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THE PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHODYNAMICS OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

by
Martin Harvey Kane

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Psychology)
in The University of Michigan
1975

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Joseph Adelson, Chairman
Professor Frithjof Bergmann
Professor Martin Hoffman
Professor George Rosenwald

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CHAPTER 1

THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE

I. Introduction: The Scope of This Thesis

The development of morality has been of interest to psychologists since psychology became a discipline distinct from philosophy, and has been a fascination to philosophers since the beginning of philosophical speculation. Yet this long history has not led to any substantial agreement among different thinkers. Some, like Bertrand Russell, have suggested that such agreement is impossible since morality is not an area amenable to logical analysis. Morality may be an area of human inquiry which encourages "special pleading" that makes inevitable a lack of agreement between rival theorists, each of whom believes he alone is on the right road toward moral "truth." It is also possible, however, that wider agreement between diverse theories is precluded not by the impossibility of investigating the area of morality itself, but by the exclusiveness of various theories and the readiness of their devotees to rush to premature judgment of the claims of conflicting views.

The current psychological literature reflects this lack of integration. In general, the state of this literature seems to be as follows: For perhaps ten years or so,

the theory of Lawrence Kohlberg has excited the most interest. Based on a philosophical system influenced by Plato and Kant, and on a psychology influenced by Piaget and J. Baldwin, Kohlberg's theory is probably the most encompassing, sweeping theory of moral development yet proposed. From the basic tenet that morality is based primarily upon cognitive growth, Kohlberg has developed a theory which makes bold claims about the process of moral development, the direction and flow of this development, and the universality of his stage conception of moral growth. Moreover, he has argued that rival theories (e.g., learning theory, psychoanalysis, etc.) are in basic conflict with his cognitive-developmental theory and have no useful information to add to this theory.

Recently, a number of critics of Kohlberg's theory have surfaced, largely in response to the exclusiveness of Kohlberg's theory and his claims for universality. This growing body of criticism of Kohlberg is important not only in that it facilitates evaluation of Kohlberg's provocative claims, but also because it represents the beginning of a more balanced, synthesized perspective on moral development.

Partially based on criticism of Kohlberg, another type of moral development theory has surfaced, which will be called here the "prosocial theory." This theory emphasizes affective as well as cognitive aspects of morality, particularly in its focus upon empathy as a central facet of moral development. Kohlberg's lack of interest in affective aspects of morality and his more general disinterest

in personality organization are called into question by this aspect of prosocial theory. Moreover, prosocial theory emphasizes that morality develops not out of an initial conflict between child and society but as an outgrowth of positive early interactions between mother and child. Prosocial theories are also critical of psychoanalytic views of morality as an exclusive outgrowth of conflict between individual and culture.

The psychoanalytic literature on moral development has been unconcerned with rival theories and has continued to focus on the vicissitudes of the superego, in the tradition of Freud. However, there have been important changes in emphasis in the study of morality in the past ten to fifteen years in the psychoanalytic literature that are not well-known to academic psychologists, and that have not yet been understood fully by all analytic writers. Much better known and accepted is the shift toward a more encompassing psychology of the ego which leads to less emphasis upon instinctual behavior toward greater interest in adaptive mechanisms of the ego in higher-level functioning (e.g., Hartmann, 1939). Similarly, there have been important changes in assessing moral development, away from an exclusive emphasis on the primitive, restrictive, reaction-formed nature of prohibitive superego morality, toward a view of important changes in the nature and function of the superego and the importance of empathy in mature adult morality.

In this thesis, an attempt will be made to pose questions and suggest some answers to questions about moral development that are of basic interest to all the above-mentioned theorists, from a perspective that integrates certain facets of each theory. The most basic question to be studied is how morality develops and this will be pursued by using Kohlberg's stages of moral development as the primary dependent variable and exploring the dynamics underlying their formation from an ego-psychoanalytic perspective which focuses on the development of empathy, and changes in super-ego development. An attempt will also be made to relate moral functioning to other facets of personality development such as identity formation and object relations.

In this introductory section, a detailed presentation of Kohlberg's theory will be followed by a review of the arguments of his major critics. Next will follow a summary of prosocial theories and their relation to Kohlberg and psychoanalysis. Next, a detailed review of current psychoanalytic literature will be presented, highlighting changing emphasis in this large body of literature. Finally, the author's own critiques of the three theories will be presented and the specific hypotheses and questions to be explored in the thesis will be presented.

II. Kohlberg's Theory

In understanding Kohlberg's theory and its implications, it is important to follow his line of reasoning in developing the theory. He begins his dissertation (Kohlberg,

1958) by contrasting various philosophical theories of the nature of morality (e.g., morality as conformity to social standard, Utilitarianism, etc.) and concludes that the only logically defensible definition of morality is as action based on moral judgment. His evidence, however, is no more than his conviction that: "The educated layman in Western cultures believes that a man is moral if he acts in accordance with his conscience. . ." (Kohlberg, 1958, p. 5).

He then argues that since morality is based on cognitive judgment, moral development must be seen as a process of increased integration and maturation of moral judgment. He sees the relevant "cognitive criteria" for moral judgments as follows, again based on his view of presumed "agreement" among Western philosophers and intelligent laymen:

> e) Moral judgments tend toward a higher degree of generality, universality, consistency and inclusiveness . . . (T)here is usually a greater degree of striving for consistency or generality in moral judgments (than in non-moral judgments). . . . The moral judgment tends to include all aspects of the man or act judged and to involve some criteria applicable to any man or act to a greater extent than other value judgments. f) Moral judgments tend to be considered as objective by their makers, i.e., to be agreed to independently of differences of personality and interest.--Someone who makes a moral judgment tends to expect other people believed capable of making moral judgments to agree with him. Where disagreement exists, the individual believes that discussion based on other shared beliefs or values will tend to lead to agreement.
>
> While honorific, these criteria are not claimed to be indicators of rationality or correctness of moral orientation. However, a philosophical conception of rational moral action pre-supposes that the act be moral in the preceding sense (1958, pp. 12-14).

As further proof of this formulation, Kohlberg cites the

validity of Kant's categorical imperative as the basic form that moral imperatives should follow. He also cites the authority of Plato in his emphasis on the idea of morality:

> I have found a no more recent summary statement of the implications of our studies than that made by Socrates: 'First, virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture. Second, the name of this ideal form is justice. Third, not only is the good one, but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows the good chooses the good. Fourth, the kind of knowledge of the good which is virtue is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of conventional beliefs.
>
> Most psychologists have never believed any of these ideas of Socrates. Is it so surprising that psychologists have never understood Socrates? It is hard to understand if you are not stage 6 (1971, p. 232).

"The developmental method takes a number of traits and attempts to put them in sequence in which the higher presuppose all the lower. Thus, when we give an individual credit for the higher we can presuppose, to some extent, the lower" (1958, p. 86). The stages took form as follows:

> Our a priori concept of morality was rather empty and abstract. Our actual procedure for studying moral development was an ideal-typological one. On the basis of close study of our cases, six types of moral orientation were arrived at. Each type was seen as focused on a distant set of interrelated concepts of good and bad or right and wrong expressed in typical patterns of thinking about our rather complex moral conflict situations. These types were arranged by us as increasingly approximating our initial concept of a moral orientation. Such an arrangement appeared to represent the developmental relationships between these types. Each type appeared to be a stage or level in social development (1958, p. 338).

The resulting six stages are further divided into three levels of moral orientation; premoral, conventional, and principled morality. Hoffman (1970) presents a cogent summary of Kohlberg's stage definitions:

Stage 1. Obedience and punishment orientation. Deference to superior power or prestige. . . . Punishment feared like any other aversive stimulus rather than because of its interpersonal implications. Belief in objective responsibility.

Stage 2. Naive hedonistic and instrumental orientation. Acts defined as right which are instrumentally satisfying to the self and occasionally to others. Awareness of relativism of values to each actors needs and perspective. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity. . . .

Stage 3. "Good-boy" morality of maintaining good relations. Orientation to approval, and to pleasing and helping others. In judging others, considers intentions and has a concept of a morally good person as one who possesses moral virtues.

Stage 4. Authority and social-order maintaining morality. Orientation to 'doing duty,' and to showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Takes the perspective of others who have legitimate rights and expectations in the situation. Believes that virtue must be rewarded. . . .

Stage 5. Morality of contract, individual rights, and democratically accepted law. Norms of right and wrong defined in terms of laws or institutionalized rules, which are seen to have a rational base: for example, they express the will of the majority, maximize social utility or welfare, or are necessary for institutional functioning. Though recognized as being arbitrary, sometimes unjust, and only one of many possible alternatives, the law is in general the ultimate criterion of what is right. Duty and obligation similarly defined in terms of abstract concept of contract rather than needs of individual persons. When conflict exists between human need and law or contract though sympathetic to the former, the individual believes the latter must prevail because of its greater functional rationality for society.

Stage 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience. Orientation not only to existing social rules and standards but also to conscience as a directing agent, mutual respect and trust, and principles of moral choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Conduct controlled by an internalized ideal that exerts pressure toward action that seems right regardless of the reactions of others in the immediate environment. If one acts otherwise, self-condemnation and guilt result. Though aware of importance of law and contract, moral conflict generally resolved in terms of broader moral principles such as the Golden Rule, the greatest good for the greatest number, or the categorical imperative (Hoffman, 1970, pp. 276-277).

Subsequently, Kohlberg has added a conception of a

regression from stage 5 reasoning back to a cynical, relativistic variant of stage 2 hedonism (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971) Kohlberg argues that moral relativism and nihilism are transitional attitudes in the movement from conventional to principled morality. He borrows Erikson's concept of "ego identity formation" and the adolescent moratorium to explain this regression, and suggests that this short-lived relativism serves the function of freeing the self from childish concerns with punitive moral expectations and guilt: "To find a sociomoral identity requires a rebellious moratorium, because it requires liberation of initiative from the guilt which our retrogressors suffer. At the 'stage' of identity the adult conforms to his standards because he wants to, not because he anticipates crippling guilt if he does not" (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971, p. 1079).

In order to distill his final 6 stages, Kohlberg delineated thirty, then thirty-two, different moral attributes that children brought into their moral thinking. Kohlberg explains these attributes as follows, and defines an area of central concern to this examination of his work:

> In addition to areas suggested by the Piaget dimensions, the aspects ranged from 'Motives for Moral Action' to 'Universality of Moral Judgment,' from 'Concepts of Rights' to 'Basics of Respect for Social Authority.' As an example, the six types were defined as follows with regard to Aspect 10: 'Motivation for Rule Obedience or Moral Action':
>
> Stage 1. Obey rules to avoid punishment.
>
> Stage 2. Conform to obtain rewards, have favors returned, and so on.
>
> Stage 3. Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
>
> Stage 4. Conform to avoid censure by legitimate authorities and resultant guilt.

> Stage 5. Conform to maintain the respect of the impartial spectator judging in terms of community welfare.
> Stage 6. Conform to avoid self-condemnation (Kohlberg, 1964).

While he acknowledges that motivation is one aspect of moral judgment, Kohlberg explicitly states that it is merely one of many aspects of moral judgment, and should not be considered superordinate. Indeed, as will be seen, Kohlberg argues that cognitive aspects of morality are superordinate.

This emphasis on the cognitive and the logical is reflected in his description of his stages and <u>their</u> logic:

> Moral stages must have a logical organization or explication if they are 'true' stages. In a given stage, each aspect of the stage must logically imply each other aspect, so that there is a logical structure underlying each moral stage. Further, an invariant sequence of stages implies a logical order among the stages. Stage 3 must imply stage 2 and must not imply stage 4, etc. Such a logical order within a stage and between stages implies that the stages themselves involve logical operations or relations. In other words, a higher moral stage entails a lower moral stage at least partly, because it involves a higher logical structure entailing a lower logical structure.
>
> This provides an explanation for the fact that movement in moral thought is usually irreversibly forward in direction, an explanation which does not require the assumption that moral progression is wired into the nervous system or is directly caused by physical natural forces. It also helps explain why the step-by-step sequence of stages is invariant. The sequence represents a universal inner logical order of moral concepts, not a universal order found in the educational practices of all cultures, or an order wired into the nervous system. This inner logical order is suggested by the statements in parentheses in our tables. These indicate that each new basic differentiation made by each stage logically depends upon the differentiation before it; the order of differentiation could not logically be other than it is (1971, pp. 186-187).

In accord with his Kantian and Platonic philosophical framework, Kohlberg argues further that this logical

order invariant, and that it holds for all cultures and societies. The content of cultural mores, values, etc., is thus given little weight by Kohlberg in influencing moral reasoning:

> In sum, our evidence supports the following conclusions: There is a universal set of moral principles held by men in various cultures, our stage six. (These principles, we shall argue, could logically and consistently be held by all men in all societies; they would in fact be universal to all mankind if the conditions for socio-moral development were optimal for all individuals in all cultures.) At lower levels than stages 5 or 6, morality is not held in a fully principled form. Accordingly, it is more subject to specific content influence by group definition of the situation than is principled morality. Nevertheless, the more generalized and consistently held content 'principles' of conventional morality are also universal. Even stage 6 principles are somewhat accommodated to cultural content, for example, Lincoln and Jefferson were able to partially accommodate their principles to slavery in response to social pressure. Accommodations at the conventional stage are much more marked, but this does not mean that conventional principles, any more than stage 6 principles, are direct reflections of cultural content (1971, p. 178).

Kolberg conceptualizes moral development from the perspective of what he calls a cognitive-developmental theory which explains moral development from the following point of view: Moral growth represents "cognitive-structural" transformations in the individual's conception of self and society based on the "interaction of the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment, leading to . . . successive forms of equilibrium in interaction" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 184). The stages of moral development represent increasingly sophisticated modes of "taking the role of others" in social situations, and their development is determined by the number and quality of

role-taking opportunities provided by the environment. An example of a role-taking opportunity is provided by Piaget's famous example of a marble game in which each player occupies the identical role as all others (Piaget, 1932).

Out of this basic position, some of Kohlberg's most important corollaries about moral development follow. The first concerns the relative importance and function of various societal institutions in influencing moral development. In contrast with psychoanalytic and other theories of socialization, Kohlberg sees the family as being important only to the extent that it provides opportunities for role taking, like any other social institution:

> Family participation is not unique or critically necessary for moral development and the dimensions on which it stimulates moral development are primarily general dimensions by which other primary group stimulate moral development, i.e., the dimensions of creation of role-taking opportunities. . . . In general kibbutz children are 'normal' in moral development in spite of marked reduction in amount of interaction with their parents" (1969, p. 399).

Moreover, Kohlberg offers a different interpretation of the importance of traditional socialization variables like parental warmth, punishment, and so on. Warmth is useful only because it facilitates taking the role of the parent, and punishment is not useful because it does not facilitate this learning. Kohlberg also suggests that the findings of other investigators fit this conceptualization. For example:

> Peck and Havighurst report that ratings of maturity of moral character are related to ratings of common participation in the family, to confidence sharing, to sharing in family decisions, and to awarding

> responsibility to the child, a cluster well-summarized under the rubric of 'role-taking' opportunities (1969, p. 400).

Kohlberg sees nothing uniquely important about the interpersonal relationship between child and parent insofar as moral development is concerned. Psychoanalytic conceptions of moral development tend to emphasize this very point, and Kohlberg has argued against this position in his review of the experimental literature on identification (Kohlberg, 1963). He concludes that identification has not been shown to correlate reliably with moral behavior in the laboratory situation, and therefore identification is not a central aspect of moral development. In a similar vein, Kohlberg has argued that interactions with peers are important in terms of their role-taking possibilities rather than in terms of object relations, identity-formation, etc.

A second, and perhaps most important corollary of Kohlberg's theory is that moral development is based primarily on cognitive rather than affective factors. In several places in his writings, Kohlberg argues that cognitive and affective factors are of equal importance. For instance:

> Discussions of cognition and affect usually founder under the assumption that cognitions and affects are different mental states leading to the question 'Which is quantitatively more influential in moral judgment, states of cognition or states of affect': In contrast to irrational emotive theories of moral development such as those of Durkheim and Freud, the cognitive-developmental view holds that 'cognition' and 'affect' are different aspects, or perspectives, on the same mental events, that all mental events have both cognitive and affective aspects and that the development of

> mental dispositions reflects structural changes recognizable in both cognitive and affective perspectives (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 188).

However, in his actual theory and further studies on moral development, Kohlberg does not give affect any discernible status in moral development. For instance, in one place he states:

> By insisting on the cognitive core of moral development, we mean rather that the distinctive characteristic of the moral is that it involves active judgment. . . . Judgment is neither the expression of, nor the description of, emotional or volitional states, it is a different kind of function with a definite cognitive structure (1971, p. 185).

Again, at another point, he writes:

> We are arguing that moral judgment dispositions influence action through being stable cognitive dispositions, not through the affective changes with which they are associated. Textbook psychology preaches the cliche that moral decisions are a product of the algebraic resolution of conflicting quantitative affective forces. Though efforts to predict moral decisions by this model have yielded slim results, the metaphor continues to have currency. We are claiming instead that the moral force in personality is cognitive. Affective forces are involved in moral decisions, but affect is neither moral nor immoral. When the affective arousal is channeled into moral directions, it is moral; when it is not so channeled, it is not. The moral channeling mechanisms are cognitive principles defining situations (1971, pp. 230-231).

He concedes that moral judgments relate to "sentiments and intuitions of persons," and that they relate to the subject's feelings. However, he believes that "sentiment," is itself understandable as a structure with a heavy cognitive component. Hence, ". . . the quality (as opposed to the quantity) of affects involved in moral judgment is determined by its cognitive-structural development, and is part and parcel of the general development of the child's

conceptions of a moral order" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 189).

The role of cognition in morality is summarized as follows:

> Our cognitive hypothesis is, basically, that moral judgment has a characteristic form at a given stage, and that this form is parallel to the form of intellectual judgment at a corresponding stage. This implies a parallelism or isomorphism between the development of the forms of logical and ethical judgment. By this we mean that each new stage of moral judgment entails a new set of logical operations not present at the prior stages of logico-mathematical thinking (1971, p. 186).

However, this does not mean that moral judgment is no more than the application of intelligence to moral dilemmas. Moral development represents a unique series of assimilations and accommodations, rather than being a mere reflection of cognitive development proper. Children require moral social stimulation, as well as cognitive stimulation:

> A child deprived of all moral social stimulation until adolescence might perhaps develop 'principled' or formal operational, logical thought in adolescence, but would still have to go through all the stages of morality before developing moral principles rather than automatically reflecting his cognitive principles in a morally principled form of thought (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 187).

In terms of actual experimental findings, Kohlberg reports a correlation of .296 between moral judgment and IQ, corrected for group and age difference to .356 (Kohlberg, 1958). He suggests that intelligence must be a necessary but not sufficient component of moral development, and that another factor probably accounts for the bulk of the variance. Although he did not measure role-taking in his thesis, he states that he believes this to be the missing

factor. As seen in his theoretical statements quoted above, subsequent to the dissertation he has claimed that role-taking is the missing factor, but again, without any published data to confirm this contention.

Kohlberg also reports finding a curvilinear relation between IQ and moral maturity. Children with below average IQ were almost all below average in moral maturity but children with above average IQ were equally likely to be low or high in moral maturity (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 391). He has little to say in regard to this interesting finding, other than to note that cognition is not the only causal factor in moral development. He does continue to emphasize role-taking, however, whose nature and function is summarized as follows:

> In Piaget's theory, which we follow, the notion that logical and moral stages are interactional is united to the notion that they are forms of equilibrium, forms of integrating discrepancies or conflicts between the child's schemata of action and the actions of others. Opportunities to role take are opportunities to experience conflict or discrepancy between one's own actions and evaluations and the action and evaluations of others. To role take in a moral situation is to experience moral conflict, for example, the conflict of my wishes and claims and yours, or yours and a third party's. The integration is provided by the basic principles of justice of a stage. Social environment, then stimulates development by providing opportunities for role taking or for experiences of socio-moral conflict which may be integrated by justice forms at or above the child's own level.
>
> In contrast to this, exposure to higher stages of thinking presented to the child by significant figures in his environment is probably neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for upward movement (1971, p. 194).

Kohlberg sees his theory as incompatible with Freud's writings on moral development, and implicitly suggests that

theory is incompatible with and superior to all psychoanalytic formulations. In making these contentions, however, nowhere does Kohlberg quote Freud's works directly, or refer to any of the more recent psychoanalytic writings on moral development. Consequently he discusses Freud and psychoanalysis in terms of broad generalizations like the following: "Psychoanalytic and neo-psychoanalytic theory has assumed that identification is illogical, i.e., a defense, and hence must be a reaction to an intense pain experience or a negative drive state"(Kohlberg, 1969, p. 447). In the same article he states categorically that:

> The cognitive-developmental view of identification differs from the psychoanalytic in the following regards: 1. Identification is viewed as a cognitive-structural stage of more general initiative or social-sharing processes. 2. Accordingly it is not uniquely dependent upon particular motives and ties only present in the early parent-child relationship. 3. Identifications are not totally fixed, irreversible, or 'internalized.' Identifications are 'solutions' to developmental tasks which may change in object or nature with new developmental tasks (1969, p. 426).

Most generally, he states that psychoanalytic theory defines moral development as the "direct internalization of external norms of a given culture" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 155).

As noted above he also argues on the basis of experimental studies of identification that early childhood learnings are irrelevant to moral development, an area that psychoanalysis has long marked as crucial for all development. Moreover, Kohlberg argues that individual differences in behavior traits do not form a "conceptually-interesting problems of socialization" (1969, p. 367). Citing the

findings of Hartshorne and May on resistance to temptation, he argues that all behavioral traits are situationally specific and instable over time. Indeed in places it seems that Kohlberg is suggesting that psychoanalytic notions have no utility in understanding moral development:

> The conception that difficult moral choices are difficult because of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, the id and the superego, is misleading. If we attend to literature and history instead of textbook personality psychology, it appears that real moral crises arise when situations are socially ambiguous, when the usual moral expectations break down (1971, p. 231).

In summary, Kohlberg's theory of moral development is based on a Platonic and Kantian philosophy of ideal forms which posits a moral ideal (stage 6) which transcends cultural differences and which is developed through a process of assimilation and accommodation of interactions with the environment. If the necessary role-taking opportunities are present, an individual will go through all six stages in order and remain at the last level, provided that he is intelligent enough to organize his reasoning in the correct manner. In some unspecified way affective factors are related to this development but Kohlberg does not believe that personality traits or moral character have any role in moral development. In his actual theory, the cognitive dimension receives dominant consideration. Similarly, interactions within family and peer group are important only insofar as they promote role-taking. While allowing for the possibility of limited regression, Kohlberg is not clear about the mechanisms underlying this event. And he does not give any

detailed explanation of why certain individuals stop at less mature stages, beyond the general observation that relevant role-taking opportunities were not available.

III. Kohlberg's Critics

While Kohlberg's theory has excited a great deal of positive attention among students of socialization, education, and so on, recently there have surfaced a number of critical rejoinders to his writings, especially in reaction to his claim of universality of his moral stages.

A. Maccoby

Perhaps the first published critique of Kohlberg's work was written by Eleanor Maccoby, in her review of the moral development literature (Maccoby, 1968). First of all, she argues that moral judgment and moral thought have not been found to correlate experimentally, and further that action and thought do not proceed at the same rate. Hence, a child's knowing a rule, and being able to remember several aspects of it may not occur simultaneously. Hence moral judgment cannot be considered the only important aspect of moral development, as Kohlberg has assumed (Maccoby, 1968).

Next, Maccoby argues that Kohlberg does not explain what stimulates or retards movement through the stages of development, although she suggests that he gives parental influence a more central role in socialization than does Piaget. On the basis of subsequent articles, it can be

said in Kohlberg's defense that he suggests that opportunities for role-taking determine progression along his moral scale. However, it still seems valid to argue as does Maccoby that Kohlberg remains vague about these variables and has attempted no detailed explication of how moral development proceeds, either in individuals or cultures.

Maccoby states that Kohlberg sees cognitive development as more important than interpersonal factors in moral development, but she argues that interpersonal factors can influence cognitive development, and that those conditions which influence role-taking will also influence moral development. For instance, she suggests that the nurturance and power of a model influence imitation and thus influence moral development on the Kohlberg scale.

Maccoby contrasts Kohlberg's conception of the child's increasing internalized morality as a developmental shift, with that of Hoffman (1967), who emphasizes shifts in parental disciplining techniques. Following Hoffman, she suggests that individual differences in moral development probably are due in part to differential methods of socialization by parents.

Turning to the area of cognitive growth, she argues that there is some evidence of a relationship between cognitive development and moral judgment but not with moral behavior. She also suggests that cognitive growth can increase the capabilities for anti-social behavior, which may in part explain Kohlberg's finding of a curvilinear

relationship between moral judgment and IQ. Maccoby also argues that one might view the role of cognition in morality in different terms than Kohlberg. The growth of cognitive abilities with age may contribute to moral behavior by equipping the individual with pro-social means to achieve his goals. This theory may account for the experimental finding that brighter children cheat less in school than less intelligent peers, but just as much in party games.

Finally, Maccoby makes a general point about early experience and its relationships with later moral reasoning and behavior. She argues that early socialization in the family may teach children necessary social motivations which will facilitate later learning of values. Hence, early interpersonal interactions may set the groundwork for later moral development.

B. Hoffman

A more systematic critique of Kohlberg's work is presented by Hoffman in his comprehensive review of the moral development literature (1970). First, Hoffman states that motivation and affect have not been given an important role in either Piaget's or Kohlberg's theories. At times both Piaget and Kohlberg talk of sympathy in the context of moral development, but the process by which it operates is not specified according to Hoffman. Kohlberg considers motivation only one of thirty aspects of morality, but presents no empirical evidence that it is an aspect of the stages, nor does he attempt to give a theoretical account of

the origins of these motivations Hoffman continues.

Next Hoffman notes that Kohlberg's research is based on subjects saying what <u>others</u> should do in a moral dilemma:

> Obviously there is a question here of the relation between one's judgments of others and one's own moral behavior. Because a person has notions of right and wrong and uses them to evaluate the behavior of others, does this necessarily mean he has the capacity to make similar evaluations of his own behavior, blame himself and experience guilt following his own transgressions, and control his future behavior accordingly? Both writers are undoubtedly aware of this problem but neither has addressed himself specifically to it (Hoffman, 1970, p. 280).

Hoffman argues that at higher stages of moral judgment the subject may use his cognitive sophistication to make excuses for his behavior. Moreover:

> It is also conceivable that a person could understand the social order and see its functional rationality quite well, discuss moral dilemmas of others intelligently and take the role of most anyone--and still act immorally himself and experience little or no guilt over doing so. Indeed, these social insights might just as readily serve Machiavellian as moral purposes" (1970, p. 281).

But Hoffman's most basic criticism relates to the evidence available to document Kohlberg's claims about universality, invariance of sequences, etc. After reviewing all available research literature, Hoffman concludes that there is not compelling evidence that Piaget's or Kohlberg's stages occur in an invariant and irreversible sequence or that movement through the stages involves a process of successive syntheses. Further, he argues that Kohlberg's claims of universality have not as yet been documented, nor have Kohlberg's contentions about the nature or function of role-taking experiences. Also in presenting his own studies

on parental discipline, Hoffman argues implicitly that parent-child interactions influence moral development in ways other than Kohlberg's rubric of role-taking (e.g., Hoffman, 1970).

There is one piece of evidence cited by Kohlberg in support of his theory that is worthy of close scrutiny. Turiel (1966) attempted to test Kohlberg's stage-theoretical assumptions by presenting arguments at a lower and higher Kohlberg stage to subjects falling into stages 2, 3, and 4. It was argued that sugjects would assimilate the higher rather than the lower arguments, because of Kohlberg's postulate of irreversibility of the stages. Indeed Turiel reported that the experimental group did move more in the +1 direction than did the control group, who were not subjected to new arguments. However when Hoffman scrutinized the original data closely, he found that for some unexplained reason, the control group shifted more in the -1 direction than the experimental group shifted in the +1 direction. Only by including this unexplained anomaly in the data could Turiel argue that his study confirmed Kohlberg's invariancy hypothesis. Despite being aware of this finding and agreeing as to its validity, Kohlberg to this day has continued to cite the Turiel study as one basic experimental proof of his theory (Hoffman, 1973, personal communication).

C. Peters

Kohlberg's theory has interested philosophers as well as psychologists, particularly because of his claims

about having discovered a universal morality. As will be seen, however, other aspects of his reasoning have interested these philosophers.

R. S. Peters (1971) makes a thorough critique of Kohlberg on a large number of points. First of all, Peters takes issue with Kohlberg's Platonic notion that specific teaching does not influence moral development. He argues that giving examples and the like does accelerate a child's understanding, and that "Kohlberg's thesis about the impossibility of adults bringing about conceptual development by teaching is either false or a conceptual truth" (Peters, 1971, p. 244).

Peters also takes issue with the central role accorded the concept of justice by Kohlberg, and suggests that Kohlberg does not give any role to early motivations having nothing to do with traits such as honesty and justice:

> There is . . . an important contrast which Kohlberg does not make between traits, such as honesty and justice, and motives such as concern for others. There are important differences between virtues which are motives and those which are character traits. But one obvious difference needs to be noted . . ., that concern for others develops much earlier in a child's life and does not require the same level of conceptual development to be operative as does justice or even honesty. Prima facie, too, there are grounds for thinking that it can be learnt or encouraged by the example of others. Of course, concern for others can be exhibited at different levels which vary according to a person's imagination and sophistication about what constitutes harm or welfare. But it certainly can get a foothold in a person's moral life earlier than justice, because it is not necessarily connected with rules and social arrangements, as is justice. . . . It may, of course, take time for children to grasp that reasons for rules can fall under it as a principle. Kohlberg's stage theory may apply to it insofar as it comes to function as a principle--that is, as providing considerations that give backing to

> rules. But a different account must be given of how children become sensitized to such considerations than is given of how they come to be concerned about justice (Peters, 1971, p. 247).

Peters suggests that Kohlberg criticizes character trait types of morality on the basis of only one trait--honesty: "Dishonesty has to be understood in terms of fairly specific situations such as cheating, lying and fraud. . . . Other virtues and vices, however, such as benevolence cruelty, and integrity, are not tied down in this way to specific types of action . . . Kohlberg's criticism, therefore, depends on the peculiarities of a particular class of character traits" (Peters, 1971, p. 248).

In conjunction with the above two points, Peters argues that the early learning of habits can provide an important basis for later moral development. Kohlberg and Piaget do not see this because they are preoccupied with abstract conceptions such as justice:

> If, however, instead of justice, we consider the status of . . . virtues such as concern for others, I think that we may look at moral education in a very different light. The plight of others is much easier to grasp, and concern for it develops much earlier in children. If such concern is encouraged early in children, it can come to function later on as one of the fundamental principles of morality, when the child reaches the stage of being able to grasp the connection between many rules and their effect on other people (Peters, 1971, p. 259).

Peters goes on to say that children learn about compassion in part by not being shielded from suffering in others, and by being encouraged to form "the habit of paying attention to people's suffering rather than just concentrating on their own projects" (1971, p. 259). He argues that

the cultivation of sensitivity is one of the most crucial aspects in the development of principled morality, in that it serves as a powerful motivation for the individual to use moral reasoning in actual behavior. In sum, then, Peters argues that sensitivity to others develops earlier and in different ways than does the concept of justice, and that sensitivity to others is a prime motivation in translating abstract moral reasoning into actual moral behavior. Indeed, Peters argues that the most important question in moral education refers not to the development of abstract conceptions of justice but to how children come to care about being moral.

