PRALL'S AESTHETICS

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Michigan
1955

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This study is the first comprehensive investigation of Prall's aesthetics, and its aim is to make his difficult to understand, and, consequently, often misunderstood theory more easily and better understood, being neither a critique nor a defense.

The procedure followed to accomplish this aim includes an unified, expository interpretation of Prall's aesthetic publications, a comparison of some of his views with Dewey's and Santayana's, an investigation and assessment of a considerable number of interpretations of Prall's views, a summary of his "contributions" to aesthetics, and some possible criticisms of some of Prall's positions.

The exposition centers around five main problems of Prall's aesthetics: 1) The isolation of the aesthetic field, the subject matter of aesthetic theory, which Prall calls "surface"; 2) the nature of aesthetic theory and the kind of knowledge of which it consists; 3) the relation between the knowledge provided by aesthetic theory and aesthetic appreciation; 4) a theory of expression which reconciles an expression theory of art and his notion of "surface"; and 5) the functions of criticism given his notion of aesthetic knowledge.

After an exposition of Prall's views on the above problems, a comparison between them and Santayana's and Dewey's views on them reveals that, contrary to general opinion, Prall is closer to Dewey with whom he has striking and important resemblances.

This close similarity to Dewey and the contextualist interpretation given to Prall in this study reveals that:

a) Surface has been too narrowly interpreted by most people. For Prall surface is the qualitative content of perceptual or imaginative situations, and includes more constituent qualities than merely colors or tones, and form, but also includes what have been variously called expressed or affective or tertiary qualities.

b) Prall's notion of surface and his resolution of expressed factors, feelings and emotions, into sense-presented qualities indicates that he attempted to develop a theory of expression consistent with a sense-presented notion of the aesthetic field.

c) Contrary to most interpretations, the present study interprets Prall as holding a presentational theory of expression rather than an association theory, because for Prall expressed factors are sensuously presented.

d) A discernment and understanding of the above three points requires an understanding of the "informing" role of cognition in primarily perceptual aesthetic experience. Neglect of Prall's view about this epistemological problem

probably accounts for most mis-interpretations.

The general conclusion to be drawn from the study is that this new interpretive approach to Prall based on a "contextual" analysis of surface provides a better understanding of Prall's solution to his central problem, expression, and provides a means for better coordinating Prall's attempts to develop the solutions of a presentational aesthetics to some problems of aesthetics.

PREFACE

There are few careful interpretations of Prall and no comprehensive ones. Further, in the main I have had to go against the grain of the existing interpretations, so that my interpretative efforts have been "lonely." This is a difficult role for the philosophical neophyte, but a necessary one for growth, for honest philosophy in its final dependence on the self is essentially a lonely task. Things must be thought through to the satisfaction of no one except the thinker and to go beyond accepted doctrine is to go alone.

This study aims only at communicating my understanding of Prall, and does not undertake a criticism nor a defence of Prall's position. Understanding someone's philosophy completely is difficult, and I have found that trying to communicate an understanding is more difficult, but, though imperfectly, I hope I have improved on the comprehension of Prall.

I must thank Professor Charles L. Stevenson for suggesting a study of Prall, for Prall has proved extremely informative and interesting to me. Professor Stevenson has also, and for this he is to be thanked, put in the word which made me dissatisfied with my previous efforts, though I don't mean to imply complete satisfaction with the present effort. Complete satisfaction is to be mistrusted.

Of all the written matter about Prall by far the most perceptive, and the one from which I most profited on the positive side, is Isabel C. Hungerland's short essay on

Prall's aesthetics.

Professor Stephen C. Pepper and Professor Arnold Isenberg have stimulated me in discussions on aesthetics, which often began with a discussion of Prall but soon veered off into other matters, as philosophical discussions in the oral tradition are apt to do.

The late Margaret Prall, the sister of David W. Prall, was very kind to me. She was surely one of the most gracious of ladies. She encouraged me, and gave me access to David Prall's papers and notes. To my sorrow and dismay she died very suddenly, and I should like to have had her read these thanks.

It is to my wife Susan that I owe most. Philosophical activity may be a lonely activity, but life is not, and I am very grateful to her for having taken so much on herself to make that activity possible. Much of the world's academic work would never be done if it were not for her kind.

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INTRODUCTION

The present study has a single aim: to provide easier and better understanding of an important aesthetic theory, being neither a critique nor a defense.

I try to accomplish my aim by several methods.

The first way is by giving, in the first five chapters, an interpretative exposition of Prall's most important and/or misunderstood views. I have organized my exposition around the six problems that I think are of main importance in Prall's aesthetic theory. The first main problem for Prall is the isolation of the aesthetic field, the subject matter of aesthetics. This field for Prall is what he roughly called "surface." My first chapter is a fairly detailed investigation of this notion and its relation to aesthetic experience. The second problem, which occupies the second chapter, is the nature of aesthetic science, or knowledge, and its method. The connection between aesthetic knowledge and aesthetic appreciation constitutes the third main problem. This is mainly a discussion of form in conception and perception. The last part of Chapter II and all of Chapter III are given over to the third problem.

Prall holds that works of art are an important segment of aesthetic surface and that they, as human products, have to be accounted for. Giving an adequate theory of art is the fourth main problem in Prall's aesthetics. The first part of the fourth chapter is devoted to a brief resume of

Prall's expression theory of art.

Given Prall's conception of the aesthetic field (surface), and his theory of art (expression), he must show that they can both be held consistently. Thus his fifth problem and its solution forms the climax of his aesthetic theory. The remainder of Chapter IV is devoted to the exposition of Prall's theory of expression. The sixth main problem, which comes as an anti-climax, is the account of criticism and its relation to the foregoing aesthetic theory. I take up this problem in Chapter V.

My exposition introduces several new terms. On the whole I do not think this should be practiced indiscriminately; new terms should be kept to a minimum. This I have tried to do; but I found myself wanting to make distinctions for purposes of clarity and expression several times, and either finding established terms unsuitable or unavailable, was forced to coin new terms. Prall pretty much confined himself to the traditional vocabulary, but he has been so much misunderstood that I took this as another excuse for introducing new terms.

My exposition omits discussion of Prall's actual analysis of aesthetic materials for two reasons. It would increase the length of this study too much, and the material is not difficult enough to require interpretation. Prall's analysis of materials occupies Chapters VI - IX in Aesthetic Judgment and Chapters II and III in Aesthetic Analysis.

I maintain, using S. C. Pepper's terminology, that

Prall is a contextualist rather than a mechanist, which is contrary to the other interpretations that I have found. Prall is usually thought to be closer to Santayana than anyone; no one suggests that Prall has any important resemblance to Dewey. In maintaining that Prall is a contextualist, and so interpreting him in my exposition, I am in effect asserting that there are some important resemblances between Prall and Dewey. In order to show the justness of this stand, in the sixth chapter I go into a fairly detailed comparison of Prall, Dewey and Santayana. The comparative method is my second method of inducing an understanding of Prall.

I continue with the comparative method in Chapter VII, this time comparing other interpretations with my own in order to sharpen the lines of difference that cleave my interpretation and the usual ones. In addition, the repetition of some of the points in a new context often helps to clarify important details.

The mass of the source material for my exposition is drawn from Prall's two books on aesthetics, Aesthetic Judgment (1929) (abbreviated in this study to "AJ") and Aesthetic Analysis (1936) (abbreviated in this study to "AA"). Other material is used as indicated to support and/or fill out what he says in these two books. Though the source materials are plural, I present a single theory, which means that I hold that the sources reveal consistent doctrines. Chapter VIII is an examination of the consistency between the two main

sources. I shall maintain that, though there are differences in emphasis and treatment of some topics, the sources involve no repudiation by or real inconsistency of one with the other.

My ninth chapter will attempt to outline what is distinctive about Prall's aesthetic theory, which should add another dimension to the understanding of Prall.

In the last chapter I attempt to indicate some areas where Prall is weak and open to possible criticism. For some of the criticisms I formulate the kind of answer Prall could give consistent with his aesthetic theory.

CHAPTER I

SURFACE, BEAUTY AND EXPERIENCE

1.1 Surface.

I shall begin my exposition of Prall's aesthetic theory with that part for which he seems to be best known, his conception of the aesthetic field, of the subject matter of aesthetic theory. One frequently runs into references to "surface," the term which more than any other he uses to name the aesthetic field.

> Not beauty only but also the aesthetically unsatisfactory; not the beauty or ugliness of the arts alone, but the whole panorama presented to us through our senses, the surface of our experienced world, is the field of the aesthetic. (AA, 5)

Prall here mentions, and rejects, two candidates for the office of aesthetic subject matter: Beauty and the arts (and later particularly the masterpieces of art). Nor, to name another, does he accept Santayana's conception of the field, human sensibility, for aesthetics is not a psychological investigation.

By accepting "surface" as the subject matter of aesthetic theory Prall commits himself to what I shall call a presentational aesthetic.[1] It is this conception of the field and particularly his attempt to solve some problems of aesthetics in terms which are consistent with the notion of

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[1] The term "presentational" was first used to my knowledge by Professor Arnold Isenberg.

surface that constitute Prall's main contribution to aesthetics. Consequently, it will repay us to give close attention to the notion of surface.

Before I proceed to an analysis of the notion of surface, I should note that in AJ Prall appears to propose a different subject matter for aesthetics. This occurs at the beginning of that book, where he proposes aesthetic judgment as the starting point for his aesthetics. He says his investigation is to be into the meaning of aesthetic judgments. He then proceeds to distinguish aesthetic judgments from aesthetic experience, and from critical and other types of judgment. However, this proposal is misleading, for when he begins to investigate the meaning of aesthetic judgments he begins to investigate that which the judgments refer to. He has a denotational notion of meaning, with respect to aesthetic judgments at least, that is, he uses "meaning" in such a way that it is identical with that to which it refers.

> The face of the whole world that we live in, as it appears to men who are attentive to it and discriminate its actually presented surface aspects, is what aesthetic judgment refers to as its meaning. (AJ, 339)

Thus, AJ does not actually, but only apparently, differ with AA in its characterization of the aesthetic field. Even a superficial glance at the two books will show their parallel practice.

The first thing to be noted about the term "surface" is its metaphorical character. The term is a striking one, like all good metaphors, but it also shares the non-explicit-

ness of metaphor. In virtue of what characteristics possessed by that which is named in the term's literal use can the term be applied to aesthetic data metaphorically?

The literal use of "surface" roughly designates the "top" or "outside" of physical objects. The "surface" of an object is one of the aspects of an object; another aspect is that which lies "beneath" the surface, the "inside" of an object. The surface aspect, for example, the outside of a box, is perceived, while the contents of the box are not perceived. The contents are thought about or inferred to, and are not presented to us in the same way that the outside of the box is. Thus Prall can use "surface" metaphorically to designate the aesthetic field if he limits the field to that which is sensed, and he does.

However, Prall does not intend to limit the aesthetic field to that which is visually sensed. He wants to include sounds, tastes, odors, etc., as part of the aesthetic field, so interpreting "surface" as the "outside" is too literal, for we do not ordinarily think of the sound of a bell, or the odor of a cheese as part of the "outside," or "surface," of a bell or cheese. It would be better to generalize the notion by speaking of "surface" simply as "the sensed aspect of objects."

"The sensed aspect of objects" is considered the appearance of objects. If we are asked to give a description of anything we list those characteristics that constitute its appearance. Here again we have to extend the notion of

appearance beyond visual characteristics; the sounding tone of a bell, for example, is part of the appearance of a bell, an aspect of it which appears. To emphasize that the surface aspect of objects is their appearance, and to distinguish aesthetic surface from the physical surface of objects in the formula ("sensed aspect of objects") I replace "aspect" with "appearance." "Surface" is "the sensed appearance of objects." Since Prall is not a naive realist in epistemology, "surface" is not to be identified with the physical surface.

> Thus aesthetic experience is an experience of an object as apprehended delightfully, primarily too, as so apprehended through the senses. This is what is properly signified by the term aesthetic in the first place, and it is the primary meaning, never to be neglected in the analysis of aesthetic experiences.[2]

I shall discuss aesthetic experience in more detail later, but for now I only wish to emphasize that the aesthetic experience is a perceptual experience. So far our formula, as containing "sensed," is not misleading. However, the formula, "the sensed appearance of objects," is only a first approximation since it is misleading as a whole. It suggests that Prall is a sense-data empiricist, whereas I interpret Prall as a contextualist. Such an interpretation will require

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2 AJ, 19. Note also, for it will be of great importance in our discussions of language and its surface aspects, that in the following quotation Prall holds that sensuous imagination qualifies as surface as well as actual sense experience. "Experience is genuinely and characteristically aesthetic only as it occurs in transactions with external objects of sense or with the objects of sensuous imagination held clearly before the mind in intuition." AJ, 28.

modification of "of objects," and additional care in the elucidation of "appearance" and "sensed," leading to a new formula for surface. "Surface" will then be: "the content of a perceptual experience." This terminology will serve to distinguish Prall, as a contextualist, from a sense-data empiricist, because "content" is more inclusive than "sensed appearance." "Sensed appearance" often refers to sense-data, ultimate, irreducible, atomic, 'given' elements with object-ive reference. Prall is most often interpreted as limiting surface to such elements -- colors, tones, tastes, odors and a 'decorative' arrangement of them; this is too narrow an interpretation of surface.

A major reason for interpreting Prall as a contextualist is the similarity of his and Dewey's account of the perceptual situation. Further, Prall and Dewey do not draw the same distinction in molar experience between sense- and non-sense-data that a Humean would. I shall show this in more detail as I proceed. For now, I begin to develop the notion of surface from a contextualist viewpoint with an account of the perceptual situation and a comparison with Dewey.

> ... when, to use Mr. Dewey's own terms, our doing has its own felt consummation ... then the aesthetic has taken on its distinctive character. This is immediate quality, directly felt as the unifying completion of the process of emotional perception. And to any conscious perception at all some degree of emotion is requisite ... The concrete object of aesthetic perception is just this determinate and emotionally intuited content. (AA, 9)

Two concepts are of central importance for both the account of Prall's notion of the perceptual experience and

the comparison with Dewey: Quality and situation or transaction.

In the quotation above "immediate quality, directly felt as the unifying completion of the process" is crucial. Experience is considered a process; it is unified by a total quality; this quality is modified by emotion. I call this total quality of a molar experience the t-total-quality. T-total-quality is identical with the notion of quality developed by Dewey in his aesthetic theory and in his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Chapter IV, from which the following passages are taken.

> It is to be remarked that a situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or felt.
>
> The pervasively qualitative is not only that which binds all constituents into a whole but it is also unique; it constitutes each situation an individual situation, indivisible and unduplicable.
>
> There is another difficulty in grasping the meaning of what has been said. It concerns the use of the word "quality." The word is usually associated with something specific, like red, hard, sweet; that is, with distinctions made within a total experience. The intended contrasting meaning may be suggested, although not adequately exemplified, by considering such qualities as are designated by the terms distressing, perplexing, cheerful, disconsolate. For these words do not designate specific qualities in the way in which hard, say, designates a particular quality of a rock. For such qualities permeate and color all the objects and events that are involved in an experience.[3]

These passages indicate the similarity of Dewey's quality with Prall's t-total-quality: Quality is of and unifies

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[3] John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938) pp 66-69.

a process and Dewey's names for them indicate its emotional character.

From the above it is also clear that Dewey closely ties quality to a situation. The following quotations from Dewey indicate that the relation between quality and situation is the same for him as for Prall. They also form the bridge to the discussion of Prall's conception of the perceptual transaction.

> The qualities of situations in which organisms and surrounding conditions interact ...
>
> ... a certain quality of the active relationship of organism and environment.
>
> The qualities never were "in" the organism; they always were qualities of interactions in which both extra-organic things and organisms partake.[4]

Quality occurs in a situation. For Prall quality is the result of a transaction, the result of an interaction between an object and a subject.

> Nature is not static, and we are not outside nature looking on; but all things, all human beings among them, act and react in a continuum of moving reality both spatial and temporal. Not only the physical world but all life is a flux. (AJ, 7)
>
> We do not dissolve into natural processes. We are self-preserving nodes in the intricate and infinite matrix of natural flux. And only as we can, so to speak, condense process into quality ... or ... only as we become aware of felt qualitative content, are we even conscious. (AA, 8)

Three terms from these quotations require elucidation: flux, self-preserving nodes and condense.

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[4] John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court, 1925), pp 259 and 260.

By flux Prall apparently means no more than that nature occurs, that is, that we require for a description of nature the category of event. This is best explained in connection with the other term, "self-preserving nodes." A self-preserving node could be a chair, or a human body, that is, anything that we generally call an object. An object is not the kind of thing that is irreducible. "Object" is not a primitive term. An object is a system of events, such that the system of events is preserved, maintains its identity as distinct from other such systems, as a chair is and remains distinct from the man sitting on it. The system of events called the chair Prall calls a physical process. The system of events called the man Prall divides into two processes, the physiological and the psychological processes. Now consider a situation such as the following. The man is looking at the chair. In this situation there is a transaction, that is, interaction between two sets of processes. The chair is a system of events, and a certain set of light rays are reflected from it, which in turn enter the man's eye and excite physiological processes, thence to the brain, at which time a certain psychological event may occur, such as recognition. At the end of this transaction we have quality, of which the man is aware. How, from this series of events, which can be seen as a transaction between two systems of events, do we get quality? It is condensed. This is obviously a metaphorical term, nowhere explained by Prall; nor, I suppose, is that process of passing from event to quality, called by Prall conden-

sation, explained by anyone. Prall owes much of this account to Dewey as he acknowledges in AA, pp 8-9.[5]

So far in the process of interpreting "surface" from a contextualist viewpoint, and showing why Prall should be so interpreted, I have t-total-quality as the "content of a perceptual experience." Surface is t-total-quality. T-total-quality occurs in a perceptual experiencing transaction. I shall borrow the next step of my interpretation from Dewey, thus extending the contextualist analysis into an area where Prall is not clear. I justify the extension on the basis of the similarity of Prall's t-total-quality and transaction to Dewey's "quality" and "situation." Prall's notions of "thin" and "thick" surface will later provide another reason for so extending the analysis.

T-total-quality is a fusion of several constituents. They are qualities and relations that can be discriminated in t-total-quality; they are recurrent and repeatable in different situations. According to Dewey, we make discriminations for the purpose of inquiry, use or enjoyment; any discriminated qualities or relations then have a function for inquiry, use or enjoyment. But traditional empiricism has taken either these qualities or what they "reveal" as the object of knowledge. This gives rise to a dualism: there is the realm of immediately apparent things and the realm of inferred objects. They are taken to be rivals of each other, and one is taken to be real and the other counterfeit. If objects are real, then one be-

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[5] The comparison of Dewey and Prall on this point is carried out at more length in Section 6.22.

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[5] The comparison of Dewey and Prall on this point is carried out at more length in Section 6.22.

comes a realist; if the immediately apparent is real, then one becomes a phenomanalist.

It is Dewey's point that a metaphysical controversy arises only because one of the items is taken as the object of knowledge. The following quotation from Dewey is an interesting one, recalling that the book first came out in 1925, two years before the completion of AJ.

> Underlying "reality" and surface "appearance" in this connection have a meaning fixed by the function of inquiry, not an intrinsic metaphysical meaning. (Italics mine.) [6]

In my formula, "the sensed appearance of objects," a dualism is implied, and one of a variety which a contextualist would decry. Thus the first reason for my repudiation of that formula.

If one admits the existence of non-apparent objects as the object of knowledge, then he has to make a distinction in the t-total-quality between those qualities and relations that are revelatory of objects, or that are characteristics of objects, and those which are not. The former qualities then are "object-ive," while other qualities are "subjective." We search in "appearance" for reliable (objective) signs that reveal the objects lying "below" the surface. We have to purify these signs, rid them of their subjective fog, get to the pure, atomic, irreducible given elements. This becomes sense-data. The objective (prior to this shift, the revelatory)

---

6 Dewey, Experience and Nature, ibid., p 139. See also Dewey's Logic:, pp 67, 68 and 517 on this topic. For almost exact parallel in Prall, see AA, 194.

is that which is sensed, and we sense the given. The given is then prior, epistemologically for the realist, logically for the phenomenalist in his search for the indubitable.

The contextualist, on the other hand, apparently does not make one set of constituents (sense-data) of the t-total-quality unalterably distinct from another set (non-sense-data). Consequently, in giving Prall a contextualist interpretation, I have to be careful about the interpretation of "sensed." Further, I certainly mislead with the term "appearance" when used as "appearance of objects." The earlier formulation is thus shot through with misleading connotations, for it indicates that Prall is a traditional empiricist which I am denying. Since a contextualist would not hold any part of the t-total-quality of a molar, perceptual experience as intrinsically epistemologically prior, all being on an equal footing, varying only functionally in different situations, it seems more accurate to modify the formula of surface as I suggested before to: "the content of perceptual experience."

One of the consequences of the contextualist position, and one which Prall accepts, is that red as a quality of a face in a portrait may be as 'subjective' and no more 'objective' than dignity as a quality of the face. The "content of a perceptual experience" includes the quality dignity, so it is part of surface; it is discriminated in t-total-quality. If one gives up the dualism, then there are three senses of the objective-subjective distinction which one gives up.

> The beauty attributed to objects in aesthetic judgments, while it is objectively theirs, just as any quality is, is like all other qualities the essence or form attended to by directed feeling, dependent for its nature as well as its manifestation upon human organic activities just as truly as upon the objects felt to be beautiful and afterwards recorded as beautiful in aesthetic judgment. (AJ, 28-29)

The three senses of "objective" that the contextualist denies serve to distinguish some discriminated qualities contained in t-total-quality from other discriminated qualities are: None of them belong exclusively to the object or subject; none of them are revelatory of the object or subject; and none of them are dependent on exclusively the object or subject. Instead: Qualities qualify a situation or transaction; no kind of object is the object of knowledge, for knowledge is more of the nature of adjustment; and the "nature" and "manifestation" of any quality depend on both members of the transaction.

Now it begins to get really interesting. Several things dovetail at this point, all calling for an answer. Since the most current topic is objectivity, let me put its question first.

There is another sense of objectivity besides the above three, and it concerns the verifiability of propositions. Some propositions seem publicly verifiable while others are not. Suppose that we have two propositions both of which predicate some quality of something. Suppose that one of the propositions is publicly verifiable while the other is not. Can we not make a distinction between the qualities then? Is not the quality contained in the verifiable proposition "objective"

while the other quality is not? Before I develop what I mean by "publicly verifiable," let me dovetail something else.

Recall that if one is a traditional empiricist he can, according to Dewey, take either the given qualities themselves as the object of knowledge, or the object inferred from the given qualities. So far in the discussion I have only shown that the latter position is not Prall's, hence that there are no epistemologically prior constituents of t-total-quality, that intrinsically all qualities are on an equal footing, that "of objects" had to be dropped from the formula, and that "appearance," hence surface, includes more qualities than those supposedly revelatory of the real objects. But so far I have not treated the monistic phenomenalist. This is the next order of business.

The phenomenalist would make some discriminable qualities logically prior to others. Some qualities form the basis for verifiable propositions while others do not. Can we include and/or exclude some qualities from "appearance" or "content" on these grounds?

Further, can a contextualist distinguish, or does he want to, between projected and recognized qualities? The question is pertinent, because Prall sometimes talks as if he takes "surface" in a fairly narrow sense. He is most often so interpreted; Prall gives the impression of tieing what is aesthetically relevant to the purely sensuous, which excludes associated factors. Let me put two questions now, which may indicate why I think all of these things dovetail. How are

we to interpret "sensed" in "the sensed appearance?" The other question, which is the correlative one for the modified formula: Is everything that is contained in the "content of a perceptual experience" to be considered aesthetically relevant?

I can put the present problem in the form of a dilemma for myself, and, indirectly, for Prall. I think that actually Prall was in one. It would account for most people interpreting him as a sense-data empiricist, and the evidence for my contextualistic interpretation.

The dilemma:

> If I interpret Prall as a sense-data empiricist, take "surface" narrowly, then there will be trouble accounting for "thick" surface later.
>
> If I interpret Prall as a contextualist, then anything that occurs during a perceptual experience is aesthetically relevant, which is certainly not the case for Prall. (AA, 19)

If one accepts the first interpretation, then there is trouble with "thick" surface later, and almost everyone has pointed out that Prall has trouble with "thick" surface; and he would with that interpretation. I accept the second interpretation, though I am fully aware that much of Prall suggests the first interpretation, particularly the first three chapters of AJ. I suggest that Prall is not altogether clear about the difficulty here, and that the "correct" interpretation is "both, now and then." To accept this as final would not help us to become clear about the rest of the theory, which might well be consistently contextualistic or empiricistic. I shall

carry through with the contextual interpretation, because it makes the most "sense" out of his theory as a whole, particularly the part on expression, thick surface.

For now, what I want to do is accept the second interpretation and show how Prall can be a contextualist and at the same time exclude some of the content as aesthetically relevant. To do this, I shall attempt to indicate a criterion of relevance.

Before doing this and trying to answer the other questions I raised, it may help to have an example to work with. I select a picture, Cezanne's "The Blue Vase." In left center there is a blue vase with irises and leaves in it. Behind, the vase, on the same table is a plate. The table sets in front of a window, of which we see only a small corner. On the table, at the left, and only half showing vertically, is a wine bottle. Beside and to the right of the vase are what appear to be apples in a row, three of them, with the two farthest right ones touching each other.

In making a distinction between objective qualities and others, there seems to be at least two possible grounds: (a) Q is objective if people agree about its presence; (b) Q is objective if it has a physical correlate. The second criterion drops out for us on two grounds. The first is that it is not pertinent here because we have ruled out the three senses of objective for which this would be the grounds. The second reason that it is not pertinent here is that the <u>aesthetic</u> object is not the physical object. If we allowed the physical correlate criterion, then we could say about the picture truly

that "The vase in the picture is blue." But we could not say truly that, "The vase stands in front of the plate." If we went to the picture and measured we would find that the vase is not in front of the plate at all; they are in the same plane. Thus, if the physical object and the aesthetic object were identical, then we could not say of the picture that the vase stands in front of the plate. This is too literal an interpretation; there is a sense in which the vase does stand in front of the plate. In addition, for a contextualist, the aesthetic object is identical with the content of the experience, though now I am trying to decide if all the content is aesthetically relevant.

If the physical correlate criterion drops out with the realist, then we are left with the agreement criterion. This, I suggest, is the phenomenalist's criterion for objectivity. Further, whatever is objective is sensed. Thus if we would look for an interpretation of "sensed" in my early formula, we have it. Surface consists of those discriminated qualities of the "content of perceptual experience" that observers agree are present. This provides us with the logically prior qualities of the phenomenalist. These qualities are those whose names are the predicates in publicly verifiable propositions. They are also the qualities that are recognized rather than projected. Is this then the criterion for the aesthetically relevant that I was looking for?

Prall wants to rule out some things as aesthetically irrelevant. The only thing relevant for Prall is that which



is perceptually presented. How can we distinguish the perceptually presented qualities in the t-total-quality from the non-perceptually presented? We distinguish them by agreement; those on whose presence we can agree are perceptually presented, and those on which we can't agree aren't perceptually presented.

Care is required at this point. For a contextualist there are no "real" distinctions to be made among the constituents of t-total-quality. All distinctions are arbitrary; we may decide into what classification any constituent falls and we may change the classification. The decision is governed, it is not willy-nilly. It is governed by the purpose in hand. The distinctions governed by inquiry may be different than the distinctions governed by enjoyment. Distinctions and classifications within t-total-quality are always functional for the contextualist. There are no gradations of reality among the constituents of t-total-quality. Prall is not a reductionist.

Let me try to illustrate what I have been saying by returning to the Cezanne example.

Imagine looking at the picture. It takes some time to experience it. That span of your experience which involves looking at the picture is a molar experience. You come away with a total impression of it; this is the t-total-quality and includes some emotional attitude. During the molar experience you experienced some of the constituent qualities of the picture. After this one could utter such sentences as:

(1) "The vase is in front of the plate."

(2) "The vase is blue."

(3) "The flowers are fresh."

(4) "The picture is fresh."

Which propositions are true? Which qualities are present? Which quality's presence can we agree on? There would probably be quite general agreement on (1) and (2), not as much, but considerable agreement on (3), and not as much agreement on (4). I take all these propositions to be true. However, if we let our distinctions be governed by scientific inquiry, then all except possibly the last are false, because that is not a vase, nor is it really in front of the plate, nor are those flowers. We would agree that there is not a vase there. We would agree that the thing that looks like a vase is not in front of that which looks like a plate. I was obviously contributing something to the proximal stimuli or I wouldn't have made those statements. But I was not making a scientific inquiry when I made those statements. If I was making a scientific inquiry I should have to classify the qualitative constituent "vase in front of the plate" as subjective, for we would agree that it is not really in front. However, if I am governed by the end of enjoyment, then that same qualitative constituent is objective, for we agree on its presence, and we can certainly agree then that proposition (1) is true. So too with (2) and (3). Since we agreed on both the absence and presence of a quality, the proposition was both true and false. So it is not agreement alone which governs whether or not something is perceptually presented, is logically prior,

but also the end in mind when we classify the qualities. One time the "vase" is in front of the plate and at another time it is not; one time the quality "vase in front of the plate" is subjective and at another time objective. Since they shift there is no unalterable criterion to decide which are "sensed" and which are not "sensed." The criterion shifts.

Perhaps I can make clearer now what I meant when I said that Prall was not a reductionist. I meant that there are not fast and hard rules which decree some qualities as basic, as the only ones <u>really</u> present, under every condition, and to which all other qualities are reducible.

Let me illustrate this with the third proposition, "The flowers are fresh." If we are governed by scientific inquiry, then the only qualities that we can agree are present are certain iris shapes, some creamy white patches, a few dark blue patches and some rusty red patches; certainly we can agree there are no flowers there, let alone "fresh" flowers. The "freshness" and "flowers" are <u>reduced</u> to a set of basic qualities. The "freshness" is mind-contributed and not really there. This would not hold for Prall under all conditions. He would maintain that, governed by enjoyment, the quality of "freshness" and the "flowers" are actually present. By agreement it is present in the experienced content, so it is part of surface. And when our statements are governed by enjoyment, then my friend and I look at the painting and we see and agree on the presence of those qualities. It is no good saying, "It is not <u>really</u> there." This "really" implies a

non-arbitrary distinction, which a contextualist is bound to deny as I see it.

Thus the kind of qualities that are admitted as perceptually presented are more inclusive than that of a sense-data empiricist, since the agreement criterion shifts to include more qualities under some functions. Now we are progressing toward a clearer notion of surface, though much remains to be done. "Surface" is "the perceptual content of a perceptual experience." The double presence of "perceptual" is not accidental, for if it were thought to be redundant in its second occurrence, one would have a naive view of perception.

I want now to show how "freshness" can be said to be present. How it can be said to be recognized rather than projected.

I shall start with the quality "vase in front of plate." The first thing to note is that the quality is equally present in two experiences, one of which measurement reveals is "veridical" and one which is not. Further, both qualities can be "reduced" to a set of "basic" qualities, for example, a blue vase-shaped patch, a light blue plate-shaped patch, and the former overlapping the latter. In both cases, prior to measurement, they reduce to the same basic units. In both cases these basic units lead to the quality "vase in front of plate." We would agree about their presence; though, as noted before, under different conditions one would be 'objective' and the other 'subjective,' that is, veridical and non-veridical.

I shall call the basic units to which both the veri-

dical and non-veridical quality in question are reducible the recognitional features. Although the veridical quality leads to further certain qualities involved in measurement and the other does not, this does not affect the presence or absence of the quality in either experience. We simply take a different attitude toward it under inquiry conditions than under enjoyment conditions. Nor are their recognitional features, which when placed together in an experiencing context or transaction "condense" into the same quality, different. In the current example, very simply, the recognitional features are the two colored patches, the overlapping and the relative place in the horizontal plane. Prall will not hold, nor I think would any contextualist, that the recognitional features have a different ontological status than the condensed quality. Their status may vary, and in an aesthetic or enjoyment situation the condensed quality might well be functionally prior. But there is an important sense in which the recognitional features may be prior, and it occurs in connection with the answer to the present question about which qualities in a perceptual situation can be said to be perceptually presented. I have still to indicate a criterion for what is legitimately surface, what is aesthetically relevant.

An example of disagreement will best serve here. I take the third proposition, "The flowers are fresh," as my example. Suppose we have a dispute over the presence of the quality "fresh." One says that the proposition is true and the other does not. We might well imagine that a critic would be

interested in stating or denying the proposition. Notice that our interest is now a cognitive one; here, I claim, the recognitional features are functionally prior. Suppose that the man who says the proposition is false claims that the other is "projecting" here, and that the quality of "freshness" is not perceptually presented at all, hence, aesthetically irrelevant. This might well become of crucial critical importance in the interpretation of a painting.

I suggest that the following solution is Prall's and constitutes the answer to our question about which qualities constitute surface, which qualities form the perceptual content of a perceptual experience. Most of us have learned that flowers when just picked are fresh; we place them in a vase, and after a while they lose their freshness. Someone says, "These flowers ought to be thrown out. They're no longer fresh." We've watched people do this, and we've noticed that the flowers looked differently when picked than when thrown out. We indicate the difference in their qualitative appearance by the words "fresh" and "not fresh." Part of the contextualist hypothesis is that some qualities at least are the result of fusion of other qualities. In taking an analytic attitude toward "freshness," we notice that it is a fused quality. Fresh flowers have a different angle on the stem, the apparent rigidity of the petal is greater, and the color is brighter than that of unfresh flowers. In my terminology, the two kinds of flower analyze into <u>different</u> recognitional features. These different features naturally fuse into different total

qualities. Returning to the dispute about the freshness of the flowers in Cezanne's painting, we can settle the dispute if we can analyze his flowers into the same recognitional features that flowers have when we cut them for the vase. Notice again, that for purposes of inquiry, recognitional features, basic qualities, have a functional priority, whereas they might not for the enjoyment of the picture. This illustrates again the shift in classification of elements of a larger quality.

The fourth proposition, "The picture is fresh," has a more metaphorical use of "fresh," but even a metaphor rests on the similarity of some recognitional feature. Instead of using this example, I shall use one from Prall. It is the best evidence that my use of recognitional features to interpret him is correct. It also extends the notion of surface, perceptual qualities, to include what are usually called "emotions." It is of great importance for his theory of expression, but I shall not develop that aspect until the fourth chapter. Prall is discussing a funeral march and how it may be extremely solemn. Notice that he is giving us an analysis of solemnity and a funeral march and is pointing out that both have common recognitional features.

> If we ask what degree of the grave or solemn, the despairingly sad, it expresses, we shall of course have to give specifications of feeling. But what could these possibly be but specifications of tempo, loudness, timbre, rhythm, pitch sequence, and so on? These terms, applicable literally to the music, precisely specify the feeling. All solemnity is somewhat slow in time. Quick solemnity is a contradiction in terms; hence the feeling called solemnity is expressed at a slow tempo. And stately solemnity,

> sanctified to usage in the phrase solemn state, has heavy accents and well defined, even ponderous, movements, terms which again apply just as literally to the music as to some supposed spiritual essence of solemnity. (AA, 152-153)

It is not difficult to imagine disagreement over the solemnity of a piece of music. "Solemnity" is used to name the t-total-quality of a piece of music as heard by someone. To call it by that name probably indicates that this quality is similar to some other quality which he has learned to call "solemnity." There is only one way to settle the disagreement. Do what Prall has done above. Look for recognitional features.

But even if one did find the recognitional features in the music, they might not fuse into a quality whose character is solemn for everyone. The nature and manifestation of a quality depends, it should be recalled, upon both terms in the transaction. There are several possible conditions existing in the organism that would prevent one from fusing the features into solemnity.

a) A person might not have been able to discriminate the recognitional features of the music because of inadequate training. This applies to any art form. This inadequacy can be taken care of with proper training; (AA, 194) also, it is part of the critic's task to make and point out these discriminations. Once something is pointed out to us we can often "see" the fused product. I was once sitting in the living room of one of my friend's looking out his window over the rooftops. He asked me if I saw Donald Duck out there. Startled, but game, I began to search for Donald Duck -- in

vain. Then he pointed out a particular smoke stack. I looked at it, but failed to see Donald Duck. Then he began to supply me with recognitional features. He pointed out holes for the eyes, the lid for his cap, a slit for his mouth. I looked at these features for some time; finally I saw Donald Duck quite plainly, grinning at me. I had finally fused them. But my friend had to analyze the smoke stack into common features possessed by both the stack and Donald Duck.

b) Even if one has been given the recognitional features, it is not automatically the case that one can fuse them. In the Donald Duck example, I sat for a little while before "seeing" Donald Duck. The example is a simple one; a piece of music is much more complex and requires some sensitivity, so it is quite possible that a person could never "learn" to fuse the recognitional features. (AA, 168)

c) A person might never have experienced the quality in question. If he has not, then there is no way for him to decide if he has in fact fused the features into that quality. Consider the difficulty of trying to fuse the smoke stack into Donald Duck without having known anything about Donald Duck. There is nothing to control our fusion, nor any check on what we have fused.

d) Another reason for failure to fuse into the desired quality is interference from associations. Those recognitional features may remind him of some experience so distasteful or delightful as to prevent appropriate fusion. This one the critic can't help. (AA, 176)

Prall has great faith in the remedy suggested in a). He believes that once the recognitional features are pointed out, the probability of fusing the features is good. This faith may be misplaced. I take up the issue in Sections 10.32 and 10.33.

Notice that the first person's failure to fuse solemnity does not constitute adequate grounds for saying that the second person's proposition attributing solemnity to the music is false. A's failure to fuse does not mean that solemnity does not characterize the music as heard by B. Nor, however, is B's experience of solemnity alone sufficient grounds for the truth of the proposition, "X music is solemn." It may be an association, and not a perceptual quality at all, hence aesthetically irrelevant. The mere presence of a quality during a transaction does not mean it is part of surface. These last pages have been devoted to showing that we can make a distinction. B, in order to have grounds for his judgment, must be able to point out that it is a perceptual quality; he does this by pointing out the recognitional features. This issue is of some interest, for Prall has been thought by Paul Ziff[7] to define disagreement out of existence, and thus made a mystery out of agreement. If my interpretation is correct, Prall does not make a mystery of agreement, though without this "public" criterion of recognitional analysis there would

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7 Paul Ziff, review of Theory of Beauty by H. Osborne, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955), p 122.

be a mystery. Of course, the proposition is meangingless unless the quality is fused.

A new formula for surface is now in order, modified in accordance with the discussion. "Surface" is "the qualitative content of a perceptual experience which is either a public recognitional feature or is that which can be analyzed into the public (agreed) recognitional features required for the consistent application of any name in question." Thus "freshness" has certain rules governing its correct application. We cannot apply it without a minimum number of recognitional features being present. To apply it in their absence is to subvert the rules and make the term meaningless. What would constitute a "minimum number" is an interesting question which Prall does not go into. Given the above kind of analysis, a complete theory would have to go into it. But I am not going to here as it lies outside the scope of this study. It would probably get us into some questions about the lines between the literal and metaphorical use of terms, which is already hunting in a vast area.

The alert reader will have noticed that the doctrine of recognitional features amounts very nearly to representation. Is Cezanne's painting a set of representations? Prall insists repeatedly that works of art present qualities, emotions and feelings, not represent them. How is this possible if this "representational" interpretation is correct? I shall attempt to answer this. I need first to develop Prall's notion of aesthetic experience in order to supply the answer.

1.2 Aesthetic Experience.

I also need to supply Prall's notions of aesthetic experience in order to explicate "perceptual experience" in the latest formula for surface. For Prall all aesthetic experiences are actual or imaginative perceptual experiences, so in explicating aesthetic experience I shall in effect be explicating the relevant "perceptual experiences" also.

Not all of the transactions in the universe will be aesthetic transactions. From our discussion so far it can be seen that the kind of transactions that can be aesthetic are experiencing transactions and these have been narrowed to perceptual transactions. But are all perceptual transactions aesthetic transactions? Prall gives three answers to this question.

The first answer is in the nature of "yes." Every perceptual experience involves the awareness of quality, and quality being the aesthetic field, every sense experience is to that extent an aesthetic experience.

However, Prall wishes to get a conception of the typical aesthetic experience as contrasted to perceptual experiences we don't ordinarily think of as typically aesthetic. Prall tries to do this in two ways. The first is to follow Dewey in thinking of it as an experience, a stand-out experience. With Dewey this is not confined to perceptual experiences, but Prall qualifies Dewey by adding this factor as can be seen in the following quotation from AA.

> When the heightening is emphatic; when the aim of the experiencing activity is felt to be achieved in

> a vital process of receiving; when, to use Mr. Dewey's own terms, our doing has its own felt consummation, comes to its own realized fruition, not beyond the immediately present, but in a direct undergoing, adequate and satisfying, then the aesthetic has taken on its distinctive character. This is immediate quality, directly felt as the unifying completion of the process of emotional perception. (AA, 9)

"Emotional perception" -- it is the emphasis that allows Prall to hold that the typical aesthetic transaction is the one where t-total-quality is the most vivid.

Prall has another, and more careful way, of marking off the aesthetic transaction, doing so by noting the attitude of the perceiver toward the aesthetic field, and noting the difference of the attitude of a perceiver in a non-aesthetic perceiving transaction.

Attitude has two moments. The first is the direction of attention and the second is the depth of interest. As is usual, for the same occurs in H. S. Langfeld's The Aesthetic Attitude, in Roger Fry's "An Essay in Esthetics," and in H. N. Lee's Perception and Aesthetic Value, the aesthetic attitude is contrasted with the theoretical and the practical attitudes. If our attention is focused on the use suggested by surface, and if our interest in it stems from the desire which such use could satisfy, then our attitude toward the qualitative content is practical. If we penetrate the surface and attend to what lies beneath it as process, or if we attend to the relations that the process has to other processes, that is, if we try to fit it into a conceptual scheme, then we take a theoretical attitude to surface. Our attention is not focused on the

surface itself, but on that which may be inferred from the presence of this content. Hence, our interest in conceptual activity is in finding the relations between that of whose surface we are aware and other things whose surface we are not now aware of.

The aesthetic experience is an experience in which our attention is directed to the qualitative content itself; and we are not interested in anything except this appearance. We savor the t-total-quality.

I wish now to make a distinction between "inferring" and what I shall call "informing." It is closely tied to the attitude-view of the aesthetic experience; it will allow me to make a distinction between "present" and "represent."

I use "inferring" here in a broad sense, indicating any activity whereby we pass over from one thing to another in our attention, as when, for example, one thing is the "sign" of another thing. If there are two things, S and R, we are inferring when we are presented with S but attend to R, which is not presented. If there is a similarity of recognitional features between S and R, then S can be said to represent R, when the presence of S leads me to infer R, that is, when I make a sign of S, as when the vase in Cezanne's picture (S) leads me to think of the vase (R) in my home that has been misplaced. However, not every case of similarity of S and R is a case of representation. I might see S and attend to it; I might recognize it as a vase because of its similarity to other vases. If I did not recognize it, then part of the

quality and discriminations now present in my experience would be lacking. My knowledge of vases, R, may inform my vision S when S resembles R and when my attention is on S. The latter is a case of presentation rather than representation. (AA, 157 and 20) The difference between "present" and "represent" is the direction of attention, though in both cases S resembles R.

Thus cognition as usually conceived is not excluded from aesthetic experiences by Prall, though Prall denies any great separation between perception and conception. (AA, 39) The difference between them is not essentially in their "nature" but in their direction and purpose, the difference between informing and inferring. Thus the aesthetic experience does not gather or verify knowledge.

1.3 The Classification of Surface Constituents.

Thus far in the inquiry I have attempted to isolate that part of the content, of the t-total-quality, of a perceptual experience that is sensed. I tried to supply what I thought was Prall's criterion for "sensed" content, the fused quality and the public presence of its recognitional features.[8]

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[8] Notice that if there are any "simple" qualities, the second part of the criterion does not apply, for it cannot be analyzed into recognitional features. Then the only criterion left is qualitative similarity. But at least none of the causes that prevent fusion will be present to aggravate disagreement. I shall not go into the question about whether or not there are any simple qualities, or whether the qualities of which we are aware are simple.

Such a criterion permits us to say that such content as dignity, freshness, in-front-of, and solemnity are sensed. Prall's acceptance of this view would definitely put him outside sense-data empiricism, for from a contextualist viewpoint, the traditional empiricist lines between qualities that are sensed (recognized) and qualities that are projected are erased.

There are three reasons to believe that Prall does accept a contextualist analysis, and that my interpretation of "surface" is correct. The first reason, the similarity of Prall's and Dewey's "quality" and "situation," has been given. The second reason will be developed in the fourth chapter, on expression, where Prall argues that feelings and emotions are sensed, are a part of surface, and as presented are aesthetically relevant. The third reason, which is closely allied to the second, grows out of Prall's views about "thin" and "thick" surface. He maintains that the distinction between them is theoretical only, that in experience no fast lines can be drawn between them. This amounts to the same doctrine, earlier discussed, that holds that no constituents of t-total-quality are other than functionally prior, that there are no constituents that are intrinsically "objective" or "subjective."

Prall uses two more metaphorical terms, "thin" and "thick" surface. He often speaks of the first as the only one which is strictly aesthetic, the only one which is sense-presented. When people think of Prall and his conception of surface, they more often think of thin surface, where thin surface is identical with sense-data. And Prall does give this

impression in AJ in many places. However, Prall also thinks of thick surface, obviously, as part of surface. He is more consistent about this in AA than in AJ. I do not think he is consistently clear about it always, as I indicated before. I want now to indicate why Prall included thick surface as surface.

If the aesthetic field is limited to thin surface, to sense-data elements and their relations of order and arrangement, then what happens to the expressed feelings and emotions? If the aesthetic field is limited to thin surface, then they are ruled out. Prall does not wish to rule them out of the aesthetic field, nor does he wish to give up the aesthetic field as sense-presented, so he introduces the notion of thick surface. It is now his task to make out a notion of thick surface that is consistent with the notion of surface itself, that is, he must try to make out in what sense that which is expressed, so often valued by observers and critics, can be said to be presented through the senses, to constitute part of the "appearance" of the aesthetic object. This is the crucial problem of Prall's aesthetic theory and the part which has been most criticized. If he can show that what is expressed is sense-presented, then he will have shown that they are part of surface, hence, aesthetically relevant. Most criticism of Prall has not comprehended Prall's attempted solution however.

I wish to do three things now: Indicate that Prall was not unaware of the problem, but conceives of his aesthetic as an attempt to show how a presentational aesthetic can

account for factors ordinarily said not to be sense-presented; second, make the distinction between thin and thick surface as clear as possible; third, classify the constituents of surface or t-total-quality.

I can best indicate Prall's awareness of this problem by giving a quotation.

> If, however, we are to keep clear the distinctive natures of the various arts -- and this, as we have seen, can not be done in terms solely of the character of the aesthetic surface -- we must find their definitions in the aim of their specific techniques. Thus apparently we must find this aim at once aesthetic and non-aesthetic, and we seem to be in a dilemma. (AJ, 221)

Prall realizes that the strictly surface beauty is felt as revealing "to the mind or spirit that intuits it more than any merely sensuous elements in a unity of form." (AJ, 223) The "more" that is revealed is what Prall calls thick surface. I have now to try and make the distinction between "thin" and "thick" clear.

Prall tries to mark the distinction between thin and thick by a psychological distinction, the distinction between intuition, or sensation, and perception. It is a familiar doctrine that perception is different than sensation; the mind is said to interpret the cues presented by sensation, adding associations that are not part of the manifold produced by the proximal stimuli exciting the retina. Awareness of the results of the proximal stimuli alone would be awareness of purely sensory content; aesthetic appreciation of thin surface only would be aesthetic appreciation of this purely sensory content. When I speak of sensory content I do not mean to indicate an

unorganized mosaic, for Prall holds, and in this he is apparently holding a doctrine similar to that held by Gestalt psychology, that this sensory content possesses a unity of form, "structural coherence."

This suggests a correlation between thin surface and purely physiological processes and between thick surface and psychological processes. However, trying to distinguish between thin and thick surface by using the distinction between sensation, physiological processes, and perception, psychological processes, is not too effective, because it is difficult to make a clear distinction between physiological and psychological processes, some people of course denying any distinction. The problem of form in sensory content alone is enough to draw the use of this distinction into question. Prall himself needs to deny the separability of sensation and perception if he is going to make his doctrine of the sensory presentation of thick surface stick. The fact that the two processes are not separable does not entail that they are not distinguishable, but I don't think they have been successfully distinguished, either in Prall or by psychologists, though Prall thinks he has distinguished them with "perfect clarity." (AJ, 223)

It will make for clarity if I classify the three kinds of relation constituents that figure in surface before I classify the five kinds of quality constituents.

The first kind of relations are those which account for arrangement, what I shall call <u>arrangement relations</u>. Examples in painting would be "above," "behind," "beside."

Or in music it might be "before," or any of the devices used in rhythm. These relations hold between qualities in the object perceived, as between one bar of music and another, both of which are heard.

