INFORMATION TO USERS

This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

A Xerox Education Company

72-29,046

EVANS, John Perley, 1939-
BLUE POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLICE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR.

The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1972
Social Psychology

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

BLUE POWER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLICE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

by

John Perley Evans

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Social Psychology)
in The University of Michigan
1972

Doctoral Committee:

Professor William A. Gamson, Chairman
Assistant Professor Peter R. Mattis
Professor Charles Tilly
Associate Professor Jack L. Walker

PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a number of people for suggestions, criticism, hard work and good humor that helped make this study possible. In particular, Bill Gamson deserves my gratitude for his involvement and encouragement with every phase of its development. From the initial suggestion that I consider the police as a worthy subject of study to allowing me to win a squash game or two, his support was invaluable as it was throughout my graduate school career.

The theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation have their origins in Gamson's, Power and Discontent. Charles Tilly's writings and classroom ideas have also found their way into the model. In addition, I am indebted to Arnold Tannenbaum and Tom Smith, original members of the Doctoral Committee, who worked with me in the initial stages of theory development. The members of the Committee provided a number of valuable suggestions in reviewing the first draft of this report.

I am, of course, deeply in the debt of the Central City and Mideast County Departments. The chief executives of both willingly subjected themselves and their men to my questions. If there is a single factor which gave me encouragement during the data collection phase of the study, it was the interest that the men of both departments took in seeing to it that I was moved onto the next interviewee. The same holds true for those dozens of "outside experts," knowledgeable men in the community, who donated hours of their time and cheerfully responded to my barrage of disconnected questions.

Finally, a special thanks to two persons. To Al Guskin who convinced me that a four year stint in graduate school could be more than wasted time and could also be an enjoyable experience. He was right on both counts and encouraged me on those occasions when I needed my spirits lifted. A wise person once told me that a doctoral program was harder on the spouse than on the student. He also was right and for this reason I thank my wife, Jake, who mostly understood when I disappeared into the basement but still doesn't understand why this dissertation is so long.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS		ii
LIST OF FIGURES		vi
LIST OF CHARTS		vii
LIST OF APPENDICES		viii
SECTION ONE		
Chapter 1	Police, The Environment and Political Behavior	1
Chapter 2	The Research Setting, Development and Method	31
SECTION TWO		
Chapter 3	Blue Power and the Politicians--An Introduction	57
Chapter 4	Control: How Thin the Blue Line?	80
Chapter 5	Accountability: Who Tells What to Whom?	144
Chapter 6	Citizen Participation: Getting What You Ask For	190
Chapter 7	Blue Power and the Politicians--Conclusions	213
SECTION THREE		
Chapter 8	Blue Power and the People--An Introduction	250
Chapter 9	All of the People, All of the Time	274
Chapter 10	Some of the People, All of the Time	327
Chapter 11	Blue Power and the People--Conclusions	370
SECTION FOUR		
Chapter 12	Toward a Theory of Police Political Behavior	407

PAGE

APPENDIX I 437

APPENDIX II 446

BIBLIOGRAPHY 453

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
A.	Predicted Effect of the Importance of Trust Variables . .	75
B.	A Partial Typology of the Political Structure	217
C.	Typology of Importance of Trust in the Political Structure	219
D.	Diagram of Centrality Within a Given Locality	254
E.	Predicted Effect of the Direction of Trust Variables . .	268
F.	Combining the Direction of Trust Variables	374
G.	Typology of the Direction of Trust in the Community . . .	375
H.	Application of Political Constraints by Police	403
I.	Motivation to Engage in Police Political Behavior	413
J.	Comparative Predictions of Motivation to Engage in Police Political Behavior	415
K.	Central City, Mideast County and the Grid	423
L.	Predicted Effects of the Trust Variables Upon Opportunity to Behave Politically	425
M.	Predicted Effects of the Trust Variables Upon Efficacy to Behave Politically	427

LIST OF CHARTS

CHARTS		PAGE
4.1	Responses by Police to Question Concerning Interest in Their Department by Elected Public Officials	83
4.2	Knowledge of the Political Structure by Ranks and Departments	90
9.1	Comparison of Number of Categories Mentioned	275
9.2	Comparison of Categories Chosen	276
9.3	Summation of Alienation and Exclusion Questions	280
9.4	Ranking of Categories by the Deputies in Mideast Department from that Presenting the Least to that Presenting the Most Problems	285
9.5	Relation of Ranking to Personal Set of Values Categories in Mideast County	287
9.6	Ranking of Categories by the Officers in Central City Department from that Presenting the Least to that Presenting the Most Problems	289
9.7	Relation of Ranking to Personal Set of Values Categories in Central City	291
9.8	Central City Police Perceptions of the Citizenry	307
9.9	Mideast County Deputy Perceptions of the Citizenry . . .	308
9.10	Police Responses About Overall Citizens' Support	312

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX		PAGE
I.1	Interview Form	437
I.2	Complaints Filed With the Grievance Officer Against the C.C.P.D. (June 1970-February 1971)	442
II.1	Chart One. Direction of Trust--Content of Police and Citizenry Political Behavior Within the Four Types	446
II.2	Chart Two. Intensity of Police Political Behavior Within any of the Eleven Categories	450

CHAPTER I

Police, The Environment and Political Behavior

Public service agencies in the United States are precariously situated with relation to their environment. These agencies are primarily organized to provide services to the citizenry of a given political jurisdiction. They are responsible to the elected officials of that jurisdiction, their creators for the performance of specified functions.[1] In turn, these elected officials are responsible to the citizens, all or some of whom receive outputs from the agencies. Within such a circular governmental system, therefore, dual and often conflicting sets of obligations are created for public service organizations: the necessity of responding to both their creators and their clientele, those who control their creators.

This study will attempt to shed some light on how one specific type of public agency, the police,[2] copes with this external political environment and what effects the environment has on its activities. The police are an ideal subject to study the manner in which our political system operates because they occupy a unique and universal position within local community government. They are present at all governmental levels and are the only public agency combining a service orientation on a twenty-four hour basis with the delegated authority to totally constrain a citizen's freedom. The police combine the potential for the most dramatic and positive of public services with the capability of imposing the most negative legal sanction, deadly force. In brief, they

are the most salient, controversial and complex of public service agencies.[3]

There have been innumerable studies on the organization and structure of police departments, on the personalities, capabilities, attitudes and beliefs of recruits and veteran officers, and on the attitudes and beliefs of different segments of the populace toward the police. These studies tend to look at the functions performed by the police and relate them to internal organizational conditions,[4] to specific external organizations such as the court system and the Prosecuting Attorney's office or to generalized attitudes toward the citizenry and the community. The general picture that develops is the police as a secretive, paramilitary organization with a closed occupational community operating within an environment of general constraint.

Perhaps the multitude of problems and the complexity of the relationships encountered by students of the police have limited most studies to the organizational level or below with few attempts at systematically relating the police to their environment. Little attention has been focused on where and how the police as an organization fit into the political and social processes of the community which it serves, at the ways in which a police department as an actor reacts to and acts upon our dynamic and circular political system of government, and at how similarities and differences between police agencies are systematically related to the community in which they are found.

Police have long been a focal point of concern for the community, the source of heated and often acrimonious debate among citizens, and the object of widely divergent views about their activities. A large body of literature, both historical and contemporary, pictures the police

as behaving in a selectively brutal and repressive manner--as agents of social control--representing the interests of the "political establishment," their own set of values, or both. It is obvious that a fairly large number of citizens in the United States are alienated from and often quite hostile to the police. Other literature depicts the police as a neutral and apolitical, peace-keeping, crime-fighting force in the community with many citizens generally apathetic about them. A third perspective from the literature shows the police as a positive force--as servants of the people and responsible to elected officials--with perhaps a majority of citizens being sympathetic toward or supportive of their local police.

Can all three of these general sets of perspectives be correct? Are the authors of the above mentioned literature and the divergent views of the citizens referring to the same police department or to agencies in differing communities? Some reports may be accurate and others not, but an interesting phenomenon is clear: be it fact or perceptual fiction, it seems that police agencies do vary. Whether looking at one department or a large number of them, differing observers report a large variation in activities and behavior.

When focusing upon just one department, the question of differing perspectives is perhaps most easily understood by borrowing Schattschneider's axiom that, "Organization is itself a mobilization of bias in preparation for action."[5] Intrinsic to being a public organization is the fact that a police department will behave in a manner which will please some citizens while displeasing others. Thus, whatever the police do, different perspectives will be generated by citizens with competing sets of interests. Looking at the comparison between depart-

ments, there are a number of well-documented studies which show that they do in fact differ in behavior when performing the same activities.[6] Thus variations across departments seem to be more than perceptual fiction developed by biased observers.

The most interesting question becomes that of why there is a variation in police activity across political jurisdictions, given that all communities in the United States utilize the same general (circular) political process and that the police in each community are called upon to perform the same general peace-keeping and crime-fighting functions. There seems to be two plausible explanations for this phenomenon: 1) that the personnel, traditions and structure--in short, the internal organization--of each department differs, thus causing a different behavior pattern; and 2) that external environmental conditions impinge upon each department creating the different observed effects. These of course are not mutually exclusive, and as I suggested earlier, most students of the police have concentrated upon and explored the first.[7] I propose to focus upon the second, the political process in the community, because it has not been looked at and can, I think, yield some useful insights of police activity.

By identifying and describing the variations in certain crucial community factors, can we account for much of the behavior of the police? For example, do the socio-economic characteristics of a community's citizenry and its political structure systematically affect the scope and intensity of activity by its police? To what extent are the police isolated and autonomous organizations which operate independently to maximize their own sense of bureaucratic efficiency? Does community political activity, for instance, play a substantial part and affect

in important ways the daily operations of the police? Does it modify the way in which they interact with differing status-defined segments of the community and affect their own involvement in political activities? How, in short, do the police cope with the variety of views about them and do these conflicting attitudes create systematic and predictable differences in police activity between communities with differing governmental forms?

> Of all the nation's institutions few have been the focus of greater concern in the recent past than the police. This concern has been expressed by whites demanding law and order, blacks, protesting brutality and harassment, and presidential commissions studying crime, rioting and violence. Out of this concern have come proposals for centralization, professionalization, and bureaucraticization on the one hand, and for community control on the other . . . if a close reading of the daily newspapers of most American communities is indicative, there is virtually no significant group unlikely to be affected by changes in policing . . . . In the absence of an historical perspective, however, it has thus far been exceedingly difficult to gain a proper understanding of the police.8

What is true of an historical perspective is even more true, I feel, of a well-developed political perspective (i.e., relating the police to both the political structure and the populace of a community). There has been little in the way of scholarly research relating police to: 1) community political activities; 2) comparative analyses based on such activities; and next to nothing on 3) the activities of the police as being politically induced, other than a large body of journalistic-type literature discussing the use of local police as a repressive arm of the state.

I have identified three areas in which there have been discussions relating modern American police to their overall political environment. These are: 1) environmental conditions inducing internal organizational changes and their concomitant effects on role holders; 2) police chief

relations with civilian decision makers regarding tenure accountability; and 3) the fear of centralization--the tyranny of a police state in a democracy. Each of these is briefly discussed in the following paragraphs by citing illustrative sources from literature on the police.

Allan Silver traces the development of the demand for order from early to contemporary societies. Basic to this historical approach is the "rising standards of public order . . . (and) an increasing intolerance of criminality, violence and riotous protest." Over the years this has led to greater civilian expectations of the police to substitute law for politics which "exposes them (the police) to pressures engendered by the idea of a uniformly peaceful civil society." Such demands bring forces to bear on the modern municipal police to revert back to when the early police forces were seen "as a sophisticated and convenient form of garrison force against an internal enemy (today, as then, seen as 'dangerous classes', e.g., the poor, blacks, hippies, etc.).[9]

Reiss and Bordua conclude an excellent chapter on innovations in organization and in legal control of the police as adaptations to changes in the urban community with a short discussion of the relations of police commanders to civil superiors. "Quasi-formalized obsession with command as a principle of control" and a "complex system of feudal loyalties" are examples of the types of departments which develop from a cross classification of "Tenure of Chief" with "Relations to Mayor."[10] This theme of the accountability of Chief (Sheriff, etc.) to civilian decision makers is also discussed by Berkley who refers to " . . . a growing tendency to view the police as a non-civilian organization . . . (which) is matched by a growing tendency to reduce, at least in some

areas, civilian administrative authority." He cites activity by the Boston policemen in 1962 who " . . . persuaded the state legislature to pass a law making it mandatory for any future police commissioner in that city to have at least ten year's experience in law enforcement," and New York City in 1964 where " . . . it was any and all forms of civilian authority that were being resisted," when newly elected Mayor Lindsay attempted to assert authority over the N.Y.P.D.[11]

The third general area concerning political activity and the police is the contradictions inherent in the concept of a 'democratic police force', and the reluctant acceptance over the years of the presence of a police force but with a "strong emphasis on the importance of keeping police decentralized and locally controlled." This has led to the fact that the U.S. has some 40,000 separate law enforcement organizations and Berkley quotes a well-known authority on the police as saying that " . . . in no other part of the world has local autonomy been carried to such extreme lengths."[12] Bordua and Reiss caught the gist of this combination of fear and public philosophy concerning political authority when they wrote:

> The mass (of citizens) is in a paradoxical situation in relation to governmental police systems. On the one hand, they are vulnerable to state tyranny enforced through the police organization, i.e., a 'police state.' On the other hand, they are vulnerable to police tyranny when state authority is unable to directly control the public police organization or hold it accountable.[13]

With regard to comparative analyses, three studies will be briefly looked at for content concerning police and community political activity. John P. Clark in a comparison of British and American police with regard to isolation (i.e., lack of social integration into the community and a lack of consensus regarding proper police functioning) concludes that

a large proportion of the policemen in both countries do feel socially isolated.[14] He studied the departments of three middle-sized cities in Illinois (80,000-130,000 population) by means of anonymous questionnaires as part of a larger study of the role of the police in social control.[15] Almost 600 citizens were individually interviewed, along with questionnaires returned from 430 social control agency personnel in the three communities. In an otherwise excellent study, it is interesting to note that he does not mention the role played by the political structures and processes in the three cities as mediating influences on the effects of social control and isolation, and that returns from the three departments were mixed together to provide 313 responses from individual policemen with no discussion of the differences which might exist in the three departments. This last point is particularly important because much of the literature on the police glosses over what I hope to show are significant differences between departments.

Skolnick's well-known Justice Without Trial is a highly commendable effort to analyze the conditions influencing police to act as they do. He states that, "It is an underlying assumption of this study that no set of police is morally 'better' than another, but rather that each responds to the conditions of his own bailiwick." In an effort to offset the fact that there are "practical differences in the administration of justice from county to county and city to city in any state, and among federal districts," Skolnick spent two weeks in another city of "comparable size, non-white population, industry and commerce (the two cities the most alike in the U.S. in these factors)" for the sake of broad comparison and "for background material to put 'Westville' in perspective."[16] Although I remain uncertain as to what effects such

a comparative effort actually had on the results of the study, Skolnick's conclusions as stated above concerning significant differences are relevant.

However, the major item of importance to us is the fact that at no time in the entire book did he discuss the relationship of the political structure of Westville or its political process as conditions influencing police to act as they do. Nor is there anything concerning the police as political actors in the political system.[17] Again this is not to be taken as criticism of the study in question but it is noteworthy that external pressures were seen as being limited to the participants in the legal process:

> The idea of operational law enforcement should suggest both the attitudes and behavior of policemen responding to judicial rulings, and interpersonal relations with the accused, the prosecutor, defense attorney, judge, and whenever applicable, with the general public.[18] (Emphasis added.)

The third study, James Q. Wilson's Varieties of Police Behavior is the major comparative study of departments in differing political jurisdictions completed to date.

> The purpose of this book is to describe how the police patrolman behaves with respect to the more frequently applied laws; to analyze the problems facing the police administration both in deciding what the patrolman ought to do and in getting him to do it; to discover how, if at all, patrolmen in various cities differ in performing their functions; and finally to inquire whether--or under what circumstances--such differences as exist are based on explicit community decisions.[19]

This book constitutes the first attempt to classify differing departments in the U.S. according to the "police" function of enforcing laws and maintaining order (as opposed to "service" functions which are omitted).

Wilson looks at eight municipal police departments (six in N.Y.

State) in what he calls an exploratory study, and suggests three patterns or styles of police behavior (watchman, service, legalistic) into which he places the eight departments studied. He states that:

> In general then understanding the political life of a community will not provide a sufficient explanation of the police policies in effect . . . . But if the police are not, in the routine case, governed by the community, neither are they immune to community interests and expectations . . . . Thus police work is carried out under the influence of a 'political culture' though not necessarily under day-to-day political direction.[20]

He then relates the three police styles to three political cultures (caretaker, service, professionalized) and concludes that "the latter constrains the former but does not uniquely determine it," and that " . . . there is also good reason to believe that politics, in the broadest sense, influences law enforcement but that the influence is more indirect than deliberate."[21]

Not discussed in this book in any organized or conscious manner are attempts by the police to become proactively involved in the political process, i.e. to apply influence within the political structure for favorable outcomes. Politics is seen, rather, as an external force acting upon and, under certain conditions, altering the internal structure of the organization with its attendant consequences on role incumbents. The next step toward a more complete understanding of the police would appear to be an attempt at placing them as actors in their circular political system and then devising some systematic method of relating departments across differing communities based upon this environmental interaction.

I know of nothing that has been written about the activities of the police as politically induced, either as a reaction to external forces or to promote their own interests. Politics tend to be seen as

the antithesis of bureaucratization, centralization, professionalization, etc., and in most "scholarly" works are thus generally confined to either historical antecedents of modern police organizations or are seen as vestigial remains best alluded to as road blocks impeding progress.[22]

Bayley, in an unpublished paper (1970) which compares the historical development of several European countries, discusses national police systems and says that their differing structures, tasks, role behavior, professional images, etc., arose from the development of unalike national political systems. He states that, "The police are intimately part of a political system; this is an empirical, not definitional or logical, conclusion," and:

> The police of France, Germany and Italy, but not Great Britain, have played a manifestly political role in the histories of their countries . . . . The extent of political activity among these (national) police systems is a function of the manner in which the force was created, the location of police authority with respect to political power, and the persistent exigencies of political life.[23]

Klonoski and Mendelsohn have edited a book, The Politics of Local Justice which begins to get at what I have been laboring to develop. In the Introduction they state that:

> The legal system functions as a subsystem of the political system . . . . Our assumption is that the values of the political system are the values of the legal system and that the actors in the legal system--police, prosecutors, judges--make judgments mirroring these values . . . . A basic assumption of this volume and the reason for bringing it together is our belief that political considerations, broadly conceived, explain to a large extent who gets--and in what amounts and how--the 'good' (justice) that is produced by the legal system in the setting of the local community . . . (and in conclusion) This book is a product of our belief that politics best explains how local legal systems work.[24]

So, by the 1970's, a few social scientists were beginning to

reevaluate our democratic political system by exploring some of the issues long discussed in the liberal and radical journals.[25] Unfortunately, after the excellent introduction to the Klonoski-Mendelsohn volume, all that was available concerning the police and their role in the legal-political systems was a 1963 article by James Q. Wilson which describes some of the subtle ways politics affect (once again acts upon) the norms which police develop to adapt to their environmental situation.[26]

Underlying the theoretical conceptions of this study and the model to be developed is the assumption that police agencies, like all other public agencies, are intimately involved in the politics of the community. I begin by positing what I later hope to show exists, that the police as an organization have the potential for and do engage in political activity. Of what, though, does political activity consist? "Politics" is a ubiquitous and utterly inconsistent term used to cover every conceivable exigency by persons ranging from the man on the street, with his conventional wisdom, to scholars who spend a lifetime disagreeing about it. To combat this, I shall briefly outline a description of the political process of a given community which is drawn from William A. Gamson's Power and Discontent. This theoretical approach to the composition and process of political behavior will be the basis upon which the study proceeds and thus the reader will need a working understanding of it.

Gamson argues that politics is a struggle between "authorities" and "potential partisans" and can be profitably viewed from either perspective--the effort to achieve societal goals or the contest over the allocation of scarce values within the political arena.

> One view takes the vantage point of potential partisans and emphasizes the process by which such groups attempt to influence the choices of authorities or the structure within which decisions occur. The second view takes the vantage point of authorities and emphasizes the process by which they attempt to achieve collective goals and to maintain legitimacy and compliance with their decisions in a situation in which significant numbers of potential partisans are not being fully satisfied.[27]

Potential partisans are interest groups who apply influence upon authorities in conflict with other interest groups for scarce resources. In some communities "(political) party organization and party tactics become the focus rather than interest group organization and tactics but the focus on competition for scarce values remains central," (p. 6) and:

> From this perspective, the instruments of authority are most important scarce resources over which groups (political parties, social classes, etc.,) with conflicting goals grapple. Legitimate power is the grand prize because it makes it possible to reconcile the losers to their disadvantaged position (p. 8).

Authorities may be disinterested servants of society, a self-serving subgroup, or a combination of both. Only this latter aspect of the dual capacity of authority (as a private resource) involves an influence perspective.

Authorities are concerned with "the ability of a society to mobilize and generate resources to attain social goals (collective goods)" (p. 11). The concern of this perspective is not with the distribution of private rewards but with the production of public goods. Furthermore, "there is a strong interest in conflict as well, since a system cannot function effectively if it must devote too much of its resources to . . . conflict management" (p. 13). Thus, potential partisans see power from an "influence perspective," while authorities see it from one of "social control." For Gamson, authorities "treat conflict regulation

as the management or control of the use of power by actors in a social system" (pp. 14-15).

Each of these perspectives is a partial view which together form a whole, the political process. An influence perspective incorporates the views of the agents of influence (potential partisans). The targets of influence are authorities "who for any given social system, make binding decisions in that system" (p. 21) and have effective (legitimate) authority to make the decision. A social control perspective incorporates the views of the agents of control (authorities) acting in their capacity as agents of the system. "The targets of control are potential partisans whose actions can potentially disrupt the orderly functioning of the system" (p. 18).

Influence in the Gamsonian model centers on actions that affect the binding choices of people in an authority role. Effective influence incorporates " . . . the requirement that the decision-making behavior of authorities has been altered from what it would have been in the absence of the influence . . . . Influence can be conceived of as a shift in the probability of an outcome."[28]

> Intentionability is imbedded in the definition of influence through the concept of a preferred outcome. Groups may also do various things which affect outcomes inadvertently. Such effects constitute influence only when they involve preferred outcomes (p. 71).

An influence attempt, therefore, is the utilization of resources (the base value of something which the actor possesses, i.e. constraints, inducements and persuasion) by the potential partisan who interacts with a salient decision maker with the intent or the consequence of altering his behavior.

In sum, when an issue affects the collective goals of society

(the public welfare) and the public resources are to be expended, the effective decision making authorities become the elected officials or their appointed (or tenured as in civil service systems) administrators.[29] Partisans would be those groups of citizens within a community who have a preferred outcome and who possess the potential in the form of tangible resources to make influence attempts. The desired outcome of these influence attempts is to maintain or alter binding decisions which would be favorable to the interests of any specified group or organization. This, then, is a skeletal outline of the Gamsonian political process theory and how political activity works in our governmental system.

Relating this political process to the police highlights the circular nature of the political system and the fact that the police face two ways. Utilizing the influence perspective, as partisans they face toward elected public officials who are the targets of influence attempts. This is done because they are authorities for decisions which affect the police. The police, or authorities from the social control perspective, also face toward the citizenry whom they attempt to control. This is a more subtle process which will be discussed in greater depth later, but essentially, the citizens are controlled because a failure to do so would leave them free to operate politically (apply influence) upon the officials who have authority over the decisions police care about. Thus, the citizens have power over the police's authorities and both the influence and the social control perspectives are political.

Now, how do the police fit into the community political scene? The public political structure is the arena in which decisions about

the use of public resources for the public welfare get made. Differing communities have evolved a myriad of variations, but in complex jurisdictions the overall form is generally as follows: at the apex are the elected officials, chosen by a qualified electorate and those executives that the officials appoint or retain to manage the administrative apparatus. This public (in the sense of being the consumer of public resources) apparatus is multi-divided into units, each of which is delegated specific functions to perform. The police as a public agency is one such imbedded unit. They are delegated legitimate authority to perform certain specified functions and are equipped with the decision making capability to fulfill their responsibilities which make them an authority viz a viz the citizenry within the community they serve. Thus, they have the power to arrest a citizen and this deprivation of freedom becomes a rather binding decision. The final outcome of this arrest decision in the form of assessing culpability is removed from the police to the courts but their social control function is legitimated by, and largely uncontested within, the system.[30]

This brings us back to police as a public agency. The decision making authority of public agencies is a peculiar one in that it is delegated to them. The authority of the police emanates from two sources, the legal code of two or more governmental levels (local, state and federal laws) and the local (political) governmental system. The police are sworn to uphold the laws and are delegated authority from the legal codes to effect the arrest of lawbreakers in certain situations. That is, they have effective authority if a misdemeanor is committed in their presence or if they have adequate reason to believe that a felony has occurred. Otherwise, effective authority lies with the

Prosecutor's Office (City Attorney, the Courts, etc.) in the sense that it is necessary to obtain an Authorization (Request) for Arrest before the police can legally proceed. The legal system has other means of affecting the decision making authority of police, an example of which Newman summarizes nicely in the title of his article, "Acquittal of the Guilty to Control Police Enforcement Methods."[31] The essence of this relationship between the police and the legal system is the fate control held over the police's decisions because of the separation of law enforcement from outcome.

The second source of authority has to do with: "A reassertion of authority by a group with formal authority that has not been exercising it." Gamson states that:

> Authority is typically delegated and under nonconflict conditions, a body without formal authority may be the effective authority for a decision . . . . However, under conditions of conflict . . . procedural regularity may not be sufficient . . . (and conflict may be both) a source and a consequence of the reassertion of effective authority by groups with formal authority. A group which has usually been the effective authority for a decision may discover it must use influence. In such a situation, a shift in effective authority has occurred and it is no longer making binding decisions.[32]

Conflict, of course, is the name of the game for the police and more than any other local public agency, their decisions are subject to potential review by elected or administrative "civilian" officials. Police, therefore, are public servants of an unusual kind. They are different, perhaps unique, because the consequences of their acts are potentially so great for the citizens. They are subject to potential public review because there is a lot at stake with the authority they hold.

One further item needs to be discussed before we can get back

to the police and political behavior. This has to do with the fact that:

> Those who occupy authority roles are important producers of influence attempts as well as producers of binding decisions . . . frequently their authority is itself an important resource used to influence others with authority . . . . Easton wrestles with this same boundary problem in discussing demands which are not 'put into' the political system from 'the experiences of persons who have acted in roles outside the political sector of society' but have 'emerged directly out of political roles themselves.' He proposes the term 'within puts' to describe demands generated by those acting in political roles. The solution proposed here is to define the authority role more narrowly and to treat the demands of those with authority as part of a different role (i.e., potential partisans).[33]

This seemingly paradoxical situation can easily be clarified with an example: Annually, local governments must adopt a budget for the next fiscal year. Those authorities responsible for this task must divide up and allocate the expected revenue among those agencies which provide services to the public. The Chief of Police, who exercises authority in many decisions, becomes a partisan when he attempts to influence these authorities concerning the size of his department's budget for the next year. That is, his influence attempt to promote a favorable outcome places him in the role of partisan rather than authority with regard to that particular decision; later, when he administers the functions of his department, he resumes the authority role.[34]

With these items in hand, a description of the political system as being a combination of the influence and social control perspectives, political activity as the interplay of influence attempts for preferred outcomes, and police as both authorities and authorities cum potential partisans, we are finally in a position to discuss police political behavior. The object of this study and the dependent variable in the

to-be-constructed model of police political behavior is the manner in which police behave both while attempting to develop as favorable an external environment as possible and while maximizing their inputs from it.

As the police perform a critical function in our society, their survival in some form is fairly secure. Survival, however, comes at the cost of a heavy reliance upon their external environment for the resources necessary to do so. Contrary to much literature on the police, they are not closed and semi-autonomous organizations who control their environment. The fact that some police agencies come to resemble that somewhat sinister description is as much a function of their creators and clientele as it is of their own machinations. What is true is that the police, like all other organizations, seek to maximize their well-being and to promote their own set of interests through the manipulation of their surroundings. The consequences of this fairly simple fact borrowed from open-system theory, and the complex manner in which it is implemented is the subject of this study.

Police political behavior falls into two categories and, not surprisingly, utilizes the dual perspectives in the Gamsonian theory outlined above: a) police in their role as authorities acting as social control agents upon a citizenry which may, through its influence on public officials, ultimately help or hurt the police, and b) police as potential partisans in the act of making influence attempts on other sets of authorities who have the capability of making binding decisions on issues of interest to them. These two categories of political behavior have disparate targets--the citizenry and the public officials of a given community--but have several factors in common:

1) To represent political behavior, the action must contain an element of anticipation. That is, the police must be aware that the consequences of an action will enhance or maintain their interests. Unanticipated consequences of an action which aid the interests of the police will not be considered as political activity. However, the presence of resources capable of influencing a target and an attempt to do so will be so considered.[35] 2) Subsumed under anticipation is the sense that the target must be perceived as capable of affecting the interests of the police, either directly or indirectly. Thus, differing sets of authorities would qualify as political actors and targets for a range of issues. The conditions for qualification are more complex when interaction occurs with the citizenry. The citizen target of a social control, political act must be identified as a political or potentially political actor in the system.[36] That is, the target must be known by the police as being a partisan who is or might become politically active on issues of importance to them.[37] 3) It should be noted that in neither category am I referring to actions which might develop political ramifications or overtones. Attitudes or beliefs toward citizens based upon their race, ethnicism, social class or religion which might lead police officers to engage in certain types of encounters (e.g. "stop and frisk" and the often attendant illegal search) are not considered political actions unless those approached were previously known to the police as political actors. If, however, an encounter between an officer and a citizen becomes politicized, any subsequent encounters would be presumptively political in

content. In sum, police behavior toward certain disliked or "unsavory" status-defined segments of the populace is differentiating the populace. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for political behavior.

Let us take a closer look at each of these categories of political behavior and cite some illustrations of what I mean. Examples of police acting as agents of influence include the Chief testifying in a City Council meeting about the need for more men to combat a drug "crisis," off duty patrolmen packing the council chambers,[38] press releases by the police which discuss relevant political issues, lobbying for new ordinances, the threat of a work slowdown, "blue flu," a strike, etc. Such actions can be made publicly as an attempt to generate public support for their position or in supporting a particular candidate for political office.[39] They can also be made privately as when the Chief tells the Mayor that an impending action would gravely lower the morale of his men or when an official is intimidated in some fashion.

Police engage in political behavior as social control agents when the target is an element of the citizenry. There are two forms of such action which, for theoretical purposes, I shall discuss separately but which in reality rarely occur apart. The first is when the police react against partisans who are in the process of trying to influence public decisions. That is, any attempt to utilize, neutralize or deprecate the potential effects of influence upon legitimate authority is political behavior. This type of behavior includes deviance labelling (e.g., the Black Panthers as a "revolutionary" and "dangerous" element), abusive, insulting or untrue information "leaks," exaggeration via

scare tactics, guilt by association and innuendo, attempts at social isolation and ostracism of politically active groups or individuals, etc. An example of this would be if a group of people went to City Hall to protest police brutality by demanding the firing or reprimand of an officer and the police reacted by releasing negative information they possessed on the protesters' backgrounds, activities, etc. (If the police were to publicly blast the Mayor for coddling known "extremists" or for responding to "violence prone groups which pose a definite threat to the Nation's security," an example of police political activity in the role of partisans would have occurred.)

The second form of political activity by police in their role as social control agents is <u>proactive</u> behavior against partisans. Any activity which is meant to channel, control or constrain the source of influence attempts by citizens is political behavior when the target is a group that might constrain the police or influence public officials in ways adverse to the police. Examples of this type of behavior are obvious: harassment, the illegitimate or extra-legal use of authority or force (illegal searches or seizures, brutality) political intelligence activities, intimidation, false arrest, and of course the ultimate constraint, the use of deadly force. To continue with the example of our protesters arriving at City Hall, if their automobile license numbers were openly taken down, if they were photographed, their statements video-taped, or if they were impeded in any fashion from legal activity by the police, political activity would have occurred. The police would in each instance be using equipment and techniques available to them for legitimate law enforcement activity for

the furtherance of their own interests.

Summary

The theory being developed relies heavily upon an open systems approach to augment the Gamsonian vision of the political process. Katz and Kahn summarize the open-system perspective:

> Open-system theory with its entropy assumption emphasizes the close relationship between a structure and its supporting environment, in that without continued inputs the structure would soon run down. Thus, one critical basis for identifying social systems is through their relationships with energic sources for their maintenance.[40]

Political behavior is viewed as an aid to getting the needed resources from the environment. It is an organizational perspective in which the police attempt to promote the interests of the entire police department rather than trying to have individual political views fulfilled. The idea of the circular nature of our governmental process was introduced to demonstrate that police face in two directions and behave in a dual political manner. The social control and influence perspectives were borrowed from Gamson to make sense of this dual set of obligations and the different types of interaction they face when dealing with their clientele and their civilian superiors. In sum, the police, acting collectively through the authority delegated to their organization, procure scarce environmental resources: 1) directly from those who control access to them; or 2) indirectly from those who could affect the manner in which the resources are divided up.

Outline of Study

A more complete understanding of the relationship between the

political activity of the police and their environment and a better grasp of why and how this occurs is the subject of this study. The next chapter describes the setting and development of the research. The two law enforcement departments are introduced with their surrounding environments. The method and source of data collection, along with the inevitable problems and shortcomings which exist are discussed.

Section Two deals with the police and their transactions with the political structure and process. Generally, this section builds upon Gamson's influence perspective, introducing the idea of the political structure as an object of trust to the police and the differential importance attached to the political process by them as a consequence of differing governmental forms. After an introductory chapter (Chapter 3) which outlines these relations, key variables of the political process are illustrated in detail using examples from the two departments.

More specifically, Chapter 4 discusses differences in types of control and how it affects the relationship between the police and their civilian superiors. In addition to differences between two forms of public administrative structures, the emergence, development and usage of police unions in the two departments is examined. Chapter 5 looks at the structural partner to control, accountability, and stresses grievance procedures, two separate but related attempts to implement changes in the legal system and police reactions to these attempts. Chapter 6 introduces the participation by the community's citizenry in the political process and its effects upon the police in the two political jurisdictions under study. Here, the influence

perspective and its ramifications will be very much in evidence. Section Two will conclude with Chapter 7 which attempts to pull these various strands together theoretically.

Section Three explores the relationship between the police and the citizenry, builds upon the police as agents of social control and introduces the concept of the direction or type of trust relationship that exists between a citizenry and its local law enforcement agency. Chapter 8 introduces the theoretical implications of a community's political composition with the socio-political characteristics of the citizenry as the key to the type of extant trust relationships. Chapter 9 discusses the social characteristics of the two communities and the police reaction to these differences. Chapter 10 continues with this differential treatment of segments of the population, looks at specific episodes in a comparative manner and discusses the volatile issue of the proactive behavior of political intelligence gathering. Chapter 11 attempts some theoretical integration of this section and suggests some conclusions from the data and ideas discussed.

Section Four, "Toward a Theory of Police Political Behavior," attempts to unify all the aspects of the external environment into a cohesive package. Police political behavior becomes the dependent variable in this model and the elements discussed in the various chapters are transformed into independent variables which are linked to the dependent variable by the two intervening concepts of trust. The model is extended into a comparative theory and some specific hypotheses are generated concerning political behavior in differing communities. Predictions are advanced, drawing upon the illustrations of the two

cases studied in Sections Two and Three. This chapter concludes with a discussion of some implications for the police and the community concerning their environmental relationship.

CHAPTER I

Footnotes

1. At least in part, as some public agencies are the creatures of more than one level or government, e.g., public welfare agencies, may be county organizations operating with state employees and county, state and federal statutes and funds constraining their operations.

2. Police, as referred to in this study, will mean publicly funded organizations utilizing sworn officers working at the local level within the United States. Local is meant to encompass the variation from incorporated village through to include the county governmental level.

3. There is little doubt that the police are the subject of more citizen interest and involvement than any other public agency. In addition, the police contain within their activities the problems of all other service agencies plus innumerable ones germane to them specifically.

4. See for example, James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, for structural conditions and William A. Westley, Violence and the Police, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, or Jerome H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, John Wiley and Sons, New York, N.Y., 1966 for psychological and socio-psychological variables.

5. E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1960, p. 30.

6. Wilson, Skolnick, op. cit. See also, Task Force Report: The Police, The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1967.

7. Wilson, op. cit., argues that the internal organization of a department is the major determinant of police behavior. He utilizes (p. 233) the concept of a "zone of indifference" within prevailing "political cultures" and says that, "In general, understanding the political life of a community will not provide a sufficient explanation of the police policies in effect," p. 232.

8. Arno Press, 1971, pre-publication pamphlet advertising The Police In America, 35 Volumes.

9. Alan Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," in The Police, David Bordua, ed., John Wiley, New York, 1967, pp. 20-z.

10. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., and David J. Bordua, "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in The Police, pp. 52-53.

11. George E. Berkley, The Democratic Policeman, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p. 43.

12. Ibid., pp. 4, 21, 27.

13. David J. Bordua and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Law Enforcement" in The Uses of Sociology, Lazarsfeld, Sewell and Wilensky, eds., Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1967, p. 284.

14. John P. Clark, "Isolation of the Police: A Comparison of the British and American Situations," in Crime and Justice in Society, Richard Quinney, ed., Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1969, p. 146.

15. Ibid., p. 134. Data was collected during 1963-64.

16. Skolnick, op. cit., pp. 40, 23, 24.

17. There is a discussion of law enforcement in Democratic Society which juxtaposes our "rule of law" to a totalitarian system where legality is not seen as an end in itself but as the instrument for the achievement of a political order. Skolnick, op. cit., pp. 17-23.

18. Ibid., p. 18.

19. Wilson, op. cit., p. 4.

20. Ibid., pp. 232-233.

21. Ibid., pp. 271 and 277.

22. Ibid., p. 277. See for example, the footnote (#37): "The police have clearly been taken 'out of politics' in the narrow sense."

23. David H. Bayley, "The Police and Political Development in Europe," multilith, University of Denver, 1970, pp. 52, 53.

24. James R. Klonoski and Robert I. Mendelsohn, The Politics of Local Justice, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1970, pp. xviii-xxi.

25. Articles in magazines concerning political activities of the police are too numerous to cite here. Such magazines as N.Y. Review of Books, Ramparts, The New Republic, Nation, Current, etc., regularly carry articles with many other magazines such as Atlantic, Harpers, Newsweek, etc., occasionally reporting on political activity from the center left perspective. Innumerable books also relate, in a journalistic-ersatz sociological fashion, such behavior. See, for

example, Gene Marine, The Black Panthers, Signet Books, New York, 1969, and especially the writings of James Baldwin, et al.

26. James Q. Wilson, The Police and Their Problems: A Theory, in Klonoski & Mendelsohn, op. cit.

27. William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent, Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1968, p. 2.

28. Ibid., p. 60. Power "refers both to authorities operating on potential partisans and to the reverse operation." Social control is the term used when Gamson refers to what authorities do to potential partisans and influence covers the reverse.

29. Obviously for certain issues authorities are more than simply government officials. "Almost everyone makes binding decisions at some level of social organization, be it community, voluntary association, work organization, family, or some other." Ibid., p. 59.

30. See Reiss and Bordua, op. cit., on the effects this removel of outcome has for the police.

31. Donald J. Newman in Delinquency, Crime and Societal Process, Donald R. Cressey and David A. Ward, eds., Harper & Row, Evanston, 1969.

32. Gamson, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

33. Ibid., p. 28-29.

34. As Gamson states (p. 29), "There is no imputation that something is wrong with people in authority acting as agents of influence. This is what we usually mean by leadership."

35. "While there need not necessarily be an action by the influencer, there must be the possibility for action." Ibid., p. 70. See as an example of this possibility, the FBI files "liberated" from Media, Pa., and later published, especially the statement of an FBI high official concerning the development of a sense of paranoia "endemic in the New Left circles." The New Republic, April 10, 1970, p. 7.

36. The necessity for including the collective nature of the target of police (social control) political activity will be discussed in detail later. For now, it is sufficient to say that with regard to such activity, the target must be organizing, mobilizing, contending, etc. partisan influence attempts.

37. Gamson implies this when he discusses the control of "private power" and states that "discontent is a problem for the system to manage, not an opportunity for actors to increase their influence," ibid., p. 17.

38. As police rarely see themselves or are seen as being "off duty" in the normal job role sense, political behavior becomes an activity to be continually monitored.

39. It should be obvious that political behavior by the police is not synonomous with partisan political party activity or the trappings-apparati of the partisan party system. This, of course, can be one of the means but the action would be subsumed under one or the other definition of political behavior.

40. Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, p. 9.

CHAPTER 2

The Research Setting, Development and Method

> Police department officials, if asked, will state that they are not involved in partisan politics. It is generally known, however, that police engage in activities which are political in nature. These include such things as surveillance of politically active groups, the use of undercover agents, statements which discuss political issues, lobbying for new laws, speeches before civic and service clubs, etc.
>
> Which of the two local police agencies, the "Mideast County Sheriff Department" or the "Central City Police Department,"[1] would you say engage in more political activity?
>
> What reasons, if any, would you give in support of this?"

These questions were posed to seventeen politically active members who held organizational positions in one of the two major political parties of Central City. Fourteen of the seventeen responded to the first question by naming the Sheriff Department, while three named the City Department. All but one (who arrived late) responded in detail, some at length, to the second question, showing both that they understood the nature of the question and in most instances that they possessed considerable knowledge of the subject upon which to base their opinion.[2]

Two of the three who chose the City Department buttressed their response by citing a news release by the Central City Police Officers' Association which had appeared in that evening's Central City paper blasting the Mayor.[3] That this recency of events might well have biased the results toward the City points to a number of interesting items:

1) When asked, politically knowledgeable citizens had little difficulty surfacing illustrations of police political behavior (other examples than the ones I provided included union activities, public relations systems, the Sheriff's desire for a "narc squad," and his "activities on the drug problem"), 2) The Sheriff Department "won" convincingly even in the midst of a long and heated struggle between Central City's Mayor and its Police Department, and 3) on the question of which engages in more political activity, my findings and theoretical arguments support the scant minority.

Data for this study of police political behavior were drawn from a series of interviews conducted in both Central City and the surrounding Mideast County. The City is centrally located in the County, and besides being the County seat, is the major cultural and economic center for the County.[4] It has a population of approximately 100,000 with a major university providing a large student population (currently at an approximate ratio of one-third of the City's population) which has a considerable impact on age distribution in the City. "About 30% of the City's population are between the ages of 15 and 24. By comparison, only 13% of the State's population and 21% of the County's population (which includes another large university) are in the same age bracket."[5] This atypical age distribution places a heavy burden on both the local school system and all municipal social control agencies.

> The City has experienced a transition from its traditional orientation as a university city to a research-professional center. The reorientation has had a considerable effect on population mix, age structure, population mobility, income and occupational characteristics. Broadening of the City's economic base has made the City's population growth less responsive to the enrollment levels of the University. However, the University is still the most significant factor that accounts for the City's dynamic population growth.[6]

Central City experienced an average annual population growth of 4% prior to 1960. Since then it has grown at 6% and estimates are that it will continue at the same rate through 1980. A comparison between 1950 and 1970 of the racial distribution in the City indicates that in 1960, 7% were non-white as compared to 8% of the County and 9% of the State. In 1970, 8% were non-white in the City as compared to 9% in the total population of the County and almost 11% in the State.[7]

Politically, the City is divided into five wards each of which elects two councilmen (one each year) for a two year term. This ten man council is chaired by a Mayor elected for a two year term with all eleven positions being contested in a partisan political system. The elections are in April, thus allowing the maximal political visibility for a local election. All eleven serve on a part-time basis with the Councilmen receiving no salary and the Mayor a mere pittance ($3,000) for what is still called a part-time job. Thus, Central City has a weak Mayor-strong City Administrator system.[8]

The political distribution within the city is such that the First Ward (nearest the center-east of downtown Central City) is heavily Democratic (Party) with between half and two-thirds of the City's blacks and a large number of married graduate students comprising a voting majority. Ward Two has the heaviest concentration of student votes and has been slowly edging into the Democratic fold with the increasing ease of student age registration. It can, however, still go either way. Ward Three, with a mixture of university-associated voters and those not connected with the university, is in local politics very much a swing ward with a slight edge given to the Republicans. Ward

Four is the most conservative and very heavily Republican. The Fifth Ward is a swing ward, slowly becoming more Republican. Most of the black population not residing in the First Ward live here and vote heavily Democratic.

Overall and in a general sense, the City could be considered politically moderate to cautiously liberal with pockets (Ward 4 and parts of 5) of strong conservatism. Over the past decade the City has moved from a Republican stronghold to a balance of perhaps 52%-48% Republican. This change is primarily due to occupational mobility plus an increase in student involvement in local politics. In April 1969, for the first time in its history, a Democratic Mayor was elected with a Democratic majority (7-3) on the City Council. The last previous Democratic Mayor to be elected was in 1959 but served with a Republican Council. In April 1971, the Mayor was re-elected,[9] again with a heavy student vote, but the Council reverted to a 6-4 Republican majority.

Central City's Police Department seems to enjoy a national reputation as being one of the nation's finest. Whether this is true or not is a hypothetical question as there are no established criteria by which to rank or judge departments.[10] At any rate, many officers in the department have a great deal of pride in membership.

As of May 1, 1971, the total personnel of the force was 177 of which 144 were sworn officers (a graduation class of 18 rookies, in February 1971, brought this compliment to its full strength). The high turnover rate causes this department to have an unusually young median age patrolman with its concomitant problems of inexperience.[11] The department prides itself on the fact that an unusually large percentage of the officers, 60% or more, either have a college degree, are working

toward one or have attended college. In the Spring of 1971, three policewomen became the first sworn female officers in the department's history. Of the 177 employees, 11 are black, although none of the 18 clerical workers are.[12] There are no black officers above the rank of sergeant and a recent externally-inspired recruitment drive for more black officers was largely unsuccessful.

Statistical reports of criminal data, the so-called crime rate, are so rife with problems that one hesitates to even present whatever data is available. The following information compiled by the State Police for the year 1969 includes this trenchant critique of its own data:

> In 1969, (law enforcement) agencies reporting, numbered 386 as compared to 251 in 1968, a tremendous improvement. Yet 36 of th 386 agencies did not report consistently for each month of 1969 (both Central City and Mideast County appear to have done so) . . . . The largest single negative and disappointing factor in compiling the 1969 Law Enforcement Officials Report on Crime is the lack of Uniform Crime Reports from 13 cities in the population group of 5,000 to 10,000, from 10 cities . . . 10,000 to 25,000, from 10 cities over 25,000; and the lack of reports from 14 of the 83 county sheriff departments.[13]

The crime rate (Part I offenses) in the State shows an increase from 1965-1969 of 89.3% with the annual increase between 1968 and 1969 being 23.2%.[14] For Mideast County and Central City, no crime rate is available for these years because there are no accurate population figures. However, Part I offenses totals for these two years for the County show an increase from 1968 of 7,784 offenses to 13,295 in 1969 (by far the greatest increases were in burglary up from 1,474 to 3,162; in felonious larceny from 1,823 to 3,043; and in miscellaneous larceny from 3,235 to 4,956).[15] Of this total, Central City contributed in the last six months of 1968, 2,903 and in the last six months

of 1969, 4,197 offenses (the City has about 43% of the County's population as of the 1970 census).[16] In the first nine months of 1970, the crime rate increased on the average of 10% nationwide. Cities experienced an average overall increase of 6%; suburban law enforcement agencies reported a 14% increase and rural areas were up 9%.

Combining all available information, it seems that crime in Central City is mirroring that of other suburban areas. That is, the annual increase is substantially higher than the population immigration increase and is increasing most rapidly in the crimes of residence and non-residence burglary during the daytime. Night time burglaries are also up, as are all categories of larceny and robbery. Many of those crimes which show the greatest increase are probably the first step in the greatly increased drug traffic process (i.e., theft of goods to be fenced for cash). At any rate, daytime burglaries-larcenies are among the most difficult for police to be able to cope with, as single family residential dwellings, especially within a largely rural county, tend to be well spread out.

Mideast County is fairly sparsely populated and can effectively be divided into two quite diverse halves. It is rectangular in shape, measuring approximately twenty-four miles from north to south and thirty miles from east to west. The County had a total population in 1970 of 234,000 which represents a 35.8% increase over 1960 and has a projected increase of 33.2% for the next ten years. Not included in the 234,000 figure is what the County Planning Commission calls a Transient Population ("students, non-student wives and their children") of 60,655 which represents a 91.6% increase over 1960.[17]

The western half of the County is primarily underdeveloped and agricultural land studded with small townships and villages. The economics of the area is agriculture. Mobility of the population is low and the belief system of the populace reflects that of any northern rural area. The people are almost exculsively white (many of German extraction) with the population increase from 1960-1970 being only 18.3% (and a projected increase from 1970-1980 of only 9.3%).[18] Much of this increased population can be accounted for by persons moving out from Central City but commuting back to work. The western half contains approximately one-fifth of the population in about 55% of the land area.

The eastern half is largely dominated by the Central City area which has about 50% of the county's total population. Just east of this is the "Eastern City" area with an incorporated City and a township (to its east and north) and a larger population. This area accounts for most of the remaining 30% population. The other large University is located in Eastern City and this area, which had a 48.8% increase in growth between 1960 and 1970, is expected to have the most rapid rate of growth in the county over the next decade.[19]

Eastern City, while not an economically depressed area by any means, does have a lower per capita income than Central City. Its population, exclusive of students, is about 30% of Central City's, being only 3-4 miles away, and reflects a "little sister" attitude in much of its actions.[20] The township within its orbit is economically more healthy and is rapidly outgrowing the city. Many of the people who once might have settled in Central City are finding land and housing to be cheaper here.

"Eastern" Township contains a volatile mixture within its populace. Most of the blacks (exclusive of Central and Eastern Cities) in the County[21] reside in the Township (or in the Township immediately to the north) and were initially attracted to the area by jobs which became available when heavy industry (auto) factories opened up near there during World War II. They have carried the brunt of the effects of the recent economic decline although the effects have to a lesser extent also been felt by the other segment of the populace attracted by the same jobs, southern poor whites. These two groups, together comprising a majority of the population of the Township, will be discussed in great detail in Section Three. For now it is sufficient to say that they do not mix well and that the greatest racial problems occur, not unexpectedly, around the school system.[22] The remainder of the residents would be generally classified as "middle class."

Politically, the County can be split into the same three areas (Western, Central City and Eastern City): it is a swing county in national politics, and becoming less conservative than it has been in the past. The thirteen man County Board of Commissioners has, as a result of the 1970 elections, a nine to four Republican majority. They are elected from specified districts every two years in the Fall elections which give the eight (actually 7-1/2) Commissioners elected from the two cities, where County politics are of little consequence and interest, very low political visibility. Prior to 1968, which was the first time that the Board had been elected (a result of redistricting following the Supreme Court's "one man-one vote" ruling), the Board had 39 Supervisors appointed by officials from the 26 political

jurisdictions within the County's boundary. The Commission form of government is highly unweildy for such a complex governmental entity and is, I suspect, in slow transition to a more modern and appropriate form of government.

The western half is conservative Republican, the Central City area is moderate and still narrowly Republican in national elections,[23] and the Eastern City area is mixed. It is nonpartisan locally and Republican nationally. The Township is heavily Democratic but split between moderates and "law and order" conservatives. Wallace did well in this area in the 1968 election. The Sheriff is the only Democrat to win a county wide election for county office in the past four biennial elections. He ran and won as a "reform candidate" in 1964 and handily defeated the same Republican opponent in 1968 (he has a four year term). By most observers, he is considered the most astute politician currently at the County level.[24]

The Sheriff Department normally patrols the rural western half and the townships on the east, exclusive of the four cities. State statute confers on a Sheriff Department the right to contract with local political jurisdiction for patrol services and this is done with Eastern Township. The Township has an estimated 50-60% of the crimes reported by the Sheriff and "70% of the crimes reported by the "Eastern Post" of the State Police."[25] These crimes reflect the pattern of other suburban areas, (for the Township "crime . . . has increased at the same rate or greater than that of the State"),[26] with a disproportionate amount of crime being committed by juveniles and young adults in relation to their percentage of the overall population,[27] and the majority

of the crimes being in the burglary category with larceny coming in second.

Elsewhere, in the rural areas of the County, crime is also rising but at a slower rate. In 1970, Mideast County experienced 688 juveniles arrested for major crime offenses in rural areas (which "compares" with 527 in 1969). There were 186 arrests for burglary and 350 apprehended for larceny. This figure represents 54.1% of all the arrests for rural Mideast County.[28]

The Sheriff Department operated in 1970 on a budget of about one million out of a total County budget of $8,100,000 (compared with approximately 2.7 million out of a 17 million dollar budget in Central City for 1970). The total complement for 1970, according to the County Annual Budget, was 66 sworn male officers (of whom 45 were deputies and 21 command officers) and 17 civilian staff (of whom 4 were "matrons"). According to one informant, when all functions now under the Sheriff are included, there are 104 personnel (i.e., marine patrol, dog patrol, etc.). There are no blacks above the rank of deputy. In addition to the road patrol function, the other major duty of the Department is the County jail which is located in downtown Central City. The Central City Department uses this jail to lodge all retained arrestees.

The Sheriff Department has a reputation within the County of taking no nonsense from any citizen for whatever reason. They are reputed to hand out more "street justice" and to do so in a more physical manner than the Central City Department. For a number of reasons (see Chapter 7), morale in the Department is considerably higher than Central City's and not subject to that department's intermittent fluctuations. The deputies feel that they are "free" to be law enforcement

officers which has a "maintenance of order" ring to it. The Central City Police are much more concerned with their image and in both public relations efforts and personal identities strive toward "professionalization."[29] The Mideast Department men, in short, are proud of their reputation and say that the college campus radicals well know the difference between the brown shirts and the blue shirts.

Recruitment patterns differ also with prior experience and common sense perhaps the most significant factors for the Sheriff Department. Educational attainment, although desirable, does not seem to have the same importance for the Sheriff Department as for Central City which leads the latter to seek recent college graduates and not experienced men. The Sheriff, with a backlog of applicants, rarely hires inexperienced deputies, the great majority coming to the Department with prior police experience. For whatever reason they join, the Deputies seem quite satisfied with their conditions, for turnover is low by comparison with Central City. It is interesting to note something which I will take up again and that is the one-way flow of transfers. Approximately one-third of the Mideast Department has seen service with the Central City Department but there has never been even one countermove in anyone's memory.

Values and the Study's Development

> To conduct research with any group whose norms and values may not conform with those of the observer, the latter must empathize with the situation of his subjects. (and) A study of law in action, whether of judges, lawyers or policemen, is a study of men interpreting and thereby transforming principles and associated rules within legal institutions. Above all, it is a study of men at work.[30]

These two quotations from a researcher who studied the police as I have

done, eloquently sum up the perspective I believe I took with me into the field. The focus of this study is the police and how they behave in a collective manner with their environment. At the outset, I felt that the police were merely the most provocative social agency, and the most useful one for studying the phenomenon of political behavior. I have tried throughout the data collection phase of this research to look upon the behavior of the police as an open system output into the environment, with the intent of maximizing favorable inputs from the environment to the organization and its members. Such a perspective in no way implies a negative evaluation; in fact, I view it as both normal and expected. Police were not singled out for study because somehow their engagement in the same type of behavior that other social agencies perform should be judged in a different light. On the contrary, they were chosen simply because I expected to find more political behavior due to their unique position in the community. Also, I expected much of the behavior to be difficult to unearth.

This study began in the early spring of 1970 when it appeared that I would have an "insider's access" to a large metropolitan police department. For a number of months I commuted to this large city and observed police activity at the precinct level (riding in patrol cars, sitting and bullshitting in the station, etc.). At the same time, I was negotiating "downtown" with the top command for access to some of the special units operating out of headquarters. The Police Commissioner suggested that I put together my ideas in some cohesive form so that he might read them prior to granting my requested access. This

I did and the result was my being shut out of the entire department as a "security risk."[31]

I therefore found myself in the early summer of 1970 with a nascent theory, my interest whetted but with no department to study. That summer was spent playing around with ideas until I hit upon a more general scheme--to study police political behavior in a comparative setting: that is, to look at departments within political jurisdictions having differing governmental forms, and to the extent possible, differing social characteristics of the populace. I was primarily interested in the effects that these two general community attributes had upon their police department. Although early discussions with the top command of the Central City and Mideast Sheriff Department over the access issue and general discussions with some of the men were held in the fall, actual systematic date collection took place between January and April, 1971.

From the general theory to be developed, I constructed an open-ended interview schedule with which to interview between twenty and twenty-five men in each department. This questionnaire (see Appendix I) was contrived so as to be non-threatening but with questions included which would give me the information I felt was needed. On all occasions which presented themselves, I went beyond the actual printed questions and probed with other questions in whatever directions our conversations were going. The actual interviews took from a low of forty-five minutes to a high of two hours, with the average running about an hour and fifteen minutes. All interviews took place in the respective headquarters of the two departments (this, of course, afforded me an excellent opportunity

to both get known to the men and to observe daily operations. There were also many hours spent sitting and waiting which I hope were not idly spent).[32]

I made no attempt at a random sampling process because I wanted to interview a wide range of men over the hierarchies of each department and there weren't enough men in the various categories. Therefore, none of the findings warrant formal statistical analysis. Even though I feel the men interviewed were broadly representative of their respective departments, percentage compilations when they exist must be taken with due caution. I made a special and successful effort to interview all men who had transferred from Central City to the Mideast Department in the last two years (four deputies) and also freely discussed the Central City Department with those who had been with the M.C.S.D. longer than two years.

In the Sheriff Department, I completed the interview form with: 1) the Sheriff, 2) the Undersheriff, 3) the Inspector, 4-7) all four of the Captains--Patrol, Jail, Detective and Staff Services/Administration, 8-9) two Patrol Lieutenants, 10-11) a Patrol Sergeant and a Traffic and Safety Sergeant, and 12-22) six uniformed Road Patrol Deputies, four uniformed Jail Division Deputies and one Safety and Traffic Deputy. In all but one or two cases, the men were very open and receptive to the interviews (some, of course, taking a little longer than others to warm up to the topic). More than a few seemed to positively enjoy the opportunity of expressing and discussing their ideas.[33] The middle level command were especially helpful to me in cornering deputies to interview and were quite concerned that I get the cross

section of views they felt were present, including those whom they suspected held some negative opinions about the Department. After a period of time, I actively sought out certain deputies whose names kept recurring (for a variety of reasons) in conversations.

At the Central City Department, conditions were a bit different. The Deputy Chief insisted upon having a copy of the interview form prior to my using it and the right to exercise a veto power over the contents. He also stated that it would be very difficult to interview patrolmen, citing a number of valid but strained reasons for why they couldn't be interviewed while on duty. (This situation hadn't occurred with the Sheriff Department where most of the men I interviewed were on duty.) When I gave him the interview form he decided to be interviewed then, and in the shortest of the interviews, we proceeded. On a number of the questions pertaining to partisan political activity in the community he answered with a "no comment." This pattern of selective non-answering, totally absent with the Sheriff Department, was to be repeated by a number of the top command (not including the Chief).

A number of the Sheriff deputies had raised the fear that I would only be allowed to interview "safe" men in Central City who would glibly espouse the "department line." Three even offered to aid me by contacting their friends in the department whom they knew would give me the "straight story" on conditions both within the department and with relation to its environment. I, initially, refused this offer which was made partly as a friendly gesture and partly out of a departmental competitiveness, the result of which was that they wanted to be

sure I got the full picture. Their fears turned out to be partially substantiated as I was shunted down the hierarchy to what appeared to be the most "public relations" conscious officers. To offset this, I went back and accepted their help in the form of telephone calls setting me up with their friends. I thus approached the Central City department from two avenues, the top down and tagentially from the bottom. Many of the best interviews were with men contacted by the helpful deputies.[34] I also sought out specific officers as I had done with the Sheriff Department (e.g., the heads of the Intelligence and Narcotics units, President of the Patrolmen's Association, etc.).

I ended up with twenty-three interviews (plus the four recent ex-Central City Patrolmen). These were: 1) the Chief, 2) the Deputy Chief, 3-4) the two Captains, 5-9) five Lieutenants--Detective, Community Relations, Patrol, Intelligence and Traffic, 10-12) three Sergeants--two Detectives and one Patrol, 13) a Patrol Corporal, 14-16) three Detectives, and 17-23) seven Patrolmen. As I had expected, the men at Central City in general were not as open and relaxed as the deputies and, for the most part, I had to work quite a bit harder to get them to open up. This became increasingly true as I went up the hierarchy to the Deputy Chief.

In addition to the interview schedule, I had innumerable additional conversations with men in both departments. Many of these were informal although I used them to constantly check my observations and cross-check pertinent facts. Certain particularly helpful individuals at various levels in both departments were approached on a fairly regular basis. This continuous contact gave me an opportunity to utilize them as "expert insiders" or informants within the departments who were very

helpful in discussing ideas and facts. In sum, I found that as long as the officers trusted me to protect their anonymity (which I promised and will), they had little to fear or be personally threatened about. The officers of the two departments, knowing I was not interested in their individual behavior, in general responded quite openly and freely, often with surprising candor. As Skolnick states, the men know the difference between a social researcher interested in general patterns and a legal investigator interested in specific names, dates and places.[35]

The interviews and the additional conversations (most of which were duly recorded) were used to generate data about the two intervening variables, the salience of the political structure and the dominant type of trust relationship with the citizenry, and the dependent variable, political behavior. Other means of collecting information on these three variables included analyzing structural and organizational conditions, (e.g., the type of grievance mechanism for citizens, public relations method, etc.), departmental documents, (hard to come by), the news media, participant observation of actual behavior and, perhaps most importantly, a series of interviews with some thirty expert "civilian" informants outside either department.

Before discussing these interviews, however, a brief word about time limitations: I decided to use as the period of record the two years from May 1, 1969 to April 30, 1971. That is, all the information collected and discussed was limited to that period of time to lend consistency to the report. (There are a few well-stipulated exceptions included because of their value to a point being made.) This period includes an election for local office in both the City (April, 1971) and

the County (November, 1970), as well as a number of altercations in which the two departments were jointly involved. Data collection was limited to sources within the County with no attempt, for example, to interview the State Police, State Attorney General's Office, etc. I was interested in the general pattern of the relations between the two police agencies and their respective communities and so immersed myself within them.

Piecing together the two year puzzle of political behavior by these two departments obviously meant going beyond my observations of the police or their perceptions of themselves, each other and their environment. Obviously, I had to be knowledgeable about how these two political systems operated and to get the views of both the systems and the two agencies from people who were both political actors and keen observers. I thus set forth to find out who the key persons were and to be certain that each "expert" was asked the proper set of questions. I had the advantage of being fairly intimately involved in both political systems.[36] I cannot judge to what extent personal friendships aided in the gathering of data but I do know that I was given extensive and often confidential information that I never would have gotten if I were unknown or had gone into a strange community as a graduate student with a thesis to research.[37]

The nature of the data collected poses a difficult problem for me as anonymity was promised in return for candor. The only way that I can see to circumvent this dilemma is to present the general patterns and conclusions in the text and to create confidential notations for the documentation. Therefore, where necessary to protect the individual

office holders and actors within the two systems, I have placed footnotes and obviously traceable facts for Sections Two and Three in confidential notes. For the time being, at least, only the dissertation committee will have access to these. To additional readers, I apologize, as they will not be included in the thesis.

Interviewed as "expert informants" outside of either department were: In Central City--the Mayor, the City Administrator, an Assistant City Administrator, the Acting Director of the Department of Human Rights, the City Attorney, an Assistant City Attorney, a City Councilman and the City's Grievance Officer (Ombudsman); at the County level--the County Administrator, the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, another County Commissioner, the County Clerk, three present or former (recent) Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys and the Director of the Legal Services Clinic (an OEO funded, County government operation). Elsewhere I interviewed the business agent for the Teamsters Union, the Attorney for the Central City Police Officers Association, four long-time residents and practicing lawyers, three reporters for the Central City News (Police, County Affairs and City Affairs), the News Manager for a local radio station (who covers both governments daily), and an Eastern Township Supervisor.[38]

These intensive interviews are the major additional source of information concerning the two police departments. The minimal length of time for an interview was one and a half hours with the longest individual source being subjected to a series of nine interviews running close to fifteen hours over a three month period. For each interviewee I compiled a list of specific questions about which I thought they might have knowledge, and thus there is no comparability between interviews.

Whenever possible, (i.e., to protect my first source in subsequent interviews), I tried to get each factual item that surfaced from one interview corroborated by at least one other expert informant. Also, I attempted to keep the interviews relevant to the topic, police in their roles as being either a partisan or a social control dispenser of political activity and the relevance of the political system or the social characteristics of the citizenry to the police. As with the officers in the two departments, I also had numerous additional casual conversations which are not included above.

Choosing the Departments

A brief discussion is in order concerning the choice of these two departments and the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. To adequately test the theoretical implications of the model developed in Section Four, I would need to study a large number of departments. Unfortunately, I lacked the resources to come even remotely close to this level and had to settle for data which provides an indication of the general soundness of the theory. A test of these variables (or others like them) will have to wait for a larger venture than this preliminary "pilot study."

Ideally, in a more limited study, one would find something like four illustrative cases--two sets of matched pairs, for example, to compare. In the most severely limited study, the ideal would be to choose two cases as disparate as possible on the independent variables to generate the most opposite of situations. All of these idealistic "experimental" conditions are tempered by the problem of needing a fairly intimate knowledge of the communities under study. However,

when one enters the real world, ideal conditions must be superceded by practical considerations and reality in this case meant gaining access to departments which were within my resource limitations. Thus, I "chose" the two local departments on the criteria of availability, my resources and my knowledge of the communities.

Using two cases, of course, is the absolute minimal number possible in a comparative study and opens up the maximum potential for idiosyncratic error. In fact, I am not testing any theory, rather I am presenting plausible data and arguments that the theory might warrant further study. That is, if I can show that the two departments differ in their political behavior in the predicted direction, I can at least state that no evidence was found to contradict the model. I should,however, be able to enrich the theoretical constructs of the relationship between the external environment and police behavior with specific factual data which support the implications of the theory.[39]

There are some built-in advantages to using these two units. Besides the positive nature of the encounters between myself and the expert informants, most of them are knowledgeable about both political systems, their differences and effects upon the two departments. The Sheriff Department does not become involved in patrol duties or ordinarily make citizen contacts within Central City (except with regard to the maintenance of the County jail). Thus, their clientele is different from the citizenry served by the Central City Department. However, on those rare occasions when the Mideast deputies did respond to intra-city disturbances in aid of the patrolmen, a comparison of the behavior of the two departments will be made. Also, members of the two departments

interact sufficiently often to be well aware of each other and their environments which invited comparisons between them while being interviewed (see the questions on pages one and two of the interview form in Appendix I). In addition to the number of personnel who have moved from one department to the other, each department has members who live in the other's bailiwick. Furthermore, the Sheriff's electoral constituency consists of both political units. The overall picture, then, is of two departments that are ideal for a comparative study precisely because of their level of interaction.

Disadvantages are also present and these relate to the inherent limitations in studying only two communities and in studying two that are inter-related. My reaction to these arguments, essentially the potential lack of generalizability, is that case studies can be a contribution if one understands the limitations of basing conclusions on the detailed study of one or two units. An example of such a limitation for each department would be the effects of a major university upon the Central City Department,[40] and the effects of the incumbent Sheriff's personality (e.g. an elected and thus internally semi-autonomous figure) on the Mideast Department. Combining Bordua and Reiss' statement that, "Studies of the external performance of the police are even more rare than studies of intra-organizational events,"[41] with my belief that this is the first attempt to study their political behavior leads me to think that the outcome should be a useful contribution.

CHAPTER 2

Footnotes

1. The identities of these two law enforcement agencies have been slightly obfucated to protect, at least nominally, their identity. More will be said on this later in the chapter.

2. Although personalities might have been involved, the County Sheriff, the Mayor and a majority of the City Councilmen were of the same political party as the seventeen. Thus, partisan political considerations were not involved.

3. "Central City News," March 4, 1971 (hereafter referred to as the C.C. News.

4. Its major "influence area" incorporates the entire county and portions of the counties to the north and east. Figure 3, A Guide for Change, City Planning Department, May 14, 1969.

5. Ibid., p. 10. This placed Central City third out of ten cities of roughly comparable size and composition (i.e., with a large university) in the United States for low median age.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. Ibid., p. 10.

8. It is an elitist form of government because only those with sufficient income can afford the time necessary to put into both getting elected and carrying on the functions of the roles. The present City Administrator has been on the job for fifteen years with the Chief of Police into his sixth year as the actual Chief after a few years in an Acting Chief capacity (1963-65).

9. An underdog at the outset, the Mayor was reelected when a hard-line conservative Democrat defected to and won the Republican primary in a major upset. He was just too much for the Republicans to take as they split their ballots in unprecedented numbers.

10. A national magazine did a series of articles on the C.C.P.D. last year after someone from the magazine communicated with the F.B.I. and were told it was one of the three best in the country. More on this somewhat humorous situation later.

11. Information in this paragraph is based upon interviews with the officers and well-informed observers in the community.

12. Reported in the C. C. News, February 2, 1971.

13. Law Enforcement Officials Report on Crime, 1969, p. 53. One is led to wonder about the "uniformity" of those agencies reporting.

14. Ibid., p. 9.

15. Ibid., p. 33.

16. C.C.P.D. published figures for July-December, 1969.

17. County Metropolitan Planning Commission Reports, 1968, 1970.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. From conversations with C.C. News reporter discussing attitudes toward public services, etc.

21. Henceforth, when I refer to the County, I shall mean that portion of the County excluding Central and Eastern Cities (and two small cities on the western side with a combined population of 8,500).

22. In fact the school system received some notoriety recently when its high school principal was tarred and feathered late one night on the way home from a school board meeting.

23. Central City is noted for the number of citizens who split their ballots, thus showing a high degree of political awareness. (E.g., the "liberal" Democratic U.S. Senator won handily in the City as did the "moderate" Republican U.S. Representative and the Republican State Senator and Representative.)

24. He is something of a political maverick having been denied the County party's endorsement in 1968 but winning the primary with ease. A nominal Democrat, he has on occasion said that his only reason for using that party's affiliation was because his opponent in 1964 had been a Republican. On many occasions he has openly feuded with area Democrats and taken exception to positions on local party platforms. He likes to think of himself as largely apolitical.

25. Law Enforcement Analysis "Eastern Township," Center for Criminal Justice, Inc., p. 6.

26. Ibid., p. 17.

27. "Since 1962, juveniles and young adults in the age group from 10-20 years of age have been the persons apprehended in better than 75 out of every 100 arrests that were made for major crimes." Ibid., p. 19.

28. Ibid., p. 19.

29. Wilson discusses this at length in his Varieties of Police Behavior and I will have much more to say about it in Sections Two and Four.

30. Skolnick, op. cit. p. 25.

31. In fairness to the Commissioner what I asked for was access to some of the most "secret" of police operations and my hastily written theoretical document mainly emphasized the negative aspects of police activity. I took pains, however, to continually assert that I was writing the most negative and discussing the most "security" ladened units precisely because I wanted to be open, honest and surface the most threatening. It was.

32. An interesting study might be to compare interviews taken while in the police station on duty and while off duty at home. Westley in his excellent work Violence and the Police interviewed at home. I took the opposite view and felt that the men would be more open while alone on the job or in the station. This decision was made partly based on an interview with the Under Sheriff (2/9/71) who stated that off the job the men were a clannish lot; "close knit family men who would be a bit closed mouth off the job but on the job would be willing to do anything."

33. Contrary to some of my prior worries, the men in this department seemed to enjoy being considered the experts and I think were somewhat flattered at the attention they received. I have no illusions, however, that omissions in responses were made. Overall, though, I was quite surprised at the extent to which they opened up.

34. All of these men were interviewed while off duty but at the Police Department located in City Hall.

35. Skolnick, op. cit., p. 28.

36. I was appointed to the Central City Human Relations Commission in May, 1969 by the new Mayor, was a candidate on the Democratic ticket for the Mideast County Board of Commissioners in November, 1970 and successfully resisted pressure to run for City Council in April, 1971. I was, therefore, personally acquainted with many of those interviewed, knew who others were, and was passed on from one to another as I got into the process.

37. My knowledge of and personal involvement in the two systems over a four year period led me, ultimately, to only partially obfucate the identity of the two communities. It would take no great sleuthing ability to track down the organizations involved in the study in any event. I felt that the reader would better be able to judge the data knowing of my relationship than by cloaking the findings in pseudo anonymity.

38. Skolnick comments on the importance of studying the "criminal law community" because "each segment tends to be more critical of the others than of itself," op. cit., p. 28.

39. The political units serviced by the two departments differ on at least three and possibly all five of the independent variables. I began with: 1) Direct vs. indirect accountability, 2) Control as immediate vs. remote, 3) Low vs. high community political participation, 4) Social diversity,and 5) Socio-political exclusion. The two units are not at the extremities of the five variables but they do vary sufficiently to cause differences in the intervening variables.

40. This is compounded by the fact that the University is one of the few in this region of the country which does not have its own internal police agency. It contributes an annual sum to the City for police and fire protection.

41. Bordua and Reiss, op. cit., p. 294.

CHAPTER 3

Blue Power and the Politicians--An Introduction

I stated in Chapter One that the police face a dual set of obligations within our circular political system--to other sets of public authorities (the influence perspective) and, to the citizenry (social control). Each of these complex external entities creates, for the police, the necessity of developing qualitatively different reactions. In this Section, I will discuss the relationship of the police to these other sets of authorities, described elsewhere as duly elected public officials and their appointed administrators.

What within the local community is important to the police with regard to their own set of interests? Of paramount concern to the police are the expectations they have for favorable outcomes from these decision makers and for positive support from the populace of the community. These expectations are based upon the trust relationship a police department has with its community. The concept of trust will be discussed in a moment, but first let me say that this trust relationship is complex and involves two components--the importance of trust and the direction or type of trust. In this Section, we will be concerned with the importance of trust as it relates to favorable outcomes from the political structure. Section Three will then take up the direction (or type) of trust in its relationship to the citizenry of the community. Section Four will tie the two back together.

A quick preview of the theory is as follows: As the importance of trust in political structures varies from low to high, and the direction varies from confident to alienated across governmental units, political behavior, it is predicted,will vary accordingly. For example, police in a community enjoying a confident trust relationship with the populace and where the salience of the political structure is low, it will have little need to, and thus will engage in little political activity. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where alienation is the relationship and salience is high, police will feel considerable pressure to apply influence in an effort to obtain favorable environmental outcomes.

> Trust in the government (says Gamson) is a political attitude . . . (whose) object or target is some level of the political system . . . (which) may range from the incumbent authorities to the political institutions and their justifications, to the political community as a whole . . . . Like any attitude, it is a predisposition to act for or against some object--it has an evaluative component.[1]

Trust, then, is an evaluative political attitude "which refers to the general expectations that people have about the quality of the product that the political system produces." It will be a shorthand term for the political attitudes held toward the outputs of the political system.

> As the object of a general attitude, the political system is a variegated one. It is perfectly possible for an individual to feel great confidence in his local government while feeling alienated from the federal government or vice versa. Furthermore, a man may be confident in political institutions while feeling alienated from the incumbents who man them. Political trust is best regarded as a differentiated attitude toward different levels of the political system.[2]

Trust and the Political Structure

Why link police to the local political structure as an object of

trust? If the police are fortunate enough to have few or no built in mechanisms which constrain their daily operations beyond the assurance of continued financial support, they need have little concern for what the structure does or how it operates. On the other hand, if there are institutions within the structure which do constrain their activities or might potentially, then the structure does become important to the police. The levels of the government which could become important to the police, therefore, are the authorities who make the decisions and the institutions they devise at the local level. Either way, the political structure mediates both formal strictures and the allocation of resources. It is the authorities and the institutions which are the sources of the means used to exact compliance with desired behavior. Examples of these are a strong and active professional city manager, a "liberal" Mayor, a civilian review board, an ombudsman, the budgetary process or an open and participative political system which is responsive to citizen influence. The police must, in defending or enhancing their self-interest, be vigilant to keep potentially constraining elements from developing. If they are implanted, they must attempt to neutralize their effects and if possible, destroy them.

Political trust, in sum, is the attitudinal base, and the influence process is the means invoked to protect these interests vis a vis the political structure as the police apply their influence resources upon the authorities.

To this point in the discussion, we have assumed that the police utilize the influence process because they may be at odds with the authorities who can confer preferred outcomes. It may, however, be that the police do not differ in their preferred outcomes or

collective goals from the authorities who delegate authority to them. This is an important question worth pursuing: 1) Whether the police actually do behave in a manner so as to primarily further their own best interests, (i.e., act as independent agencies using their own set of values); 2) Whether they serve the interests of their "masters," (i.e., act dependently as coercive/repressive social control agents for the "establishment"); 3) Whether the two coincide so that both occur: or 4) Whether neither of the above occur.

If only possibilities two or four occur, then there is a plausible argument that no actual influence process is necessary or occurs. The police merely receive resources and carry out the instructions of those in legitimate power. In this case, there would be no police organizational boundaries with regard to the civilian overseers.

Much was said in the literature on the police reviewed in Chapter One concerning the fact that neither possibilities one or two above occur. Many authors viewed the police as being nonpolitical or apolitical and as being bound by the impartial rule of law. Klonoski and Mendelsohn react to this by saying that most scholarly work on the legal system reminded them of:

> . . . earlier work in public administration and local government. The models tend to be proverbial insofar as they contain numerous unverified propositions: the legal process is conceived as impartial, politics is identified with partisanship, and the machinery of justice is too often visualized as standing apart from the broader environment.[3]

They go on to make the point which has often been made by other authors:[4]

> . . . . the legal subsystem allocates costs and benefits of the political system . . . . The local legal subsystem . . . is a political resource, and we might add, a political instrument.

