptians had any such awareness, it was probably with regard to the Turks. Tribes of Turkish origin had been in contact

with the Near East as early as the 8th century--as warring elements which threatened the eastern borders of the Abbasid Empire, as a source of manpower for the Caliph's army, and in the 9th century as the power behind the Caliph. By the latter date Turks were being sent as governors to distant parts of the empire, including Egypt. Repercussions of Turkish contact were noticeable in numerous aspects of Near Eastern life, but in the literature of the Arabs, and later in that of the Egyptians, the aspect of Turkish character that received the greatest attention was military valor. An early example in Arabic literature are the 9th-century comments of Jahiz of Basra on "The Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in General".[14] In a discourse addressed to al-Fath ibn Khaqan, the Turkish wazir of Mutawakkil, the author quickly establishes the military prowess of the Turks. " . . . and if a thousand Turkish horsemen charge and discharge a thousand arrows all at once, they prostrate a thousand men."[15] The reason for this proficiency was that a Turk's whole life was considered to revolve around the acquisition of military skills.

> And whereas they do not busy themselves with industry and merchandise and medicine and agriculture and engineering and forestry and architecture and irrigation and the raising of crops, but all their interest is in raids and incursions and seeking for plunder and subduing countries, and their energy is turned in that direction and fitted for such exercises and limited and adapted accordingly; they have made themselves completely masters of that department, and have learned all that is to be learned in it.[16]

These skills, in turn, infused the Turks with a "lust" for war and plunder, and consequently there were few that could withstand and none

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[14]"Exploits of the Turks and the Army of the Khalifate in General", trans. G. T. Harley Walker, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, (Oct 1915), 631-697.

[15]Ibid., p. 666.

[16]Ibid., pp. 684-685.

that desired to oppose them. It is no wonder, the author concludes, that "the Arab armies fear no people as they fear the Turks."[17]

Writers of succeeding centuries continued to reflect both an awareness that Turks were distinct from Arabs and that an animosity had grown up between them. An interesting example of this hostility has been uncovered by Professor Gabriel Baer in his study of Egyptian guilds. One of his most important sources for the early years of Ottoman rule in Egypt was the Gotha manuscript.[18] Writing in the late 16th or early 17th century, the unknown author describes the deteriorating effect that Ottoman rule had on Egyptian guilds. Not only were they infiltrated by members of the Ottoman military corps, but in many cases they were completely monopolized by them. In the ensuing struggle over control of guild affairs, the Turks are accused not only of having caused the decline of the guilds, but of having discriminated against Egyptians and destroying their tekyes while keeping intact their own. "This seems to have generated fervent hatred of the Turks, who are described as beasts and accused of being sodomites. It is not only the nakib of the guilds that is superior to the governor, but Arabs in general are superior to Turks."[19]

The first three volumes of Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti's 'Aja'ib al-'Athar fi al-Tarajim wa al-'Akhbar also report the existence of friction between the two elements during the 17th and 18th centuries.[20] We are

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[17] Ibid., p. 689.

[18] See Gabriel Baer, Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1964), pp. 2-3, for more information on this manuscript entitled Kitab al-Dhakha'ir wa al-Tuhaf fi bir al-Sana'i' wa al-Hiraf.

[19] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[20] See, for example, al-Jabarti, II, 151-152 in which the author describes armed clashes between Egyptians and Turkish troops.

primarily concerned, however, with volume four in which the author deals with events during the early years of Muhammad Ali's reign. Sensitive toward his subject matter, al-Jabarti rarely attempted to conceal his bias toward those about whom he wrote, and it is quite obvious that he had little faith in either the new ruling elite or its system of government. The corruption of the Turks is described in some detail, while the general condition of the country under their administration is regarded as little better than what it had been under the Mamluks. It is the ruling family, however, which stood as a symbol of the entire ruling class as well as the driving force behind it, against which al-Jabarti directed his most vehement attacks. The following passage recounting the actions of Ibrahim Pasha in 1813 when his father travelled to the Hijaz, reflects both a tone and approach expressed throughout the fourth volume of al-Jabarti's study.

> His son only remained [in Cairo] a few days after his departure, spending one night in Gizah and another with his brother in Bulaq. He then set out for Upper Egypt to continue his persecution of its people. He treated them as would the Tartars when they roamed over the countryside--humiliating esteemed members of the community, looting their livestock and property, seizing cattle and sheep, calling upon them to account for their actions and expenditures, attributing to them crimes they had never committed and then imposing huge fines on them amounting to much more than they had. He would demand that they obtain it, seal it up, and pay him immediately, which they were unable to do. Thereupon, he would subject them to all kinds of punishment--beating, suspension, branding, burning. I've heard, although I cannot verify it, that he bound a man to a long piece of wood and then had him turned over a blazing fire like kibab by men holding either end of the plank. Such a thing is not improbable for an ignorant young man less than twenty years old who, having arrived from his homeland without having seen anything else, was completely uneducated and without knowledge of the Shari'a, the commandments or the prohibitions. I've heard that someone asked him,

> "Who gave all this to you?", and he answered, "Who do you think?" and the other replied, "Allah!" To this Ibrahim answered, "He gave me nothing. My father gave it to me." ...He was schooled in a morality taught him by his father, and that was the acquisition of wealth in any way possible.[21]

Although the most serious accusations--including heresy--are tempered by the indirect nature of the evidence, it is not difficult to understand why the publication of the 'Aja'ib was forbidden until some fifty years after the death of its author, that is, soon after the accession of Tawfiq.[22] But if Muhammad Ali, his family, and the Turkish class in general entered 19th-century historiography as supreme villains, the attitude toward them was to vary from era to era as well as from author to author.

Ali Mubarak, like al-Jabarti, reacted with varying degrees of sympathy toward the historical figures of his time. But since he was primarily a compiler of biographical and topographical data, his bias is reflected more in his selection of material than in the patterns of thought into which it is woven. Of the four authors under study, he was the only one closely associated with the Muhammad Ali family, and as such one of the first indigenous Egyptians to be appointed to highest-level government positions. A member of the 1844 mission to France, Ali Mubarak returned to Egypt in 1850 and rose from the post of instructor at the military school in Tourah to Minister of Public Works, Waqfs and Education in 1868. It was in the latter field that he made his most significant contributions, holding the position of Minister of Education in several Ministries from 1868 until his death in 1893. As a member

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[21] Ibid., IV, 197.

[22] For more detailed comments on the suppression of al-Jabarti's study, see David Ayalon, "The Historian al-Jabarti and His Background", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, XXIII (1960), Part II, 217-249.

of the ruling elite, it is not surprising that in his monumental study, al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyah, he praised the ruling family for its modernization and development of Egypt. To have done otherwise would have been to depreciate his own contributions. Only Said, who had denied him any significant government position, is ignored by the author, and it is in a similar fashion, i.e., by omission, that he indicates criticism of those who opposed the Khedival family.

Turning to still another of Egypt's better known historians, we find that Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i has treated the Turkish element and the Khedival family in a manner quite unlike either al-Jabarti or Ali Mubarak. And because his texts have probably been consulted more frequently than those of any other 20th-century Egyptian historian, his attitudes toward the Turk undoubtedly had--at least until 1952--a significant effect on the minds of numerous Egyptians. al-Rafi'i was a fervent supporter of Egypt's national movement as well as an historian. As such, he was greatly concerned with many of the political issues of his time. Thus it is not surprising that Egypt's cultural diversity, which was regarded by many of al-Rafi'i's contemporaries as weakening national self-consciousness,[23] has been minimized in his historical studies by stressing the assimilation of all elements--including the Turks--into Egyptian life and society.

> This [assimilation] also applied to Muhammad Ali's associates who were not of Egyptian origin, many of them being of Turkish or Macedonian descent. But the wars in which they participated under the standard of Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim separated them from their original homeland and assimilated them into Egyptian society. Egypt became a glorious homeland for them

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[23]See pages 163-165 of this study.

> and for their families and descendants for whose sake they fought. Their effort and blood were expended for her elevation and glory. They were assimilated into the nation and became a part of the new Egyptian community.[24]

Even more surprising is the author's treatment of Muhammad Ali, who takes on qualities which until then few historians had attributed to any Egyptian, except perhaps Ahmad 'Urabi. Thus Muhammad Ali's power, although described as being partially personal, is also depicted as having been derived from the people who not only accepted him as their ruler but regarded his policies and achievements with both pride and approval. He, in return, is said to have undertaken his program "in the name of Egypt" and for her benefit. Even more important, al-Rafi'i implies that Muhammad Ali created in Egypt a new spirit, for by giving her an independent identity he had revived a long-dormant national self-awareness.[25]

This rather unusual interpretation of events in early 19th-century Egypt appears in a sub-chapter of Asr Muhammad Ali entitled "The Ruling Class". As indicated above, a key word throughout the analysis is indamaj (to be assimilated, to merge). Indeed it is used with such unusual frequency that one cannot help but feel that al-Rafi'i has attempted to popularize a theory held by himself and his fellow nationalists by projecting it into the past. The section, however, takes on a somewhat more traditional tone when at the end of his analysis the author adds, almost as an afterthought, "It is true that a group of Egyptians who were of Turkish or Macedonian origin continued to look upon

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[24] al-Rafi'i, Asr Muhammad Ali, p. 641.

