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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL IN JAPANESE EDUCATION: A STUDY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE IN SHIKOKU, 1948-1949

by
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL IN JAPANESE EDUCATION: A STUDY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE IN SHIKOKU, 1948-1949

by Fred N. Kerlinger

The main objective of this study is to demonstrate that a change from authoritarianism to democracy has taken place in Japanese education and attitudes during the Allied Occupation of Japan. To reach this objective, Japanese educational administration and ideology, together with the attitudes of educators and the people toward education before and during the Occupation are examined for evidence of change. The underlying hypotheses of the study are tested by examining the educational changes that occurred in one area of Japan, Shikoku, during one period, October, 1948, to November, 1949, to determine the extent and depth of Occupation influence.

The foundations of pre-Occupation Japanese education and attitudes pertinent to education were laid in the latter part of the nineteenth century, and were influenced to a considerable extent by foreign ideas. After 1890, however, Japanese education emphasized traditional Japanese virtues and values, and educational practices and thinking were quite commensurate with Japanese hierarchical, authoritarian society. In short, the educational system emphasized loyalty to the Emperor and the submission of the individual to the state. Over the years these characteristics became exaggerated until, just before and during World War II, they reached their greatest depth and intensity.

During 1945 and 1946, the Occupation Forces first negated

the most objectionable features of the educational system, and then stimulated the construction of a democratic system the basic determination of whose policy would be the people of Japan. The apex and epitome of Occupation reforms in education are seen in the election of local boards of education in October, 1948, and the actions and operations of the four prefectural boards of Shikoku during their first year are examined for signs of democracy and changed attitudes. Several criteria for judging democracy in education are given, and the Shikoku educational situation is studied in the light of these criteria. It is found that the four boards of Shikoku met their difficulties and solved their problems in a relatively independent and responsible manner, and their decisions and actions helped to strengthen educational democracy in Shikoku. Teachers and the people showed interest in and supported the boards, and they also participated in educational affairs to an extent unknown and impossible under the old system.

Positive and negative influences on educational democracy in Shikoku are discussed, and it is concluded that the positive influences outweighed the negative. Of these positive influences, perhaps the most important was the atmosphere of freedom that existed in Shikoku during the latter part of the Occupation. Judging from the behavioral evidence presented, there seemed to be a marked predisposition to accept the reforms and the new education.

The conclusions drawn are that, during the Occupation, there was a change from authoritarianism to democracy in Shikoku education and attitudes--and Japanese education and attitudes--that, other things being equal, the prospects for continued educational democracy, in Shikoku and in Japan, are good, and that it is doubtful if Japan can ever return to the former unilateral hierarchical authoritarianism of its earlier educational system.

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PREFACE

Shikoku is one of the four main islands of Japan--the smallest and in many respects the most backward. It is also the smallest of the eight officially recognized regions of Japan. It consists of four prefectures (ken) and has a total population of 4,220,285. These four prefectures and their populations are: Ehime: 1,521,878; Kagawa: 946,022; Kochi: 873,874; and Tokushima: 878,511.[1] Its area is 7,228 square miles, or about 5 per cent of the total area of Japan proper.[2] Shikoku is a little more than half as large as Kyushu, and only about one-fifth the size of Hokkaido. For the most part it is a rural area. What little industry there is is mostly concentrated in the northern part, and in the life of the people is subordinate to agriculture and fishing. So it can be said that Shikoku is a predominantly rural area of relatively small size but very much like other rural areas of Japan. Its ten important cities, including the capitals of the four prefectures, do not appreciably alter the rural character of the area; in fact, it might be said that they themselves are

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[1] General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Economic and Scientific Section, Program and Statistics Division, "Population, Labor, Food Supply, and Prices," p. 2. Japanese Economic Statistics, Bulletin No. 53, January, 1951.

[2] Glenn Thomas Trewartha, Japan: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography, p. XV. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1945.

not much more than large towns. Shikoku is, therefore, a compact, rural geographical region more or less isolated from the mainland of Japan. This is important because it is in such an area that one would expect to find a Japan less touched by outside influences, a Japan in which those influences that are effective can be studied with less fear of being overwhelmed by too great complexity of internal and external influential factors.

The impact of the Allied Occupation on education in Japan is here studied in Shikoku since Shikoku is assumed to be, in a sense, an epitome or a sample of all of Japan. Naturally the fit is rough. But it is probably close enough to allow the limited hypotheses and generalizations of this thesis. More specifically, the four boards of education of Shikoku, which were elected in October, 1948, are taken as an epitome or sample of educational reform in Japan during the Occupation. The election of the boards crowns the educational efforts of the Occupation since the principal step toward decentralization and autonomy of educational administration and toward participation by the people in educational affairs was thus decisively taken.

At the outset it may be helpful to the reader to have some idea of the nature of the author's experience in Japan. He was assigned to the Shikoku Military Government Region as Civil Information and Education Officer (CI&E Officer) in August, 1947, after having been Assistant CI&E Officer of the

IX Corps Military Government Staff Section (Sendai).[1] At the time little constructive work in education had been done by Military Government except for the rather sporadic efforts of two or three energetic Americans. That is, no overall coordinated program on the basis of Occupation objectives had been conceived for the area. This was not so much a reflection on the individuals assigned to education positions, but was, rather, a reflection of a situation that existed all over Japan. In Shikoku it was simply sharper and more clearcut. In one very important respect this was fortunate: most Americans assigned to Civil Education jobs did not understand the principles of healthy, democratic relationships with the Japanese. The concept of "letting the Japanese do the job" was still in its early stages. At any rate, the point to be made here is that, so far as the educational objectives of the Occupation were concerned, little of a positive, creative nature had been done in Shikoku. Conditions were much the same in August, 1947, as they had been in the pre-war days, excepting, of course, for the surface changes made by the directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and of the Ministry of Education. The writer had the unique opportunity of working steadily with the Japanese in this area almost from the beginning of educational reform to a point well beyond an intermediate maturity stage--August, 1947, to December, 1949.[2]

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[1] This title was later changed to Civil Education Officer (CE Officer) when additional personnel were assigned to the Civil Information function.

[2] When the writer went to Shikoku there was a negative attitude on the part of the Japanese toward the Occupation

During this period most of the important Occupation educational reforms were either instituted or implemented. Those that had been started before August, 1947, had only the slightest of implementation in the schools of Shikoku. That is, for all practical purposes, it can be said that the author had the opportunity and privilege of working during a period which saw the inception, growth, and early maturity of educational reform in Shikoku.

The writer is indebted to a large number of people in the United States and in Japan for their help with one phase or another of the work that went into this dissertation. First as a group and as individuals are the members of my doctoral committee who have given invaluable assistance during the planning and writing of the thesis. Then, too, they have consistently helped the writer with many other problems the solution of which has guided him to a great extent in the organization and writing of the thesis. This is particularly true of the committee chairman, Dr. William Clark Trow, who has for three years been unsparing in his help and kindness.

Thanks are due to the Center for Japanese Studies of the University of Michigan for permission to use its facilities and for the help and training the writer received in reading and translating difficult Japanese publications. In this respect, special thanks are due to Mr. Yotaro Okuno, Librarian of the Center,

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Forces. One of the author's assigned tasks was to try to build Japanese confidence in American educational objectives and personnel. It should also be remembered that Shikoku was successively under a number of different Occupation tactical administrations: American, British, Australian, and again American. But Military Government was always American, with a few excellent British and Australian officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to Military Government.

for his expert help with the translation of particularly difficult and obscure passages.

It would be exceedingly difficult to list all the Japanese people to whom the writer is indebted. In fact, all those Japanese with whom he came into official and unofficial contact would have to be mentioned. All these former colleagues and friends are here thanked both for their help and unfailing kindness and for their witting and unwitting help in the genesis of the present study. But special thanks are due the superintendents of education and the officials of the secretariats of the four boards of education of Shikoku. They were always extraordinarily cooperative and helpful to the writer and his colleagues, and contributed to a very considerable extent to whatever success the new education has had in Shikoku. They appreciated the difficulties and delicacies of the situation during 1947-1949, and, by their sincerity, intelligence, and hard work, made the task of the writer a pleasant and profitable one. The whole situation could easily have been unpleasant and frustrating. No one is more aware than the writer that without this help, consideration, and tacit encouragement, the job in Shikoku would have been intolerably difficult.

Special acknowledgements are due to two groups of people directly connected with the writer in Military Government in Shikoku. First are the American Civil Education officers with whom the writer worked for so long. They were capable and understanding men and women who contributed in great part to whatever democracy may have been achieved in Shikoku. The second group is

the Japanese personnel of the writer's office. The people who worked in the Civil Education office of the Shikoku Military Government Region were among the most important of the writer's teachers about Japan. This is not to mention the great quantity and high quality of the work they produced. May the writer, at this point, ask their pardon for his occasional obtuseness in failing to understand some of the subtleties of Japanese culture. He is sure that he must often have offended their sensibilities. If so, he is sorry.

Three more individuals should be specially mentioned. The first of these is Miss Carmen Johnson, former Assistant Civil Education Officer (later Adult Education Officer) of the Shikoku Military Government Region and my assistant during 1947-1949. She knows to what extent I am indebted to her. But more important, she holds a special place in the esteem of thousands of Japanese women whom she helped and led to some understanding of democracy and democratic thinking and methods. The second person is Mr. Eiichi Kubota, Superintendent of Education of Kagawa Prefecture. In addition to his cooperation during 1948-1949, Mr. Kubota has given the writer a great deal of help since his return to the United States. He is a good representative of the new Japanese educator, a man who is working hard for his prefecture's education and his country's future. For his help, kindness, and regard, the writer is indeed grateful and here expresses his thanks. The third person is Colonel Robert E. Coughlin, former commanding officer of the Shikoku Military Government Region. Among Army officers and among men in general,

Colonel Coughlin holds a special place. Of all the people with whom the writer worked, Colonel Coughlin was probably the most indefatigible in his efforts to forward the objectives of the Occupation. He not only believed in democracy; he lived it and insisted that other Americans live it. And he wanted the Japanese people to live it. In fact, he was a central figure, perhaps the central figure, in the great attempt to democratize the political, economic, and educational structures of Shikoku. Thanks are due him not only from me, but also from the Japanese people and from his country for a unique service extraordinarily well rendered.

My wife knows to what extent I am indebted to her for her consideration, encouragement, and help while we were living in Japan and even more while we have been living in Michigan. But as she may not know so clearly, she was a sort of model of democratic living to many Japanese associates and friends.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM: ATTITUDE CHANGE AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN

The problem of this dissertation may be stated: Has Japanese education, under the Allied Occupation of Japan, become democratic and will it remain democratic? Or: What are the nature, extent, and lasting quality of the changes that have taken place in Japanese education during the Allied Occupation of Japan? The central hypothesis of the study is that the Allied Occupation of Japan has induced a change from authoritarianism to democracy in Japanese education. Actually, to produce significant changes in the educational system of a nation it is necessary also to produce fundamental changes in the attitudes of the nation's people. The real task of the Occupation of Japan was the re-education of the Japanese people; and re-education depends, in the last analysis, on attitude change. To change attitudes, it seems certain that a broad attack on all cultural fronts is necessary; peripheral or superficial change of institutional structures or changes on the verbal level are never enough.[1] In the forefront of this broad attack the school is central. Yet it is a single institution whose essence it is impossible to change without concomitant cultural and attitudinal changes.

The study of the reform of Japanese education under

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[1] Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts, pp. 45-51 and 58-59. New York: Harper & Bros., 1948; David Krech and Richard S. Crutchfield, Theory and Problems of Social Psychology, pp. 198-201. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948.

the Occupation is, thus, a study of attitude change. It is the study of basic changes in the attitudes of the Japanese people and Japanese educators toward their educational system, toward education in general, and toward the ideas behind the educational system. Therefore, in appraising the evidence of the educational change that has presumably occurred during the Occupation, it would seem necessary to attempt to evaluate the attitudes of the Japanese people toward their educational system and toward the educational thinking and practice that have been stimulated by Americans. But, as is well known, it is exceedingly difficult to measure the attitudes of a people. Thoroughgoing attitude sample surveys and perhaps the newer type of intensive interviewing would have to be used with a maximum of careful controls. But even though it might be assumed that valid and reliable techniques were available--and this is questionable, especially for attitude study in Japan[1]--carefully controlled conditions were certainly not to be had in 1948-1949, the approximate time period of this study. These difficulties do not absolve the investigator from making every effort to ascertain the attitudinal state of the Japanese people toward education since it is probably through attitude change that major changes in personality, and perhaps in society and culture, take place.[2] In the present study,

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[1] See Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology, pp. 531-545. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952, for inquiry and analysis of the present inadequacies of attitude testing and measurement.

[2] Principles of attitude change, as such, will not be considered in any great detail in this thesis. The author's position is more or less expressed in Krech and Crutchfield,

direct rather than indirect behavioral manifestations of attitudes are examined. That is, attitudes are inferred from data of a rather direct kind--actions and records of actions.

Attitudes toward education are deeply imbedded in a people; they are part of the cognitive, emotional, perceptual, and predispositional fabric of the mentality of the people. This is because education is always a rather accurate reflection of any culture's mores and usually an accurate index of the ideational complex of the people. In an old, hierarchical society, this is particularly true since education is used primarily as a tool for the perpetuation of the hierarchical status quo of the society. Where, in younger societies, it may be possible for education to be heterogeneous and not always a reflection of the status quo, this is less likely in the older, hierarchical society. The attitudes of the people in the hierarchical society are relatively homogeneous and serve unilaterally to reinforce the society's educational system. Conversely, the school reinforces the people's attitudes. In other words, there is a tight circle in such a society: attitudes support education, and education supports attitudes with little leeway for deviation.

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op. cit., pp. 149-204, and in Lewin, op. cit., pp. 34-68. Lewin's discussion of the problems and principles of re-education are the best the writer has yet seen. They agree very closely with empirical principles arrived at in working with the Japanese. An excellent article which is pertinent to much of the discussion of this chapter and the last chapter is: Dorwin Cartwright, "Some Principles of Mass Persuasion," Human Relations, II (1948), 253-267.

An important assumption of the present study needs to be stated. This is that there is a definite positive correlation between an authoritarian social and educational structure and the attitudes held by individuals on social issues and education. That is, it is assumed that the attitudes of the Japanese people are or were basically authoritarian, and that any change that can be noted during the Occupation which would indicate more freedom for the individual, say, can be interpreted as a datum supporting the hypotheses of this study. In other words, when it is later said that a change has taken place from authoritarianism to democracy in education, this means that the attitudes of the people of Japan, as well as Japanese institutions and laws, were changed in this direction.

There was little thought, in 1949, of trying to determine attitude changes of the Japanese people toward education, unless occasional Japanese opinion surveys of questionable merit can be considered.[1] Occupation education personnel were of course interested in Japanese attitudes toward education, but little was done of a scientific nature to determine these

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[1]Opinion surveys in education were made, but they were usually limited to very circumscribed areas or schools, and hardly penetrated much below the surface. Two examples of such surveys are: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section (GHQ, SCAP, CI &E Sect.), Public Opinion and Sociological Research Branch, Research Unit, Analysis and Research Division, "Current Japanese Public Opinion Surveys," No. 6, 17 July 1948 ("Attitudes in Tokyo Toward the New Lower Secondary Schools," Yoron Kagaku Kyokai, March, 1948); GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Public Opinion and Sociological Research Branch, Research Unit, Analysis and Research Division, "Current Japanese Public Opinion Surveys," No. 2, 5 June 1948 ("Attitudes in Kyoto Toward Coeducation in the New Lower Secondary Schools," Nagasue Yoron Kenkyujo, March, 1948).

attitudes. Most of the effort was sporadic and casual. A Civil Education (CE) officer would ask a Japanese official what he thought the people thought about some phase or other of the educational system. Or the CE officer would ask those Japanese he encountered on field trips or in his office what they thought about an issue at hand. There was little idea of systematic, carefully controlled study to determine what people thought. At any rate, even if they had been possible, such studies were unfortunately not made, and the investigator who is interested in appraising the extent to which the Japanese accepted the Occupation reforms of education is thrown almost wholly on objective facts and behaviors. Such evidence, as well as other kinds, will be used in this dissertation.

Despite the great difficulties, there is one important point in the present study that makes it safe to advance the limited generalizations that will be advanced. This is the simple fact that the basic hypothesis--the educational changes made describe the process of moving from authoritarian to democratic control--is quite limited itself, quite amenable to limited proof, providing no precise statement is made as to the amount of change that has occurred. Thus, only carefully limited and circumscribed statements can be made as to the extent of acceptance by the Japanese people of the educational reforms of the Occupation. Another more precise way of expressing it would be to say that if there is <u>any</u> evidence of acceptance of change, then the hypothesis can not be rejected. Or, if there is any evidence of certain changes in practice which can be described as democratic and which did not or could not

occur in the past, then the hypothesis is to that extent supported. On the other hand, if there are concomitant ameliorative changes in the former authoritarian practices, or a relative absence of such practices, then the hypothesis is further strengthened.

If, as has been implied in the above discussion of attitude change, democracy is a state of mind as well as a political system, then the central question of this study--Has the Japanese educational system become and will it remain democratic?--is, at the present state of scientific knowledge, very difficult or almost impossible to answer. Any attempted answer will be at best an inference, a shrewd guess, perhaps, as to the state of mind of the Japanese people. But since it is possible with reasonable accuracy to infer a state of mind from the behavior of individuals and groups, appropriate qualifications being made, the problem becomes not insuperable. An additional difficulty is that of inferring the state of mind of the people of a culture so unlike that of the investigator's. While this cultural difference is kept constantly in mind in the following appraisal of Japanese education and the influence of the Occupation on this education, there must necessarily be some departure from it. That is, it is impossible not to make some assumptions, for example, about democracy and its effect on people, about principles of participation in group processes and group decisions underlying democratic philosophy and thinking which should be common to any people, and about the relative similarity of the responses of any people, irrespective of culture, to certain

stimuli, certain conditions being fulfilled. In attempting to answer the question as to whether or not Japanese education has become democratic and will remain democratic, therefore, these assumptions will have to be made. But an attempt will also be made not to get caught in a culturally ethnocentric trap of assuming that what is good for the United States in education, say, will also be good for Japan. This would indeed be a gross error that might vitiate any validity the study might have.

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Japan has been one of the greatest educational, sociological, and psychological laboratories the world has seen in modern times. Far in advance of sound scientific knowledge of the mechanics of cultural change, one nation has deliberately set itself to change many aspects of the culture and psychology of another nation. The Occupation of Japan has differed in one significant respect from all other preceding great military occupations: it has had the general approval and cooperation of the occupied country in its purposes and objectives. In fact, there is little doubt that it has had, for the most part, the desire of the occupied country for the change from authoritarianism to democracy.[1] Whether or not this desire on the

[1] It should be noted that the Japanophile denies that Japanese cooperation was sincere; many an Occupationnaire thought that the obvious cooperation of the Japanese was superficial, calculated to "fool" the conqueror, lull him into false security, and then throw out all Occupation reforms. Even if this argument is accepted, it would not alter to too great an extent the thesis of this study. An attempt will be made to show that even if compliance was merely on the surface it ultimately would lead to changes just as irrevocable as if they had been fully and wholeheartedly accepted from the

part of the Japanese was a real desire of truly permanent nature is here not the point. The point is that the American occupying powers in one way or another had the cooperation of the Japanese people. Had this not been so it is very doubtful if the reforms that were demanded could have been effected even on a superficial level of outer conformity. At the least, the reforms, especially the educational reforms, could not have been accomplished, could not have been written into law and effected throughout the nation in the thorough manner that they were.

The purpose of this dissertation is to consider one part of these reforms, education, in one part of Japan, Shikoku, and to try to understand how they were accomplished and how effective and permanent they were. The problem, in short, may be stated again: What are the nature, extent, and lasting quality of the changes that have taken place in Japanese education during the Allied Occupation of Japan? In order to answer this question, the educational system and the changes made during a part of the Occupation in one self-contained region of Japan will be studied. To guide and point up the study, the following hypotheses are to be kept in mind:

The Occupation produced changes in Japanese education.

The changes describe the process of moving from authoritarian to democratic control.

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beginning. It is perhaps the unconscious knowledge of the inevitableness of this process of surface compliance gradually becoming accepted, matter-of-course fact which is in time interiorized as part of the culture that particularly aggravates the sensibilities of the Japanophile.

The changes are fundamental and give some assurance of permanence.

The four boards of education of Shikoku show, in epitome, the nature of the changes.

An important assumption should be here brought out: Shikoku education is considered to be fairly representative of Japanese education, and the Shikoku prefectural boards of education, likewise, are considered to be fairly representative of prefectural boards of education in Japan. In other words, it is assumed that the Shikoku education situation, in most fundamantal respects, is a representative sample of education elsewhere in Japan. It is further assumed that the advent and operation of the boards of education of Shikoku epitomize, in a sense, the educational reforms of the Occupation, since the birth and early growth of the boards occurred at a significantly high point of the Occupation and nearly at the end of a series of changes imposed from the national level, and since the changes made in Shikoku closely resembled the changes made elsewhere in Japan.

From November, 1948, Japanese education became legally decentralized. No longer did the Ministry of Education have the right arbitrarily to impose educational policies on local areas.[1]

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[1] See Ministry of Education Establishment Law (Mombushō Setchi Hō), Law No. 146, May 31, 1949, for the present general and specific functions of the Ministry. See, especially, Article V, Para. 2 and Article IV, Para. (1). Also, see Board of Education Law (Kyōiku Iinkai Hō), Law No. 170, July 15, 1948, Articles IV, XLXVIII, and very especially, Article LV, Para. 2. For the Ministry of Education Establishment Law, see GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, II, 1-23. Tokyo: GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., April, 1952. For the Board of Education Law, see ibid., pp. 231-251. The original Japanese of all contemporary education laws are most conveniently found in Mombushō Kambō Sōmuka, Gakkō Kankei Hōrei Shū (Collection of School Laws and Ordinances), 2 volumes. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1949-50.

That the Ministry continued to be influential is not the essential point; it no longer had the legal right to create and impose policy; it could only suggest what it wanted. Within the limits of national legislation, it was at least legally the responsibility of the local boards of education to determine the nature of the educational program in the prefectures. The business of education was in the hands of the people. Boards of education were elected in all prefectures and in some cities, and these boards were given powers such as local educational authority never had in Japan. This tremendous move toward real local autonomy, this culmination of educational reform epitomized all preceding changes and at the same time threw an enormous burden on the local areas. They were faced with problems the magnitude of which few Japanese or Americans realized. That they generally succeeded in assuming this responsibility and in helping Japan to take the important step away from authoritarianism and toward democracy is the basic argument of this dissertation.

The method to be used in establishing the hypotheses outlined above will be mainly historical and analytical. But it should be noted that the historical approach is used because in this case no other approach is possible. Part of the purpose of the study, it should also be noted, is social psychological and nomothetic. That is, in addition to its basic purpose of attempting to demonstrate the change from authoritarianism to democracy in education, it is additionally oriented toward the present and future establishment of principles of re-education and toward future research on Japan and on democratic re-education. At any rate, the background of Japanese education

prior to September, 1945, will first be examined. Emphasis will be on the administrative and the social, psychological, and ideological aspects of Japanese education rather than on educational history as such.[1] Second, the educational administrative machinery and the policy of the Japanese Government and the Occupation Forces during 1945-1948 will be sketched with two objectives in mind. The first is to examine similarities and contrasts between pre-Occupation and Occupation policy, administration, and thinking. The second is to furnish the necessary background for later study of the Shikoku board of education situation and the impact of educational reform on Shikoku. Third, the maturing of Shikoku education will be examined, using the four boards of education during their first year of existence, from November, 1948, to December, 1949, as principal foci of attention.[2] In doing this, authoritarianism and democracy are always the

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[1] Unfortunately, there is still no authoritative and objective account of Japanese education. However, existing references in English and Japanese will be cited. It should be pointed out that Japanese writings on Japanese education have been very much neglected, probably due to the difficulty of the written language. An exceedingly regrettable fact is the wholesale destruction of Japanese educational documents by the Japanese themselves during the Occupation. The loss is probably irreparable.

[2] No attempt is made at this point to describe the data to be used. It should be said, however, that most of them were gathered by the writer during his tour of duty in Shikoku. They will be cited and sometimes briefly described in the course of the discussion. They include board of education minutes, official reports, the author's personal field notes and official reports, Occupation reports, letters from and interviews with Japanese educators, and so forth.

fundamental issues; the theory and facts presented are conceived always within the framework of these basic concepts and ways of life and thinking. Finally, after outlining the principal changes and the Shikoku reaction to the changes, an evaluation will be given. Implications relating mainly to Japanese attitudes and attitude change will then be discussed, after which appraisal and prognosis will be attempted. For this appraisal, the key question will be: Did Shikoku education, in 1945-1949, become the democratic instrument of a democratic people? And, by extension and implication: Did Japanese education, in 1945-1949, become the democratic instrument of a democratic people?

CHAPTER II

THE SITUATION PRECEDING CHANGE: JAPANESE EDUCATION PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 1945

On October 5, 1948, the people of Japan went to the polls and elected boards of education in all prefectures and in a number of cities. The turnout was comparatively large, if not as large as expected or wished by Occupation authorities. But by American standards and in view of the almost complete Japanese ignorance of elected boards of education and their functions, it was a success: 56 per cent of the eligible voters expressed their wishes as to who should determine educational affairs in their localities.[1] In Shikoku the figure was 64 per cent.[2] This turnout, however, cannot be interpreted entirely as the action of an intensely interested electorate. It is true that there must have been considerable interest, but a good deal of the large vote was due to a complex of almost adventitious factors--local headmen orders to voters, the very intense and sustained SCAP and Military

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[1] Figures given out verbally by the Assistant Civil Information Officer, Military Government Staff Section, Headquarters Eighth Army, November 10, 1948, at a conference of regional CI&E officers. It is interesting to compare this figure with that of the United States presidental election of 1948--51 per cent.

[2] From figures prepared by the writer in October, 1948, immediately after the elections for report to Headquarters Eighth Army.

Government informational work which was centered around getting the voters to the polls, and simple habitual participation by the people in a social function. For many Japanese, going to the polls was probably a social break in an otherwise rather monotonous life.[1] But the point to be noted here is that the voters, for the most part, did not know too well what they were doing. The election procedure was too complex and, from a democratic point of view, questionable.[2] The voters had no precedent to go on; they had never had anything to say about who should run "their" education system. They were going to the polls because they were told to; the American and Japanese authorities had decided that they would vote, that they would be democratic. So, they were "democratic. But they were also confused; they had only very little understanding of the broad issues involved. This was apparent in Shikoku where, due to

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[1] The writer visited many polls on October 5, 1948, and noted the almost festive air at some of them. Men and women gathered, talked, and generally seemed to have a good time. The information programs noted above will be discussed later.

[2] For example, out of eighteen candidates in Kagawa Prefecture, each voter had only one choice--and there were six members to be elected to the board. This was due to the fact that the board of education election procedure was based on the election rules of the Local Autonomy Law (particularly Article XXXII). The Local Autonomy Law, Law No. 67, April 17, 1947, may be found in Govt. Sect., SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948, II, 902-959. Washington: U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1949. See Board of Education Law, Article XXVIII, ibid., II, 1207-1215, and Cabinet Order Concerning the Enforcement of the Board of Education Law, Cabinet Order No. 239, August 19, 1948, Articles VII and X. This Cabinet Order, in English, is in the author's possession--there is no published English version, to his knowledge. The Japanese original is in Mombushō Kambō Sōmuka, op. cit., I, 133-135 (Seirei No. 239, August 19, 1948, Kyōiku Iinkai Hō Shikō Rei (Implementing Ordinance of the Board of Education Law).

the relative homogeneity of the area and the people and the isolation of the area from the rest of Japan, the conflict or confusion was clearly outlined.

In Shikoku, a particularly intense campaign to get the people interested in the to-be elected boards and to get them to vote was conducted by Military Government and Japanese educational, political, and information officials.[1] In addition, the local newspapers showed unusual interest, and the Teachers Union was of course deeply involved. But after the people had gone to the polls and elected representatives to govern their educational affairs, did they know what they had done? This question can probably never be answered accurately. All that can be said is that some few did but that most of them probably did not. Few Japanese realized that the most thorough revolution in Japanese education had taken place. After the board members officially took office in November, 1948, Japanese education was officially and legally decentralized. A law which destroyed most of the absolute power of the centralized educational authority, the Ministry of Education, and which provided for representatives of the people to be elected and to run educational affairs had been passed by the highest legislative body

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[1] One example of the all-out character of the Military Government effort can be given. The writer, sometimes alone and sometimes in company with the Senior Military Government Officer of Shikoku, other staff officers of the Shikoku Military Government Region, and with team CE and CI officers, gave explanatory and exhortative speeches all over Shikoku. On the special railroad train used to take the party around the island, a huge sign read: "Get Out and Vote! Shikoku Board of Education Elections, October 5, 1948."

in the land.[1] In order to understand how drastic and complete a change this was, and to understand the full educational philosophical and psychological significance of this action and what it meant for Japanese education, it will be necessary to sketch the historical and ideological foundations of Japanese education. This historical sketch will start in the early years of the reign of the Emperor Meiji,[2] that is, in the 1870's, and will extend to September, 1945, when the Japanese surrendered to the Allied Powers. Education prior to this time is of course important, but will not be considered because we are here concerned mainly with the contrast between the present system and the system as it existed before the Occupation.[3] The older system was really born during early Meiji, specifically in 1872, got its firmly Japanese bent with the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890, and continued with merely technical and administrative changes to 1945. The ideology remained essentially the same down through the years. Our purpose is to determine

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[1] This was not the first time in Japanese history that educational control was put into the hands of the people. It had happened, partially at least, during early Meiji (1879 and 1890). This will be discussed later.

[2] Emperor Meiji reigned from 1868 to 1912. The Japanese customarily date their years by deceased emperors' names, thus these years embrace the so-called Meiji Period.

[3] The most complete accounts of early Japanese education are in Japanese and are not cited here. Virtually the only systematic accounts in English are those put out through the years by the Ministry of Education (since about 1873)--which, except for special purposes, are inadequate--and one written by Lombard. Frank A. Lombard, Pre-Meiji Education in Japan. Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1913.

what this ideology was and then to contrast it with present ideology. In this way we should be able to understand the magnitude, importance, and fundamental quality of the changes made during the Occupation. In other words, what was in the mind of the Japanese citizen of Shikoku when he cast his ballot for a board of education member? Did he understand what he was doing? Did he realize the changes in his life, but especially in the lives of his children, his ballot might make? Study of the older education and thought system of Japan may help in understanding this education and this mentality and thus lead to better understanding of the present problems of Japanese education.

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The history of modern Japanese education is best understood if it is divided and subdivided into periods corresponding to major changes in governmental emphasis in education. The entire period, 1868-1945, is, therefore, here broken down into three arbitrary, but fairly distinct periods: (1) Meiji Education--The Beginning: 1872-1890; (2) Middle Period--Implementation and Growth: 1890-1930; (3) Preparation for War--Nationalism: 1930-1945.[1] The first period is characterized by experimentation, conflict, and resolution of the conflict, the second period by implementation, growth, and a sort of settling process, and the third period by the extension and intensification of the nationalistic tendency

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[1] Cf. Yamashita's breakdown: (1) 1872-1886; (2) 1886-1918; (3) 1918-1938. Yamashita Tokuji, Education in Japan, p. 9. Tokyo: Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1938.

that was implicit in the first period but which was a "normal nationalism," so to speak. For the purposes of this thesis, the Meiji Period will be further subdivided into three periods. Since these periods are difficult to categorize briefly, no attempt will be made to label them. They are important and are considered at some length because of the educational similarity of part of the era to the Occupation period, and because of foreign influences on Japanese education and the resulting cultural and ideological conflict that followed these influences.

It should be understood that what follows in this chapter and later chapters is not a history of Japanese education. It is, rather, a selective discussion of those factors of Japanese educational development pertinent to later discussion of Shikoku boards of education during 1948-1949. In this historical sketch we are seeking three things: (1) a general overall picture of Japanese education that will better help us understand what happened during the Occupation; (2) determination of the philosophy of Japanese education, the ideology behind it, and how it got that way; and (3) insight into Japanese culture, thinking, and attitudes, particularly educational thinking and attitudes, so that the alleged effects of the Occupation on Japanese education may be more accurately assessed against this thought-culture background.

The statement made by most Japanese writers and some American writers that the modern Japanese educational system was born in 1872 and has remained essentially the same since is, like most generalizations, both true and untrue.[1] Taken very broadly

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[1] The most recent example of this generalization is Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, p. 225. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. A more clearcut example is Hugh L. Keenleyside and A. F. Thomas, History of Japanese Education and Present Educational System, p. 87. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1937.

in the administrative sense, the statement is true: the administrative foundations were legally laid by the 1872 Gakusei (Educational System).[1] But the statement is not entirely true from the ideological point of view. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration wished to create a highly centralized system of governmental administration in order to achieve their objective of rapid modernization of Japan along Western lines.[2] This objective, so clearly held in mind and almost ruthlessly implemented by these men and their successors down through the years, of course applied to education. In fact, it can be said that, since there was no formal official administrative educational framework before the Restoration, their task in education was simpler than it was in politics. That is, since there was no formal official educational structure

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[1] The Gakusei of 1872 is hard to find despite its great importance. I know of no English version. For the original ordinance, itself, see Dai Nippon Kyōiku Shinkōkai, Dai Nippon Kyōiku Shi (History of Education of Greater Japan), pp. 777-811. Tokyo: Dai Nippon Shinkōkai, 1939. It should be here noted that practically all laws and ordinances cited in this paper can be found in the great collection Hōrei Zensho (Complete Collection of Laws and Ordinances). This collection is not cited, however, because of its comparative inaccessibility and the difficulty involved in using it. Of course, this is to some extent true of most of the Japanese sources used. The writer has used those sources either in his own possession or readily available to him. Some very important sources have been translated and included in the text and in the appendices.

[2] Probably the best objective account of the early influences of the West on Japan is: G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, pp. 450-467. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950. An excellent and more factual account is Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 70-119. See, also Robert King Hall, op. cit., pp. 218-227, and Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, pp. 100-111. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1949. Yanaga gives some small but significant points that other sources omit. Japanese accounts, both in English and Japanese, are of course numerous, but are not cited here.

and hence little in the way of preconceived ideas as to what such a structure should be, the setting up of one would not have to encounter the same sort of obstacles and opposition that the political changes did.

The early leaders took as their model the French system of university districts emanating from a central source, with the whole system of national authority, regional authority, school districts, and schools organized into a hierarchy from the capitol to the rural village.[1] In the case of Japan the hierarchy was: the National Department of Education (created in 1871 and called Mombushō--now usually called Ministry of Education), the eight university districts, and the prefectures, schools, and personnel under these districts. The 1872 Gakusei is probably the most ambitious and magnificent attempt of any nation to establish a modern educational system of somewhere in the neighborhood of 54,000 schools almost at one stroke. That it could not have succeeded in the manner outlined by the Gakusei is now apparent since there were simply not the resources to implement it.[2] This the Japanese soon realized and started that series of modifications of the original code which continued to 1945.[3] Since we are here

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[1] 1872 Gakusei, Articles I, II, V, VI, and IX. Dai Nippon Kyōiku Shinkōkai, op. cit., pp. 779-780.

[2] Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 90-91; Kikuchi Dairoku (Baron), Japanese Education, pp. 74-75. London: John Murray, 1909; Sansom, op. cit., pp. 456-457; Ōkubo Riken, Meiji Jidai no Kyōiku (Education of the Meiji Period), p. 36. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1933. (This reference is part of a large series called Nippon Rekishi, Iwanami Kōza (Iwanami Lectures on Japanese History).)

[3] See Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 70-119; Sansom, op. cit., pp. 450-467; Kikuchi, op. cit., pp. 66-84 (probably the

concerned with the changes pertinent to our thesis, only the very major changes made will be considered. Before discussing these changes, however, two points with reference to the 1872 Gakusei should be emphasized. First, it provided for a thoroughly centralized system whose general policy would always emanate from Tokyo. In this respect, the system, with one significant exception to be noted later, did not change down to October, 1948, when boards of education were elected. And second, it contained no clearcut, strong statement, as did directives after 1890, on nationalistic ideology. Its implied philosophy of education was practical, hardly a philosophy at all. It aimed at promoting the education of the people for efficiency and mastery of subject matter rather than for specifically national ends. The Introduction to the Gakusei of 1872 specifically stressed this practical end.[1]

The argument can be better understood if it is realized that practically all important rescripts and ordinances referring to education issued after 1890 contained basic statements of purpose, and these statements, plus references to the Imperial Rescript on Education, were unequivocal. They specifically state the basic aim of education to be moral, civic, and national. An example of this is Article I of the

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most complete and the clearest factual account). Hall, op. cit., pp. 222-227, et passim (brings the account to 1946).

[1] A complete English translation of this Introduction is given in Japanese Department of Education, An Outline of History of Japanese Education, pp. 124-125. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1876.

Shōgakko Rei (Elementary School Ordinance) of 1900.

> Article I: The main purpose of the elementary school, in addition to the physical development of children, is to teach the ordinary knowledge and skills essential as a basis for moral and civic education and essential to the life of the citizen.[1]

A stronger example and one which becomes very pertinent to later discussion is Article I of the Kokumin Gakkō Rei (National Elementary School Ordinance) of 1941.

> Article I: The purpose of the national elementary school (kokumin gakko) is to give ordinary elementary education in accordance with the Imperial Way, and to achieve fundamental civic training of the people.[2]

Still another example to help clarify the difference between the 1872 Gakusei and later ordinances was the place assigned the subject of Shūshin (Morals).[3] In the 1872 Gakusei it was listed as the sixth of the subjects of study in elementary schools with no statement as to its importance. But starting with the 1880 Kyōiku Rei (Educational Ordinance), it was listed first,[4] and from 1890 on was defined as the most

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[1] Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, Kyōiku Hōki Ruishō (Compilation of Educational Laws and Ordinances), I, 53. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, 1902. This is Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 344, August 18, 1900. The wording of Article I of the same ordinance, as amended to 1926, is the same.

[2] Teikoku Hōki (Imperial Laws and Ordinances), p. 44. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Teikoku Hōki Shuppan K. K., 1949. This is Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 148, March 1, 1941, as amended to 1943.

[3] Gakusei of 1872, Article XXVII, Sec. 6, and Article XXIX, Sec. 15 and Sec. 19. Dai Nippon Shinkōkai, op. cit., pp. 784-786.