The second kind of relations I shall call order relations. These hold between elements of the same variety. Color and tones are each ordered by order relations, or, as Prall calls them, intrinsic relations. Color has hue, all hues are related to each other, are ordered, for each hue necessarily falls between two other hues. Prall calls these relations "intrinsic" because the order into which they fall depends only on the nature of the elements themselves; orange, being what it is, necessarily falls between red and yellow. We have an ordered series when all the elements of a certain variety are related by "betweenness." With pitch we have first and last elements of course, it being a linear series, while in hue we do not, it being a circular series. But we can still order a linear series by "betweenness" by simply denying betweenness to the two end members and the preceding (or succeeding) notes. So far as we know now taste and odor do not form such an ordered series. Unlike arrangement relations, order relations do obtain an element now presented and others not now presented. When we hear a note, for example, it comes as an ordered quality, for it is automatically heard in relation to the scale.

> (Intrinsically related elements) cannot occur except as exhibiting positions or relations in these orders.

> That is to say, when we consider certain aspects of relatively concrete sensory elements, the pitch of sounds ... the brightness of colors ... we find the whole range of sounds or colors serially ordered with reference to these aspects of them ... And to hear a note at a particular pitch is to hear a note in its relation to any and every other note. (AA, 135)

This means that the character of any element, or its quality, is not self-dependent, so to speak, but dependent on all the other elements to which it is related. Prall expresses this by saying that elements have "relational character."

> This is to say not only that elements have character of some sort, in order to be elements of any one kind, but further that the character necessary to elements if they are to compose structures apprehensible as such, is relational character. (AA, 41-42)

Thus red, yellow and green are all elements of the same kind not because of something that each of the elements possesses in common, since their character is relational, hence, different, but because they differ from each other in a particular way. Prall seems to be following W. E. Johnson here. Consider the following passage from Johnson as quoted by Arthur N. Prior.

> What is most prominently notable about red, green and yellow is that they are different, and even, as we say, opponent to one another; is there any (secondary) adjective which analysis would reveal as characterising all these different (primary) adjectives? In my view there is no such (secondary) adjective; in fact, the several colours are put in the same group and given the same name colour, <u>not</u> on the ground of any partial agreement, but on the ground of the special kind of difference which distinguishes one colour from another; whereas no such difference exists between a colour and a shape.[9]

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[9] Arthur N. Prior, "Determinables, Determinates and Determinants," <u>Mind</u>, Vol. 58, (1949), p 11.

According to Prall, the differences between the determinates (red, yellow, green, etc.) of a determinable like color and tone are systematic, while those of taste and odor are not known to be systematic. Does the fact that they are opponent to each other allow us to infer that their differences are systematic, even though it is not known?

To think of elements as having relational character is a contextual view. The nature of t-total-quality depends on both the 'object' and 'subject' for the contextualist. Let me consider explicitly only the object for a moment, with the subject's role understood. The nature of t-total-quality depends on the constituent qualities and relations. The nature of constituent qualities varies with the context, and context is nothing other than fellow-constituents and the relations between them. This can best be shown by means of an example. Imagine a series of concentric rings, alternating in color between white and red with a solid circle in the center. Imagine that the center circle is red and that the last ring is red. To indicate that the t-total-quality depends on arrangement relations, reverse the order of alternation and let the center circle be white and the last ring be white. To indicate that the t-total-quality depends on order relations and constituent qualities, which cannot be separated, for to change only the color order is to leave the same arrangement but to replace some colors with others, replace the red with blue in either arrangement. The nature of the white constituents will vary when blue replaces red. Anyone who has tried to

match colors when he is painting will have experienced how often he is misled.

Thus, to say of any qualities that they have relational character is simply to say their character varies with context. This is the case for any quality. This is the case for colors and tones in a special sense. They have a permanent, usually non-present context. The color chart and the scale are such a context. It is in virtue of this that we can unequivocally identify a hue, though it occurs in different contexts, for there is a permanent context in which it is C4 and always comes between C3 and C5. We often take this permanent context for granted, so it is easily forgotten that the character of any element is fixed for analytic purposes by this context. If we didn't have the permanent context, then it would be impossible to definitely label the constituents, because they change in every different context. Analysis and naming depends on a static context.[10]

I am now in a position to answer the following question about relations: Are relations sense-presented? My interpretation of surface demands that any constituent of it be sense-presented. Now I am saying that relations are constituents of t-total-quality. Are they constituents of surface? Yes, they are analytic constituents of surface; and though they are, I think it can fairly be said that relations or arrangement are not perceived. I cannot see the relation of "above," nor hear

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10 For more discussion of this point see Section 7.64.

the relation of "before." What I can fairly be said to see and hear is the relationship of A above B and C before D. I don't see the relations into which a tin can can be analyzed; what I see is a certain cylindrical qualitative presentation. But if I alter any relations, for example, if I flatten the can, then the qualitative presentation is altered.

The same thing seems to apply to order relations. Alter the color relationships of any design by replacing one of the colors by another and the qualitative presentation will alter.

The conclusion I draw from this is that though relations are not themselves perceivable, they affect the character of perceived quality. This is the importance of form in aesthetics for the contextualist. Form as relations is not something perceived by itself, nor are qualities perceived without having relational character. Relations are conceptual, analytic, products, but they are important for aesthetics because any shift in relations is paralleled by a change in perceived quality. Form as relationship is perceived. One of the consequences of such a view is that for the contextualist the form-matter distinction is conceptual, analytic, distinction, but they are not separable.

> This procedure is not to suggest that beauty itself can be separated into matter and form; for the very materials of sensuous beauty are discriminated and defined in an order intrinsic to their qualitative nature. (AJ, 176)

There is a suggestion in this doctrine, though Prall does not suggest it nor develop it, about the reasons for the

preferance of one kind of order over another. Since form helps determine the nature of the qualitative presentation, one form may result in a preferred qualitative presentation. Form is dynamic. Dewey develops this to some extent and S. C. Pepper takes it much further in his Aesthetic Quality.

The third kind of relation, which I shall call learned relations, holds between that which is presented and that which is not presented in virtue of some psychological connection, as when the presented reminds a person of something not present. It is in virtue of these relations that informing and inferring are possible. In my Donald Duck example the quality of the smoke stack changed considerably when my vision was informed by my knowledge of Donald Duck. As another example take any of the ambiguous figures often pictured in psychology books. There is "surprise" at the emergence of the "other" quality.

I now proceed to the qualitative constituents. There seems to be five kinds of qualitative constituents of t-total-quality for Prall. I shall call them sub-, form-, unit-, emotional- and value-qualities. Sub-qualities I shall treat as if they were simple and unfused qualities. Examples of these are colors, tones, tastes and odors. Form-qualities are fused qualities; with these learned relations play a subsidiary role. These qualities, therefore, are generally nameless. It is the quality, approximately, that we are aware of when we are presented with an object for the first time. It is not an unorganized mosiac, formed but not informed. Design, pattern, and melodies are form-qualities, as are decorative touches.

Unit-qualities are also fused qualities, but learned relations play a more important role in their case. Unit-qualities might be characterized as informed form-qualities. Examples of unit-qualities are cylinders, human bodies, chairs.

Emotional-qualities are difficult to talk about, not only in Prall's case, but in most everyone else's also. Prall appears to have two views about them. The first is similar to Broad's view.[11] Broad thinks of emotions as cognitions, that is, they have an epistemological object. We can always ask of an emotion, "Toward what object is it?" Compare his with Prall's statement: "Feelings are feelings about objects, toward objects, of objects." (AA, 154) Although every emotion has a psychical quality called emotional tone, emotion is not an isolated quality; solemnity just doesn't occur by itself, there are solemn occasions. There isn't just fearfulness, we are afraid of something. It would be more accurate to say of Prall's position that "emotions are emotions about sub-, form- and unit-qualities. They fuse with the emotional tone to produce the emotionally toned t-total-quality and unit-qualities. Emotions have no character apart from these qualities, and description and expression of emotion must be in their terms.

> We cannot specify even these kinds or degrees (of emotions) except in terms of the determinate objective presentations directly apprehended ... most of our

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[11] C. D. Broad, "Emotion and Sentiment," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 13, pp 203-214.

> names for emotions are large, loose covering terms for a great variety of feelings. (AA, 153)

Prall's other notion of emotional-quality seems to make it more like a unit-quality. It is more like a fused, recognized quality, one with recognitional features. (AA, 152-153) It is that which is expressed by a work of art, and instead of being <u>our</u> reaction, we are trying to grasp the <u>artist's</u> reaction. My treatment of emotion in the chapter on expression does not recognize two views of expression on Prall's part for the reason that I do not think these are two views. An understanding of each in the light of contextualism does not find them opposed. I shall indicate only briefly why I think this is the case, for a fuller treatment of emotion comes in Chapter IV. For the constitution of any quality, an organism is required, so in this sense any quality of which we are aware is <u>our</u> reaction. The artist's expressed emotion becomes our emotion. Further, since the specific determinateness of an emotion is dependent on the other qualities, attention to them, as organized by the artist, reveals the emotional-quality of which the artist was aware; awareness and fusion of them is a fusion of the recognitional features of his emotion, and now naturally ours.

I shall hold that emotional-qualities are more like unit- than form-qualities in that they are dependent on learned relations for their emergence and nature, for they are cognitions. When one walks down a street of strangers that experience has one kind of emotion, and when one recognizes an old friend amongst them that experience has a different kind

of emotion. But emotional-qualities are unlike unit-qualities in that they permeate all the constituents of a situation rather than only a part. All the segments of a molar experience are colored or re-colored by them. The unit-quality "flowers" permeates only a part of Cezanne's picture, but the "freshness" in "The picture is fresh," permeates the whole picture.

Value-quality, according to Prall, is a constituent of every quality. We take a pro- or anti-attitude toward every presentation. Prall speaks of this sometimes as liking, sometimes as interest, and at other times as satisfaction. He never decides on a single one as the synonym of value-quality, so the only alternative seems to be to take them all as descriptions.

These relations and quality constituents are those which can be sense-presented, they are the constituents of surface. The qualitative constituents of thin surface are sub-, form- and value-qualities, of thick surface are unit-, emotional- and value-qualities. This seems to be a clearer way of distinguishing between thin and thick surface than by distinguishing between sensation and perception.

1.4 Beauty.

Although the term "beauty" only occurs three or four times in AA, it occurs frequently in AJ and is the most discussed topic of the first three chapters of that book. Many things are said about it, and it is perilous to say that this is what Prall meant by "beauty." However, I shall venture the

opinion that beauty is identical with a valuable t-total-quality, while ugliness is identical with a disvaluable t-total-quality. Beauty is the total apprehension of an aesthetic experience.

One reason why this seems to be a defensible position is the similarity of the constituents of beauty and t-total-quality. We have seen what the constituents of t-total-quality are. I shall argue that the constituents of beauty are the same. Beauty is usually thought to have a value aspect. It does for Prall also. "This apprehension of beauty ... is characterized roughly by the delight we feel or fail to feel in apprehending objects." (AJ, 19) "The delight we feel is our sense of the beauty of the object." (AJ, 319) Now if beauty is not delight[12] or preference (AJ, 16) alone, as Prall holds it is not, then beauty is not identical with value-quality, and so must include other qualities as well. This is strengthened by the fact that beauty, like t-total-quality, is unique to every situation. "Beauty is unique and individual always." (AJ, 320) T-total-quality is unique because the constituents of each context are different, for t-total-quality is a fusion of these, and its fused character will differ when its constituents differ, which is always. And always, it must be if the conditions of uniqueness are to be satisfied. Thus, for beauty to be unique, we must assume that it is also a fusion of other qualities besides delight, else it would

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[12] AJ, 19. See also Prall's "Metaphysics and Value," pp 127-128.

not be able to satisfy the conditions of uniqueness.

That beauty is a quality is clear. "Beauty --- is recognized as a quality supervening upon this flux in some particular situation." (AJ, 7) I have argued that it is a fusion above, so that so far beauty and t-total-quality are similar. From the quote immediately above it is also clear that beauty, like t-total-quality, qualifies the <u>situation</u>.

Further, t-total-quality <u>identifies</u> a situation. "And situations are marked for human minds by these supervening qualities and nothing else." (AJ, 7)

> So of all qualities and so of all beauties. It is because any particular beauty is thus identically what it is in its own self-defining nature or being that it is nothing else, but solely and separately its purely qualitative and unique self. (AJ, 9-10)

Another point of similarity between them, which also abets the view that beauty has other qualitative constituents like t-total-quality, is that both depend on processes in the subject and object.

> The beauty attributed to objects in aesthetic judgments ... is like all other qualities the essence or form attended to by direct feeling, dependent for its nature as well as its manifestation upon human organic activities just as truly as upon the objects felt to be beautiful and afterwards recorded as beautiful in aesthetic judgment. (AJ, 28-29)

Some interesting implications follow from this view of beauty. The first is that it is useless to try to define beauty in the <u>genus</u> and <u>species</u> way, trying to find some qualities which always appear when beauty is present. Beauties are unique, hence, plural. There are as many

beauties as there are delightful qualities of situations.

One cannot say that "X is beautiful" unless he has had perceptual commerce with X. To utter the sentence and not to have perceived X is to utter a meaningless sentence.

Since beauty is constituted by the interaction of two sets of events, the sentence "X is beautiful" may be false for A and true for B, because the subjective set of events may differ. It is false for A if the value component is marked by non-delight, true for B because marked by delight. It is to be noticed that the sentence is true or false only insofar as "beauty" characterizes the situation, not the object. The sentence form misleads, because it reads as if the object is that which possesses value independent of its role in a situation. It is the object as perceived by someone that is beautiful.

The situation is the same with regards to the same person at two different times as with two persons at the same time. The same sentence at T1 may be true for A, while at T2 it may be false.

Thus "X is beautiful" and "X is not beautiful" are not contradictory statements if uttered by two different persons, because the sentences are records of two different transactions. The subject of the sentences would lead us to believe that the propositions are talking about the same thing, but as perceived they are not the same thing. They would be contradictory only if we assumed that the quality of beauty could exist as a quality of the object independently of the subject.

Much of traditional aesthetics has thought of the term "beauty" as determinate, whereas, to use W. E. Johnson's term, it is a determinable. It is not a single, determinate quality. It is simply a term which can designate any t-total-quality whatsoever whose value-quality component is positive.

1.5 The Origin of "Surface."

Much of this sounds familiar, particularly the section on aesthetic experience. The distinction of the aesthetic from the conceptual is common and goes back to Plato; in more recent times the two were contrasted by Baumgarten. Kant, and most everyone else, has contrasted the practical and the aesthetic. The "perceptual experience" part of the surface formula is thus not new.

So far as I can tell the term "surface" is original with Prall, as is the conception of it as a field for systematic study. People have spoken of elements, form, principles of symmetry, etc., for many years, and insofar as they have done this they have been talking of surface, but they have not conceived surface as the sole subject matter of aesthetics.

Prall's notion of surface in its t-total-quality aspect is similar to Dewey's conception of quality, but Dewey is mainly interested in this as a basis for a philosophy of art, and how this quality comes to be; unlike Prall he does not go into an actual analysis of the surface constituents.

The closest anyone has come to speaking of this qualitative content as the subject matter of aesthetics is Roger Fry in "An Essay in Esthetics."[13] Fry contrasts actual life with the imaginative life and holds that art is an expression of the imaginative life rather than a copy of actual life. In actual life our perception is used to get cues for behavior, each thing perceived being a signal for some appropriate action on our part. So we never see what things really look like. Further, connected with our perception and the resultant actions is emotion, and like objects we never stop long enough to clearly feel them, but are hurried along in our action. It is in the imaginative life that we have time to pay attention to the appearance of objects and sounds and the emotions connected with them; the absence of pressing action allows us time to contemplate the perceptive and emotional aspects as they are in themselves. This is similar to Prall's surface.

> But in the imaginative life no such action is necessary, and, therefore, the consciousness may be focused upon the perceptive and the emotional aspects of the experience. In this way we get, in the imaginative life, a different set of values, and a different kind of perception.[14]

Fry then goes on to discuss the constituent qualities which an art object must have to be an instrument for disinterested, i.e., non-practical, perceiving and for arousing our emotions.

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[13] This was suggested to me by Professor Charles L. Stevenson.

[14] Roger Fry, "An Essay in Esthetics," printed in Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Esthetics, Revised Ed., (New York: Henry Holt, 1952), p 46.

Fry, like Prall, holds that the sensuous charm of thin surface does not exhaust a work of art, for this alone does not account for the profound significance of art; a beautiful pot is not as significant as a Rembrandt. Thus Prall and Fry agree that significance of the surface of art is its expression of emotion, in Prall's terms, its thick surface.

There are other similarities between Fry and Prall. In fact the similarity is so strong that Fry's essay begins to look like an outline of Prall's aesthetic, without the detail of course. Fry's essay is concerned only with the visual arts, so that he does not get into many of the interesting problems that arise for a general aesthetic theory.

In the main it does not seem that Prall's notion of surface is something new under the sun, and Fry came closest to him in holding that it is the subject matter of aesthetics. "Surface," according to my interpretation, owes much to Dewey also. But the close attention to materials belies Santayana's influence.

CHAPTER II

AESTHETIC THEORY

2.1 Method.

Given that the subject matter of aesthetic theory is surface as I have explained it, I wish now to discuss Prall's conception of: (a) the method required for the study of surface; (b) what we can expect to learn from a study by that method; and (c) of the use to which we can put what we have learned, that is, finding the connection between a theory of surface and an appreciation of that surface.

I shall treat method first. In the Introduction to the Sense of Beauty, Santayana mentions three possible ways of approaching aesthetics. We have the didactic method if we approach aesthetics through pronouncements, giving judgments of praise and blame. We have the historical method if we wish to make aesthetics an anthropological study. Another method, the psychological, is Santayana's own, and this one is suited to give us an understanding of the mechanics of taste, the conditions for the arousal of those feelings we base our preferences on.

None of these is Prall's method. Prall explicitly denies that the methods of psychology are useful for studying the aesthetic field; neither are the methods of physics. (AA, 11) Nor is aesthetics normative; it is not concerned to formulate standards. These denials are perfectly consistent with his conception of the aesthetic field, which is quality.

If his method were to be either that of psychology or physics, then they would be useful for studying the processes which are responsible for the constitution of quality, but they would not be useful for studying quality itself.

Having partially seen what aesthetic theory is not, let us see what it is. "Aesthetics is the science of the immediate." (AA, 12) "... a sort of qualitative mathematics." (AA, 173) "Science" and "mathematics?" These have a strange sound in a book on aesthetics. These quotations occur after Prall has denied that psychology and physics help us to understand the aesthetic aspect of our world: but what aesthetics does have in common with them is that each is a species of analysis. Indeed, the title of Prall's second book on aesthetics contains the term "analysis." It is analysis which makes physics and psychology sciences, and since aesthetic's method is to be analysis it too can be called scientific. Before I go into an explication of Prall's notion of analysis, which is the same for both aesthetics and physics, I had better clear up an apparently conflicting notion that occurs in AJ; it is the same one I treated at the beginning of the first chapter, but now it could mislead us about Prall's conception of analysis as it might have misled us about the aesthetic field before.

The following quotation in Prall seems to be diametrically opposed to the above quotations.

> Lacking then any full knowledge of the subject matter of aesthetics, we may profit by examining the meaning of our own aesthetic judgments, an analysis which should supposedly tell us what

> that meaning is ... In other words we are noticing frankly that in method our study is not to be strictly or narrowly scientific but general and philosophical. (AJ, 4)

Once again we notice the term "analysis." This time it is used in conjunction with "meaning." This suggests that he conceives analysis to be linguistic analysis. Now Prall does not intend to, nor does he, proceed like Ayer; he does not conceive of analysis as the attempt to find logically equivalent expressions for a given expression. Analysis is not a logical activity, the deducing of equivalent expressions by the rules of entailment governing the language.[1] Nor does he wish to give the stock uses of the terms contained in aesthetic judgments, for he does not have a "use" conception of meaning. Nor does he wish to give an analysis of a "usage" after Langford's conception. Prall does not give us a verbal expression which can be called the analysans and then state that it is synonymous with a verbal expression called the analysandum.[2]

The above conceptions of analysis are non-factual. Ayer holds that philosophical analysis is purely a logical activity, that philosophy is to make no factual statements. This is not Prall's conception of analysis. For him, aesthetics, as a part of philosophy, is like the sciences; it makes factual statements, and it makes them about the surface as-

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[1] A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: 1947) p 70.

[2] C. H. Langford, "The Nature of Formal Analysis," Mind, Vol. 58, N. S., 1949, p 212.

pect of our world. As I stated in the first chapter, Prall uses "meaning" as if it were identical with what it refers to.[3] This is taking the meaning of a term to be the same as the denotation of that term. Thus Prall's "analysis" is not conceptual analysis either, for this would take meaning in a connotational sense.

But neither is analysis "real" definition. "Real" definition has been held to be an examination of the kind of thing that a term names, and then a listing of that combination of characteristics which belong exclusively to that kind of thing. Prall's notion of analysis here is not of the term "surface" but of that to which it refers insofar as it displays relations, since it is the search for relations. Science as statement is the formulation of relations; its language is mathematics, which developed from logic; and logic is nothing but the study of systematic structure. Any study which attempts to find and formulate systematic relations among the elements of that which constitutes its subject matter is to be called scientific. This is the kind of study which aesthetic theory is to be -- this is what aesthetic analysis is to be, a search for systematic relations among the elements of surface.

2.2 Aesthetic Analysis.

Is analysis of aesthetic surface, of quality, possible? Can aesthetics be a systematic study? Prall holds that

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[3] See AJ, 339 and "Abstract Ideas." p 163.

it can.

An analysis of the type conceived by Prall requires that the subject matter contain elements and that relations hold between these elements; these relations must be formulable, that is, systematic. A complex is made intelligible when its form, its system of relations is revealed. The qualitative constituents of aesthetic surface according to the last chapter are sub-, form-, unit-, emotional- and value qualities. The relations so far found in surface are order, arrangement and learned relations. Thus the question about the possibility of making aesthetics a systematic study rests on the possibility of systematizing the above relations, and assuming that they exhaust the relations in surface.

Chapters V - VII in AJ and Chapters II and III in AA are devoted to showing the systematic intrinsic order relations that hold between color sub-qualities and between tone sub-qualities. Prall uses W. Ostwald's color scheme as an example of the formulation of the order relations in color. Order relations between color sub-qualities are systematic. So far Prall is on sound ground. The same can be said for the relations obtaining between tone sub-qualities.

The sub-qualities odor and taste defy systematic analysis. That is why they are not satisfactory materials for composition and why we do not generally call a meal, for example, beautiful. It is possible that future artists may discern order in them, however.

Having seen that there are systematic relations

among the important surface sub-qualities, can we say the same for arrangement relations? Prall holds that we can. He discusses these under two headings: spatial relations and temporal relations. In Chapter VIII of AJ, Prall discusses spatial relations in terms of the systematic relations of dimensionality. In Chapter IX of AJ, Prall discusses temporal relations in terms of rhythm: In Chapter IV of AA he makes a rhythm analysis of English poetry.

So far Prall can make good his "qualitative mathematics" claim. But before he can fully establish it, three other matters have to be investigated, any one of which might upset his claim. (1) Can he show that learned relations are systematic? He either has to do that or hold that these relations are not constituents of surface. (2) Are there other relations besides the three mentioned? What about the relations involved with unit-, emotional- and value-qualities? So far Prall has only discussed the relations involved in thin surface. (3) Prall's books on aesthetics consist of more than "qualitative mathematics." Does his own theory violate his claim?

Prall never raises the issue about the systematization of learned relations, but I don't think that he would hold an analysis of such relations to be pertinent to the analysis of surface <u>as presented</u>. We are interested in the processes that account for the constitution of surface qualities, but an investigation of the relations involved in the informing process, which modifies the presented manifold, is psychology, and

has nothing to do with an analysis or description of quality itself. To think that such a study would be pertinent would be to confuse the relations necessary for the description of quality with the relations necessary for the recognition of qualities. If these latter are formulable, then it is the task of psychology, but not the task of aesthetics. This is the problem of cognition in a presentational aesthetic, and has nothing to do with the analysis of surface as such.

Do the three kinds of relations so far discussed exhaust the relations in surface? If they do, then they must also be adequate for describing the relations involved with unit-, emotional- and value qualities. If they are not, then Prall must either add to the kinds of relations or hold that aesthetic surface is identical with thin surface alone, thereby excluding thick surface as aesthetic, which he doesn't want to do. If he does add to the kinds of relations, then they must either be systematizable or not. If not, then his "qualitative mathematics" claim fails. If they are, then his theory as it stands is incomplete.

I don't think any other relations are required for unit-qualities. They can be handled exactly as form-qualities are. Their elements, in this case recognitional features, can be handled by arrangement and/or order relations, as can unit-qualities relations to each other. With unit-qualities there is, of course, the relation between the presented and the non-presented. But this involves learned relations which are psychological and not constitutive.

As to the relation of value-qualities to other qualities Prall tends to think of this as an attitude relation, a motor-affective attitude, and as such it is psychological also, hence, not a relation constitutive of surface.

> In aesthetics our objects are relatively concrete wholes, and our feeling of them is complicated by all that enters into a total organic response to the concrete presentation before us. Aesthetics has not reached the point where a fully adequate analysis of a whole concrete experience can be made out, partly ... because such an analysis would involve all the findings of all the sciences, (and) a complete knowledge of the organic conditions of the response ...
>
> And there are theoretical compensations for its inadequacy. What we are concerned with in aesthetic subjects is not primarily all the relevant conditions, but the structural whole in which they emerge as determinate content. It is within this field that our systematic analysis applies; if there were not some such boundary for the subject, then aesthetics would simply be science in general. (AA, 177)

The reader can see the extent to which the above passages apply to emotional-qualities also. The perception of X may arouse an emotional response in us which is what it is because of some prior experience with X. These naturally modify t-total-quality considerably, but we cannot trace out and fully analyze all the psychological relations involved there.

There is, however, for Prall, another account of emotional-quality in regard to aesthetics. There is first the <u>arousal</u> of emotional-quality, as above, and there is second the <u>recognition</u> of emotional-quality. It is the latter which is of importance for aesthetics, for Prall will hold that

works of art express emotions by way of presenting them, which involves recognition in the same way that we recognize presented unit-qualities. In this sense emotional-qualities too have recognitional features, as I pointed out earlier. Attention to these recognitional features leads to the constitution of the emotion expressed by the artist, that is, leads to another quality, for example, of a statue besides the form-quality, color-quality, and unit-quality of this sculptured human form. Attention to the features allows the recognition of arrangement relations as accounting for form-quality; the recognition of a human by those same arrangement relations. Now that there is also emotional-quality, and non-associative, but presented, can I not assume that there is another set of relations between the features which would account for this other quality? Is there not emotional-form?

It seems to me that there must be another kind of relations between elements if Prall is to hold a presentational theory of expression rather than an associative one. Composition, Prall insists, depends on systematic relations. (AJ, 65) How is it possible to compose expressive objects unless there are systematic relations between elements in their expressive function. For Prall, expression by works of art is not accidental, does not depend on chance similar associations for the creator and spectator. Expression, according to Prall, is a means of communication, so it must be controlled; but again control is impossible if the expressive

relations of elements are non-systematic. We do not compose with tastes because there are no systematic relations among them. Can we do any better with expression if there are no systematic relations?

To the extent that the above argument is valid, Prall's claim to "qualitative mathematics" fails. And it is important to see that this is not a question of psychological relations as it is with expression by association. For as with unit-qualities, so with emotional-qualities, there is a difference between inferring and informing. What I called "inferring" in regard to unit-qualities includes "association" in regard to emotional-qualities. Once again, for Prall, these associated emotions, according to the sense-presented criterion, are not aesthetically relevant. (AA, 19) This, however, does not rule emotions out, for, and this is the point of Prall's theory of expression, emotions may be sense-presented. I pointed out that they fulfill the "recognitional feature" criterion, and used as an example Prall's passage on solemn music. (AA, 153)

Now I am arguing that the composition of an emotional-quality, as well as controlled recognition, depends on systematic relations between elements. This is taken up further in Section 10.34, where I make a suggested solution.

Prall does realize that elements and patterns have an expressive function as well as formal function; further, he recognizes that the analysis of individual works of art requires attention to the expressive functions. In a work

of art they contribute to the unitary t-total-quality, and critical analysis must point out how the parts function in contributing to it. I later call this a focus analysis. The kind of analysis that seeks systematic relations I call discrimination analysis. In this terminology then, I am claiming that Prall needs to make a discrimination analysis of emotional relations in order to complete his "qualitative mathematics" claim; focus analysis does not satisfy this claim.

The third matter concerning this claim involves the content of Prall's books. Do they violate his claim for an aesthetic "science?" Prall wants to account for the value of the arts and for the difference between the aesthetic judgments of several people; he discusses the functions of criticism and the qualifications of the critic; he concerns himself with communication in the arts and a theory of expression. These are not discrimination analyses.

One way out of this is to say that the above investigations are meta-aesthetics. It is talking about surface and and, for example, one may express emotions via surface. Thus, just as aesthetic theory or meta-aesthetics is distinguished from criticism, so should we distinguish meta-aesthetics from aesthetics proper. Meta-aesthetics is concerned with the relations of surface to other aims and activities of man. Prall can make this distinction if he wishes to, of course. However, aesthetics is most often used in the way that I use meta-aesthetics. What Prall calls aesthetics "proper"

is far narrower, and when he says that he wishes to make it a "science," he must be understood in the narrower sense of aesthetics "proper."

Prall's conception of aesthetics proper is nothing new. It is a systematization of the kind of things that people working in the arts know intuitively. To be a painter one must know colors; so Prall's conception of aesthetics proper is mainly technical.

> Thus intelligent technical training is very largely aesthetic, and sound aesthetics is largely technical. To consider training for appreciation radically different from technical training, and to be separately cultivated, is one of the obviously misdirected attempts that helps explain the often total lack of intelligent relation to the arts among civilized people who have had what are called fine opportunities. (AA, 204)

To say that technical training and discrimination analysis are the best training for the appreciation of the arts requires some explanation. I turn to this in the next section.

2.3 The Use of Discrimination Analysis.

Prall rightly insists that aesthetic analysis is to be distinguished from aesthetic appreciation; this does not mean that it is irrelevant to aesthetic appreciation, though there are those who think that analysis destroys or falsifies that which is analyzed. But these fears are ungrounded, for the "strongest thoughts in the world will not crush rocks nor move mountains." (AA, 33) Analysis involves abstraction,

as all thinking does, but it can be conceived to be a falsification only if we are said to never remember that there are other aspects of the object besides the aspect abstracted.

Aesthetic analysis should help us to be less strangers to the surface of our world; by pointing out its elements and the relations that hold between them, we learn to become better acquainted with the surface, that is, we learn to discriminate, become better observers. If we cannot discriminate we lose many of life's pleasures. One cannot appreciate anything unless it is noticed; there are no more pleasureable responses than there are things to be responded to (excepting repeated pleasures from one thing); and there are no more things to be responded to than there are things that are discriminated. Thus, if we increase the number of discriminations we can make, we can increase the possible number of pleasures we can have.

These discriminations can take place equally when we take note of our work surroundings and when we place ourselves before the masterpieces. So aesthetic analysis can help us become better acquainted with both the workaday world and with works of art. Specific discriminations are recorded in the most ordinary judgments. You may be driving along in your car and notice an odor; it strikes you and you attend to it, take a discriminating (aesthetic) attitude toward it, and then pronounce, "Ah. Smell that wonderful pine odor." Or your friend's new tie is not just red, your sensitive discrimination reveals it to be a most subtle hue, even though

you can't name it.

The use of aesthetic analysis is just to increase our pleasures by increasing our powers of discrimination, then. Surely a sufficient use. It remains now to explain how this is possible. How does the conceptual knowledge provided by analysis become translated into appreciation? Prall's answer seems to me to be a contribution to the epistemology of aesthetics, an attempt to show the place of cognition in the aesthetic experience without turning into a conceptual experience.

To find out how conceptual knowledge is instrumental to appreciation, we need to know what Prall's conception of knowledge is. I shall give a brief summation, only enough to indicate how Prall answers the question.

Prall's notion of knowledge is best summed up in the title of an article on knowledge, "Knowledge as Aptness of the Body." Prall there develops a behavioristic notion of knowledge. He denies that statements constitute our knowledge; they only express it, and we may say and repeat them without knowing what we say. The real evidence that we possess knowledge is the ability of our body to make the kind of response that is required for the verification of a statement. Knowing that reduces to the body's knowing how. Thus knowledge is not the property of a mysterious "mind." Knowledge is a state of the body, it is the body's aptness for adaptation. (AA, 62) Prall tries to account for knowing without assuming the existence of a mythical mind. This will sound familiar to those

who are acquainted with Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Prall thinks this kind of knowledge account is implied by pragmatism.

Thus for Prall "the difference between perceiving clearly and understanding distinctly is not the great difference we are sometimes led to think it." (AA, 39) When we get knowledge of the materials that constitute surface, we take note of the elements and the relations that hold between them, that is, we get a conception of their possibilities for surface. By adaptation to surface through these conceptual schemes we build up in the organism a readiness to respond to anything that is possible. Thus acquiring knowledge is nothing except acquiring an aptness of the body to respond to any possible situation, acquiring adaptive dispositions. Conceptual knowledge, the fruit of analysis, disappears into physiological structure and habits of action. The expert does not have his knowledge consciously present; it is lost in his modes of response. So when we perceive clearly, that is, discrimiate, it is only distinct conception adapting through physiological aptness.

Prall tries to make sense of a verification theory of meaning, to penetrate the area shrouding the nature of knowledge. We have long been given its tests, but never knowledge itself. Now we can see the sense of operations, the demand for first-person confrontation and the privacy of knowledge itself, for knowledge is the possession of the private person. Its expression is public, but knowledge itself can

be thought to be public only when we confuse its expression with what is expressed.

If the task of aesthetics, and Prall thinks this is its main task, is to increase our appreciations, then it must increase the body's aptness, increase our readiness to respond. This can be increased insofar as we can exhibit and become habituated to the possibilities of surface. And the way to do this is to analyze surface, make it intelligible; and it is intelligible when it is systematized. In the musical scale reside all possibilities; to see the kind of order that resides there is to know what to look for in musical compositions. Discrimination analysis becomes the chief instrument for training in the arts.

But there is another way we can be prepared for response besides the schemes provided by discrimination analysis; the other way is by familiarity with wholes or types. The next chapter takes this up, thereby continuing the attempt to show the role of cognition in aesthetic appreciation, to expand on the informing activity.

CHAPTER III

FORM

3.1 Form and Intelligibility.

Aesthetic theory is an intellectual enterprise. Its method is that of discrimination analysis, which is the search for systematic relations. The systematic relations to be found in aesthetic surface when formulated are of use to aesthetic experience. Learning conceptual systems provides us with discrimination dispositions, increases the aptness of our body.

A traditional term for a set of relations holding between elements is "form." Form, traditionally, has been the principle of intelligibility. It is no less so for Prall. We have seen that relations themselves are understood and not perceived. Though not themselves perceived, relationships are perceived and they each have their own quality. It is out of these relationships that relations are distilled -- we translate from perception to conception. Form is thus obviously relevant to qualitative aesthetic surface, and, derivatively, so is aesthetic theory, as Prall conceives it, relevant to aesthetic experience of that surface.

Since many of Prall's statements lead us to believe that the sole enterprise of aesthetic theory is analysis, the search for "form," it can be seen that form is of prime importance to his aesthetic theory. This being so, I want to see what he has further to say about form, its intelligibility and how the latter is pertinent to appreciation.

Despite the importance of form, beyond the elaborate discussions of natural orders, Prall has little specific to say about form. He is, however, the first to admit it, and realizes that a complete aesthetic must give a complete account of form. (AA, 83) He holds that a complete aesthetic should start where he does, though. He regards his theory as unique in that it starts with qualitative orders or relations, and that a beginning which is other than here cannot but be vague and of no more than literary interest.

For Prall, the "form" of something consists of the relations that obtain in that thing or complex. So to describe the form of anything is to stipulate the relations of which the form consists. The term "form" is then a collective general name for any set of relations.

I don't think that Prall makes the assumption that every complex in fact has a form. For him it is not necessarily the case that a lack of form is an epistemic lack; it may be a metaphysical lack. "Form" may not be equivalent to "known form," and "chaos" may not be equivalent to "non-known form." Consider a meal so far as its tastes are concerned; the taste complex cannot be ordered, for there are no relations that exist between them such that we can make a series out of tastes. There are no order relations that obtain between them as for tones and colors. Prall concedes that we <u>may</u> later discover that there are order relations, but he nowhere suggests that they necessarily exist. Thus insofar as aesthetics is concerned there may be some complexes which shall remain forever formless; our appre-

ciation is not of the complex then, but of the individual elements separately. Cognition plays hardly any role at all there, and such elements are as close to pure sensation as we can get. Perception and conception are as divorced here as anywhere.

Since "form" is a collective term for a set of relations, for purposes of clarity I wish to distinguish between two different sorts of collections. The first I shall call a total form, which is a set of relations like the octave musical scale or Ostwald's color system. Total form is contrasted with particular form, which is possessed by a particular composition or a particular fabric design.

Total form does not characterize anything, is not possessed by any one thing. It is a system of possibilities. Particular form does characterize something, is the actual form of some musical composition or fabric design. Total form provides the permanent context I spoke of before, in virtue of which we can specify the elements in particular complexes.

Prall has distinguished two kinds of relations, order and arrangement relations, so we have two kinds of form, order form and arrangement form. Order form generates two kinds of total form, color form and sound form. Arrangement form generates two more kinds of total form, dimension form and temporal form. Anything that has form will be characterized by, and only by one or more, of the possible particular forms as defined either by the total color, tone, dimension or temporal form. If this last statement is true, then Prall has the mach-

inery for a discrimination analysis of all of surface. However, this fails if, as I argued before, there is another kind of total form; I suggested that Prall needs emotional form. Then every individual would be characterized by an emotional form, while not every individual is characterized by, say, color form or sound form.

I should like now to juxtapose three propositions. (1) Form is the principle of intelligibility. (2) Not every form is intelligible, in the sense that some forms are too complex for our powers of analysis, such as the geometry of a face. (3) Even if a form was intelligible, some are so complex that a total descriptive analysis of its form would be a gigantic task.

Prall holds the first proposition. But the last two propositions seem to render form of limited value, especially when we come to works of art. Consider a painting by Rembrandt, say a portrait. I could not begin to give an analysis of that painting using the relations of dimensionality. Even if I could do so, we can see by the third proposition that it would be a gigantic task (and worthwhile?). The fact that something has some form means that it is in principle intelligible, but it certainly does not follow that the form of anything is or can in fact be known. "Intelligible" indicates only the possibility of being known. Not everything is seen as ordered, and form can serve us usefully in aesthetics only insofar as it helps us to see or hear a complex as ordered. In view of this, how can form usefully function as the principle of intelligi-

bility? How can it actually help us to apprehend what is sensuously presented?

Prall's treatment of form is such that a solution to this problem is afforded. To increase the meaningfulness of some traditional notions as Prall uses them, some prefacing remarks should be made.

Of the many possible forms that are or could be realized, each is completely <u>determinate</u> in form; and there are few, if any, in the universe whose determinate form is identical. Thus, forms are generally <u>unique.</u> To fully apprehend any presented thing is to apprehend its determinate form, to notice what is different about it. And full apprehension is aesthetic apprehension, for Prall believes that aesthetic perception which fails to grasp the uniqueness of an aesthetic object misses the unique value which that thing possesses. (AA, 188) To be fully alive to the world, to know and appreciate the world is to know it aesthetically. One must be able to discriminate successfully. For Prall this means one must grasp the determinate character of the object of our attention.

Aesthetic theory, through its systematization of total forms, should help us to become better discriminators, should help us to grasp determinate character; but we have just seen that there seem to be difficult barriers preventing the successful prosecution of that task.

If many forms, and important ones for art, such as the human body, are beyond discrimination analysis, then the only way in which a determinate form can become intelligible to us

is as a whole. For Prall a form is intelligible as a whole when it is a recognized form. Just as "form" is a collective name for a set of relations, we have collective names for particular forms, such as "cube," "face," and "doughnut." We see such things as ordered even though we may not be able to stipulate all the relations obtaining in that complex. I recognize a cube as a qualitative whole, as a familiar whole; it is recognized. It is possible to see a difference in form that way because form affects the qualitative whole. His discussion of these wholes can be put under three heads: Types, partial patterns and repeat patterns.

The term "types" will be familiar to readers of Santayana, for whom it is also a recognized form. Prall is here apparently following Santayana, for his discussion of its origin also parallels Santayana's discussion. Both consider the type an abstraction from a series of acquaintances with similar forms. Prall speaks of forming a norm in our mind. We build up a conception of, for example, the human body. The length of the neck is such and so in relation to the arms, the thickness of the torso has such and so a ratio to the thickness of the thighs, and so on. Prall calls these ready-made forms, complexes that we are acquainted with in our practical life. We build up our norms while carrying on normal living. When we see them used in works of art, we instantly recognize them, and that much of the work of art is successfully apprehended by us, is seen as ordered.

Acquaintance via use also helps us to apprehend form.

A spoon or a simple pitcher is beyond the geometry of most of us, but through our constant use of them, they appear quite ordered. This should be enough to indicate what Prall means by "type."

This abstract norm which we have built up in our minds, a conceptual average, will not be identical with some presented member of the class, for the presented member will always be what it is. But knowing the type we are left free to notice what it is that makes this determinate specimen unique. If we do not have to organize a form from the bottom up, if it is familiar, then we are left free to discriminate its differences. This body is relaxed; that one is characterized by poised alertness. Subtle differences allow us to recognize these characteristics, which would be impossible if it were not in the main organized for us. These characteristics are in the main what I called unit-qualities before. Our visual apparatus apparently organizes our sense-data into form-qualities for us, but the form-quality changes when we can relate it to something else in mind. That something else in the case of ready-made forms is the norm-type. Thus the quality of a relationship is altered when a form can be related to something not now presented, as in my earlier example of Donald Duck.

Types help us to discriminate the unique, hence, satisfies one of the conditions necessary for an appreciation of the unique value of complexes. Further, it is precisely this which distinguishes aesthetic perception from practical perception. The latter notices that about a form which permits its classi-

fication, so that we may act successfully in relation to it, and then passes on, while in aesthetic perception we notice, not what is similar in a form, but what is different.

Two other ramifications ought to be mentioned here. The first has to do with the vocabulary of aesthetics, and the second with representation. Theoretically, on the sense-data view, the only vocabulary we need for a description of the aesthetic object are the sub-quality terms and the terms for intrinsic relations and arrangement relations. Though of course there are no properties which qualify the whole that are not reducible to sub-qualities and their relations, it will be admitted by all, I suppose, that we can not ever hope to carry out a full description of any interesting aesthetic object in those terms. Thus we must be satisfied to use terms which name wholes. Prall does not subscribe to this view. The properties that qualify wholes are as epistemologically reliable and metaphysically real as sub-qualities. Thus a description of an aesthetic object which was wholly in terms of sub-qualities and their relations, and one which contained no form-quality or unit-quality terms would be incomplete.

The second ramification of Prall's type discussion concerns representation. In one sense of the term when X is said to represent Y, X is taking the place of Y, is a surrogate for Y, as a salesman who represents his company. Any importance that the salesman has comes from his standing in for and calling attention to his company.

There is another sense of representation, in which X is

said to represent Y when X resembles Y. This is often used in aesthetics, but it is also the case that the salesman sense is often included with the resemblance sense when it is used. According to Prall the salesman sense is not to be included. In aesthetics it is not the company that is important, but the actually presented salesman that stands before us. Prall is concerned that no one should commit the salesman mistake. A human body in a picture is not there as the representative of Body Incorporated, but is to be appreciated for itself. Once again, the difference between inferring and informing. The body norm serves to inform our vision, and allows aesthetic perception to attend to the presented, not the represented, to the determinate form before us.

It is interesting to note that most people do not commit the salesman mistake with order forms, such as color representation. People generally appreciate the colors of a painting for themselves, but it is clear that there can be resemblance of structures involving order relations as well as in those involving arrangement relations, as in sculpture. There are color types. We build up norms for color combinations, and anything that violates them throws us into color chaos. Matisse does this for many people. The impressionists also did this. They noticed that light and shadow, color structure, were not being adequately represented in painting. When they improved the representation many people had no familiar norms to help them perceive the color structure of the paintings, and reacted against them. This in spite of the fact that their paint-

ings better represented, in the resemblance sense, the light of nature. Those same people who objected to this resemblance in the case of color objected to the departure from resemblance in objects formed by arrangement relations. When understanding critics began to point out that this is the way colors really look if you notice them carefully, people began to revise or increase the number of their color norms; consequently, the color structure became ordered for them again.

The second head under which Prall discusses recognized or familiar form can be called, following Gotschalk, type patterns, but I shall call them <u>partial patterns</u> so the term "type" does not appear twice. A partial pattern characterizes the work of art as a whole rather than a part of it as types do. This has to be modified, for there are some art forms whose partial pattern is identical with its type, as in sculpture. The figure of a horse by itself has as its partial pattern the norm for the type horse. On the other hand when the figure of a horse appears in a painting, it is part of a larger pattern. It is the larger patterns, those belonging to more massive works of art, that I am now concerned with.

An aesthetic object has a determinate and complex pattern and in that sense is generally unique. Granted that this is the case, it can still be said that several aesthetic objects may have certain features in common and as such have a <u>partial amount</u> of their form in common. Types as I have discussed them above are not sufficient to organize massive and complex aesthetic objects. Partial patterns perform this function. The

source of types is in ready-made forms, while partial-patterns have an art-ificial source rather than natural source.

Familiar examples of partial patterns are plentiful. Poetry -- the sonnet; music -- the sonata; drama -- Greek tragedy; painting -- triangular composition. Partial patterns are abstractions from determinate aesthetic objects. In large aesthetic objects there is such a vast amount of material that we may not always be able to keep it all in mind, cannot keep it all related; when this happens, we do not apprehend the work of art. But if we are acquainted with partial patterns and find that this particular form fits into this partial pattern, our prior organization equipment immediately takes over and orders the presented complex. We find we already have the readiness to respond, so we know what next to look for in a piece of music; we take advantage of previously acquired dispositions to inform our perception.

All that I said of types before can be said of partial patterns in regard to its informing function, so there is no need to repeat it here. But there is something else that bears mention here because so much has been made of it in the past. This concerns the principles of aesthetics.

> Unity, coherence, a theme in variations, balance, symmetry, hierarchy, climax, simplicity, purity -- all these are names for unification for apprehension, and also general characteristics of the apprehended object in its completeness. (AA, 180)

Partial patterns which are characterized by the so-called principles of aesthetics are often considered good. Such partial patterns then become structural critical standards. But for

Prall these are vague literary names and suggest the character of works of art rather than defining the characteristics of partial patterns. They represent one step on the way to using partial patterns as value norms, instead of informing norms. People use type norms for the same purpose quite often. If something does not conform to any of their store of norms, then it is worthless. This will come in for more detailed treatment in Chapter V, but I mention it here so that we can see the origin of the standard and the shift of function involved.

For Prall partial patterns are functional organizing aids only; the "principles" of aesthetics are too vague to be of use in form analysis.

The third heading for recognized form I shall call repeat patterns. This kind of whole is one which can be apprehended in a single act or span of attention. An example is a melody, or a rhythm. We can hold only a few notes or beats together as a whole when it is presented to us anew. This can then be made use of throughout the work of art. It is most commonly noticed in temporal works of art, though it is no stranger to visual works as is evidenced by the frequent, though, according to Prall, misleading, use of the term rhythm in describing the non-temporal arts.

Prall also mentions that form performs another function, though Prall is not particularly enlightening here. It provides the possibility for novelty. It permits variations of content, which we must have if our interest in the presented is to be retained. Otherwise we soon become bored.

Learning the total form in order to increase the aptness of our body can now be seen to cooperate with the use of the various kinds of recognized forms. The latter organize a complex as a whole, while the former prepares us to notice the variations from the norm. Thus both inform our vision. If they do not, what is the use of aesthetic theory? I take it that this is one of the main points of Prall's aesthetics. It is an explication of the role of cognition in aesthetic experience.

A natural question which would occur to one after seeing the importance that Prall places on form is to ask if Prall is a formalist. This concern with relations is characteristic of formalists from Herbart to Bell. Prall denies that he is a formalist. (AA, 19) In the next section I shall attempt to show how Prall rejects one of the conditions necessary for holding the formalist position. However, it should be noted that Prall does subscribe to one of the fundamental tenets of formalism; he insists that only the sense-presented is aesthetically relevant. (AA, 19) Both formalism and Prall deny the relevance of suggested aspects; this is the similarity between Prall's presentationalism and formalism, but Prall thinks that he can include more in the sense-presented than the formalist is willing to include without admitting that the additional qualities are suggested.

But besides this issue over "suggestion" there are other grounds on which Prall would deny the truth of the formalist position. I proceed now to an examination of those grounds.