[25] Ibid., p. 640.

the genuine Egyptian with contempt, and this mental attitude persisted until it became one of the causes of the 'Urabi revolt."[26]

Our fourth and final study, a master's thesis by a recent graduate of Cairo University, reflects the thoughts of a student exposed to history as it has recently been taught at an Egyptian university. In a study of the social habits and institutions of Egypt's Turkish element during the early part of the 19th century,[27] Muhammad Salah al-Din Hilmi echoes the same blunt criticism expressed over a hundred years earlier in 'Aja'ib al-Athar. In a short résumé of his objectives, the author states:

> La lutte contre ces Turcs se poursuivit alors, ce qui exigea de plus en plus l'esprit de haine chez les égyptiens contre ces colons étrangers, pour s'en débarrasser. C'est pourquoi, je considère la révolution égyptienne actuelle, comme une étape finale à cette longue et amère lutte. Par elle, les efforts de plusieurs générations, furent couronnées enfin par la destitution du dernier représentant de la dynastie turque de Mohamed-Ali, et la proclamation de la République. Cette thèse montre comment les turcs exagéraient dans l'exploitation illégale des biens du peuple égyptien à cause de leur vie luxueuse à ses dépens.[28]

This, then, is the point of view from which Hilmi begins his thesis, and the data is treated accordingly. In many ways the attitudes that emerge from this passage reflect those transmitted to a still larger audience in works of fiction and by the Egyptian press and other news media since the revolution of 1952. Thus the Turks are depicted

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[26] Ibid., p. 642.

[27] Muhammad Salah al-Din Hilmi, "Hayyah al-'Atrak al-Ijtima'iyah fi Misr fi al-Nasf al-'Awwal min al-Qarn al-Tasi' 'Ashr" (unpublished Master's thesis, Dept. of History, Cairo University, 1960).

[28] Ibid., p. 4.

as an alien minority who prospered in Egypt at the expense of the indigenous population and whose presence continued to be felt as late as the middle of the 20th century, both as a symbol and causative agent of the past against which Egypt is now revolting.

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A second source to which we may turn to obtain insight into the feeling of Egyptians toward the Turk is that group of intellectuals who during the early part of the 20th century turned their attention to the problems of social reform and Egyptian nationalism, e.g., men such as Muhammad Abduh, Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid. In certain instances their views paralleled traditional attitudes toward the Turk. Thus Muhammad Abduh might complain that too many important government positions were held by Turco-Egyptians and suggest to Lord Cromer that he use his influence to encourage the appointment of more Egyptians to Ministerial posts.[29] Or he might attack members of the Khedival family for pursuing policies that swelled their own pockets rather than those of their subjects.[30] But in general the thinking of these intellectuals did not reflect the anti-Turk prejudice so frequently reported by the historians. One of their primary concerns was the unity of Egypt, and it was in terms of this concept rather than Turco-Egyptian rivalry that they interpreted the past and looked to the future. Unity became the key to the evacuation of the British and eventual independence, and thus it was the task of the intellectual to promote a truly Egyptian personality by bringing all

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[29]Hourani, Arabic Thought..., p. 159.

[30]Muhammad Rida, Ta'rikh al-Ustadh al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad Abduh (Cairo: Matba'at al-Manarah, 1947/48), II, 382.

elements into the total national community. Disunity--and not the Turk--was the enemy which Egypt had to overcome. As a result, attitudes toward the Turk underwent a near metamorphosis. We have already noted how it affected the work of the historian al-Rafi'i, and the same may be said about the writings of many of his contemporaries.

In looking to the past, the period of Turkish predominance became at worst a gloomy tale recalled by one's parents or grandparents about conditions that no longer existed.

> How often our fathers and mothers, our grandfathers and grandmothers, would tell us about the rule of those who looked with scorn and contempt upon Egyptians. They used to thrash them with whips, with or without reason, and this is what led to the popular proverb 'A service rendered to the Oguz ends in a beating.'.[31]

Furthermore, in surveying the events of 1882, the nationalists criticized the 'Urabists for their "ethnic hostility". Thus Mustafa Kamil pointed out that the occupation might never have occurred if it had not been for the split between Turks and Egyptians.[32] Similarly Muhammad Abduh, who during the revolt had been primarily concerned with the power of an unjust autocrat, questioned 'Urabi's motives in calling for political reform, suggesting that in doing so he had only sought to legitimize his efforts to displace his Turkish and Circassian superiors.[33]

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[31] Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mudhakkarat fi al-Siyasat al-Misriyah (Cairo: 1951), I, 20. The Oguz, a term used pejoratively by many Egyptians when referring to the Mamluks or later to the Turks and Circassians, were the Turkish tribe from whom the Ottomans traditionally traced their descent.

[32] al-Rafi'i, Mustafa Kamil (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahdhat al-Misriyah, 1950), p. 142.

[33] Rida, I, 198, 207.

In looking to the future, the nationalists called upon Egyptians to abandon their allegiance to any entity other than Egypt, e.g., allegiances to pan-Islamism or Ottomanism, the Copts or the Turks. This so-called "dual allegiance" could only weaken Egypt in its efforts to surmount the urgent problems of the time. Indeed there was no reason for such ties, for Egypt was a nation set apart from all others by specific characteristics shared by all Egyptians without distinction. These traits, inherited and acquired, spiritual and material, created a bond among Egyptians stronger than those to any other entity. It was perhaps Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid who treated this theme with most success, and in numerous articles published in al-Jaridah between 1907 and 1915 he explored its many facets. Thus in an article which appeared on January 2, 1913 entitled "Our Solidarity", he stated:

> We have a long history whose phases and stages are joined by firm links into one chain whose beginning is in pre-history and whose end is the link through which we are now passing. It encircles our age and our customs. Therefore, we are the Pharaohs of Egypt, we are the Arabs of Egypt, we are the Mamluks of Egypt, and we are her Turks. We are the Egyptians.[34]

But despite this concern with the essential unity of Egypt as a nation, there remained a few within Egypt's intellectual community who did not regard absorption into Egyptian culture with the same urgency as did Lutfi al-Sayyid and his fellow nationalists. Thus for a fuller understanding of the problem of "dual allegiance" we should also examine the thoughts of those who expressed an unwillingness to relinquish their Ottoman identity.

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[34]Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Ta'ammulat (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1965), p. 65. For further discussion of this topic see also Lutfi al-Sayyid, Safahat Matwiyah (Cairo: 1946), pp. 32-34 as well as Husayn Fawzi al-Najjar, Lutfi al-Sayyid (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahirah al-Hadithah, 1963), pp. 108-111.

Within Egypt's intellectual community those of Turkish origin have been both numerous and active, as is testified to by names such as Sami al-Barudi, Hasan Husni al-Tuwayrani, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Muhammad and Mahmud Taymur, Ahmad Shawqi, Wali al-Din Yeghen and many others. In most instances they, as other "Turks" in Egypt, seem to have retained an awareness of their origins, and indeed it is from them that we have obtained our few viable pictures of what it has meant to be a "Turk" in Egypt.[35] But if most retained a psychological awareness of their Turkish identity, almost none displayed an intellectual desire to preserve it. A survey of their works turns up few who could be called apologists of Turco-Egyptianism, and fewer still as exponents of the aristocracy with which they are generally connected. In dramatic works their images of the Turk have generally coincided with those of other Egyptian authors. In social and political tracts they have had almost nothing to say about the status of the Turk within Egypt, while in looking without their views have only occasionally strayed from those expressed by their Egyptian compatriots. Indeed in all fields they have shown a tendency to embrace the intellectual outlook of their fellow countrymen, which is an indication of the assimilation that, at least from the turn of the century onward, most of these intellectuals seemed to desire. Of those willing to write on the subject of their Ottoman identity, only a handful openly expressed a desire to "survive" as a Turk, and perhaps none so eloquently as Wali al-Din Yeghen.

For over three generations the name Yeghen was nearly synonymous with Egypt's ruling class. The word itself, which in Turkish means

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[35]See especially Tawfiq al-Hakim's Awdat al-Ruh, which will be discussed in a later part of this chapter.

"nephew" or more specifically "son of the sister", was adopted as a laqab by the three sons of Muhammad Ali's sister. As such, it gives an indication of their status during the early years of the 19th century, and undoubtedly a meaningful prototype of the entire Turkish element could be developed from a thorough inquiry into the family history from that time onward. A glance into any standard collection of Egyptian biographies reveals the impact of the Yeghens on nearly every aspect of Egyptian life. Nevertheless, it is a member of this same family to whom we turn as the voice within Egypt's intellectual community that perhaps most articulately expressed an unwillingness to accept Egypt as its first or only homeland. A brief sketch of Wali al-Din's life, emphasizing those events that may have been responsible for the formation of ideas later expressed in his literary works, should help to explain the question of identity as it was faced not only by Wali al-Din, but undoubtedly by numerous other members of Egypt's Turkish community.