Moving to a more abstract plane, Peters argues that Kohlberg's choice of the concept of justice as the central facet of morality is arbitrary. One could just as justifiably emphasize "concern for others" as the prime ingredient of morality. It could be argued that all moral considerations are derived from one principle, such as justice, but Kohlberg has not so argued.

Finally, Peters calls attention to Kohlberg's wholesale rejection of Freudian theory:

> Kohlberg assumes that Freudians must be in some way producing an alternative theory to his own Piagetian theory of moral development. No doubt, many Freudians have thought that they were doing this, and some of Freud's speculations in this area might support such a view. But, as I have maintained elsewhere . . . it is equally plausible to maintain that, in fact, Freud was attempting explanations of a rather different realm of phenomena. . . . What, then, did Freud's theory of moral development explain? . . . Freud was not basically concerned with a simple theory of content transmission in his theory of the ego ideal, let alone in his

> later speculations about the superego. On the one hand, he was trying to explain the fact that some children seem to develop more rigorous standards than those demanded by their parents; on the other hand, he tried to explain the fact that many people have a picture of themselves . . . which is quite out of keeping with the traits which they in fact exhibit. In other words, Freud's theory of the superego was basically a theory of moral failure--of why people become obsessional, unrealistic, and aggressively self-punitive in the moral sphere. It therefore can be seen as a supplement to Piaget's type of theory rather than as a substitute for it. . . . Therefore, insofar as Freud and his followers have been attempting explanations, however far-fetched, of phenomena of this sort, they are providing a much needed supplement to the work of the Piaget-Kohlberg school. It is not doing justice to them to represent them as providing merely a competing theory of moral development (Peters, 1971, pp. 264-266).

D. Alston

Alston (1971) is another philosopher who takes issue with a number of Kohlberg's propositions. His first point is that many conceptually sophisticated philosophers have taken stage 4 or 5 positions rather than stage 6. The following point is similar to Peters':

> Unless Kohlberg can do more than he has done to show that his choice of a definition of 'moral' is based on something more than a personal preference among the variety of definitions that have been proposed, the fact that his later stages conform more exactly to his conception of a moral judgment has no objective significance. It is notorious that moral philosophers agree no more about what is distinctive of the moral than about anything else; and a large number of distinct accounts of what makes a judgment, a reason, an attitude, a rule, or a principle, moral have been put forward. Kohlberg chooses one of these . . . but fails to do anything by way of showing that this is more than a choice of what seems most congenial or interesting to him. . . . What Kohlberg really wants most to recommend to our acceptance is the principle of justice . . . as a supreme moral principle. But stages of prescriptivity will not advance that cause. A judgment based on a principle of racial destiny, or on no principle at all, can be just as prescriptive, as a judgment based on an application of Kohlberg's principle of justice (Alston, 1971, p. 277).

Next, Alston argues that in the Service of advancing the case for the cognitive aspects of morality, Kohlberg has overstated his case: "I believe that we can fully recognize the importance of developmental stages of moral thinking without condoning the excesses of Kohlberg's dismissal of other kinds of variables" (1971, p. 278). Specifically, Alston points out that Kohlberg has not made clear what role he gives to affect in moral development.

Alston then suggests that a rough statement of the Freudian theory of the superego can be made to conform with all the empirical results of Kohlberg's theory:

> A necessary condition of a person's taking a principle or rule to be moral is that it either be part of, or be associated with, a certain set of rules which he has internalized in early childhood in the special kind of way and with the special kind of emotional intensity that Freud describes as the establishing of the superego (1971, p. 279).

A second proposition follows: "In order for one to be motivated to act in accordance with a moral principle, rule, or judgment, it must be the case that one anticipates (not necessarily consciously of course) that feelings of guilt would ensue on one's failing to act in accordance with it (1971, p. 280).

Alston also argues that Kohlberg's argument that pure affect is not sufficient to explain moral reasoning processes does not argue that it is unnecessary. He suggests, finally, that one reason that Kohlberg has slighted the role of affect is that his research has been focused on situations where reasoning, by virtue of test instruction,

is overvalued. In the end, however, Alston argues that Kohlberg's stress upon cognition is no more than a poorly defended value preference. He alludes here to:

> . . . Kohlberg's astounding statement that "the conception that difficult moral choices are difficult because of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit, the id and superego, is misleading . . . real moral crises arise when situations are socially ambiguous, when the usual moral expectations breakdown." Surely there are plenty of difficult moral situations of both kinds, and it is only a kind of intellectual "vested interest" that could lead one to award only one of these kinds of situations the label of "real moral crisis" (Alston, 1971, p. 284).

E. Simpson

Elizabeth Simpson has recently advanced two different critiques of Kohlberg's work. The first (1972) fits within the basic structure of the theory as described by Kohlberg and attempts to expand upon what has been done. She begins her argument with the observation that Kohlberg has not stressed the emotional factors in moral reasoning, and the suggestion that there is congruence between Kohlberg's description of the motives attendant to each stage of moral development, and Maslow's (1962) hierarchy of needs: "If this is the case, then individuals who remain motivated by unfulfilled psychological needs will not be able to function at higher levels of moral development" (Simpson, 1972, pp. 5-6). She points out that Kohlberg has not detailed the exact conditions that stimulate or retard development through the stages and suggests that the gratification of basic psychic needs, and the development of imagination facilitate such development.

Her next point speaks to Kohlberg's overvaluation of reason:

> . . . Reasons may be a shelter, as we all know, especially when they are developed after the fact and apply to our own behavior or to that of someone in whom we have an ego-investment. In any case, reasons are inseparable from the personality of the reasoner, whether they apply to his own behavior or that of others. They are grounded elsewhere, not in the situation in which decisions are made, but in the psychic definition of past experience. Passionate irrationality in the name of impassioned reason occurs in the market, the classroom, and in science, as well as elsewhere, and often unconsciously (1972, pp. 10-11).

Moreover, the compulsive use of reason can be in itself evidence of defensiveness: "The need for a defining framework of reason and the overwhelming attribution of decision-making to rational processes are themselves products of defensive repression and a means of coping with a fearful world" (1972, p. 18).

In her more recent critique, (1973) Simpson aims strong critical words at Kohlberg's claims for the cultural universality of his theory and at the evidence upon which these claims are based. Her first point is that Kohlberg's claims about a universal morality are based solely on Western philosophy:

> Any philosophical system which supports a universal theory of development must account for conceptual differences which arise in the varying perceptions and explanations of reality adhering to the customs and broad social environments of diverse groups. Western and Eastern philosophies differ far more between themselves than within, both in substance and methodology (1973, pp. 5-6).

In order to prove cultural universality, Simpson argues that Kohlberg must (1) account for regression to

previous stages, and (2) explain the fact that post-conventional or principled reasoning is not found in some groups. She argues that he has not accounted for these factors in satisfactory fashion. Nor has he demonstrated that so-called cognitive shifts from stage 2 to 3, for example, are not merely the result of accepting the values of new micro-societies (school, etc.). She wonders, for instance, if a six-year-old in a society believing in sharing one's work would conceptualize cheating as wrong for stage 3 reasons.

Simpson goes on to criticize Kohlberg's use of a test of moral development based on the style of thinking of Western cultures and assuming that this is a defensible cross-cultural tool: "It seems more appropriate to ask whether the same paradigm is suitable for use as a moral index with members of widely differing cultures if the methods involved require modes of classification and problem-solving not utilized within each specific group" (1973, p. 16). Moreover, stage 5 by definition can occur only in a constitutional democracy: "Since this notion (of constitutional law) is both alien and irrelevant to the masses of human beings who are not members of a constitutional democracy, its use as a criterion for the attainment of stage 5 is somewhat suspect" (1973, p. 16).

She then examines Kohlberg's conception of internalized morality as a basic ingredient of principled morality. Viewing Kohlberg's conception of internalization as based on ideals that enable a man to do what seems right to him

regardless of what the social environment dictates, she argues that it is all but impossible to be sure that such an individual is not merely conforming to the learned values of a different and smaller reference group ". . . so well internalized that its members believe themselves to be functioning autonomously" (1973, p. 18)

She also suggests that there is cultural bias within Kohlberg's scoring manual itself. To be scored as a principled reasoner, a subject must refer to highly abstract entities such as hierarchies and principles, universal ideas and highly idealized concepts such as justice and equality: "Requirements for the highly trained use of analytic and theoretical modes of thought and language would automatically disqualify most of the world population (including Americans) at any age" (1973, p. 19). She also suggests that one reason that Kohlberg finds a strong correlation between moral reasoning and IQ is because IQ is in part a measure of verbal facility: "Kohlberg's stage 6's are not functioning independently of their socialization; they have been very thoroughly socialized into the company of intellectual elites who value and practice analytic, abstract, and logical reasoning" (1973, p. 20).

Simpson advances further arguments against the universalist claim by suggesting that there is wide cultural variation in highly abstract concepts such as justice and equality.

Simpson next turns to a crucial area in the critique

of Kohlberg's work, yet one in which few have ventured":

> . . . acceptance of the theory as universally applicable --if it is to be regarded as scientifically based-- should rest upon sources of authority which are traditional to science, e.g., the systematice, controlled, replicable, and consistent accumulation of data among well-defined groups (1973, p. 28).

Simpson lists a series of impressions that are no doubt familiar to all serious students of Kohlberg's work:

> Where are the tentativeness, the waiting on solid replication, the care about generalizing beyond the data, and, above all, the accuracy in reporting fully the data upon which the massive mountain of inference, philosophical speculation, normative statement, and extrapolation has been built? Without changing the labels, the discursive writing and wide-ranging, if extremely interesting and provocative, discussions slide freely from empirical material to theorizing and prescription whose relatedness to the actual data base involves several levels of discourse. If the assertion of universality is based on scientific evidence, we are entitled to know in detail the extent and shape of that data. It is time for the cross-cultural data to be fully published so that the comparability of methodology and results may be carefully examined. As it is, access to existing data poses a serious impediment to evaluating the work done in this field. The two major publications cited by Kohlberg (Stages in the Development of Moral Thought and Action, 1969 and with Furiel, Recent Research in Moral Development, 1971, both New York Holt) are not listed in Books in Print. Kohlberg is hardly responsible for publisher's delays, but in the meantime questions remain which it is presumed these books will answer since the numerous articles and chapters have not (1973, p. 28).

Simpson's final argument against Kohlberg is itself a highly subjective, emotional special pleading:

> The saber-toothed tiger survived for forty million years, so the teeth which finally grew inward and destroyed him could hardly be called maladaptive. But the moral reasoning which we see actively applied today by the Western world, quite apart from high-minded professional philosophy, bids fair to destroy man far short of a life span of forty million years. . . . We would do better to explore and analyze differences wherever found, to borrow and adapt, and to nurture invention and cultural mutation as it occurs, than to perpetuate the ideology of a suicidal world trying to reconcile

> its differences through the use of a theoretical framework ill-suited for containing and ordering real human diversity (1973, pp. 32-33).

F. Hogan

Although the main thrust of his work is not directed toward a critique of Kohlberg, Robert Hogan has made a number of explicit criticisms of Kohlberg's thinking. Moreover, as will be seen in greater detail below, his own theories of moral development suggest a very different way of conceptualizing moral growth from Kohlberg's method.

One point that flows from Hogan's dialectical perspective on development is that Kohlberg is guilty of lionizing the concept of autonomy in moral development:

> But autonomy is a two-edged concept. That is, if we think in terms of individual differences, one who is at the low end of the autonomy dimension will be pusillanimous and conforming, but one who is at the high end may be either autonomous or autocratic because there is only a fine line between the two. Too much autonomy is as problematical as too little, and autonomy alone cannot be the endpoint of moral development (Hogan, 1972, p. 5).

More generally, Hogan takes issue with Kohlberg's concept of moral action as distinct from ordinary social activity. He suggests that this distinction is arbitrary and misleading and asserts that moral behavior is merely one aspect of ongoing functioning within a social context: "The function of morality is to regulate and moderate human affairs" (Hogan, 1973, p. 219).

Another basic criticism pertains to the overly rational perspective of morality taken by Kohlberg and Piaget. Hogan argues that moral conduct is basically irrational and

that ". . . differences in even such obviously cognitive phenomena as moral judgments derive from more basic personological structures" (1973, p. 225). Moreover, he argues that: ". . . a proper evaluation of a person's moral posture requires considerable information beyond the manner in which he reasons about moral dilemmas" (Hogan, 1972, p. 412). As will be seen below, Hogan argues that variables like empathy, socialization, and autonomy must be considered in addition to Kohlberg's purely cognitive variable.

Perhaps the most radical of Hogan's arguments against Kohlberg is his critique of Kohlberg's stage theory itself. He argues that moral development is not viewed most profitably as occurring as an individual proceeds through preset stages in a stepwise fashion, such that later stages are reached only after the earlier levels are passed. In contrast, Hogan suggests that:

> . . . socialization, empathy, and autonomy are major transition points in moral development which occur at progressively later points in time. Moreover, once attained, these capacities bring about qualitative changes in the underlying structure of moral conduct. . . . Attainment of the later "stages" is not dependent on successful transition through the earlier levels. Rather, all three stages are distinct developmental challenges whose outcome defines each person's unique character structure (1973, pp. 230-231).

G. Hartmann

Although never referring to him by name, Heintz Hartmann has made a number of observations about moral development which can be viewed as a psychoanalytic critique of Kohlberg. Indeed, Hartmann's remarks coincide with many

of my own reservations about Kohlberg's work, and have formed one source of impetus for the current study.

First of all, Hartmann criticizes those who would attempt to erect an ideal system of morality based on *a priori*, idealistic criteria:

> Ethical systems based on an image of man as a totally rational being are an example. That image is then used to decide what man "ought" to value. But, from our point of view, this particular picture of man is a distortion of reality. . . . Analysts try to keep apart what man actually values from what, according to this or that philosophy, he ought to value. . . . Intellectual constructions of ethical systems which neglect the psychological forces that actually determine moral behavior are likely to impede both the stability and the power of these systems (Hartmann, 1960, pp. 44-45).

What Hartmann has in mind by "the psychological forces" noted above is the influence of id, ego, and superego factors on moral development. He amplifies this statement in his discussion of the way in which a person's morality is studied within psychoanalytic therapy:

> In the process of analysis, the dealing with an individual's moral system takes place on many levels at the same time. His moral feelings, judgments, actions are not considered in isolation but in their relatedness to the total personality of the patient. Their psychological background is being scrutinized, beyond the reach of conscious motivation and the conscious aspects of moral conscience. Part of this process is the analysis of the superego, but it actually includes also the superego's relations to the other mental institutions and to reality (1960, pp. 89-90).

Hartmann goes on to say that an individual's moral behavior ". . . is as much an essential part and a distinctive sign of his personality as is his character or his instinctual life" (1960, p. 53). He also argues that rational behavior can be used in the service of both moral and immoral aims.

He suggests that the "philosophers of reason" insofar as they are interested in concrete mental functions, should consider what psychoanalysis has to say about rational and irrational behavior. Implied in this statement is the well-known psychoanalytic discovery that rational thought can often be used to distort and deny certain less rational aspects of personality. To link this point directly with Kohlberg's theory, it might be argued that the highly rational, logical formulations advanced by Kohlberg's stage 5 and 6 reasoners can represent rationalization and intellectualization just as easily as pure "moral reasoning." Nowhere does Kohlberg suggest that ego defenses can be represented in the reasoning measured in his studies, however.

Hartmann finishes his article on moral values by suggesting that in order to understand fully an individual's moral system, an approach conversant with both rational and irrational factors of human functioning is necessary:

> Psychoanalytic psychology can often be used to considerable advantage beyond the analytic situation in order to determine how far moral actions and motivations are genuine and how far they correspond to a given standard. . . . It will consider many more variables than a non-analytic approach would consider. But the analytically informed judgment will often be not only more complex, but also more subtle. A comprehensive study, on these grounds, of moral casuistry (in the original sense of the word) does not exist. It might be instructive to attempt it (1960, pp. 98-99).

Hartmann's most basic point is that morality is only one aspect of personality functioning but in the end it is reflective of personality organization and character. Hence, if one wishes to study morality fully, one must study the

ways in which personality influence moral reasoning and moral behavior. This point serves both as a critique of Kohlberg's naively rational approach to the study of morality, and as an argument for the type of clinically-oriented psychoanalytic research on morality reflected in the present study.

IV. Pro-social Theories of Moral Development

Representing a midpoint between the cognitive theories of moral development advanced by Piaget and Kohlberg, and conflict theories of moral development advanced by Freud and certain (although by no means all) of his followers, is a developing body of work in the moral development field stressing neither a strictly cognitive view of morality, nor a view claiming that morality results from the inevitable clash between the individual's needs and those of "society." These pro-social theories, as I have chosen to call them, argue that moral behavior flows from a basic human propensity which need not be taught, but rather that it can either be encouraged or discouraged by the family and later socialization agents. These theorists focus upon the development of empathy and role-taking as basic variables in moral development, and look to interpersonal interactions within the nuclear family for conditions which will either promote or interfere with the development of pro-social behavior. Although critical of both Kohlberg's work and certain psychoanalytic formulations, this theoretical orientation is consistent with certain aspects of Kohlberg's formulations as

well as with some recent trends in ego psychoanalytic theorizing about morality to be detailed in the next section. The movement toward a pro-social theory of moral development seems to be a recent trend, yet it is coming to have an ever-increasing broad base of devotees. For instance, the recent interest in altruistic behavior (Hoffman, 1971), role-taking (e.g., Flavel, 1972), and even the basic orientation of the critics of Kohlberg summarized above all fit within the confines of this new theoretical bent. The most sophisticated and thoroughgoing theoretical statements of the "prosocial" orientation to this time have been done by Hogan and Hoffman however and it is these two writers I will focus upon.

A. Hogan

Hogan's theorizing is based on a conception of the human infant as initially pro-social. He suggests that most social psychologists assume there to be a natural antagonism between the individual and society, and cites Freud as a notable example of this line of reasoning. In contrast, he suggests that:

> One might equally hypothesize . . . that children are not anarchical but social by nature, that they enter the world programmed to be obedient, and that warmth and nurturance are essential in eliciting these tendencies. . . . Thus, rather than ask what must be done to the child to fit him into society, it may be more important to ask what must be done in order to drive him out (1973, p. 221).

He argues that this initial pro-social attitude is brought about by several biological mechanisms. Among these, he cites an innate disposition to comply with authority,

functioning in conjunction with "the dynamics of human culture." He suggests that social compliance is based a natural sensitivity to the expectations and demands of peers. He cites Lorenz' suggestion of a strong tendency for rule-governed behavior to become ritualized and then autonomous, as evidence for a biological basis for autonomous moral conduct (Hogan, 1973, p. 219).

Further, he argues that there is a ". . . fundamental compatibility between man and society, and . . . societal living has, in general, facilitated the evolution of the human species rather than distorted it" (Stayton, Hogan, and Ainsworth, 1971, p. 1059). The "ordinary expectable social environment" is seen to be both responsive to the child's needs and protective of his interests. In a study of 25 infants from 9-12 months and their families, he and his co-authors found that infants whose mothers are accepting, cooperative, and sensitive to signals, tended to obey mother's verbal commands more consistently than infants whose mothers are rejecting, interfering, and insensitive. They also found that the child's tendency to comply was independent of any specific disciplining techniques used by the mothers (Stayton, Hogan, and Ainsworth, 1971). The authors argue that ". . . a disposition toward obedience emerges in a responsive, accommodating social environment without extensive training, discipline, or other massive attempts to shape the infant's course of development" (Stayton, et al., 1971, p. 1065). They argue, in contrast with

Hartmann and other ego psychologists, that this compliance is not dependent upon identification, fear of loss of love, or other "constraining" motivations. On the contrary, they found that those infants with the most harmonious relationships with their mothers (i.e., those who have the least reason to fear loss of love) were the most readily compliant with the wishes of their mothers.

Given this initial biological pro-social potential, Hogan argues that moral development can be understood in terms of five independent dimensions of personality structure. All five must be taken into consideration in order to arrive at a full description of the character structure of an individual. Based on a number of correlational studies (Hogan, 1970; Grief and Hogan, in press; Hogan, 1973; Hogan and Dickstein, 1972) he argues that an individual's moral judgments are intimately related to the structure of his personality, which is seen to justify his list of the five dimensions of personality. The first dimension concerns learning social rules, which provides the individual the beginnings of self-control. Socialization is the second dimension, and is defined as the degree to which a person considers these rules personally binding. The third factor is empathy, which facilitates thinking in terms of the spirit rather than the letter of the law, and of the effect of one's actions upon the well-being of others. Fourth is autonomy, the degree to which an individual's moral decisions are free from peer group pressures and need for prestige. The final

dimension is the degree to which the individual sees rules as having an instrumental value. He sees two polar groups on this dimension, (1) those that rely upon rules, conventions, and the like to regulate social interactions; and (2) those who mistrust rules and prefer to rely upon personal intuitions of "the right." The former is called the "ethics of responsibility" and the latter "the ethics of conscience" (Hogan, 1972, pp. 5-6).

He defines moral maturity as optimal placement on each of these five dimensions and suggests that this optimal placement is toward the midpoint of each dimension. Too much or not enough of any dimension reflects less mature morality than a balanced amount. For instance, too little empathy results in a person who does not care about the consequences of his actions for the welfare of others. Too much empathy, on the other hand, leads to excessive concern with the expectations of others, and excessive regression of aggression: "Unleavened role-taking can produce an equivocating jellyfish as well as a compassionate person with a broad moral perspective" (1973, p. 224). As noted in his critique of Kohlberg cited above, too much or too little autonomy interferes with moral maturity in a similar manner.

Hogan cites correlational evidence for his choice of these dimensions (Hogan, 1973) and further argues that these dimensions can be conceptualized within a developmental perspective focusing upon the continuous process of adjusting internal conditions to external demands. Because of external

and internal pressures, the individual is forced to adapt as follows: Infants must secure nurturance and protection, especially once they become mobile and expose themselves to environmental dangers. Obedience to commands helps the child in its interaction with parents and facilitates survival. The child at four or five is learning to become a social being in contact with peers. Adaptation to group norms requires the learning of a wide variety of new norms and makes strict obedience to parental rules maladaptive in the group. The development of empathy facilitates smooth functioning within the peer group, and favors a new flexibility in interpersonal interactions. Young adults must define their identity and find a compatible life-style. The development of autonomy allows them to deviate from the expectations of both parents and peers, yet in a pro-social manner (Hogan, 1972, p. 6; Hogan, 1973, p. 230).

Hogan is quite clear about what factors he believes to mediate development along these dimensions. In all cases he looks to the interpersonal relationships between parent and child as the major determining factors. However there are other factors cited as well. For instance, he suggests that empathy is related to intelligence, because the process of shifting perspectives seems related to spatial reasoning. He cites correlations of .30 to .50 between his empathy scale and several measures of intellectual performance (Hogan, 1973, p. 223).

Secondly, he suggests that parents who encourage

their children to adopt alternative perspectives in relation to them facilitate role-taking. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, children must be willing to act upon their empathic perceptions, an inclination which depends on receiving empathic treatment themselves, and experiencing injustice, ridicule, betrayal, or persecution themselves sufficient to make a lasting impression. Similar reference to parental behaviors are cited to suggest the antecedents of autonomy (Hogan, 1973, p. 227).

Expanding upon his claim that aspects of moral reasoning reflect character structure, Hogan cites data reflecting the interaction of empathy, socialization, and character, as follows: Those low on both empathy and socialization tend to be delinquent; those low on empathy but high on socialization tend to be rigid rule-followers; those low on socialization but high on empathy are emancipated, cavalier individuals who are mildly sociopathic but essentially normal members of society. Those high on both socialization and empathy are seen as morally mature. They comply with social rules without effort yet they betray sympathy for the moral weaknesses of others (Hogan, 1973, p. 223; Greif and Hogan, in press).

In a methodologically similar study, (Hogan, 1973), he reports that "ethics of conscience" individuals are independent, innovative, and form creating, but are also impulsive, opportunistic and irresponsible. They are described most consistently by their peers as rebellious. "Ethics of

responsibility" individuals, on the other hand, are reasonable, helpful, and dependable, but are also conventional and resistant to change. They are seen as "thoughtful" most often by their peers. This type of study suggests that moral reasoning can be seen to relate to more general aspects of personality, and implies that the realm of personality organization may be a fruitful one for discovering a fuller understanding of morality. Indeed it is a central hypothesis of the current study that only through a detailed examination of personality functioning that morality can be understood in its full complexity.

Despite the promising start Hogan has made in linking morality with general personality functioning, a number of limitations exist in his method of investigation. First of all, once Hogan finds correlations between personality traits and moral dimensions like ethics of conscience, etc., there is no detailed explanatory discussion of these findings. Why should ethics of conscience people be irresponsible? How has this occurred as a result of their life experiences? How does this affect their morality? More generally, while Hogan states that familial experience influences moral development, he does not detail how this occurs in a thoroughgoing fashion. Furthermore, there is more to personality functioning than traits like responsible-irresponsible. Hogan shies away from variables like object relations, identity, and the like, which are difficult to measure by using questionnaires but which seem to be quite important in

personality development. Similarly, Hogan does not capture the complex kinds of familial interactions which influence both personality and moral development. Punishment, guilt, the nature of parental rules, and so on, are not discussed, nor can they be when one uses this type of research strategy. On another level, Hogan states that moral reasoning is at least in part "irrational" yet he has not as of yet discussed this factor of morality. Like so many other social psychologists he has written off the psychoanalytic approach because Freud saw morality as "an imposition from without," and as a sign of pathology. As will be seen in the next section, however, such contentions do not represent an accurate reading of Freud's theories of moral development, let alone the large body of ego psychoanalytic literature which is both consistent with Hogan's approach and more thorough in its analysis of the variables which he considers important for the study of morality. The current study is in part an attempt to answer some of Hogan's unanswered questions about moral development and personality organization, utilizing a less constraining methodology.

B. Hoffman

Among the major investigations of moral development, Hoffman's work is the most committed to a multiple-perspective, and a synthesized view. At the end of his comprehensive review of the moral development literature (1970), Hoffman suggests that on the basic of current evidence moral development can be conceived of as proceeding along four

somewhat independent avenues which culminate in behavioral conformity, a view of authority as rational, the ability to control impulse, and concern for the welfare of others. He suggests that each flows from different aspects of experience. Early precursors of morality develop as a reaction to the rewards or punishments of parents. Later, interaction with authorities that are objective and rational leads to the internalization of the earlier standards. Parents who use "inductive" disciplining techniques (i.e., techniques which focus on the effects of action upon others and require reparation for damage done to the other) and who do not rely on power assertion to force compliance, are able to present demands to the child which make sense in terms of his own experience and which communicate a basic sympathy with the child's interests and needs. The child's experiences in taking the role of authority also facilitate this process of internalization.

Internalization is also facilitated by the giving and withholding of love utilized by parents to "tame antisocial impulses," resulting in the generation of anxiety and guilt which gradually serve to demand compliance to standards in the absence of the parents and other authorities, according to Hoffman.

Finally, Hoffman argues that moral development is also furthered by building on the child's potential for empathic response to others. He argues that empathy becomes an aspect of morality as "gross empathic potential" and

sympathetic reactions come to be integrated with a cognitive structure. Again Hoffman suggests that this integration occurs primarily as a result of the parental use of inductive disciplining techniques which both foster empathy for others and an awareness of the potentially harmful effects of one's actions upon others. Hence the child is taught both to empathize with others and take responsibility for the consequences of his own actions. Hoffman suggests that induction results in a unique type of guilt reaction which focuses primarily on the "victim's" feelings, rather than the "actor's" own impulses. Moreover, this type of guilt reaction is seen to lack much of the irrationality of superego guilt as generally conceptualized by psychoanalytic writers. Hoffman also suggests that other experiences facilitate the development of empathy, such as mutuality in interaction with peers (Hoffman, 1970, pp. 345-347).

In a recent article, Hoffman (1973) has presented a detailed theory of the development of empathy and altruism based upon a thorough review of pertinent developmental psychology studies. He begins his presentation by arguing that on a cultural level, altruism can be seen as a proclivity generally mistrusted by western man. While altruism is stressed in most western religions, ". . . the striving individualism of the culture places obstacles in the way of such behavior. The society places a positive value on altruism but also sends mixed messages about it. . ." (Hoffman, 1973, p. 1). He argues that altruistic behavior should not

always be seen as fired by self-serving motives, a position difficult to maintain in a cultural climate where altruistic motivation in general is debunked.

Yet Hoffman argues that in terms of human evolution there has been some natural selection for altruistic motives since concern for the group was necessary in many primitive societies for survival of both individual and group. He quotes Campbell to the effect that both egoistic and altruistic tendencies have greater survival value than either alone. Hoffman suggests that one motive system may be emphasized over the other on a societal level--e.g., western cultures push egoism and eastern cultures favor altruistic forms of relatedness. He assumes however that all men are innately capable of both responses. Research evidence is quoted to document that helping others need not be initiated solely by a state of deprivation in the "actor." Indeed, he cites experiments that indicate the most empathic children are those who are most popular and emotionally secure (e.g., Murphy, 1937).

Moving to the development of empathy, Hoffman argues that this human capacity requires both cognitive and affective "skills." A central prerequisite for empathy is the child's growing awareness of difference between self and other. Object permanence in the Piagetian sense is the first step in such evolution, followed by role-taking and awareness of identity. Hence the child first learns that self and other are separate, then learns that the other has feelings

of his own, and only later that others have a sense of identity (in the Eriksonian sense) similar to one's own sense of identity.

Hoffman sees the development of empathy occurring in stages. The first is "empathic distress," a primitively conditioned affective response based on the similarity between one's own distress and that inhibited by others. Self and object have not yet been differentiated at this stage and the dominant motivation is elimination of discomfort in the self. However, Hoffman also believes there to be a built-in altruistic component: ". . . we are built in such a way that distress will often by contingent not on our own but someone else's painful experience" (Hoffman, pp. 24-25."

The next stage is called "sympathetic distress," which is characterized by the ability to differentiate self and other. At this stage, then, the dominant motivation is to alleviate distress in the other. The child learns this form of empathy as a result of the development of object permanence, role-taking abilities, and finally the development of a mature ego-identity. Hoffman speculates that the motivation underlying the shift from empathic to sympathetic distress may be the perception of similarities between the self and others despite obvious differences: "In real life when he takes the perspective of others he (the child) is apt to find that it is much like his own except for minor variations" (Hoffman, p. 31). Hoffman even suggests that

there is an awareness of a "sense of oneness" on the part of the youthful "empathizer." Hoffman stresses the importance of cognitive advances in such development since the cognitively more sophisticated child can perceive ". . . conceptual as well as perceptual similarities" (Hoffman, p. 33). Hoffman then discusses the relationship between the capacity to be empathic and actual empathic behavior. What disposes a person to act on empathic awareness? Hoffman suggests that one answer is that awareness of pain in others disposes the individual toward action which reduces the painful state of sympathetic distress.