> The appropriate question then becomes: Who uses the legal instrumentality and for what purposes?[5]

Obviously for them, "neither" is an inappropriate answer to the question of whether the police are neutral as they continue by citing numerous examples of the utilization of police "to suppress and frustrate political, economic and social demands."

Nieburg reiterates the same arguments when he states that:

> The history of crime reflects the history of law, which in turn reflects the normative systems of prevailing power groups, that is, the social and economic conditions with which their emergence is identified and by which it is perpetuated . . . . The social values which receive the protection of a criminal code are those treasured by the dominant interest groups.[6]

At least to some students of the political system, then, the police serve the interests of the powerful elite represented in the form of those who hold political power or those in whose name they hold it.[7] Other authors argue that the police are a runaway force serving their own interests. This surely is the point of much of the current writing concerning the actions of the FBI, Army Intelligence, etc., who with local police collaboration have compiled thousands of dossiers on non-criminal, political activists. Each writer asks the question whether the responsible civilian officials are even aware that such activity is occurring. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights' hearings, headed by Senator Sam Erwin, Jr., suggests that many are not. The New Republic ended an editorial on the FBI by asking: "But then whose employee is J. Edgar Hoover?"[8] At least one author, Frank Donner states that:

> It is illusory to talk of an effective investigative and statutory attack on the powerful intelligence system at present. The elimination of the evils of political surveillance and dossiers is yet another reason why we need a new politics.[9]

We shall see in Chapter 10 that the elected officials and administrators of Central City are uneasy over this situation. Information they have received from reliable sources suggests that agent provocateurs from the C.C. Department are operating on the University campus. Chapter 5 discusses attempts by elected officials to exercise some degree of control over the Central City department with regard to a complaint's procedure. In addition, a raging interjurisdictional battle over the submission of an intelligence unit grant proposal by the Sheriff awaits us in this Chapter.

We now get back to our original question of whether the police primarily serve: 1) their own interests, 2) those of the establishment, 3) both of these, or 4) neither of these. It appears from the arguments just cited from the literature that possibility number four is the least probable description of reality and that possibilities one, two or three could be occurring. I propose to quickly resolve this problem by suggesting that number three is as likely to reflect reality as either possibility number one or two and that either of these represent political influence attempts by the police upon the political decision makers. This none too startling conclusion may appear obvious to some, but it is often overlooked by many observers who tend to see the police as part of a nondifferentiated and monolithic power structure.

Whether the police are dependent agents of social control acting for the "dominant interest groups" or not, the fact is that their political behavior toward the citizenry should be viewed as an act of influence with relation to the authorities who make binding decisions concerning them. Their use of delegated authority to engage in "approved"

social control tactics is essentially nothing more than a special case of the added influence potency available to the police as authorities. In fact, police are well aware of this and often utilize these resources for influence attempts. Chapter 10 will discuss an example of this, the "campus unrest as a threat to society" scare tactic. The point being made is that the preferred outcomes of the police and the other authorities may coincide although the reasons differ. The question of "whose interests are served" remains problematic, as it should, because in all situations, the activity would be subsumed under the influence process.[10]

"Whose interests are served" in a given community is problematic because within different political jurisdictions, the police vary with regard to both their "perceived" and "actual" autonomy.[11] The Mideast Sheriff Department, for example, has far fewer external constraints (both perceived and actual) upon it from its political structure than does the Central City Police Department. Returning to the trust concept (and remembering that it is a differentiated political attitude toward the political structure), this would mean that as an object of trust importance, the County political structure is less important to the deputies than is the City political structure to the City officers because they feel they are less constrained by it. Thus, the concept of trust contains a variability dimension which links a police agency to the rest of its political structure in terms of actual and perceived autonomy.

Not only can actors differentiate between levels within a government, they can also winnow out which levels or in a comparison between governments, which governments, are more important with regard to their

interests. For example, the interview form I used on both departments asked a three part question about the salience of the respective political structures at two levels.

> Let's compare the Central City Council with the Mideast County Board of Commissioners for a moment: 1) Which has the more pressure from the citizens of the community on it concerning its police department? 2) Does this mean that the Councilmen (Commissioners) act differently toward the Department? 3) In general, does the City Council and Mayor or the Board of Commissioners seem more interested in the activities of their Department? How do they differ?

Every single officer and deputy (save one new deputy who wasn't sure but guessed the County) gave the City in their response to the first question concerning citizen input. Questions two and three which deal with the level of political decision makers, are more complex and will be dealt with later but here also both departments overwhelmingly chose the City Council and (especially) the Mayor.

The "why" of this overwhelming discrepancy leads us to another question. What is endemic to the City that the County has less or none of? This in turn leads us to the vast literature, a "murky midregion" littered with conflicting theories and complex typologies about how local governmental units work. In looking for the factors which differentiate our two governments with regard to the police, I shall avoid a lengthy discussion by briefly looking at the results of two recent studies of local governments and then take another look at Wilson and Reiss-Bordua.

Political Structures and Their Variables

Crain, Katz and Rosenthal in The Politics of Community Conflict look at why some communities adopted fluoridation while others did not. They summarize their extensive efforts by saying:

> . . . We perceive decisions as involving two levels of activity: the government and the public. At the governmental level . . . we conceive of a dimension which we may term 'executive centralization.' Within this frame of reference, forms of local government may be seen as ranging from 'weak' to 'strong' along a continuum. We would hypothesize that the strongest government centralization would occur in council-manager cities, especially if the councilmen are united by active political parties, and the weakest in nonpartisan commission (communities). . . . At some point in the decisional process, of course, public opinion is likely to be taken into account, but this varies greatly from one community to another.[12]

In addition to the role played by professional city managers, "who use their professional colleagues in the rest of the country as an important reference group," their action orientation and their centralization of power, the authors place great emphasis upon partisanship, as an insulating device from maintaining a more "open" system of government. ("While partisanship plays an important role in centralizing authority, it is probably even more important in channeling public opinion.")[13] Nonpartisan elections, say the authors, force the elected official to be more responsive to a greater range of public demands. They conclude by saying that:

> By itself, however, a structural explanation which depends solely on forms of government and party organization is not adequate. It is necessary to try to determine some of the sociological characteristics of 'participative' and 'nonparticipative' communities.[14]

I find, nevertheless, that their summation, in the form of a Table crossing "executive centralization" with "participativeness of system" and the four city "types" that emerge, relies too heavily upon the structural form of government. The number of referenda is their only index of participation, and this coupled with their overdependence on partisanship as a controller of influence channels makes their participativeness a weak variable. However, their major points of both the

importance and variance of executive centralization and citizen participation are central to my theoretical argument.

Aiken and Alford report on innovation which they relate to community decision outputs in their "Community Structure and Innovation," a study of Urban Renewal in 586 American cities. They critically review five general theories on community decision making found in the recent social science literature and find "none of . . . (them) completely satisfactory."[15] In developing a "tentative alternative explanation" their data shows that:

> Cities that appear to be heterogeneous, differentiated and fragmented--as indicated by ethnicity, a large working class, nonwhite composition, size--are most likely to have innovated in urban renewal. The same studies show that the more groups and actors participating in current decisions, the higher is the level of innovation and outputs . . . . In other words, the more choice among acting units in the system --centers of power--and the greater the state of information about organizational actors, the higher the probability that a minimum coalition can be formed (to effect an innovation).[16]

This dualism (heterogeneity of the populace and autonomous organizations) when combined with their conclusion:

> That the appropriate analytic unit for understanding specific innovations, as well as performance in such innovations, is a subsystem of a community in which the central actor is the community decision organization, (defined as the center of power whose mission is to supervise the planning, ordination and delivery of the innovated activity).[17]

This brings us right back to the political and administrative decision makers with regard to the police. Except for those innovations which are internally inspired and are therefore the least threatening, innovative change of police agencies tends to be externally inspired and mediated through the governmental organization as their "center of power." The pressure for such change can either come from the adminis-

trator and political officials (i.e., professional city administrators or "reform" minded politicians), or from citizens participating in the decisions as suggested by Crain, et al. Aiken and Alford add to this, the dimension of "functional specialization" and say that such"structural differentiation," as for example, a Public Safety Director or a Civilian Advisory Board might make innovations easier to attain, and of course, more potentially threatening to the police. In short, the amount of authority centralized in the governmental form, its degree of internal differentiation and the composition and capability of the populace to effectively participate in the political influence process seem to be paramount in comparing governments with respect to the potential autonomy of each unit's police agency.

Wilson's three police styles, which I earlier stated were congruent with three political systems, fit into this summation. Each system relies upon a combination of citizen input in the form of what they want or expect and the actions of the incumbents who hold political office. The "caretaker" political style can be summed as "providing the voters with a minimum of public services at the lowest possible cost" (i.e., few civic pressures and little internal urge to change); the "service style" as politics and politicians "providing services and amenities to persons clearly able to afford them, (i.e., responding with "exceptional sensitivity" to the powerful community interests); and the "professionalized style" where the most obvious difference was "the presence . . . of a strong, professionally oriented city manager," who both acted on his own initiative and reacted to community pressures.[18]

Reiss and Bordua stress the effects of formal accountability by the civil authorities toward the Chief in relation to his tenure. Differing

combinations lead, they contend, to four different types of command styles.

> Perhaps in the long run it is hard to have a professionalized police without a professionalized Mayor. Perhaps this would also lead us to expect different kinds of command styles where a professional city manager intervenes between the Chief and the Mayor.[19]

They conclude that "variations in the formal control of the police by civil authorities in different cities . . . (is one of the important) consequences of the external environment on police organization and operations."

You will recall that we began this discussion of how local governmental units worked to see if some light could be shed on what caused the difference in our two governments as objects of trust to the police. The social scientists, just reviewed, suggested a number of possibilities including civic participation, executive centralization and functional differentiation in general with accountability and control being additionally specified for the police. The first item, civic participation, can be seen as a separate category while the other four are essentially the actors or the means devised to place civilian constraints upon the police.

I propose to categorize the crucial differences between governments with regard to the police as: 1) control, 2) accountability, and 3) community political activity. Control and accountability deal with the relationship between the police and their civilian superiors, whatever the structural formation, while community political activity refers to the inputs of the citizenry to the political structure. These three, when taken together, should explain what there is about the political structure that the police feel affect their interests and why trust

relations vary between governments. I will briefly discuss each of these three separately and then conclude this Chapter with the cumulative effects these have on the political behavior of the police.

Control

Control is analogous to the social control perspective because it deals with the ways in which the civilian decision makers, in the political structure, act toward the police to whom they "delegate authority." The police react to this by employing the influence resources available or mobilizing to generate new ones. In general, control means the limitations and restrictions placed upon the freedom of the police to maneuver by political or administrative actors. It consists of the input to the police's operational policy made by "civilian" decision makers from outside the organizational boundary of the police agency. Examples of this control from our two departments will clarify what I mean. The Central City Department was ordered by City Council resolutions to discontinue the use of Mace, to wear name tags, to recruit more black officers, and to issue receipts when officers institute encounters with civilians. By contrast, the Mideast Department received no such orders and even through its Sheriff told the County Board of Commissioners that they would continue to use riot-trained dogs in civil disturbances in spite of the Board's insistence that the practice end. The City Administrator acting on his own or under the direction of the Mayor or Council can order the police chief to make certain changes, whereas the County Administrator and the Board can suggest changes at best. Of course, the City police react to such demands by developing their own means of avoiding these direct orders.

Nevertheless, the control mechanisms exist and can be used for any given issue or situation.

An interesting adjunct to this control concept is its reciprocal effects. This can be simply put by stating that the more control Actor A exercises over Actor B, the more Actor B might be induced to develop the resources necessary to influence and control Actor A. This is certainly borne out in the two departments studied. Chapter 4 discusses the development of unions in the two departments and the different uses to which they are put with regard to political behavior. The Central City Police Officer's Association has, on a number of occasions, made public statements concerning the actions of the Mayor and Council. Such public utterances carry the potential for constraining decisions made by this body. Also, we shall see with regard to the budgetary process that anticipated reactions from those controlled can be utilized as a political strategy. The point being suggested is the direct relationship between the amount of control exercised and total control available in the political system. The more control is utilized, the more total systemic control is created.[20]

Accountability

Whereas control focuses on regulation through the input--both content and process--to police activity and policy, accountability is concerned with the organization's output.[21] Accountability is of great importance to the police, as it is to any public agency, because their major product is service and service is an extremely difficult output to accurately measure. In addition, the police are in the disadvantageous position of having: 1) the criteria (an increasingly negative one) by which their success is measured (i.e., arrest rate vis a vis the skyrocketing

crime rate); and 2) the outcome of their success criteria judged by other actors (i.e., arrests are resolved by the courts and the prosecutor's office). Appraisal of how well the police have performed, "efficiency" measures, type of tenure for the top administrator, grievance procedures for citizen complaints, etc., are examples of this concept. They should be seen as constraints which have a direct bearing on how the political system is viewed by the police. Chapter 5 will discuss, among other items, the different citizen complaint procedures extant in our two communities and an attempt to pass an ordinance reducing marijuana possession or use to a misdemeanor (which changes the output criteria and the method of operation).

Again our two departments will illustrate this concept. The Sheriff is accountable to the electorate via the electoral process which occurs only every four years. True, his budget is subject to the approval of the County Board but he is protected by the State Constitution from removal except under a few well-specified legal conditions requiring formal legal proceedings. Contrast this with Central City, where the Chief is accountable to the City Administrator and ultimately to the Mayor and Council. In theory he could be removed from office for any number of reasons, none of which need to be related to legal misconduct. The difference as suggested earlier by Reiss and Bordua is substantial.

Accountability, like control, also has a related aspect; the more closely accountable they are held, the greater the likelihood that the Chief and the Department will apply influence on their own behalf. Although not recognized as political behavior, Reiss and Bordua have an excellent discussion of police reactions. The following are a few

examples of their behavior:

> The manipulation of the (crime) statistics to create a favorable public image . . . the development of a set of attitudes that define the police as alone in 'the war on crime,' . . . (publicizing) investigations of organized crime . . . arrests under public pressure of well-known gangsters, or crack downs on prostitution, gambling or narcotics peddling (which) have their symbolic public relations value . . . (an emphasis on) the high volume of crime in the community and the difficulties they face in meeting it with the resources available to them . . . and (the officers who tend) to take the law into their own hands, often by making a decision not to arrest or by making an arrest where there is no intention to prosecute (or very little likelihood of success).[22]

Community Political Activity

Community political activity is the third variable which causes differences in police perceptions of government as objects of trust, and is perhaps the most complex of the factors to accurately measure. It includes: a) the amount of potential political influence available in the community which can be mobilized (i.e., the resources already committed or readily commitable); b) the level of politicization of the citizenry (i.e., the level and amount of collective political organization); and c) the participativeness of the political structure (as adopted from Crain, et al., and modified). These three components can be collapsed into a two part variable dealing with the amount of influence circulating in the political arena (a and b above) and the openness of the political structure.

Westley states in his study of "City X" that the police can readily "distinguish and define" five publics based primarily upon "their political power and their relationship to the ends of the police." He goes on to say that " . . . they (do so in order to be able to) analyze these groups in terms of the degree of influence they have over the

police and (therefore) the way in which they must be treated in order to obtain respect and other social goals of the police."[23] At this point in our study, we are interested in the process by which this influence is channeled into the political structure, and must go a step further by looking at the receptivity of the political structure to influence attempts. That is, to be able to understand how a government works and then compare two or more of them, we need to view participativeness or politicization as an interrelated mixture of the potential for political influence and the ability to have an impact on elected and appointed officials.

Chapter 6 looks at this "participation." We have already seen in the interview responses that the police in both departments readily perceive and agree that a difference exists in our two communities. Among other items to be discussed will be the impact of this influence process on the police. The Chapter includes the use of the media and the effects of citizen input on Mayor-Police relations.

The Variables Combined--A Summary

How do these three factors, varying as they do between localities and over time, fit together to give a unified view of the political structure as an object of trust to the police? Let us briefly review by remembering that each of the three does vary from little or no control, accountability, or political participation to the presence of a great amount of any or all of the three. Although there is a clear conceptual distinction between control and accountability, it is hard to distinguish in practice between reactions by the police to either. In Chapters 4 and 5, I present data which seem to fit, primarily, into

one or the other category. It is very possible that the events I place in one Chapter could as easily have been in the other, or at least represent the result of the presence of both concepts. In Chapter 7, I will look at the relationship between these two variables and whether they are independent or co-vary.

At this point it is sufficient to say that each of the three can be seen as continuous or as varying from low to high in the degree of their presence. The three may be difficult to precisely measure within a given government, but one ought to be able to say that Government A has more or less of each when compared with Government B.[24] The general hypothesis is that as the three cumulatively increase in their presence, the political structure becomes more important to the police as an object of trust. This in turn, goes the prediction, leads to an increase in the possibility of police political behavior. Figure A depicts a schematically drawn, value-added model and illustrates how a combining of these three concepts predicts the importance of the political structure as an object of trust to the police and how this trust interacts with the predicted development of a desire for the police to engage in political behavior.

Subsumed within Figure A are five hypotheses which tie this portion of the theory together. Other things being equal, they are:

1) The more immediate (greater) the control, the greater the importance of the political structure as an object of trust.


2) The more direct (greater) the accountability, the greater the importance of the political structure as an object of trust.

3) The greater the community political activity, the greater the importance of the political structure as an object of trust.

FIGURE A

PREDICTED EFFECT OF THE IMPORTANCE

OF TRUST VARIABLES*



*(1) = Control

(2) = Accountability

(3) = Community Political Activity

4) The greater the presence of these three in combination, the more important will be trust in the political structure.

5) The greater the importance of trust (i.e. the higher the level), the greater the motivation (press) for political behavior.

You should note that I refer in Figure A and the fifth hypothesis to a press for or motivation to engage in political behavior rather than actual police activity. As Chapter 7 will discuss this in some detail, I will only introduce now, the idea of opportunity to act as an external restraint. Lack of opportunity could make the amount of political behavior actually produced less than the amount desired or predicted by the trust importance level (hypothesis 5). This leads to a sixth hypothesis:

6) The greater the presence of an opportunity to engage in police political behavior, the closer actual political behavior will come to equaling the press for such activity.

Thus, press or motivation for political behavior must be combined with opportunity to produce actual police political behavior.

This combination provides an original view and predicts some, not at all, obvious consequences of activity within the political arena of a community. For example, the greater the attempt by the political leaders or the citizenry to control the police, the less controllable they may become; or, the greater the agitation to change a political structure to make police more accountable, the less accountable they may be in the end. These apparent paradoxes are the result of the effects that such external actions could have upon the police in terms

of their politicization. These paradoxes are only resolved if the opportunity to act politically becomes an integral factor in weighing the unanticipated consequences of the relationship between the police and their environment. We shall see in the ensuing chapters that Central City has the greater presence of all the hypotheses save opportunity, the sixth, and what effects this has upon the C.C.P.D.

CHAPTER 3

Footnotes

1. Gamson, William A. "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," Chapter in Abcarran, Gilbert and Soule, Jack B., Social Psychology and Political Behavior, p. 1.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

3. Klonoski and Mendelsohn, op. cit., p. 10.

4. See for example, Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, and E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People.

5. Klonoski, op. cit., p. 11.

6. Nieburg, H. L., Political Violence: The Behavioral Process, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1969, p. 52.

7. Including Dahrendaf, Marx, Simmel, etc.,--the so-called "Conflict Theorists."

8. The New Republic, May 1, 1971, p. 10.

9. Donner, Frank J., "The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence," the New York Review of Books, April 22, 1971, p. 39.

10. An example of what I am referring to is the tactics utilized by police toward certain minority groups who are labelled some form of public enemy, usually with the implicit approval of many incumbent authorities, and are then "efficiently" destroyed. See, for example, Gene Marine, The Black Panthers or Frank Donner, op. cit.

11. The difference between perceived and actual is discussed by Tannenbaum and Smith in Chapter 13 of Control in Organizations, Tannenbaum, Arnold S., McGraw-Hill, 1968. What I am calling perceptual is referred to by them as "phenomenology" or "How does the social situation seem to the actor." Real as used by me is denoted as "structural" by them and refers to "What are the objective facts about the situation," p. 199. I shall endeavor to keep these two separated and appropriately labelled.

12. Crain, Robert L., Katz, Elihir and Rosenthal, Donald B., The Politics of Community Conflict. Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1969, p.p.198,199.

13. Ibid., pp. 197,200.

14. Ibid, p. 205.

15. Aiken, Michael and Alford, Robert R., "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Urban Renewal." American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 661.

16. Ibid., pp. 660 and 663.

17. "The more highly differentiated or specialized a community system, the higher the proportion of decisions that are likely to be made by subsystems and the less likely the entire system will be activated on most issues." Ibid., p. 662.

18. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 236, 251 and 257.

19. Reiss and Bordua, op. cit., p. 53.

20. Tannenbaum discusses this in referring to Allport's control cycle and to the concept of partial inclusion, see pp. 6 and 16, op. cit.

21. Bordua and Reiss use the term accountability in a different way. They refer to "civic accountability in the sense I talked about in Chapter 1, civilian control and the fear of a 'police state.'" Op. cit., p. 284.

22. Reiss and Bordua, op. cit., pp. 35-37.

23. Westley, William A., Violence and the Police, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1970, p. 96.

24. This is an exploratory study and at this point I can only approximate the measurements of the independent variables. With a larger number of cases for example, it may turn out that all that is needed are the intervening variables for comparability.

CHAPTER 4

Control: How Thin the Blue Line?

Control, you will recall, is the structure developed by civilian decision makers in our public government through which they induce, persuade or constrain the public agencies to comply with the behavior deemed desirable. This process is reacted to by the police who, like all such agencies, would prefer to be able to operate with reasonable impunity if not autonomy. The limitations and restrictions (rarely do inducements or persuasion seem to institute changes) placed upon the police in our two departments and their reactions to these restraining efforts are the subject matter of this Chapter.[1]

A few words are in order about the organization of the Chapter. It is divided into three major sections reflecting the three variables and four of the hypotheses from Chapter 3. Every attempt will be made to keep discussion and analysis to a minimum so the data can be presented in an unencumbered manner (generalizations, conclusions and implications for Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will be found in Chapter 7). The first section examines responses to questions from the interview form as they relate to perceptions by the police of the formal structures of control or hypothesis one: the more immediate the control, the greater the importance of the political structure as an object of trust. This is tied in with the fourth hypothesis which directly related greater control in combination with accountability and community political activity to a

greater overall sense of trust importance in the political structure. Data on the intervening perceptual variable is tapped in these questions.

Later in this section, the police also comment on the process by which their behavior is externally regulated or controlled. The distinction between the structures for and the process of controlling the police is important, for it is within the political process that the extant formal structures are or are not subverted. In short, in the discrepancy between the process and the formal structures, or what the political actors actually do, is much of the basis for the sixth hypothesis: the greater the presence of an opportunity to engage in political behavior, the closer actual political behavior will come to equaling the press for such activity.

In the second section, the outside experts look at both the structure and the process of the two communities. The three hypotheses alluded to above (1, 4 and 6) are discussed from the perspective of these observers, many of whom are active participants. In these two sections, the independent variable of control and the intervening variable of trust importance are established. The first section covers, predominantly, the intervening variable from the perspective of the police while in the second one, the experts discuss both the independent or structural variable and the trust variable.

The third section is composed of two parts. It begins with responses to two questions from the interview form and I then offer a few illustrative examples of the reactions of the police to external restraining efforts. This is, of course, the dependent variable, police political behavior. The hypothesis related to this section is number

five: the greater the importance of trust, the greater the press for political behavior. As Central City has a higher trust importance level, the data will show there is a greater press for political behavior within the C.C.P.D. The last part of this third section consists of an illustration of the greater press which exists within Central City. It discusses the genesis and development of the three police unions and, thus, links the dependent variable with the intervening variable.[2]

Police Perceptions of the Political Structures

With regard to control, the police and the two political structures, the task before me was to discover which governmental form, the City or the County, had the more formal structures in operation vis a vis the police from the perception of the police. My belief is the more control being used, the more the structure is perceived as being important to the police. I, therefore, used the strategy of asking two kinds of questions of the police to measure perceived control. The first method was a direct comparison of the two structures in which I asked for their opinions. The second was an indirect means of soliciting responses from which I could infer the salience. The second set of measures requires an explanation. I reasoned that the more important the structure, the more an individual would take pains to find out how it operated and who the actors were. Knowledge and motivation to act were the two items I was after. Thus, I asked factual questions about properties of the actors within the two political structures. It seemed reasonable that behavior of a political nature would require information. As Gamson says:

Information may be regarded as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for influence. Not all of those who are informed will feel that they can influence the outcomes of the political system but it is hard to see how those who lack knowledge will feel that they can select the appropriate targets and tactics for influence.

The direct opinion question about the two departments was: "In general does the City Countil or the Board of Commissioners seem more interested in the activities of their department? How do they differ?"[3] I divided the responses into seven categories which Chart 4.1 illustrates.

Chart 4.1--Responses by police to question concerning interest in their Department by elected public officials

Category Description	Number of Respondents from Mideast Sheriff Department	Number of Respondents from Central City Department
1) Those who named the city and gave at least one reason.	17	16
2) Those who named the County and gave at least one reason.	0	0
3) Those who named the City and gave no reason.	2	2
4) Those who named the County and gave no reason.	1	0
5) Those who were essentially neutral or gave offsetting answers.	2	2
6) Those who refused to answer.	0	3
7) "Don't know."	0	0
TOTAL	22	23

Those responding with opinions (Category One) did so of their own volition and please note the question does not mention anything beyond "interested" plus an invitation to discuss "how they differ." Here are a few statements by members from the Sheriff Department:

> The Mayor has made the police only partly function and his views are going to keep them like this . . . . The men in brown (Sheriff) are more free to do things than the men in blue--we're more feared. We do things that the men in blue (Central City) wouldn't because maybe they're more afraid of their supervisors and the politicians . . . . The City Council tries to keep everyone happy and so they jump in to control the police . . . . Councilmen want more control than do the Commissioners. . . . City Council is very active in politics, procedures and efficiency of their department . . . . The question of interest could be from interested in better law enforcement to meddling. Council does more meddling in stuff they don't know anything about . . . . City Council is concerned with sticking their nose in. (They) use the police department as a whipping post or a scapegoat . . . . If (they) didn't have the present Mayor, (I) feel that the Council would stay out of operating policy.

Here are a comparable number of responses to Category One from men within the Central City Department:

> They've hired an Ombudsman (and are) hiring a recruiter for more minorities. Supposedly it's for everyone but I think it is really for us . . . . Both are interested. The exercise of control (by the Council) is the major difference . . . . (The) Commissioners don't have the movement of the pressure group interests on them . . . . (I) don't think I've ever heard the (County) Board get after an individual deputy the way the City Council has with individual patrolmen . . . . City Council is involved totally. (There is) much more community reaction and they look into things in more depth . . . . (I) think it all boils down to pressure from interest groups. Why are we doing this or not doing that. (There is) very little pressure on the (County) Board . . . . (It) seems to me that our Council is more responsive to citizens' complaints concerning us. (The) wheels turn more quickly also. In some cases the (County) Board takes no action . . . . I think the Mayor takes a closer and more critical look at what our police department is doing.

The other category of interest is the three Central City officers who refused to answer the question. All of them were among those I

interviewed early upon my arrival at the Department.[4] In order of their being interviewed, the first respondent said, before I could read the introduction, that he wanted to ask me a few questions. They were: "What Political party are you affiliated with?" and "Why were there always surveys, etc., just before elections?" The next respondent said that he didn't want to "discuss politics" and answered all non-factual questions with a curt "no comment." The third officer answered that he "preferred to give no response." These three officers were in the middle to high command range but were not the Chief or Deputy Chief, both of whom answered with opinions.

Four factual questions to elicit knowledge of the two structures were asked: Each department was asked three direct questions concerning the number of officials elected to each of the political structures and their political affiliations. The fourth question dealt with the number of County Board officials elected to the Commission from Central City and was asked of both departments.

To the question of "how many elected Commissioners are there on the County Board of Commissioners," (correct answer is 13), the following is the breakdown in the responses from the two departments.

Category	Central City Department	Mideast Department
Don't know	5	7
0 - 6	3	1
7 - 12	6	5
13	8	8
Over 13	1 (14)	1 (20)
TOTAL	23	22

The corresponding question for the City was,"How many elected City Councilmen are there in Central City?" The correct answer is 10 although many think of the City Council as being 10 plus the Mayor. The following results are quite interesting when compared to those above.

Category	Central City Department	Mideast Department
Don't know	0	14
0 - 5	0	1
6 - 8	1	4
9	3	0
*10	8	2
*10 plus Mayor	11	0
Over 10	0	1
TOTAL	23	22
*Number with correct answer	19	2

The next set of responses will have to be shown on two charts and visually compared. They are the responses to: "How many Republicans and how many Democrats are currently on the Board/Council?" Each department was asked concerning their own political structure. The correct answers are 9 Republicans (R) to 4 Democrats (D) in the County and 5 Republicans and 5 Democrats for the City. Those in the Central City Department who added the Mayor as a sixth Democrat can be given a few bonus points for political knowledge.

Category	City Department
Don't know	0
*5D - 5R	1
*6D - 5R (including mayor)	16
7D - 4R (including mayor)	2
5D - 4R	2
5R - 4D	1
5D - 1R	1
TOTAL	23
*Correct Answer	17

Category	County Department
Don't know	12
*9R - 4D	1
9R - 3D	1
6R - 5D	1
7R - 6D	1
7R - 6D	1
Split even	1
More Reps.	4
	22
*Correct Answer	1

The question, "How many of the Commissioners on the Board are elected from the City of Ann Arbor?" is more subtle. To know precisely would take a working knowledge beyond the other questions of the County

political structure. However, one could hazard a guess if they knew either how many Commissioners there are or were sufficiently knowledgeable about City politics to be aware of the five ward voting system (one elected from each ward for a correct total of 5). Nevertheless, the nod goes to the Sheriff's men for the "competitive" edge. The following is a breakdown of the responses which were asked of both Departments.

Category	Central City Department	Mideast Department
Don't know	7	11
0	0	1
1 or 2	3	4
3 or 4	7	3
5	5	3
Over 5	1	0
TOTAL	23	22

A few comments are in order concerning the respondents and their answers. I had originally planned to run a control for place of residence as it might have a confounding effect on the respondent's knowledge and present that in the above data. However, an interesting item turned up--the two departments exactly paralleled each other in terms of those: a) living within Central City (6-6), b) those living outside the County (1-1, the Central City patrolman accounting for for the 5D - 1R split and 6 man Council response),and c) those living in Townships and Villages within with County (15 Sheriff and 16 Central

City). An examination of the data showed no effects of place of residence upon the answers.

Another item worth looking into is the relation of the rank of the officers to their knowledge of the system. I reasoned that the higher the rank held the more contact there would be with civilian decision makers and the political structure. Chart 4.2 below, shows this relationship and it is a mixed bag. In the Mideast Department the only men having the correct answers to all the questions (one with another very close) were in the top brass category. This contrast with the C.C. Department where two from the middle level and three from the top brass had all correct answers. In general, as you went up the ranks, the compiled answers came closer to being correct. The major difference between departments as shown earlier, is that a larger percentage of the men in the middle and lower ranks of the Central City Department displayed political knowledge.[5]

Each officer was asked questions about his structure's governing body ranging from factual (open-ended) ones concerning content and process to personal preferences based upon informed opinions. These were meant to elicit both knowledge and attitudes based upon this knowledge. The first question was: "How does the Board/Council usually divide on issues of importance to the Department?" The responses (21 from each department, not including the Sheriff or Chief and Deputy Chief) of "don't know" and "no comment" was low in the Central City Department--one each--as compared to 10 and 0 for the Sheriff Department. From there things don't fall neatly into categories.[6] In the Mideast Department those responding with a statement concerning the normal voting pattern (11) were all over the range of possibilities

Chart 4.2--Knowledge of the Political Structure by Ranks and Departments

Questions	Central City Department			Mideast Department		
	Patrol-men 10	Cpl.-Sgt. 4	Lts.-D.C. and Chief 9	Deputies 11	Sgts.-Lts. 4	Capts.-U.Sh. & Sh. 7
Number of Commissioners in Mideast County (13)	D.K.=1 P.C.=20%	D.K.=0 P.C.=50%	D.K.=4 P.C.=44%	D.K.=4 P.C.=18%	D.K.=1 P.C.=50%	D.K.=2 P.C.=57%
Number of Commissioners Elected From Central City (5)	D.K.=5 P.C.=0%	D.K.=0 P.C.=50%	D.K.=2 P.C.=33%	D.K.=6 P.C.=0%	D.K.=2 P.C.=0%	D.K.=3 P.C.=43%
Number of City Councilmen in Central City (10, 10+M)	D.K.=5 P.C.=20%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%	D.K.=9 P.C.=18%	D.K.=2 P.C.=0%	D.K.=3 P.C.=29%
Number of Republicans and Democrats in Respective Governing Bodies (5R-5D or 6D and 9R-4D)	D.K.=0 P.C.=60%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%	D.K.=0 P.C.=78%	D.K.=6 P.C.=0%	D.K.=3 P.C.=0%	D.K.=3 P.C.=14%
Term of Office	D.K.=0 P.C.=90%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%	D.K.=3 P.C.=27%	D.K.=0 P.C.=75%	D.K.=0 P.C.=100%

D.K. = Don't Know
P.C. = Percentage Correct

but except for two responses ("10 for to 2-3 against" and "about 8-3 in favor of most law enforcement proposals") the answers were in generalizations. Examples of these are:

> Over 50% in favor of whatever the needs are . . . . Usually unanimous . . . . Usually have a majority but one or two say no . . . . Board will back law and order . . . . (They're) all for law enforcement even though money issues are defeated . . . . Only 3 or 4 go with desires of the Sheriff or law enforcement . . . . Are usually against the Department when it comes to appropriations for us.

Only one person responded with a partisan answer which was that the "Democrats (have) always been more willing and more open to finding a way if "the issue is a good one."

The Central City Department officers responded much more specifically, some even discussing individual councilmen. For example:

> (Along) party lines although Councilman X doesn't necessarily follow party lines . . . . They usually stick together (in parties) except Y who is really a Democrat . . . . There is a Republican and a Democrat who vote both ways (i.e., cross party lines).

Twelve, including the four above, answered that the vote was primarily along party lines. However, four had different opinions:

> Not much partisanship unless it's a political issue . . . . Less party line than you find with other kinds of issues . . ... I've not seen much difference . . . . (and) Damn near everything is a false alarm.

Others looked at the vote from a more general perspective or along partisan party lines:

> (Two said) It seems to depend on public opinion . . . . When errors are made as to our needs it is our own fault . . . . Normally (the) Republicans are in favor of our way of doing things in the performance of our job . . . . (and) Democrats tend to listen to and be influenced more by the views of the minority pressure groups and the views of the University people.

The next question was worded to tap personal opinion based upon knowledge of the partisan form of politics and its effects upon each Department. "In general, do you think a Republican controlled or a Democrat controlled Board/Council would be more favorable to the Department?" "Don't know" responses were eight for the Mideast Department and one for Central City. In addition, Central City had three who answered "no comment." Again the rest are difficult to categorize. In the city ten answered "the Republicans." Three of the ten, however, joined with four others to say that the D's had given them more money for pay raises. Others were once again involved in the effects of the Community upon the Council. "(We are) now finding local politicans who are becoming more liberal minded" . . . . "The community probably dictates what the Council does" . . . . (and) "The D's are more liberal with regard to social issues and change." The last quotation was the only one that spoke positively of the D's other than the financial issue of increased wages.

In the Sheriff Department other than the eight "don't know", four said Republican for the same general reasons as with the City employees. Three said Democrat "because the Sheriff is a Democrat" and one additional one was strongly partisan: "D's because I feel their views are more realistic (while) the R's are fanatically the opposite way." The other five had moralistic "politics and law enforcement don't mix" feelings (only one of this variety occurred in the City):

> Doesn't make any difference as long as the ones in power let the laws be enforced . . . . I vote for the man . . . . Hard to say, it depends on the man . . . . (I) don't believe political party has anything to do with it--it's the individual person . . . . Neither, it makes no difference (as it's) an individual thing.[7]

The final question of these three is an attempt to judge perceptions of control from what the officers think their governing bodies are most concerned with. I asked, "What questions about your department seem to be most important to the Commissioners/Councilmen?" An interesting fact occurred with this question; only one member of the Sheriff Department responded with "don't know" (also one with Central City).[8] Of the other 21 respondents, 13 gave single issue responses and all of them were the same. Whether it was called "finances, budget, salary, money issues, financial, budgeting, quality with relations to finances," etc., it boiled down to money. Five of the other eight mentioned two issues and had money first (and second was "services," "service we give," "use of manpower," "manpower under budgets," and "care (over) police work in the County"), two had it second (with the first being "assignment of personnel" and "how manpower is used") and the last respondent mentioned four issues--"public relations, money, training and service, patrol response time."[9]

The responses of the City personnel were as different from those of the Sheriff's men as could be imagined. One could rest one's case concerning control and the importance of the political structure as an object of trust on these two sets of answers alone. All officers with one exception ("money") gave at least two responses with only five even mentioning money (only one gave it as his first response). Here are a number of representative answers:

> Overtime-justifying finances, procedures and explanations for handling incidents of a controversial nature . . . Personnel demeanor--conduct--deal too much with personalities and not enough with things like new equipment . . . . Mainly methods of operations and why we do things--policy oriented questions . . . . Invariably: 1) discrimination--minority groups and hippies, 2) excessive use of force, 3) personal

> conduct . . . . Probably the isolated situations, police-citizen encounters. Some questions (asked) as to the actions of particular officers . . . . Everything, most important is (to be) more responsive to the citizens at large . . . . Any part of the structure although they only are supposed to be involved in finances and policy procedures--(I) don't know why they go farther unless they lack confidence in us . . . . Issues change, the latest one has been liberalization of community issues . . . . Police-community relations (four others mentioned this first, also), budget, overall efficiency and effectiveness . . . . Citizen complaints, budget and training.

The last part of this section is composed of officer's perceptions of the process by which their behavior is regulated and the effects this, plus the formal structures, have on the two departments. What do some of the individual officers say about the differences between the two departments? I asked a supervisor at M.C.S.D. if, as a supervisor, he noticed a difference between newly arrived officers from C.C.P.D. and the others. He said:

> The fellows who come over from Central City feel great about being free from the C.C.P.D. They've heard that things are much looser here (and thus they) will try to sort of make up for how they've been held down. They've heard the Sheriff Department likes to bust some ass. As soon as they find out that we're not chicken shit but don't allow that sort of busting ass, they shape up and become great officers. We have, you see, sort of a bad reputation for being hard nosed, for use of force, (which) we probably got because of South University (see Chapter 10). We didn't take any bullshit--we're not violent but don't take any crap. Whereas we're well equipped, they in C.C. are not and have to take the shit we don't have to.[I]

Another supervisor at M.C.S.D. also referred to South University.

> The Mayor and President (of the University) wanted to get out and calm people instead of trying to let the police do their work. Cops from the city are supposed to take rocks, etc.; they're held back by the Council and the Mayor. We went up to South University and got no heat from the Commissioners. (We)actually got a letter of commendation.[II]

A supervisor in the M.C.S.D. summed up his feelings by saying:

> If I decided to quit here, the C.C.P.D. is the last place I'd go because of the conditions you have to work under. This is partly because of the citizens' pressure and partly by motives of the Council.[III]

And a ranking official stated as one of his favorite themes:[IV]

> You would think that the Sheriff was more political, the city police are far more than we are. (There are) many more pressures operating on them there than we have here. (The) Sheriff tells the politicians to go to hell and runs the department the way he wants to. Up there, (there) are many more mechanisms to control the police. Are many more grievances filed in C.C. because of the liberalism of the Mayor and Council . . . . If our salary structure was the same as the City (about $2,000 less) we could have the pick of the City police. We just got two damn good ones--these two even the City had to say were damn good. (The) reason is one of morale--city cops feel that everytime they have contact with or arrest a black (or other minority, student) they are under attack for any number of things. (They) are very upset with many means for filing and controlling protests which are out of their hands. At the County, we have none of this harassment.[V]

What about those deputies who had moved over to the M.C.S.D. from the C.C.P.D.? Five were asked the questions at the bottom of the first page in the questionnaire. I shall look at the first and last questions in this Chapter. To the question: "Did you have any reason for joining this Department?," responses were:

> Fed up with the C.C.P.D.[VI]. . . . Yes, I feel this department is doing a little more in the way of law enforcement for the majority of the people--(it's) less restricted here.[VII]

> (I) always had fear of the police as a child and respect for them and I sort of fell into being a cop. (The) C.C. police didn't live up to my idea of being a cop. Cops are given power to take life but they wouldn't give any decision making to the individual--the Corporal, Sergeant and Lieutenant, all had to be in on everything.[VIII]

> I was never directly affected but I couldn't put up with the political bullshit (at the C.C.P.D.). I could have been the next sacrificial lamb.[IX]

> (The) reasons are numerous. (I) wanted to do some police work but felt that I was too restricted in C.C. The main restriction was the political administration and the city administration.

> This was translated as their beliefs in the policing of the criminal elements of the city. They are handicapped by political pressures. The specifics are based on my feelings. Police can only do what the law will provide--cannot arrest for personal beliefs. At that department, (I) felt I could not enforce the law because the arrestee is seen as a political thing--did the officer have to do that, did he have to use force, etc.--a very defensive reaction. Some of the officers countered this by looking the other way, curtailing their activities. Most who don't want to change their attitudes or stay constantly in trouble, move out."[X]

With the volunteered reasons for leaving the C.C.P.D. as background, let's look at an admittedly loaded question and let the officers tell their own stories in some detail. "In general, is there more or less talk in this department about external interference with police operations?"[10] The responses were:

> Definitely less here, we have a good sheriff who keeps outside interference from the men. (The) men get less harassment.
>
> (I've) not heard it brought up while I've been here--in C.C. it's an everyday, constant topic of conversation.
>
> No talk over here--just (about) appropriations. In C.C. (you) live in constant fear of the HRC (Human Relations Committee), etc.--worry more about them than their own superior officers. If something happens, you're automatically wrong over there. The fellows have to live with this fear . . . . (And from the same officer) The city government has squashed the ability of the police to uphold the law. I've seen reverse discrimination--seen: a) black person arrested and then let go and then seen a white person arrested for the same thing and booked. The South University thing raised morale--the enemy (teen-age youth--mostly white, middle-class) was allowed to be fought back at. I was astonished by the vigor of which the cops took out after the guys. I handed out justice in the street. (I) was isolated among some 300, saw a guy throw a brick and knew I had no chance at arresting him, so I hit him one good one and ran. My idea of a cop isn't to chase down people who are running and beat on them to vent their (sic) frustration.
>
> More in C.C.--have the political machine telling you what to do. (You) talk about it constantly there because it happens everyday. Knowing that at any time you did the best job you possibly could and still you might get fired. Here you don't have to worry about BAM, etc.[11] I really like the Sheriff. The

> Chief is okay but he can't do what he'd like to, too many pressures on him.
>
> Much less talk here. It's almost nonexistent. In C.C. it is a constant discussion. They are very concerned about any aspects of politics that affect them. Very concerned about the mayoral campaign (and) having to respond to the nonsensical letters of the Grievance Officer (see Chapter Five). In sum, C.C. is really uptight. They are very closely knit, very closed and self-protective because they're terribly pressured. The people and the community really make the department what it is.[12]

Expert-Observer Commentary

In this section, the outside experts, those not in either department, will comment freely on the structures and processes of the two communities and the perceptions of both by members of the two departments under study. The relevancy of the comments, it should be noted, is the manner in which the political process unfolds against the backdrop of the implanted, formal structures in the two governmental units. Much of what is reported here is the behavioral reaction by the police to these political structures. First a look at the city government.

> Any time you have anything that is at all likely to be political you have to think of the County Prosecutor's office. It has a big say in what happens with the C.C.P.D. The Chief and the police have to decide whether to go to the City Attorney or to the Prosecutor. If they choose the County Prosecutor, they still have to decide which charges to arrest on and whether the Prosecutor's Office will buy the charges or not. Therefore, they have to be in on it from the beginning. (The) City Attorney is seen as some sort of way out ACLU lawyer who is close to the Mayor anyway and so as often as not they would go to the County Prosecutor. There is a real lack of harmony between the four most involved in politics and law enforcement in the city. The County Prosecutor is a Republican who stays above and out of things and is, thus, untouchable. The Mayor, a Democrat, is seen as way off base, the City Attorney as an ACLU lawyer and the Chief of Police as being under the thumb of the "liberal" Mayor.[XII]

Under the previous administration (to 1969), the City Attorney had been seen as an ally of the police (police as used here refers

primarily to the officers up to the two captains). The new City Attorney, appointed by the Mayor, is seen as being of the ilk of the Mayor by the police who also feel that there are several "anti-cop" Assistant City Attorney's.[XIII] Under the old administration, the police used to go to the City Attorney to get their side of an issue explained in City Council meetings. They felt that he would take their side.

> The City Attorney used to act as a buffer between the department and the Council. The present City Attorney is seen as an enemy. The police won't go to the City Administrator either because he is their boss, is seen as being inaccessible or difficult to talk to and as he is accountable to the Council, he will take the Council's side against them. They (the men) just don't feel comfortable with him and don't feel that he understands them.[XIV]

> The City Administrator played a larger part under the former administration because they were status quo oriented concerning the police and not concerned with charges of police brutality, racism, etc. By and large they let him run the shop and the police took care of themselves. Under the present Mayor, the City Administrator is more defensive of the police.[XV]

This individual thought that the City Administrator had moved from being "a father under the old administration to a protector under the present one,"[XVI] and went on to say that prior to the formation of the Central City Police Officer's Association (hereafter the C.C.P.O.A.), the Administrator had felt himself to be very close to the men, even "buddy, buddy."

> He liked to think of himself as in with the men. Shortly after the Association was formed he went down to an Association meeting and was given a very rough time. After that he went to a cocktail party at which a number of Councilmen were present and was almost crying and said that he had lost the intimate relationship he had had with the police.[XVII]

Another observer said that the relationship between the Administrator and the Chief is a very complex one (the former has been here since 1956; the latter, the Chief, since 1966 and before that was Acting

Chief for 2-3 years).

> He has no problems about stopping the Chief on problems of money. He's willing to cut the budget proposal with no qualms. On other issues his values are pretty good. He thinks in the professional city manager sense of what is good vs. bad government. For him what is legal vs. illegal isn't terribly important.[13] On the other hand, he is almost always opposed to setting up a formal policy to control the police.[XIX] He seems to think that things can be done under the cloak of administration in a quiet manner, not under formal policy.[XX]

> The Chief is responsible to the Administrator and if there was an attempt to fire him it would definitely go to the Council for discussion, etc . . . . The Chief is the most political of the Department heads and there is no question that things are different with the police (than with other departments). The Chief has the budget established and the personnel policies fixed, etc., in the same manner as any other department but there are major exceptions. It is a para-military organization which means that: 1) there are many more assertive rules and regulations for everything and expectations that they will be followed which puts the officers under much more control than employees of other departments; 2) they have their own internal procedures, an example being their own personnel folders which only they have access to. The new personnel director who is black has created some problems for the police because he insists on certain procedures being followed, and has thus had an impact; and 3) the police department perceives that they are threatened by things that no one else in the city administration would feel threatened by or about. For example, the unions felt that they had to negotiate for certain personnel records to be kept strictly within the department.[XXI]

I asked the expert informant, whose quote is the above paragraph, what the effects would be if the police dealt directly with the Mayor and Council. The response was that "the police would operate far more independently than they do now. They would be far less controlled."[XXII]

> The Administrator acts as a check on decisions whether from Council and Mayor or from the interior of the police department if they call for major changes or more appropriations.[XXIII]

> The police will go to the Administrator for funding requests and for tough decisions where they are not clear in which direction to go.[XXIV]

Another informed observer commented also on the more precise sets of regulations which govern their duties and make them less amenable to the chain of command and the (civilian) authorities. "You find this higher order of affairs where they are sworn to do their job to a set of abstract laws."[XXV]

He gives as an example of this the fact that the Administrator can order any other department head not to go onto campus to perform their functions and they won't go. If he were to do this with the Chief, he would be told that the Chief would have to go or send his men to enforce the law. In spite of this, though, this observer felt that the City had a much better structure than the County because the Chief was in the chain of command.[XXVI]

> However, managing the police is like telling engineers how to build a road, that is, a nonprofessional telling professionals what to do.[XXVII]

> The police probably tend to be less oriented toward responding with a great degree of flexibility to the world around them. They tend to isolate themselves and to go by the book . . . . Of course, they also have a very explicit code of conduct--rules and regulations which govern their conduct. When police are sworn in they are acknoledging that they are different, that they might be giving up some of their normal rights because of the strict code, etc. The self-discipline is a key factor and with it comes the feeling that via the rigidified type of penalties and internal discipline that the department provides through the union contracts, etc., they are being appropriately disciplined. This leads to a sense of uneasiness and unhappiness when there is an attempt from outside to discipline them--a sort of sense of double jeopardy or dual adjudicator.[XXVIII]

> The police have a wide latitude of discretion in how they go about enforcing the laws and one of the paramount problems is how to make them see that certain people, minorities, street kids, campus students, etc., are working through or have problems which are not always best dealt with by arrest or the tough cop approach.[XXIX]

I asked another individual about the concept of a Public Safety Director and how effectively he might coordinate the police and the

civilian authorities. He responded by saying that:

> A Public Safety Director would really mean another Assistant Administrator, a civilian who could work full-time, which might be important in getting the right information passed down to them. However, I feel a bit uneasy as to whether this would really make much difference in policy changes or implementation.[XXX]

> Either they'll figure out some way for the thing to boomerang or (they) will informally circumvent it. The problem is to convince the men through the use of the command (structure) that what they (the civilian administrators) want changed makes good sense and is an improvement over the old way of doing things. They cannot be told; they must be shown or see for themselves. A full-time Director might be able to do this but . . . .[XXXI]

A close observer of the City Administrator's office (not in the city government) summed up his overall feelings of that role by saying:

> (That) the administrator felt the police were in fact considerably different than the other departments he had to administer to. In addition, I had the feeling there was a lot that the Administrator would like to change or that should be changed about the police but he couldn't or didn't do anything about because: 1) they were unique in their enabling composition; 2) they were well insulated from many direct kinds of control, and 3) it just took too much time to work on them in that he would have to spend one helluva lot of energy trying to convince the top brass about what I guess would be best called the realities of the real world.[XXXII]

With regard to the police and City Council, a number of observers had opinions. One said:

> This council does seem to be more involved in the operations of the police on a more regular basis. The police feel it is the Democrats who do this and that they are anti-police. They feel the Republicans are more conservative, more supportive and not interested in sticking their noses into the business of the police.[XXXIII]

Another well informed informant stated that actual debate "on the floor is usually about police brutality and the budget, with regard to brutality. (Former Councilman X) used to surface these things for and from the people but now, with him gone, they come directly to the

Council meetings."XXXIV

A third commented:

> There are always five or more cops there in the audience when police activities are being debated by the Council. Sergeant X of the department is the Sergeant of Arms and one of the Councilmen has, on a number of occasions, directed questions to him which have obviously been discussed prior to the meeting. These are on issues of importance to the police. Most police contacts (that this informant is aware of) are made in the corridors during the breaks. An example of this is that Councilman Y, after such a break, asked that the police and especially the Chief be present at the working session on the Marijuana Ordinance to give their views.XXXV

County Government

The County government with relation to the Sheriff can, perhaps, be best summed up in the words of the County Administrator: "There is a direct non-comparison to the City."[14] He went on to say that his office and the Sheriff operate by mutual agreement and that:

> The Sheriff has sole control of his department. From that point on, there is only budgetary interaction with no policy coming from this office. The Board of Commissioners cannot dictate but will recommend on policy matters. (It is) in the position, then, of making recommendations which on occasion they can back up with some clout. The Board has the right to ask him to appear and answer specific questions concerning expenditure of funds, etc. If the Sheriff or any other official refuses to appear, they can appeal to the (State) Attorney General who has the power to remove him from office after due process.16

Others echo from the everyday, operational perspective the view held by the County Administrator.

> (The Sheriff) has, thus, no party pressure upon him as a result of the 1968 elections, (when he overwhelmingly defeated in the Democratic primary the candidate put up by a splintered party), and is an independent individual who seems to get what he wants from the Board of Commissioners with very few controls on him.XXXVI

> The Board of Commissioners almost always votes along with (the Sheriff).XXXVII

> In the County the budget is the only means that control can be applied on the Sheriff.XXXVIII

> The Sheriff has become less visible to the Board this last year. Up to a year ago the Board tried very hard to force an administrative assistant on him. Prior to that there had been a large number of questions about his accounting for funds, handling of administrative funds, etc. About two years ago he conceded and got (Captain X). Now a lot of the previously open argumentation is done quietly between (X) and the County Administration.[XXXIX]

And finally:

> A few years ago the Board was getting into policy matters and was going around and around with the Sheriff. Now they realize that their only control is over the budget . . . . Another big help was the appointment of an administrative assistant. The Sheriff has a volatile personality and Captain (X) does a lot of face to face contact work with the Board that (the Sheriff) had to do. (X) has been able to put together a lot of economic statistics and data the Board wanted. This has helped considerably in improving relations. Also, the Commissioners have realized they can't run the department. The Sheriff, on the other hand, has learned that he can't shout and name call in public if he wants more funds. For the Commissioners the department is a priority and they just can't do much about policy matters.[XL]

Another informed expert said:

> There are very few checks and balances available to the County other than with the deputy's union contract and the budgetary control. There just isn't any legal way to bind the elected officials, although one can look (the next County over), at what they are about to do or try to do with the Sheriff's functions (i.e., reduce him to just a jailer for the county).[XLI]

This remote possibility and the fact that all proposals for more County funds are now routed through the Administrator's office appear to be attempts by the County to exercise some influence over the Sheriff. His ideas are now reviewed and perhaps modified a bit before they are sprung on the Commissioners. Of course, the Commissioners can bring pressure to bear on the Administrator to recommend nonsupport for a proposal in an attempt to provide a buffer against political reaction if they vote a proposal down (i.e., use as the reason for their voting behavior the fact that the Administrator was opposed to it).

How, then, does a partisanly elected incumbent react in such an environment? Here are a few viewpoints:

> The Sheriff probably has a majority of the Board who will support his loose brand ("hardnosed philosophy") of law enforcement. The Sheriff will definitely call individual Commissioners to try to get things through that he wants. Other than that, the only time he seems to get involved in politics is when someone or thing ticks him off or when they attack him.[XLII]

Another version:

> My impression is that (the Sheriff) does a lot of work selling what he wants to a couple of the Commissioners and then to (a senior Assistant Prosecutor) who (the Prosecutor) listens to on political issues . . . . He would go there first and then to the Director of the (new County Law Enforcement) Training Center. To cover the blacks he would get (Y) who would take that area . . . . These are all patsies and planted guys who will always support (him) unless he gets too far out. (The Assistant Prosecutor) stays on top of things and the rest of the Prosecutor's Office go along. The Prosecutor can get what he wants through the Law and Justice Planning Board (Mideast County organization and the representative body to Region One of the State's Law Enforcement Assistance Act's network). At the Law Enforcement Committee (of the Board of Commissioners) the Prosecutor swings a lot of weight. On the County Administration level there is no real opposition, the Sheriff has (the County Administrator) in his hip pocket.[XLIII]

A close observer cites the following as an example of the way in which partisan politics and political battle lines have had little to do with the ongoing activities of the Sheriff.

> Proof that there is very little partisan politics involved is a study of the budget done by the County Planning Commission in 1967. For the six years prior to 1967, the Sheriff Department received about 12% of the budget. It was consistently the same even though the Sheriff changed in 1964 from a Republican to the present Democrat. The old (39 man appointed) Board didn't want a change in the way things were going. The new Board (voted into office in 1969) which is heavily Republican has done perhaps even more to support the Sheriff as his percentage of the budget has gone up.[XLIV]

Another informant says:

> The Sheriff purposively declined to mention anything about partisan affiliation in the 1968 elections, and in fact came

> out and said that he was an independent. In all his literature he never mentioned party . . . . He is very inactive in Democratic party politics. The deputies work very hard for him for re-election. They talk during road patrols to citizens, put in many hours when off-duty at social functions, help put up signs, hand out literature, etc. For the great majority, it is the only political activity that they engage in. The only other thing that they do politically is to bitch about (Central City's Mayor).

This informant said that as a result of the formation of the deputy's union there has been a withdrawal of "much of the Sheriff's power."[XLV]

A highly knowledgeable source says that:

> The Sheriff is very publicity hungry. Although he deals in partisan politics only every four years, once a month or so he loves to get his kicks by getting a lick or two in here and there . . . . The Central City Chief has never set-up a press conference affair as the Sheriff did (after a drug raid in Central City). The Sheriff did it to get publicity for and use it against the upcoming City Marijuana Ordinance vote.[XLVI]

A third observer, a supporter of the Sheriff, said that:

> He doesn't get involved at all in Township politics . . . (and that) his public statements against those who attack him are emotional, nonthinking and intemperant blasts.[XLVII]

And finally, as a summation:

> The Sheriff has more flexibility than the Chief who is more under the gun of the Administration and Council. The Sheriff has greater freedom to say what he wants as the ability to remove the Chief gives them much greater opportunity for more control. Both face the purse-strings issue and both engage in political activities. (The Sheriff) has more freedom to speak out and use the media for political pressures. For the Chief to do it he needs to go through a third party for support. He knows a lot of people downtown in the City . . . . The controls on the C.C.P.D. are much greater. Everything becomes an incident with someone from the Administrator's office going right down into (the Chief's) office wanting to know what he's doing about what's going on. The Sheriff doesn't have any of this sort of pressure. This means that the commands do things differently. When there are incidents, the M.C.S.D. command has more freedom to move whereas the C.C.P.D. command is more cautious.[XLVIII]

Political Activity as a Result of External Controls

I asked the members of the two departments about their own political behavior and the behavior of their fellow officers with regard to their own political structure. The linkage between the two following questions and the earlier ones is that a heightened sense of the importance of the political structure would lead to greater knowledge of it, which in turn might motivate an officer to engage in a political way toward the object. The first question in this sequence was in two parts: "When is the last time you attended a Board/Council meeting? How often do you go? Here again there was a great variance. In the Central City Department not one officer said he had never attended a meeting. This department can be roughly broken into two categories with regard to interaction with City Council: 1) Those who rarely go (e.g., "not very often, very rarely attend, two years ago," etc.). All those who said they had not been to a meeting for more than a year or said rarely, etc., were placed in this category. There were fourteen of these. 2) The other eight ranged from "80-85% of the time." Some responses were:

> Been probably a month, usually go about once a month . . . . Always read the agenda--normally will attend about 20% of the time . . . . Two months ago--every so often . . . . Will attend if interested . . . . If of great interest, I might go myself.

These eight included men from patrolmen through the Deputy Chief (Chief not included as he usually only goes when asked to attend).

By contrast, the Mideast Department can be placed into two very distinct categories: 1) Three men, the Sheriff, Undersheriff and Captain X, "usually attend" the Law Enforcement Committee meetings[15] and infrequently the full Board meetings. Two other high command officers

had attended (one had been once, the other twice) to answer questions about their divisions and one jail division deputy said he had been back once in October, 1970. 2) Not one other officer in the Department had ever been to even one meeting. One deputy said: "I have never known in advance that an issue of importance to us was going to come up."

It is interesting to note that four of the Mideast deputies who had been with the Central City Department offered a direct comparison. All four had never been to a County meeting (full Board or a Law Enforcement Committee) and volunteered the following statements:

> When I was with the City, I used to go on issues related to us . . . . (Never) but I did go to City Council meetings . . . . When I was with the Central City Department at least one representative (was) at every meeting . . . . (I) went to quite a few Council meetings because of issues related to the Police Department.

The second question was meant to elicit data on the information network within each of the departments and to find out about the behavior of fellow officers. This two part question was: "When issues of importance to the Department are discussed at Board/Council meetings, how do you usually get information on what happened--from fellow officers who were there?" The same pattern as in the last question was repeated in both departments. 1) The three top brass in the Sheriff Department said that they usually attended. The two who had been to testify said they got information from one of the three in the form of a memo or bulletin "if important for my division." They said that no one else goes. 2) All the rest gave as responses "news media" (4); "newspaper" (6); "hearsay/grapevine" (3); "weekly bulletin/departmental meetings" (2 besides the two above); and "don't find out" (2). Of the seventeen in this second category, six stated that Captain X, the Undersheriff or

the Sheriff attended meetings while the other eleven said variations of "No, (I) can't recall any deputy who has ever attended a meeting."

In the Central City Department (excluding the Chief and Deputy Chief) all but one (see footnote 9) said they regularly got information from fellow officers who were there or went themselves. There is a Sergeant from the Department who is always in attendance as he is the "official" Sergeant at Arms, but none of the above mentioned him as a source of information. Sources of information, other than going personally or from those who were there, were (many mentioned more than one source): 1) radio, the meetings are broadcast live on a local FM station (8), and 2) newspaper-news media (9).

The foregoing has prepared us to look at a few examples of police political behavior within the two communities. The following are selected examples of efforts by the "civilian" public officials to control their respective police departments and the responses they invoked. We will look first at two examples from the County and then at three from the City. In these five, it is important to recall that the formal structures as designated by the public authorities, are meant to restrain the activities of the two departments. Observe what happens during the process of political interplay.

Overtime Pay--"The Great Raid on the County Treasury"[XLIX]

At one time the Sheriff had the authority to call up his deputies to full mobilization and present a voucher to the Board for overtime. In 1969 this overtime bill came to "some $60,000 or more over the $25,000-30,000 that had been budgeted for,"[L] and caused great consternation among the Commissioners who, nevertheless, always paid in the end.

"At one point someone came down from the State Attorney General's office and admonished both the Board and the Sheriff for their squabbling over the overtime."[LI]

The County got their break when the deputies unionized and bargained in the Fall of 1969 for a one-year contract for 1970. Prior to then there had been no control on the usage of overtime by the Sheriff. The first contract "called for a flat amount, $1,200, per deputy, for overtime plus the payment of emergency overtime with the emergency pretty well defined."[LII] However, this failed to clear up the problem as "the Board had to get down in the first year (of the contract) to the point of saying that if (Central or Eastern Cities) wanted the Sheriff, he had to prove, in writing when submitting vouchers for overtime, that they had asked for him. Also, the Sheriff had to notify the Administrator and Chairman of the Board of any sort of impending flap."[LIII]

The second contract in the Fall of 1970 called for an "automatic $1,800 flat overtime in the salary with no emergencies and no overtime to be included from January 1, 1971 for bills outstanding. The County very much wanted this flat overtime proviso in the contract."[LIV] "This means that the union contract has tightened up considerably and the County has control over more of the conditions that used to be left to the discretion of the Sheriff."[LV]

The "Haircut Suit"

One, if not the only, occasion in which the Board has had an opportunity to publicly vote on and to separate the present Sheriff as a man from the Sheriff as the purveyor of law and order in the County is the "haircut suit." The Sheriff exists in a dual role, the Sheriff as a State statute officer who is responsible for the actions of his

men and as we all are, as a private person. In the former role, the County is responsible for the Sheriff so that both get involved in any civil suits against the incumbent as Sheriff. The County must pay any lost law suits and the County Prosecutor must defend him.

The Sheriff has a standing order "to clean up" any person who is remanded to the County Jail before being put into a cell. The order "to clean up" seems to be sufficiently broadly interpreted to encompass the cropping to near and not neat baldness of any "long hair" type. (Remember that the County Jail is the repository of all those arrested in the County including all those involved in the affairs of the two major Universities). A few comments on this practice are:

> The whole haircutting scene is entirely political and aimed at those elements of the County that are anti-student.[LVI]

> The use of the haircutting thing adds to his image of the crew-cut, hardnosed guy who takes no bull although he says that he is just enforcing the law about cleanliness in the jail.[LVII]

And:

> (The Sheriff) does a great job politically of keeping the thing (shearing the "long hairs") before the public.[LVIII]

Eight students arrested during a University incident were summarily given the treatment which is actually done by the deputies (turnkeys) and the inmate trustees. As a result, they filed a $200,000 civil suit in federal court in 1969 against the Sheriff, both as the Sheriff and as an individual, (the case has languished in the court backlog since then). This led to a rather humorous situation at the County Board meeting. As an observer states:

> It would be practically impossible to separate the two roles but one of the Commissioners got excited and demanded the Prosecutor give a response as to defending the Sheriff's private person. The Prosecutor then gave one of his patented

> yes and no answers which could have been interpreted in several ways. (Another commentator says that he "was trying to tell the Commissioners by hinting at it that there was no way you could divide the private and public role up and in effect you would be defending him for both.").[LIX]
>
> The vote probably would have gone his way except that the Sheriff demanded protection.[LX]
>
> The first vote on the issue:
>
> Now therefore be resolved that the County Board of Supervisors (since changed to Commissioners) hereby authorize and direct the Presecuting Attorney to represent the Sheriff in his defense of the $200,000 law suit involving haircuts at the County Jail,[17]

was tabled by an 8-4 vote. Later in the day the resolution was removed from the table and a substitute motion was moved: "That the Board of Supervisors go on record as denying personal representation for (the Sheriff) and in no way limit the Prosecuting Attorney in his statutory duties."[18] This vote passed by a 7-4 margin. "Although the Commissioners were in fact voting against the man, they said for publication that they were voting only on the issue and the principle."[LXI]

The Sheriff, however, not to be outmaneuvered, turned the thing in his favor.

> Rather than the Sheriff bowing to the desires of the Board, he saw this as a way to get another jailer so he went to the Board, requested and got a professional barber-jailer.[LXII] An attorney then jumped into the fracas and said that he was going to defend the Sheriff after he had heard that the Sheriff would find his own attorneys.[LXIV]

The wife of a deputy then set up a Sheriff's defense fund and a number of benefit dinners were held around the County. A large one attended by the Chief and swelled by the City's "concerned citizens" was held in Central City (no statements have been released on the amount raised).

The Citizens' Receipt Form

The City Police have also experienced a number of control efforts and the three short incidents related in this section of the Chapter reflect this. The Mayor in the early Summer of 1969 decided to set up a "blue ribbon" citizens committee as a result of a series of incidents which raised tensions between the black community of the City and the police. This "Police-Community Relations Ad Hoc Committee" was set up to make recommendations to the Council for changes in police policy.[LXV] There were a total of three reports submitted to the Council by the Committee.

> The first report came out and made six recommendations which were all passed by Council. These covered the least difficult of the areas as the idea was to get them dispensed with before the difficult areas were attacked. Now, a year and three quarters later not all of the six have been implemented as there has been considerable foot dragging by the City Administrator and the police department. (Others will be discussed later but) the most notable of these is the "citizens receipt" (for police initiated citizen encounters) which has not really been initiated at all.[LXVI]

An informed observer had this to say about the citizen receipt form:

> A good example of the City Administrator acting as a middleman between the Council and the police was the idea instituted by the Council in 1970 whereby the police were to give out receipts for citizen contacts they made. It was passed by the Council and (the City Administrator) was to see that it was put into practice. Later, he was cornered by the Council and asked if the police had instituted the practice and his response was that no he hadn't insisted on it because he was informed it wouldn't work and so he hadn't ordered them to do it.[LXVII]

Another informant stated that:

> On occasion the citizen's receipt form turns up, having been received by a citizen but it is probably used very infrequently. The reasons for this are two fold: 1) the Cops feel it is a bunch of junk, are opposed to it and feel no pressure from above to use it; and 2) The citizen can and usually must request a receipt and very few if any of them know anything about it. Certainly nothing even remotely systematic is being done and no effort is being put forth by the police.[LXVIII]

Formation of the Command Union

> When the Police-Community Relations Ad Hoc Committee was out deliberating about their proposals, the Democrats on the Council decided they wanted to be able to bring in black command level officers, laterally, from other departments (none in the Department were considered capable of being so promoted). The problem was that none of these cops wanted to transfer to C.C. because they would lose their retirement and accrued benefits. To solve this problem the Democrats decided to use the State statute and join the Reciprocal Retirement Benefits Act which allows all joining cities to have any of their employees transfer without loss of benefits. The Democrats brought in this resolution to join the group which was passed 8-3 without much in the way of discussion. Later Councilman Z blew the whole thing by making a speech as to the real reason behind this action--to allow the City to laterally transfer in black command officers. Within one hour the Department was all in a lather and they (the Command officers) very shortly afterwards joined the Teamsters Union. Up to then there had been very little if any agitation to form a union.[LXIX]

Formal Control Structure

Another (non-city government) informant was asked about the relationship of the Chief to those who applied pressures upon him. He said that:

> One such pressure was the rank and file patrolmen, both directly and through the C.C.P.O.A. The Chief worries about a possible "blue flu" epidemic and is terrified that large numbers will decide to quit the department. An example of this is that at one point there was an idea floating around that Council should pass a formal policy stating which cases should go to the City Attorney and which should go to the County Prosecutor. This was an attempt to provide some guidelines for and controls over the police. When the Chief was asked about this he said such a policy would send his men right up the wall and he just couldn't do it. As a group they wouldn't allow it. Whenever anything is suggested from the outside like the innocuous recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Police Relations, (the Chief) says it would destroy morale or somehow morale becomes "lowered" in the immediate aftermath.

This informant sees morale "as a code name for the Chief's fears about the boys getting blue flu or thinking about quitting."[LXX]

Black Action Movement (BAM)

The following lengthy and complex case offers a unique insight into the police and their enviornment. All the actors within the political structure--the police, administrative officials and elected politicians--are fully involved as they marshall support for their interests. It vividly portrays the manner in which the police react, politically, to an external threat and how allies are mobilized to circumvent formal restraining structures. The political process is fully utilized as opportunities abound for influence attempts by the police upon the public authorities.

The BAM case is essentially a three part affair with the precipitating event occurring on March 19, 1970 while the University was in the fourth day of a strike (which was about 80% effective in closing the University). A series of well publicized statements and rebuttals surfaced in the first two weeks of September, 1970, and what now appears to be the grand finale was played out in the first week of March, 1971.

On March 19, 1970, the Regents of the University arrived on campus for their monthly meeting to discuss BAM demands. In the course of the Regents' meeting and while the strike was in its fourth day, a brief melee broke out between some 500 or so students (whose numbers rapidly swelled) massed in front of the Administration Building on campus and the police which resulted in a number of arrests (all black). The incident began with a patrol car with four patrolmen in it was surrounded and they called for help. When it arrived another twelve were soon trapped. During the ensuing attempt to disengage their fellow officers, a number of police charges into the crowd occurred. I personally observed the hurling of a goodly number of heavy (around

six pounds at a guess) pavement bricks at the police when they were massed and partially surrounded. Another observer saw the entire incident and reports of one charge that, "the charge of five or so cops was a brutal one in which they intemperately and in an uncontrolled manner swung at any one that they could get their clubs on."[19]

From someone inside the police department comes this impression:

> The cops are all uptight over the whole thing. The whole incident was fucked up from the beginning of the incident. We were trying out a new system of using four men in (each) squad car patrolling close to but not in the area rather than keeping all the men mobilized in the basement of City Hall. When the call came from the Administration building that some students were forcing their way in, one of the cars responded very rapidly alone and they got trapped in the middle of the mob. Shortly thereafter, twelve other men got trapped trying to come to their aid. On top of that, the men were scared because they had never seen blacks organized before.[LXXI]

Right after the event the Mayor was asked by a BAM student leader to go to the cells to see if any of the arrested had been injured and to see if they were receiving fair treatment. The Mayor did so and talked briefly with a black student (whom we shall call "Davis") who complained of a pain in the back of his neck as a result of being struck by an officer, although he didn't know which one or how it occurred.[LXXII] BAM then brought to City Council the charge that racism was involved in the incident as only blacks had been arrested and they also complained of another black (not Davis, nothing as yet was mentioned about him) being beaten. The City's complaint procedure at that point was a three man committee consisting of one man from the Human Rights Department and one each from the Administrator's and the City Attorney's Office. These charges were referred to this traditional three man committee for investigation. That was the end of the incident, publicly, until September.

Internally, though, things were happening. The Committee which consisted of the Acting Human Rights Director (an avowed "anti-cop" from the police's perspective), the Assistant City Administrator ("the Administrator didn't want to get into this one"), and the City Attorney learned that TV news film coverage was available of the confrontation. They saw it at full speed and all agreed that an incident of improper police activity had occurred. This committee then told the Chief and Deputy Chief about the film and they moved "to cover up for the affair by slapping a written reprimand in his folder."[LXXIII] During the time that the three men were investigating, the Grievance Officer (ombudsman) was set up (see Chapter 5) and the "much more difficult problem of whether race was involved in the arrests" was reassigned to him.

The three man report came out on the first of September and set things off again. Headlines in the C.C. News for September 1, 1970, read, "Mayor Advocates Criminal Action Against Officer." The Mayor is quoted as saying:

> Unless there is additional information which the committee has not mentioned, I think the police should forward the matter at once to the County Prosecutor for prosecution as a serious crime . . . . My layman's judgment is that a written reprimand (more serious than an oral warning, but less serious than four other punishments that could have been used) is not viewed by patrolmen as very serious discipline. An officer must inevitably wonder whether official statements abhorring excessive use of force are sincere or whether they are just public relations talk, which officers can ignore in practice without incurring the wrath of the command. The punishment imposed in this case and cases like it gives the patrolman his major cue about how his department really feels when all the pious talk is stripped away.

The "matter" of which the Mayor was speaking was the unanimous committee finding:

> . . . that a police officer did attempt to strike with his night stick a black youth who was pinned to the ground by another officer. (One member), however, filed a minority report stating that the discipline was very limited compared to the severity of the act committed by the Officer . . . . The committee report indicated the major source of information on the incident came from television news clips of the confrontation. The Police Department, upon viewing that film clip, determined that the officer who had swung the stick had behaved inappropriately.[20]

The Mayor was most upset, however, because the police involved were not asked to even give their account of the story. The Mayor felt, according to my informant, [LXXIV] that the complainant is always forced to testify and is placed in jeopardy concerning his future but that the cop is never asked to testify, is always covered up for by the Department and then protected by the Administration.

> What the Mayor wanted to occur was to have the police in question testify in the same manner as any defendent and as a threat to get them to testify he pursued the situation. He wanted to allow the new Grievance Officer to be able to get interviews with the police officers because in the past no one had been able to do so (e.g., the Human Relations Commission, the traditional three man investigating committee, etc.). So when the three man report came in and was clearly inadequate he decided to force the Administrator to administer over the cops. It was a case of potential criminal prosecution not of reopening the internal discipline as that would have been unfair. Furthermore, he was really pissed off that until the TV news film became available, absolutely nothing had been done by the police--no charges had been brought to bear on any officer nor had any officer even admitted or stated that anything had occurred.[LXXV]

> The Mayor criticized the long awaited report as being incomplete in that it did not delve deeply enough into certain aspects of the incident . . . . (He) asked that the city administrator see that his recommended steps were taken.[21]

The reaction to this move by the Mayor was swift. The headlines in the C.C. News on September 2, 1970, were: "Suit Aimed at Mayor Threatened by Police." The following are excerpts from the article.

> The C.C.P.O.A. today announced that its attorney has been directed to send a letter . . . demanding that (the Mayor) retract 'the libelous statement.' The President of the Association said: '(The Mayor) has publicly prejudged the guilt of one of our officers and has publicly stated that the officer committed a criminal act. In America a man is innocent until found guilty, and smear attacks against the police must stop. We have suffered, in silence, the repeated libeling of policemen and the Police Department by politicians and private citizens long enough. The officer's integrity and professional capability have been smeared in a McCarthy-like act. We feel it is inexcusable for the Mayor . . . to have viciously attempted to destroy a police officer's reputation. We do not intend, any longer, to be restrained from answering such attacks because of the Mayor's policy of forbidding police officers to make public statements.
>
> We believe he has attacked this officer's reputation for political purposes. The Mayor is in obvious political difficulties with the community over the West Park incidents (see Chapter 10). He is attempting to sacrifice this police officer to placate a vocal, but small, segment of the community which is bent upon intimidating the Police Department. He is using this officer in an attempt to discredit the police with the rest of the community.
>
> The report was submitted at this time, 164 days after the investigation was ordered, for political purposes and not because the investigation was either thorough, fair or time-consuming.

In the same paper another article appeared under the headline: "GOP Councilmen Say (Mayor) 'Out of line.'" It goes on to say:

> The Mayor was clearly out of line in urging criminal prosecution. The result can only be further deterioration of police confidence in fair treatment by the Mayor. (The) Mayor jumped to some dramatic conclusions Monday night based on a City Hall report which contained very few hard facts and is based entirely on TV film clips. The most serious false conclusion reached by the Mayor is that (the) Chief was incapable of administering appropriate departmental discipline.
>
> The facts, as presented in the report, do not justify the Mayor's conclusion. The fact that the City Administrator did not originate the idea of criminal prosecution is conclusive of the fact that the idea has no merit. In the final analysis, the City Administrator must now exercise extremely good judgment before making a decision on criminal prosecution and this should be done completely independent of any pressure from the Mayor's office.

