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THE EFFECTS OF RACE AND PARANOIA ON POWER INVOLVEMENTS

by
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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF RACE AND PARANOIS
ON POWER INVOLVEMENTS

by
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The clinical and experimental literature suggests considerable support for the psychoanalytic theory of the etiological role of homosexuality in paranoia. The data is not without ambiguity and alternative theories growing out of this literature present themselves. One of which is that the early experiences of the paranoid individual result in a self-perceived power deficit as a consequence of his not developing a sense of being able to control his own rewards and punishments. This power deficit results in conflictual relationships with power figures, and situations with a tendency to be preoccupied with notions of power. The sociological data on paranoia suggests that social isolation is also a major precipitant of the paranoid condition with such isolation being noteworthy for its consequent reduction in social power.

Black Americans, though not socially isolated, have experienced considerable powerlessness growing out of the racist American social structure. The effects of this racism include lowered self-esteem, inhibited aggression, and a realistic self-perception of being powerless among Black Americans.

Four hypotheses grew of these notions. It was predicted that paranoids and blacks would demonstrate a similarly higher number of power themes in their fantasy production than would comparable groups

of non-paranoid schizophrenics, normals and whites. Secondly, it was predicted that the power concerns would be greatest when the stimuli represented illegitimate (though more accessible) situations than when the stimuli depicted legitimate (though less accessible) means to power. Here again the involvement was predicted to be greatest for the black and paranoid groups. The third hypothesis was that paranoids and blacks given their self-perceived incapacity to control their own rewards and punishments would show a greater tendency to see rewards and punishments emanating from external sources. Finally, it was predicted that paranoids and blacks would be more likely to respond to power blockages with conflicting tendencies to both submit and rebell rather than with a direct expression of either of these responses.

The hypotheses were tested by using six groups: 10 black and 10 white, hospitalized paranoid schizophrenics, 10 black and 10 white non-paranoid schizophrenics, and 10 black and 10 white normals. These subjects were presented with twelve modified TAT pictures selected for their depiction of legitimate, illegitimate, or trophy power and were instructed to make up stories for the pictures and to choose their preferred pictures. The stories were then scored for the number of power images included. The Julian Rotter questionnaire of external control was also administered and scored. Finally an experimental forced-choice questionnaire was administered with four alternative ways of resolving each of ten power blockages.

Statistical comparisons were made of the average number of power themes per story for each of the six groups of subjects. Their picture preferences were compared as were their external scores and the answers to the power blockage questionnaire. The results of the analysis of the data suggests support for the hypothesis that blacks for all comparisons

show a higher incidence of power involvements than do their white counterparts. The paranoid groups score significantly higher than do the non-paranoid groups, though the black normals scored higher than did the black paranoids. There was no statistically significant difference in the incidence of power themes for the white normals and white paranoids. The data failed to support the remaining hypothesis with no significant difference found in the preferences, external orientations or resolutions of power blockages.

In conclusion, it would appear that the realistic power deficits of blacks in America result in greater preoccupation with power among black subjects than among comparable whites. The earlier findings that paranoids show a greater incidence of power concerns than do other psychopathological groups receives additional support from these data. Some question is raised growing out of these findings about the appropriateness of the power-deficit hypothesis as a central dimension of paranoia when there is no difference found between the white normals and paranoids and when the black normals show a greater incidence of power concerns than do the black paranoids. The lack of support for the latter hypotheses suggests a need to refine some of the theoretical notions leading to the hypothesis of greater involvement in illegitimate power as well as an improvement of the measures being used. Some questions are raised about the appropriateness of the Rotter questionnaire for measuring external control in a clinical population, as well as the appropriateness of a questionnaire measure for resolutions of power blockages.

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CHAPTER I

SOME THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL CONCEPTIONS OF PARANOIA

The contribution of psychoanalysis to the understanding of human behavior is undeniable. One of its major deficits as observed by many of the critics of the theory is its emphasis on the intrapsychic often to the illogical exclusion of the function of social, cultural and interpersonal factors operating in the development and functioning of human behavior. An in depth look at the theoretical and research literature at any one area of human function or dysfunction as elucidated by this theory reveals repeatedly the theoretical difficulties resulting from this deficit in Psychoanalytic theory.

My intention here is to look rather intently and critically at the Psychoanalytic, theoretical and research literature on the development and dynamics of paranoia. This will be done in a sequence of steps involving a look at the theoretical, clinical and research support for Freud's original hypotheses concerning the nature of paranoia, followed by a look at some of the theoretical factions coming from later psychoanalytic observers and finally an attempt to integrate these positions with the data coming from the more socially oriented students of human behavior.

Classical Psychoanalytic Notions of Paranoia

Freud's original statements on the nature of paranoia, which remained essentially unchanged in his writings, grew out of the analysis of the autobiography of a man he never saw. In his analysis of the autobiography of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber, Freud put forth his hypotheses about the characteristics of a paranoid illness. The genetic basis of his illness, Freud suggests is: "what was characteristically paranoic about the illness was the fact that the patient, as a means of warding off

a homosexual wishful fantasy, reacted precisely with delusions of persecution. . . (1911)" With this statement Freud set the stage for the essential theoretical and research hypotheses concerning paranoia for about the next 40 years. Freud, being a scientist not given to over-simplified notions of human behavior was straight-forward in his conception of paranoia: "It is a remarkable fact that the familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: "I (a man) love him (a man). . ." Freud's subsequent discussion of the mechanism of paranoia is a description of the familiar symptoms of paranoia and a demonstration of how they serve to bolster the defense against the homosexual wish. Since, in the later literature these symptoms have come to be the sine qua non of the disease and have often been misrepresented in observational attempts to confirm or negate Freud's theory, it may be worthwhileto briefly summarize his carefully systematized description of the symptoms. The essential (and too frequently, only) diagnostic criteria for paranoia havebeen delusions of persecution. According to Freud, such delusions loudly contradict the proposition "I (a man) love him" by asserting "I do not love him--I hate him."

> This contradiction, which must have run thus in the unconscious, cannot, however, become conscious to a paranoic in this form.* The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia requires that internal perceptions--feeling--shall be replaced by external perceptions. Consequently, the proposition "I hate him" becomes transformed by projection into another one: 'He hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in hating him.' And thus the impelling unconscious feeling makes its appearance as though it were the consequence of an external perception: 'I do not love him--I hate him, because HE PERSECUTES ME.' (1911)

*This statement concerning awareness of the unconscious motive will later become one of the essential arguments against Freud's major hypotheses.

Erotomania becomes another way to bolster the contradiction of the unconscious wish by the paranoia. "In obedience to the same need for projection, the proposition is transformed into: "I observe that she loves me. I do not love him--I love her, because she loves me."

The third way in which the original proposition can be contradicted would be by delusions of jealousy; 'It is not I who loves the man--she loves him,' and he suspects the woman in relation to all the men whom he himself is tempted to love.'

Thus we see in Freud's (1911) descriptions quoted above, three ways in which the basic unconscious proposition 'I love him' can be contradicted: Delusions of jealousy contradict the subject, delusions of persecution contradict the verb, and erotomania contradicts the object. Freud asserts that there is a fourth kind of possible contradiction--namely, "one which rejects the proposition as a whole":

> 'I do not love at all--I do not love anyone.' And since, after all, one's libido must go somewhere, this proposition seems to be the psychological equivalent of the proposition: 'I love only myself.' So that this kind of contradiction would give us megolomania, which we regard as a sexual overvaluation of the ego and may thus set beside the overvaluation of the love-object. . .(1911)

Such a brief description of Freud's extensive discussion of the autobiography of Dr. Schreber, his subsequent interpretation of the case and his extrapolation of the mechanisms of paranoia, fails to do justice to the acuity and brilliance of insights involved in Freud's capacity to logically put together so much otherwise confusing data. In any event, this does provide a base from which to look at the limbs of theoretical speculation leading from Freud's notions.

Knight (1940) suggests that "perhaps no psychoanalytic theory of psychosis rests on firmer foundations or has been less frequently

attacked by critics of Freud, than his brilliant analysis of the Schreber case." He goes on to suggest some of the questions left open by Freud's discussion of the case and provides a starting point for reconsideration of the theory. Knight suggests that Freud's discussion does not explain why the paranoid has strong homosexual wishes which are repressed in other, non-psychotic ways or are acted-out in overt homosexuality, "perhaps even with a minimum of psychic conflict."

> Why does the developing paranoic react so frantically to the dimly perceived homosexual drive in himself? Is the homosexual wish so much more intense in him than it is in other men who successfully repress it without forsaking reality testing, or is it that the need to deny the homosexuality is so much greater? And if the latter is true, why is this need to deny so terrifically strong? Why is the thought of homosexual contact with another man so completely intolerable? (1940)

We shall return, briefly, to Knight's answers to these questions, but for the moment let's consider more closely the questions which he raises. In the first place, the unacceptability of homosexual impulses happens to be a culturally defined proscription and in no way conflicts with the ego's self-preservative reality-testing functions. If there is an intrapsychic conflict at all, it would have to be characterized as one between internalized standards of behavior and id impulses. Consequently, an organism which had not been required to internalize such proscriptions would have no need to so frantically defend against the emergence of homosexual wishes. This becomes the most basic metapsychological question to be answered.

As Knight (1940) goes on to suggest and as is clear from Freud's later writings, the early psychosexual development of the individual results in a bisexual potential in all human beings. So given, at least an unconscious, predisposition for homosexual wishes in all men, what is

it in the nature of the wishes themselves which results in such an active, vigorous denial of these wishes by the paranoic?

The fact remains that there is considerable evidence for an undeniable coincidence (at least in Western culture) for paranoia and homosexual concerns. Brill (1934) went so far as to say the "paranoia is nothing but distorted homoerotism.". As early as 1931 Gardner found in a review of the literature that the psychoanalysis of many cases exhibiting delusions of persecution indicates that the bases of the delusions are the repressed homosexual trends of the patient. In the same publication Gardner surveyed 120 unanalyzed cases exhibiting such delusions and found that in 45% of the cases there were evidences of such homosexual trends in the unconscious behavior of the patients. The shortcomings in this early attempt to seek support for Freud's theory, unfortunately leave the findings of Gardner almost useless as a statement about the nature of paranoia, per se. In the first place, his tendency as that of others to equate the symptoms with the disease leave us with the same confusion as would come from presuming a high body temperature to be invariably an indication of a single physical disease entity. Though delusions of persecution are in fact an important diagnostic sign for the condition of paranoia, to assume this sign to be the disease itself is logically misleading. Similarly, Gardner failed to compare the homosexual trends in his cases with so-called "paranoid content" with patients who did not demonstrate such content which leaves his results equivocal. Neither did he define clear criteria for recognizing homosexual trends.

In clinical work with patients with homosexual conflicts, it becomes clear that the manifestations of homosexual impulses are not so clear cut as have been assumed. Some of these patients, for example, manifest

these conflicts by their passivity in heterosexual relations while indulging in homosexual fantasies. It appears that anything from overt homosexual acts to such fantasies can be defined as homosexual trends.

Probably the most frequently quoted negation of the presumed invariable concurrence of homosexual concerns and paranoia is a study of 80 patients by Klein and Horwitz (1949). Strangely enough, it's a study which summarizes the result of these investigators' observations with the absence of any data. They assert, however, that in studying all references to homosexuality in content during the illness only 1/5 of the patients diagnosed as paranoid gave any expression of this. They fail to provide an operational criteria for "homosexual content." The one connection they found was that the paranoid patients with demonstrable homosexual concerns, showed an earlier onset than those who were not manifestly concerned with homosexuality. Despite their interpretation to the contrary, their findings may actually support Freud's view of paranoia and its relation to homosexual wishes in that Freud claims that the paranoid mechanism is a defense against the conscious awareness of homosexual wishes; consequently one would not ordinarily expect to find manifest homosexual concerns among the paranoid patients. The point remains that their findings are not necessarily in contradiction nor in support of the theory.

Klaf and Davis (1960) made another attempt to look at no more than the incidence of occurrence of homosexual concerns amongst paranoid patients. They found the complete opposite of Klein and Horwitz's findings: 41.8% of the paranoids they studied had homosexual preoccupations as opposed to only 6% of their control group; previous homosexual experience was recorded twice as frequently in the paranoid group as in the control group. Three years later Moore and Selzer

(1963) demonstrated that overt behavior, patient preoccupation and examiner's opinion showed the presence of homosexuality significantly more often for the paranoid schizophrenic group than the non-paranoid group. Overt homosexual concerns seemed to occur before the psychosis and was rare during the florid psychosis. The paradox here is that this study was conducted in search of support for Freud's hypotheses which they felt to have been called into question by Klein and Horwitz. Whereas, in fact part of the findings of this study stands as a potentially greater embarrassment to the theory than the Klein and Horwitz's findings did.

Even if one assumes as does Grauer (1955) that the eruption of homosexual impulses in paranoia may be considered the result of a breakdown in ego integration and ego identity, one must still question the prevalence of homosexual behavior found in this study. Defenses do fail, especially in psychosis, but if this were generally the case, one would expect even a greater incidence of homosexuality among paranoids, if in fact their essential conflicts center around these impulses. Assuming a conceptualization which sees paranoia as a rather efficient defensive structure against homosexual impulses, one must wonder why there is such a high rate of occurrence of homosexual conflict.

So far, we find the research on the theoretical notions about paranoia to be of little use because of pure misunderstandings of the theory. Planasky and Johnston (1962) followed the same flaw by looking in case records and attempting to relate "degree of paranoidness" with the incidence of heterosexual problems and homosexual concerns. They found no significant relation between homosexual concerns and their untested measure of "paranoidness." They only mention tangentially that there was a significant relation found between such concerns and

staff diagnosis of paranoidness.

Other investigators took into account Freud's statement of the unconscious nature of the paranoid's homosexual concerns and chose more subtle ways to circumvent the defenses of the patients. Norman (1948) used sodium amytol ("truth serum") to test for the unconscious presence of homosexual concerns. He found the presence of such concerns in 31% of the paranoid cases and in 16% of the catatonics which he tested. Aronson (1952) showed that paranoid subjects respond with an overwhelmingly greater number of homosexual signs on the Rorschach test than do either non-paranoid psychotics or normals. Watson (1965) found a significantly higher mean latency when he presented homosexual stimuli to a paranoid group leading to his suggestion that paranoids are made more anxious by such stimuli. He also found that the paranoids in this study showed a significantly lower mean (Homosexual awareness) score which supports the contention that paranoids are less aware of homosexual feelings or needs than the non-paranoid schizophrenics. Such a finding stands in support of the Freudian hypothesis of repression of homosexual wishes.

This represents only a sample of the voluminous literature seeking to confirm or deny Freud's hypothesis. As should be clear, the findings are not completely unequivocal although one hypothesis does seem to stand firm: at least some form of what is clinically defined as homosexuality is generally demonstrated to be in some way empirically related to paranoia. The research evidence permits one to say neither more nor less. The question remains then: what type of homosexual concern or involvement is functional in paranoia and what is its relationship to paranoia?

The Role of Aggression in Paranoia

Knight (1940) seeks to formulate the distinguishing feature of the latent homosexuality of the paranoid by emphasizing the role of aggression in the psychodynamics. He states:

> Freud's first proposition might read: 'I must love him and be loved by him to neutralize my hatred for him; but the nearer I get to him the more dangerous the relationship becomes for me and for him. . .' the fixation point in psychosexual development that is specific for paranoia lies in the first anal or anal expulsive stage and the type of hate characteristic of paranoia is anal sadism. . . . attempts to love and be loved by the father is an aid to the repression of his negative feelings and as a seductive method of enticing his father to his destruction.

Knight in his discussion places aggression as the basis of the homosexual conflict in paranoia. His elaboration of Freud's suggestions with the added insight of the role of aggression in human behavior seems more consistent with the clinical facts. The homosexuality function in the paranoid takes on a defensive garb rather than an impulsive one and begins to suggest why the peculiar prominence of the homosexual wish. Viewing the latent homosexuality in paranoia in this light rather than as the sole basic proposition against which the ego must defend itself, one is better able to understand the possible presence of the homosexual wish occurring along with the paranoid psychosis.

Rosenfeld (1949) follows Knight's line of reasoning. He reported on a patient who used the active homosexual role as a defense against anal sadistic tendencies. The same patient used homosexuality to check and deny the persecutory anxiety, until the time when even the men he had intercourse with became persecutors (i.e. when the attempted neutralization of aggression through sexuality failed). A second patient of Rosenfeld's (1949) used homosexuality to appease external persecutory figures by passive anal intercourse and by the need to test and to

reassure himself by fellatio about the destructiveness of his oral impulses. Rosenfeld states in conclusion that the "homosexuality is related to the idealization of the good father figure, who is used to deny the existence of the persecutors."

Additional evidence of the defensive function of homosexuality in paranoia comes from Hesselback (1962) in his discussion of superego regression in paranoia. He, too, emphasizes the role of aggression in paranoia: "all of the aggressiveness and sadism with which the superego was once endowed is now felt to be at the disposal of these 'real persecutors.' In reporting on a borderline paranoic in the same article, Hesselback describes him as follows:

> . . . his sexual life had consisted of frequent masturbation and rare instances of discreet homosexual behavior with intimates who he admired for their intellectual brilliance, their masculine good looks, and their lovability. . . His masturbation fantasies were either homosexual or involved being physically admired or considered 'eminently lovable' by some woman. His paranoid persecutors became limited to certain women with whom he had frequent business or social contacts. 'These women,' he explained, 'are some kind of wild unscrupulous monsters poisoning everyone's mind against me.'