If one does not act on such awareness, various types of guilt responses may ensue. Guilt can facilitate empathic behavior, according to Hoffman, if it is not the neurotic type of irrational guilt described by Freud: "This suggests that one mechanism by which guilt may contribute to altruistic behavior is to trigger a process of examination and restructuring of values which may help to strengthen one's altruistic motives" (Hoffman, p. 39). A form of this guilt--existential guilt--consists of an awareness of one's relative advantage in comparison with the plight of others. Hoffman likens this existential guilt to the "survivor" guilt experienced at Hiroshima (Lifton, 1968).

Hoffman finally suggests that certain forms of interpersonal relatedness in the family facilitate the development of altruistic motives, although: "Under normal conditions of growing up everyone acquires the capacity for

sympathetic distress, assuming he is sufficiently secure emotionally to be open to the needs of others" (Hoffman, p. 48). Faciliative experiences include 1) allowing a child to experience distress in others rather than shielding him from it; 2) giving the child the opportunity to practice role-taking and learn to interpret feedback from the other; 3) encouraging the child to imagine himself in the other's position, and 4) exposing the child to loved models who behave empathically and can articulate their own feelings. In conclusion, Hoffman also suggests that in order to act empathically, traits like courage and autonomy may be essential. In this way he suggests that empathy is related to more general personality functioning.

Although there are striking differences, Hoffman and Hogan make a number of similar points about moral development. Hoffman's four avenues of moral development (behavioral conformity, perception of rational authority, impulse control, and empathy) bear a striking resemblance to Hogan's five aspects of morality (socialization, empathy, autonomy, learning social rules, and attitudes about following laws). While Hoffman argues that some aspects of morality stem from the tension between child and society, he also argues that one strand of morality-empathy, is inherently pro-social. And while he accepts the importance of the concepts of anxiety and guilt generated by punishing parents, Hoffman is critical of what he sees as an overemphasis on the early superego by psychoanalytic writers. Hoffman's position

seems to fall between Hogan's extreme pro-social theory of morality which does not incorporate any conception of guilt or the superego, and certain psychoanalytic views which Hoffman feels do not appreciate any pro-social aspects of moral development.

Hoffman's critique of psychoanalytic theory is worthy of detailed consideration in its own right, because he is the only moral development psychologist discussed here who has based his critique of psychoanalytic theory on any extensive reading of the analytic literature on moral development. Hoffman (1970) reviews a number of important papers on superego development by Hartmann et al., Schafer, Jacobson, Lederer, etc. His conclusion is that while modern psychoanalytic writers have recognized

> . . . the need for positive moral concepts and have clarified and sharpened some of Freud's notions about the superego, they have not . . . developed any basically new views regarding the processes of moral development nor do they claim to do so. They all accept the core Freudian notion that the superego begins to develop in the course of the child's resolution of Oedipal conflicts during the fifth or sixth year of life, expands later by assimilating other authority figures as well as the value system of the culture, is subjected to conflict with new biological drives in adolescence, and eventually loses much of its power. And they further agree with Freud that despite the resulting changes, the superego's characteristic modes of operation are laid down in the early years and remain substantially unchanged (Hoffman, 1970, p. 335).

Hoffman argues that only Hartmann comes close to a conception of guilt which is not neurotic:

> However, however, does not develop the notion of an integrated superego or give any idea as to how the capacity for constructive guilt might develop, although he seems to imply that this is what is left after psychoanalysis removes the destructive guilt. The same is

> true of the neo-Freudian writers like Fromm who use such concepts as "humanistic conscience" to refer to a more positively based morality than one based on the traditional Freudian view of superego dynamics. None of these writers has delineated the properties of a positive conscience, theorized systematically about the antecedent experiences that help foster its development, or investigated its antecedents empirically (1970, p. 335).

Hoffman suggests that one reason that psychoanalysis has not evolved a theory of the positive functions of morality is because of the emphasis on treatment of individuals with severe pathology:

> The same is true of the early psychoanalytic conception of ego development, which later had to be revised to encompass the coping behaviors and higher mental processes of normal and creative persons. The ego was originally thought to draw its strength from id drives, but to account for conflict-free ego function it was necessary to abandon this notion and postulate the importance of structures which never were part of the id. . . . Ego development is now seen as derived from these structures and largely independent of the id. In a similar manner it may be necessary, as currently recognized in "ego psychology" . . . to reevaluate superego theory and search for structures that form the basis of a positive morality. Since the destructive elements of the superego derive primarily from its repressed-impulse base, a necessary point of departure is to search for an alternative motive base. Our earlier discussion of the parent-child research . . . suggests that one such possibility may be the child's primitive empathic potential (1971, p. 335).

This critique by Hoffman is more telling than the critiques of Kohlberg, Hogan, et al., who argue on a simplistic level that Freud's superego concept casts all morality in the light of pathology. However, in the next section, I will examine the current psychoanalytic literature in great detail in the explicit expectation of demonstrating that there are a number of trends in this literature which conceive of moral development in terms somewhat compatible with

the pro-social theorist's emphases on empathy and other pro-social aspects of morality not dominated by primitive superego functioning. Specifically I shall attempt to show that there are a number of conceptions of superego development and later consolidation of identity and a related Weltanschauung which represent a new emphasis in the psychoanalytic literature.

V. Psychoanalytic Theories of Moral Development

It is usually encumbent upon a reviewer of the psychoanalytic literature to begin with a detailed review of Freud's relevant remarks on the topic under discussion. In the case of moral development, such a review has been attempted by numerous writers (e.g., Flugel, 1945; Schafer, 1959; Furer, 1972) with divergent results. Many inconsistencies exist in Freud's long-term project of describing moral development, and it is impossible to be certain that a modern reconstruction reflects Freud's actual intent. In this context, it does not appear fruitful to present yet another review of Freud's thought. Instead, I will confine myself to reviewing what appear to be the major summaries of Freud's work and interpretations of Freud's thought. Next the literature on early precursors of moral development--narcissism and empathy--will be discussed, followed by a review of the literature on superego development. Following will be a section on changes in morality during adolescence. The final section will discuss the contributions of Schafer to the moral development literature of psychoanalysis.

A. Freud's Theory

1. Furer

In his comprehensive review of the history of the superego concept, Furer (1972) implies that Freud's concept of morality has been misunderstood as emphasizing only the restrictive elements of superego morality. He emphasizes that Freud discussed both positive and negative feelings in the child accounting for the crucial identifications that form the superego.

Furer (1972) notes that even in its earliest form, Freud's concept of the superego contained elements of love and hatred based in the object relationship with the father. In Totem and Taboo Freud (1924) first discussed the genesis and content of the superego, and characterized it as internalized and independent, "with no need to appeal to anything else for support" (Furer, 1972, p. 12). Freud argues that the source of conscience is emotional ambivalence reflected in a conflict between hatred and fear of the father, and love and admiration for him. In The Ego and the Id (1923) Freud discussed the importance of identification for the formation of the ego-ideal, and lays stress upon this earliest manifestation of an emotional tie with another, here the boy's wish to grow up and be like his father. When the boy develops sexual feelings toward his mother, these two contrasting affect states collide. The original ambivalent attitude manifested in the identification with the father is narrowed down so that the hostile component

predominates, resulting in the well-known process of identification with the aggressor, and the giving up of libidinal strivings toward the mother, culminating in the development of the superego and the passing of the oedipal complex. Freud also calls attention to the simultaneous identification with both parents during the oedipal phase, resulting in both the positive and negative Oedipus complexes, and in the unification of identifications with both parents. Hence important identifications are made with the nurturing mother as well as with the demanding father.

Freud argues that the superego is born as a result of the lengthy period of helplessness undergone by children. The power of the superego derives in part from its status as the first identification, which occurs when the ego is still feeble. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1931) Freud enlarges his view of the function of the superego, such that the superego is seen as the main means by which civilization defends itself against the aggression inherent in man. This aggression is taken over by the superego, which then turns it against the self rather than against others. The experience of guilt gives testimony to the mastery of aggression. Guilt has its origins in the fear of loss of love of the parents. Initially, guilt takes the form of social anxiety, which derives entirely from a fear of loss of love from an external object. In the second stage, parental authority is internalized and demands compliance with parental demands even in the parent's absence.

As noted above perhaps the most significant emphasis placed by Furer is upon the importance of both positive and negative feelings, and identifications with both father and mother, in the process of moral development. In another article, Furer (1967) amplifies this emphasis into a discussion of the importance of the identification with the mother for superego development. In particular, the child identifies with the mother as "consoler," as one who gives solace and strength to the child and makes sure that pain does not overwhelm him. The identification with this consoling mother facilitates controlling aggression and bringing about the reaction-formations required by socialization practices. Moreover, this identification lays the foundation for empathy and later superego development. Being empathic is seen by Furer as coming from the loving aspect of the superego. The child relates to himself and to others in the same loving way that the parents related to him. Empathy and concern for others are linked in this manner to superego functioning. Here we see that Furer argues that there is an important prosocial core to moral development based on pre-ambivalent identification with the mother.

2. Schafer

The first to argue that there was also a loving aspect of the superego was Schafer (1959), however, who demonstrated that this theme was foreshadowed but never pursued in the work of Freud. Schafer argues that Freud emphasized the hostile rather than the loving aspects of the superego

because (1) it helped explain the negative therapeutic reaction, (2) it fit in with his elaboration of the death instinct, (3) it explained how socialization of the child could be accomplished so rapidly in the face of the centuries in history it took to accomplish this task in regard to mankind in general, and (4) because Freud's theorizing about the superego was based primarily on observations of obsessional neurosis and melancholia. Building on Freud's well-known observation that children identify with their parents' own superegos rather than their actual behavior, Schafer argues that both are important, a point made also by Loewenstein (1966). First of all, disturbance in the parental superego exaggerates the oedipal conflict and provides a faulty model for resolving it. On the other hand, a parent with a healthy superego provides the child with an adaptive model for controlling love as well as aggression. At this point the parents' actual behavior becomes important:

> Both by imposing meaningful limits on behavior and by administering real punishment, the parent corrects the terrifying archaic fantasies of punishment introduced by the child in his struggle with his own impulses. As a result, the child will experience less alienation from real objects, less damming up of impulses, less devious discharge or sudden eruption, and less sense of guilt and need for punishment (1959, p. 184).

Schafer also points out that rigid permissiveness in parents often represents attempts to deny their own superego-ego conflict, with the result that the incompletely concealed superego is responded to be the child despite the parent's defensive maneuvers: "Unconflicted gentleness is likely to go

hand in hand with unconflicted firmness" (p. 185). Schafer summarizes his arguments as follows:

> There is a loving and beloved aspect of the superego. It represents the loved and admired oedipal and pre-oedipal parents who provide love, protection, comfort, and guidance, who embody and transmit certain ideals and moral structures more or less representative of their society, and who, even in their punishing activities, provide needed expressions of parental care, contact, and love. The maturing child will identify himself with these parental aspects. . . . By means of this identification the child ultimately attains the position of being able to love, protect, comfort, and guide himself and his children after him, and of doing so according to relatively ego-syntonic, culture-syntonic, and impersonal sets of ideals and moral standards (pp. 186-187).

The work of Schafer and Furer is clear in its emphasis upon the important role of identification with the mother and resulting empathy, for later moral development, although the integration of this pro-social aspect of morality with later changes in the superego is not described by either.

3. Hartmann

Hartmann (1960) attempts further clarification and elaboration of Freud's views on moral development. First of all, he counters the common criticism that Freud believed all morality to be neurotic. On the contrary, Hartmann argues that Freud saw moral codes as necessary for the survival of human society and believed that the development of an internal form of morality (the superego) had the potential for reducing the amount of external coercion necessary in society. As an individual, Hartmann notes that Freud admired independent, autonomous morality and refused to compromise

his own intellectual integrity, even in the face of widespread bitter condemnation of his ideas. Moreover, Hartmann argues that Freud did not succumb to the then-current proclivity to debase moral positions because of their instinctual origins. On the contrary, Freud believed that the "highest" and "lowest" in man have common origins. Even his criticism of religion was grounded in the hope that the moral aspects of Western civilization could be established on nonreligious grounds.

Hartmann's (1960) monograph also provides an authoritative summary of the current psychoanalytic theory of moral development. First of all, Hartmann argues that morality develops as a result of the child's long period of dependence; the identifications and object relations that tie the child to his parents, and the conflicts that arise as a result of the development of sexual and aggressive impulses which must be subjected to some control if adaptive social functioning is to occur. In this formulation, Hartmann amplifies Freud's earlier formulations such that it is clear that moral development is not solely explainable in terms of the wholesale acceptance of external standards forced upon the child by society: "Not only the prohibitions of the parents, but also their love survives in the relation of the superego with the ego. In the course of the same development the experience arises of being responsible to oneself" (Hartmann, 1960, p. 27). Responsibility to the self is a central aspect of superego functioning, according to Hartmann, and

he emphasizes the importance of moral integrity and responsibility in the psychoanalytic conception of moral development.

Hartmann also suggests that psychoanalysis stresses more than the prohibiting aspect of morality. The distinction between the superego and the ego-ideal can be conceptualized as the difference between imperatives stressing the "good" (ego-ideal) and "ought" and "ought not" (the superego). All moral systems contain both, although in differing degrees. In cases where morality is based on tyrannical superego dictates, such a state is often caused by difficulties in checking aggression--an ego problem. In such cases, morality regresses to its origins rather than proceeding to a more integrated, mature level. And he suggests that the consistency and dependency of morality in the face of reality demands is a crucial factor in moral development. In this context he defines superego autonomy as the ability of the individual to maintain a relatively integrated nonreversible morality.

In discussing moral growth, Hartmann suggests that a "transvaluation of moral values" occurs in the development of every individual. Early values are later generalized, formalized and integrated with current tastes and conceptions of morality, a task undertaken by the ego. The influence of both ego and superego can be found in all systems of morality. With the internalization of the superego, morality does not remain static, for interactions with peers, as Piaget notes, make moral codes more secure: "The socio-

cultural environment has a positive share in the establishment of moral behavior. But it is also true that relative freedom from sociocultural pressures runs parallel with the development of the superego" (1960, p. 38). Indeed, as noted above, responsibility to self is seen by Hartmann to be the signal quality of internalized morality. This point is of great importance since so many critics of psychoanalysis seem to believe otherwise: "Although it has been sometimes so misconstrued, 'acceptance' of reality does not imply, in the context of analytic thinking, passive submission to a given social system. Self-knowledge also has moral implications" (1960, p. 89).

A final point made by Hartmann is of importance. He argues in the context of discussing the analytic process of therapy that mature morality does not consist of a lack of guilt feelings: ". . . we expect that his guilt reactions will be more clearly in line with the integrated parts of his personality, with his authentic moral codes, and with the reality situations" (1960, p. 90). Rather, the superego is more integrated with ego functioning such that there is a greater consistency in the application of the individual's moral code, which makes the moral code a stronger influence on actual behavior.

4. Bieber

A somewhat different assessment of psychoanalytic views on morality is found in Bieber's (1972) critique of

Freud's conception of superego development. Bieber argues that Freud's formulations do not provide an adequate role for compassion, sympathy, and the like. Bieber refers to Freud's analysis of man's need to be part of the group (Freud, 1914) and suggests that Freud posits a spurious opposition between "altruistic" and "egoistic" needs in man. Freud saw altruistic urges as coming from the need to be accepted by the group, and saw morality as based on restricting gratification for the good of society. Hence the superego results from the internalization of the interests of society. In contrast, Bieber argues that there is another aspect of the superego beyond the restrictive one detailed by Freud. He points out that signs of generosity, kindness and consideration can be observed in children at preoedipal--pre-superego age. He sees this behavior occurring as the result of the unfolding of affectional potential within the individual which is released by reciprocal interaction between infant and parents. Parental smiling stimulates smiling in the infant, which then stimulates smiling in the parent once again:

> Where the parent-child affectional system develops satisfactorily, children develop the affectional behavior of humans. . . . Serious distortions in the developing affectional parent-child system produce disturbed children to whom we may refer as defectively humanized. They become the so-called affectionless characters whose moral behavior will be grossly impaired" (Bieber, 1972, p. 128).

He argues that a morality focused on humane and socially constructive attitudes is based on positive affective exchange while a morality based on sublimation, inhibition of instinct, and mediated by a "conscience-stricken" superego

leads to teetering on the edge of perpetual temptation. He further criticizes Freud for distinguishing superegos only along the single dimension of severity/leniency. Moreover, he takes issue with Freud's conception of guilt:

> Freud's concept of guilt as the punishment of the ego by the harsh superego for attempts at gaining unacceptable gratifications has several limitations. For one, it excludes guilt induced by guilt-provoking parents. Their children tend to manifest guilt reactions very easily even in situations where they are innocent of any wrong-doing and where guilt is entirely inappropriate. Parents who inculcate guilt feelings as a technique of domination are usually egocentric, exploitative, perfectionistic and intolerant of shortcomings in their child whom they regard as personal property. . . . In such families, the child experiences guilt for not doing what his parents wish, not just for doing some unacceptable instinctual act. Guilt associated with the lack of fulfillment of parental wishes may be unrelated to introjection (1972, pp. 140-141).

Bieber also argues that Freud does not account for what has been called "existential" guilt, a guilt based on the reality-based consequences of actual behavior for which the individual is sorry.

While it might be argued that Bieber's criticisms are not valid in reference to the recent psychoanalytic literature on morality, and may even represent a misreading of Freud, the thrust of his arguments seems to be toward viewing compassion as a vital part of moral development which cannot be understood as occurring solely as a part of the prohibiting function of the superego. As such, he too emphasizes a psychoanalytic perspective that sees empathy as a basic pro-social ingredient of morality.

B. Narcissism and Empathy: Vicissitudes of Early Object Relatedness

1. Narcissism

Since in the psychoanalytic perspective morality is seen as a reflection of total personality functioning and as formed on the basis of all early experience in the interpersonal world, the child's earliest interactions with others are seen as crucial for later moral development. In particular, as noted above, positive interactions between mother and child are seen as vital to later moral development. A central aspect of the early mother-child interaction is the development of narcissism in the child. In psychoanalytic usage, narcissism is defined as the cathexis of the self, Hartmann (1950) and is seen to undergo a definite pattern of development. A distinction between pathological and healthy narcissism is made, which implies that narcissism *per se* is not bad or immoral. Certain forms of narcissism facilitate moral growth and the development of mutual object relationships, while other forms mediate against such growth. While definitions differ among various writers, and few systematic attempts have been made to describe the development of narcissism in detail (Federn (1952) and Kohut (1971) are exceptions) I believe that a trend can be discovered in the analytic literature on this topic, which bears on moral development although this connection has not been made by analytic writers. Analogously, the analytic literature on empathy can be linked with the moral development literature, although it is not always so linked.

Narcissism is an aspect of personality organization that influences moral development to a great extent. The more primitively narcissistic an individual, the less the needs of others have any reality. On the other hand, as narcissism develops, the needs of others come to have importance and morality comes into being. The linkage between narcissism and moral development is made most directly in the psychoanalytic conception of the ego-ideal, which is seen as an organization of identifications which functions originally to maintain a sense of omnipotence for the young child who has begun to experience frustration and incapacity in interacting with the world (Jacobson, 1964).

Morality, in the psychoanalytic literature, is seen to be composed of two different types of ideals, and two related feeling states have been posited--the ego-ideal and related feelings of shame, and the superego and feelings of guilt. Numerous writers (e.g., Hartmann and Loewenstein, 1962; Sandler, 1960; Beres, 1966; Laufer, 1964) have argued that ego-ideal is a component of the superego system. They argue that shame and guilt are not easily differentiated, particularly in adolescents and adults, and that the ego-ideal does not have the system status of the superego. Other writers (e.g., Piers and Singer, 1953; Lampl-de-Groot, 1965; Loewenstein, 1966; Schafer, 1968) have argued that superego and ego-ideal are most productively conceptualized as separate structures, each contributing an aspect of moral behavior. Arguments about the system status of the ego-ideal

and superego seem to be academic discussions of metapsychology however which have few implications for our discussion of moral development. Hence in this discussion only relevant differences between the ego-ideal and superego will be discussed.

Out of the initial, global identifications with parents which proceed before self and object are differentiated fully, ego-ideals arise (Jacobson, 1964; Schafer, 1968). The early fusion of infant and mother provides experiences of safety and even competence in dealing with the environment, and primitive representations of this competent mother-child dyad are organized. But these early attempts are distortions, not only of the child's capabilities, but also of those of the parents, who the child needs to see as perfect. As Jacobson (1964) argues, if premature disillusionment with the parents occurs, the child will never be able to work out more realistic ego-ideals, since a fixation at this early magical level will occur. The ideals at this stage are essentially pregenital and thus narcissistic in focus. At first value is equated with pleasure (Jacobson, 1964) which is primary narcissistic pleasure reflecting the lack of differentiation between self and object. Competencies at this time are the major source of narcissistic gratification and the early ego-ideal consists mostly of visions of absolute competence. As Grinker (1957) notes:

> To the ego ideal is allocated the function of striving for future gratification with pride in self as the reward and shame as the penalty. Its patterned process seems to be derived from experiences during metabolically

> oriented infancy when only need-gratification exist. Frustration of unequivocal gratification facilitates growth and increases capacity to learn and develop. A modicum of success instills confidence, hope and further aspirations. Thus, the ego ideal receives its content from experiences in early life and only later becomes differentiated as an allocated function (p. 383).

A shift then occurs from wishes for passive mastery (incorporation of valued substances) toward active mastery. Schafer (1960) sees the achievement of independence and fortitude at this time as fired by wishes to become like the admired father, who is seen as a "great man." To the young child, he is self-reliant and convinced of doing the right thing, which makes the child admire but also fear him. Schafer (1966) emphasizes that these ideals are not moral in nature. Rather, ego functions of drive gratification, defense, reality testing and synthesizing are seen in ideal form in the parent. Thus at this time the child strives for perfection, or excellence which has no relation to objects and is pre-moral. Schafer indicates that such 'ego standards' (of perfection, beauty or excellence) continue to be non-moral throughout life.

Novey (1955), Lampl-de-Groot (1962), and Piers (1953) have pointed out that the ego-ideals is characterized by its ego-syntonic quality, while the superego proper is initially or always ego-alien. Novey, for instance, argues that the superego exercises power through threat--of guilt, loss of love, and the like, and thus may be ego-alien, particularly in cases of a severe superego. It seems probable, however, that this ego-alien quality is a trait of

a primitive, non-integrated superego. More autonomous superego functioning is ego-syntonic, (Hartmann, 1960) since the individual has come to define himself, in part, in terms of the values he has constructed. It is only when values are not internalized completely that exercising them is experienced as ego-alien. Thus in the earliest superego functioning where internalization is not complete, pressure is still experienced in an ego-alien way.

Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) indicate that after the passing of the oedipal situation, ego-ideals and the dictates of conscience come to resemble each other, and acting in accordance with standards not only reduces guilt but also leads to narcissistic gratification. Just as the superego becomes autonomous of the motivations which cause its formation, the striving for perfection of the ego-ideal becomes a partially independent direction-giving function which is relatively independent of objects and of instinctual precursors. These aims exist no longer as illusions based on magical wishful thinking and consequent distortion of inner and outer reality. These aims are then experienced as "direction-giving demands" which help give the individual his unique sense of individuality. Thus ego-ideal autonomy, like superego autonomy, is characterized by independence both of drives and objects (Hartmann and Loewenstein, 1962).

While ego-ideal and superego values come to be integrated as the individual matures, there are important distinctions between them functionally and experimentally.

Both agencies are integral in the process of self-evaluation and contribute to the experience of self-esteem, but through different self-feelings. Successful emulation of ego-ideals lead to narcissistically based feelings of pride while failure leads to shame and inferiority feelings. Moral behavior in consonance with superego values, on the other hand, leads to self-love and self-respect which is the internalized equivalent of love and respect shown by the parents. Moral missteps occasion guilt and self condemnation.

As Jacobson notes (1964) the prevalence of shame and inferiority over guilt feelings after adolescence is often a sign of narcissistic disturbances which are part of serious identity conflicts. A shift in self-esteem problems occurs developmentally--from preoccupation with narcissistic insults to a concern with one's relations with others, which reflects a growing appreciation for moral concerns. And, while there are more and less realistic, mature, forms of guilt, guilt itself is developmentally more advanced than pure shame reactions. As Hammerman notes (1965):

> Thus guilt particularly is concerned with hostility against others and object relations in general, with no feelings of loss of self or identity (as in shame). Guilt requires a sufficient organization of the aggressive drive, so that circumscribed ego defenses can be formed. Such an organization of the aggressive drives or hatred can occur only with the development of memory and stable object representations upon which aggressive cathexis can be invested (p. 335).

Pathology based on superego problems is thus different from ego-ideal based pathology. The former is betrayed in excessive self-punitiveness as seen in depressive

reactions and the driven ego-alien quality of superego values in obsessional reactions. Relations with others also typically betray inadequately defended hostility, often in the form of moral condemnations. "Aggressivized" standards, whether used against self or object, betray superego pathology. Extreme superego pathology is seen in delusional individuals whose split good and bad introjects cannot be housed internally. In less severe conditions, a stable, yet cruel and overpunitive superego is in part a result of the inability of the ego to neutralize aggression (Hartmann and Loewenstein, 1962).

Ego-ideal pathology has been characterized most fully by Reich (1954, 1960) who sees such conditions marked by defensively grandiose ego-ideals where fantasies of omnipotence protect the individual from feared decimation. Narcissistic inflation is undertaken to overcome threats to bodily intactness, and the distorted ideals betray preoccupation with sexualized issues of size and power. Children who have suffered severe traumas in which infantile pleasure and security are interfered with do not experience any ability to control their own bodies, let alone objects. These narcissistic injuries are undone through narcissistic overvaluation of body parts. Typically fantasies of phallic intactness and greatness abound (Reich, 1960). The fantasied undoing of the trauma takes the place of continued confrontation of the early ego-ideals with reality, and thus growth of the actual self is stunted. De Saussure (1971) points

out that where the actual self is capable of triumphs in a self-system containing archaic ego-ideals, no pleasure can be gained from actual accomplishments, since the archaic ideal proscribes only perfection. Thus for mature narcissistic gratifications to accrue, both real and idealized self-representations must mature and function on the same level. A less serious form of ego ideal pathology is described by Laufer (1964). A pseudo ego-ideal, usually formed in adolescence, is striven for with the purpose of protecting the ego from anxiety rather than assisting in the development toward maturity.

We come now to definitions of narcissism and to its relationship to moral development. Pathological narcissism is defined by Bing, McLaughlin and Marburg (1959) as a greater than appropriate amount of libidinal cathexis of the self, which implies that the individual is preoccupied with self to the exclusion of others, in consonance with Freud's (1914) characterization of narcissistic cathexis of the self. Secondly, in pathological narcissism the self representations are distorted and take on a primitive grandiose quality. There is a disparity between actual attributes of the self and the self-representations of the individual. Finally in pathological narcissism, these self representations are sexualized. This suggests that primitive sexual attributes of power, size, potency and the like dominate the self image in pathological narcissism and that sexuality is primarily focused on the self, either in exclusively

autocratic practices or in sexual contacts where the other is not given any reality.

A. Reich (1960) also emphasizes that pathological narcissism occurs where objects are insufficiently cathected in comparison with the self but also suggests that we can distinguish infantile narcissism in cases where the self and object representations are incompletely differentiated. Hence she implies that there are different levels of narcissism and that the earliest is defined by incomplete differentiation of the self from objects while other forms are based on "hyper-cathexis" of the self as opposed to objects. This suggests that pathological narcissism can occur in more organized personalities with greater ego strengths. Indeed it seems plausible to consider oral, anal, phallic and genital forms of narcissism, with the latter representing a level of narcissism where self and object are subjected to a balanced cathexis such that mutual object relations are possible (Erikson, 1959). This idea will be dealt with at great length in Chapter VII below.

Reich, however, focuses on the more primitive forms of narcissism, where under the stress of intense castration fears, a "bottomless" need for compensatory grandiosity inflates the self representations beyond recognition. Magical denials are utilized to convince the individual that he is not destroyed but omnipotent. In the face of such a threat to the integrity of the self, a defensive withdrawal from objects occurs. Indeed Reich suggests that self-preservation

always takes precedence over object love (Reich, 1954, 1960).

In such cases of pathological narcissism, the ego-ideal reflects images of compensatory grandiosity and remains primitive and unrealistic for defensive reasons. This has a devastating effect on moral development, which also remains on a primitive level. All value resides in the sexualization of the self. There is an overvaluation of bodily parts, especially the penis. Such individuals are aggressively competitive. They correlate value with size, and inflate themselves with feelings of contempt for others. Once their fragile grandiosity is deflated, however, they hate themselves because they do not measure up to their ego-ideals. Their view of self and objects fluctuates between gloriousness or nothingness. De Saussure notes (1971) that external objects continue to serve as glamorous superego figures who bestow gifts or punish severely. The process of identification is fixated at the early level of introjection and more realistic parental images are not internalized. Moreover the growth in control of aggression which coincides with superego development is prevented from occurring, which leaves these individuals as well as the people in their worlds at the mercy of their poorly controlled aggressiveness. Dominated by archaic ego-ideals, their morality is narcissistic in its total disregard for the value or worth of others. Their only value is inflating the self so as to fortify their defensive self representations (De Saussure,

1971).

Further clarity is given to the concept of narcissism by Brodey (1965), who suggests that the narcissist is not aware that he loves himself and thinks that he loves an external object. Narcissistic individuals project self images on the other and thus do not allow the other to have traits of his own. This process is sometimes referred to as narcissistic identification, and is reflected in the myth of Narcissus, who fell in love with his mirror image. Brodey suggests that this type of narcissism occurs in cases where the parents treat the child as an extension of self such that autonomous growth is made difficult for the child. As a result the child remains in a narcissistic state, poorly differentiated from objects, and treats others only as extensions of self. Morality can only be a primitive need to aggrandize the self in such cases.

Lichtenstein (1964) suggests that the earliest sense of identity (primary identity) is grounded in the earliest mother-infant attachments where the closeness to objects is what he calls a "mirroring experience." The self is seen in the object and the object in the self. This early narcissistic identity provides organization and a sense of security; the "oceanic" feeling described by Freud as accompanying primary narcissism (Freud, 1914). When these experiences between mother and infant are positive and not unduly interfered with by anxiety, the groundwork is set for later mutual object relations and the concomitant ability to empathize

with others. Positive primary identity also facilitates later moral development because the positive attachment to objects facilitates later identifications with the loving parent which can be organized as a part of a compassionate superego. Lichtenstein also suggests that the mirroring experience is a pro-social beginning. Infants do not have to be forced into this sort of arrangement. Once again, it can be seen that later morality is portrayed by psychoanalytic theory as having a pro-social aspect in addition to emanating from the conflict-dominated process of identification with controlling and punishing parents.

Federn (1952) gives a still more detailed description of healthy narcissism, which he describes as involving a strong participation in one's own experience, affirmation of one's own affective reactions, and satisfaction with one's personality. Healthy narcissism involves relatively realistic expectations about gratification which are buttressed by the ability to delay gratification and which are not characterized by magical thinking or pervasive fantasying about "bountiful gifts." Self-flattery, exhibitionistic gratification and grandiosity all suggest pathological narcissism. As others have noted, narcissism that is defensive and interferes with object relations is also pathological. In sum, Federn sees healthy narcissism as a reflection of realistic self-images and an awareness and appreciation of actual abilities that can be used to obtain reachable ends. Healthy narcissism suggests self-acceptance which is not

defensive in nature and which also allows for further growth and change. Although not stated explicitly by Federn, it can be seen that healthy narcissism implies mutually gratifying, mature object relations, and goes hand in hand with a sense of moral integrity and a well-internalized, mature form of morality.

