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GEORGE C. WALLACE: INSURGENT
ON THE RIGHT

by
Forrest Harrell Armstrong

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A B S T R A C T

GEORGE C. WALLACE: INSURGENT ON THE RIGHT

by

Forrest Harrell Armstrong

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The South seems always to have been set apart from the rest of the United States; long an internal economic colony, it is possessed of a distinctive social and political culture as well.

The oppressor of today is the same as it has always been for the South, the national government of the United States in its myriad manifestations, but the symbols of resistance have changed. Even during the early years of this century that statue of a gaunt Confederate soldier leaning on his rifle which adorned the courthouse or central square in so many Southern towns was alive with meaning. But the figures in butternut that have stood ever-vigilant against the interlopers from the North proceed to deteriorate and corrode; no longer are they bewreathed with flowers and sentiment as in days of yore. A new symbol has arisen, but it is not one to raise sentiment in Southern hearts as did Sir Walter Scott in the ante-bellum past or tales of the heroic legions under Pickett; instead, were the symbol to be preserved for the ages in some of the plastic arts, it would be a representation of a small, dark figure with out-thrust chin barring children from a school house door.

The figure, of course, is of George C. Wallace, who

burst upon the national consciousness in 1963 with his celebrated Stand in the School house Door and went on to contest the Presidency of the United States in 1968. The Wallace candidacy is significant in several respects, not the least of which is that he presented for but the third time in this century a threat to the two-party system. The Wallace candidacy forced reconsideration of the Electoral College system for electing the president, as well as the complex machinery (not invoked since 1824) for breaking an Electoral College deadlock.

The Wallace candidacy was unique because, unlike the 1948 election, Wallace made serious strides toward the creation of an ongoing, major third party and toward the promulgation of a truly national, not sectional, campaign. And not least, the Wallace candidacy assured that the "law and order" theme would be a central one for all candidates in 1968. In this regard it would seem to have presaged the rise of the Silent Majority which we are now experiencing.

This study attempts to delineate the execution of the campaign from the candidate's point of view, assessing at every crucial point the decisions that the candidate made, from a more detached point of view. Central to this effort is an understanding of Wallace, the man, and the intellectual baggage which informed his political and ethical beginnings. The candidate's public actions are then assessed against his essentially populist "ideology."

The peculiar basis of Wallace's populism--economic liberalism coupled with social conservatism--is examined;

the change from once having been tagged the "most liberal" Alabama legislator to the antithetical posture which he assumed during the 1968 campaign may be seen as a viable tack to have taken, given the populist background and the exigencies of Alabama politics.

The author then argues that the candidate's relatively poor showing in 1968 occurred in part because of the inability to assess national phenomena against any save Alabama standards. The Wallace Movement in 1968 is examined in both organizational and programmatic terms for signs of potential future viability.

Acknowledgements

The responsibility for this work must ultimately fall on my shoulders alone, but I owe a debt of gratitude to my doctoral committee, without whose efforts the burden should be infinitely greater: where it is readable, credit should go to Professor William Porter (Journalism); where it is perceptive, credit belongs to Professors Jack L. Walker (Political Science) and Shaw Livermore, Jr., (History), who kept asking questions for which I had no answers: and special consideration must go to my chairman, Professor Joseph Kallenbach (Political Science), whose sage advice and keen insights into presidential politics have been too generously at my disposal. Professor Donald Stokes, though prevented by a leave of absence from remaining on the Committee until the completion of its work, was a major force in helping mold my original ideas into more workable form. Thanks, too, to my colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay whose insightful comments have kept me from further error, and to the staff at that institution for their help in preparing the manuscript.

Of special assistance to me while on the Southern Tour were three of the most perspicacious newsmen it has been my fortune to meet. Jim Bennett of the Birmingham Post-Herald, Bob Hey of the Christian Science Monitor (Atlanta Bureau), and Walter Rugaber of the New York Times freely shared their accumulated years of Wallace-watching with me, to my inestimable benefit; their good company was an ancillary, but no less welcome, benefit.

But two persons stand out from all the rest. They are the ones who have had to live with me day in and day out through the whole

course of this project and those without whose love and understanding I could not have persevered. To my wife, Dottie, and my son, Forrest II: May we see much more of each other in the months and years ahead. It's been a long haul for you, too.

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Introduction

". . . And I resent that, too, if you want to know the truth about it. I resent that, too." The lines need no antecedent, no referent. One finds them explicitly at several points in his standard speech, but implicitly they formed the warn and woof of the entire movement on which former Alabama George C. Wallace, Governor, hoped to ride up Pennsylvania Avenue as President-elect on Jan, 20, 1969. Whether he would ever enjoy such a moment in that or any election year, because suddenly a matter for intense controversy among political pundits, practical politicians, and not a few scholars as the presidential election of 1968 approached.

It was not so in the beginning. When I began work on this dissertation in November of 1967, Wallace's was a name not widely known outside the South. True enough, he had created a national sensation in 1963 when he placed his body "at the schoolhouse door" between the University of Alabama and its first two Negro students, James Hood and Vivian Malone. He had given local political powers in the states of Indiana, Wisconsin, and Maryland considerable consternation in 1964 when upon entering the Democratic presidential primaries in each of those states, he drew between 29% and 42% of that party's vote with a poorly organized, ill-financed, whirlwind effort. And he gained a measure of repute (or notoriety, as you will) when after an abortive attempt to force a change of the Alabama Con-

stitution's rule prohibiting successive terms in office for its chief executive, he successfully ran his wife for that post in 1966, and became Alabama's "governor-by-proxy" in 1967.

But he was not considered by many of even the most knowledgeable politicians to be a figure of national political import. His (and the South's) bitter enemy, Lyndon Johnson, it was thought could not be denied his party's renomination; and though Wallace had withdrawn his short-lived "candidacy" in 1964 because he felt the Republican Party's nominee Barry Goldwater, offered the voters "a choice", neither he nor the GOP really could envision itself embracing the other. And ours has been for a century or more, with perhaps but one exception-the 1902-1916 period -securely a two-party system. Of the plethora of "third parties" (a curious designation for any and all banners save the traditional two) extant during the past century, not even the Progressive Party--personal vehicle, as it was, of a former President--mounted a serious challenge to the ascendancy of the major parties in presidential politics. There has been in recent elections, of course, always the threat of a "Dixiecrat" revolt such as Strom Thurmond led in 1948; but even the seemingly troubled 1948 re-election bid of Harry Truman was not derailed by the defection of a substantial part of his Democratic coalition. Wallace's influence on the coming election, seen from the vantage point of Fall, 1967, must have seemed minimal even to that small portion of the cognoscenti who deigned consider him at all.

But, by August, 1968, the situation had changed. At that time the polls gave him an estimated 21% of the total popular vote; Wallace might perhaps gather even more electoral votes than the nominee of the Democratic party, Hubert Horatio Humphrey. Granted, totally unforeseeable factors had intruded to alter the situation as it appeared in 1967: Johnson had put himself out of the race through choice and Robert Kennedy had been assassinated. Granted, also, the most serious recent third party candidacies, those of 1948, had led to dire predictions of catastrophe and cataclysm for the system--based in large measure on the strength shown by the Henry Wallace (no relation) "Progressive" splinter group of liberal Democrats coupled with the "Dixiecrat" wing's defection but in the end came to nothing as the Progressives Party's appeal all but evaporated by the closing weeks of the campaign. Yet the fact remains that George Wallace in 1968 achieved something no third party has ever managed before--ballot position in every state. Even though the electoral votes he eventually garnered all fell in the South, it is to be stressed that Wallace was not running a "Southern strategy" such as that which took Thurmond in 1948 and in a somewhat different sense, Goldwater in 1964, down to crashing defeat.

I am brought to conclude that there is much in this "Movement" (the candidate's preferred designation) which might lead to the establishment of the first continuing third party in American history since the emergency of the Republican Party in 1854-1856. The contingencies which the future will bring are no more open to me than to any man,

but certain factors pointing toward continuation of the "Movement" as a "third force" in American politics, will remain operative, namely the popular feelings giving rise to the "Movement" and the personal skills and weaknesses of its leader and raison de'etre, George Corley Wallace.

When one purchases a new appliance these days he is asked to fill out a warranty card and send it to the manufacturer in order for the warranty on the product to be in force. But the card seldom is so simple as to require merely the purchaser's name and the date of purchase. One is usually asked to answer some questions--"How old are you? In what size town do you reside? In what kind of store did you purchase this article? Why did you buy this brand over its competitors? Was this product recommended to you by a friend? a relative? Have you seen advertisements for this product? If so, on which media?"--the answers to which are fed into a computer to help the firm maximize its returns through efficient marketing. To understand fully the Wallace phenomenon, one ought ask the same sort of questions of the electorate after the 1968 election: one must endeavor to reach the voter's perceptions of the candidate, which are the only functional sources of truth in the voting context. That I plan to make a separate project in the months ahead.

Of equal import in dissecting the environment of electoral choice is full knowledge of how the candidate assesses his situation and how, therefore, he molds his campaign so as to reach and influence as wide an audience as possible. A candidate engaged in promoting his candidacy can only assess his situation and mold his strategy on the basis of his prior experience in politics; he is denied the

certainties of post-election surveys. He must make his nitch while remaining basically in the dark about how he is being accented or why.

This was particularly true in the Wallace campaign, for the candidate professed no interest in the professional polls which played so large a part in the political strategy of the 1968 campaigns. Such polls are expensive, and for that reason were beyond Wallace's reach before 1968, even though after he started intensive national fundraising in June his campaign was adequately financed. But there were two main roadblocks to the use of such polls in Wallace's campaign: first, and foremost, the candidate did not believe in them. He could not see how results gleaned from a sample of only two thousand respondents could possibly be representative nor was he interested in even learning the basis on which this number of respondents was selected. (The phobia about polls runs through his entire organization, for I was able to find no ranking advisor who professed any interest in their use. "They can't be any good," I was told repeatedly, "look at how they said Dewey was going to win.") Second, the campaign was not sophisticated, either in execution or intent, and probably would not respond well to "tinkering", based upon polling results. One of the major pitches of his campaign was that Wallace "tells it like it is" to all the people, without altering his spiel from group to group "just to win votes." The possibility exists, of course, that his distaste for professional polls stemmed from his poor showing in them relative to the outcome of amateur polls which were being taken by local TV and radio stations across the country. These polls more

nearly reflected his followers' intensity of feeling, perhaps, than their relative numbers among the electorate.

It should be noted, however, that while professing no faith in the polls Wallace and his staff nonetheless seemed hyper-conscious of them, always knowing the latest results and using them when it suited their cause. The polls may well have had a major impact on the campaign, first in deluding the candidate over the summer as to the success he would have at the ballot box in November, and second in perhaps helping to convince him that a change was needed in October to counteract his 30% decline in popularity as compared with the heights reached at the time of the Democratic Convention in August.

The proper study of the Wallace phenomenon is really of two parts--how he went about building support on the one hand, and where that support really came from on the other. I view Wallace's role and function in the 1968 election as basically that of a salesman or carnival pitch-man. He had a product which he marketed through creation of an image, and through use of which he hoped to make converts to his brand who would pay in votes for the product they received. For the general voter this kind of product is ephemeral at best; it is expectation, it is anticipation, it is hope. For the Wallace voter, the product was more concrete: personal vindication. The model was simple and unsophisticated because the man and the campaign were seemingly unsophisticated. But through such a model it might be possible to look at the electoral process from the candidate's viewpoint and to deduce, perhaps, a rationale for the execution of the campaign which the candidate is unwilling, at least at present, to confirm. Of importance, then, are the

candidate's philosophy (the product which he had to sell), the image he strove consciously to build (brand differentiation in the marketplace) and those particular personal strengths and weaknesses which, together with the correctness of his perceptions of the mood of the electorate (assessment of the marketplace), were to determine his fate on election day. But just as the candidate's skills were important, so were the expertise with which they were utilized. Thus one must attempt to evaluate the tactical and strategic decisions promulgated by the Wallace campaign by juxtaposing them against an assessment of that campaign's needs. The decisions as to how he might best go about this task of building votes, the actual tactical maneuvers of the campaign, provide such "facts" as are available, though they may lend themselves equally well to constructions other than my own.

The proper study of the Wallace phenomenon then, would begin with his cultural antecedents--those portions of his intellectual baggage which came to him as to many of his time and place and which, though having had their genesis even before his birth, were to have an impact upon shaping him into what he became. One would then want to look at what the man has made of his background--the ways he has modified and molded it into a unique and personal worldview.

If his cultural antecedents and personal worldview are significant, it is because he became, at least for a few months, a significant entity on the national political scene. To understand the Wallace movement, one must also analyze the impact such training and predispositions have had on his political machinations. To this end, one might examine his actions since 1962 (when he became

Governor of Alabama and found himself barred from further advancement in the politics of that state) to see what caused them to take the course that made him significant figure for students of American politics. In particular, one must seek to isolate the key variables in the Wallace equation; my contention is that such variables are reflected predominantly in strategic and tactical decisions. If one can understand the factors behind the outcome of these various decisions, one can approach understanding the Wallace phenomenon as the candidate himself would perceive it. The task I have assigned myself at this point is an examination of but one half of the dialogue. The perceptions of the electorate are a related matter for separate study, but they are ingredients without which the Wallace self-image probability statement will be only partially complete.

One might compare the span of Wallace's life since 1962 to a computer programmer's flow chart: the key points are the branching points--those from which any number of mutually exclusive alternatives may be dimly seen.

Decision Variables in Wallace's Candidacy

- 1) Ultimate personal goals
- 2) Desire to go "national"
- 3) Timing of national effort
- 4) Short-run expectations
- 5) Vehicle: major party, 3rd party, or splinter
- 6) Ideology: liberal or conservative
- 7) Image and style of exposure
- 8) Funding
- 9) Candidates for lesser offices
- 10) Running mate
- 11) Platform

Because of the ad-hoc nature of the man and of the politics which he practiced for so long in the state of Alabama, many of these

'decisions' cannot be treated as the discrete and discontinuous variables which social scientists would seek to manufacture in a controlled environment. Although I will argue that Wallace did, in fact, have a choice as to which image and ideological posture to emphasize from his peculiar background, nonetheless it is obvious that that same past effectively limited the range of credible alternatives open to him.

One would, for the purposes of analysis, hope to find a strong sense of direction existing from the first in such a man, a sense which could be demonstrated to be antecedent to a host of subsequent decisions. But this means-ends relationship is less than helpful (albeit highly significant) because the prime end to which Wallace seems always to have been attuned is not one of ideological implementation but of personal political advancement instead.

There is little justification for any save a temporal ordering of these crucial decisions. Moreover, if one is to attempt to view the realities of the American electoral system through the eyes of the candidate, one is not allowed to start with a clean slate on which to write. For it is generally agreed that George Wallace's overarching ambition was not to seek the Presidency: he fulfilled his lifetime dream in 1962 when he ascended to the Governor's chair in Montgomery. Thus, when he was forced to turn his attention to finding other worlds to conquer, he found himself at a loss on how to begin anew.

There are, then, three distinct sets of components to the Wallace equation. The first set comprises those inputs to the man which would not likely change in response to short-term forces or pressures: among these would be the candidate's cultural background,

his personality traits, his basic philosophical orientations, his professional expertise, and to a certain extent, the opportunities or roadblocks created by his past actions.

The second set would be the rules of the new game with which Wallace found it necessary to comply. These rules were to represent an extraordinary hurdle for two reasons; the first was that he would have to appeal to persons dissimilar from himself--that is to say from outside his state or section--and to adherents of competing political parties, if he expected to win; the second was that he would necessarily run on a third party ticket, and any such candidacy is beset by an almost impenetrable maze of legal technicalities (which differ in each of the 50 states) designed specifically in many instances to make such candidacies, from without the established two parties, prohibitively difficult. My argument is that Wallace's preliminary probings in 1964 convinced him that there were enough persons across the country who felt as he did to warrant a presidential move, but that the technicalities were at that time insurmountable. The 1968 effort, I am suggesting, was initially to a "dry run" with primarily internal goals: discovering each state's differing ballot and election requirements and meeting them, identifying a cadre of workers in each state and organizing them, and building financial backing.

According to this scenario, only a limited amount of success with the voter--enough public acceptance to remain a viable candidate over the inter-election period--was requisite; anything more would be banked against the real object, the 1972 election. The signs that this plan began to change became apparent by early June, 1968.

Fanned by the 22% of the popular support he was granted by professional pollsters just after the Democratic National Convention, the candidate's emphasis changed to a whole-hearted belief that he could win in 1968 and to an effort to achieve this end.

The third set of components are largely derived from a mating of the first two sets: they are the highly visible decisions to which a second-guesser might point as the immediate determinants of victory or defeat, decisions which were rendered necessary and significant by the fact that the candidate's predispositions and training (set one) often ran counter to the requisites of the new game and its rules (set two).

In order to place the analyst in the candidate's shoes, to the extent that this is possible, the attempt is made first to delineate the personal make-up of the man that evolved over time and was independent of any concern for "playing the game" by the rules of national politics. In at least this one instance, Wallace's life style makes it easy to isolate the goal toward which his actions were (or were not) intended to lead. Then, just as it occurred "in real life", one should be presented with the factors surrounding Wallace's forced redefinition of goals, including exegesis of the difficulties which he would face if he were to seek the only higher executive office open to him.

Finally, from that vantage point, one should be able to examine the conduct of the campaign (stretching in its various stages from 1962 until perhaps 1972, as I define it) from what may be posited as the candidate's point of view. One might then be sensitive to some of the same concerns, limited and focused by some of the same predispositions, and not a little confused by the new circumstances,

in which he found himself, as Wallace was.

There are several answers to sources of information one might mine in doing a study of this type. One is to explore the candidate's thought through the device of interviews with him. Another technique in achieving an understanding of the man is to examine critically his work--speeches he has given, pronrams he has authored, books he has written. A third method is through discussion with those who know him best, friends and foes alike.

Of these, the first is usually the most difficult to employ: the candidate's time is valuable and there is a lack of certainty as to his plans even 24 hours into the future. This was especially true of Wallace, a man who has been known to change his destination while enroute and who was plagued with a staff that was badly organized. Through the kindness of the candidate, however, this proved no obstacle to me. I wrote him asking permission to accompany his campaign for several days at two different points in time, preferably early in the summer and again after the Democrats and the Republicans had held their conventions, so that he would have been able to see exactly the ground rules (who his opponents would be and what their platforms would be) and thus have had an opportunity to set his own "final" strategy.

Some six weeks had elapsed without any word from Wallace headquarters when I learned of a set of hearings to be held in late April before the Secretary of State in Oklahoma for the purpose of determining whether George Wallace was elinible, under Oklahoma law, to be on the general election ballot. Several of his top advisors were to appear; it was rumored that Wallace, himself,

might appear; and I had a contact in that state. I attended that meeting. The hearings lasted three exhaustive days, during which time plaintiffs tried to prove that Wallace had advocated sedition. If he had done so, under Oklahoma's law he would not be "fit" to appear on the Oklahoma ballot. Wallace did not appear at the hearing, but several of his top aides did (Stan Sikes, Hugh Maddox) and they testified as to his philosophy. State leaders of the Wallace movement were also called to testify as to what they thought he stood for. Implacable enemies of the Wallace movement (William Bradford Huie, for example) were brought in from Alabama to rebutt the testimony of Wallace's counsel. A number of Wallace's state elector candidates came to watch the proceedings and in some cases, to testify.

Those hearings proved inconclusive, as all knew that the losing side would appeal the Secretary's decision to the State Supreme Court, but I did speak at length with all the participants and did get assurances from Sikes that I might see Governor Wallace. That aspect of the visit proved academic, however, for upon my return I found a letter from Bill Jones, the Governor's executive secretary, press secretary, and general right hand man, making me welcome at Wallace headquarters.

Accordingly, I flew to Montgomery on Wednesday, June 5, the day before Wallace was to emerge from the seclusion he had assumed upon the death of his wife to begin the campaign with a swing through eleven Southern states. But June 5 was also the day that Robert Kennedy was shot and when I reached Montgomery, Wallace headquarters was in a state of confusion as to the fate of his Southern tour. The decision was made to postpone the tour indefinitely, awaiting

the turn of events, and after talking with various campaign personnel I left Montgomery.

I returned to Montgomery June 10 and went on tour with the Wallace campaign entourage to Memphis (June 11), Chattanooga (June 12), and Atlanta (June 13). June 14 I left the tour. Though I was free to remain longer, I felt that I had learned about all from the persons on board the plane that I could get without wearing out my welcome (I planned to return for another week in late August). I was unable to make the long follow-up visit due to an illness which kept me bed-ridden most of August, but I did go to Milwaukee in early September for the one day that Wallace was there. I had wanted to see him in a Northern milieu for comparative purposes. I felt that the Milwaukee visit was sufficient for this purpose.

The Governor and his staff (particularly Bill Jones, Stan Sikes, and Mrs. Dorothy Garrett) were most gracious and helpful to me and without them this facet of the project would not have been possible. The Wallace Campaign even made the plane travel available at no cost to me, for which I am also grateful. Governor Wallace was most generous with his time, granting me two interviews on the plane and answering other questions as time and circumstances permitted.

The second source of information on Wallace--his speeches, books, legislative record--is immensely valuable but not extensive. During the campaign he gave one basic speech (The Speech), a transcription of which forms Appendix A of this dissertation. Informed observers say that it is the same speech he has used in Alabama since 1958 (the extent of their personal knowledge) with only the illustrations up-dated. Wallace had done little writing.

on his own; he has yet to feel the need of producing his Every Man a King. (To the allegation that he doesn't talk about "purposes, causes, destinies, anything like that," Wallace says "Naw, we don't stop and figger, we don't think about history or theories or none of that. We just go ahead. Hell, history can take care of itself."¹)

Furthermore virtually all of Wallace's pronouncements, either in the form of press releases or off-the-cuff answers to questions in a press conference, are merely repetitions of material contained nearly verbatim in The Speech. He prides himself on being consistent in his responses. No matter what button one pushes, one still gets The Speech.

The third source of information open is those who have had access to him and presumably can speak knowledgeably of the man, his philosophy, ideals and motivations. Wallace is a very guarded and "cany" man, one not given to making unthinking remarks to the press. Those who have his confidence, presumably, are in a better position to see the real Wallace than are those whose contacts with him are not personal and close.

There are two excellent sources of this type. The first was Bill Jones, the Governor's long time friend, confidant, and advisor, who wrote the semi-official campaign biography The Wallace Story which was sold with the other official campaign paraphernalia. There can be no question that Jones accurately reflects Wallace's own thoughts in that work and, no doubt that the book was acceptable to the candidate. It was published two years before the campaign

¹Marshall Frady, Wallace (Cleveland, 1968), p. 13.

began and might easily have been revised or withdrawn from publication if it were incorrect or misleading in any way.

The other source is Marshall Frady's Wallace, based on his experience of nine months as an intimate in the Wallace camp. Frady was given the run of the camp because it was felt that he was going to do a complimentary work, which would be of use during the campaign. I arrived in Montgomery on the day the first installment of the book had appeared in the Saturday Evening Post; the Wallace staff were almost speechless in their rane, which was of particular intensity because they had felt Frady to be "with" them. The one caveat to bear in mind regarding Frady's work is that he had first considered doing a "journalistic novel" from his research. As such, it would have been of highly dubious value in scholarship. But subsequently, says Frady, "He [Wallace] has assumed a pertinence beyond that of an intriguing character from which to fashion a novel." Why? Because "figures like Wallace can be said to pose the great dark threat."² This book is therefore no novel. It is a fine foil to Jones' pro-Wallace work and they can be fruitfully juxtaposed in many places.

The third source, which is of a semi-documentary nature, is a set of interviews with the candidate conducted and edited by John J. Synon, a Virginian who convened a conference in which Wallace participated wherein those assembled sought to devise a strategy to make the South regain influence in national politics. I interpret it as being neutral so far as the Wallace candidacy and strategy

²Ibid., p. 6.

thereof are concerned.

The organization of this dissertation is in two major parts: The first part is an attempt to delineate what it is that Wallace, the man, really is. As such, it deals with the cultural antecedents which informed his culture and his region; with what he has said his principles are (to the extent that he worries about such things); and with what he has made of his principles while a political officeholder. This part sets forth the base from which he must work in forming a national campaign.

The second part of the dissertation is an analysis of what Wallace, the candidate, made of Wallace, the man. In this context I examined the strategic decisions and choices which the candidate was forced to make: which aspects of himself to emphasize, which to play down; which issues to push, which to ignore; in what manner his campaign should be executed--where to go, which audience to address, and how tactically to go about it. And, in an epilogue, the dissertation contains an evaluation of the potential inherent in the Wallace movement for becoming the first viable, ongoing major third party in American history.

The complete study of the Wallace Movement, of course, rests on far more than simply the candidate's perceptions (and rational decisions promulgated on the basis of such perceptions); of equal importance are the perceptions of the electorate: how did they view Wallace, the man, and Wallace, the candidate? How did they view the American Independent Party--as a legitimate party or as simply the creation of a man engaged in a temporary splinter movement within the two-party system? If 98% of the electorate knew of

Wallace, what did they think of him, of his platform, of his realistic chances for success? These questions can be answered only through use of survey data; but as such data become available (as from the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center) scholars will want to use them to complete the study of the Wallace phenomenon.

I: CULTURAL ANTECEDENTS

On election day, 1968, George Corley Wallace was among the losers; but he was also a relatively youthful 49 years old and could be a serious contender for the succeeding three elections. It almost seems he was born running for some office and those who know him best feel he will run till he dies. Politics has become his way of life; his personal tragedy may be that his successes have been so rapid in coming that he is left but one post to which he may aspire--and that but quadrennially.

Wallace was born August 25, 1919, at Clio, in Barbour County, Alabama. "Probably the most virulently political county in the state"¹ and one in which turning out politicians (particularly governors) "has been its chief industry and major pastime."² His grandfather, a respected doctor, may have been the person to whom Wallace was closest, although the boy did not fulfill his grandfather's wishes by becoming a minister. Dr. Wallace also served a term on the bench, though it is said in Clio, "Rein' a good Christian man and a doctor don't get you the votes in politics. It was George, Sr., that did the real dirty-work politicking."³

From his father, George Jr. received the legacy that remains with him today--scrapping and politics. His father was elected chairman of the county Board of Revenue and did the "real" politicking

¹Frady, op. cit., p. 53.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 59.

for Dr. Wallace's race. George Sr. also counted votes during local elections, and Wallace remembers staying up all night to watch the tabulation. "I wasn't but about ten years old, but I was fascinated. Watchin' him count those votes was like watchin' somebody water-ski for the first time."⁴ And George Jr., like his father, took naturally to politics.

The other legacy which his father may have imparted was that of fighting. George Sr. suffered from such a spate of maladies that one writer has characterized him as being sustained only by "a sheer cold impotent rage."⁵ He had dreams of being a gentleman farmer and, recalls an old friend, "wasn't brought up to work."⁶ Yet all he touched seemed to fail, perhaps adding to the fury of his fights. He was a small, frail man who would fight anyone--often with a knife for equalizer.⁷

George, Jr., too was a small man and a fighter, though with his fists. After quickly outstripping local rivals in boxing talent, George had to use his persuasive powers to convince even larder youths to enter the ring with him to suffer the whipping which invariably followed. Wallace even went to the finals of the State Golden Gloves Championships as a bantamweight, only to lose under unusual circumstances. It seems that George and his boxing coach came upon two toughs who were beating a young Negro; though the championship bout

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 57.

⁶Ibid., p. 58.

⁷Ibid., p. 55, p. 58.

was to take place the next day, George waded in and routed both assailants. The Negro youth was saved, but at the cost of injuries to Wallace's hands which left him unable to mount an attack in the big bout. Today he recalls the incident with almost deprecating modesty.

It is ironic that George, Sr., headed the county Board of Revenue because of his utter inability to handle the personal finances of his family. He tried to raise fine cattle but fed them improperly and lost the whole herd within two years. He tried farming but continued to lose money. Indeed, one old friend says, "he didn't really make any money until he got that little bit from being on the Board of Revenue."⁸ His finances were in such chaos that, at the time of death, he was thwarted in an attempt to run again for office when he could not raise the funds necessary to mount a campaign. His legacy to his sons was a hopelessly mortgaged farm--mean, unprofitable, the last vestiges of the gentleman farmer--and a modest home in Clio.⁹

But if George Jr. lacked material resources, he nonetheless had been blessed with skills and attributes which would serve him well in his chosen field--politics. A childhood argument with a brother over George's failure to do his share of the chores elicited from the candidate the rejoinder, "there ain't no future in that stuff"¹⁰--an echo of his father's sentiments. But, given the proper motivation, Wallace has proved to be indefatigable. As a teenager

⁸Ibid., pp. 58-59.

⁹Ibid., p. 60. See also John J. Synon, George Wallace, (Kilmarnock, Va.: Ms, Inc.), n.d., pp. 11-12.

¹⁰Frady, op. cit., p. 64.

he was dumped on a Montgomery street corner and told to "go to it" in a race for page of the Alabama legislature. He "lit running", won the contest handily, and has been running ever since.

It is exceptionally difficult to assess the private character of a man with the singleness of purpose of George C. Wallace, Jr. His whole being is wrapped up on politics; everything about him is attuned to this one goal, to a degree perhaps unequalled in modern political annals. Although there is little of the fictional character's malevolence about him, one must see as particularly apt the parallel between Wallace and Faulkner's timeless portrait of Ab Snopes:

"He looked again at the stiff black back...of the figure which was not dwarfed by the house, for the reason that it had never looked big anywhere and which now, against the serene columned backdrop, had more than ever that impervious quality of something cut ruthlessly from tin, depthless, as though, sidewise to the sun, it would cast no shadow. Watching him, the boy remarked the absolutely undeviating course which his father held...."¹¹

The fit is perfect: the now-famous black suit (irridescent and beetle-like to some), the small stature, the dimensionless quality of a political image or facade behind which there is nothing that is not on the surface.

But above all, the portrait is apt in its reference to that undeviating aspect to the man, to a singleness of purpose which has as its goal political advancement and which subverts all to that goal. Both career and campaign have been so organized; and

¹¹William Faulkner, "Barn Burning," in Selected Short Stories, (New York: Modern Library), 1962, p. 11.

if success be measured in votes won, George Wallace has been extraordinarily successful. Aside from two losing contests during college (in which he "took on the machine"¹² for a high campus post) and the loss in his first race for governor in 1958 (following a pattern which has become something of an Alabama political tradition), Wallace has been successful in every race he has entered. Over the course of years he has progressed from a seat in the Alabama legislature to a county judgeship and thence to the chief executive post in the State of Alabama. Although his career in elective posts has encompassed all three branches of the government, and although he seems not possessed of those traits which one might seem desirable in an administrator, he has no desire to return to any but the executive branch of the government. Senator Lister Hill's decision not to seek re-election in 1968 left Wallace an opening for high public office just at the time when his wife (the Governor's) death was to deprive him of any official connection with government. But Wallace reports he did not seriously consider taking the post for himself. "What's a Senator?" he said. "In the Senate you just one of a hundred. They make pretty speeches but they got no power. The President the only one's got any power. That's why we runnin' for President, so's we can turn this country around." In this context--search for the highest office his country has to offer--even the 29% Wallace got in a hasty and amateurishly executed campaign during the 1964 Indiana Democratic presidential primary must be considered a success.

¹²Jones, op. cit., p. 1.

Alabama's license plates proudly proclaim her to be the "Heart of Dixie," and even today one repeatedly hears Montgomery called "the cradle of the Confederacy." So much has been made of the fact that the South is still fighting the Civil War (the War between the States, suh, if you will!), that so stating has become a cliché. The fashion today is to look to something called "the New South"--an entity whose coming has been hailed continuously since the days of Henry Grady.

But outside Atlanta one sees more than mere vestiges of a people prideful in defeat and yet smoldering with resentment. They may no longer verbalize such resentment explicitly in terms of that historic defeat, but it is a response that has become so deeply ingrained in what is known as "the mind of the South"¹³ as to be almost endemic.

The oppressor of today is the same as it has always been for the South, the national government of the United States in its myriad manifestations, but the symbols of resistance have changed.

Even during the early years of this century that statue of a gaunt Confederate soldier leaning on his rifle which adorned the courthouse or central square in so many Southern towns was alive with meaning, buttressed in no small part by the United Daughters of the Confederacy--dauntless Scarlett O'Hara's all and dressed from head to toe in flowing white. Today the UDC has become vestigial and, with its octagenarian members, is dying out. As it does so, the figures in butternut that have stood ever-vigilant against the interlocutors from the North proceed to deteriorate

¹³The term has become popular due in large part to the brilliant and probing work of that title by W.J. Cash.

and corrode; no longer are they bewreathed with flowers and sentiment as in days of yore. A new symbol has arisen, but it is not one to raise sentiment in Southern hearts as did Sir Walter Scott in the ante-bellum past or tales of the heroic legions under Pickett; instead, were the symbol to be preserved for the ages in some of the plastic arts, it would be a representation of a small, dark figure with outthrust chin barring children from a schoolhouse door. That the plastic arts can not render a two-dimensional figure--one that would not cast a shadow--is the only flaw in the scene.

Wallace was born a scant two months before the end of World War I. The world he would come to know--that against which the Alabama society into which he was born would violently react--would bear but faint resemblance to the South of the Reconstruction period. From the moment the Federal troops departed the South in 1877 as a result of the "Compromise of 1877" which grew out of the disputed presidential election of 1876, whites began to promulgate that return to normalcy--exclusion of the Negro from political leadership and power--which was capped by the Supreme Court's giving its blessing to the "separate but equal" doctrine in *Plessy v. Ferguson* in 1896.

It was not until after the advent of Populism, however, that the Negro was generally disenfranchised in the South.¹⁴ Prior to that time the Negro vote had been a valuable resource to those who might hope to control it. Generally the beneficiaries of the Negro vote had been the more conservative elements in Southern society. As the noted historian C. Vann Woodward has written:

¹⁴C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877-1913, (Baton Rouge, La: Louisiana State University Press), 1951, p. 321.

Hampton, Lamar, Nicholls, and Redeemers of that type gave their solemn pledges in the Compromise of 1877 to protect the Negro in all his rights. They were probably guilty of less hypocrisy than has been charged. The class they represented had little to fear from the Negro and at the same time considerable to gain for the conservative cause by establishing themselves in a paternalistic relationship as his protector and champion against the upland and lower-class whites. This would better enable them to control his vote (against the same white element), not to mention his labor.¹⁵

That the Negro should, at this time, have joined forces with "the conservatives" demands explanation. There are twin poles to the term "conservative," one having to do with economics, the other with social relationships (popularized today as "civil rights" or "race"). In the years immediately following Reconstruction, the three important social groups in the South were the same as we see today.¹⁶ The wealthy lowland whites represented the upper social class and the political aristocracy as well as the conservative fiscal interests. They existed in geographical proximity to the second major group, the South's Negro population in whom they found a ready (and inexpensive) source of labor for their large land holdings. The hill country, on the other hand, was populated predominantly by whites, but ones whose economic interests were at odds with those of their low-land white brethren. In an environment markedly less fertile, and possessed of little more than forty acres and a mule, the upland white had little

¹⁵Ibid., p. 209.

¹⁶For a modern analysis of the power relations among these groups see V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics, (New York: Vintage), 1941, esp. pp. 42-46.

need of Negro labor. As persons who had little stake in any particular locale, these marginal members of the society tended to become uprooted easily; at the slightest provocation--disease, epidemic, economic recession, flood or drought--these people were prone to give up and move on to new and supposedly less hostile surroundings.

So long as the old system prevailed, the three elements of Southern society were fairly well insulated one from the other; the lower economic and social strata were segregated geographically by race and could not grate on each other. But not all members of these two groups remained on the land. With the coming of industry to the South, those with the weakest ties to the land among both races were brought together in direct economic competition for industrial wages. And the innate superiority which the working class white felt over his black counterpart was in no way reflected in the industrial wage he received. He demanded a change, payment in a different coin; he demanded the recognition by all that his place in society was superior to that of the Negro:

It is one of the paradoxes of Southern History that political democracy for the white man and racial discrimination for the black were often products of the same dynamics. As the Negroes invaded the new mining and industrial towns of the uplands in greater numbers, and the hill country whites were driven into more frequent and closer association with them, and as the two races were brought into rivalry for subsistence wages in the cotton fields, mines, and wharves, the lower class white man's demand for Jim Crow laws became more insistent. It took a lot of ritual and Jim Crow to bolster the creed of white supremacy in the bosom of a white man working for black man's wages. The Negro pretty well understood these forces, and his grasp of them was one reason for his growing alliance with the most conservative and politically reactionary class of whites against the insurgent white democracy.¹⁷

¹⁷Woodward, op. cit., p. 211.

With lower-class whites demanding reparation, it was left to the upper classes (white, naturally) to determine the coin of the realm. With the boldness of hindsight, we can see that it was naturally to the benefit of these men to "pay" as they did. We cannot, of course, say that they formulated the problem in precisely these terms, but they did first react to the potential threat to their economic well being posed by the insurgent whites. The insurrection forced the three groups to choose allies anew, with different prizes to be won:

The political strategy of Southern Populists was based on combinations and alliances along regional, class, and racial lines--first, an alliance between South and West; second...between farmers and city and factory laborers; and third, a political union with Negro farmers and laborers within the South. Every phase of this strategy was a challenge to the New South system, which had sought to divide all the elements the Populists were trying to unite.¹⁸

Through the gift of hindsight, it can readily be seen that the white establishment could retain its preeminence only by keeping the Populists economically deprived. A white skin was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to upper class status; with the coming of industrialism to the South, economic power was coming to replace "family" as a sufficient condition among whites who aspired to higher status. To keep the club exclusive, one would derive maximum benefit from a system whereby all aspirants were kept bereft of one of the prime requisites of status. By the overt creation of a caste system wherein each of the lower castes was effectively blocked from upward mobility, the upper class would

¹⁸Ibid., p. 252.

be giving up nothing; it would merely change the objects of its paternalism from Negroes to lower class whites.

But the old order was not changed overnight or without a struggle. The radical economic dissent which was to sweep down from the Great Plains and begin to take hold in the red clay country of the South had first to be subverted. Typifying the clarion call which was to have such a profound effect on the South for decades to come were the words of the Populist's national platform of 1892: "We believe that the powers of government-- in other words, of the people--should be expanded as rapidly and as far as the good sense of an intelligent people and the teachings of experience shall justify."¹⁹ A Populist paper proclaimed the struggle "a bitter and irrepressible conflict between the capitalist and the laborer,"²⁰ one in which the opportunity existed for the economically oppressed to better themselves through concerted action across trade and racial lines.