3.2 Form-Matter and Form-Content.

The form-matter and form-content distinctions are old and have been much ragged. Prall's stand on them, particularly the form-matter distinction, in a sense outmodes further discussion about them, rendering the usual treatments rather traditional.

I distinguish the form-matter problem from the form-content problem by equating matter with sub-qualities and form-quality, and content with unit- and emotional-qualities. Recollection of the role played by form in determining the qualitative character of the presented should, in general, be sufficient to indicate Prall's stand on the issues and his reason for taking that stand.

I take formalism to be the belief that all aesthetic value lies in form. Some, for example, Bell, included sub-qualities as valuable, but then everything except form and sub-qualities are irrelevant to aesthetic appreciation. Prall does not hold this position, for he thinks that such a view cannot account for nor provide an understanding of the arts. Without admitting non-formal significance, the full significance of the arts is lost. Aesthetic value is not exhausted by the value of thin surface.

One way of showing that formalism is not a tenable position is to attack a proposition which states a necessary condition for its possibility. Before one can say that aesthetic value belongs only to form, one must show that it is separable

from that which is declared anathema. It is Prall's position that form is not separable, which denies the truth of the proposition stating the necessary condition for the tenability of the formalist hypothesis.

There are at least three ways of considering the relation between form and matter or form and content, thus three ways of considering their separability. Can form be conceptually distinguished from matter or content? Hardly anyone would deny that they can be; even the contextualist discriminates between relations and the qualities related.

Are form and matter or content existentially separable and independent? This is a metaphysical question which Prall doesn't go into, and it is not relevant to aesthetics in the way that the following relation is.

Are form and matter or content separable in a perceptual situation? Aesthetic experience is a perceptual experience, so the problem of the relation between form and matter and form and content can be meaningfully posed only in this situation.

From the past discussion the reader can see that Prall denies the possibility of their separation. Surface tends toward a fused, qualitative unity in the aesthetic experience. A change in relations, that is, a change in form, results in a different fused, qualitative unity.

I pointed out earlier that there are total and particular forms. This means that the form-matter separability issue has to be discussed with both types of form in mind. I shall discuss the total form-matter case first. On Prall's view

of intrinsic order relations, a total form is elaborated on the basis of the intrinsic relations holding between the elements, which exist just because of the nature of the elements. Thus in the total form case the matter we are interested in are the individual sub-qualities. And we know because of the intrinsic relations holding between them that their character is relational or contextual. In the perceptual situation total form and sub-qualities (matter) aren't separated, for the quality is revealed to us as what it is because a color or tone is heard always in relation to the total form, because it has a particular place in that total form.

> This is not to suggest that beauty itself can be separated into matter and form; for the very materials of sensuous beauty are discriminated and defined in an order intrinsic to their qualitative nature. (AJ, 176)

In the case of particular form the matter is what I earlier called form-quality. Form-quality in a perceptual situation may be altered by two different kinds of form change. Take a set of color patches. I can alter the order form by replacing a color with another and the form-quality will change. I can also alter the arrangement form by rearranging the patches and again the form-quality will change. Form-quality (matter) in a perceptual situation is dependent on, not separable from, both order form and arrangement form. We do not perceive form, we perceive quality whose character is dependent on form, which, of course, can be <u>conceived</u> apart from the matter. The perceptual situation tends toward a <u>unitary</u> fusion, not a dualism. The dualism occurs in conception.

By following out Prall's suggestions my present terminology indicates the traditional form-matter distinction turns into a form-matter and a form-content distinction. Prall is denying separability in both cases. In the first, form-matter, we have two kinds of form, total and particular form. Particular form breaks down into two other forms, order and arrangement form. The "matter" of total form is individual sub-qualities, and the "matter" of particular form is form-quality.

In the second case, form-content, we again have two different kinds of form, particular and emotional form. The "content" for particular form is unit-quality. The content, a unit-quality, results when the recognitional features are so related as to be recognized as related by similarity to something else. A change in the relations between the recognitional features will alter the similarity, giving us a different unit-quality, or none at all, depending on the learned relations available. The "content" of emotional-form is emotional-qualities. What applies to the above applies mutatis mutandis to this case.

The only kind of quality the formalist commits himself to are sub-qualities. He is afraid that commitment to any other quality commits him to an appreciation of "subject matter," and he does not want this because he is afraid that he will then have to admit the relevance of associated and suggested factors. I am not sure if the formalist's appreciation of form is the same as the appreciation of what I have called form-quality or whether it is more like a logician's apprecia-

tion of a proof. I should think it would have to be the latter if he is to maintain the form-matter separation, for it seems to be a conceptual distinction. For Prall the aesthetic field is quality. In a perceptual situation we appreciate the qualitative nature of form, not form as a set of relations.

Two strands now. Prall does not want to admit the relevance of suggested non-present factors either, except in their informing function. But neither does he believe that a complete description of any aesthetic object can be given in terms of sub-qualities and their order and arrangement relations alone. We cannot deny that the sculptured human body possesses the quality of poised alertness. The formalist is pushed into denying this because: a) He does not wish to allow suggested factors into aesthetic experience; b) he thinks that all "content" is suggested by the "mind"; c) he thinks that content does not actually qualify that which is presented to him in the way that sub-qualities and their relations do; d) he generally believes that the only theory of expression that can be held is the association theory. Prall wishes to hold a) and thinks he can do so and still hold that "content" can be presented, because b), c) and d) are false. Prall has to come up, therefore, with an alternative theory of expression, which he does. He thinks that content need not be suggested, but may be presented, just as sub-qualities may be presented, and he does this by abandoning the association theory of expression.

Incidentally, it is curious to see this same rejection of "suggestion," the wish to deny a), in someone like Santayana

who accepts the truth of b), c) and d).

> The indulgence in sentiment and suggestion, of which our time is fond, to the sacrifice of formal beauty, marks an absence of cultivation as real, if not as confessed, as that of the barbarian who revels in gorgeous confusion.[1]

It may be instructive in discussing Prall's stand on form-content separation to elaborate his view by comparing it with A. C. Bradley's.[2]

Bradley's first step is to distinguish between subject-matter and substance. Subject-matter is what a work of art is about; consequently, it lies outside the work of art. Substance is what is in the work of art. Thus, it is substance, not subject-matter, which is to be contrasted to form. "Substance is within the poem, and its opposite, form, is also within the poem."[3] I take it that Prall's "content" is the same as Bradley's "substance." Both Prall and Bradley are insisting on attention to what is presented, not on what is suggested. Prall's notion of "informing" is designed to allow the distinction. Knowledge of subject-matter may inform our perception, but it is not part of the work of art. Bradley's distinction, like Prall's, is aimed at the belief that "content" is extraneous to the work of art, hence, that it is aesthetically irrelevant.

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[1] Santayana, Sense of Beauty, op. cit., pp 96-97.

[2] A. C. Bradley, "Poetry for Poetry's Sake," reprinted in Melvin Rader's A Modern Book of Esthetics (New York: 1952) pp 335-356.

[3] Ibid., p 343.

Bradley's second step in his argument against formalism is also parallel to Prall's, for he too perceives that if one can deny that substance and form are separable, then one can deny that aesthetic value lies wholly or mainly in form, or in substance.

> They imply that there are in a poem two parts, factors, or components, a substance and a form; and that you can conceive them distinctly and separately, so that when you are speaking of the one you are not speaking of the other. Otherwise how can you ask the question, In which of them does the value lie?[4]

So after Bradley distinguishes between substance and subject-matter and shows that it is possible for substance to be <u>in</u> the work of art, he now sets up the denial of substance or content-form separation by showing that one has to believe that they can be thought of alone.

Bradley, like Prall, takes the next step in the form-content argument by arguing that the form-content separation issue is relevantly discussed only in regard to the aesthetic experience, that is, in the appreciative situation.

> When you are reading a poem, I would ask -- not analyzing it, and much less criticizing it, but allowing it, as it proceeds, to make its full impression on you through the exertion of your re-creating imagination -- do you then apprehend and enjoy as one thing a certain meaning or substance, and as another thing certain articulate sounds, and do you somehow compound these two? Surely you do not, any more than you apprehend apart, when you see some one smile, those lines in the face which express a feeling, and the feeling that the lines express... Afterwards, no doubt, when you are out of the

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[4] <u>Ibid</u>., p 334.

> poetic experience but remember it, you may by analysis decompose this unity, and attend to a substance more or less isolated, and a form more or less isolated. But these are things in your analytic head, not in the poem, which is poetic experience.[5]

Bradley's fourth step, and the fourth parallel to Prall, consists in denying the possibility of separating the substance or meaning of a work of art from its form by holding that a work of art is non-translatable. If it was translatable, then the meaning could be separated without loss from its form, but if it cannot be translated without loss, then the form is obviously necessary to and inseparable from the content. Thus if some one asks for the meaning of a work of art, you can only point to the work of art itself. To separate the meaning from the form is to destroy that work of art. The appreciated works of art is a unity.

There are some interesting similarities in some passages from Prall and Bradley.

> Bradley: Just as there is in music not sound on one side and a meaning on the other, but expressive sound, and if you ask what is the meaning you can only answer by pointing to the sounds.[6]
>
> Prall: If music is itself expressive ... then it is because through an arrangement of sounds as such express meaning and significance can come to the mind. (AJ, 215)
>
> Prall: If we ask what degree of the grave or solemn, the despairingly sad, it expresses, we shall of course have to give specifications of feeling. But what could these possible be but

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5 Ibid., p 345.

6 Ibid., p 346. Also, see p 354.

> specifications of tempo, loudness, timbre, rhythm, pitch, sequence, and so on? (AA, 152-153)

With the notion of content or substance, the notion of expression is introduced. The problem of the relation between form and content inevitably is part of the problem of expression. This serves then as the transfer point to the next chapter on expression.

CHAPTER IV

ART AND EXPRESSION

4.1 Foreword.

Prall holds that the intelligible apprehension of aesthetic objects requires familiarity with their various forms through our built-up norms. These familiar norms we have in mind force us to go beyond formalism and thin surface, for they inform our vision in such a way that unit-qualities are revealed. I indicated earlier that emotional-qualities also play a role in aesthetic experience.

Having examined thin surface, sub-and form-qualities, in some detail, I have now to examine thick surface, unit- and emotional-qualities.

> This surface reveals to the mind or spirit that intuits it more than any merely sensuous elements in a unity of form. The surface, that is, must have a degree of depth to be seen or felt at all, and out of its depths comes much of what it exhibits as beauty. (AJ, 223)

There seems to me to be much confusion about expression in art, and much of it concerns unit- and emotional-qualities. I shall try to reduce this confusion by making some distinctions, and ones which seem to be implicit in Prall. Prall, however, does not make them explicit enough to prevent his theory of expression from being confusing, even though it may not be confused, and thus makes it less convincing and less useful than it ought to be. This is one thing I plan to do in this chapter, but before this I wish to show why Prall needs to consider

expression in his aesthetic theory.

4.2 A Theory of Art.

Although the field of aesthetics is not exhausted by the arts, they constitute the most significant part of the field, hence any theory of aesthetics that would be complete must find a place for the arts. Prall's theory of art commits him to the view that works of art express feeling and are instruments of communication. Given that Prall believes that works of art express feeling and given that aesthetics is concerned with the sense-presented, he now has to show that an expression theory of art and a presentational aesthetic can both be held consistently.

There are as many variants of the expression theory of art as there are people who hold it. Prall is not significant because he adds another variant, but because he attempts to show that an aesthetic theory is possible that holds a variant of this theory and which also subscribes to a traditionally rival, supposedly mutually exclusive view, that that which is of aesthetic value is only that which is sense-presented. This results in an interesting theory of expression. The expression theory of art and a theory of expression must be kept separate. The former is concerned with questions about the origin, aim, function, significance and value of the arts in the human enterprise, is a philosophy of art, while the latter is concerned with an account of the mechanism of expression, a part of aesthetics or meta-aesthetics, proper.

The arts, Prall holds, cannot be begun to be understood nor their value accounted for unless we recognize that they are the products of human activity. The value of the arts does not consist only of their thin surface value; if it did, then poetry would be little valued, for it has little surface that attracts our attention. Works of art must be seen and valued as products carrying the mark of human feelings, intentions, and techniques. We do in fact value them as expressions of human beings; we do value the technique which is consummated on the surface; we do delight in recognition.

Thus, even a cursory glance at the arts, and their various values forces us beyond thin surface; but, and this is the central point which needs to be worked out in more detail, all these additional factors are consummated on the surface, alter the appearance of works of art. Man's intentions, his feelings, his knowledge and his technique come to fruition, and our attention, on the surface of his works of art; they are there to be seen.

The arts in general, for Prall, involve a) intentions or purposes, b) techniques, c) materials and d) products. What distinguishes the <u>fine</u> arts from the other arts is the difference in intention or purpose.

> Thus the aim of each of the fine arts is that sort of expressiveness possible to its defining technique operating upon its own particular medium to produce structural wholes with necessarily sensuous surfaces. (AJ, 224)

The aim of the useful arts, being use, differs from the fine arts, then, in the intentions guiding the technique, and not

in the fact that the fine arts have a satisfying surface. That the fine arts must have a satisfying surface is necessary before we can call them fine, but that useful objects may also have a satisfying surface goes without saying, so that it does not constitute the differentia of the arts. This is sufficient to indicate why Prall thinks aesthetic theory has to find a place for thick surface. I wish now to go into a more detailed outline of his notions of art. Prall does not go into great length or detail; his main intent is not to give a theory of art but to show that aesthetics must cope with thick surface.

Origin of art: Prall gives three sources for the origin of art, two of which stem from the expression impulse. One origin is in the pleasure derived from decorating articles of utility. Repeated handling calls attention to them and the user starts elaborating their form. A second origin is free expression of the interest taken in the exciting and interesting aspects of experience. Prall apparently thinks that free expression is undertaken to record an experience, and the act of creating it is an elaboration of the wonder felt in having it in the first place. Art as expression in this sense is a means of extending and clarifying the original impression. A third source is found in spontaneous activities where expression is not consciously directed as it was in the other cases. Sounds from the human throat and movements of the body may arise to give relief or pleasure or express emotions for their own sake.

The third and second source can be seen to be very

similar to Yrjo Hirn's treatment.[1] Hirn sees art as the best means of satisfying the impulse to express overmastering feeling; it gives relief or pleasure. Further, in art the expresser wishes to control the expression and make it social, not only to preserve the mental state for itself alone, but also to embody it in such a way that other men may also experience it. With this last notion we have communication: Prall does not mention it in connection with the origin of art, but that it can be seen as an extension of the attempt at controlled preservation indicates that it cannot be far from his mind. Prall mentions that an artist must constantly check his work to see if his intention is being fulfilled, that is, he must act as a spectator also. There would be no need to mention this unless the desire to perpetuate or preserve his feeling was social to some extent, that it is intended to be preserved for other eyes besides his own. (AA, 160-161) Hirn insists on the social character of the origin and Prall's statements do not make it seem unlikely in him also.

Aim of art: We saw before that fine arts are distinguished from other arts by the aim of expression. Prall makes it much stronger than this when he considers the motive for this end. "But of course the only authentic motive for artistic composition is individual feeling, originating in the artist, to be externalized." (AA, 184) Without naturally interesting

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[1] Yrjo Hirn, The Origins of Art (London: 1900), p 100.

feelings no one would think of externalizing his feelings, that is, expressing them in art. People in a society where art exists may practice painting or sculpting without such feelings, but they do not practice art, for they do not express but copy. The only authentic aim of fine art, of a technique, then, is to externalize what is inwardly felt. The motive for practicing an art is to externalize interesting feelings; the aim of the art is the expression of those feelings.

Function of art: This requires a distinction between the act of making art and the product of the act.

Act. In the act of expressing himself, which is the act of art activity as modified by his forming techniques, the artist may find relief, pleasure, and understanding through the clarification of his feelings; it is also a means of preserving his stand-out experiences. These functions naturally follow from the drives toward expression considered as a creative act.

Product. Art as a product serves as the embodiment or preserver for the artist. When we add the spectator it also serves as an instrument of communication. Its unique function is to express and communicate what language can not express and communicate. (AA, 163)

Significance: The significance of art also stems from the communication function. Works of art are products of human beings, and have all the significance that the life of their creator had. Cezanne gives us his vision and Mozart his "overt disregard of the insistent wretchedness and difficulty of living." (AA, 152) The arts communicate the feelings of our

masters.

Value of the arts: The value of the arts for expression theories may lie in the act or in the product. Art expression as a catharsis, as Hirn would have it, is obviously of psychological value. Tolstoy sees its value as mainly moral by virtue of its power to communicate feelings. Others see the value of art as dependent on the value of the feelings expressed: the more romantic turn of mind finds its suggestibility a further value. For Prall expression confers three values on art. The first I have mentioned in speaking of the human significance of the arts; we value the arts as products of extraordinary human beings, who have and who can communicate feelings that enrich our life. Second, expression is the source of originality: without the patent attempt to render his own feelings in an honest manner the artist would only give us conventional copies of feelings easily recognizable and familiar to all rather than fresh works of art. Third, expression, springing as it does from intense feelings, gives art vitality. Prall never tells us what he means by vitality, but it should be clear enough when one reviews mentally the pictures or plays he has seen and recalls that some are filled with life, while others are flaccid and gray.

Expression theories may stress one or others of the above categories. There are variants of the theories. I have gone into some detail on Prall's theory of art not because he has something new to give us, indeed, there is nothing new here, being an eclectic account, but to indicate the importance

which he places on the notion of expression, and the consequent necessity for working out a theory of expression.

4.3 The Meaning of "Express."

Men express their feelings. Works of art express feelings. Prall holds both of these propositions to be true. Two terms are of especial interest to us in these propositions: "express" and "feelings." The latter term is to be used in preferance to "emotion," since Prall holds that what is expressible includes things other than emotion; the term I shall use for this is "feeling." My present task is clear; I need to indicate what Prall means by "express" and "feeling" and show how the feelings that are expressed can be said to be "presented" by works of art.

(1) Men express their feelings. (2) Works of art express feelings. "Express" can't mean the same thing in these two propositions. Works of art don't have feelings like human beings have feelings, nor can they pursue the activity of expression. It would be better then if I used a different term in one of the propositions. I shall replace "express" in (2) with the traditional term "embody." Thus I not only have to explicate "express" and "feelings," but also "embody."

Continuing with "express," I shall give some meanings which can be found in Prall's writings. Prall often uses "express" where I have decided to use the term "embody," so I shall divide the meanings that Prall gives to "express"

(which include my "embody") into two groups: the first group concerns the activity of expressing as in (1), the second group concerns embodiment as in (2).[2]

Group 1.

To express X means to <u>externalize</u> X
(in defined form and structure, E18)
(in objective determination, E30)

To express X means to make X <u>explicit</u> on the surface of experience
(E12 and 16)

To express X means to give "outward sensuous and formal specification" to X
(E20)

This first sense of "express," as activity, can be taken as synonymous with "externalization." The expresser wishes to express and/or communicate. Out of this kind of situation comes perhaps the best way of explaining externalization.

Let E be an expresser, S a spectator and O a sensuous object hereafter. Consider that E has had an experience which has made a deep impression on him; it is significant to him. In retrospect he turns it over in his mind and discriminates elements that escaped him during the actual occurrence. The experience grows in meaning and significance. So far as preserving it for himself, he has his memory, but he may wish others to know of his experience. When something unusual happens to us, we want to tell it to someone else. But our experiences apparently are private. Some one else, according to most evidence, cannot have our experiences, cannot possess our feelings.

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2 See Appendix for the quotations referred to by the "E" numbers.

And yet we wish to share them. There is E and there is S. How can we bridge the gap that exists between us?

S cannot be aware of our experiences directly. If we wish S to be aware of our experiences indirectly, we must at some place give him something he can be aware of directly. This condition seems to be satisfied by directly offering him a sensuous presentation. This simply means that we have to externalize what is private, so to speak, make what is "inside of us" and private and non-observable by others, external, "outside of us," public and observable. And what is this externalized result but surface?

Consider the analogy with language. (This analogy should not be pushed further than the "externalization" because of special problems of language in Prall's aesthetic.) I have certain thoughts, and you might ask me what they are. You ask me simply because they are private. You cannot know what they are unless you can be made aware of them. Now when I say what I was thinking about, my saying takes the form of some sensuous presentation, for example, sounds or mounds of ink. I have externalized my thoughts in one sense; they are now in a form which you can hear or see. But this is speaking loosely, you will say. I haven't really externalized my thoughts. Sounds or mounds are external and because of conventions regarding them you are "referred" to what thoughts I have, but the thoughts themselves are not dirctly presented.

Imagine the same situation again. Suppose I have been thinking of blue. I can externalize my thoughts by language

as I did before, or I can take up a brush and paint a patch of blue. Prall would agree that language used non-aesthetically, as it would be if I said, "I am thinking of blue," does not directly present my thought. But he would hold that painting that patch of blue would be actually externalizing my thought: it is now public, observable by you, not indirectly observable, but directly observable. You are actually seeing now what it was I was thinking; you are seeing what I was thinking about, you are seeing my thought, for a thought always is a content. The thought and what it is about are identical for Prall.[3] This is not an ordinary view and obviously calls for further explanation. I shall attempt to give it, but will do so after I add another thread to the skein. For now the notion of expression as an activity should be clearer. It is the act of externalizing. This externalizing may take at least two forms, the act of saying or the act of exhibiting. Both have it in common that the product of the activity is something external to the body of E. Next, I turn to the second group of meanings of "express," which term I have replaced with "embody."

Group 2.

To embody X means to present X
(directly, E1, 27, 34)
(E26, 30, 33, 37, and 38)

To embody X means to exhibit X
(determinately, E19 and 28)

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[3] It would seem difficult to hold that all thoughts of E can be externalized for direct observation by S. What about the thoughts of causal necessity?

To embody X means to <u>reveal</u> X
(on the surface, E13, 17, and 22)
(E8, 10 and 13)

To embody X means to (precisely) <u>specify</u> X
(E1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 29, 30, 35, and 41)

I shall use "embody" and "present" synonymously. Works of art embody feelings. Works of art present (not represent) feelings. To explicate "embody" is then to explicate "present." This I have already done. Consider again my thinking about blue. When I externalized my thought, I <u>presented</u> my thought. Prall's position was that I literally did externalize my thought, and when I expressed it I presented it to you as a public presentation. I gave a sensuous manifestation of it. So when we say that works of art express, that is, embody feelings, we are saying that they sensuously present feelings. There they are to be seen (or heard). This is meant literally. This notion of express is quite different from the first one. The first use of express concerns the act of finding and giving the equivalent sensuous presentation; the second use of express states the fact that a particular sensuous presentation <u>is</u> that which E was trying to find the equivalent sensuous presentation for.

When Prall fails to separate explicitly the two uses of "express" he may not be confused, but he is confusing. It leads people to misinterpret him in a way which obviously no one would hold. Susanne Langer is one of these who fails to see the distinction.

> Both writers (Baensch and Prall), however seek salvation in the same tour de force of simply treating emotive elements as qualities of a concrete object, something which this inanimate object and not its percipient, somehow "has;" and both know that the "expression" of real human feeling by a nonhuman object, which may be analyzed, without spatio-temporal relations, presents a paradox, and that their philosophic device is a counsel of despair.[4]

Obviously Prall is not holding that a statue "has" feelings; it would be more to the point to say that it is feelings.

Three things of some interest follow from this account. The first thing to note is that there are two ways of expressing, hence, communicating. One way is by language and the other is by art. The way of art is the way of presenting our feelings. (It should be noted that language may be used as an art, as in poetry, and which, Prall holds, also presents feeling: language functions differently when used poetically than when used non-poetically.) Second, the gap between an expression theory of art and the demand for sense presentation of all relevant factors has been bridged. To express is to externalize in some sensuous medium; that which is expressed is identical with the sensuous presentation: Prall has not gone beyond surface. Thus we can retain all the richness of art and need not sacrifice ourselves to formalism.[5]

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[4] Susanne K Langer, Feeling and Form (New York: 1953), p 58.

[5] For a further and more detailed development of this point see Arnold Isenberg's "Perception, Meaning and the Subject-Matter of Art," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, pp 561-575.

A third consequence of this view, which Prall also draws, and makes much of, is the greater precision of communication that is possible through art than is possible through language. I make use of blue again as an example; the same thing will apply, though with more complexity, to anything that is expressible. Consider the two ways of indicating to someone what you were thinking about. If I say, "I was thinking of blue," you know a range of color that I was thinking about, but you do not know the particular or specific color that I was thinking about. In this sense language is not precise, though it serves another purpose of course, for we have to have some tool for general reference. But if I have the techniques of an artist, am skillful at mixing and applying colors, then I can present you with the particular color that I was thinking about. I can specify it quite precisely. Here is my blue-thought. My expression is as good as my technique and the communication is as good as your ability to discriminate. You must be ready to respond to this soft, powder, etc., blue. It is important to notice that here in successful communication the readiness to respond that is acquired through thin surface analysis again stands in good stead. This will become clearer as we proceed; I mention it here to show the tightening fabric of Prall's argument.

4.4 Feeling.

I turn now to "feeling," the other term requiring ex-

plication. Prall uses it in various ways and failure to distinguish them makes his repeated statements quite opaque. In reading Prall on expression one gets a sense of intense struggle for a clear way of saying what is on his mind. He has something out of the ordinary to say and none of the usual terms and modes of expression suffice. The several distinctions which follow are made in the hope that another vocabulary besides Prall's will prove to be a means to a better expression and an easier understanding of his doctrines: they may also serve to reduce the initial feeling of implausibility that seems to attach itself to the cursory reader. That it is difficult to understand can be seen from the usual interpretations of Prall's aesthetics, in which it is held that Prall does not bring his notion of surface into relation with his doctrine of expression.[6]

I shall give six main distinctions for the term "feeling," and after each there will be an abbreviation which will be used in the succeeding material.

1. Feeling as sensitivity. (SF) A critic to be successful, an artist to be important must have feeling, that is, sensitivity, emotional and perceptual flexibility. Prall holds this to be especially important for the perceptive critic. I take sensitivity to mean that a readiness, or disposition, to respond is possessed by the individual.

2. Feeling as awareness. (AF) Just as sensitivity is the <u>disposition</u> one has for noticing or discriminating, so

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6 This is discussed at greater length in Section 7.8.

awareness is the occurrence of discriminating, the actual taking notice of the presence of something. To be aware of is to take note of.

3. Feeling as content. (CF) The first two distinctions imply that there is something separate from awareness to be sensitive to and something to be aware of. A person has to have some content of which he is aware, something of which he can take note. I take Prall's view here to be similar to C. D. Broad's.[7] Broad makes a distinction between "mental" events such as "sensing" or "feeling" and the "objective constituents" of these events, such as noises or toothaches. The former we have introspective knowledge of; the latter we have inspective knowledge of.

Broad holds that we introspect only mental events, so that we introspect only AF (sensing, feeling, being aware of), because Broad does not think CF, "objective constituents," are mental.

> It will be remembered that I refused to call the kind of cognition (inspection) which I have just been discussing "introspection" because I think it doubtful whether its objects, viz., sensa, images, bodily feelings, etc., can properly be regarded as "states of mind." I am doubtful whether they are even existentially mind-dependent, though I think it likely that they are to some extent qualitatively mind-dependent.[8]

It is of some interest to note that Broad's "sensa and images" are part of the CF of Prall, and that Prall's view that

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[7] C. D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1949) Ch. VI, "Introspection."

[8] Ibid., p 304.

they are not mental, which comes in his denial of dualism, is supported here by Broad. So Prall does not stand alone in supposing that CF is not essentially private and unexperienceable by someone else. This becomes an important link in Prall's argument, as we shall see shortly.

As to "inspection." This is of some interest for it seems to correspond agreeably with Prall's notion of aesthetic experience, which was defined in terms of attention. "Inspection" is a mode of attention to "objective constituents," or in my terminology, CF.

> At this point we come to a parting of the ways. A part of the field selected by me may (a) be used for perceiving a certain physical object and for learning about <u>its</u> physical characteristics, or (b) it may become an object of inspection by me with a view to learning accurately <u>its own</u> apparent characteristics ... But we can either inspect or perceive with a part of a field which we sense and select.[9]

"Inspection" is similar to attention to "surface" and the discrimination thereof. Note also that this is similar to the point I made in the first chapter concerning the functional use of discriminations. If we use "surface" or the "objective constituent" as revelatory of objects, then some of the "surface" is "objective" and some is "subjective," but in the "inspective" situation this distinction disappears.

When the "field" or CF is used for <u>perception</u>, then it is used as a mode of cognition of something else besides the "field" or CF. It has a referential function. It is in this

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[9] Broad, <u>ibid</u>., p 297.

capacity that we think of some of the "field" as sense-data. I shall call CF when it is used this way, "CFD." Content, the "field," when inspected I shall call "CFC." CFC is identical to t-total-quality, and to Dewey's "esthetic quality." CFC is wider than Broad's "Objective constituent."

Before passing on to the components of CFC, it should be noticed that CFC may be either private or public. AF and CFC are distinct. AF is more in the nature of an event, while CFC is qualitative and so may recur. CFC is private when only one person can be aware of it, can feel it. It is internal. If that person has the techniques available to him it is possible for him to make CFC public, that is, he can express his CFC; when he gives his CFC sensuous embodiment it becomes public, for now several people can be aware of it, can feel it. I shall abbreviate private CFC to CFCPr, and public CFC to CFCPu.

Further, the sensuous manifestation, CFCPu, may be either actual or possible. Suppose that E is a painter. When he expresses CFCPr he uses pigments and canvas; E's technique operates upon his medium and he wants so to arrange them that a sensitive (SF) observer will in fact be presented with E's CFC when he enters into a perceiving transaction with the physical processes constituting the physical picture. This in effect means that we can speak of a work of art in two ways, as constituted in an apprehending situation and as a physical thing. CFCPu is the work of art. As actually constituted in an experiencing transaction I shall speak of the work of art

as ActCFCPu and as a possibility for becoming ActCFCPu I shall speak of the work of art as PosCFCPu. So, when Prall says that works of art express feeling he is saying that when PosCFCPu, the physical stimulus, enters into a perceiving transaction with a sensitive and trained observer ActCFCPu can occur. And this ActCFCPu is the same as the expresser's CFCPr when there is successful communication.

No CFC is exactly identical with any other CFC. CFC is a fusion of three components, what I shall call response-feeling, value-feeling and quality-feeling. Like Dewey's "quality" it is the fusion of several components into a single feeling.

4. Feeling as response. (RF)

5. Feeling as value. (VF)

6. Feeling as quality. (QF)

It seems best to treat these together, all being components of CFC. Since they are components, they are all content, something of which we are aware. They are all responses of our organism to stimuli in a way in which sensitivity and awareness are not, and they are relatively unfused responses in comparison with CFC. It should be emphasized that the <u>generic</u> class to which they belong is feeling, taking feeling to mean organic response to stimuli. In an important sense they are similar to each other rather than different. Since they fuse into CFC, they must possess something in common to be fusible.[10]

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[10] See Charles Hartshorne, <u>The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation</u> (Chicago: 1934), p 180.

The term best suited to name this commonalty seems to be "feeling." But we are to take this use of "feeling" as content response to stimuli, which, when attended to aesthetically, is aesthetic surface, so that between them they exhaust aesthetic surface, both thin and thick. What appears to us as conscious beings is quality, quality being the "condensation" of a perceptual transaction, that is, the content response of a transaction involving physical, psychological and physiological processes.

RF, VF and QF all alike being feelings as responses, or alternatively, quality as content, I now wish to indicate the differences between them.

Under QF are included the already familiar sub-, form- and unit-qualities. Prall holds that these are feelings in the same sense that RF and VF are. The names for qualities are names for the way things feel to us. Blue is the name of the feeling we have when we look into a sunny cloudless sky. Sensations of this type are simply a sub-class of CF.

VF are those feelings which Prall, being a naturalist in value theory, variously calls, pleasure, liking, satisfaction, delight, interest and their opposite numbers for negative value. Prall holds that every CFC has this as a component. We are not indifferent to any content. Prall has little to say about this aspect of CFC so far as presentational possibilities are concerned. Individuals' make-up differ and we find people disagreeing violently about works of art, so that he apparently means this feeling to be S's contribution to CFC more than E's. (AA, 178)

RF is that which in the usual terminology is usually called an emotion, just as in the usual terminology QF is usually called a quality. It is Prall's point that insofar as RF and QF are concerned the usual view that they are essentially different has to be rejected. There are differences between them to be sure, but there are also essential similarities. QFs are organic responses like RFs are, and RFs are qualitative like all organic responses are. Each is both a response item and a content item. Qualities are thought to belong to a different class than emotions because CF is more often taken as CFD rather than as CFC. Colors and forms are held to be more objective because they are attended to as signs, as data, and as such they are abstracted from CF, as are emotions when we wish to name our "reaction" to some "content." (AA, 146) For aesthetic vision, (CFC) these distinctions do not apply. Blue as a quality no more characterizes the system of events called the object than any emotional quality. Qualities are constituted in a transaction and qualify that transaction.

The usual sorts of names for RFs are such things as fear, joy, sadness, gaiety, quiet. But for Prall these names are poor crutches indeed. (AA, 153) They are quite general and it is the point of art to be more precise in this matter than language. Further, these terms do not begin to exhaust the RFs that art expresses. Few works of art are concerned with these "massive" feelings. An artist may wish to express his response to a visual presentation. Consider the following from Prall.

> But Cezanne was not just painting trees. He was giving us the feeling of them with the spaces and lights among them, their fine delicacy in solid volume and space relations ... all apprehended together as one single qualitative feeling (CFC), not nameable as lightness or subtlety or delicacy or strength or space filled with light and air and leaves and branches. Not nameable at all, except as the specific effect of this particular painting with its perfectly determinate degree of complexity, of delicacy, of color contrast and harmony, with just these shapes and masses and spaces.

Language cannot name the feeling (CFCPu) here given. (AA, 162-163) Language is far too poor to communicate CFCPr; it requires the presentation, CFCPu, that art can give of it.

Heinz Werner discusses an interesting allied phenomenon that he calls "physiognomic perception."[11] We see <u>faces</u> as expressing an inner life (hence, the use of the term "physiognomic"). But, Werner points out, this may be generalized beyond faces, for we often perceive other things besides faces as expressing an inner life. Things may be perceived as "animate," when in fact they are lifeless. A landscape may be seen as gay, and a paranoid may see a pair of swinging doors as something about to "devour" him. What happens in these cases is that the "affective attitude" of the perceiver becomes fused with the rest of the content; thus, physiognomic perception is that kind of perception in which affect (RF and VF) has become a factor in the configuration of the surrounding world. Werner calls physiognomic perception more "syncretic" than ordinary

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[11] Heinz Werner, <u>Comparative Psychology of Mental Development</u> (Chicago: 1949), pp 67-68.

perception, because the psychological functions (RF and VF) are more intimately fused.[12] In ordinary perception things are known according to their "geometrical-technical" nature, which corresponds to our taking CF as CFD and ignoring that part of CF which does not function well as CFD.

Prall is maintaining that it is this syncretic perception which art communicates, which works of art embody.

4.5 The Paradox of Embodiment.

The problem of expression in art involves the paradox of embodiment. When people state propositions about works of art that they experience, some of them include names for emotions: peaceful, relaxed, solemn, spirited. They also include names for qualities which the physical works of art obviously do not have: delicious, smooth, distant, dilapidated. These names are used in such a fashion that they are predicated on works of art. They are predicated because works of art or parts of them do in fact seem as they are described. This seeming to be what they are not in such a convincing fashion is often called the embodiment of these feelings. But obviously a work of art does not possess a state of the organism that is literally described by these terms; nor is that table in the painting really smooth, it only appears to be smooth; why, in fact, that is not even a table, sir!

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[12] Werner, ibid., p 213.

Is this not a paradox calling for resolution, that works of art should so convincingly seem to be truly describable by these terms but in fact are not?

There are several ways to do away with or resolve the paradox. One can do away with it as the formalists do, deny the aesthetic relevance of all non-sensory "suggested" feelings, so that this embodiment paradox is of no interest to the aesthetician.

Or one can resolve it as Santayana does. Santayana holds that there are two terms. One term is the object actually presented, the expressive thing; the other term is the object <u>suggested,</u> the further thought, emotion or image evoked, the thing expressed. This is often called the two-term theory of expression; it is also called the association theory. The first term has associated with it the emotions which were aroused in some past situation: the past situation is so hushed in the mind that the emotions which belong to the past situation are thought to belong to the present object. Only when the past situation is submerged to consciousness do we have a case of genuine expression, though of course the emotion attaching to the past situation is not submerged, but very much in evidence and now attaching to the first term.

This theory attempts to account for the seeming embodiment by a psychological theory of association. It accepts the fact that the physical work of art does not in fact have those feelings or qualities attributed to it, but we see why it seems to possess them. One of the consequences of this theory

is that communication is a fairly haphazard possibility, for the second term will vary considerably for most of us, if association is taken as personal association. This cannot be a satisfactory theory for Prall if he wishes to insist on the accuracy of communication which he does in fact insist on. Further, Prall cannot accept Santayana's solution because the latter holds the proposition that works of art do not in fact possess those feelings. Prall holds that works of art do possess these feelings. For him, embodiment is not seeming.

> If it is asked how qualitative imaginal content can present feeling, how it can be actual feeling that art expresses, we arrive at the supposed miracle that art is so often said to be, the embodiment of spirit in matter. But thinking can have no intercourse with miracles. And since the simplest thinking finds that works of art do express feeling, we are forced by the obvious character of our data to look for feeling <u>within</u> presented content, as an aspect of it, that is, integral to its actually present character, or as its unitary qualitative nature as a whole. (AA, 145)

It should be noted that for Santayana the first term is a physical thing and the predication of emotions of it is false. For Prall we do not predicate of the physical object, not of PosCFCPu, but of ActCFCPu, and so the predication is not false.

Another solution is given by C. C. Pratt.[13] Pratt takes the "seeming" or "apparent" way out of the paradox, but not by the explanation of "hushed reverberations" and "assoc-

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[13] C. C. Pratt, <u>The Meaning of Music</u> (New York: 1931), Part II, Ch. 13. Langer's theory is similar to Pratt's. Pratt acknowledges the similarity of his position to Langer's as she enunciated it in <u>The Practice of Philosophy</u>.

iation." Pratt maintains that the attribution of emotions or qualities to the work of art is a case of the pathetic fallacy, for these words characterize how humans feel. We think we have to account for embodiment only because we think that aesthetic emotions are emotions, but in fact they are not; so we do not have to worry about the problem of embodiment: it need never arise. There is apparent embodiment of emotion because our visual and especially our auditory processes intrinsically contain certain properties which, because of close resemblance (structural) to certain characteristics in the subjective realm, are frequently confused with emotions proper. Real emotions evoked by the work of art are of no aesthetic interest for Pratt.

For Pratt, as for Santayana,there is a dualism involved. The work of art is identified with those qualities which are commonly called sensory qualities, and VF, RF and unit-qualities are those which belong to the subject, not the object. Certain events in experience appear external and others appear to be internal. The former are called objective and the latter subjective.

Charles Hartshorne suggests that in addition to there being structural icons for emotions, as suggested by Pratt (with which Hartshorne agrees), there might also be qualitative icons. For Hartshorne the problem of expression is the problem of the relation between sensory qualities and emotional

or affective qualities.[14] Hartshorne, like Prall, holds that sensory qualities are a sub-class of feeling tones. He also finds it of some significance that they are similar and wishes to emphasize this rather then their differences. Hartshorne's discussion of expression is closer to Prall's than anyone else's.

Hartshorne calls his theory of expression a monistic theory. It accounts for expression through resemblance or congruity, structural and qualitative, rather than by contiguity as Santayana does. Thus he denies the truth of the two-term theory of Santayana.

> The 'affective' tonality, the aesthetic or tertiary quality, usually supposed to be merely 'associated with' a given sensory quality is, in part at least, identical with that quality, one with its nature or essence. Thus, the 'gaiety' of yellow (the peculiar highly specific gaiety) is the yellowness of the yellow. The two are identical in that the 'yellowness' is the unanalyzed and but denotatively identified X of which the 'gaiety' is the essential description or analysis.[15]

Does each quality, one might ask, have an "affective" name for it, and one which can be attached on a non-associative basis, or as Hartshorne puts it, on the basis of congruity? Hartshorne holds that this is possible. I wish now to try and explain how he thinks this is possible. But first it is important to see that this is pertinent to Prall's position.

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[14] Charles Hartshorne, "The Monistic Theory of Expression," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50 (1953) pp 425-434. This article is a short restatement of some positions held in his earlier book, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation.

[15] Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, p 7.

It can best be seen by giving a quotation which is close to that given above from Hartshorne.

> Pale blue feels milder than flaming red just as definitely and accurately as it feels pale blue. (AA, 148)

As I understand Hartshorne's position it can best be explained as follows. Consider affection in its most clearly recognizable forms. Now imagine a continuum of affection as if it were a long band with end limits. Let this band-continuum exhaust affection in its typical aspects, which includes such things as gaiety and mildness. Now take any color, and given that the band-continuum exhausts the "area" of possible qualitative experience, then any given color will fall somewhere on that band-continuum. Where it falls is determined by the resemblance which it has to some sub-area of the affective continuum, which is the qualitative iconicity I spoke of earlier. Yellow falls on that sub-area of the affective band which is termed gaiety, just as blue falls on the mild area. Thus all qualities, no matter of what dimension repeat the characteristics of some affective feeling, so that affective feeling is said to generate the continuum. So far as Prall is concerned I think that we can substitute sub- and form-qualities in the above exposition, with some reservations that I shall develop later.

4.6 Communication.

Now I want to develop Prall's views about the embodiment and communication of CFC further, with special reference

to thick surface, unit- and emotional-qualities. I shall find use for Pratt's view about expression with regard to unit-qualities and Hartshorne's with regard to emotional-qualities.

> It will be objected at once that clear apprehension of the spatial and colored surface of a picture is not getting its essential point, and is in any case not emotional but purely intellectual or perceptual, or even critical. The answer to this objection is now very simple, however. The adequate picture is one in which, if attention is focused on just what is presented in color and spatial form, and dwells on these as there before it, not explicitly comparing them or the whole picture to other things or to other pictures, nor distracted by any other concern, theoretical or practical, the natural attentive process, being intimately connected within the organism and totally directed by the presented object, will deepen into a unitary qualitative feeling, which is as clearly and fully emotional as it is intellectually discriminating. It is just as true that this feeling is the given character of the picture, as that the feeling is actually conditioned, both by the physical nature of the picture and by the organic emotional and other processes of the person appreciating it. (AA, 155-156)

> The point of the picture, its effective being, is just this embodied feeling that we have, if with open sensitive eyes we look at it and let its character become the content of our own affective conscious life at the moment. If this could be as well translated into language, there would be no special reason for painting at all. (AA, 163)

We have a clue to the means of communication in the last quotation from Prall: let its (the work of art) character become the content of our own affective conscious life. "Character" in the first quotation, is ActCFCPu, in Prall's terms "unitary qualitative feeling," part of which is emotional. If the character of the work of art becomes part of our affective life and if the character of the work of art (ActCFCPu) is the actual manifestation of the artist's CFC, his unitary feeling, then we are aware of the same feeling that the artist, E, was.

We now have to ask two questions: Can this occur and how does this occur?

In order to affirm that it can occur Prall has to maintain, which he does, that CFC, the fusion of RF, VF and QF, is not essentially private. For Prall CFC is not something which is ineffable, characterless, essentially private, the possession of the "mind" and thus inaccessible. Feeling is what is felt, feeling is defined in what is felt, always has some content, some body, hence, character; even the most spiritual feeling, for example, love, remains solely bodily disturbance until it becomes defined by the object of love.

The feeling (CFC) that is embodied and communicated is not the exclusive possession of a "mind," because the mind-body dualism is Christian myth, given philosophical dignity by Descartes. The spiritual is not to be set over against the material. Mind is not a separate entity, it is "aptness of the body." Thus, it seems to be a mystery how feeling can become public, CFCPu, become embodied, only if it is first thought ever to have been disembodied. Only if there is thought to be some component of feeling peculiarly contributed by the "mind" is it reasonable to suppose that feeling is other than what it is, the character of certain content. Further, the artist is moved to express himself because he possesses some interesting feeling; he begins to externalize it, and in the process it becomes clarified and defined for him, less turbid, just because it begins to be exemplified by content when he works it out in his medium. Here is his feeling, this body of content

is the feeling: and any spectator who attends to it, his attentive processes being what they are, will also become aware of this feeling, since it is now a part of his affective life.

It is only when we realize that Prall is not a dualist, but a contextualist or pragmatist, that we can begin to understand his theory of expression. His theory does not appear plausible if we think he believes that the physical work of art really can have feelings like a human being can have feelings. This is attributing improbable naivete to Prall.

When a proposition predicates of the work of art a quality named by a unit- or emotional-quality term, it is not predicated of the physical work of art, the PosCFCPu, the stimulus object. The work of art of which the quality is predicated is the ActCFCPu, that is the work of art is the "unitary qualitative feeling." Consequently, it is possible to predicate gaiety of the work of art if that feeling is fused in the qualitative appearance of which the spectator is aware. The music is that which is present to the spectator as quality, and solemnity is fused into it as part of it, hence, is part of the character of the music; it is literally part of the music. It is of the art object as ActCFCPu that we predicate feelings.

Art is experience; "art as experience." The art object as a qualitative presentation is not constituted except in an experience transaction. The art object as ActCFCPu is created on each occasion. In no sense do any qualities, including sub-qualities, belong to the stimulus object, PosCFCPu, apart from an experiencing transaction; but neither is there any

defined feeling present to a subject without some content as conditioned by a stimulus object. Recalling the discussion of the experiencing transaction in the first chapter, we can see that both sets of processes are necessary for the constitution of any quality, and once constituted, any quality of every quality type may characterize a situation. The situation may be predominantly blue and it may also be a predominantly frightening situation, but they fuse together, and if E is to communicate this quality of the situation, he has to get S to feel the same fused quality. We often describe something as frightening, and we do not mean that the object possesses a certain emotional state, but that "frightening" names the qualitative feel of the situation better than any other term.

Suppose we grant that all qualities occur only in an experiencing situation, then the next question is: How does S re-create the total unitary quality which E has attempted to express? How can S make it a part of his affective life as it was a part of the affective life of E?

First of all, S has to enter into an experiencing transaction with the PosCFCPu that E fashioned. Second, since the unitary quality is a fusion of its components, S must be able to re-create or re-constitute the various types of component qualities. Sub- and form-qualities are apparently re-constituted by physiological processes alone; however, since I am mainly interested here in the re-constitution of unit- and emotional-qualities, I turn my attention to them.

Unit-qualities are named by terms that name kinesthetic

sensations, emotional states, objects, and properties of an object. Emotional-qualities are named by terms that name emotional states. Since they both may take emotional-state names, a distinction between them is required. They are distinguished by the fact that when we are aware of unit-qualities named by terms for emotional or kinesthetic states of the body our body is not characterized by those states, whereas when we are aware of emotional-qualities our body is characterized by that state.

In the following propositions consider that all subject terms refer to works of art or parts of works of art.

Group A.

That face is peaceful.

That body is relaxed.

That decoration looks graceful.

That dance is spirited.

That music sounds solemn.

Group B.

Those flowers look fresh.

That table looks smooth.

That house is dilapidated.

That rock looks ponderous.

That house is distant.

Both group A and B have unit-qualities as predicates, and both groups require reference to norms for the recognition of the predicate qualities. The groups differ in that group A attributes emotional and kinesthetic states to the propo-

sition's subject terms, while group B predicates qualities which do not depend on emotional or kinesthetic states in the proposition's subject terms.

The descriptive terms of group A are names for emotions or states of the body and surely those things described by them, the statues, the pictures, the decorations, cannot possess those states; nor are the objects in the pictures of group B actually distant, dilapidated, smooth or ponderous. We have seen that Prall agrees so far as the physical work of art is concerned, but we have also seen that he holds that these qualities are actually embodied in the work of art, understanding the work of art to be ActCFCPu.

Prall's account of the expression of unit-qualities is close to Pratt's theory of expression. Both hold that the physical object, or stimulus object, does not possess emotional or kinesthetic states; recalling the discussion about recognitional features, one sees that they agree about the similarity of the constituted presentation to something else; further, they both agree that the observer does not possess the state predicated. However, there <u>seems</u> to be an important difference between them. Prall maintains that the unit-quality, for example, peacefulness, is actually presented, that it is constituted as part of ActCFCPu, while Pratt denies that aesthetic e-emotions are real emotions. Are Pratt's "real emotions" the same as Prall's "actually presented emotions?" I don't think they are, and by so answering I am denying that there is any difference between their theory of expression -- so far as unit-

qualities are concerned. Of course, Pratt's theory of expression is not the same as Prall's, for the latter's includes emotional-qualities while Pratt's includes only unit-qualities.

I proceed now, by means of an example, to explain in what sense the unit-quality, which is a part of the t-total-quality re-created by S, can be said to be a re-constitution of part of what E expressed, in what sense part of what E experienced can be said to be actually presented to S.