Hesselback further observes that this patient's paranoid anxiety disappeared during overt homosexual activity. This kind of clinical evidence seems to stand in support of Knight's notion that aggression seems to be the major impulse against which the paranoid person is fighting with the homosexuality as a compromise operation to hold the unconscious hostility in check.

Numberg (1948) suggests that the conflicts over aggression are not just a part of the "type" of latent homosexuality found in paranoia but is a focal conflict for homosexuals in general. On the basis of clinical experience with homosexual patients, he states:

> . . . the homosexual act represents also a triumph over

> the man--over the father. Not only does he overcome him and appropriate his strength, but he makes a woman out of him and feels himself sufficiently masculine to take possession of his mother.

The idea Nunberg puts forth here is that the passive submission of the homosexual act, contrary to its superficial appearance is a magical aggressive act that through contact with a masculine man, the patient himself becomes masculine by absorbing from the partner his strength. Bollmeir (1938) reports a similar case of a man for whom mutual masturbation proved a way in fantasy of getting a big penis from the big strong man by castrating him.

Hartogs (1964) reinterprets the Schreber case itself in the light of Ego psychology and the role of aggression. He suggests that the precipitant of Schreber's illnesses was that his ego-capacity for neutralization and especially deagressivization of aggression broke down twice, each time in a situation where Schreber was called upon to assume a more prominent and certainly more aggressive role against the father figure. He goes on to suggest that "a secondary, homosexually oriented libidinization took place only for the purpose of protecting the objects of aggression against the destructive, sadistically determined impact of free aggression." His conclusions carry the same notions about the secondary nature of homosexuality in paranoid psychodynamics, as those discussed above:

> The defense against homosexual strivings may therefore appear not to be the central issue in paranoia, but merely a concomitant feature of the process of megiomanic self-cathexis, characteristic for the narcissistically sensitized and vulnerable individual who attempts the hopeless task of delusional reneutralization of libidinized free aggression.

Power and Paranoia

We have, to this point considered Freud's hypotheses on the mechanics

of paranoia, looked at the experimental and clinical support for his theory and briefly considered some additional Psychoanalytic elaborations of Freud's original conceptions. The major flaw in all of these speculations so far is their emphasis on the vague primary process world of the id. This characteristic of much of early psychoanalytic writings often leads to a degree of inexactness that makes it often difficult to see the world from the perspective of the ego. As already suggested, the idea of a "homosexual wish" oversimplifies our consideration rather than providing any real precision in our attempt to understand the issues which the patient in psychotherapy is grappling with. Similarly, "aggression" or "anal sadism" is lacking in precision. These concepts certainly provide the clinician with the necessary awareness of the general area of conflict, but they fail to assist in real-life communication to the patient, the quality of his conflictual interactions. So even with the increased precision afforded by the recognition of the role of homosexuality as a way of dealing with basically aggressive impulses for the paranoid patient, there is still room for more rigorous definition. In other words, the need remains for an ego translation of these unconscious conflicts. How does the ego of the paranoid perceive these internal and external stresses.

Lionel Ovesey (1955) made an attempt to bridge this gap between the intrapsychic and the external when he coined the concept of "pseudo-homosexual anxiety." He says:

> 'competitive relationships between men are placed in a male-female context in which the weaker male is castrated by the stronger male and forced to submit to him as a woman. . . For this reason, a competitive defeat, the result of a failure in assertion can be misinterpreted by the defeated male as evidence of homosexuality even though the area of struggle may be completely non-sexual. The motivation for all is power, sparked by the fear of domination by a

> superior male competitor.'

Ovesey goes on to say that it is this failure in masculine assertion that sets the equation in motion and carries it through the following sequence:

> I am a failure = I am not a man = I am castrated = I am a woman = I am a homosexual.

The terminal idea in this series generates a pseudohomosexual anxiety--that is, an anxiety misinterpreted by the patient as homosexual in its motivational origin when in reality he is concerned with a failure in nonsexual assertions. The defense against this anxiety is the paranoid projection.

Ovesey begins from an entirely different vantage point: from the outside--in. In the process he provides a beginning insight to the interaction between the intrapsychic and external conflict of the paranoid patient. As he later suggests:

> The pseudohomosexual conflict can develop only in those men who fail to meet successfully the societal standards for masculine performance. . . either the man never learned how to meet these standards; or he learned how and he suffers from an inhibition of assertion and cannot put his knowledge to effective use. The resort to dependency represents the seeking of magical solutions to the failures in assertion in other areas.

The acuteness of Ovesey's insights become more laudable when one looks at the clinical data and finds the invariable picture of paranoid patients showing such failures or perceived failures as a major precipitant of their psychosis. The evidence for this comes from clinical accounts of precipitating origins as well as from sociological data which will be discussed briefly.

Following Ovesey's lead, Nydes (1963) related the psychodynamics of paranoia with those of masochism and provides us with an additional

elaboration of Freud's discussion of Schreber:

> Schreber's appointment as Senatsprasident was a major success--a success which he unconsciously experienced as the acquisition of power great enough to challenge and overthrow GodsFlechsigs Father. Schreber's unconscious wish to usurp God's place and power arouses God's retaliatory wrath (via projection).

There is a marked similarity in Nydes' discussion of Schreber and that of Hartogs' quoted above. The striking difference is the more phenomenological description which Nydes gives. It is interesting that Nydes comes to a similar conclusion as well:

> Schreber's homosexuality, in this view as distinct from Freud's, does not represent so much the emergence of an infantile wish for libidinal gratification from his father, but is primarily defensive against the wish to kill and the dread of being killed by the father figure. . . Fellatio for example is often a symbolic way of warding off punishment by placating the father figure; and is also accompanied by a hostile wish to drain off and incorporate his strength.

This line of thought is familiar to us from Knight and Nunberg as well. Bollmeir's (1938) patient already referred to above comes as an additional example of Ovesey and Nydes' theories. This patient, at any point when there was an insult to his masculine esteem, would find male pick-ups for fellatio.

Nydes makes a strong departure from Ovesey in one area, however. He thinks that Ovesey stresses the patient's failure to meet societal demands, while ignoring the fact that the paranoid patient unconsciously equates highly selected negative features of otherwise positive societal reactions with his primitive infantile superego. "Paranoid masochistic trends may sometimes serve adaptational needs but they are motivated by a need to resolve intrapsychic conflict rather than by an attempt to adjust to objective reality." It is my contention that Nydes criti-

cism is an overstatement rather than recognizing the interactive process of objective reality and intrapsychic conflict. Nydes also fails to take into consideration the probable adaptational origin of the intrapsychic conflict. His suggestion that the basis of paranoia is not merely a response to failure in meeting societal demands is certainly an important observation.

If our intention is greater precision, then a digression is necessary at this point to clarify exactly what our conception of an ambiguous term like "power" is for the paranoid person. Following Nydes, power as a concern of the paranoid does not reflect constructive mastery or achievement so much as it implies "power to enforce submission from others!" For a more formal definition we might refer to Fenichel (1939):

> In magical thinking 'power' is conceived of absolutely concretely: one can kill the powerful one, or rob him of his power-substance, or, finally, partake of that substance through partial identification, and even through mere contact. This last is a compromise between the craving for power on the one hand and, on the other, fear of the powerful being and passive love for him.

"Passive love" as described here by Fenichel needs additional clarification. Nydes characterizes this same type of love as being obtained through apparent submission to the love object; a love which affirms weakness andneeds for care and protection.

We can see from these definitions further crystallization of the notion that the paranoid's homosexuality or homosexual concerns are (1) an affirmation of his self-perceived weakness and vulnerability and are (2) a defense against the retaliation of power figures on the one

hand; (3) an attempt to placate the power source as well as (4) a regressive wish to seduce the power away from the holder of power. Persecutory delusions become most intense for the paranoid at times of potency and success: promotions, successful intercourse, marriage, childbirth, etc. It is at these times that the perception is: "I have challenged the holder of power, but since he is powerful, he will retaliate against me." This is based on the idea discussed above that power can't be shared because it always involves the submission of another.

Narcissism and early ego development of the paranoid

One could very easily devote volumes just to the problem of the developmental origins of the power concerns of the paranoid. To fully elucidate these roots is not our intention in this discussion but it is crucial to consider, at least briefly, the developmental origins of the reality-distorting potential of the paranoid person, along the power dimensions.

Freud speaks of the developmental stage of narcissism as being critical for the development of paranoia. In line with his earlier hypotheses he points to this stage as being the source of the self-cathexis functional in homosexuality and consequently as crucial in the development of the paranoid as well. Our expanded understanding of narcissism renders its libidinal character only partially explanatory. For our purposes, we are interested in the individual's experience of his capacity to control gratification and maintain survival. From this point of view we consider omnipotence which the infant in its narcissism feels. Later on it learns that its power is quite limited and his omnipotence is no more than a capacity to influence those with the real power. This is the beginning conception on the part of the infant of

interpersonal causation; the prerequisite for which is the capacity to conceive of two separate people, one having effects on the other. The capacity to cause something in another person requires a feeling of power.

What if the child is unable to cause effects in the external world to relieve his internal tension? "Faced by intrapersonal and interpersonal experiences which emphasize his feelings of inadequacy and insignificance," says Schwartz (1964), "the infant denies these feelings by constructing and projecting onto the outside world various alternative explanations for his feelings." Schwartz continues:

> . . . . if the parent responds to the child's 'badness' by withdrawal, it would be difficult for such a child to recognize his own behavior as leading ultimately to his unpleasurable feelings; not being able to recognize his own power to cause events which would end ultimately in his own pleasure or unpleasure, such a child could have no sense of responsibility.

The child emerges from such experiences lacking the capacity for self-referred responsibility, seeing deprivation as meaning he does not matter to others; "he is insignificant not because he has done something bad, but because there is nothing about him which has value to others." Schwartz says "this sense of basic inferiority is quite different from a sense of wrong-doing."

The infant characterized above is essentially the model of the ego for the paranoid individual. As a result of prolonged frustration or interference of basic needs, we may hypothesize as Thorne (1953) that acute or chronic anger reactions are stimulated which prevent the person from identifying with other people and consequently regaining omnipotence by participation in the power of the perceived omnipotent other. In order to obtain external supplies though he is markedly dependent on the external world. He can endanger his crucial external supplies by

neither denial of external reality (as is possible for the autistic schizophrenic) nor by direct expression of his aggressive impulses. The aggressive impulses are projected outward into the external world to which the paranoid is firmly committed, but the price he must pay is an armed guard to protect him from the attack of his own aggression. As is suggested by Waelder (1951): "the concentration both of erotic and aggressive drives upon an object is deterimental to the sense of reality." As a consequence, the paranoid's irrevocable commitment to reality and dependence on it does not provide for reliable reality testing because of the inevitable distortions due to the concentration of his own aggressive drives.*

There is limited experimental support for these notions. An extensive study of family patterns in Boston and Burma by Hitson and Funkenstein (1959) demonstrates the family patterns which result in paranoid orientations. They found that in families of paranoid patients, the father expected wife and children to carry out his orders as he gave them without contradiction. In families of this group, the father appears to be the sole source of authority and the mother the sole source of affection. The paranoid child becomes sensitive to negative sanctions, and the great concern becomes one of defending the self from the potentially harmful effects of authority figures and avoiding their anger. The child comes to view his environment as having potentially harmful properties that he cannot control and that must be avoided in some way. Such an environment, according to Hitson and Funkenstein, leads to a

*Even here I have fallen victim to the error of emphasizing the intrapsychic experience with only a passing mention of the interpersonal experience of the infant. Though the implication is clear, I should like to emphasize that the ego deficits discussed here resulted from experiences with the real world which made such distortions adaptationally necessary.

perception of the environment as being the source of gratification as well as of danger, but always with directionality from the outside into the child.

On the more specific issue of power, Wolowitz (1961, 1965) found a differential response to the pictures of men on the basis of their adjudged powerful appearance. He found that male paranoids placed pictures of increasingly powerful men farther and farther away from them. The striking thing about this finding is that paranoids did not manifest a global net attraction towards men in general as would be predicted on the basis of Freud's homosexual hypotheses. Wolowitz's findings suggest support for the idea that the critical variable is one of perceived powerfulness interacting with maleness. Wolowitz and Shorkey (1966) developed an objective, reliable content coding system for scoring TAT stories for the presence or absence of power concerns and found that paranoids in comparison with other diagnostic groups manifested a greater involvement in power. The same finding was replicated by Weems and Wolowitz (1970) with another sample of paranoids.

Wolowitz and Shorkey (1969) found that paranoid children showed the same involvements with power in their fantasy productions as do paranoid adults.

Though the theoretical precision is improved with the addition of the power hypotheses, all of the evidence is not in. The studies briefly mentioned above do suggest a greater precision in our thought about the psychodynamics of the paranoid. The particular issues about the nature of these concerns with power are still in need of further clarification and additional data is needed.

The Relation of Paranoia to the Social Structure

Freud (1911), despite his emphasis and insistence on the sexual aetiology of paranoia, states in the beginning of his discussion on the mechanism of paranoia that "the strikingly prominent features in the causation of paranoia especially among males, are social humiliations and slights." This one sentence statement of Freud was the extent of his consideration of the import of social factors in the etiology of paranoia. Harms (1937) makes a logical and emphatic case for the consideration of the social conditions of the paraniod:

> Paranoia is a sign of fallacy and of non-conformity to reality in the thought-content and philosophy of the individual. . . The actual thought content of a person's mind is much more a product of the social environment, which is constantly changing and developing, than of any other psychic factor. It follows, then, that in paranoia more than in any other field of psychiatry, social conditions and the environment are the factors to be taken into consideration.

In order to better define exactly what social conditions were critical in the development of paranoia, the early attempts were to see what kinds of social groups showed a particular likelihood to develop paranoid reactions. Tyhurst (1957) indicates that the evidence regarding migration and minority groups suggests that paranoid reactions are more characteristic in these groups than in others. The evidence for this observation abounds: Listwan (1956) found that paranoid states in patients seeking psychiatric help occurred nearly twice as frequently in migrants as in the native born of Australia. He called the social factors leading to breakdown "migration stresses." Kino (1951) in a study of a group of Polish patients in England found:

> . . .as long as they continued to live within their own units or groups they felt well and relatively contented. The change occurred with their transfer to workshops or pits, where they found themselves

> isolated in a foreign environment whose language and habits were unknown to them, making every attempt at interpersonal approach very difficult.

The earliest of this group of studies was by Allers (1920) in which he reported observations of foreigners in good mental health when admitted to a general hospital in Austria among German-speaking patients whom they could not understand, soon developed an acute psychotic state conspicuous by fear, agitation, ideas of reference and persecution. Both Allers and Kino attribute the paranoid reaction to some form of linguistic isolation. These studies, all conclude that external circumstances--changes in norms and values, displacement, strange environment, isolation and linguistic separation--may create a paranoid disposition in the absence of any special character structure. The question remains: What is the result of a lifetime of estrangement and how does paranoia represent an adaptation to such isolation?

In response to this question, we can begin to integrate the notions about power discussed in the preceding section with the social considerations raised here. Cameron (1962) indicates that the adult who is especially vulnerable to paranoid developments is one whose deficient social learning and poorly developed social skills leave him unable to understand adequately the motivations, attitudes and intentions of others. Bonner (1951) makes the similar point that "as a consequence of his isolation he (the paranoid fails to develop the capacity of role-taking which is indispensable to successful living." Both writers are suggesting an early deficit in the capacity to relate socially which leads to a state of social isolation. This has already been alluded to in our discussion of early ego development which leaves the child with a self-perception of being unable to have causal effects on the environment and in turn does not develop those necessary social skills. A

finding by Beitner (1961) that paranoids when administered the semantic differential show a peculiar use of language which is at least partly due to a disturbance in word meaning. We can better see the relevance of the social findings discussed above, because it is clear that the transitory social situation of the migrants reflects the lifelong experience of paranoids in general.

The sociological studies of family patterns of paranoids provide even additional insight into this state of social isolation and consequent impotence which we are suggesting is paramount to an understanding of paranoia. Bonner (1950) found that ambivalent relationships between child and parents was extremely common among paranoids. The fact of ambivalence is no less true in any other form of psychopathology, so the why of the ambivalence is critical. Hitson and Funkenstein suggested one explanation. Relevant to this answer is Bonner's (1951) findings that the families from which a large number of the paranoid patients in his sample came are either severely authoritarian or excessively dominating and critical. "The usual consequence was to set-up patterns of hatred and aggression in the child, which because of his fear of his parents, he was impelled to repress or inhibit. As a consequence of his early affective frustrations and parental harshness or cruelty, the child tends to withdraw from normal social contacts." Goodman (1968) found that paternal figures were more valent for paranoids, than were maternal figures. He also found that paranoid patients are not simply influenced to conform to the opinion of the valent parent, but are influenced both to conform and to oppose the opinion of the valent parent.