[4] Kyōiku Rei of 1880, Article III. Kuroda Shigejirō and Hijikata Nagagoto (eds.), Meiji Gakusei Enkaku Shi (History of the Meiji Educational System), p. 41. Tokyo: Konkōdo Shoseki K.K.,

important subject in the Japanese school curriculum, a subject which must penetrate all other subjects and all teaching.[1]

The Japanese educational authorities soon came to see that the 1872 Ordinance was impracticable. The country simply was in no position to start and support the imposing educational edifice the Ordinance demanded. The first revision was made the next year, and in 1879 was displaced by an ordinance that is of considerable educational and historical significance and importance. This was the Kyōiku Rei of 1879. Its importance in the history of Japanese education has been more or less neglected by both Japanese and Western writers.[2] It is important for two or three reasons. First, it represented an attempt by the then Minister of Education, Tanaka Fujimarō,

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1906. This was the first time that Shūshin was put at the head of the list of subjects. Yanaga, op. cit., p. 109, gives 1882 as the year, but this is evidently an error because the ordinance is dated Meiji 13 (1880). This ordinance is in my possession (handwritten). For discussions of the development and use of Shūshin as a subject of study in Japanese education, see Robert King Hall, Shūshin: The Ethics of a Defeated Nation. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1949, and Fred N. Kerlinger, "The Modern Origin of Morals Instruction in Japanese Education," History of Education Journal, II (Summer, 1951), 119-126. Shūshin can be defined as: morals, ethics, moral science, moral training, morality. The Japanese word carries social and ethical connotations which English cannot convey.

[1]See the examples given by the writer in the article cited above.

[2]Kuroda and Hijikata, op. cit., pp. 37-41. (The 1880 Kyōiku Rei is also in this reference, pp. 41-46.) Most sources mention and describe the 1879 Ordinance, but no one to date has brought out its peculiar significance for Occupation reforms leading to local educational autonomy. Both ordinances called for school affairs boards, but whereas the 1879 Ordinance allowed their election by the people, the 1880 Ordinance allowed the people to recommend candidates who would then be "elected" (sennin) by prefectural governors.

to decentralize the educational system along American lines. Tanaka had accompanied a Japanese mission to Europe and the United States in 1871-1872 and had been much impressed by the decentralized system he observed in the United States.[1] His impressions, together with the recognized failure of the 1872 Gakusei and perhaps the influence of David Murray, who was then serving as a sort of foreign advisor-vice minister of education,[2] resulted in the 1879 Kyōiku Rei. Second, the new ordinance provided for the setting up in each town and village of educational boards (gakumu iin), elected by local citizens, for the purpose of administering educational affairs.[3] The authority of these boards was not complete, however. They were to be under the control of prefectural governors. And Article I of the ordinance still kept Japanese education under the Ministry of Education. This is one aspects of Japanese education that did not change until 1948.[4] But despite the centralized control, the

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[1] Sansom, op. cit., pp. 455-457.

[2] See Japanese Ministry of Education, An Outline History of Japanese Education, pp. 9-35, for Murray's interesting chapter on Japanese education. This was the Introduction to the Philadelphia International Exhibition book on Japanese education (1876).

[3] Articles X and XI. Kuroda and Hijikata, op. cit., p.38. See Appendix I for English translations of these two articles as well as pertinent articles from other ordinances to be cited later. See, also, Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, p. 225; Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 94-95; Japan Department of Education, Outlines of the Modern Education in Japan, pp. 19-20. Tokyo: Japan Department of Education, May, 1893.

[4] Kuroda and Hijikata, op. cit., p. 37. See, also, Article XII, p. 38, which puts the gakumu iin under prefectural governors. See Appendix I for translations of these two articles.

close resemblance to the American system can be clearly seen. Even more important for our purposes, the close resemblance to the 1948 Board of Education Law is also seen. The main difference is that the present boards of education are not under prefectural governors or the Ministry of Education but are almost autonomous authorities, at least legally.[1]

It is interesting to speculate on the possible development of education in Japan had this law been left on the books in its original form. It is possible that in time and with the proper encouragement and help these boards might have succeeded, and Japan's educational system might have become something quite other than the highly centralized system it did become. But for several reasons the system was doomed to failure. One reason usually given is that the public did not have sufficient interest in education and thus allowed it to decline. In addition--and this was one of the more important reasons--local authorities and citizens feared the possibly too great financial demands to be made of them. But still another reason, which is the most fundamental of all the reasons, is that the people simply did not have an adequate background for such a drastic change, for such great local responsibility.[2] The parallel with conditions in 1948-1949

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[1] Board of Education Law, Articles IV, XLVIII, LV. The boards' powers and autonomy, however, are seriously limited by the fact that they have no real financial power and autonomy. See Articles LVI-LXIII.

[2] Most writers (for example, see Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., p. 95) give the first two reasons, but tend to neglect the third. And, as will be seen, this is the reason which becomes the most important during the Occupation.

is striking and unmistakable, except that, in 1948-1949, it might be said that the people and the authorities were less in a position to understand the decentralization of their educational system. All they had ever known was extreme centralization, whereas in early Meiji they had hardly known any sort of educational administration at all. That is, they had had few precedents to fix their attitudes toward educational administration.

At any rate, the system failed and the failure was quickly seen. In 1880, the Kyōiku Rei was revised. What the revision did, in effect, was to nullify the power of the boards by taking the direct vote away from the people and putting the choice of board members into the governor's hands,[1] by adding a headman to each board, and by more definitely stating the dependence of the boards on prefectural governors.[2] Another means of strengthening the national authority over education which is not apparent from superficial examination of the laws was the very considerable detail of the instructions to the localities. That is, while the 1880 directive left a good deal

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[1] This issue, significantly enough, has recently arisen again. The Ministry of Education has been studying, among other things, the question of "reducing the number of boards and whether the board members should be elected or appointed. The Ordinance Review Commission has recommended appointment. . ." Nippon Times, December 29, 1951 (editorial). There will be further consideration later of the reactionary force that is trying to vitiate the reforms made during the Occupation.

[2] The pertinent articles are IX, X, and XI. Kuroda and Hijikata, op. cit., p. 43. See Appendix I for translations of these articles.

of apparent authority in local (mostly prefectural governor) hands, it stated what should be done in detail--leaving little room for implementation or deviation, and actually more strongly controlling the system.[1]

Up to this point, certain important facts about the early Japanese educational system have been mentioned. These are, principally, the establishment of an ambitious system of modern education along Western lines, the centralized hierarchical nature of this system, and its efficiency and subject matter centeredness. It can be seen that the very foundations of the system were authoritarian, imposed from above along quite rigid lines. This was probably inevitable in the very nature of Japanese society which was just emerging from hierarchical feudalism. In short, the authoritarian foundations of the educational system were laid right from the beginning of modern Japan. As will be pointed out later, the early centralized authoritarianism did not radically change down to September, 1945. Now, to complete the case on the authoritarianism of the system to show the contrast under the Occupation, developments subsequent to those outlined above will be discussed. At this point, however, a digression is necessary in order to round out the early Meiji background on local educational autonomy, and to bring to light and emphasize what legal educational autonomy existed in Japan down to World War II.

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[1] Kikuchi, op. cit., p. 78.

In the Western sense, it can be said that there was little local educational autonomy in Japan. But the fact that the boards of education of 1948 were not, strictly speaking, new phenomena in Japan must be brought out. In the sense that the 1948 boards had real power and legal autonomy, they were new and quite unprecedented. The 1879 boards were the nearest thing to them, but the main idea in 1879 was still centralized control with only a little power of implementation given to the boards(to establish and build schools, for example). But educational boards, as such, were certainly now new. Starting with the first ones in 1879, Japan has had "educational affairs boards" (gakumu iin) right down to the Occupation, with the exception of one short period from 1885 to 1890. This fact, so important for understanding the nature of Japanese education, and pointing up the contrast between pre-Occupation and post-Occupation education, is so little known that it needs to be more strongly emphasized.

It has been shown how, in the early Meiji period, the establishment of locally elected boards was ordered (in 1879), how they failed to achieve the purpose of the ambitious educators who inspired the order, and how certain features of the system were altered so that, in effect, the boards existed but had little power. In 1885, they were abolished entirely due to the reaction that set in under Minister of Education Mori.[1] During 1888-1890, the Japanese Government gave some measure of

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[1] Ibid., p. 79; Mombushō, Gakusei Gojū-Nen Shi (History of Fifty Years of the Education System), p. 95. Tokyo: Mombushō, 1922.

local autonomy to cities, towns, and villages, through the Shi Sei (Regulations for the Organization of Cities), the Chōson Sei (Regulations for the Organization of Towns and Villages), and other regulations. In Articles LXIX and LXXXII of the Chōson Sei, in its 1934 form (and this form did not differ much from earlier forms), it was stated that towns and villages might establish special or standing committees whose purpose was to assist mayors and headmen in local administration.[1] When these regulations went into effect, it was seen that local educational administration was incommensurate with the general administrative system. This necessitated a revision of educational ordinances to bring them into line. So, in 1890, the Shōgakkō Rei (Elementary School Ordinance) was revised, and "local educational affairs were entrusted to local authorities. . . ."[2] Article XXV put the power of establishing elementary schools into the hands of local assemblies; Article LXX decreed that mayors and headmen "shall take charge of the educational affairs of State, belonging to cities, towns, and villages and also manage city, town, or village elementary schools. . . .", Article LXXII set up educational affairs committees or boards (gakumu iin) in cities, and these boards must include male

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[1] Tsubouchi Takejirō (ed.) and Hozumi Shigetō (rev.), Komin Hōki Yōten (Essentials of Civil Laws and Ordinances), pp. 155 and 159. Tokyo: Tokyo Kaisei Kan, 1934. See Appendix I for a translation of Article LXIX.

[2] Japan Department of Education, Outlines of the Modern Education in Japan, p. 6. See, also, Okubo, op. cit., p. 47, et passim, for a good brief description of the changes that took place.

teachers; Article LXXIII said that city school committees were to assist mayors with education; Article LXXV permitted the setting up of district school boards in cities; Article LXXIX ordered the establishment of school boards in towns and villages with teacher members appointed and dismissed by headmen; Article LXXX gave the duties of the boards: to assist headmen with education matters; Article LXXXII permitted the setting up of district boards;[1] and Article XCII defined "educational affairs" as meaning elementary school business only.[2]

Again, it is fairly probable that the Japanese authorities were sincere in believing that they were creating local educational autonomy. But it is also clear that they were only creating surface manifestations of it. The functions of the gakumu iin were purely advisory. Their membership was rather tightly controlled by appointment by officials, by law, and by tradition. It is very doubtful if the boards did much more than rubber stamp the regulations of the central government and the government's local representatives. But in any case it cannot be said that the Japanese had no tradition of local autonomy in 1948 when they voted for prefectural and city boards of education. Judging from the laws from 1890 down through the years to the Occupation, the gakumu iin were legal entities with clearly

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[1] Japan Department of Education, Outlines of the Modern Education in Japan, pp. 41-42. This is a Ministry of Education translation of the 1890 Ordinance.

[2] Ibid., p. 44.

defined functions. Apparently gakumu iin articles were included in all elementary school ordinances from 1890 to 1945.[1] Since they have been neglected by Western, and even by Japanese, students of Japanese education and are not available in English, and since they are so pertinent to the subject and hypotheses of this thesis, some of the major provisions of important and recent pre-war ordinances with respect to gakumu iin are here summarized.

The Kokumin Gakkō Rei (National Elementary School Ordinance)[2] of 1941, as amended to 1943, says that cities, towns, and villages and the school unions of cities, towns, and villages

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[1] The writer has checked the collections of laws and ordinances in his possession and found such articles in each of them. Hōki Zenshū, Dai Yonshū, Gakuji (Complete Collection of Laws and Ordinances, Compilation No. 4, School Affairs), Ch. IV, pp. 1-7. Tokyo: Teikoku Hōki Shuppan K. K., 1928. This the Shōgakkō Rei, Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 344, August 20, 1890. as amended through the years to Chokurei No. 242, 1926. The pertinent articles are LXII and LXIII. All of Section VII of the implementing ordinance to the Shōgakkō Rei is on the gakumu iin, and gives their duties (Articles CLXXXII-CLXXXV). Ibid., pp. 24-25. This is the Shōgakkō Rei Shikō Kisoku (Elementary School Ordinance Implementing Regulations), Mombushō Rei No. 14, August 21, 1900, as amended through the years to Mombushō Rei No. 10, 1928. Teikoku Hōki pp. 44-49. This is the Kokumin Gakkō Rei (National Elementary School Ordinance), Chokurei No. 148, March 1, 1941, as amended by Chokurei No. 199, March 1943. The pertinent articles are XXXVIII and XXXIX, p. 47. In the implementing ordinance, Kokumin Gakkō Rei Shikō Kisoku (National Elementary School Implementing Regulations), Mombushō Rei No. 4, March 14, 1941, as amended by Mombushō Rei No. 6, February 1944, the pertinent articles are CXVIII-CXIX, ibid., pp. 64-65.

[2] Kokumin Gakkō was the name adopted in 1941 for the elementary schools. They had been Shōgakkō (elementary schools), but this was not nationalistic enough; they became Kokumin Gakkō, literally, national citizens' schools, or national schools.

will set up gakumu iin, and that the Minister of Education will decide their duties.[1] Equally important is the implementing ordinance. Article CXVIII prescribes the number of members there shall be on educational affairs boards (less than ten, with certain exceptions), and Article CXIX gives their duties, as follows:

> Article CXIX: Educational affairs boards will assist mayors and headmen of cities, towns, and villages and the managers (kanrisha) of city, town, and village school unions, and will state their opinions on such questions as the mayors, headmen, and managers may have regarding the following:
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> (1) Urging school attendance
> (2) Exemptions and delays from the obligation of school attendance
> (3) Equipment
> (4) Budget estimate preparation
> (5) Tuition fees
> (6) Permanent school property
> (7) Establishment and abolition of detached classrooms
> (8) Operation of instruction that is divided into two parts
> (8) Establishment or abolition of special subjects of study.[2]

This list may at first seem impressive, but closer examination will reveal that only three of the nine duties are of any great importance: budget estimate preparation, school property, and establishment and abolition of special subjects of study. And in Japan it is extremely unlikely that the gakumu iin had much to do with real financial policy; their function was probably to get other citizens to help support the schools.[3]

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[1] Articles XXXVIII and XXXIX. Teikoku Hōki, p. 47. See Appendix I for translations of these articles.

[2] Ibid., pp. 64-65. (Writer's translation.)

[3] This inference is based on the known principal function of the different groups--the Fukeikai (Fathers' and Elder

And it is perfectly certain that they had nothing significant to say about important subjects of study. These were fixed by the Ministry of Education. The subjects, their content, and the way they were taught were determined by the central authority. The boards' functions were limited to those few subjects, like drawing, singing, sewing, etc., whose inclusion in the curriculum was left by the government to local discretion.[1] School property and its management and disposal may occasionally have been an important function. (It became very important during the Occupation when it was necessary to build thousands of new schools, as well as make additions to old ones.) The remaining functions, however, are relatively unimportant.

This digression on the gakumu iin has been a long one. But it has been a necessary one even though it has interrupted the account of the rapid flow of the educational events that occurred during the Meiji period. Without it the picture, while generally accurate, might have been somewhat distorted. This is because the existence of these local boards might be

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Brothers' Associations), the Haha no Kai (Mothers' Clubs), the Kōenkai (Supporters' Associations), and the Boshikai (Mothers' and Elder Sisters' Associations)--that were connected with the schools and that were vaguely similar to American PTA's. After talking to a number of Japanese education officials and former officers and members of these associations, the writer and his assistant came to the conclusion that the organizations had little or no influence on schools and school policy. Their function was limited mainly to raising funds for schools, particularly for school building construction and school supplies. And because of the tight hierarchical setup and strict control of education, which necessarily included a tacit hands-off policy, it is fair to make the above assertion about the gakumu iin. By extension, the same argument applies to almost all the listed functions of the boards.

[1] Kikuchi, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

erroneously interpreted as the existence of true local educational autonomy and thus as the existence of some democracy in education in Japan. But it has been shown that the boards and their operation cannot be so interpreted; neither their existence nor their operation can be interpreted as democratic. They help, rather, to make clearer the basic authoritarianism of the system. While a superficial knowledge of their existence might lead the investigator to think that they were democratic-seeming phenomena, closer study shows them to be not at all incommensurate with the hierarchical, authoritarian educational system. This will become clearer when the boards of education of Shikoku and their functioning are described. Then it will be seen that the present boards are attempting real democracy whereas the older ones were merely reflections of the older society.

In 1885, when Mori Arinori became Minister of Education, a "new" era in Japanese education started, and the older, more liberal ideas initiated by Tanaka and others met their quick death. Mori felt that the system was too loose, too free, and consequently caused several ordinances to be issued that changed, once again, the face if not the heart of Japanese education. The educational affairs boards were abolished,[1] and the little local autonomy the government allowed was put into the hands of mayors and headmen. Instead of one ordinance governing education, several were issued relating to schools in general, elementary schools, secondary schools, and so forth (1886). Educational power was delegated to prefectural governors, more

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[1] Ibid., p. 79.

emphasis was put on moral education and discipline, especially in normal schools,[1] and the system of school inspection and inspectors was revived.[2] And quite important for future developments, German influence was introduced into the university. Herbart's ideas, with their strong moral overtones, infiltrated Japanese education, giving strong support to the growing tendency to center the Japanese curriculum around Shūshin. And--hardly to be omitted in any study of Japanese education--the system of innumerable detailed directives and instructions started. Mori loosed a flood of instructions, perhaps as great as the wealth of orders issued during the Occupation. In a quite real sense, 1886 can be considered the date of the birth of the Japanese educational system as it existed when the United States occupied Japan. It had not much farther to go after Mori.[3] The groundwork of nationalism, moral emphasis, discipline, and authoritarian control was at last almost complete. But one more step had to be taken before the Japanese leaders in power were satisfied, before there was an official end to the competing influences on the educational system.

Seemingly, the authorities still had difficulties with liberal ideas and liberal thinkers, and, in 1889, proposed chū-kō-nin-gi (loyalty-filial piety-benevolence-righteousness)[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 81.

[2] Ibid., p. 81.

[3] It should not be inferred that Mori was an anti-foreign reactionary. Rather, he was apparently a modern-minded man. See Sansom, op. cit., pp. 460-461.

[4] See Kerlinger, op. cit., for definitions of these and other important Japanese concepts.

as the basis of Japanese moral education. This education was to have a strong nationalistic foundation with implicit rejection of Euro-American morals and ideas.[1] This aroused criticism from those in favor of enlightenment but the criticism only helped to precipitate the inevitable. In 1890, the whole conflict was resolved by the issuance of the justly famous Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo) of the Emperor Meiji.

It will be helpful to re-trace our steps a bit and note that Japanese education from 1872 to 1886 had been subjected to three successive influences: French (1871-72), American (1879-80), and German (1885-86).[2] In addition, indigenous influences of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism were at work--even in severe conflict. Three more or less distinct schools stood opposed for the control of educational thought. One school, personified by such men as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Minister of Education Tanaka, wanted Westernization, at least partial abandonment of some of the traditional ideals, and in general, a pragmatic, utilitarian, "scientific," philosophy of education. The second group was the Shinto, anti-Buddhist, anti-Confucian group which advocated a return to the older Japanese ideals. And the third group, the Confucian, wanted, of course, a core of Confucian ideals in the schools. From 1871 to about 1885, the utilitarian group was predominant; from 1886, however, the

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[1] Abe Shigetaka (ed.), Kyōikugaku Jiten (Encyclopedia of Education), II, 1090. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1939.

[2] Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 100-103.

Confucian and Shinto groups made themselves felt, and in 1890, as mentioned above, the whole long, sometimes bitter conflict was finally completely and irrevocably resolved by the Imperial Rescript on Education.[1] From the time of its issuance to the end of World War II and even after, the Rescript was the basic statement of Japanese life and philosophy of education. It quite definitely determined the rather tight and narrow path down which Japanese education must run, a path of Confucian morality heavily tinged with Shinto ideology. But more important it implicitly rejected Western ideals and standards and in effect told the country that henceforth foreign ideals and ideas were unsuitable. The ideas of chū (loyalty, particularly loyalty to the Emperor) and kō (filial piety), instead, were firmly implanted in the national morality by the highest power in the land. In short, the Imperial Rescript on Education was a direct antithesis to the philosophy of education the Occupation was to preach fifty-five years later.

There were of course many changes in Japanese education after 1890, but they were mainly implemental in nature; none of them differed essentially from the precepts of the Imperial

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[1] The story of the Imperial Rescript on Education is a fascinating one--and an exceedingly important one for both Japan and the United States. There are a number of good references on the Rescript, the best of which, probably, are in English. See Sansom, op. cit., pp. 464-467, Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, pp. 162-168, and Robert King Hall, Shushin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation, pp. 34-38. These three references contain English translations of the Rescript. But it should be borne in mind that no translation can ever convey the feeling of the original. Its words and phrases are emotion-loaded and culture-loaded. The English translation is only a pale copy of the original.

Rescript on Education and the early directives for all levels of education. Yet, it is possible to distinguish two or even three more periods in Japanese education before 1945. These are somewhat arbitrarily labelled: 1890-1930; 1930-1941; and 1941-1945. The first of these can be called the period of implementation and physical growth, or the middle period. The second, broadly viewed, is that of growing and intensified nationalism, or preparation for war. The third, of course, is the period of ultra-nationalism during the war years. However, since the fundamental ideas behind Japanese education did not change but only became intensified during the whole forty years, and since this discussion is mainly concerned with the ideas behind education and not so much with physical changes, as such, the whole period will be considered as a single unit, and will be outlined primarily from the standpoints of administration and ideology.

The main features of the period 1890-1945 are the gradual building up of a full-blown educational structure from kindergarten to university graduate work, the consolidation of the power and influence of the Ministry of Education and its subsidiary agencies in the prefectures, the building up and intensification of authoritarianism and hierarchy in education, and the expansion and intensification of nationalism and ultra-nationalism. Attention is first centered on the Ministry of Education and on those facts and ideas that tend to show more clearly the substructure of Japanese education. After this, the other features listed will be discussed as a whole mainly through a study of the educational directives and literature that are pertinent to the problem.

Perhaps the most pertinent question that can be asked is: How did Japanese education become so completely dominated by the Ministry of Education? The early origin of this power and influence has been mentioned. But how, after early attempts to liberalize education, was the Ministry able to stifle all such attempts and take unto itself the last word, the ultimate authority that decided everything important connected with schools, school subjects, religion, social education, and almost all things cultural and educational? It is hard for Americans to understand such all-out domination and control. But in Japan it became a quite natural thing. It was of course a reflection of the culture and the society, a reflection that even overemphasized the unilateral and hierarchical characteristics of the society. Yet educational domination and control did not spring up overnight. They were so ordered by the Japanese Government, but how did they become accepted, interiorized characteristics of Japanese education? The answer is that during the period from 1890 to about 1930 the Ministry of Education simply took it upon itself, legally of course, to lay down general policy, to issue the orders for implementing this policy in great detail, leaving little or no room for local implementation, and to see to it that the orders were carried out. If there was any early question as to the right to do this or as to the wisdom of it, certainly by 1930 little of it was left. The Minister of Education was master; prefectural governors and their assistants were secondary masters. The hierarchy was quite complete with the people and the teachers having little to say about what children should learn or how they should learn it.

And what the children must learn should have the function of ever strengthening the system. Thus we find, for example, the subject of Shūshin (Morals), with its emphasis on respect and obedience to superiors and loyalty to the Emperor, the heart and soul of the Japanese curriculum. The implications of this cannot be overemphasized. Since, under the Japanese system, ministers of state and all civil servants, including teacher and educational administrators, but especially Ministry of Education bureaucrats, were representatives of the Imperial will, respect and obedience to these functionaries were paramount. And not only was Shūshin taught at all levels (except university), but it must also permeate all other subjects of study.[1] And its basis, as shown above, was the Imperial Rescript on Education and the ideas that the Rescript embodied. The authoritarianism of the system, especially in view of later conditions during the Occupation, is apparent.

For the best understanding of the relationship of the Ministry of Education and Japanese education, it might be helpful to examine certain provisions of laws and ordinances that bear directly on this relationship. First, since they are perhaps the clearest evidence of Ministry of Education power, governmental ordinances which gave the various ministries of state

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[1] One sentence of Article I of the implementing ordinance to the Shōgakkō Rei is: "It is necessary always to be mindful of and teach moral education and civic education in all school subjects." Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, op. cit., I, 70. This is Mombushō Rei (Ministry of Education Ordinance) No. 14, August 21, 1900.

their great powers will be studied. Then, other ordinances as they refer to education will be taken up, with special emphasis on the powers of the Ministry of Education. Tracing some of these important policy statements and orders should be profitable for two reason: to understand how completely centralized educational authority was, and later to be able to see the contrast between these statements and the statements of administrative policy made in recent legislation, particularly in the Board of Education Law.

As early as 1872 the authority of the Ministry of Education was clearly laid down. Article I of the 1872 Gakusei says: "Educational administration of the whole country is controlled by the Department of Education."[1] As mentioned above, there was some modification of this when gakumu iin were ordered in 1879. But both the 1879 amd 1880 ordinances mentioned the control of the Ministry of Education of educational affairs in the country.[2] In 1893, however, an Imperial ordinance of the first importance was issued. This was the"Provisions for the Organization of the Several Government Ministries" which drew the lines of authority the newly-created cabinet ministers were to hold in their hands.[3] Articles IV, V, and VI of this

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[1] Kyōiku Shinkōkai, op. cit., p. 777. (Writer's translation.)

[2] 1880 Kyōiku Rei (Education Ordinance). Kuroda and Hijikata, op. cit., p. 41. This article was the same in the 1879 Ordinance, ibid., p. 37.

[3] Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 122, Kaku Shō Kansei Tsūsoku, October 31, 1893. See Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, op. cit., II, 607-611.

ordinance are very important for understanding the power of the Japanese bureaucracy and especially for understanding the reforms of the Occupation. They clearly show the great powers of the ministers of state, including the Minister of Education. Each minister may issue ministerial orders, with respect to the matters under his control, to prefectural governors. In addition, he exercises supervision over the governors, and if he disagrees with the regulations issued by the governors he may suspend or cancel them.[1] The line of authority was strong and clearcut. The Minister of Education was legally and practically the last word of authority in Japanese education. In matters relating to education, he had the authority to issue orders to prefectural governors--and of course did so. In effect, the orders were issued by his subordinates, the various Ministry bureau chiefs and their subordinates, to the subordinates of the governors. This meant that, until the Board of Education Law was passed in July, 1948, the Ministry of Education bureaucracy regarded itself as the master of the local bureaucracy. A chief of one of the bureaus of the Ministry of Education, for example, could and did issue orders on educational matters under his jurisdiction to his counterpart section chiefs under the prefectural governors. Due to the social and legal factors

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[1] Ibid., p. 607. For translations of these articles, see Appendix I.

mentioned above, these orders were never questioned; they were obeyed, and usually obeyed to the letter. This was of course one of the biggest obstacles to the democratization of Japanese education during the Occupation. The authoritarian values of the system were so well accepted that they amounted to fixed attitudes, with all the rigidity and resistance to change of any attitudes.

In the years that followed the issuance of the 1893 Imperial Ordinance, the powers of the Ministry of Education, if anything, became greater. An Imperial ordinance of 1942, as amended to 1947, outlining the organization of the Ministry of Education, shows that it controlled a very sizeable part of human activity.[1] It needs only to be said that the working of the system apparently was evenmore thoroughgoing in its centralized, authoritarian character. The Japanese bureaucracy exploited its allotted power to the fullest degree; it dominated every phase of education throughout the country.[2]

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[1] Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 748, November 1, 1942, as amended to 1947, Mombushō Kansei (Organization of the Ministry of Education), Articles I and II. Tokushima-ken Gakumuka, Genkō Tokushima-ken Gakurei Ruisan (Compilation of Current School Ordinances of Tokushima Prefecture), p. 528/27. Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1928/1948. (See Appendix I for a translation of these two articles.) It should also be remembered that the Ministry of Education had a Bureau of Thought Control which, with the backing of certain laws and ordinances, had great power over the life of the Japanese people, especially Japanese students and teachers. See Japan Department of Education, A General Survey of Education in Japan, pp. 58-59. Tokyo: Japan Department of Education, 1935. This bureau was first set up in 1934.

[2] Time and time again, the author and his colleagues were confronted by this seemingly impenetrable and immovable barrier to progress. When working toward some local reform or other, very often it would happen that the Ministry of Education

Before concluding the case on the power of the Ministry of Education, it might be profitable to compare the provisions cited above with provisions of a similar nature passed by the Diet in 1948. Hōritsu (Law) No. 120, July 10, 1948, as amended to March, 1950, Kokka Gyōsei Soshiki Hō (Law for the Organization of National Administration), delimits the power of the different ministries. Article XI of this law states that when ministers of state deem it necessary to enact, amend, or abolish laws or ordinances, they must present a draft of the proposal to the Prime Minister and request a Cabinet conference. Article XII states that ministers of state, for the purpose of implementing laws or ordinances, or acting under the special mandate of laws or ordinances, may issue instrumental orders with respect to the matters under their jurisdiction. Further, Article XII delimited the ministers' powers by hemming in the interpretation of the word "order." "Order" may not be interpreted to mean the setting up of penal regulations, the imposition of obligations, or the establishment of rules and regulations restricting the rights of citizens.[1] The difference between this law and

would send "suggestions" referring to the proposed reform and this ended any attempt at local autonomy. Unless directly ordered to take another line of action--and this was, for the most part, out of the question--the local educational administrators would then cleave faithfully to the line laid down by the Ministry. The frustration of Americans working toward educational reform, particularly if they did not understand the rationale of the system, can well be imagined.

[1] Mombushō Kambō Sōmuka, op. cit., I, 31-32. See Appendix I for translations of these articles.

similar pre-War laws is quite apparent and need not be labored.

During the 1930's and early 1940's, the Japanese educational system, faithfully reflecting national trends, reached the height of its hierarchical, authoritarian character. The voice of liberalism that was heard in the 1920's was effectively stilled by the government's repressive measures.[1] Thought control was the word, especially in education, and the implications of the Imperial Rescript on Education, other Imperial rescripts, and the directives of the Ministry of Education issued around the turn of the century were fully exploited in the cause of nationalism and ultra-nationalism. In fact, it might be said that the totalitarian tendencies of the 1930's went far beyond the original intentions of the Meiji planners. Certainly these leaders had well laid the ground for later developments, for it is hardly possible that without this groundwork the ultra-nationalists could have accomplished what they did. But while the earlier government fully intended that the country be centralized and dominated by Tokyo, they probably had little or no idea that their work would be turned to the imperialistic ends of the 1930's and the 1940's. Rather, it is more accurate to say that militarists and ultra-nationalists used the very convenient background of Japanese history and government, interpreted it

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[1] For a good account of the liberalism and the radicalism of the 1920's and the aftermath of this movement in the 1930's, see Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 467-518.

according to their desires and needs, and extended and distorted it to mean what they wanted it to mean. While it would be extremely hazardous to say that Japan could have become a democracy of some sort, it is fairly safe to say that she did not have to become so completely a totalitarian state. The trends of the 1920's show that there was considerable hope for at least some sort of liberalized constitutional monarchy. This was of course effectively squelched, and events took the unfortunate turn they did. Education almost as a matter of course became the compliant instrument of the militarists and ultra-nationalists.

What education became in the decade before World War II can be best understood by examining, if only briefly, the core of the ideology of the educational system as expressed in the Shūshin (Morals) texts and in two documents that allegedly portrayed the "Japanese Spirit" and the "Japanese National Polity." These latter were the Ministry of Education-produced Kokutai no Hongi (Essence of the National Entity, or Cardinal Principles of the National Entity or Polity) and Shimmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject). These books and the changing character of the Shūshin texts show very clearly the way the Empire was going. They showed, among other things, that Japan had, by 1937, thoroughly committed herself to "Japanism," to the Imperial Way (Kōdō). Western ideas and practices were to be examined and perhaps adopted, but were invariably to be subordinated and assimilated to the peculiar Japanese "National Entity" or "National Polity." We are here

not concerned with political developments, as such, but we must examine in some detail, in order clearly to understand later contrasts, what happened to Japanese education and Japanese thinking at this time. This can best be done by studying Kokutai no Hongi, Shimmin no Michi, and the Shūshin texts since these works constitute the best existing written epitomes of the ideology behind pre-War Japanese education and thinking.

Kokutai no Hongi was published by the Ministry of Education on March 30, 1937, and thousands of copies were distributed to the teaching personnel of the whole nation. From 1937 through the war years, approximately two million copies were printed and sold.[1] The effects of the book, of course, cannot now be accurately estimated, but it may have had a considerable impact since it was strongly played up by the government. To Westerners its ethnocentrism is obvious and almost naive, and its reasoning specious. But to many Japanese it must have been logical and compelling because of its emphasis on national pride and greatness and because of its very wide distribution and use throughout the entire educational system. And, too, its content fitted well into the whole background and fabric of Japanese education.

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[1] The entire text of this exceedingly important book has been ably translated by John Gauntlett (who worked for the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP) and edited by Robert King Hall. John Owen Gauntlett (trans.) and Robert King Hall (ed.), Kokutai no Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan). Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1949. Hall also has written an informative introduction, ibid., pp. 3-47, in which he gives the history of the work and its writing and also discusses the action of the Occupation in

Essentially, Kokutai no Hongi is a strong repudiation of Western ideas and influences, especially individualism, and an equally strong argument for the unique character and fate of the Japanese nation and the Japanese people. The following passages illustrate what is meant.

> Following the Meiji Restoration Occidental cultures poured in with a rush, and contributed immensely toward our national prosperity; but their individualistic qualities brought about various difficulties in all the phases of the lives of our people, causing their thoughts to fluctuate. However, now is the time for us to sublimate and assimilate these Occidental ideologies in keeping with our national entity, to set up a vast new Japanese culture, and, by taking advantage of these things, to bring about a great national development.[1]
>
> No true culture should be the fruit of abstract individual ideas alienated from the State and the race. Every cultural feature in our country is an embodiment of our national entity. . . in our culture there always subsists the spirit of the founding of the Empire, and this spirit is one in essence with our history.[2]

These excerpts clearly show what the authors were after: elimination of Western ideas and ideals and a complete cleaving to the peculiar essence of Japanism. This, of course, ratifies all the actions of the government. Thinking and criticism of governmental policies, then, are not in accord with the Japanese spirit. The essay's section on education has this to say:

> That education in our country is also wholly based on our national entity, that it makes the manifestation of this national entity its focal point, and that it has

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banning it. Another discussion of the book by Hall is Education for a New Japan, pp. 168-176.

[1] Gauntlett and Hall, op. cit., p. 178. The "sublimate and assimilate" might better have been "refine and absorb." The Japanese words are junka and sesshu. See Mombushō, Kokutai no Hongi, p. 114.

[2] Gauntlett and Hall, op. cit., p. 150.

> its distant source in the Way handed down to us since the founding ofthe Empire, is a fact we have seen to be equally true in the case of scholastic pursuits.[1]
>
> . . . "To guide" means the guiding of your children so that they may reach the Way. Just as the Emperior Meiji enjoined in the Imperial Rescript on Education, our education, for one thing, comprises the spirit of guarding and maintaining the prosperity of the Imperial Throne by following the august spirit manifested in the founding of the Empire in keeping with our national entity. Hence, this is entirely different in its essence from the mere development and perfection of oneself such as is seen in the idea of self-realization and perfection of one's character as set forth in individualistic pedagogies. . . Education whose object is the cultivation of the creative faculties of individuals or the development of individual characteristics is liable to be biased toward individuals and to be led by individual inclinations, and in the long run to fall into unplanned education, and so run counter to the principles of the education of our country.[2]

As Hall says, Kokutai no Hongi "establishes the whole structure of its political ultranationalism as the raison d'etre of education."[3]

The volume, Shimmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject)[4] was published on August 15, 1941.[5] According to Hall,

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[1] Ibid., p. 153.

[2] Ibid., p. 155.

[3] Hall, Education for a New Japan, p. 172.

[4] The word "Way" which is used so much in Japanese educational and other directives and constantly reiterated in Kokutai no Hongi, Shimmin no Michi, and the Shushin texts requires some explanation. The original is "michi," which has a large number of equivalents. Some of these are "path," "road," "way," "reason," "guidance," "course," "moral code," "moral principles," etc. The word carries connotations, as do many other Japanese words used in these texts and in official documents, which are not apparent in translation.

[5] This is the date on my copy of the booklet. Mombushō, Shimmin no Michi (The Way of the Subject). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1941. (For an English edition of the document, or of one of its versions, see Otto Tolischus, Tokyo Record, pp.

over a million copies and a million and a half commentaries were published.[1] The text of this document is inflamed, a quite frank admission that Japan was out to "emancipate East Asiatic nations and to diffuse the "great and glorious principle of the Empire to the world"--acting under the "Divine Mission." It was so strong, in fact, that the Ministry of Education prepared answers to possible questions as to its inflammatory nature that might be asked by the Diet.[2] In an introduction, Hisamatsu Senichi, a professor of Tokyo Imperial University and the man who prepared the original draft of Kokutai no Hongi, stated that Shimmin no Michi was written on the basis of the national polity (kokutai no hongi) and was to clarify the Way of the subject with respect to this national polity.[3] It is thus an extension and elaboration of the precepts of Kokutai no Hongi with emphasis on the subordination of the subject to the state and the Emperor and on the extension of the Empire's beneficent influence to other peoples. It is also a justification of the euphemism "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." A significant different between Kokutai no Hongi and Shimmin no Michi is that the latter is less theoretical

405-427. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1943. This translation differs considerably from my Japanese text.) But Hall says that there must have been several editions. Hall, Shushin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation, p. 68.

[1] Ibid., p. 69.

[2] Ibid., p. 69.