I take as my example a proposition from group A, "That body is relaxed." Suppose that the proposition has been asserted of a statue. When I perceive the unit-quality "relaxation," it actually characterizes the presentation just as "freshness" did in my re-creation of Cezanne's picture; it is a re-creation of part of the artist's perception, the perception that guided his fashioning activities. When we perceive the relaxation, we have been presented with part of his vision and it is now part of our affective life. Perceive a state of relaxation?

In order to be aware of relaxation as a quality of the statue the spectator doesn't have to feel relaxed, that is, doesn't have to have the kinesthetic sensations which define relaxation, just as the creator wasn't relaxed when he fashioned the statue, though the model did have those kinesthetic sensations. There are various ways of becoming aware of a feeling; one can feel relaxation and one can see relaxation. This is sometimes called "crossing the senses." In both cases, I sup-

pose, they are unit-qualities. The awareness of the unit-quality relaxation, or of any unit-quality, is explained as I explained it before. We possess a norm; the present perception is informed by the norm, organized for us, and we perceive that the statue is relaxed instead of, for example, tensed. Learned relations are necessary for the perception of unit-qualities. It is not relaxation in general that we perceive, but this particular relaxation -- this arm careless at the side, the body slightly twisted at the middle, the weight of the halves wheeling them in different directions, the neck supporting no mass, but one leg slightly propped.

It is important to note that what is communicated is the artist's perceived content, the relaxation as he sees it. His perception of the model includes this quality we might call non-specifically "relaxation," but which he defines for us more specifically in material as this relaxation. When we look at it with sensitive attention we see what he saw; thus he communicates the feeling he had; it is now a part of our affective life. All this supposing that the artist was successful of course, for the success of communication depends in part on his ability to translate his private feeling into a public feeling; the other part depends on the observer's ability. If the observer fails in his sense discrimination, he will fail to perceive the unit-quality present.

We can say the same thing for any of the unit-qualities of group B. I shall try to explain "crossing senses" with one of these examples; it should help us to understand embodiment

somewhat better and make it more plausible, while at the same time giving a better notion of the means of communication. Let me take as my example, "That table is smooth." We can substitute "looks" for "is" if the table appears in a painting. Ordinarily one is inclined to say that "looks smooth" when used in a proposition indicates that the speaker means that "the visual appearance of the table leads me to believe that if I went up and felt (ran my hand over the surface of) the table, it would feel smooth." We infer from some appearances to other appearances. If we interpret a judgment about an aesthetic object in that fashion, it would be clearly a false, even absurd, proposition. Not only would it probably not feel smooth, there would not even be a table there.

We notice from the above that we have two different sets of experiences of the table -- felt smoothness and seen smoothness. Now if crossing the senses means translating felt smoothness into seen smoothness, this is quite false for aesthetics; there are two separate qualities. Just because we use the same term to name them does not mean that this looks like this feels; there need be no resemblance between them that is important. In ordinary practical life we take the visual smoothness as a sign or indication of felt smoothness, but this is a connection which does not necessarily involve anything like similarity at all. What is the case in the communication, presentation and expression of unit-qualities seems more like the following: The artist is communicating the look of the table to us, that is, his visual impressions: we can ourselves see what his vision

was when we re-create it, it is presented to us; what is not presented to us is the "look" of a kinesthetic feel, but simply a look; it seems as if we are crossing senses, because we don't pay much attention to our visual impressions for themselves alone, but use them to give us clues about what else to expect: consequently, they get the names of that which they indicate, rather than being named for themselves; we don't name things that are unimportant to us; usually a visual look is not as important as what we may infer from it; hence, the visual look which indicates a smooth feel takes as its only name "smooth" look. This "smooth" name should not lead us astray. If a person wanted to communicate the feel, then he would be a texture-artist.

Looking at the situation in this way indicates that the need for "association" in a theory of expression is over-exaggerated. Not recognizing that there are <u>two</u> feelings involved, it assumes that there is only <u>one</u> feeling and that the first term, the "expressive thing," can acquire this feeling only because this same one feeling is associated with it; thus the first term acquires a feeling it doesn't need. This also explains why associationists have such difficulty accepting the phenomenon of "presentation," for, they ask, how can a visual thing present the kinesthetic sensation of smoothness? This objection is got over by pointing out that this is not what is done; the <u>visual</u> "feel" is what is given us, presented to us. Thus Prall could defend his notion of the presentation of unit-qualities: they are a part of surface and <u>sense</u>

presented.

I have gone somewhat beyond Prall in my account of the manner of presentation and awareness of unit-qualities, but it seems to me to be a fair interpretation of his less explicit but suggestive language.

I turn now to emotional-qualities. The names for these do not include such as occurred in group B, but only such as appeared in group A, names for states of the body. Emotional-qualities differ from unit-qualities in that they are actually states of the creator's body, unlike our "relaxed" example. Emotional-qualities, RF, is the creator's response to sub-, form- and unit-qualities. How can he communicate this, for is it not more private, and essentially so, than the other qualities? How can we make his response part of our affective life as Prall suggested we do?

In order to explain this we shall need to take account of the expressive as well as formal function of sub- and form-qualities, ("The formal function itself of elements and patterns is modified by their expressive function;") (AA, 165) emotional form, and focus analysis.

Before going into these it seems best to dispense with one of the means for knowing what a creator's state was. We can infer what the creator's state was by looking at his product, just as we infer from anyone's behavior what his state is. This doesn't satisfy the presentation criterion however, so we shall have to look elsewhere.

So far I have discussed only discrimination analysis,

that is, analysis of elements and form insofar as they can be organized into a total form. These, we have seen, help us to better observe aesthetic objects. But it is not satisfactory for the analysis of individual works of art. An individual work of art is both a collection of elements and a single qualitative feeling. Expressive qualities are components of the latter. Since this is the case, the elements must function not only formally but also expressively. The analysis of an individual work of art must point out the expressive contribution made by elements and forms toward this unitary feeling. The artist had a unitary feeling he wanted to communicate; it was this feeling that governed what elements and what relations were to go into the work of art. The analysis of a work of art as a unitary qualitative presentation is not complete until it shows their contribution toward unitary feeling. A necessary pre-condition, then, of a relevant critical analysis is the critic's grasp of the unitary feeling. The critic must have a focus point if the functions of the elements are to be intelligible to him, and this focus point is expressed feeling; hence, I call this kind of analysis <u>focus</u> analysis. It is to be distinguished from discrimination, or systematic, analysis.

The critic cannot give a relevant focus analysis of a work of art unless he can grasp not only sub-, form- and unit-qualities, but also emotional-qualities, RF. This is crucial for appreciation and communication also.

To understand how elements function expressively so far as the re-constitution of emotional-qualities are con-

cerned, recall Hartshorne and the affective continuum. Hartshorne maintained that there is a reliable congruity between a sub-quality and its affective quality. Recall also the earlier discussion (Section 2.2) about emotional form, where I held that Prall needs emotional form if the artist is to be able to compose expressive works of art. If there were such a form, then there would be intrinsic relations between affective qualities just as there are between sub-qualities. There is an interesting passage in Prall, quoted earlier, which suggests that he may have been probing for just such a thing: Pale blue feels milder than flaming red just as definitely and accurately as it feels pale blue. (AA, 148) Massive emotions could occur because of the process of fusion of a complex of affections.

It remains now to become particular about the actual constitution of an emotional-quality.

If there is an invariant connection between an element and its affective quality, then all the artist need do is select those elements which upon perception will be felt to have those affective qualities that will fuse into the emotional-qualities he wishes to express. If there is an invariant connection between elements and their affective quality, and if men respond alike, then the artist's expression, and, subsequently, communication, of his RF is not accidental. When a spectator discriminates the elements selected by the creator, and here again we see the place of response readiness, then he will read off their "meaning" automatically. (AA, 159)

"Meaning" is Prall's term for affective quality. The spectator will "read off" the affective qualities, fuse them, and so re-constitute the emotion of the artist. The re-constitution is effected by the perceptual control exercised by the elements. It is literally presented to him, and fused into the whole presentation. And notice that unlike unit-qualities, the bodily state named by terms naming emotional-qualities is the actual bodily state of the spectator.

But, someone may ask, if emotional-quality is perceptually presented. For answer, there is the reply that it is as perceptually presented as any color, if one recalls that such a thing as color is not something given to perception, but something constituted neurally just as an emotion is. Emotional-quality is as given for perception as any color. As an example, consider Picasso's Absinthe Drinker, and imagine its blues replaced by rose. Our perception of Picasso's response disappears as much as the blue. Thus Prall can take advantage of the recognitional feature criterion for the perception of qualities in the case of emotional-qualities also.

One other point deserves attention here, and that is the dependence on like responses from different people. When the artist enters into an experiencing transaction with what he has fashioned, he may fuse the affective qualities into the emotional-quality he desires to express; but, unless other people have a similar fusion apparatus, they will not re-constitute the same emotional-quality, and communication will then fail. Their fusion apparatus, I am assuming, is beyond their

control, unlike their discrimination ability, which can be improved by training. Prall acknowledges the importance of man's similarity.

> It is only by their (man's) like ways of functioning that communication is possible at all, and hence that science is a general possession. Aesthetics, like all other knowledge, makes its generalizations on the assumption that human organisms in perceptual-affective response are not totally various, but largely alike. (AA, 176)

Prall seems to be suggesting that communication depends on some kind of normality, and that eccentricity, either on the part of the creator or the spectator, results in the loss of communication. This assumes some importance in the next chapter where it has some interesting consequences for the qualifications of critics and the value of criticism.

This completes my account of expression here. However, there is another part of expression theory which is quite crucial, the expressiveness of language and its consistency with presentationalism. I treat that in Section 10.35.

CHAPTER V

CRITICISM

5.1 Aesthetic Theory and Criticism.

Many people approach aesthetics through criticism. The aesthetic theory of such people is likely to be much occupied with problems that arise from a critical and interpretative interest in the arts; its orientation results in an extensive treatment of criticism. On the other hand, Prall's approach to aesthetics is mainly technical; he is convinced that technical knowledge of the arts is the best way to appreciation, upon which he places greater emphasis than evaluation. Consequently, Prall's views about criticism are not extensive, nor are they difficult, for he has not the interest in criticism to sustain complicated care, even though he first turned to philosophy because of his search for reliable literary standards. Since Prall's views concerning criticism are not extensive nor difficult, this chapter will be more in the nature of a summary than the previous chapters.

Prall thinks that aesthetic theory should be informative. He recognizes that in the past criticism has played a large part in making information about the arts available, so his interest in criticism now is mainly to see what relation there is between an informative aesthetic theory like his own and criticism. So his views about criticism will be mainly do's and don'ts formulated on the basis of the limitations

drawn by his aesthetic theory.

Prall's discussion of criticism falls under four heads: (1) The contrast of aesthetic theory and criticism; (2) the purposes of criticism; (3) the role of standards and the limitations of their usefulness for purposes of evaluation; and (4) the basis of the value of criticism and its reliability. I shall treat them in the order given.

If a person is a non-naturalist in value theory and believes that aesthetic theory is normative, then aesthetics is grounded on something extra-mundane. On the other hand, if one is a naturalist in value theory and believes that aesthetics is a normative science, then aesthetics is analogous to a science of chemistry organized for the purpose of separating food from poison. Though most people would deny that aesthetic theory is identical with art criticism, there would be many who fall into one of the two above categories, believing as they do that aesthetic theory is a normative "science." For Prall aesthetic theory is non-normative; it is a study of empirical facts, not values; it is an analysis of surface, not a search for principles with which to judge the good and the bad. Aesthetics for Prall is then concerned neither with the extra-mundane nor with what it is that distinguishes the good from the bad, but is concerned with surface and its analysis, being like the knowledge that we have in any other science except that it differs in content. "General aesthetics is a sort of qualitative mathematics." (AA, 173)

There is another distinction between criticism and

aesthetics besides the normativeness and non-normativeness of them respectively, and that is the difference in the type of analysis engaged in by each. Aesthetics is discrimination analysis, and criticism is focus analysis. The former is general and concerned with possibility; the latter is specific, concerned with actuality and the unique, with particular works of art and nature.

There is another difference between criticism or a body of normative judgments and aesthetic theory due to their different ends. The end of the activity carried on in discrimination analysis is to get a better understanding of the content presented through sense, while one end of critical activity is increased appreciation. The latter makes use of, has a means attitude toward the product of discrimination analysis, because it applies that product to individual works of art. Any appreciator, including any critic, applies the product if he has developed a readiness to respond. Aesthetic science is not identical to the use of that science.

5.2 The Purposes of Criticism.[1]

The purpose of aesthetic theory is to further our knowledge of possibilities. The purposes of criticism are several.

One function of criticism is to make recommendations.

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[1] These are to be found mainly in Chapter 14, AJ.

A critic, official or non-official, may say that one should take some time to go and see or hear something that is available. In this capacity the critic is a value economist. He has a social function; he judges that the value to be received from such and such an experience is worth the time, effort and money to be spent in acquiring that value.

No one can make a recommendation except it be based upon an evaluation, and no one can make an evaluation except it be based on an honest aesthetic judgment. Thus we have three kinds of judgment, a recommending judgment, which is somewhat of the nature of an imperative, a critical judgment, which results from comparison of values, and an aesthetic judgment, which is simply a record of felt value.

For someone to recommend that somebody else go see something means that the value to be received will compare favorably with the value that somebody would receive from some other activity. This is comparison. Thus recommendation judgments depend on critical judgments. A critical, hence recommendation, judgment would be meaningless and its expression a deceit, if it were not based on an aesthetic judgment, that is, if there were no valuation, no actual experience of value in the presence of that which we are recommended to go see, then any evaluation is nonsense. How absurd for someone to recommend an apple rather than an orange, unless he thought the apple better than the orange, and how deceitful if he has not tasted them both.

Thus, the second function of criticism emerges, the

making of evaluations. Prall makes it clear repeatedly that evaluation is the least important function of art criticism.[2] Since evaluation involves comparison, if one thing is to be said to be better than another, then they must share something in common as a basis for comparison. This is value character. However, rather than just accepting the felt value as sufficient reason for saying that one thing is better than another, people wish to appeal to some standards to justify their judgment. Prall is concerned to debunk this use of standards. For now I shall discontinue the discussion of evaluation and standards and pick it up again in the next section.

The third and main function of criticism for Prall is to educate. The critic must make "the blind see and the deaf hear." (AJ, 330) He expects the critic to have a grasp of aesthetic theory, a readiness to respond, which is better than that of the normal hearer or seer. He should use this to get others into appreciative contact with the arts. To do this through the linguistic medium is the art of the critic. Consequently, he must have a mastery of the language in order to express his own experiences, to put it in such terms that he can get his readers to understand as he does, as any teacher of the defective must do.

In carrying out this task there are a couple of sub-

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[2] See AA, 190, 199, 202 and 203.

sidiary functions that are of some importance. Since the critic is talking about some work of art, he has to describe it (the fourth function) for the reader to know what aspect of the aesthetic object he is discussing. Without some reference criticism is soliloquy instead of communication.

A problem involved in description that has received some attention lately is that of interpretation. Prall does not consider this problem at all; there seems to be fairly easy acceptance of our uniform ability to discern the same qualities in the object under analysis. Is Prall naive in ignoring the problem of interpretation and its difficulties for description? An answer in the affirmative should not be given until two points are noticed. Prall is not here concerned with criticism proper and its problems; he is not interested in normative tasks, the practice of criticism, except as related to his theory. Thus if he were to fully treat criticism, he might include a discussion of interpretation. Second, to indicate a possible view of his about interpretation, it could be said that this problem is not sluffed off unconcernedly. All that I have been saying about qualities up to this point seems to show that he believes careful training in the arts and sensitivity will insure agreement on the qualities possessed by the aesthetic object. The arts are the most precise means of communication that we have and close attention to them will reveal those qualities that were intended by the artist. Thus, although grasping the work of art is not easy, he might hold that there need be no special problem of

interpretation beyond that of training in the arts. In addition, he might hold that it only seems to be a problem because of our inadequate vocabulary. This makes it difficult to talk precisely about the qualities, and it is this which makes it seem as if there are alternative ways of interpreting works of art. I shall briefly consider Prall's discussion of our inadequate critical vocabulary later.

This doesn't sound like a very convincing view, but Prall would be committed to some such optimistic view if he were to maintain his belief in the accuracy and precision of communication. To admit problems of interpretation, alternative possibilities, is to weaken faith in the work of art as an instrument of communication. Perhaps Prall had such great faith in the arts as a communication medium precisely because he did not consider interpretation.

The fifth function of criticism, and it is a subsidiary function that accompanies the education function, is explanation. A cursory reading of much criticism will find the critic explaining how X builds to his crisis, or how Y achieves such a soft atmosphere in his landscapes. Explanation involves showing what it is that conditions our perceiving such and such qualities. It involves psychology, technical knowledge of the arts and their craft, historical knowledge and all sorts of other knowledge whose relevance cannot be predicted. It is here that criticism goes far beyond aesthetic theory. Of the knowledge required to carry out this function Prall lays, and not unexpectedly, most stress on technical acquaintance

with the arts.

5.3 Standards.

I pointed out earlier that for Prall critical judgments express evaluations, and that evaluations involve comparison.

It is possible to make a comparison on the basis of felt value. This is an intuitive criterion. Often, however, the attempt to compare calls forth the desire for more explicit, less intuitive, criteria. These more explicit criteria for judging comparative worth are what Prall calls "standards."

Standards may be used in at least two ways. They may be appealed to to justify a comparative judgment. They may also be used to name conditions for the occurrence of value. Examination shows that these two uses fuse into each other.

Prall holds that a standard cannot serve as a justification for a critical judgment unless that which is named by the standard has been found to yield value to the judger. If J says, "X is better than Y," and gives as the justification for that judgment the further judgment, "X is better balanced than Y," then he is using balance as his more explicit criterion, as his standard. But, Prall maintains, the appeal to balance is empty unless the presence of balance yields value while its absence does not. It also follows, of course, that it must be the case that "more" or "better" balance, if there is such a thing, gives more value. Standards have their origin

in our experience, and their use as a standard is itself justified only because that which they name generally yields value. Thus a standard turns into a kind of empirical generalization, that is, the presence of the standard's referent more often than not leads to value. Thus the first use fuses into the second; we can also see that the attempt to look for alternative, more explicit criteria fails, for we always come back to felt value as the criterion. Thus one must take the experience of preference seriously.

Besides the above circularity objection to standards in general, Prall has other objections to specific kinds of standards. He distinguishes two kinds of standards: Structural and qualitative. A structural standard is either a partial pattern, part of a partial pattern, a property of a partial pattern (e.g., balance) or a type. A qualitative standard usually names some general character of the unitary quality, is descriptive of t-total-quality. Examples are "sweet or harsh or brittle or flowing, of music; compact, economical, swift, of style in language; profundity, clarity, and so on indefinitely through a thousand familiar epithets." (AA, 198-199)

Prall has different objections to each of the types. I shall treat structural standards first. For Prall each aesthetic object is unique, and this uniqueness is its most valuable characteristic. Attentive discrimination will note this uniqueness, but if it is not noticed, then one misses that which is of main value. Recall now the role that types and partial patterns play. They are organizing forms, and as such help us

to apprehend the aesthetic object. A work of art containing familiar types, or one which has a familiar partial pattern is organized for us, and we are then left free to note its determinate character, which is always unique. Now if structural standards name types and partial patterns, then they are obviously inadequate as justifications of aesthetic judgments, for they do not cover the unique, hence, most important value and characteristic of the aesthetic object.

Further, the uniqueness of aesthetic objects renders comparison futile. Comparison is dependent upon sameness; a comparison of that which is common to two unique aesthetic objects is an incomplete comparison of them, so standards also fail to justify critical judgments. (AJ, 325-326)

The structures named by standards are often diverted from their normal function as organizational aids to evaluational criteria. A critic must be equipped with a stock of structural aids if he is to be ready to respond to a diverse number of aesthetic objects. However, and this is another objection to structural standards, they tend to become hard and fast rules. A critic may notice that the presence of these structures is conducive to a valuable experience and makes an empirical generalization about their success. These generalizations tend to harden, and then the critic regards the absence of these familiar structures as sufficient reason for condemning that aesthetic object. Though not justifiable, it is understandable, for if an aesthetic object does not possess a familiar pattern it will be unintelligible to him, and he will

miss its value. This has occurred wholesale as often in art as there has been innovation. A recent example was the critic's and public's wholesale condemnation of the Impressionist and Expressionist innovations.

To avoid misuse structural standards should be used mainly for descriptive and explanatory purposes rather than for justification purposes, and critics must remain alive to structural innovations.

Although Prall insists on the secondary importance of evaluation in criticism and on the primary importance of description and explanation, his analysis of the use of qualitative standards reveals the difficulty of keeping the two distinct. Prall is alive to the inherent danger of misuse of standards even when they are used descriptively. In trying to describe the unitary quality of an aesthetic object we might use such terms as "harsh," "brittle," "thick." So even though we might use these kind of terms to describe, "Brahms' harmony is thick," instead of to justify, "I don't like Brahms' harmony because it is thick," they suffer from two defects. First, they are vague and point up the inadequacy of our critical vocabulary; second, they function not only descriptively, but they also connote our value attitude toward a work of art, and as such turn out to be aesthetic judgments, not just descriptive judgments, a report of felt value or disvalue, for "thick" applied to Brahms' harmony is meant to be disparaging. Qualitative standards turn out to be just more determinate ways of saying "Good" or "Bad" even when we attempt to use them only

descriptively. And even if we used them for justification purposes, this analysis indicates that they cannot serve as sufficient justifications of our value judgments, for they are merely more determinate value judgments themselves.

As to the vagueness of qualitative terms. They are of little descriptive use unless we can indicate degree. Take a term like "intense." English novels are not as intense as Russian novels, but compared to themselves one could say that "This English novel is intense." Thus the application of such a qualitative term to some aesthetic object is not complete, is vague, until the degree of its presence is indicated. Now the usual sort of qualitative terms are vaguely used, so that the critical vocabulary is weak.

Prall suggests a remedy for this. The critic can indicate some work that possesses the quality in question and let this be his reference point. Then any other work that possesses this quality can be described by reference to and comparison with that reference work. This way we can at least partially repair the deficiency of our vocabulary; but even so we cannot think of criticism as more than roughly descriptive and expressive of the critics' feelings.

5.4 The Reliability of Criticism.

One can't help but have noticed that people disagree in their value estimates of works of art. Disagreement has been the life, if not the blood of criticism, though Prall

thinks that disagreement has been overemphasized, that there is relatively little in comparison to the amount of agreement.

The evaluational aspect of criticism has always raised interesting questions about the reliability of criticism. Are some criticisms better than others? Is one critic's estimate of the value of O better than, or truer than, another critic's estimate? Which one shall we accept? Thus is one critic more of an "expert" than another?[3] The answers to these questions depend upon a theory of value. I shall briefly develop Prall's theory of value, an account of which is to be found mainly in "Metaphysics and Value" and A Study in the Theory of Value.

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value is fundamental to Prall's theory of value. So when we say of anything that it is valuable, we have to distinguish between intrinsically valuable and extrinsically valuable. Roughly, anything that is valuable as an end is intrinsically valuable and anything that is valuable as a means is extrinsically valuable. Anything that is valuable as an end is that which possesses intrinsic value, and anything that is valuable as a means is instrumental to something which possesses intrinsic value.

So now I have to answer two questions. What is intrinsic value, an ontological question, and in what kind of situation is an object an end, that is, when does it possess intrinsic

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3 See Section 7.92 for a discussion of this issue.

value?

Prall asserts two significant propositions which bear on these questions. He does not always keep these propositions distinct.

a) All intrinsic (end, positive) value is aesthetic value.

b) All aesthetic value is aesthetic quality.

The first proposition gives us a clue to the answer to the second question, while together they give us a clue to the answer to the first question which I take up now.

If all intrinsic value is aesthetic value, and if all aesthetic value is aesthetic quality, then all intrinsic value is aesthetic quality.

> Positive value is thus aesthetic quality, felt satisfactoriness. And taken in the light of what I have already said, this is my definition of value, and in the end all that I have to say of it.[4]

The ontological status of intrinsic value is the same as the status of aesthetic quality then. We should know what aesthetic quality is by this time. Now I shall give the reasons why Prall identifies intrinsic value and aesthetic quality.

Prall is a naturalist in value theory, identifying intrinsic value with psychologically named qualities. He vacillates between "interest," "satisfaction," "pro-attitude" and "liking." In the above passage he uses "satisfactoriness."

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[4] D. W. Prall, "Metaphysics and Value," appearing in Essays in Metaphysics, Vol. V, (1924) University of California Publications in Philosophy, Berkeley, p 119.

Satisfactoriness, which is intrinsic value, is a felt quality. In the aesthetic experience we attend to this quality just as we attend to any other quality, and recalling the discussion about the components of t-total-quality, we can see that it is the VF component. Thus, intrinsic value is a component quality of aesthetic surface, hence, aesthetic quality.

Now that we know what intrinsic value is, we want to know when an object is an end, in what kind of situation it is intrinsically valuable. Proposition a), "All intrinsic (end, positive) value is aesthetic value," gives us a clue.

An object is always an end and never a means when we aesthetically contemplate it. Intrinsic value occurs only when an object enters into an aesthetic transaction with a conscious being. When an object is good-in-itself, it is said to be intrinsically valuable, and it is only in the aesthetic experience that an object is attended to in-itself, is isolated. When it is attended to in-itself and it is found to possess a value quality, for example, satisfactoriness as a quality, then it is said to be good-in-itself, good without reference to anything else, itself-good. Thus even ethical value insofar as it is intrinsic value is aesthetic value. Poverty is not condoned simply because it has an offensive value quality in the contemplation of it.

So some things can be said to be intrinsically valuable. Satisfactoriness is not valuable, for it is value. But any object that "possesses" intrinsic value is intrinsically valuable. What kind of object can "possess" intrinsic

value? The term "object" is ambiguous. Earlier I pointed out that the work of art can be spoken of in two ways, as ActCFCPu and PosCFCPu. The former is the aesthetic object and the latter is the physical object. The former is identical with qualitative surface, and the latter is a system of events. It is only of the former that we can predicate intrinsic value, for it is the only one which can be said to "possess" value. Let me explain the sense of "possess." One of the qualities of the aesthetic object is the value quality, so that the aesthetic object, as a qualitative existent, is constituted in part by value quality. Among the qualities which compose the aesthetic object is value quality, so we can say that is valuable just as we can say that it is red. The aesthetic object is good-in-itself, is an end, because one of its properties is intrinsic value.

PosCFCPu is extrinsically valuable. As a fairly permanent possibility, a reliable system of events, it may be instrumental to the constitution of ActCFCPu when it enters into an experiencing transaction with some subjects. Further, anything that helps us get in commerce with a PosCFCPu that yields value is also extrinsically valuable.

Now that we have some idea of Prall's value notions, I want to take a look at his position about the reliability of critical judgments. Some of the implications of his position have been drawn in regard to beauty toward the end of Section 1.4.

When critic A says "O is valuable" we may take him in

two possible ways.

a) I find that O as ActCFCPu is characterized by intrinsic value quality, and/or

b) I believe that most people's commerce with O as PosCFCPu will result in intrinsic value.

When A says "O is valuable" and B says "O is not valuable," they are not contradicting each other if we take them in sense a), because both may be uttering true statements, or both may be uttering false statements. Their judgments are reports of the value quality found in their own transaction with PosCFCPu. One of the transaction's may truly contain value quality and the other may contain dis-value character. Suppose that A and B are two critics. We can't say that one's value judgment is true and the other's false and then accept the first's because it is true. The truth of their judgments (supposing they are both reporting truly) does not form a basis for accepting one judgment rather than another, since both may be true. Further, they may not be talking about the same aesthetic object, so the judgments are not exclusive alternatives; nor are they comparable, so that one isn't better than another.

If we take the two critics statements about the value of O in sense b), then one's judgment may be false, and if it is, then the other's judgment is true. Their judgments are empirical generalizations about the extrinsic value of O. What kind of evidence does the critic have for believing that O will yield intrinsic value for most people, or for most people equipped to experience it? He could make a survey after the

fact, but the critic does not go through this kind of evidence gathering. Also, he often writes a criticism about something that most people won't see or hear, and that most people who are equipped won't see or hear, so that he couldn't gather the evidence required to prove his judgment even would he engage in that activity. The reliability of such judgments depends on the "normality" of the critic. If the critic is a "normal" or "representative" person, then his own reaction can be taken as evidence that most people entering into a transaction with O will experience the same value character.

> Criticism depends for its fulness and value upon the capacity and sensibility of the critic's mind, for its validity upon his normality and logical acumen, and for its importance upon his importance, upon his adequacy, that is, to speak for human beings.[5]

So as to the reliability of critical judgments, we may say that if we take them in sense a), we can't say that one is more reliable than another because one is true, for both may be true. If we take them in sense b), then they are subject to truth and falsity and their reliability depends on the critic's normality. But the reliability basis for sense b) can be seen to revert to sense a), which is a report of felt value. But when we took judgments in sense a), disagreement was shown

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[5] D. W. Prall, A Study in The Theory of Value, (1921) p 285. For a contemporary view, which, in the main, and in an amazing amount of detail agrees with Prall's position on value and criticism, see an article by the Harvard Heir of Prall's aesthetic chair, Henry Aiken in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 59, "A Pluralistic Analysis of Aesthetic Value," pp 493-513. This, like many of Aiken's articles, indicates a close study of Prall, especially in the vocabulary used.

to be only apparent disagreement; it was held that the two men, being different, were reporting on different transactions, thus were talking about two different things. If that is the case, what implications does this have for the reliability of sense b)? Either sense b) has no reliability because no two critics are ever talking about the same thing, and so no one else can experience what they have experienced and the critic's reaction is of no significance for others, or one of the critic's is abnormal, or supernormal. It is hard to see how Prall can accept the reliability of criticism in sense b) unless he accepts the second alternative. So when two people disagree, one of them does not have a normal reaction. This seems to be a shaky position to hold. It would be difficult to determine which reaction was normal and which one was not.

I don't think that this problem would bother Prall very much, since disagreement is an infrequent event compared to agreement. The frequency of agreement indicates that most reaction is "normal." Normality seems to be a function of men's common nature; we must assume this common nature.

> But it is through men's common nature, not through their differences, that they know and serve one another, as Spinoza long ago taught. It is only by their like ways of functioning that communication is possible at all, and hence that science is a general possession. Aesthetics, like all other knowledge, makes its generalizations on the assumption that human organisms in perceptual-affective response are not totally various, but largely alike. (AA, 176)

Thus Prall would not place much significance on disagreement, so the problem would not appear acute to him. The important

thing to notice about criticism is the prevalence of agreement.

In raising questions about the reliability of judgments so far, I have dealt only with the evaluative aspect. For Prall this was the most unimportant function of criticism, so now I wish to raise the question about the reliability of criticism in regard to its most important function, its educative function. Instead of asking about the "reliability" of criticisms in their educative function, we should ask about their "value." Thus one critic's criticism is better than another's, if it has more value than the other's. Criticisms can be ranked like objects on the basis of their extrinsic value.

Now we know that nothing is extrinsically valuable unless it leads in the end to intrinsic value. Whatever leads to intrinsic value we can rank according to the amount of extrinsic value it has, that is, the amount of intrinsic value it leads to. Some objects will satisfy more interests than others, so such objects have more extrinsic value. Immediate liking or disliking is not the only criterion for the amount of value of an object. The schoolboy may dislike his geometry book, but there are other likings to which the book may be instrumental in the future, so its extrinsic value is not exhausted by its effects on his <u>present</u> interests.

Apply this to criticism now. Let the "object" be the criticism itself. What kind of interests would the criticism be instrumental in satisfying? Since the main function of criticism is its educational function, it should be instrumental

in getting us to increase our appreciation of an aesthetic object. If one piece of criticism does this better than another, if one helps to increase the amount of intrinsic value received and the other does not, then the former is of greater extrinsic value. So on an instrumental basis we can rank criticisms.

What value criticism has depends on the critic. It depends on his knowledge of aesthetic theory and structural standards, his grasp of the technology of the field in which he criticizes and upon his character as a full man, for he is trying to grasp the expression of other human beings. Further, the critic must be able to express his own qualitative reaction. In these senses the critic must be extra-normal, but as a human being he must be normal. Prall does not go into length about the properties of a normal man, but I suppose he is a man who has loved, who can laugh, delights in children and the feel of a path in the woods, who carries on happy relations with friends and associates, and so forth. And I will go with you Everyman.

CHAPTER VI

PRALL, DEWEY AND SANTAYANA

6.1 On Comparison.

Eliseo Vivas, in his review of Aesthetic Analysis, called Aesthetic Judgment the most important book in aesthetics published since The Sense of Beauty except for Dewey's. Whatever may be the final "ranking" and whether or not it is finally possible, that these are three of the most important men in twentieth century aesthetics, and the most influential, can hardly be doubted. In this chapter I want to make a more detailed comparison of these three men.

In comparing I hope to do several things. First, more people are acquainted with Dewey and Santayana than with Prall. By pointing out similarities and differences between them and Prall, we may be led to a better understanding of Prall and his contribution. Second, I may be able to indicate some possible influences.

Influences are hard to trace and difficult to prove. At most we can essay shrewd or not-so-shrewd guesses, but for me here, since I am mostly concerned with trying to get a better understanding of Prall, the suggestion of a possible influence on the basis of similar doctrines will be all the further I intend to go. In general, AJ will show the influence of Santayana, so that most of the similarities that we find between Prall and Santayana will stem from the latter. In AA

which occurred later than Art as Experience, we shall notice some possible influence from Dewey, particularly where Prall drops the term "beauty" and shifts the same analysis to "quality" (t-total-quality). The shift in terms indicates no difference in doctrine. We can also probably note some Dewey influence in Prall's emphasis on communication in AA, with its correlative notion, the publicness or community of feeling, worked out more thoroughly. It is as if Prall took new heart in a doctrine which has previously set him apart. But most of the similarities that we find in Dewey and Prall, more probably went from Prall to Dewey, for Dewey cannot but have read Prall carefully after their debate on theory of value and value judgments.

A third thing drops out, almost gratuitously. We can note by the similarities revealed that several people coming at aesthetics from different angles are in agreement about some aesthetic "facts." This agreement may be accounted for because of "general" influence, for many of these facts are in the public domain, which, consequently, makes the confirmation of "particular" influences doubly difficult. We may not know whether one man got them from another source than the supposed one, or whether he found them in another source but also in the "influential" source, and because he found them in the latter, adopted them. Let X be the supposed "influential" source and Y be the supposed "influenced" person. Y may have got his doctrine (D) from X and only from X; or Y may have first got D from X and got it confirmed in Z; or Y may have first got D

from Z and not have known of it in X at all, though as a matter of fact D is in X. We can see the double facet of the process of "influence" (found or confirmed), as well as the difficulty of getting sufficient information to confirm our statement, as much of the evidence must "lie in the man's head." This we can see from the above, for neither "found" nor "confirmed" is open to inspection, hence, not confirmable unless a man has said that he was influenced by such and so. This satisfies most people.

We find such "saying so" as evidence for the influence of Santayana on Prall, for the personal acquaintances of Prall will testify to his very high admiration of Santayana, as do Prall's quotations of Santayana, especially in his early articles. "Saying so" in regard to Dewey occurs in Prall's AA, pp 8, 57 and 163, and in his two reviews of Art as Experience. What he speaks approvingly of in the reviews appears with new emphasis in AA. Other kinds of evidence for influence besides the"saying so" variety are the use of similar terms, the borrowing of characteristic phrases, sometimes even the use of unquoted verbatim statements.

We seem to be in a better position when the doctrines in question are in a private, not a public, domain, as when the doctrine is "new" with or held only by X. Thus, if we find D in Y and we know that D was new with X and preceded Y's holding D and that Y knew X held D, then we say that X influenced Y. This seems to complete and exhaust the possibilities of "influence" and seems to be (except perhaps "saying so") the best

of all possible evidence for an influence. One factor makes this evidence of influence seem dubious however, and that is that Y may not have known of it in X at all, or even if he did he may at some time prior to his acquaintance with D in X have come to the same conclusion independently; and this possibility I did not list before. It should be added.

The fourth thing I hope to accomplish by comparison is that it will provide some concrete examples of the many possible ways that one can classify aestheticians.

6.2 Comparison.

In order to compare, I shall break this section up into sub-sections according to some problematic divisions of aesthetics: method, field, experience, value and beauty, form, art, art and life, expression and criticism. I shall treat all three men together on each of the topics.

6.21 Method.

In the Introduction to the Sense of Beauty[1] Santayana discusses method, or three ways of approaching the subject of aesthetics. The first is by excercising our judgment itself, giving praise, blame, and precept. This is aesthetic (critical) activity, but not aesthetic science. The second consists in

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[1] George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, (Scribners, 1896), pp 6-7. This book will be labelled "SB" hereafter.

giving an historical explanation of the institution of art, an anthropological study. The third method is psychological, where the other two are didactic and historical. Instead of pronouncing judgments or being a philosophy of art, his aesthetics will be more akin to a psychology of taste. Santayana wants to "understand the origin and conditions of these feelings" that we base our preferences on, and which prompt our aesthetic judgments. "The discussion will be limited to the nature and elements of our aesthetic judgments." (SB, p 6. Note the similarity of Prall's proposed subject in AJ.) "If the inquiry is kept close to the facts of feeling," then it should "yield an understanding of the reason why we think anything ... beautiful ... or ugly."

If this is to be our method, what can we expect theory to accomplish? What is the use of a theory which uses this method?

> When it (a theory) is good it reacts favorably upon our powers, guides the attention to what is really capable of affording entertainment, and increases, by force of new analogies, the range of our interests. (SB, p 8)

Santayana wants to get at the psychological causes for the feelings on which our taste is based, and he hopes to improve our taste and increase our appreciation by his investigation.

Santayana is explicit about his method where Dewey is not; but as a first step we should notice that Dewey's Art as Experience[2] is not essentially a book on aesthetics. Both

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[2] John Dewey, Art as Experience (Minton, Balch and Co., 1934). Hereafter I shall refer to this book as "AE."

Prall and Pepper note this, Prall holding that only Chapters IX and X add anything to aesthetics proper, and Pepper holding that it might well be classified as a book in ethics.

Dewey's method could well be described as primarily didactic, not in the sense of pronouncing judgments on particular works of art, but in trying to break down the "compartmentalization" that has been set up for fine art in general. He wants to thwart the attempt to divorce art from life, from its soil; he inveighs against the separation of the intellectual from the aesthetic, and against the belief that discursive language is the only form of communication. Here Dewey is the irate social-minded philosopher, the moralist. This method cannot be separated from the historical or anthropological in Dewey's case at least.

This can be seen in Dewey's emphasis on the continuity between art and the aesthetic as it is found in any experience with unity, any experience which is an experience. Art is seen by Dewey as growing out of experiences that rise above the undifferentiated stream of experience. Art is the intensifier and clarifier of those traits that are to be found in all experiences that have aesthetic quality, an emotional unity. Here Dewey is interested in the generation of works of art. In trying to understand the generation of art, Dewey is involved, like Hirn, Groos, and Lange, in a psychological and anthropological method. The heart of his "aesthetics" is his concept of an experience. This calls for a close analysis of standout experiences. Dewey's philosophy of art does not disclose

metaphysical sources, nor social-minds, but the human being as he experiences.

What is the use of a theory, or, in Dewey's case, theories?

> My purpose ... is to indicate that theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not inherent in the subject-matter but arise because of specifiable extraneous conditions. Embedded as they are in institutions and in habits of life, these conditions operate effectively because they work so unconsciously ... The implications of the statements that have been made may be useful in defining the nature of the problem: that of recovering the continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of living. (AE, 10)

This is the first purpose of his theory.

The first purpose requires a second, to find a new mode of approach, since many theories about art already exist. He must find a "conception that discloses the way in which these works (of art) idealize qualities found in common experience." (AE, 11) This is his philosophy of art.

A third purpose is to make theory a way of understanding works of art, for "theory is a matter of understanding. Theory is concerned with discovering the nature of the production of works of art and of their enjoyment in perception." (AE, 10)

In comparison, where Santayana's method was to be psychological, a reaction against the "audacious metaphysicians and somewhat incompetent critics," Dewey's can be described as multiple. Prall on the other hand, says one thing in AJ, that his is to be a philosophical study of aesthetic judgments

(AJ, p 4) but does another thing, which is the same that he does in AA, which he there calls aesthetic analysis.

What is the use of a theory for Prall? It seems to be two-fold. First: "The purpose of all theory is the intellectual grasp of our world or of some of its aspects, so that we may be more at home in it." (AJ, 368) Second: "Analysis is a way of learning what works of art are in their actual presented being, by learning the aesthetic elements and relations which go to make up that being. And this would seem to be the function of aesthetic theory itself." (AA, 169)

Santayana -- Aim: Improvement of taste.

Method: Psychology.

Dewey -- Aim: a) Break down compartmentalization.

Method: Didactic.

b) Show continuity of art and life.

An account of generation, production and appreciation.

Method: Psychological -- anthropological.

Prall -- Aim: Understanding the surface of the world, eventuating in understanding works of art.

Method: Analysis.

One thing they all agree on. Aesthetics is not to be the handmaid of criticism in the old sense, i.e., a search for value standards, nor is it to be hortatory or normative.

6.22 Field.

We have the aims and the methods. What their methods shall operate on, the field of aesthetics, is the subject for this section.

If Santayana's method is psychological, there cannot be much choice for his field.

> We shall therefore study human sensibility itself and our actual feelings about beauty, and we shall look for no deeper, unconscious causes of our aesthetic consciousness. (SB, 7)

But we know, from reading SB, that Santayana considers more than this. For though Santayana's subject is the sense of beauty, in order to find what is sensed, he also has to study materials, form and expression, those things that afford us the feeling of pleasure; but not just any pleasure, just those things which allow the objectification of our pleasure. Thus his study of what our sense of beauty is a sense of is much smaller than Prall's. For we recall that for Prall, the whole qualitative surface of the world was the field of aesthetics. (AA, 5) Here is a dividing line, one side of which we find Santanyana saying that odor and tastes are non-aesthetic, and one side of which we find Prall emphasizing their aesthetic character.

Prall's field is quality-centered and he explicitly disavows the identification of aesthetic theory with psychology, thus setting him definitely apart from Santayana in avowed field. But the cleavage is not as deep as explicit statements would make it. Where Santayana began with the investigation of

the elements of judgment and divided aesthetic judgment off from intellectual judgment, because the former involves value, and thus was led to feeling, because it is this which confers value on anything, and from feeling he was led to the why of feeling and into psychology, and since the feeling he was dealing with involves the sense of something, Santayana was led to a consideration of materials, form and expression, the same elements that Prall considers primary, Prall begins with quality, and began with the study of qualitative materials, their form and how we express through them, but then found that quality always involves feeling, hence value, hence into feelings and emotions, their expression and their role. This is more of a characterization of Prall's procedure in AA, than in AJ, for in AJ his procedure is more nearly patterned on Santayana, beginning with beauty; but nevertheless his own method is followed through, for he carries on from there with an analysis of materials. Santayana also, though he comes to consider more than he explicitly states he will, essentially follows through on his own method, for there is always a psychological reference point in his discussions. Both Prall and Santayana must be considered then as following through consistently on their aims, with their own methods, but trying to include all the pertinent facts in their investigation. Prall's contribution of Analysis is not abandoned along the way.

Prall and Santayana, beginning at different ends, both came to an investigation of both feelings and content, but they diverge at a crucial point, for where Prall and Dewey wed

the two, integrate or fuse the two elements into one quality, Santayana insists on their separation. We shall see the consequences of this position appearing in Expression.

The integration of feeling and content into a single quality suggests that Prall and Dewey are in agreement here on the field of aesthetics. I hold that indeed here is a point of agreement, and an important one, between Dewey and Prall, and an important difference between Prall and Santayana.

Pepper holds that quality is the central notion for Dewey and people with similar theories.[3] (In this section I consider Dewey's aesthetics proper.) Prall agrees with this estimate, when he approves of Dewey's locating the philosophical locus of the field of aesthetics in an experience, where our doing and undergoing consummates in an immediate quality as the unifying completion of the process of emotional perception.[4]

> Mr. Dewey has made this out more clearly than any one else, perhaps. We must realize first that we live along in the infinitely complex processes that constitute bodily organic life within nature. We are self-preserving nodes in the intricate and infinite matrix of natural flux. And only as we can, so to speak, condense process into quality, only as we can sum infinite minute perceptions

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[3] S. C. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, (Harvard University Press, 1949) p 290. Pepper's book will hereafter be referred to as BCA.

[4] D. W. Prall, review of Art as Experience, The Harvard Journal Review, April 12, 1934, and a review of the same book in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 44, 1935, p 388. Hereafter we will refer to the first as Review 1, the second as Review 2.

> into large clear ones; or, to speak more literally and in more modern terms, only as we become aware of felt qualitative content, are we even conscious. We resist in our own organic ways, and in so doing find a world, not ourselves, about us and present to us; present not as process itself, however, but as qualitative content. Mr. Dewey, in fact, calls this aesthetic surface the quality of the process. (AA, 8-9)

We note here Prall's identification of "surface" and the "quality of the process," where "quality" is to be understood as t-total-quality. He is seen here acknowledging a similarity; but we must not suppose that this statement is a recent formulation, and that he is here being influenced by Dewey's AE. Consider the following statement from AJ, p 13;

> For the present all we need to notice is the plain fact that aesthetic experience, recorded in aesthetic judgments, is aloof not in indolence, but in the intense activity of full contemplation, and aloof because what such experience takes as its object is not existing things but their essential qualities, not events but appearing essences or forms immediately and satisfyingly present to us, whether as embodied externally in things or in imagination.

Further, consider the title for the second chapter in AJ, "The Transaction Involved in Aesthetic Experience." The key is the transaction, or situation, or context, and what results from it is quality. This occurrence in AJ indicates that Prall was not influenced by Dewey in AE, though he may have been influenced by Experience and Nature.

We must be careful at this point to notice that the term "quality" has two uses in both Dewey and Prall. When Prall discusses beauty in AJ, it is the same notion of quality that Dewey is talking of in the following:

> An experience has a unity that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts. (AE, 37)

This is similar to Prall's statements in AJ:

> Nature is not static, and we are not outside nature looking on; but all things, all human beings among them, act and react in a continuum of moving reality both spatial and temporal. Not only the physical world but all life is a flux. Beauty, if it is seen or heard or felt, is recognized as a quality supervening upon this flux in some particular situation. And situations are marked for human minds by these supervening qualities and by nothing else ... (because) ... the quality itself has an identity. (AJ, 7)

This then is the first use of quality, the quality of unity of an experience.

The second use of "quality" is the more familiar one of constituent qualities such as sense qualities, the kind of thing that Prall searchs for intrinsic order in, though it should be remembered that for Prall this use of "quality" is not confined to "sense" qualities like hard and sweet, that is, sub-qualities. Dewey notes his use when he says: "The material of the fine arts consists of qualities."[5] It is quality in the first sense which the artist tries to achieve and which is the criterion of the relevance of sub-qualities, i.e., it determines what constituent qualities will be selected for inclusion in a work of art. Selection is on the basis of

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[5] AE, 38. See also Chapter IV, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry for a discussion of "quality" and its two uses, especially pp 68-70.

their contribution to the desired unitary quality.

Pepper makes note of this same distinction in quality in his investigation of the concept of fusion in Dewey, which also applies to Prall. Pepper calls the two the "controlling quality" and the "specific intuited quality."[6]

In making this distinction we can note an important difference between Dewey and Prall. Dewey's main interest is in unitary quality; his discussions of art, form and expression are all functionally oriented, i.e., he looks to them to see how they contribute to the intensification of unitary quality. Instead we find in Prall a primary interest in constituent qualities. It is here that Prall finds the analytic base for a scientific aesthetics. There is no primary interest here in a "philosophy" of art. Prall's analysis of the sub-qualitative field distinguishes Prall from Dewey, though both agree on two kinds of quality and on their constitution. Too, it is Dewey's neglect of these sub-qualities, and Dewey's suspicion of analysis that Prall is critical of. We find Prall saying:

> An analyst will also a little resent the suggestion that he always forgets what he is really about and so misconstrues experience, and he will refuse to be convicted of the sin of mechanization even when he insists on the numerical count of rhythmic divisions or upon abstract qualitative ranges of pitch or color variations. (Review 1, p 6)

The primary field for Santayana then is human sensibility; for Prall it is quality; this gives Prall and Dewey a similar

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[6] S. C. Pepper, "The Concept of Fusion in Dewey's Aesthetic Theory," The Journal of Aethetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 12, pp 169-176.

field, except that Prall's main emphasis is on the analysis of sub-qualities and Dewey's emphasis is on the unitary quality and its intensification in art, its separation from other experience by other theories, and its function as a link between other experiences and the distinctively aesthetic experience.