Bonner's (1950) next point in his discussion of family patterns and Sociological aspects of paranoia, is that boundless ambition is a vital

element in the paranoid's egocentricity. "His inordinate drive to achieve is frequently initiated by his parents' intense wish for his success." This finding coincides with Adler's hypothesis discussed by Thornton (1948) that "paranoia constitutes an escape from social responsibility or constitutes a distorted means whereby the individual seeks to procure power, importance or distinction for himself." He emphasized the paranoic's "desperate need to keep out of consciousness a sense of inadequacy or inferiority." A directly relevant experimental finding is one by Rogers (1958) who asked paranoid and normal subjects to overlap colored glass to the degree that their ideal selves overlapped with themselves. He found that the paranoids had a significantly higher self-ideal self congruence than the normal group. Milner (1949) in a study of criminal paranoia concluded that:

> The paranoid may be regarded as a person whose overgrown ego has led him to attempt what is for him an impossible achievement, and who has disowned his failure and preserved his self-esteem by building a system of delusion. These delusions are his defense against self-criticism and self-exposure, and his great aim is to keep them active.

The clinical evidence seems to go along with the theoretical and experimental notions discussed so far. Grant (1954) reports the case of a 36 year old man diagnosed paranoid which he interpreted as: "because of a demanding, perfectionistic father, the patient developed frustration relative to an ego ideal which became the setting of a chronic rage reaction directed primarily against the self." Despite this patient's high intelligence he was unable to compromise with an all-or-nothing reaction to goal-seeking. Bak (1943) observes that "one of the prominent strivings (in a patient he reports) had been the ambition to be recognized, appreciated and loved by important outstanding men. Through masochistic identification he could become the father--the

powerful and loved enemy."

So far in this section, the attempt has been merely to demonstrate that there does seem to be some relationship between the development of paranoid symptomatology and ones relative isolation from the social milieu. For any student of individual behavior, such a generalized explanation is hardly adequate, so we are forced to fall back upon psychological notions to explain the ego's adaptation to such external reality. Prange (1959) in discussing a Chinese patient studying in the United States made such an attempt. He attributed the development of paranoid symptons in this young woman to the crucial factor of "cultural isolation" which he suggests was felt unconsciously as a deprivation of oral supplies. He goes on to say that "physical isolation becomes represented psychologically as a decrease in oral narcissistic supplies (because of warmth and physical closeness of oral environment); a need, left unsatisfied becomes painful and, being painful, is projected into the environment." Unfortunately, the generality of the conception introduced by Prange's explanation raises more questions than it answers. Certainly in various controlled situations, it has been demonstrated that physical isolation such as in sensory deprivation studies, the most likely development is psychotic manifestations on the part of the subject. There is considerable controversy as to whether this is essentially a physiological reaction to sensory stimulation or a psychological process. Again, the critical issue of length of isolation must be raised along with nature of the isolation. In the case Prange discusses, the absence of Chinese peers and difficulty with the linguistic transition, provided the basis of the isolation. We intuitively know, however, that every Chinese student who studies in the states does not develop paranoid symptoms. We must

begin to look more closely to understand the characterological predispositions which make such a development likely. Prange quotes Hsu as regarding the Chinese as being "situation-centered" rather than "individual centered" which leads to an exaggerated dependence on the environment for behavioral cues.* Such an atrophied dependence on environmental cues for behavior would certainly result in an intensified experience of loss when an individual is placed in an ambiguous or non-communicative environment.

We might take Prange's notion one step further and see a better integration of our power concept with this sociological data. The individual who has developed an excessive dependence on the external environment has done so because of an early environment which demanded one to turn outside of himself in order to gain gratification. Such is the case for most of us. The added variable of critical importance is that the individual who is likely to suffer most severely from social isolation is the individual whose sense of personal control over supplies from outside is minimal. This will be immediately recognized as the same situation which occurs in other cases of paranoia already discussed where the individual emerges from childhood with a limited sense of power to influence his own rewards and punishments. It might follow then that a situation of social isolation calls forth in the individual an exaggerated sense of powerlessness which sets into motion the paranoid dynamics, which we have already discussed.

There is one other broad area of cross-cultural and sociological

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*Julian Rotter has discussed the same notions of individual vs. situation-centeredness as internal and external control, a conceptual notion to which we shall return in the final section of this discussion.

data which is relevant to our discussion. This area involves a cross-cultural look at the delusions of the paranoid. Though our understanding of delusions as symbolic processes has increased tremendously since Freud's time, the fact still remains that most of the theoretical notions about paranoia grew out of Freud's discussion of Schreber's autobiography. Few reputable analytic thinkers would place such emphasis on the manifest meaning of delusions as did Freud in this instance. Our understanding of the delusion as being similar to the manifest dream as symbolic expression of unconscious processes serves as a major theoretical deterrant to the literal interpretation of the delusions. Consequently, whatever similarities occur in these delusions separate from the content should be a lever to the increase in our understanding.

Lucas, Sainbury and Collins (1962) quoted a study by Sherman and Sherman where they looked at the delusions in a mixed American population. They found that American men formulated their grandiose delusions in terms of wealth; foreign-born males did so more often in terms of literary or artistic abilities and in Negroes a religious component tended to predominate. Tooth (1950) observed that in the Gold Coast (Ghana) the delusions of the more warlike people were more grandiose; those of the more Europeanized were more persecutory. Lambo (1955) found that grandiose delusions occurred with greater frequency among the urbanized and literate Nigerians and persecutory ones were more frequent among the rural and illiterate. Lucas, et al found that in general grandiose delusions were found to have a higher incidence in patients of higher social class and superior educational status; "the top-dog, in short, had grandiose ideas; those of inferior status in terms of class

and education were not only less grandiose, but tended to have more delusions of inferiority.

If delusions are viewed most simply as an attempt by the ego to maintain some semblance of balance between the external world and the internal demands for gratification, the least that we can learn from them is cues to the external obstacles and internal demands. The Sherman and Sherman study suggests that given different cultural contexts and the definitions of potent persons in that context, if one is attempting to come to grips with a self-perceived power deficit, he would choose a fantasy identification which represents the holder of power in that culture. The most limited knowledge of American society would make one guess that the premium on capital as the definition of potency in this society would make one in search of such power choose a monetary resolution. The Europeans' (I fear, dying) emphasis on the aesthetic and scholarly as progenitors of cultural potency would result in this choice as an attempted fantasy solution. We could continue, but the case seems clear that the aim of these delusions is to overcome a self-perception of being deficient of power and to redefine oneself as more powerful in the context of the cultural milieu.

Why the varying incidence of persecutory and grandiose delusions with different class status? One hypothesis may be considered. The socially "inferior" suffer from a chronic condition of thwarted ambitions which has resulted in a more dependent stance as a means to attainment of gratification. The message has been clearly communicated that one attains rewards, not on the basis of assertion but from submission (consider the earlier discussion of paranoid masochism). The point remains: "I do not have the personal capacity to obtain rewards by personal action, but by submitting to those who are powerful, I may

receive those needed supplies." For the socially "superior", the message is reversed in the sense discussed by Fenichel (1939): "If one cannot do something that the more powerful person can, one wants to appropriate his possession which makes him powerful." This demands a certain limited awareness of those attributes which define power in a particular culture. Such an awareness, of course, comes from a wider exposure to the culture through learning or status.

CHAPTER II

Paranoia and Black Americans

The potential relevance of the social structure to the understanding of the psychodynamics and genesis of paranoid orientations should be clear by this point. Other writers have chosen to make use of this relationship by referring to entire cultures as "paranoid cultures" (Ruth Benedict, Hitson and Funkenstein). The implication of entire social groups being built around an essentially paranoid orientation certainly makes the term meaningless in the understanding of so-called aberrant or pathological behavior. I wish to claim at this point that certain characteristics of ones social environment can lead to predispositional factors which under stress can result in the development of paranoid symptomatology.

Blacks in the United States are members of a caste. According to Rainwater (1965): "the effect of the caste system is to bring home through a chain of cause and effect all of the victimization processes, and to bring them home in such a way that it is often very difficult even for adults in the system to see the connection between the pain they feel at the moment and the structured patterns of the caste system." Elaborate descriptions of the caste system in this country have already been written and do not require a review in this discussion. The critical features of this system are general knowledge and/or experientially (confirmed) by most members of the American Culture. For our purposes, it is necessary to point to a couple of the personality configurations resulting from membership in this oppressed caste.

At an early age the handling of aggression begins to present one of

life's greatest problems to the Black child. He may adopt one or more of several techniques in adapting himself to his underprivileged position and handling his hostile impulses. Any such technique must be subject to revision when the object of hostility is white. The cultural definition that one does not express hostility directly towards the majority of the population often results in a neurotic response such as that described by Sclare (1963):

> Perhaps the commonest neurotic response occurs in those Negroes who are bitter and resentful, but give the white man what he wants. They present a complaint, subservient facade which outrages their own feelings of pride and masculinity. They are unable, however, by such a facade to achieve social economic security, knowing that if they assert themselves they will incur the white man's displeasure. Under stress they may become obsequious sycophants or pathetic clowns in order to gain acceptance; so great is the masochistic need to appease the wrathful white god.*

It is important to keep in mind, our earlier discussion which indicated that inhibited aggression is critical to the establishment of a self-perceived power deficit.

Another mode of handling the conflicts over aggression is for the Black man to identify himself with the white man as a defense against his aggression. It is not uncommon for the psychotic Black to occasion-

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*There are those who would argue that this perception of whites and the consequent behavior here described on the part of blacks is archaic, given the "monumental changes" of the last 5-10 years. I am aware that it has become fashionable to be openly hostile to whites and the recent urban riots certainly don't appear to be acts of inhibited aggression. The limits of such hostile expressions are still defined by the white power structure as is clear when one contrasts the results of such expressions by LeRoi Jones at a University Lecture and the same expressions by a person who states his membership in the Black Panthers. Despite the cost to white property-owners resulting from the Urban riots, it is striking that the battlefields of aggressive expression remain confined within the black community. External restraints though less pervasive are still more confining on Black Americans than on whites.

ally deny his color completely. This is not unlike Fenichel's notion of a "mild form" of seizing from the possessor of power his power. This milder form is made peaceful by identification, "of partaking in the power-substance, which is a compromise between the hunger for power on the one hand, and the fear of the mighty one and passive love for him on the other." The complication growing from this style of adjustment by identification with the aggressor or powerful one results in the black man coming to despise himself and beginning to loathe what he recognizes of himself in other blacks. Thus he may seem to hate blacks more than he does white men.

There are other self-destructive modes of managing aggression for the Black American. Some blacks abandon the struggle by flatly accepting the idea that whites are superior and avoiding dangerous competition with them. Accordingly, the strategic retreat from the achievement arena, with an implicit admission of the greater potency of whites, leaves the black with a reliance on the white man as the source of supplies for survival. Such dependency growing out of submission, rather than love, is paradigmatic for the suspicious, wary, external orientation which we are suggesting is a predispositional factor for the development of paranoia.

Sclare (1949) offers an important piece of data which she relates to the result of inhibited aggression. She found that malignant hypertension is 2½ times commoner in the Negro than in the white man in America, while the disease is almost unknown in the native African Negro.

> The psychodynamic problem in the hypertensive American Negro consists in the inhibition of aggression and self-assertive tendencies. Such a pattern is especially common among the group of Negroes in the big northern cities which attempts to compete with and please the white man.

Harburg (1968) also found that blacks living within the inner city of Detroit were more prone to hypertensive problems than blacks and whites living in out-lying areas.

Being forced to inhibit the defensive survival functions for fear of destruction, as well as the assertive energy system of the personality leaves blacks with an extreme attitude of self-derogation. Blacks inherit an inferior caste status and almost inevitably acquire the negative self-esteem that is the realistic ego reflection of such a status. Through unpleasant contacts with white persons and with institutionalized symbols of caste inferiority--and more directly through mass media and the reaction of his own family--he gradually becomes aware of the social significance of racial membership. He soon learns that skin color is important, that white is to be desired, dark regretted. He perceives himself as an object of derision and disparagement, as socially rejected by the prestigeful elements of society, and as unworthy of succorance and affection. Having no compelling reason for not accepting this officially sanctioned negative evaluation of himself, he develops deeply ingrained feelings of inferiority. Such feelings of inferiority are reinforced by parental and peer interactions where the dominating value is one of acceptance as one approaches "whiteness" in physical and attitudinal make-up and rejection as one tends to deviate from this norm.

Though we have moved in this discussion to a social structural level of analysis, it is important to keep in mind that we are still referring to forces which affect the early ego development of the individual, as well as his later life. Fanon (1967) makes a relevant observation:

> In every case the analyst clings to the concept of the

> family as a 'psychic circumstance' and object . . . the family represents in effect a certain fashion in which the world presents itself to the child. In every country characterized as civilized or civilizing the family is a miniature of the nation.

So what is clearly a cultural disorder to any realistic observer becomes communicated to the child in such a way that he adapts to this disorder and is more likely than not adjudged "disordered" in his later life. For a child whose very survival is threatened if he challenges the holders of power within his society, it would be foolhardy to provide a socializing model which bespeakes a sharing of power. Erikson makes a forceful case for this position when he suggests that "given American Negro history, the 'instinctive sense' may have told the majority of Negro mothers to keep their children, and especially the gifted and questioning ones away from dangerous and futile competition, that is, for survival's sake to keep them in their place even if that place is defined by an indifferent and hateful compact majority." The point being made is simply this: much of what is pathological in the family of the white paranoid which we have discussed so far, due to the social alternatives for other forms of behavior is an institutionalized necessity in the experiences of the black individual. Unfortunately, the result is the same as Eugene Brody (1958) observes, "the fact of belonging to a visible minority, unified mainly in terms of shared negative rather than positive features of its existence, may reinforce feelings of difference, loneliness and low self-esteem, as well as the need to be vigilant, suspicious and reactively hostile."

Before pointing to the research support for the ideas being discussed, there is one other important concept which comes from Social Learning theory of personality. Julian Rotter (1966) hypothesized:

> One determinant of how reinforcement is perceived is

> determined by the degree to which the individual perceives that the reward follows from or is contingent upon his own behavior vs. the degree to which he feels the reward is controlled by forces outside of himself and may occur independently of his own actions.

This is Rotter's distinction between internal and external control. The concepts in his definition are tangential to our discussion but can be intuitively translated into our notions of self-perceived powerfulness and power deficits. The striking findings from research in this area using varied measures on varied populations repeatedly show blacks to cluster around the external end of the control continuum. Unfortunately, one can only speculate about the relevance of this variable to the understanding of paranoia, but certainly the most striking characteristic of paranoid conditions is their external orientations. So, without imposing a structure on our understanding of paranoia or the modal function of black personality, we are faced with yet another shared characteristic of paranoids and blacks.*

Inhibited aggression, debased self-esteem and an over-reliance on the external in a culture demanding internal control for success are three characteristics of black people in the United States which though adaptive to their cultural experiences are ominously similar to the genetic picture of the paranoid American. There are two further steps which must be taken in this discussion; first we must see what evidence is there for a connection between being black and being paranoid and what is the nature of this connection.

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*Caution is demanded here. A logical error frequently made by social scientists and analytic thinkers is that resemblance necessarily implies identity. To make such an assumption often leads our investigations awry because established causation in one instance is assumed to be the same in all similar instances, rather than giving due consideration to the context of the occurrence. The fallacies growing from such errors have left us with volumes of misleading truths.

Probably the only reliable statistics on the incidence of paranoid illnesses comes from Malzburg's (Karon, 1958) now rather dated study of mental illness in New York State. He found that Negroes tend to have much higher psychosis rates than whites, but he attributed this increase to the higher rates among migrants from the South. He found that Negroes born in New York State have the same psychosis rates as do whites. This is a finding with important implications. When we consider our discussion above about the incidence of paranoia among migrants in all parts of the world, we are forced again to take note of the social isolation variable as being critical as a precipitant of paranoia. Though Malzburg's data do not indicate, one would expect that those migrants who join relatives in the North and are able to join a supportive social group would tend not to suffer as do those migrants who must rely upon whatever social skills they have to join some new social group. Similarly, one would expect a difference between those entire families which migrate together and those individuals who make the move alone.

Breen (1968) compared Negro and Jewish Schizophrenics and found a higher incidence of paranoid schizophrenics with Negroes and what he called "dependency" schizophrenias among Jews. The dependency schizophrenias are catatonia, simple and hebephrenia. His explanation differs slightly from our emphasis in this discussion but does warrant consideration. He attributes this difference to the fact that the paranoid interpersonal pattern is actually an exaggeration of the independent or counter-independent or even combative life style. He continues:

> Where there is a cohesive, aggression-controlling culture, the dependency pattern is most likely to appear in reaction to stress and where there is a dispersive aggression-expressing culture, the paranoid pattern is most likely to appear in reaction to stress.

Breen's interpretation on the surface does not seem to match with the discussion of aggression above. In fact though, the data suggest that dispersive aggression-expression is characteristic within the black subculture. The often inappropriateness of the object choice, i.e., turning the aggression toward other blacks when the object of the hostility often is white provides some dispersion of the aggressive energy, but fails to gratify completely. Such inappropriate object choice often results in self-destructive life-styles which direct the aggression against the self. The encouragement of other modes of self-assertion among Jews and the culturally provided arenas for this assertion such as academic and vocational achievement permits an expression of intra- and intergroup aggression. Such possibilities for sublimation are restricted for blacks, given the cultural restraints on the more direct expressions of aggression whereas the less "productive" sublimations (e.g., dancing) become the only vehicles open.

