INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

73-24,699

TEEUWISSEN, Walter John, 1942-
THE ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: AN OVERVIEW.

The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1973
Language and Literature, general

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED.

THE ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: AN OVERVIEW

by
Walter John Teeuwissen

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(English Language & Literature)
in The University of Michigan
1973

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Walter H. Clark, Chairman
Associate Professor Renate McLaughlin
Associate Professor Leo F. McNamara
Associate Professor Earl J. Schulze

When I peruse this tract which I have writ,
I am abashed and much I hold unfit.

Robert Burton
Anatomy of Melancholy

for
Professor Charles Crow

As a Scholar
As a Teacher
As a Gentleman
The Emblem of Christian Humanism

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation, like all such projects, is the product of the efforts of many people though it is signed by only one. I should like especially to acknowledge the particular assistance of several people and, by so acknowledging their assistance, to thank them each. I am grateful to:

Professor Charles Crow, Department of English, University of Pittsburgh, for introducing me to the Anatomy of Criticism in such a way as to challenge me to come to terms with it.

Professor Walter Clark, Department of English, University of Michigan, for encouraging and guiding me through the composition of this dissertation as chairman of my doctoral committee, and most of all for having the courage to accept the direction of this dissertation and of its author in the first place.

Professor Morris Greenhut, Department of English, University of Michigan, for providing assistance and encouragement while Professor Clark was on sabbatical leave.

Professor Abraham Kaplan, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, for his direction of the seminar in the philosophy of science to which this dissertation is deeply indebted, and for the inspiration of the example of the resolution of the scientific and the humanistic cultures which he himself manifests.

Jay Roberts, captain of radio station WJR's "Night Flight 760," for keeping me very pleasant company through many long nights of composition and frustration.

And, most importantly, my wife, Betsy, and son, Pieter, for their patience and encouragement beyond the call of duty through many months of occasional joy and frequent aggravation for all of us, and for helping me to keep this project in its proper perspective.

CONTENTS

Introduction		1
I.	The Critical Dissection of the *Anatomy*	18
II.	The First Approach: The *Anatomy* as Science	60
III.	The Second Approach: The *Anatomy* as a Formal Imitation of Science	145
IV.	The Third Approach: The *Anatomy* as a Parody of Science	169
V.	The Fourth Approach: The *Anatomy* as a Vision of Culture	188
Conclusion		206
References		213

INTRODUCTION

This is an essay in the philosophy of literary criticism. My subject is Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism.[1] My object is two-fold: to provide a general framework within which the Anatomy may be viewed and analyzed as a whole, and to pursue the analysis of the Anatomy within that framework. My comments are intended to be suggestive rather than conclusive, to open up lines of inquiry rather than to close them off. I find the words of F.E. Sparshott, in the preface to The Concept of Criticism, appropriate to the present endeavor:

> What follows is an essay, not a treatise. It attempts to develop a single line of thought, rather than exhaust a topic or cover a field. Positions alternative to those taken here are not elaborated, and their proponents for the most part not named. Other writings are cited only when the argument lays them under specific obligation.[2]

To begin, I shall define and discuss five terms which are important in this essay. These terms are "criticism," "philosophy of criticism," "concept of criticism," "critical theory," and "normal criticism." All of the definitions are essentially stipulative, although they have varying degrees of similarity to common usage. Some of the terms present more problems than

others and will require more extended discussion. All are inter-related, and cross-references will occur. In presenting what may be a pattern or system of terms, however, I shall attempt to avoid the circularity which would defeat my purpose in distinguishing among them. With the exception of the basic term "criticism," all were created or borrowed in response to specific needs which arose in my attempts to construct a framework for the analysis of the Anatomy. The concept has usually preceded the term. The necessity to create new critical terms and to redefine old ones is a commentary either on the state of critical terminology or on the state of my own knowledge.

Criticism

Criticism is that activity which has as its subject the works of literature and as its object the building up of a body of knowledge about those works which will assist in the fuller comprehension of them. As an activity and as a body of knowledge, criticism is a mixture of theories and myths, categories and measuring devices, human error and strokes of genius, objectivity and dogmatic assertion, scholarly journal articles and sophomore essays, naivete and sophistication. It is certainly cumulative, and occasionally systematic. Now this definition, or description, of literary criticism ought to be sufficiently broad to be acceptable

to practically everyone. "Criticism" is one term which I should like to be able to use with a freedom which too much precision would preclude. There is one point about criticism which I should like to emphasize, however.

Criticism, although it cannot exist without literature, is separable from literature as a subject of study. Works of criticism can be analyzed not only in terms of what they say about literature, but also in terms of their own inherent structures, principles, aims, and methods, without always referring to the works of literature which they are immediately criticizing. In other words, there may be the analysis of literature, which we commonly call criticism, and the analysis of criticism, for which we have no separate term. Since the two activities are distinct, even when conducted by the same person in the same work, it is reasonable, for analytical purposes, to introduce a separate term for the analysis of criticism.

Philosophy of Criticism

I propose to call the analysis of criticism, as distinct from criticism itself, the "philosophy of criticism." This use of the term "philosophy" is consistent with its use in such phrases as "philosophy of religion" and "philosophy of science." When we use these terms, we generally mean by them the systematic analysis of religion and science. Herbert Feigl, introducing a col-

lection of readings in the philosophy of science, describes that activity as ". . . a specialized part of analytical philosophy."[2] The ". . . task of the philosopher of science," according to Feigl, "is the logical analysis of scientific concepts, laws, and theories."[3] As philosophy of science consists in the analysis of the structure, methods, and components of science, so philosophy of criticism consists in the analysis of the structure, methods, and components of criticism in general and of specific works of criticism in particular.

There is another important reason for using the term "philosophy of criticism." The term "philosophy" itself has two primary uses. It may refer to the intellectual system of thought of a particular philosopher or school of philosophy, as when we refer to Thomistic philosophy of the American school of pragmatic philosophy. Or "philosophy" may indicate a general way of thinking about things, a manner or mode of analysis which is characterized by its logical analytical procedure and its fundamental disinterestedness. It is in this latter way that the term is used in "philosophy of science" or my own "philosophy of criticism." The task of the philosophy of science is to analyze science as it exists and is conducted without being arbitrarily judgmental. So, too, the philosophy of criticism must be both inclusive and disinterested. The philosopher of science or of criticism does not prescribe or proscribe: he describes.

Now a question may arise at this point: Isn't criticism itself supposed to be disinterested? Matthew Arnold, to take the most notable example, argued strenuously for the disinterestedness of criticism. At the same time, however, Arnold's own critical practice was evidence of his own tendency to be an "interested" critic. The apparent discrepancy between Arnold's objective and his performance is not, however, an indication of failure. For the practicing critic, like the practicing scientist, cannot afford to be totally disinterested. In order for either the critic or the scientist to carry on his regular business of analyzing his subject matter, he must operate within the boundaries of some sort of methodological framework, a framework which makes certain assumptions about the subject: what should be studied; how it should be studied; why one thing should be studied and not another. Both the critic and the scientist, in practice, must accept certain first principles, at least provisionally, if they are going to get any work done at all. These first principles ought not to be accepted blindly, but they must <u>be</u> accepted in order for the practitioner to have a place to begin. Neither the critic nor the scientist can constantly revise his most fundamental principles of operation, no matter how fair minded he may be. The critic, like the scientist, operates within some sort of conceptual framework. This framework, too, needs a name.

Concept of Criticism

The general framework which is the context for the critical practice of an individual critic or a school of critics I shall call a "concept of criticism." This is an awkward term, but the alternatives present greater problems. Since I have already appropriated the term "philosophy" in one of its common uses, I think it wise not to confuse things by also adopting the other. What we might call the "philosophy of criticism" of, say, the Chicago Critics, I am here calling their "concept of criticism." In order for the specific criticism of a critic or a school of critics to be consistent, it must operate within the context of some fairly constant principles and methods. Concepts of criticism, as I have defined them, do exist. We demonstrate their existence whenever we identify the critical practice of a certain critic as Aristotelian, Johnsonian, or after the manner of Richards, or Eliot, or the New Critics. As these examples indicate, the term "concept of criticism" can be applied both narrowly and broadly. Simply put, it is a term which serves to replace both "philosophy of criticism" (when referring to an individual critic's conceptual framework) and "school of criticism" (when referring to the conceptual framework which a number of critics have in common).

The distinction between the philosophy of criticism and a concept of criticism is essentially that between an

analyzing activity and a constructing activity. The first must be disinterested to succeed. The second, on the other hand, is necessarily an interested activity. Most critics realize that the construction of a critical framework within which to practice criticism is necessary. Difficulties arise, however, when we attempt to distinguish between the analytical and the constructing activities in particular cases. Unlike scientists, who are usually satisfied to work within conceptual frameworks devised for them by those who work with more "theoretical" aspects of science, many critics who work within a particular concept of criticism still feel a need to restate the premises of the conceptual framework which they accept.

Even critics primarily concerned with the constructing of concepts of criticism often fail to draw a clear line between their analytical and constructing activities. Northrop Frye, in the Polemical Introduction, is a case in point. There is both philosophy of criticism and the statement of some of the premises of a concept of criticism there, but Frye does not himself distinguish carefully between his analytical and his constructing activities. It is often possible, however, to make this distinction by determining the specific use to which certain observations are put. When Frye concludes from his analysis of literary criticism that criticism is a systematic study of literature, for example, he engages

in philosophy of criticism. Then Frye makes systematization a basic part of his own concept of criticism. He uses "criticism is systematic" in two different ways, as an analytical generalization and as a conceptual premise. This illustration suggests that a critic's concept of criticism may arise from his analysis of other critical works. In practice, this is clearly often the case. But the distinction between analysis and construction must be maintained for two reasons: to enable us to clearly differentiate two frequently confused activities, and to relieve the critic who is operating within a particular concept of criticism from the impractical notion that he must also construct his own premises of critical operation.

Critical Theory - Theory of Literature

In presenting the term "concept of criticism," I reject the use of "philosophy of criticism" to denote the activity of constructing conceptual critical frameworks. Another term often used for what I have called a "concept of criticism" is "theory of criticism." But just as "philosophy" must be reserved for a more specific purpose, so must "theory." In discussing my use of the term "theory" I will draw on the sciences by analogy. In science, "theory" denotes something more limited in scope than the large conceptual framework for a discipline which I have called, in the case of

criticism, a concept of criticism. A theory establishes relationships among certain phenomena. In the words of Abraham Kaplan, "Theory puts things known into a system."[4] Theories are a means of organizing data at hand, Kaplan says, in order ". . . to make sense of what would otherwise be inscrutable or unmeaning empirical findings."[5] The same empirical findings may, of course, be matter for more than one theory, and there are often competing theories about the same data within a discipline. In fact, different disciplines may have different, though not necessarily competing, theories about the same data, as when Dickens' novels become data for theories in literary criticism, history, and sociology.

Theories operate <u>within</u> a discipline.[6] In psychology, there is Freud's theory of dreams. There are several theories of evolution in biology, most familiarly Darwin's theory of the survival of the fittest. In geology, there is the theory of continental drift. Physics includes four field theories: gravitational field theory, electromagnetic field theory, and strong and weak atomic field theories. Physicists have sought a more comprehensive theory which would unite these four into a "unified field theory." Note, however, that such a unified field theory would still be a theory operating within the context of physics as a whole. Theories are often stated in mathematical form in science, indicating both the generality of application and the unity of form which is

characteristic of many scientific theories. Mathematical form is by no means a requirement for the statement of a theory, however, as the social sciences demonstrate.

Two points about theories should be noted here: they are tentative, and they are limited in scope. Theories attempt to organize and explain the relationships among data, but they are not to be confused with laws. Laws apply without exception. A theory may be less than conclusive and still be used as the basis for a great deal of actual practice in science, or in criticism. Disciplines such as sociology and psychology, in fact, have very few laws. These disciplines, on the other hand, have a plethora of theories. The predominance of theory rather than law in these disciplines is an indication of the general tentativeness of much of their work. It may be that as the social sciences progress they will develop more laws. Or it may be that the nature of their subject matter precludes laws, in the usual scientific sense. It is certainly the case in literary criticism that theory is not about to be supplanted by law as a guide to critical practice. At the same time that we recognize the tentativeness of theories, however, we should remember that this tentativeness does not preclude their use in critical practice.

Theories are limited in scope. Not only do they

operate within a discipline, they deal with only a small part of the data analyzed by that discipline, or with a wider range of that data in a limited manner. It seems inappropriate, then, to speak of "theories of criticism" when we mean concepts of criticism, frameworks within which theories may operate. Critical theories are theories of literature, taking as their subject matter some aspect or part of literature. Critical theories may be about the historical development of literary forms, about the nature and structure of genres, about prosody, about the relationship between the literary work and its author or its audience, about the authorship of a disputed work, and so forth. Thus, much of what we call "theoretical criticism" is just that, the formulation of theories about the relationships among various kinds of literary data.

The formulation of theories of literature or of concepts of criticism, however, are not the common activities of most critics. Literary criticism, as I have described it, is a conglomerate of a number of activities having to do with the study of literature. Like other disciplines, including the sciences, literary criticism is actually both a field of study, defined by its formal concepts and procedures, and a social phenomenon, made up of a variety of individual and group activities. All of these activities presuppose concepts of criticism, i.e., they take place within the

context of some conceptual framework or frameworks which make certain initial assumptions about literature and criticism.

The individual critic seldom becomes involved in theory formation or the construction of concepts of criticism. Instead, he does one or several of a variety of things of a more limited and specific nature. He may not even be clearly aware of the concept of criticism within which he works, and may even work within different concepts of criticism at different times. This situation is by no means unique to criticism. In most disciplines, practitioners are only generally aware of the fundamental assumptions underlying their disciplines. Like most students of literature, they are too busy with their own specialties to bother with more philosophical or theoretical matters. We need a term to refer to the kinds of activities which take up most of the working time and energy of students of literature.

Normal Criticism

The regular activities of most students of literature I shall call "normal criticism." I have borrowed the term by analogy from T.S. Kuhn's term "normal science." For Kuhn, "normal science" denotes the variety of activities carried on by scientists within the context of what he calls a "scientific paradigm," a term

comparable to my "concept of criticism."[7] Normal criticism, then, consists in such activities as teaching and research, the writing of scholarly papers and reviews, and the composition of term papers and doctoral dissertations.

I am dispensing, therefore, with the common term "practical criticism" and replacing it with the similar, but somewhat broader, "normal criticism." "Practical criticism" has always seemed to me an unfortunate term, implying that what is not "practical" criticism is somehow impractical. Theory formation and construction of concepts of criticism are certainly practical activities, since the conduct of normal criticism depends on them. Moreover, a great deal of normal criticism is not very "practical," that is, it is not directed toward the specific analysis of particular literary works.

What is normal criticism for any particular critic or group of critics will vary according to the concept of criticism within which it takes place. Both the kinds of literature which the critic chooses to examine and the manner of his examination are affected by the critical construct which guides him. This becomes clear when we compare the normal criticism of the different schools of critics. The Chicago School is founded on Aristotle--as they interpret his principles--and the normal criticism of the Chicago Critics is guided accordingly. In Critics and Criticism Ancient and Modern,[8] for example,

the essays are concerned for the most part with critical theory of the analysis of literary works in terms of form and structure. Analysis of form, as a method, seems most effective with larger literary works, and the Chicago Critics most often write about the drama or the novel. The New Critics, on the other hand, are guided in their normal criticism by a concept of criticism which sees the text as autonomous and emphasizes close textural analysis. Not surprisingly, New Criticism most often examines short works of literature, like lyric poems, instead of longer works.

These differences in normal criticism are familiar. What is important here is the recognition that they arise from, and operate within, different concepts of criticism. Each concept of criticism provides "norms" for the normal criticism of its adherents, and each precludes some things which are normal criticism for those who accept another concept of criticism. The critic of poetic texture is not likely to deal with a Shakespearean play in its entirety, as a whole, though he may examine selected parts, since the intensity of his normal critical procedure is difficult to maintain in the analysis of an entire work of great length. The formal critic will examine the play as a whole, studying its parts primarily as they relate to the whole. If the formal critic works with the same poems as the textural critic, he is more likely to categorize them according to type than to

examine the intricate inter-relationships of words and imagery within each poem. This variance in normal criticism is, of course, healthy. But there are difficulties which arise when the adherents of one concept of criticism insist upon the priority of their modes of normal criticism. Where there is a variety of concepts of criticism, the unfortunate tendency has been toward competition rather than cooperation.

I have now defined five terms: "criticism," "philosophy of criticism," "concept of criticism," "critical theory," and "normal criticism." It is time to indicate more fully my intentions in introducing these terms. I began by stating that this is an essay in the philosophy of criticism. I have defined the philosophy of criticism as the analysis of criticism in general and of particular works of criticism. The philosophy of criticism, I have said, is an analytical and disinterested activity, one which does not seek to construct conceptual frameworks for the conduct of normal criticism. Although philosophy of criticism is not a constructing activity, it cannot proceed without some analytical framework which will enable it to be systematic rather than haphazard. As the philosophy of science analyzes the laws, theories, and concepts of science, so the philosophy of criticism analyzes the components of criticism. From the perspective of the philosophy of criticism, literary criticism is a

formal discipline composed of three main components: concepts of criticism, critical theories, and normal criticism.

These three components form the categories for my analysis of the structure of the Anatomy within the main sections of the essay. It should be noted immediately, however, that the status of these categories depends on their usefulness as analytical tools. I do not urge their universal adoption. It seems reasonable that when one is going to examine a work of literary criticism one will be concerned with its initial and general assumptions about the nature of criticism, its particular critical theories, and the implications of its concept of criticism and theories of literature for the conduct of normal criticism. These three categories are generally applicable to all works of criticism. We may further expect that the analysis of a particular work, such as the Anatomy, requires the creation of special categories appropriate to its distinctive nature in addition to the general categories here outlined.

NOTES

1. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

2. F.E. Sparshott, The Concept of Criticism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), preface.

3. Herbert Feigl, in the Introduction to Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Appleton, 1953), vii.

4. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 302.

5. Kaplan, p. 302.

6. One almost never hears a reference, for example, to a "theory of science" or even a "theory of physics." There is really no term exactly equivalent to my "concept of criticism" in other disciplines, though other disciplines certainly have conceptual frameworks. The conceptual frameworks of the sciences, like concepts of criticism, are containing structures. They provide a basis for the operation of the activities of a discipline; they do not provide explanations of relationships among data, or laws, as do theories.

7. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1962, rev. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 10-22.

8. R.S. Crane and Others, Critics and Criticism Ancient and Modern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952).

I

THE CRITICAL DISSECTION OF THE ANATOMY

> It is the rare kind of book that the reader must come to terms with, even if it takes him the rest of his life.[1]
>
> - David Daiches

My subject is the Anatomy of Criticism.[2] My object is to facilitate the attempts of the reader to come to terms with the book. In this chapter I shall present an overview of the critical commentary on the Anatomy. I shall then establish a context or contexts within which explanations of the Anatomy may be pursued. I propose to speak not only of Frye's concept of criticism as it is found in the Anatomy, but also of his system of critical theories, the relationship between the concept of criticism and the critical theories, and the implications of these for the conduct of normal criticism, and likewise of any other matter in the same line of inquiry. Let us begin.

Criticism has three major components, concepts of criticism, critical theories, and normal criticism. We may begin with a brief analysis of the Anatomy in terms of these three categories. The Polemical Introduction to the Anatomy of Criticism opens in this manner:

> This book consists of "essays," in the word's original sense of a trial or incomplete attempt, on the possibility of a synoptic view of the scope, theory, principles, and techniques of literary criticism. The primary aim of the book is to give my reasons for believing in such a synoptic view; the secondary aim is to provide a tentative version of it which will make enough sense to convince my readers that a view, of the kind that I outline, is attainable.[3]

We may translate the primary and secondary aims of the Anatomy, as Frye states them here, into the terms of the categories of analysis which I have introduced. Frye's primary aim is to present a certain concept of criticism. His secondary aim is to provide a system of critical theories which will complement and illustrate that concept of criticism.

The Anatomy does not contain a sustained effort at normal criticism per se, and Frye himself admits that it needs a companion work of "practical criticism."[4] But the Anatomy does contain evidences of normal criticism in its many specific insights into particular works of literature. These enable the reader to infer what normal criticism must be for one who accepts the Anatomy's concept of criticism.

Frye describes his concept of criticism with three related words: criticism is "synoptic," "systematic," and "scientific." Of these terms it is the last which is the most significant. Simply stated, the Anatomy is founded on the concept that literary criticism is scientific. By "synoptic," Frye seems to mean that a poetics

ought to be comprehensive, taking all of literature as its data and all valid critical theories as its forms of explanation. By "systematic," he means, as his critical theories illustrate, that literary criticism ought to organize its particular observations of literature within the explanatory systems of coherent, internally consistent theories of literature. Frye's use of "synoptic," "systematic," "coherent," and "comprehensive," is in part to counter the "emotional overtones of unimaginative barbarism"[5] which, he suspects, the term "scientific" conveys to some people. But his own use of "scientific," especially in the Polemical Introduction, clearly indicates that he finds neither barbarism nor lack of imagination to be associated with it. For Frye in the Anatomy, literary criticism is scientific.

The second component of the critical system of the Anatomy, its critical theories, is easy to identify. The Anatomy offers four theories of literature, each of which organizes works of literature according to a certain pattern and from a certain perspective. The explication of the four theories, the Theory of Modes, the Theory of Symbols, the Theory of Myths, and the Theory of Genres, comprises the main body of the Anatomy. Each is a full field theory in that it finds a place for all works of literature. The four theories are intended to be neither contradictory nor simply complementary, but coextensive.

The system of critical theories is central to the Anatomy for two reasons. First, the theories do, after all, comprise the bulk of the book. The arguments and discussion of the Polemical Introduction and the Tentative Conclusion are brief by comparison to the elaboration of the four critical theories. But even more important, the critical system is central to Frye's own argument for a scientific criticism. The general arguments for a scientific approach to criticism, as found in the Polemical Introduction, are insufficient in themselves to be persuasive without a clear demonstration in specific form of the possibility of a scientific poetics.

Given the central importance of the system of critical theories, we must be careful how we take Frye's own disclaimers about "the system." He appears, on first reading, to insist that his system is of little importance. In the opening sentences quoted above, Frye indicates that his "tentative version" of a synoptic poetics is secondary to his primary intention of persuading the reader that criticism really ought to be synoptic (i.e., systematic). And later in the Polemical Introduction he says specifically:

> Whenever schematization appears in the following pages, no importance is attached to the schematic form itself, which may be only the result of my own lack of ingenuity. Much of it, I expect, and in fact hope, may be mere scaffolding, to be knocked away when the building is in better shape. The rest belongs to the systematic study of the formal causes of art.[6]

It would appear that Frye is suggesting that his system of critical theories is not very important. It is possible, of course, that these remarks are intended to be taken ironically--they may be a ritual disclaimer which actually signals what is most important. If this is so, Frye belongs in the tradition of Wordsworth, Coleridge, Poe, Yeats, and others who began great works with protests of modesty about their incompleteness. Like Mallarme, Frye may be symbolically turning his back on that which he most values. But Frye's reservations about his system can be explained more simply without recourse to a Romantic tradition.

Frye's caution in presenting his system indicates his recognition of the risks inherent in his endeavor. Committed to the principle that criticism should be scientific, he must provide a demonstration sufficiently plausible to ". . . convince my readers that a view, of the kind that I outline, is attainable."[7] His own system must be highly persuasive, for his general argument depends on it for specific illustration. He is willing to dispense with much of his system as "mere scaffolding"--but only when "the building is in better shape." His system is not to be dismissed, but superseded by another and better.

Normal criticism, the third component of the Anatomy, is an activity which Frye intends to be an analysis of literary works in terms of the explanations provided by the critical theories. There is to be an alternation "be-

tween inductive experience and deductive principles."[8] As in a science, normal activity in criticism involves the application to phenomena of the explanations provided by theories. There will be, of course, a constant dialogue between theory and data. The critical theories, arrived at after an inductive survey of the literary universe, will be used as the basis for explanations of the various relationships among literary phenomena. In the process of applying the theories to literature, the theories themselves will be modified, amplified, and refined as the data requires.[9]

In brief, then, the Anatomy may be seen as having each of the three components of literary criticism as I have outlined them: a concept of criticism as scientific; a formal structure of the four critical theories of modes, symbols, myths, and genres; and an implied normal critical procedure which involves the continuous interplay between the critical theories and the literary works from which they are derived and to which they are applied. This description of the Anatomy is deliberately simplified and ignores, at least for the moment, many of the complexities of the work. But it is one of the advantages of these analytical categories that they allow us to begin at a point of relative simplicity. It seems wise to begin simply if we are, like Zuleika Dobson's French maid, to attempt "to make chaos cosmic."

Even this analysis of the Anatomy into three compon-

ents, however, allows us to begin to ask the fundamental questions about its structure which will concern us in this essay. Indeed, the questions are more easily asked and the problems more easily seen within this context. Confronted with the Anatomy's contention that criticism is scientific, the reader immediately asks what is meant by "scientific." Examining the system of four critical theories, the reader wonders whether these are really scientific theories. And considering Frye's directions for normal criticism, the reader asks whether it is possible to treat literature in the same manner that the scientist treats a super nova or sub-atomic phenomena.

My analysis of the Anatomy hardly begins in a vacuum. In the fifteen years since its publication, there have been nearly sixty reviews, articles, and sections of books devoted in whole or in part to the Anatomy of Criticism in particular, or to Northrop Frye's work as a critical theorist in general. Most of these references are brief, consisting in initial notices and reviews and later short characterizations of the Anatomy in books such as Wimsatt and Brooks' Literary Criticism: A Short History.[10] The critical attention to Frye and the Anatomy reached a peak with the decision of the English Institute to devote a series of papers to the topic "Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism" in 1965, rather an honor for a man still living. Surprisingly, in light of the number of articles

which treat the Anatomy, there have been very few examinations of the work in any length--or depth. Few of the articles extend to even a dozen pages, and only a handful exceed that length. In their reviews, critics often complain that they do not have the space to present the sort of analysis which the Anatomy demands, but few take steps to remedy that difficulty. A sampling of some of their comments is instructive. While the critics do not share the categories which I have chosen to establish, their concerns fit generally within my framework. They deal with the concept of criticism as scientific, with the critical system of theories, and with the implications of these for normal criticism. Let us look at a few representative examples of this criticism.

The Anatomy's concept of criticism as scientific is treated in an interesting manner by the critics. Many do not even mention this component of the Anatomy, or, if they do, they dismiss it briefly. Their assumption seems to be that Frye's contention that criticism ought to be scientific is not really central to the Anatomy. This is strange when one considers the extent of Frye's arguments in the Polemical Introduction. Perhaps the idea of poetics as a scientific activity is seen as so inappropriate as to demand no consideration. This attitude is expressed fairly explicitly by R.M. Adams in an essay whose title, "Dreadful Symmetry," indicates his general feelings about the Anatomy.[11] Adams contends that

Frye's search for a conceptual framework for criticism is "wholly unsound," and that critics would do well to emulate the methods and attitudes of their fellows in history. Historians, Adams says,

> . . . have relatively few misgivings about their procedures and a total lack of that sense of academic encirclement which seems to haunt Professor Frye. Happy in their traditional lebensraum, they seem content to live with no loftier common principles than a general mutual regard for the rules of historical evidence. Their condition is not Utopian; they still have a few crackpots who try to tell them what history as a whole is all about; and I myself think they would do well to formulate into something more distinct than a gentlemen's agreement the rules of the game they are playing. But I think, as their approach is essentially modest, it provides access to most truths possessed of a vigorous dimension and a reasonable resistance to the wintry eye of scepticism.[12]

Adams' argument is representative of those critics who cannot be bothered at all with the idea of placing their activities within any sort of large conceptual framework. Indeed, he does not even contend in his article that critics should formulate "the rules of the game they are playing" into "something more than a gentlemen's agreement," as he advises the historians to do. To the critic who refuses even to entertain the notion of a systematic poetics there is probably no persuasive argument to the contrary. Adams, after all, is not really interested in an argument; he prefers rejecting the systematizing in the Anatomy out of hand to confronting it directly. It is contrary to the attitudes and purposes of this essay, however, to avoid genuine complexities.