At least at the onset of the revolt such an alliance was deemed possible; certainly the poor of both races could expect to benefit from enactment of the Populist's demands against the burgeoning corporations which had come to the South only on the heels of their success across the rest of the nation. As the voice of the common people, the Populists called for an increase

¹⁹Cited in Woodward, op cit., p. 250, emphasis added.

²⁰Southern Mercury, (XI) (April 28, 1892), n. 3, cited in Woodward, op cit., p. 251.

in the amount of currency in circulation, abolition of the national banking system, and--to break the iron grip of the crop-lien system--some type of commodity credit which would be to the benefit of the producer. (The sub-treasury system is one of the commodity credit proposals which was advanced at that time.) They attacked the profligacy with which, they said, the government was dissipating common treasure--the land--in grants to large private corporations for the encouragement of railroad development, particularly when it seemed that the managers of the roads felt no need to act in the public's interest. It is indeed paradoxical that the solution proposed by the Populists to the ills which they saw as emanating from the increased governmental powers of the immediate post-War period was yet another infusion of the same thing--though with a different objective.²¹

As Marxists have ruefully noted, however, Americans seem at heart not to be "economic men." Recognizing that cheaper Negro labor would inexorably set the prevailing wage in direct competition with whites, the Populists could advocate either excluding the Negro from the skilled trades through restrictive unionisation or making common cause with him for a higher common wage. It would appear that the potential which the upper classes perceived to be inherent in such a united front played no small part in eventually evoking a response through substitution. Clearly it

²¹ Adapted from Woodward, op. cit., p. 250.

was fear of concerted action on the economic front, coupled with increasing control of the political apparatus by the lower classes, which eventually prompted the upper classes to act and to act as they did.

Joint action by economic classes faced one major hurdle: Those who faced common economic deprivations (and ought, therefore, to have been natural allies) were historical antagonists dating from before the War. Of paramount import for Southern politics in the 20th Century as well as for the ultimate fate of the Populist movement in the 1890's was the fact that "the regions where Populism made its strongest appeal were the very regions that found it most difficult to overcome racial feelings."²² That such feelings ultimately prevailed proved to be to the economic detriment of the lower classes of both races. As Tom Watson put it, "You are kept apart that you may be separately fleeced of your earnings."²³

In this era of racial solidarity for political gain it might well have been said that a Negro was "good" or "bad" depending on the degree to which he was obsequious and servile.²⁴ Vaudeville made blackface comedy popular, but it was the comedy of apes and buffoons, not of men. The South, it is said, had long been wary of a Negro uprising, whether from the promptings of the Turner rebellion or of conscience. Strong, too, in the psyche of the South was the desire to repel any attempt upon Southern

²²Ibid., p. 254.

²³Thomas Watson, "The Negro Question in the South," Arena VI (1892), quoted in Woodward, op. cit., p. 257.

²⁴I.A. Newby, Anti-Negro Thought in America, 1900-1930, (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press), p. 116, p. 120, and passim.

womanhood by the bestial urges, real or presumed, of the rutting Negro male.²⁵ Even today Wallace's chief lieutenant, Bill Jones, writes:

There is no evidence on record that indicates the Negro is morally superior to any other race, particularly the white race. Actually, if crime statistics, welfare rolls, and such criteria are used, then the opposite is true. Illegitimate birth figures frighten Alabamians, reflecting one of the basic fears which stiffen Southern resistance to school desegregation. The high percentage of Negro population in many areas could put equal numbers of Negroes and white children into Southern schools and increases the Southerner's fears of inter-racial sex. The attitude of protectiveness, which has surrounded the Southern white woman for generations, is strongly rooted in the Southern mind; the idea of a Negro man being intimate with a white woman is abhorrent to Southern manhood.²⁶

The threats seen emanating from the Negro were nullified by his symbolic (and occasionally actual) emasculation,²⁷ to say nothing of lynching; he was to be made little more than the organ grinder's monkey, dancing to music not of his choosing and being paid in coin peculiarly Southern--racial violence.

Then, as now, the racial "harmony" which Wallace prides the South on having attained was predicated on the assumption, common to all in the society, that if a Negro "got out of line"

²⁵Ibid., pp. 135-40.'

²⁶Imagine the solace for Southern Negroes in the words of Congressman Thomas Spight of Mississippi, who "did not think that lynchings for any other crime than the nameless one against womanhood ought ever to occur." And the Confederate veterans of Grenada, Mississippi, proved their humanitarianism by resolving, in 1904, that they were "unalterably opposed to the lynching of a human being, save, perhaps, for the one unmentionable crime." (Ibid., p. 138)

²⁷Jones, op. cit., p. 351.

he might expect swift retribution from the white community. The knowledge by the black community that violence might strike at any time, but certainly in response to the slightest indiscretion, served effectively to narrow even the set of possible alternate responses which a Negro might internalize.

So long as Southern society continued in its involuted character, the deterrent posed by white threats became increasingly inbred in the culture; thus the conditioned responses of the dominated group militated against the need for actually using an increased amount of violence. The law of anticipated reaction was generally sufficient. But the First World War put an end to the insularity of the South. Although probably not written about Southern Negroes in particular, the popular song "How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm, after they've seen Paree" pointed up a source of serious dislocation for Southern culture after the War. Negroes who had never known a mode of existence except that based on fear and reprisal were suddenly uprooted and thrust into a strange new life--one in which many whites, particularly Europeans, were wont to interact with them from bases other than fear alone. The theories of Copernicus could scarcely have been more unsettling!

So long, of course, as the blacks whose minds had been affected by this new virus remained in Europe, the impact was but on individual expectations. The problem arose when these men attempted re-integration into the world whence they had come stateside. Suddenly they thrust themselves into a society which had not proceeded apace, a society which was not prepared to

accept such mutations of character in its subservient peoples.²⁸ The Southern response to changed expectations amongst its Negroes was a renewal of the Klan on a level of violence never before experienced. Founded in 1866 by Confederate General Nathan Bedford Forrest, the Ku Klux Klan revived and, for the ensuing decade, it enjoyed unparalleled success. Membership rose to perhaps 5 million across the nation and it achieved political dominance in Oklahoma, Texas, and Indiana. The bubble burst upon the conviction of Grand Dragon David C. Stephenson of Indiana for 2nd degree murder in late 1925, a year after the Democratic Party officially denounced the Klan in its Platform.²⁹

But if racism seemed to wane toward the end of the decade after the war, the issue of the Negro's place in society, particularly in the South, had not been resolved. Southern resistance stiffened in response to Negro "agitation", and the uneasy truce which came after 1930 was predicated--like that which came after the turn of the century--upon keeping the Negro submerged. Even as late as the Second World War a leading Southern Congressman could assert:

This war was not fought to change one whit the definition or meaning of true democracy and true Americanism. We fought to preserve what we already had....If some overzealous person or persons...left colored Americans under the impression that a victory in this recent war meant the break down of the color line in

²⁸See, for example, William Faulkner's novel Sartoris.

²⁹R. B. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History, (New York: Harper), p. 332, p. 335.

the South or social equality and intermarriage
with the white race, than I am sorry.³⁰

It was into such a world that George Wallace was born, a
world imbued with Populist ideals and a common orientation among
a majority of whites: to maintain their place in society by
keeping the Negro beneath them.

³⁰Theodore G. Bilbo, cited in Newby, op. cit., p. 191.

II: Worldview: verbalized

In recognition of the fact that the economic aspect of the movement fell prey to baser interests, Wallace today bristles at being termed a Populist--strenuously rejecting the idea that he might be considered a racist. When told by an interviewer that a newsman had termed him such, Wallace replied:

They've got a word for everything, haven't they? You should have asked him if he knew what Populism was--and I say "was" because there is no such thing anymore. Populism, in the sense these pseudo-intellectuals use it carries overtones of anti-one religion or another. They don't dare charge me with that, so they just say "Populism"--it's a sort of highbrow smear.

Racism has become a normatively tinged concept and, in the eyes of "liberals", is loaded with opprobrium. Wallace prefers to build a neutral term--"segregationist"--which purports to denote those who, through no dislike of the Negro, sincerely believe that separation of the races is the most mutually beneficent policy to follow:

Racism is evil, but there is a difference between a racist and a segregationist. Racism is disliking God's handiwork because a person is another color. If a man is convinced in his heart, and I am, that segregation is in the best interest of both races, there is nothing immoral or sinful about it. I am an Alabama segregationist because we have found, as have others in other parts of the nation and world, that race-mixing when there are large numbers of each race simply does not work in the interest of anyone.²

¹Wallace, quoted in Synon, op. cit., p. 123.

²Wallace, quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 178.

To understand properly such a statement, it needs be juxtaposed against both Wallace's working version of it and against others' conceptualisations of the same distinctions. Wallace's intent and effectiveness in putting his views into practice will be left for the following chapter. For parallax on the concept of racism see I. A. Newby's broad definition:

Throughout this study, the term "racist" refers to those who held or voiced anti-Negro attitudes, including anyone who accepted the innate inequality of the races and/or objected to social equality of whites and Negroes. Thus, broadly defined, it included the overwhelming majority of Americans in the early twentieth century....³

In his 1964 speech at Harvard, Wallace "...touch(ed) on the mulatto children born of Yankee occupation troops and Southern Negro women. He pointed out that in many instances, these children took the characteristics of their fathers and were more ambitious than the full blooded African Negro."⁴ Jones calls this a "frank, scholarly approach," but its emphasis on the racial stereotype transmitted by blood seems to make Wallace a racist by any definition.

Wallace's own pronouncements notwithstanding, it would appear that as a candidate he was not averse to profiting from such racist feeling as might exist. Marshall Frady, now persona non grata in the Wallace camp, but for nine months an intimate, says that Wallace told him, "Let 'em call me a racist. It don't make any difference. Whole heap of folks in this country feel the same way I do. Race is what's gonna win this thing for me."⁵ Certainly the strategy

³Newby, op. cit., p. IX.

⁴Jones, op. cit., p. 112.

⁵Frady, op. cit., p. 7.

of the campaign in 1964 called for identifying Wallace with the creed of white supremacy, racism even by the most restrictive of definitions. Bill Jones reports:

Had (Louisiana Governor John) McKeithen been willing to exert the necessary leadership, Wallace could have won the place on the ballot under the rooster....an emblem of white supremacy in the South.⁶

Obviously, Jones considered the rooster a prize to be sought.

In fairness, one must report that in his unsuccessful race for Governor in 1958, Wallace had the endorsement of Alabama's sizeable Jewish minority and the NAACP. While the difference between him and his opponent, John Patterson, whom the Klan endorsed, may have been one of degree, Wallace had the tag of "liberal" to Patterson's "conservative" on that single, all-important dimension in Alabama politics--race. Wallace even went so far as to denounce the Klan. Frady quotes one of Wallace's oldest associates as commenting:

(H)is heart was really in it. He had a genuine aversion to the Klan. He just, in some vague way, didn't trust them. Anything that's basically uncontrollable makes him feel a little uneasy; he'd just rather stay away from it, whether it's for him or against him.⁷

But in that same campaign he found that he could not control the sine qua non of the politician--the votes. Why? In Wallace's assessment it all boiled down to one thing. "John Patterson out-

⁶Jones, op. cit., p. 321.

⁷Quoted in Frady, op. cit., p. 126; for an alternate view of Wallace's relationship with the Klan, see Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South, (New York: Ballantine Books,), 1968, pp. 313-314.

nigguhmed me. And boys, I'm not noing to be out-niqquhed again."⁸

While he rejects out of hand the "Populist" tag, it would appear to fit him rather well; his own transmogrification curiously parallels that of the movement from which his world view seems to stem. Former Alabama Governor Jim Folsom, who broke every racial more of his time and place by inviting Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, a Negro, to the Governor's mansion for drinks on the veranda, considers that both he and Wallace were Populists, at least in economic outlook:

'Course, George, now, George wadn't no race binot either back yonder. Me 'n' George was always close. My uncle and his grandaddy was Populists together. George ain't nothin but an old Ponulist himself. We just disagreed on one thing: I never did want to take any credit for handin' niggers. And he wadn't always like he is now. He just wanted to get elected to thins, that's all....⁹

Wallace was once Folsom's protege', but they broke over the Powell affair. The rift ostensibly occurred over Folsom's appointment of one of Wallace's political opponents to the Board of Review in Wallace's home county of Barbour. But attempts to patch up things came to nought, again reflecting Wallace's assessment of the political situation: "Naw boys, folks are fed up with this entertainin' nigguhs in the mansion. Somethinn else they fed un with too is the drinkin'. Naw boys, I'm goin' all the wav with it."¹⁰

(Folsom was reportedly drunk constantly while in office;

⁸Ibid., p. 127.

⁹Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁰Quoted in Ibid., p. 110.

Wallace, once was a social drinker, but found that he got drunk easily. Just as he distrusted the Klan for being uncontrollable, so did he distrust what he himself might do under the influence of alcohol. This, plus the feeling that the voters did not approve of Folsom's deportment combined to impress upon him the importance of giving up liquor. It is a tribute to his singleness of purpose that to this day he holds unwaveringly to that political decision. Even his closest campaign advisors feel they cannot drink in his presence; as a result they are in constant search for someone who does not feel the need to drink that can be sent in to occupy the Governor's time with talk of politics--the only topic which engages his interest--while the bottles are brought out in the next room).

While Newby has placed himself firmly in the camp opposing racists, he was unable to level many of the common peioratives at them. Regardless of whether the finding brings one comfort, he reported himself unable to call them hypocrites:

To dismiss them as crackpots, bigots, or uneducated simpletons is, I think a mistake... too often made. (I am convinced that) whether intellectual or emotional in their approach, most racists were not hypocritical. They believed firmly and completely that Negroes were racially inferior, and they were concerned that racial policies reflect that belief. The fact that their efforts were misdirected and their beliefs rested upon prejudice, emotion, and ignorance did not make them any less real. They acted upon the assumption that they were correct, and their policies were justified by their premises.¹¹

¹¹Newby, op. cit., pp. VIII-IX.

Neither is Wallace hypocritical; undoubtedly his views on the Negro are emotionally tinged from the environment in which he matures, but he also has verbalized some of the reasons he feels as he does.¹²

The key to his general downgrading of the Negro might baldly put be termed "laziness." The feeling that Negroes are naturally shiftless and "want something for nothing" pervades the South. Thus branded, they stand in bold contrast to those hard-working, God-fearing, long-suffering yet uncomplaining sons of the soil who still form the bulk of the Southern ethos and who are the modern purveyors of the Protestant work ethic. George Wallace is one of these men, but one who--by dint of sheer grit, drive, and determination--rose on his own to positions of leadership. "Can a former truck driver," asks a campaign brochure rhetorically, "who is married to a former dime store clerk and whose father was a plain dirt farmer be elected President of the United States?"¹³

The answer is plainly affirmative: "As a farm boy, he learned early the lessons of hard work and economy, doing manual chores to

¹²The source for much of this section is a two-part interview this author had with Gov. Wallace on board his campaign plane on June 9 and 10, 1968. No tape recording of the interview was made because of the candidate's penchant for sitting as close to the engines as possible, so as to better able to hear any malfunction which might arise. (The traumatic experiences of Wallace's WW II service as a flight engineer in the Pacific led to his fear of flying). Because of his seating preference, the noise from the engines is so great as to make conversation difficult and to preclude any attempt to tape record. Notes of the conversations were made immediately afterward, though, and it is upon these notes--fleshed out with material from other sources whenever available--that this analysis depends for authenticity.

¹³"History shows Gov. George Wallace CAN be Elected President," in Stories and Comments about George C. Wallace Next President of the United States, (n.p.; n.d), p. 4.

help his family financially,"¹⁴ and because:

He has been a working man all his life. As a youth he chopped cotton and dug potatoes to help his parents. He worked his way through the University of Alabama by waiting on tables and doing other chores before and after classes. Before...World War II, he drove a dump truck and loaded ammunition.¹⁵

Lack of funds did not keep him from prospering in his education, either, even though he remembers having "maybe one" suit, one pair of shoes, and "very few" shifts.¹⁶ He could not even afford many law books:

(I)n those days...there were desks where two people sat together and a professor would call upon a student to get up and give the next case. What George would do was this: When others took a ten minute break between classes, he'd rush to the next class and read the first case and if he not called on he'd get up and explain it. If he didn't then he'd read the second case from his seatmate's book while the first case was being explained.¹⁷

Wallace was tenacious and willing to work hard to achieve his goals. He cannot understand why persons who are unwilling to make the same effort should be rewarded. He did it, so can others.

Of equal import to Wallace today is another explicit comparison between himself and many Negroes. When he married his wife,

¹⁴"George C. Wallace...Statesman...Patriot," in *Stories and Comments...*, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁵"Gov. George C. Wallace--A Friend of the Working People," in *Stories and Comments...*, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁶Synon., op. cit., p. 23.

¹⁷Judge Glen Curlee, quoted in Ibid., pp. 25-26.

Lurleen, during the war, they once were faced with another of the problems which confront Negroes today: the shortage of suitable housing. As a result, they lived in a converted chicken house in Alamogordo, New Mexico. He remembers it "had a concrete floor that had been cleaned out and fumigated and so forth...(I)t was a one-room affair. We cooked on a hot plate and used the bathroom inside [the landlord's] house."¹⁸

But did they turn this or any of the others in their string of dingy homes into a tenement? Did they "sit on the front porch and throw their empty bottles onto the street just to hear them break," as he feels Negroes are wont to do? No! Lurleen managed to make things tidy, he recalls; they planted flowers--maybe chrysanthemums--put on a coat of whitewash, or built a little fence. Not that they had any money, understand; they just did what they could, because they cared. "It doesn't cost anything to be neat, to pick up the garbage rather than throwing it into the yard" he says, again implying a comparison with himself, the symbol of a different ethos, in which the Negro comes out second best: All the "excuses" and intellectual rationalisations are inconsequential beside his visceral reaction to memories that are still sharp within him. He did it--a fact to which there can be no rebuttal, he feels--and he did not complain. He will complain, however, when persons who are able choose not to do it, in favor of seeking a dole, an unearned increment. It is a tenet deeply felt, hence one most difficult to refute through logic.

¹⁸Quoted in Ibid., p. 39.

Nor is the ability to rise from hard times peculiarly Wallace's; it extends to a whole people as he asserted in his inaugural address:

The liberals' theory that poverty, discrimination and lack of opportunity is the cause of communism is a false theory. If it were true the South would have been the biggest single Communist bloc in the Western Hemisphere long ago....After the great War between the States, our people faced a desolate land of burned universities, destroyed crops and homes, with manpower depleted and crippled....There were no government handouts, no Marshall Plan aid, no coddling to make sure that our people would not suffer....There was no money, no food and no hope of either. But our grandfathers bent their knees only in church and bowed their head only to God.

...Not for one single instance did they consider the easy way of federal domination and amalgamation in return for fat bellies. They fought. They dug sweet roots from the ground with their bare hands and boiled them in the old iron pots. They gathered poke salad from the woods and acorns from the ground. They fought. They followed no false doctrine. They knew what they wanted, and they fought for freedom. They came up from their knees in the greatest display of sheer nerve, grit and guts that has ever been set down in the pages of written history. ¹⁹

Jones would have it that the South has a proprietary interest in hard work. South Milwaukee, an area which went heavily for Wallace in the 1964 Wisconsin primary race,

¹⁹Quoted in Ibid., p. 39.

"is heavily populated with Polish Americans, and they carry many of the same attitudes that are held by Southerners. Many of them are only a generation or so away from Europe and, while America has been good to them, it has been through hard work and dedication to their families that the Polish American has been able to progress as far as he has in this nation."²⁰

Not only are there benefits deriving from hard work, but accepting handouts entails an element of risk:

(Working for what he wants) is a way of life for (Wallace) and he rebels at the thought of street demonstrators demanding they be given this freedom, this job, this right. To Wallace, the only way to gain anything is to earn it. Nothing is given without strings attached, but everything is taken away at the whim of the government.²¹

Jones reports a chain of reasoning which might (with apologies to Hans Morgenthau) be dubbed "the domino theory of civil rights":

The Governor strongly feels that you cannot deal with street revolutionaries; you can never satisfy them; first it is a front seat in a bus; next, it's a take-over of parks; then, it's public schools; then it's voting rights; then, it's jobs; then, it's distribution of wealth without work. Then it's more and more to the final breakdown of the private property system as the revolutionists take over the nation.²²

Though he has been forever "typed" as being anti-Negro, and though his words are oft-undercut by his actions (again, see below, Chapter 3), Wallace has taken something of a melioristic view of the race problem. Negroes, he feels, are not now ready for equality

²⁰Ibid., pp. 214-215.

²¹Ibid., p. 76.

²²Ibid., p. 377, emphasis added.

and one gets the feeling that they may not soon be so judged, but in theory the opportunity does exist; it is, oddly enough, at the end of that very road which he, himself, followed: hard work, with particular emphasis on self-improvement through education.

Jones reports that, though "some" Negroes (he feels certain) disagree with Wallace, nonetheless the Governor "clearly sees his duty in regard to the Negro citizens." Labeling the enhancement of educational opportunities for all as "a sane and sensible" policy Jones comments:

Wallace feels that the Negro must improve himself before white Alabamians accept him as an equal in education, politics, and social and civil life. Wallace does not want intermixture to be a by-product of his program of additional education opportunities and better jobs for the Negroes. However, it could be the final result.²³

Education, in fact, is what Wallace says he is going to do about the race problem:

Education is going to solve the race question and nothing else, and that's what we're doing in Alabama. We are educating all of our people. We're building junior colleges and trade schools throughout our State, we are educating all of our people. And every man and woman in this country, White or Black, who will go to school and will stay in school--train himself--will find his place in the nation's economy, a place that will give him a good standard of living. Education is the solution to the problem.²⁴

²³Ibid., p. 452.

²⁴Wallace, quoted in Syron, op. cit., p. 54.

Political ascendancy, not material wealth, is the measure of success in Wallace's world, but in his determination to provide assistance for those who will help themselves he is not unlike the Andrew Carnegie embodied in The Gospel of Wealth. Note, too, the end product of the education that Wallace envisions. Far from intending to produce Renaissance Men, or for that matter even Liberal-arts Men, the focus of the program is on turning out persons with the ability to tend the machines which are a hallmark of our technological age. Wallace's Alabama made giant strides in at least one educational department; it became engaged in re-training the agriculturally oriented to become industrial workers. Since it is abundantly clear that fewer and fewer yeoman farmers can be economically self-sufficient on the land, providing the opportunity for them to educate themselves to a new and more economically rewarding place in the economy is a laudable goal; Wallace can point with pride to the fact that Negroes profited disproportionately from this trade and vocational school program (which, as shall be shown later, had great "ancillary" benefits of an entirely different sort). The point to be made is that Wallace's view of the solution to the racial issue turns on education only insofar as it will help Negroes to become economically self-sufficient. He professes no higher goal than this.

It is manifestly unfair to judge the man on the quality of systematic thought which he offers. Wallace, is, after all, preeminently a politician, one schooled in the art of the possible. Furthermore, he makes no attempt to be a systems builder; there is a random character to his thoughts which has seemed to

necessitate the term "world view" rather than the more common appellation "philosophy." As with most Americans, perhaps, Wallace seems to have made no effort to work out inconsistencies or to formalize his motivations in any way. His view of the good life seems always to be left implicit and to the inferential powers of the listener. He nowhere makes explicit a set of priorities. Since it seems desirable to discover his scale of values for the purposes of gaining an insight into the man, one must reconstruct, in relatively coherent fashion, something which very probably does not exist on a conscious, formalized level, within the man himself. As Sherrill suggests, "Wallace is not burdened with a philosophy."²⁵

To do so in his own words is, no doubt, the best approach possible, although at best a necessary evil. The ad hoc nature of the politics to which he has set himself (hence of the man himself, due to his absolute concentration on the requisites of his profession) is such that formulation of a philosophy might well hem him in unnecessarily. Having subverted everything to his goal--being a successful (winning) politician--he has so conditioned himself that he finds it hard to discuss even in an informal context anything of an abstract nature, including his view of "the good life."

Wallace, at least the man to whom this writer spoke during the campaign, is a man of preconditioned responses. To streamline his operation (and to guard himself against giving varying responses to similar questions) he has developed a set of standardized answers

²⁵Sherrill, op. cit., p. 314.

which are culled from his major campaign document--The Speech (see Appendix A). He is so immersed in The Speech that it is extraordinarily difficult to get him to go beyond its bounds, say, to some of the possible ramifications of the ideas expressed therein. To get him to leave "the real world" for the abstract is almost impossible without the tact of a Hammerskjold and the patience of Job.

Perhaps Wallace's worldview is so unsystematic because it is much less the end product of ratiocination than it is the outgrowth of the attempt to make his feelings intelligible and communicable to others. There can be no doubt about it; Wallace feels deeply. His personal experiences are alive to him and have provided much of the stuff of his motivation. It is, bluntly, as if he had struggled with his visceral, "gut" reactions only to the point where he could put them into words. No first premises for him; he needs them not. He feels!

That he feels does not preclude his thinking, naturally, and one finds the most explicitly systematic thought in the area of his greatest concern--the relationships that ought to exist among the various branches and levels of government and between government and man. In this regard Wallace is particularly well versed, he feels, because of his wide experience in all branches of government: Assistant Attorney General, State Legislator, Circuit Court Judge, Governor, and candidate for President of the United States.

This is not to say that Wallace is a highly original or innovative thinker in governmental relationships, for the position he espouses is generally the same as that held by others in his region both in and out of government. He holds strongly to the traditional

view of power relationships, which, he feels, are supported by a strict interpretation of the Constitution and vigorous defense of states' rights against the voracious, insatiable federal octopus.

Wallace believes that the Constitution of the United States was established as a device to limit the power of the central government, and that the U.S. Supreme Court was only a division of that government and not vested with absolute power. Wallace believes that the Constitution was conceived as a protective device for all the people against arbitrary action on the part of the court or any other branch of the government.²⁶

The issue today, he feels, is a big government, "pseudo-intellectual government, where a select group writes guidelines for bureaus and court decisions,"²⁷ government which is leading to "the destruction of local government and local domestic democratic institutions"-things like "schools, hospitals, the seniority and apprenticeship lists of labor union(s), businesses, the apportionment of legislatures, and even the matter of housing...."²⁸ Wallace, and those who identify with him may well feel their own egos threatened by a government of pseudo-intellectuals who "look down their nose at the average man on the street."²⁹ Wallace and his followers wish no more recognition than to be known as average men-- "the People."

But what, then, would a Wallace presidency have meant? Would he look with favor upon the characterization, by John J. Synon, of

²⁶Jones, op. cit., pp. 30-31 and passim.

²⁷Ibid., p. 54.

²⁸"People Concerned About Trends In U.S. Gov. Wallace Says," in Stories and Comments.... op. cit., p. 9.

²⁹Ibid.

John Tyler as having been our greatest president because "they didn't pass a law during his four years"?³⁰ Not at all. He took great pains to stress throughout the campaign that his was not a purely negative movement and that he would not be a do-nothing president. On practical grounds, once introduced to the man's power sense one would not expect the federal sphere to become quiescent during a Wallace tenure, but even on a theoretical plane Wallace appears as an activist. The recipients of government largesse would change to be sure, but the flow of federal dollars would certainly continue almost unabated.

Wallace forever removes himself from the camp of Goldwater conservatism when he says "...I'm not one of these ultraconservatives. They against everything. The only thing they for is the dollar, that's all they want to conserve. Well, that's not me...."³¹ Frady quotes Wallace's statement during the 1966 gubernatorial campaign (in which Wallace stumped the state and won the office in the name of his late wife, Lurleen):

They talkin' about yo guvnuh borrowin' money to build roads and bridges over this state. Well, whatever it takes, we gonna build those roads and bridges. And they talkin' about all the other money we spent. Well, spendin' money for the blind and crippled and elderly and disabled--that's what we spose to do. That ain't no giveaway, that's easin sufferin', that's heppin' folks.³²

³⁰Synon, op. cit., back cover.

³¹Quoted in Frady, op. cit., p. 138.

³²Ibid., emphasis in original.

But that is far different, to hear Wallace tell it, from the proper relationship between another centralized government--the federal--and its component parts, the states. Here, in the high rhetoric of his inaugural address, he expands at length upon the evils of centralization:

We can no longer hide our head in the sand and tell ourselves that the ideology of our free fathers is not being attacked and...threatened by another idea...for it is. We are faced with an idea that if a centralized government assumes enough authority, enough power over its people, that it can provide a utopian life...that if given the power to dictate, to forbid, to require, to demand, to distribute, to edict and to judge what is best and enforce the will of judgement upon its citizens from unimpeachable authority...then it will produce only "good"...and it shall be our father...and our God. It is an idea of government that encourages our fears and destroys our faith...for where there is faith there is no fear, and where there is fear there is no faith.

...Governments do not produce wealth. People produce wealth...free people, and as these people become less free...then this government must assume more and more police powers and we find that we are becoming government-fearing people, not God-fearing people. We find that we have replaced faith with fear and though we may give lip service to the Almighty, in reality, government has become our God....It is a system that is the very opposite of Christ...it assumes the responsibilities that we ourselves should assume. Its pseudo-liberal spokesmen and some Harvard advocates have never examined the logic of its substitution of what it calls "human rights" for individual rights, for its propaganda play upon words that have appeal for the unthinking. Its logic is totally material and irresponsible as it runs the whole gamut of human desires, including the theory that everyone has voting rights without the spiritual responsibility of preserving freedom.

Our founding fathers recognized these rights, but only within the framework of those spiritual responsibilities. But the strong, simple faith and sane reasoning of our founding fathers has long since been forgotten as the so-called "progressives" tell us that our constitution was written for "horse and buggy" days. So were the Ten Commandments.³³

The seeming contradiction between Wallace's strong central government at the state level but his strong indictment of it at the national level is "solved" to his satisfaction by the fact that the various subdivisions of local government--cities, counties, school boards--are in fact legal creatures of the state and, as such, by law clearly subordinate to it. But of the federal government, as he says in *The Speech*, "They may have the power, but they don't have the right."³⁴ The legal distinction, to a strict constructionist, is a correct one. But Wallace further identifies himself as a conservative "In the sense that I am against government regulations." Victor Gold, the most perceptive analyst of Wallace's record, rightly suggests that:

...to a local or county school board in Alabama, elected by and for the citizens of the immediate area and threatened by overriding state authority out of Montgomery, "government regulation: is "government regulation"--and George Wallace's "conservatism" on the matter of local government is open to question.³⁵

³³Wallace, quoted in Jones, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

³⁴Cf. p.186 Appendix A; the remark was nominally in reference to the Supreme Court, but from Wallace's point of view it would apply equally to any and all branches of the Federal Government.

³⁵Victor Gold, "The Rise and Stand of George Corley Wallace," in Human Events, Jan. 27, 1968, reprint, p. 1.

Wallace's critics have long charged that the governmental sphere which he would hold to be rightly superordinate is that which he commands or that to which he holds immediate aspirations.

The emphasis on religion in the passage from Wallace's inaugural quoted above brings out another important element in the man's world-view. Wallace, himself, holds a position of leadership in his church's convention, although unabashed Wallace does claim that the position was gained through political pressure and that he dares not attend the convention meetings. Says Jones:

Religion, and much of it deeply emotional even in modern day America, has had a profound effect on the attitudes and morals of those living in the old Confederate states....

Religious training of the South has helped to mold the paternalistic feeling which exists in the Southern white mind for the Negroes of the South. The religious philosophy which pervades the region is as conservative in nature as in the political philosophy which is rampant throughout the old Confederacy.³⁶

His statements dovetail nicely with Newby's contention:

...to most Americans religion was a vital force, an intimate part of life. An exclusively "profane" racism was, therefore, unsatisfactory, or rather incomplete. It must be supplemented by religious authority, by scriptural proof of racial inequality. Religious racism was by its very nature most appealing to the ignorant and uneducated, to those, that is, whose racial views were prejudiced and emotional rather than rational or scientific.³⁷

³⁶Jones, op. cit., p. 414.

³⁷Newby, op. cit., pp. 83-84 and Chapter 3 passim.

As with other forms of racism, the religious emphasis manifested itself most strongly in the South. One must realize

there exists in the South a strong feeling that Christianity's greatest enemy is Godless Communism, and rightly or wrongly, the great majority of Southerners believe that the same forces motivating the current civil rights unrest in the nation are those forces who oppose the anti-Community positions taken by the government...to contain Communistic expansion throughout the world.³⁸

In this statement all the components of the Southerner's anti-Negro feelings can be seen. Science and religion are one; no source of authority can be adduced in rebuttal. Wallace does not want government to become our God. Instead, he is motivated by a desire to return this country to "States Rights and local government and to bring a halt to this destruction of individual liberty and personal responsibility."³⁹ He implies that if Negroes progress economically they are partaking of all individual liberties that the good life has to offer.

³⁸Jones, op. cit., p. 415.

³⁹Wallace, quoted in Synon, op. cit., p. 66.

III Worldview: operationalized

Wallace's principles, briefly and concisely put, would seem to comprise the following list:

- 1) The Constitution, which embodies a doctrine limiting federal power, should be upheld.
- 2) State's rights (whereby the people of the various states can adapt governmental policy to fit their particular local conditions and desires) are guaranteed by the Constitution.
- 3) Segregation is the best form of relationships between the races and ought to be allowed as a viable alternative to any other form of social relationships so that persons on the State level may opt to pursue it if they so choose.
- 4) Government exists to help people who are unable to help themselves (the elderly and infirm) or whose own earnest efforts cannot suffice without governmental action (as in the field of education). It does NOT exist to help those who choose not to exert themselves in their own behalf (governmental action characterized as "the giveaway").

These are the enunciations which one finds in Wallace's own words or which would seem to be essential were one to construct complete lines of syllogistic reasoning from the candidate's feelings.

During his years as a public official, Wallace has had ample opportunity to translate these principles into action, a process during which not a little fidelity to the original positions may

be lost. (For a case in point compare Thomas Jefferson's acts while in the White House against the pronouncements he made before assuming that office).

How well, then, do Wallace's years in Alabama's public service reflect his principles? If government is, in fact, in existence to help people, Wallace would seem to have done a good job as Governor of his state. Who in Wallace's Alabama need help? The catalog is by now familiar: the yeoman farmer, the lunch-pailer, the elderly, the infirm, those trapped in dead-end occupations from a lack of education.¹ Furthermore, by helping these "special interests," all of Alabama would become more prosperous. Everyone among Wallace's personal constituency (which includes very few Negroes, despite his claims to the contrary) could be seen as profiting from the policies of road-building and state-supported resistance to integration, particularly in the educational system.

A veteran political reporter in Alabama suggested that Wallace was very probably the best governor that the state had ever had. If only for his people, Wallace nonetheless produced volumes of beneficial legislation and "progress" for the state. Although he rails in the finest Populist tradition against the "multi-billion dollar tax-exempt private corporations" such as the Rockefeller Foundation, he has departed from that earlier economic radicalism in his attempts to lure industry to the State. Wallace holds no tenet more firmly than that which saves capitalism, private property, and the free enterprise system are those things which have made

¹Sherrill, op. cit., p. 325.

this nation great. Most importantly, industrialism has brought wealth and prosperity to great portions of this country, the South generally excluded. Wallace set out, in four years, to bring Alabama to parity with the rest of the country in industrial development. He did this not for itself, but because he felt it was the best, perhaps even the only way to help the people of Alabama. Much of his program rested on this assumption.

Upon his taking office in January, 1963, the situation facing him was one of mixed blessings. Long an economic colony of the rest of the nation, the South had developed little industry of its own. At a crucial point, Birmingham steel had been saddled with "Pittsburgh-plus" and the era of runaway textile mills was largely over.

The traditional cotton empire of Alabama had been hit by an enemy worse than the boll weevil. Mechanized farming in the West had made serious inroads on Alabama cotton production, and as farmers turned to more modern methods of crop production, field hands lost their jobs.

The state's giant coal-mining industry had taken a similar whipping. Natural gas was flowing across Alabama into its cities. Railroads were using diesel fuel instead of coal, and Alabama coal-mining operators were forced to automate their operations. The result: many miners lost their jobs.²

Southern railroads have been legendary for their slipshod management and transportation overland has been made difficult by the mountains which form a barrier to the northeast; only recently

²Jones, op. cit., p. 48-49.

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have interstate highways begun to replace the winding, narrow, pothole-filled roads which used to plague the region. To the credit side of the ledger, land was cheap, labor was docile and cheap trade-unionism having yet to permeate the South, and there were significant natural resources in the region which had yet to be fully exploited.

But the existence of a cheap, docile source of labor is of no consequence if it is so unskilled and unschooled as to be unable to perform the tasks which have become common to modern industrial needs. This portion of the South's labor force existed in large part as a result of changed conditions in agriculture; the one-man farm was becoming increasingly unfeasible economically, and only a love of the land and an inability to take up any other occupation were keeping many a yeoman farmer in agriculture. And at that he had to be willing to work for a fraction of industrial wages in order to be able to compete with the tractor.

The problem, then, was (is?) to ready such people for the new demands made by industry so that they could become a valuable resource of the region. Wallace recognized this problem early in his career and, as a freshman legislator, sponsored his first trade school bill. One of those first five trade schools went to his home county, Barbour, but by the end of his term as governor he could boast that 28 junior colleges, technical junior colleges, and trade schools, were situated over the state in such a way that no one was more than a bus ride away from learning a trade. The way out of the dead end is there, provided by the state. But it is up to the individual's own initiative to take

advantage of the opportunity with which he has been presented. The State can and ought to do only so much.

During Wallace's tenure, he aggressively went about securing new industries for the State. While a legislator he had sponsored the Wallace Industrial Development Act; as Governor he created the Industrial Development Authority, through which tax exemptions and other special inducements for new and expanding industries were made possible:

(It) has the power to make surveys to determine suitable locations for prospective industry and to determine the availability of labor in various areas of the state according to skill and educational levels. The authority also assists counties, towns, and local industrial development groups, not only in assessing their industrial resources but by making grants to them for the purpose of locating suitable industrial sites. It also assists them...to finance any necessary preparation of sites such as grading, draining and the construction of access roads and bridges.