[3] Shimmin no Michi, pp. 1 and 3.

and historical and is directly aimed at imperialistic action. Perhaps most important, it discusses the world situation in 1941 from the Japanese point of view, and in so doing is probably the last word in Japanism and Japanese imperialism. The influence of the book is conjectural since little is known as to its distribution and use. Certainly its style and difficulty forbade its use and comprehension by the comman man of Japan--as was true also of Kokutai no Hongi. Nor was either book intended for Japanese students, except students in institutions of higher learning. Both books, rather, were aimed at Japanese educational leaders who were expected and ordered to transmit the ideas they contained to teachers and students. The important task of getting the message across to students in all schools below the highest levels was delegated to teachers and the essential message was conveyed, for the most part, in the Shūshin texts. The "legal" foundation of the "new" philosophy of education in the late 1930's and early 1940's and the importance attached to the Shūshin texts can be seen very clearly in the important Kokumin Gakkō (National Elementary School) directives. So before discussing the Shūshin texts and to elucidate part of the basis for the later nationalistic and militaristic emphases of these texts as well as to give the intrinsic flavor of Japanese education in the late 1930's and early 1940's, key passages from the Kokumin Gakkō directives will be cited and the advent of the Kokumin Gakkō

and some of the events leading up to it discussed.[1]

During the 1920's, the government apparently was dissatisfied with the practice of military training in the schools, and accordingly, in 1925, issued a directive to the effect that military officers on active duty would be assigned to give military instruction to male students in government and public schools above the elementary level and below the university level, that is, in normal schools, middle schools, _semmongakkō_ (specialist schools or colleges), technical schools, _kōtōgakkō_ (higher schools), etc.[2] This move can be considered the opening wedge in the campaign of the ultra-nationalists to convert the schools to their doctrines and purposes. The whole trend toward ultra-nationalism is epitomized in this early directive. Of course the directive was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of a larger movement which is well illustrated by a series of directives starting with an Imperial rescript issued shortly after the 1923 Earthquake. These directives (six in all), together with an Imperial rescript and an implementing ordinance from the

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[1] Brief accounts of the so-called National School Reform of 1941 can be found in Hall, _Education for a New Japan_, pp. 247-249, and in General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section, Education Division, _Education in the New Japan_. I, 39. Tokyo: GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., May, 1948.

[2] _Teikoku Hōki_, pp. 39/1-39/2. This is _Chokurei_ (Imperial Ordinance) No. 135, April 13, 1925, as amended to 1929, _Rikugun Geneki Shōkō Gakkō Haizoku Rei_ (Order for the Assignment (Attachment) to Schools of Army Officers on Active Duty). See, also, Keenleyside and Thomas, _op. cit._, pp. 117-119.

Ministry of Education, directed toward school youth, pointed out the new Japanese Way very clearly.[1] The first four of these--one Imperial rescript and three implementing directives--were issued in 1923. Their tone is moralistic with an accent on encouraging the "National Spirit." The original rescript may have been conceived as encouragement of a grief-stricken people, but it was used as a vehicle of a more acute attitude toward national virtues. The fifth of the directives, issued in 1933, as a ten-year commemoration of the issuance of the first one, came from the Prime Minister, and together with the usual moralistic exhortations, mentions the Japanese walking out of the League of Nations, and talks of the beauty of chūkō (loyalty and filial piety) and bravery. The Prime Minister's finishing note is " . . . the gradual strengthening of the National Spirit" and the glory of the Empire being exalted in the world. The last directive on the National Spirit came in 1937 and was again from the Prime Minister. The tone here is of course moral and exhortative, as usual, but there is an added element. He speaks of the Empire desiring stability in the Far East, and in coalition with China, wishing to plant the foundations of world peace and likewise showing the same road to all countries. China always forgets the friendship of her neighbor, loses faith, and for many years with a government

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[1] Shimmin no Michi says that about the time of the Imperial Rescript after the Earthquake (1923) the "Back to the Japan Spirit" began. I had arrived at this conclusion before I saw the statement in Shimmin no Michi primarily from a study of ordinances and rescripts of the time.

policy of anti-Japanism, disregards the power of the Empire, brings about extreme violence, and finally causes the present Incident (the "China Incident"). This rationalization is used to tell the nation that he must have its help, etc., etc.[1]

Two other documents, issued in 1939, further set the tone of Japanism and Japanese education. They were an Imperial rescript and an implementing Ministry of Education ordinance to school pupils. The rescript is an exhortation to school children and youth to take up great responsibilities and burdens, to be frugal, to respect morals, to nourish the country's strength, and so on. The implementing ordinance is similar, and concludes with the words, "We must expect humble response to the unlimited Imperial Grace."[2] The trend toward tighter authoritarianism can clearly be seen. But it was to go even further.

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[1] All six of these documents can be found in Teikoku Hōki, pp. 3-5 and 5/2. The later Shūshin textbooks nearly always included one or more of these. The Imperial rescripts to be found in the beginning of the Shūshin texts, at least those for the secondary schools, are: The Imperial Rescript on Education (included in all Shūshin texts), the Meiji 1886 Rescript (the Charter Oath), the Boshin Rescript (a sort of follow-up to the Education Rescript and issued in 1908. Boshin is a zodiacal date.), and the above-mentioned rescript to pupils. Others sometimes included are the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (Emperor Meiji, 1895), the Rescript on the withdrawal from the League of Nations, etc. It must be remembered that this sort of thing was discussed in Shūshin classes with guidance for the "discussion" coming from ordinances like the Prime Minister's and with Ministry of Education instructions as to how they should be represented.

[2] Ibid., p. 5/3. There are a great many other interesting directives that would well repay careful study. During the twenty years before the War, and during the War, hundreds of them were issued on education alone. These included directives from military matters to baseball.

The nationalistic trend reached its educational culmination in the National School Reform of 1941, a reform which was the apotheosis of nationalistic Japanism. It was a reform along the lines laid down in the above-discussed directives and in Kokutai no Hongi and Shimmin no Michi, and was mainly ideological and curricular. The most obvious change, and a significant one, was the name of the elementary school: from Shōgakkō (elementary school) to Kokumin Gakkō (National Elementary School or National School). In December, 1938, the Kyōiku Shingikai (Education Investigation Council), a committee or council set up to advise the Ministry of Education, proposed a change in the public school system. The Ministry studied the proposal, accepted it, and put it into effect in April, 1941. Actually, the system hardly had a chance to get started due to the War. The following extracts from the Kokumin Gakkō Rei (National Elementary School Ordinance) and the implementing ordinance to this ordinance sum up rather well what the educational system was intended to become. The first extract is Article I of the original ordinance.

> Article I: The purpose of the Kokumin Gakkō is to give ordinary elementary education in accordance with the Imperial Way, and to achieve fundamental civic training of the people.[1]

A comparison of this article with previously cited elementary school directives will show that here we have a bald statement of national purpose unalloyed with "educational" substance.

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[1] Chokurei (Imperial Ordinance) No. 148, March 1, 1941, as amended to March, 1943, Kokumin Gakkō Rei. Teikoku Hōki, p. 44 (Writer's translation.)

This is a departure from the past, and yet a logical continuation of the past. Even better for seeing the contrast are the following excerpts from Article I of the implementing ordinance.

> . . . Following the purport of the Imperial Rescript on Education, pervading all of education there must be training in the Imperial Way, and especially there must be deepened faith in the National Polity. . . Along with clarifying the special characteristics of our national culture, pupils should be acquainted with the situation in the Far East and in the world, led to realize the position and mission of the Empire, and led to cultivate a great national quality.[1]

Article II of this important document makes another radical change: Shūshin, history, geography, and national language (Japanese) are included together under a new category, Kokuminka (National Subjects), with Shūshin the first of these. Shūshin had been the first and most important subject for many years--since 1880, in fact--but now a new element has been added. To an older definition, ". . . Shūshin, based on the Imperial Rescript on Education should guide to the practice of national virtue, should nurture the morals of children," is added, "and should arouse (children) to the moral mission of the Empire."[2] The statements for the middle schools, the higher schools, and the normal schools are similar. They all follow the Imperial Way, etc., etc.[3]

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[1] Mombushō Rei (Ministry of Education Ordinance) No. 4, March 14, 1941, as amended to 1946, Kokumin Gakkō Rei Shiko Kisoku (Implementing Regulations of the National Elementary School Ordinance). Ibid., p. 50. (Writer's translation.)

[2] Ibid., p. 50 (Article III, Kokumin Gakkō Rei Shiko Kisoku).

[3] Ibid., pp. 88, 90, and 92.

The importance of the 1941 change in the school system is what it stood for: it was the educational culmination and implementation of the ulta-nationalism, anti-individualism, and anti-foreignism that had been growing since the 1920's and 1930's, the logical culmination of an educational system ridden with thought-control. It was the final step in centralization and authoritarianism.

The all-important subject of Shūshin (Morals) has been referred to a number of times but only in passing. At this point it might be wise to inquire into it a bit more specifically so that when later Occupation changes are discussed they can be understood in their proper context. Then, too, no discussion of Japanese education is complete without mention of Shūshin.

Shūshin's number one position in the Japanese public school curriculum has been mentioned. Its predominance and emphasis remained pretty much the same for forty years. The early Shūshin texts had a more or less neutral Japanese moral emphasis which remained the same from 1890 to 1920. The texts were highly, and even naively, moralistic, and stressed the homely virtues.[1] They stressed, of course, the Confucian

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[1] One might say the same about American and British school readers of the time, but there is a decided difference. The morals in Western readers were based on a general Christian philosophy which most Americans and Englishmen subscribed to without propaganda. The morals in Japanese readers, however, were part of a definite, carefully planned indoctrination program to change a trend in thinking and to help perpetuate older values that were threatened by outside influences. See Abe, op. cit., II, 1090, where the writer says, "Just as the morals of foreign countries are based on religion, the morals of Japan are based on the Imperial Rescript on Education."

concepts of on (obligation), chū (loyalty), and kō (filial piety). But their emphasis on national virtues and duties during the earlier years was only moderate. While they contained the seeds of later nationalism, extreme nationalism did not appear in the Shūshin books until the 1930's and 1940's. The books for the first three years of the elementary school stress the ordinary personal virtues together with general Japanese orientation for the young child. From the fourth year on, civic virtues are stressed and duty to country, loyalty, filial piety, education, elections, the qualities of the "Good Japanese," etc. are discussed. The texts for the upper elementary school are similar. They simply extend and elaborate the previous teaching.[1] As Kikuchi says, these texts are one long commentary on the Imperial Rescript on Education. It is hard to find anything "dangerous" in them. What is dangerous is the implication behind Shūshin and the potentialities it contains for unlimited development along nationalistic and ultra-nationalistic lines and along the lines of thought-control.[2]

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[1] Part of this discussion on early Shūshin is based on Kikuchi, op. cit., pp. 149-163, and part on personal knowledge of the texts.

[2] See Hall, Shūshin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation, pp. 13-21, for an illuminating discussion of the implications of the Shūshin texts. See, also, Kerlinger, op. cit., for further discussion. A good treatment of the subjects, in English but strictly from the Japanese point of view, can be found in World Conference Committee, Japanese Education Association, Proceedings of the Seventh Biennial Conference of the World Federation of Education Associations, IV, 386-416. Tokyo: W. C. C., J. E. A., 1938.

The later Shūshin texts faithfully reflected the direction and emphasis of the ordinances cited above. On, chū, and kō were repeated more often, and these concepts were bent to nationalistic and authoritarian ends to a greater extent. The texts, like the directives, especially emphasized chū (or chūkun, loyalty to the Emperor) and related concepts. At first there was a slight but perceptible change in emphasis: pupils must be made to realize the "National Polity of Japan" and to perceive the "special characteristics of Japanese national morality." As an antidote to "Dangerous Thoughts" the government prescribed a liberal dose of Confucian morals plus chauvinism, and there was a gradually increasing emphasis--it might almost be called nationalistic hysteria--on the "Japanese Way," "The National Polity," "The Sacred Mission of Japan in the Far East and in the World," and so forth. And so it was during the period 1930-1945 that the potentialities of the Imperial Rescript on Education began to appear, and the seemingly innocuous wording of the earlier directives and Shūshin texts began to take on new meaning and character. It must be pointed out here that, as Hall says, it is difficult for a non-Japanese to understand this when he reads translations of directives and textbooks. The Shūshin texts and the directives were loaded with emotional overtones, difficult for the foreigner to grasp but well calculated to inculcate in the Japanese breast unilateral, undeviating feelings of patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor and to Dai Nippon.

What is the content of the later Shūshin books and

why was this content so "dangerous" to the Occupation that it was banned? How did it differ from the earlier content of the Meiji Shūshin texts? Answers to these questions will greatly help us to understand the drastic nature of Occupation reforms and to appreciate the ideological magnitude of the Occupation task in education and in thought--to change a nation's educational system from authoritarianism to democracy.

The first thing that strikes the student of Shūshin when comparing Meiji and later texts is the great difference in emphasis and content. The contextual method is similar: repeated exhortations on virtues, stories heavily embellished with moral points, explanations of Confucian concepts and morals, and increasing complexity of content and language with repetition of ideas in the ascending school years. In the Meiji texts the main emphasis was on Confucian morals and on Japanese morals. In the later books, however, this emphasis was supplanted by an emphasis on Empire propaganda. It is interesting to compare the tables of contents of books of different periods. For example, the primary school third year books for 1893, 1930, and for 1943 show significant contrasts. An examination of these tables will show that there are great differences in content and treatment between the first and third sets, with the second set somewhere between, even if the basic ideology is practically the same.[1] The Meiji text emphasizes

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[1]See Appendix II for translations of these tables of contents. The third-year books were selected at random. Almost any year would probably show the same or similar differences.

homely virtues, Japanese virtues, and even military virtues, but all are given approximately equal treatment; they are all considered part of the virtues of the "Good Japanese." But in the 1943 volume military and allied virtues of blind loyalty and self-effacement for the military cause are very much paramount. The 1930 book shows a midway treatment leaning toward the 1943 side: the older system has been considerably altered and is somewhat nationalistic but still not yet ultra-nationalistic.[1]

It should be apparent that the Shūshin courses and texts were the most influential instruments of the Japanese educational system for accomplishing the government's purposes. They dominated the curricula of almost all schools, certainly of

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[1] To give the flavor of characteristic Shūshin lessons, which are somewhat different from Hall's translations and which directly illustrate a portion of the Japanese philosophy of education, the writer has translated two lessons from a 1941 middle school book and included them in this thesis as Appendix III. These lessons are called "School" and "On to the Teacher." The latter is particularly interesting because of its centering around the concept of on (defined as "obligation" of a non-onerous kind, usually to the Emperor, to teachers, and to parents). See Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, pp. 99-116. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1946, for what is probably the best discussion in English of this difficult concept. Excellent descriptions of on and related concepts can also be found in Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan, pp. 133-177. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. A recent Japanese description is Sakurai Shōtarō, Nippon Hoken Shakai Ishiki Ron (Japanese Feudal Social Consciousness). Tokyo: Nikkō Shoin, 1949. Sakurai's discussion is mostly based on Japanese literature. For translations of elementary school texts, see Hall, Shushin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation. The observations and conclusions on Shūshin of this thesis are based on a wide range of Shūshin texts in my possession, (Hall's book is a translation of the books that were used in the first six years of the elementary school during one short period, 1936-1940), on conversations with informed Japanese educators, and, of course, on inference from study of official documents.

most of the schools; they helped fix the attitudes and mores of a nation. And these attitudes and mores were the direct and indirect results of a carefully planned and nurtured government policy. Before the Meiji Restoration, there were no such general attitudes. But after the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education, the Confucian philosophy of the ruling classes was transmuted into a general philosophy for the common people, for all Japanese, and, most important, it was a philosophy made acceptable to and accepted by the Japanese people. This, of course, was because the government did not take a strange, new philosophy but rather took an old, fairly familiar one, one congenial to the Japanese mind and to Japanese culture, and with extreme cleverness and even wisdom, from the Japanese point of view, adapted it to the desired national ends. To deny the efficiency and the efficacy of the system is to be unrealistic. The intellectual Japanese may say, nonsense, but it is nonetheless completely true that the Japanese people accepted, believed, and acted upon the basis of this philosophy. And the evidence was apparent during the Occupation, and is still apparent after the Peace Treaty. In fact, had it not been for this philosophy, the Americans who went into Japan after the War and worked and lived there would not have had the security they did have. The Japanese are not a submissive people to an enemy. And they were not submissive to the Americans of the Occupation, at least not in the Western sense. Had it not been for the severe discipline of Japanese life and the Japanese school system and the built-up

philosophy of complete loyalty and obedience to the Emperor and to superiors, there would be many Americans who would never have left Japan alive.

There was, then, during the 1940's,an all-out effort to indoctrinate thoroughly all students in all schools in the Imperial Way. The Confucian virtues were raised to the nth power of loyalty, obedience, and sacrifice for the Emperor. The directives showed the Way; the Shūshin texts helped implement the Way. The technique was unlimited repetition of emotion-loaded words, phrases, stories, and proverbs, using the long-familiar, heavily moral phraseology of the Shūshin texts but with the latent potentialities of the language realized for ultra-nationalistic and authoritarian ends. The method was efficient, thorough, effective. It succeeded in creating the "Good Japanese" who did not think or act like an individual nor wanted to, and who could not make an individual decision. His thinking was group thinking; his decisions were group decisions. And the group decisions were hierarchical, authoritarian, and emotional,governed by power minorities. All Japanese life was colored by Shūshin and by the powerful ideas behind Shūshin. Almost every Japanese individual's thoughts and actions were complete and thorough jobs of psychological indoctrination ever seen in the history of the world.

It seems very clear from the evidence that the Japanese educational system was thoroughly authoritarian in

its ideals and methods. The officials that ran the system were authoritarian, as were the teachers who actually taught the children. The political and social systems, too, must have been authoritarian, and the children produced by the whole system, must have learned authoritarian ideals and ideas. As adults, in turn, they must have passed on their attitudes to their offspring and their pupils. In sum, then, the Occupation of Japan faced, in September, 1945, a society whose basic ways of thinking and doing were very opposed to the ways of doing and thinking that the Occupation was to attempt to teach. Since the Occupation was to teach democracy with its emphasis on individual freedom, autonomy, and responsibility, its task was to effect changes in political, economic, and social institutions, and even more drastic changes in the mores and attitudes of the Japanese people. It is evident how complex, enormous, and difficult a task this was. Even on a small scale, effecting a change from authoritarianism to democracy is difficult enough. In view of the firmness and depth of authoritarian attitudes in Japanese education, it would seem that the Occupation attempted an impossible task. Yet, to a certain considerable extent, the goal was successfully reached. We now turn to a consideration of how this was done.

CHAPTER III

THE MACHINERY OF CHANGE--THE OCCUPATION

In order to understand the very complicated picture of educational reform in Japan during the Occupation, it is necessary to grasp clearly the role of the Ministry of Education, Occupation policy and its implementation, the three phases of Japanese and Occupation effort into which the overall reform breaks down, and the contrasts to be noted between the older and the newer systems. It was against this wide background of national reform and activity that the climax of the educational reform, the election of boards of education, took place. This background also makes educational reform in Japan and in Shikoku understandable.

It is difficult to assay the extent to which the Ministry of Education advanced or obstructed educational reform in Japan during the Occupation. Many Americans who were presumably in a position to know the situation insist that the Ministry was obstructionist; others say that basically the Ministry was behind the reforms of the Occupation and that only here and there did obstructionism occur.[1] No easy and clear answer is possible. That there should have been a

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[1] Neither statement, of course, can ever be substantiated beyond the opinion of observers. It seems to the writer, however, that the latter is the more realistic and more accurate view psychologically. For an excellent discussion of Japanese cooperation during the Occupation, see Edwin O. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 218-234. This statement and others following it are

good deal of obstructionism seems obvious--the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Education knew only one way of doing things, and certainly many of them could only have been convinced that the proposed reforms of the Occupation would be deleterious to the Japanese educational system and to Japan. Others might have been equally convinced that the reforms would be good for Japan. The safest statement to make, perhaps, is that a good majority of them were well-intentioned but confused. They were asked to assimilate and propagate educational reforms whose basic philosophy was very different from that which they had learned and worked under. Many of them, to be sure, tried to do this. It is probable that only a small minority of the Ministry of Education personnel was opposed to the proposed reforms. A well-balanced view, then, of educational reform in Japan during the Occupation must take into account the confusions and contradictions which will naturally arise from the close impact of two different cultures and philosophies of life and education. On the one hand was the Japanese system with its authoritarianism and idealism; on the other hand was the American system with its democracy and pragmatism. No contrast could be more clearcut. No differences would seem to be so irreconcilable. It is therefore little wonder that Japanese education officials should have been bewildered, little wonder that much of what they did should have seemed obstructionist. It is much more to be wondered at that an ultimate reconciliation of these opposed views (with a distinct edge toward the American side) was not only possible but was

made on the basis of conversations with staff members of the Education Division, CI&E, SCAP, with local Japanese officials, and on other personal knowledge.

actually achieved.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the Ministry of Education was the executive instrument for the educational will of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Before the capitulation of Japan it had been contemplated that educational administration would be much more directly in American hands.[1] As it turned out, the very wise and very practical objective of the Occupation, right from the start, was to let the Japanese run their own affairs--with American advice and assistance in the background. This system had several advantages over a more direct system, among which the most important were that it closely resembled Japanese governmental administration and thinking and thus was well understood by the Japanese, and overwhelmingly important, it threw responsibility and autonomy directly into Japanese hands and started re-education in the only way that could have achieved long-range success. Its greatest disadvantage was that it was very hard for the rank and file Japanese and American to understand why it was so imperative for Americans to keep a hands-off policy, even to the point of allowing, sometimes, serious mistakes to occur.[2]

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[1] John D.. Montgomery, "Administration of Occupied Japan: First Year," Human Organization, VIII (Summer, 1949), 4-16.

[2] This policy probably caused most of the troubles of Americans working in Japanese education. Many, or most, of them simply could not understand it; they persisted in doing the job themselves; they persisted in interfering, and thus helped weaken Japanese responsibility and autonomy. No more striking example of this can be found than the curiously ethnocentric policy and implementation of policy of the education officers of the I Corps' area (from Kyoto south).

What has been said of the Ministry of Education is true, more or less, of other Japanese education officials: in general, they were well-intentioned, cooperative, but confused. And this confusion was not helped by the occasional contradictions in Occupation policy that persisted in occurring in Tokyo and in the local areas.[1] All in all, however, it can be said that the Ministry of Education ably performed the very difficult functions of being the executive agency of Occupation educational reform and the intermediary between SCAP and Japanese education personnel all over the country. Although it was often very weak in this latter function and although there was a contradiction in using the agency which was formerly the executive arm of Japanese educational authoritarianism to implement democratic policies, it was also unavoidable. The circumstances being what they were, it is hard to see how any other policy would have been possible.[2]

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[1] Braibanti has ably outlined one of the sources of greatest contradiction: the different conceptions of Occupation policy held by SCAP and by local commanders and officers of Military Government teams and the assumption of enforcement powers by local Military Government officers. Ralph J. D. Braibanti, "Occupation Controls in Japan," Far Eastern Survey, XVII (September, 1948), 215-219. It should be pointed out, though, that Braibanti's view is rather extreme, and was based on his experience during the early part of the Occupation. (And he spent most of his time working in only one prefecture, Yamanashi.) The situation definitely improved later. See, also, Montgomery, op. cit.

[2] For a detailed account of this whole situation, see Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, pp. 249-266 and 287-292. For the official Occupation viewpoint, see GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, I, 135 ff. A definitive and objective account of Japanese education during the Occupation, the policy of SCAP, and the difficulties and contradictions within this policy has yet to be written.

The role of the Ministry of Education was to "initiate" those changes considered necessary to the democratization of Japanese education. Most of the reforms, naturally, were proposed by SCAP education officers. The earlier negative measures were accomplished in part by SCAP directives to the Japanese Government.[1] Almost all the changes initiated by American and Japanese officials after the first negative period were based on the recommendations of the United States Education Mission to Japan[2] and the Japanese Education Reform Council.[3] In brief, the system was as follows. SCAP officers would decide that such-and-such action was necessary. They would then confer with their Ministry of Education counterparts and "suggest" that the action be taken. Theoretically, the details of the action would be left to the Japanese; practically, the Americans would often outline in considerable detail what they considered to be appropriate measures for implementing the action. This was particularly true early in

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[1] See ibid., II, 25-47, for copies of the most important of these directives affecting education.

[2] The United States Education Mission arrived in Japan in March, 1946, and studied the situation for one month. It drew up its excellent report in the same month Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan. Tokyo: SCAP, March 30, 1946.

[3] For a report of this council, see Japanese Education Reform Council, Education Reform in Council. Report of the JERC, 1950. A perusal of this report by an uninformed reader would lead to the impression that the JERC was mainly responsible for the educational reforms made in Japan. This was supposed to be true, but the facts were probably otherwise. The JERC probably had little influence during the first half of the Occupation, and very likely not much more influence later. For the future acceptance and amalgamation of the reforms made, however, it would be a good thing if the Japanese people were to believe this fiction.

the Occupation. Later, as the Japanese gained experience and confidence, it became less necessary to suggest implementation. If acceptable to them, the Ministry officials would work out a draft of a directive to prefectural governors, submit this draft to the American education officers (many directives they did not submit), and if approved, send it out through Japanese channels.[1] In its main outline, the same system was used in the prefectures, except that, during the early Occupation and even later, local education officers were often more authoritarian in their methods. Variations of this procedure of course occurred, especially when the Japanese were opposed to or did not clearly understand a proposed measure. This is not the point here, however. What is important is the fact that the proposed democratization of Japanese education was being attempted by using the very agency which had above all other educational agencies stood for hierarchical authoritarianism and by using almost the same administrative methods that were described in Chapter II.

The administrative policy of SCAP in educational reform and the role of the Ministry of Education have been suggested above. The American and Japanese systems of implementation of SCAP and Ministry of Education Policy will

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[1] Based on what has been told the writer by SCAP education officers and by Japanese officials, on sitting in on two SCAP-Ministry of Education informal conferences, and on other personal experience.

now be outlined together since they are essentially inseparable and since they point up an important contrast to the system that now exists in Japan.[1] It is not the function of this thesis to discuss the actual educational changes made, except as they throw light on the original hypotheses set up. The function is, rather, to examine and analyze the older and newer systems for basic ideological, administrative, and psychological contrasts.

The Japanese system of educational administration, as it worked in practice during the early Occupation, was very much the same as it had been before the end of the War. The Ministry of Education, or the appropriate section of the Ministry, would write a "directive" to prefectural governors ordering or suggesting that a certain action be taken. Many of these directives, as outlined above, originated in SCAP headquarters, either from the Education Division of the Civil Information and Education Section or from other sections concerned with educational change.[2] The governors, on

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[1] This point is very important since much of the criticism of educational reform in Japan has centered around the fact that SCAP used the centralized government to achieve the reforms desired, and thus, according to the critics' argument, defeating the fundamental purpose of the Occupation: decentralization of educational administration. But, as will become apparent later, the aim of decentralization was in mind all the time, and the use of the central government was an unavoidable temporary expedient.

[2] For example, the so-called purge directives of educational personnel originated, in good part, in the Government Section of SCAP. See Govt, Sect. SCAP, op. cit., I, 10-81. An excellent but unpublished source of early Ministry of Education directives is: "Digests of the More Important Ministry

receiving the directive, would refer it to their appropriate staff officers. (This was in theory, of course. Actually, the directives went directly to the section chiefs concerned.) The staff officers would then refer the directive with appropriate comments or orders to one or more subordinates. The subordinates would transmit the directive or its substance usually to local executives--mayors and headmen--or to municipal and gun (county) subordinates or directly to schools. This was the essential procedure. Variations naturally occurred.

Alongside this Japanese administrative setup was a roughly comparable Occupation structure. When an important directive was issued by the Ministry of Education, or a SCAP directive issued to the Ministry,[1] the American implementing arm of the Occupation, the Eighth Army, was notified and sometimes given instructions as to what should be done by American personnel to see to the implementation of the directive. In the absence of explicit instructions, it was assumed that American field personnel knew what to do.[2] Although inadequate information to the field from SCAP on

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of Education Orders and Directives Issued Since the End of the War, 10 May 1946." Tokyo: GHQ, SCAP, CIE Sect., Educ. Div., May 10, 1946 (mimeographed--in writer's possession). Collections of these digests were sent to Military Government teams from time to time, and thus the titles differ somewhat from that given above (dates). Many of the early directives can be found in GHQ, SCAP, CIE Sect., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, II, 131-256.

[1] It should be noted that quite early in the Occupation a number of directives referring to education were issued by SCAP directly to the Japanese Government. The administrative system, however, was the same. The only difference was in emphasis. The "direct" directive had more weight than SCAP-"suggested" Japanese directives.

[2] See Appendix IV for the basic Civil Education

Japanese governmental action was a serious weakness of American Occupation administration, this system worked fairly well. Its greatest defect was the fact that almost never did American or Japanese prefectural personnel have anything to say about what should or should not be done. Military Government education officers in the prefectures did have a reporting system by means of which they could report on the effects of directives or other action, but even when these reports were seen seldom were they effective in changing the minds of Tokyo administrators and advisors. It is quite likely that the Supreme Commander himself never saw more than diluted or distorted versions of the reports.[1]

The educational structure of the Occupation Forces was more hierarchical and complex than the Japanese. Beneath SCAP, which was essentially a policy headquarters, was the Eighth Army with a very large headquarters in Yokohama. On the staff of the Eighth Army Commander (a Lt. General) was a Senior Military Government Officer (Major General, Brigadier General, or Colonel). Under this latter officer there was a CI&E Officer (Lt. Colonel or Major) and an Assistant

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directive, Operational Directive 19, February 26, 1947, from Eighth Army to all Military Government units. This directive was originally an order from SCAP to the Commanding General, Eighth Army (AG 000.8 (18 Jan 47), CIE, 18 January 1947, "CI&E Projects"). See, also, Appendix V for the revised Civil Education directive, issued October 4, 1949. O. D. 19 was the fundamental guide for regional and prefectural CE officers; all their work was presumably guided by it. O. D. 52 (the revision) was not nearly as influential as O. D. 19. O. D. 19, together with the job descriptions given in Appendices VIa and VIb, give a good idea of the scope of the CE officer's job.

[1] This was common knowledge among American education personnel in Japan. The writer deduced from remarks made by

CI&E Officer (civilian) who had a small staff to assist them. In 1946, there were two corps headquarters under Army in Sendai (northeastern Japan) and Kyoto (southwestern Japan), five dependent regions, and three "independent" regions. Two of these latter regions were independent because their areas were under the tactical command of British Commonwealth troops, and these troops had little or nothing to do with Military Government. The other region was directly under Eighth Army. The two corps had similar setups to Army's: a Senior Military Government Officer (Colonel)[1] and a CI&E Officer (civilian) and Assistant CI&E Officer (civilian) with Japanese personnel, for the most part, as assistants.[2] Under corps were the regional headquarters which were purely for Military Government purposes and which were situated at central points of the various regions of Japan. With one or two exceptions, there were no Japanese counterparts to these eight regions or to their personnel.[3] Finally, under the regions

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the Chief of CI&E, SCAP, in a conversation in 1948, that General MacArthur probably never saw any original Military Government reports.

[1] Actually, this officer and his subordinates were not assigned as corps officers. It was almost pure accident that they had the corps titles. The true title of the corps Military Government commanding officer was Region Senior Military Government Officer. But since they did their business in the same buildings as the commanding generals of the two corps they were considered to be and treated as corps staff officers. This had no small influence on actual Military Government administration and operation in the field.

[2] From January, 1947, to August, 1947, the writer was Assistant CI&E Officer of the IX Corps in Sendai.

[3] This regional system was adopted from the Japanese regional administration which was set up for war purposes. The Japanese abandoned it after the War.

The regions were: Hokkaido (IX Corps), Tohoku (IX

were the Military Government teams themselves, the true operational level of the Occupation. The Senior Military Government Officer (Lt. Colonel) of each of the forty-eight prefectural teams had under him staff officers (usually from 2nd Lieutenant to Major or civilians with appropriate Civil Service rank) among whom was the CI&E Officer (later CE Officer). The CI&E Officer was responsible for the surveillance and guidance of the Japanese prefectural education personnel, from the Education Chief down to the school teacher, to see that the educational policies of SCAP were carried out. Actually, most CI&E officers did far more than this. Some of them, especially early in the Occupation, almost tried to run the educational programs in their areas. In addition, they had responsibility for encouraging local associations, inspecting schools, engineering informational programs, and in general being a sort of super-superintendent of education.[1]

It can be seen that the American structure was complex and unwieldy. Despite repeated recommendations and demands for simplification and reform, it was not essentially altered until July, 1949, when an order was issued by SCAP drastically

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Corps), Kanto (IX Corps), Tokyo-Kanagawa (directly under Eighth Army), Tokai-Hokuriku (I Corps), Kinki (I Corps), Chugoku (directly under Eighth Army), Shikoku (directly under Eighth Army), and Kyushu (I Corps).

[1] See Appendix VIa. This is a job description of a prefectural CE Officer. See Appendix VIb for the regional CE Officer's job description (the writer's). Actually, these job descriptions are later ones; thus the use of CE instead of CI&E. In 1948, the CI&E function was broken down into CI and CE.

changing the whole setup of Civil Affairs (the new name adopted in 1948 to take the place of Military Government). Civil Affairs teams were ordered to start gradual liquidation and a date was set (December 31, 1949) for the discontinuance of the Civil Affairs sections of Army and the two corps. Regional Civil Affairs headquarters were maintained and put directly under SCAP. They were to take over all field functions.[1] However, although the American system was much slower and more inefficient than the Japanese, it accomplished its purposes fairly well,[2] and it is due in good part to the hard, sincere work of many Military Government CI&E officers that the system worked as well as it did. Knowledge of the system is important for an understanding of education under the Occupation, and

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[1] Letter Order, AG 320 (25 July 49) SGS, from GHQ, SCAP, to Commanding General, Eighth Army, "Reorganization of Civil Affairs Activities," July 25, 1949. This order was sent out without much advance warning and caused a great commotion among Civil Affairs personnel. Some were shocked and disappointed; others were gratified. The regions were discontinued in 1950, and Civil Affairs ended in 1951. (The reader should know that the terms Military Government (MG) and Civil Affairs (CA) are interchangeable. In this thesis, the former term is most used, but when writing of events after July, 1949, the latter term is used.)

[2] Out of the complex variety of reasons for this, an important one was that a good deal of administrative autonomy was achieved willy-nilly by local Military Government Officers because of inadequacies of Occupation communication. While Shikoku communication with higher headquarters was very good during the time Shikoku was directly under Eighth Army, Shikoku was relatively neglected by officers and visitors from higher headquarters because of its comparative isolation. The prefectural officer got his autonomy somewhat as follows. He would have to take action in the absence of any precedent or orders because he either could not get through to headquarters or because headquarters would not give him an answer to his questions. Another point is that the region officers often took responsibility for supplying interpretations of Eighth Army, SCAP, and Japanese Government policy.

especially important in view of the radical changes in administration made by the Board of Education Law of 1948.

From the brief description of the Japanese educational administrative machinery during the period 1945 to the middle of 1948, it is evident that there was not too much difference from the pre-war system. The big difference was in the content of education; the manner in which the reforms were accomplished was much like the older down-the-line authoritarian system. The existing structure was "purified" and used by the occupiers. But their ultimate goal was always to change the system itself, too. Criticisms of the Occupation using the bureaucratic and hierarchical Ministry of Education in order to accomplish reforms which the personnel of this Ministry could not understand are quite logical. But the early changes had to be made and made quickly. The school system had to be put into immediate operation--in September, 1945, the whole system had practically stopped.[1] Immediate decentralization was impossible. Such a decentralization would have required a very large force of trained American and Japanese personnel to implement it. This personnel did not exist or was not available. What was done was probably the only possible course of action-- at the time. It is not meant here to condone the many mistakes made nor the prolongation of the hierarchical system beyond reason. The system long outlived its real usefulness, and even helped

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[1] GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, I, 31.

to slow down educational reform by strengthening and perpetuating at least part of the Ministry of Education stranglehold on education.[1]

Shikoku's place in this early scheme of things was much the same as it had been before the Occupation. Except for purged officials and teachers, there was little change in administration and thinking. There was, of course, change in content. But even this change was superficial. When the writer arrived in Shikoku in August, 1947, the educational situation, speaking administratively and psychologically, was not too much different from what it had been during, say, 1939. The ideology and part of the content had changed. But Japanese educational thinking and doing had not caught up with the ideological change. The practices and thinking of authoritarianism were used to "further" educational ideas of democracy.

Educational administration in Shikoku paralleled that of other regions of Japan. There were the four education chiefs of the prefectures, members of the staffs of the four governors, who had under them the prefectural education offices or sections which handled most of the educational administration necessary for their prefectures. These education sections were broken down into subsections responsible for school education, physical education, social education,

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[1] Even now the effort to re-establish the Ministry of Education in its position of power is being made. See Luhmer's excellent article: Nicholas Luhmer, S.J., "Revision of the Post-war Educational Reform in Japan?" School and Society, LXXV (May 31, 1952), 337-340. See, also, Nippon Times, April 21,

and general affairs (personnel, finance, etc.). Each of these subsections had its chief and its staff. It was the responsibility of the prefectural education office to transmit the wishes of the Ministry of Education and of the Occupation Forces (Shinchūgun)[1] to local administrators, mainly town and village chiefs, gun (county) officials, and school principals.[2] Fortunately or unfortunately, there was considerable confusion from top to bottom due to lack of understanding of the changes being made.

One of the specific duties of the American education officer was to help Japanese administrators and teachers understand the content changes being made.[3] According to the size and presumed importance of the prefecture, there were one,

1952, (editorial), December 29, 1951 (editorial), and March 19, 1952 (article, "Local Bodies Hit Education Plan," p. 7). The Ministry of Education issue is still by no means a closed one in Japanese education. In the opinion of the writer, the Ministry should have been liquidated or drastically reformed some time in 1947 or 1948 as a preliminary step to establishing the boards of education.

[1]The Japanese use of the word Shinchūgun for "Occupation Forces" is an interesting example of Japanese euphemism. The word means, literally, "advance residing army." The more accurate but more offensive word to the Japanese is senryōgun (army of occupation).

[2]The Japanese had no superintendents of education, as such.

[3]It should be clearly understood by the reader that very often the American education officer was ill-equipped to do this. He often did not have the knowledge or experience to understand the changes himself. And even when he did have the necessary understanding and knowledge, he might lack understanding and knowledge of the Japanese educational system and the Japanese way of looking at things educational. This point is important because, despite the great inadequacies of the American setup, the ultimate objectives were pretty much achieved. (The reasons for American inadequacy will not be discussed here.)

two, or more education officers in each prefectural Military Government headquarters plus Japanese personnel to help the Americans. The usual table of organization called for a CI&E Officer (later CE Officer),an Assistant CI&E Officer, and one or two so-called Education Specialists.[1] Early in the Occupation the two former positions or one of them were filled by military personnel, but by late 1947 or early 1948, most of these had been replaced by civilians specifically hired for the job.

