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SOCIAL CLASS AND CITIZEN ORGANIZATION/COMMUNITY AGENCY INTERACTION IN URBAN PLANNING DECISION-MAKING.

The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1976
Urban and Regional Planning

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SOCIAL CLASS AND CITIZEN ORGANIZATION/COMMUNITY AGENCY INTERACTION IN URBAN PLANNING DECISION-MAKING

by
David Cason, Jr.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Urban & Regional Planning)
in The University of Michigan
1976

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Paul H. Ray, Chairman
Associate Professor Rachel Kaplan
Professor Allan G. Feldt
Professor William D. Drake

DEDICATION

To my wife, Armene, who cheerfully concurred with my wishes to interrupt my professional career in order to pursue an advanced academic degree.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express profound thanks to all of the members of my doctoral committee - their sincere concern and solid support enabled me to undertake and complete this study. A special debt is owed to the Chairman, Doctor Paul Ray, whose patience and persistence prodded me above and beyond my normal efforts.

I am, also, endebted to Dr. Michael D. Usdan, President of the Merrill-Palmer Institute. He generously allowed me the use of its facilities to do a significant portion of my interviewing and writing.

In addition, I extend my utmost appreciation to the anonymous respondents who contributed the crucial data that made the research meaningful.

Finally, I am grateful to all of those who aided me in so many ways that it is impossible to list them.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I am an urban planner. In that role, I have had significant involvement in community organization and urban development administration in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. During that time, I was able to observe, at close range, citizen organizations and community agencies involved in the shaping of public policy.

The stated purposes of these particular policies were related to two specific government goals: 1) elimination of the causes for urban deterioration, and 2) correcting, as much as possible, the damages that had been already done. As a part of these objectives, the concerned agencies were required to include citizens, in those phases of the decision-making process that affected them.

It soon became obvious that the task of widening the circle of decision-makers was not as simple as originally conceived. Destructive conflict between community agencies and citizen organizations became a continual expectation. Consensus, an imperative for urban problem solving, became increasingly difficult to achieve.

The possibility that I might be able to contribute to the means for the resolution of these unanticipated consequences forms the basis of the purpose for writing this dissertation. Specifically, I believed that this contribution could be toward the development of a social theory that might be influential in reducing destructive

conflict in Agency/Citizen interaction in the urban planning decision-making process.

After considerable serious thought and speculation, I reduced the number of questions to five:

1. Are there distinguishing characteristics in the behavior of citizen organizations?

2. If so what types of patterns do they form?

3. Do these patterns relate to any existing social structures in society?

4. What is there about the style of urban policy making agencies that has potential for starting conflict with citizen organizations?

5. Are the citizen organizations' reactions to this style, generally, the same or do they vary in significant ways?

Several things materialized from these introspections. First, from my community experiences I had noticed variations in citizen organization behavior, depending on geographical location. In "middle class" areas, I had observed that citizens used bureaucratic approaches to problem solving with emphasis on order and analysis.

In lower class areas, the citizens' behavior tended to verge on disruption and confusion, with a great deal of attention being given to final outcomes. Much less concern was given to the actual policy making process.

Second, from memory, I recalled that in the majority of the conflicts, I had witnessed, between agencies and lower class citizen organizations, the citizens seldom won the decision. No matter how vigorous the protestations of the citizens, the ending was the same, especially in the long run. Eventually, the citizens' organizations

just disappeared. They were short either on memory, patience, or resources. All of their energies seemed to have been spent for naught.

On the other hand, middle class citizen organizations persevered and picked up some victories, or had at least sustained meaningful dialogue with agencies.

Because social class descriptions continued to appear, I decided to determine how the concept of social class could be related to dysfunctional areas where major differences in patterns of citizen organizational behavior were observed. Thus, I knew that an exploration of the theories of social stratification would be necessary.

Simultaneously, another aspect of the problem loomed in front of me. I suddenly realized that what I had been actually doing was assessing wins and losses within the decision-making perspective. Wins and losses are the substance of power struggles. So my interests had inevitably compelled me to review social power theory. From this exercise, I concluded that social power was closely linked to social class. However, what I didn't know was precisely how the two concepts interfaced. Therefore, I was required to demonstrate how social power is derived from social class. Chapter II contains that information.

Before proceeding there, in the interest of clarity of exposition, I choose to briefly consider the subject of decision-making and public policy.

DECISION-MAKING AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

The urban communities of this country contain masses of people who interact in many ways. The welfare and quality of life of these communities are partly maintained through various governmental services. These governmental services result from policy analysis conducted by functionaries. Policy analysis refers to the study of possible means to specific ends.

> Traditional and modern political scientists, politicians, public administrators, and citizens generally are accustomed to a functional approach to policy analysis and debate. Functional categories refer to the concrete, substantive, and purposive activities of government and would include, for example, education, transportation, public welfare, and public health, natural resources, and public safety. (Wade, 1972, 1)

Policy analysis is initiated through governmental response to signals it receives from its vast bureaucratic network. These signals may contain information about such things as; economic disequilibriums, health epidemics, inefficient circulation patterns, and elements leading to community disruption (rising crime rates, minority groups unrest, and poor housing).

A special impact upon this bureaucratic network are the pressure groups. These groups spring up around a myriad of issues that are usually rooted in the types of community problems described above. Their strategies and tactics are geared for confrontation that will increase the opportunity for intervention into the governmental policy making process.

> Voluntary associations appear to be formed to provide the means for experiences and accomplishments which the members cannot obtain through either the small informal

> groups which make up the mosaic of the informal social organization of the community or the extensively bureaucratized and often somewhat coercive major institutional sectors that provide the community's formal social organization. (Mann, 1969, 105)

These pressure groups and the bureaucracies with which they interact are types of organizations. An organization is a "social device for efficiently accomplishing through group means some stated purpose; it is the equivalent of the blueprint for design of the machine which is to be created for some practical purpose" (Katz and Kahn, 1966, 21)

The stated purposes of governmental agencies is to refine, maintain, and implement community policy in order to reach the key decision makers' goals.

The citizen organizations' purposes are not, always, stated as clearly. Generally, they are reacting, in various fashions to problems that emerge from society's malfunctions. Frequently this may involve goal modification or substitution. Therefore, it can be said that community decisions involve choosing among alternative policies that relate to the maintenance of community facilities and institutions (Mann, 1969, 65)

Organizational purpose and decision-making are inseparable concepts. Mouzellis illustrated this point as follows:

> Behavior in formal organizations is not completely emotive or aimless. On the contrary, it is primarily purposive. People become organized in order to pursue a common objective. In doing so, they have to coordinate their activities in a conscious way. It is precisely this purposiveness, this conscious coordination of relationships which mainly distinguishes formal organization from other kinds of social groupings...This being the case the concept of decision-making should be central to any theory of administration. When people

> coordinate their activities for the attainment of a certain goal, they have continuously to make decisions to choose among alternatives of action. A member of an organization, more than an instrument or an autonomous agent of drives and emotion, is a decision-maker and problem solver. (Mouzellis, 1968, 123)

Decision-making, as a concept central to this study, is not just an act of choosing between two or more courses of action, it is also a process. This, as outlined by Miller, includes three critical variables:

1. The making of decisions - the state of choice;
2. The manner in which they are given approval and made legitimate - has a deep relationship to acceptance and durability factors of a given decision; and
3. The execution of the decisions in the sense of allocation and/or manipulation of the means at the disposal of the community - an index of the distributive factor. (Miller, 1968, 309)

THE REALITY OF DECISION-MAKING

It must be understood that what precedes the formal traditional approach to choosing among alternatives is the tough, sometimes ruthless political infighting. This behind the scenes eye gouging is part of the reality of bargaining. Lasswell's (1960) theme, "Politics is who gets what, when, how," applies. The central fact of the eye gouging, etc. is <u>whose</u> preferences will be paid attention to, given that there are many contending groups, each of whom wants a larger slice of the public pie. The question of who gets what, is often stated by public administrators and writers as being antecedent to the "real" process of decision-making. This is because they (writers and

administrators) wish to regard decision-making as primarily a technical and economic exercise, in which available resources are counterposed to available means for achieving objectives, this viewpoint conceals the fact of bureaucratic power in this situation because it pretends that objectives are externally given and unchangeable; when in fact these objectives are continually open to negotiation if only the other side is powerful enough. The fact of the matter is that politics and technical decision-making are interwoven as "warp and woof" of reality from beginning to end.

Decision-making is a Bargaining Process. Therefore, it involves constant assessment of the other party's strength, resources, and knowledge. Additionally, being part of a process, a single decision is not an isolated act, rather it is usually a part of many other events and relationships of a given community.

> Decision-making is an activity notoriously difficult to describe.. One thing, however, is quite clear from the many studies made. A political decision can rarely if ever be described in terms of a single once and for all act. Instead "a decision on any major policy must be seen as the outcome of the accumulation of lesser "decisions" in which many people may have taken part, in which the original objectives themselves may have changed in which compromises may well have been made.... it is only by establishing precisely how decisions - or kinds of decisions - are reached that one can assess the nature of actual participation and the degree of realism of those who aspire to increase it. (Parry, 1972, 6)

This brief discussion about decision-making and public policy is intended to convey the importance of the process to the direction of the study. It is against this backdrop that the relationship of

social class and citizen participation will be surveyed.

DIRECTION OF THE SURVEY

The primary goal of the research is to determine if significant differences of social class exist between citizen organizations in their approach to decision-making and perceptions of social power. This involves:

1. Seeking distinctions in consensus and conflict between middle/lower class citizen organizations as they bargain with community agencies;
2. Examining value differences related to long term and short term perspectives that exist between lower/middle class citizen organizations and resulting effects on appropriate community agencies; and
3. Analyzing the consensus seeking styles of community agencies and any differences of their impact on lower/middle class citizen organizations.

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND TYPE OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Research Findings

The data analysis indicated that social power is derived from social class and is the key to the control of the decision making process. Community agencies are middle class institutions and possess resources which are a form of power. These resources give them the "edge" in decision-making. The middle class citizen organizations also have resources which allow them to compete with agencies in decision-making at a higher level than lower class citizen organizations.

The single most important factor of social power is competence, which enables all forms of organizations to acquire needed resources.

Policy Recommendations

The recommendations were listed in three categories: 1. legal, 2. education, and 3. economic.

1. Legal - A body of citizen participation law should be established with emphasis on arbitration.
2. Education - Intensive training programs for organization building and decision-making should be established so that citizen organizations can develop competence.
3. Economic - Establish "rights" of citizens to resources. Remove profit making loop holes from citizen participation processes.

I have laid the foundation for the research. The next step is a review of social stratification theory and social power theory. A set of propositions will be derived from these data.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND PROPOSITION DERIVATION

The major focus of this dissertation is citizen participation. This concept concerns the joining of citizens under a particular interest group's banner for intervention in the urban development decision-making process.

This chapter contains: 1. A historical overview of citizen participation with special attention paid to some of its "inherent dilemmas;"

2. a brief review of the theoretical development of social stratification and its relationship to the concept of power; and 3. a set of propositions derived from 1 and 2 that forms the substance around which the research is based.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Historical Development

There is no generally accepted operational definition of citizen participation, at present, for any of the parties involved and/or concerned with its activity.

> Citizen participation in planning, a seemingly facile subject at first glance, becomes upon further analysis a phenomenon of infinite complexity and subtle dimension. Truly the more one explores the endless ramifications of citizen participation the more one appreciates the old adage of "having a tiger by the tail." Every effort to reduce its protean-like substance to a definable, systematic and comprehensible body of thought

> is resisted by inherent dilemmas - contradictions, between myth and reality, even between different sets of observable social phenomena. Citizen participation virtually defies generalization and delights in reducing abstractions to dust. (Spiegal and Mittenthal, 1968, 3)

Citizens participation is not a new thing in the United States. It has been customary for Americans, through their civic and neighborhood associations seek to become a part of the governmental decision-making process. They were generally private and voluntary organizations that were designed to meet individual and group needs, but on a different scale... the political system itself was the main "brokerage" agency for patronage, reward, wealth, status and power. (Bell and Held, 1969, 144). The early immigrant, in addition to his other memberships, identified with and was part of the political process. Minority groups such as the blacks, the conglomerate which speaks Spanish, poor rural southern whites, the American Indian, and others, while having been physically a part of the United States, from the beginning have been socially excluded. The exclusion specifically involved the denial of social mobility. Other immigrant groups, some who each in turn served a sort of apprenticed status, but being allowed to use certain rungs of the system, slowly climbed into the mainstream of American society. This was in spite of the time of entry into the United States; therefore, some newcomers moved on much before some older resident groups.

The above factors resulted in the existence of a category of individuals (the excluded minorities) who were not given the chance to learn how to participate through regular channels. But it was only a matter of time before new events began to occur to allow for some

changes in participation opportunities.

Beginning with the ending of the second world war, the excluded minorities accelerated their thrust for first-class citizenship. The initial attempts were expressed mainly in judicial actions. With the accomplishment of certain small victories, unrest continued and in some cases escalated. The United States Congress and the Executive Branch jointly began cautious experiments with various Federal programs in an attempt to "pour oil on troubled waters." The intended results were to bring in a lower strata of the populas.

> The reasons for having affective citizen participation were many and diverse. Some wanted to build "community competence" in the poverty sector; that is, participation as a means of training local leaders, helping people articulate their views, and building a communal self-determination was the ultimate goal. Others wanted to gain public support for the anti-poverty programs building up a constituency for them. Getting people (local citizens) involved in planning decisions, they thought, would guarantee that the programs in question would affect some permanent social change.
>
> Still others wanted to expand representation assuming a pluralistic society to include the poor and disadvantaged. The Establishment was considered to be adopting its structure to deal more effectively with the poor. Decision-making power it was felt should be shared more widely in society. Finally, some social planners believed that since the thirties Federal programs had been the "victims" of the expertise of administrators. Democratization of the bureaucracy was needed in order to make programs more effective. (Burke, Foster and Nash, 1970, 15)

Some chronicles of citizen participation development credit the 1949 Housing Act as the official beginning of the movement. (Bell and Held, 1969, 30) Urban renewal, the central feature of the 1949 Housing Act, included as part of its structual underpinning the "Workable Program," (a requirement of the Workable Program) stating that

community organization was mandatory. This edict was brought about through conflicts that ensued mostly because of the use of emminent domain, the police power, and controversial relocation policies.

At the same time of burgeoning governmental activities in this area the private sector began to express interest. In the early 1960's, the Ford Foundation made two major contributions: (1) The Great Cities School Improvement Program, and (2) The Gray Areas Program.

> Throughout the 1950's, the Ford Foundation was showing increasing concern for the problems of American cities. Beginning in 1960, the Foundation instituted the Great Cities School Improvement Program in the cities. Grants totalling $3.2 million were made for a series of educational experiments focused on the needs of culturally disadvantaged children. These exploratory programs led the foundation to a conviction that a more coordinated attack on all aspects of deprivation was necessary. By late 1961, the Community Development (more commonly known as the Gray Areas Project) was born with a three-year $2 million grant to the city of Oakland to mount integrated effort to ameliorate slum conditions and to bring slum residents into the mainstream of American life. Soon after New Haven, Boston, Philadelphia, and North Carolina received grants. (Rubin, 1969, 19)

The essential ingredient of strategy was the provision of means whereby the target groups could identify with the particular program in order to effectively participate and that an indigenous leadership was necessary to form the communications link between the community and the related agencies. A rewarding consequence of the Ford Foundation grants was to make urban areas aware of problem ramifications and possible solutions, thereby encouraging grant contributions from other sources.

One such example is when the City of Detroit received a Great Cities grant but did not receive a Gray Areas grant. Consequently, when Jerome P. Cavanaugh won the mayoral election in 1961, he immediately instituted a Non-Federally Assisted Neighborhood Conservation Program that basically borrowed the format of the Gray Areas Program. The prominent feature of that program was citizen participation and community organization.

Almost simultaneously another phase of citizen participation was emerging through the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (May 11, 1961). It was inspired by Attorney General Robert Kennedy who incorporated a type of citizen participation "based on a theory of delinquency by two sociologists from Columbia University School of Social Work, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin - a theory derived from Robert K. Merton's hypothesis of the relationship between the social structure and anomie." (Bell and Held, 149)

A goal of the Committee on Delinquency was to develop individual and group competence for the purposes of coping with and solving life's problems.

> Leonard Cottrell, chairman of the Grant Review Penel of the Committee, had long been concerned with the issue of "competence." Accordingly, he laid great stress on programs that encouraged the development of competence - on the "necessity for the upgrading the capabilities of the inarticulate and disadvantaged to become more articulate and more capable of participating effectively in the settling of goals and implementing those goals in the life of the community." (Rubin, 20)

In order to generate community competence for eradicating juvenile delinquency community organizations and institutions, and the families of the individual delinquents were formed into "Action Teams." These

teams, trained through a highly concentrated approach, attacked the problem from every angle with particular emphasis on self-help.

Before the completion of the grant life for this program, the Office of Economic Opportunity was fully operational, and the committee was terminated. However, "some of Cottrell's ideas of community competence were carried into OEO via the Community Action Program." (Rubin, 21)

It was in the development phase of OEO that the nebulous concept of citizen participation, in some quarters, became synonymous with the equally as vague concept "maximum feasible participation," that seemed, as suggested by Rubin, to have materialized from the air.

> The clause...relating to participation of the poor was inserted with virtually no discussion in the task force and none at all on Capital Hill. I cannot say that I was aware of the implications of the clause. It just seemed like an idea that nobody could quarrel with.
>
> Its language was the result of countless hours of discussion among a dozen or so key people.
>
> It emerged from an evening drafting session which included Daniel P. Moynihan..., Harold Horowitz..., John Steadmon..., and myself. None of us is quite sure who first thought of the phrase. The phrase, "maximum feasible participation," entered our discussions largely at the insistance of Dick Boone. At one point he had used it several times, I said, "You've used that phrase four or five times now," "Yes, I know," he replied. How many times do I have to use it before it becomes part of the program?" "Oh, a couple of times more," I told him. So he did, and it became part of the program. (Rubin, 21)

An integral part of OEO's self-help focus was the Community Action Program (CAP) and shortly it became synonymous with citizen participation. Seidler comments on the nebulousness of these concepts:

> A fundamental difficulty underlying the policy advisory process is that the rules of the game are not adequately defined. Community action and maximum feasible participation are much heralded phrases but they have never been given precise or authoritative definitions. (Seidler, 1969, 199)

In his perplexity with this issue, Seidler omits, (perhaps innocently) the fact that some individuals, deliberately, did not desire an operational definition for fear of limiting the experiment of citizen intervention in decision-making.

Another controversial issue that had not been clarified was the nature of the policy advisory process. Pivotal to the concept of citizen participation is the degree of its input into the shaping of policy. Does "advisory" mean superficial comments by citizen organizations, or does it mean an equal voice in the decision-making? Also, does it go a step further and imply an involvement in the implementation process?

It is fairly obvious from the previous discussion that these provocative aspects of citizen participation were unanticipated, not surprisingly, they also, later served to help lay the foundation for later controversies.

As the conflict situations developed desperate officials and administrators requested that Sargent Shriver, then, Director of OEO, provide an adequate definition of terms. He replied as follows:

> There has been much misunderstanding about what community action means. It has been a difficult story to tell and we need your help in getting greater public understanding of it. Community action does not mean control by social workers. It does not mean control by the poor, it does not mean control by professional staffs. It means just what the name implies, action by the whole community. It means all

> these groups and many local citizens working together to seek solutions on which the whole community can agree. It means democracy in action. (Seidler, 200)

This statement had little impact in reducing the struggle between citizen organizations and community agencies. Evidently the stakes were too high to heed a Washington bureaucrat's lukewarm admonition. Perhaps a great deal of the cause for the chaos can be found in the briefness of the initiation for change in recruitment tactics for citizen participation. The possibility of this factor's existence has been alluded to by others as follows:

> The heart of the participation ideology was the Poverty Program, and the section entitled the Community Action Programs (CAP) which provides for participation by the poor in the programs that will affect their lives. The key phrase in the section was "maximum feasible participation, a phrase which for some was rhetoric, for some ideology, and for some an instrumental means whereby the poor would gain a sense of political identity."
>
> While rationale and intentions of the "participation" idea are clear, the political history of its emergence and realization is still somewhat of a mystery. The Wagner Act had behind it a large social movement, a long history of agitation, and a political ideology. The Community Action Program had none of these. It was initiated almost completely from the "top" by professionals, rather than by the poor, and on the basis of a mystique of participation. (Bell and Held, 1969, 149)

As the citizen participation struggle continued to rage in OEO, another Federal program was introduced late in 1967. This was the Model Cities Program. The major goal of this program was to evaluate the partnership dynamics of citizen organization and community agency in comprehensive planning efforts. However, from the outset, the Model Cities Program encountered rocky seas and it was <u>never</u> to sail

in calm waters. In my opinion, this situation occurred because: 1. The planners did not comprehend the relationship of power to decision-making; and 2. the planners failed to correctly interpret the citizen participation dilemmas in OEO and anticipate them in Model Cities. They believed the conflicts in OEO stemmed from uniform application of national guidelines for citizen participation. Accordingly, for Model Cities, they mandated a citizen participation requirement based on the style of the particular locality. Consequently, the citizen participation format was left to the local chief executive who was usually limited by local constraints (Civil Service regulations, politics, etc.) leaving little latitude for the desired social change.

Perhaps another contribution to the turmoil was that some of the proponents of citizen participation were so concerned with the immediate and significant involvement of excluded citizens in the decision-making process that they tended to ignore the intricacies of the participation process itself. For example:

> My answer to the critical "what" is simply that citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is a means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of an affluent society. (Arnstein, 1969, 216)

Arnstein, (217) in her article, constructs an eight-level typology ("ladder") of citizen participation that ranges from the

community agencies' manipulation of citizens for the unobstructive carving out of programs to the total citizen control of programs. She briefly mentions what she terms "roadblocks" to citizen participation:

> It should be noted that the typology does not include an analysis of the most significant roadblocks to achieving genuine levels of citizen participation. These roadblocks lie on both sides of the simplistic fence. On the powerholder side, they include racism, paternalism, and resistence to power redistribution. On the have-nots side, they include inadequacies of the poor communities political socio-economic infrastructure and knowledge base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens' group in the face of futility, alienation, and disgust.

The objective analysis of these roadblocks to effective citizen participation represents the primary focus of this study. Commentaries, similar to Arnstein's, have been prevalent for some time about community agencies thwarting citizen organizations' interventionist roles in the decision-making process. However, most advocate planners appear, from my observation, to be relunctant to seriously examine, for constructive purposes, alledged deficiencies of citizen organizations.

It is understandable from a political viewpoint, the necessity to minimize and explain away existent shortcomings of citizen participation, but in order to maintain objectivity we are required to consider all relevant aspects of the situation.

What Arnstein does contribute, however, is an unequivocal declaration about the concept of social power and its relationship to citizen participation.

Power and Citizen Participation

Since power is a key factor in the decision-making process, it

logically follows that if citizen organizations are to share in policy formulation with community agencies the role of power and its ramifications must be amplified in this study.

> A society that is increasingly based upon an advanced technology inevitably requires greater centralization of power. This would seem likely to decrease the autonomous activity at the level of the local community. This, however, has not been the case so far. For an advanced technology also demands a higher level of education and a greater degree of responsibility among the labor force. This is usually thought of in economic terms as aspect of manpower planning. But it also has a major effect on the community since it is now well established that initiative and social participation in community activities increase with social status and education. It is the expansion of this more articulated stratum in our society, at a time when the growing centralization of political and economic power puts the ordinary citizen increasingly at the mercy of those vast oligarchies of our time which accounts for the very rapid growth of consumer societies and civic groups, which since the war has given lie to the view that voluntary civic action would be made redundant by the establishment of the welfare state. (Broady, 1969, 368)

Broady makes two relevant statements for this dissertation: 1. That paradoxically there is an increase instead of a decrease in the demand for power by community groups; and 2. That as one's social mobility increases so does one's desire for citizen participation. Both of these observations are neatly stated and deserve empirical validation. Broady, also, has pertinent remarks regarding the increased interest of citizens in governmental decision-making.

> ...and thus is influenced by the administrator's characteristic assumption that the ideal situation is one which the public authorities provide such a satisfactory service that the citizen is content to allow the officials to conduct their affairs without interference - an ideal in which the best testimony to administration would be a completely passive citizenry.

> This kind of assumption was appropriate enough in the early nineteenth century when our present system of local government was set up in response to the urban problems thrown up by the early phases of capitalist entrepreneurship. It had three major characteristics. First of all, it was chiefly responsible for providing tangible things like streets, sewers, lighting and the maintenance of law and order. Second, there was a great disparity of status between the members and officials of local councils and those for whom municipal services were provided.
>
> Third, the latter were effectively a lumpenproletariat, uneducated, and not yet enfranchised, and subject to long hours of routine manual employment. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that government should have been conceived as the provision by a strong executive of services needed by largely - indeed ideally - passive and differential population.
>
> The assumptions do not fit into contemporary life ... Government for one thing is now responsible for services like education which not only affects the personal life of the citizen more directly than did the provision of the streets, but which require for their efficient prosecution his willing concurrance, if not active collaboration.
>
> Structural tensions such as these make themselves felt in the public arena in the form of issues - in this case, citizen participation. Interest in this idea grows chiefly out of the planners concern to overcome the "suspicion tinged with contempt" which Colin Buchanan identified as the public attitude toward his profession. Citizen participation, therefore, has been placed in the rather limited context of professional self-interest rather than in the broader framework of social theory. (Broady, 368)

Broady is describing the British experience, but it parallels, to some extent, the American. The direct effects of governmental decision-making in the provision of services has changed drastically. More people are now reacting by demanding a "say" in what's happening to them. The nature and manner in which that particular input is made is one of my chief concerns. Also, it is my contention that a large part of the problem has been the limiting aspect of professional self-interest of the planners. Such limitation has been revealed in

the failure of programs. We have observed the planner being overwhelmed by citizen participation which in turn is developing its own self-interest. It is from this collision course that we can begin to identify the problem which appears to be centered in the concept of power.

Lowry (1970, 3) begins to come closer to the course in which this study is set. He writes:

> First, many groups are demanding meaningful involvement in the decision-making process far beyond the localized community level.
>
> Second, the new thrust is a natural consequence of recent and rapid technological and social change.
>
> Third, modern society is becoming more overtly politicized.
>
> Earlier theories and perspectives, therefore do not provide an adequate basis for assessing the true nature of present changes. Contemporary demands for participatory democracy do not represent simple returns to earlier structure and relationships. Since they are based upon earlier concepts, contemporary political forms and relationships do not provide totally adequate mechanisms for easily assimilating these new demands. Thus, movements toward participatory democracy, though rooted in traditional values and ideals involve radically new requirements.
>
> Political scientists and sociologists have identified five fundamental types of leader-citizen relationships, which determine the essential nature of a political system: responsiveness, accessibility, availability, participation and accountability. When responsiveness, accessibility and availability are maximized, we can refer to government as responsible. When participation and accountability are maximized, we can refer to government as democratic.
>
> As suggested in the previous discussion, citizen participation in more than local affairs is minimal and restricted. As a consequence, accountability of leadership has yet to be fully achieved in contemporary America. This helps explain the widespread disillusionment with authority in all forms and with "the establishment" in particular. Similarly, political accountability by citizens for their actions is not a fully functioning part of our political system. This could partially explain two polar responses

> in the electorate: widespread citizen apathy and alienation from the political process and extreme and violent participation without concern for the political consequences. Therefore, participatory democracy contains both evolutionary and revolutionary characteristics. Though representing a natural extension of process of political development, it creates new demands which call for radical alterations in prevailing accepted political relationships and structures. Research on these needs should be a major priority in contemporary society.

While I agree with Lowry's statement, I feel he does not go far enough. From several vantage points I have observed that participatory democracy contains more than evolutionary and revolutionary characteristics.

It also contains anarchistic and nihilistic elements. How to reduce these destructive forces is an objective of my research, and it is my belief, that a great deal of the cause for the present situation is due to a lack of the understanding of and the uses of power.

A good illustration of this critical point is made by Crozier 1969, 56):

> The idealist of the New Left and the embattled standard-bearers of Student Power offer so varied a spread of contradictions that choice is onerous. To condemn violence when official and praise it when revolutionary may seem a minor ethical lapse. To complain of alienation while declining a dialogue with authority in any guise is at least consistent with a visceral need to revolt. More exquisite to my taste is the call - so often heard from the same or adjacent lips in Berkeley or Columbia, the Sorbonne, or LSE - for "participation" and "workers" control or "liberation Marxism." Let us term the goal envisaged "participatory anarchy."
>
> Anarchy, however, rarely takes place for long between consenting participants: consent soon yields to coercion and terror. Nor is "Participation" an activity associated with consenting anarchists." Such examples as the contemporary world offers of "participatory" democracy are tyrannous and authoritarian.

Lowry does not go far enough, Crozier, perhaps, goes too far.

The ideas of this study are bracketed somewhere between these two theorists and they add up to a mandate for the consideration of power.

Let us reconsider the Community Action Program which was discussed earlier in terms of the historical development of citizen participation. Vanecko claims that CAP's main thrust was not the direct elimination of poverty alone, but, rather a movement for the transference of power to the poor through their participation in decision-making.

> The theoretical basis of the Community Action Program is the proposition that poverty in an affluent society is nether lack of individual economic resources nor "relative deprivation, but a lack of control by poor people over the institution which serve them. The theory holds that this power vacuum has come about in a wide variety of ways - the increasing scale of society, the elimination of ethnic politics and of urban political bosses, the concentration of the poor black population in the northern urban ghettoes - but the critical fact is that all of these processes together are producting increasing detachment of the poor population and thus strengthening the cycle of poverty. To break the cycle, both power itself and self-awareness of poverty is necessary. The implication of this theoretical perspective is that intervention into this process must take one of two courses. Either the poor must obtain political power so that they can influence the institutions affecting them or the institutions themselves must be changed so that they are more responsive to the needs and demands of the poor. Community action in theory and action aims at both targets. (Vanecka, 1969, 610)

Warren shares a similar viewpoint. His thesis is that the total system has to undergo change and that citizen participation is necessary to insure the effectation of change in the proper direction. He acknowledges that community agencies do not all necessarily resist positive changes in citizen participation, indeed, they may even desire it on behalf of their clients. "But they dominate the definition of where the problem lies, what has to be changed and by

whom and with what methods." (Warren, 1969, 17) He believes that this attitude is not expressive of significant change but "mutually compatible adaptive adjustments at the margins within a stable and controllable (even if not wholly predictable environment.") (Warren, 44)

Warren (22) postulates a set of "diagnostic paradigms." Diagnostic Paradigm I indicates a need for a change in the individual, while Diagnostic Paradigm II indicates a need for a change in the social structure. He believes that it is an advantage to the power structure that:

> ....participation of the poor in devising programs for improving hiring conditions (amenable to either Diagnostic Paradigm I or II) is desirable, but it must flow through regularized channels, must not become disruptive, and must somehow blend into the notion of comprehensive planning in the public interest. If not, it is obstructionist, disruptive, irrational, ineffective, and rebellious. (1969)

Therefore "enlightened" community agencies prefer Paradigm I. Warren (73) found the Diagnostic Paradigm II is vigorously opposed by most community agencies. It threatens their existence, therefore they also resist even minimal innovations in this area. Based on his findings, he described four developments in the Model Cities Program:

> 1. The first is the widely noted dissent behavior, including protest, boycotts, and other kinds of veto activity. This activity we conceive of as a rudimentary and elementary way of reacting against the institutionalized thought structure of Paradigm I in the absence of a technology suited to a different paradigm. The complaint is made that such resident groups are loud in their protests but have no viable alternatives to present. We believe this is quite true; but it is given assessment only if the relationship of the dissent to the entire institutionalized thought structure is properly understood. Yes, they only

protest and yes, they have no alternative technology to offer.

> 2. This being the case, the second development is highly relevant. There has been a growth of "advocacy planning" precisely in order to afford disadvantaged groups the technical competence which they need in order to formulate program proposals on their own. But the important-widely ignored-aspect of this situation is that advocacy planners themselves, have technical competence only of the type which is applicable to operation within the prevalent institutionalized through structure. They do not have an articulated technology and expertness regarding alternative strategies designed to change the institutional structure on the basis of Paradigm II. Hence, we come to a development which was seen at first as quite anomalous in terms of the study's original assumptions.
>
> 3. The third development has been to the extent that resident groups have gained power in the program-planning process, they almost without exception have come up with substantially the same type of (Paradigm I) programs as have the more established agencies in cases where resident groups have little power. Decision-making power, often hard-fought and hard-won by resident groups, seems to have made little difference in the actual programs. Both they and their advocacy planners, where they had them, slipped inadvertently into modes of response based on Paradigm I, the only paradigm which offered explicit technologies for addressing the problems.
>
> 4. The fourth development overlaps the others somewhat but deserves special treatment. Co-optation occurred, both of the usual type and of a type not yet treated in the literature. We have seen in numerous instances the success which community decision organizations have had in confronting challenges by disadvantaged citizens who were rejecting the placing of the problem at their own door, and who claimed to see it in the institutional structure. This often was accompanied by an incipient redefinition of the problem from that of Paradigm II to that of Paradigm I. (1969)

What Warren is saying is that true citizen participation or citizen power can occur only through Paradigm II which is not a contest over specific programs and operations but over the legitimacy of the game itself. (Warren, p. 36 48) This paradigm denotes a new game in which everybody participates equally in making the rules.

In order to achieve Paradigm II, Warren suggest the utilization of Rose's strategy:

1. Organization of the poor
2. Transfer of power
3. Change in opportunity structure (Warren, 1970, p. 38)

The problem in accomplishing these goals is that there is no available technology. As Warren himself has stated, everybody reverts to Paradigm I. Therefore Warren (42) has to advocate power struggles as holding actions.

> The implications of Paradigm II are of course, to refuse to accept the implicit constraint of (Macro) system maintenance, but rather to emphasize the competitive struggle of individual actors (classes, groups, interests, organizations, individuals) for their own well being, leaving the loose ends at the system level rather than at the individual level. To put this in a more vernacular, more practical mode, once the disadvantaged poor concede that the interests of "society" are more important than their individual interests they throw in the sponge on the location of the highway which will raze their homes. (1969)

Wilson, (50), sees the situation from amuch different perspective. He believes that competence is the key to successful citizen involvement. This places his viewpoint within Warren's Paradigm I.

> Most neighborhoods which planners consider in need of renewal are not, however, like [Hyde-Kenwood] in Chicago and are not heavily populated with citizens like the ones who organized the Hyde Park-Kenwood Conference. Most renewal areas are likely to be low-income, often Negro sections, many of whose inhabitants are the opposite in almost every respect from the cosmopolitan elite of Hyde Park-Kenwood. Such people are more likely to have a limited time perspective, a greater difficulty in abstracting from concrete experience an unfamiliarity with and lack of confidence in city-wide institutions, a preoccupation with the personal and the immediate, and few (if any) attachments to organizations of any kind, with the possible exceptions of churches. Lacking experience in and the skills for participation in organized

endeavors, they are likely to have a low sense of personal efficacy in organizational situations. By necessity as well as by inclination, such people are likely to have what one might call a "private-regarding" rather than a "public regarding" political ethos. They are intimately bound up in the day to day struggle to sustain themselves and their families.

Such people are usually the objects rather than the subjects of civic action: they are acted upon by others, but rarely do they, themselves, initiate action. As a result, they often develop a keen sense of the difference between "we" and "they," being outside city-wide civic and political forces which seek to police them, vote them, and redevelop them. It is quite natural that "they" are often regarded with suspicion. Although such people are not likely spontaneously to form organizations to define and carry out long-range very general civic tasks, it is wrong to assume that they are not likely to organize - or to allow themselves to be organized - for any purpose. The important thing is not that they are unorganizable, but that they can be organized only under special circumstances and for special purposes. Except for organizations which are in some sense extensions of the family and the church, lower-income neighborhoods are more likely to produce collective action in response to threats (real or imagined) than to create opportunities. Because of the private-regarding nature of their attachment to the community, they are likely to collaborate when each person can see a danger to him or his family in some proposed change. Collective action is a way, not of defining and implementing some broad program for the benefit of all, but of giving force to individual objections by adding them together in collective protest.

The view which a neighborhood is likely to take of urban renewal, then, is in great part a product of its class composition. Upper and upper-middle-class people are more likely to think in terms of general plans, the neighborhood or community as a whole, and long-term benefits (even when they might involve immediate costs to themselves); lower and lower-middle-class people are more likely to see such matters in terms of specific threats and short term costs. These differences account in great measure for some of the frustrations of the planners, redevelopers, and community organizers who are involved in urban renewal. Whereas it is relatively easy to obtain consent to renewal plans when people are thinking in terms of general goals and community side benefits, it is much harder - often impossible - when people see the same set of facts in terms of possible threats and costs. (1970)

As we have seen, Warren unlike Wilson, does not consider the public regarding/private regarding dichotomy because public regarding implies that the individual rather than the system is deficient.

The horns of the dilemma have fully emerged. It centers around Warren's paradigms and Wilson's public/private regarding concepts. Warren needs a yet undiscovered technology and Wilson implies the need for a sophisticated better educated citizenry. The goal is the same - an improvement of the power position of citizen organizations in the decision-making process.

I agree with Warren's hypothesis, but I am at a loss as to the invention of an appropriate technology. What I intend to do is to unearth the causes for the dilemma, perhaps then, the task of technology discovery will be easier.

Let's reassess citizen organization demands for broader entry into the policy formulation process within the power contact. Sviridoff, (1969, 4) says that:

> ... several specific factors peculiar to our time underlie today's thrust for participation. Some of these are basic characteristics of modern society and other are international in scope. Others are manifest only in the United States and exacerbate the broader tendencies.
>
> In the former category are the impact of technology, the accelerated trend to urbanization, the growth of government and the advent of the welfare state, and the generally higher level of education in the developed nations.
>
> All these factors, of course, are closely entwined. Technology has made possible the existence of high organization, material affluence, computers, and instant telecommunication. Urbanization has concentrated problems and stimulated the spectacular growth of government at the local level. Along with this, the Federal government in this country has begun to assume in ever larger measure its rightful responsibilities in welfare, housing, community development, transportation, education and medical care.

> All of this means a bigness, a complexity, a remoteness which can overwhelm and alienate some members of a generation which while better educated than its predecessors, finds it increasingly difficult to cope with the changes that are occurring with unprecedented speed. Furthermore, they lack the clear authoritative moral guidelines of an earlier era.

As community agencies begin to provide limited arrangements for citizen organizations' participation in decision-making interesting things began to occur. Warning barriers in many cases were attacked or overrunned. This was particularly true among the new poorer participants in the black ghetto communities as Piven (34), who has a special interest in advocacy planning, describes it:

> To argue that these small gains diverted the poor black from greater demands is to set a dubious possibility against a gain that is real, however limited. Furthermore, small material advances, by raising the expectations of blacks, may have spurred them to greater demands. In this sense, the Federal strategy for the cities, and especially the poverty program may have contributed to a growing discontent at least in the short run. (1970)

An additional complication was that community agencies had, perhaps, unknowingly oversimplified the planning process. It rapidly became painfully apparent that many citizen organizations did not have the experience or expertise to cope with the difficulties of deriving solutions to complex problems of urban development.

Piven (35) indirectly, shares some of Warren's views about Paradigm I in regards to real power gains for the underclass with the present system:

> What all of this suggests is that involving local groups in elaborate planning procedures to guide them into a narrowly circumscribed form of political action and precisely that for which they are least equipped. What is laid out for the poor when their advocate arrives is a strategy of political participation which to be effective requires powerful group support, stable organization, pro-

> fessional staff and money-precisely those resources which the poor do not have. Technical skill is only one small aspect of the power discrepency between the poor and the city bureaucracies (1970).

Ross and Rosen (3) have arrived at similar conclusions at Piven about the inability of new citizen organizations to cope with the frustrations and multistyles of problem solving:

> The black community is attempting to gain from the relatively affluent society which surrounds it fundamental changes - especially those concerning land development, housing and of course school. The demand for participation in planning - for whatever service or project is underway - is a result of its view that only the black community or its direct agents can be trusted to represent itself. It was thought that by decentralizing power and authority, in some cases to the neighborhood level citizen interest could be weighted in the decision-making process. A number of obstacles have made it clear that, by itself, this is an inadequate strategy for reallocating power alignments and the representation of interests. Two such problems are relevant here: (1) Once on various committees or boards, the residents of low income communities were often manipulable, for the issues were presented to them by experts or political professionals in technical terms which obscured their ability to differentiate between possible alternatives. (2) Community control is a relatively undifferentiated concept, especially in the black community where, because of racial segregation, there are frequently conflicting class interests internal to the black community as a whole. (1971-72)

These observations illustrate a reality that many sincere advocates ignore or minimize in their quest to right the wrongs done to a less fortunate part of American society. However sincere they may be, the question remains as to the magnitude of the success of their endeavors. Coupled with this often glaring uncertainty is a failure to assess ghetto communities as being composed of multiple entities instead of monoliths.

Bell and Held (142) are two advocates who are aware of existing

paradoxes in the ghetto community:

> One cliche of contemporary political discourse is that the people have no real voice - or less a voice in their political affairs, a view reinforced by a ponderous academic sociology that asserts "a decline or eclipse of the local community and a change wherein "all groupings based on traditional criteria such as shared ethnic descent and inheritance of status are undermined..."
>
> We believe both assertions to be wrong. In fact, the opposite may be true - that there is more participation than ever before in American society, particularly in the large urban centers such as New York, and more opportunity for the active and interested person to express his political and social concerns. The very state of affairs leads to a paradox because it is the increase in participation which creates a sense of powerlessness and consequent frustration. A person who is socially conscious wants results, particularly his results, and he wants them immediately. But the very fact that there is an increase in the number of claimants leads inequitably to lengthier consultation and mediation, and, more importantly, to a situation within thousands of different organizations, each wanting diverse and contradictory things, simply check each other in their demands. As a Mrs. Gladys Gonzales, vice president of the Parents-Teachers Association of Junior High School 71, is reported as saying at the public hearings of the Board of Education on the School decentralization plan; "You graciously allow us to say what is on our mind and then turn around and do what you want to anyway." But this is precisely what every speaker, whatever his point of view, feels and says at such a meeting, and the result is rancor and a sense of frustration.

It is obvious that Mrs. Gonzales, like various other members of citizen organizations, is unaware of power dynamics and their relationship to decision-making in public policy. Maybe this attitude is representative of the attitude that compels Warren to call for the implementation of Paradigm II. But as it can be seen from this recital there are immense difficulties that impede the construction of an appropriate technology for the transformation of Paradigm I to Paradigm II.