The latter is an important item to an industrialist. More than once while he was governor Alabama agreed to build a bridge costing as much as \$5 million in order to get a plant costing perhaps \$100 million. This...was good business.³

As Wallace more ebulliently put it: "Yessirree, and I'll tell industry, 'We'll borrow five million dollars more and build you a bridge straight up in the air if you want.'"⁴

³"Gov. Wallace Made Alabama No. 1 in New Industry and Jobs," in Stories and Comments..., op. cit., p. 21.

⁴Quoted in Frady, op. cit., p. 138, emphasis in original. Monetary costs were not the only ones occasioned by industrial expansion. Frady reports that, when asked about the "squalid scent" from a paper mill outside Montgomery, Wallace replied "Yeah. Sho does smell sweet, don't it?" (Ibid.).

Wallace has managed to meet the demands of both industry and labor. Even with such highly unionized industries as mining and steel production within the state, trade unionism has never had much success in the deep South. It is not surprising, therefore, that Wallace could support a right-to-work law without tarnishing his political image across the state. But he has managed to keep the active friendship of labor in spite of that action. To try to refute Northern union leaders' charges against him during the 1964 and 1968 campaigns, Wallace brought Alabama union leaders to be showcased in the North. Perhaps a working arrangement was struck whereby the Alabama unions were "bought off" with the promise that their seniority and apprenticeship systems would not fall under state scrutiny--in effect, promising that segregation might still be practices, to the benefit of the white union member's job security. One long-time leader of a major union spoke with some bitterness of attempts to organize workers in the South. He was unable ever to organize anything except on a segregated basis, separate locals for Negro and white workers in the same industry. "Racism is more important than anything and everything to those people down there," he said. "Economics--pension plans, unemployment insurance--means nothing if you are not 'right' on race." Wallace could then have his cake and eat it, too; he had his right-to-work law (a necessary aid to luring industry to the state), while also having a docile labor force. That the arrangement might have been worked out by sacrificing the Negro's economic interests (just as in the Populist

compromise) is instructive.

For each of the last three years of his term, Wallace's Alabama led the South in attracting new or expanded industry--a total of 1304 instances, representing almost \$2 billion in capital investment and employing approximately 100,000 people, one-third of whom are Negroes. Why?

Industrialists like our attitude toward local government and toward the property ownership system and the free enterprise system. In the eyes of the industrialists our image is that we are for free enterprise, our people make good employees and our government appreciates new industry.⁵

Then, too, Wallace is reported to have said that "in Alabama profit is not a dirty word."⁶ The image is not one of radical economic dissent, but it does strike at the heart of the Populists' program, namely helping people.

This record industrial boom means that men and women in this state are able to enter into this great economic system of freedom called free enterprise. There are jobs, trades and professions waiting for them...where they may move upward through ambition and hard work...where the sky is the limit...where they have pride in standing on their own feet, providing for their families and acquiring true human dignity in the only way that it can be acquired.

It means their future is as bright as they have the innenuity to make it. It means they are not placed on a dismal dole passed out by the totalitarian bureaucrats.⁷

⁵Stories and Comments...., loc. cit.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

Of particular note here is the fact that these beneficiaries are preeminently Wallace's people. Providing economically for the agricultural drop-out is important, but there are other human needs which must also be met. Wallace sincerely believes city life to be brutalizing and lonely for persons displaced from a life on the land. For one who has been raised in the secure knowledge of relationships which life in a small town or rural environment provides, the prospect of life in the big city is bleak indeed. It is far better, Wallace feels, to remain in one's traditional abode, with old friends and relationships, but at a task which may be new. By locating trade schools near where the people are, Wallace has made it possible for them to go to school and learn a new trade while still plying the old one, thus lessening the shock of suddenly being immersed in a totally alien environment of physical and personal relationships while yet anxious about one's skill in the new and unsettling job.

Furthermore, he shared with Hubert Humphrey the desire to extend some form of governmental incentives (tax credits, perhaps) to those industries which were willing to decentralize and to locate plants out of the metropolitan centers. He did not choose to make anything of the plan during the bulk of his campaign, but it emerged in a conversation which took place over the roar of the airplane engines. His concern for the happiness, as well as the economic interests, of his people is genuine.

In this same vein, he is willing to do all in his power to help those who choose to do so to stay on the land. In an interesting line of reasoning regarding agricultural policy, Wallace

sees the main problem as being one of under-production. He indicates horror at the absurdity of butchering hogs and dumping potatoes in the Mississippi when there are people who haven't enough to eat. These people interestingly enough, are living in countries other than the United States. The man who is not known as an internationalist offers this as a rationalization for cutting off price supports and acreage restrictions! When pressed to consider the fact that withdrawal of such supports might well drive out many of the yeoman farmers for whom he holds such a special respect, Wallace took a deep breath, sighed, and replied, "I know, but it can't be helped." The demand for food the world around is going to be so great, and the benefits from mechanization and consolidation of small farms so considerable, that he feels the sacrifice of the yeoman farmer is the price that must be paid!

- 1) (major premise) The world must be fed.
- 2) (minor premise) The yeoman farmer is ultimately counter-productive.
- 3) (conclusion) Ergo, the yeoman farmer must ultimately go.

This syllogism is striking in its seeming inconsistency with Wallace's other priorities.

But if this be ultimate reality, nonetheless Wallace is intent upon bettering the lot of the small farmer for as long as he remains on the land; in Alabama, this means helping him to increase his yield and to market his crops. Just as he did in locating trade schools near where there was the greatest need, so did Wallace

place soil and cattle testing stations all across the state, thus hoping to help induce the farmer to bring his samples in for analysis. According to Wallace, farm income could be increased by \$200 million from soil testing and the better fertilization which should ensue.⁸ He also spent \$2 million on a liming program which, his campaign literature claims, returned a \$10 million dividend via higher crop yield on half a million acres of Alabama land.⁹ In the same vein of making advances in applied technology available to the consumer, Wallace's Alabama sponsored an Auburn University Swine Evaluation Station for locating superior strains; he estimates the increment to Alabama hog raisers is \$3 million annually.¹⁰

Stimulation of new products and markets was not overlooked either. Just as fertilizer could be used to bring fallow land back into economically feasible tillage, so did Wallace prime the pump for expansion of Alabama agriculture into new and untapped fields. He was able, after a legislative battle which lasted two sessions, to provide a state-wide network of farmers' markets wherein the producer could process and sell his food. This necessary adjunct to truck farming--heretofore an unknown quantity in Alabama--might, he felt, open new horizons to those for whom the traditional agriculture of the region was only marginally profitable.¹¹ When

⁸"Gov. George Wallace Popular With The Nation's Farmers," in Stories and Comments..., op. cit., p. 26.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., p. 8.

one considers that he also removed taxes on weed killers and reduced the levy on certain types of farm equipment, following the pattern set for industry in the state, it is little wonder that in 1967 Southern Farm Publications found him favored almost two to one over the other potential presidential aspirants (Nixon, Reagan, Johnson, Romney, and Kennedy in order of preference). Note, however, that an alternate hypothesis might also hold: that the Southern farmers polled generally preferred candidates in order of their "conservativeness." In a state with the occupational composition of Alabama, Wallace's programs were clearly in line with popular desires. His priorities concerning the ultimate fate of the yeoman farmer seem not to have been stressed.

All of these programs cost money; and while Wallace could have simply raised taxes to provide the additional revenue, governors who do that tend to lose popularity with their constituents--taxpayers who also, and most importantly, vote. Luring industry to the state increased the tax base, of course, although not enough to offset immediately the increased expenditures overall. But Wallace hit upon an ingenious plan to tax without making it "hurt". He cut the tax on certain farm machinery, for example, thus giving that sector of the electorate a small but real and highly visible gift; he then increased the taxes on cigarettes, beer, sporting events, gasoline, and automobile registrations,¹² all regressive taxes, but much less visible. It is as if he went about handing out ten dollar bills for effect while quietly taking in much more than he had given out, though in nickel and dime amounts which can more easily go unnoticed.

¹²Frady, op. cit., p. 138.

Then, too, Wallace drastically increased the state's bonded indebtedness; in the first five years under the husband and wife team such indebtedness tripled--with \$750 million in new borrowing.¹³

As Judge Roy Mayhall, former Alabama State Democratic Party Chairman, reveals:

We owe per capita in this state twice what we ever owed. And we have to pay more interest on it, because it's not a general state obligation which entails all the state's revenue--a general state obligation has to be voted on, but Wallace hasn't submitted a one of these bond programs to a popular vote.¹⁴

This sort of "taxing" is the most invisible of all and one does not run the risk of being turned down at the polls. One thing that might help to offset the deficit created by increased spending is federal aid, to which Wallace has declared his undying, if qualified, enmity: "...the Wallace administration will firmly resist dictation and control by federal agencies in areas which traditionally and constitutionally are matters for state and local control. Our way of life must be preserved."¹⁵ But Gold reports that Alabama receives \$2.50 in federal aid for every dollar it contributes in federal taxes.¹⁶ Is Wallace caught in an inconsistency? Not at all, he would submit, because there is really no such thing as federal aid. "It is taxpayers' aid, because it is your money and my money, and they just

¹³Gold, op. cit., p. 1; on this general subject see also Sherrill, op. cit., pp. 337-340.

¹⁴Quoted in Frady, op. cit., pp. 137-38.

¹⁵Quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁶Gold, op. cit., p. 3.

return a small portion to us after throwing most of it down a rat hole somewhere."¹⁷

When one adds the efforts Wallace made to publicize his economy measures (such as clamping down on the state's liquor agent system and on unauthorized use of the State's official yacht, which is kept at Mobile for the purpose of entertaining prospective customers of the State), his own spartan habits at the Governor's mansion, and the fact that, in marked contra-distinction to other administrations, no major scandals ever surfaced, it is understandable that Wallace could have the image of being both the State's biggest spender (the gross disbursements increased from \$963 million to \$1.44 billion over the first five years of the Wallaces' combined terms, for a rise of 50 percent) and one who is against additional taxes "as a matter of principle."

The dissonance between principle and practice (if we have correctly identified the principle) nowhere shows more clearly than in Wallace's actions in the area of civil rights while he was Governor of Alabama. In fact, Wallace seems to shy away from delineating just what "civil rights" a person possesses, save to say that "such rights are guaranteed to us all in the Constitution of the United States."¹⁸ (The term "civil rights" is used here in its popular sense of "civil liberties.") Among such civil rights is the right to vote, which implies the right to register on a non-discriminatory basis, the right to have one's vote counted, the right actually to direct the policies and personnel of government insofar as our electoral system allows.

¹⁷Wallace, quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 243.

¹⁸Quoted in Syron, op. cit., p. 60.

Wallace admits to being a segregationist, indicating that this label refers to a theory of human association wherein the good life is reached by each race, but separately. That whites are nearer than Negroes to the good life goes without saying, and because of their innate lack of ambition, such progress as Negroes had achieved was in large measure attributable to the goodness of white hearts:

When we speak of the Negro in the South, the image in our minds is that great residue of easy-going, basically happy, unambitious African, who constitutes 40 percent of our population, and who the white man of the South, in addition to educating his own children, has attempted to educate, to furnish public health services and civic protection.¹⁹

Wallace said in a telegram to President Johnson that "...any individual who is qualified to vote is entitled to vote."²⁰ Yet it is obvious that his "qualifications" are more comprehensive than those established by the laws covering voter registration. It would appear that ambition, or a presumed lack of it, is one of those unwritten determinants of a Negro's voting rights in Wallace's Alabama.

White Alabamians cannot justify to themselves the turning over of their city, county or state government to people who either have never exerted any leadership, or even shown any inclination toward leadership.²¹

In reference to the conditions leading up to the Selma march, Jones indicates that there are other "good" reasons why Negroes

¹⁹Quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 112.

²⁰Quoted in Ibid., p. 376.

²¹Ibid., p. 350.

ought not be registered to vote:

I do not want to imply that Dallas County (which includes Selma), or other Black Belt counties with their particular economic, social and educational problems, had been registering Negroes to any great degree. With good reason they had not. But caught in the throes of the federally sponsored social revolution, the Black Belt registrars, admittedly under federal court order pressure, were beginning to register some Negroes in accord with existing Alabama law....In the great majority of Alabama's 67 counties, where the economic conditions differed from conditions in the Black Belt, Negroes registered as a matter of course, the same as anyone else.²²

Nowhere does Jones make clear just what he intends by their "particular economic, social and educational problems," but the Black Belt, which includes Dallas County, is the area of highest Negro concentration in the state. It got its name from the rich black loam which made cotton plantations economically rewarding; but such land made necessary the use of large amounts of slave labor. The pre-Populist period saw the Negroes of the Black Belt (who had not yet been disenfranchised by the Populists) voting with their upper class masters against the hill country of the northern parts of the state (which are also markedly devoid of Negroes).

Note that Cullman County, home of former Populist Governor Jim Folsom, has but 1.1 percent non-white population compared with Macon County's high of 83.5 percent; Dallas county has a moderate 57.7 percent non-white population (see Table 1 and Fin-

²²Ibid., p. 348, emphasis added.

ure 1). In fact, all of the counties in Alabama wherein Negroes constitute more than 40 percent of the population, and thus might be able to seize political power if given the right to vote, are located in the Black Belt--that area of the "particular... problems." Where the Negro's vote means little in practical terms because of his low concentration in the population of the political subdivision, it is granted him as a matter of course, Jones says. But where he might gain political ascendancy it is withheld "with good reason." It is as simple as that. Whatever else he may be, Wallace is a student of history

and is particularly devoted to the history leading up to the War between the States. He has studied the war, Reconstruction and the South recovery. Wallace knows the South suffered during Reconstruction when Negroes ran pell-mell over white people. He knows what chaos resulted when Northern politicians placed Negroes in charge of the Southern governments.²³

Obviously he feels the outcome would be similar today, were Negroes to come to power. That is unthinkable, though, as Jones has reported (see above, Chapter 3, note 20), because government "still has the power to tax, to destroy, to make laws."²⁴ In short, to allow Negroes to vote would be to make available to them the same source of power through which the whites have for so long kept them subservient. It would ultimately serve to destroy the very basis of Southern existence. Of the drive for the 1965 Voting Rights Bill Jones could report: "Wallace realized the attempt for what it was--

²³Ibid., p. 451.

²⁴Ibid., p. 350.

a blow at the Southern power structure which had controlled voting since most states adopted new constitutions around 1900, following the Reconstruction period"²⁵ (and following the disenfranchisement of the Negro and the codification of Jim Crow laws in the wake of the Populist revolt). And again: "The old economic-social-political power structure was under what may prove to be fatal attack."²⁶ The system under attack is that which George Wallace has mastered and of which he is the ultimate embodiment.

Having thus unearthed Wallace's intentions regarding the Negro and his place in Southern society, one may then begin to take his pious pronouncements about the Negro's well-being in Alabama less seriously. Jones reports that part of Wallace's support comes "from Southerners who (want) to preserve the social and educational order which had brought harmonious race relations to the South for several generations...";²⁷ he also says that the Governor prided himself on the fact that during his administration in Alabama there had been no race riots--situations, Wallace says, in which Negroes and whites attack each other. (Evidently, such bloodshed as was widely publicized through a hostile press came about because of Negro depredations upon whites who merely defended themselves and did not "attack").

Wallace's version of the process whereby such "harmonious" relations are achieved harkens to vigilante days of old:

²⁵Ibid., p. 27.

²⁶Ibid., p. 319.

²⁷Ibid., p. 326, emphasis added.

Nigguh comes up to a white woman down here like they do up North, tryin' all that stuff, he's gonna get shot. Yessuh. Or get his head busted. That's why we don't have any of that business down here. They know what's gonna happen to 'em. They start a riot down here, first one of 'em to pick up a brick gets a bullet in the brain, that's all. And then you walk over to the next one and say, "All right, pick up a brick. We just want to see you pick up one of them bricks, NOW!" Let 'em see you shoot down a few of 'em, and you got it stopped....Hell, we got too much dignity in government now, what we need is some meanness.²⁸

Neither the process nor the intent has changed. Incidents in which the injured parties are Negroes--such as the famous Birmingham church bombing in which four little girls were killed--can be attributed to Negro militants who seek to gain sympathy for their cause.

On balance, then, what kind of man is George Wallace? He is a man curiously transformed over the course of his political career, even though he steadfastly claims that he holds the same convictions he did twenty years ago. Folsom's comment that Wallace was a Populist on economics would hold true today, as would Wallace's tenet, deeply felt, that government is supposed to help people (at least some people). But he has altered his image by altering his stand on the issue he chooses to emphasize to the near exclusion of all others.

The man who professes not to care about "theories" manifests one principle above all others: he chooses to be a successful politician, which means he wants to win. He has subordinated everything to this single goal. When he saw that drinking to excess was impolitic and that he could not be sure that he could drink in

²⁸Quoted in Frady, op. cit., pp. 8-9, emphasis in original; see also Sherrill, op. cit., pp. 312-313.

moderation, he gave up drinking. When he saw that Folsomism was becoming unpopular, he tried to destroy the public's memory of his championing of the Cullman Giant. When he saw that an opponent had gained favor with the voters by raising the ante on old age pensions, Wallace raised it yet higher. (The bidding had begun at \$80/month and had risen to \$110/month during the heat of the campaign, but actually averaged about \$80/month over the Wallace years.) When he saw that the NAACP's endorsement meant less than the Klan's, he forever removed himself from the "liberal" camp on that all-important issue--race.

Possibly the latter two stories are revealing. One of Wallace's political objectives has been to be a bit distinctive, so as better to stand out for the voter, but to stand out in a positive way. The realistic \$80 figure which he had offered in pension became lost when Folsom raised the ante, so Wallace had to raise him back. The champion of the Negro failed to profit from that label (relative only to his Klan-endorsed opponent), so he changed it. Wallace is not a racist according to John Kohn, typed by Frady as the "consultant-intellectual, the Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the discreet guru of Wallace's Administration,"²⁹ and a self-professed racist. But, says Kohn, "he had enough practical political sense to know cussin' nigras was popular."³⁰ And yet, one would not say that Wallace was an insincere man. Frady pinpointed it brilliantly when he said:

²⁹Ibid., p. 142.

³⁰Ibid., p. 144.

He seemed to mesmerize himself with his own posturing. "He made himself believe what he had to believe out of political necessity, out of that inordinate ambition of his," says one of his old associates from the Folsom days. "He used to be anything but a racist, but with all his chattering, he managed to talk himself into it."³¹

That he has so mesmerized himself in no way detracts from the obvious sincerity with which he now supports his secessionist policies. Nor does he accept the charge that he panders to The People by telling them what they want to hear. Day after day during the campaign he asked his audiences, "What's wrong with tellin' the People what they want to hear?" The roar of approval from the crowd was the weapon with which he slew his straw man.

If one accepts political advancement as the primum mobilier of Wallace's world, all else falls into place. One can see, then, how from his complex and sometimes contradictory Populist heritage he could have been transformed through political exigency into that which he is today. To Populist sympathizers, Wallace might appear to have been spoiled by success. If he had ever been in the Huey Long school of economic politics, as his appellation "the most liberal" Alabama Representative might suggest, political success had wooed and won him.

So well did Wallace learn the subtle niggering admired so much in Alabama campaigns--wherein one mentions beatniks and federal snoopers and other understood code words for racism--that when John Patterson tried to make a comeback in 1966 against Lurleen, he found that the incumbent had preempted the act and now he, Patterson, was in the same role Wallace filled in 1958, left with nothing to talk about that

³¹Ibid., p. 141.

appealed to the rabble. Sadly the old racist told a meeting of campaign workers, "You can talk about roads and schools and old-age pensions all day and the crowds will stand there and watch the traffic go by."³²

This premise, gleaned from Alabama politics, is that on which Wallace promulgated his 1968 Presidential campaign. He had not given up on "helping folks", far from it. But being right on race was the necessary if not sufficient condition in Alabama politics. By adopting such a posture, Wallace might then focus on out-bidding his opponent in traditional fashion. On the national scene, however, his racial posture was anything but the "protective coloration" it had been in Alabama. And though his economic views might well have differentiated him significantly from Nixon and even Humphrey, he chose not to emphasize them. As a result, the other conservative portion of his Populist heritage became the totality of his candidacy for the vast bulk of the American electorate. Perceptions in this case proving the ultimate functional reality, Wallace made himself the Insurgent on the Right. It might well have been from the left, but it was not; by the candidate's choice.

IV: Decision to Run

It is perhaps, a sign of the insularity of the South that in a land where, so the story goes, any boy might grow up to become President, the political aspirations of George Wallace had from youth been directed toward attaining the Governor's mansion in Montgomery. Possibly no one, the candidate included, knows just when the thought of running for President first entered his mind. It might have been not long after the first blush of victory in 1962 gave way to more pragmatic matters, when Wallace first faced the sobering consideration that victory, too, had its costs: at age 42, he had "arrived", while leaving himself nowhere to go. As Governor of Alabama, he was restrained by law from succeeding himself in that post.

Because Alabama's chief executive is elected in "off-years" to a four-year term, Wallace had a grace period during which he could plot his strategy for the ensuing years; his position as Governor gave him the "forum", as he puts it, to help him build the image that he would use (to catapult) him to new heights. There were several options open to him: having gained the principal post in his state, he could not well settle for a lesser one; so unless he could remain as Governor for a second term he was to be forced onto the national scene in some capacity. He might have sought the sinecure provided by a federal judgeship, having once served on the Alabama bench, but with implacable enemies in power in Washington, the thought of ever netting such an appointment was not realistic. Then, too, Wallace had tasted

the bitter wine of impotence while on the bench, though he did manage to manufacture a great deal of political capital from his post as an obscure county judge. He knew full well that the initiatives of the bench are severely limited and that it possesses no infallible means by which to ensure compliance with, or execution of, its dicta. And besides, he was not ready to accept what would, for him, be a "retirement".

If not the federal bench, he might have turned to the Congress. Here he would have been dealing with an Alabama constituency, one in which he would certainly have been the choice for whatever post he chose to seek. But Wallace chafed under the thought that he would have to start at the bottom of the seniority list. Knowing the workings of that system, he felt that he would be submerged on the least desirable committees and end up having even less power in Alabama than he did as her Governor. Nor did he feel himself to possess the legislative temperament; the endless debating and having to work with others--to compromise--was not for him. In his own eyes, he was an executive. But to be upwardly mobile while yet remaining in the ranks of executives meant there was but one post to which he might aspire--the Presidency of the United States.

To seek the Presidency must have seemed an impossible dream, yet such a goal was in some ways easier than either a judgeship or a powerful post on the Hill. Wallace might employ the old Southern strategy of threatening a third-party movement to force one of the national parties into accepting him as its standard bearer, or he might actually carry out such a threat--a la Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond in 1948. And President was what he wanted to be. As such, he would have to rely on no one to achieve a great deal; he would

not have to compromise with congressional or Court liberals, but might merely refuse to see that offensive laws were executed, in the mold of Andrew Jackson. Even his purposive goals might be fulfilled through the sole expedient of executive orders.

As a practical politician, he knew full well that the Presidency was the focal point of power in the political system; quite openly he sought that power. He was, no doubt, encouraged in his pursuit of the ultimate goal by the fact that, his victory having come in an "off-year", he would not have to give up his post in order to seek another; such is the measure of job security that politics can offer.

But the siren call of the White House must have been dulled by the realities of his political stock on the national scene. Wallace had always been that special breed--a Southern Democrat. As such, he was effectively shut out of consideration for the Presidency by his own party, which had not nominated a man without experience outside the South in over a century. He reports that he would not have felt right running as a Republican, nor (as the events of 1968 were to demonstrate) would the Grand Old Party have been comfortable with him in its midst.

The only alternatives were not appealing. He might threaten to lead the Southern bloc in a walkout if the Democratic Party did not accede to his demands; the irony of the situation is apparent when one considers that he had led the lovalists in 1948 when Strom Thurmond walked out over Hubert Humphrey's civil rights plank. The ploy rested on two key assumptions: one, that the Democrats wanted above all to win the election and, two, that they felt they could not

possibly do so without the South. (The latter point is reminiscent of the so-called "Southern Strategy" which Barry Goldwater presumably espoused in the 1964 election). And, on top of that, the exercise would inevitably prove futile, given Wallace's real goals. His rhetoric aside (but see below), Wallace's main goal has always appeared to be personal officeholding. No mere programmatic goal might suffice, and in his pursuit of power he would not want to accept the dead-end of the Vice-Presidency--the only office the national Democratic party might conceivably throw his way.

Merely threatening a walk-out, then was not enough. He needed some positive inducement to make his party seriously consider him for its Presidential nomination; he knew that the party label is the sine qua non of politics, for he had profited greatly from it in Alabama. Formation of a third party was an alternative, but never an alternative to he preferred to capturing one of the two major parties as a vehicle.

The advantages which accrue to the nominees of the major parties are so numerous and so significant as almost to preclude any third-party effort bent on winning the election. (It is true, of course, that third parties can and do fulfill many goals other than winning by vigorously prosecuting a campaign).

There are really two major groups of such benefits. The first such group stems from the loyalties which the party, not the candidate, has generated over time among members of the electorate. It is not untrue to say that one learns his politics in much the same way he learns his religion...and that he changes

the one about as frequently as the other. Most of the orientation to politics a person receives comes from his parents in the home. He learns that his relevant others are Democrats or Republicans long before he can attach reasons thereunto, or come to reason out such matters for himself. But the emotional, pre-cognitive attachment remains, often in face of substantial reasons for change.

It is true that Wallace's region, the South, has shown great willingness to change its "normal" Democratic voting patterns for presidential elections (as, for example, with Hoover, Eisenhower, and Nixon, among Republicans, to say nothing of Thurmond and Wallace). But Wallace's true measure of success would come not by carrying the South but by appealing to partisan identifiers from across the country whose loyalties to the traditional parties have perhaps been less volatile over time than have the South's.

The impact of such a deep-seated emotional attachment which is formed so early in life is immense. It provides a ready-made bias, so to speak, which operates to color the individual's intelligent assessment of political reality. One responds automatically to certain cues as being those of a friend, others as being annointed by the enemy, merely by the presence of a party label. This is the simplest of possible cues and one which the authors of The American Voter found (through self-classification) in approximately 90% of a series of national samples of the electorate.¹ Moreover, no more than 20% of their sample had ever changed party affiliation, with 56% having never voted for any save their party's nominee

¹ Angus Campbell, et al. The American Voter, John Wiley (New York: 1964), p. 69. The percentage of non-identifiers varied, between October, 1952 and October, 1958, from a low of 9% to a high of 14% of the total sample. "True" independents constituted roughly half of this group, as did "apoliticals."

in the Presidential race.² Campbell, et al, suggest that, because of "the electorate's slight involvement in politics and limited awareness of public affairs... [and] the nonideological quality of its thinking," the impact of party identification is "pervasive".³ In lieu of any other stimuli, party identification will prove to be the determinant of the individual's vote, and, as through the operation of selective perception, for example, the chance that competing stimuli will "get through" is relatively slim. When speaking of the great mass of people, too, it is not an ideological stimulus so much as an emotional one which might induce one to change party identification--cataclysmic events, such as the Civil War and the Depression, having led to the only two massive shifts of this kind the voting public of this nation has ever experienced. As Polsby and Wildavsky remark, "...fundamental changes in party allegiance among large numbers of people are not likely to arise from their reasoned look at issues."⁴

In fact, as these same authors suggest, "most people will have made up their minds how to vote in 1964 before the candidates are chosen..."⁵ Either these persons were astute political observers who felt that the nominations were a foregone conclusion, hence allowing them to assess ultimate reality before the fact, or they were making their electoral judgment in light of loyalties and attachments

²Ibid., p. 88.

³Ibid., p. 290.

⁴Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections, Scribner (New York: 1963), p. 14, in original.

⁵Ibid., p. 7. Italics added.

which transcend the immediate and the particular--party identification. Given "the electorate's slight involvement in politics and limited awareness of public affairs" one must rule out the first possibility for all save the knowledgeable few. Truly, as Donald Stokes has said, "No element of the political lives of Americans is more impressive than voter's political loyalties."⁶

That one party or the other has a lead in registration or nonularity at some point in time is of less import than the fact that even the second place party is possessed of 20-40% of the electorate which is favorably disposed to it. In contrast the third party candidate falls heir to virtually no such pool of pre-disposed supporters. If this is really a splinter movement (rather than a true third party movement), the candidate may find that he has certain factions of political activists who will join him in leaving one of the two major parties for the nonce. But if he be a true third party candidate, one who seeks to create a permanent, lasting symbol with which one might identify over time in competition with the major parties, then his job is doubly hard: he has no group of favorably disposed voters (identifiers) whose tendencies he can reinforce, nor any dormant identifiers whose fires he might rekindle. Rather, he must either convert persons formerly partisan to one of the two major parties (the most difficult task of the three) or he must draw persons not before among the politically active into his camp (though in the over - 21 age group such persons seem at best to be few in number).

The second group of benefits stemming from gaining the head of a major party's ticket is organizational: having done it before, the

⁶Donald E. Stokes, "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Electors", Journal of Politics, 24 (November, 1962), p. 682.

major parties have a ready supply of campaign workers and financial contributors (though never a surplus of either) which the third party must generate anew. Further, and of particular significance, the election laws in each of the 50 states have been written in state legislatures by major party adherents. Perhaps through a fear of being "done unto" upon a change of administrations, the party in power in a state has shown remarkable restraint in legislating against the opposing major party, but members of both major parties have presented a common front in prosecuting the fight against any and all fledgling third parties.

As a result, except in a few states the third party is stymied even in its attempt to get its name on the ballot. In states like Massachusetts, where a political party is defined as a party which drew more than 3% of the total vote in the preceeding gubernatorial election,⁷ the major parties are further advantaged by being able to spend their resources of time and money on presenting their candidate and programs; minor parties must expend those same resources in attempting to gain ballot position. Thus consumed with the fight to gain official status anew before each election, third parties are hampered in their efforts to develop the issues and arguments which are their particular raison d'etre. The composition of Wallace's 1968 campaign staff and the post-election events in several states (where the American party must run candidates in 1970 or lose ballot position for 1972) are testimony enough to the primacy with which Wallace viewed these legal barriers to his dream. The first and foremost hurdle his third party movement had to surmount was legal and technical.

⁷H.R. Penniman, Sait's American Parties and Elections, 4th ed. Appleton-Century-Crofts (New York: 1942), p. 161.

By his own admission, Wallace did not want to run as a third-party candidate. He wanted to lead one of the two ready made campaign organizations extant--those of the two major parties--but he was in no way in line for the nomination from either one. Unlike running as a third-party candidate, the major effort for the nominee of a major party would not be the general election campaign, but the campaign for the nomination. The key to the nomination would be to make himself attractive to the professional party politicians who dominate the conventions; the question was how to do so.

Esteem in the eyes of party pros could be generated in several ways: one could spend years of service to the party, quietly accumulating political debts through yeoman service on the rubber chicken circuit (the route chosen by Richard Nixon in his latest political resucitation); one could seek to become "everybody's second choice" and wait for a draft when the convention found itself unable to settle on any of the factional leaders (although there is overwhelming evidence in support of the aphorism that "the only thing one catches from a draft is a cold"); or, one could play on the kingmaker's professionalism--their mania for winning--by attempting to prove before the convention, either through opinion polls or primary elections, that he is the candidate who can lead the party to victory in November (Nelson Rockefeller's eternal gambit).

To capture one of the major parties, it was clear that he needed to pose himself as a serious candidate, one capable of wooing and winning a national audience. The Democratic party's longtime stance toward its Southern leaders shows tacit acceptance of the fact that the politician who excels at the sectional task is one who has internalized behavior patterns at odds with, or at least irrelevant to, pursuing a national post as anything save a vice-presidential candidate to balance the

ticket. Moreover, although he had led the Alabama loyalists in 1948 when Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat splinter defected from the Democratic party, Wallace's continued castigation of national Democratic policies and personnel for the delectation of down home audiences had caused in irreconcilable rift between him and the national Democratic leadership. They would not have him by choice.

Nor was he a desperation candidate--their only hope--for the party had an incumbent President who would, it was naturally assumed, seek the "automatic" renomination of his party. No, if Wallace wanted to become President, it seemed he would have to show that he could be President of all the people. If he could demonstrate that his appeal was not solely sectional, he might combine his control of the Southern bloc with the image of potential winner to persuade the Convention to give him the nomination. The question, then, was not what he needed to do, but how he was to do it.

V: National Probings

Rather than pursuing a set strategy with set goals, Wallace always seems to be operating on an ad hoc basis, improvising responses as events occur. And instead of locking himself in through becoming dependent on any particular outcome, he seems content to generate publicity whenever possible, cognizant that he can bank on its residual effects in future events yet unplanned. In this light there can properly be no precise beginning noted for his push toward the Presidency. His first real national publicity came in 1963, shortly after he became Governor, with his vain attempt to "stand in the schoolhouse door" and thus prevent two Negro students from enrolling in the all-white University of Alabama. It was a perfect example of the technique of fight and fall back which Wallace, who lacks many real successes for which he can claim credit, relies upon constantly.

The episode must be counted a success for one seeking to break onto the national political scene, for as a direct result of his "stand" he was proffered hundreds of invitations to speak his mind across the nation. Not a few of the invitations were from institutions of higher learning, which, as Jones points out, provide "an excellent forum for a speaker who wishes to have his message known nation-wide."¹

Accordingly, Wallace decided to undertake a speaking tour across the nation, though with no definite goal in mind:

¹Jones, op. cit., p. 105.

It seemed...that such a tour could very well be the build up he would need if he did decide to enter any of the presidential primaries, or in any event, it would be helpful in whatever course he chose to chart in the 1964 elections.²

The first of the engagements were booked into the heart of his arch-rival. President John F. Kennedy's, stronghold-- four Ivy League universities, beginning with Kennedy's alma mater, Harvard.

The Harvard speech was, by all accounts, a virtuoso performance, although some of the impact no doubt arose from the gap between what Wallace had been presumed to be after his "stand" and the image he chose to project that November night. Carefully tailoring the speech to the audience, and displaying none of the clinched fist rhetoric which marked his 1968 campaign, Wallace proceeded to give what Jones calls "a frank, scholarly approach to the racial issue."³ To Jones' mind a "proud, yet humble man"⁴ on that rostrum, Wallace's history lesson was replete with such uncharacteristically arty passages as this, which sounds reminiscent of John Kohn:

Let us look at the 1954 school case, *Crown vs. Topeka*, the lawyers call it. It did not, I assure you, as some seem to think, spring instantly into existence full-grown and ready for action equipped with injunctive process, preferred appeal, set bayonets and all its counterments like Botticelli would have us believe Venus came to the shores of Greece full-grown and full-blown on the breath of Boreas.⁵

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁴Ibid., p. 111.

⁵Ibid., p. 114.

Even the peroration was a model of forbearance and Grady-esque reconciliation:

To ask us to equate our children, classroom for classroom, with a race that is two years behind at the sixth grade and three years behind at the twelfth grade is to ask us to deprive our children of the education to which they are entitled and, in the effort to give this, we strain our resources to the utmost. It is our problem, not yours. Your problem here is yours, not ours. We ask you to believe that we are civilized, humane and considerate of human rights. We give you the credit for so being and we ask you to extend us the same consideration.⁶

Because he was at the time serving as the governor of his state, and because the state was paying for his trips, Wallace combined politics with attempts to lure industry to Alabama--one of his chief accomplishments, and the cornerstone of his efforts to bring progress to the state. This enabled him to play down the only thing that had been heretofore about him in the eyes of millions of non-Southern American voters, that he had a distinctive posture on race. Alabamians knew that, while one had to be "right on race", it was but a necessary, not a sufficient condition to success. The attempt to lure industry to Alabama was one of the major non-racial accomplishments to which Wallace could point. With the non-racial emphasis, he, like Grady, was met with a favorable reception in the supposedly--hostile North.

Nor were his personal political fortunes the only beneficiaries of his speaking tours. Wallace, more than any other politician of national

⁶Ibid., p. 117-118.

stature, is the personal embodiment of his constituents--reflecting their hopes, their fears, their every perception. One of the most venerable traditions in the South, again dating to Gradv, is to feel that Northerners (1) look down at Southerners and (2) act as corrupting influences upon Southern youths who (misguidedly) stray north of Mason and Dixon's line in search of an education.

It was a part of his regimen, therefore, to dispel the image he and his fellow Alabamians had of the Northerner's image of the state and its inhabitants--namely that of the uncouth "redneck".

On one such trip to Portland, Oregon, Wallace observed:

The taxpayers of Alabama are paying
for it, and I don't believe they mind.
I have every reason to believe I
represent the majority opinion of Alabama
people who want to help emancipate
you folks from distorted versions
of our state presented by the left-wing
liberal news media.⁷

At Harvard, where students were being exposed, during their most impressionable years, to the Harvard philosophy, "as liberal as it may be",⁸ Wallace ate dinner with the contingent of young Alabamians. After repeating to them much of his inaugural address, and in an effort to make sure the students understood him, Wallace admonished them: "Don't be ashamed of your heritage. Don't ever apologize for being from Alabama."⁹ It was almost as if he were speaking, in loco parentis, for the folks back home who feared that they were being shunted aside for something which

⁷Wallace, quoted in Jones, op. cit., p. 129.

⁸Jones, op. cit., p. 111.

⁹Wallace, quoted in Jones, loc. cit.

they did not understand. The message of pride in his people was one of the most important he could deliver for his constituency.

It was on a foray into that bastion of liberal causes, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, that the Governor's staff became sold on the idea of having their man enter the Wisconsin primary, scarcely a month hence. They felt that, while he had been greeted warmly wherever he went, he had done particularly well in Joe McCarthy's old state, "where students and citizens alike embraced the Governor."¹⁰ A Wisconsinite who must remain nameless hounded the Governor's staff until he was granted a brief interview, during which he proceeded to line out the potential inherent in the Wisconsin race and the legal requirements for obtaining ballot position. This was not the first such suggestion Wallace had received; he had been quietly exploring the Ohio situation but, upon being advised that technical difficulties forced that state out of consideration, he chose Wisconsin as the first test. His hat was in the ring!