Immediately above the prefectural Military Government headquarters was the region headquarters consisting, like the prefectural headquarters, of a Senior Military Government Officer (Colonel) with his staff of advisors in civil education, economics, legal and government, welfare, and public health. (Later, in 1948, civil information was added.) The Civil Information and Education Office of the Skikoku Military Government Region consisted of a CI&E Officer, an Assistant CI&E Officer, and an Administrative Assistant (a sergeant). In addition, there were Japanese administrative, specialist, and clerical assistants. The responsibility of this office was mainly administrative. Direct contact with Japanese education personnel was theoretically limited to those contacts made in the course of visiting and assisting prefectural Military Government officers. In practice, however, the

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[1] Only one prefecture of Shikoku, Ehime, was entitled to an assistant CI&E officer.

situation was more informal and the Regional CI&E officers had considerable direct contact with the Japanese, but always in conjunction with prefectural Military Government officers and/or with their knowledge and consent.[1]

The Occupation of Japan up to 1950 can be broken down, conveniently and somewhat arbitrarily, into three broad periods, each of which has distinctly recognizable characteristics. The three periods are: September, 1945, to early 1947; early 1947 to late 1948; late 1948 to early 1950. The first of these periods was characterized by negative measures: education officials and teachers were purged, militarism was eliminated from schools, and objectionable textbooks and other teaching materials were discarded. While positive measures were taken, they were overshadowed by the general aura of negation prevalent during the period. Still, the bases of later positive action were laid. The second period can be called the period of early positive and constructive measures and democratic beginnings. It was during this period that the all-important Fundamental Law of Education (Kyōiku Kompon Hō) and the School Education Law (Gakko Kyōiku Hō) were passed.[2]

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[1] This administrative point is important because it was necessary to establish the autonomy of the prefectural Military Government CI&E officers in the eyes of the hierarchical-minded Japanese. Otherwise, Japanese educators would not have respected and worked efficiently with these officers. See Appendix VIb for the responsibilities of the Region CE Officer of Shikoku.

[2] See GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sec., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, II, 109-130, for reproductions of these laws in English. The Japanese originals can conveniently be found in

Of course, this was also the time of the passage of the New Constitution. Tremendous efforts were made by Americans and Japanese to understand and implement these laws which changed the base and face of Japanese education. The changes can be summed up in the words "equality of educational opportunity."[1] The system was still run by the central government, but it was supposed to be run for the benefit of all the children of all the people. That other concept necessary to democratic education, education run by the people, or educational autonomy, had to wait until 1948 when the Board of Education Law was passed.

The last period, which really comes down to the present, is the time of early maturity, autonomy, and decentralization. Here there is both the structure and content of a democratic educational system. The structure was provided by the laws passed to initiate educational equality, autonomy, and decentralization, the content by the greater understanding of the Japanese people and Japanese education personnel of the new system and their highly motivated efforts to achieve democracy of education. It is the task of the next chapters to outline the administrative changes aimed at decentralization and local autonomy in education and to estimate roughly

Matsugawa Hiro (ed.), Roppō Zensho (Complete Compilation of the Six Codes), Section "Kyōiku to Kōsei" (Education and Welfare), pp. 1-19. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1949. English versions of most of the important Japanese education laws and ordinances issued during the Occupation can now be found in GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, Vol. II.

[1]See Fundamental Law of Education, Article III.

the degree to which education in Shikoku, and in Japan, has been democratized.

CHAPTER IV

THE BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND THE FIRST ELECTIONS

At what point in time did Japanese education become democratic? This question, while a bit absurd, helps to focus thought on a possible dividing line between the old and the new. The central theme of the preceding chapter was that the administration of Japanese education during the early part of the Occupation was much the same as it had been before the Occupation. The basic philosophy of education, its ideology, and its content were radically changed, but these changes were attempted, contradictorily, through an imperfect medium, a central educational organ of government with a long tradition of authoritarian hierarchy. It can be said arbitrarily, therefore, that the educational system did not become democratic until this chain of command was broken, until local administrators and educators, with the backing of local governments, were permitted or forced to take unto themselves the planning and running of the educational system with some semblance of real participation by the people in the decision-making process. Here, as later, then, our central criterion is decision-making. Who makes the decisions as to how the schools shall be run and what shall be taught? On the answers to this question and others like it depend the authoritarianism or democracy of the educational system.

This point in time can well be October, 1948, when prefectural and city boards of education were elected all over Japan. Before examining, specifically, the boards of education of Shikoku and their operation for signs of incipient and maturing democracy, it would be wise to examine the Board of Education Law itself and how it came to be. Obviously this is a law of extraordinary importance if it is used as a dividing line between authoritarianism and democracy in Japanese education. And it is of extraordinary importance. It is the law which throws the responsibility for Japanese education into the hands of the Japanese people and which breaks the legal back of Ministry of Education domination of Japanese education. The law says, in effect, that the people of Japan should elect representatives to govern local educational affairs. Within the limits of national law, it divorced local education from the strong grip of the central government and the prefectural governors.[1] No matter what the defects of the law--and there are serious ones--and no matter what cultural arguments are brought against the system, it was a tremendous jump forward into the difficult waters of educational democracy.

The Board of Education Law, above all other things, put the responsibility for education into the hands of elected representatives of the people. Theoretically, at least, the Ministry of Education no longer had anything to say about the actual administration of Japanese lower education except as

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[1] Board of Education Law, Articles IV, XLVIII, and LV.

such power was delegated or implied by national law.[1] Instead, boards of education were to be elected in all prefectures, cities, towns and villages of the nation to take charge of all the multiplicity of functions of educational administration,[2] To assist them in their work and to be their executive arm, each board of education was to have a superintendent of education (kyōikucho) whose powers and duties were to be much like those of American superintendents, and whose term was to be four years with reappointment possible.[3] Under the superintendents were to be secretariats which were, in most cases, much the same as the previous education sections, except that the law required that a section of educational research and statistics and a section for educational guidance be set up.[4] Prefectural boards were to have seven members, six elected by direct vote and one chosen from among its own members by the prefectual or city assembly. City, town, and village boards were to have five members, four elected by direct vote of the people and one chosen from among its members by the local assembly.[5] The

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[1] Ibid., Article LV/2.

[2] Ibid.,Articles XLVIII, XLIX, L.

[3] Ibid., Articles XLI and XLII.

[4] Ibid., Articles XLIII-XLVII.

[5] Ibid., Article VII.

people-elected members were to have a term of four years with half of them elected every two years.[1] The law requires boards to meet at least once a month (ordinary session) and more, if necessary (extraordinary or special sessions).[2] A majority of the members of any board is defined as a quorum, and a quorum must be present to transact business.[3] Board meetings must be open to the public, but secret meetings can be held if a board so decides by two-thirds vote.[4] Provisions relating to the financial power of the boards were complex. The boards were given the authority to draw up their budgets, but these budgets had to be submitted to the chiefs of the local public bodies for revision, approval, and passage by the local public body.[5] The first election of board members for the prefectures and the five big cities (Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Kobe, and Yokohama) was set for October 5,

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[1] Ibid., Article VIII.

[2] Ibid., Article XXXV.

[3] Ibid., Article XXXVI.

[4] Ibid., Article XXXVII.

[5] Ibid., Articles LVI-LX. This part of the law was severely attacked and is still being attacked by educators in general, by the Ministry of Education, and by the JERC. The essence of the criticism is that boards of education should have power over their own budgets. See JERC, op.cit., p. 21, and Ministry of Education, Progress of Education Reform in Japan, pp. 100, 107, 127, and 92-93. Report by Ministry of Education, 1950. A number of newspaper editorials have also come out against the limitations on the boards' financial powers. See Nippon Times, October 4, 1949 (editorial), March 28, 1950 (editorial), and Mainichi (English edition), October 28, 1949 (editorial, as examples.

1948, and the boards were to take office on November 1, 1948.[1] The boards of cities, towns, and villages were to be established by November 1, 1950, but this part of the law was amended to the effect that they would be established by November 1, 1952, but could not be established in 1949 or 1951.[2]

This is the essence of the Board of Education Law. The contrasts with the older system are obvious and need not be labored here. Moreover, they have been touched upon previously in the discussion. Suffice it here to say that the chief contrasts rest in the principles of participation by the people in education and the educational autonomy of localities. It is clear that the whole board of education system, while differing in a number of particulars, was inspired by American example. As pointed out earlier, there was virtually no tradition for boards of education in Japan nor was there much real participation by the people in educational affairs. Rather, the system was diametrically opposed to Japanese tradition. It was a foreign cultural institution grafted on to the Japanese educational body. But was it also a foreign importation essentially unsuited

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[1] Ibid., Articles LXX, LXXII, and LXXIII.

[2] Ibid., Article LXX, and Article LXX, as amended to 1951. This is another serious point of debate. Apparently, Japanese educators wanted the law changed so that boards would not be elected in all cities, towns, and villages, as the law requires. It was expected that the Diet would amend the law, but, although a motion to amend was made, it failed to get sufficient support. So, as the law now stands (Summer, 1952), boards must be elected in all cities, towns, and villages. It has been conjectured that this will ruin

to Japanese culture and society, as its critics have said? It would seem so. This, however, is a cultural argument with which we need not here be concerned. Our concern is with how the system has worked in practice and, if it has been successful, whether it will continue to be successful. That is, the question to be asked is: Has the board of education system of Japan succeeded in being an instrument for the democratization of Japanese education and will it continue to be such an instrument? To answer this question, Japanese reaction to the law and some of the sociological and psychological implications of the law must first be examined. Then, the system as it worked in Shikoku must be studied for at least partial answers to the questions.

A flat statement that the Japanese of Shikoku did not understand anything but the barest superficials of the proposed board of education system and the Board of Education Law can be safely made.[1] This is true of both educators and average citizens. Had the Occupation Forces not pushed the

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Japan financially or very seriously cause education to deteriorate. (Writer's knowledge and letter from Rev. Nicholas Luhmer, S. J., to the writer, August 13, 1952.) The writer believes that boards in all cities, towns, and villages should not be created. Instead, they should be created only in cities and in some sort of consolidated districts or regions.

[1]This statement is made on the basis of the first-hand experience of the writer and other American education officers whose job it was to interpret the law to the Japanese. Summaries of this experience were contained in the Monthly Military Government Activities Reports of the Shikoku Military Government Region and the four Military Government teams, mostly during 1949. As mentioned above, the newspapers often mentioned this lack of understanding of the board of education system.

system as vigorously as they did, it is even doubtful whether the law would have been passed by the Diet. The Japanese not only did not understand the law, but they also misunderstood it. One good example of this was the prevalent conception that the boards of education were "educational governors," i.e., that they took the place of the prefectural governors in educational affairs, thus confusing policy and executive functions, or legislative and executive functions. The Ministry of Education, itself, fostered this misconception. Board members, too, often had only a vague conception of their functions.[1] They conceived of themselves, more often than not, as educational administrators, and often took upon themselves executive functions. Two or three examples may clarify what is meant. Even as late as the summer of 1949, the Ehime Board of Education members visited a number of schools of Ehime Prefecture for the purpose of helping to make their policy decisions.[2] The Kagawa Board of Education, in revising its "Regulations for the Reorganization of the Upper Secondary Schools

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[1] For newspaper comment on this, see Nippon Times, October 4, 1949 (editorial), and Mainichi (English edition), October 28, 1949 (editorial).

[2] Personal interviews with members of the Ehime Board of Education and the Ehime Superintendent of Education, September, 1949. There is disagreement on whether or not it is desirable for board of education members to visit schools. The position taken here is that if they do so merely to familiarize themselves with the school system, the practice is justified--to a limited extent. However, if they do so for administrative-executive purposes, the practice is not justified, and is an encroachment on the executive function. Apparently the Ehime Board's visits were of the latter type.

(Property Disposal)," changed the word "governor" to "Chief of the Board of Education," showing a concept of the board chairman as an executive.[1] The change, of course, should have read "Board of Education." The Kagawa Board, on another occasion, commissioned one of its members to study and report on a lower secondary school construction project, clearly a function of the superintendent and his staff.[2] The Kochi Board of Education decided that board members would personally "supervise" or inspect the operation of the Kochi Board of Education Secretariat (the staff under the superintendent) and set up a schedule and order for this "supervision."[3]

In the face of this lack of understanding by the people most concerned, it is little wonder that the average citizen did not realize what the real nature of the change was. But the people did grasp the fact, even if vaguely, that education was "different," "democratized," and that they were henceforth to show interest in it. This last fact was attested to by, among other things, the mere size of the Board of Education election vote, which was 64 per cent of the eligible Shikoku voters in the 1948 elections. Another criterion was the growth of PTA's.

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[1] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," May 17, 1949.

[2] Ibid., July 26, 1949.

[3] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," June 1, 1949. In a report to Eighth Army, the I Corps outlined and strongly criticized poor board practices in the I Corps area. Letter, Headquarters I Corps, AG 000.8-BA, to Commanding General, Eighth Army, 1 June 1949, "Boards of Education." This report, while strongly condemnatory, is generally accurate. But it tended to neglect the good things the boards were doing. This was a mistake most CE officers were making, due, no doubt, to lack of perspective and the desire for the system to succeed.

There were 1,916 PTA's in Shikoku in 1949.[1] Still another criterion of interest and participation in education was later shown by the extraordinary reaction of the people to proposed upper secondary school reorganization and re-districting. The minutes of the Shikoku boards of education reflect the growing active interest of the people in the reorganization.[2] The most extraordinary exhibition of interest in the reorganization, however, occurred in Ehime in 1949. Petitions and cards with literally thousands of signatures came into the Ehime Military Government Team headquarters.[3]

Japanese reaction to the Board of Education Law, then, was interested but non-comprehending. The people went to the polls probably because they were told to do so or felt that they ought to do so. But they did not know very well what they were voting for--except that it was another measure of the

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[1] From preliminary reports of four prefectural Civil Affairs teams, April, 1949. Consolidated in CE Sect., SCAR, "Social Organizations of Shikoku," 1 May 1949 (typed). While this figure may not be accurate, it is some indication of interest. For a discussion of PTA's in Shikoku, see Fred N. Kerlinger, "Social Organizations of Shikoku," (M. A. thesis, University of Michigan, January,1951), pp. 60-61; 54-55; 17. An abridged, published form of this thesis is: "Local Associations of Shikoku," Occasional Papers No. 2, Center for Japanese Studies, pp. 59-72. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952.

[2] Examples from one prefecture are: "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," February 22, 1949, March 29, 1949, April 21, 1949, April 16, 1949, February 8, 1950.

[3] The writer saw these petitions and cards in the Ehime CE Office. There can be little doubt tht the whole petition movement was engineered by special interests, but nonetheless this great number of signatures certainly indicates some interest.

Occupation Forces to promote democracy in Japan. Thus, it was accepted and acted upon. What little understanding the people had was probably due to the intensive informational programs and activities of all echelons of the Occupation Forces and all pertinent agencies of the Japanese Government. In fact, there can be little doubt that the publicity and informational and educational program on boards of education and the Board of Education Law from August to October, 1948, was the most comprehensive and intensive such program of the whole Occupation. Because of its importance and its role in creating Japanese interest and understanding, it is important to look briefly at the board of education situation after the Diet passed the Board of Education Law to immediately after the boards were elected.

Considering the great amount of attention paid by educators, Occupation officials, the Japanese press, and the Japanese people to boards of education and education immediately before and after the election of the boards in October, 1948, it is remarkable how little was known about the law in official American and Japanese educational circles in July, 1948, when the law was passed. Certain education officers of CI&E, SCAP knew a good deal about what was going on, and Military Government education officers, too, knew that such a law was being considered, but when the law was passed in July, 1948, it came almost as a surprise. Education officers in the field were not prepared for it; they were, in fact, chagrined at the lack of time they would have to help prepare the people in their areas

for the election.[1] The largest element in the surprise was the fact that the boards were to be elected that year. It had been anticipated that they would be elected in 1949.

In Shikoku, and probably elsewhere, efforts had been made to stimulate the so-called Temporary Conference Groups to some activity as preparation for the advent of local boards of education.[2] And in July, 1948, an article on boards of education, prepared by the writer and translated into Japanese, was published.[3] This work with TCG's and the article were the only Occupational attempts at informing the people of Shikoku on boards of education (excluding, of course, the personal efforts of team CE officers). While the Shikoku CE Section knew that eventually boards of education would be elected, it was not thought to be an imminent possibility. Whether this was a result of

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[1] This is a subjective impression which seems to have been shared by other CE officers. The first official word to Military Government came at a conference of Military Government regional commanders assembling in Yokohama in May, 1948, and this was only about the bare bones of the proposed law. The regional commanders were told that the law was to be introduced in the Diet on May 21, 1948.

[2] SCAR, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," March, 1948, Civil Education Section. Also monthly report for May, 1948. The writer visited many communities all over Shikoku in early 1948 to determine the status of the TCG's and to help stimulate some activity. For the most part, they were inactive and ineffectual. They were similar to the previously discussed gakumu iin (educational affairs committees).

[3] Fred N. Kerlinger, "Amerika ni okeru Kyōiku Iinkai" (Boards of Education in the United States), in Minshuteki Kyōiku to Dantai no Shomondai (Various Problems of Democratic Education and Organizations), pp. 1-7. Takamatsu: Shikoku Shimbunsha, 1948.

inadequate planning and communication by SCAP is not known. All that is known now is that Shikoku Military Government--and probably other Military Government headquarters in Japan--was caught almost unprepared.[1] It is highly probable that local Japanese educators, too, were unprepared.

A period of feverish, almost frenzied, activity began. The people had to be informed; candidates had to be produced; the elections had to take place. Occupation Forces education and information officers at all levels were ordered to shelve everything else and concentrate on informing the people on boards of education and their functions and on the Board of Education Law, and on getting out the vote. Japanese and American and joint conferences were held all over Japan to discuss the law, to decide on strategy, and generally to help make the elections a success. Japanese and American agencies all over Japan prepared, published, and distributed an enormous amount of informational material. The newspapers and radio of the country were most active in promoting the coming change in education. And the quality of most of the informational material was quite high, especially in view of the hurry in

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[1] Several Military Government regional headquarters made efforts to have the date of the elections advanced to 1949, since the CE officers thought that the whole action was premature. Whether it was or was not premature will never be clearly known. Looked at in retrospect, it does not seem to have been as premature as was thought, Newspapers, too, probably under the influence of Occupation opinion, thought the elections premature. See Nippon Times, September 7, 1948 (editorial), and September 9, 1948, both of which called for postponement of the elections.

which it was prepared and the lack of background of the people preparing it. At any rate, the campaign never let up. As mentioned before, it was probably the most extensive and intensive integrated campaign the Occupation Forces attempted during the entire Occupation of Japan.

The campaign was based mainly on the theme, "Get Out and Vote!" but there was a great deal of emphasis on trying to get the people to understand what they were to vote for and to vote as intelligently as possible under the circumstances.[1] That is, with their lack of understanding of what constituted a board of education and their lack of knowledge of the candidates and what sort of people were desirable as board of education candidates, it was very difficult for the voters to make intelligent choices. The campaign in Shikoku and elsewhere took on a distinctly political and partisan tinge with various factions, political and educational, pushing their candidates. At the time, it seemed as though the proposed board of education system was being perverted and subverted by power elements anxious to get control of the educational system. The most vociferous and eventually most powerful of these elements was the Japan Teachers Union and its branches in the prefectures. The Tokyo Headquarters of the Union had devised an efficient

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[1] As mentioned before, each voter could only vote for one candidate despite the fact that six men had to be elected in each prefecture.

plan for getting Teachers Union candidates elected.[1] Political parties, too, tried to get their candidates in.[2] The Communist Party branches of Shikoku prefectures also tried but did not succeed in getting communist candidates elected--with one possible exception.[3]

Military Government and Japanese promotional activity was exceedingly vigorous, sustained, and widespread. The Senior Military Government Officer of the Shikoku Military Government Region urged his team commanders to give the Board of Education elections their personal attention, and outlined objectives for them to follow.[4] He backed up this letter with personal visits to the teams, and briefed all his staff on the importance of the campaign. The Civil Education, Civil Information, and Legal-Government sections of the Region and the teams carefully

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[1] This plan consisted to a great extent in having teachers and even students campaign from door to door. The plan was quite successful.

[2] As an example of this in one prefecture, see Kōchi Nippō, August 16, 1948 (editorial). See, also, Kōchi Shimbun, August 20, 1948 (editorial), and Kōchi Nippō, September 10, 1948 (editorial). The latter editorial mentions the predominance of Teachers Union candidates. The first reference lists candidates by their party affiliations.

[3] The communist candidate in Kagawa polled 6,716 votes. The lowest number of votes polled for a successful candidate was 21,993. (Total possible votes: 487,453.) It is interesting to note that the Shikoku Shimbun, October 8, 1948, expressed surprise that the three candidates running for the Kagawa Board who were supported by political parties were all defeated. The only uniform campaigning success was that of individuals and Teachers Union candidates. For a complete list of candidates by special interest breakdown, see Mainichi, September 30, 1948.

[4] Letter, Commanding Officer (SMGO), SMGR, to Shikoku Military Government team commanding officers, "Board of Education Law Program," August 27, 1948. See Appendix VIII for a copy of this letter.

coordinated their work, and the result was a large-scale program that apparently was quite effective. In addition to the informational material put out, there were many visits made and conferences held to help Japanese officials understand the law. For the month preceding the election, practically everything else was swept aside by the three Military Government sections concerned and by Japanese education, information, and other sections of the prefectural and city governments. Judging from production of informational material alone, Japanese effort, too, was very considerable. In short, there was never such an all-out effort made in educational reform before or since.[1]

As a result of the extraordinary effort described and/or of the interest of the people of Shikoku, or due to other factors, the people did get out and vote. Of the 2,182,503 eligible voters of Shikoku, 1,391,614, or 64 per cent voted.[2]

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[1] It should be remembered, however, that there were probably many Japanese who did not believe in the change being made. This was seemingly true of many of the officials of the Ministry of Education. The CI Officer, Eighth Army, in a talk to CE and CI officers, Yokohama, November 9, 1948, said that the Ministry of Education showed almost "passive resistance." (He also said that the vote was "tremendous.") Yet, it must be said that Shikoku education officials really pushed the election. It is difficult to understand why they would do this--they made efforts beyond the merely necessary--unless they were sincerely convinced of the wisdom of the move or the wisdom of the policy of the Occupation in general.

[2] These and other figures are taken from a special report prepared by the CE Section, SMGR, right after the elections (cited above). They may disagree slightly with other Japanese figures.

The percentages for the four prefectures were: Ehime: 65 per cent; Kagawa: 68 per cent; Kochi: 65 per cent; Tokushima: 57 per cent. The male vote was 49 per cent and the female 51 per cent of the votes cast. Rural areas produced proportionately more votes than did urban areas. Right after the election, it was thought by CE officers that there was only one "good" board elected, but later perspective showed this to have been a too dark outlook. Three of the boards turned out to be "good" or at least "fair," and one "poor." This is the writer's present opinion based on all his experiences and the experiences of the team CE officers with the boards. The initial bad opinion was largely colored by the fact that so many Teachers Union-backed candidates and other rather indifferent candidates were elected.[1] For example, Ehime had three teachers, Kagawa three, Kochi four, and Tokushima one. (In the cases of Kagawa and Tokushima, there was also one former teacher elected to each board.) But it later turned out that the teacher board members did their jobs carefully and conscientiously, for the most part. It is interesting and very

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[1] In Japan, as elsewhere, it is expensive to run for public office. The prospective candidate must be ready and willing to spend quite a bit of money to conduct a campaign. This extended to the board of education elections. The Legal-Government Officer, SCAR, in 1950 prepared a penetrating report on the methods employed by candidates in Japanese elections. Legal-Government Section, SCAR, Memorandum for the Record, "Methods Employed by Candidates in Japanese Elections for Public Office," June 19, 1950.

significant to note that three women became board members.[1]

It is impossible to know scientifically the attitudes of the people of Shikoku toward the board of education system and to the people elected as board members. Attempts were made by CE and CI officers of Shikoku to determine what the people felt, but these attempts were naturally limited by the magnitude and complexity of the situation.[2] With a reform so opposed to the Japanese system, it might be suspected that the Japanese would be opposed and negative in their attitudes. But as with other Occupation reforms, this did not seem to be the case. The people seemed to accept the reform and gradually to think it was a good thing. Opposition and negation seemed, rather, to come from a small minority of the more powerful reactionary elements. But there is little direct evidence to support this statement. The Occupation feeling that it would be a tremendous job against a good deal of opposition to acceptance of the system turned out to be mostly groundless.[3]

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[1] One each in Ehime, Kochi, and Tokushima. (One woman was a candidate in Kagawa, but was not elected.)

[2] The SMGR CE Officer and Assistant CE Officer, for example, made trips to the prefectures and questioned a number of educational administrators, teachers, parents, and other people. Japanese officials, too, tried to do the same, but the answers received may not have been reliable or valid. A number of honest criticisms were recorded, however. What is said above is based on all the sources open to CE, including the conversations mentioned, the opinions of team CE officers, Japanese and American reports, and newspaper articles and editorials.

[3] This is a very important social-psychological problem that should be investigated by attitude studies. Shikoku, or some similar area of Japan, would be excellent for studying acculturation-education problems.

By and large, the Japanese of Shikoku worked hard both to understand the reform and to make it a success. Of these, the boards of education themselves did a notable job. Without this positive approach and cooperation the board of education system, as complicated and delicate a structure as it was, depending on cooperative, coordinated work of all educators and many laymen, would certainly have failed. It can be even more firmly said that the boards' advent in Shikoku was a great stimulant to public interest in education and to a feeling of responsibility for educational matters on the part of the people. It should be noted, however, that many people thought that the board of education system was a failure, and that a good part of this failure was due to lack of interest of the people in the boards and in education.[1] But what must be remembered is that there was no responsibility at all before; now there was at least some. In other words, the elections, above all else, focused attention on the people's responsibility in education. This was of course in the general line of Occupation policy of encouraging the Japanese to decide things for themselves instead of having everything decided for them by functionaries not of their own choice. Time and time again, they were told that these boards were their boards and that education could not be improved and democratized without

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[1] Two good examples of this opinion are expressed in: Nippon Times, May 10, 1949 (translation of Asahi editorial, May 9, 1949) and Nippon Times, October 4, 1949 (editorial).

their help and cooperation.[1] This was the theme of innumerable local meetings before and after the elections; it was the strong undercurrent behind all the work of the first year of the Shikoku boards. The fact is inescapable; the people of Shikoku were coming to know that they were to be actively concerned in education and that no longer would the central government foist upon them educational dicta without their consent. The next chapter will explore some of the work of the boards of education of Shikoku during this first year, November, 1948, to December, 1949 (and later). It will also explore the growth of educational democracy by examining, from time to time, the relations of the people to the boards and the people's participation in educational affairs.

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[1]The writer still has in his possession a supply of the informational material used--posters, pamplets, letters, newspapers, speeches,etc. Almost all of them emphasized the people's responsibility.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHANGING ATTITUDES: GROWTH OF EDUCATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Boards of education in Japan came into being at psychologically the right time for maximum acceptance and understanding by the people and maximum acceptance and implementation by educational officials. Had this very crucial change been made earlier, it is possible that it might have foundered because of lack of understanding and subtle opposition due to this lack of understanding and to entrenched belief in the older centralized system. Time and experience gained in working with the newer concepts were necessary as groundwork for successful implementation of the Board of Education Law. Some of the tight power of the Ministry of Education had to be broken and stay broken before the people and the educators would really accept such a drastic change in educational administration and thinking. While not completely broken, the power and prestige of the Ministry were seriously challenged and weakened by the middle of 1948. It is true that the Ministry was still running education in Japan in 1948, but the presence and prestige of the Occupation Forces had weakened it. Now there was room for a good deal of latitude in the running of local educational affairs. The time had come to break the power of the Ministry of Education once and for all.

Had the change been made later, it is difficult to know what would have happened. For example, had the elections been postponed a year, it might have been too late for acceptance. At the time, almost all American education officers thought the move premature; it was believed that the Japanese were not ready for such a sweeping change, nor had they been adequately prepared for it. And as the time for the elections approached, this feeling became stronger since it was evident that power elements in the nation and in local communities were trying to get control of education. The leading newspapers agreed with this opinion, and there was a growing demand that the elections be postponed, if only for two or three months, so that the people might be better informed on what a school board is and who the members should be.[1] The Shikoku Military Government Region made an unusual effort to get postponement but failed completely.[2] As it turned out, the time was about

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[1] Nippon Times, September 9, 1948: Nippon Times, August 28, 1948 (editorial); Mainichi (English edition), September 18, 1948 (editorial); Nippon Times, September 7, 1948 (editorial). The second and last-cited editorials were very strong in their condemnation of the "elements who threaten to subvert and pervert the boards of education to wrong and undemocratic ends," and called for a postponement of the elections for a month or so. The editorials summed up the whole situation by saying that there was a real danger of a shifting of control from centralized bureaucracy to a professional bureaucracy (the Teachers Union).

[2] Apparently, the CI&E Section of SCAP wanted postponement, but the Government Section did not. And the Government Section, under Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, always had more influence with SCAP than any other section. General Whitney came to Shikoku a short time before the elections, and an effort was made by the SMGO, the CE Officer, and the Legal-Government Officer to lead the conversation to the subject of postponement (in the General's special train, travelling from Kochi to Takamatsu). General Whitney was affable but silent; the decision had been made.

right, even though a short postponement would probably have resulted in better electorate understanding of the issues involved.

Despite the expressed fear that radical elements would get control of the boards, the election results for all of Japan showed a heavy majority for conservative elements. Of the 296 members elected to prefectural and city boards in the 46 prefectures and five big cities, 213, or 72 per cent, were conservative. Seventy-six, or 26 per cent, were regarded as progressive. So-called radicals (mostly communists) won seven seats (2 per cent).[1] Other interesting results were: out of 63 women candidates, 38 were successful; 40 per cent of the total members elected (112) were teacher or ex-teachers.[2] The vote was proportionately much larger in rural than in urban areas: 65 per cent in rural; 35 per cent in urban.[3] And, as mentioned in the early part of this thesis, the all-Japan vote was 56 per cent of the electorate, a creditable showing.

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[1] Nippon Times, October 8, 1948.

[2] This teacher element would have been larger except that many teacher candidates withdrew on the advice of local Military Government officers. See ibid.

[3] Nippon Times, October 10, 1948. This article also stresses radicals failing to get on the boards. (It should be emphasized that this was the greatest fear of Occupation education personnel. But the situation was miscalculated.)

The Shikoku vote has already been given above. It should be pointed out here, however, that Shikoku was above the national average: 64 per cent. And half Shikoku's board members were teachers--a larger proportion than at the time was considered desirable.[1] Of the 24 members elected, 11 were teachers, two were ex-teachers, and 11 were laymen. Of these laymen, there were four professional men, two farmers (both women), one businessman, and four miscellaneous types (priest, author, politician, and a labor relations man).[2] The four men who were to become superintendents of education were, with one exception, quite capable. Three were career officials, one a former professor and village mayor. Strictly speaking, all their backgrounds were "irregular" for the job of superintendent. The greatest "irregularity," of course, was that they had been, the professor excepted, prefectural officials more or less imbued with the bureaucratic outlook. Three of them turned out to be good superintendents, one of them rather ineffective. Since it is difficult and invidious to make comparisons, names will not be mentioned here. Suffice it to say that the poorest board had the least effective superintendent. But the "best" board did not clearly have the most

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[1] Later, there were CE officers who said that it was a good thing that teachers did get on the boards. They were the progressive elements who tried to make the educational system move forward, it was said, whereas the laymen members were too conservative. The writer tends to agree with this opinion--with reservations.

[2] From special report prepared by CE Section, SMGR, to Headquarters Eighth Army, after the Board of Education elections.

effective superintendent. That is, the other three boards had capable men who, while they had not been public school educators, as such, were men of some vision who had political and administrative experience.[1] Judging from what little the writer has found out about the boards and superintendents of other prefectures of Japan, the Shikoku boards, on the whole, did their jobs well in the first year. The task of this chapter is to judge how well and to see to what extent the Shikoku school system took on a democratic character.

To judge the working of the boards and the extent of democratization of the educational system and related elements, a number of criteria will be used. No attempt is made to cite all the evidence for each of the criteria, for such a procedure would be unduly tedious. Certain of the criteria were considered to be more important than others, and some had better supporting data than others. One of the most significant of all, as far as the boards of education were concerned, was the method of decision-making employed. It was believed that the means the boards used for reaching decisions would be indicative of their democratization. Thus, the minutes of the four boards plus the writer's notes and memories of board meetings that he attended were carefully studied for evidence of change in decision-making procedures.[2] Another carefully

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[1] This statement is based on a good deal of business and personal relationships with these men before and after the elections. Two of them are still superintendents; two have resigned.

[2] For a discussion of the older type of Japanese

considered point was the relative autonomy of their decisions, i.e., did they arrive at their decisions independently, without coercion from the Ministry of Education or other outside authorities? Put differently, the method of decision-making was felt to furnish a clearcut distinction between old and new thinking and practice.

The criteria that were used in judging the work of the boards as a whole were as follows:

1. Methods of decision-making and relative autonomy of decisions.
2. Participation by parents, teachers, and citizens in educational affairs and board of education business.
3. Decrease of power and influence of the Ministry of Education and of local officials concomitant with increase of responsibility, power, and influence of the boards of education.
4. Free and open discussion of educational problems by boards and by citizens.
5. Criticism of boards of education and secretariats by teachers and public.
6. Interest in board of education business.
7. Direct action by boards of education to help further equalization of educational opportunity, coeducation, adult education, local participation in educational decisions, etc.

These criteria have been used to buttress the arguments which follow. No attempt has been made to examine each one in order; but all have been kept in mind to provide a basis for discussion and to serve as reference points for measuring the degree of change from authoritarianism to

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decision-making, see Fred N. Kerlinger, "Decision-Making in Japan," Social Forces, XXX (1951), 36-41.

democracy in Shikoku education.

The problems faced by the Shikoku boards of education in November, 1948, were the problems which faced boards of education all over Japan. The central underlying problem was a matrix of problems which can be represented by the words responsibility and autonomy. The boards had to learn to be responsible to the people and they had to accept and learn the idea that they had the obligation to be relatively independent, to make their own decisions without undue dependence on centralized authority. That is, they could not be said to be instruments of democratic educational reform unless they were, first of all, responsible, autonomous agencies of the people. Thus, all through the closer study of the boards and the men and women working in education in Shikoku during 1948-1949 and later, it is imperative to keep these factors in mind.

As if the problem of responsibility and autonomy were not great enough, the boards were faced with a number of specific administrative and educational problems of great complexity and difficulty. When reading accounts of the reform of Japanese education, it is very easy to overlook the difficulty and complexity of the task facing Japanese educators. It cannot be emphasized enough that the Japanese were working with concepts and practices for which they had little or no precedent. And, too, many of these ideas and concepts went against traditional Japanese practice and thinking. Some of these problems grew out of the new laws; it was imperative that the boards solve them in the legally prescribed manner.

(For example, one of the greatest problems was the tremendous financial burden imposed by the legal nine years of compulsory education.) Other problems grew out of the implications of the new education or out of the peculiar educational situation of Japan at the time. Legally prescribed or not, all the problems had to be faced in one way or another. The ensuing discussion, by focussing on the most important problems, by sampling Shikoku solution of the problems, and particularly by examining the manner of solution, will attempt to support the hypotheses originally enunciated. Of these hypotheses, the central one is that the changes made and the manner in which they were made describe the process of moving from authoritarian to democratic control, from authoritarian to democratic education.

The very first problems which occupied the four boards of education were administrative and procedural. How were they to conduct meetings? How would they bring up and consider business? What was the relationship between the boards and the superintendents of education? What was the relationship between the boards and the secretariats? And what should be the structure of the secretariats? What was to be the relationship of the boards and the people? Where did Military Government fit into the picture? What system of decision-making should the boards use in their meetings? How much compensation should board members get?

The board members were men and women of varied experience. The difficulty was that much of this experience

did not fit into the new pattern. But there was plenty of guidance available. There was the Board of Education Law itself which prescribed certain details of board meetings and decision-making, the functions of the boards, the functions of the superintendents and their relation to the boards, and some details on secretariats.[1] The Ministry of Education sent guiding information to the prefectures, some of which was of doubtful value.[2] And the boards consulted Ministry officials rather frequently.[3] Military Government, too, was always there with advice and help, presumably if the boards wanted such advice and help. Perhaps more often, however, the boards got Military Government advice and help whether they wanted it or not.

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[1] Board of Education Law, Articles XXXIII-XLIX.

[2] A good example of this was the suggested pay for board members: ¥3,000 a month for members elected by the people; ¥1,000 a month for assembly members; plus expenses. Letter from Office of Local Finance Commission, Director of Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Education, to prefectural governors, September 27, 1948. In the opinion of Occupation authorities, board members should get no pay. The Japanese found it hard to understand this, and insisted on paying board members for their "work." Many board members seriously misunderstood their positions. They thought they were a sort of administrative official of education. The Ministry of Education even called them "educational governors." It is little wonder that they thought they should be paid. The American idea of voluntary, unpaid public educational service was almost completely foreign and even antipathetic. The Japanese situation being what it was, the question is still open as to whether or not they should have been paid. Certainly, American standards can not be applied to this problem.

[3] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," December 7, 1948; "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," April 21, 1949, August 31, 1949, October 4, 1949.

At any rate, the Shikoku boards of education, sometimes resolutely, sometimes waveringly and confusedly, set up tentative administrative structures in their first meetings. They naturally depended, to a great extent, on the structures that had existed before. More significant changes in structures had to come later.[1] Unfortunately, the boards did not define clearly the relationship between themselves and their superintendents. They required the superintendents to attend board meetings with appropriate subordinates and allowed reports of activities, but whether or not the superintendents could or should recommend legislation was not clear.[2] In practice, however, they seemed to allow such recommendations. But they had only a poor idea of the "proper" relationship between boards of education and superintendents, and they were almost defensively anxious to show or prove their authority and autonomy. While their attitude toward superintendents was deplored by Occupation education officers, it was a definite sign of their feeling of responsibility for education and their

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[1] See Appendix IX for a chart of the Kagawa Board of Education Secretariat in 1949.