Figelman (1968) makes a similar finding in comparing a Boston hospital population of Negroes and Jews. He too found that Negroes had significantly more paranoid and fewer affective disorders than Jews. He goes on to speculate that when outlets for acting-out, whether by means of alcohol or anti-social behavior are available for Negroes, there are fewer paranoid disorders. This makes intuitive sense when one considers that one basic issue of conflict for blacks is the issue of control. Alcohol, narcotics and other forms of anti-social behavior are vehicles for disavowing control. (As well as insulating oneself from the pervasive assaults on self-esteem provided by this culture if one is black.) Both patterns are in response to ambivalent relationships with external authorities who are unwilling to permit a sharing of their power. In contrast, we refer back to the Hitson and Funkenstein (1959)

study above which suggests that affective disorders are the result of exaggerated internal responsibility. In the former case the authority says: "Do as I say!" In the latter, the dominant authority throws the responsibility to the individual to know what is expected of him.

The one directly relevant finding on the relationship of paranoia with being black is one by Weems and Wolowitz (1969). These observers scored the TAT stories of a hospital population of Schizophrenics for their involvement in power concerns. High power involvement had already been demonstrated to be characteristic of paranoia in general. Veroff, Atkinson, et. a. (1960) in an investigation of a representative national sample employing the TAT, found non-institutionalized Negro males to be unusually high in their need for social power and dominance. In the Weems and Wolowitz study a comparison was made between the scores of paranoid and non-paranoid, black and white schizophrenics, black paranoids were found to have the highest involvement with power, followed by white paranoids, black non-paranoids and finally white non-paranoids. These findings point to the interactive strength of being black and paranoid as a source of considerable involvement, conflict, and frustration over power.

The clinician in his necessary involvement with the intrapsychic often makes the mistake of presuming the external realities to somehow be constants for his patients. He views the distortions of the realities he knows as pathological in their origin. The characteristics of Black Americans discussed so far would be viewed by practically any clinical observer as manifestations of psychopathology. Milner (1953) makes another suggestion:

> I believe that this personality organization, which clinicians would ordinarily consider to be schizoid and hence 'abnormal' is in a sense an 'adjusted' per-

> sonality organization for Negroes in American Society, since it is reality-adaptive and adaptable, and since it serves to protect the core or ego aspects of personality and to maintain them at levels sufficient for psychologically adequate functioning.

Other observers have suggested similar cautions when making diagnostic judgements. Geoffrey Tooth (1950) working on the West Coast of Africa, remarked that "one is forced to the conclusion that there are real qualitative differences in the psychotic reactions of individuals with different cultural and racial backgrounds, differences which make it impossible to fit them into the accepted nosological framework." Lambo (1955) says, "it would be a dangerous suggestion for scientific orientation to think that being different is being pathological. In addition to this, apparent superficial analogies are often drawn whereas the underlying differences in their genesis are often ignored." The call for caution is the same in the demand that so-called scientific thinkers not be deluded into viewing their constructs of reality to be the only existent ones. E. H. Ackernect (Lambo, 1955) makes a strong statement in his protest against the egocentricity of Western thought:

> Our culture is unique in the outlawing of the irrational, the emotional, the ecstatic. These phenomena have thus become incomprehensible and unknown to our society. The bedroom, the liquor store and the office of the psychiatrist are their last sanctuaries, but only the last of these three places is not tabooed for public expression. Thus it is no wonder that an almost unlimited number of phenomena have acquired a psychopathological label.

Freud observed in Civilization and its Discontents that increasing civilization, since it is associated with various prohibitions must be attended by discontent and mental conflict; he also points out that of the three sources of human suffering--that from our body, from the environment, and from our relations with other men--the most painful is the last. Certainly our discussion points to the last origin of

suffering as being foremost in the relations between black and white men in this society.

More specifically, we find with increasing frequency the turning of our focus to the social organization as a critical source of madness within the people. As early as 1937, Harms suggested that:

> The basic structure of our social organization (social secrecy), the opposition of varying social and spiritual environments (social deception and prejudice), the accompaniments of so-called scientific progress (abstraction and relativity) are all disorienting paranoic factors.

If Harms' observation contained even minimal validity in 1937 the exacerbation of all these factors has managed to create for all--black and white, alike--a disorientation which makes adaptation difficult and corrugated. Add to this general cultural make-up the problem of social prejudice and deception which often casts its victims into an entirely insane world.

Is the recommendation here that a concept of psychopathology for Black Americans and other oppressed groups is rendered meaningless? Indeed not! Certainly no observer of psychotic populations could be so naive. The point I am making is that the pathology of blacks, especially is so inextricably bound with the pathology of an oppressive culture that any demarcation must necessarily be an artificial one. Let's not make the mistake often made by social analysts who imply a one-to-one relationship between social structure and membership in that structure. Personal experience and particular family patterns serve as critical mediating variables between the culture and the psychic structure of the individual. Without a thorough knowledge of the realities of the black social and interpersonal world in this country, one cannot make a comprehensive or even reasonable statement about the intrapsychic

functioning of Black Americans.

The assumption of a normal distribution of behavior for all members of a culture is a fallacy. Simply on the basis of the data presented in this discussion, it should be clear that the range of so-called "normal" behavior for blacks and whites in this country differ radically. Certainly within the same culture, there is a range of acceptable (i.e., rewarded) behaviors for all members of that culture. The oppressive caste system in this country has created a culture within a culture and must recognize the behavioral disparities of its own creation without its usual dismissal tactics such as calling these behaviors aberrant, pathological, antisocial, etc. The inference to be drawn for this is that the diagnostic criteria and measures used for making such differential judgements must be questioned and perhaps revised when the object of investigation is a Black American.

Before concluding, I should like to return to Fenichel's (1939) discussion which I have used as a reference point for much of this discussion. Toward the end of his discussion of "Trophy and Triumph" he states: "a social institution must afford a substitute for rebellion which channels off the rebellious impulses of the society in a harmless way, or directs them so that they serve, on the contrary, to strengthen the existing society." He says, "The illusion of a purely magical participation in power can reconcile one, to a certain extent, to actual helplessness." Magical participation in power is the origin of the homosexual concerns for the paranoid, as we have already suggested. Such an involvement stands as a compromise for the considerable hostility resulting from one's helplessness. On the wider social scale, how can the enormous quantity of pent-up hate which must accumulate under such conditions be prevented from erupting? Fenichel suggests that

external force is one control, but the clearly most effective is a psychic "restructuring" of the members of society whose instinctual and ego formation is bent by education in a direction desirable to the society. "Those who are in fact helpless are offered illusory participations in power." In this society, the illusion is maintained by the "trophy" which are those symbols of monetary affluence which define the holders of power. Consequently, blacks who involve themselves with the acquisition of trophies are prevented the recognition of their own helplessness. The government's relatively ready dispensation of such trophies while being more frugal with true participatory power manages to maintain a tenuous control over the instinctual response to oppression. Fenichel continues:

> Clearly human beings have only two ways of facing a power which restricts them: revolt or else a (more or less illusory) participation, which makes it possible for them to bear their suppression--a submission (with more or less masochistic sexualization) in which their hostility, their 'latent revolt,' persists somewhere, but is combated by the fantasy that it has been already accomplished, and that they are already one with the authority.

Paranoia is an extreme in the illusory resolution of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless. The greater is the disparity between these two groups, the greater the likelihood that extreme restructuring of the psychic apparatus must be accomplised in order to survive. As the gap between the powerful and the powerless narrows, more direct means for altering the balance are likely to be called forth. As Fenichel concludes: "The needs of men cannot for long be left unsatisfied and suppressed without calling out in them a tendency to revolt. The suppressed see that the others are powerful and want to strike them down so as to attain the power for themselves."

CHAPTER III

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

In the preceding sections, the view has been presented that Paranoia is an extreme adaptational resolution to experiences of extreme insults to ones capacity to control his own rewards and punishments. The specific argument has been put forth that black paranoids in the United States should show consistently more evidence of power concerns due to the legitimacy of these concerns growing out of experiences of deprivation in the social structure. It was pointed out that a limited number of studies have already shown some evidence for a greater incidence of paranoid illnesses among Black Americans (Figelman, 1968; Breen, 1968; Grier and Cobb, 1968).

The results of earlier studies by Wolowitz and Shorkey (1966, 1968) and Weems and Wolowitz (1969) seem to be consistent with the theoretical position put forth here. Wolowitz and Shorkey consistently found white paranoid children and adults to depict significantly more power imagery in their TAT stories than other diagnostic groups when these stories were scored according to the Manual for scoring Power content in TAT stories (Shorkey, 1966). The present study is a direct extension of the earlier study by Weems and Wolowitz which not only replicated the earlier findings by Wolowitz and Shorkey using white paranoids, but included a sample of black paranoids and found them to show an even higher incidence of power concerns in their stories than their white counterparts. There were many questions left unanswered by this finding in terms of specifying the origin and nature of the greater power concerns by the black paranoids. The question was also raised as to the extent of power concerns being a correlate of normal black motivation.

The heinous American racial caste system described in the preceding section stands as the major causative factor in the thwarted economic, social and emotional ambitions of black Americans. Blacks receive the same cultural promises and definitions for the achievement of socially and personally legitimate instrumental power. They are simultaneously bombarded by social blockages and consequent frustration in the realization of such power from their early family interactions throughout life. These blockages to a great extent are legitimized by the society of which they are a part creating a legitimate reality barrier to the accomplishment of self-perceived potency, i.e., a capacity to control one's rewards and punishments consistent with the control which most societal members have. One consequence of such a reality situation may be a personality configuration similar to that of the paranoid individual noteworthy for its suspiciousness, choices of fantasy and magical symbols of power with the underlying dynamic picture of severe insults to self-esteem, self-perceived power deficits, dependence on external sources of supplies and highly conflicted inhibitions of aggression. The non-black paranoid receives as a consequence of pathological family interactions which are illegitimate given the social realities, the same early experiences which are replicated in fantasies resulting in their paranoid condition. These early experiences are no doubt similar to those experiences with American racism. The difference seems to be the reality replication of such early experiences by the society which at best reinforces and sustains early fantasies for the black individual.

We have argued to this point that Paranoia is a social, interactional product and one would expect the true test here to be one of that hypothesis in itself. Such a test would of course most effectively

be longitudinal. We are in fact hypothesizing an origin of paranoid disorders and testing the disease as if our hypothesis were fact. The paranoid's hypothesized extreme adaptational resolution to experience of extreme insults to his capacity to control his own rewards and punishments results in perseverative concerns with issues of power. Similarly, we have suggested that the black paranoids in the United States should show consistently more concerns in measures of their power preoccupations due to the legitimacy of these concerns growing out of experiences with the social structure. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are formulated:

HYPOTHESIS I (RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF POWER CONCERNS:) PARANOIDS SHOULD SHOW A GREATER INCIDENCE OF POWER CONCERNS THAN WILL OTHER GROUPS OF SCHIZOPHRENICS OR NORMALS.

Societies provide normative definitions of legitimate instrumental power. An important factor which is involved in being adjudged aberrant (be the label 'criminal,' deviant, or crazy,') has to do with the degree to which ones choices of paths to power are aligned with those normative prescriptions of legitimate potency. If an individual should experience consistent blockages to legitimate social triumphs, one adaptational maneuver is for greater personal investment to be in the more accessible though perhaps illegitimate or fanciful modes of power accrual. Such personal investment should show itself in the differences in amounts of power motivation elicited by varying stimulus situations highly valent in legitimate, fanciful or 'renegade' power. Accordingly, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

HYPOTHESIS IA (PARANOID INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGITIMATE AND FANTASY SOURCES OF POWER:) PARANOID SUBJECTS WILL SHOW GREATER POWER CONCERNS WHEN PRESENTED WITH ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY

POWER STIMULUS SITUATIONS. SIMILARLY, PARANOID SUBJECTS WILL SHOW A PREFERENCE FOR SITUATIONS WHICH ARE HIGHLY VALENT FOR ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER.

The psychoanalytic notion of a repetition compulsion which means that ungratified needs persist and seek expression is the theoretical basis for this hypothesis. If power is a basic ungratified need in the paranoid condition, paranoids should exemplify this need in most expressions of their personalities. Similarly, blacks who have experienced thwarted power strivings should exemplify such concerns with power. Therefore, the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS II (INCIDENCE OF BLACK POWER CONCERNS): BLACKS IN GENERAL AND BLACK PARANOIDS ESPECIALLY WILL CONSISTENTLY SHOW A GREATER INCIDENCE OF POWER CONCERNS THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS.

HYPOTHESIS IIA (GREATER INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGITIMATE AND FANTASY SOURCES OF POWER BY BLACKS): BLACKS IN GENERAL AND BLACK PARANOIDS ESPECIALLY WILL DEMONSTRATE GREATER POWER CONCERNS WHEN PRESENTED WITH ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER SITUATIONS THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS. BLACKS WILL STATE AS PREFERRED SITUATIONS THOSE WHICH ARE MOST VALENT FOR ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER.

In the preceding section, a connection between external control and self-perceived power deficits was suggested. Julian Rotter's Internal-External scale was thought to be a reliable measure of exterality with earlier studies already demonstrating blacks to score consistently higher on this variable than white counterparts (Lefcourt and Ladwig, 1965; Gore and Rotter, 1963). Though the literature offers no instances of this measure having been used on clinical populations,

it was thought that its standardization on other normal populations would make it an appropriate index of generalized expectancy about how reinforcement is controlled. The early recognition by blacks and paranoids of their power deficits would seem to result in a perception of the locus of causality and control being outside of themselves. One would consequently expect a high correlation with power concerns resulting from power deficits and externality. It seems that the extreme of external orientations is seen in the ideas of reference and persecutory delusions of the paranoid. The following formulation follows:

HYPOTHESIS III (EXTERNAL ORIENTATIONS): BLACKS AND PARANOIDS WILL DEMONSTRATE A HIGHER GENERALIZED EXPECTANCY OF REINFORCEMENT BEING CONTROLLED BY EXTERNAL SOURCES THAN WILL COMPARABLE GROUPS OF WHITES AND NON-PARANOIDS RESPECTIVELY.

So far, the studies in this area by Wolowitz and associates have only demonstrated the presence of a greater proportion of power concerns by paranoids and blacks. One question which has come out of these earlier findings is the differences in these involvements in power and the modal response to power blockages given different racial and/or personality configurations. Some theoretical notions about the nature of the power involvements of paranoids have already been put forth in earlier sections of this discussion and by Wolowitz (1965) and Slavin (1970) which suggest that the paranoid experiences strong attraction with simultaneous aversion to perceived powerful figures. An extrapolation from this notion would suggest that paranoids would respond to power blockages by external figures with a conflicted influence to both submit and rebel rather than with an unconflicted tendency to either rebel or submit. The hypothesized similarity of blacks and paranoids

would suggest a similar response.

HYPOTHESIS IV (CONFLICTED RESPONSES TO POWER BLOCKAGES): PARANOIDS AND BLACKS WILL REACT TO POWER BLOCKAGES WITH A GREATER TENDENCY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY SUBMIT AND REBEL THAN WILL THEIR WHITE AND NON-PARANOID COUNTERPARTS.

These hypotheses are attempts to guage the similarities and differences of paranoid and racial group involvements in power. It is obvious that there are other dimensions of paranoia and certainly of ethnic personality configurations, but the salience of power for both groups is a dimension which the literature suggests is critical in understanding the uniqueness of these two socially distant but dynamically similar individuals.

CHAPTER IV

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

In order to provide a test of the hypotheses discussed in the previous chapter a rather straight-forward and simple experimental design was employed. In this chapter the various aspects of this design will be described, including the independent, dependent and control variables, the experimental procedure, the subject selection, the instruments employed and the methods of data analysis.

The Independent Variable

The hypotheses generated in the preceding section suggest a pattern of expected responses to social situations by paranoids and Black Americans. One of these expected responses is a tendency to see such situations in terms of power connotations much more frequently than do other populations. To maximize this potential a selection of situations highly valent for their depiction of power interactions was made. The pictures varied according to the type of power suggested by the interaction.

The stimulus pictures were chosen from a variety of popular magazines. In selecting pictures, three varieties of pictures were defined a priori: 1) situations which depicted legitimate instrumental power. These were pictures which according to American values would be seen as people involved in socially condoned activities of instrumental power. 2) These situations depicted people who were involved in activities of instrumental power which were clearly outside of the normative structure of American society and would be adjudged renegade in terms of American values. 3) The final group of pictures involved

the depiction of symbolic manifestations of power, which though not instrumental in their own right would be seen as the accoutrements or trophies of power in this society. These pictures were judged by a group of 10 graduate students in psychology for their adequacy in illustrating the above situations.

> The students were given the above description of the criteria and were asked to sort the pictures according to these criteria.

Twelve pictures (Appendix A) were chosen to be used in the study. Six of these pictures were judged to be illustrative of legitimate instrumental power (e.g. men looking over a blueprint, a man working with a slide rule, a soldier with a gun.) Four pictures judged to be representative of symbolic or "trophy power" (e.g. a well-dressed couple standing beside a new car, a plump man smoking a cigar reclining on a chaise lounge surrounded by a television and push button instruments) were also included. Finally two pictures which were highly valent for renegade or illegitimate power (e.g., a young black man sitting with a pistol in slum surroundings) were also used.