When Wali al-Din was born in 1873, he joined his cousins Adli and Ahmad Midhat, as well as his brother Yusuf Hamdi, as one of a third generation of Yeghens who were to leave a significant mark on Egyptian history.[36] Although he was born in Constantinople, his formative years

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[36]Adli Pasha, one of the outstanding figures of the post-War period, was Prime Minister three times following World War One, while Ahmad Midhat Pasha held posts of Ministerial rank on three separate occasions during the same period. Yusuf Hamdi, like Wali al-Din, was to gain considerable success as an author and poet, although he never achieved the heights of his brother. All four were descendants of Ibrahim Pasha Yeghen, who was himself governor of the Yemen for many years during the reign of Muhammad Ali. The material for this brief biography was obtained primarily from the following sources: Daghir, 764-768.; Muhammad Mandur, Wali al-Din Yeghen (Beirut: Dar al-Sharq, 1960); Zirikli, IX, 136-137; al-Hilal, XXIX (May 1, 1921), 777-784; al-Muqtataf, XVIII (April 1, 1921), 375-378.

were passed in Egypt under circumstances similar to those of many Turco-Egyptians. His father, who had married the daughter of a Circassian Amir who had fled to Ottoman Turkey, died in 1879 a few years after their return to Egypt. Wali al-Din, who was still only a child, was taken into the family of his uncle, Ali Haydar Pasha, who was then Minister of Finance in a short-lived Ministry of Tawfiq. As did most of his relatives, Wali al-Din attended the finest schools of his day--the madrasat al-Anjal, established by Tawfiq for the education of his own sons; the madrasat Marcel, named after its French director; and finally the Egyptian government schools. Upon completing his education, he began almost immediately to write articles for various Cairo newspapers, although like most members of the family he also held a government position, working for several years in the Foreign Section of the Royal Cabinet. In 1896, at the age of twenty-four, he travelled to Constantinople to spend a year with his uncle, Muhammad Fa'iq Yeghen. This too was not an unusual diversion for the children of wealthy Turco-Egyptians, although by then only a few, like Adli Pasha, remained for three or four years and received a part of their education there. Despite his short stay, Wali al-Din was captivated by the beauty of the city. As he was to write some years later, "I used to yearn for Constantinople when I was there. What am I to do when I am so far away?"[37] Returning to Cairo the following year, he helped to publish the newspaper al-Istiqamah, while at the same time contributing numerous articles to both the Arabic and Turkish sections of the newspaper al-Qanun al-Asasi. Most of the articles were political in nature, a favorite target being the tyrannical government of Abdul Hamid. Indeed so violent were his

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[37] al-Hilal, May 1, 1921, p. 778.

attacks, that al-Istiqamah was eventually banned from Ottoman Turkey. Nevertheless, upon returning to Constantinople in 1898 Wali al-Din was again honored by the Sultan, who made him a member of the Majlis al-Ma'arif al-A'li. But by 1902 his criticism of the Sultan had become so violent that he was exiled to the province of Sivas where he remained until the Young Turk revolt of 1908. Returning to Egypt soon afterward, he again turned to his pen as his primary occupation, writing a book on the Turkish revolt, numerous articles for papers such as al-Muqattam, al-Mu'ayyad, and al-Ahram, and translating several works from Turkish to Arabic. At the same time he held a post in the Ministry of Justice and later became Arab Secretary for the Royal Chamberlain, a position he held until his death in 1921.

From this short and admittedly selective biography, some of the ambiguities of Wali al-Din's identity become apparent. Indeed even his biographers had difficulty placing him, some calling him Egyptian and others an Arabized Turk.[38] As we have noted, the influences that shaped his character were both Egyptian and Turkish. Thus although he lived the greater part of his life in Egypt, he spoke and wrote both Arabic and Turkish, lived, worked, and had family connections in both Cairo and Constantinople, and was even decorated by both governments. If there were few Turco-Egyptians who had either his intense or prolonged physical and emotional ties with Ottoman Turkey, there were many who shared with him at least one or more elements of this duality. For most, political and economic connections with Turkey were tenuous or non-existent, but many remained aware of their partial alienation from Egyptian life on the one hand and their intellectual and

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[38]See, for example, Daghir, p. 764 and al-Muqattam, May 28, 1909.

cultural ties with Ottomanism on the other. And for a few still another factor contributing to the ambiguity of their position, especially following the British occupation, was the question of citizenship--a problem to be dealt with shortly. Wali al-Din's answer to the question of allegiance is best expressed in his own words.

> May Allah and every true Ottoman who has read my works bear witness that I am prejudiced toward neither religion nor race. I am a Turk. And to me the most loathsome of Allah's worshippers is a Turk who transgresses. I love all Ottomans and stand by any of them who are oppressed. Moreover, I love the Arab, a love that blends with the soul and flows with the blood through the veins. I am an Arab by tongue and pen, an Arab by inclination. And whosoever loathes the Arab is loathed by me.[39]

The attachment to Ottoman Turkey expressed in these lines undoubtedly exceeded that of most "Turks" in Egypt--except perhaps those who had fled there during the latter part of the 19th century to escape the regime of Abdul Hamid. Even among pan-Ottomanists there were few in Egypt who would adopt his views, for Wali al-Din was a Turk first and an Ottoman second. Beyond that he was an Arab--"by tongue and pen"--but not an Egyptian. This rejection of any allegiance to Egypt or even the concept of an Egyptian nation is confirmed by his views on the 'Urabi revolt, the nationalist movement, and the British occupation. Those who had rallied to the support of 'Urabi he referred to as insurrectionists.[40] To those who demanded "Egypt for the Egyptians" he replied "Egypt for the Ottomans".[41] And those who sought British evacuation and constitutional

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[39] Wali al-Din Yeghen, al-Saha'if al-Sud (Cairo: Matba'at al-Muqtataf, 1910), p. 108. This book is a collection of articles by Wali al-Din originally published in al-Muqattam.

[40] Wali al-Din Yeghen, al-Ma'lum wa al-Majhul (Cairo: Matba'at al-Ma'arif, 1911), I, 29.

[41] Ibid., p. 30.

rule he called "riffraff" and "rabble", men with neither sufficient experience to rule nor ability to recognize the security, justice and prosperity that a quarter of a century of British rule had brought to their land.[42] It is unfortunate that we have no appraisal of Wali al-Din's words by other Turco-Egyptians so that we might relate his feelings to those of others in the same position. A clear contrast does exist, however, between his articles in al-Muqattam and al-Mu'ayyad and those by Lutfi al-Sayyid in al-Jaridah calling upon all who lived in Egypt--no matter what their origin--to proclaim their allegiance to Egypt. It was just such sentiments as those expressed by Wali al-Din to which Lutfi al-Sayyid was reacting.

For most Turco-Egyptians, however, the problem of identity was to be clarified by the political upheavals that followed the Young Turk revolt of 1908 and the First World War. Thus the overthrow of Abdul Hamid and the proclamation of a new constitution in Turkey prompted many Turks in Egypt to return to their fatherland, and some of them had been in Egypt for several generations. It was the latter to whom Lutfi al-Sayyid directed a special appeal in an article published in August, 1908.[43] A majority, however, recognized that their primary committment was to Egypt and even the Hizb al-Ummah, the political arm of al-Jaridah, could claim among its supporters many Egyptians of Turkish origin, including Abd al-Khaliq Tharwat, a future Prime Minister and a member of a highly respected family of Turkish origin. For others the establishment of the Protectorate in 1914, the withdrawal of Turkey from the Arab countries following World

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[42] Ibid., p. 17 and Yeghen, al-Saha'if al-Sud, p. 45.

[43] Lutfi al-Sayyid, Sahafat Matwiyah, p. 32.

War One, and the independent status granted to Egypt in 1924 removed any lingering doubt that Egypt was a distinct political entity, as did a law of 1926 defining more precisely qualifications for Egyptian citizenship.[44] Although the passage of laws cannot completely dissolve what is primarily a psychological attachment, they can place such ties in an entirely new perspective. Caught between the influences of two nations and two cultures, most Turco-Egyptians realized that although they might be Turks in some of their deepest memories, their most meaningful ties were with Egypt. Indeed there was now no real alternative, other than returning to Turkey. As a semi-independent nation Egypt was faced with many new problems and it was to these rather than to the survival of Ottomanism that the intellectual community turned its attention.