September 3 brought this banner headline: "Mayor Says GOP, Police Wrong." Excerpts include:

> The (GOP) press release avoided the hard questions posed by the facts found by the investigating committee; instead it speculated on the possibility that perhaps the true facts might be different and then addressed itself to that happier possibility. It went on to suggest, in effect, that any act of a policeman done in a confrontation can be called a mere mistake of judgment, and that once the act is so labelled it should never be criticized by any elected official. If we heeded the advice of that press release those of our city employees who happen to be policemen would no longer be responsible to the electorate or to the law for their conduct in confrontations. The C.C.P.O.A. press release, erroneous as it was, at least avoided this kind of irresponsibility.
>
> The Association purports to be breaking free of the 'Mayor's policy forbidding police officers to make public statements; 'the policy is the Administrator's, not mine; it applies to all departments and not just the police; it has never been interpreted to apply to statements by unions; and the President of the Association knew I did not object to his union making statements because the day before the release in question he and I amicably discussed an earlier public statement he had made for the Association at the Council meeting this past Monday.
>
> I adhere to my statement and to the resolution a unanimous Council passed the week before. Councilmen who made that pledge on the night it led us to reject some Blacks United for Liberation and Justice (see Chapter 10) demands, should not repudiate it less than two weeks later when it requires Council to man the wrath of a police union.

On September 9, 1970 came the headline: "Police Command Union Strikes Back at Mayor,"[22] as the Command Union jumped squarely into the fray. The gist of their commentary varies but little from what the Association had to say with the exception of the following.

> (The Mayor) failed to speak with Cpl. Gary Geer, the officer who was sitting on the prisoner when the night stick was swung. It would have been an extremely simple procedure for (him) to have spoken with Cpl. Geer. He has not been approached by either the investigating committee nor any representative of the Mayor. Cpl. Geer is more than willing to discuss the situation with the Mayor or any other responsible person. The Corporal has the facts at his fingertips together with all

> other circumstances which will display a knowledge of the facts which the Mayor so woefully seems to ignore.

The September 10 edition of the C.C. News carried the following headline: "Mayor Answers Police in Growing Word Battle." In it the Mayor summed up and responded to "the four points" in (the Teamster's business representative's) press release that are worthy of public reply.

> . . . Third, the Teamster spokesman correctly states that the investigating Committee never interviewed a certain police officer witness. Indeed, the investigating committee, in the tradition of prior three-man investigating committees of this sort, did not interview police officers directly. It relied on the department's summary of statements gathered from officers for information from these sources.
>
> The report on the committee was submitted to the Police Department prior to its release to Mayor and Council and the Police Department indicated that it had nothing further to add or to suggest to the investigating committee. As the Teamsters knew before their press release, the City Administrator has been seeking such additional information ever since I referred the matter to him, and he has interviewed the officer whom the Teamsters mention.
>
> But this raises the larger question of why such three-man investigating committees inquiring into allegations of police misconduct traditionally have been denied direct access to police officer witnesses and have been compelled to restrict their inquiry to department summaries of statements given by officers to their superiors.

Two other C.C. News articles bear brief mention. Headlines in the edition of the 11th read: "Officer in Hassle Takes Lie Detector Test" and is another C.C.P.O.A. political press release. The President said that:

> The results of the test showed that the officer did not know a police prisoner was under control when he swung his night stick at the man, that the patrolman did not attempt to use excessive force and that the officer has not tried to hold back facts in the matter.

It goes on to continue the verbal attack on the Mayor. The other article

responds to the public accusations of the Acting Director of the Human Rights Department (the member of the three-man investigating committee who issued a minority report). In it the Mayor states:

> I did not know that Mr. X had urged the other members of the three-man committee to take direct testimony of police officers and to examine police reports. I wish Mr. X had come to me at the time he was having trouble with his fellow committee members over this, for I agree (with him).
>
> Mr. X is correct that the Administrator gratuitously commented on the question of whether race was involved in deciding whom to arrest; this question is being re-examined by the grievance officer. On the other hand, Mr. X's entire press release was gratuitous for whatever one wishes to make of that fact.

Back to my informant who reports that when the City Administrator went back to the Mayor with his tentative findings, the Mayor sent him back out to get more information (e.g., to get a copy of the report on the X-rays that Corporal Geer had taken of his arm, to interview the University newspaper's reporters who were there, some of the witnesses that had been dug up by the BAM leader who had originally asked the Mayor to go to the jail cells, etc.). Reportedly, the City Administrator balked at looking into the polygraph (lie detector) tests that the C.C.P.O.A. said the officer took or interviewing the black youth (Davis) who had been charged with the felony of "assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder."[LXXVI]

> Then after one whole afternoon's discussion with the Chief and the City Administrator, my informant continued,[LXXVII] the Mayor seemed to change his mind and think the whole thing should be dropped. The Administrator was going to make a short statement about the follow-up report but the Mayor said that this wouldn't do because it must be made to look reasonable as to why he had changed his mind. So the Mayor ended up writing the statement for the Administrator and said that on the basis of what has been found out--meaning but not saying on the basis of the long afternoon discussion--he doesn't see any reason for prosecution. The officer had just used bad judgment. The University newspaper and other critics then immediately cried cover up and white-wash and that the Mayor had sold out.[23]

There the matter lay until the Davis (the black youth, arrestee and victim) trial during the latter part of January, 1971. The defense subpoenaed the TV news film but the prosecution showed the film because:

> They (the prosecution and the police) were trying to show that Davis was lying when he said that he was hit three times.[24] As a result of the showing of the film by the prosecution, frame by frame, one of the witnesses called up the Mayor and said that this type of stop action viewing showed that the incident was much more serious. To this the Mayor replied that he didn't believe it and that there would be no reason for the Administrator to lie to him--he had seen the film many times. Thus, the Mayor concluded, there was no reason for him to see it. However, the caller insisted and finally the Mayor agreed to see the film thinking that once and for all he would lay the matter to rest. I also think he was put in the position of having to defend his action in the follow-up report of closing the matter. The Mayor then called up the C.C.P.O.A. President and said that he was going to show the film all over town to prove, finally, that the cop didn't hit anyone and thus the incident should be closed. The President immediately delivered the film to the Mayor.[25]
>
> A friend of the Mayor's then made three copies of the film, frame by frame. On a Friday in mid-February the Mayor watched the film for the first time. As they watched it, they were completely faked out. They saw an officer come upon Davis, who is lying prone on the ground, face down with his hands over his head and Corporal Geer sitting astride him on his lower back. This officer started to swing, saw things were under control, checked his swing and moved off. The Mayor and the others there (says the informant) thought that this was the officer in question and that obviously nothing had occurred. Then they see him (the officer) come up behind the fallen pair and start blasting away with his night stick. The pictures showed Geer warding off the blows after the first one hit him on the arm. Later Geer actually seemed to be grabbing at the stick and even tugging at it with the officer. The last frame showed the officer straightening up and putting his hand up to his head as if to say 'what have I done.'[26] They saw the film over and over again getting angrier each time they saw it.[LXXVIII]
>
> After the Mayor got over his shock that everyone from Corporal Geer up through the Chief and Administrator had covered up he came to a number of us for advice on what to do. Quite frankly we all advised him to do nothing as it was only some seven weeks until the election; X (a right-wing law and order candidate) had just been nominated in the Republican primary and taking on the police was, we felt, political suicide. The Mayor, however, went to the City Attorney to see if the officer could be prosecuted on a city misdemeanor. It turned out this wasn't possible.

> After a few days the Mayor made his decision and broke it to the Administrator and told him he wanted him to see the film frame by frame. The Administrator wanted to bring the Chief and Deputy Chief and it was set up for the next norming.[LXXIX]

> The next norming the Chief and Deputy Chief arrived thirty minutes late and the Chief's first words were something like, 'I think you better not show this. We'll get in trouble with the Prosecutor.' The Mayor told them that he had gotten permission from the TV station to make a copy and went ahead and showed it. The Mayor then told them that he was going to show the film to the Council (which was having a special closed working session the next morning) and to the public.[LXXX]

Saturday morning the Council and the Administrator saw the film with the Mayor narrating.

> He gave it the full treatment throwing in things like, 'Oooh, that must have hurt, etc.' He showed it first at full speed, then at half speed and finally frame by frame. Then we were subjected to (the Administrator) who told us that all along he had told the Chief that the man should have been fired. Z, (a Democrat, the only black Councilman) went nuts and gave a very strong and eloquent speech. The Republicans didn't say a word and couldn't even be taunted into making a statement. To tell the truth we were all a bit stunned by the damn thing. [LXXXI]

Monday night the film was shown to the public and Council. It had the obvious effect on the audience and when it was over Councilman Z tore into the City Administrator and the police and accused them of covering up the whole incident. Councilman A (Senior Republican on the Council) came back at Z with a statement about 5 1/4 seconds of a man's life (the length of the film) being too short a period to condemn him and then attacked the Councilman for thinking only black people had any wisdom and knowledge and understanding about race problems. The next morning at 9:00 a.m. the public got an opportunity to see the film and Tuesday's C.C. News (March 3, 1971) carried a story and printed five photographs from the TV news film showing the incident.[LXXXII]

In what now appears to be a parting shot, the C.C.P.O.A. came out

with a stinging blast which was duly carried by the C.C. News on March 4, 1971. Excerpts from this statement are:

> (The Mayor) is attempting to buy support of certain blacks and students through the reopening of an incident which occurred (almost a year ago). (He) is trying to cover the failures of his two years in office by means of a disgusting McCarthy-like maneuver. It is no coincidence that one month before the mayoral election, (he) has resurrected (this) incident. This is politics at its worst. It is designed to open old wounds and to polarize the community for his benefit. (It is) a common thing in incidents of this type to distort the real issue, to forget who was at fault and to attempt to shift the blame to police officers for failing to exercise perfect judgment. (The officer) is being used as a scapegoat . . . (and) does not deserve this political crucifixion.[27]

The University newspaper on February 2, 1971, wrote the following; the last paragraph in a lengthy editorial.

> Ideally, the Court System provides a check on the acts of other governmental branches. Yet in the case of the police officer, his case never reached the courts due to investigations by his own department and the City Administrator, who, according to (the Chief) is effectively Central City's police commissioner. Davis, however, while involved in a glaringly similar case, had no institutionalized department to rely on. He had only the fairness of the judicial system as his support. But because he was only a private citizen, that support was clearly insufficient.[28]

The Budgetary Process--An Example of Control's Reciprocal Effects

Before moving on to discuss the three police unions, I would like to conclude this section on control with a lighter (and briefer) example of its reciprocal effects.[29] In Central City the annual budget process is a hassle grown tighter this year as a result of a defeated referendum in April, 1970, which called for a City income tax. This, coupled with the fact that the University is only going to turn over $350,000 for the next fiscal year rather than this year's $1,100,000 for police and fire protection, means that next fiscal year's budget will have to

actually be cut back from this year's. The budget process works in such a way that for twice a week for three weeks the Council in public sessions goes over, Department by Department, the proposed budget as submitted by the City Administrator. Eight of the eleven Council votes are needed to change this proposed budget or it becomes law in the second week of May.

On April 17, 1971 it was the Police Department's turn to be discussed. The Administrator's proposed budget for the Department was $2.6 million, a reduction from the $3.3 million that the Chief had submitted (which in turn had been scaled down from an earlier appropriation's request of $3.7 million calling for the addition of 22 men.)[30] This proposed budget would have reduced the force by 10 sworn officers to be taken from the patrol division and meant the firing of these 10 men (i.e., the reduction in size of the total department from 144 to 134 sworn officers). At the budget session on the 17th, there was no question about reducing the force. The discussion was solely around whether the 10 would be fired from the patrol division or taken from such divisions as traffic, Community Relations, Communications, etc.

Also discussed at length was the question of overtime. This fiscal year, $350,000 was allocated for overtime and as of the first of April, $280,000 had been expended.[31] The City Administrator proposed cutting this to $119,000 to which the Mayor replied that "this would just mean deficit spending because you know that we will need it, and therefore, we should budget for it now."

To this the Administrator answered, "No, when the money is gone, that will be it and there will be no more overtime."

The Mayor, playing it straight, then asked, "Do you mean that if there is a disturbance in the schools and there is no overtime left, you just won't send anyone?"

The Administrator, picking up the cue, said, "That's right, it would be a school problem."

The Mayor continued, "If there's a parade, you mean we won't provide police protection?"

"Yes, that's correct."

"What if we have a confrontation or a riot?"

"If there's no money, there will be no police overtime."

The Assistant City Administrator for Finance also got into the act by saying that the officers would be very upset with this cut in overtime because it means that they will take that amount less home of what is now assured income. The next day the C.C. News carried these events in an article under the eye catching headline, "Police to be Fired."

Two days later, the Association President was on the radio with a prepared statement lamenting the regrettable consequences of this type of budget cut. The next day the Chief said that he might have to eliminate the school crossing guards, reduce the staff of the Police Community Relations Division and cut out the police counselors (civilian liaison between police and primarily black youth). He went on to say that he only hoped it would be a "cool summer" and that the School Board could pick up the expense of crossing guards.

The Chief then came up with an alternate budget proposal at the April 28 budget session which would "eliminate the need to reduce the number of sworn personnel in his department."[32] The basic method would

be to cut out many services including those cited in the above radio interview (and printed in the C.C. News). Supporting his alternate budget, the Chief said that, "If the City loses 10 sworn personnel it will lose some $175,000 that has been invested in these men.'

He said if he loses these men he would have to reduce foot patrols and "hope things keep cool." He also said that the recommended new overtime allocation "is $200,000 short of being realistic."[33]

To this the City Administrator replied:

> Of all the city services, I would note police as top priority. The police have to go back along with all the other departments in the cutting. I disagree basically with eliminating payments for school crossing guards. I'd rather give up some sworn personnel and keep these guards on.[34]

A Republican Councilman said:

> He did not agree with the City Administrator that if one department in the City is cut that all have to be cut. 'We have to look at what the community can stand the largest cut in, and the least cut in.'[35]

Looked at from the perspective of the uninformed, the above is a very serious episode concerning the potential loss of vital city services. However, when looked at more closely, the educated eye can detect a few of the actors playing the game with a certain charade-like flair.

The gist of what is going on is that the Mayor feels that the April, 1970 income tax referendum was primarily lost because "the citizens were not convinced of its need at this time." As the probability of a new referendum on the issue is very high, it thus becomes imperative to educate the populace. What better way to publicize the City's dire financial straits than to stir things up by adopting a budget which requires the firing of policemen? The incumbent administration, anticipating the vociferous reactions of the police, promulgates a heavily cut police budget, twists the screw a bit at the budget sessions,and

awaits the indignant public outbursts.[36] The game is quite serious, however, "as it is a campaign to scare people tempered by the possibility that all concerned may have to live with the budget as it is agreed to in mid-May," if a City income tax is not forthcoming.[LXXXIII]

Police Unions

The genesis and development of police unions in our two departments reflect to a high degree the differing environmental perceptions by the two sets of police. The unions are the structures which are most relied upon by the men to channel their political influence attempts. The extent of their development and use as a political resource is, perhaps, the best single indicator of the level of trust importance with which the political structure is viewed.

I will discuss the M.C.S.D. deputy's union first, follow up with the C.C.P.D.'s Command Union and conclude with its Association.

In 1966 the deputies of the M.C.S.D. formed an independent local Association among themselves. From there stories diverge as to what occurred. One version is that:

> They hired a lawyer and through him tried to put pressure on the Board of Commissioners for economic items. At the same time, the Sheriff was negotiating with the Board for better economic conditions for the Deputies. When the lawyer or someone went to the press with a pressure tactic (news release), the Sheriff hit the roof, called in the Association's Executive Board and said they had to retract the statement. The Board said that they had not issued it and would not retract it. The Sheriff then fired them all, although later he hired a few of them back.

The informed observer went on to say that:

> (The Sheriff) was very angry, probably because they were trying to take over certain functions that he felt were his perogatives and also shooting down his attempts at getting better conditions. When the move came to join the Teamsters, he was in favor of it.[LXXXIV]

Another expert said that:

> The deputies tried to organize an independent union among themselves. They asked me about it and I told them to go ahead but they would be broken financially the first time they took you to court--its easy to find out how many financial resources you have. So they formed a union and when they went into litigation over the Executive Committee being fired they found out that one day in court broke them.[LXXXV]

A third observer said that:

> The deputies earlier had twice tried to go with the State Deputy's Union which failed both times. Many of us were upset that they felt they needed a union . . . from the county's perspective, it turned out to be an advantage to have the union. It took a great amount of control away from the Sheriff. The original union organizers, X and Y were poor cops and rabble rousers who would alienate their own cause.[LXXXVI]

This was offered on behalf of the Sheriff who had fired them "over the issue, supposedly, of unionizing."

A fourth added that:

> Three of the four who were fired by the Sheriff were ordered reinstated by the State Labor Mediation Board, and said that, in 1968 there was a private deputy's union formed with the Sheriff having the impetus to get this started.[LXXXVII]

A fifth observer seems to synthesize most of the above conflicting opinions when he says that:

> Around 1966 a Deputy's Association was formed at the instigation of the Sheriff himself who later said that his suggestion turned into a monster. The basic format and the working agreement were going along fine when three or four deputies became officers in the Association and thought they would dictate to the Sheriff what the department and the Sheriff would and would not do. They were fired by the Sheriff sometime after they got legal recognition from the State as an association. They claimed publicly that they were fired because they were trying to organize. The Sheriff said that was ridiculous because the idea for the union had come from him.
>
> The Union was dissolved a year or so before the new one was set up because no one seemed to take much of any interest in it and the guys felt it wasn't worth a damn.[LXXXVIII]

Out of this recent (and somewhat confused) past came the present Deputy's Union. One observer stated that it was brought about "on the issue of job security, not economics . . . the deputies formed the Union: 1) for job security, 2) for safety equipment, and 3) for financial gain."[LXXXIX] A second informant agreed saying, "The deputies formed their union as an internal result of and for economic security."[XC] A third concurred but added:

> It was formed two years ago--not for money but for job security from the Sheriff himself--both the possible threat of what a new Sheriff would mean and the possibility of arbitrary firing by the present one. The reason for the union is that the deputies are better off. It was formed because the Sheriff can be a wild man."[XCI]

> So after a while the deputies began talking again about unionizing . . . went shopping for a union and went to Y and asked him if he knew anyone who took police. Y said he didn't but set them up to see the UAW and AFSCME. Both of these came in and talked to the men. Then Y was asked if he would talk with them so he went before them and talked and told them that they had to get into an organization that had some money and could support them as they could not be self-sustaining then or in the near future. He then left and they talked it over and called him and said they wanted to go with him. He then talked with the Sheriff about it. His big fear was that they (the union officials) would want to run the department. Y said that he knew nothing about the police and had absolutely no intention of getting involved. So they had a formal election and voted to go Teamsters.[XCII]

> The discussion during the setting up of the union and in the initial bargaining was over the reality of what would or could happen if a new Sheriff were elected. The deputies are answerable to the Sheriff and only to him because by statute the elected official has complete authority to hire and fire without cause. They were concerned that the Sheriff needed to have reasonable cause to fire and they hoped that the contract would provide for continuity. If nothing else, such a contract would make a strong campaign issue as the deputies could try to bind both candidates to continuing with the same manpower.

> Also, there is a dual relationship which is quite confusing and hasn't ever been fully worked out as to who the employer actually is. Both the Board and the Sheriff are listed as employers with the former doing the paying and the latter doing the personnel

> selection. The Labor Mediation Board has never answered that and thus the Sheriff continues to act as the agent for the County in this respect.[XCIII]

> Everyone up to the Under Sheriff was in the Union--formally known as a 'Unit.' We then went into negotiations with the County who hired an attorney from out of the County ("who really scalped the County for his fee"). While in the negotiations, the attorney brought up the question of the command being in the same union as the road patrol deputies. We saw it as an attempt at splitting the men and forcing another election. He figured that we would balk at it and object so he could call for another election but we didn't object. All we said was that there could be two units but they had to be within the same union. So we got the first contract which was for one year (1970) and are now into a second, two year contract.[XCIV]

Negotiations are carrried on by the Teamster's Business Representative, and the stewards of each unit for the union and for the County. Someone from the Sheriff's office (usually the Under Sheriff), the County Administrator and someone from the Prosecutor's office. The County is "more difficult to negotiate with because there are in effect two bosses and they both have to agree on something before we can reach an agreement."[XCV]

A few comments are in order about the Union before I move on the Command Union.

Says an insider:

> We have a business agent who aids in the negotiating process and we also have a grievance procedure with the units. The one deputy who has been fired since the union was formed did not use the union to appeal. The union will not go to bat for a fuck off.[XCVI] At the level of the deputies, they don't feel threatened. The Sheriff speaks for them. This might be why they don't engage in any of the political statements that the C.C.P.O.A. does.[XCVII]

From an insider with experience in both departments, "We don't have meetings like we did in Central City. Here the union is used only for collective bargaining."

Another insider appears unhappy:

I don't think the union did us any good at all beyond the initial job security. It went along with (the County's) lousy package which didn't give us much. We don't have the type of associational meetings that other police departments do. They leave you in the dark about a lot of proposals. The State Police and C.C.P.O.A. are more effective than our union.[XCVIII]

Command Union

They were the scaredest people I ever saw. There was absolutely no problem organizing them at all. They wanted job security. (The Mayor) really organized the City Police (Command). They felt that their jobs were in jeopardy or at least their advancement because of the City Council action and the lateral transfer business. Also, there were some racial overtones because they were afraid of having a black sergeant or something transferred in and then moved along rapidly. The whole operation was kept very hush hush until after the State Labor Mediation Board had set up an election. It was held at City Hall and 100% voted to join.[XCIX]

Two other outside observers comment that:

The Command went with the Teamsters because they are fairly small (about 30) and mainly because they felt threatened and could use the power of the Teamsters.[C]

The Command has the normal fears of the within vs. without replacement problem, (the Chief, Deputy and two Captains are not in the Command Union) which led to the Command Union where there seemed to be some sort of a payoff between lesser pay and the assurance of advancement through the ranks to the top (four positions).[CI]

An insider said that they went with the Teamsters because:

With a membership of 28 we are a very limited group and no one else would have been interested in us, given our small unit. The greatest reason for joining is probably because of their research ability and their excellent attorney. This is why all our (press) releases go through them. It saves you from shooting off your mouth. They know when you're right and wrong.

We put the no strike clause in our contract, not the City. We just wanted to do our jobs without fear of obstruction or dismissal and (wanted) position security with no scapegoats.

> In the first contract we tried to show that we didn't go Teamsters for more money by not asking for anymore. (As to the lateral transfer clause), we didn't want it because we'd be the only one (to have it). You just show us one department where we could transfer into. There are none.[CII]

A knowledgeable observer commented:

> The Teamsters Union was not one which normally police would be very excited about,given the seeming amount of criminality at the top ("with Beck and Hoffa in prison"). Later it was stated by (the Chief) that they joined them because it would give them more muscle at bargaining time. At the first bargaining session with the City, the Union representative brought in a clause that there be no lateral transfers allowed to command positions. The City refused to agree to that clause and it went to compulsory and binding independent arbitration. He found for the Union and thus no lateral transfers. Since then the command officers have been quite anti-Democrat.[CIII]

With regard to the negotiations:

> We demanded binding arbitration on the 'security promotion clause' (i.e., "that they must serve so many years in each position before they are eligible to take the test for the next higher rank"). We felt that if we didn't get that then there was not much reason joining the Teamsters because that was the major thing we were after and interested in. We won the decision hands down.
>
> In the City the head of personnel, someone from the City Administrator's office and a third from the City Attorney's office negotiate. We personally requested that the Chief be present for the negotiations but the Administrator absolutely refused to even consider having him there. They said that they would negotiate the contract. We felt that it was unfair for the Chief to just be landed with a contract without having been in on the discussion. We wanted him to know the reasons behind the various clauses and why they were included.[CIV]

The Association

The Association began informally, 7-8 years ago and was organized as a strictly social function. In 1967, it was formally organized as an Association with a constitution and by-laws. Its purposes were "rather vast and all inclusive. Such things as to perpetuate the memory of officers lost in the line of duty, to promote economic stability, to foster wholesome relations with the citizens,to gain their respect, etc."[CV]

In January, 1969, the Association received a letter from AFSCME (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees) stating that they were going to attempt to move into the City and unionize all city employees by holding an election.

The Association's reaction was that:

> The Union knew nothing about us and our unique situation. We felt that they mainly wanted to have the police in their Union because we have higher salaries and they wanted to bring their salary grades up. We feel that we were forced into unionizing by AFSCME.[CVI]

So they sent a letter to Mayor and Council (the former Republican Administration) asking that the Association be the sole bargaining agents for the noncommand sworn officers. Through their attorney they revised the articles of the original 1967 Association and became a legal union (Council approved the resolution unanimously).

> We wanted very much to stay local. We have our own problems and wanted control over our own destiny by working problems out our own way. The men just don't like the idea of a professional union. The business agent and the union council that decisions have to go through aren't local and they don't understand our special problems. In addition, there is a moral feeling among the men that we shouldn't engage in strikes or picketing. We have sufficient legal means to use the proper channels and binding arbitration, so that we can get what we want and a fair shake by legal means. Also, this isn't a union town like "R" where the police went out on strike and picketed City Hall. We could never get away with it here. They wouldn't stand for it (citizens and political decision makers).[CVII/37]

The first negotiations came almost immediately as the first contract went into effect July 1, 1969 and the Association went in with no prior experience, although they did look at a few copies of contracts from other cities. The City Administration had access to experts at the University with the Personnel Director being the City's chief negotiator.

We went in with the idea that we would come out with a fair and decent proposal; that is, as reasonable people we could sit around and come up with a fair contract. We quickly learned that this was an adversarial proceeding and that everyone was out to protect their own interests. I didn't think that this attitude was necessary and we very quickly got the feeling that the administration would try to do what was necessary to see that their interests were protected. This made us feel that we were forced to look out for our own rights and perhaps for the first time forced us into a sense of being independent and, perhaps, even militanct in regard to our own interests.[CVIII]

This sense of being on their own:

Came as a sort of a revelation to the men as the City and the Command had always played sort of a paternalistic role. In the end, it did the men a great deal of good because it forced them to look closely at everything that they did out of fear that they might give something up. They have been like that ever since.[CIX]

We try to keep abreast of the latest developments in fire and police unions. We attend meetings when experts speak at the University and elsewhere. Some of the men attend classes at the University. We also have the Police Officers Association of the State which does a lot of the leg work for us like keeping files on all contracts signed in the State, etc. They also do research on wages, laws pertaining to labor, etc. ("as well as part-time lobbying at the State Capital for legislation"), so that when we get into negotiations we know when the city is bluffing. Economically, we got a good second contract from the Democrats in 1970 which runs through 1972. We did find a few loop-holes in some of the fringe benefits which we'll plug next time.[CX]

A year later when the Command Union went Teamsters:

Most of the men were very unhappy that they went with the Teamsters and would have been if they went with any other organized union.[CXI] This caused a split within the Association as there were those who felt that they should go with the Teamsters as well, whereas others felt that not only should the Command have stayed local but that the Teamsters was something of a highly questionable union.[CXII]

Things tightened up in the department after we organized. Discipline became formalized (and routinized). The old way was an informal system where the semi-military organization was such that you took whatever the Command gave out. The new formal vs. the old informal causes some hard feelings, sometimes, when you have to step on some toes because the Association doesn't feel a fair shake has been given. This change-over made the entire department more formal in the

relationships between the levels. We negotiate directly with the City but in discipline its with the two Captains, Deputy Chief and Chief. We keep records and files of the discipline that has been handed out for different kinds of offenses to make sure that they are equal and fair. We can have a member of the Association in on all meetings about discipline and we get a copy of all complaints.

The Association is now an economic and business organization. Social life is not a part of it at all. This is all done on an individual basis although we may have one function a year. Meetings are now for union business and about one-third of the guys normally turn out for meetings. We get more if there is a hot issue and nearly all to vote on new contracts. Most of the actual business is carried on by the executive committee and the President.[CXIII]

The Association has gone from being one which was primarily social with a secondary attempt at instilling professionalism to one which is primarily economic. As an organization has to justify itself to keep its members, so they have to respond to the command, the City and the grievance procedure. They felt they had to respond to the attempts by people in the community to make them into scapegoats for the politicians who are responding to the minority groups. One of the major functions of the Association is the protection of its members from what they feel is undue political pressures from outsiders.

So far in a majority of the instances, they have been defensive and reacted to what they felt was a threat. The idea has been to strike early, hard and fast to keep this sort of thing either from happening or to a minimum. There is also the public education and relations aspect to which they have devoted some time and energy.[CXIV]

When we were first organized we wanted to stay completely out of politics as we felt they didn't mix (police and politics). But we found out that there was something about unions and politics that went together. People began to expect you to take stands. (For example) X (the Republican candidate for Mayor) came to us and asked us to endorse him. We turned him down for two reasons: 1) its morally wrong for the police to do it (there's a split in the Association over this), and 2) we wanted to be in the position to be free to protect our own interests. The "Z" POA publicly endorsed "T" and gave him a financial contribution. As a payoff, he promoted 100 dicks to Sergeant. We don't want to be in that sort of a political situation.

We took a stand on the BAM situation for our own protection, not for politics. We knew in advance that some people would think that the way it was worded would be seen as an (implicit)

endorsement for X. The Mayor is a liberal and two of his constituencies are blacks and students. It's no coincidence that the Monday before (the Mayor) decided to reopen the case, a black and a student had come to the Council meeting and blasted him for not taking a strong stand against the police. We made a single release. We could have made a number of them. We could have gone whole hog and really attacked the Mayor but we haven't. We get politically involved if we want to or not--or so we're seen.[CXV]

I asked an observer about the future of the Association. He said:

I see it as expanding greatly. They are beginning to deal with legislation on the state level, with the City Administration and with City Council. They are learning political know-how and the realities of political power. There is no question but that there are attempts--pressures made to influence decision making, and it should increase in the future. I've noticed, ever since I began dealing with police officers, a strong sense of 'professionalism' which can be translated into a sort of feeling that the police should not in any way get involved in what would be considered political activity. I feel that as time goes on this sense is lessening, that more are coming to see that this is the way things are done to get things that are needed. There is no question but that the younger ones are more militant (concerning the way the Association should go) than the older ones. For example, a lot of the younger guys felt that they should have endorsed X for Mayor and that they should do here the things that are done elsewhere (Detroit, Philadelphia, Montreal, etc.).[CXVI]

It makes good sense to have our views heard with all levels of lawmakers. For too long the police have sat back and said nothing which made everyone assume that we were happy with the way things are going. Now we speak out. If only a small part of the population shows up and are continuously vocal, they'll get what they want. Take, for example, the open Council hearings on the marijuana ordinance. Only those in favor spoke and it was passed. So when things happen which are counter to our interests or to our members feelings, we are going to speak out.

I asked him what other means are available. His reply was:

For overall general support, we contact various businessmen and the (civic and service) clubs like the J.C.'s, Kiwanis, Optimists, etc. We belong to various clubs and we contact and talk with them. So far we've never contacted these groups on specific issues or problems but we may come to that point if we need to. They do contact us, though, and we talk to them.

> For example (candidate) X's people contact us daily (which must mean that X feels that the police are a powerful weapon in his campaign strategy).
>
> As to the future, hopefully the Association will be a tool to making this (the department) a professional organization--to upgrade the caliber of men we hire, a better wage scale, better working conditions and improving our public image. We charge the members $10 a month dues which covers our attorney's fees, etc. If our expenses outrun our income we may have to join an organized labor union at some future point as they have more resources at their command. But I sure as hell hope not.[CXVII]

Relating the Command Union to the Association

A few words are in order concerning relations between the Command Union and the Association with regard to internal police policy.

> There is a slowly developing feeling that the Association should and can be involved in inputs into policy decision. (Thus, there are changes brewing in the formal line, paramilitary, bureaucracy because) the Association is now engaged in direct discussions with top command. The command feels they are being by-passed, that the Chief and Deputy Chief are responding to the Association with things that haven't been cleared up the command line. Because of the changes in the structure via the dual unions, there currently exists a lack of definition of what should go through the command and what should go directly to the top.[CXVIII]

This informant felt that where decisions concerning existing rules and regulations are concerned, going up through the line isn't going to get the Association anywhere because such decisions are made at the top level. He feels "these decisions should be made by representatives of the two unions sitting down with top command. Something that will inevitably come to happen." This, of course, is a radical departure from the traditional highly bureaucratized organization and is in sharp contrast to the Sheriff Department where none of this sort of thing exists (in fact men were fired for supposedly trying it).

I asked a top command officer if the two union structure was

creating a new departmental form. He began by saying that "the Association attempts to assume a dictatorial attitude toward the (departmental) administration but they have a contract and management still runs the show."[CXIX] He then got onto pressures from the outside and said that he is put squarely in the middle between them and "the growing strength of the Association to protect its own." Discipline is a problem as there now is less latitude in the procedures than there used to be. "You have to be absolutely right (in the procedures you follow) because the employees rights are now greater (as a result of the contract)."

A member of the Association feels that:

> (The Chief) is in the position of having to follow and do what Council wants. If we felt that some decision he made was jeopardizing our work we would first try to go internally to get it changed and if that didn't work we'd go public. There is a generation gap with the older guys still operating as if the police were a semi-military organization. They give the orders and you are supposed to follow without questioning them. Today, the younger men just won't buy that. That doesn't go with them anymore. Now the younger officer wants to know why and will question whatever they think is wrong. We're a young department and we have some problems with the older, more traditional commanders here.[CXX]

An outside observer comments that:

> The C.C.P.O.A. seems to fear that the command can be kept quiet by the threat or reality of political pressure from above. So at times they feel that they are assisting their command with their (public) statements.[CXXI]

And, finally, another outside observer notices that:

> The department is going through a major transition. There is a split between the bright young officers and the older guys they perceive as being traditional and old fashioned. There is also a communication problem between the young and the old . . . (and) the Chief and the Deputy Chief are possibly quite isolated. An example of the problems in the department is the Command Union. They wanted to force,in the last negotiations, meetings with the Chief, Deputy Chief and the City Administration because they thought that they were getting distorted information or orders which were based on misconceptions.[CXXII]

One Last Question

Perhaps it is only fitting to end this Chapter as I began it, with a question from the interview form. Although I had originally meant the following question for quite another purpose, I found the answers very relevant to these three differing unions. The question was (on page 4, #6): "If they do try to cause trouble for you or the department with their grievance. who can you count on to support you? What means can you use?" Although for several reasons a number were not asked the question, those that did fell into an interesting pattern. In the C.C.P.D., of those within the Command Union, only one out of eight answering the question mentioned the union ("possibly the union," a Lieutenant said). Of those in the Association, eight of nine mentioned the C.C.P.O.A. (The ninth, once again a patrolman with more than six years experience, got off on a tangent concerning lack of command support which four others also mentioned). No one in either union mentioned the top command.

In the M.C.S.D., of the deputies answering the question, six of nine responded with the Sheriff and not one mentioned the union. The other three said: "Citizens' support" . . . "a few of the Board are 100% pro-Sheriff" . . . "a handful of the Commissioners--especially X and Y." Of those at the Sergeant's level or above, eight answered and five mentioned the Sheriff. Again the union was not mentioned. The others suggested: "Civic groups, prominent business people, etc." "(I) hope the Commissioners will back us" . . . "would expect total support of the community."

CHAPTER 4

Footnotes

1. Inducements and persuasion are both often attempted and invariably fall short of desired performance. Thus, constraints are generally necessary. This is in line with the theory developed by Amitai Etzioni in his A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. (I.e., coercive as opposed to remunerative or normative powers).

2. As described in Chapter 2, there will be a dual set of footnotes. Roman numerals will be used for sources which will be cited in the restricted notations.

3. The word "interested" was purposively used to elicit as broad an answer as possible and to not lead the respondent (e.g., the words control, influence, constrain, etc. were excluded).

4. None were names given to me by the interested and worried deputies that I mentioned in Chapter 2.

5. For example, of the 50 chances for patrolmen to answer (5 questions times 10 patrolmen) there were 6 "don't knows" compared to 28 "don't knows" out of 55 (5x11) for the deputies. This was also true in the middle level category where C.C. had 0 out of 20 and the Mideast had 8 out of 20. In the top brass category it was 6 of 45 for C.C. and 11 of 35 for M.C.

6. In fact this was the least well conceived and answered question of those discussed in this Chapter. The question was just poorly worded, adds little and probably needn't have been asked.

7. This was an interesting finding, that almost one-quarter of these interviewed in a department with a partisanly elected chief were "apolitical" when it came to role performance and evaluation.

8. Two of the patrolmen I interviewed had been on the force as patrolmen for 9 and 13 years respectively. Consistently they were the most apolitical of those interviewed. Perhaps this ties in with Niederhoffer's study which shows a direct relationship between years of service and cynicism. (C.f. Behind the Shield, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y. 1967).

9. This is the individual, a high-ranking officer whose job it is to deal with the political structure, who consistently was the most knowledgeable.

10. The respondents will answer this question in the same order as they did the prior one.

11. This is an affair concerning black students at the University and a strike over certain demands. It will receive a great deal of attention later because of charges of police brutality.

12. Unfortunately, as I said earlier, there are no officers who have moved in the other direction to give us a more balanced picture. However, the officers I talked with in the C.C.P.D. did not take issue with what deputies had said. In fact most agreed and reiterated what I had heard and more. For example, a Lieutenant[XI] said he thought that the C.C.P.D. "is very uptight and defensive--everything is thought of and done from a self-protection point of view. Little (is) done in the way of positive type of work because everything is analyzed to death."

13. For example, "in the ROTC building take over at the time of Kent State, he thought that they could stay in there forever and burn the building down if necessary but he wasn't about to send in the C.C.P.D.--he's in favor of the peaceful way of doing things. Another example, is that he was great when the University wanted to use the police to break the BAM student strike."[XVIII]

14. County Administrator. Interview on 4/19/71.

15. The Law Enforcement Committee is one of a large number of Committees of the Board which is composed of five commissioners from the Board. All items concerning the Sheriff Department, Court system, Prosecutor's office, Legal Services Clinic, etc., are channeled through this committee.

16. Ibid.

17. Minutes, County Board of Commissioners, March 17, 1970, p. 2.

18. Ibid., p. 65. Four of the seven votes against the Sheriff came from Central City.

19. A University employee.

20. C.C. News, September 1, 1970.

21. Ibid.

22. The C.C.P.D. has two unions. The Association for all non-supervisory sworn personnel and a Command Union. In addition, there is a Union for the non-sworn full and part-time personnel. The latter two are affiliated with Teamsters Local No.XXX. The first two unions will be discussed shortly.

23. This followup report was made public on October 29, 1970.

24. That is, if they could discredit his testimony on this issue, they could infer that all of his testimony was a fabrication.

25. A friend said that he could show the film if the Mayor could get it from the police who still had custody while the prosecution was using it.

26. The major reason this informant remembered the film so vividly is, as he says, that he saw it.

27. As of this writing, the County Prosecutor has done nothing with the case. The officer in question was promoted from Patrolman to Detective. Davis was found guilty of the lesser offense of felonious assault and the Mayor was re-elected by a large margin.

28. It should be pointed out that Davis was accused of intent to do great harm because he allegedly threw a brick which could have killed someone if hit in the head (it landed on a patrolman's hip) whereas the officer was partially defended by the Chief and Administrator because he allegedly failed to hit Davis (hitting Corporal Geer instead) whatever his intent was.

29. Remember my statement in Chapter 3 that, "There is a direct relationship between the amount of control exercised and total control available in the political system."

30. C.C. News, April 29, 1971. This fiscal year's budget is $2.7 million.

31. Overtime in the C.C.P.D. is more than mobilization for emergencies such as crises. The money seems to be spread around the Department very evenly and is tantamount to a $1,000 virtually guaranteed increase in pay to the men (about two-thirds of it is for court appearances).

32. C.C. News, 4/29/71.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. No other City Department received any publicity concerning their cutbacks in the Council budgetary sessions. No other Department head or employees made any public statements in spite of the fact that "the percentage of the cut in the Police Department is smaller than most other departments." (Ibid., C.C. News, March 29, 1971).

37. Through this discussion ran a strong strain of unionism and all it entails not being compatible with the desired self-image of professionalism.

CHAPTER 5

Accountability--Who Tells What to Whom

Accountability, you will recall, refers to the regulation of a police department through a concern for its output. Also stressed, was that accountability, like control and participation, can vary in the amount of its presence between political structures and the more closely a department is held accountable, the greater the press for political behavior. This Chapter further details a number of less obvious examples of behavior produced by the police as a result of external accountability structures. (Chapter 4, while referring primarily to the structure and process of control, also provided such illustrations).

This Chapter is organized in the following manner. At the outset two questions from the interview form are looked at for their content with regard to the second hypothesis in Chapter 3: The more direct the accountability, the greater the trust importance of the political structure. The first question taps the police officers' perceptions of the two structures while the second unearths their perceptions of the two processes of accountability. From there, I go right into a major accountability structure, the citizen's complaint structure,as the outside experts look at the two political systems and discuss how they operate.

Following this are four (the first three are quite lengthy)

descriptions of events that illustrate either: 1) the use of police political behavior to circumvent or destroy an implanted accountability structure (the Human Relations Council-Grievance Officer and the Ozone House Pact); or 2) the use of police political behavior to prevent accountability structures from being developed or altered (the Tri-County Intelligence Squad and the Marijuana Ordinance). These four examples depict the manner in which the police utilize their resources within the political process to extract outcomes from the environment which are favorable to their set of interests (i.e., how the process provides opportunity for political behavior).

Perceptions by the Police

"Does it make any difference whether the top administrator (man) in your Department is elected or appointed when dealing with the Board/Council?" Of the 43 responses from the two departments, only two in the Sheriff Department didn't think it was important ("don't know if it would or not" from a Captain, and "don't believe it has a bearing" from a deputy). Of the other 19 respondents in the Sheriff Department, 17 gave as their primary response some version of external controls being brought to bear upon the top man as a result of his being elected or appointed. All of these 17 were in favor of an elected top man for such reasons as:

> (An) elected official has more authority . . . is more of his own boss . . . less dictation if top man elected . . . being elected means more power--more effective . . . . Sheriff isn't under the same pressure as the Chief . . . if appointed they can force him to do what they want to. Now they have to use other kinds of pressure.

I shall give one deputy's answer in full as an illustration of the feelings

of the men.

> . . . A good example is Central City. A fine, dedicated man like (the Chief) has to condone a lot of what is going on with the radicals and minorities. (He) has to do what the City Council and Mayor want. The Sheriff does what he thinks is best for the majority. He has been able to withstand many of the pressure groups, the very same groups which bring our society to the brink of destruction.

The other two respondents (out of a total of 21) gave as their primary response some aspect of the problems inherent in getting a qualified leader. One high administrator said that:

> You can argue either way. If he's elected he has more independence because if appointed he's working at their discretion and must follow their procedures. On the other hand, if you have a lousy Sheriff, what kind of a department will you have.

The other respondent, a sergeant, said that:

> Overall, elected has more advantages for the department. Judging between the two departments, there is much more direct pressure on the police to cram things down your throat in Central City. Both methods have pros and cons. If you have a lousy official it's hard to get rid of him if he's elected.

In the Central City Department, 13 of the 22 respondents reacted with similar sentiments to buttress their opinion of preferring an elected official. Rank seemed important to this answer as eight of the ten Association members were in this elected category (the other two were, once again, the older patrolmen--see below). A fourteenth (Lieutenant) said that: "The elected has an advantage. He doesn't have to worry about public sentiment. But it has some disadvantages because the Chief recognizes that he must deal with citizens which makes him more alert and accountable daily, not just every four years."

Four respondents mentioned the problem of proper qualifications with elected officials. Two examples of such responses are:

> . . . have a tendency to get a better qualified, more professional man if he's appointed rather than rely on the whims

> of the voter . . . . The main problem with elections is getting qualified men. As you know, most police are biased against getting non-sworn officials (two sergeants).

One of the older patrolmen thinks that the Sheriff's brand of law enforcement is the best in the State but: "He wouldn't last in Central City for longer than one term because it is so liberal. (Therefore), probably being appointed is the most stable or best compromise." The other four respondents I've placed in the area of "politics and law enforcement don't mix." A sergeant said: "Any officer in law enforcement should not be in politics or responsible to politicians. The top man should come up through the ranks." The other older patrolman thought that: "There is no place for politics in law enforcement. He should be appointed based on merit and his abilities."

In general, then, there seemed to be a pattern in this department of the younger men in the lowest ranks (8 of 10) feeling that an elected administrator would be more beneficial in both getting things for and defending the department. The older men in the higher ranks (12) were split in their feelings with five (plus the lieutenant I quoted above) being concerned with fewer controls, three with proper credentials and three with mixing politics with policing. These responses from the two departments should dispel any lingering doubts about the police perceiving their political structure as important to them.

The other question of importance to this Chapter concerns the means that the men feel are available to them and that they would use in attempting to influence those to whom they are accountable.[1] After a gratuitous statement meant to loosen up the respondents ("Today we see an increasing need and desire for police officers like all other pro-

fessionals to join together in seeking better conditions for themselves.") I asked the following question: "If there were an issue of importance to the department (e.g., to develop a civilian review board) which was being decided by the Board/Council, how would you go about trying to get a favorable decision?"

The most striking difference between the two departments was in the reliance placed upon the unions. Not one respondent in the M.C.S.D. mentioned the Union, whereas every member of a union in the C.C.P.D. except one (a lieutenant who said he would "rely on the Chief and Deputy Chief") did so, some mentioning just the one they belong to and others suggesting both. (The Association with 10 respondents was mentioned more than twice as often as the Command Union with eight--17 to 8). One of the more detailed responses was the following: "We would: 1) use the Association, 2) probably require that all officers contact their personal Councilmen, 3) news and press releases to attempt to bring out public support, and 4) might address some civic organizations."

Other comments were that: "we'd use an extensive group effort". . . "a contingent of 6-12 officers would go to testify" . . . "do heavy research, use facts and then present them to Council via a unified group rather than individual officers."[2]

The avenue of influence in the Sheriff Department seemed to be via the Sheriff or Undersheriff. Ten respondents mentioned one or both saying things like:

> The Sheriff would fight it all the way for us . . . somebody would need to do some research, Captain X would probably do that, and the Sheriff or Undersheriff would deliver the information . . . don't really know other than the Sheriff being the spokesman . . . with the facts--usually the Sheriff or the Undersheriff go over.

The other major difference seemed to be the sense of personal capability to effect change by one's own individual actions. There was, once again, a great difference between the two departments. Four deputies alluded to potential personal activities. The deputies stated such things as:

> I wouldn't go over (to a meeting) . . . . I know several Commissioners but would definitely not contact them . . . as an individual I wouldn't try to stop them . . . don't know . . . I wouldn't talk to my Commissioner . . . don't know how I would voice my opinion . . . all you can hope for is that Board members are open and unbiased.

Contrast this with some of the views of the Central City Department.

> I would not be reluctant to give my opinion . . . I would talk with my own (Councilman) and get others to talk with theirs . . . anyone who gives a shit would be there . . . would also contact councilmen directly and use my friends . . . I don't think we'd get involved in indirect activities--we'd go directly to the Council.

One response was quite extensive:

> The way we do it is through representative bodies (everything works along a union structure) or talking to third parties to get them to talk with Councilman. The whole game of policing is being political. We're into the overall community and interested in its betterment. So we are involved in politics to the same extent as other citizens and should have the same rights.

None of the 18 union members expressed any sentiments about not taking personal or direct action. Compared to the Sheriff Department where the men seemed to be saying that the Sheriff, Undersheriff or Captain X would perform the necessary or desirable actions, the C.C.P.D. men gave the impression that they would personally get involved in attending meetings and the necessary background "research" or "fact finding."

Other methods besides the above, suggested by men in the Sheriff Department, were five deputies who mentioned use of the media--letters

to the editor (either written personally or getting others to write), radio, use of newspaper reporters, etc., ("make the public aware by personal contacts, radio, paper" and "try for citizen response via letters."). Two deputies mentioned the use of groups in the community. "We've used influence with groups. The Concerned Citizens would do anything. They have helped us out before" . . . . "The Chamber of Commerce in various towns and cities are very influential and we could contact them." A third suggested the use of other police departments and the staffs of state, local and federal police officer associations (National Sheriff's Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, State Sheriff's Association, etc.). Men in the C.C.P.D. also suggested news media, letters, press releases, "third parties to put pressure on" and one said: "About four or five years ago we wanted more benefits so the C.C.P.O.A. printed up thousands of leaflets. We divided up the city and officers went door to door explaining the benefits because we needed a referendum to change the City Charter."

Outside Experts--The Citizen Complaint's Structure

I would now like to move from the perceptions of individual officers about the accountability structure and process to the citizen's complaint mechanism built into each system and its effects upon the police and the citizenry. Intimate observers of the police will be employed once again to share their opinions concerning the grievance structures and how the police are held accountable for their actions.

> There is a hopeless feeling in the County. They (the complainants) come in here and I tell them to go see Commissioner X or Y. About all you can do is to get publicity. You can't get or do much else unless you go with a civil suit which is almost

impossible to win (the 'Haircut Eight' don't have a chance of winning). If the complaint were against the C.C.P.D. I'd send them over to the Grievance Officer. It is much less threatening for the complainant to go there than to go to the Sheriff. In part this is because the Sheriff has a reputation for being a mean, vindictive bastard who is not at all above retaliation. The C.C.P.D. doesn't seem to have a reputation for retaliation.

I think that the C.C. police are much more concerned with their sense of vulnerability than are the Sheriff's men. Concerning supposed infractions, the C.C. men figure they have to watch their conduct. Although there are the same kinds of problems now with the Grievance Officer that there were before him, I feel much more confident sending complainants to him than I did (sending them) to the old Human Relations Council. Nothing ever seemed to come out of that.[I]

There is little or no effort to go through the procedures of going to the Board or the Sheriff (with complaints). A few will go to the County Prosecutor. The main reasons would be not knowing about what channels are available and also a real fear of retribution--a feeling that if they complain they risk two or three more criminal charges tacked on to them (e.g., a number of cases where the prisoner has said that after being beaten they were told that if they did anything they would have criminal charges filed against them).

In the Summer and into the Fall of 1969, I would say that we had some 10 trials--mostly young white long haired kids where 80% felt and said that they had been physically abused to the point of wanting to file a suit. Nineteen sixty-nine was the worst. Nineteen seventy wasn't so bad by comparison . . . . The Prosecutor's office will sometimes offer to dismiss the case if there is a question that the defendant may sue. They do this in exchange for a guarantee that there'll be no suit.[II]

There was a certain hesitancy or fear about complaining about the police. Perhaps this is a hangover from their sense of southern justice (retaliatory effect) and perhaps they realize that (the Sheriff) is far better than the deputies under the former Sheriff when there used to be real beatings.[III]

Whereas a fourth observer felt that:

The lack of actual complaints is the reason why no mechanisms have been set up. There is an administrative review method and Board, internally, within the Sheriff Department which handles complaints . . . . The black community uses a different route than the others, they use a letter to the proper authorities. Blacks tend to demand hearings. They come in groups and disturb meetings to be heard. They use the mass media and what

they call leaders. The lower class whites don't group up like the blacks do but are very abusive and violence prone.[IV]

I asked a fifth observer about the Grievance Officer in Central City. His reply was that:

The police see it as being (the Mayor's) baby whereas the Board of Commissioners never felt that they had enough problems or complaints to set one up which would cost in the area of $15,000. When asked, the Sheriff doesn't usually explain such things. He calls on the Undersheriff to do the explaining of complaints. He actually runs the department as the administrator.[V]

If an individual Board member (or anyone else) gets a complaint, either an official complaint or if someone wants something investigated, it goes to the full Board and is then referred to the Law Enforcement Committee. It can be turned over to the Prosecutor for investigation if there is a criminal charge involved. Then a report is compiled and it goes back to the full Board. If nothing comes out of it, it is turned over to the Sheriff for his appropriate action.

There have been a few complaints but they have never gotten very far. The Board really has no power although the Prosecutor can press charges. No suits against the Sheriff have been won that I'm aware of although the County did settle one out of court.[VI]

All grievances end up with the Sheriff or one of his line command. That is, if the complainant goes to the Board, Prosecutor or state official, etc., it is filtered down to him and he has a procedure to follow. We do not keep systematic records of grievances filed. You would have to go through the men's individual folders or look into the intra-departmental file to find the cases. Both of these contain confidential information not available to outsiders.

This informant said:

I guess that last year they might have had a total of four although even that might have been too many complaints which were in writing. On occasion someone in the chain of command would get telephone calls or verbal messages with a complaint and the Sheriff or Undersheriff would tell them that they could do nothing until the person came in and made a written documentation of what occurred.[VII]

Whenever someone calls in or comes in with a complaint against an officer, I offer to bring in the officer involved and the complainant can talk with the officer directly. I don't think that one in 50 goes any farther with their complaint.

> Or (says this insider) I sometimes offer to have the complainant see the Prosecutor to have a formal warrant for arrest drawn up (e.g., assault and battery). If a good case were made I most definitely would investigate it and certainly wouldn't be above suspending officers for a few days.[VIII]

A third insider who said that anyone could come in and make a complaint put the matter quite succinctly when he said: "Most don't think they can get a fair shake, especially if they have long hair. Why complain to one pig about another one."[IX]

Human Relations Council-Grievance Officer

These two structures, developed by public officials in the City, were neutralized and their goals vis a vis the police subverted by the political activity of the police. The story of the Grievance Officer is told in detail to show how the imposed structure and the process he attempted to implant was effectively stalemated. With regard to complaint mechanisms, the City is considerably more complex because three different methods have been tried in the past two years. We have already seen the three-man investigating team in action during the BAM affair. This format grew out of the old Human Relations Commission and has been superseded, at least for the moment, by the Grievance Officer. I will briefly look at the Human Relations Commission's interaction with the Police Department and then move on to the newly devised Grievance Officer.[3]

> The Human Relations Commission--twelve years old this year (1969)--has had a rather stormy history full of paradoxes. One wit, a former employee, has likened it to serving as a U.N. observer on the Arab-Israeli border with all its attendant comforts.
>
> Militant blacks are currently attacking the Commission for not doing enough, while critics are complaining that it is doing too much.

> The HRC is credited with reducing tensions between blacks and whites in some areas, but its detractors maintain its actions and methods have increased tensions in other areas where none formerly existed.
>
> Black supporters of HRC praise the Commission for its efforts to increase black employment in the city, but add that as soon as the "white establishment" bows to their demands and appoints a Negro to a responsible position, chances are he will be denounced as a "nigger" or an "Uncle Tom." The HRC perhaps reached its nadir last Tuesday when one of its black commissioners called a black staff member an "establishment nigger."[4]
>
> The Commission's job is not the kind that is likely to make lots of friends. In its first dozen years, HRC at one time or another has come into conflict with the city police, the Sheriff's Department, the public schools, City Hall, the county, the University, realtors and landlords and business firms.
>
> . . . The powers of the HRC were limited to educational activities, investigation of complaints, hearings and conciliatory efforts. It was stated (in 1957) that any person may file a complaint of discrimination with the HRC which would then investigate and 'attempt elimination of discriminatory practices through conciliation,' (the only 'powers' available).
>
> . . . On another occasion, HRC charged that one of (the Sheriff's) deputies was unnecessarily brutal to a prisoner. But the most publicized incident involved an HRC staff member, (X), who claimed that while he was investigating discrimination at a local bar, a city police officer struck him in the face and charged him with being a disorderly person (May 10, 1969). The patrolman resigned and was then hired by (the Sheriff).[5]

This incident probably more than anything else led to the demise of the old HRC and its replacement. In essence, two agencies of the City, the police and HRC, were feuding over which department's employee had acted the more improperly, but this was only the tip of the twelve year old iceberg. The crux of the battle was over jurisdiction to investigate complaints against the police. The HRC claimed the jurisdication from its original mandate in 1957 but the police denied it in fact by closing off access to information they possessed. The Mayor, on November 24, 1969, in a statement to the Council and HRC members succinctly summarized the problem. "Friction between Police and HRC has been so

intense that it is undesirable to give HRC staff the task of investigating and resolving complaints of discriminatory conduct by police." His solution was a recommendation that he had made to the "Ad Hoc Committee or Police-Community Relations" (formed in June 1969, see Chapter 4) that:

> A new agency should be created for handling all kinds of citizen complaints against the city including this category of them (discriminatory conduct by police). Citizen complaints against city government should not be handled by the (soon to be formed) Department of Human Rights.

On September 23, 1969 the Ad Hoc Committee came out with its preliminary report which stated that:

> One of the most vexing problems which the committee must face is the situation created when a citizen believes he has been mistreated, or denied his rights, or refused the help he requested and was entitled to receive. It is clear to us that the Police Department, like any other arm of city government is an instrument set up to serve the needs of the citizens. Its actions, therefore, are not above review, criticism and redress. It is also clear to us that a mechanism for review and redress which has the confidence . . . (of) those citizens who have occasion to resort to the process and those groups who are concerned about the process . . . is essential to the development of good relations between the police and the community.
>
> It is also clear to us that significant groups within our city lack confidence in the system for redressing grievances that presently exist. While we are clear that the problem exists, we are anything but clear as to what is the best solution . . . although we do not have a solution to propose at this time, we continue to work on this problem and expect to report on it at a later date.[6]

The second report came in early 1970 and was a recommendation to the Mayor for a civilian review board. The Mayor, meeting with the Chief and the City Administrator, changed this civilian review board committee to a one-man grievance officer. Originally, the Democrats wanted a three year contractual arrangement with a local attorney but

to get the Republican support necessary to commit funds (eight votes are necessary and by then the April, 1970 elections had reduced the Democratic majority from 8-3 to 6-5), they had to accept a Republican compromise to make the contract good only through the next elections--April 30, 1971.

> The reasons for this were obvious; they could kill it if they won a majority in 1971. We went along with this emasculation because we felt that if it didn't have sufficient public support by then to be politically viable, the thing should probably die anyway.[X]

On June 2, 1970, the Grievance Officer began operations for and in Central City. His task was to investigate all cases assigned to him and all those who initiated complaints either to him directly or by referrals concerning any public agency of the City. On April 19, 1971 he filed a report with City Council which covered the nine months from his office's inception through February, 1971.[XI] Of the 123 complaints handled, 56% were filed against the Police Department. I'll first speak of the relationship between the Grievance Officer (hereinafter G.O.) and the police and then briefly look at the 69 cases he handled up to the end of February, 1971.

The incumbent G.O. was hired by the City after the joint recommendation to the Council of the Mayor, Administrator and City Attorney who went "strictly on reputation."[XII] The general framework for the position was imposed by the terms of the contract. In the first few weeks on the job he had to hammer out with the administration and department heads a formal procedure (i.e., filing of a written notice, 10 day limit to respond, submission of a preliminary report, 10 days response time before submission of public report to Council). In the process of setting up this policy the police acted no differently than any other

department. However, only the police have shifted back and forth in their willingness to accept and work with the program. From a police perspective, the shift from a recommended Board to a one man G.O. was seen by the Command as a step in the right direction. The C.C.P.O.A. saw either system as being a product of the "liberal" Mayor and undesirable. An informed guess is that the lone negative Councilman's vote came as a result of conversations with the police and their opposition to it.[XIII]

To offset criticism that he couldn't adequately handle the job because the G.O. "couldn't know what a cop's life was actually like," the G.O. accepted the idea that, at the very least, he should spend a few weekends riding in patrol cars. The offer was turned down by the top command ostensibly for being too dangerous and involving problems with insurance in case of injury. (It has, however, been done.) The only other problem encountered in these initial talks with the police was the added grief the G.O. would cause them in keeping additional records of complaints generated via the G.O. as opposed to the ones they received themselves.[XV]

The G.O. worked through the Deputy Chief, initially, as his contact with the Department. All responses to his formal process of written notices were compiled by the Deputy Chief from reports written and reviewed up the line. Says a police insider:

> The G.O. only talked with three officers during this early period. Twice while the G.O. was discussing the Deputy Chief's response in the latter's office, the Deputy Chief called the officers in to answer a few questions pertaining to factual matters. The third time a formal interview was set up with the G.O. and a policeman who took along the C.C.P.O.A. attorney.[XIV]

Shortly after the first few final reports were published in the C.C. News, the C.C.P.O.A. met and passed a resolution stating that none of the members would talk with the G.O. concerning complaints enumerated in filed notices.[XVII]

Thus, began a long ordeal for the G.O. which has yet to be resolved. Beginning on September 29, written notices requesting interviews with officers involved in the specific incidents received no response from the Police Department at all. In November after continued talks with the Chief and Deputy Chief achieved nothing, the G.O., through the City Administrator, held a meeting with all the relevant police officials. The police union leaders and the Teamster's business representative made impassioned pleas to get the G.O. burden off their backs. They said that the procedure didn't provide adequate protection for the officers involved. All requests for interviews on complaints were seen by them as the instigation of criminal prosecution and as nullifying the rights of officers against self-incrimination.

The union heads agreed that the G.O. had been responsible for greatly demoralizing the department and for the great increase in crime in Central City due to a curtailment of "discretion," (seen as the all important "hunches" which lead to police initiated citizen contacts). "Once in a while mistakes in these hunches will be made and we shouldn't get hanged for it," said a union official. The Chief was supportive of all this and said that most of the complaints were "nickel and dime" stuff. "There was no doubt in their minds, though, that the G.O. was a separate prosecuting office set up with criminal type sanctions ready to move against them."[XVIII]

To this the G.O. responded by saying that on the one occasion when he had been able to talk with an officer, many points of fact and much of the problem had been cleared up. The upshot of the meeting, with the City Administrator in attendance, was that the Chief reluctantly agreed to issue an order requiring officers to talk with the G.O. when requested.[XIX] At this point the idea was passed around that the G.O. was the cause of conflict between the two unions. It seemed that the command was afraid that they weren't getting the full and true stories from the troops in the field. If too much pressure was applied from the G.O., the story went, the command would lose control of the men.[XX] The G.O. continued to pursue every possible lead to get access to the men including talking with City Council, a local group from the National Council of Christians and Jews (with some officers on it for a special project), the Vice-President of the C.C.P.O.A. and repeated talks with the Chief and Deputy Chief. All to no avail, access was not to be had.

> From the first of February and to this point in time the G.O. said 'to hell with it.' Rather than come out with reports on individual events, he would compile a consolidated report which attempted to analyze the kinds of problems that were illustrated in the individual fact situations. He hoped to get at the scope and kinds of problems being encountered and to get around the roadblock which had been instituted in the individual cases.[XXI]

> At least partially as a result of this impediment, the G.O. moved to an informal process as well. In only selective cases would he send over formal written notices. When a complaint came in he would call the Deputy Chief and ask him to set up a conference with the D.C. (or a command officer), the complainant and the officer(s) in question. The idea was to get information from the complainant to the department and back to the complainant as rapidly as possible. The formal procedure, with its minimum of a two week delay (where it works), was reserved for cases when there was just no resolution possible . . . . Sometimes the officer(s) involved would be there.[XXII]

At the present time the informal process, whereby the complainant can see and talk with a superior officer and on occasion see the officer involved, is working. Yet the formal process which had initially been agreed to (by the Administration and all department heads) and which continues for the more serious cases has been "effectively and completely blocked" in the sense that the G.O. cannot get information of any sort out of the police department nor can he talk with the officer(s) involved.[XXIII]

The C.C. News of April 20, 1971 under the heading: "Police--People Idea Stressed, Complaint Officer Files Findings"[8] reported that:

> The comprehensive, 48 page document covers complaints ranging from the attitude of officers in contact with citizens to charges of illegal search . . . . (The G.O.) said that policemen, compared to other City employees, are much more sensitive to criticism. 'Police officers are more likely to regard a complaint as a threat or as an accusation to be denied, while employees in other departments are more likely to regard a complaint as a mistake to be corrected or a misunderstanding to be explained.'
>
> . . . A number of complaints received by (the G.O.) related to charges that police stopped persons for a minor (auto) violation to make a search or 'harass' the complainant. He said these types of complaints are difficult to prove or disprove, but he noted these complaints become more evident as the community places more pressure on the police to increase law enforcement measures.

The G.O. received limited funds for the continuation of his office through the fiscal year (ending June 30, 1971). At that time the Republicans added the stipulation that he could only continue to work on cases pending and not collect any new ones. The Administrator's budget for the next fiscal year contains some $10,000 to continue the function and the G.O.'s hope is that additional funds can be raised from some other source to make up a sufficient sum to carry on a "feasible operation."[XXIV]

> It's up to the City Administrator to try to convince the Republicans. He has been supportive all along of the position and has said privately that it has been a great time saver for him and taken a lot of work off his back. However, he didn't feel that he should intrude that sort of talk into last Monday night's Council meeting (when funds were voted to continue the office through June) because the position was being used as a political football. I think that the Republican position is one of 'show us that something has been done which is of great and earth shaking significance and we'll be willing to change our minds.' They have said all along that the position is a luxury which the City cannot afford.[XXV]

A political figure in the City had this to say about the G.O. and the Republicans:

> It was very interesting that after they voted to restrict the G.O. to the cases he currently had, every Councilman to a man, including X who had originally voted against the office, voted to refer the Y issue[7] to the G.O. . . . . There has to be more to their opposition than just the issue of money. I suspect that they think he just isn't getting them out of hot water in the sense that they are on the hot seat with the emotions involved in the facts of specific cases. (The G.O.) is doing general systematic types of problems without resolving facts. He does not see the office as an attempt to reestablish the historical facts. He is more interested in the patterns (and) not in individual fact finding of the incidents. This is a necessary and welcome activity (but) it decidedly does not get the elected officials off the hook as it is no defense against raised tensions.[XXVI] (Author's Note: What is occurring here is that the politicians, some of whom established the office at least partially for their own purposes to get angry and upset citizens off their backs, are not getting that function performed for them.)

This informant was also a bit upset with what he saw as a deficiency in the report and he used the example of the car stops. The Police Department thinks that most of the car stops and searches are probably unconstitutional but to say so is not politically feasible. Therefore, they continue the subterfuge of stopping cars driven by youths, "long hairs, blacks, etc." for phony or unrealistic reasons like faulty equipment. He felt that the G.O. should surface this sort of thing so that there could be some honesty involved.

A "police insider" interviewed the day after the G.O.'s report was made public said that:

> Many of the officers see external pressures as political interference and are avidly opposed to such things . . . . The G.O. isn't anything new really, just a different manner for the processing of grievances. We have always gotten complaints and still do. We originally had an internal investigating team in the Community Relations Division when it was set up in 1966. Then it was taken out of there. Then came the three-man Administrative Board and on to the G.O. I think that the report was overly critical but the areas chosen for discussion are largely those which I feel need to be attended to.[XXVII]

A second insider, an Association member, said of the G.O.'s function:

> It could be handled just as easily by the City Administration. It would be ideal for us to do it ourselves but the community, mainly a vocal few, probably wouldn't accept that. Community support is coming because we're becoming more visible. We're trying to show them that we're out there doing a professional and human job. We make mistakes and we want them not to hang us for them. We're now beginning to get our feet on the ground and we're finding support in the community we didn't know existed. I think you'll see even more press releases in the future.[XXVIII]

A third officer in a command position offered the fact that the Association had no problems with the G.O. as they had voted to ignore him. He thought that the few command officers he had talked with about the G.O.'s report didn't agree with his criticisms but didn't seem very upset by it. He then went off on a tangent and said that:

> The police are being used as a political football. Take for example (Republican Mayoral Candidate X) and his attack on his anti-police opponent . . . . (The police are benefiting from this political game) by gaining more material things but they are being politicized. They are developing into a self-serving interest group . . . and developing an empire. They are more interested in gaining and developing an empire than in doing police work . . . . The pay and future of the police are in politician's hands so we are into politics (in the same way as) the Police Chief (which is) . . . a very political position.[XXIX]

The G.O. was asked at the City Council meeting (4/19/71) to summarize the overall impact that the program is having on the community. He said that:

> The institution has established rapport. He said that with the police it may be getting somewhat better (this was very revealing as it was the only public agency so referred to) as he had managed to come along way in his ability to work with them. With blacks, he could only answer in terms of the number who had come to him with their complaints. On the campus scene, (the G.O.) said that most every incident that you(the Council) have heard about has been turned over to him.[XXX]

On April 19, 1971, the G.O. submitted a report entitled "Citizens and the Police" to City Council in which he summarized his findings on the 69 cases brought to his attention in the nine month period from June, 1970 to February, 1971. As the information contained in this report is not directly germane to this account of how the aims of the office were subverted by the police, it is summarized in Appendix I.2[XXXI] In addition, information is included in the Appendix comparing this nine month period with complaints filed with the HRC for the five previous years. Information on those who complained directly to the police and utilized their internal grievance procedure was unobtainable.[XXXII]

The Sheriff's Tri-County Intelligence Squad

The following is a reconstruction of the most important events in a struggle between two elected officials, the Mayor of Central City and the Sheriff of Mideast County, over how the war against drug abuse was to be waged. As one observer put it: "The biggest thing so far this year (politically in 1971) has been the regional vs. the tri-county intelligence drug squad. Each side has publicly let it be known that the other's plan is either silly, not practical, or worse."[XXXIII]

This elongated episode represents an excellent example of the resources which the police can and are willing to mobilize to offset the development of an undesired structure of accountability. In this case, the battle was over how the squad was to be constituted and to whom it would be accountable. The story has two streams which rapidly converge. I shall begin with the Mayor's plan.

In the Fall of 1970 the Mayor asked the Chairman and members of the executive committee of the "Citizens Blue Ribbon Committee on Problems of Drug Abuse"[9] if their committee would be reporting anything that specifically pertained to the police and the drug problem. He was told that practically nothing would be recommended.[XXXIV] The over-riding concern of the Mayor was the drying up of the drug traffic and how to attack those fairly high up in the local (southeastern section of the state) distribution system. He soon hit upon the idea of using the State Police to lead a task force and of bolstering their manpower (in a time of tight money) through the loan of men to them by local police departments. This fairly simple concept, the utilization of manpower accountable to himself and other locally elected civilian officials, rapidly developed into a highly complex, political battle.

The Mayor's plan was to use the State's L.E.A.A. (seven county) Region One[10] as a base of operations. To implement the plan he went first to the local Council of Governments' six county organization (a federally funded program for voluntary cooperation by differing governmental units to jointly plan the area's future) and explored the idea. He was referred to the Region One Director and the game was on.[11] He was told there that the plan wouldn't work but got no satisfaction as to why it wouldn't or to practical questions he raised.

Enter the other stream. Shortly thereafter, X (on loan to Mideast County from C.O.G. and an auxiliary Sheriff's deputy) came to the Mayor with a proposal he had written for the Sheriff which proposed a single county intelligence squad to pursue the drug and related problems at their sources. This proposal called for funds to purchase intelligence equipment and to provide manpower for the Sheriff Department with all other law enforcement units in the County also loaning men to that Department. It had a familiar ring to it. The upshot of the meeting was that there was no agreement to go ahead with this proposal.[XXV]

On December 21, 1970 the Mayor addressed City Council regarding "C.O.G. organizing a regional police task force under the direction of the State Police to detect and arrest individuals engaged in illegal smuggling or distribution of hard drugs and individuals engaged in criminal activity as part of an organized group."[12] The Council unanimously approved the Mayor's plea and authorized him to proceed with negotiations at the C.O.G. level on behalf of the City.[XXXVI] The Mayor then called the C.O.G. Director to appraise him of X's visit and the Council endorsement. He was told that the Sheriff's proposal would probably go through as it had the backing of the law enforcement personnel in L.E.A.A.'s Region One Council.

Sometime after the Council meeting, the Sheriff, feeling he owed the Mayor the courtesy of talking to him personally, set up a meeting with the Mayor to discuss the County-wide intelligence squad.[XXXVII] The Sheriff stated at this meeting that he had everyone's approval in the County for the plan except the Central City's Chief who had told him that it had to be approved "upstairs." The Sheriff then asked the Mayor for his approval. The Mayor replied that many people the Sheriff

said had approved his plan told him when he (the Mayor) contacted them that they had not done so or had never heard of it. Furthermore, the squad should be under the State Police. The Mayor was finally asked again, after he had asked a "bunch of questions which twisted everything around . . . (whether) he was going to include or exclude (Central City). He said he would exclude."[XXXVIII] The Sheriff, Undersheriff and X then "stalked out but had to come back after their grand exit because they had forgotten their overcoats."[XXXIX]

Sometime after this and before January 5, 1971, the proposal was rewritten to include three counties with the old one-county plan suspended. On January 6, 1971, the University Newspaper under a banner headline reading: "Sheriff to Seek Funds for Campus Surveillance" broke the story. Excerpts from the article include:

> (The Sheriff) has announced his intention of seeking federal funds for the purpose of creating an 'Intelligence Squad" which will engage in the political surveillance of students at the University among other activities. But (Z), Director of Business Operations at the University said last night that, '(the Sheriff) has not contacted anybody in an official position at the University as to the appropriations of the grant request.' And (the Mayor) has refused to allow (Central City) police to participate in what he calls the Sheriff's idea of a squad engaged in 'political surveillance on campus.'
>
> (The Sheriff) retorted to the (Mayor's) statement with the accusation that, 'in the short time of two years (the Mayor) has gagged his police chief, he has demoralized his police department, he has hampered law enforcement and he has contributed to explosive situations by making political decisions on police matters.'
>
> In the meantime (the Mayor) said that he had every intention of pursuing the course of action proposed by him to City Council, a region-wide anti-hard drugs squad using borrowed personnel from police departments in the Southeast State Area.
>
> The (Sheriff's) proposal states that, 'We have experienced several civil disorders in the past three years. Riots, sit-ins and demonstrations are becoming common place. We have not had an intelligence unit in this department for intelligence information.'

> 'With campus disorders, civil disorders and union strikes an intelligence unit is desperately needed in this community,' it concludes. A reliable source at City Hall says that part of the money requested will be used for the purchase of electronic wire tapping and bugging devices.

The next day, January 7, the University Newspaper under larger headlines, "(Sheriff) Admits to Undercover Men Spying at 'U'," said:

> (The Sheriff) claims he presently employs undercover agents for surveillance of students at (both Universities) . . . . (The Sheriff) told a (Metropolitan Newspaper) of the existence of undercover agents on the two campuses yesterday afternoon. 'We will continue as we have always had, with undercover men on both university campuses' . . . . (The Sheriff) said yesterday he will probably infiltrate agents into militant student groups such as Students for Democratic Society, if a grant proposal for federal funds . . . is approved.
>
> Although a highly reliable source in City Hall said that the Sheriff wants the money to buy electronic wire tapping and bugging devices, the (Metropolitan Newspaper) quotes the Sheriff as saying, 'We don't have to buy it, we already have it.' The Newspaper says the Sheriff wants the money to be spent instead on other equipment, such as radios and cars.
>
> University President (X) said last night he was not aware that the Sheriff was operating on campus. 'He's never approached me about it or anyone else to my knowledge,' he said, but added that he would investigate the situation.

January 9 University Newspaper carried an article with the headline, "(President) blasts (Sheriff's) Plan for Spying Unit." In a statement the President said that he 'would write to the people concerned with funding (the Sheriff's) proposal to advise them of the University's opposition.'

Reacting to (the President's) statement, (the Sheriff) said last night, 'I don't care if we get the grant or not, if I want to operate on that campus I'll go ahead and do so.'"[13]

In the meantime the City personnel were busy. The L.E.A.A. Region One Director was called to see what could be done.

> He counseled not fighting the tri-county squad because he felt the Regional Council (made up of law enforcement people) wanted to move in that direction of sub-regionalization and it would go through. The State Police were called and they guardedly said they would be interested in heading up the Mayor's plan but rather than do it at the regional (seven county) level, 'can't we do it like it is currently being done in (X) county and then informally tie in across county lines.'

In (X) County it is set up to look like the police chiefs, etc., are running the operation but in reality the State Police are the power behind and run it.[XL] Also contacted at this time were the Prosecutor of (X) county, the Sheriff of (Y) county and a UAW official.

The Mayor then presented his plan to the C.O.G. executive committee (of which he's a member). In lieu of the State Police and Sheriff of Y County discussions, he changed his plan into seven county squads all under State Police control which could go anywhere in the Region. The plan received unanimous approval. The Governor's office was then contacted to create support for this proposal. His office turned it over to the Lieutenant Governor, a former FBI agent and Assistant County Prosecutor, who is:

> "in thick with the various state level, county law enforcement organizations (prosecutors and sheriffs) and as they are backing the very much more localized proposal of 'our" Sheriff, no support was forthcoming from the Governor's office. Also contacted were the State Police, State Attorney General's office, State L.E.A.A. Director and Mayor of the State's largest city.[XLI]

Back to the public scene. On January 27, 1971 under the headlines, "Sheriff Asks $92,000 for Intelligence Squad," the University Newspaper carried an article which stated: "(The Sheriff) intends that $36,785 of the money be spent on surveillance equipment." The article goes on to list the specific equipment to be purchased, the price, and the

manufacturer. The proposal was to be discussed and voted on at the County L.E.A.A. Executive Committee meeting that day.

> The Executive Committee will make a recommendation on the proposal to the full meeting of the (County L.C.A.A.) board next week and the board will then recommend acceptance or rejection of the request to the County Board of Commissioners, which is being asked for $23,015 toward the cost of the proposed plan.
>
> The board will also forward recommendations to both Region One (of L.E.A.A.) and (C.O.G.). Applications for $64,046 of Federal Safe Streets Act money for which the Sheriff is applying must be cleared by all these bodies, prior to the acceptance of the proposal.

January 28 C.C. News summed up that meeting with the headlines: "County Panel Favors Sheriff's Probe Plan if Control Modified." According to the article the changes, "would give it a broader base of control and make it 'less antagonistic' to the college community." This would be done by creating a Board of Governors to decentralize control of the squad from the Undersheriff to a Board of law enforcement officers from throughout the three county, target area. A second change was for the squad to deal only in "criminal activities" and to "eliminate any mention (in the list of goals) of surveillance of university campuses." However, there was no mention of eliminating the requested $36,000 worth of "equipment."

A week later at the full county board meeting, the Sheriff's proposal was tabled for at least a month. An article in the C.C. News of February 4, 1971 said:

> The tabling action came at the start of what promised to be a lengthy discussion and after (Central City's Mayor) asked for a delay until certain law enforcement groups and individuals have had a chance to respond in writing to (the Sheriff's) proposal.[XLII]

(The Mayor) also asked that if action is taken to approve the plan, the intelligence squad be included in a proposal he has submitted to (C.O.G.). He said that with four changes the intelligence squad could become a major element of the task force (C.O.G.) is considering.