The decision to enter the primaries took place amidst extremely favorable circumstances for Wallace. He did not need to make a choice of offices to contest, nor did a bad showing in the national outings necessarily besmirch the Governor's record. While one may relevantly question what reasonable expectations of success Wallace harbored concerning his efforts during the 1964 primaries, he was already adept at rationalizing defeat. Utilizing the "fight and fall back" technique, Wallace often was able to maneuver

¹⁰Jones, op. cit., p. 171.

himself into the enviable position of being able to call anything, even utter defeat, a victory, given the impossible odds he had faced. Often he was able to enter the lists championing hopelessly lost causes yet emerge the hero in the popular estimation, demonstrating that the style with which the battle was fought often displaced the "real" issue in the public mind.

Jones continues the impressive catalog of benefits which would accrue to the Governor from merely entering the primary campaign:

Wallace felt that any showing of strength by him would mean a slow-up of the proposed civil rights legislation and a stall, for the time being, of the on-rushing grab for power by those in control of the federal government. Too, the Governor saw the primaries as a vehicle he could use to build support for the free elector movement in the South. The Governor felt as long as Kennedy was President there was a real possibility the South might maneuver into position to control the election of the President in November, 1964.¹¹

At the very least, he would be generating publicity which could be "banked" for later use in almost any sort of political endeavor.

If one assumes he held serious aspirations toward winning the Oval Office, major benefits from contesting the primaries appear. Just as the South has remained distinct from the rest of the nation in numerous ways, so has the politician she has produced. Concerned with her own peculiar problems (derived from the "peculiar institution"), the South has taken an involuted posture in politics. Too, she has been content with points of negative access,

¹¹Jones, op. cit., p. 172.

at which the changes most threatening to her way of life might be blocked in favor of the status quo. No need had she felt for majoritarian action: a firmly-ensconced minority served her well. With success among southern politicians at local and state levels reinforcing behavior patterns that seem to have had only sectional viability, none save Huey Long had possessed personality and power enough to attempt national dominance. Though Wallace steadfastly refused to accept the belief that his was a sectional appeal (at least in his public utterances), his campaign literature attempts to dispel the myth that a Southerner cannot be elected President.¹² Could Wallace, the preeminent Southern politician, impose his successful brand of sectional politics on the nation as a whole, or could (would) he adapt his appeal to a constituency not his own? The primaries offered the perfect opportunity to test his appeal in a dry run. If he were successful, he might continue to prosecute his case; if unsuccessful, he might fall back, to regroup, to restructure, and to fight again.

If he really did harbor the idea that he might "go national", the primaries promised an opportunity to test another component of his campaign--the organization of the supporting apparatus. Was it sufficient to the task? Did he even know what was entailed by such an undertaking? All of these important questions might be answered in only one way--through experience.

The importance of making such an effort, even in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds, had not been overlooked by Wallace

¹²"Many Presidents Were Born in South, The Record Shows," in Stories and Comments..., op. cit., n. 7.

in the run-off to the 1958 Governor's race. "The prospects of winning were bleak to the point of hopelessness," Jones reports, "...however...Wallace could still look toward 1962. He decided to run."¹³ With benefits both personal and programmatic, the thought of running in the Presidential Primaries proved irresistible. As an intimate told Frady, "he grabbed it and ran like a hungry fish."¹⁴

The Wisconsin primary was to mark the beginning of a concerted effort at a single-issue campaign: its focal point, the Civil Rights Bill pending before Congress. Before entering the Wisconsin test, Wallace analyzed his mail and decided that "there was much greater support in the North for a states' rights campaign against the Civil Rights Bill"¹⁵ than popularly thought. Recognizing the basis for any Wallace campaign, Ralph Adams, the president of Troy State College, once a member of Wallace's Alabama cabinet and a top level aide during the '64 campaign, suggested that when the persistent caller suggested trying the Wisconsin primary, "I thought he was a crackpot...Wisconsin seemed like the last state he wanted to run in--they had no Negro problem and they had their own civil-rights law. The whole idea seemed like a joke."¹⁶ Adam's judgment was made, no doubt, in light of Alabama standards. During the unsuccessful attempt Wallace made for the governor's chair in 1958, the Opelika Daily News had opined: "If Wallace can steer the coming gubernatorial campaign around the issue of desegregation vs.

¹³Jones, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁴Frady, op. cit., p. 174.

¹⁵Jones, op. cit., p. 173.

¹⁶Quoted in Frady, op. cit., p. 174.

integration, he will have half-won his race...."¹⁷ It appears that Wallace simply transferred those standards to the national scene when he began his 1964 campaign: he tried to make race, specifically the Civil Rights Bill, the issue.

If one were interested in maximizing immediate returns, and if one were campaigning in an area known to be relatively homogeneous, and if one could find an issue which was sufficiently salient to the voters in that area, then running a single-issue campaign would be easily justifiable. But Wallace's situation at this time was far different in each of the three vital areas. He was, to be sure, interested in graphic impact that could only come from a large vote total in the state, but he was not interested in appealing to the voters of Wisconsin alone. Any issues which he might consider developing would have to be applicable elsewhere across the nation if he were to avoid the charge that he pandered to the electorate, telling each different sub-section what it wanted to hear in return for votes. So, although he happened to be trekking through the snows of Wisconsin, his sights were, of necessity, set on a larger and more heterogeneous group of voters than that state's boundaries encompassed.

Nor, at first glance, was Wisconsin particularly attuned to any of the issue orientations that Wallace had shown in Alabama. He did, and does, have strong views on such things as the proper role of government spending,¹⁸ but his economic views are not dissimilar enough from those regularly espoused by other national

¹⁷Opelika (Ala) Daily News, Jan. 24, 1958, cited in Jones, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁸See above, ch. 2, notes 31 and 32.

politicians as to build him a distinctive image, nor are economic issues of overriding importance to the American electorate (as followers of Karl Marx might ruefully attest). Wallace's "liberal" spending policies might have been distinctive in fiscally conservative Wisconsin, but not so across the nation. If he were pointing toward the larger goal, then he could not expect to "ride" on economics alone.

But there was an issue--race--which had become identified with Wallace over time and on which he was far removed from the public position of any national politician. Whether he had adopted it originally out of conviction or expediency is of little moment any longer; it is "his." Across the nation, he was, as it increasingly appeared, expected to talk about race. And if Wisconsin did not appear to be fertile ground for such an appeal, as Adams reported, Wallace had had what he considered great success in such unlikely places as Harvard, had he not? (Although Sherrill's unsympathetic description of Wallace-"super-cocky"¹⁹-is exaggeration, the candidate's optimism in the face of long odds is abundant). And it had come to be Wallace's "natural" issue; from Americans' fears of the Negro had come the lion's share of that political capital which convinced Wallace to try for the Presidency. That he would feel out the rest of the nation on race was inevitable; having met with success in those probings, that he would emphasize it is understandable. And, upon closer analysis of Wisconsin, that he emphasized it was even to prove desirable.

Primaries are short campaigns and as Wallace was relatively unknown he had to work rapidly and efficiently in stimulating support.

¹⁹Sherrill, op. cit., p. 352.

In such a situation, the single-issue campaign is an excellent strategem to follow. One needs, of course, some simple issue that will appeal to the mass of the voters. That appeal ought really to be emotional in character, perhaps taking the form of creating an image or facade. There is not time, nor is there the inclination (in the great mass of our voters), to dig beneath the surface. And by striking to the emotions, one would by-pass the laborious and time-consuming process of reasoned change, before which so many barriers seem to lie.

Following that, one would want to limit the campaign only to the issue that creates the highest net rate of return. Wallace did this through refusing to come to grips with issues others tried to inject into the campaign, even going so far as to refuse to become informed on a major popular concern in order to keep his "best" side paramount in the voters' minds:

During the question-and-answer period, one student asked Wallace about what he thought was the best policy in Viet Nam. The Governor replied that he wasn't qualified to answer that because he had not been briefed by the State Department. It was a good answer because, a few days later, President Johnson announced that all candidates for President would be offered briefings by the State Department and Wallace never took advantage of the offer, because he had his civil rights issue and made the campaign revolve around it, no matter how hard his opponents tried to inject other issues.²⁰

Jones openly suggests the role that the race issue was intended to play for Wallace when, in discussing President Johnson's campaign visit to Indiana, he states:

²⁰Jones, op. cit., n. 240.

The President's visit, if it did no more, took some of the attention away from the Wallace attack on the Civil Rights Bill, and focused it, for a day at least, on the economic aspects of the campaign. It gave (Indiana's Democratic Leaders) an opportunity to portray the party's attitude toward the economy and away from the emotion-packed civil rights discussion.²¹

And in Maryland, Jones reports, Wallace attempted to dissuade his staff from mud-slinging, the oldest of expedient political acts, on the grounds of expediency: "The Civil Rights Bill is the issue, and let's not let them draw the people's minds away from that by engaging in the mud-slinging they are".²²

The importance of "the issues" for Wallace cannot be over-estimated.

Quite early in the campaign he tried, then rejected, the traditional hand-shaking sort of vote-seeking. The decision was a sound one for several reasons. Persons who come to spend some time with him by and large find him difficult to dislike on a personal basis, even if they are vehemently opposed to that which he symbolizes. But though it would have been an effective technique, the number of persons to be so contacted was far too great to make it feasible. In a short campaign where he was unknown to the vast majority of the electorate, he simply could not afford the time to use the personal touch. Nor was the handshake a weapon which would bear the emotional impact necessary to convert someone into becoming a Wallace supporter. It might serve to renew the flagging spirits of an unknown worker in party headquarters,

²¹Jones, op. cit., p. 249.

²²Wallace, quoted in Ibid., p. 272.

but in the beginning he needed to have a more emotional type of impact and that upon much greater numbers of persons.

By relying on speeches and news conferences, Wallace was also able to control his environment more completely than if he were on a street corner. Even though he might be 99% successful, he feared the unfavorable press coverage that might result from that other 1% of the persons he met.²³ Almost at its inception the campaign adopted a near-phobic concern with the security of the Governor's person against the possible assassination which he firmly believes to be his fate;²⁴ this, too, rules out exposure to the public without the protection of his bulletproof lectern.

The issues, then, were to create the emotional impact of the campaign, and Wallace expected people to vote for him on that basis.²⁵ A graphic illustration of the technique that was to prove effective occurred in South Milwaukee, when the Governor spoke to a wildly enthusiastic crowd in Serb Hall. The sponsor of the speech, tavernkeeper Bruno Gruber, ordered two Negroes, who had refused to stand for the national anthem, to leave the hall. Then, when Negroes shouted "police dogs" while the candidate was being introduced, Gruber, a former marine retorted:

Let me tell you about police dogs. Maybe we need some here. Who was it that beat up an elderly white woman in my neighborhood a few weeks ago? They were three of your countrymen. Who is it that beats up newshovs, rapes our women, attacks old women? You know who it is--it's your colored brothers. How long can we tolerate this? Did I go to Gaudalcanal

²³Ibid., p. 193.

²⁴See, for example, his mother's remark in Frady, op. cit., p. 63.

²⁵Jones, op. cit., p. 193.

and come back to something like this?²⁶

Wallace, who really does hope that violence will not down his path because of the bad publicity it will produce, had to calm the crowd before he could deliver his message. But his speech is a logical extension of the ex-marine's remarks, which are unique only in that one does not often hear them uttered so prominently and publicly; the speech does seek to stimulate the spectre of fear that seems to exist within many Americans. Wallace was striking close to home when he told the audience at Serb Hall that the Civil Rights Bill would, for example, destroy job seniority.²⁷ The fear of economic damage,--immediately and personally relevant--coupled with an emotional and perhaps irrational fear of the dark, unknown mass might reasonably be expected to give expression an image and to project it with great impact upon the electorate.

Obviously the stratagem worked. Indiana was chosen as a state in which to contest the Presidency because Wallace felt that, with Ohio removed from consideration, "Indiana offered the best opportunity to show backlash against the Civil Rights Bill."²⁸ In Maryland, too Wallace was to profit from backlash, this time aroused by a story in the Baltimore Sun that stated "Baltimore will have a Negro majority in the city council by 1970 and a Negro mayor by 1975 to become the first Negro-controlled city in the country..."²⁹ Wallace got 42%

²⁶Jones, op. cit., p. 217.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Jones, op. cit., p. 229.

²⁹Jones, op. cit., p. 268.

of the Democratic presidential primary vote in Maryland and claims that he was robbed of a win by election officials.³⁰

But, to the campaign staff, the most signal victory came in Wisconsin, where Wallace's vote total was the smallest of any of the 1964 State primaries he contested. Its import was that it backed up the impression garnered from the Governor's mail after the Stand in the Schoolhouse Door: "The turnout showed conclusively for the first time that large segments of people everywhere believed in local government...."³¹

And just where did Wallace's support come from in the 1964 presidential primaries? Even in Wisconsin, where the open primary allows voters to "cross over", thereby endowing them with the option of choosing which party they wish to influence with their primary vote, the votes seem to have come largely from traditional Democratic strongholds. It is not surprising that this should be so, considering that Wallace was running as a Democrat. He garnered almost 100,000 votes in the three heavily Democratic congressional districts around Milwaukee to Gov. Reynolds' 175,000 and Republican John Byrnes' 66,000. (Reynolds was the stand-in candidate for President Johnson and at that time a highly unpopular political figure in the state. The Republican party re-captured the statehouse in the election following his administration).

In both Wisconsin and Indiana, the Wallace vote centered in areas which were heavily populated by organized labor. In Indiana,

³⁰ Jones, op. cit., p. 304-05.

³¹ Jones, op. cit., p. 176, emphasis added.
"Local government" is often used as a euphemism for "segregation" or discrimination of some kind. Some people, value local government for other reasons.

Wallace even won three delegates to the Democratic National Convention from the heavily industrialized Gary-Hammond area. (Gary proceeded subsequently to elect a Negro mayor, Richard Hatcher, thus becoming the first major American city to do so). It would appear that race is far from the only force motivating voting behavior. This success was all the more encouraging to Wallace because he had met almost total opposition from but two sources: the clergy and the leadership of organized labor. Wallace had been on good terms with much of Alabama's labor leadership,³² many of whom, laden with long telegrams and petitions bearing the names of Southern workers, were willing emissaries for spreading the gospel to their Northern brethren. Wallace seldom failed to introduce such persons when he spoke before labor-oriented audiences, hoping to produce the immediate and emotional impact which can only come if the audience grants the speaker acceptance as "one of us".

Except for the barrier presented by having an incumbent President in his party, the coalition that was apparently responding to Wallace's appeal was indeed impressive enough to give rise to dreams of the Presidency. He had been successful with laborers, even against the wishes of their leaders; he had been successful in the bedroom suburbs of Baltimore with persons of a different economic and occupational orientation; and he had, of course, the South in his pocket. But an examination of the sources from which contributions had come, and the reasons for which they had been sent, produced an even more impressive catalogue:

The contributions came from anxious
parents wishing to preserve their
neighborhood schools, from young

³²See above, p.61-62.

home owners wishing to protect their investment. It was from union members believing in job security and wanting to protect their jobs, from small businessmen wanting to advance the free enterprise system and protect the profit system, ...from Southerners who wanted to preserve the social and educational order which had brought harmonious race relations to the South for several generations, from police officers throughout the nation who knew the crime statistics and who knew how the Communists had infiltrated the civil rights movement and were making the streets of our nation's cities unsafe.³³

It was a list of persons that knew no sectional boundaries but who were tied together by the fears they held in common. They saw in Wallace one who might turn the country around through strong leadership, he saw in them the stuff of a national campaign.

But if the desire to mold a national campaign out of the raw material described above was strengthened by the three state efforts, the best route to follow toward that end remained very much in doubt. Jones suggests that Wallace was not considering a third party move in 1964. Certainly a practical politician of his type would not wish to give up the obviously preferable vehicle, the major party, without even attempting to utilize it, so it is reasonable to assume that he was, in fact, hoping to influence the Democratic Convention by his campaign. Perceiving that Lyndon Johnson was prepared to take the same course which the South had found abhorrent under the late John Kennedy, Wallace felt that a strong showing in the primaries would not be lost on the party's professional politicians, who would

³³Ibid., p. 326. For parallax on Wallace's view of the South's "harmonious race relations" see above, pp. 32-33, 72-73.

probably not want to enter the general election campaign without to some degree mollifying an essential part of their coalition. Or, in the rhetoric of Wallace's campaign kickoff in Appleton, Wisconsin;

I believe that if we get a good vote in Wisconsin, it will have repercussions all over this nation. We can have a voice in the national convention and in the party platform. We can let it be known that we are sick and tired of some of the things that are taking place in Washington.³⁴

Perhaps the most significant evidence that Wallace had at that point rejected any action outside the Democratic party stems from his own experience as a successful politician who bore that imprimatur. When rejecting a suggested try for the GOP vice-presidential nomination, Wallace did so because "he [felt] his political future in Alabama and in the nation, too, lies with the label ["Democrat" or "Alabama Democrat"]."³⁵

After his win in 1964, because he had served less than half of President Kennedy's unexpired term, Lyndon Johnson was eligible to run for re-election. At that time this meant there would be an incumbent President to claim the Democratic party's nomination in 1968. But his experiences in 1964 proved to Wallace that it would be an extraordinary task to undertake a national campaign without the backing of a party organization similar to that extant in the two major parties. He had seen the inadequacy of his own staff and its efforts in the limited scope of 1964. Obviously he could not tackle all 50 states without first undertaking long

³⁴ Ibid. p. 194, emphasis added.

³⁵ Ibid. p. 324.

range planning and careful consideration to organizational problems the major parties had long before solved: who will do it? What needs to be done? Where will the money come from? These are but a few of the major questions a third-party candidacy raised, yet it was true that there was no alternative if he chose to run for the Presidency. And choose to run he did. As yet a young man, as politicians of national stature go, he could afford to use the 1968 election as a testing ground for the campaign machinery he was forced to create. That momentary success beyond his wildest dreams would dissuade him from that path was not a part of the vision.

VI: Dress Rehearsal

Given Wallace's situation and prior experience, the cues he took from his 1964 showing were predictable. In retrospect, the exposure his views had received was altogether limited, but it cannot have seemed so to him at that time; the primaries were a far larger undertaking than he had ever before attempted. To him, the campaign "on the issues" had been a striking success. He had received no negative feedback from that aspect of his campaign; quite to the contrary, he must have been more than a bit surprised that people "everywhere" would give him the ultimate form of political acceptance--their votes.

He could draw but one inference from the evidence at hand: his strategy, to build on fear and resentment, was sound. The nation's views on the Negro's proper place in society have changed, if at all, but exceedingly slowly over the past century. Wallace could rest secure in the thought that they would mellow very little over the inter-election period. Any upswing in racial unrest, however, would redound almost immediately to his favor. The years from 1964-1968 were to prove the most racially volatile that this generation of voters had ever experienced, embracing as the period does, the Watts, Newark, and Detroit riots as well as those, such as in Washington D.C., which followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

In a campaign on the issues, the manner in which he presented his views was of utmost importance. It is not too much to say that Wallace's stock speech, "The Speech" (see Appendix A), embodies the very heart of the Wallace phenomenon. The material contained in this speech is about all that the candidate ever chose to put forth,

and he even went so far as to make all the supporting documents such as press releases and remarks at press conferences almost rote renderings of his central document. He was not going to be caught in an inconsistency.

Moreover, Wallace has, over time, relied on the creation of an image, a facade, for communication with the electorate. As a large portion of this image, he has stressed his honesty and sincerity; he stresses that he is a man of ideas and that though he may face persons of widely divergent views he will not change his statements just to win himself votes. He will tell everyone the same thing, regardless of the consequences. (Ironically, his stand on race, honestly expressed, brought him the support of some militant blacks--persons who felt as he did on separation of the races. But on the whole, Wallace did not do well with Negroes in the 1968 election, drawing perhaps less than 6% in ghetto areas.¹ And even that 6% may have come from some of the few whites remaining in such areas.

Newsmen who have covered Wallace since his unsuccessful race for Governor in 1958 attest to the fact that he has altered his basic speech only to the extent of updating the examples and anecdotes. Students of such matters might appreciate hearing that the message upon which Wallace staked his political future had been carefully crafted, the result of long months of careful analysis of the electorate, the mood of the country, and the candidate's strengths and weaknesses. But he says it was not. In his version, like Topsy, it "just grewed". His staff, too, is unwilling to admit to having

¹Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 967.

attempted to create anything like a comprehensive document; they admit only that these are Wallace's views and that they think people will, upon hearing the message, come to agree with him. While they will not admit that a rationale existed by which elements could be included or excluded from The Speech, it is obvious that Wallace is satisfied that it presents his views fairly and effectively. No doubt it has grown over time out of myriad small experiences and experiments on the backroads and county squares of Alabama that were only reinforced by the votes of the people "everywhere" in 1964.

The Speech is composed of a set of topical and anecdotal building blocks which remain separate entities and can be strung together in almost any order. It is as if Wallace has a series of mental note cards which he shuffles anew before each public utterance: the order of the "issues" changes, but the message is always the same.

What are "the issues" as Wallace sees them? They fall into three broad topical categories: governmental obstructionism, law and order, and foreign affairs. His treatment of them reflects his assessment of the mood of the electorate:

...the mass of the people in this country, especially working people have got to the point where they are not going to vote for any candidate who has any sissy platform on domestic issues. The voter wants to hear some specifics.²

The statement indicates the area of his major concern--domestic politics--and the way in which he believes his pitch should be structured--on specifics, as opposed, perhaps, to theories.

²Wallace, The Speech; Synon, op. cit., p. 68.

On governmental obstructionism, which is his major "issue," The Speech records Wallace's indignation at the injustices which he sees in the federal government's regulation of "democratic domestic institutions"--things like schools, hospitals, labor unions, businesses, and even one's privately-owned housing, should it be put up for sale or lease.³ The specifics which the voter wanted to hear on the issue, those explicit enunciations which would serve to show the worth of Wallace's candidature, are presented in their entirety: "And I want to say that one of the first things we going to do when we get into the White House, and we going to do it within the law, we going to turn back to you these domestic institutions

The issue which Wallace instituted in the 1968 campaign, and which every opposing candidate save perhaps Eugene McCarthy came to adopt as his own, was known as "crime in the streets," or as Wallace put it "the breakdown of law and order." With the sometimes violent dissent to the war at home, with the riots in the big city ghettos, and with the increasingly popular view that the Supreme Court was coddling criminals and preventing law enforcement officials from doing their job, the issue was a natural one for a candidate of Wallace's persuasion.

If Wallace had not staked out his position long before the other candidates jumped on the law and order bandwagon, his strident cries might be written off as an attempt to make his

³Wallace, The Speech, p. 183-184.

⁴Ibid., p. 185.

position visible; but as he was making clear the specifics from the beginning one ought not assign them to mere expediency. The causes for disorder were clear: The Supreme Court and "those who want to lose the war in Viet Nam. It's militants, activists, revolutionaries, anarchists, and communists, that's who."⁵

The Supreme Court had "made it almost impossible to convict a criminal,"⁶ so the solution was obvious: "I'm gonna appoint some different sorts of judges when attrition takes its toll."⁷ In the meantime, other steps could be taken to ensure vigorous law enforcement. Ramsay Clark, the Attorney General, was "another advocate of the breakdown of law and order," albeit "unwittingly"⁸ perhaps, and could be replaced. And Wallace saw nothing wrong with the abilities of the nation's lawmen: "Just let the police in Memphis and Little Rock and Los Angeles and New York enforce the law like they know how to enforce it, without fear or favor, and we'll have peace in the land...."⁹ One of the first things he would do, as President, would be to give his moral support to the police of the country.¹⁰

⁵Ibid., p. 188.

⁶Ibid., p. 188.

⁷Ibid., p. 186.

⁸Ibid., p. 192.

⁹Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁰Ibid.

Perhaps his most famous anecdote concerns the dissenters to the war in Viet Nam and, in a larger context, the supposed abuses being perpetrated by those on the nation's campuses in the name of "academic freedom." Wallace shows specifically how he would provide strong leadership when he recounts the story of President Johnson's cavalcade's being stopped when a war protestor lay in the path of the President's automobile. If he were elected President, said Wallace, "and a group of anarchists lay down in front of my automobile, it's gonna be the last one they ever gonna wanna lay down in front of."¹¹ And though on direct questioning Wallace would not say that he meant to run over such persons, the inference was clear to all who heard. Certainly the stand was not a "sissy" one.

Changing Attorneys General would be beneficial in combatting dissent, too, because Wallace would have his chief legal officer seek an indictment against anyone calling for a communist victory, even though it be in the name of academic freedom. "And I say that a few of them ought to be dragged by the hair on their heads and stuck under a good jail and that would stop that and that's what we are gonna do when I get to be President."¹² Yes, Wallace's specifics made his orientation clear on the issue of crime.

The most disturbing area for Wallace was foreign affairs. He had built his reputation on his domestic stands and had had no need to deal with the international situation while an Alabama

¹¹Ibid., p. 190.

¹²Ibid., p. 196.

state politician. As he appeared ill at ease when asked to discuss other than domestic matters, Wallace would probably have been overjoyed to ignore foreign affairs entirely, but the concern of the American people over the Viet Nam war would not let him.

In 1964 the war had not taken on the character which it later assumed under the increased American involvement of 1965 and after, so Wallace could get away with refusing confidential briefings and refusing to deal with the conflict as an issue. But by 1968, the issue was at the forefront of the campaign and Wallace clearly was not prepared to deal with it. The section of The Speech which treats the war is the longest and least effective of the entire document. The whole of his message can be summed up as follows: our allies are profiting from the protection they derive from our "nuclear shield," yet they are not backing us up. We should tell them that "if you don't help us...and don't quit tradin' with the North Vietnamese and the communist enemies of ours, we not only gonna cut off foreign aid, but we gonna make you pay back every dime you borrowed from us during and after the two world wars."¹³

By similar action one might solve the supposedly complex problem of the gold drain:

And Mr. DeGaulle evidently wants to see the American dollar devalued, which has been devalued enough through inflationary processes in our own country. When he has some dollars he

¹³Ibid., p. 193.

wants to drain our gold out....We ought to tell Mr. DeGaulle "If you gonna keep on takin' gold fo' yo' dollahs when you don't have to"...I would just say "You owe us 7 billion dollahs from World War I" and write it up on the wall--"7 billion dollahs"--"and when you wanted 100 million in gold we'd just put 100 million under it and subtract it and say 'you owe us six billion, nine hundred million.'"14

Seen in the light of "cab-drivin' logic" the problem is not insoluble. "They say it's so complicated and it really isn't all that complicated, we just need some common sense in some of the decisions of our government."15

But our proper relationship with our allies is not the same as the propriety of our Viet Nam involvement. For this, Wallace had no clear answer, except to suggest that we should learn not to become unilaterally involved. In fact, however, over 500,000 American servicemen were involved at that time, which to Wallace and to the persons of the South, whose sons have made up more than their proportionate share of our fighting men, meant that the first determination should be not the desirability of our involvement, but the safety of our boys overseas. Although he did not make it explicit in The Speech, elsewhere Wallace explained his stand:

I would not abdicate civilian responsibility to the military and say we'll let the Joint Chiefs (of Staff) decide when we'll fight--that's civilian responsibility.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 194-95.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 195.

But I do feel that once we are in a war, then we should lean heavily on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to tell us how to fight. We should make an attempt to win the war militarily in Southeast Asia.¹⁶

He stood firmly, although not always loudly, on the side of "an honorable...and a successful conclusion."¹⁷

The foreign policy portion of The Speech was invariably the weakest, even to the point that he often began to lose his audience's rapt attention. Although the section began with the attention-getting words "Vietnam," there was little discernible threat to hold together such desperate elements as the gold drain, Vietnam, a history of communist treachery from World War II, napalm, and transgressions of the concept of dissent in the name of academic freedom. The thread was there, the words were there, but the audiences were not always able to follow.

Even though, in our political system, we isolate our elections from the direct identification with "the issues" that one finds in a country such as Great Britain, and even in the year which produced an extraordinarily bland and issue-less campaign by our own standards from the winning Presidential candidate, not even the "Great Debates" of 1960 the Wallace effort stands out for failing to live up to the candidate's claims of giving specifics on the issues. One knows how he feels--his emotional orientation--but is hard-pressed to find an identifiable "program" of specific proposals for concerted action to correct

¹⁶(Wallace quoted in Synon. op. cit., p. 102).

¹⁷(Wallace quoted in Synon. op. cit., p. 100).

the problems extant in American life.

Wallace may not have resembled an Adlai Stevenson in his treatment of the issues, but his speech nonetheless can be seen as containing an extraordinarily powerful message for certain portions of the electorate. The appeal is not so much that which is made explicit in The Speech as it is in that which is left implicit; and while Wallace rejects as patently invalid any attempt to go beyond the literal boundaries of The Speech in search of significance, it is in just such a reading between the lines that the outlines of a potent appeal become visible.

If these "issues" are those upon which Wallace built his appeal, they served as the core of his campaign because of the emotive power of their symbolism rather than any detailed and workable solutions through which he proposed to solve them. What Wallace did, through use of "the issues," was to conjure up a series of visions which expressed his sometimes violent disapproval of sundry facets of modern life, often supposed injustices suffered at the hands of the infamous "they". The Speech is not poetry, nor is it on a high level of abstraction; far from it. It is one man's visceral, "gut" reactions, which become significant not because he is a candidate for President but because by expressing them he is expressing the common orientation of those who made up the Movement. By showing that they share a common bond of tribulation, The Speech serves to demonstrate an instant and complete identity between speaker and listener, an identity which could create an emotional bond far stronger than that which might result from the force of ideas over a similar span of time.

certainly personal factors ought to be seen as having played a major role in any individual's determination whether to support the Wallace candidacy, although the data necessary to suggest the precise nature of such personal factors are not currently available to scholars; but by examining the group appeal offered in the Wallace candidacy one might get some indication of a lowest common denominator to his follower's perceptions.

The person to whom the Wallace message was most appealing might well have been a person who felt that he had been shunted aside in modern life. Not only had his sense of personal worth been lessened by having persons tell him that he was no longer capable of coping with the complexities of modern life, when he once had felt himself efficacious, but the very foundations of his equilibrium had been disturbed when those in position to authoritatively allocate values disestablished his personal code and replaced it with one repugnant to him.¹⁸

A person of such persuasion might well be one of relatively limited education who, by application of hard work and common sense, had risen a notch or two on the social scale and who had been accustomed to verifying his personal efficacy through appeals to his senses. He was, in Wallace's words, "the average man on the street." He was "the bus driver, the truck driver, the beautician, the fireman, the policeman, and the

¹⁸Although it may well be impossible linguistically to "allocate" a "value", Easton's famous phrase does retain its utility as a concept when accompanied by the necessary caveat.

steel worker, the plumber, and the communication worker and the oil worker and the little business man."¹⁹ He could feel at one with society because the dominant set of values reflected virtues such as his own. He had come to find the status quo a relatively tolerable state.

For persons of this sort, change could be a powerful enemy. With the proliferation of alternatives occasioned by urbanization, a man no longer could have experienced all those aspects of life on which he might be called for judgment; he could not, therefore, rely only on common sense, for he had not sensed relevant things. He had to go to a higher level of abstraction. But persons of limited education might well not be able to make the shift from ego-centered to other-centered reasoning. As a result for such a person the world could become a bewildering maze; others might tell him that he was incapable of coping with the increased complexities and his only recourse--to that which his own senses told him--was no help: his senses, too, told him that he was incapable of coping. By feeling bewildered and helpless when told that he would be so, such an individual must have come to doubt his personal worth; and when he perceived the values of the society no longer corresponded with his own, at least the doubt must have been raised in his mind as to whether he really did possess Truth. And if he did not possess Truth, then he was in fact rejecting his entire life's efforts at best misguided and in vain.

If it is a natural human response to seek to reduce anxiety,

¹⁹Wallace, The Speech, p. 184.

the state of a person in whom such doubts have been raised might understandably be seen as intolerable and/or unstable. He would seek in some way to resolve the doubts and to rebuild his confidence in his personal worth, with its twin components - efficacy and rectitude. He might either adapt to his changed situation, or he might seek to vindicate his former vision of himself. For many such persons, any hope of the former course was indeed slim; to this group, however large it may have been, the only alternative was to seek vindication. Yet, almost by "definition," such a person would be incapable of completing the task himself. It is for precisely this person that the Wallace appeal could have had incalculable importance: he offered to restore the individual's sense of personal worth and at the same time affix any "blame" for the period of doubting outside the individual.

Seen in this light, all that Wallace had to do was to identify himself completely with this sort of person and suggest that, through the ballot box, this sort of person could become "established" once again in the person of George Wallace. By expressing confidence in this sort of person, Wallace was also expressing confidence in the viability of the traditional responses to traditional problems. He did not offer "solutions" because to have done so would have been redundant; he expressed his faith in a people whose solutions were well known. He offered them the opportunity once again to be in the driver's seat, with both leader and followers cognizant of the course of action

that would be taken. When he said that his purpose was "to restore back constitutional government in this country,"²⁰ his intent was clear.

A person bewildered by changing conditions might well be fearful while the source of his doubt and bewilderment remained unknown; upon identifying the causal factor, his fear might change to resentment, with anger a constant companion. Wallace identified the sources for his followers and utilized their resentment. Anti-intellectualism is one of the hoariest of American traditions and Wallace's intellectual predecessor, Populism, is seen by some as prime exemplar. In this modern movement where the message was for persons of limited education, what better scapegoat than academics? According to Wallace, they were the persons who had expressed a lack of faith in the ability of the average man, which was half their crime:

"And they've looked down their noses at the average man on the street too long....(T)hey say 'We've gotta write a guideline. We've gotta tell you when to get up in the mornin.' We've gotta tell you when to go to bed at night. And we gonna tell both national parties the average man...don't need anybody to write him a guideline to tell him when to get up.'"²¹

Not only in the area of efficacy, but in values as well, the intellectuals were the cause for concern. Largely in the name of academic freedom, the old values were being perverted. Professors were calling for Viet Cong victory and "liberals"

²⁰Ibid., p. 183.

²¹Ibid., p. 184-85.

were coddling criminals. Wallace pulled no punches; the culprits were easily identifiable: "Its militants, activists, revolutionaries, anarchists and communists, thats who."²²

Another traditional enemy of "the people" was the newspaper editor, who had taken upon himself the job of adjudicating questions of societal values. To people who found themselves in disagreement with such editors, Wallace was able to bring comfort. The man who sets himself up above his peers and advocates values different from your own, Wallace in effect said, is just one man. "And you are one man and you one woman and your attitude and mine is just as good about these matters or better than theirs."²³

But Wallace could do more than merely assert that these persons were at fault...he could, by appealing to sensory evidence "Truth" for the sort of person to whom his message would be of highest impact-even prove it! Guideline writers, those who "wanna tell you how to do," are themselves incompetent and therefore unfit to tell anyone else "how to do". Some of 'em have pointed heads and cain't even park a bicycle straight."²⁴ Newspaper editors, too, are fallible.

And when Castro was in the hills of Cuba they brought him up to Washington and New York and they introduced him on national television as the George Washington of Cuba and he was said by the New York Times to be the Robin Hood of the Caribbean. And every cab driver in Alabama said he

²²Ibid., p. 188.

²³Ibid., p. 202.

²⁴Ibid., p. 187.

was a communist. By instinct, they knew.²⁵

The message was clear. Those who set themselves up as being better than their fellows--"pseudo-theoreticians" and "pseudo-social engineers"--had come out second best when pitted against the average man in a search for Truth. The average man, in both efficacy and values, stood vindicated. For one who saw himself as one of Wallace's average men, what more powerful appeal could be made?

Wallace saw his role clearly. As he remarked to Synon concerning a speech he was asked to make:

And so the Tennessee School Board was so disgusted about the takeover of their school system that they decided that the best way to let them know they didn't like it was to invite me to come and make the main speech. That's what they told me, that "we invited you to show our resentment at the takeover of our schools in Tennessee."²⁶

He played the part to the hilt, providing the bellicose posture of one who will aggressively "Stand Up For America" and, implicitly, for his people's right to return to the comfortable old ways.²⁷ Although the Confederate flag, symbol as it is of rebellion, implicitly stands for the same thing, an equally appropriate and more explicit rendering of the message could have been achieved

²⁵Ibid., p. 202-203.

²⁶Synon. op. cit., p. 79.

²⁷For a visual interpretation of the Wallace message, see the typical campaign advertisement in Appendix G; the same cut ran in newspapers all across the country, not just in the South. Wallace has always sought the image of a fighter, it seems; earlier in his career he gained the appellation "the fightin' little judge" for momentary defiance of federal authority in a voting records dispute.

by flying a flag from the tense period which culminated in the Revolutionary War: a snake, ready to strike, accompanied by the words "Don't tread on me."

As both spokesman and champion, the role that Wallace was to play for his followers was similar to that which he performed for his Alabama constituents when he met with the contingent of Alabama students at Harvard in 1964.²⁸ The Harvard example is but a microcosm of the 1968 campaign, with the list of beneficiaries expanded to include not only Alabamians but the "average man on the street" everywhere. "Average" men are the most numerous group in the electorate; the problem would be to let them all know they had a champion.

But if the strategy was sound, and all the "facts" generated by the primary campaign suggested that this was the case, Wallace came to doubt the adequacy of his supporting organization for carrying out the tactical maneuvers which a national campaign necessitated. Even his staff admits that organization has never been Wallace's strong suit;²⁹ if he were to undertake a national campaign on his own, he would have to revamp his coterie of technicians.

After the 1964 primaries, Wallace set out to bolster his campaign organization, to duplicate as best he could the apparatus through which the major parties execute their electoral

²⁸See above, p. 88-91.

²⁹Jones, p. 313.

campaigns. He needed to find persons in every state who could be trusted, persons who could man the offices, stuff the envelopes, keep tabs on the political pulse of the state, and see that the bills were paid. By and large he was restricted to persons without significant political experience or stature, because almost without exception the upper level functionaries of the major parties remained in the fold.

The core of the campaign organization was really the secondary level of four coordinators like Stan Sikes, a bright young lawyer from the University of Alabama who, like many other of Wallace's aides, had at one time been an employee of the State. It was the campaign coordinator's job to deal with all the campaign's undertakings within a given set of states, amounting to roughly a quarter of the nation.

The range of duties associated with this post was wide indeed. In every state the prime requisite was to get on the general election ballot; it was the coordinator's job to come to grips with the state codes and then to arrange to take those steps necessary for compliance, which ranged from gathering a few hundred names on a petition through getting a set quote of notarized changes in registration per territorial unit, or organizing state and/or district conventions for party members to use in nominating Wallace for President. (In Ohio the requirements were so stringent--over 300,000 signatures within a specified time period--that Wallace had to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to get his name on the ballot). It is to the credit of the four coordinators that Wallace became the first third-party

candidate in history to be listed on the ballot of every state in the Union.