Innocently enough, Mrs. Gonzales was engaged in a private regard-

ing posture which ultimately can lead to denials of trade-offs. A series of nontrade-off can lead in the long run to irrationality of organizational goal seeking. A successful example of the use of trade-offs can be seen in labor unions resolutions of jurisdictional disputes in spite of existent anger, hostility and frustration. Resolution has resulted largely because of labors dependence on bargaining and negotiation processes.

Lindblom (1) expands on the need for bargaining and negotiation:

> It is argued that bargaining and negotiations are not only inevitable processes in the American form of government - but also that such processes deserve our sympathetic respect and admiration. The alternative to bargaining is hierarchy. The author advances the hypothesis that bargaining is preferable for various reasons in particular because the bargaining process tends to insure that all vital interests obtain a hearing and because the results of bargaining tend to be in the public interest. In a hierarchical organization there is no assurance that all interest will be represented, nor still less that decisions can be made on the basis of all relevant facts and values. (1955)

Hierarchy is not the only detrimental alternative to bargaining. Previously I commented about two possible others - anarchy and nihilism. Both are self-destructive. For the achievement of Paradigm I evolution and even revolution are preferable because they both can contain elements of the bargaining process.

Two signal aspects of the study's foundation have been discussed thus far in this Chapter: 1. A recent history of the development of citizen participation; and 2. The relationship of social power to citizen participation. The third step is an overview of social stratification theory with emphasis on those elements that may account

for any power differentials in the citizen participation process.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

The initial part of this discussion is directly concerned with the general theory of social class. The second relates that concept to the derivation of social power from the class structure and its impact on bargaining in the decision-making process.

Kohn (110) makes a typical assessment of social class, an assessment that is part of conventional social science, but has little cutting power, as we shall see:

> ...social class has been proven to be so useful a concept because it refers to more than simply educational level or occupation, or any of the large number of correlated variables. It is useful because it captures the reality that the intricate interplay of all these variables creates different basic conditions of life at different levels of the social order. Members of different conditions of life, come to see the world differently - to develop different conceptions of social reality, different aspirations and hopes and fears, different conceptions of the desirables. (1972)

Kohn points to an issue but does not specify it well. Although social scientists and laymen alike commonly employ similar terminology there is yet no formal agreement about a class structure. Most of the disputes usually revolve around the number and type of variables assigned to given categories or class levels. Also, each element must be examined for its significance to the social structure. What we need are definitions that pick out processes that reinforce inequality. An example is when Hamilton (152) expands on the educational variable. He says that education alone does not make the difference, but rather the kind of education, the kind of institution, the amount of

education, and the motivation. Value systems, likewise, are important considerations, within his definition. (1972)

Perhaps the area of highest agreement among those individuals interested in social stratification is the education-occupation-income triad. Jenks (14) discovered that:

> The higher the average pay and the average level of education of men in an occupation, the higher its prestige with every sort of American... The status of various occupations have remained stable over the forty years since sociologists first investigated the subject. (1972)

As with education, the particular job must be considered along a spectrum that "differentiates the lives and careers of upper and lower-middle class families. (Hamilton, 375) In order to become socially mobile, the job must be openended, i.e., allowing for increasing responsibility, prestige, advancement, and power. Instead of a place to earn a living, work involvement becomes "career" and "position" and not just a job of limited potential, skill and little if any privilege. As one advances there is less confinement to routine operations; instead flexibility is encouraged and individual decision-making opportunities are available. Power and autonomy on and off the job are automatic concomitants of occupational prestige.

It is imperative in any discussion of social class to list the groups comprising a given hierarchy. Kohn (111) enumerates four levels:

> Social classes will be defined as aggregates of individuals who occupy broadly similar positions in the scale of prestige. In dealing with the research literature we shall treat occupational position (or occupational position as weighted by education) as a very serviceable index of social class for urban American society. And we shall adopt the model of social stratification implicit in

> most research, that of four relatively discrete classes: a "lower class" of unskilled manual workers in semi-skilled and skilled occupations, a "middle class" of white collar workers and professionals and an "elite" differentiated from the middle class not so much in terms of occupation as wealth and lineage. (1972)

A major criticism of this definition is that it tends to cause difficulty in comprehending the size and diversity of the middle class. Parker's (54) comments add substantially to clearing up past illusions in this matter:

> But the absence of dramatic and extensive poverty is not the whole story. The data seems to show that the "middle class" has always been, as it is today, a misleading category made up, not of one, but of two distinct parts: the upper and lower middle class. Even 200 years ago the upper half was filled with professionals and skilled craftsmen, and the lower half inhabited by semi-skilled and unskilled workers, small shopkeepers, and minor officials. Of the two, the upper half has always enjoyed the fruits of prosperity disproportionately, while the lower half has existed above poverty, in the strict sense, but not above deprivation. The life style of the lower middle class shades at one end into poverty and at the other end into modest comfort, but defies the comfortable myth of affluence that economic mythology has ascribed to 70% of the nation. (1972)

The salient idea being expressed is that the literature contains a general framework of supportive evidence that attempts to account for distinctions between groups. Though at times such boundaries may appear to be nebulous and even non-existent, they exist and they have significance for the way in which individuals relate to one another. Objective well-being and power are one part of this, and the socialization into such roles is another part.

Hence, another dimension of the social class concept is the self perception of individuals in regard to relative class positions - their

class identity. Lasswell (125) points out that it is not necessary for individuals to internalize the conglomerate of class hierarchy to accept it:

> Social organization does not require consensus on all norms or conceptual categories. It is quite possible for persons to have quite distinct concepts of their roles and of the norms that govern them and yet achieve meaning for their interaction. "Objective" meanings of acts, events, and processes may not exist at all. A society is organized when its constituents can depend on their expectations of the behavior of others and can depend on the reactions of others to their own behavior most of the time. (1965)

This particular emphasis illustrates the fact that individuals and groups have expectations of others. It is sometimes argued that these expectations are outgrowths of life styles resulting from "cultural patterning," (9. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, p. 332) of elements or traits. However, there are "practical and theoretical dangers arising from the unqualified use of the class-culture concept. Although there is overlap they are not synonymous in definition. Hamilton (387) ventures a basis for the distinction.

> It has been argued that as a result of presumed equalization processes, notably an equalization of incomes and of consequent ability to acquire similar consumption standards the "life-style" differences between the classes have been reduced. It has been indicated here, to the contrary, that there is substantial difference in the pattern of income development over the life-time with the upper middle-classes having a markedly different pattern than is the case with the lower middles and working class. The former career is one of continuous improvement; the latter two involve an up and down pattern. To the extent that income and more specifically the lifetime patterns of income provides the basis for life styles and determines the pattern of location and social contacts and more generally to the extent that these "income-careers" affect life plans, there would be "differences" so long as this "source of outlook remain differentiated. (1972)

This survey provides a perspective from which the notion of social class and its relationship to social power will be presented.

Social Class and Power

This phase of social class and its ramifications is concerned primarily with power and its manifestations such as privilege and influence. As Lasswell notes: Another way of understanding social classes is as a category of people who have special privileges (or disprivileges) of differential prestige or special degree and kinds of influence (or lack of it) over others." (Lasswell, 30). Lenski, has arrived at similar conclusions. He says that social class can be defined as an aggregation of persons in a society who stand in a similar position with respect to some form of power, privilege, or prestige. (Lenski, 45) Lasswell hastens to amend his statement saying that "... it is not possible to set down a coherent theory of social class based on power differentiation. (Lasswell, 187). However, he believed that Mills was coming closer to it than any other social theoretician at that time.

Mills, like other investigators of social stratification, includes in his analyses the standard variables of social class. His findings also stress the importance of maintaining an awareness of the fact that given sets of people sharing similar life choices ultimately result in differentiated sources and amounts of income (Mills,307). But as Lasswell comments, Mills was perceptive enough to discern significant linkages between social class and social power. He roughly defined power as the ability to accomplish goals in spite of opposition. (Mills, 1963, 315) He says:

> When we speak of the power of classes, occupations, and status groups, however, we usually refer more or less specifically to political power. This means the power of such groups to influence or determine the policies or activities of the state. The most direct means of exercising such power and the sign of its existence are organizations, either composed of members of such strata or acting in behalf of their interests or both (Mills,1963)

Lenski's (45) approach to power differentials emanating from social class position is reminiscent of Mills' but he appears to base his conclusions more on socio-economic aspects of resource scarcity and its redistribution. He also is interested in relationships between privilege and prestige and how they intermingle with power. For example, he reasons that:

> If privilege is defined as a possession or control of a portion of the surplus produced by a society, then it follows <u>that privilege is largely a function of power and to a very limited degree</u> a function of altruism. This means to explain most of the distribution of privilege in a society we have but to determine the distribution of power. (1966)

Lenski hypothesizes that if power is the foundation of political sovereignty then it is also the foundation of every society with a surplus. Whenever a prevailing system is found to be weak, it is replaced with a more powerful system. Such a system is usually, at first, based on coercive power. However, in the long run coercive power is too expensive and difficult to maintain. The effective substitute for such power has been found to be in the bureaucratic system which is based upon authority. Authority is power in a form that subservient populations accept as legitimate. (Lenski, 51)

> ...<u>with a shift from the role of might to the role of right, power continues to be determinant of privilege, but forms of power change</u>. Force is replaced by institutionalized

> forms of power as the most useful resource in the struggle between individuals and groups for prestige and privilege, though force still remains in the picture as the ultimate guarantee of the more genteel forms. (Lenski, 1966,56)

This dissertation borrows heavily from Mills' (23) theorizing about the derivation and importance of power subforms that are considered basic to its substance. An example is the following quotation:

> Surely nowadays, we need not argue that in the last resort, coercion is the "final" form of power. But then we are by no means constantly at the last resort. Authority (power that is justified by the beliefs of the voluntarily obedient) and manipulation (power this is wielded unbeknown to the powerless) must also be considered along with coercion. In fact the three types must be sorted out whenever we think about power. (1963)

Lenski expands the subforms of power by introducing the concept of influence. He defines it as "the ability to manipulate the social situation of others or their perceptions of it, by the exercise of one's resources and rights, thereby increasing the pressures on others to act in accordance with one's own wishes." (Lenski, 1966) He makes the distinction that influence is more subtle than authority.

Important to both concepts, authority and influence, is that either one can be vested in property or position. Whereas, in the past during feudalism and early capitalism influence and authority were principally vested in real property, increasingly today, both tend to rest in positions and roles. Also, authority and influence that are attached to position appear to be much more nebulous and fluid than that vested just with real property.

The object of this discussion is to develop the consistent and systematic illustration that social class is ultimately based on

power differentials that are effective in structuring and maintaining significant relationships between competing groups. Although these groups may not necessarily be aligned against one another in conscious conflict involving finite boundaries, concrete issues, and specific goal orientations, their actions in most instances are not accidental nor incidental. What makes for the critical distinctions between these competing groups are their perceptions of their own internal structures. Mills' (316) comments in this regard indicate some crucial aspects of power acquisition:

> The accumulation of political power by any stratum is generally dependent upon a triangle of factors: willful mentality, objective opportunity, and the state of the organization. The opportunity is limited by the groups' structural positions within the stratifcation of society, the will is dependent upon the groups' awareness of its interest and ways of realizing them. And both structural position and awareness interplay with organizations, which strengthen awareness and are made politically relevant by structural position. (1963)

Giddens (101) introduces some pertinent theory through his consideration of the social class concept. His basic argument follows:

> In clarifying some of these matters we may start from the premise which is fundamental for both Marx and Weber: that, in capitalism, the market is intrinsically a structure of power, in which the possession of certain attributes advantages some groupings of individuals relative to others. While it is a power structure, the market is not a normatively defined system of authority in which the distribution of power is, as such, sanctioned as legitimate. The rights of property, and the sale of labour, are rights of the alientation or disposal of goods. (Commodities in the Marxian sense) which underpin the system of power, not in spite of, but because of the fact that they are specified in terms of freedom of economic exchange. The operation of market relationships obviously presupposes the existence of normative agreements (ultimately sanctioned by the state) which define the general conditions governing the formation of contractual ties, etc., but these norms merely specify

> the boundaries of the framework. The market is thus a system of economic relationships founded upon relative bargaining strengths of different groupings of individuals. The development of capitalism dissolves the differentiation between labour and commodity markets which exists in more rudimentary forms of economy, since labour itself becomes a commodity. This is the basis of course of Marx's dichotomous model; those who are propertyless are almost completely powerless in the bargaining encounter as compared to those who own property in the means of production. In accepting that "property and lack of property are basic categories of all class situations," Weber adopts the same view, although he then proceeds to suggest further that we may identify other attributes which create class differences among the propertyless. (1973)

Gidden's theory is that property holdings are directly proportional to power levels and given categories of property holders form aggregates of power levels. Market capacity is the key to power intensity and it specifically "refers to all forms of relevant attributes that an individual brings to the market place." (Gidden, 103)

Being well aware of possible dangers inherent in the linking of class and culture concepts, particular attention, when required, will be paid to examine the interesting ideas of culture and class.

Giddens, unfortunately does not clearly define the magnitude of those attributes which contribute to market capacity. However, it will be assumed that such an attribute is any beneficial characteristic for the bargaining or exchange capacity of persons or groups. It is quite possible for a given individual or group to define an attribute for a given subsystem but when related to the system in question it can be possible for that attribute to have a negative function. An example of an attribute is a "skill" which has importance for market power because people can be excluded from political or

economic rewards by clever use of "skills" terminologies, often in the name of efficiency but not incidentally for class privilege.

> As Weber indicates, possession of recognized "skills" including educational qualifications - is the major factor influencing market capacity. Differentiations in market capacity may be used, as various recent authors have indicated to serve economic returns other than income as such. These include principally, security of employment, prospects of career, advancement, and a range of 'fringe benefits,' such as pension rights, etc. (Giddens, 103)

Utilizing "skill" as the basis upon which the labor market is structured, Giddens (107) is able to replicate the configuration of social stratification as seen below:

> For the effect of closure in terms of inter-generational movement is to provide for the reproduction of common life experience over the generations; and this homogenisation of experience is reinforced to the degree to which the individuals' movement within the labour market is confined to occupations which generate a similar range of material outcomes. In general we may state that the structuration of classes is facilitated to the degree to which mobility closure exists in relation to any specified form of market capacity. There are three sorts of market capacity which can be said to be normally of importance in this respect: ownership of property in the means of production; possession of education or technical qualifications; and possession of manual labour-power. In so far as it is the case that these tend to be tied to closed patterns of inter and intra-generational mobility, this yields the foundation at a basic three-class system in capitalist society; an 'upper,' 'middle,' and 'lower' or working class. (1973)

This basic three-class system is structured in much the same fashion as the model we have originally suggested. Each of the three classes is further separated into two groups. He divides the working class into: 1. The old or established working class, which is predominately white "in semi-skilled and skilled occupations, more unionized, and employed in high-income manufacturing, manufacturing

and construction industries;" 2. The underclass, the bottom tier of the total American society composed of the poor, Blacks and Chicanos. (Giddens, 215)

Giddens' subdivisions of the middle class rest heavily on the differences in market capacity. "The most significant type of difference is undoubtedly between the capacity to offer marketable technical knowledge, recognized and specialized symbolic skills, and the offering of general symbolic competence." (Giddens, 186)

In addition to the skills factor status segregation through neighborhood polarity reinforces differentiation.

> Differences in neighborhood organization are directly bound up with the exploitive connotations of class relationships apart from those pertaining to the economic sphere itself - particularly insofar as the differences influence the distribution of education chances. (Giddens, 1973, p. 184)

Giddens (130) defines exploitation as any socially conditioned form of asymmetrical production of life chances.

Finally, this study incorporates another important facet of Gidden's theory which he refers to as "the mediation of control" or "distributive power." The mediation of control concerns the actual (effective) policy formation and decision making input that a given group in a stratified structure of social class can exert at the expense of others. (Gidden, 122)

Together, these concepts boldly lifted from the works of Lenski, Mills and Giddens, provide the framework for the contention that social power is the major element of social class. As a part of power there are four subelements that reflect class differences. They are

communication, competence, style/tactics and goal orientation. The patterns that these variables form ultimately manifest themselves in some degree of mediation of control which plots the ability of a citizen organization to affect decisions in a particular policy making process.

In order to undertake this study it was necessary to provide: 1. a set of working definitions for the major terms used in relating organizational behavior to class theory; and 2. Nineteen propositions that form the basis for the interview schedule.

Some General Definitions

I Middle/lower class organizations

A. Middle class organization members include a few upper class members.

1. Middle class - medium to high income derived from educational and technical qualification for symbolic skills. (medium market capacity)

2. Upper class - elites who possess great property, (personal or real). Rights of property may be substituted for the physical. (high market capacity).

B. Lower class organization

1. Lower or working class - ranges from an erratic low income derived from non-skilled manual labor and state welfare, to a higher steady income from semi-skilled and skilled manual labor (low market capacity).

II All community agencies in this study are categorized as being middle class.

III Citizen organizations/Community agencies

A. Citizen organizations - volunteer groups organized for intervention in urban development decision-making.

B. Agency - a bureaucratic organization, either governmental or private established to refine and implement policy decisions.

V Conflict/Consensus:

A. Conflict - "a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals." Essentially, conflict as I am using the term here, implies a belief on the part of one of the parties to a decision making situation, that other groups in that situation are aliens. They do not identify with the other parties in the decision making situation. Therefore they are in conflict and seek power differentials.

B. "Consensus is a particular state of the belief system of a society. It exists when parties concerned with decisions regarding allocations of scarce commodities are in approximate agreement in their beliefs about what decisions should be made... an element of consensus is a widespread sense of identity or unity which discloses to individuals who experience it, those features in respect to which they are identical and therefore equal." Groups in consensus about a particular decision are not significantly aware of power differentials. (The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 232)

THE LITERATURE AND PROPOSITIONAL DERIVATION

The preceeding sections of this chapter accomplished two objectives: 1. presented an overview of citizen participation history and social stratification theory; and 2. linked these data to a concept of social power that has an application for decision-making. I have labeled this endeavor the power conceptual scheme.

The scheme consists of five concepts and nineteen propositions. These components reduced the abstractions to the concrete vehicle needed to facilitate the analysis.

THE CONCEPTUAL POWER SCHEME

Because the true meaning of power is sometimes elusive and nebulous, the approach to its definition is broad based. It has at its center, the main Power element, but it cannot function without the ancillary concepts of Communication, Style/Tactics, Competence, and Goal Orientation. All of these elements are in tight interaction, each impacting on the other (see Fig. II-1). They can best be analyzed through observing them as separate entities.

The essence of the power conceptual scheme is that social class is the repository of power. By extracting and organizing the components of power we are able to more clearly devise methods of predicting decision outcomes (See Fig. II-2).

I. POWER

Power is defined here as the ability to determine the outcome of a given situation. I have quoted Mills as roughly defining power as the ability to accomplish goals in spite of opposition. In any bargaining situation where multiple alternatives exist and the parties

FIGURE II-1

THE INTERRELATION OF POWER AND ITS ANCILLARIES





Figure II-2

The Linkage Between Class, Power and Decisions



are divided as to which ones to select, then other things equal, those whose alternatives prevail are the one's who possess the power.

The variables of the core power element are:

A. Powerlessness - can be detected through expressions of frustration due the inability of participants to impact on decision-making process.

An ironical aspect of powerlessness is that "it is the increase in participation which creates a sense of powerlessness and a sense of frustration." Therefore, social change agents should be prepared to cope with this paradox. (see p. 32)

Proposition 1. Lower class organizations interacting with community agencies experience more effects of powerlessness than middle class organizations interacting with community agencies.

B. Fear - apprehension about possible reprisals because one has attempted or actually intervened in the decision-making process.

The fact that the participants are actively engaged in bargaining is an indication that they might not be afraid of the idea of participation. However, those of us who have an interest in the process should

be vigilant in case there are subtle manifestations of fear that may have a bearing on the decision-making process, such as shifts in goals, lack of accountability and a lack of responsiveness. These actions may be indirect expressions of fear that possibly relate to the individual's feelings of incompetence.

Proposition 2. There is little or no fear evidenced between middle class organizations and community agencies or lower class organizations and community agencies.

C. Authority - legitimate power, in this case defined as the ability to mobilize resources.

We have discussed Lenski's opinion of authority as related to resource scarcity and its redistribution (p.39). The bureaucratic system is based upon authority-power that is accepted as legitimate by the voluntarily obedient (power surrender). These people have either temporarily given up their property rights or have little or no property.

Proposition 3. Middle class organizations and agencies possess a great deal of legitimate power through their control of resources, whereas, lower class organizations possess less legitimate power, because of a general lack of resources.

D. Influence - the ability to exert intangible force in the decision-making process.

Lenski notes that influence is more subtle than authority.

My definition equates "intangible" with "subtlety". Lenski, as we have seen, interrelates influence with manipulation and authority when he defines influence as "the ability to manipulate the social

situation of others, or their perceptions of it, by the exercise of ones resources and rights, thereby increasing the pressures on others to act in accordance with one's own wishes" (p.40). I interpret this to mean that influence is a part of the power needed to control the making of decisions.

Proposition 4. Agencies and middle class organizations have a reciprocal degree of influence on each other. The degree of reciprocal influence between agencies and lower class organizations is uncertain.

II. COMMUNICATION

Communication is the state of the input and output flow of information. It is the mortar that binds the components of interaction. Communication can be harmonious, discordant, or anything between the extremes, but without communication there will be no interaction. It is the quality of communication that contributes to the worsening or the reduction of friction. Quality can be discerned from the following four variables.

A. Mutual Trust - the ability to maintain a reciprocal reliance.

Wilson (p.27) in his discussion of the Kenwood-Hyde Park case, elaborates on the causes for the lack or trust between agencies and "the low income, who because they are the objects rather than the subjects of civic action often develop a keen sense of the difference between "we" and "they." It is quite natural that "they" are often regarded with suspicion."

Bureaucracy reacts with equal distrust and suspicion because "these people" do not understand and are constantly disrupting their plans.

Group perceptions of situations are significantly different because of social realities, therefore, if the avenues of communication are not widened as a first step toward the establishment of mutual trust, the expectations are that community decision-making activity will be farcical.

Proposition 5. Middle class organizations and community agencies display a higher degree of mutual trust than lower class organizations and community agencies.

B. Access - the ease of obtaining meaningful face-to-face interaction with key decision makers.

Accessibility was cited be Lowery (p.22) as one of the five fundamental types of leader-citizen relationships which determine the essential nature of the political system. Any party to a bargaining situation who denies accessibility, severly limits communication. The act of denial helps to lay foundations of distrust.

Proposition 6. Face-to-face meetings between agencies and middle class groups is easy to achieve and the atmosphere of the meetings is usually harmonious. Face-to-face meetings between agencies and lower class groups is easy to achieve but the atmosphere varies widely, depending on the issue, from hostility to harmony.

C. Cooperation - the free and open exchange of pertinent data for problem solving activity.

The literature, as we have observed, has not been explicitly concerned with the matter of cooperation between Agency/Citizen groups, rather it has focused upon the extremes. It cited either citizen co-optation by agencies or citizen take over attempts of agency run programs. To me, the act of citizen participation demands mutual

efforts for problem solving. It is the nature of the cooperative involvement that is at issue rather than than being preoccupied with the extremes.

Proposition 7. Cooperation and information flow exists at a high level between middle class organizations and agencies regardless of the issue. Substantive issues and vested interests are determining factors for the degree of cooperation and information flow between lower class organizations and agencies.

D. Accountability - responsible behavior toward other parties in the decision-making process.

Lowery offers explainations for the lack of citizen accountability. He lists restricted citizen participation as a partial cause. As a result, he believes that "poor citizen accountability is manifested in alienation or violent participation."

Low level accountability between participants in decision-making is an indicator of low level communication.

Proposition 8. Agencies initially develop high levels of accountability to middle class organizations with which they share common goals. Ultimately, due to situational changes, they may attempt to reduce such levels. Agencies have less accountability to those middle class or lower class organizations of non-shared identity.

III. STYLE/TACTICS

These are organizational procedures for goal accomplishment. Kohn (p.34) and Hamilton (p.34) both point out the fact that because social classes are different by virtue or adjustments to different life conditions, individuals develop different conceptions of social

reality and especially different conceptions of the desirables (values). Therefore, I maintain that individual's attitudes and behavior patterns are reflected in the organizations they join and organizations develop styles most familiar to their memberships.

A. Threat - menacing warning to cooperate on the other parties terms.

Traditionally, the lower the social level, the more overt and violent the threat. My expectations are that bureaucrates and middle class organizations employ threat tactics, but in subtle forms and with higher probabilities of implementation. My expectations for lower class organization threat tactics is that they would be manifested in flaming rhetoric, occassionally leading to physical violence.

I venture to say that as individuals acquire higher social status their threat tactics become more subtle, however, just as deadly.

Proposition 9. Agencies and middle class organizations react to each other in an environment free of mutual threats; while depending on the issue, threats between agencies and lower class organizations is a standard way of negotiating.

B. Interaction - deliberate involvement for the purpose of decision-making.

Interaction and cooperation are related concepts and closely identified with citizen participation. It is improbable that one can be jointly engaged in decision-making without interacting.

From my A/C involvement, I am now inclined to believe that the more power one has, the more confident one becomes toward interacting with others in decision-making. The intensity of interaction is more important than the amount of interaction.

Proposition 10. Agencies attempt to persuade both social class levels of citizen organizations to interact via agency terms. Middle class organizations are more accepting of this tactic than lower class organizations.

C. Manipulation - achievement of subtle control to insure the advantage in decision-making.

Manipulation is a style of interaction and often involves the use of influence. The successful manipulator is the one who possesses the most power. Mills (p.40) defined manipulation as power that is wielded unbeknown to the powerless.

Proposition 11. When confronted with crutial issues, agencies and lower class organizations attempt to manipulate each other through secret maneuvers. Manipulative efforts between agencies and middle class organizations are more difficult to identify.

D. Appeal to Higher Authority - neutralizing others in a decision-making situation by introducing a more powerful ally to make-decisions.

This is a tactic based on the use of influence and manipulation. By definition it can be assumed that the lower class organizations have fewer supportive high authorities to call on than middle class organizations.

Propositions 12. Middle class organizations and agencies when engaged in disputes with each other do not respectively seek the aid of higher authorities. Lower class citizens organizations and community agencies individually seek aid from some higher authority. Timing in making appeals is more sophisticated with middle class organizations and they do not petition for support like lower class

organizations, who because of powerlessness and lack of skills "go to the well too often."

E. Competitive Staff - staff members who concentrate on factors of power as an end rather than original goals.

In my experience as a community planner I have on occassion observed this phenomenon. It was included in this study because of its potential impact on the decision-making process. There are times when healthy staff competition might work to the benefit of an organization in terms of acquiring power, but as a tactic the risks outweigh the benefits.

Proposition 13. Agencies and lower class citizen organizations often attempt to expand their individual orginal goals and authority. Middle class organizations tend to restrict their activities to the original goals. Agencies and lower class organizations are "imperialistic" and carry long shopping lists and agendas in their "back pockets." Agencies try to expand their authority. Lower class individuals seek personal leverage and advantage.

Competence

For the purposes of this study, competence defined as the demonstrated ability to solve problems that arise out of the urban development process.

Earlier in the chapter I recounted Cottrell's insistence for community programs that encouraged the development of competence for the disadvantaged in order to increase their effectiveness in goal setting and policy analysis. If we accept as fact that competence is largely derivative of educational and occupational backgrounds then

it follows that competence is also an integral part of market capacity. Therefore, competence is an aspect of power.

Three indicators of competence are training, expertise and responsiveness.

A. Training - instruction that results in an improved ability to adequately perform specific tasks, especially of a symbolic nature.

Reference has been made in the literature discussion to Ross and Rosen's comments (p.31) about the vunerability of citizen groups to manipulation. The agency experts trained in issue perspectives can easily control the bargaining process because naive citizen, no matter how dedicated, have had little if any exposure to the use of analytical techniques.

Proposition 14. Members of lower class organizations are deficient in skills that can be acquired in traditional educational institutions. Therefore, lower class citizen organizations are more at a disadvantage when relating to agencies than middle class organizations.

B. Expertise - an exceptional skill in a specific area.

Expertise emerges from educational and experience combinations. It is a subtle and hypnotic power component that has a tendency to put those without it in awe of those who have it. Remember Giddens' (p.30) observation that possession of recognized "skills" including educational qualifications is the major factor influencing market capacity.

Proposition 15. The expertise for problem solving and decision-

making in lower class organizations is likely to be an intimate knowledge of the life style and dynamics of the target community. The expertise of middle class organizations is usually professional competence.

C. Responsiveness - the ability to react in a minimum time span for the purpose of problem solving.

Responsiveness is one of the five fundamental types of leader-citizen relationships listed by Lowery (p.22) and is a key factor in the process that develops organizational responsibility. Response time is also an indicator of organizational cohesiveness.

Proposition 16. When called upon to: a. Meet deadlines; and b. Be receptive to the ideas of others, lower class organizations have difficulty with both a and b, agencies have difficulties with b, and middle class organizations have difficulties with neither.

V. GOAL ORIENTATION

This is a process of being consciously directed toward problem solving objectives. The distinction between goal orientation and style/tactics is that the former is substantive, while the latter is procedural. The model for decision-making features problem definition and goal setting. A competent organization is equipped to carry out these functions with a minimum of deviation, diversion and procrastination. It may be true, that in given situations, focal consideration of side issues is unavoidable, however, it is axiomatic that if the original goal remains valid its pursance should not be hindered by subordinate factors.

A. Private/Public Regarding - private-considerating personal

goals over community goals. This posture interferes with group decision-making and the process dilutes group power. It usually occurs when the individual has a low supply of the basic survival resources.

Public-consideration of community goals over personal goals. This posture allows for the consolidation of resources and power increases. It usually occurs when individuals possess surpluses. Wilson mentions these states in Chicago's Hyde-Park-Kenwood situation.

Proposition 17. When negotiating with community agencies, middle class citizen organizations are more public regarding than lower class citizen organizations.

B. Policy Formulation - the devising of definitions and strategies for the resolution of issues and the accomplishment of desired objectives. When policy formulation is efficient and effective it contributes to a higher market capacity.

Cottrell, Piven, Lowery, Rose and Rosen, all alluded to the necessity for increased competence among citizen groups to enable them to function effectively in the policy making process. In addition, I have pointed to the differentials of competence as partial reasons for differentials in the social class system.

Proposition 18. Middle class citizen organizations have less difficulty devising strategy for the general public than lower class citizen organizations. Agencies, also, encounter difficulties in this area, but since they have specific skills in this function, they enjoy a higher proficiency than either middle class citizen organizations or lower class citizen organizations.

C. Issue Focused - the ability to define the pertinent issues and pursue them whenever and wherever to closure, while excluding trivial, phony and irrelevant issues.

Goal orientation as an ancillary to power has much in common with Mills' reference to (p. 41) "willful mentality - the will is dependent upon the group's awareness of its interests and the ways of realizing them." The less willful mentality a group possesses the more prone it is to flounder in decision-making.

Proposition 19. Lower class organizations have more difficulty than middle class organizations and community agencies in focusing on central issues and stated goals.

SUMMARY

Citizen participation has been shown to be a matter of political power in which the needs of citizen groups and bureaucracies are intertwined. Since power is the pre-eminent issue, it was found necessary to examine the interconnections of social class and power as viewed in the sociology literature. From this problem focus and these two literatures were derived a body of propositions relating to how various power themes interact with social class differentials to create the dynamic of citizen participation. This is a complex and puzzling pattern as the succeeding chapters will show.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter developed the reasoning for this inquiry's direction. It contains relevant information about the emergence of the need for citizen participation in urban development and the importance of social power to social stratification. A set of propositions was derived from the literature and my personal experiences to provide a pathway for the analysis.

This chapter's primary concern is the development of the methodology that can be of aid in portraying how social class and social power are intermingled in the making of urban policy decisions.

The methodological procedure is divided into five steps:

I. Provide the rationale for community agency/citizen organization selection.

II. Explain the data gathering process. Give some idea of the atmosphere and flavor of the individual interviews.

III. Show how the data that were generated from the concepts and variables was organized for the analysis.

IV. Explain the questionnaire design.

V. Given an overview of the data analysis procedure.

   A. Explain the function of organizational histories and characteristics.

   B. Explain the function of the critical events.

C. Describe the scoring method.

THE RATIONALE FOR AGENCY/ORGANIZATIONS SELECTION

First, the inquiry was restricted to those community agencies involved in social programming. Second, I made a definite effort to select agencies that were structured to function differently in problem definition and goal attainment. This orientation provided the opportunity to examine the possibilities of distinctions in the spectrum of decision-making in citizen/agency relations.

At the present time not all of the organizations under study are in existence and those that are still viable vary in age. This in no way effects the research because my concerns were directed at the point in time that a particular decision-making situation took place.

After the agencies were selected, citizen organizations that related to respective agencies were named. Below is a listing of the community agencies/citizen organizations (A/C).

I. THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY (MNA)

I was the Agency's first director. During that period (1967-1970) I aided in its establishment. As a result, the MNA staff operation, structure, and general policy were very familiar to me. I was highly involved with MNA's peculiar problems and subsequent attempts for their solutions, but I am not included in this study as a participant.

The MNA is now the Neighborhood Service Department.

II. THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD (CGB)

The corresponding citizen organization to the MNA is the CGB, a predominantly lower class organization. I also participated in its

organization and knew all of the key actors personally. The two CGB sub-units that received the most attention in this study are the Social Service Committee and the Metropolitan Arts Program because the conflicts between them and the MNA permeated the total CGB.

The MNA was specifically organized to facilitate the involvement of citizen organizations in decision-making, therefore, it is important that this phase of citizen participation be compared with other agencies whose directions are not as explicit.

The CGB is no longer in existence.

III. THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES (UCS)

UCS is an "umbrella" agency. It disburses the local torch drive agency (United Foundation) funds and supplies planning expertise to subagencies and organizations. Since the lines between citizen organizations and UCS are loosely connected, but the accounting of funds is somewhat rigid, I believe UCS is an ideal agency for investigation.

UCS is still in existence.

There are three citizen organizations under UCS's umbrella in this study. They are:

IV. THE WOMENS COMMITTEE (WC)

An upper middle and lower upper class women's group that provided support services for the UCS staff. Their value to this study is their distinct class position and long time relationship with UCS;

The WC is no longer in existence.

V. LATINO AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (LASED)

These citizens are organized for the purpose of improving service

delivery systems for a lower income community. The Board consists primarily of lower middle class and lower class people. It was selected because it represents a section of the lower income populace that traditionally has not had a Detroit history of participation as a group.

LASED is presently in existence;

VI. ST. PETER CLAVER (SPC)

This organization functions as the Board of a neighborhood settlement house. The community it serves (mainly black) is depressed and deprived. The organization is composed of middle and upper lower class individuals. It was chosen for analysis because of the diversity of the Board and the direction the majority of the Board is following in order to solve problems;

SPC is presently in existence.

VII. STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS (STRESS)

STRESS was a special unit organized in the Detroit Police Department. It was a crash program whose goal was to drastically reduce street crime. The primary reason for including it in the dissertation is because the Police Department is a para-military organization and its importance to the research is to observe whether there are any distinquishing features in the method by which the Detroit Police Department handles citizen intervention in the decision-making process. STRESS is no longer in existence. Two citizen organizations that relate to STRESS are listed below:

VIII. THE COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS (CCHR)

The CCHR is an organization of organizations entirely composed

of middle class members. The purpose for its selection is to study how the Police Department interacted in the policy development process with a broad based (establishment) middle class organization.

CCHR is presently in existence.

IX. THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE (SEC)

The SEC was a coalition of organizations, but differs markedly from the CCHR because of its non-establishment nature. In fact, it can be described as a radical organization. I believe that the SEC provides an interesting contrast to the other citizen organizations in the study.

Initially, I had attempted to interview members of the Labor Defense League and From The Ground Up, two organizations that were heavily committed to the SEC, but they were unwilling to be involved in this study as separate organizations. However, I was able to interview individual members of those organizations in the name of the SEC.

Neither the Labor Defense League, From The Ground Up nor the SEC are presently in existence.

THE DATA GATHERING PROCESS

The next decision was to choose representative members of each organization for interviews in order to generate the needed data. This procedure consisted of three steps:

1. A description of the manner in which the respondents were to be selected;

2. The format for conducting the individual interviews; and

3. The specific way the information divulged by the respondent was to be recorded as data.

RESPONDENT SELECTION

The people interviewed for the study were selected in several ways. One, through my personal involvement; , through mutual friends; and three, through suggestions of members in organizations who had already been interviewed. In the latter case the typical comments were, "You should talk to John or Mary Doe. The information they have will be extremely valuable to your study." Or, they would say, "I want your dissertation to have as many of the facts as possible so please contact Mary or John Doe. Please use my name as a reference. In addition, I will talk to them and tell them you will be calling and to cooperate because the results of the study could be valuable."

I completed four pretest interviews. After evaluating the process and the resulting data, I made a few minor modifications in the questionnaire than I proceeded with the task of organizing the data.

Because the study involved sensitive social power relationships and much discussion of confidential information. I promised all respondents I would not give any real names or describe too vividly those activities that might inadvertently give clues to true identities. Therefore, pseudonyms are used throughout the data and their role descriptions are general. Listed below are descriptions of the range of roles and number of respondents for each organization.

Model Neighborhood Agency

Supervisors, social and economic planners, and researchers (8)

Citizens Governing Board

Committee leaders, committee members, area chairpersons and Executive Board members.

United Community Services

Planners (3)

Womens Committee

Leading and active members (8)

Latin Americans for Social and Economic Development

Officers and active members. (8)

St. Peter Claver

Active members (5)

Stop The Robberies-Enjoy Safe Streets

Command officers and patrolmen. (9)

Coordinating Council on Human Relations

Executive Committee members and leading members. (8)

State of the Emergency Committee

Active members (7)

THE INTERVIEW PROCESS

Once the respondent had agreed to meet for a discussion about the interview, a time and a place were designated. The time varied from as early as seven thirty in the morning to as late as nine at night. It was at their convenience.

The location of the interview was either at the respondent's home, job or the Merrill-Palmer Institute where the author had been graciously allowed the use of their premises for interviewing purposes.

The first part of the interview process (a half hour to a full hour) was spent in a detailed explanation, to the respondent, about the nature and content of the study. After the respondent fully understood the direction of the research they were given the opportunity

to withdraw any commitment for an interview. In the great majority of cases the respondents were insistent that they be a part of the research and except for SEC members, were not concerned about detrimental results from their having been interviewed.

The interviews took from three to eight hours for completion. The individual sessions usually did not extend beyond three hours, with rescheduling for additional needed sessions.

I have described my approach to this study as somewhat unorthodox. Briefly recapturing some general interview conditions should allow the flavor of actual interview situations to emerge.

An example is a STRESS interview I had with a high and respected police official. The time was mid-morning, the place his office in police headquarters. Except for a few minor interruptions from subordinates about routine police work we were not disturbed.

The officer was candid in his answers and obviously possessed a storehouse of knowledge about the logic of the local law enforcement process as well as being highly perceptive about community dynamics. He was able to provide background information and social insights about STRESS' functions. In addition, he objectively discussed the pros and cons of community concern about the violence emanating from STRESS.

An interesting bit of information he provided, was that the Police Department had been totally unaware of the black community's feelings about Richard Worbec in relation to the New Bethel shootout. This incident involved the fatal shooting of Worbec's partner in front of the New Bethel Church by a revolutionary black group.

Subsequently, Worbec joined STRESS and was involved in some

fatalities which some community people considered "revenge killing."

Throughout the interview I became increasingly conscious of the idea that law enforcement was becoming more administrative and political, and less focused on traditional investigative activities. While sitting in that air conditioned office of a business executive type of policeman, who had smooth well mannered assistants, I could not help but contrast this scene with the haphazard struggle over resources going on out in the "streets."

Part of my introspections concerned the identity of actors who were really interacting in law enforcement decision-making.

A Womens Committee respondent, who also happened to be a long time friend of mine in community activities was interviewed at Merrill-Palmer. The session occurred over a period of several days. Her knowledge of the historical development and decline of the WC was illuminating and filled with fascinating accounts.

She was convinced that the WC Director had seriously considered the possibilities of limiting the influence of the WC long before the final decision, and she agreed with him. Otherwise, she stated, the WC would have become too powerful.

The interview sessions were pleasant and we spent some of the time discussing our mutual involvement in WC activities. This interview was typical of those with the other WC respondents. Except for occasional flashes that related to personality differences of various WC members. I received impressions that WC had been functioning like an exclusive service club that was on the way to becoming involved in some controversial issues.

A Citizen Governing Board interview was conducted in the Board's

office. The respondent, an old friendly adversary, looked a bit tired and I could tell that he was apprehensive about his future. I discovered that the CGB had been recently informed that there was no hope for its continuation. This news could be detected in the faces and actions of members and staff as they aimlessly moved around the office.

I was surprised and saddened at the news this was because my involvement in the CGB's organization had been deep. This particular respondent and I engaged in some reminiscing about the hectic and hopeful days of the sixties.

The interview included two sessions and my memory about actions and events during my Directorship at the MNA was much refreshed. In various living and dining rooms of other CGB respondents, I encountered similar experiences; we seemed to share a relationship and a spirit of cooperation on a level that never developed when I was the Director.

The SEC interviews were harder to come by. Although the respondents were friendly and cooperative, they were very cautious and concerned about confidentiality. I detected a deeper sense of hostility and bitterness about community decision-making than any other group of respondents including St. Peter Claver. The major difference between the SPC and the SEC interviews is that the SEC concept of power seemed to have been based on ideological conclusions, whereas the SPC appeared to be fighting for money.

Recording The Data

The information was recorded in an open ended interview schedule

composed of fifty-six detailed questions based on the propositional scheme. The respondents were encouraged to talk as much as they believed was necessary to explain the reasons for their individual perceptions.

From one to two hours was spent editing the questionnaire as soon as possible after the interview.

DATA ORGANIZATION

Chapter II presented the basis for a linkage of the power conceptual scheme to social class and citizen participation. The power conceptual scheme contains a set of nineteen propositions. The present task becomes one of designing a format so that these propositions can be analyzed.

I decided that the most convenient and effective way to approach the analysis was through the case study method. Therefore, I created Table III-2. The cases are the three Community Agencies/Citizen Organization sets with each group being assigned a column, making a total of nine.

The other three columns are for the power concepts and numbered propositions.

With the columns as a point of orientation, each case can be taken in turn. Case I contains the data for Chapter IV, Case II contains the data for Chapter V and Case III data for Chapter VI.

The chapters are each similarly divided into three sections. The first section contains a brief organization history, the second a description of organization characteristics and the third the critical events. Critical events are important interactions between A/C that have a major share in testing the propositions.