6.23 Experience.

Santayana doesn't directly discuss the aesthetic experience, but from other things he says we can piece together his views. The aesthetic experience is the perception of beauty. Since beauty involves value, and value involves pleasure, all cases of the perception of beauty are experiences involving pleasure. Further, since our aesthetic judgments are "necessarily intrinsic and based on the character of the immediate experience, and never consciously on the idea of an eventual utility in the object..." (SB, 23) the aesthetic experience has the character of what is often called"aloofness" or "disinterestedness." Finally, an experience that is pleasurable because of "immediate perception" can qualify as a perception of beauty, rather than as the pleasure of sense, only if the pleasure is regarded as a property of that which is immediately perceived, and not as a property of ourself. (SB, 50-51) So the aesthetic experience for Santayana is an experience where there is a) immediate perception (disinterestedness), b) pleasure in the immediate perception and c) where the pleasure

felt is not qualifying the perceiver, but the object of immediate perception.

We know that Santayana allows the pleasure of something else besides that which we are immediately perceiving, something associated, to be a legitimate part of the aesthetic experience, as long as that pleasure is attached to that which we immediately perceive. This is his doctrine of expression.

Prall, on the other hand, is not so lenient as Santayana, not wishing to allow irrelevant associations into the "aesthetic" experience. (AA, 19) He wishes to keep the aesthetic experience primarily sensuous, though he does allow imagination to enter, especially in literature. Still, whatever else there is in the experience, it is not a legitimate part of the experience if it takes our attention away from what is actually presented to us. This is Prall's presentationalism, and constitutes another difference from Santayana.

Recall Prall's treatment of the aesthetic experience in AJ: a) primarily directly sensuous; b) delightful; c) and disinterested. This is close to Santayana, if a) is taken as immediate perception; we must note a difference though in the matter of the legitimacy of associations, for Santayana admits them as part of <u>what</u> is felt as beautiful while Prall admits them not as part of the content of what is beautiful, but to 'inform' what is beautiful.

There is a shift in AA from the close similarity in AJ with Santayana's order of discussion, beginning with beauty, and Santayana's view of the aesthetic experience and its value

relation to beauty. Instead, Prall's discussion begins with quality (as the field), and he then points out its close alliance with aesthetics, not on a value basis, but on the basis that experience is used to mark off the aesthetic aspect of quality. In AA the aesthetic experience is defined in terms of attitude, attitude having two facets, focus of attention and focus of interest. We attend to the sheer appearance of quality (same as both the immediacy and disinterestedness found in the AJ view) and our interest is in that appearance alone (the delight of AJ).

There is a close wedding of constituent qualities, analysis, immediacy and the aesthetic experience with its unitary quality. This constitutes Prall's most exciting contribution, for what we have before us is the epistemology of aesthetics, when aesthetics is conceived presentationally. It is a careful working out of the aesthetic apprehension, how and what we come to be acquainted with, a working out of emotional perception. We could without distortion call Prall's aesthetic theory the epistemology of emotional perception.

Where Prall starts from the ground up, with an analysis of sub-qualities, Dewey starts from the unitary quality. Dewey does not give us a detailed account of the process that gives rise to the unitary quality. In this respect Prall is a more valuable contextualist and aesthetician than Dewey. He digs beneath unitary quality in such a way that we come to a better understanding of unitary quality than we do with Dewey; we have a better explanation, and, consequently, a better foundation

on which to base training for the arts. Prall is more rigorous and departs farthest from the generality of typical aesthetic theory. It is this which makes Prall more exciting to read and more original. Where Prall has a genuine start on the epistemology of aesthetics, Dewey is more old-fashioned, discussing "art" in its relation to unitary quality, to an experience.

But Prall acknowledge's the central importance of an experience, recognizing it as the source of unitary quality, and intends that his study lead to an understanding of an experience, that its aim is to help us have an experience. (AA, 169-171)

An experience for Dewey is one which has unity, "satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement." (AE, 38) It is a unity with parts which fuse into a unity while maintaining their identity. These parts have direction, lead on to something else, an experience with no holes. It flows to fulfillment, satisfying fulfillment, i.e., it is a consummation, not a cessation. An experience: unitary emotional quality, fusion of parts, maintenance of part's self-identity, dynamic organization with the fusion of parts leading to a consummation, and has "its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency." (AE, 35)

Now it can be seen that this characterization of an experience fits any consummatory experience, not just those experiences that arise in the presence of a work of art. Think-

ing and doing can eventuate in this kind of an experience. And this is Dewey's main point.

But is there not a distinctively aesthetic experience that is not either intellectual or practical? Dewey agrees that there is, and when he comes to delineate it he sounds more traditional and more like Prall and Santayana: "delightful perception;" "intrinsic quality;" controlling "interest and purpose." Three quotations will indicate what his views seem to be; though none of them say the same thing, I take it that in combination they cover the subject.

> Because experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is esthetic experience. (Italics mine) (AE, 19)

> The material of the fine arts consists of qualities; that of experience having intellectual conclusion are signs or symbols having no intrinsic quality of their own, but standing for things that may in another experience be qualitatively experienced. The difference is enormous. ((AE, 38)

> Nevertheless, the experiences in question are dominantly intellectual or practical, rather than distinctively esthetic, because of the interest and purpose that initiate and control them. In an intellectual experience, the conclusion has value on its own account ... In a distinctively esthetic experience, characteristics that are subdued in other experiences are dominant; those that are subordinate are controlling -- namely, the characteristics in virtue of which the experience is an integrated complete experience on its own account. (AE, 55)

The aesthetic experience is for Santayana an experience where there is in the objectified pleasure immediately perceived. For Prall: An experience where the focus of attention and interest is on qualitative immediacy. For Dewey: an ex-

perience where those characteristics which lead to a consummated, integral emotional qualitative unity are dominant.

6.24 Value and Beauty.

What has value to do with aesthetics? Santayana is investigating the sense of beauty; beauty itself turns out to be "value positive, intrinsic, and objectified. Or in less technical language, Beauty is pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing." (SB, 49) Value, being pleasure, is existentially dependent on that being which has the feeling of pleasure, which means that beauty requires a sense of beauty.

> We may therefore at once assert this axiom ... that there is no value apart from some appreciation of it, and no good apart from some preference of it before its absence or opposite. In appreciation, in preference, lies the root and essence of all excellence. Or, as Spinoza clearly expresses it, we desire nothing because it is good, but it is good only because we desire it. (SB, 18)

Further:

> Values spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature. (SB, 19)
>
> It is evident that beauty is a species of value, and what we have said of value in general applies to this particular kind. (SB, 20)

In Prall, as in Santayana, we find a statement approving of Spinoza.

> It has long been seen that we call things good because they satisfy us; that we do not -- could not -- learn to desire what is somehow in itself good, since good is necessarily dependent upon individual and social human wants and capacities. (AA, 203)

Prall agrees with Santayana about the "irrational" source of values.

> A subject is always requisite to there being value at all -- not necessarily a judging subject, but a subject capable of at least motor-affective response. For the cat the cream has value, or better and more simply, the cat values the cream, or the warmth, or having her back scratched, quite regardless of her probably inability to conceive cream or to make judgments concerning warmth.[7]

This statement contains the two elements of agreement with Santayana; a) the existence of value is dependent on the individual and b) dependent specifically on its irrational nature, its desires, interests or satisfactions.

There is an important difference between Santayana and Prall however. For Santayana pleasure only appears to be a quality of the object; for Prall the value does not attach to the subject really, or to the physical object really, but qualifies the transaction, in which both subject and object are integral.

> The value is there as the quality of this spatio-temporal happening. And it only comes to be there when the substance of animal so reacts upon the substances about it that the animal feels pleased or displeased.[8]

Prall begins with beauty in AJ and ends up calling it quality in AA, while Dewey begins with quality and ends up calling it beauty. Prall and Dewey agree that value is part of the quality of the situation. The very names for qualities

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[7] Prall, A Study in the Theory of Value, p 227. Hereafter this work will be referred to as STV.

[8] Prall, "Value and Thought-processes," p 122.

of situations indicate this, such as distressing or cheerful. This means, unlike Santayana's notion, that beauty is not identified with the pro-feelings, but with the t-total-quality of the transaction, which includes the character contributed by the sub-, form-, unit- and emotional qualities. There is a genuine fusion into a unitary quality, and this is also called beauty. For Dewey:

> Beauty is at the furthest remove from an analytic term, and hence from a conception that can figure in theory as a means of explanation or classification ... For purposes of theory, it then becomes an obstructive term. In case the term is used in theory to designate the total esthetic quality of an experience, it is surely better to deal with the experience itself and show whence and how the quality proceeds. In that case, beauty is the response to that which to reflection is the consummated movement of matter integrated through its inner relations into a single qualitative whole. (AE, 129-130)

> The picture is the integral outcome of their (external and organic causes) interaction with what the mind through the organism contributes. Its "beauty," which, I agree with Mr. Richards, is simply a short term for certain valued qualities, in being an intrinsic part of the total effect, belongs to the picture just as much as do the rest of its properties. (AE, 251)

We see Prall and Dewey agreeing on the reference of the term "beauty," giving similar accounts of its occurrence, and neither using it as an explanatory category. But they disagree on one of the subjective processes involved in the constitution of this quality, Prall holding that the value character of the t-total-quality, involves only our irrational nature, while Dewey holds that the process of rational judgment is also involved. This is covered in Section 7.93.

Santayana -- Beauty: Pleasure regarded as the quality of the thing perceived, but only apparently, and springing from the irrational part of our nature.

Prall -- Beauty: The unitary quality of the aesthetic transaction, the fusion of constituent qualities due to physical, psychological and physiological processes, the value character springing from the irrational part of our nature.

Dewey -- Beauty: The same as for Prall except that judgment is also a part of the process responsible for the value constituent.

6.25 Form.

For Santayana "the manner in which the elements are combined constitutes the character of the form." (SB, 96) Form is the organization of elements then, and is grasped because of a synthesis by the mind. Its unity arises unconsciously, but it "differs from sensation in the consciousness of the synthesis, and from expression in the homogeneity of the elements, and in their common presence to sense." (SB, 97) Here we see form contrasted with elements and expression. On this point Santayana and Prall differ. For Prall elements are not formless, since elements also have a relational character which constitutes their intrinsic order.

In this order not all elements are present to sense. Santayana only recognizes form involving arrangement relations.

But in their treatment of arrangement Santayana and Prall are pretty much in agreement. The first value of a form is the delight of recognition.

> The second and more important element is the relation of the particular impression to the form under which it is apperceived. This determines the value of the object as an example of its class. After our mind is pitched to the key and rhythm of a certain idea, say of a queen, it remains for the impression to fulfil, aggrandize, or enrich this form by a sympathetic embodiment of it. (SB, 115-116)

Here Santayana is making almost the same point as Prall, that familiar forms help us to grasp what is there and see how the type, or norm, which we have built up out of experience with similar forms, informs our vision. This quotation also suggests associative filling out. Prall, too, suggests this in some places (AA, 156-157) but warns us against its dangers. (AA, 157-159)

Santayana and Prall both insist on close discrimination and on the uniqueness of form, so that it shall not be the idealization of the norm we have in mind, but be determinate instead.

> The indeterminate in form is also indeterminate in value. (SB, 144)

> Whenever beauty is really seen and loved, it has a definite embodiment: the eye has precision, the work has style, and the object has perfection. The kind of perfection may indeed be new; and if the discovery of new perfections is to be called romanticism, then romanticism is the beginning of all aesthetic life. (SB, 150)

Form, for Prall as for Santayana, plays a role in expression also. I shall take this up later in the section on Expression.

With Dewey we get an entirely different treatment of form, though Dewey and Prall are in agreement on the non-separation of matter and form. Dewey holds that:

> The sum of the whole discussion is that theories which separate matter and form, theories that strive to find a special locus in experience for each, are, in spite of their oppositions to one another, cases of the same fundamental fallacy. They rest upon separation of the live creature from the environment in which it lives. One school (the idealistic) ... makes the separation in the interest of meanings or relations. The other school, the sensational-empiricist, makes the separation in behalf of the primacy of sense qualities. (AE, 130-131)

Prall maintains the same belief, for this is the aim of his presentationalism. He shows the intimacy of form and matter in intrinsic orders and so lays, as Ushenko says, the first reliable foundation for the separation denial. It is Prall's analysis here, a digging to the foundations, which proves convincing. The intimacy of form and substance is also shown by his aesthetic epistemology. Knowledge of the subject-matter is used to inform what is before us.

In other respects, Prall and Dewey seem to be in two different worlds. Dewey speaks of aesthetic form as the "organization of energies."

> What we perhaps are less cognizant of is that this organization of energies to move cumulatively to a terminal whole in which the values of all means and media are incorporated is the essence of fine art. (AE, 172)



Form is the development of that factor which makes an experience move or flow to a consummation. It is one more example of Dewey's analysis of art as a development of the factors found in an experience.

Prall mentions this, (Review I, p 5) and thinks this notion of form must be accepted, although one searches in vain for a similar notion in Prall's works. This is probably to be accounted for by Prall's failure to develop the temporal process side of the aesthetic transaction which Dewey emphasized.

A point of sharp disagreement exists between them on the analyzation of form, which I noted in Section 6.22. Dewey objects to a "mechanical" analysis of rhythm, for example. Prall has defended the notion of analysis, by making a distinction between theory which seeks to understand and the actual experience.

Santayana -- Form: Arrangement, the relations of elements. Form is distinct from elements and expression.

Prall -- Form: Intrinsic order and arrangement. The first admits no separation between form and matter; the second admits no separation between form and substance.

Dewey -- Form: The organization of energies; in art it is a development of the factors contributing to consummation.

6.26 Art and Life.

One cannot mention Art in connection with these three men without also mentioning Life, or an equivalent term. It is this which contributes to the vitality of their aesthetic theories. With all three men art has more importance than the merely esoteric has. Art finds its source in normal activities for all three men; the aesthetic is not confined to art, and for Prall and Santayana all intrinsic values are aesthetic values. The existence of Reason in Art is sufficient testament to the part that art plays in the good life for Santayana. And, of course, separation of life from art is the subject of Dewey's anger.

There are two important points where Santayana and Prall agree about art and life and the aesthetic and life.

The first finds both holding that all intrinsic values are aesthetic values. Prall adds that aesthetic values are also aesthetic qualities, which is a position that Santayana does not follow him in, since his method is more psychological and less quality-centered.

> Evidently all values must be ultimately intrinsic. The useful is good because of the excellence of its consequences; but these must somewhere cease to be merely useful in their turn, or only excellent as means; somewhere we must reach the good that is good in itself and for its own sake, else the whole process is futile, and the utility of our first object illusory. (SB, 28-29)

This same point is made by Prall in STV, Chapter VI.

> This reduction of all values to immediate appreciations, to sensuous or vital activities, is so inevitable that it has struck even the minds most courageously rationalistic. (SB, 29)

> Not only are the various satisfactions which morals are meant to secure aesthetic in the last analysis, but when the conscience is formed, and right principles acquire an immediate authority, our attitude to these principles becomes aesthetic also. (SB, 31)

In a similar vein we find Prall saying that it would be easy to show that:

> ... what has aesthetic value is the model or type of everything that is finally valuable at all, but also to show how all value is literally aesthetic just so far as it is fully and genuinely value in the strictest sense of the word. Means are only valuable with the actual value attributed to their real ends; and this attribution, if it is valid, always involves the situation in which the end-value is directly and immediately experienced. (AJ, 336)

Similarly:

> It is after all aesthetic criteria that are final in judging the values of all things, including even that of social usages and laws, and of forms of society in general. And it is direct aesthetic attention that most realistically and surely discerns the features of society as it is. (AJ, 346)

Both Prall and Santayana make application of these notions to democracy. The similarity is so striking as to lead to the possibility of an influence of Santayana on Prall. No others since the Greeks have taken so seriously the notion of the good life as the aesthetic life (though not in the "precious sense") as Prall and Santayana.

A second similarity between Prall and Santayana can be seen in their tracing the origin of art to the discrimination of surrounding nature, spontaneous activities and utility. We see this in Santayana's RA, especially Chapter III, and in SB, Section 37. Prall's chapter on Primitive Art closely

parallels this treatment.

There is another sense of the connection between life and the aesthetic in Prall's insistence on the presence of qualitative content, aesthetic content, in all of our experience. He is talking of a stone, how we might think of its skipping qualities, or its geological significance, or a possible assay, but:

> In all of these cases it is not the world as aesthetic content that we are primarily concerned with, though such content is never totally absent ... And we should of course remember that, as no experience can be totally anaesthetic, so also no experience is totally aesthetic. (AA, 7)

This is more similar to Dewey than to Santayana, though Dewey marks the continuation not so much in terms of quality as in terms of the type of experience which has unitary quality. Again it is the difference of emphasis and method that would account for the two ways of saying what comes to essentially the same thing, since quality and an experience are intimately connected. Dewey puts it this way:

> There are substantially but two alternatives. Either art is a continuation, by means of intelligent selection and arrangement, of natural tendencies of natural events, or art is a peculiar addition to nature, springing from something dwelling within the breast of man, whatever name be given to the latter. In the former case, delightfully enhanced perception is of the same nature as enjoyment of any object that is consummatory. It is the outcome of a skilled and intelligent art of dealing with natural things for the sake of intensifying, purifying, prolonging, and deepening

the satisfactions they (the things of everyday primary experiences) spontaneously afford.[9]

Santayana: All values are finally intrinsic and all intrinsic values are aesthetic values. Art finds its source in spontaneous and utilitarian activities, with constant renewal through acquaintance with nature.

Prall: Same as above with the addition that all aesthetic values are aesthetic qualities. Also, aesthetic quality is to be found in all experiences.

Dewey: Like Prall, Dewey holds that the aesthetic is continuous with life, but emphasizes the fact that the aesthetic appears in all experiences that have a unity, rather than the universal occurrence of quality.

6.27 Expression.

It is in their theories of expression that Prall and Santayana diverge most and Prall and Dewey agree most. All the differences between Prall and Santayana and all the similarities of Prall and Dewey now come to emphatic fruition; particularly in Prall's and Dewey's conception of quality,

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[9] John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court, 1925), p 389.

hence, in their conception of the aesthetic field, value and experience. Prall's and Dewey's difference about the "constituents" of value must not blind us to more important similarities.

I shall outline Santayana's theory first. Although I briefly outlined Santayana's theory of expression in Chapter IV, I shall do so again for the handiness of proximity and because my present purposes require a more extensive comparison and analysis. Santayana holds a two-term theory of expression, while Dewey and Prall hold a monistic theory. Santayana's theory is also sometimes called the association theory of expression. Expression is "the suggestion of the not-given." (SB, 175) The beauty of materials and form come from "the reaction of an innate disposition," while the beauty of expression has its <u>origin</u> outside, extrinsic to, the object perceived. "Expression then differs from material or formal value only as habit differs from instinct -- in its origin." (SB, 195)

> In all expression we may thus distinguish two terms: the first is the object actually presented, the word, the image, the expressive thing; the second is the object suggested, the further thought, emotion, or image evoked, the thing expressed.
>
> These lie together in the mind, and their union constitutes expression. If the value lies wholly in the first term, we have no beauty of expression. (SB, 195)

Nor do we have beauty of expression unless the second term is "incorporated" into the first term; if not, we are valuing the associations rather than the object before us.

We see here the same insistence on attention to what is before us that we saw in Prall. Santayana does not wish to allow the ruminative consciousness unreined freedom; he wants to rein it in, but it is not as severe a check on suggestion that Prall makes.

> Not until I confound the impressions (of the first and second terms) ... will the expressiveness constitute a beauty.
>
> The value of the second term must be incorporated in the first; for the beauty of expression is as inherent in the object as that of material or form, only it accrues to that object not from the bare act of perception, but from the association with it of further processes, due to the existence of former impressions ... Expressiveness is the power given by experience to any image to call up others in the mind; and this expressiveness becomes an aesthetic value, that is, becomes expression, when the value involved in the associations thus awakened are incorporated in the present object. (SB, 197-198)

I say that Santayana's rein is not as severe as Prall's because Santayana allows the incorporation of the value of the second term into the first, whereas Prall insists that our associations must inform what is before us and <u>allow</u> us to see <u>its</u> value. There is no incorporation of another value into the value of what is presented. Prall does not want any and all "reverberations" to be part of the value of what is presented, "hushed" though they may be. Prall's taste does not permit a wide ranging of our imagination. Further, unchecked association also imperils the possibility of communication, particularly precise communication.

Several people tend to think that Prall follows Santayana in his theory of expression. I am denying the

correctness of that position here. Failure to see the difference between Prall's and Santayana's positions is failure to see the differences between "incorporating" and "informing" (my term).

The first difference might be phrased as follows: For Santayana the perception of O reminds us of O', and the value of O' appears to become the value of O, but the value is really of O'; for Prall we recognize O for what it is, and value O for what it is, because O' informs us of what it is, but the value of O' is not aesthetically relevant.

> What the picture that happens to represent a garden wall with shadows aesthetically (italics mine) presents, so far as it accomplishes an artist's aim, is what the wall felt like to the painter, or what the painter felt as capable of being embodied in a picture with a wall in it. (AA, 160)

This brings us to the second difference. For Santayana the expressed emotion that occurs in an aesthetic experience is the emotion evoked in virtue of the suggestion of O', the emotion that is appropriate to or attached to O'. For Prall the emotion that is relevant is not our emotion attached to O', but the emotion of the artist or creator which is embodied in O. This most clearly shows the tighter rein Prall holds on "expression."

The last difference in turn leads to a third difference. For Santayana there always remains two terms, sense qualities and feelings, which never merge. The expressed feeling relevant to appreciation for Santayana is in us alone. For Prall the feeling really is in O (ActCFCPu) as much as

the sense qualities. There are not the qualities and the feeling, for they are one and the same. This third difference might be expressed in the following terms: For Santayana feelings have only one possible location, within our body; for Prall a feeling may have two or more locations, and at the same time, which indicates that feeling is public.

> The point of the picture, its effective being, is just this embodied feeling that we have, if with open sensitive eyes we look at it and let its character become the content of our own affective conscious life at the moment.[10]

I shall use this third difference to distinguish some points that ought not to be confused, but often are, in discussions of expression.

1. Some feelings are private, felt by us alone, our exclusive possession, our reaction.
2. Some feelings are public, embodied in works of art, no one's exclusive property.
3. Public feelings are not always felt by something (PosCFCPu). The picture when not perceived (or when perceived) does not feel sad privately. It does not have a private reaction, having no nervous system.
4. Public feelings may be felt by someone.
   (a) The embodied feeling is what we are feeling, is part of "the content of our own conscious affective life," (ActCFCPu).

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[10] AA, 163. Thus, apparently, is communication also affected.

(b) and we may have a private feeling about this public feeling, i.e., we may react emotionally to the public feeling.

5. Any private feeling may theoretically become public, becoming so when successfully expressed, fully clarified. Most of our feelings do not become public because they are not expressed.
6. Thus "feeling" must not be confused with private feeling, with reaction only.

I do not wish to argue whether or not these are valid distinctions, but only to hold that Prall makes these distinctions, and that these distinctions differentiate his position from Santayana's.

Prall's position has some implications, though he does not draw them, concerning the work of art.

In the aesthetic experience, the object and the subject remain distinct, the aesthetic object being identified with the physical work of art for people of Santayana's persuasion. For Prall the aesthetic object is the funded and fused experiences had in the process of observing. Prall does not draw this implication as explicitly as Dewey does.

> But in no case can there be perception of an object except in a process developing in time. (AE, 175)

> We speak of perception and its object. But perception and its object are built up and completed in one and the same continuing operation ... In its capacity of object-of-perception, it exists in exactly the same interaction with a living creature that constitutes the activity of perceiving ... Esthetic perception ... is a name for a full perception and its correlative, an object or event. (AE, 177)

> The picture is the integral outcome of their (atoms, electrons, protons) interaction with what the mind through the organism contributes. (AE, 251)

What is of interest for aesthetics, then, is the transaction where vivid or heightened unitary quality occurs.

When we turn to Dewey we find a theory much more similar to Prall's.

Dewey, like Prall, holds that during creation feeling or emotion controls the selection of material, and he also holds that when we express a feeling we clarify it through the operation on media, through the attempt to suit the feeling to the expressive possibilities of the different media.

> Expression is the clarification of turbid emotion. (AE, 77)

> The act of expression is not something which supervenes upon an inspiration already complete. It is the carrying forward to completion of an inspiration by means of the objective material of perception and imagery. (AE, 67)

> That art is selective is a fact universally recognized. It is so because of the role of emotion in the act of expression. Any predominant mood automatically excludes all that is uncongenial with it. (AE, 67)

The fact of attachment to a medium indicates that it is not just an emotion, something which belongs exclusively to a "mind," which is expressed.

> The expressiveness of the object is the report and celebration of the complete fusion of what we undergo and what our activity of attentive perception brings into what we receive by means of the senses. (AE, 103)

We are not interested only in the wall, nor only in the emotion aroused by the wall, but in what-the-wall-felt-like to

the painter, as Prall was wont to say.

Just as Prall held that certain media are satisfactory for the expression of some things and not others, so does Dewey.

> Because objects of art are expressive, they are a language. Rather they are many languages. For each art has its own medium and that medium is especially fitted for one kind of communication. Each medium says something that cannot be uttered as well or as completely in any other tongue. (AE, 106)

Thus both hold one of the reasons for the untranslatability of works of art: the medium specifies <u>this</u> and nothing else can specify the same thing. The substance is altered if put in a form possible to other media.

This notion of specification by a medium results in a further similarity. Prall and Dewey both held that no idea is clarified unless it is worked out in some medium, but now we see Dewey, like Prall, refuse to separate the "mental" from the "objective."

> The experiences that are emphatically called, because of the dominance of the internal contribution, "mental," have reference, direct or remote, to experiences of a more objective character; they are the products of discrimination, and hence can be understood only as we take into account the total normal experience in which both inner and outer factors are so incorporated that each has lost its special character. (AE, 246)

> Erroneous views of the nature of the act of expression almost all have their source in the notion that an emotion is complete in itself within, only when uttered having impact upon external material. But, in fact, an emotion is <u>to</u> or <u>from</u> or <u>about</u> something objective, whether in fact or in idea. (AE, 66-67)

Compare this last sentence of Dewey's to this statement of Prall's: Feelings are feelings about objects, toward objects, of objects. (AA, 154)

So far, in summary, we have seen both Prall and Dewey grant the importance of feeling for creation; both hold that feelings are clarified in the expression of them, and changed too, since the medium specifies certain things. This is not peculiar to art, for no idea or feeling or emotion is without "objective" content, and so better suited to one medium than another. The "mental" and the "objective" are not to be separated into different spheres. Thus both are holding that feelings may be public, not necessarily private, not "mental" alone.

Dewey has mentioned that different media are different languages, and both Dewey and Prall agree that art is able to communicate.

> Because the objects of art are expressive, they communicate ... In the end, works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered communication between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls that limit community of experience. (AE 104-105)

"Public" and "community" are words used by Dewey concerning feelings and intents. Is a community of feeling achieved automatically? Not quite.

> There must be indirect and collateral channels of response prepared in advance in the case of one who really sees the picture or hears the music. This motor preparation is a large part of esthetic education in any particular line. (AE, 98)

Prall makes the same point about the "application" of

aesthetic knowledge, that it should become habitual, physiological. It is this which aesthetic analysis is to lead to, automatic discrimination! This is the essence of Prall's aesthetic epistemology.

What about the knowledge gained in our ordinary living? What about association and representation? We should know by now Prall's position on these. But what does Dewey have to say about this kind of knowledge that we bring with us to the work of art?

> The other factor (besides motor dispositions) that is required in order that a work may be expressive to a percipient is meanings and values extracted from prior experiences and funded in such a way that they fuse with the qualities directly presented in the work of art ... I have avoided the use of the word "association" because traditional psychology supposes that associated material and the immediate color or sound that evokes it remain separate from one another. It does not admit of the possibility of a fusion so complete as to incorporate both members in a single whole. Psychology holds that direct sensuous quality is one thing, and an idea or image which it calls out or suggests is another distinct mental item. The esthetic theory based on this psychology cannot admit that the suggesting and the suggested may interpenetrate and form a unity in which present sense quality confers vividness of realization while the material evoked supplies content and depth.
>
> The issue that is involved has a much greater import for the philosophy of aesthetics than appears at first sight. The question of the relation that exists between direct sensuous matter and that which is incorporated with it because of prior experiences, goes to the heart of the expressiveness of the object. (AE, 98-99)

This is a nice series of statements from Dewey to exhibit his similarity to Prall, on the notion of association. (AA 156-157) But Dewey goes further toward an

association theory of expression here than Prall does, if by the fusion of "meanings and values from prior experiences" Dewey means them to be part of that which is relevant. One cannot help but think that Dewey has Santayana in mind here. Dewey is adverse to "association" when it is thought of as not inter-penetrating. He wants to hold that it fuses into the quality. Now if Dewey went no further than this, it would be difficult to see how he differed from Santayana. He is not being quite fair to the association theory of expression. People who hold this are not doubting the fusion of the associated factors. Santayana insists on "incorporation." Dewey himself uses this term, as we saw above. If what I have said of Santayana is not sufficient, let him speak for himself: And we may here insist upon a point of fundamental importance; namely, that the process of association enters consciousness as directly, and produces a sensation, as any process in any organ. (SB, 199)

Dewey often speaks no differently than the associationists, though he disavows them. More to the monistic point is the following:

> Extreme instances of the results of separation of organism and the world are not infrequent in esthetic philosophy. Such a separation lies behind the idea that esthetic quality does not belong to objects as objects but is projected into them by mind. It is the source of the definition of beauty as "objectified pleasure" instead of as pleasure in the object, so much in it that the object and pleasure are one and undivided in the experience. (AE, 248)

Still Santayana would not deny that they are undivided in

the experience, in the phenomenal object -- this he affirms, but are they undivided in reality?

The language, if not the intent of Dewey, sounds as much like an associationist as anyone. Prall has attempted to work out the problem, which is central for Dewey also, of the relation of sense quality to feelings in more detail than Dewey. He has been more explicit in his monism, has held that the transaction is primary, and that qualities and values qualify this transaction or situation. It has been customary to interpret Dewey as holding the same thing, but in some places in AE his language does not bear this out as clearly as one could wish. An example of this kind of interpretation and the implications that it has for the theory of expression can be given by quoting Douglas Morgan.

> It is worth nothing that a Deweyan "contextualist" might claim to avoid the two-term paradox at the outset, by taking as primary some category like "situation" or "context," and thus avoiding the categorical polarity of "subject" and "object," each of these latter being defined in terms of the more fundamental category. For such a contextualist, the sadness will be as "fused" in the music as the sweetness in the lemonade, and the phenomenal occurrence of the sadness, like that of the sweetness, will be explicable only in terms of the interrelations between "subject" and "object."[11]

Dewey, like Prall, insists that representation itself is not expression, but that it may aid expression if it aids

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[11] Douglas Morgan, Part II of the "Symposium: The Concept of Expression in Art," Science, Language and Human Rights, Vol. I of the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, University of Pennsylvania Press (1952), Footnote 8, p 163.

us in seeing a specific case of what is being expressed, if it helps to inform us, helps us to recognize the feeling expressed. Prall told us of this in the example of the dilapidated house. (AA, 157) We should not think of dilapidation, but of this specific dilapidation. It is what is presented, not what is represented that is important. Similarly, Dewey says,

> ... the inference that there is no re-presentation of any meanings of any subject matter whatever, no presentation that is of a subject matter having a meaning of its own which clarifies and concentrates the diffused and dulled meanings of other experiences does not follow ... The diagrammatic drawing that suggests grief does not convey the grief of an individual person; it exhibits the kind of facial "expression" persons in general manifest when suffering grief. The esthetic portrayal of grief manifests the grief of a particular individual in connection with a particular event. It is that state of sorrow which is depicted, not depression unattached. It has a local habitation. (AE, 90-91)

This should be sufficient evidence for the similarity and difference of Prall's and Dewey's views on the theory of expression. Santayana is the dualist and Prall and Dewey the monists.

6.28 Criticism.

Prall held that aesthetic judgments or critical estimates of intrinsic value are not universally applicable, but that this does not mean that judgments are private effusions, of interest to no one else. On the contrary, insofar as men are similar, one man may speak for another, and so criticism may be significant for others. But men are not totally alike

any more than they are totally various, so we should not expect universality. We find Santayana saying something similar.

> That the claim of universality is such a natural inaccuracy will not be hard to show. There is notoriously no great agreement upon aesthetic matters; and such agreement as there is, is based upon similarity of origin, nature, and circumstance among men, a similarity which, where it exists, tends to bring about identity in all judgments and feelings. It is unmeaning to say that what is beautiful to one man ought to be beautiful to another. If their senses are the same, their associations and dispositions similar, then the same thing will certainly be beautiful to both ... But no two men have exactly the same faculties, nor can things have for any two exactly the same values. (SB, 41-42)

> Could our nature be fixed and determined once for all in every particular, the scale of aesthetic values would become certain ... As a matter of fact, however, human nature is a vague abstraction; that which is common to all men is the least part of their natural endowment. (SB, 138)

We find Dewey also admitting that any judgment cannot be expected to be universal.

> He (the critic) will realize that his assertion of "good" or "bad" in this and that degree is something the goodness or badness of which is itself to be tested by other persons in their direct perceptual commerce with the object. (AE, 309)

Prall finds support in Santayana when he holds that "standards" are acquired by us in our experiences with works of art and our attention to nature. Their justification is in the value we attach to exemplifications of them.

> Good taste is indeed nothing but a name for those appreciations which the swelling incidents of life recall and reinforce. Good taste is that taste which

is a friend to a whole man.[12]

Dewey agrees and adds that standards are not to be trusted in their office of criticism.

> Judicial decision can be made only on the basis of general rules supposed to be applicable to all cases ... In general, it is safe to assume, I think, that reliance upon rules is a weakened, a mitigated, version of a prior, more direct, admiration, finally become servile, of the work of outstanding personalities. (AE, 300-301)

But if standards are useless for judging the value of works of art, what are they useful for? Dewey, though he does not develop it to the extent that Prall does, holds that standards are useful for grasping a work of art. The more knowledge a critic has, the better he will be able to apprehend what is before him.

> If there are no standards for works of art and hence none for criticism (in the sense in which there are standards of measurement), there are nevertheless criteria in judgment, so that criticism does not fall in the field of mere impressionism. The discussion of form in relation to matter, of the meaning of medium in art, of the nature of the expressive object, has been an attempt on the part of the writer to discover some of these criteria. But such criteria are not rules or prescriptions. They are the result of an endeavor to find out what a work of art is as an experience: the kind of experience which constitutes it. As far as the conclusions are valid, they are of use as instrumentalities of personal experience, not as dictations of what the attitude of any one should be. Stating what a work of art is as an experience, may render particular experiences of particular works of art more pertinent to the object experienced, more aware of

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[12] George Santayana, Reason in Art (New York: 1905), pp 206-07. This book will hereafter be referred to as RA.

> its own content and intent. This is all any criterion can do. (AE, 309)

Since all value is dependent on human preference, the most adequate pronouncement will be given by the most adequate man, the man best trained and with the most emotional flexibility. He will have the knowledge necessary to grasp the object and the responsiveness to speak for other men.

> Santayana tells us that "Only a technical education can raise judgments on musical compositions above impertinent autobiography. The specific values of art are technical values, more permanent and definite than the adventitious analogies on which a stray observer usually bases his views." (RA, 196)

> The ideal enlargement of human capacity, therefore, has no tendency to constitute a single standard of beauty. These standards remain the expression of divers habits of sense and imagination. The man who combines the greatest range with the greatest endowment in each particular, will, of course, be the critic most generally respected. He will express the feelings of the greater number of men. (SB, 130)

Criticism is not all of the same value then, some people being better equipped for criticism than others. What may we expect of good criticism, i.e., what are its functions?

Both Dewey and Prall stress, as we saw before, the unimportance of judicial criticism, the comparative ranking of value. This does not contribute to the understanding of a work of art. The critic should be able to grasp a work of art, technically and expressively, in order to help educate others, help them to an appreciation. Prall emphasized these functions of criticism in AJ. We find Dewey in essential agreement with Prall, though both arrived in different ways. Dewey insisted on the role of judgment in the constitution of value,

but he gets nothing more out of its inclusion in regard to criticism than Prall does with its exclusion.

> Criticism is a search for the properties of the object that may justify the direct reaction. And yet, if the search is sincere and informed, it is not, when it is undertaken, concerned with values but with the objective properties of the object under consideration -- if a painting, with its colors, lights, placings, volumes, in their relations to one another. (AE, 308)

> Criticism is judgment. The material out of which judgment grows is the work, the object, but it is this object as it enters into the experience of the critic by interaction with his own sensitivity and his knowledge and funded store from past experiences. As to their content, therefore, judgments will vary with the concrete material that evokes them and that must sustain them if criticism is pertinent and valid. Nevertheless, judgments have a common form because they all have certain functions to perform. These functions are discrimination and unification. Judgment has to evoke a clearer consciousness of constituent parts and to discover how consistently these parts are related to form a whole. Theory gives the names of analysis and synthesis to the execution of these functions. (AE, 309-310)

Analysis is guided by the point of the work of art, its unitary quality, or the analysis is not relevant. This is Prall's point in connection with focus analysis and Dewey makes the same one with his notions of "analysis and synthesis."

> They cannot be separated from each other, because analysis is disclosure of part as parts of a whole; of details and particulars as belonging to total situation, a universe of discourse. (AE, 310)

> There is a unifying as well as a discriminating phase of judgment -- technically known as synthesis in distinction from analysis. This unifying phase, even more than the analytic, is a function of the creative response of the individual who judges. It is insight. There are no rules that can be laid down for its performance ... Analysis, discrimination must result in unification. For to be a manifestation of judgment it must distinguish

> particulars and parts with respect to their weight and function in formation of an integral experience. Without a unifying point of view, based on the objective form of a work of art, criticism ends in enumeration of details. (AE, 313-314)

Prall expects criticism to be description and explanation, a literary rendering of his own aesthetic perception, all for the purpose of helping others to see. This also holds for Dewey.

> The function of criticism is the re-education of perception of works of art; it is an auxiliary in the process, a difficult process, of learning to see and hear ... We lay hold of the full import of a work of art only as we go through in our own vital processes the processes the artist went through in producing the work. It is the critic's privilege to share in the promotion of this active process. His condemnation is that he so often arrests it. (AE, 324-325)

> Hence the critic, if he is wise, even in making pronouncements of good and bad, of great and small in value, will lay more emphasis upon the objective traits that sustain his judgment than upon values in the sense of excellent and poor. Then his surveys may be of assistance in the direct experience of others, as a survey of a country is of help to the one who travels through it, while dicta about worth operate to limit personal experience. (AE, 309)

Santayana -- Criticism: Critical judgments not universally valid. Adequate criticism depends on critic with technical knowledge and flexible emotional response, sufficient to speak for other men, so that criticism is not personal. Standards justified in experience.

Dewey -- Criticism: Same as for Santayana and adds that standards are of use in grasping

> the work of art. Function of criticism is to give a focus analysis of a work of art, with especial attention to the properties of the object, and handled in such a way that the critic helps in the education of his readers.

Prall -- Criticism: Both of the above set of views.

6.3 On Classification.

After my survey of similarities and differences between Prall, Dewey and Santayana, the question about classification comes up. Is Prall to be classed with Santayana or Dewey, or is he to form a genus of his own? After going through several aspects of comparison, we can see that there are several possible bases for classification. Should we classify men on the basis of their theory of expression, or on their notions of criticism, or on their conception of the field of aesthetics, etc.? Which is the most important aspect? If we could decide on this then we could have a basis for classification. This would be a difficult matter to get agreement on.

Why should we wish to decide on a basis of classification? It is supposed that one would want to classify people, things, ideas, etc., if in doing so we thought we could better understand the things classified. It is probably the case that one may wish to classify on any one basis, depending on what one wants to learn. So, it seems useless to argue about

which is the proper basis for comparison and classification. We might compare P with D on the basis of X, P with S on the basis of Y, etc.

I have compared these men in several ways, and thus have several possible classifications. Each one was done in the hope that it would throw some light on Prall, what I have been trying to do in the whole study, in this case by using two men with whom others might be more intimately acquainted. To be satisfied in the comparison on a single basis would not enlighten us about the whole theory. If I had classified Dewey and Prall together only on the basis of their expression theories, we would not have known of the similarity of Prall's and Santayana's views on the relation of Art and Life.

S. C. Pepper has attempted to classify these three men, and he does so from a special point of view, criticism. This is perfectly proper. We can take any aspect we wish and classify with respect to this aspect in order to throw some light on the matter, in Pepper's case, criticism. It must be emphasized again, that a classification from a limited aspect does not necessarily give us a true picture of a whole theory, such as an aesthetic theory. He puts Prall with Santayana, and Dewey with the contextualists. What I want to examine now is the justice of this classification. I shall challenge the propriety of his view in the matter. This forms the subject of the next section.

6.4 S. C. Pepper

My procedure will be to list those doctrines held by Santayana and Dewey which Pepper lists as definitive of these men's position. It is assumed that it is on the basis of these listed doctrines that Pepper wishes to rely. Then I shall place an "*" in front of the doctrine that is similar to Prall.[13]

Santayana	Dewey
1. Dualism (38)	*1. Monism, emphasis is on "situation." (54)
*2. Value is identified with feeling. (38, 40-41 and 44) (This a tough one, for Prall's theory of value is not cut and dried.)	*2. Value belongs to a situation and is not identified with feeling alone. (55)
3. No community of feeling. (38)	*3. Pepper does not mention this, but Prall's and Dewey's emphasis on communication stress a community of feeling. See AE, p 334 and AA, p 163.
4. Feelings are located in the body. (38)	*4. The boundaries of our body are insignificant. (54)

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[13] Numbers in parentheses will refer to the pages in BCA on which the doctrine in question is given.

This is important for Prall, for the feeling is in the work of art. See AA, p 156, and AE, p 42.

*5. Similarity of structure of SB and AJ. (39) But AA and SB not similar. 5.

6. Santayana keeps closer to mechanism than Prall. (39) Very true. 6.

7. Aesthetic field: Things liked or disliked for themselves. (44)

*7. Quality. (56) The main emphasis for Prall is on sub-qualities, but there is great attention in his expression theory on unitary quality.

8.

*8.

Intuition	Analysis
Quality	Relations
Fusion	Diffusion
Unity	Detail (58)

The left hand column represents the distinctively aesthetic features of a situation, while the right hand column names the analytic features of a situation for a contextualist theory. The similarity with Prall's notion of t-total-quality

	and aesthetic analysis should be clear enough by this time not to require comment. It should be noted, however, that Prall emphasizes discrimination in the aesthetic process more than Dewey.
9. Hedonism sets up the discriminating expert as the embodiment of his standard. (53)	9. The standard of a work of art is the realization of experience achieved by the artist. (68)

We shall have to declare 9. a draw. Prall certainly holds to the first as the basis for the value of criticism, but as to the standard for a work of art, the following quotation from Prall proves interesting.

> The adequate picture is one in which, if attention is focused on just what is presented in color and spatial form, and dwells on these as there before it, not explicity comparing them or the whole picture to other things or to other pictures, not distracted by any other concern, theoretical or practical, the natural attentive process, being intimately connected within the organism and totally directed by the presented object, will deepen into a unitary qualitative feeling, which is as clearly and fully emotional as it is intellectually discriminating. (AA, 155-156)

The majority of "*'s" seem to be in Dewey's column; that being so I seem constrained to conclude that Pepper has interpreted Prall's aesthetics views differently than I.

As to a final classification, Dewey and Prall seem

closer than Prall and Santayana, but to classify Prall with either one would not lead to a better understanding of Prall's theory as a whole which is the only reason for a classification. Perhaps Prall's position on standards in judgment applies to classification here: Certain standards do not apply ultimately to anything because of the uniqueness of works of art (and aesthetic theories).

To classify Prall with either one would obscure his distinctive contributions. It is Prall's notion of analysis and his presentationalism that makes him distinctive and worth reading in addition to Dewey and Santayana. I shall let his similarities to these two men and his differences speak for themselves.

CHAPTER VII

INTERPRETATIONS

7.1 Chapter Plans.

In this chapter I plan to take up some interpretations of Prall that occur in various sources. I shall neither defend nor criticize any of Prall's doctrines in the face of such interpretations, some of which, of course, are themselves criticisms. I only wish to assess these interpretations, see whether or not they report on Prall's views correctly. This naturally involves the comparison of their interpretations with my own. But more important still, I hope in every case to forward our understanding of Prall. Misunderstanding corrected can lead to new understanding. My aim is essentially positive.

If interpretation is to be of any use, then it must be easier to understand than that which it interprets. I am not the last judge of whether the present interpretation is clearer than Prall's own statements, but the present chapter indicates that something clearer is needed, for it is claimed that not many of the interpretations are correct or comprehensive. In view of the multiplicity of misinterpretations, Prall's importance, the "authority" of the various interpreters and the number of people it can keep away from Prall's contribution, it is time that a more extended analysis of his aesthetics take place. The effectiveness of such an analysis

is lessened unless the alternative analyses which are incorrect, misleading or not comprehensive are cleared from the field.

I shall organize the chapter by the subject of interpretation instead of by the author of the interpretation, so some authors will appear under various headings.

7.2 Aesthetic Experience.

7.21 Eliseo Vivas.

Eliseo Vivas discusses Prall's notion of aesthetic experience in two places.[1]

> The aesthetic experience is an experience of intransitive, rapt attention on any object which may elicit interest. Now, attention may address itself to what Prall calls "surface," so that one attends to color, or light, or sound, or movement only. Or it may concern itself with surface and with the meanings which the organization of surface elements embodies immanently. In either case, it seems to me, in disagreement with Prall, that it is proper to use the term "aesthetic" in connection with our response so long as our attention concentrates on the object and does not go outside it. But the wider use of the term "aesthetic" (Vivas' use) does not free us from the need to explain how we can behold objects intransitively which nevertheless embody all sorts of meanings and all sorts of values from all sorts of ranges of human experience without restriction. (B, p 100)

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[1] Eliseo Vivas, "A Definition of the Esthetic Experience," (1937), pp 406-411, reprinted in The Problems of Aesthetics, Edited in conjunction with Murray Krieger, Rinehart and Company, (1953), and "A Natural History of the Aesthetic Transaction," in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, edited by Yervant H. Krikorian, Columbia University Press (1944), pp 96-120. The pages that concern us in the first essay are 406-408, and in the second, page 100. For the remainder of this section let "A" denote the first essay, and "B" the second.

Vivas then goes on to state that the last sentence poses a central problem for aesthetics, one on which he hopes to throw some light. Even a cursory reading of my exposition will reveal the similarity of Viva's statement with what Prall was trying to do in working out a presentational theory of expression. Vivas' failure to see the similarity can probably be explained by his failure to understand Prall's notion of aesthetic experience and its implications for surface expression.

Vivas wants to define the aesthetic experience in terms of attention. It is primarily rapt and intransitive attention, an apprehension of "an object's immanent meanings in their full presentational immediacy." (A, p 408)

Vivas' acceptance of intransitive attention as part of the character of aesthetic experience is no different than Prall's contrast of aesthetic experience with the practical and theoretical modes of experience on the grounds that the latter two involve the shifting of our attention away from the object to its use or relations to other things. Vivas' use of "rapt" is no different than Prall's notion that our <u>interest</u> is centered fully on the object before us.

Next, Vivas claims that his use of "aesthetic" is "wider" than Prall's. So far in his definition there is no difference. Prall's definition of the aesthetic experience, more clearly in AA than in AJ, which appeared before either of Vivas' articles appeared, is in terms of attitude and has two modes: focus of attention and focus of interest.

So far there is no difference in scope, but the remainder of Vivas' definition of the aesthetic experience would indicate that the reason he thinks his definition is wider than Prall's is his inclusion of "the object's immanent meanings" in the aesthetic experience. This is not sufficient claim for greater width unless one forgets Prall's notion of thick surface and his vast attention to a theory of expression. Vivas' "width" is Prall's "thickness."

Prall certainly can not be accused of narrowing the field of aesthetics by Vivas' criterion. In fact, Prall has been accused of making it too wide.[2] Prall himself admits that saying the field of aesthetics is the whole qualitative appearance of our world, in short, everything, is wide, but he marks off the aesthetic aspect -- of everything -- by defining the aesthetic experience. (AA, 5-6)

Vivas, on the other hand, thinks that Prall defines the aesthetic experience by the kind of things it attends to. Vivas doesn't realize that Prall does not use the notion of surface to define aesthetic experience. Rather it is the other way around. Surface is a result of the aesthetic attitude, it is isolated as an aspect of quality because of the mode of attention in the aesthetic experience. What appears to us is quality, and that is all that can appear to us ever; but quality has several aspects and aesthetic experience is not

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[2] D. W. Parker accuses Prall of this in his review of AA in Philosophical Review, Vol. 46, (1937), pp 674-675.

defined by naming the aspect it attends to; rather the aesthetic aspect is isolated by making clear that quality becomes surface when we are having an aesthetic experience; then Prall proceeds to define the aesthetic experience.