The race of the subjects in the pictures varied. Three of the pictures from the legitimate power group contained subjects who were all black, two contained white subjects and one picture included a black and white subject. Three pictures from the "trophy power" group were of white subjects and one was of blacks. Both of the renegade pictures were of blacks. All of the pictures were cut down to fit 8½" x 11" cardboard backings and were covered with a cellophane surface to retard wear on the pictures. There was a random selection of black and white and color pictures in all three groups.

In addition to trying to tap the differences in power content as a function of nature of interactions, the subsequent hypotheses on the

nature of responses to power frustrations was also included in the design. It was thought that by presenting to the subjects imaginary situations which they were asked to identify with and structure the alternative solutions one could guage the characteristic ways of responding to such situations. A questionnaire was prepared which presented ten vignettes all involving the blockage of an individual's power, privileges, pleasure or enjoyment. The vignettes were all phrased in the third person using fictional names. For each of these vignettes four alternatives were presented. The alternative either involved an unchallenged submission to the "power blockage;" a rebellious challenge to the "power blockage;" behavior which was overtly submissive to the power blockage but involved a covert rebellious challenge or behavior that was overtly a rebellious challenge but ultimately involved a covert submission. The ten graduate students who evaluated the pictures described above, were also asked to judge these vignettes and alternative solutions on their adequacy in fulfilling the above criteria and the items were revised until 100% agreement was achieved on the character of the items. This test instrument was not controlled for social desirability. The rebellious responses by their very nature were usually undesirable responses, given the general societal norms regarding rebellion of any sort in American society. However, it was felt that despite this possible flaw in the instrument, the consistency of the social evaluations themselves would serve as a control and it would be possible to observe any differentiation of response by groups.

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables were the scored number of power themes in the stories given in response to the selected pictures, and the pictures

chosen as preferences. The other two measures were the "power blockage" questionnaire and the Rotter Internal-External control scale.

Power Scores and picture preferences

The TAT stories were scored in accord with the Shorkey (1966) Manual for the scoring of power in TAT stories with revisions of the manual (Appendix B). The stories were individually scored for each subject and a power score was computed by summing the total number of power themes and dividing by the total number of stories given (12 stories). Thus the higher the power score the greater the relative frequency of power themes in the subjects' stories. The number of pictures chosen as preferences were totaled according to the type of group represented by the picture.

Power blockage questionnaire

As described above, the power blockage questionnaire was constructed with each of ten vignettes having the same four alternative modes of solution. Of course, the content differed from item to item. It was possible to observe the types of choices made simply by totaling the number of each type of solution chosen, i.e., the number of rebellious, submissive, overt rebellious-covert submissive, overt submissive-covert rebellious choices.

Rotter internal-external scale

The Julian Rotter Internal-External scale (Appendix C) is a 29 item, forced-choice test including 6 filler items which were included to make somewhat more ambiguous the purpose of the test. The test is scored by a key of external choices. According to Rotter (1965): the items deal exclusively with the subjects' belief about the nature of the world.

That is, they are concerned with the subject's expectations about how reinforcement is controlled. Consequently, the test is considered to be a measure of generalized expectancy. The test was standardized on a variety of samples, chiefly of college students (Ware, 1964; Ladwig, 1963; Strickland, 1963 and Rotter, 1965). Studies by Lefcourt and Ladwig (1965) found Negro prison inmates to be significantly more external than white offenders. Gore and Rotter (1963) found Negro college students to be more external than comparable white college students. There is no evidence of the measure having been used with clinical populations prior to this study. It seemed an adequate rough measure of subjects' views of themselves in the process of obtaining reinforcements. In the light of the hypotheses discussed earlier regarding the source of the sense of powerlessness growing out of ones perception of himself as incapable of controlling his rewards and punishments, it seemed that such a measure would be of value in this study. It was additionally recommended by the consistently higher external scores of blacks found in earlier studies which suggested evidence for the questions being raised in this discussion.

Experimental Procedure

Subjects were located in the hospital settings after the pre-screening procedure noted below. They were greeted and a brief explanation of the procedure was given. They were told that the experimenter was in the process of studying how different people saw and responded to different situations and some of the men in the hospital between the ages of 18 and 35 were being asked to participate and they were invited to participate. If their consent was received they were given the 29-item Rotter questionnaire, the instructions were explained to them

and they were asked to sit alone somewhere on the ward and complete the questionnaire. When the questionnaire was completed, the experimenter collected them and the subjects were taken to private offices (or in some cases remained at the bedside of the subject) and the following instructions were given:

> I have twelve pictures here which were cut out of various magazines. I want you to pretend that the pictures are about a story, though, and I want you to make-up the story that goes with the picture. The story should describe what's going on in the picture, what led-up to the situation and how it will turn-out. There are no right and wrong stories, I simply want you to tell me whatever comes to mind when you see the picture.

The pictures were shuffled before each administration to insure a randomness in order of presentation. The stories were recorded verbatim by the examiner as they were reported by the subject. The pictures were presented individually to the subjects, which they kept until the story was completed, returning them to the examiner before receiving the next picture. Inquiry was kept to a minimum to avoid the possible intrusive bias of the examiner. Subjects were occasionally asked for a clarification or in some instances where subjects showed resistance to telling stories and relied upon describing the concrete features of the picture, such as the colors or enumerating the objects, they were asked questions such as: "What is going on?" "What led-up to the situation?" or "How will it turn-out?" Even this degree of prompting was limited, however.

When stories to all 12 pictures had been elicited, the subjects were told:

> Now, we are going to go through the pictures again, but this time I don't want you to tell stories, I simply want you to pick-out the three pictures you liked best. Just tell me the three pictures which were your favorites.

The examiner then presented the pictures one-by-one in the same order as they had originally been presented. When the subjects picked a picture,

it was placed face-up in front of them, while the others were turned down as they were rejected. Occasionally subjects would choose their three "favorites" before the stack had been exhausted, in such instances they were asked to look at the others in case there was one they preferred. In other instances subjects picked more than three pictures as preferences and were asked to eliminate the excessive ones and pick the three out of their selections which they most preferred. When the three preferences were established, the examiner took them and told the subjects:

> In just a few words, tell me what is it about each of these pictures which you liked.

The three preferences were again presented one-by-one and the responses were recorded by the examiner.

Finally, the resolution of power blockages questionnaire was given to the subjects. The instructions were written at the beginning of the questionnaire but the subjects were asked to read them along with the examiner. The examiner emphasized that the answers given should be chosen on the basis of what the subjects believed rather than what they thought was appropriate, right or wrong. The subjects were then asked to fill-out this questionnaire in the presence of the examiner. When the questionnaire was completed the subjects were invited to ask any questions they had. They were then assured of the confidentiality of their test responses indicating that neither the hospital nor their doctors would have access to the results. They were then thanked and returned to their ward activities.

Subjects:

The subjects for the study were chosen from four different hospital settings: 1) a large inner city general hospital psychiatric service

which is set-up essentially for the disposition of patients to the state hospitals upon initial admission; 2) the admitting wards of a Michigan State hospital; 3) a Veteran's Administration hospital serving primarily cases of brief hospitalization; and 4) a VA hospital serving the same metropolitan area as the general hospital above, from which only subjects in the normal group were chosen. Subjects from all the experimental groups described below came from all three of the psychiatric hospital settings.

Rather stringent controls were instituted to avoid contamination of the data from the differences in these settings. The subjects were all male between the ages of 18 and 35 with a mean age of 26.3 years. All of the subjects were either unemployed, unskilled or at most semi-skilled workers at the time of hospitalization. Their educations varied from 6 years to 14 years with a mean education of 11.4 years. It is unusual to find either professional or highly educated patients in these hospital settings and the few who met the other criteria, but seemingly occupied middle class status were eliminated from this test population. Consequently, all subjects would either be classified as lower class or lower middle class on the basis of their occupations and education.

No patients who had been hospitalized continuously for longer than one year were included in the samples. The mean period of hospitalization was 3 months for the paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenics and 2 weeks for the 'normals.'

A total of 60 patients were chosen with ten subjects in each of three American born black and white groups: 1) paranoids were those hospitalized patients whose official hospital diagnosis was paranoid schizophrenic and whose major symptom picture included persecutory delusions and ideas of reference. The examiner carefully studied the admitting notes and ward records of all patients and when there were

questions of diagnosis either by the admitting physician, social worker or the examiner, the patient was omitted from the sample; 2) the non-paranoids were hospitalized patients whose diagnosis was schizophrenic without symptomatology suggestive of paranoia. Most of the subjects (18 out of 20) were diagnosed as undifferentiated schizophrenic with occasional mixed diagnoses of schizophrenia with psychotic depression; 3) the normals were patients on the general medical wards. These subjects were carefully screened as far as possible to insure that their presenting problems did not involve possible psychological or psychosomatic bases. Consequently, patients being treated for ulcers, drug addiction, migraine and similar disorders were not included in the sample. The psychological consequence of any medical disorder is difficult to assess, but so is "normality" in any context.

The race of the subjects was established from the hospital records before meeting the subjects. The only stipulation for the racial variable was that all subjects were American born and reared.

Operational Hypotheses

Since precise procedures for measuring power concerns have been proposed, the major hypothesis and its alternatives can now be presented in terms specific to this study:

HYPOTHESIS I (RELATIVE INCIDENCE OF POWER CONCERNS BY PSYCHOPATHOLOGY): PARANOID SUBJECTS WILL SHOW A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREQUENCY OF POWER IMAGERY IN STORIES TOLD TO MODIFIED THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST PICTURES, THAN WILL COMPARABLE GROUPS OF NORMALS OR SCHIZOPHRENICS.

The procedure for varying the content of the pictures used to elicit stories has also been described and the following hypothesis can be stated

as follows:

HYPOTHESIS IA (INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGITIMATE AND FANTASY SOURCES OF POWER): PARANOID SUBJECTS WILL MANIFEST A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREQUENCY OF POWER IMAGERY IN THE STORIES THEY TELL TO MODIFIED THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST PICTURES WHICH DEPICT SITUATIONS RATED AS HIGHLY VALENT FOR ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER, THAN THEY WILL FOR PICTURES RATED HIGHLY VALENT FOR LEGITIMATE POWER.

In terms of the second measure of involvement, this hypothesis follows:

HYPOTHESIS IB: WHEN PARANOID SUBJECTS ARE ASKED TO CHOOSE A PREFERRED PICTURE, THEY WILL CHOOSE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE PICTURES JUDGED AS DEPICTING ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER THAN THEY WILL CHOOSE PICTURES JUDGED AS DEPICTING LEGITIMATE POWER.

If, as suggested, power concerns are also correlates of racial membership, the extension of the above hypothesis would be:

HYPOTHESIS II (INCIDENCE OF POWER CONCERNS BY RACE): BLACK SUBJECTS OF ALL GROUPS (NORMALS, PARANOIDS, AND SCHIZOPHRENICS WHO ARE NOT PARANOID) WILL SHOW A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREQUENCY OF POWER IMAGERY IN STORIES TOLD TO MODIFIED THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST PICTURES THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS.

The parallel hypothesis for the racial groups follow accordingly:

HYPOTHESIS IIA (BLACK INVOLVEMENT IN ILLEGITIMATE AND FANTASY SOURCES OF POWER): BLACK SUBJECTS WILL SHOW A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER FREQUENCY OF POWER IMAGERY IN THE STORIES THEY TELL TO MODIFIED THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST

PICTURES WHICH DEPICT SITUATIONS RATED HIGHLY VALENT FOR ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS.

HYPOTHESIS IIB: WHEN BLACK SUBJECTS ARE ASKED TO CHOOSE A PREFERRED PICTURE, THEY WILL CHOOSE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE PICTURES JUDGED AS DEPICTING ILLEGITIMATE OR FANTASY POWER THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTER PARTS.

As regards the additional notions of greater power concerns manifesting themselves in higher external orientations, the following hypotheses are formulated.

HYPOTHESIS III (EXTERNAL ORIENTATIONS OF PARANOIDS): PARANOID SUBJECTS WILL TEND TO SCORE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER ON THE ROTTER SCALE OF EXTERNAL CONTROL OF REINFORCEMENT THAN WILL COMPARABLE GROUPS OF NONPARANOIDS AND NORMALS.

HYPOTHESIS IIIB (EXTERNAL ORIENTATIONS OF BLACKS): BLACK SUBJECTS WILL TEND TO SCORE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER ON THE ROTTER SCALE OF EXTERNAL CONTROL OF REINFORCEMENT THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS.

Finally, the experimental questionnaire which presents choices in the resolution of power blockages leads to the following predictions:

HYPOTHESIS IV (CONFLICTED RESPONSES TO POWER BLOCKAGES BY PARANOIDS): WHEN PARANOID SUBJECTS ARE ASKED TO CHOOSE RESPONSES TO FICTIONAL VIGNETTES INVOLVING POWER BLOCKAGES, THEY WILL CHOOSE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE RESPONSES JUDGED AS REPRESENTING BOTH SUBMISSIVE AND REBELLIOUS BEHAVIORS THAN THEY WILL CHOOSE RESPONSES JUDGED AS EITHER REPRESENTING SUBMISSION OR REBELLION.

HYPOTHESIS IVA (CONFLICTED RESPONSES TO POWER BLOCKAGES BY

BLACKS): WHEN BLACK SUBJECTS ARE ASKED TO CHOOSE RESPONSES TO FICTIONAL VIGNETTES INVOLVING POWER BLOCKAGES, THEY WILL CHOOSE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE RESPONSES JUDGED AS REPRESENTING BOTH SUBMISSIVE AND REBELLIOUS BEHAVIORS (AS OPPOSED TO EITHER SUBMISSION OR REBELLION) THAN WILL THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS.

HYPOTHESIS V (INTERACTION OF RACE BY PSYCHOPATHOLOGY): THE RACIAL AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL STATUS OF SUBJECTS WILL INTERACT DISTRIBUTIVELY THEREBY FACILITATING GREATER EFFECTS IN THE PREDICTED DIRECTION DEPENDING ON THE DIRECTIONAL DIFFERENCES OF THE VARIOUS SPECIFIC HYPOTHESIS (E.G., THE PREDICTED GREATER POWER CONCERNS OF BLACKS WILL INTERACT WITH WHATEVER THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL STATUS TO RESULT IN HIGHER SCORES THAN THOSE ACHIEVED BY THEIR WHITE COUNTERPARTS).

Analysis of Data

The TAT stories were scored according to the "Manual for Scoring Power in TAT Stories" (Shorkey, 1966) with revisions (Appendix B). Power concerns were represented by the description of a person with either a surplus or deficit of some resource related to masculine self-esteem (e.g., physical strength, wisdom, talent, sexual potency, etc.) or by a situation involving a relative inequality in the distribution of such a resource. The following are examples of the criteria used to score a story for a power concern. Each discrete concern in a story is given a score of one.

1) A story is scored for power if it involves either physical, moral or mental assistance, help, aid, support, etc. Power is not scored if there is an

exchange of aid or if the two people are helping each other. An example of such a story scored for power is the following: "This is a policeman who is helping a tourist find his way back to his hotel."

2) A story is scored for power if it depicts a culturally defined superior-subordinate status relationship in which the superior is in control of the means of influencing a subordinate. Example: "This is an executive talking to his employees; this man is calling the shots just like a quarterback."

3) A story is scored for power if someone is depicted as made or forced to do something which he otherwise would not be doing. Likewise a story is scored for power if a person is seen as exposed to such influences. Example: "This is a black militant with his back against the wall. He has come from a terrible environment, had so many failures that he gave up hope. He is now forced to defend himself.

4) A story is scored for power when a person is seen as having a deficit or surplus in any of the following resources--physical strength, social influence, wealth, special abilities, intelligence, etc. Example: ". . . a very educated man, studious and intent. He's a good family man, well liked and in good standing, better than average man."

(A complete description of the criteria with examples is included in Appendix B.) A power score for each subject was computed by totalling the number of power themes in all stories and dividing by the total number of stories told. This proportion was called the total power score. These power scores are assumed to reflect the quantitative differences in power concerns for the subjects. With such individual scores it is possible to compare the groups in terms of their relative power concerns. The appropriate comparison of these scores will be an analysis of variance to test for the effect of race and diagnostic group on the power scores. It was decided than an F with a probable occurrence of .05 or less would be considered as a reflection of a significant effect of these variables on the power score. The analysis

of variance will only reflect the broad effect of diagnosis and race on power scores, and if the null hypothesis of no difference is rejected, an additional test will be employed to test the effect of particular group membership. Tukey (Edwards, 1961) has pointed out that a "significant gap" between adjacent group means could be used to determine which particular group means represented the significant differences indicated by an analysis of variance. Such a "significant gap" could be computed by arranging the means in order of magnitude and concluding a significant difference if the means differed beyond a predetermined magnitude of significance. Here again the difference was calculated on the basis of a 't' of .05 probability of occurrence.

The absolute frequency of power themes was calculated for stories told to the six "legitimate" pictures and the six "renegade" and "trophy" power pictures. The differences in the mean number of power themes told by each group of subjects to the two types of pictures will be compared by individual tests for significant differences between the means. The same probability level of .05 was decided as the significance level for the difference between these means.