Getting on the ballot was the sine qua non and, as in the case of Ohio, a concern with it alone could last until quite near the election. Following the successful completion of that set of technicalities, however, lay burdens of a far different sort for the jack-of all-trades coordinators. A particularly thorny problem was to hound the Wallace campaign almost from its inception. While desirous of stimulating the outpouring of scarce resources--time, energy, and money--from campaign workers, Wallace was at the same time wary of being used by myriad groups of political opportunists who viewed his campaign as a vehicle which they could ride to positions of prestige and influence. Such groups bode disunity and internecine strife, with neither of which Wallace's overworked organizational staff could afford to be concerned. Of at least equal import to the candidate was the worry that, by allowing certain types of fringe political groups to become associated with him, he might destroy the meager store of credibility as a candidate to be taken seriously that he was beginning to generate with the help of his implacable enemies, the national press. (As one of Wallace's highest ranking advisors put it, "We always gotta worry about them kooks.")

The coordinator was also supposed to make time to schedule the Governor's campaign appearances in "his" states (which were not apportioned on the basis of geographic contiguity) and to fulfill the rest of the role of the advance man. Until the

candidate's health broke down in the waning months of the campaign, the heavy schedule was always the same: fly into town for an airport news conference in mid-morning, eat a private lunch with the large contributors from that area, nap briefly in the afternoon, give a truncated version of The Speech at a \$25-a-plate fund raising dinner at the largest dining facility in town, and then arrive an hour late for an evening rally, open to the public, at the local auditorium. Publicity, reservations, and press relations were all the province of the coordinator in whose territory the candidate happened to be appearing. When the Wallace entourage actually arrived in its chartered airplanes, the coordinator would often greet it at the airport, turn the hotel keys and last minute data over to Bill Jones and Mrs. Dorothy Garrett, and then leave for another in the seemingly endless list of cities to be visited.

It is readily apparent that with so many responsibilities in the hands of so few trained personnel, any time which was taken up in settling disputes between factious groups of backers was really time wasted. The case of South Carolina is particularly illustrative. South Carolina was a state which went heavily for Goldwater in 1964 and which Wallace was wont to count as "his". Even before his official announcement of candidacy, rival groups -- "hard-line segregationists" on the one hand and "ultraconservatives" on the other³⁰ -- were claiming to be his annointed in that state and circulating petitions to raise the 10,000 signatures required for Wallace's name to appear on the general election

ballot. The candidate designated the Wallace Forum Association as the "official" group in the state, but the South Carolina Independent Party had collected the bulk of the signatures. The leader of the Independents, L. Maurice Bessinger, had made plans to run a slate of candidates for lesser offices under the Wallace banner, including himself as a candidate for the Senate. Wallace staffers felt that Bessinger was seeking only to get a lift from Wallace's coattails, but that the Governor would actually be harmed by associating himself with a ticket known to be racially motivated.

A blatantly racist posture would, of course, affect the national constituency Wallace sought far differently from the South Carolinians to whom it was pitched. And it was national considerations -- the fear of particularly acid attacks from the national press -- which worried Wallace and moved him to disassociate himself from the local slate. Wallace headed off such problems by declaring that "he could not be associated with state third-party movements that would link him with local candidates."³¹

(He was later forced to go to court to keep his name from appearing on the South Carolina ballot more than once. Under state law, votes for rival slates of electors, even though pledged to the same candidate, could not be combined. Wallace feared that splitting his vote in that manner might cost him the state. Whether from the influence of Strom Thurmond and Spiro Agnew or from the factionalism that plagued his own camp, Wallace failed to carry South Carolina in November).

³¹Ibid.

The decision to refuse to allow candidates for lesser offices on the American Independent Party ticket is a significant one, altogether in keeping with Wallace's "style," as it has developed over time, and with his long-range battle plan. Wallace is extraordinarily concerned with controlling every facet of his environment. In its most obvious form, this became a concern for his physical safety against mob violence or assassination. But the attempts at control go far deeper than mere safety from bodily harm; they go to the very heart of his campaign style.

There are, necessarily, three components to this environment to which ought to be controlled, each of which ought ideally be identical to, or reinforcing of, the other two. Of the three, the candidate can have least control over the image of him that is presented through the media, because persons outside his control are creating the product which will reach the electorate. He is able, with varying degrees of skill, to control that which emanated from himself, whether it be prepared speeches, off-the-cuff remarks, or publicity and press releases from directly supervised staff. Wallace has over time been remarkably successful in his attempt to remain internally consistent, though consistently offering nothing but a narrowly-based message may not have proved particularly efficacious in the 1968 campaign (see below).

But internal consistency really implies being able to control not only the emanations of one's own mouth, but also that which is said and done by one's supporters--those persons with whom one

is identified by the media and by the electorate. It was to the good of Wallace's image as he perceived it, then, that he restrain his followers from violence that could be directly tied to his presence or views. It was thus of utmost importance to reject being identified with the Klan or other such groups which are looked down upon by the bulk of the American electorate.

It was to this end that Wallace refused to allow the American Independent Party label to any candidates for lesser offices. While being on such a ticket might have been beneficial to such aspirants, Wallace felt that, as he would lead the ticket almost anywhere, he had nothing to gain in the way of votes. There was talk that certain wealthy political hopefuls would bankroll the Wallace ticket in a state in order to be given the opportunity to seek office on it and to benefit from Wallace's supposedly broad coattails; but in the early, lean days of the campaign Wallace chose to reject this form of funding. The risk to the image from being associated with a bunch of "kooks" whom he could not control was just too great.³²

³²Practical necessity forced Wallace to modify his ban on candidates for lesser offices (in one instance). His right to appear on the ballot had been challenged in only one state--Oklahoma. (State law provides that the ballot shall not be open to candidates who have advocated the overthrow of the government through force or violence). Part of the controversy came to center on the relationship that existed between Wallace and the third-party advocates in the state who came to adopt the A.I.P. label. In their defense, the state party chairman, Reuel Little of Madill, argued that his party was much more than a vehicle for Wallace's Presidential ambitions; he argued that the party had come first in the causal chain and that it had planned to contest the election at various levels long before the advent of Wallace as a Presidential hopeful. They had looked for good candidates to put forth, had found Wallace, among

Again it is obvious that Wallace was foregoing immediate gratifications for success in the longer run; he is preoccupied with not making political mistakes, for he knows how many years of effort can be required to overcome even a single slip. If his real aim were beyond 1968, he would not be able to take the expedient but high-risk course in his trial run.

Foreclosing the possibility of any candidates for lesser offices was a decision reached quite early in the campaign and reflects not a little of Wallace's experiential nature. Never had he run as a part of a team, which was a powerful argument for adopting that strategy on the national scene. He has not expressed the willingness to tamper with the responses that have appeared to bring him political success in earlier races, even though his position in the national political arena was in no way similar to that which he had come to master in factious Alabama Democratic politics, where a candidate's personal following was of supreme importance.³³

But he was unable to avoid having at least one other name on the ticket, that of his Vice-Presidential running mate. His

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others, and the party convention had voted to ask Wallace to be "their" candidate for President. To support this version of the genesis of the party, Wallace did allow a candidate for U.S. Senate, George Washington, to run on the A.I.P. label, as if to demonstrate that he could exert no control over the actions of an autonomous group of political activists. (Wallace was right about the absence of a "reverse coattails" effect: Washington got 2% of the vote, while Wallace piled up 20% in the same state).

³³See V.O. Key, op. cit., p. 36-57.

choice of a running mate was to prove his biggest error of commission. And while the man actually chosen for the post, General Curtis E. LeMay, was an extraordinarily bad choice, given the needs of the campaign, Wallace would have found it difficult to have almost anyone in the role.

Quite probably Wallace would have been better off without a Vice-Presidential candidate, given the character of the campaign he was running and the list of men from which he could draw. A running mate was necessary in order to get on the ballot in several states, some of them insignificant in terms of national politics or of Wallace's appeal. To this end, former Governor Marvin Griffin of Georgia had agreed to be a stand-in, but under the condition that he would serve in name only; he did not want to campaign actively. (Indeed, when the Wallace caravan reached Atlanta, Griffin made only a token appearance. The major part of the remarks from local supporters that night came from Roy Harris, long a power in the state, who remarked: "There's only one issue in this campaign: n-i-g-g-e-r!") The other technical disadvantage which the lack of a running mate would have caused, and that only if the assumption is made that Wallace were actually to win the Presidency, is that as President he would have been deprived of the influence of the presiding officer and the tie-breaking vote in the Senate.

1968 is a particularly good example of how the Vice Presidential candidates can aid the national ticket. Despite the fun which the press had with Agnew's malapropisms it is evident that his presence on the Republican ticket was a

significant factor in helping Nixon's candidacy in some states. Senator Muskie's placement on the ballot was also of demonstrative value for the Democrats. But Wallace was unable to find a politician of national stature who was willing to join in the venture. In June the Wallace camp was buzzing with rumors of a top-level politician who was to be announced "immediately" as the Alabamian's running mate, but the deal, were there ever one, fell through. Knowing Wallace's desire to control his environment, it is reasonable to discount the speculation that the mystery politician was to have been Louise Day Hicks. Even had her stock risen from winning the Boston mayoralty race, Wallace is far too astute a politician to have sought out one of such monumental political ineptitude.

Wallace seems to have put off replacing Griffin as long as possible; but a running mate was, after all, another of the trappings of a "real" political party and Wallace was always concerned with appearing a viable, serious candidate, one for whom a vote (if cast) would not be wasted. When the polls suggested that he might be losing some of the strength he had garnered in August, he felt a need to resuscitate his campaign by the creation of big news. He sent up a trial balloon with the name of former Governor A.B. "Happy" Chandler of Kentucky attached, but members of The Movement responded with cries of outrage and the name was retracted.

Wallace and his staff were obsessed with getting a big name for the Vice-Presidential spot on the ticket; failure

to do so would be implicit admission of their secondary status. But it was clear that he was going to have to modify in some way his demand for a politician of national stature. The ideal was composed of three parts: fame, national (as opposed to sectional) stature, and political expertise. But Wallace had been given the cold shoulder by a united front of politicians during his primary campaign in 1964, and even the Southern Democratic establishment was leery after he bolted the fold for his third-party. His hopes for achieving his full ideal exhausted, Wallace was forced to set priorities for choosing among the alternatives available to him; apparently wishing to avoid any further identification as a sectional candidate, he rejected all "name" politicians as being of that stripe. Instead, he chose a man devoid of political experience but who had a national reputation--Curtis E. LeMay, retired Air Force General.

In retrospect, the decision was an obvious blunder, but it cannot have seemed so at the time it was made. Having always campaigned alone, Wallace could not have felt that he needed spell-binding oratory or far-sighted program proposals from his running mate. Neither did he need a sectional candidate; a man with purely Southern appeal would reinforce him just where he was already the strongest, would probably destroy the national image which Wallace was attempting to build, and would probably bring enemies in the bargain. What he needed was someone who had no political enemies, someone who would

reinforce the ticket as one being worthy of truly national consideration, and someone who would demonstrate through the mere fact of his presence that Wallace's candidacy had won the approval of a solid section of the Establishment. LeMay fitted in well with all of these requirements.

Actual experience was to demonstrate the one major flaw in their arrangement. Wallace appears to have assumed that running with LeMay would naturally be the same as when he ran with his only other "running mate," his wife Lurleen, who was the nominal candidate for Governor of Alabama in 1966 when Wallace was blocked by law (and the state legislature) from succeeding himself in that post. At that time, Lurleen would do little more than introduce her husband and then retire to hear the speech which he offered and on which she was elected. But someone failed to impress upon LeMay the proper way to fulfill his role. From the very day he was announced, the press and the American electorate were treated to the sight of a political parallel to Alphonse and Gaston. LeMay was shipped to Viet Nam on a "fact-finding" tour, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the real virtue of his going to Viet Nam was that it removed him from public scrutiny. Out of sight, out of mind must have been Wallace's hope.

LeMay's appointment may well have reflected a significant change in the direction of Wallace's campaigning, both in 1968 and for any future political ventures. Wallace's decline in the polls began almost coterminously with his naming of LeMay, and thus could not have been in itself a causal factor in that

act. But the polls may have played a significant role by indicating that Wallace's Viet Nam position was not a winning one with the voters. A month before election day, at a time when Wallace was holding at around 20% of the national samples, pollster Louis Harris found that little more than half that number felt that Wallace would do the best job in Viet Nam, as they placed him a distant and dismal last in the balloting.³⁴ Compared with his showing against the other two contenders on the questions of "race" and "law and order," in which he was given 26%, Wallace's treatment of the war was clearly his weak point.³⁵

Under such circumstances, the possibility of picking up a running mate whose strength, if any, would be in the most needed area may have seemed providential. But, from the moment that LeMay made public the sentiments "Bomb 'em back into the stone age," he probably cost more votes than he gained. As Wallace's decline in the polls began to become precipitous upon LeMay's arrival, it is tempting to suggest that his unacceptability to the electorate was the cause; but the correlation may well be spurious. On the basis of the limited evidence available, all one can say is that LeMay ran behind Wallace in trial heats.³⁶

³⁴"The Harris Survey," Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 7, 1969.

³⁵"The Harris Survey," The Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1969.

³⁶"The Harris Survey," The Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 21, 1968.

It would appear that LeMay's presence did not even serve to bolster the ticket on the Viet Nam issue. In a survey published October 7, 1968, which could not have reflected significant public consideration of the LeMay candidacy, which had been announced a scant four days before, Wallace was the choice of 26% of those voters who might be termed "Hawks" and of only 15% of the "Doves." By October 28, however, after the impact of the LeMay position would have become relatively widespread, Wallace's standing among the same groups had actually regressed slightly, to 25% and 15% respectively. And while there were undisputably other factors that served to strip Wallace of some strength over that two week span, LeMay's impact would seem to have been of negligible benefit even in the area presumably his strongest.

But the naming of LeMay may have had a significance far greater than those votes which he gained or lost the Movement. That LeMay's strength supposedly lay in the campaign's weak spot could, of course, have been coincidence and nothing more. But if it were not mere chance, then it marked the first public indication that Wallace had given second thoughts to the material of which his campaign appeal was made. From the moment he had tasted success in the 1964 Wisconsin primary, Wallace had assumed that success would come from exposing his message, simple and limited as it was, to enough of the electorate. Everything was oriented around The Speech, which he pushed continually, in speeches

television programs, and the press, for over four years, intensively for over four solid months. He had felt exposure to be the key, and exposure he got.

Although the evidence is no better than circumstantial, it is plausible to believe that, toward the end of the campaign, Wallace came to see the paucity of his message. His popularity was declining in the polls, but not because his message had failed to elicit passionate followership among the faithful. The zeal with which his new converts comported themselves, taken with the self-selectivity feature, is the most likely explanation for Wallace's tremendous showing in the amateur polls taken by radio and television stations, state and county fairs, and the like. But, perhaps like Goldwater--who in 1964 doubtless overestimated the number of "stay at home conservatives" waiting in the wings for a candidate of their liking--Wallace may have misjudged the breadth of his appeal. He might reasonably have come to believe that his message had reached the bulk of those to whom it would naturally appeal, which is to say that he had overestimated the number of persons who shared his fear, resentment, indignation, and retribution perceptions, or underestimated the strength of their ties to the traditional parties.

Under the circumstances, the rational strategy would have to be diversify the message, to add whole groups in the electorate as possible converts by addressing oneself to issues which, unlike the previous ones, would be salient to them. It appears

that naming LeMay might have been just such a step for Wallace. And while debatable in its significance when seen as an isolated event, this interpretation of the LeMay candidacy takes on more the air of veracity when seen in conjunction with the release, on October 13, 1969, of the American Independent Party's platform.

Normally, in American politics, the platform is generated and approved at the nominating convention and bears the stamp of the faction that successfully controlled the party's Presidential nomination. But with the American Independent Party, which did not even hold a national convention, the situation was quite different. Although plagued by factionalism as is any other political party, there was never any doubt of the origin and reason for being of the AIP. The fact that some of the dissident groups had existed prior to Wallace's entry on the national scene in no way detracts from the primacy of his role in making those groups part of a significant national movement. Besides the fact that he provided what appeared to be a viable, actionable alternative around which such groups could coalesce, the political resources, campaign organization, and message of the AIP were due overwhelmingly to but one man--George Wallace.

Due to the primacy of his role in the AIP, Wallace did not have to treat with other chieftains in generating his message; nor, unlike other Presidential nominees, did he have to temper the stand of his party's platform so that nominees for all manner of lesser offices in all sections of the country could "live with it." As a platform is one of the trappings to which

the electorate has become accustomed in political parties, whether they be major or minor, Wallace from time to time was asked whether he had a platform and if so when it would be released. Over the summer months Wallace would reply that they were considering such a document and that they were working to draw it up. The basic outlines of the platform, those points outlined in the Preamble, were identified at the Oklahoma City hearings in April, 1968, as representing the party's platform, yet the completed document was not released to the public until October 13, 1968, scarcely three weeks before the end of the campaign. In no way did Wallace indicate that the creation of the platform was a high-priority project.

It is possible that it was the lack of manpower, when combined with the emphasis on exposure of The Speech, rather than deliberate stalling that delayed completion of the Platform until mid-October and that it was released immediately upon completion. But an alternative hypothesis is perhaps more plausible. Such a line of thinking suggests that the platform was issued as a supplement for The Speech upon the recognition that the message in The Speech, if not broadened, would not be sufficient to generate a winning body of support. In this context, a broadened appeal would produce two desired effects: first and foremost, an appeal to the electorate on an expanded range of issues would operate to increase the number of possible converts by touching on a wider range of topics that voters found salient; of secondary significance, a voter for whom the big three issues of The Speech were salient might nonetheless

find himself more firmly attached to the party because of the agreement which he felt with Wallace's position on lesser issues, much as we envision the behavior of man in pluralist society or Gulliver in Lilliput.

There is a danger, of course, to a politician's making his views known on a wide range of controversial topics. It is a commonplace of American politics that the major party out of power takes a more strident tone in its campaigning than the party in power, and that the most strident tone of all is left to the third parties and splinter movements. Certainly the major parties have, over time, faced a much broader range of concerns than have the dissident movements which arise from time to time because their specific demands are not met by the major parties - movements which die out when their position is co-opted by a major party. If it is true that Americans vote against, rather than for, the bulk of their political alternatives, then stridency is in order only on those topics from which one can expect a positive net return in the form of votes.

It would appear that Wallace played the role of leader of a narrowly focused splinter movement until he perceived that he had milked the appeal to its limits and that it was not good enough; and that he then turned to an alternate strategy - that of assuming the various encumbrances of a major party. These included a Vice-Presidential candidate who conveniently could have been taken on to shore up a major weak spot; a far-ranging and relatively catholic platform (relative to that which had proceeded it from the Wallace camp); and a tone of moderation uncharacteristic of other Wallace

pronouncements. Had Wallace been anxiously waiting for the completion of the platform, he could have considerably broadened his appeal (and given a needed hypo to his press coverage) by releasing the various planks as they were finalized by his staff. Major party candidates often have dealt with theretofore unexplored issues from time to time in what have become known as "major policy addresses," but while Wallace's drumbeaters continually proclaimed his evening address as such--a "major" one--it was always the same, The Speech.

The fact that he held the entire platform in reserve until he began to slip suggests that it was a part of a new conception of the needs of the campaign; that he did not make efficient use of his platform after once having chosen to release it suggests again that he had not fully prepared for the sudden turn that the campaign took. (The protestations by Wallace and his staff that they paid no attention to the polls should not be taken seriously, it would seem; they always were the first to know of and to broadcast any results which they deemed favorable. It is to be assumed, then, that the campaign could in fact have been run with public opinion, as measured by the polls, a determinant.)

The major undertakings of the 1968 campaign all seem to point to Wallace's strategy as having been one of aiming for 1972, with but minimal expectations of success at the ballot box in his first full scale national undertaking. Even when he must have been worried that he might fall short of one of those minimal goals--coming to hold the balance of power in the Electoral College--he chose to seek help in the short run with an alternative which was geared to fit into the long range goal of building a

third major party. Increased stridency was another alternative for short-run assistance, as demonstrated by Louise Day Hicks in her shrill appeals to racism in the waning days of the Boston mayoralty race. Certainly this would have been an easier course for Wallace to follow. The fact that he did not do so is of added significance.

With no more than the organization extant during the 1964 primaries, Wallace could expect to do well in the South in future Presidential elections. If he could secure the electoral votes of the Confederate states, a reasonable expectation given a full-scale campaign effort in the area, he might well hold the balance of power in the Electoral College by depriving any candidate of the 270 electoral votes necessary to win the Presidency. This had been the traditional "Southern play." But the myth that winning the South was a necessary condition to winning the Presidency had been refuted in 1964 (when five Deep South states and his home state of Arizona were the only electoral votes that Barry Goldwater won) and 1948 (when Truman won reelection despite the defection of four Southern states to then-Democrat Strom Thurmond with the Southern protest vote). Though Wallace felt Goldwater's effort had been horribly inept, the South's image as a prize must have been somewhat tarnished in the bargain.

The idea that one might hold the balance of power in the electoral college by winning enough electoral votes to deprive any candidate of the necessary 270 also requires examination. The electoral college is the device designed by our Founding Fathers for electing the President and Vice-President. It consists of 538 independent actors (electors) apportioned to each

state in the same numbers as that state's total of United States Senators and Representatives. The 23rd Amendment has also granted three electoral votes to the people of the District of Columbia even though they are denied Congressional representation, thus raising the total of electoral votes to 538.

The manner of choosing those persons who shall be electors is left to the individual states. Out of the myriad variations on this theme arises the salient fact: electors are persons whose partisanship is known far in advance of the general election date and whose sole claim to the office, save long years of dedicated service to the party, is that their electoral vote, should they be called upon to cast it, is absolutely predictable. When one casts a ballot for President, one is actually voting for a slate of electors, even though their names may not appear on the ballot. It is the current practice in all 50 states that the slate of electors which accumulates the greatest number of popular votes within the state be allowed to cast the total number of electoral votes allocated to that state in the electoral college. (This need not be the case, and some states have in the past experimented with fractionating their vote in various ways, but it does serve to maximize each state's political "clout" and, as such, is deemed desirable by politicians).

Party regularity is of supreme importance in designating potential electors, because persons holding this post are independent of any legally enforceable constraints on their vote in the Electoral College--a vestige of the College's former role. A person who has been designated an elector for, say, Nixon in a state Nixon carried has been given one of his state's electoral

votes because it is assumed he will execute the wishes of the persons in that state whose votes elected him and add "his" electoral vote to Nixon's total. In all save a handful of instances in this century, the electors have followed popular expectations and voted as their constituents expected of them. In 1968, however, one Nixon elector from North Carolina reneged and voted for Wallace. In 1960, another dissident Republican elector, this time from Oklahoma, had tried to organize an effort to deny John Kennedy the necessary electoral vote majority by appealing to the other electors, Republican and Democrats, all of whom were functionally free to vote their own personal whims, rather than for Kennedy or Nixon. Along with 14 other "unpledged" electors from Alabama and Mississippi he had voted for Senator Byrd for President.

This aspect of the Electoral College has spawned numerous Southern attempts to maximize bargaining power by electing slates of electors whose appeal was that they would remain uncommitted. If, on election night, it became apparent that neither major party had accumulated 270 electoral votes, then the unpledged electors could "sell" their support to the party that would grant the most significant concessions.

There is an inconsistency in the plan to bargain within the Electoral College which Wallace never seemed to come to grips with, even in the face of direct questioning. The plan rests on the assumption that the major parties would bargain over the "swing" electors during that period of about a month between the general election, at which time the "normal" electoral vote will

become apparent, and the meeting of the electors to cast their ballots.

More of the unique features of the Electoral College become apparent when one realizes that the final determination of the election of the President does not lie with that body. Each elector casts a ballot but once for President. Should no candidate receive the necessary majority, the election is thrown into the House of Representatives, where each state is granted but a single vote, to be determined by a caucus of the delegation. Again an absolute majority is required for election; if no candidate can muster 26 state votes (the District of Columbia plays no part at this stage of the election because it has no representation in the House), the House continues to ballot. Because the election of a President would be considered by the House immediately after it had constituted itself for the new session, and because the House could consider no other business until it makes a determination, deadlock at this stage could bring government to a standstill.

There are many other interesting features of this system, such as the possibility of having an Acting President for four years, or having a President and Vice-President chosen from opposing parties, but the significant aspect which would have worked against Wallace or any third party candidate is that once the decision reaches the House it is in the hands of men who owe their professional lives to one of the two major parties. Although party discipline in our system is notoriously lax, never since the rise of the modern politician party has there been an issue of such magnitude

on which the parties have been forced to seek internal cohesion. The closest counterpart would be the disputed election of 1876.

Furthermore, the willingness of the party professionals to restrict the field to but two parties, as manifest in the barriers before a third party's gaining ballot position in many states, might well play a crucial role. It is reasonable to assume that men who have risen as high as the Congress of the United States are also among the strongest supporters of the rules of the game as they know them.³⁷ These persons might well act to preserve the two party system, even if it meant supporting the other major party, rather than allow a third party to gain power. Certainly this is what Richard Nixon was suggesting when he attempted to gain agreement from the Democrats before the 1968 election that, because of the threat posed by Wallace, the two major parties should agree to effect the election of that candidate who drew the most popular votes. It is also true that such an agreement would have worked only to Nixon's advantage: all the polls showed him a victor in the popular vote, whereas the only strength the Democrats possessed was in the House. If the election had gone to the House, Humphrey would have had the clear advantage, assuming perfect party discipline. (Humphrey did not agree to Nixon's "solemn covenant.")

While he began the 1968 race with goals other than actually winning the Presidency, Wallace nonetheless would not turn down

³⁷Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," APSR, June 1964, p. 361-382.

any opportunity to show his political muscle. To this end, he selected his electors with extreme care and required of them a signed affidavit in which they swore to vote only for him or for the candidate he designated should they be elected to the Electoral College. Whether such affidavits would be upheld in the courts is a matter of some controversy, but his actions were obviously an attempt to cope with the independence of the electors while still making use of it for his own ends.

In early June, 1968, when he resumed campaigning after the death of his wife, Lurleen, the way in which he would flex this "muscle" was a topic of concern among the newsmen covering Wallace's political machinations. And though he quibbled with the wording used by the press, he and his staff would admit that they hoped for a deadlock in the Electoral College so that, in their preferred terms, they might "make a solemn covenant" with one of the major parties to trade votes for policy concessions.

At a Pittsburgh news conference the day before his wife underwent surgery for cancer, Wallace noted the outlines of this "covenant." He stated that he would release his electoral votes to the party that would agree to execute seven key tenets of Wallace's movement:

- 1) "Turn back to the states their control over their own domestic institutions."
- 2) Cut off United States aid to countries failing to support the war in Vietnam or trading with Communist countries.
- 3) "Punish treason by putting some of these Vietnam dissenters in jail."

- 4) Maintain law and order.
- 5) Restrict the Supreme Court.
- 6) "Abandon any type of civil rights legislation."
- 7) Return jurisdiction over legislative reapportionment and congressional redistricting to the state courts.³⁸

But the matter was stripped of its significance when Wallace suddenly changed his tune; after his tremendous success with both contributors and voters in June's tour of Southern cities, Wallace came to speak only of winning.

As a tactical move, the shift was a sound one: it made him more of a "real" candidate to the electorate at large, always a problem for Wallace; it was probably to increase the efforts of his campaign workers; and it undoubtedly served to spur potential contributors. Yet persons with him at the time could tell that the shift was the result of a sincere belief that he could win. He no less than the accompanying press was astounded by the overwhelming reception he got in Memphis, Chattanooga, and other Southern cities. He "bought" the idea that he could be a winner; the press bought it and passed it on to the country at large, enough of whom bought it to lead the spiral to over 20% of the electorate in polls taken on the heels of the Democratic Convention. Again he had met success and been unable to cope with it; success at Memphis meant abandonment of the long, slow approach to the Presidency.

³⁸New York Times, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 36.

Not only did momentary success dissuade Wallace from what might be called a more reasonable set of short-run expectations, but it convinced him that a higher output level could be attained with no change in the level of inputs. Indeed, it is probably that Wallace overestimated his ability to cope with the demands of a national campaign and, with his resources taxed to the utmost, could not have increased the level of certain important campaign inputs even if he had seen the necessity for doing so. Had he stuck to the original strategy, though there might not have been 9.9 million votes in his column election night, neither would there have been such despair and resignation. Instead of seeing once high hopes dashed on the floor of an all-but-empty coliseum, Wallace could have spoken of victory in the face of insurmountable odds and of renewed vigor for the push for 1972. But on election night, 1968, even Wallace could not claim a limited victory with conviction.

It might have been different. If one assumed him to have had goals no more taxing than building an organization that could function with efficiency, of obtaining ballot position in every state, and of making a trial run in national politics in preparation for an honest attempt to win--anything but insignificant achievements in themselves--then his 1968 campaign effort was indeed a success. But nobody assumes that; he made certain of it.

VII-I

Aftermath

What then of George Wallace? Although it may not have appeared so during the campaign, he is a man not unlike many other men, particularly those born of a similar background. An accident of birth, perhaps, determined that he would come to be motivated wholly and solely by politics, with personal political officeholding his ultimate objective. Populism, with its twin foci of economic and social relationships, seems to have provided him with much of his worldview; and his training in Southern politics provided the set of experiences which served as standards against which he came to judge things political.

The South knows many like George Wallace, but the nation at large does not, perhaps because men of his background feel limitations which keep them from projecting themselves on the national scene. Within memory of many voters living today, only Huey Long could be comparable to Wallace, and The Kingfish's national career was cut off by assassination almost before it began. More recently, the only Southern politician active in Presidential politics--Strom Thurmond--took part as an unabashed sectionalist who sought to have an impact through isolating the South.

But Wallace is vastly different from men like Thurmond; he wanted to create a movement which would cut across sectional lines and thus integrate Southerners with persons of similar persuasion across the nation. Perhaps other such politicians would have tried it if they saw a chance for success, but they did not.

As he was building his public record, Wallace undoubtedly did not act with the Presidency in mind, attuned toward Montgomery as he always was, but in the process of creating political capital he found that his acts were having an impact outside the state. Confronted by the unhappy realization that he had no further conquests to make in Alabama, no higher posts to hold, he set out to test the possibilities of seeking the only office which appealed to him, the Presidency of the United States.

When Wallace lost his first gubernatorial campaign he attributed it to his having the "liberal" tag relative to the other candidate on the race issue. When the clash between ideology and personal office-holding had been resolved within him, Wallace vowed that he would not be "out-niggered" again.

Getting right on race did not require taking a harder line than his opponents, but simply that he must not be distinctively liberal. As such, his about face (going from being the "liberal" to being the "conservative") on the race issue was simply fulfilling a necessary condition of Alabama politics. The bidding on old age pensions and other live issues continued apace and Wallace believes that his program in this area--economic liberalism--is what won the 1962 race for him. Race was a necessary but not a sufficient condition in Alabama politics.

Given the underlying strains of populism which formulated much of his worldview, the response was not intellectually dishonest; and having found success (the ultimate vindication of one's political judgment in his eyes) in Alabama politics through a hard line on race, it is altogether understandable that he would stay with

that tactic until he had reason to believe that it would not bring him success. In Alabama, his political universe until after 1963, he received no such negative cues and so continued with the line that had brought him his life's dream. This is not to say that he foreswore any economic liberalism when he became a conservative on race, as his record in Alabama clearly shows. He served his constituents well and is considered by perhaps the bulk of the Alabama populace to have been the best governor they have ever known. They seem to like him not for the power of his oratory, which is at best mediocre, and pales before even such modern practitioners of the art as Billy Graham, but simply because they think he is "right". Moreover, they appear to like his style.

For one who tested reality on the basis of his experiences, the more limited his range of experiences the less the likelihood of his making "correct" decisions; and Wallace's experiences with national politics were altogether inadequate to the task. On the basis of letters from across the nation in favor of his "stand in the school house door" he undertook a series of speaking engagements. Largely on the success he perceived in such outings, he chose to enter three state Presidential primaries in 1964; and on the basis of running as a Democrat and winning between 29 and 42% of the votes in his party's primary in three states (Wisconsin's was, of course, an open primary, but he feels his votes came from Democrats), he decided to run for President in 1968, knowing full well that he would have to do it on a third-party ticket. The cue he had gotten from 1964 was that, as people "everywhere" responded to his message, success would be his if only he could

expose his message to enough of the electorate. The unexpected outpourings of votes from "people everywhere," plus the fact that he had only Alabama standard to apply nationwide, combined to convince him that his message had been thoroughly tested and found capable of sustaining a full-scale Presidential bid. It was his first mistake, and the first time that he had been unable correctly to interpret his success.

For one of Wallace's political acumen, it is not surprising that he correctly perceived the necessity of becoming a third-party candidate and the complexity of such a venture. To this end, he began the long range plans which would generate both organization and exposure through a trial run in 1968; by 1972 he would have created a reservoir of identifiers among the electorate and a store of good will among some persons who could not bring themselves to leave the traditional party affiliations in 1968. If change continued apace, there would be even greater numbers of persons ripe for his message, because it would be obvious that neither national party was able or willing to provide relief. Success in the 1968 venture would have been measured largely in internal terms, with no expectation of winning the Presidency in the first attempt. But in causing him to speed up the timetable, his extraordinary successes of June, 1968 again proved the basis for his downfall. Having done no campaigning since securing ballot position in California almost six months earlier, Wallace's experimental approach again had failed him.

The extent of Wallace's failure depends largely upon one's referent. Even for a candidate who attempted to buoy the hopes of his

supporters with the explanation that, due to the electoral college system and the apportioning of electoral votes within the individual states on a plurality basis, it was possible to win without a majority (while steadfastly refusing to admit that theirs was a minority point of view), his actual performance, if measured in absolute totals--9,906,473 popular votes (13.5%) and 46 electoral votes, including the one from the renegade North Carolina elector--was utterly disastrous as seen by the revised standards.

Envisioned in terms of the original scenario, however, his 1968 efforts appear in a much better light. Not surprisingly, progress was made in just those areas that Wallace sought to bolster; namely, exposure and organization. Even though the unflagging efforts of the Wall Street Journal were not able to uncover a "financial angel", money remained as little a problem as when he was able to command the services of many state of Alabama employees.

That he was able to meet ballot requirements in every state is a tribute to the coordination provided by his personal campaign staff. Moreover, he began to develop, with varying degrees of success, the nucleus of a volunteer cadre in each state--a prime requisite for any sustained attempt to seek the Presidency over time. And if the success he met in 1968 might be measured by an inverse relationship of the percentage of votes gained in a state to the distance that state lies from the Deep South, (see appendix D and appendix E), he at least has a solid base which might be built upon for succeeding elections.

On balance, however, the 1968 campaign must be counted a

disaster in terms of Wallace's own original perceptions, for he failed to create a deadlock in the Electoral College and he failed to persuade a politician of national stature to become his running mate. While political pundits were dubious about the latter; the vast bulk of popular comment about the Wallace candidacy was over the threat it posed to the Electoral College method of deciding presidential elections. He, too, gave the impression that whatever else he might accomplish, the vote deadlock would provide the irreducible minimum of influence which he might have.

The election was indeed a close one in popular vote, where Humphrey trailed Nixon by 510,315 votes, but Nixon had a clear edge in electoral votes (301-191-46) with 270 needed for an outright win. For Wallace to have been in a bargaining position, Nixon would have to have been deprived of the necessary 270 electoral votes. This could have come about through a shift of votes from Nixon to either of his rivals. If there had been a shift of 41,971 votes from Nixon to Humphrey--Missouri: 10,245 (0.6%); New Jersey: 30,631 (1.05%); Alaska: 1,095 (1.1%)--Nixon's electoral vote total would have been only 269, or one vote short of a majority. Though these votes would have shifted from Nixon to Humphrey, it would have been Wallace who stood potentially to gain.

Figured on the basis of a shift of electoral votes from Nixon to Wallace, however, the role of spoiler becomes much more difficult to have attained. The shift of 108,721 popular votes--North Carolina: 65,603 (4.1%); South Carolina: 19,317 (2.9%); Tennessee: 23,901 (1.9%) would have left Nixon with 270 electoral votes, or exactly the minimum number needed to deprive Wallace

of any bargaining position. If figured on the basis of lowest percentage of the statewide vote needed, the state next most easily captured by Wallace would be Florida, where a shift of 6% (131,299) popular votes from Nixon to Wallace would allow Wallace to carry the state; on the basis of fewest popular votes needed it would be Alaska, where a shift of 27,576 popular votes would be needed--a whopping 16.6% of that state's total presidential vote.¹

One may question whether missing the deadlock position by 41,971 votes from three specific states is in reality a near success in absolute terms; certainly the whole idea that a deadlock would have seen one of the two major parties willing to bargain with Wallace or that, failing that, the professional partisans in the House of Representatives would have deserted their party (or the two-party system) to provide him with the only bargaining power he could possibly have, having no A.I.P. members in the House upon whose professional allegiance he might call, remains untested and in a sense "academic". It will remain with us until it is tested or until the Electoral College is replaced with a different system.

A failure which must particularly bother Wallace was his inability to lure an established major party politician of national stature onto the second spot on the ticket. As he was unable to do so, the eventual choice for the post, a man with national stature but no political experience, served as little more than a millstone around the neck of an already floundering man.

¹The raw data from which the above inferences were drawn appear in Congressional Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No. XXIII, part 1 of 2 parts, June 6, 1969, Special Supplement, back cover.

Data from the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center indicate that in a thermometer scale test given to a national sample of the electorate, LeMay actually was more popular than Wallace (35.1 to 31.2). This seeming inconsistency is explained by the fact that a "don't know" response was rated as 0 and, when averaged with the ratings of a person perceived in negative terms would actually make him appear to be more popular than he actually was. Among persons who knew and could thus react in qualitative terms to both men, LeMay proved to be less popular than Wallace.²

That the campaign was in trouble even before LeMay joined it is fairly evident, and the cause stems directly from Wallace's inability to interpret correctly his success in the 1964 primaries. He perceived that, as people "everywhere" had responded to his message, the only strategy called for in the 1968 campaign was to seek maximum exposure for that message. This he did, by limiting all his public pronouncements to The Speech: the result, for one claiming major party status and presuming that he could actually win the election, was disaster.