TABLE 3-2

SEQUENCE FOR DATA GENERATION

CASES			I		II				III		
			MNA	CGB	UCS	WC	LASED	SPC	STRESS	CCHR	SEC
CON-CEPTS	NO.	PROPOS-ITIONS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
POWER	1	Powerless-ness									
	2	Fear									
	3	Authority									
	4	Influence									
COMMUNICATION	5	Trust									
	6	Access									
	7	Coopera-tion									
	8	Account-ability									
STYLE/TACTICS	9	Threat									
	10	Inter-action									
	11	Manipu-lation									
	12	Appeal to Higher Authority									
	13	Competitive Staff									
COMPETENCE	14	Training									
	15	Expertise									
	16	Responsive-ness									
GOAL ORIENTATION	17	Public/ Private Regarding									
	18	Policy Formulation									
	19	Issue Focused									

CHAPTER VIII

Chap. IV

Chap. V

Chap. VI

Chap. VII

It is with the critical events that, initially, Table III-2 is utilized. This occurs when efforts are made to give the critical events a structure by examining relevant propositional responses (see critical event section of this chapter for a detailed explanation).

In Chapter VII: Patterns of Decision-Making as Perceived by Members Of Community Agencies/Citizen Organizations, full utilization of Table III-2 occurs because responses to each proposition by individual cases is needed for the analysis.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The rationale for the questionnaire was based on two primary points:

1. The conceptual scheme for power that is strongly related to the different patterning of social class; and
2. The author's direct acquaintance with a majority of the respondents and their organizations' histories. This factor has a high degree of significance in regard to the quality and quantity of information obtained in the questionnaire.

Being aware of the subjectivity hazard inherent in this approach, much care was spent in the design of the interview schedule. Particular emphasis was placed on linkages between the power conceptual scheme and the specific information needed from the respondents. Therefore, the questionnaire is long, comprehensive, and detailed; but because the community agencies' functions may vary, all of the questions may not be universally appropriate.

The instrument contains seven sections: (1) Organizational

existence; (2) Communication level; (3) Power awareness; (4) Organizational style; (5) Competence level; (6) Goal Orientation; (7) Demographic Information. (See Appendix)

Detailed and operational definitions of propositions emerge via specific questionnaire items in the Critical Events Section and the Scoring Methods Section of this Chapter.

ORGANIZATION EXISTENCE 1. (Questions 1-15) A series of questions that establish the fact that an organization exists. This determination is arrived at through the questions about organizational goal, organizational structure and client identification. Important to this first stage of the interview are assertions about the respondent's perceptions of his role within his organization, the social status of his organization and the social status of interacting organizations. It is, also, at this point that a search is begun for social class distinctions between the various organizations.

These distinctions may be revealed in several ways:

1. the entire organization membership can form a homogeneous social class;
2. the membership of the organization can contain a mix of social classes in both leadership and rank and file; or
3. the leadership can be predominately middle-class and the rank and file can be predominately lower-class.

COMMUNICATION 2. (Questions 16-24). This section initiates a mapping of the group process to the conceptual scheme. The questions, in this part focus on the concept of <u>communication</u>. Two things are being sought from the respondent; a) the organization's assessment of communication as an element in problem solving activity, and b) the

relationship of the degree of communications exhibited by the organization as part of the power conceptual scheme.

The critical events, (Questions 16b, 17) those episodes of given duration and intensity, that allows for the calculation of impact on the conceptual scheme are introduced.

The level of communication is estimated through the evaluation of the following variables that were defined in Chapter II.

1. Mutual trust - does the organization rely on the good intentions of its counterpart in negotiations and can it, in turn, be relied on by the other?

2. Cooperation - are there organizational procedures for the free exchange of data and information?

3. Access - examples of the types of organizational penetration in order to develop mutual decisions.

4. Accountability - indications of feelings of responsibility toward other involved organizations.

The intent of this section is to discover any evidence of a non-desire to relate directly to other organizations and the reasons for such behavior.

POWER 3. (Questions 24-30) Knowledge about definitions and dimensions of power; the major thrust in the study is extensively explored here by probing the depths of the respondent's understanding of power especially in terms of prestige and privilege, and how this relates to the process of making decisions.

For this analysis, the variables, powerlessness, fear, authority and influence are viewed from multiple angles in order to obtain some measure of their effect on institutionalized force.

1. Powerlessness - determine the respondent's consciousness of power ramifications and their relationship to strategy - what "helplessness" connotes in bargaining situations and vice-versa.

2. Fear - see out those instances where the respondent believes that his organization is being victimized and why. Does her/his recital sound paranoid? What effects did this have on negotiating ability? The reverse is also significant: did she/he report their use of fear tactics?

3. Authority - Does legitimacy of control over resources effect the decision-making process? Is there a "blackmail" element present in either direction?

4. Influence - Does the respondent believe that subtle and intangible pressure have been applied against his organization?

Document the presence of any historical accumulations of power due to social class factors that account for the growth of a peculiar composite of control factors that perpetuates itself.

STYLE/TACTICS 4. (Question 31-37) This is a solicitation for information about daily operational characteristics or style/tactics of an operation. It represents a quest for the formulation of expectations about organizational signatures. The variables examined are:

1. Threat - It is not uncommon during political negotiations for participant organizations to view threat tactics as legitimate and necessary behavior. Concern about this type of behavior involves the extent that threat is utilized during decision-making activity and how it affects the bargaining process.

2. Interaction - Is the involvement free and easy or strained and conflictful? Is it over daily and routine activity or is it over

major policy decisions? Low levels of interaction offers no real test for power.

3. Manipulation - It is not unusual in ordinary bargaining encounters to discover the parties testing each other through manipulative thrusts and parries. However, to ascertain the extent of the attempts at exploitation, the respondent must be urged to give full descriptions of the maneuvers. Successful manipulation may be, like influence, indicative of subtle power.

4. Appeal to Higher Authority - This information reveals how the respondent's organization reacts in the clinches when the going gets tough. Do they have the clout to bring in outside help and if so how does it affect the contest? Do they understand the appropriate occasions for such appeals? Do they "go to the well" too often?

5. Competitive Staff - This variable is sometimes overlooked by practitioners when studying organizations in struggle. It is included because in my experiences I have seen the style of organizations shaped by the internecine struggles of staff for privilege and prestige. The purpose is to find out if the respondent is knowledgeable about this type of behavior and if he/she has observed elements of it in his/her organization. Further, does she/he think that it has affected her/his organization's output?

COMPETENCE 5. (Questions 38-43) Competence - I wanted to ascertain the intellectual ability of the organization. The important factor in this set of questions examine whether the respondent comprehend the definition of competence, and know the degree of competence of his organization, and can she/he relate it to the concept of power and social class? The variables are:

1. Training - Does the respondent know the value of particular types of training, what kinds of training have the various members undergone and what has been the value of such training?

2. Expertise - What types of skills relating to the decision-making process does the organization possess and what types of skills does the organization need to acquire to improve its decision-making abilities?

3. Responsiveness - Time schedules, speed of response and deadlines are important issues in organizational decision-making. It is necessary to analyze the state of awareness that organizations possess about these issues. Community agencies frequently complain about poor citizen organizational response.

GOAL ORIENTATION 6. (Questions 44-58) Goal Orientation. Citizen organizations and community agencies are often unclear about goals. Confusion about goal-setting and method of attainment is one of the major problems in citizen organization/agency decision-making ventures. Therefore, this portion of the questionnaire seeks information that might lead to unravelling of the dilemma. The majority of the respondents found this to be the most difficult section to answer. The variables are as follows:

1. Private and Public Regarding - The questions are highly related to social stratification. It is said that the lower class seek immediate gradification, while the middle class can postpone personal satisfaction until pertinent elements of their life scheme are fulfilled;

2. Policy Formation - The specific interest in this variable is with the methodological and analytical ability of the organization,

for the development of public policy. Of particular importance is the cohesiveness of the organization for solving common problems.

3. Issue Focused - This area is closely related to policy development in that the organization must be able to define the problem in order to set the goal. The lower class generally has difficulty in dealing with large complex urban issues and consequently scale down the scope of their concern to "manageable" proportions - sometimes to the level of routine "housekeeping" issues.

The final aspect of this question is related to an important issue in decision-making with lower class groups. This is the issue of monetary rewards for voluntary participation in policy making. Not only is this in conflict with traditional volunteer service, but it can become diversionary from the main issues.

DEMOGRAPHIC 7. (Questions 44-48) Demographic. The objective in this section is to secure a socio-economic profile of the respondent. Analysis is focused on racial, and class distinctions so that they can be analyzed in terms of the conceptual power scheme.

DATA ANALYSIS

The structure of this dissertation is based on the case study method. For this reason and the fact that my concerns are focused on organizational histories and characteristics including social status, I have, as mentioned earlier, devoted chapters IV, V, and VI to considerations of these factors.

In each of the chapters a historical statement, in addition to an evaluation of social class is presented for the respective A/C When appropriate, any organization peculiarities that can be of help

in clarifying dubious situations are also noted.

Social class levels for each organization will be examined from the following three aspects:

1. The respondents' assessment of their organizations position;

2. The respondents' assessment of their individual positions; and

3. The respondents' assessment of the particular confronting organizations' position.

These data came from several sources.

1. Requests were made to various respondents for available historical documentation. Those that had it demonstrated their generosity by either lending or giving it to me. In several instances the information obtain from these sources was invaluable. It usually consisted of papers, pamphlets, or consultant evaluation reports. (See Bibliography)

2. Supplemental historical information was generated through the "Organizational Existence" section of the questionnaire.

3. Social class data was compiled from the "Organizational Existence" section and the "Demographics" section of the questionnaire.

CRITICAL EVENTS STRUCTURE

Critical events are those episodes of given duration and intensity, that allows for the calculation of impact on the conceptual scheme. They are analyzed in the final sections of Chapters IV, V, and VI.

The data for identifying and estimating the intensity of the critical events from the participants' point of view were generated

from the following battery of questions.

Q. 16b. Name some critical events that engendered distrust.

Q. 17. Do you think the results of these events affects:

a. The individuals in the organization?

b. The appropriate roles in the organization?

c. The organization as a whole?

Q. 27. Can you describe any examples that appear to have been vendettas against your organization?

Q. 30. What do you think the general community's perceptions are toward the weight that your organization carries in decision-making?

What do you think?

a. What are the other organization's perceptions? Explain.

b. How were you able to use your influence?

1. Controlled most decisions -

2. Brought in dominant forces -

3. Other -

c. What did your opponents do to counteract your influence?

Q. 31. When your organization was working on the project, did the other organization warn it either directly or indirectly to cease intervention in the decision-making process?

a. If so, what did it do?

b. Why do you think it did so?

c. Did anyone threaten you or your organization?

In what way did it happen?

Q. 47. Should boards of agencies and organizations be salaried?

a. Should they be given expense monies?

1. How much and in what ways? Explain

Q. 48. Has there been any controversy about payment to board members? Explain

One test of the validity of the propositons is through the use of certain vehicles as related to the variables of social class and race. This is done by probing the data in regard to: 1. Organization Relationships; 2. Violence; 3. Confrontation Results and Decision-Making Time.

The process is accomplished via examinations of responses in four areas:

1. Organizational Results - the tenor of interaction between agency/citizen interaction (hostility, cordiality, etc.);

2. Violence - respondent opinion in reference to use of inflammatory rhetoric and threats bodily harm to influence a decision;

3. Confrontation Results - benefits or setbacks from outcomes of "showdown" situations; and

4. Decision Making Time - an assessment of the respondents' perceptions about the impact of citizen involvement upon the time frame of decision-making.

THE SCORING PROCESS FOR THE RESPONDENTS PERCEPTION'S OF THE CRITICAL EVENT

I. Organizational Relationship

Q. 11. What has been the general nature of the relationship of your organization with the other organizations?

a. Partnership
b. Adversary
c. Coalition
d. Other

If the relationship was an adversary one, the response was scored negative. If it was other than adversary it was scored as a positive response.

The propositions are: fear, trust, accountability, interaction and manipulation.

II. Violence

Q. 37. Do you think most people in these situations find it effective to talk violence or use violence?

If the respondent answered that violence was not necessary or emphasize the benefits of nonviolence the question was arbitrarily scored positive. If violence had been used or the participant thought that it should have been used it was scored negatively.

If the respondent answered no, the score is positive. If the answer was affirmative and the effect was positive it was scored as a positive. If the answer was affirmative and the effect was negative the score is negative.

The propositions are: threat, powerlessness, authority, and access.

IV. Decision-making time

Q. 43. Do you think in general it takes longer to reach decisions in urban development problem solving?

a. Why is this so?

If the answer to the first part is yes, the second part must have a rational explanation to be scored as a positive. If the

answer is no, again, there must be a rational explanation to be scored as a positive.

As in the other questions affirmative or negative answers are not necessarily equated with "good" or "bad". Human behavior in these situation must be evaluated in terms of the total situation and the circumstances of the particular society at a given point in time.

The propositions are: training, expertise, responsiveness, policy formulation, issue focused, accountability and cooperation.

ORGANIZATIONS CRITICAL EVENTS ANALYSIS

The procedure for conducting comparative evaluations is as follows:

I. Select respondent quotes for both MNA and CGB about critical events that are related to Organizational Relationships;

II. Provide a brief summary statement that includes, when appropriate, relevant propositions, social class and racial observations.

III. Repeat this procedure for the other three areas (Violence, Confrontation Results, and Decision-Making Time);

IV. Subject the UCS and STRESS sets to a similar examination.

V. Conclude with a statement that summarizes this data.

The underlined words in parenthesis that precedes each quote is the pseudonym of that respondent. The capital letter beside it is the code for respondent variables. The letter M = middle class, L = lower class, W = white, and NW = non-white.

THE SCORING METHOD

The scoring method is related to the responses to questions about the propositions in Chapter VII. In those cases where there is more than one question per proposition the overall question is scored as a combined question.

There are three possible ways of arriving at a positive score for a question.

1. If a positive response is "right" in terms of "good" organizational procedure, i.e., "Does your organization freely seek to involve itself in activities with the other organization in order to solve mutual problems?" If the response is yes, the question is scored positively;

2. If the question is stated in such a way that a negative response would actually be "right" according to "good" organizational procedure, i.e., "Has your organization had any difficulty obtaining meetings with members and leaders of the other organization?" If the response is no (negative) this would be an example of "good" organizational procedure. However, in order to have a more realistic accounting, an adjustment has been made. If the response indicated good access, the question was scored positively, and if the answer indicated poor access, the question was scored positively, and if the answer indicated poor access, it was scored negatively; and

3. If the answer to the question depends upon a value judgement or cannot be evaluated in terms of "right" or "wrong" organizational procedure, i.e., "Does your organization believe it is necessary at all times to become involved in secret political maneuvers in order

to gain some control of the decision-making process?" The question is scored positive with no prejudice intended.

The scores for the responses are:

+, positive

-, negative

B, positive and negative

DK, don't know

NA, no answer

DW, didn't want

PROPOSITIONAL QUESTIONS

POWER

1. Powerlessness:

Question 24. How much does your organization consider the element of power when it decides strategy?

Question 26. How much does it think about power in terms of the tactics of the other side?

a. We're going to blow 'em out of the water.

b. We understand their position so we'll go easy.

If the respondent's answer to Q. 25 reveals that his organization considered the element of power a great deal and stated why, then it became known that the organization had an awareness of the concept of power and its ramifications. This is further weighted in Q. 26 which attempts to ascertain not only a perception of power, but how the organization used it.

By combining this set of questions it was possible to deduce from the answers whether or not the respondent was of the opinion that

his organization was with or without power. One of the better indicators of power is lack of powerlessness. Many citizen groups may be expected to have feelings of powerlessness. If the respondent thought his organization had power it was scored minus because there was little or no feeling of powerlessness. If he thought they did not have power it was scored positive.

2. Fear

Question 27. "Can you describe any examples that appear to have been vendettas against your organization?" This is an effort to determine if the respondents could point to specific instances why the opposing organization was conducting a campaign detrimental to their organization's interests.

Question 28. a. Did this make (your organization) somewhat afraid to participate any more with the other organization? Here, the motive is to find the effects, if any, that could result from a vendetta.

Question 28. b. Did you or other members have the feeling that they (other organization) were negotiating with your organization out of fear? It is obvious that the other effect is being searched for - did the other side fear them.

This group of questions illuminates the possibilities of reciprocal fears. If there was little evidence of fear of the opposing the question was scored as a minus, if there were distinct expressions of fear it was scored as a positive.

3. Authority

Question 29. As you know, it takes (or took) various efforts and things to help solve the given problem. What resources did your organization contribute that significantly aided in solving the problem?

(Money, manpower, expertise, facilities, equipment, supplies, etc.)

a. Did your organization have a difficult time acquiring those resources? Explain.

b. Did you think that both sides tended to use resources as levers?

Since authority has been defined as legitimate power and an aspect of legitimacy is the ability to gather resources the thrust of these questions is to arrive at what type and amount of resources were contributed and levels of difficulty for their attainment. Further, it is a sifting operation to turn up any elements of black-mail that that may be present in the utilization of these resources. These factors summed, indicates a degree of authority. If it was judged that the organization possessed a significant degree of resources the question was scored as a plus. If not, it was scored as a negative.

4. Influence

Question 30. What do you think the general community's perceptions are toward the weight that your organization carries in decision making? What do you think?

a. What are the other organizations' perceptions? Explain.

b. How were you able to use your influence?

1. Controlled most decisions

2. Brought in dominant forces

3. Other

c. What did your opponents do to counteract your influence?

The first three pieces of information gives a glimpse of the

respondent's assessment of their organization's influence. If there were indications of the existence of influence, the next step was to determine how such influence was used. Finally, what was the reaction of the other side to this influence? If the respondents stated an awareness of their organization's influence the question was scored as a plus, if not it was scored as a minus.

Communication

The following set of questions are concerned with the magnitude and depth of communication between interfacing organizations.

5. Mutual Trust

Q. 16 Does your organization think that mutual trust is a problem with the other organization?

a. Name some critical events that engendered trust

b. Name some critical events that engendered distrust

The first part of the question was usually answered with a simple yes or no, "a" and "b" is a description of those events that related to the answers of the first part.

Q. 17 Do you think that the results of these events affects:

a. The individuals in the organization?

b. The appropriate roles in the organization?

c. The organization as a whole?

The rationale for the question is to locate the focus of mutual trust or distrust, whether it lies within the individual, the role of the individual, the organization or some combination of all three. Therefore, if mutual trust is believed to be a problem it is scored as

a minus, if not, as a plus.

6. Accountability

Q. 18 Did the other side make an effort to show your organization that their strategy was worthwhile?

a. Gave adequate explanations

b. Showed concern for the other point of view

c. Provided a feedback structure

d. Other

Did the respondents believe that the opposing organization was dealing with their organization in a cavelier and arbitrary fashion or were they treated with respect and dignity with an implicit obligation present? This is a very important element in the communication concept because it bears a direct and coroborating relationship to mutual trust.

If the interviewees reveal that their organization was accountable the question is scored as a plus and vice versa.

7. Cooperation

Q. 19 What are some specific activities your organization engaged in with the other organization:

a. Structure, b. Mailings, c. Clerical,

d. Goals, e. Problem Solving?

Q. 20 Were the recommendations for decisions acceptable to both parties?

If it was clearly indicated from the data that the parties had functioned cooperatively in decision-making activity the score is plus

Q. 21 Does your organization believe that the other

organization has intentionally withheld vital information about specific urban development projects: a. Political contacts, b. Higher level sources, c. Membership lists, d. Financial assets, Equipment and materials, f. Other

This inquiry represents additional attempt to probe the levels of information exchange with a look at the secrecy factor. These data were melded with the first part of the information assessment.

6. Access

Q. 23 Has your organization had any difficulty obtaining meetings with members and leaders of the other organization?

Q. 24 Would you describe the tone of these meetings: a. Corial, b. Hostile, c. Cooperative, d. Contrived

Was there agreement to have more meetings? Which side proposed further meetings? Is there a structure for access? (Describe it)

If there was little or no difficulty in obtaining access as viewed from an overall assessment of this series of questions, the score is positive. If access existed but was not in a healthy atmosphere or if there was not access, the score was negative.

COMPETENCE

This group of variables seeks those indicators that can unequivocally distinguish operational differences in organizational behaviors.

14. Training

Q. 38 How have the individual members of your organization prepared themselves to carry out their specific assignments:

a. On the job training, b. Professional schools, c. Vocational schools, d. High School or less, e. College, and f. Special workshop and seminars?

Q. 39 How well has this worked out in practice?

This probe is an effort to acquire sufficient data for accurate evaluation of the organizations' members readiness to engage in decision-making activities. Also it is an attempt to evaluate their perceptions of the factors that allowed for such preparation. If the evidence clearly indicated that there was adequate preparation, the score was a plus, if not a minus.

15. Expertise

Q. 40 Name some of the areas that members of your organization are skilled in that enables it to accomplish its goals?

a. Cite some applications.

The scoring of this question is similar to the scoring of the above questions that relate to the training factor with in depth probing of specific areas where the respondent is given the opportunity for elaboration such as:

b. How helpful would it have been (or is it) if your organization's members had skills and training in: 1. Leadership, 2. Legal Approaches, 3. Grantsmanship, 4. Fiscal, 5. Organization Theory, and 6. Other?

If the organization had the relevant expertise and used it to an advantage, the question was scored as a plus, if not, as a minus.

16. Responsiveness

Q. 41 Many times people are unhappy about the way things are going who (except the other organization) criticize your organization internally and externally about: a. Failure to meet deadlines? b. Low receptivity to ideas? and c. Lack of willingness to talk over problems?

If they are responsive the score is a plus, if not responsive the score is minus. Responsiveness was based on the three factors in the question: If there were assertions that the organization did not comply with one or more of these factors a probe was made for the "why" and scored plus if their lack of response was deemed justified.

Q. 42 Has your organization ever been accused of by the other organization of: a. Failure to meet deadlines? b. Low receptivity to ideas? and c. Lack of willingness to talk over problems.

The scoring is the same as for Q. 41.

An overall assessment of Q. 41 and Q. 42 is given in terms of a plus for responsiveness and a minus for non-responsiveness.

STYLE/TACTICS

9. Threat

Q. 31 When your organization was working on the project, did the other organization warn it either directly or indirectly to cease its intervention in the decision making process: a. If so what did it do; b. Why do you think it did so; c. Did anyone

threaten you or your organization? In what way? How did it happen.

If there was a positive answer to the first part of the question, answers to the remaining sections were examined in order to gain more dimensions of the threat. The total question was then scored minus for threat and plus for non-threat.

10. Interaction

Q. 32 Does your organization freely seek to involve itself in activities with the other organization in order to solve mutual problems: a. How does it do this? Are there limited demands and objectives or is the involvement around unlimited demands and objectives?

The major question and its subquestion gives the socpe and substance of the interaction. If the respondents admits to significant interaction on the part of their organization the proposition is scored a "plus".

11. Manipulation

Q. 33 Does your organization believe it is necessary at times to become involved in secret political maneuvers in order to gain some control of the decision-making process: a. Describe some of these maneuvers. b. What strategies are these good/not good for?

If the respondents reply in the negative the question is scored as "plus."

12. Appeal to Higher Authority

Q. 34 In working on the project did your organization involve or try to involve the courts or some other authority (mayor, City Council, clergy, Congress, Governor, etc.) to intervene on their behalf?

If they did the question is scored "minus," if not plus.

13. Competitive Staff

Q. 35 Who had the most influence in defining day to day goals and responses of your organization: a. Staff, b. Director, c. Members, d. Others, e. Don't know? Explain in detail.

Q. 36 How important is the staff in setting the style and tactics of the organization: a. Very important, b. Important, c. Somewhat important, d. Unimportant? Why is this so?

Q. 35 and Q. 36 are linked together for scoring. The score is positive if the staff does not appear to be involved with organizational debilitating goals such as "empire building" and infighting instead of concentrating on its major function of providing service to the organization.

GOAL ORIENTATION

17. Public/Private Regarding

Q. 44 Which do you think is the most important:

A. Solving the immediate problems that affect you directly or

B. Solving long range problems that affect the

general community.

Q. 44AA If A, is it because:

1. The uncertainty of the future
2. You can't effect the outcome of what happens to the rest of the people.
3. You want to protect what you see and understand
4. Other

Q. 44BB If B, is it because:

1. Eventually, it will all work out to be good
2. You are a part of everyone else's welfare
3. Other

C. What does the leadership of your organization think is the most important - the immediate or the long range? Why?

D. What does the rank and file think is the most important? Why?

The intent of these questions is to ascertain how community conscious the respondents are, and the direction of their orientation (group - public, individual - private) toward solutions to reach goals. If the choice happens to be the long range, the question is scored an overall "plus," if not it is scored as a minus.

18. Policy Formation

Q. 45 What are your organizations' ideas and methods about the development of means to reach goals?

a. Does the leadership consult with the rank and file on this?

The search in this instance is to discover whether or not there is a consistent and systematic approach to problem solving, instead of the hit and miss chaotic approach. The second part of the question relates to the involvement of the membership in policy-making activity. Where there are replies that can detail the particular organization's policy making process and it (the process) is coherent and logical the scoring is a "plus." When it is to the contrary the scoring is a "minus."

19. Issue Focused

Q. 46 How does your organization set priorities on the various problems of its particular project?

a. Who was the most important in your organization for these issues?

b. Were there factions? What did they do?

The main purpose for this question was to verify how successful the organization could maintain its original goal orientation posture. Also, how it responded to any diversionary attempts and how cohesive was the membership around goal defining and policy making efforts. If it can be determined from the respondents answers that the issues were generally clear, with broad membership consensus, the question was scored a "plus." If not it was scored a "minus."

CHAPTER IV

THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY/THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD-HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS AND CRITICAL EVENTS

This phase of the study is concerned with the delineation and structure of the nine cases and providing the necessary linkage to the power conceptual scheme. The Model Neighborhood Agency (MNA) and the Citizens Governing Board (CGB) are the specific cases under review in this chapter.

The format for the case study is as follows:

I. HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

- A. Reasons for the organization and description of its structure
- B. Social class composition of the organization

II. THE CRITICAL EVENTS AND THE ORGANIZATION

- A. Definition of each critical event for each A/C
- B. Clarification of goals, policies and key member roles

III. CRITICAL EVENTS AS VEHICLES THAT PROVIDE MEANING FOR THE PROPOSITIONS AS RELATED TO THE VARIABLES OF SOCIAL CLASS AND RACE

- A. Organizational relationships
- B. Violence
- C. Confrontation results
- D. Decision-making time

IV. SUMMARY

THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

The Model Neighborhood Program was an innovative approach to the solving of critical urban problems. It was established through Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. The outstanding feature of the program was the non-categorical grant. Previously, the Federal financial contributions to cities had been in the form of categorical grants--funds that were earmarked for specific purposes with stringent regulations attached. The Model Cities approach deviated in that a general grant was allocated for a limited number of selected cities (on an experimental basis) with the particular locality expending the funds through independent decisions made at that level. Neighborhood residents were required to be involved in this policy making process.

In the case of Detroit (1967-1975) a planning process with the assistance of the Housing and Urban Development Agency - (HUD) was devised to carry out objectives:

> In partnership with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Detroit has identified a multitude of social, physical and economic problems, and through the Model Neighborhood Agency is working to alleviate them. (Detroit Model Neighborhood Program, 1)

The primary goal of the Program was to improve the quality of urban life. To reach this goal, the MNA planners concentrated on the development of social service delivery systems in housing, health, education, employment, etc. They were assisted in the making of policy decisions by residents in the area who were organized into a Citizens

Governing Board (CGB).

The organization of citizens was by governmental mandate in an effort to insure that the citizen needs would be met. Inherent throughout this strategy was the intent to minimize conflict between citizen organization and agencies. In spite of the successful execution of the mandate, conflict not only remained as an obstacle to successful policy making, but, in many cases, it escalated into paralyzing proportions.

Through the entire period of MNA and the CGB existence, under three directors and three political administrations, this debilitating conflict continued in the decision-making process.

The MNA had its own staff and administrative functions. The CGB likewise had its staff. The CGB was divided into various committees whose concerns were related to specific component strategies and projects for problem solving in specific areas. These committees, in turn, related to the Executive Board which relayed information for final decisions to the total CGB membership. Throughout this system, MNA provided liaison staff and support.

The MNA, in the role of coordinator, interfaced with countless other governmental organizations and private institutions.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. MNA Respondents' Perception of MNA

The respondents described MNA as a middle class organization. The members have college degrees, professional jobs, incomes of $15,000 plus, "high" and frequent consumer expenditures, home owners, or dwelling in "good" apartments in "nice" neighborhoods and "stable" family backgrounds.

> "They come from working class backgrounds with middle class aspirations. They tend to be in 'limbo' and thats part of the problem in dealing with the grass roots. Ambivalent feelings cause dishonest reactions." (REONA)

B. MNA Respondents' Perceptions of Themselves

Of the eight interviewed, four described themselves as lower middle class, three as middle class and one, Reona, attempted to identify with lower class blacks while in reality her background and life style satisfies this study's middle class criteria.

C. MNA Respondents' Perception of the CGB

Most of the members are grass roots, lower or working class, poor factory workers and blue collar menials. They live in public housing projects or "bad" neighborhoods. They have limited education--high school or less. "Appearance and speech is lower class." Most are culturally deprived. "Generally speaking, they are unable to conceptualize."

D. Conclusion

MNA is a middle class community agency and regards the CGB as a lower class organization.

THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

Prior to the establishment of the Detroit Model Neighborhood Agency a coalition of citizen organizations under the name of the Congress of Grass Roots Organizations (CONGRO) drafted a document that outlined a structure for citizen participation in the Model Cities planning effort. The major purpose of this act was an attempt to give

control of the Program to the people.

> 1. Basic Concept: A democratically selected governing board chosen with the widest possible participation of residents in the areas selected or to be selected for Model Cities, shall have direct policy control over the planning and execution of the Model Cities Program. (Mayor's Committee for Community Renewal)

Although the full intent of this doctrine was never realized, it was used in a modified form to establish an official citizens group. The members were elected from specific sub-areas of the Detroit Model Neighborhood. The CGB had its own paid staff in addition to the staff services it received from the MNA. The organizational form was based on an executive board and committee structure that was specifically geared for partnership planning ventures with the MNA. From the beginning, the CGB was greatly concerned, as an entity, with its power prerogatives and community representation. In addition, most members were conscious of building individual member power and maintaining political independence from the MNA. As a result, in many instances, the CGB staff and the MNA staff were not amicably involved in CGB decision-making procedures. This state of affairs led to destructive conflict.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. CGB Respondents' Perception of CGB

CGB respondents described the CGB as an upper lower class organization with middle class professionals comprising a small minority. The majority of CGB members were "poor people" who received their incomes from either public assistance, retirement, blue collar, domestic work or paraprofessional employment. The educational level averaged high school or less. They tended to live in "poor ghetto

housing."

B. CGB Respondents' Perception of Themselves

Three saw themselves as middle class, three as lower middle class, and five as upper lower class.

C. CGB Respondents' Description of the MNA

In general, the MNA staff was perceived as being members of the middle class.

They have higher incomes, live the "good" life in "nice" neighborhoods and "good" schools. They have "good" clothes and "big" cars. "They were not like us poor down below people. That was part of the problem. They couldn't understand the way we lived and why we wanted the things we wanted. What was important to us was not important to them." (Murray Hubbel) "The attitudes toward the lower class was not too cool. It was an "us" and "them" relationship (Courtney) who was a middle class member of the CGB) "They were educated and knew the system." (DeJohg).

D. Conclusion

The CGB is an upper lower class organization and regards the MNA as a middle class agency.

CRITICAL EVENTS

As a step toward establishing the validity of the power conceptual scheme, it is necessary to sift the data for any unusual organizational behavior that can be reduced from the abstract. "Unusual organizational behavior" is defined as any decision-making activity that created harmful rippling effects in the interaction patterns between organizations. These effects, that I defined as critical events, are

assessed in relation to their impact on the power conceptual scheme.

The Model Neighborhood Agency and the Citizens Governing Board, together, administered the tasks to achieve the agreed upon goals. These were mainly accomplished through the individual component projects. Usually, it was during the implementation of project activities that the critical events occurred. Because of the complexity of the projects, the occurrence of critical events was frequent. For the purposes of this study the number of critical events have been reduced to three:

The Metropolitan Arts Complex Inc.; The Model Neighborhood Loan and Grant Program; and The Issue of Stipends.

THE METROPOLITAN ARTS COMPLEX, INC.

A. Definition

This project, popularly called "Metro Arts" originated out of the recreation and culture component. It was established jointly by the MNA/CGB to provide community recreational opportunities. Like the majority of "real world" conflicts, the problems of Metro Arts were not spontaneous. In one of the first project evaluations (June 21, 1971 p. 8) its minority report stated that, "It was felt that the program placed too much emphasis upon talent development and too little on recreation and activities.

As officials of Metro Arts begin to require expensive equipment, this action was construed by the Agency as a divergence from the original goal of supplying recreational services to the community, to the new goal of doing business - the construction of "a little Motown." This, the Agency contended, became a continuous problem. The problem

was complicated by three factors: the Agency goals, the CGB goals; and the Project Director's goals. The fact that the CGB goals may have approximated the Agency goals is not important, because when the Agency, based on information obtained in its periodic evaluations, attempted to limit the Project activities, the CGB supported and defended the Project Director. Therefore, the dispute, in reality, was between the MNA and the CGB.

Another reason for the turmoil, also, materialized at the outset when it was discovered that the Agency staff, because of possible conflict of interest, had to be removed from the Metro Arts Board. This action caused a possible misinterpretation about the lack of faith on the part of the Agency. Later, for the same reasons, CGB members had to leave the Metro Arts Board.

B. Clarification of Goals, Policies, and Key Member Roles

Gradually the Agency incorporated the essence of the minority report into its strategy of reducing the power of Metro Arts: Crafton, an Agency official states:

> "We had allowed citizens a powerful decision-making role in establishing their priorities and the MNA acted as closely as possible in keeping with these established priorities. Yet the MNA did not and would not abdicate its overall responsible role where we found it necessary to modify the priorities based on the evaluation of the Program funds. Metro Arts is an example of our approach.

As the Agency increasingly applied pressure, Metro Arts began to retaliate. What was at first viewed as a difference in goals soon escalated into a personality conflict between the aggressive male MNA Director (who had the support of the Mayor) and the aggressive female

Metro Arts Director (who had the support of the Common Council).

One CGB participant (Courtney) said:

> "The critical event was the taking away of the responsibilities of Metro Arts. That's where the battle was joined. They did not want us to have the power of hiring teachers and buying equipment and supplies. The MNA Director's view was the only point of view, - "My way or NO way!" Their main goal was to eliminate Metro Arts as soon as possible."

Each side thought the other was conducting a vendetta. The basis of the vendetta, or personality conflict, was a struggle to gain power over resources.

After a series of Agency and Consultant Evaluations, the Agency decided to terminate the Metro Arts Project. During this period confrontation and violence had esculated, with detailed sensational reporting in the media. The MN Director was assulted and had to be placed under continuous police protection.

A MNA member (Cox) describes the battle:

> "The CGB conducted a poorly organized vendetta against the MNA Director. They tried to make us look like the enemy and rallied everyone around that theme. They threatened us, and the MNA Director had to hire around the clock police protection. We did everything we could to fight the Metro Arts thing - expertise, manpower, etc.

The fight was temporarily resolved by the Common Council where the CGB went for aid. The Council made the decision that the CGB had been unfairly treated so Metro Arts was allowed to continue to operate. However, the Agency secretly never gave up and when Metro Arts became complacent they were ultimately phased out without fanfare.

One CGB member (Ivory) vividly describes the end in this manner:

> The Metro Arts Director began to let up on the MNA Director. I told her that she was giving him a stick to beat her with. She didn't believe me and that's just what happened. He took the "ring pole" and knocked her to her knees. He fought to win any way he could.

The eventual termination occurred in the following manner.

> "A few months prior to the inception of Year IV, a new element changed the entire outlook of the program. A funding cut was mandated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the entire MN program and the Fifth Action Year was eliminated (this did not actually happen). It was clear that projects in the Recreation and Culture program account needed to be eliminated or drastically cut.
>
> "The CGB committee prioritized the projects and then allocated the reduced funds available." (Crafton)

In spite of the fact that the Fifth Action Year was not eliminated, the Metro Arts Program which had been scheduled for elimination under that assumption was in fact eliminated without significant protest from its Director.

The citizens had originally believed that the Agency's attempt to eliminate Metro Arts was an attempt to keep them from gaining power and autonomy. In the end they seem to prefer the direct expenditures through the Recreation Fund Program to that of a performing arts program. The reasons for this distinct change in attitude was attributed to fatigue and disallusionment.

In spite of the Common Council, the media, and strong community support the CGB had lost out to "expertise, manpower, etc.

THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD LOAN AND GRANT PROGRAM

A. Definition

The Loan and Grant Program was a creature of the Social Services Committee of the CGB. It succeeded the Citizen Urban Opportunity Fund (CUOF), which because of some alleged abuses and questionable administrative tactics was abolished.

The goal of the Loan and Grant Program was to provide financial assistance to citizens in specific cases of need.

The problems were several:

1. A general dissatisfaction with the Project Director;
2. Uncertainty of the amount of funding for the Year V programs with an eventual significant amount of funding.
3. Misunderstanding between the MNA and the CGB over the selection of a new Project Operator and;
4. A promise that loan repayment money would be used for a scholarship fund, but the MN Director then diverting this money to the Health Component.

The citizens believed that the "Agency did an effective job of crushing the last hopes of the Social Services Committee to leave something of a permanent nature as evidence of their involvement." (BURCH)

B. Clarification of Goals, Policies and Key Member Roles

Like the Metro Arts project, the Loan and Grant project suffered because of MNA/CGB goal differences. Relevant MNA goals were:

1. to insure financial accountability;
2. to develop flexible allocations priorities due to uncertainties about Federal Funding of MNA.

> The loan and Grant program was a critical event. The CGB said the MNA didn't want the Loan and Grant program. We didn't approve their contractor. The CGB wanted the Loan and Grant to enhance their power. They finally took us to the Common Council, but we won. (COLEMAN)

> We deliberately terminated Citizens' approved programmatic contracts; Citizens Urban Opportunity Fund (CUOF) and its successor the Loan and Grant Program which financially assisted area residents. Basically, the termination of both these projects was due to the problems of financial accountability. (CRAFTON)

The CGB goals were: 1. Provide a financial resource to the community; and 2. Add to the evidence of the worth of the Social Services Committee.

> In the case of the Social Services Committee, the withholding of information (MNA) led to the ending of the Loan and Grant Program at least six or eight months before it had to end. First, they said there was not enough money in the budget. Then the MNA refused the first contractor and said it was too late for the second.
>
> Not only was this committee misled, but the entire CGB. The reason the L & G program was not allocated funds was due to the Agency's statement that since no contract had been given out, it did not have to be considered. This followed the MNA Director's assurances to the committee that the program fund's would be secure while the committee sought a contractor.
>
> The committee and CGB were put in the untenable position of saying scholarships were more important than health. Everyone was aware the health program would flounder anyway, but for the Agency it was a very convenient means to end a program. In this instance, the Agency did an effective job of crushing the last hopes of the committee to leave something of a permanent nature as evidence of their involvement. (BURCH)

The Agency took a calculated risk in dropping the L & G program. This is a striking example of a situation where, because of cir-

cumstances beyond their control, Administrators have to make hardnosed, unpopular decisions that have tragic consequences for their relationships with citizen groups.

If there had been a history of mutual trust between the two organizations, perhaps the resulting antagonism would not have been so deep. Here are comments of two MNA members about the CGB reactions:

> The results of the critical event affected the MNA staff, their roles, and the organization as a whole because of general distrust. This was partly rooted in the receivers (CGB) not being able to understand. (COLEMAN)

> In order to counteract our influence they:
> 1. Voted down our alternatives and modifications;
> 2. Appealed to the City Council for support for their desires; 3. Exerted subtle pressure by having State elected officials write us polite letters of inquiry regarding the issue. (CRAFTON)

The CGB felt horribly betrayed. The detailed bitter responses of some members illustrate their dispair and disappointment. Citizens unaccustomed to bureaucratic realities find it difficult to cope and to maintain faith in the system. This is because bureaucrats are much more conscious of the extent that decision-making will require justification from a professional viewpoint and are prone to be more resilient about short-term losses on issues than unsuspecting volunteers such as those who speak as follows:

> A critical event was the L & G cut-off. They (MNA) were not honest with the people. We had one set of goals; they had another. They would come and try to bullshit. They were not trying to find a contractor. I found one in a week one time when they claimed it was impossible to get a project operator for the L & G Program.

> Yes, they had a vendetta against us. Near the end they promised us a modified L & G Program. Then, they said they couldn't even provide the small amount needed. Next, they said we could use the interest and the Loan repayments for a scholarship program, but they bullshitted us on this. They gave us nothing in the end but a pack of lies. (BROOKS)

> Citizen urban Opportunity Fund (CUOF) and the Loan and Grant Program were critical events. The CGB believed that the MNA intentionally withheld vital information about specific urban development projects. Financial assets were some of the information withheld. They never defined how much money was taken off for themselves. The results withholding caused distrust between the CGB and the Agency. Nobody believed the Agency, especially when they lied so about the Loan and Grant Program.

> The Agency people for Metro Arts and Loan and Grant were always changing things without letting us know until it happened. (DEJOHG)

> The Loan and Grant fiasco was a critical event. In this case MNA limited our participation. The recommendations were not acceptable to both parties - this was the cause of the conflict. They (MNA) wouldn't listen to us and did what they wanted to do.

> They didn't withhold, they just acted arbitrarily. It caused us to become frustrated and distrustful of MNA. They completely disregarded our wishes. They treated us wrongly all the way on this. (JARVIS)

The dynamics of these critical events are generated by CGB members reacting to their perceived role functions and to constituent expectations. These elements fuse with MNA's self-defined professionalism and with their role preoccupation as "Keepers of the cash."

A fear of corruption and damaging publicity is a real concern, thereby requiring appropriate regulation. What the data suggests is that citizen groups should be knowledgeable about the reasons for regulatory procedures. This may help them to understand agency caution.

As of now, the issue may be counterposed as administrators'

insistence on successful accomplishments through efficiency, and attempts to reach closure on issues, versus citizens' attempts to satisfy segmented community interests that may imply adopting inefficient actions that are difficult to justify to that part of the society that has the power to allocate funds.