The number of legitimate and illegitimate pictures chosen as preferences were compiled for each group. These frequencies are to be compared by use of a chi square test to determine if there was a significant difference in the pictures chosen by different groups of subjects as their "favorites." A chi square with a probable occurrence of .05 was decided as reflective of a significant enough difference to conclude that group membership determined the choices of one or the other group of pictures.

The Rotter questionnaire is to be scored according to the key provided (Rotter, 1965). These scores are indications of the degree to

which the subject perceives causality as coming from outside of himself. Again, an analysis of variance will be used to test for the difference between the scores made by the groups on this measure. The null hypothesis of no difference in the test scores of the groups will be rejected if the resulting F has a probability of occurrence of less than .05.

In order to compare the responses made to the questionnaire dealing with the resolution of power blockages, percentage of solutions reflecting submission and rebellion are to be compared with the percentage of answers judged to be indicative of combinations of submission and rebellion. These percentages are to be compared by testing the reliability of the difference between percents. The differences are to be considered significant if the resulting chi square has a probability of occurrence of less than .05.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS

The results of the testing procedures described in the preceding chapter are presented in this chapter. Essentially the format is one of examining the effects of being black, white, normal, paranoid schizophrenic and non-paranoid schizophrenic on performance on the three measures used in this study.

The Effects of Race and Diagnostic Group Membership on Power Scores

The major hypothesis to be tested was the effect of being paranoid schizophrenic on the incidence of power concerns expressed in TAT stories. As noted in the previous chapter, this was to be tested by assessing the relative incidence of power concerns by different racial and diagnostic groups. The results of the analysis of variance of the difference in power scores by race and diagnosis are summarized in Tables 1A, 1B and 1C. We can see from Table 1A that the null hypothesis of homogeneous variance or no difference between the racial and diagnostic groups is rejected at confidence levels well above our predefined .05 probability level. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that paranoids, non-paranoids and normals have significantly different incidences of power themes in their TAT stories. Normals have the highest mean scores followed by the paranoid schizophrenics and non-paranoid schizophrenics. Similarly, with race as the independent variable, the results suggest that blacks and whites show significant differences in the magnitude of their power scores on the TAT test with the mean score of blacks being significantly higher than that of whites (Table 1B). It is noteworthy that the interaction between

the race and diagnostic variables does not seem to reflect an appreciable effect on the power scores. This permits the conclusion that the greatest variance in the scores is accounted for by race and diagnostic variables exclusive of their interaction.

Once it had been established that the broad group means did differ significantly additional tests were necessary to ascertain which of the particular group means accounted for the significant F's found in the analysis of variance. The individual group means were compared by the use of the Tukey test for a significant gap between group means. The results of this test are presented in Tables 2A and 2C. In Table 2A we observe that a significant gap between the means of the diagnostic groups would have to be equal to or exceed 0.290. On the basis of this we find that the mean score of all normal subjects (black and white) did not show a significant difference from the mean power score of all paranoid schizophrenic subjects (black and white). When the mean power score of black and white normals is compared with that of the black and white non-paranoid schizophrenic subjects, we find that the normals do score significantly higher. A comparison of the mean score of all the paranoid schizophrenic subjects with that of the non-paranoid schizophrenic subjects reveals the paranoids to have a significantly higher mean score, and by implication the normals also score significantly higher than do the non-paranoids.

In Table 2C we can conclude that a significant difference between the means exists when the difference in magnitude is greater than 0.065 between adjacent means. From this we find that the normal black subjects have a significantly higher mean power score than do the normal white subjects. Similar results show that the black paranoid schizophrenics and non-paranoid schizophrenics have significantly higher power scores

than do their white counterparts. With race held constant and diagnostic groups compared we find that both the black and white paranoid schizophrenics have significantly higher power scores than do their non-paranoid counterparts.

TABLE 1A

Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Race and Diagnosis on Power Scores of TAT Stories

Source	df	ms	F	P
Race	1	5.87	10.481	.002
Diagnosis	2	2.74	4.897	.011
Interaction	2	.68	1.221	.303
Error (Within)	54	.56		

TABLE 1B

Mean Power Scores of Racial Groups from Stories Told to TAT Pictures

Group	N	Mean
Blacks	30	1.209
Whites	30	0.583

TABLE 1C

Mean Power Scores of Diagnostic Groups from Stories Told to TAT Pictures

Group	N	Mean
Normals	20	1.169
Non-Paranoids	20	0.474
Paranoids	20	1.044

TABLE 2A

Summary of Significance Tests for the Effects of Diagnostic Group Membership on the Difference Between Mean Power Scores

Group	Means	Difference Between Means	Significance of Mean Difference 0.290*
Black & White Normals Black & White Paranoids	1.169 1.044	0.125	
Black & White Normals Black & White Non-Paranoids	1.169 .474	0.695	*
Black & White Paranoids Black & White Non-Paranoids	1.044 .474	0.570	*
			*p .05

TABLE 2B

Summary of Mean Power Scores on Stories Told to TAT Pictures for Racial and Diagnostic Groups

Groups	Means	N
Black Normals	1.663	10
Black Paranoids	1.365	10
White Paranoids	0.724	10
White Normals	0.674	10
Black Non-Paranoids	0.598	10
White Non-Paranoids	0.349	10

The black normals score significantly higher than do either the black paranoid schizophrenics or the black non-paranoid schizophrenics. The black normals also score higher than do the white paranoid schizophrenics or non-paranoid schizophrenics. The conclusion is that the black groups for all comparisons have significantly higher mean power scores than do their white counterparts.

TABLE 2C

Summary of Significance Tests for the Effects of Racial and Diagnostic Group Membership on the Difference Between Mean Power Scores

Group	Means	Difference Between Means	Significance of Mean Difference 0.068*
Black Normals White Normals	1.663 0.674	0.989	*
Black Non-Paranoids White Non-Paranoids	0.598 0.345	0.253	*
Black Paranoids White Paranoids	1.365 0.724	0.641	*
Black Normals Black Non-Paranoids	1.663 0.598	1.065	*
Black Paranoids Black Non-Paranoids	1.365 0.598	0.767	*
Black Normals Black Paranoids	1.663 1.365	0.298	*
White Normals White Non-Paranoids	0.674 0.349	0.325	*
White Paranoids White Non-Paranoids	0.724 0.349	0.375	*
White Normals White Paranoids	.674 .724	.050	
Black Paranoids White Non-Paranoids	1.365 .349	.916	*
Black Normals White Paranoids	1.663 .724	.939	*
Black Paranoids White Normals	1.365 .674	.891	

*p .05

We find, however, that the white normals do not score significantly different than do the white paranoids in the average number of power

themes in their TAT stories. The white normal score is significantly higher than the white non-paranoid schizophrenic mean score as is the white paranoid score.

The Effect of Legitimate and Illegitimate Power on Power Scores

From the analyses of variance in Tables 3A and 4A, we observe that the racial and diagnostic variables result in significantly different scores on both the "legitimate" and "illegitimate" pictures. In Table 3B, the mean power score of blacks of 6.43 on the "legitimate" pictures when compared by an analysis of variance with the mean score of 3.36 by the whites yields an F of 6.67 with a probable occurrence of 0.012. The null hypothesis of homogenous variance for these two groups is rejected and we conclude that the blacks had significantly higher scores on the "legitimate" pictures than did the whites. It is also concluded according to Table 4A that the blacks scored significantly higher on the "illegitimate" pictures as well with a mean score of 7.99 as opposed to the mean score by whites of 3.83. These results are in part confounded by the considerably higher score made by blacks on all of the pictures. From Tables 3A and 4A we find that the variables are also confounded for the diagnostic groups as well with the normals and paranoids making significantly higher scores on both groups of pictures. It is not possible to conclude from this analysis whether the "illegitimate" pictures elicited a higher number of power themes than did the "legitimate" pictures.

However, in Table 5 the individual group means are compared by the use of a t test. With our predetermined significance level of p .05 we conclude that the mean scores on "legitimate" and "illegitimate" pictures did not differ significantly. We observe, however, that the mean power

TABLE 3A

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Race and Diagnosis on Power Scores of Stories Told to A Set of Pictures Depicting "Legitimate" Power Situations

Source	df	ms	F	P
Race	1	141.06	6.676	0.012
Diagnosis	2	86.59	4.098	0.021
Interaction	2	22.06	1.044	0.360

TABLE 3B

Mean Power Scores for Racial Groups on Stories Told to A Set of Pictures Depicting "Legitimate" Power Situations

Group	N	Mean
Blacks	30	6.430
Whites	30	3.360

TABLE 3C

Mean Power Scores for Diagnostic Groups on Stories Told to A Set of Pictures Depicting "Legitimate" Power Situations

Group	N	Mean
Normals	20	6.200
Non-Paranoids	20	2.500
Paranoids	20	6.000

score on pictures depicting "illegitimate" power was higher for all six groups of subjects though they are not significantly higher. The conclusion from this aspect of the test is that blacks, normals and paranoid schizophrenics tend to score significantly higher on pictures

TABLE 4A

Summary of the Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Race and Diagnosis on Power Scores of Stories Told to A Set of Pictures Depicting "Illegitimate" Power Situations

Source	df	ms	F	P
Race	1	260.41	9.177	.004
Diagnosis	2	114.31	4.028	.023
Interaction	2	17.61	.620	.546

TABLE 4B

Mean Power Scores for Racial Groups on Stories Told To A Set of Pictures Depicting "Illegitimate" Power Situations

Group	N	Mean
Blacks	30	7.999
Whites	30	3.833

TABLE 4C

Mean Power Scores for Diagnostic Groups on Stories Told to A Set of Pictures Depicting "Illegitimate" Power Situations

Group	N	Mean
Normals	20	7.699
Non-Paranoids	20	3.200
Paranoids	20	6.850

depicting both "illegitimate" and "legitimate" power situations, but the data does not indicate a significant difference between the scores on these variables.

TABLE 5

A Comparison of the Mean Differences Between Power Scores on Stories Told to TAT Pictures Depicting "Legitimate" or "Illegitimate" Power Situations

Group	"Legit." Mean	"Illegit." Mean	Mean Difference	t	df	p
Black Normals	8.80	10.30	1.50	.751	9	.52
Black Non-Paranoids	3.00	4.20	1.20	1.474	9	.17
Black Paranoids	7.50	9.50	2.00	.958	9	.63
White Normals	3.60	5.10	1.50	1.745	9	.11
White Non-Paranoids	2.00	2.20	0.20	.301	9	.77
White Paranoids	4.50	4.20	-0.30			

TABLE 6

The Effect of Racial and Diagnostic Group Membership on the Choice of "Legitimate" or "Illegitimate" Pictures as Preference

Group	Preferences Legitimate	Illegitimate
Black Normals	11	19
Black Non-Paranoids	12	18
Black Paranoids	16	14
White Normals	11	19
White Non-Paranoids	18	12
White Paranoids	16	14
Totals	84	96

$X^2 = 6.161$ $p = .29$

The Effect of Race and Diagnosis on the Choice of Preferred Power Situations

In Table 6 the number of choices from the three preferences made by each subject which were "legitimate" or "illegitimate" are combined

and compared for each of the six groups of subjects. The resultant chi square of 6.16 with a probable occurrence of .29 suggests that these choices do not significantly differ from the expected frequency of choices. From observations there is a tendency for black and white normals to choose more of the illegitimate pictures as their preferences and for the black and white paranoids to choose more of the legitimate pictures as preferences. These directional tendencies seem to be consistent though we are unable to conclude a real difference in the nature of the choices made by the subjects.

TABLE 7A

Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Effects of Race and Diagnosis on Scores of Rotter Test of External Control

Source	df	ms	F	P
Race	1	.26	.013	.91
Diagnosis	2	20.03	1.000	.38
Interaction	2	3.41	.170	.85
Error (within)	42	20.02		

The Effects of Race and Diagnostic Group Membership on Test Scores

The results of the analysis of variance for scores made on the Rotter test of external control are summarized in Table 7A. The resulting F's from comparing the variance of Rotter test scores in terms of race and diagnosis, would both occur by chance considerably above 5% of the time. We conclude consequently that the variance is homogeneous for test scores by the various groups and there is no difference in the variation of these scores. It is noteworthy simply

from observation of the mean scores in Tables 7B and 7C that all of the black groups tend to score higher on the Rotter test than do the white groups. Similarly, the normals tend to score higher than do the paranoids or the non-paranoids. This tendency though not statistically significant is at least consistent in terms of direction.

TABLE 7B

Mean Scores on Rotter Test for Racial and Diagnostic Groups

Group	N	Means
Blacks	30	9.26
Whites	30	9.11
Normals	20	9.46
Non-Paranoids	20	7.94
Paranoids	20	10.14

TABLE 7C

Individual Cell Mean Scores for Racial Groups (N=30)

	Normals	Non-Paranoids	Paranoids
Blacks	9.625	8.428	9.714
Whites	9.300	7.444	10.571

The Effects of Race and Diagnostic Group Membership on the Choice of Resolutions to Power Blockages

The results summarized in Tables 8A-8C show the percentages of different responses to the power blockage questionnaire. The hypothesis for this questionnaire as discussed in the previous section stated that blacks and paranoids as opposed to their counterparts would show a

tendency to resolve power blockages more frequently by mixed responses of both submission and rebellion rather than by the more direct responses of either submitting or rebelling. The results in the tables summarize the percentage of alternative solutions chosen which were

TABLE 8A

Percent of Responses to Power Blockage Questionnaire Indicating Either A Direct (Submissive or Rebellious) Reaction to Power Blockages or A Mixed (Submissive and Rebellious Reaction to Power Blockages

Group	Direct Responses	Mixed Responses
Black Normals	45%	55%
Black Non-Paranoids	54%	46%
Black Paranoids	53%	47%
White Normals	54%	46%
White Non-Paranoids	53%	47%
White Paranoids	51%	49%

TABLE 8B

Comparison of Racial Groups on Percentage of Direct or Mixed Responses to Power Blockage Questionnaire

	Direct Responses	Mixed Responses
Whites	52%	48%
Blacks	50%	50%

either direct or mixed responses. Inspection revealed further statistical tests to be unnecessary to ascertain that there was no significant difference beyond chance variation (50% of either type of response) between the choices of resolutions. All of the percentages

cluster closely around the 50% mark with a maximum variation of 5 percentage points which for a sample of this size is unlikely to reflect any real difference. We conclude that responses made to the power blockage questionnaire did not vary significantly from chance.

TABLE 8C

Comparison of Diagnostic Groups on Percentage of Direct or Mixed Responses to Power Blockage Questionnaire

	Direct Responses	Mixed Responses
Normals	49%	51%
Paranoids	52%	48%
Non-Paranoids	53%	47%

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

In the present chapter the implications of the findings of the effects of paranoia and racial group membership on the relative incidence of power concerns in fantasy productions generally and with varying stimulus situations will be discussed. Consideration will also be given to the findings on external orientations of blacks and paranoids and their reactions to power blockages. Some clinical applications of these findings and the bearing of the results on future research will also be discussed.

Relative Incidence of Power Concerns

Paranoid schizophrenics

As reported in the previous chapter the subjects diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic regardless of racial membership had significantly more power themes in their TAT stories than did comparable groups of non-paranoid schizophrenics. This replicates earlier findings of Wolowitz and Shorkey (1966) and Weems and Wolowitz (1969). The conclusions from this finding in earlier studies has been that this greater incidence of power concerns for paranoids suggests a focal importance of the role of the power factor in paranoid dynamics. This finding is further confirmation of the role of power in the psychodynamics of paranoids when compared with other groups of schizophrenics. The additional finding that racially combined groups of normals do not differ significantly from paranoid schizophrenics in the incidence of power concerns has other and more commanding implications.

The assumption of the original theory growing out of psychoanalytic literature was that the paranoid dynamics differed from

normal dynamics. The implication of this finding is that power concerns are a correlate of normative motivation in this society. If the frequence of occurrence of power themes in fantasy productions is indeed an operational definition of degree of preoccupation with power, these findings suggest that there is no difference between normal individuals and paranoid individuals, at least along this particular dimension. Because of the absence of cross-cultural data we are unable to confirm an additional implication that as Harms (1937), quoted in chapter 2, indicated: "The basic structures of our social organization . . . are all disorienting paranoic factors." This means, of course, that power preoccupations, if they are a correlate of paranoid orientations are a consequence of a social organization which requires such motivations.

The differences between paranoids and other pathological groups noted in this study and earlier ones may suggest varying ways that diagnostic groups deal with this learned motivation. It has long been hypothesized (Cameron, 1963) that paranoid schizophrenics are the least regressed of the schizophrenias resembling normals most in their cognitive functioning. An implication of these findings is that non-paranoid schizophrenics have regressed beyond the state that power concerns and conflicts represent a major role in their dynamics. If regression in part represents an increasing withdrawal from realistic concerns, it could be concluded that if power concerns are adaptations to societal realities, then the smaller the incidence of such concerns the greater is the distance from social reality. Such evidence militates against viewpoints that regard all forms of schizophrenic psychopathology as qualitatively alike.