Later, Region One (seven county) Council met and the C.O.G. Director was told that there was no place on the overfilled agenda for the Mayor's proposal (which C.O.G. had passed unanimously). They found room, however, for it but did not invite either the C.O.G. Director or the Mayor. It was referred to a six man subcommittee (all law enforcement officers) which promptly reported out that the plan wasn't feasible and recommended that the Regional Council turn it down. They did, and tossed in a recommendation that the C.C.P.D. cooperate with the Sheriff's proposal.

The Sheriff also took his case to the public. The C.C. News carried an article under the heading: "Big Quantity of Marijuana Seized." The concluding paragraph quoted the Sheriff as saying:

> The arrests and the drugs seized point up the potential which exists for an all-area squad. These kinds of drugs are pouring into (C.C.) and the only way they can be stopped is to organize the type of squad I've been advocating.

To summarize: The Mayor's proposal was passed by the Central City Council and in a modified form agreed to in principle by the area Council of Governments (C.O.G.). The C.O.G. Director was then effectively neutralized by the pressure threats of adverse publicity from the law enforcement establishment, publicity a precariously balanced C.O.G. couldn't take to stay afloat. The proposal was then killed by L.E.A.A. Region One Countil which had to approve it to keep it moving along. The Sheriff's proposal has been tabled in a modified form in the Mideast

County's L.E.A.A. Committee. If it does get out of there, ready acceptance for it is probably waiting at the Region One L.E.A.A. level. However, it still has to be passed by the Mideast County Board of Commissioners who must lay out $23,000 for the local contribution and be approved by both C.O.G. (advisory only) and the State L.E.A.A. Committee. An informant says:

> When the proposal gets to the Law Enforcement Committee (of the Board of Commissioners) there will be no real problem because of the largely pro-Sheriff nature of the members. When it gets to the full Board there should be some fun because on the one hand they don't have the necessary $23,000 in funds and there are a number of Commissioners who dislike the particulars of his plan. On the other hand, there is a strong feeling that the proposal will be killed by the State L.E.A.A. and so the Board might do the political thing and pass it here hoping for it to be killed at the State level . . . .
>
> Even if the Sheriff loses, it is good politics. He can go to his constituents and say he tried to crack down on hard drugs and crime and lost to the politicians. He very much wanted the whole grant to go through under cover, to ship it through with very little if any publicity. He refused at first to make any of it public.[XLVII]

Another close observer stated that:

> The Sheriff's proposal is dead. At the State level there are enough votes to kill it. There are three reasons for this: 1) the economics of it as the money goes only to the Sheriff Department, 2) many people have little respect for the Sheriff's abilities, and 3) the Sheriff blew the thing by publicly stating he was going after federal L.E.A.A. money for surveillance equipment and then detailing what he wanted. In fact, although they deny that money is available for this sort of hardware, it is only done secretly or quietly. This may be the major reason. The public controversy already stirred up (over the intelligence function, the equipment and the target) may have killed it.[XLIV]

A close observer in the Sheriff Department was asked why the Mayor developed the supposed counter-proposal. He said that:

> He thought it all began back with the first incident at South University . . . . After that incident, the Mayor got very upset by what had occurred and opened up a number of investigations and even called in the FBI to check out the charges

against the Sheriff's Department. As a result of that incident (the word got out) that the Sheriff should definitely not be called into the City for such things. This upset the Sheriff who said that Central City was in his area. When the L.S. & A. (University building) sit-in occurred, the Sheriff told the Mayor that he (the Sheriff) had control over the C.C. Police Department if he wanted to assume it and that no one in Central City could or would keep him out of the City if there were problems there, especially if the State Police was going to be involved . . . . I think he did it because he has a personal vendetta or hard feelings against the Sheriff. (This was) the only reason and had nothing to do with the actual contents of the proposal.[XLV]

Another informed insider stated that:

(The Mayor) wants a substantial voice in any relations the City gets into. Also, he wants to undercut the Sheriff whom he has lost to twice and doesn't want to do again. The Mayor is using anti-(Sheriff) sentiment on the campus to his own ends. (He) wants to control the campus or at least to keep (the Sheriff) off. His actions are purely political . . . . (The Mayor) is misguided--naive as far as police work is concerned. He just doesn't understand how the police work.[XLVI]

The Making of a Law--Central City's Marijuana Ordinance

The following event represents another example of police political activity to prevent both the development of an accountability structure and the public authorities from attempting to set internal police policy. Reducing marijuana possession or use from a felony to a misdemeanor is of major importance to the police because it changes the output criteria and gravely affects the method of operation (i.e., the rules of evidence, search, seizure, and arrest). The episode begins with a brief background which leads into the Council's deliberations.

The Blue Ribbon Committee on Drug Abuse state in their report released in December of 1970:

The rapid growth of the drug abuse problem within the Community has tended to outrun the capacity of law enforcement agencies in the community to deal effectively with the problem. Therefore, the committee sees the necessity of establishing priorities

> with respect to the kinds of law enforcement that can be engaged in. 1) The Committee recommends that law enforcement agencies concentrate on control over drug traffic in the community, with emphasis on so-called 'hard' drugs, e.g., heroin. 2) Particular emphasis should be placed on those who supply and distribute hard drugs. 3) Less emphasis should be placed on control over drug users, particularly on 'soft' drugs, e.g., marijuana. Marijuana, among the widely used drugs, raises a special problem in law enforcement . . . . Its continued status as an illegal, dangerous drug only creates disrespect for our legal system . . . . The Committee therefore recommends that the community support efforts within (the State) to change the state law . . . . However, until changes are made in the State laws, we recommend a temporary expedient measure within (Central City) to deal with the marijuana problem. Several communities within (the) Southeastern (part of the State) have already adopted an ordinance making the use and possession of marijuana a misdemeanor. We recommend that the (Central City) Council adopt such an ordinance.[14]

January 18, the proposed marijuana ordinance, the result of one of the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, was to have been taken up by City Council for a first reading. However, "some members expressed reluctance to act on it without first having lengthy discussions during working session on January 25 (a monthly open meeting to discuss complex issues without voting). Law enforcement officials and judges have been asked to attend . . . to give their views on the ordinance."[15]

The working session of the Council began and quickly the battle lines were drawn. The Republicans in attendance (four or five) were openly pro-police and supportive of them. For example, the Chief was asked by one of them what impact the ordinance would have on local law enforcement. Another "asked" the Chief if other "hard" drugs were found with pot. A third asked if the representative from the Association could be heard from (the decision was no as working sessions are public but not open to audience responses). A fourth said that "passage of the ordinance may be interpreted by the citizenry that Council is condoning the use of marijuana." The Democrats with one exception were supporters

of the bill and asked questions concerning drug enforcement methods.[16]

The C.C. News for January 26, 1971 featured front page headlines: "City Council Appears Split on Marijuana Law Issue." Excerpts from the article are:

> Police officials spoke against passage of the ordinance, while Blue Ribbon Committee members reinforced their recommendation. (The Police Chief) said that because of the questions raised concerning the ordinance the Council ought to direct its attentions to the State Legislature and Federal Government 'to see if anything can be done to change the maximum penalties' for possession and use. 'The facts we placed before you place it (a decision on the ordinance) in your souls' . . . . Also, he said, 'you must keep in mind we're talking of an ordinance which may be overturned by the courts. I have my reservations whether the ordinance is legal on its face.'
>
> (The Chief) said 'generally' other drugs are found during marijuana arrests but Councilman X questioned if 26% (figure of 35 of 135 given earlier by the Chief) can be classified as general. Asked if the Chief knew of murders or manslaughter by persons under the influence of marijuana, (as it was said, is true with alcohol), he said, 'I really can't answer that question; I can't recall at this moment where it happened.

The Chief summed up the Department's view by saying, "I would say at this time that I would have strong reservations about endorsing an ordinance on marijuana."

January 28 C.C. News carried a lead editorial endorsing the marijuana ordinance. It said in part:

> There seems a possibility that the drug law question could become mired in politics, not only as an issue for the coming spring elections but even as a subject for debate on 'support of your police.' It doesn't belong in either arena, but given the confusion that surrounds the whole issue of drugs, it isn't surprising that such an impasse has occurred . . . . It should be evident that the change (in the law) is not in the interest of encouraging any drug use but to recognize a fault in the law.

January 31 C.C. News in discussing the vote upcoming the next day said that the Chief had:

> Voiced the strongest opposition to the ordinance but a meeting was held in City Hall Friday to determine if differences of opinion between (the Chief) and the City Attorney (on the issue of constitutionality) can be resolved. If they are, the ordinance stands a far better chance of passage tomorrow night.

The first vote reading, however, was put off until the following week as the Mayor, sensing the lack of a sixth vote due to an absence, pulled the item from the agenda.

On February 9 the vote came. As reported in the C.C. News:

> A lengthy, emotion-packed debate . . . came to a temporary halt last night as the City Council gave narrow support (6-5 with one from each party crossing over) for passage at first reading (there are two such votes). It will not be known for a month whether the ordinance will survive final action of the Council. Councilman Y, who cast the key 'yes' vote last night, says he is . . . reserving the right to change his vote depending on reports submitted by the City Administrator and the Police Chief on how the ordinance would be enforced locally.

The final vote came on March 9 and after further partisan political wrangling, the C.C. News front page headline tells the tale, "Marijuana Penalty Cut by City."

We have heard from the Chief with his public statements. What else were the police doing concerning the marijuana ordinance, during the period that it was being debated by Council?

The C.C. News on January 20, 1971 (five days before the Council's working session) carried this headline: "Three Arrested in Drug Raids, Firearms, Money Seized." Excerpts from the article are:

> (The Chief) called the daylight raids part of his department's 'continuing push' to drive narcotics traffic from the City. One of the three places hit by a combined force of C.C. police narcotics detectives and State Police was the headquarters for the Argus, an underground newspaper affiliated with the White Panther Party. Sergeant (X), who led the 15 raiders, said six loaded shotguns and rifles ("believed to have been stolen") as well as a 'variety' of what was believed to be narcotics were seized . . . (Also the Sgt.) 'identified the three persons arrested as White Panther members.' The raiders

> also seized more than $4,000 in cash which they said came from the illegal sale of narcotics.
>
> The Chief said (that) those warrants were obtained after months of surveillance and undercover investigation by his officers. 'We didn't move into this thing blind,' he said. 'We knew who we were looking for. And what we were looking for.' (The Chief) used the circumstances of the raid to support his belief that marijuana and hard drugs are usually found and used in conjunction with one another: 'The important thing in this is that people say marijuana is harmless; yet everytime we have a raid or arrest involving marijuana we find other drugs, mostly LSD and other types of illegal drugs. This has been the pattern right along,' said the Chief.[17]

The University newspaper reported on January 21 that the Police Chief had:

> promised, 'repeated drives' against illegal drugs in the community . . . . More warrants will be issued and there will be more raids. You could say the heat is on. The Chief also defended his department against reports from witnesses of police misconduct during Tuesday's raid. Among the charges leveled at the police by those present during the raids are: that the police, most of whom were in plain clothes, allegedly refused to identify themselves when asked by inhabitants of the houses during the raid, and did not inform them of their rights; that police refused to tell those arrested what materials were taken from both houses and took the financial records of the Argus. In addition, while the raid on the Argus house was ending, a C.C. uniformed policeman allegedly exposed the film of a (University newspaper) photographer without identifying himself. The photographer said he had not attempted to take any pictures.
>
> (The Mayor) said that if the charges were true, they would constitute 'a particularly delicate and serious situation. My understanding of the law is that without a warrant naming an individual you can search incident to the arrest only. I don't believe you could search a whole house.'
>
> The Mayor late last night began contacting several witnesses to the raid in an effort to investigate the incident. After a meeting yesterday morning with the Mayor in which the Chief was asked to check out the charges of misconduct, the Chief said there was nothing unusual about the raids . . . .
>
> Both (X and Y, two of the arrestees)had their hair cut by police before their release from (Mideast) County Jail. Both had had shoulder length hair when they entered police custody but left with their hair closely cropped . . . . In addition,

(X) said he was put in a cell with no sanitary facilities and without a blanket or bedding. X said there was 'an inch of filth' on the cement floor of the cell, which X said inmates called 'the hole.' He also said he was kicked by policemen during his stay.[18]

The University newspaper of January 22 stated that:

The C.C. Tribal Council (a coalition of youth groups which released this press release in conjunction with Drug Help, Inc., the White Panther Party, Ozone House, Inc., and Free People's Choice, Inc.) yesterday sharply criticized local law enforcement agencies for their involvement in drug raids on three (C.C.) houses.

Included in the statement was opposition to:
- unnecessary searches of a highly questionable nature, one of which illegally removed (C.C.) Argus business records, money and equipment.
- excessively high bail.
- illegal confiscation of (University newspaper) films of the arrests outside the Argus house and the subsequent ruin of the film.
- the illegal cutting of the hair of two males prior to release.
- the issuance of public statements by the police suggesting that arrest for hard drug charges had been made although no warrant contained such information.

Council members said that a substance confiscated by the police as suspected heroin was actually organic sea salt. Yesterday's statement charges that the raids severely threaten 'the relationships between our organizations and the youth community on one hand and the police and city administration on the other. The Tribal Council has been working with city authorities to fight the 'hard drug' problem in (C.C.). Tuesday's arrests were not for what the Council considers 'hard drugs,' although the Council charges that police language 'confuses the issue to divert attention from the heroin, amphetamine and barbituate problems.' Representatives of the Tribal Council are meeting with (the Mayor) this morning in an attempt to 'develop a rational approach to drug problems,' (Z of Drug Help) said. He added that, 'supporters of Drug Help have been very disturbed by (the Chief's) statement,' (confusing hard with soft drugs).'

The next day under the heading, "Drug Raid Awakens (C.C.)," the University newspaper reported:

Residents were jolted by more than just the charges and high bails levied against their peers--the incident (also) effectively immobilized a major community underground newspaper,

> the (C.C.) Argus. Now two days after the raid, the community appears to have recovered from its initial shock and has been applying pressure on the police and courts, calling attention to alleged police misconduct and excessive bails . . . .
>
> Some of the confiscated articles (including the Argus' financial records and an 'incomplete' list of other articles taken) were released on Thursday, after several ACLU members argued the youths' case to (the Mayor) and (the Police Chief) . . . . Some of the youths involved in the drug arrests credited the reduced bail to their criticism of the raids. Judge (X), however, said bail was reduced because, 'we had an opportunity to investigate the matter.' Many of the arrested youths also credit their strong criticisms of the drug arrests with curtailing further raids . . . .
>
> Though police repeatedly deny charges that the raids were related to a recently proposed amendment (pot ord) to city law . . . most of the youths see it as an attempt to discredit the proposal through a 'scare campaign.'

January 24 saw articles in both local newspapers. The C.C. News under a headline, "Chief Denies Charges About Narcotics Raid," said that a news conference had been held at the Argus headquarters. Spokesmen for the Argus said that:

> The police had rifled drawers, ransacked closets, ripped down posters and left belongings strewn around . . . . The members claim still missing is a file of negatives, a list of C.C. policemen, prescription drugs and credit cards. Police destroyed $75.00 worth of film and photographic paper when they turned on lights in a dark room. The Argus collective also charged that police turned the raid to coincide with the trial of three officers of the White Panther Party . . . . They did this to deplete funds for the trial or link the White Panthers with Argus staff even though none of the five persons arrested was a member of the White Panther party.
>
> The Chief said last night that, 'It was routine police work with no special favors or ulterior motives involved . . . . But I'll not try this case in the newspaper. If there is a constitutional question, it will be determined in a court trial and not through press conferences or in meetings held in City Council or anywhere else, (referring to a closed door conference held in the Mayor's office Thursday morning).'

The University Newspaper used the heading, "Argus Raid Labelled 'Political.'"

> Members of the collective said they believed that police were primarily interested in breaking up the group's political organization. They cited alleged statements by police that those arrested were members of the White Panther Party.

On January 25 the Sheriff was on the radio with an interview. He said in part:

> This is a prime example of why law enforcement people are opposed to any lowering of the penalties on drugs . . . . Politicians should stay out of the law enforcement business and leave it to the police to deal with this sort of thing.[19]

That evening was the working session of City Council. I overheard during a break the following discussion between the Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Drug Abuse Committee and the Chief and Deputy Chief.

Chairman asking the Chief, "Can't some of us establishment people along with some of the long hairs get together with you to patch up the problems created by the recent raids."

Chief, "I don't think that would be of any value."

Chairman, "I think there would be. There is a great need because of the tremendous loss of trust."

Chief, "Somebody has been receiving a snow job up to their ears."

Deputy Chief, "Our intelligence reports say otherwise." Then the Chief and Deputy Chief turned and walked out of the room ending the conversation.[20]

On January 26 the C.C.P.O.A. released a press statement carried in that evenings C.C. News supporting the Chief. It said in part:

> We do not believe that such action would be legal or in the best interests of society and the young people of our city . . . . Such an ordinance would not do any good anyway. It is unrealistic to attempt to isolate marijuana from the total drug scene, where it has played a leading role. The use of marijuana fosters experimentation with other drugs including, in many instances, so-called 'hard' drugs. It is a statistical fact that where any type of illegal drugs are possessed

> or used by a large segment of the population, an increase in other types of crime usually results. Thus, in (C.C.) breaking and enterings, armed robberies and larcenies have increased dramatically. An ordinance which reduces the penalty for possession or use of marijuana could only serve to encourage its use.[21]

The C.C. News in front page headlines stated on February 12 that, "(X), (Y) Deputies Stage Drug Raid in City." Excerpts from the article are:

> The Sheriff said that the (C.C.P.D.) was notified of the raid after the arrests were made . . . . The Sheriff said his department will continue to enforce state law on all narcotics cases. 'City ordinances can be passed, repealed or hung on the wall,' (the Sheriff said). 'They don't mean a thing to us. (The Mayor) and his council might as well know it: my department will continue to operate throughout (the) County and that includes (C.C.). When we do make narcotics raids here (in C.C.) and arrests are made they will be made under the existing state law. And I can assure him, raids will be made here.'
>
> The Sheriff's remarks were in reference to an ordinance now up for second reading action by (C.C.) Council which would make possession of marijuana a misdemeanor rather than a felony as it presently is under state law.[22]

On the same day, the University newspaper carried an article of which the last two paragraphs are quoted below.

> The raid was carried out without the knowledge of the (C.C.P.D.). (The City Administrator) said last night that the Sheriff had supplied 'no advance information at all to our people.'
>
> (The) City Police Chief said last night that he had not been informed of the raid by the Sheriff.

On March 10, the day after the second successful reading and thus passage of the marijuana ordinance, the University newspaper in a front page story said that the, "Effect of Marijuana Law Appears Doubtful." It said:

> County Prosecutor (Y) says he has 'no intention' of referring any marijuana cases to the City Attorney's office for prosecution and further adds he will continue to prosecute all

> defendants under the State law . . . . (He) denies any knowledge of an agreement cited by several city officials under which he would decide on a case by case basis . . . . (The Police Chief) says that at least for the present nothing will be changed concerning prosecution for marijuana possession in (C.C.). He says that the police will continue to refer all cases to the county prosecutor's office for prosecution under state law until such time as a new referral policy is reached by the City. (The City Attorney), author of the new ordinance, expresses dismay at the possibility of the law being obstructed by (the County Prosecutor) saying, 'to preclude prosecution under city law is an unacceptable approach' to marijuana law enforcement.

This parallel set of activities, Council action and police action, is what the public experienced. What are a few reactions to these events from knowledgeable persons who had access to behind the scenes activity? One observer said that although the police denied that the Argus raid was timed to occur just before the working session, he was very sceptical about the timing and the target.[XLVIII] Another informant took the opposite view when queried on the timing. His feeling was that the timing was not a political concern as work had been ongoing for months on this raid and seemed a logical progression from earlier raids elsewhere. Also, as the ordinance would take a few months to implement and took a few months to get where it was on January 20, any activity of the police might have been construed as being political.[XLIX]

The latter, however, gravely questioned the target and the nature of the raid which I'll take up in a minute. But first, it is interesting to note that <u>three</u> sources mentioned the failure of the police to notify the City Administrator that this raid was to take place. Standard policy at City Hall is that the Administrator or his Assistant are informed in advance of any raids, major busts, mobilizations, confrontations, etc. This was surely a raid of some significance

coming as it did upon the "only independent newspaper in Central City."[23] If, as the Chief said, months of preliminary work went into it and arrest warrants were obtained, there was sufficient timing for advance notice.[L]

I was informed that originally the Republican Councilmen had not been opposed to the ordinance and that very little had been said about it prior to the Argus Raid. They had heard the Blue Ribbon Committee's Report to Council in "solemn acceptance." The only action from the report's recommendations which could be taken without financial cost was to implement the "pot ord" which the Democrats set about doing. The Republican opposition got started at their caucus the night before first reading (each party caucuses on Sunday night prior to Monday's Council meeting). The first Republican to raise the issue was a candidate for the upcoming Council elections (April). He wrote a letter to the C.C. News published the week prior to the first reading voicing his opposition. In the Republican caucus initial opposition was raised by the most pro-police of the Councilmen. Their move in the Council meeting was to ask for the "pot ord" to be bound over to the working session and invite the police and judges to give their feelings. "At this time the Chief switched and became opposed. After that the thing went on party lines to the final vote."[LI]

The informant who had been upset about the target and nature of the Argus raid said that:

> This was solely an LSD and pot raid using state statutes on marijuana sale. It wasn't immediately clear why the (Argus commune house) was hit and ransacked or why the warrants were issued for these 12. Was it aimed at the Argus or the White Panther Party or both?

He also queried the legality of the search, given that the warrants were for arrest and not for search and seizure. "Why did they search the entire place and confiscate the records of the underground newspaper? Could they just not resist taking them to look at and xerox? Obviously a few seconds perusal would show what they were." In addition, he was upset about the Chief's alleged statement that where pot is found, usually hard stuff will be found also. He said that:

> Whatever else can be said about the political motivation of the police, it is obvious that they did the raid on their own without consulting their superiors. Then, when things immediately heated up as a result, they stood their ground and used their allies. Essentially, they fought back via the press just sufficiently to gather the neutral ground.[LII]

The Ozone House Pact

The last event illustrates the manner in which an accountability structure, imposed by civilian authorities in concert with senior police administrators, is circumvented. This external restraint upon police autonomy appears to have a chance of working, although its survival is somewhat tenuous and it is the object of considerable grumbling among the men. The following is a brief summary of opinions from civilian and police authorities about events linking the Argus House raids to the Ozone House.

A number of city officials were upset about the "LSD and pot" raid because of the working arrangement that had been forged with a youth operated and oriented program, Ozone House, Inc. (part of the loose city-wide "youth network"). The City had invested $6,000 (if matched) into it with the major goals being aid for those youths with drug problems and aid for juvenile runaways. At the time of the subsidation by the City "there was no Police opposition to such support."[LIII] Subsequent

to that, some city officials "got some input from the (police) command that there were some things not right about what was going on there." As a result a meeting was set up between the police and the Ozone House people because it "made sense" not to have problems between the police and a "place that the city was supporting." A series of meetings were held and an agreement was worked out as to what the police and Ozone House would and would not do.

As one police insider puts it:

> The Ozone House was begun by street people who have picked up some semi-professional help (graduate students). They try to maintain a street people staff (and the program is) in two parts, drug help and the runaway child. As they get runaways and it is our duty to pick them up and return them to their parents, we were making random and periodic checks (on their establishment). We had to sit down and work out some sort of feasible plan. We had talked with them on the phone and we were far apart (on what to do). So, I think Captain (X) set up a meeting. Their primary objective was to stop the random dropping in of uniformed officers every time they got a tip. So now we contact one of four or five people, supply them with who we're looking for and they'll tell us if they've had contact (with the child) and when.
>
> We have had fairly good success, given our main objective of trying to recover them. We've left the door open as to whether this will work. (Central City) gets a large number of chronic runaways. They're no sooner home than they run away again. They (the Ozone House people) try to get parental approval to put the kids in foster homes.[LIV]

Another police insider said:

> The arrangements were set up with authority from the top command to do so and was worked out at the Captain level. The thing was originally done with the Assistant City Administrator and someone from the City Attorney's office sitting in with us and the Ozone House people. It was done partially to show that we are willing to give concessions (i.e., the order that no police are to enter the Ozone House). We have to show them that we are willing to show good faith and see if they do also. The thing isn't working out too well but I don't feel we can condemn those who are trying to do good although there are those who are screwing things up. There have been problems with the arrangement in that escapees

> ("or should I say fugitives") from certain juvenile centers have on occasions been harbored by them to the point of being illegal.
>
> Of course, if there were any overt cases of illegality, there would be no question but that we would move in on them. However, we would probably wait to move until we had a strong case and then we'd move in and arrest and prosecute.[24/LV]

At a lower level within the department, however, there are those who see things differently. Two men, when talking about specific categories within the community, mentioned that the Ozone House people were "particular problems." One said that "they truly hate the police--the uniform and what we stand for." Another said that the Ozone House and Tribal Council Group are a "definite pain in our sides. It is currently our biggest problem. They get runaways with mental problems and when we go looking for them we get no help." A third said that:

> Officers are not to go into the Ozone House ("a memo came down in written form") unless there is an extreme emergency in progress. We have to call in to the Lieutenant to see how to proceed even if we have a runaway in there with a warrant on him. The reason seems to be to provide some sort of a sanctuary to be able to help these kids. The Police don't seem to have been the ones convinced (of this need). My feelings are that someone higher up passed the word down to the police.

Someone within the City administration said that on the same day as the Argus raids, "a cop went into the Ozone House. This got the people there very upset and they called in to complain. The Association President later sent them an apology and (the Chief) was talked to about it." Later word got back through the Assistant Administrator and from some of the people at the Ozone House that the police had decided to normalize the relationship again.[LVI]

Another city official (when asked about the Argus raid, given that the police were supposed to be cooperating with the Tribal Council,

et al. on hard drugs) said:

> There are some problems with working it out. On the one hand the police couldn't be told not to engage in a raid of this nature but on the other hand they could and should be told to be pretty careful in advance concerning the evidence they were going on and if the raid were carried out to do the thing legally in terms of search and seizure.[LVII]

He went on to discuss the whole area of cooperation with certain community groups and the problems involved. He said that it was:

> a problem of drawing the line between people you are working with and supporting and whether or not you hit them (with a raid). My way of dealing with them would be to tell them to clean up their own shop first and then hit them with the raid if they didn't do so. On the other hand, you get into the whole hairy mess of the police and their feelings that they had intelligence (information) which showed this or that group involved in criminal activities and then not letting them effect the raid. This creates the feeling amongst the police that these groups, involved in 'criminal activity,' are receiving some form of political protection. This creates a true dilemma to be worked out between the administration with its ideas of supporting such groups and the police who'll see the thing from a purely criminal angle.

CHAPTER 5

Footnotes

1. The rest of the questions in this section of the interview form will be discussed in citizen participation and the political process in Chapter 6.

2. The four non-union members talked about going through the two top men to the Administration and directly to the Council.

3. I was appointed by the incumbent Mayor to the "old" Human Relations Commission on 1 May 1969 and for what it is worth was the first student to be on any city commission. We went out of business, so to speak, in March of 1970 when a new city ordinance was passed which dissolved the old Commission and in its stead put a new city department, The Human Rights Department.

4. This last incident occurred during "a bitter debate over the proposed appointment of (X) as the Police Department's new recruitment officer." C.C. News, November 20, 1969.

5. C.C. News, November 24, 1969.

6. C.C. News, September 23, 1969.

7. This issue dealt with the firing of the Assistant Director of the Human Rights Department by the new Director. The former "Acting Head" had been the dissenting voter on the 3-man investigation committee looking into the BAM incident. He took his case to court concerning the firing and won a decision that the firing had been improperly achieved. Thus, the city had a hot political issue on its hands as to what to do with him.

8. "Citizens and the Police," a report submitted to the City Council by the G.O. on April 19, 1971.

9. This Committee made up of 33 members held its first meeting on April 14, 1970 and issued a printed report in December, 1970. They were charged by the Mayor and Council with seeking "information on all aspects of the drug problem in Central City, to relay that information to the community, and to make broadly based recommendations for concrete action," (page 1, the Report). Out of this committee came the proposal for a city marijuana ordinance, to be discussed shortly.

10. L.E.A.A. is the Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act or the so-called Safe Streets Omnibus Act. In each state there is a three-tiered hierarchy consisting of County committees, Regional committees and a State committee. All proposals for funds must pass each of these three hurdles whose membership consists mainly of law enforcement personnel.

11. As these two federally funded programs share territory in common, some bureaucratic relationship had to be worked out. It was decided that the L.E.A.A. Region One staff would be under the Council of Governments, (C.O.G.) and that the Region One Director would be under the C.O.G. Director. However, the Director and staff, theoretically C.O.G. staff, are emotionally tied to the L.E.A.A. Regional Council made up of law enforcement folks. There is, therefore, constant friction between them.

12. Press Release, Mayor's office.

13. A "highly reliable" source within the Sheriff's department told me that "the Sheriff just shot his mouth off without thinking. We do not have manpower directly covering the campus. We have some people who see things and call the Sheriff but do not have anyone paid to cover the campus."

14. Blue Ribbon Committee, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

15. C.C. News, January 24, 1971.

16. Personal notes of author in attendance.

17. I refer you back to his statement made five days later in the working session of 35 out of 135 cases or 26%.

18. It should be stated that the University newspaper is probably as biased in the direction of the student viewpoint as the C.C. News is in the direction of the police. In support of this the following was said of the C.C. News Police Reporter: "If something is pretty obviously amiss (Y) will do a good job of covering it. However, on the day to day activities, Y emphasizes the good points of the police . . . . Y is very pro-(Sheriff) and makes no secret about it.[XLVII]

19. Heard on the radio, January 25, 1971 by the researcher.

20. This was the gist of the conversation. I wrote it down immediately after I overheard it.

21. This press statement was also heard twice by me on the radio being read by the Association President.

22. Two City Officials have commented on the Sheriff being in "the enviable position of being a popular, elected official who can say what he wants and use this publicity to squeeze the Chief."

"The Sheriff's threat over (the Chief) is a real and dual one. On the one hand, he can at any time say that the Chief and the (C.C.P.D.) are soft on crime, that it's not doing its job of law enforcement, that he's being tied down by the Mayor, etc."

"On the other hand, he can at any time threaten to move in and make some dramatic arrests (e.g., narcotics) and can thus blackmail (the Chief) into getting his support for such things as an intelligence squad."

Another City official said, "The Chief tells me that the Sheriff Department personnel on occasion will taunt the (C.C.P.D.) with being tied down with and by radical politicans concerning (their) being able to truly enforce the law."

23. That the police were well aware of the nature of the location is obvious from the fact that an undercover agent, "Terry," was the initial contact who entered the house and left just prior to the bust. He asked one of those arrested to make a transaction on pot. (University Newspaper, January 21, 1971).

24. I think that this was meant to mean that since the whole arrangement was worked out above the police department, they would only break the agreement when they had a fool proof case to play with. This informant also said that, "there are other problems" without elaborating.

CHAPTER 6

Citizen Participation--Getting What You Ask For

The focus of this Chapter is citizen involvement in governmental affairs. Citizen participation, you will recall, is a necessary aspect of understanding how a government works. It is an interrelated mixture of the potential in the community for political influence and the ability of the citizenry to have an impact on elected and appointed officials. I should stress that citizen participation is in relation to the political system and the effects this has on the police. It is viewed solely from the perspectives of the police and those expert informants, both public officials and private citizens, whom I interviewed. There was no attempt in this study to elicit the views of the citizens-at-large toward their community political involvement. Citizen-police attitudes, encounters, differentiation of segments of the populace by the police and the like will be discussed in Section Three. Although there are many items in Chapters 4 and 5 which are relevant here, in the interest of brevity, I shall avoid repeating them.

This Chapter is organized into three sections with the first consisting of five questions from the interview form which elicit responses from the perspective of the police. In order, these five questions ask for: 1) views comparing the amount of citizen participation in the two communities; 2) the effects this differential involvement has upon the elected officials; 3) direct responses concerning actual political

behavior engaged in; 4 and 5) indirect responses about political behavior. This series of five questions taps hypotheses three (and thus, again, four) and five or the direct relationships between greater community political activity and a greater trust importance level and the latter with a greater press for police political behavior.

The second section, from the perception of the outside experts, also taps information on these three hypotheses (3, 4, and 5), as well as the sixth, the presence of an opportunity to behave politically. Whereas the other two variables had opportunity built into the discrepancy between the formal structures and the actual political process--that is, how the structures might be subverted in practice--process is an integral part of C.P.A. The openness of the local political system and the amount of influence circulating in the community have a direct bearing upon the extant public structures as they affect the police. Thus, the potential for opportunity is built into this variable causing it to carry added value in regard to the sixth hypothesis. This phenomenon is discussed in real world terms by the outside imformants as they look at the two systems, the political processes and police political activity.

The third section is a short statement of the use and effects of the local mass media. It is meant as a summary of the media's involvement in the illustrations provided in Chapters 4-6.

Police Perceptions

The following two-question series was asked of the men in the two departments to elicit their views on participation by the community in the working of their respective governments and the reaction of the

public officials to such activities. The questions followed this brief introduction. "Let's compare (Central City) Council with the (Mideast) County Board of Commissioners for a moment." The first question asked was, "Which has the more pressure from the citizens of the community on it concerning its police department?" In the Sheriff Department every respondent (21) said the City Council (with one saying "unquestionably the City" and another saying "the City--more radicals"). One of them, a deputy with four months on the force, however, reversed the reasoning from the other twenty. His reason for mentioning the City was given in his response to the second question, "Yes, (the Council) seems to be more favorable toward the department." The other twenty, as we shall see below in the next question, had negative feelings about Central City's increased citizen input.

In the City Department 18 of 22 responded "the City Council." (Four of these 18 said "without a doubt" or "no doubt about it" with another commenting, "the Commissioners have damn little pressure, they seem to be damn near autonomous"). The nineteenth said, "I don't really know, I assume the City does." Two did not want to "discuss politics" so did not respond to this question and the twenty-second said, "Both have had pressures, I can't say which have had more."

The second question a bit more complex, evoked an interesting pattern of responses. It was, "Does this mean that the Councilmen/Commissioners act differently toward the Department?" and to respond required the development of a reaction to the word "differently." More of the C.C.P.D. men seemed to be taken aback by this (7 to 1)[1] and failed to answer than did the Sheriff Department respondents. I would speculate that an

ignorance of the Board's operation was the major factor, as five of these seven had no problem responding to the third question in the series ("In general does the Council and Mayor or the Board of Commissioners seem more interested in the activities of their department?").

Two others in the C.C.P.D. refused to respond leaving 13 who had definite opinions, some of which were quite lengthy. Excerpts from these responses are:

> Yes, more responsive to the people because the pressure is there. They probably put more 'why' inquiries to the department . . . . Council will ask questions when the citizens need to know . . . . Yes, has a bearing. (It is) not unusual to get extreme right and left wingers at Council generating controversy which divides the community. The citizens of (C.C.) are very much involved in the political process . . . . They (Commissioners) seem to pretty much go their own way. The Mayor seems to yield quite a bit to minority groups (when) under pressure. During confrontations the Mayor seems to compromise and apologize rather than standing behind us . . . . Much more community participation in Council meetings. (It) makes Council much closer to the community pressures and (there is) wider publicity (given) to Council meetings . . . . (And) one thing this administration has done is to open up the input on the Council floor to the average citizen. Also there are many more public hearings in which many more individual citizens can get in and express their own personal feelings.

In the Sheriff Department, in response to Question 2, (we've heard from two, one saying "I don't know" and the other saying the Council "seems to be more favorable toward the (C.C.) department."), 19 gave the City as their opinion choice. In general, their responses were voiced more fully than the respondents in the C.C.P.D. Examples of these are:

> Seems the Council there puts more pressure on the police. (C.C.) has more organized radical or subversive groups (and) pressure groups like those from the University . . . . Even though the Sheriff is a political officer, I believe there is more politics in (C.C.). The Council attempts to run the police department (and) I think this is why we have higher morale . . . . Sure they do, (they're) always against the cop when they do something. . . . 1) Have more control which would in turn make them act differently, 2) the Chief is appointed,

> and 3) as a result of pressures from the community in conjunction with #1 . . . . Yes, there seems (to be) a feeling from the citizens that Mayor and Council are handcuffing the police from doing their duty, (e.g., "the ombudsman, denying the Chief from making public statements, harassing officers by making them issue (citizen) receipts, etc.") . . . . Yes, I think indirectly they attempt to try and do things to suit certain groups in the City (e.g., black people should get more of this or that) . . . . Partly because of citizen pressures and partly by motives of Councilmen. You've got some quacks that put more pressure (on and) try to rule with an iron thumb . . . . They can only operate as a half department. They can only function properly without the shackles that are being put on by the Mayor and Council . . . (And) mostly complaints (to the Council and from the Council to the Police)--half are bitching about what's going on; the other half are saying that not enough is being done. They're catching it from both ends.

Political Activity

Who, if anyone, do the police turn to in the community to counteract the pressure from the citizens on political decision makers? We have already seen how the police turn, internally, to their unions (especially in the C.C.P.D.). The following series of questions were developed to elicit both direct and indirect responses to external alliances.

The first question asked them, "In your experience, which clubs, groups or organizations in the community have officers turned to for aid?"

Seventeen of the 21 C.C.P.D. respondents, perceiving a dual potential in the question, split their answers into two parts. In the first part they reacted to the question as if the solicitation were for political aid in influencing the political decision makers. Thirteen of the 21 respondents said in effect that they "don't know of any we've turned to" (i.e., "none to my knowledge" . . . "don't personally know any in that respect" . . . don't know of any we've solicited support from," etc.). Four of the younger officers, however, expanded on this by mentioning

the desirability of engaging in such political activities. Examples are:

> Depends on what nature of assistance they could render for the given issue. There are always groups that are more responsive to the police moves: Concerned Citizens, Kiwanis, American Legion, etc., groups which have influential people. I think it would be wise to solicit support . . . . There are certain organizations to stay away from. It would make sense to hit the Optimists, Kiwanis, etc., those that are most influential and tend to have the most interest in the police . . . . Pressure groups are always pressing for their interests. It makes very good sense to get some to back us . . . . Organizations we've done favors for we would expect some help from.

The remaining four failed to see the dual potential and went right to enumerating the clubs and organizations that have been of aid in specific projects or services.

The second part of the question, as the C.C.P.D. reacted to it, dealt with the groups in the community that they have interacted with. Many said that groups seek them out.

> Many groups have offered to support our work . . . . None to my knowledge (have we sought out) but speaking for us would be the American Legion, Kiwanis, Elks, Optimists--the service and civic organizations . . . . There are lots of conservative groups around like the VFW who would offer their aid (but there are) no indications of our moving toward them.

Others said they have sought groups out.

> I know officers who have contacted some of them (J.C.'s, Kiwanis, Optimists, VFW, American Legion) for support (for projects) . . . . (And) we have turned to a helluva lot of them for aid in certain services (i.e., flags, Pig Bowl,[2] public relations, etc.).

There were those, however, who were somewhat ambivalent about the whole thing. Four illustrations are:

> I don't know that we actually approach them. In everyday contact we run into many guys who are pro-police, who don't like the way things are done and want to change things themselves. They need very little prodding . . . . When an issue

> occurs various groups come to the police and we are used to accomplish their ends. There is a difference between legitimate and illegitimate support . . . . (And) A tough question. We are pretty much reluctant to join clubs. We've developed an attitude over the years of staying away from them. By and large we don't appeal directly for aid to pressure on . . . . (The) closest we would come would be to convey our ideas to individuals. Going to groups for specific (political) aid can backfire.

The Sheriff Department with 21 respondents generally reacted to this question by naming groups (that officers have turned to for aid) with whom they have interacted. Only two caught the same dual potential that the 13 C.C.P.D. respondents read into the question. These two said:

> Offhand, I don't know of any. Sometimes people come to us and ask to help—ham radio operators, Kiwanis, J.C.'s (Junior Chamber of Commerce). . . . (and) Not to my knowledge, (we) have in the past had some groups offer us aid.

Two said they "don't know" and a fifth said, "not off hand." The other sixteen mentioned specific groups and their attitudes. A few examples are:

> American Legion, VFW, K of C, Kiwanis, Rotary. Civic groups seem to be pretty well law and order oriented. They have been helpful in community support when criticism has been thrown at us. We need the support they try to give . . . . Real strong are the civic groups--J.C.'s, Kiwanis, VFW, American Legion, Moose, Elks, etc. I don't know why. (The) kind of guys who belong to these groups are pro-police in a controversy. Most of them are pretty right wing--anti-protest and marches, etc. On a controversial bust or raid or something, they are the ones saying, 'Why didn't you bust their heads,' etc. . . . . Civic groups--J.C.'s, Optimists, etc. In general they back police. They're pretty good at giving moral support . . . . (and) J.C.'s are pretty conservative (and) support law and order. Other groups like Kiwanis, Optimists, Rotary, etc. are mostly upper middle class, white, businessmen, Republican and (both) status quo oriented and pro-law and order.

Whereas a number of the C.C.P.D. respondents either advocated the solicitation of political influence from groups or saw a moral dilemma

in doing so, (roughly a third), not one Sheriff Department deputy did so. The group most mentioned by the two departments was the J.C.'s. It was followed by the service, civic and veteran's organizations with the Concerned Citizens ("They would do anything" . . . . "Have helped out before") being the only non-"fraternal" group mentioned. Politically, the officers said that the groups ranged from moderates to the far right ("John Birchers--conservatives, groups and organizations to the right."). I asked one high command respondent about this pattern and he said that they had very little contact with leftist oriented groups. "one or two rap sessions with a young lawyer group but in general very little interaction."

I also asked two questions in the interview meant to evoke an indirect answer to the external alliances that police make. These were, "What groups, clubs or organizations do you belong to?" and "How do they support the department?" The second question was essentially a wash-out as there were very few organizations that the respondents belonged to other than law enforcement related associations (e.g., International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Sheriff Association, National Rifle Association and state, regional or county-local groups).

In the Sheriff Department six (all Captains or above, except one deputy) mentioned at least one group besides the law enforcement associations. They were, "VFW, Elks, Moose," . . . "J.C.'s, a couple of others from (C.C.) also are in it. Everything else has expired" . . . . "Optimists, Elks" . . . . "American Veterans." The other fifteen said either none or law enforcement related associations except one who also mentioned "church."

To the question of how the groups they belonged to support the department, the responses were sparse.

> "Various groups get together to raise money. They always volunteer. (We) never had to ask for it. For example, the Moose where some 300 gave a $1.00 a piece . . . . Moose has a large membership. We can call upon these people and they get the word out to their membership. They have a speaker's bureau . . . . With moral support. To get something done, though, you need the police oriented groups . . . . American Veterans back all departments pretty much. It seems that our generation has a little more respect for laws of the land and police departments than the younger generation . . . . About the same as the others. . . . (Law enforcement organizations) support legislation which involves the Sheriff's Department.

In the C.C.P.D. the pattern was much the same. The top command (4) all mentioned at least one group beside the police related associations which they were members of. Of the other 18, in addition to the police groups, 3 mentioned "church," 2 the "YMCA," one the "Knights of Columbus," and the other 12 either said none or the police related organizations. Responses to the second question were even more scarce than with the Sheriff Department. Two responded directly by saying:

> Yes, we have asked for financial support for certain Community Relations pamphlets to be printed. Also, we have an Explorer Scout Troop and they have aided by buying items . . . . The Knights of Columbus Council here hasn't yet. I'm about to approach them to foot the bill on a safety pamphlet. There are K of C Councils in the country that have actively supported their local police department.

Three others had a variety of responses:

> No local ones. I don't because a lot of prejudice is shown by local social groups. (It would be) a form of corruption of the police to be socialized into their beliefs . . . . None except the (Command) Union. We've used the Union only twice socially after the Pig Bowls. Usually we'll have shift parties at guys' houses . . . . I hunt and fish with only four or five buddies. All other officers pretty much do the same. We used to have a lot of shift parties. Now we don't seem to do so.

Outside Expert Perceptions

The following reactions to inputs from the citizenry--pressures upon the political decision makers and the police--will show that Central City has a politically more active community which, in turn, activates more involvement by the police in the political process. One knowledgeable observer mentioned a large number of sources of pressure on the police and broke them down by levels within the department.

> On the rank and file there are the real right wing lawyers who verge on being Birchites only with a bit more of a reality base. These guys are always down bullshitting with the men, buying them coffee and bringing in sandwiches, etc.; the same kind of guys who talk up the police at fetes in their honor.
>
> The sort of lawyer contact from the right wing which combines flattery with snooping for gossip . . . the Prosecutor's office has a political input beyond the technical[I]. . . . I don't think that the police are joiners of groups. The cops aren't in such clubs as Kiwanis, Rotary, etc. Many seem to live outside the City.
>
> At the next level, the so-called command officers (Corporal-Lieutenant) are all members of the Teamsters Union which locally is quite right wing. (X) is the business agent (and) is very right wing. He was active in the Recall (the Mayor) campaign. In fact all the members of the Concerned Citizens work hard at wooing the cops . . . . There is also much State Police contact and with certain cop oriented University types. (The latter) begin a talk with the conspiracy type of theory and end up at the other end of the line pushing moderation, etc. They also get the irate citizen calls moaning about the lack of physical safety, etc.
>
> At the Deputy (Chief) and Chief level, there is a much greater conscious wooing by service organizations and the downtown business groups, the Chamber of Commerce, J.C.'s, etc. They do such things as sponsor the Pig Bowl and department wide things. This is partially an agitation and lobbying force for more police protection (e.g., "they agitated very forcefully for beat patrolmen"). The Chief spends large periods of time blandly bullshitting with the business men on the phone.
>
> The pressure on the Chief from the business community is great. Any event that scares the retail-oriented merchant puts them right on the phone to him, (e.g., (Y), the Chamber of Commerce

President, was in the Chief's office ("the so-called War Room") throughout the whole South University (Avenue) 'Street People' affair. How he got there or why is anyone's guess.

The Bar exacts its inordinate amount of influence, especially the extreme right wing as a pressure group. An example is that they thought it would be a great idea to set up a Grand Jury so that people could testify secretly without having to blow the cover of informants. The Chief thought it a good idea and brought it up with the Mayor. They seem to hang around with the police and fill their minds with their particular sorts of thoughts.

(We have already heard from this informant concerning pressures from the Prosecutor and the Sheriff.) The Chief is also terrified of the press. It is impossible to put a gag on him as via the administrative order to clear all things through the Administrator. He will say that he will abide by the ruling but then he won't. He is afraid that the press will turn against him if he doesn't talk with them so he opens up on all issues to stay on their good side . . . . The news media are not just transmitters of information. They also frequently tell you what you should say. (X) does a lot of this. In a way they are sort of opinion passers to the police.[II]

The Chief gets a lot of inputs from the State Police and the FBI. They give him the impression that there is more conspiracy going on than anyone else, like us, would think (e.g., "an underground network of drugs, draft dodgers, revolutionaries, etc."). (The Chief) seems to buy this and when he combines it with tips from informers who get highly suspect second and third hand information, and probably some second hand information from wiretaps, all this makes him much more suspicious than he probably has any need to be.

The police do not get a comparable wooing from the liberal establishment. I suppose partly because they're regarded as intellectual inferiors and also as somewhat unsavory. In any case the left does not do anywhere near the talking to the police that the right does. (There are) not many contacts initiated by them.[III]

Another knowledgeable informant said:

There is a basic paradox in the shouting at the left wingers about interference with the police. The liberals and civil libertarians don't come down and try to talk the police into anything or to change them in their attitudes. It is the rightists, the law and order types, who come in and through their talk give credence and credibility to all the handcuffing, etc., nonsense that goes on.[IV]

A third informant stated that:

> The police work through the businessmen, Chamber of Commerce and right wingers. (When asked who initiated the contacts, he said that,) I assume that the community people make the initial contacts and then the police spill their problems and emotions and they then carry the ball for the police. I don't think that the police are that savvy yet although they are coming along . . . . I think that the pressure that the business community can put on the City Administrator is quite considerable. (The City Administrator's) two blind spots are the Chamber and the police.[V]

A fourth, well informed observer said:

> The veteran's clubs are allies and strong supporters and the police surreptitiously seek their support. The (Republican Mayoral Candidate) and the Concerned Citizens are big police boosters. Also the Sheriff Department gives support (to the C.C.P.D.). Not only the Sheriff himself but every so often one of the deputies will write a letter to the (C.C.) News blasting the City Administration about the police.
>
> The Chief's strongest point is that for years he has gone to other people and groups. He never turns down a talk, meeting, etc. He talks in an easy conciliatory manner in which he says he needs the help of the citizens to do a very difficult job. I feel the purposes are: 1) Straight public relations for and about the police, 2) to solicit their aid, and 3) he can use the contacts. I expect (the Chief) uses this network which he has developed to aid him in getting support when he needs it. Also, Lieutenant (X) works very hard at building black support. (The Sheriff) on the other hand is very independent. He feels that he and his men can do it alone. He has very strong views and airs them publicly. He feels that he doesn't need anyone to do his job.[VI]

And finally, a fifth said that:

> In (C.C.) the older downtown business people try to get some influence with the police via social contact. Most of the young cops moonlight for the business or service people, selling, stocking, etc. This has an influence on the way they think and what they do . . . . There is a fraternity of lawyers-prosecutors-judges, all attorneys, who somewhat temper the harshness from the lower level (of the legal system) of police and their charges and ideas about sentencing.[VII]

The C.C.P.D.'s "External Constituency"

Two informants commented on the "external constituency" of the police. Said one:

> The Chief has both a certain amount of autonomy and an invisible external constituency that he can turn to for support for his own causes. The big problem with the constituency is that the potential support is only perceived. No one really knows how strong they are or if they really exist. There is no way to measure this but we cannot ignore (emphasis included) this factor.
>
> The Chief feels that the greatest pressures for change and control is from the Administration and Council. He very much perceives of himself as the man in the middle between them and his men. I don't know to what extent he uses this greater constituency but given that he has a real fear of losing his men and knowing that he can only go so far (with Council and Administration), he certainly sets up the situation where it would seem very advisable to do so (i.e., the logical alternative is to go the route of trying to influence the electorate toward putting pressures on the political decision makers to not press for the kinds of changes which will alienate his men).[VIII]

The second informant talked about the "political base" of the police. He saw it as a sort of iceberg situation with the "visible tip" being an overlapping of those who are in the forefront of being pro-police and making visible actions in that direction with those who are in the hierarchy of the Republican party.

> The Republicans have had good success since 1968 with the whole law and order issue in combination with the shackling of the police argument in (political) campaigns. The liberal leadership of the Democratic Party has great difficulty warming up to the cops because they do things which they are just not cozy about. The Democratic Party (in C.C.) is partially made up of large minority blocks of students and blacks who are anti-police. Thus, it is very difficult for (the Mayor) or others to warm up to the police and the pro-police sentiments just are not forthcoming. What does come through are the "good government" types of things which appear anti-police and with a large Republican constituency doesn't go down well.[IX]

This informant isn't sure

> ... whether the political base for the Police Department is as large as I think it is for them to be getting away with some of the things that they are but shouldn't be. There seems to be a sentiment in the 'liberal community' that the police have quite a large following . . . . I think that (the Chief) has the counsel of a small and a biased portion of the community on the outcome of the (upcoming April) election. The guys

> who hang around the (C.C.) Police Department are those most into the (Republican Mayoral Candidate's) type of mentality. The pressures from the right might be getting to him and convincing him of their ultimate victory.[X]

An example of the effects of citizen pressures on the workings of government is given by the following observer.

> I have seen a change in the way (the Mayor) has dealt with the (C.C.) police over the past two years (1969-1971). When he just got started he was wide open and anything that came to his attention concerning the police would be brought before the City Council. Then, as a result of the South University (Avenue) affair,[3] he was clobbered by public opinion. He began to handle problems concerning the City Police by himself and not openly in the Council except when there were major things like the BAM incident. He now likes to use the Blue Ribbon Citizen's Committee approach to take the heat off him (i.e., to neutralize his involvement in police reformation). I think now that he doesn't have a majority in the Council, he will be even less open in his handling of problems with the police.[XI]

I asked this informant if the police had anything to do with the development of this negative public opinion toward the Mayor. His answer was:

> Of course, they were very heavily involved in developing the public image of (the Mayor) as holding down the police and keeping them from doing their job. They used people like (X, the upcoming Republican Mayoral Candidate), (they) fed him the information and then he acted in their behalf by going publicly to City Council. (When asked he said,) I don't think that the police actually sought them out, they're not that political yet, but that they were in close contact normally and transmitted their feelings to (X) and other people. The Sheriff also jumped in with his public statements blasting both the Mayor and the (University) President.

Another commenter said of the aftermath to the South University event:

> Just about this time, the Recall (the Mayor) Campaign got underway. The actual campaign didn't start then, just the threat that one might, as by law they must wait three months before they can ("The Mayor took office in April 1969 and this was the middle of June"). (X) and some of his friends began it with a claim of the police being politically interfered with, hand-

cuffing, etc. It was the seeds of the Concerned Citizens group who later led the Recall (the Mayor) Campaign.[XII]

The County

The following are views about activity in the County and by the Sheriff:

> The political atmosphere is all pro-law and order. There are no politically active groups on the left or anywhere to speak out for constitutional rights. In (C.C.) you have all ranges of political attitudes. So the Sheriff gets pressure only from the right. The people who don't like him aren't politically organized.
>
> The allies of the (Sheriff) Department are the small town merchants, Chambers of Commerce, Legion posts and fraternal lodges, civic clubs, etc. The Sheriff and Undersheriff and some of the higher command seem to make the rounds of these organizations giving talks, etc. That seems to be all they feel they need to do to get support for their Department. The least favorable are the kids, blacks, and hippies who are anti-police in general. Other than them, only (Mrs. X) (and) no organized groups are anti the Sheriff that I can think of.
>
> In (C.C.) the detectives (of the C.C.P.D.) might get some contact with left groups in court and in arresting kids but not much of any dialogue with any of the 'respected' (left) groups with possible exception of lawyers. Allies in (C.C.) are the service clubs and the merchants--Republican community combination. There is almost a direct parallel between those people who don't like public assistance (welfare) and a strong pro-police stand. Opposed groups (to the C.C.P.D.) in (C.C.) would be those people whose rights are stepped on or civil libertarians who don't like this to happen to certain groups. There is a need, however, to break down why different groups do not like the police because they differ.[XIII]

Another observer echoed these feelings by stating:

> The Sheriff doesn't seem to have many active political groups in the community where he normally operates. I know the deputies won't go into the Oval, not because of a high degree of politically organized people. (There's) not much in the County that is extraordinary in the sense of controversial political institutions. To my knowledge, there is very little radical political activity outside the two cities. In fact there is very little political activity and not much in the way of political awareness. Every so often a group or so may get turned on in an ad hoc manner over a park or a parking lot but, for

example, in the Oval area the blacks have not succeeded in getting themselves together over the school thing which is a very important issue for both the blacks and the whites. I've talked with concerned parents and they just cannot get a collective effort together. They can't arouse either the people with kids or those without kids.

In (C.C.) the (C.C.P.D.) clearly has to deal with much more in the way of organized groups which the Sheriff doesn't have to. The obvious groups are radical students, hippies (drug culture), militant groups and the left-liberal middle class--much of the Democratic Party and various church groups, ad hoc committees, etc. Thus, there are pressures on the police from a variety of angles. Not all are from the 'down and outs' or the 'have nots,' a substantial amount come from the middle-class intellectuals.

The (C.C.) groups which are pro-police are the Republican Party, right wing American Legion types of groups and 'respected' institutions like the Chamber of Commerce. The Sheriff's support is from the unions, particularly the construction, UAW and industrial unions. The leadership is largely 'hillbilly' and is a major source of his support (e.g., "Mideast County Commissioner (X) is a committeeman of the UAW and a staunch Sheriff supporter"). The so-called hard hats are very heavily pro-Sheriff and as he is a Democrat, they can vote for him and vote their heart without having to worry about potentially voting against their pocketbook (i.e., "a vote for Wallace is an unknown on the economic issues."). XIV

A third observer said that:

The Sheriff gets strong rank and file union support and strong support from the Teamsters' leadership and organization. The leadership and organizational support of the other unions probably are not very strongly pro-Sheriff but they have nowhere else to go as he is a Democrat and so far the unions have just not been able to support his opponent anyway. XV

A fourth observer felt that:

Basically, (C.C.) has more groups that have a voice in the political issues, a stronger black voice (than the blacks in the County), the activist students, the drug oriented professional people who are interested in setting programs into motion, etc. In the County the only ones doing this sort of work are the County government. There are no groups pressuring for action. Anything that gets done is done via the initiation of the government people. The City has more groups and they have a better system for having their pressures felt (i.e., the structure is more open for influence). As an example, contrast

> the blacks living in the Oval (in the County) with those living in the near northwest side of (C.C.) on their ability to get their ideas and voices heard. The County has no grievance officer, no Human Rights Department and no Community Relations Division (of the C.C.P.D.) as in the City.[XVI]

With regard to the citizenry within C.C., a C.C. official said:

> I don't think that the public is of much help to the police. They are so heavily polarized. Most of the public to the right and the middle look at the police as the last bastion of hope to enforce a world in which there is a changing morality that they don't understand and that they never participated in trying to change. This kind of polarization (i.e., "over the things that the kids and minorities are trying to do and change") has an inordinate effect on the police.
>
> The Chief changes like a needle in a magnetic field with whomever is putting the pressure on them. It is however, this bulk (middle to the right) of the population who get their input into the police. The police to a great degree sense and feel the citizens' pressures on their operations. This type of influence can be a divisive thing which keeps the police from exercising, for example, different kinds of tactics on the vocal minorities.[XVII]

Another observer, speaking of the socializing habits of the police said that he

> feel(s) that the police because of their shift work socialize mainly with other police. Thus, there is an informal socializing technique, a set of do's and don'ts which are both on and off the job constraints upon their behavior. For example, with the idea of smoking pot off duty. There is usually or always another cop with the same internalized norms with them, a sort of 1984 element about them. Friends are always watching them and as they tend to be police could, of course, always either turn them in or start the rumors around. This whole off duty socializing is very significant in the way they think.[XVIII]

This pattern fits in with what other informants have said about the police being a "clubby and clannish lot. When they do join any thing it is the solid middle class type of organization, the service clubs, etc."[XIX] A city official also discussed this social cleavage:

> The greatest break in the way the police operate is the cleavage between those within the department and all the remaining citizens. I have very often seen them be very protective of

> their own; where what one of them did which would be a clear violation if a citizen did it would have all sorts of extenuating circumstances attached to nullify the actual charge when an officer did it. There is a true double standard for themselves and for the rest of the people.[XX]

Political Gamesmanship--A Two-Way Affair

The following are four short examples which illustrate the use of the policing function for political influence by authorities--public officials and police--upon the citizenry in an attempt to mobilize positive public support.

This game can be played both ways and the police can be used as a "political football" (as in the 1971 C.C. Council Budget episode) to accentuate a politican in the public's eye. The following two stories illustrate this point.

> Some newspaper chain or magazine called the FBI and asked them to identify two or three of the most outstanding police forces in the country, or ones that were good because they wanted to choose one to write a series of articles about. They were told that San Francisco, (C.C.), and one other were good. So the chain called (C.C.) and mentioned this as flattery to aid them in being able to get the story. When (the Mayor) heard this he immediately made a press release that our department has been named one of the top three by the FBI and got it out right away. This was after he had been in office for about a year and was continuing to get flack about his dealings with the police.

> Two weeks ago, (X, the most pro-police Councilman) revived the thing at a (Council) agenda meeting. (The Administrator) tried to talk him out of it but to no avail and the idea, formal recognition as being one of the country's top three police forces, got onto the Council agenda. There all eleven voted to refer it to the Administrator to have some sort of an insignia developed. I guess (X) had some sort of a design or something all worked out. I have no idea if the Department wants it or not.[XXI]

The other story by the same raconteur is about the "First Annual Pig Bowl," held in the Fall, 1969.

(X) was running for State Supreme Court and his itinerary had him coming to town on the date of the game. When he heard this, he suggested that he had a stuffed wild boar's head which he'd like to donate in a half time ceremonv as a permanent trophy for the Pig Bowl (currently the fruit of victory is an old beaten and painted, five gallon milk can). It turned out that neither of the departments wanted it although some of the more politically savvy officers did some hard thinking about it. It seems in the end that they didn't want politicians getting into the act and horning in to their Pig Bowl for their own ends.[4]

The Police Take a Turn--Community Relations

And, as we have seen, the police are also well aware of the value of the citizen's inputs. Further evidence of this comes from a police insider.

> We began the Community Relations Division with one man when (the) Chief took office in 1966. We now have eight full-time men and one half-time man. We felt that it was important to get to the young children so we began asking schools if we could have officers come into the classrooms and talk with the children. Another important function is our young counselor program. We have over the past five years had some 50 or so young blacks which are sometimes called the 'Mod Squad'. We used to have gang fights and things and these counselors moved in and cooled things down. Its better than having arrests.
>
> But, we are not an intelligence division although there is a real problem trying to establish this difference. We have to go on our personal integrity. I have never gone against my word. If that goes, I don't have much left. I feel that the Division has succeeded although you never know what success is. If the community is quiet and things go well, you're told you're lucky. Otherwise, you're told (by the citizens) that you're not doing the job.[XXII]

An outside observer largely agrees with this assessment and says:

> The Police Community Relation's black counselor program would never have come about or been successful in the black community if it hadn't been for the years that (the Chief) has been building the groundwork. (The Division Commander) also works very hard at building up black support. He goes to their meetings, has been invited by them to accompany one of their youth groups to Washington, D.C., etc.[XXIII]

From within the Department comes another version of the Community Relations Division. When asked for his views, a respondent answered:

> I say that (they) are public relations men. Their task is selling the police and the image to the community. (It is) a soaping job of the nonpolice by the police.[XXIV]

A second insider said that:

> At the time the Police Community Relations Division was set up in 1966, it originally had an internal investigative team in that shop. Then it was changed out of there.[XXV]

An outside observer, when asked about the Division commented:

> (C.C.) has this Division because of political pressure from the outside. It was done to create an image. They feel unloved and this was a tenative step to make themselves appear more human. In the County, there isn't much in the way of comparable pressure (to set one up). Also, they are deathly afraid of outside pressure to develop some sort of a civilian review board type of thing. This was a political play to offset having one of these set up. For example, they will not talk with the new Grievance Officer without imposing severe limitations.[XXVI]

Another outside observer questioned the neutrality of the black counselor. He said that:

> The police use the Community Relations workers. They pay them as gang workers, etc. They are really informers . . . . Many of the black people in BULJ (Blacks United for Law and Justice) were props of the City government and the police. The idea of this involvement was to see to it that the group did not continue to function or to turn it into an in-channel establishment, non-aggressive group. An example of this sort of infiltration is the use of the police counselors. About nine of them were there at the first BULJ meeting (see Chapter 10) and involved. They kept raising parliamentary objections and objecting to the direction in which things were going and what should be done.[XXVII]

A third informant in comparing the two departments said that:

> The Community Relations Division in (C.C.) is probably a public image thing. They have more of a problem with vocal minorities (than the County). Even if the Sheriff Department had a chance, the Sheriff wouldn't set such an instrument up. In general, I think that the Sheriff Department feels they probably don't have to go beyond the lunch-dinner type of circuit in their contacts to promote the alliances and support they need or have.[XXVIII]

Recently, the Sheriff announced that he was going to put all the men in his department through a week long, in-service training session on public relations. The course, to be taught by himself and other members of the Command was to cover initiation of contacts with citizens, the encounter procedure, etc. He said that this Police Relations School was in response to informal feedback concerning the need for "brushing up the conduct" of his deputies.

An outside observer, (a pro-Sheriff, County political official), had this to say about that.

> The week long school sessions are probably an attempt to improve relations. (The Sheriff) is beginning to hear rumblings from even his strongest supporters about the behavior of his deputies. So, as he has to be aware of and do something about his potential, long-run political survival, he is getting onto the public relations kick. The eastern part of the County is rapidly being settled by people who would once have gone to (C.C.) but settled there because land and housing was cheaper. Thus, there is slowly developing a more moderate, middle class group (which the Sheriff must begin to take into account). (Also), for the Sheriff to get his favorites in the department advanced when they lack the formal education,[5] they will have to have in-service training experience.[XXIX]

The Local News Media

Of course, to effect the two way flow of communication between the citizenry and public officials discussed in these Chapters, the news media must be heavily relied upon. Many illustrations have been given and much has been said about the usage of the media in Chapters 4-6. This includes the use of the press release and press conference, an administrative restraining policy, the personalities of many role holders and the biases of both newspapers and individual reporters.

Different actors in the political system have used the local newspapers and radios to promote their own interests and to educate and mold

the opinions of the populace to their particular viewpoints. At other times the media has in a "MacLuhanesque" manner used the political actors for their own designs by creating "media happenings." A fitting end to this Chapter on citizen participation is the open recognition of the importance played by the local media in the political process. It is indeed, as we have seen in many divergent examples, a powerful and oft-turned to resource for influence.

CHAPTER 6

Footnotes

1. The one duputy in this reversal of responses to all other questions said he "didn't know." Examples of the responses in the C.C.P.D. were, "No, I don't think so" (3) . . . "can't say" . . . "don't know" (2) . . . "don't know how the Board operates."

2. The Pig Bowl, so named by the participants, is now an annual football game between the C.C.P.D. and the M.C. Sheriff Department. The first year (1969) it attracted national publicity and some 4,000 spectators while last year well over 8,000 turned out to watch and donate money to buy Christmas presents for needy children. A former C.C.P.O.A. President said in discussing the general increase in community support, "Maybe we're capitalizing on charity in the Pig Bowl but it's working."

3. The South University Affair, alluded to earlier, was the first big citizen-police confrontation of the Mayor's administration (June, 1969) and his first run-in with the Sheriff.

4. In the first Bowl the tensions were quite high between the departments. (The Chief) told me that he could bear anything but a loss to them. "I was never so elated over a victory in my life. It was a real epic struggle."

5. In addition, a new State law requires officers (recruits) to have 240 hours of police related training.

CHAPTER 7

Blue Power and the Politicians--Conclusions

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 introduced the reader to opinions and attitudes of both law enforcement officials and those who either work with them or are close observers of their activities. In addition, through the narration of such episodes as the BAM incident, the formation of the police unions, the complaints procedures and the battle over composition and control of an intelligence/narcotics squad, we have seen many of the political actors at work within the circular, open system of local government.

This is the concluding Chapter in Section Two which has presented the police and their transactions with the political structure and process. It represents half of the dual set of obligations which the police as a public service agency face and depicts the influence perspective as the police relate to political actors, primarily other sets of authorities, within the local political structure. The second set of obligations, the police relating to the citizenry, their clientele, represents the social control perspective and will be the subject of Section Three. This Chapter will offer conclusions about the relationship between the police and the political structure and will relate the data recorded in the three chapters to the theoretical model of police political behavior being developed.

In the introductory chapter to this section I stressed the concept of autonomy and said that from the viewpoint of the police, this was

their perceived sense of "freedom" to operate with minimal external constraints. I suggested that such constraints were mediated through the public governmental structure which also provides the public resources necessary to carry on operations. I went on to link the police to their local political structure by introducing the perceptual variable of the importance of trust in their structure. This variable, which also carries the capability of allowing us to differentiate between local governments, was seen as the key concept relating the extant activity of the system's political actors to political behavior on the part of the police. In essence, the greater the perceived capability for imposing restraints, the greater the sense of the structure's importance.

Political behavior as exercised by the police was shown as occurring to maximize resource input from the environment and to minimize those constraining elements which impede their freedom of operation. Three structural variables, control, accountability and community political activity, were introduced to explain what there is about the political structure that the police feel affect their interests and why trust relations vary between governments. When combined as in Figure A of Chapter Three (page 75), it was hypothesized that they would predict both the "importance of trust in the political structure" and in turn "motivation (press) to engage in political behavior." The greater the former, the larger the latter.[1]

Each of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 was constructed around one of the three variables predicting trust and provided data (1) to clarify the nature and variance of the concepts and (2) to show how they related the actions and beliefs of the external political actors to those of the police. I

shall now continue constructing the theoretical model and explain the "independence" of the three concepts. The three have been developed to this point to show that they vary continuously from low to high and that they have a cumulative effect upon both the intervening and dependent variables. I am now going to introduce structural mechanisms which by their presence or absence in any chosen political system will determine the level of the variables within that system.[2]

Control of the police by the civilian authorities can be seen as a continuum from remote, where there are few if any restraining institutions-traditions, to immediate where the police perceive they are regularly and systematically restrained. For the purposes of the model, this variable will be partitioned into immediate and remote categories. Although Chapter 12 will discuss the criteria for separating the variable, some of the factors include a partisan electoral system, presence-absence of a professional city manager or a public safety director, strong-weak mayor system, appointment criteria for the Chief, presence of reform measures in which civilians are involved in police policy making, etc.

Accountability is also divided into two categories, direct and indirect, which are differentiated by the form of government operative in a community. It is to whom the police are immediately accountable that is the critical factor. Those political systems in which the top police administrator is responsible to a public safety director or the city administrator, rather than directly to the elected officials (e.g. Mayor, Council, Board, etc.), have a built in insulatory device which may act as a buffer in cooling-out public controversy. Therefore, directly elected top police administrators such as the Sheriff of Mideast County and those who are accountable directly to elected officials are in the

direct category. Others are placed in the indirect category based on the assumption of a potentially lowered, political vulnerability. I am not implying that the indirect category includes departments which receive less perceived pressure upon them--it may as in Central City and Mideast County be the reverse--but only that, structurally, they are more deeply imbedded in possible administrative protection from the public and the elected officials.[3]

Figure B depicts the outcome of combining control with accountability. This produces a typology of political structures and illustrates that the two variables can and probably do co-vary. For example, some implanted structural mechanisms can affect both policy input and product output so that direct accountability could make actual control more immediate.[4] I consider the two variables to be independent because one should be able to objectively place the department at issue into one or the other category of each variable. That the effects of the two might easily be confounded in the perceptual process of the police is highly possible and thus supports the increased specificity gained by combining the two variables when one wishes to differentiate between political structures.[5]

The bracketed numbers refer to the predicted extent of the press for (motivation to engage in) political behavior. The upper left cell (1) reflects the highest potential while the lower right cell (3) represents the least probability.[6] The two cells (2) on the other diagonal have an intermediate probability and are represented as roughly approximate. This Figure reflects the imprecision generated when continuous variables are dichotomized and then combined. In Chapter 12, this impression will be partially rectified. I would place the Mideast Sheriff Department in the upper right cell and the Central City Department midway

FIGURE B

A Partial Typology of the Political Structure

ACCOUNTABILITY	CONTROL: Immediate	CONTROL: Remote
DIRECT	(1) Elected or appointed police official answerable to elected officials where concerns of importance to the decision makers and mechanisms are in place to make policy inputs and evaluate service output.	(2) Incumbent elected to office with very few ties to other authorities or an appointed official in a political system which has very few mechanisms in place to interfere in the making of policy or desire to evaluate police service output.
INDIRECT	(2) City or County Manager form of government where the police, civilian boards and other departments are accountable through the professional manager(s) to the elected officials.	(3) Police imbedded in the executive-administrative branch and protected from the political decision makers where they, also, are of little importance to the elected officials.

between the lower left and upper left cells.[7]

The third variable, community political activity, is the concluding independent variable which predicts the importance of trust placed in the political structure by the police. Its importance can be underscored by the fact that, whereas in reality, the two departments appeared in Chapters 4-6 to be far apart on the intervening variable, Figure B would make them appear fairly close together in predicted behavior. This continuous variable is perhaps the most difficult to accurately measure because it reflects both the amount of political influence circulating within the political arena and the openness or receptivity of the political structure to influence attempts. Chapter 12 will present the criteria and arguments for bifurcating this variable into high and low categories.[8] High community political activity should be perceived by the police as making the political structure more important to them as an object of trust because it would indicate an increased capability for instituting restraints upon them.

Community political activity, when combined with control and accountability as in Figure C, provides us with three necessary theoretical elements: 1) it is a more complete typology into which any city or county can be placed; 2) it offers the relationship between key factors within the political structure; and 3) it generates the predictability of the intervening variable. Let me stress that these three variables are not phenomenological perceptions by the police but objective measures, made by outside observers, of concrete structural conditions prevailing at a certain point in time. Although I would be surprised if they are not, it is not crucial to the theory to show the police as being consciously aware that the system operates in this manner.

FIGURE C

Typology of Importance of Trust in the Political Structure

	HIGH COMMUNITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY	
	DIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY	INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY
IMMEDIATE CONTROL	Type One Council - Strong Mayor, tenure and economic benefits to the police directly negotiated with the authorities; high civilian controls directly responsible to the C-M as are the police. Heavy citizen involvement.	Type Two Manager - Council; professional city manager, public safety director, etc.; high civilian controls and accountability;responsible to the administrator (e.g., tenure and economic benefits, etc.); awareness of citizen's input.
REMOTE CONTROL	Type Three Elected; Town meeting form. Police with few ties with other political authorities. Tradition of little involvement in police affairs and activities regardless of citizen involvement; successfully offsetting citizen inputs.	Type Four Police imbedded in administration bureaucracy--(layers)distant from authorities; informal ties with no written controls, lack of civilian controls, police handle complaints, etc., successful isolation from citizen inputs.

FIGURE C (Continued)

Typology of Importance of Trust in the Political Structure

	LOW COMMUNITY POLITICAL ACTIVITY	
	DIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY	INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY
IMMEDIATE CONTROL	Type Five Council - Mayor: same as Type One (including police chief as a political position, job patronage a possibility, etc.) but with little political pressure from the citizenry to effect changes.	Type Six Manager - Council; non-professional manager; low political pressures from the community for controls or accountability beyond what the professional administrator desires.
REMOTE CONTROL	Type Seven Elected; Commission form of government. Little citizen pressure to change the status quo, innovate, etc.	Type Eight Same as Type Four but with little influence being put on the political authorities to change the status quo, i.e., to change the system and bring control mechanisms into being.

Figure C is the complete typology for the placement of the political structure of any given community. The inclusion of the third variable provides an opportunity to inculcate more precision to the model than Figure B. This Figure operates in the same manner as Figure B did. The eight types are situated in a generally descending order of the political structure as an object of trust importance to the police. Type One in the uppermost left cell represents the highest amount of perceived importance and thus predicts the highest motivation to engage in police political behavior. Type Eight represents the least perceived importance of the political structure and thus the least probability of such police activity.

I would place Central City in the high category on community political activity and Mideast County in the low category. Thus, Central City is placed, objectively, in Type Two which has indirect accountability, where control is immediate and where community political activity is high. As I suggested when discussing Figure B, under the present administration there are strains toward moving Central City in the direction of Type One. The County has now moved a considerable distance away and is placed in Type Seven with its concomitant direct accountability, remote control and low community political activity.

Confirming the Hypotheses

For the two departments studied, the data presented in the three preceeding chapters clearly support the general hypotheses that: 1) the greater the presence of the combined variables--control, accountability and community political activity--the greater the perception of the political structure as an object of trust importance to the police

(hypotheses 1-4),and 2) the greater the importance, the more the press for political behavior by the police (#5). Let me discuss these two hypotheses separately and please remember that this Section is only concerned with the influence perspective.

With regard to the intervening political trust variable, which you will recall from Chapter 3 is a differentiated attitude toward the political system, the responses from the two departments overwhelmingly supported the Central City structure as being the more salient. When the interviewed police respondents were asked directly which body of elected officials "seem(ed) more interested in the activities of their department," 19 of the 22 in the Sheriff Department responded with the City while 18 of 20 (3 more refused to answer) in the City police gave the same answer. While this question primarily measured perceived control, aspects of the other two variables were incorporated to buttress their opinions. Five factual questions were asked concerning knowledge of each structure and then compared. I stated in Chapter 4 that knowledge of a system was correlated with its perceived importance. The C.C. respondents have a far greater knowledge of their own structure both in terms of total correct answers and in terms of fewer "don't know" responses.[9]

Another set of three questions elicited knowledge of a more informed nature about the elected legislative actors and the officers' personal preferences. These qualitative questions dealt with: 1) the substantive nature of the governing bodies' deliberations such as what subject matters were most important to the governing body concerning their department, 2) how the bodies divide when voting on the issues of interest to the police, and 3) which partisan political party was most favorable

to the needs of the police. The knowledge to answer these questions is of the type necessary before officers can become motivated to act on their own behalf.

Chapter 4 enumerates the responses to these questions and shows that: 1) there were far fewer "don't knows" in the C.C.P.D.,[10] 2) the C.C.P.D. respondents were more specific in their knowledge, and 3) based upon the content of the responses, the breadth of knowledge was considerably greater in the C.C.P.D. I stated that the responses from the two departments to "what questions about your department seem to be most important to the Commissioners/Councilmen?" were as different as could be imagined and that one could rest one's case concerning control and the importance of the political structure as an object of trust on these two sets of answers alone.[11]

In Chapter 5, I said that the responses to "Does it make any difference whether the top administrator (man) in your department is elected or appointed when dealing with the Board/Council?" should dispel any lingering doubts about the police and their ability to perceive the importance of the political structure. Thirty of the 43 respondents to this question said that, in essence, an elected top police official was desired to cope with the externally imposed pressures.[12] A comparison between departments is difficult because the Sheriff is elected but it is interesting to note that in the C.C.P.D. the younger men in the lower ranks (8 of 10) felt that an elected administrator would be more beneficial in both getting things for and defending the department whereas only 5 of 12 of the older men in the higher ranks felt this way.[13] Also, it is noteworthy that 13 of the 22 respondents in the C.C.P.D., where there is an appointed top official, felt moved to react to the systemic pressures by opting for

the other selection method.