In A Vivas wishes to arrive at a definition of the aesthetic experience, but first he must:

> ... take issue with those writers who give the emotion the central role in their account of the esthetic experience. There are in this respect two theories worth considering. One holds that the esthetic object arouses emotion in the spectator; and the other that the content or meaning of art, objectively speaking, is emotion. Both propositions seem to be maintained by Mr. Dewey while only the latter is maintained by Mr. Prall. (A, 408)

Two comments seem to be in order on this quotation. a) Prall certainly does hold that the aesthetic object arouses emotion in the spectator, for the apprehension of anything whatever involves some emotional reaction. We react to every presentation, and it is this which is a necessary component of valuing. To say that Prall does not include it is to ignore his value theory. b) Vivas does not make his point clearly here, for it is difficult to see what a statement about Prall's theory of art has to do with his account of the aesthetic experience. Vivas goes on to pursue Prall's theory of expression from this original unclearness without making it any clearer.

> To the definitions of the experience grounded on the assertion that the objective meaning of art is

> emotion the following objections must be raised: First, as yet no adequate explanation has been given of the means by which the object expresses "emotion." In his last book Mr. Prall tries to tell us how; but his explanation, careful reading will show, does not go beyond the statement that objects do as a fact express emotion ... The second objection is much stronger: the assertion that the objective content of art -- or as Mr. Prall puts it, its meaning -- is emotion, fails to distinguish between objective characters in things and the objective-subjective complex which is the emotion and which has, so to speak, its center of gravity in the subjective. Objective characters of things are what they are, and when Mr. Prall maintains that they are "feeling" or that they have a "feel," so far as the careful reader is able to make out this contention can only mean that when language seeks to denote the untranslatable characters of an esthetic object it sometimes chooses for the task terms which are often used to denote emotional states. (A, 407-408)

No more need be said about the elusive connection between a theory of art and the aesthetic experience which again occurs. Instead I turn to Vivas' first objection against Prall.

In his first objection, after "careful reading," Vivas says that Prall has not explained how works of art express emotions. If my reading has been careful enough, it shows that Prall's pages come to more than the statement that aesthetic objects <u>do</u> express emotion. It is not surprising that Vivas should have come to his conclusion when we look at his second objection.

The second objection is "stronger," and it needs to be if his first objection is to have any force. Mr. Vivas tells us that Prall fails to distinguish between objective characters and emotion, that objective-subjective complex. Prall

does not "fail" to do so; he denies the distinction. Vivas' failure to see this is of a piece with his failure to see, in the previous quotation, that an aesthetic object arouses emotion, that all character is an objective-subjective complex.

Next, a small point perhaps, but it might prevent the incorrect placement of Prall in the symbolic school of aestheticians, we find Vivas saying that the "meaning" of art is emotion. Prall does not use this terminology.

7.22 D. W. Gotschalk.

D. W. Gotshalk provides the last comment on Prall's conception of aesthetic experience.[4]

> Basically, the difference between aesthetic experience and scientific observation, according to this view (Gotshalk's), is a difference of purpose, aim, direction, or immanent plan. The two move in opposite directions and with opposite aims or immanent plans.[5]
>
> The difference between the two is genuine, I believe, and may be stated as follows: Both activities employ perception. But scientific observation, like so-called "practical" activity, employs perception as a means to a further end, in its case the derivation or verification of a description or an explanation of features of observed situations.[6]
>
> Cognitive theories of aesthetic experience, however, which describe knowledge as its end, have not been lacking since Plato described the aim of

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[4] D. W. Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1947), p 8.

[5] Ibid., p 8.

[6] Ibid., p 7.

> art as the purveying of third-rate information. Indeed, cognitive theories have considerable vogue at the present time, being held in some form by such diverse thinkers as Bergson, Croce, Roger Fry, D. W. Prall, S. C. Pepper, T. M. Greene, and Leo Stein among others. Such theories, I believe, unwittingly jeopardize the status of art and the aesthetic response as major modes of human activity.[7]

We know that, whatever Prall may think about aesthetic experience, Gotshalk is incorrect in holding that Prall believes the fine arts are primarily cognitive, for Prall is quite explicit about the aim of the fine arts -- they are primarily expressive of feelings, desires, and emotions. I'm not sure why Gotshalk includes Prall in those who hold cognitive theories of aesthetic experience, but if we look further, we can find a probable reason.

> Cognitive theorists have not been unaware of the danger of their procedure and have sought to avoid it by assigning to science a certain area of objects, reserving another area for art and aesthetic experience. But this position does not seem tenable. Typical of it are the following assertions: Science deals with the space-time structure of the world; art and aesthetic experience with the qualitative stuff or surface.[8]

If we are to believe that this last statement is "typical" of Prall, and it is probably meant to be, containing the word "surface," we can see that Gotshalk has confused "aesthetic experience" with "aesthetic theory." Aesthetic theory is the pursuit of knowledge of the "qualitative stuff

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7 Gotshalk, ibid., p 8.

8 Ibid.

or surface," just as science is the pursuit of knowledge of process. But aesthetic theory as knowledge (as well as any other knowledge) is applied in the aesthetic experience, not for theoretical use -- Prall is very clear about this -- but for grasping what is before us. And we wish to grasp what is before us, not for verifying any knowledge or gathering new knowledge -- these are not the ends of the aesthetic experience and its grasp on the immediate -- but for appreciation of it. We wish to enjoy that which is before us for its own sake; Prall clearly distinguishes the aesthetic attitude from the practical and theoretical attitude.

Not to see this is to miss the main point of Prall's presentationalism. My comments on Vivas should be sufficient to indicate what Prall's theory of aesthetic experience is. Indeed, in the aesthetic experience, in order to appreciate what is before us, we have to know what is before us, but this doesn't make the aesthetic experience cognitive, any more than action is cognition because we know what we are doing. Any theory that would leave us standing dumb before a work of art cannot account for appreciation.

7.3 Value and Beauty.

7.31 B. Heyl.

There is always the danger of over-simplification in the attempt to exemplify the many different ways that key words, such as "beauty," are used. It is especially unfor-

tunate when it occurs in an influential book like Bernard Heyl's. Mr. Heyl is attempting to lay out the multiple meanings of "beauty" and "art."

> One will receive a similar impression (dizzying), in this case from a highly restricted point of view, by contrasting typical concrete instances of attitudes which may be roughly labeled "objective" and "subjective."
>
> (a) Beauty and art are frequently held to be some sort of quality or property of things. Prall, for example, says that beauty "is a quality of the object apprehended" and adds that "if it is properly only a tertiary quality so-called ... it is still an objective quality just as truly as any other -- shape or size or redness.[9]

One must admire the audacity of Mr. Heyl, if not his nicety of perception, for going ahead and "roughly" labeling a theory as objective or subjective. There are a few "multiple meanings" to the words "objective" and "subjective" also, and these should be taken into consideration. In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 I held that there was a sense in which Prall's notion of beauty, which is similar to his notion of quality, is both subjective and objective. Any interpretation of Prall's notion of beauty is liable to go astray; his many statements on it present any reader with a dilemma. It is not mainly the incorrectness of Mr. Heyl's interpretation that is being objected to here, for it is a difficult task, and one whose accomplishment must always be accompanied with reserve, but his willingness to be over-bold and over-simpli-

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[9] Bernard C. Heyl, New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism (Yale University Press, 1943) p 23.

fying in an area which requires care.

7.32 J. R. Reid, P. Jessup, H. E. McCarthy and T. E. Hill.

To indicate the diversity of interpretations of Prall's value theory we might consider a few such interpretations. Where Heyl put Prall in the "objective" column, H. E. McCarthy classifies Prall as a subjectivist.[10] He holds that value for Prall is immediate, consists of personal likes and dislikes, though noting correctly that Prall uses the terms "liking" and "interest" interchangeably. This unresolved ambiguity of Prall's is one thing that makes value interpretation of him difficult.

McCarthy goes on to point out that aesthetic value is not intrinsic to certain objects, is not independent of a subject, but, he holds, that to say that aesthetic value is a potential within the object, realized only in a transaction with a subject, is not different finally from subjectivism, which it seeks to replace.[11] McCarthy realizes that Prall holds that aesthetic value is constituted only in a transaction with an object, but persists in calling him a subjectivist. Yet Heyl has made him an objectivist, and this same transaction notion has made P. Jessup attribute a relational-affective

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[10] H. E. McCarthy, Aesthetic Evaluation, Ph. D. Thesis for the University of California at Berkeley, (1947), pp 112-128.

[11] Ibid., in abstract of thesis.

view to Prall. Jessup realizes that value is constituted because of a relation between an object and a subject, and he holds that for Prall "value consists of or derives from feeling in the presence of or upon the occasion of an object."[12]

T. E. Hill does not attempt to classify Prall in the objective-subjective classification. Understandably enough, he has a difficult time finding any classification for Prall. He finally decides to classify him with affective theories.[13] This comes after Hill is wisely cautious. He points out that the "precise character of this psychological factor is not always clear, for Prall never works it out in detail and he presents it in a number of diverse ways."[14]

Jessup outlines variants of relational theories. He classified Prall as holding an affective theory; Perry becomes a member of the volitional school; Laird is said to be holding the natural election theory; and Dewey and Alexander are described as holding conditioned-quality theories. This last one deserves more attention. Jessup describes this type of theory as holding that value is a quality of a subject-object situation, or that value is a quality which an object has in

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[12] Phillip Jessup, Relational Value Meanings, Ph. D. Thesis at the University of California at Berkeley, (1938) p 9.

[13] T. E. Hill, Contemporary Ethical Theories, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1950) pp 214-217. Mr. Hill's different ways of classifying are sometimes not as useful as they might be. Prall is classified on the basis of the nature of value.

[14] Ibid., p 215.

certain relations to a subject. We see that from his numerous statements about beauty in AJ, Prall holds both of these alternatives. In his discussion of quality in AA he leans to the first alternative, and this is the final interpretation that I have given him.

This is a pivotal point and one which has ramifications in Prall's theory of expression, as well as in Prall's relation to Dewey and Santayana. I explored the latter in the last chapter. Jessup can certainly find several statements backing his position, and Hill, as we shall see later in this section, takes the same position as Jessup. However, a complete explication of Prall's value theory in all its ramifications must turn to, for its source, his books on aesthetics, which neither Jessup nor Hill does. The notions of intrinsic value as aesthetic value and aesthetic value as aesthetic quality must be taken account of. Further, the plurality of "beauty" cannot be accounted for without noticing that the difference between beauties consists in great part in the difference between the character of the quality as affected by the "objective" content. A Cezanne <u>looks</u> different than a Lautrec, and this means that the quality, or beauty, simply is not the same, because the object also contributes to the character of the fused quality, <u>i.e.</u>, to the character of the beauty, or preference. More characteristically it is feeling. That which constitutes value is frequently spoken of in terms of the affective states indicated by "liking," "satisfaction," "contemplation," or simply "feeling."

John R. Reid also selects as most characteristic such affective terms in what seems to be the best among these interpretations of Prall. Reid is discussing value judgments, and he says:

> The first kind seems to be in a fairly literal sense a "report" of some fact, of a tertiary quality intuited as lying on the "esthetic surface," as Mr. Prall has called it, of the object, the judgment in question asserting that the value-quality characterizes the presented object, as liked, felt, appreciated. But as we have already seen, this judgment, within a naturalistic value theory, requires the tacit qualification that the object is so characterized in this context. In another context, involving perhaps a different percipient, the object of course might not be so characterized. Hence the kind of (epistemological) "objectivity" enjoyed by such esthetic values offers no guarantee at all of the "validity" or "universality" of the value judgments which record them, since these judgments make no transcendental claim, but only report, a relative state of affairs qua experienced.[15]

Reid notices the transaction setting of value, the relativity of its occurrence, but its, and this word seems a wise choice, epistemological objectivity, which doesn't fail to emphasize its reliance on a subject for its occurence. He also notes that reports of its occurrences by value judgments are a factual report about a particular situation. and that they do not have a transcendental universality. Reid is sensitive to all the nuances of Prall's value theory. The reason would seem to be his attention to Prall's aesthetic writings. As a general comment on the other interpreters it

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[15] John R. Reid, A Theory of Value, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1938), p 199.

might be said that one cannot hope to give a good interpretation of Prall's notion of value without careful study of his aesthetics. For Prall, even in his earliest work, STV, all intrinsic value is aesthetic value, and aesthetic value is aesthetic quality. The latter is discussed in detail only in his aesthetic books, so only close attention to them will afford one with the necessary background for an interpretation of intrinsic value.

7.4 Data.

Several people take exception to the limitations of Prall's aesthetic surface. Among these are H. Aiken, C. Ducasse, C. Hartshorne and H. C. Brown. Most of their criticism has to do with the relation of surface to expression. I will take up a discussion of their interpretations in Section 7.8.

7.41 A. Ushenko.

Recent discussions of the "immediacy" of the aesthetic experience point up the ambiguity of that word, and it is this which undoubtedly misled A. Ushenko in his interpretation of Prall's use of that word.

> The aesthetic effect is felt as an immediate experience. Among most aestheticians, there is no disagreement on this point, and one writer, D. W. Prall, even defines esthetics as "the science of the immediate." Neverthe-

less, aesthetic immediacy is questionable.[16]

Ushenko is here seizing on the term when it is being used to contrast aesthetic theory with physics and psychology.[17] "Immediate" here has the meaning of "non-inferred," for physics and psychology are spoken of as investigations of process and their relations and causes and effects. Aesthetics is neither of these, but is an analysis of quality, the condensation of process, that which we experience directly, not that which lies behind appearance and is inferred to. As such, Prall is not using "immediate" in this context, from which the quoted phrase was taken, to characterize aesthetic experience, but the directly inspectionable data of aesthetics.

Prall does not think of the aesthetic experience as instantaneous, but, like Ushenko, thinks of it as a process. His notion of unity, our having to read off the "meaning" of the elements in order to integrate them into a unity, clearly implies a process conception of the aesthetic experience.[18]

7.5 Aesthetic Judgment.

7.51 C. Ducasse.

We have already seen J. R. Reid's interpretation of

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16 A. Ushenko, Dynamics of Art, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1953), p 120.

17 See Section 2.2.

18 See Section 4.6.

aesthetic judgments in which he correctly notes that they are reports of a tertiary quality, that they are not universally valid, that they report a fact, and that:

> ... the truth of the judgments whose sole function it is to report and mediate them (values), is frequently obscured because of the objective form in which the judgment is expressed, because of our natural tendency to refer feelings to the periphery, to think of values as independent attributes of things ...[19]

whereas they are constituted in part by a subject also.

Mr. Ducasse gives by far the most discerning review of Prall's books. His summary of AJ is excellent, but I think he makes an error in regard to aesthetic judgments. It occurs, when, after saying properly that Prall is a relativist about beauty and that aesthetic judgments about the same thing differ because of many highly variable factors, and after he properly notes that aesthetic theory is neither arbitrary nor non-objective, he says that this objectivity of aesthetic theory is true only if it is non-normative, and it cannot be if judgments are value judgments, hence, normative. In holding that Prall cannot claim objectivity because value judgments are normative, he fails to distinguish between aesthetic judgments, which do contain value commitments, and aesthetic theory, which studies the reference of aesthetic judgments. (AJ, 339) Aesthetic theory does not consist of aesthetic judgments, but is an investigation of them.

Such a mistake could occur easily from a study of AJ

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[19] Reid, op. cit., pp 199-200.

however, and Prall remedies any possible misunderstandings by making this quite explicit in AA. "Aesthetic analysis, as its groundwork has been sketched in these chapters, offers explicitly no critically determining principles." (AA, 173)

7.6 Surface and Intrinsic Orders.

7.61 H. N. Lee.

Lee wants to hold that the aesthetic attitude is one of complete occupation with perceptual data considered in their own nature. He realizes this implies that all the materials of aesthetics are perceptual in character. This calls for a distinction between perception and sensation, for the datum as it appears to consciousness is more than the sensation, the response of the stimulated sense organ. In addition to the stimulus there are psychological and physiological determinates in perception. He points out that sight and sound tend toward perception because they fall into forms, while taste and odor tend to be amorphous and are closer to sensation. After making these points, Lee then turns to Prall. He correctly points out that for Prall the object of the aesthetic experience is the intuited surface of the world, that which is given immediately. Then Lee says that he prefers the expression "perceptual" aspect to "surface" because there are perceptual aspects of objects that are not superficial. The metaphorical sound of "surface" is misleading, suggesting that all aesthetic aspects are superficial. These other aspects

should not be excluded from the materials of the aesthetic experience and "surface" seems to exclude them. (AA, 26-34)

Lee's point is well taken. The term "surface" has apparently misled many people into the belief that "surface" is constituted only by sub- and form-qualities. That Prall does not wish to exclude the additional aspects of unit- and emotional-qualities from surface should be fairly obvious when one considers, even for a moment, the central role that expression plays in his theory of art, appreciation and creation. His distinction between thin and thick surface points to the same thing. Further, he did not believe that in practice a line of demarcation could be drawn between thin and thick surface. It is the belief in their continuity that affords one of Prall's strongest arguments for a presentational theory of expression. Prall is clear and explicit about not confusing surface with sensation, for he says,

> the bare sensuous surface, though it may be theoretically distinguished with perfect clarity -- and the distinction is one of great importance -- as that content which is immediately present to sense in a surface form of structure, is never present to sense alone. For senses are the avenues of intuition and perception, and it is the mind or the spirit to which any sensuous content must be present if it is to be present at all. That is, intuition and perception are single processes, involving both sense organs and the mind that uses these organs, and though we may speak of the bare sensuous surface present in intuition, this surface reveals to the mind or spirit that intuits it more than any merely sensuous elements in a unity of form. The surface, that is, must have a degree of depth to be seen or felt at all, and out of its depths comes much of what it exhibits as beauty. (Italics mine) (AJ, 223)

7.62 M. Rader.

Prall has told us that the surface has "depth" and as such includes more in it than "mere sensuous elements." I have emphasized the implications of this for a presentational theory of expression. Rader fully realizes the importance of surface in Prall, as the following quotation will show, but he tries to make what is expressed something that is "referred" to by this surface, rather than being identical with the surface, conceiving surface in accordance with the above quotation from Prall.

> He (Prall) begins with an analysis of the sensuous materials, then describes the composition of these materials in orders or forms, and finally discusses the expressive features that result from reference to the surrounding world. Although he thus deals with referential expression, his books are characterized by their emphasis upon immediate sensuous surface and form.[20]

Rader, like many other people, has tended to emphasize Prall's "surface " contribution and the analysis thereof rather than seeing it as part of his presentationalism in which expression plays a large role. This has been the most persistent misinterpretation of Prall.

7.63 A. Ushenko.

Ushenko has some interesting things to say about Prall's intrinsic orders and his notion of analysis, as well

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[20] Melvin Rader, A Modern Book of Aesthetics (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1952), pp 231-232.

as the problem of analysis for a contextualist. I have maintained contrary to other interpretations, that Prall is in many important respects a contextualist. Ushenko does a good job showing that one may analyze surface materials like Prall has and still be a contextualist. He makes clever use of Prall in showing how this is possible. It comes in "Analysis and Context," Section 27 of Dynamics of Art.

Ushenko develops a theory he calls "contextual analysis." He characterizes the extreme positions of the analyst and the contextualist. The contextualist holds that

> ... all qualities are contextual, and therefore no element E can be known to have the contextual quality Q without an antecedent knowledge of context. The contextualist concludes that analysis is superfluous. There is no point in studying a whole by way of its parts if the parts cannot be known without a knowledge of the whole. Of course, the analyst denies that qualities are contextual ... The supposition of contextual qualities, the analyst concludes, rules out not only analysis but any unambiguous discussion concerning the complex X.

Ushenko proposes to solve the dilemma by distinguishing between "absolute" and "contextual" qualities. We can then have "contextual analysis" by amending the contextual formula as follows:

> The element of the complex C which would be distinguished by the quality E within the context y has the quality Q within the context x. The formula can be granted. But the identification of the element E, contrary to the contextualist's expectation, is feasible provided the identifying quality E is confined to the range of absolute qualities ... No doubt the contextualist will protest that our differentiation between absolute and contextual qualities violates our agreement with him that all qualities without exception are contextual. Actually there is no violation. I do not deny that absolute qualities are also

> in a sense contextual. But I contend that absolute qualities differ from all other contextual qualities in a way which enables us to treat the former as if they were entirely independent of context. To make my position clear let me contrast the expressions, "the quality E within the context y," and "the quality Q within the context x," in the contextualist version of the formula of analysis, on the assumption that "E" stands for an absolute quality and "Q" for a contextual quality. Whereas the contextualist takes both expressions to be entirely analogous, I contend that "x" is a variable but that "y" is not, or which amounts to the same thing, that "y" is a variable which always assumes the same value. My position is a development of D. W. Prall's theory of natural or standard orders of sense data.[21]

The variable "y" always has the same value because it is a "context" with a natural order that doesn't change. We can unambiguously name an element E because we have a non-changing context for our reference point, wherein E always finds the same place in the order of that context. An example of this kind of "context" would be the octave scale. That quality which we have identified as E in the non-changing context may have the quality Q in another context, but the non-changing context is always publicly available when we wish to name what now appears as Q in a different context; so we can hold both that all qualities are contextual and analyses of a work of art.

> However, to take advantage of Prall's theory we must complete it at the point where he has left it unfinished. He failed to account for the way in which the sensation of a single element brings about a perception of the cor-

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21 Ushenko, Dynamics of Art, op. cit., 214-216.

responding standard series.[22]

Ushenko then goes on to try and account for it. This seems to be a fair criticism, unless the expression "relational character" is self-explanatory, which it does not seem to be.

> This is to say not only that elements have character of some sort, in order to be elements of any one kind, but further that the character necessary to elements if they are to compose structures apprehensible as such, is relational character. (AA, 41-42)

7.7 Form.

7.71 E. Vivas and M. Krieger.

> Contemporary discussions of form must be viewed with an awareness of the fact that the word has at least two different meanings as it is employed by modern aestheticians. For Gotshalk and for Bell (and for others, too; for instance, for Prall, although we are not including his discussion of form) form is composition or the manner in which the physical properties of the medium are arranged. These writers see the properties of the object more or less mechanistically, so that form for them often seems to stand as a self-sufficient entity to which content, if there is to be any, is superadded. On the other hand, writers like Isenberg and Bradley ... have more organic theories. It may seem to be a matter of degree, but they see form as the manner in which everything that is to be found in the object is put together, as the total interrelation of whatever is discriminable (the expressive as well as the formal elements) in the object. Form is for them, obviously, much more than mere composition, and they have to deny the possibility of making any dichotomy between form and content.[23]

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22 Ibid., p 217.

23 E. Vivas and M. Kreiger, The Problems of Aesthetics, (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1953), p 181.

Vivas and Krieger overlook the fact that for Prall arrangement is not the only kind of form. In Section 3.1 I pointed out that Prall distinguishes two kinds of form, arrangement form and intrinsic form. Vivas and Krieger ignore intrinsic order as form, hence, leave out any possible conception of color form. Further, the intrinsicality of these orders means that form doesn't stand by itself, but is integrated in the closest possible way with matter. Ushenko points out that Prall has organically laid the first firm foundations for the denial of the form-matter separation. Vivas and Krieger are in error then in classifying Prall with those who think of form as exclusively arrangement. Vivas here ignores that which he earlier said was Prall's chief contribution.[24]

Vivas and Krieger contrast Prall with organic-form people, whereas, he should be included among them. The similarity of his views with Bradley's on the form-content separation was agreed on in Section 3.2 and seems too strong to deny. What form we find in our perception, i.e, the familiarity that we find, helps us to focus and unify what is there before us. Form could not serve its role of familiarity, of helping us to grasp and unify a work of art, unless it served to interrelate the parts, and give determinateness to the works of art. And Prall's emphasis on the unitary, fused, t-total-quality of a work of art when the work is fully apprehended cannot be ignored. Form is not something appreciated in it-

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[24] Ibid., p 18.

self in a painting, for example, but contributes its share to the unified response. If this were not so, what would be the basis for holding the untransalatability of a work of art? Prall thus denies the form-matter separability with his doctrine of intrinsic orders; he also denies the form-content (form-substance) separability on the basis of form's unifying (interrelating) and specifying function, resulting in a unitary, non-translatable t-total-quality.

7.72 D. W. Gotshalk.

> The four principles of harmony, balance, centrality, and development, with their associates and derivatives -- recurrence, similarity, gradation, variation, modulation, symmetry, contrast, opposition, equilibrium, rhythm, measure, dominance, climax, hierarchy, and progression -- are probably the chief formal principles used by the imagination of artists for the purification and enhancement of existential structure in works of art. Employing these principles, artists build up perceptually vivid spatial, temporal, causal, and telic unities in the details and the over-all designs of their works.[25]

In a footnote Gotshalk says that he is in debt to Prall, among others, especially D. W. Parker, for notions of form. Gotshalk, like Prall, points out that these are principles of design used by artists, but Prall, unlike Gotshalk, does not put much stock in the "principles" which were named above. Prall wants analysis to give us tools for ready and better apprehension of works of art, but Prall thinks these

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25 Gotshalk, Art and the Social Order, ibid., pp 114-115.

terms are too vague for that.

> The distinctive point of our scheme is that it starts with these lower levels, instead of being content to give rather vague literary names to the character of completed works of art, names which sound more adequate than our terms because they suggest the full character instead of defining particular aspects of the structure which has such character. Most of the famous traditional principles of aesthetics are of this large sort. Unity, coherence, a theme in variations, balance, symmetry, hierarchy, climax, simplicity, purity -- all these are names for unification for apprehension, and also general characteristics of the apprehended object in its completeness. (AA, 180)

7.73 E. Vivas.

Vivas, in his review of AA,[26] claims that there is a difficulty in Prall's aesthetics in the notion of "aesthetic apprehension." For Prall, says Vivas, this consists of the apprehension of "the surface" of our world, but it excludes the apprehension of conceptual schemes, and hence is not an intellectual activity. As we saw when I discussed Gotshalk's comment about Prall's cognitive theory of aesthetic experience, Section 7.22, Prall does not think that the end of aesthetic apprehension is to gain knowledge. In this sense aesthetic apprehension is not intellectual activity. But there is intense intellectual activity going on in the process of aesthetic apprehension, for we are applying the knowledge of intrinsic orders, types and partial patterns that we have obtained through various sources to what is now before us. For the

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26 Eliseo Vivas, review of Aesthetic Analysis in The Nation, June 10, 1936, p 752.

For the presented to be apprehended, hence, in order to appreciate its novelty, we must be able to grasp its form. And according to Prall's theory apprehending form is dependent on our knowledge of conceptual schemes, the kind of thing that Vivas wants. Prall wants analysis to provide us with conceptual schemes. In Prall's words: "It is simply that any conscious content is taken to be intelligible just so far as it is grasped as form or structure." (AA, 41)

Vivas sees correctly, though his choice of the word "meaning" is not advisable, that surface apprehension includes the apprehension of meanings present on the aesthetic surface. He says that Prall holds, and rightly, that the apprehension of mere surface is never possible. But he claims that Prall, in holding that we do not apprehend conceptual schemes but do apprehend meaning on the surface, is involved in a contradiction. Having shown that Prall does not hold one of the propositions that leads to a contradiction, we no longer have a contradiction.

Vivas is correct in noting that there are surface "meanings," though care must be taken with "meaning." For Prall it means that feelings and emotions and desires are presented by the surface. This brings us to comments about the relation of surface and expression. I have had occasion to discuss one of Vivas' comments about the relation between surface and expression already. This occurred toward the end of Section 7.21.

7.8 Surface and Expression.

7.81 Van Meter Ames.

Two quotations from one of Van Meter Ames' essays is a fitting introduction to this section, for they exhibit in one essay what seems very difficult for people to grasp: that Prall is holding a presentational theory of expression, which tries to show that "surface" and "expression" are not foreign to each other. In holding this theory, the arguments he advances for his cause prove him to be a contextualist and not a mechanist. By this I mean to assert that Prall is not holding to a dualism, but to a qualitative monism, in which the primary notion is the context, or to use his term, the transaction. Out of this transaction comes quality, which is what aesthetic theory is to investigate. Quality, being the product of two process-terms, contains characteristics reminiscent of its double origin. This quality is what he often calls surface, which he divides into two kinds, thin and thick. We saw in Section Section 7.61 that the division is a purely theoretical one, which it should be for the sake of consistentcy. Prall is <u>not</u> holding an association theory of expression, which states that the immediate factors are separate from what they may stimulate, arouse or evoke in our memory-house. Prall does not believe in such separation; the subjective and objective are abstractions from <u>concrete</u> experience. Rather, we are to think of two kinds of processes as modifying each other to produce <u>one</u> quality. It follows that to ask about

the relation of sensory quality to emotional or feeling quality is to ask about the relation of two kinds of quality whose existence he denies. We have only one quality.

Prall thinks it is time that we took seriously what we have known for a long time, that all quality, in its immediate appearance, is conditioned by two processes, "subjective" and "objective," and this is what aesthetics is interested in, this is its data. Process is not its data, what we may infer about cause and effect, but just what appears to us. Aesthetics is not psychology nor physics. An inspection of the total immediate qualitative presence reveals analytic characteristics of the quality. In discriminating and reporting on those characterists, the feeling "blue," as the color of the sky, is no more and no less a real characteristic than "mildness." "Mildness" is no more and no less an emotional term for the untranslatable character of our experience than "blue." Emotional means no more than subjectively "conditioned," and "blue" is as subjectively conditioned as "mild," for it occurs in a transaction, a process part of which are physiological and psychological processes.

It is not my part here to defend Prall's view, but it is my part to see that people do not misinterpret Prall's doctrine.

> Dewey considers art to be expressive of the values in a particular medium, and also of the artist's feelings. He would agree with David Prall that what is felt cannot be revealed except in the qualities of a wrought object. These are what the artist's feelings are, if they are anything that can be perceived at all.

> The object objectifies what came to be felt in the fashioning of it, more than or rather than something that might have been felt before the work began.[27]

So far this is excellent Prall and cannot be objected to, and it points out how close Dewey is to Prall. But Ames falls prey to the usual notion of Prall later in this essay, only to undo his former good work.

> But if Dewey's underlying thought is still consistent, he is simply affirming over again that knowledge and intellectual effort go into art as well as into strictly cognitive work. He is also reacting, by implication, against David Prall, H. N. Lee, and all who would restrict "aesthetic" to sensuous surface and form while obliged to let art mean more.[28]

Mr. Ames does not comprehend in the second statement what he said in the first. In the first he saw the connection between the artist's feelings and the "qualities of a wrought object," while in the second he does not.

7.82 H. N. Lee, H. C. Brown and C. Hartshorne.

I shall let my conception of the relation of surface and expression at the beginning of the previous section be the foil against which other interpreters of Prall can fence. It is only a summary of things I said and tried to demonstrate elsewhere, now so put as to suit the specialized questions at hand. I shall trust the reader's memory of this summary of

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[27] Van Meter Ames, "John Dewey as Aesthetician," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. XII, p 157.

[28] Ibid., p 164.

the chapter on Expression rather than repeat the arguments substantiating that position again.

Mr. Lee interprets Prall as holding in Chapters X - XIII in AJ the same kind of value theory as Santayana, i.e., an association theory of expression. The wealth of statements quoted from AJ, almost none of which Santayana would find acceptable, concerning expression is surely enough to make a ghost of this interpretation.[29] Such terms as "exhibit," "direct," and "specify" are not terms one would expect to come across in Santayana.

H. C. Brown is clearly aware that Prall has talked of the surface of the world and emotion in AA, but obviously fails to understand the discussions of them when he says that Prall never examines the essential problem: the relation of sensory stimuli to emotional response.[30] This review is of the book in which Prall wrestles with a problem suggested but not fully faced in AJ.

C. Hartshorne, in a review of AJ,[31] also notes that Prall discusses surface and emotion principally, but is more perceptive than Brown, for after he too asks about the relation between the expressed feeling and the expressive sensuous content, comes up with two possible answers. He at least realizes

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29 H. N. Lee, Perception and Aesthetic Value, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938), footnote on p 117.

30 Harold C. Brown, review of AA, in The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. 47, pp 255-256.

31 C. Hartshorne, review of AJ, The International Journal of Ethics, Vo. 40, pp 273-275.

that Prall does not ignore the question.

Hartshorne finds that Prall appears to reject the Crocean identification of sensuous quality and feeling tone, and to fall back on "association," though his more usual mode of description implies precisely that identification. Hartshorne further notes the "organic unity" of the aesthetic experience, which he observes stands in contradiction to the duality of association. Hartshorne is a good observer, and his reservation about association is quite justified when we consider that he had only AJ at the time, for that book has passages suggesting the acceptance of association as contrasted with the purer presentationalism of AA, though some statements in AJ, notably pp 310-311, do ask for a consummation of the expressed in a qualitative specification.

7.83 A Ushenko.

> And, in a similar vein, D. W. Prall asserts in Aesthetic Analysis that ..."pale blue feels milder than flaming red just as definitely and accurately as it feels pale blue." But neither Whitehead nor Prall nor, as far as I know, any other writer attempted to analyze the relation between a sense quality and the associated feeling. Is the association indissoluble or is the sense quality separable from feeling? If separable, is one of them the cause of the other? And if not separable, may they not be simply identical? ... Inseparability may be taken to mean that quality and feeling are to be identified with each other, and I think that the foregoing quotations show that both Whitehead and Prall favor the alternative of identification.[32]

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[32]Ushenko, op. cit., p 109.

Ushenko then goes on to argue against the doctrine of identification, which I shall take up in a moment.

I shall argue, contrary to Ushenko, that Prall does not hold an identity theory. It is clear that transactions have a single, unitary quality. But this does not mean that there are not separate elements of feeling which fuse into this one quality. Indeed, there are separate elements, for according to Prall a work of art is also a complex object. (AA, 155) Prall's treatment of clarity and determinateness in AA, pp 149-151, shows that presentations are complex, and so the sky may be both blue and mild. The fact that they fuse does not mean that they are identical. In fact, the quotation ("pale blue feels milder than...") that Ushenko gives from Prall would lead us to believe that "mild" is a second-order property, a property of "pale blue," rather than identical with "pale blue."

Fusion does lead to difficulties for analysis, however. How do we tell if we have a single identical quality or if we have several qualities fused? Integration or fusion resulting in a unitary quality makes it difficult to know when we have reached the limits of analysis. Prall does not go into the many questions that lie buried here, and Ushenko is certainly entitled to some questions about unity.

The next point to make is that although Prall does hold that sense qualities are feelings, just as the "associated feeling" is, neither does this commit him to an identification of these two feelings.

Though the separability-and-fusion interpretation of Prall leads to analysis difficulties, Ushenko's interpretation also leads to difficulties, for he holds that the identification of feeling with sensation prevents Prall from using feeling as a unifying or fusing agent. Ushenko recognizes two things in his earlier article ("Esthetic Immediacy") that he apparently ignores or repudiates in the Dynamics of Art which show that Prall's "feeling" is a unifying agent. This would seem to be reason enough to show that Prall should not be given an identity interpretation if it prevents "feeling" from functioning as Ushenko earlier said that it does. He recognizes that for Prall the aesthetic experience is a process, and that the aesthetic object is qualitatively immediate. How can one hold both that the appreciation of an aesthetic object takes time and that the object is immediately present? Ushenko recognizes secondly that there is implicit in Prall an explanation of this, of how we can hear a note in relation to the rest of the scale through only the one note is sounding, or how the reading of an earlier part of a novel can affect our reading of the latter part of a novel.

He finds a solution in Prall's "feeling," though Prall does not himself give an account of the convergence of quality and feeling into a single, unitary, immediate presentation. Ushenko's use of Prall's views is very clever, and as neatly done as his use of Prall in explaining "contextual analysis" in Section 7.64. Ushenko holds that there is "convergence" of all the feelings we have had into a present feeling, which

is immediately given. We see how this occurs, how past feelings can converge into the present if we take a cue from Prall's "Knowledge as Aptness of the Body."

> As an account of esthetic cognition that goes beyond the directly given sense-data, the assertion that such cognition is feeling of bodily aptitudes for certain performances is more than merely plausible.[33]

During our perception there is physiological conditioning and reconditioning resulting in a physiological complex, and an echo is held over.

> The requirements of esthetic immediacy is satisfied if the feeling of the bodily complex can blend or harmonize with the feeling of the directly given sense-data.[34]

Ushenko rightly notes that Prall's notion of "immediate" has epistemological consequences.

> For if esthetic cognition deals exclusively with quality as directly presented, it must be cognition by acquaintance and not, like science, knowledge mediated by concepts.[35]

This conception of cognition is reminiscent of Croce's intuition, and a tie-in with Prall's emphasis on the grasp of the uniqueness of the aesthetic object is also suggested. Cognition mediated by concepts would be general rather than determinate. We have to be careful, however. Ushenko's statement seems to me to need qualification. Consider representation,

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33 A. Ushenko, "Esthetic Immediacy," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, (1941) p 70.

34 Ibid., p 71.

35 Ibid., p 68.

and Prall's attempt to show how it is consistent with presentationalism in that it directs our attention to what is before us; form, operating as familiarity, shows that our immediate perception is mediated by conception. In fact, this is the whole point about the efficacy of analysis. Aesthetic immediacy is important epistemologically, but not as a separate form of cognition, but as it shows how perception and conception aid and abet each other. It makes explicit Kant's doctrine that concepts without percepts are empty, and percepts without concepts are blind, except that the last statement has to be modified in view of Prall's intrinsic orders.

7.84 C. Ducasse.

Mr. Ducasse, in his review of AJ, makes some comments upon the difficulties of Prall's notion of aesthetic surface and its relation to expression. For easier treatment I shall paraphrase them somewhat and number them.

1. Aesthetic surface is defined in terms of sensuous intuition.
2. Prall later speaks of depth; this includes much that is not sensed but signified.
3. Prall's justification: Things signified appear upon the surface.
4. But they do not appear upon it, but through it. The surface is transparent.
5. What is perceived through that surface cannot be

described as that surface.

6. To allow depth to surface is to take away the essence of surface.

7. We can save surface by dropping its sensuous character, and define it instead in terms of intuition of immediacy, whether sensuous, imaginal or conceptual.

In analyzing these statements, I shall take them step by step using the same numbers for easy reference.

1'. Ducasse is not quite right in his first assertion. Surface, in its thin sense, is held to be "primarily" that which is "apprehended directly through the senses." (AJ, 19) It is this which Prall usually stresses. But we should note his later statement that this thin surface can be only "theoretically" made out, since it does not occur in its pure state. I discussed this in Section 7.61 when I considered the difference between sensation and perception.

Another comment needs to be made. Prall's notion of surface does not stick rigidly to "directly through the senses," for surface may be presented through the imagination also. And certainly not all that appears to come through the senses does come through the senses, as was pointed out in the distinction between sensation and perception.

> ... What such experience (aesthetic) takes as its object is not existing things but their essential qualities, not events but appearing essences of forms immediately and satisfyingly present to us, whether as embodied externally in things or in imagination. (Italics mine) (AJ, 13)

2'. Ducasse is right in that Prall does speak of depth, but his use of the word "signified" to indicate how depth is acquired does not seem to be warranted. Ducasse's use of "signified" indicates that he is thinking of language, and Prall's attempt to give it a sensuous surface. This is confirmed by the similarity of the terminology of his fourth comment, that the surface is transparent, that we see through it, to Prall's terminology in AA, p 164. Considering this, the comment must not be taken as general in its criticism, but more specific than it is no doubt intended.

3'. Ducasse thinks that Prall tries to justify his doctrine (as interpreted by Ducasse) by saying that that which is signified appears upon the surface. This is close, but far enough off to make Prall's theory unrecognizable here. If something is signified then it can't be on one surface, for if it is on the surface, what is it that performs the office of signification? Ducasse's interpretation requires a dualism which Prall denies. The specification of depth is articulated surface. Recognition is not to be confused with signification. I am treating his use of "signified" in the general way he apparently intended, though actually it applies only to language.

This is a fair reply to Ducasse except in the case of language. Prall's treatment of language in trying to make it consistent with presentationalism discusses the possibility that the surface is not the word heard or seen, but what it points to, what it "signifies." This is why he treats poetry

and especially prose as a mixed art.

> ... It is these meanings that are presented to us in discourse, and almost directly, for written or spoken discourse is almost transparent to educated ears and eyes. These meanings are in large part, as we have already seen, ultimately aesthetic data, not so fully specified by linguistic symbols as by actual sensuous and particular aesthetic surfaces, but called up by the imagination, or, in their connections and relations, grasped by the intellect. In the one case they are recognized sensuous content, in the other a changing structural scheme. (AJ, 291)

This quotation is pregnant, and clearly indicates what he was trying to show, that a presentationalism need not renounce even language and signification. This topic will come up again in the next section which considers A. Isenberg's discussion of language and aesthetics.

4'. I have made sufficient comment on the fourth statement.

5'. Ducasse's fifth statement, that what is perceived through a surface cannot be described as that surface, begs the question of whether we shall call the "vehicle" the aesthetic surface or not. Further, it is not a pertinent question, except for language, if 3. and 4. are a misinterpretation as I have claimed they are.

6'. To say that the essence of surface is taken away if we allow it some depth, is to assume as surface what Ducasse thought surface was in the beginning; but this is not what Prall meant by surface. For Prall, surface is not identified with sensation, but with perception. Ducasse apparently thinks that Prall's thin surface, is other than theoretical; it is

not. On this he is explicit.

7'. Ducasse's proposal for "saving" surface comes after the supposed victim has already swam to shore under its own power. Our life guard has been dozing in the sun. Ducasse wants to include imaginal and conceptual character, as well as sensuous character, in surface. We have seen that the "imaginal" was included by Prall, and enough has been said about conceptual analysis, and its application to the presented not to require repetition. The immediacy of X means that X is determinate, and ideas when determinate have their meaning exemplified by sensuous quality. Prall may be incorrect in holding such a theory of meaning, but he does hold it, and in that fashion includes the conceptual in surface.

Ducasse makes another point about Prall, that Prall's term "expression," is vague and has many senses. A reading of our selection from AJ in Appendix A surely bears him out here, though I have maintained that a careful reading reveals a central notion. For the not-so-casual reader even, it must be admitted that they are bewildering.

7.85 A. Isenberg.

There are some similarities between Ducasse's interpretation and Isenberg's. Mr. Isenberg takes up the problem of the aesthetic function of language in the "The Esthetic Function of Language."[36]

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36 Arnold Isenberg, "The Esthetic Function of Language," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, (1949), pp 87-95.

He states the main problem treated in his paper as a paradox. I number the statements for clarity.

1. If the "esthetic object" is purely sensuous, language cannot be an esthetic object, because language is not purely sensuous.
2. And the esthetic object <u>is</u> purely sensuous; for a non-sensuous object can not be directly perceived and enjoyed; and what is not directly perceived and enjoyed is not aesthetic.
3. But, language is, or can be, an esthetic object.

Isenberg says that there are three ways of dealing with this. a) We can deny the third proposition, that language is an aesthetic object, as Prall was in one vein inclined to say, holding that music is almost wholly aesthetic in its value and poetry slightly so. b) We can deny that the aesthetic object is purely sensuous; or c) we can show that language can be intelligible, meaningful, without indicating or referring to anything. If this last alternative can be shown we can hold that (1) the aesthetic object is not purely or exclusively sensuous, and (2) that it is nevertheless directly perceived and enjoyed. We then are denying all the statements in the second part of the paradox. What we have to do is to show that there is such a thing as non-referential meaning.

Isenberg very nicely sets the problem out for us. What he says about Prall contrasting music with poetry in one vein is true, which involves a denial of the third statement. My concern is to show that Prall had another vein. Isenberg

like Ducasse, is treating surface as "thin" surface, which is not completely representative of Prall's view. He is treating Prall's notion of direct perceivability as perceivability through the senses alone and not also through the imagination.

My statements in the last section indicate that Prall, in treating language as a mixed art, meant to do the same thing that Mr. Isenberg does; allow sensuous objects to be also imaginatively sensuous and at once immediate or directly perceived and enjoyed.

Isenberg, in the rest of the article, then goes on to try and show that there is such a thing as non-referential meaning, that the sign function of language depends on the attitude of the reader, and that in the contemplative attitude, language's reference to reality is discarded. This keeps it immediate, which is precisely what Prall wants to do. Further, he thinks he can make out an immanent function of meaning by means of a behavioristic or operational theory of symbolization. To certain data we have feeling responses, which can be modified by associative connections from past experience. The feeling response is an operational, or contemplative behavior (as contrasted with theoretical or practical behavior), index of a meaning. Aesthetic feeling, as an index of meaning, is like any other index; it is nothing but a modification of behavior induced by previous learning. Hence, the difference between meaning and reference corresponds to the difference between <u>kinds</u> of behavior affected. Meaning is thus shown to have a

distinctively aesthetic function.

By this time the observant reader will have noticed the similarity between Isenberg's essay and the proposed extension of Prall's theory by Ushenko in Section 7.83, where Ushenko tried to bring process and immediacy together.

Isenberg mentions only one of Prall's views about language, and I have been concerned to point out that there is another side, that his treatment of language as transparent is similar to Isenberg's. But Prall is more inclined to a Humean treatment of the meaning of words, at least in their aesthetic aspect, by holding that their meaning is the images summoned up. Isenberg mentions some difficulties of this view (though with no reference to Prall), which seem to be valid criticisms. Criticism of Isenberg's interpretation must be softened, for he talks of Prall's view "in one vein."

7.86 H. Aiken.

Mr. Aiken brings his largest guns to bear on the people who hold either surface or expression theories of art. He poses them as two rival views, and puts Prall in the survace camp, naturally.[37] As such he does not fail to note that Prall also wants to include expression, but he claims that in doing so, Prall lets wide the floodgates of surface,

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37 H. Aiken, "Art as Expression and Surface," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, (1945), pp 87-95.

so that the notion of surface becomes so indefinite that nothing can be excluded from it. This is a summary of Aiken's comments on Prall. I shall go into them in more detail. Again I will paraphrase and number them, and the points he makes are almost exactly the same as those made by Ducasse, and in almost the same order! Aiken has more space at his command however, and comes closer to the mark than Ducasse does, but he is still off the mark somewhat since he, like most associationists in expression theory, insists on a sensationalistic notion of surface. He tries to foist this off on Prall and tell us that if Prall includes more, he is being untrue to surface!

There is a fine line which consistently runs through all these criticisms of Prall. It is finest with Aiken, who approaches closer to Prall than any of them. Let us try to state it again, in different words; I hate to belabor a point, but one which has been so often overlooked that it is in danger of becoming habitual needs to be repeated.

Prall is not denying that association, signification and representation modify our feeling-response, to use Isenberg's terminology. But Prall wants us to attend to what is before us as "informed" by these other factors; he does not want us to attend to what is associated, signified or represented. The aesthetic attitude confines our attention to the "informed presentation," just as the theoretical attitude confines our attention to what is associated, signified or represented. In the aesthetic attitude we have immediacy as contrasted to <u>reference</u>. Presentationalism involves immediacy

and immediacy involves non-reference. This is what Isenberg was trying to make out in the article I discussed in the previous section. With this in mind, we can see that surface may be ever so complex and yet immediate. Prall can legitimately let in to surface anything that can be experienced, but this does not make surface "indefinite," for it is marked off by our attitude toward the qualitative presentation. Indeed, he has told us that the whole content of the heavens and the earth are our field -- as long as we maintain an aesthetic attitude toward it.

"Informed perception" is perception of all the qualities actually presented by the surfaces of art, including unit- and emotional-qualities. Aiken in the latter part of the article doubts this tenet of monistic theories of expression, citing the usual association argument that this does not jibe with the variety of reactions usually reported. This is an argument which does not concern us here, because it is not a problem of interpretation. Whether Prall's argument that "sense-qualities" are no different than "affective-qualities" is valid is also not our conern. But this seems to be a crucial point of difference between an associationist position like Aiken's and a monistic position like Prall's. Here Aiken sees clearly what Prall's position is, and what he must hold in order to show that affective-qualities are not literally in the work of art, like Prall maintains they are. In this respect, Prall has more difficulty with the language arts than the arts visual and auditory surfaces. These last can more plausibly be said

to literally contain affective-qualities which "informed perception" can recognize, just as the figure of a horse is in a sense literally in the picture but not in the poem. But the horse figure cannot be perceived unless our perception of the figure is "informed" by that which is necessary to permit recognition.

After what I have said, I shall not say much in the way of detailed commentary on Mr. Aiken's views, but only recall the parallelism with Ducasse's comments.

1. There are two rival theories of art. The first is that art discloses immediate qualitative "surfaces of experience."

2. The second is that in art the mediums of language, color and sound are used exclusively to express or evoke emotional attitudes.

Comment: This is expressed as a dichotomy here, while in Ducasse the first two points are a conjunction. In his sixth step Aiken makes them a conjunction for Prall, so that the parallelism is preserved.