If, as has been claimed, the candidate was desirous and capable of running a rational campaign, the question to be asked is why the failure of his "message". The question is appealing to scholars no less than to the candidate, but there

²Phillip E. Converse, et. al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," mimeo, Table 2 and pg. 9).

is no assurance that the two would use similar techniques in their analyses. The scholar would probably seek to use individual level survey data to determine how persons received the Wallace message, what they thought he was saying. They might then apply such individual level data toward breaking down the aggregate data toward an analysis of group appeal in the Wallace campaign. By juxtaposing interpretations (such as the one rendered here) of what Wallace was attempting to do, with the electorate's perceptions of his message, scholars would be able to suggest the roots of the movement's malaise.

Such individual level data undoubtedly do exist, but they are not currently available to the general scholarly community. Analysis of the widely available aggregate data without reference to individual responses is at best productive of hypotheses which one would want to endeavor to "prove" when it became possible to do so. (For example, one can see from aggregate data that the vast majority of persons in an overwhelmingly agricultural district voted for Wallace, but one is unable to say why it is that they did so. This example is particularly good, for until the release of his platform, Wallace never dealt with the farm question; thus, even though he had appealed to a group of farmers, it must have been on something other than their approbation for a policy he had not chosen to make known.)

Lacking immediate access to individual level data, one must rely on secondary analysis and on aggregate data, tempered as they always are by the ecological fallacy. The questions one would like

answered are twofold: to whom did Wallace appeal (or fail to appeal) and what were the electorate's perceptions of Wallace and his message? If he had been perceived correctly and rejected on that basis, then the message could relevantly be faulted. If he had not been understood, then the effort to gain exposure for the image could be blamed.

The answers to such questions can only be hinted at for the present and, as in some cases the data are seemingly contradictory, any conclusions drawn must be seen as highly inconclusive--more in the nature of hypotheses to be tested in the future than in results gleaned from primary analysis of hard data. Nonetheless, some answers can be given. Wallace did achieve his goal of almost total exposure: 98% of the electorate "knew" him as compared with 99% for Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Nixon, and Humphrey. His running mate, Curtis LeMay, also compared favorably with the other vice-presidential candidates in this regard with 93%, the same as Agnew and 1% better than Muskie.³ In this regard, Wallace seems to have succeeded at the task to which he set himself, although the task itself may have been in error.

It is clear that Wallace grossly misjudged the extent of his appeal when he made the decision to seek maximum exposure. In the Survey Research Center's national sample (see Table 3), Wallace's mean rating was 31.4 (out of a possible 100), far and away the lowest for any candidate or potential candidate. (Because the relatively high percentage of "don't know" answers on

³Herbert Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation", mimeo, Table 1 and p. 158.

LeMay were scored as 50's, thus serving to raise the mean of actual qualitative responses of those who knew the man, Wallace trails even his running mate in the poll). The problem for Wallace can be easily seen from the relative numbers of first and last choice mentions for the various candidates: Nixon had a healthy positive bulge with 36% first choice responses against 8% last choice answers, Humphrey benefited from a 25%-13% advantage, and Muskie from a 16%-10% differential. But the A.I.P. candidates suffered from just the reverse situation: LeMay was the first choice of only 3% of the voters (in which he ties George Romney for being the man preferred by the least) while 40% made him their last choice, and Wallace's 11% first choice rating was offset by a monstrous total of last choice mentions: 62%, or almost two-thirds of the entire sample, said that George Wallace was the man they least wanted for their President.⁴

To say that the A.I.P. ticket was unpopular is not enough; one must also say why and among whom this was so. Again we must rely on aggregate data and sometimes contradictory analyses. There can be no question that Wallace did best in the South and that his percentage of the vote fell off as one ventured farther from the border states and the Old Confederacy, where he garnered over 30% of the total vote cast and earned almost two-thirds of his personal total. There is general agreement that Wallace's success was inversely proportional to general indicators of socio-

⁴Ibid. (Note that the combined total of first place mentions for LeMay and Wallace--14%--closely approximates the actual vote they received in the election--13.5%).

economic status--occupation, education, and income--with a massive concentration in the working class.⁵ Moreover, Wallace voters were likely to be men, instead of women (59%-41% compared with 43%-57% for both Humphrey and Nixon) and were as likely to be union members as Humphrey supporters.⁶

Wolfe argues from SRC data that Wallace did best among rural and small town residents in the South, but that in the North he drew "substantial support in the big cities as well as in the suburbs and less densely populated areas."⁷ Figures from another source indicate that Wallace's appeal was inversely proportion to population density, while making no distinction among areas of the country.⁸ Wolfe correctly calls attention to the possible effects of migration, but seems to be inconsistent in his treatment of the subject. He suggests that neither are Wallace voters "distinctively concentrated among either recent migrants or long-term residents of their communities, nor are northern Wallace voters disproportionately migrants from the South."⁹ But Wolfe is also co-author of a paper based on the same SRC data which indicates that "Wallace drew over 14% of the vote from (these southern migrants to the North) and less than 7% otherwise outside the South."¹⁰

⁵Arthur Wolfe, "Challenge From The Right: The Basis of Voter Support for Wallace in 1968," mimeo, Table 2.

⁶Ibid., p. 4, p. 5, Table 2.

⁷Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁸1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 967.

⁹Wolfe, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰Converse et. al., op. cit., p. 26.

A Gallup poll from mid October indicated that persons in the 21-29 age bracket were twice as likely to call Wallace an "excellent" choice for President as were persons in the other age groups.¹¹ Wolfe supports this view with the comment that Wallace voters "tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the 25-34 age group and to be underrepresented in the over 65 age group."¹² This information is interesting because of the visual impressions to the contrary gathered at Wallace's public rallies. In Atlanta, for example, a count of the crowd revealed fewer than a dozen such young persons and a heavy concentration of the elderly.

Interestingly enough, Wallace seems to have been some ways on target with his Speech: although the theme which may be seen running through it is concerned with the government's intervention in affairs which rightly ought be decided by private citizens, the three areas of specific concern--civil rights, Vietnam, and "law and order"--dovetail nicely with the areas of concern across the country. And make no mistake; Wallace's general orientation in these areas seems to have been shared by the bulk of the electorate in 1968. Whether it was in advocating a stronger stand in Vietnam (or in accepting the label "hawk"), in looking down at the Vietnam war protesters, or labeling actions by Negroes "mostly violent" and injurious to the cause of civil rights for pushing too fast, Wallace was representative of the mainstream American viewpoint.

¹¹Gallup Opinion Index, Princeton, N.J., October 1968, p. 8.

¹²Wolfe, op. cit., p. 4.

¹³See Converse et. al. op. cit., and Wolfe, op. cit., *passim*.

But in all of these issue areas cited above and the overwhelming proportion of all others, Wallace's position if in agreement with the majority was also the most extreme manifestation of it. Wallace may well have needed to gain visibility by taking strident stands on the issues, particularly when "his" issue--law and order--was rapidly picked up by all the other candidates, but in doing so he may have fallen victim to the same distrust Barry Goldwater seemed to evoke when he said "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice". Wallace's candidacy was overwhelmingly seen in issue terms, but even though many people may have agreed with him, he may not have been able to evoke that feeling of trust which seems to be essential in our politics. Extremism, of whatever stripe, is not of political benefit in this country.

One of the key ways in which a candidate can generate that sense of trust is to become associated with a well-known and venerated symbol; a political party. If one's socialization into a political party is of paramount importance,¹⁴ surely Wallace's third party candidacy was virtually doomed from the start. But loyalties are ongoing, and while he was starting from ground zero in his first national race he nonetheless could expect some positive transfer from campaign to campaign as he built up his own following of persons adhering to his party label.

In such long range considerations, the source of his followers prior political leanings is significant; for if he were to draw from only one party, that party might relatively easily regain its

¹⁴See above, Chapter IV.

errant members' loyalties by co-opting the third party stance on some vital issue(s). If, however, Wallace were able to draw relatively equally from two established parties; then it would be more difficult for either party to siphon off his support.

The authors of The American Voter suggest that there is some support for the stereotype of differences between Republicans and Democrats, so that it would take some sort of twin pronged attack (such as populism provides) to cut across traditional party lines in significant amounts.

But it was on precisely this variable that Wallace liked to differentiate himself from Barry Goldwater, who, according to Wallace, could not appeal to all classes of voters, businessman and worker alike.

The great potential inherent in the Wallace movement was seen by the candidate as his ability to relate effectively to persons on either end of the socio-economic scale simultaneously, by creating an issue, on which persons of all types could vent their spleen.

Last year I spoke to the Amen Corner Club in Pittsburgh and got the finest reception I suppose a Southern Governor ever got from the top business and professional people in Pittsburgh. Now, I spoke in Pittsburgh two years before that, to 3,200 working people, and got the same reception, and I said the identical things about big government. That's why I will win; people--blue collar and white collar--are going to vote for me.¹⁵

The data seem to indicate, however, that Wallace's appeal was not as broad-gauged as he had hoped. Again not all the data agree (with

¹⁵ Synon., op. cit., p. 69.

one source stating that Wallace did proportionately better among Republican identifiers, particularly strong ones, than he did among Democrats)¹⁶ but the SRC data indicate (Table 5) that Wallace's appeal was predominantly to the Independent voter (as might, of course, be expected, since the true independent would have fewer ties to an established party which would have to be overcome) and then to the weak to moderate Democrat. Not only does Wallace appear to have drawn a higher percentage of the Democratic than of the Republican identifiers, but the Wolfe reports that 38% of those Wallace supporters who had voted previously had always voted Democratic and another 10% reported never having cast a Democratic ballot.¹⁷

Wallace support seems to have come in roughly equal percentages from each of the established parties, although he drew a larger number of Democrats in absolute terms as befits the registration advantage that party enjoys nationally over the Republicans. But having drawn equal percentages from each party does not necessarily support Wallace's contention that all types of people (in SES, not partisan terms) were going to support him as they would not support Goldwater. The Gallup data and the SRC data agree in this: whatever party the Wallace voter had supported previously, he was fairly well of a type concerning income, occupation, and the like. It is entirely reasonable to presume that Wallace made inroads on

¹⁶ 1968 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, p. 967.

¹⁷ Wolfe, op. cit., p. 6.

uniting persons in a sort of functional representation--cutting across party lines and traditional loyalties to offer them the message that neither established party was willing to utter. The person with such profile generally found himself in the Democratic party; one wonders how many such persons exist within the Republican party that Wallace might potentially reach.

One nagging question which may not soon be resolved concerns the extent to which the Wallace vote was not an affirmation of certain principles and precepts but a protest vote against the established parties (Tweedledum and Tweedledee), riots at home, an unwinnable war against an unseen enemy, a lack of respect for authority and old values, a new morality and long hair, the Establishment, the Negro, and perhaps much more. Wallace played quite obviously upon the fears, frustrations, and disquietudes of the moment, but a lasting political movement must be built on firmer ground, that which will not change so drastically between elections. As with the McCarthy vote in New Hampshire, there are strong indications that persons voting for Wallace did so for exceptionally diverse even contradictory and antithetical reasons. When asked to rate a second choice, Wallace voters gave Richard Nixon the highest median score (60° on the thermometer scale described above) but Robert Kennedy was close behind with a median of 56°. ¹⁸ Again, one-third of the Republican identifiers

¹⁸ Wolfe, op. cit., p. 2.

who voted for Wallace reported that they wanted Ronald Reagan to become the GOP standard-bearer, while McCarthy and the late Robert Kennedy each got 25% of the pre-convention sentiment from Democratic identifiers.¹⁹

Such diverse sentiments on the part of Wallace voters could result from any of several things: these voters could be searching for a candidate not tied to the Establishment, but then why the lack of support for any save the more radical candidates on either side? They could be searching for a charismatic candidate, but then why Regan? Although building a case on such data as these would be indeed risky, there is no reason to suspect that the indications from the data are anything but correct--that Wallace support was, in fact, bi-modal. Throughout this interpretation of the Wallace movement, it has been this writer's contention that the twin poles of populism were resident in Wallace simultaneously; this presented a paradox, a contradiction, in the terms of national politics, perhaps, but not for the South and not for Wallace. The data at least tentatively support this thesis: Wallace voters were significantly more liberal on economic matters than were Nixon voters.²⁰ And if they are not yet seen to be as liberal as Humphrey supporters, it is to be recalled that Wallace did not stress such economic concepts at all during the 1968 campaign. His message of social conservatism came through

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁰ Wolfe, op. cit., Table 5, p. 20.

overwhelmingly even though none of it was couched in explicitly racial terms; but as he did not make the economic pitch in the national scene as he had routinely done in Alabama, it is striking that his supporters revealed attitudes so similar to his own in this area. Did they somehow perceive his stand and gravitate to him because of it, or did they manifest such feelings independently of their having known where he stood on such issues? The data at hand do not give us the answer, but it is highly significant one to scholars and the candidate alike.

While he may continue to draw persons who are responding solely to one or the other pole of his ideology (and who might find themselves in common cause with persons of a markedly different cast of mind as a result), Wallace might significantly strengthen his appeal by attempting to focus on those groups in the society which might naturally respond to both prongs of the message simultaneously. Perhaps the largest such group is one among which Wallace did surprisingly well in 1968, although not nearly as well as he had expected--the unions. Wallace and Humphrey were tied for the lead among union voters, each with 29% and the plummet Wallace took in the national polls during October has been widely attributed to a massive campaign the union leadership waged against him and in favor of Hubert Humphrey. If union membership provides both job security and economic benefits, a union member should be perfect Wallace material. Yet Wallace failed to emphasize one entire side of the argument relevant to such persons. The argument was not new to him, for he had thrived upon it in Alabama.

Though it was evident in the 1968 campaign that Wallace had done little if any thinking about broadly inclusive areas of concern--farm policy, taxation, national priorities, labor-management relations--nonetheless, through extended probing, this researcher was able to unearth a side to the candidate which perhaps few other scholars have come to see. At the time of this questioning (mid-June, 1968), it was abundantly clear that the problems of taxation, farm policy, and the like were of no moment to Wallace. He clearly had not been wrestling with them and had great trouble in coming to grips with things that were obviously unfamiliar and foreign to him. But, underneath it all, there were ideas, or preferences, on the basis of which he could greatly broaden his message and perhaps enhance his appeal.

The genesis of Wallace's preferences thus unearthed no doubt parallels that of those views which he chose to make known. Taken as a whole they do not differ widely from the position of any latter-day Populist, but they do flesh out the message which he offered in 1968 and they do present the opportunity to strengthen his appeal to the working man--that area of greatest failure in 1968.

In fact, the government has helped the working man by some of its interventionist tactics, and Wallace would be the first to say that in his view government was for helping people. But his economic liberalism may not have come through from his 1968 campaign. He has blindly applied Alabama standards to the national scene, as when he suggested that the nation's farm problem was one of under-production (because he had profited

from stimulating yield per acre while Governor), so it is surprising that he did not also continue the practice of out-bidding his rivals, as with old age pensions in Alabama. Who among the electorate knew that he was in favor of raising the personal exemption from \$600 to \$1000 in computing income tax? Who knew that he was in favor of granting tax credits to firms that would locate their plants in rural as opposed to urban areas? Who knew that he was deeply and sincerely concerned about the thousands of persons around the world who starve to death daily? Few if any in the electorate did, for Wallace did not see fit to tell them.

There is some evidence which may lend credence to the view that Wallace has already demonstrated his willingness to change. In particular this can be seen in the platform that Wallace released in the waning days of the campaign, when it was clear to the pollsters that Wallace was losing a good bit of the support that earlier had been "his". The platform is broad and vague, like platforms of other parties which hold hope for majoritarian support, and significant for the very reason that it is so different from The Speech, that document upon which the whole campaign theretofore had been based. Not only is the range of topics covered all-inclusive, in marked contradistinction to The Speech, but the tone of the document seems to suggest a moderation which is highly uncharacteristic for the Wallace whom national political audiences came to know.

It is not implausible to think that the press made Wallace's candidacy by according him prominent mention as a serious threat, thus as a serious candidate; but in the end his implacable

enemies may have done him in by allowing him to expose fully the lack of depth and thought he had to offer. It was clear to those studying him, and perhaps to the average man on the street as well, that Wallace sought the power that the Presidency had to offer. But it became increasingly apparent also that Wallace had little idea what to do with that power; they would "worry about what to do with it," his staff reported, after they got it. His release of the platform can be seen as an attempt to indicate some positive aspects to his candidacy and to provide his party with more of the trappings of an established contender, but when compared to the platforms of the traditional parties his is hardly distinctive enough to cause people to vote for him.

Out of the shambles of 1968's dashed hopes, is it possible that Wallace could yet emerge a major party or major threat for the Presidency? Certainly the odds for success are not good, but there are factors which suggest that Wallace may have a better shot at it than the 1968 showing would indicate.

Probably the most salient consideration justifying this point is the care with which Wallace has sought to build a supportive apparatus. Given the attachment of the electorate to the two major parties, it is unlikely that anyone could win enough support in a single national attempt to wrest the Presidency from its traditional possessors. But a party that was able to draw supporters from each of the traditional parties and build strength over the course of several elections might be able to take advantage of the winner-takes-all system by which our states currently apportion their electoral votes; it might actually win the Presidency with only a

relatively small popular vote total. Assuming that any third party could garner some votes in an election by appealing to those dissidents who were tired of both national parties (Tweedledum and Tweedledee,²¹ to hear Wallace tell it), the key would be in the third party's ability to hold on to the support it gains in one election and to add to the total in succeeding ones. It must replace the traditional two parties as the giver of political cues for a significant number of persons. Supporters of splinter movements have historically reverted to their "normal" party affiliation after having expressed their dissatisfactions and perhaps having been mollified by party promises of reform. Third parties have offered such a restricted bill of fare (prohibition, vegetarianism, etc.) that they may have ferretted out the bulk of persons holding such matters of paramount political saliency.

Recall the distribution of Wallace's votes among age brackets and a potentially significant idea emerges: while Converse et al report that "on almost every issue of nearly a score surveyed, the position characteristic of Wallace voters in our sample is also the position associated with older citizens" (in his appeal to "traditional and even obsolescing American values"),²¹ it was the younger voters who responded best to Wallace's appeal. The reasons for this are not hard to find. It is obvious from various surveys that the prototypical American youth is not of the long-haired, liberal-radical, upper-middle-class sort that seems to have

²¹Op. cit., p. 26.

captured the headlines of late; it would appear that among youth as well as other age groups the silent majority in fact is the majority. Traditional values may well appeal across all age groups. Moreover, the under-thirty group where Wallace's appeal was greatest is the group most affected by the Vietnam war; Weisberg, and Rusk indicate that the war was, after urban unrest, the most salient facet of Wallace's issue-oriented candidacy, due in large part to the fact that youth of either extreme want the war ended-- although the hawks outnumbered the doves among Wallace's supporters by about 2-1.²² They also note that a large number of young persons will return from Vietnam to join the pool of first-time voters.²³ Having been inculcated with militaristic values as a part of their combat training, it may well be that in Wallace many of these persons could find a candidate quite to their liking.

It is altogether to be expected that a third party candidate would appeal to younger rather than older voters from the aspect of political socialization alone. The more practice (reinforcement) a person has had in attachments to the traditional parties, the more difficult it should be to tear him away. Wallace succeeded with many such voters in 1968 and now has the task of keeping the newly formed tie to the A.I.P. uppermost in those voters' political consciousness (of which more later).

Another aspect also emerges from this line of reasoning. The

²² Op. cit., Tables 6 & 7.

²³ Ibid., p. 22.

rate of political participation also varies with age (degree of politicization), so that younger persons tend to vote less than their elders. They have weaker ties to party, hence weaker motivations to vote. But the events of the sixties seemed to point toward a general upturn in political consciousness among youth--although by no means of a single ideological persuasion--and, as a result, the baby boom of the post-war years will be feeding great numbers of voters who are but slightly politicized to party loyalty into the system. For these persons, a vote for a third party will be less significant a deviation than it would for a long-time adherent of one of the traditional parties, and it is just this person who may be the most susceptible to an extremist appeal (such as Wallace's was perceived to be in the 1968 election). With these young voters Wallace is at less of a disadvantage than he is with their elders, so it would be a rational strategy to focus upon winning them to his cause. Apparently it can be done with the package of values that he has to offer, although moderation of his extremist image would seem to be in order. Perhaps that will come from nothing more than four more years of visibility to the national electorate.

For Wallace, the votes which he got in 1968 are a precious resource for the future. The votes were hard earned, for he had to convert practically all of them from identification with one of the traditional parties. Having taken the big step, even if for only a single time, such persons would nonetheless be more amenable to Wallace's message than others who had not been

able to make the break. If Wallace could continue to appeal to then, could cause them to reinforce their temporary identification with him over time, then he might begin to make persons "normal" identification is with his party, not one of the traditional two.

In fact, this seems to be what he has attempted to do. While it was necessary to do so in order to get ballot position in a number of states, the concept of conducting a petition drive would have been a good one for other reasons. Even in a country where it is said people will sign anything placed in front of them, every act such as signing a petition, displaying a bumper sticker, or contributing money would add to the forces working to increase the voter's identification with the candidate or with his party.

Undoubtedly it is just this sort of constant renewal of faith which Wallace had in mind when he designed his funding program. He had adopted the "pledge" method wherever possible, wherein a contributor signs a card and pledges to contribute a sum--\$1, \$5, \$10, sometimes more--every month to the Wallace campaign. For this he gets the newsletter and the thought that he is Standing Up For America for all the world to see. But the candidate gains much more than mere money from the procedure. Each person who has taken the pledge is billed by computer each month, and Wallace staffers admit that the cost of the billing procedure offsets any real monetary gain from the dollar-a-month contributors, who make up the bulk of those who have signed pledges. But the monthly reminder of obligation gives the supporter a continual

opportunity to renew his faith, and thereby to strengthen it. Since the idea is to solidify his hold on the voter as well as to add to his campaign chest, it would be to the candidate's benefit to stimulate contributions no matter how small, this Wallace did. Because of the dual nature of the "obligation", any significant drop-off in the number of pledges made good over the inter-election period would presage a loss far greater than the dollar amount involved.

Other sorts of activity could serve as well as fulfilling financial pledges for keeping the ties between party and identifier close over the inter-election period. The traditional parties have a continuous program for the most active partisans, party work at the various levels. Wallace has not yet achieved such far-reaching organization as to be able to reach into the bulk of America's wards, or even into all its counties or congressional districts. But he has instituted a national party, the American, with a headquarters and staff separate from his own. (His personal headquarters is located in Montgomery, Alabama, the "Cradle of the Confederacy," while the party's headquarters, under national chairman T. Coleman Andrews, is to be found in Richmond). The division of labor has not yet been made clear. But if Andrews is expected to handle organizational details, such as factionalism and staffing at the lower state levels, it would leave Wallace and his personal staff free to decide matters of high policy.

A particularly pressing and thorny problem which looms on the horizon is the question of Wallace's role in the 1970 elections.

There are real benefits which would accrue to the candidate from contesting at least some of the seats which are up for renewal. In some states, for example, if the party gains over a set percentage of the vote cast for, say, governor, then it is allowed to retain its ballot position for the coming Presidential campaign. Besides thus being granted recognition as a major party, the more such nonproductive efforts that Wallace can save himself in 1972, the better off he will be, other facts being equal. Furthermore, it presents an opportunity to marshall his forces in mid-term, thus keeping the fires burning at close to fever pitch. It would give him a way to take the pulse of the nation and to try out new "issues" if he chooses to alter his spiel.

But there is a major drawback: where does he find candidates for contesting these posts? He wants to retain enough control over the candidates that they will not create an image which is ultimately counter-productive for his Presidential plans, while at the same time doing as well as possible in the selected races to show signals of strength on which he can build a possible snowball effect for 1972. Un-frivolous candidacies of this sort would almost certainly require that the persons running be professional politicians, and such persons have not responded to the party's call. A series of LeMay type candidacies almost certainly would do more harm than good, but, judging from 1968, he has no experienced middle-of-the roaders to offer.

Possibly persons of this stripe might respond to his call if

he were to become more middle-of-the road himself; indeed, this is the trend which may have been presaged by the platform and which Downs would suggest as the rational strategy for one bent on winning.

The step to supporting a third party is far greater than that of alternating among the traditional two, but Wallace is in a strong position for 1972. By then he can say that both national parties have had a chance and "there ain't a dime's worth of difference between them". He warned audiences in 1968 that if they thought they were going to "correct" the ills they suffered under a Democratic administration by voting for the Republicans, it was going to be four long years before they had a chance to do what they should have done in the beginning - turn both of them out in favor of the A.I.P. Certainly if the war in Vietnam is not settled, if the riots on the campuses (which seem to have taken the place of riots in the ghettos) have not passed, there will be some other crisis; and Wallace, who found support among both extreme Hawks and extreme Doves in 1968, will again be calling for rejection of Tweedle-dum and Tweedle-dee. But by pairing economic assistance (albeit through government action) with the same thinly veiled position on race, his appeal for the blue collar worker might bear the fruit of which it is capable--a large number of votes. Nor would such an appeal be intellectually dishonest; it is there in his Populist background, it is visible in his record as an Alabama legislator and Governor. It almost certainly would be of benefit before a national constituency. A combination of liberal and conservative, a linking of the businessman

and the working man--what more powerful political force could there be? Perhaps it is not so far fetched to think that Wallace might someday fulfill the potential that the visit to the Amen Corner portended.

Although an interim assessment at best, what of George Wallace? He is a man not unlike other men in myriad respects: it is just that he is suddenly visible and they are not. He is perhaps, unexceptional in any respect. His undeviating pursuit of a goal, that quality which suggests Faulkner's portrait of Ab Snopes, is not remarkable to us when seen in a business executive; but even that evaporates upon closer scrutiny. Whether one sees him as benevolent or malevolent, statesman or demagogue, upon closer inspection one must see him as undeniably human. He parallels the situation of a protagonist in Greek tragedy, one who has met his downfall through some fatal flaw, some error in judgment, rather than through vice or depravity. As with others of his kind, Wallace has not been able to handle success as he has failure. In a paradoxical turn of fate, he has been undone time and again by successes which perhaps have been too rapid in coming. In seeking the Governor's chair, he set his sights too low; and his personal tragedy is that success left him no alternative save to dream the impossible dream. He met with success and was not able to cope with it. Having met with failure, can he once again turn it to his advantage? He has changed his mailing address from Box 1968 to Box 1972.

Appendix A

"The Speech"

On the night of June 11, 1968, George Wallace returned to the campaign trail following a two month hiatus caused first by the death of his wife, Governor Lurleen Burns Wallace of Alabama, then by the assassination of Democratic presidential aspirant, Senator Robert Fitzgerald Kennedy. On this occasion Wallace spoke to a wildly enthusiastic, overflow crowd of more than 10,000 persons in the Mid-South Coliseum in Memphis, Tennessee. But if the crowd was responsive, so was the candidate. He had been prepared to start a campaign through the South the very day Senator Kennedy was slain, but postponed his tour one week out of respect for the dead. He was now rested and eager to make a striking success with which to begin his intensive campaign for the presidency: as a result, Tennesseans were treated to a speech which, to veteran Wallace watchers, ranks as one of his best ever.

The following is a transcription of that speech as taken from a tape recording made by the author and in his possession. It is an attempt to record faithfully and accurately the events of that evening, even to outcries from the crowd and moments of intense applause (marked by asterisks (*)). The speech which follows is the central campaign "document", one from which Wallace never seemed to vary significantly.

MID SOUTH COLISEUM
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen. And I am sure tonight that you have shaken the eyeteeth of the liberals of both national parties here in Memphis, Tennessee. *I am sure from your attendance here tonight that those throughout the country know that the overwhelming majority of the American people are sick and tired of tweedle-dee and tweedle-dum. *I'm very grateful to you folks for the fact that you have made it possible to be on the Tennessee ballot, by signing the petitions, so that you might have the opportunity and give opportunities to other Tennesseans to vote for this movement in November. So I want to thank you on the first public political appearance that I have made in the last several weeks, to tell you that I am appreciative of the fact that so many of you have thought of us in Alabama during the last several weeks and several months, and of course we are on a fund-raising drive and we appreciate the fact that you have contributed in that regard--because we don't have two national party treasure chests like the two national parties at the moment and so when they ask me at press conference and on television and radio "where are you going to get the money to run for the Presidency?" and I think they've gotten that answer here in Tennessee from the average man on the street. *And there are millions of people in this country who think exactly as you do. If this were not true and I have the experience, the reception necessary to make up my mind to run--all the way from Concord,

California--I wouldn't be here on a political mission tonight. Because there's no need to butt your head against a brick wall. But I know the people in this region of the country are offerin' leadership to this movement which has millions of supporters from one end of the country to the other. And I been from one end of the country to the other, and to California last year to comply with the California ballot law that said we must get 66,000 people to register in the American Independent Party to get on the ballot. And all the press--most of the press--and news media said "it can't be done," because the law was written to keep this movement off the ballot in California. We not only got 66,000 people who went and re-registered, we got 107,000 people who went and re-registered. * And on May 4, in Texas, durin' their primary day and I believe ten candidates runnin' for Governor and other offices, the Texas law was changed to make it impossible to get on the ballot, in my judgment. 15,000 people had to go to precinct conventions on the day of the primary, May 4, and no one knew where our precinct conventions were goinq to be held, because the other two parties held theirs at the courthouse and other public accommodation places, and so on May 4, election day in Texas, 2,000 more people attended the precinct conventions of the American Party in 30 counties than the combined total of the Republican and Democratic parties in 254 counties. * And some of the politicians in the state capitol of Austin, Texas, said a week before that, "We hadn't heard anything about

this movement in Texas." But the other day the same politicians said, "We were surprised and shocked at the support this movement has." Well if they'll go out and ask the average man on the street in Texas or Memphis or any other city in the country, they'll find that there are millions, as I said a while ago, who think as we do.

The only thing I'm gonna say about race tonight is this: that I am grateful for the fact that the people in our state-- of all races--and in this state have thought so much of me and my family during the last several weeks and several months. And in 1966 my wife was the candidate for Governor and had two opponents in the general election, And contrary to what I resent as portrayal of people like you and me as being racists and against people because of color, my wife received more Negro votes than did either one of her two opponents in the general election- * and over at Selma, Alabama, where they made a mountain out of a molehill because we maintained law and order, on election day half of those who voted were members of the Negro race--6500 voters--my wife received 11,400 votes in round numbers to a combined total of 3800 for her two opponents, and in the all-Negro precincts and ward in that city my wife received 87 1/2% of the Negro vote. * So we are not fighting to defend the system that has made it possible for people of all races, colors, creeds and religions and national origins to live in peace and freedom. When they

say you and me are a racist and a hat.-monger and a facist, its because they cain't logically argue against the position we take. And so they write us off. And when I was in California and made the announcement that we had made ballot position one newsman said, "Haven't you changed yo position? Don't you talk differently now than you used to?" I said, "No, I talk basically the same as I did from the first day I got into politics, but you drew a conclusion in your mind about Tennesseans and Alabama'ans and wrote it without listenin' to us and you didn't pay any attention to what we said in the past, but you've got to pay attention to what we say now." *I invite people in Memphis and Tennessee and the cuntry of all races and colors to support us in November because we want to save the system that makes it possible for good people whoever they might be to live in peace and freedom and to restore back constitutional governement in this country.

Now what are we talkin' about and what are some of the issues in this country that confront people in Memphis? They have taken away the right of people to determine the policies of democratic domestic institutions. The National Democratic party and National Republican party both have drawn together to take away the right of people in Memphis to control the policies of their schools, the education of their children, to run their own hospitals, the seniority and apprenticeship list of their own labor unions, or their businesses, and now recently, Democrats and Republicans in Congress, including some from your own state, have joined to

pass a law, that will put you in jail without a trial by jury, because you don't want to sell or lease yo' property to somebody that they think you ought to sell or lease it to, and one of the first * And you know, these national Republican leaders in Tennessee and throughout the country, they say, "You may take some votes away from the National Republican party and the National Democratic party might win." Well, if Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rockefeller stand for the same things that Mr. McCarthy and Mr. Humphrey stand for, what difference does it make who * Now if you want to beat the National Democratic party for the sake of beating them, that's one thing. But if you want to beat them for the sake of changing trends in the country, that's another. And if you elect the National Republican party in November, one week after they are inaugurated you'll want to put them out and you'll have to wait four years to do it. Let's put 'em both out in November. *

They not gonna get by with that. And they've looked down their noses at the average man on the street too long. They've looked at the bus driver, the truck driver, the beautician, the fireman, the policeman, and the steelworker, the plumber, and the communication worker and the oil worker and the little businessman and they say, "We've gotta write a guideline, We've gotta tell you when to get up in the mornin' We've gotta tell you when to go to bed at night. And we gonna tell both national parties the average man on the street in Tennessee and Alabama and California don't need anybody to write him a guideline to

tell him when to get up *

And you know, what do you hear from the liberals in Tennessee and the country? "We believe in free choice," they say. "Let every man choose." Well, we had a school system in Alabama that allowed people to choose to go to any school they want a go to regardless of their race or color. You had that in Tennessee. The Courts recently have stricken it down because they filed a court suit in which they said not enough people have chosen to go to school from this side of Los Angeles to this side of Los Angeles, and not enough people from this side of Memphis have chosen to go to school on this side of Memphis! And we said, "Well, they could choose if they so desired. What are we gonna do about that?" An' the Justice Department says "That's your problem." And the Federal court wrote a decision that's now been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and also the Supreme Court of our country that says that you can choose if you choose properly, but if you don't choose right, we gonna choose fo' you." * They want you to choose if you choose correctly, but they look down they nose at Alabamians and Tennesseans and the workin' man in California. And I want to say that one of the first things we going to do when we get into the White House, and we going to do it within the law, we going to turn back to you these domestic institutions. *

In California, they voted on the matter of housin' not too long ago, in 1966, and the people of that state voted 4 1/2 million

to 2 million that they wanted to dispose of their property in the manner they saw fit. And the Supreme Court of your country said, "You cain't vote that way." And they struck it down. And the people of Oklahoma voted on the matter of apportionment of their legislature. And the Supreme Court said, "The people of Oklahoma cain't vote that way." Well, why cain't the people of California and Oklahoma and Tennessee vote to dispose of their property in the manner they see fit or apportion their legislature in the manner they see fit? It never has been unconstitutional for them to do that and its not unconstitutional now, just because the Supreme Court of our country said so, but they too can violate the law. And they have the power but they don't have the right. And recently they wrote a decision, the other day, in which they gave the police some authority [stop and frisk]. And you know why they wrote that decision? Is because of you who are assembled here. They are hearing from the people of this country and when they can change the law at their own whim, I say they go beyond the law and I'm gonna appoint some different sorts of judges when attrition takes its toll. * They say you cain't pray in a public school anymore--oh, that's violatin' the law, they say. And you know, the other day the Supreme Court of this country ruled that a communist can work in a defense plant without a security clearance and I wouldn't believe a communist with a security clearance, and when I get to be President * If you elect me President, I tell you what I'm gonna do. And I'm

gonna do it within the law. I'm gonna take every communist out of every defense plant in Tennessee * Yes, we fight the communists in Southeast Asia and let 'em run wild in this country and if you don't think people aren't tired of it you oughta been with me in California. And you know when we were out in California we have a professor,--I'm not talkin' about all professors, but here's an issue in the campaign--we got these pseudo-theoriticians, and these pseudo-social engineers that we find on some college campuses and we find in some pulpits and we find on some judges' benches * and we find in some newspaper editors' offices * they guideline writers. They wanna tell you how to do. And those that write guidelines, some of 'em have pointed heads and cain't even park a bicycle straight * I'm not talkin' about the true intellectuals, we need true intellectuals in this country. I'm talkin' about the kind that assaults the pentagon. I'm talkin' about the kind that assaults draft board stations. I'm talkin' about those who lay on railroad tracks and stop defense shipments. I'm talkin' about those kind. And the folks in our country's sick and tired of those kind of folks, and when I was in California one UCLA professor, who made a speech derogatory of Alabamians in which they referred to us as rednecks--and I said, "Yes, our necks are red from workin' in the sun * I've seen some folks whose necks won't ever get red cause they've got too much hair on their necks" * --You know he made a speech, and he draws about \$40,000 a year on the tax money in California, and I said "you hard-workin' taxpayers are

payin' him \$40,000 a year and he makes a speech in which he calls for the burin' down of the city." He said he oughta burn this town down. And they say that's academic freedom and free speech. And I said, "I wanna tell you, the first public college professor in my state who makes a statement drawin' tax money that he wants to burn the town down, my little wife's gonna fire him so fast he won't know what's struck him"*

Another great issue that faces the American people is the breakdown of law and order. And you know those in high places in this country have helped to bring about the breakdown of law and order because they said we must remove the causes, we must remove the reasons, and the leadership of both national parties are sayin' we gotta remove the causes for the destruction of the internal security of our country, and I tell you that no small group of people in this country, regardless of who they happen to be, have the right to destroy the security of 200-odd millions of people in this country and do you know who's responsible for the breakdown of law and order in this country? It's those who want to lose the war in Viet Nam. It's militants, activists, revolutionaries, anarchists and communists, that who * And I'm not talkin' about race. The overwhelmin' majority of the people in our country--of all races--are just as sick and tired of this breakdown of law and order as those of us who assembled here tonight. And yet I'm asked the question when you talk about law and order, and local government, the property ownership system, "Aren't you bein' a racist?" Well, it's a sad day in the country when you

cain't talk about law and order unless they wanna call you a racist. I tell you that's not true and I resent it and they gonna have to pay attention 'cause all people in this country, in the great majority, the Supreme Court of our country has made it almost impossible to convict a criminal and if you walk out of this buildin' tonite, and someone knocks you in the haid, the person who knocked you in the haid will be out of jail before you get in the hospital, and on Monday they'll try the policeman if you don't watch out * * I want to say that you in Memphis, and wherever you might live, better be proud of the police and firemen in this country because I * One of the first things I'm gonna do if you elect me president is to give my moral support to the police of this country and tell them that I'm gonna do if you elect me president is to give my moral support to the police of this country and tell them that I'm gonna give you the moral support of the President of the United States. * We don't need any national police force. Just let the police in Memphis and Little Rock and Los Angeles and New York enforce the law like they know how to enforce it without fear or favor and we'll have peace in the land and you know it's a sad day in our country * when people in high places cannot even run for public office without being slain. And yet we have heard people in high places speak that you've got a right to obey the laws you wanna obey and to disobey those you don't wanna obey. And if that prevails we'll have anarchy. I don't like some of the laws that they passed on us, and I don't like some of the court orders, but

we got to obey them whether we like them or not. And one reason I'm runnin' for the Presidency is we gonna change some court orders and some laws in the proper constitutional manner. *

You know, the president of our country--and even though I don't support President Johnson, he's the president of our country and he travels the length and breadth of this country, he did sometime ago, and whether we agree with him or not, and I've always been opposed to him politically, but he is the president and he is entitled to the respect that office is due. Not only personal respect, but he is entitled to respect as the president of our country. And yet he went to California not so long ago, and while he was there his personal safety was impaired, his life was impaired and threatened, and when he went to the cardinal's funeral in New York some time ago, he had to go in the side door because of a group of anarchists threatening the personal safety of the President of the United States. And when he was in California a group of anarchists lay down in front of his automobile. I want to tell you as I said on television the other night, you elect me the president, and I go to California, or I come to Tennessee, and a group of anarchists lay down in front of my automobile, it's gonna be the last one they ever gonna wanna lay down in front of." ** And yet we find today some of these politicians on the national scene that all of a sudden are talkin about law and order themselves and you know down in Selma Alabama, the Washington Post they wrote about what a great holy crusade it was--to come down a group of anarchists

of all races, to impair the safety of people in Selma. To block trade, commerce and traffic. Yet the other day when I announced for the presidency in Washington, D. C., the Washington Post had an editorial in which they said we shouldn't let them come to this town and block our trade and commerce, we ought to put a stop to it. Well, they advocated the breakdown of law and order in Selma, they created themselves a frankenstein and now they callin' on help and you an' me gonna help Washington and Selma in November *

Hypocrites? You got more hypocrites there than any place I know. * And in Berkeley, they talked about open housin' there, y'know everybody had a runnin' academic fit about open housin'. They voted on it twice in Berkeley and voted against it, so you see hypocrisy, bad faith, and lack of candor hasn't helped race relations in our country but it has hurt them. And I say we ought to be honest with people, and that's the reason I believe that people of all races are eventually gonna support this movement, because they'd rather have somebody honest talkin' to them than some hypocritical liberal who lives in Washington *

You know, I can remember not long ago in Detroit, Michigan, when you talk about the breakdown of law and order, Gov. Romney said, "President Johnson didn't send troops on time." President Johnson said, "you didn't ask for 'em on time." Gov. Romney says, "they too many papers to fill out." President Johnson says, "you didn't fill out enough papers." And then my wife gets a

telegram from Mr. Ramsey Clark, who's another advocate of the breakdown of law and order, unwittingly maybe, * wrote my wife a letter, two pages, explaining to her how you have to go about getting federal troops in case of the breakdown of domestic tranquility. You got to hold up your right hand and swear before so many notary publics; you got to hold your left hand and swear to satisfy the left-wingers in the country; and you got to fill out duplicate copies to one bureau, triplicate copies to another, quintuplet copies to another, and octopunlet copies to another. And my wife says, "you know, this is amusin' and confusin', George, how difficult it is to get troops! I remember we got 'em in Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi and didn't even ask for 'em." * They thought it was politically expedient to violate the Constitution insofar as Alabama was concerned, but they're finding now that it's not expedient to violate it even insofar as a deep southern state is concerned.