The hypothesis that paranoids would score significantly higher in the number of power themes in their TAT stories than comparable groups

of normals and non-paranoid schizophrenics is in part confirmed. The lack of support for the idea that paranoids would differ from normals suggests an important caution in future theoretical assumptions. The hypothesis grows out of an assumption that there is a kind of discontinuity between paranoid and normal psychodynamics and consequently factors observed in a paranoid population are different from normals. Such an assumption was made with few comparable observations of normals. This is a potentially serious flaw in the theoretical thinking here and perhaps in much of psychoanalytic literature which implies, but fails to emphasize, the continuity between normal behavior and pathological behavior. The fact that much of this literature emanates from clinical observation exclusive of concern with reality demands and involvements is in part to blame. In discussing psychopathology we may sometimes too emphatically state the difference between the "abnormal" and the "normal" while failing at times to see relevant and important similarities between the two groups. The important point to be made from the findings of this study is that along this particular dimension of power concerns we are clearly dealing with differences in degree of concern and not categorical differences.

Racial differences

The finding that all black subjects regardless of diagnostic group score significantly higher than their white counterparts replicates the earlier finding by Weems and Wolowitz (1969). The implications are slightly different than might have been inferred from the earlier findings, however. In this study we have evidence to suggest that power concerns are a variant of normal motivation rather than paranoid motivation and rather than seeing these higher power scores as indic-

ative of paranoid factors, we must think of them as variations on a "normal" theme. This finding calls into question some suggestions made in the introductory chapters that blacks will tend to be more paranoid given the social realities of their environment. It also calls into question the use of such terms as "healthy paranoia" as used by writers such as Grier and Cobb (1968). The assumptions in both these instances is that the social environment demands the development of certain adaptational devices which are also developed by paranoids. While this seems reasonable it seems unnecessary to assume that these devices are an outgrowth of paranoid orientations to reality which casts a shadow of implied maladaptation which these findings suggest is questionable.

The fact that the black normals had the highest power scores in this study still supports the contention that the social realities of blacks and whites in this country differ. Rather than assuming that the difference is necessarily a negative one (such as maybe implied by concepts such as "healthy paranoia") we might think of it as an exacerbated sense of reality rather than a distortion of reality. If we can assume that this study tapped normative preoccupations as was suggested in the previous section then we must conclude that black normals are relatively most cognizant of their social realities resulting in greater power concerns.

Following the same line of reasoning, the fact that the black normals had significantly more power concerns than did the black paranoids, whereas the white normals and paranoids did not differ significantly suggests that white normals and paranoids are more alike along this dimension than are black normals and paranoids. If the statistical assumption that significant differences imply that the samples were

drawn from different populations we must question an assumption made by some writers that observations made of middle and upper class white European and American patients have relevance to comprehending the dynamics of lower class black and white Americans. If our earlier contention that black normals are most sensitive to their social realities resulting in power preoccupations, it follows that black paranoids are involved in part in denying such realities followed by black non-paranoids. The absence of a significant difference between the white normals and paranoids is suggestive of a closer relationship between these two groups along this particular dimension. The fact that these black groups do appear to differ from each other and the whites do not suggests perhaps a difference in either the social realities and/or the psychodynamics of these subjects along racial lines. Consequently, the indiscriminant application of white norms on a black group or vice versa would appear to be ill-advised. The data from this study suggest a very clear difference in the normative incidence of power concerns for white and black subjects.

One major criticism which has been repeatedly raised recently as regards research on Black Americans is the assumption that norms based on research on whites is generalizable and applicable to blacks. One clear implication of these findings is the fact that such generalization is clearly inappropriate. As with the generalizations from clinical observations questioned in the previous section, such indiscriminate use of white norms leaves us with a plethora of questionable conclusions about black behavior. The suggestion here is that we are dealing either with discrete groups or with varying degrees of similar characteristics and to assume one group to be normative and the other a deviant is the essence of racism, rigidity and arrogance.

Appropriate norms must be drawn from relevant human experiences rather than from inappropriate situational contexts.

One argument that may arise is that the sampling of this study was biased in that hospitalized medical patients were used as the normal controls. Though we certainly cannot assess the growing evidence that all medical disorders are in someway involved with psychological factors, we can assume that the behavior which calls attention to the medical disorder differs from the behavior which calls attention to the mental disorder. There is reason to believe that individuals whose egos have stood the stress of war experience without observable behavioral aberrations are certainly individuals of demonstrated ego strength. The point being that the medical veteran patients used in this study represent if anything a group with particular ego strengths rather than weaknesses as compared with the general population. Even by restricting the generalization of our findings to this veteran population, we must take note of the impressive differences between the white and black normals which repeat themselves when other groups of whites and blacks are compared.

One additional factor which may have influenced the results of this study is the race of the experimenter. The effect of a black tester on the test results of black and white subjects has been only slightly researched (given the historical scarcity of blacks examining other blacks and even fewer whites). It is difficult to speculate on how this might have affected the findings of this study, but it could account in part for the variation between these and earlier findings.

We must also keep in mind that the TAT pictures used in this study had not been used in previous studies. Until additional research is done, we cannot ascertain the differential stimulus value of these

instruments, the Murray TAT set or other such stimuli.

Involvement in Illegitimate and Fantasy Sources of Power

Paranoid schizophrenics

Given the earlier finding of a somewhat higher incidence of power concerns in this study by normals than by paranoids, one would have hoped that this variable attempting to distinguish between "normal" and "abnormal" involvements with power would have been more revealing. In fact we only find additional support for the idea that regardless of the adjudged nature of the stimulus in terms of legitimacy or illegitimacy we maintain the same ordinal transitivity of increasing power concerns as occurred when the concerns are compared without consideration of the nature of the stimulus situation, i.e., regarding types of power. In many ways this serves to bolster the assumption that even highly structured material such as the TAT pictures used in this study do not differ in their capacity to elicit comparable data. On the other hand we must either question our assumption that paranoids and normals differ in their responses to different stimulus situations along the dimension of legitimacy - illegitimacy or that our assessment of these situations is not valid.

When one considers the double support coming from the lack of significant distinctions on the number of power themes or the choices for either of these stimulus settings, it is reasonable to conclude that paranoids are not responding differentially to legitimate and illegitimate power situations. If this evidence can be accepted at face value then we must assume that whatever may be the difference in paranoid and normal involvements with power it is not one of legitimacy vs. illegitimacy.

On the other hand we might question the judgements originally made that the pictures actually represented differences in legitimacy. It might have been superior methodologically if the subjects themselves were asked to assess the relative legitimacy of the pictures. The assumption that a group of middle class, mostly white, students in Clinical Psychology could assess such an important variant of social reality is not necessarily defensible. An assumption underlying the original hypothesis is that different groups may be assessing the same apparent reality from different perspectives which would imply that legitimacy itself may vary.

It is striking merely from the observation of directional trends that all of the subjects except the white paranoids had higher power scores on the illegitimate pictures. One reason for this may be that clearly one of the most valent pictures for illegitimacy (based on the frequence of its choice as a preference) was also highly valent for aggressiveness. Considering the earlier arguments of aggression being an essential element of power concerns, it also is an impulse of considerable conflict in this society, consequently much of what we see maybe the outcome of conflict around aggression rather than reactions to "illegitimacy." When the scores were collapsed into "legitimate," "trophy," and "renegade" groups, essentially the same findings as were reported for the two groups were observed, but the unequal numbers of pictures made them difficult to compare. With three choices per subject, we in part confounded our findings on preferences because the subjects were not asked to rank these preferences, i.e. most liked, etc. Consequently, all choices received equal weight for later comparisons which concealed a considerable amount of data about what went into the choices.

Racial differences

One assumption that went into the hypothesis that blacks would show greater involvement was based on the apparently erroneous conception that blacks are more similar to paranoids and therefore, more "deviant" in their choices than are whites. Such a negatively loaded assumption has already been questioned as might this hypothesized conclusion. It shows the extent to which later assumptions are guided by prior ones without the necessary step of testing reality, and the consequent dangers of such jumps.

Given the findings in the earlier part of this discussion that power concerns seem to be a correlate of normal behavior, we might have hypothesized that blacks were in fact more invested in legitimate power since we have already speculatively concluded their greater sensitivity to reality. Considering the problems in our instruments which we have already discussed, few conclusions if any can be made from these findings.

External Orientations of Paranoids and Blacks

The hypothesis that paranoids and blacks would show significantly higher external orientations than would their diagnostic or racial counterparts failed to be supported by the data. Neither was the opposite suggested to be true because the mean Rotter scores fail to differ significantly from chance for either the racial or diagnostic groups. There are some reasons why we failed to replicate the numerous findings by Rotter and associates of blacks tending to score higher on his external scale than comparable groups of whites. For one thing, none of the samples on which this test was validated were clinical populations. Two samples included prison or reformatory inmates, but these groups still

differ from the clinical samples drawn in this study. Other than for one national sample, most subjects used in validating this test were college students which immediately moves us into a population which is not comparable to the lower class, high school educated subjects in this sample.

The high probability of occurrence of the F's in comparing the group means suggests that many of the subjects might have answered the questionnaires in a random order. If we recall the test procedures, all subjects were left alone to fill out the Rotter questionnaire and it was prior to anything other than a brief explanation of what the experimenter was about. One might suspect a certain amount of vigilance in such a context and perhaps a tendency to answer in a socially desirable way rather than as their individual perceptions dictated.

Conflicted Responses to Power Blockages by Paranoids and Blacks

The final hypothesis that Paranoid Schizophrenics and blacks would tend to choose more solutions to power blockages which involved conflictual submission and rebellion rather than either one response or the other failed to be confirmed by the data of this study. The major problem, of course, rests in the experimental nature of the questionnaire which was not studied extensively in terms of its validity and realiability. It was at best an attempt to get a rough indication of a device such as this in assessing differential responses to frustrations of ones power.

The major problem in constructing the questionnaire was in finding alternative answers which were equally weighted in terms of social desirability. The pervasiveness of the cultural norm that rebellion especially with aggressive implications is socially undesirable

probably confounded many of the overt rebellion alternatives. The striking similarity in the percentage of direct and mixed responses by all groups certainly suggests that the subjects were responding to some underlying variable which had not been taken into account by the experimenter. The other question is whether this is an appropriate device for assessing the kind of behavior we were interested in observing, but we shall return to this issue briefly. Again, we must note that the group which looks most dissimilar to the other groups in performance on this questionnaire is the group of black normals. Though the difference is far from significant, it is noteworthy that they were the only subjects to respond with more than 50% mixed responses. This may represent a meaningful tendency but for the time being it must be just noted.

Some Clinical Implications of the Research

The traditional outlook of the psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapist is the use of the patient's productions as fantasy keys to the unconscious and ultimately to the root of his emotional difficulties. Many critics of the theory have pointed to precisely this conscious dismissal of the patient's reality as the flaw in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. In some psychoanalytic thinkers zeal to unravel the often fascinating caverns of the unconscious they have not always perceived the plains of reality which coexist with the caves of hidden impulse and early childhood trauma. One clear implication of the findings of this research is to turn a more critical eye toward the social environment which surrounds our patients beyond the perimeters of the couch. The theoretical notions about power which are the essence of this discussion grew out of an older tradition which saw

these same power struggles as the result of unconscious homosexual impulses struggling for expression. It is noteworthy that little of the research even on homosexuality in paranoids bothered to include a normal sample. The implication is that we should perhaps study normals more carefully if the results of this study are representative. One question which the clinician must come increasingly to ask is to what extent is his patient's difficulty a direct result of his individual failure at adaptation and to what extent is the patient succeeding in surviving in a social setting which is failing to meet his needs as a member of that society. The growing emphasis on this facet of human experience can be seen in the recent upsurge in community psychology programs which are geared toward making adjustments in the pathology of the environment rather than converting the individuals to the demands of the pathological system.

Another issue raised is the question of diagnosis and definition of paranoia. Psychologists are already aware of the primitive quality of their nosology and the serious problems resulting from the imposition of such crude categories on human beings, but attempts to upgrade this system have not received widespread acceptance. Paranoia is, of course, one of the most abused of these categories. As noted in the earlier chapters, it has been used indiscriminantly to characterize everything from entire societies to some pistol-wielding assassin. At least to some extent, all of these phenomena may share certain characteristics, but how meaningful is this distinction if as in this study we discover that we are looking at variants of normal behavior, normal conflicts and normal motivations. We are called upon to refine our concepts or permit the field of psychology to self-destruct by its ever-widening inclusion of reality into its pot

of psychopathology. This is not to suggest that the work of psychologists to this point is meaningless, it is merely to suggest that caution is critical if our skills are to be useful to a world with increasing needs for guidance to some modicum of contentment. We most of all must be more sensitive to what is real and what is fantasy if a critical part of our jobs will be helping people assess precisely that delicate balance for themselves.

Finally, a strong note of caution is suggested for the psychological evaluation and treatment of black patients. Traditionally the psychotherapist's office has not been a gathering place for the Black American. With increasing economic affluence and a rapid assimilation into American society, the pressures which led to the Western development of psychotherpay are being felt by a growing number of blacks who are beating paths to the office of the psychotherapist. It is possible to do these people considerable harm if we assume them to be "just another set of human beings" when our definition of another set-of-human-beings means middle class White Americans. As suggested above and throughout this discussion, the realities of being black in America are different from being any other race, religion, social class or immigrant in America. To impose the wide body of assumptions growing out of research essentially on middle class white, Europeans and Americans seems at best inaccurate and at its worst, frankly destructive. If we look at the large number of programs geared toward assisting the suffering masses of Black Americans we see program after program geared toward rehabilitating, reinstructing or rebuilding blacks into some Western notion of what men must be. All of these programs have grown out of assumptions that blacks differ from whites, but that difference is conceived on the negative side of the continuum and assumes we can

in some way change them into "our" own image without attending to the conditions which have made them the way that they are. The implication here is not that most therapists impose a belief system on their patients, but simply that the therapist is attuned to certain content by virtue of his socio-cultural background and theoretical learnings. Perhaps we will treat a black man who comes to our office and believes that white America is bent on his destruction by asking him to free associate and tell us about his dreams for three hours a week without taking note of the fact that at every turn in his environment a large white rock blocks his passage. This is not to overlook the frequency with which oppressive realities are used for defensive purposes, to justify the failures at adaptation made by certain patients. The caution here is that we not err by always assuming the imperfection to be in the person rather than, as might sometimes be the case, in the world around him. These are the fallacies of our thinking, these are the injustices of our science and the findings of this study along one very limited not very well-defined dimension says to us that some theoretical and practical housecleaning is in order.

Implications for Future Research

Several rather obvious areas present themselves to clarify the findings of this study and to extend them. The first area seems to be a replication of the findings of this study. The instruments used to tap the power concerns were all experimental instruments. In earlier studies projective techniques have been used repeatedly, the Murray set of TAT pictures and the modified Thompson TAT have been used. Though the findings from these earlier studies have been replicated it seems crucial that a normal sample be compared with other groups using

the Murray or Thompson TAT as the instrument for measuring. It could very well be argued that the findings of this study are more a consequence of the untested instruments than of the experimental procedure itself.

It would also be valuable to apply Wolowitz's (1961, 1965) conflict model of paranoia to a normal sample. It seems that the critical question from the findings of this study is no longer one of how paranoids differ from other schizophrenics, but how (and if) paranoids differ from normals. The entire body of available research and clinical observations of paranoia based on the model used in this study requires some additional consideration employing normals as the criteria for norm-setting.

If the findings of this study are truly reflective of an absence of difference in the incidence of power concerns for normals and paranoids, then it now becomes more critical than ever to ascertain the exact quality and nature of the paranoid's power concerns and if these qualities differ from the normal power concerns. An issue already raised from earlier research is the question of whether power concerns based on a self-perceived power deficit are different than concerns growing out of a self-perceived excess of power. This is an issue which still has not been clarified and seems to be a fertile area for future clarification of the quality of power concerns.

It also seems important that consideration be given to some other critical variables which were not taken into consideration in this study. The social class variable might critically affect the findings of this study in that the social realities of lower class and middle class Americans differ widely. Similarly, the effect of family organization and the particular social adjustments of the subjects should be taken into account.

The failure of the procedures in this study to distinguish between responses to legitimate and illegitimate power situations leaves this as a deficit in the literature. More rigorous methods should be employed to control these two variables for certainly much of the behavior we observe splits along this particular variable. The mere act of the paranoid becoming more actively involved in fantasy and less with reality as his illness progresses suggests that this is a path of movement in dealing with the issues of power. The revision suggested above in the procedure of this study may be one such device, i.e., to ask the subjects to make their own judgments from a more diverse population than was used in this study. The request for preferred situations seems effective, but should also employ a ranking of preferences to better ascertain the qualitative differences in chosen situations.

The kinds of rather forceful societal indictments which I have made in this chapter and throughout this discussion speaks to a most critical need and that is for more cross-cultural research. The egocentricity of much of our thought has to do with the limited amount of data to which we avail ourselves. With the widening borders of communities, more and more frequently we are being called upon to apply our ideas to different societal contexts without knowing how applicable those ideas may be. The argument put forth in the earlier chapters is that much of lack Americans' behavior can be understood by considering the context of their existence. The validity of this statement rests on the comparisons of Black Americans with blacks throughout the world. As we become increasingly cognizant of the pathologies in our environment we are called upon to look at human behavior in different contexts to better understand to what extent we are dealing with human nature in

the American sense or human nature in a more universal sense. The remarkable differences found between blacks and whites in just this study offer a fertile field for finding to what extent are we dealing in fact with a racial difference, a social difference or perhaps an interaction of the two.