There would be little sense in continuing further if we were to accept the position that Frye's theorizing may be dismissed as irrelevant to the conduct of criticism.

A belief in the potential value of coming to terms with the complexities of the Anatomy is suggested at once by the number of eminent critics who have commented on it, among others, Meyer Abrams,[13] Frank Kermode,[14] Murray Krieger,[15] Hazard Adams,[16] and David Daiches. While their criticism has by no means been entirely favorable, it has at least attempted to deal directly with the Anatomy. Even W.K. Wimsatt, who finally throws up his hands in mock--or perhaps real--horror at Frye's system, first attempts to analyze it.[17] To the circumstantial evidence of the existence of the criticism of these men, we may add a few remarks directed specifically to R.M. Adams' dismissal of Frye's theorizing.

Hazard Adams, in an article on criticism for the American Scholar, takes up R.M. Adams' contention that criticism ought never to be very theoretical or systematic:

> This is an old argument and one that is difficult to answer in the terms in which it is offered. Wimsatt and Brooks reply that the fundamental principle in Adams' philosophy is a mistrust of philosophy, and this seems to be a correct judgment if we look at Adams' . . . review of Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism. Adams' seems to be the kind of view that would reduce all thinking to nothing. Surely Adams would not cavil at Einstein's general theory

> even if he knew, as we all do know, that some day it must be proved inadequate. An argument that a "conceptual universe" is not possible is the argument of someone so disillusioned with the limitations of conceptual thinking that he has come to see no use in it at all.[18]

John Holloway makes much the same point: a rejection of critical theory and the idea of a conceptual framework for criticism is in itself a theory, and undermines itself by its very existence.[19] These arguments are similar to those in my introduction. Critical theories and concepts of criticism are necessary components of literary criticism as a discipline and as an activity.[20]

Among the critics who do discuss Frye's concept of criticism and critical system there are certainly those who find them less than satisfactory. George Whalley, for example, has this to say of the Anatomy's attempt at a scientific criticism:

> The book does not impress one with the scientific possibilities of criticism. To take one point only: the analogies drawn from Ptolemaic astronomy, from Spengler and Frazer, are all analogies outmoded in their own disciplines. This might not matter if the Great Wheel diagram in the third essay did not behave in the way scientific analogies do when they need to be replaced, exhibiting features of excessive complication, asymmetry, and rigidity.[21]

These remarks have at least the virtue of being somewhat specific in their condemnation. I shall return to Whalley's description of the state of Frye's analogies later in this essay. It is interesting to note, however, his reference to the asymmetry in the Anatomy in contrast

to R.M. Adams' condemnation of the work for an excess of symmetry. On this, as on all important aspects of the book, there can be found opposing opinions.

In contrast to the several critics who will not accept the concept of a scientific criticism, few willingly entertain it on Frye's own terms. Harold Bloom goes so far as to say that

> The major value of Frye's Anatomy is constructive; a Poetics which is complete, sane, and honestly discursive, based as it is upon an inductive survey of the whole of literature, has at last been offered us.[22]

While Bloom does not say that the Anatomy demonstrates that criticism may be scientific, he comes rather close to accepting Frye's contention that poetics can be synoptic. George Whalley, in a review published a few months after the one quoted above, moderates his response to the Anatomy's concept of scientific criticism:

> A close reading of the book shows that in fact this is not criticism-as-science, but rather the use of the sciences as a "suggestive analogy."[23]

This is still a rejection of Frye's concept of criticism as I have outlined it, but Whalley's suggestion is provocative.

The majority of the Anatomy's critics focus directly on the system of critical theories. The strongest denunciation of the system is made by W.K. Wimsatt. In an essay prepared for the English Institute,[24] he gives up his attempt to comprehend the system with a great exclamation of futility:

> Frye wants all the idealism, autonomy, and absoluteness of a subjective humanization but at the same time a highly concrete typology, variegated specific categories, a brimful inhabited world of Aristotelian genres, styles, and characters. Occam! thou shouldst be living at this hour! Benedetto Croce! thou shouldst be living at this hour! I am thinking of such arrangements as Frye's twenty-four overlapping divisions of the seasonal cycle of myths, or his permutations of the high, middle, and low styles, complicated by the ideas of hieratic and demotic, and of verse, prose, and associative (or speech) rhythms, at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, or the endless recital of parallel conventions, or hopeful parallels, or qualifications of parallels, among Shakespeare's comedies and romances.[25]

Prof. Wimsatt sounds here like nothing more than Mr. Buckley taking out after the idiosyncrasies of the latest liberal welfare reform bill. Merely to say that Frye's is a complicated system is not sufficient to damn it.

Murray Krieger attempts to reply to Wimsatt in his paper for the English Institute:

> The fidelity of the critical imagination must first be to its own free creatures, even before its fidelity to the creatures of others, of the poets, and surely before its fidelity to the bounds of critical discourse as agreed upon by the theoretical tradition from Aristotle to--shall we say--Wimsatt. To the last, Frye seems to demand systematic irresponsibility, a wilfull recklessness. For his is not only a revolutionary conception of the poet and of criticism, but a revolutionary conception of the nature and function of critical discourse. Whatever may be the accuracy of Wimsatt's assault on Frye's discursive methods, we must ask whether it is appropriate to Frye's elusive disdain for the methodological presuppositions which underlie all such assaults; whether it "is like trying a man by the laws of one country, who acted under those of another," as Pope said of neoclassical attacks of Shakespeare.[26]

The cavalier disregard for the demands of traditional

critical discourse which Krieger here attributes to Frye does Frye a disservice. Frye himself protests that he is not attempting to transvalue traditional critical discourse but to organize and co-ordinate it. He insists that his concept of criticism, ". . . whose principles apply to the whole of literature and account for every valid type of critical procedure . . . ," is what ". . . Aristotle meant by poetics."[27] Both Wimsatt and Krieger react to the Anatomy with more emotion than logic here. Such passionate outbursts do not contribute to the disinterested analysis of the Anatomy, whatever the position of the partisan. The strong feelings associated with opposing views of the Anatomy are nearly as great an obstacle to its reasonable analysis as the fact of the oppositions themselves.

It is left to Meyer Abrams to make the best balanced statement on the subject of Frye's attempt at science in criticism. He suggests that much of the Anatomy consists of

> . . . valid elements in a science of criticism, according to the criterion for a science which, Aristotle suggests, is the only one an educated man will apply: that it yield just so much precision and certainty as the nature of a particular subject will admit. As for the remainder, though it is not science, it is a thing no less valid or rare--it is wit, "a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike."[28]

Here, at least, is an attempt to give the Anatomy its due, even when one is not entirely persuaded by it.

The controversy surrounding the Anatomy is not confined to the concept of criticism upon which it is based, nor to the system of critical theories. There is substantial disagreement over the implications of the Anatomy for the conduct of normal criticism. Some of the discussion of the suitability of the Anatomy as a guide focuses, naturally enough, on the categories of the critical theories. Erwin Clapp, while noting the complexities of Frye's theories, says nonetheless that ". . . strangely enough, this kaleidoscope of categories is an instrument of vision."[29] Philip Hallie, on the other hand, sees no practical use for the Anatomy:

> It seems plain that Frye's "supreme" system cannot be taught or learned, let alone further developed, because it is made up of impenetrable paradox, profound incoherence, and a bold but ultimately arbitrary disregard for the facts of literary experience.[30]

Even taking only one of Frye's four theories of literature there is a pronounced division of opinion on its usefulness. Speaking of the Theory of Genres, Frederick P.W. McDowell calls it a

> . . . brilliant discussion . . . on the specific forms of prose fiction, a discussion so clear and forceful as to say almost the last word on this perplexing subject.[31]

Wayne Booth, in The Rhetoric of Fiction, is not so favorably disposed toward Frye's discussion of fiction. "Unfortunately," Booth says,

> Frye's ten types are of limited use as a basis for judgments on technique, since they give us groups of works still unmanageably large and

> heterogeneous, groups differentiated from each other less by an induction from their common effects than by a deductive classification of the materials presented.[32]

Booth's disagreement with Frye, however, may be more a reflection of differing purposes and perspectives than an outright rejection of the Anatomy's discussion of fictional types. For Booth does say that his remarks are not to be construed so as ". . . to deny the perceptiveness and effectiveness of Frye's classification for his own purposes."[33] McDowell, on the other hand, has no reservations about the usefulness of the theory of genres. "In instances such as this when Mr. Frye speaks so authoritatively," McDowell says, "it is to be expected that critics will immediately make use of the terminology which he has provided for them."[34]

The disagreements about the usefulness of the Anatomy's system of critical theories are mild compared to the controversy over Frye's rejection of comparative value judgments in normal criticism. Before sampling the controversy, let us review briefly the Anatomy's remarks on value judgments. First, let us be clear about what Frye does not say on this issue. He does not deny that either literature or criticism has value; he clearly affirms the value of both in many ways. Neither does he contend that literature is of no value without criticism, although he does assume--as all critics must--that intelligent criticism will be of service to literature. Nor does he deny the proposition, stated generally, that some

literature is better than other literature. He is not above referring to the "great masterpieces" or to "ephemeral rubbish." If Frye is himself willing to make value judgments, then what does he say to provoke controversy?

Frye's discussion of value judgments is extensive. But it can be represented by a few selected statements:

> (1) Value-judgements are founded on the study of literature; the study of literature can never be founded on value-judgements.[35]
>
> (2) . . . criticism has no business to react against things, but should show a steady advance toward undiscriminating catholicity.[36]
>
> (3) . . . the difference between redeemable and irredeemable art, being based on the total experience of criticism, can never be theoretically formulated.[37]

Let us examine the implications of these statements.

Criticism, for Frye, is a disinterested analytical study of literature which seeks to be thorough, comprehensive, and systematic. If it is to be such a study, it cannot begin by making comparative value judgments among works of literature. It must accept all literature as its subject matter, as the source of its data. And any system which does not comprehend the entire "literary universe," to use one of Frye's favorite phrases, is by definition an incomplete system. Thus, as Frye suggests in (2), literary criticism must continually seek to progress to the point of being able to account for all literary works, regardless of any particular critic's preferences. Frye insists that you cannot build a com-

plete systematic study of literature by first dividing it into the "good" and the "bad," and then either ignoring the "bad" or basing theories on the distinctions used in separating the "good" from the "bad."

Note, however, Frye's use of "criticism" rather than "critic" in (2). It is criticism, the discipline and the "consolidating body of knowledge," which must be catholic. Individual critics, by implication, are recognized to have preferences. Frye says that these preferences, however, should be the result of disinterested criticism, not the basis of it (1). There can be no a priori judgment of literary value. In (3), Frye goes a step further. Even if one does make judgments of value on the basis of as complete as possible an examination of literature, there is no way in which these value judgments can be defended on a theoretical basis. In short, anyone who has studied literature intelligently may know that Henry James is superior to Harold Robbins--but he can't prove it. And trying to prove it is quite peripheral to the main business of literary criticism.

Frye's comments on value judgments are consistent with his concept of criticism as scientific and must be seen in the context of that concept. Science cannot rest upon the preferences and prejudices of its practitioners. All data must be considered as at least potentially valuable, and sciences must generally be as inclusive as possible. It is dangerous to rule out any information arbi-

trarily. Scientists, like critics, do have preferences, biases, prejudices. Many scientific breakthroughs have been held back as much by the refusal or inability of individual scientists to view them disinterestedly as by an actual lack of information. But scientists usually condemn the man who insists on basing his work in his particular prejudices. Critics, Frye implies, are more likely to view such a man favorably. The sciences also have as their primary goal the explanation of all of the data which fall within their purview. None accomplishes this, of course, but all are likely to be disturbed by those things they cannot include. Criticism, on the other hand, too often is judged on the basis of what it excludes, and the critic who can present the most widely accepted selection of the few great masterpieces may be the critic who is most admired.

It is not possible to determine whether Frye's views on comparative value judgments gave rise to his concept of criticism, or the concept was formulated first and the views on value judgments proceeded from it. Precedence here is of no importance. What is important is the recognition that the concept of criticism as scientific and the views on value judgments are necessarily related. This then is Frye's position on comparative value judgments: comparative value judgments are peripheral to literary criticism. The purpose of criticism, like the purpose of science, is to explain and describe the nature and inter-

relationships of its phenomena as completely as possible. Criticism must be inclusive, and it cannot afford to rule out in advance the potential value, for criticism, of any work of literature. As a discipline, criticism must be disinterested, even while recognizing that critics themselves can never be completely so. If a critic does make judgments of value, he must do so only on the basis of as nearly a total experience of literature as is possible, and even then he will not be able to prove his judgments accurate. Like the sciences, criticism cannot afford to prejudge its data.

The objections to Frye's banishment of comparative value judgments from criticism are of two types, those questioning its advisability and those questioning its possibility. The rejection of comparative value judgments is certainly troublesome to many critics. Some express dissatisfaction only in passing, but others are much more pointed in their objections. George Whalley condemns the Anatomy for its ". . . lack of any informing theory of knowledge, value, truth, and belief."[38] His comments are restrained in comparison to those of Robert Martin Adams. Frye's ". . . critical machinery," Adams complains, "is limited primarily by its remoteness from anything like a scheme of values."[39] The nature of the "limitations" of Frye's machinery are made more explicit a few paragraphs later when Adams says, "Professor Frye seems to me singularly deficient in devices for

straining the junk out of literature."[40] And Fred Inglis compares Frye's ideas about the function of criticism with those of F.R. Leavis, who, we are told approvingly, knew that criticism was supposed to identify and explicate the great masterpieces of literature.[41]

Rejection of Frye's position on comparative value judgments and of his systematization often go hand in hand. Inglis, for example, concludes his argument for "values" in criticism by saying, ". . . systems of criticism either lose touch with live literature, or offer formulations which are too crude and clumsy to be any help in understanding."[42] Just as it is difficult to reply on their own terms to those who reject the use of systems in criticism, so it is futile to defend the Anatomy's position on value judgments against those who have, after all, concepts of criticism incompatible with the Anatomy. When R.M. Adams complains that Frye presents no "devices for straining the junk out of literature," he is begging the question. Proscription and prescription are outside the framework provided by the Anatomy's concept of criticism. This is not to say that those who believe criticism's main task to be a division of literature into the "good" and the "bad" can be dismissed. Their tradition is old, and nearly all critics have succumbed to the temptations of the "literary stock market." There is little to be gained, however, by attempting to refute the position of the literary stock

brokers. Frye is himself much more concerned with showing what can be done by avoiding comparative value judgments than with building a prior case against them. He banishes comparative value judgments from his critical system because his concept of criticism demands it. It is a theoretical and a practical necessity.

More to the point here are the objections to the possibility, rather than to the advisability, of putting aside comparative value judgments as a basis for normal criticism. Whalley takes the position that a poem cannot be considered as a neutral artifact, a "hypothetical verbal structure," because it has been imbued with meaning by the poet. To analyze a poem without reference to what the poet "means" is not possible in Whalley's view. This "meaning" precludes the possibility of a neutral examination of the poem. "Language in itself does not mean," Whalley says, "but persons can."[43] But Whalley confuses the question of the poet's intentions with the problem of the critic's judgment of the poem.

While Whalley's objections to the assumption of the neutrality of the verbal artifact focus on its creator, John Fraser contends that the reader/critic cannot remain neutral himself in his response to and analysis of the poem. He characterizes the Anatomy as

> . . . an elaborate apologia for a conventional academic taste by someone who was incapable of responding passionately to individual works yet craved to talk about literature on the grandest scale possible, and who had been re-

> vising the rules of the game to permit himself to escape from genuine critical confrontations.[44]

Fraser's description of the Anatomy and its author does not speak directly to the possibility of avoiding comparative value judgments. In some ways, his comments suggest that he finds Frye able to avoid them, but only at the cost of avoiding genuine criticism. Fraser, like Whalley and Inglis, feels that without some judgments of value there is no criticism. But Fraser goes even farther in his finding the Anatomy and Frye deficient because they do not respond "passionately" to literature. This implies that a passionate or emotional response is required by literature even in the process of criticism. Frye himself is careful to distinguish in the Polemical Introduction between the direct experience of literature and literary criticism. For Fraser, apparently, there is no such distinction to be made.

The objections to Frye's position on value judgments are really questions about the nature of the subject matter with which the critic deals, and the nature of his response to that subject matter. The objections suggest, though they do not articulate, two important questions raised by Frye's concept of criticism and his ideas about the conduct of normal criticism: (1) Is literature as a subject matter sufficiently like natural phenomena that it may be treated as a collection of data without reference to the particular meaning or meanings which the

authors express in and through their works? (2) Is it possible for the critic to analyze literature without passion, that is, with the same objectivity that characterizes the analysis of natural phenomena by the scientist? A work of literature, after all, is not quite the same sort of thing as a rock formation or a subatomic particle, since it may be seen both as the product of conscious intention and as a performance which presumes a certain response on the part of the reader. These are indeed crucial questions for the Anatomy's critical position, and they will be examined at length in the following chapter.

The attack on Frye's position on comparative value judgments is usually explicit. The position's defense is more often implicit, a part of the acceptance of the concept of a scientific criticism. But before leaving this issue it might be well to emphasize that criticism is comparative in the Anatomy. It is comparative in the same sense that the philosophy of religion is comparative. Categories are established, and particular works are compared within the categories. The object of the comparison is to facilitate the discovery and discussion of similarities and differences, as in the comparative study of religions, and not to determine whether one of the things compared is superior to the others. David Daiches summarizes the Anatomy's sense of criticism as comparative quite well:

> Thus criticism is comparative not in the sense that is is concerned with comparing some works with others and saying that this is better or worse than that, but in the sense that it places a given work in a context, by defining its mode, its kind and degree of symbolization, the kind of archetypal themes and images it employs, the way it handles words with respect to a real or implied audience or to the writer's relationship to his material. This inevitably makes it "like" other works (and, of course, unlike still other works).[45]

This seems a nice description of the Anatomy's manner of comparing works of literature and of the purposes of the comparisons.

I have attempted here a presentation of a fair sampling of the criticism and opinion, favorable and unfavorable, which have grown up around the Anatomy, using the three components of criticism as general categories for the presentation. The critics have not, of course, analyzed the Anatomy entirely within the neat categories which I have set up. I have used them to organize, insofar as is possible, the quite disorganized volume of commentary. If some of the comments have not seemed quite to fit the contexts which I have established, that is only because I have sought to be inclusive and have not tried to use my categories too rigidly.

I should like to make three general observations on the extant commentary on the Anatomy, observations which these examples serve to illustrate. First, the criticism of the Anatomy is nearly always "interested" criticism, reflecting the critical positions and preferences of the

commentators. The Anatomy needs and deserves dispassionate analysis, but it has not gotten much analysis of that sort. For this reason, the fundamental disinterestedness of that activity which I have called philosophy of criticism must be brought to bear on it.

The second observation to make about the criticism of the Anatomy is that it is consistently fragmentary. Few critics attempt to see the Anatomy whole, to provide a context for all of its parts. Instead, they focus on a single part or aspect. I have noted the major obstacles to dealing with the Anatomy as a whole, its complexity, comprehensiveness, and apparent contradictions. It is surely true, as Frederick P.W. McDowell puts it, that the work ". . . resists being all held in the mind at once . . ."[46] But the time is past due for an attempt to overcome that resistance.

Finally, it may easily be observed that the criticism of the Anatomy is itself full of contradictions. There is no major facet of the work which is not praised and accepted by some and damned and rejected by others. The manner of my presentation of the various criticisms serves to emphasize the contradictions, but the examples themselves illustrate that these contradictions do not arise merely from my form of presentation. Further, the alternative views of the Anatomy are all held by intelligent and respectable critics. These are thoughtful men who are disagreeing. If there is to be a comprehensive and

disinterested overview of the Anatomy, however, some way must be found to deal with these contradictions.

The task of the philosopher of criticism in examining the Anatomy is evident. In the face of partisan, fragmented, and contradictory criticism, he must find a means to analyze the Anatomy which is disinterested, comprehensive, and goes beyond the contradictions of the extant commentary. How is this to be done? Two possible approaches suggest themselves immediately: We could choose one view of the Anatomy, rejecting the others; or we could attempt an amalgamation of the various views into some sort of gestalt theory of the Anatomy. Neither of these approaches is adequate, however. Indeed, there is only one attempt in the literature to provide an overview of the Anatomy, and this attempt, though consistent and complete on its own terms, does not do justice to the book's complexities.[47]

The second approach, an attempt to amalgamate the various views of the work, won't work either. An eclectic compromise would yield a view of the Anatomy much like the survey of criticism just presented. We could list the positions taken by various critics, balancing them against one another in order to present a fair view of the Anatomy. Such an approach, while it might do justice to the criticism, would not necessarily do justice to the Anatomy. We are concerned to develop an overview of the Anatomy, not to present everything that

has been said about it. Such an overview of the Anatomy, while it ought to be informed by the best criticism extant, must finally be developed on its own terms.

This, then, is the situation of the philosopher of criticism who seeks a disinterested, comprehensive overview of the Anatomy of Criticism. He cannot select a single explanation from among those offered by the critics, since none is sufficient by itself, and no single view of the Anatomy is likely to quite fully comprehend it. He cannot patch together an attempt to balance the various critical opinions of the Anatomy, since that would still leave the contradictions standing and fail to provide a unified and consistent perspective on the work. What alternative is left?

There are certain similarities between my position at this point and Frye's position when first confronting the disarray of critical approaches to literature which he attempts to resolve in the Anatomy. I, too, am confronted with a subject on which ". . . there has been much endeavor and little attempt at perspective."[48] I am confronted with a subject too complex to be reduced to the terms of a single, simplified view, a subject which seems to demand a multiple, though consistently related, set of perspectives. And I am confronted with a set of contradictory criticisms, apparently impossible to resolve. Given these similarities, it seems wise to seek counsel from Frye himself. In his essay "The Archetypes

of Literature," Frye offers this advice:

> Antitheses are usually resolved, not by picking one side and refuting the other, or by making eclectic choices between them, but by trying to get past the antithetical way of stating the problem.[49]

The critic who seeks an inclusive framework within which to conduct the analysis of the Anatomy must begin by rejecting the contradictory opinions of the work as a basis for this framework, that is, by getting past "the antithetical way of stating the problem." My task, then, is not to resolve the conflicts of the commentary as it now exists, but to provide a new framework which is beyond these conflicts. In creating this framework, two basic principles must be affirmed: (1) Complete understanding of the Anatomy requires several perspectives from which to view the work. A framework for the analysis of the Anatomy must provide for a set of complementary perspectives. (2) We must be able to view the Anatomy as a whole from each of these perspectives, identifying its concept of criticism, and examining its critical theories and directives for normal criticism.

The first principle for the creation of a framework for the analysis of the Anatomy is that it allow for more than one perspective on the work. I adopt this principle in order to avoid the limitations of a single point of view. Let us consider what two respected critics say about multiple perspectives. R.S. Crane's The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry[50]

presumes, as its title indicates, that there are several "languages" of criticism. What Crane calls a "language of criticism" is much the same as what I have called a "concept of criticism," along with its attendant critical theories and directives for normal criticism. Crane insists that ". . . literary criticism is not, and never has been, a single discipline."[51] For Crane, criticism is a collection of diverse "languages of criticism," distinguished by the kinds of questions each asks. Their subjects are the same--works of literature. But each has its own form, its own way of asking questions about literature, and its own kind of answers. The distinctions among languages of criticism are a matter of what a critic thinks <u>with</u>, rather than what a critic thinks <u>about</u>.[52] It might be noted that in this book Crane is engaging in the activity which I have called philosophy of criticism. This suggests that philosophy of criticism is an integral part of general critical activity.

A work which argues for the necessity of a multiplicity of approaches to criticism itself is F.E. Sparshott's <u>The Concept of Criticism</u>.[53] Sparshott presents six approaches to the defining and describing of criticism, indicating his preference for one of them. He insists, despite his conclusion that one approach is the most productive, in considering and explaining all six. The essay is quite open, and Sparshott's arguments in favor of the need for a variety of approaches are remarkably

like those of Crane. "There cannot be a general theory of criticism," Sparshott contends, "or even of literary criticism." This is so because

> . . . a theory's scope cannot be determined by its subject-matter, by what it is a theory about; it must be determined by its purpose, by the logographical setting in which the phenomena are placed--by the discipline to which the theory belongs, by the problems to which it offers solutions; and, to the extent that the theory is the correlate of practice, by the undertaking to which it is complementary.[54]

Like Crane, Sparshott argues that there may be, and usually ought to be, more than one theory, more than one perspective, on any given subject matter. And the differences among the theories will depend on the kinds of questions they ask and the kinds of solutions they offer.

The Anatomy is not, in itself, a whole field of phenomena. But the principle of multiple approaches can certainly be applied. If criticism in general must be viewed in several ways, then so must a particular work of criticism. The observations of Crane and Sparshott, both of whom are dealing with criticism, serve to reinforce the general methodological argument which I have presented: the Anatomy, if it is to be considered with any attempt at thoroughness, must be considered from more than one point of view.

The nature and structure of the Anatomy argue for multiple perspectives. The Anatomy embodies multiple per-

spectives in its four critical theories. It seems reasonable, therefore, to apply to the Anatomy itself the approach it takes toward literature. Further, the diversity of the criticism of the Anatomy suggests that a single view of the work will be insufficient, as I have argued earlier. While it may be impossible to resolve the contradictions of the current controversy over the Anatomy, an overview of the work which allows for several approaches will go some distance toward that end.

The second principle underlying the creation of a framework for the analysis of the Anatomy, the principle that it must be taken as a whole, is a practical necessity. Pragmatically, it is wiser to assume unity and then consider inconsistencies than the other way around. Only when a consistent and unified view of a work cannot be discovered or created can a work be assumed to be fragmentary, and then only tentatively since the possibility of attaining a unified view still remains.

There are other than methodological reasons to begin with an assumption of the Anatomy's unity. Both Frye's own stated intentions and the structure of the Anatomy argue for this position. Frye states quite clearly that he wishes to attempt a comprehensive, self-consistent, "synoptic" view of literary criticism. These intentions are realized in the deliberately schematic form of the system of critical theories, and in the inclusion in one volume of a concept of criticism, critical theories,

and directives for, if not very many examples of, normal criticism.

Critics of the Anatomy also see unity and consistency in it, even when they find this unity perverse. Harold Bloom, in a passage noted earlier, calls the Anatomy ". . . a Poetics which is complete . . ."[55] Hazard Adams comments that the Anatomy ". . . is not really four essays, but one . . ."[56] and says he wants Frye's ". . . theory along with his insights, his wit and his style, because I am uncertain which precedes which."[57] Among the Anatomy's detractors, its unity is often insisted upon as a basis for condemnation. R.M. Adams' title "Dreadful Symmetry" indicates both his feeling that the Anatomy is schematically consistent and his rejection of that schematization.

There are two different kinds of reasons for affirming the principle that the Anatomy be treated as a whole. The first kind is methodological. The assumption of the work's consistency is to be justified on basically pragmatic grounds. Reinforcing the methodological reason is the specific evidence of the completeness and wholeness of the Anatomy to be found in the statements of intent of the author, the structure of the work itself, and the opinions of critics on both sides of the controversy surrounding it. Of the two kinds of reasons for treating the Anatomy as a unified and complete work of criticism, the methodological kind is more important to my essay.

The direct evidence is helpful primarily in that it suggests that an approach which is intended to serve for any work of criticism will serve in this case without much difficulty.

We have seen that there are sound reasons, both methodological reasons and reasons based in the direct evidence of the work and its criticism, for assuming that the Anatomy ought to be treated as a whole within the context of several perspectives. The next step is to offer a framework for criticism of the Anatomy which embodies these characteristics. I propose to present a framework for analysis of the Anatomy which allows four approaches. Each of the approaches is based upon an interpretation of the Anatomy's concept of criticism.