While the comments of Egyptian historians and intellectuals on the Turkish element in Egypt must be considered an important source for a study of Egyptian attitudes toward the Turks, we cannot assume that they always express the prevailing spirit of the times. As we have noted, the intellectual may represent the attitudes of some particular group or hope to manipulate public opinion for political purposes, while the historian may seek to interpret events in light of a particular theory. In addition, both the intellectual and historian in Egypt undoubtedly felt somewhat inhibited by a government which until 1952 was presided over by descendants of the very family that established the dominance of the Turks. In this vein it is interesting to note that among the

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[44]As early as 1889 Egyptian law provided that anyone born in Egypt or any Ottoman subject who had resided in Egypt for fifteen years was an Egyptian subject, but vagueness surrounding the principles of domicile curtailed its effectiveness. For additional remarks on this subject, see James H. Scott, The Law Affecting Foreigners in Egypt (Edinburgh: William Green, 1908), pp. 106-108.

few less restrained outcries against the Turco-Egyptian, those of the Copts were frequently the most vehement.

> Egyptian society at the beginning of the present age was in reality a Turkish society. To spend one's summer vacation in Istanbul was a normal thing. Every year, the Egyptian government sent the jizyah to Turkey. All the wealthy families were of Turkish or mixed Turkish descent. There were scarcely any rich Egyptians.... All the Prime Ministers were racially Turks; sometimes in the days of Ismail and Tawfiq the Council of Ministers did not even contain one true Egyptian. We used to see them, those ridiculous and vulgar aristocrats, taking drives in their carriages over Qasr al-Nil Bridge. They were always preceded by a qawwas,[45] or even two, in their fool jackets, carrying long sticks and running on before the carriage shouting at the top of their voices, 'Hayya! Hayya!'[46]

The language that the Coptic writer Salamah Musa has used to describe the Turco-Egyptian characterizes an approach which is not always objective. In such terms as "ridiculous and vulgar aristocrats" one detects the minority frustrations--a sense of inferiority coupled with anger--which so often develop within one cultural group faced with the predominance of another. Naturally the ranking of ethnic or religious groups provokes dissatisfaction on the part of those who find themselves in lower levels, but this is often more noticeable in the writings of Copts than in those

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[45] Qawwas is an Arabic term meaning "archer" which was applied in the Ottoman Empire to armed servants attached to high dignitaries. Descriptions of the qawwas, who in Egypt as elsewhere in the Near East became a symbol of Turkish rule, may be found in the works of such travellers to Egypt as Robert Curzon and James St. John, descriptions that in themselves help to explain the resentment felt toward these personal bodyguards of the ruling class. See Robert Curzon, Visits to Monasteries in the Levant (London: Arthur Barker, 1955), p. 54.

[46] Salamah Musa, Tarbiyat Salamah Musa (Cairo: Mu'assasat al-Khanji, 1962), p. 33.

of Muslim members of the indigenous population.[47] The fact that Musa's comments were written at a time when the conditions that had originally caused hostility toward the Turks had nearly disappeared reflects not only the tenacity of attitudes once they have been formed, but a dissatisfaction among Copts with their own social progress and standing as compared to that of other Egyptians. Although it might be argued that Musa was merely supporting Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid's plea for total allegiance to Egypt,[48] his vigorous condemnation of the Turco-Egyptians would seem to have strengthened the very ties that Lutfi al-Sayyid sought to eliminate. Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalize about attitudes on the basis of only a handful of sources, especially since Musa had at one time incurred numerous personal setbacks at the hands of Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi Pasha, who was himself of Turkish descent.[49] These reversals undoubtedly contributed to the ill-feeling that led Musa to charge that Sidqi's policies during the 1930's had supported "the continued exploitation (of Egypt) under a Turco-Circassian regime."[50] But if the selections tell us more about the men

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[47] Sentiments echoing those of Musa appear in the following passage by the Copt Amir Boktor. "Perhaps the only aristocrat who shows a sort of stupid superiority complex is the wealthy Egyptian of Turkish origin. Neither he nor the Levantine likes to say that he is Egyptian regardless of the fact that legally speaking he is so. In the case of the Turk the reason for this is the fact that he likes to boast of his ancestors who were for a long time the rulers of the country." Amir Boktor, School and Society in the Valley of the Nile (Cairo: Elias Press, 1936), pp. 52-53.

[48] Musa warmly applauded Lutfi al-Sayyid's articles in al-Jaridah attacking "dual allegiances". Musa, p. 32.

[49] In 1930 Sidqi Pasha not only banned the publication of two magazines put out by Musa--the monthly al-Majallat al-Jadid and the weekly al-Masri, both of which reflected the very liberal ideas of their editor--but engineered his expulsion from the Egyptian Academy for Scientific Culture. Musa, p. 109

[50] Ibid.

who wrote them then about those whom they attacked, they nevertheless remain important as an additional manifestation of the varying shades of feeling toward the Turkish element.

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, our purpose in introducing literary texts as historical evidence has been twofold:

1) To help define the concept of the "Turk" as it developed in the mind of the Egyptian and emerged from his literature--both dramatic and non-dramatic--of the 19th and 20th centuries.

2) To show how Turks and Egyptians reacted to each other when forced into intimate symbiosis.

In the literature surveyed thus far, we are faced with an interesting series of contradictions in the attitudes of Egyptians toward the Turk. Some responded with overt hostility (al-Jabarti) and others with lavish praise (Ali Mubarak). Some emphasized the fusion of the Turkish element into Egyptian society (al-Rafi'i) or sought to minimize Turkish distinctness by urging the Turks to look to their national, i.e., Egyptian, identity as the basis of social and political consciousness (Lufti al-Sayyid). Others viewed the period of Turco-Egyptian symbiosis as a form of parasitism that was advantageous only to the Turk, who was to be rooted out by revolution (Salah Hilmi).

Although these authors do not cover the entire range of opinion pertaining to the Turks of Egypt, they do reflect the major sentiments expressed in the non-dramatic literature of the past century-and-a-half. The lack of agreement among them may be partly explained by two factors which emerge from the foregoing survey.

1) Each era tends to interpret the past in light of its own preoccupations. In Egypt, where most historians and intellectuals have been active participants in the political events of their time, ideas frequently reflect not only an author's personal involvement in such events, but also his concern with the reader's response. Thus whereas the attitudes of Ali Mubarak toward the Turk reflect his close association with the Khedival family, those of al'Rafi'i and Lutfi al-Sayyid reflect the aims and goals of Egyptian nationalism prior to World War One, those of Salah Hilmi the goals of Egypt since the Revolution of 1952, and those of Salama Musa the frustrations of a minority group.

2) The lack of a clear definition for the term "Turk" made it difficult for Egyptians to accurately assess the role of the Turk in Egyptian society and all too frequently led to generalizations based more on prejudice than actual fact. The primary offenders were those who regarded the Turks as a conveniently vague scapegoat on whom to heap the blame for the ills of society. As will be seen in the second half of this survey, it was in the dramatic literature of this same period that the image of the Turk assumed a more cohesive and meaningful form.

Although the attitudes of the Turks toward the Egyptian are somewhat more difficult to document, it would appear that for many years the bonds that held the Turks together and gave them a sense of identity were strengthened by their feeling of superiority over Egypt's indigenous population. But by the end of the First World War those Turks who still clung to their Ottoman identity represented only a minor sub-culture in

Egyptian life and society. For most, "Turkism" had become little more than an object of sentimental recall for which Wali al-Din's eloquent pleas were the last flowering in Egyptian literature.

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In order to speculate about the thoughts and feelings, purposes and motives of a people, the historian must frequently turn to the dramatic literature of the society in question. Although the novel as a literary form was almost unknown in 19th-century Egypt, in the present century there have been produced many pieces of fiction to which we may turn to help establish the image of the "Turk" as portrayed by Egyptian authors. Thus one of the earliest works dealing with the life of the Egyptian people, Muhammad al-Muwaylihi's Hadith 'Isa Ibn Hisham first published in 1898, has as one of its central characters the Turk Ahmad Pasha al-Minikli, a famous General and Minister of War during the reign of Muhammad Ali. A satirical condemnation of the rapid westernization of Egypt, it is perhaps the first work in Egyptian literature to explore at least in part the Turco-Egyptian mentality. However, it is to the works of later authors, in particular Muhammad Taymur and Tawfiq al- Hakim, that we must turn for more meaningful descriptions of Turco-Egyptianism. A point of interest with regard to these two writers is that although for most practical purposes they were fully Egyptianized, both were of alien descent. In the case of the former, the father, Ahmad Taymur, was of Turkish origin,[51] while Tawfiq al-Hakim's mother came from a sea-faring family which had emigrated from Persia to Turkey before settling in Egypt.[52] Both then were able

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[51]Muhammad Shafiq Ghurbal (ed.), al-Mawsu'ah al-'Arabiyah al-Muyassarah (Cairo: 1965), p. 573.

[52]Tawfiq al-Hakim, Sijn al-'Umr (Cairo: 1964), p. 19.

to call upon personal knowledge of the Turkish mentality as well as the image current in Egypt at the time of their writing. Approaching more recent times we may turn to the novels of Ibrahim al-Mazini and Najib Mahfuz, while the short stories and poems of the popular journalist, poet, and prose writer Salih Jawdat bring our quest up to the immediate present. It should be remembered, however, that the Turk has never been more than a minor figure in the total spectrum of Egyptian literature. Thus our analysis should not be regarded as an exhaustive study of the poetry and prose of that country or even of the works from which material has been drawn. Moreover, no attempt has been made to catalogue the numerous Turks who have appeared in modern Egyptian literature. It is only the intention here to chart the way they have been treated by several representative writers and to analyze some of the cultural and historical factors that produced the depictions. By so doing it is felt that certain basic trends will be brought to light which would be borne out in a more rigorous study devoted entirely to this subject.