The evidence of this study does not permit us to throw away the notion that paranoids and normals may differ in the way they cope with power frustrations. Though the power blockage questionnaire failed to tap these differences, it seems that many questions still remain in this whole area. One methodological revision may be a more carefully controlled experiment where subjects are frustrated very directly in their power strivings and measures are made of the ways they deal with this frustration. It is conceivable that an instrument which supplies fantasies and asked subjects to identify with them provided too much psychological distance to get a realistic picture of how the subject deals with real power blockages.

Most critically, these findings call upon us to relook at many of our notions of human behavior which have been indiscriminantly generalized to populations considerably distant from those about whom the notions were originally stated. The potential detrimental implications of this tendency for Black Americans has already been discussed and it is important that we be more circumscribed in the generalizing of our concepts. It becomes imperative to retest each of our hypotheses in every context that we are confronted with an organism with perhaps a markedly different reality and be willing to raise questions not only about his reality, but our concepts in describing the reality.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY

A review of the clinical and experimental literature suggests considerable support for the psychoanalytic theory of the etiological role of homosexuality in paranoia. A review of this literature is presented along with some revisions and expansions of Freud's original notions. Among these expansions is the consideration given to the role of aggression in the psychodynamics of the paranoid. This view maintains that the paranoid projects his aggressive impulses and destructive power outside of himself for fear of destroying his object world and risking retaliation and subsequently concretizing this aggression in powerful men. The result is a preoccupation with powerful figures and power situations due to self-perceived powerlessness.

Consideration is also given to the sociological data on paranoia which in essence demonstrates a higher incidence and greater likelihood of occurrence of paranoia among social groups who experience a realistic social isolation and consequent social impotence. This is especially true of immigrant groups or groups experiencing linguistic isolation in an alien environment.

Attention is then given to the situation of the Black American who though not isolated certainly experiences a realistic powerlessness growing out of the racist American social structure. The effects of this racism on black personality is considered which reveals battered self-esteems, marked inhibitions of aggression and realistic self-perceptions of being deficient in power, i.e., being unable to adequately control ones rewards and punishments.

Four operational hypotheses were developed from these viewpoints.

The first, following the notion of the greater involvement of paranoids in power, predicted that paranoids would express a greater number of power themes in their fantasy productions than would comparable groups of non-paranoids or normals. Similarly, it was predicted that blacks would show a greater incidence of power concerns than would comparable groups of whites. The second hypothesis comes from the notion that societies provide normative definitions of legitimate power. An important factor in being considered "normal" has to do with the degree to which ones choices of paths to power are aligned with those normative prescriptions of legitimate potence. Given consistent blockages to the achievement of legitimate power, one adaptational maneuver is for greater personal investment to be in the more accessible though perhaps illegitimate or symbolic modes of power accruement. On the basis of these assumptions, it was predicted that paranoids and blacks would show greater power involvement in socially illegitimate and/or symbolic sources of power than will non-paranoid or white counterparts. The third hypothesis was that paranoids and blacks would show a greater tendency to see rewards and punishments emanating from the outside given their self-perceived powerlessness which would result in higher external orientations. The fourth hypothesis attempted to assess the characteristic mode of resolving frustrations to power and predicted that paranoids and blacks would be more likely to respond conflictually, involving strong influence to both submit and rebell rather than a direct expression of either of these responses.

The hypotheses were tested by presenting 20 black and white, hospitalized paranoid schizophrenics, 20 non-paranoid schizophrenics, and 20 normals with twelve modified TAT pictures selected for their depiction of legitimate, illegitimate or trophy power. The subjects

were instructed to make up stories for the pictures and choose their preferred pictures. The stories were then scored for the number of power images included. The Julian Rotter questionnaire of external control was also administered and scored. Finally an experimental forced-choice questionnaire was administered with four alternative ways of resolving each of ten power blockages.

Statistical comparisons were made of the average number of power themes per story for each of the six groups of subjects. Their picture preferences were compared as were their external scores and the answers to the power blockage questionnaire. The results of the analysis of the data suggests support for the hypothesis that blacks for all comparisons show a higher incidence of power involvements than do their white counterparts. The paranoid groups score significantly higher than did the black paranoids. There was no statistically significant difference in the incidence of power themes for the white normals and white paranoids. The data failed to support the remaining hypothesis with no significant difference found in the preferences, external orientations or resolutions to power blockages.

In conclusion, it would appear that the realistic power deficits of blacks in America result in greater preoccupation with power than for comparable groups of whites. The earlier findings that paranoids show a greater incidence of power concerns than do other psychopathological groups receives additional support from these data. Some question is raised growing out of these findings about the appropriateness of the power-deficit hypothesis as a central dimension of paranoia when there is no difference found between the white normals and paranoids and when the black normals show a greater incidence of power concerns than do the black paranoids. The lack of support for the latter hypotheses

suggests a need to refine some of the theoretical notions leading to the hypothesis of greater involvement in illegitimate power as well as an improvement of the measures being used. Some questions are raised about the appropriateness of the Rotter questionnaire for measuring external control in a clinical population, as well as the appropriateness of a questionnaire measure for resolutions of power blockages.

APPENDIX A







APPENDIX B

"MANUAL FOR SCORING POWER CONTENT IN TAT STORIES"

Clayton T. Shorkey
University of Michigan
Fourth Draft, April, 1966

I. Introduction and Definitions:

The method discussed in this paper for scoring Thematic Apperception Stories for power content was devised for an analysis of the amounts of power content and types of power content present in TAT protocol. The method may be used with any TAT card with only one person represented, but is geared especially for use with cards that represent two or more persons in some type of interaction.

The first draft of this manual was constructed to determine whether or not power was present in a TAT story, and was tested only on adult male hospitalized patients. The second manual was the initial attempt to numerically score the amount of power concern present in a story and to give an indication of the type of power concerns that were present. The second draft was tested with both adult and child patients and with adult normals and was found to be in need of adaption. The third draft offered a more accurate scoring system for power content for a greater variety of age and mental health groups, including children both normal and patient types.

Several of the power criteria listed in the manual are essentially similar to those used by Joseph Voroff in his Scoring Manual for Power Actions measured in such a way so as to allow determination of types of power concerns present. We will not talk about power motivation in this paper, but only of measurable power concer, as there is still lack of clarity as to whether concern and motivation of the power factor are similar phenomena. There appear to the author to be significant

differences in power motivation which is goal oriented as in normals; and the power concern of patients such as, paranoid schizophrenics, in which the concern is not goal oriented and posses more of the character of an obcession.

II. Definition of Power:

"Power is present in interactions in which there is a defined inequality of resources on the part of characters represented in the story, which has implications for control over the means of influence, or over the means of effecting behavioral change in another person."

Five major power areas may be identified:

1. Power in the intellectual area (omniscience).
2. Power in the social area (influence).
3. Power in the sexual area (potency).
4. Power in the physical area (strength).
5. Power in the psychological area (strength in the psychological function).

Three other power areas may be identified but these appear to be of minor concern and the frequency of concern by patients in these areas is slight.

1. Power in the material area (wealth).
2. Power in the moral area (legitimate power).
3. Power from faces outside nature (spirits, etc.).

The scoring sheet that accompanies the manual will allow the experimenter to identify into which of these power areas most of the persons concern is centered. Each time power may be scored by use of the following criteria--one point should be added to the scoring sheet in the appropriate category.

Section 1.0 - Attributes of the relation itself which defines power

imagery.

Criterion 1.1

Score power for a story which contains an interpersonal relation culturally defined by legitimate or traditional means as ones in which there is a superior person having control over the means of influencing a subordinate. Examples: (Judge-defendent), (police-citizen), (parent-child), (worker-boss).

Exception 1.11

Stories involving the parent-child relationship are not to be scored for power per se. Score for power if the parent is persuading the child to do something or helping him in some area where a clearly defined differential set of resources is apparent.

Exception 1.12

The relation of an older person to a younger person may not be scored for power under criteria 1.1 unless there is clearly an indication that one of the pair is clearly superior to the other in one of the power areas. Due to cultural changes we cannot score power on the assumption that age alone makes a person superior to juniors.

Section 1.1

Some interrelations contain power imagery although they are not traditionally or legitimately defined as unequal dyadic relations. These may be scored for power if one person is presented as possessing certain attributes which are themselves traditionally considered powerful. Score power if one person is depicted as having an excess in one of the power spheres.

Criterion 1.21

Score power if one person is depicted as having excess in the physical area (very strong, muscular, a tremendous athlete, etc.).

Criterion 1.22

Score power for a person depicted as having excess in the social area (everybody likes him, ability to get people to do what he wants, etc.).

Criterion 1.23

Score power for a person depicted as having an excess in the sexual area (potent, seductive, a dealer).

Criterion 1.24

Score power for a person depicted as having an excess in the psychological area (ability to support others in times of crises, ability to withstand pressures, tensions, frustrations).

Criterion 1.25

Score power for a person depicted as having an excess in the intellectual area (brilliant, genius, superior knowledge, ability, and skill).

Section 1.2

Score power if one person is depicted as lacking or incompetent in one of the power spheres.

Criterion 1.31

Score power for a person depicted as lacking resources in the physical area (a weakling).

Criterion 1.32

Score power for a person depicted as lacking in the social area (nobody likes him, not accepted by others, no friends).

Criterion 1.33

Score power for a person depicted as lacking in the sexual area (impotent, not able to deal with chicks, or no ability to interest men).

Criterion 1.34

Score power for a person or persons lacking in the psychological area (not able to stand up under stress, a person who is overly dependent).

Criterion 1.35

Score power for a person shown as intellectually lacking (stupid, lacking in skill or ability).

Note:

Score one point for each of the preceding categories for each individual occurrance of this type of concern in the story protocol. Repetition of similar power concerns may occur, and each of these should be scored as one point in the appropriate area when they appear at different places in the story.

Section 2.0 - The Nature of the Interaction

Determination of whether or not a story contains power imagery may be made by considering the relation of the characters in the story to each other, if some interaction takes place. Therefore, for Section 2.0, (unlike Section 1.0), there must be a definite verbal or physical interaction of persons in the story in order to score for power.

A situation as (boss-worker) would not be considered under any of the 2.0 categories unless a physical or verbal power interaction is also present.

Section 2.10

Score power in situations in which power is exercised by one person over another in one of the power areas in a facilitating way. Power present in the situation is displayed as one person with superior resources helping another deficit person.

Criterion 2.11

Score power for stories containing physical help (aiding or assisting another person).

Criterion 2.12

Score power for a person being helped by a force outside nature (spirits, mystical force, gods, God).

Criterion 2.13

Score power for stories containing material help (money, resources).

Criterion 2.14

Score power for stories containing psychological help (supporting, sustaining another person in the emotional area).

Criterion 2.15

Score power for stories containing intellectual help (explaining, advising).

Section 2.20

Score power in situations in which power is influenced over another person in any of the power areas, but not in a helping way. Power in this section is concerned with persuasion or forcing persons to do something he would not otherwise be doing.

Criterion 2.21

Score power if one person is physically forced or persuaded to do something. Score power for rape and physical assault. Score power for murder only if one person is attempting to persuade or force another person to do something, and in failing murders the person. Aggressive outbursts of action are not scored for power, but only use of physical power to persuade or change another person.

Criterion 2.22

Score power if one person is forcing another person to do his

bidding by a force considered outside nature (by spirits, religious powers, and in most cases, hypnosis).

Criterion 2.23

Score power if one person is sexually persuading another (seducing, enticing, or controlling another person's behavior because of sexual attraction).

Criterion 2.24

Score power if one person is psychologically persuading another (begging another to do what he wants, pleading, acting on the emotions of the person).

Criterion 2.25

Score power if one person is intellectually persuading another by superior knowledge or skill (leading a person to a desired conclusion by argumentation).

General Exception

Power is not scored in any of the 2.00 criteria if there is a mutual helping or coercing in the story. Power is scored only in the case of inequality.

Total Power Value for an individual story is the sum of all power scores of the presented categories and is indicated on the scoring as N1-2.25. Each section may be summed also; power in the relation is indicated as the sum N1.1-1.35. Power by facilitation is indicated by N2.11-2.15. Power by persuasion is indicated as N21-2.25 on the scoring page.

Analysis of predominent power concerns may be identified by summing the scores of each criteria vertically down the page for all stories of the individual, and noting where the highest score values lie.

Revision of "Manual for Scoring Power Content in TAT Stories"

The Shorkey (1966) Manual for Scoring Power was constructed on the basis of keyed responses to the Murray Thematic Apperception Test. The general responses to these pictures turned out to differ from responses to the modified TAT used in this study and did not satisfy the criteria as defined in the Shorkey Manual. It was necessary to expand some of his criteria in order to include frequent references to power imagery in these stories. For example, in the "Manual" Shorkey indicates that "Power in the material area (wealth)" does not appear as a frequent concern by patients in his samples. In this sample, it was one of the most frequent concerns expressed.

Revisions were made only in terms of expanding some of the criteria in the Manual, rather than adding additional criteria. The following revisions were made for the indicated criteria (other criteria remained as defined in the Manual):

Criterion 1.1

White-black relations are scored for power if there is an indication of the white person influencing the black person. Power is scored when a person is characterized as a social renegade ("black militant," radical, revolutionary).

Criterion 1.22

Power is scored when a person is depicted as having a position of high social status or influence (wealthy, well-bred, from a prominent family).

Criterion 1.24

Power is scored if a person is depicted as being self-confident ("a mellow cat," self-assured, "knows where he's going").

Criterion 1.32

Power is scored when a person is depicted as having a position of inferior social status or influence ("never had much in life," poverty-stricken, poor ghetto background).

Criterion 1.34

Power is scored if a person is depicted as psychologically helpless (in a daze, confused, scared, feels pinned-down).

APPENDIX C

Name_____
Sample_____

Instructions: Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you would like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief: obviously there are no right or wrong answers.

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.

   b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.

2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.

   b. Peoples' misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.

   b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.

   b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.

   b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.

6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.

   b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.

7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.

   b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.

   b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.

9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.

b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.

10. a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.

b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.

11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.

b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.

b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.

b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.

b. There is some good in everybody.

15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.

b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.

b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do with it.

17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.

b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.

18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.

b. There really is no such thing as "luck."

19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.

b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.

b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.

21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.

b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.

b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.

b. There is a direct connection between how hard you study and the grades you get.

24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.

b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.

b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.

26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.

b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.

27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.

b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.

b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction of my life is taking.

29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.

b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government or a national as well as on a local level.

APPENDIX D

Name_____
Sample_____

Instructions: Please choose what you think is the best solution for the following problems. There are no right and wrong answers; we only want to know what you think will be the best way to deal with the problems presented.

1. John is in a bar. He has had two beers and the bartender says he has had too much to drink and will not serve him another one. John knows he is not drunk, he should:

   a.) Leave the bar and go to another one.

   b.) Say nothing to the bartender but tell his friends to stop going to this bar.

   c.) Demand to have another beer.

   d.) Cuss-out the bartender and leave.

2. A policeman stops Bill and tells him he ran through a red light. Bill knows that the light was yellow. He should:

   a.) Argue with the policeman.

   b.) Take the ticket but refuse to pay it.

   c.) Tell off the policeman but pay the ticket later.

   d.) Take the ticket and pay it.

3. Robert was fired from his job because he wouldn't do something his foreman asked him to do. Robert thinks the foreman had him fired because he didn't like him. Robert should:

   a.) Get even with the foreman but find another job.

   b.) Say nothing to the foreman, but take his case to the union.

   c.) Refuse to leave the factory until he is rehired.

   d.) Find another job.

4. Frank and Mary want to get married but Mary's father won't let her because Frank is on probation. Frank has had a steady job for six months and hasn't been in trouble for two years. Frank should:

   a.) Try to find another girl to marry.

   b.) Insist that Mary should disobey her father and marry him.

   c.) Tell the father off, but make no attempt to marry without his permission.

d.) Obey Mary's father but try to persuade her to run away with him.

5. Jimmy bought a 1970 convertible. Two weeks after he got the car, his license were revoked. Jimmy should:

a.) Sell the car.

b.) Keep driving but not in the city limits.

c.) Try to get driver's license in another state.

d.) Drive anyway.

6. Chuck wants to make love to his wife. She won't let him. He should:

a.) Make her cooperate.

b.) Not bother her, but find another girl.

c.) Leave her alone until she is ready.

d.) Yell at her and then go to sleep.

7. A new law has been passed saying that all taxes are to be increased. The people should:

a.) Refuse to pay them.

b.) Protest to their congressman, but pay if nothing is done.

c.) Pay the taxes, but not vote for the same officials next time.

d.) Pay the taxes without question.

8. An expressway is planned to be built through Fred's well-developed farm. Fred should:

a.) Sell the land and move immediately.

b.) Sell the farm, but for more money than is offered to cover the inconvenience.

c.) Refuse to sell under any circumstances.

d.) Try to get the expressway re-routed, but sell if this doesn't work.

9. The bank made a mistake on Phil's checking account causing two of his checks to bounce. He should:

a.) Accept the bank's apology and leave his account with them.

b.) Move his money to another bank.

c.) Accept the bank's apology but change banks.

d.) Write a letter to the bank but leave his money there.

10. Bob's landlord wants to evict him because he makes too much noise in his apartment. Bob should:

a.) Refuse to move.

b.) Promise to keep the noise down, but refuse to move.

c.) Find another apartment immediately.

d.) Say he will move out of the apartment but make no attempt to find a new place.

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