3. If the first is true, that is, if the characteristically aesthetic aspect of experience lies in its sensuous "surface," then

a) either feeling and emotion are aesthetically significant only as they appear <u>in</u> the surface itself,

b) or they are not in themselves "part" of aesthetic experience as such, though they are normal <u>effects</u>.

Comment: In the sixth point Aiken will maintain that Prall holds the first alternative, which is correct, thus

maintaining the parallelism still.

4. If the aesthetic object is regarded as essentially "expressive," then "precisely the opposite result ensues. From this it follows that the perceptual object, although doubtless a necessary condition of the aesthetic 'effect,' is simply a vehicle by which feeling is incited."[38]

Comment: This is not completely parallel with Ducasse's fourth point, since Aiken does not attribute this view to Prall. But we know in point of fact that Prall holds an expressive theory of art; in the next point Aiken in effect affirms this and states what he takes to be a consequence of holding the two rival theories simultaneously, which he maintains in the sixth point that Prall does do. He is doing the same thing that Ducasse did, point out thin surface and then show that Prall also wants to hold to expression in art, and consequently gets himself into an inextricable situation, which only Ducasse and Aiken can remedy!

5. "If either (of the rival views of art) is adhered to rigorously, it is impossible to include the factor emphasized by the other theory without either relegating it to the place of mere condition, cause, or effect, or else so extending the sense of 'expression' or 'qualitative surface' that it no longer retains any useful or clearly recognizable meaning."[39]

6. "This latter result, I submit, is precisely what

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[38] Aiken, "Art as Expression and Surface," Ibid., p 87.

[39] Ibid., p 88.

has happened in the case of Professor D. W. Prall's analysis of aesthetic 'orders.' For him, apparently, these 'orders' of sound and color are the very stuff or substance of the aesthetic."[40] But for Prall, as for others, feeling and emotion, imaginative association and suggestion are in some sense "present" in the aesthetic experience, and the experience has value attributed to it because of these factors; so "Prall is obliged to extend the notion of 'qualitative surface' so as to include them as well as the purely sensuous factors with which he starts. But the notion of 'surface' becomes so indefinite that nothing can be excluded that can possibly be experienced."

Comment: Prall does not want to exclude anything. The surface is not defined solely in terms of sub- and form-qualities (usually called "purely sensuous qualities"). That is only thin surface which Prall holds can be distinguished only theoretically. Surface, both thin and thick, is marked off by attitude, as is clearly stated in AA (p 5-6). Next, Aiken, like Ducasse, comes up with a solution of the dilemma which makes no advance beyond Prall -- attitude. Aiken and Ducasse include nothing as aesthetic that Prall doesn't include. They miss the nature of Prall's argument, which is to examine the conditions of expression in the arts. Prall is the last to exclude anything from aesthetic contemplation; his is an examination of what and how man is <u>able</u> to express his feelings and

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[40] <u>Ibid</u>., pp 88.

ideas in a public medium. This involves a philosophical investigation of the relation between the expressed and the sensuous, their differences and similarities.

7. Surface, expression, imagination may all be aesthetic, unaesthetic or non-aesthetic "depending upon the nature of the attitude with which they are viewed ... So long as the interest which is taken in them is directly focused upon and renewed by the satisfaction resulting from the experience itself, it is aesthetic, regardless of whatever components of sensation, perception, emotion, or imagination it might contain."[41] The aesthetic is not to be marked off by the kind of object we attend to -- surface or expression -- but by our attitude.

Comment: Close attention to the above statement reveals that Aiken is recommending what he warned others of; an experience is aesthetic if we focus on "the satisfaction." He himself takes one of the elements to define what is aesthetic (data?). But he says elsewhere on the same page something more similar to Prall and more in keeping with his own recommendation. Anything becomes aesthetic "when the observer takes an immediate interest in apprehending its characteristic qualities, whatever they may be."

Before I close out this topic I should mention a short essay by Isabel C. Hungerland, "The Aesthetics of David Wight Prall." Hers is by far the most perceptive written grasp of

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[41] Ibid., p 93.

Prall. She correctly appraises his presentationalism in relation to representation, though she mentions her treatment as a development of the "implications" of his views, when in fact they are his developed views.[42]

7.9 Criticism.

7.91 A. Isenberg.

Isenberg, in an article which is up to his usual excellent quality, makes a correct statement about Prall's view of standards.[43] He attributes the view to Prall that norms or standards play no function in criticism. He means here in the context he is discussing, that they will not do as measurements of value. That standards do have a function to help us comprehend we saw clearly in Section 5.3. Standards imply some kind of similarity, and it is absurd to try and judge a work of art by its degree of resemblance to something else, when its excuse for existence is its difference from everything else. But, says Isenberg, to so hold, we neglect to give a positive interpretation of criticism.

To hold that Prall does not give a positive interpretation of criticism if standards as yardsticks are thrown out

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[42] Isabel C. Hungerland, "The Aesthetics of David Wight Prall," a David Wight Prall Memorial lecture, Vol. I, Number 1, 1945.

[43] A. Isenberg, "Critical Communication," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 58, (1949), pp 330-344.

the window, implies that the only positive thing about criticism itself is its comparison of values. Prall indeed denies that this is an important function of criticism, but he goes on to outline the other functions of criticism, which may fairly be held to be a positive theory of criticism. The headings of the functions of criticism -- Recommendation, Evaluation, Explanation, Description, Translation and Education -- indicate a concern for criticism. Indeed, as it turns out, these are essentially what Isenberg wants in criticism. He himself finally disavows the efficacy of norms to back up the reasons we give for our value verdicts. But if we give them up, what is criticism? Criticism is communication. Our reasons are not meant to prove that our verdict is correct; our reasons have another role. They are a description, and we understand a description when accompanied by perception. Critical communication seeks to bring communication about at the level of the senses, to induce a sameness of vision. Thus, to read criticism without being in the presence of or directly recollecting the objects discussed is a senseless employment.

I cannot find anything here that Prall would disagree with. If Prall is not providing a positive notion of criticism, then neither is Isenberg; but if Isenberg is, then so is Prall.

Notice that both disavow the use of standards as reasons or norms while both hold that they help us to perceive the work of art. Criticism is to communicate to others so that they too can see, and the seeing is its own justification, not needing "reasons" to back it up.

It would seem that communication would be better brought about if we had a more adequate critical vocabulary. We have seen what Prall has to say of the inadequacy of our vocabulary. Isenberg recognizes the doctrine, but disagrees with it. It seems that Isenberg's criticism of the usefulness of an improved critical vocabulary depends upon the belief that Prall thought a superb vocabulary could be a substitute for the work of art, and of course this is not the case. Prall has continually championed the untranslatability of works of art.

7.92 H. E. McCarthy.

I noted in an earlier section (7.32) that McCarthy held Prall to be a subjectivist.

> D. W. Prall and George Santayana attempt to avoid the extreme relativistic implications of their subjective premises by appealing (respectively) to the most adequate human being and to the aesthetic expert in hopes of establishing a standard of taste ... However, any attempt to institute a standard subject is futile. [44]

The standard that McCarthy selects is from a quotation from STV, p 277, "The most adequate critic is simply the most adequate human being." McCarthy asks what "adequate" can mean but "prefer," on the basis of a subjective value theory? The evaluations of one critic are no better than the other, except that we prefer one. A quotation from Prall seems to bear him out, for Prall says, "To say that I value a musician's judgment

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[44] He. E. McCarthy, Aesthetic Evaluation, Ph. D. Thesis for the University of California at Berkeley, (1947), in abstract of thesis.

of the concert is only to say that I prefer such a judgment to the judgment of the unmusical or the musically illiterate." (STV, 258) For a subjectivist, says McCarthy, "valuings are valuings and the only basis for distinguishing some valuings from other valuings is in terms of more valuings."[45] Also Prall seems to infer that one kind of training is better than another, but not in the preference sense.

One more quotation from McCarthy:

> When we turn to the problem of the evaluation of aesthetic objects, we may note that the evaluation of any one object, being merely a report of a had, motor-affective attitude or liking, is in itself, no truer than any other truthfully reported liking of the same object.[46]

The reader will have seen that we have three problems here. There is 1) the adequacy of the critic, 2) the adequacy of training, and 3) the question of ranking evaluations.

Let us take the third one first. On re-reading the last quotation from McCarthy we note that he is talking of e-valuation. Now he apparently means by evaluation the same thing that Prall meant by aesthetic judgment, since McCarthy tells us that an evaluation of an object is "merely a report of a had, motor-affective attitude or liking." This is not what Prall means by evaluation, of course. For Prall evaluation involves the comparison of values of objects. To evaluate is to distinguish, in McCarthy's words, "some valuings from other

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[45] McCarthy, op. cit., p 118.

[46] Ibid., p 117.

valuings ... in terms of more valuings." Prall agrees that this is all we can do, that valuings are not true or false, correct or incorrect. From the fact that aesthetic judgments cannot be established to be transcendentally true or false, from Prall's assent to this, except of course that they are or are not reporting truthfully our own feelings in the matter, does it follow that "adequacy" means nothing?

Now we see a fourth problem the moment we try to get at Prall's answer to the above question. This concerns the ranking of criticisms of objects, or the adequacy of criticism.

The reader may perhaps recall from Chapter V how these three notions of adequacy of the critic, training and criticism are connected. McCarthy does not see them as inter-connected except in so far as they all bring up the status of the term "adequacy."

Let us consider criticism first of all. Prall does not consider criticism to be only evaluation, i.e., a comparing of values of things. (AA, 203) It is this which is least important, but written criticism does describe, explain, translate and educate. These are functions of written criticism. Prall considers this kind of thing extrinsically valuable. Criticism can be ranked by its ability to perform these functions, by the ability to get other people to appreciate an object, hence, is more or less adequate.

Next, McCarthy in the first quote goes too far in supposing that Prall wants to set up a "standard subject" which can be taken to be the universal norm. Prall does not claim

that some can speak for everyone.

This leads us to the notion of the adequacy of the critic. He cannot perform his function, i.e., implement the functions of criticism unless he has the qualifications to grasp the complex object before him.

McCarthy's position was arrived at because he believed that Prall held a subjectivist theory of value. Prall's position is better stated in the way that H. N. Lee states his own position.

> There are some experiences, however, the sufficient conditions of which are neither merely objective or subjective -- or, one could say, are both objective and subjective -- such as, for example, the experience of beauty, of goodness, or of any kind of value. Certain objective conditions are necessary but not sufficient. To get the sufficient conditions, there must be what Prall calls a transaction between the objective and the subjective conditions.[47]

When we consider that the object has to be grasped in order for the sufficient conditions of value to occur, then we can understand that adequate training is not another name for "prefer," though it is held that the training has value because it leads to a satisfaction.

7.93 B. Heyl and J. Dewey.

Bernard Heyl, while comparing relativism and subjectivism, quotes John Dewey with approval. The quotation is from

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[47] H. N. Lee, "A Precise Meaning for Objective and Subjective in Value Theory," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 37 (1940), pp 631-632.

Dewey's "The Meaning of Value" which formed the last article in the Prall-Dewey debate on the role of judgment in the constitution of values.

> The conception that mere liking is adequate to constitute a value situation makes no provision for the education and cultivation of taste and renders criticism, whether aesthetic, moral or logical, arbitrary and absurd.[48]

We can see that Dewey is concerned to provide a non-arbitrary basis for criticism and education of taste, and as such he thinks that the occurrence of value must have as one of its conditions intelligent judgment. He does not want it to be a purely irrational affair. Apart from the questionability of thus insuring a secure rational basis for criticism, we see Heyl echoing this view.[49]

> The relativist critic takes a very different stand (from the subjectivist). Believing that value is conditioned to a considerable extent by deliberation and reflection, he affirms that artistic sensitivity and appreciation may be enormously enhanced, perhaps even acquired, through training and experience.[50]

We have just seen that Prall is not denying this at all, and Heyl misses the main point, as does Dewey. Prall says:

> While I do ... not only admit, but very specially assert, that judgment may help in the acquisition of the value that things may acquire, I do not admit that in the total complex situation in which alone value occurs, judgment plays the kind of part that is played

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[48] John Dewey, "The Meaning of Value," The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, (1925), p 131.

[49] B. C. Heyl, "Relativism Again," reprinted in Vivas' and Krieger's Problems of Aesthetics, pp 436-445.

[50] Ibid., p 438.

by an attitude that excludes judgment.[51]

> The making of the judgment (about whether to study harmony or learn to play the violin in order to appreciate music that I think is good -- extrinsically) will have been but one step in a long causal sequence, at the end of which there will occur a value situation, a situation caused by the judgment no more than by the various activities of eyes and ears and other organs, of violins and bows and perhaps of pianos and piano movers.[52]

I cannot hope to completely disentangle a most entangled discussion of value theory here, but I do want to point out that Prall is not committed to a theory which makes no distinction between criticisms, nor one which rules out the education of taste, for we have seen that Prall can and does hold that there is such a thing as adequate training, training which allows us to grasp the value of certain objects not otherwise grasped. Further, Prall's belief that men are not totally various, but similar in some qualifications, shows that he does not consider recommendation an isolated personal affair; as Heyl would have it, it is binding for particular groups of people.

People can be easily misled by Dewey's insistence in this affair, but ought not to be. Heyl, by using Dewey's quote here, is giving a false interpretation to Prall's view.

Three things may be said about this debate which might bring some order into it and better explain Prall's position on this matter.

First, Prall wants to make a distinction between valuing and valuation. The latter involves some judgment, and the

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[51] D. W. Prall, "Value and Thought-Process," p 119.

[52] D. W. Prall, "In Defense of a Worthless Theory of Value," p 131.

former requires an attitude on our part. Heyl fails to distinguish them and so attributes reflection only to "relativism" when he should also attribute it to "subjectivism" when valuation is involved. He uses the term "evaluating" instead of "valuation."

> Though this similarity (value involves psychological terms) between their theories allies relativism with subjectivism and differentiates both from absolutism, relativism, unlike subjectivism, insists upon the necessity and importance, when evaluating, of deliberation and reflection. Mere preference and liking, though an essential condition, is an insufficient one for the activity of valuing, since that activity should in large measure depend upon the rational factor of thoughtful inquiry. (Italics mine)[53]

> On this Prall says, ... "It seems to me ... that most of what I mean does not interfere with accepting Mr. Dewey's doctrine of valuation judgments, except in so far as this doctrine suggests that such judgments are integral to the occurrence of value itself."[54]

Prall holds that when we evaluate judgment is involved, but, and this is his second point, it is sufficient for the occurrence of value, when liking, or satisfaction occurs in a situation, and, of course, it is also a necessary condition.

The second point, then, is Prall's admission that judgment about learning to play the violin, etc., does affect our valuing, but such judgment itself does not constitute valuing; only liking does. Value may occur when there is liking and no judgment modifying it, as in the cat's drinking milk or being stroked, or the cow's ruminating on her cud. This is a different way of stating what I said before, that liking, unlike judgment, is necessary and sufficient for a value transaction.

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53 Heyl, "Relativism Again," p 437.

54 Prall, "Value and Thought-Process," p 125.

The third point is that Dewey as well as Heyl, might be confusing judgments conditioning our likes with likes conditioning our values. Judgments do condition what kind of things we are able to like, and it is in this sense that Prall holds that we can cultivate our taste, but it is the liking which creates the actual value. To be sure, if judgments condition our likings, then our valuing will be different. This Prall is not denying, but it is the difference between judgment as remote cause of what we like (hence value) and liking as proximate cause that we value. This seems to me an important distinction, and one which should be kept in mind, or the confusion continues to thrive well into Heyl-time.

Dewey's discussion with Prall should not stampede us into believing that Prall held, or necessarily must hold, the subjectivists position which Heyl outlines, and which, by inference we must suppose he thought Prall held.

7.94 S. Langer.

I cannot, I suppose, pass over Langer in silence, since she has several references, one of six page length, to Prall, but her account is careless in so many particulars that it seems hopeless to go into a detailed account of it. However, she makes few new errors, so I shall trust the reader to make the appropriate corrections if they so desire.

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISON FOR CONSISTENCY

8.1 Summary.

Though there are two books on aesthetics by Prall, as well as other statements on aesthetics mady by him in other articles and in his book on value theory, I have presented an aesthetic theory. To make a single aesthetic system out of several source materials implies that he held only a single aesthetic, that the views expressed in the various sources are consistent or supplement each other. I shall explore the justness of this view in this chapter. But first a summary of Prall's views.

Prall has a presentational aesthetic, one which emphasizes the immediacy (which does not mean instanteousness) and non-referential character of the aesthetic experience; which emphasizes that the aesthetic data, including that which is expressed, is directly or imaginatively presented sensuous data; which emphasizes that aesthetic value follows from the attention and interest in this qualitative data alone, though this does not rule out cognition in the aesthetic experience; which emphasizes that aesthetic theory is concerned with this immediately felt sensuous qualitative content, with an analysis of that data; which emphasizes that aesthetic appreciation must begin, and end, in the discrimination of that which is immediately presented; which emphasizes that aesthetic criticism

has as its main function the description, explanation and translation of the immediately presented by a critic trained to discriminate and to emotionally respond; he should help others to appreciate the value of the immediate data in a full aesthetic experience, to which end theory should contribute.

Summary:

1. The field for aesthetic study is quality, sense-presented qualitative data.
2. Quality occurs in a situation comprised of two sets of events, that of the object and of the subject.
3. The aspect of quality aesthetics deals with is the surface aspect.
4. This aspect is isolated by the aesthetic experience, which in turn is defined by attitude.
5. Our attitude in the aesthetic experience is such that our attention is focused on the appearance of the data alone, and all interest ends in that appearance, not in the practical use of that content, nor its theoretical relations to anything else. The usual division of qualities into the "subjective" and "objective" disappears when they function aesthetically.
6. Beauties are t-total-qualities when delight is the component value-quality. Varying components and changing psychological processes imply that beauty is not single, but many, that each is unique.
7. Aesthetic judgment reports felt value.

8. Different aesthetic judgments about the same physical processes are not contradictory, because both may report truly on different situations because of different physiological and/or psychological processes.
9. The aim of aesthetic theory is to make us better acquainted with qualitative data, which is the reference of aesthetic judgments.
10. If our theory is to be scientific, it must be analytic, though it should not be confused with psychology or physics, (since it is not studying processes, but the fusion of those processes), aesthetic theory is an analysis of quality, an attempt to find systematic relations.
11. We can in fact, find systematic relations, for we find in color and sound intrinsic or natural orders. We also find temporal and spatial orders.
12. It is in virtue of these relations that artists are able to compose, to control their material.
13. We must know these forms if the more complicated, as well as simple beauties and works of art are to be comprehensible to us.
14. Appreciation thus depends on our grasping something familiar as a means for organizing the complex and then noticing how it differs from others belonging to the same class, what its <u>unique</u> value is.
15. Familiarity may be attained through the use of types or ready-made forms, such as the use of the human body in



sculpture, or through knowledge of qualities and their intrinsic relations, so that we comprehend the color form of a painting, or through partial patterns.

16. Art involves someone working with material, using a technique, guided by intent.

17. In fine art the intention is to express, which involves us in an additional set of qualities and values (thick surface), besides the strict aesthetic value of material and form (thin surface).

18. Feelings, emotions and ideas are expressed.

19. Whatever is expressed, is externalized in some sensuous medium; it is made determinate in sensuous data, hence is aesthetic.

20. What is externalized in sensuous material is perceivable. Mind-body dualism is denied -- feelings do not belong exclusively to minds, nor does a feeling or idea have any determinate meaning unless clarified by sensuous content, CFC.

21. Representation is aesthetic only if we direct our attention to the sensuously presented object. The cognitive processes involved in aesthetic appreciation do not refer us beyond the sensuously presented, but tend to refer us to that presentation itself, to inform our vision.

22. When the expressed feeling is constituted in and the perceivers' experience (ActCFCPu), then we have a communication transaction.

23. This communication is precise, because the feeling is

made specific by the sensuous data.

24. All extrinsic value depends on intrinsic value.

25. All intrinsic value, immediate value, is aesthetic value, occurring when the thing valued is viewed for its own sake, i.e., when the aesthetic attitude is taken toward it.

26. And all aesthetic value is aesthetic quality -- that which appears to us immediately as a quality in the aesthetic experience.

27. Critical judgments are not to be confused with aesthetic judgments.

28. The main function of criticism is not evaluation, but its description of aesthetic objects, the explanation of techniques and conditioning processes, and the education of others through a linguistic medium, so that others can also appreciate the object.

29. Criticism in fulfilling its many functions may be ranked according to its extrinsic value.

30. The value of criticism depends on the adequacy of the critic.

31. The critic must have the kind of knowledge Prall was trying to increase through the study of the qualitative field; but he must also have emotional flexibility and be a full human being, for aesthetics is wider than the artistic, artistic value only being a part of aesthetic value.

32. If the critic is to give us valuable criticism, criticism that we can use, he must be "representative" of others.

33. He may be representative, for man is not completely various, but shares a common nature.

34. This common nature is what makes any theory, including aesthetic theory, possible, and it is this which makes criticism extrinsically valuable, that several with similar qualifications may use it to condense intrinsic value out of their commerce with the aesthetic object. Criticism need not be mere individual effusion, without significance for others.

35. For a presentational aesthetics, being able to automatically discriminate the sensuously presented surface is all-important, even for grasping what is expressed, for nothing is properly part of the aesthetic data unless it is or eventuates in the sensuous medium. Knowledge of this surface must be possessed for full appreciation, and it must be developed to a point where its application is automatic, habitual, i.e., physiological, otherwise we will not get the unitary fusion required for the constitution of beauty.

8.2 Aesthetic Analysis: A Supplement.

The main evidence for the consistency of Prall's two books lies in the exposition and its documentation from both books and other writings. The evidence for the fairness of the interpretations that fit one book to another lies in the comparison anyone can make between the present exposition

and Prall's writings. On most topics, statements are found in both books supporting the views attributed to him as I interpret them. Aesthetic Analysis, being a later book, is in many aspects an expansion of, and is also more technical than Aesthetic Judgment, because it is not designed, like Aesthetic Judgment was, for use as a college text, and so will naturally predominate in some documentations, for those topics treated at length in AJ do not need to be gone over again in the later book.

The later book, AA, does not repudiate any doctrine of the earlier book, AJ, but in the main expands or supplements it, where the first was either short or unclear. This is most obvious in:

a) his contrast of aesthetic theory with physics and psychology;

b) a more careful delineation of the aesthetic field;

c) the notion of analysis as an instrument of knowledge, and its relation to aesthetic knowledge;

d) an analysis of feeling and ideas;

e) the working out more fully of a presentational theory of expression and its role in the aesthetic analysis of individual works of art;

f) the role of form, other than intrinsic qualitative orders, in aesthetic apprehension;

g) and a fuller discussion of aesthetic standards and their vocabulary.

These should serve as an answer to anyone should they

ask, "Why would Prall write a second book on aesthetics?" They simply fill out and complete his aesthetic theory. There is nowhere any indication that he meant it to replace any of the views he held in AJ.

8.3 The Exposition Revisited.

I shall now go into more detail in showing the differences between the first and second book. The main differences are listed above, at the end of 8.2. I shall go into the differences at such length as will indicate clearly what the difference is and why it does not argue against their mutual inclusion in the exposition.

My procedure will be to go back over the exposition and indicate those views which are pertinent to the aim of this chapter.

8.4 Chapter I.

The views most important to the first chapter are numbers 1 - 10 in the summary in Section 8.1. That chapter is mainly concerned with surface, the aesthetic experience, and beauty.

8.41 Judgment and Data.

AJ begins differently than AA. AJ takes as its starting point aesthetic judgment, while AA seldom mentions aesthetic

judgment. AJ then proposes to make a study of the meanings of aesthetic judgment. AA proposes in the beginning to analyze qualitative data, the surface of the whole world, so that it appears that both start with a different field. This is misleading, however, and in fact, both agree on the field, for when Prall wishes to investigate the meaning of aesthetic judgments, he has in mind an investigation of that to which they refer. What they refer to is the surface of the world. It is this which aesthetics is to investigate. That it is no idle promise is soon demonstrated when Prall begins an investigation of surface materials and their intrinsic orders. This is precisely what AA proposes that aesthetics should do, though it does not actually carry on such an investigation at the length that AJ does.

8.42 Aesthetic Experience.

AA defines the aesthetic experience by the attitude we take toward qualitative content. Our attention is focused on its appearance and our interest is in this appearance alone. The terminology of AJ was more traditional. The direction mode of attitude was described in terms of "disinterestedness" or "aloofness" toward the practical use and the theoretical implications, and the interest mode of the attitude received more of a "value" twist, holding that we perceived a thing for its own sake and with "delight" or "pleasure." (AJ, 290)

AJ stressed more than AA that aesthetic experience is

primarily sense experience. Later in that book, when he came to "thick" surface, especially the expressiveness of language, he had to modify the emphasis somewhat; consequently, it does not receive the same stress in AA. This modification, which admits imaginative content, occurs in both books; in AJ, p 13, in AA, p 139.

8.43 Aesthetic Value: Beauty.

Judgments of beauty, being records of felt value, constitute the main discussion of the first two chapters of AJ, but "beauty" is used no more than three or four times in the entire course of AA. But what is called "beauty" in AJ is no different than what is called "quality" in AA. In both cases they are the result of the transaction between the object and subject processes.

There seems no reason to suppose that he gave up his views about beauty, since the things that he says about beauty are the same things he says about quality in AA; and in AJ he calls beauty a quality, the result of a transaction. (AJ, 122)

As I interpret Prall's notion of beauty, it is identical with the total apprehension, not just the value aspect of that apprehension, the delight or pleasure in our apprehension. And for Prall quality has its value aspect since it always includes emotional reaction as one of the fused aspects. (AA, 154) Any interpretation of Prall's notion of beauty is fraught

with danger, for he has an amazing assortment of statements about it, and one could select from them to give several variant interpretations. I am ready to defend the present interpretation, because it can handle so many of these statements, having great unifying power; and because it is so close to his discussion of quality in AA. This is most clearly seen in pp 9-10 in AA, where the emotional character of quality is explicitly said to be related to beauty, in one of the rare occurrences of that term in the book.

At any rate, their both being a product of sets of events, processes in nature, seems the best evidence that both are discussing the same issue. It takes the form it does in AJ probably because he starts with judgments of beauty. Hence, only in AJ are the implications of this notion of beauty developed in connection with the conflict of our own judgments of beauty (quality) with each other and with other people's judgments. These implications, discussed in Section 1.4, appear only implicitly in AA in the chapter on criticism.

8.44 Aesthetic Theory.

It is in the characterization of method for aesthetic theory that the two books diverge most completely verbally, though in practice they do not do so. "In other words we are noticing frankly that in method our study is not to be strictly or narrowly scientific but general and philosophical. (AJ, 4) "But this is to say that aesthetics is the science of the

immediate." (AA, 12) Prall, in proposing to study aesthetics by trying to understand the meaning of aesthetic judgments, would appear to be formulating aesthetics *via* the linguistic method, and as such be engaged in a philosophical study, but he soon leaves this method and launches on an investigation of qualities and their intrinsic relations.[1] It is this formulation of intrinsic relations which serves as the foundation for the claims made for aesthetic theory as science in AA. So, the practice in AJ is at variance with the professed beginnings, though it is consistent with the practice in AA. Prall is more confident of his science of the immediate in AA, and he claims that it is consistent with the notion of science as a relational study.

It is only in AA that Prall explicitly differentiates aesthetic theory from physics and psychology, which results in added clarification of the task he has set himself, and further helps to isolate the subject matter, quality, distinguishing an inquiry into process from an inquiry into quality, the fusion of process. His notions of aesthetic theory, like his description of the aesthetic experience, are more traditional in AJ than in AA. In AA beauty is obviously absent and

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[1] For an interesting and detailed metaphysical study of intrinsic order itself see R. W. Church's *An Essay on Critical Appreciation*, Cornell University Press, (1938) pp 66-82. He goes into a discussion of just why the orders of quality are truly "intrinsic" and not "extrinsic." His discussion indicates a possibly interesting connection with Langford's synthetic *a priori* claims in connection with color.

the investigation of meaning is not mentioned. Prall is clearer about what his actual practice was in AJ when he wrote AA than when he wrote AJ, his terminology and characterization in AA catching up with his practice in AJ.

8.45 Analysis.

The title of the second book reflects this acknowledgment of his actual practice in AJ, and includes a defense of analysis and a concern to show that the results of the analysis of quality, the knowledge gained thereby, when applied, is pertinent to appreciation. He does nothing differently in the later book, but he formulates what he does in both more explicitly and comes to a defense of it. Prall succeeds in sharpening the relevance and importance of qualitative analysis for knowledge and its bearing on aesthetic appreciation. This is a more systematic way of saying what he had to say about "discrimination" in AJ. AA succeeds in placing aesthetic theory as knowledge within the confines of knowledge proper; in pointing out that when that knowledge becomes habitual it is not trivial, but essential to appreciation, and so is of some consequence, he is showing the significance of his own study. This carries us up to the first attempts at actual analysis.

In AJ Prall is concerned to show that we take cognizance of qualities in our ordinary experience, especially when we play truants from the workaday world. This is indicative that aesthetic judgments begin with discriminations, mainly

sense discriminations. The judgments characteristic of these ordinary discriminations do not contain the word "beauty," but reflect greater discrimination than that word does. These judgments use more determinate names such as "noisy," "opaque," "hot glue" and "musty," as in, "The room is noisy this time of day."

Thus all aesthetic discriminations begin with observations of nature and our environment. This indicates two things that are important for aesthetics. It indicates first that the aesthetic is not something esoteric, but pervades all our waking life, and indicates that our experiences of art are simply the same sort of thing with heightened effect. This is then illustrated in a chapter on primitive art. The second thing that is indicated is the importance of discrimination for full aesthetic appreciation, hence, the importance of analyzing the aesthetic materials, which he then proceeds to do. Thus the two books do not diverge; his discussion of discrimination in AJ says more concretely and with illustrations what he says more abstractly in AA. The first book says it in a way best comprehended by students coming to aesthetics for the first time, using AJ as a textbook.

In both books the implication of holding that conceptual analyzation is important for perceptual appreciation comes to the same thing: "But the difference between perceiving clearly and understanding distinctly is not the great difference that we are sometimes led to think." (AA, 39)

8.5 Chapter III.

In Chapter III I discussed the role of form in making complex aesthetic objects comprehensible to us, the form-matter and form-content distinction, and how "informing" carries us beyond "thin" surface.

The role of form for comprehensibility is most discussed in AA, which is natural, since he is more self-conscious about the role of analysis in that book, and more concerned to show the applicability of form-knowledge to aesthetic objects. As such AA is merely a supplementation and justification of the notion of analysis held and practiced in AJ.

Prall's denial of the form-matter and form-content separations is explicit in AJ unlike AA, though in the latter the emphasis on the unity of the aesthetic object is also a denial of those separations. (AA, 165) The unity occurs in the aesthetic experience, and Prall makes clear that the perceptual situation is the only pertinent place to deny their separation by distinguishing very clearly in AA between aesthetic experience and aesthetic theory. It is only when we take an analytic attitude toward the presented that we separate form from matter or content. AJ and AA thus both deny the separations.

The role of form in "informing" our vision and its leading us beyond "thin" surface is a common doctrine to the two books, as it prefaces the discussion of expression in both, though the "thin" and "thick" terminology appears only in AJ.



Although he does not discuss "thin" and "thick" explicitly in AA, his views in that book assume them. Prall acknowledges that strict surface values are not the only aesthetic values when he discusses technique and expression in AA. His recognition of "intention" in AA indicates that he recognizes this factor in the arts; the large place he gives to expression and its importance for aesthetic analysis indicates that this is the important and definitive characteristic of the fine arts. Further, his effort to develop a presentational theory of expression shows that he thinks of the "thick" factors contributed through intent as being partly constitutive of "surface."

8.6 Chapter IV.

8.61 The Expressive Problem.

We saw that the intent to express is what differentiates the fine arts from the arts in general. The value of the fine arts is not confined to strict aesthetic value, value attached to thin surface alone. But the aesthetic experience has been said to be primarily sensuous. His theory of expression is then an attempt to account for the additional values of fine art, (since any adequate theory of the fine arts must recognize that they are the result of human efforts guided by intention) and still preserve the aesthetic experience as primarily sensuous, attention to qualitative data. How can we account for the aesthetic value of expression? Prall has to

develop a presentational theory of expression.

The problem is clearly recognized in AJ, where the meaning of "express" is given in repeated, though apparently variant, assertions.[2] The phrase "thick surface" indicates his wish to preserve the sensuous character of the aesthetic experience. His repeated assertions stating that the expressive factors are "directly" received, especially in connection with music, indicate his attempted solution. His efforts to make poetry and prose surface arts indicate that he wishes to see the problem through, for these are the arts that would be most likely to prevent a solution to that problem. Finally, he explicitly recognizes the problem himself.

> Since they are arts, technique, that is, applied to fulfilling intentions, some aim they must have after all, else no rational being would practice them. And since, as we have seen the enjoyment of beauty is disinterested, this aim, so far as it can be aesthetically fulfilled, must be consummated upon an aesthetic surface, even though the beauty of that surface is not the whole aim ... Thus apparently we must find this aim at once aesthetic and non-aesthetic, and we seem to be in a dilemma. (AJ, 221)

It is this problem, as stated, that Prall continues to accept in AA, and the discussion of expression in AA is a supplementation of crucial points in his argument, as well as an orientation of expression towards its role as a criterion of relevance for the analysis of individual works of art.

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2 For the multiplicity of the assertions concerning the meaning of "express" see Appendix. For a resolution of their multiplicity see Section 4.41.

The intent of the treatment of the two books of expression is not different. It remains to indicate the difference in detailed treatment.

8.62 What Is Expressed?

The Appendix gives us a multiplicity of suggestions, AA being less profuse in its contribution. That Prall does not confine expression to traditional emotions is clear enough, and that they do not constitute the majority of things expressed seems as clear. We may want to express our feeling about a peaceful country scene or a bowl of flowers. There are many things we might wish to express whose dimensions are less than the traditional emotions. A discussion of expression theory usually mirrors this preoccupation with emotions in its choice of examples, e.g., sadness, gaiety.

8.63 Intention.

Intention is given an important role in both books. Its presence in AA confirms the theory of fine art expressed in AJ. Its full role is brought out more clearly in the chapter on expression in AA, where it is the factor which is responsible for the unity of the work of art, and for the point of the work of art which serves as a criterion of relevance for a focus analysis. The artistic is distinguished from the natural by the presence of this intention guiding a technical mastery; this is made clear in AJ, and its role in the fine arts

is expanded in AA, where it functions not so much for purposes of creation as in AJ, but for purposes of appreciation and comprehensibility.

8.64 Feeling and Ideas.

The most important difference between the two books lies in the careful analysis Prall gives to ideas and especially feeling in AA. If he is to hold a presentational theory of expression, Prall feels he must show how feeling can be a constituent of aesthetic objects, how it can be perceived as on the surface, can be grasped by attending to the sensuous qualities. It is in AA that he denies substantial dualism, and holds that it is an error to believe that feelings are the property solely of mind. He must establish that feelings and ideas, when determinate, require sensuous content, that all feelings and ideas, when clarified, have a sensuous embodiment. This allows him to say that feeling can be grasped by others, and is public, because this feeling is embodied or externalized in a sensuous medium for all to see.

8.65 Symbolization and Representation.

In AJ Prall makes the point that not all media use the same means to express. There seems to be no significant difference nor important additions in AA on this issue. That is aesthetically relevant only which comes to sensuous consummation, and this is argued for at most length in AJ in the sec-

tion on the expressiveness of language. He there holds that prose can be aesthetic, because it is a mixed art; its symbols being transparent, we see through them to that to which they refer, so that the words are means used to focus our attention on imagined qualitative content; and this imagined content, not the shape of the words on the printed page, is what is aesthetically relevant. The expression consummates in an imaginative sensuous surface. This position is elaborated in AJ but affirmed in AA. (AA, 92 and 145) The crucial case of language demonstrates as well as anything the unity of his thought on expression.

8.66 Communication and Precision.

Most of the detailed statements about communication in the arts occur in AA. Precision is made more of in AJ. It is recognized by Prall that both go hand in hand, so that both books complement each other. AA provides a good basis for claiming the uniqueness of the quality perceived, for when feelings or ideas are made determinate, we do not have a general expression of them, but a concrete presentation of them. Being presented to us, if we are adequately trained, we can accept a feeling as the feeling which it is. If we reconstitute what the creator intended, then there has been communication. Both books agree on these two points, and indeed in their expression is contained some of the most emphatic passages in the books; they can be called central tenets

of Prall's, though the term "communication" does not appear in AJ. (AJ, 215-217 and AA, 163)

8.67 Relevance.

An obvious difference in the amount of discussion of the necessity for a criterion of relevance in the analysis of individual works of art occurs in the two books. The chapter heading of the expression chapter in AA indicates that relevance is of much importance to him there, but that the germ of this is contained completely in AJ can be seen if one turns to AJ, pp 320-321, and pp 326-327. The first reference discusses relevance and a focus; the second discusses analysis. Once again, we see the justness of treating AA as a supplementation and strengthening of the views in his first book.

8.68 Chapter V.

Both books, AA explicitly, and AJ implicitly by not naming any specific standards, deny that aesthetic theory is designed as an instrument for criticism. For Prall aesthetics is an instrument of understanding. This orientation is quite clear in both books, and can be drawn from what Prall has said about including aesthetic theory as knowledge within knowledge proper, especially scientific knowledge, from what he has to say about its application in AA, and from his more explicit formulation of the functions of criticism in AJ.

The main function of criticism is not the rendering

of comparative judgments, though any criticism must be based on an appreciation of the subject of criticism. The main function of criticism is to help others to the same appreciation -- on this both books agree, but AJ is more explicit in stating how this is to be gone about.

Prall's attitude toward standards follows from his belief about the function of aesthetics in understanding works of art, for he holds that they are misused for purposes of comparing value. (AA, 185 and AJ, 324-325) Their important use is to help us in apprehending what is before us. Prall discusses standards in both books, but in AA, unlike in AJ, he discusses "structural" standards, though reference to "qualitative" standards occurs in both books.

AJ recognizes the vagueness of the terms naming qualitative standards, especially the degrees of qualities. The implications of vagueness are developed more fully in AA where Prall goes into the inadequacy of our critical vocabulary for fully carrying out the descriptive and explanatory functions of criticism.

Though Prall denies that there are universally reliable normative standards, he recognizes that that which they name is responded to and that the names for them have value connotations, and for more than one person. This is saying, in effect, that standards become normative because that which they name, when experienced, are valuable. On this both books agree. But standards are ultimately useless for purposes of value comparison, for standards are general and fail to apply

to what is unique to a work of art, thus failing to apply to its unique value. This is brought out most clearly in AA, and is consistent with his emphasis on the uniqueness of beauty found in AJ.[3]

The section which discusses the critic and value, 5.4, is drawn mainly from Prall's book on value. That section states two important views: Criticism may be valuable, and more or less valuable than other criticism; and the value of criticism is dependent on the critic.

Although it is not explicit in Prall's two books on aesthetics, his citing of the functions of criticism indicate that some criticism performs its function better than others. This means that some is extrinsically more valuable than other criticism. Further, AJ states, especially on pp 324 and 326 just as A Study in the Theory of Value does, that the value of criticism depends upon the adequacy of the critic. But it receives greater emphasis in the latter.

The necessity for the critic being a full human being follows from the point, made often in AJ and several times in AA, that all intrinsic value is aesthetic. Art and life do not have the great difference between them that they are often thought to have. AJ displays this aspect of his thought at greater length, but is the natural development of the point that the whole surface of the world is to some extent aesthetic, which Prall made at the beginning of AA. This same point is

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3 Prall is not so emphatic about this in AJ. See AJ, pp 324-325.

made in "The Esthetic Heresy."[4]

8.69 Conclusion.

A close study of Prall's aesthetic writings indicates a single theory, no doctrines of which are repudiated in later writings. What differences there are between AJ and AA lie in the expansion or clarification of views held in AJ. There are really only three new topics in AA, aside from the analysis of the octave scale and rhythm in poetry, and these are made to buttress what he had already said in AJ or other articles. These three are the conception of aesthetics as a science (which is really only a new name for what he practiced in AJ), the discussion of analysis as knowledge and a defense of its place in aesthetics, and the metaphysical arguments brought to bear for the defense of the perceptual presentation of feeling in the discussion of expression.

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[4] D. W. Prall, "The Esthetic Heresy," The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 18, (1921), pp 516-526.

CHAPTER IX

PRALL'S CONTRIBUTION

9.1 "Originality" and "Contribution".

In discussing Prall's "contribution," I shall not use that term in the originality sense. It seems to me to be remarkably perilous to state that such and such a doctrine is original with X. It's almost certain that somewhere someone would find a similar doctrine expressed earlier. This does not necessarily mean that X "borrowed" the doctrine, or that it didn't spring from his own thinking; it is simply that doctrines or "ideas" have hazy outlines, making similarity-finding a relatively easy game to win, and, conversely, making originality-finding a relatively easy game to lose.

What is interesting, and important, about a person's "contribution" is its distinctiveness. This requires going into some detail about his doctrines and showing how he handles certain ideas, that is, how his treatment differs, not absolutely, but in detail. Appreciating a philosophy for the trained person, like appreciating a work of art, is not looking for superficial similarities, but looking for modifications, variations, development and buttressing, and structural fitting. The movement and dovetailing of an extended argument is a lovely thing to watch. Consequently, "contribution" is to be taken here in the "distinctive" and not in the "original" sense.

Since appreciating a philosophy involves acquaintance with some detail, this chapter, in order not to be repetitious, will only serve as a backward glance at where we have been. It will serve to point to the main "distinctive" features of Prall's aesthetics. From what has gone before, the reader will have the detail in mind, so that what I say here will only be a reminder.

Prall's aesthetic theory as a whole is of some consequence because it is comprehensive, vital and has had considerable influence.

Prall's theory is not exhaustive but it is comprehensive in that it covers most of the main problems of aesthetics, at least those that were current when he wrote. Comprehensiveness alone does not make a man worth reading; but Prall's theory is informative, non-imitative and stimulating. He reads with some excitement and is never trite.

With Prall, as with Dewey and Santayana, we have a vital aesthetics. For these people the interest in aesthetics stems from an interest in the good life, in which aesthetics plays as great a role as any other factor. Santayana's first book was in aesthetics and he continued to write about it all his life; Dewey first wrote exclusively on aesthetics late in his life, but he reveals a vital concern with the subject long before he wrote Art as Experience, and we have the chapter in Experience and Nature which contains the central views that are expressed more fully in the later book; Prall wrote little that didn't contain some reference to aesthetics; indeed, one

gets the feeling that all philosophy must begin in aesthetics for Prall. Aesthetics is not something to be taken up in leisure, but is to be taken up first, for it is of first importance. It is this sense of the importance of aesthetics as much as anything else that makes us feel that we are in the presence of an important aesthetician -- and for Prall this almost seems synonymous with philosopher.

Prall's influence on contemporary philosophy also indicates a man to reckon with. One only needs to name a few people interested in aesthetics and value theory to see that this influence is important, such as S. C. Pepper, A. Isenberg, R. W. Church, H. N. Lee, John Reid, Isabel C. Hungerland, Henry Aiken, George Boas and C. I. Lewis.

I have said that Prall's aesthetics is informative and non-imitative, vital and influential. It cannot be anything at all like this, unless he touched aesthetics like it hadn't been touched before, and unless aesthetics hasn't been the same since then. What is Prall's distinctive contribution?

The most distinctive thing about Prall is his <u>presentationalism</u>. The breakdown of presentationalism involves what I outlined as the main problems of Prall's aesthetics in the Introduction -- the aesthetic field, surface; the nature of knowledge of this field; the connection between knowledge and appreciation of this field; a theory of expression consistent with his notion of surface and an expression theory of art; and the implications for criticism of his notion of aesthetic knowledge.

I shall break this chapter down into a section for each of them and will briefly remind the reader of the distinctive points about each of them.

9.2 The Aesthetic Field.

Prall's AJ was finished in 1927, though it wasn't published until 1929. The leading figures in aesthetics at that time were Croce and Santayana. Fry's "An Essay in Esthetics" was published in 1909.

Croce's aesthetics was still the traditional "philosophy of art." Santayana in a sense broke away from the traditional notion of aesthetics, was frankly naturalistic as well as non-literary, taking psychology seriously, as had many German aestheticians. But even so Santayana is still rather traditional, still concerned with "beauty," even though it is the "sense of beauty." Fry too, though he, like Santayana, sounds more modern, approaches aesthetics through art.

When Prall makes sense quality the subject matter of aesthetics he breaks out of the narrower traditional field of Croce and Fry, and sets the style of the coming quarter century. There is a clear break with Santayana's psychological theory also, though it is more explicit in AA, 1936, for Prall is interested in the quality resulting from process, not process itself, which is the interest of either physics or psychology. In this he has not been generally followed, but it is one of the most distinctive features about Prall's theory.

Prall here conceives of a truly autonomous area for aesthetics. Fry suggests this field, but he doesn't see it with Prall's clarity, and still thinks of art as the main field.

> But in the imaginative life no such action is necessary, and, therefore, the whole consciousness may be focused upon the perceptive and the emotional aspects of the experience.[1]

As I have interpreted Prall, he is not only distinct in isolating surface as an autonomous field, but his conception of surface, of qualitative sensed appearance is somewhat distinctive. Prall does not follow the traditional classification of appearances into the "subjective" and "objective," believing the latter only are sensed qualities, but includes unit- and emotional-qualities as sensed. Thus, what appears to be a rather narrow conception of the aesthetic field is not in fact narrow at all, but commodious enough to accomodate art and its expressiveness besides "decoration" and "pleasing images."

The notion of aesthetics being concerned with the delights of sense is not new with Prall, but a very old notion. However, Prall in treating it contextually gives it a new twist. He also draws out some notions about aesthetic theory or knowledge about this field which are distinctive.

9.3 Aesthetic Theory.

The usual sorts of treatment that people concerned

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[1] Fry, "An Essay in Esthetics," op. cit., p 46.

with the delights of sense gave were hedonistic literary appreciations or a psychological study. There was no suggestion of a reliable, systematic theory. Prall, on the other hand, not only isolated an autonomous field, but maintained that it was possible to systematically study this field. Aesthetics could be a science as well as physics. It is to be a study of systematic relations, and he himself proceeds to make some such studies, though he admits that his work is only a scratch on the surface. His theory points the way to a possible scientific study, which is a vast study; he praises Birkhoff's Aesthetic Measure as a pioneer study, especially of "balance" in regard to simple polygons. Birkhoff's book shows the complexity that such a study could take.

Prall must have thought he had finally, and for the first time, really put aesthetics on its own feet. This realization does not come until AA, for in AJ he is still, as I said before, not aware of what he has hold of; AJ is much more traditional in conception, starting with a discussion of "beauty" and concerned with value and its record in aesthetic judgments. In AA on the other hand he realizes that his conception of the aesthetic field and the method of studying it puts it on a scientific, not a philosophic basis, and that it is non-normative, so that the break with "philosophies of beauty" is now complete. Prall stands at the beginning of a period in which the main interest in "beauty" has declined.

Aesthetic theory as Prall conceives it again is not entirely new, but belongs to the long tradition of those who

realize that technical knowledge is important. Prall's approach to art is appreciative, not philosophical nor historical, and he suggests the same avenue to appreciation and knowledge as creator's have to take -- intimate, technical acquaintance with the qualitative material of the arts and nature.

9.4 Aesthetic Knowledge and Appreciation.

This notion of aesthetic knowledge poses the next problem for Prall: How can he show that this knowledge is relevant to appreciation? Thus, Prall is forced into investigating the role of cognition, or reason, in old-fashioned terminology, in appreciation. Prall has to link a presentational notion of the aesthetic field, the content of a perceptual experience, with an analytic notion of aesthetic theory, a product of conceptual experience, and show how the latter is relevant to the former.

This problem spills over into other areas of philosophy, involving an epistemological position concerning "knowledge" and its application. Prall developed a dispositional theory of knowledge, where knowledge is the apt disposition of the body to respond and adapt. This gives a nice distinctive twist to the usual emphasis on discrimination in the aesthetic experience, noticing what is individual, which is in the Crocean tradition, as well as explaining the sense presentation of "thick" surface through the notion of what I have called "informing." Prall could take advantage of Santayana's discussion of types and use it for a thoroughly presentational

theory of aesthetics, rather than veering off into an associationalism as Santayana does. At the same time he does not have to make the aesthetic experience a conceptual experience as Croce does, but can make our main interest a value interest.

Prall ties a neat bundle: Knowledge is important for full appreciation; analysis is the instrument for arriving at reliable knowledge; yet with all this we can attend to the sense-presented.

9.5 Expression.

Prall's presentationalism is most threatened by expression. But he cannot side-step it because his expression theory of art forces him to face it. There is nothing distinctive about Prall's theory of art, but his attempt to reconcile it with his notion of the aesthetic field produces his most interesting and most original contribution. I should say that it is also the most important contribution that Prall has to make, contrary to most judgments which fail to see what he was attempting.