The feelings of a society, however, are not laid bare in its literature alone, especially when much of that society is illiterate. In many parts of Egypt, and in particular in the rural districts, it has for centuries been the system of oral communication through which ideas and values have been diffused, and for this reason we shall also turn to the tale, anecdote, and other forms of oral tradition. For this one of our most useful sources is a small study entitled Contes Populaires inédits de la Vallée du Nil. A selection of folk stories collected and analyzed by Ya'kub Artin in the latter part of the 19th century, it gives us numerous insights into the attitudes of the Egyptians toward their

successive alien rulers, especially the Turks. In addition, a number of jokes and proverbs have been collected that also reflect the feeling of the Egyptian toward the Turk better than any attempt to analyze how we as Westerners might have felt and thought in similar circumstances.

In the hierarchy of villains to be found in Egyptian literature, theater, folklore, etc., the Turk retained a high position throughout the period under study. Even today he is perhaps third only to the "foreign imperialist" and "decadent Pasha". There has rarely, however, been any real interest in analyzing the Turco-Egyptian personality for its own sake, but rather for purposes of contrast with that of the indigenous Egyptian. As such the Turk quickly became a stereotype for whom a set cluster of emotions and expectations would arise whenever he made an appearance. Perhaps the characteristic most consistently identified with the Turco-Egyptian, no matter what the period or medium of expression, has been Hubb al-Saytarah, "Love of Authority". Even jokes common in Cairo today convey much the same image as many of the tales collected over half a century ago by Ya'kub Artin. One such joke tells of a Turco-Egyptian aristocrat who, having squandered the family fortune, is forced to sell water to earn a living. Purchasing two zirs or large conical jars used for storing liquids, he places them at a busy street corner. A short time later the first thirsty passerby to dip into one of the jars is startled by the Turk's order, "Don't drink from that one, use this one." A second joke reflecting the same inability of the Turk to shed his autocratic habits no matter what the circumstances tells of a Turco-Egyptian in similar financial difficulties who turns to begging for a living. His success is surprising

considering his unusual request, "'A'ti hasanat la sidak Hasan 'Agha." ("Give charity to your master Hasan Agha."). There is scarcely a Turk in all Egyptian literature who does not display similar characteristics,[53] numerous examples of which will be noticed throughout the remainder of this chapter.

A second frequently-recurring component of the Turco-Egyptian image is impetuosity, a characteristic frequently rendered in Arabic by the expression Hiddat al-Sharakisah. In a short story entitled Fi al-Qitar ("In the Train"),[54] Muhammad Taymur provides us with a striking example of the hot-tempered Turk with his overbearing arrogance and massive disregard of others. As the title suggests, the story takes place in a train compartment and reveals the reactions of its various occupants to a newspaper article stating that the Egyptian Ministry of Education will undertake to make education accessible to the general public. Four of the travelers--a village Umdah, an Ustadh, an Effendi and a Circassian--disapprove of the reform. But whereas the others base their opposition on such things as experience (the Umdah) or the Koran (the Ustadh), that of the Circassian seems to stem solely from the loudly expressed conviction that the "lash" (al-Sawt) is the only instruction that the fellah needs or understands. And it is he who violently reprimands a fifth occupant of the car, a student who vainly opposes the ideas and values expressed by these representatives of an older generation.

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[53]See, for example, Ibrahim al-Mazini, Thalathat Rijal wa Imra'ah (Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyah, 1964), p. 4, in which 'Ayyad, a Turco-Egyptian, is identified as one who "shouts for the servants, even when there is a bell nearby."

[54]Muhammad Taymur, Mu'alifat Muhammad Taymur (Cairo: 1922).

More touching but no less forceful examples of Turkish wrath may be found in the works of Tawfiq al-Hakim. Of his many plays and novels dealing with various aspects of Egyptian society, the most rewarding for our purposes is the novel 'Awdat al-Ruh ("The Rebirth of the Spirit"),[55] which describes the childhood days of a youth called Muhsin. Patterned loosely after the early years of the author himself, most of the story takes place in Cairo where the young boy has been sent to live with his school-master uncle in hopes of improving his mediocre academic record.[56] It is only during the midterm holiday that he visits his home near Damanhur where his mother, a proud and haughty Turkish woman, runs the family estate with an iron hand. Not only does she dominate her timid husband, who is himself of fellah origin, but shows nothing but contempt for the patient agony of the less fortunate fellahin employed on the estate.

> Muhsin had scarcely been in his room in the country estate an hour when it was time for lunch. The table was set and as usual two Nubian servants stood at its head.
>
> Sitt Izzah entered, followed by her husband and Muhsin, and as soon as she noticed the plate of "local" bread on the table she shouted:
>
> What! Where is the fino?[57]
>
> One of the servants mumbled:
>
> There isn't any.
>
> The madam stormed:
>
> You forgot to bring the fino from Damanhur? Very nice. And what am I to eat?
>
> I'll go, yaa Sitt, and bring some from Damanhur right away.

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[55] Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-Ruh (Cairo: 1964).

[56] Sijn al-'Umr is the authentic autobiography against which the events of 'Awdat al-Ruh must be checked for accuracy. Until the former was published in 1964 many writers interested in the life of al-Hakim made the mistake of taking the events portrayed in 'Awdat al-Ruh much too literally.

[57] In colloquial Egyptian a long loaf of "French" bread.

Sitt Izzah was silent for a moment. Then noticing the burning sun outside resumed:

It's too hot for you, Balal. Tell one of the fellahin to go.

Balal was about to leave, but she stopped him.

Wait, Balal. Call that dog of a supervisor for me.

The servant went out and returned in a moment with the supervisor.

How do you expect us to eat the bread of fellahin, you stupid fool?

The bewildered supervisor answered:

This bread is fresh, yaa Sitt. It was baked today, this morning. My wife baked it with her own hands especially for you.

Don't be disgusting. Am I to eat bread like this? Go and send one of the fellahin at once to bring some European bread from Damanhur.

Now, madam, at the hottest time of the day?

Yes, now, at the hottest time of the day.

Yes, madam, but...

But what?

But madam, you know that the fellah toils in the fields from five in the morning and longs for noon to arrive so that he can throw himself under a tree and rest for a while.

My God! Rest for a while. Fellah rest? Since when such luxury?

Aren't they human beings, madam?

Get out. No more pampering. Get one of the fellahin right now to bring some bread from Damanhur or on my father's honor the whip will fall on your turban. Fellah race!

The supervisor lowered his head and the madam turned to her husband, the Bey, as though reproaching him for his silence, his willingness to watch. Confused, the Bey quickly agreed.

Of course. What else? Send one of those fellahin sleeping like buffalo in their homes.

The supervisor raised his head.

Yes, madam.

Or go yourself if you want to pamper them. Aren't you one of them? Are you a Turk?

The supervisor said politely:

Yes, madam.

He left to carry out the harsh order and Muhsin followed him with sympathetic eyes until he had disappeared. Then looking down he began to toy with the buttons on his jacket, avoiding the eyes of his parents as though embarrassed by their actions.[58]

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[58] al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-Ruh, II, 21-23.

But the image built up around the Turco-Egyptian has never been entirely negative, reflecting rather an ambivalence containing elements of attraction as well as aversion. Vigor, courage, tenacity, i.e., the military instincts and virility of character frequently attributed by a subject people to a ruling class or race, are as much components of Hubb al-Saytarah as impetuosity and make their way into nearly every work dealing with the Turco-Egyptian. This equivocal attitude toward people of life and action is revealed in yet another of Tawfiq al-Hakim's brief sketches of Sitt Izza in whom almost the whole range of Turkish character in Egyptian literature is to be found. Thus the arbitrary traits which scar the childhood of Muhsin and eventually alienate him from his mother were regarded with awe and fascination by her childhood playmates who seemed eager and willing to submit to the wishes of a neighbor whom they remember as "the daughter of a Turkish soldier, that man with a yellow mustache", and whom they called "Queen, daughter of the Sultan".[59] A similar attraction appears in one of the first stories concerning a Turk in Ya'kub Artin's Contes Populaires inédits de la Vallée du Nil from which the following loose translation has been taken.

> After creating Adam and Eve, Allah placed them in the Garden of Eden with express orders not to eat from the forbidden fruit. When they disobeyed his command, he sent word that they were to leave Paradise for the sin they had committed. "It is right.", said Adam. "We shall go.", added Eve. But they lingered to enjoy the pleasures of Paradise and a short while later Allah was dismayed to learn that they had still not departed. "Did no one tell them that they must leave?", Allah demanded of his aide. "They have been informed but have not yet departed.", responded the aide. "Go again," Allah told one of his messengers, "and tell them to leave at once." The messenger hastened to the Garden and finding the two still there

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[59] Ibid., I, 95.