2. Empathy

Psychoanalytic conceptions of narcissistic development shade into notions about the development of empathy. Empathy--the ability to put oneself in the other's place and understand how he feels--is seen to develop initially out of the undifferentiated relationship between mother and child. Initially the child learns about his own needs and feelings through the sensitive ministrations of the mother within the "mirroring relationship" described by Lichtenstein (1965). Gradually self and object are differentiated, and as narcissism develops into a more object-related phenomenon, the other is seen to have needs and desires also. Compassion and sympathy are born of these beginning phases of the development of self and object relations and contribute to the growth of a morality which has both "loving superego" and "judging superego" aspects.

The earliest signs of empathy are narcissistic in focus however, and only gradually reflect object-related motives. Moreover early empathy may be no more than an intuitive sensing of similarity between one's own behavioral states and those of another. As cognitive capacities grow,

they enrich this initial intuitive response until at the highest, most differentiated levels of empathy, sophisticated inferences and observations of the other, tied together through abstract notions of human motivation are necessary in order to understand the other (Hoffman, 1973). At its most developed levels, empathy can be seen as a controlled merging with the other without fear of loss of self boundaries, toward the end of understanding and enriching the other's experience (Schafer, 1959). As Schafer notes (1959) the empathizer's own ego skills are strengthened and the process "renews and advances internal mastery . . . (and) at least potentially, communication with the object is enhanced" (p. 346). Thus empathy is not a selfless act, but in essence, an expression of mutuality; both self and other are gratified and enhanced by the process. Indeed empathy is perhaps the best single example of this merging of mature narcissistic and object-related strivings. Being the embodiment of mature object relatedness, empathy allows for a variety of relationships rather than the rigidity found in the pathological phenomenon of altruistic surrender (Schafer, 1959). Indeed, mature empathy is a manifestation of autonomous behavior: "just as the affective aspect of empathy insures and reflects the ego's relative autonomy from the environment, its cognitive aspect insures and reflects the ego's relative autonomy from drives" (Schafer, 1959, p. 349). Schafer presents a well-balanced statement of mature empathy:

> Generative empathy is a sublimated creative act in personal relationships which combines the gratifications

> of intimate union with the recognition and enhancement of separateness and personal development of both persons involved. Such identification as is involved differs from the identifications which permanently modify the ego for optimally it remains segregated within the ego, suspendible, and available for contemplation and reality testing. In the end it enhances rather than replaces and impoverishes object relations (Schafer, 1959, p. 371).

As Urist notes (1973) mature empathy is the behavioral expression of mature-object-relatedness.

The origins of empathy are seen by analytic writers to occur in the relationship to the mother. Sullivan (1953) has discussed early empathic interchange between mother and child as a bodily transfer of the mother's tension or relaxation to the child through physical handling. Kohut (1971) on the other hand, argues that the mother facilitates the development of empathy in the child by being aware of his tension, etc., and responding with nurturance:

> A child's severe anxiety tension . . . will elicit an immediate empathic signal anxiety in the adult. After an assessment of the reality situation, however, the adult may recognize that no danger is present and he will become anxiety-free. He will then include the child in his own calmness by phase-appropriate actions which emphasize the empathic merger--transmission of the emotional state, by picking the children, for example and holding him close and the like. Such interactions encourage the development of a wholesome and balanced empathic capacity in the child (p. 278).

It seems likely that to some degree both of these experiences contribute to the development of empathy. Sullivan's example illustrates some ways in which infants learn to distinguish feeling states both in themselves and in others, clearly a crucial lesson for the development of empathy. However if the mother responds to the child's

anxiety with panic, "then the child will attempt to protect himself against the development of a traumatic state through distancing and premature autonomy or . . . through the phase-inappropriate (i.e., premature) replacement of empathic perception by other modes of reality assessment" (Kohut, 1971, pp. 278-279). Kohut illustrates how nurturant handling gives interpersonal contact a positive valence and thus sets the stage for later initiation of nurturant contacts by the child himself. As we have noted above, early ego identifications with the mother as nurturer are precursors to the loving, caretaking aspects of the superego which facilitate empathy and a compassionate morality.

Mothers who are unable to minister to the child's needs, who are emotionally cold or inconsistent in their contact with the child, or who withdraw when the baby is unresponsive, interfere with empathic development in their children (Kohut, 1971; Olden, 1958). Moreover, mothers who cannot give up the narcissistic bond with the child may be very close to their children but will be unable to empathize, since their own feelings will be projected upon the child rather than being used to understand the child. In a clinical report on mothers who could not give up this primitive narcissistic fusion with the child, Olden (1958) reports that:

> This (bond) enabled them vicariously to gratify their own frustrated instinctual needs by virtue of projecting themselves into the child. Their cases demonstrate that psychic immaturity necessarily precludes true empathy in the mother, which in turn, is a prerequisite for the development of empathy and social

abilities in the child (p. 512).

She concludes that

> . . . the sensitivity of one person to another can be called empathy only when it is not in the service of narcissistic needs but in that of mature object relations (p. 505).

Indeed this is not true of earlier phases of empathy but it is definitely necessary for mature empathy.

In sum, early interpersonal relationships influence later moral development through their influence on the development of empathy and of narcissism and the ego-ideal. Empathy born in a gratifying infant-mother relationship leads to later compassionate concern for others and the development of a loving and beloved superego. Healthy narcissistic development leads to realistic self appraisal and self-love and interest in others and a concern for their needs.

C. Superego Development

1. Ritvo and Solnit

Ritvo and Solnit (1958, 1960) have described in great detail the importance of a close relationship with the mother for later moral development. Their most general proposition is that: "In superego formation, the idealization and internalization of parental attitudes are often an aid to the ego's adaptive efforts" (1960, p. 298). Based on a clinical study of parent-child interactions, they suggest that children who identify with parents in a non-conflicted manner showed a higher degree of ego-autonomy and resistance

to regression under stress. They conclude that an identification with a nurturing and protective mother is the forerunner of a superego which will be protective of the ego, and by implication, will foster an attitude of protectiveness toward others. Such positive identifications also result in superego flexibility and effective adaptation. On the other hand, identification with a restrictive mother or a poorly controlled one inhibits superego functioning. Where parents overemphasize their own approval or disapproval, healthy self-esteem and well-integrated ego identity is interfered with. Ritvo and Solnit also point out that the mother organizes and regulates the infant's needs and thereby influences the child's subsequent control of impulse. These identifications with the protecting and controlling mother are a major impetus toward the child becoming ". . . the organizer and initiator of independent adaptive activities" (1958, p. 83). Moreover, they argue that positive libidinal ties to the mother facilitate full internalization as opposed to a predominantly aggressive tie, which interferes with further internalization.

2. Beres

Beres (1966) argues further along these lines that premature internalization is a major cause of an overly harsh superego, and inhibits later internalizations which would make the superego less harsh. Premature internalization can be forced by overly severe parents or early identifications with a parent who has disappointed the child. In

addition hostility experienced by the child as a result of this disappointment is turned into self-punitive attitudes by the severe superego. However, Beres also notes that part of the punitiveness of the early superego comes from the child's distortion of reality. Oedipal children often interpret their growing autonomy from the mother as a hostile rejection on her part because of presumed misdeeds. The child then identifies with the seemingly hostile, rejecting parent and ". . . accepts the fantasy of a crime that deserves punishment, and assumes the guilt which such an act requires" (Beres, 1958, p. 348). By implication, however, it follows that as the child becomes more comfortable with individuation in adolescence, the severity of the superego will be lessened.

3. Hartmann and Loewenstein

In the same vein, Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) argue that an overly cruel, punitive superego results from ego weakness, specifically the inability to neutralize aggression. As noted above, this weakness can come from conflicts within the mother-child interaction. Where more ego-strength is present, a certain amount of superego aggression can be channelled into self-preservation and the bolstering of defenses. Later increases in ego strength and adaptive abilities during latency and adolescence further modify the severity of the archaic superego. Hartmann and Loewenstein suggest that a punitive superego at these later stages represents incomplete development, for authentic values reflect

the individual's experiential background through the present. A punitive superego in this light is not authentic because it is based on early experience only, and as such, represents a distortion of current reality. Loewenstein (1966) amplifies the above formulation by suggesting that enhanced ego abilities and changing attitudes toward the parents which occur during latency and adolescence modify earlier superego functioning and content to a great extent. He argues that these changes are represented in Freud's poorly understood notion of the dissolution of the oedipal complex, which is a long, gradual process of individuation. He argues that superego development continues through adulthood: "The systematic teaching of religious and ethical principles, from latency on, certainly enlarges the scope and strengthens the functioning of the newly formed superego" (Loewenstein, 1966, p. 310). Moreover, further developments of the id and ego lead to changes in later superego regulation, for example in the area of sexual gratifications, which becomes valued and ego-syntonic where it was once forbidden territory guarded by the superego. Other superego regulations are subordinated to a concern for reality, social responsibilities and expediency. Loewenstein argues that the early superego does not change totally, but is synthesized in a more realistic, contemporary moral code.

4. Sandler

In contrast to views that the development of the superego is forced upon an unwilling child and results in

debilitating interference with adaptive efforts, Sandler (1960) discusses a number of adaptive results of superego formation. First of all, Sandler argues that internalization occurs not solely to avoid loss of love from the parents. Indeed a large part of the motivation for such internalizations comes from the child's wish to maintain a fused state with the parent via identification, as a means of countering the painful aspects of separation from the parents. Autonomy to the child is frightening as well as desirable and the child attempts by identification to regain early happiness fostered by the love, approval, and praise of the parents. Hence identification is more than a defense, and moral development is not merely forced compliance by society, but also represents the meeting of many of the child's needs. The formation of the superego represents both an imposition of external control and the facilitation of natural growth.

Sandler states that the superego formed at the time of the oedipal complex is no more than an "undergraduate superego" which is not ready for full autonomy from the parents. The child is still under the supervision of the parents until the oedipal resolution in adolescence, which is a great step toward full autonomy. However, even the earlier stages of superego development facilitate a reduction of interest in and dependence upon the real parents. The major source of self-esteem is no longer the parents but the internalized superego. This internalized source of self-esteem allows the child to be more independent from

environmental approval for his activities. Superego formation also facilitates further development in object relationships. With the institution of the superego, sexual and aggressive feelings toward the parents are diffused, allowing tender feelings toward the real parents to bloom. The superego controls aggression and thus makes loving relationships more possible. The degree to which the ego cannot control aggression is the degree to which the superego remains severe. Sandler also notes that the superego will be listened to only as long as it supports the ego. When the superego attacks the ego, the individual will attempt to fight off the dictates of the superego, which results in self-destructive behavior or acting out of unacceptable impulses.

5. Jacobson

In all of the above statements about superego development it is argued that the superego continues to grow and change throughout life. Few writers have specified these changes in the function and content of the superego in detail, however. We turn now to more detailed formulations of this superego development. Perhaps the most comprehensive formulations of this development was presented by Jacobson (1964). Another important contribution Jacobson made to the literature on moral development was her detailed explanation of the influence of parental behavior upon the development of the child's personality. She states that this relationship is the most influential factor in the child's development. The parents' role in building up the child's ego is

as follows:

> Parental influences stimulate the growth of the ego and support the control, partial inhibition, partial fusion, neutralization and utilization of sexual and aggressive drives in the service of the ego and of "secondary" process functioning. Thus they contribute greatly to the psychosexual development and the maturation of feelings, thinking, acting, and the sense of reality, and promote the establishment of aim-inhibited personal and social relations and of solid identifications with the love objects in the ego and superego. In general, they promote the child's gradual individuation and his advance from the psychobiologically determined dependency situation to independent ego activity spreading out to social, cultural, and eventually egosyntonic sexual pursuits (1964, pp. 54-55).

The parents must also help the child weather the oedipal storm by gently discouraging the child's magical wishes and unrealistic aspirations and helping him to understand external reality. However, if the child's inevitable disillusionment is forced upon him before he can take refuge in positive identifications with the loving parents, further advances in object relations and superego and ego-ideal development may not occur. For this continued development to occur, the child must have a certain admiration and respect for his parents. When this is not the case, he may become a cynic dominated by selfish, infantile ego goals which stress power, prestige, and the like, instead of goals more consistent with beneficial object relationships. Moreover, if the parents present confusing, contradictory attitudes, this often results in lasting contradictions in the child's unconscious and conscious values, which often go hand in hand with severe identity problems during adolescence and beyond (Jacobson, 1964).

It is during adolescence that Jacobson sees the most profound changes in superego functioning and morality in general. On one level, during adolescence the final maturation of both ego and superego results in a gradual moderation of youthful idealism and illusions, which leads to the setting of more reasonable goals, the ability to test reality accurately, and to a greater moral tolerance for the weaknesses of others as well as the self.

The strong identifications with peers and group ideals that are formed during latency and adolescence are seen by Jacobson as one means of disengaging from the expectations and values of the parents. However, this process reflects ". . . the limited autonomy of superego and ego in the latency child, who tends to reproject and reattach his superego, and likewise his ego goals, to dominant influential persons in the outside world" (1964, p. 138).

In adolescence massive changes occur in superego functioning, in comparison with initial superego formation at the initial rise of the oedipal complex. The oedipal child represses his sexual and aggressive feelings so that affectionate attachments to his parents can emerge. In adolescence, these repressed feelings resurface but they must be relinquished at this time if development is to proceed. Moreover, the adolescent must loosen even his affectionate ties to his parents to insure freedom of object choice and involvement in his own generation. This task is made even more difficult by the need to abandon his practical

and emotional dependency on his parents. During the initial oedipal phase, the development of the superego facilitated a relative autonomy from external expectations. At adolescence modifications in superego and ego further facilitate the process of individuation.

One of the major changes in superego functioning relates to the expression of sexual impulses. At the initial oedipal stage, the superego forbade expression of these impulses. At adolescence, incestuous wishes continue to be denied expression, but the individual must be guided toward ". . . the sexual freedom of the adult and . . . mature personal and love relationships" (Jacobson, 1964, p. 173). This shift represents a shift of the superego from a forbidding agency to a facilative agency. The restrictiveness of the childhood superego is often re-experienced during adolescence but must be overturned (Jacobson, 1964).

Another major shift in adolescence is away from identifications with the parents toward new object relationships. However this relinquishing of the infantile relationship with the parents does not imply a total rejection of these relationships or identifications. Rather, they are reduced, displaced onto new objects, changed in quality, and subordinated to new attachments and identifications. But the original positive relations with the parents remain as a structure for new values and object relations: ". . . the superego cannot be remodeled, reorganized, and consolidated, and new personal and sexual relations, new ego

structures and ego functions cannot be built up and integrated unless these new formations are allowed to grow organically from those of the past" (Jacobson, 1964, p. 174). Indeed Jacobson suggests that only when adults have relatively unambivalent relationships with their parents can it be said that their infantile desires and symbiotic ties with parents have been given up.

Another major shift in the moral functioning and thinking of the adolescent is seen in the development of a Weltanschauung, which ". . . includes and determines our values, ideals, and ethical standards, but also extends to our opinions on nature and culture, on sexual, social, racial, national, religious, political and general intellectual problems" (Jacobson, 1964, p. 182). The development of a Weltanschauung indicates maturation of the synthetic function of the ego, and a merging of ego and superego based on new ego identifications with more current, realistic images of adults. Jacobson sees the ego ideal of adults thus integrating all earlier ego and superego identifications:

> . . . The final stages in the development of the ego ideal demonstrate beautifully the hierarchic reorganization and final integration of different earlier and later value concepts, arising from both systems, into a new coherent structural and functional unit. . . . This reconstruction of the ego ideal can proceed only in conjunction and close interrelationship with the remodeling of the entire superego system and of its directive, enforcing, and critical functions, and with a corresponding growth of the ego's capacity for critical and self-critical moral and intellectual judgment (1964, p. 187).

Thus Jacobson suggests that the punitive, moralizing aspect of the individual's childhood superego withers away

in favor of judgment seated in the ego function of testing reality. This suggests more than a toning down of the archaic, severe superego, for the individual's ever-growing awareness of social reality comes to be integrated with earlier moral perceptions and results in a new moral vision of the world that is more in tune with current reality than with past introjections alone. The harsh, unyielding spectre of the childhood superego fades and is replaced by a superego dominated by ego functions that lend a new variability, flexibility, and individuality to moral reasoning.

In adulthood, identification plays less and less a role in the moral realm, as the individual's Weltanschauung becomes more and more the major determinant of morality. However, this moral autonomy does not depend upon rejection of all earlier identifications. These identifications continue to exist in modified form in the Weltanschauung. Jacobson does insist that there are some important identifications which are made during adulthood, such as with marital partners, and vocational, social, political, or religious groups. But the integrated morality specified above is relatively impervious to external assault: "Occasionally we encounter persons who, having lost their health, their work, their money, their position, their social status and prestige, nevertheless do not collapse under the onslaught of such narcissistic assaults, because they find support from their intact ethical and moral codes" (1965, p. 199).

A final important point made by Jacobson is that the

final changes in the ego and superego which occur during adolescence are influenced greatly by the parents' attitudes toward their child's individuation. Those parents who, for their own reasons, resist this separation, make the adolescent's task even more difficult. In the face of parental opposition, the adolescent ". . . may violently rebel against the parents; but, unable to break away from them, he forever remains regressively fixated at the adolescent level of insoluble conflicts, vacillating between dependent- and aggressive-narcissistic trends (1964, p. 201). Hence, even during adolescence parental attitudes and behaviors have a crucial impact on the child's development.

6. Hammerman

In his (1965) theory of superego development, Hammerman emphasizes the gradual growth of superego autonomy. Early superego development is based on the child's wish to refuse with protective, seemingly omnipotent parents via identification so as to hold on to these valued objects. Further superego growth is promoted in cases where the mother is loving and protective. Extreme punitiveness occurs only in cases where the ego is not strong enough to bind aggression. However, a certain measure of strictness is normal in the latency superego, which is not yet autonomous of parental sanctions. The latency child is not yet independent and continues to rely on parental support. The rigidity of the latency superego recedes, however, as drives come to be less intense and as parental authority begins to

be challenged. Adolescence is seen by Hammerman as the final stage of internalization of the superego, at which time earlier identifications are integrated into a well-developed code of morality sufficiently influenced by mature ego capacities that it has flexibility and adaptability to changing conditions, and the ability to operate with a minimum of unrealistic guilt or self-punitiveness.

D. Adolescent Morality

1. Erikson

Erik Erikson, in his eight stages of development, first suggested that personality development is not completed by age five or six, and that the unique shape that adult personalities take is forged only during adolescence, when the formation of an ego identity first becomes the crucial life task facing the individual. He was the first in the psychoanalytic movement to suggest that moral development proceeds throughout life.

One of Erikson's basic theoretical emphases is upon the potentially supportive, self-enhancing aspects of the individual's interaction with society. He has not accepted Freud's vision of the child and society inevitably locked in a struggle over conflicting needs. On the contrary, Erikson has suggested that personality development can only be seen as a gradual process of merging of individual needs and social needs which culminates in a sense of ego identity which inextricably links the individual to his society in a mutually beneficial way. It is only in cases of individual,

parental, or societal pathology that there is war between the individual and society. In analyzing Freud's (1914) conception of the sources of self-esteem in the individual, Erikson suggests that: "Psychoanalysis came to emphasize the individual and regressive rather than the collective-supportive aspects. . ." (Erikson, 1959, p. 39). It is this collective-supportive aspect of cultural participation that Erikson has chosen to emphasize in all his writings. But rather than seeing his work as a critique of Freud, Erikson has always maintained that he was merely emphasizing the other side of human development implied by Freud, but never pursued, perhaps because of Freud's Viennese, Victorian Weltanschauung (Erikson, 1968).

Erikson's emphasis on the pro-social aspects of early mother-child experience is unmistakable:

> For if a residue of infantile narcissism is to survive, the maternal environment must create and sustain it with a love which assures the child that it is good to be alive in the particular social coordinates in which he happens to find himself. Infantile narcissism, which is said to fight so valiantly against the inroads of a frustrating environment, is in fact nourished by the sensual enrichment and the encouragement provided by this same environment. Widespread severe impoverishment of infantile narcissism (and thus of the basis of a strong ego) is lastly to be considered a breakdown of that collective synthesis which gives every newborn baby and his motherly surroundings a super-individual status as a trust of the community. In the later abandonment or transformation of this narcissism into more mature self-esteem, it is again of decisive importance whether or not the more realistic being can expect an opportunity to employ what he has learned and to acquire feeling of increased communal meaning.
>
> If experience is to corroborate part of the infantile sense of omnipotence, then child training must know not only how to teach sensual health and progressive mastery, but also how to offer tangible social recognition as the fruits of health and mastery (1959, p. 39).

Turning to moral development in particular, Erikson argues that moral education is not primarily a coercive attempt to force socialization upon an unwilling child. On the contrary, the development of self-control and identification with loving, competent parents facilitates the child's attempts to cope with and master an increasingly complex social reality. Moral development becomes dominated by conflict only when ". . . a parent who served as the model and the executor of the conscience . . . (is) found trying to "get away with" the very transgressions which the child can no longer tolerate in himself" (1959, p. 80). In such situations, the child comes to believe that morality is really only a matter of arbitrary power, rather than having anything to do with "universal goodness":

> The suspiciousness and evasiveness which is thus mixed in with the all-or-nothing quality of the superego, that organ of tradition, makes moralistic man a great potential danger to himself and to his fellow men. It is as if morality, to him, became synonymous with vindictiveness and with the suppression of others (1959, p. 81).

Erikson notes that the phase of infantile moralism is one to be lived through and worked through, until replaced by a more mature morality.

Erikson also looks at the oedipal stage as a time of growth as much as a time of renunciation. The child must give up omnipotent, grandiose fantasies about himself and must reconcile himself to the role of a child who cannot act out his sexual and aggressive fantasies toward his parents. But he also begins to learn more about what he can do, and

begins to make his mark in the outer world of peer interaction, where he is relatively autonomous of his parents for the first time. Early, unrealistic identifications must be given up or modified. "Often, however . . . the child can be guided by the parent himself into a second, a more realistic identification based on the spirit of equality experienced in doing things together. In connection with comprehensive technical tasks, a companionship may develop between father and son, an experience of essential equality in worth. . ." (1959, p. 82).

In his conception, morality is only one aspect of personality organization and function, and is subsumed during adolescence and forever after, by the individual's ego-identity. During adolescence, vital resyntheses of identifications occur, and new identifications are made, which differ greatly from childhood identifications:

> Children at different stages of their development, identify with those part aspects of people by which they themselves are most immediately affected, whether in reality or fantasy. Their identifications with parents, for example, center in certain over-valued and ill-understood body parts, capacities, and role appearances. These part aspects, furthermore, are favored not because of their social acceptability (they often are everything but the parents' most adjusted attributes) but by the nature of infantile fantasy which only gradually gives way to a more realistic anticipation of social reality. The final identity, then, as fixed at the end of adolescence is superordinated to any single identification with individuals of the past: it includes all significant identifications, but it also alters them in order to make a unique and a reasonably coherent whole of them (1959, pp. 112-113).

Moreover, the identifications of childhood are playful and experimental. The identifications of adolescents are serious,

urgent attempts to integrate personality in a culturally and individually meaningful role. In addition, adolescent identifications take place in the context of the development of ideology, and as such, are organized by an ego with much greater cognitive abilities, and a greater appreciation of reality and of "what is possible."

Erikson believes that morality, per se, is only one aspect of the adult ego-identity, and that superego functioning becomes visible only in cases of conflict and arrestation of growth:

> It is in the totalism and exclusiveness of some ideologies that the superego is apt to regain its territory from identity: for when established identities become outworn or unfinished ones threaten to remain incomplete, special crises compel men to wage holy wars, by the cruelest means, against those who seem to question or threaten their unsafe ideological bases (1959, p. 159).

Schematically, Erikson sees the superego as an ". . . archaic and thoroughly internalized representative of the evolutionary principle of morality, of man's congenital proclivity toward the development of a primitive, categorical conscience. . . . The superego remains a rigidly vindictive and punitive inner agency of "blind" morality" (1959, p. 148). The ego-ideal is seen by Erikson to be bound to ideals of the current historical period and thus based more on the ego function of reality testing. In comparison, ego-identity is seen by Erikson to correspond even more closely to social reality, ". . . in that as a subsystem of the ego it would test, select, and integrate the self-representations derived from the psychosocial crises of childhood" (1959, p. 148).

In the process of identity formation, the potentially malignant dominance of the infantile superego is counterbalanced, which allows the individual to avoid excessive self-repudiation and the repudiation of others: "Such freedom (from superego dominance) provides a necessary condition for the ego's power to integrate matured sexuality, ripened capacities, and adult commitments" (1959, p. 164).

Erikson's pioneering discussions of the changes in personality during adolescence suffered somewhat from what Schafer (1968) has called a highly impressionistic view of man, lacking in specificity about concrete functions of the superego and ego. Jacobson (1964) has also criticized Erikson's rhetorical zeal in writing off the process of identification as important for adolescent functioning. Many have criticized his conception of ego-identity as being elusive, multiply defined, and impossible to apply to empirical problems. Nevertheless, his emphasis on adolescence as a time of massive reorganization of psychic functioning has stimulated a great deal of detailed scrutiny of the dynamics of that period of life by psychoanalytic writers.

2. Blos

Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the adolescent period has been undertaken by Peter Blos, whose book On Adolescence (1962) is generally considered the classic psychoanalytic study of this period. Blos has clarified the psychoanalytic conception of superego development greatly,

in his conceptualization of adolescence as the second period in the individual's life dominated by the process of individuation. This second individuation process of adolescence bears some resemblance to the first major time of individuation during and after the rise of the oedipal complex before latency. With the institution of the oedipal superego, the archaic superego loses some of its former rigidity and power, and the ego-ideal acquires more influence. Movement away from unity with the mother is attended by the formation of internal regulation promoted by motor, perceptual, verbal, and cognitive advances. However, autonomy is only relative, since the child is still dependent upon the parents to a large extent. The individuation process which occurs during adolescence, on the other hand, represents a significant change in self-definition. In addition to physical and emotional autonomy from the parents (and their archaic images surviving as introjections and identifications) the individuation of adolescence results in the taking of responsibility for what one is and does, rather than placing this burden on the shoulders of parents. This shift in experiencing of the self and parents meshes with a radical shift in the superego during adolescence. Rather than continuing to be an agent of repression, prohibition, and denial, the adolescent superego must form the basic core of a sense of autonomy, individuality, and responsibility for what one is and does. In short, the adolescent superego serves as the basis of a sense of moral integrity (Blos,

1962, 1967, 1968).

This process of individuation is a most difficult one, however, and occasions the re-emergence of infantile feelings about self and parents, and strong wishes to hold on to this seemingly secure past. The protective, defensive regression undergone by most adolescents also results in a withdrawal of interest in others and a narcissistic preoccupation with self. Blos indicates, however, that this regressive process is usually in the service of future growth and individuation. He suggests that the regression brings the adolescent into contact with infantile drives, old object relationships and ties such that they can be resolved, and integrated in the process of character formation (Blos, 1968). Character serves to integrate early and later self and object representations, giving rise to a sense of historical ego continuity translated into a subjective sense of wholeness and inviolability. This internal structure replaces the protective function of the family, which no longer is useful in that capacity. The reliability and sameness of character replaces the childhood reliability and sameness of the family environment. As adolescent individuation proceeds, the person is dependent more on himself and less on others for stability, resulting in greater strength and constancy of self-esteem: "The process of internalization and automatization in character formation establish and stabilize the psychic internal milieu, thus enabling man to shape his environment . . . by impressing on it those con-

ditions that correspond most favorably with the inviolability and integrity of his personality" (Blos, 1968, p. 262).

More specifically, the superego is changed in this process. Blos, following Erikson, argues that the ego-identity or "self" develops throughout life but during adolescent becomes the most important focus for development. Ego-identifications during adolescence are not irrational like early superego identifications and are ego-syntonic (Blos, 1962). The adolescent's narcissistic withdrawal from the world facilitates internal mastery and results in the narrowing and modification of aims and goals toward the possible. During adolescence, the "self" comes into being and integrates all earlier identifications, along with the ego-ideal and superego. Morality, along with all other facets of human experience, becomes dominated by accurate reality testing and realistic self-evaluation, rather than by poorly repressed images of infantile object relations and the dictates of the archaic superego. Along with the demise of the punitive superego, adolescent individuation sees the abandonment of infantile grandiosity, which also has a hand in making early morality unrealistic and potentially dangerous (Blos, 1962).

Blos (1967) also argues that peer involvements can be helpful in the adolescent's search for autonomy, in that they allow for role tryouts without the need for permanent commitment, and more generally can provide a safe place in the adolescent's journey away from dependency upon the

parents. The group also shares and alleviates guilt feelings which arise from rejecting infantile (parental) objects. Moreover, groups also facilitate joining the generation within which the adolescent has to establish his social, personal, and sexual identity. However, peer relationships can also serve as no more than a replacement for childhood dependency, and as such only undermine individuation.

3. Douvan and Adelson

Douvan and Adelson (1966) focus more directly than Blos or Erikson, upon concrete changes in superego and ego-ideal during adolescence. Indeed, they see adolescence imposing two major tasks on the child, both of which are related to moral development: the consolidation of internal controls, and the movement toward new values within the context of an "autonomous personal philosophy." The pressure toward autonomy is seen to emanate both from society and the individual, but great pressure is exerted on the individual by adults and peers, who seem to argue for radically different values. Douvan and Adelson point out that while in essence there may not actually be such a large gap between the standards of peers and adults, the adolescent must nonetheless synthesize the demands of separate "moral communities." Indeed, they argue that the synthetic requirements made upon the adolescent ego are prodigious: "The youngster must integrate prevailing social norms, his own early moral codes (the superego), early and late ego-ideals, his ego dispositions and defenses, these and more, into a coherent pattern

of moral belief and conduct" (Douvan and Adelson, 1966, pp. 83-84).

Changes in morality are based upon important changes in the interaction between ego and superego: ". . . the ego must learn to unlearn the superego-more precisely, some parts of it--as one of the intrapsychic tasks of adolescence" (Douvan and Adelson, 1966, p. 100). Those parts which are taken over include the archaic, punitive superego, which is overcome by the formation of new ideals which oppose, replace, or are synthesized with the older superego injunctions. These new values may emanate from the peer group, the culture at large, or even from the parents. Older values are re-synthesized in such a way as to facilitate the move toward autonomy into vocational and role commitments.