Among the three components of a critical system, the concept of criticism is central since it provides the basis for the critical theories and normal criticism which complete the system. The concept of criticism may be seen as the unifying component of the three. The concept that criticism is scientific is the concept of criticism which unifies the Anatomy, and it is on alternative interpretations of the terms "scientific" and "science" in the Anatomy that my four approaches are based. There are two ways in which one may arrive at a set of interpretations of these terms as they apply in the Anatomy. The first way is to determine all of the uses to which the terms are put in the work itself. The second

way is to provide a set of interpretations from outside the work. It is the second way that I shall choose, for reasons which I now explain.

Within the Anatomy, "science" and "scientific" may be found in several contexts and with several meanings attached. At one point, Frye says that the reader who is uncomfortable with his description of criticism as "scientific" may substitute the term "systematic."[58] It is clear, however, that Frye does not intend to consistently take "scientific" to mean only "systematic." He also attaches to "scientific" the implication of "progressive."[59] And he uses the term in another manner when he insists that there is definitely a "scientific element" in the procedures of literary scholars, particularly in such matters as the determination of accurate and authoritative texts.[60] The discussion of comparative value judgments adds yet another facet to the meaning of "science" in the Anatomy: an activity, in order to be "scientific," must studiously avoid making comparative value judgments, particularly as a basis for the construction of theory. A scientific activity must also make "an assumption of total coherence" about the phenomena which it examines.[61] The list of uses, implications, and contexts of "science" and "scientific" in the Anatomy could easily be extended.

The many and various usages of the terms "science" and "scientific" in the Anatomy, especially in the Pol-

emical Introduction where Frye is setting forth and discussing his concept of criticism, suggest two things: these terms are central and fundamental to the Anatomy's concept of criticism; and Northrop Frye is firmly committed to his principle of polysemous meaning. One can catalog many uses of "science," but it would be quite difficult either to collate or to differentiate them. Frye does not define these terms; he uses them. And while definition from context is possible, in this case it is unlikely to lead to much clarity.

There is another reason for going beyond Frye's own uses of "science" and "scientific." An analysis of any work should always take into account the evidence of the work itself, and I do this in assuming, on the basis of Frye's recurrent use of "science" and "scientific" in discussing his concept of criticism, that these terms are absolutely basic to that concept of criticism. But a logical analysis should also be based on its own consistencies, and it should bring to the work to be analyzed the categories within which that analysis is to proceed. Analytical procedures must take into account, and account for, the works they analyze, but they cannot be limited by those works. One provides a context for analysis on the assumption that more light will be shed on the subject at hand if it is placed within that context than if it is viewed without a framework. Heeding Frye's own advice, we would be unwise to limit ourselves to interpre-

tations of a work made by the author alone. He may not himself be aware of all possible interpretations of his own text, and we ought not to be limited by his discussion. I am concerned in this essay with providing several contexts for the analysis of the Anatomy. I assume that it cannot provide its own context. It is not what Frye means or may mean when he says that criticism is scientific that is important here, but what that concept may mean if interpreted from a perspective outside the work itself. "Science" may be seen as a recurrent symbol in the Anatomy, a symbol which is central to any interpretation of the work. Accordingly, the symbol must be worked out in all its major possibilities.

The question may be put in this manner: What is the relationship between the Anatomy and its central symbol "science"? Four possible relationships suggest themselves: (1) The Anatomy is scientific; (2) The Anatomy is a formal imitation of science; (3) The Anatomy is a parody of science; and (4) The Anatomy is a vision of human culture which contains science, but is not limited to science. In these four answers to the question of the relationship between the Anatomy and its central symbol we have the basis for four approaches to the analysis of the Anatomy as a whole. Each definition of the relationship, each approach, provides a framework for the explanation of the structure and the procedure of the Anatomy. By "structure" I mean the system of critical theories, and

by "procedure" I mean its illustrations of and implications for the conduct of normal criticism. The four definitions of the relationship between the work and the symbol are not contradictory, but, as in most cases of symbol interpretation, complementary. And the alternative perspectives of analysis which the definitions offer are coextensive, each applying to the whole of the work, and each enabling one to see a whole in the work.

Now that four approaches to the analysis of the structure and procedure of the Anatomy have been presented, we may examine it within the context of each approach. Individually, the approaches should provide for a variety of specific comments on the Anatomy. Together, I hope they will enable the reader to evolve a complete view of this complex work. The purpose of the next four chapters is to establish the four contexts for analysis more fully, indicating in general outline the possibilities of each. Some of the approaches will require more extensive discussion than others, for reasons which will be evident. Specific commentary on the Anatomy will illustrate, in a limited way, some of the uses to which these contexts may be put, and some of the answers which they provide to the questions raised by the Anatomy. The direct analysis of the Anatomy should be considered suggestive rather than definitive, tentative rather than final. Method is of primary interest here, for this essay is first of all philosophical, and then critical.

NOTES

1. David Daiches, rev. of Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, by Northrop Frye, Modern Philology, 56 (1958), 72.

2. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

3. Anatomy, p. 3.

4. Anatomy, vii.

5. Anatomy, p. 8.

6. Anatomy, p. 29.

7. Anatomy, p. 3.

8. Anatomy, p. 22.

9. Cf. Anatomy, pp. 12-15.

10. W.K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism: A Short History (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 709-711, 714.

11. Robert Martin Adams, "Dreadful Symmetry," Hudson Review, 10 (1958), 614-19.

12. R.M. Adams, p. 616.

13. Meyer H. Abrams, "Anatomy of Criticism," University of Toronto Quarterly, 28 (1959), 190-96.

14. Frank Kermode, "Northrop Frye," in Puzzles and Epiphanies (New York: Chilmark Press, 1962), pp. 64-73.

15. Murray Krieger, "Frye and Contemporary Criticism," in Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York and London, 1966), pp. 1-26.

16. Hazard Adams, rev. of Anatomy, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 13 (1958), 533-34; "Criticism: Whence and Whither?" American Scholar, 28 (1959), 226-38.

17. W.K. Wimsatt, "Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth," in Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 75-107.

18. Hazard Adams, "Criticism: Whence and Whither?" p. 232.

19. John Holloway, "The Critical Zodiac of Northrop Frye," in The Colors of Clarity: Essays in Contemporary Literature and Education (London: Archon Books, 1964), pp. 153-60.

20. R.M. Adams refers to those historians--and by implication to those critics--who would try to provide conceptual frameworks for their disciplines as "a few crackpots" (p. 616). Among those "crackpot" historians must certainly be counted Karl Marx, Oswald Spengler, and Arnold Toynbee. The "crackpot list" in criticism would have to include S.T. Coleridge, I.A. Richards, R.S. Crane, and Cleanth Brooks, among others. Some crackpots.

21. George Whalley, "Fry[e]'s Anatomy of Criticism," Tamarack Review, No. 8 (Summer 1958), p. 98.

22. Harold Bloom, "A New Poetics," Yale Review, 47 (1957), 131.

23. George Whalley, rev. of Anatomy, Modern Language Review, 54 (1959), 108.

24. Wimsatt, "Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth."

25. Wimsatt, "Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth," pp. 92-93.

26. Krieger, pp. 23-24.

27. Anatomy, p. 14.

28. Abrams, p. 196.

29. Erwin R. Clapp, rev. of Anatomy, Western Humanities Review, 13 (1959), 111.

30. Philip P. Hallie, "The Master Builder," Partisan Review, 31 (1964), 658.

31. Frederick P.W. McDowell, "After the New Criticism," Western Review, 22 (1958), 313.

32. Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 37n.

33. Booth, p. 37n.

34. McDowell, p. 313.

35. Anatomy, p. 20.

36. Anatomy, p. 25.

37. Anatomy, p. 25.

38. Whalley, rev. of Anatomy, MLR, p. 109.

39. R.M. Adams, p. 615.

40. R.M. Adams, p. 618.

41. Fred Inglis, "Professor Northrop Frye and the Academic Study of Literature," Centennial Review, 9 (1965), 319-31.

42. Inglis, p. 323.

43. Whalley, "Fry[e]'s Anatomy of Criticism," p. 97.

44. John Fraser, "Mr. Frye and Evaluation," Cambridge Quarterly, 2 (1967), 98.

45. Daiches, p. 70.

46. McDowell, p. 314.

47. Andrew von Hendy, "A Poetics for Demogorgon: Northrop Frye and Contemporary Criticism," Criticism, 8 (1966), 318-35. I shall return to von Hendy's article in Chapter IV; cf. pp. 176-77 below.

48. Anatomy, p. 3.

49. Northrop Frye, "The Archetypes of Literature," in Fables of Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 9.

50. R.S. Crane, The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953).

51. Crane, p. 13.

52. Crane, p. 13.

53. F.E. Sparshott, The Concept of Criticism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967),

54. Sparshott, p. 2.

55. Bloom, p. 131.

56. Hazard Adams, rev. of Anatomy, JAAC, p. 534.

57. Hazard Adams, "Criticism: Whence and Whither?" p. 232.

58. Anatomy, p. 8.

59. Anatomy, p. 8.

60. Anatomy, p. 8.

61. Anatomy, p. 16.

II

THE FIRST APPROACH: THE *ANATOMY* AS SCIENCE

The first approach to the *Anatomy* is based upon a literal and descriptive interpretation of the central symbol "science." According to this interpretation, the *Anatomy* *is* science. The four theories of literature, the formal structure of the *Anatomy*, are scientific theories, and the application of these theories to the phenomena of literature, the *Anatomy's* critical procedure, is the normal critical procedure of science. The critical theories are induced from a general survey of literature. Once the inductive leap has been taken and the theories formulated, they may be used to explain certain things about the nature and structure of literary phenomena. This deductive application of theory to phenomena results, in turn, in the continuing refinement and adjustment of the theoretical framework allowing for further and more complete explanations of the phenomena. Thus there is the constant alternation of induction and deduction which marks the conduct of a science.

The literal interpretation of a symbol places certain obligations on the critic that other interpretations do not. While most interpretations of symbols may be seen as

hypotheses which are limited to and tested by the work within which the symbol appears, the literal interpretation is dependent not only on the context of the work but also on the general context provided by the requirements of the standard denotative definition of the symbol. Fortunately, the literal interpretation of a symbol is not often a matter of dispute. Moby Dick, as the central symbol of Melville's novel, has been variously interpreted to be good, evil, fate, impersonal nature, the instrument of God, the devil incarnate, and in many other ways. Each of these interpretations may be judged on the basis of its internal consistency and the insight which it allows into Moby Dick. All of these hypotheses are, in a most important sense, optional. The story makes sense without them, even if it makes more sense with them. But the literal interpretation of the symbol Moby Dick is mandatory. Whatever else he may be, Moby Dick is a whale. To reject the literal interpretation of Moby Dick would make a whale of a difference. Even in the case of a metaphysical poem such as Donne's "The Sunne Rising," where the identification of the sun and Christ seems basic to any significant reading of the poem, the literal interpretation of the sun as the sun is mandatory and not likely to be challenged. If Moby Dick cannot consistently be seen as a whale, or the sun as the sun, in these works, we would find them basically flawed. All non-literal interpretations tend to imply a foundation in literal

interpretation.

For the critics of Moby Dick and "The Sunne Rising" the literal interpretation of central symbols does not create difficulties. In the case of the Anatomy, however, it is the literal interpretation of the central symbol "science" which is the most problematic. For many critics obviously feel that whatever the Anatomy means when it says that it is scientific it cannot possibly mean that it is, literally, scientific. While the other three approaches to the Anatomy may be judged primarily on their usefulness to the critic in enabling him to gain insight into the work, the first approach must also be judged on the basis of its literal accuracy. The context of the three other interpretations of "science" in the Anatomy is primarily the Anatomy itself. The context of the literal interpretation of "science" in the Anatomy includes the general usage of the term, usage outside the work. The main objective of the present discussion will therefore be to seek an answer to the question: Is the Anatomy literally science?

Since the Anatomy is a work of literary criticism, the view that it is scientific implies that literary criticism may be a science. Analysis of the Anatomy within the first approach is thus an analysis of both the specific proposition that the Anatomy is scientific, and the general proposition that literary criticism may be a science. If the Anatomy is a work of literary criticism, a

demonstration that it is scientific is also a demonstration that literary criticism may be a science. And a demonstration that literary criticism may be a science is a demonstration of the possibility that the Anatomy, as a work of criticism, may be scientific. On the other hand, if the Anatomy is shown not to be scientific, this will not prove that criticism is not a science; nor will the demonstration that criticism may be a science prove that the Anatomy, in particular, is scientific. The view that the Anatomy is scientific and the view that literary criticism may be a science are thus correlative, and may support each other, but the two views are not mutually dependent. Nonetheless, in the discussion which follows the reader may assume that general statements about criticism as science may be specialized to apply to the Anatomy, and particular statments about the Anatomy as science may be generalized to apply to literary criticism.

When we attempt to answer the question "Is the Anatomy science?" we are immediately confronted with the practical impossibility of the task. In order to provide a definitive answer we would first have to establish conclusive definitions of both literary criticism and science. While I have defined and described literary criticism, both as an activity and as a formal structure of three primary components, this description serves primarily to provide categories for analysis within this essay. Since alternative definitions and descriptions of criticism

are readily available, and since I have presented an explanation and defense of my own definition and description which is essentially relative to the purposes of this essay, I cannot defend my own definition and description of criticism as conclusive. And the task of providing a definitive description of science is impossible here. Indeed, if the evidence of the conflicting definitions of science found throughout the philosophy of science and the scientific community is considered, one doubts the probability of a conclusive definition of science at all. If we cannot put forward a conclusive definition of either criticism or science, we cannot give an absolute answer to that fundamental question, "Is the Anatomy science?" We could arbitrarily choose definitions of both terms in order to carry on discussion, but such arbitrary choices would be open to substantial criticism.

Fortunately, this essay is intended to be suggestive and tentative rather than absolute and conclusive. Since I wish to provide frameworks within which explanations of the Anatomy may be pursued, and not the final answers to all the questions it raises, I will attempt to demonstrate only that the consideration of the Anatomy as science is sufficiently viable to be taken seriously. This will be done in two ways: first, I will consider certain general problems raised by the proposition that literary criticism may be a science; then, I will present a framework within which the Anatomy may be seen as scientific, a

framework which attempts to determine the part that the Anatomy in particular might play in the general development of literary criticism as a science.

The proposition that literary criticism may be a science raises a host of issues. From among these I have chosen four which seem to me to be crucial. These four issues may be put into the form of questions: (1) Can a work of literature, a product of the human mind, be treated as data, or a source of data, in the same manner as natural phenomena? (2) Can the critic examine literature objectively, as the scientist examines natural phenomena? (3) Are there patterns of relationships among works of literature such that we may posit a "literary universe" comparable to the physical universe of the sciences? and (4) Can literary criticism, like the sciences, be progressive? It would seem that these questions must be answered affirmatively if we are seriously to consider the possibility of a scientific criticism.

The first question, whether a work of literature may be treated as data or a source of data, arises primarily because a literary work is the product of the creativity of the human mind, human activity which is at least partially intentional. Is it possible to analyze a work of literature without giving due consideration to the individual who created it, his motives and intentions, the workings of his mind? The evidence of other disciplines and of criticism as it is commonly conducted clearly

indicates that we can analyze the creation without recourse to analysis of the creator.

Consider history and sociology. Both use works of art, including literary works, as part of their subject matters. Pope's essays, Dickens' novels, Ibsen's plays, Kipling's poems--all have been used by historians and sociologists as sources of data. And archeology, while it does not often use literary works, uses other art works as primary sources of data. There is a catch, however, in the argument that literature may be treated as objective data in criticism because it is so treated in other disciplines. While history, sociology, and archeology all use literature as part of their subject matters without reference to the author's intentions, they nonetheless see literature as a reflection of the minds of its creators and original audiences. The common use for literature in these disciplines is as a basis for drawing conclusions about the nature and activities of the people who produced it. So that while a historian does not assume that he must know the mind of the creator in order to analyze the creation, he does often assume that analysis of the creation can yield conclusions about the creator. Thus there would still seem to be a necessary relationship between creator and creation, between author and literary work.

The use of works of literature as data on which to base conclusions about its creators is most pronounced, of

course, in psychology. Evaluation of works of art created by their patients is a technique of analysis common among psychologists. And there is a tradition of psychological biography and criticism which includes such works as Marie Bonaparte's celebrated study of Edgar Allan Poe.[1] Joseph Wood Krutch, in his biography of Poe,[2] not only used Poe's works to explain his personality, he also used Poe's supposed psychological problems, most notably his supposed impotence, to explain Poe's works of literature. It is clear that in psychology and psychological criticms, at least, a definite connection is seen between art and artist. Can this be avoided in criticism?

Literary criticism not only can view a literary work as separate from its author, it must view a literary work on its own terms. The kind of psychological criticism practiced by Krutch and others is both suspect as psychology and outside the mainstream of criticism. Whatever insights into his work an author's biography may provide, criticism is not dependent on that biography. And often the details of an author's life prove both meaningless and misleading when applied to his work. It is much simpler and more reasonable, for example, to see Poe's literary women as typical of 19th century Romanticism than as products of psychological or physiological impotence. The point here is that criticism is concerned with literary works, not with their creators.

Whether or not it is valid for a psychologist to draw conclusions about an artist's psychological condition from the evidence of his works is a matter of debate. But even if this can be demonstrated to be valid procedure in psychology, there is no obligation placed on criticism to use the same procedure. Krutch's biography of Poe may better be read as early 20th century pop psychology than as genuine literary criticism.

While the psychologist must concern himself with the creative mind, because the mind is his subject matter, the critic must concern himself with the work created, because that is his subject matter. The contention that criticism is inherently concerned with the work rather than its author is demonstrated by the fact that Beowulf is as important to the critic as works whose authors are known, while the lost plays of John Heywood, no matter what we know of Heywood himself, are of no use to the critic. For the critic, the mind of the author holds a status analogous to that of the mind of God for the physicist. The critic may be one up on the physicist, who has no biographical access to the mind of God, but he is nonetheless concerned directly with the creation and not the creator.

If criticism is to be a science, it must be able to separate the work of literature and the author. The evidence of other disciplines indicates that this is possible, but the critical tradition provides an even clearer demon-

stration that it is the literary work which is the critic's primary subject matter. Aristotle treats literature, in the Poetics, in essentially the same manner in which he treats natural phenomena elsewhere. Aristotle may see his criticism as of potential value to the poet, the maker of the artifact which he analyzes. But he apparently sees no need to consult the poet prior to or during the analysis. The fascination with poets, as well as or instead of poetry, is a late, Romantic characteristic. If this fascination leads to scientific study, the science will be psychology. Perhaps in the future psychology and poetics may find some significant points of convergence, as the natural sciences, having first separated from each other, now often converge. But only when the natural sciences had each been able to establish themselves on their own terms could they come together in such areas as bio-chemistry, chemical psychotherapy, and bio-physics. So, too, it is only when psychological studies of creativity and critical studies of the thing created have each reached a sufficient stage of development that they will have much to say to one another. Eliot's essay on "Tradition and the Individual Talent"[3] illustrates the difficulties such convergence now presents. Eliot's concept of tradition, in which poems are seen to grow out of other poems, is a step, though only an initial step, toward seeing criticism as the kind of study of inter-related phenomena it must be in order to be scientific. But the

speculation on poetic creativity which accompanies this concept of tradition, while extremely interesting, has little scientific status. And Eliot's conclusion that the highest function of criticism is to operate in conjunction with creativity in the mind of the poet goes beyond the direct evidence at hand.

From the practice of Aristotle in the beginning of the critical tradition to the practice of the New Critics and the Chicago Critics more recently in the tradition, the separation of poem and poet, with the critical emphasis on the poem as a thing-in-itself, has been represented in literary criticism. So an initial objection to the idea of a scientific criticism, the insistence that creation and creator must be taken up together, may be dismissed. If the psychologists wish to concern themselves with the poet, and with the poem as an expression of his psychological state, they are welcome to do so. The same phenomena often yield different data for different disciplines. But if criticism is to exist as an independent discipline, scientific or not, it must analyze the poem alone. And this, indeed, is common critical practice.

The practice of treating a work of literature as a thing-in-itself, however, suggest that we really ought to be able to describe or define that thing-in-itself, especially if it is to be the subject matter for a scientific inquiry. As Frye notes, we do not even have a

single term to refer to a "work of literature."[4] Yet this fact is not really an impediment to the conduct of criticism as a science. The definition and description of the nature and characteristics of works of literature is, after all, the object of criticism. If we knew exactly what a work of literature is, we would presumably have done most of the work criticism might do. Criticism has gotten along rather well for some years without a common definition of its subject matter, and while this has caused a bit of confusion from time to time, criticism has survived rather well.

A comparison with other, scientific, disciplines may help to show how the business of a science may be conducted even when there is not a common idea of the exact nature of the thing-in-itself being studied. Criticism, if it is a science, is certainly in its earlier stages of development. In the early stages of a science, uncertainty, confusion, and even open dispute about the nature of the thing-in-itself being studied is quite common. The 18th century electricians, such as Franklin, Volta, Coulomb, and Cavendish, all wrote about "electricity," each conducting a variety of experiments which added to the general knowledge of the phenomenon. Yet there was no common definition or understanding of just what "electricity" was. Indeed, it was not until quite late in the 19th century that theories of electromagnetic force were formulated in such a way that electromagnetic fields

could be sketched. And the man who derived the equations which apply to electromagnetic fields, James Clerk-Maxwell, was not himself able to visualize or diagram the fields of force which his equations described mathematically.[5]

Even in the most fully developed science there may be disputes about the exact nature of the thing-in-itself being studied. Sub-atomic physics has been confronted with such a problem in talking about those entities which comprise an atom. We are used to hearing of elementary "particles," such as neutrons, protons, electrons, and the couple of dozen more that have been discovered. Yet these "particles" have long since been discovered to have wave properties. Sometimes these elementary entities behave as if they are matter, sometimes as if they are waves. Or, more precisely, it is sometimes necessary to assume them to be matter in order to explain their behavior, and at other times necessary to see them as waves in order to explain other behavior. The physicist is then confronted with what is essentially a problem of metaphor. He can only describe what he does not know in terms of what he knows. There is nothing else in his experience which has both wave and matter properties which will serve as an analogy or metaphor for elementary particles with both of these properties. So when the physicist refers to them he must call them either "matter" or "waves" depending on the context of the reference, or, if he wishes to include

both kinds of properties, as "wave-packets," after the suggestion of de Broglie.[6] These examples from the studies of electricity and sub-atomic physics are intended to suggest that scientific activity may go forward even when there is doubt about the nature of the thing-in-itself being studied. Criticism as a science need feel no obligation, then, especially in its early stages, to provide an exact definition of a work of literature. There may even be a certain heuristic value in the multiplicity of definitions and descriptions.

Nonetheless, it will be of some advantage to a science of criticism to suggest a few ways in which the critic may refer to the thing-in-itself which he is criticizing. A number of terms have been suggested. I have used the term "work of literature" and its variant "literary work" throughout this essay, primarily because these are fairly neutral terms. At the same time, however, they have the limitation of not really saying anything about the nature of the thing-in-itself. The common term "poem," used to refer to any work of literature, is short, and thus convenient. But, as Frye notes, "poem" has certain more limited generic connotations which tend to hamper its usefulness as a general referent.[7] Prof. Frye's own contribution is "hypothetical verbal structure."[8] This term has the advantage of indicating the sort of thing Frye considers a work of literature to be, although it also suffers from its awkwardness for general

use. Frye's term also suggests that critics' terms, like those of physicists, involve some degree of metaphor. They are attempts to describe subject matter in ways that reflect the manner in which the particular critic perceives it. As the perceptions differ, so do the descriptions. Thus a Romantic critic may discuss a poem as if it were a living, organic entity, while another critic, taking a more mechanistic view of literature, may find it preferable to refer to a poem as a "verbal construct."

One of the most attractive ways of perceiving the thing-in-itself which is the subject of criticism is presented by F.E. Sparshott. He suggests the term "performance" to denote the subject of criticism. "A performance," he explains, "may provisionally be defined as anything that is done or made when considered simply as the outcome of the doing or making of that very thing."[9] Paintings, poems, dances, musical compositions, and the performances of musical compositions may all be considered performances according to this definition. A performance ". . . involves three factors, a performer, his performance (a definite end result he produces), and his performing of it."[10] In terms of this concept, the performer exists only as performer, maker, or constructor, and other facets of his existence are not relevant to the analysis of his performance. And the actual performing of the performance is also seen only in terms of the

end result, the performance itself. In some cases, as with a dance, it may be difficult to distinguish the performance, the performing, and the performer. In other cases, as with a painting, the painter as performer, the actions of painting as performing, and the painting itself as performance are more readily distinguishable. In the former case, criticism of the dance as a performance necessarily involves criticism of the dancer as performer and of the performing of the dance in a more immediately related sense that the criticism of the painting involves the criticism of the painter as performer and of his actions as performing. But even with the dance, it is possible to criticize the end result as a thing-in-itself, just as it is possible to criticize the painting alone.

The advantage of the concept of the subject of criticism as a performance comes in its recognitions of the performer and of his performing as factors of the performance while at the same time allowing these factors to be disregarded in the act of criticism. Sparshott, in effect, finds a middle ground between New Criticism and biographical criticism. What we do when we criticize, he says, is to isolate the creation from its creating and its creator. This is artificial, but necessary, if we are to engage in criticism. Following Sparshott's argument, we might wish to refer to a literary work as a "written performance" or a "verbal performance." Or, if

we want to distinguish it from other written or verbal performances, as a "literary performance," although that may be unduly restrictive. Why should we want to distinguish a "literary" from a "written" or a "verbal" performance? Such distinctions may reasonably be made within literary criticism, but not prior to the formulation of critical theory. Perhaps we should simply say that a work of literature is a "performance in words."

We have, then, a number of terms by which we may refer to the thing-in-itself which is the subject matter of literary criticism. Whether we choose "poem," "hypothetical verbal structure," "work of literature," "performance in words," "verbal artifact," or even "word-thing-in-itself" (rather an Anglo-Saxon sort of term), will depend on our particular concerns. The terms are not entirely interchangeable, since they imply differing perspectives on the nature of literature, but neither are they fundamentally contradictory. Most importantly, all recognize the independent status of the work of literature as a subject of criticism. This independence is an artifical one, in that it is established by isolating the work of literature from its creator and his creating of it, but the artificiality is essentially no different than that of the sciences in their seeing nature as a collection of things independent of their creating.

Before leaving this discussion of the work of literature as subject for criticism as science, it might be helpful to distinguish between two other terms as they apply to literature as scientific subject matter, the terms "phenomena" and "data." An individual literary work may be considered a critical phenomenon and works of literature generally as critical phenomena. These phenomena yield a variety of specific data. That part of a literary phenomenon which is considered relevant data will depend on the theoretical framework within which the phenomenon is placed. A mountain chain, a political convention, and oxidation are phenomena of interest primarily to geology, political science, and chemistry, respectively. In order for these phenomena to be analyzed, however, certain relevant parts or aspects of them must be isolated as data, either for the purpose of constructing theory or for the purpose of applying theory.

Data may be taken to be those specific bits of information which are drawn from the general phenomenon for examination. Any given phenomenon or set of phenomena may yield data for a variety of theories, even, in some cases, for theories within different sciences. The political convention, for example, could yield data for sociology, psychology, and even economics, as well as for political science. This explains also how a work of literature may provide data for several theories of

history, sociology, or psychology, as well as for literary criticism. But the point to remember here is that a literary work may provide data for several theories of literature. While it may certainly be analyzed as a whole within different theories, it may also be viewed as the sum of its parts, or as a whole in relation to other wholes, or its parts may be seen in relation to other parts of other literary works. Thus, a particular literary phenomenon may be the subject, in whole or in part, of a number of critical theories, i.e., it may yield a variety of data. It will be important to keep this distinction between phenomena and data in mind when we turn later to a consideration of the system of critical theories which the Anatomy presents. We may then offer an affirmative answer to the first of our crucial questions. Literature may indeed be treated as phenomena are treated in the natural and social sciences.