> said, "Allah has forbidden you to remain in the Garden of Eden. Leave at once." "Is he so rushed for time?", asked Adam. "Let us make our preparations." "Would he want us to leave without first taking care of our effects?", added Eve. A quarrel ensued and the messenger returned to Allah and told him what had taken place. Allah then called for his Turkish Chaoush,[60] Timur Agha, and ordered him to see to the expulsion of the two sinners. As soon as the Chaoush reached the Garden he cried, "Where are you, Adam?". "Here", replied Adam. "Take your wife and leave.", ordered the Chaoush. "Hadir, I obey.", replied Adam. And Adam and Eve left Paradise just as they were, nude, for they had been bathing when the Chaoush arrived and did not take time to dress.[61]

On occasion admiration leads to envy and even imitation. Thus Muhsin is shamed and embarrassed by the "precious cane", "diamond ring", "silk stockings" and above all false pride that his father adopts in the name of Ottoman civilization. Urged on by the nagging tongue of his Turkish wife he not only wears the costly clothes of an Ottoman gentleman, but assumes her contempt for the Egyptian fellah, a development brought home with shattering impact to Muhsin when his father explains away his son's shortcomings with the remark, "Fellah, what more need you say?".[62] Perhaps imitation reaches its peak, i.e., beyond the mere adoption of material and personality traits, when there is physical similarity. In many stories it is skin color which gives the first indication of Turkish or Circassian origin (e.g., Muhammad Taymur's outspoken critic of

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[60] Literally "herald"; one of a corps of Ottoman officials who served as ushers, messengers and guards. Robert Curzon in his admirable book Visits to Monasteries in the Levant has aptly described the Chaoush as he found him in early 19th-century Egypt as "a kind of living firman, before whom everyone makes way." Curzon, p. 55.

[61] Ya'kub Artin, Contes Populaires inédits de la Vallée du Nil (Paris: J. Maisonneuve, 1895), pp. 7-9.

[62] al-Hakim, loc. cit., II, 12.

public education in Fi al-Qitar),[63] and in more than one instance we read of native Egyptians whose light complexion makes them feel superior to other Egyptians for it allows them to "mingle with the Circassians and Turks."[64] Imitation of the Turk, however, has never been overly stressed. There seems to have been no strong psychological motivation for imitation such as that resulting from feelings of inferiority, partially because during much of the period under consideration it was not so much the Turk who set the pattern for upper-class Egyptians in dress, manners, etc., but the western world. It is not the world of Ahmad Pasha al-Minikli that is condemned in al-Muwaylihi's Hadith 'Isa Ibn Hisham, but the inroads of Western society. This is perhaps one reason why differences between Turks and Egyptians so rarely flared into open conflict from the 19th century onward.

The formation of a restricted stereotype greatly simplifies the task of identifying Turco-Egyptianism, but in assessing this prototype we must not lose sight of its relation to historical fact. Did the Egyptian writer novelize the Turk in the ways of the actual world or was reality frequently changed to fictional illusion? In some instances it would appear that the latter prevailed, or at least that the "image" lagged so far behind changes in the socio-political structure that at the time of writing the menace of the Turk lay primarily within the mind. One such example arises in the following passage taken from Salih Jawdat's al-Fallah al-Saghir ("The Little Fellah") published some time

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[63] "The door of the compartment was opened and a Shaykh entered. He was about sixty years old, red-faced, and had twinkling eyes; the color of his skin indicated that he was of Circassian origin." Taymur, p. 96.

[64] al-Mazini, p. 4.

after the 1952 revolution. Written in a journalistic style generally reserved for popular consumption, the story has little if any literary merit. It does, however, have definite social implications.

> 'Amm Shalabi could do nothing but yield to the word [fellah] for he knew that in reality he was a fellah while Shawkat Bey was of Circassian origin. Egypt at that time--and that was twenty years ago--did not belong to the fellahin. Her rulers were from Turkey, her lords and masters were of Turkish origin. As for the Egyptians, they were fellahin, no more and no less.[65]

Within the context of the story, "twenty years ago" implies that as late as the 1930's the Turks continued to control political and economic life in Egypt to the exclusion of the indigenous population. But, as has been pointed out in earlier chapters, by the beginning of the present century they had lost not only their control over political affairs but their monopoly over land as well. Nevertheless, the shadow if not the substance of Turkish domination lingered, and this residue of prejudice, along with occasional honestly-felt inequalities, could still be called upon to inflame the reading public when deemed desirable by politically-minded authors. In the case of the example cited above, justification of the confiscations called for by the land reform program of 1952 would seem to be the most plausible explanation for the author's tampering with historical (if not commonly felt) truths.

It cannot be said, however, that the image of the Turk as portrayed by Egyptian writers has been entirely static. Although in a great portion of the literature surveyed the Turk's way of thinking and acting has remained largely the same, the conditions surrounding his life have

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[65]Salih Jawdat, Kalam al-Nas (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, n.d.), p. 90.

gone through definite stages of development. The stock character of an amorous-warlike Turk that prevailed in 19th-century folklore gave way to a landowning Turk in the literature of the early 20th century. Then sometime after the First World War, the latter yielded to a Pasha class whose members were partly but not necessarily all of Turkish descent. It should be added, however, that the progression was perhaps more distinct in the literary world than in the minds of the Egyptian people, where some of the stereotypes and images undoubtedly existed contemporaneously or at least overlapped. In each case, moreover, there was a definite time lag before changes in the fictional world caught up with those of real life, but when the adjustment came about it established a more realistic relationship between fiction and reality. Special events such as the 'Urabi revolt, the Young Turk revolution of 1908, or the land reform program of 1952 were to focus unusual and frequently erroneous attention on the Turkish element--as did the personal sentiments of specific authors--but these had a less lasting effect upon literature than the deeper trends of an evolving society.

It is not surprising that a principal theme of 19th-century folklore was warfare, for among the Arabs the Turks had always been known for their military virtues. (See the remarks pertaining to this subject on page 156.) Thus it is as a warrior aristocracy that the Turks were normally depicted in the first of the stages mentioned above. The opening lines of Ya'kub Artin's "Les Trois Femmes et le Kadi" establish a setting typical of the tales of that period.

> J'étais tout d'abord et dès ma première jeunesse mariée à un Turc, fort bel homme, mais qui a toujours eu le défaut de me faire peur. Sa vue seule me

> remplissait d'effroi et lorsqu'il me parlait, quoi qu'il fît pour adoucir sa voix et son regard, mon sang se glaçait dans mes veines!
>
> Encore aujourd'hui lorsque je pense à ses moustaches, longues d'une aune, et à ses yeux, gros comme des noix, je ne puis me défendre d'un sentiment de frayeur, qui me saisit malgré moi!
>
> Il passait tout son temps à la guerre, et lorsque la paix lui donnait des loisirs, il les employait à la chasse des bêtes féroces![66]

The Turks had come to power in Egypt by force--first in 1517 under Salim and again in the early 9th century under Muhammad Ali--and on both occasions they established a system of government based primarily on military characteristics. Since Egyptians played no role in the military establishments of the first period and held only subordinate positions during much of the second, it is not surprising that the Turks existed primarily as a military entity in the minds of most Egyptians. Variables such as language, wealth, etc., might at times be ascribed to the Turk to give him additional social reality, but in general identification based on military virtues was more than sufficient to demarcate the separate status of Turks and Egyptians.

The advent of our second stage, i.e., the concept of the Turk as a landowning aristocrat, did not hinge on any single event, author, or year, but rather reflected a gradual effort to place the Turk in a more realistic setting. As has been noted in an earlier part of this study (see pages 98 to 99) the land policy of Muhammad Ali underwent a rather dramatic reversal after the failure of his ambitious plans of military conquest. For the first time individual landownership was allowed to reach proportions large enough to have a substantial effect

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[66]Artin, p. 41.

on the distribution of social and political power. The immediate benefactors of this policy--in addition to members of the Muhammad Ali family--were the officers and government officials closest to the seat of power, a majority of whom were Turks. Although the exclusiveness of this new Turco-Egyptian landed aristocracy appears to have reached its peak by the 6th and 7th decades of the 19th century, the literary image with which we are here concerned did not reflect any change until the early years of the following century. The most dramatic event involving the Turco-Egyptians in the latter part of the 19th century, the 'Urabi Revolt, was of a politico-military nature. As such it focused little attention on the question of landownership, which continued to be ignored as a social theme by writers just as it was as a political issue by politicians. It was only in the 20th century that the Turk of literature became consistently identified with the land while the warlike Turk was reduced to a relic of the past to re-emerge only in conjuncture with special circumstances such as the victory of the Turks over the Greeks following World War One.[67]

The emergence of the landowning Turk as depicted in novels such as Hakim's 'Awdat al-Ruh coincided with a growing interest among Egyptian

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[67]The most important contributions to this later interest in the Turk's military prowess were made by the well known poets Ahmad Shawqi and Hafiz Ibrahim. The former, a strong supporter of the Khedival family--and himself reported to have been of Turkish (as well as Kurdish, Greek and Arab) origin--used Turkish themes in many of his best works. For a good example of the way in which the latter praised the Turkish army, see the poem included in his biography by Zaki Fahmi, p. 645. Although the poems of these two writers made no direct reference to the Turks of Egypt, they undoubtedly revived memories among Egyptians of the military role the Turks had once played in their own country,

intellectuals in land and the people who tilled it. Egypt's incipient national consciousness had intensified the search for a national culture for which many authors turned to the rural scene as a source of inspiration. For them the fellah became the true representative of Egypt's national identity and a kind of Tolstoyan "noble peasant" became their literary ideal. In such an identity there was little room for a Turkish element. The Turk could and did, however, play the role of provocateur, an alien force which challenged Egyptians to turn to their own people and past--as it did Muhsin.