[2] The Board of Education Law, as passed in July, 1948, was considered to be very unsatisfactory as far as the position and functions of the superintendents were concerned. Because of this dissatisfaction, the law was amended, and the superintendent's function and his relation to the board were clarified. See Board of Education Law, as amended to 1951, Article LII-(3). For press comments on the earlier situation, see Nippon Times, October 25, 1949 ("Press Comments," Mainichi article translated, October 24, 1949), and Mainichi (English edition), October 28, 1949 (editorial).

quite legitimate desire for autonomy.[1] They were determined not to be ayatsuri ningyo (puppet dolls) performing at the hands of the bureaucrats.[2] So in their reaction they perhaps went too far. Later the relationships normalized themselves, and superintendents occupied their positions as full-fledged educational administrators with a minimum of board interference.[3] Thus, the whole problem of the relationship between boards and superintendents and the way it started and the way it worked out can be cited as evidence of maturity.

Closely related to the inner relationships of the boards are the outer relationships. One of these--a temporary one, to be sure--was that with Military Government. During the latter part of 1948 it was evident, even though direct evidence would be hard to find, that the boards did not want Military Government interference and help. Naturally, this feeling almost of defensive independence was, in the writer's

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[1] Before, during, and after the elections, the board members had heard unceasingly about their responsibilities and their responsibility to the people. They also heard a great deal about the dangers of bureaucracy. They were most anxious, therefore, to establish their independence of bureaucratic influence. The fear of bureaucracy in Japan is widespread and deep--as it probably is in any authoritarian country. The issue of the bureaucracy versus the people came to a head during and after the Board of Education elections.

[2] This expression was used a good deal in the Board of Education election campaign in Shikoku by Military Government. It so happens that the famous dolls used in the Japanese puppet plays originated in Tokushima.

[3] For an opposing point of view, that the superintendents had too much authority and were running the boards, see Tokushima Shimbun, October 17, 1949 (editorial).

opinion, a temporary thing, a natural manifestation of the psychological state of mind of the board members. There was an ambivalence engendered by the peculiarity of the situation: the manifest democracy of the advent of boards of education and what they stood for and the equally manifest contradiction of the presence of Military Government officers who were closely watching every move of the boards. The boards were told they should be autonomous, and they tried to be autonomous. Rarely, except as a formal gesture, did the boards ask Military Government for advice and help in the later part of 1948. Of course, there were the usual formalities of expressing cooperation and the phrases, "due to the kind offices of the Occupation Forces," and "grateful for help received; please continue to help," but these expressions and others like them were as much linguistic characteristics of the Japanese language as they were sincere protestations of cooperation. Yet, it can also be said that the board members, for the most part, did not have an active antipathy toward the Shikoku CE officers.[1] At least by about February or March, 1949, they knew that Military Government did not want to dictate to them, that it was there, at least in Shikoku, purely in an advisory capacity to help ensure the

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[1] There is one possible exception to this statement. In one prefecture of Shikoku, Kochi, the Board of Education consistently "refused"--not openly, of course--to work with Military Government. Until the writer left Japan in December, 1949, the situation remained much the same. It is significant to note, also, that the Kochi education situation was found seriously wanting not only by the CE Officer of Kochi but by outside officers who visited Kochi. The Kochi problem is a very significant one that would well repay detailed socio-psychological research.

success of the new system and the new education.[1] The ambivalence is clear: the board members wanted to use Military Government knowledge and know-how and wanted to show respect for the Occupation Forces, but at the same time they also wanted autonomy. And never did the boards lose the desire for autonomy. Apparently this was one lesson well learned.[2] The difficulties of the situation, both for the board members and for CE officers,

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[1] These are not empty words. The SMGO, the CE Officer, and the Assistant CE Officer (who worked mostly with Shikoku women) had come irresistibly to the conclusion that giving orders to boards, superintendents, or any other education personnel was vain and futile. The orders would be obeyed, but the values behind the orders would not be understood and accepted. It is true that suggestions were made, sometimes strongly, but rarely after early 1949 was an order given--in the field of education. The time had come for almost complete autonomy. The Japanese themselves knew what was best for their own educational system (with certain reservations). It was believed that the function of Military Government in relation to education was purely advisory. It is interesting to note that the Japanese educators found it quite difficult to understand this attitude and practice, and often tried to get CE officers to give orders and strong suggestions, especially after they realized that the CE officers were reluctant even to make suggestions.

An outstanding example of an excellent relationship between a CE officer and a board of education was Kagawa Prefecture. The Board of Education, while split down the middle and having a difficult time, came to see that the Kagawa CE Officer was sincerely working for the good of Kagawa education. Educational personnel of Kagawa Prefecture came to hold him in high esteem. In 1949, when the Board of Education members learned that he was returning to the United States for a vacation, they became very worried that he would not return. They sent the Superintendent of Education to ask the writer for assurance that he would be assigned to Kagawa on his return. (There had been some talk of giving him a better job elsewhere--he was a very capable and understanding man.) The Superintendent said that the Board, together with many educators who knew the CE Officer, wished to send a petition to the Eighth Army to send him back. The writer dissuaded the Board from taking such action; it would certainly have meant his being assigned elsewhere. Later, the officer concerned was given his choice of Kagawa or another "better" job. He chose Kagawa.

[2] During 1949, when the boards wanted information or advice from CE officers, they would frequently send the

can easily be appreciated.[1]

Concomitant with the strong desire for autonomy was a growing sense of responsibility. Board of educatinn members of Shikoku (with the exception of Kochi) showed almost from the beginning a sense of responsibility that could only have arisen in a democratic atmosphere. They kept insisting that the responsibility for education was theirs. At board of education meetings the writer attended this came out several times, and the difference between the old and the new attitudes was quite marked and very encouraging. For example, strong evidence of this desire for responsibility came out at one such meeting of the Kagawa Board of Education on February 12, 1949. Again and again board members upbraided secretariat officials for taking action without the Board's knowledge and consent.[2] Now in Japan the taking of responsibility has always been a touchy matter. There is a well-known expression, sekinin-nogare, which

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superintendents. Sometimes board members would come to Military Government but only rarely. The fact that it was the administratively proper procedure was not the reason for sending the superintendents.

[1] The above discussion is based on personal experience and knowledge of the writer, on verbal and written reports of Shikoku CE officers, and on conversations with Japanese education officials. Objective negative evidence is the fact that, except for rare mention of the visits of CE officers to board meetings or some action to be taken on the departure of a CE officer for the United Sates, the board of education minutes for the four boards of Shikoku do not mention Military Government. It is highly probable that Military Government and Military Government policies were discussed by board members only outside of board meetings.

[2] SMGR CE Officer,"Field Trip Notes," February, 1949. Also, "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," February 9-11, 1949 and February 23-24, 1949.

means "passing the buck." And sekinin-nogare was a customary practice in Japanese official and educational circles. No one wanted to accept responsibility for important decisions--the consequences were too severe if the decisions were wrong ones. But here there was a different attitude: the boards insisted on their right to make important decisions. They got advice and help, of course, and often depended too much on outside authorities, particularly the Ministry of Education. When in a very difficult situation, it became fairly common to dispatch someone to Tokyo "to see the Ministry." Sometimes, in a more roundabout way they tried to get Military Government to commit itself on some policy or other so that they could pass an unpleasant action off "by order of the Occupation Forces."[1] But this occurred rather rarely, certainly not with the frequency with which it had occurred earlier in the Occupation. Another habit the boards had when confronted with a difficult problem was to find out what other prefectures had done with the same problem and then act accordingly and imitatively on the basis of what was learned. Most of the time this was done informally, but occasionally such action would creep into the minutes of the boards. One such example was when the Kochi Board was discussing

[1]This was a procedure which was the easiest and most prevalent of buck-passing devices in the Occupation. Many Occupation officers, under the illusion that they were being consulted on important matters, would give their well-considered or offhand opinions. Some time later, they would find that the Japanese had taken action on the basis of the opinion, and had labelled the action "by order of the Occupation Forces."

the reorganization of the Kochi Secretariat (it had been stalling the issue for months) and could not reach a decision. Finally it was decided to investigate the secretariat structure of the other three prefectures of Shikoku.[1] Despite these and other remnants of dependence and sekinin-nogare, it was still a fact that the boards of education of Shikoku felt and exercised their responsibilities in a commendable manner. As the discussion proceeds, it will be seen that they took the responsibility for several important decisions, one or two of which were almost sure to hurt them.

It is much more difficult to appraise the autonomy and responsibility of education officials (the local bureaucracy), principals, and teachers. In 1948-1949, the situation was confused and even a bit chaotic. Drastic changes had been made and were being made with great rapidity, and the Japanese professional educator was perhaps the most confused man in the country. By 1949, to be sure, many educators were beginning to understand what was happening; they were beginning to understand their place in the new scheme of Japanese education. But generally speaking, the rank and file of Japanese teachers was quite insecure in its grasp of the newer methods of thinking and operation. It was even more insecure in its resolution of the cultural conflicts engendered by the rapid changes that had been made and with which teachers were faced. Of all the various elements of the Japanese population, teachers were perhaps the element which was most severely regimented and indoctrinated in the Japanese Way. They had been thoroughly

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[1] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," November 18, 1948.

trained in at least one thing: unquestioning acceptance of and obedience to the desires and orders of their superiors. They had been made to learn teaching methods that well fitted into the authoritarian social structure. In sum, they were unthinking, unquestioning women and men who knew the one way of teaching along the narrowly prescribed Japanese educational track. Now they were asked to do a complete volte face, to rid themselves of their well-learned, well-introjected cultural and educational past and to become the carriers and transmitters of a democratic education. It is obvious what the result must be and was--insecurity and confusion.

Educational officials were in a like case. They differed little from teachers in fundamental attitudes and training, except that they were nearer to the source of the indoctrination and were the in-betweens of the system. And like in-betweens everywhere but particularly in sekinin-nogare Japan, they were in the precarious position of being transmitters of the Word and at the same time supervisors of the execution of the Word. They perhaps feared even more than did teachers to transgress against the established Way. If it is possible they were more indoctrinated and undeviating than the teachers. Occasionally a teacher might be original and even daring. But it is hard to imagine a prefectural education official being original. His job was to transmit, to occupy his proper place in the educational hierarchy. If signs can be found, therefore, that teachers and officials broke from or were trying to break from the traditional mold, then

these signs can be considered as evidence in partial support of the argument that Shikoku education was being democratized.

The writer and his colleagues found quite a few signs of teacher and official, especially teacher, breaking away from the mold. The air of freedom evidently has astonishing properties. The comparative freedom given to Japanese teachers under the influence of the Occupation occasionally stimulated fine teaching. For example, the writer saw such teaching in 1947, 1948, and 1949 in widely scattered places. In early 1947, in Miyagi Prefecture in northeastern Japan, a young woman teacher was holding a Social Studies discussion session in a sixth-grade class of a village school on the rights and responsibilities of the citizen in a democracy. Her handling of the group, her questions and examples, her attitude--everything about her, in fact--were excellent.[1] Other similar cases of good teaching were observed in northern Japan in 1947. But it must be admitted that they were very sporadic; most of the teaching was the traditional type of teacher talk and exhortation and pupil recitation--usually in a loud voice and stilted manner.[2] Taking a big geographical

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[1]Report, Headquarters IX Corps, Mil. Govt. 000.3, to Commanding General, Eighth Army, May, 1947, "Report of Field Trip--Miyagi Prefecture."

[2]The reading of lessons by Japanese pupils was always a wonder to behold. The pupils held their books at arm's length directly in front of the face and read as fast and as loud as they could. When the writer asked a young woman teacher in Yamanashi Prefecture whether she ever tried to have the pupils adopt a more "natural" manner, she could not understand the implication and was very confused and embarrassed. The writer never asked this ethnocentric question again.

leap to Shikoku, a comparatively large number of examples of good teaching was observed in late 1948 and during all of 1949. The outstanding example was seen in 1948 in a lower secondary school in Matsuyama City, Ehime Prefecture.[1] In almost all classes visited there was good and even superior teaching. The inspiration for this school came from the school's head teacher, a woman.[2] Another exceptional example of teaching in the same prefecture was in a rural lower secondary school where the students went out in groups into the community once a month to orient the people of the community on the new education! This was sponsored by the local PTA.[3] On the same field trip, the writer visited about eight elementary and lower secondary schools in Matsuyama City. Although very overcrowded and on the shift system, a relatively large amount of good teaching was observed, especially in Social Studies classes. Perhaps the most unusual example of democratic education if not superior teaching was a school on the outskirts of Tokushima City in Tokushima Prefecture. A SCAP education advisor[4] visited this school in October, 1948,

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[1] SMGR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," October, 1948.

[2] This was the only case the writer encountered of a woman head teacher. It was not until 1949 that women principals were appointed.

[3] Report, CE Sect., SMGR, to Commanding Officer, SMGR, October 30, 1948, "Report of CE Field Trip--Ehime Prefecture."

[4] Dr. Howard M. Bell, the author or stimulator of the volume Minshushugi (Democracy), which had sold one and a half million copies when the writer left Japan in December, 1949. It is used as a text in Social Studies classes of secondary schools. Mombushō, Minshushugi (Democracy). Tokyo: Mombushō, 1949.

and was both surprised and pleased at what he saw and heard. The school called itself a community school, and, according to the principal, had been doing so since 1945. Students were made to use the community for educational purposes, and the community was encouraged to use the school.[1] Such cases of good teaching and educational thinking were by no means isolated or very rare. The writer observed, if to a lesser extent, similar scattered cases of good teaching throughout Shikoku. There should be no misunderstanding here. Most of the teaching was, in 1948 and 1949, poor from the point of view of a democratic, progressive philosophy. The intended meaning here is that understanding of democratic education was growing, that the situation was such that teachers who were trying to enter into the spirit of the new education could do so, other things being equal. In other words, the spirit of experiment and democratic sharing of the learning experience had been born and was growing. The evidence for this was unmistakable; there were too many cases observed which could not have been observed in Japan before 1945.

It is more difficult to ascertain to what extent Japanese education officials were really affected by the newer tendencies. They were the in-between men who had to go along with whatever trend was current. Like the Ministry of Education officials, many of them, it is believed, sincerely tried

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[1] A sign at the street corner in front of the school read, in English and in Japanese: "Sako Community School;" "School and Community Work Together;" etc.

to understand and execute the policies of the new education. But again, they were hindered in this by their background and training. The greatest working difficulty was that they consistently used the authoritarian methods they had previously learned to further the new objectives. That is, they tried to impose democratic education by fiat. Perhaps the outstanding example of this was in the social education (shakai kyōiku) field.[1] Social education, in Japan, is approximately equivalent to American adult education, and, during the Occupation, was presumably governed by similar principles as to purposes, objectives, and methods. But Japanese social education officials could not grasp the central principle of autonomy in democracy and invariably "encouraged," "suggested," or even ordered democratic social education to come into existence. A typical social education-sponsored conference, for example, would be run somewhat as follows.[2] A certain locality would be told, through school principals or local officials, perhaps, that

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[1] Social education now has the backing of national law. The Social Education Law (Shakai Kyōiku Hō), Law No. 207, June 10, 1949, in English, can be found in GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, II, 203-219. Although SCAP officials supported this law, some education officers in the field, including the writer, opposed its passage. For a discussion of the law and social education in general, see Kerlinger, "Social Organizations of Shikoku."

[2] Based on observations of such meetings by the writer and his colleagues, especially on those of the Assistant CE Officer, SMGR. For theoretical aspects of such meetings to effect attitude change, see William A. Scott, "The Information Meeting as an Instrument of Social Change in Occupied Japan," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVI (Summer, 1952), 160-178. Scott was Civil Information Officer of the Kochi Military Government Team during 1948.

such-and-such a conference, say on PTA's, would be held at such-and-such a place and time. People would attend, voluntarily or involuntarily, and listen to lecturers expatiate on the subject of PTA's. Discussion was almost non-existent. It is very likely that little change in attitudes occurred. (Changes would occur when a few leaders would get a PTA to try out some of the methods they may have learned, either at conferences or by their own efforts.) This pattern was repeated over and over again, and only began to change a bit during the latter part of 1949. In other words, the social education officials--and to a lesser extent other education officials--were working with the shell of the new ideas. The spirit behind them was not comprehended except by a lone man or woman here and there.[1]

However, despite this pessimistic account, a number of the education officials in the secretariats of Shikoku seemed to develop surprising understanding of the purpose of the new education. This understanding was noticeable in early 1949, or, in some cases, in 1948.[2] Whereas in 1947 and early 1948 it was often difficult for CE officers to make themselves understood on many points, e.g., the necessity for increasing lower secondary school and decreasing upper secondary school opportunities and facilities in order better to equalize educational

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[1]Social education is one field in which Shikoku Military Government did quite a bit of good in a rather negative way. Again and again, the CE Officer and Assistant CE Officer of the Region requested social education officials to leave the people and their organizations alone. But it was uphill work all the way. The officials had to show something, some results. They did not understand the argument that such results would be almost worse than useless, that the people and the organizations had to be allowed to grow and mature--without governmental interference.

[2]This statement is based on the writer's and his

opportunity, after the boards had been in operation for a time they seemed to grasp the principles involved with less difficulty. Whether or not this understanding would have occurred anyway in the natural course of events is not known. It is believed, however, that the advent and meaning of the board of education system was an example and a sort of release for democratic potentialities that had been building up. At any rate, in 1949, the job of working with education officials, in most cases, became an easier and more profitable one. Apparently, even the bureaucracy was becoming democratized.

All in all, then, officials, principals, and teachers were developing some sense of autonomy and responsibility. This was reflected in their increased grasp and use of the new principles of education. Many of the teachers no longer needed to be told how to teach; they had grasped some of the important principles behind democratic education, and their teaching methods changed almost inevitably. They learned to know their responsibilities as teachers and began to convey the responsibilities of the citizen in a democracy to their pupils. The officials, too, began to get a good grip on democratic principles of administration. In all likelihood, the Board of Education Law helped greatly in stimulating this growth and maturation. The principles behind the Board of Education Law of local autonomy and responsibility, once grasped, were probably seen to apply to all of education functions--from policy-making to classroom teaching and learning.

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colleagues' frequent official and friendly contacts with the officials.

Closely related to the responsibilities of boards of education members, officials, and teachers are the responsibilities of the people and of teachers as shown by their participation in educational affairs. It will be remembered that before the War the people and the teachers had little to say about the educational system and had little sense of responsibility for education. They conceived of education as a governmental function to which they would contribute when asked and not otherwise. Intimately tied up with this concept of responsibility were those of hierarchy, decentralization, and local autonomy. In order to have democratic education, citizens and teachers must accept responsibility for education. And in order for citizens and teachers to accept such responsibility there must be relative decentralization and local autonomy. If there are decentralization and real autonomy, hierarchy and its privileges and abuses are dealt a serious blow. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the Shikoku education situation in 1948-1949 to see whether there was any real participation in educational affairs by the people and by teachers and by local areas in general, since it is through participation and the efficacy of local decisions and actions that the degree and quality of decentralization and autonomy can be judged.

Fortunately for the hypotheses previously enunciated, the evidence for this important criterion of democratic education (participation) is plentiful. During November, 1948, to December, 1949, the people and the teachers both had a generous hand in influencing educational policy. Let us look first at

teacher participation.

If that powerful organ of the teachers' interests, the Teachers Union, is taken into consideration, it is safe to say that the teachers of Shikoku not only had a powerful hand in determining educational policy and making educational decisions, but they also were more directly influential than the people. The participation of the teachers in all educational affairs was exceedingly well organized; the Teachers Union was a powerful pressure group with systematic organization and internal discipline. It succeeded, in short, in establishing itself as the single most powerful education group in Japan.[1] And it was the single most powerful education pressure group in Shikoku. An examination of the influence of the Teachers Union on the boards of education and on education in Shikoku should show very well the great difference between the pre-Occupation and Occupation educational atmospheres.

Before the Occupation there was no place for nor possibility of a union of teachers. Even had it been permitted, there would have been no functional reason for such a union. The central government and the prefectural representatives of the government determined all educational policy. As in all

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[1] The problem as to whether or not the Teachers Union was dominated by the Communist Party will not be considered here, even though it is pertinent. Certainly the Communist Party was at least influential in the Union during 1946-1948. But it seems that communist influence may have diminished during 1949 due mainly to the general discredit into which the Communist Party fell at the time. The files of Japanese newspapers are full of articles and editorials on communism and education, and most of these articles and editorials are highly critical and condemnatory.

authoritarian societies, teachers were considered only the ultimate executive instruments of this policy. There was no room nor reason for teacher participation in deciding educational affairs, or in the establishment of working conditions and salaries. But early in the Occupation the Supreme Commander encouraged the establishment and growth of labor unions. A number of small teachers' unions were organized in late 1945 and early 1946. The present Japan Teachers Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai), an amalgamation of other teachers unions into one strong union, was born on June 8, 1947. But even before this there was much agitation. The movement was so self-assured in November,1946, as to call a strike.[1] The Japan Teachers Union conducted a good deal of national agitation for better teacher conditions, but really had no adequate means of bringing pressure to bear locally since up to October, 1948, educational policies were mostly determined on a national level. The advent of prefectural boards of education, however, completely changed the picture. Now, education policies were to be determined locally. Thus, the local branches of the Teachers Union could now work locally. And this they did with great energy and initiative.

The activity of the Teachers Union in getting union-backed candidates elected to boards of education has been mentioned before. After the boards took office, the Shikoku branches

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[1] Yanaga, op. cit., p. 634. See GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, I, 177-181, for a brief description of the early teacher union movement.

of the Union, if anything, increased their activities. By this time the Union no longer considered itself just a labor organization; it saw itself as a sort of labor union and teachers professional organization combined. It drew up demands and recommendations in almost all phases of education. There was no action or contemplated action of the boards of education which the Union did not scrutinize and criticize. It did not hesitate to announce its policies or to denounce others. It was, in short, an aggressive, hard-hitting organization which sought to gain control of education in Japan.

The Shikoku branches of the Union were nagging voices in the ears of the boards of education--despite the fact that half the board members had been teachers themselves. The local unions presented demands and counter-demands, plans and counter-plans. The boards of education found them impossible to ignore and difficult to fight. Here were two bodies both sensitive to their powers and rights, both conscious of their responsibilities, and both anxious, presumably, to further the progress of Japanese education. But one had the legal right to make decisions on educational policy; the other did not but acted as though it did. A few examples of important Teachers Union action on Shikoku should show how different things were from pre-Occupation days.

At the very first meetings of the boards of education, the Teachers Union presented formal demands. At a Kagawa Board of Education meeting of November 9, 1948, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Kagawa Teachers Union[1] presented

[1]This man became one of the most powerful men in

a demand for increased wages for teachers. The Board decided to take up this proposal at its next meeting.[1] On November 8, the executive staff of the Ehime Teachers Union were guests at a meeting of the Ehime Board of Education, a Union demand was read, and a Union official gave a speech of greeting to the new board. In addition, the Union stated that it wanted the Board of Education to cooperate with the Union.[2] In December, 1948, the Ehime Union presented another demand for increasing the number of teachers and their travel expenses. Later at the same meeting, the Board decided to follow the principles suggested by the Union for teachers in remote areas.[3] In Tokushima, the Union, through its Information Department Chief, severely criticized the Tokushima Board of Education for its selection of superintendent of education and for holding secret meetings.[4] The most vigorous and aggressive Union action, however, occurred in Kochi. In December, 1948, and January, 1949, the Kochi Teachers Union presenting sweeping demands to the Board of Education on educational activities and adminstration.[5] At the

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Kagawa education. His influence ran strongly through many important negotiations, and he later became the Education Chief of Takamatsu City. The last the writer heard about him was that he ran for the Diet in 1950. He narrowly missed being appointed Kagawa Superintendent of Education.

[1] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," November 9, 1948.

[2] "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," December 8-9, 1948. The Board decided that its reply to the Union demands would be oral.

[3] Ibid., December 21, 1948.

[4] Tokushima Shimbun, December 3, 1948. In all the prefectures, the Union branches thought they should have a say as to who would be superintendent.

[5] Kochi Prefectural Teachers Union, Hatsu No. 169 to

January, 1949, meeting of the Board, hearing the Teachers Union representative who was to present the Union demands was the first item on the agenda. His speech was a vitriolic and vituperative attack on the Board based on the ideas that the Board was bureaucratic and undemocratic and that it had taken no significant action for the three months of its existence.[1] The minutes of the Kochi Board for February, 1949, have a significant sentence: "The change to the new pay base is to be decided by conference with the Teachers Union. . ."[2] A similar case occurred in Ehime. The Board decided to consult the Teachers Union on revision of teachers' salaries.[3] In July, 1949, the Superintendent of Education of Ehime reported to the Board that the Teachers Union had demanded a minimum number of employees in the Ehime Secretariat of the Board of Education.[4] On May 31, 1949, the Kagawa Superintendent of Education reported in detail to the Kagawa Board of Education on changes in the elections of officials of the Central Executive Committee of

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Kochi Board of Education, December 21, 1948, "Promotion of Written Demands Concerning Activities and Administration." Kochi Prefectural Teachers Union, "Recommendations to the Kochi Board of Education," January 26, 1949.

[1] The writer attended this meeting of the Kochi Board of Education and heard the attack on the Board. Actually, the Union's charges were well-founded, if a bit exaggerated.

[2] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," February 8, 1949.

[3] "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," February 9-11, 1949. The minutes of March 7, 1949 say that the Board consulted the Union on the revision.

[4] Ibid., July 18, 1949.

the Kagawa Teachers Union.[1] And so it went.

The above incidents were by no means sporadic instances of Teachers Union and board of education action and interaction. Similar action occurred continuously throughout the first year of the boards' existence and after. Indeed, the scope and insistence of the Union influence seemed to get broader and stronger as time went on. In addition to its board-directed activities, the Union also prepared and distributed a quantity of informational material for teachers. Most of this was propagandistic, aimed at improving the welfare of teachers--which certainly needed improvement--and getting more governmental funds allocated to education.[2] While the Union's methods and concept of its functions were questionable, it served the purposes of democratic education in that it acted as a watchdog and a gad of the boards of education and the secretariats.[3] Whether or not, on the other hand, it made the board members anxious and fearful and thus lacking in

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[1] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," May 31, 1949, Appendix to Minutes.

[2] Good examples of Teachers Union material are the so-called "White Papers" of education put out in Ehime and Kagawa prefectures. Ehime-ken Kyōin Kumiai, Ehime-ken Kyōiku Hakusho (Education White Paper of Ehime Prefecture), June, 1949; Kagawa-ken Kyōshokuin Kumiai, Kyōiku Hakusho (Education White Paper). Takamatsu: Kagawa-ken Kyōshokuin Kumiai, August, 1949.

[3] Military Government in Shikoku, in its desire to be neutral, consistently ignored the Teachers Union. The writer believes that this was a serious mistake, a short-sighted policy engendered by the often aggressive and arbitrary action of the Union.

initiative cannot be known. However, the lesson to be drawn here is that the action of the Teachers Union in relation to the boards of education and the secretariats was unprecedented in Japan. No one had ever interfered with, much less denounced, constituted authority. The Teachers Union did both--and more. Its presence, while a great nuisance to the boards of education and to the central government, was salutary because it was a constant reminder that the days of arbitrary, unilateral official action were over. It was a constant reminder that the boards were elected organs of the people and that educational officials were servants of the people. Its existence and its actions are indisputable evidence of the great change that had taken place in Japanese education.

While the clearest indication of teachers' participation in educational affairs outside the classroom was represented in Teachers Union activity, there were other indications of more direct participation by teachers. Due to the repeated exhortations of Occupation education officers and the Ministry of Education, teacher participation in individual school policy and in in-service training gradually took on reality. There is little direct evidence of this participation beyond what was told the writer and his colleagues by principals and teachers. But there is evidence that teachers participated, in a broad sense, in the determination of teaching philosophy and methods. Numerous conferences were held in all parts of Shikoku for the orientation of teachers and for teachers to share their thoughts and experiences. Until 1949, these conferences were rather hortatory in nature, that is, they were stimulated by the

Occupation Forces, by the Ministry of Education, or by prefectural education officials for the purpose of indoctrinating, to use a rather strong word, teachers in the principles of the new education.[1] For the most part, "experts" lectured to teachers, and there was little thought about having the teachers really participate. Rather, they were recipients in a most passive sense. The Japanese version of an education conference was very restricted, much like the traditional university classroom in Japan--and in America. Except in question and answer periods, rarely did the conferees have the chance to share their experiences, actively to take part in the proceedings, or have any say as to what would be discussed.[2]

In 1949 a distinct change took place. Apparently it was seen that lack of active participation was a defeat of the program. Real understanding could hardly grow with such methods. Anyway, the workshop type of large conference and the teacher-initiated smaller conference were held on Shikoku.[3] Two good examples of the larger workshop conference in elementary and secondary education, which the writer attended, were held in

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[1]Accounts of a number of such conferences all over Japan may be found in GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., CI&E Bulletin, issues from June, 1947, to November, 1949.

[2]The writer attended many such conferences during 1947-1949, and same to the conclusion that they were accomplishing very few of their objectives. Occupation education personnel were just as guilty as the Japanese. The prevalent concept revolved around the hortatory and informative speech.

[3]The monthly Military Government activities reports of the four prefectural Military Government teams report such conferences.

Tokushima and Kagawa Prefectures in September and November, 1949. The September conference in Tokushima was in preparation for later all-Shikoku conferences to be held in October and November. This conference was run in a strictly workshop manner; there were no lectures. Teachers chosen from all over Tokushima mainly discussed what should be studied at the later workshops. Participation was at a high and democratic level. The writer's report of this conference says: ". . . the contrast to similar conferences held in 1947 and 1948 was marked and gratifying. . . the growth of some of the teacher consultants and some of the participating teachers points to a maturity . . . hardly anticipated earlier in the Occupation.[1] The November conference, in which SCAP, Ministry of Education, and Shikoku education officials and teachers took part, was a very large affair that also used the workshop method. There was speech-making, but there was also a good deal of well-directed, purposeful discussion. Incidentally, it might be remarked that this conference was the first such enterprise of its type and scope to be planned and handled at the local level. That is, preceding conferences had been mostly directed from the SCAP and the Ministry of Education levels. This one, however, was a cooperative affair with almost all the planning and handling done by local authorities with SCAP and Ministry of Education personnel as consultants. Here, again, is evidence of the growing democratization of

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[1] SCAR, "Monthly C. A. Activities Report," CE Section, September, 1949.

Shikoku education.[1]

In rounding out this discussion of teacher participation, it might be profitable to inquire into the attitudes of Shikoku boards of education toward teachers in general and toward teacher participation in particular. Under the older system, it was customary to deal with teachers as though they were essential but not too important cogs in the educational machine. They were transferred at will and almost by caprice, for example. While the boards did their share of transferring teachers, their minutes show a changing attitude of more respect for the individual and his importance in the educational scheme of things. One example of this was in Tokushima. The Tokushima Board of Education approved nine fundamental principles for the administration of teachers' affairs. The whole nine principles show a definitely democratic approach to personnel problems. Principle Two, for example, said that the Board of Education would respect the ideas of individuals and would listen to the opinions of responsible people who were elected from among teachers and others.[2] The minutes of the other boards, too, show, if not so directly, that a new concept of educational administration was growing, a concept rooted in the democratic principle that teachers are participating individuals, to be

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[1] An interesting 1950 development were prefectural curriculum planning committees consisting of teachers from each gun(county), who met to discuss local curriculum needs. SCAR, "Monthly C. A. Activities Report," CE Section, November, 1950.

[2] "Tokushima Board of Education Minutes," June 24-25, 1949.

treated with consideration and respect.

The participation and interest of the people in educational affairs were very apparent in the latter part of 1948 and during 1949. There are several ways of judging this participation and interest, two or three of which will be explored because of the great importance of the subject. First of all, the CE officers of the Shikoku Civil Affairs Region and the four prefectural Civil Affairs teams, especially the latter, had many visitors of all kinds, most of whom were interested in getting advice on their educational problems.[1] Early in the Occupation, most of these people were handled directly by CE officers and their assistants, but the pressure of work became so great that it became impossible to continue this procedure. More important, CE officers were trying to build up the responsibility of Japanese education officials and teachers. Thus, the visitors were usually referred to local Japanese offices

Secondly, there were the many PTA's and similar educational groups. While hardly to be called PTA's in the American sense of the term, there is little doubt that they were a growing force in stimulating citizen interest in education.[2] Another thing, the very existence of the PTA's,

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[1] Visitors to the Region CE Office were discouraged. They were requested to see the team officers concerned. This was a calculated policy of not undermining the local officers' prestige and influence.

[2] The growth of PTA's was taken by SCAP as a central criterion of the democratization of Japanese education. Figures

with their enlarged idea of parent-teacher participation, acted both as a stimulant and as a check on education officials and administrators. That is, the mere fact that PTA's were meeting and discussing something more than helping to finance school construction stimulated officials and administrators in their efforts to democratize education and checked the arbitrary use of directive power. The actual working of PTA's in 1949 was another matter. Like teachers, PTA members were rather confused as to the objectives and methods of the new education. They were also confused as to how a PTA should operate. Despite these growing pains, their numbers and quality grew until they were, by the latter part of 1949, a definite force to be reckoned with in education.[1]

A third index of the people's participation and interest in education was the number of petitions made by individual citizens and groups to Military Government and to

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released by SCAP in reports and to newspapers, however, came from Japanese sources and were inflated. See Kerlinger, "Social Organizations of Shikoku."

[1] The writer made a special point of studying PTA's during late 1948 and early 1949, although Military Government interest in them was continuous. The above conclusions are based on this study plus the study and experience of the prefectural team CE officers. An extraordinary example of the conflict engendered by the impact of the old and new philosophies of education and organization was a meeting of the PTA of a Takamatsu City upper secondary school on June 21, 1949. The conflict became so severe that the writer had to leave the meeting before it was over. That is, some members of the PTA were so consistently challenging the Chairman (an unthinkable procedure) and so insistently demanding that the "democratic" thing be done that the tension became very severe and the Chairman very confused and embarrassed. According to reports of parents and teachers, this sort of thing was happening elsewhere. (The writer has a nearly complete stenographic record of this meeting.)

boards of education. It is not known by the writer whether the Japanese people ever petitioned governmental agencies on problems of education before the Occupation. It is more likely, in view of the mores, that petitions were frowned upon or even unthought-of--they would constitute a challenge of authority and an affront to official face. But there were a considerable number of petitions made to the boards of education and to Military Government during 1949, especially middle 1949 when reorganization of the upper secondary schools was in progress.[1] As will be pointed out later, proposals announced by the board of education for the reorganization of the upper secondary schools aroused intense interest all over the island. When first announced, there was a good deal of opposition and protest. (This in itself is a sign of maturation.) This reform touched the tenderest sensibilities of many people, especially people of wealth and relative prestige who wanted special privileges and thus special schools for their children. At any rate, as explained earlier, petitions to Military Government (Civil Affairs, by this time) and to boards of education ran into the thousands. The people, whether engineered by power interests or not, were exercising the rights they had

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[1] Such petitions were not unprecedented, however, during the Occupation. For example, the Teachers Union petitioned the prefectural governors on several occasions. One such occasion was when the Kagawa Teachers Union petitioned the Governor of Kagawa on the selection of students for the Institute for Educational Leadership, objecting to the selection of the Prefectural Superintendent Selection Committee. Asahi, October 7, 1948. Early in the Occupation, the Occupation Forces received a great number of petitions on all sorts of subjects. (The writer even saw one written in blood.)

been given--and exercising them against or toward their elected representatives.[1]

An interesting example of a petition on a relatively minor matter, but one which was a concern of many communities in Shikoku, was that of the PTA of a particularly feudal community that requested the Kagawa Board of Education to change the name of one of its upper secondary schools from "Second Shodoshima Upper Secondary School" to "Shodoshima Upper Secondary School."[2] The reason for the request was the usual one: the "First" and "Second" on schools immediately implied hierarchy and differential quality. The Board at first rejected the request, but after repeated objections by the PTA, finally gave in and authorized the name change.[3] Similar action occurred elsewhere. At a May, 1949, meeting of the Kagawa Board of Education, one member said he had received many petitions on the proposed reorganization of the upper secondary schools.[4]

An unusual case occurred in Kagawa right after the Board of Education elections. A communist school teacher had run and been defeated. His candidacy attracted attention:

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[1] The Japanese took to democratic instruments with a fine will. Initiative, referendum, and recall, especially the latter, were used time and again all over Japan, often with not too much restraint.

[2] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," April 16, 1949.

[3] Ibid., April 21, 1949.

[4] Ibid., May 17, 1949.

half of the parents of the children he taught withdrew their children from school, and local PTA members conducted a signature campaign to have the man ousted from his job.[1] Another case was that of the people of two villages protesting the Board of Education appointment of personnel for the kindergartens when all the expenses came from the village! They said they wanted autonomy in this matter![2]

The three most extraordinary cases of petitioning, however, are the case of Ehime people petitioning by the thousands on upper secondary reorganization, the February meeting of the Ehime Board of Education at which four separate petitions were heard in silence, in patience, and at length,[3] and the national case of eight million parents sending petitions asking for more educational funds to the Chief of CI&E, SCAP, and to other American and Japanese officials.[4] It is quite apparent that the Japanese people had well learned another lesson of democracy. As an Asahi editorial said, "The board of education system is a system very suitable for the democratization of education, as it urges people who would ordinarily not take interest in education to become conscious of the need to participate in educational administration."[5]

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[1] Details of case learned on field trip to Kagawa Prefecture, November, 1948.

[2] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," February 27, 1950.

[3] "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," February 9-11, 1949. The petitions were heard on February 9th. The writer was present.

[4] Nippon Times, July 12, 1950.

[5] Asahi, November 6, 1949 (editorial).