The second crucial question, however, raises some issues, though they are not entirely unrelated to those raised by the first. Granted that literature may be examined on its own terms, may it also be examined objectively? We can surmount the difficulties presented by the relationship between poem and poet, but can we surmount those presented by the relationship between poem and audience? When one reads a poem, after all, he is experiencing it directly, in a manner quite different it

would seem from the experiencing of a rock or a super nova or a chemical reaction. These latter phenomena are not designed to create a certain response in those who perceive them, and they may thus be examined objectively. But works of literature are specifically designed with an audience in mind. And even works ostensibly written without any intention of publication, such as many of Emily Dickinson's poems, have at least an audience of one, and imply, by the fact that they were set to paper, an even larger audience.

The objection to a scientific criticism embodied in the second question is this: works of literature are intended to be experienced subjectively, and it is not possible to separate direct subjective experience from the critical analysis of literature sufficiently for there to be real objectivity in criticism. This objection may be answered in several ways. First, there is again the evidence of centuries of critical practice. While the difficulties of separating the direct experience and the critical analysis have long been recognized, criticism has continued to operate on the practical assumption that such a separation can be made to a degree sufficient to allow for the conduct of critical discourse. Granted that the problems attendant to an attempt to view literature objectively are chronic, critics have continued to analyze literature <u>as if</u> it could be viewed objectively. Even if this is a false premise

in the sense that is cannot be absolutely proved, it has served--and must serve--criticism if criticism is to be something more than sophisticated emotional responses.

Criticism, however, is not the only area where the problem of separating subjective and objective responses arises. The mixing of the two kinds of responses is inherent in all of man's activities. Consider the dual nature of man's experience. Man is a self-conscious being. As such, he both experiences himself directly and analyzes himself from the perspective of his self-consciousness. At no time is he either purely subjective or purely objective about himself--if he is a normal human being. This dual vision carries over into all of man's activities. He experiences the (subjective) beauty of a rainbow, and he also analyzes (objectively) certain physical characteristics of the spectrum of that rainbow. He stubs his toe on a rock, then carries it to the laboratory to analyze its metal content. The direct and the analytical experience may be separated in time, or they may occur simultaneously. A man concerned with his sexual performance is very likely to be both enjoying and analyzing a sexual encounter at the same time. If there is a possibility of human sciences, there would seem certainly to be a possibility of a science of criticism.

As we can separate direct experience and analysis

in other areas, always remembering that such a separation can never be made absolutely, so we can separate the direct experience of literature from the analysis of it, and from the creation of critical theory. Frye comments on the resistance toward this separation which causes many critics to pretend that they have no real critical theory at all:

> The strong emotional repugnance felt by many critics toward any form of schematization is again the result of a failure to distinguish criticism as a body of knowledge from the direct experience of literature, where every act is unique, and classification has no place.[11]

Here Frye actually overstates the case for the uniqueness of the direct experience, since few readers of literature, if they have had much experience, are able to eliminate the critical perception of the work from their direct response to it. Indeed, many of us who have been through several university courses in literature find it impossible to eliminate the critical perception of our subject matter even when we try to do so. The common complaint that courses in literature ruin a student's ability to enjoy what he is reading reflects a misunderstanding of the purposes of criticism. (It may also reflect some bad teaching.) But the existence of the complaint is itself evidence that direct experience of literature and critical analysis are separable.

To suggest that the critic cannot free himself from the emotions of direct experience is like suggest-

ing that the pyschologist cannot help letting a hatred for a murderer color his analysis of him. While there is always going to be some subjectivity in our objective analysis and a certain degree of objective perspective in even our most passionate moments, to say that the two cannot be sufficiently separated to allow a poetics which is essentially different from the direct experience of literature contradicts our direct experience--as we analyze that experience.

What we have been discussing here, to put the matter in more specifically scientific terminology, is the process of observation. Complete objectivity in observation is a scientific ideal--for some--but in no science is that ideal attained. There are two kinds of limitations which prevent complete objectivity in observation, limitations of instruments and the limitations of the human nature of the observer. In the social sciences, and certainly in a science of criticism, these dual limitations may become a single one, since the instrument of the observer is in these cases his own mind. It might be helpful to note that these limitations operate in the most rigorous sciences, and to consider how the "human factor"[12] in observation may be minimized--since it cannot be eliminated.

The limitations which the instruments of observation place upon the process of observation, even in the natural sciences, may be illustrated by turning once

again to sub-atomic physics. Werner Heisenberg explains:

> While, in observing everyday objects, the physical processes involved in making the observation play a subsidiary role only, in the case of the smallest building particles of matter, every process of observation produces a large disturbance. We can no longer speak of the behavior of the particle independently of the process of observation. As a final consequence, the natural laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal with the elementary particles themselves but with our knowledge of them.[13]

The disturbance of the experimental situation by the presence of the experimental apparatus is not uncommon in science. And examples of instruments or observers who affect the outcome of an experiment are especially common in the social sciences. But it is interesting to note that fundamental problems in observation, problems which prevent the scientist from ever seeing the thing-in-itself which he attempts to observe as it "really is," are common to the most advanced sciences.

There are ways, however, to deal with these problems. Abraham Kaplan suggests certain ways to minimize the "human factor" in observation in the behavioral sciences: insulating the observation, cancelling the error, or discounting the error.[14] First, an observation can be rid of all of the extraneous factors possible to get rid of. When this is not possible, as when a variety of individuals close to a child observe him with varying degrees and kinds of emotions, the errors of observation may tend to cancel each other; they may be discounted.

And even when errors cannot be prevented or cancelled out, a standard factor of error may be regularly figured into the account of an observation.[15]

A minimizing of the human factor in criticism, where the human mind is the primary instrument, and interpretation is often difficult to distinguish from observation, may be more a problem than in the social sciences. Yet this may be accomplished to a substantial degree by insulating the critical observation from direct experiencing, by cancelling out error through the comparison of a variety of observations of the same phenomena, and by agreeing to certain standards for accepting an observation which allow the discounting of obvious individual aberrations. The community of critics must be, in its own practice, a check against itself.

The practice of checking the accuracy of observations by comparing the several observations of different observers of the same phenomena is called intersubjectivity, and is often offered as a substitute for objectivity in the social and natural sciences. As a reporter may check his observations of a news event by comparing them with those of other reporters present, so a critic may test his observations of literary phenomena by comparing them with those of other critics. The object of such intersubjective comparison of observation is twofold: to provide the most error-free interpretation of the literary phenomena, and to permit the individual to

test his ability to make accurate observations. As a matter of common critical practice, we train ourselves in observing literary phenomena by comparing our observations with those generally accepted as accurate. While criticism jealously guards its right to observe a much-examined work of literature anew, it also defines and corrects the observations of students within limitations which are really quite commonly adhered to. While none of us wishes to be restricted from presenting a new observation about Hamlet, we do not permit nearly the variety of interpretation of that work which our students wish to be allowed.

It has been argued against scientific criticism that words and works of literature "mean" something, and that they are thus inherently different from other kinds of phenomena. I do not see that there is a significant difference between the meaningfulness of a work of literature as a thing-in-itself and the meaningfulness of the human behavior which is the subject matter of the social sciences. But even if there is a difference, it is obvious that there are limitations to the meaning or meanings of any work of literature, and that in most cases common accord can be reached on what the primary meaning or meanings of any particular work of literature is or are. We cannot ever absolutely restrict those meanings, but we can restrict them for the purposes of criticism. If criticism is to be a science, it is more likely to be

concerned with what a literary work is than with what it means, with its properties rather than its messages.

The third crucial question for a scientific criticism is whether there is a "literary universe" comparable to the physical universe of the sciences. This question resolves itself into two parts: Can criticism define the boundaries of its subject matter area such that it may be distinguished from the subject matter areas of other disciplines? and Does the universe of literature admit of being ordered in the manner which the sciences order the physical universe? Both questions may be answered on methodological grounds.

The first evidence that there is a literary universe is to be found in the practice of traditional criticism. Literary criticism has always been the subject of boundary disputes with other disciplines, as noted in our discussion of psychological criticism. And there are periodic raids on literature by other disciplines, especially psychology and sociology, which have as their object the annexation of some or all of literature to the universe of subject matter of those disciplines. Arguing by reduction, psychology says that literature is "really nothing more than" additional sources of data for the scientist of human behavior, and may best be explained by him. The sociologist may argue that literature is "really nothing more than" social phenomena, like weddings, funeral, depressions, and elections, and

may best be viewed in the context of sociology. The literary critic, on the other hand, has always argued that literature is his turf and has been disdainful of the uses to which literature is put within other disciplines. The large majority of critics have generally held that it is they, and they alone, who can explain a work of literature on its own terms. From the perspective of the literary critic, a course in the psychology or philosophy or sociology of literature is always suspect, since it treats literature as if it were something other or more than what it is as a literary thing-in-itself.

Boundary disputes, with several disciplines claiming jurisdiction over the same phenomena, are false disputes, however. I noted earlier that almost any phenomenon may be the subject of study of several disciplines. What is unique to criticism is not its subject matter per se, but the manner or method which characterizes its analysis of literature. The literary universe is composed of all of those works in words which may be examined <u>as if</u> they were literary artifacts or performances, whatever the original intentions of their authors. The old problem of deciding what is literature and what is not dissolves when we understand that any written work which can be analyzed on its own terms as a thing-in-itself and through comparison with other written works with similar properties may be considered a part of the

literary universe, a work of literature *for the purposes of critical analysis*. Some works of literature, like some other phenomena, will be found to yield more data and more interesting data than others. *Hamlet* may then be valued by the critic for purely scientific reasons--it is a gold mine of literary data. Mrs. Trollope's novels, on the other hand, may have less critical value, despite their volume, because they yield little significant data for the critic, i.e., he may soon exhaust what may be said about them within his framework of analysis. But both *Hamlet* and Mrs. Trollope's novels are part of the literary universe. And so, too, are works of history, no matter how good or bad they may be as history. And philosophical essays, and economic analyses, and graffitti, and even the works of Ossian. In short, if we may treat a work *as if* it were a literary artifact or performance, it *is* a work of literature for the purposes of literary criticism.

It is the matter of the ordering of the literary universe, however, which presents the most problems. A number of critics of the *Anatomy* suggest that there is insufficient "natural" order in literature to allow for its organization by scientific theory. Either literature is simply a conglomerate of works, they say, or its organization by schematic theories, such as those of the *Anatomy*, is arbitrary and does not reflect the "real world" of the literary universe. Yet if criticism is to

be a science, patterns of relationships among works of literature, patterns which can be the basis for theory, must be discoverable.

The assumption that there are discoverable patterns of relationships among literary works, and among their various parts, properties, and aspects, is not as arbitrary and mechanical as it first may seem. Division of the literary universe into genres, discussions of various types of symbolism, definitions of schools of literature, and the delineation of historical periods in literature are common practice in criticism. Indeed, it may be said that wherever two or three literary works are gathered together in the name of comparison and contrast there is theory--at least implicitly--in the midst of them. So here, too, the regular practice of criticism argues for the possibility of theorizing and the assumption of order in the literary universe which lies behind the construction of theories.

Yet there is still likely to linger a doubt in the mind of the critic when he makes an ordered comparison among works of literature: Is this order (of genre, symbolic types, historical periods, or whatever) which I use in criticizing literature "really there," or am I just making it up? Can the whole of literature be looked upon as some sort of universe which will yield laws, theories, and explanations, as the natural universe does? Isn't the natural universe really fairly orderly, as the

natural sciences demonstrate? And isn't my literary universe only artificially ordered by a poetics which is, after all, made up?

In the Polemical Introduction, Frye explores the implications of a scientific conceptual framework for criticism. We ought to be able, he says, to see literature ". . . not only as complicating itself in time, but as spread out in conceptual space from some kind of center that criticism could locate."[16] Frye explains more fully:

> It is clear that criticism cannot be a systematic study unless there is a quality in literature which enables it to be so. We have to adopt the hypothesis, then, that just as there is an order in nature behind the natural sciences, so literature is not a piled aggregate of "works," but an order of words.[17]

Thus, criticism, if it is to be a science, must assume that the literary universe is potentially orderable. At first, this may seem only a sort of truism. If criticism is to be orderly, its subject matter must admit of being ordered. But in the sciences, isn't the order of the universe more than just an <u>assumption</u>?

If we turn to the natural sciences, however, we discover that this isn't so. Even in the sciences, as Frye observes, "A belief in an order of nature is an inference from the intelligibility of the natural sciences . . ."[18] The order in nature behind the natural sciences is as much a hypothesis as the order in the literary universe behind criticism. We believe nature to be

orderly because the sciences are orderly--at least most of the time. But the order of the sciences, even when it appears to be confirmed by a high degree of correspondence between science and nature, is a fundamentally human order. For the sciences, like other disciplines, are man-made. No science fully comprehends and explains nature, so no science can prove nature to be completely orderly. There is always data which cannot be explained by current theory, and no theory explains all of the data available in its field. There are orders in science; there is no Order.

Scientific theory, that which gives order to nature, provides an organizing conceptual framework within which to examine natural phenomena. But theories are always abstractions from the available data. They ignore some data, and often go beyond the data itself to formulate theory in a so-called "inductive leap." Newtonian mechanics, for example, is not simply a reflection of the order in nature, the way nature "is." Rather, it is an abstract conceptual framework for oganizing data which is accepted because of its usefulness and the fairly high degree of accuracy in prediction which it allows. But we know, of course, that Newtonian mechanics is an oversimplified, or, if you will, over-ordered view of nature. Quantum mechanics presents a physical universe which is also ordered, but in a much different manner. It may even be said that the universe of Newton and the universe

of Einstein and Planck are two different universes, for these are not just two ways of seeing what is really there (since we do not know what is really there), but two ways of recreating the physical universe--what we know of it--in ordered terms. In both cases, the order is a human order, not the order of nature.

Science may be seen as a mapping process. But even the mapping of nature implies certain prior assumptions about the techniques of map-making. Data does not exist by itself; it exists within theory. We must ask questions of nature in order to get answers. And we must formulate a theoretical framework, an ordered framework, before we can ask very many significant questions. There is no way finally to determine how much of the order we see in nature is inherent and how much depends on our conceptual frameworks. At one time, scientists thought that we might be able to discover virtually all there is to know about nature; now they are beginning to think this may never be possible. Heisenberg says that the atomic physicist

> . . . has had to resign himself to the fact that his science is but a link in the infinite chain of man's argument with nature, and that it cannot simply speak of nature 'in itself'.[19]

The lesson for criticism is clear. If the order in nature which we associate with the natural sciences is in fact the order of the sciences, and not the order of nature in itself, then we may also be satisfied in

criticism with an ordered literary universe which is created rather than discovered. While the literary universe may never admit to as high a degree of ordering as the natural universe, we might reasonably expect that we can order it as well as the social sciences can order their phenomenal universes.

The final crucial question raised by the concept of criticism as a science is whether criticism can be progressive. We may put this in another way: Is it possible in criticism to resolve some matters once and for all, building up in the process a body of knowledge which is generally accepted throughout criticism? At first glance, this seems very nearly impossible. Almost every critic, no matter what his particular subject or perspective, seems to feel that he has to begin at the beginning. We return again and again to basic questions about literature (What does Hamlet mean?) and to basic questions about criticism itself (What is literature? What is criticism?). Man has been talking about literature for a least 2500 years, yet we often seem to have made no qualitative progress in criticism in all of that time. The criticism piles up, article upon dissertation, discourse upon lecture. But do we really know any more than Aristotle did? The very fact that so many literary theorizers find it necessary at some point to return to Father Aristotle for authority suggests that not much progress has been made.

I am inclined to think that there has been progress in criticism, that we now have at our disposal more and perhaps even more sophisticated means of analyzing literature than had Aristotle and Plato. But the fact remains that each new theory or analytical technique may be found applied to the same old questions, always with the insistence that "this time we <u>really</u> know what <u>Hamlet</u> means, and what literature is." And in every case, while a few critics become believers, the general critical community soon resumes its skepticism. If criticism is to be scientific, we must be able to temper both belief and skepticism by establishing what we do know, in order to know what we do not know.

The argument for the possibility of progress in criticism, more than the arguments for affirmative answers to the other crucial questions I have raised, depends specifically on the development of a general conceptual and theoretical framework for criticism, the kind of thing that Frye attempts in the <u>Anatomy</u>. The criticism within various schools of criticism does demonstrate that certain questions can be resolved once and for all--within the frameworks provided by those schools. Only when these schools are reconciled or superseded by a more general critical system will we be able to resolve questions for criticism in general. If we can ever get critics to agree generally on the nature and procedure of criticism, as the members of individual schools agree, then normal

criticism can become largely a matter of puzzle-solving,[20] with certain literary problems solved with some fair degree of finality. While the history of criticism does not permit much sanguinity on this matter, there is at least nothing theoretically impossible about a more general agreement on the nature and methods of criticism which would allow more obvious progress. But the possibility of progress in criticism depends primarily on the development of a commonly accepted framework for criticism in general, something which is in the future--unless the Anatomy be it.

Our analyses of these four crucial questions about criticism, then, suggest at least the possibility that criticism could be scientific. Criticism can and does separate its subject matter, the works of literature, from their creators for purposes of analysis. It is possible to see a poem as a thing-in-itself. Criticism can and does separate the direct experience of literature from the analytical experience, and it is possible to examine literature with an objectivity--or intersubjectivity--sufficient for criticism to be scientific. There is a literary universe distinguishable in terms of its critical methodology from the phenomenal universes of other disciplines, a universe which permits ordering of literary data after the manner of the ordering of natural data by the natural sciences, or human behavioral data by the social sciences. And criticism could be progressive, if

it did develop into a science whose principles and practices were more generally agreed upon. It may be noted finally, particularly in reference to the fourth question, that all of the sciences were once not sciences. In the development of each science there came a time when a transition was made from a pre-scientific period of unorganized observations of certain phenomena to organized science. And this note suggests the potential usefulness of the Anatomy for scientific criticism.

If it is at least possible that criticism can be scientific, then we may turn to the question of what place the Anatomy might take in the development of scientific criticism. The Anatomy cannot in itself be a whole science of criticism, but it is possible to see it as a part of the transition from the pre-scientific to the scientific period of criticism. In the following discussion of the Anatomy's significance as a part of the development of scientific criticism I shall use a theory propounded by T.S. Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Although Kuhn's theory of the development of the sciences is controversial in its own field, I use it here because it provides a perspective from which to view the Anatomy's place in the development of scientific criticism.

The key concept in Kuhn's theory of scientific development or "revolution" is what he calls a scientific

"paradigm." By the concept of "paradigm," Kuhn says,

> . . . I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of scientific practice--examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together--provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. There are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as 'Ptolemaic astronomy' (or 'Copernican'), 'Aristotelian dynamics' (or 'Newtonian'), 'corpuscular optics' (or 'wave optics'), and so on.[21]

These complete models of scientific practice which enable the development of "coherent traditions of scientific research" are the "paradigms" which are central to Kuhn's theory. These paradigms serve an essential and fundamental purpose within science because

> The study of paradigms . . . is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition.[22]

The development of a particular scientific field, according to Kuhn, is marked by a series of changes in the shared paradigms within that field. Because the replacement of one paradigm by another creates fundamental changes in the structure and conduct of a science, as when Copernican astronomy replaced Ptolemaic astronomy, Kuhn calls these changes in paradigms "scientific

revolutions." Such revolutions within a field presuppose the existence of a paradigm, and it is the acquisition of an initial paradigm which, for Kuhn, marks the transition of a discipline from a pre-scientific stage to full scientific status.

Kuhn describes the historical situation of the pre-scientific stage of a field of study as being marked by competition among a number of schools of thought and practice, each school being insufficiently persuasive to come to a position of enduring dominance. Describing the state of physical optics before the acceptance of the Newtonian paradigm, Kuhn says,

> Being able to take no common body of belief for granted, each writer on physical optics felt forced to build his field anew from its foundations. In doing so, his choice of supporting observation and experiment was relatively free, for there was no standard set of methods or phenomena that every writer felt forced to employ and explain. Under these circumstances, the dialogue of the resulting books was often directed as much to members of other schools as it was to nature.[23]

Kuhn observes that this state of affairs is ". . . not incompatible with significant discovery and invention."[24] But he also insists that it is not characteristic of a developed science. This confused state of affairs can be overcome only through the acceptance within a field of an initial paradigm, and the ". . . acquisition of a paradigm and the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field."[25]

The advantages of the adoption of an initial paradigm are several. Competition among various schools is reduced as the majority of practitioners in a particular field come to agree upon their basic goals and methods. Normal science, in the form of "puzzle solving," may proceed with greater ease, since the problems or "puzzles" which the particular science sets about to solve are more clearly defined. The instruction of students is facilitated by the common agreement on methods and goals, and one of the signs of the establishment of a paradigm is the introduction of standard texts and teaching procedures based upon the paradigm. The science is better able to order its priorities within the guidelines of an agreed-upon framework. Indeed, it is even better able to determine just what "the facts" are since ". . . in the absence of paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant."[26] In order for an achievement in a particular field to become the basis for the initial paradigm which serves to establish a field as a science, Kuhn says, it must have two characteristics. It must be ". . . sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity." And it must be ". . . sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practicioners [sic] to solve."[27]

If we consider literary criticism to be a discipline in its pre-scientific stage, according to Kuhn's description, we may see the Anatomy as a candidate for the initial paradigm in a science of criticism. At present, criticism is certainly marked by the competition among schools, the inability to agree on methods, goals, or even "the facts," and the urge on the part of many critics to "begin at the beginning" which Kuhn says characterize the pre-scientific stage of a discipline. And the Anatomy is a compendium of theory, examples, and laws--or at least law-like definitions--which is sufficiently broad and complete to be considered as a candidate for an initial critical paradigm.

The pre-scientific stage of a discipline, when it reaches a kind of crucial point at which a paradigm seems to be demanded, is often marked by an intense concern for theory and wide discussion of fundamental issues. The 20th century has certainly seen such concern and discussion in criticism, and it may even be said that other candidates for paradigm have been offered in such works as Richards' complementary discussions of theory and practice,[28] Crane's essays cited above, Abrams' The Mirror and the Lamp,[29] Burke's The Philosophy of Literary Form,[30] and, more diffusely, in some of the writings of Eliot, Pound, Wellek, Brooks, and Wimsatt. But none of these has offered a system of the scope and magnitude of the Anatomy. More than any other modern work in criticism,

the Anatomy would seem to satisfy Kuhn's requirement for paradigm that it be ". . . sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practicioners to resolve." A scientific criticism developing from the Anatomy as paradigm has literally hundreds of tasks before it, tasks defined and clarified by the organization of critical theory in the Anatomy. The other requirement for paradigm, that it be ". . . sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. . . ," is more difficult to apply to the Anatomy. The Anatomy is certainly highly unprecedented. But it has yet to attract an enduring group of adherents. Only further developments will tell us whether the Anatomy will become the foundation for a substantial science of criticism.

Frye's remarks in the Polemical Introduction indicate that he sees the Anatomy as serving a purpose essentially like that of Kuhn's initial scientific paradigm. Frye contends that criticism has reached a point where the confusions and competitions of various schools of criticism must be reconciled within the framework of a systematic, scientific criticism. And he puts forward the critical system of the Anatomy as a candidate for what is, essentially, an initial paradigm. "Each modern science," Frye says, in terms much like Kuhn's, "has had to take what Bacon calls . . . an inductive leap, occupy-

ing a new vantage ground from which it can see its former data as new things to be explained."[31] "It occurs to me," Frye continues, "that criticism is now in such a state of naive induction as we find in a primitive science."[32] The Anatomy is presented as a first, tentative, version of a coherent and co-ordinated system of criticism which has taken that "inductive leap" to "a new vantage ground."

Kuhn not only defines paradigm historically, however, he also describes it analytically, breaking it down into four components: (1) "symbolic generalizations"; (2) "beliefs in particular models"; (3) "values"; and (4) "exemplars."[33] As we considered the Anatomy as a paradigm in the historical sense, we may also see it as a paradigm which fits this analytical description.

The first of the components, "symbolic generalizations," are

> . . . those expressions, deployed without question or dissent by group members, which can readily be cast in a logical form. . . . They are the formal or the readily formalizable components of the disciplinary matrix.[34]

Kuhn's examples are primarily what we usually call "laws," such as f=ma, which often appear in mathematical form, though symbolic generalizations may also be put into words, as in "action equals reaction."[35] Yet while symbolic generalizations often look like laws of nature, Kuhn insists that they seldom function only as laws. In

cases where the terms used in the law have been defined prior to its formulation as a law (Kuhn uses the Joule-Lenz Law, $H=RI^2$, as an example), the symbolic generalization serves primarily to establish the relationship among previously known entities. But in many cases, the symbolic generalization serves also to define, or help to define, the terms whose relationship it formalizes. "Furthermore," Kuhn says, "the balance between their legislative and definitional force shifts over time."[36] In other words, what may begin as an attempt to state the relationship between known entities may finally require acceptance of changes in our concepts of those entities themselves. As an example, Kuhn cites the difficulty which Einstein's theory of relativity presented for the concept of simultaneity. According to relativity theory, simultaneity is itself relative. Did the statement of relationships involved in relativity theory ". . . show that simultaneity was relative?" Kuhn asks, or did it ". . . alter the notion of simultaneity itself?"[37] Here Kuhn points to a fact in science that is commonly recognized in criticism: the combining of terms in order to define another term affects the meanings of the defining terms as well as the term defined.

While the Anatomy does not contain laws which may be put into mathematical form, it does contain symbolic generalizations in the form of its definitions of critical terminology. These definitions are not, at least at

this point, "deployed without question or dissent by group members," since, as I have noted, the Anatomy has yet to attain the status of paradigm in criticism. If there were a group of critics who accepted the Anatomy as a critical paradigm, however, its critical definitions would serve the functions which symbolic generalizations serve in science:

> If it were not for the general acceptance of expressions like these, there would be no points at which group members could attach the powerful techniques of logical and mathematical manipulation in their puzzle-solving enterprise. Though the example of taxonomy suggests that normal science can proceed with few such expressions, the power of a science seems quite generally to increase with the number of symbolic generalizations its practicioners have at their disposal.[38]

The variety of critical terms, new and redefined, which the Anatomy contains, suggests that if it were to be accepted as a critical paradigm, its adherents would have quite a number of symbolic generalizations at their disposal for use in the puzzle-solving activities of normal criticism.

In order to understand how a definition of a critical term may be a symbolic generalization, it is important to remember the dual nature of symbolic generalizations: they are both legislative and definitional. Just as we more readily associate legislative functions with laws, we associate definitional functions with definitions. But as laws may be definitional, so, too, may definitions perform legislative functions. A definition

is a formal statement of the relationship between its terms and thus becomes, as a symbolic generalization, the "readily formalizable" component of the critical paradigm. As a formal statement of the relationship among its terms, the critical definition serves not only to relate those terms, but also to legislate the relationship. Both laws and definitions serve to define and to legislate: both are symbolic generalizations. And we may note that, as relativity theory required a redefinition of "simultaneity," so Frye's critical theories require redefinitions of old terms. In his glossary, Frye defines "lyric" in this manner:

> A literary genre characterized by the assumed concealment of the audience from the poet and by the predominance of an associational rhythm distinguishable both from recurrent metre and from semantic or prose rhythm.[39]

This definition not only serves to redefine an old term but also to change our concept of "lyric." And, insofar as the redefined term is to be used within the context of the critical paradigm of the Anatomy, the newly formalized relationship of the terms of the definition is legislated for all uses of the term.

The Anatomy's critical definitions come in two forms which we may call "rigorous" and "non-rigorous." "Rigorous" definitions are specific, and the symbolic generalizations which they create are used consistently and narrowly throughout the Anatomy. Most of the terms in Frye's glossary, including the names of genres ("lyr-

ic"), character types ("eiron"), historical modes ("high mimetic"), and types of symbols ("motif"), are rigorously defined.[40] "Non-rigorous" definitions are more general, and the terms they define are used more variously in the text. "Anagogic," for example, is defined in the glossary as "Relating to literature as a total order of words."[41] This is very nearly not a definition at all. A full comprehension of the term requires familiarity with all of its uses in the text.[42] Some terms are defined both rigorously and non-rigorously. "Romance," for example, is rigorously defined as a type of mythos in the Theory of Myths,[43] and it is also used non-rigorously, with "romantic," to indicate a ". . . general tendency to present myth and metaphor in an idealized human form . . ."[44] Other terms defined both rigorously and non-rigorously include "mythos" and "archetype." Such dual usage of a single term is caused in part by the paucity of critical terminology. But similar situations obtain in the sciences. "Force," for instance, is defined and used non-rigorously in a wide variety of contexts. But "force" is also rigorously defined in the law f=ma.