4. Esman

More recently, Esman (1972) has argued that while a number of authors have discussed changes in the superego during adolescence, the nature of these changes have not been spelled out in detail, except by Jacobson. He argues that just as old ego-identifications are re-evaluated during adolescence, old value identifications are similarly reappraised. Some are abandoned, others updated, and still others are formed from new, non-parental models. Esman also suggests that certain aspects of superego functioning have been misunderstood. For instance: "The peremptory and categorical quality of the 'primitive' or 'preoedipal' superego is the consequence of the immature cognitive equipment of the

young child . . . rather than the intensity of the instinctual energies ascribed to it" (Esman, 1972, p. 90). During adolescence sharpened cognitive skills, a wider awareness of human experience and potential, and involvement in the process of individuation all change the process of valuation itself. The idealization of parents which grew during the latency years begins to break down as the adolescent tests reality more fully and gives up magical notions about so-called omnipotent objects. While in some cases this disillusionment reflects accurate perceptions of glaring parental flaws, more often it is a necessary, but somewhat exaggerated reaction to ordinary human limitations. Esman argues that the process of internalization is continuous, rather than being complete at age 5 to 6. Adolescence is a second important step in the definition of internalized values: "If heir to anything, then, the superego as we find it in the adult, as a stable guiding system of autonomous values, must be seen as the heir to the adolescent process" (1972, p. 99).

5. Lederer

As noted above, one trend in the recent psychoanalytic literature is toward viewing the superego as developing away from its punitive, harsh roots toward a more compassionate, and reality based morality. In a fascinating monograph, Lederer (1964) has argued that there are a number of positive superego functions that accrue from the initial internalization. This point has rarely been discussed in

the literature, but deserves attention. Most generally, Lederer argues that one of the early conditions necessary for the internalization of the superego--identification with the aggressor--has been conceptualized solely as a negative event occasioned by fear and coercion. He suggests that identification with the aggressor can also be seen as a positive superego function, since a powerful superego results from this identification, a superego which performs the function of controlling frightening impulses. Lederer restates the common clinical observation that individuals often experience the inability to control impulses as terrifying, and will attempt to force others to control them. In contrast, a strong superego modulates strong affects and keeps the person on a more even emotional keel. Where such internal control is available, prolonged states of depression are minimized, for instance. Whereas it is true that superego internalizations give rise to fantasies of incorporating the father's power, it is also true that the oedipal child identifies with his assertiveness and effectiveness as a man. A strong father serves as a good model of positive identity formation.

Lederer also notes that identification with the aggressor will facilitate personality growth only when the child feels that it is safe to do so. Such identifications cannot be made, for instance, with a really punitive parent who does not embody real strength. Or a parent who cannot show aggression will give the child no model or sanction for

his own aggression. In such cases the child must repress anger, and since the ego is not strong enough to handle this unexpressed but potent anger, it will often result in an overly severe superego which channels all anger against the self. A father who is able to show anger openly yet not be out of control, shows the child that the parent is powerful enough to control the child's uncontrolled affect, and also that anger can be expressed in a modulated, controlled manner. Parents who do not allow their children to "hate" the good parent, set up situations where the child must "invent devils of his own and perhaps become one himself" (1964). Lederer notes that children perceive violence all around them in the world. If adults do not discuss it or manifest it, then they cannot be trusted, nor can they serve as positive models for identification. A parent who can be both aggressive and protective helps the child understand that potential retaliation by the parent is within manageable bounds. Parents who inhibit their aggressiveness lead their children to fantasize about terrifying retaliations much more severe than warranted. If the father is comfortable with his aggressiveness, then there are no surprises for the child.

On the other hand a father who shows his assertiveness only when angry influences the child to define assertiveness as a manifestation of anger, which can often limit the child's ability to be legitimately assertive when not angry (Lederer, 1964).

Lederer argues further that an important function of aggression is the assertion of one's individuality and creativity. The "no" of aggression is more creative than the "yes" of assent, which is often a sharing of a contribution but is never creative itself. Even when the "no" falls into negativism it has the potential of replacing what it has torn down with something new and creative. Assertion of identity becomes particularly important during adolescence and if a strong foundation has not been built during the oedipal phase, the adolescent is likely to experience later difficulty.

Lederer also suggests that the superego and ego cooperate in striving for goals. Ego planning is always self-interested, but superego planning can be in the service of higher goals. Hence a strong superego facilitates a moral orientation which transcends mere self-interest. The superego guarantees the rights of others to fair treatment, and serves as a check on the ego's attempts to adapt without regard for other values. Blind ego is an amoral force--an impulse to adapt with no sense of community or tradition. Hence a strong superego is essential for "higher ideals."

Lederer also notes that love from father is conditional upon performance and thus establishes value. A son who pleases a father does so by doing something to be proud of, while love of the mother is more unconditional and giving. Both are important, but Lederer emphasizes that pleasing the father eventuates in the setting up of an internal

standard of adequacy which insures an internal source of self-esteem and mediates against a strong need to conform to others' expectations. Hence a strong superego assures a measure of autonomy in moral matters. Opposition in the face of prevailing standards results in a firm sense of identity, and the ability to be alone comfortably is an accomplishment of the superego.

Moreover, obedience to superego demands conveys a feeling of destiny--an inner certainty of direction and purpose. The prime dictate of this type of superego is to be responsible to oneself. This form of self-government leads to freedom as well as to taking responsibility for others. In sum then, Lederer suggests that a strong superego based on positive identification with an assertive father leads to the ability to control one's own impulses, a strong sense of identity, a morality focused toward others' needs as well as one's own, and the ability to maintain a certain autonomy from prevailing opinion.

E. Schafer on Internalization

Perhaps the most comprehensive work on the process of internalization and the development of values has been done by Schafer, whose major work to date, Aspects of Internalization (1968) represents a synthesis of all the psychoanalytic literature in this area in the form of a well-articulated theory which both incorporates the clinically useful aspects of psychoanalytic theory and argues forcefully for certain modifications of that theory. Schafer

begins with an important definition of the process of internalization: "Internalization refers to all those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and characteristics" (Schafer, 1968, p. 9). He emphasizes that internalization is not a process in which the subject passively takes in values, commands and the like from without. On the contrary, internalization occurs as the result of the subject's active interpretation, organization, synthesis, and replacement of the attitudes and behaviors of significant others. This emphasis is clear in his definition of identification:

> Identifications cannot be created out of nothing. They involve selective reorganization of already existing wishes, behavior patterns, capacities, viewpoints, and emphases--and quite possibly earlier identifications too. . . . Identification does imbue the use of these (identified with) capacities with a particular object. . . . The selective reorganization of these already existing factors is evidenced by the subject's experiencing and expressing them under altered conditions, in a different style, with a changed regard for the object, and with shifted emphasis, revised meanings, and transformed pleasure-pain possibilities. It is the reorganization itself (and the accompanying fantasy of continued but revised object relation) that is the novelty in identification (1968, p. 147).

Schafer also makes an important distinction between introjection and identification. The former perpetuates needfulness and ambivalence about objects and interferes with renunciation of affects and later synthesis. Identification, on the other hand, is a higher level form of internalization which involves self-control, changing conceptions of self

and objects, and a degree of autonomy from objects. Schafer cautions against assuming that superego development eventuates in total autonomy from external influence. He argues that the concept of total autonomy is a value-judgment rather than an observation of actual functioning:

> Observation shows that to some extent and within limits people with highly developed moral standards continuously redefine what is moral and estimable about themselves in terms of what the environment appears to recognize, accept and reward. Could a mature person fall in love otherwise? Could his moral code continue to develop in relation to his historical circumstances? Could he play a responsive part in the evolution of his family, community, or occupation? (1968, pp. 157-158).

A related point is made by Schafer about the importance of early identifications. While not under-emphasizing the changes in identificatory patterns during adolescence and later life, Schafer nonetheless argues that the early identifications are the most solidly established and influential. Each new identification is set down within the contest of these early identifications.

> To affirm this point is not to deny that true growth and increasing autonomy may be involved in, and result from, later identifications; nor is it to deny the importance of new experience or the adolescent identity problems described by Erikson. . . . My point is not that everything can be reduced to the same old infantile things. . . . My point rather is to call attention to the continuities implied or concealed in apparent discontinuities. It can only be pre-existing organizations of forces that makes it necessary and possible for the subject to change as he interacts with new objects and copes with new experiences (1968, p. 161).

In this context, Schafer also notes that there are a large number of motives responsible for identifications, and it is misguided to attempt to find "the" motive for identification, as has been done by many analytic and non-analytic writers

alike. Moreover, the motivations which originally influence an identification may change through the process of development such that new motivations replace the old or the old motivations attain a relative autonomy from their origins.

In discussing mature adult moral codes, however, Schafer emphasizes autonomy from the original conditions under which the internalizations took place. Such a moral code is much more than an identification with the father, for instance; "The code itself is to be regarded as a relatively autonomous and impersonalized substructure spanning the systems ego and superego . . . the function of the moral code is no longer nothing but, or mostly the restraint of incestuous impulses in their original infantile forms; a change of function must be taken into account" (1968, p. 177). The code stands on its own, uninfluenced by current conflicts:

> Thus it is that a grown son may resist actual paternal example and precept that pressure him toward compromising his ethical standards--the very standards that in large part originated in an early identification with the "moral" father. And, with regard to change of function, the mature moral code no longer primarily expresses the vicissitudes of infantile instinctual tendencies and object relations that have been carried over into the present; instead, that code is so integrated with other interests, goals, and relationships, which it both supports and is supported by, that it has become an essential aspect of psychic organization, is represented as a major aspect of the subjective self, and is insisted on in order to preserve that organization and that self--sometimes at great cost to the subject (1968, pp. 177-178).

However, Schafer again cautions against viewing autonomy as an absolute. If stress is great enough, a regression to crude superego and ego functioning can occur.

Schafer also sees many positive gains accruing as a result of superego formation, and describes these gains in great detail:

> The internalizations that are part of the relative resolution of the boy's oedipal crisis, and that are consolidated during the latency period, are indicated by his caring about himself in a more active, self-observant, organized way than he has before: he wants to do more for himself and demands more of himself; he seeks less to have others in the family do things for him and demand things of him; and he becomes unconsciously and self-consciously moral and ambitious, taking increased pride in his own aspirations, standards, accomplishments, and instinctual renunciations, and feeling guilty or ashamed over his shortcomings in these respects. His patterns of self-reward and self-punishment, with their associated feelings of affection for and hostility toward himself, speed up in their development and become more articulated and precisely conditional. At the same time, the boy becomes more patient, manifesting time perspective and a capacity for delay that earlier were far less developed, and that were strikingly diminished in the climaxes of his oedipal involvement. In practice and in fantasy the boy begins to become his own parent; in this development he uses his representations of his own parents as his models (1968, p. 182).

Perhaps more than any other psychoanalytic writer, Schafer has emphasized the importance of actual parental behavior for the development of morality. He summarizes the importance of good early object relations as follows:

> The child's capacity to live in a world of securely external objects seems to depend in large part on his having experienced continuity and satisfaction in relation to his first objects. On the basis of this experience, he can afford to develop and maintain significant external object relations alongside his various internalizations and in interaction with them. He can dare to keep open his world of self and object representations. And he will be able to enhance and use the products of internalization in an active, adaptive manner (1968, p. 236).

In his paper on the loving and beloved superego (1960) summarized above, he stresses the importance of a

loving relationship between parent and child if morality is to contain a compassionate core. He also indicates that if parents are conflicted in their own attitudes the child will internalize such conflicts within his superego, causing later difficulties of synthesis. Moreover, parents may reward personally acceptable identifications of their children, and oppose less acceptable identifications. He suggests, further, that parental love must represent a balance between id-dominated feelings of instinctual pleasure at interacting with the child, and more neutralized ego and superego love which insure that the child is not overstimulated or seduced. "Parental agency" is the term Schafer gives to the complex series of contributions made to the child's development, and is defined as follows:

> . . . (1) it provides tender love which, although colored by sensual elements, is not dominated by them; (2) it teaches and guides, setting aims and standards that are ahead, but not too far ahead, of the child's capabilities; in this way the parental agency conveys to the child attainable ideals and also workable models for his own aim-setting ego motives and behavior patterns; (3) it restrains, punishes, and protects the child, thereby laying the groundwork for the child's later successful exercise of instinctual control, modification, and defense, and his capacity for action against inner and outer dangers; (4) it provides these nutriments in a sufficiently coherent, consistent, dosed, phase-specific, and child-specific fashion that the child is enabled to have organized experience of himself and of the parental object, and thus to establish a base for successful id, ego, and superego development (1968, p. 228).

Finally, Schafer argues that morality is not built around identifications alone, and that ". . . Freud's basic theory of superego formation cannot stand without including spontaneous tendencies toward the development of morality"

(1967, p. 143). As noted above, parents facilitate the development of morality through the exercise of parental agency, and by embodying demanding, yet realistic ideals themselves. Moreover, parents and the social environment generally must offer encouragement for the ideals developed by the child at each stage of growth. And the culture must indicate that its stated ideals are taken seriously. At the same time, parents must help the child to temper grandiose, unrealistic ideals. Finally, Schafer suggests that encouragement of moral tendencies is particularly important in the contemporary world:

> If we consider . . . the social, economic, political, and military conditions that exist in this world, we must recognize how they seriously challenge the validity and utility of many positive ideals. They become one more source of temptation to put denial, carpe diem, or jungle law in place of a socialized ideal self and a search for ideal objects. The family's early and continued realistic sustenance of the child's ideal creations may, in respects such as these, help establish one more safeguard of personal and social vitality and integrity (1967, p. 170).

F. Summary: The Psychoanalytic Theory of Moral Development

From the psychoanalytic perspective moral behavior is seen to be a reflection of total personality functioning, and in particular the functioning of the superego, ego-ideal and ego identity. There are both rational and irrational elements in moral behavior and a variety of defenses may influence moral reasoning.

Psychoanalysts have always argued that the most promising avenue for tracing moral development is the

organization of the superego, which is now seen to change in structure and function through adulthood. The superego is formed through an active process of internalization in which relationships with parents, and parental attitudes and behaviors are coded internally and invested with a motivating force in exercising internal control. Superego internalization results in transferring external control into self-control, and esteem based on external support into self-esteem based on internal support.

The superego is being formed from the first moments of life but the first definitive change occurs during the oedipal period, around the ages of four to six. During this time, the child experiences two related conflicts. The first is a conflict over the expression/inhibition of sexual and aggressive impulses toward both parents. The child experiences ambivalent feelings toward mother and father, and feels intense jealousy, competitiveness, powerfulness and powerlessness. Anxiety can become quite intense during this period and is often experienced consciously or unconsciously as the fear of castration. The second related conflict concerns ambivalent feelings over the child's growing autonomy from the parents. The child is conflicted about giving up the infantile relationship with the parents because it is safe and reliable. Both internal and external forces push the child toward autonomy, yet this process of individuation is frightening.

The resolution of these conflicts results in decisive

changes in the child's morality. First of all, there is a massive internalization of parental prohibitions against sexual and aggressive behaviors and more general narcissistic, anti-social impulses. Where the parents had to control behavior externally, the child now controls his behavior internally, by acting as his own parent. The child prohibits and condemns himself internally as the parent once did externally. This results in a movement toward relative autonomy from the parents. Control and self-esteem are relatively internalized. Self-respect and responsibility become important superego virtues and more abstract notions of right and wrong begin to form as relevant cognitive capacities mature. The sense of identity forms around a positive identification with an assertive parent and the child begins to learn how to express anger in a modulated, controlled manner.

However, the superego at the oedipal stage is archaic, punitive, and harsh. In part, this is due to the lack of cognitive sophistication the child possesses, but is also due to the turning of anger at the parents back on to the self. The child is fearful of his own competitive, hostile impulses and fears retaliation from the parent. Hence the parents are seen often as more hostile than they are in reality, and the child's superego becomes harsh. At the same time, as the autonomy conflict is resolved, the child gives up infantile feelings and moves away from parents into the peer world. As the superego is established and the oedipal complex fades, tender ties to the parents are free to emerge.

Growing autonomy from the parents also results in the toning down of the infantile ego-ideal, which embodied magical wishes for boundless omnipotence and grandiosity of both the representatives of the parents and the self. The levels of narcissism and object relatedness mature, further facilitating a movement away from exclusive concern for the self toward a moral awareness of the existence and importance of the needs of others.

Another major aspect of moral development relates to the development of empathy. Initially, empathy emerges from a mutually gratifying mother-child interaction. The mother is able to perceive and gratify the child's needs. The child learns about its own needs and of the existence of the need of others. The infant is seen to have a built-in potential to respond to warm maternal behavior and thus empathy is seen as a basic, pro-social component of human functioning. During the oedipal period, the child's natural empathic reactions are given some organization and begin to form a basic part of the moral code. The child identifies with the loving and nurturing parents as well as with the punitive parents and thus develops a loving and beloved superego in addition to a restricting and controlling superego. Morality becomes a matter of compassion for others as well as a matter of self-control and inhibition of impulse.

Moral development is largely dependent upon interactions with parents who can either facilitate or impede moral growth. The child's superego is in part a replica of the

parents' superegos but also codifies actual parental behavior. Parents who are overly harsh and/or unloving contribute to a particularly uncompromising superego in their children. Parents who lack self-control have difficulty teaching this ego skill to their children. Parents whose own moral codes are rife with contradiction insure that their children will internalize these conflicts. And parents who consistently break the very rules they force their children to obey, communicate that there is no right, only might. Parents who are not empathic and who have tense, conflicted relationships with their children, interfere with the child's developing object relationships and empathy, and influence the development of a moral code lacking in compassion. Parents who have serious problems arising from their own unresolved oedipal crises are poor models for oedipal resolution by their children. On the other hand, parents who have a strong, consistent moral sense and ego-identity, who love their children sensually but not seductively, and who embody and teach self-control and the pursuit of realistic ideals, facilitate the child's moral development.

During the latency period the superego remains relatively harsh and unyielding, in part because of continued dependence on the parents and because of lack of cognitive sophistication. During adolescence, however, pervasive changes take place in the child's superego in particular and morality in general. The superego changes from an agency that prohibits sexual expression to one that encourages and

guides such expression. It demands giving up of infantile relationships with the parents. The superego shifts generally away from impulse control toward a focus on the virtues of responsibility, autonomy, and moral integrity. Distorted, overly harsh archaic superego dictates are re-experienced during adolescence and then replaced, toned down, or integrated with later identifications and perceptions of current reality. Ego ideals and superego dictates are integrated into a coherent Weltanschauung governed increasingly by ego skills, especially reality testing. Early values become more realistic and less grandiose. Ego-identity subsumes morality and stable character traits are solidified. The superego no longer functions in conflict with the ego and id and there is a merging of these systems into an ego-syntonic, reality-based morality.

Identifications are less playful or experimental during adolescence and now lead toward vocational identity. The infantile ties to the parents are re-experienced and discarded, leading to a second individuation which frees the individual to pursue new object relationships and form new ties with the contemporary culture. The moral code becomes more realistic, less judgmental, and more compassionate, and yet demands behavior which is in accord with the individual's concept of integrity. Guilt is based less on unrealistic, unconscious conflict and more on actual behavior in the world, especially in relation to others. Self-esteem becomes primarily an internal matter of living up to one's own

expectations, which grants a measure of freedom from environmental expectations, although the individual is never entirely autonomous. Oedipal feelings are re-experienced and resolved finally. However, once again, actual parental behavior plays a significant role in these developments. If the parents are unable to allow the child to break the infantile bond, then individuation will be forestalled, and moral development impeded.

New identifications are made from adolescence through old age but play less of a role in moral development. They add on to what has already been set down and are integrated into an individualistic style of morality which reflects identity and character formation. Finally, the environment plays a large role in legitimizing the budding morality of the adolescent. Positive ideals must be nurtured, accepted, and embodied by significant others or else morality may decompensate into a single law code.

VI. Critique of Moral Development Theories

A. Kohlberg

The most often criticized aspect of Kohlberg's theory is his overemphasis on cognitive dimensions of morality. While it is true that in several places he argues that morality reflects both cognitive and affective development, in the actual theory of stage development, logical reasoning is greatly overvalued. Nowhere is the relationship between affect and morality made clear. Even in his discussions of

role-taking, Kohlberg does not specify how the affective dimension fits into his schema.

Kohlberg's arguments for this exclusive emphasis on cognitive factors in moral reasoning are not convincing. He bases his theory of moral stages on an a priori definition of moral reasoning justified by appealing to what intelligent philosophers and laymen agree to be the definition of morality. As has been noted by Alston and Peters, however, no such agreement exists among philosophers, let alone among laymen. As Peters notes, it is equally plausible to argue that morality is based on consideration for others, as upon Kohlberg's abstract notion of justice. The empirical evidence cited by Kohlberg to establish a connection between moral reasoning and cognitive functioning is not impressive. Correlations between moral reasoning and IQ are low (.30 to .50) and a large bulk of the variance is not accounted for. Kohlberg argues that much of this left-over variance is due to role-taking, but to this date he has presented no hard data to buttress this contention. Yet Kohlberg continues to write about his theory as if the connections between moral reasoning, and cognition and role-taking are already a matter of fact.

Conceptually, Kohlberg's overemphasis on conscious cognitive aspects of moral reasoning precludes an investigation of the possible role of dynamic conflict, unconscious thoughts or feelings, and conscious thoughts which the individual does not consider logical but nonetheless influence

his moral decisions. Kohlberg's perspective precludes any investigation of the experiencing of and control of impulses, or the role of guilt and anxiety in morality. Similarly, feelings about the self, self-evaluations, ideals, goals, etc., are all excluded from morality without logical justification for their omission. Kohlberg's emphasis on the conscious, intellectual aspect of moral reasoning also ignores the potential role of defenses in moral judgment. It is well-known that cognitively sophisticated individuals often use "intelligent" defenses such as intellectualization, rationalization, and isolation of affect in the service of making irrational or uncomfortable feelings seem logical and under conscious control. Particularly at the higher stages in Kohlberg's theory one might expect the involvement of intellectualizing defenses in conscious moral judgments.

The moral development literature reflects inconsistent correlations between conscious moral reasoning and actual moral behavior (Maccoby, 1968; Hoffman, 1971). One explanation for this inconsistent correlation may be that unconscious, conflict-dominated feelings influence actual moral behavior, yet are excluded from awareness for defensive reasons. Conscious morality may itself represent defensive idealizations of moral motives which obscure rather than express the individual's functional morality. The above suggests that a full understanding of individual morality can come only from an analysis of both conscious and unconscious aspects of moral functioning.

Kohlberg's limited view of morality is reflected in the actual moral dilemma stories that he presents to subjects to assess their moral stage. These stories (see appendix) posit situations that an individual is unlikely to encounter in his life and require abstract answers which do not even ask the subject what he would do in the situations. Kohlberg makes no attempt to assess the affective reactions his subjects have to the stories, nor to examine how they actually feel about moral conflicts experienced in their own lives. Yet it is not unwarranted to assume that subjects have other reactions to these stories, reactions which are loaded with affective aspects of their moral reasoning. On the basis of his a priori hypotheses, Kohlberg assumes that these reactions are not important for understanding the individual's morality. However, by searching only for a scorable response on his cognitive dimensions, Kohlberg precludes gathering further information about the unique properties of a given individual's morality, not to mention the affective elements of the responses. Psychoanalytic writers such as Jacobson, Schafer, and Erikson have pointed out that adult morality reflects ego-identity and unique perceptions. Kohlberg precludes gathering information about this level of morality by prematurely limiting his investigation of a subject's responses.

In a related manner, Kohlberg draws a sharp distinction between the structure and content of values. Based on his overvaluation of the cognitive, he states that the

structure of a moral argument is more important that the actual values expressed. Again in a priori fashion, Kohlberg eliminates another area of possible fruitful investigation. Indeed, the actual content of an individual's values may tell as much or more about his morality than the way in which he reasons logically. Moreover, there may be important causal interactions between structure and content ignored by Kohlberg in his exclusive concern for formal structure.

Even Kohlberg's definition of the cognitive component of morality is limited. He chooses to focus on logical reasoning and the organization of verbal formulations. While such skills are clearly important in reasoning, they are by no means the only cognitive skills relevant to morality. Indeed, as Simpson notes, Kohlberg overvalues abstract, analytical, "philosophy course" reasoning. Psychoanalytic writers have described a wide range of important cognitive functions under the rubric of ego functions. Many of these functions operate unconsciously, and have little to do with formal logic, such as the synthetic function, seen to be crucial for the evolution of a functional moral code during adolescence by Douvan and Adelson (1966), Erikson (1959), Jacobson (1964), and others. In assessing moral reasoning, then, it seems important to examine an individual's ego skills, including their ego defenses, as they relate to the development of an identity that emphasizes certain value preferences.

It also seems important to assess the manner in which individuals reason about moral issues they actually experience in their lives. This process may or may not relate to the abstract, impersonal answers they give to Kohlberg's hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moreover it would seem important to understand how individuals actually feel and act in relation to emotionally meaningful moral dilemmas. The way an individual conceptualizes an actual moral dilemma may differ greatly from the hypothetical dilemmas invented by Kohlberg.

There are other difficulties attendant to Kohlberg's use of the variable of "role-taking" to explain the way in which the individual assimilates new moral knowledge. He interprets "taking the role of the other" in totally cognitive terms, and avoids using the affectively-toned word "empathy." He also argues that interpersonal relationships within the family are important only insofar as they promote this cognitively toned form of role-taking. As Hoffman has demonstrated (1967, 1971) however, at very least, parental discipline correlates with moral reasoning, and it is possible that more general patterns of parent-child interaction influence moral development, as the psychoanalytic literature has argued. Indeed, an individual's position on the Kohlberg moral maturity scale may be influenced greatly by interactions with parents.

Another implication of Kohlberg's exclusively cognitive emphasis has been a resulting lack of interest in a potential role for personality traits in moral development.

He argues on the basis of the old Hartshorne and May (1930) findings that moral proclivities in different areas are not related, and that moral character has no role in moral reasoning. However, as Peters notes, the Hartshorne and May study focused on traits like honesty but did not investigate more basic moral characteristics like compassion, which may well form the core of moral character. Moral character and personality organization may well be variables which account for a large portion of the variance in the study of moral reasoning.

In an impressionistic manner, Kohlberg does link morality with increasing autonomy and internalization, yet gives no explanation of this development in terms of personality development. Internalization and autonomy are far more than mere cognitive operations, however. It is possible, in fact, that Kohlberg's higher stages of moral development reflect increased internalization rather than more sophisticated reasoning. In the psychoanalytic literature, internalization has been linked to the development of guilt, the superego, the vicissitudes of the oedipal complex, and most generally, to identity formation. Kohlberg rejects the psychoanalytic position by arguing that the experimental laboratory literature on identification does not prove this to be a strong predictor of moral reasoning or moral behavior (Kohlberg, 1963). As Hoffman notes (1971) and as can be seen in the summary of psychoanalytic thought above, the experimental literature on identification in no way tests this

theory in its full complexity. Indeed, as noted above, identification is only one aspect of the development of morality. Kohlberg's critiques of Freud and psychoanalysis noted above indicate a lack of familiarity with or understanding of the thrust of this body of theoretical literature. Indeed, Kohlberg has not even mentioned one basic psychoanalytic concept concerning moral development, that morality reflects the total functioning of the human personality--its conflicts, defenses, individual organization of character and identity, etc. Kohlberg makes no mention of psychoanalytic investigations of unconscious elements of morality, and as noted above, mentions the concept of the superego only once or twice for the purpose of rhetorically dismissing it.

Another facet of Kohlberg's theory that has led to a great deal of critical response is his contention that his stages are invariant in sequence, and universal. As Hoffman (1971) and Simpson (1973) have noted, his evidence for these assertions is far from convincing at this time. It remains an open question as to whether his stages are developmental, especially stages four, five, and six.

Kohlberg also does not present a convincing explanation of why his stages fall in the precise order they are said to. In his dissertation he argues that, a priori, morality is a cognitive process which increasingly approximates an abstract conception of justice resembling Kant's categorical imperative. Yet he offers no proof of this assertion and it is possible that there are other,

non-philosophical explanations for his stage sequence, should it prove to be accurate. For instance, the stages may be developmental not in terms of cognitive factors alone, but in terms of object relations, the development of internal control, superego development, identity formation, or some other personality variable. Kohlberg himself does not really offer an explanation of how and why moral development proceeds, nor does he explain how and why development is arrested for some individuals at particular stages. He makes no attempt to explain individual differences at all. He allows for the possibility of regression, primarily from the stage five position, but does not explore this regression with any thoroughness.

From a psychoanalytic perspective, on the other hand, it is precisely the exploration of individual differences that is most important since morality is seen to flow out of an individual's actual life history and represents a unique, individual way of making sense of the world. There are similarities in moral codes yet each individual's morality has features that make it one of a kind. In order to understand an individual's unique moral code, we must understand what that individual has internalized, how it has been reorganized, and under what interpersonal conditions these processes have occurred.

These considerations suggest that there may be important similarities in personality organization and interpersonal background among members of a given Kohlberg moral

stage. On the other hand, individuals falling into the same stage may reason similarly yet organize their values quite differently and have quite different moral codes. A study of the interpersonal causes of the development of a given type of moral reasoning may flesh out Kohlberg's concept of role-taking, or provide alternate explanatory variables.

Another possibility to be investigated in this study is that Kohlberg's six stages represent an accurate reflection of some aspects of moral functioning. Rather than representing developmentally more mature modes of reasoning, they may picture different organizations of moral character that may or may not be developmental in Kohlberg's sense. From this perspective, each Kohlberg stage represents an organization of personality in the form of a consistent constellation of character traits, motives, and preferred ways of assessing moral reality based on past experience, relevant psychodynamic conflicts, the operation of defenses, and the reorganization of values through the process of identity formation.

B. Pro-social Theories

The pro-social theories of moral development argue for the importance of empathy and compassion in morality, but present a limited view of how such traits develop in the context of the family, and do not indicate how this pro-social facet of moral development complements the development of prohibitions, self-control, and moral autonomy in particular, or superego development in general. Hoffman

(1970) emphasizes the importance of relatively limited parental modes of disciplining which do not capture the more general influences of parental personality or the complex parent-child interactions that form the basis of moral development. His conception of object relations is similarly more "laboratory"-oriented than clinically oriented. Also lacking is a detailed perspective on individual differences in moral growth.

More generally, while Hoffman lays important stress on parent-child interactions in his work on moral development (Hoffman, 1970, 1973) he is oriented toward uncovering "mechanisms" and "techniques" parents use with kids rather than describing the more general interactive tone of the parent-child relationship. To be sure, the latter is most difficult to "measure" but is no less important for that reason. Hoffman has also attended more to affective aspects of moral development than other non-analytic writers but has still not really incorporated any functional description or appreciation of the unconscious or of the operation of ego defenses into his theories. Moreover, while in his article on empathy (1973) he argues for motivations based on a sense of "oneness" with others, Hoffman still relies on stimulus-reduction explanations to account for motivation, a position in seeming opposition to his stated belief in "clean" altruism. In sum, Hoffman's work on morality is perhaps the most sophisticated in terms of being finely attained to actual research findings, and therefore the most "scientific." It

falls short, however, in failing to incorporate clinical tools to enlarge his vision of human moral growth.

Hogan has begun to link moral reasoning with personality traits, but as of yet has not offered any detailed explanation for how and why these traits are related to moral development, nor has he described personality organization in terms of the complex interaction of traits. Hogan also does not utilize a dynamic conception of the unconscious even though he states that he believes moral functioning to be essentially irrational. Setting up a psychoanalytic "straw man," Hogan does not really do justice to ego-analytic conceptions of moral development, despite the similarity in tone and perspective.