THE ISSUE OF STIPENDS

A. Definition

One of the goals emphasized in the Model Cities Program was to insure and increase citizen participation of target area residents in community decision-making. The objective was especially intended for lower income and minority persons who had formerly been routinely excluded from the traditional processes. This exclusion, as commented on in Chapter II, is probably responsible for some of the ingrained apathy and alienation observed in these groups. Therefore, those officials who were on the alert for vehicles that could aim them in goal achievement, soon saw that lower income residents needed some type of financial assistence that would enable them to participate in a form commensurate to that of the middle class person who is usually expected to cover normal expenses.

On the basis of this knowledge, Model Cities' planners obtained authorization for certain budgetary expenditures to encompass necessary personal expenditure of participating citizens. These expenditures were designated as payments for transportation, baby sitting and other costs that could be incurred by the average citizen. In order to reduce processing time, and stigma, an uncomplicated procedure was adopted by the City. Citizens were reimbursed by a

fixed amount, without voucher, for attendance at local meetings. These local payments were called stipends.

Those individual Board members who did not need the stipends supported those members who had a vested interest in them.

The stipend as a partial solution to the problem of citizen apathy was soon discovered to have some undesirable secondary consequences.

The issues revolved around the size and payment periods of the stipends for policy making Board members. The money for the stipends came from allocated governmental funds. Was it a conflict of interest and did the increasing size of the stipend take on the characteristics of a salary or compensation for services rendered? Finally, were some of the citizens interested solely in the stipend and not the problems of the community?

B. Clarification of Goals, Policies, and Key Member Roles

Typical responses, follow, from participants in the Model Cities program (MNA/CGN), and show the magnitude and complexity of the compensation issue:

MNA Attitudes

> Salaries should not be paid citizens for participating in decision-making. Paid expenses should be limited to cover incidental costs for meetings in relation to their organization administration.

> We've had controversy with the CGB. It appears that the CGB has interpreted its stipend as a salary and they demand to get a certain amount of money per meeting for pay. Constantly occurring is the issue of stipend increase. (CRAFTON)

CGB Attitudes

> I think the MNA had a vendetta for the CGB in relation to stipends. They would threaten to either reduce or totally eliminate the stipend which many lower income CGB members had developed a dependency on. This contributed to our distrust of the MNA. Boards should not be salaried. Rather, they should be limited to out-of-pocket expenses. (BURCH)

> Boards should not be salaried. They should be given expense money to pay for travel, baby sitting, etc. A fellow who really cares will do it for nothing, but he should be compensated for his costs.

> We were always fighting about stipends. Sometimes our people were wrong. They would come to meetings, sign the attendance sheet, and leave in a few minutes. We finally had to set some rules for the meetings. (HUBBEL)

> Boards should be salaried. They should be adequately compensated. Too long have citizens participated for a better way of life. A lot of their input has been taken and used. The MNA didn't want to give us anything. (IVORY)

From the data, the general consensus was that citizen boards should not be salaried. However, there was corresponding acknowledgement that lower income individuals need financial support in order to freely participate, like the middle class in decision-making activities. Therefore, it was recommended, where indicated, out-of-pocket expenses should be refunded.

However, a paradox arises because the majority of the respondents' statements favor out-of-pocket expenses in lieu of either salaries or stipends, but further probing into the compensation controversy clearly reveals that a significant number of citizens seek salaries for their participatory efforts under the guide of stipends.

The confusion multiplies when a closer examination of the data indicates that, whether rightly or wrongly, some citizens believed the

Agency arbitrarily used the stipend as an instrument of power against them. Because some of the poorer citizens had developed a dependence on the stipend, they were quite vulnerable.

The convincing aspect of the MNA/CGB example is that citizens want income and that they may go to extraordinary lengths to obtain it. What indeed, may take place in this process is not a reduction in alienation, but additional evidence of it.

Because of the intriguing aspects of the stipend issue, the exploration was intensified by submitting the same set of questions to all of the other organizations in the study.

CRITICAL EVENTS: THE VEHICLES THAT PROVIDE MEANING FOR THE PROPOSITIONS AS RELATED TO THE VARIABLES OF SOCIAL CLASS AND RACE

The preceding sections of this chapter focused on the development of critical event definitions. There was elaboration through the delineation of organizational goals and policies that were related to the critical event. The key actor·roles were sketched in through direct quotes of the respondents. That technique is repeated here to test the validity of the propositions.

The process is accomplished via examination of participant responses in four areas:

1. Organizational Relationships - the tenor of interaction between agency/citizen interaction (hostility, cordiality, etc.);

2. Violence - respondent opinion in reference to use of inflammatory rhetoric and threats of bodily harm to influence a decision;

3. Confrontation Results - benefits or setbacks from outcomes

of "showdown" situations; and

4. Decision-Making Time - an assessment of the respondents' perceptions about the impact of citizen involvement upon the time frame of decision-making.

MNA CRITICAL EVENTS ANALYSIS

The procedure for conducting the evaluation is as follows:

I. Select respondent quotes for both MNA and CGB about critical events that are related to Organizational Relationships;

II. Provide a brief summary statement that includes, when appropriate, relevant propositions, social class, and racial observations.

III. Repeat this procedure for the other three areas (Violence, Confrontation Results and Decision-Making Time ; and

IV. Conclude with a statement that summarizes this data.

The underlined words in parenthesis that follows each quote is the pseudonym of that respondent. The capital letters beside it is the code for respondent variables. The letter M = middle class, L = lower class, W = white, and NW = non-white.

MNA/CGB: Metro Arts; Loan and Grants; and Stipends

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

Model Neighborhood Agency

> It was adversary because of disagreements over the citizens' stipends. The CGB staff over-spends, then tells the citizens it's MNA's fault. They gave their staff a five percent increase without MNA's approval. (BLACK MNW)

> It was adversary. In my opinion, I feel the citizens blew it because of bad strategy on

> their part; they diminished their power. Initially, everytime there was a disagreement with the Agency the only mechanism they had for redress was Common Council. They ran down for every little issue. It overtaxed Common Council who eventually tended to dismiss citizen concerns (Cry Wolf!) They should have carefully picked and chose issues and conceptualized. (COLON MW)

CGB Citzens Governing Board

> It was definitely adversary. When the second Director came into the Agency, an evaluator began to falsify the Metro Arts' records claiming to have monitored programs which they hadn't. The Director's mission was to give the City control of the money. Therefore, he wanted Health, CUOF, and Metro Arts out of the Program. (COURTNEY MNW)

> The third Director shot down the Loan and Grant Program because she wanted to take the money back to the Mayor. The Metro Arts dispute was the result of the same kind of thing. (BURCH MW)

There was a definite adversary relationship between MNA and CGB. This attitude transcended social class and race for both organizations. Trust did not exist for either and they both constantly engaged in manipulative tactics to gain control over the money.

The Agency tended to exhibit some accountability to citizens (this was called for in the guidelines, which as professioanls they did not choose to ignore). The citizens seemed to be oblivious to the concept. To them the act of being accountable made them vulnerable. To some extent they followed the guidelines for interaction but it was not always positive. However, there were times that they cooperated with each other as organizations and there were many examples of individual friendships across organizational lines.

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE USE OF VIOLENCE IN DECISION-MAKING

Model Neighborhood Agency

> Yes, most people tend to use violence. Because they don't know about cooperative efforts. Conflict situations are an aftermath of failure to communicate. (BLACK MNW)

> In the early days, yes. Many citizens carried guns. There was a knife fight at one of our planning sessions. The MNA Director and Deputy Director at one time both carried guns. (COX MW)

Citizens Governing Board

> Yes, most people believe in violence because they get their way. People are intimidated by rhetoric and violence. It works sometimes. (BURCH MW)

> No. The people are not into revolutionary tactics they tend to put up with bullshit. (BROOKS MW)

> In some cases, it is good, because it scares people into doing somethings they would't do. It helps them to carry through. (HUBBEL LNW)

MNA/CGB respondents' reactions to questions about various uses of violence in decision-making were mixed. However, even some anti-violence people stated that they could comprehend the reasoning of those who resorted to inflammatory rhetoric and/or physical conflict to affect the decision-making process.

The Metro Arts critical event was especially fraught with violence by citizens that left many members of both groups bitter and disallusioned.

On other issues the MNA/CGB members cooperated in harmonious interaction without threats to achieve mutual goals. Violence was not a standard way for interaction, but the lack of, MNA/CGB, mutual

trust and accountability certainly helped to create a predisposing atmosphere for committing violent acts when other negotiating tactics failed.

There were no instances of the Agency committing violence. This is probably due to several factors:

1. Violence, in disputes, except for the military and law enforcement agencies is unprofessional conduct;
2. It is not traditional middle class behavior and usually denotes a lack of intelligence and breeding; and
3. It is the ultimate use of power and the MNA felt secure enough with its power resources not to have to consider the use of violence.

PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE USE AND RESULTS OF CONFRONTATION AS A DECISION-MAKING TECHNIQUE

Model Neighborhood Agency

> Yes. There were occasions leading up to the Metro Arts when the MNA Director would flat out say absolutely "No!" It caused a great distrust and a resort to violence. (COX MW)

> Metro Arts confrontation ended in violence. The MNA director was physically adulterated. Many people on both sides were disgusted with MNA. Distrust grew even worse. The vacillations of the Agency with the Loan and Grant caused a contrentation that effectively alienated the Social Services Committee.

Citizens Governing Board

> Yes, we confronted the MNA over the Loan and Grant without any effect - we were behind in the game. (BROOKS MW)

> We confronted MNA about Metro Arts. It really didn't do anything for us. We just got more

> frustrated. It was just one thing after the other. We never had smooth sailing. We won some battles, but lost the war. (JACOBY LNW)

The MNA and CGB constantly confronted each other during the Program's history. These confrontations usually occurred around money or other forms of program control.

The MNA confrontation method typically followed the pattern of first ordering a low level staff person to deliver an ultimatum to the CGB. If it was not heeded, the current MNA Director would "lay down the law." In the majority of counter-confrontations, the CGB, filled with righteous indignation, would reply with rhetoric and political manuvering, and would eventually go to the Common Council. In the extreme case of Metro Arts, the confrontation ended in violence.

The CGB employed an indirect method of confrontation. They would unilaterally make a decision on an issue contrary to known MNA policy, and then counter-confront the MNA. "Show down" confrontation usually cost both parties more than what was gained, because frustration and distrust multiplied with increasingly negative interactions.

DECISION-MAKING TIME LAGS AND ITS SUBSEQUENT EFFECT ON URBAN PLANNING EFFICIENCY

Model Neighborhood Agency

> Oh sure, it takes longer with citizen organizations. You add a whole additional macro layer of the CGB with a micro layer of committees. This results in a new system that doesn't understand itself and the general conflicts, plus the fact that it was never evidenced who was supposed to make a decision. (COX MW)

> Oh yes! A lot of citizens don't have the background and training. It takes more time to explain. Information dissemination is time-consuming, and time is crucial. Due to deadlines it becomes a problem. (CORONA MW)

Citizens Governing Board

> Yes, because people with little education and experience in decision-making tend to have difficulty arriving at group consensus. (BURCH MW)
>
> Yes. Because every little detail has to be explained to people. The unwillingness of people to accept what they are being told. If another program comes in, people should be picked by their ability to learn. (DEJOHG LNW)

The data explicitly reveals concurrence around citizen-caused delays in the urban planning process. The primary reason advanced for these conclusions was that citizens lack the necessary education, training and experience for effective problem-solving. This revelation has great significance for our study because of its implication to social change theory.

If it is a fact that some citizen groups have trouble with conceptualization processes, and therefore tend to find it seriously difficult to formulate policy, then we can begin to consider the relative disadvantage of the lower class organization in the bargaining process.

When the relevant propositions are re-examined it is noted that fifty percent of the CGB respondents were of the opinion that its members needed more training for improved decision-making. Yet, one hundred percent of the CGB respondents stated that its members possessed the needed expertise for participation in decision-making. However, this expertise was limited to knowledge of the local community and its needs, and did not include expertise at reconciling differences or at dealing with problems. It can be deduced from this information that contrary to expectations of citizens and of some advocacy planners,

a knowledge of the community alone will not suffice for the making of adequate decisions within reasonable time frames.

SUMMARY

The analysis has revealed that each organization had a unique approach that give the critical events specific dimensions. These approaches have been defined and classifed as "models." They are characterized as:

I. Adversary/Non-Cooperative - Indirect communication, threatening style (rhetorical and violence), and control of the decision-making process by any means;

II. Adversary/Cooperative - Initial state of number one with gradual co-optation or acquiescence, supportive and mutual identification with goals and policies; and

III. Cooperative - Second state of number two.

THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY

The Metro Arts and Loan and Grants critically demonstrate how the machinations of power function in bargaining situations. Compared to the CGB, the MNA was a powerful organization. Initially its middle class staff was bewildered by the CGB's assertive efforts through critical events. Later by building on its competence and strong goal orientation, MNA overpowered the CGB and dominated the decision-making.

Listed high among the reasons for the MNA successes was its support from all levels of government. This support granted the MNA the authority to control finances, materials, equipment and information.

It was recognized as a legitimate entity and was, thus, accorded the respect of other institutions.

MNA staff was professionally trained and endowed with multiple skills. It developed confidence and experience and was a member of various networks that enable professionals to thrive. Due to these factors, MNA exhibited a degree of influence and prestige.

In establishing its power, MNA engaged in manipulative conduct, as the critical events have illustrated, and often acted in a capricious and arbitrary manner. The critical fact is that this behavior, which some individuals would criticize as unethical secured for the MNA control of policy making in spite of the CGB's best efforts, and MNA succeeded primarily because of its middle class orientation and capabilities.

The MNA model is Adversary/Cooperative.

THE CITIZEN GOVERNING BOARD

Initially, the CGB had the potential to be a powerful organization. However, it was never able to establish an authoritative position for two principle reasons. One, it was never able to free itself from debilitating internal organizational squabbles enough to become a stable organization. Two, it was never able to obtain the respect of the business and professional community (where the greatest market capacity is lodged).

The CGB was so caught up in trivia that it never seemed to comprehend the value of prestige to the acquisition of power. Therefore, it was never able to command trust for financial and legal arrangements. It especially ignored the accountability factor which is

imperative for cooperating organizations (as opposed to protest organizations).

Lacking in these essentials, and tactically restricted by having given lip service to the Agency guidelines, the CGB did not gain significant power, for it had only patronizing support of the Common Council to postpone its eventual loss of bargaining strength.

The CGB had a "just cause" of protecting and enhancing community bargaining rights, but because of its lower class position it did not possess the relevant training and expertise to accomplish its goals.

One of the unfortunate aspects of this situation is that the CGB as a largely lower class organization was afraid to trust its professional and middle class members. These members (in order to be eligible for the trust they were never to receive) were reluctant to insist on the acceptance of their expertise. Such expertise could have possibly given the CGB the needed structure to bargain on a par with the MNA.

Therefore, the CGB was unable to muster necessary momentum for goal achievement, and was woefully unresponsive to failure signals. The CGB never fully understood the real reasons for its plight.

The Metro Arts critical event was decided not by CGB power, but because of community sentiment provoked by MNA's high-handness. The justification for this viewpoint was demonstrated later when the Agency again engaged in a ruthless power play in the Loan and Grant critical event. There was no significant community response on the behalf of the CGB, and the MNA decision prevailed.

The stipend critical event that introduced an issue with the potential for generating substantial debate and innovative national

policy was defined by the general community as a rip-off because of CGB abuse of the funds.

CGB observers found a classic process of organizational deterioration. The tragedy is that some persons try to explain these results as being deliberately programmed by government. I am opposed to this point of view. Instead, I believe that the CGB was programmed for failure through the dynamics of the social class system. The CGB as constituted simply did not have the market capacity even to survive, much less to make its lower-class oriented goals prevail against the power of the status quo.

The CGB model is Adversary/Cooperative.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES/THE WOMENS COMMITTEE/LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/SAINT PETER CLAVER - HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRITICAL EVENTS

This chapter's format is similar to that of Chapter IV. The four organizations' histories and characteristics are briefly presented, followed by a discussion of the respective critical events and their ramifications.

THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

The UCS is a quasi-public service organization that was founded in 1917. It receives the major portion of its operating revenue from the United Foundation (Torch Drive). A significant source of funds are Federal grants.

> USC present functions are primarily the product of over 50 years of historical development. They derive mainly from decisions made in 1951 when the Council of Social Agencies and the community chest became UCS, with the United Foundation serving as the federated fund-raising body. Budgeting is a UCS function as a result of what was then felt to be in the best interests of voluntary fund-raising and planning. (Greenleigh Associates, Inc., 1)

Today UCS carries out diverse functions and services through a wide variety of administrative units. An evaluation report of these

efforts said:

> ...the disbursement of UCS' financial staff, and volunteer resources among so many ongoing activities that the organization lacks a sufficiently strong sense of purpose and direction. (Greenleigh Associates, Inc., 1)

A key operation of UCS is conducted through its agency relations staff. This involves the provision of organizational assistance to emerging citizen groups until they are able to qualify as full-fledged agencies eligible for UCS grants.

The interest that this study has for UCS is how it makes policy decisions with these citizen groups. An additional factor influencing the selection of UCS is that I have been fortunate enough to have developed a rapport with some of its key personnel over the years, thereby enabling me to have access to pertinent data that otherwise might not have been available.

There were approximately eight staff members in Agency Relations. Three of them including the Director of the Agency were interviewed.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. UCS Respondents' Perceptions of UCS

They are middle class professionals. They have "good" educations, "good" family backgrounds and stable incomes. They live in desirable neighborhoods, belong to the "right" clubs and have "good" school systems and follow the protestant work ethic.

B. UCS Respondents' Perceptions of Themselves

They see themselves as being middle class with all that is stated in "A".

C. UCS Respondents' Description of the WC, SPC, and LASED.

The WC are of lower upper class and upper middle class backgrounds. They have had generations of college educated families. Their husbands have high job status with excellent incomes.

LASED is upper lower class blue collar with emerging social mobility especially through union membership. Most of them have less than a high school education.

SPC Board is primarily middle class professional. Their clientele is poor black ghetto.

D. Conclusions

The UCS is a middle class bureaucratic organization of a lower social status than the WC, but of higher social status than either LASED or SPC.

THE WOMENS COMMITTEE

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

In the beginning, during the depression years of the 1930's the WC's purpose was to mobilize women for the United Community Services' Fund Raising objectives. Later, when the United Fund (UF) was established, the Women's Committee became involved in educational services. The Greenleigh Report comments about the WC as follows:

> The UCS Women's Committee represents a reservoir of talented and skilled women interested in meaningful community services basically educational in nature. Its concerns have broadened considerably since its inception in 1935. More recently, it has moved toward the task of stimulating community awareness of social needs.

> The dedication and enthusiasm of the Women's Committee are highly prized by the UCS board and staff. However, the organizational strength and talents of this group could be used more effectively, especially in the development of new approaches to the use of volunteers and in the provision of informational and educational services. (Greenleigh Associates, Inc., 4)

Among the WC activities were:

1. The Tribute Fund - a limited sum of money to be disbursed for needy and emergency purposes;

2. Follow Your Dollar Tours - guiding contributors around the community to observe how and where their money was spent;

3. Board Member Institutes - educational projects based on subjects of community concern;

4. Community Calendar - published list of yearly events of community interest;

5. General Bus Tours - observations of geographic communities; and suburban/inner-city-sponsored activities to soften barriers between suburbia and the central city.

Originally the WC recruited its members from the lower upper class and the upper middle class, but toward the end of its existence, there were serious efforts to include women from a somewhat lower strata. The membership averaged fifty women. Eight were interviewed for this study.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. WC Respondents' Perception of WC

Upper middle class and lower upper class. Formerly most were from the lower upper. Much leisure time with a gracious and sophisticated life style. Economically secure, well educated with

a strong sense of social values. Financially able to travel nationally and internationally. Experienced in community activities. Live in fine neighborhoods and have a high scale of influence.

B. WC Respondents' Perception of Themselves

Upper middle class to lower upper class.

C. WC Respondents' Perception of UCS

Middle class. Somewhat lower in the class structure than WC but doing all right. Recently from the working class but with good professional education.

"Social exposure to the better things in life, living in good and desirable neighborhoods" (POWERS)

"Life style that fits in with the average American way of life." (KELLY)

"Lower middle. They have many attributes of the upper and upper middle classes, but they have had to struggle. This is a recent achievement and only part of the family has risen to their level." (WASHINGTON)

D. Conclusion

The WC is an upper middle class and lower middle class organization of a higher social status than the UCS.

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

The organization originated among some Latino members of the Steel Workers Union at the Great Lakes Steel Company. It was initially

finance in 1969 by the Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit. LASED began seeking funds in 1970 after receiving some help from New Detroit Incorporated.

LASED was formed because of the unique problems confronting the Latino community.

> Identification of the social problems facing the Spanish speaking is not difficult. The problems themselves fall into many areas and are the same as those of other minority groups, except that they are compounded by the language problem. We could fill many pages identifying and documenting each problem individually. The lack of decent housing (to be treated in a separate proposal), decent medical attention, education, civic involvement, etc. They shall be dealt with in some detail in our proposed solutions. Suffice to state here that social problems unique to the Latino community exists. The inflexibility of the Latino grouping presents major obstacles to amalgamation with the present overall social structure. The inability to communicate usually results from the lack of formal education. This usually results from the economic dependence upon a way of life which offers little or no hope of social mobility.
> The high concentration of Latino people who gather in areas which are identifiable with their tradition and customs helps to create situations that this organization hopes to correct by the nature of its self-imposed boundaries. (The LASED proposal to UCS for funding, 1)

LASED boundaries are; North-Penn Central Railroad tracks, South-Interstate Highway 75, East - West Grand Boulevard, and West - Woodmere Street.

The major goals of LASED are: 1. To help the Spanish speaking people to establish their identity and 2. provide needed social and development services either directly or by proper referrals.

The LASED executive board has sixteen members. Eight of them were interviewed.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. LASED Respondents' Perception of LASED

Blue collar working class with low education and income, living a barrio life style. "Tight family network." (LOWS)

B. LASED Respondents' Perception of Themselves

A general consensus that they are recently from the upper lower class into a very upwardly mobil lower middle class.

C. LASED Respondents' Perceptions of UCS

Middle class white life style. Educational backgroumd at good incomes, decent housing and neighborhoods, at least college graduate. Civic and community involvement.

"Middle class professionals with symbolic skills. Suits and attache cases." (ROME)

"Middle class - a lot of power and prestige, comfortable in their roles, satisfied with the way life is going for them." (LOWS)

D. Conclusions

LASED considers their organization to be lower class, their personal status lower middle class and UCS middle class (several "cuts" above them").

SAINT PETER CLAVER

HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS

HISTORY

St. Peter Claver is a settlement house. It was founded in May, 1939, by the League of Catholic Women at the request of Cardinal Mooney. The service boundaries are: North-Edsel Ford Expressway, East-Dequindre Street, South-Adams Street, West-Woodwared Avenue.

> St. Peter Claver Community House is located at the corner of Eliot and Beaubien. It is funded by the United Community Services and was sponsored by the League of Catholic Women. The staff consists of professionals in social work, recreation, and paraprofessionals from the surrounding area. The staff is provided to fill the needs of the community and agency programs are initiated and carried through in the light of these needs... Through this the agency attempts to speak to core community problems as they relate to the present urban crisis. Services undergo a continuous evaluation process, in the view of the above goals, by community participants, by referring agencies and by workers. (From a phamplet-St. Peter Claver Community House 1)

At present SPC and UCS are engaged in vigorous debate concerning the scope of SPC's automony.

SPC has a board of nineteen people which is undergoing some turnover due to the issue of autonomy. Five of the Board members were interviewed.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. SPC Respondents' Perception of SPC

Most of the Board is middle class professional with nice homes, incomes and life styles similar to UCS. The clientele is mostly lower class recipients of welfare. Non-gainfully employed, alcoholics etc. living in public housing.

"The membership is lower class and public charge strata. High school or less education, blue collar life style revolves around a 'high' velocity dollar Also a system of community surveillance to shut the establishment out." (JEFFERSON)

B. SPC Respondents' Perception of Themselves

Mostly middle class with a few upwardly mobile lower class.

C. SPC Respondent Description of UCS

Middle class. A value system reflecting higher education and possessing the necessary credentials. Live in nice neighborhoods.

"They are not people conscious, therefore they are poor in spirit. If you want a true classification - people conscious means that there is little or no regard for the underprivileged." (WARNER)

D. Conclusion

SPC has a Board that has a class mixture of predominantly middle class and a minority of upwardly mobile upper lower class individuals. Its clientele and membership is lower class.

CRITICAL EVENTS

The UCS and the MNA both have functions that involve the granting of financial aid to local citizen groups. There is a major difference between these two organizational functions that has critical implications for their policies: the MNA receives its funding directly from the Federal Government, whereas UCS funding is derived indirectly from local and private contributors. Private donors tend to be even more sensitive to the way expenditures are made than is the Federal government. Tax revenues come from involuntary sources and are more remote and less identifiable than a local private donation.

It is unquestionable that governmental units are greatly concerned about fiscal accountability (as observed in the description of the MNA/CGB critical events) but because of the above stated suppositions, UCS is more acutely aware than government about its fiscal accountability. Thus, a non-publicly stated UCS goal is the

avoidance of any connection with "controversial" social issues (for which read, "not approved by conservatives") for fear of direct and immediate retaliation by unsympathetic donors. (Thus, one reason conservatives prefer charity to welfare is that charity is directly under their power; welfare is much less responsive.)

A stated UCS goal is the maintenance of an efficient organizational structure with specific functions assigned to each group under its umbrella. The implementation of both UCS goals is done through adroit maneuvering and great effort to avoid overt conflict. However, as we will see, these goals had a large part to play in the causes for the crystallization of the critical events.

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES (UCS)/WOMENS COMMITTEE (WC)

THE ELIMINATION OF THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE

A. Definition

Perhaps the best way to describe this particular critical event is to quote a former WC member:

> "You asked about the formation of the United Foundation and the pressure to merge the UCS Women's Committee into the newly formed Women's Committee for the United Foundation (now called WUF - Women for the United Foundation.) Before the formation of the UF, both the fund-raising and the planning functions existed side-by-side at 51 West Warren in two divisions of what we called the Council of Social Agencies. As often happens after a fund raising organization has been around a while and a number of agencies have either been formed and are raising money on their own or whatever, the pressure builds to "combine all the campaigns into one to save fund raising costs, to save all the wear and tear that separate campaigns are for businesses," etc., etc. Therefore, in about 1948 or so, the United Foundation was formed, and set up shop downtown, and all the people at 51 who had been working on fund raising were moved to UF. This created a tremendous

morale problem at 51 and split many official and personal relationships.

> The UF, recognizing the value of an educational arm of volunteers, formed their own women's committee (the UCS Women's Committee had not been transferred to the UF). The UF began a series of pressures on UCS to dissolve their committee, or to merge it with the UF's into one. The UCS Women's Committee, still seeing their role as broader than just the fundraising part of the work, resisted this pressure. There was not much help from UCS in this resistance. The focus of the resistance was not, however, power techniques in any sense of the word. Rather it took the form of trying to persuade the UF and the UF Women's Committee that there was a valid function for both organizations. There was an eventual "agreement" that the UF Women's Committee would concentrate on education about the services. I would say, however, that the UCS Committee was permanently weakened from this point on, even though Mrs. Livingston was still alive during some of this. However, UCS did not visibly withdraw its support from its Women's Committee until after her death - she, by her family and associates, represented an entity not to be meddled with." (WASHINGTON)

The critical event materialized when the WC was phased out. Although, some of the members offered resistance, in "diplomatic and tactful" ways, they did not succeed in warding off the final blow.

B. Clarification of Goal Policies, and Key Member Roles

This UCS Director did not appear to be consciously aware of any WC disenchantment.

> When the WC was faced with the fact of their disbandment, they reacted by dealing with alternative such as negotiating and participating in other parts of UCS as a means of achieving their objective. (BOOTH)

However, there were mixed feelings, on the part of various UCS members about their disbandment, in which some concurred with UCS:

> I don't remember any critical events. We had a good relationship. They did nothing to counteract our

> influence they knew that most of us had influential husbands. (KELLY)

While others expressed a contrary viewpoint:

> The movement to do away with the WC was a critical event. Laidlow was out to get us. I think we had influence with the UCS Director but the pressure from UF was more than he could bear and eventually they proved to be more influential. It was a stealthy operation. The UCS bored from within and convinced some of the WC members to go either with UCS public relations or with WUF (STRICKLAND)

Two critical events were:

> 1. A downgrading of WC at the time of Mrs. Livingstone's death. (This was an opportunity to negate the WC's power.)
> 2. A series of efforts to prevent the WC from involvement in social reform efforts.
> UCS strategy was to kill us with kindness. (WASHINGTON)

The WC's original goal involved the planning and implementation, primarily of educational and public relations projects supportive of the UCS image and goals. Potential conflict point arose when: 1. The United Foundation decided it was advantageous to have the direct services of the WC; and 2. Some WC members, such as (WASHINGTON) above, wanted to adopt as additional goals "controversial" social reform activities.

> There were a lot of policies that WC wanted to get into that UCS did not want them to - general issues of social reform.
>
> Peaceful implementation for busing is an example. UCS did not want the WC listed as a sponsor with a pro-busing coalition. They didn't want us involved, they feared the loss of significant financial support. To counteract our influence, they tried to build innocuous tasks for us - busy work. (POWERS)

This description of the UCS/WC critical event demonstrates how subtle the use of power can be even when the participants are well aware of what is happening, and neither side feels powerless. Perhaps, the key factor to see in this case, at this point in the analysis, is how an unstated mutual agreement between two powerful groups to avoid open conflict can be accomplished. This should be kept in mind as the other two groups which relate to UCS are examined.

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES/LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (LASED)

FUNDING ELIGIBILITY AND BOARD REORGANIZATION

A. Definition

Though some of its members had acquired organizational and leadership exposure in the Steelworkers Union, the problems and goals of the community that they preposed to serve were vastly different than those of organized labor. As a result, the critical event for LASED reflected its unfamiliarity with reality.

LASED had several critical events only one will be a part of this study. It concerns "open membership" and UCS' initial refusal to grant adequate funding for LASED's social service delivery programs.

When LASED first organized, the Executive Board membership was restricted to Mexican-Americans. This action ruled out Puerto Ricans, Cubans and all other Spanish speaking people from the decision-making arena. The UCS flatly refused, not only to allocate funds for LASED, but to communicate with the group on any matter until they had re-organized the Board to include a more representative cross section of the Latino community.

This UCS attitude displeased the Mexican-Americans who claimed a numerical representation of ninety percent of Spanish speaking residents of the community. As a result an impasse was created. There was no further movement until the Board was reorganized.

THE FUNDING METHOD

> "UCS policy for financial member requires a number of items. However, the ones that appear crucial are: Applicant agency in existence for at least two years, active representative board of directors; 501 C3 IRS tax status; audit of financial assets for two years.
>
> UCS violated part of these requirements by admitting NARCO (Narcotics Addition Rehabilitation Coordinating Organization) due primarily to a powerful and influential board, NARCO was admitted to UCS as a financial ongoing agency in a relatively short period of time. Whereas UCS negotiated with LASED for four years. LASED was aware of what happened NARCO's case therefore funding became a critical event." (KAPLA)

LASED viewed this action of UCS as unfair and paternalistic.

B. Clarification of Goals, Policies, and Key Member Roles

The salient UCS goal, in this instance, was the establishment of LASED as a viable organization that would provide for an effective social service delivery system specifically geared for the Detroit Latino community.

LASED had two goals, the first was to cooperate with UCS in its goal of establishing a social service delivery system for the Latino community, the second was to function as the official "voice" of the Latino community.

The critical event as stated, emerged from LASED's policy of restricting Board membership solely to Mexican-Americans. UCS policy for the building of effective community organizations demonstrated in

its insistence of board representation for all groups in the target community. They are able to maintain this policy through their control of the funding mechanism.

> We withheld funding until they satisfied our requirements for a more representative board. They mustered whatever power they had to counteract our moves. (BOOTH)

There were two major critical events for LASED:

1. Contradictions about UCS guidelines in the LASED Board representation.

2. LASED thought we should be funding them instead of another group.

> LASED tried to counteract our influence by withholding information. They tried to rally a base of support through community meetings. They tried to establish their own funding base.
>
> They would "forget specific assignments." They would invite us to stacked meetings. They would speak in Spanish. They did all of these things in an attempt to gain control. (KAPLA)

LASED was aware of the rationale for the UCS position, but they were also aware that UCS was not as rigid about policy changes as they claimed, for UCS had altered their funding regulations, in a different context, to accommodate another group.

> The small size of the budget that UCS gave us. They were putting out more for other organizations, that were not really organizations. They thought we were just a bunch of people who got together and started to raise hell.
>
> The UCS Director's efforts were indirect. He wanted open LASED community meetings. If we didn't cooperate, we were told we would not be funded. (HEIGHTS)
>
> Two critical events. 1. The failure to provide sufficient funding to initiate constructive action

> that would address itself to the problem. 2. Paternalism - the feeling that they (UCS) was bright children playing games with idiots (LASED). (LOWS)

As in the previous example of the WC, LASED capitulated to UCS demands, but for different reasons. LASED did not share an identity with UCS as the WC had done, nor were they directly supportive of the UCS structure - they only wanted the money. However, the cold fact of the matter was that LASED had no leverage. They also had no other place to go for financial support.

Although LASED data responses indicate that they did not feel powerless during negotiations with UCS, in reality they personified that condition and individual LASED members' comments about UCS paternalism reflect this fact.

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES/SAINT PETER CLAVER (SPC)

DENIAL OF AUTONOMY - UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES/ST. PETER CLAVER

A. Definition

The members of the SPC Board are experienced in community affairs, but there are marked differences in their individual views about community control of institutions. These differences have caused some resignations and created factions. The conflict centers on what the strongest faction of the Board refers to as their "autonomy." This is the substance of the critical event.

UCS Denial of Fiscal Control

The SPC is determined to have autonomy. What the majority of its members want is UCS funding with no strings attached. This goal

is to realize through the establishment of a private bank account, their own accountants, and full control over all and any property.

UCS defines these demands as arbitrary and unreasonable and is threatening to cut off the SPC funds.

SPC regards this threat as a lack of good faith and trust on the part of UCS. They perceive this as paternalistic behavior.

B. Clarification of Goals, Policies, and Key Member Roles

The UCS goal for SPC is the development of SPC into an effective neighborhood center under UCS control. The goal of SPC is, in part, diametrically opposed to the goal of the UCS. It is to develop SPC into an effective neighborhood center, final control resting with SPC.

UCS policy, consistent with the other cases previously examined, is that each of its member organizations must subscribe to UCS guidelines in order to be eligible for receipt at UCS funds. In this case the guidelines concern financial accountability.

SPC policy is to establish those practices, especially in financial management areas, that permit complete SPC autonomy.

These opposite viewpoints have created the critical event. The UCS is adamant that SPC readjust its financial methods to meet UCS criteria.

> A critical event is the SPC financial structure. They opened a bank account contrary to good fiscal policy. The auditing for the SPC is officially done by the League of Catholic Women. The new bank account would not be under UCS control. As a result the League of Catholic Women held up SPC pay checks.

> A second critical event involves the question of who should own the building that houses SPC operations - UCS or SPC.

> The SPC tries to counteract UCS influence by being disriptive in meetings, being stubborn in decision-making situations and stalling. They threaten us in subtle ways by negotiating with other people and ignoring us because they want complete control over fiscal and property policy. (MILLER)

The controlling faction of the SPC Board can see no wrong in their demands and resent the attitude and contrary actions of the UCS.

> They have accused us of lack of management, of not knowing how to manage; also, of being uneducated, of being community-oriented, and not efficient and acceptable to them.
>
> UCS has threatened to cut our funds off which means we will have to go out of business. They are tired of dealing with us and our legitimate demands. They want to control all final decisions. (WARNER)

The principle UCS actors, its Director and the staff member assigned to SPC, are playing a waiting game. As the situation stands at the time of this writing, unless there are major changes in the attitudes of the UF donors it is unlikely that SPC will prevail. At best they will possibly obtain a slight modification in UCS policy.

A COMMENT ON STIPENDS

The United Community Services has never paid expenses or stipends to any of its umbrella organizational boards. The UCS Director admits that the subject has come up, but it, generally, has been ignored. Neither the WC or the LASED memberships had considered the issue, nor have they, personally, thought about expenses. St. Peter Claver has considered salaries and expenses, but has not yet raised the issue officially.

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

> No salaries or expenses should be paid. We think not, because citizens are volunteers. They may build a vested interest in stipends. (MILLER)

WOMENS COMMITTEE

> No salaries, but expenses and some kind of a tax deduction. (TESSION)

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

> No salaries. It would not be wise. It would take the real meaning out of community representation. It would reduce independence. Out-of-pocket expenses are OK. (HEIGHTS)

SAINT PETER CLAVER

> They should be given both salary and expenses because of the time for problem solving. (WARNER)

> Boards in poor areas should be given full salaries. This is a full time job. (DAVIS)

Perhaps the major social class difference to be noted from the comparison of the four organizations if that the only lower class individuals (two in the SPC) opted for salaries. Several members of the WC referred to the possibility of having the expenses of their participation deducted from their income tax.

A common thread of consensus that ran through the four organizations was that salaries and stipends would cause the citizen organizations and their representative communities more harm than good. By building dependence on the stipend, potential power of citizens, in the decision-making process would be dissipated.

CRITICAL EVENTS: THE VEHICLES THAT PROVIDE MEANING FOR THE PROPOSITIONS AS RELATED TO THE VARIABLES OF SOCIAL CLASS AND RACE

As in Chapter IV, a test is conducted for the validity of the

propositions in regard to the critical events.

This is done through an examination of the data in four areas:

1. Organizational Relationships - the fluidity of A/C;

2. Violence - respondent assessment of its utility;

3. Confrontation Results - "eyeball to eyeball" benefits;

and

4. Decision-Making Time - temporal impacts of citizen input.

UCS//WC/LASED/SPC: Organizational Relationship

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

> They were and are all partnerships (WC, LASED, and SPC). The WC was a support to us, but we had the ultimate authority. For LASED it was with granting the operational budget and for SPC it is with negotiating the granting of an operational budget. (BOOTH MW)

> It was adversary with LASED. I think its a matter of control. A few people seemed to have been trying to get control. They were in conflict with out policy which required a broad-based community board. If the Board representation had been too limited we couldn't have put up with them. As for the SPC, the immediate crisis is financial. They don't want to comply with our fiscal accountability procedures. (MILLER MW)

WOMENS COMMITTEE

> It was somewhat paternal. Any action we took had to have the approval of the UCS Board. We did not have the control to hire and fire out Director. (MITCHEL MW)

> Partnership in the beginning, adversary at the end. Adversary developed first after Mrs. Livingstone's death, when UCS wanted to place WC under the Director of Public Relations, who in turn reported to the UCS Director. The only activities that the WC considered functional or within its province they had to get permission from UCS. Examples are deep social issues that became increasingly difficult for WC to become involved in. (WASHINGTON MW)

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

> It was a coalition involving financial aid and service delivery advice along with resolving the issue of Board representation. (WATERS MNW)

> It was adversary: allowing this thing to be a one sided affair with UCS in control. Also, it was a lack of funding by UCS. (LOWS MNW)

SAINT PETER CLAVER

> It was adversary. Part of it came from our request for autonomy which mainly has been expressed through our insistence for control of our fiscal operation. (HEART MNW)

Allocating funds and providing social planning services is the raison d'etre for UCS. The data shows that the functions of this role gave rise to the major adversary relationships, whether for WC, LASED, or SPC. The intensity of adversary relationships ranged from very weak for WC, moderate for LASED, to virtually irreconcilable for the SPC.

The UCS/WC interaction offers a revealing variation on the power theme relative to social class and status. This invaluable observation was contributed in answer to a question about the level of WC/s consciousness of power.

The respondent replied:

> You asked if the women on the Women's Committee were conscious of emplying power tactics. I would say not on the part of the "upper class" women. The reason would simply be that they were so used to having it as a lever that they really were almost unconscious of it as a technique. Furthermore, for the middle class women too, power in the community derived from the business activities of the men - and therefore competition would be around the business relationships. The emphasis would be on a woman's relationship to the wife of the man important to her husband's business career - not

> on the Women's Committee versus UCS. To go one step further in this logic, it would be pretty unthinkable to take on the UCS, the "big board," as its board was called, because that was where the big power was.

The above quote provides a rational explanation of UCS' rather delicate position, placed between the business power and wives of representatives of this power. To function efficiently and perhaps sanely, the UCS Director had to adopt on the one hand a conciliatory manner with the WC, while maintaining strong control over their activities. His control would have to include a limitation of WC's extension of its activities into "controversial" areas of social reform that could possibly conflict with the attitudes of their more powerful husbands.

Another factor that deserves important consideration, in this analysis, is that UCS' tight financial control over the grantee groups; WC, LASED, and WC is based directly on the model imposed by the financial control practices of the big corporations and upper class executives who donate to UCS. This model demands financial control over money as a sign of "good management practice," and as an automatic concommitant of the chain of power that is "supposed" to flow from money centers.

As a result of this posture, those WC members who were wives of somewhat "lesser" executives and professionals using WC in order to make and maintain social contacts with the upper crust, found it "unthinkable" to develop an adversary relationship with UCS, because UCS' Board represented the money power of big business, and a chance at higher status.

LASED, initially adopted an adversary position, but soon discovered they couldn't win against UCS' control over available funds. SPC is still truculent, but stymied at the time of this writing. In all cases, power equals control over funds.

The propositions are consistent with the above conclusions. For UCS/WC there is no evidence of fear and they display a significant amount of trust for each other. There is positive interaction between them, but the Agency has a manipulative style. Both are competent and superficially cooperative.

USC//WC/LASED/SPC: Violence

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

> No. Most people don't want to crystallize a situation so as to limit further involvement. (KAPLA MNW)

WOMENS COMMITTEE

> I am not one for that. It simply raises a lot of heat that puts out the light. However, I wouldn't criticise those who do it providing they know when to quit. Sometimes you have to make a dramatic point. (KELLY MW)

> No. In our group what is usually done is to resign or appeal to the UCS Board. These are final acts. (WASHINGTON MW)

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

> I think that violence would have been better at that time than rhetoric. It would have given more attention and publicity to the community. The media would have been much more interested. (ROME MNW)

> Yes. If you know what you are doing you can do both. There must be a division of roles. Once the people who raise hell have gotten the other side to negotiate, the mediators must come in, because the establishment can run circles around the violent ones in negotiations. (HEIGHTS MNW)

SAINT PETER CLAVER

> I don't think so. I really don't think you solve anything with violence. It only makes the other side more hostile. (WARNER LNW)

The UCS with its traditional middle class identity and professionalism, in addition to its close alignment with the business community, shunned violence as a means of affecting decisions. The WC abhorred the mere thought of violence. However, the fact that must be reiterated is that neither organization, similar to the MNA, has found the use of violent tactics (or coercive power) to be necessary in order to attain its ends.