An indirect criterion of interest of the people in a subject is indicated by the preoccupation of newspapers with that subject. This is less true in Japan than in the United States since the Japanese had to take what newspapers they could get or none at all (due to paper shortage). Yet the Japanese newspapers tended to carry items of interest to their readers--and many Japanese are prolific letter writers and do not hesitate to let editors know their thoughts and feelings. The newspapers of Shikoku carried a good quota of articles on education, and particularly on the boards of education, in 1948-1949. A number of these articles has already been cited. Such articles and editorials ranged from the striking of a student by a teacher to important board of education decisions. Not of few of them expressed criticism of the boards of education. If this criterion is valid according to the above reasoning, then the people of Shikoku, or at least a portion of those who read newspapers--and the Japanese seemed to read and enjoy newspapers to a surprising extent--were interested in education.[1]

Free and open discussion of educational problems by boards of education and by citizens is of course a vital criterion of educational democracy. While the boards of education often had secret meetings to discuss "difficult" policies, and

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[1] The writer has a large supply of translations of Shikoku and national newspaper articles and editorials on education in his files. They are particularly heavy for 1948-1949.

while Military Government education officials, the Teachers Union, and newspapers complained of secret sessions,[1] in general the boards discussed their problems openly and freely. Sometimes the degree of frankness was surprising. At at least three meetings of boards attended by the writer in Kagawa, Tokushima, and Ehime, delicate subjects came up and were very freely ventilated, even at the expense of occasional loss of face. And interestingly enough, the Kagawa Board of Education held meetings in ten different parts of the prefecture so that the people could learn more about the Kagawa Board of Education and its operation.[2] At one such meeting in October, 1949, a public hearing was held. The people of the locality had appointed representatives to ask the Board to complete educational facilities of the two upper secondary schools in the area as soon as possible.[3] This is not an isolated case of a board

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[1] This came out strongly in a joint conference of board of education members, superintendents of education, and Military Government officers held in Takamatsu City on January 7-8, 1949. Team CE officers told the writer of these meetings, and said they had recommended that the boards keep them to a minimum. An I Corps' report on the whole board of education situation brings out the secret meeting problem. Letter, Headquarters, AG 000.8-BA, to Commanding General, Eighth Army, June 1, 1949, "Boards of Education." For Teachers Union and newspaper criticism, see, as examples, Tokushima Shimbun, December 3, 1948, and October 17, 1949 (editorial); Tokushima Minpō, September 13, 1949; Shikoku Shimbun, April 14, 1949. The very able Japanese interpreter and assistant of the Ehime CE Officer told the writer on September 14, 1949, that the Ehime Board of Education's procedure (we were attending the meeting) was cut-and-dried; the real discussion, he said, took place behind closed doors.

[2] Kagawa Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, March, 1949.

[3] Shikoku Shimbun, October 6, 1949. See Nippon Times, May 10, 1949 (translation of Asahi editorial, May 9, 1949), for exhortation to boards of education to use unusal methods to

of education being concerned over the opinions and wishes of the people. The minutes of Shikoku board meetings from time to time contain references to this concern. A good example of this occurred in Kagawa in May, 1949. The Board of Education had been discussing the possibility of consolidating a number of lower secondary schools in the prefecture to save money and increase educational efficiency. The Board decided to send out a questionnaire to each city, town, and village in the prefecture to sound out the feeling toward such a reorganization.[1] Under the old system, had the educational authorities deemed it necessary to consolidate, an order to that effect would have been issued. Public sentiment would simply mold itself along the lines of the order.

Finally, in talking of free discussion, the many contacts of the education officers with Japanese people in all walks of life, both privately and publicly, must be mentioned. The writer and his colleagues heard, at conference after conference and meeting after meeting, free and frank expressions of opinion on all phases of the education system--boards of education, secretariats, local education matters, and even Occupation policy. At several meetings the writer attended, he heard criticism of Japanese and American policy, sometimes in quite strong terms. When he made speeches and had question and

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acquaint the public with education and board of education functions. The Ehime Board of Education members attended several public meetings on education problems. "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," September 14, 1949.

[1] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," May 23, 1949.

answer periods on the special board of education election trip around Shikoku in September, 1948, he was politely but quite definitely and openly challenged in all four prefectures, but especially in Kochi and Tokushima. His colleagues reported occasional similar experiences.

Of the criteria previously listed, perhaps the most difficult to substantiate is the decrease in the power and influence of the Ministry of Education and of the local bureaucracy and a concomitant increase in that of boards of education. There is no doubt that even in 1948-1949 the Ministry had great influence on education in Japan, and that the boards of education of Shikoku--and most probably elsewhere in Japan, too--deferred to the Ministry when they felt that certain important decisions were beyond them. It almost seemed that whenever it was possible to do so, the boards turned to the Ministry for guidance and backing. It may be that they really lacked the autonomous stamina to make up their own minds because, through long-established custom, they had come to depend on the omniscience and power of higher, established authority. Another interpretation might be that many of the difficult problems which confronted them were really beyond their ability and the ability of their subordinates to solve. Or it may be that they made use of the Ministry as an umpire as a simple way out of situations in which opinions differ--a practice as appropriate in democratic as in authoritarian countries. Still another interpretation is that 1948-1949 was the inevitable

transition period through which Japanese education had to go in order to attain maturity. It is quite true that the boards of education consulted the Ministry of Education and accepted Ministry interpretations and suggestions as law. When the Kochi Board, for example, was undecided as to what sort of entrance requirements should be set up for upper secondary schools, it decided finally to inquire of the Ministry of Education about the problem and then make its decision.[1] And entrance qualifications and requirements for secondary education became key problems since traditional Japanese secondary education had always been bottle-necked and highly restrictive and selective. A more justifiable deference to the Ministry occurred in Kagawa when the Chief of the Educational Affairs Section of the Secretariat, perplexed over the upper secondary school reorganization problem, said that he would report to the Board after the Superintendent of Education consulted personally with the Ministry of Education.[2] While this consultation may have been thought necessary, actually it probably was not--provided the Superintendent, the Educational Affairs Section Chief, and the Board of Education were willing to take responsibility for the basic decision to reorganize. They had all the information they needed as to objectives and methods of reorganization. Moreover, they had local help. The real reason the Tokyo visit

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[1] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," December 7, 1948.

[2] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," April 21, 1949.

seemed imperative to them was that they knew the storm of protest that would arise on reorganization, and they wished to be able to fall back on the strength and prestige of the Ministry. One more example, a trivial one but one that shows, in a small way, how all-embracing was the attitude of the Ministry, was when the Kagawa Superintendent of Education told the Kagawa Board that he had accepted the suggestions of the Investigation Department of the Ministry showing the methods of commemorating the one-year anniversary of boards of education.[1]

But the power and influence of the boards of education and the Ministry of Education is a relative matter, as is the power and influence of boards of education and local officials. No definite statement can be made as to the precise amount of dependence or independence that existed, nor can it be said that the dependence the boards showed crippled their autonomy. All that can be said is that legally the Ministry no longer had the right to run local education, but that the boards of education were dependent, and that such dependence was inevitable in the extremely difficult transition period through which Shikoku education was going. It might even be said that, despite the menacing sword of criticism always hanging over the boards' and superintendents' heads and despite the unpopularity they

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[1] Ibid., October 4, 1949.

would inevitably incur, especially from power elements, the boards made a few courageous, almost independent decisions. There is no better way to illustrate this than by discussing briefly their actions on reorganization of the upper secondary schools.

An adequate discussion and analysis of reorganization of secondary education would be a thesis in itself. When the boards announced that they were going to reorganize the upper secondary schools so as to make more and better education available to more young people, they were treading on traditional, almost sacrosanct toes. The Japanese secondary education system was, like similar European systems a class system, a screen to educational and economic opportunity that filtered out many applicants.[1] In other words, it made no profession of equalization of educational opportunity, nor did it profess to train students for life. It was part of the ladder to the university--for those very few who could get through the middle school (chūgakkō) and the higher school (kōtōgakkō), and then into the university The ladder was steep and difficult. Very few could and did climb it.

Probably the most serious Occupation attack on the older Japanese educational thinking and practice was its reform of secondary education. All boys and girls were to have the opportunity to get secondary education, depending on needs, abilities, and inclinations. The secondary schools were to

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[1] See Keenleyside and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 193-198 and 208-214; GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Education in the New Japan, I, 67-86.

be no longer a closed system for the favored few. Most Japanese accepted the reforms of the elementary school and, to a lesser extent, the reforms that set up the three-year (7-9) Shinsei Chūgakkō (New Type Middle School, or Lower Secondary School). And from 1946 to early 1949 or thereabouts, the reforms were concentrated on these two levels and supported by the people and by power elements. But the reform of the last level of the public school system, the three-year (10-12) Kōtōgakkō (Higher School), was left for the boards of education to accomplish. This level was comparatively untouched in 1948 due to the specific exigencies of the Japanese economic and educational situation. It was, in fact, the most delicate of all the actions the boards had to take in 1948-1949.[1] With the exception of budget matters, it was also the business which probably took the most time at Shikoku board of education meetings during the first year. The minutes of all four boards show that reorganization of secondary education was a recurring and difficult problem.[2] The board members knew, apparently,

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[1] The reader should know that the boards and superintendents were being prodded very vigorously by Military Government in some areas. This occurred in Shikoku when the British Commonwealth troops withdrew from tactical responsibility for the island and the American I Corps took over. The I Corps had launched a campaign for reorganization of secondary education and brooked no opposition to the campaign. The writer was very much opposed to its arbitrary attitude of forcing reorganization down Japanese throats. Such forcing had occurred elsewhere and had had deleterious results, particularly in Kyoto, and the writer did not want to see inadequate, poor reorganization and a loss of Japanese confidence in Military Government. An attempt was made by I Corps to transfer the writer to another region to smooth the way for the imposition of I Corps ambitions and plans. The attempt failed. I Corps never succeeded in its self-imposed mission on Shikoku.

[2] One example of this is: "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," March 7, 1949, February 8, 1949, February 26, 1949, January 18,

the importance of their work in this field. When the Ehime Board of Education unanimously passed Bill No. 30 on the reorganization of upper secondary schools, the minutes say, ". . . one of the most important documents in Ehime's education. . ."[1] The Kagawa minutes of one meeting show the anxiety of the board members. All of them supported reorganization, but they cautioned the Superintendent to be careful, and requested the Board Chairman to publish an official statement to quiet unrest.[2]

Despite the heavy obstacles in the way, and despite the questionable character of some of the changes made in individual prefectures, the boards of education of Shikoku adopted definite policies of reorganization. Each prefecture's plan was different. Tokushima made an immediate rather drastic reform.[3] Kagawa adopted a plan of more gradual reorganization.[4] Ehime's plan was moderate, with a substantial reduction of upper secondary schools.[5] The Kochi plan, after

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1949, April 26, 1949, June 1, 1949, June 23, 1949, and July 25, 1949.

[1]"Ehime Board of Education Minutes," July 29, 1949.

[2]"Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," February 22, 1949.

[3]"Tokushima Board of Education Minutes," March 22-23, 1949. On July 16, 1949, the Tokushima Superintendent of Education told the writer that upper secondary school reorganization was, in effect, finished. While this statement was not precisely accurate, a great deal had been accomplished.

[4]"Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," March 1, 1949.

[5]"Ehime Board of Education Minutes," July 29, 1949. Interesting developments in the evolution of this plan are noted in the Ehime Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Reports," CE Section, for May, June, and July, 1949.

a great deal of opposition and lethargy, was initiated in July, 1949, and accomplished a good part of the basic purposes of the reform.[1] It is noteworthy that the boards of education made a sincere attempt to determine the opinions of localities, to inform the people of the changes being made, and to keep arbitrary action to a minimum. The Kagawa and Ehime Boards of Education made trips out to study the upper secondary school situation first-hand and to hear the opinions of the people. As mentioned above, Kagawa even went so far as to have ten public information meetings in different parts of the prefecture to hear public opinion on the reorganization.[2]

Evidently public opinion changed midstream. By middle 1949, there seemed to be more acceptance of the changes made; the attitudes of the people evidently changed in the same way they had changed during previous educational reforms. Why this was so and to what extent it was so is not clearly known. It can only be conjectured that the informational efforts of the boards and education officials had some effect. Then, too, the people may have come to see the benefits to all children

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[1] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," July 25, 1949. An excellent running account of the plan, from its start to the July decision of the Board, is to be found in Kochi Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Reports," CE Section, February to August, 1949. Similar accounts are also found in the Military Government reports of the other three teams.

[2] Kagawa Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, March, 1949.

of the proposed plans.[1]

In general, the boards of education of Shikoku performed well in their reorganization of secondary education. There are those who would dispute this statement saying that the boards stalled and then only did what they had to do.[2] But the record reads otherwise. Once they became convinced of the necessity of the move and of the incommensurability of a reformed elementary system and a partially reformed secondary system, they took action. And the action was, on the whole, commendable. Perhaps more important, while the action was not as thoroughgoing as it might have been from an idealistic standpoint, it did accomplish the basic purpose of reorganization and it probably did not alienate the people of Shikoku, except for those few individuals and groups of comparative wealth and/or power who wanted a restrictive system for their children.[3]

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[1] The Shikoku Shimbun, November 1, 1949 (editorial), congratulated the Kagawa Board of Education on its one year of work, and especially congratulated the Board for its work in secondary reorganization and for making efforts to hear the opinions of people from different sections of the prefecture. It should be remembered, however, that the newspapers mostly found fault with the boards. See, for example, Kōchi Nippō, November 2, 1949 (editorial). But even this caustic editorial praises the Kochi Board for its reorganization work.

[2] The I Corps, for example, said this about Shikoku reorganization. Letter, I Corps, op. cit.

[3] A final note on reorganization should be added. The boards of education and the superintendents were by no means unguided in their efforts in reorganization. Some of the best educational material put out by the Ministry of Education--mostly inspired by SCAP CI&E advisors--was on reorganization. The material was clearly written and practical. The three major publications in this field are: Mombushō Gakkō

Returning to the original thread of discussion, while they were dependent on the Ministry of Education and often looked to Tokyo for leadership, the Shikoku boards of education took upon themselves the responsibility for making important decisions the results of which helped change the basic character of education in Shikoku. They, their superintendents, and their secretariats cooperatively worked toward the equalization of educational opportunity. They made long strides toward achieving coeducation throughout the public educational system. They broadened the restrictive entrance requirements for the upper secondary schools. They attempted to eliminate the practices which made it impossible for poorer students to get secondary education. They succeeded in accomplishing redistricting plans that went far toward eliminating discriminatory and hierarchical thinking and practices in upper secondary education. Finally, they cut down at least some of the large inequality in facilities and personnel between lower secondary and upper secondary schools. Reorganization of the secondary school structure was only one of the accomplishments of the

Kyōiku Kyoku, Shingakkō Seido Jisshi Jumbi no Annai (Handbook for Preparation of Execution of the New School System). Tokyo: Mombushō, February 17, 1947. This document, known as Hatsugaku No. 63, was basic for reorganization of the school system. (The only English version, to my knowledge, is a mimeographed edition forwarded to Military Government CE officers.) Mombushō Gakkō Kyōiku Kyoku, Shinsei Kōtōgakkō Jisshi no Tebiki (Handbook on Preparatory Steps for the Organization of the New Upper Secondary School). Tokyo: Mombushō, December 27, 1947. This was known as Hatsugaku No. 534, and is also unavailable in English. Ministry of Education Bulletin, Curriculum of the New Upper Secondary Schools, Part I. Tokyo: GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect.,Educ. Div., December 19, 1948. Parts II, III, and IV were mimeographed and distributed to Military Government units.

boards of education. But the example of reorganization is here sufficient to show some of the difficulties of the boards and the manner in which the difficulties were resolved, and to show that the boards did make autonomous decisions that were by no means the same in all prefectures. In other words, they were educational policy-making bodies that legislated under a variety of pressures--Ministry of Education, Military Government, educational officials, the Teachers Union, and, most important, the people of Shikoku--but at the same time they preserved an essential core of difference and autonomy.

The question as to whether there was a decrease of the power and influence of local officials with a concomitant increase of the power and influence of boards of education is easy to answer. The boards of Shikoku were definitely more powerful and more influential than Shikoku officials. In only one prefecture, Tokushima, was this disputed. And even here it was hardly true that the Superintendent of Education was more powerful than the Board of Education.[1] The Shikoku boards of education made the decisions and everyone at all interested in education knew it. And the boards themselves plainly let it be known at their meetings that they were the educational authorities in their prefectures.[2] In 1949, the relationship of the boards

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[1] Tokushima Shimbun, October 17, 1949 (editorial). This editorial shows a lack of knowledge of the relationship between boards and superintendents. It says, for example, "The board of education takes advice or recommendations from the superintendent only in case it has to dispose of business quickly." The Superintendent of Education of Tokushima was a strong, determined, highly intelligent man, and the Board knew it. He did not rule the Board. Rather, he did a good job as superintendent and helped the Board greatly.

[2] This is partly a subjective impression picked up by th

and the superintendents even became a matter for public comment, and there was a demand for revision of the Board of Education Law to clarify this relationship.[1] Because of this demand, the law was revised, and the relationship clarified.[2] Board members, before this revision of the law, were even rather high-handed with superintendents and secretariat officials, and sometimes insisted on studying school situations at first hand, on personally hearing complaints, and on conducting negotiations which might better have been left to the officials. As discussed previously, the boards were hardly to be called ayatsuri ningyo (puppets) for outside influences or for officials. The whole impression from personal contacts and from study of the documents available is quite the opposite. They were, in short, almost defensive in their desire to assert themselves, and the people of Shikoku, as evidenced by the petitions and demands of different groups and localities presented to the boards, were quite aware of this. In their own eyes, in the eyes of the officials, and in the eyes of the people, then, the boards of education were the local power in education, the to-be respected repositories of the legal right to make educational policy. They

writer in a number of visits to board meetings during 1948-1949 and on information supplied by the team CE officers. The writer also heard board members instruct and rebuke education officials at board meetings.

[1] For press comments on the problem, see Nippon Times, October 4, 1949 (editorial) and Mainichi (English edition), October 28, 1949 (editorial).

[2] See Board of Education Law, Article LII-(3). GHQ, SCAP, CI&E Sect., Educ. Div., Post-War Developments in Japanese Education, II, 240-241.

were maturing to the point of becoming relatively independent of the Ministry of Education, and they became dominant over the officials of their secretariats.

The last of the criteria to be considered is decision-making. In the early part of this chapter, it was said that decision-making, in a sense, was the single most important criterion of the relative amount of democracy of the boards of education of Shikoku. Before investigating decision-making in relation to the boards of education, something of the rationale behind this statement should be given.

It is the belief of the author that decision-making is a central criterion of large and small groups, of governments and local associations. If it can be determined how a group reaches its decisions, and the underlying causes for the methods used can be determined by analysis and inference, then the social scientist is in a position to make some estimate of the relative amount of democracy or authoritarianism that exists in the group. If all other criteria were impossible to investigate, the study of the decision-making methods of a group might still give some knowledge of and insight into the underlying philosophy of the group. These statements are based on empirical observations of the writer of Japanese and American groups in action.[1] The philosophy and methods behind Japanese and American group thinking and procedure are very different,

[1] Some of the thinking and conclusions that arose from this experience has been brought together in the author's article, "Decision-Making in Japan," previously cited.

naturally. They spring from different political systems and from quite opposing ideologies. But let us examine the chain of thought behind the so-called authoritarianism or democracy of decision-making.

It is not so much decision-making itself that is important in determining the ideology of a group. The truly important thing, of which the decision act and process are the manifest expressions, is the participation of the group member in the decision-making process. That is, to the degree that all or most group members are able to participate in the deliberations of the group--the system used makes it freely possible--to that degree the group is democratic. The degree to which group members do not participate in the process leading to ultimate decisions--something or other impedes or stifles this participation--to that degree is the group authoritarian. A group leader, let us say, thinks that he knows the group's mind, and somehow or other makes the decisions for the group. Even though he has quite accurately determined the group's will, the group is authoritarian--it has not participated in the decision-making process, or in the deliberations leading to the decision-making act. On the other hand, a group leader tries to get all those group members who have something to say about the issue under discussion, or should have something to say about it because they are affected by decisions on the issue, to say it. Everyone does not have to speak directly, of course. But everyone must have the opportunity to speak, or the potentiality of in some way or other influencing the ultimate

decision.[1] This is democracy in at least one vital sense of the word. The authoritarian order, in one way or another, using one rationalization or another, does not permit this participation in the decision-making process. In the balder forms of authoritarianism, there is no pretense made: decisions are handed down, and there is no question of who makes the decisions or who has the right to make them. In the subtler, more concealed forms of authoritarianism, such as paternalism, the stifling of participation is glossed over or rationalized. Naturally, there are few or no pure forms of either authoritarianism or democracy. Rather, there are only degrees of both and often mixtures of both which are difficult to disentagle. This is especially true for the observer of decision-making in a culture other than his own. Present-day Japan is just such a culture.

Japan was an authoritarian country. It must be presumed, therefore, that Japanese decision-making was also authoritarianism. It must also be presumed that, if Japan has become democratic to any extent, the decision-making methods of Japanese groups have also become democratic to more or less that extent. This does not mean, for example, that the Japanese have to use American forms of parliamentary procedure. The only criterion to be sought is: to what extent is true participation encouraged and to what extent is there actual participation in the decision-making of Japanese groups since the Occupation? If parliamentary

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[1] For a discussion in which decision-making is an important or central factor defining the nature of societies, see Harold D. Lasswell, et al, The Comparative Study of Elites, pp. 1-7. Hoover Institute Series, Series B: Elites, No. 1. Stanford University

procedure aids participation in decision-making, then it becomes a criterion of the democracy of the groups using it. In the study of Shikoku associations previously cited, the writer tried to show how Shikoku organizations had grown toward democracy in this respect. The tentative conclusion was reached that Shikoku organizations--PTA's, women's associations, youth associations, and miscellaneous social clubs and the like--had gone part of the way toward democratic participation in decision-making. At this point, then, the decision-making of the four boards of education of Shikoku will be examined to try to discover whether the boards, too, had gone part of the way toward democratic participation in decision-making. In addition, if evidence can be found that the people have influenced the boards' decisions to any considerable extent, then it can be tentatively asserted with even greater force that education in Shikoku has been to that extent democratized.

Decision-making in Japan emphasizes the group and de-emphasizes the individual. The system, of course, has proceeded from and been reinforced by the hierarchical, authoritarian culture of Japan. In groups, the individual or small group--the chairman or executive committee, say--makes the decisions. The group is often asked its opinion (often it may not be asked), but essentially it is expected that the leader or

Press, January, 1952. The authors say that the key question turns on accountability of leaders to the people, which is a variation on the theme of participation.

leaders will make the decision and the group will concur with this decision, at least overtly. Should an individual or a minority disagree, the interests of the individual or the minority should be submerged in the will of the group as "known" and expressed by the leader. The writer has coined a Japanese expression for the decision-making process itself: "Suisen-Sansei-Igi Nashi" (Recommendation-Agreement-No Objection) System. The following passage from the writer's book on parliamentary procedure is quoted to show the efficient working of the system.

> The main basis of the Japanese organizational system is based on what might be termed the "Suisen-Sansei-Igi Nashi" pattern of thinking. . . . For example, an organization will need a president. Recommendations (suisen) will be made by someone prominent in the organization or in the community. If whoever is in charge of the meeting at which this choice is being made then asks the members their opinion on a certain candidate, they will usually say "Sansei" (agreement), and the particular person recommended at the time is elected. Similarly, if an organization needs to reach a decision on an important matter, seldom is a vote taken. Instead, the chairman may state the matter under consideration. The members will usually say "Igi Nashi" (no objection). . .
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> All this supposes that the chairman bothers to put the matter up to the members at all. Many times he will not put it up to them but will listen to a few opinions and then say, without further ado, vote, or anything else, "It is decided that. . . ."[1]

In the first meetings of the boards of education of Skikoku, the Suisen-Sansei-Igi-Nashi System was almost exclusively used. The Kochi CE Officer, in his November, 1948,

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[1] Fred N. Kerlinger, Minshushugi no Gijutsu (Techniques of Democracy), pp. 123-124. Hiroshima: Hiroshima Tosho K. K., 1949. (English edition: Takamatsu: Shikoku Military Government Region, 1948, p. 46.) See, also, Robert E. Ward, "The Socio-Political Role of the Buraku (Hamlet) in Japan," American Political Science Review, XLV (December, 1951), 1025-1040, and John F. Embree, Suyre Mura, pp. 167-168. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. These last two references were also based on direct observation.

monthly report, said that, although there were indications of interest and sincerity on the part of the Kochi Board, there was a "great lack of knowledge and skill in conducting efficient meetings."[1] The minutes (or rather, record) of the Tokushima Board of Education meetings during the first two months show almost exclusive use of the No-Objection system.[2] In fact, the Tokushima Board minutes show an apparent use of this system down to November, 1949. The Ehime and Kagawa CE officers, in talking to the writer, said that the Ehime and Kagawa boards were also using the same system, but they also said that there were occasional attempts at voting on important issues. The minutes of the Kagawa Board's regular meeting for December, 1948, show that a hand-vote was taken on a salary boost for Takamatsu City teachers.[3] During these first two or three months of the boards' existence, the minutes and the written and verbal reports of team CE officers led to the conclusion that the Japanese system was predominant, but that there were sporadic efforts on the part of board chairmen to get an accurate registration of opinion on some issues.

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[1] Kochi Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, November,1948.

[2] "Tokushima Board of Education Minutes," November 1, 1948, November 24-25, 1948, December 11, 1948, and December 17, 1948. It should be here noted that sometimes the so-called "minutes" of the boards of education were not really minutes, in the usual sense of the word. They might be a rather rambling record of decisions made or of points discussed with no record of decisions reached, or they might be very complete records of everything that went on at the meetings. The Kochi minutes during late 1948 and early 1949 are a case in point.

[3] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," December 7, 1948.

From approximately February, 1949, the record shows more of these attempts to get away from the traditional Japanese system. In only one case, Ehime, can it be said that a board tried almost to imitate American methods of parliamentary procedure. (It is not meant here that the use of American-type parliamentary procedure would have been desirable. The criterion is: Did the boards use a method of decision-making that ensured active participation in decision-making by all board members?) In February,1949, the writer attended board meetings in Ehime, Kagawa, and Tokushima.[1] In Kagawa, the Igi Nashi System was used exclusively throughout the meeting attended. In fact, the procedure of the whole meeting was a hodge-podge from any point of view. The inadequacies of the Japanese method for the situation at the time--or perhaps lack of method in this case--were very apparent. Board members talked, and even shouted, back and forth at each other. There was acrimonious snapping, especially by the Prefectural Assembly member of the Board. (He was irked by the "independent" actions of the Secretariat officials.) In short, decision-making was almost at a standstill. It was neither authoritarian nor democratic; it was almost anarchy. However, at a special meeting of the Kagawa Board later in the month, three actual votes were taken, and the results of this voting were recorded in the minutes.[2] This is very significant. It

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[1] SMGR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," February, 1949.

[2] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," February 22, 1949.

marked the use of a democratic method of decision-making in which opposition to a subject of discussion or a decision was publicly exposed. This probably could not have happened in pre-Occupation Japan.[1] At the February Ehime Board regular meeting, too, there was difficulty in reaching a budget decision. One board member said they should vote "democratically" to break the impasse. The Chairman took the vote, and the results of the split vote were published in Board minutes.[2]

The Tokushima February Board meeting which the writer attended is an excellent example of the incommensurability of the Japanese system of decision-making with democratic intentions. It seemed obvious to the writer and to the Tokushima CE officer that the board members were sincere, responsible, and willing, but they clearly did not know what they were doing. They consistently used the Igi Nashi System, but they sometimes did not even know to what proposition they were supposed to be saying "No Objection." At one point, the Superintendent of Education asked the Chairman what had been decided after the Chairman had said, "It is decided, then." It was an embarrassing and un-Japanese moment.[3] The trouble, of course, was that the

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[1] But votes had been taken and the results made public right from the beginning of the boards' existence, when there were candidates for office to be elected. Apparently votes were taken in such cases. In November, 1948, all the boards of education of Shikoku voted in the most orthodox Western manner for their chairmen and vice-chairmen.

[2] "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," February 9-11, 1949.

[3] SMGR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," February, 1949.

individual board members were determined that they would have some say in the decisions of the Board. This was democracy, they had been told and so believed. So they asserted themselves. But confusion resulted in a system geared to authoritarianism. The Japanese system evolved from the needs of an authoritarian culture. Now, an incipient democratic culture was trying to use this system, i.e., the Suisen-Sansei-Igi Nashi System, and the result was confusion and a sense of bewilderment and frustration on the part of board members. The same thing was happening to the other Shikoku boards of education, and indeed, the same thing was happening all over Japan to boards and other groups and associations of all kinds.[1] These groups tried to achieve democratic participation with highly inadequate machinery to achieve this participation. Japan had started the long, hard road toward the assimilation of Western ideologies and methodologies-- with the consequent price any culture must pay for such radical change.

At Ehime, too, there was confusion, but the Ehime Board of Education had advanced further along the road toward the scrapping of the Igi Nashi System. It was evident at the meeting of the Ehime Board the writer attended in February, 1949, that certain board members had considerable understanding and knowledge both of the procedure of discussion and voting and the raison d'etre behind the procedure. Yet there were curious anomalies. For example, there would be a motion which would be

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[1] Nippon Times, November 13, 1947 (editorial). This is a penetrating Japanese opinion on the whole problem of Japanese meeting procedure.

seconded, but a vote would not be taken. To illustrate the mixed nature of the proceedings, one incident can be given. Toward the seeming end of a discussion, the Chairman said, "Is it agreed that . . .?" A board member said, "Why don't you take a vote?" An official of the Secretariat answered, "Since this is informal discussion (they had decided to have 'informal discussion') and since this is not something submitted to the Board Secretary through the Superintendent of Education, voting is not necessary."[1] If nothing else, this shows preoccupation with the decision-making process and its implications for democracy.

There were situations like the ones described above in all four prefectures during the first three months. But as time went on, differentiation took place. The Ehime Board formalized its deliberations to a considerable extent along the lines of American-type parliamentary procedure. This was perhaps due to the fact that the Ehime CE Officer put a good deal of stress on the subject, as did the Region CE officers.[2] The Kochi and Tokushima boards used mostly the Japanese system with occasional motion-making and vote-taking, and the Kagawa Board was a sort of mixture of formal parliamentary procedure and the Japanese system, with a distinct edge toward the latter. Some examples

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[1] SMGR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," February, 1949.

[2] The other team CE officers suggested procedural clarification by the boards, but did not stress the subject as much as the Ehime CE Officer.

of actual incidents that occurred may help to clarify a complex situation.

The Tokushima CE Officer, in his monthly reports, refers to board procedure in February, June, and July, 1949.[1] In February, he mentions the very faulty procedure of the Board, but by June and July, 1949, he says that there has been decided improvement. Unfortunately, details are not furnished, but the Tokushima Minutes do give some indication of what happened. The minutes from March through October, 1949, indicate that Yeas and Nays were taken. The terms "move" and "second" are used, and the persons so moving and seconding are recorded.[2] Apparently this rather formal procedure was followed scrupulously throughout all these meetings of the Tokushima Board. The change took place in March. The point is that presumably the Tokushima Board rejected quite a bit of the Japanese system and began using parliamentary procedure in its fifth month of existence. But some doubt is thrown on the above statements by the fact that, except in the cases of elections, there is not a single indication in the minutes of a split vote. It is possible that the Japanese system was used, and that the minutes were made up on one of the models available to the Board. At any rate, Tokushima is the only prefecture where there were no split votes on issues. The

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[1] Tokushima Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, February, 1949, June, 1949, and July, 1949.

[2] "Tokushima Board of Education Minutes," March-October, 1949.

other prefectures all record such decisions in their minutes. The Ehime Board of Education Minutes record several split votes,[1] and, very interesting to note, on one such decision made in April, the vote was tied, and the Vice-Chairman, who was presiding in the Chairman's absence, added his vote to the ayes to carry the proposal.[2] In August, one member abstained from voting on an issue regarding the regulations for upper secondary schools.[3] At the September, 1949, meeting of the Ehime Board, the writer was present.[4] The procedure was not too clearcut; there was still the mixture of the old and the new. But there was nothing like the confusion of the February meeting, nor was there as much of the rather automatic "No Objection" (Igi Nashi) System. A neat example of the mixture of methods and the change that had taken place was when the Chairman asked the group if there was any objection to voting on a certain issue. The answer was "Igi Nashi!" Then the Chairman said, "Please raise your hands (if you want to take this action)." All the members then raised their hands.

Kagawa's mixed procedure started in March, 1949. All decisions reached at the March 1st meeting were reached by the Igi Nashi System. Even a very important decision on the

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[1] "Ehime Board of Education Minutes," February 9-11, 1949, April 12-13, 1949, October 25, 1949.

[2] Ibid., April 12-13, 1949.

[3] Ibid., August 24, 1949.

[4] SCAR, CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," September, 1949.

reorganization of upper secondary schools was reached in this manner.[1] But at a special board meeting later in the month, there was a four-three vote on a relatively minor issue, and this split vote was so recorded in the minutes.[2] At the same meeting, a motion was made to postpone the above decision, and the Board voted down the motion, five to two. And three more matters were settled by similar splits.[3] The Kagawa Board had one more special meeting in March, 1949, and an unusual incident occurred. A board member made a suggestion on the districting of upper secondary schools. A vote was taken and the suggestion was rejected, six to one.[4] This was flat, bald action unusual in Japan. There can be little doubt that the member lost face. On the other side of the coin was the rather arbitrary making of a decision by the Kagawa Board Chairman at a September, 1949, meeting. A member made two suggestions presumably for board decision, both of which were important. The Chairman brushed aside the first suggestion by saying it would be taken care of, and simply rejected the second.[5] In other words, he decided both issues without

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[1] Stenographic notes of this meeting were taken down by a Japanese assistant of the writer, March 1, 1949.

[2] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," March 14, 1949. Incidentally, this decision caused a good deal of protest from the small city it affected, but the Board would not retreat from its position.

[3] Ibid. The other splits were 3-4, 4-3, and 6-1.

[4] Ibid., March 29, 1949.

[5] Ibid., September 22, 1949. It is not known to what extent, if any, this sort of chairman action occurred.

consulting the Board.

The Kochi Board presents a different decision-making picture. At an April, 1949, meeting which the writer attended, all decisions were reached by the Igi Nashi System, and the meeting was not too orderly or businesslike.[1] It seems that the Kochi Board did not make much attempt to change its decision-making habits during 1949, but this statement cannot be definitely made since the Kochi Board of Education Minutes are highly inadequate. They record nothing but the decisions reached. On the basis of the writer's knowledge, two visits to Kochi Board meetings, and the verbal and written reports of two CE officers assigned to Kochi during 1949, it is probably safe to say that the system remained pretty much unchanged. In 1950, however, a change seems to have taken place. The minutes for January, February, March, and May, 1950, all record votes taken.[2] The impression received from the minutes is that when there was palpable disagreement, the Chairman called for votes. Evidently other decisions were of the Igi Nashi type. The Kochi Board, then, probably changed little in 1949, but did change in 1950.

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[1] SCAR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," April, 1949. The meeting was held on April 20th.

[2] "Kochi Board of Education Minutes," January 10, 1950, February 1, 1950, February 7, 1950, March 4, 1950, March 15, 1950, and May 6, 1950. (There is some doubt about the May Minutes. On the one decision out of twelve that is not unanimous details are not given.) Several sets of 1950 board of education minutes were sent to the writer by his successor in Shikoku.

From all the above data and reasoning on board of education decision-making, it is still not possible to make generalizations with any great degree of certainty. Like all other very complex sociological phenomena, the decision-making processes of the four boards of education of Shikoku are very difficult to understand from this distance. But taking what evidence there is, it can be said, at the least, that the boards were not dominated by the authoritarian methods of decision-making that were a common cultural feature of pre-Occupation Japanese groups. They did use the Japanese methods, perhaps much more than they used more democratic methods. But apparently the board members were not dominated by the chairmen in their decision-making as they might have been under the old order. Voting was resorted to on a number of occasions, maybe more than the records show and more than the CE officers of Shikoku observed. Briefly put, the system of decision-making the boards used was no one system, as it probably would have been in pre-Occupation Japan. It consisted, rather, of a mixture of the Japanese Suisen-Sansei-Igi-Nashi System and elements of the American system of parliamentary procedure. No one can say, categorically, that the board decisions were unilateral and authoritarian. In general, they were arrived at without chairman haragei, without chairman so-called intuition and coercion. Or going deeper, board members had the opportunity of disagreeing, without group disapprobation or stigma, with proposals that were made. And they did so disagree, as the evidence shows. They participated in the board decisions, and

were usually not deprived of their participation rights by chairman or group pressure. There can be little doubt that a definite cultural change took place that was both a direct and an indirect result of the Occupation and the democratic atmosphere that existed in Japan during the late Occupation. The principle involved is an inversion of a very significant sentence of Hitler's. In 1933, he said,"We must now get rid of the last remains of democracy, especially of the methods of voting and of the decisions of the majority. . ."[1]

Further to support the hypothesis that drastic changes in the direction of democratic education were made by the boards of education of Shikoku, a number of miscellaneous actions of the boards should be noted. It was pointed out above how the boards sought the opinions of the people before making certain important decisions. It was seen how the boards listened to the demands and recommendations of the representative organ of teachers, the Teachers Union, It was also seen how the boards occasionally deferred to the wishes of localities. In addition, they took several important steps toward the equalization of educational opportunity some of which were relatively unknown and/or unappreciated by the people of Shikoku. A few of these actions will now be discussed.

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[1] Speech to Reich Commissioners, Berlin, July 6, 1933. In Harold W. Metz and Charles A. H. Thomson, Authoritarianism and the Individual, p. 257. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1950.

One of the salient characteristics of the old educational system was the attitude toward teachers. They were considered employee-pawns to be ordered about and, very significantly, transferred about at will and even caprice. This transfer power was in the hands of officials and was held as a weapon over teachers' heads. It was even used as a means of extortion.[1] Little attempt was made to equalize the differences between rural and urban areas, i.e., the better teachers were left in the better schools and the poorer teachers were left in the poorer schools. The same was true of equipment and facilities. In a predominantly rural area like Shikoku, therefore, many localities suffered from the lack of good teachers. The good teachers tended to be concentrated in the few urban areas of the island or to be transferred elsewhere in Japan. A final point is that the teachers of institutions higher in the educational scale, e.g., the kōtōgakkō, got more privileges in every way than did teachers in the lower schools. Also, the upper schools had priority of facilities and equipment.

The Shikoku boards of education took action to remedy this situation, at least to some extent. Tokushima drew up the previously mentioned nine principles for the administration of teachers' affairs, among which the following two are very pertinent.

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[1] These facts were discovered by the writer over a long period by questioning Shikoku prefectural and local officials and teachers on the older practices.