Chapter 6 again clearly indicates that there is greater citizen participation in Central City's government and that this augmented the sense of the structure's importance. Two questions were asked: 1) "Which (department) has the more pressure from the citizens of the community on it concerning its police department?", and 2) "Does this mean that the Councilmen/Commissioners act differently toward the Department?" The responses to the first question were almost unanimous with 40 of 41 respondents picking Central City and 39 of these 40 expressing negative feelings about this citizens' input. The second set of responses from both departments elaborated on the City's structure with 32 of 33 answering the question. The reader is referred to pages 82-3 to confirm that the responses from both departments showed that the City government was of greater personal concern to the police.

In sum, whether the police were asked directly to compare the two political structures, were asked for information which inferred knowledge and thus importance of the structure, or were asked about their behavior, the responses consistently pointed to Central City as producing a greater effect from each of the three independent variables. What stands out is the clarity with which Central City's government was perceived by their police to be of more importance than was the County government to the Sheriff's deputies.

The outside experts, quoted in the three chapters, confirmed that there was both a greater perceived and a greater actual presence of the three variables in Central City and that this created: 1) a greater political awareness of the City government by their police, and 2) a greater reaction to it. Thus, although the independent variables were

not tested directly, there appears strong evidence that these three in combination predict the perceptual intervening variable.[14] At least I can say that the hypothesis is confirmed to the point that the greater the presence of these three, the greater the importance to the police of the political structure as an object of political trust. If this is so, then one might be able to employ just the objectively measurable independent variables (see Chapter 12) to predict the intervening variable without the time consuming and difficult interview process.[15]

The second hypothesis stated that the greater the feelings of trust importance, the more the motivation by the police to engage in political activity. In Chapter 4 two questions were asked which dealt with the officers' actual political behavior and that of their fellow officers. The first question, "When is the last time you attended a Board/Council meeting? How often do you go?" elicited responses with a great departmental variance. In the C.C.P.D. not one officer stated that he had never attended a meeting whereas 16 of 22 in the M.C.S.D. had never attended a meeting. To the second part of the question, 14 in the C.C.P.D. said they rarely went while 8 ranged from "80-85% of the time" to "will attend if interested." In the M.C.S.D. three high level command attended frequently, two Captains had been once and twice respectively and one deputy had been once.[16]

The second question was, "When issues of importance to the Department are discussed at Board/Council meetings, how do you usually get information on what happened--from fellow officers who were there?" Without repeating all the responses, the same pattern as in the above question evolved. In the M.C.S.D. three usually attended, four stated "weekly bulletin or departmental meetings" and all the rest stated that either they didn't get

information, got it via "hearsay/grapevine" or got it from external sources (e.g., "news media"). In the C.C.P.D. all but one said they regularly received information from fellow officers or went themselves.

From Chapter 5 comes a question which concerned the means the men felt were available to them and that they would use in attempting to influence those to whom they are accountable. "If there were an issue of importance to the department . . . which was being decided by the Board/Council, how would you go about trying to get a favorable decision?" Not one respondent in the M.C.S.D. mentioned the Union whereas every member of a union in the C.C.P.D. save one did so. The avenue of influence in the Sheriff Department seemed to be via the Sheriff or Undersheriff. The other major difference between the departments on this question seemed to be the sense of personal capability about having an impact through one's own individual actions. Compared to the M.C.S.D., where the men seemed to be saying that the Sheriff, Undersheriff or Captain X would perform the necessary or desirable actions, the C.C.P.D. officers gave the strong impression that they, personally, would get involved.

Combining the two questions from Chapter 4 (attendance at governing body meetings and how relevant information is disseminated) with the one from Chapter 5, it is apparent in the Sheriff Department that three men act as information gatekeepers concerning the political structure. Furthermore, through them is channeled the preponderance of political interaction with the elected or administrative officials. From the Captains down to and including the lowest ranks, the deputies felt content to let these three handle external political activities. Not so, however, with the C.C.P.D. There, the men had little rank consciousness with regard to political involvement and as has been illustrated, the

younger men in the lower ranks were more politically oriented than the older men in the higher ranks. Certainly, the top command has to share the political activity directed at other sets of authorities with the C.C.P.O.A., and at times with the Command Union, whether they like it or not.

Chapter 6 includes a question which discusses who, if anyone, the police turn to in the two communities to counteract the political pressure from the citizens on the political decision makers. Whereas roughly a third of the C.C.P.D. respondents either advocated the solicitation of political aid from groups or saw a moral dilemma in doing so (8 of 21), not one M.C.S.D. deputy did either. Additionally, in response to, "In your experience, which clubs, groups or organizations in the community have officers turned to for aid?", 13 of 22 C.C.P.D. officers were sufficiently aware politically to state they had no knowledge of direct attempts to develop external political alliances. By contrast, only two respondents in the M.C.S.D. caught the same dual potential the 13 men from the C.C.P.D. read into the question. Most of the M.C.S.D. (16 of 21) deputies responded by naming specific groups with whom they have had some interaction. In the C.C.P.D.'s secondary response, there were those officers who said that certain civic-service-fraternal organizations sought them out for political reasons and others who stated that for police-run, community projects, officers sought aid from the groups directly.

From the perspective of the officers in the two departments, then, a number of things are occurring with regard to influencing other sets of authorities. On the one hand, the Sheriff Department seems to feel minimal external pressures throughout the departmental hierarchy from

either the political structure or, through the structure, from the citizenry. Thus, boundary mechanisms with the decision makers are left to three men who, because of the low salience of the political structure, the deputies unanimously feel can handle the external environment to their satisfaction.[17] The Union is presently viable only at contract time and, although it has yet to be so used, is available as a grievance mechanism. To date it has not been utilized as a political resource. The men feel the Sheriff or Undersheriff will protect them from vague or unjust citizens' complaints and that as the mechanism for adjudication is an internal one, they will get a fair hearing. In addition the men have, at present, scant awareness of the potential or need for political alliances with community groups, although many are aware of the political source (right wing, etc.) of the support they gratefully receive.

On the other hand, throughout the hierarchy of the C.C.P.D., external pressures from the political structure and citizenry are keenly felt. In fact, there appears to be an inverse relationship occurring whereby the lower one goes in the ranks, the higher is the sense of noxious external political pressures. Translated into action, this makes for a department with internal strains. Many of the men in the C.C.P.O.A. feel they cannot allow the boundary mechanisms to be the purview of the top command.[18] Whether in support of top command or, when there are disagreements, in support of their own interests, the C.C.P.O.A. has become increasingly active in attempting direct influence upon other sets of authorities and in using the Union's resources to neutralize external restraints such as the Grievance Officer and the Citizen's Receipt Form. The Command Union is also aware that its collective body is a political resource but to date the men have used it more sparingly.[19]

With regard to the use of indirect means of influencing the authorities--third party groups from the community or elsewhere[20]--there seems to be an ideological split within Central City's department. Again it seems to be related to age and rank. A number of the younger officers advocate the utilization of third party political resources as well as direct political involvement such as endorsing and supporting political candidates financially. So far they appear to have been restrained from such overt activity. A second group of officers, some young, others not, are currently in the throes of a dilemma between supporting their interests "as would any vocal interest group" and an abstract "ideal" of law enforcement, apolitical "professional" behavior. A third group, the older men in the command, appear either not to think about indirect influence as a political tactic, to see it as unsavory, or to leave such activity to the bailiwick of the top command.

Outside expert commentary on political activity ran continuously through the three preceeding chapters. In conjunction with the narrations of specific police political activities, they confirmed the fact that within the Sheriff Department the deputies in the ranks below Undersheriff were only active, politically, when a few of the deputies aided the Sheriff in his quadrennial bid for partisan political reelection. Otherwise, they left the interface between the Department and the political structure, the Gamsonian influence perspective, to the three top administrators. A number of informants mentioned that with regard to direct influence on County government authorities, the Sheriff liberally used the news media (local radio and newspaper) and on occasion even called press conferences. Also, he, the Undersheriff or Captain X engaged in personal persuasion contacts with the decision makers to enhance the

interests of the department. No one else from the department seemed to get involved in such activities. Furthermore, the Sheriff was free to,and did on rare occasions, endorse local political candidates, especially when personally attacked or angered by their opposition.

As to soliciting indirect influence attempts on the authorities by third parties, the consensus was that the Sheriff did utilize such groups as made themselves available. Not much was done, they thought, about actively pursuing political support from specific citizens' groups although it wasn't beyond the realm of possibility. Certainly the news media was pressed into service to keep the public's attention as to the proper "image" and to manipulate their views. Examples are the haircutting episode and thus deviance labelling of "long hairs," the pot ordinance, and the intelligence vs. hard drug squad feud with Central City's Mayor. In general, support from a number of sources was volunteered and utilized when the community groups perceived a need to do so. The consensus was that, as a result of the current level of activity, the Sheriff felt he could go it alone when dealing with the authorities. Contacts with third parties was limited to social interaction through group memberships or the lunch-dinner, guest speaker circuit. Partisan political activity and influence attempts at the township or village level by the Sheriff or his men were seen as being minimal to nonexistent.[21]

In Central City, the observers felt both the anxiety of the police concerning external pressures and the acute awareness of the political structure which made men at all ranks react in the manner I have taken pains to describe as political. Many examples were cited with regard to direct influence attempts by officers ranging from patrolmen to the Chief.[22] There appears little doubt but as there is a greater level of

trust importance in Central City than in the County, so is there a greater press for direct political activity toward the authorities by the police.

With regard to third party solicitation for political support, the C.C. Department is at a disadvantage vis a vis the Sheriff Department. They lack the freedom at the top, possessed by the Sheriff, to openly utilize the public media. Thus, as a number of experts stated, third parties are sought out by the top command who spend large portions of time with such groups as the downtown business men's clubs and the Chamber of Commerce. In addition to telephonic communication, social contact is heavily used. The impression was left that there was greater interaction with community groups in Central City but that, at the lower ranks at least, the contacts were made by the external groups themselves.[23] The policy regarding news releases is more honored in the breach than any other way and the Chief is regularly heard on the radio or quoted in the local newspaper. The difference is one of self-restraint to which the Sheriff is unaccustomed.

Of course, the inherent disadvantage is somewhat nullified by the increasingly active and vocal C.C.P.D. unions, especially the C.C.P.O.A. They are aided by an obliging local news media who not only circulate their public releases but often actively seek out their thoughts. As was made clear, Central City can look forward to an increase in public statements supporting the interests of the nonsupervisory police officers. Also, a few informants prophesized the C.C.P.O.A. will branch out into and use the network of community groups as it becomes more politically knowledgeable.

In sum, then, it appears there is ample evidence to support the second hypothesis that the greater the trust importance placed in the political structure, the more the motivation or felt need by the police to engage in political activity. This leads to the generalization that an increase in external efforts to restrain and change a police department creates an increase in internal efforts to insulate and politicize that agency.[24]

Opportunity and Efficacy

One other theoretical issue must be discussed before I offer a few implications of the interaction between the police and the political structure. There are two aspects to the difference between motivation to engage in and actual political behavior. The first is an external factor and focuses upon "opportunity" while the second factor deals with a sense of personal or group "efficacy."

The officers of a department, as the result of a certain level of trust importance, feel the press for political behavior of a "given" amount toward the structure. It is entirely possible, though, because restraints are in place, that they may not have the opportunity to carry out their given amount of "need."[25] For example, it is hypothetically possible that upon completion of a study with a fairly large number of local police agencies, two departments might be found with a roughly equivalent trust importance level. However, one department might have engaged in considerably more actual political behavior toward the political structure than the other and thus, the possibility of opportunity to act is raised.[26]

I would suspect the following things might occur. The level of tension or anxiety would vary between the two departments. The department with the lower actual behavior might experience such items as a lowered

sense of "morale," greater alienation and sense of isolation from the community, greater bitterness toward political actors, a higher level of cynicism, a higher turnover rate, more early retirements, lower mental health and possible suicide attempts, a lower service output such as would be reflected in arrest rates, sporadic outbursts against certain elements of the citizenry and possibly more graft/criminality.[27]

The opportunity to act is expressed in the political process actually followed by the police which may support the formal regulative structures, may seek to subvert and destroy them or may prevent them from being developed. The discrepancy between the actual process and the procedures proscribed by the formal accountability-control structures is a measure of political behavior. Opportunity is created through: 1) the allowance by public officials of a discrepancy between the process and the formal structures to develop; or 2) a lack of such restraining regulative structures which leaves the police free to act as they choose. It is my thesis that in the latter case, although opportunity is greater, the press for political behavior is lower and thus less political behavior actually occurs.

In general, it makes intuitive sense that the greater the press to engage in political behavior, the less the opportunity to do so on a broad and unencumbered front. This follows from the manner by which the felt need develops--the effects of greater control, accountability and community political activity. Restraints operative in certain areas could create strains toward police activity in others. As an illustration, in Central City the police felt they lost the close relationship with the City Attorney's office and much of their ability to neutralize or persuade the Mayor and Council when the new Administration took office

in 1969.[28] This led to a heightening of anxiety, lower morale, talk about quitting (some actually did) and increased bitterness toward city personnel which in turn led to the formation of the Command Union, to the politicization of the C.C.P.O.A. and to the development of the above mentioned discrepancy. On the other hand, the Sheriff Department has the greater opportunity but lesser need for political behavior. Thus, although the Sheriff is free to say what comes to mind, there is actually considerably less overall political activity by the Sheriff Department toward County political structure.

Political efficacy is closely related to political trust but whereas the latter refers to "the general expectations (attitudes) people have about the quality of the product (outputs in the form of decisions) that the political system produces," efficacy refers to the general expectations people have about their ability to contribute significant inputs to the political system. "The efficacy dimension refers to people's perceptions of their ability to influence; the trust dimension refers to their perception of the necessity for influence."[29] The trust dimension, referred to in Chapter 2 as the type of trust (alienation, neutrality and confidence), will be discussed in Section III. The efficacy dimension has been an undercurrent running throughout this Section. When discussed in conjunction with the police, ability to influence or efficacy has an added component, whether they feel it is proper for police, per se, to engage in political activity.

We have already seen that within the C.C.P.D. there is a "generation gap" concerning this component of appropriateness. There are those officers who feel this sort of within-system political behavior is a major way to effectively represent their interests, others who are

wavering and a third set (and including all the Sheriff's deputies) who are either opposed to contributing inputs on moral grounds or are pre-efficacious.[30] For those officers who have worked through the propriety of political activity, knowledge of the structure plus a sufficiently high trust importance level raises the personal sense of efficacy.[31] When an issue or series of issues became sufficiently important to the Central City police, personal investment in the unions and group solidarity increased which had the consequence of increasing the resources of the unions. This occurred as a result of the perceived necessity of using them to influence the authorities.

In sum, the independent and intervening variables in this study assess the environmental impact and the causation of the political behavior which does occur. As I am interested in explaining only this dependent variable, I am not discussing the effects of the environment which might lead to other activities in place of political behavior. Thus, the concepts of efficacy and opportunity were introduced to clarify why in some cases motivation to act is not synonymous with political activity.[32]

Implications

With this clarification in mind, let's move to a few implications. As one outside expert informed me, police political awareness, the political use of their numbers and societal function, is only some two years or so old.[I] If this be so, then many departments must be going through a transition. Transition in the form of developmental levels is perhaps nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the three unions discussed in Chapter 4 and the effects they are having upon their

respective departments. A result of the relations between the political structure and the police is that those below the top administrative positions who do so, primarily apply direct influence upon civilian authorities through their associations cum unions. Evidence for this linkage between increased political awareness and the development and utilization of the unions comes from the C.C.P.D. with the M.C.S.D. providing an example of pre-transitional stability.

In today's modern department, political awareness means change and change is often in the form of "professionalization" or a "more professionalized" approach. The following are five disconnected quotes, out of which I shall draw a conclusion.

> I think we need to speculate on what the term professionalism means. I wonder what it's like to be a cop in a world of rising crime rates where the civilian population thinks the police are doing a lousy job of curbing crime and the violence and thus they are very vulnerable to the law and order cries of the right. There are, as I see it, three ways for the police to go: 1) the emotionally unsatisfying route of trying to educate the populace that no one is at fault, that there are certain deep seated socio-economic reasons for crime. This doesn't satisfy the public and besides, it's too sophisticated for them; 2) they can allow the public to attempt to scapegoat them as the fault and reason for all the crime increase. Obviously, this is unsatisfactory to them; or 3) another scapegoat must be found for why life is going to hell. I think there is a conscious effort by the police to shift blame from them to the 'real' causes of crime, knowing that the first route isn't going to satisfy anyone. So there are all sorts of efforts made--the Mayor, Democrats, Council, outside agitators, conspiracy theories, street people, etc. This, of course, is a ready made political issue for any who want to jump in and play the game with them. I think that the guts of the term professionalism is how (the Chief) could get morale to rise in the Department in an era of rising crime. II/33

A sergeant within the C.C.P.D. said:

> You hear a lot of talk and complaints about the Sheriff Department in Central City. I feel we strive for and achieve more professionalism at an earlier stage than the Sheriff Department. We live in a professional town. The citizens demand and have a right to get professionalism and we saw the

need a little sooner.

A lieutenant felt:

> I didn't really want to join the (Command) Union. Unions seem to take away from the dignity of attempts to professionalize. There's always the possibility of strikes or other skullduggery.[34]

The common strand running through these five quotes is that professionalization is a commodity which is: 1) a perceived panacea for external consumption--supposedly its infusion will produce a better "product" and is thus, at least partially, a political public relations gimmick; and 2) the creator of internal problems whereby member attachment, isolation from the public and tensions increase. The use of professionalization, therefore, contributes to the politicization of a department through the necessity of relying upon an image to avoid being scapegoated and to appear modern. In turn, professionalization contributes to the unionization of a department as a reaction to the internal tensions which develop between the ranks. In addition, anything which tends to politicize a department contributes to unionization as unions are the vehicle for political expression. In short, as the following informants detail, unions are intimately related to and the agitating agents for strains toward rather unusual structural changes in the C.C.P.D.

> There is a relationship between intelligence in the individual police officer and his sense of being political ("political means that they attempt to influence the policy set by the decision makers"). Take as an example (the University in Eastern City). They used to hire the typical simpletons for campus cops. Now they are hiring grad students and the (campus) police have become exceedingly political. Compare this with the (Eastern City) Department which has maintained the same men, the same level of following policy and the normal social order--they are just being sort of traditional apolitical cops.
>
> . . . to the degree that they (police) beat the shit out of people they are the traditional dumb cops and the best example

> I can think of is the Sheriff Department. There is another relationship, between the use of brutality and intelligence. You hardly ever find the intelligent young cops beating on people unless they just lose their cool now and then . . . . They (the young) look at the world in terms of their own well-being. The easiest way to get ahead is to create a bigger system--a larger bureaucratic structure--rather than just waiting around for the guys ahead of them to retire. Also, they are hung up on the rules. They want clear and definite guidelines because it lets them know where they are and what to do in their insurmountable task of being told what not to do.[III]

A member of the C.C.P.D. in discussing the future of the C.C.P.O.A.[35] said, "Hopefully, (it) will be a tool to making this (department) a professional organization--to upgrade the caliber of men we hire, a better wage scale, better working conditions and improving our public image."[IV]

Finally, from a privileged source a requote from Chapter 4:

> There is a slowly developing feeling that the Association should and can be involved in inputs into (police administrative) policy decisions. The Association is now engaged in direct discussions with top command. The command feels they are being passed by, that the chief and deputy chief are responding to the Association with things that haven't been cleared up the command line . . . . Because of the changes in the structure via the dual unions, there currently exists a lack of definition of what should go through the command and what should go directly to the top.[V]

This informant felt that where decisions concerning existing rules and regulations are concerned, going up through the line isn't going to get the Association members anywhere because such decisions are made at the top level "where they should be made." As was said in Chapter 4, he feels "these decisions should be made by representatives of the two unions sitting down with top command . . . . Something that will inevitably come to happen." Before I discuss the implications of this, a few words about relations within the Association.

In discussion with this informant, it became apparent there is a split within the Association between the bright young, upwardly mobile officers and the older patrolmen who have been around for six or more years and know they aren't going anywhere in the department.[36] This mixture is the basis for some of the confusing pattern of political behavior by the Association.[37] "The younger ones are more progressive in their thinking and much more willing to not abide by the more traditional thinking of the old timers."[38]

In responding to a question about the union leadership the informer said:

> There is a tendency to have some of the older people (3-6 years experience) be the leaders but each year there are a few new young faces on the executive board. Although each year there has been a new president, there are no limitations in the by-laws on the length of time a person can be president or on the executive board.

Thus, it appears the Association is fairly free of a ruling elite and the positions of authority are open to those seen as either the most desirable or the most zealous.

There is one further point worth making and this concerns a potential check upon the actions of the C.C.P.O.A. by the police administrators. A peculiar situation exists in which success or compliance can spell the end of participation by an individual in the Association. A particularly active, able or bothersome-to-his-superiors, leader can be promoted out of his position of influence into the least influential position (corporal) in the Command Union. This could create a dilemma for those young men who are organizationally or politically motivated as they must choose between a position of some power in the department and the desire for success via promotion. On the other hand, playing ball with the top command

while president could lead to a leg up on the promotion ladder.[39]

In conclusion, the C.C.P.O.A. is undergoing a transition from a traditional quasi-job oriented, social and benevolent society to an organization whose primary mission is the promotion of the members' broader interests. This transition is being led by the new, young and brighter officers. In reacting to their external environment, the young officers see political activity, including the modern "professional" departmental image approach, as a primary means of advancing their cause. The emerging political philosophy seems to be the extant "interest group pluralism" in which the Association is perceived as the agent for getting the rights everyone else already has, as well as acquiring newly evolving rights.[40]

This battle is carried on both within the outside the police agency with the targets of influence being civilian authorities, police administrators and their immediate supervisors--anyone whom they perceive as having the capability of denying them their rights or blocking their development. Two results of this emergent political awareness are: 1) the politicization of the department with regard to its external environment as the officers collectively combine political savvy with political efficacy; and 2) the democraticization of the department internally as they progressively reject the oppressive aspects of the para-military, bureaucratic structure.[41] In sum, an unanticipated consequence of increasing restraints from the external political structure is internal pressures toward sharing departmental authority and structural rearrangement. As this is a developing phenomenon, it is unclear what the long range effects will be both to the Central City Department and to its external environment.[42]

To generalize from this department to all local police agencies is a risky business but I'll do so by briefly outlining what I think are developmental levels in the politicization of police associations and through them, their departments. The Teamster's Union in the Sheriff Department can be regarded as existing at a pre-political level. It is used neither as a political resource to enhance external gains for the men and their Department nor as a vehicle by the lower rank deputies to effect alterations in the structural status quo of the Department. Although there are two sections to this Teamster's unit--command and noncommand--there has been no interest in splitting them in two. Therefore, as the deputies perceive a low trust importance of the political structure, there is little reaction of a political nature and partial inclusion (personal involvement) in the Union is low. This in turn creates fewer tensions within the Department which leads to its pre-political state.

The Command Union in Central City stands between this pre-political level and the C.C.P.O.A. on the brink of the nascent political level. Although their Union is a bit more salient, to date the members have utilized it only sparingly. External threat led to its inception and with regard to the environment, the Union is turned to by its members only when issues return to that perceived level of threat, as in the BAM incident. Otherwise, its function is as a bargaining agent at contract time. There is a paradox in its relations to the C.C.P.O.A. If the C.C.P.D. had been a one union department, the Command Union, I predict, would have become more political more rapidly as a result of the high level of the importance of trust variable. However, the C.C.P.O.A. took some of the pressure off with their more active political partisanship.

On the other hand and with regard to internal affairs, Association democraticization efforts may force the command to turn increasingly to their Union and develop more group solidarity to prevent incursions upon what they perceive as their rightful domain. This mobilization of resources (greater partial inclusion) may have the catalytic effect of politicizing them with regard to environmental events as well.

The C.C.P.O.A. is into the nascent political state and if the vision of its future, as related by several of its members, is borne out, it is well on its way to the full political level. The C.C.P.O.A. has to date been primarily a reactive body utilizing direct influence attempts both externally and as it became more active, internally. The latter has had an effect on the top command and as we have seen, the C.C.P.D. is more heavily politicized than the M.C.S.D. and in the throes of transition. The full political level has, therefore, yet to be reached in the C.C.P.D. Although I believe it has yet to be reached elsewhere, as well, there are Departments which come closer to being full fledged interest groups vying openly in the political arena as partisan political actors for scarce resources. This, I believe, is what the future holds in store for the police and the gist of Section Two.

CHAPTER 7

Footnotes

1. This portion of the model, then, states that the three structural variables are independent ones which predict the intervening variable of importance of trust in the political structure. This intervening variable in turn, predicts part of the dependent variable. I said in Chapter One that this model is only concerned with the external relations of the police as causing political activity and thus, plausible explanations for such behavior emanating from internal factors are not considered here.

2. Remember that I stated this was an exploratory study and it would be possible in a two case study to compare the level of the variables in the two governments--that is, that the County was higher or lower than the city--but that I would not be in a position to measure or test the variables themselves.

3. An example of this possible administrative protection is the following excerpt from the C.C. News of August 19, 1970. The incident itself will be covered in Chapter 10.

   > Demands came that the officers involved be suspended until the case has been thoroughly investigated and all the facts had been presented . . . . The youths asked (the City Administrator) to suspend them.
   >
   > 'No,' (he) said, 'I don't approve of suspending the officers. I'm not about to take a stand against the police because I have the facts as they presented them.' The audience also demanded that (the) Police Chief be allowed to speak on the suspension but (the Administrator) did not permit this.

4. To continue the example cited in footnote 3, if accountability had been direct and the Council had as a consequence of the incident moved to set up a citizen's board to oversee police operations, control would have become more immediate. As it was, the Administrator stepped in to cover for the Police.

5. For example, it might prove impossible to measure the difference to the police of the effects of a civilian review board involved in policy input vs. the effects of an external Grievance Officer for citizens' complaints. Therefore, to avoid this quagmire I have combined the two to predict the perceptual intervening variable.

6. This is based on the ideas developed in Chapter 3, the greater the perceived ability of the structure to constrain the "freedom" of the police, the more there is an urge to engage in offsetting political behavior.

7. Perhaps the Mideast Sheriff represents a special situation where, although accountability is direct, the attendant pressures are felt most keenly only at election time. This, of course, is idiosyncratic as other elected county law enforcement officials may not be as autonomous. Central City was placed between the two left cells because under the current administration, the elected officials (Mayor and Council) have both instituted mechanisms such as the Grievance Officer which are accountable to them and usurped some of the functions normally performed by the City Manager. Under the former Republican administration, I would have placed Central City on the border between the lower left and the lower right cells. This illustrates the points that individual departments vary over time and that it is important to utilize a discrete time block when reporting on a department.

8. Briefly, CPA is measured by using a weighted set of criteria which would be scaled and split into the two categories.

9. There is an interesting possibility that once the police are politicized by the interaction with their own environment, they become generally more politically aware. Evidence for this assertion is the two questions asked of the departments in which each was to give: 1) the number of elected legislators within their own government, and 2) the number of elected legislators of the other's political structure (i.e., C.C. respondents were asked the number of elected County Commissioners and the M.S.D. respondents the number of elected City Councilmen). For the County government the C.C.P.D. respondents gave exactly the same number (8) of correct responses, were closer with accurate gueses (7-5), and had fewer "don't knows" (5-7) than the M.C.S.D. respondents. With regard to the City, the divergence was even greater. Nineteen of 23 C.C.P.D. respondents gave the correct response with 0 "don't knows" while there were 14 "don't knows" and only 2 correct answers in the M.C.S.D. The same pattern of responses was recorded with the tricky question about the number of County Commissioners elected from Central City where the correct answer responses were 5 for the C.C.P.D. and 3 for the M.C.S.D., near misses were 7-3 and "don't know," 7-11.

10. Respectively for the M.C.S.D.--1, 10, 8, and for the C.C.P.D.--1, 1, 1, with 3 of the C.C.P.D. refusing to answer the third question.

11. This was based on the fact that 13 of 21 in the M.C.S.D. gave "money" as a single response and 7 gave it as one of two responses. However, in the C.C.P.D. all of the 23 officers, save one, gave <u>at least</u> two responses with only 5 even mentioning money (one gave it as his first response).

12. See page 193 for the other 13 responses.

13. Later in this Chapter, I will discuss the evolution of the police with regard to political activities and suggest several development stages. Data such as this will be important there.

14. It may be, for example that just one or two or some other structural variable or variables are the true causal factors.

15. As stated in Chapter 2, the interviews with the law enforcement officers were to establish the intervening variable while the outside experts were used to confirm the levels of the independent variables and as a check on the intervening variable.

16. Recall, also, that four deputies with former C.C.P.D. service had never been to a County governmental body meeting but all had regularly or on occasion attended Council meetings when with the City.

17. This is most clearly observed in the attitudes of the five deputies with previous C.C.P.D. experience. None expressed any desire to behave in a political manner toward the other authorities whereas all felt the C.C.P.D. had and continue to have a motivation to act upon the external pressures.

18. There is much evidence for this. Primarily it deals with the feelings that the four top command officers are, perforce, controlled by the political administrative authorities. Evidence for this is the question, "If they (citizen groups) do try to cause trouble for you or the department, who can you count on to support you?" In the C.C.P.D. 8 of 9 members of the C.C.P.O.A. mentioned their Union while only 1 of 8 members of the Command Union mentioned it. Not one officer in either union mentioned the top command. In the M.C.S.D., 6 of 9 deputies responded with the Sheriff and 5 of 8 deputies at the sergeant's level or above mentioned the Sheriff. Conversely, not one deputy mentioned their Teamsters union.

19. This reflects, perhaps, the fact that there is a larger portion of the membership who still feel that, somehow, law enforcement and "politics" don't mix.

20. Examples of "elsewhere" are higher government level law enforcement agencies or professionally related associations.

21. Except with regard to local law enforcement officials where the Sheriff needed them to support such items as his C.O.G. tri-county intelligence squad. This, of course, includes attempts to control the C.C. Chief.

22. Examples from Chapters 4-6 are legion--use of the former City Attorney, the current Prosecutor and the Sheriff, the utilization of the City Administrator for insulation and protection as in the BAM incident, attendance and appeals at Council meetings, personal contacts, the formation and use of the Command Union to thwart the intentions of Council with regard to lateral command transfer, the politicization

of the C.C.P.O.A., the neutralization of the Grievance Officer, press releases, defamation of character as in the ad hominum attacks on the Mayor during the BAM affair, the use of constraint attempts such as linking the pot ordinance with higher crime rates or the oft used threat of lowered morale and large scale resignations, the insulation attempts such as the insistence on keeping personnel records and the control of access by the Deputy Chief, the Community Relations Division, the lack of public records concerning citizen complaints against the department, etc. Of course the insulation efforts are also true of the Sheriff Department including the entire complaints process but there have been scant few of the kinds of attempts by the citizenry or authorities to change them in the County as there have been in Central City.

23. Remember, for example, the debate by the C.C.P.O.A. over whether or not to actively endorse the Republican Mayoral candidate (April, 1971) who worked extremely hard to gain such an endorsement.

24. Insulation has not been discussed but it can be seen as an adjunct to efforts at constrainment by the authorities. One of the things that decision makers most need to institute constraints or changes is information, thus the creation of Presidential Commissions (among other reasons) and the Central City Ad Hoc Citizen's Police-Community Relations Committee. Access to police activities and information is controlled by the police and as the Grievance Officer and the 3-man investigative committee in the BAM incident found out, can be difficult if not impossible to obtain.

25. Examples of lack of opportunity caused by restaints might be the non recognition of police unions, autocratic employment policies practiced by the top police administrator, or the presence of an unusually powerful Mayor.

26. In this study with regard to the influence perspective the situation did not arise as there was a substantial difference between the trust importance levels. If the situation had arisen, then a closer look for the impediments to opportunity would have been necessary.

27. Also, these things would be more likely to occur in any department with a higher trust importance level when compared to one with a lower level and might easily be alternatives to the dependent variable presented in this study. Certainly many of the items listed occur in the C.C.P.D. when compared to the M.C.S.D. The issue will be taken up again in Section III where there appear to be differences in opportunity for political behavior vis a vis the citizenry.

28. Recall as examples, the loss of closeness between the police and the City Administrator and the attacks upon the Mayor.

29. Gamson, Power and Discontent, op. cit., p. 42.

30. By pre-efficacious I mean those who feel it is unnecessary to influence authorities to obtain favorable outcomes, those few who haven't thought about it and those who feel it will do no good or will have a reverse effect on the authorities and in the community.

31. Gamson refers to a Ph.D. dissertation by Jeffery M. Paige on Collective Violence and the Culture of Subordination and says: "Paige's strategy was to use a measure that is uncontaminated by trust but quite highly related to efficacy--namely, a measure of political information." In Political Trust and It's Ramifications, op. cit., p. 12.

32. I would hypothesize that where the intervening variable of Section Two is low, there would be a close correlation between motivation to engage in and actual political behavior. This, as we shall see in Section III, is especially true of behavior toward the citizenry as there would be little felt need to interact with the political structure.

33. "Whereas the professionalization of other occupations might be looked upon as very desirable by the general population, its emergence here (in the police) serves to aggravate an already sensitive relationship between the police and the public. Becoming more expert and more unreproachable in the restriction of behavior may be interpreted quite negatively . . . . (Thus) the profession may become isolated from other occupations and the general public." John P. Clark, Isolation of the Police, op. cit., p. 128.

34. "A recent study of police reform indicates that the process of reform, centralization - professionalization heightens the significance of the organization rather than the public as a source of police self-esteem. It implies also that the reform process has increased member attachment--a necessary requisite to any eventual decentralization. Another study of a department in the throes of change indicates that traditional techniques of control coupled with professionalization . . . which often arrives in a department in the form of crisis-produced reform . . . creates a punishment-centered bureaucracy with high levels of uncertainty among young officers and a consequent emphasis on personal ingratiation with superiors. In this department the formal rules seem more a set of opportunities for punishing officers than a set of bureaucratic imperatives." Bordua and Reiss. Law Enforcement, op. cit., p. 293.

35. The readers may wish to refresh their memories of the C.C.P.O.A. by re-reading the final few pages of Chapter 4.

36. The choice of year "six" was a fairly arbitrary one by me. The informant thought that by then most men "know pretty well what the score is."

37. Chapters 4-6 include some of the issues upon which the C.C.P.O.A. chose to make a public statement. It is also known that the Republican Mayoral nonendorsement was debated hotly and about evenly. In addition,

two members agreed, concerning a political advertisement for the incumbent Mayor in the C.C. News two days prior to the April, 1971 election, that they were very upset over the Mayor "taking credit for the things in the police advertisement. If the big ad hadn't occurred the Saturday prior to the Monday election, we (the C.C.P.O.A.) would have blasted him." In addition, one of the men was equally upset with a heroin raid which occurred just before the election and was given substantial news coverage. "I would certainly rather of seen it after the election because it made it look like the Mayor was cracking down on (hard) drugs." Another officer said, "In the future it is possible we will become more political. I was all for coming out in the C.C. News saying that we do not support (the) Mayor and saying what we disagreed with. (X) wanted our support. We didn't want to go political because then every press release would be seen as political."

38. Or, as another of many who commented on this said, "The younger cops are the ones more able to swing with the new ideas than the older ones. Also, the younger ones are more intelligent and it seems that the more intelligent they are, the less willing they are to go along with things by the book. In specific situations they'll question the time-worn way of doing things."[V]

39. With regard to such promotions, one interviewed officer said, "It seems to be an unwritten policy around here that (C.C.P.O.A.) presidents get promoted." On promotions in general, two other officers commented, "A lot of brown nosing goes on--(there are) a lot of guys with stripes who shouldn't have them . . . (and) the order of importance for promotions is: (1) ass kissing--nice personality, (2) work, (3) complaints record. The guys who work the hardest are the most vulnerable and get the most complaints filed against them. Most of the best cops are still patrolmen. The hard workers get tired of filling out forms, taping, etc., on complaints and end up telling some command (officer) to stuff it. It's the accusations that are important, not whether you're guilty or not A few (good ones) make it, made it, before the complaint system (was introduced). We don't sweat the Grievance Officer. We don't answer that S.O.B.--no one gets worried. You have to worry about the people who come in and see the Chief. If they see the Mayor, we've got even more problems."[VI]

40. Theodore J. Lowi has an excellent discussion of this prevalent model of our political system in The End of Liberalism. W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1969.

41. The same strains are developing in the U. S. Army as the incidents of "fragging" and open discussions concerning the carrying out of orders by such small groups as squads, patrols, etc., in Indochina illustrate. Again, it is the bright young men who are questioning the traditional authority structure.

42. With regard to the future of police unions, one informant's idea is to organize as many different police agencies as possible in the Mideast County area. The plan would be to get about 1000 law enforcement officers and then get a Charter for them to form their own Local. (Right now all Teamster's police units in the Southeastern part of the State belong to Local XXX). "About 1000 are needed to sustain a Local autonomously. It would be the first such union in the USA which deals, collectively, with cities and counties as an 'independent' union. They would elect their own officers from among their own local police units. I think this would be great for them to have their own union. Furthermore, it would aid them in organizing more of the local departments because they wouldn't have to deal with all of the scare tactics used by the various politicians about the threat of strikes, using the Teamsters or the ability of the Teamsters to threaten the politicians with sympathy strikes."[VII]

CHAPTER 8

Blue Power and the People--An Introduction

I stated in Chapter One that the police face a dual set of obligations within our circular political system: to other sets of public authorities--the influence perspective of Section Two--and to the citizenry or the social control perspective. I also outlined in Chapter 3 the two items in a locality which were of paramount concern to the police, namely, favorable decisions from the authorities and positive support from its populace. These dual expectations, mirroring their obligations, were said to be based upon the trust relationship a police department has with its community. Section Two dealt with their sense of the importance of trust and related it to potential outcomes from the political structure. This Section focuses upon the other ingredient of political trust, the direction or type of trust, and discusses the interaction between a community's police force and its citizenry. As we shall see, the direction of trust--from alienation through neutrality to confidence--is related to the social characteristics of the citizenry.

But before we look at this relationship between the police and their clientele, a few concepts about the nature of the political involvement of the citizenry must be explored. I shall first discuss their political behavior as a collective activity and then link this activity to all the citizenry within any governmental entity.

Political Behavior as Collective

Gamson in his work on an alternate theory to pluralism utilizes a model which depicts actual and potential political behavior as a collective activity by the citizenry. He relates this collective activity to a government via the concept of the direction of trust. Confidence, neutrality and alienation are the three types which comprise the direction of trust. They become the social cement by which collectivities are attached to the political system. Evans in a 1968 working paper then linked this model to three levels of group organization--quasi, solidary and interest group--and to the traditional literature of political behavior as a group phenomenon.[1] The essence of these works is that group behavior becomes the organizational backbone for the great majority of political actors and activities within any governmental entity.[2]

Tilly in an unpublished paper supports this contention by stating:

> . . . the elastic word 'group' stretches from nearly unorganized categories like southerners to highly disciplined organizations like the Nazis. The word is nevertheless essential, for it calls attention to the large extent to which the participants in political life are organized groups rather than individuals . . . (and, later, in discussing a strategy for measuring mobilization). The procedure depends on the assumption that no group will ever form which is not definable in terms of some combination of status distinctions already in use within the population.[3]

Among other possibilities, political groups can be differentiated by their degree of formal organization, (footnote one), by a ten point scale of mobilization which Tilly has formulated,[4] or by their relative position within the polity as I discuss below. Gamson postulates a partition of political collectivities into two categories--represented and unrepresented groups--or those within and those outside the political system. Represented groups meet either of the following conditions:

1) There exists some significant set of authorities in whom the group has political confidence; or

2) There exists some interest group in which the solidary (represented) group has confidence, and there exists some significant set of authorities in which this interest group has confidence.[5]

An unrepresented group meets neither of these conditions.

Gamson argues in support of his Stable Unrepresentation Model that:

> The American political system normally functions to: 1) keep unrepresented groups from developing solidarity and politically organizing, and 2) discourage their effective entry into the competitive establishment (the collection of represented groups and authorities) if and as they become organized. The competitive establishment is boundary-maintaining, and the boundary-maintaining process involves various kinds of social control, (ibid., p. 20).[6]

Tilly develops essentially the same thesis concerning the boundary-maintaining process of political systems in general. He visualizes three entities within a defined population:

> FIRST, the principal formal structure exerting control over the legitimate means of coercion: the government.
>
> SECOND, a number of groups sometimes engaging in collective action and contending for influence over the operations of the government, but varying in coherence and strength: the contenders.
>
> THIRD, a smaller set of the contenders actually sharing power, (albeit unequally) over the government, having routine means of influencing each other and exerting some collective control over which groups belong to their number: the members of the polity; for short the polity, (op. cit. p. 3).

He builds upon Gamson's dichotomy and envisions four categories of political collectivities, two within the polity--those remaining inside and those inside but losing favor (i.e., on their way out)--and two outside the polity--those outside but actively engaged in vying for admittance and those outside which are lying dormant.[7]

In summation, two points have been developed. First, political activity is primarily group oriented and takes place within a dynamic


and fluid political process whereby groups have a differing degree of access to the public authorities. And secondly, this access or, in some cases, actual entry into the political arena is at least partially determined by the authorities and represented groups (polity) through some form of social control.

As the police are authorities within the system and the locus of this study, we must look beyond the relationship between the political establishment and citizenry as potential partisans to the interface between sets of authorities as well. I have devised a diagram which considers this additional factor and places all political actors--ten categories of collectivities, both authorities and citizens--in juxtaposition to each other. This Diagram of Centrality, a heuristic device, is divided into three areas. The first area, as shown in Figure D, represents the formal public government and is located in the square at the center. The middle or circular boundary is the hypothetical demarcation of the political arena--Gamson's competitive establishment and Tilly's polity. The outermost, octagonal line is the boundary of the political unit with all the inhabitants--be they citizens, aliens, transients or slaves--included.

The ten categories of political collectivities are meant to be exhaustive but not mutually exclusive. Therefore, any group at a given point in time could be placed in a maximum of only two categories.[8] Location is based upon the perception of the group with regard to their direction of political trust in the extant public authorities. The ten categories are not necessarily ranked in any order of political "power" but according to their perceived potential for favorable outcomes from the public authorities. The ten numbers represent the schematic placement of the categories ennumerated below the diagram.

FIGURE D

Diagram of Centrality Within a Given Locality



CATEGORIES OF (POTENTIAL) POLITICAL COLLECTIVITIES

1. Non-elected administrative decision makers within the public government.
2. Elected decision makers within the public government.[9]
3. Agencies within the public government--city/county departments, commissions (quasi-public groups), judicial system, attached public service agencies.
4. Groups which act as agents for the public government--professional organizations, associations, unions, preferred interest groups (e.g., Farm Bureau to Department of Agriculture).
5. Groups with a favorable (confident) trust relation to public authorities (e.g., businessmen's clubs, J.C.'s, civic and service organizations, etc.).
6. Groups with a favorable (confident) trust relation to police as authorities.
7. Groups with a neutral trust relation to public authorities.
8. Groups with a neutral trust relation to police as authorities.
9. Groups with an unfavorable (alienated) trust relation to public authorities (e.g., minority groups--blacks, chicanos, youth, etc.).
10. Groups with an unfavorable (alienated) trust relation to police as authorities.

In this scheme, the police would be represented by category three unless the top command is elected directly which would place them in category two. The three police unions are represented by category four. This diagram succinctly illustrates the two-way predicament of the police in our circular governmental system. The internal relationship between categories 1-4 with the addition of political inputs from the other categories was the subject matter of Section Two. The relationship of the police agencies to categories 4-10, the social control perspective, is to be the focus of this Section.

The Direction of Trust

Chapter 3 presented the intervening variable of trust importance. This Chapter introduces the other intervening variable--the direction of trust. To understand it, we must look at the composition of the community's populace rather than at the interaction between the structure and the police. We have seen in the diagram of centrality a hypothetical model of how a given community can be politically divided in terms of their trust in the public authorities.[10] What do the three trust types used in this model mean and why is the direction of trust important to the police?

These three aspects of political trust in relation to groups of potential partisans,

> can be defined as the probability of obtaining preferred outcomes from the political system even when this system is left untended (i.e., no influence is attempted). A preferred outcome is one that is regarded as most favorable to one's interests when they conflict with those of others or as the most efficient for the system as a whole.
>
> The probability of receiving preferred outcomes without doing anything to bring them about--let me call this P_b--can range

> from 0. to 1.0. Although the trust variable is continuous, it is convenient to describe three pure points on the dimension for the purposes of discussion. Confidence is the belief that for any given decision, $P_b = 1.0$. For a group to have confidence in authorities means that it perceives them as its agents, that the group members identify with them. Neutrality is the belief that for any given decision, $P_b = .5$. Neutrality toward authorities means that a group believes that such authorities are moderately competent and efficient in achieving collective (public) goals . . . . On questions of conflict, a group with a neutral attitude regards the authorities as indifferent and disinterested. Finally, alienation is the belief that for any given decision, $P_b = 0$. Alienation from authorities means that they are regarded as incompetent and stupid in achieving collective goals and biased against the group in handling conflicts of interest. They are anti-agents of the group, the agents of groups with conflicting goals.[11]

Why is the direction or type of trust of importance to the police? Gamson argues that "a plausible theoretical argument can be made that the means of influence that a partisan group directs against a set of authorities will tend to emphasize a dominant means," (ibid., p. 11) and is related to the trust orientation of that group. In turn, "(T)he trust orientation of (partisan) groups is not only related to the means of influence used but to the social control response as well."[12] A hypothetical relationship exists between different status defined political groups in the community and the manner in which the police will react to them. It is, therefore, important to the police in terms of how they act to know what their trust situation is in the community. In short, the intervening variable of direction of trust is the police's overall perception of how their community's populace view them--with confidence, neutrality or alienation. The prediction of the dependent variable of press to engage in political behavior is that as the trust direction varies along the continuum from confidence to alienation, motivation increases.

The source of this press to engage in political behavior differs from the pressures felt by the police from the political structure.

In Section Two I discussed community political activity as an input to the political structure while dealing with the relationship between the police and other sets of authorities. Here in Section Three, I look at social and political characteristics of the populace as they bear upon a direct relationship between the citizenry and the police. These characteristics affect the dozens, even hundreds, of daily interactions that each officer makes. As Westley says:

> It is with the public that the policeman is most concerned. He is its hero, its aid, its servant, its disciplinarian, and its avenger. It is the public that the police must differentiate, define, protect himself from, and contend with. The most important part of his time, the greatest part of his energies, his future, and his prestige are involved with the public . . . . The theme of an enemy public that threatens and criticizes binds the policeman's group to isolation and secrecy. It is an occupational directive, a rule of thumb, the sustenance and the core of meanings. From it the definitions (of the police) flow and conduct is regulated for the general and the particular.[13]

Before proceeding to the independent variables, I shall refresh the memory on political activity by the police in their role as social control agents. In Chapter One I said there were two forms of such political behavior--reaction and proaction--which normally occurred in combination when addressed to a target. In either activity the target must be politically active groups whose behavior the police are aware will have consequences for their set of interests.

Reactive political behavior occurs when the police become involved with citizen partisans who are in the process of trying to influence public decisions. The reaction is against the content and the source of the influence. Attempts to utilize, neutralize or deprecate the potential effects of such influence upon legitimate authority is political behavior.[14]

Proactive political behavior is more easily understood because it is better known and creates the potential for more grave consequences. An activity which is meant to channel, control or constrain future influence attempts by partisan groups upon any actor within the political system is proactive political behavior. Here, the target consists of the source of future influence attempts. It includes those targets which the police identify as being in their own best interests to act against.[15] Examples of this type of behavior are obvious: harassment, the illegitimate or extra-legal use of authority (e.g., illegal searches or seizures, brutality), political intelligence activities (e.g., wire-tapping, bugging, infiltration, etc.), intimidation (e.g., threats, etc.), false arrests or multiple arrest charges, and the utlimate constraint, deadly force.

Social Diversity

I stated in Chapter One and reiterated in the diagram of centrality that there were at least three general sets of perspectives by which the police are viewed. Quite aware of these conflicting attitudes, as Westley has aptly demonstrated, the police are fully equipped with their own cognitive mappings of the perceptions carried by various status-defined population segments toward them. As cues are received, the police constantly reinforce their own stereotypical beliefs, and when necessary, develop new ones. It seems logical that the magnitude of variations in trust by the citizenry toward the police is partially dependent on the social diversity of the community. The more divergent and numerous the solidary groups, the greater the potential for cross-group disagreement and disparate conceptions of the police.

Directly following from that would be the increased difficulty with which the police can rely upon relatively unambiguous cues of either a positive or negative nature. The higher the social divergence in a community, the more the perceptual inputs to the police will be mixed and tend toward increased ambiguity. This ambiguity leads: 1) to increased pressures to differentiate between the cue senders; 2) to increased anxiety and tension concerning the overall trust direction of the community; and 3) to increased efforts to offset the potential political effects of the negative attitudes while reinforcing the positive ones. The prediction from the independent social diversity variable to the intervening direction of trust variable is that the more social diversity is present, the more the police will perceive the direction of trust as tending toward alienation.

Social diversity is continuous and, of course, varies between communities. There are communities which have very few relevant divisions along "ascriptive, attitudinal or behavioral cleavages," and of course those with numerous and large ones.[16] In those communities where the status defined population segments are few or similar, life styles and values of the populace will tend to mean a shared set of interests. As a consequence, police will readily discern the direction of trust radiating from this common bond, ambiguity will be low and behavior relatively stable. Communities at the opposite pole will evince a converse set of solidary groups with their multivaried interests having the opposite predicted effects upon the police. Chapter 9 will present illustrations of the difference between the two communities studied. As you might expect from Section Two, Central City has more social diversity--more solidary groups

divided by cleavages--than does the portion of Mideast County the Sheriff Department patrols. In turn the C.C.P.D. is, as we have seen, considerably more tense and anxious than the M.C.S.D.

However, by itself, social diversity will not accurately predict the community's direction of trust as perceived by the police. The following two examples will demonstrate the social diversity encompasses only a portion of the relationship. They illustrate that: 1) high social diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for differing trust types within a community to develop; and 2) low social diversity, as in the second example, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for community cohesion and does not guarantee a similar trust relationship. In both examples, another characteristic of the community is needed to understand the development of differing trust types. I have identified this characteristic as socio-political exclusion.

Community A has a highly diverse population with a fairly large number of solidary units. From my earlier statements, logic would predict the police should feel pressured to ferret out the different cue senders, should feel greater anxiety and as a result be more withdrawn or isolated. In addition, there should be pressure to engage in political behavior to offset negative political inputs. But, in Community A all the solidary units are represented within the political system and thus enjoy at least a neutral if not a confident trust relationship with the authorities.

Community B, for example a southern, small-to-middle sized city, has few cleavages. The norms of the community are understood and are currently being honored. However, a fairly large percentage of the population is outside the political system and its interests are un-represented. Should this segment of the populace develop an active

alienated stance toward the vie for representation within the system, a considerable social control problem could develop for the police. Certainly the police comprehend the situation and are alert to the potential conflicts inherent in the Community. Although social diversity is lower in Community B than in A, political behavior by the police is of greater likelihood should the suggested and, elsewhere oft-observed events occur.[17]

Socio-Political Exclusion

I stated that to obtain the direction of trust variable we had to look at the composition of a community's populace. Social diversity, (the manner in which a community is divided into groups) and socio-political exclusion, (the members of the community excluded from its operation) are the critical social characteristics of a community which predict the intervening variable. Below I discuss the concept of exclusion and then I shall briefly outline the strength the two possess when combined.

The citizenry provides the impetus to a local political structure in the United States and this input dictates much of the basis for incumbent role behavior by officials and executives. Although they have, as we have seen, differing degrees of freedom to operate, " . . . political reality requires elected officials (and their administrators) to take popular opinion into account."[18] Popular opinion reflects the interests of the diverse groups which make up the polity and the polity with its dominant trust relation provides at least broad directional guidelines. In short, if there were no constituency influence process to provide this direction, a given community would be a closed, nonresponsive system with Figure B in Chapter 7 (crossing control with accountability

within the political structure) providing an adequate descriptive model.[19]

If we define the polity as those participating in the electoral process, more than just the polity and the community political activity variable are necessary to tap trust directionality. We must take all the members of a community into account. Crain, et al., speak to this point specifically:

> (O)ne can argue that politics may not be a salient area of expression for those low in the status or economic hierarchies . . . . Indeed, in the United States politics has rarely been a vehicle for the expression of lower class disaffection, (ibid., p. 42).

Schattschneider a decade ago saw this point and wrote:

> The vice of the (interest group pluralism) theory is that it conceals the most significant aspects of the system. The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent . . . . Abstention (from electoral involvement) reflects the suppression of the options and alternatives that reflect the needs of the nonparticipants. It is not necessarily true that the people with the greatest needs participate in politics most actively. Whoever decides what the game is about decides also who can get into the game.[20]

The segment of the population outside the boundary of the political arena--unrepresented, perhaps unorganized and most likely alienated--stimulates, nonetheless, a need for police response. The fact remains that police are delegated authority and exercise legitimate social control over them. Thus, these members must be taken into account as they have a bearing on the nature of the community and more directly on the dominant trust type.

Socio-political exclusion, the degree of exclusion from the socio-political system of the populace, is also a continuous variable. This exclusion, however, includes more than political apathy, disorganization or alienation from incumbents. It reflects, as well, those groups or

individuals who choose to opt out of the extant system. Thus, the variable subsumes those who are unrepresented by the competitive establishment, whether they choose to do anything about it or not, and those who reject the system. The former includes, for example, those who are vying to get into the polity (e.g., some minority groups) while the latter depicts those opposed to the system's survival (e.g., "revolutionaries," "radicals," etc.). Both forms of exclusion, voluntary and involuntary, may be present to varying degrees in differing communities. Of importance to this study is how the degree of exclusion affects the police-citizenry trust direction. It is predicted that the greater the degree or amount of exclusion, the more the police will perceive the community's dominant trust type as one of alienation.

Combining the Two Independent Variables

How do these two factors, varying as they do between localities and over time, fit together to give the police a unified generalization of the citizenry's direction of trust? First, by way of a reminder, a caveat. The intervening variable is the perception by the police of the dominant trust type held by the citizenry. It is conceivable that the perceived will differ from the actual trust direction. All the evidence presented in Section Two, which will not be controverted in Section Three, points to the conclusion that when a discrepancy occurs, the error by the police is in the direction of perceived citizen alienation.[21] Now, to put the two independent variables from the citizenry--social diversity and socio-political exclusion--together, I must go back and pick up the strand, left dangling, of the hypothetical relationship between trust direction and the police. Recall Gamson's

hypotheses that the trust orientation of partisan groups is related: 1) to the means of influence they will use; and 2) to the social control response. Relating the trust orientation to the means of influence, Gamson states:

> A confident group will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence . . . . Persuasion involves some change in the minds of the target of influence without admitting anything new to their situation . . . . (A) neutral group will tend to rely on inducements . . . inducements are the addition of new advantages to the situation or the promise to do so, regardless of the particular resources used . . . . (A)n alienated group will tend to rely on constraints . . . . Constraints are the addition of new disadvantages to the situation or the threat to do so, regardless of the particular resources used.[22]

To the extent these hypothesized relationships are borne out in reality and the police recognize them as such, their identification of the dominant trust type is facilitated.[23]

In any event, the hypothesized relationships between trust direction and social control response are more germane to our purpose. Gamson in Power and Discontent states:

1) Authorities will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of control over confident solidary groups;
2) Authorities will tend to rely on sanctions (which are either inducements or constraints) and particularly on inducements as a means of control over neutral solidary groups; and
3) Authorities will tend to rely on insulation as a means of control over alienated solidary groups, (p. 181-182).

He buttresses his argument by stating that the type of control used by the authorities is based upon the continual desire to increase and maintain high confidence or, if other trust orientations exist, to move when possible toward that state. High confidence is desirable because "it affects the capacity of authorities to achieve collective goals," (p. 179).

Let me now make this connection between trust type and social control

concrete by relating the social control responses to police political behavior. In communities where the police perceive the dominant trust direction as being confidence, persuasion is the hypothesized social control technique. Police maintain the peace and go about fulfilling their functions with a minimal amount of social control effort. Their mere presence and informal admonitions are usually sufficient to remind the populace of the norms and values of the society. As there is confidence in the authorities, only partisan politics may bring out political reaction by the police if their employment is tied to a particular regime. Discontent is low and there is a common interest with the citizenry. Thus, little necessity exists to either apply influence on other sets of authorities by mobilizing resources or to engage in political behavior toward the populace.

Police in communities perceived as having a neutral trust relationship will rely upon inducements as the hypothesized social control mechanism. This corresponds to the service style of Wilson and positive actions such as a community relations program would be stressed. The police would primarily be involved as a referee to see that the rules were maintained by the competing groups who tend to share the same norms and values. To the extent necessary, political behavior by the police would be of a reactive social control nature to maintain their relative position and the status quo. There might be some preliminary organizing by the police to apply influence upon the authorities for organizational benefits. Proactive political activity would be rare and addressed to those few who might voluntarily exclude themselves through "immoral" behavior. Those who are involuntarily excluded would mostly accept their fate and thus be treated somewhere from indifference to being ignored by the police.

Insulation as a means of control over a perceived alienated community exacts the maximal amount of police political behavior. As Gamson states, "insulation offers protection against the use of constraints by alienated groups," (ibid., p. 182). It is here that police would be most heavily involved in both reactive and proactive political behavior as they would most assuredly be a target of constraining influence attempts. Police, relied heavily upon as social control agents, would mobilize their resources to apply partisan political influence on the authorities in their own behalf and to offset their sense of isolation in the community. An example of this use of authority as an influence attempt is the following. There would undoubtedly be:

> Periods of sharp challenge to the distribution of power and privilege (and) the police (would) tend to be used as a partisan instrument in defense of privilege. When this happens, they usually become agents of established groups and opponents of (alienated) challenging groups.[24]

The Variables Combined--A Summary

As with the three independent variables in Section Two, social diversity and socio-political exclusion may be difficult to precisely measure within any given community, but one ought to be able to say that government A has more or less of each when compared with government B. The two variables and their combination will be discussed more fully in Chapter 11. At this point, it is sufficient to conclude that each can be seen as varying from low to high in the degree of their presence. The basic hypothesis for the independent variable, social diversity, was that the more it is present, the more the police will perceive the direction of trust as tending toward alienation. For socio-political exclusion, the hypothesis is that the more it is present, the more the police, also, will

perceive the community's dominant trust relationship as one of alienation. Therefore, a combination of these two will tend to reinforce a perceived direction of trust.

The intervening variable is the police perception of the direction or type of trust. This variable in turn predicts the dependent variable of motivation to engage in political behavior. We have just seen that as the perceived direction of trust varies along the continuum from confidence through neutrality to alienation police political behavior toward the citizenry increases--that is, reactive and proactive activities increase. Figure E resembles Figure A and depicts a schematically drawn, value added model. It illustrates how a combining of the two independent variables predicts the direction of trust and how this trust type interacts with the predicted dependent variable. As the two variables increase from low to high, the type of trust relationship moves from confidence toward alienation and the motivation to engage in political behavior increases.

To summarize, subsumed within Figure E are four hypotheses which tie the second portion of the theory together. Other things being equal, they are:


1) The greater the social diversity, the more the police will perceive the dominant trust type as tending toward alienation;

2) The greater the socio-political exclusion, the more the police will perceive the dominant trust type as tending toward alienation;

3) The greater the presence of these two in combination, the more the perceived trust relationship will be toward alienation;

4) As the trust relationship moves from confidence to alienation, the press for (motivation to engage in) police political behavior increases.

FIGURE E - PREDICTED EFFECT OF THE DIRECTION OF TRUST VARIABLES*



*(1) = Social Diversity

(2) = Socio-Political Exclusion

MOTIVATION TO ENGAGE IN (PRESS FOR) POLICE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

Press for political behavior must be combined with opportunity to produce the actual police political activity toward the citizenry.

The remainder of Section Three is composed of three chapters. This Section will diverge from Section Two in that there will not be a chapter for each independent variable. In Chapter 9, I will present the social characteristics of the two communities studied. The data explored will come from the respondents interviewed in the two police agencies and from the outside experts. Chapter 10 will focus on differential treatment of their citizenry by each department. Political behavior by the police will be emphasized as we look at a confrontation scene at the University, comparative treatment of a number of groups and finally, discuss political intelligence. As in Section Two, analysis of and generalizations from the data, except where necessary, will be held to a minimum in these two chapters and presented in Chapter 11. In addition, Chapter 11 will carry the theoretical model farther along toward its eventual completion in Section Four.

CHAPTER 8

Footnotes

1. Drawing on Dahrendorf, quasi groups are "any collectivity of individuals sharing positions with identical latent interests without having organized themselves as such." Interest groups are defined as "any organized collectivity of individuals sharing manifest interests." The quasi groups are "recruiting fields" for interest groups. Interest groups are recruited from the larger quasi groups. Solidary groups are at an intermediate level and are the more immediate constituency of an organized interest group. They are differentiated from quasi groups in that the individuals have some common identification or feeling of political "we." They take into account the perspectives of others. Mancur Olson in Chapter 5 of his, The Logic of Collective Activity, Schocken Books, New York, 1965, gives an excellent historical development of the literature on collectivities as the basis for political behavior.

2. Even such individual acts as voting are infrequently accomplished without some politically active group utilizing resources to exercise influence on private decisions.

3. Tilly, Charles. "From Mobilization to Political Conflict," multilith (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan, 1970). Pp. 4 and 15.

4. A scale of increasing specificity was concocted which proceeds from:

   > 1) No one within this category ever identifies it as a group, so far as some defined set of sources reveals; (through) 5) the group has standard symbols, slogans, songs, styles of dress and/or other identifying marks; (to) 10) at least one central organization exercises extensive control over the personal relations of its members. Ibid. p. 14.

5. Gamson, William A. "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," The American Behavioral Scientist, November-December, 1968. P. 19.

6. Gamson states:

   > My central argument is that the American Political system normally operates to prevent incipient competitors from achieving full entry into the political arena. Far from there being built in mechanisms which keep the system responsive, such groups win entry only through the breakdown of the normal operation of the system or through demonstration on the part of challenging

groups of a willingness to violate the "rules-of-the-game" by resorting to illegitimate means for carrying on political conflict.

Any political system must handle discontented groups in some fashion. Such discontent can be handled either by some modification of the content of policies or by some effort to control the discontented groups. Ibid., p. 18.

7. In discussing the model with regard to conflict, Tilly states, "In the short run, the magnitude of conflict depends on an interaction of the tactics of the contenders and the coercive practices of the government. In the longer run, the magnitude of conflict depends upon the established means by which contenders can enter and leave the polity, and the frequency with which entries and exits actually occur. Op. cit., p. 4.

8. A perusal of the categories below the diagram will show that a group could be in one of categories 5, 7 or 9 with regard to the public authorities and in one of the categories 6, 8 or 10 with regard to the police. As this is a study of the police, I have attempted to simplify the diagram by only bifurcating the public authorities into police and all others when looked at from the perspective of the involved political groups.

   This diagram is only viable for groups. Individual political actors can and usually do belong to more than one group. Thus, with regard to centrality they can range across the boundaries. Certain actors might have an inordinately high partial inclusion in one group as in a sect or commune and identify with that specifically with group's placement.

9. These two are interchangeable. I placed the administrators in category one simply because in today's public bureaucracies they tend to make more of the daily decisions.

10. "The political trust of a group is its perception of the efficiency of the political system in achieving collective goals and its bias in handling conflicts of interest." See also Chapter One herein. Gamson, Power and Discontent, op. cit., p. 53.

11. Gamson. "Political Trust and Its Ramifications." Op. Cit., pp. 10 and 11.

12. Gamson. Power and Discontent. Op. cit., p. 178.

13. Westley. Violence and the Police, op. cit., p. 49. He wrote exclusively about the citizenry-police interaction. I have taken pains to show in Section Two that they are as equally if not more concerned with the potential effects of the political structure.

14. In this reactive phase the police are both acting as social control agents vis a vis the citizenry and as partisans to the authorities by attempting to undercut a group with conflicting interests. This demonstrates the circular nature of the open political system.

15. There are a myriad of examples in the popular literature of this type of police behavior. Anyone who has followed the nationwide symbiotic relationship between the Black Panthers and the police is fully aware of them. Another provocative set of examples is the continuing saga of those opposed to the war in Indochina.

16. "Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places. These cleavages fall into three general classes: (1) ascriptive or "trait" cleavages such as race or caste; (2) attitudinal or "opinion" cleavages such as ideology or, less grandly, preference; and (3) behavioral or "act" cleavages such as those elicited through voting and organizational membership."

    Rae, Douglas W. and Taylor, Michael. The Analysis of Political Cleavages. Yale University. New Haven, 1970, p. 1.

17. This example is not limited to the south as Cairo, Illinois and numerous other northern cities aptly demonstrate.

18. Crain, et al. The Politics of Community Conflict, op. cit., p. 19.

19. The model would be one of an authoritarian political system. Some local communities in the U.S. may resemble this form of government.

20. Schattschneider. The Semisovereign People, op. cit., p. 35 and 105. He refers to the 40% non voting citizens (40 million out of 100 million in the 1956 Presidential election) as our "soft underbelly."

21. This is built into the theory. Complexity causes doubt and ambiguity which in turn leads to anxiety, tension and perceptual error. As has been shown repeatedly, the police live with a touch or more of paranoia. On occasion this is healthy.

22. Gamson, "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," op. cit., pp. 10 and 11.

23. Later in the above multilith, Gamson looks at Paige's dissertation data and relates the different means of influence to the trust types. He says that:

    > With a little stretching . . . civil rights groups us(ing) the threat of demonstrations of legal action to influence white authorities . . . may be viewed as a form of mild constraint. Thus, the political activities reported upon (by Paige) run from voting ('a form of inducement') to civil rights activity ('a mild constraint') to rioting ('a severe constraint') . . . .

> Paige argues . . . that the relative occurrence of each type of activity will reach a maximum at a different trust level (type). Ibid., p. 14.

24. Gamson, William A. and McEvoy, James. "Police Violence and Its Public Support," in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Philadelphia, Vol. 391 (September, 1970), p. 104. This type of social control activity--repression--emphasizes once again the circular nature of the open political system. The same reactive-proactive behavior can also be seen within the influence perspective as an influence attempt upon the relevant sets of authorities.

CHAPTER 9

All of the People, All of the Time

This Chapter focuses upon the independent variables of social diversity and socio-political exclusion and their relationship to the intervening variable of trust type. Although the independent variables can be measured by employing criteria such as those outlined in Chapter 12, a number of questions were asked of members of the two departments which corroborate these objective measurements. A total of 20 questions from the interview form will be looked at and their responses presented in this chapter. A number of them will have direct bearing upon one or the other variable while the bulk of the questions will be addressed to unearthing the trust direction or the effects of diversity and exclusion in combination. The outside experts will then be called upon for their analysis of the germane aspects of these two communities.[1] As I stated in Chapter 2, statistical analyses will not be performed because of the manner in which the data was collected (non-randomly) and the nature of the data (too few samples).

Social diversity or the presence in the community of solidary groups with diverse political self-identifications was tapped directly by asking, "As you know, every community has different kinds of people living in it. What would you say are the principal categories or types of citizens in this community?" In each department there were 19 respondents out of a possible 21. Two lieutenants from Central City refused to answer the question and neither could be induced to enter into the "sociological

spirit" of the exercise. In the Sheriff Department the two nonresponses were due to newness on the force and with the other, who had switched over from Central City, so much time had elapsed on earlier questions that we just never got to the latter questions.

As Chart 9-1 below shows, when the two departments are compared for the number of categories each respondent mentioned, an interesting similarity occurs.

CHART 9-1

Comparison of Number of Categories Mentioned

Number of Categories	C.C.P.D. Respondents	M.C.S.D. Respondents	*C.C.P.D. Total	M.C.S.D. Total
3	6	6	18	18
4	6	6	24	24
5	5	5	25	25
6	2	0	12	0
7	0	1	0	7
9	0	1	0	9
Didn't Answer	2	2	0	0
TOTAL	21	21	79	83

* = derived by multiplying number of categories times number of respondents.

Upon closer examination of the data, however, the similarity becomes more apparent than real. Chart 9-2 gives a comparative overview of the

choices made.

CHART 9-2

Comparison of Categories Chosen

Category Chosen	C.C.P.D. Respondents	Category Chosen	M.C.S.D. Respondents
(a) Professionals/Business men	11	(a) Upper income (work in C.C., commuters)	6
(b) Students - "Regular"	11	(b) Middle Class	7
(c) Students -		(c) Southern White "Hillbillies"	19
"Militant/Radical"	4		
"Hippies/Street People"	6		
(d) Middle Class (service, white collar, technicians	8	(d) Blacks ("colored", "Negroes")	19
(e) Blue Collar (laborers, factory workers)	4	(e) Farmers (white, German-Dutch ancestry, rural)	19
(f) Blacks-Minority	13		
Sub-Total	57	Sub-Total	70
Other Responses	22	Other Responses	13
TOTAL	79	TOTAL	83

I should point out that as a result of geographical dispersement, the Sheriff deputies had a considerably easier time with this question. Everyone of the 19 respondents divided the County in half (remember Central and Eastern Cities are excluded) and then proceeded to pick out and label the populated areas. In Cent 1 City, however, the officers did not have the natural advantage of geographical, population dispersion. In fact only two responses were area specific. To simplify the data, I combined a number of similar categories which were separately mentioned such

as professionals and businessmen, blacks and minority, and the "militant-radical" students with the "hippie-street people." It was not necessary to do this for the Sheriff Department's responses.

With the exception of three officers who used political criteria and two who utilized age, the majority (14 of 19) viewed the city from a socio-economic perspective which subsumed racial and in many instances political criteria, (e.g., breaking down the student category). Four of the six who mentioned but three categories used abstract categories thus, essentially, avoiding the actual task of specifying solidary groups. In sum, the C.C.P.D. respondents appear to have had a more difficult assignment and responded by structuring the task with more general criteria but more identified categories than the Sheriff's deputies.

The next question, "Do any of these categories of people seem estranged or alienated from society?" falls into the socio-political exclusion area. It was meant: (1) to elicit the respondent's sense of the perspectives of the various solidary groups; and (2) to unveil their understanding of the social problems existing in our society. The question is the first half of a two-part sequence with the second one, "Do you feel they exclude themselves?" asking for the officer's own views on the voluntary-involuntary nature of the exclusion (where) mentioned in the previous question.

To the first question, the C.C.P.D. had one respondent out of 21 who didn't answer the question. Of the 20 answering, "radical-militant students" were mentioned 13 times, "hippies-street people," 4 times, and blacks (one would not discuss minority groups) were mentioned 9 times. In addition, three other categories were mentioned once each,

"certain criminal elements," "one within the working class" and "in the middle class there are the ultra-conservatives." Another officer said, "No, (C.C.) has high income-high resource people willing to get involved." Lastly, one officer said that, "any category has a small minority" while a second responded with, "the claim is yes." Only these three officers failed to mention a specific category of people who seem estranged or alienated from society although six qualified their answers by saying it was a "group," "portion," "small percentage," etc. of an overall category.

Of these 20 respondents to the second question concerning self-exclusion, 18 answered "yes." They said things like, "to a certain extent the militant students do. The most militant certainly do" . . . . "No one excludes them" . . . . "Some are rejects or misfits, others are misguided or lack direction" . . . . "They bring it on themselves" . . . . "I think so by their attitudes and actions" . . . . "Guess I'd have to say yes" . . . . "In a way" . . . . "In many ways."

One officer split his answer by saying, "Yes, for the hippies, (and) no, for the blacks." To the first question he had said, "The hippies live in a world of their own. They don't subscribe to our values. The blacks are alienated to some extent." Only one other, high ranking officer said no. To the first question he had answered, "(The) blacks feel they are. Some of them are treated differently. To some extent there is a basis for it (i.e., the alienation)." His response to the second question was, "No, I feel in a lot of sectors they are (excluded)." He then went on to cite an example of a black officer not being able to get a loan which he felt he would have been able to obtain.

In the Sheriff Department there were 19 respondents to the two questions. The first question (do any categories seem estranged) elicited seven who answered negatively ("probably not" . . . "don't really think there are" . . . "not really" . . . "some are a little hostile" . . ."don't believe I have run across this. There are some segments which are alienated from the eastern (part of the County) categories") and one who gave a "don't know" response. Interestingly, two of the seven said that this sense of alienation did take place in Central City. Nine respondents mentioned the blacks. The remaining two deputies said in turn, "There are some groups who feel you have it out for them," and "Both sections (blacks and southern whites) do in the east."

To the second question about self-exclusion, all seven (plus the "don't know" who repeated) who responded with a negative answer to the previous question came up with a negative response on this one as well. An eighth who had stated that "some of the blacks think they are and some seem to be pushing separation," responded with, "I just really don't know." The remaining 10 gave affirmative answers. The two who had given other than "black" responses said, "(There is a) strong tendency toward this in the Oval area" and "Yes, they (both) want to be on their own." Chart 9-3 below summarizes these two questions for the two departments.

CHART 9-3

Summation of Alienation and Exclusion Questions

Categories of People Who Seem Estranged/Alienated	C.C.P.D. Respondents	M.C.S.D. Respondents
Radical-Militant Students	13	Not Applicable
Hippies-Street People	4	Not Applicable
Blacks	9	9
Other Categories Mentioned	3	2
Answered without a Category	3	0
TOTAL (can answer more than once)	32	11
None	0	7
Don't Know	0	1
Didn't Answer	1	2

Responses to Whether They Exclude Themselves (Question 2)		
Yes	18	10
Yes/No Split	1	0
They are Excluded	1	0
They are Not Excluded	0	7
Don't Know	0	2
Didn't Answer	1	2
TOTAL	21	21

The next set of two questions dealt with the identification of the interest groups or leaders within the solidary groups (principal categories or types of citizens) mentioned in the first question of this chapter.[2] The object of these questions was to have the police officers identify the spokesmen of the solidary groups and to the extent possible, to unearth how they were viewed by the police. Thus, the questions are concerned with both qualitatively different reactions to the diverse solidary groups in the community and to the underlying sense

of socio-political exclusion. The first question was, "Are there certain groups, clubs or organizations within any of these differing categories (pointing to the diagram from the first question) which attempt to speak for the entire category?" The second question followed upon the response with, "Do you think they actually do?"[3]

An interesting pattern evolved. You will note that the first question is completely content neutral. There is no reference to any specific category and thus, the respondent was free to pick any, all or none of them. However, in the C.C.P.D. only 8 of 20 respondents gave answers which could be viewed as a generalized response to all categories of citizens within the community. One officer gave a negative answer ("None that I know of"), leaving 11 respondents who chose either the black category (1), the "radical-militant" students (4), or mentioned both these categories (6) to discuss. Even within the 8 who responded generally, 5 picked out these categories to give as illustrations. The question which immediately followed (Do you think they actually do?) was an attempt to ferret out exactly what the officers meant in their responses to the previous question. Of the eight who gave answers I classified as pertaining to the overall diversity of the community, only one gave a positive answer: "Yes, the hippie element, they actually are represented by their spokesmen. The students, no."

Of the 11 for whom the first question conjured up the blacks or militant-radical students, the responses were: "No, definitely not . . . ." "No" (6 simply said this.) "No, they try to." "No, take for example, the Weathermen . . . ." "No, I've never seen any group yet that can do what they profess, speak for everybody . . . ."

In sum then, only one respondent out of 20 in the C.C.P.D. was willing to consider that any group ("the hippie element") is actually represented by their spokesmen, although even he thought the students weren't represented by the radicals. One other officer thought that, perhaps overall, the ecology organization was possibly the most representative, hardly a threatening group. Of the groups, other than those from within the black or militant-radical student categories, chosen as illustrations--the Concerned Citizens, the John Birch Society, the Junior Chamber of Commerce, the Salvation Army and the Wealthy Women's League--only the last three, mentioned by the same officer, were not picked as negative examples possessing some undesirable qualities.

In the Sheriff Department the pattern of reading categories into the first question was even more pronounced. Of 21 respondents, two didn't answer and one said he "didn't know," and only four gave generalized responses; four more said they didn't think it happened, four said it occurred in Central City, and eight mentioned the blacks (one of these also said it happened in Central City).

For the second question (concerning whether they actually do speak for their category) here are the responses of the eight who had mentioned the black category previously. Two of the eight just said no but of the other six, three seemed on the verge of granting legitimacy to the leaders.

> No. they're like the Black Panthers who think they're talking for all the blacks . . . . No, definitely not. Many, are not with them. Whichever groups organize over night to speak for them usually don't last long . . . . One or two in the black category probably speak for the majority involved in school problems. Because the blacks have some, the whites felt they would (also). Both rise and fall over night but the white splinter groups probably speak for fewer. In

> general these groups only speak for those involved in that specific issue. . . . I don't believe so . . . . In that small section (the Oval) they seem to . . . . They tend to, this spokesman group. They do not condone any of the violence--don't want all Negroes being thought of badly because of what a few do.

In summation three of the eight deputies who picked out the blacks as opposed to one of the 11 in the C.C.P.D. who chose either blacks or activist students were willing to concede some degree of organizational leadership, even if it were ephemeral at best. Here again, with the exception of four deputies who mentioned the Farm Bureau, unions, political parties, local politicians, black ad hoc parents' groups and the Negro Professional League, the selected examples carried vaguely to strongly negative connotations about the least desirable categories. The point being made in these two questions is the selection by the police of only certain groups which were judged as attempting to speak for their underlying constituency. As I will show shortly, the groups chosen are those most alien to the police. In addition, a legitimate leadership role was denied these groups. A comparison of the two communities demonstrates that Central City has the greater perceived socio-political exclusion.

The next question asked was:

> Now, would you please rank these categories of citizens from that category which presents the least problems to you as a law enforcement officer to that which presents the most. On the diagram, mark a "1" for the least, a "2" for the next least and so on to the most.