C. Psychoanalytic Views

Psychoanalytic views have focused too much on pathological manifestations of the superego and have not explored individual variants of "normal" development. Jacobson, Schafer, et al., describe some important effects of actual parent-child interaction, yet do not link these with particular moral organizations. Empathy is mentioned in relationship to morality by a number of writers, but the linkage is not clear. For instance, empathy is seen as one concrete manifestation of developing object relationships, yet moral development and the development of object relations have not been linked in any systematic way. Similarly, narcissism is seen to relate to morality but the interaction has not been spelled out clearly. In general, further specifications of

the role of object relations, narcissism and empathy in moral development are needed, and, while psychoanalysis has had much to say about character development, only Blos has linked character development to the realm of morality. The concepts of responsibility and integrity have been linked to morality but their development remains poorly understood.

A few more general criticisms of the psychoanalytic theory of morality are in order. Non-analytic writers have delighted in criticizing Freud for stating that all personality developments occurs in the first five or six years of life. And while psychoanalytic writers like Erikson, Jacobson, Schafer and even Hartmann have attempted to describe changes in morality during adolescence and adulthood to counter such charges and expand psychoanalytic theory, it is far from clear how they conceptualize the rapid shifting of value positions and preferences advertized by adolescents. Moreover, psychoanalyists are not clear about exactly how cultural "tastes" are internalized or more generally how current culture influences morality beyond the influence of conventional agents of socialization (peers, parents). The influence of current culture on moral codes needs to be spelled out in finer detail.

Erikson (1950), among others, has suggested that individual development and the development of societies and cultures show a close parallelism. Erikson has thus pointed out that the development of the superego was a cultural event in the history of society as well as an event in the

lives of individuals. However, psychoanalysts have not documented historical change in the form and shape of the superego, let alone the content of superego values. Hence it is difficult to compare superegos of individuals living during different historical eras.

And, while Freud also spoke of the "timelessness" of the superego, most analysts have shied away from addressing themselves to questions concerning the possible existence of a universal morality (Hartmann, 1960). Indeed, most psychoanalytic writers are themselves too formalistic in their discussions of morality and avoid discussions of moral "content" as if such discussion could infect them with the plague of "wild analysis" (cf. Grodeck, 1923). Erich Fromm (1939) made some attempts to describe universal "humanistic" morality but did not link his efforts to Freud's structured or genetic theories. Ticho (1972) asserts that universal morality centers around concern for others besides the self, a promising beginning, but also seems almost embarrassed even even discussing such a possibility. Needed is a frank detailed psychoanalytic discussion of moral "content" as well as structure and a firm position taken on the issue of universal morality.

VII. Hypotheses and Questions

The present study will attempt to shed light on some of the unanswered questions left by each of these theories, and suggest a means of synthesizing the most productive hypotheses of each. Specific hypotheses to be examined and

(questions to be answered) are as follows:

1) Kohlberg's stages represent the consolidation of moral character around a specifiable central theme which reflects psychodynamic conflict, the use of defenses, the status of superego and identity.

2) Moral development reflects cognitive and affective development and therefore should be related to superego development, object relationships, empathy, narcissism, defensive style, and identity formation. The study will investigate how these aspects of personality organization interact to form moral character.

3) If Kohlberg's stages are developmental, then they should reflect increasing maturity in terms of object relations, narcissism, superego development, and identity development. At higher stages, morality should be less reflective of psychodynamic conflict and the oedipal ties to parents should be diminished or resolved.

4) The question of the genesis of morality has been linked by all three theories to various parent-child interactions. The study will attempt to shed light on such interactions by exploring the subject's memories of their personal "moral careers" and their perceptions of important inputs and changes in their own development. It is expected that an individual's current moral stance will be comprehensible in the context of this interpersonal background. Specific parameters will be sought in the data, and a theoretical statement about the role of parent-child interactions

will flow from these data.

5) By examining individuals and their perceptions of their own development in detail, it is expected that further clarity can be given to psychoanalytic notions of moral development. In particular, the role of moral character, integrity, responsibility, and identity will be examined in detail.

6) Finally, from these data, a theoretical summary of the development of morality will be constructed and compared with the three theories.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. Theoretical Rationale

In the moral development literature, the relationship between personality organization and moral reasoning has not been explored in detail as noted in Chapter 1. To date, Hogan (1972, 1973) has been the only researcher to explore the personality dimension in relation to moral reasoning. Subjects organizing their morality around an "ethics of responsibility" or an "ethics of conscience" were given personality tests by Hogan. These two ethical orientations were found to correlate with personality traits such as "responsible," "impulsive," etc. (Hogan, 1973). Hogan did not discuss the organization or genesis of these traits or any connection they might have with moral reasoning, however. Nor did he attempt any detailed genetic explanations for the development of these two ethical orientations.

Similarly, in the psychoanalytic literature, the moral development of a non-patient population has not been studied. As Hartmann notes (1960), there is a need for such a study of moral development employing the clinical method of investigation of psychoanalysis--a method sensitive to conscious and unconscious elements of morality and to the genetic determinants of a given moral code. Such a study

could explore the areas of relationship between personality and moral reasoning not touched upon by Hogan.

A clinical, phenomenological method of investigation differs from more traditional research strategies in several basic ways. First, the focus of the interview is dictated as much by the subject's way of organizing his perceptions and the associational links that exist in his mind between discrete areas of experience as by the interviewer's prepared questions. The subject is given room to organize and structure the interview in a way that reflects his personality in action. All interviewer questions are open ended and allow the subject to dictate the content and flow of the answer. Hence the interviewer follows the subject's associations more than imposing a limiting structure of his own on the interview. For this reason, each interview covers the same general area but is different from all others since it is shaped by the uniqueness of the subject. Such an investigation transcends a pursuit of abstractions and shared, consensually validated modes of perceiving and focuses on the personal, idiosyncratic meaning given to experience by that individual and to the way he organizes and makes sense of his life.

Secondly, the material generated by a clinical interview is interpreted much differently than other data. Since the subject's own mode of organizing experience and personal associations between topics are dominant, these data can be thought of as containing meaningful

interconnections both in terms of ideational and affective linkages. Rather than seeing inconsistencies and paradoxes as blind alleys or useless data which do not fit into the preformed "objective" categories utilized in traditional hypothesis testing research strategies, in a clinical investigation paradoxes are pursued for their underlying meaning. Logical inconsistency often yields emotional parsimony.

A third difference occurs in the area of hypothesis construction and evaluation. Rather than testing preformulated hypotheses, a clinical investigation seeks to uncover meaningful relationships in the data themselves. Hypotheses about a subject or group of subjects are thus generated through the process of investigation itself. The focus of the interview is upon the pursuit of interconnectedness and meaning of the subject's experience. The writeup of such an interview points toward a demonstration of this underlying connection of content areas. In contrast, most traditional statistical research describes the relation of variables in mathematical terms which do not help in understanding the meaning of connections. Interpretation of statistical relationships is based on speculation which of necessity transcends the actual data themselves. For instance, it is exceedingly difficult to understand the meaning of Kohlberg's finding that moral reasoning correlates between .30 and .50 with measured I.Q. (Kohlberg, 1958). To be sure, clinical investigations cannot hope to uncover objective causal connections between past and present, feeling states

and moral reasoning, etc. What can be uncovered are meaningful connections that make the various facets of an individual's experience comprehensible. More specifically, in the present study meaningful connections are being sought between moral reasoning and personality functioning essentially in its affective modalities. The study is a search for parallels between these areas, for points of contact and interlapping. On one level, this endeavor culminates in viewing moral reasoning as elicited by Kohlberg's moral dilemmas as data similar to that gathered through projective testing. The clinical methodology will be used to explore the connection between logical argumentation and feelings expressed about self and others. The expectation is that abstract moral reasoning is intimately interrelated with an individual's perceptions and experiences of human interactions.

One basic contention this study is based upon holds that the relationship between moral reasoning and personality organization is complex and transcendant of simple linear causal connections. Specifically no attempt will be made to reduce moral reasoning to a simple reflection of dynamic conflicts. It is expected that moral reasoning is not caused by personality organization but rather meaningfully interrelates. Hence in the interview writeups, no connections will be portrayed as strictly causal, but rather as meaningfully interrelated. Parallel themes in moral reasoning and personality development will be pointed out

with no attempt made to decide on a causal sequencing. Hence parallelism rather than simple causality is the focus of this study.

The use of clinical methodology for a psychoanalytic study of moral development is also made necessary by the way in which development is viewed from this perspective. For instance, adult morality is seen by Erikson (1950), Jacobson (1965), and Schafer (1968) as a synthesis of past and present perceptions of self and relations to important others; as a composite of old and new identifications and as a reflection of the individual's current attempts to make sense of his life experience. To investigate the development of morality in these terms, clinical methodology is ideally suited, for only through the uncovering of detailed case history "data" can one trace the evolution of meaning of an individual's morality and its relationship with subjectively perceived incidents in the individual's life. Investigations which focus on coding a subject's responses in terms of objective, externally imposed categories run the risk of undercutting the subjective meaning and relatedness these data have. The uniqueness and internal consistency of clinical material can be lost through such categorization. Specifically, in the attempt to understand the evolution and development of an individual's moral code and its relationship to general personality organization, coding and categorization can serve to dichotomize and isolate the data rather than to facilitate understanding of the interrelatedness and connectedness

of the whole.

Historically, there have been precedents for this type of clinical research. Freud's pioneering use of the clinical method is well-known (e.g., 1905), as are Erikson's biographical studies of identity formation (Erikson, 1950, 1953, 1969). And the area of morality and values has seen a number of studies based in part or in whole on clinical investigations. The first of these studies, The Authoritarian Personality (1950) had a large portion devoted to clinical interviews. Similarly, Smith, Bruner, and White, in Opinions and Personality (1956) utilized extensive clinical interviewing in addition to testing data, and concluded that the interviews provided more detailed material descriptive of unique, individual aspects of personality in comparison with the somewhat global generalizations provided by their testing data. Even Piaget's studies have been based on detailed observations of actual behavior and verbalizations. Hence clinical methodology is not a novel tool for research on morality.

The particular methodology adopted in this study emanates most directly from Josselson's (1972) clinical investigation of identity formation in "non-exceptional" women. Josselson utilized open-ended clinical interviews to trace the identity development of her subjects, and focused upon the subjects' responses as the basic data, rather than applying codes to this material.

It could and has been argued that the data obtained

by interviewing a small number of subjects cannot be viewed as representative of anything more than the functioning of these few individuals. The most extreme of such arguments holds that these data must be seen as random, chance findings devoid of any functional significance for the description of general human behavior.

I believe that these arguments suffer from methodological biases introduced by overreliance upon correlational methods of statistical analysis. To be sure, in order to make generalizations about wider populations it would be better to have a large number of detailed case studies from which to work. However, if one's goal is to demonstrate meaningful interconnections between various facets of personality functioning rather than to make linear causal claims about the relationship of discrete variables, then a large number of cases would not appear to add meaningful information. However, in deference to the above argument it would appear that in order to guard against overvaluing individual differences in a biased manner, scrutinizing more than one case in each category to be assessed is advisable. Accordingly, rather than presenting one case for each Kohlberg stage, I have chosen three. The choice of this figure was in part random in that 12 subjects of the original sample were available for interviewing. Beyond this, however, I wanted to have at least one male and one female subject in each stage with at least one more "swing" subject. Hence the marriage of convenience and methodological concern

led to the choice of three subjects as the magic number. Basing clinical generalizations upon analysis of small groups of subjects is also not a new approach. In recent years the foremost practitioner of this methodology has been Keniston (1968, 1970).

II. Method

This study was conducted during the spring of 1973 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

A. Subjects

Subjects were 34 men and women enrolled as beginning students in the school of social work in a large public university. Social workers were chosen because it was expected that they were part of a population 1) familiar with and not unduly opposed to extensive clinical interviewing, 2) interested in values, politics and morality in general by virtue of their occupational choice, and 3) of relatively high intelligence such that there would not be expected to be fluctuations in IQ as wide as in the general population.

After obtaining permission from the School of Social Work, the first year class was asked to participate in a two-faceted study by my research associate, Elizabeth Kelly Hodnefield. She administered a written Kohlberg Moral Dilemma questionnaire, in addition to other forms, and indicated that I would ask the subjects to be interviewed at a later date. Subjects' questionnaires were coded by myself and Mrs. Hodnefield and a Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score was

assigned to each protocol. In coding we used Kohlberg's (1972) manual which details the use of his latest coding system and decided that a dividing line had to be set arbitrarily between stages. In Kohlberg's system, scoring 100 means a "perfect" stage one, i.e., the person either gives all stage one responses or the responses average out to that. Similarly a score of 600 means a person gives all stage 6 responses. In reality, however, most subjects depart from this ideal and give responses coded as several different stages, a fact noted by Kohlberg as well (1972). Mrs. Hodnefield and I decided therefore to somewhat arbitrarily assign subjects to Kohlberg stages according to these criteria: a person scoring between 0 and 174 was assigned to stage 1; one scoring 175-274 was designated as stage 2; one scoring 275-374 was called stage 3; one scoring 375-474 was seen as stage 4; one scoring 475-574 was viewed as stage 5; and one scoring above 574 was designated as stage 6. Our reasoning was that if a subject's responses are 3/4 of a given stage, then that represents a dominant trend in that direction. While other stage reasoning was present in all subjects we feel that our use of these criteria has resulted in subject placement that maintains the spirit of Kohlberg's original schema.

Several months after administering the Kohlberg stories I contacted the subjects to participate in the interview portion of the study. The design called for three subjects for each of the Kohlberg moral states, but of the

34 subjects only one fell into Kohlberg stage 1, and none fell into stage 6. Hence 3 subjects were interviewed from stages 2, 3, 4, and 5, making a total of 12 interview subjects. The subjects interviewed were chosen randomly within each state on the basis of time available and interest.

Each subject was contacted by phone and was given a detailed explanation of the intent of the study. The confidentiality of the interview was stressed as was my lack of affiliation with the social work school. I explained that I would be asking them questions about their past lives and personality that might be seen to relate to the answers they had given to the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma stories. The subjects were told they would be paid. The only subjects who refused to participate were those either already out of town for spring semester or those leaving soon.

B. Procedure

1. Independent Variable

All subjects filled out a modified Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Questionnaire that was presented in written form. It contained five standard Kohlberg stories and three new stories created by Mrs. Hodnefield to tap moral dilemmas specific to the practice of social work (see Appendix A). This written presentation represented a departure from Kohlberg's usual interview format. However, on the basis of the written protocols, scorable responses were obtained from all but one subject. To insure that important information was not overlooked, each of the 12 subjects

interviewed was readministered the Kohlberg questionnaire in interview form to obtain their dilemma answers. While additional information was obtained through this procedure, in none of the cases did it change the stage level already ascertained for the subject. The new information dealt primarily with affective responses to the stories, and yielded a more detailed, personal portrait of the subjects' values. In one case, there was a discrepancy between the initial written answers and the later interview, which was comprehensible as an example of what Kohlberg has called the 5/2 regression. This interesting case is described in the chapter on stage 5. All protocols were rated separately by both raters and 20 protocols were then used for a reliability check of placement of subjects into one of Kohlberg's 6 stages of moral development. The reliability correlation was .79. After the reliability check, each protocol was discussed by both raters and an agreed upon pooled rating was arrived at for the final stage placement for the subjects, based on the criteria detailed above.

2. The Dependent Variables

All personality variables were assessed on the basis of extensive clinical interviews lasting from five to six hours. The interview began with a representation of the Kohlberg stories. A more comprehensive view of the subjects' moral values was obtained by asking more detailed questions about the same Kohlberg stories (see Appendix B). In an open-ended interview format, subjects were asked about

their emotional reactions to the stories and also to try to explain how and why they had come to believe in the values they were espousing. Subjects were asked to relate these values to other facets of their lives, and to explain the personal meaning they gave to these values. This type of questioning went well beyond a level that would yield scorable material for the Kohlberg moral reasoning codes. This form of questioning yielded two or three basic values which the subject seemed to utilize in all moral dilemma situations. These basic values, which inevitably took a unique, individual form, were then traced to the individual's past experience by asking the subject to explain how and why these values become important to them. To retain each individual's unique way of organizing these values and conceptualizing them, the interviewer asked non-leading questions (e.g., Why? Tell me more. Why is that important to you? How did you feel?, etc.) Next subjects were asked to describe moral dilemmas they actually experienced in their own lives. Subjects were asked to describe how they defined the situation, how they felt about it, and how they resolved it.

The subject's moral career was then traced to its beginnings in the family. Detailed questions were asked about parental discipline, types of rules stressed, and general moral climate in the home. Subjects were encouraged to recall concrete situations. Subjects were asked to recall times they felt shame and guilt and to describe the feelings and circumstances in detail. They were asked to

recall early goals, aspirations, and values as children and to describe people they admired and wished to emulate. Next they were asked to describe one person they thought of as having integrity and one they thought of as lacking integrity, and then to evaluate themselves on this dimension.

Subjects were then asked to describe their parents in detail and relate early memories about them and their childhoods in general. They were asked to trace their development as children, and to relate their current conception of their identity to the past, and to try to account for changes in their identity, values, etc.

The interview was conducted similarly to a clinical interview. The above format was used as structure but often was abandoned when the subject brought up interesting feelings or ideas, which were pursued as far as possible. Subjects were encouraged to be introspective and once they were given an explanation of the purpose of the interview, were able to volunteer valuable information and suggest new areas for examination on their own. Most subjects become actively involved in the interview process, and volunteered many valuable insights about themselves. The interviewer maintained an impartial non-judgmental position and refrained from making interpretations or confronting defensive positions. Other than that, the interviews were much like a standard initial clinical evaluation.

Since the length of the interviews made taping impractical, the interviewer took extensive verbatim notes

during the interviews, which were then used as the raw data for the study. To insure accurate reporting, the interviewer read back important passages for the subject's approval.

On the basis of these interview notes, the following aspects of personality functioning were assessed:

1) Basic Moral Values: The most salient aspects or foci of the individual's moral code representing a combination of affective and cognitive factors. These values were more detailed and personally idiosyncratic than the Kohlberg stage specific type of moral reasoning.

2) Superego Functioning: The degree of internalization of these values, i.e., the degree to which they are exercised because of guilt, degree of realistic guilt. Emphasis on compassion or punitiveness, and degree and quality of control of impulses. The role of responsibility and integrity in the moral code and the degree of synthesis with ego-identity. An assessment was also made of the issues around which integrity centered, and the individual's basic "moral" self-esteem.

3) Narcissism: The degree of exclusive investment and interest in the self as opposed to others. The quality of self-representations and self-evaluation in general.

4) Object Relations and Empathy: The quality of images of people, the ways in which relationships with others are portrayed. The ability to take the other's position and demonstrate understanding of their feelings and behavior.

5) Ego Functioning and Defenses: Degree of ego-strength, major defenses and their adaptiveness. General intellectual functioning.

6) Ego-identity: Those aspects of self that are most clearly definitional--the way the individual organizes and understands past and present identifications, ideals, goals.

7) Genetic Explanations: The interrelationship of these facets of personality organization will be sketched, and the individual's unique moral character will be explained as a product of the individual's interpersonal past within the family. Morality will be related to general personality organization and character formation. Relevant parent-child interaction paradigms will be described and related to the development of moral character.

3. Presentation of Data

The clinical, relatively non-structured format of the interviews resulted in obtaining a large mass of data which did not fall naturally into discrete categories such as "moral orientation," "identity," "superego," etc. Indeed as has been claimed in the first chapter it is most difficult and perhaps even erroneous to attempt to separate moral reasoning from the rest of personality functioning. However for the purpose of unbiased exposition, I have chosen to present the data of this study in the following manner: First a short summary of scorable moral reasoning responses taken from the original Kohlberg protocols will be presented to give the flavor of reasoning from the

Kohlbergian perspective. Next a detailed interpretive summary of the moral orientation interview (Appendix B) will be presented, followed by a presentation of life history data (early memories, etc.) organized in terms of psychodynamic principles of interpretation. Following this is a summary of the individual's moral orientation of moral development and its relationship to general personality development of that individual. Finally a summary of the individual's moral orientation and its relationship to the subject's reported parent-child interactions will be presented.

For each Kohlberg stage, the three clinical interviews will be presented first, to be followed by a general discussion of the personality dynamics and development of each stage. The interviews will thus present a detailed portrait of the subject's unique way of organizing moral considerations as well as the specifics of his personality organization. The general summary of each stage, on the other hand, will focus on commonalities between the subjects of the same stage, in terms of similar parent-child interaction patterns, personality organization and organization of morality. Relevant differences between the cases will be discussed as well, and comparisons between stages will be made.

CHAPTER 3

KOHLBERG'S STAGE 2: NEEDY HEDONISTS[1]

I. Interviews

A. Miss A--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 256[2]

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses[3]

Miss A deals with the suicidal mission story (story 3) in typical stage 2 fashion. She argues that the captain should send a sick man rather than a troublemaker on the mission because: "his odds of living in the end are less." On the Kohlberg coding this answer receives an H_2

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[1]The designation "needy hedonists" represents my characterization of the character development of the stage 2 subjects above and beyond Kohlberg's moral reasoning designation. Such characterizations are attached to each Kohlberg stage.

[2]This and all subsequent Moral Maturity Score designations reflect coding of Kohlberg stories on the basis of his latest coding schema (Kohlberg, 1972). The score reported here represents the final agreed upon score tabulated by Mrs. Hodnefield and myself. It should be noted that originally Mrs. Hodnefield and I coded each protocol independently and thus arrived at our own Moral Maturity Score. As noted above, a rater-reliability coefficient of .79 was obtained by comparing 20 protocols coded independently. The final Moral Maturity Score in no case departs significantly from the independent placement of subjects into Kohlberg stages. The only differences between Mrs. Hodnefield and myself were over the exact Moral Maturity Score (i.e., 256 vs. 247 in the case of Miss A).

[3]All references to Kohlberg story number can be found in Appendix A, where the stories can be found in their entirety.

designation, i.e., stage 2 thinking about human life.[4]

In story 4, several "non-scorable" responses are of interest. To the question "What does someone do when his conscience bothers him?" She answers: "Either rectifies the situation, if possible, or by rationalizing enough becomes able to forget about it." When asked about her own conscience: "I would say I don't have much 'conscience' and I usually feel guilty about not doing things than about doing wrong things, but I rarely feel guilty at all." This response is not scorable in Kohlberg's system but is indicative of the whole moral orientation.

She believes that the worst thing about Karl's theft was: "Inconveniencing the people who have to investigate the crime." Scoring this response is difficult but it was assigned a stage one score on Kohlberg's BII category.

In story 5, she believes that it is acceptable for the student to cheat because: ". . . if the student really needed it (the scholarship) he should have it." This response was given a stage 2 scoring on Kohlberg's BII category.

2. Moral Orientation

Miss A's initial response to moral dilemmas is to express a generalized concern for others. For instance, in story one she asserts that: "you should go out of your way to be nice to people," and that: "discrimination is bad

[4]All references to Kohlberg's moral issues A-K can be found in Appendix C.

because you hurt others' feelings. How would you feel?"[5] Once questioned briefly about any of these statements, however, a pragmatic, unprincipled side of her morality surfaced which suggested that the above-mentioned "principles" are incidental to her actual moral decisions. For instance, in story one, after asserting that she disapproved of discrimination, she suggested that Mrs. W could avoid any trouble by not advertising her room publicly and then renting to whoever she chose. By not advertising, she would break no law by discriminating against the black. Her approach is to find a way of circumventing a moral issue rather than facing it and finding some resolution of the conflict. She was aware of some incongruity between her initial sentiments about discrimination and her method for Mrs. W avoiding the conflict, but seemed unperturbed by this awareness: "yea, I know I'm inconsistent."

In addition to inconsistency about principles, Miss A's stated concern for others' feelings is not borne out in answers which indicate empathic sensitivity to others' feelings. She felt for instance that Mrs. W would not be "hurting anyone" by refusing to rent to the black. She mentions that the only possible harm would be putting the black through the "inconvenience" of coming out to look for the

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[5]All excerpts from Kohlberg stories in the normal orientation sections come from the expanded interviewing done of each subject using the Kohlberg stories as a starting point for eliciting more general moral orientation including affective dimensions as well as cognitive. Accordingly these excerpts differ in focus and interpretation from the interview format suggested by Kohlberg (1972).

room and not getting it. Her focus is thus upon immediate, short-term convenience or inconvenience rather than upon any feelings a person might have as a result of being discriminated against. Similarly, in story four she argues that the worst thing about stealing is that it inconveniences the police. Once again, matters of moral principle are seen solely in terms of convenience.

Another example of her superficial belief is principle and need to avoid moral conflict can be found in story two. After the initial statement: "I believe in free speech," she goes on to argue that the principal can "get out of" his dilemma by simply forbidding the use of school duplicating and printing equipment to the students: "Principals do this sort of thing all the time, although it is ideally wrong." And the fact that it is "ideally" wrong is not very important in the end: "Free speech doesn't extend to demands that other people cooperate with you." Her stated belief in free speech is further undercut by her contention that dissidents have a right to free speech only if their opinions are "factual."

Her basic moral stance is well summarized in part of her answer to story three: "Outside the bounds of usual activity, nothing applies in terms of what is right." In conflict situations, she finds it too difficult to be consistent and apply moral principles she claims to believe in. Instead she is drawn to immediate pragmatic considerations, which she justifies by stating that she has ideals, but she

does not live up to them very often: "I believe in consistency, probably because I'm not. I'm always going back and forth on things, but I believe in consistency as an ideal."

Relatively meager superego development is suggested by her lack of investment in principles and in the absence of feelings of guilt. Indeed she has no recollections of ever feeling guilt and observes; "I have a poorly developed sense of guilt." She did state that she felt that hurting people was wrong but only because if one hurts someone then one is "not living up to others' expectations." Hence she focuses on avoiding disappointment and rejection from others rather than upon her harming someone else. For instance, in one class everyone was supposed to hand a paper to a classmate for a critique. Her paper was late and the student assigned to read it was upset. Miss A was also upset, but not over what she was doing to the other student: "I was afraid she'd think less of me and might think I wasn't a good student. She might not like me."

In sum Miss A does not take responsibility for the impact her behavior has on others and is not drawn to a consideration of their feelings. Her morality is narcissistic in focus and lacks any developed conception of the needs of others, beyond making sure they are not inconvenienced. Principles exist as ideals divorced from any sense of imperative or obligation. Her ideals are flexible and expendable enough to facilitate her efforts toward avoiding involvement

in or awareness of moral conflict. In essence she strives to placate others and have her own immediate needs gratified, without making any useful distinction between short term and long term needs.

3. Genesis of Moral Position[6]

Miss A is the oldest daughter of two psychologists and has a younger brother. Her parents spent a great deal of time in their professional work and in a summer family business and consequently did not have much time for the children. Miss A recalls being in day-care centers and play-groups since she was two or three. In general she felt her parents were permissive disciplinarians who did not actively involve themselves in structuring her behavior: "Mother never said no, but she might say she didn't approve." Miss A's lack of investment in principles and rules is comprehensible in this light. Rarely does she recall mother intervening actively in her life and there is a strong sense that she felt mother was not actively concerned about her safety. This feeling is implied strongly in the following story. When she was six or seven she asked her mother if she could go to the beach with the rest of the kids. It was early spring, a time of danger in and around the lake they lived near. Mother felt it was dangerous but refused to forbid her going: "I'm not going to tell you no." Miss A did not go and her stated reason is not logical: "So the

[6]All material in this genesis section comes from the interview (see Appendix B).

kids don't think I have a mother who says no." One suspects that her actual wish is to have a mother who does say no, thereby showing interest and concern for her child.

In her early memories, she remembers mother as "snow white," a hard worker who taught her how to do things and who got her involved in projects. But while mother would let her help with household chores, she would soon be left on her own. Mother was back at work before she was ready for nursery school: "Mother was very cheerful and happy most of the time, but very busy. It was always a big treat when she let us do things with her." Mother was the bookkeeper for the family business and the children weren't allowed to bother her, "because she was so busy."

Her picture of father is not well-differentiated from that of mother. He was also remembered as someone who taught her things and as extremely busy. She felt he was a nice man: "He was always well-liked and he communicates concern to others." But he had little time for her. She recalls visiting his office and twirling around in his chair: "But that was only an occasional thing."

The focus on gratifying immediate needs in her morality is comprehensible given the sense of deprivation she experienced in her family. Her childhood was punctuated by feelings that she was misunderstood and not accepted fully. When she was 12 or 13, for instance, her dog died: "I had the feeling that the dog was the only one who understood me. Father was off at school and mother was picking

on me. I was left with no one except a friend in New York I was writing to every day." She felt she missed out on parental affection. For instance she recalls being sick once with measles and her parents sending her to her room. She felt very lonely and was aware of their talking with her brother once she was gone. She felt alone and left out.

Her early memories are filled with themes of death and loss. She recalls a man having a heart attack next door; her dog dying; a playmate sick and wishing the child's father, a doctor, could cure him. The intensity of her neediness is best captured however, in her memory of taking money from her mother's purse and sneaking down to the candy store with it. She began to get fat and mother tried to reason with her: "You'll be happy if you lose weight." But Miss A wanted more than logical advice even though her conscious attitude was quite to the contrary at the time: "I felt I'd be happy if she left me alone." Unconsciously, stealing the candy and getting caught seem to be representations of the wish to be fed, taken care of, and noticed by mother.

When there were conflicts between herself and mother, she could usually rely on father to take her side. For instance, when she was moping around the house as an adolescent, mother tried to encourage her to get out. Father, on the other hand, told her to do what she wanted. She would approach him when she wanted to get her own way: "He was the one most likely to relent." But there is a question

in her mind about his interest in her. For instance, when her brother was beating her up, father would take him into his room and pretend to spank him. Father would hit the bed with his hand and brother would pretend to cry.

She continues to yearn for some form of relatedness to the family. For instance, in the interview she constantly referred to "we" (the family) when it seemed clear she was talking about herself alone. And she continues to spend all her summers living at home, working in the family business. She fantasizes about spending the rest of her days at home. Separation from the family is most difficult for her. It is as if she believes that if she is good and stays around long enough, she will get the love and concern she felt she missed. Attempts to separate from the family have proven difficult. For instance, the family has always been involved in politics. When she left home after graduating from college, she went east, to "where it was at, politically." But when she got there, she felt lost: "I didn't know where to go to get involved. I felt I wasn't contributing and didn't have that much time." She was not able to maintain her interest in politics apart from her parents.

Returning home was a common theme represented throughout her interview. One person she admires, for instance, was an American Field Service student who lived with her family: "He was well-educated and originally interested in medicine and law. He decided to go back home and take care of the family farm. He decided to bring his education

back to the people instead of doing what he wanted, like living in Paris." On the other hand, she envies her brother's rebelliousness: "He's committed to his ideals and won't sacrifice himself to conform to society. He dropped out (of school) because he couldn't stand the bureaucracy. . . . He's not just going through the system." He defied the parents constantly, for instance refusing to go to high school; "they left the house before he did and he just refused to go to school." Her own compliance is in sharp contrast: "I never did anything much that mother disapproved of." It appears, then, that she is ambivalent about compliance. She wants to be loved, but also wishes to rebel angrily as did brother. It seems plausible that she was angry about her parents' lack of consistency over rules and therefore wishes to overthrow them, an idea given intellectual expression in her "anti-system" values (see below).