> (2) To pay respect to the individual's ideas and at the same time to listen to the opinions of those representatives who are elected from among teachers. . .
> (8) To appoint those principals as teachers who are better as teachers than as principals.[1]

The Kagawa Board of Education caused a considerable stir in educational circles by deciding on all teacher transfer itself, and by trying to improve rural schools by sending to them good teachers from city schools.[2] The Kagawa Board also laid down four principles for the reorganization of upper secondary schools which are here pertinent. They were that coeducation was to be encouraged, upper secondary schools were, if possible, to be comprehensive, attendance districts were to be established and adhered to, and lower secondary schools were to have priority of teachers and facilities.[3] Similar principles, if not such explicit ones, were adopted in the other prefectures. The Kagawa Board, in 1950, refused to permit exceptions to the established attendance regulations for upper secondary schools in Takamatsu City.[4] This is important because many influential people got their children into the better schools, usually the "First" such-and-such Upper Secondary School. Again in 1950,

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[1] "Tokushima Board of Education Minutes," June 24-25,1949.

[2] Kagawa Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, April, 1949.

[3] Ibid., February, 1949.

[4] Shikoku Civil Affairs Region, "Monthly Civil Affairs Activities Report," CE Section, May, 1950. There were fifty-nine violations reported in Takamatsu City alone.

the Kagawa Board eliminated entrance examinations for upper secondary school applicants. The Board policy read that if the number of candidates exceeded the fixed number to be admitted to a school, emphasis should be on pupil records rather than on examinations.[1] Prior to this, the Kagawa Board had reduced the tuition fees for upper secondary schools, and said that the tuition fees of poor students could be reduced or omitted altogether, if the poor students could pass an examination.[2] At the same time, the Board discussed the possibility of getting poor children to school by giving financial aid to the family.[3]

In January, 1949, the Ehime Board publicized an ambitious set of problems the Board would tackle in 1949. These included complete enforcement of coeducation, the five-day week, and reorganization.[4] Later in the year, Ehime set up an experimental education program of no mean proportions. Thirty-six schools were designated as experimental schools to test newer methods in teaching and administration. Ten other schools, elementary and lower secondary, were used by the Prefectural Educational Research Institute for curriculum experimentation,

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[1] "Kagawa Board of Education Minutes," February 20, 1950.

[2] Shikoku Shimbun, October 18, 1949.

[3] Asahi, October 20, 1949.

[4] Ehime Shimbun, January 15, 1949.

but the Institute also studied the local education situation and helped the schools with newer methods, questionnaires, and intelligence tests.[1] The Tokushima Board of Education, in a meeting held on February 18, 1949, showed an interest in broadening the educational base by discussing part-time upper secondary schools at length. Board members said they wanted to provide upper secondary education for all who wanted it, and since the part-time upper secondary schools were primarily for working youth, they wanted to keep the tuition fees low.[2] To broaden teachers and to help in-serivce training, the Kochi Board of Education decided that it would send teachers, expenses paid, to universities for further study, and would make it possible for other teachers to spend six months at the Kochi Prefectural Educational Research Institute for study and research.[3] Ehime, Kagawa, and Tokushima studied the possibility of instituting a five-day school week instead of the Japanese six-day week. Tokushima started and continued a rather thoroughgoing five-day week experiment, the results of which were conceded to be successful. Thus, by September, 1949, 40 per cent of Tokushima's schools were said to be on the five-day week.[4]

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[1] SCAR CE Officer, "Field Trip Notes," September, 1949.

[2] Ibid., February, 1949.

[3] Kochi Military Government Team, "Monthly Military Government Activities Report," CE Section, April, 1949.

[4] Conveyed to the writer by the Tokushima Superintendent of Education and Tokushima Secretariat officials, April 14, 1949 and September 16, 1949.

There are a number of other instances of forward-looking board of education discussion and action, but the sample given will show the direction of events. There are of course examples of action not so commendable. Yet the writer's experience and study show that they are not reflections of the true direction of events. The very least that can be said is that the general educational situation and educational and social attitudes were definitely changed in a democratic direction, were definitely influenced by the Allied Occupation of Japan. The extent of this change, in view of the many actions of the boards of education and the known reaction of the people to the changes being made, was considerable. The central hypothesis of this dissertation, "The changes made (in education in Japan) describe the process of moving from authoritarian to democratic control," seems to be established in Shikoku. The next and final chapter will examine this hypothesis and the others enunciated earlier, and, in the light of the supporting evidence given, will make decisions as to whether Shikoku education--and Japanese education--has been democratized, and if so, to what extent.

CHAPTER VI

APPRAISAL: DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION IN SHIKOKU AND IN JAPAN

> A society which makes provisions for participation . . . of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible adjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control. . . .[1]

This statement by John Dewey aptly summarizes the educational effort of the Occupation in Japan. If the educational reforms of the Occupation were to succeed, it was above all imperative that Japanese educators and the Japanese people accept them. This required participation in the educational process.[2] But more important, it was imperative that educators and people accept the philosophy and principles behind the reforms and that they be "actively motivated" to pursue meanings and understandings.[3] And it is believed that they did do this. As shown in Chapter V, Japanese educators and the Japanese people participated in the educational process, and by and large, they came, uncertainly, confusedly, and perhaps too hurriedly, to accept the meanings and principles behind the reforms. It is not meant that they had a complete under-

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[1] John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 115. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1916.

[2] See Lewin, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

[3] Krech and Crutchfield, op. cit., p. 154.

standing of the underlying bases of democratic education, but that they came to have sufficient understanding by 1950 to enable them to carry on under the newer concepts and institutions, providing they wished to do so, and providing they felt capable of reconciling them with the new Japanese culture. To be sure, these factors were not sufficiently understood or accepted by the general public to make it a certainty that democratic education would continue to thrive in Japan. Yet the structure was there with enough acceptance and understanding to ensure a good start, and there was a fair but somewhat less certain prospect for its continuation and growth.

In the preceding chapters an outline of Japanese education and educational change before and during the Occupation has been drawn with the principal idea of contrasting the authoritarianism of the old system and the democracy of the new. Much care was devoted to analyzing the radical difference between education for the nation, the Imperial Way, and war, and education for the development of individual personality and peace. The historical and ideological foundations of Japanese education in modern times were sketched with special reference to administrative centralization and the lack of any real tradition of local autonomy and responsibility. All important educational policy, it was established, was determined by the Ministry of Education in Tokyo; and, with the exception of a superficial gesture in the form of the gakumu iin (educational affairs committees), all important administrative functions were carried out directly by the Ministry of Education or by its representatives in each

prefecture. Education was standardized and routinized. It was an efficient instrument for the transmission of the wishes of the Japanese Government, a government which was regarded as omniscient and omnipotent, which determined down to the last textbook what the Japanese child would learn and to the last thought what beliefs and attitudes the Japanese child would have. It was education by directive, a system in which the individual personality was, from a Western viewpoint, smothered and dwarfed. Obviously, such a system was a direct antithesis to democratic education, with its stress on the development of an individual's personality and his active participation in deciding how and by whom the government should be run. In other words, the Japanese educational system was the authoritarian educational instrument of a highly authoritarian and hierarchical government and social system. Finally, it was pointed out how the spirit of nationalism implicit in the early educational system became noticeable by the 1930's and markedly accentuated by the 1940's. In that decade, particularly, Japan's educational aims became education for war, the subordination of the individual, and the complete exaltation of the state and the Imperial Way. Those years may be described as the climax of Japan's education for authoritarianism.

In September of 1945 when the Americans commenced the Occupation, the educational system had all but collapsed. In the midst of the confusion, the Occupation Forces started a program of reform. The older system was "purified" of undesirable elements, and a radical turn toward democratic education

was inititated. There can be no doubt whatsoever that there were many far-reaching and fundamental changes made in the form, content, and philosophy of Japanese education.[1] The physical alterations were effectively accomplished, and a new philosophy of education was officially written into law and into textbooks. There is little room for argument over the ideological and physical changes that were effected. The core of the problem is, rather, a complex of questions centering around the problem of whether the Japanese were really accepting and introjecting the changes or only conforming outwardly and superficially. Thus we again come to the matter of attitude change.

Critics have said that the Japanese will throw off the so-called "democratic" reforms and return to their old educational system when the Americans are well out of Japan.[2] Some of these critics say that the Japanese never had any intention of abiding by the changes, that they were cunningly waiting for the chance to go back, and that meanwhile any sabotage that could not be detected would be attempted. This

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[1] This statement is necessary since some students of Japanese education seem not to recognize it. Robert King Hall, for example, says that there was no change made by the Occupation in the Japanese philosophy of education. Hall, Shūshin, The Ethics of a Defeated Nation, p. vii.

[2] Sansom, for example, strongly implies this. Yet he does say that there is no precedent for the Occupation and its all-out effort to effect change and thus no prediction is really possible. Sansom, op. cit., p. 504. For other criticisms by Sansom, see his letter to the editor, "Education in Japan," Pacific Affairs, XIX (December,1946), 413-415, and "Conflicting Purposes in Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVI (January,1948), 302-311. (Most of the criticisms the writer has heard expressed informally.)

argument furnishes a rationale for the fumbling and confusion so frequently encountered in the Japanese of 1946-1948. Other critics say that even if the Japanese were sincere in their desire and efforts to achieve a democratic educational system, it would still be impossible for them to understand and use concepts so remote from their culture. It is naive, say the critics, to suppose that an utterly foreign institution can be imposed on an old culture with well-worn ruts leading to different goals.

It must be conceded that the cultural argument is sound and potent. True, it was and still is very difficult for many or even most Japanese to accept and understand the ideas behind the educational reforms of the Occupation. But this does not mean that they cannot possibly be achieved. It can be shown that even if a people is compelled to observe certain practices and reforms, some individuals will come to accept them readily, especially if they do not lead to punitive consequences. Moreover, if recognizable benefits can be seen to accrue from the changes, the process of acceptance and habituation is facilitated. Gradually the reforms become part of the societal <u>mores</u>, cultural and societal musts for most people.

This, it is believed, is what has been happening in Japan. Foreign reforms of the educational system were introduced by the Occupation Forces, not only for their own benefit but also for the good of the Japanese. The conquered people had expected harsh punishments. Instead, they got benefits.[1]

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[1] It would be profitable and interesting to explore this problem from the point of view of Thorndike-Hull learning theory. That is, the idea might be examined that the Occupation rewarded the Japanese instead of punishing them--thus stimulating learning.

The conqueror said to them, in effect, that if they would put such-and-such reforms into practice and cooperate with agencies of the Allied Powers, then there would be no reprisals. The only condition, it may be repeated, was that they should accept, try to understand, and implement the suggested reforms. As nearly as could be determined in the field, this was not looked upon as largesse by many Japanese; they could only deplore the threat to their traditional culture that it really was. But to most Japanese the announced changes probably sounded as though they were only aimed at the improvement of the lot of the average citizen. And when it was seen that the stated intentions were actually put into practice and not merely made as empty promises, a sort of wondering admiration, respect, gratitude, and acceptance grew, and most important, an important change in attitudes began. The charge that such apparent acceptance was a deliberate deception calculated to lull the conqueror into placidity and somnolence is, in face of the facts that have been presented in the last chapter, unwarranted and hardly deserves serious consideration.

No doubt the Japanese wanted the Occupation Forces to leave Japan and let them run their own affairs. But mixed with this wish was a desire for the security of the powerful conqueror and for the continued protection and reinforcement of the reforms that were being made.[1] The resulting ambivalence produced by these contradictory desires was accompanied by a great deal of misunderstanding and misconception. And relations

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[1] See Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 303-317, for an excellent discussion of several of the problems treated in the present chapter.

between Japanese and American personnel working together in education were complicated and often difficult. The Japanese individual, for the most part, felt friendly and respectful. He may even have been grateful. He wanted to work with the Americans; but he also wanted autonomy--at least from foreigners. Yet, despite all the complexities and difficulties, Japanese and American educators worked cooperatively and amicably toward the common goals that had been set. Some explanation of this relationship and its working out in practice was attempted in the previous account of Shikoku education in 1948-1949. It would be wise now to glance at some of the positive influences that were operative in Shikoku in 1948-149, and that were effective in producing an attitude of acceptance of educational reform. Then, some of the negative factors can be weighed to see if they are sufficiently powerful to counterbalance the positive influences.

The most potent influence in changing the attitudes of the educators and the people of Shikoku was probably the sheer weight and momentum of the whole educational reform program, plus the prestige the reforms of the Occupation enjoyed. Educational and cultural change had been set in motion by the Occupation Forces, and the inertia of the first few advances carried the reforms along without much slackening during most of the Occupation. Change after change followed one another, and the Japanese accepted each as it came along. The Board of Education Law, passed late in 1948, represented both the climax and the epitome of democratic educational reform in Japan. And the

Japanese, despite misgivings and grave concern over the suitability of boards of education for Japan, accepted this most radical change as they had accepted all others. The structure was practically finished. All that remained to be done was to implement and complete it. And the period from November, 1948, to December, 1949, saw a good deal of this implementation and completion. It was a great step forward in the steady advance toward democratic education.

A second important factor in changing attitudes toward the new education was the American and Japanese information program which, during 1948-1949, reached its height. This program was stimulated by SCAP, the Ministry of Education, and Military Government, and was designed to promote interest and understanding of democracy and democratic practices. The program was not focused on education, as such, until the Board of Education Law was passed; then, it focused on education and stayed there for some time. Actually, the information program was an indirect factor the importance and relative influence of which is hard to estimate. But, as stated earlier in this thesis, the sheer weight and volume of the various information programs, combined with the constant stream of comment on democracy and education in the press, must have had a not inconsiderable effect over the months and years.[1]

The direct contact of Military Government personnel with Japanese officials and the Japanese people in all walks of

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[1]See Cartwright, op. cit., for a pertinent discussion of information programs and their effects on beliefs and attitudes.

life must certainly have been of some influence in changing attitudes. Most Military Government CE officers were good representatives of democratic America, and the Japanese were quick to note the very essential differences that distinguished American from local officials. The informality of most of the Americans, their friendliness, their enthusiasm, sincerity, hard work, kindness, and even naivete puzzled yet pleased the Japanese. They often showed their appreciation of the qualities of the Americans with whom they worked, sometimes in embarrassing ways. And these qualities, good or bad, were well known in any Japanese community of which an American was a part. The Japanese informal communication system was very efficient. Let an American officer or civilian treat his wife or his servant well or badly--the Japanese at the prefectural offices would probably know it that day or that week. The effect of this situation, unfortunately, is another of those irritating intangibles that cannot be measured, at least now. Dependence must be put on the first-hand observations of Americans, and the general, very universal pattern of Japanese friendliness toward Americans.[1] Very certainly the warm friendly atmosphere between Americans and Japanese in Shikoku in 1948-1949 and after must have been good environment to nourish the seeds of acceptance toward the things the Americans were promoting. Even board of education members, at first cool, distant, and insecure, came to like or at least to respect the Americans with whom they came into professional contact. This was well demonstrated during and after

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[1]Cf. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 218-223.

a board of education member-superintendent of education-SCAP-Military Government officer conference held in Takamatsu, January 7-8, 1949.[1] This conference was informally run with emphasis on discussion and participation by board members. There was a decided unbending of board members before the first day was over. Opinions were rather freely expressed, and many important problems were brought forth that had never come out before. At the end of the conference, board members turned in anonymous comments and criticisms on the conference and on the Americans and on each other. These criticisms were uniformly favorable to the Americans, but showed particular surprise at the "amicable atmosphere" of the conference and at the great skill of the woman chairman. Attitude change is at least incipient in these remarks and criticisms. The best example of this is the fact that out of nineteen sets of comments turned in, sixteen either mentioned or expatiated upon in an admiring manner the conduct of the meeting, the skill of the chairman, the effectiveness of the informal discussion technique used, and the generally democratic atmosphere of full participation that prevailed throughout the conference.[2]

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[1] The writer has a stenographic record of the conference plus a complete record of all written conferee comments on the conference.

[2] The writer must confess that such conferences were rare. This very fortunate one was probably the only one of its kind run on Shikoku during 1947-1949. It was organized from a local Military Government-superintendent of education level with participation and help from SCAP. The writer insisted on no speeches. It was to be strictly a workshop. The SCAP consultants, who had been requested by name, fell in enthusiastically with the plan, suggested excellent revisions of it, and worked very hard for the conference's cooperative success. There was

This board of education conference is only one example among many that could be offered of the friendly and mutually respectful relations that existed between Americans and Japanese in Shikoku. The point is important because it is clear that for changing attitudes and customary behavior one of the first prerequisites is an atmosphere of acceptance and permissiveness.[1] Forced changes in behavior that need to be perpetuated by force and coercion will not be reflections of basic attitudes, basic predispositions toward behavior. Rather, such behavioral changes will be thrown off as soon as or even before the compulsion to perform the behavior is removed. A feeling of acceptance must precede permanent attitude and behavioral changes. If this is so, it might be asked how it is that the educational reforms of the Occupation will not be thrown off in the next year or in the next five years? These reforms were certainly forced on the Japanese, at least in the beginning of the Occupation. The answer has been partly given above, but is so complex as to need further elaboration.

True, the initial reforms of Japanese education were forced upon the Japanese; they were the immediate results of SCAP edict or "suggestion." But right from the beginning the Japanese were asked to accept the reforms, to cooperate with the

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not much doubt of its success. (The SCAP consultants were Dr. W. W. Carpenter, Miss Rebecca Barnhart, and Dr. Earl Peckham. All Shikoku CE officers attended and participated. And a preliminary planning meeting of CE officers, SCAP consultants, and superintendents of education was held on the day before the conference. It is interesting to note that the no-speech rule was broken only by one Ministry of Education consultant.)

[1] See Lewin, op. cit., pp. 41 and 65-67.

agencies implementing the reforms. It is true that the Nazis in their occupied countries also asked for cooperation. But in Japan there was a very crucial difference: the Japanese were asked to cooperate in order for them ultimately to take over their own government and run their own affairs--for their own benefit and on the basis of popular will. In other words, the Americans were tutors; the Germans were masters and thus oppressors.

Occupation authorities were well aware that without ultimate deeper acceptance of the changes the whole effort would be useless. They were even dimly aware that they were coping with the difficult psychological and sociological problem of attitude change. Under the old order, the Japanese had never been asked to cooperate; they had been asked to obey. They had never been asked to participate; they had been told to listen and follow. This was something new: the conqueror was almost elevating the Japanese from the dreadful state of psychological confusion and shame they were in to a state of comparative self-respect. It was a tremendous step forward toward the "appropriate" attitude changes. The occupying power was in effect telling the Japanese that, although they must not forget that they had brought on the war and were responsible for great suffering, the way was open to regeneration and restoration of collective face through cooperative and autonomous work toward democratic goals. The two main conditions were that they be peaceful and that they become democratic. This was not what they had expected. Here was not continued

punishment and shame, but reward and pride. Looked at in this light, it is not so surprising that the Japanese supported, even enthusiastically, the reforms of the Occupation.[1]

Perhaps equally important in a social psychological sense was the fact that the older ideals, and the beliefs and attitudes that accompanied these ideals, were now discredited. To achieve a change in attitudes, people must be dissatisfied with their previous situation and feel the need for change.[2] As Newcomb points out, the older frame of reference must be seen to be obsolete or no longer relevant.[3] The rulers of Japan had staked their all on the outcome of the war. Had Japan won, the traditional Japanese ideals of Bushido (Way of the Warrior) and the like would have been exalted even more than they had been by the extreme chauvinism that had swept Japan in the late '30's and the early '40's. But Japan had lost. The alleged spiritual strength of the boasted ideals had not worked. Japan had failed. Now there were no ideals, or only badly shattered ones. And consequently the attitudes of the people suffered a rude unsettlement, if not displacement. Although the state of mind and emotions of the people was chaotic and numbed, still it was precisely the right psychological moment to initiate important reforms and to start the

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[1] See Lewin, op. cit., pp. 38-39 and 50-51, for a penetrating resolution of the contradiction of "democracy by fiat."

[2] Ibid., p. 51.

[3] Newcomb, op. cit., pp. 234-235. See, also, Muzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Ego-Involvements, pp. 34-37. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949.

process of belief and attitude change. As the social psychologist might put it, the old cognitive and motivational structures of the Japanese people were severly traumatized and the way was open for new cognitive and motivational structures. These new structures were supplied by the Occupation Forces, and the proper atmosphere for building and growing them was sedulously promoted.

This idea permeated all reform, educational and otherwise, in Japan. The Japanese were to do the job themselves, they were to be motivated to want to do the job themselves. So the seemingly amazing contradiction of a conquered country willingly and even enthusiastically executing the wishes of the conquering country was seen during the Occupation of Japan for perhaps the first time in the history of the world.

To return to the original theme, another vital factor in creating the proper cognitive and motivational structure for reform was the everpresent evidence of Occupation desire for the quick material as well as ideological renovation of Japan. All the people became familiar with American canned goods and staples. Tons and tons of food were shipped to Japan to feed an impoverished and starving people. The same people also saw a reform of the rice distribution system so that more people could get more rice, Rural people saw land taken away from wealthy landowners and practically given to poor farmers under the Land Reform Program.[1] Mothers saw

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[1] Reischauer says that the Land Reform Program was an unquestioned success. He also says that it was the most surprising reform from the American point of view. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 279-282. See, also, William M. Gilmartin and

their children get supplementary meals in schools in the form of school lunches. Mothers also saw the friendliness, kindness, and generosity of many Americans toward their children and themselves. Parents saw educational possibilities, and thus other possibilities, open up for their children. They also were asked to help decide political and educational policy. And so it went.[1] How could the soil help becoming fertile for such changes as the Occupation authorities wanted? Actually, the reforms, once initiated, became wanted by most Japanese. As time went on, the possibility of retrogression became less and less.

Still other positive factors on Japanese and Shikoku democracy and educational democracy might be enumerated, but the more important have been discussed. Shikoku in one sense felt less of the Occupation influence than did other areas of Japan. This was due to its relative isolation. Shikoku was not overstimulated and perhaps oversatiated with the multitudinous reforms, as some of the more accessible areas possibly were. The pace was more leisurely, and this was a good thing. Educators and the people had more chance to absorb and accept the changes. And there were fewer of the sporadic, rather

W. I. Ladejinsky, "The Promise of Agrarian Reform in Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVI (January,1948), 312-324.

[1] There are of course many examples on the other side of the fence, examples of American cupidity, stupidity, cruelty, fumbling, and dishonesty. But these were in the minority, it is believed. The greater part of the Occupation personnel was fundamentally well-intentioned. See Reischauer, op. cit. pp.205-317, for what is probably the best discussion of Occupation policy yet published.

faddist ideas of the occasional American zealot who was sure that his particular brand of reform would give the Japanese democratic salvation. At any rate, Shikoku felt all the important Occupation reforms, and, with occasional exceptions, seemed to react favorably to them.

Some of the negative influences on democratic and educational reform in Japan and in Shikoku must now be discussed. The most important is the gap between Japanese culture and Occupation reform. It is not necessary here to say any more than to emphasize the fact that the completely different nature of the educational changes and the philosophy underlying them may even have helped their acceptance.[1] Had SCAP tried to maintain the Japanese hierarchical authoritarian administrative structure and at the same time change the curriculum, say, then the attempt at reform might have failed. That is, had the reform not been thorough and all-encompassing, the halfway measures might have actually impeded acceptance and reform, as in the psychological experiments on memory and inhibitory conditioning in which items learned somewhat similar to items previously learned impeded the recall of the latter items. In other words, either of the two possible extremes--keeping the older system intact or doing away with it almost altogether--

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[1] Lewin, in discussing changing authoritarian into democratic leaders, says, "There are indications that it is easier to change an unsatisfied autocratic leader toward democratic techniques than to change a laissez faire type of leader or a satisfied half-democratic leader." Lewin, op. cit., p. 51.

might have been successful, but half measures might have resulted in defeat and failure. The very significant point is that the Japanese were psychologically ready for the drastic choice that was made.

Another negative influence which was made much of in the early part of the Occupation was the ultra-nationalistic, ultra-reactionary element of the country. It was feared that this group would in one way or another try to defeat the purposes of the Occupation. But as it turned out, there was little difficulty in this respect. Incidents involving such elements were rather rare; and, in late 1946, the attention of the Occupation authorities was diverted from possible ultra-nationalist to communist subversion. What few ultra-nationalist manifestations there were were carryovers from the past, mostly unintentional practices of men who knew little else.

Reminiscent of the past and potentially dangerous to educational democracy have been recent important attempts at turning the clock back. These attempts, very significantly, have emanated from high governmental authorities. One such incident was when Minister of Education Teiju Amano disclosed on February 19, 1952, that he was planning to revive Chinese classics as a compulsory subject in secondary education.[1] Evidently, nothing came out of this announcement. A similar attempt was that of Prime Minister Yoshida when he toyed with the

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[1] Nippon Times, February 21, 1952. This article claims that there was a letter bearing 12,000 signatures advocating compulsory Chinese classics in the secondary curriculum. See, also, Nippon Times, February 22, 1952 (translation of a Mainichi editorial), and Nippon Times, February 26, 1952.

idea of a new "Education Rescript" to replace the Imperial Rescript on Education.[1] This idea, too, was dropped when strong opposition was encountered.[2] Shortly before this, the Ministry of Education was reported to be planning a new series of "standard textbooks."[3] But the most important attacks on Japanese education have been aimed at a practical destruction of the whole new system. One of these, allegedly sponsored by politicians and businessmen, proposed cutting the 6-3 system to a 6-2 system. The argument was that nine years of compulsory education was too long a period in view of Japan's straitened financial condition. There was a vigorous opposition to this proposal, and the government pledged itself not to make any such change.[4] At the same time as this attack, another one which was just as serious was launched at election of board of education members when the Ordinance Reform Commission recommended their appointment.[5] The issue remained alive for some time. In April, 1952, it was still being considered.[6] A Nippon

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[1] Mainichi (English edition), June 9, 1949 (editorial). This editorial adversely criticizes the proposal.

[2] Nippon Times, December 29, 1951 (editorial).

[3] Nippon Times, January 22, 1952 (translation of Yomiuri editorial). The editorial criticizes this proposal adversely.

[4] Nippon Times, December 29, 1951 (editorial).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Nippon Times, April 21, 1952 (editorial).

Times editorial writer said that the "Ministry of Education may be desirous of reviving the former highly centralized school system, which was tailor-made for the nation's past military masters."[1] The most serious overall attack, however, came from the above-mentioned Ordinance Reform Commission in its report of November, 1951. The report, in effect, attacks most of the major educational reforms of the Occupation. It recommends, among other things, giving the Ministry of Education more responsibility (and, of course, more power), appointing board of education members by prefectural governors with the consent of prefectural and city assemblies, putting all public and private schools under boards of education, determining a procedure "to control unlawful measures" of the boards (presumably control of boards from above, probably from the Ministry of Education), and measures that would effectively vitiate Occupation reforms.[2]

It is very heartening and very significant that there were press and public reactions against these and other proposed revisions of Occupation reforms. Many observers knew that such attempts would be made, but they could hardly have predicted with confidence that practically all of them would be ineffectual. There may yet be successful onslaughts on the educational reforms, but it is quite clear that arbitrary, directive change

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[1] Ibid.

[2] The report is digested and criticized in Nicholas Luhmer, S. J., op. cit. This is an excellent and important article which helps round out the present discussion. (The present writer has the original report of the Commission, handwritten.) Prof. Katsuda Shuichi of Tokyo University says that this report is an "osoroshii" (frightful) thing. Mainichi, December 27, 1951.

is no longer likely. This is not to say that reactionary measures cannot be put through. It means that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to do so.

A far more dangerous negative influence on the educational reforms of the Occupation was the activity of the Communist Party of Japan. There is little doubt that the communists did have considerable effect on Japanese education mainly through their influence on the Teachers Union and through acting as a minor but important irritant to education officials. It would be impossible to discuss all the pro's and con's of the Communist Party and its impact on Japanese education. All that need be said is that it succeeded in causing a good deal of trouble, especially in 1949 when the Japanese debated the idea of dismissing all communist teachers.[1] The communists also succeeded in inflaming students and causing a large number of student strikes.[2] It published a good deal of inflammatory material, among which was the Akahata (Red Flag), the Daily Worker of Japan. A good indication of the state of democratic freedom existing in Japan was the fact that the communists were allowed to disseminate

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[1] See Mainichi, July 20, 1949 and Nippon Times, July 26, 1949, for the large public beginning of this issue. The Mainichi article describes the first speech of Dr. Walter C. Eels, SCAP, CI&E, Advisor on Higher Education, at Niigata University, July 19, 1949, in which he advocated taking a positive stand on red professors. The Nippon Times reference contains the speech itself. This speech and its successors given all over the country set off a great furore which has not ended yet. See, also, Nippon Times, October 20, 1949, for a reply by Shigeru Nambara, President of Tokyo University, to those who would oust any professors. This is an excellent indication of freedom of speech and of democracy in Japan. Here a prominent Japanese planted himself firmly against a prominent American connected with the Occupation Forces.

[2] For an aroused, condemnatory editorial on radical students, see Nippon Times, July 17, 1950 (editorial). See, also,

their propaganda. The tone and content of the Akahata, for instance, were most insulting to the Occupation Forces and it was tolerated until, apparently, it went too far. General MacArthur ordered the Prime Minister to purge seventeen Akahata editors. Shortly after this, he further ordered the suspension of publication of the communist newspaper.[1] As far as Shikoku is concerned, communist influence was never very strong, except in the industrial areas of northern Ehime. This was probably due to the fact that Shikoku, as a whole, was quite conservative, as are most predominantly rural areas of Japan. Thus, while there were occasional disturbances and disturbing influences, the reforms of the Occupation suffered no great setback due to communist activities in Shikoku. On the contrary, it might even be said that communist activities strengthened the Occupation education program because Shikoku people reacted rather strongly against the violence and strong tactics of the party. The communist program of violent upheaval was a good contrast to the persuasive techniques of the Occupation.

There are a number of other negative influences on educational reform in Shikoku and Japan which need to be mentioned. The first and most important of these was the general economic distress of the nation. Teachers, pupils, and parents were

Nippon Times, April 5, 1949, special article, "Trend Toward Communism Growing Among Students." This is an important article. It gives a good general outlook on the whole problem. There were very many articles and editorials in practically all Japanese newspapers on the Communist Party, its ideologies, methods, and activities.

[1] Nippon Times, June 7, 1950, June 9, 1950, and July 27, 1950.

suffering from lack of food, malnutrition, lack of clothing, lack of shelter in many cases, and general lack of the bare necessities of life. It is little wonder that Japanese teachers did not have great quantities of energy and enthusiasm for their very large job. Added to this was a widespread deficiency of educational facilities: buildings, classrooms, supplies, heat, and other necessities for running schools.[1] Anyone who criticizes the Japanese too adversely for their lack of educational effort should consider their staggering achievement in building a new system literally on the ruins of the old, with a woeful inadequacy of materials. What is to be wondered at is not the apathy and lack of initiative of teachers but rather the amazing amount of energy and rich productivity there was in the face of enormous difficulties. The sheer pertinacity and endurance, the strength of will and body, and the uncomplaining matter-of-factness of the people and the educators of Shikoku and of Japan were witnessed over and over by observers who did not even want to admire the Japanese. But they were compelled to respect, even if not to admire them.

Another important negative influence was the unwillingness to take individual responsibility when confronted with a problem, and the marked predilection to depend on authority for solutions to problems. In education, this was particularly reflected in the traditional exaltation of memoriter learning

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[1]See Robert King Hall, Education for a New Japan, pp. 2-27, et passim, for a good description of the difficult conditions under which the Japanese worked in the early part of the Occupation.

and the fact that there had been little or no critical examination and discussion of issues and problems by pupils and teachers. From one point of view, this could be considered the most significant negative influence since individual responsibility and a pragmatic philosophy of education were essentially what the Occupation Forces were trying to instil into the minds of Japanese teachers and pupils. Unless this responsibility and philosophy could be instilled, it was and still is quite likely that all the reform efforts would be nullified. But considerable strides were made by the Japanese in learning this lesson. One of the difficulties in the way, oddly enough, was the very eagerness with which many teachers and students tried to learn the lesson. Such eagerness often blocked the path to understanding--and a concomitant change in beliefs and attitudes--because the Japanese would resort to the older methods in their haste and in their desire to conform; they would sometimes "learn" democratic methods and concepts by rote. An amusing instance of this was when the writer visited an elementary school assembly in Miyagi Prefecture (in northeastern Japan) during Constitution Week in 1947. When the school principal, who was lecturing the pupils on the New Constitution, saw the writer enter the assembly room, the talk took a rather mature turn and the principal began to ask the pupils questions on "democracy" and "democratic" ideas and practices. The answers came with gun-like rapidity. But one pupil just could not remember his whole answer, made three or four starts, and finally succeeded

in reproducing his "democratic lesson."[1]

A negative influence which has been touched upon repeatedly in what has gone before but which needs reiteration is what might be called the "System by Directive." Or this influence might be subsumed under the general category "Ministry of Education." The directive method of the Ministry of Education and of the lower echelons of the Japanese governmental and educational structure was both a powerful device for maintaining the status quo and a powerful influence for perpetuating the traditional attitudes and practices of Japanese educators. To take independent action, to show initiative, created anxiety. Japanese education officials had learned not to take independent action or to show initiative. Such actions were cultural anomalies in Japan. The system required that important policies be decided only by responsible groups whose delegated task it clearly was. The decision was then conveyed to a chief executive who in turn directed his subordinates down the line to take appropriate action. For the most part directions were explicit and detailed; little or no room was left for subordinate or lower echelon interpretation, implementation, or initiative. The result of such a system is obvious. Its full implications became very apparent during the Occupation, and they became especially apparent in the field of education. It became, for the Occupation Forces, a struggle to overcome these entrenched, deeply-rooted attitudes which had all the tenacity and resistance to

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[1] Letter, Headquarters IX Corps, Mil Govt 000.8, to Commanding General, Eighth Army, May, 1947, "Report of Field Trip--Miyagi Prefecture."

change of any such deeply introjected attitudes.

It may now very pertinently be asked: if all this is so, if these attitudes were so strong and resistant to change, how can it be said that they were significantly changed, especially to the extent of making statements about the present democracy of Japanese education? A complete answer to this question, of course, would be a textbook on attitudes and attitude change. However, one important thing that is now known about attitudes may be adduced, in addition to preceding arguments on attitude change. One of the important psychological conditions that must be present if a new attitude is to be adopted, is that it must suit the present needs and goals of the persons making the change.[1] And, too, the ego-involvements of the individuals concerned must be given due consideration.[2] We have seen how the old order was discredited and the way paved for the implantation of new attitudes. That is, the older order, and presumably the attitudes that went with it, did not meet the motivational and cognitive needs of the Japanese people and Japanese educators at the time, nor did they seem likely to do so in the foreseeable future. The older frame of reference was obsolete, was not relevant, as Newcomb would say.[3] Rather, the new order, at least temporarily, served these needs and supplied an apparently satisfactory new frame of reference. And as time went on and

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[1] Cf. Cartwright, op. cit.

[2] Newcomb, op. cit., pp. 246-248.

[3] Ibid., pp. 233-235.

bits of the new order were adopted and gradually accepted, the new order and its ways began to become part of the cognitive and motivational structures of Japanese individuals. This of course meant that new attitudes were being formed. As Krech and Crutchfield might put it, the psychological fields of individuals were such that the old attitudes had to change or die, and the new attitudes were incorporated into these psychological structures. Stating the problem in a somewhat different way, new and satisfactory frames of reference came into existence, as far as Japanese perception and motivation were concerned. While the question is very complex, it is believed that this is a valid social psychological explanation. In short, through the mechanism of attitude change essentially, the negative influence of education by directive was very slowly and gradually overcome and the groundwork for future educational democracy laid. In Shikoku, as has been seen, progress toward the goal of educational autonomy and away from education by directive was achieved to a considerable extent.

Judging from the evidence, then, the positive influences on Shikoku education were stronger than the negative ones. In the face of a great weight of negation, the foundations of a democratic educational system in Shikoku were well laid by late 1949. The positive influences, struggling against tradition and traditional attitudes, were given strong aid by the advent of boards of education in 1948. To repeat, the boards of education were both the climax and the epitome of Japanese educational reform, the climax of the Occupation program and the epitome of the positive efforts of the Japanese.

It is now time to return to the question proposed at the beginning of this dissertation and early in this chapter: Has Shikoku education become democratic and will it remain democratic? Part of the basic problem of this study--What are the nature, extent, and lasting quality of the changes that have taken place in Japanese education during the Allied Occupation of Japan?--has been answered. And the four hypotheses enunciated have also been supported to a considerable extent. It now remains to summarize the answers to the basic question, to review, briefly, the evidence in support of the hypotheses, and to make some estimate as to the future of Shikoku and Japanese education. But most important, the central hypothesis that the changes made and being made describe the process of moving from authoritarian to democratic control of education must be woven into this final summation.

It can be said that already a great deal has been accomplished toward the achievement of educational democracy in Shikoku. Shikoku education has moved considerably along the path from authoritarian to democratic control. Decision-making, which was considered to be a basic criterion of any kind of political or educational system, has undergone and is undergoing a fundamental change. While there was, in 1949, considerable confusion on the part of groups attempting democratic decision-making, there is no doubt, at least, of the amelioration of the authoritarianism of the Japanese system of reaching decisions. Boards of education and voluntary organizations again and again demonstrated this movement from authoritarianism to democratic decision-making,

this movement from arbitrary, unilateral decisions to decisions in which there was a base of general participation.

Closely allied to decision-making was the significant beginning and continuation of participation and interest in educational affairs by teachers and by the people. It was seen how very different the Shikoku 1948-1949 participation pattern was from the Occupation situation in which such participation was not considered appropriate, or rather, was not even considered. The elected representatives of the people and their subordinates came, in 1948 and 1949, to be considered figures who could be challenged and criticized. Concomitant with the interest and participation of the people were the interest and participation shown by agencies of communication, particularly the press. Very clearly this interest and participation indicate a decisive move from authoritarianism to democracy in education.

Further strong evidence in support of the authoritarianism-democracy hypothesis is the demonstrated decrease of the power and influence of the Ministry of Education and the local bureaucracy with concomitant increase in the power and influence of the boards of education. The Ministry of Education still had power, prestige, and influence, too much in fact. But its power, prestige, and influence were not what they had been before the war, nor were they ever likely to attain their former status. Legally the change was drastic; attitudinally it had at least begun. The same is true of the local bureaucracy. It began to lose its awe for the people and for teachers. In short, the idea

that education officials were servants of the people was born.[1] This was particularly true in education, less true in other fields. There can be little doubt that the long shadow of the bureaucratic bugaboo of Japan, at least in education, was considerably shortened by late 1949, and that the people were turning more and more toward their elected representatives.