Very briefly the distinctive points about Prall's theory of expression are: a) Holding that feelings are qualities and that there is no intrinsic epistemological nor logical priority to be attributed to some qualities and not to others; b) this priority denial results in the denial of dualism, the denial of the mind-body separation; c) this gives

him a basis to deny the mind-privacy of feelings and emotions; d) thus, feelings can be externalized publicly, that is, the same feeling that the expresser had can be reconstituted in the experienced aesthetic object of the spectator; e) the feelings can be said to be sense-presented because they can be analyzed into agreed recognitional features; f) and he now has a basis for holding that the arts are the one means of precise communication.

Not all of these steps are distinctive in themselves, but in combination we do have a distinctive argument. Prall's effort to bring expression into line with his notion of surface is crucial and the result seems to me his most brilliant effort.

9.6 Aesthetic Theory and Criticism.

Prall's notion of analysis, of aesthetic knowledge, is non-normative. He has a definite basis on which to break away from the more traditional aesthetic theories which are devoted to a study of value through beauty, or those devoted to finding "objective criteria" for judging "good" and "bad" art. Aesthetic theory, not being approached as the philosophy of art or beauty is not the handmaiden to the normative function of criticism.

Prall, in effect, suggests an escape from the endless attempts to find justifying criteria for criticism's appraisals of the value of aesthetic objects by talking of the value of criticism rather than the value of aesthetic objects. He

succeeds in shifting the problem by emphasizing the other functions of criticism rather than its normative function. Criticism would do better to affect the cognitive requirements of appreciation rather than making normative statements about the good and bad, to apply aesthetic knowledge to the presented rather than pronouncing injunctions. Thus we talk of the value of criticism as an aid to appreciation rather than the value of the aesthetic object.

Of course Prall acknowledges that critical description involves valuation but the point at issue is the ability of criticism to effectively aid in the appreciation of what the critic appreciated.

These sections are the breakdown of what is distinctive as a whole about Prall's aesthetics, its presentationalism.

CHAPTER X

SOME CRITICISMS

10.1 Chapter Aim.

In this chapter I shall take up some actual criticisms that have been made of Prall that I think are fair in that they do not depend upon a misinterpretation of Prall. I shall make some answers to these criticisms that I think are possible, that is, consistent with the theory as already presented. I shall also take up some possible criticisms. Most of these will not be other than those raised internally, i.e., only those which arise not from alternative theories, but from his own theory. For example, I will not question whether works of art communicate, but given the statement that they do, we want to know how, and what the test of communication is, questions that we would like to have answered if such and such is the case.

10.2 Vagueness: Value, Aesthetic and Feeling.

Prall's notion of value is not all clear. He uses alternative terms in its definition, such as, liking, satisfaction, interest, desire, and finally a motor-affective attitude.

There is a further vagueness about value when we come to the value of beauty. Sometimes he speaks of beauty as if it were identical to one of the above terms, as beauty is identical with value for Santayana, while at other times

beauty seems not to be identical with the value alone but with quality. I have interpreted Prall according to the latter because only then can I knit together the things that he says about beauty. On this view one of the constituents of beauty is value, while it is also made up of the "content" (sub-, form-, unit- and emotional-qualities) that is "perceived." They are fused into one quality, one beauty, and different on each occasion; hence, the plurality of beauty, and its uniqueness.

The term "aesthetic" is used in two senses, "thin" and "thick." We know that they represent a theoretical distinction and not a real separation. Still Prall speaks of "strict" aesthetic surface, sub- and form-qualities, not informed by or modified by extrinsic knowledge. The latter gives surface depth, so that we then have "thick surface." But we can't be sure, when he uses "depth," whether or not he means it to be aesthetic at all. This arises mostly in AJ. He speaks of the ratio of the amount of "strict" aesthetic value to the total value as varying in the different arts, as if the remainder of the total value was not "aesthetic." Music is mostly surface, and here he apparently means "thin" surface, while poetry and prose are hardly aesthetic at all, the only interesting surface of poetry being its rhythm. The value of poetry lies almost exclusively in expression Prall tells us; yet he goes to great pains in AJ, and reaffirms his position in AA, to show that poetry and prose are a mixed art, and that in imagination they really do have surface -- thin? -- and so qualify

as arts after all. He also holds, increasing the sense of paradox, that music is the most expressive of all media.

He has not taken full advantage of his presentationalism in AJ; it would permit him to hold that extrinsic knowledge is consummated on the surface, and, hence, that expressive values are aesthetic values, not non-surface values. Prall pushes this position more in AA, but the question of value doesn't come up there as it does in AJ so that he never does completely clear up the vagueness.[1]

Another crucial term is "feeling." Several people have complained of the vagueness of this term. The context sometimes tells us what is indicated but not always. Too much study is required to find out what can be meant in some cases. I have listed in Section 4.4 some of the ways in which Prall uses the term. They were: Feeling as: 1) sensitivity; 2) awareness; 3) content; 4) response; 5) value; 6) quality.

Aiken finds it possible to take Prall in several of these ways from: "A feeling is never the feeling of nothing." (AA, p 154)[2] The several meanings he finds are:

a) A feeling is a mode of cognition by which something else is perceived. This is one of the ways of dealing with 3) above.

b) A feeling is itself always felt, i.e., perceived. This seems to correspond to a) above.

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[1] See AJ, 221-224, for the best discussion on this matter.

[2] Aiken, "Art as Expression and Surface," ibid., p 92.

c) There is always a consciously present "object of feeling. I believe Aiken has my sixth use in mind.

10.3 Expression and Communication.

One of the main considerations of Prall's aesthetic theory is the notion of expression. Correlatively he stresses communication. Despite the amount of effort he put into working out those notions, there are several questions that remain.

10.31 Intent to Express.

The arts, being human products, are produced with an aim in mind. The aim that differentiates the fine arts from the other arts is the intent to express. To be sure, fine art products must have a satisfying aesthetic surface or we will not admit them to the charmed circle, but this is not a sufficient differentiating criterion for objects of utility may have a satisfying aesthetic surface.

Suppose that we have an art product, and suppose that it has a satisfying surface. If someone asked us to classify it as fine art product or a merely useful object, what criterion would we use? According to Prall's differentiating criterion we should have to ask if it was formed with the intent to express. Is this a good test? This does not seem like a useful criterion in the absence of further criteria to help us decide if "intent" to express was the intention that caused

the forming of this object.

Prall sometimes speaks as if the difference is not in the intent to express, but in its actual expression. We should then have to ask if it does express, and we can well imagine a diversity of answers to this question, so that it does not seem like a good criterion either.

Further, why should we wish to differentiate between the fine and useful arts? Prall does not answer this, but apparently thinks it important, or he would not have bothered making the distinction.

10.32 Communication.

It is clear that we must distinguish expression from communication. Expression involves intent and its attempted execution. Communication is a more complicated transaction for it involves successful execution and apprehension of the expressed in addition to expression.

Prall claims two things about the arts. The first is that they are the most precise modes of communication that we have; expression in the arts is determinate, specific. This involves his second claim, that the resultant expression is untranslatable.

Given these we might ask what criterion we would use to decide if there was a case of communication when P looked at the work of art O. In order for communication to take place P must grasp what the creator intended. In order not

to set up an impossible number of barriers, let us suppose that the creator is still alive, that he knew what he wanted to express, that he in fact was successful in execution and that P is a sensitive observer. How do we know that a communication event in fact occurred? Well, you say, we will ask the creator if this is not what he meant to express, this thing that I understand it, O, to express. But this will do you no good, sir, for you see the expression is untranslatable, and even if you asked him he could only point to O and say, "That is what I intended." There are no synonymous expressions in art or in language for what is in a work of art. So, we in fact never can know if communication took place at all. What happens to such a statement as "The arts are the only precise means of communication that we have."?

Perhaps there is an answer to be found in that pointing that the creator did. Unfortunately Prall does not directly give a detailed answer to how communication actually occurs. By picking carefully perhaps I can build up some idea about the pertinence of pointing, not at the work as a whole, but pointing out its parts; this may be a way of finding out if we are apprehending the same thing.

If the feeling is truly in the work of art, and if we are able to grasp all that is presented to us, then we should be able to "grasp" what is expressed. What form does this grasping take? Is it like perceiving or like possessing? Grasp is a figurative term which does not indicate what actually takes place when and if there really is communication.

First, Prall acknowledges the need for the creation of an object (PosCFCPu) to embody what is intended, something that the observer can perceive.[3]

> But expressed feeling requires as its object what an organism with consciousness can grasp as distinct and individualized and intended, formal fulfillment of feeling, the vagueness and irrelevance gone, the response totally caught up and directed in an object sufficiently complex to engage its whole attentive interest. (AA, 154)

> Significantly aesthetic objects, such as artists are concerned to make and other human beings to appreciate, are on the one hand single qualitative feelings given in apprehension. On the other hand, they are intricate and coherent complexes of aesthetic elements so patterned as to constitute single apprehensible and exciting presentations of feeling, consciously requiring this embodiment to become completely and intelligibly any feeling at all, to become the intended full feeling only suggested in the artist's processes of experience and not defined until he has worked it out in his medium. The feeling is not constituted in its own proper being until the process is complete and the work of art finished. The work of art is aesthetically adequate to just the degree to which the apprehension of the constituent elements in the structure they compose, and present to a normally sensitive human organism, results in this concretely present feeling. In one sense, then, discriminating the elements is the condition of apprehending the particular determinate whole in question. In another sense the discriminated elements as apprehended in their structural relations constitute this whole, so that actually apprehending the qualitative determinate feeling is apprehending the constituents in this way. (AA, 155)

Prall tells us that "feelings are given in apprehension," (ActCFCPu). If the object which embodies the intended feeling is apprehended, i.e., if the elements and the structure

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[3] All italics in the remainder of this chapter will be mine unless otherwise indicated.

of the object are apprehended, then apprehension will "result" in "this concretely present feeling." This assumes that the feeling we concretely have will be the same that the artist embodied, and intended to embody if he was equal to his task. This depends on the further assumption that the apprehension of the details of a work of art will result in this, and only this, feeling. There is no hint here of the possibility of several interpretations. I shall examine both of these assumptions after the next paragraph.

Can we count on this feeling to hit us without any effort on our part? If we have been well trained, then we should get the concrete feeling without apparent striving.

> Training in aesthetic perception is the cultivation of habits that discriminate details so readily that their meaning, as we call it, is read off unconsciously and integrated in the larger but equally determinate effect that we feel as this individual expression of faith or this specifically presented case of dilapidation. (AA, 159)

Prall stresses the discrimination of details, so that if we attend to them and the feeling we get from them, all these feelings will blend, integrate, fuse into the single qualitative feeling that the artist felt and intended to embody; he will have put such elements in such relations that when they enter into a perceptual transaction with a trained perceiver the feeling will be constituted.

> But if the picture is adequate to the sort of intention that defines a work of art, it certainly will put on the canvas such spatial and colored elements in such color and space relations as trained perception will apprehend to constitute this feeling. (AA, 160)

The notion that the intended feeling is communicated if we experience the same feeling that the artist intended gains further support in the following quotation.

> Language cannot name the feeling here given; for language cannot reach, in these regions of light and color and volume, the specification that constitutes the quality of an actual, determinate, individual picture. The point of the picture, its effective being, is just this embodied feeling that we have, if with open sensitive eyes we look at it and let its character become the content of our own affective conscious life at the moment. (AA, 163)

We can see why Prall would want to hold that communication in the arts is precise if this is the case, for the feeling is not indicated but presented, "Here it is. Experience it." It becomes part of our life also. This seems to be the best interpretation of the notion of "present." In one sense it is there to see or hear, in the sense that the elements and relations are out there to be seen and heard and they constitute, are, the feeling. They are feeling made public. The feeling is communicated when someone else feels it privately, makes it their own. The communication event is then complete. "Grasp" and "apprehend" then mean "possess," an actual experience of the feeling.

"But communication is never altogether pure and undefiled." (AA, 163) This reservation is a wise one to make, for Prall may already have been claiming too much precision.

> And while much of this character depends on formal sensuous elements as such, the very nature of these forms, so often derived from nature and human experience, brings into art the non-formal significance attached to the same forms in nature and life. (AA, 165)

The situation is more complicated than first represented, for attending to the elements and their structure is not all that we have to contend with. If what we bring with us modifies the feeling we get from the previous discimination, and given that we have all had different experiences in relation to the form presented to us, won't we have different feelings in our possession? This seems to make the second assumption questionable and leaves open the possibility of several interpretations. If it is questionable, then of course we do not have that <u>exact</u> feeling that the author put into the object. Going back to our first difficulty, verifying the occurrence of communication, how are we going to know if we diverge very much? I will take this up in the next section.

Is the original problem solved? Not completely. We still have no way of knowing if communication really has taken place, but we know now that pointing involves pointing to elements and their relations. We do so in the hope that a person who discriminates them and their relations will <u>automatically</u> experience the feeling -- providing they have had sufficient training.

But this is being too hopeful, for --

> ... the senses too are instruments of our whole responding self, and they function to give us only the vaguest sensory data unless we have the organic means of correlating them into a whole. If that whole is a feeling totally out of the range of our powers, because it is conditioned by a complex of processes that we <u>cannot attain</u> even with the fully determinate physical character of the object to <u>guide</u> the articulation of our <u>response</u>, then our only help is to enlarge our capacities, to

> cultivate greater flexibility and range of perceptual and emotional apprehension. (AA, 166-167)

There is another reason to suppose that "automatically" is too hopeful, and it indicates another difficulty. Prall talks of a focus analysis; such an analysis has no relevance unless guided by the expressed feeling. We cannot tell what function the parts have to the whole unless guided by this feeling, so that the feeling has to precede the analysis. This means that elements may function in more than one way.

Still Prall sometimes talks as if the discrimination of all the factors in a work of art necessarily lead to the same feeling, as if the elements could function in one way only, could contribute to only one feeling. This does not seem self-evident, and Prall does not argue for it. I shall take this up in Section 10.34. Further, even supposing that the elements and their relations necessarily did lead to one and only one feeling, we still have to take cognizance of the fact that the feelings we bring with us from outside the work of art modify our feeling derived from the elements. This is one of the difficulties of the presentational view. What we bring with us does not simply "inform" our vision, it modifies it. Prall, however, expresses confidence that all irrelevancies will drop out if we practice discrimination.

> To the ear trained to listen, and to hear the actual technical structure presented, neither the confusion nor the irrelevant feeling and imagery and ideas are present. For this ear takes in an actually and objectively defined structure of sound, and this sensuous structural content itself demands full and active powers of attention which are absorbed in discriminating its details in

> their coherent connection, and so in receiving from it its own specification of feeling and emotion, which is not merely relevant but specifically and uniquely and unambiguously expressive. There is no "interpretation" of music as such, except just that minutely specified feeling and emotion that is summoned and sustained by sounds in definite succession and combination, striking upon an ear capable of hearing them when it listens. (AJ, 211)

10.33 Varied Response.

We saw before that it is difficult to tell if communication has taken place even if it really has taken place; but we also saw that it seems overhopeful to believe that we automatically will have the same feeling as the creator intended, or really did put into the work of art. In this section I draw attention to the variation in response between different observers, rather than difference between what the observer received and what the creator intended.

The same reasons given before, of the modification made by feelings for forms brought from outside the work of art, and doubts about the automatic and necessary feeling attending discrimination, now make us wonder about the identity of response among observers. The variety of response among observers has always been the strongest and most popular argument of those who doubt if the feeling expressed really is in the work of art. For such people any expressed feelings that occur in the aesthetic transaction are attributed to our response to what is heard and/or the associations aroused. Our feeling response indicates the arousing power of the

thing seen or heard. Peacefulness really isn't in the sculptured face. It only looks like a face with which some, though not everyone, associates peacefulness. This association is aroused, though hushed, attached, and then (erroneously) attributed to this sculptured face.

Peacefulness is not a property of the object like hardness, or the color green is. As I have interpreted Prall the feeling response is aroused by a work of art (PosCFCPu); but the feeling-of-the-peacefulness-of-the-face (ActCFCPu) is aroused because peacefulness is in the face. Our arousal is also a <u>recognition</u>, while the other view holds that arousal is not a recognition, and that any apparent recognition and attribution of the feeling to the sculpture is a <u>projection</u>. (SB, 234-235)

Now Prall holds there is a sense in which the specific feeling aroused is untranslatable; so we cannot finally tell if responses do vary! This is using untranslatability to Prall's advantage instead of his disadvantage.

But surely we can give the feeling a <u>general</u> name. This should be sufficient to indicate a difference in response, so that the use of the untranslatability argument by Prall is not conclusive. If someone says that the face is peaceful and another says it shows masked turmoil, surely we have enough indication to show that the responses are different. But suppose they have the same feeling; still one could call it peacefulness and the other could call it masked turmoil. It might be replied that we must assume some unanimity of emotion lan-

guage; if not we are in a hopeless daze. (This is not an argument, but an act of faith.)

Prall never considers the varied-response argument anywhere, though he must surely have been aware of it. What kind of an answer does his aesthetics supply? He might take one or both of the following tacks.

First, he might say that the person who sees masked turmoil is letting his associations interfere with his perception. But there is a difficulty here. How can we decide that the masked-turmoil man is the one who is not perceiving correctly? Perhaps the peacefulness man is incorrect. How shall we settle the accusations that fly between them now? Prall doesn't supply a sufficient criterion for telling if peacefulness <u>really</u> is there or is not, since the only criterion he gives is response, and we have that all right, only we have two different responses.

> Aesthetics, like all other knowledge, makes its generalizations on the <u>assumption</u> that human organisms in perceptual-affective response are not totally <u>various</u>, but largely alike. Since the one test of communication is <u>response</u>, since response is affective as well as intellectual, affective content in any given case must be for all men sufficiently resembling to be amenable to generalization, if there is any full communication among men at all. (AA, 176)

But it is just this assumption of sameness of perceptual-affective response that is being challenged. It is not enough to make an assumption. Yet Prall might argue, the other side has also had recourse to an assumption. They have to assume some similarity of emotion language. The varied-response argument assumes that each man will call the

same feeling by the same name, or alternatively, that the use of the same name indicates that they have the same feeling. They must in order to maintain that they may have different feelings because they gave their feeling response different names. Both make a crucial assumption. Which are we to rely on for communication purposes, works of art or discursive language? How could I know what you were talking about, i.e., how could you and I communicate, unless we meant the same thing by peacefulness? Which are we to rely on, language or art? Prall gives no arguments why we should accept his alternative. I shall not carry the argument beyond this point, that is, I shall not attempt to settle it. To go further would be beyond the intent of this study.

A second kind of answer, though in the end it comes to much the same thing, is somewhat different. Instead of holding that one observer is allowing his associations, which are irrelevant, to interfere, it might be claimed that one of the observers does not know enough to fuse the elements and relations that constitute that feeling into a unitary feeling. We saw that he did hold that this could occur, and the observer would then fail to get the intended feeling. This would account for the difference between two observers; one has learned to fuse and the other one has not.

The feeling of blue is largely unlearned, being physiological only, and occurs automatically if our eye sight is normal; but the feeling of peacefulness is more difficult to perceive because we have to learn to fuse it. Now the fact

that one man hasn't learned to fuse the elements and relations that constitute peacefulness into a perception of peacefulness doesn't mean that peacefulness isn't there. Someone could say that there *is* peacefulness there and begin to point out the elements that go to make it up, *i.e.*, give a focus analysis. He would have to teach the other person how to fuse.

But suppose someone else thought that there indeed resided masked turmoil and also began to give fusion lessons. This leads to another problem.

10.34 Single Elements and Expressiveness.

If people are going to give fusion lessons, and if we are going to be able to *demonstrate* that peacefulness is there rather than masked turmoil, then we are going to have to hold that the elements and their relations have an expressiveness which we can rely on. This is allied with what I said before concerning the *necessity* of getting a unitary feeling if we have discriminated all the elements and their relations.

Before we can hope to demonstrate that one feeling is embodied rather than another, we shall have to hold that an apprehension of the factors analyzed *necessarily* does lead to such and such an integrated feeling. In order to show this is the case the problem of the expressiveness of single elements and relations has to be explored. If the feeling F necessarily expressed by the color C? That is, will everyone see C as expressing F? To affirm this seems to involve

holding an intrinsic order of feelings.

According to the intrinsic-order doctrine of elements, orange being what it is in its intrinsic nature, must necessarily appear between red and yellow. Is there an expressiveness attaching to orange which is what it is just because it is orange and stands between red and yellow? "Pale blue feels milder than flaming red just as definitely and accurately as it feels pale blue." (AA, 148) This statement seems to indicate that the necessity of intrinsic orders applies to feelings also, but it is not developed by Prall. C. Hartshorne does consider this question, and at some length. On this issue he says:

> The "affective" tonality, the aesthetic or tertiary quality, usually supposed to be merely "associated with" a given sensory quality is, in part at least, identical with that quality, one with its nature or essence. Thus, the "gaiety" of yellow (the peculiar highly specific gaiety) is the yellowness of the yellow. The two are identical in that the "yellowness" is the unanalyzed and but denotatively identified X of which the "gaiety" is the essential description or analysis.[4]

If what Hartshorne says is true, and if we hold to the notion of intrinsic orders, then the identification of the affective feeling and color would mean that there is an intrinsic order of feelings. However, in Section 7.83, I have argued against identification in the case of Prall, and the above quote from Prall gives no indication of identifica-

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[4] Charles Hartshorne, The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) p 7.

tion, but rather of two feelings. We know that he holds color to be a feeling, as in blue is the way the sky feels to me. Simple elements are not so simple.

A difficulty standing in the way of acceptance of intrinsic feeling orders is conditioning. The feeling that blue gives to a "pure and undefiled" subject is often modified by acquired attitudes. There attitudes interfere with the "pure" operation of intrinsic orders of feeling, hence with the demonstration of peacefulness, and hence with the necessity of getting this feeling if only we discriminate accurately. Perhaps this can be gotten around, but Prall has indicated no answer.

10.35 Presentationalism and Language.

If one wants to develop a presentational aesthetic theory which includes within the aesthetic field only that which is directly presented, how does one handle language? Prall admits that the beauty of poetry and prose is hardly "strictly" aesthetic at all, owing most of their beauty to their expressiveness. This expressiveness is not directly consummated on a surface like it is in painting, a sculpture or music, but is executed by virtue of symbols which refer beyond themselves. The actual printed words, or the sounds heard when poetry is read are the direct sensuous surface of the language arts, and are not of much value in themselves.

Does Prall's theory thus have a limitation which he

cannot excape? Can his aesthetics handle all of the arts? Prall realizes the problem.

> But at the best, language could only hint at what is to be had through human eyes in color and shape and space and line. And our very need of the arts, their unique functional value, rests on their expressing -- and hence communicating -- what language cannot express directly in any case; for what language gives us directly is only words, conventional symbols, the meaning of which is to be found only in concrete non-verbal content. (AA, 163-164)

Prall tries to meet the problem in two ways:

> Art in other words presents (Prall's italics) meanings. When an indirect symbolic medium like language functions aesthetically, it is in two possible ways. Completely familiar words in completely familiar linguistic structures are transparent . They are not fully heard but heard through (Prall's italics) ... When they are not heard but heard through (Prall's italics), what they present is their meanings, not themselves. When language presents content by such transparent functioning, this content is not verbal at all, but fully imaginal and emotional. In the second place, words may be so placed with other words, not conventionally but poetically, and so integrated in specific contexts, that we find them in rhythm and in skillful connotation -- which again is not verbal but imaginal -- leading us to feelings which are not their meanings as separate words and phrases and sentences, but presented feeling, a content actually received by way of the sounds and presented imaginal content. (AA, 164)

In trying to meet the problem in two ways, he in effect has two surfaces. When, through imaginal content, he makes literature a mixed art, (since imaginal content covers all the materials) he makes the imaginal content the surface. Early in AJ, on page 13, he included in surface that which is presented by imagination. Thus his notion of surface is not confined to that which is directly presented through the

senses now, but includes that which was directly presented at some other time, and now called up in the imagination as sensuous content. This sensuous content is for Prall the determinate meaning of symbols. Thus Prall's presentationalism is not confined to present (in time) direct presentation, though these quotations make it clear by italics and repetition that he thinks art presents (directly) meanings. This view about language opens the imagination flood-gates to the other arts, but Prall doesn't discuss its effects on his presentational theory for the other arts.

Prall also wants to make the sound of the words (and we can include their appearance on paper, etc.) the surface of the language arts. This is the directly presented surface. Its presence indicates what is indicated in other asides that one finds scattered through Prall's books, that he sometimes feels inclined to confine the term "aesthetic" to what is usually considered the directly presented, sub- and form-qualities. This is another aspect of the vagueness of "aesthetic" that I mentioned in Section 10.2

Which one of these is the surface? Or is the fusion of the two surface? If it is the imaginal content or the fusion, then Prall makes it difficult to maintain a presentational notion of surface. This has some bearing on the issue of the nature of the work of art, which I mentioned only briefly in Section 6.27.

10.4 The Art Object.

In discussing which one Prall means to be the surface of the language arts, I can also indicate how this leads to the problem of the nature of the work of art. Consider the language arts as analogous to music. Are the words to the score as the literary object is to the music?

If some one asked us to specify what the musical work of art is, we might point to the score, or we might say it is the heard interpretation of the score, or the imagined sounds, when the score is read, to make it more analogous to literature. In his two books, Prall always speaks of music as heard music, the heard music being the musical work of art. The collection of notes could then be taken as the "control" object (PosCFCPu) the embodiment of the artist's technique, which, if we follow the directions of his technique, are held over into the present. This involves an extension of the notion of technique as being potentially active in the physical object which preserves this technique. The physical marble is the embodied technique of the artist.

Is not this solution open to Prall? The words are not the literary art object, any more than the notes are the musical art object, but are the physical means of preserving the artist's technique, which technique guides the occurrence of, or controls the occurrence of, the imaginative sensuous content. (ActCFCPu). The words are like the notes of the music. As such we are not interested in the appearance of the notes on

the page. They are not relevant to the music as heard, except as they control our activities, such as, what notes to play, at what tempo, and how loud. The visual appearance does not add to the heard appearance of the notes, though they may be instrumental in what heard notes appear. Prall doesn't carry this notion through in language, for he seems to want to preserve the sound of the words as well as what is imagined.

In keeping both sound and imaginal content in language he is closer to his analysis of the other arts than he is to his notion of music, for in sculpture the physical object is not merely the control object. Part of its beauty is the material, the sheen of the marble, its clarity and smoothness.

Further, as I mentioned in Sections 4.4 and 6.27, Prall's views seem to be that the work of art is the funded experiences. An art object may change for us on every seeing or hearing, and just because we have heard it or seen it before. On this view the art object can never be pointed to in its finality. (Note that this jeapordizes the accuracy of communication.)

Now one might ask if this notion of art as experience (ActCFCPu) (the title of Dewey's book) doesn't allow Prall to include the direct surface and the indirect surface into a funded experience, (the third, or fusion alternative) that in fact he has to if he is to have a unitary quality as the essence of the work of art, and if he is not to bifurcate that which belongs to the "object" (smoothness, clarity) and that which belongs to the "subject" (acute awareness attributed to the statue of a human body). This might be a good answer if it

did not leave us with one more problem, and that is the question of the relevance of certain experiences. Then does not Prall have to allow anything that is funded to be properly funded? If smoothness is relevant to the appreciation of the statue, is not the squareness of the notes revelant to the appreciation of the heard music?

Again, I do not wish to investigate all the problems that are raised, as here in a discussion of the nature of the work of art, but only indicate that there is still work to be done on a presentational theory beyond that done by Prall.

10.5 Uniqueness and Value.

Even a cursory reading of Prall's books will leave one with an impression of his emphasis on the specificity and uniqueness of works of art. Prall holds that a work of art which does not have a unique quality is conventional, imitative, and of little value.

> This unique individuality not only constitutes the essential character and hence value in works of art, but also ... (AA, 187)

Standards for judging the value of non-imitative works of art are in the end not applicable, for they do not apply to the unique character but the common character; neither in their cognitive capacity do they help us grasp the unique, hence, does not lead to an appreciation of the unique value of a work of art.

> Thus critics require familiarity with patterns at all levels of complexity if they are to be

> able even to see what is before them. But no such knowledge will give them the individual character of a genuinely original expression in art; for it is the very nature of such expression to mold instrumentalities to the fulfillment of a unique intention; and important artists are marked by the degree to which such molding of instrumentalities to fresh purposes take place in their work, as truly as by the individuality of the intention itself. (AA, 184-185)

> What specifies any aesthetic composition in its individuality is, as we have seen, the unique feeling expressed by it. (AA, 186)

Prall does not make clear why so much emphasis should be placed on uniqueness, why it should be specially valued. If the necessary constituent of value is the motor-affective attitude, liking or satisfaction, what difference does it make if that which is valued is or is not unique? Someone may appreciate, value, the most banal picture in the world, or he may miss the "unique feeling" and hence "unique value" of a highly original work of art but still like the picture. If he values the banal picture or the wrong thing in a picture, why should we condemn this?

On what basis can we consider one value more "proper" than another one? Must there not be something else accomplished by the uniqueness of a work of art besides its uniqueness to set it apart? Prall does not mention anything else. Perhaps it is that uniqueness provides something to value. It is better, on this view, to increase the number of valuable things in the world than to create works of art imitating those we already have.

One might also argue that an artist has revealed some-

thing else about our world that was not evident to us before we experienced his work of art. The art object then has cognitive significance, and it is this which is the additional accomplishment of the unique work of art. Prall does not mention this. On such a view, one could also insist that the unique point be grasped, for if we do not, then its cognitive significance is lost. It is not enough to enjoy whatever one can.

Unless it is pointed out why the unique should have a special place, there is no reason to insist that someone get the unique point of a work of art. Is not one pleasure as good as another? This question allows the possible answer -- Mill's -- that qualitatively pleasures are different; one could say that unique qualities give qualitatively better pleasures.

Perhaps there is a kind of answer we can make out of Prall if we consider the notion of "novelty." He makes much of novelty when he discusses form. For Prall the purpose of novelty is to sustain our interest in the created product. If the human body is sculpted in such a way that nothing novel comes over, we soon lose interest in it. Our interest is not constantly refreshed when we begin to discriminate the banal. Thus uniqueness has a functional justification -- without it we soon grow bored and find no pleasure, no liking, hence no value.

However, this does not quite touch all the problems, for he does not seem to be speaking functionally in the quo-

tations I have given, but of the value of uniqueness itself, apart from how it functions. Further, suppose we get an observer who is not acquainted with the feeling expressed by a work of art, one to whom it is in fact unique. To someone else it might well be banal. Uniqueness is a relative term, depending on the amount of acquaintance someone has with the arts. The connoisseur is easily bored, but the young novice is delighted with the sumptuous "new" fields that lay before him.

One can see that freshness becomes a requisite for those who are well acquainted with an art form. In that case, it is not uniqueness itself which is valued, but the uniqueness in its interest-retaining function. Prall has made this out, but he sometimes seems to go beyond this.

10.6 The "Adequate" Picture.

Although Prall decries the use of any standard for valuating, he does seem to slip in a standard in a couple of places. We have already seen that he has a standard when he holds that "important artists" are ones who have uniqueness of intention and the ability to give it expression. Thus a work of art must express something unique or its value is not great. We noted before that to a student not acquainted with work in the past, this may mean nothing, and the work really can be fresh to him, so that any judgment along these lines is relative to the person viewing the work in question.

Important artists have fresh purposes and the technical means to express them, hence adequate works of art are those which express this fresh purpose.

> The work of art is aesthetically adequate to just the degree to which the apprehension of the constituent elements in the structure which they compose, and present to a normally sensitive human organism, results in this concretely present feeling.[5]

Thus Prall seems to have a qualitative standard here, some degree of uniqueness, by which he judges the value of a work of art. A work of art is adequate insofar as it is constructed in such a way that a trained observer can grasp this uniqueness.

10.7 The Qualifications of the Critic.

If Prall is serious about his uniqueness criterion, then one of the critic's qualifications must be his knowledge of the works of art of an art form so that he can tell if this is really a fresh expression. If he isn't historically informed he will not be a reliable judge of the quality of uniqueness.

A critic must also be acquainted with the materials of an art, as well as the technical means of that art form. Further, he must have emotional flexibility, and he must be able to speak for other men. Since the value of criticism rests on the qualifications of the critic, this is a crucial point for Prall. We also know that the critic must have a good grasp

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5 AA, 155. On the same and succeeding pages he has much the same thing to say again.

of his own art form, literature, if he is to express the feeling he had in the presence of the work of art, and infect us with his vision. These are all agreeable enough characteristics, though it must be confessed that they are vague. Statements like the following don't help us to be clear about the qualifications of the critic either. "Thus the critic must be of noble character, comprehensive mind and sound judgment." (STV, 270)

Prall has other statements which clearly indicate that the value of criticism for him rests on the critic.

> The most adequate critic is simply the most adequate human being ... The best criticism is simply the most accurate expression of the most fully human response. (STV, 277)

> Criticism depends for its fulness and value upon his normality and his logical acumen, and for its importance upon <u>his</u> importance, upon his adequacy, that is, to speak for human beings. (STV, 285)

In trying to set up a standard for good criticism Prall has to set up norms for a good critic, since he holds that the value and validity of criticism depends on the critic. In other words he has to set up the "normal" critic. What is the "normal" critic? Now we know that Prall does not think he should be <u>average</u>, at least not in his knowledge of the technique, the partial patterns nor the examples of the art form in which he practices criticism. His knowledge of these must be above average. If it is not, then he will not be able to carry out his educative function upon which Prall lays so much stress.

But what about another important qualification of the critic, his emotional capacity? Is the critic to be average in his emotional capacity? Prall thinks that the critic should have emotional flexibility or sensibility. He also thinks that the critic must be able to speak for other human beings; in order to speak for other human beings the critic must be an "adequate human being," but what this can mean in connection with his emotional capacity is not clear. In trying to see what Prall intends in regard to emotional flexibility, "the most adequate man," it can be approached through this "ability to speak for other men."

There are at least three possibilities for an adequate critic. a) One can think of the adequate critic as <u>average</u> in his emotional capacity. His reactions are those which would be common to most men. His educational and social background has been such that if he is presented with O he will react emotionally the same way that most men would. This interpretation fits into Prall's emphasis on man's "common nature" which appears in some quotations that are given in the next section.

b) A second possibility is to think of the critic as being <u>normal</u> in the sense that he is healthy. One would then have to find a criterion for a "healthy" human being. It might be given by the psychiatric branch of medicine. This possibility is not identical with the first one, for it is possible that the "average" emotional development is warped, unhealthy, unadjusted, for example. Prall seems to suggest this

possible meaning in the quotation given above -- "Criticism depends for its ... validity upon his normality ..." It seems also suggested by the term "adequate." The adequate critic might not be speaking for most men in this case, but for most human beings.

c) A third possibility lies in taking "flexibility" and "sensibility" literally -- readily adjustable to varying conditions. The most adequate critic would be one who could vary the conditions of observation and get several emotional reactions, flex his reactions. I have in mind here the kind of thing Stevenson discusses in his essay on "Interpretation." On this view of adequacy, the critic could speak for most men because he can react from various points of view; he can speak for more than the average man.

Prall does not tell us which view he takes about the "most adequate critic," but I think that the third possibility is a weak one. Prall has committed himself to precise communication too much to make this one palatable; nor do the problems of alternative interpretations arise as they naturally would from this interpretation of "adequacy." Further, by flexible Prall sometimes seems to mean that the critic can adjust himself to the uniquenesses of several different works rather than several different reactions to one work.

If the value of criticism is to rest on the "adequate critic", then Prall's theory is weak at this point in that it fails to be more definite about the "adequate critic."

10.8 The Fiction of a Common Nature.

A qualification of the critic's which is of primary importance, one which permits him to speak and recommend for others, is that he have a nature similar to other men's. It need not be similar to all men's, but to some men.

> But it is through men's common nature, not through their differences, that they know and serve one another, as Spinoza long ago taught. It is only by their like ways of functioning that communication is possible at all, and hence that science is a general possession. Aesthetics, like all other knowledge, makes its generalizations on the assumption that human organisms in perceptual-affective response are not totally various, but largely alike. (AA, 176)

Prall is making an assumption about men's common nature. He sees the importance of it, not only for criticism and aesthetics, but all knowledge and communication. Yet in another place he speaks of the "fiction of identical common natures."

> Even if the abandonment of such antiquated realism in other fields were too shocking to minds habituated to the convenient fiction of identical common natures as necessary to give meaning to class names, and so also to general adjective terms, which are in fact quite another matter, it is plain enough that in aesthetic theory we cannot arrive at the individuality of any particular work of art by any definition that fits anything else. (AA, 187)
>
> It should be fairly easy to see, not only that the assumption of a common defining nature in them (works of art) is highly dubious, but that the fact that they exemplified such a common nature -- if this were (italics Prall's) a fact -- would be quite beside the point, so far as insight into their actual felt character is concerned. (AA, 187)
>
> Is this fiction not equally dubious in the case of

human nature? With works of art it is their uniqueness that is important, while with observers it is their commonalty that is important. Why should not the unique part of a man's reaction be the most important part, just as it is in works of art; and since Prall admits that men are not totally alike, uniqueness is possible for their reactions.

In admitting that men are not totally various, he is holding that there is something which is identical in all men, in virtue of which they are men, I suppose. Thus it is that some men can speak for other men. But what does it mean to say that one man is more adequate to speak for others than another man? Is he more of man? How can one possess more of a common nature? These questions do not come up for Prall, perhaps because in another place he holds that the idea of a common nature is a "fiction."

APPENDIX

From Aesthetic Judgment

E1 pp 184-185

> It is only as works of art give specification -- not linguistic names or any other sort of symbols merely, but actual present determination for direct sense perception -- to human feelings, emotions, desires, and satisfactions, embodied in the sensuous surface and felt upon it as being its character and quality -- only so do they share in the nature of actual concrete works of fine art.

E2 pp 213-214

> But this expressive functioning (in poetry) does not take place through linguistic symbolism alone, which is common to verse and the least artistic character, including its strictly aesthetic surface, which by means of sounds and rhythms is a verbal and auditory specification of the exact emotional effect that it embodies and thus expresses.

E3 p 215

> If music is itself expressive, ... then it is because through an arrangement of sounds as such express meaning and significance can come to the mind.

E4 p 215

> The passage expresses that which it does express simply by specifying, to the alert and listening mind, that precise, sensuous, rhythmical, auditory pattern that is directly received as the nature or pattern of a human feeling or emotion, now clearly defined in sound through the ear to the mind.

E5 p 216

> As music may be solemn or gay, or rhapsodic or triumphant, so obviously enough any particular music expresses in its own particular degree, and in its absolutely determinate pattern and fullness, just that precise, determinate feeling that is externalized in its determinate form and filling of sound.

E6 pp 216-217

> So color and shape and rhythm as such have also their expressiveness, not only through representation, but again, like music, in those particular sensuous

kinds of specification that they are capable of, namely, those of design and color and texture and rhythmic pattern.

F7 p 217

... and drawings and paintings and sculpture externalize to our view yearnings and meanings, and seem somehow to make immediately present to sense the attributes and ideas, and even the fundamental significance, of the universe and of human destiny.

E8 p 222 (Contrast his use of "immediately present" above and in the following quote:)

It is clear then that strictly surface beauty is not the full beauty of works of the fine arts or even of nature, since the surface of such objects is felt as revealing more and deeper beauty than that of this immediately present sensuous surface which is strictly called aesthetic.

E9 (The two seem to be reconciled by the following:)

... the bare sensuous surface, though it may be theoretically distinguished with perfect clarity -- and the distinction is one of great importance -- as that content which is immediately present to sense in a surface form or structure, is never present to sense alone.

(For, sense plus mind, perception and intuition, are single processes.)

E10 p 224

So the aesthetic surface holds up to view in its very form and content not only the sensuous elements as such in a structural coherence, but all that they or their structural form may summon of varied imagery immediately associated with them by the mind, all that they may reveal as technical perfection consummated in their form and texture, all that they may signify of ideas, through these elements and forms taken as transparent symbols, and all that they may express by direct and detailed specification, in sensuous media, of the passions, desires, and objective satisfactions of men. If the aesthetic surface is as such and at its thinnest only a sensuous delight, at its thickest and deepest it is the revelation in external and objective form of the last aspirations of men.

E11 p 224

> ... and this expressiveness consists in significant specification, the direct delineation of such elaborated and finished spatial and temporal configurations as make present to the mind its own passionate and vivid actuality, externalized in the objective determinate beauties of works of art.

E12 p 226

> How adequately exprssive they (works of art) are depends on the native physical possibilities of their medium, the perfection of the technique applied to it, and the vitality and power and skill of the artist intent upon the expression of the meaning he feels within and seeks to make explicit upon the surface of experience for the common view of all men.

E13 p 248

> So that it is clear enough that actual aesthetic surface specification upon physical objects, human bodies or not, is what we call, even in life, the expression of human traits or moral sentiments, or any other quality that appears to the eye in the world about it.
>
> The expressiveness of art, then, is no unfamiliar phenomenon so far as it is merely one case of physical objects revealing on their surface, and thus specifying the characteristics they express.

E14 p 249

> ... so that, whether he has a model, or not, what he puts into permanent structural form or design is the significance of that design as given on an aesthetic surface, the expression of himself, of course, but also the expression of what he feels as the possibilities of his medium to specify quality, character, meaning.

E15 p 240

> ... music can thus indubitably render external and make explicit to men's ears the articulation of their felt passions, and this so precisely as to constitute the individual expression of an individual human being in a recognizable musical style.

E16 p 263

> ... any transparently effective functioning of a building of any sort, since it comes at once to be defined in terms of that function, also expresses, even if crudely, some of the character and quality of such functioning in its own specifications in spatial form apparent to sense.

F17 p 264

> On the other hand, the frank fulfillment of specific purpose upon a structure, the mere making of a long clear line of protecting roof against trees on a windy slope, or the lines of firm flat foundations achieving a convenient resting place there for human feet, though the aesthetic surface achieved may be itself almost negligible, express security, comfort, peace, protection, and so give to the aesthetic surface a beauty of expression hard to distinguish from the beauty of that surface strictly taken, since it is upon it that these qualities appear.

E18 p 300

> Since the arts are works of mind and spirit, carried out in such natural material as is itself only physical stuff, beauty being wrought upon it by human imaginative intention, working through an appropriate technique of operation and thus externalizing in defined form and structure a mental or spiritual content, this beauty of works of art has been felt quite naturally to be humanly significant and expressive as nature could not be.

E19 p 303

> What we need now to add is the sense in which natural beauty is also definitely expressive ... If mountain storms are not human or divine wrath, if black clouds do not intentionally threaten destruction to trees and animals and wayfarers, these same storms and clouds do literally in their actual appearance exhibit such violence and power as human wrath itself only mildly displays.

E20 pp 303-304

> If to express is to give outward sensuous and formal specification to meanings, characters, qualities, and significant activities, then floods present

us, if not with the fear they inspire, at least with fearfulness itself. Trees, if only figuratively patient, are literally sturdy and lasting.

E21 p 304

Nature's actual surface in its aesthetic particulars thus gives us the last terms in our definitions of even the most humanly or the most divinely significant meanings.

E22 p 305

But there are those who still insist that nature, instead of being beautiful and expressive in the various aspects of its aesthetic surface as such, is only so if taken symbolically ... For any clear mind, however, it is difficult to see how there could be relevance in such symbols at all, did they not bear upon their aesthetic surface some of the actual nature or character that they are taken to symbolize.

E23 p 311

If their sensuous surface and their form is not positively offensive on strict aesthetic grounds, its value, even for disinterested contemplation, is not merely that of this not unpleasing surface content, but all the associated images and feelings that are involved in the recognition of it as what it and what it means on our world, functioning as it does, and integrally related as it is, in our lives and interests.

E24 p 311

But natural as well as manufactured objects become thus familiarly acceptable to sense, and they too may express in their appearance the friendly or sustaining functions that they serve.

E25 pp 311-312

As in art expressiveness is a great part of its vitality and fulness of beauty, so much of nature has more of expressive beauty upon its surface than would appear to the eye of a mind innocent of all experience except that of bare sense perception. Not that the strictly and narrowly aesthetic beauty is increased in such cases, or that the strictly and narrowly aesthetic lack of beauty is not felt;

but that the aesthetically satisfying surface, seen for example as the surface of water, is grasped in intuition as expressive of refreshment and coolness, its beauty therefore deeper and more voluminous and stirring than its merely aesthetic surface loveliness, however beautiful the surface may happen to be.

From Aesthetic Analysis

E26 p 145

And since the simplest thinking finds that works of art do express feeling, we are forced by the obvious character of our data to look for feeling within presented content, as an aspect of it, that is, integral to its actually present character, or as its unitary qualitative nature as a whole.

E27 p 147

An experience is aesthetic just so far as it is full felt response to what is directly given.

E28 pp 147-148

And if we were only free of the cultivated but factitious view that feeling is not defined in what is felt, but is in some mysterious way within us, and yet not "really" or "objectively" in our world, there would be no difficulty in seeing that the sensuous presentations of art directly embody feeling, that they are those bodies the presented nature of which is the presence of feeling determinately exhibited.

E29 pp 152-153

If we ask what degree of the grave or solemn, the despairingly sad, it expresses, we shall of course have to give specifications of tempo, loudness, timbre, rhythm, pitch sequence, and so on? These terms, applicable literally to the music, precisely specify the feeling. All solemnity is somewhat slow in time. Quick solemnity is a contradiction in terms; hence the feeling called solemnity is expressed at a slow tempo.

E30 p 153

> But such large general terms as solemnity, slowness, ponderousness of movement, will not do to make out fully determinate meaning or character ... We cannot specify even these kinds or degrees except in terms of the determinate objective presentations directly apprehended.

E31 pp 153-154

> The present objects need not be outside our bodies, of course. A toothache is a perfectly determinate and characteristic feeling, of its own unique degree, in any given case, of intensity and extent. It is not, however, an object expressed; for it has no intelligible structure that fully clarifies it to us, nor is it -- and this is the main point here -- the conscious externalizing and completing of felt intention by operations upon a medium. Artistic technique consists in clarifying feelings by means of such operations, completing in external structural form an apprehensible content.

E32 p 155

> Significant aesthetic objects ... are intricate and coherent complexes of aesthetic elements so patterned as to constitute single apprehensible and exciting presentations of feeling, consciously requiring this embodiment, to become completely and intelligibly any feeling at all, to become the intended full feeling only suggested in the artist's processes of experience and not defined until he has worked it out in his medium.

E33 p 155

> The work of art is aesthetically adequate to just the degree to which the apprehension of the constituent elements in the structure they compose, and present to a normally sensitive human organism, results in this concretely present feeling.

E34 p 157

> The content, then, when we are presented with such shapes, natural or useful, is directly seen and felt as these familiar things, or at least, as the shapes and appearances of these familiar things. And no one who has lived in the civilized world can grasp a house in attention and dwell on

what it presents to his eyes, without responding in some of the ways in which we regularly respond to the sight of a house. We apprehend the sort of shape and relative size that feel like a human dwelling place, warm with human comfort and affection, or bleak in abandonment, or sad in decay or offensive in brazeness or delapidation. And we apprehend its offensiveness as directly and simply, and usually much more definitely, than its exact shape and the details of color that mark, say, its delapidation.

E35 p 163

Language cannot name the feeling here given; for language cannot reach, in these regions of light and color and volume, the specification that constitutes the quality of an actual, determinate, individual picture. The point of the picture, its effective being, is just this embodied feeling that we have, if with open sensitive eyes we look at it and let its character become the content of our own affective conscious life at the moment.

E36 p 163

Moreover, the great artist is also a human being; and his own judgment of what he is accomplishing depends on his being able to apprehend normally and humanly, not what he may have intended, but his actual painted picture, the expressed embodiment of his intention as it is given to any human being to apprehend.

E37 p 164

Art in other words presents meanings.

E38 p 164

Art is always concerned to present, not to represent, and it must be plain that when we are presented with a single content in experience, one and individual, this content is characterized by its felt quality, which is no more and no less truly emotional, and no more and no less truly intellectual, than any full concrete experience of any conscious being.

E39 p 166

But both processes (apprehension and composition) are guided by an end as intended by the artist

and as grasped by aesthetic observer, and this end is the feeling embodied in the concrete work of art.

F40 p 170

To suppose that the spiritual values may somehow shine out of themselves, unencumbered with the mere sense qualities, is to forget that without embodiment such values are simply nothing.

F41 Foreward, p xiii, E. F. Carritt's Philosophies of Beauty, (London: 1931)

Modernistic art likes to call itself abstract. But that for some centuries art has been characteristically expressive we are likely to take as authenticated fact. And it is only one step further to the generalization that art as such is expressive, that its defining function is the objective specification of feelings and emotions in a given medium. There is not much doubt that in some just sense this is so, a sense which has still to be made fully determinate, however, in the face of the current claim to abstractness of pattern as the prime criterion of strictly artistic achievement. We need then to notice what Bosanquet has pointed out: that this principle of expression that he calls "The characteristic," is the 'central idea of modern aesthetic.'

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