The question asked for problems the respondents faced as law enforcement officers. This, of course, would have led to a ranking based most heavily upon their perceptions of the crime generated within each category.[4] Implicitly, the ranking could also have been a perceptual diagram

of centrality which related the various categories to the trust direction. That is, the officers, from a criminality perspective, would equate trust type with crime generation (i.e., the most confident would create the least crime and vice versa). In this sense socio-political exclusion might also be tapped,as those categories with the least favorable ranking would be considered maximally distant from the officers' views of the values and norms of society. To test this, I will construct a chart of the combined responses from each department and then relate this data to answers from the question, "What category is closest to your own personal values or beliefs--which category is most distant?" (i.e., closest to/the most distant from your self-identity).

In the Sheriff Department every single respondent (19) put the rural white farmers from the westside in the number one ranking as presenting the least problems. As the respondents could have ties and thus place more than one category within the same rank, two other categories were each mentioned once--farmers on the eastside and upper income, subdivision dwellers on the westside. Chart 9-4 below shows the ranking of all the categories selected. You will remember from Chart 9-2 that every deputy mentioned at least three categories--farmers, southern whites, and blacks. In order to show in what order the deputies ranked these Southern whites and blacks, (a) and (b), are introduced into the chart. Thus, of the six deputies who chose only three categories (Chart 9-1), there was an even split; two chose the whites and two the blacks as their second choice--(a) in rank #2--while four, each chose the blacks and whites as their third choice--(a) in rank #3. The same process was followed for the six deputies listing four categories. Here, however, the

CHART 9-4

Ranking of Categories by the Deputies in Mideast Department

From That Presenting the Least to That
Presenting the Most Problems

1	2	3
Western White rural farmers----19	Upper Income---------- 3	(Low Class White-Lost Lake; Minorities-Westside; Executive type Westside; Small Towns Eastside; Eastern U. Apt. Complexes; Factory Workers-Westside)
Upper Income westside--------- 1	New Breed Liberals---- 1	-------each--------- 1
Eastside farmers---------- 1	Eastside Farmers------ 2	Hillbilly Whites
	Villages & Townships-- 2	---(a)-- 4
	Southern White "Hillbillies"------- 2	---(b)-- 2
	--(a)-- 2	Low Colored ---(a)-- 4
	Low Class colored---------- 2	---(b)-- 5
	--(a)-- 2	
	Suburban middle class-------- 7	

4	5	6
Hippies;	Middle Class - white - northern oriented, factory workers---------- 1	Low Colored--------- 1
High Income westside--each--- 1	Low Colored---------- 3	
Low Colored-------- 1		
--(b)- 1		
Hillbilly Whites--- 5		
--(b)- 4		

(a) = ranking by an individual who listed 3 categories

(b) = ranking by an individual who listed 4 categories

third choice was 5-1 in favor of the blacks and reversed, 4-2 for the fourth choice.

An interesting reversal occurs in the chart for those deputies choosing more than 4 categories. The fourth rank is as low as they place the Hillbilly whites while three low class blacks are placed in rank 5 and one in rank 6. It appears that the more diversely the deputies perceive the community, the less the blacks are assimilated. In general, it seems the western dwellers fare better unless they are eastern farmers. The rough order of centrality for the 5 dominant categories (Chart 9-2) goes western farmers, western upper income (and eastern farmers), eastern middle class, and then with the proviso just mentioned, a toss up between low class blacks and whites. Remember that these 5 categories accounted for 85% of the categories mentioned by the 19 deputy respondents.

Chart 9-5 relates the rankings to the nearest and most distant category based on each deputy's personal set of values or beliefs (i.e., life style). All 19 responses are presented in the chart as there was no way to effectively shorten it. Looking first at the relationship between the lowest rank recorded and the least desirable category, it is evident that the black community is the most distant. Fifteen of the 19 placed them farthest away from their personal values and beliefs. Fourteen of the 19 did correlate their lowest rank with their least personal choice. Four of the other 5 respondents chose their next, least-personal choice when related to their lowest rank recorded. The remaining deputy who had a lowest rank recording of blacks doesn't appear to think much of the "executive type," twice removed from his most distant personal choice category.

The relationship between the highest rank, farmers, and the closest

CHART 9-5

Relation of Rankings to Personal Set of Values
Categories in Mideast Department

	Lowest Rank Recorded	Most Distant Category	Number of Categories	Highest Rank	Nearest Category
1)	Black	Black	3	Farmer	(2) Southern
2)	Black	Black	4		White Farmer
3)	Black	Black	7		(3) Middle Class
4)	Black	Black	3		Northern Farmer
5)	Black	Black	9		(2) Small Village
6)	Black	Black	3		(2) Southern White
7)	Black	Black	5		(2) Middle Class
8)	Black	Black	5		None of them
9)	Black	(3) Executive Type	5		Farmer
10)	Southern White	Black	3		Farmer
11)	Southern White	Black	3		Farmer
12)	Southern White	Black	4		Farmer
13)	Southern White	Southern White	4		Farmer
14)	Southern White	Southern White	4		Farmer
15)	Southern White	Southern White	5		Farmer
16)	Southern White	Tie between black/ Southern White	4		Farmer
17)	Southern White	Tie between black/ Southern White	3		None of them
18)	Southern White/ Black	Black	5		(2) Middle Class Suburban
19)	High Income In C.C. area	(3) Black	4		(4) High Income in C.C. area

category is, as I would expect, not as neatly correlated. Law enforcement officers have no reason to perceive of their present life style as being farm spun. Nonetheless, 15 of the 19 had their nearest or next nearest category correlated with their highest rank. Two of the highest command mentioned that "none of them" were nearest their categorization of the populace and were not pushed to "squeeze one out." One deputy perceived his personal values as being closest to the northern-oriented, middle class whom he had ranked third behind the farmers and the upper-income categories. There's one clown in every crew and the nineteenth proved it by displaying a love-hatred relationship to the "high income category in the Central City area." Although from his perception, these are our society's criminals, he evidently aspires to join them or perhaps he has, as this was his preferred category and his lowest recorded rank.

The Central City relationship is a bit more complex as only 74% of the total number of categories mentioned fell into 6 <u>combined</u> categories. Furthermore, of the 21 respondents, 7 failed to rank order the categories (whereas all 19 asked to do so in the Sheriff Department did). The reasons given by these 7 are indicative of both the greater complexity within Central City, with its more diverse citizenry and the increased anxiety within the department. The responses were:

> I don't identify people by categories . . . . I would not categorize the population . . . . Statistically, it's not possible to rank them . . . . It's hard to breakdown the community by ranking categories . . . . All of the categories, according to law enforcement, are problems. They set up problems for us in terms of moral values which should not be a function of law enforcement. Prejudices do, however, enter in (and) many officers do work moral attitudes into their law enforcement programs. The remaining two deputies could not be effectively ranked because their categories were, juveniles, students, adults ('each of the three categories present problems at certain times'), and 23-, 35-, 35+. ('I can't see any reason to break the community down any farther.')

CHART 9-6

*Ranking of Categories by the Officers in Central City Department

From That Presenting the Least to That Presenting the Most Problems

1	2	3
Professional-Business---------- 8	Blue Collar---------- 2	Students--------- 4
Extremely Wealthy---------- 1	Full-Time Students---- 4	Blacks-Low Income----- 4
Conservatives-------- 2	Middle Class---------- 2	Militants - Radicals------- 2
"Average" - Middle Class------- 5	Upper Middle Class - Conservative-------- 1	Commune - Hippies-------- 2
	Professionals--------- 2	Wealthy - Liberals------- 1
	Liberals---------- 2	
	Wealthy---------- 1	
	Blacks---------- 1	
	Greeks---------- 1	

4	5	6
Blacks - a Small %---------- 2	Militants - Radicals---------- 2	Blacks---------- 1
Students---------- 2	Blacks - Low Class---------- 1	"40 Thieves"----- 1
College Area Bums---------- 1	Hippies - Drifters---------- 1	
Militants - Radicals---------- 1		
100 Block of E. Ann---------- 1		
Middle Class--------- 1		

*14 of 19 respondents and 59 of 79 categories.

This chart displays the rankings of the 14 respondents and the 59 category choices they made. As there was not the constellation of choices around three specific categories as in the Sheriff Department, no effort was made to check second and third rankings. It can be seen that the 6 categories which accounted on Chart 9-2 for 74 percent of the total responses line up on a diagram of centrality roughly in this order: (1) Professional-business; (2) Middle class; (3) Regular students; and (4-5-6) the order of militants-radicals, hippies-street people and blacks bring a toss up.

Chart 9-7 is quite a surprise as the relationship is so close. The relationship between the lowest rank recorded and the most distant or least preferred category is almost perfect. Twelve of the 14 respondents matched the pairs while two chose their next, least preferred category. The relationship between the highest rank recorded and the most preferred category is almost as close with 10 of 14 showing a perfect pairing. Three more chose their next closest preference and as with the Sheriff Department, one officer proved the world is human by "noncategorizing" himself.[6]

In conclusion and as I suggested earlier, there appears to be a direct relationship between the rank order of and the direction of trust in the categories. The major point of these two questions, in combination, is a demonstration that the diagram of centrality can be operationalized and is a useful diagnostic tool. For each officer,a nominal scale has been constructed from the most to the least trusted category of citizens.

Another question specifically asked for those within the community who are perceived as hostile to the police as authorities, "Are there any people who seem to be constantly outspoken in their criticism of the

CHART 9-7

Relation of Ranking to Personal Set of Value Categories in Central City Department

Lowest Rank Recorded	Most Distant Category	Number of Categories	Highest Rank	Nearest Category
1) Militant Students/Blacks	Militant Students/Blacks	6	Professional-Businessmen	Businessmen
2) Students	Students	3	Professionals	Professionals
3) Low Income Blacks	Blacks	3	Average Citizens	Average Citizens
4) Hippies-Street People	Hippies-Street People	4	Professionals	(2) Middle Class
5) Radicals/Low Class Negroes	Blacks/Radicals	5	Extremely Wealthy	(2) Upper Class Conservatives
6) Radical Students	Radical Students	3	Conservatives	Conservatives
7) Radicals	Radicals	3	Conservatives	Conservatives
8) "40 Thieves"	"40 Thieves"	6	Average Citizens	My view of life doesn't fit any of these
9) University Students	(3) Black Militants	4	Middle Class Citizens	Middle Class Citizens
10) Students	(a) Wealthy	5	Middle Class	Middle Class
11) Commune Hippies	Commune Hippies	4	Professionals	Professionals and (2) Blue Collar
12) Colored/ Hippie Types	Hippies	4	Average Upstanding Citizens	Average Citizens
13) Blacks/ Radicals	Blacks	5	Businessmen	Businessmen and (2) Working Class
14) Hippies/ Blacks	Hippies	5	Businessmen	(2) Middle Class

(a) = a three way tie for middle rankings between wealthy, Greeks and Blacks out of 5 category choices.

police?" Here it was assumed not hypothesized that of those suggested, the most alien solidary groups and their spokesmen would be the overwhelming selection.[7] Looking at the responses from the men of the two departments adequately answers, I think, the question of how the two communities compare to each other on the trust direction continuum. As the responses to this question are of importance to the theory, I shall quote at length.

First the Sheriff Department, where the answers can be divided into two groups: those who discussed the county; and those who saw the city as the most reasonable area for response. There were 10 respondents for the former and eight for the latter. Those discussing the county said:

> Not that I can think of . . . . Oh, a few maybe . . . . In the black community that we come into contact with. Also, the southern whites . . . . No, the range of instigators is from 18-40. They tend to be different from week to week . . . . Not any one group or individual . . . . There are but I couldn't identify any by name. . . . Yes sire, the black people. I could identify a couple of them myself. Young adults. There's high hostility in the Oval . . . . Yes, (but I) could not identify (any) by name . . . . Don't think we've had too much of that . . . . No.

That eight who chose to discuss the city surprised me as there was nothing in or surrounding the question to dislodge their their focus from the county. They said:

> The Negro people in (C.C.). The white movements that have taken over the campuses--the hippie groups. . . . (W, X, Y and Z--specific persons in C.C.) are good examples. Lots of blacks say they don't speak for them . . . . Yes, militant and radical groups but they are mostly in the City of (C.C.) but only occasionally in the County . . . . Most of the ones I think of are in (C.C.). Can't think of any in the County with maybe a few in (Eastern) Township . . . . Definitely in (C.C.). Black leaders who aren't leaders and represent only themselves. For example, (X, Y and Z). Also the radical groups on campus. . . . Most of these live in (C.C.) . . . . Not like (C.C.).

Many of Central City's respondents will speak for themselves.

> Yes, the militant segment of the students although many are not really students. Young people of student age who hang on to students.
>
> Don't know how else to call them except the "radicals." They feel they are getting at the establishment through the police.
>
> Yes, there are, blacks and students. The leaders of groups of both segments whether real or self-appointed are quite vocal. They are pretty well known to the average officer on the force.
>
> Street people because we're enforcers of the establishment.
>
> Radical students and also some in the black community. I think rapport with the majority of the black community is damn good.
>
> A, B, C--H (8 specific persons including the Mayor, a Councilman, a city official, three white "radicals" and two black "militants").
>
> Yes, NAACP, CORE, Black Panthers, RNA (Republic of New Africa), White Panthers, S.D.S., Weathermen and splinter groups from students and blacks.
>
> Naturally those that are victims of police action. This goes back to black militants and student radical groups that are most consistently boisterous about anything we do.
>
> Yes, student element (and) black element. In general, the professional people are probably the least critical. There is also a small element of blue collar people who have been critical of our not doing our job.
>
> There are always the same ones who will jump on any band wagon. The radicals go with black causes as will a certain segment of the University population. This tends to be more of a one-way thing. About the only time blacks will join with the radicals is when they can personally get something out of it. The white radicals will join with the black cause even if they will gain nothing.

It is obvious from these responses that the two categories perceived by the officers as most distant from their values were in fact chosen. Eight of the 16 respondents discussed both solidary groups, two just the blacks, three the radical students--hippies and three who spoke in brief generalities but had specific individuals in mind. In

general, then, Central City seemed to have a greater presence of alienated citizens.

In an attempt to corroborate the differential views held by the officers toward differing solidary groups, I, at random, chose one of the categories that each officer had selected in the first question discussed in this Chapter and asked him a series of 9 questions about the specific category. This was partially another attempt to measure the social distance separating the groups within each community, partially to compare the communities on this dimension and partially to better understand the method by which political groups get identified and treated.[8] There were 18 respondents in each department and each was asked the 9 question series.[9] For obvious reasons the responses to these 324 questions (36 x 9) will be summarized below. In the C.C.P.D. the categories for discussion chosen were: university "full-time" students--2, militant-radical students--3, college area bums--1, drifters-hippies--1, youth--1, adult--1, working class-blue collar workers--2, businessmen--1, professionals--1, average middle class citizens--2, and blacks-low income--3. In the Mideast Department the categories were: blacks--6, southern whites--5, students--1, farm community--2, high income--2, and white middle class--2.

The most orderly way to proceed is to use the rough diagrams of centrality developed from Chart 9-6 for the C.C.P.D. and from Chart 9-4 for the M.C.S.D. I will move outward from the solidary groups in which the officers have the most confidence to those in which, as we have seen, they have the least. For each solidary group (e.g., professionals--businessmen), there will be a brief distillation of the 9 questions into scenarios which will stress the germane points and include as many

illuminating quotes as seem reasonable.[10] The most alien solidary groups will receive the most attention. The order for Central City is:(1) professionals--businessmen, (2) average-middle class and blue collar--working class, (3) regular students, (4) blacks--low income, (5) militant--radical students and hippies--street people.[11] Charts 9-8 and 9-9 will summarize the synopses at their conclusion and outline why the perceptions of the police are important to the citizenry.

1. Professionals--Businessmen. Groups within this category which were identified included the Chamber of Commerce,J.C.C.'s, Optimists, Rotary, businessmen's clubs (downtown, S. University, etc.). None were seen as presenting particular problems to the police and they were perceived as being "very supportive and positive." If the members of or an organization within this solidary group had a grievance toward the department they would "call the Chief, Deputy Chief or Captains--call one of the executives and say something like 'this is what happened and I don't like it.'" In terms of trying to get support for their grievance, "they usually do it on their own." "(I) never heard of them soliciting support." Implicit in the responses was that deference, respect and efficiency was the way to deal with them and the interviewees thought that all the officers felt this way.

2. Average-Middle Class and Blue Collar Worker. Service, civic, fraternal and veterans organizations and unions were membership groups. "None that I can think of" were problems to the police and "DUIL (Driving Under the Influence of Liquor) is the only possibility" named for the citizenry in this expanded category. Their feelings toward the department were perceived as, "Positive. They like to let me believe they support

me 100% although I think many are actually indifferent unless they are in need of us. We should have a positive opinion from the average citizen." If they had a grievance they would, "probably come in and talk with the duty sergeant or lieutenant. It will be straightened out at the shift level." "If not familiar with the Grievance Officer procedure they would normally come in to the duty officer. Most would just come in." Support for their grievance would come from, "probably a friend or someone they know in the department . . . . " "Members of their family or maybe a fellow worker." To gain their respect the officers "treat them like you'd want to be--just plain courtesy. You have to be impartial. They tend to be law and order respecters but I don't necessarily like it on them. If they see us not enforcing the law, we lose a lot of respect."[12] The other officers were seen as feeling this way although "if they (the citizens) are irate, you'll lose some courtesy. Other officers use their voice and mannerisms. The way they say something seems to upset many people (and) the citizen hasn't really anything to complain about." The C.C.P.D. treats this category of citizen better than the Sheriff Department because of "our training and accountability. The philosophy of our role as police officers is better."

3. Regular "Full-Time" Students. They can be broken into "three basic types, student government groups, Greek organizations and SDS types" with the "third category, the ultra liberals," presenting the problems to the police. It was "hard to say" how the regular students felt about the police because "we don't usually see them other than traffic citations unless they've been riled up by some radicals . . . . " "The rock concerts have brought police and youth together for a mutual

education and tremendously good cooperation." With a grievance "some (students) contact an officer they know--those that work the concerts or the two on campus--or refer through Lieutenant (X, of the Community Relations Division) . . . . " "Occasionally they'll use the formal structure--the city government." They will get support mainly from "the student population and sometimes the faculty." Respect by them is gained by "in-service training (where you) learn as much as possible about the groups so . . . you can work with them as much as possible. We have personnel assigned to the University and to C.R. to promote better understanding . . . ." "As a whole, the department is very supportive of this type of an approach."[13]

4. Blacks--Low Income. "NAACP, CORE, Black Berets, BULJ (Blacks United for Liberty and Justice) and a dozen or so like them," are the groups mentioned along with the "Black Elks, Community Center, Scouts and the Y(MCA)." The Black Berets, "young blacks with Black Panther leanings" created problems for the police but they've "died down and are disorganized." In terms of their feelings toward the Department, "In (C.C.), there's not a united feeling of animosity toward the police. CORE and the Black Berets were definitely anti-police . . ." "The Police were the army for the establishment, their (the Berets) aim was to bring about drastic change and (they felt) only the police prevented them from doing so." Some blacks took their grievances to the "ombudsman"--"a number of complaints went to the Grievance Officer when it was first organized and before that to the old HRC . . . ." "The Black Berets and the militants would bypass all this (formal mechanisms) and would go directly to City Council with a fiery 10 minute harangue about generalizations."

To gather support for their grievance, they would go to "other blacks. If they feed them enough harangue, they might get them (the other blacks) angry." They would also try to get the support of the City Council and Mayor. The Blacks Berets would "try to generate support with the street people, White Panthers" and the "the students." To gain their respect for the police, there is "no easy way to go about it. I don't believe in appeasement or overlooking violations. Pick them up if they're wrong--firm, fair and honest . . . . " "(You) must enforce the law--they respect being treated as an individual not a black. Eventually you may get through if he is receptive at all." With regard to the feelings of the other members of the department, "No doubt you have some that feel differently." Does the C.C.P.D. treat this category better than the M.C.S.D.? "Yes, nothing that I could be sure of--training has a lot to do with it, so does (the) leadership of the Chief."

5. Militant-Radical Students and Hippies-Street People. "Ozone House, Tribal Council, White Panthers, Argus, Student Mobilizations, Canterbury House, Old Whistle Stop (Depot House), S.D.S., Weathermen," etc. were some of the groups mentioned. All of these groups were seen as presenting particular problems to the police.

"They hate us--they feel cops are repressive . . . . " "They resent the police in what we're attempting to do . . . ." "Anti-police because they're in movements that are fighting the establishment and we are the establishment. So at least verbally, they work against us . . . ." "Paranoid. They feel they're being oppressed."[14] With their grievances they go "outside the formalized structure--demonstrations, riots, disruptions . . . ." "They'll go to the (present)Mayor and democratic Councilmen who in turn will go to the press . . . . " "Political pressure . . .

the radical left attempts to get maximal publicity. They don't come to the police because they feel they won't get any satisfaction." For support they'll go to the "student body, news media, politicians . . . ." "Mayor, democratic Councilmen . . . street people, other movements, other sympathizers . . . ." "If they go public, they may be able to pick up support from groups that have different motives for doing so." "Sixty percent of the White Panthers support is from college kids. The rest are runaways and teeny boppers."

Gainiing their respect is not perceived of as an easy task. Two officers said, "I really don't know. I guess listen to complaints and answer them", and "Rap sessions on an individual basis only. We'll never get the group to discuss or agree with us." Two others said, "They are just about the opposite of what an officer believes in but some will see that fair treatment is possible" and "If some S.O.B. starts getting tough, I'll change his mind. Ninety-nine percent of the time the college area bums and blacks get themselves thrown in jail. They talk themselves into jail." In response to the better treatment than the M.C.S.D. statement, some unhappiness was expressed.

"Yes, only because they're not held down. We take a lot of shit and don't get backing. They get backing and don't take a lot of shit. That's the way it should be . . . . " "Yes, because we have to because we are more subject to being reprimanded, whereas the Sheriff Department doesn't have to put up with this type of cross-nastiness. Thus, we get hostilities by us which are increased toward them (the radicals) because of the constraints on us . . . . " "The Sheriff's deputies work with hillbillies and farmers and are old, hard-core Americans who don't dig long hairs, etc. Deputies and students are just two different types of people."

The consensual order for Mideast County's diagram of centrality was: (1) western rural farmers; (2) western upper income which will be categorized here with eastern middle class; (3) working-low class southern whites, and (4) working-low class blacks.[15] Although the officers discussed the above categories at a ratio of 2-4-5-6, many freely offered comparisons between the groups, especially the last two.[16] Thus, for some questions I have as many as 10 responses and the scenarios will perforce be extended.

1. Western Rural Farmers. Those groups identified were the fraternal organizations, veterans groups, several farmers associations and some involvement in township political activities. "None to my experience" was the reaction concerning police problems and their feelings toward the department was seen as "very favorable--high support for us. . . ." "I think they feel we're doing the job they're wanting us to do." With a grievance "about 50 percent go straight to the Sheriff. They feel they elected him. Fifty percent go to: (1) township supervisors; (2) Board of Commissioners; and a few who are always complaining go to (3) the news media." To get support for their grievance they'd use "the Sheriff or their Commissioner or (go) through their local (township) supervisor to the (County) Board." To gain their respect, "the main way is the service they ask for. (You) have to make them think that no service is too large or small by having time for them . . . . " "If you can you bullshit for a while, show an interest that you care for them not just their problems. (There's) a different personality in the east and you have to handle them differently." As for the other deputies, "basically we all realize the situation and treat them this way."

2. Upper-Income and Middle Class. Membership in groups were hard to come by for this category. "Professionals stick together . . . . " "I couldn't identify by groups, just as individuals . . . . " "I don't relate to them as groups. Particular problems were "only in the students (children). The problem comes up only once every six months or so--drugs. Some have ties with the White Panthers and campus groups in (C.C.)." The feeling of this category to the department was perceived as, "Overall, (they) are middle of the road. If you're acting in a capacity to help them, they love you . . . . " "They seem to feel they know what's going on . . . ." "The majority feel they are getting adequate protection. Law enforcement is good for them as long as you don't step on their toes seems to be their morality." When they have a grievance they "see the Sheriff, Undersheriff or their Commissioner . . . ." "The only complainant (in this category) I know of came in." To support their grievance, they try to get "themselves . . . usually just themselves --they don't come up with a group . . . ." "The Board got a letter from one which went to the media." For their respect, the deputies treat them "with respect and understanding. Most of the problems are traffic violations . . . ." "Public relations--spend a few minutes to educate and inform them."

3. Working-Low Class Southern Whites. "Most groups are local unions." These are the membership organizations with two agreeing and three not identifying any. Thus, there were no groups which caused particular problems for the police, although one deputy said there used to be "a motorcycle group," another offered "with blacks--summer problems with people milling around--nothing really organized," and a third said,

"there are some take-out eating places on the eastside where there are sometimes problems between black and white kids." With regard to this category, although no groups were identified as causing particular problems, a number of deputies commented on the high volume of crime it generated.

In terms of their feelings for the department, reactions were mixed. "Generally, most of them would back the department . . . ." "Pretty high regard for us . . . ." "They act like they're being picked on . . . ." "Very mixed area--some will show respect--others won't." Trying to get satisfaction for a grievance, "they might come to the Sheriff or Undersheriff . . . ." "Come directly to the Sheriff . . . ." "Some will come to (the) command of the department . . . ." "Some use a letter to the editor and others just scream and holler . . . . " "Write letters to the Sheriff or the Board." For support they would try to get "their Commissioner" (three said this) . . ."Commissioner or go to the paper--not to other categories . . . . " "The southern whites seem to work through the Township government and supervisors . . . . " "Nobody to my knowledge. They tend not to go to news media, Board, etc. . . . ." "They wouldn't, generally, go outside their category ("the blacks would"). The whites don't tend to have leadership." To gain their respect, the typical way the deputies deal with them, "depends on what they've done. You might have to take it. You look closely for a law violation and then grab them . . . ." "The main thing is to try to find out his bitch. Don't designate your authority over a man and make him feel an underdog. . . ." "Age seems to be a major factor in respect, especially the blacks . . . ." "Problem of establishing fairness but firmness. Going to be fair but take no shit from

them. If you go in there, right away they are against you. You have to tell them you're there to enforce the law. You must go into more detail than with the middle class."

Do the other deputies feel the way you do? "The biggest percentage does. (We) do have an element which hates the coloreds and hillbillies . . . ." "The officers who have been here less than five years might have some attitudes (and thus are) not emotionally stable enough to handle some of the authority . . . ." "We do have with the department people who feel they can muscle their way around to get respect. I don't think this can be done." The Sheriff Department treats this group better than the (Eastern City P.D.) because, "City Departments can get away with a bit more than we can because city police have more job security and protection than we do."

4. Working-Low Class Blacks. Perceptions of this category's membership went from "none to my knowledge" to "O.E.O., some student groups." "There is a loosely organized group in the Oval with some kind of club house in the housing unit." "(I) Don't pay much attention--there are a few. There's that race club, the NAACP." Groups in this category presenting particular police problems? "No." "No groups . . . ." "Don't know of one . . . ." "None which seem to recur . . . ." Not any problems on the same plain as (C.C.). . . ." "Many come into (C.C.) . . . ." "Same loose group--the same guys hang together." [17]

Perceived feelings toward the department were that they "don't like us--awfully hostile . . . ." "Younger ones are completely hostile --alienated. The older are not so (hostile)--some sort of split in age but they (the older ones) could go with the younger ones in certain confrontations . . . ." "Majority of the problems are with the young."

"They feel discriminated against . . . ." "The middle aged show respect, teenagers and young adults--disrespect."[18]

What the blacks would do if they had a grievance elicited numerous comments. Here are a few.

"If white, they call here. The blacks go through neighborhood groups or a spontaneous group will form. The spokesmen go directly to the Sheriff or the NAACP. If it really gets rolling, the (C.C.) blacks get into it. Strikes me as strange that they will back down (if come in directly). Seems it's agitators. There are a half dozen or so of these who seem to steer clear of problems with the law (in C.C.) . . . ." "They go through one of our colored Commissioners (three, two from C.C. and one from Eastern Township in 1969-1971). These Commissioners want publicity and will go to news media . . . ." "There are two to three colored reverends who make contact by coming to see the Sheriff or letters to the editor . . . ." "They use the news media--clai. racism . . . ." "Sheriff. Some go the Board . . . ." "I don't know. They might call in but might be more hesitant because they feel they might not get satisfaction. In (C.C.) the blacks would call the Mayor or HRC. No matter what the event, they would make it into a black-white or black-police issue. The blacks seem to have a fear of the Sheriff Department. Unlike (C.C.) where pressures and politics can hamper the police, the blacks out there have a pretty good idea of their relative power. Thus, they know they can't get away with anything."[19]

There was a greater consensus on whom they t ned to for support. "They might go to the NAACP in (C.C.) . . . ." "Black leaders on the Board, they even go to the HRC and NAACP in (C.C.). Very seldom do they

go to other categories (in the County) . . . ." "If a black youth has a complaint, neither he nor his parents will come in. They'll go to some group . . . ." "They hang together but don't feel the race thing to the extent they do in (C.C.). They lack the unity and political direction . . . ." "They like to spread a scandal or something with the news media rather than (go through) the legal authorities . . . ." "(They) print complete untruths in the underground news media (referring, I think, to the C.C. blacks)."

To gain their respect for the officers, the responses were: "In the Oval I go in with the attitude that we have to do it and that's it. . . ." "This department has had five years of not letting anyone get away with anything. They have a certain respect for us because if you take a swing at one of us, you'll get your head busted. In the City (C.C.) they have to take it . . ." "If necessary, I'd latch onto them quicker to establish my authority. You don't always arrest a guy just because he swings at you. This ain't going to be another Selma . . . ." "Depends on different groups. With militant groups I try to come on strong, enough force to show them I'm not afraid. The others (groups) who know they need law enforcement can be dealt with easier . . . ." "They're almost a community aside. I feel they don't need us or like to have us around."

Below are the responses to whether they think the other deputies feel as the respondents did to the last question.

"A majority of the guys do with four of five exceptions. There's no racists here. They love to beat the shit out of long hairs . . . ." "Depends on personality. I'm not that gifted. I can't get along with them. Some of the men can get along well with them. I can't . . ."

"If you go into the Oval and show cowardice, they usually take advantage of you right away . . . ." "Every organization has a few people with different personalities. Some can't control their tempers and say or do the wrong thing . . . ." "Most have a certain pride in the reputation the Department has built up. We have good morale because of our good reputation."

And finally, the Sheriff Department treats this group better than the C.C.P.D. because, "In general we treat them fairly. Everyday the C.C.P.D. gets complaints. We don't. Maybe they (on the eastside) know that these trumped up charges aren't going to get them anywhere. They will get the treatment they ask for. They will not get babied here." "I wouldn't say we treat them better. If anything (C.C.) treats them better to please, I should say, appease, them."

On the two following pages, I have developed charts to summarize the police perceptions of the nine categories outlined above. The conclusion I draw from viewing the lowest two categories in each community is that there is a greater amount of perceived voluntary exclusion within Central City. All of category five and the youth portion of category four are seen as self-exiling. The other portion of category four has access to and collectively uses the political structure. At this time juncture, I would say this latter portion is, as a solidary group, viewed as on the boundary of the political arena vying for entry into the system and striving to become a fully represented group.

In the County I would place category four (black), the lowest one, as perceived to be just outside the political arena and involuntarily excluded. Although there are some stirrings, especially among the young,

CHART 9-8

Central City Police Perceptions of the Citizenry

Category	Particular Problems	Perceived Feelings	Grievance Satisfaction	Support Sources	Method of Interaction
1) Professional-Businessmen	None	Very Supportive and Positive	Top Police Administrators	Individually Direct	Respect-Deference
2) Middle Class-Blue Collar	None-Limited, (DUIL)	Positive	Duty Officer	Family-Friends	Courtesy-Reactive
3) Regular Students	Irregular	Mixed-Positive to Neutral	Within "Channels"	Within Category	Cautious Understanding
4) Blacks-Low Income	Split-Mostly by Age	Mixed-Neutral to Alienated	Mixed-Mostly Within "Channels"	Collectively Within & Outside	Firmness-Necessary Force
5) Radicals-Hippies	All	Very Negative-Alienated	Mostly Outside of "Channels"	Collectively Wherever possible	Necessary Force-Repressed hostility

CHART 9-9

Mideast County Deputy Perceptions of the Citizenry

Category	Particular Problems	Perceived Feelings	Grievance Satisfaction	Support Sources	Method of Interaction
1) Western-Rural Farmers	None	Very Favorable-Highly Supportive	Sheriff-Political Incumbents	Individually-Direct	Interest-Friendship
2) Upper Income-Middle Class	None Limited (Children)	Supportive-Neutral	Top Police Administrators	Individually-Direct	Public relations-Formal Respect
3) Working-Low Class Southern	High Crime Rate-Non-Group Oriented	Mixed-Positive to Alienated	Within "Channels" With Some Media Usage	Individually-Within Category-Direct and Indirect (Media, Politicians)	Firmness-Establish Authority With Necessary Force
4) Working-Low Class Blacks	Difficult Access Community-High Crime Rate	Mixed-Neutral to Alienated	Nothing-Within "Channels" and More Extensive Media Usage	Collectively-Within and Outside Category-Direct and Indirect	Necessary Force-Collective, Minimal Policing

collective political activity is yet to occur to achieve full representation. Agents who purport to speak for the category are within the system but the category is not sufficiently politicized to press for favorable outcomes. As a result of the lack of political conflict, I believe that the social distance--the strength of the perceived alienation--is less for this category than for the fifth and a portion of the fourth category in Central City. I would, therefore, conclude that the police perceive considerably less socio-political exclusion in Mideast County than in Central City.

It can be seen from the two charts that these differing perceptions of trust and exclusion by the police are of great importance to the categorized populace. As one moves away from the most trusted categories toward those perceived as being least trusted, the method of interaction changes quite drastically. Chapter 10 will show in some detail that: 1) police political behavior increases as a community is seen as being more diverse (e.g., Central City has more than Mideast County); 2) the more alien the category, the greater the likelihood of police political behavior toward it; and 3) the more alien the category, the more severe the consequences of this behavior becomes for those involved.

We come, finally, to the last of the questions. It is lengthy and thus reproduced below as it was presented to the respondents. In most instances, after the respondent had completed the task, the choices were briefly discussed.

Now, please remember that different communities have differing categories of citizens. I am going to read four questions to you in sequence and then ask you to circle the answers you feel are closest to being what each police department must face daily.

1) Combining all the people in that part of Mideast County which the Sheriff Department patrols (excluding Central City and Eastern City but including Eastern Township), where would you rate the CITIZENS in their feelings toward the Sheriff Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

2) Now, combine all the people of Mideast County, where would you rate the CITIZENS in their feelings toward the Sheriff Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

3) How do you feel that the CITIZENS living in Central City feel toward the Central City Police Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY SUPPORTIVE

4) And finally, how do you feel that the CITIZENS of the City of Metropolita feel about the Metropolita Police Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

5) Please rank the four communities above (each has a different combination of categories) from that community which has the MOST cooperative citizenry to that which has the LEAST.

_____ _____ _____ _____

(MOST) (LEAST)

The object of the above exercise was to directly compare the two communities in terms of perceived overall citizen support and thus, tap the intervening variable of trust direction. Although it would not accurately place the communities on the trust continuum (confidence--alienation), it was hoped the responses would be useful for comparative purposes--that one community would be perceived as being closer to the confidence pole than the other. For purposes of greater clarity, I broke Mideast County down into that portion we have been concerned with throughout this study--#1 or the area the Sheriff Department patrols--and I then asked about the entire County, (#2).[20] In the latter case, I was interested in what the effect would be of also including the two

largest cities as they are both within the electoral constituency of the Sheriff's office and his deputies are called into them on occasion. "Metropolita" (#4) was included to test what the reaction would be to a huge, nearby metropolitan city.

In general, the officers took quite some time to answer, pondering for long minutes over their choices. That they understood the question and their assignment was evident by the logic they employed to defend their responses. Of the 37 respondents in the two departments who completed the fifth question forcing them to rank the four communities, 32 chose Community #1 first and the other five ranked it second. In addition, of the 27 "very supportive" answers recorded, #1 received 21 which included three when it ranked in the second position. Community #2 received five of the remaining six "very supportive" answers. At the other end of the scale, Metropolita or Community #4 was ranked last 30 times out of 35 responses. The other times Central City, Community #3, was ranked last. Six other respondents failed to complete the rankings for a total of 41. Overall, three in the C.C.P.D. (18 of 21) refused to rank the communities and one in the M.C.S.D. (19 of 20) could only rank "#3, last". Eight of 18 in the C.C.P.D. and 12 of 19 in the M.C.S.D.--20 of 37--ranked the four communities in order, 1-2-3-4.[21] The chart below provides the breakdown by departments for the 41 respondents.

In short, it appears that community support (the overall sense of trust) as perceived by the 41 officers descends in the predicted order.[22] There is strong evidence that the citizenry within the County, at least the portion we have been concerned with, is perceived by both departments as having, overall, a more confident trust direction than Central City's

CHART 9-10

Police Responses About Overall Citizen's Support

C.C.P.D.-Questions #	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Very Supportive	10	1	1	0
Supportive	9	17	13	7
Indifferent	0	1	6	8
Unsupportive	0	0	0	1
Very Unsupportive	0	0	0	1
Didn't Answer	2	2	1	4
TOTAL	21	21	21	21

M.C.P.D.-Questions #	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Very Supportive	11	4	0	0
Supportive	9	15	15	11
Indifferent	0	1	3	5
Unsupportive	0	0	2	2
Very Unsupportive	0	0	0	0
Didn't Answer	0	0	0	2
TOTAL	20	20	20	20

clientele. From Figure E of Chapter 8, this trust relationship was predicted given the lower presence of both social diversity and socio-political exclusion in the County. This, in turn, would lead to a lower movitation to engage in police political behavior.

Summarizing the general findings from these 20 questions establishes that from a number of approaches, social diversity and socio-political exclusion are perceived by the police in both departments as being greater in Central City. This leads to Mideast County having more confident overall trust relationship between the police and the citizenry, again as perceived by the police. That this has predictable ramifications for the behavior of the police is the subject I will now take up.

Outside Expert Commentary

Knowledgeable observers, members of the two communities who interact with the police on a daily and professional basis, were asked to discuss the manner in which the two departments interact with socially diverse segments of the two populaces. In some instances, the experts took the diversity for granted and talked about the differing effects this had on police behavior. Others elected to discuss the process by which categories of citizens in the two communities are identified by the police.

Although none of the experts talked about the exclusion of any particular segments, their observations are important because they corroborate in behavioralistic terms both the perceptions of the police and their methods of interaction which were developed earlier in this chapter.

> The City has no felony jurisdiction so most of the cases with regard to political groups would, by the nature of the types of offense with which they would likely get involved, go to the

> Prosecutor's office. There are, thus, very few requests for authorization to make (such) arrests emitting from the City Attorney's office except traffic violations. In this category (of offenses) I think there is definitely a higher probability that a "long hair" or someone with a "XXX" bumper sticker would get a traffic citation. I also think the police would be somewhat slower to process a complaint from one of these local hippie types. Overall, I think there are three possibilities: (1) the police may actually fabricate charges against certain (previously) known individuals; (2) they might go out of their way to pin legitimate offenses on certain people by closely watching them; and (3) they might derive particular satisfaction out of making an arrest against certain individuals. I don't think there is much, if any, of the first category. I know the police do the third (e.g., "the wife of a Legal Aid lawyer being picked up for some offense"). The second is a gray area which is very difficult to get accurate data on. It is probably a fairly subtle thing, although it is highly probable that the police are naturally more attentive to people with certain appearances and therefore, will see more violations.$_{I}$

> I think that it isn't so much political behavior like certain kinds of agitation that upsets the police as much as it is a difference in what I guess I'd call living patterns. To the police, 'political' tends to be an all embracive term. They use it to refer to anything which impedes a case from getting the letter of the law thrown at it. For example, if consideration (i.e., "giving a guy a break") were given in a case, for any reason, it would be seen as political . . . . With regard to the attitudes of some of the officers who have left or want to go to the Sheriff Department, I think this means they can get the groups or be free to go after the groups they personally dislike or have labeled as being the 'negative elements.' This is what I think some of them mean when they say they want to go to a police department where they can truly enforce the law without encumberances. I think the Sheriff (department) has some pretty solid views as to who the lawbreakers are and they've been pretty well identified--("student radicals, hippies," etc.)$_{II}$

In response to a question about whether the C.C.P.D. differentiates between segments of the population, the following are excerpts from an informant's lengthy reply.

> It's obvious that they do. They are consistent with the other racial and class ideals of the white majority. If the majority of the police are white and that which is immediately in front of them (is white), then the police feel they are enforcing the values of the will of the people--white middle class values.

> The police are predominantly from the lower class and aspire to and act at the same as middle class people. Thus, there is an effort to emulate and maintain a value system which is middle class.
>
> Life for them is seen as a class society from the top class on down. Therefore, it is necessary to repress radical expressions which . . . threaten the virtues of middle class life. Blacks are inferior as are hippies, communes, free love, the drug culture, etc. . . . Things like other life styles create a real threat. What if there were another way to gain satisfaction, other than the stullifying drudgery of work. It would destroy their whole concept of life . . . (as) they need to continue to emulate the middle class ethic that hard work brings self-satisfaction . . . . Cops are the strangest of all groups because in our society they are unique. They have, with all the others, the basic problem of human survival but in addition they see themselves as having to struggle for survival against all the others who have singled them out.

How do the police discern these groups in our society with divergent life styles and values?

> Whoever represents a threat to their job security and politically to their value system become known to them. Change for our system means attempting to get change within the system--either structural or attitudinal. This type of change effort, within certain channels if it is to be effective, is by the nature of the game a visible one. There are those groups which use overt actions and become known that way. They get put on someone's list and there is a constant interchange of such lists. Others are visible because of specific hassles such as resisting arrest. Their names get known. Some are constant critics of the department and are deemed as trouble makers--as opposed to a 'kook' whom they laugh at as being harmless. People are singled out in another way. They are observed doing things which are not necessarily against the law but are against the police's value system as for example with interracial dating or marriage.
>
> . . . In (Central City) the student activists and blacks are harassed by such things as issuing a warrant for a moving traffic violation and then going after them at 3:00 in the morning or sometime like that and then getting them for resisting arrest, etc. They use the law to get to them and set them up for a felony. They also harass people to the breaking point to set them up for something they can pin on them which is really big.[III]

A lawyer informant was asked about the differentiation of the citizenry by the police. He saw a three-way breakdown.

> The socially prominent adults get very lenient treatment. Usually the police will let them go with something like a 'Don't you think your wife should drive' response. Children of prominent folks, on the other hand, get nailed if they get caught. They don't get a second chance. The police seem to think they should know better. This is especially true if they have long hair. They end up getting fewer convictions and lighter sentences because they can afford and do get the best lawyers, but they sure need them.
>
> Poor kids, black or white, usually do get the second chance. You can get them some sort of reduction (plea bargaining) without much difficulty because the police seem to think they don't know any better. That is, if you handle the case properly, you can get a reduction more easily with fewer hard feelings.
>
> Or take another kind of example. On Saturday nights, plain clothed police will check the small or less well healed bars and will arrest on the street outside (these bars) for drunkenness. They never go near the bars or night spots that the socially prominent or well-to-do frequent. Or, they'll go to the bars frequented by the long hairs--college crowd and do the same, wait for someone drunk to leave and then nail them.[IV]

Another prominent lawyer responded to the same question concerning differential behavior toward the citizenry with:

> The police do not like young people. To a large extent the treatment (of youths) depends on who their parents are . . . . There are two sides to the establishment; the larger portion is made up of the type of people (X, a leading businessman) represents--fine, upstanding Republican parents whose kids get good treatment and a smaller portion whose parents are prominent but have some sort of a label attached to them--University, liberal democrat, etc. These kids tend to get the book thrown at them. The police like to embarass them and their parents.
>
> In general, young people are a threat. Their habits and actions produce change which is a threat--strangeness, differentness. A cop's sense of order is best defined and rooted in the past. Police don't believe in change and are thus opposed to protest. They're afraid of the left-radicals and see conspiracy everywhere.[V]

A third lawyer said:

> Basically (C.C.) has more groups from different backgrounds that have a voice on issues--stronger black voice, activist students and (upper middle-class) professionals than does the County . . . . Surprisingly enough, (X, a black leader) has some influence. He may not actually change any of the ways in which the police operate but they do talk. (X) has made known to the police in the way the County blacks haven't, the problems of the blacks.

I then asked him about the treatment of different segments of the population.

> In a normal encounter the same range will likely be shown in both departments with both blacks and whites. If temperatures rise, the deputies are likely to take less shit and the (C.C.) P.D. to put up with more shit. The deputies are likely to get physical sooner. (I asked why). Even if an officer 'knew in his heart' (using Goldwater's 1964 quote) that he was right in using the force he did use, the (C.C.) cops would be far more worried about administrative reviews, the grievance officer, command watching more closely, etc. . . .
>
> The cops take a closer look at anyone with a physical stigma--beard, long hair, skin color, etc. It is hard to say if this is because they are identified as being in a high crime category or if their mode of living is different and they are then watched more closely and more criminal activity is found. I don't know which comes first, the identification and then arrest or vice versa. It is amazing how easy it is to arrest the hippie-drug culture types. They're quite open and use very poor discretion.[VI]

Another knowledgeable informant said:

> In (C.C.) you clearly have much more in the way of organized groups which the Sheriff doesn't have to deal with. The obvious groups are the radical students, hippies into the drug culture and communal living scene, militant groups, left-liberal middle class ("much of the Democratic Party and various church groups and ad hoc committees") . . . . Not all the pressure on the police is from the down and outs. They get it from a variety of angles. A substantial amount comes from the upper-middle class intellectuals.
>
> The (C.C.) police take pride in what they regard as professionalism. Thus, they feel some constraint because they see themselves as an elite force, as better than other departments. Often, however, this thin veneer is broken through. They act in a vindictive manner. You see it most clearly with the radicals, long hairs and also with the young blacks, especially the sharply dressed ones. I feel they go beyond doing their job in an even-handed way. They concentrate their efforts on groups

they regard as anti-social. Many do this for what they see as positive reasons. They feel that society is teetering on the brink and that it is very close to crumbling. They see themselves ad defenders of the 'American Way of Life' and that these groups are threatening its existence. They are going after evil forces which (to them) is not necessarily seen as being personally vindictive.

It is not just life style, not just that they are politically active or that a person is different, but that they are threatening social stability. They are all seen as tarred with the same brush. Certain categories of people are lumped in a camp and sought out. It is however, very difficult to document this differential treatment because the statistics just aren't kept in this manner; that is, by race or other easily identifiable categories. I don't know how it could be documented because the statistics just aren't there . . . . However, I know damn well they do (differentiate between groups within specific segments of society). They'll even tell you they're out to get someone. (It) can either be someone they think is a law breaker or an identified politically active person. Either way, they are seen as a bad guy to get. (X) or (Y, leaders in the church sit-ins) have to watch their steps.[VII]

A closely connected observer said about Central City:

E.Ann Street is a place which they keep their eye on but sort of a hands off policy toward. They need to patrol it yet they sort of only respond to calls when they must. They seem to be constantly in trouble there . . . . The (C.C.) police could tell you what houses the political activists and leaders live in. The plain clothed dicks, if they have nothing else to do, will drive or walk around in the areas where the 'undesirable' sorts live. They'll also stop in at (X Bar) or wherever the 'in' spot is. From time to time they may infiltrate the different groups to see what's going on. I know they keep a dossier of political activists; partly for political reasons and partly for building up pot violations. A few of the police personally keep lists of left-wing leader types. Officers go on the 'narc squad' for three to four months at a time. They may grow a beard and they hang around the right areas and make contact. Some of this is good police work but with the young (officers), especially, it is abused (e.g., "they copy all names from address books, etc., which they wouldn't do with a 'respectable' person arrested and then use these as a followup for tips, etc.").

. . . In (C.C.) late at night all black or hippie looking groups or drivers are stopped. The police invariably use a defective equipment violation for an excuse for a shakedown (search) which is illegal. I think the police take particular interest and joy in arresting certain people (e.g., "I know the police were

almost ecstatic when (X, a high ranking city official) was fired. He was seen as the archetype of the protected enemy"). I'm sure that they do differentiate between groups within categories (of the citizens). I'm sure that the Black Berets and the White Panthers, for example, were arrested more often and certainly watched more closely and harassed, although some of this comes from their own political and other sorts of activities.

The County

In the Sheriff's domain when dealing with problem people or specific groups, the deputies sense their least desirable element or pick out their 'enemies' by neighborhoods (e.g., "Eastern Township and Lost Lake"). None seem to be organized into formal groups or organizations but they sort of hang out or run around together. The deputies get to know this and they are picked out or labeled or classified by their neighborhood and their age level. The actual treatment given them by the deputies and on into the prosecution interaction depends on: (1) the attitude of the person; and (2) if they have given the deputies any trouble before. If just #1 above occurs and their attitude is 'good,' they may get a break in the charges and in the bond level. Thus, in your terms (the author's) they have a reactive attitude toward these kinds. If they act up, are insolent, or don't respect authority, which often means, if they don't say what they're supposed to in terms of confession, then they get treated more harshly. If the deputies run into people they know are trouble makers then their attitude can be one of a proactive nature. They have their eye out for specific people and try to find domething to pin on them. This is especially true of the classification of 'long hair.'

So, you have, generally, a continuum (with regard to the deputies' perceptions of the populace). From those individuals not classified, to reactive where the person falls into an identifiable category, to proactive where the person is known, to proactive where a category is labeled and everyone falling into that category is seen as a serious crime possibility.

In general, if there are a number of possible charges which can be made, the prosecutor will go with a number short of the total. If it looks like the case will go to trial, then they will issue a warrant for a few more. This is used as a threat not to have a jury trial and to set up a plea bargaining situation. The police can pick their assistant prosecutor on the basis of the number of charges they want to confer, they can go to more than one assistant prosecutor or they can have two officers investigate the same case or person and both can go to get warrants.[VIII]

A commentator said the following about the categories of citizens in eastern Mideast County.

> (1) High to middle income ($25-100,000 a year)--in south and west parts of the Township. The Paint Creek Association ("a vigilante, law and order type organization forming to patrol their neighborhood at night") is in here. They tend to belong to the professional societies and to the service clubs, etc. Most of the B. and E.'s (breaking and entering) are occurring in this area.
> (2) 221 area--northside--the southern and white hillbilly types. The old homestead area. Cheap housing, low income, almost all factory workers. Many of the youthful criminals come from here, although they tend to commit their acts elsewhere. Most of the crimes committed are family quarrels, etc. There appear to be no sorts of organizations or groups except the White Advisory Council which surfaces at school board meetings ("these are the Wallacites of the north"). They were also in evidence when they wanted to march on (Eastern) University.
> (3) Black area--Oval area--government low income housing project in the northeast. The blacks are in the project and on some (other) six streets. About 2000 or so, most of whom are in Township. Eastern Township is 8-9% black at most. There are a few more organizations in the black than in the low income white area. The Black Citizens' Group which counters the above white one, NAACP, O.E.O. Groups tend to form on an ad hoc basis around the school crises which recur. There was a viable organization around the project which seems to be disintegrating.
> (4) Lower-middle, income group--most moderate. S.E. corner of the Township. They are law and order conservative types but not in the Wallacite vein as #2 above. These are mostly second generation in (the State) who are one rung up economically from them (#2). This area is mostly white but is integrating more rapidly and on a better basis than any other area. It is becoming the most stable area in the Township.

With regard to the relationship of these four categories to the Sheriff Department, the commentator had this to say.

> (1) Hillbilly whites--the Sheriff's strongest supporters. There seem to be very few complaints from these people. They are more apt to call the Sheriff than the State Police. These are bitter people who are much the same in their temperament as the young blacks of today. The deputies have a lot of problems and trouble making arrests.
> (2) Oval--They're always complaining about excessive force and excessive numbers of cars that come into answer complaints. These are very bitter people against whites. They are very able to identify the different deputies and (X) and (Y) can go in

> with few problems. I think the treatment given them is very much the same (as the southern whites). They know they have to be firm and are liable to have problems every time they go in. I think a couple of the deputies are up to the use of excessive force.
> (3) and (4) In general these areas have good relations with the Sheriff. They do tend to be more critical of the department but this is mainly from the aspect of lack of service. IX/23

And finally, the following was excerpted from a lengthy interview with a lawyer who primarily discussed the blacks and southern whites on the County's eastern side.

> The overall interaction scene between the deputies and the hillbillies is a sense of hating one another. This is especially true of the youth. The deputies expect trouble and they get it. They (the young) will fight with the officers and on many of the arrests which are affected out there, a charge of resisting arrest is tacked on. There seems to be something of a personal vendetta between the deputies and the white kids. If the State Police (who have overlapping jurisdiction) go in, there are no real problems. The difference seems to be that the State Police are capable of making the approach and getting things done without the statements which inflame the situation. The deputies don't seem to come into contact with black kids as often and there don't appear to be as many fracases. It must be the geography or less verbal interchange or maybe they go to the State Police more often. Certainly, there isn't the personal vendetta aspect but there seem to be fewer resisting arrest charges. Fewer suits seem to come out of the Oval against the Sheriff. The blacks don't seem to resist the deputies to the extent the white kids do. There seems to be more fear or something.
>
> The Oval has some rudiments of organization, something akin to a tenant's council. The same people seem to rally to the various crises. The whites seem to have no organization at all in their area. About all there is are the unions which never get involved in such community or neighborhood disturbances vis a vis the police. When there is a disturbance, the blacks tend to follow through more than the whites do in terms of group cohesion and action. Over time, though, money causes the thing to fade away in terms of any effective action. They're all excited but when they find out it'll cost them, very few carry on.
>
> The overall impression I get is one of the deputies dispensing a great deal of street justice and doing their duty in a physical manner. There seems to be very little polish to their performance and the power behind the badge seems to be the

means used to keep some semblance of order in (these areas of the) east county. The men seem to be very moralistic in their evaluation of people and they are categorized into good and bad. The bad ones are then watched--sometimes openly with taunts of 'we're going to get you' or 'we know you're guilty and we're watching you,' etc.

There does seem to be a difference between the way the blacks and (southern) whites are treated or the response they have to the deputies. A quick guess would be that the difference between the deputies and the blacks leaves some room for mutual respect--perhaps based on fear--which seems to dampen the potential for violent encounters while the relations with the whites is one of close, almost equal, social entities. This closeness seems to make for the mutual gaming that goes on in terms of trying to effect arrests, resistance, etc.[XI]

CHAPTER 9

Footnotes

1. Once again, I regret to say that sources of information will be protected by utilizing notations which will have extremely limited circulation. Thus, roman numeral footnotes will demark both sources of statements and, where necessary, added commentary whose source would become obviated by the material's content.

2. Throughout the questions in this Chapter, the respondents were referred back to the diagram on page 6 of the Interview Form that they or I had sketched of their initial breakdown of the community into categories. This was kept constantly in view so that prior questions would not contaminate subsequent questions.

3. This question is more complex than it appears. It is possible to state in general that no interest group actually speaks for its constituency. On the other hand, a technique utilized by social control agents is the denial of rightful leadership to a group vying for power within or challenging to enter the political arena. Therefore, to understand the way in which the respondent meant the answer, it is necessary to tie it in with the previous response.

4. It is, of course, possible that some officers would also be thinking in terms of those who created political problems for them. Certainly, the number of times such comments cropped up uninvited would warrant such an assertion.

5. The following is an example. Deputy X of the Sheriff Department broke the community down into and ranked the categories as follows: (1) rural-farm type-white; (2) middle class; (3) colored; and (4) middle to lower income bracket-southern white. In response to the questions of the category closest to his personal values or beliefs, he chose #1. For the category most distant, he said, "#3 and 4 are pretty close." This obviously, displays a high correlation between the two answers. Others may not.

6. It is interesting to note that of the six situations in Chart 9-7 where there wasn't a direct comparison, an above average number of categories were selected by the respondents (4.83 to an average of 4.16 overall). This was also true of the Sheriff Department where the overall average was 4.37 and the twelve nondirect comparisons showed an average of 4.92 number of categories chosen. I wouldn't want to make much of this but it's worth a footnote.

7. While I have presented evidence which shows a strong direct relationship between crime-generating solidary groups (categories or principal types as they were introduced to the respondents) and how the officers personally feel about the groups, the relationship remains hypothetical and is certainly not perfect.

8. One of the most difficult issues to adequately handle is how a given political groups moves from one trust type into another in the eyes of the police or any other observer. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be covered by the data collected for this study as there is no time frame for comparative reference.

9. The nine questions were those numbered 1-8 and the one immediately following #8 on pages 3 and 4 of the Interview Form. See Appendix I.

10. Question 6--"If they do try to cause trouble for you or the department with their grievance, who can you count on to support you?" was covered at the conclusion of Chapter 4. It will be used here only to make comparative points. Questions 7 and 8 ("In general, what is the typical way to deal with them to gain their respect for you?" and "Do the other members of the department feel the way you do or differently?") were disappointing in the C.C.P.D. as the answers, with a few exceptions, were predictably public relations oriented. Nonetheless, when useful, they will be utilized. The reverse was true in the M.C.S.D.

11. These combinations seemed to make the most sense from the data. Thus, average-middle class is not significantly different from the blue collar workers in Central City, although they are probably two solidary groups. Low income is synonymous with blacks in the eyes of the police and the fourth category is very much lumped together by them. Within each category, the ideas and quotes are taken <u>solely</u> from officers who discussed that specific category.

12. This particular quote refers to "blue collar workers";the officer continued the quote:

> If students break windows, etc., we lose respect from the blue collars whereas the more professional might see a little deeper and realize why we didn't go out into the street. (This) seems to be an area where there is a dilemma--damned if you do and damned if you don't.

13. In general, this category had the weakest data from which to work as the officers kept slipping into rapping on the radicals.

14. One officer mentioned the radical right. "The left is openly hostile to us. The right is hostile to the left and to the blacks."

15. Excluding, you will recall, Central and Eastern Cities and two small cities of under 8,000 on the west side.

16. The one officer who discussed students related most of the activity to Central City and reiterated what the C.C.P.D. respondents said. His feeling about grievances was, "most don't think they can get a fair shake if they have long hair. Why complain to one pig about another one."

17. Two deputies overheard an interview and offered the following:

> There are school problems over at _____ _____. It's part of a movement all over the country. (We) think it is organized by the same groups such as the Black Panthers or other radical groups. There's a plot behind this. It must be communist inspired. For example, the thievery of weapons and the hijacking. All of this is a build-up for a complete civil war. The Reds are using the Negroes because they are not leaders but followers--mainly because they're not educated. If they can get to a few (black) leaders, they can get them all.

They were deadly serious.

18. One of the above deputies (a lieutenant) not interviewed, offered this comment about how the blacks feel. "What draws the black people together (and against us) is their tribal heritage from Africa. Take the worst of the oppressed people, the American Indians. If anyone has a right to retaliate, they do. They should take it all. Yet they commit very few crimes."

19. The last quote was from an officer who had been with the C.C.P.D. He went on to say:

> When I was with the C.C.P.D., I was once called in because a white woman had called in to complain about me passing her with my blue lights on. If she had been black she might have said something about trying to side swipe her of force her off the road.
>
> In (C.C.) there was more or less of an unspoken order that you don't go on (the 100 block of) E. Ann Street. We were more leery about giving tickets to black than to white people. You tried to screw the students and get the wealthy whites--we gave tickets to them more readily.

20. As this could have been somewhat confusing and was contrary to the way the respondents had been continually instructed to think of the Sheriff Department's "terrain," I took great pains to be certain each respondent understood the conceptual differences before they answered. I did this by reading and explaining the entire question prior to giving them the page.

21. Two of these were partial exceptions. Number 3 in the M.C.S.D. ranked no fourth community and #16, M.C.S.D., had 2 and 3 a "toss up."

22. The inclusion of Community #2 made this a potentially tricky series of questions as these seven respondents indicate. It set up a comparison between the two departments by the officers of the viewpoint of Central City's citizenry. As such, it is the one place in the study where the question of possibly overlapping jurisdiction is surfaced. The results were mixed although the majority went with Community #2 as being more supportive than #3. Perhaps, as one respondent said, "the noninteraction played a part; normally they don't care about the Sheriff Department for they have their own."

    Three deputies and a C.C.P.D. respondent did put #2 first with three using the supporting argument of more people, ergo, more support. The fourth used the above argument (a different respondent) of noninteraction making the feelings held by the citizens of a fonder sort. Again, though, the majority saw the inclusion of Central and Eastern Cities as introducing a more negative mixture of citizen's feelings and thus a considerable drop-off in support.

23. Another outside respondent said:

    > As a department, the Sheriff Department uses more force than the (C.C.)P.D. Hitting of prisoners is rare at the (C.C.) police station. I've had at least two deputies tell me they've hit prisoners because they felt like it. Also, there have been prisoners who say they've been beaten in the jail . . . . Then there was the twosome of (X and Y), both big brutes, who rode a patrol car together for at least 2-3 years and the Sheriff tolerated their brutal behavior. At least three of four law suits started over their physical assaults.[X]

CHAPTER 10

"Some of the People, All of the Time"

In this Chapter I will continue to present illustrations of the social control perspective in the form of police political behavior toward the citizenry. Whereas the outside experts in the last section of Chapter 9 primarily discussed this behavior from a general level, here they will be employed to generate information about specific activities. The Chapter will begin with a number of deputies who transferred from the C.C.P.D. to the M.C.S.D. discussing the differences this has brought about in their citizen contacts. From there, we will move right into the South University incident of June, 1969 in Central City as one of a number of examples of the two departments' involvement with University affairs. Then to another comparative situation, East Ann Street in Central City, and on to the C.C.P.D.'s treatment of three groups within the two most alien solidary groups--the blacks and the predominently white youth culture. Finally, proactive police activity in the form of political intelligence will be discussed.

Four deputies had switched over from the C.C.P.D. within the last year or so and were asked the following questions, "Do you feel that you have to be more careful in this department when you arrest an influential person? How about a black?"[1] Their responses underline the differences between the two departments and set the stage for the later comparisons in their behavior.

(1) If I worked in (C.C.) I would hate to arrest (X, a black leader). Here, I wouldn't give it much thought. People in (C.C.) can make an awful lot of noise whether justified or not. Here, if the arrest was justified, there wouldn't be any backing down. In (C.C.) if pressures are put in proper places, the arrest would be eradicated. (C.C.)'s biggest problem is that the Chief isn't running the department. Everything is being run from the third floor (of City Hall where the City Administrator and the Mayor have offices).

(2) The other way around. Here, it is your baby and never does anyone attempt to influence you. This department is far less political. I feel the Chief is a mouth-piece for the politicians. Same with the situation of the blacks. They use political influence and make a big stink. Then there's a big investigation that puts all sorts of pressures on the police. I'll give you an example that happened to me (in 1969). There were six colored guys who felt they had some influence, loitering on South University. They refused to move on. I got (X, brother of a black leader in C.C.) up against the car first. Another one jumped my partner from behind . . . . He was going for my partner's gun . . . . The fourth time he went for the gun, I slugged him as hard as I could. I had no choice. Well then the shit hit the fan. First the write up in the paper, then the lies from (Y, another black leader), etc. There was no support for me in the department until the two were found guilty.

I can guarantee there would have been none of the above publicity and stuff if the two had been white middle class and in moderate politics. If the affair had occurred here, I would have gotten much more departmental support . . . . I feel people have far more respect/fear--they can be used interchangeably--for us here. In (C.C.) they have all sorts of places to go to get aid to cover up for what they do. I feel it makes them feel more than equal to an officer. They (feel that they) don't have to listen to or obey an officer.

(3) During the General Motors strike (1970) I brought in an aresstee from one of the picket scuffles. The President and Vice President (of the local union) came in to see (the Sheriff, calling him by his first name). I told them in front of the Sheriff not to call him by his first name. The deputies hate that. Anyway, the obvious influence attempt didn't work . . . . In (C.C.) during one of the confrontations at the University (1969 or 1970), (X, a City Councilman) hit Corporal (Y). He was going to swear out a warrant for the Councilman but the Chief and City Administrator said no . . . .[I] (I've seen) reverse discrimination in (C.C.). I've seen a black person arrested and then let go and then seen a white person arrested for the same thing and booked.

(4) Here, we don't care. In the City they have to worry--am I going to get any flack from upstairs. I got all kinds of bull shit for writing up (a parking ticket on X, a former Governor). It was voided out. They are more careful in the City about blacks. We were ordered (there) to use extreme caution, to arrest them only when it was really important.

. . . Every police officer at first is gung ho. They want to do a great job. In (C.C.) they come in like this but it doesn't last long. You can get choosy with which laws you enforce. In (C.C.) the officers selectively avoid people because of the problems and the hassle. (They) have to explain why they did this or that. I have (X, black leader) in mind. If I followed him around, I could break him in a week with money (fines) but I didn't because he would complain most vociferously.

(5) Definitely less. There's more politics in the (C.C.)P.D. There were overtones as to whom you have to look out for, who they are with--which group. Here, they are equal. In (C.C.) what concerns them (the officers) more is if they will be released or what will happen. If it wasn't <u>really</u> serious, they (the supervisors and the politicians) would let them go because it was easier to avoid problems. (There's) a double standard for blacks in (C.C.).

<u>The South University Affair--June, 1969</u>

The South University Avenue affair began on a warm summer's night in June, 1969 and lasted for some four nights. It's significance lies primarily in the different method of interaction used by the two departments. Largely confined to a three block area of the Avenue about a block from the center of the University, the affair was, essentially, a continual nocturnal battle over who would control this stretch of turf. The sidewalks, lined with stores and student hangouts, are a focus of student evening gatherings. These were not at issue. It was whether the road, itself, could be made into a "people's place" with no automotive traffic, or whether the police would control the road and keep it open for traffic.[2]

In the words of a C.C.P.D. official, the affair broke out on a Monday night and:

> Started over a guy doing 'wheelies' on a (motor)cycle in the middle of the road. A patrol car went by, stopped him, put him in the patrol car and started giving him a ticket. Street people then gathered around the car and began wrecking it--damn near turned it over. The car radioed for help and we got them and got out. The next night all hell broke loose. I think we should have moved them out right when they first got into the street (that first night).

Another version is admittedly second-hand and has a different origin.

> The account I got was that the White Panthers were at a City Council meeting protesting about something and weren't getting any satisfaction and so they stormed out. At the same time, there was a crowd of people forming on South University and they blocked up the street. The Panthers were accused of starting the thing but they denied it. Most of the people were youngsters, not yet college age. The police somehow were there and called in for advice and (X) looked it over. His advice was to cool it, do nothing and let it burn itself out. The thing really got going when some girl blew a guy and then they fucked right there in the middle of the street ("which was duly reported the next day in the C.C. News as 'an alleged fornication'"). It did finally end about 3:00 in the morning.
>
> The next day, Tuesday, all sorts of things got started. Someone began distributing handbills saying that 'the people' would take the streets again the next night. The handbill was sort of a Berkeley 'people's park' thing. Meanwhile the police heard these things and, of course, the paper that afternoon told the world so they began organizing to handle the situation. They were determined that the road would stay open. Their plan was to get to the scene ahead of the kids and occupy the street first. They didn't make it.[II]
>
> When the (C.C.)P.D. first got to the scene, the Deputy Chief tried to disperse the crowd with a bullhorn and somebody tried to get him with a knife which put the police more uptight than they already were. The (C.C.)P.D. then swept down the road from gutter to gutter and cleared the street. People, many of whom were just watching from the sidewalk, were then totally surprised when the police turned around and swept back clearing everything from storefront to storefront.
>
> Meanwhile, the Sheriff had his deputies and those from other counties mobilized and waiting out at the County Services Building

along with some 50 State Police. The Deputy Chief called out there early in the evening and asked that the State Police be sent in to help out. (A County Commissioner) answered the phone and the Sheriff demanded to know why they wanted the State Police and didn't ask for him. He then grabbed his boys (deputies) and took off leaving the State Police to find their own way to the scene. The Sheriff arrived, found the situation in some difficulty with the (C.C.)P.D. taking some heat, grabbed a bullhorn and set his men to clearing the west end of South University. In the meantime the State Police got royally lost and it took them some four hours or so to arrive and get coordinated with the (C.C.)P.D. and in position. During this time, the Sheriff's men had been mopping up in a brutal fashion.[III]

By 11:30 p.m. the police had organized separate turfs. I found out much later that the (C.C.)P.D. had actually charged through the Engin Arch and used tear gas on the campus. Also, there must have been a number of police charges up side streets and onto private property.[IV]

Somewhere around midnight I found myself in a car with the Mayor and the Director and Assistant Director of the HRC. We watched the deputies, some from (adjoining) Counties, chase people up on porches and into buildings. The Sheriff's people were charging in all directions, using tear gas, etc. At this point the Mayor felt as though his department was under good control but that the Sheriff and his assortment of deputies were totally out of hand. (The Chief) said that he couldn't do anything about it. So around 2:00 a.m. the Mayor called the Governor and said that things were out of control with the Sheriff, that there was no coordination between the three police forces and that he thought he wanted the National Guard. The Governor told him that he couldn't have the Guard and that he was just excited. So, the Mayor went back to the Chief and Deputy Chief who also said they didn't want the Guard called in. By 3:00 a.m. the thing burned itself out.[V]

On Wednesday the Mayor wrote a press release and tried to get (the University President) to jointly sponsor it. (The President) said that he would if the release included a statement that the vast majority of the people were not University students. The Mayor did this and said that this was not a police riot like the Chicago (Convention) debacle but was in fact the people's fault. Furthermore, he praised the (C.C.)P.D. for their restraint and efforts. At this point he didn't know about the charge through the Engin Arch onto campus.

That morning they all held a skull session at City Hall and the Mayor said there would be no more charges by the police. From then on they would walk slowly and use bullhorns, no running. The idea was to use the faculty and ministers to try to talk the crowd into staying off the street. The theory was not to

have a large number of cops in evidence to entice the crowds back. They were to be in readiness but in reserve. Well, things might have been much quieter but a green car tried to go through and some people felt it had hit someone which set the people off into the street, which brought the (C.C.)P.D. down again. The police didn't like having the ministers and faculty between them and the kids because they kept getting in the way. At one point, the decision was made to pull the police out because they were getting hurt by dropped bricks and thrown stuff. The Deputy Chief gave the order but they couldn't get out so they changed their tactics and stayed in. In the meantime, the Sheriff did the same thing he did on Tuesday night. Again, the thing died naturally but a bit earlier.

On Thursday, and for the first time, they now had a lot of faculty organized. The police were mobilized and although this time they didn't show up, the crowd was back again. (Y, a city official) was with the Chief in the evening and said the police were getting intelligence reports that the Panthers and other youths were buying cheap wine and giving it to the kids--most of the trouble came from the 12-15 year olds. The faculty was getting the traffic through slowly and only the punk kids were in the street. It's interesting that every night after the thing was over, the White Panthers and their young kids swept the street. There were lots of young kids hanging around the Panther's place at that time.

At 10:30 p.m., the thing was sort of building up but on a lower key. The Mayor was at City Hall when he got a phone call from (X, a black leader) who said that if he could get a bullhorn he could get (Y, a White Panther leader) to tell his people to get out of there. The Chief said it was O.K. with him. The Prosecutor told him not to do it and tried to scare the shit out of him with tales of the dangers involved. The Mayor, however, decided to do it and left with a bullhorn.[VI]

The Mayor found us and we got together with (X and Y above). (Y) spoke into the mike which barely worked and told them that they should all go home, that this wasn't their thing. They pretty much ignored him so we all started going around and asking the kids to get back up on the sidewalk. There was a kid in the crowd with a radio who was monitoring the police broadcast band and as we went by he started saying that the police back at City Hall were coming, that they were moving to a staging area. The Mayor then had to find a pay phone which he finally did to find out if this was true, which it was. He told them that things were under control and not to bring in the police. We then went back out into the street and within a half hour he ran into another or the same kid who said, again, the police were coming. So he went back to the phone and again repeated that things were under control, don't send the police. Around 2:00 a.m. it really began to pour which washed the whole thing out.

> We then went back to City Hall feeling pretty good about all the people who worked so hard to avoid another confrontation between the two factions ("In the whole thing 17 or so police went to the hospital for treatment"). No sooner had we gotten there than the Sheriff came in and proceeded to shout at the Mayor about politicians messing in police business and the usual stuff about handcuffing his department. He then abruptly turned around and stomped out.[VII]

As a result of this series of confrontations, Central City was rather rudely jolted and the effects are still being felt two years later. This had been the first large scale clash in years involving both the local police departments. In addition, a pre-college aged, youthful generation and a new "liberal" political administration, elected in part by a large student turnout, had been participants. Recriminations reverberated from all actors. We have seen in Section Two how the aftermath of this led to the formation of the Concerned Citizens, the "Recall (the Mayor) Campaign" and ultimately to the mayoral candidacy of a right-wing Democrat who bolted that party, captured the Republican primary and then lost badly to an incumbent who had previously been a heavy underdog for reelection. This event also opened the public rift between the Mayor and the Sheriff which has continued (remember, the intelligence squad interaction) to this day. As a result of the ensuing adverse publicity, it constrained the Mayor in his overt attempts to change the police within a public forum. It also was a genesis of the "Recall (the Sheriff) Movement." And, as we have seen, it was the beginning of ruptured relations between the Mayor and the C.C.P.D. In addition, as the following quote illustrates, it gravely threatened the political coalition with at least a vocal minority of the students. The following are excerpts from a column which appeared in the (University Newspaper) on September 18, 1969.

(The Mayor), billed as a liberal Democrat in last April's mayoral election, was swept into office by a heavy student voter turnout . . . . But by repeatedly putting political expediency ahead of moral responsibility, (he) has already succeeded in alienating a substantial portion of that student support.

. . . The real test of a political figure is how he reacts in crisis situations. During the summer, (the Mayor) got that test and failed it . . . . Three days of police terror, complete with 'super' tear gas, pepper fog, and night sticks, provided a sad lession for the liberal students whose dedicated campaign work enabled (him) to oust an encrusted and insensitive Republican dynasty.

After two nights of confrontation with the street people, (the Mayor) delivered a public statement defending the inexcusable brutality and terrorism of the police . . . . 'The (C.C.) police showed great restraint, (he) said, in the face of rocks, bottles, and abuse from the non-students who were obviously trying to bring on a confrontation.'

. . . But the most absurd aspect of the South University affair was (his) valient attempt to place the blame for the disorders on "non-students" . . . . It is unforgivable that (the Mayor) chose to rely on an emotional plea to the citizenry's racist hatred for 'hippies,' 'long haired weirdo's,' 'non-students' and 'revolutionaries.' It turned a political disaster into a political advantage. But it was cowardly and dishonest.[3]

The Mayor, after the confrontations got the (old) HRC, the police and the city attorney to take complaints of police misconduct. They got only one filed against the (C.C.)P.D. and 13 or 14 against the Sheriff Department. Nothing could be done about the Sheriff's complaints because they had no badges on and couldn't be identified. The Mayor was, however, convinced that the Sheriff had to be controlled (and he tried a number of other avenues all of which ultimately failed).[VIII]

From the other side comes the following feeling about the South University confrontations.

South University really raised morale in the (C.C.)P.D. The enemy was allowed to be fought back at. I was astonished by the vigor (with) which the cops took out after the guys . . . . My idea of a cop isn't to chase down people who are running and beat on them to vent (your) frustration.[IX]

There's a real difference between the way the radicals and street people felt toward or acted toward the blue and the brown. They could spit on and hurl language at the blues (C.C.P.D.)--

> even stand right up next to us. When they heard the browns were coming, they ran. They know they can't get away with that sort of stuff with the browns. The only time this wasn't true was that first night . . . up on South University.[X]

In response to a question that the M.C.S.D. treats radical students worse than the C.C.P.D. (#9, earlier in Chapter 9), the following is the response of a high ranking M.C.S.D. official.

> I don't think that's accurate but I feel that they (the students) feel that way. The (C.C.)P.D. did little or nothing but stand around in their relations with the various demonstrations. The only relationship we have is when mass busts and head busting must take place. So, we're in the position of always being the bad guys vis a vis the students. In our department when we say do something, you better do it. The (C.C.)P.D. begs and pleads with them (and) they get used to this. I don't believe in bluffing. If a line is drawn, stick to it or lose a lot of respect--both your own and of the others.[XI]

L. S. and A. Sit-In--October, 1969

Another example of the differing type of relationship between the two departments and the citizenry of C.C., this time University students, was over a student sit-in which took place around the issue of a student-run book store. It illustrates, succinctly, the difference in techniques and control used. Hundreds of students, with many hundreds more outside, barricaded themselves inside a University building (the Literature, Science and Arts office building) and refused to come out. The following is an abbreviated account of what transpired.

> About 4:00 p.m. (a city official) had received word that a sit-in was occurring. (The President) had called the police and they were going to get a massive arrest thing underway if the building wasn't cleared at 5:30 p.m. . . . He was persuaded to go the injunction route and the injunction was prepared. Once (the President) and the judge had signed it, the problem was how to serve it. They thought of using a loud speaker hook-up to the Administration building and even of using the helicopter that (the Sheriff) had procured which had continuously flown overhead further rousing the students.

> Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. several officers tried to serve the injunction but were barred by the press of bodies from getting up to the building to post it or into the building to serve it. They went away . . . . The whole idea of an injunction was a bluff, anyway, to see if they could get the students to leave as they had elsewhere (at other Universities). The reason they hesitated about using the injunction was that the next step meant going back to the court to get a show cause effort for contempt of court. If the injunction is defied and such a citation is issued, the contempt citation has to be served by the Sheriff and no one had any intention of bringing the Sheriff into the act. But they went ahead and served it anyway to see what the effect would be. It didn't work.
>
> So, Colonel (X) of the State Police arrived and set up a plan whereby the building would be cleared. The Sheriff was to come up State Street and keep any from escaping out that exit while the State Police secured the rear exit. The (C.C.)P.D. were to actually go inside through the rear exit and bring them out one at a time. There are 10 or more statements, all of which are consistent, as to what happened with the Sheriff's men (once again with support from other counties). They swept up State Street and stopped at the steps which were packed with students. Someone then gave the warning with a bullhorn to clear the steps. Within 10 seconds, the deputies charged up the steps striking people with upraised rifle butts sending some nine or ten to the hospital. This was directly against orders and contrasts with what occurred in the rear of the building where the State Police, to clear the steps, lined up and double timed in place and then moved forward without making contact with any students. The arrests (107) went very smoothly. No complaints were heard about the conduct of the (C.C.)P.D. XII/4

Chicago 'Seven'Trial Verdict March--February, 1970

The last incident in this brief trilogy is meant to illustrate: (1) the differential treatment accorded the same citizens by the two departments; and (2) by comparison, that differing segments of the student-youth population are treated differently by the (C.C.)P.D. It is a march from the University campus to the downtown section of Central City.

> Some 3,000 or so students massed at the (center of campus) and then did some marching around campus to protest the verdict. It seemed from earlier reports that they were not going to venture downtown. The police, however, mobilized. Both the

> Sheriff and the (C.C.) departments were afraid the crowd might trash City Hall or the County Building. The strategy was that if they did march and went on by the buildings, to let them go and do nothing. If they did try to break windows, etc., they were to be dispersed. The plan called for the two departments to be intermingled and massed (along a side of City Hall which runs parallel to the road the marchers would use). Captain (X) of the (C.C.)P.D. was in charge.
>
> As the marchers went by, a few bottles were tossed down the short hill there at the massed police. I doubt any of them hit anyone. (X) gave the order to charge which they did and dispersed the crowd . . . . (X) was asked immediately afterwards what percentage of the crowd he thought was prepared to trash. He said upwards of 50%. This leads directly back to the quality of the intelligence which came in. It was inflammatory and only mentioned the negative things that were occurring--like a bank window being broken, carrying the Viet Cong flag, shouting, etc. There was nothing about the more positive or overall influences and pressures. In this case intelligence was bad and so was the plan of having the police massed in front of City Hall. The less said about the charge itself, the better. It was a brief, brutal scene. XIII/5

From two of the men in the C.C.P.D. massed against the wall to protect City Hall, came these remarks about the incident.

> (1) More of our men understand these types of radical crowds than do the Sheriff's men. We understand that they strategically place people throughout the crowd to incite the rest of them. We seek more professional means than they do, like sitting down and talking rather than knocking someone over the head. Although, there are times when I've been very mad that we haven't taken decisive action.
>
> I think we have gotten the kind of attitude from the youth community that they can do anything they want with us. If we were right or wrong, what we did had a very decisive impact. We tried a scare tactic--to run out screaming to get them to run. I don't expect to see them ever march down the street like that again.
>
> We were standing there and they taunted us. They started throwing things at us and we charged immediately. The size of the crowd sort of scared me when I saw how large it was but they soon scattered. I think quite a few of those radicals and the ones they were able to incite will remember that night for a long time.
>
> (2) The White Panthers are dying out as a problem but with summer will come hippie problems. The real members of the White Panthers, those who actually live in the house, generally

don't give you much shit. In the summer there are about 300 or so that sort of hang around the Panthers and give you a lot of problems. It is very difficult to go undercover against them, you get blown right away. When we used to have confrontations, it would be (X and Y, and others, White Panther leaders) who would get things started but weren't anywhere near the scene when the actual confrontation began.

On the Chicago Seven march, they (unspecified) thought they were going to take City Hall. We heard there were a lot of guns in the crowd. If a firecracker had gone off, it would have been all over (I suspect he was referring to a potential student's Sharpesville). Some guys got carried away, others didn't, but there was little attempt to be kind. The object was to hit them in the face, bust them up, get their teeth and nose--make a lasting impression. There's a dead end alley across from City Hall between (two buildings). We trapped a whole group up in there. There were very few arrests (although all could have been). A helluva lot of kids got badly busted up. It was a reaction to the command holding the men in control. They are more interested in public relations than in the protection of the officers.

The effect of this charge was to get the leaders and to bring a little lasting respect for us. Now, they won't be so eager to throw things at us. They won't get involved like this again. (When asked why there were no complaints filed, he said:) They didn't complain because they were afraid they would be arrested. As it was, the only ones we arrested were those laying on the ground or who couldn't scatter.

100 Block of East Ann Street--Central City

This block is the focus of downtown "low class" black activity. It is in the block between City Hall which houses the C.C.P.D. and the County Jail and has a number of bars, pool halls, etc., with a fairly high density from black patronage. As you have read, it creates a problem for the C.C.P.D. In the brief section below, I pull together the thoughts of three deputies who commented on this.

(1) Take for example Ann Street. The (C.C.) police go there, they get nothing but trouble. If our boys go there, the trouble and mouthing off stops. They say, 'Yes sir,' etc., and there's no trouble. (I asked why.) They know they can talk back to the (C.C.)P.D. but we say things once and they do it. I think you needn't feel that you respect the man or the badge but respect the uniform. If he's right or wrong there are proper channels to follow it up.[XIV]

> (2) This department has had five years of not letting anyone get away with anything . . . . In the City they have to take it. For example, Ann Street problems. If we go up to assist the (C.C.)P.D., the trouble stops right away. They (the blacks) will battle the (C.C.)P.D. all right. When we come in and say to do something, they do it. We are going to demand respect. If we don't get it, someone is going to pay for it. We're not going to back down.[XV]

> (3) Another deputy gave the following illustration:

> Three ex-city officers went into a bar on Ann Street and picked up someone on some charge ("like possession of burglar tools or a stolen credit card") and someone else on suspicion of having a warrant out and then they all sat in the car in front of the bar for half an hour with no disturbance at all. The city police would never have been able to do that and the three felt quite good about being able to do their job as police officers without harassment.[XVI]

A fourth deputy, formerly with the City, said earlier and I repeat, "There is more or less an unspoken order that (you) don't go on Ann Street (when on patrol)." An officer in the (C.C.)P.D. said that in this block there are "narcotics on the street, fights, shootings, stabbings, etc. They are pretty much left on their own." An outside expert, commenting on the narcotics problem on Ann Street, said he felt, " . . . There almost has to be some connection between the police and the drug traffic (on Ann Street). They must be either directly involved or paid off. It's just too goddamned open and obvious for them not to be aware of its going on."[XVII]

BULJ, Black Berets and White Panthers

These three groups are representative of the two categories which were found in the last chapter to be most alien to the police--the black community (split into two portions) and the radical, white, young adults. BULJ (Blacks United for Liberation and Justice) developed in the aftermath of the West Park affair and was made up of members of both portions of the

black community. The Black Berets were, of course, an important group from the most hostile black portion and the White Panthers were, along with S.D.S., one of the two most representative of the groups within the radical-hippie category. Each of these groups will be looked at separately with regard to the method of police interaction. Then, a brief summary will outline the important differences in their treatment by the police.

West Park--BULJ

"Blacks Disrupt Council's Meeting--40 Youths Appear After Park Melee" was the front page headline of the C.C. News on August 18, 1970.

> . . . Charges leveled at the police at the close of last night's (Council) session included that they were chasing 13 and 14 year old children around the park with guns drawn, that they were swinging guns indiscriminantly, and that they choked one of the youths and also struck him on the leg with a flashlight as he attempted to kick the door of the patrol car open.
>
> They said the first patrol car on the scene sped into West Park at about 40 miles per hour endangering the youths playing there . . . . Some of the youths who made up the angry group may have been disturbed by the fact that, when the police cars poured into the park, the vehicles were driven across curbs and over a baseball field where young blacks were involved in a scheduled game . . . . Youths said police failed to contact adult supervisors who were on hand and started chasing a 13 year old who was charged with fighting with a white youth.
>
> The mother of the youth said he fought because a white youth 'called him a bad name . . . . This has gone too far. Something has to be done about it. The white boy was not chased.'
>
> . . . Earlier in the meeting, Councilman (X of that Ward) presented council with petitions signed by some 190 persons in the West Park area asking that the park be cleared by 10:30 nightly and that the police patrol be continued indefinitely . . . . (X) charged that certain groups are turning the park into a training ground against the establishment. 'I'm also concerned that when officers go into arrest a person the whole group attacks them.' He suggested that police study the use of other weapons--such as Mace and a crowd control weapon which fires pellets. I can't see the present policy of standing

> back to avoid confrontation at all costs,' (X) said, stating there are '25 to 40 trouble makers who are known to all.'
>
> . . . In a press conference later, the Police Chief called the assault on the officers 'an unprovoked attack upon the police for no apparent reason.' Denying that it was actually a racial situation, (he) termed the incident a 'spontaneous outbreak resulting only from police trying to do their job.'

On August 19, 1970 in an article in the C.C. News entitled, "Melee Meeting Solves Little--Shouts End Council Session" BULJ first surfaced.

> Last night a group calling itself 'Blacks for Liberation and Justice' met 'to develop strategy to end police harassment of black youths and to call public officials to account for closing their eyes to racist legal injustice against black citizens.' This same group plans to meet again tonight at the Community Center.

"Mayor Refers Park Case to City Grievance Officer" said the C.C. News of August 20. In the article was the following:

> A group calling itself 'Blacks United for Liberation and Justice' met in a 'blacks-only' session at the Community Center last night and drafted a list of 18 demands they plan to present to city officials at 4:00 p.m. today. (The Mayor) and other city officials planned to receive the demands.

August 21, 1971, C.C. News headlined, "Blacks Make 18 Demands of City."

> . . . In submitting the 18 demands (X, a black leader) said 'the (C.C.)P.D. over reacted against black youths on the basis of telephoned allegations of disorderly conduct. This action, characterized by a flagrant disregard for the rights of these youths and for professional behavior, is typical of similar incidents against the black community in recent years.
>
> Prior to the presentation of the demands, some 50 black youths paraded in front of City Hall chanting and carrying picket signs . . . . The list is topped by the request to suspend the officers involved immediately without pay until after the trial or other disposition of the cases of the four youths charged in the incident. The next demand is that the charges against the four youths be dropped immediately and police cease any further arrests or escalation of charges associated with the incident . . . . Among other demands listed (were):
>
> - cease excessive patrol and surveillance in the black community;
> - cease harassment and illegal arrest of black citizens in (C.C.);

- that city officials not call law enforcement agencies into the city for patrol, surveillance or assistance at peaceful assemblies, legal confrontations or minor incidents;
- City Council is also being asked to close the division of Police-Community Relations in the Police Department and to discuss the paid police counselors.

The Group also had a list of five demands for the County Board of Commissioners, including legislation against the use of dogs and toxic chemicals on citizens, new rules on deadly weapons, prohibition on the hiring by the sheriff of police officers who have been dismissed by other agencies, the wearing of identifiable badge numbers, and use of 'your budgetary powers to force the Sheriff Department into changing from a brutal, racist, oppressive agency into a department which deals with all citizens humanely and justly.

On August 25 came the reply of City Council and the C.C. News headline, "Unhappy Blacks Walk Out on City Council" sums up the tale.

> . . . The orderly withdrawal from the packed Council Chamber left city officials wondering what the next move of the BULJ group would be. The answer came this morning as a picket line was thrown up in front of City Hall to protest what the group calls inadequate responses to their demands.
>
> . . . One of the major demands of BULJ was that the officers involved in the West Park incident be suspended immediately . . . . (The Mayor) said that the city policy is to inactivate an employee with pay and that the city administrator 'stands ready to evaluate any evidence citizens may present and, after hearing the employee's side of the story, to take whatever action is indicated by all the evidence.' To date the administrator has not been presented with evidence regarding the West Park incident.
>
> . . . A second major demand was that charges against youths arrested at West Park be dropped, and the Mayor's resolution states the city has no power to dismiss these charges . . . . The Mayor's resolution also defended the grievance officer approach to the handling of complaints instead of establishing a police review board as demanded by BULJ.'We believe the present institution deserves a fair trial before we start altering it,' (the Mayor) told the large crowd ("estimated at 200") which included some 20-25 off-duty police officers. He further noted that this would be a violation of the union contract with the police . . . . The Mayor's resolution again called for use of the grievance officer in the BULJ demand that the Police--C.R. Division of the Police Department be disbanded, asking for more detail on why citizens are aggrieved over the operations of this division and the work of youth counselors . . . . About the most positive response came to the demand that Lansky's junk yard be removed.

On September 1, 1970, the C.C.P.O.A. replied to the BULJ demands at a Council meeting after the Grievance Officer had stated "he is awaiting the go-ahead to look into police records of the incident," (C.C. News, September 1, 1970).

> The president (of the C.C.P.O.A.) told the council last night it has heard only one side of the West Park story and said that side was a prejudiced view. He charged that for the past few weeks the department has been subjected to unjustified ridicule and that certain elements of the community are attempting to undermine 'one of the finest police departments in the nation.'
>
> Commenting on the West Park incident, (he) said the officers involved should be commended for their restraint rather than being disciplined. He said the 18 demands of BULJ are 'not worth the paper they're written on.' (The President) said the BULJ group is attempting to establish itself as judge, juror and executioner and that the Association will not tolerate creation of a police review board, (C.C. News, September 1, 1970).

Two weeks later, the other side of the West Park residential area citizenry had its say as excerpts from the following C.C. News article of September 15, 1970 relates.

> As opposed to recent weeks when the debate on the council floor was held before a largely Negro audience, last night's meeting was attended by scores of white citizens expressing concern over West Park and the handling of the August 17 incident. The audience came out by and large to hear the city administration's reply to the 21 demands made by white citizens last week. This set of demands was prompted by a set of 18 demands submitted earlier by BULJ.
>
> (X and Y) scored the Democratic controlled council for the handling of the Police Department--BAM and West Park incidents . . . . (Y) charged the administration is 'padding the voting rolls to keep themselves in power.' He also charged the City Attorney with 'laxity' in law enforcement and said 'anarchy' is reigning in (C.C.). When he said society is being invaded by 'Communist rats,' (Councilman Z) laughed . . . . (Y) drew a large round of applause upon completion of his talk.
>
> . . . (In responding to the 21 demands, the City Administrator said) 'The West Park situation cannot be wholly met by a continued increase in police surveillance and patrols.' One of

> the demands was to publish the name of the juveniles arrested, and (he) noted this is a matter of state law and news media policy that names are not released. 'Can't we publish the names of the parents?' (Councilman X) asked . . . and said 'new leadership is needed from the black community.'
>
> . . . (The Administrator's) report noted police are in the park from 4:00 p.m. up to the time youths leave the area and that patrols are maintained on perimeter streets. . . . (He) said an ordinance requiring the closing of all parks by 10:00 p.m. would be presented to council for consideration . . . (and) said it would be difficult in a college town to enforce a curfew for persons above the age of 17.
>
> On other demands, (he said) the Police Department is not curtailed by city government . . . a'gag rule' has not been imposed . . . police command officer job security has not been jeopardized . . . (and) the use of the chemical spray Mace has been voided by a council policy decision.

So much for the views of various interested political groups, let's get back to BULJ and the police. A close observer comments,

> Interestingly, the only ones arrested in the West Park thing were those with prior altercations with the police. The one who was charged with hitting the cop over the head with a bat had a previous charge. He was not the one who did it. The kids and others know who did do it . . . . BULJ is made up of people on Model Cities, Legal Aid, black educators, NAACP, etc., who were leaders in setting it up. They then went before Council with their demands--nothing ever came of them except referral to the Administrator or the Grievance Officer. The (X, white leader) group of Concerned Citizens on the other hand, got most of their demands met.
>
> . . . The police realize the history of black fragmentation. Many of the black people in BULJ were props of the city government and, indirectly, of the police. The idea of the involvement was to see to it that the group did not continue to function or to turn it into an establishment-channeled, non-aggressive group. An example of this sort of noninsidious infiltration is the use of police counselors. About nine of them were there and involved (at BULJ meetings). They kept raising parliamentary objections and objecting to the direction in which things were going and what should be done. Also a block of black people who were known to be in with the police or administration were making noises about the procedures, personalities, etc., (e.g., "a black probation officer . . . who got his job even with an unbelievably bad driving record. In fact, shortly after his appointment, he killed someone in an accident and nothing at all happened to him.").

A fundamental fact to be reckoned with by the rest of (C.C.) is that the black community doesn't have the resources to sustain an action. The best tactic, therefore, is to wait out the furor. Police are well aware of this--the method seems to have worked. If the situation changed so that an effort in the black community could be sustained, then the police and the establishment would have to change their tactics also. I offer as proof of this thesis, the fact that City Council made no compromises on the two sets of demands submitted to them. Over time, the black demands were ignored and the majority of the white demands, except those which were just too ridiculous, were instituted.[XVIII]

Black Berets--Headquarters Busted

The Berets got started as a loosely organized group which failed to get the backing of the national Black Panther organization. So, they called themselves the Black Berets and all wore black berets, leather jackets, blue-jeans, etc. Many of the members were pious and politically stupid but rhetoric aside, their efforts were well intentioned. At the peak, there were maybe 25-30 of them. They shared the same headquarters (on Ann Street) with a group of white liberals who began a "Recall (the Sheriff) Campaign" as a result of his campus activities. It was perceived of as being a coalition effort which always scares the police. Actually, the Recall movement had gotten started earlier but was floundering. These two groups then had an influx of white radicals and some internal conflicts developed. The cops, especially the (C.C.)P.D., were afraid that the Berets were becoming a viable group--especially that the blacks were uniting with the whites. If their information via surveillance had been any good, (infiltration just wasn't possible as everyone was known to each other), they (the police) would have known this wasn't so.

They were systematically arrested nearly every week. The police knew most of them and of course, they were easily spotted by their attire. There isn't much of a way to prove this harassment--to get systematic evidence of this treatment, because you would need some sort of a baseline of the amount of police involvement with the normal black youths to use as a comparison. You just can't get that kind of information from the police, (nor, as we have seen, from the court records). This information just isn't available because the statistics are not kept by race. Thus, you can only go on the opinions of people who know the Berets.

I think the Berets were singled out. During that period, if there was such a thing as a number one target of the (C.C.)P.D., the Black Berets were it. I think they were watched more closely and picked up more than other black or white youths. On the

other side of the coin, I think that the Berets tended to socialize more with what the police would label as a criminal element.[XIX]

Another observer stated:

I was not aware of a feeling of there being any attempts to get into the Black Berets. I know that the police were very aware of who they were and via surveillance watched them very closely. I expect they were arrested more than other black kids. When the police got an opportunity to raid the office, they did so. I don't think it was planned although it could have been and it certainly seemed that way to the Berets.

According to the police's version, (Y, a young black), who had a bench warrant out for his arrest, was walking down the street with his white girl friend and some officers (in a patrol car) saw him. They went around the corner to intercept him and he in the meantime went into the Beret headquarters. The police then descended and the melee was on. The Berets said he wasn't there. They thought they might be able to discredit the police's story (of the incident). However, evidence shows he was in there and walked out the front door past a rookie who was standing at the front door and didn't recognize him.[XX]

Another version of the raid on the dual headquarters goes a bit differently.

The night they raided, they said that (Y) was there, that they had seen him standing on the corner and they had a warrant for his arrest on a misdemeanor. The officers in the car that saw him said that they radioed for assistance when (Y) went into the office. Nine (C.C.) cops and four Sheriff's men arrived and when told at the door that (Y) wasn't there, entered anyway. I happened to be driving by at that moment and the first patrol car was behind us. Well within a minute, almost like, all of a sudden, three other cars arrived. It seemed to me to be a planned raid. In the ensuing raid they took all of the "Recall (the Sheriff)" petitions, both the signed and unsigned ones,[6] and their records. In addition, they found a bandolier of ammo. for a 30.06 rifle and the unloaded rifle. They had no search warrant (remember the Argus House, pot raid in Chapter 5). Five or six were arrested and charged with interference, felonious assault, resisting arrest, etc.[XXI/7]

Before leaving the black solidary group(s) and their relations with the police, one other incident should be briefly viewed as it gives some insight into that relationship.

> On January 13, 1971, 40-50 blacks went to a school board meeting to protest most vigorously some action in the schools. I noticed four or five plainclothed cops, I don't know if they were on or off duty, and I noticed they were recording the black speakers. It was an effort to identify the names of the blacks who spoke at the meeting. Their (the blacks) being there to complain was perceived as a threat to the police and the middle class way of life; black people in their eyes have not earned the right to have things changed in their favor . . . . Okay, if they were not on duty, why take notes and record? If they were on duty, one could ask the same question. Why were they so interested in knowing what went on and who said it?[XXII]

The C.C. News of January 14, 1971 carried a brief article about the above occurrence entitled, "Policemen's Roles Debated."

> A brief distraction occurred during last night's (C.C.) Board of Education meeting after (X), assistant Director of the Human Rights Department for the city, asked the school board if the purpose of the meeting was to gather information to be used against citizens at a later date.
>
> (X) made reference to the fact that there were several police officers in the audience. He said one of them was taking notes and using a tape recorder during comments (audience participation period) from the audience. Board President (Y) told (X) the board had no intention of collecting statements as (X) had implied, and that it was not aware of a police recording being made at the meeting.
>
> Several other members of the audience said they wanted the recording of their names and comments stopped or they would leave the meeting.
>
> Police Community Relations Director, Lieutenant (Z), said following the meeting that no tape recorder was being used but he did not know at that time if the officer was taking notes. (Z) said he did not know of any official reason for the officer to do this.
>
> (X, a woman in the audience), said she saw the officer write down her name after she spoke and felt that this was intimidation on the part of the (C.C.)P.D. The officers were not in uniform.
>
> Lieutenant (Z) this morning told the News that the note taking officer was doing so of his own volition and for personal rather than police reasons. He emphasized however, that 'no officer at that meeting was taking a tape recording. I in no way want an intelligence unit there.' (Z) said one officer was using a police radio and kept in contact with the police station as a 'precautionary' measure at the board's request.

White Panthers

This well-known group, headquartered in Central City has, to say the least, a long history of relations with the law enforcement establishment. The following will be a fairly brief encapsulation of some of the more illustrative highlights in the Central City career of this group.

> John (X) . . . organized Trans Love Energies in (Metropolita). It was his thing, a sort of cultural communism. They decided to blow Metropolita because they were getting too much heat from the police department and because they wanted to be near some trees. They came to (C.C.). The White Panther philosophy was created out of whole cloth with all that free fucking, etc. The original cadre was an intelligent group that dug (C.C.) and had very few problems, initially, with the (C.C.)P.D. That is, the (C.C.)P.D. was quite unsuccessful in getting them.
>
> Their attempts (the C.C.P.D.) were based on the Panthers being a threat to them with everything free, including sex. What really galls them is the whole sex bag. They are really hung up on sex ("The Concerned Citizens are too, remember the letter they sent to all the C.C. residents about the White Panthers philosophy during the Recall the Mayor Campaign?") . . . . Police are upset by this kind of idealism. Anyone who is going to get above them (socio-economically) better be damn good and better work very hard to get there. The cops hate their jobs yet there isn't anything else they can do that has the power and the steady income. Cops and security, you ask them and they'll tell you they are never laid off, etc. So, they resent the Panthers who in their eyes are doing everything wrong, are getting away with it and are still going to be able to succeed.
>
> They harassed and harassed them but had no real effect. An example was the arrest of (X, a leader) for indecent exposure for pissing in an alley one night. Also, the traffic violations they had hung on them--both moving and parking. They were constantly watched and followed. One of the good things that the Panthers did was to let it be known that they were armed in their abode. The police will not normally touch such places.[XXIII]

A second observer comments on the White Panthers:

> It all began on Hill Street with the stately homes in suburbia. The group began as a commune type of living arrangement. A

group of this nature was totally alien to this area. The first hassle was over the lease, but they got that straightened out. Then came continuous harassment by the city building code people against the owners. (There was) very tight enforcement of the building code with the idea being to force the owners into getting everything into excellent shape or get them to force the White Panthers to move out to relieve the pressure. All these efforts failed but complaints kept coming in. All sorts of accusations were made--from the white flag out in front, to 'wild' parties freaking kids out, to growing long hair, preaching revolutionary politics to being a place for degenerates,("they continued to use the health and building inspectors"). Teenage kids would go home with stories about what was going on. It was too much for the kids to take.

The (C.C.)P.D. began surveillance because they thought there might be illegal activities occurring. I haven't heard of them using electronic surveillance equipment. Of course, unless they were caught in the act we wouldn't hear because they could only use it for investigation. Only the FBI can use it for evidence. Such surveillance is used for furthering investigations or to give information to a higher police organization. Infiltration is, of course, very common into almost every political group by the (C.C.)P.D.

Then the (C.C.)P.D. busted one of them for pot. They got a good lawyer and beat the case. The group about that time became much more openly political, backed the Black Panthers and came out with their own list of 10 platform items. They became larger and more powerful. The White Panthers probably would have remained a local affair between themselves and the (C.C.)P.D. if they hadn't gone political. It would have remained a local hassle and (they would) probably have been seen or identified as a local criminogenic group. So, the (C.C.)P.D. were both frustrated in their attempt to get something on these 'long hairs,' feared a potential alliance with the Black Berets and their going political. ("I'm not sure if the Panthers did this intentionally or just were political by dint of their actions").

So the (C.C.)P.D. moved to a higher level of authority where they could marshal more resources--the FBI and State Police--what I call coalition warfare by allies in arms. This allows the use of the (federal) Attorney General's office with its powers to <u>legally</u> tap and bug.[XXIV]

A third observer discussed police tactics with regard to the Panthers' leader:

John was ripped off (arrested) on the old sale of (marijuana) indictment from Metropolita. It had taken three years to get him tried again after the original case("for which he had been

sentenced to six months") had been thrown out on appeal. This time he got 9 1/2 years for giving two reefers to two undercover men.

He didn't even get the charge reduced to possession. Most likely he got the whole thing thrown at him for his White Panthers political activity.[XXV]

And finally, three additional commentators observed:

(1) Enter the FBI and the whole blowing up of the CIA hassle and the wiretapping and probably bugging. I think that all they have on the defendents is some general bullshit which everyone comes out with now and then about wanting to blow up D.C. or certain offices, etc. They don't have anything to go on except what they, themselves, manufacture. To have anything on them, would be all but impossible. The White Panthers, like all radicals, are unbelievably paranoid about being bugged and on top of that they have a real fear of being locked up. Also, since they had them under electornic surveillance, surely they would have had them under physical surveillance and would have caught them in the act.

Then there is the great length of time that elapsed before they were arrested and the whole conspiracy nonsense. I mean, what are they using thos secret tapes for? If they had anything, why wait so long? Also, surely the leaders wouldn't do the job themselves. Someone else would have done it. It seems a fairly obvious thing that the charges against the White Panthers are phoney.[8] It was, simply, an opportunity to get their leaders. First, they got John on the earlier pot charge and also implicated him in this and then Pun and the other leaders.[XXVI]

(2) Putting up Pun for the bombing of the CIA office is ridiculous. First, a good question is why the CIA is even here (in C.C. with an office)? Obviously, because they're into internal spying. No one, or at least very few people, ever knew it was here before it was blown, let alone where it was. How did Pun know where it was? Then there's the whole question of why the newspapers were informed or at least how they found out it was the CIA office. John knew there was one here but not where and didn't even know it had been blown until the next afternoon, (he's up for conspiracy).[XXVII]

(3) I got to know Skip, Diane, John, etc., at the first draft office sit-ins (1965). I feel the source of information on them (in the CIA conspiracy case) isn't at the local level but is from the State Police or the 'feds' . . . . In 1969, the White Panthers had a conference of all the underground newspapers around the country at a house out on Plymouth Road. The Sheriff's deputies surrounded the house and then raided it with a considerable amount of violence. The Sheriff Department never even

> acknowledged later that they were there. In 1970, they had another such conference in the same place. In advance the (C.C.)P.D. was called and asked to lay off harassing the meeting. The Chief said they never were involved (last year) in harassing the group. They left the house alone because the Panthers let it be known they were going to arm themselves and guard the house. So, that year both departments made illegal stops at the corner of (two streets). The whole thing was patently illegal, the stops, shakedowns, searches, etc. They arrested two or three for carrying guns and for pot.XXVIII/9

Conclusion

Comparing these brief case studies, the BULJ--West Park, Black Berets and White Panthers is informative. Remember that these three groups are representative of the two categories which were found by the police to be the most alien from them. BULJ was made up largely of community leaders and citizens from that portion of the black community which was seen as primarily working within the system to alter the social status quo, although their values and beliefs were mostly seen as alien to the police. With this group, the police had a well-oiled mechanism with which to insulate themselves. The city administration covered for them publicly and forced the action back on to the group in Council sessions. Fortified with a coalition from the right, the white Concerned Citizens, who not only leapt to their defense but demanded more police action, the police and the administration were able to neutralize the black demands (e.g., use of the Grievance Officer on the Police Community Relations division demand). Direct police action was in the form of: (1) the Association's public statement undercutting the legitimacy of the black leaders and their grievances, (this was aided in part by an alliance with at least one Republican Councilman); (2) denial of any racial overtones or unrest; and (3) the utilization of the para-police forces which were

sent in to cool out the immediate situation and avoid the repercussions of any short run violence.

The police could then wait for time and the expected attrition to take care of any long range problems, leaving only the residue of stored-up bitterness, but effective political influence. The social control mechanisms utilized in this confrontation were somewhat muted because involved were members of the black community who were respected and had some political clout outside their immediate solidary group. Ironically, it is possible that the new Grievance Officer, whose function the police so dislike, might have played a part in preventing BULJ from creating further political influence. Here was a new mechanism which the liberal Mayor and Council (now only four months in office) were pleading should be given a fighting chance.

The Black Berets and White Panthers, on the other hand,could be dealt with by different means. The Berets, representative of the most alienated portion of the black community, were already largely isolated by their youth and rhetoric from the majority of the community, including much of the black population. By defining them as a criminal element, the police were able to realize a self-fulfilling prophecy. Identification and close surveillance led to the Berets being often arrested, thus developing for each a criminal record. Regardless of the disposition of the cases, the police were able to deal effectively with this group by arresting them. A raid was carried out on their headquarters with the attendant negative publicity. This further isolated the Berets and made such actions as the multiple arrests during the raid easier.[10] Labeling, isolation, surveillance, harassment, intimidation and arrest were the social control mechanisms used.[11]

Treatment of the White Panthers, representatives of the most alien solidary group, creates some new questions. The social control mechanisms used against them were the same as those directed at the Berets, minus the raid, but with one important exception.[12] The local law enforcement agency elected to escalate the resources used against them by drawing in the higher level police agencies. Why did they team up with the State Police and FBI on the White Panthers but not the Black Berets? Were the Panthers more of a threat to them because of their life style and the fact that they were upper and middle class white youths? Were they preceived as having more potential political resources and thus the ability to reach and affect great numbers of students? Or were they more effective in their political activities? Perhaps the police saw them as the local branch of a nationwide underground conspiracy. Certainly, at some point the law enforcement establishment was persuaded of this, as the public rationale for wiretapping was the threat to the nation's internal security.

At any rate, short of the ultimate social control mechanism of deadly force, all resources available to the local police agency were directed at the White Panthers. It is noteworthy that the proactive treatment utilized against them did not take the form of direct physical action on their headquarters, as has allegedly been used nationwide against the Black Panthers. More subtle resources from their arsenal, electronic surveillance equipment, developing court admissable evidence etc., were used.

Political Intelligence as Proactive Political Behavior

According to Wilensky:

> The more an organization is in conflict with its social environment or depends on it for the achievement of its central goals, the more resources it will allocate to the intelligence function and the more of these resources will be spent on experts . . . (who supply) political and ideological intelligence.[13]

He goes on to argue that "there are upper limits of these generalizations . . . . If it (the organization) has a monopoly of the relevant resources, it has no need for information about rivals."[14]

From these quotations on apparent paradox surfaces. We are led to deduce that the police, being heavily dependent on and often in conflict with their environment, would engage in political intelligence. On the other hand, police at the local level in the United States are a monopolistic social control agency with no rivals at that level. They are unique in that they do have a monopoly of "relevant resources" (i.e., social control techniques) and thus should have no need to engage in political intelligence gathering. Nor should the FBI. However, local police agencies (and the FBI) do engage in covert information gathering upon politically active groups, where the conduct under investigation is political opinion and affiliation.[15] Why is this so?

Precisely because the police can be more than apolitical or neutral social control agents. They may in fact be political partisans with their own set of interests, vying within the political arena for favorable outcomes. In this political game, they have no resource monopoly and must, therefore, contend with rivals. To the extent a local police agency or the FBI engage in political intelligence activities, they are a partisan political group utilizing their monopolistic and legitimate

social control resources upon political rivals. This activity is the essence of social control oriented, political behavior by the police and illustrates that resources allocated for one function can be utilized for other functions.[16]

The remainder of this chapter will be quotations by the outside experts and a few police officers from the two communities discussing the presence of and reasons for political intelligence within the two communities. It illustrates that the C.C.P.D. has entered into political activity by engaging in intelligence activities aimed at political figures and groups.

> With most groups, the (C.C.)P.D. gathers information initially on individuals rather than on the group because they are not supposed to be politically oriented. That is, they enumerate a list of charges or suspicions of which they think the person is guilty. The (C.C.)P.D., though, have general reviews of certain groups--the White Panthers, Tribal Council groups, etc. --so they must be reacting to these people as members of specific groups because they don't do this sort of general review with all known criminals. There's no question but that they keep a political file.
>
> Why is it assumed that it is good police work to do surveillance on political groups? Why must it include surveillance on nonviolent groups? It must be an interpretation of their own moral laws. Whenever there is a radical mass meeting, the police are there taking pictures and trying to identify who was there. Sooner or later some of them will get into some sort of trouble. They use the information on these people to malign and label them by innuendo and guilt by suspicion. They use such things as, 'reported to have been in Cuba in 1963,' etc.
>
> They definitely use undercover agents, often from another agency like the State Police recruit school, although the (C.C.)P.D. have used their own recruits. An example (of the usage of the latter) is a few years ago. (X, a black guy) and a couple of white guys were involved. (Y) and another cop were recruits who infiltrated (X's) group and got caught. They couldn't figure out what to do with the cops and so after a while they let them go. The next day the cops busted them and charged them with kidnapping, etc.[XXIX]

Says another:

I think that the (C.C.)P.D. does wire tap or much easier, they bug. The bug can easily be placed and then monitored in a car a few blocks away and recorded--not for evidence but just for an idea of what's going on. There was the case recently of the use of two police women and the use of a bug on one of them to entrap some guy on the buying of some pot in a car . . . . I think the Argus House raid was probably a leak from one of the kids that they got something on. They're always approaching lawyers with a reduction plea to get (enlist) informers. Lieutenant (Z) is the intelligence center. His main area of concern is the University, along with the black community. In the latter he has informers, the young black counselors who are the information conduits and have jobs in the community center, recreation, etc. In the University he also has informants and I'm sure there's infiltration.XXX

A third observer said:

I think that the (C.C.)P.D. police do bug but I don't know what or where . . . . I looked into the whole police surveillance thing. I went over to the City's Comptroller's office and looked up the record of the budget for each department for the last two years--well, actually not every department, they have them there for every department, I just looked at the police. The 'capital outlay' portion, where they record the equipment that has been purchased, shows that in the last two years they have purchased at least $20,000 worth of surveillance equipment. Such things as an IBM Surveillance Kit, etc. I can't remember the names of all the equipment but it's all written down there.

I also found pencilled in a statement, '$500--(X, the Chief)--informers.' I know that City Council gave (the Chief) $7,500 as reward money for the capture of the 'coed killer' which was to be used as he saw fit. There have never been any questions about where the money went. The money was used to pay informers. I know they have some kind of a slush fund to pay off informers but I don't know the source of the money.

I was told by an officer that I 'would be surprised at the files we have.' They have files on people who aren't even considered political activists. I know for sure they had a file on (Y, convicted of embezzling funds from a city department) before she was even suspected of doing it. (The City Administrator) doesn't even have access to them (the files) and the County Prosecutor has said he has no right to access. Detective (X) seems to be in charge of keeping the files . . . . The other day in District Court there were two police officers from the (X)P.D. testifying in a local narcotics case. They had been undercover narcs operating on campus.XXXI/17

A fourth feels:

It tends to be seasonal although they always have intelligence being fed in. There is at least one full-time intelligence officer directed at the campus. I don't think that the Sheriff has one. If there is to be some sort of demonstration, they will get a bunch of men out onto the street to pick up whatever information they can. The State Police have a full-time, sophisticated intelligence staff and I'm sure they work the campus, although I doubt the local forces (C.C. and M.C.) would know who the agents were . . . . (When asked what the C.C. undercover man was looking for, he said,) some investigation of acts committed, other times they are just trying to get on top or stay on top of an event or what's going on. If there's a demonstration planned, there is an attempt to pick out the leaders and know what's going to happen. (Y, local radical leader) is a good example of someone who is constantly being watched.

They use the prosecutor's office too in demonstrations. The assistant prosecutors will go to the spot of the action and will usually begin with a misdemeanor if it looks fairly calm (i.e., what those potential arrestees would be charged with). If the demonstration/confrontation looks like it might be going to develop into something, they will switch to a felony to get the higher bond rate of the felony. This is done to exhaust whatever funds are available to the group in setting the individual arrestee free and back on the street. Also, the Prosecutor or one of his assistants will go to check on the severity of the situation just to see what level the charge should be set at. Usually felony is used when something goes beyond one day. To some extent they switch to a felony when warranted (e.g., "the conditions are real like dropping bricks on cops from the roofs in the South University incident"). But they will also do it because they like to 'hang the kids' who cause trouble in such situations. Also, they will go after the highest charge if an officer is injured or the defendent is someone the police have been keeping tabs on and want to get.[XXXII]

A fifth expert stated that:

Going after those in the 'subversive culture' (his term)--those involved in potential disturbances, riots and bombings,--is more formalized and developed in (C.C.). There is a lot of cross referencing done between the State Police, the FBI and the C.C.P.D. and all this within the C.C.P.D. is coordinated through Lieutenant (Z). All the intelligence work is made well known to the County Prosecutor's Office and in fact much of it may be coordinated by the County Prosecutor. As the chief law enforcement agency in the County, the Prosecutor's Office works very closely with and gets totally involved, as it is their office which issues warrants and authorizations for arrest. The State Police could use the State Attorney General but this is rarely done.

The State Police and (C.C.)P.D. work very closely together. There are more undercover men in the (C.C.)P.D. by far than in the (M.C.)S.D. where I don't think there are any, although a few deputies are used from time to time on loan from other counties for special cases (and vice versa). I agree that two to six intelligence agents being run is a reasonable figure. They are run under Lieutenant Z with the campus community being the focus of interest and activity. I also know that the State Police have a few agents here. I believe that the White Panther action was really a State Police activity. I think the (C.C.)P.D. tends to use its rookies more on the undercover drug scene whereas the State Police are used more for undercover political intelligence. At any rate, it is often difficult to distinguish between the two cultures ("drug and subversive") because the two tend to be so close together. XXXIII/18

The last observer had specific details which he related.

The (C.C.)P.D. is quite extensively independent from the political establishment. The city-manager form of government is supposed to control the police but in (C.C.) they just don't know what's going on . . . . (C.C.) uses agent provocateurs. To my knowledge, the Sheriff doesn't and not because of their lack of jurisdiction. (C.C.) does it not because they have jurisdiction but because they know that everytime they begin something on campus and then clean it up, they can get extra political clout (influence resources) and thus more of the necessary bureaucratic resources . . . . Any law enforcement agency worth a damn is putting their resources into the campus because this is where it gets its bread, where the action is. The smart young guys who go to work as cops and want to get ahead know the only way to do so is to develop the organization so they can move up it. That is why, perhaps, undercover work is so desirable to the men. The chance to go up the ladder faster and to be where the action is. So, if you're career oriented, that is the way to go.

The Sheriff Department has little notion of political reality although the Sheriff is getting into it with his intelligence squad. A big crime for them, one that's reported in the papers, is a straight crime--breaking and entering, armed robbery, etc. They are much more into the solve-a-crime thing with stake outs, etc. They have little notion of the idea of a political criminal whereas the (C.C.)P.D. are very much into and good at getting the political criminals. Although their primary day to day interest is in parking tickets and traffic violations, they understand very well the political realities. For example, the (C.C.)P.D. are now bored with drugs and that scene and they use the State Police or other police departments for undercover narcs. Their undercover agents are now used much more for political activities.

A number of campus demonstrations have changed from being non-violent to violent at the instigation of agents. For example, the BAM incident. I saw the person who threw the first brick and can identify the man. It was thrown by a white undercover (C.C.) recruit who is now an officer. Another example, (on February 19, 1971) there was a peaceful demonstration in front of the Administration building where the Regents were meeting about recruiting on campus, war (oriented) research, etc. (X), alias Phil--threw the first snowball which hit Lieutenant (Z). He lives with another bachelor (C.C.) policeman. He's been at other demonstrations and been violent before but never been arrested. (He did not observe this incident but it was related to him by someone who also took it to the City Administrator's office).

A third incident I saw in person. After the recruiter--S.D.S. confrontation at the (School of Engineering) where there were some 16-17 arrests (February, 1970), I went late to an S.D.S. tactics meeting. As I arrived, I saw the back of someone who was standing up and talking about the need for violence. When I got into the room, I recognized him as an undercover (C.C.) policeman. I stated that this was the case. He denied it and then left shortly thereafter. He's now an undercover narc agent with the State Police.

When asked how many agents are used and why they use them, this observer said:

From 2-6 are employed, with the narcs being different. With the narcs business, the (C.C.)P.D. seemed to get out of using its own recruits some two years ago, although they might still be using some. They now mainly seem to use the State Police. As to why they run agents, there are two possible theories: (1) They have some strange notions. They think they can entice out those kids who have a feeling or penchant for violence. They can then get them to commit the lesser types of offenses which they can control because it's in a confrontation situation. They can get them arrested and put on probation for four to five years. Thus, it is a selection process. By their (the police's) own actions they can create criminals by pulling out those with a propensity for violent activity. (2) Power and budget increases for the police come only from such confrontations, etc. Thus, they manipulate their environment to create such happenings and build up their organization. This is the more 'paranoid' or 'cynical' view--an attempt to show that they are needed--propoganda or whatever one wants to call it.

He was then asked how they defend this kind of political activity.

Well to begin with, they're pretty well insulated. They have the payroll fixed up at City Hall so you can have undercover agents

working with the (C.C.)P.D. without being on the direct payroll. It is worked out so they can get it another way. The police won't even tell (X, a city official) that Phil (the above mentioned pseudonym) is even on the payroll. They will say that he was on the payroll up to a year ago and that's it. However, he continues to live with one or two bachelor (C.C.) cops and has undergone a radical change in appearance. He now has long hair and wears old clothes, the whole bit. Of course, it is possible he is on the State Police payroll.

Then there's the other line of argument I was given by (X, the city official). They say they have agents out there only for identification, to get information on criminal activity, that it's good police work. An agent has to take part in the action to protect his cover. The police, themselves, always come on with, 'You know we're necessary and you know we can't say anything about what we're doing. I had one (C.C.) lieutenant tell me once that I really shouldn't worry about politics or the philosophy of the police. All they're interested in is more appropriations. The police have absolutely no deep or abiding concern for crime, etc. It's just the money. Police are interested in economic self-interest.

(C.C.) is one of a very few departments that I know of that actually has gone into the agent provocateur business. It's hard to know if the men who are undercover agents and do violent acts are operating on orders to do so or if they're just being zealous in their roles.

If, in the course of a demonstration, they beat someone, they have to arrest them to protect themselves. Lietuenant (Z) is the center of action in these confrontations. All the police watch him for the ones he fingers to be arrested. He is damn good at picking out the leaders who usually get arrested for assaulting an officer and/or resisting arrest. Of course, some of the arrests are legitimate but a number of the arrests are made strictly because they've gotten to the leaders.[19]

Lieutenant (Z) and the others are very hip to student politics. They misinterpret and misread the data but this is not for lack of information. However, they have missed some real opportunities to get the true revolutionary left by misreading the data. The people who are really into guerilla training or organized revolution are known to the police but known as followers. They concentrate on the demonstration leaders and these guys are too smart to get involved in such demonstrations. They've never picked out the 'dangerous revolutionaries,' although they have culled out some of the lesser ones. The ones into real armed revolution are not about to be infiltrated. They're terribly paranoid, are very heavy on secrecy and use the old leftist type of organization.[XXXIV]

What are the views of the city officials concerning police surveillance activities? The following three responses resulted from their being directly asked about undercover political intelligence operations.

> (1) There is undercover work. I don't know who they are or where they operate. There is nothing to be gleaned from the budget request and nothing in it about buying information. I just have very little knowledge about what is happening in intelligence. I honestly do not have an answer to the whole possibility of political intelligence activities.[XXXV]

> (2) I am kept informed on the undercover narcotics operations, informally, but (the Chief) does not do so on political intelligence operations. It is my impression (when asked) that there isn't any of this going on but I haven't asked (the Chief). Maybe I should.[XXXVI]

A third city official when asked about political surveillance brought up the so-called "snowball incident" which he had heard from (X) and then had a follow up on from (Y).

> It seems that (X) knows some incognito dick who had been infiltrating certain campus groups and he saw him throw the first snowball aimed in what appeared to be an attempt to break one of the Administration building's windows. (X) wanted the whole thing investigated. Then Councilman (Z) heard about it and wanted to get into the act by bringing it up on the Council floor and ordering an investigation. ("He was dissuaded from doing this") . . . . Up to this point, nothing has come from the investigation . . . . Two years ago at the . . . budget discussion . . . (we) did go into the question of undercover agents . . . . I got the impression then that there were two full-time agents.[XXXVII]

Lastly, a few comments from those involved, the police, on the issue. I asked one high ranking (C.C.)P.D. police official what the rationale was behind the use of police for what is generally called political intelligence.

> History has proven that certain individuals have been involved in disruptive, I should say criminal acts. I feel that we should keep tabs on such people as the White Panthers, the Black Panthers, radical elements of S.D.S. Some of these people go to the point of involving national security.

I asked if having intelligence might be partially protection for the Department to cover them in case of an occurrence.

> Not in that sense. It is protection to the community. I feel that the better informed we are of what might happen, the more pitfalls we may be able to avoid in the sense of avoiding confrontations. Information and the ability to work with radicals has paid dividends. Lieutenant (Z) can pretty well sense what they have in mind to do and may even be able to talk them out of doing it. Thus, we are better able to respond to what is happening when we get a citizen's complaint.
>
> For example, a while back there was a march up around campus. They marched around and broke a few windows in business establishments in the area. If we had just listened to the statements of the people calling in, we might have dispatched 20 to 30 men. But we had men observing what was going on and so we didn't send them. It turned out doing that would have been the spark to set something off. Another example is a call we got about a riot in the Union (at the University). I happened to be there and Lieutenant (Z) arrived shortly thereafter. Nothing at all was happening and we just sent a patrol car to cruise by. Here again, we avoided the pitfall of the type of tactics the radicals like to try to set up. There are other examples of this whereby knowing in advance what is happening we can control what might have developed into a helluva disaster . . . . Or take the BAM incident. Throughout the march around campus by the blacks (at the time the Regents were meeting), they were being observed and monitored by guys who were watching the events unfold.
>
> It is a bunch of goddamn crap that we have undercover intelligence officers working the campus. We do have officers taking courses up there and they naturally might get involved in what is going on but we don't have the money to be putting agents up there.[XXXVIII]

I talked with another ranking police official who said that he wouldn't let me anywhere near the intelligence unit or its operations as it would jeopardize the years of trust he had developed with other agencies (notably mentioned was the FBI). Furthermore, a leak could seriously harm what might have been years of work to develop a case. Any questions about the intelligence unit would have to be asked of him as he was directly involved in supervising it. He forewarned me, however,

that he would give me scant information on the intelligence operation. I never asked him.[XXXIX]

Another officer in the C.C.P.D. had some extensive and trenchant remarks to make about intelligence operations and the police. I asked him about reactive vs. proactive policing.

> In municipal forces we tend to react, especially in the case of marijuana. The drug scene was reactive by the police,--trying to arrest people for the drug flow (users) rather than go one step further and prevent it. Some of the citizen's groups have gotten into the proactive scene and have forced police out of their shells into going after the trafficers. This happened up to 1967, the Detroit Riot. As a result, programs were set up to get political information. Local intelligence units are trying to justify their existence. They are incredibly unsophisticated. They engage in a lot of things not really necessary in order to justify their being. Intelligence really consists of (an) ability to ably analyze what is going on. Not just the collection of material.
>
> I agree that there is both a glamorous side, the undercover intelligence staff, and it is used to bolster bureaucracy building. If the campuses stay quiet, the scene will have to shift from them or to an attempt to create contention.

We then talked about this aspect of policing, the empire building, and he brought up the examples of Hoover and his 1,000 FBI men to cover the campuses and "the accompanying fusillade of highly dubious rhetoric" as well as Anslinger "who built the (federal) Bureau of Narcotics empire on fear and nonsense by chasing the victims, etc."

> I feel it is in our best interests to have a unit that can stay on top of things, to relay information to the proper police channels to control future problems. Intelligence is involved in everything--knowing what is happening in the city. So we do develop information on things like narcotics but we turn it over to the Narc unit for the follow up work. They are primarily into drugs. We are largely oriented toward the campus . . . (and the idea is) to be with it, be knowledgeable about all groups. Try to be aware of how to handle confrontations, figure out ways for the police not to over react. To try to control situations to keep them from occurring if possible. For this we need input from the street people and we need to know reality so (the police) won't over react.

Intelligence is a bad thing--so many bureaus set up all over the place, all trying to justify their bureaucratic existence and not really needing them or knowing what to do. It's very prestigious (in the law enforcement establishment) for local departments to have intelligence units. If (you) had the proper organizational set up to process incoming information, (you) wouldn't need an intelligence unit. But since you have specialization, you set one up. You could just use the men.

Undercover agents are used because we like to know who the leaders are and what their ideas are. We want to let them know who we are so we can communicate in case of an incident. The idea is to let them know that they are responsible for their actions. We are here for the protection of people, their freedoms and rights. Too often the police, arrest scenes and confrontations are used by leaders for their own ends and ego trips. They use the police to develop their own causes. On the other hand, there is no doubt that cops have tried to enforce their own moral values, feelings and prejudices rather than the law.

Detective bureaus have become nothing more than reactive paper shufflers. There is very little actual crime investigating. There is going to have to develop a new section or bureau which will get out into the community and become aware of what's going on. This is the true nature of criminal or political, as everything is political, intelligence.

Narcotics is the truly political thing. Politicians are harboring the big time importers. I don't see this as scapegoating to avoid police responsibility. The police have failed because they are incapable and incompetent. I think that the undercover narcotics agent has another year or so to go, before the hard drug scene moves back into the ghetto or black areas. This will wipe out 90 percent plus of the possibility for undercover work.[20]

(In sum), intelligence is going to evolve into what detective bureaus used to be--highly knowledgeable about the whole community scene and aware of what's going on. The question is one of being able to make the transition as (and when) municipal police departments become more sophisticated. It is going to be difficult to empire build on that but (until then) there is still plenty of mileage to be had out of the political games (yet) to be played on the hard drug scene.[XLI/21]

CHAPTER 10

Footnotes

1. A fifth who had switched over longer than two years prior to being interviewed, also answered the question.

2. Not lost on those who vied for the former alternative is the fact that each year for a week in July, this three block stretch is closed for a combined art festival-mercantile sale. For the evenings in 1969 the terrain was in contention, the road was blocked by the police and their paraphenalia.

3. The following day, the paper published a letter from the Mayor in reply to this article. Two brief excerpts are worth repeating:

   > (1) . . . I confined my praise to the (C.C.P.D.). My omission of any reference to other (police) departments was deliberate and and was noted, with resentment, by the Sheriff; and (2) . . . I was not attempting to incite hostility toward street people. I was attempting to make the point that the mass of students had not been drawn into the fray. I did and do consider it vital to keep a state of affairs from developing in which the enormous college student population is alienated from the police to the extent that they will act violently toward the police.

4. I can verify this account of what occurred in the area of the building as I was there throughout the evening and witnessed the maneuvers which took place around 4:00 a.m. I did not see what occurred in the front of the building. Newspaper accounts from those who were there and witnessed the events confirmed the statement as accurate.

5. Although unverified, the University Newspaper the next day mentioned a number of the marchers were undercover police officers who had joined the marchers. At least two of these were up in the front ranks as they went by the City Hall.

6. Other than the obvious harassment and the potential for intimidation of the signers, this was an important part of the campaign itself. A certain percent of the total votes cast in the 1968 election must be on the petitions signed and submitted before a recall referendum can be instituted.

7. To illustrate that this treatment of the Black Berets was more than an isolated occurrence, I offer the following quotation from the University Newspaper dated, September 25, 1970.

> . . . (X, co-chairman of BULJ, a woman) says that a black teenaged group formed this summer, called the Blackstone Rangers, is now effectively defunct due to what she called 'intense police harassment' of any youth who wore the group's jacket . . . . 'We're all accustomed to this kind of action, it just continues to boil within you.' . . . (Z), a senior in a (C.C.) high school and a member of the Blackstone Rangers, spoke of personal dealings with the police this summer. 'Every morning as I walked to work,' he said, 'a squad car followed me. When I reached my destination, the car would circle the block twice, and then leave only to repeat the performance the next day.'
>
> Another mother said that police commonly pick up black youths, arrest them and then never follow through on the charges. 'You just don't know what they're going to do,' she said.
>
> 'I've had dealings with the police for several years now, since my children reached their teens,' says (Mrs. X, another mother). 'Two weeks ago (my 15 year old son) was picked up for carrying a burglary tool, a screw driver. He was taken to City Hall, unclothed, and searched thoroughly. Later he was released. I didn't even know he had been picked up until he returned home.'

As the president of the C.C.P.O.A. said earlier in another context, the above examples of police-community relations presents only one side of the picture.

8. At the trial for conspiracy to blow up the C.I.A. office, the federal judge sustained a defense motion that the government had to produce the wire tapping tapes. Currently, the federal government is appealing the judge's ruling.

9. The informant quoted immediately prior to this one corroborated the 1969 incident. He said:

> The deputies first came by saying they were looking for some runaway. They came back with large numbers of men and weaponry and found nothing. It was a show of force by them in which they hoped to capitalize on what they found. They never said a public word about it. For one thing, it was an illegal search.

10. It is interesting to note how many "average" citizens believe that police officers would not be engaged in an activity or involved with an individual unless there were sufficient cause. An example of this would be defense peremptory challenges at jury seatings. Many citizens when asked directly, openly state that the accused must be guilty because the police arrested him or that they would tend to believe an officer if he testified. This, of course, is the burden of our innocent-until-proven-guilty system of justice.

11. Arrest is a very effective mechanism. Criminal justice can be extremely expensive and slow. In addition to creating criminality via the arrest record, it forces the arrestee to expend valuable resources such as money and time. Furthermore, being out on bail awaiting trial, results in less-than-full rights for the defendent. It can effectively neutralize him.

12. Although to my knowledge, the Panthers communal house was never raided, the Argus House pot raid could be seen as tangentially aimed at them. Recall that the first press release by the police after the raid was in part an attempt to link the Argus with the White Panthers while also linking them to "dangerous" drugs and weaponry stockpiling.

13. Wilensky, Harold L., Organizational Intelligence. Basic Books, New York, 1967, p. 10.

14. Ibid., p. 39. In a footnote on page 135 and on page 136 he says:

> A prime reason that the FBI is so free to intimidate men of power is that it has no strong institutionalized competition . . . . The FBI faces only local police who are unlikely sources of public criticism. (And) in its sensational exaggerations, the FBI is like its counterparts elsewhere-intelligence agencies that try to persuade administrative leaders that they are imminently threatened by one conspiracy or another, one crime wave or another. What is perhaps unique is the FBI's success in publicizing its secret activities as a national cause beyond criticism and its chief as 'Public Hero Number One.'

15. That this type of behavior by the police occurs is common knowledge and no longer newsworthy. I'll quote the following source as an example.

> The authorities of the City of Buffalo are continuously and unremittingly hostile to them (the University of Buffalo campus radicals) and boast, thereby winning elections, of the undercover agents who infiltrate student groups to search for pot and sedition. Some of these are regarded by the students--I think justifiably--as provocateurs. Friedenberg, Edgar Z., "Report from the Niagara Frontier," N.Y. Review of Books, May 7, 1970, p. 31.

16. A police state is present when the police move from a service role, that of protection and peace-keeping to a political role . . . . I am asserting only that our tradition of violence, abetted by the ignorance and wilful blindness of white town and immensely stimulated by resistance in black town, have together resulted in 'satispression' ("the repression of the dissatisfied by the satisfied"), a police state and the establishment of the police as a political entity, (e.g., "the number of police chiefs running for mayor in large cities"). Ferry, W. H., "Is a Police State Emerging," in Current, February 1970, No. 115, pp. 34 and 36.

17. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between covert political intelligence activity and covert narcotics operations. They are separate entities run by different units. In this study, I am concerned with the former and will only discuss the latter when the two coincide. Undercover narcotics activity, per se, is activity directed at illegal acts specified in the state statutes.

18. Three other lawyers contributed these thoughts:

> I was told that the Prosecutor's office keeps dossiers on suspected militants. They supposedly have an Assistant Prosecutor who keeps this up--not systematic intelligence but a regularly attended file.
>
> Often at night, Assistant Prosecutors like (Y) ride around with the police trying to get members of certain groups. Another good example is their attendance at the early rock concerts. At first, there were all sorts of them around looking for arrests. Later, a group of about 10 citizens began informal policing and also, the concerts became more respectable.
>
> The Prosecutor's office is full of sheer, right-wing, egotistical know-it-alls. They come across as competent guys. In fact, they don't know much of any law. Thus, they are inadvertently saving the community from the over zealousness of themselves and the cops. They bring in guys whose politics are right who have law degrees and never seem to question their competency.

19. An example of this is the February confrontation outside the Regents meeting alluded to earlier (the provocative snowball incident). The C.C. News of February 20, 1971 carried an article stating that one student had been arrested when:

> Officers said 35 to 40 persons attempted to push their way into an already packed regent's meeting room . . . . City police say (X) obstructed and attacked Cpl. (Y) . . . . A second University student is scheduled to be arraigned next Monday afternoon on assault and battery and obstructing and resisting a (C.C.) police officer. Chief (X) says it is anticipated that a warrant will be signed this weekend.

As you see, <u>two</u> students were either arrested or it was expected would shortly be arrested. However, the University Newspaper carried the following article in March.

> (X), (a well-known student activist), has been arraigned on assault charges in District Court, in the <u>third</u> arrest resulting from a confrontation between demonstrators and police during <u>last</u> <u>month's</u> Regents meeting (emphasis added) . . . . (X) admits to being present at the confrontation but denies assaulting (Z). He has said he is being 'framed' on the charge and was 'picked out' because of his history of political activism at the University.

20. Another officer said:

> Very seldom do we mix drug stuff with what (Z) does. He's into trying to stay on top of his stuff. Each would be ineffective --the mixing of the two could blow the whole investigation. To some degree, especially on the campus, there is some overlap between the two, except with the commercial dealer . . . . on the drug activity. Many times informants are set up. We try to get to the point of shipping someone into the operation. He might be from any department. We work this out cooperatively on a temporary basis.[XL]

21. The whole drug thing is great for the police for there is no way that there can be adequate public accountability for the expenses involved in trying to deal with the drug traffic. The police are able to put together a large bureaucracy around the whole drug thing. For example, the State Police just got appropriations for five new crime labs to identify the stuff. There used to be one in ____. This is a bureaucratic thing, the urge to continue to enlargen their organization. As long as pot or the harder stuff is not declared legal, there is no problem. It can go from a felony to a high misdemeanor, they could care less, as long as the samples keep coming in . . . . The cops have no idea what they're doing.[XLII]

CHAPTER 11

Blue Power and the People--Conclusions

This Chapter concludes Section Three which has presented the police and their transactions with the citizenry in the two communities studied. This relationship represents the other half of the dual set of obligations faced by the police and depicts the social control perspective as they interact with their environment. You will recall that Chapter 7 summarized the first of the dual set--the influence perspective and relations with the decision makers of the political structure. This chapter will offer conclusions from the data presented in the two preceeding chapters concerning the police and their encounters with the variegated populaces, their clientele. In addition, I will continue to develop the comparative model of police political behavior.

In the introductory chapter to this section I stressed that political behavior by the citizenry was: (1) primarily group oriented and thus collective in nature; (2) related to the political structure and to the polity by the differing trust types of confidence, neutrality and alienation; and (3) at least partially determined by the authorities and represented groups (the polity) through some form of social control. The concept of a diagram of centrality was devised to heuristically position all the political actors within a given community in relation to the public authorities and to each other. It showed that some groups are within the polity, some may be outside but vying to get in or change

the structure and others may just be outside the political arena and politically dormant.

Finally, it was suggested that the political trust orientation of these groups toward the authorities affects the means of influence they will use on them. This trust type,in turn, affects the manner in which social control will be applied. Thus, the theory stated that confident groups will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence which would be countered with persuasion as the social control means. Neutral groups will use inducements and be controlled in a like manner and alienated groups would utilize constraints and be controlled by insulation as a social control technique. It was hypothesized that those groups lying outside the political arena were discouraged by those within the polity from organizing and entering the competitive political establishment.

Political trust is the social cement binding together all the political actors within a community and has, as we have seen, two components. In Section Two, I focused on the importance to the police of the political structure as an object of trust. In this Section I looked at political trust's other aspect, it's direction or type. The two components are also the intervening variables in the theory of political behavior with each being a perceptual variable taken from the viewpoint of the police. The theory states that two independent variables, social diversity and socio-political exclusion, can, when combined, predict the second intervening variable. Before discussing the hypotheses involved, I shall briefly look at the two independent variables.

Social diversity is a characteristic of the citizenry of a given community. When comparing communities or the same one over time, diversity

can be viewed as varying and continuous. That is, given sound criteria, one should be able to fairly accurately count the number of status-defined solidary groups distributed throughout the population in a community being studied. This number would then be used to place that community into the high or low categories that I'm employing for this study. Chapter 12 will discuss the criteria for counting the groups and separating the variable. Essentially, the populace is divided along the ascriptive, attitudinal or behavioral cleavages which, politically, are the most meaningful. The prediction explained in Chapter 8 from social diversity to the direction of trust was that the more diverse a given political entity, the more the police will perceive the direction of trust as tending toward alienation. (See Figure E on page 268).

Socio-political exclusion is also a continuous variable which, once again, I have bifurcated into high and low categories. As I said in Chapter 8, exclusion from the political arena can either be voluntary or involuntary. It includes more than those who are politically apathetic or disorganized and thus do not have their interests represented in the competitive establishment. Also included are those who choose to opt out as well as those who are involuntarily kept out. Both forms of exclusion may be present to varying degrees in differing communities and Chapter 12 discusses how a given community is placed in either the high or low category. The theory predicts that the greater the exclusion present within a given community, the more the police of that community will perceive its dominant trust type as one of alienation. Figure E in Chapter 8 depicts this relationship schematically.

Figure F shows the outcome of combining these two bifurcated variables and provides us with another typology, this time for the direction of trust

variable, into which any local community can be placed. This figure describes four socio-political types of communities which vary significantly in their implications for police-clientele relations. The socio-political exclusion variable clarifies the social diversity variable with regard to predicting the overall direction of trust in a given community. Again, let me stress that these independent variables are not perceptions by the police but are measures, as objectively gathered as possible, of conditions extant within the political jurisdictions under study.


To actually predict the intervening variable, this typology must be converted by relating the four communities to the three trust types. From Figure E, you will recall that if both variables are low, the police, it is predicted, will perceive the dominant trust orientation of the citizenry as being confident. If both variables are high, alienation is the predicted trust type perceived by the police. Intermediate levels, where one variable is low and the other high, will produce differing perceptions with qualitatively different consequences for police-citizen relations. Figure G shows this transformation and is the predicted direction of trust, given the level of presence of the two independent variables.

FIGURE F--Combining the Direction of Trust Variables

Socio-Political Exclusion	Social Diversity: SOCIAL Low	Social Diversity: DIVERSITY High
Low	Similarity of life styles, values; High cohesion; Few solidary groups; Little or no social distance between the few (if any) cleavages or division into segments; Very little discontent or political conflict with authorities. All political activity and influence attempts made through the appropriate political channels. Example: Rural County or small "backwater" town/city.	Best Examples: How classic liberal democracy and pluralism are supposed to work. Many solidary and interest groups all of which are represented in and vying for favorable outcomes from the system, OR reasonably easy access to the political arena for new and contending solidary groups. A consensus on values about the public philosophy and institutions of the political regime with the various interest/solidary groups vying for content and personnel amongst the authorities.
High	Polarized community with few solidary groups but with divergent life styles--values. A great social distance between polar segments (e.g., a caste or highly stratified system with little mobility--rigid socio-economic classes, etc.). Strong cleavages in the citizenry. Those in the political arena vying for content and personnel, those outside high in potential discontent. Examples: Southern town/city; Some metropolitan areas with a black inner (central) city and white or "conservative" suburbs.	Highly segmented populace with many solidary groups. Little consensus on values. Many groups with discontent about content, personnel, and philosophy of political system. Many groups with sense of unrepresentation. High conflict (potential) between groups. Police receiving negative cues from all sides, re: performance of their functions--too lenient or too repressive, etc. Example: Cities; Large--Newark, N.J. Small--Cairo, Ill.

FIGURE G

Typology of the Direction of Trust in the Community



Type One with a confidence relationship would have both variables low and the prediction would be that the police would feel little motivation to engage in political behavior. Persuasion, as I stated in Chapter 8, would be used, when necessary, by the police. Political behavior would be largely unnecessary and would probably only occur sporadically when partisan politics or employment conditions (e.g., pay, uniform allowance, vacation, overtime, etc.) warranted it. The target of such political behavior would be confined to the authorities.

Type Two is farther along the trust continuum because of the higher diversity, although, because all groups are within the polity or can fairly easily gain access to it if such is desired, the community type is still reasonably homogeneous, politically. Here, the police would combine the persuasion techniques (e.g., activation of commitments, moral reminders, etc.) of the confident trust type with inducements of the neutral relationship (e.g., service orientation). As there are competing

solidary-interest groups within the polity, there will be differing levels of trust in the police which will result in the reception of mixed cues. This would tend to make the police take greater pains to be seen as a neutral organization; a collective referee whose duty it is to keep the peace and be neutral toward the various groups vying for favorable outcomes.

Police political activity would largely be limited to reactive behavior to ensure the continuation of their relative status and image. This might entail some organizing of resources and include limited reactive political activity directed at portions of the population in addition to the necessary influence attempts upon the decision makers. Although socio-political exclusion is low, there may be small segments or pockets in the community of those who are either voluntarily or involuntarily excluded. Police behavior toward these segments, most likely to be defined geographically, is described in Type Three below.

Type Three is a more complex extension of the second type and combines neutrality with alienation. Those within the polity are treated in a largely neutral, service-oriented, manner. An effort is made, publicly, to ensure that the various represented solidary groups are treated equally. Thus, behavior toward these groups may vary from deference for those with high status to "treating them as they would like/deserve to be treated" for the average-status citizens. Although there are segments of the populace which have a confident trust relationship, the police, as in Type Two, will only warily provide inducements such as plea bargaining, warnings rather than ticketing, etc.

Those outside the political system present varying degrees of problems. If they are involuntarily excluded or voluntarily excluded

but subservient, they can largely be ignored or controlled to the extent necessary via order maintenance. Alertness is necessary to maintain the artificial stratification of those involuntarily excluded. If they are involuntarily excluded and react to this by attempting constraints upon the authorities, they are controlled by the force or threat/fear of force necessary to subdue them. The police political behavior toward them would primarily be of a reactive nature. Voluntary exclusion with the exercise of constraining influence attempts on authorities produces proactive police political behavior. The presence of this element of the citizenry provides the police with an opportunity to utilize their greatest range of social control resources on citizens as political partisans. A considerable amount of organizing and mobilization of resources by the police might be necessary to engage in either reactive or proactive political behavior upon the citizenry, in addition to the influence attempts on the authorities.

Type Four represents a community in which the police are caught in the middle between competing groups using all means of influence available. Here, the full range of resources would be mobilized by the police and they would act politically toward all actors within the system to offset their defensive sense of isolation and to safeguard against being forced to make modifications or suffer decisions injurious to their set of interests (e.g., civilian review board, constraints on policy or operations, etc.).

Location of the Two Departments

Placing Central City and Mideast County illustrates that the direction of trust is a continuous variable with the boundaries of the four community

types, as a result of the dichotomization of the two independent variables, being somewhat arbitrarily drawn. It should also be remembered that: a) the direction of trust, b) the relationships within the four communities between their citizens and police, and c) the differences between the four types, are all predictions. These hypothesized relationships will be discussed shortly utilizing data from Chapters 9 and 10.

The western portion of Mideast County, excluding the Central City environs, provides an excellent example of a Type One community where both diversity and exclusion are low. However, with the inclusion of the eastern half of the County and those areas around Central and Eastern Cities, Mideast County moves over to the dividing line between low and high social diversity. I would place it in the low socio-political exclusion category because only the few thousand blacks on the east side are not adequately represented at the County level. Therefore, combining the two variables would place Mideast County on the border between Types One and Two. If all the citizens of Mideast County were considered, vis à vis the Sheriff Department, I would place the County in Type Four. This special case, so labeled because the Sheriff doesn't patrol within the cities, will be discussed along with the other two later.

Central City would be just over the dividing line between low and high diversity in the high category and in the high socio-political exclusion category. It is primarily placed in the high socio-political category because of the large number of students residing in the City.[1] Overall, then, Central City is just over the boundary into Type Four.

The Hypotheses

In this portion of the theory, there are two general hypotheses: (1) the more the combined variables of diversity and exclusion are present, the more the police of that community will perceive the dominant trust type or orientation as being in the direction of alienation; and (2) the more the dominant trust type is perceived of as being alienation (i.e., the farther it gets from confidence), the greater the press to engage in police political behavior. Subsumed within the second general hypotheses which predicts the dependent variable are two specific hypotheses about police political behavior: 1) the form of political behavior engaged in by the police--the resources and social control means--are specified for each community type and increase in range from persuasion through inducements to insulation via constraints as trust varies from confidence to alienation; and 2) the targets of police political behavior are likewise specified and move outward from the center of the diagram of centrality as the trust direction approaches alienation. I shall discuss the two general hypotheses separately and please remember that the data in Section Three is only concerned with the social control perspective.

With regard to the intervening variable of direction of trust, let us look first at the data concerning the greater presence in Central City of the two independent variables. From the perspective of the police, Charts 9-1 and 9-2 in Chapter 9 show that, although the total number of solidary groups (called categories in the data collection) mentioned were approximately equal (79-83), Central City had a greater number of principal solidary groups specified by at least four respondents (8-5) and by a wide margin of 22 to 13 had more other groups mentioned.

Conversely, the deputies clustered the majority of their responses (57 of 83) around three categories with a great drop off to two other categories. These were the results in spite of the greater difficulty experienced by the Central City respondents in answering the question. Evidence of this is that four of the 19 C.C. respondents actually failed to specify any solidary groups (mentioning abstract categories instead).

Chart 9-3 shows the extent to which the officers felt the solidary groups were alienated. Here, Central City had three times as many exclusionary responses as Mideast County (32 to 11) with every C.C.P.D. officer thinking that there were alienated groups in C.C. By contrast seven of the M.C.S.D. deputies thought there were no alienated groups in the County. To the question of whether the exclusion was self-induced, 18 of 21 C.C.P.D. felt it was, whereas only 10 of 21 felt this way in the County. Seven of the latter (none in the City) felt the groups in the County were not excluded. Taking these two questions together, it is apparent that the officers feel there is greater exclusion within the political arena of the City then within the County. Furthermore, two categories were frequently mentioned in the City as being alienated but not in the County.

This greater sense of alienation and exclusion in the City was heightened by responses to a question concerning spokesmen or interest groups speaking for the entire solidary group. The question was, "Are there certain groups, clubs or organizations within any of these differing categories which attempt to speak for the entire category?" Only eight respondents within the C.C.P.D. gave answers which could be viewed as a generalized response to all the solidary groups within the community.

Thirteen of 19 (including 5 of the 8) used either the black or student radical groups or both as negative illustrations and none were willing to concede any degree of organizational leadership to these groups (i.e., they felt they did not speak for the whole solidary group). In the M.C.S.D. eight gave the black category as a negative illustration but three were willing to give at least minimal credence to black leadership in the County. In addition, four deputies felt moved to mention groups in Central City which they felt did not speak for the solidary groups in the City.

The two variables in combination were tested in two questions. In the first the respondents were asked to rank the categories they had chosen and then, later, they were asked to give the categories which were closest to and most distant from their personal values or beliefs. Charts 9-4 and 9-6, it was hypothesized, could have been composite diagrams of centrality for the perceptions of the two departments. These two charts, showing the order of the rankings for all the categories mentioned, were correlated with the near/far personal value question to test the hypothesis. The results of the four relationships (Chart 9-5 and 9-7) clearly indicate, at least for those categories nearest the poles, that the Charts were diagrams of centrality. The categories mentioned first (or second) in the ranking were those with whom the officers had the greatest sense of social cohesion. Those at the other extreme on the rankings had the opposite perceived relationship with the officers. In sum, these Charts and the responses to the questions, operationalize the theoretical direction of trust concept by placing the solidary groups into confident, neutral and alienated trust types. The neutral groups are the most difficult to accurately

label, as they were not explicitly discussed as such, and therefore, are assumed to be somewhere between the polar trust orientations. The solidary groups can now be discussed more specifically.

Strength of alienation was tapped in two questions, one of which could have been partially viewed from a criminological perspective ("Are there any particular people in your community who cause problems for the police?") While the other was specifically asked to ferret out hostility ("Are there any people who seem to be constantly outspoken in their criticism of the police?"). Responses to the first question indicated that Central City had people who were problem causers and the problems went considerably beyond those caused by crime. To the second question, I summarized the responses by saying they adequately answered the question of how the two communities compare to each other on the trust dimension. The Sheriff Department split into two groups with almost half (8 of 18) discussing, not the County, but volunteering groups in Central City. All 16 Central City respondents discussed the two most alien categories and at some length.

Next, I reported on an attempt to corroborate the differential views discussed in the paragraph above which are held by the police toward the solidary groups. On Charts 9-8 and 9-9, I summarized the 324 questions asked of the 36 respondents in which each was asked a series of nine questions about one of the solidary groups. The conclusions I drew from them were that: (1) there is a greater amount of perceived voluntary exclusion in Central City; (2) overall, there is less perceived socio-political exclusion in the County; (3) the most alien group in the County is closer to the views of the Sheriff Department then are

the two most alien groups in C.C. with regard to their police (i.e., the social distance in terms of perceived hostility is less); and therefore, (4) social diversity is greater in the City as the solidary groups there are perceived by both departments as being farther apart from each other in terms of life styles and values. There are, in addition, some important findings in these charts which are of primary significance to the specific hypotheses subsumed under the second general hypothesis and will, therefore, be discussed later.

The final question of the interview form was a direct attempt to compare the two communities under study on the intervening variable. This question asked each respondent to judge the overall community support received by each of four police agencies and then to rank order the four from the one receiving the MOST to the one receiving the LEAST support. I said in Chapter 9 that the rank order descends for the four communities as would be expected. The County (as we have been viewing it) was seen as the most supportive by a wide margin in both departments, (it received 21 of the 27 "very supportive" designations awarded. The other 18 ranked it as being supportive). Community #2, taking all the citizens of the County together vis a vis the Sheriff Department, was ranked second overall. This was debated by some officers, especially in the C.C.P.D., who felt that they received more support than C.C.'s citizenry gave to the Sheriff Department.

However, given the potential confusion of C.C.'s citizenry being in two of the communities asked about, it was still readily apparent that members of both Departments were able to differentiate between the three geographical entities in question. The placement of "Metropolita" fourth lends further credence to the theoretical argument that

diversity and exclusion predict perceived support or the direction of trust. In summation, from this series of questions, there appears to be strong evidence that the citizenry of the County (Community #1) was perceived by both departments as having a more confident trust direction than Central City's citizenry.

The outside experts confirmed that Central City has both a more diverse population than the County and has a greater amount of active alienation from the police by its citizenry. In discussing the two political jurisdictions, the informants clearly indicated that the Sheriff Department received more support or, to put it another way, received much less negative input from its clientele than the C.C.P.D.

Summarizing the date concerning the relationship between the independent and intervening variables, I conclude from the evidence presented that: (1) the two independent variables do predict the direction of trust; (2) Central City has both diversity and exclusion (primarily voluntary) present to a greater degree than does Mideast County; and, therefore (3) the perceived trust orientation in Central City is closer to the alienation pole on the trust direction continuum than is the perceived trust type in Mideast County. Thus, although the independent variables were not tested directly, there appears to be strong evidence that these two in combination predict the intervening variable. At least I can say that the general hypothesis is confirmed to the point that the greater the presence of these two, the greater the sense of alienation the police perceive is felt toward them by their clientele. If this is so, then one might be able to employ the objectively

measurable independent variables here, as well, to predict this intervening variable.

The second general hypothesis in this portion of the theory links this intervening variable to the dependent variable by predicting that the more the dominant trust type is perceived of as being alienation, the greater the motivation by the police to engage in political behavior. Political behavior in this combination is primarily the relationship between the police and the citizenry--the social control perspective--and thus the activity by the police is directed at the populace. As I stated earlier, there are two specific hypotheses within this general one which detail the means and the targets of social control-oriented, political behavior for each trust type. These will be discussed individually and if they hold true, the more general hypothesis will in large part have been put to the test.