Her lack of consistency in moral thought and the lack of investment in principles is traceable to a discipline environment that was inconsistent, capricious and lacking in active concern for her welfare. As noted above, mother never said "no" and father told her she could do what she wanted. On the other hand, harsh punishment would be administered for misbehavior that inconvenienced the parents. Spankings were administered for leaving her room messy, being late for dinner, etc., but where her safety was concerned (e.g., the lake incident) mother refused to intervene. In other areas the rules could be quite stringent and

exacting. For instance she and her brother did the dishes and were supposed to go to bed right afterwards. One night they decided to work slowly so as to stay up a bit later. Immediately mother imposed a two-minute penalty for each minute they were up past their regular bedtime.

Father was easygoing, but also punished minor behavior by spanking when it interfered with his comfort. If a major transgression occurred, such as hurting another child, she was asked why she did it. If she confessed to being sorry, there was no punishment. And yet father would become outraged if she were noisy when the family was on an outing, again suggesting that the greatest sin in this house was to inconvenience the parents. There is also a sense that her parents were inconsistent about their morality. For instance she recalls them talking often about the importance of not discriminating and "giving everyone a chance," yet she recalls that they did not allow drunken fishermen in their family store because <u>once</u> a drunk used crude language in the store around a family with young children.

The validity of the rules was further undercut because she felt her younger brother was allowed to be an exception. He didn't go to school, wouldn't make his bed, or arrive on time for dinner. She felt he was spoiled and encouraged to ignore the rules (e.g., father pretending to punish him for hitting her) which made her jealous and angry.

In this realm of capricious rules, she learned to verbalize the "correct formulas." She could avoid further

unpleasantness by saying she was sorry, without having to modify her behavior. She pictures mother as being "extremely logical" in her presentation of demands and expectations and she felt it was easy to "acquiese enough to make her happy." The appearance of compliance was sufficient. No internalization was expected or encouraged. The parents seemed more concerned with keeping order than teaching the children any sense of responsibility. In Miss A's case, this lack of internalization of principles has extended to a general problem over exerting any type of internal control. Indeed her overt submissiveness to authority and need to remain an appendage of her family seem to be outgrowths of this difficulty. She wishes to be rebellious like her brother but she is drawn back to the parental sphere for a sense of stability.

Her thinking about occupation choice reflects this ambivalence about breaking free of her parents. She confided that she didn't want to be a psychologist like her parents, yet she sees social work as a combination of psychology and political science, both areas associated with her parents. In social work she felt she found an area that would not make too many demands on her (i.e., similar to her parents' laissez faire attitude): "Political Science and Psychology have too many strict rules." She reports not being very involved in school and is not thinking about finding a job when she finishes. Instead she has a fantasy about going home to involve herself in the family business

and to do "independent research."

Her descriptions of her relationships with others also suggest a lack of purposefulness or direction. There is a lack of vitality or life in her images of others and in her self image as seen in her early memories and characterization of other objects in her world. Even her memories of deprivation in childhood were related in a disinterested, affectless manner. There was a sense of emotional deadness about these memories and her life in general. She related that all her recent relationships have been "superficial" and feels herself to be a "go-between" rather than one who relates directly or actively with others: "I'm too nice, not aggressive enough. I'm afraid of pushing people and I put up with semi-commitments." She describes having lost track of old friends and not making new ones. It is as if she lacks energy for interacting with the external world.

4. Summary of Moral Development

It seems that Miss A's major conflicts center around the transition between narcissism and relatedness to objects at a time when self is not clearly separated from object. She feels herself to have been unloved, uncared for, and deprived and has not developed any abiding involvement with others beyond a dream of remaining in her family for life and somehow getting the love she missed as a child. Others are seen primarily as potential gratifiers of her needs, i.e., as narcissitic extensions of self. Mother and father are undifferentiated object representations and are poorly

differentiated from self. She experiences herself as a non-self with constantly shifting boundaries and with a lack of energy for interacting. Her morality reflects a lack of internalization and focuses on narcissitic considerations. Her parents' lack of involvement in her safety, their inconsistent standards, and lack of pressure on her to internalize principles have resulted in a severely stunted superego development where there exists little or no capacity for experiencing guilt and meager development of moral principles. Similarly she evidences little or no ability to empathize with others beyond immediate needs, which is reflected in her clinging, childlike, yet detached form of relating to objects. Her identity centers around being reincorporated into her family and no new identifications have been formed to help establish an autonomous identity. There are no signs of pronounced ego weaknesses in her functioning, however. She is not doing well in school currently, but this seems to be due more to a lack of motivation to act in the world than to any actual cognitive defects. Her reasoning is often inconsistent but also does not suggest cognitive flaws. Here too she is content to allow inconsistencies to flourish.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

By her description, Miss A's parents appear to be narcissistically preoccupied individuals who left their children to their own devices rather than providing guidance in the form of rules or more general concern for their

safety. This sense that the parents were not concerned for her safety appears to have been experienced by Miss A as a narcissistic injury which has been translated by her into a moral code focusing on getting needs gratified and especially on obtaining narcissistic gratifications. Her parents did not set up rules and therefore moral principles were not modeled for Miss A. The only rules of any consequence in her home were instituted for parental convenience. Hence rules and principles are seen by her as narcissistic constructions geared toward one's own gratification. Inconsistency does not alarm her because her models were consistently inconsistent. Any object-related aspect of morality is thus lacking in Miss A as well as in her parents, or so it seems. Moreover her parents were capricious and capable of being severe, hence rules are seen by her as potentially destructive. She wishes for an existence bereft of rules but where she can feel safe and loved within the confines of a symbiotic relationship with her parents.

If one views character development as a means of organizing the world in a protective manner once one can no longer count on one's family to provide such security (Blos, 1968), then it can be seen that Miss A's character organized early in life around the conflict between narcissistic strivings and object-relatedness resulting in the development of an oral character structure constructed to undo the narcissistic injuries experienced in her family. Her stage two moral reasoning can be seen as a logical extension of

this primitive character position. Her moral reasoning is comprehensible as a reflection of the character armour she took on early in life so as to protect herself from a functionally uncaring environment.

B. Miss B--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 230

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story one, Miss B argues that Mrs. W's most important consideration should be: ". . . saving her own skin. (Otherwise) people will be dictating what she'll do." This response was given a stage 2 coding under Kohlberg's BIV category. Further on Miss B argues that people should be able to decide what to do with their own homes unencumbered by any restraint: "If a person cares about their home they should be able to make that decision. There shouldn't be someone else dictating the decision of what is their's." This response was coded as stage 2 under Kohlberg's D category.

In story 2 she argues that Fred should go ahead and publish despite the principal's ban: "I'd feel he told me I could do it. . . . If the principal were allowed to do this he'd be like a dictator. It would change the school for the better." This was also scored stage 2 under Kohlberg's D category.

In story form she argues against stealing in the following manner: "It's not the law (against stealing) that makes it wrong. What if I come up to you and take your stuff? If everyone starts doing it, it's going to

happen to you too." This response was not scorable under Kohlberg's stringent criteria but gives the flavor of her appeal to personal needs and self-interest.

In story 5 she at first argues that the social worker should not report the cheater because: "it would be up to that student to do it." She would try to talk to the student instead but if the student didn't listen to her: "I'd turn them in. There has to be some way they understand." This response was given a stage 2 coding under Kohlberg's E category (civil rights).

2. Moral Orientation

The most prominent aspect of Miss B's morality is her emphasis upon personal autonomy. In story one she states: "People can go all the way through life doing what others say. Mrs. W's boarders could dictate all of what she can do because they knew they had some kind of control over her." She argues forcefully that one must not let others coerce one to act in any way contrary to what one wishes. In story one she also states that concern for others is very important to her and she opposes discrimination because one should judge people on their own "personal qualities." She elaborates: "There's a lot you can learn from others; a lot the other can grow from you. . . . If you want to be valued yourself, you have to value them." The rationale for concern for others, then, is a form of rational self-interest. One should care about others so they will care about you. Ultimately, concern for others is less important than

concern for oneself. Of Mrs. W she says: "In the long run, saving her own skin is most important." Hence her most basic moral concern is in maintaining herself as an autonomous, self-sufficient entity.

Miss B resents and struggles against external interference of any type. For instance, in story one, she says that even though discrimination is wrong the state does not have the right to pass open housing laws because this is coercive: "Mrs. W does have the right to say who lives in her house. The real solution is not to pass a law but to go back and convince her she's wrong. . . . If a person cares about their home, they should be able to make that decision. There shouldn't be someone else dictating the decision of what is theirs."

Her feelings about violations of a person's autonomy are intense and reappear in every Kohlberg story. In story three she argues that "no person has the right to say someone else should go (on the suicidal mission). If she were the lieutenant she would go back herself rather than choosing someone else. The principle of autonomy is more important to her than survival: "The most important thing is for others to decide their own fate; more important than my own life."

In story four she argues against stealing because "It's a violation of the other. It's not fair! It's hurting them, taking something away from them." And she doesn't see the law as being relevant to the issue of stealing

because the law is an external restraint and she believes people should be governed only by internal controls. Her most basic argument against stealing revolves around self-interest, however. In story four she would convince the thief of his error by arguing: "What if I came up to you and took your stuff? If everyone starts doing it, it's going to happen to you too."

Beneath her belief in autonomy is an inclination to use power against those who oppose her rational arguments. In story five, for instance, she would try to convince the exam cheat that it was in his interest to give himself up. However if he would not listen to her, then she would turn him in, arguing that if people don't listen, then one is justified in using all means necessary to "get them in line."

A related moral principle is honesty. In story two she criticizes the principal's dishonesty above all else. In addition, he is not being "true to himself," nor is he standing up for what he believes. In this light, honesty is seen as a way of maintaining a sense of integrity and inviolability in the face of potential external coercion. But honesty is also important in that it maintains the esteem of others: "Stand behind what you say so people can trust you."

The issue of honesty has been of signal importance in actual moral decisions she has made. Twice she was in the position of facing failure in a school course and knew she could cheat and probably not be caught. What stopped

her was the feeling that her integrity hinged upon not cheating. But more than this, she felt she would be depriving herself of a sense of accomplishment if she cheated: "I would have felt I didn't really do it for myself. I would have felt I was slighting myself. When I did pass I felt I did it." For her, honesty is integral to a sense of autonomy and inviolability of the self.

Another important facet of her moral orientation surfaces in this incident. Her moral deliberations focus on the integrity of the self and avoid reference to the external world. Guilt is not a salient factor of her morality. Her elaboration of the above mentioned incident makes this clear: "I would have felt I hadn't been honest with myself. I don't think I would have felt guilty. I would have thought about it and convinced myself it was right. Then I wouldn't be guilty."

Miss B's morality functions as a means of protecting herself from potential external influence or coercion, and there is no noticeable superego pressure involved. She seems to be able to insulate herself from guilt by an act of will: "I don't believe in guilt. If I convince myself of what I'm doing is right, I don't feel guilty." She does experience guilt occasionally, and describes it as an intense, unpleasant feeling which compels her to undo the harm. She recalled stealing gum from a store as a child and paying for it the next day because she felt so badly. But for her, right and wrong are relative matters and have

nothing to do with the behavior of others. She knew, for instance, that her friend stole every day but she did not believe that the friend was either right or wrong in so doing. This indicates a lack of generalization of principles. Her morality is a private one with little or no reference to others. It is as if the world of objects is not part of the moral sphere for her, despite her protestations of concern for others.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Miss B is the youngest child of a financially successful company president and a working mother. She has one older brother. Her parents were rarely home and often were off vacationing or "doing something interesting" with their friends. She was given an unusual amount of personal freedom and recalls being a daring, fearless child who was considered a bad influence in the neighborhood. She was often in trouble in school due to her outspoken views and general anarchic tendencies.

Her family background appears to have been fertile ground for the development of a preoccupation with honesty and maintaining herself as a separate, autonomous individual. It became clear to her that brazen honesty was a tool that could be quite useful in dealing with her parents. If she did something her parents did not approve of, and then confessed openly, then her parents would not punish her. For example, her parents once told her not to go to a fair alone while they were gone. They questioned her about it

upon returning and she admitted that she had gone. At first they didn't believe her. She felt they were shocked not so much by her disobedience, for this was far from uncommon, but rather by her candid admission: "They couldn't punish me too much because I'd been so honest." Hence being shockingly honest became a means of doing as she pleased and also winning her parents' admiration.

Honesty was far from a prime virtue of her parents. She recalled many instances of hearing her parents lying to each other. Once mother lied to father in front of her and father asked if mother were telling the truth. She said no and mother was furious at her for tattling. The incident had a dramatic effect on her: "It made me wonder about trusting her in other ways."

Her parents also lied to her when her grandmother died. Her playmates found out about the death before grandmother died and teased her about it. She ran home and confronted her parents in front of a roomful of people. She recalls her parents being furious about her making a scene in front of their friends, and has not yet forgiven them.

Father would also offer her rewards for good grades; once promising her a TV. She worked hard and achieved the necessary grades, but father never gave her the TV and denied he promised it. The next time he offered her a reward, she made him put it in writing! It seems that the truth was not especially important to her parents and they were likely to say almost anything to achieve ends that they viewed as

valid. In so doing, however, they seemed to communicate a striking lack of respect for her integrity. In such an atmosphere, her concerns about honesty and integrity are comprehensible. Indeed, she felt that her parents would often not believe her. Her brother would beat her up and then deny he'd done it. If she had no bruises to show, the parents would accuse her of lying: "I knew how it was to be lied to and also knew how it felt to not be believed."

Another important emotional aspect of her childhood is Miss B's sense that her parents were indifferent to her, especially to her safety. For instance as a preadolescent she was expected to take care of a child of her parents' friends when the friends visited. She was never consulted about this and one day she wanted to play with a friend of hers instead. She refused to take care of the child, locked herself in her room and climbed out the window to return four hours later with a severely cut leg which required stitches. Mother was very angry at her for not looking after the younger child, and instead of responding by taking her to the doctor, threw a bandaid into the room. The friend's mother was concerned and thought Miss B needed to go to the doctor. But her mother was not concerned at all: "She probably felt I got my just punishment."

There were no rules in this house and no sanctions for misbehavior. While on the one hand, she reveled in this freedom, Miss B also seems to have felt that her parents were not very concerned about her safety and wished that

they took a more active role in her life: "I was really free to do what I wanted, to make my own decisions, at times wishing that they had set something up." She would often take off from home at all hours of the day and night and her parents never voiced any concern. If they would not take precautions, however, then she would: "I was concerned that they would be worried about me. I would always leave a note by the telephone. They knew I was gone but they weren't concerned about me. They never seemed to be worried about me."

Miss B also feels that there was covert encouragement from her parents for her to be defiantly independent: "When I was four I was supposed to take naps but I didn't like it so I said 'no' one day and walked out the door and sat behind a rock all afternoon. I had no idea of what was going to happen. When mother didn't say anything, I thought, 'wow, that's far out!' I was almost rewarded for it!" It thus became clear to her that her parents were not going to take care of her and that she would have to look after herself if she were going to survive. It is not surprising, then that protecting her autonomy has become the central preoccupation of her morality and identity.

While the wish to be autonomous is almost entirely ego-syntonic it is clear that she continues to wish that there would be others available to care about her welfare. When asked to describe a person with moral integrity, for instance, she described a teacher who respected her as a

person. This teacher "took an interest to sit down and help me." She felt the others were not interested in her, but this teacher encouraged her and told her she could do some things well. It is clear that Miss B feels the lack of such an encouraging presence in her life: "When someone was taking that interest it really made a difference. She made me want to learn and made me feel good about myself." Also striking is that she thinks of moral integrity in conjunction with a person who was kind and encouraging to her. When one has been subjected to "benign neglect" by parents, morality will be subordinated to more basic human needs (Maslow, 1962). Hence she confuses moral integrity with love and concern. Her wish for a close intimate relationship with a mothering individual overshadows any moral concerns.

She felt for years that her parents: "very much had their own lives. They were gone a lot--traveling or just out with friends." She was left most of the time with a housekeeper, whom she recalls more vividly in her early memories than her own mother. This housekeeper was very grandmotherly and was "honest and hardworking. I really trusted her. She was a loving human being-really open to people, really caring about people."

Beneath Miss B's self-image as an active, independent, fun-loving child lurks the image of an orphaned waif, of someone who felt herself to have been deprived of emotional involvement from her parents. This largely

unconscious self-representation and corresponding feelings have been transformed into an acute sensitivity to the plight of underdogs and a strong identification with them. This identification was apparent in her early memories.

In grade school there was to be a community conference at which a black speaker was "hassled." She felt terribly sorry for him and wanted him to come to her house to give his speech instead of at the school. But while her parents had openly talked of their lack of prejudice before, they now refused to invite him in "because of the neighbors." She was infuriated by this perceived hypocrisy, which was reminiscent of situations in which her parents had lied to her. Again she felt her parents had turned their back on a needy person, only this time it was her "friend" rather than her directly.

She recalls always being bothered by prejudice. In school she recalled the kids ganging up on one kid, a Filipino boy. She felt sorry for him and asked him to dance at a school dance. She also recalls feeling sorry for an "awful looking" girl who was dirty and wore tattered clothes. Miss B was the only child to play with her.

Miss B's kindness to down-and-out people suggests attempts to mother and take care of them. Indeed, by identifying with their neediness and then taking on a mothering role toward them, she enacted symbolically both the mother anc child role of a mother-child symbiotic tie. In this fashion she is able to experience both being a helpless

infant who is being cared for (via the identification with the needy other); and a powerful, active, loving mother, thereby denying her own neediness and insuring an active, controllable, loving presence.

Her own feeling of neglect is reflected in a memory of the death of an infant brother. Father was concerned about the effects of the death on her mother and brother, but did not think that she would be concerned. Miss B was at a day-care center at the time and she recalled that the woman from the center called her parents to ask what was wrong with her. The parents were surprised because they hadn't noticed anything wrong with her. She also recalled feeling isolated from the family during this period. In another memory, she is in a car alone, crying; "probably because mother punished me." She wants everyone to go away and not to try to comfort her. Her reaction to feelings of isolation and rejection is to push others away and to attempt to take care of herself. To handle rejection she has convinced herself that she does not need others.

She recalled running away at four because she felt she wasn't valued. This was precipitated by mother's request that she take a nap. She remembered mother reasoning with her: "If you don't take a nap, it's only going to hurt you, not me." Miss B "won" this battle and didn't have to take naps again. But her independence was won at the cost of maternal concern. Mother let her stay behind a rock for an entire afternoon, further encouraging her "autonomy" and

isolation. She learned that she could not expect care and love from her mother and that if she was going to accomplish anything it would have to be on her own.

Other women are recalled more vividly in her memories than her mother. In addition to the housekeeper, there was a nice woman next door who: "was funny, fun to be with. She'd play with me and stuff. She'd knit me things." This woman would do things for and with her and is represented with an aliveness and involvement lacking in her representations of her mother. In the memories of mother there is no interaction between them and mother is portrayed as affectless and somewhat severe.

Miss B sees her mother as a woman lacking in identity of her own who has defined herself in terms of her husband's business identity: "She's getting caught up in his world defined in terms of his things and its hard for her to develop her own interests. She wants to be a really caring person but is missing a lot of life. She gets smothered in the social world. She is really a loving woman but is afraid to love." On the surface she has accepted her parents' lack of involvement in her life and has focused most of her energy upon maintaining herself as an intact, autonomous person. However, a tinge of anger is reflected in her clear rejection of mother as a model: "She is superficial, always saying what's 'right,' and is always agreeable, being in the 'right' places, and very rarely standing up for her own mind by avoiding arguments."

In contrast, she remembered being father's "little girl" and had one memory of playing with his hair and combing it into different styles. There is laughter and fun. But she also felt that her father was not overly concerned about her welfare either. In another memory she is in the car with her parents. They are driving in a dirt field that has big ruts. She is sitting next to father and remembers telling him to watch out for the holes. But he hit a hole and she banged into the dashboard: "It almost knocked my teeth out." She recalls being scared and then a bit indignant toward father. He felt badly and apologized, but this apology did not seem to be enough.

Her present image of father suggests her feeling that any interest he had in her was of a superficial, narcissistic sort. Quite angrily she related that her father is caught up totally in business and "is really concerned about other people too, but this often only goes as far as it affects him. He gets wrapped up in what he's doing and misses life and people. He has a hard time accepting me as being anything but a little kid. He lets me be independent but doesn't value where I'm at unless it's connected with him. If I wanted to be president of his company, he would value it but anything else and he's not interested. He's very sincere and does really care, but gets very wrapped up in the world and doesn't realize others are there." Her only happy memories center around doing things for herself --being outside skiing, swimming, hiking. These are all

ways of acting on the world and mastering it alone.

Given her history, good feelings about herself can be based only on being independent--i.e., away from others and not influenced by them. Close relationships are seen as interfering with her freedom and she avoids such bonds. For instance, once she "almost" got married but was frightened by the idea of being tied down by a close relationship. She had nothing against the boy, with whom she remains friendly, but she felt that her freedom would be interfered with by marriage and so she broke it off and fled. And yet she cannot hide her need for closeness: "I'm disappointed that the family wasn't closer. . . . I'm resentful of our not being closer or knowing each other." But now her energy is invested in pulling away from potentially harmful, entangling relationships. She has many friends, feels an ease in interacting with others, but sees no protracted involvements in her future. Her identity as it now stands will not allow for closeness. To feel good and safe she must be free. To get close is to be trapped, encumbered, and swallowed up, as she felt her mother to be with her father. And to risk being close is to risk experiencing the pain of neglect and anger at rejection.

All her energy is turned into being a "free spirit." Her image of her future is active, exciting and alone: "I live day to day. I want to be free to move around. I can't see working for big business and having someone tell me what to do. I dream of traveling around, building a cabin in the

woods. I dream of the ocean and the mountains, fires on the beach, meeting all kinds of people, seeing the world. . . ."

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, while her embracing of independence as a way of life was adaptive in her family circumstance, given that the parents were not going to take care of her, now it is an encrusted part of her character defenses and has interfered with the development of satisfying object relationships. Her images of others are one-dimensional and often are poorly separated from self-representations. Her morality is similarly frozen around early conflicts. Due to her lack of internal controls she is quite impulsive, wilful and probably not very reliable. Because her empathy for the underdog and belief in integrity are narcissistic in essence her moral sense is capricious and unreliable. With a change in her feeling state, her morality changes. Since she rejects guilt, and thus accountability to the object world, she alone decides what is right according to a fluctuating amalgam of standards. There is no abiding belief in principles and no sign of any sense of obligation. Her lack of guilt further indicates a poorly developed superego and a morality dominated by narcissistic considerations more in line with early defensive ego-ideals (autonomy, etc.) than superego values. Her empathic abilities are limited by the encompassingly narcissistic tone of her identifications. She empathizes with aspects of herself that she projects on to others and then almost merges with that resulting

self/other, only to move away when the threat of closeness is too great. Hence the actual feelings of the other disappear. And because she is essentially a needy waif herself, her own needs must come first.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

The most basic image of her parents communicated by Miss B is of individuals too preoccupied with having fun and involving themselves in their own affairs to be involved with her except insofar as she was treated as a narcissistic extension. She was left alone to fend for herself and was even encouraged to be rebelliously independent (e.g., mother allowing her to remain behind the rock rather than taking the nap that was "for her own good"). Such lack of involvement on the part of her parents was undoubtedly experienced as a narcissistic blow which she combatted by making a virtue of necessity. Precocious self-sufficiency thus became the basis of her existence as an individual. Experiencing conflict at early levels of narcissistic and object-relations development, Miss B took a road opposite to that taken by Miss A and set up her existence as an individual by divorcing herself from others and renouncing her conscious desires for closeness and union. Seeing her parents as untrustworthy and coercive, she never developed any abiding trust in objects and her character formed around being truthful herself, but always out of reach of the coercive advances of others. Being a free spirit for her meant being inviolable and different than her parents. Seeing herself

essentially as an orphan treated unjustly by her parents (i.e., abandoned by their narcissistic self-preoccupation) she came to identify with all underdogs and to villify all oppressors. In this fashion she was able to give expression to painful feelings of worthlessness, anger and fear in relation to her parents by externalizing the conflict. Her moral reasoning can be seen to flow logically from these familial interactions and her resulting character structure. That is, she came to value honesty and personal inviolability in the moral realm and has remained especially sensitive to having her narcissistic needs met alone in safety. But since her parents were experienced as lacking in sensitivity or compassion she was not able to develop any authentic empathy for others. Hence her identifications with sufferers represent a covert search for love along with a terror of closeness. For to approach others is for her to imperil the continued existence of a prematurely integrated self based on a defensive form of autonomy. As seen above, her moral reasoning expresses these perceptions and feelings intellectually, and serves as a guide for dealing with the frightening object world.

C. Mr. C--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 274

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story four Mr. C argues that: "Karl did worse largely because of the greater potential for trouble, i.e., he could have been shot or hurt someone else by the break-in." A stage 2 score on Kohlberg's BIII category was

contemplated but it was felt to be unscorable given Kohlberg's criteria. His entire answer to this dilemma taken as a whole was given that score however.

In the fifth story, Mr. C's reporting of the cheating would be influenced if the student were poor ("It would affect my decision. I would be less apt to report the student"); or bright: ("There would be less reason to report it.") Stage 2 scoring on Kohlberg's BIII category was awarded.

In story 6, Mr. C argues that the social worker should not report the criminal if he were a bright, capable local leader: "The social worker should be able to garner increased support by his action (i.e., of not turning the leader in)." This response was scored as stage 2 under Kohlberg's BIV category.

2. Moral Orientation

Mr. C equates moral behavior with rational, logical behavior: In story two, for instance: "The principal was wrong in going back on his word. He has an illogical reason for changing his mind-pressure. In a moral sense, there is no way of justifying what the principal does." He explains the importance of logic as follows: "Logic opposes a lot of instinctual needs. Lots of things I see as bad are instinctual-discrimination, war. Here needs are not satisfied in a better way. Aggression, the pecking order, short-sightedness, lack of concern for the future, an inability to put oneself in the other's place--these are

human qualities considered by me as illogical."

Accordingly he searches for the "rational" method of satisfying human needs. In this search he argues that self-interested motives cannot be dominant: "Personal reasons shouldn't play a part (in decision-making of authorities like the principal). This can become dangerous, as with Johnson and Nixon, their personal pride became involved in their decisions about the war. Their personal feelings were very destructive to society underneath them." The method of solving moral problems is logic: "Logic is a method of solving problems--what will be for the well-being of people. Law becomes a logical method. Authority should be tied to this sort of responsibility." If left to its own devices he fears that authority can become extremely destructive. He is concerned that the well-being of these dependent on authorities be foremost in the mind of authorities. Law serves the function of enforcing that responsibility.

His conception of democracy is based on this notion of the logical operation of society for the benefit of the oppressed: "Democracy at its best is humane and logical in the first place. Democracy is important and embodies majority rule and minority rights. You have to have some way of becoming the majority. Free speech is related to this ability to become the majority--to express feelings and opinions."

His belief in the responsibility of authority is in marked contrast to his own inclination to impose his will

on others. In contrast to his devotion to an abstract morality based on logic, law, and democratic principle, he elevates his own interests and values to a superordinate position. In story three, for instance, he asserts that Fred has the right to publish what he pleases in the school paper because he agrees with what Fred is writing: "He (the principal) stopped what I want from happening. He stopped the expression of the type of goals I'd approve of. He's exercising authority for authority's sake. For personal reasons not moral reasons." He argues that personal reasons shouldn't be acted upon by leaders in the abstract, yet he asserts explicitly that his own personal reasons or preferences carry a moral weight not granted to others' opinions. When asked if he would support Fred if Fred were expressing principles he opposed, he said: "I'd express myself in support of the individual but not risk myself. I dislike what he's saying. He may influence others. I want the right (of free speech) to exist but I'm unhappy when someone opposing my views is influencing people. . . . It's helping the opposition in a way I cannot combat. . . . There is a concern that he might influence others. . . . It's a threat to my values. He might win people over to his side and the consequences would be segregation, Nazi tactics. . . . I see people open to propaganda and I like to see more of my propaganda."

Hence, his conception of democratic process is subordinated to his determination to have things go the way he

wants, to pursue "the general good" as he defines it. He supports law only insofar as it serves his ends: "Laws are important because most "liberal" accomplishments are achieved through law. Liberals have difficulty existing without law. Laws, even ones we don't agree with are important because they are a means to an end--making a better life for people." Ultimately, then, Mr. C's abstract conceptions of law, democracy, etc., cover over a more basic philosophy of pursuit of self-interest--in his case, an idiosyncratic conception of the "General Good" as a "liberal" sees it.

For instance, the case of Mrs. Webster, in story one, her self-interest is of primary concern to him. Her needs have to be weighed and the greatest need takes precedence: "There are two types of self-interest--'real' like losing your livelihood (Mrs. W) and second--where a millionaire is losing some money. Where there is a logical and humane need, this takes precedence." Individuals are therefore not equal before the law. Some people's needs are more important than others, which grants them rights that others do not have. For him the issue of self-interest boils down to an equation of poor=good and rich=bad, as will be seen in greater detail below. To be sure, Mr. C is aware of the difficulty of deciding whose needs take precedence and accordingly he looks to a benevolent authority to arbitrate: "There should be arbitration by a just authority who can look at the black's needs. Can he find another

place? The greater need prevails. In the end by following the law you end up by doing right by most people. The law will maximize the good." The contradiction here goes unrecognized. He wishes an authority to make a determination, but also argues that the law should be upheld.

In story two he is also drawn to the issue of need: "In a practical sense the principal's job may be on the line and they (Fred and friends) should be moderate so the principal doesn't lose his job. They should look for compromise." But in the next breath he modifies this statement. It becomes more important to assess the student's interests: "If we knew we'd get a better person, it'd be OK to push the issue and perhaps get the principal fired. The issue is more important than his personal interest. He won't be hurt and could get another job." He is in conflict over whose self-interest counts most, first opting for the principal and then for the students. In either case, his moral reasoning focuses around self-interest, gratifying needs, and deciding whose needs are most important. Moreover, the issue of survival is always prominent. In the example above, he immediately introduces the issue of the principal's job, which is not a part of the original Kohlberg story. He is drawn to these sorts of immediate consequences.

His passionate arguments for humanism also indicate the prominence of this need to survive: "Being humane is the basis of my morals-survival of the human race. It's

relevant because I'm part of the human race. It's instinctual--the wish to be immortal. I'm part of it (humanity) and want to see it perpetuated." His basic moral concern is over maintaining the integrity and continued existence of the self, and his reference to immortality suggests a certain grandiosity that adheres to his morality, which will be seen in greater detail below.

The centrality of protecting the integrity of the self as a moral issue is further reflected in his discussion of stealing in story four, where he argues that stealing is wrong only because "it could happen to you." If such a retaliatory threat is not present because one is poor, then stealing is acceptable: "A poor person does have a right to steal. If I steal from a wealthy person then it isn't a threat that they might steal from me." Right and wrong boil down to a consideration of the possibility of retaliation. It is morally acceptable to do whatever one deems central to one's self-interest. The only deterrent is the possibility of harm to the self, in his view.