Symbolic generalizations in criticism are more like those in the social sciences than in the natural sciences, suggesting again that scientific criticism might be closer to the social that the natural sciences. Such concepts as money, social class, political party, and

schizophrenia are symbolic generalizations in economics, sociology, political science, and psychology, respectively. Some of these terms are rigorous and some non-rigorous. "Money," though it takes various actual forms, may be defined fairly rigorously as a symbolic generalization. "Schizophrenia," on the other hand, is defined non-rigorously. There is no standard denotative definition of the term, and psychologists often use it in its adjectival form, "schizoid," in order to avoid making a commitment to a definitely specific and single interpretation or definition. These symbolic generalizations in the social sciences serve both to define and to classify, or legislate.

It should be noted that a non-rigorous term may be as useful as a symbolic generalization as a rigorous term. "Schizophrenia," despite its non-rigorous definition, is used frequently by psychologists and seems to maintain a high degree of communicative power. A term such as "novel," as it is now used in criticism, is another such non-rigorous term of wide usefulness. We all know, more or less, what a "novel" is, or we at least recognize one in all but a few borderline cases. Kuhn notes that even in science symbolic generalizations may be restated in a variety of forms by different practitioners.[45] At the same time, a basic ground of common agreement allows these symbolic generalizations to be used as common currency among them. We may still see the

narrowing and specifying of terms such as "novel" in the Anatomy, however, as a step toward the more rigorously stated symbolic generalizations characteristic of developed sciences.

The second component of a paradigm is "beliefs in particular models." Examples of such models are that of gas molecules as ". . . tiny elastic billiard balls in random motion . . ."[46] and the Bohr model of the atom as a miniature solar system. These models ". . . supply the group with preferred or permissable metaphors."[47] They provide a means for the scientists to describe the less fully known in terms of the more fully known. The Anatomy is full of such models. It may even be said that the explication of the critical theories consists in each case of an elaborate model. But specific illustrations abound. The use of the four seasons as a model for the four phases of mythos, for example, is an attempt to find a heuristic analogy for the Theory of Myths. One does not have to identify irony and satire with winter in order to understand or to use the Anatomy's theory of myths. But such metaphorical identification of theory and model is convenient. Models are often useful in teaching, and they may also serve to help to define problems which may be solved through normal criticism.

The Anatomy's models also include musical notation, in the Theory of Genres, and various geometric figures throughout. The models of the circle, or the cycle, and

the line, or diameter, dominate the entire Anatomy. It is possible, for instance, to draw a model of the Theory of Myths which consists of a circle divided into quadrants, with each quadrant divided into three segments. Like a compass (another model!), this circle may be seen as a continuous series of points--the phases of the myths--which both phase into each other around the circumference and dialectically oppose each other at opposite ends of diametric lines. If one is of a particularly schematic turn of mind, the four critical theories may themselves be seen as quadrants of a circle, with the two macro-theories of modes and myths opposite one another, and the two micro-theories of symbols and genres opposite. Given a large enough sheet of paper, and perhaps a computer, the industrious scholar, using just the line and the circle, could diagram the entire literary universe as constructed or mapped in the Anatomy, locating its center, defining its boundaries, and mapping its interior.

By "values," the third component of paradigms, Kuhn does not mean, of course, the kind of comparative value judgments of specific phenomena which Frye dismisses early in the Anatomy, but, rather, generally shared values which concern the nature and conduct of a science, or of science generally. As examples of values, Kuhn especially cites those concerning predictions:

> . . . that they be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be satisfied consistently in a given field . . .[48]

Other values might include insistence on a high degree of objectivity or intersubjectivity in observations; reduction of error in experiment to a human minimum; simplicity in theory formulation; and a high degree of formalization in symbolic generalizations. Values, more than any other component, may be commonly held but variously interpreted. Kuhn says that shared values ". . . can be important determinants of group behavior even though the members of the group do not all apply them in the same way."[49] Both Einstein and Planck, for example, held a shared value that theory should be sufficiently consistent to allow the pursuit of normal science as a puzzle-solving activity. Einstein, however, found the original formulation of quantum theory too inconsistent to provide a basis for normal science, while Planck insisted that the inconsistencies could be overlooked in the practice of normal science and would eventually work themselves out.[50] Accuracy in prediction, a commonly held value in almost all sciences, is another which may be variously interpreted. Social scientists are likely to interpret "accuracy" with somewhat less rigor than natural scientists, and within a science there are often disputes over the question, "How accurate is accurate?"

The Anatomy implies or demands the acceptance of a

number of values, some general scientific values, others more limited to criticism. Among the general scientific values inherent in the Anatomy are a rejection of subjectivity and acceptance of objectivity or intersubjectivity in observation insofar as the situation allows; an acceptance of the necessity and desirability of a high degree of schematization in theory formulation; an insistence on the practical applicability of theory as a guide for normal science; an insistence on a high degree of inclusiveness of potential data; a support of internal consistency in theories; and an assumption of the orderability of its phenomenal universe. Other values perhaps more limited to criticism include the Anatomy's insistence on multiple perspectives; its acceptance of explanation and description as goals of criticism, rather than such other possible goals as moral edification and the qualitative improvement of literature through the instruction of authors; and the insistence on a clear separation of the creator and his creation. Similar values may operate in other sciences, but less obviously where some of the issues common to criticism do not normally come up.

Such general scientific values as consistency, plausibility, and simplicity are observed in the Anatomy, but there is some difficulty presented by the common scientific value of a high degree of accuracy in prediction. Indeed, it is not clear that prediction plays a part in the science of criticism as presented in the Anatomy's para-

digm at all. This need not bother us. History, anthropology, and archeology are generally accepted as social sciences without being able to make more than the most tentative predictions at best. Neither history, anthropology, nor archeology can, on the basis of what it knows, predict a future state in the way physics can. So we might observe, with Meyer Abrams, that its inability to make predictions marks criticism's limits as a science.[51]

But still there is a sense in which it may be said that the critical theories of the Anatomy allow for prediction. There is the implied and tentative prediction of the historical Theory of Modes which sees the five primary modes of literature appearing initially in classical literature and repeating themselves in sequence in medieval and modern literature. The Anatomy even speculates that the cycle of modes is once again about to repeat itself as the ironic and satiric modes dominant in the late 19th and early 20th centuries give way to a new mythic mode as the 20th century matures. But the other three theories may be seen as predictive as well.

We are used to thinking of predictions in terms of applying to particular situations such law-schema as "For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction." Once the action is determined, the reaction may be predicted according to the symbolic generalization. This kind of prediction is temporal, in a narrow sense of the

term. It involves the prediction of the future state of a system on the basis of our knowledge of the past and present states of the system, within the context of the application of a symbolic generalization. But theories may be predictive in another, temporal, sense as well. The formulation of a theory may imply that we will discover data to complete the theory. A theory is not merely an abstraction from the facts; it goes beyond the limits of the facts themselves to create a new order for some corner of the phenomenal universe. Once the theory is formulated, it can be used to predict the existence of new data by showing us where to look for it. A certain phenomenon may always have existed, its existence unsuspected, its location undetermined. How might a new theory aid us in the discovery of this phenomenon?

The germ theory of disease was a significant breakthrough in medical science. Although the existence of micro-organisms had been postulated, no one had actually discovered a germ. Once the theory had been set forth that disease was transmitted by tiny micro-organisms, medical scientists knew what sort of phenomena to look for and where to look for them. Relativity theory, when applied to hitherto unexplainable eccentricites in the orbits of the outer planets, allowed scientists to predict the existence of the then undiscovered planet Pluto. It was not until advances were made in astronomical equipment

that Pluto could actually be located. But when it was located, it turned out to be where relativity theory predicted that it would be. Pluto had existed prior to the development of relativity theory, but only through the application of relativity theory was its existence predicted and location discovered. Similarly, Priestley's rejection of the phlogiston theory and acceptance of a different conceptual framework allowed him to see oxygen where others had seen only "dephlogisted air."[52]

Actually, it is not so common for theories to be primarily concerned with predicting future states. Rather, their predictions are most often about things which already exist, but whose existence, or whose existence as data, we are not aware of. Or theories may help us to predict that something with which we are familiar is more than or different than what we thought it to be. Freud's theory of dreams, for example, deals with phenomena with which man has long been familiar. But only through dream theory were men able to perceive dreams as sources of data upon which certain predictions or conclusions about personality could be based.

It might be said, then, that theories may be predictive not only in positing the future state of a system, but also in positing the present state of a system. It is only the <u>discovery</u> of the state of the system which is in the future, and not the state of the system itself.

The theories of the Anatomy may be seen as theories which predict that literature will be found to be organized or related in certain ways, if the theories are applied to literary phenomena. This is not a self-fulfilling prediction, since the data serves as a test. The discussion of prose fiction with the Theory of Genres, for example, posits four primary forms: novel, romance, confession, and anatomy. The prediction inherent in this part of the theory is two-fold: first, there is a prediction that all four forms can or could exist separately, and in all possible combinations; second, there is a prediction that all examples of specific continuous forms, or prose fiction, can be seen in terms of the categories established by the theory. Thus, for example, the theory predicts the existence of "anatomies" and is reinforced by the actual discovery of works which fit the parameters of the category "anatomy," such as The Anatomy of Melancholy, Tristram Shandy, and The Compleat Angler, among others. And the theory is also reinforced by the demonstration of its capacity to account for all of the prose fiction with which we are familiar. The Theory of Genres does not and cannot predict the future coming into existence of another anatomy. But it can predict the nature of the relationship such a work would have to other forms of prose fiction, should it come into existence. In this limited sense, then, prediction is not at all impossible for a science of criticism.

The fourth component of a paradigm Kuhn calls "exemplars." By exemplars, Kuhn means "the concrete problem solutions that students encounter from the start of their scientific educations."[53] These standard problem solutions serve as exemplary guides for the students' own scientific practice. In physics, for example, exemplars include "problems such as the inclined plane, the conical pendulum, and Keplerian orbits" and the learning of the use of instruments such as "the vernier, the calorimeter, and the Wheatstone bridge."[54] Exemplars are perhaps most readily identifiable in mathematics, where certain standard problem solutions provide the student with guided practice in mastering the techniques of his field. Exemplars show the student "how it's done."

The Anatomy is deficient in exemplars of a more extended sort, that is, the full length analyses of literary works which are the models for normal criticism. It is this deficiency that Frye refers to when he suggests the necessity for a companion volume of "practical criticism." The Anatomy, to put the matter in Kuhn's terms, provides the theoretical framework for normal criticism, but there must also be a collection of "exemplars" which may be used by the student as guides in his own normal criticism. The essays collected in Fables of Identity are intended to provide some of these exemplars.

At the same time that the Anatomy does not contain

extended examples of normal criticism, it does contain many small exemplars. Each act of classification in the Anatomy may be seen as an exemplar for the student learning normal criticism within the context of the paradigm provided by the Anatomy. And there are many exemplars of a paragraph or two in length within the Anatomy, such as the brief discussion of Finnegans Wake in terms of the four forms of prose fiction proposed in the Theory of Genres,[55] or the analyses of several poems within the discussion of the genre Frye calls the "rhythm of association" or "lyric."[56] While these analyses are presented primarily to reinforce by illustration one of the theories of literature, they may also serve as exemplars for normal criticism.

It is possible, then, to see the Anatomy as a candidate for initial paradigm in a science of criticism, both historically and analytically. Before concluding the analysis of the Anatomy as literally scientific, however, we must surely give some specific attention to the primary component of the Anatomy, its four theories of literature. It is somewhat surprising that Prof. Kuhn does not list theories as a component of a scientific paradigm. This is explained, however, by the fact that theories, such as the Copernican theory in astronomy or the quantum theory in physics, are the historical source of new scientific paradigms. We may say that a paradigm is theory, and the other components may be said to derive

from or be implied by the initial theory or set of theories which precipitates the development of a complete paradigm. The component which Kuhn calls "models" includes models of theories, indicating their presence within the complete paradigm. Theories are a primary component of scientific enterprise, whether as the bases for paradigms or as guides for normal criticism.

The Anatomy's four critical theories raise several important questions and issues which must be discussed if we are to take the literal approach to the interpretation of "science" in the Anatomy. We may first ask whether they are really scientific theories at all. Beyond this initial general question, the four theories pose certain specific problems: they are complex, highly schematic, and often go beyond the limitations of the data cited in their support. And the existence of a set of four theories about the same subject matter has been held by some critics to be sufficient in itself to demonstrate that they and the Anatomy are not scientific. Is it possible to hold what appear to be competing or conflicting theories about the same phenomena within a single science?

We should note immediately that it is not necessary to defend the accuracy of the Anatomy's theories in order to establish that they are indeed scientific theories. As theories of literature, each may be found more or

less than adequate, but their accuracy does not bear directly on their status as theories. The Ptolemaic theory was found to be severely inadequate as an explanation of the relationships among celestial phenomena, but it was--and is--a scientific theory, even now that it has long since been discarded.

As we begin our consideration of the Anatomy's theories, we are again faced with an old problem: there is no easy and universally accepted definition of "scientific theory." Abraham Kaplan says, "Theory puts things known into a system."[57] The Anatomy's theories each provide a systematization of things known about literature, organizaing data in such a way as to provide meaningful contexts or patterns or relationships for those things which we know about literature. But we need something more specific than this. For our purposes, then, we may define a scientific theory as a theory which is derived according to standard scientific procedure and which has certain kinds of components which set it off from theories in general. A scientific theory may be defined both in terms of the process by which it is derived and in terms of its nature as a construct composed of certain components.

The standard scientific procedure for the derivation of theory, a procedure which is at least as old as Bacon, is to derive or create theory by induction from evidence or data at hand. When a theory derives from a

source external to the data and then is applied arbitrarily, it is rejected as unscientific because it is not founded in the empirical evidence. Consider, for example, alternative theories seeking to explain the cause of epileptic seizures. One theory explains the seizures as the result of the actions of evil spirits which have taken over the bodies of the victims; another explains them as the result of certain chemical imbalances in the brains of the epileptics. We may reject the first theory as unscientific because its authority derives from a source (religion or superstition) external to the data and because it makes certain assumptions that are not potentially demonstrable using standard scientific procedure (that there are spirits; that these spirits may be evil; that evil spirits may inhabit human bodies, etc.). The second theory is scientific, even if it turns out to be inaccurate, because it is based in, and may be tested against, empirical data.

If we examine the theories of the Anatomy, we quickly discover that they are copiously illustrated with specific data from a wide range of literary phenomena. But there is little direct evidence of their derivation from the data through induction. Indeed, Frye says that he has ". . . proceeded deductively, and been rigorously selective in examples and illustrations."[58] This raises the possibility that the theories are really imposed upon the data without being derived from it. Frye insists

he has derived the theories inductively and presents them deductively only as a matter of convenience. Frye's predicament in not being able to demonstrate the step by step derivation of his theories, however, is not uncommon in science. Many scientific theories have been created under circumstances not easily relatable. The moment of inspiration in which a variety of hitherto unrelated data falls or is pulled together by a scientific theory is not always recreatable. But science provides for this by accepting a theory as induced from empirical evidence if it can be successfully tested against that evidence once it has been derived, created, envisioned, or whatever. To return to the evil spirits theory of epilepsy, we may say that there is perhaps no way to disprove its adherents' insistence that it is founded in observation of empirical evidence. But the theory is not, as has been noted, testable by any standard scientific procedure. We can no more disprove than prove the existence of evil spirits within a scientific context. They do not admit of being testable. The chemical imbalance theory of epilepsy, however derived, can obviously be tested in a number of ways.

The pertinent question for the Anatomy's theories, then, is not whether Frye can demonstrate exactly how he derived them, but whether it is possible to test them against the evidence of literature itself. There would seem little doubt that this sort of testing can be done.

By applying the theories to literary phenomena not cited in their support it is possible to determine their accuracy to some degree. The nature of literature--and of critics--is such that complete agreement may be impossible, as the critical discussion of the theories demonstrates. But they are constructed so as to permit and invite testing. Insofar as testability is a criterion of a scientific theory, the Anatomy's theories are scientific. They may be, like some other theories, both scientific and wrong.

Given the difficulties in demonstrating exactly how a theory is derived, it is fortunate that there is another way to determine whether a theory is scientific, that is, by examining its structure. Abraham Kaplan provides a description of theory which we may use for this purpose:

> We may say to start with that a theory is a system of laws. But the laws are altered by being brought into systematic connection with one another, as marriage relates two people who are never the same again. Each law takes up into itself something of the substance of the others. It is generalized, reformulated, or at any rate, reinterpreted. The theory is not the aggregate of the new laws but their connectedness, as a bridge consists of girders only in that the girders are joined together in a particular way. The theory explains the laws, not as something over and above them, but by giving each the strength and purpose which it derives from the others. For my part, I would say that a law explains a fact: by relating it, not to an abstract entity (a "regularity" or a "uniformity") but to other facts. What "governs" the particular is just this relationship to other particulars.[39]

This description of theories presents them as constructs whose components are laws and whose function is to establish a significant pattern of relationships among those laws. The theories of the Anatomy may be seen as constructs of this sort.

I have earlier presented the concept of critical definitions as symbolic generalizations serving the same functions in criticism as laws in the natural sciences and as definitions and statistical laws in the social sciences. It is these definitions which are the primary components of the Anatomy's theories. And the theories function to establish a pattern of relationships among them in the manner described by Kaplan. An example may be seen in the first part of the Theory of Genres.[60] Here Frye relates four critical terms, the familiar terms "prose," "drama," and "lyric," and the newly created term "epos," by presenting each as the name for works with a particular kind of "rhythm." Epos is characterized by the "rhythm of recurrence," prose by the "rhythm of continuity," drama by the "rhythm of decorum," and lyric by the "rhythm of association." What Frye's theory of genres has done here is to relate these four definitions, or symbolic generalizations, within a certain pattern or system. The terms with their definitions are the components of the system, and the system serves to explain the terms by relating them to one another. The resulting construct is then a theory which conforms to the stated characteris-

tics of Kaplan's description.

This manner of viewing the theories also helps to explain why the definitions in the Anatomy often differ somewhat from common usage. The relating of the terms within the construct of the theory, here through the unifying concept of "rhythm" in literary works, necessarily involves the modification, reformulation, or reinterpretation of the terms and their definitions as they are commonly used separately. If we are able to see this reinterpretation as the advantage which it is to the critic, since it allows him to perceive or use relationships which were unavailable prior to the creation of the theory, we should be able to get beyond the point where we complain that the Anatomy does not adhere to all of the time-worn definitions with which we are familiar. The systems of terminology and definitions in the Anatomy, the theories whose components are the symbolic generalizations of criticism, are surely preferable as guides and tools for normal criticism to the anarchy of the present state of critical terminology. It is ironic that some critics, reading the Anatomy's terms only in its glossary, and ignoring their relationships within the context of the critical theories, claim that the Anatomy's own use of terminology is anarchic. To some, apparently, any change from common practice, even a change which, once understood and assimilated, simplifies and systematizes, is anarchic.

In light of their conformity to Kaplan's description,

it seems reasonable to accept the Anatomy's theories, whatever their accuracy, as scientific theories. According to Frye, they are inductively derived from empirical evidence. Whether or not this is so, they are extensively illustrated and supported with data, and they are testable. And they can be seen as the sort of systematic constructs of related laws, or symbolic generalizations, which Kaplan describes as theories. There are still several problems raised by certain characteristics of these theories, however, particularly their complexity, their schematic nature, their insistence on going beyond the data at hand, and the possible conflict presented by the existence of four theories which each apply to the same phenomena.

There is no doubt that the Anatomy's critical theories are at times quite complex. The Theory of Myths, with its basic division into four parts and its further divisions and variations within these parts, set forth by the model of the divided circle, is especially complex, and it has prompted the sort of criticism represented by Wimsatt's parody.[61] Of course the Anatomy's theories are complex. Most theories are complex. We may be used to thinking of relativity theory in terms of the simple-looking equation $e=mc^2$. But the theory which lies behind that equation is certainly no less complex than the Anatomy's critical theories. The table of contents of the Anatomy has the same sort of look of simplicity

as Einstein's equation, but it, too, represents a complex set of theories. We seem to have little difficulty accepting the fact that theories dealing with the physical universe or with human behavior must often be complex since their subject matter is itself complex. There should also be no difficulty in accepting the necessity for complexity in theories of literature, a subject matter as full of variety as human behavior or the physical universe.

If there is a disturbing element in the structure of the Anatomy's theories, it is that they are complicated as well as being complex. George Whalley condemns the Anatomy for its complications and holds them up as evidence against its being scientific in a passage noted earlier:

> This book does not impress one with the scientific possibilities of criticism. To take one point only; the analogies drawn from Ptolemaic astronomy, from Spengler and Frazer are all analogies outmoded in their own disciplines. This might not matter if the Great Wheel diagram of the third essay did not behave in the way scientific analogies do when they need to be replaced, exhibiting features of exgessive complication, asymmetry, and rigidity.[62]

In response to Whalley's rejection of Frye's analogies because they no longer hold in other disciplines we need only say that the outmoding of a model in one discipline in no way proscribes its use in another. There is always open season on models, analogies, and metaphors. Criticizing the Anatomy for using Ptolemaic astronomy seems

hardly different from criticizing the Divine Comedy for the same reason. Both Frye and Dante use Ptolemaic astronomy because they find its structure suits their purposes, though neither gives much indication of finding it scientifically accurate. And when one considers that many scientific analogies were originally borrowed from literature, there would seem to be no reason why criticism should not borrow some of them back. Whalley is more to the point when he points to the strain, rigidity, and complications of the Anatomy's theories. The normal scientific response to such a situation, however, is not the out of hand rejection of theories which have become overly complicated and rigid, but their replacement by newer, and initially simpler, ones. Until replacements are found and accepted, the old theories must continue to guide normal science, since science does not operate to much purpose without theories. Frye, in the Polemical Introduction, complains himself that his theories are not wholly adequate, and he invites his readers fo follow the normal (scientific) procedure of replacing them with better ones.

Whalley's comments on the rigidity of Frye's theories brings up the second objection commonly made against the Anatomy, the objection that its theories are overly schematic. But while Whalley objects to their asymmetry, it is their preponderant symmetry which most critics find objectionable. To this objection, we may reply that it

is in the very nature of theories, as systems of laws, to be schematic, and often to be highly symmetrical and balanced. To reject the Anatomy's theories because they are schematic is nearly to reject the notion of theory in criticism. The apparently excessive schematization of the theories may also be explained by the Anatomy's compactness. The Anatomy provides a very condensed version of a set of theories which could be elaborated into volumes. If they were so elaborated, they would probably seem less schematic, if not less systematic. The possibility of condensing a theory into a brief mathematical equation, certainly a schematic form, is often seen as a sign of a theory's validity in the sciences.

Objections to the systematic and schematic nature of the Anatomy also arise from a failure to distinguish between the process of scientific activity and the formal report of this process after it has been completed. Anyone who has written a lab report knows that there is a great deal that happens in the actual laboratory experience which is not indicated in the report, and the report becomes, at least to a degree, an idealization of the experience. The systematic statements of theory in the Anatomy are statements after the fact, as I have noted; they state the theories which have already been derived. Such formalizations are necessary both to make clear the nature and structure of the theories, and also to provide constructs which may be used as guides for normal

science.

Abraham Kaplan makes a distinction between "logic-in-use" and "reconstructed logic" in science which is useful here. "Logic-in-use" is the logic of the actual process of experimenting or of evolving a theory. Often, Kaplan says, this logic "is embedded in a matrix of an alogic-in-use, even an illogic-in-use.[63] "Reconstructed logic," on the other hand, is the logic of the lab report or the scientist's a posteriori description of the developing of a theory. The reconstruction is an idealized version of the actual process, eliminating extraneous, alogical, and illogical elements. Such reconstruction is necessary for purposes of clarity and communication. "The reconstruction," Kaplan says, "idealizes the logic of science only in showing us what it would be if it were extracted and refined to the utmost purity."[64] One of the reasons the sciences so often impress the members of other disciplines with their logic is that we seldom see science except in terms of reconstructed logic.

While Kaplan is here primarily concerned with the processes attendant to the practice of normal science, his distinction may help to explain the schematic appearance of theory as well. Whatever the process by which theories are derived, it is often mysterious. The so-called "inductive leap" involves not only logic, but such non-logical factors as inspiration, intuition, genius, and the temperature-humidity index in the scientist's

study. The theory itself, however, is not simply a report of this process, but the result of the process, a systematic pattern which may be developed in a most unsystematic manner. Unless it is formalized, it will be difficult to explain, to develop further, and to use in normal science. The Anatomy's theories, then, are schematic because they are both more logical and more useful in schematic form. If they are idealizations, that is because an idealized form is necessary for practical application.

The nature of the creative process in the developing of theory not only necessitates a "reconstructed logic" in the subsequent description of the theory, it also accounts for the theory's characteristic outstripping of the facts at hand. In one of the best discussions of the creative process in theoretical science, Jacob Bronowski even compares the creativity of the scientist and the poet.[65] Though that comparison is a tantalizing one, it is Bronowski's description of the creation of theory which interests us here. "The man who proposes a theory," Bronowski says,

> makes a choice--an imaginative choice which outstrips the facts. The creative activity of science lies here, in the process of induction. For induction imagines more than there is ground for and creates relations which at bottom can never be verified. Every induction is a speculation and it guesses at a unity which the facts present but do not strictly imply.[66]

Bronowski then points to the man-made-ness of theory which

we have already seen noted by Heisenberg and Planck:

> The scientist's demand that nature shall be lawful is a demand for unity. When he frames a new law, he links and organizes phenomena which were thought different in kind; for example, general relativity links light with gravitation. In such a law we feel that the disorder of nature has been made to reveal a pattern, and that under the colored chaos there rules a more profound unity. . . . A theory is the creation of unity in what is diverse by the discovery of unexpected likenesses.[67]

Note here especially the emphasis on the concept of man as the orderer of a disordered nature. With Planck and Heisenberg, Bronowski sees science as an order made out of nature more than as the discovery of the order in nature. Science, the order, is man-made.

The creative element in the inductive process is illustrated specifically by Bronowski in a reference to Planck's creation of the first quantum theory:

> When Max Planck proposed that the radiation of heat is discontinuous, he seems to us now to have been driven by nothing but the facts of experiment. But we are deceived; the facts did not go so far as this. The facts showed that the radiation is not continuous; they did not show that the only alternative is Planck's hail of quanta. This is an analogy which imagination and history brought into Planck's mind. So the later conflict in quantum physics between the behavior of matter as a wave and as a particle is a conflict between analogies, between poetic metaphors; and each metaphor enriches our understanding without completing it.[68]

Even in the hard sciences, the creative process operates with a high degree of freedom and originality, "outstripping the mere facts" of the data. So, too, must critical

theories, whether those of the Anatomy or any others, go beyond the face value of the literary data to perceive or to construct the striking patterns of relationships which enrich our understanding of literature. Science, Bronowski says, is ". . . less preoccupied with facts than with relations, less with numbers than with arrangement."[69] Lest it seem that the argument here for the imaginative and creative elements in the formulation of theory make the process seem entirely arbitrary, it should be noted once more that though theories go beyond the facts they begin in the facts and are checked against the facts once they are created.