And another issue, and there are many issues in the campaign, that we'll develop as we go along, is our involvement in Southeast Asia. And I don't impugn anybody's motives in the top echelons of our government. I have been to classified and confidential briefings when I was governor of Alabama with other governors, the cabinet of the President, the President, the Vice President, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a frustrating and exasperating experience, the matter of Vietnam. And there is no simple, utopian solution to our involvement there. There are several

things we should have learned about this involvement. Is that we should never have become involved by ourselves, because it is just as much to the interest of Western Europe and the non-communist nations of Asia to defend against communist aggression as it is for the United States and we should have looked them in the face. *

And whether you agree with our involvement or not, we've got 500,000 American servicemen and other allied servicemen who are totally committed between life and death at this very minute, and some of them are bein' killed in Southeast Asia and so we should look our European allies in the face and say, "We need you and you need us. * But our nuclear shield is your deterrent to communist aggression. We know that Eastern European nations were lost and sold out evidently at Yalta, but Western Europe, we stabilized you after the war, we loaned you money, we built back your industries and we glad we stabilized you because you have been in a stabilized position, a deterrent to further communist aggression." And we should tell our neighbors in Asia the same thing. "But you gonna help us, and you gonna go with us, and if you don't help us and you don't go with us and don't quit tradin' with the North Vietnamese and the communist enemies of ours, we not only gonna cut off foreign aid, but we gonna make you pay back every dime that you borrowed from us." *

And advise Mr. DeGaulle who's been flirtin' with the communists and they are now about to stab him in the back, you

cain't deal with the communists except from a position of strength and I'm not talkin' about rattlin' sabres and rockets, I'm talkin' about bein' strong fiscally, economically, industrially, agriculturally, militarily because that in itself is a deterrent to a possible third world war. But Mr. DeGaulle evidently has seen the British pound devalued because of socialistic overspending, spending which has brought no return to the British people. I'm not against spending money, I believe in spending money. The government oughta build schools and roads and harbors--that is an investment. When I was governor of our state, and durin' my late wife's administration, we had the largest highway program in Alabama's history, the largest hospital program, we had the largest school program, with more colleges and trade schools built to serve the average citizen of our state of all races than at any time in our history. And we borrowed some money to do some of these things with. But we didn't borrow any money to build bridges in Cuba; we didn't borrow any money to build any bridges in Yugoslavia; we built them in Alabama and there's a real difference. * And Mr. DeGaulle evidently wants to see the American dollar devalued, which has been devalued enough through inflationary processes in our country. When he has some dollars he wants to drain our gold out. And so, we find that he gets hundred-million here and a hundred-million there. We ought to tell Mr. DeGaulle, "If you gonna keep on takin' gold fo' yo' dollahs when you don't have to, we gonna do some old cab-drivin' logic in our business relations with you which would be just as good or better than

some of the pseudo-theoreticians logic." --I used to be a cab driver in college, is the reason I say cab-drivin' logic. Their fierce contact with life teaches them some things that some of our pseudo-social-engineers never learn, in college, and so, what I would do, I would just say, "You owe us 7 billion dollahs from World War I" and write it up on the wall--'7 billion dollahs'-- "and when you wanted 100 million in gold we'd just put 100 million under it and subtract it and say you owe us six billion, nine hundred million." * They say it's so complicated and it really isn't all that complicated, we just need some common sense in some of the decisions of our government. * I sincerely hope that the negotiations bein' carried on in France are fruitful and that we have an honorable peace. I hope that, and I pray for that, and you do too. But one way that I think we can help conclude this war, if it has to commence on a large scale because they break down, is that we should stop the morale buildup by the communists in our own country. When we say, today, academic freedom, and free speech and the right of dissent, give people the right to advocate treason, it's not dissent. And you know you have a right to dissent about the war, and you have a right to say that I don't think we ought to be in the war, if that's the way you feel. Because that is free speech, and that is a freedom we possess. But every man on the street understands the difference between honest dissent and that which is not honest. And when a professor at Berkeley, the University of California, rises and makes a speech and says let us organize a freedom brigade and go

fight the American imperialist soldiers in Southeast Asia and they print that in Hanoi, Peking and Moscow, and boost the morale of the communists who then kill some more American troops and then up at Rutgers University one--and many have said this--"I long for a communist victory" he says, and when they said, "Do you want to fire this man?" They said "Academic freedom!" We going to destroy academic freedom in this country if we continue to abuse it and if you'll elect me the president, the first thing I'm gonna do, is have my attorney general to call for an indictment against anyone callin' for communist victory and we see if we can't put 'em under a good jail. * There is a great difference in honest dissent and an overt act of treason and when I've said that in some places they've written "Wallace would jail the Senate." I never said any such thing. I said that I would jail traitors, and dissenters are...entirely...two different definitions as far as I'm personally concerned. Yes, and you find also on some college campuses in our country organizations raisin' money, blood and clothes for the Viet Cong communists and flyin' the V.C. flag and they say, "Well, that's dissent. That's academic freedom." And I say that a few of them ought to be dragged by the hair on their heads and stuck under a good jail and that would stop that and that's what we are gonna do when I get to be president. * When I was out in California they was gonna raise everything under the sun against this movement cause they are disturbed now about it, about this movement, and after this crowd here in Memphis they gonna be doubly disturbed. * When I was out in Los Angeles they

had to write that Wallace flies the Confederate flag on the capitol--like we didn't fly the American flag. Well, no flag flies higher in the hearts of Alabamians and Tennesseans than the American flag. But one reason we love the American flag is because* it embraces the flags of all our states and the flags of our heritage, which includes the flag of the Confederacy. So we flew the Confederate flag to commemorate the centennial of the War between the States. And the American flag flies on the same spot on the capitol grounds in Alabama since the year 1917 --before I was born. And a contingency of Ohio troops put the flag up. And they put it in the wrong place--it was Ohio folks that did it--* And what I said in California--we might fly the Confederate flag, but there's one thing for sure. Where you see the Confederate flag flyin' you won't see any Viet Cong flags flyin' * And you won't see anybody raisin' money and blood and clothes for the communists. And I am proud of the condition of support for our country in Tennessee and our great section of the country and in the Volunteer State.

Now, you know while I was out there they talked about napalm, and I want to tell you this, I don't want to hold you here too long because (No!No!) you been here a long time but let me tell you this, while I was in California a group of folks was marchin' on all the college campuses sayin' we ought not to have napalm and we against killin' civilians. Well, I'm against killin' civilians, too, and I'm sorry that any civilian is killed in any war. But the communists cause the killing of civilians, not the

people of our country. Were it not for the communists no civilians would be bein' killed any place--not in Southeast Asia or any place else. But during World War II, my young friends who might attend college are here tonight, when you hear somebody stand up and beat his chest and say we got to stop killin' civilians in Hanoi, and his organization has opposed the dropping of napalm, you ask him what his organization said durin' World War II when we were on the same side as the communists and you know the communist Daily Worker and every front organization in Tennessee and California said we ought not to be in this war. That's when Germany and Russia were at peace with each other. But the day after the night that Germany invaded Russia, the communists Daily Worker and every front organization came out and said we must join this war and defend and fight this war and we did fight and I was against Nazism because it's just as mean and terrible as communism and we fought Nazism but we were on the same side and we saved the communist system at Leningrad, at Stalinrad, with 10 billion dollars of materials manufactured in Tennessee and Alabama. And every time we dropped a thousand tons of bombs on Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome, these same groups who today decry the bombing of cities said "Bomb 'em some mo'. Kill all the civilians in these countries." So when they tell you, my young friends, they don't want any civilians killed, they talkin' about civilians in the communists' capitals. They didn't mind killin' all the civilians in the non-communist capitals of the world in fightin; Russia, so when they tell you they for peace and for civilians, they lyin'

to you. And if you pay any attention to them and you an objective person, you gonna wake up short one day because they not one ounce of truth in any organization in this country that advocates the breakdown of law and order on the one hand and their leaders then wind up in Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. And have you seen the likes in this country of people in high places winin' and dinin' folks who advocate the breakdown of law and order and then themselves wind up some place callin' for communist victory. I don't understand it. The average man in California don't understand it, and people in Tennessee don't understand it, and so they going to get the ax in November.

So you know they say if you run for the presidency, can you win? Well, let me tell you this. It doesn't take but a plurality to win when three or more are runnin'. In our electoral college system that Sen. Dirksen said the other day, "We going to have to change this thing on account of this Wallace fellow." * We at least got 'em talkin' about changin' the Constitution, which is something that no movement in the country like this has ever done before. But you know if I get 34% of the vote in Tennessee and the other two parties get 33% apiece, then we win the electoral vote of the state. * You can win without a majority. Not that we don't have a majority viewpoint, but it is a political fact that you can win on less than a majority.

And you know I went to Wisconsin four years ago with all these things they said about me, with no time and no money and no

organization, and we got 35% of the vote in the Democratic primary in Wisconsin four years ago; and we got 30% in Indiana; and we got 44% in Maryland and they counted the votes. I don't know how many I'd have gotten if I'd counted them myself. *

You know, this was on a television show, from one of our speeches but I'd like to tell it again. You know we were leading in Maryland with no organization, just the grass roots people, but we were leading in that state about 8 or 9 o'clock that night with about several hundred thousand votes already reported and they called the mayor of Baltimore on the television and he was a big-time politician, naturally: they said "what do you think about it?" And of course he said, "It's a sad day in the free State of Maryland!" He said, "We won't ever live this down if we exist another thousand years! What has come over the people of the free state of Maryland?" Well, if he'd gone out and asked a good cab driver he would of told him but they don't ask cab drivers any more, they ask some fella like I said a moment ago who can't park his big ole straight. * About that time there was a request for a recapitulation of the vote. Well, bein' from Alabama, I wasn't sure what recapitulation was (Laughter all through here.) But I knew that I was noing to find out. * And about 10 o'clock the head recapitulator of Maryland came on the television * and he said * "We have had a request for recapitulation. * And we have thoroughly recapitulated * and upon this recapitulation * Gov. Wallace is now behind * "I'm not quite sure what it is yet, but if anybody in Memphis ever tells you they

gonna recapitulate on you, you better watch'em, they gonna do somethin' to you. *

We've learned how to recapitulate ourselves and we've learned many things since 1964 and they've learned a lot of things about us. And to those Republicans who say "you might cause us to lose," let me say that I withdrew in 1964 from those states I was qualified in because I didn't want to split the vote up and I withdrew, and they ran a poor campaign, as you know. So since the Gallup poll the other day showed that there are more independent voters than there are Republican voters, maybe somebody ought to withdraw for us. *

And remember this also, they've talked about the people of our nation, they've talked about throwin' it into the House. Well, we're not runnin' to throw it into the House, we're running to win. * But that question comes up and the only time I answer it is that it's asked. But if it were thrown into the House and no one got a majority in the electoral college, since both parties stand for the same identical philosophy, we have nothing to lose and everything to gain. And so, don't let 'em talk that to you in the newspapers. And remember this, they keep talkin' about our people are sick in the country. They say our people are sick. The people of our nation are as good and fine a people as ever populated the United States and I'm tired * I tell you who's sick. It's some of the leadership in this country that's sick. * When the newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times and the Milwaukee Journal

and the other large newspapers when they write an editorial about you and me you remember that the editorial writer's one man and you are one man and you one woman and your attitude and mine it just as good about these matters or better as theirs. So, don't let that worry you when they tell you that some newspaper said * well, you said so and you represent just as many votes as the editor of any newspaper in this country good or bad * and let me tell you this * they are not always right. I remember when Mao Tse Tung was comin' to power in China. What did the New York Times and the Newsweek, and the Time magazine that makes fun of people even in death--year that's what they do and I resent that too, if you want to know the truth about it. * -- They said, they said Mao Tse Tung is an agrarian reformer, he wants to help the poor people of China and Chiang Kai-Shek oughta be thrown out. It turned out they were mistaken. Mao Tse Tung was a communist who wanted to destroy the United States and so they were not right then, were they? And many people in the armed services while they was in the South Pacific they knew from private to general that Mao Tse Tung was a communist but not the smart folk who sometimes try to mold public opinion in this country, they didn't see that from their ivory towers; and when Ben Bella was down there in Algeria they said the same things--"He's a good man"--he turned out to be a communist. And when Castro was in the hills of Cuba they brought him up to Washington and New York and they introduced him on national television as the George Washington of Cuba and he was said by the New York Times to be

the Robin Hood of the Caribbean. And every cab driver in Alabama said he was a communist. By instinct, they knew. * And they not always right.

And so, my friends, as one writer has said, the people of this nation look to the soul of the South to help place this nation back on the road to sanity. And there are millions of people who are as good as we in other parts of the country but their leadership has let them down. And they lookin' to us. And if you don't believe it you go with me to Milwaukee or to Escanaba Michigan, to Macomb, Ohio, to Tacoma, Washington, to Fontana, California, you can see that--they dependin' on you. And I again say that my prayer is, as I said in the openin' of at the end of my inaugural address when I was inaugurated Governor of Alabama, that God would bless all of the people of this state and of this country, regardless of their race or color. And I'll tell you what you do, if you'll go out and work for us from now on till this campaign's over, I'll come back to Tennessee prior to the campaign and you and me together will continue to shake the eveteeth of the liberals in both national parties. Thank you all very much.

Table 1

<u>RANK</u>	<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>PERCENT NON-WHITE</u>
1	MACON	83.5
2	GREENE	81.3
3	LOWNDES	80.7
4	WILCOX	77.9
5	SUMTER	76.3
6	BULLOCK	71.9
7	HALE	70.7
8	PERRY	65.8
9	MARANGO	62.1
10	DALLAS	57.7
11	BARBAUR	52.0
12	MONROE	50.7
13 (T)	CHOCTAW	49.6
(T)	RUSSELL	49.6
15	CLARKE	49.5
16	HENRY	45.6
17	CONECUH	45.5
18 (T)	BUTLER	44.7
(T)	PICKENS	44.7
20	AUTAUGA	42.2
21	PIKE	41.3
22	MONTGOMERY	38.3
23	LEE	36.8
24	CHAMBERS	36.7
25	COOSA	36.2
26	JEFFERSON	34.6
27	WASHINGTON	34.5
28	ESCAMBIA	34.2
29	ELMORE	33.8
30	MOBILE	32.3
31	TALLADEGA	32.0
32	CRENSHAW	31.1
33	BIBB	30.8
34	TALLAPOOSA	28.9
35	TUSCALOOSA	28.7
36	HOUSTON	27.4
37	RANDOLPH	25.5
38	LAWRENCE	22.3
39	BALDWIN	21.0
40	LIMESTONE	20.9
41	COFFEE	20.8
42	COLBERT	19.3
43	SHELBY	18.9
44 (T)	CALHOUN	18.8
(T)	MADISON	18.8
45	DALE	18.0
46	ST. CLAIR	16.8
47	CLAY	16.4
48	COVINGTON	16.1
49 (T)	CHILTON	15.9
(T)	FAYETTE	15.9
51	ETOWAH	15.5
52	GENEVA	15.1
53	LAMAR	14.7
54	MORGAN	12.6
55	LAUDERDALE	11.8
56 (T)	CHEROKEE	10.4
(T)	WALKER	10.4
58	CLEBURN	6.4
59	JACKSON	6.1
60	FRANKLIN	5.6
61	MARION	3.4
62	BLOUNT	3.3
63	MARSHALL	2.3
64	DE KALB	2.0
65	CULLMAN	1.1
66	WINSTON	0.5

STATE

30.1

ALABAMA COUNTIES RANKED BY PERCENT NON-WHITE POPULATION: 1962
 (ADAPTED FROM: U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS;
COUNTY AND CITY DATE BOOK (WASHINGTON, 1962); P. 12)




Figure 1: Distribution of Alabama's Negro Population by County

Table 2

States Ranked by Percent Statewide Presidential Vote for Wallace, 1968

<u>State</u>	<u>%Wallace</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>%Wallace</u>
Alabama	65.9	New Jersey	9.1
Mississippi	63.5	Wyoming	8.7
Louisiana	48.3	Illinois	8.5
Georgia	42.8	Nebraska	8.4
Arkansas	38.9	Pennsylvania	8.0
Tennessee	34.0	New Mexico	7.9
South Carolina	32.3	Wisconsin	7.6
North Carolina	31.3	Colorado	7.5
Florida	28.5	Washington	7.4
Virginia		Montana	7.3
Oklahoma		California	6.7
Texas		Utah	6.3
Kentucky		Oregon	6.1
Maryland		Connecticut	6.1
Delaware		North Dakota	5.7
Nevada		Iowa	5.7
Idaho		New York	5.3
Alaska		South Dakota	4.8
Ohio		Minnesota	4.3
Missouri		Rhode Island	4.1
Indiana		New Hampshire	3.8
Kansas		Massachusetts	3.7
Michigan	11.0	Vermont	3.2
Arizona	9.6	Maine	1.6
West Virginia	9.6	Hawaii	1.5
		Washington D.C.	0

STATES RANKED BY PERCENT STATEWIDE VOTE CAST FOR GEORGE WALLACE FOR PRESIDENT: 1968. (ADAPTED FROM CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, VOL. XXVII NO. 23 (PART ONE OF TWO PARTS) JUNE 6, 1969, BACK COVER).




Figure 2: National Distribution of Wallace Vote, by State, 1968

Table 2

States Ranked by Percent Statewide Presidential Vote for Wallace, 1968

<u>State</u>	<u>%Wallace</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>%Wallace</u>
Alabama	65.9	New Jersey	9.1
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South Carolina	32.3	Wisconsin	7.6
North Carolina	31.3	Colorado	7.5
Florida	28.5	Washington	7.4
Virginia	23.6	Montana	7.3
Oklahoma	20.3	California	6.7
Texas	19.0	Utah	6.3
Kentucky	18.3	Oregon	6.1
Maryland	14.5	Connecticut	6.1
Delaware	13.3	North Dakota	5.7
Nevada	13.2	Iowa	5.7
Idaho	12.5	New York	5.3
Alaska	12.1	South Dakota	4.8
Ohio	11.8	Minnesota	4.3
Missouri	11.4	Rhode Island	4.1
Indiana	11.4	New Hampshire	3.8
Kansas	10.2	Massachusetts	3.7
Michigan	10.0	Vermont	3.2
Arizona	9.6	Maine	1.6
West Virginia	9.6	Hawaii	1.5
		Washington D.C.	0

STATES RANKED BY PERCENT STATEWIDE VOTE CAST FOR GEORGE WALLACE FOR PRESIDENT: 1968. (ADAPTED FROM CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, VOL. XXVII NO. 23 (PART ONE OF TWO PARTS) JUNE 6, 1969, BACK COVER).




Figure 2: National Distribution of Wallace Vote, by State, 1968

Table 3
Summary of Candidate Rankings

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Know</u>	<u>50⁰</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>First Choice Mentions*</u>	<u>Last Choice Mentions*</u>
Nixon	1%	16	66.5	36%	8%
Humphrey	1	14	61.7	25	13
Muskie	8	31	61.4	16	10
Agnew	7	41	50.4	4	13
LeMay	7	29	35.2	3	40
Wallace	2	13	31.4	11	62

Note: columns marked with an asterisk (*) may total to more than 100% because a respondent could have given more than one candidate the same highest or lowest score.

(Adapted from WEisberg and Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation", mimeo, Table 1).



WALLACE

Tonight—Mon., June 10
WCOV-TV Channel 20 8:30 p.m.

Tomorrow Night—Tues., June 11
WSFA-TV Channel 12 9:30 p.m.

Pd. Pol. Adv. for George Wallace Campaign 10 High Bldg. West. Ala. Soyuzo Transmitt chas.

Typical Wallace Campaign Advertisement

Appendix H: The American Independent Party Platform

PREAMBLE

A sense of destiny pervades the creation and adoption of this first Platform of the American Independent Party, a Platform personifying the ideals, hopes, aspirations and proposals for action of the Party and its candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the United States, George C. Wallace and Curtis E. LeMay.

As this great nation searched vainly for leadership while beset by riots, minority group rebellions, domestic disorders, student protests, spiraling living costs, soaring interest rates, a frightening increase in the crime rate, war abroad and loss of personal liberty at home; while our national political parties and their leaders paid homage to the legions of dissent and disorder and worshipped at the shrine of political expediency, only this Party, the American Independent Party, and its candidates George C. Wallace and Curtis E. LeMay, possessed the courage and fortitude to openly propose and advocate to the nation those actions which are necessary to return this country to its accustomed and deserved position of leadership among the community of nations and to offer hope to our people of some relief from the continued turmoil, frustration and confusion brought about through the fearful and inept leadership of our national political parties.

It is to this end and for this purpose that this Platform is designed. Herein will be set forth the policies, attitude, proposals and position of this Party and its candidates, treating with those matters of deepest concern to the average American,

his home, his family, his property, his employment, his right to safety and security in the pursuit of the activities of his daily life, his right to freedom from interference and harassment from and by the government at all levels and, lastly, his pride in himself and this nation and all that it has stood for.

We feel that this American has an intense devotion to his country, glorifies in its accomplishments and is saddened by its failures and shortcomings; that he is tolerant of the mistakes of political leaders if he senses their actions to be in good faith and directed to the best interest of the country, but he is confused and dismayed when these leaders desert the principle of government for the people and dedicate themselves to minority appeasement as the country burns and decays.

This document treats of both foreign and domestic policy and is basically designed to present the proposals and action programs of this Party and its candidates in the area of:

1. Peace abroad and domestic tranquility at home.
2. An enlightened and advancing educational program, assisted but not controlled by the federal government.
3. Job training and opportunity for all Americans willing and able to seek and hold gainful employment.
4. An alliance and partnership with the private sector of our economy seeking an end to poverty among our people.
5. Efficiency and prudence in governmental spending leading to a helpful and stable economy free from the need for ever continuing taxation.
6. Inclusion of the farmer in our program of prosperity through his own efforts rather than total reliance on government subsidy.
7. Reestablishment of the authority and responsibility of local government by returning to the states, counties and cities those matters properly falling within their jurisdiction and responsibility.

8. Ending the inflationary spiral of the past decade through fiscal responsibility and efficiency in all echelons of government.
9. The orderly and economical utilization of the natural resources of this nation coupled with a sensible program of conservation of these resources.
10. An insistence that the laboring man and woman be given his fair share of responsibility and reward for the development of the mighty potential of this nation.
11. A re-dedication of this country to the love of God and country and the creation of a judiciary mindful of the attitudes of the people in this regard.

With these cardinal principles in mind, we herein set forth the precepts of our Party and Candidates in the following areas of concern:

DOMESTIC POLICY

Clearly, our citizens are deeply concerned over the domestic plight of this nation. Its cities are in decay and turmoil; its local schools and other institutions stand stripped of their rightful authority; law enforcement agencies and officers are hampered by arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions imposed by a beguiled judiciary; crime runs rampant through the nation; our farmers exist only through unrealistic government subsidies; welfare rolls and costs soar to astronomical heights; our great American institutions of learning are in chaos; living costs rise even higher as do taxes; interest rates are reaching new heights; disciplines of dissent and disorder are rewarded for their disruptive actions at the expense of our law-abiding, God fearing, hard working citizenry. America is alarmed that these conditions have come to exist and that our national leadership takes no corrective action. We feel that the programs and policies of our Party offers this leadership and provides constructive proposals of

action for the elimination of the conditions now existing.

This we would do in the following manner.

Local Government

The Founding Fathers of our country, when they had won their freedom from King George III in the American Revolution, and were engaged in setting up our Federal Government, in their infinite wisdom, visualized the tyranny and despotism which would inevitably result from an omnipotent central government; and, they sought to avoid that peril by delegating to that central or federal government only those powers which could best be administered by a central or federal government, such as the laying and collecting of taxes to pay the national debt, providing for the common defense, regulating commerce between the states, declaring and waging war, coining money and establishing and maintaining a postal system. And then they provided, in Article X of the Bill of Rights, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, that:

"The powers, not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."

The Federal Government, in derogation and flagrant violation of this Article of the Bill of Rights, has in the past three decades seized and usurped many powers not delegated to it, such as, among others: the operation and control of the public school system of the several states; the power to prescribe the eligibility and qualifications of those who would vote in our state and local elections; the power to intrude upon and control the farmer in the operation of his farm; the power to tell the property owner to whom he can and cannot sell or rent his property; and, many other rights

and privileges of the individual citizen, which are properly subject to state or local control, as distinguished from federal control. The Federal Government has forced the states to reapportion their legislatures, a prerogative of the states alone. The Federal Government has attempted to take over and control the seniority and apprenticeship lists of the labor unions; the Federal Government has adopted so-called "Civil Rights Acts," particularly the one adopted in 1964, which have set race against race and class against class, all of which we condemn.

It shall be our purpose to take such steps and to pursue such courses as may be necessary and required to restore to the states the powers and authority which rightfully belong to the state and local governments, so that each state shall govern and control its internal affairs without interference or domination of the Federal Government. We feel that the people of a given state are in better position to operate its internal affairs, such as its public schools, than is the Federal Government in Washington; and, we pledge our best efforts to restore to state governments those powers which rightfully belong to the respective states, and which have been illegally and unlawfully seized by the Federal Government, in direct violation of Article X of the Bill of Rights.

The Federal Judiciary

Our forebears, in building our government, wisely provided and established, in the Constitution of the United States, that the Federal Government should consist of three branches, the Legislative, represented by the Congress, whose duty and responsibility it is to enact the laws; the Executive, represented

by the President, whose duty it is to enforce the laws enacted by the Congress; and, the Judicial, whose duty and responsibility it is to interpret and construe those laws, not to enact them.

The Constitution of the United States provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish; and, further, that the judges of the Federal courts shall hold their offices for life, during good behavior.

In the period of the past three decades, we have seen the Federal judiciary, primarily the Supreme Court, transgress repeatedly upon the prerogatives of the Congress and exceed its authority by enacting judicial legislation, in the form of decisions based upon political and sociological considerations, which would never have been enacted by the Congress. We have seen them, in their solicitude for the criminal and lawless element of our society, shackle the police and other law enforcement agencies; and, as a result, they have made it increasingly difficult to protect the law-abiding citizen from crime and criminals. This is one of the principal reasons for the turmoil and the near revolutionary conditions which prevail in our country today, and particularly in our national capital. The Federal judiciary, feeling secure in their knowledge that their appointment is for life, have far exceeded their constitutional authority, which is limited to interpreting or construing the law.

It shall be our policy and our purpose, at the earliest possible time, to propose and advocate and urge the adoption of an

amendment to the United States Constitution whereby members of the Federal judiciary at District level be required to face the electorate on his record at periodical intervals; and, in the event he receives a negative vote upon such election, his office shall thereupon become vacant, and a successor shall be appointed to succeed him.

With respect to the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals I would propose that this amendment require re-confirmation of the office holder by the United States Senate at reasonable intervals.

Private Property

We hold that the ownership of private property is the right and privilege of every American citizen and is one of the foundation stones upon which this nation and its free-enterprise system has been built and has prospered. We feel that private property rights and human rights are inseparable and indivisible. Only in those nations that guarantee the right of ownership of private property as basic and sacred under their law is there any recognition of human rights.

We feel that the American system of private property ownership, coupled with its system of free enterprise, upon the basis of which our country has grown and prospered for more than two hundred years, is sacred; and, we repudiate and condemn those who propose to transform our nation into a socialist state; and, we propose to furnish and provide a national leadership that is dedicated to the preservation and perpetuation of the great American system of private enterprise and private ownership of property.

We repudiate and condemn any federal action regulating or controlling the sale or rental of private property as a socialistic assault upon not only the system of private ownership of property, but upon the right of each American citizen to manage his private affairs without regulation from an all-powerful central government.

There is no provision in the Federal Constitution which gives Congress the power to regulate the sale or rental of private property. Such legislation strikes at the very heart of the American system and if followed to its logical conclusion will inevitably lead to a system alien to our concept of free government, where citizens are no longer able to make decisions for themselves, or manage their personal affairs. We pledge to take the Federal Government out of the business of controlling private property and return to the people the right to manage their lives and property in a democratic manner.

Crime and Disorder

Lawlessness has become commonplace in our present society. The permissive attitude of the executive and judiciary at the national level sets the tone for this moral decay. The criminal and anarchist who preys on the decent law abiding citizen is rewarded for his misconduct through never ending justification and platitudes from those in high places who seem to have lost their concern for that vast segment of America that so strongly believes in law and order.

We hear much of the "root causes" for the depredations committed in our streets and in our towns and cities. We hold

that these are to be found in the apparent absence of respect for the law on the part of the perpetrators of these offenses, and the unexplainable compassion for the criminal evidenced by our executive and judicial officers and officials. We advocate and seek a society and a government in which there is an attitude of respect for the law and for those who seek its enforcement and an insistence on the part of our citizens that the judiciary be ever mindful of their primary duty and function of punishing the guilty and protecting the innocent.

We urge full support for law enforcement agencies and officers at every level of government and a situation in which their actions will not be unreasonably fettered by arbitrary judicial decrees.

We will insist on fair and equal treatment for all persons before the bar of justice.

We will provide every assistance to the continued training and improvement of our law enforcement facilities at federal and local level, providing and encouraging mutual cooperation between each in his own sphere of responsibility.

We will support needed legislation and action to seek out and bring to justice the criminal organizations of national scope operating in our country.

We will appoint as Attorney General a person interested in the enforcement rather than the disruption of legal processes and restore that office to the dignity and stature it deserves and requires.

We will provide leadership and action in a national effort against the usage of drugs and drug addiction, attacking this

problem at every level and every source in a full scale campaign to drive this evil from our society.

We will provide increased emphasis in the area of juvenile delinquency and juvenile offenses in order to deter and rehabilitate young offenders.

We will not accept violence as the answer to any problem be it social, economic, or self-developed. Anarchists and law violators will be treated as such and subjected to prompt arrest and prosecution.

We will oppose federal legislation to enforce the registration of guns by our citizens, feeling that this measure would do little or nothing to deter criminal activity, but, rather, would prove restrictive to our decent, law abiding citizens, and could well encourage further activity by the criminal. We will preserve to the states their rights to take such reasonable measures as they deem appropriate in this area.

Cities and Suburbs

The urban areas of our nation are in a state of social and economic unrest, largely brought about through unfilled promises hastily and carelessly made and the failure of ill-conceived programs enacted under duress and compulsion. For this, we must hold responsible the national leadership of the other two parties, for they were joint partners in this disastrous course of action resulting in the situation now existing in our cities.

We object to a federal policy which has poured billions of dollars into our cities over the past decades but which has not been able to prevent stagnation and decay and has resulted in

the flight of millions to the suburbs. We reject the notion that the solution is untold additional billions to be poured into the cities in the same manner, whether such huge sums are to be raised from taxes on the middle class in general, or by unwelcome taxes on those who live in the suburbs of the individual cities. We submit that no government can buy contentment for those living in the cities, suburbs, or rural areas. We advocate the formulation of a mutually arrived at, joint federal, state and local policy which will make it economically and socially attractive and physically safe for people to live again in all sections of all of our cities. We submit that the science and technology, which made possible the development and growth of these cities, is the instrument whereby this can be brought about.

Specifically, there must be a restoration and maintenance of law and order before any program, no matter how well conceived will succeed. We pledge ourselves to this accomplishment and will exert forceful leadership at local level to such effort.

Those totally unfitted by training, background and environment for urban living who have been lured to the metropolitan areas by the wholly false promises and commitments of self-seeking political leaders must be afforded an opportunity for training or, in the alternative, an opportunity to return to gainful employment in the less urbanized area from when they came. This we propose to accomplish in conjunction with private industry through a program of diversification and de-centralization of expanding industry into areas away from metropolitan centers, thereby providing relief for many of the problems of the area while providing productive

life for those afforded the opportunity to depart these overcrowded areas.

We advocate assistance, but not control, to local governmental units from the federal level to enable them to cope with their multiplicity of problems, feeling they are better prepared to offer solution than those more removed therefrom.

We advocate and will sponsor a partnership with the private sector of our economy in the restoration of job opportunity and a healthy living environment to our cities through programs made economically attractive to industry.

We will support programs designed to provide means by which home-ownership can become a reality to our city dwellers, thereby instilling a greater feeling of dignity, stability and responsibility in those benefiting from such a program.

Above all, there must be a restoration of order in our cities as a prelude to any program of assistance, for without order neither government nor private industry will meet with success. Herein lies the cause of much failure in the past.

Job Opportunity and The Poor

We feel that the matter of our citizens in need and the existence of job opportunities are so closely related as to warrant concurrent consideration.

We are convinced that the average American believes in the inherent dignity of gainful employment, preferring this method of attaining a livelihood to any welfare grant or benefit not earned through his own efforts. For this reason we consider the solution to the problem of our needy citizens, capable of

gainful employment to be the provision of job opportunity. This will be the goal of our Party and our administration.

Our first consideration will be the inclusion of private industry in this program and effort. We believe that the private sector of our economy has the will and capability of providing a solution to the problem of poverty much more promptly and efficiently than any or all governmental programs of indiscriminate welfare contributions. Based on this premise, we will work in partnership with private industry in a program mutually beneficial to each to provide these job opportunities. We propose to make this program economically attractive to industry through tax incentives and other means of economic benefit, believing fully that the answer to this problem lies in the vigor and capability of our tremendous free enterprise system.

We would propose that the federal government aid and assist in a well designed program of job training or re-training for those in need thereof. This will be at the vocational school and lower level, depending on the needs of the trainees. We will encourage and assist the states in programs of job training or re-training through realistic productive efforts in this respect, including assistance to the establishment and maintenance of vocational trade schools and other like institutions designed to provide skilled and semi-skilled personnel for industrial employment, as well as means whereby "in-training" programs can be carried out by private industry in cooperation with government.

In the event a public works program becomes necessary to provide employment for all employable Americans, we will provide such a program assuring, however, that these programs be needful

and productive and that the participants engage in labor beneficial to the nation and its economy rather than becoming wards of the government and the recipients of gratuitous handouts.

For those unemployable by reason of age, infirmity, disability or otherwise, provision will be made for their adequate care through programs of social services based on the requirements and needs of these persons. We hold that all Americans are deserving of and will have the care, compassion and benefits of the fullness of life.

Health and Welfare

Senior Citizens

Social Security is basically an old age, survivors and disability Insurance Plan. It provides for citizens to pay into the Trust Fund during their working years and is designed to replace part of the earning capacity of the participant, or his family, lost due to retirement, death or disability. During past administrations, the Social Security Trust Fund has been depleted and current payments are being made from current revenues. Social Security cannot be financed from current revenues or from the Federal Treasury without raising taxes or jeopardizing other essential programs of government. Such a policy is irresponsible.

We pledge to restore the Social Security Trust Fund to a sound financial basis and by responsible fiscal policies to insure following:

1. An immediate increase in social security payments with a goal of a 60% increase in benefits.
2. An increase in the minimum payment to \$100, with annual cost of living increases.

3. Restoration of the 100% income tax deduction for drugs and medical expenses paid out by people 65 and over.
4. Removal of the earnings limitation on people 65 and over in order that they may earn any amount of additional income.