Another vital condition of democracy, free and open discussion of problems, was also partially fulfilled. The atmosphere of late Occupation Shikoku was a free one. There was frequent open discussion and criticism of educational policies, the boards of education, education officials, local educational administrators, and teachers. Naturally there were pressures against open discussion, as there are in any society. But the important point is that there was the possibility of free discussion on any question and this possibility was exploited to a considerable extent. Such exploitation could not have happened in pre-Occupation Japan.

The changes discussed above are the important ones; they are the ones that are most potent in shaping attitudes. They are the ones that aid the growth of the necessary permissive psychological fields in which essential attitude changes can occur. They are the more intangible and yet more potent changes that signified the true birth and growth of democracy in education in Shikoku. On top of these intangible changes were all the tangible

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[1] This idea was one that officials found it extremely difficult to understand. Occupation objectives were very often stymied by official hostility toward and lack of understanding of the concept that civil service personnel are servants of the people. The writer and his colleagues came across this resistance many times. It is still problematical as to how far the idea has penetrated official Japanese understanding.

ones that were achieved by the reforms of SCAP, the Japanese Government, and boards of education. These all inhered in the idea of equalizing educational opportunity, Compulsory education, the 6-3-3 system, coeducation and increase of opportunity for the education of women, increased school facilities, expansion of adult education opportunities, opening up the traditional bottlenecks in secondary education, increasing cultural facilities and making them available to more people, and all the many changes that accompany democratic administration and instruction--all these and more were accomplished in greater or lesser part by the end of 1949. The framework of the structure and the initial attitudes of democratic education became, in its tangibles and intangibles, a reality which could not be conjured away by Japanese reactionaries or radicals or by Western Japanophiles loathe to believe that the preciously regarded system of the past could be changed. Yet it was changed. Education in Shikoku and in Japan had started on the way toward educational democracy.

All the preceding facts and arguments, however, will be worth little if it is not possible to say, with some degree of assurance, that democracy and educational democracy in Shikoku--and consequently in Japan--are well-rooted and will grow. Despite all the changes made, it is of course possible that the whole complex process can be stopped. It is possible that the great pressure of external events in the Far East, or a reactionary government, or protracted economic difficulty, can effectively halt the gradual process the beginning of which has been outlined

in this dissertation.[1] Yet, granting this possibility and even faced with the imminent failure of this really stupendous attempt at changing the political and educational face of a nation, there is a much more cogent fact that must be clearly recognized. Japan and Japanese education can never revert to what they were without a great struggle.[2] As stated before, the people of Japan have come to see and appreciate, even if only vaguely and confusedly, the benefits of the political, economic, and educational reforms of the Occupation. Apparently they have come to like freedom. And once a people has well imbibed this precious liquor, it is exceedingly loathe togive it up. In other words, it is highly likely that educational democracy in Japan is fairly well-rooted and will probably continue to grow. But, even if the work of the Occupation be negated, it will have been one of the most magnificent attempts at altering the culture and psychology of a people that the world has yet seen. If it succeeds--and its chances seem fairly good--then education, social science, and the world will have gained materially and spiritually from this great educational, sociological, and psychological experiment of modern times.

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[1] Cf. Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 316-317.

[2] Cf. W. I. Ladejinsky, "Trial Balance in Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXVII (October, 1948), 104-116.

APPENDIX I

SELECTED PASSAGES FROM JAPANESE LAWS AND ORDINANCES

Kyōiku Rei (Education Ordinance) of 1879:

> Article X: In order to administer educational affairs in towns and villages, educational affairs boards (gakumu iin) shall be established. . .
> Article XI: Educational affairs boards shall be elected by the citizens of towns and villages.[1]
>
> Article I: By reason of the control of the Minister of Education of educational affairs of the whole country, schools, kindergartens and museums, public and private alike, all come under the supervision of the Minister of Education.
> Article XII: Educational affairs boards come under the supervision of prefectural governors, and will control school attendance, establishment and protection of schools, etc.[2]

Kyōiku Rei (Education Ordinance) of 1880:

> Article IX: Each town and village shall obey the orders of the prefectural governor, and independently or in combination shall determine the school age of children and shall establish one or more elementary schools.
> Article X: In order to administer educational affairs, each town and village will establish, independently or combined in districts, for setting up elementary schools, an educational affairs board. Town and village headmen shall be included in such boards. . .
> Article XI: Two or three times the fixed number of educational affairs board members shall be recommended by town and village citizens, and from among them the prefectural governor will elect (sic) the boards. Recommendation regulations will be drafted by prefectural governors and approved by the Minister of Education.[3]

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[1] Kuroda Shigejirō and Hijikata Nagakoto (eds.), Meiji Gakusei Enkaku Shi (History of the Meiji Educational System), p. 38. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Konkodo Shoseki K. K., 1906.

[2] Ibid., pp. 37 and 38. (Writer's translation.)

[3] Ibid., p. 43. (Writer's translation.)

Chōson Sei (Regulations for the Organization of Towns and Villages):

> Article LXIX: Towns and villages may establish special or standing committees. Committee members will be persons of good reputation, and will be chosen by town and village assemblies according to the recommendations of town and village headmen who will make their recommendations from among people having the right to vote or from town and village assemblies. However, the committee chairman shall be the headman of the town or village or his delegated deputy.[1]

Kokumin Gakkō Rei (National Elementary School Ordinance), 1941-1943:

> Article XXXVIII: For the benefit of educational affairs relating to national elementary schools (kokumin gakkō) in accordance with Article LXXXIII of the Regulations for the Organization of Cities (Shi Sei) and Article LXIX of the Regulations for the Organization of Towns and Villages (Chōson Sei), or those regulations that apply, mutatis mutandis, cities, towns, and villages and the school unions of cities, towns, and villages shall establish educational affairs boards (gakumu iin).
>
> A member of the staff of the elementary school shall be included in the educational affairs committee.
>
> Article XXXIX: The Minister of Education will decide the duties of educational affairs committees as well as other matters concerning them.[2]

Provisions for the Organization of the Several Government Ministries, 1893:

> Article IV: Each minister of state, by virtue of the authority of his office or by special mandate, may issue ministerial orders (shōrei) with respect to the duties of the various department heads (under the governors).
>
> Article V: Each minister of state may issue orders (shirei) and instructions (kunrei) to the Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police, to the Governor of the Hokkaido and the governors of the prefectures with respect to the duties of the various department heads (under the governors).

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[1] Tsubouchi Takejirō (ed.) and Hozumi Shigetō (rev.), Kōmin Hōki Yōten (Essentials of Civil Laws and Ordinances), p. 155. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Tokyo Kaisei Kan, 1934.

[2] Teikoku Hōki (Imperial Laws and Ordinances), p. 47. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Teikoku Hōki Shuppan K. K., 1949.

Article VI: Each minister of state, with respect to the duties of the various department heads (that concern him), exercises supervision over the Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police, the Governor of Hokkaido and the governors of the prefectures, and may, if he disagrees with the management regulations of the Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police, the Governor of Hokkaido and the governors of the prefectures, or when he considers them as harmful to the public interest or as exceeding authorized limits of power, suspend the orders and measures or cancel them.[1]

Mombushō Kansei (Organization of the Ministry of Education), 1942-1947:

Article I: The Minister of Education controls (kanri) affairs dealing with education, arts and sciences, religion, and publications, translations, and production rights.
Article II: The Minister of Education's Secretariat, besides those matters published in the general rules, will control the following business:

(1) The establishment of integrated plans and the general drawing up of important policies regarding culture and education;
(2) Public school personnel;
(3) Prizes and awards;
(4) In general, consideration of jurisdictional administration;
(5) Religion.[2]

Kokka Gyōsei Soshiki Hō (Law for the Organization of National Administration), 1948-1950:

Article XI: Each minister of state, when he deems it necessary to enact, amend, or abolish laws (hōritsu) or ordinances (seirei) with respect to the administrative business of department heads (in the prefectures), must prepare a draft, present it to the Prime Minister, and request a Cabinet conference.
Article XII: (1) Each minister of state, for the purpose of implementing laws or ordinances, or based on the special mandate of laws or ordinances, may issue various instrumental orders (sōri furei, hōmu furei, shōrei) with respect to the

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[1] Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, Kyōiku Hōki Ruishō (Compilation of Education Laws and Ordinances), II, 607. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Mombushō Sōmukyoku Bunshoka, 1902.

[2] Tokushima-ken Gakumuka, Genkō Tokushima-ken Gakurei Ruisan (Compilation of Current School Ordinances of Tokushima Prefecture), p. 528/27. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1928-1948.

administrative business of department heads (of the prefectures). . . .
(3) The word "order" (meirei), as used above, if there is no mandate of laws (horitsu no inin), may not be interpreted to mean the setting up of penal regulations, the imposition of obligations (gimu), or the establishment of rules and regulations restricting the rights of citizens.[1]

Kokumin Gakkō Rei Shikō Kisoku (Implementing Regulations of the National Elementary School Ordinance), 1941-1946:

Article I: In the national elementary schools, children must be educated paying heed to the following provisions based on the purport of Article I of the Kokumin Gakkō Rei.
(1) Following the purport of the Imperial Rescript on Education, pervading all of education there must be training in the Imperial Way, and especially there must be deepened faith in the National Polity.
(2) Efforts must be made to realize the necessary ordinary intellectual skills for national life, to refine the sentiments, and to promote the growth of strong minds and bodies.
(3) Along with clarifying the special characteristics of our national culture, pupils should be acquainted with the situation in the Far East and in the world, lead to realize the position and mission of the Empire, and lead to cultivate a great national quality.[2]

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[1] Mombushō Kambō Sōmuka, Gakkō Kankei Hōrei Shu (Collection of School Laws and Ordinances), I, 31-32. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1949-1950.

[2] Teikoku Hōki, p. 50. (Writer's translation.)

APPENDIX II

TABLES OF CONTENTS OF SHŪSHIN TEXTBOOKS: 1893, 1930, 1943

1893[1]	1930[2]	1943[3]
Filial Piety	Her Imperial Majesty, the Empress	Greater Japan
Wise Sayings	Loyalty to the Emperor and Love of Country	Capt. Sakuma's Will
Admonitions	Filial Piety	The Sage of Omi
Three Rules	Devotion to Work	Election Day
Maxims	Learning	Farmer Sakueye
Sample Story--The Filial Piety of Ninomiya Sontoku	Order	Tanjun Bridge
Friendship (with similar breakdown)	Honesty	Etiquette
Peace and Harmony	Respect the Teacher	Capt. Kuda
Sincerity	Friends	The Face of the God of War
Respect and Honesty	Obey Regulations	Katsuyasu Yoshi
Charity	Behavior	Kanrin Maru
Knowledge and Virtue	Courage	Mamiya Rinzō
Equal Benefits	Patience	Uryō Iwoko
Obeying the Law	Don't be Confused About Things	Kodai Shrine
Bravery	Kodai Shrine	The Imperial Household
	Festivals	The Seven Seas
	Thrift	Aviator Iinuma
	Charity	North Manchurian Dew
	Don't Forget On	From Olden Times to Now
	Generosity	
	Health	
	One's Own Things and Other People's Things	

[1]Kyōikugakukan, Jinjō Shōgaku Shūshinsho (Ordinary Primary School Morals), Third Year, Table of Contents. (Writer's translation.) Tokyo: (Osaka): Dai Nippon Tosho K. K., 1893.

[2]Mombushō, Jinjō Shōgaku Shūshinsho (Ordinary Primary School Morals), Third Year, Table of Contents. (Writer's translation.) Osaka: Osaka Shoseki K. K., 1929-1930.

[3]Mombushō, Shotōka Shūshin (Lower Primary Course Morals), Third Year, Table of Contents. (Writer's translation.) Osaka: Osaka Shoseki K. K., 1943.

APPENDIX III

SCHOOL[1]

Daichin of Tsukushi went at an early age to Hitachi in the East to study the Nine Chinese Classics under the tutelage of a noted scholar. When the Confucian lectures started, he did not have enough to eat. Although someone gave him a measure of beans which he cooked in his corner a handful a day, he barely satisfied his hunger. This went on for fifty days, and when Daichin began to read the Ekkyō, his resources ran out. Because of this he returned to Tsukushi and borrowed some money with which he returned to Azuma and completed his studies of the Ekkyō.

This was during the Muromachi Period when there were no schools and few teachers. The difficulties of a person desiring learning can well be imagined. In the Edo Period, learning gradually arose and schools were built all over, but the benefits of schooling were limited to the samurai class; farmers and merchants were restricted to the learning of the terakoya (temple schools) which were on a low level.

Today the common people can study at fine schools. In villages there are no illiterate households and in households there are no illiterate persons. Should we not be grateful for the blessings of this glorious reign, and can we not but study diligently?

To begin with, schools are not just places to attain knowledge and to learn arts and crafts. Taking to heart the purport of the Imperial Rescript on Education which the Emperor Meiji has deigned to give us, the school is a place in which, as subjects of the Empire, worthy knowledge and attainments are pursued.

The person who studies in the schools does not stop only with knowing merely things; he puts all things into actual practice. A strong, healthy development of mind and body, knowledge, arts, and crafts are all pursued so that the student will some day become a person of use to the nation.

If the objectives and policies of the schools in which we study are like this, then it must be said that they are, so to speak, sacred training places, like the dōjo which followed the Moral Way.[2] The pupils assembled here must all have the will to temper mind and body and have the will to be sincere

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[1] Lesson Three, from Nishihara Shigetada, Kōkoku Chūgaku Shūshinsho (Imperial Middle School Morals Textbook) I, pp. 14-19. (Writer's translation.) Kyoto: Nagazawa Kinkōdō, 1941.

[2] The dōjo were training places or schools, and were of two

persons striving for knowledge and learning arts and sciences. If the pupil has the will to temper mind and body and to acquire culture, and if the teacher has the fervent will which tries to teach and guide, then between teachers and pupils there will spontaneously appear a beautiful respect and harmony.

When there is respectful trust and harmony between teachers and pupils, there is indeed school unity, and it can truly be called a fine school and can be esteemed as a true dōjo.

In such an atmosphere school regulations will automatically be strictly observed, a feeling of love for the school will naturally be awakened, and the honor of the school will be spontaneously valued. The senior will naturally love the junior; the junior will naturally respect the senior. In this school reason and beautiful human feelings[1] will pervade. In this beautiful group life, indeed, are nurtured the various necessary virtues and abilities for the time of entering the world. From this sort of school good friendships which continue throughout life will be gained. And human material of promise to the nation will continually emerge. Truly, respect and harmony between teachers and pupils are the soul of the school. The size and beauty or lack of beauty of a school are things not to be regarded.

The Matsushita Village School was a humble eighteen-mat school built by the teachers and the pupils themselves. But despite its miserable outer appearance, how many splendid men has it not turned out? Once again, the soul of a school is the respect, trust, and harmony of its teachers and pupils.

Words of the Emperor Meiji:

> Be not lazy--study and succeed.
> Become persons who do not bring
> shame on our ancestors.

---

kinds: places where military arts and virtues were taught and Buddhist schools. They were patronized mainly by the samurai or warrior class. The use of the word dōjo here and later is a regression to the old ideal of the dojo as a place of high moral training.

[1] The word used in the original is ninjō. It is an important concept in Japanese and goes far beyond just "human feeling." It means this and more: sympathy, humanity, kindness, manners, customs and habits of a people. It is opposed to giri, obligation or duty.

ON TO THE TEACHER[1]

The objectives of the school are fulfilled through respectful trust and harmony between teachers and pupils. Respectful trust and harmony of teachers and pupils were explained in the previous lesson as being, firstly, the pupils' strong will to try to study. No matter how good the teacher, if there is not a fervent will to try to seek for the Way[2] and to pursue learning, it is the same as preaching to the wind[3] and casting pearls before swine. The good pupil, who is valued above all by the teacher, is the zealous one who by himself tries to improve and learn.[4]

Food eaten after hunger is truly appreciated. A feeling of gratitude arises for water drunk after thirst. And the pupil who has the will to try to train mind and body and to acquire knowledge is only that serious pupil who deeply feels *on* to his teachers. The spirit of feeling *on* to one's teachers is indeed the basis of the pupil's path.[5]

Children who could not even write *kana* freely attain, after five or six years, advanced reading power. Ask yourself whose help has made this possible. You can recall many former teachers to whom you owe gratitude. If you think of the various efforts of teachers to teach you in the past six years, you can not but be grateful.

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[1] Lesson Four, from Nishihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-25. (Writer's translation.) The concept of *on* is impossible to translate adequately into English. It means obligation, gratitude or grateful obligation. One owes *on* usually to superiors: the Emperor, parents, teachers. It is not considered onerous (like *giri*) and can be a natural feeling of gratitude for kindness. Its meaning was probably distorted in the Tokugawa Period from an earlier more natural meaning approximating the English term "gratitude."

[2] This is the ambiguous and vague word "*michi*," so much used in Japanese writings. It has several meanings: way, road, route, path, moral code or principles.

[3] A delightful idiom in the original. Literally, wind in the horse's ear.

[4] The expression used here has the very broad meaning of to temper, discipline, learn, drill, practice.

[5] Once again the ambiguous word "*michi*" is used, and means more than "way" or "path." It means, in this case, "learning,""moral doctrine,"and the like.

"The one who has given me life is my father; the one who has made me good is my teacher." This saying is that of the brave King Alexander.

Truly, the teacher is one's spiritual parent. Teachers and pupils are spiritual fathers and children.

After the on to one's lord and father, what a blessed thing is on to the teacher! In the Far East from ancient times there has been an atmosphere of warm respect for the teacher even to the extent of thinking, "Keep a seven-foot distance so as not to tread on the teacher's shadow."

The Emperor Meiji, even after the death of the Imperial tutor, Motoda Eifu, from time to time thought of him and composed the following poem:

"The old man gave for me his best;
Even today his teaching is not forgotten."

When we read this poem, can we not but feel the magnanimity of His Imperial Highness?

The great happiness for the teacher is to see his pupils grow into fine persons, and to know of their accomplishment of worthy undertakings, in short, to see the effect of his teaching. It must be said that the teacher who has fine persons in his pupils is a great and happy man.

The relationship between Noguchi Eisei, who accomplished many great things in science, and the teachers of his youthful days was truly a beautiful thing. What great happiness it must have been for his teacher to hear, from time to time, that his old pupil whom he taught was an internationally great scholar. Katada Ya, one of Noguchi Eisei's obscure teachers, through his great pupil became immortal. Yes, greatness of all teachers manifests itself in the world through their pupils. The teacher is contented with his unrecognized but significant task, earnestly strives for the cultivation of his pupils, and accomplishes his varied work in the nation and in society through his pupils. The happiness of the teacher, his satisfaction, lies in this.

Motoori Nobunaga, impressed by the words of his teacher, aspired to study the Kojiki, and when he wrote his splendid commentary of the Kojiki, what happiness his teacher, Mabuchi Yoshishige, must have felt in his grave. The ways of repaying on to the teacher are various, but there is probably none which exceeds this.

From time to time you think of your former teachers, but have you written letters to them? Even if it is only a short message of one page, how happy your former teacher, who thinks of the children he taught, will be! And what if you wrote a detailed letter about the circumstances of your present studies! The teacher, from repeatedly reading the letter, will know the growth of the spirit of the child he taught, and how happy he would be!

Broadly speaking, at present when our country's ancient courtesies have deteriorated, are there not persons inclined to rudeness and lack of manners even to teachers? This is a

regrettable tendency. With a spirit which respects learning and gives due respect to the Way, if a person is learning in school, how can he have an unmannerly attitude toward teachers who are transmitting this learning and this Way?

A Poem of the Emperor Meiji:

> Even the man who has become learned in the Way
> Should not forget the blessings of those who
> taught him.

APPENDIX IV

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NUMBER 19 — 26 February

CIVIL EDUCATION PROGRAM

1. Reference; Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 350 (22 Oct 45) CIE (SCAPIN - 178), subject: "Administration of the Educational System of Japan".

2. In order to further implement the Civil Education Program, the commanding general of each corps and the commanding officers of the Chugoku and Shikoku Military Government Regions and Tokyo-Kanagawa Military Government District will promptly initiate the following projects:

a. Assistance to teachers and principals in the use of the "Course-of-Study" for the 1947 school year as soon as it becomes available.

b. Encouragement and assistance in the development by teachers of supplementary teaching aids and materials and in the utilization of community resources for instruction.

c. Assistance in the establishment of the "6-3 steps" of the educational ladder when provided for by Japanese law and encouragement to individual schools, local communities and prefectures in the study and solution of practical problems involved in such a transition.

d. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of the following:

(1) An "in-service" training program for teachers in individual schools.

(2) A program of regular conferences of teachers.

(3) Continuing workshops and study groups of specialized teachers, such as social studies teachers, English teachers, and national language teachers. It is desirable to encourage the development of professional associations of teachers in specialized fields.

e. Assistance in the development of sound and comprehensive programs of public relations with regard to the reform of Japanese education, the responsibilities of teachers; principals, parents and communities in this regard, and reporting of progress made in educational reform at national, prefectural and local levels.

f. Encouragement of the local governments in the rehabilitation of school plants and facilities.

g. Encouragement and assistance in the promotion of a sanitation and health program, to include the school lunch program.

3. The following projects are included in the long-range planning of the civil education program. Many of them have already been started but it is desired that they be initiated in each prefecture, where they are not in operation, as soon as practicable.

a. Assistance in the elimination from public institutions of earning of all methods of school entrance selection based upon economic status, family position, sex, creed, or political belief.

b. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of co-education as a basic pattern in education and assistance in providing equal educational opportunities for men and women.

c. Encouragement and assistance in the selection of demonstration and experimental schools on elementary and secondary levels in each prefecture, giving consideration to the possibility of utilizing the resources of normal schools for this purpose.

d. Encouragement and assistance in the healthy professional development of teachers' research conferences established within each school by directive of the Ministry of Education.

e. Assistance to school administrators at all levels, including school inspectors, in the assumption of their new professional responsibilities in a manner appropriate to a democratic system of education and in the elimination of all expressions of arbitrary control in school administrative machinery.

f. Encouragement and assistance in the development of professional associations and Parent-Teachers associations which are democratically established and operated.

g. Encouragement and assistance in the expansion of visual and radio education programs.

h. Encouragement and assistance in the development of physical education activities in and out of schools and of sound programs of sports.

i. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of vocational guidance and counselling facilities, both in schools and in local communities outside the schools.

j. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of cooperative part-time training programs involving vocational schools and local industries.

k. Encouragement of community use of school plants for evening classes for part-time students and adults, discussion forums, recreation programs, and for PTA meetings.

l. Encouragement of the establishment of discussion groups in order to provide democratic media for the expression of opinions by adults on international, national, and local problems.

m. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of Citizens' Public Halls and inspection of them as they are established, making certain that democratic procedures concerning the establishment and operation of such halls are followed, as outlined in Ministry of Education directive Hatsu-sha # 122 (Subject: "Citizens' Public Halls: An Outline of their Creation and Management", dated 5 July 1946).

n. Encouragement and assistance to colleges and universities to establish extension courses for adults.

o. Encouragement and assistance in the development of youth organizations, giving particular attention to the problems of training of adequate leadership for such organizations, and preventing any tendencies to revert to the prewar and wartime pattern of the Seinen Dan type of organization, and preventing the utilization of youth organizations for political, nationalistic or militaristic purposes.

p. Encouragement and assistance in the development of sound county and prefectural federations of youth organizations.

q. Encouragement and assistance to private institutions of learning in the solution of their urgent problems of reconstruction and reorganization.

r. Implementation of Ministry of Education directives through interpretation in terms of democratic school practices.

s. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of local and prefectural boards of education at such time as they are provided for in Japanese law.

t. Encouragement and assistance in the establishment of methods for furnishing financial assistance to capable and deserving students of low economic resources.

4. It is desired that military government units include in Annex E of the Monthly Military Government Activities Report, information concerning progress made and difficulties encountered in implementing civil education projects.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL EICHELBERGER:

OFFICIAL:

SCHANZE
G-1

CLOVIS E. BYERS
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX V

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
United States Army
Office of the Commanding General
APO 343

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE)
NUMBER 52) 4 October 1949

CIVIL EDUCATION PROGRAM

1. Reference:

Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government, file AG 350 (22 Oct 45) CIE (SCAPIN - 178), subject: "Administration of the Educational System of Japan."

2. To continue the implementation of the Civil Education Program, commanders of corps and chiefs of the Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka Civil Affairs Teams will take necessary action to furnish advice and assistance to individuals, organizations, or groups listed below in connection with, but not necessarily limited to matters indicated.

a. Boards of Education.

(1) Conducting meetings.
(2) Making rules and regulations.
(3) Organizing the secretariat.
(4) Preparing, presenting, and administering the budget.
(5) Regulating political activities in schools.
(6) Planning for future school districts and local school boards.
(7) Adult education activities conducted in Citizens Public Halls.
(8) Reorganizing and consolidating schools to provide buildings and teachers for lower secondary schools.
(9) Providing educational opportunities for out-of-school youth and adults.
(10) Establishing desirable relationships with the general public, superintendent, secretariat, teachers and principals, local school boards and the government.

b. Superintendents.

(1) Establishing desirable relationships with the school board, secretariat, teachers and principals, and general public.
(2) Organizing and presenting programs to the board of education.
(3) Directing preparation of the budget.
(4) Selecting teachers and principals, teacher consultants, and other education personnel for recommendation to the board of education.
(5) Assuming educational leadership of the prefecture or local district.

c. Teacher Consultants.

(1) Conducting supervisory visits to schools.
(2) Initiating and supervising in-service training programs (under the general direction of the superintendent), to include experimental schools, demonstration classes, workshops, conferences, local study groups, and research committees.
(3) Advising the superintendent on professional matters.
(4) Improving their professional status.

d. Principals.

(1) Revising the curriculum to meet new standards of education.
(2) Providing for home-rooms and scheduling.
(3) Regulating student participation in school activities.
(4) Providing for teacher and community participation in school planning and administration.

e. Leaders of Teachers' Unions and other Organizations of Teachers.

(1) Establishing desirable relationships with boards of education, and with other units of the school systems.
(2) Developing a professional program.
(3) Reorganizing unions on a democratic basis.
(4) Freeing unions from the domination of bureaucratic and subversive influences.

f. Youth Associations (Seinen Dan).

(1) Developing a positive program of democratic education specifically designed to combat communistic influences among youth groups.
(2) Organizing small, democratic interest groups in education, recreation and civic activities.

(3) Drawing up democratic constitutions and practicing democratic procedures.
(4) Planning and conducting training courses for youth leaders.
(5) Providing for local autonomy of youth groups.
(6) Freeing themselves from government control.
(7) Establishing liaison with other youth groups.
(8) Setting up recreation projects, such as games, sports, parties, dances, hikes, camping trips, etc.
(9) Developing programs in political ideologies designed to lead to an understanding of the principles and techniques of communism.
(10) Encouraging participation of young men and women in youth activities on an equal basis.
(11) Encouraging cooperation of youth groups with other community agencies in the attainment of common objectives.

g. Student Organizations.

(1) Maintaining proper relations with the school administration.
(2) Freeing themselves from subversive influences.
(3) Developing student programs designed to foster the welfare of the student body and institution.

h. Boy Scout and Girl Scout Councils.

Practicing accepted principles of scouting.

i. Adult Organization.

(1) Developing educational, recreational and civic programs.
(2) Planning programs and promoting use of informational materials supporting various programs of the teams as they relate to women.
(3) Developing programs to encourage men and women to work together as a group.

j. Home Demonstration Agents.

(1) Matters affecting farm and family life such as:
(a) Household efficiency.
(b) Food and dietetics.
(c) Sewing and wardrobe planning.

k. Women's and Miners' Bureau Field Representatives.

(1) Coordinating activities with other agencies and organizations concerned with women and minor workers' problems.

(2) Encouraging participation of women unionists in union affairs.
(3) Cooperating with Labor Standards offices.
(4) Conducting conferences and discussinn meetings.
(5) Utilizing all media of publicity and properly using materials prepared by the Women's and Minors' Bureau, and other agencies.
(6) Maintaining good public relations.
(7) Carryimg out research programs as directed by the national office of the Women's and Minors' Bureau.

l. Appropriate School Officials.

(1) Encouraging coeducation at all levels.
(2) Planning educational and vocational guidance for girl students.
(3) Planning health programs including sex education.
(4) Increasing educational opportunities for women teachers.

m. Officials of Private Schools.

Correlating efforts of private schools to the whole educational program.

n. Officials of Teacher Training Institutions.

(1) Cooperating with public and private school officials in developing teacher training and in-service training programs.
(2) Vitalizing the curriculum of these institutions to meet the demands of modern education.

o. Officials of Institutions of Higher Learning.

(1) Encouraging and regulating desirable types of student organizations.
(2) Democratizing school administration.
(3) Modernizing the curriculum.

3. Many activities herein directed are closely related to, and must be integrated with, other programs for which responsibility has been given to the commanders listed in paragraph 2 above. Such programs include public health, public welfare, labor relations, civil information, economic affairs and agricultural activities. The necessity for close coordination and cooperation in these programs at all levels is emphasized.

4. Where the loss of personnel in Civil Education Sections of prefectural teams renders impracticable the discharge of assigned duties at that level, responsibility for continuance of the program will be assumed at once by appropriate regional teams or, in the case of the Tokyo, Kanagawa or Shizuoka teams, by

Civil Affairs Section, this headquarters. After 30 November 1949, responsibility for carrying on the civil education program will be assumed by regional and district teams in their respective areas.

5. (Omitted.)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALKER:

WILLIAM F. DEAN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

CHAZAL
G-1

(MG-CE)

APPENDIX VI,a

POSITION DESCRIPTION

Eighth Army
Prefectural Military Government Team
Civil Education Section
T/O Position: Civil Education Officer

Incumbent's Name

_____
(insert)

Duties and Responsibilities

Under the general supervision of the prefectural or special area senior military government officer, incumbent organizes and directs the civil education program within the prefecture or special area.

Duties:

1. Based on current priorities in the surveillance and direction of the civil education program, he proposes for the approval of the team executive the detailed weekly activities schedule of his section, participates actively therein, and supervises its execution.

2. Based upon field inspections by himself and members of his section to gather facts, develop evidence or secure information on education matters in the prefecture, he checks conformance to policies, procedures and requirements of higher headquarters, ascertains violations of directives, and plans conference programs, the use of information media and lectures to strengthen and guide the development of all phases of the education program. Particular attention is given to individual and group conferences with Japanese principals, teachers, prefectural education officials, and parents of students.

3. By means of inspections, personal observations and contacts with Japanese officials and conferences and reports on field trips of subordinates, will determine whether or not directives of higher headquarters are being carried out by the Japanese and will make recommendations to prefectural or special area senior military government officer to increase effectiveness of the civil education program.

4. Will program in detail the work of his assistants, including his NCO office and field assistants, outlining information to be gathered during field inspections and providing these assistants with available information such as officials or

citizens to contact, information to disseminate, and such fact finding aids as questionnaires and check sheets.

5. Will keep the prefectural or special area senior military government officer informed on all phases of the civil education program by means of oral reports, memoranda and staff studies.

6. Will maintain liaison with the Japanese prefectural government on all phases of governmental work pertaining to civil education.

7. Will advise, encourage and assist Japanese education officials in carrying out the reorganization and decentralization of the school system of the prefecture or special area.

8. Will make school inspections and forward reports as required by higher headquarters.

9. Will prepare and submit recurring and special reports on civil education matters as required by higher headquarters.

10. Will maintain liaison with Japanese Prefectural education section and social education section representatives.

APPENDIX VI,b

POSITION DESCRIPTION

Eighth Army
Shikoku
Regional Military Government Team
Civil Education Section
T/O Position: Civil Education Officer

Incumbent's Name

(insert)

Duties and Responsibilities

Under the general supervision of the reginnal senior military government officer, incumbent directs, organizes and coordinates throughout the region the civil education program to include various programs on women's affairs. Being primarily a field supervisor of the work of the civil education sections of the prefectural teams, he spends a large part of his time with these teams. His operational activities are limited to dealings with appropriate governmental bureaus and non-governmental agencies whose authority is region-wide.

Duties:

1. By means of field inspections, reports and recommendations submitted from prefectural military government teams, and recommendations submitted by assistants, studies the progress of the several programs in civil education to determine the effectiveness of the programs as applied.

2. By means of personal visits to prefectural or special area teams, conferences with civil education officers of subordinate units and directives from higher authority, coordinates the civil education program throughout the region. Organizes and directs frequent group conferences of subordinate CE officers to facilitate the operation of a coordinated regional program and reviews reports submitted by the prefectural teams for the purpose of gaining additional information upon which to improve the work of subordinate team personnel in strengthening the various phases of the civil education program throughout the region.

3. Will make recommendations to the regional senior military government officer and higher headquarters to increase the effectiveness of the program.

4. Will exercise staff supervision over lower echelons of command for compliance with directives pertaining to civil education.

5. Will keep the regional senior military government officer informed on all phases of the civil education program by means of oral reports, memoranda and staff studies.

6. Will exercise technical staff supervision over the work of the civil education officers of the prefectural or special area military government teams.

7. Will render required reports to next higher headquarters. As circumstances dictate, will make special reports with recommendations to higher headquarters, such reports to contain critical and important information to help higher headquarters in its formulation of policy. These reports will point out superiorities or inferiorities of special phases of the Civil Education program and situation and will usually recommend emulation or correction.

8. Will contact and work with Japanese educational agencies and individuals whose responsibility is region-wide to help coordinate prefectural activity. Will also contact prefectural Japanese educational personnel and agencies when making field trips in order to improve knowledge of field problems and to help team Civil Education officers in their work with these individuals and agencies.

APPENDIX VII

SCHOOL BOARD ELECTION--SHIKOKU

5 October 1948

Total Votes Registered:			2,182,503	
Ehime:	757,266			
Men:		359,265		
Women:		398,001		
Kagawa:	487,453			
Men:		227,010		
Women:		260,443		
Kochi:	479,955			
Men:		226,499		
Women:		253,456		
Tokushima:	457,839			
Men:		214,683		
Women:		243,156		
Total Votes Cast:			1,391,614	
Ehime:	491,809			65%
Men:		243,603	(49%)	
Women:		248,206	(51%)	
Kagawa:	330,759			68%
Men:		159,036	(48%)	
Women:		171,723	(52%)	
Kochi:	309,709			65%
Men:		152,536	(49%)	
Women:		157,174	(51%)	
Tokushima:	259,330			57%
Men:		135,348	(52%)	
Women:		123,988	(48%)	
All-Shikoku Percentage Average:				64%
Male Vote:				49%
Female Vote:				51%

APPENDIX VIII

HEADQUARTERS
SHIKOKU MILITARY GOVERNMENT REGION
APO 1050

Takamatsu, Shikoku
27 August 1948

SUBJECT: Board of Education Law Program

TO : Commanding Officer, Ehime Mil Govt Team, APO 1050
Commanding Officer, Kagawa Mil Govt Team, APO 1050
Commanding Officer, Kochi Mil Govt Team, APO 1050
Commanding Officer, Tokushima Mil Govt Team, APO 1050

1. The Board of Education Law recently passed by the Diet is one of the most important laws promulgated to date. On the success of its implementation depends much of the success of the Allied Occupation of Japan and probably the whole success of the educational program of the Occupation and the Japanese government.

2. There are several obstacles in the way of the success of this program. The shortness of the period between the passage of the law and the elections of the school boards is one. This difficulty must be overcome by an intensive drive on your part using every means at your disposal. CE, CI and Legal-Government officers should work closely together with you actively behind them. The immediate objectives are to help get out a large vote; to inform the Japanese public of the importance and meaning of the law; to discourage political and partisan groups of any kind from maneuvering to get control of the boards; to encourage worthwhile lay candidates to come forth; to encourage evaluation of candidates' qualifications by the public (through newspapers, for example); and generally to make the Japanese of Shikoku understand the meaning and purpose of school boards--the people running their own education through representatives of their own choosing--and to discuss it openly and vigorously.

3. The news I have to date leads me to believe that we have a tremendous job ahead of us. For example: Right now the political parties and the Teachers' Union, perhaps in good faith, perhaps not, are trying to get their representatives on the boards. This is <u>not</u> a political election. And it is <u>not</u> a happy hunting ground for self-seekers. But it will become so unless we and the Japanese work together to achieve the above objectives.


4. I should like to urge you to give this matter your personal attention. Despite the obstacles in the way, we must not

let this program fail. Intangible as such a failure would be, it would be nonetheless real and lasting in effect and would be a great setback to all of our objectives. Put your strength behind it and make this opportunity into a real success.

R. E. COUGHLIN
Colonel CE
Commanding

APPENDIX IX

ORGANIZATION OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE KAGAWA PREFECTURAL BOARD OF EDUCATION 1949



APPENDIX X

SHIKOKU SCHOOL STATISTICS

JULY 1949

	Primary			
	Ehime	Kagawa	Kochi	Tokushima
Schools	445	223	414	296
Pupils	200,335	122,231	109,168	120,370
Teachers	5,494	3,582	3,164	3,225
Student's Average Per School	450.2	548.1	263.7	406.6
Student Per Teacher	36.5	34.1	34.5	37.4

	Lower Secondary			
	Ehime	Kagawa	Kochi	Tokushima
Schools	291	176	193	147
Pupils	92,216	57,192	50,234	57,192
Teachers	3,141	2,111	1,895	1,997
Student's Average Per School	315.5	324.9	264.9	389.1
Student Per Teacher	29.4	27.1	26.5	28.6

	Upper Secondary			
	Ehime	Kagawa	Kochi	Tokushima
Schools	48	26	22	21
Pupils	18,327	19,209	13,120	12,683
Teachers	1,095	1,086	692	637
Student's Average Per School	381.8	738.8	596.4	603.9
Student Per Teacher	16.7	17.6	18.9	19.9

	Population Figures				
Prefecture	Ehime	Kagawa	Kochi	Tokushima	Total
Male	719,648	450,501	423,045	421,127	2,014,321
Female	761,458	483,622	443,340	448,163	2,136,583
Total	1,481,106	934,123	866,385	869,290	4,150,904

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