There remains one more significant difficulty presented by the four critical theories of the Anatomy if we are to view them as scientific: not only are there four of them, but the four seem at points to contradict one another. Indeed, the meanings of certain non-rigorous terms, such as "image," "myth," and "romantic," change with context from one theory to another. Richard Kuhns objects to the contradictions which may occur when two or more of the Anatomy's theories are applied to the same work of literature. Such contradictions, he insists, would not be allowed in the sciences:

> Scientific theories do aim at comprehensiveness, and if one of two theories excludes the other, in whole or in part, then we assume one is mistaken.[70]

I have already argued for the validity and the neces-

sity of multiple perspectives on literature and criticism in general, and on the Anatomy in particular. But it is not so much the number of the Anatomy's theories that bothers critics as it is their apparent overlapping and contradictions. Each seems to take all of literature as its subject matter. This should be less bothersome, however, if we remember that the same phenomena may be the source of a variety of data, both within a discipline and among several disciplines. While I have been referring to the theories as theories of literature, it may be more correct, strictly speaking, to call them theories about literature, and of modes, symbols, archtypes, and genres. The scope of a theory is not limited by its general subject matter, but it is limited by the context of the theory and by the specific data which it chooses--from among the general phenomena--to organize.[71] Further, the variety of manifestations of a single nonrigorous term such as "myth" in the four theories serves to relate the theories, not to drive them apart, to suggest unity in diversity, not to create division where none really exists.

It seems to be incorrect, then, to suggest that the Anatomy's four critical theories are unscientific on the basis that they appear to exclude one another, since each uses a different set of data, to distinguish it from the others, yet also includes variations on the same symbolic generalizations, tying it to the others. The theories do

not contradict one another; they complement one another. Were there two theories of genres, for instance, we might presume the two theories to be contradictory. But this, of course, is not the case. Even if we accept the proposition that the four critical theories are not mutually exclusive, however, it would still be desirable to establish some clearer sense of the relationship among them. This is not easy to do. But three possible analogies (or poetic metaphors) for the relationship among the Anatomy's four critical theories do suggest themselves: the four levels of medieval Biblical interpretation, the four field theories in physics, and the relationship of "mutual complementarity" which obtains among certain scientific models.

The four levels of medieval Biblical interpretation--literal, anagogical, moral, and allegorical--have a certain appeal as an analogy for the relationship among the Anatomy's four theories. For one thing, Frye cites these four levels of interpretation as a kind of model for his own "phases" of interpretation of symbol in literature.[72] But the analogy is inadequate. The theories in the Anatomy are not presented in a hierarchical order, as are the four levels of Biblical interpretation, beginning with the literal level and ascending to the allegorical. Structurally, the Anatomy presents its theories as being parallel in importance rather than in a hierarchical order. If any of the theories is of

greater importance, it is probably the Theory of Archetypes. Yet the Anatomy does not present this theory in the final, and logically superior, position. Beyond this, the four theories do not directly parallel the levels of Biblical interpretation in any other consistent manner.

The analogy to field theories in physics also has the advantage (which is purely cosmetic) of a coincidence in number. There are four field theories in physics: gravitational, electromagnetic, and strong and weak atomic field theories. Physicists hope that these four theories may some day be subsumed in a single, unified field theory. But the present state of field theory in physics suggests that the comparison to the four theories of the Anatomy is appropriate. In each case, the systematic study may look forward to the unification of its various theories. But in the meantime, each must operate with four separate theories. There are other theories than field theories in physics, of course, but the comparison here seems apt since it shows that several theories may exist within a science whose potential or implied relationships have yet to be systematically established. This state of affairs, however, makes the science no less scientific.

To apply my third analogy, it is necessary to consider the Anatomy's four theories as models. This presents no great difficulty. There is always a close relationship between a theory and its model(s) as Kuhn im-

plies by his inclusion of models as part of scientific paradigms. Since a theory is usually expressed best through a model, mathematical or verbal, it is often difficult to separate a theory from its explanatory model. When we talk of one, we talk of both.

The concept of mutual complementarity was expounded by Niels Bohr to explain the relationship among the several models of the atom. Werner Heisenberg explains that by the concept of mutual complementarity Bohr

> . . . means that the different intuitive pictures which we use to describe atomic systems, although fully adequate for given experiments, are mutually exclusive. Thus, for instance, the Bohr atom can be described as a small-scale planetary system, having a central atomic nucleus about which the external electrons revolve. For other experiments, however, it might be more convenient to imagine that the atomic nucleus is surrounded by a system of stationary waves whose frequency is characteristic of the radiation emanating from the atom. Finally, we can consider the atom chemically. We can calculate the heat of its reaction when it becomes fused with other atoms, but in that case we cannot simultaneously describe the motion of the electrons. Each picture is legitimate when used in the right place, but the different pictures are contradictory and therefore we call them mutually complementary.[75]

As is the case with the particle and wave pictures of light, the different pictures of the atom are all necessary to a full understanding of the phenomenon. The contradictions among the models are, as Bronowski suggests, contradictions among metaphors. There is no single model which will do in all experimental situations. The scientist is faced again with the problem of explaining

the unknown in terms of the known. There is nothing exactly like an atom or like light except the phenomena of atoms and light themselves. So they must be pictured in terms of several models, until and unless a single model which is adequate for all experimental situations can be found. The models are mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot be applied simultaneously, but mutually complementary in the sense that they together form a multi-dimensional picture of the phenomena or theories they illustrate.

A variation on the concept of mutual complementarity might be found in the process of mapping. There are several ways to map a country, depending on the kind of data which the mapper seeks to represent, or the way in which he wants to represent it. Maps may be, for example, topographical, demographical, political, or military. In this case, the maps may not be considered contradictory or mutually exclusive, though it may be difficult or confusing to create a single map which comprehends them all. Such a unified map becomes impossible, however, if we also consider the alternative projections a map may have: the variety of representations of the globe on a two-dimensional surface, the globe itself, and the Mercator projection, among others. These cannot be reduced to a single model. Each kind of map and each projection has its purpose in particular experimental or explanatory situations. They are often mutually exclusive,

but nonetheless mutually complementary. So the principle of mutual complementarity may even work when we are dealing with phenomena which are much better known than the atom or light.

The concept of mutual complementarity is an especially appealing explanation for the relationship among the four critical theories of the Anatomy. The literary critic examining a work of literature, like the scientist examining the atom or light, finds it necessary to deal with several manifestations of a single phenomenon, manifestations which cannot be reconciled within one model. The critic who examines In Memoriam: A.H.H. within the context of historical theory will perceive it differently than the critic who sees it within the context of a theory of symbols. In the former case, the poem is seen as a product of, and within, time; in the latter case, the poem is considered timeless. Within a theory of genres, the poem may even be seen as within time--as one of a historical sequence of pastoral elegies--and without time--as the momentarily timeless manifestation of a genre which exists in time. How can a work of literature be both limited by time and outside of time? The poem is clearly both in time and without time, as all critics recognized. But no single model of the literary universe, no single theory, suffices to accomodate these two different manifestations of the same work of literature. The combination offered by generic theory only

becomes a third alternative. Only by admitting the fact of the contradictions between the models when they are taken simultaneously and then accepting them can there be progress in criticism. Like the scientists, the critics must learn to be pragmatic, to use the model that works best for the purposes at hand. As both Sparshott and Kaplan note, theories--and thus models of theories--must be constructed with the immediate experimental purposes in mind, as well as with the intention of providing general systems for the relationships of symbolic generalizations. If scientists can survive and even progress with the contradictions of the models of the atom and of light, critics ought to be able to survive the contradictions of the theories of the Anatomy. And more, they ought to be able to see the variety of theories as an opportunity rather than as a drawback.

The four theories of the Anatomy, then, may be seen as scientific theories. Those characteristics which criticism finds most troublesome about them, their complexity and complications, their schematic structure, their consistent tendency to go beyond the immediate data at hand, and their multiplicity and contradictions, they share with other scientific theories. This is no brief for their adequacy as theories of literature, but a defense of their nature and characteristics. Like all scientific theories, it may be presumed that the Anatomy's may be improved upon or superseded. But they are not

inherently unscientific.

The literal approach to the interpretation of "science" in the Anatomy has required extended discussion since it was first necessary to establish the general possibility that criticism might be a science and, thus, that such an approach might reasonably be taken. The consideration of the Anatomy as literally scientific involves more issues, of course, than have been discussed here. Limitations of space and the demands of the other three approaches preclude further examination of the Anatomy as science here. Nonetheless, I believe the two main purposes of my discussion have been accomplished. We have seen that it is possible to surmount major objections to considering criticism as at least potentially a science; and we have been able to outline the part that the Anatomy might play in the establishment of a scientific criticism.

NOTES

1. Marie Bonaparte, The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation (Berlin, 1933; London, 1949; rpt. New York: Humanities Press, 1972).

2. Joseph Wood Krutch, Edgar Allan Poe: A Study in Genius (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926).

3. T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," in Selected Essays, new ed. (1932; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960), pp. 3-11.

4. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 13.

5. For these and other examples cf. Freeman J. Dyson, "Innovation in Physics," Scientific American, Aug. 1958, pp. 74-82.

6. Cf. Erwin Schroedinger, "The Image of Matter," in On Modern Physics, trans. M. Goodman and J.W. Binns (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1961), p. 47.

7. Anatomy, p. 71.

8. Anatomy, p. 71.

9. F.E. Sparshott, The Concept of Criticism (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 28.

10. Sparshott, p. 32.

11. Anatomy, p. 29.

12. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 128.

13. Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, trans. Arnold B. Pomerans (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), p. 15.

14. Kaplan, pp. 129-30.

15. Kaplan, p. 130.

16. Anatomy, p. 17.

17. Anatomy, p. 17.

18. Anatomy, p. 17.

19. Heisenberg, p. 15.

20. The concept of normal science as "puzzle-solving" comes from T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1962; rev. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Cf. esp. Chapter IV, "Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving," pp. 35-42.

21. Kuhn, p. 10.

22. Kuhn, pp. 10-11.

23. Kuhn, p. 13.

24. Kuhn, p. 13.

25. Kuhn, p. 11.

26. Kuhn, p. 15.

27. Kuhn, p. 10.

28. I.A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism (London, 1925; rpt. New York: Harvest Books, 1956); Practical Criticism (London, 1929; rpt. New York: Harvest Books, 1956).

29. Meyer Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953).

30. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, 2nd ed. (1947; rpt. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967).

31. Anatomy, p. 15.

32. Anatomy, p. 15.

33. Kuhn, pp. 182-87.

34. Kuhn, p. 182. Kuhn's analytical description of paradigm appears in a postscript in the 2nd ed. of his work. In this analytical description, Kuhn substitutes the term "disciplinary matrix" for his original "paradigm," specializing paradigm in the postscript to mean a "shared example" within a larger "disciplinary matrix." I shall continue to use "paradigm" in its original, broader sense.

35. Kuhn, p. 183.

36. Kuhn, p. 183.

37. Kuhn, p. 184.

38. Kuhn, p. 183.

39. Anatomy, p. 365.

40. Anatomy, pp. 365-66.

41. Anatomy, p. 365.

42. Cf. Anatomy, pp. 115-28.

43. Anatomy, pp. 186-206, cf. esp. p. 186.

44. Anatomy, p. 367.

45. Anatomy, pp. 365-67.

46. Kuhn, p. 184.

47. Kuhn, p. 184.

48. Kuhn, p. 185.

49. Kuhn, p. 186.

50. Kuhn, p. 185.

51. Meyer Abrams, "Anatomy of Criticism," University of Toronto Quarterly, 28 (1959), 196.

52. Kuhn, p. 118.

53. Kuhn, p. 187.

54. Kuhn, p. 187. Kuhn does not clearly distinguish here between the exemplar as a problem solution and the exemplar as a particular scientific instrument whose use the student must learn for successful problem solutions. We may clarify Kuhn's concept of "exemplar" here by suggesting that the instruments are not themselves exemplars, but that they must be used in the solution of exemplars. There is a sense, then, in which the instruments are exemplars insofar as the learning of the problem solutions requires their use. But to call them specifically exemplars, as Kuhn does, seems to confuse his definition unnecessarily.

55. Anatomy, p. 314.

56. Anatomy, pp. 270-82.

57. Kaplan, p. 302.

58. Anatomy, p. 29.

59. Kaplan, p. 297.

60. Anatomy, pp. 251-82.

61. Cf. Chapter I, p. 30.

62. George Whalley, "Fry[e]'s Anatomy of Criticism," Tamarack Review, No. 8 (Summer 1958), p. 98.

63. Kaplan, p. 10.

64. Kaplan, p. 11.

65. Jacob Bronowski, "The Creative Process," Scientific American, Aug. 1958, pp. 59-65.

66. Bronowski, p. 62.

67. Bronowski, p. 64.

68. Bronowski, pp. 63-64.

69. Bronowski, p. 65.

70. Richard Kuhns, "Professor Frye's Criticism," Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1958), 754.

71. Cf. Sparshott, pp. 2-4.

72. Anatomy, p. 72.

73. Heisenberg, pp. 40-41.

III

THE SECOND APPROACH: THE *ANATOMY* AS A FORMAL IMITATION OF SCIENCE

The second approach to the *Anatomy* is based upon a formal and analogical interpretation of the central symbol "science." According to this interpretation, the *Anatomy* is a formal imitation of science. A formal analogy of proportions holds in which literary criticism is to the literary universe as natural science is to the natural universe. Here criticism is not a science itself. Rather, it is seen as an activity and discipline which analyzes its subject matter, literature, in the same manner as science analyzes its subject matter, nature. The formal structure of criticism, here the four critical theories of the *Anatomy*, is seen as analogous to, but not the same as, the formal structure of science, scientific theories. And normal criticism, the examination of particular literary phenomena within the context of the critical theories, is analogous to normal science, the application of scientific theory to natural phenomena. A continuing interaction between literary phenomena and literary theory takes place which is analogous to the continuing interaction of induction and deduction in

science.

Initially, there appears to be little difference between the literal and the formal interpretations of "science" as it is used in the Anatomy. Both interpretations draw analogies from science and posit fundamental similarities in technique and form between criticism and science. But in the literal approach to the Anatomy, comparisons were drawn between literary criticism as a science and other sciences, that is, between different versions or examples of the same activity. In the formal approach to the Anatomy, analogies may be drawn between criticism and science--indeed, many of the same analogies--but as between separate, though formally similar, activities. The distinction between the Anatomy as science and the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science is a distinction between identity and analogy, between "is" and "is like."

The distinction between declaring the Anatomy science and considering it as analogous to science may appear small, but it is actually quite crucial. The primary effect of this shift in perspective is to free criticism from certain restrictions imposed upon it by the attempt to match the rigor and precision of the natural sciences, while retaining for criticism the advantages of a formal structure and procedure which enable it to be both highly systematic and grounded thoroughly in data obtained through direct observation. Literary criti-

cism may thus formally imitate science insofar as the nature of its subject matter permits, but it is under no obligation to develop a reconstructed logic as precise or an experimental procedure as exact as those which the nature of its subject matter usually allows the sciences to develop.

Considering the Anatomy literally science implies that both criticism and the natural sciences are members of the same family of activities. When we consider the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science, we may also consider criticism and science as members of a family of activities, but a family which is more extended and less rigorously related. This latter family would have three main branches, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and what we might call the aesthetic sciences. The relationships between the members of each branch may be considered relationships of identity, while the relationships between the three different branches are relationships of analogy, or formal imitation. There are certain general family characteristics common to all three branches of the family and certain more specific characteristics common to the members of each branch. Thus, instead of treating literary criticism and the natural sciences as branches of the general family "science," we may consider them as members of separate branches of a larger family of activities.

This larger family of activities we may call "in-

quiries." I have borrowed the term "inquiry" from Abraham Kaplan's discussion of methodology in the social sciences, The Conduct of Inquiry. Kaplan uses the term to denote the basic activity of the natural and social sciences, emphasizing the commonalities of the two scientific activities. I have expanded the term to include art criticism as well as the sciences, making it the name for a kind of discipline. While I have construed the term after my own purposes, I believe my usage of "inquiry" is consistent with the spirit of Kaplan's usage. I am indebted to Prof. Kaplan for the term alone, however. The discussion which here follows is my own.

The formal analogy between literary criticism and the sciences, then, assumes neither something so specific as that criticism is a science, nor something so general as that both criticism and science are simply "human activities" and are thus capable of common analysis. Rather, I am suggesting that both the various sciences and literary criticism are members of branches of an identifiable family of human activities which may be called inquiries. An inquiry may be provisionally defined as that kind of human activity which systematically analyzes a particular kind of concrete natural or human phenomenon in order to determine the nature of and the relationships among those phenomena which comprise its subject matter. Inquiries include those activities which usually become academic disciplines: the natural

sciences, the social sciences, and the criticisms of the arts. Inquiries do not include those activities which have as their primary goal the learning of a particular skill, such as performing within one of the arts, or speaking or writing a language. Inquiries may, of course, be more or less skillfully conducted, but skillful performance in an inquiry is a means to the end of a fuller understanding of the subject matter, not, as in an artistic performance, an end in itself.

The family inquiry may be divided, as I have indicated, into three main branches: the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the criticisms of the arts. There is a lack of parallelism among these terms as they stand, however, since only two of the three use the word "science." I earlier got around this difficulty by referring to the criticisms of the arts as the "aesthetic sciences." But such a term, while it might be appropriate to the consideration of criticism as a science, is inappropriate to the consideration of criticism as an inquiry. Since we wish to restrict "science" to one branch of inquiry, we may refer to the criticisms of the arts as "performance criticisms," and to the social sciences as "human behavioral analyses." These are admittedly awkward terms. But I wish to emphasize by them the distinctions among the branches of inquiry, as well as to provide a basis for comparisons among them. To

refer to two of the three branches of inquiry as sciences is inconsistent; to refer to all three as sciences defeats the purpose of the distinctions among them. So we shall have to put up with a bit of awkward terminology in the name of a greater clarity. We may now distinguish the three branches of inquiry in this manner: the natural sciences, the human behavioral analyses, and the performance criticisms.

There is further practical reason for this impractical terminology. I have noted that the analogical approach to the Anatomy enables us to take into account the limitations imposed upon criticism as a formal discipline by the nature of its subject matter. The concept of inquiry, unlike the general concept of science propounded in the previous chapter, considers the differences between the subject matters of inquiries as significant in the determination of the specific forms which their structures and procedures take. Thus it is appropriate to call the three branches of inquiry by names which indicate the nature of their subject matters: the human behavioral analyses, the performance criticisms, and the natural sciences.

The members of the family inquiry have in common three primary areas of family resemblance: procedure, structure, and goal. The normal procedure of an inquiry consists in the systematic analysis of the concrete phenomena which comprise its subject matter. The

formal structure of an inquiry consists in the patterns which organize the relationships which are found to hold among those phenomena. And the goal of an inquiry is the fuller understanding of the nature of and the relationships among its subject matter.

The normal procedure and formal structure of an inquiry may most clearly be seen in those inquiries which comprise the branch of the family which we call the natural sciences. Here, the normal procedure is the alternation of induction and deduction, the creation of theory and the application of theory through controlled experimentation. The formal structure of the sciences consists of tightly formulated theories which are often statable in mathematical terms. The procedure and structure of inquiry are more exact and rigorous in the sciences than in the other two branches. Thus the procedures and structures of the other branches may be clarified by comparing them by analogy with the procedure and structure of sciences. It is in this sense, then, that we may consider human behavioral analyses and performance criticisms as formal imitations of science. Science, because it is more exact, becomes the standard of comparison for the other branches of inquiry, not in the sense that it is a standard of excellence which the other inquiries should strive to attain, but in the sense that the rigor and precision of its structure and procedure provide clarification, through analogy, of the

necessarily less rigorous and precise procedures and structures of the other inquiries. To say, then, that literary criticism imitates science is not to describe an action but to state a formal relationship. Here, imitation is a state of being, not an activity.

We should, however, consider the implications of the historical fact that the most exact inquiries, the sciences, are also the oldest inquiries, insofar as they were the first to develop substantial formal structures and procedures of systematic analysis. The human behavioral analyses were the next to attain a degree of rigor in structure and procedure, and marked their attainment by appropriating the term "social science." Only recently, in the works of I.A. Richards, for example, has a performance criticism begun to take on the characteristic rigor of a science. And taking a historical view, we might wish to see the Anatomy as a further development of the rigor and precision of performance criticism. It would be easy to interpret the chronological sequence of the development of the various inquiries as indicating a direct causal relationship between the ability of an inquiry to emulate the natural sciences and its emergence as a fully developed formal inquiry. Such a causal relationship may in fact exist. Or it may be that the different nature of the subject matters of the human behavioral analyses and the performance criticism has made it more difficult for them to develop as quickly as the

natural sciences. It may simply be that it takes man longer to learn to analyze human behavior and human performances than to analyze natural phenomena. The lack of precision and rigor in the human behavioral analyses and the performance criticisms, as compared to the natural sciences, may result more from the complexities inherent in their subject matters than from their relatively recent origins and limited periods of development.

The connection between the sciences and the other inquiries which allows those inquiries to use the sciences as models, as a standard for formal imitation, is not, then, a necessarily historical connection. As a prior and more formalized kind of inquiry, science provides a convenient model for later inquiries because it is more familiar. The concept of inquiry is introduced here to suggest that the Anatomy turns to the sciences for analogies primarily because the sciences are the most formalized branch of the family of activities to which literary criticism belongs. Whether the development of the sciences was a prior condition for the development of the other branches of inquiry is a matter of speculation and not fundamentally important to this discussion. The important thing, as far as the Anatomy is concerned, is that the sciences are there, and that they provide the Anatomy with analogies which help to explain the new and unfamiliar procedure and structure for literary criticism which the Anatomy puts forth in terms

of something familiar and more clearly and formally organized.

The concept of inquiry provides an explanation of how the Anatomy can be a formal imitation of science without being a science itself. But the ability of the concept of inquiry to allow for the differences among related activities which arise because of their differing subject matters is even more important for the present consideration of the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science. The first approach to the Anatomy required that we establish an identity between criticism and science. The concept of inquiry, however, permits us to see the form and procedure of the Anatomy as analogous to those of science but uniquely appropriate to the subject matter literature. The Anatomy and criticism gain a degree of independence from the restrictions of science without becoming fundamentally non-scientific. The analysis of the first approach is still relevant, but it may be seen as arguing for the relatedness of science and criticism rather than for their identity. With the concept of inquiry, we can consider the ways in which literary criticism is unique among the members of the family of activities to which it belongs, unique because its subject matter--literature--is unique among subject matters.

The nature of literature as a subject matter affects the normal procedure and structure of literary

criticism in general and of the Anatomy in particular. Performances are more varied and individual than natural phenomena. In the sciences, normal procedure involves controlled experimentation and assumes that the responses of individual scientists to an experimental situation will be so nearly similar as to be for all practical purposes identical. In the first approach to the Anatomy, I introduced the concept of intersubjectivity as a substitute for the narrower concept of objectivity in order to enable us to consider the possibility that observation in literary criticism could be scientific. But in most scientific situations, observations are sufficiently uniform as to be, for all practical purposes, uniform. While we may accept the principle that all science is fundamentally non-objective, in practice most scientific situations yield such a high degree of intersubjective agreement as to be considered objective. Just as the effects of relativity may be ignored in all but a few experimental situations in physics, even though they are always present, so may the effects of individual variations in the observations of an experimental situation be ignored in most cases, even though they, too, are always there. But in literary criticism, variations in the responses of different critics to the same work of literature are often quite pronounced, and they cannot be easily ignored. If we consider the Anatomy as an imitation of science, these variations are

less crucial than if we consider it as science itself. In the present discussion, we might wish to consider intersubjectivity as an attribute particularly appropriate to performance criticisms. Intersubjectivity would become, then, an imitation of what we normally call scientific objectivity, not a substitute for it. The objectivity of most scientific experimental situations becomes a model for the intersubjectivity of normal critical procedure, a formal model which clarifies and guides critical activity without demanding that normal criticism follow the reconstructed logic of normal science.

The Anatomy uses the scientific terms "induction" and "deduction" to describe the process by which observation is developed into theory and theory is applied to particular works of literature. If we take into account the nature of literature as a subject matter and the nature of the critical response to literature, however, we see these terms as analogies for the procedure of the Anatomy rather than as a description of that procedure. There is in the Anatomy an alternation between direct observation of literature, which yields the discovery of patterns of relationships among literary phenomena, and the application of these patterns to particular works of literature. We may call this alternation a rhythm of observation and the creation and application of patterns of relationships. This rhythm

is a formal imitation of the scientific process of induction and deduction within the context of criticism. There is a common concern in science and criticism with the primary importance of the data and a common attempt to organize the data into meaningful patterns of relationship. To describe the alternation of observation, pattern formation, and pattern application in the Anatomy as induction, theory formation, and deduction is to state that there is a relationship of proportion between the procedure of criticism and the procedure of science, while at the same time recognizing that the specific forms of normal criticism and normal science vary according to the nature of the subject matter which each examines. Again, the scientific terminology and procedure is used as a model for criticism, a model for explanation without being a model for direct emulation.

The general effect of viewing the Anatomy as an analogy to science, then, is to provide for the Anatomy a model which may be used as a point of reference in explaining the kind of procedures which the Anatomy proposes for the conduct of criticism. As long as we are considering the general procedure of normal criticism, the main difference between the first approach and the second approach to the Anatomy is the relaxing of the requirements which the concept of criticism as science imposed on the Anatomy's critical procedure. When we consider the implications of the concept of the Anatomy

as a formal imitation of science for theory formation, however, the differences between the first approach to the Anatomy and the second are more specific and significant.

The concept of the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science, in which an analogy of proportions holds between literary criticism and science, implies that the formal structures of criticism and science are parallel without being identical. In the first approach to the Anatomy, the theoretical structure of the Anatomy was presented in such a way as to establish an identity between the symbolic generalizations of science and of criticism, between the definitions of the Anatomy and the laws of science. Similarly, the theories of the Anatomy were presented as formal organizations of the relationships among the symbolic generalizations, or definitions, which were identical with the theories of the sciences which formally organize scientific laws. When we consider the Anatomy as an imitation of science, however, a parallel system of formal structures is set up between criticism and science in which metaphor and myth are seen as formal imitations of law and theory. Within the context of criticism, metaphor is the appropriate form for symbolic generalizations, and myth is the appropriate form for theory, or pattern of organizations.

It has been held against the Anatomy that it uses metaphor and myth as its basis for the organization of

literary data. George Whalley expresses the objections to the use of metaphor and myth as structural units and forms in literary criticism:

> Although the suggested unification of the literary field is highly intriguing, the attempt to make criticism an autonomous universe is less convincing. A close reading of the book shows that in fact this is not criticism-as-science, but rather the use of science as a "suggestive analogy." For "hypothesis" in the definition of a poem as a "hypothetical verbal structure" is not hypothesis in the scientist's sense; and the "identity" that occurs in metaphor is not the same as the identity that occurs in a mathematical equation. . . . Again, myth and archetype are regarded as "structural principles" organizing literature; yet it is not clear how a pattern can organize.[2]

Whalley presents a key to the explanation of his objections to the Anatomy's use of scientific terminology in describing the structures of criticism even as he presents those objections. For if we consider science as the "suggestive analogy" which Whalley says it is, the Anatomy's use of scientific terminology to describe the structure of criticism becomes an asset rather than a liability.

If the Anatomy is a formal imitation of science, then metaphor is the critical equivalent of the equation or law in science, and myth is the critical equivalent of scientific theory. If we consider symbolic generalizations as a basic component of inquiry, the laws stated in mathematical terms become the particular manifestation of symbolic generalizations appropriate to science, and the relationships stated in meta-

phor become the particular manifestation of symbolic generalizations appropriate to criticism. Similarly, larger formal patterns of organization of symbolic generalizations are the primary structural components of inquiry. These formal patterns take the form of theories in science and of myths in criticism. The identity implied by metaphor need not be exactly the same as the identity expressed in an equation; given the nature of literature, the metaphor need not be as exact as the equation. And the patterns of organization of myths need not be exactly the same as the formal structures of scientific theories. These structural units and forms need only hold parallel positions within the overall systems of their own inquiries and serve equivalent functions.