You will recall from Chapter 8 that the Gamsonian model states there is a plausible theoretical argument concerning the means of influence that a partisan group directs against a set of authorities. It tends to emphasize a dominant means or more specifically, a confident group will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence, a neutral group upon inducements, and an alienated group upon constraints. In turn, the authorities tend to emphasize a dominant means of social control for each trust type. As I discussed earlier in this Chapter, these means are linked to the four community types so the hypothesis for this study of the police specifies that: (1) where the overall trust type from the community as perceived by the police is confidence, persuasion if necessary, will be used; (2) where the trust type is neutrality, persuasion and predominantly inducements will be employed; and (3) with alienation,

primarily insulation via constraints and to a lesser degree persuasion and inducements will be utilized. That is, as perceived trust moves toward alienation, more social control resources in the sense of a greater range of means will be employed against the citizenry. This hypothesis will be tested by looking at data from the two preceeding chapters.

The most germane information from the interviews with the police officers is the nine question series asked about selected solidary groups. The 38 respondents in the two departments discussed the nine most prevalent solidary groups with their views summarized in the scenarios presented in Chapter 9. Charts 9-8 and 9-9 show the ranked solidary groups and the five most relevant items taken from the police perceptions of the citizenry. (See Chapter 9, pages 307-08.) In each chart, the first two columns (Particular Problems and Perceived Feelings) give the perceived trust relation. The second two columns (Grievance Satisfaction and Support Sources) give the means of influence applied to the authorities (the theoretical argument from the Gamsonian model of partisan group interaction). The fifth column (Method of Interaction) reports how the police feel the citizens in the groups should be handled: that is, what means of social control is necessary to police them. This last column is the hypothesis now being tested.

It is apparent from looking at the two charts that both Gamson's theoretical argument concerning the dominant influence means of partisan group interaction and the specific hypothesis under consideration receive strong support.[2] As you move down each chart from the first to the last category, the trust relationship changes from confident through neutral to alienated. Concomitantly, the means of influence change: from (1)

direct, individual persuasion; through (2) direct or within channels influence attempts by close personal or within-the-solidary-group supporters (a form of inducement in the sense of the gratification available for amicably solving a mutual conflict); to (3) indirect, generalized constraints applied where and when possible (e.g., threats of confrontations, disturbances, defamation, picketing, etc.). In the same manner the social control means vary from persuasion (respect, deference, interest-friendship, etc.) through inducements (attempts at understanding, courtesy, treat them as they deserve, etc.) to insulation via constraints (all resources available). These, then, are the means of influence and social control used on the differing groups as reported by the police respondents. The remainder of Chapter 9 was devoted to the outside experts commenting on the manner in which the two police agencies treated segments of the populace differently and why they felt it occurred.

Chapter 10 presented specific examples of the manner in which the two police agencies dealt with different solidary or interest groups in the two communities.[3] Nine separate sets of relationships and/or incidents in addition to political intelligence were discussed. For the purpose of analyzing the social control resources used, the nine can be most succinctly broken into two groups. Group one includes the South University incident, the L.S. and A. "Book Store" sit-in, the Chicago "7" Trial Verdict March and the 100 block of East Ann Street. Group two includes BULJ, the Black Berets, the Blackstone Rangers, the C.C. School Board Incident and the White Panthers. Group one represents those affairs in which both departments were involved while Group two includes those affairs in which the C.C.P.D. participated.[4]

Group one has within it one incident where most of the participants were from a solidary unit seen by the C.C.P.D. as being neutral, the L.S. and A. Book Store Sit-In. The South University Incident's active participants were primarily the "street people," many if not most of whom were pre-college in age. The Chicago "7" Trial Verdict March was made up of the University radicals and their followers. These last two incidents were seen as led and populated by members of the most alien solidary group in C.C., the Radicals-Hippies. Ann Street in C.C. represents a volatile area mostly patronized by the "lesser" respected members of the Blacks-Low Income solidary group. This fourth group falls between the Regular Students and the Radical-Hippies on the diagram of centrality (Chart 9-8) and is unique among these four by being a continuous activity.

Taking the behavior of the C.C.P.D. toward these groups first, it illustrates a progression in the use of force, a social control resource. In the Sit-in, the C.C.P.D. were depicted as doing their duty; a building was being illegally occupied and they arrested in an orderly and controlled manner, those who chose to remain. This incident represents two things: (1) the C.C. police proceeded with caution and restraint against this largely neutral body of students; and (2) the police, as social control agents, were used by the Sit-in leaders to further their own cause. On Ann Street, the C.C.P.D. seem to take, to the extent possible, as little action as they can. As interaction appears to lead to altercations, avoidance is the preferred tactic. However, firmness and necessary force are used to maintain order in this fairly circumscribed downtown area. The C.C.P.D. are aware that the patrons of this area do have access to and will use political influence resources if

their behavior becomes too "unprofessional." Thus, a certain restraint is normally present even though mutual hostility is high. Political behavior toward this area is limited as the patrons are viewed by the police as being of a minority group but most, with the exceptions already mentioned, are politically apathetic. Racism, not politics in the sense I've been discussing it, is the prevalent criticism leveled at the police from this area.

The uncontrolled charge on the first night of the South University Incident and the breaking up of the Chicago "7" March in front of City Hall represent use of reactive social control resources. Here, the police retaliated with the means available to them for the behavior they had received over time from this solidary group. Barely concealed emotional and intellectual hostility, usually controlled, was vented in these two fairly short occurrences. In Chapter 7, I discussed a number of possible behavioral outcomes in departments where motivation to engage in political behavior was wholly or partially stymied. One of them was the release of frustrations against an element of the citizenry least able to protect itself politically. It is no surprise or accident that the two collectively uncontrolled and morale building incidents which occurred during the two year time span of this study, where excessive force was collectively utilized, were directed against this segment of the populace. In neither case were arrest nor planned tactical moves the primary resources used by the police; rather, straight physical and emotional fury was unleashed.

With regard to these four groups and the Sheriff Department, three of the four interactions, all against the University area populace, represented the use of the maximal reactive social control resources

available short of their firearms arsenal. Excessive collective physical force was employed against these groups as a planned or at least, allowed, social control tactic. That the deputies are primarily employed within Central City to aid and augment the C.C.P.D. is of secondary importance to the manner in which they independently strive to control mass crowd demonstrations. The means used against the "University crowd" is the same as that employed when they venture onto Ann Street or while patrolling/ controlling the eastern portion of the County--the invocation of "respect" by fear.

All four of these incidents represent instances where the Sheriff can further enhance his political standing in the County by using a hard-nosed, take-no-shit stance. Life for the C.C.P.D. is not that simple; they are less able to capitalize on the "town-gown" cleavage unless the group can be clearly designated and negatively labeled in advance. Harassment of individuals within specified groups is one thing but intimidation by the threat of collective physical force ups the stakes in the Central City political arena to a level where the costs for the C.C.P.D. outweigh the benefits.

The second group of relationships were with the C.C.P.D. and included BULJ, the Black Berets, the White Panthers and two less-well documented events--the School Board meeting and the demise of the Blackstone Rangers. These were summarized in Chapter 10 and thus, will be only briefly discussed here. With BULJ, the C.C.P.D. (and the city administration which was forced into the affair) was able to neutralize the anti-police attacks by using the public political machinery. Basically, they developed counter-political influence by activating commitments from political allies and by their own overt political actions. In

social control terms these would be seen as utilizing both inducements to foster a political coalition and reactive, insulatory sanctions of a mild but effective form (e.g., undercutting the grievances, maligning the group's leaders, attempting to manipulate the group's meetings, etc.).

The Black Berets were handled with more stringent constraints. The goal was not just to neutralize their political influence, as in the BULJ case, but to neutralize or destroy the source of political partisanship, the group itself. Insulation as a social control technique in this situation took the form of utilizing both reactive and proactive social control resources. Defamation and surveillance were followed by raid and arrest. The view taken by the police was tantamount to the belief that the only good Beret was a jailed or on probation Beret.

The White Panthers strategy represents both reactive and proactive, social control insulation in its fullest orchestration. Here, all the resources available at the Central City level were employed including, as I have said, the inclusion of resources from higher level law enforcement agencies. Again, the object was the destruction of the group, the source of potential partisanship. Destruction, however, proved more difficult than with the Berets and required the escalation of activities. Some observers have suggested that the ultimate in proactive political behavior has occurred, the fabrication of evidence against the Panthers.

In sum, then, with regard to the specific hypothesis concerning social control means, it does appear that as the perceived trust orientation moves toward alienation, more social control resources are brought to bear upon the citizenry. Furthermore, considerable support was generated for the congruence of perceived trust type and concurrent social control means. This seemed to hold true at the group level where,

for example, neutral groups were dealt with in a considerably different manner than alienated groups. At the overall community level, there was also evidence, with one proviso, that congruence occurred. In Central City, which you will recall was just over the border into Type Four (a perceived alienated state), social control means extended beyond reactive to proactive insulatory constraints. Mideast County, on the other hand was on the border between Types One and Two with confidence the predominant trust orientation. Here, persuasion was utilized to maintain social control with the proviso, mentioned above, being that solidary groups which are excluded from the political arena (e.g., blacks in the Oval area) receive the reactive constraining force necessary to maintain a level of fear sufficient to keep at least minimal order.[5] The Sheriff Department did not engage in proactive political behavior such as electronic surveillance or infiltration, although it did engage in undercover narcotics operations aimed at statutory violations.

An interesting thing occurred when the Sheriff Department ventured into Central City. I stated earlier that Mideast County, with all the citizenry included, would be placed in Type Four. Here, then, the prediction would be that all social control means would be utilized as with the C.C.P.D. The Sheriff Department, however, responded to all situations in the same way and only to the same extent that they traditionally used in the County: with the unsophisticated, often excessive, reactive and direct use of physical force to develop fear. It is as if they are activating social control resources (i.e., collective physical force or constraints) which easily and often become uncontrolled. When a number of incidents, primarily around the University, brought the

Sheriff Department into Central City, the Sheriff sought, covertly, to develop the resources to cope with this new and more alienated terrain. The Department attempted to develop an intelligence unit to engage in proactive political surveillance on the campus.

The second specific hypothesis, subsumed under the more general one which links the direction of trust to press to engage in political behavior, details the targets of social control oriented, political behavior. This hypothesis states that as the direction of trust moves from confidence to alienation, the targets of police political behavior move outward from the center of the diagram of centrality to include a greater scope of the citizenry. Specifically, the hypothesis is that in communities: (1) with a confident dominant trust type, there will be little or no political behavior engaged in vis à vis the citizenry. Political behavior, if it occurs, will be within the influence perspective and aimed at the first three categories (the public government) of the diagram of centrality; (2) with a neutral trust type, political behavior of a social control nature will be limited to reactive means against members of the polity. That is, police in their role as referee might react in specific situations to one or more of the various interest groups vying within the system for favorable outcomes; and (3) with an alienated trust type, political behavior will extend out to include all residents within the political jurisdiction. Those collectivities of potential partisans within and outside the polity will be subject to reactive or proactive social control activity.

This hypothesis cannot be discussed at a lower level (the solidary group) as the prior one could. Therefore, as the data at hand only covers two communities, testing it is a limited proposition. We have seen that

the Sheriff Department does limit political behavior to the first three categories of the diagram of centrality. As Mideast County is on the border of Types One and Two, the prediction is that political behavior should be limited to this target with some sporadic reactive behavior against specific groups in the polity. Section Two discussed the use of the media by the Sheriff and you will recall it was limited to attacks upon other political decision makers (or partisan candidates) with an occasional remark about some group or group leader usually in reaction to an unfavorable public statement about the Department. The politically active groups that do exist in the County are largely unidentified and ignored by the Sheriff with the type of exception that occurred when Central City's White Panthers ventured out into the County for a meeting.

The most alien solidary groups within the County are not differentiated on a specific group basis but are handled on an atomized individual level. Deputies do tend, however, to identify individuals by such generic traits as race, age and neighborhood. You will remember a number of outside experts commented on the individual vendettas, hatreds and identifications into good or bad that occur. One observer developed a continuum of interaction which went from reacting to unknown single individuals to proactive behavior where a category (e.g., black or southern white youths) is labelled and everyone falling into that category is seen as a potential crime generator. Those within these categories, though, are atomized individuals who, at most, hang around together. Thus, they are not labelled as Berets or Panthers, but as "punk" kids ("hillbilly" or "colored") or given a geographic label such as being from "the Oval" or the "Lost Lake area."

In Central City, a Type Four community, the prediction is that police political behavior will extend out to include all persons within the City. Because of the alienated trust relationship extant within the community, the police view all collectivities as either potential allies or enemies. As we have seen, these influence means include constraints. Thus, the scope of political activity is enlarged to include the entire populace. We have seen from the influence perspective of Section Two how confident and neutral groups are influenced by the C.C.P.D. (the Sheriff Department rarely engaged in this political influencing). Reactive collective political behavior occurred against BULJ and those in attendance at the School Board Meeting and in a more violent form against the "street people" and "radicals" in the South University and Chicago "7" incidents. Proactive collective political behavior occurred against the Berets, Blackstone Rangers and White Panthers as groups.

The members of the most alien solidary groups within Central City are identified by the C.C.P.D. as existing on two levels, whereas those in the County are viewed, as we have seen, by the M.C.S.D. as being monolithic. In the latter, with the exception of age (youth-adult), the solidary groups are rarely broken down farther than the gross ethnic, racial or geographic criteria utilized to define them. Evidence of this was the paucity of responses to questions put to the M.C.S.D. asking them to identify specific groups, clubs or organizations within those categories chosen for a closer look (see the scenarios in Chapter 9). A number of groups do exist but it was as if they were irrelevant to and thus ignored by the deputies. In Central City a similar gross identification occurs so that "long hairs" and black youths are occasionally harassed but, in addition, specific classification into partisan (interest) groups

occurs. As the outside experts stated, the C.C.P.D. are well aware of who these politically active people are--by label, where they live and with whom they interact. Political files and dossiers are kept and, of course, political intelligence is pursued. It is significant that the C.C.P.D. has both a Community Relations Division and an Intelligence Unit, whereas the M.C.S.D. has neither.

This hypothesis, then, received support to the extent the data was available. Targets of police political behavior did correlate with the two community trust types considered. The confident trust orientation in the County led to the citizenry there receiving limited, if any, political behavior. Central City was at practically the opposite end of the spectrum with targets of police political behavior both within and outside the polity.[6]

With the completion of discussion on these two specific hypotheses concerning resources and targets of police political behavior, I can now summarize the general hypothesis. It predicted that the more the dominant trust type (direction of trust) is perceived of as alienation, the greater the motivation to engage in political behavior against the citizenry. For purposes of greater clarity and for testing, social control (or citizenry) oriented, political behavior was separated into the two components of means and scope. Both components were shown to be additive as the trust direction approached alienation; that is, the range of social control resources and the scope of those citizens involved as targets were greater in Central City when it was compared to Mideast County. Therefore, I conclude there is ample and clear evidence to support the prediction linking the intervening variable to the dependent variable.

Opportunity

As with the concluding chapter on the influence perspective, opportunity and efficacy must be discussed in conjunction with the interaction between the police and the citizenry. Chapter 7 introduced the concept of opportunity as an externally placed restraint upon the freedom to carry out a given level of press to engage in political behavior. Here, again, it is hypothetically possible that upon completion of a study with a fairly large number of local police agencies, two departments might be found with a roughly equivalent motivational level to engage in political behavior. However, one department might have actually engaged in more actual political activity toward the citizenry than the other and thus, the possibility of opportunity to act is raised.[7]

In Chapter 7 I discussed the behaviorial implications to and the internal impact upon the departments of this differential capability to act. The reactions in terms of levels of anxiety and frustration remain the same, (see, for example, the discussion in this chapter concerning the South University and Chicago "7" morale boosters). With the social control perspective and opportunity, the issue of means becomes paramount. External restraints would tend to be most operative in the more severe resource areas of direct, reactive (excessive) physical force and proactive political intelligence. As these are the resources whose utilization is most questionable, the police would be vulnerable to political attacks concerning them. On the other hand, and this is the key to opportunity, these resources are primarily applied to alienated groups who, in the main, have the least political capability of protecting or of legitimately avenging themselves.[8]

Examples of this come from the two communities studied. Unbridled excessive physical force by the C.C.P.D. occurred against only one solidary group, the radicals-street people. On the two brief occasions it was unleashed, even the C.C.P.D. officers commented upon its uniqueness and salutary departmental effects. As was repeatedly stated, the department was tightly controlled during all other such interactions. It was further stated that such control led to the vehemence of the uncontrolled charges. The Sheriff Department, on the other hand, was free to use whatever force they desired when entering into these affairs. Students, of any nature, are fair game to the Sheriff Department and as we have seen, are available for and used for political gain by the Sheriff. Numerous individuals commented on the potential political resources that students within Central City possess. By default, the converse is true--students have traditionally been capable or desirous of mobilizing precious few resources at the County level.[9]

Opportunity to engage in proactive political behavior is a more complex item. Intrinsic to its effective use in covert operations is secrecy. Nowhere was this better illustrated than in the attempt by the Sheriff Department to slip through, covertly, the request for funds to purchase electronic surveillance equipment enroute to the development of an intelligence unit. Upon being unearthed, he first tried to brazen his way through by denigrating the potential unit's target (the University), and then probably too late, altered the function of the unit from political intelligence to a more palatable narcotics operation. Another example is the fact that the C.C.P.D.'s engagement in political intelligence is a closely guarded secret and, as one informer observed,

could, if surfaced, be a highly volatile issue--one that could "easily cause the campus to erupt."

Proactive, covert behavior of this type tends to occur in communities with an alienated trust type. One observer discussed this activity in Chapter 10 and said:

> Any law enforcement agency worth a damn is putting its resources into the campus because this is where it gets its bread, where the action is . . . . The Sheriff Department has little notion of political reality . . . . A big crime for them, one that's reported in the papers, is a straight crime--breaking and entering, armed robbery, etc. . . . They have little notion of the idea of a political criminal whereas, the C.C.P.D. are very much into and good at getting the political criminals.

Opportunity, then, has an added dimension when proactive, covert intelligence activity takes place. No longer is it just the function of the police to solve crimes through the apprehension of the perpetrators of these crimes. The police in their secretiveness are also culling out those who <u>will become</u> "criminals"--those who have committed or are "conspiring" to commit a crime against the morality code of the police. In a nutshell, they are looking for prelabelled "criminal types" who can either be removed from society or at least, under the guise of societal stability, be "controlled."

A growing body of literature attests to the fact that this activity is occurring today on an unprecedented scale (e.g., U.S. Army Intelligence). At the same time, new evidence continuously surfaces that such activity has been a continual part of the FBI's history.[10] With the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act in 1968, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was formed. Its operating budget for 1971-72 is over a billion dollars which is

> . . . (P)roviding local police with sophisticated 'crime prevention' hardware . . . . The result enables police to keep citizens--the innocent and the guilty alike--under electronic and photographic surveillance . . . . Clarence M. Coster, associate administrator of L.E.A.A. looks forward to the day when police will make sound and photographic recordings of 'mass protests' and rock festivals, as evidence for future prosecutions.[11]

Combining this new agency with the FBI and the politicization of the hard drug problem means that from both the federal level and at the local level there will be increased pressure and thus, opportunity to engage in covert political intelligence. For a department like the C.C.P.D. which is moving to the full political level (Chapter 7), exposure of such practices against the citizenry could further strain many already tenuous trust relationships and increase both alienation and polarization in the community. It was only through extensive publicity and hard work by Central City's Mayor that the Sheriff's proposed Intelligence Unit was temporarily blocked at the local level.

Efficacy

This chapter concludes with a discussion of efficacy and the targets of police political behavior. Chapter 7 stated that efficacy referred to the general expectations people have about their ability to contribute significant inputs to the political system. In short, a person's perception of his ability to influence sets of authorities was the definition used when the influence perspective was being discussed. With regard to social control, efficacy can be extended to encompass political influence, in this case by the police, upon the citizenry. Thus, efficacy becomes the perception by the police of their ability to influence collectivities of their clientele through the use of social control resources. The question becomes not whether the opportunity exists but

whether to and upon whom to exercise differing kinds of social control-oriented, political behavior.

We have already seen that strong correlations exist between the trust orientation and means of influence used by a partisan group, and the corresponding social control response. The police are, however, often in the position of being able to choose among alternatives concerning the resources to utilize against a partisan group. Although they would, for example, tend to use constraints against alienated groups and not against neutral groups, constraints like inducements have their own internal hierarchy from mild to severe.[12] And, of course, constraints need not always be invoked against alienated groups.[13] How, then, could one predict when constraints, to use the most provocative of resources, would be applied within a community with an alienated trust type.

Two factors, in addition to the hypothesized general relationship discussed earlier (the dependent variable), are worth considering when combining efficacy with the difference between press for and actual political behavior. The first uses the diagram of centrality and suggests that: (1) when a partisan group has a trust imbalance with the two sets of authorities discussed in this study (the political decision makers and the police); or (2) when a partisan group has an alienated trust relationship with both sets of authorities, police political behavior is more likely to occur. If a partisan group has a confident or neutral orientation toward the political decision makers and is aliented from the police (e.g., liberals, many of the University people, middle class blacks, etc), milder forms of constraints would be expected. If the reverse were true (e.g., law and order citizens of "blue collar-


working class" in C.C.'s "liberal" administration), forms of persuasion or inducements would be expected toward them by the police. Finally, if authorities are lumped together and alienation is the overall orientation, the more severe constraints would be expected (e.g., Categories 5 and the alienated portion of 4 in C.C.).

The second factor recognizes that in this study there has been limited discussion of the relative political power of either the local police agency or of contending partisan groups. By power, I mean the capability of either to participate in conflict and includes both mobilized resources and slack but fluid resources (i.e., money, auxiliary forces, allies, lapsed memberships, previous local history, tradition, access to media, etc.). Relative political power is the relationship, as perceived by the police, between the local police agency and the solidary-interest group(s) who are the actors in a given interaction. Below in Figure H, I combine this concept with the trust type of the partisan group from the perspective, again, of the police to give a rough prediction of when it will be most efficacious for the police to apply political constraints.[14] The hierarchy of severity of the constraints could also be superimposed on the chart.

In conclusion these two factors in combination make for a strong prediction concerning the efficacy of politically constraining behavior upon targets within the citizenry. Remember that this prediction is subsumed under the two general hypotheses discussed in this Chapter and that here, I am referring to a Type Four community. The greatest likelihood of the most severe direct activity would come when the partisan group is alienated from both sets of authorities and their political power relative to that of the local police agency is low. Illustrations of

FIGURE H

Application of Political Constraints by Police



this situation are the Black Berets and the "street people" in Central City. Another illustration would be the involuntarily excluded blacks in the Oval (County), if they were to begin mobilizing for political activity. Severe activity but with some qualms would occur when the partisan group is higher in relative political power (moving toward the upper right quadrant of Figure H). This is the case of the White Panthers and may explain why the higher level law enforcement agencies were brought into that conflict.

Although all nine of the interactions discussed in Chapter 10 could

be analyzed here, I shall conclude with BULJ. Within this variegated group were citizens with a neutral, perhaps even confident, trust relationship at that time toward the new Democratic administration but all of whom were alienated from the police. As a group, their relative political power within the polity was an unknown quantity but not, certainly, as low as that of the Black Berets. We have seen that the political constraints applied to them by the police were less severe (e.g., reactive and overtly proactive) and in aftermath, indirect (i.e., through the political system). It is in this central area of Figure H, where relative political power is often imprecisely calculated, that the greatest social control errors of overreaction are continuously made.

CHAPTER 11

Footnotes

1. This is changing as the voting age is lowered to 18 in January, 1972 and with a recent state Attorney General's ruling forcing the easier voter registration of students within Central City.

2. You will recall that the specific hypothesis is also taken from Gamson's social control perspective. It is being featured here because this study focuses upon the police and their activities. The plausible argument hypothesis is presented because it is an important corollary to the social control hypothesis, i.e., it is a congruency model of interaction.

3. With the completion of Chapter 10, all incidents of police political behavior for the two year time period which were known to me and verified by at least two observers have been presented. No incidents were omitted because inclusion might have proved embarrassing to the theory being developed. Undoubtedly what has been included represents only the tip of the political behavior iceberg, but even in communities of this fairly small size, it's amazing how much political behavior can be unearthed.

4. The minor exception to this is the White Panther sponsored, underground newspaper meetings in which both departments were involved. The police actions in the two years these took place represent examples of political harassment but pale next to the other resources brought to bear against the Panthers.

5. This would generally be true with the police-citizen relationship in the first two types of communities. Reactive social control resources in the form of physical force, often excessive because noncontrolled, would be employed to regulate the alien segments of the populace. Such police behavior would likely be unsophisticated, direct and often not fit into the definition of political behavior as the target would not be a politically active collectivity.

6. Mideast Sheriff Departments incursions into Central City were not discussed in this hypothesis because of the predetermined nature of the targets. That is, the Sheriff is asked to support the C.C.P.D. in certain situations where the actors within the given conflict are already mobilized or at least known. Therefore, it could not be said that the Sheriff Department participates in determining action against targets within Central City. At least, with the exception of narcotics raids, this has been the situation to date.

7. I shall repeat the footnote from Chapter 7 which dealt with this issue. In this study with regard to the social control perspective, the situation did not arise as there was a substantial difference between the two communities in the perceived directions of trust.

8. On rare occasions this occurs within the full potential of the news media. Thus, in Central City, the BAM incident was caught on TV film. Perhaps the most infamous recent national example was the 1968 confrontation in front of the Hilton Hotel at the Democratic Convention in Chicago.

9. At the end of Chapter 6, I quoted an informant who said that as a result of slow demographic changes in the populace of the County's eastern portion, the Sheriff has embarked on a public relations school for his deputies to clean up his image. This is an example of a developing external restraint upon Freedom of activity.

10. See for example, the instructive article in the July, 1971 issue of Ramparts (Vol. 10, No. 1) by James Rideway entitled, "The Enemy Within: The FBI's Forgotten Past." It is a review of the book written in 1950 by Max Lowenthal entitled, The Federal Bureau of Investigation. William Sloane Associates, publisher.

11. Goulden, Jsoeph C., "The Cops Hit the Jackpot," in The Nation, November 23, 1970, p. 520. This federal agency was to be the source of the Sheriff's funds for equipment and manpower for his Intelligence Squad.

12. A rough continuum of constraints would begin with the mildest of the indirect and reactive resources (such as signs of lack of respect, nonrecognition of leaders, etc.), through direct reactive, overt proactive (by nature direct), covert proactive, to the most severe area of fabrication and falsification of evidence, testimony, etc., and concluding with murder. The use of these resources would entail political behavior if it met the other criteria outlined in Chapter 1 and reviewed in Chapter 8.

13. An example of non-use of constraints upon an alienated group is the first night (Monday) of the South University Incident when the police were kept away from the three block area and let the "kids have their fun." This incongruent behavior was sufficiently different to cause many comments among the police and observers alike. Tuesday evening saw a reversion to congruent behavior. In fact, the Sheriff Department personnel and many of the C.C.P.D. officers think that the "normal" strategy used by the C.C.P.D. commanders on this solidary group is insufficiently severe. Many citizens of Central City seem to agree.

14. I am indebted to Charles Tilly for providing this suggestion before the theoretical model was even formulated.

CHAPTER 12

Toward a Theory of Police Political Behavior

In this concluding chapter, the theoretical model will be completed by putting together the components already introduced in the three earlier sections. This model of political behavior by a social control-oriented public service agency has been gradually developed throughout the study to perform three functions: (1) It attempts, for the first time that I am aware of, to surface and define police political behavior in a systematic manner; (2) It attempts to unearth the external environmental factors which cause such behavior; and (3) It attempts to predict with some specificity when police political activity will occur, the means that will be used and upon whom it will be performed. To be able to do these things I have developed a theory within the framework of which the approximately 40,000 local law enforcement agencies in the United States could be compared.

It is necessary to state at the outset of this chapter that the theory being developed has not been tested in this study. Two cases were presented to illustrate the concepts introduced and to provide preliminary findings for the hypotheses which link the concepts. Although the components have not been adequately tested and thus none of the internal relationships confirmed, the two cases presented did provide evidence that support the theory. With the data at hand, I can say only that overall, the model appears to have both explanatory and predictive capabilities. Obviously, many more intensive studies are needed to both

test and further clarify the complex interrelationship between the police and the environment beyond their organizational boundary.

A quick review of our progress to date is in order. The police were initially classified as a public service agency who, within our open and circular form of government, faced a dual set of often conflicting obligations in relating to both other authorities and to their clientele, the citizenry. These obligations were created because the police develop expectations concerning both favorable decisions from the authorities and positive support from the citizenry. These differing expectations are of paramount concern to the police and are based on their trust relationship with the community. Trust, a political attitude composed of two components, importance and direction, can be of critical concern to the police because it varies between communities and over time within a community.

Utilizing the Gamsonian model of the political process, the police were shown to be both potential partisans and authorities and to have the capability for engaging in political behavior while in either role. Section Two discussed the interaction between the police and the public discision-makers of a community. It introduced the influence perspective and related the police, as partisans, to their political structure via three independent variables (control, accountability and community political activity) which predicted the level of the importance that a police department placed in its structure as an object of trust. This level in turn was directly related to the press for or motivation to engage in political activity. In short, the higher the former, the more the latter.

Section Three then looked at the other set of obligations and the manner in which the police relate politically to the citizenry. Here, the social control perspective was introduced to describe police behavior while in their role as authorities. The citizens were depicted as engaging in collective political behavior with each collectivity perceived by the police as having a predominant trust relationship(s) with them and other authorities. From there an overall community trust type, as seen from the perspective of the police, was constructed which became the other intervening variable of the direction of trust. Social diversity and socio-political exclusion were introduced as independent variables, objectively measurable, which it was hoped, would accurately predict this trust direction. As the direction of trust moved from confidence toward alienation, this prediction was that motivation to engage in police political behavior in the form of scope and means would increase.

Opportunity and efficacy were introduced as possible restraints which mediated a potential disparity between the level of desired police political activity and actual political behavior by any given department. These two concepts were shown to be operative in interactions of a political nature with both public governmental authorities and with the potential partisan collectivities of the citizenry. In the two cases studied, the model accurately predicted: (1) the different levels of trust importance in the political structures of the two communities; (2) the different dominant trust type; (3) different levels of political behavior from the influence perspective; and (4) different levels of political behavior from the sociol control perspective. Opportunity and efficacy also varied in the two communities, although to date these have only been an indrect derivative of the theory.

Combining the Two Perspectives

It is now time to put the overall model together by blending the theoretical strands of Sections Two and Three. To this point, we have two intervening trust variables which politically link the police of a community to the manner in which they behave toward their political structure and their citizenry. Although in the interest of clarity I have presented the two trust components independently, they obviously must intertwine to present a composite of the relationship between a police department and its external environment. Therefore, I shall return to where the two perspectives were left in Chapters 7 and 11 and carry them to their final combination.

Figure C from Chapter 7 was an eight-celled typology of political structures into which any local community could be placed. Crossing the three variables in that manner permitted us to situate the eight types of communities in a generally descending, diagonal order of the political structure as an object of trust importance to the police. Type One in the uppermost left cell represents the highest amount of perceived importance and thus predicts the highest motivation to engage in police political behavior. Type Eight represents the least perceived importance and thus the least probability of such police activity. The Figure is reproduced in skeletal form below.

These eight community types represent a continuum from high to low (diagonally downward from 1 to 8) of the predicted importance of trust placed in the compared political structures by the police departments in question. As there was some imprecision generated by the process of bifurcating each of the three variables which were used to generate this matrix, the typology will now be collapsed into three levels. This will

have the additional advantage of making the final matrix more managable. Thus, the eight types are broken into HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW levels.

	HIGH	C.P.A.
	D. Acct.	I. Acct.
I. Cont.	1	2
R. Cont.	3	4
	LOW	C.P.A.
	D. Acct.	I. Acct.
I. Cont.	5	6
R. Cont.	7	8

HIGH - Type One is the most obvious candidate for inclusion as it is the culmination of the greater saliency from each of the three variables. Types Two and Three are also included as they represent the higher saliency from two of the three variables.

MEDIUM - Type Four is placed somewhat apprehensively in this level chiefly because it subsumes a high C.P.A. (community political activity) which from my limited experience I consider to be the most important of the three variables.[1] Type Five with two higher saliences but a low C.P.A. could be equal to or higher than Type Four. Thus, the two are placed together in the medium level.


LOW - Type Eight is the most eligible candidate for this level with Types Seven and Six included for the inverse reasons accorded Types Two and Three.

The dimension of trust, the intervening variable from the other perspective, was summarized in Figure G of Chapter 11. This typology had four socio-political community types which will be retained (Confidence, Confidence-Neutrality, Neutrality-Alienation and Alienation) because each contains qualitatively different implications for interaction between the police and the citizenry. Again, any given local community could be placed in one of the four types based upon the socio-political characteristics of its populace. The typology represents a continuum of the dimension of trust and predicts the perception and actions of the police toward the citizenry.

The two typologies, representing the two components of the political attitude of trust, are now ready to be combined. Let me stress, again, that trust refers to external conditions which lead to press for police political activity. Figure I shows that, theoretically and in general, motivation increases as the importance of trust increases from low to high and as the direction of trust shifts from confidence to alienation. As expected, motivation is at its zenith when the trust type is most alienated and trust importance is at its highest point. Intermediate to low levels occur as the two variables range along their individual continua.

FIGURE I

The Relationship of Motivation to Engage in Police Political Behavior to the Trust Variables




Greater specificity is obtained by employing the two typologies which when combined produce a twelve-celled grid. This matrix (see below) provides the basis for predicting where and how a felt need to engage in police political behavior will occur within a given community and for comparing two or more communities. The grid works in the following fashion. Any local governmental unit is located in one of the four columns (1-4) according to its direction of trust classification and in one of the three rows (I-III) according to its level of trust importance. This placement, it should be remembered, is based upon the criteria developed to objectively measure the five independent variables. The governmental unit, once placed, can then be compared to other units located in any cell.

FIGURE J

Comparative Predictions of Press for Police Political Behavior

(Scope and Intensity)



Political behavior, whether from the influence or social control perspectives, is divisible into two parts, scope and intensity. Scope refers to the categories of (potential) political actors from the diagram of centrality which constitute the targets of police influence attempts. You will recall from Chapter 11 that each community type had a predicted range of potential targets. Thus, in column one recipients are limited to the political decision makers and the (quasi) public administration (the first 3-4 categories). Column two extends out to possibly include the other members within the polity (categories 1-8). Column three includes the categories within the polity and under certain specified circumstances, possibly those outside the polity. Column four encompases all the members within the political jurisdiction, (categories 1-10).[2] Scope, therefore, refers to the range of political actors who are most likely to be the recipients of police political behavior within a given community. The resources utilized by the police in their political influence attempts are specified under intensity and include both the influence and the social control perspectives.

Intensity refers to the amount and means of political behavior directed at the combined categories predicted for each of the four community types. Chapters 7 and 11 discussed increased intensity or greater magnitude of political behavior with examples being the three levels of politicization of police departments and the hierarchy (continuum) of constraints discussed in Chapter 11. As you ascend column one from the lowest to the highest row, political influence attempts intensify with a greater quantity and severity of resources utilized against the authorities and the salient agencies-organizations within the political structure (categories 1-4). The prediction is that a

locality placed in a row above another locality in column one would have the same scope of targets as the other but the police would mobilize more resources (e.g., unionization, alliances with third-party groups, etc.) to be brought to bear on the targets. It must be remembered, however, that the means used will not normally exceed those predicted for the interaction of groups in a confident trust relationship. The same rationale applies to the other three columns.

For example, placement of a community in column two would mean political activity with the authorities (1-4) and the possibility of political interaction with certain groups within the polity (categories 5-8). Activity would increase in the departments placed in rows II and III of column two in the same manner as in column one with the addition of those means (resources) used by groups in a neutral trust relationship. All four columns and three rows are thus traversed in an additive manner from the lower left to the upper right corner cell.[3]

Measuring the Independent Variables

Prior to placing Central City and Mideast County on the grid as specific illustrations, I must return once again to the five independent variables. In Chapters 3 and 8 these were introduced and set into the model with the understanding that I would clarify them later. I stated that each should be objectively measurable using either structural or social criteria. At this point, each is in a crude developmental form as detailed refinement was unnecessary to place the two cases studied. Furthermore, as I have repeatedly stated, each independent variable was not actually tested for causality in this exploratory study--they were looked at for their greater or lesser presence and related to the

intervening and dependent variables while in combination. To adequately test the independent variables would require a study with a fairly large number of cases within each cell, something well beyond the scope of my resources. Therefore, with the understanding that much work remains to be done, I will outline below the criteria for each variable leaving their further development to a time when it is useful to do so.[4]

CONTROL - A continuous variable, it is partitioned into immediate and remote categories utilizing a scale which combines the following set of weighted criteria for any given community:

1) Non partisan--2; Partisan--1.
2) Professional Manager System--2; Any other arrangement--1.
3) Public Safety Director (or equivalent)--1; Not present--0.
4) Strong Mayor (elected top official)--2; Weak Mayor--1; no top elected official (commission form)--0.
5) Particularistic criteria (patronage)--1; Universalistic criteria for appointment to the police (civil service)--0.
6) Appointment of top police administrator by political criteria--2; appointment of top police administrator by professional criteria--1.
7) Direct policy making powers by other authorities over the police--3; Indirect method (through administrator)--2; Budgetary only--0.
8) Presence of reform measures where (community) civilians are involved in policy--2; Lack of this--0.

This list of eight criteria provides a scale which ranges from a minimum of three (five of the criteria have a zero category) to a maximum of 15. The point of bifurcation on the control variable is nine with any locality scoring nine or greater going into the immediate category. Those below nine are in the remote category. Below is a chart showing how Central City and Mideast County fare on these criteria.

Criteria (Range)	Central City	Mideast County
1 - (2-1)	1	1
2 - (2-1)	2	1
3 - (1-0)	0	0
4 - (2-0)	1	0
5 - (1-0)	0	0
6 - (2-1)	1	2
7 - (3-0)	2	0
8 - (2-0)	2	0
TOTAL (15-3)	9	4

ACCOUNTABILITY - Direct and Indirect Accountability, the two categories of this variable, are differentiated by the form of government operative in a community. To whom the police are accountable becomes the critical factor. Directly elected, top police administrators (e.g., Mideast County Sheriff) and those who are directly accountable to elected public officials such as to a Mayor or Mayor and Council go into the direct category. Those political structures in which the top police administrator is accountable directly to an administrative official (Public Safety Director, City-County manager of administrator) who in turn is accountable to the elected officials, as in Central City, go into the indirect category. Some localities may have their departments a number of administrative layers removed from the elected officials thus offering a greater insulation potential.

Community Political Activity - A continuous variable partitioned into high and low categories, C.P.A. consists of the amount of influence circulating in the political arena and the openness of the political structure. Like control, C.P.A. has a weighted scale for any community:

1) Strong (Major) Political Parties--3; Weak (local) Parties--2; One dominant Political Party--1.
2) Third Party Organized--2; Attempted--1; Neither--0.
3) High conflict within a political party--2; Low conflict--1; Neither--0.
4) High independent or party splitting voter pattern--1; Low--0.
5) Highly competitive local news media (two or more newspapers, TV stations, news oriented radio stations, underground press, etc.)--3; Medium amount of competition--2; Lack of any real competition--1.
6) Leadership (individual leaders, interest groups) of politically active solidary groups normally considered outside political parties--2; Within--1.
7) High incidence of referenda-proposals--2; Low--1; Rare--0.
8) Frequent public meetings on political issues--2; Infrequent--1; Rare--0.
9) Heavy attendance--2; Light attendance--1; None--0.

This scale of C.P.A. in a community, meant to measure the amount of political influence circulating in the political arena and the ability to have an impact on the public authorities, has a range from three to nineteen. This would make eleven the cut-off point with all those below eleven going into the low category and those communities scoring eleven or more being placed in the high category. Based on these criteria, the chart below positions Mideast County and Central City.

Criteria (Range)	Central City	Mideast County
1 - (3-1)	3	1
2 - (2-0)	1	0
3 - (2-0)	2	1
4 - (1-0)	1	0
5 - (3-1)	2	1
6 - (2-1)	1	1
7 - (2-0)	2	1
8 - (2-0)	2	0
9 - (2-0)	2	0
TOTAL (19-3)	16	5

SOCIAL DIVERSITY - I stated in Chapter 11 that this continuous variable would be divided into high and low categories based upon the number of

politically meaningful solidary groups within the community. Although much work needs to be done on this variable to fully operationalize it, for this study I will go with the following decision rule. If a community's citizenry can best be partitioned into at least five major status defined solidary groups, that community will be placed in the high category. Partitioning is done along relevant political cleavages which you will recall utilize ascriptive (race or caste), attitudinal (ideology or preference) and behavioral (political acts or organizational membership) criteria.

Central City, therefore, has the following solidary groups with the cleavage criteria included for clarification: (1) upper-middle class, professional-businessmen; attitudinal and behavioral; (2) average middle class--blue collar; stretching it a bit to combine the two--same criteria; (3) regular, "full-time" students; ascriptive and possibly behavioral; (4) blacks--low income (including some blue collar); ascriptive and to some extent, attitudinal; (5) militant blacks; attitudinal and behavioral to differentiate them from #4; and (6) militant-radical students and hippies--street people; ascriptive,behavioral and attitudinal.

Mideast County weighs in with these solidary groups: (1) rural farmers; ascriptive; (2) middle class; attitudinal;[5] (3) Southern whites--working and low class; primarily ascriptive with some attitudinal; (4) Blacks--working and low class; ascriptive with some attitudinal.[6]

SOCIO-POLITICAL EXCLUSION - The high and low exclusionary categories are the most difficult of the five variables to accurately classify as they are descriptive of both potential and real socio-political situations.

For example, a community could have a single excluded solidary group with but a small segment of the total population which is sufficiently active to create the same general conditions that a large but moribund solidary group(s) does for another community. This highlights the fact and is a reminder that exclusion can be either voluntary or involuntary and that each can be in either a passive or an active political state at a given period of time.

The decision rules, therefore, are: (1) if two or more solidary groups specified in the social diversity variable are excluded (i.e., politically unrepresented); OR (2) if one solidary group exists which is both excluded and either (a) a large percentage of the population (greater than 15%) or (b) highly active politically over at least a year; that community is placed in the high category.[7] Mideast County, from this criteria, would fail both tests for inclusion in the high category as it has but one small and passive excluded group--the blacks in the Oval area. Central City would be included in the high category on both tests. Three of the six solidary groups--regular students, radical-street people and militant blacks--were excluded (or excluded themselves), politically, during the 1969-1971 time period with the radical-street people group having been highly active from June 1969 to June 1970.

Central City, Mideast County and the Grid

With the above criteria for measuring the five variables as background, the two communities can now be placed on the grid as specific illustrations. Central City was just within the immediate control category, in the indirect accountability category and well into the high C.P.A. category. Combining these three variables placed Central City in Type Two of the

political structure typology which corresponds on Figure J to the high importance of trust level (row III). In Chapter 7, I stated that there were strains toward moving Central City in the direction of Type One as the Democratic Mayor and Council had assumed some of the functions normally performed by the City Manager. Thus, Central City is at least half way ascendant in the third row.

To place Central City in the appropriate column, one looks at its placement on the two remaining variables. It is barely into the high social diversity category and more comfortably into the high socio-political exclusion category. When these two are crossed as they were in Chapter 11, Central City is just across the boundary into Column 4. Combining the row with the column, then, puts Central City into the upper right corner cell (see Figure K below). The same process is used for Mideast County with the importance of trust being in the middle of the low level--row I (type 7--remote control, direct accountability and low C.P.A.)--and the direction of trust being almost on the border between column one and two (low social diversity but close to the division between high and low exclusion).

FIGURE K




Figure K, a skeletal frame of the grid, shows the placement of the two cases studied. As you can see, localities can be differentialy located within each cell. Thus, although the two political jurisdictions are in the most polar cells, there is room above and below the two in these cells for the placement of other communities.

Sections Two and Three presented data and discussed the differences between the scope and intensity of motivation to engage in police political behavior in the two cases I've used for illustrations. From their placement on the grid, the theory predicts that press for political activity by the Central City police should be much higher than it is in Mideast County. In fact, the press for political behavior should be very low--close to nonexistent--in Mideast County. All the evidence supports these two predictions.


Both the departments and the communities they are within are relatively small which produced political interaction on a concomitantly small scale. Larger communities, generating the same level of motivation as the department in Central City, for example, would have political activity of a grander size representing the larger economics of scale (e.g., resources, group size and numbers, complexity, etc.). Central City and Mideast County were, perhaps, close to ideal for study as they presented in microcosm much of the variety available in localities throughout the nation. Charts One and Two, largely a summation of the germane portions of Chapters 3, 7, 8 and 11, are presented in Appendix II and offer specific suggestions for how intensity and scope increase as one ascends the grid from the lower left to the upper right.

From Motivation to Engage in to Actual Political Behavior

I will conclude with some general remarks about the manner in which opportunity and efficacy affect the capability of the police to actually engage in political behavior. Discussing opportunity first, Figure L below shows the impact that the influence and social control trust variables have upon opportunity.

FIGURE L

Predicted Effects of the Trust Variables Upon Opportunity to Behave Politically



Restraints from the political structure would be at their lowest when the importance of the political structure as an object of trust is low. It follows from the nature of the three independent variables subsumed within it, that opportunity is high when importance of trust is low. As the importance of trust increases to high and the direction remains confidence, it is predicted that opportunity would universally


decrease to its minimal point. This occurs as a result of the minimal allowance by the public officials of a discrepancy to develop between formal structures and the everyday process (or what the actors actually do) which might subvert the structures. When the direction of trust moves toward alienation, opportunity would increase due to the additive effects of increasing the targets (scope) and the political influence means (the resources of inducements and constraints which are added to persuasion). Therefore, opportunity is at its maximum when importance of trust is low and the trust type is alienation. The police feel very few restraints from the other sets of public authorities to curtail or avoid political activity toward alienated solidary groups. On the other hand and for the reason just mentioned, where importance of trust is high and the trust type is alienation, opportunity will be lowered. It will, however, be greater than where the trust type is confidence due, once again, to a greater range of scope and resource means. Figure L reflects these four positions.

Turning to efficacy (a perceived ability to influence), Figure M shows the corresponding four corner predictions given the impact of the two trust variables. Efficacy potential is seen as expanding from its minimal point in the lower left corner as the trust variables move upward from low to high and to the right from confidence to alienation. By efficacy potential increasing, I mean the ceiling on the range of possibilities rises: That is, in the lower left corner the efficacy range is greatly constricted so that a sense of personal or group efficacy there would be minimal by comparison with departments in the other corners. Efficacy is at a minimum there because there are few if any incoming stimuli upon the police to behave in a political manner

toward either the political structure or the citizenry. Thus, their own feelings of an ability to contribute significant inputs to the political arena are not debated and rarely even considered. However, as the importance of trust increases and the police become increasingly aware of external restraints from the other authorities, the ante goes up. In short, the total amount of influence necessary is seen as expanding to effect a desired outcome. Efficacy potential rises and with it the range of efficacy possibilities.

FIGURE M

Predicted Effects of the Trust Variables
Upon Efficacy to Behave Politically



DIRECTION OF TRUST

The same phenomenon occurs with regard to the citizenry and the direction of trust. Efficacy potential increases as the perceived dominant

trust relationship becomes more alien to the police. As social distance (alienation) increases, the prediction is that the police will feel increasingly able to influence partisan groups, often in the name of "social stability," through the use of social control resources. In Chapter 11, I said that this sense of efficacy vis à vis a specific populace was a question of whether and upon whom to exercise differing kinds of political behavior. As expected, efficacy potential would be at a maximum in the upper right corner where external pressures upon the police are also maximal. These pressures, representing restraints upon autonomy and anti-police inputs, are forces which drive the police to seriously question their relative position in the community.

Although it is often a difficult step for police to move from grumbling about conditions to consciously mobilizing for effective political input, we have already seen the C.C.P.D. begin this transition. There is a close theoretical relationship between efficacy and motivation to engage in political activity.

Potential efficacy and motivation to behave politically vary directly because they are affected by the same external factors/conditions. When one is high, so is the other with the reverse also holding true. Realized efficacy is the necessary adjunct to potential and is that state where political savvy and motivation combine to raise first the personal and then the group (e.g., union) sense of the need to utilize available political resources or mobilize new ones. These are seen as necessary if the police are to work within the system to effectively represent their own set of interests. It is the realized efficacy which actually gears the police to behave politically.

The real world difference between the two is the time lag between vague feelings of political discontent (potential) and organizing to take effective remedial action (realized). Where realized efficacy equals its potential, a condition exists in which awareness and organization to behave politically is closest to the motivation to do so. Actual political activity, therefore, is maximally ready to occur and dependent only on opportunity. Thus, although the upper right corner predicts maximal efficacy potential, it is plausible that the actual or realized sense of efficacy might dampen political behavior in the same manner as low opportunity would.

Combining opportunity and efficacy reveals that three factors are necessary to predict actual political behavior. Press for and actual police behavior would correlate most closely where: (1) opportunity is maximal (or high), (2) realized efficacy equals the predicted level of (3) potential efficacy (e.g., there is no time lag). This should occur most readily in the lower left and lower right corners of the grid. Elsewhere, opportunity and efficacy interrelate in such a manner as to impede actual political behavior from occurring. The lower left corner represents the unique situation whereby the external conditions which make opportunity high also produce both a low potential efficacy and a low motivation to behave politically. Here, the potential efficacy range is low which allows the realized efficacy level to more easily equal the predicted potential efficacy.

The Mideast Sheriff Department exemplifies the interrelationship of these three factors in that corner. You will recall that the deputies felt few pressures to behave in a political manner (efficacy potential low) and consequently there were few feelings of translating political

discontent into organization (realized efficacy low). Opportunity was high as the men of this department have few formalized external structures which might impede their actions. Consequently, when the press for political activity occurs usually in the form of emotive and physical outbursts; it tends to equal actual political behavior.

The lower right quadrant represents another possible congruent state where potential efficacy is high and opportunity to act is maximally present. If realized efficacy is high, that is, in spite of the increased range it equals the potential, then there should be a close relationship between press for and actual political behavior. As the importance of trust increases, opportunity decreases at the same time that potential efficacy (the range or ceiling) increases. Thus, two conditions occur in the upper quadrants which reduce the correlation between press for and actual political behavior: (1) Opportunity decreases due to increased external restraints; and (2) the disparity between potential efficacy and realized efficacy increases. This results from the ceiling on potential efficacy rising which makes it increasingly difficult for realized efficacy to equal its potential.

An example of a case in the upper right quadrant is the Central City Department. Here the prediction is that opportunity will be lower than in Mideast County. Again, the reason for this is the external restraints. The data presented throughout the preceeding chapters indicate that there are formal structures and procedures which impede the autonomy of the C.C.P.D. to behave at will (opportunity is lowered). Motivation to engage in political activity raised the potential efficacy and these conditions led to a raising of the group sense of realized

efficacy to the transitional political level. It was shown that the patrolman's association had organized to mobilize political resources.

These resources were used to influence the political structure through the political process and to influence partisan political groups in the community. However, the realized is below the potential efficacy and thus as changes occur, a latitude is present for more political behavior by the police in Central City. Or said another way, in other municipalities in that quadrant where the two are more closely approximated, a greater amount of actual political activity takes place.

Implications for Public Policy

At the beginning of Chapter 1, I suggested that among the many studies done, little attention has been focused on a broad political analysis of the community and its police agency. I have attempted to fill this void by developing a comparative theory which integrates the police as a public agency into our dynamic and circular political system of government. The theory and the data presented to support it were analytical in nature with no effort made to prescribe methods by which police behavior might be modified. If there is one message in this study, it is that most external efforts to "change" the police are doomed to failure because they produce unanticipated consequences that nullify desired outcomes. The misunderstanding of the police's complex relationship with their environment has led to repeated reform failures; this has helped create an exaggerated image of their organizational invulnerability.

I hope that I have demonstrated through the two trust variables that the police are anything but invulnerable. To the contrary, they are conscious--perhaps overly so--of the importance to their interests of

external reform measures and change attempts. To the chagrin of the reformers, however, the police do not behave as the reformers would have them behave, preferring instead to react by developing political resources for their own protection. This is the reality to which the theory has tried to speak.

Public policy makers who seek to alter police behavior should take into account the effects their actions will have on the level of press for political behavior by the police. The study pinpoints those formal structures which tend to raise the importance of trust and thus the motivational level. It is highly unlikely, however, that external restraining devices could be developed which would not have this effect. The same is true for the socio-political characteristics of the community. Under the present system, the characteristics will dictate the direction of trust which will affect the press for political behavior. Either way, therefore, it is imperative that decision makers recognize that police do react by mobilizing and applying political influence.

From a public policy perspective, then, the critical point is not whether motivation to behave politically will occur but how to deal with its development.[8] It follows from the earlier discussion in this chapter, that opportunity to act is the major determinant of the actual political behavior which will occur. The most viable alternative is to contain opportunity and force police political activity into legal and public political influence channels.

With relation to the political structure, this means minimizing the discrepancy between the actual daily process and the regulative devices formulated to either control the police or make them accountable.

I stated in Section Two that when this discrepancy was allowed to occur, political behavior could be used within the process to curcumvent, neutralize or destroy the implanted regulative devices. Public administrators, outside the police department, are the parties immediately responsible for minimizing such opportunities. They must force the police to perform their political activities in the same manner that any other partisan group does.

Central City and Mideast County provide disparate illustrations of this containment of opportunity. In both cases, grievances against the departments in question will be the external irritant. Central City responded by developing a formal structure, the Grievance officer, to accept and mediate complaints. The structure seems to have operated effectively with every city department except the police department. Here, political influence in the form of alleged low morale, threatened resignations, "loss of control over the men" and attendant publicity about "crippling" the department was applied to the public administrators. By successfully neutralizing the administrators, they were able to circumvent the intent of the City Council and offset any positive impact that the formal accountability structure might have had. The public officials should have acted to control this political process by forcing the police to adhere to the intent of the Council. This would leave the police free to use the public channels such as influence attempts on the populace or the officials to publicly change the policy.

Grievances in the Mideast County system offer quite another problem. Here there is no formal structure, grievances are filed with the Sheriff Department and opportunity for political activity is high (in the lower left quadrant of Figure L). The Sheriff is free to react to a grievance

in any manner he desires and the situation is tantamount to asking the department to police itself. As we have seen, this procedure does not exactly inspire confidence in the populace that filing a complaint will have a positive effect. In fact, fear of reprisal--a social control, political resource--often instills the opposite reaction, determination not to do so. In this case, responsible public officials must develop an accountability structure which will lessen the Department's freedom to operate at will.

The latter example is also germane with regard to the police's relations with the general populace. The means which are used by the police for influence purposes must be no less legal than those available to any private interest group. The proper authorities must explicitly deny to the police the use of the social control resources which they presently possess on a monopoly basis for their political advantage. No better example could be chosen to illustrate this point than the resources and tactics employed by the Central City Department and their law enforcement compatriots toward the White Panthers, (see Section Three).

If public officials could be induced to accomplish this dual responsibility, the development of appropriate regulative structures and the containment of opportunity, the police might begin to be perceived by other political actors as a more equal combatant in the partisan struggle for scarce resources. The desired outcome would be a movement toward the confident trust relationship. Police political behavior would then become an acknowledged but not socially debilitating influence in our political system.

CHAPTER 12

Footnotes

1. High community political activity puts the police in the position of attempting to maintain their relative position vis à vis the political structure when unfavorable influence attempts are made by the citizenry. A sufficient amount of such activity could create the conditions for structural changes toward more immediate control and direct accountability.

2. The prediction is that the targets within each of these community trust types would not normally exceed the ranges enumerated. It is possible, due to opportunity and efficacy, that the scope would not extend out as far as the predictions.

3. There is also room for considerable variation within each cell as each can reflect the range of possibilities available from the bifurcation of the continuous variables. For example, the difference between columns three and four is that social diversity is high in the latter. The difference between rows II and III could be no more than the dividing line between low and high C.P.A. This means that the upper right cell has within it all local governmental units with high C.P.A. and high social diversity and ranges from those like Central City which barely make it into the high social diversity classification to Metropolita. The theory specifies only that deaprtments in this cell should have more motivation to engage in police political behavior than departments in cells to the left and below it.

4. As I have said, with the development of some experience in classifying localities, it might prove advantageous to add, delete or alter criteria for each variable. It is possible, therefore, that the positions on the grid of the two communities I have studied intensively might be altered given the findings of an extensive study.

5. The upper-middle income persons mentioned in Chapter 9 were sufficiently scattered, scarce and Central City oriented so as to not constitute a solidary group.

6. At this point in time, there appears to be less of a well-defined attitudinal cleavage and perhaps as a consequence, a behavioral cleavage amongst the blacks in the Oval area of the County than there is in Central City.

7. Highly active, politically, would be defined in terms of the number of constraining influence attempts made by the solidary group or, more likely, its challenging group(s). Examples of such constraints run from threats through to confrontations and rioting.

8. Let me reiterate, that I am imputing no values to the expression of political behavior by the police, per se. The police, like any actors in the political arena, have a set of interests to protect and enhance. Which resources and targets they choose to utilize, however, do become of paramount concern.

APPENDIX I.1

Interview Form

Introduction - I am doing a study of the forces and cross pressures from different communities as they act upon their police departments. It is my belief that the average citizen does not know the extent to whicy you are subjected to external pressures. I have chosen your Department along with the _____Department because each operates in a different setting. Most of the questions I am going to ask you have no right or wrong answers. I do not believe in asking trick questions to get information you might not otherwise give. Your identity and the identity of your department will remain anonymous.

How long have you been with this department?

Which division do you work in?

What is your present rank?

Have you ever worked for any other law enforcement agency prior to joining this one?

Where do you live in the County _____ Any particular reason for this?

(For those who have been with the department longer than 7-8 years) - Are there any differences in the type of men being recruited today than when you joined the force?

FOR THOSE WHO HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE IN A SECOND DEPARTMENT

Did you have any reason for joining this department?

Are there any differences in the type of men that are recruited?

How would you compare the supervision of the two departments?

Do you feel that you have to be more careful in this department when you arrest an influential person? How about a black?

Morale in a department is often discussed--how would you compare the two departments on differences in morale?

In general, is there more or less talk in this department about external interference with police operations?

Some people take more of an interest in local political activities than do others.

I would like to ask you a few questions about local political items.

How many elected Commissioners are there on the County Board of Commissioners?

How many of the Commissioners on the County Board are elected from Central City?

How many elected City Councilmen are there in Central City?

How many Republicans and how many Democrats are currently on the BOARD/COUNCIL?

What is their term of office?

In general, do you think a Republican controlled or a Democrat controlled BOARD/COUNCIL would be more favorable to the department?

How does the BOARD/COUNCIL usually divide on issues of importance to the Department?

When is the last time you attended a BOARD/COUNCIL meeting?--How often do you go?

When issues of importance to the department are discussed at BOARD/COUNCIL meetings, how do you usually get information on what happened--from fellow officers who were there?

What questions about your department seem to be most important to the Commissioners/Council.

Let's compare the Central City Council with the M.C. Board of Commissioners for a moment.

1) Which has the more pressure from the citizens of the community on it concerning its police department?

2) Does this mean that the Councilmen (Commissioners) act differently toward the department?

3) In general, does the City Council and Mayor or the Board of Commissioners seem more interested in the activities of their department? How do they differ?

Today we see an increasing need and desire for police officers like all other professions to join together in seeking better conditions for themselves.

If there were an issue of importance to the department (e.g., - to develop a Civilian Review Board) which was being decided by the BOARD/COUNCIL, how would you go about trying to get a favorable decision?

In what ways would your union be of help?

In your experience, which clubs, groups or organizations in the community have officers turned to for aid?

What groups, clubs or organizations do you belong to?

How do they support the department?

Does it make any difference whether the top administrator (man) in your department is elected or appointed when dealing with the BOARD/COUNCIL?

As you know, every community has different kinds of people living in it. What would you say are the principal categories or types of citizens in this community?

Here is a rough diagram of the categories you have chosen. Would you break down the community any further?

Do any of these categories of people seem estranged or alienated from society?

Do you feel they exclude themselves?

Are there certain groups, clubs or organizations within any of these differing categories (point to sketch) which attempt to speak for the entire category?

Do you think they actually do?

Now, would you please rank these categories of citizens from that category which presents the least problems to you as a law enforcement officer to that which presents the most. On the diagram, mark a "1" for the least, a "2" for the next least and so on to the most.

Now let's take X Category of citizens.

1) Within this category, will you identify as many groups, clubs or organizations as you can?

2) Within this category, are there any groups, clubs or organizations which present particular problems to the police?

3) How does this group feel about or act toward your Department?

4) If they feel that they have a grievance toward your Department, whether justified or not, how do they go about trying to get satisfaction?

5) Who do they try to get to support them?

6) If they do try to cause trouble for you or the department with their grievance, who can you count on to support you? What means can you use?

7) In general, what is the typical way to deal with them to gain their respect for you?

8) Do the other members of the department feel the way you do or differently?

It has been said that your department treats this group better/worse than _____ Department. Do you think this is an accurate statement?

What category is closest to your own personal values or beliefs--which category is most distant?

Can you think of any other categories that C.C./M.C. has that M.C./C.C. doesn't?

Are there any particular people in your community who cause problems for the police?

Are there any people who seem to be constantly outspoken in their criticism of the police?

Now, please remember that different communities have differing categories of citizens. I am going to read four questions to you in a sequence and then ask you to circle the answers you feel are closest to being what each police department must face daily.

1) Combining all the people in that part of Mideast County which the Sheriff Department patrols (<u>excluding</u> Central City and Eastern City but <u>including</u> Eastern Township), where would you rate the CITIZENS in their feelings toward the Sheriff Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

2) Now, combine all the people of Mideast County, where would you rate the CITIZENS in their feelings toward the Sheriff Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

3) How do you feel that the CITIZENS living in Central City feel toward the Central City Police Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

4) And finally, how do you feel that the CITIZENS of the City of Metropolita feel about the Metropolita Police Department?

VERY SUPPORTIVE SUPPORTIVE INDIFFERENT UNSUPPORTIVE VERY UNSUPPORTIVE

5) Please rank the four communities above (each has a different combination of categories) from that community which has the MOST cooperative citizenry to that which has the LEAST.

_____ _____ _____ _____

(MOST) (LEAST)

Break down by categories of citizens of the Community patrolled by _____ Department.

[NEXT PAGE]

APPENDIX I.2

Complaints Filed With The Grievance Officer
Against the C.C.P.D. (June 1970-February 1971)

With regard to the 69 cases filed against the C.C.P.D. in this nine month period, 43 were in the formal category ("Complaint Cases Filed") and 26 were in the informal complaint contact procedure. This compares with 73 formal and 50 informal out of the 123 total cases filed. As I stated earlier, 56 percent of the complaints filed were against the police. The next highest departments were Building and Safety and Code Enforcement,10 percent; Traffic Engineering and Transportation, 8 percent; Public Works, 4 percent; Parks, 3 percent; and all other departments, 19 percent.

The cases were broken down in the report into two categories: "Citizen Initiated Contacts" where citizens seek some kind of help from the police, and "Police Initiated Contacts" which cover those situations "where the police have stopped or detained a person for some alleged violation of law."

> Complaints or citizen initiated contacts accounted for 30 percent of all complaints made against the police. White citizens filed 86 percent of the complaints on these kinds of contacts while black citizens filed only 14 percent of such complaints . . . . Complaints on police initiated contacts accounted for 70 percent of all complaints made against the police. Black citizens filed 60 percent of the complaints on these kinds of contacts while white citizens filed 40 percent of such complaints.
>
> The existence of definite problems in this community involving black citizens and the police are indicated in statistical information derived from the complaints received by the G.O.

Forty-seven percent of all complaints against the police were filed by black citizens, while 53 percent were filed by white citizens. Since black citizens comprise only a little over 8 percent of the total population, the 47 percent figure . . . is disproportionately large.

Another indication of the extent of the problem is shown in the heavy concentration of complaints made against the police by black citizens compared to their complaints against all other city departments (77 percent for blacks and 45 percent for whites). One striking difference between black and white complainants is the kinds of problems they have with the police. Nearly all of the complaints against the police filed by black citizens--91 percent--resulted from contacts initiated by the police, while only 9 percent resulted from citizen initiated contacts (those filed by white citizens were almost equally divided into the two categories).

The small number of complaints on contacts initiated by black citizens is probably an indication that black citizens do not seek aid and assistance or information from the police as often as white citizens do. In police initiated contacts, the majority of black complainants believed there was some form of police harassment involved.

Problems of the young, both black and white, in contacts with the police are also disclosed in statistical information from the complaints. Seventy percent of all complaints against the police involve persons under 25 years of age, (under 17--20 percent, 17-25--50 percent,over 25--30 percent). Of this 70 percent, 40 percent (19 of the 69 cases) were long haired white males or blacks with Afro hair styles. When comparisons are made for age groups and race, certain similarities and differences emerge. Fifty percent of both black and white young adult (17-25) complainants reported problems on police contacts. Differences appear between blacks and whites when complaints involving juveniles and adults are compared.

The following chart is taken from the report.

PERCENT OF POLICE COMPLAINTS BY AGE AND RACE

	*Juvenile	Young Adult	Adult	Total	(Cases)
Black Complainants	38%	50%	12%	100%	(33)
White Complainants	5%	49%	46%	100%	(36)
					69

(*"In all complaints about police contacts with juveniles, the complaints were filed by the parents.")

Other items of interest for 68 of the cases were: (1) where the complaining incidents took place (13 auto stops, 1 motorcyle, 3 bicycle, 14 sidewalks, 9 incidents at residence, 3 park, 12 police station, and 13 other--bus, theater, motel, etc.); (2) sex of complainant (18 female, 50 male); (3) number of officers involved in the incidents leading to complaints (1 officer--23 cases; 2 officers--26 cases; 3 or more officers--19 cases); and (4) time of contact (daytime--41, night time--27). Twelve of the cases were where force was used and complained about. A thirteenth was subsequently added.

It is important to understand that these 69 cases do not by themselves represent a study of sampling of police behavior, as only a minute percentage of the total police-citizen encounters are included. The essence of the G.O.'s report is the sociology of those who will complain. Further data is needed about the source of the initiation of complaints, what institutions are getting the complainants to see the G.O. (e.g., the family, Legal Services Clinic, church, peer groups, etc.), and which segments of the populace are not using the G.O.

A quick comparison of these 69 cases in nine months (June 1970-February 1971) with the years preceeding the G.O.'s office is in order. Only the HRC had kept a record which was public information or attainable. In 1965 there were two complaints against the police received by HRC (both unresolved). In 1966, there were 12 cases of which 8 were unresolved complaints of physical mistreatment (two other cases were dropped by the complainant after filing and in two cases the officer apologized to the complainant). In 1967, there were 8 cases of which one was dropped by the Commission and another one was resolved. The other six were unresolved. After 1967 there was a great tapering off in the number of complaints

filed with the HRC. Nineteen sixty-eight showed two cases and 1969 one. Of these three, one was resolved by an apology to the complainant. Information on those who complained directly to the police and utilized their internal grievance procedure was unavailable.

APPENDIX II.1

CHART ONE

Direction of Trust--Content of Police and Citizenry Political Behavior Within the Four Types

Type One--Confident

Norms, values, etc., firmly in place; no need for police social control efforts with solidary-interest groups as all other mechanisms for social control are being utilized; Trust is high in philosophy and system and in personnel although partisan politics might make authority level an issue (e.g., party politics). High consensus on the outcome of decisions; as the amount of discontent is relatively low, there is little necessity to apply influence on authorities and need for decision-makers to modify their outcomes. Thus, authorities are relatively free from influence and have discretion in their use of authority as a political resource (and reserve). Police will have the use of discretion and maximum room for maneuverability--i.e., they have bestowed upon them a high level of effective authority. If things become more politicized, police will attempt persuasion and to activate commitments to the extent necessary beyond just the first few categories. They will be able to use the full potential of resources from discretionary authority-no need to mobilize new resources (e.g., organize, etc.). Potential partisan activity should be limited to content of issues before the decision-makers with the rare personnel issues being confronted at the authority level. To the extent necessary, the police will limit the scope to the three categories within the public government.

Type Two--Confident-Neutral

A consensus on the values of the regime with high heterogeneity. Here one would find content and personnel issues in question. Besides the authorities and the content, we might find some feelings about scope and procedure. The main type of influence response would be outcome modification by the authorities. The police would not be utilized as social control agents as everyone (groups) is within the system and operating within the legitimate boundaries. The major questions which arise would be over equality of police practices across groups but change would be incremental. Police as potential partisans-no need to get involved much beyond the first three categories (some activity upon authorities and perhaps a few more categories to maintain level of status quo). Here they would also use attempts to activate commitments and persuasion with some attempts, perhaps, at inducements. The authorities might utilize outcome modification as a means of containing influence. Police might lose some of their discretionary power and need a little more effort to develop the resources to apply influence. As there are competing solidary units within the political unit, there will be differing degrees of trust in the police with mixed cues coming in which would tend to make the police feel they are or should be neutral, (and are seen as a neutral organization) whose duty it is to keep the peace and be neutral toward the various interest groups vying for favorable outcomes. The police will mainly work within the public government with some extension into the socio-political system. Perhaps this extension and the increased pressure to appear neutral are the keys to the difference between Types One and Two.

Type Three--Neutral-Alienated

This presents the clearest case of two types of police political activity within one community. Those within the system will be treated in a neutral manner as they vie for power (i.e., perhaps deference to social status but not as agents for any particular group unless it is a one party situation, etc.), much as in Type Two above. The segment of the population within the socio-political system is not the same as Type One because of the presence of those outside the system which magnifies the difference of those in the system. Thus, although there are sectors with confidence, overall there will be a neutral state. This is the essence of Wilson's order maintenance police style. The system is a potentially volatile one as the social cohesion can break down under attempts by the previously excluded to get in. Thus, we have the potential introduction of social control techniques against those excluded and some degree of altertness to those within the system to maintain the "artificial" stratification. As long as there is stability, there will be high consensus on decision-making with some outcome modification (short of any structural change) with the targets being content and perhaps personnel (authorities). Those outside the system, again if it is stable, can be largely ignored as being non-humans or via social control kept isolated from power.

With greater political activity by the unrepresented, social control techniques become more intense (see Chart Two) in an attempt to offset the changing situation. In this Type we have a combination of influence attempts on socio-political actors-persuasion, inducements, limited social control to maintain status quo, and constraints on those outside the political system as they become organized. Scope is a hybrid affair with the

police concerned with maintaining the status quo on those within the socio-political system and little concern with those outside the system until they begin vying to get into the system.

Type Four-Alienated

A trust deficit is perceived by the police as a result of the withdrawal of a sense of effective authority (a double loss-the use of discretion and authority as a resource). Thus, a necessity of mobilizing resources to combat the trust deficit and offset the sense of being alone (defensiveness) with the use of social control and appropriate alienation types of resources (e.g., insulation, isolation and the sanctions of constraints). Here police are heavily used as social control agents (i.e., used as potential partisans via social control mechanisms to safeguard against being forced to make outcome modifications too great for the maintenance of desired kind of stability and incremental changes). Large numbers of the citizenry could be alienated from not only the authorities and the political institutions but also from the political philosophy of the regime. The police will be social control agents plus partisan activities which will involve them in the maximum number of categories of behavioral interaction. This type of total scope activity makes for the maximum amount of potential mistakes as the authorities overly rely on social control techniques.

APPENDIX II.2

CHART TWO

Intensity of Police Political Behavior Within Any Of The Eleven Categories

(Each of the subgroupings below increases from least to most political intensity. The actual political behavior used depends on the column within which the police organization is located.)

Attitudes--Percpetions - non-formed, not salient, never think of or not phenomenologically aware, etc.; to have thought of but not discussed; to discussed with other in small groups/individually with acknowledged disagreements; expected agreement within the police force; strong unanimity of opinion within the force. Intensity of feelings also varies from non-awareness through weakly felt, strongly held, a central place in the mind, (psychological to socio-psychological level of interaction).

Concrete Behavior - no activity; activity contemplated on a single basis; single action; spontaneous small group behavior; planned group behavior, formal organization to behave politically (which can be broken down into a continuum of inclusion of members of the force from just one's own rank or section/platoon through to the entire force, i.e., increased mobilization via informal, quasi-formal and official, official as well as on and off duty mix, etc.).

Resources Used

1) Single activity - persuasion, activation of commitments, sense of professionalization or bureaucratic efficiency, use of sense of tradition or status quo; sanctions-inducements or constraints, minor - i.e., citations, ticketing, verbal abuse and harassment, etc., major - i.e., deprivation of liberty, arrest, over elaboration of offenses-major offenses, deprivation of life or personal injury-use of force, deadly force, etc.

2) Group activity - same continuum of actions taken and including shows of strength, use of collective resources (strike, picketing, blue flu, group testimony, active campaigning, organized official activity-surveilliance, infiltration, deviance labelling, wire-tapping, organized false arrest, etc.). This also includes off duty as less intense behavior as on duty or official behavior (while in the role of a legitimate authority--i.e., use of legitimate power as well as expert or referent power--a greater resource or intensity of activity).

Level of Influence Attempts

1) On authorities - incumbent personnel and content of specific decision-making outcomes at the individual or collective authority level (i.e., feelings about individual decision-makers, the collectivity, content of issues like city ordinances, pay raises, conflict situations, etc.); procedure and scope issues where deal with both personnel of authorities and with the political institutions (i.e., attempts to change the structure, police fear of loss of discretionary power or authority as a resource). As salience of political system becomes greater, will move to more generalized level of political institutions but police won't lose trust in the

regime itself or the public philosophy, e.g., move from content to personnel to bias in procedure and scope issues and from personnel to political institutions level--attempts at outcome modification to resisting increased social control attempts, (made by other sets of authorities on the police).

2) On other categories - partisan influence attempts to gain support, allies, neutralize, etc., the above continuum of levels. As social control agents will act as partisans when are attempting to become involved in the political influence process--i.e., can divide legitimate authority activities into authority roles and partisan roles; use of legitimate authority to: a) insulate themselves or elected officials (via lessening potential for influence), b) isolate, c) withhold information by acting as a barrier to communication flow, etc.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aiken, Michael and Alford, Robert R., "Community Structure and Innovation." American Sociological Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, August 1970.

Bayley, David H., "The Police and Political Development in Europe," Multilith (Denver, Colorado, University of Denver, 1970).

Banton, Michael, The Policeman in the Community. New York: Basic Books, 1964.

Berkley, George E., The Democratic Policeman, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969.

Bordua, David J., (ed.), The Police, Six Sociological Essays. New York: Wiley, 1967.

Bordua David J. and Reiss, Albert J., Jr., "Law Enforcement" in The Uses of Sociology, Lazarsfeld, Sewell and Wilensky, eds., Basic Books Inc., New York, 1967.

Chevigny, Paul. Police Power (Police Abuses in New York City), New York: Vintage, 1969.

Clark, John P., "Isolation of the Police: A Comparison of the British and American Situations," in Crime and Justice in Society, Richard Quinney, ed., Little Brown & Co., Boston, 1969.

Crain, Robert L., Katz, Eliha and Rosenthal, Donald E., The Politics of Community Conflict. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1969.

Donner, Frank J., "The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence," The New York Review of Books, April 22, 1971.

Evans, John P., "The Problem of the Unit of Analysis," University of Michigan, unpublished (working) paper, 1968.

Ferry, W. H., "Is a Police State Emerging," in Current, February 1970, No. 115.

Friedenberg, Edgar Z., "Report from the Niagara Frontier," New York Review of Books, May 7, 1970.

Goulden, Joseph C., "The Cops Hit the Jackpot," in The Nation, November 23, 1970.

Gamson, William A., Power and Discontent, Homewood, Illinois, The Dorsey Press, 1968.

Gamson, William A., "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," The American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. XII, No. 2, November-December, 1968.

Gamson, William A., "Political Trust and Its Ramifications," Chapter in Abcarran, G., and Soule, J.B., Social Psychology and Political Behavior.

Gamson, William A., and McEvoy, James C., "Police Violence and Its Public Support," The Annals, Vol. 391, September, 1970.

Graham, Hugh D., and Gurr,Ted R., Violence in America. Vols. I and II, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1969.

Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L., The Social Psychology of Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966.

Klonoski, James R., and Mendelsohn, Robert I., The Politics of Local Justice, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1970.

Lipsky, Michael, (ed.), Police Encounters. Trans-Action Books, Aldine, 1970.

Lowi, Theodore, The End of Liberation, New York, W. W. Norton, 1969.

Marine, Gene, The Black Panthers, Signet Books, New York, 1969.

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders Report. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., March 1968.

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. To Establish Justice, to Insure Domestic Tranquility, New York: Bantam Books, 1970.

Newman, Donald J., Delinquency, Crime & Societal Process, Donald R. Cressey & David A. Ward, eds., Harper and Row, Evanston, 1969.

Nieburg, H. L., Political Violence (The Behavioral Process). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969.

Niederhoffer, Arthur., Behind the Shield (The Police in Urban Society), Garden City, New York. Doubleday, 1967.

Olson, Mancur., The Logic of Collective Action, Schocken Books, New York, 1965.

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. Task Force Report: The Police, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1967.

Rae, Douglas W. and Taylor, Michael, The Analysis of Political Cleavages. Yale University, New Haven, 1970.

Reiss, Albert S., Jr., and Bordua, David J., "Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police," in The Police, Bordua (ed.) op. cit.

Ridgeway, James, "The Enemy Within: The FBI's Forgotten Past," in Ramparts, July 1971 (Vol. 10, No. 1).

Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1930.

Silver, Alan, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," in The Police, David Bordua, ed., John Wiley, New York, 1967.

Skolnick, Jerome H., Justice Without Trial. New York: John Wiley, 1966.

Skolnick, Jerome H., The Politics of Protest (The Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. New York: Ballantine Books, 1969.

Tannenbaum, Arnold S., Control in Organizations, McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Tilly, Charles, "From Mobilization to Political Conflict," Multilith (Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan, March 1970).

Westley, William A., Violence and the Police. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1970.

Wilensky, Harold L., Organizational Intelligence. Basic Books, New York, 1967.

Wilson, James Q., Varieties of Police Behavior. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.