As popular knowledge of social and political conditions increased, the popular attitude toward the Turk entered its third and final stage. Among the numerous factors hastening this transition, one of the most important was the outburst of feeling against the British following World War One. Although it is not the purpose of this study to explore the causes of the "Revolt of 1919", it would be difficult to ignore its effect on the literary products of the post-war period. Having greatly broadened and solidified resentment against the occupation among all classes, the revolt focused attention as never before upon the British as the alien oppressors of Egypt. At the same time, the great wealth which accumulated in the hands of many Egyptians during the war seems to have gone a long way toward breaking down the barriers between upper-class Egyptians and Turks. As we have already seen, indigenous Egyptians had begun to challenge the Turks' monopoly over land as early as the last quarter of the 19th century, but it was not until sometime after World War One that a clear image evolved doing away with "hyphenated" Egyptians. With the realization that differentiation based on race or culture was no longer as meaningful as that

based on wealth, the Turk was submerged into a larger "Pasha Class" representing all elements of Egypt's broadening aristocracy. Although the term "Turk" continued to be used as a symbol of this new synthesis of Turkish and Egyptian landowners, terms such as al-bashawat (the Pashas) and al-'aqta' (the feudal lords) were increasingly called upon for this purpose. With these new images of the British and the Pasha Class to engage the attention of an increasingly aroused public, it is not surprising that the Turk emerged as a somewhat less villainous character in most of the post-war literature.

Works dealing with the new "Pasha Class" are too numerous to list, although those of Mahmud Taymur should be considered among the most effective. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, a second author whose literary talents are well known to readers of contemporary Arabic literature, has also provided us with an excellent example of the trends and images referred to above. Although his novel al-Ard deals primarily with the internal conflicts of a small Egyptian village,[68] by placing the events in the early nineteen-thirties the author is able to explore the anguish and ill-feeling of the villagers toward two external forces--the English occupation and the class of Beys and Pashas who held life and death power over the villages of the Nile. With regard to the composition of the Beys and Pashas, neither Ismail Sidqi Pasha, the Prime Minister "who could deal death to thousands" while "eating sandwiches quietly in his office"[69] nor the landlords who supported his so-called People's Party

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[68] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, al-Ard (Beirut: 1954). An abbreviated translation of this work entitled Egyptian Earth has been made by the English novelist Desmond Stewart.

[69] al-Sharqawi, p. 138.

are outwardly identified as Turks. But what is clear by implication to an Egyptian is not always so to the foreign reader. Thus Mahmud Bey, the cousin of the Pasha who owned most of the land surrounding the village, becomes in translation "the son of that Turkish woman"[70] while in the original text the words "the son of Anji Hanem"[71] are sufficient to indicate his Turkish origin. The emphasis throughout, however, is on the fact that he is a Bey, and whether Turk or Egyptian in origin, is as alien to village life and interests as the "English soldiers with red faces" whom the Prime Minister unleashes on the streets of Cairo to bolster his authority.[72]

Our study of the development of the Turco-Egyptian image would not be complete without briefly mentioning a parallel transition in the image of the indigenous Egyptian vis-a-vis that of the Turk. In each of the tales collected by Ya'kub Artin the Egyptian would outwardly appear to be a complacent creature, forever willing to submit to the wishes of his alien masters. On closer observation, however, the tales are never really uncomplimentary to Egyptian pride. But curiously enough, it is almost always an Egyptian woman who outwits the Turk, who with feminine charm and cunning circumvents his physical prowess and shows him for the buffoon that he is. In a good many of the tales even the leading role falls to an Egyptian girl, as reflected in such titles as "Le Turk Jaloux et sa Femme Cairote"[73] and "Les Trois Femmes et le Kadi".[74] In analyzing this phenomenon Artin makes the interesting

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[70]Abd al-Rahman al-Sharkawi, Egyptian Earth, trans. Desmond Stewart (London: Heinemann, 1962), p. 135.

[71]al-Sharqawi, al-Ard, p. 200.

[72]Ibid., p. 11.

[73]Artin, pp. 195-200.

[74]Ibid., pp. 41-43.

suggestion that in a society long ruled by alien authorities the national character frequently takes on the feminine qualities reflected in so many of these tales.[75]

Starting with the 20th century we find what would appear to be a continuous groping among Egyptian writers for the formation of a new and more hopeful self-image. Youth (usually male) and education are stressed increasingly as the instruments of national revival while the identification of Egypt with feminine characteristics becomes much less pronounced. Indeed, it is now the Turco-Egyptian who more often than not is portrayed in a female role. This not only offsets the shift in the Egyptian image toward the male, but also acknowledges the fact that as greater numbers of Turks are absorbed into Egyptian society and culture it is Turkish women--who lead a more secluded and protected life than men--that are more apt to retain their old habits and language.[76]

One of the earliest examples of these trends may be found in al-Muwaylihi's Hadith 'Isa Ibn Hisham in which the Turk, al-Minikli, is equated with the old Eastern habits of thought while the young author 'Isa Ibn Hisham, who stumbles upon the resurrected Minister of War in a graveyard outside of Cairo, signalizes the birth of a new more

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[75] Ibid., pp. 7-9.

[76] See, for example, Ibrahim Ramzi's play Sarkhah al-Tifl, which shows how the restricted contact of Turkish girls makes them attractive to Egyptian suitors. Thus 'Atiyah Hanem, being "Turkish in upbringing and thought" is considered a good match because she has been insulated from the corrupting effects of society. Ibrahim Ramzi, Sarkhah al-Tifl (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1938), p. 94. It is interesting to note that Ramzi, like al-Hakim and Taymur, was of Turkish descent, his grandfather having come to Egypt from Anatolia.

Western-oriented mentality. To the amazement of al-Minikli even a donkey driver who imposes himself on the Pasha and his young companion shows little of the fear and respect customarily reserved for Turkish authorities. Indeed it is the charges of that "insolent fellah" that lead to the General's arrest and introduction to Egyptian law courts for which he has neither understanding nor patience.

This emphasis on youth and education has remained the core of the Egyptian image in a great deal of the literature of the present century. In the hands of a few the results have been stimulating. Such is the case in al-Hakim's 'Awdat al-Ruh from which Muhsin emerges as one of the most powerful projectors of Egyptian ideas and values. Too young to counter or openly oppose the ways of his parents, he continually questions the values they represent. Finding them lacking, he turns to those of the "people" with whom he has found a common bond while studying in Cairo. Consequently it is undoubtedly with as much relief as shock that he receives his mother's rebuke "You haven't turned out at all like me."[77]

Unfortunately in the hands of others the image is less adequately realized. In the case of the young student in Muhammad Taymur's Fi al-Qitar the story is too short for the author to do more than reveal his ideals. But once again it is youth and education rather than the wily charms of an Egyptian maiden that challenge the representatives and institutions of the past. Much the same may be said of Hashim, the "little fellah" in Salih Jawdat's story of the same name. As we have already noted, the emotions evoked are related to conditions that

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[77] al-Hakim, II, 12.

exist primarily in the minds of a prejudiced public, a public receptive to the charge that the land reform program of 1952 was "a battle for the liberation of the land from its alien masters."[78] But if emotions are aroused against a tyranny of race that had long before been replaced by a tyranny of class, the instruments of change are more in keeping with the times. For Hashim they are long years in medical school in preparation for the new role in society that the Egyptian has begun to envisage for himself. For the country as a whole the weapons are those of revolution. Both are indicative of the hopes and aggressiveness of a people who have begun to seek pride through identification with nation.