In the Tentative Conclusion to the Anatomy, Frye himself suggests a view of metaphor and myth which fits in well with the idea of the Anatomy as an imitation of science. Frye asserts a similarity between the languages of mathematics and literature. Both languages, Frye says, are essentially self-contained and create their own universes, universes which are not restricted by the external world. The application of mathematics to the physical universe does not demonstrate the "reality" of mathematics. Rather, it involves a restatement of the conditions of the physical universe in terms of the hypothetical and self-contained language of mathe-

matics:

> Mathematics is at first a form of understanding an objective world regarded as its content, but in the end it conceives of the content as being itself mathematical in form, and when a conception of a mathematical universe is reached, form and content become the same thing.[3]

We have seen in our discussion of the Anatomy as science that science does not merely describe the objective world, but, instead, recreates that world in a language which is man-made. Mathematics is the language which the sciences most often use to translate the non-human physical universe into humanly understandable terms. And mathematics is a human language, ultimately responsible only to the premises established by its creators. Mathematics, Frye says,

> . . . appears to be a kind of informing or constructing principle in the natural sciences: it continually gives shape and coherence to them without being itself dependent on external proof or evidence, and yet finally the physical or quantitative universe appears to be contained by mathematics.[4]

The similarity which Frye perceives between mathematics and literature as special, self-contained, "hypothetical" languages leads him to suggest a function for metaphor and myth in the human behavioral analyses which is equivalent to the function of mathematics in the sciences. There is, Frye suggests, a

> . . . curious similarity in form, for instance, between the units of literature and of mathematics, the metaphor and the equation. Both of

> these are, in the expanded sense of the term employed by many logicians, tautologies. But if the analogy is to hold, the question arises: is literature like mathematics in being substantially useful, and not just incidentally so? That is, is it true that the verbal structures of psychology, anthropology, theology, history, law, and everything else built out of words have been informed or constructed by the same kind of myths and metaphors that we find, in their original hypothetical form in literature?
>
> The possibility that seems to me suggested by the present discussion is as follows. Discursive verbal structures have two aspects, one descriptive, the other constructive, a content and a form. What is descriptive is sigmatic: that is, it establishes a verbal replica of external phenomena, and its verbal symbolism is to be understood as a set of representative signs. But whatever is constructive in any verbal structure seems to me to be invariably some kind of metaphor or hypothetical identification, whether it is established among different meanings of the same word or by the use of a diagram. The assumed metaphors in their turn become the units of the myth or constructive principle of the argument. While we read, we are aware of a sequence of metaphorical identifications; when we have finished, we are aware of an organizing structural pattern or conceptualized myth.[5]

Frye follows this remarkable speculation on the function of myth and metaphor as structural principles in the verbal disciplines with specific examples from psychology. We are used to thinking, Frye says, of Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex as

> . . . a psychological conception that throws some light on literary criticism. Perhaps we shall eventually decide that we have got it the wrong way round: that what happened was that the myth of Oedipus informed and gave structure to some psychological investigations at this point. Freud would in that case be exceptional only in having been well read enough to spot the source of the myth.

> It now looks as though the psychological discovery of an oracular mind "underneath" the conscious one forms an appropriate allegorical explanation of a poetic archetype that has run through literature from the cave of Trophonius to our own day. Perhaps it was the archetype that informed the discovery: it is after all considerably older, and to explain it in this way would involve us in less anachronism. The informing of metaphysical and theological constructs by poetic myth, or by associations and diagrams analogous to poetic myths, is even more obvious.[6]

Frye even goes so far as to suggest that the myth of the sleeping beauty may inform the structure of Rousseau's theory that modern civilization is an encrustation upon an originally pure and rational society waiting to be freed from the corruptions with which modern man has covered it.[7] The important thing here, Frye says, is not to demonstrate that Rousseau had the myth of the sleeping beauty in mind when he put forth his own theory, but to recognize that such a myth may provide the ". . . source of coherence of his argument."[8] Such examples, though they are limited, provide fascinating illustrations of the possibility that the language of metaphor and myth, in its "pure" literary form, may provide the structure of much of the human behavioral analyses.

Frye does not go on to apply his speculations about the uses of myth and metaphor as structural principles in the verbal disciplines to literary criticism. But then that would hardly be necessary. The Anatomy consistently uses metaphor and myth to provide structure to

its version of systematic criticism. We may consider the definitions of the Anatomy, its symbolic generalizations, as metaphors, since they, like all definitions, provide a relationship between a term and its meanings, a kind of identity. More conventional metaphors abound in the Anatomy. And the use of myth as a structural principle in the four critical theories is apparent, particularly in the complex and elaborate "unimyth" of the Theory of Myths. There is certainly a sense in which W.K. Wimsatt's characterization of Frye's work as "criticism as myth"[9] is quite appropriate. The idea of a "myth of myths" may at first seem strange, but in literary criticism we are presented with the unique situation of organizing data by using structures inherent in the phenomena from which that data comes. Once we have gotten beyond the initial strangeness of the idea, it should seem reasonable.

I have suggested, then, that the concept of criticism as an imitation of science implies the equivalency of theory and myth, law and metaphor. Or, to put it somewhat differently, that metaphor and myth are formal analogies of law and theory. Indeed, one might say that for the Anatomy criticism is myth-math. One significant question remains, however, a question raised by Whalley in his comments on the Anatomy: Can metaphor and myth really provide explanations for the relationships among literary phenomena? Can a "pattern" organize?

There seems to me to be no great difficulty in saying that a pattern, in this case the pattern of a myth, can organize literary phenomena in a manner analogous to that in which scientific theories organize the phenomena of the physical universe. What, after all, is a theory, if it is not a pattern? The real question may be whether myths are arbitrary and artificial in a way that theories are not. If myths have independent existence, can they be reasonably applied as patterns of organization to the objective world of literary phenomena? Again, if we accept the comparison which Frye makes between mathematics and literature, there is no great problem in accepting the application of the "pure" language of metaphor and myth to external objective phenomena in criticism.

In the final analysis, the question of the applicability of myth and metaphor as structural principles in criticism will be answered in a manner analogous to that with which we approach theories and laws in science. The organizing myths of the Anatomy, like scientific theories, may be tested in two ways, by examining their internal consistency and by checking them against the phenomena which they purport to organize. It is not my purpose here to make those tests, though the organizing myths of the Anatomy do seem to be internally consistent. Indeed, they are often criticized for being too consistent. As for whether they are accurate, that is,

whether they may be successfully applied to literary phenomena as organizing patterns, only tests will be able to demonstrate. The same procedure is open to critics as is open to scientists who would test theories, that is, the procedure of experimentation. Extensive intersubjective analysis will yield the verdict on the Anatomy's theories. Yet the important thing here is not whether the particular myths, or theories if you will, of the Anatomy are sufficient to provide a basis for systematic criticism, but whether it is possible to test the myths at all. Since the possibility is clearly there, and since many critics have chosen to deal with the adequacy and accuracy of one or more of these myths, they may seriously be considered as formal organizing patterns for criticism.

The second approach to the Anatomy assumes that the Anatomy is a formal imitation of science in which a formal analogy holds: literary criticism is to the literary universe as science is to the natural universe. Metaphor and myth are the organizing units and structures of criticism as law and theory are the organizing units and structures of science. If we make use of the concept of inquiry, seeing criticism and the sciences as members of parallel branches of a family of analytical activities, the second approach has certain definite advantages. As compared to the first approach, in which the Anatomy is considered to be literally science, the second

approach allows us to have our cake and eat it, too. We are able to see the Anatomy as analogous to science, to use the more familiar terms and forms of science to help us to understand the structure and procedure of the Anatomy. We can even retain most of the explanations of the Anatomy in terms of science which were used in the first approach. At the same time, the concept of criticism as a formal imitation of science frees criticism from the restrictions of a too slavish emulation of the reconstructed logic of science. On the other hand, if the Anatomy is a formal imitation of science rather than science itself, it may lose a certain degree of credibility as a candidate for acceptance as the basis for a systematic reorganization of the whole field of literary criticism. Science, after all, is the religion of our century, and the ability to establish that something is "scientific" is often the key to its success. In any case, the concept of the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science offers an interesting variation on the theme of the first approach.

NOTES

1. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964).

2. George Whalley, rev. of Anatomy, Modern Language Review, 54 (1959), 108-109.

3. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 352.

4. Anatomy, p. 352.

5. Anatomy, pp. 352-53.

6. Anatomy, p. 353.

7. Anatomy, p. 353.

8. Anatomy, pp. 353-54.

9. Cf. W.K. Wimsatt, "Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth," in Northrop Frye in Contemporary Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 75-107.

IV

THE THIRD APPROACH: THE ANATOMY AS A PARODY OF SCIENCE

The third approach to the Anatomy is based upon an ironic interpretation of the central symbol "science." According to this interpretation, the Anatomy is an intentional parody of science. This parody takes the form indicated by the Anatomy of Criticism's title, the form that Frye calls "Menippean satire" or "anatomy."[1] The formal structure of the Menippean satire is a ". . . vision of the world in terms of a single intellectual pattern."[2] The Menippean satirist proceeds ". . . by piling up an enormous mass of erudition about his theme . . ."[3] The term "anatomy," as it is used in the title of Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, Frye explains, ". . . means a dissection or analysis, and expresses very accurately the intellectualized approach of his form."[4] The single intellectual pattern which provides the terms of the Anatomy's vision of the (literary) world is the structure of science, especially scientific theory. The continual heaping up of specific illustrations is a parody of the exhaustive experimentation of science. As an anatomy, the Anatomy is wit-

criticism, a tremendous collection of brilliant, specific perceptions held together by an intricate structure carefully constructed to parody science. This structure is, in the last analysis, arbitrary. It serves to hold together and provide a rhetorical context for the specific perceptions of wit-criticism.

Frye identifies two kinds of anatomies, one entirely fantastic, the other entirely moral.[5] If we presume that the Anatomy is not intended to be entirely fantastic, then we may take it as a moral anatomy. "The purely moral type" of Menippean satire, Frye says, "is a serious vision of society as a single intellectual pattern, in other words a Utopia."[6] And what is the most appropriate form for a utopia in the 20th century? The religious utopia began to be superseded by the scientific utopia with The New Atlantis. If a 20th century critic wishes to put his specific critical observations into utopian form, the most appropriate form is scientific, for science is the key to modern man's heaven. The concept of the Anatomy as a parody of science involves an ironic interpretation of "science" in the Anatomy none the less, for, in this interpretation, the Anatomy is not really scientific at all.

The third approach to the Anatomy involves a shift from a traditional and classical perspective to a modern and romantic perspective. This shift is marked by several significant changes. Criticism is no longer seen as

an activity conducted by a community, but rather as depending on the efforts of the individual critic. In the first two approaches there is a basic assumption that criticism is a community activity. The concepts of objectivity and intersubjectivity, with their built in checks on the excesses of the individual scientist or critic, imply communication and substantial agreement among the practitioners of a discipline. And in both of the first two approaches some kind of consensus among critics is required to establish the validity of a critical observation. The concept of criticism as a team effort, with a whole host of critics pursuing common goals within a common framework, is basic to both the concept of criticism as science and criticism as inquiry formally analogous to science. Such a concept is traditional and classical in its view of the conduct of a discipline and, indeed, of human affairs in general.

The ironic concept of criticism as a parody of science, in contrast, involves a typically romantic emphasis on the individual rather than the common. If the Anatomy is viewed as Menippean satire, it is seen as a highly individual and idiosyncratic effort. Despite his insistence that he wishes to unify the field of criticism, Frye's critical system and procedure may easily be seen as unlike those of any other critic. Frye's argument that the Anatomy is deductive in form because such a form is more convenient for communicating his critical obser-

vations may simply be a cover for the fact that the Anatomy, though firmly rooted in literature, is not really inductive at all. If we view the Anatomy as highly personalized Menippean satire, the authoritative tone which Frye adopts throughout becomes that of the oracle, not the communal authority of science. Frye's critical insights, though they may be checked--by the individual--against the literature from which they arise, require no corroboration from other critics. As one reads the Anatomy, it often seems that the basic forms of critical communication are the aside and the parenthesis, along with the oracle. The home of wit-criticism is Delphi, not Cambridge.

Nowhere is the difference between the classical approaches to the Anatomy and the romantic approach more evident than in their differing views of the nature of critical system itself. As we move from the second approach to the third approach, there is a shift from concern with form to concern with process. Whether criticism is viewed as a science or as an inquiry formally analogous to science, the forms of the discipline take precedence over the processes. The precedence is a formal precedence. In a science or an inquiry, observation and perception chronologically precede theory or myth. But since the observations do not become significant until they are shown to be formally inter-related, theory and myth may be said to logically

precede the individual observation. Since observations usually become meaningful only when they are fitted into a pattern, the pattern may be said to be the most significant element of a scientific discipline. When we think of science or of an inquiry, we think of it primarily in terms of its reconstructed logic, the forms of theory and myth which provide meaning for individual events and phenomena. Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, for example, assumes that particular scientific disciplines are established, defined, and governed by formal paradigms, and that a science changes fundamentally when the basic forms which provide its framework of reconstructed logic are superseded by new forms. The new paradigm, according to Kuhn, redefines normal science in a particular scientific discipline. Procedure follows paradigm; function follows form.[7]

Wit-criticism, in the other hand, replaces concern for form with a modern and romantic concern for process. According to this view, it is the critical process and the specific critical insights which arise from this process which are of primary importance. The formal structure of theory or myth is merely a convenient way to organize and communicate what would otherwise be a mass of unorganized perceptions. The perceptions do not gain in validity by being put into the context of a certain form, they are merely easier to assimilate. Classification becomes primarily pedagogical. The system is

both arbitrary and disposable. Once it has been used as a vehicle for the organization and communication of critical insights, it may be "knocked away," since it is "mere scaffolding."[8] The rather casual manner in which Frye suggests that his system may be replaced at the reader's discretion suggests both the relative unimportance of the system and a highly personal and individual concept of criticism. Like other romantic critical systems--Coleridge's Biographia Literaria, Poe's Eureka--the Anatomy, in this view, is sui generis. In wit-criticism, form itself becomes part of the process. The forms of the Anatomy's theories or myths are part of the process by which the individual critical insights are communicated. Theory follows procedure; form follows function.

The most significant changes implied by the shift from the classical approaches to the romantic approach are those from community to individual and from form to process. There is also a shift in the perception of the tone of the Anatomy as well. Science and inquiry, as impersonal community activities, develop languages which strive to be precise, concise, and devoid of individual idiosyncrasies. Much of scientific writing is pervaded not only by attempts to make language purely logical and objective, but also by a certain severity. By these standards, the language of the Anatomy is baroque at best--and rococco at worst. The terminology becomes

overly complicated and involuted, crying out for simplification. And the tone may be considered inappropriate for the conduct of scientific inquiry, even irreverent. If we consider the Anatomy to be a parody of science, however, our perception changes. The language of the Anatomy becomes both an erudite parody of erudition and a joy in itself.

Wit and humor not only pervade the Anatomy, they help to sustain it. The exuberant style and irreverent tone, so inappropriate to discursive scientific exposition, are a vital part of the Anatomy's form and process. Yet Frye has been roundly condemned for attempting to hold together his poetics through sheer force and brilliance of style. W.K. Wimsatt, in the passage noted earlier,[9] is critical, even sarcastic, in his discussion of the intricacies of Frye's system and terminology. Andrew von Hendy describes the system as "alexandrian."[10] And Meyer Abrams, in an otherwise favorable review of the Anatomy, sounds a strong cautionary note:

> Such criticism is animating; though only so, it should be noted, when conducted with Frye's special brio, and when it manifests a mind, like his, which is deft, resourceful, and richly stored. And intuitive perception of similarity in dissimilars, Aristotle noted, is a sign of genius and cannot be learned from others. Wit-criticism, like poetic wit, is dangerous, because to fall short of the highest is to fail dismally, and to succeed, it must be managed by a Truewit and not by a Witwoud.[11]

From a romantic and modern point of view, however, it is just these qualities which are fundamental. What the

classical critic condemns, the romantic critic praises. Through brilliant and perceptive insights and witty systematization Frye has, indeed, been able to "bring it off," to be a Truewit.

Though Frye may be said to have "brought it off," however, it should not be said that he has "put us on." The Anatomy, as Menippean satire, is not mere play. Andrew von Hendy, in an article examining the Anatomy as romantic poetics, emphasizes its playfulness. But von Hendy insists that

> Frye means his "single intellectual pattern" to be taken seriously, of course; the Anatomy is central to his critical achievement precisely because its principles pervade his entire critical career, but in the Anatomy he chooses to remind us of the element of play in his work. Frye illustrates the concept of "anatomy" primarily by referring to Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, from which he borrowed the word. And when he describes Burton's achievement as a "creative treatment of exhaustive erudition," I think we are right to suppose that he has his own "anatomy" in mind.[12]

Wit and playfulness, then, are not to be confused with frivolity. The Menippean satirist, like other satirists, is serious beneath and through the cleverness of his manner of presentation. And Menippean satire, like other satire, is highly moral, inextricably bound up with the author's vision of utopia.

But to view the Anatomy as a romantic poetics creates a certain dilemma. Von Hendy explains this dilemma and the nature of Frye's response to it in a concise and illuminating paragraph:

> Frye's ironic emphasis on the "creative" aspect of his literary criticism expresses, I think, a tension very deep within Romanticism. On the one hand, Frye answers Arnold's appeal. Criticism (culture) is "a disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world." On the other hand, he cannot quite forget the voice of his great inspirer saying, "to generalize is to be an idiot." The very idea of a Romantic system is full of potential contradiction. I think Frye's achievement in contemporary criticism reflects this contradiction. It is what we might expect for a Romantic poetics in a Romantic culture. Frye is widely influential because of his brilliant specific insights. But he is widely disbelieved because of his symmetrical cosmology and his Blakean vision of apocalypse. And I think his irony implies that, subconsciously at least, he accepts his fate. The traditional critic could talk of erecting a monument more lasting than bronze, but in the world of process where everything that lives must change, the Romanticist writes a poetics for Demogorgon.[15]

The dilemma of the romantic and modern critic may thus be simply put: his criticism is comprised of specific insights and perceptions, but these require some form of organization if they are to be communicated, that is, if culture is to be propagated. Yet the form which is chosen to organize these perceptions, even if it is unique and individually constructed to the critic's needs, is necessarily inadequate. For the critic's perceptions change, and by the time he has organized them they are no longer the same. Like the weapons in our modern arsenals, the modern romantic poetics is obsolete by the time it is formulated. Modern man has sought to alleviate his formal difficulties by chang-

ing the analogies which he uses to describe the nature of the form which organizes and unifies his particulars. The clockwork machine has given way to the organism as the dominant metaphor for organizational form; mechanically consistent movement has been replaced by growth as the metaphor for organizing procedure. But this very change in metaphors suggests the ultimate futility of trying to create a romantic system for the ages, no matter what the subject. Frye's title is well chosen--his is an anatomy of criticism, a description of the vital changing literary universe. Like all anatomies it must continue to change and grow, as the universe of its phenomena changes and grows, and that growth may be complicated by permutations which do not fit the fixed systems of our classical forbears. The Anatomy may be a full and comprehensive system for Frye's own criticism--at the moment. But the moment has already passed, and a new Anatomy, however slightly changed, is already overdue.

The romantic tension in the Anatomy between the need for system and the final inadequacy of any particular system could easily lead the modern critic to the abandonment of all attempts to organize his field of study. Criticism has existed in chaos for years, and it seems in moments of quiet desperation that chaos will always reign. Yet the critic cannot abandon his attempts to organize the literary universe as he perceives it, for

to do so would be to abandon the basis for his very existence as a critic. If all perceptions of the literary universe are allowed to stand in isolation, there may be critics, perhaps, but there will be no discipline of criticism. Before we abandon all hope of organizing criticism in a romantic age, however, we should consider the example of another discipline which has confronted dilemmas much the same as those confronting modern criticism. We may yet be able to consider the Anatomy a general guide for critical form and practice, as well as the individual systematization of an individual critic's perceptions. And what is this discipline which may be the guide to critical salvation? Oh, irony of ironies, it is science!

For nearly three centuries after Newton, the physicist's world was an orderly one. The mechanical clockwork universe described by the laws of Newtonian physics became more orderly, more nearly perfect, as research continued within the Newtonian paradigm. But beginning in the later decades of the 19th century, this ordered world began to become increasingly less, rather than more, ordered. We need not attempt a summary of the developments in physics which led to the modern crises, the problems of an ordered world become disorderly. But some consideration of a few of these developments and the nature of the modern physicist's responses to them may illuminate the situation of the modern critic. For both

the modern physicist and the modern critic confront the same sort of problem--the ordering of a constantly changing phenomenal universe.

A clear concept of the nature of matter and a set of fixed laws governing its behavior were the foundation of classical physics. Matter was conceived as consisting of indivisible particles which behaved according to laws which were constant, universal, and immutable. But the concepts and laws of classical physics have been eroded in a number of ways. We have learned that matter and energy are convertible, according to Einstein's formula. The concept of relativity tells us that the behavior of matter is relative to certain conditions, and that under the extreme condition when the velocity of matter approaches the velocity of light its behavior is remarkably different than under more usual conditions. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle indicates that we cannot know the velocity of a sub-atomic particle and its position simultaneously--we must choose in each instance to know one or the other. Perhaps most astonishing of all, we have discovered that matter isn't really matter at all, but some sort of hybrid of particle and wave. Indeed, we can no longer distinguish absolutely between matter and fields of force. Even empty space is not empty, since it is filled with light and with force fields, each of which must be some <u>thing</u> because it obviously cannot be nothing at all.

Physicists initially found these discoveries disconcerting, but the manner in which they have come to deal with them is instructive. The physicist has learned to accept uncertainty and relativity as part of the nature of his perceptions of the physical universe, and perhaps as part of the nature of the universe itself; he has learned to dwell in a world where the only absolute is that there are no absolutes. A single picture of matter has been replaced by complementary pictures. Statistical laws describing the behavior of matter in general have replaced laws which purported to describe the behavior of individual particles. And there has been a shift in concern from description of the state of the universe to description of the processes of the universe. Modern physics, like modern ethics, has become relative and contextual. Indeed, from the viewpoint of classical physics, modern physics has become a romantic science.

Northrop Frye, in his romantic poetics, seems to attempt to come to terms with the literary universe within a modern context in much the same way that modern physicists come to terms with a changing universe. Uncertainty and relativity are accepted as part of poetics in the Anatomy. Frye's poetics is a poetics of the moment, and like the physicist's description of the state of a system which is obsolete a moment after observation, Frye's description of the literary universe is itself relative

to the moment. It must and will be superseded. Yet criticism has at least the advantage of a slower pace of change than physics, and the Anatomy may be able to stand longer than some of the present structure of physics.

We have already seen that the Anatomy, like modern physics, accepts the principle that its most fundamental phenomena must be viewed from more than one perspective, that complementary views are necessary for full comprehension. The definitions of the Anatomy are also similar to the symbolic generalizations of modern physics in that they are essentially statistical laws. The definition of a generic name such as epos is arrived at by abstraction from many particular examples, as statistical laws are arrived at through the analysis of the cumulative effects of vast numbers of individual phenomena. Each particular phenomenon, literary or physical, may deviate to some degree from the statistical norm. Yet a literary work may be perceived as epos if it falls within the "statistical range" described by the term. Like those of contemporary physics, the forms and procedures of the Anatomy seem less concerned with describing what literary phenomena are than with explaining how they are related. The Anatomy is more an attempt to describe what goes on in the literary universe than the state it is in. Or we may wish to say that the state of the literary universe, like that of the physical universe, is not static but dynamic. Perhaps it must be tracked rather than

mapped.

Even more than physics, biology may provide a model for the Anatomy. Biology is the 20th centruy science, both historically and metaphorically. Concerned with growth and change rather than stasis, it seems the appropriate science for development by modern man. There is an interesting coincidence in the emergence of biology and the dominance of organic metaphors over the past century and a half. These metaphors were part of the romantic vocabulary before biology became the pre-eminent modern science, and one cannot help but wonder whether the increasing tendency to replace mechanical metaphors with organic ones in the arts may have been a signal of, and even perhaps an encouragement for, the emergence of biology later in the romantic age.

Biology is the science which describes the growth and development of organisms; it deals with living things. Since the biologist must extrapolate from what he knows of the past development of an organism, prediction of the future development of the organism is always full of uncertainties. The biologist knows that there may be mutations which result from conditions impossible to foresee, even impossible to discover after the fact. The development of some species cannot even be fully explained in retrospect, no matter how fully it is recorded. The Darwinian concept of the "survival of the fit-

test" may be more practically stated as the "survival of the survivors." "Fitness" is here defined by survival, and we can only assume that the fittest species have survived if we make survival the primary defining characteristic of fitness. The biologist, like the romantic critic, lives in a world of change. He can only describe the world as it is at the moment. All statements about the world as it might be in the future must contain some degree of speculative extrapolation.

The organizing classifications of the Anatomy seem much like those of biology, and Frye notes in his introduction that he intends to follow Aristotle's practice of dividing literature into genre and species. Myth and archetype seem particularly appropriate forms for a critical taxonomy, creating a system which is at once systematic and flexible, allowing for growth. Myth and archetype are forms which are at once constant and changing. The idealized or abstract form of a myth or archetype may have an indefinite number of particular manifestations in literature, past, present, and future. Or, to put it in Frye's terms, they may be indefinitely displaced. They allow for mutations, and, like the classifications of biology, they may even be restructured to yield new categories. The myths Frye provides as formal structures for the Anatomy share these characteristics of literary myths. They can accomodate growth in the literary universe and in the perceptions which comprise

the specific insights of criticism, all the while shaping and containing the growth of the literary universe in forms which make it comprehensible. The biological form of taxonomy and procedure of dissection seem to provide especially fitting analogies for the form and procedure of the Anatomy. And what better analogy could there be for the Anatomy than anatomy!

The analogies from physics and biology do not, however, resolve the tensions and paradoxes involved in the concept of wit-criticism, or romantic poetics, though they may help to make us more receptive to the concept. For to say that these sciences are relative rather than absolute is to suggest that science, too, in this modern age has become romantic. There may be some consolation for criticism in this discovery, but the concept of a romantic poetics, built upon a parody of science and written with full ironic knowledge of its contradictions, is still a bit disconcerting. That this poetics may be taken as a model for the critical practice of others is more disconcerting yet. But in a romantic age, from a romantic perspective, such a model may finally have to be accepted, for it is the only kind of criticism which can accomodate itself to the demands, and the knowledge, of the age. The closest we can come to experiment and theory may be to compose a poetics which is episodic and encyclopedic, a poetics of dissection and taxonomic classification. The example of the Anatomy suggests that

such a poetics in the hands of Truewit is certainly more than adequate. And as the sciences themselves have had to learn, a parody of science may now be the best science of all.

NOTES

1. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 309-12.

2. Anatomy, p. 310.

3. Anatomy, p. 311.

4. Anatomy, p. 311.

5. Anatomy, p. 310.

6. Anatomy, p. 310.

7. Cf. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (1962, rev. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 10-22.

8. Anatomy, p. 29.

9. W.K. Wimsatt, "Northrop Frye: Criticism as Myth," in Northrop Frye in Contemporary Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 92-93. Cf. p. 30 above.

10. Andrew von Hendy, "A Poetics for Demogorgon: Northrop Frye and Modern Criticism," Criticism, 8 (1966), 334.

11. Meyer Abrams, "Anatomy of Criticism," University of Toronto Quarterly, 28 (1959), 196.

12. Von Hendy, p. 335.

13. Von Hendy, p. 335.

V

THE FOURTH APPROACH: THE ANATOMY AS A VISION OF CULTURE

The fourth approach to the Anatomy is based upon an anagogic interpretation of its use of the central symbol "science." According to this interpretation, the Anatomy is an attempt to provide a basis for a total vision of human culture in which the "two cultures," science and criticism, become one. The procedure of the Anatomy, viewed anagogically, is a search for identities which subsumes both scientific experiment and critical insight. The form of the Anatomy, viewed anagogically, is a total vision of human culture which subsumes both scientific theory, constructed of laws, and critical myth, constructed of metaphorical identifications. In the anagogic interpretation of the Anatomy, the scientific and mathematical form of identity, the equation, and the critical and literary form of identity, the metaphor, are united in one radical form of pure identity, the monad.