Our goal is to make every senior citizen a first class citizen; to restore their dignity, prestige, self-respect, independence and their security, without intrusion into their private lives by federal bureaucrats and guideline writers.

Health Care

It is the obligation of a responsible government to help people who are unable to help themselves. There should be adequate medical assistance available to the aged and those unable to afford treatment. This can best be achieved through a partnership between federal and state governments and private enterprise. Medicare should be improved. It should be strengthened in conjunction with medical care provided at state and local governmental levels and by private insurance. Through sound fiscal management we set as a goal the following improvements in Medicare:

1. Relief to persons unable to pay deductible charges under Medicare.
2. Relief to persons unable to have deducted from their Social Security checks the monthly fee for physician service coverage under Medicare.
3. Providing for uninterrupted nursing home care for those with chronic illness who require such care.
4. We will encourage low cost insurance programs for the elderly and will assist the states and local communities in building hospitals, nursing homes, clinics as well as medical and nursing schools.

In this land of plenty, no one should be denied adequate medical care because of his financial condition.

We are particularly disturbed about the doctor-patient, and the hospital-patient relationship. We stand solidly for freedom of choice in this relationship. It is our intent that medical care programs be carried out without subjecting our professional people and our hospital administrators and personnel to the harassment which has been their lot since the implementation of the Medicare program. We believe that those assisted by the Medicare program should have some degree of selection in the medical and hospital services furnished to them, and that simplification in the administration of this program would prove of benefit to government, patient and the professional practitioner alike.

American medical and dental practice is the admitted marvel of the world. Its traditional freedom is one of the chief reasons why this is so. The American Independent Party pledges continuous study and effort to maintain that freedom both for doctor and for patient.

Other Social Services

The people of this land are the fiber of our nation. Their well-being is essential to a strong America. Unfortunately, many of our citizens are unable to earn an adequate living, due to no fault of their own. Our aged, our blind, and our disabled who are unemployed are the concern of us all.

In every area of social welfare, rehabilitation should be of paramount concern. This includes physical restoration where possible, training to develop new skills, adult education in many instances, and broad cooperative endeavors between government and private industry to develop jobs that the less skilled can fill.

We believe that every American prefers independence and a wage earned. For those infirmities, age, or other problems prevent such independence, welfare services should be adequate to provide a living with dignity and honor.

Dependent children become the responsibility of government when they lack the care and support of parents or guardians. Every effort should be made to provide support by responsible persons rather than the government, where possible. However, when children are separated permanently, by death or other cause from their families, all facilities of government should safeguard, protect, serve and care for them.

In every area possible, federal grants should be administered through existing state and local governmental agencies, thus eliminating additional federal offices and agencies which merely duplicate efforts of existing state and local agencies.

We will review and examine the administration of these programs with a view to the elimination of waste and duplication and thereby better serve the purposes and people designed to be assisted. We subscribe to the principle of block grants, administered by state agencies as a possible solution to these problems.

National Economy

The national economy must be restored to and maintained in a healthy, viable posture under conditions assuring to each individual American the opportunity to participate in and enjoy the benefits arising from a real prosperity, as distinguished from the false, inflationary conditions presently existing. As a first step the nation's business, industry and other agencies

and organizations of production must be freed from the ever increasing intrusions of government into the affairs of these institutions and organizations. This nation achieved its economic greatness under a system of free enterprise, coupled with human effort and ingenuity, and thus it must remain. This will be the attitude and objective of this Party.

There must be an end to inflation and the ever increasing cost of living. This is of vital concern to the laborer, the housewife, the farmer and the small business man, as well as the millions of Americans dependent upon their weekly or monthly income for sustenance. It wrecks the planned lives and retirement of our elderly who must survive on pensions or savings gauged by the standards of another day.

We will take immediate, affirmative steps to bring these conditions to an end through selective decreases in the lavish expenditures of our federal government and through the institution of efficiency into the operation of the machinery of government, so badly plagued with duplication, overlapping and excesses in employment and programs. Bureaucracy will cease to exist solely for bureaucracy's own sake, and the institutions and functions of government will be judged by their efficiency of operation and their contribution to the lives and welfare of our citizens.

We will support and assist business and industry in those areas needful and desirable, such as in the area of small businesses.

We will enforce those laws designed to protect the consumer and wage earner, but will eliminate those programs and agencies serving only to harass and intimidate our business community.

We will review and propose revisions to our present tax structure so as to ease the load of the small income citizen and to place upon all their rightful share of the tax burden.

We will work toward a reduction in the tax burden for all our citizens, using as our tools efficiency and economy in the operation of government, the elimination of unnecessary and wasteful programs and reduction in government expenditures at home and abroad.

We will eliminate the favorable treatment now accorded the giant, non-tax paying foundations and institutions and require these organizations to assume their rightful responsibility as to the operation of our government.

To achieve these goals and objectives, we would use government for the strengthening of the free enterprise system rather than the replacement of the free enterprise system by government. We believe that strength and confidence in the American political and economic system will tend to encourage domestic private investment and prosperity in our economy.

We would propose that effective use be made during our administration of economic advisors dedicated to the preservation and strengthening of our economic freedoms in the area of enterprise, labor and marketing that have contributed so much to the strength of the American system.

Our administration will be dedicated to the maintenance of prosperity and price stability in our economy. We will institute a strong anti-inflationary fiscal, monetary and debt management policy in our nation as the first requirement to solving international problems.

We propose to rely heavily upon a competitive market structure rather than upon prices administered or fixed by bureaucratic procedures.

We do not propose to use periodic, intermittent tax adjustments or surcharges as a tool of economic policy under the guise of stabilizing the inflationary spiral we are experiencing.

We feel little is done to curb inflationary trends in the nation's economy merely by taking from the taxpayer in order to enrich the spending programs of big government. We propose, rather, a stabilized and equitable tax base affording fair treatment to those of small income and designed to cause all persons, organizations and foundations to assume their rightful financial responsibility for government coupled with selective and prudent reductions in the wasteful expenditures of government.

Agriculture

America's agriculture, and especially the small farmer, is on the brink of disaster. Under both Democratic and Republican administrations, the income of our farmers has steadily declined. Farm prices have been ranging at a parity level the lowest since the dark days of the great depression. Individual producers are unable to regulate the output or price of their products and stringent government controls have been forced upon farmers. Revolutionary methods of production have resulted in increased yield from less acreage and requiring less manpower. The farmer is hampered by a faulty system of distribution, and his costs have continued to increase at an astronomical rate. Yet, all America's farmers have received from either of the other two

parties has been broken promises.

The following is the pledge of the American Independent Party to our nation's farmers:

1. We pledge ourselves to the protection and preservation of the family farm, which is the backbone of American Agriculture.
2. We pledge that the new Secretary of Agriculture will immediately begin to support prices at 90% of parity which is the highest level provided under present law.
3. Congress will be urged to increase the maximum support to 100% of parity.
4. Legislation will be sought to permit farmers to exercise their freedom of choice to vote whether or not to come under self-imposed controls.
5. We propose the creation of a National Feed Grain Authority, authorized to make long-term loans for development of farmer-owned and controlled warehouses, to be strategically located, permitting farmers to store large quantities of grain and to sell direct to the trade through their own local organizations.
6. We propose that no portion of the nation's emergency reserves of food, feed or fiber be sold for less than 115% of the prevailing farm price support of that commodity.
7. A limit to subsidy payments should be set in order to prevent an unfair advantage being built up by giant corporate farm structures over our small farmer or family farms.
8. We propose to impose reasonable limitations on the import of foreign farm and meat products into this country.
9. It is our belief that continued support of the REA and other cooperative programs designed to improve marketing methods conditions throughout the nation is vital to our farming interests.
10. It is our belief that federal support for farm research is important, and that Agriculture Colleges and Extension Services should be more effectively utilized.
11. Governmental agencies similar to the Farm Home Administration have been beneficial to farmers and should be improved and continued.

12. We propose that the State Department and the Agriculture Department work together in a joint effort to develop a vigorous export program.
13. We support a good soil conservation program and pledge the continuation and improvement of such program.
14. It is our policy to assist in improving farm production reporting in order that farmers obtain more accurate production forecasts for planning purposes.
15. It is our intention to simplify the administration of all farm programs, and to eliminate wasteful duplication and red tape within the Department of Agriculture.
16. We will work toward gradual relaxation and elimination of farm regulation and control with a concurrent reduction in required subsidization as farm income increases, the eventual goal being the elimination of both controls and the need for subsidy, such program being contingent upon the increase in farm income to a level making subsidy unnecessary.
17. We will require that programs for disease and insect control be continued and expanded where needed if it is indicated that state and local bodies need and desire assistance from the federal level. Such program would, among other things, provide for necessary steps to eradicate the imported fire ants. This pest is not prevalent throughout a major portion of the southern region but will eventually affect three-fourths of the land area of the United States if eradication is not accomplished promptly.

The farmers of this nation are entitled to a fair, just and equitable profit on their investment, just as citizens in other fields of endeavor. It is our belief that a major step toward solving our problems in agriculture would be to insure a substantial increase in farm income. It is time for a new Secretary of Agriculture who represents the views and interest of the farmer and the rancher, and who will work ceaselessly and tirelessly to improve the income and the lives of America's farm families. We pledge to you such Secretary and such a program.

Labor

America achieved its greatness through the combined energy and efforts of the working men and women of this country. Retention of its greatness rests in their hands.

Through the means of their great trade organizations, these men and women have exerted tremendous influence on the economic and social life of the nation and have attained a standard of living known to no other nation. In the meantime, American labor has become a bulwark against the intrusion of foreign ideology into our free society. America must be eternally grateful to its working men and women.

The concern of the Party is that the gains which labor struggled so long to obtain not be lost to them either through inaction or subservience to illogical domestic policies of our other national parties.

We propose and pledge

To guarantee to and protect labor in its right of collective bargaining;

To assert leadership at the federal level toward assuring labor its rightful reward for its contribution to the productivity of America;

To propose and support programs designed to improve living and employment conditions of our working men and women;

To prohibit intrusion by the federal government into the internal affairs of labor organizations, seeking to direct and control actions as to seniority and apprentice lists and other prerogatives;

To provide for and protect the working men and women in the exercise of democratic processes and principles in the conduct of the affairs of their organizations, free from threats, coercion, or reprisals from within or without such organization;

To support programs and legislation designed to afford an equitable minimum wage, desirable working hours and conditions of employment, and protection in the event of adversity or unemployment;

To add efficiency and dispatch to the actions and activities of the National Labor Relations Board, resulting in more prompt decisions by this agency;

To pledge and assure that labor will be adequately represented in all deliberations of this Party and its administration of the affairs of government;

To cause all agents of government to refrain from any coercive action in strike settlements, serving in the role of counselor and advisor only, believing that good faith bargaining between the parties concerned is the best solution to any settlement.

Education

Without question education offers the answer to many of the nation's social and economic problems. It is tragic that during the past decades, while governed alternately by the Republican and Democratic parties, we have witnessed the deterioration of our public school systems into a state of disruption wherein the maintenance of order is the major problem and quality education is a forgotten objective. Our educational leaders and administrators are discouraged and dismayed by the continuing attacks upon, and the erosion of, their duties and authority by agents of the federal bureaucracy and members of the federal judiciary.

Local educational officials have been stripped of their authority to administer the affairs of their school systems. Harassing directives and requirements of an unreasonable and unrealistic nature are constantly being imposed upon them. Parents, students and educators alike are dismayed, confused and at a loss as to where to turn for relief. Many of our institutions of higher learning have been completely disrupted by a small band of

revolutionaries, encouraged by the permissive attitude of executive and judicial officials of government and the activities of other anarchists throughout the nation.

Many of our primary and secondary school systems have become centers for social experimentation rather than centers of learning, serving merely as pawns for the whims and caprices of some member of the federal judiciary or some agent of the federal bureaucracy.

These conditions must come to an end. Our educational systems and institutions must once again be given the opportunity to resume their rightful duty of preparing the youth of America for entry into our highly competitive society.

As a first and immediate step we must absolutely prohibit the agencies and agents of the federal government from intruding into and seeking to control the affairs of the local school systems of the states, counties and cities of the nation. Control of these schools must be returned to the local officials, representatives of the people, who have the rightful duty and authority to administer such school.

Once returned to proper control, order must be restored and education of our children again become the primary matter of concern in these schools. Sociological experiments must cease. The people of the several states, counties, cities and communities must be given the right to administer the affairs of their schools as they see fit without fear or threat of reprisal, economic or punitive, from the federal government.

We must cooperate with the administrators of our institutions

of higher learning now in the hands of revolutionaries. We must support these officials in the restoration of order on their campuses and we must assure that no assistance, financial or otherwise, from the federal level be given to those seeking to disrupt and destroy these great institutions.

America is a nation "Under God" and we must see that it remains such a nation. We will support with all the power of the Executive action to restore to our educational institutions and the children they serve the right and freedom of prayer and devotions to God.

We must assure that the federal government assist in all phases of the educational processes of the nation without attempting to control these processes.

With these thoughts in mind,

We advocate a greater role of the states in administering federal aid and in determining national policy.

We advocate the return of our school systems to the states and to local, county and city officials.

We advocate support for administrators of our educational institutions in their efforts to restore order to these institutions.

We advocate fewer federal guidelines, regulations, and administrative procedures and greater simplification and consolidation of programs and procedures.

We advocate less categorical aid and more general aid to states with funding provided for well in advance.

We advocate educational opportunity for all people regardless of race, creed, color, economic or social status.

The complexities of education are many. State and local officials are faced with tremendous pressures to provide early childhood education, increased teacher salaries, provide vocational

technical education, improved elementary and secondary education, provide adult education, continuing education, and urban and rural education, provide for higher education, graduate and professional education.

The goals of the American Independent Party are to improve the educational opportunity for all our citizens from early childhood through the graduate level. We believe that the improvement of educational opportunity can best be accomplished at the state and local level with adequate support from the federal level.

Science and Technology

The scientific and technological skills and accomplishments of America are the marvel of modern civilization. Our potential in this area is unlimited. Our development of this potential must be commensurate with our capability. We live in a fiercely competitive world in the area of science and technology. For social, economic and security reasons we must not lag behind.

We would propose, encourage and provide from the federal level assistance to those of our youth showing demonstrated capacity in these areas of endeavor. Federal grants based on ability and aptitude will be provided to assure development of skills in this field.

Federal assistance will be made available for research in various fields of science for in research lies the key to tomorrow. Such assistance will be directed both to individuals and to institutions.

We propose that this research, development and scientific knowledge so acquired be directed to human problems as well as national security. In the fields of housing, transportation,

education, industry and related activities, these skills and the knowledge so acquired can make for a better life for all Americans.

Emphasis on the further exploration and utilization of space must be renewed. This, again, is a highly competitive area between nations, but not for this reason alone, but for the welfare and security of this nation, we must not be lacking in our effort in this field.

We fully support renewed and expanded efforts in our space program with the objective of acquiring knowledge and experience of benefit to the peaceful pursuits of mankind as well as that essential to the military security of this nation.

Transportation

The expansion of America's industry, commerce and its economy depends upon its transportation system. America cannot maintain its position as world leader in industry and commerce unless all modes of transportation are able to meet the demanding challenges of the future. To solve America's transportation problems requires ingenuity and planning.

Airport congestion around most major cities is not only a growing problem, but an ever increasing danger. We face a major railroad crisis and citizens in many urban areas are unable to travel short distances without delays due to congested highway traffic. Our merchant marine fleet has dwindled and our ship building industry suffers today. This not only affects our economy, but is a serious handicap to America's military might.

We therefore favor

1. The development of a modern, low cost domestic mass transportation system within our congested urban areas;

2. Development of high-speed passenger trains between urban areas;
3. An emergency program carried out cooperatively by the federal government and the airline industry to develop adequate methods of controlling air congestion, and for financing and improving airport facilities;
4. Developing a program of assistance to modernize and stimulate our merchant marine fleet and our ship building industry.

The Interstate Highway System is one of America's wisest investments. Every effort must be made to speed up construction on existing plans, and farsighted planning of additional facilities must be accomplished. The Interstate Highway System must be expanded, adding new routes between population centers, and extra attention should be given to constructing additional freeways in and around congested urban areas. Not only is this necessary for the expansion of commerce and the economy, but highway safety demands it.

Thousands of Americans lose their lives each year on the nation's highways. Most of these deaths are unnecessary. With proper highway planning, stricter enforcement of highway laws, and intensified driver education, along with proper safety devices provided on automobiles, we will be able to cut these needless and tragic fatalities to a small fraction.

Public safety and convenience demand that we engage in a vast program to improve and four-lane many of the local road and highway networks. Highway construction is financed by those persons using the highways and is one of the few federal programs that is self-financed which amounts to a capital investment of public funds, and this we greatly favor.

We will encourage the development within the transportation industry of organizations who are specialists in the movement of passenger and cargo from point to point, using all modes and means of transportation, and we will encourage healthy competition between such agencies and organizations.

Natural Resources and Conservation

The preservation of our natural resources and the quality of our natural environment has greatly been ignored during the past decade. We are vitally concerned about the future well-being of our citizens and fully realize that positive action programs must be undertaken, in a cooperative effort between the federal government and the states, to assure adequate outdoor recreational facilities and to assure necessary health safeguards for generations to come. To these ends we make the following pledge to the American people:

1. We will promote an aggressive campaign at all levels of government to combat the serious air and water pollution problem.
2. Full support will be given to the establishment of adequate water quality standards to protect the present high quality waters, to abate pollution, and to improve the status of waters not now considered of high quality.
3. We will work in close cooperation with private industry and governmental agencies toward engineering designs to abate the mounting air pollution problems.
4. We will actively support research to control pests through biological means and chemical means which are more selective and less persistent than those now used.
5. Legislation and an active program are necessary to protect our endangered wildlife species. This problem is of serious concern and will receive our immediate attention and action.
6. We will work for protection of our waterfowl wetlands and nestling areas.

7. Our estuarine areas must be protected as vital to the production of fish, shellfish, furbearers, water fowl and other aquatic creatures.
8. All federal assistance programs to the states in the areas of game and fish and for outdoor recreation will be streamlined to gain the maximum benefit from each dollar invested.
9. Our increasing population demands improved and additional outdoor recreational areas. To this end we will support active programs at all levels of government for the development of existing parks and proper outdoor recreational programs. Public lands must be utilized for multiple uses to benefit all of our people.
10. The preservation of our forest and timber resources is of utmost concern to the nation. We pledge federal cooperation with efforts of state and local governments and with private industry for a sound and economically regulated basis to avoid depletion of this vital natural resource. Government and industry will be encouraged to participate in planned reforestation programs, and programs for protection of our forests from the ravages of fire and other destructive causes.

America is blessed with an abundance of natural resources, with beautiful scenery and bountiful waters. This land of ours should not be marred and its resources wasted. We recognize that progress invites construction and industrial development and we recognize its necessity, but we must assure that the intangible values of our parks, forests and estuarine areas will be protected, promoted and developed and that America shall retain its scenic beauty of centuries to come.

We will place particular emphasis on the problems of air and water pollution and will initiate joint cooperative programs with private industry to attack and solve these problems, as their correction is in the interest of all segments of our national life, the people, the government and the nation's industry.

Veterans

America owes no other group of citizens so much as we do our veterans. To that group of self-sacrificing and patriotic individuals who have risked their lives for our nation and its principles in past wars and conflicts, and to our brave men and women returning from service in Vietnam, we pledge you the support of the American Independent Party. We pledge to you and your dependents our assurance of active and vigorous assistance in seeking out job opportunities; job training; further educational opportunities and business opportunities. We likewise support a program to provide educational benefits to children of deceased veterans in order that they may receive a quality education and participate in America's competitive society of the future.

We pledge to our veterans, their families and dependents the cooperation and active assistance of their government in providing adequate medical treatment and hospital care. Veterans' benefits and disability benefits will be updated and revised periodically in order to meet the increased cost of living. The Veterans Administration and its hospitals will remain as an independent agency of the government, and its one objective will be to serve our veterans and their families.

Indian Affairs

For over 100 years the other two parties have been making promises to our fellow citizens, the American Indians and Eskimos. For over 100 years the promises of those parties have not been kept. Our Party offers to these independent and hard working people a new hope. We promise that all of the programs of the

federal government which have so lavishly bestowed benefits upon minority groups of this country will be made equally applicable to the American Indians and Eskimos. There will be no discrimination with respect to these two ancient and noble races.

We also promise that the federal government will cooperate fully to insure that job opportunity, job training, full educational opportunity, and equal application of all health and housing programs are afforded to these, our native citizens, in order that they may enjoy the same benefits and privileges enjoyed by every American. We will foster and support measures through which the beauties and accomplishments of their native culture will be preserved and enhanced.

FOREIGN POLICY

One of the greatest needs of our country at this moment in history is a strong, realistic, well defined policy to guide our relationship with the other nations of the world. The policy developed to govern our actions in foreign affairs must be one well stated and well understood, first by our own people and, equally as important, by friends and foes alike throughout the world. The absence of any such well defined and consistent policy throughout the past two decades has contributed immeasurably to the chaotic world conditions now existing.

Our foreign policy will be one designed to secure a just and lasting peace. We feel that such a situation can best come to exist when nations deal with one another on a basis of mutual trust and understanding. If this be lacking, as is so often the

case in today's world, the only alternative is complete frankness and determination to adhere to stated objectives and courses of action. If a nation, as is the case with an individual, will only say what it means and mean what it says, it will gain the respect, if not always the admiration, of its sister nations. It is in this regard that we have failed, so often equivocating in such a manner as to cause friendly, as well as unfriendly, nations to have grave doubt as to our stability, determination and reliability of purpose.

We feel that the road to peace lies through international cooperation and understanding. We will pursue this goal to the limits consistent with our own national interest. We will become participants in international programs of aid and development from which all member nations, including our own, derive benefit.

We will not abandon the United Nations Organization unless it first abandons us. It should be given fair opportunity at resolving international disputes, however, we will not subordinate the interest of our nation to the interest of any international organization. We feel that in this organization, as in any other, participating members should bear proportionate shares of the cost of operation and we will insist on financial responsibility on the part of the member nations. We also feel that the officers and officials of such organization must conduct themselves with an abstract air of objectivity and impartiality, and we will so insist. We will give this organization every opportunity to succeed in its purpose but should it fail, we will reappraise our relationship with it.

Foreign Aid

Foreign aid and assistance, both of an economic and military nature, will be granted on a basis of what is in the best interest of our own nation as well as the receiving nation.

We will deny aid and assistance to those nations who oppose us militarily in Vietnam and elsewhere, as well as those who seek our economic and military destruction by giving aid and comfort to our avowed enemies. This must be so in order to protect the economic welfare and national security of this country.

We will continue aid to those countries who need, deserve and have earned the right to our help. This will be done freely and willingly with every effort directed to elimination of waste and dishonesty from such programs.

Foreign aid must become an instrument of foreign policy and be used in such manner as to further the interest of this nation.

Export-Import

We believe strongly in the free enterprise system for America, internally as well as in its trade relations with other nations. However, should the increasing inflow of imports from low-wage nations endanger employment or marketing by American industry, we will approve reasonable quantitative limits on these imports. We feel that our home industry is entitled to a fair share of the present market and of future growth. Before seeking additional legislation in the import field all efforts will be exerted toward securing negotiated agreements that would fully protect American industry.

We will insist on equitable tax treatment for any industry adversely affected by foreign imports, in the area of depreciation

allowances for plants and equipment and in like measure.

We will cause the Department of State and other interested agencies of government to work toward the lowering of trade barriers against American goods in a manner consistent with the policy of our administration on controlling imports into the American market.

In the event certain segments of our industrial economy are adversely affected by foreign imports to such an extent as to cause economic harm, we will sponsor and develop programs of re-training and re-employment for those so affected.

Balance of Payments

A serious situation now exists in our balance of payments and this must be ended.

We feel that the adoption of the programs and proposals set out in this Platform will result in a more favorable balance of payments situation. Specifically, we feel that the relief we so badly need in this respect may be achieved through reductions in spending for foreign aid, more efficiency in the use of funds for international programs, and more reliance on our allies in meeting heavy military expenditures abroad.

We have earlier proposed that foreign aid be granted on a basis of need and in a manner consistent with the best interest of this country and that it be denied those who aggressively seek our destruction. We strongly advocate efficiency in operation and the elimination of waste and corruption from expenditures under international programs and we will insist that our allies assume their proportionate and rightful share of the burden of defenses in those areas in which we have mutual interest.

Our export-import situation remains in reasonable balance but our disastrous situation as to balance of payments is caused by excesses in our foreign aid program and other international gratuitous expenditures.

We will work to reduce our military expenditures overseas, not by lessening our military strength and preparedness, but by causing our allies to assume and bear their proportionate share of the burden.

Middle East

The Middle East remains a source of high potential danger to world peace. In the interest of securing a stable peace in this part of the world, we will take the initiative in seeking mutual cooperation between the adversaries in this area in reaching agreement in their age-old dispute. We will encourage the initiation of multi-lateral discussions to arrive at the best possible terms of settlement. This will mean resolving and stabilizing boundaries and the free use of water and land routes throughout this area. Biding non-aggression agreements must be developed and we must seek the mutual respect of both Israel and the Arab nations.

First and foremost is the need for sincere negotiations between these two parties. Until this is accomplished we must assure that no imbalance of force comes to exist in this area. Nothing could more endanger the peace.

Should arms continue to be introduced into this area by foreign powers to such an extent as to endanger the peace in this part of the world, we must take steps to assure that a balance of

force is brought to exist. We will join with other nations of the free world in providing the means whereby this balance of force will continue and the threat of aggression of one nation against another is made less likely. More importantly, this nation will strive in every way to merit and receive the friendship of all parties to this dispute and to earn the respect and good will of Israel and the Arab nations alike. The road to peace in the Middle East lies in this direction rather than in the continued use of military might.

Europe

We continue to regard Western Europe as an area of vital importance to America. In our concern with the interminable conflict in Southeast Asia we must not lose sight of the strategic importance of our relationship with our European allies. We must retain a posture of strength in this area and must work with and for our allies to assure that they remain economically and militarily strong.

We will continue to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and seek to strengthen it through the cooperative efforts of all member nations. We will retain the necessary troop strength in this vital area and will insist that our allies and member nations do likewise.

We will deal patiently but firmly with the present French government feeling that in due time its actions will, of necessity, be directed toward increased cooperation with its Western allies of long standing.

We will remain concerned for the captive satellite nations of Eastern Europe and share with them their hopes and aspirations for their eventual and inevitable return to the family of free nations.

Latin America

The interests of the nations of Latin America are closely related to those of this country, economically, geographically, security-wise, socially and politically.

We must and will provide aid and assistance to these nations to enable them to achieve political and economic stability and to better prepare them to resist the threat of communist infiltration and subversion from the Red satellite, Cuba.

We will develop a program of assistance to these countries designed to relieve the conditions of economic and social poverty existing in some segments of these nations and to provide for their less fortunate citizens a better condition of life.

We will assist in the development of the agricultural and industrial potential of these nations and the development and proper utilization of their tremendous natural resources rather than the exploitation thereof, to the end that the nations of this hemisphere may live in peace, prosperity and harmony with one another and that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine may once again become a cornerstone of our national policy.

We will work with and support the Organization of American States.

Cuba

As for Cuba, we will continue and strengthen the economic pressures on the Castro tyranny. In order to do this, we must secure a greater degree of cooperation from nations of the free world than we have had in the past. Trade with Cuba by our allies must be effectively minimized, if not completely curtailed.

To frustrate Castro's attempt to export subversion, we must increase the quality and effectiveness of our military aid and assistance to Latin American allies with a primary objective of developing realistic indigenous counterinsurgency capabilities within those countries. Economic aid, more carefully planned and scrupulously administered, will be continued through the Alliance for Progress Program, or an improved version thereof.

Africa and Asia

The emerging nations of Africa and Asia desiring assistance and demonstrating a capability of reasonably assimilating such help and assistance will be aided. We will not aid in the replacing of one form of despotism with another, nor will we become concerned with the internal quarrelings of dissident groups and factions.

We disagree with present economic sanctions and pressures applied to Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa and will seek to have these removed and eliminated. We consider these to be nations friendly to this country and they will be respected and treated as such.

General

We will conduct the foreign affairs of this country on a basis of aiding, assisting and cooperating with our friends and recognizing and treating our enemies and adversaries as such. We feel that foreign affairs can be conducted effectively only when there is respect for our nation and this respect is best engendered by attaining a position of strength and adopting an attitude of firmness and fairness. This we will do.

We feel that when this nation again becomes a strong and determined nation, dedicated to a fixed national and international policy, many of our existing difficulties throughout the world will become resolved and new difficulties are less likely to arise.

We will oppose aggression and subversion, Communist or otherwise, whenever it infringes upon the national interest of this country or its friendly allies through means appropriate to the situation.

We do not propose, nor does this or any other nation have the capability, to police the entire world. We will avoid unilateral entanglement in situations not vital to our national interest and will seek the cooperation of our allies at every opportunity.

Vietnam

The current situation in Southeast Asia, and particularly in Vietnam, is one of the most critical which has ever faced this nation. The American people are angry, frustrated and bewildered as they seek for leadership which apparently fails to exist. There is no parallel in American history of such a situation as now exists, not even our engagement in Korea, where there were at least vaguely defined objectives.

It is too late to engage in debate as to why we are so deeply involved and committed in Vietnam. The fact is that we are so involved. No one can retrace the steps of the last ten years and correct and adjust all that has gone wrong. We presently have more than one-half million Americans committed to this conflict and they must be supported with the full resources of this nation. The question now is what does America do to

maintain its honor, its respect and its position in this most strategic part of the world, Southeast Asia.

The prime consideration at this time is the honorable conclusion of hostilities in Vietnam. This must be accomplished at the earliest possible moment.

We earnestly desire that the conflict be terminated through peaceful negotiations and we will lend all aid, support, effort, sincerity and prayer to the efforts of our negotiators. Negotiation will be given every reasonable and logical chance for success and we will be patient to an extreme in seeking an end to the war through this means. If it becomes evident that the enemy does not desire to negotiate in good faith, that our hopes of termination of hostilities are not being realized and that the lives and safety of our committed troops are being further endangered, we must seek a military conclusion.

Hopefully such a situation will never arise, but should it come to pass, I would then seek the advice and good judgment of my Joint Chiefs of Staff as to ways and means of reaching a military conclusion to this conflict with the least loss of life to our American servicemen and our South Vietnamese allies, stressing the fact that this is to be accomplished through the use of conventional weapons.

Military force has always been recognized as an instrument of national policy and its use to obtain objectives has always been accepted. However, once national policy is established by the civilian government and military force has been selected as one of the means of attaining national objectives, the tactical employment of this force should be left to the military so long

as this employment is consistent with national policy, and the mission of the military should be to attain these national objectives--nothing less.

I would retain full control, as a civilian Commander-in-Chief, of final decision, but I would pay heed to and consider to the fullest extent the advice and judgment of my military advisors.

Unfortunately, there is not clearly defined national policy with respect to the conflict in Vietnam. If there were, much of the doubt, debate and despair of the American people would be eased. There is a total absence of clearly announced and understood national objectives with respect to Vietnam. We are told that it is not victory over the enemy we seek but something else--what we do not know. In battle, and certainly this is battle, there can be but one objective--that is victory. Anything worth dying for is worth winning.

As first step we must develop a clearly defined national policy as to Vietnam. This policy will be made known to the people of this country and will be based on our own national interest. The essence of this policy will be a timely and successful termination of the conflict, either through negotiation or by victory over the enemy. We will not allow this conflict to drag on indefinitely with its great drain on our national resources and manpower.

As President, we will designate a Secretary of Defense who holds the confidence and trust of the people, the Congress and the military establishments and one with the capability and

desire of working in harmony with each. He will be required to reduce the excessive manpower of the Pentagon and rid the Department of Defense of those who have fostered the "no-win" policy.

We will then require the establishment of firm objectives in Vietnam. Should negotiations fail, and we pray that they will not fail, these objectives must provide for a military conclusion to the war. This would require the military defeat of the Vietcong in the South and the destruction of the will to fight or resist on the part of the government of North Vietnam, which is equipping and supporting the enemy troops in the South. We feel that the prompt and effective application of military force could achieve this objective with minimized loss of life, and the tactical employment of this force will be left in the hands of the military commanders, so long as they act pursuant to defined national policy.

We will require the military to plan and conduct military operations once policies and objectives are established and we will not, or will we permit civilian subordinates, to usurp these functions and assume the role of "commander" or "tactician." This must be a team effort with officials and leaders of civil government performing their required functions and the military establishment being allowed to perform in the manner and for the purpose for which it is trained.

Once hostilities have ceased, efforts must be undertaken to stabilize the government and economy of Vietnam. This must be through programs of self-help and not through completely

meaningless "give away" programs. We are dealing with a proud people of ancient culture. They are not, and never will be, adapted to all the facets of western civilization, nor should they be. We must help them to become secure in their government, their lands, their economy and in their homes, as their friends and allies and not as sanctimonious intruders. In this manner, we will gain a lasting ally.

NATIONAL DEFENSE

Nothing is of greater importance to the American people at this time than the state of our National Defense, and sadly, there is not area of our national structure so fraught with misrepresentations and inconsistencies. As we near the end of the era of "computerized defense" and "cost effectiveness" rather than military reliability, it is difficult, if not impossible for the nation to ascertain the true state of its defenses.

We are aware of basic fallacies in the doctrines and logic of those who have been charged with the responsibility of our national security.

We have been told that strength is weakness and weakness if strength--This is not true.

We have been told that parity rather than superiority in weapons and munitions is sufficient to assure the keeping of the peace and the protection of this country--This is not true.

We have been told that a "deterrent" capability is preferable to an offensive capability in maintaining peace and assuring freedom from attack--This is not true.

We have been told that commitment of our military forces need not always be followed by a quest for victory--This is not true.

We have been led to believe in the proven invulnerability of our "second strike" capability--This is not true.

We have been told that the complete disruption of the structure of our Reserve Components resulted in a more readily responsive Reserve--This is not true.

We have been told that our research and development program, especially in the area of space research and development, is not lagging--This is not true,--And so on.

We propose an intensive and immediate review of the policies, practices and capabilities of the Department of Defense with a view to re-establishing sound principles of logic and reasoning to the decisions and directives of that agency and to eliminating from its ranks all of those who have been party to the dissemination and promulgation of the false doctrines of security and the coercion, intimidation and punishment of all who would oppose or disagree with them.

We are in accord with civilian control of our defense establishment but will insist that the civilian authorities work in partnership and harmony with the splendid military force with which this country is blessed. We propose to restore to their proper duties, functions and authority the leaders of our military services so that the nation may once again profit from their wisdom and experience.

We will require our civilian and military leaders of defense to establish a reasonable relationship between defense and

offensive capabilities and provide our services with the proper arms, munitions and equipment to afford a proper mix of both type weapons and munitions.

We will place increased emphasis on research and development in the area of space, weaponry and mobility, as well as other areas vital to our national security.

We support the installation of an anti-ballistic missile defense for the protection of our nation and its citizens. We will expedite this program.

We will assure to our services the best attainable weapons, equipment, machines and munitions without resort to devious distinctions of cost effectiveness and the substitution of arbitrary, unsound judgment for that of the professional military.

We will guarantee to the services and to the nation that American troops will never be committed with less than full support of available resources.

We will seek efficiency in the collection and evaluation of vital intelligence throughout the services.

We will never permit a static situation to develop wherein America stands still while her potential enemies continue to advance in all areas of development.

We will hasten the reconstitution of an adequate and efficiently organized reserve force throughout the several states of the nation. We will accept these reserve component forces into full partnership with the regular military establishment and will assure stability to their organizational structure and operation.

We will take all steps necessary to return our Merchant

Marine fleet to its rightful place among the maritime nations of the world. This is not only vital to our national security but to the economic progress and viability of the nation. Maritime shipping has been, and will once again become, a vital part of the nation's economy and trade activity.

We will take steps to make military service more attractive to the enlistee, the inductee and the career personnel at all levels. We will support programs for better pay; better housing and living conditions, both on and off post; more realistic programs of promotion potential so that merit and performance may be rewarded; equitable sharing of hardship assignment; and increase and more uniform retirement benefit to correct serious inequities now existing; a pay scale commensurate with that of private employment, with provisions for periodic increases measured by the cost of living index; improved and expanded medical and hospital benefits for dependents, and a restoration of the dignity and prestige rightfully due those engaged in the defense of our nation.

With military services becoming more attractive the requirement for involuntary inductions through the Selective Service System is reduced. However, we favor retention of such system for so long as there is a need for manpower being acquired by this means. We would approve any changes to such system designed to eliminate inequities in the selection of inductees, and quite likely some do exist.

We would feel that eventually manpower requirements may be met on a voluntary basis. In such event, a fair and equitable system of civilian induction will be kept in existence, on standby basis,

for use in the event of national emergency.

CONCLUSION

This Platform represents the attitude, policy, position, judgment and determination of this Party with respect to the major problems confronting America.

We believe that our analysis of the nature of these problems is in keeping with the feelings of the great majority of our people. We further feel that our approach to solution of these matters is sound, logical, practical and attainable and in keeping with the basic, inherent good judgment of the American people.

Among other proposals,

We offer opportunity for early peace to a nation at war.

We offer order and domestic tranquility to a nation sorely beset by disorder.

We offer a program of job opportunity for the jobless.

We offer a return to respect for the law and an opportunity for every citizen to pursue his daily activities in safety and security.

We offer to relieve our citizens, their businesses and institutions, from harassment and intimidation by agents of the federal bureaucracy.

We offer to return to the officials of local government those matters rightly and properly falling within their scope of responsibility.

We offer the laboring man and woman an opportunity to provide for himself and his family a better and fuller life

and a greater democratic freedom in the management of the affairs of his organizations, free from intrusion by federal government.

We offer to the farmer an opportunity to regain a place of prominence in the economy of this nation, a fair price for the products of his labor and less dependence on federal subsidation.

We offer to restore the dignity, strength and prestige of this nation to a level commensurate with its position as acknowledged leader of the nations of the free world.

We offer a national defense designed to assure the security of this nation and its citizens.

And, above, all, we offer to each individual citizen a system of government recognizing his inherent dignity and importance as an individual and affording him an opportunity to take a direct hand in the shaping of his own destiny and the destiny of this nation. Under such a system, we are convinced, America will reach new heights of greatness.

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