While the shift to youth and education is a further indication of changing relationships between Turks and Egyptians, it is frequently coupled with an attitude that remains constant throughout the period of our study. In the literature of both the late 19th and 20th centuries the Egyptian shows that he is rarely frightened by his image of the Turk. Thus the ridicule to which the Turk was often subjected in the folklore of the past century has continued into current literature. Although this aspect of the indigenous attitude toward the Turk has been noted in other parts of our investigation, we have yet to discuss developments pertaining to the theater and it is in this medium that the Turk has often been most effectively satirized. Two of the most imaginative actors to engage in this form of entertainment were Ali al-Kassar and Najib al-Rihani who reached the height of their popularity in the

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[78]Jawdat, p. 94. The author not only makes it explicit that these "alien masters" were Turks, but follows up this attack on them with a poem bitterly condemning Ottoman rule in Egypt, which he calls "the darkest period of Egyptian history". Salih Jawdat, "al-Hukm al-Turki", Ughniyah 'ala al-Nil (Cairo: Maktabah Misr, 1962), p. 77.

mid-1930's. At times their techniques were strikingly similar. Thus both were especially skillful in their vaudeville-type caricatures of the manners and customs of the various religious and ethnic groups in Egypt. Among these a favorite target was the Turco-Egyptian whose mispronounciation of Arabic and autocratic mannerisms were the source of constant barbs both on the stage of Cairo and in the towns and villages where their use of the vernacular carried the joys of the popular theater to all strata of society.[79] Eventually al-Kassar's antics were to reach an even larger audience over the radio, while the plays of al-Rihani and his talented collaborator Badi' Khairi were still enthusiastically received at the Rihani Theater in Cairo as well as over television.[80] One of the most successful has been the recent revival of al-Rihani's 'Illa Khamsa ("Five To") in which a wealthy

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[79]The Turco-Egyptian's mispronunciation of Arabic and his use of Turkish expressions when speaking Arabic have also been mimicked in numerous novels, although usually with less effect than on the stage. Thus the exasperated Circassian in Muhammad Taymur's Fi al-Qitar seeks to end his conversation with the young student with the admonition "adabasis" (ادبسيز) meaning "impolite" or "insolent". In his anger he has fallen back on a corrupt form of the Turkish "edebsiz" (ادبسز) rather than its Arabic equivalent "qalil adab" or "bila adab". Although many native Egyptians may have recognized this term in 1917 when the story was written, it is doubtful whether any would have used it except in jest. Such expressions, however, are not inserted as comic relief alone. For a people who have little perceptive understanding of the differences which separate them from other cultural groups, external signs such as peculiarities in speech are immediately recognized as something which sets them apart from others.

[80]For additional information on al-Kassar and al-Rihani see Nevill Barbour, "The Arabic Theatre in Egypt", Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, VIII, (1935-1937), 995, and Landau, Studies in the Arab Theater..., p. 90.

Turco-Egyptian matron has a prominent part.[81] The play itself has only a sketchy plot, dealing with a poor lawyer's bumbling attempts to find a 150-year-old legacy of gold. In pursuit of the treasure he takes the job of chauffeur in the home of a rich Turkish lady who submits him to the humiliations for which the Turkish women of Egypt are still so well known.[82]

Although our survey of Egyptian literature, folklore, theater, etc., has added little new to what we already knew about the economic, political and social status of the Turco-Egyptian, it has given us a clearer conception of indigenous responses to this alien minority. If at times the link between fiction and fact seemed to break, it is because such sources frequently articulate feeling rather than reality. Thus in the eyes of the Egyptians the "Turks" remained identifiable as a separate entity (both a military and landed aristocracy) long after they were only remotely identifiable as such in real life. Similarly the Turk of fiction was never a truly human figure, but one whose formulaic character made him easily recognizable to every Egyptian. Indeed, the ease with which Egyptians agreed upon the character and status of Turco-Egyptians would seem to indicate that it was in the

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[81]Indeed the role is so large that the actress who had become famous for her portrayal of various Turkish characteristics in a great many of Rihani's plays was by-passed in favor of the more accomplished and even better-known Mari Munib. Unfortunately the works of al-Rihani have not been published, but it is to be hoped that this will soon be corrected thanks to the efforts of Miss Laila Abu Seif. A student at the University of Chicago, she has obtained the original scripts of many of al-Rihani's plays which she plans to edit and publish.

[82]While gathering material in Cairo the author of this study encountered numerous Egyptians who felt that on occasion they had been the victim of slights or condescending airs on the part of Turco-Egyptian women.

minds of the indigenous population that this difficult-to-define entity took one of its most cohesive and meaningful forms. Given the history of the Turk in Egypt, it is not surprising that a stereotype dominated his image in Egyptian literature. Yet it is unfortunate that by the time authors were less inhibited by taboos limiting expression with regard to this alien minority, it was no longer regarded as a serious subject for literary endeavor. Most of the more talented writers had turned their attention to more timely problems and only the newspapers, magazines such as al-Musawwar and Ruz al-Yusuf, and less capable authors occasionally concerned themselves with the Turk, and then primarily to justify certain economic or political actions of the government. As a result, the Turco-Egyptian as presently presented to the reading public is invariably the same shallow character we have been exposed to for the past fifty years. Now that the problem symbolized by the Turk (i.e., foreign domination) has been largely resolved, it is to be hoped that we may look forward to an occasional figure who reflects a more human interpretation of the Turk's character yet retains his uniqueness in the Egyptian cultural framework.

More specifically and in answer to the problem posed at the beginning of this chapter--i.e., whether the mass of Egyptians were indifferent to the Turco-Egyptians or harbored definite antagonisms toward them--it would appear that the latter was frequently the case. Nevertheless, there was a minimum of what might be called inflammatory literature. The Egyptian seems to have looked upon all members of the governing classes with suspicion, be they "Turk" or otherwise. It was usually only in cases where personal interests were involved that

there was vigorous anti-Turkish sentiment. But if this record of thinking and feeling shows little popular demand for the elimination of the Turks, it does indicate a willingness to support or at least not hinder any force (e.g., 'Urabi, the British, or the 1952 revolution) that might challenge the Turk's predominance.

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Although remarks on the Turks of the Nile Valley are a common feature of studies pertaining to modern Egypt, this important minority has never been the object of rigorous, analytical inquiry. The present work, which is an initial attempt to fill this gap, is largely a synthesis constructed from a scattered literature in both Eastern and Western languages. In Western languages there are unfortunately few authoritative documents pertaining to the Turks of Egypt, aside from sporadic reports to be found in the Public Record Office in London, England. Although many useful observations concerning the Turks may also be found in the works of contemporary travellers, etc., we must be wary of the judgements of many such observers, for their opinions can rarely be accepted as unbiased and their evidence is generally not authenticated. The best, e.g., Clot Bey, Apercu Général sur l'Égypte, at times provides valuable data based on long and continuous service in Egypt. More often, however, such works provide little more than anecdotal evidence on the manners of the Turco-Egyptians without the benefit of commentary or analysis. All too often such observations seem to have been motivated by little more than a desire to express moral indignation with some of the more bizarre habits of the Turks. Such works, then, may at times be illuminating, but they are totally inadequate to give a complete or continuous story.

Arabic historical works are also strikingly lacking in studies of the ruling aristocracy of 19th-century Egypt. Even though Muhammad Ali was a man of great military and administrative talents, there were few works written about him by his contemporaries that may serve as the basis of a study made today only a little more than a century-and-a-half after his death. Those that do exist generally represent both Muhammad Ali and the Turks from a limited point of view, e.g., al-Jabarti in his monumental 'Aja'ib al-'Athar fi al-Tarajim wa al-'Akhbar wrote from a strongly anti-Turkish point of view while Ali Mubarak in al-Khitat al-Tawfiqiyah al-Jadidah could find little fault with a dynasty he supported throughout his adult life. Fortunately biographical material, especially with regard to better known members of the Turco-Egyptian aristocracy, allows us to form some picture of their background and daily lives and thereby fills a conspicuous gap in the works of all Western observers. Care, however, must be taken in the use of such works for frequently we have to select from a number of contradictory sources while carelessness and typographic error lead to numerous problems with dates, origins and other factual data. With regard to documentary material, there is a definite lack of information subject to statistical analysis. The Abdin Archives which contain most of the government records on such important matters as landholdings from the time of Muhammad Ali to the present were not accessible to this researcher. On the other hand, material in the Turkish Archives in Istanbul concerning 19th-century Egypt is primarily diplomatic in nature, dealing with such matters as tribute, international disputes, etc., rather than the internal situation in Egypt. Unlike Syria, Palestine and other parts of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was both advanced and

independent enough to keep her own records. Finally, in an attempt to interpret the conflict between Turks and Egyptians in more human terms, I have brought Egyptian literature and folklore into the study of history. Often such works contain stereotypes of the Turks that are radical simplifications of reality, but generally they not only conform to what the public preconceived to be the truth, but helped to mold public opinion as well. Moreover, by bringing this more human element into the study, I have been able to show the existence of conflict between the two cultures even after other indices would seem to indicate that the assimilation of the Turks had taken place.

Although it is difficult to categorize the sources that follow according to chapter, I have done so as far as possible. As a result, the works listed under some chapters (e.g., Chapter two) include references that were useful in many parts of the study. Chapters three, four and five, on the other hand, which deal with more specialized topics, contain far fewer entries, reflecting the limited amount of work done by scholars on military, administrative and economic conditions in 19th-century Egypt.

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