The anagogic approach to the Anatomy is based on Frye's own concept of anagogic meaning, and his use of the anagogic approach to literature in the Anatomy may serve as a model for an anagogic approach to the Anatomy

itself. In the Theory of Symbols, Frye explains his concept of anagogic meaning in this manner:

> In the anagogic aspect of meaning, the radical form of metaphor, "A is B," comes into its own. Here we are dealing with poetry in its totality, in which the formula "A is B" may be applied to anything, for there is no metaphor, not even "black is white," which the reader has any right to quarrel with in advance. The literary universe, therefore, is a universe in which everything is potentially identical with everything else. This does not mean that any two things in it are separate and very similar, like two peas in a pod, or in the slangy and erroneous sense of the word in which we speak of identical twins. If twins were really identical they would be the same person. On the other hand, a grown man feels identical with himself at the age of seven, although the two manifestations of this identity, the man and the boy, have very little in common as regards similarity or likeness. In form, matter, personality, time, and space, man and boy are quite unlike. This is the only type of image I can think of that illustrates the process of identifying two independent forms. All poetry, then, proceeds as though all poetic images were contained within a single universal body. Identity is the opposite of similarity or likeness, and total identity is not uniformity, still less monotony, but unity of various things.[1]

This discussion of the anagogic aspect of meaning is supplemented in the Anatomy by Frye's definition of the symbol in its anagogic phase, what he calls "symbol as monad." Frye does not define "monad" in his text, but he does supply a definition in his glossary:

> A symbol in its aspect as a center of one's total literary experience, related to Hopkins's term "inscape" and to Joyce's term "epiphany."[2]

Frye's explanation of the anagogic phase of symbol and of the anagogic aspect of meaning require some clarifica-

tion. Here, as elsewhere in the Anatomy, it becomes necessary to interpret for Frye as well as to interpret Frye.

The anagogic interpretation of meaning in literature is the logical radical form of Frye's general assumption of the total coherence of the literary universe. The literary universe, as Frye explains elsewhere in the Anatomy, is like the mathematical universe. It is fundamentally self-contained, and only the general postulates of the literary universe and the specific postulates of the particular work determine the final meaning of a work of literature.[3] Since there are no prior theoretical limitations on any metaphor in literature (though there may, of course, be such limitations in other forms of discourse), all metaphors are created equal and are equally permissible, at least until they are limited by a specific context. From an anagogic perspective, the literary universe consists of an indefinite number of literary identities, or metaphors, as the mathematical universe consists of an indefinite number of mathematical identities, or equations. Conceived spatially, the literary universe thus becomes the great circle of the Theory of Myths, in whose still center stands the verbal sign of identity, "is," as the mathematical sign of identity, (=), stands in the center of the mathematical universe.

The definition which Frye supplies for "monad," the

literary symbol viewed anagogically, is vague and demands some clarification as well. "Monad," we are told, is a symbol ". . . in its aspect as a center of one's total literary experience. . ." That we are also told that "monad" is related to "inscape" and "epiphany" is of little help in understanding the term, since Frye refuses to explain the nature of the relationship. And neither of these two terms is sufficiently precise to provide much assistance in defining another. From Frye's general description of anagogic meaning, however, we may come to a more specific idea of what he means when he calls a symbol a "monad." A "monad" seems to be a metaphor in its purest form, that is, a one term metaphor which identifies two terms so completely and compactly in its one as to eliminate the need for the sign of identity, "is."

Our understanding of the concept of monad is hampered not only by the lack of clarity in Frye's definition, but also by his failure to provide an adequate specific example. The man/boy image attempts to illustrate the concept, but this illustration present difficulties. If monad in its pure form is a single term or image or symbol which establishes an identity between two terms, then the term "man/boy," which is the closest we can come to a single image of Frye's example, is obviously inadequate, for it is not really an "image" at all. The yoking together of terms which is here required

is indeed a bit violent. Perhaps if we were to substitute for "man/boy" the term "Northrop Frye" we would have a monad, for "Northrop Frye" as monad presumably combines all possible manifestations of the individual whom it identifies. This example would probably appeal to Frye himself, but there is a better illustration of monad possible.

We might see the child as a monad of his parents. Adam and Eve, complementary and antithetical human beings, come together in marriage, and in marriage they "become one." This oneness is manifest in their child: he is the image of both and of each. The two parents are radically identified in the single child, and the child may be called the monad which unites the variety or antithesis of the parents in a single identity, an identity which maintains the integrity of the identities which combined to create it. In a similar manner, the literary symbol as monad unites the identities of its creating terms into a single identity which is composed of both. To carry the analogy further, we may see all the generations of Adam and Eve as a collection of monads of humanity, each child recreating humanity anew. And since each child is a recreation of humanity through the combining of its antithetical or complementary parents, each child as a monad of humanity is identical with all other children. In the literary universe, each metaphor is a monad of literature, presenting in its form the fundamental

qualities of literary identity, as the child presents the fundamental qualities of human identity. And each metaphor, as monad, is then identical with all other metaphors, as each child is identical with all other children, while at the same time both metaphor and child maintain separate and distinct identities. This analogy between the child as monad and the metaphor as monad serves to demonstrate how, in Frye's terms, "Identity is the opposite of similarity or likeness, and total identity is not uniformity, still less monotony, but unity of various things."[4]

The anagogic approach to literature assumes that the symbol as monad may unite or "identify" any two terms. But in Frye's actual practice in the Anatomy, anagogic criticism consistently unites complementary or antithetical terms, as, in my analogy, the child unites the antithetical terms of male and female, Adam and Eve.[5] I noted earlier Frye's advice that the best way to resolve antitheses is to ". . . get beyond the antithetical way of stating the problem."[6] One way to get beyond the antithetical way of stating a problem is through the use of multiple perspectives, the primary method of both this essay and of the Anatomy. But there is an alternative method for getting beyond antithetical ways of perceiving things, the anagogic method which unites opposites in a single identity.[7] And while the primary method of the Anatomy is analysis of literature through the use of mul-

tiple perspectives, there is an underlying anagogic strain throughout the work. Indeed, one is tempted to view the Anatomy as an attempt to combine the variety of multiple perspectives with the unity of the anagogic method. While anagogic criticism is present throughout the Anatomy, a few samples will serve to illustrate the strain.

The first essay of the Anatomy, the Theory of Modes, contains a number of antitheses which are resolved through anagogic criticism. The essay begins with the organization of historical criticism in the form of a pattern of historical modes, beginning with myth and progressing through romance, high mimetic, and low mimetic, to the ironic mode.[8] This arrangement of the modes is linear. But in closing his discussion of the ironic mode, Frye notes the similarities between certain works in the ironic mode, such as Kafka's Trial, and myth. On the basis of his observation of similarities between the ironic mode and the mythic mode Frye observes:

> Irony descends from the low mimetic: it begins in realism and dispassionate observation. But as it does so, it moves steadily towards myth, and dim outlines of sacrificial rituals and dying gods begin to reappear in it. Our five modes evidently go around in a circle.[9]

What began as a linear sequence has become a circular one, and in the Theory of Modes the line and the circle, antithetical forms, become one. The theory or myth of modes, as a pattern of relationships, may then be symbolized by

the cycle, a geometric monad which unites line and circle.

Frye continues his anagogic approach in the first essay with his discussion of the two forms which literature takes in each mode, the fictional and the thematic. Frye posits a continuum, with pure thematic literature, where "dianoia," or "poetic thought," is of primary interest at one end, and pure fictional literature, where "mythos," or organizing pattern (plot), is of primary interest at the other end. No actual work of literature, however, is found to be purely thematic or purely fictional. Though some works, such as Pilgrim's Progress, are primarily thematic and others, such as Tom Jones, are primarily fictional, each of these two works, and all other literary works, combine the fictional and thematic modes. Here it is the individual work of literature which becomes the monad, uniting the antitheses of theme and plot, dianoia and mythos, content and form.[10]

The first essay also uses the anagogic approach to unite the antithetical forms of lyric and epic, or, as Frye prefers to call them, "episodic" and "encyclopeadic" forms.[11] To unite these forms anagogically, we must go beyond the individual work to the literary universe as a whole, or at least to one of the five specific historical modes. Frye concludes the Theory of Modes by suggesting an anagogic approach to the resolution of the traditional antithesis of Aristotelian catharsis and Lon-

ginian ecstasis. He contrasts these two fundamental kinds of human response to literature, catharsis, which is generally a community response appropriate to such forms as drama and epic, and ecstasis, which is generally an individualized response appropriate to such forms as lyric.[12] While he does not indicate specifically how these two responses may be united, it is clear that they are to be united in the individual who responds to literature, either in his response to an individual work or in his response to literature in general. In uniting these responses it is the reader who becomes the monad.

From the second essay, the Theory of Symbols, we may select one or two more examples of anagogic criticism at work. In his discussion of the symbol as image, Frye further unifies the aspects of literature which he calls dianoia and mythos. "The mythos," Frye says,

> is the dianoia in movement; the dianoia is the mythos in stasis. One reason why we tend to think of literary symbolism in terms of meaning is that we have ordinarily no word for the moving body of imagery in a work of literature. The word form has normally two complementary terms, matter and content, and it perhaps makes some distinction whether we think of form as a shaping principle or a containing one. As shaping principle, it may be thought of as narrative, organizing temporally what Milton called, in an age of more exact terminology, the "matter" of his song. As containing principle, it may be thought of as meaning, holding the poem together in a simultaneous structure.[13]

Although Frye here defines mythos and dianoia in terms of each other, further unifying them, it is again the work

of literature itself in which the stationary and moving aspects of form are united and which becomes the monad which resolves their opposition without destroying their differences.

The Theory of Symbols contains Frye's discussion of the anagogic phase of symbol with which we began this chapter. In a later part of that discussion, Frye uses anagogic criticism to resolve the old antithesis between instruction and delight in literature. He again uses mathematics as an analogy for literature:

> What we have now is a conception of literature as a body of hypothetical creations which is not necessarily involved in the worlds of truth and fact, nor necessarily withdrawn from them, but which may enter into any kind of relationship to them, ranging from the most to the least explicit. We are strongly reminded of the relationship of mathematics to the natural sciences. Mathematics, like literature, proceeds hypothetically and by internal consistency, not descriptively and by outward fidelity to nature. When it is applied to external facts, it is not its truth but its applicability which is being verified.[14]

The term Frye uses to describe the relationship between the hypothetical world of literature and the real world is "potential." "The conception of art as having a relation to reality which is neither direct nor negative, but potential," Frye says, "finally resolves the dichotomy between delight and instruction."[15] The "potentiality" of literature's relationship to the external world implies the continuing possibility of such a relationship without either requiring it or judging literature by its

attainment. The concept of a "potential" relationship between literature and the external world thus serves as a sort of monad which contains the concepts of instruction and delight, utility and pleasure.

Frye's anagogic criticism reaches its full flowering in the Theory of Myths, as does also his analytical criticism. To completely summarize the Anatomy's theory of myths is a virtual impossibility, since the theory itself is already a highly concentrated version of what could easily become the foundation for a series of volumes in systematic criticism--or mythology. But we may briefly examine Frye's geometric model of the literary universe to see how his anagogic criticism is here married to his analytical criticism in a theory which is itself a more inclusive anagogic system.

Briefly put, the geometric model for Frye's literary universe consists in a circle with four primary quadrants. These quadrants, reading clockwise from high noon, represent comedy, irony and satire, tragedy, and romance. Each of these quadrants is in turn divided into six phases, the first three of which parallel the last three phases of the preceding quadrant. The upper two quadrants, romance and comedy, are what Frye calls an "analogy of innocence"; the lower two quadrants, irony and satire, and tragedy, he calls an "analogy of experience." At twelve o'clock high is the zenith of apocalyptic vision, at the point where romance and comedy come

together. At six o'clock low is the nadir of demonic vision, at the point where satire and irony come together with tragedy. The whole system is complex, even in simplified form, and presents real difficulties for those of us who were never able to learn to box a compass. In the midst of his elaboration of the Theory of Myths, Frye remarks rather casually, "A somewhat forbidding piece of symmetry turns up in our argument at this point . . ."[16] Fortunately, it is not necessary to box Frye's critical compass in order to comment on the nature of his model.

Earlier we saw Frye, in the Theory of Modes, identify the line and the circle in the cycle. This monadic identification is relatively simple since the cycle is without an interior. But in the Theory of Myths the cycle is replaced by the filled-in circle as the monadic form, identifying the circumference and the diameter. The circle has an interior and has become a containing form as well as a shaping one. And in the center of the circle is that still place to which I have referred, the location of the sign of verbal identity, "is." Any point on the circumference of the circle can be reached from another point in two ways. One may take the great circle route around the circumference from any one point to any other point, passing through up to twenty-four "phases" of myth along the way. The route around the circumference represents the analytical or taxonomic method of

criticism. But if two points are diametrically opposite, one may travel the diameter between them, passing through the center of the literary universe, the metaphor as monad, the "is." The diametric route represents the anagogic method of criticism, relating two parts of the literary universe by placing them on either side of the verbal monad. The geometric model of the literary universe as a whole thus becomes itself a monad resolving the opposition of analytical and anagogic criticism by containing them at once.

This examination of the geometric model of Frye's literary universe provides an opportunity to move from the consideration of Frye's anagogic criticism of literature to the anagogic criticism of the Anatomy itself. Here we must create a model which goes beyond the Anatomy as it stands, but which is strongly implied in the Anatomy nonetheless. This model must represent a total vision of human culture, uniting criticism and science. We may represent this total vision of human culture by a sphere, one of whose hemispheres has as its face the model of the literary universe as Frye constructs it, the other, a face consisting of a complementary model of the natural universe as constructed by the sciences. (We need not outline that model--indeed, we cannot. But we can imagine it.) Confronting one another, then, face to face, would be the myth of myths and the theory of theories, the unified representative constructs of criticism

and science. Aristotelian analysis combines with platonic form, and in the center of the sphere literary identity, the metaphor, and mathematical identity, the equation, merge. The verbal "is" and the mathematical (=) are identified in a single form of pure and complete identity which we may call Monad, with a capital M.

It is difficult to conceptualize the idea of an identity of equation and metaphor, an identity of identities. But perhaps if we return to our earlier illustration of monad this difficulty can be somewhat alleviated. The monad in our illustration was symbolized by the child of Adam and Eve. But children, like Adam and Eve, come in two varieties, male and female. In the total vision of human culture, we may see the equation as the male monad and the metaphor as the female. As each child is fully human and equally a monad for all humanity, regardless of sex, so each of the two forms of identity are equally Monad. And as each child contains both male and female hormones, so each of the two types of Monad may contain both mathematical and verbal characteristics. The sphere which contains the total vision of human culture is populated by identities of two different but identical kinds, identities which are indefinitely various, yet all related as members of the same symbolic family. As culture expands the sphere will grow, and as criticism and science expand, the hemispheres will grow. But the center remains still, a point

of reference and identity which will remain for as long as there is culture.

The vision of the total sphere of human culture is metaphysically awesome. If the reader is made uncomfortable by Frye's system of myths as it now stands, the prospect of an even more elaborate system attempting to organize all of the symbolic relationships of criticism and science is not likely to decrease his discomfort. While such a structure is implied by the Anatomy, there is a more conventional and less complex way in which to view the Anatomy anagogically. "The form of literature most deeply influenced by the anagogic phase," Frye tells us, "is the scripture or apocalyptic vision."[17] The total vision of human culture which I have sketched is certainly apocalyptic, but the concept of the Anatomy as scripture is less complex than the model we have been considering. From an anagogic perspective, the Anatomy may be seen as either secular or sacred scripture. Both secular and sacred analogies apply.

We have concentrated in this essay on the four critical theories of the Anatomy, paying less attention to the Polemical Introduction and the Tentative Conclusion as integral parts of the work. The concept of the Anatomy as scripture, however, allows us to perceive the book as a complete whole. If the Anatomy is seen as secular scripture, the Polemical Introduction is the Aristotelian beginning and the Tentative Conclusion is the

Platonic ending. The Polemical Introduction is concrete, specific, analytical, and scientific. The Tentative Conclusion is general, creative, and artistic. The Introduction is fairly closely reasoned in preparation for the analysis which follows. The Conclusion is highly speculative and asks of the theories of the Anatomy: "If these be true, what then is possible?"

If the Anatomy is seen as sacred scripture, the Polemical Introduction is its Genesis and the Tentative Conclusion is its Apocalypse. Between the Genesis and the Apocalypse lie the law and the prophets, setting down the rules of critical discourse and prophesying the coming of the Word Incarnate. Viewing the Anatomy as an analogy to the Bible may even explain the otherwise puzzling fact that the Theory of Myths, which is clearly the most important of the four theories, is not placed in final position. After the laws of the Theory of Modes and its records of the wanderings of the hero in the literary wilderness come the symbolic prophecies of the Theory of Symbols. The Theory of Myths then follows in the place appropriate to the coming of the Word. The Anatomy then concludes with the Theory of Genres, an infusion of Greek classicism and a return to the law which parallels the post-Christian writings of St. Paul.

As a total vision of culture, as the new scripture, the Anatomy again attempts to unite antitheses of classic and Christian. The Anatomy is whole, but it is not

yet complete. In the Anatomy, Northrop Frye is engaged in the task that his Theory of Modes, his sense of history, tells him is at hand. As befits the scribe of scripture, his vision is truly apocalyptic. He is remythologizing the old myths, "making them new." Is it possible? Can it be? . . . that in Northrop Frye we have the answer to the question asked by his critical and spiritual forerunner:

> And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
> Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born?

NOTES

1. Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 124-25.

2. Anatomy, p. 366.

3. Anatomy, pp. 352-54.

4. Anatomy, p. 125.

5. I realize, of course, that children, like their parents, come in two versions, male and female. Each, however, is sufficient as a monad of its parents and of humanity regardless of its sex. I shall make use of the two manifestations of the human monad later. Cf. p. 201f.

6. Northrop Frye, "The Archetypes of Literature," in Fables of Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), p. 9. Cf. p. 46 above.

7. It should be noted that the anagogic method of resolving antitheses differs from the Hegelian resolution of thesis and antithesis in a new synthesis. The anagogic monad does not abolish the two terms which it identifies, nor does the monad lead necessarily to the rise of an anti-monad.

8. Anatomy, pp. 33-35.

9. Anatomy, p. 42.

10. Anatomy, pp. 52-53.

11. Anatomy, pp. 54-55.

12. Anatomy, p. 67.

13. Anatomy, p. 83.

14. Anatomy, pp. 92-93.

15. Anatomy, p. 93.

16. Anatomy, p. 177.

17. Anatomy, p. 120.

CONCLUSION

This has been an essay in the philosophy of literary criticism. At the outset, I indicated that the object of the essay was two-fold: to provide a general framework, or set of frameworks, within which the analysis of the Anatomy as a whole might take place, and to pursue the analysis of the Anatomy within that framework. The presentation of the four approaches to the Anatomy has been primary, systematic, and intended to present the critic with alternative perspectives on the Anatomy. The specific criticism of the Anatomy has been secondary, ad passim, and intended to suggest a few of the possibilities allowed by each perspective. There remains one question for our consideration: What is the relationship among these four approaches to the Anatomy?

We might consider the approaches to be chosen arbitrarily. In that case, there is no relationship among them beyond the fact that all deal with the Anatomy as a whole. If the approaches are chosen arbitrarily, then their number may be multiplied or diminished according to the preferences of the critics. Six or three or two approaches may serve as well as four. Once we accept the principle that each work of criticism, like each work of

literature, requires examination from several points of view in order to be fully understood, there would seem little reason to limit the number of these points of view except as a matter of convenience. But examination of the four alternatives presented here suggests that there is a pattern of relationship among them which is more than arbitrary.

As we moved from the second approach to the third approach, I noted that we had shifted from a classical to a romantic perspective. If we consider the two major poles of criticism to be the romantic and the classical, then we may see the four approaches as spread across a spectrum stretching between these poles. The first approach, in which the Anatomy is considered to be literally scientific, represents the classical pole of the spectrum. This approach is founded in close analysis both of the Anatomy and of the nature of scientific activity, and it may be characterized as objective, concrete, analytical, and Aristotelian. The fourth approach, in which the Anatomy is considered to be the basis for a vision of the whole of human culture, represents the romantic pole of the spectrum. This approach is founded in speculation as well as in analysis, and it may be characterized as subjective, general, synthetic, and Platonic. The second and third approaches may then be seen as each related primarily to the pole to which it is closest.

The first two approaches are clearly tied to one another. The concept of the Anatomy as a formal imitation of science takes the concept of the Anatomy as science as its referent. The relationship between the last two approaches may be less apparent, however, since the third approach also appears to take the first approach as its referent. But the relationship between the concept of the Anatomy as an ironic parody of science and the concept of the Anatomy as science is more ostensible than real. When we see the four approaches spread across the spectrum between the two poles, it is clear that the real referent for the third approach follows rather than precedes it. The concept of the Anatomy as an ironic parody of science may then be seen as an imitation of the concept of the Anatomy as a total vision of culture, establishing an essentially romantic relationship between science and criticism. The nature of the imitation in each case is appropriate as well. The second approach imitates the first in form; the third approach imitates the fourth in procedure.

By viewing the four approaches as spread across a spectrum from a classical pole, the concept of the Anatomy as science, to a romantic pole, the concept of the Anatomy as the basis for a total vision of human culture, it is possible to perceive an overall relationship among them. Although we may still see each approach separately as an equally useful framework for the analysis of the

Anatomy, this overall view focuses our attention on the two opposite poles of our critical spectrum and on the concepts which stand at those poles. Both the concept of the Anatomy as science and the concept of the Anatomy as the basis for a total vision of human culture are whole, integrated views of the relationship between science and criticism, nature and art, the "two cultures." The classical position identifies science and criticism by demonstrating that criticism is science, subsuming criticism within science. The romantic position identifies criticism and science, not by showing them to be two versions of the same activity, but by presenting them as complementary activities of equal stature which are identified within a total vision of human culture. Since the source of this vision is criticism, it might be said that in the fourth approach science is subsumed by criticism. But this is not really so, since the vision which criticism here creates goes beyond criticism and science.

There is a balance between the classical approach and its imitation and the romantic approach and its imitation. If we view our critical spectrum as static, this balance suggests that the four approaches to the Anatomy are a complete set within the context of this spectrum. We cannot see the critical spectrum as static, however, except for the moment. For the nature of the fourth approach suggests that the spectrum will change in the future. Both the first and the fourth approaches present

integrated versions of the relationship between criticism and science. But the classical approach is a conservative and static one, relating criticism and science as they are, outlining the limits of the relationship. The opportunities for criticism and science to learn from one another are confined to those limits defined by essentially traditional concepts of both. The romantic approach, however, is a radical and dynamic one, attempting to show criticism and science as they might be related in a total utopian vision of the fundamental identity of all human attempts to come to terms with a world of both natural and artificial experiences. The opportunities for science and criticism to enrich each other are here limited only by the imaginative scope of the human mind. The anagogic approach is dynamic, and the romantic pole of the spectrum may thus be expected to move as the imagination continually reaches further into the unknown.

What follows from the possibility of viewing the Anatomy through a spectrum of perspectives, one pole of which is stable, the other movable? It seems to me that what follows is a kind of anagogic view of the four approaches themselves, a comprehensive and simultaneous apprehension of the four views of the Anatomy as comprising a whole, multi-dimensional view which subsumes both the classical and the romantic versions of the relationship between science and criticism. Holding all four

approaches in our minds at once, we may stand with our feet securely on the ground of classical analysis and our heads in the clouds of romantic vision. And this is indeed the essential human position, secure in what is, searching for what might be.

In the Anatomy, Northrop Frye suggests that the myth of the quest is the ultimate myth, representing man's yearning to go beyond his present limitations. The quest myth is a romantic myth, placing primary emphasis on process rather then form, on the importance of the search rather than the gaining of the goal. In the myth of the Holy Grail, only one knight achieves the Grail itself. But for the rest of the knights who seek the Grail, the search itself is a purifying experience, drawing from them power which they did not suspect they had. Though they fail of the ultimate goal, each accomplishes lesser but noble goals, and none is left with all of the limitations with which he began his quest.

The attempt to view the four approaches to the Anatomy anagogically is a kind of quest for an intellectual Grail. It is not finally possible to hold all four approaches in the mind simultaneously, except for a moment. For the image which we use to hold them together, the image of the spectrum stretching between two poles, is a momentary image. The classical pole may remain stable, but the romantic pole will move in ways we do not now even suspect. Like the physicist who can know the

position of a particle or the particle's velocity, but never both simultaneously, we may know where we are or construct a vision of where we might be, yet the two cannot be held in the mind at once. For as soon as we reduce the chaos of our perceptions to an ordered system we artificially limit our vision. As with scientific theory and critical myth, the pattern of perspectives on the Anatomy presented in this essay not only organizes information at hand, it impresses upon us the enormity of what we do not know--even as it guides our search into the unknown. The framework for criticism of the Anatomy is thus both definite and indefinite, complete to the moment, but obsolete at that next moment when the reader, using it, moves beyond it to a new order.

REFERENCES

Abrams, Meyer H. "Anatomy of Criticism." University of Toronto Quarterly, 28 (1959), 109-112.

Abrams, Meyer H. The Mirror and the Lamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Adams, Hazard. "Criticism: Whence and Whither?" American Scholar, 28 (1959), 226-38.

Adams, Hazard. Review of Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, by Northrop Frye. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 13 (1958), 533-34.

Adams, Robert Martin. "Dreadful Symmetry." Hudson Review, 10 (1958), 614-19.

Bloom, Harold. "A New Poetics." Yale Review, 47 (1957), 130-33.

Bonaparte, Marie. The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation. Berlin, 1933; London, 1949; rpt. New York: Humanities Press, 1972.

Booth, Wayne. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961.

Bronowski, Jacob. "The Creative Process." Scientific American, Aug. 1958, pp. 59-65.

Burke, Kenneth. The Philosophy of Literary Form. 2nd ed., 1947; rpt. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967.

Clapp, Erwin R. Review of Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, by Northrop Frye. Western Humanities Review, 13 (1959), 109-112.

Crane, R.S. The Languages of Criticism and the Structure of Poetry. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953.

Crane, R.S., and Others. Critics and Criticism Ancient and Modern. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

Daiches, David. Review of Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, by Northrop Frye. Modern Philology, 56 (1958), 69-72.

Dyson, Freeman J. "Innovation in Physics." Scientific American, Aug. 1958, pp. 74-82.

Eliot, T.S. Selected Essays. New ed., 1932; New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1960.

Feigl, Herbert, and May Brodbeck, eds. Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton, 1953.

Fraser, John. "Mr. Frye and Evaluation." Cambridge Quarterly, 2 (1967), 97-116.

Frye, Northrop. Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Frye, Northrop. Fables of Identity. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963.

Hallie, Philip P. "The Master Builder." Partisan Review, 31 (1964), 650-58.

Heisenberg, Werner, and Other. On Modern Physics. Trans. M. Goodman and J.W. Binns. New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1961.

Heisenberg, Werner. The Physicist's Conception of Nature. Trans. Arnold J. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958.

Holloway, John. The Colors of Clarity: Essays on Contemporary Literature and Education. London: Archon Books, 1964.

Inglis, Fred. "Professor Frye and the Academic Study of Literature." Centennial Review, 9 (1965), 319-31.

Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964.

Kermode, Frank. Puzzles and Epiphanies. New York: Chilmark Press, 1962.

Krutch, Joseph Wood. Edgar Allan Poe: A Study in Genius. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926.

Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed., 1962; rev. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Kuhns, Richard. "Professor Frye's Criticism." Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1959), 745-55.

McDowell, Frederick P.W. "After the New Criticism." Western Review, 22 (1958), 309-318.

Northrop Frye in Modern Criticism: Selected Papers from the English Institute. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Richards, I.A. Practical Criticism. London, 1929; rpt. New York: Harvest Books, 1956.

Richards, I.A. Principles of Literary Criticism. London, 1925; rpt. New York: Harvest Books, 1956.

Sparshott, F.E. The Concept of Criticism. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967.

Von Hendy, Andrew. "A Poetics for Demogorgon: Northrop Frye and Contemporary Criticism." Criticism, 8 (1966), 318-35.

Whalley, George. "Fry[e]'s Anatomy of Criticism." Tamarack Review, No. 8 (Summer, 1958), 92-98, 100-101.

Whalley, George. Review of Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, by Northrop Frye. Modern Language Review, 54 (1959), 107-109.

Wimsatt, W.K., and Cleanth Brooks. Literary Criticism: A Short History. New York: Vintage Books, 1957.