Thus, we are in the advantageous position of watching the emergence of a pivotal aspect of social stratification theory. The middle and upper class possess a profound repugnance for the employment of rhetoric and combative physical activity in decision-making. They have genteel substitutes (manipulation, patience, etc.) that are acceptable and much more effective in the long run. Their education, training and life style gives them the ability to conceptualize and see the "whole" of conflict-producing situations. They are not caught up with fragmentation of life experiences as is the lower class, nor is their need for survival as acute.

LASED initially indulged in limited amounts of rhetoric and posturing, but soon abandoned those techniques. The data suggests that they did so because of its membership's recent entry into the middle class; thus anticipatory socialization served to reinforce its adaptability to a middle class decision-making style.

The SPC, being under heavy lower class influence, manifested

latent violence through its controlled hostility, but managed to keep it repressed by maneuvering and manipulating in fiscal areas.

This behavior, although irritating to UCS, is not sufficient as a tactic for crystallizing the issues, for it is being tolerated (to the consternation of a small minority of the SPC Board), and this enables UCS to continue to play out its waiting game.

UCS//WC/LASED/SPC: Confrontation Results

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

> Yes, we have showdown meetings. They are necessary at times to let everybody know what the situation is and what must be done to resolve. (BOOTH MW)

WOMENS COMMITTEE

> My impression is that they confronted the UCS Director with questions of "Why are you throwing us out," although they knew why. The WC Director and Chairwoman met with the UCS Director but he would always out-talk and confuse them. They always came away without anything definite. Finally he got rid of our Director. (STRICKLAND MW)

> We sought confrontation when he actually placed the WC under the Public Relations Department. We met with him (the UCS Director) but he faked most of us out. This kept us out of the decision-making process. (WASHINGTON MW)

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

> During my period of tenure, there were no such confrontations. I heard in my absence that there were confrontations between our Board and UCS. Anger and confrontation had a negative effect on decision-making. It is better to negotiate in peace. This is the way we were able to survive. (BATES MNW)

> Yes, we confronted UCS with the issues, The Program was funded for $15,000. The implementation of the Multi-Service Delivery Program was a result of our confrontation with UCS. Confrontation gave us the necessary

> confidence in ourselves to keep pushing until our plans were a reality. (LOWS MNW)

SAINT PETER CLAVER

> Yes. Almost every meeting between SPC and UCS has ended in confrontation about fiscal and property issues. In effect, it tends to put the SPC in a higher decision-making capacity. (HEART MNW)

UCS and MNA have comparable agency styles of confrontation but UCS has not adopted MNA's hardline tactics. What, in fact, the UCS has done is to blur the decision-making line. MNA was prevented from taking this tack because the CGB had the option of seeking relief from Common Council. The UCS, being a private organization, does not offer the citizens a similar court of appeals. Certainly, the United Fund contributors would not be sympathetic to citizens' monetary desires, because the model for UCS decisions comes from the corporate bureaucratic style, in which employees or other lower status people must "go along."

The WC were aware of their being compromised, but since most of its membership identified with UCS, there were no collective complaints nor serious confrontations. They simply went along with the program.

In the beginning, LASED attempted to confront UCS over the lack of adequate funding and control of board representation, but not being willing to risk the consequences of continual obstinacy such as the SPC exhibited, they eventually withdrew and complied with UCS demands.

LASED, also, had an internal pecularity to consider. As a new organization seeking to bring rather fringe group into general community dynamics for the first time, it was necessary not to overly risk their fragile reputations.

SPC has made confrontation their primary decision-making tool for increasing its community power base. Unlike LASED they are not worried about personal reputations. The SPC community loves a "brawl" win, lose, or draw. However, what they have defined as power acquisition may be a will-o'-the wisp unless they are able to persuade the business community to alter their policies.

UCS//WC/LASED/SPC: Decision-Making Time

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

> Yes. Because of the endless discussions and long meetings. It is part of their tactics, not to reach decisions at present (SPC). Many citizen groups do not have the expertise or they have hidden agendas. (MILLER MW)

WOMENS COMMITTEE

> Yes. I believe that to include the ideas of more people takes more time. You have to educate the community people, but it takes more time. (HOOKER MW)

> Yes. I suppose it becomes difficult the more people you have until they shapeup to what everybody else is talking about. Sometimes there are various hidden agendas that other people don't know about. (KELLY MW)

LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

> Yes, because citizen organizations are usually not aware of what the whole process is about. This takes time and a great deal of education which prolongs the decision-making process. (ROME MNW)

> Yes. We learned that there were many different objectives and how to deal with the problems of deadlines. This is much more difficult decision-making. There is no contract like the unions. We have to plan more and work with many more people. (HEIGHTS MNW)

SAINT PETER CLAVER

> Doesn't take any longer to me, I don't think citizens are any more guilty of shuffling their feet than bureaucrats. (WARNER LNW)
>
> Yes, because of additional definitions to be made through the additional people brought into the process. (HEART MNW)

The concern that most of the respondents wrestled with, no matter what organization they belonged to, was the woeful tack of citizen group preparedness for tough decision-making procedures. True, the date show that some respondents believed hidden agendas and tactical maneuvering were present, but the overwhelming response was in the area of citizen incompatence.

Tasks that are taken for granted by middle class persons are often totally new and incomprehensible situations for lower income people. While the study subjects may have dismissed fear of the other organization as non-existent, there exists the strong possibility that fear may have existed about coping with the general decision-making situation.

In some instances when the "real" issues became exceeding complex and intricate, it seems conceivable, (based on inferences from the data) that citizens substituted practical, lower level, more easily understood issues like those involving stipends. Thus, the process of interaction was reduced from the abstract to familiar reality - and much real work was derailed.

SUMMARY

THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES

UCS is a traditional middle class organization of competent pro-

fessionals. It is similar to the MNA in good orientation. Unlike the MNA its original focus for services included the broader community as a target for services. Recently its services delivery has undergone an important shift to the "inner city."

The bulk of UCS funding is derived from the business, industrial, and financial community, a fact which influences its characteristic method of operating by a combination of maneuvering and use of financial control to hold power. UCS administrators are much more subtle and deceptive than MNA administrators, and it has the power to always maintain the power in policy negotiations. It is difficult to imagine UCS involved in a critical event like Metro Arts.

UCS is a prime example of traditional bureaucracy in that it is authoritative and influential. Its long history of community acceptance can be attributed to an almost uncanny ability to obtain citizen cooperation and accoutability for compliance with their planning regulations and financial practices. UCS always retains an "edge", and rarely takes a secondary position in the bargaining process for any appreciable length of time. This fact is reflected in the critical events with the WC, LASED, and SPC.

The UCS model is Adversary/Cooperative.

THE WOMENS COMMITTEE

The majority of the WC membership was recruited from the upper middle and lower upper class. This being the case, WC had the potential for being a very powerful organization. This factor assumes special importance when it is noted that WC lost in interaction with the UCS staff of a lower status than their own.

However, it has been explained that UCS was receiving signals from the "Big Board" which was more powerful than the WC. As a result the WC identified with the UCS, and learned how to reconcile personal desires with UCS needs to limit WC activities to "safe" areas. So WC members could not become involved in activities of their own selection.

This example has special value in the analysis of power concepts, because it offers a variation on a theme that is present, but not often observable. We are able to examine a potential power conflict at the upper end of the class system, and can see how bloodlessly it was resolved. This is an interesting case of market capacity at work: the money power and the ability to bestow status of the male donors on the "Big Board" had to prevail. Even though the WC was involved in a critical event centered on their own survival, unlike the participants in the Metro Arts they went quietly because there was much more at stake for the individual woman.

The WC model was Cooperative.

THE LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

LASED members are new arrivals from the upper lower class to the lower middle class. They are in the process of attempting to establish power outside the Latino community. To accomplish this task they are concentrating on the development of techniques that will strenthen their organization in the ancillary power areas of communication, style/tactics, competence, and goal orientation.

From their progress, it appears that they are successfully achieving their goal.

The outcome of the critical event with UCS indicates the low level of their market capacity, and also their awareness of it. For the moment, LASED has reluctantly elected to cooperate with UCS, so that they can be funded for survival in order to engage in community building.

The LASED model is Adversary/Cooperative.

ST. PETER CLAVER

The SPC is very conscious of power and its implications for organizational success. However, they have gambled somewhat wildly "to make their point" (crapshooter style). SPC tactic include thrusts to embarrass UCS, and to make them "lose their cool." These actions consist of moves diameterically opposed to UCS financial policy. The immediate results have been the critical events.

These SPC maneuvers have, for the moment, proved somewhat disconcerting to UCS because of the difficulty of adjusting a smooth manipulative style to SPC's blatantly offensive and obstinate position. It is expected that UCS skill and experience will discover a method to cope with and defeat SPC proposals without visible "strong arm" retaliation.

Unless SPC develops more sophisticated sets of tactics and durable set of goals, it is doubtful whether any gains can be sustained in the long run.

CHAPTER VI

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS//COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS (CCHR)/STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE (SEC)

This chapter is the last in the series which examines the history, characteristics, and critical events of my three cases. As with the other two chapters, the following outline is utilized to systematically exhibit the information.

1. History and Characters
2. Critical events definition
3. Critical events related to the variables; propositions, social class, and race.

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS

HISTORY

The Detroit Police Department's STRESS was organized January 13, 1971. Inspectors James Bannon and Gordon Smith were asked by the Department's Commissioner to find a solution to escalating street crime. The two inspectors, after studying crime statistics and other relevant information, organized STRESS.

> One of the maor elements of the overall increase in crime in Detroit in recent years has been the felony known as robbery in which the criminal confronts the victim with violence or the threat of violence.
>
> While all major crimes in the city increased 32 percent from 1968 to 1970, robberies increased 67 percent. Of the seven major crime categories,

> murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary and auto, robbery along occounted for 24 percent of the overall increase between 1968 and 1970.
>
> In actual numbers of crimes committed in Detroit, robbery ranks third behind burglary and larceny and first among crimes in which force or threat of violence is involved.
>
> To deal with this most prevalent of the crimes of violence, a special operation was devised and announced within the Detroit Police Department on January 13, 1971. Its mission was stated succinctly in its acronymic code name, "S.T.R.E.S.S." meaning "Stop The Robberies - Enjoy Safe Streets."
>
> The nature of the mission was to operate in plain clothes in such a way as to "merge" with the environment, and to be the type of person that a thug seeking a victim would be likely to confront. Officers would be expected to work in teams. One member of the team on occasion might be expected to pose as a perspective robbery victim.
>
> January 18, 1971, the first arrest was made by one of the earliest volunteers. April 5, STRESS operation results were reported publicly for the first time. (Statement by John F. Nichols 1)

The first STRESS officers were recruited from the Precinct Support Unit, a special task unit of the Department.

At first, STRESS did not arouse too much controversy. But several things occurred that were later to have a profound effect not only on the Police Department but on the entire Detroit administration.

These factors were based on the two major controversial aspects of STRESS:

1. The decoy operation and 2. the surveillance operation. The former caused the most problems for legal theoriticians and change agents. It resulted in eleven fatalities in the first five month period.

The fatalities arousing the most community concern involved the killing of two teenagers by STRESS officers. Also, there was a shoot-out between Wayne County Sheriff's deputies and some STRESS officers (all of whom were black) under suspicious circumstances that left the community puzzled. (A complete chronology and description of STRESS can be found in Detroit Under STRESS, published by From the Ground Up, 2316 W. McNichols, 48221. Designed by Changeover Productions, 1973.)

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. STRESS Respondents' Perceptions of STRESS

Most of the members are lower middle class. They have a "good" salary range from $12,000 to $16,000 per year. They live in "nice" neighborhoods and are developing liberal consumer habits. "Most are trying to get up the ladder by getting more education and trying to make more money." (CHAPIN) "Their values, life style and goals differ from the lower class in that they are less apt to engage in physical violence or rough horse play." (GOODMAN) "Most are getting a college education but they are still in the lower class because of the blue collar values about life styles, bars, entertainment and family life." (PATRON) The general consensus is that STRESS members are upwardly mobile lower middle class individuals.

B. STRESS Respondents' Perceptions of Themselves

The general consensus among the officers is that they are in the lower middle class.

C. STRESS Respondents' Perceptions of CCHR and SEC

"The leaders are well educated (always reading and studying)

and very smart. Most of them have money and live in good neighborhoods. They have contact with powerful people and the press. They have good clothes, cars and nice offices. The members are poor people. The leaders use their positions to whip the mass membership into line."

"They have social action oriented values of middle class people about social change and the direction society should take." (PATRON) "The leaders are Jane Fonda types, trying to prove something. Going around taking up causes when they have money and the good life." (WEBER). "The ones we had contact with on the streets were either hustlers or had low paying jobs." (LAXTON)

D. Conclusions

STRESS officers consider themselves as members of the lower middle class. They believe that CCHR and the leaders of the SEC were in a somewhat higher segment of the middle class than themselves. They are convinced that the SEC rank and file are deceived members of the lower class.

THE COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

HISTORY

The CCHR was much more accessible than the SEC. It can be described as a quasi-establishment organization. The Mayor's Interracial Committee was formed January, 1944, following the race riot during the summer of 1943. Immediately after the establishment of that Committee, the CCHR was organized to provide community support for it.

The membership is derived mainly from the major civial rights

and human relations organizations in the area. CCHR functions as a board (forty members) for the collective organizations, but it appears to have a high degree of autonomy in its own right.

Section A. Purpose and Policy

1. The Coordinating Council is to serve as a medium through which the agencies and organizations may be encouraged to engage cooperatively in promoting understanding and goodwill among individuals and community groups and eliminating racism, prejudice and discrimination. It will be the intent of the Coordinating Council to engage in activities designed to foster cooperation among members in:

   1. Planning, education and research activities
   2. Exchanging information on techniques and materials
   3. Sharing facilities
   4. Organizing joint programs
   5. Stimulating human relations programs in member organizations

2. The Coordinating Council will be governed in accordance with the most recently revised "Statement of the Working Relationship" between the Commission on Community Relations and the Coordinating Council on Human Relations. (CCHR Bylaws, Rev. 4/2[illegible]'72, 1)

The CCHR can be classified as an establishment protest organization. Therefore, it tends to follow the "rules" in a traditional sense.

There were eight interviews with the CCHR membership.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. CCHR Respondents' Perception of CCHR

"Predominantly middle class, college graduates with professional jobs." "They are able to afford good vaccations and other amenities." (KRIEBLE) "They have socially accepted behavioral patterns." (POPTON)

"They don't think like ghetto people think." (DALE)

"They have middle class values and attitudes-noblesse oblige" (WALKER)

B. CCHR Respondents' Perceptions of Themselves

All consider themselves to be middle class. WALKER in her statement says, "Economically I am part of the middle class. Value-wise, I perceive myself as part of the struggling lower class."

C. CCHR Respondents' Perceptions of STRESS

In general, STRESS officers were perceived of "as members of the lower middle class. Until recently, they had less than a college education. They have lower middle class incomes based on current police salaries. They live in nice well-kept neighborhoods with smaller, less elaborate housing."

D. Conclusions

CCHR perceives STRESS as an upwardly mobile group but several cuts below CCHR's social class level.

THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

HISTORY

The SEC was a diverse group of protest organizations linked together in coalition form for the distinct purpose of neutralizing or eliminating STRESS.

After the civil disturbances in the latter 1960's there were efforts on the part of many individuals and organizations to seek solutions to the problems that infected the black community. One such effort emanated from the Inter-Faith Council of Organizations (IFCO) which had called for a "Black Manifesto." This manifesto basically demanded reparations from the white churches for injustices imposed on Blacks from slavery till the present.

Eventually, this movement received eight million dollars. From a small amount of this money, The Black Star Printing Company was

organized. A publication, The Inner City Voice, a monthly Black newspaper that represented every major Black revolutionary movement of the previous decade, was organized. Dan Georgakas/Marvin Surkin, 17) This paper was supposed to have eventually replaced the Michigan Chronicle, the long-standing Black weekly newspaper.

Thereafter, came a proliferation of organizations among which were: People Against Racism, Control, Conflict and Change Book Club, the International Black Appeal. Urban Design, ESVID, Operation Get Down, The Pan African Congress, The Revolutionary Black Workers, The Republic of New Africa, The Black Panthers, The Concerned Citizens, The Labor Defense Coalition, From The Ground Up, Support Families under STRESS and The Guardians. Most of these groups and/or their members came together under the banner of one organization - The State of the Emergency Committee whose stated goal was the elimination of STRESS.

Perhaps the major difference between the Coordinating Council on Human Relations, and the SEC was that in addition to the elimination of STRESS, and latter organization was using the issue of STRESS as a politicizing force in the community. An interesting and informative point of view around this observation can be found in Detroit: I Do Mind Dying.

The beginning of the SEC was September, 1970. Immediately after the Attica Prison Revolt there was a coming together of the above listed organizations symbolized by a demonstration march (the largest since 1967). "This broad based support coalesced around the issue of police brutality, in the sense of the violence of due process." (PHYLLIS BEELER)

The organization's membership grew from approximately six hundred to approximately 15,000 by petition count (BEELER). However, the leadership size was a coordinating group of about twenty-five key individuals.

Through my personal contacts and persistence I was able to gradually gain access to some of the important actors. A total of seven interviews were formally recorded, but off the record, SEC activities were discussed with many of its former members, who refused to, or were reluctant to submit to the regular interview process. However, these interviews were basically in accord with the recorded ones.

SOCIAL CLASS LEVEL

A. SEC Respondents' Perception of the SEC

A middle class leadership, with professional jobs, high consumer expenditures and amenities. A life style that included appreciation for the arts. They also possessed cultural and educational advantages. The majority of the membership was poor. Their incomes were derived from blue collar jobs, menial jobs and public assistance with a sprinkling of college students who resided in the black ghetto.

"The leadership was middle class. The membership was upper lower class. The middle class leaders flaunted it over the lower class membership (WAGNER).

B. SEC Respondents' Perceptions of Themselves

Four identified themselves as professional/middle class. One as upper lower class and two refused to label themselves.

C. SEC Respondents' Perceptions of STRESS

The majority are lower middle class. They have a higher income, more education, and different consumption values than the lower class. They live in better neighborhoods and have middle class values of achievement.

"They are lower middle class hunkies for the first time getting good salaries. They live in little old white neighborhoods and are now getting more than just a high school education." (O'CONNOR)

D. Conclusions

SEC is an organization of affluent, articulate middle class leadership with a poor underprivileged membership in confrontation with STRESS, a lower middle class organizations.

CRITICAL EVENTS

DEFINITIONS

STRESS/COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CCHR)

CCHR was very concerned about the fatalities and law enforcement problems involving STRESS. Their Police-Community Relations Task Force was specifically charged with research and investigation into the specific incidents.

Two critical events for CCHR and STRESS are analyzed.

TEENAGE FATALITIES

Two black teenagers, Ricardo Buck (15) and Craig Mitchell (16) were fatally shot on the near eastside of Detroit. This was later to be referred to as the Belmont shooting. They were allegedly assaulting STRESS officers. CCHR demanded that STRESS be abolished. Failing in this, they asked for the elimination of the decoy operation

and initiation of psychological testing for all STRESS officers. This was later accomplished with the aid of other community groups.

THE BOYD, BETHUNE AND BROWN MANHUNT

The B, B, and B manhunt was one of the largest in the history of Detroit. The activities of these three men have yet to be satisfactorily explained, and the circumstances are too involved for a detailed explanation in this place. Briefly this is what occurred as written in Detroit Under STRESS. (pg. 35)

> "On December 4, 1972, four Detroit policemen, working in plainclothes as STRESS unit members on a narcotics related detail, were wounded. Warrants were issued for three black Detroiters. Three weeks later, on December 28, Patrolman Robert Bradford was killed in the follow-up of a mistaken lead on the three suspects Mark Bethune, John Boyd, and Hayward Brown, Prosecuter Cahalan formally charged these three men with murder and assault with intent to murder."

The immediate results of that manhunt became a critical event for CCHR and STRESS. Below is a partial quote from a statement issued by CCHR (Hughes, et al.,) that is indicative of the intensity of their protests.

> "During the past month, Detroit Police have entered and searched numerous homes of Black citizens without search warrants and have detained many Black citizens without apparent cause to believe they had committed any crime. The police have forced Black female occupants of raided apartments to strip at gunpoint and have unnecessarily beaten Black citizens."
>
> "We believe that these police actions have violated the constitutional rights of a large segment of the community, and have again exposed the degrading and inhumane treatment which Detroit's Black citizens receive from a Police Department which is behaving as if only white citizens have "liberty" which needs "protecting." The Detroit Police Department disclaims any racism in their

> actions, but no one seriously believes that these same police tactics would be used in Birmingham, Grosse Pointe, or any other all white neighborhood."

It is evident from the above quote that CCHR perceived the STRESS unit as being engaged in more than law enforcement; but that in fact STRESS was acting as judge and jury, and in a racist way.

STRESS/STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE (SEC)

SEC was in vigorous disagreement with the total STRESS concept. For SEC each STRESS act constituted a critical event. Two of all of the episodes listed by SEC are analyzed in this study.

1. Clarence Manning and Nathaniel Johnson Incident

This critical event as perceived by SEC can best be described by a quote from Excerpts From Anti-STRESS Law Suit (2).

> "3. Clarence Manning and Nathaniel Johnson were driving home at about 2:10 a.m. on May 28, 1971. They stopped so Manning could urinate. A white hippy-appearing man approached Manning on the sidewalk. He uttered something to Manning which made him angry. Manning told Johnson who was still sitting in the car, "Wait a minute, I've got to see what this motherfucker wants." Manning took a couple of steps toward the "hippy" and the "hippy" pulled a fun and fired. The "hippy" was STRESS Patrolman Michael Worley. Manning was shot seven times, with the fatal shot being fired by Raymond Peterson.
>
> While the aboved-mentioned officers were firing at Manning, the fourth officer in the unit, Richard Worobec claims to have been running from the scene of the original shooting, firing at the escaping car which Nathaniel Johnson was driving. He claims to have fired six shots while being at a maximum of ten to fifteen feet away from the car. An investigation of the car made by the Accident Prevention Bureau determined that there were no bullet holes in the car. A total of 18 shots were fired by the four STRESS officers.

> The trial of Nathaniel Johnson took place in December 1971. No weapons were ever introduced into evidence, and the State dropped the assault with intent to rob while armed charge before the jury began deliberations. After considering the remaining charge of felonious assault for approximately 30 minutes, the jury returned a verdict of NOT guilty.
>
> At the time of his murder Clarence Manning, Jr. was 25 years old. He had no criminal record, and he was employed as a part-time plumber by his father, Jack Johnson."

This critical event is representive of several others that the SEC believed to be examples of police oppressive tactics in a new form. The next critical event, though involving STRESS officers is different in character than those consisting of police/citizen confrontation.

THE ROCHESTER SHOOTOUT

This critical event is described in Detroit Under STRESS.

> "Extensive court testimony provided the basic facts on the case. Black STRESS officers, Virgel Starkey, Ronald Martin, and James Harris, all dressed in street clothes, observed a man, later identified as Wayne County Sheriff Deputy James Jenkins, walking toward an apartment building at 3210 Rochester with what appeared to be a gun. He entered Apartment #14 to join some friends in a card game. The STRESS officers, assisted by other police officers called to the scene, fought their way into the apartment with guns blazing, killing Deputy Henry Henderson seriously wounding Deputy Jenkins and wounding two other deputies present in the apartment....
>
> The real story of the Rochester Street Massacre has never satisfactorily explained, nor do we expect that it ever will be. There were constant rumors that it was really a "battle for turf" by different law enforcement agents competing in the building of local herion trade."

The major significance that this critical event has for the SEC

is that the "Rochester Shootout" had implications of hidden criminality for STRESS, i.e., that somewho, trafficking in illegal drugs could have been a sideline of some STRESS officers.

The manner in which a series of acts coalesced and emerged into what this study characterizes as a critical event, has been described in detail, above, for each set of organizations. The next phase of the analysis expands on those critical events by quoting observers to those situations. The purpose for this exercise is twofold: First, it enables the reader to gain a clearer understanding of the goals and policies of the interacting organizations. Second, it allows for a broader assessment relative to the roles of the key individuals in the critical events.

STOP THE ROBBERIES, ENJOY SAFE STREETS/COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS/STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

TEENAGER FATALITIES, BOYD, BUTHUNE AND BROWN

MANHUNT, CLARENCE MANNING AND NATHANIEL JOHNSON INCIDENT, AND THE ROCHESTER SHOOTOUT

The STRESS goals included: 1. The reduction of "street crime" within defined geographical areas through the utilization of non-traditional law enforcement techniques; and 2. The reduction of community opposition to these techniques.

The CCHR goal was the modification of STRESS policies for its (STRESS) goal attainment.

The primary SEC goal was the elimination of STRESS.

STRESS' policies for the achievement of their major goal were the use of decoy and surveillance operations.

CCHR policy included confrontation with public officials supporting STRESS and the arousal of public opinion against STRESS.

SEC policy was to expose and elaborate on STRESS' weakness whenever, however, and wherever they could; in the courts, on the streets, and in emotional public rallies.

The critical events occurred because of the escalating fatalities resulting from STRESS' policy of decoy and surveillance and the insistance of CCHR and SEC on the reduction or elimination of the STRESS operation.

STRESS as a unit was acutely aware of the fatality problem but it believe that the crime rate justified their procedures. Also, STRESS questioned the motives of its detractors. The following quote sums the STRESS prespective:

> Critical events were the killing of various people, both STRESS police officers and suspected criminals. When we killed suspects, they hated us; when they killed police officers, we hated them.
>
> The vendetta can be seen from the following:
>
> 1. The court case I have told you about where the Defense attorney called us racists and all kinds of names that had nothing to do with the case.
>
> 2. The Boyd, Brown, Buthune case - "The mad dog killers." They were not concerned with these men. They just wanted to get us. Judges were always interfering with us. Twice Pevitz and Del Rio took it upon themselves to try to prevent arrests when they didn't even know what was going on. One time in a restaurant where Revita was eating a patrolman tried to make an arrest of a man who had been pointed out by a woman, but Revitz interfered. He should have waited until the case came before him. Del Rio did the same thing on the street.
>
> They knew we carred a lot of weight in decision-making that's why they kept screaming about us and wanted us out of the picture. They didn't want us to become more powerful.

> They tried to stop us by putting pressure on the Mayor, through mass meetings, continual law suits and statements in the media. Finally, they mounted a massive political campaign in which their man won the mayoralty. That's what eliminated us, because it was a part of his platform. (CRANE)

The differences between CCHR and SEC policies are apparent from the data. CCHR is more impersonal and abstract.

> I don't know if I can be specific, but the whole entrapment element caused us problems. The decoy element because if you were looking for that kind of thing you will find it, and there should have been other methods in the Program beside the shootings. Especially those in the back.
>
> I think all they did was to lay the facts out about crime rates, and how in their judgement they (the crime rates) were affecting the City of Detroit. (POPTON)
>
> Everytime there was a shooting we got more upset. The Heywood Brown thing was another critical event. They tried to counteract our influence by running the Police Commissioner for Mayor, who lost. (SOWLAND)

SEC members are more concrete and personal in their observations about what was going on.

> The fatalities and shooting, also the decoy traps were critical events along with constant harrassment and arrests. They called Boyd, Bethune, and Brown "mad dog killers," and they were hunting them like that. So their families and friends were subjected to all kinds of illegal searches and mistreatment. They threatened us with general harassment, trying to stop us from organizing and warning people against us.
>
> They went to the media about crime and how it was affecting business in Detroit. (O'CONNOR)
>
> Critical events were the fatalities, shootings, intimidations, especially the killing of black teenagers.
>
> There was a vendetta expressed through harassments, parking tickets, and trivial arrests. I'm sure we

> were infiltrated by them because they were undercover cops and with the comings and goings of so many strange people in the SEC it would have been easy for them to do so. We suspected a few strange dudes.
>
> They had the law and order thing going for them among many black and white community people. (WAGNER)

Perhaps the greatest weakness of STRESS leadership is that; 1. they did not place credence in the protests of their opponents and 2. they failed to check the number of fatalities. STRESS, relied heavily for its existence on crime statistics and on those community people who privately supported their activities but did not take a public stance.

The elimination of STRESS certainly can be attributed to the outcome of the mayoralty contest in the general election. However, what effects the primary election had on the demise of STRESS will probably never be known because of fate and other side issues.

The subject of compensation for citizen participation in decision-making was not an organizationally defined issue for STRESS, CCHR or SEC. However, when the question was posed, it was revealed that a majority of the respondents had firm opinions.

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS

> They should not be paid salaries, but they should get stipends and expenses for meetings. That good-will shit only goes so far. You lose a lot of good men this way. (WEBER)
>
> No salary, but expenses, honorariums or consultant fees. Sometimes when you get unpaid people they have private agendas. (ARONSON)

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

> I don't think they should get a salary. They should get out-of-pocket expenses, but that shouldn't be abused. People should not be paid to attend the

meetings. (DALE)

STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

> Yes. Why not (for salary and expenses)? They should get as much as anybody at GM would get. (WAGNER)

Most of the responses are in favor of the out-of-pocket expense remuneration method. There were more "don't know" answers from the STRESS grouping, perhaps, because the subject of compensation was more foreign to these types of protest activities.

Both of the respondents who believed that salaries should be paid to board members come from the lower middle class, one, each, from STRESS and the SEC.

Members of the CCHR, similar to members of the WC and LASED strongly expressed their belief that volunteers for decision-making activities are making a contribution and should not be financially compensated.

The impressive dimension of these particular data is that the general respondent consensus favor out-of-pocket expenses, with equal concomitant expressions against the granting of salaries.

The principle reasons are that:

1. It tends to make citizen organizations dependent and susceptible to agency power;
2. It may invite private agendums; and
3. It takes the spirit out of voluntary community service.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF CRITICAL EVENTS GOALS, AND POLICIES IN CHAPTERS IV, V, AND, VI

The foregoing analysis details how critical events emerge from goal and policy conflicts in decision-making. UCS as a traditional

organization retained its power across the board. MNA operated in a semi-traditional fashion and retained the power of the traditional agency. STRESS confronted two types of citizen groups, one of a traditional nature and the other a much less structured protest group. Maintaining a fairly cooperative alliance, the two groups take most of the credit for defeating STRESS, their opponent in decision-making. In this last case, citizens groups had the power.

CRITICAL EVENTS, PROPOSITIONS, SOCIAL CLASS AND RACE

ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

STOP THE ROBERRIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS

> It was adversary. Around the killings, especially Belmont and John R. of the two teenagers. This was the event that angered the community the most. But the other killings and injuries were a part of it, plus some people were generally hostile toward the police. (KERR MNW)

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

> Adversary. The fatalities. It really went beyond fatalities. It was an undesirable activity that infringed on the social climate of Detroit which produced mere hate and discrimination between Detroit citizens. (CARSON MW)

STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

> It was a total adversary model around the fatalities, decoy operation, increased use of new technology on target communities. (PEELER MNW)

The relationship between STRESS and CCHR was adversary. Positive evidence was lacking for mutual trust and accountability between the two, however, a fair amount of beneficial interaction was prevalent. This interaction took place in sessions between CCHR members and top

brass of the Police Department to lessen the harmful impact of STRESS on the community. CCHR did not interact in any way with the line STRESS officers. STRESS/CCHR engaged in low level manipulative moves through the media to sway public opinion to their respective positions.

The STRESS/SEC relationship was also adversary, but there were some discernible differences with those of STRESS/CCHR, especially on the "street" level. It was as PEELER says, "a total adversary model." Trust, accountability and positive interaction were non-existent. The two parties were vicious in their struggle to out-manipulate the other.

VIOLENCE

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS

> No. Most of the people tend not to use rhetoric or violence. Its the agitator who wants to exploit the situation who does. (WEBER MW)

> Yes. It instills fear. Violence has its purposes. Martin Luther King had a philosophy of practicing love, but if there had not been militant organizations at the same time preaching and practicing violence, he would not have been as successful as he was. People knew he was the better alternative.

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

> No. Violence doesn't help no place. I don't care where it is. Anywhere you have violence you have something that drives people away. Even the people that commit violence are driven away.

STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

> Rhetoric only. Because it is the safest thing to do. Because people can be out manned and out equipped. It was the romantic thing for people to do at the time and it played a key role in the evolution of community organization. (ISOLET MNW)

> No. In this situation these are precisely the tactics we are opposed to. If you are reinforcing violence. (PEELER MNW)

The majority of STRESS officers are convinced that most people believe violence, when necessary, to be effective in decision-making situations. These officers, similar to LASED members, are entrants into the lower middle class arriving from the upper class. Their departure from the "middle class norm" of excluding violence from decision-making can, perhaps, be attributed to their profession, which as one of its central concerns the apprehending of criminals.

Consistent with our finding relative to middle class attitudes and violence, CCHR were definitely opposed to its usage.

The majority of SEC members believed in violence as an expedient. Ironically, their expressions were more compatible with STRESS than CCHR. The logical explanation is that the SEC was fundamentally a protest organization of an ad hoc nature. It was hastily assembled and its membership consisted of many different types of people who believe passionately, for various reasons, that STRESS should be eliminated at any costs and by any means.

The "rational" middleclass leadership of the SEC was pragmatically opposed to the employment of violence, but for political reasons at times it reflected the views of its lower class constituency. This phenomenon was first noticed in the MNA/CGB case. Often the middle class professionals departed from logical and idealistic positions in order to present a united front with their lower class brethren.

CONFRONTATION RESULTS

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS

> I'm sure they did. Even if we didn't want to, we had to confront. It didn't help. It hurt our work more than anything else trying to appease them. They were set in their ways to eliminate STRESS. (WEBER MW)

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

> Yes. Through meetings that may have led to eliminating the decoy and providing psychological tests for STRESS officers. We were adamant in our protests that the killings be stopped. STRESS was going wild. (POPTON MNW)

> Yes, at public hearings. We issued strong statements because what they were doing was unconstitutional. We hoped it fanned the flames of public opinion. It worked. (SOWLAND MW)

STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

> Yes. We confronted the Police Commissioner at an Urban League meeting where he was giving some "bullshit excuses" to some silly black people about crime statistics. It made the people stop and think that what the media and police were talking about didn't necessarily have to be true. (O'CONNOR LNW)

> There were demonstrations, and certainly confrontations in court. Through elections and police changes, STRESS was ultimately abolished.

STRESS command officers did not relish the though of confrontation with the community over "police matters." They wanted to be alone in their frantic pursuit to reduce street crime through the methods they considered to be the most effective.

To STRESS officers, citizen involvement in law enforcement decision-making signified a drastic and dangerous departure from tradition.

Rank-and-file STRESS members confronted the lower class anti-

STRESS people on the streets in a typical police crackdown fashion, with seemingly little congizance of the fagility of their position. STRESS had almost completely under-estimated contemporary power forms in the community. This served to infuriate and unite the non-criminal lower class anti-STRESS factions of the SEC.

Middle class SEC members opted for courtroom confrontation. This tactic later proved to be extremely effective, because their legal record of wins increased the general community's skepticism of STRESS' actions.

The CCHR confronted STRESS directly, in joint meetings with the Mayor, and indirectly, through carefully-worded statements in the media.

Through a succession of political events, and the combined efforts of CCHR and SEC, a pro-STRESS Mayor was banished from the decision-making process.

In this case a mixture of confrontation techniques had established critical bargaining power for citizen groups.

DECISION-MAKING LAG TIME

STOP THE ROBBERIES - ENJOY SAFE STREETS

> It sure does. It takes too long. Because everybody has their own ideas. They all want to get in the act. I don't know how to solve this problem, because people should be able to express their views about decisions, and yet everything slows up. (CRANE MW)

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

> Yes. Because, usually there is a different perception about goals and policies between various citizen groups themselves and the agencies. (WALKER MW)

> Yes because these citizens are not professionals. They are not inclined to be yes men. They raise questions that staff people generally don't raise. Their loyalty is to the community. They ask for and need more information and time to digest it. (CARSON MW)

STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

> Oh yeah! Because there are so many hands in the urban pot with a lack of resources. And the community is so ill-informed. (COMPTON MNW)

> Sure. Because of the number of people involved. You are asking people to come down front and be committed. This is not easy. They have to be taught about facts and issues.

The STRESS set of organizations differs slightly from MNA and UCS sets in their members' opinions about causes for time lags in decision-making. It, too, acknowledges citizen organizational deficiencies as related to the definition and selection of alternatives but the individual respondents were also aware of the expanded temporal requirement for the development of ideological commitment.

Of special note is the observation that protest organizations have no qualms in admitting goal divergence with agencies. In fact overt goal and policy clashes are usually the substance of debate. The data indicates that this is not so for non-protest citizen organizations. They may have sub-rosa goals, that sometimes cause conflict when they surface, but citizens go to considerable effort to keep them concealed from the public. In many cases their goals are to considerably extend the political formula, or mandate, for program funding. It is likely they adopt this surreptitious behavior to protect their funding authorization. It is doubtful that government or business will be eager to support liberal-to-radical policies that are so contrary to the status quo as to possibly alienate critical

taxpayers and donors.

SUMMARY

STOP THE ROBBERIES, ENJOY SAFE STREETS

STRESS, initially, was powerful. It possessed authority and influence in addition to a self righteous posture. Its primary weakness was a lack of communication with the general community. A part of this problem was the dilemma that resulted from STRESS paying heed to the limited community that agreed, privately, with its goals, but gave no public support when the critical events materialized.

Another reason for STRESS' power decline was its active involvement in a mayoral political campaign. Its vulnerability was increased, and because of a series of unforeseen political events, it was eventually abolished. STRESS' fatal mistake was a false estimate of the alignment of power in Detroit: over-estimating its own market capacity, and underestimating its opposition.

The STRESS model was Adversary.

COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS

CCHR is a middle class citizen organization whose members are professionally trained. Its strength and success is based on a bureaucratic structure superimposed on a volunteer community organization. CCHR's power is supported by the ancillaries of goal orientation and communication which enables it to maintain a strong bargaining position.

This was demonstrated in CCHR's interaction with STRESS during the critical events.

Through a loose alliance with the SEC, CCHR was eventually able to control the decision-making process.

CCHR's model is Adversary/Cooperative.

THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

The SEC in reality was composed of two organizations. One, the middle class professional, and two, the lower class community people.

A respondent, somewhat bitterly, describes the situation as follows:

> The (SEC leaders) were not receptive to our ideas. They were secretive, and the leadership was elitist in their dealing with the masses. Our main leader and the other men in leadership were going with what they considered the "best" women in the organization. They were eating and drinking in the best places with our money to pay the expenses and they didn't invite the poor people. At the same time they were telling us how to be revolutionists. They thought they were above criticism. They couldn't do anything wrong.

The middle class members were trained in power acquisition techniques. Through the courts and the media, they were able to increase their power and take advantage of STRESS' bureaucrative blindness.

The lower class operated on the streets, perhaps not fully cognizant of the support they were providing to the middle class leadership through their risky and sensational confrontations with line STRESS officers. Although, exploitation of STRESS shootings were probably not at first a deliverable part of SEC strategy, eventually they did become the substance of their policies to obtain more power. This strategy was immensely successful.

The SEC model was Adversary.

CHAPTER VII

PATTERNS OF DECISION-MAKING AS PERCEIVED BY MEMBERS OF COMMUNITY AGENCIES AND CITIZEN ORGANIZATIONS

The preceding three chapters discussed the histories and social class characteristics of selected community agencies and citizen organizations. Included in those chapters were the Agency/Citizen (A/C) decision-making interactions that form the concrete base for the study's direction. This chapter continues the analysis by citing specific perceptions of the respondents that are linked to the power conceptual scheme.

The process for accomplishing this objective is developed through the following tasks:

I. An examination of the nineteen variables within the five concepts for each community agency/citizen organization; and

II. A summary of each community A/C relationship in terms of the five concepts of the power conceptual scheme.

However, before proceeding with this assignment I will briefly review the substance of the power conceptual scheme.

POWER is the ability to determine the outcome of a situation.

I am specifically interested in that aspect of the data that relates to the respondent's consciousness of power (how they perceive the possession and use of power).

COMMUNICATION is the state of the input and output flow of information.

In order to evaluate this concept the research focuses on the quality and quantity of communication between the competing organizations. What we want is to obtain answers to questions such as: Are there significant negative effects in given decision-making situations when little or no communication exists? And, are there different effects in the decision-making processes between direct and indirect communication techniques?

STYLE/TACTICS are organizational procedures for good accomplishment.

The purpose for the inclusion of this particular element is to provide a description of unique organizational behavior that can alert urban change agents in regard to the making of predictions about particular outcomes in decision-making.

Are these behaviors "rational" and capable of producing effective results, or are they aimless procrastinations that produce nothing but paralyzing conflict?

COMPETENCE is a demonstrated ability to solve problems germane to the urban environment.

It is expected that the determinations being sought for in this case can be derived from the following queries.

What preparations did the participants make to enable them to function effectively on behalf of their organizations? Did they have special skills and credentials that were of aid to them in effecting the outcome of negotiations? What is required in the way of group proficiency to improve the various organizations' situations for the making of decisions?

GOAL ORIENTATION is the state of being consciously directed toward problem-solving objectives.

True appraisals of this concept necessitates that appropriate answers be received from the following questions.

Were there positive data indications about the organizations' sustained drives to goals? Did goal consensus exist between interacting organizations? On what basis, if any, was there goal conflict? Can any valid speculations be derived from the data about unstated goals that disrupt stated goal attainment?

Finally, any evidence concerning the interlocking of these concepts will be noted because the individual elements of the power conceptual scheme are tightly related and it is highly desirable for the purposes of this study that this fact be demonstrated.

The data are derived from the scoring method developed in Chapter III. It is arrayed by community Agency/Citizen organization grouping in tables. (See Table 7-0)

Each table represents a given concept and its propositions by number. Responses to questions about the propositions are recorded

TABLE 7-0
SAMPLE

			ORGANIZATION RESPONSE	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	POSITIVE	NEGATIVE
CONCEPT				

as positive (+), negative (-), don't know (DK), didn't want (DW), and no answer (NA).

Following each table is:

1. A brief discussion of the propositions by A/C set.
2. Some respondent quotes for each proposition except for the UCS and STRESS groups, in which case citizen responses are alternated.

The format, similar to Chapters IV, V, and VI is based on the case study approach (see Table 3-1) which is by column or A/C set.

The cases in order are MNA/CGB, UCS//WC/LASED/SPC, and STRESS// CCHR/SEC.

RESPONDENT PERCEPTIONS BY A/C

TABLE 7-1

POWER PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY AND THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

			MNA		CGB	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-
POWER	1	Powerlessness	0	8	1	11
	2	Fear	2	6	2	10
	3	Authority	8	0	11	1
	4	Influence	5	2, DK 1	8	4

1. Powerlessness - frustration due to the inability to impact on the decision-making process.

MNA: +0, -8/ CGB: +1, -11

It is clearly evident that neither the MNA or the CGB expressed feelings of being without power in decision-making situations. However, this question alone is not sufficient to ascertain true attitudes pertinent to actual bargaining situations. It is the overall pattern of reactions that gives the accurate picture.

1.1 MNA

> "We go ahead and give it to them the way it is. We have to and all along the way. We use the power of the Mayor, if we didn't, we'd be out there without a paddle. The citizens feel they have the power of the Common Council." (BLACK,-)

> "We try to build in protection against their power. We understand your position so we'll go easy or if you like confrontation be my guest." (COLEMAN,-)

1.2 CGB

> "The feeling was that we were the ones putting out the money and we should say who would handle it. In general, the MNA regarded the CGB as emotional and unstable. So they felt they should go easy on us." (BURCH,-)

> "The CGB thought that the MNA simply went ahead and acted without letting it know what was going on. A fait accompli." (NEWTON)

2. Fear - apprehension about possible reprisals because one has attempted or actually intervened in the decision-making process.

MNA: +2 -6/ CGB: +2 -10

The individuals that displayed any evidence of fear were small minorities in both organizations. This fear was usually temporary and was related to specific situations.

Both organizations were so intent on their survival tactics that possible thoughts of fear were forgotten.

2.1 MNA

"They never exhibited fear against us, they conducted vendettas. It was, 'OK, you didn't give us this, so we'll give you the finger.' Example: 'You will not deal with the Consumer Training Program, so screw you while we settle the Loan and Grant Program.' We were not afraid of them." (COLEMAN,-)

"It was a basic fight to obtain and control, that is the Citizen vis-a-vis the MNA. At times we were reluctant to deal with them, but not afraid. They were definitely not afraid of us, but they tried to instill fear in the Agency." (CRAFTON,-)

"They started a campaign of harassment and uncooperativeness. They sugared by car and slashed my tires. I was threatened by phone to back off or I would get hurt. We were afraid of them. They were afraid we would find out they were forging checks." (CORONA,-)

2.2 CGB

"Their main goal was to eliminate Metro Arts and as soon as possible. We were fearful of their every move in our direction. They were scared to death of me." (COURTNEY,+)

"I think they (MNA) did that (vendetta) in relation to stipends. They would threaten to either reduce or totally eliminate the stipends which many of the lower income members had developed a dependency on.

It contributed to distrust, but we were not afraid to work with them. I don't think they were afraid to work with us." (BURCH,-)

"They were not afraid of us, but only because they knew they had the upper hand." (BROOK,-)

"Sometimes they were afraid of us. We knew, they didn't want to make the Mayor look bad or they (MNA) might lose their jobs or wreck their careers." (IVORY,-)

"We were never afraid of the MNA. They were afraid of us because Common Council was on our side." (DEJOHG,-)

3. Authority - legitimate power, in this case defined as the ability to mobilize resources.

MNA: +8, -0/CGB: +11, -1

Both organizations firmly believed that they possessed significant amounts of authority based on the possession of, or control of resources.

The resources listed for MNA were skills and money, for the CGB, community knowledge and manpower.

The MNA and CGB were candid about the employment of their individual resources to gain the "edge" in bargaining encounters. This gives us an opportunity to begin to consider the importance of this particularly defined aspect of authority in relation to the concept of market capacity.

Another consideration revolves around the relative merits of community knowledge as opposed to skills and money.

3.1 MNA

> "Our expertise was the principle resource together with the simple procedure of honesty which they hadn't been exposed to." (BLACK,+)

> "I think it is a general practice to use resources and levers in those cases where agreement is not accomplished solely by cooperation or constructive negotiation." (CRAFTON,+)

> "Yes, both sides tended to use resources as levers. The citizens would frequently say, 'Without us you can't make your deadlines.' The Agency would counter by saying, 'You'll lose the Program if you don't straighten up." (COLON,+)

3.2 CGB

> "Withholding resources was all a matter of strategy; we both were playing to win." (IVORY,+)

> "The CGB would have to sign for the money, but it would have to come from the MNA. I don't see why we needed two staffs. We didn't need them (MNA). The MNA staff was the one that had the power." (HUBBEL,-)

4. Influence - the ability to exert intangible force in the decision-making process.

MNA: +5,-2, DK;/CGB: +8,-4

While the majority of the respondents from both organizations believed their organizations were influential, there was a substantial

number of members from both groups who doubted the impact that their organizations had in the making of important decisions.

An interesting observation in regard to CGB perception of MNA influence was that it flowed from the Mayor. The truth is that the MNA was the Mayor's program. The point that may deserve some future study is whether or not a municipal program should develop an influence separately from the Mayor.

4.1 MNA

> "I think much of the time we have the weight in the ultimate decision. It's been more a matter of persuasion. When necessary swing the big hammer." (COX,+)

> "Most people don't know us. We should have advertised like Mayor Daley. In the end we control only because the ultimate decision rests with the mayor." (CRIEBAL,-)

> "I don't think the MNA is held in high esteem anywhere. The CGB believes that if the MNA has been influential in decision-making it came from above, not MNA." (REONA,-)

4.2 CGB

> "I think the feeling in the community about the power and importance of the CGB was very minimal. I don't think it was all that great, because I came away with the feeling that the Agency way would prevail.
> I don't know if MNA felt we had influence, but they thought we were a necessary evil." (BURCH,-)

> "MNA definitely thought we had influence. For example, a director tried to give me a line of bullshit and I threatened to take it to Common Council. She unwound like a snake on a stick." (IVORY,+)

> "The community didn't think the CGB was powerful. I thought the CGB was influential at one time, but when that little piece of money came in they lost their cool." (DEJOHG,-)

TABLE 7-2

COMMUNICATION PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY AND THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

			MNA		CGB	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-
COMMUNICATION	5	Trust	1	7	1	11
	6	Access	6	2	7	5
	7	Cooperation	7	1	2	9, B1
	8	Accountability	4	4	0	11, B1

5. Mutual trust - the ability to maintain a reciprocal reliance.

MNA: +1, -7/ CGB: +1, -11

The scores dramatically demonstrate the low level of mutual trust that existed between the MNA and the CGB. This lack of mutual trust allows for a fascinating commentary on the interaction of this A/C. It is rooted not only in the total lack of understanding of respective bargaining positions, but, also, in the mutual desire not to develop an appreication of respective bargaining positions.

As a result, the lack of trust between the two organizations came to be an expectation. In fact, any evidence of trust was viewed as a sign of weakness.

5.1 MNA

> "Initially Angel's appointment and his reputation as a hardnose. The crucial fight with the Metropolitan Arts Project caused a great deal of mistrust." - critical (COX,-)
>
> "The CGB as a whole does not trust me but my committee does." (CORONA,-)

"The CGB trusts me but not the Agency." (COLON,-)

5.2 CGB

"Oh, definitely! The taking away of Metro Arts was where the battle was enjoined. They did not want us to have that power.

It was a combination of all of it (Q 17). The people were whipped like dogs by an organization of insensitive people in powerful roles." (COURTNEY,-)

"I don't think trust ever was there. They tried to treat us like children. They were too paternalistic about fund allocations and priority differentials.

It was the roles in the organization (MNA) we were concerned about. We got along with the staff as individuals and knew we needed the Agency." (JACOBY,-)

"I think the problem of trust was serious. Uncooperative staff - we thought these people were just visiting our meetings. They would come in, sit, and knit. They didn't help us until we put the pressure on them.

They would never give the good jobs to our residents. They always said they couldn't get local people with special skills, so they went outside for the money jobs." (HUBBEL,-)

6. Access - the ease of obtaining meaningful face-to-face interaction with key decision-makers.

MNA: +7, -1/ CGB: +12, -0

Both groups agreed that one of the most important functions for the Model Neighborhood Program was to provide reciprocal access between community agencies and citizen organizations. The A/C admit that this objective was generally accomplished but because of the hostility and violence that often resulted from conflict in meetings, access does not necessarily strengthen the bargaining positions of lower class citizen organizations.

The level of access permits for more definitive analysis of style/tactics.

6.1 MNA

"The entire MNA was organized so citizens could have an impact on decisions that concerned them. Therefore, the MNA is accessible to both citizens, leadership and general membership. Meetings are hostile and contrived because the CGB chairman primes his citizens for action against the MNA." (BLACK,-)

"Generally as the Program progressed the meetings changed from hostility to cordiality to hostility." (COX,+)

"Sometimes the meetings were hostile to the issue at hand, but never to me. When the proper information was conveyed, the hostility ceased." (CRIEBAL,+)

"Most meetings are now being held by the citizens just to get stipends." (REONA,-)

6.2 CGB

"There was no problem with access. There were always MNA staff people available, it was part of the Program. However, the meetings were not cordial. They (MNA) made unrealistic demands and showed a lack of respect for our staff. Things were bad, we almost had physical fights." (COURTNEY,-)

"There was no problem. The purpose of the Program was to provide access between citizen organizations and service delivery systems." (BRODSKY,+)

"There was no problem with access, it was a part of the Program. The Model Neighborhood Program was designed for decision-making with citizen organization. As a result both the Agency staff and citizen organization were structured with many access points."

A lot of times the meetings were hostile. Sometimes ending in brawls and fisticuffs. Depending on the circumstances, situations, and atmosphere, the tone of meetings would vary across the entire spectrum from cordiality to a display of weapons." (IVORY,-)

"No, we never had any trouble here. If they couldn't come sometimes when we wanted them, they would let us know and meet at a later date.

Sometimes the meetings would get pretty hot. I used to sit near the door, so when somebody got violent I could get out fast. One time some of our women members beat the employment staff man with their umbrellas because they thought he was trying to put something over on them." (HUBBEL,-)

"The tone of the meetings depended on the issues. We've had from the very cordial to the most violent where there were

guns and the police had to come. Most of the time hostility was present in our meetings because some members just did not trust the MNA. Especially in our general membership meetings. The various committees and Executive Board meetings tended to be more cordial." (JEFFERSON,-)

7. Cooperation - the free and open exchange of pertinent data for the solving of common problems.

MNA: +7, -1/ CGB: +2, -9, B1

It is obvious from the data that the MNA/CGB have distinct differences of opinion about the meaning of cooperation in problem-solving activity. The MNA believed that there was significant cooperation from the CGB. The CGB did not believe that the MNA cooperated with them.

At this point, we can begin to see that one reason for this critical divergence of opinion apparently lies in the fact that ultimately, no matter what the case, the MNA dominated the decision-making.

The reality is that indirectly the CGB, in fact, believed that it was powerless, contrary to the answer they gave to the direct question.

7.1 MNA

"We constantly shared information at all levels. Not in all decisions were the recommendations acceptable to both parties. Sometimes where mutual agreement did occur, it happened only after negotiation and open confrontation." (CRAFTON,+)

"Not all the time especially in regard to the Yearly Grant Submission. Citizens often disagreed with the priorities." (COLON,-)

7.2 CGB

"We worked together through our projects such as Public Benefits to acquire aids for people who were not visibly in need.

In the end decisions had to be made acceptable to the Agency or they never went.

At times decisions were unacceptable to the Citizens such as questionnaires about the area households." (BURCH,+)

"The recommendations for decisions were not acceptable to both parties. We were completely manipulated. They (MNA) had no respect for the citizen's wishes. They thought we would forget all the false information they had given us and go along with their little games. We were always at odds in the decisions. We had one set of goals, and they had another." (BROOKS,-)

8. Accountability - responsive behavior toward other parties in the decision-making process.

MNA: +4, -4/ CGB: +0, -11, B1

Neither of the groups viewed each other as being accountable in decision-making. Each believed that the other wanted to privately define the goals without considering the needs of anyone else.

This attitude was most apparent in MNA/CGB failing to provide adequate explanations for unilateral decisions.

8.1 MNA

"Showed concern for the other point of view only to the extent that the Agency can't tell duly elected citizens what they can and can't do. We tell the Agency!" (CRAFTON,-)

"CGB has lacked the expertise to develop adequate explanations. In fact, they have fallen down in attempting to develop an adequate communication link.

They showed concern for the other point of view to a limited extent, but for the most part their major concern was for themselves and their goals." (COLON,-)

8.2 CGB

"Their explanations were not adequate because they were devious. They showed no concern for our point of view. Her attitude towards us was that we were poor misguided children." (BURCH,-)

"Not initially (gave adequate explanations), sometimes it was just, 'I'm the Boss.' Towards the end I think they listened more than they did before, because they began to respect our ideas (Alpha - the Transportation Project)." (NEWTON, B)

TABLE 7-3

STYLE/TACTIC PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY AND THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

			MNA		CGB	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-
STYLE/TACTICS	9	Threat	0	8	3	9
	10	Interaction	8	0	8	4
	11	Manipulation	3	5	2	10
	12	Appeal to Higher Authority	2	6	0	12
	13	Competitive Staff	2	6	0	12

9. Threat - menacing warning to cooperate on the other party's terms.

MNA: +0, -8/ CGB: +3, -9

The responses of the MNA and the CGB conclusively portray each group as being consciously engaged in mutually threatening behavior.

It is interesting to compare the nature of the threats. In some instances, the CGB used threats of physical violence and political retribution. The MNA used bureaucratic regulations. Again, these styles and tactics parallel some of the classic distinctions of social class behavior.

9.1 MNA

> "In the Metro Arts Project the MNA Director was threatened and physically assaulted." (CRAFTON.-)
>
> "I was threatened with bodily harm to either give a loan or lay off." (CORONA,-)

"I was threatened and called a racist after a rip-off project funding was stopped." (COLON,-)

"They tried to get me and the Director removed." (REONA,-)

"An armed CGB member threatened to send me out of town." (CRIEBAL,-)

"They threatened to take me to Common Council." (COLEMAN,-)

9.2 CGB

"Yes, there were times when they threatened us. MNA tended to use monitoring and evaluation reports to intimidate the CGB. Also, contracts and union agreements.
I think the Agency was interested in what it wanted to do and it didn't think this was out of line." (BURCH,-)

"Yes. The MNA director told us we were no good and he was taking the Metro Arts Project away from us. He wanted all the power. The community was coming to us instead of him. He threatened to cut our funds off, and take our equipment which he did." (DONAHUE,-)

"Yes. When they changed the directors of the Mental Health Project there was a scandal of misuse of funds and we had violated Act 54 Board of the ratio of professionals to parapros (too many parapros). The Agency threatened to withhold their share.
My personal opinion is that they thought the little people were getting too much power and doing things that should only be done by pros." (JEFFERSON,-)

10. Interaction - deliberate involvement for the purposes of decision-making.

MNA: +8, -0/ CGB: +8, -4

The Model Neighborhood Program was unique in that interaction between citizen organizations and community agencies was mandated through Federal regulations. Most of the interviewees recognized this fact in their responses, but both groups qualified their answers.

The MNA gave credence to the limitations in the Federal guidelines imposed on citizen participation. Some MNA respondents also commented on what they believed to be the inadequate preparation of some citizens to engage in serious decision-making activity.

CGB members reacted negatively to these MNA attitudes and complained about the ineffectiveness of the governmental mandate in allowing for significant citizen involvement and interaction in community decision-making.

10.1 MNA

"It is mandated, however, the CGB is limited in its interaction by CDA letters 10A and 10B." (BLACK,+)

"It is mandated. However, I really feel that the Education Committee is not equipped to make many of the decisions. Because some decisions require knowledge and expertise they don't have or are unwilling to gain. The reduced grant allocation is a case in point -- citizens could not adjust their goals with changes in the means." (REONA,+)

10.2 CGB

"It (interaction) was all a part of the Program, we were supposed to be partners. We were limited to making minor suggestions. They wanted to make all the important decisions. In the end they did what they wanted to do from the beginning." (BROOKS,-)

"Yes. This was all part of the Program. They had the last say. We were supposed to be equal partners, but gradually we lost more and more of our original power." (BRODSKY,+)

11. Manipulation - achievement of subtle control to insure the advantage in decision-making.

MNA: +3, -5 / CGB: +2, -10

Manipulation as a tactic was regularly practiced by MNA/CGB. The data indicates that they did so to obtain the superior advantage in negotiations. Manipulation became an accepted way of life for both groups in their quest for one-up-manship.

11.1 MNA

"No. You start all that kind of stuff and you have to keep it up. I'd just as soon meet it head on." (BLACK,+)

"We selected out those CGB members we shared common beliefs with and manipulated them. Also, we used the ploy of delay until things simmered down. Citizens can't bring heat." (COX,-)

"Yes. Sometimes it is necessary, but I'm not usually involved in these maneuvers, therefore, I don't defend them. At this point I join forces with the Citizens in secret political maneuvers." (REONA,-)

11.2 CGB

"We would appoint a committee so that there would be talk on the floor. We did the real work in secret.

In order to accomplish something you arrive at a position. The feeling is that if it were public the Agency would take countersteps." (BURCH,-)

"No. We should have done things like this, but we had Agency sympathizers among the CGB members." (BROOKS,+)

"Yes. At one time during the reprogramming of the funds, several of the Citizens Areas and component members engaged in secret political maneuvers. Whispering campaigns to discredit the Agency.

This was to make the MNA change in favor of the Citizen strategies." (IVORY,-)

12. Appeal to Higher Authority - attempting to neutralize others in a decision-making situation by introducing a more powerful ally to make decisions.

MNA: +2, -6 / CGB: +0, -12

Most of the MNA respondents and all of the CGB respondents revealed that they had requested individuals and groups they considered more powerful than themselves to intervene in particular decision-making situations. While this tactic may not be considered an unusual tactic for increasing market capacity, the amount of dependency and the frequency could possibly have a "boomerang" effect.

12.1 MNA

"We called in the Secretary of HUD to appear before the Citizens to give them the official word that the City had the ultimate and final authority in these decisions as they relate to grant funds." (CRAFTON,-)

"We brought in accountants to check their books." (CORONA,-)

12.2 CGB

"Yes. Common Council, HUD, Congressmen." (NEWTON,-)

"A delegation from Detroit went to Washington to meet with the Black Caucus. The issue was that we had been led to believe that the Program was going to be phased out. It delayed Nixon's actions." (IVORY,-)

13. Competitive Staff - i.e., members who concentrate on factors of power as an end, rather than the original goals of the group.

MNA: +2, -6 / CGB: +0, -12

The MNA staff were professionally trained. The Directors set the style and call the shots with great dependency on expertise contributions from the staff.

The CGB tightly controlled their professional staff. Most of the decisions were made by the CGB, usually from a political bias.

13.1 MNA

"The Director is involved with the broad questions. However, decisions came from the bottom as things developed at the bottom planner level and gradually works its way up. The staff is not very important for setting the style and tactics." (COX,-)

"We participate and make comments, the Director makes the final decisions." (CRIEBAL,+)

"The Director trusts the staff's ability until there is a big confrontation." (COLEMAN,+)

"It's very important for the staff to set the style and tactics because they deal with the people and have professional training." (CRAFTON,-)

"We were left to work on our own after broad agency goals were established. The 'assholes' in physical planning didn't help and we didn't have the research we needed." (CORONA,-)

13.2 CGB

"(The members) Whoever made the most noise at the meetings. Most of the members were conscious of their position as elected officials. They were also jealous of it. This caused much bickering and sniping in the meetings which was designed to illustrate individual power.

c. Somewhat important - I considered them (CGB staff) as a sounding board. They were there every day; however, they were not necessarily all that good, therefore, I tended to use them as sort of indicators of what was going on." (BURCH,-)

"(Members) The Members all wanted to be the big chief. They had to have all matters referred to the general membership. This slowed things down to a crawl.

The importance of staff for S/T depended on the individual staff person. Because some were more competent than others. Some were more experienced. Some people were more dedicated than others. They had to work for us or the CGB got rid of them." (NEWTON,-)

"(Director) He got most of the information and he controlled the staff. The staff was incompetent. If we had had a good director and staff, the Agency would not have been able to control us.

The staff is the most important, because they are paid full time and they acquire knowledge and experience to benefit the organization. They build needed contacts and should contribute to the stability of the organization." (BROOKS,-)

"The Director. He had a staff to do the wishes of the CGB and we gave him the power, although many of our members were just as involved in the final decisions of our staff as the Director.

It is very important that the staff set the S/T. Because we had a weak Director. He wasn't qualified for the job. He worked on petty things instead of the important things." (BRODSKY,-)

"(Members) This was the basis of one of our major problems. The whole membership of the CGB wanted to be in on the decisions. So we used Robert's Rules of Order. Sometimes it took two or three meetings for decisions.

Finally, we tried to substitute the Executive Board as the final decision maker, but they were still kept in check by the members.

The staff is very important in setting S/T, because they are supposed to be gathering information to tell us which way to go. This was one of our downfalls because they made us be behind on the tail end of everything. In the last eighteen months they got terrible." (JACOBY,-)

"The Assistant Director was the most important. The Director was just a puppet. We had a committee structure for each of

the component areas plus the administrative committees. The job of the Director was to coordinate all those committees and provide information to each committee, the Executive Board, and the total Membership.

The staff is somewhat important. The CGB was the ruler of its destiny. The staff was its servant." (IVORY,-)

"(Members) ...The members had a compromise chairman but they didn't want a leader. Everybody wanted to be equally in on the decision-making and be a power.

It is important that the staff set the S/T because they can brief you as to what is important. But they should be kept under control and do only what the Board wants them to do." (DEJOHG,-)

"The CGB members didn't trust anybody but themselves to set policy. As a result we were constantly misled. I think we needed the one person, a director who knew what he was doing and who we could have all rallied behind." (JARVIS,-)

"The Executive Board. I didn't care too much about the Executive Board because they were hand picked. It was only the people with a lot of mouth, not the knowledge who got on the Executive Board. They didn't care about the membership. I don't think that was ever intended.

The staff is very important for setting S/T." (HUBBEL,-)

TABLE 7-4

COMPETENCE PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY AND THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

			MNA		CGB	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-
COMPETENCE	14	Training	4	4	6	6
	15	Expertise	8	0	12	0
	16	Responsive-ness	1	7	1	11, B1

14. Training - instruction that results in an improved ability to adequately perform specific tasks, especially of a symbolic nature.

MNA: +4, -4 / CGB: +6, -6

The MNA believed it had the necessary education and training to administer the unique and complex Model Cities Program. However, some MNA staff in concert with some CGB members believed that the MNA was deficient in the peculiar skills needed for working with ghetto communities.

The CGB respondents pointed out, in their comments, their various shortcomings in the technical qualifications necessary to enable them to comprehensively analyze the issues and arrive at proper decisions.

14.1 MNA

"They came here with degrees, but they were not prepared for these kinds of experiences here." (COX,-)

"In terms of the traditional established system, I think it has worked out very well. Particularly when you consider the basic conflict that seems to be inherent in the Program. This conflict resulting from the constant encounters with established traditional agencies, the grass roots individual of varying ethnic backgrounds and the MNA efforts to implement the Program under the New Model Cities concept approach while being in the middle of these two groups." (CRAFTON,+)

"There could be and should be additional training for staff members in the area of interpersonal relations and communications for citizen interaction." (COLON,-)

14.2 CGB

"We were artists who represented all fields. This worked out great because we were all skilled people and knew what we were doing and also knew how to inspire others." (COURTNEY,+)

"I don't think the special training carried through in actuality. It was not internalized. This is due to a defect in the learning process of most CGB members who had a high school or less education." (BURCH,-)

"The majority of the CGB members had a high school or less formal education. However, the problem as I saw it stemmed not from the educational level of the CGB member, but rather from the inability of higher educated Agency staff who couldn't communicate with or comprehend the needs of the average CGB membership." (NEWTON,+)

"High school or less. No this was not sifficient by itself. The citizens did not have the needed education to compete with the MNA or the project operators." (BREAKS,-)

"On the Job Training (OJT) and high school or less. This was not good because if they had had better training we could have accomplished more. All we had was a little training in Robert's Rules of Order." (BRODSKY,-)

"The majority had high school. We had to bring in professionals, however, most of our members were exceptional in dealing with and controlling the MNA who were all professionals." (IVORY,+)

"HS or less and special seminars. They got worse instead of better, because they were always pulling for that power. They were just like a can of worms." (DEJOHG,-)

"In general, HS, OJT, Seminars. I can't say with some people who were prepared to learn it was very effective. Others were not capable, they were just there for their stipend." (JARVIS,-)

15. Expertise - an exceptional skill in a specific area.

MNA: +8, -0 / CGB: +12, -0

The MNA respondents emphasized their professional expertise as being integral to the success of their Agency. In a parallel assertion, some CGB people cited their personal knowledge of the community and intimate acquaintance with the problems facing deprived people.

15.1 MNA

"We had skills to carry out specific tasks requiring professionalism." (COX,+)

"One of the key areas is our general ability to relate to the Citizens and to make them aware that we make every effort to respond to what they consider their needs." (CRAFTON,+)

15.2 CGB

"We had community knowledge. If we had training in leadership

at least we wouldn't get bogged down on so many issues. A lot of our members didn't know what they were there for." (JEFFERSON,+)

"They (CGB) know the people in the community and how to work with them. They know their standards and capabilities and lifestyles. These professions lived other places; they didn't know our standards." (HUBBEL,+)

"We needed to know how to make a better selection of members who could have done the job. I don't know how to do this in a democracy, especially since we were elected, but most of our members just didn't know how to do the job." (JARVIS,+)

"We needed knowledge about organizational theory. Because we could have been given some overview of different alternatives of organizations and power differentials." (BROOKS,+)

16. Responsiveness - the ability to react in a minimum time span for the purpose of problem-solving.

MNA: +1, -7 / CGB: +1, -11, B1

In general, the MNA admits that they were constantly accused of being unresponsive to the CGB in decision-making. However, they did not take this criticism seriously, since they were of the opinion that the CGB was unreasonable in its demands.

The CGB had an almost identical attitude toward the MNA and other critics who complained about its lack of responsiveness.

16.1 MNA

"Nobody questioned their (MNA) responsiveness except CGB members. As long as everything is in their direction things are fine. When we show them reality they are unhappy." (BLACK,-)

"It has frequently been difficult to meet deadlines. Federal monies usually cause this. The CGB complains when they don't get their way." (CRIEGEL,-)

"Angel, the Director was not receptive at times to our ideas. The CGB complained because the Agency held up their contract and stipends." (CORONA,-)

"Common Council and HUD complained we were not meeting deadlines and CC wondered why Agency didn't talk over problems with citizens." (COLON,-)

16.2 CGB

"The Executive Board was often criticized because they were given the task of getting the tasks finished. CGB criticized by its own members, various project operators, the Media and Common Council." (BURCH,-)

"The MNA wanted us to do it their way." (BROOKS,-)

"The MNA was too impatient." (IVORY,-)

"This was due to our lack of experience and knowledge." (DEJOHG,-)

TABLE 7-5

GOAL ORIENTATION PROPOSITIONS FOR THE MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY AND THE CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD

GOAL ORIENTATION			MNA		CGB	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-
	17	Public/Private Regarding	6	1, DK1	9	3
	18	Policy Formulation	7	1	11	1
	19	Issue Focused	7	1	8	4

17. Public/Private Regarding - consideration of community goals over personal goals/consideration of personal goals over community goals.

MNA: +6, -1, DK1 / CGB: +9, -3

The Agency responses indicated a definite public regarding posture with consideration for some of the factors involved that would incline one to be in favor of private regarding. The Citizen responses were mixed. Although the interviewees for the most part stated that they

preferred the long-range, they elaborated on the fact that most of their membership, rank and file, unlike the leaders, were fixated at the short-range.

17.1 MNA

> "I think you can't answer this question with one excluding the other. It would set bad social policy. You can't afford position a, if you don't have a steady income." (COX, DK)

> "I think they are both important, but I think it is absolutely important to solve the immediate so you can hopefully solve the long-range problems that affect the general community." (CRAFTON,-)

> "I think the long-range is the most important but the Agency thinks in terms of the short-range. They don't care about the community, they just want to keep the Mayor happy. The rank and file now think in terms of the short-range because we believed we could have effected change. Now everybody is cynical." (CORONA,+)

17.2 CGB

> "We found out the band aid therapy of the short-run didn't work." (NEWTON,+)

> "The short-range is the most important. The rank and file were trying to protect what they saw and understood. People who have been fooled so much so far as promises are concerned, feel that you had better get it while you can. The leadership was intent on building a utopia." (JACOBY,-)

18. Policy Formulation - the devising of definitions and strategies for the resolution of issues and the accomplishment of desired objectives.

MNA: +7, -1 / CGB: +11, -1

Policy formulation guidelines were handed down to MNA and CGB via Federal guidelines, mostly to be found in CDA letters (Community Demonstration Agency memorandums). Policy structure was intended to be flexible and innovative, but based on efficient management techniques. This presupposed that the fact that the participants had a

fundamental knowledge of the concepts or the ability to acquire same.

18.1 MNA

"Do it in conjunction with Citizens and hopefully arrive at those goals which will benefit the total citizenry." (BLACK,-)

"I think we have a sophisticated approach for this. From the planning process of problem identification to evaluation and feedback." (COX,+)

"Money is the major consideration for policy decisions based on research and evaluation." (CRIEBAL,+)

"It's kinda dictorial. Policy is dictated to the Citizens." (REONA,-)

18.2 CGB

"They would meet and bitch it out and finally come to a conclusion." (COURTNEY,-)

"Discussion of issues in committees and the Executive Board, then vote." (BURCH,+)

"They followed the leaders who were middle class. The leaders used committee and Executive Board information to make decisions." (DEJOHG,-)

Issue Focused - the ability to concentrate on prior selected subjects without being distracted by peripheral matters.

MNA: +7, -1 / CGB: +8, -4

The MNA consistently, in a bureaucratic way, attempted to adhere to the issues as suggested by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the City administration. This to some extent accounted for their rigidity.

The CGB at times were diverted by subgoals which some sections of the community deemed more important than the publicly stated goals. This, in some cases, led to aimless maneuvering.

19.1 MNA

"The planning department is the most important. There are probably factions in the monitoring department because they have more threatened people.

Boards should not be salaried. Citizens have attempted to increase their stipends." (BLACK,+)

"The Director is the most important for deciding issues. Occasionally there have been factions; however, when you have very strong people at the top, factions don't last.
Boards should absolutely not be salaried. There has been controversy; a lot of people thought it was a rip-off. People just want the money, not meeting content." (COX,+)

"The citizens set the basic priorities for the allocation of funds. However, the Agency really pushed health. They pushed the things that were very visible and they know the citizens would like.
There has always been a fight between social and physical planners." (CORONA,+)

"Policy is set in house among staff. It is not based on interaction with the community but through past experiences to community reaction. Boards should not be salaried." (REONA,-)

19.2 CGB

"The MNA designed policy and told the Citizens what they were going to have.
There were all kinds of factions because people had certain pet projects and would seek support for them through political maneuvering. For example: Poles, Blacks, high-rise v. low-rise, East of Woodward v. West of Woodward, pros v. nonpros. The effects of these divisions were mostly negative." (COURTNEY,-)

"We played games, it was all politics. The powerful won." (DEJOHG,-)

TABLE 7-6

POWER PROPOSITIONS FOR THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SAINT PETER CLAVER

			UCS		WC		LASED		SPC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
POWER	1	Powerlessness	0	3	2	6	2	6	0	5
	2	Fear	0	3	0	8	2	6	0	5
	3	Authority	3	0	8	0	7	1	4	1, NA1
	4	Influence	3	0	4	4	5	3	3	2

1. Powerlessness - frustration due to the inability to impact on the decision-making process.

UCS: +0, -3 / WC: +2, -6

In answer to direct questions about feelings of powerlessness, all four groups responded negatively. No group admitted to experiencing any significant feelings of powerlessness. The Women's Committee tended to ignore the existence of a power factor.

LASED was aware of power and initially attempted to use it. SPC is highly aware of power and its ramifications and have constantly tried to use it as a tactical weapon.

1.1 UCS

> "We consider power very much. You attempt not to use it, but people are people. If you have to you use it depending on the circumstances. UCS does not.
> UCS does not feel powerless in spite of the overt moves of SPC." (BOOTH,-)

1.2 WC

> "They gradually became aware of power, but they were unwilling to risk disharmony within the group. They simply would not believe that a specific task of the UCS Director was their elimination, therefore they misinterpreted or rationalized various things that occurred. (WASHINGTON,+)

> "I think that there was an awareness of the power element because Lee Jaffee spoke of this (Lee was our President). But generally we did not think in power terms. We did not feel the necessity to do so. It was all step by step and they were all trying to find a place for us after our elimination so that we would not be hurt too much." (HOOKER,-)

2. Fear - apprehension about possible reprisals because one has attempted or actually intervened in the decision-making process.

UCS: +0, -3 / LASED: +2, -6

There was virtually no overt expressions of fear between any of the organizations. We will have to sift the data for indirect clues for the existence of fear.

2.1 UCS

> "There was a fear of unpleasantness rather than our being afraid of them per se. LASED feared that we would withhold their money." (BOOTH,-)

2.3 LASED

> "We feared them because we didn't know organizational structure or politics of decision-making. We were especially ignorant of UCS methodology." (ROME,+)
>
> "All they had for us was contempt." (LOWS,-)
>
> "We were not important enough for them to fear us." (BROWN,-)

3. Authority - legitimate power, in this case defined as the ability to mobilize resources.

UCS: +3, -0 / SPC: +4, -1, NA1

UCS' claim to authority is its possession of money, manpower, and professional expertise. These attributes have been used as levers against LASED and SPC, but not the WC.

The WC authority came from their husbands' social and business positions, their professional status, and their educational levels. WC did not attempt to use these resources as levers in bargaining with the UCS.

LASED's authority was based on their knowledge of the local community. Initially they made an effort to use this resource to an advantage against UCS, but soon found that they lack the necessary overall power, for any hope of success in decision-making domination.

SPC viewed their chief resources as manpower and community expertise. They have tried strongly to employ these resources in frontal attack against the UCS.

3.1 UCS

> "SPC was constantly trying to use their community resources as levers against us." (BOOTH,+)

3.4 SPC

> "Yes, we are using resources as levers. It's a plain old struggle. We withhold our community cooperation and they withhold their money." (HANSONT,+)

4. Influence - the ability to exert intangible force in the decision-making process.

UCS: +3, -0 / WC: +4, -4

UCS was viewed by the citizen organizations as being influential because they control and distribute money.

The WC was evenly divided in terms of member perception as to the degree of influence they wielded in decision-making activity. They utilized alternatives such as negotiations and participation in other parts of the UCS structure as a method of influencing their objectives.

LASED member response to an assessment of their organization's influence strength was mixed. The slight majority had a belief that their independence and goals of community improvement enhanced LASED's position. On the other hand, a minority believed they had little influence. This indirect response is indicative of a feeling of powerlessness. SPC displays a similar perception of their influence position.

4.1 UCS

"UCS controlled by making the citizens use their guidelines. Also UCS in some cases redirected studies and surveys or limited expenditures and used them as carrots." (BOOTH,+)

4.2 WC

"They did nothing to counteract our influence. They knew that most of us had influential husbands." (KELLY,+)

"I think the community thought we had a great deal of power, because of our position in many organizations. I thought we had a great potential for power but it was never used for social reform.

To counteract WC power potential UCS found innocuous tasks for us. Busy work." (POWERS,+)

"I don't think the general community looked upon us as a major decision-making organization. I think most people knew that UCS made the decisions." (KELLY,-)

TABLE 7-7

COMMUNICATION PROPOSITIONS FOR THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY, THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SAINT PETER CLAVER

			UCS		WC		LASED		SPC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
	5	Trust	0	2, B1	6	2	2	6	0	5
	6	Access	2	0, B1	6	1, B1	5	3	5	0
	7	Cooperation	2	0, B1	5	3	3	4, B1	0	3, B2
	8	Accountability	1	1, B1	4	3,DK1	3	5	1	4

5. Mutual trust - the ability to maintain a reciprocal reliance.

UCS: +1, -0 / WC: +6, -2

UCS definitely believed there was mutual trust between it and the WC. The majority of the WC believed the same thing until the very end when they were phased out. The exceptions were:

5.2 WC

> "There was no problem with trust at first, but later the United Fund wanted their own WC and this caused friction." (STRICKLAND,-)

> "The difficulty of access, a downgrading of WC, and a series of efforts to prevent the WC from involvement in reform efforts contributed to a growing distrust of UCS." (WASHINGTON,-)

LASED, initially did not trust UCS. This reaction resulted, mostly, from an equivocation of UCS about the time an organization had to be in existence in order to be eligible for funding from UCS.

SPC, as an organization did not trust UCS at all. This was based on UCS' firm refusal to grant SPC complete financial accountability.

6. Access - the ease of obtaining meaningful face-to-face interaction with key decision-makers.

UCS: +2, -0 / LASED: +5, -3

UCS believed that there were no access problems with WC, and only a few with LASED. They had problems of access with SPC because of the financial autonomy issue.

A LASED majority agreed that access was no problem with UCS, although the meetings did nothing to change their position in decision-making.

All of the SPC respondents believed they had good access to UCS, but UCS' position remained unchanged.

6.1 UCS

"There were no access problems with LASED. They would always meet with us or we with them." (BOOTH,+)

6.3 LASED

"They (UCS) would just go through the motions. They tolerated us." (WATERS,-)

"Sometimes UCS was unsympathetic. We were a group of people with demands to meet specific needs, but UCS was waiting for us to demonstrate something that we were not familiar with." (WATERS,-)

7. Cooperation - the free and open exchange of pertinent data for the solving of common problems.

UCS: +1, -0 / WC: +5, -3

UCS staff was of the opinion that the cooperation factor was successfully functioning with the WC. The WC, for the most part, agreed with that opinion.

In the beginning of the UCS/LASED relationship, both parties complained that the other was not cooperating in decision-making situations. Later, as LASED gave in to UCS demands these assertions diminished.

In the UCS/SPC relationship there was no cooperation at all.

7.1 UCS

"Depends on what decisions were under consideration. In most cases the decisions were mutually acceptable with the WC." (BOOTH,+)

7.2 WC

"More and more the Director turned over the planning of meetings to us. But at a mechanical and superficial level which the WC resented. The meetings were generally educational events concerning the work of UCS - a kind of public relations, but we were not in any way dealing with the more serious socioeconomic root causes of the need for some of the types of social services we could be providing.

I think what we did was acceptable (by both parties), we were just not allowed to do some of the things we wanted to do that we thought would have made a great impact on community needs." (POWERS,-)

"Yes (there was good cooperation). In every instance until the disillusionment. We strongly identified with UCS, and its goals were our goals. There was not much dissent within our ranks. We just tried to do our best for UCS." (FREEMAN,+)

8. Accountability - responsive behavior toward other parties in the decision-making process.

UCS: -1 / SPC: +1, -4

There was mutual accountability in the UCS/WC interaction for much of its duration. Toward the end UCS accountability became somewhat askew. Perhaps the best description of the WC at that point is that individual members were bewildered or chose to ignore the state of events.

UCS/LASED mutual accountability developed when LASED restructured its Board to meet UCS standards.

Neither UCS nor SPC had any illusions about accountability. It appears that unilateral action is the standard method of operating for this A/C pair.

8.1 UCS

"SPC is not yet accountable to UCS." (BOOTH,-)

8.4 SPC

"No. When we pulled explanations out of them it was just like pulling teeth. They just didn't regard us as grown enough to be talked to like adults." (WARNER,-)

"No. What they said was all in their favor instead of ours." (DAVIS,-)

TABLE 7-8

STYLE/TACTICS PROPOSITIONS FOR THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES, THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND ST. PETER CLAVER

			UCS		WC		LASED		SPC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
STYLE/TACTICS	9	Threat	0	2, B1	6	1, DK1	3	5	2	3
	10	Interaction	3	0	5	3	6	2	2	3
	11	Manipulation	0	3	4	1, DK3	2	6	0	5
	12	Appeal to Higher Authority	2	1	4	1, DK3	0	8	3	2
	13	Competitive Staff	0	3	3	5	1	7	0	5

9. Threat - menacing warning to cooperate on the other party's terms.

UCS: +1, -1 / LASED: +2, -5

UCS and WC cooperated in a threat-free environment. During LASED's organization phase they exchanged threats with UCS but threats then declined. The basis for UCS/SPC communication is threat.

9.1 UCS

"LASED would invite us to stacked meetings." (KAPLA,-)

9.3 LASED

"UCS's efforts were indirect. They wanted open LASED community meetings. If we didn't cooperate we were told we wouldn't be funded." (HEIGHTS,-)

10. Interaction - deliberate involvement for the purposes of decision-making.

UCS: +1, -0 / LASED: +6, -2

UCS and WC interacted as equals. The UCS/LASED A/C interaction, at first, was limited by LASED's lack of appreciation for the control UCS had over funding. UCS and SPC interact, but it is in a hostile atmosphere.

10.1 UCS

> "We function by interacting with community organizations that have a potential for meeting human needs. There is a limitation as to the autonomy of citizen organizations and UCS must have good fiscal management because of United Foundation funds." (BOOTH,+)

10.3 LASED

> "Yes we do interact. That's why we went to them in the first place. We needed their services and their assistance." (KATZ,+)

> "Our interaction is very limited. When you are holding the money bag you are holding the program. You are dealing in a climate with a restricted atmosphere." (LOWS,-)

11. Manipulation - achievement of subtle control to insure the advantage in decision-making.

UCS: +0, -2 / SPC: +0, -5

For the UCS, manipulation is a key tactic. This holds true for LASED and SPC. This style of interaction is definitely not true for the WC who look upon such activity with disdain. LASED believed (to no avail) that this style would enable them to achieve equality in bargaining with the USC. SPC is staking everything on manipulation to outmaneuver the UCS.

11.1 UCS

> "We did it to create a consensus for our point of view." (BOOTH,-)

> "We engaged in back door conversations with sympathetic Board members. This was done to develop counteracting power in their ranks and to secure information." (MILLER,-)

11.4 SPC

> "We check their membership list to see who we can coopt. We talk with other UCS groups who have had similar problems with them. Subgroups within our own group, because of possible spies are not informed of our actions. These strategies are good for obtaining information and swaying public opinion." (DAVIS,-)

12. Appeal to Higher Authority - neutralizing others in a decision-making situation by introducing a more powerful ally to make decisions.

UCS: +1, -0 / SPC: +3, -2

UCS response indicated that it did not, as a rule, appeal to higher authority in dealing with its citizen organizations. The WC shared this point of view. LASED was vigorously and actively seeking allies in their initial encounters with the UCS.

Most of the SPC respondents said that they did not appeal to higher authority. Those who admitted to making such appeals, referred, only, to technical and professional assistance instead of political assistance. However, a total assessment of the data leads me to believe that SPC was desparately trying to marshal support as best they could to help them in their fight against the UCS.

12.4 SPC

> "Yes, but only experts in the fiscal area at present. We believe they will develop the innovative type of solution we need." (HANSONT,-)

> "We engaged in attorney to represent us. We have used the press as a threat. Also, we are contacting the large UF doners to make them aware of what UCS is pulling off." (DAVIS,-)

13. Competitive Staff - are those whose members concentrate on factors of power as an end rather than the original goals.

UCS: +0, -3 / WC: +3, -5

UCS is modeled along the lines of a traditional bureaucracy with decisions flowing from the top based on staff reaction to the data. These professionals carry out their jobs in a hierarchical system.

The WC had a one-person staff, one of whose functions was to serve as liaison between the WC Director and the UCS Director. The attitude of the Board was mixed about staff performance. The LASED staff was noncompetitive. It carried out the directives of the Board. The SPC staff was completely subjected to the wishes of the Board.

13.1 UCS

> "The staff does the daily work the Director makes the important decisions." (BOOTH,-)

13.2 WC

> "The WC Director had the most power. She was there everyday and had constant interaction with UCS staff. Also constant interaction with various members of the WC who casually dropped in or called. She took power for her own ends. She didn't care about us.
>
> It is very important that staff set the S/T of the organization because physically the office was located an extreme distance from all the members' homes and the UCS staff was all there for our Director to work with daily. If our Director had been working for us things would have been wonderful." (TESSION,-)

> "From my observation the Director did. She was in the UCS office full time and she was always communicating with their staff.
>
> She took the issues we had decided upon in our Board meetings to UCS for approval. Most of us trusted her to do what she thought we wanted." (HOOKER,+)

> "I hate to say it but the WC Director did...It was very hard for the volunteers to maintain control of daily operations. She didn't always carry out policies as we had designed them. It was kind of frustrating sometimes and sometimes I became adamant about her behavior but it didn't help much. I believed that she had some irons in the fire and did not want to sacrifice them for us." (POWERS,-)

"She was there all the time and had a pipeline of information. She had the confidence of everybody on the WC." (MITCHELL,-)

TABLE 7-9

COMPETENCE PROPOSITIONS FOR THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES, THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SAINT PETER CLAVER

			UCS		WC		LASED		SPC	
COMPETENCE	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
	14	Training	3	0	8	0	5	3	3	2
	15	Expertise	3	0	8	0	8	0	4	1
	16	Responsiveness	2	1	6	1, DK1	0	8	0	5

14. Training - instruction that results in an approved ability to adequately perform specific tasks, especially of a symbolic nature.

UCS: +3, -0 / LASED: +5, -3

UCS respondents expressed great satisfaction about the training they had received for the jobs they were doing. All of the professional staff had earned graduate degrees. The WC respondents' comments duplicated those of UCS. The majority of LASED members did not graduate from college. The specific training mentioned in LASED interviews concerned on the job instruction or special seminars. They believed this type of education helped them to accomplish their goal, but they were very much aware of the need for more training to compete in decision-making with UCS.

SPC expressions were mixed about the quality of training that they had been exposed to for decision-making activity.

14.1 UCS

"The staff all have higher education training. This has worked very well. They have been able to formulate sound social policy and distribute the funds that will carry out the policy." (BOOTH,+)

14.3 LASED

"We are increasing in our capability to increase services to the community, but it would have been much easier to had done so with the proper training. Our community is deficient in training and skills." (BATES,-)

"It has worked out well because the people in charge had the natural talent. The only difference for us was to switch from serving people in the local union to servicing people in the local community." (HEIGHTS,+)

"Not too well, we were floundering. The community should have been organized to face UCS and other service suppliers together." (ROME,-)

15. Expertise - an exceptional skill in a particular area.

UCS: +3, -0 / SPC: +4, -1

UCS, as an agency, feels fully confident that it has the needed expertise to reach its goals. This belief, to a large extent, is lodged in the successful track record of service deliveries. WC shares an identical viewpoint.

All of the LASED and a majority of SPC respondents are confident that the individual personal experiences acquired from active involvement in community problem-solving has given them a unique expertise. This skill, they believe, compensates them for much of their formal educational deficiencies.

15.1 UCS

"We are especially skilled in planning and budgeting." (KAPLA,+)

15.4 SPC

"Training in all these areas is necessary. That's the major problem with community groups. They lack the training to compete with professionals who are always taking advantage of poor people." (DAVIS,+)

16. Responsiveness - the ability to react in a minimum time span for the purpose of problem-solving.

UCS: +2, -1 / WC: +6, -1, DK1

In the main, UCS was responsive except in those instances where it would have to make or to challenge major and "controversial" policy changes.

The WC members were almost in complete agreement that they were members of a very responsive organization. There were a few mild negative comments relating to some unresponsive WC behavior.

Both LASED and SPC were unresponsive at various times in decision-making. They believed this to be necessary for the sake of survival.

16.1 UCS

"WC accused us of procrastinating with their future. We did this to keep from offending too many volunteers." (BOOTH,-)

16.2 WC

"Internally there were a few people who were unhappy because we were trying to go the route of controversial v. non-controversial conflict and that we really didn't want to make a significant impact on social reform." (POWERS,-)

"I think there were some women that thought this way from time to time, but this was small potatoes. There was nothing to keep them there if they were unhappy." (KELLY,+)

TABLE 7-10

GOAL ORIENTATION PROPOSITIONS FOR THE UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES, THE WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND SAINT PETER CLAVER

GOAL ORIENTATION			UCS		WC		LASED		SPC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
	17	Public/Private Regarding	3	0	8	0	2	5, DK1	0	5
	18	Policy Formulation	3	0	6	2	6	2	1	4
	19	Issue Focused	3	0	6	2	8	0	1	4

17. Public/Private Regarding - considering the personal goals over community goals/considering the community goals over personal goals.

UCS: +3, -0 / WC: +8, -0

UCS staff embraced the philosophy of public regarding. In their role function of distributing funds and planning programs to improve the future of some unfortunate people, it was imperative for them to consider the long-range and the general public good.

The WC had a similar orientation. LASED tended to be private regarding and the SPC respondents were exclusively private regarding.

17.2 WC

"Solving one person's problem will not change the system. The system as a whole must be reckoned with." (WASHINGTON,+)

18. Policy Formulation - the devising of definitions and strategies

for the resolution of issues and the accomplishment of desired objectives.

UCS: +3, -0 / LASED: +6, -2

UCS employed the traditional problem-solving approach of bureaucracies for problem identification, management objectives, and goal setting. Its staff had a strong background that emphasized the need for acquiring the effective concepts needed for policy analysis and implementation.

The WC, probably because of its members' professional backgrounds, functioned within traditional bureaucratic limits. As a result, WC had developed systematic policy formulation processes.

LASED, while not functioning at the level of UCS and WC, were moving along in its ability to structure coherent policy. SPC did not have it together. Their principle stated goal of fiscal autonomy was obvious, the policy to achieve this goal was not apparent, except through the obstructionist posture they had adopted.

18.3 LASED

> "The Board set priorities based on the community needs. Then they set up objectives. The areas we didn't make progress we changed.
>
> Everyone was asked to discuss the items we were going to deal with in the fiscal year. A few saw it differently." (HEIGHTS,+)

> "Our methods were to deal with the immediate needs as we saw them. They didn't consult with the rank and file, because they were in that position to do things for the community that they didn't have time to explain to the community about." (ROME,-)

19. Issue Focused - the ability to define the pertinent issues and pursue them whenever possible to closure, while excluding trivial, phony, and irrelevant issues.

UCS: +3, -0 / SPC: +1, -4

There were no discernible factions within the UCS. All issues were decided through local community needs, budget consideration and donor sensitivity.

The WC was focused on the original issues assigned it. No potential faction could muster the strength for significant opposition or shifts to side issues.

LASED was totally committed to the original issues as opposed to SPC which was totally committed to alternative issues.

19.4 SPC

"I don't know. They are set somewhere else. The Board meeting is a formality." (JEFFERSON,-)

"The Board sets priorities depending on current conditions." (WARNER,-)

TABLE 7-11

POWER PROPOSITIONS FOR STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS, THE COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, AND STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

			STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-
POWER	1	Powerlessness	0	9	0	8	0	7
	2	Fear	0	9	0	8	0	7
	3	Authority	8	1	8	0	7	0
	4	Influence	9	0	0	2	6	1

1. Powerlessness - frustration due to the inability to impact on the decision-making process.

STRESS: +0, -9 / SEC: +0, -/

The police respondents were very much aware of being involved in a community power struggle, but most of them were preoccupied with the implementation of their mission. Being a paramilitary organization, the line officers were not always aware of what was going on.

The CCHR membership, being consciousness of their individual community and organizational positions, were confident that their market capacity was equal to, or superior to that of STRESS. The SEC was very conscious of power. As far as its members were concerned, power was what the struggle was all about. They definitely had no thoughts about being powerless, in fact, they had much faith in their own power.

1.1 STRESS

> "We were very much aware of power, because of the nature of the protest groups. We did not feel powerless, we had a job to do." (GOODMAN,-)

> "We didn't have a hell of a lot to do with this. The upper command knew it and I'm sure they considered power, especially Gordon Smith when he was in charge." (WEBER,-)

1.3 SEC

> "We knew what we were dealing with and understood the consequences which could have ended in death, but nothing stopped us. We believed we would ultimately win." (O'CONNOR,-)

2. Fear - apprehension about possible reprisals because one has attempted or actually intervened in the decision-making process.

STRESS: +0, -9 / CCHR: +0, -8

There was no fear between STRESS officers and CCHR members. Most CCHR members thought STRESS was too busy chasing criminals to be con-

cerned with them.

Most STRESS officers believed that SEC but not CCHR had a vendetta against STRESS. However, they like the SEC were not fearful or believed anyone feared them.

What's happening here is that all members of CCHR related to the City Administration and Police Brass, whereas SEC leadership tended to relate to the STRESS Brass and their membership to STRESS line officers.

2.1 STRESS

> "No. We were not afraid of them (SEC). We kidded with them all the time. We used to bullshit with them. Both sides knew where we stood." (WEBER,-)

2.2 CCHR

> "I don't think we were important enough for anyone to have a vendetta against us. Some of our members thought we were. I could see no evidence of the Police Department tracking us down." (BRADLEY,-)

> "No. We didn't fear them. We knew we were equal to them in relation to the power structure.
> No, they didn't fear us. They just thought we were good-hearted souls trying to go easy on thugs." (WOODROW,-)

3. Authority - legitimate power, in this case defined as the ability to mobilize resources.

STRESS: +8, -1 / CCHR: +8, -0

The majority of the STRESS interviewees thought that they had the necessary resources to do the job - manpower, expertise, and organizational structure. Only one individual had a different opinion.

There was consensus among CCHR respondents that they possessed important resources such as manpower, access to the media, and professional expertise.

They believed that these resources were sufficient to reduce STRESS' operation. As the SEC gathered momentum, because of the fatalities and STRESS' negative community involvement, its resources of manpower and prestige increased. These factors enabled them to achieve a significant role in the political campaign of Coleman Young, who had vowed to eliminate STRESS once he was elected.

3.1 STRESS

> "We were given lousy equipment. Our cars would rarely run. Our radio equipment was lousy. We were operating on garbage equipment. We had an old Twin Pines milk truck used as a decoy that the men chipped in their own money to keep running." WEBER,-)

3.2 CCHR

> "Yes, we definitely used resources as levers. CCHR is an organization of organizations which are all powerful. As a result there was a large scale of citizenry who were being influences indirectly. Resolutions of support were constantly coming in.
>
> The Police Department went to the media and cited crime statistics. They thought this would frighten people." (CARSON,+)

4. Influence - the ability to exert intangible force in the decision-making process.

STRESS: +9, -0 / SEC: +6, -1

STRESS was convinced that it had influence in the general community because it was attempting to maintain law and order. Almost all of the SEC members thought that their influence ballooned as STRESS became more involved with fatalities. Because of their expertise and broad community base, CCHR were confident of their overpowering influence.

4.1 STRESS

> "The general community thought we had influence. They figured we had the authority to stay in business. I thought so most assuredly. We were doing a good job. I think that's why the protest groups wanted to stop us. They probably thought we had too much influence and power." (PATRON,+)

4.3 SEC

"I don't know what the general community thought. This part is difficult to answer. I think we were clearly influential because we laid the political base for Coleman's (Young) election.

It was in the legal arena, much more than community sentiment, that perceived our influence. Our opponent tried to counteract this influence by running Nichols (John) for mayor, building support for a law and order atmosphere and tying law and order statistics to STRESS operations." (PEELER,+)

TABLE 7-12

COMMUNICATION PROPOSITIONS FOR STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, AND STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

			STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-
COMMUNICATION	5	Trust	0	9	0	8	0	7
	6	Access	3	1, DK4, B1	3	2, DK3	2	DW4, DK1
	7	Cooperation	2	5, DK2	6	2	0	5, DW2
	8	Accountability	0	9	2	6	0	6, DW1

5. Trust - the ability to maintain a reciprocal reliance.

STRESS: +0, -9 / CCHR: +0, -8

The three organizations independently arrived at the consensus that there was no mutual trust between the A/C. CCHR and SEC did not trust STRESS because of unorthodox police methods and the resulting fatalities. All of the STRESS officers firmly believed that it was hopeless as far as mutual trust between STRESS and both opposing organ-

izations were concerned. They believed that this situation was brought about mainly because of the fatalities STRESS committed and ghetto community traditional distrust of the police.

5.1 STRESS

> "I don't think anything would have engendered trust. When we did the things they asked us for in good faith, we found it did not eliminate hostile feelings. They just moved to other demands, they never trusted us." (LAXTON,-)

5.2 CCHR

> "This lack of trust could have been due to a lack of knowledge about the motivations of STRESS." (POPTON,-)

6. Access - the ease of obtaining meaningful face to face interaction with key decision makers.

STRESS: +1, -3, DK4, B1 / SEC: +2, -0, DW4, DK

For STRESS the interviewee reaction is mixed. On the one hand, some did not know anything about the access situation because of the command hierarchy tradition of excluding the rank and file from negotiations. On the other hand, one command officer admitted access to the CCHR, but not with the SEC. The rest of the respondents thought that none of the opposition groups were interested in access.

In the case of the SEC, the prevailing attitude about access was a non-desire to participate with STRESS. This finding contrasts sharply with the rest of the organizations in this study.

The CCHR, because of their mobility, demanded and received access to command police officers. This resulted in some significant modification of STRESS operation.

6.1 STRESS

> "To my knowledge we did (have difficulty). They seemed to only want to talk to us through the media. They sensationalized it (our activity)." (KERR,-)

"There were a couple of requests for meetings they made to us that we didn't keep because the meetings were located in suspicious neighborhoods and buildings. We figured they were set-ups.

When the 'good' block club people had meetings with us and wanted information there would be people in the audience who would ridicule them and us." (WEBER,-)

6.3 SEC

"I think we were more or less protest organizations. We did not intend to negotiate with STRESS. We were against all forms of STRESS and didn't recognize it as a legitimate organization to bargain with." (LEECH,-)

7. Cooperation - the free and open exchange of pertinent data for problem-solving activity.

STRESS: +2, -5, DK2 / CCHR: +6, -2

The majority of the STRESS respondents reported little cooperative involvement with the opposition. CCHR believed some cooperation was obtained for the elimination of the decoy operation and the initiation of psychological testing for STRESS officers. The SEC didn't want cooperation.

7.1 STRESS

"We were never asked by anyone. If I as a patrolman was asked, I would have gone and rapped with the opposition. We have some smart and articulate guys who would have sat down with them and communicated." (CRANE,-)

7.2 CCHR

"We never had any response from them. We sent letters of opposition to STRESS. We had a TV editorial and a press conference against it and asked for public hearings. They refused to give any information and ignored us." (ROWLAND,+)

"Not that we alone did it, but we were one of the factors that eliminated the decoy operations. It seemed to have been acceptable to the command officers." (CARSON,+)

8. Accountability - responsible behavior toward other parties in the decision-making process.

STRESS: +0, -9 / SEC: +0, -6, DW1

There was no evidence whatsoever that either STRESS or the SEC had any thoughts about being accountable to each other. The STRESS/CCHR situation was somewhat different in that each recognized the reasons for the other's existence.

8.1 STRESS

> "They gave explanations but not the right kind. They continually said genocide. They based all of their explanations on racial reasons. They just hammered away and tried to make us look bad and ineffective." (CRANE,-)

8.3 SEC

> "I actually don't think we thought it was beneficial for the Police Department to know who we were. We were not interested in accountability, it was war." (O'CONNOR,-)

TABLE 7-13

STYLE/TACTICS PROPOSITIONS FOR STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, AND THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

			STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-
STYLE/TACTICS	9	Threat	0	9	8	0	0	7
	10	Interaction	4	4, DK1	4	4	0	5, DW2
	11	Manipulation	2	5, DK2	4	4	1	6
	12	Appeal to Higher Authority	4	4, DK1	0	8	0	7
	13	Competitive Staff	0	9	0	8	5	2

STRESS: +0, -9 / SEC +0, -7

The STRESS officers were unanimous in their affirmations of having been threatened. Also, all SEC respondents revealed that they had been threatened by STRESS officers. Some stated that they suffered constant harassment and were subjected to intimidation. In fact, as indicated in the data, threats were a major tactic of both sides. None of the CCHR respondents threatened, or were threatened by STRESS officers.

9.1 STRESS

> "Yes, we were threatened. They tried to build hostility against us in the community. They did it because they wanted to get rid of us because of general hatred of policemen and because they had political malfunctions to elect a new mayor. They called us pigs and killers." (KERR,-)

> "There were threats but it was just bullshit talk. Like in Court on the streets, they would come up to our men and say, 'We are going to get you motherfuckers.'" (WEBER,-)

> "My partner and I were shot at from ambush by an unknown assailant." (RAY,-)

9.3 SEC

> "Yes, we were threatened by police officers at the 15th Precinct. They dropped little words on folk like, 'You better keep your ass out of shit.' They did these things because we were beginning to polarize people of influence against STRESS." (ISOLET,-)

10. Interaction - deliberate involvement for the purpose of decision-making.

STRESS: +4, -4, DK1 / CCHR: +4, -4

STRESS and CCHR respondents were respectively evenly split around the amount of interaction they had with each other. Most of the interaction that took place was at top command levels. In the case of STRESS/SEC interaction either took place in the courts or in the streets.

The SEC did not want any direct form of interaction with STRESS.

Both organizations' respondents are evenly split around the amount of interaction they were involved in with the opposing organization.

10.1 STRESS

"No, we went our own way, they went theirs." (LAXTON,-)

"Yes, but they didn't want to meet with us (SEC)." (KERR,+)

"Yes, we wanted to work with them in decision-making. That's part of the reason for our organization, to intervene when community problems occur." (WOODROW,+)

10.2 CCHR

"No. CCHR was on the outside throwing brick bats at STRESS especially after each killing." (DALE,-)

11. Manipulation - achievement of subtle control to insure the advantage in decision-making.

STRESS: +2, -5, DK2 / CCHR: +4, -4

A majority of STRESS officers admitted using manipulative tactics against those opposed to STRESS operations. CCHR respondents were evenly split in their attitudes about manipulation. SEC engaged in constant manipulative tactics against STRESS.

11.1 STRESS

"We campaigned for Nichols because we knew he would keep STRESS. This was one of the major issues. We circulated petitions among businessmen. I think there were appeals to outlying sections of the City. The DPOA, our Union, was working very hard behind the scenes in the election. However, I don't believe the DPOA should get too political because they were doing some things I didn't like and I had no say so." (CRANE,-)

11.2 CCHR

"Yes, like getting information from friendly police officers." (WOODROW,-)

"They (manipulative tactics) were employed for the welfare of the situation we were trying to resolve and it took pressures stronger than ours to finally get rid of STRESS. You have to use these kinds of methods when you really want to win." (POPTON,-)

"I don't feel that these kind of tactics are good for anything because they don't weight the issue fairly." (DALE,-)

12. Appeal to Higher Authority - neutralizing others in a decision-making situation by introducing a more powerful ally to make decisions.

STRESS: +4, -4, DK1 / SEC: +0, -7

Approximately half of the STRESS officers said they knew of no appeals being made by their organization for external help in dealing with the opposition. The other half mentioned their appeals to public opinion, via the media, to understand and support STRESS' position.

All of the SEC respondents admitted to seeking help in as many influential places as possible. CCHR was more selective in its appeals, but it frequently did so to insure successful intervention against STRESS.

12.1 STRESS

"I would like to say yes when I think of Nichols (John) with "Buzz the Fuzz" (a weekly TV show), Bannon (James) being made available to the electronics media and other things we did to survive." (LAXTON,-)

12.3 SEC

"Yes all the resources mentioned were sought by us." (PEELER,-)

13. Competitive Staff - members who concentrate on factors of power as an end, rather than original goals.

STRESS: +0, -9 / +0, -8

Because of the paramilitary nature of the organization, staff competition among the STRESS officers was very low.

Staff services for CCHR was furnished by the City of Detroit's Commission on Community Relations. CCHR never fully utilized this service preferring to do most of the staff work itself except in minor areas. The person most relied upon was the chairperson, followed by the task forces chairpersons.

The SEC did not have a formal staff structure. Policy analysis and implementation was usually conducted by a small inner core of middle class leaders. Some lower class members believed that this group was competitive and concerned with additional goals that the total SEC membership was not aware of.

13.1 STRESS

> "Paramilitary orders and policy is made and sent down from the top. Perhaps some of this should be changed so that the line officers have a better inowledge of what's going on." (GOODMAN,-)

13.2 CCHR

> "Staff is unimportant, because there is only one staff person and that individual is part time. The staff has acted more like a clerical person instead of an administrator." (CARSON,-)

14. Training - instruction that results in an approved ability to adequately perform specific tasks, especially of a symbolic nature.

STRESS: +9, -0 / CCHR: +8, -0

On-the-job-training was the primary way STRESS officers received their law enforcement education. Their formal education was high school and junior college levels. The tuition was being paid for by the city. They tended to rate on-the-job-training to be the most effective for

TABLE 7-14

COMPETENCE PROPOSITIONS FOR STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, AND THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

			STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
COMPETENCE	NO.	PROPOSITION	+	-	+	-	+	-
	14	Training	9	0	8	0	6	0, B1
	15	Expertise	9	0	8	0	7	0
	16	Responsiveness	0	8, B1	5	3	1	6

working in STRESS.

Virtually all of the CCHR Board were professionally trained with advanced college degrees. This training was considered by them to be a valuable asset to the organization.

The SEC considered the professional legal training of some of their leaders important. However, they believed that a protest organization such as the SEC profited by the intermingling of member training for organizing and rallying people to a cause.

14.1 STRESS

> "OJT is the best and only way, I think, the police officer learns about the Street.
>
> The urban area is a jungle and you don't learn about it in books. You have to learn about it on the job and you have to learn fast. Mistakes can cost you your life. I remember a case where an officer (Bradford) did not have a shell in the chamber of his shotgun when he accosted a suspect. He was shot and killed and his partner was shot four times in the back and is now paralyzed for life. We've learned to always keep a shell in the chamber." (CRANE,+)

14.2 CCHR

"I think it has been especially effective. Being an organization of organizations we have many trained people and we are able to cope with almost any situation we are called upon to help make decisions." (BRADLEY,+)

15. Expertise - an exceptional skill in a specific area.

STRESS: +9, -0 / SEC: +7, -0

The expertise of the STRESS officer was related in terms of the various techniques utilized in law enforcement such as crime detection and the ability to communicate with informants. All of the STRESS respondents believed that they possessed this expertise but there were some comments in regard to areas of competence and traditional police hierarchy that needed to be changed. The SEC counted among their attributes the relevant forms of expertise that they possessed such as a knowledge of politics and community organizing abilities for dramatic social change.

The CCHR counted heavily on their expertise in the field of human relations and conflict resolution.

15.1 STRESS

"Leadership should not be based on seniority as it is now, for it assumes that length of time on the force is proof of leadership potential. Leadership skill can be taught and learned early." (CRANE,+)

15.3 SEC

"We had legal skills, print abilities. Also, publishing and public speaking experiences." (PEELER,+)

16. Responsiveness - the ability to react in a minimum time span for the purpose of problem-solving.

STRESS: +0, -8, B1 / SEC: +1, -6

All STRESS officers were aware of their lack of responsiveness in dealing with community dissatisfaction. The officers believed some of the citizen disenchantment to be justified. Some, however, they judged to be unreasonable, and to be based on general citizen hatred of police and authority. The majority of CCHR members believed their organization was responsive in the STRESS decision-making situation, while the SEC candidly admitted they were not.

16.1 STRESS

> "Our own people were criticizing us about violence. Some didn't prescribe to our violent approaches to the problem.
> We were looked upon as Neanderthal men with thick heads and not willing to listen to anybody." (PATRON,-)

16.3 SEC

> "People in and out of the movement were constantly complaining about our inefficiency in meeting deadlines. As I have said this type of action was so new to us we had to learn by making mistakes.
> Many people were claiming that we didn't want to accept their particular solutions to problems.
> The complaint about lack of willingness to talk over problems was due mainly to different political views of people attracted to our movement." (ISOLET,-)

17. Public/Private Regarding - considering community goals over personal goals/considering personal goals over community goals.

STRESS: +6, -3 / SEC: -3, -2, B2

The majority of the STRESS respondents were public regarding. They discussed the necessity for crime prevention programs. Some of them showed concern with rank and file officers who only saw the short-range in terms of their jobs and duty to eliminate crime.

TABLE 7-15

GOAL ORIENTATION PROPOSITIONS FOR STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS, COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS, AND THE STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

GOAL ORIENTATION	NO.	PROPOSITION	STRESS +	STRESS -	CCHR +	CCHR -	SEC +	SEC -
	17	Public/Private Regarding	6	3	7	1	3	2, B2
	18	Policy Formulation	6	2, DK1	8	0	4	2, DK1
	19	Issue Focused	7	DK2	8	0	3	3, DK1

CCHR responses indicated that its membership was public regarding. The SEC membership reaction was mixed.

17.1 STRESS

"The rank and file are looking at self, so they chose the short-range. The leadership chooses the long-range because they realize they are part of everyone else's welfare." (GOODMAN,+)

17.3 SEC

"They don't see the cause they just see the effect. They can't even identify the problem." (LEECH,+)

"They, the rank and file, don't have the adequate education and communication to see beyond the present. They couldn't see relationships." (WAGNER,+)

"Some folks just wanted to get rid of STRESS, they were not concerned with related long-ranged issues." (PELLER,+)

18. Policy Formulation - the divising of definitions and strategies for the resolution of issues and the accomplishment of desired objectives.

STRESS: +6, -2, DK1 / CCHR: +8, -0

The Police Department's leadership set STRESS policy based crime statistics. CCHR policy was initiated through the findings and deliberations of the Police Relations Committee. Its policy reflected CCHR's human relations focus on the rights and dignity of man.

SEC policy was designed by a small group of middle class leaders. It was apparently based on human relations, legal precedents and leftists' political theory.

18.1 STRESS

> "Stay within the bounds of legal propriety and public acceptability." (ARONSON,+)
>
> "They (the Brass) are more or less interested in themselves, instead of the public. There is so much infighting they don't have time to set policy." (CHAPIN,-)

18.2 CCHR

> "Assess the CCHR membership opinion and act accordingly to the majority consensus.
> They have to report back to their representative organizations. Sometimes they have acted without having done so." (DALE,+)

19. Issue Focused - the ability to define the pertinent issues and pursue them whenever possible to closure, while excluding trivial, phony, and irrelevant issues.

STRESS: +7, -0, DK2 / CCHR: +8, -0

The issues for STRESS are based on crime patterns within given geographical areas. The command officers made the major decisions for the delineation of issues. The CCHR operated in a typical bureaucratic manner by sifting out the issues they considered most compatible

for their purposes and then setting priorities based on their resources. The SEC considered the issues that violated human freedom and having general community appeal. Sometimes its varied membership reflected differences in priorities.

19.2 CCHR

> "Issues are basically selected by the interest of the leadership. Its dynamic chairperson then takes over and keeps them on course through tradition bureaucratic organization." (WALKER,+)

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION
RELATIONSHIP SUMMARY IN TERMS OF THE CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

We have examined the data responses for Community Agency/Citizen organization interactions by each of the nineteen propositions. Now for the sake of integrating these data around the potential impact of power on the decision-making process, I will assess the information in terms of the power concept and its ancillaries.

MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AGENCY/CITIZENS GOVERNING BOARD POWER

The MNA, as a bureaucracy, displayed responses of organizational security and power. This was due, mainly to its financial resources and the prestige that de jure control from the Mayor's office lent to MNA.

The CGB had some localized feelings of powerlessness, but little real fear. This is a curious mixture; perhaps further analysis will provide an adequate explanation. The CGB was willing to take on the MNA but they were willing to gamble with the minimal authority and influence they possessed.

COMMUNICATION

The MNA communicated with the CGB from a bureaucratic vantage point. It had the organizational training and experience. In addition, MNA staff had personal feelings of financial security.

The implication gained from the data is that the MNA could afford to communicate at the level it desired. It had the trump cards for making decisions.

The CGB was deficient in all aspects of the communication process. Although it had enforced access to joint decision-making with the MNA, its organizational and individual basic insecurity did not allow it to cooperate freely or develop accountability.

STYLE/TACTICS

MNA and CGB are seen to have been decided adversaries in a power struggle. Both had combative styles that permeated the bargaining activity. Other parties were continually being dragged into brawls. The MNA attempted to "wage war" with typical bureaucratic finesse; the CGB with ponderous political maneuvers.

The data revelations illustrate turbulence in decision-making when there are inequities in market capacity and the subordinate participant attempts to acquire the mediation of control with what it considers substitute attributes.

COMPETENCE

Both organizations, it appeared from the findings, lacked the necessary competence for joint decision-making in the complex model cities program. This factor led to serious effects on their bargaining capacities and they would have neutralized each other except for

the communication and goal orientation skills of the Agency which place it in the power position for the making of decisions.

GOAL ORIENTATION

The MNA was more public regarding than the CGB. This was likely due, for the most part, to the governmental mandate of the Agency to carry out certain functions in a professional manner. The individual CGB member was often operating from a personal and independent, rather than an organizational bias.

UNITED COMMUNITY SERVICES/THE WOMENS' COMMITTEE/
LATIN AMERICANS FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/
SAINT PETER CLAVER

POWER

The data shows UCS operating very smoothly in a low-key style. It is a powerful agency to deal with in decision-making. The WC had latent power that remained unused. LASED gave the superficial impression of being a somewhat powerful participant in policy setting with UCS, but in reality the respondents had feelings of powerlessness. They shaped up to the UCS demands.

SPC is unafraid of UCS and is very confident that they have the power to out-bargain the Agency.

COMMUNICATION

UCS and the WC shared a common identity, therefore they maintained a high communication level. Initially, LASED and UCS did not have good communication links, but when LASED agreed to UCS demands, the level of communication was raised.

SPC and UCS had a very low communication level. They consistently talked past each other.

STYLE/TACTICS

The data highlights UCS' intensive manipulative behavior. WC interacted with UCS in a placid, professionally motivated manner. LASED, initially attempted to outmaneuver UCS in decision-making but was easily defeated due to the UCS control of resources. SPC, through attempted manipulation and obstructionist behavior, challenged the UCS' power in decision-making, resulting in a stand-off, to the time of this writing.

COMPETENCE

UCS and WC were professionally trained and had developed expertise in many areas. LASED and SPC had a mixture of expertise and experience based on a knowledge of their local communities. Their lower actual competence levels put them at a disadvantage with UCS in decision-making.

GOAL ORIENTATION

UCS, WC, and LASED were highly goal-oriented. SPC was also highly goal-oriented, but it had substituted goals of its own which the UCS had no intention of making mutual. This factor had a profound effect on the decision-making process.

STOP THE ROBBERIES-ENJOY SAFE STREETS/COORDINATING COUNCIL ON HUMAN RELATIONS/STATE OF THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE

POWER

STRESS remained a powerful organization until the change in political administrations. CCHR was powerful because of the authority and influence its members brought to it. SEC developed into a powerful organization because of the competence and resources of its leadership.

COMMUNICATION

One of the chief reasons for the downfall of STRESS was its negative attitude toward the need for communicating with citizen groups. According to the data, CCHR demonstrated a high communication potential for decision-making. The responses suggests that the SEC did not desire to communicate directly with STRESS in decision-making.

STYLE/TACTICS

STRESS conducted its operations in a paramilitary style using only its rules for guidance. It had an exclusionary attitude toward citizen groups that wanted to intervene in decision-making activity about crime. CCHR's style was couched in a vigorous "fight for right" and fair play. It was based on the bureaucratic model of fact-finding and conciliation.

The SEC style was a combination of "street" resistance with dramatic courtroom presentations and political power plays.

TRAINING

STRESS officers were trained for their jobs of crime fighting, but were not as well trained for community decision-making.

CCHR members had been trained for their professions. This training, in many areas, prepared them to deal adequately with community decision-making.

The SEC leadership was highly trained for the individual professions and to survive the type of decision-making atmosphere in which they finally placed STRESS.

GOAL ORIENTATION

STRESS, as an agency, was strongly motivated to continue reducing "street" crime although its methods were questioned. CCHR's goal was to modify STRESS' policies. SEC had multiple goals, of which one was to eliminate STRESS, and another was to "radicalize the masses," or at least to mobilize the lower class into the political arena.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter was limited to recording some perceptions of various respondents to pertinent questions about the power conceptual scheme.

The most important observation from this exercise, for me, is that the majority of these participants, though aware of the power factor, did not seem to comprehend the dimensions of its relationship to the decision-making process.

The next chapter contains some comparisons of the community agency/citizen organization responses in order to detect and assess any differences in organizational behaviors.

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISONS AND EVALUATION

The attention of the preceding chapters was primarily directed to an assessment of the power conceptual scheme data in terms of individual organizational behavior. With the completion of that survey the next move is to make an inter-organizatioanl comparison. My reasons for this decision are to try to uncover any distinctions or related peculiarities, between the organizations that may bolster my original belief about the validity of the power conceptual scheme.

I will proceed with this task by first, restating each concept and proposition definition for the reader's convenience, second, make the appropriate comparison, and third, evaluate the concept.

POWER

Power is the degree of influence one can bring to bear in producing a decision weighted for his benefit. Power and its uses are not necessarily negative. It is sometimes temporarily necessary for an organization or individual to be in the ascendant position in decision-making; however, for one party to be continually subjected to the other's will, even when the results are beneficial to both, is to encourage demoralization.

POWERLESSNESS - expressions of frustration for being unable to impact on the decision-making process.

Proposition 1. Lower class organizations interacting with

community agencies experience more effects of powerlessness than middle class organizations interacting with community agencies.

According to the data (see Table 8-1) none of the organizations confessed to feelings of powerlessness, but a closer examination informs us that this is not the actual case. Some of the individual responses to the direct question about powerlessness approached bravado, because throughout the interviews both the Citizen Governing Board (CGB) and Latin Americans for Social and Economic Development (LASED) in referring to paternalistic Agency behavior, when translated, become feelings of powerlessness.

I have classified the CGB as a lower class organization and LASED as a middle class organization. It is important to note that although LASED exhibits a very high mobility potential, it is fundamentally a lower middle class organization that has retained some upper lower class trappings.

Saint Peter Claver (SPC), an organization with a predominantly middle class Board under lower class influence and serving a lower class community, was engaged in a frantic fight that appears to have been largely a struggle to keep from admitting to a status of a powerless organization.

The State of the Emergency Committee is split along social class lines in regard to the proposition. The dominant middle class leadership do not display feelings of powerlessness, but the lower class membership similar to the SPC was attempting to fight off feelings of powerlessness.

The Coordinating Council on Human Relations, a decidely middle class organization did not give me any reasons to suspect that it

TABLE 8-1

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION POWER COMPARISONS

CASES			I				II										III			
CONCEPT	NO.	PROPOSITIONS	MNA		CGB		UCS		WC		LASED		SPC		STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
			8		12		3		8		8		5		9		8		7	
			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
POWER	1	Powerless-ness	0	8	1	11	0	3	2	6	2	6	0	5	0	9	0	8	0	7
	2	Fear	2	6	2	10	0	3	0	8	2	6	0	5	0	9	0	8	0	7
	3	Authority	8	0	11	1	3	0	8	0	7	1	4	NA1 1	8	1	8	0	7	0
	4	Influence	5	2 DK1	8	4	3	0	4	4	5	3	3	2	9	0	6	2	6	1

harbored significant feelings of powerlessness.

Perhaps the CGB should have followed a different strategy, to be more like the LASED, until it had begun to develop the competence to take on the MNA. The CGB also could have used its middle class members in leadership roles as the SEC did.

Only a minority of the WC membership expressed powerlessness, but their social status was high enough for them to minimize feelings of powerlessness.

Overall the data indicates that the proposition is generally true.

FEAR - apprehension about possible reprisals due to attempted or actual intervention into the decision-making process.

Proposition 2. There is little or no fear evidenced between community agencies and citizen organizations.

There were no direct affirmative responses to the question, however, probing elicited the information that fears were present to some degree in all organizations. So the problem became one of deciding what fear forms would be valid. The fear, I found to be acceptable was the type that had a significant effect on decision-making. This situation was most observable with the CGB, LASED and SPC where it involved scarce resources, such as money. Fear is very much a part of bargaining, especially between Agencies and lower class citizen organizations. There is a lot of whistling in the dark going on.

The proposition is not true. Close examinations of the data refute the direct responses.

AUTHORITY - the ability for the legitimate mobilization of resources.

Proposition 3. Middle class organizations and agencies possess a great deal of legitimate power through their control of resources, whereas lower class organizations possess less legitimate power, because of a general lack of resources.

The data unequivocally reveals that the possessor of the most resources is the key decision maker. The most frequently quoted resources were money, property and expertise. The only instance that knowledge of the community proved to have some significance as bargaining leverage was in the case of the SEC contribution to the defeat of STRESS. Here too, this resource had its limitations because it was backed up by the expertise and money of the middle class leadership.

If the MNA and CGB had been able to cooperate by pooling resources, together, they could have built a power for community change. Instead, the CGB went into oblivion and the Model Cities community change is negligible. The proposition is true.

INFLUENCE - is the ability to exert tangible force in the decision-making process.

Proposition 4. Community agencies and middle class citizen organizations have a reciprocal degree of influence on each other. The degree of reciprocal influence between agencies and lower class organizations is uncertain.

The MNA influence over the CGB lasted in the long run because of its control of the funding and the unquestioned legality of its existence. In the beginning, the CGB "blew it" because it never

developed the competence "to get it together."

UCS had influence over the WC, LASED and SPC because of its tight control of resources. WC, in spite of its high status, had little influence over UCS because of the peculiar control the "Big Board" exerted in decision-making over resources.

LASED had no influence with UCS. SPC in spite of initial "stonewalling" tactics had no appreciable influence over UCS.

STRESS lost its influential status in the community because it ignored the influence potential of CCHR and SEC.

Generally, the middle class agencies prevailed in decision-making. STRESS lost because of a debateable primary election (One version is that: Nichols and Young were pitted against each other in the general election because, Ravitz the front runner had his votes siphoned off by other liberal candidates - Molgek and Bell. The liberals had no place to go except for Young who was liberal. Nichols the conservative could not buck the tide. Young, as a campaign promise had vowed to get rid of STRESS.)

The conclusions for the proposition are that lower class citizen organizations have little of an enduring influence with community agencies because they are not strong enough to command respect.

Middle class citizen organizations have various degrees of influence over community agencies depending on their strength and the situation.

POWER CONCEPT SUMMARY

We have discovered from the data that authority and influence are closely related. As a part of power, they are two of the vital elements that make up market capacity. The more of them an organiza-

tion has, the less doubtful that organization will be plagued with fear and feelings of powerlessness.

Social class is the deciding factor as to the ratio of this inverse relationship.

All of the groups, to a significant degree, believed or responded as though they believed that they possessed the necessary power to adequately influence the making of decisions. However, the bases for these beliefs were not the same for all groups. The agencies thought that their official positions (both individual and group), to a large extent gave them certain rights and duties that were translated into "prerogatives of power." The citizens equally were convinced that their special "intimate" knowledge of the target communities converted them into non-expendable experts.

Feelings of powerlessness and fear were virtually excluded from the responses, but they were present, being covertly expressed through cognizance of the potential power positions of the opposing organizations.

While these emergent discoveries shed information about Agency/Citizen decision-making involvements, they are by no means conclusive. Further explorations into the assessment of power and its relationship to decision-making activity are necessary. Therefore, the ancillaries of power are examined in a similar fashion to search for general trends in A/C problem solving in urban development.

COMMUNICATION

Communication is the state of input and output flow of information. It is the mortar that binds components of interaction. Communication can be harmonious or discordant. It can be anything between these extremes, but whatever fashion, without communication, there will be no interaction.

It is the quality of communication that is to be considered in the interest of reducing social friction.

Information obtained from the evaluation of the following propositions can serve as a valuable aid in determining the quality of communication. (See Table 8-2)

MUTUAL TRUST - the ability to maintain a reciprocal reliance.

Proposition 5. Middle class organizations and agencies display a higher degree of mutual trust than lower class organizations and agencies.

The case in the study where this proposition shows the highest probability for sustaining truth is the UCS and the very middle class WC. They also demonstrated sharply a sharing of identities. No where else was there evidence of significant mutual trust in decision-making.

I venture a speculation based on the data for STRESS//CCHR/SEC grouping; it is that citizen organizations, whether middle or lower class, when engaged in ideological protest decision-making activity with community agencies have a low inclination for entertaining mutual trust - or sharing identities.

An additional observation is that the greater the divergence in

TABLE 8-2

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION COMMUNICATION COMPARISONS

CASES			I				II								III			
CONCEPT	NO.	PROPOSITIONS	MNA		CGB		UCS		WC		LASED		SPC		STRESS		CCHR	SEC	
			8		12		3		8		8		5		9		8	7	
			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+ -
COMMUNICATION	5	Trust	1	7	1	11	0	2 B1	6	2	2	6	0	5	0	9	0	8	0 7
	6	Access	6	2	7	5	2	0 B1	6	1 B1	5	3	5	0	3	1 B1 DK4	3	2 DK3	2 DW4 DK1
	7	Cooperation	7	1	2	9 B1	2	0 B1	5	3	3	4 B1	0	3 B2	2	5 DK1	6	2	0 5 DW2
	8	Account-ability	4	4	0	11	1	1 B1	4	3 DK1	3	5	1	4	0	9	2	6	0 6 DW1

resource ownership, the greater the possible divergence in mutual trust for decision-making. The relationship is converse - the haves do not trust the have nots and vice-versa.

ACCESS - is the ease of obtaining face-to-face interaction with key decision makers.

Proposition 6. Face-to-face meetings between agencies and middle class citizen organizations is easy to achieve and the atmosphere is harmonious. Face-to-face meetings between agencies and lower class citizen organizations is easy to achieve but the atmosphere varies widely depending on the issue, from hostility to harmony.

Generally, there was a minimum amount of access between the A/C. The MNA/CGB were specifically designed to insure the incorporation of access. Although the structure in this case was provided, interactions that resulted were not fruitful in many cases. This fact demonstrates that structure alone for access does not suffice.

An additional observation is found in the frequent comments by individuals who describe themselves as members of "protest" organizations. They candidly revealed that they had no desire for access to STRESS, with the implication that they would have ignored a structure for it, if it had existed. Access in this case seemingly is equivalent to giving recognition to something that shouldn't exist.

The proposition is supported by the data.

COOPERATION - the quality and quantity of voluntary contributions toward problem solving activity.

Proposition 7. Cooperation and information flow exists at a high level between middle class organizations and agencies, regardless of the issue. Substantive issues and vested interests are the

determining factors for the degree of cooperation and information flow between lower class organizations and community agencies.

Cooperation was extremely fluid for the UCS/WC case. It was on an intermittent basis for, STRESS/CCHR, UCS/LASED and MNA/CGB. Cooperation between the UCS/SPC and STRESS/SEC was virtually non-existent.

Although apparatus for the facilitation of cooperation was deliberately built into the Model Cities Program it was difficult to achieve and maintain. The CGB sometimes perceived cooperation with the MNA as cooptation. If there is secret goal divergence by a party to decision-making cooperation becomes a liability.

Cooperation is incompatible with aggression and truculance. To the SEC, SPC and sometimes the CGB, cooperation was a sign of weakness.

Agencies, those guardians of resources, can afford to define their positions as "cooperative" so long as they control the cut-off values.

The proposition is generally true, but is must be understood that cooperation in an unequal decision-making relationship tends to make bargaining easier for the strong and uncertain for the weak.

Cooperation Proposition Evaluation

An important aspect of cooperation is that all parties to the situation should be fully aware of what grounds "cooperation" concept is defined. Further, that those areas where cooperation is needed, for mutually beneficial purposes, have to be jointly identified. The data reveals confusion in both of these places for all the A/C sets. These facts contribute invaluable commentary about the state of

communication between the various groups under study. In addition, they definitely link Communication to Style/Tactics and Goal Orientation as key elements in the power concept.

ACCOUNTABILITY - responsible behavior toward the other parties in the decision-making process.

Proposition 8. Agencies, initially develop high levels of accountability to middle class citizen organizations with which they share a common identity. Ultimately, due to situational changes, they may attempt to reduce such levels. Agencies have less accountability to those middle class citizen organizations or lower class citizen organizations of non-shared identity.

The data leads us to believe that the Agencies were accountable to citizen organizations but usually on Agency terms or when it was convenient for their purposes. This is "counterfeit accountability" and is similar to "agency cooperation."

To the SEC and SPC accountability was a dirty word and thus not spoken or spoken about. To the CGB accountability was a foreign word to which they gave the impression they did not know of an English translation.

Accountability to the WC and CCHR was something they could live with, within reason.

Accountability is indispensable for successful negotiations between equals. For any participant to expect what he does not intend to give is not only "bad faith," but poor judgement.

The data illustrates that usually the members of most groups were divided in their responses about issues of accountability. The

SEC and CGB were decidedly negative in their views. The SEC was not concerned with accountability and the CGB were convinced that MNA was not an accountable agency and yet one half of the MNA respondents accused the CBG of not being accountable.

Generally, the more the A/C shared identity, the more mutual the accountability.

The proposition is generally true.

COMMUNICATION CONCEPT SUMMARY

The data analysis reveals that meaningful communication is a rarity for the A/C. However, the disturbing question is: Does the lack of communication lead to decision-making conflict or does decision-making conflict lead to poor communication?

I think some clues to the answer can be found in the main power concept with its emphasis on competence and authority. This direction, leads in turn, to social class with its middle class focus on communication skills. The information in this study indicates both questions share a relationship based on the degree of competence the parties bring to the bargaining encounter.

STYLE/TACTICS

These are organizational procedures for goal accomplishment. Every successful organization develops methods for achieving its objectives. Eventually these procedures acquire identifying characteristics that enable individuals and other organizations to make predictions about the particular organization's behavior around given issues.

Style/Tactics are organizational behavior traits assembled from the four other

concepts, power, communication, competence, and goal orientation.

I have delineated five proposition variables for clarifying the concept. (See Table 8-3)

THREAT - menacing warning to cooperate on the initiating organizations terms.

Proposition 9. Agencies and middle class organizations react to each other in an environment free of mutual threats; while depending on the issue, threats between agencies and lower class organizations is a standard method of negotiations.

Threats were not a part of UCS/WC or STRESS/CCHR tactics. In the UCS/LASED relationship threats were employed by both parties until LASED capitulated. Threats were standard operating procedures for the MNA/CGB, STRESS/SEC and UCS/SPC.

The clearly observable pattern is that threats are common to lower class citizen organizations. The middle class citizen organization that was included in this pattern was the SEC (which had a lower class membership) which I have noted before. Being a protest organization it tended to deviate markedly in some characteristics from the typical middle class citizen organizations. In this case the tactics were carried to extremes.

The UCS/WC and STRESS/CCHR operated in a relatively threat-free environment. Therefore, the proposition can be considered true.

INTERACTION - deliberate involvement for decision-making purposes.

Preposition 10. Agencies attempt to force both lower class citizen organizations and middle class citizen organizations to inter-

TABLE 8-3

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION STYLE/TACTICS COMPARISONS

CASES			I				II								III					
CONCEPT	NO.	PROPOSITIONS	MNA		CGB		UCS		WC		LASED		SPC		STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
			8		12		3		8		8		5		9		8		7	
			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
STYLE/TACTICS	9	Threat	0	8	3	9	0	2 B1	6	1 DK1	3	5	2	3	0	9	8	0	0	7
	10	Interaction	8	0	8	4	3	0	5	3	6	2	2	3	4	4 DK1	4	4	0	5 DW2
	11	Manipulation	3	5	2	10	0	3	4	1 DK3	2	6	0	5	2	DK1 5	4	4	1	6
	12	Appeal To Higher Authority	2	6	0	12	2	1	4	1 DK3	0	8	3	5	4	DK1 4	0	8	0	7
	13	Competitive Staff	2	6	0	12	0	3	3	5	7	1	0	5	0	9	0	8	5	2

act via agency terms. Middle class citizen organizations are more accepting of this tactic than lower class citizen organizations.

MNA/CGB were federally mandated to interact with each other. However, this never occurred in the intended style. The interaction was continually fraught with conflict. Each wanted the other to interact on its terms. The Agency's method was based on a bureaucratic model, the CGB on random moves toward independence.

The SPC, in a desparate maneuver was trying to force the UCS to interact on their terms. The UCS tied to a financial/management style was playing a waiting game, which it could well afford to do because of its control of resources. The SEC refused to interact with STRESS on any terms and dominated the final decision because of the aforementioned peripheral events.

The UCS forced the WC and LASED to interact on their terms. The CCHR eventually persuaded STRESS to interact on its terms.

The proposition is generally true. The deviations can be attributed to the protest organization phenomenon.

MANIPULATION - is the achievement of insidious control to insure the advantage in decision-making.

Proposition 11. When confronted with crucial issues, agencies and lower class citizen organizations attempt to manipulate each other through secret maneuvers. Manipulative efforts between agencies and middle class citizen organizations are more difficult to identify.

Except for the UCS and the WC, the practice of manipulation as a tactic was considered legitimate and correct in order to survive. It is no mystery that the successful use of manipulation increases one's power, the real issue is whether the use of manipulative tactics

is "ethnical." Determining the answer to that question is beyond this study's limits of investigation.

The proposition is generally true.

APPEAL TO HIGHER AUTHORITY - is minimizing an opposite equal's role by seeking a party that has more power than the original negotiators to make the decision.

Proposition 12. Middle class citizen organizations when engaged in disputes with each other do not respectively seek the aid of higher authorities. Lower class citizen organizations and community agencies individually seek aid from some higher authority. Timing in making appeals is more sophisticated with middle class organizations and they do not petition for support like lower class organizations who because of powerlessness and lack of skills "go to the well too often."

All of the organizations made attempts to involve other forces in disputed decision situations. The CGB membership did this routinely, the WC employed the tactic the least.

Appeals to higher authorities in order to increase one's advantage in bargaining encounters is similar to the use of manipulation for the same purposes. While, from the data, it seems to be standard practice, an evaluation of its use for this study can only be conducted on two levels: 1. The purposes for which an A/C made the appeals, the level of need, and most important, the frequency; and 2. The type of power represented by the potential intervening authority.

The appeals were made when the weaker member at the decision-making situation believed that his alternatives would not be accepted. Sometimes the alternative were frivolous or a part of a larger stalling

maneuver.

The widest appeal was when the SEC and the CCHR went to the public to curtail STRESS. The proposition does not hold except for the WC.

COMPETITIVE STAFF - is the situation where staff members attempt to expand the organization's original goals and authority. Middle class citizen organizations tend to restrict their activities to the original goals. Agencies and lower class organizations are "Imperialistic" and carry long shopping lists, and agendas in their back pockets. Agencies try to expand their authority. Lower class citizens seek personal leverage and advantage.

From the evidence in the data most of the staffs were non-competitive, seemingly content to carry out the directions of either the Boards of Citizen Organizations or the Directors of Agencies. The CGB staff was the most docile, followed closely by the CCHR (who virtually ignored their staff). The SEC staff appeared to be the least organized, possibly because of its ad hoc nature.

The WC staff, according to the data, exhibited the tendencies that approximated the image of a staff that is pursuing separate goals and ignoring the wishes of the membership.

The Agency staffs adhering to their bureaucratic postures did not contest their organizations' goals except in case of the MNA, where individual staff members admitted to working quietly for the CGB cause.

The proposition does not hold.

STYLE/TACTIC CONCEPT SUMMARY

The style/tactic propositions indicate degrees of differences

in social class approaches to decision-making. The middle class relying less on aggressive behavior and more on its financial and bureaucratic resources in addition to its utilization of subtle political skills. Perhaps the pertinent observation is that the middle class organization or agency is itself a higher authority.

Another point is that the middle class does not have to make overt threats. The threat is implied: through its control or ownership of resources, it can always cut off the flow of resources needed by others. This is the essence of the mediation of control.

From the responses, I outlined descriptions of how the nine A/C, in this study, performed in the decision-making arena. They are succinctly stated below for general impressions:

I. MNA - bureaucratic, paternalistic, seeking to achieve and maintain power through interaction with the CGB on its own terms and control of the funds. Attempted to utilize "efficient" management techniques to accomplish objectives, especially the one of satisfying the Mayor;

II. CGB - unpredictable, non-bureaucratic, seeking to achieve and maintain power on its own terms through political action. Preoccupied with the acquisition of personal power through threats, manipulation and control of funds;

III. UCS - Smooth bureaucratic operation, maintaining power through control of funds and "efficient" planning techniques, with the additional use of manipulative acts and interaction with the Citizen Organizations;

IV. WC - Greatly committed and preoccupied with immediate tasks. Possessed much latent power, but disdained to use it. Proud

and confident. Relied on interaction to exist;

V. LASED - General self restriction to a specific community which led to some naivety; Stubborn and suspicious. Some mild threats with appeals to higher authority;

VI. SPC - Truculent, secretive and independent. Desires autonomy to carry out community help programs of its own. Is attempting to use threats and manipulation for these purposes;

VII. STRESS - Paramilitary in structure. Was preoccupied with daily duty assignments to the point of being insensitive to a portion of the general community's concerns. Confident and persistent. Used threats and appeals to the general community based on public safety issues;

VIII. CCHR - Bureaucratic, professional, confident and assured of prestige and status. Possesses many powerful contacts. Was able to appeal to higher authority with ease; and

IX. SEC - Hodge - podge conglomerate, somewhat disorganized but filled with revolutionary zeal. Truculent, totally unafraid, confident with no desire for interaction with STRESS. Utilized threats, manipulation, appeals to higher authority and political action to further its position in the making of decisions.

COMPETENCE

Competence is demonstrated ability to solve problems. Organizations develop competency through education, training and experiences from making decisions. Competence is vital for successful interaction. In most instances it reduces response time and when involved in confrontation and conflict, competence enables organizations to become innovative instead of distructive. (See Table 8-4 for Competence

TABLE 8-4

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION COMPETENCE COMPARISONS

CASES			I				II								III					
CONCEPT	NO.	PROPOSITIONS	MNA		CGB		UCS		WC		LASED		SPC		STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
			8		12		3		8		8		5		9		8		7	
			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
COMPETENCE	14	Training	4	4	6	6	3	0	8	0	5	3	3	2	9	0	8	0	6	0 B1
	15	Expertise	8	0	12	0	3	0	8	0	8	0	4	1	9	0	8	0	7	0
	16	Responsive-ness	1	7	1	11 B1	2	1	6	1 DK1	0	8	0	5	0	8 B1	5	3	1	6

propositions)

TRAINING - exposure to instruction that results in an improved ability to adequately perform tasks.

Proposition 14. Members of lower class organizations are deficient in skills that can be acquired in traditional educational institutions. Therefore, lower class citizen organizations are more at a disadvantage when relating to agencies than middle class citizen organizations.

Negative expressions from the MNA concerned its lack of adequate staff training for working with lower income people. Negative expressions from the CGB impinged on its lack of traditional educational techniques that could have helped the citizens to conceptualized the issues and corresponding strategies for decisions.

Agency response defined training as systematic on the job growth coupled with traditional education. Citizen responses defined training as a process of getting to know the community.

When close attention is paid to these citizen responses it is discovered that "knowledge" of the community is defined rather narrowly. This peculiar knowledge is often restricted to shifting and fragmented experiences that may have value under specified conditions, but on other occasions may be entirely meaningless.

Perhaps, this is the crux of lower class/middle class separation. An idea about the depth of the separation is captured from the state of the State of the Emergency Committee, where the middle class leadership controlled the lower class membership. I have doubts that the SEC would have been successful in reaching their goal without the middle class market capacity.

The proposition is true.

EXPERTISE - an exceptional skill in a specific area.

Proposition 15. The expertise for problem solving and decision-making in lower class organizations is likely to be an intimate knowledge of the life styles and dynamcis of the community under consideration. The expertise of the middle class is professioanl competence.

Almost all of the respondents regardless of A/C considered themselves experts in various aspects of decision-making. The Agencies, together with the WC and the CCHR cited their educational achievement and experience. The rest of the Citizen organizations detailed their knowledge of communities and community organization as reasons for qualifying themselves as experts.

The proposition is true.

RESPONSIVENESS - is the ability to react in a minimum time span for the purpose of problem solving.

Proposition 16. When called upon to: a. Meet deadlines; b. Be receptive to the ideas of others; lower class citizen organizations have difficulty with a. and b., agencies have difficulties with b. and middle class citizen organizations have difficulties with neither.

The most responsive organizations were the WC. All of the other organizations had very low response scores. The tendency was to cast the blame for their lack of response on some deficiency of the opposing organization. Responsiveness is very closely related to accountability, so this observation is consistent with the earlier finding of accountability.

The poor response of SEC and CCHR is probably due to their

function of protest organizations. Although, CCHR reacted, like the Agencies, in bureaucratic styles such as subtle stalling and refusals to be receptive to the ideas of others.

The proposition is generally true.

COMPETENCE CONCEPT SUMMARY

The scores for the training and expertise propositions responses for all of the organizations are fairly high. These data illustrates how the respondents positively perceive their abilities for problem solving in terms of knowledge and experience. However, it can be seen from the responsiveness scores that there is a serious discrepancy. The acknowledged training and expertise scoring levels are not sufficient to compensate for the low response rate which is necessary for the decision-making process for the solving of urban problems.

GOAL ORIENTATION

Goal Orientation: Consciously directed toward problem solving objectives. One indication of a mature and competent organization is the ability to handle side issues and at the same time not lose sight of the original goal if it still has legitimacy. Of prime importance is adequate knowledge about the processes of goal attainment. The ability to define problems, set goals, and devise strategies for reaching the goal is the essence of the process. (See Table 8-5 for the propositions)

PUBLIC/PRIVATE REGARDING

Public Regarding - consideration of community goals over personal goals. This posture allows for the consolidation of resources and power increases. It usually occurs when the individuals possess sur-

TABLE 8-5

COMMUNITY AGENCY/CITIZEN ORGANIZATION GOAL ORIENTATION COMPARISONS

CASES			I				II								III					
CONCEPT	NO.	PROPOSITIONS	MNA		CGB		UCS		WC		LASED		SPC		STRESS		CCHR		SEC	
			8		12		3		8		8		5		9		8		7	
			+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
GOAL ORIENTATION	17	Public/Private Regarding	6	1 DK1	9	3	3	0	8	0	2	5 DK1	0	5	6	3	7	1	3	2 B2
	18	Policy Formulation	7	1	11	1	3	0	6	2	6	2	1	4	6	2 DK1	8	0	4	2 DK2
	19	Issue Focused	7	1	8	4	3	0	7	1	8	0	1	4	7	0 DK2	8	0	3	3 DK1

pluses.

Private Regarding - considering the personal goals over community goals. This posture interferes with group decision-making and in the process dilutes group power. It usually occurs when the individual has a low supply of the basic survival resources.

Proposition 17. When negotiating with community agencies, middle class citizens organizations are more public regarding than lower class citizen organizations.

The responses were mixed, but one can observe the development of a distinct trend. While a majority of each A/C pair, except the SPC, declared a preference for public regarding, the signs clearly showed that rank and file membership were decidedly private regarding. The respondents explained this difference primarily on the lack of education and money.

The proposition is true.

Policy Formulation - the devising of definitions and strategies for the resolution of issues and the accomplishment of desired objectives. When policy formulation is efficient and effective it contributes to market capacity.

Proposition 18. Middle class organizations have less difficulty devising strategy for community decision-making than lower class organizations. Agencies also encounter difficulties in this area, but since they have specific skills in this function, they are more proficient than either class of citizen organization.

Most of the organizations had a procedure for the design of policy. MNA and UCS had utilized modern management concepts based on problem definition and goal setting. STRESS established a similar

structure that was heavily dependent on crime statistics data for its maintenance. The CGB due to its affiliation with the MNA and subjected to the same general guidelines had developed clearly enunciated policy procedures. Although, from the evidence a great deal of difficulty was encountered in attempting to meet these guidelines for policy formulations, citizens did benefit from the exposure to a systematic process of problem solving. The WC and the CCHR, both having backgrounds similar to the Agencies, were no strangers to the process and functioned in the same fashion. LASED, although, initially unfamiliar to the new methodologies soon began to adapt.

The SEC and the SPC were conspicuous by deliberately ignoring standard management practices and in turn devising their own concept of policy formulation. The substance of this method was not clearly defined.

The proposition is true.

Issue Focused - the ability to define the pertinent issues and puruse them whenever possible to closure, while excluding trivial, phony and irrelevant issues.

Proposition 19. Lower class organizations have more difficulty than middle class organizations and community agencies in focusing on central issues and stated goals.

The selection of salient issues is crucial to the policy formulation process. Therefore, as expected, the immediate previous pattern observed for policy formulation is closely duplicated for this proposition. As organizations take on more of the trappings of protest, correspondingly, the more "unpredictable" becomes the perception of the issues by the total membership.

The underlying problem is that citizen organizations (especially lower class) have the issues formally defined for them by agencies, either because the agencies have the resources or the citizens are confused. When issues emerge from the process of decision-making that capture their interests, they avoid direct confrontation with the agency for fear of losing resources. Defining and structuring issues is a part of competence.

The data supports the proposition.

The CGB and SPC are prime examples of citizen organizations that become immersed in side issues that are poorly formulated and presented. The conflict that swirls around them has a tendency to weaken the total problem solving structures. Agencies usually simply try to squash these disruptions, frequently not being aware of their causes or how they relate to decision-making.

The responses, generally, indicate that the leadership of various organizations tend to be more public regarding and the membership tends to be more private regarding. The more a citizen organization identifies with an agency the higher will be the probability of its being public regarding.

Significantly, the more education and money an individual possesses, the more likely will he tend to be public regarding. Finally, the more bureaucratic an organization is, the more structured is its policy-making process and the increased prospects of its developing membership consensus around issues.

SOCIAL CLASS EVALUATION

The History and Characteristics sections in Chapters IV, V, and

VI have allowed me to categorize individual members of each organization by social class. (See Tables 8-6 and 8-7) I am now at liberty to make some determinations about social class and the power conceptual scheme. This will help to explain what was going on.

This study has highlighted the observation that among the differences in social classes is the ability to appreciate the value of competence. It is important that the individual be exposed at an early age to the many forms of educational experiences that initiate and maintain competence. The best occurs in family groups, friendship nets, and neighborhood locations that systematically conditions the individual in the art of acquiring (style/tactics) the resources needed for the establishment of authority.

Authority helps to create and maintain power. It is important to remember that authority is not easily transferred across class lines. Latin Americans for Social and Economic Development and the WC are good examples of authority's low transferability. LASED, admittedly, in transit from the upper lower class to the lower middle class were still thoroughly "boxed" by the middle class United Community Services.

The Women's Committee, an upper middle class organization underwent the same treatment when the upper class made the final decision.

Saint Peter Claver and the Citizens Governing Board attempted to give their authority potential to their lower class fellow members and as a result their respective organizations were checkmated by the United Community Services and the Model Neighborhood Agency market capacity.

TABLE 8-6

SOCIAL CLASS PERCEPTIONS OF CITIZEN RESPONDENTS

CITIZEN ORGANIZATION	Member Organization[1]		Self			Confronting Agencies		Agency
	MC	LC	MC	LC	N/A	MC	LC	
CGB								MNA
Leadership	1	11	6	5	1	12	-	
Membership	1	11						
CCHR								STRESS
Leadership	8		8			6	2	
Membership	8						-	
SEC								
Leadership	6	1	4	1	2	7	-	
Membership		6						
Mixed								
WC	*							
Leadership	8		8			8		
Membership	8						-	
SPC								UCS
Leadership								
Mixed	5		3	2		5		
Membership		5				-	-	
LASED								
Leadership	8		8			8		
Membership		8						

*Lower upper and upper middle

TABLE 8-7

SOCIAL CLASS PERCEPTIONS OF
AGENCY RESPONDENTS

COMMUNITY AGENCY	Member Organization		Self			Confronting Citizen Organization		Citizen Organization
	MC	LC	MC	LC	N/A	MC	LC	
MNS	12		8	3	1		12	CGB
STRESS	6	3	9			9		CCHR
						9	9	SEC Leaders Members
UCS						2(2)		WC
	3		3			2(1)	2	SPC Leaders Members
							3(3) 3	LASED Leaders Members

Only 2 agency people related to SPC and WC[2] Lower upper and upper middle [1]mixed-mostly middle, [3]upper lower.

The middle class members of the State of the Emergency Committee maintained control of the organization and created the opposite by exerting their market capacity and out maneuvering middle class STRESS with the aid of the middle class Coordinating Council on Human Relations.

The conclusions are, that as lower class organizations develop style/tactics of the middle class their market capacity increases. This increase, as we have seen, may allow lower class organizations to help make changes in society. I believe it is a partial step in the direction of Warren's Paradigm II because it allows for changes in society. However, I do not believe, based on the data, that the lower class position in community decision-making will significantly change until its competence level and therefore, its power level is increased. This means that the lower class individual must undergo some therapeutic change. Her/his class position may not be his/her fault, but at present, reality does not give us any alternatives.

Finally, although I tried I could not find any lower lower class organizations for inclusion in this study. Perhaps the lower lower class market capacity is at such a low level they have no viable organizations.

CHAPTER IX

RECOMMENDATIONS

The data analysis conclusively indicates that the power conceptual scheme has validity for predicting community agency/citizen organization decision-making outcomes. The expectation is that lower class citizen organizations in most routine cases of decision-making will be in subordinate positions because they have less power than community agencies. Middle class citizen organizations, due to competence factors and access to resources are more equal in bargaining encounters with community agencies.

Lower class citizen organizations attempt to compensate for their inferior status through disruptive, uncooperative, truculent and "irrational" behavior. These displays in many instances reduce the effectiveness of social change efforts. The vicious circle is completed by citizens remaining in slum and blighted neighborhoods, going to poor schools, having insufficient health care and generally extending the culture of poverty.

In order to help ameliorate debilitating A/C conflict in decision-making I have constructed a set of recommendations based on the propositional evaluation that was generated in Chapter VIII (see Tables 9-1 through 9-5).

These tables outline the steps in the process I employed in going from the propositions to the recommendations. I first listed

TABLE 9-1

FOUNDATION FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
POWER*

PROPOSITION		EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
1. Powerlessness	(GT)	Lower class organizations have feelings of powerlessness Middle class organizations do not	Reduce lower class feelings of powerlessness
2. Fear	(F)	Fear is present in all organizations especially the lower class	Develop effective means for detecting fear
3. Authority	(T)	Agencies and middle class organizations have more power because they have more resources. The lower class lack resources, therefore they lack power.	Increase lower class resources (expertise)
4. Influence	(M)	Lower class has little if any, middle class various depending on the situation.	Increase resources of the lower class (expertise)

*Command of Resources
T = True
GT = Generally True
M = Mixed
GF = Generally False
F = False

Recommendations:
Education
Economic

TABLE 9-2

FOUNDATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
COMMUNICATION*

PROPOSITION	EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
5. Trust	(T) More trust between agencies and middle class organizations than agencies and lower class organizations. (Except when middle class organizations are protest.)	Encourage the sharing of identities to increase mutual trust
6. Access	(T) Access is easier to achieve and is more harmonious between agencies and middle class organizations.	Reduce hostility in meetings between agencies and lower class organizations.
7. Cooperation	(GT) Cooperation is more difficult to achieve between lower class organizations and agencies than middle class organizations and agencies.	Develop means to determine what is causing poor cooperation.
8. Accountability	(GT) Agencies have less accountability to all organizations. They do not share identities.	Establish minimum levels of accountability. (responsiveness)

*Strongly based on Competence

Recommendations:
Legal
Education

TABLE 9-3

FOUNDATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
STYLE/TACTICS*

PROPOSITION		EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
9. Threat	(GT)	Middle class organizations and agencies tend to operate in a threat free environment except when middle class organizations are protest lower class organizations and agencies use threat as standard procedures	Reduce threat tactics, they create a hostile atmosphere for bargaining
10. Interaction	(GT)	Agencies attempt to force all citizens to interact on their terms. Middle class organizations are more accepting of this behavior than lower class organizations.	Establish ground rules for interaction.
11. Manipulation	(GT)	There is more manipulation between agencies and lower class organizations except middle class organizations in protest.	Establish parameters for the reduction of extreme manipulation
12. Appeal to Higher Authority	(GF)	Except for middle class organizations with high shared identities.	Teach lower class citizen organizations the techniques of of using higher authority.

*Strongly based on Competence

Recommendations:
Legal
Education

TABLE 9-3-Continued

PROPOSITION	EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
13. Competitive Staff	(F) Does not hold	--

* Strongly based on Competence

Recommendations:
Legal
Education

TABLE 9-4

FOUNDATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
COMPETENCE*

PROPOSITION		EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
14. Training	(T)	Lower class citizen organizations are more at a disadvantage in bargaining with agencies than middle class citizen organizations.	Increase training of lower class citizen organizations.
15. Expertise	(T)	Middle class citizen organization expertise is competence. Lower class citizen expertise is community knowledge.	Expand skills of lower class citizen organizations beyond "community knowledge."
16. Responsiveness	(GT)	Middle class citizen organization unresponsiveness due to protests. Lower class citizen organizations have trouble meeting deadlines and being receptive to ideas of others. Agencies have difficulty being receptive.	Establish minimum levels of responsiveness of all organizations. (Accountability)

*Strongly related to Power

Recommendations:
Education

TABLE 9-5

FOUNDATIONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
GOAL ORIENTATION*

PROPOSITION		EVALUATION	OBJECTIVE
17. Public/Private Regarding	(T)	Middle class citizen organizations are more public regarding than lower class citizen organizations.	Teach lower class citizen organizations the relevance of public regarding
18. Policy Formulation	(T)	Middle class organizations have less difficulty devising strategy than lower class citizen organizations.	Teach lower class citizen organizations the proper techniques of policy formulation.
19. Issue Focused	(T)	Lower class citizen organizations have more difficulty than middle class citizen organizations and agencies in focusing on central issues and stated goals.	Teach lower class citizen organizations the value of concentrating on central and valid issues

* Strongly related to Competence

Recommendations:
Education

the proposition. Next, I presented its evaluation. Last, I provided a general objective, based on the evaluation, that is needed to reduce conflict and promote harmonious change. The recommendation is a specific means of arriving at the objectives via the power concepts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are sorted into three categories; legal, educational, and economic.

LEGAL

The data has colorfully illustrated how random and uncoordinated community decision-making can be. Federal guidelines have been vague, and local and state regulations for citizen participation have been non-existent. Therefore, I am making a specific recommendation that a body of citizen participation law be established. Since many disputes involving citizen participation are eventually resolved by the judiciary, this approach should not be considered constraining.

Substantively, the law should be an instrument for regulating representation, funding and jurisdiction. The court empowered to judge disputes should, also, include among its purview, laws and ordinances concerning housing and health codes, zoning regulations, and subdivision regulations. This would also be a logical place for pollution controversies and property disputes of all types to be settled.

Arbitration should be a central focus of the court's structure. These arbitration panels should be composed of skilled persons, who not only know the law, but who have experience and training in urban problem solving. Such sensitive positions should not be available to

individuals who neither desire or understand the rationale for community change. "The foxes should not be let in the hen house."

A body of citizen participation law would be expected to accomplish several things.

1. It would reduce unnecessary delays in decision-making by having the court or arbitration panel, when needed, make rulings based on law and fact.

2. It would aid in the orderly expenditure of funds. Much discussion has concerned the need for additional financial assistance to cities. However, it is generally known, though seldom documented that often cities have not been able to spend, as scheduled, any significant amounts of grant allocations because consensus between community agencies and citizen organizations could not be reached.

3. A court should monitor decision-making conflict with an expressed purpose of retarding escalation, before it reached the point of physical violence.

4. The major function of the court would be to aid the participants during times of urban decision-making crisis so that original goals of promoting the general welfare would not be overlooked.

EDUCATIONAL

This study of power and decision-making has clarified the role of competence in decision-making. Competence is the mechanism that regulates the use of power and makes possible further acquisition of power. Therefore, the powerless must have access to adequate means for the development of competence so that they can effectively bargain for community change.

The data have illustrated an array of deficiencies of lower

class citizen organization members. The reasons for these deficiencies can be traced to faulty educational experiences and peculiar life styles. As a result, they have difficulty with conceptualization processes. They find it difficult to define problems that require wide ranging solutions. They cannot "see the forest for the trees."

Therefore, it is relatively easy to become embroiled in side issues such as fights for stipends and avoid the difficult immediate problems that necessitate "hard" thinking.

What is worse is that they fall victims to their own inadequacies and are frequently outmaneuvered in decision-making, not realizing what caused defeat. As a result, they have a tendency to blame the wrong factors. Being so diverted they get nowhere.

My recommendation for a partial solution to the problem is to subject citizens to intensive study in the making of decisions. They should be taught how to be responsive and accountable. For example, they should learn the tactics of unresponsiveness to one's political opponents (in order to delay action, set up later action, etc.) and how to distinguish it from incompetence, in which citizens simply don't know how to react. Much effort should be spent teaching issue analyses, and how to tell "what's really going on."

Students in elementary and high school should be required to take courses in community decision-making so that community leadership is developed.

This study establishes that there is an important precondition to competent lower class citizen participation in the political arena. It is that there must be some continuing organization or institution that has resources at stake in the competent participation by local

groups and therefore, will invest sufficient resources to train local leadership. Until such training programs exist on a large scale, then, the lower class will inevitably be "losers" in decision-making.

Our society has seen, at least, three examples of training of lower class people to take competent roles in complex and bureaucratic decision-making settings. These are labor unions' training of rank-and-file members for shop stewards and negotiators; the Community Action Program (CAP) in the Office of Economic Opportunity; and the precinct and ward delegate system of the big urban political machines. Each of these examples shows that intelligent and sophisticated participation can come from the more motivated members of the lower class if only they are given training and opportunity.

ECONOMICS

Economics is the basis for a majority of community bargaining encounters. The issues, usually, revolve around scarcity, its definition, and who receives the benefits. This is the place where goal conflict is born.

This study establishes that there is another important precondition to competent citizen participation by the lower class in community issues. Unless this precondition is satisfied by the larger society, citizen participation efforts will give short shrift to the lower class. This precondition is that there has been an effective mechanism to provide for a minimum level of life. Once these more basic needs are satisfied, then competent citizen participation in the political arena will be possible.

My recommendations for the reduction of economic based conflict in community agency/citizen organization decision-making are:

1. Detect and remove all loopholes of profit making from the act of citizen participation.

2. Provide adequate funding for citizen participation expenses, all of which should be paid through a carefully constructed voucher system.

3. Establish conflict of interest guidelines and give citizens the reasons for their applications.

4. Establish the "right" (and "duties") of citizens to personal and organizational resources. These include both income and technical aid.

CONCLUSION

Citizen participation is not a simple concept. It is an exceedingly complicated notion and it becomes more complex as attempts are made to involve the lower classes in community decision-making.

Fundamentally, it is a struggle between the haves and the have nots. This struggle escalates, sometimes, when the haves, in responding to pressure, attempt to minimally satisfy the have nots.

The struggle is conducted through the utilization of an elaborate social power ritual that on close examination shows how futile the struggle is for the majority of the have nots.

Power is usually acquired and maintained through its prized element - competence. Competence is the key resource upon which the acquisition of other resources depend. Competence is derived from life style and training and it becomes more accessible as the social class order is ascended.

Unless the distribution of competence is wider, social power

will remain concentrated in the upper middle and upper classes. Urban planners who have an interest in changing the lower class and lower middle class positions in the decision-making process must be made to realize that they have to change lower class attitudes about the value of competence.

In order to succeed with this objective, it has to be proven to the lower class that competence is an integral part of power and power is the controlling factor in decision-making. This observation is the major result of the study.

APPENDIX

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

SOCIAL CLASS, CITIZEN ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL PROGRAMMING AGENCY INTERACTION IN URBAN DEVELOPMENT DECISION MAKING

INTERVIEW GUIDE

THE ORGANIZATION

1. Name_____

2. What is the organization's general structure, function, and goal?

   a. Who does it serve?

3. How long has the organization been in existence?

4. If the specific program is a subset of the organization, how long has it been in existence?

5. What is your present (the interviewee's) role in the agency?

a. What other roles have you had in the agency?

6. What specific event(s) pertaining to urban decision making have you been involved in?

7. How would you describe the social status of the members in your organization?

   a. Upper _____

   b. Middle _____

   c. Working _____

   d. Don't Know _____

8. For what reasons do you describe them as such?

9. What level of social status would you describe the majority of the members of the _____organization?

10. For what reasons do you describe them as such?

11. What has been the general nature of the relationship of (your) _____ (organization) with the _____ organization?

a. Partnership _____

b. Adversary _____

c. Coalition _____

d. Other _____

Around specific events, if any? (Describe in detail)

12. What has been the nature of your involvement with_____ organization on behalf of (your) _____ organization? (Describe in detail)

a. Boundary Spanner _____

b. Investigator _____

c. Other _____

13. List what issues (your)_____ (organization) considers the most important?

    a. Political _____

    b. Social _____

    c. Economic _____

    d. Other _____

14. Can you name those organizations that you and_____ (organization) consider parties to the problem-solving activities?

15. Where was the site(s) located for the interactions?

THE CONCEPTS AND VARIABLES

COMMUNICATION

Mutual Trust

16. Does your organization think that mutual trust is a problem with _____ (organization)?

a. Name some critical events that engendered trust.

b. Name some critical events that engendered distrust.

17. Do you think that the results of these events affects:

    a. The individuals in the other organization?

    b. The appropriate roles in the other organization?

    c. The other organization as a whole?

Accountability

18. Did the other side make an effort to show (your)_____ (organization) that their strategy was worthwhile?

    a. Gave adequate explanations -

    b. Showed concern for the other points of view -

    c. Provided a feedback structure -

    d. Other -

Cooperation and Information

19. What are some specific activities (your)_____ (organization) engaged in with _____ organization?

a. Structure _____

b. Mailings _____

c. Clerical _____

d. Goals _____

e. Problem Solving _____

20. Were the recommendations for decisions acceptable to both parties?

Secretiveness

21. Does _____ organization believe that the other organization has intentionally withheld vital information about specific urban development projects?

a. Political contacts -

b. Higher level sources -

c. Membership lists -

d. Financial assets -

e. Equipment and materials -

f. Other -

22. What were some results of the withholding?

Access

23. Has (your)_____ (organization) had any difficulty obtaining meetings with members and leaders of _____(organization)?

24. How would you describe the tone of these meetings?

a. Cordial -

b. Hostile -

c. Cooperative -

d. Contrived -

Was there agreement to have more meetings?

Which side proposed further meetings?

Is there a structure for access? (Describe it)

Powerlessness

25. How much does your organization consider the element of power when it decides strategy?

26. How much does it think about power in terms of the tactics of the other side? (The consciousness of power)

a. We're going to blow'em out of the water

b. We understand their position so we'll go easy

Fear

27. Can you describe any examples that appear to have been vendettas against your organization?

28. a. Did this make your organization somewhat afraid to participate any more with that organization?

b. Did you or other members have the feeling that the other organization was negotiating with your organization out of fear?

Authority

29. As you know, it takes (or took) various efforts and things to help solve the _____ (problem). What resources did your organization contribute that significantly aided in solving the problem? (Money, manpower, expertise, facilities, equipment, supplies, etc.)

a. Did your organization have a difficult time acquiring those resources. Explain.

b. Did you think that both sides tended to use resources as levers?

Influence

30. What do you think the general community's perceptions are toward the weight that (your organization)_____ carries in decision making? What do you think?

a. What are the other organizations' perceptions? Explain.

b. How were you able to use your influence?

1. Controlled most decisions -

2. Brought in dominate forces -

3. Other -

c. What did your opponents do to counteract your influence?

STYLE/TACTICS

Threat

31. When (your organization) _____ was working on the project, did the _____ (organization) warn it either directly or indirectly to cease its intervention in the decision making process?

    a. If so, what did it do?

    b. Why do you think it did so?

    c. Did anyone threaten you or your organization?

       In what ways? How did it happen?

Interaction

32. Does (your organization) _____ freely seek to involve itself in activities with _____ (organization) in order to solve mutual problems?

a. How does it do this? Are there limited demands and objectives or is the involvement around unlimited demands and objectivies?

Manipulation

33. Does (your organization) _____ believe it is necessary at times to become involved in secret political maneuvers in order to gain some control of the decision-making process?

a. Describe some of these maneuvers.

b. What strategies are these good/not good for?

Appeal to Higher Authority

34. In working on _____ (project), did (your organization) _____ involve or try to involve the courts or some other authority (mayor, city councilmen, clergymen, congressmen, governor, etc.) to intervene on their behalf?

Competitive Staff

35. Who had the most influence in defining day to day goals and responses of the (your organization) _____?

a. Staff _____

b. Director _____

c. Members _____

d. Others _____

e. Don't Know _____

Explain in detail.

36. How important is the staff in setting the style and tactics of the organization?

a. Very important -

b. Important -

c. Somewhat Important -

d. Unimportant -

Why is this so?

37. Do you think most people in these situations find it effective to talk violence or use violence?

a. As a tactic, has (your organization) _____ ever become involved in or considered confrontation tactics during conflicts with the other side?

b. Name some and explain how they affected the decision-making.

COMPETENCE

Training

38. How have the individual members of (your organization)_____ _____ prepared themselves to carry out their specific assignments?

a. On the job training _____

b. Professional schools _____

c. Vocational schools _____

d. High school or less _____

e. College _____

f. Special workshop and seminars _____

39. How well has this worked out in practice?

Expertise

40. Name some of the areas that members of (your organization) _____ are skilled in that enables _____ to accomplish its goals.

a. Cite some specific applications.

b. How helpful would it have been (or is it) if your organization's members had skills and training in:

1. Leadership -

2. Legal Approaches -

3. Grantsmanship -

4. Fiscal -

5. Organization Theory -

6. Other -

Responsiveness

41. Many times people are unhappy about the way things are going. Who criticized your organization internally and externally about:

a. Failure to meet deadlines?

b. Low receptivity to ideas?

c. Lack of willingness to talk over problems?

42. Has (your organization) _____ ever been accused _____ the other organization of:

a. Failure to meet deadlines?

b. Low receptivity to ideas?

c. Lack of willingness to talk over problems?

43. Do you think, in general, that it takes longer to reach decisions in urban development problem solving?

a. Why is this so?

Private and Public Regarding

44. Which do you think is the most important:

a. Solving the immediate problems that affect you directly _____ or,

b. Solving long range problems that affect the general community _____

44AA. If A, is it because:

1. The uncertainty of the future._____

2. You can't effect the outcome of what happens to the rest of the people. _____

3. You want to protect what you see and understand. _____

4. Other

44BB. If B, is it because:

1. Eventually it will all work out to the good. _____

2. You are a part of everyone else's welfare. _____

3. Other _____

c. What does the leadership of your organization think is the most important, the immediate or the long rang?

_____

Why?

d. What does the rank and file think is the most important? _____

Why?

Policy Formation

45. What is (your organization) _____ 's ideas and methods about the development of means to reach the goals.

a. Does the leadership consult with the rank and file on this?

Issue Focused

46. How does (your organization) _____ set priorities on the various problems of its particular porject?

a. Who was most important in your organization for these issues?

b. Were there factions? What did they do?

Income Seeking

47. Should boards of agencies and organizations be salaried? _____

a. Should they be given expense monies? _____

1. How much and in what way? Explain _____

48. Has there been any controversy about payments to board members. Explain.

Now, I'd like to find out a few things about you:

49. Age: 16-20 _____ 21-30 _____ 31-40 _____ 41-50 _____ 51+ _____

50. Income: 0-$5,000 _____ $5,000-$10,000 _____ $10,000-$15,000 _____
$15,000-$20,000+ _____

51. Education: 0-8 _____ 9-12 _____ College 1-2 _____ 3-4 _____
Grad School _____ Professional School _____

52. Occupation (at time of events): _____

53. Occupation (at present): _____

54. Race _____

55. Residence _____

56. Social Class _____

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