Mr. C is aware that his belief in the special status of the "downtrodden" contradicts many of his stated abstract moral beliefs. In story five he deals with this contradiction as follows:

> If the kid who placed high and cheated needed the scholarship (because of a lack of money) then I wouldn't say anything. I want this person to get scholarships but I couldn't justify it easily. It's basically contradictory. There would be a lot of conflict--"did I do the right thing? Was it violating my concept of justice?" But the well-being of the needy individual would win out. It would not be hurting anyone (to give him

> the scholarship even though he cheated). It would not be taking the chance to go the college away from anyone because the richer students could go to college anyway.

Personal need dictates his moral decisions in actual situations as well as in hypothetical moral dilemmas. Once he was a union steward pushing for the union to strike when many or most of the members were balking because they were afraid of losing their jobs:

> There was a good chance of their getting fired and I felt responsible for those under me. Should I push? They might lose their jobs. Could they cope with it? I could. We ended up going out on strike. We had our backs pushed to the wall and I felt we'd lose more if we didn't strike. Our contract would have been thrown out. But I was somewhat elitist. I was using my own attitudes and I was confident that we could win. I didn't really think about the others but about myself--the notoriety--striking a blow for progressive unionism, establishing progress. It wasn't important enough to me what would happen to other people.

Hence he considers the needs of others but his own need to establish himself as a political "hero" predominates.

In general the need to exhibit his political views and have them noticed is of great importance to Mr. C. In assessing his political career, he noted: "It ends up in many situations where I have some notoriety as a radical. Here (Ann Arbor) I'm at the center. Maybe being different is most important to me. Now I stress some of my more conservative features, such as my strong family orientation." It seems then that he feels most comfortable being militantly different than most of those around him. And politics and values are the areas around which he centers his identity: "My values are the real me. I like people to see this part of me. I like people to know my ideas. I like

talking about these things more than about hobbies, etc."

His need to "stick out," wishes for immortality, and the like suggest that narcissistic, grandiose feelings and fantasies are attached to his values and political behavior. His morality is based on maintaining the continued existence of the self as a glorified, powerful object. His narcissistic strivings have thus been elevated to a moral status. Early ego-ideals dictate this morality rather than object-related superego injunctions. As an example, he could not recall feeling guilt except for discomfort in situations in which he knew his behavior displeased his parents: "I felt guilt only when I was hurting my parents' feelings; when I was being a bother to them by not achieving scholastically." He describes no sense of guilt in relation to the needs of any other person and his guilt response was generalized no farther than his parents. Little internalization beyond this primitive beginning occurred.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mr. C is the youngest, by many years, of four siblings and emanates from a lower-class working background. He is the only member of his family to go to college and takes pride in his liberal political views which contrast so markedly with his conservative family.

A dominant perception Mr. C has of his family was the sense that his parents were not sufficiently concerned with his safety as a child. He felt they were "permissive" and allowed him to roam freely without much supervision or

discipline: "The discipline was very flexible, and there was not much worry about my safety. At eight I'd be gone all day. We lived on a farm and it was OK as long as I came home at nightfall. It was dangerous! I was doing too much at too young an age. I was wandering around on the railroad tracks and my parents often didn't know what I was doing and I did take a lot of chances. I had the availability of guns from ten and used to take the gun out and practice and my parents didn't say anything." It is as if he is crying out for their intervention.

Mr. C felt hurt by their lack of involvement in his life and has attempted to understand their behavior in intellectualized socio-economic terms:

> They were the typical "ethnic" parents. Father was strong and silent and mother was quiet and permissive. They are very hard-working, kind people who didn't involve themselves in my life. They didn't think it was their duty--they were not expected to. I couldn't talk to them about my problems--I missed that. I would have liked to. They never asked how I was doing in school. They only looked at the report card.

When he was younger he was hurt by this perceived inattention: "My parents were responsible but not responsive. I didn't feel I was important. When I was younger I saw it as an injustice. There was little consideration of my feelings and more emphasis on objective values. I felt my parents didn't care."

He felt particularly estranged from his father, whom he nevertheless viewed as an important figure: "My father was fairly aloof; a typical 'ethnic' father who felt he shouldn't be getting too close to his son. I always felt he

was a very important person coming home. I recall a feeling of respect and 'don't bother your father when he comes home'."

Indeed, the only contact he recalls with father was in later years having bitter arguments over racial issues. Both he and father would become angry, yet he continued to seek out these arguments, even though the position of each was well known to the other. It seems that at least in these arguments he was given attention by father and was able to make some impact on him, a feat he felt he could not accomplish in other ways. As noted above, his political ideology and radical activity have continued to function as a means of being noticed by others. This wish to be noticed and participate in interaction with his parents is a key impulse in his emotional life and is reflected in his earliest memory: "I was trying to talk. I was hearing my parents talking and not knowing what they were saying but I knew they were communicating. I remember the excitement of being able to say something. I did say something and they were happy."

He feels there was more positive contact with mother and has some warm memories of interactions with her: "I remember going for a walk down a river with mother. I enjoyed it. There was a very close feeling. We got along well--talking, walking, holding hands, looking at things--birds, etc." But these pleasant times were rare. Mother was busy and often emotionally unresponsive: "I remember

watching her doing housework--doing dishes and she shows no emotion. I'd be playing and I watched her. My impression was that mother worked very hard." He was grateful for what she did give however: "She stays at home and is not very social. She sacrificed a lot for me and gave me a lot of time, just being there." Her "just being there" was crucial because she surfaces as virtually the only person he has much contact with throughout childhood. His three siblings were much older than he and they never played together, nor did he have any friends he could recall. He now feels he is closer to his parents than his siblings are, in large measure because he was <u>not</u> close to them as a child:

> My brothers and sisters were much more involved with my parents than I. Father was more involved. The other three never rebelled and always felt father was the boss. I'm closer to my parents as a friend now (than his siblings). Making the break made a difference. My brothers and oldest sister were closest to father. But it was a child-parent closeness; dominance, patriarchal.

He sees them as having continued this submissive relationship to father while he now feels more of an equal.

When he went to college he rebelled and had fantasies of greatness: "I always had the feeling I'd do something important. In science, then in politics. I had very high standards and wanted to accomplish something great." Again the wish to stand out and be noticed is a central motivator in his life. Now that he is married and has a family of his own, he feels that his aspirations toward greatness have receded. He feels that he is important and valued in his family and no longer needs to seek notoriety as much.

The needs for attention, recognition, and compensation for past injustices have remained dynamically significant in his morality however. One central theme is his feeling that his needs (values) are worthy of special consideration because of the injustices done him in the past. His focus is upon socio-economic injustice: "When I got to college I noticed how wealthy others were and I had adopted many of my class values. I was resentful and angry at wealthy people. Most of my friends were from wealthier backgrounds. In terms of justice, I asked: 'Why are some people wealthy? I work as hard as they do'." His conclusion is that those who have suffered deserve special compensation and enjoy rights not granted to those more fortunate. His attitudes about poverty (economic deprivation by parents/society) seem to be linked dynamically to his more basic, general feelings of unimportance in the eyes of his parents.

4. Summary of Moral Development

Indeed, despite perceived changes in his feelings about himself and his parents, Mr. C's morality continues to reflect his feelings of deprivation and injustice as a child. The narcissistic injury has never healed entirely. He continues to feel that it was unjust that his parents ignored him as a child and continues to expect compensation for all he has suffered. And he continues to wish for adulation, now in the form of admiration for his high-minded liberal ideals. The narcissistic, grandiose cast to

his values reflects the persistence of early attempts to survive by fantasizing omnipotence. Related early feelings of deprivation and neediness have not disappeared. In many ways he experiences himself as a needy, rejected lonely child thirsting for love and protection.

The lack of parental surveillance over his behavior as a child was perceived as a lack of concern or interest and he guardedly expresses the wish that his parents had provided more structure and control. These feelings have found expression in his morality as the injunction that authority be dedicated to taking care of those in need and uninfluenced by personal need. Moreover, the perceived lack of external control and guidance from his parents has been translated into intellectual attempts to impose logical control upon destructive impulses through the creation of his own personal brand of legalistic democratic philosophy. His wish for an ordered, logical world makes sense in terms of his feeling of insufficient control as a child. Similarly, the wish for the satisfaction of his survival needs and for immortality that are reflected in his moral reasoning are comprehensible as outgrowths of his feeling as a child that his needs were not important to his parents.

His object relations bear the stamp of this feeling of deprivation as well. He does not see others vividly as individuals in their own right. His descriptions of others predominate with generalized images based on socio-economic categories which function in part to explain away many of

his intense feelings of deprivation and injustice. While aware of others' feelings he is not moved to act out of such a consideration, being more drawn to aggrandizing his narcissism (e.g., the union steward vignette). Indeed his liberal politics are dominated by the need to be noticed and appreciated rather than by concern for others. His morality is dominated by narcissistic strivings which seem to have blocked superego development. In most situations he focuses on his own immediate needs and does not seem overly burdened with guilt. Indeed, this form of narcissistic morality is totally ego-syntonic. His sense of integrity rests on narcissistic grounds and objects do not seem to be important in his world, except insofar as they can give him nurturance or approval.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mr. C describes his parents as being preoccupied, aloof, and unconcerned about his safety. In his family he felt alone, and cut off from both parents and siblings. He felt he was allowed to do dangerous things that required parental supervision but his parents refused to supervise. To him it seemed that all they were interested in were his report cards. There were no rules in the family and consequently he did not develop any internalized principles save for obeying his parents while in view. As an adult he learned to articulate "liberal" values which serve however to gain attention more than to govern his actual behavior.

Seeing himself as a victim of the injustices of his poverty and the lack of parental involvement in his life, he decided that he had the right to take what he needed from the environment. His reaction to the narcissistic blow of being ignored by his parents was to develop a primitive character structure oriented toward obtaining narcissistic gratification through making others notice and admire him. In this fashion he attempted to hide his neediness and loneliness by fantasizing his own omnipotence and by attempting to engage others in idolizing him. For him, getting others to notice his morality is a way of obtaining the attention he felt he missed in his family. Largely through an act of will he decided to make people notice him by emphasizing his differences. His morality reflects these attempts to be noticed, and he has acted out the roles of the "radical," the "leader," and the "educated liberal." Dynamically he has hypercathected his conscious moral values but the content of these values is dominated by primitive ego-ideals glorifying notoriety and power. His is a thoroughgoing narcissistic morality which places him at the center of the moral universe. Such a grandiose stance is at variance with his liberal values, however, and he must thus perform plastic surgery on his moral reasoning. This he performs by pasting a logical veneer over his grandiose moral visions. In accordance with this veneer he argues in favor of logic in political life, the importance of democratic institutions and of the law. His moral reasoning reflects both the grandiosity

and his intellectualized attempts to mask it and organize the universe into a consistent moral entity. Also clear in his reasoning is the dominant influence of the narcissistic character he developed in response to the aloofness and moral insensitivity of his parents.

II. Psychodynamic Summary of Stage Two

The most recent and most functional definition given by Kohlberg of stage two is contained in his revised scoring manual (1972). Here stage two is characterized as follows:

> Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice. A sense of concrete rights to property and to freedom, regardless of authority. A sense that the individual makes his own choice (Kohlberg, 1972, p. 7).

Kohlberg stresses the concept of need in this definition and, indeed, this emphasis was reinforced by interview data with the stage two subjects. Stage two individuals (to be referred to henceforth as "twos") are indeed needy, but to an extent and in a manner not presaged by Kohlberg's description of their moral reasoning. Indeed their personalities are organized around a pervasive sense of neediness. Their personality traits, their object relations and their defenses are organized around the experience of deprivation and their morality focuses on maintaining the existence and integrity of the self from external onslaught.

The twos in this sample each reported a feeling that

their parents were not concerned with their safety as children, and this perceived lack of concern for safety appears to have been a pivotal experience in their development. A great deal of what they feel, do, and think in the present can be understood as a reaction to this perception of their interactions with their parents. A view of the personalities of the parents of the twos will facilitate understanding the personality organization of the twos and their perception that their parents were not concerned about their safety.

A. Family Dynamics

Whenever one attempts to understand the personality functioning of parents on the basis of recollections and feelings of their children, one must be prepared to acknowledge that the resulting portrait may not be entirely factual, subject as it is to the understandable distortions children lend to their views of their parents. Indeed one could argue that the portraits of their parents given by the sample reflects no more than their distorted vision; no more than a conglomerate of projections, displacements, and other defensive activities. However, when one has the opportunity to compare several of such parental portraits, and finds regularities in the picture, then one can begin to describe commonalities in early experience. Surely at very least one can argue that the distorted and undistorted perceptions children have of interactions with their parents play a significant role in their development. What I will portray

below are the commonalties in the parents of the twos, as seen by their children.

The twos describe their parents as unusually easy-going people who are decidedly permissive in disciplining. The children were given a great deal of freedom and few if any restraints were imposed on their behavior. Rules were not important to these parents for the most part, and their children could recall few actual rules which were upheld consistently. The children were often able to persuade their parents to relax restrictions and, more often the children merely did what they pleased without fear of parental intervention. The children at times perceived their own actions as dangerous, yet the parents seemed unconcerned. Indeed all the twos felt more or less consciously that they wished their parents had offered more structured discipline, and were the only subjects to voice such a feeling.

The lack of concern for their safety was interpreted by the twos as a sign of lack of love or interest in them as people and was experienced as a severe narcissistic injury. They characterized their parents as people too busy for their children. The parents are seen as self-absorbed, selfish, and cloyingly narcissistic. The only discipline the twos do recall are rules and subsequent punishments administered because the child did something that was inconvenient for the parent. Hence rules and morality were experienced as a means of making the parents' lives less complicated. And there was a decided lack of reciprocity in the

administering of rules. The parents often blatantly broke their own rules and the child was expected to accept these discrepancies without comment. These parents would often express conventional cliches about being nice to others, etc., but the children did not feel there to be any abiding parental commitment to these admonishments. And since the parents readily accepted superficial compliance on the part of their children, there was no expectation that the child internalize any of these moral visions.

These parents were seen often as outgoing and superficially sociable people with many acquaintances. But the children did not portray the parents as having any deep investment in object relations. Rather the parents were seen as narcissistically self-preoccupied individuals who often demanded that others serve as reflections of them (e.g., Miss B). The twos did not report much warmth and love in their interactions with their parents. Their early memories were stark, bleak, and lacking in a sense of involved human interaction. Often it was hard for the twos to remember anything at all about their parents. Twos did not recall their mothers as demonstrating consistent maternal interest in them. Generally the mothers of twos were seen as aloof, businesslike, and lacking in tender feelings. The twos did not seem to view their parents as being clearly differentiated in terms of personality traits or in functions as parents. It appears that the parents did not fit culturally shared stereotypic notions of what mothers and

fathers are like.

B. Empathy and Object Relations

We now turn to the personality characteristics of the twos themselves. Here the data are more direct and less inference is required. In addition to the above-mentioned pervasive neediness, the twos manifested superficial, bleak object relationships. They tend to avoid permanent ties (Miss A and Miss B) or involve themselves in new relationships which promised the fulfillment of unmet needs (Mr. C) but which are characterized by the very neediness that caused so much disruption in the first place. People are viewed as one-dimensional, as lacking in life or depth. They do not communicate much investment in others and their views of others are stereotypical and tend toward positive or negative extremes. Subtle nuances of human behavior are not communicated and they tend not to show much insight about human motivation,--their own or that of others.

As in all stages, there are various ways of dealing with the central conflict of that stage. The three twos in this sample exemplify three distinct ways of coping with a pervasive sense of neediness and lack of parental concern. Miss A has remained in close proximity to her parents most of her adult life in hopes of obtaining the love she was not given before. Miss B became a carefree, free-wheeling, will-o-the-wisp with no plans, no attachments and no conscious need for the sustained companionship of others. Mr. C compensated for his neediness at first through an attention-

getting narcissistic stance which forced others to notice him, and later married with the almost conscious intent of getting the love and attention in his new family he missed as a child.

Despite these external differences, these twos all radiated an intense neediness. In this sense Miss A's dependent, masochistic withdrawal and preoccupation with her own needs is dynamically similar to Miss B's "waiflike" presentation of her own neediness, and Mr. C's neediness in his family. In none of these cases was the individual able to diminish the early sense of deprivation. Their early memories abound with themes of loss, death, oral longings, and the like.

Given this aura of oral deprivation, difficulties in empathizing are understandable. The twos do not portray human interactions as mutual in Erikson's (1950) sense. The feelings of others are not attended to except insofar as they coincide with their own feelings. In other words they tend to project their own feelings onto others and then empathize with the others' "feelings." In order to accomplish this narcissistic identification, however, the real feelings of the other have no meaning for them. The twos also demonstrated a lack of clarity in the boundaries between self and other, inner and outer, etc. Miss B in particular made such transitory narcissistic identificatory links with others. And Miss A maintained fantasies of merging with her family. The particular form this narcissistic identification took

with these twos was as an identification with the underdog, this being particularly strong in the case of Miss B and Mr. C. But it was clear that this concern represented a displaced concern for self. Hence the social concern of the twos was essentially narcissistic in origin and function. The only real object involved was the self. The twos, especially Miss B and Mr. C, did express what they labeled as "humanistic" values. But there seemed to be little substance to these positions in terms of actual empathy. Rather it seemed that they were projecting their own neediness onto the world and seeing themselves in other "victims."

These forms of object relatedness do not allow for a full appreciation of the actual, non-projected feelings of the other. Contrary to Kohlberg's description of stage two, quoted above, the twos in this sample did not give an equal status to the needs of others. Others are useful only if they can be nurturant (Miss A and Mr. C). For Miss B others represent a threat to her autonomy and therefore she must keep her distance.

Dynamically, this stance is comprehensible. A character structure built around deprivation cannot organize around a mutuality of needs. The narcissistic injuries suffered by twos are too debilitating for such a resolution. The twos understand the abstract notion of need that Kohlberg details. Indeed, they understand all the abstractions in his moral development scale straight up through stage six. However, these abstractions are not integrated

emotionally. The twos understand Kohlberg's abstractions about human needs but run their lives in terms of the more insistent demands of their actual needs, before which Kohlberg's Platonic abstraction of human needs pales in comparison.

Of interest also is that the twos, for all their perceived suffering at the hands of others, do not express much hostility. It is clear that they do not trust others, especially Miss A and Miss B. But their view of the world is not conspiratorial and they are not vindictive people. They do not see others as vicious and despicable, and they do not feel persecuted. Rather it seems that they focus on their neediness and function in a benign narcissistic manner. Hence their orality is more benignly incorporative than sadistically cannibalistic (Abraham, 1927).

The actual personalities of the parents may have had some influence on this relative lack of anger. None of the parents of the twos are portrayed as vicious, angry or controlling people. They were not cruel to their children and apparently offered some form of relationship, inadequate though it may have been in other ways. Their children did not seem to grow up amid hatred and anger, but rather under benign neglect. The twos don't seem to hate their parents. Rather they experience a longing for the parental love they felt they never received.

C. Identity Formation

The vicissitudes of their basic mistrust have led,

rather, in the direction of the incomplete development of identity. Narcissistic identifications can proliferate only where self and other are not differentiated totally. As noted above, the twos had one-dimensional views of themselves as well as of others. For the most part they did not view themselves as dynamic, ever-changing individuals. Rather they experience themselves as static and directionless. Even Mr. C, who verbalized a sense of change in his life, did not seem pointed toward any goal more complex than feeling needed and loved and at peace with himself. His identity is not much involved in the social sphere, as Erikson (1950) argues that it must be for identity formation to progress in the adult years. Mr. C's "heaven on earth" seems to be a form of narcissistic bliss akin to the "oceanic feeling" that Freud (1914) described as the essence of infantile narcissism. How different in scope is such a feeling in comparison with Erikson's concept of identity as a linkage of individual past, present and future in a culturally meaningful, dynamic role.

Not surprisingly, none of the twos had much understanding of their choice of social work as a profession. Lacking are the synthesizing identifications with important others found in other subjects in the sample. The twos are unclear about why they are social workers and they are less committed to this choice than are any of the other subjects. For these twos, being a "helper" is probably the next best thing to being helped themselves. To be sure, such a

motivation is far from unusual in any of the helping professions. But for these twos, it seems to be the primary motivation, as their relationships with others are dominated by narcissistic identifications in other sectors of their lives.

These twos had difficulty understanding the past, were vague about what they are doing in the present, and seem not to think much, if at all, about the future. Their identities are bound up in attempts to differentiate themselves from their families. Miss A is a social worker because she thinks being a psychologist like her parents is too much work. Miss B defines her existence as free and independent, as not needing anything from anyone. Mr. C loves to show how liberal he is in contrast to his conservative, "bigoted" parents. And he is educated, while they are not. But each of them has been unable to differentiate successfully, for the pull of the infantile relationship with the parents is too strong. Miss A works in the family business; Miss B has no identity save for being independent of her parents (and everyone else); and Mr. C talks of getting back to his ethnic roots, which for him seems to be an attempt to merge rather than to differentiate.

D. Superego Development; Narcissism and Self-esteem

Superego development has been linked by Erikson (1950), Schafer (1968), and Jacobson (1964), to the process of identity formation. And consonant with the twos' general difficulties with identity, is their incomplete superego development. They do not experience guilt, the calling card

of the superego. They have not internalized parental dictates and do not govern their behavior with conscience. They have difficulty with internal control, and most of their actions are governed by narcissistic motives, which have little relatedness to the object world. The superego, according to Jacobson (1964) and Schafer (1968) is in part an organized set of self and object representations which help the individual to relate to others by means of synthesized principles and values. The superego represents an important step in the development of narcissism and object relations and it is the locus of their intersection as will be seen in Chapter 7. But the infantile narcissism, and hazy distinctions between self and object of these twos have not been organized along superego lines. Their morality, such as it is, is a pre-superego morality, a morality of expediency. The only principle they seem to be aware of is the talion, an eye for an eye. The talion principle is described by Schafer (1971) as one of the earliest precursors of the superego. But these twos do not seem to govern their actions by this principle either. Hence even this primitive principle is internalized incompletely.

Oedipal conflicts, since Freud, have been considered to have a hand in the genesis and development of the superego. The twos do not show signs of oedipal conflict. Their conflicts with people deal primarily with issues of oral gratification, rather than with the more complex interpersonal conflicts characteristic of the oedipal stage of

development. The twos seem to have fixated at the oral stage and therefore oedipal issues seem not to come up for them (e.g., jealousies, competitions, triangular relationships).

In this study I have and will argue further that another important byproduct of superego and identity development is the sense of moral integrity. And consistent with the other findings is the lack of a developed sense of moral integrity in the twos, compared with the other subjects. It seems as if integrity is not salient to their lives, as if they do not care whether they have a sense of their own integrity or lack thereof. This lack of salience of moral integrity is particularly vivid when compared with the salience of integrity to fours and fives.

Moreover since their superegos have not developed noticeably, these twos do not judge themselves or others harshly. They do not prescribe what others should do and do not feel that they should do anything either. In fact, "should" and "ought" are not words they use at all. They are unencumbered by this sort of superego pressure. They feel no need to justify their "moral" position, basking as they do in narcissistic unconcern. They do not indulge in abstract intellectual arguments about moral conduct, in part because they do not seem to experience moral conflict. In a sense they resemble carefree children unencumbered by the dread intrusion of the civilized and civilizing superego. This is not to say that self-righteousness, burdensome

conscience, etc., are characteristics of mature superego functioning. Quite the contrary, as will be seen in the discussion of stage 5. But the development of a sense of obligation does represent a more complex, differentiated stage of moral development than stage 2 premorality.

In the psychoanalytic literature, the ego-ideal has also been linked in complex ways to superego development (Piers and Singer, 1953). And the ego-ideals of the twos are grandiose and omnipotent, which bespeaks also of incomplete development and primitive narcissistic components. Wish and fantasy govern such ideals, rather than reality. It is as if their ideals have undergone little change since infancy. Schafer (1968), A. Reich (1950, 1964), and Jacobson (1964) have all described primitive ego-ideals of this type in great detail. As Schafer notes (1968), there is a time in the child's life when it is important that the parents be seen as "giants," in the service of their protective function. And ordinarily, the parents <u>are</u> seen as giants by the child. But the parents of these twos seemed to be too preoccupied to be giants. They could be little more than disinterested observers in their childrens' lives. The twos' parent, have not been involved, friendly, protective giants and the children seem to have held on to their primitive ego-ideals in compensation. Consciously the twos have written their parents off as potential helpers although there is buried resentment and a strong wish for parental omnipotence. But they consciously experience their parents

as people they wish were stronger, kinder, more involved, and so on.

Self-esteem, conceived of as a subjective experience, can be seen to flow from the state of superego development, narcissistic development and of identity in general. Not surprisingly, the twos have low self-esteem. They believe that they were not important to their parents and thus believe they are of little worth. Their attempts at compensation--actually varying ways of getting others to "parent" them--fail in part because the quest for love only serves to show them that they were not loved when they felt they needed it most.

E. Ego Development and Character Organization

Although no intelligence test was administered it is possible to gather a subjective impression of intellectual functioning from the interview material and to responses to the Kohlberg Questionnaire. From this vantage point, the twos were not differentiable from the rest of the sample in terms of intellectual functioning. They were as articulate and as capable of using abstraction as the rest. There were some signs of slightly disorganized thinking in Miss A, in that a few of her answers on the Kohlberg stories seemed somewhat confused. Upon closer inspection however, these answers made sense emotionally. It does seem true that Miss A engages in "lazy" thinking, insofar as she doesn't always expend energy to clarify what she says or justify it. This was also true of Miss B. But this lazy thinking appears to

be caused by a lack of motivation, rather than a lack of cognitive sophistication. All the twos are intelligent enough to have graduated from college and be accepted by a graduate school of some quality academically. It seems clear that they are all above normal in intelligence, as is the rest of the sample. Miss A and Miss B are not highly motivated to succeed as social workers, as noted above, and by their own words are not doing extremely well, although both of them explained this in terms of lack of motivation to study.

To repeat, the twos are not the intellectual inferiors of the sample. What they do lack are overriding goals. They lack ego strength and a sense of unifying identity more than cognitive facility. They are capable of reasoning abstractly but rarely do so in their moral lives, for they lack reliable internalized principles.

Their defenses seem to be somewhat more primitive than those of other subjects in this sample, however. They do not seem to use intellectualizing defenses as much and they seem to have utilized repression and denial more. Their projective identifications also speak for an early form of adaptation. Practical intelligence seems to dominate and they are able to cope with their lives and "get along." There are no signs of serious pathology which would argue for the brittleness of their defenses, however.

Miss A and Miss B have some difficulty involving themselves in school work, as noted above, but again this

appears to be true because of their lack of discipline, impulse control, or coherent identity. In general their lives are characterized by a lack of planning and direction, which suggests a deficit in integrating ability. Impulses are hard to resist and direct discharge is sought, although there is no suggestion of a pattern of destructive acting out in their lives. Mr. C's only difficulty appears to be a lack of design to his life. He did not show signs of pronounced impulse problems, although his grandiosity and need to attain notoriety are suggestive of poor reality testing.

The above-mentioned difficulties encountered by Miss A and Miss B might be characterized as ego weakness, which implies that emotional concerns may interfere somewhat with adaptive efforts. However, even labeling their problems as ego weakness may be erroneous, since they do not seem to be motivated to succeed as social workers, or as anything else for that matter. In either case it seems clear that energy which could be used in self-actualizing efforts is bound up defensively.

Because conflict occurred in the lives of the two's at an early phase of narcissistic development before self and object were reliably differentiated, defensive character armour was erected that precluded the development of a fully autonomous self and interfered with object relations and subsequent superego development. Resulting character structure formed around the issues of need and obtaining narcissistic gratification of a primitive sort. The two's have

character organizations that have roots in the oral phase of psychosexual development, a position most clearly exemplified by Miss A. Mr. C, on the other hand, developed a somewhat similar organization around narcissistic considerations and has striven to become noticeable and revered by objects. Miss B, on her part, erected a reaction-framed type of counter-dependents character structure so as to deny her oral longings and pursue narcissistic notification safely alone. As noted above, this general type of character structure dictates the form of character structure moral reasoning described by Kohlberg as "hedonistic," but naturally so, for the two's felt deprived and suffered narcissistic injury in their families, and understandably now gravitate immediately to issues of need and gratification in the moral realm, as in other phases of experience.

CHAPTER 4

KOHLBERG'S STAGE 3: MARTYRS

I. Interviews

A. Mrs. D--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 334

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story 2, Mrs. D views the issue of whether Fred should obey the principal as follows: "I think he and other students and teachers who support him should try to meet with the principal and discuss the whole situation." This response was scored at level three under Kohlberg's BIV category.

In story 4, she condemns Bob for "deliberately deceiving a trusting person," which was scored as stage 3 under Kohlberg's BII category. In a similar response to story 5, she argues that the social worker should report the cheater because: ". . . there might be a chance that another student could have the scholarship. . . ." This response was scored under category E and was seen as stage 3 level.

In story 6 an unscorable response serves to underline the importance of interpersonal trust and compatibility to her moral view: She is not certain whether the social worker should report the incident to the police: "I'm

tempted to say no tentatively--not to withold (sic) this information but not to offer it either, since he has gained this trust."

2. Moral Orientation

The major focus of Mrs. D's morality is upon empathy for others. In her life, this value has taken on a complex meaning. In part, her concern for others represents a way of avoiding selfishness, which was seen as a prime sin in her family: "It was instilled in me that it was good to help other people." In empathy she also sees a means of avoiding interpersonal conflict: "A lot of fights, conflicts and trouble have arisen from the fact that someone hasn't fully considered the other--what it's like to be that person." Empathizing with others is also a way of experiencing feelings vicariously, in a safe manner. If she empathizes with what the other feels, then she need not take responsibility for the feeling: "I've always been a very avid reader of fiction. I have to put myself in the other's spot, or in plays I take on other characters. . . . I remember dressing up in my mother's clothes, acting with dolls. I could create my own world. I could express many emotions I couldn't express otherwise-violent, passionate emotions. It was a great release for me."

By valuing empathy she consciously denies her own self-interest, but recognizes that she is not comfortable with her self-less values: "I admire people who can feel

selfish and not feel guilty about it. I admire people who can do self-centered things." As an adolescent she tried acting but gave it up because it was "too selfish" an activity. In her relationships with friends since childhood, she sees that she would always place herself in the role of helper to her friends in hopes that they would reciprocate and show concern for her feelings. She never felt that they did sufficiently, however.

Another related moral value is equality, which to her means that no one has any unfair advantages. In story one, she states: "People should have a fairly equal chance of getting housing and food. . . . Right from birth people have lots of counts against them--unequal beginnings." Her feelings about having advantages are conflicted, however. She felt that because her father was a judge, others would think she had advantages they didn't: "They might think I was richer than I was and I hadn't come through hard times and didn't know what their experiences were." Equality is thus a means of avoiding jealousy and conflict. Wishing all to be equal is a way of denying her own needs for more. Yet in another context it is clear that she felt deprived as a child. For instance, she wanted to have a piano but was refused by her parents. A neighboring family with less money purchased a piano for their daughter, however, and Mrs. D felt this was unfair.

But she is unable to accept her needs and has to refuse herself even those "advantages" she does have. In

college, for instance, she went to England for a summer on money she had earned. But her father gave her extra money and she felt guilty about having more money than the other girls. So she would not spend any of the extra: "I was projecting how I might feel. . . . I would feel bad if I could do something they couldn't . . . I've always felt varying degrees of guilt about having more, being in a better position." She denies her angry dissatisfaction (selfishness) by convincing herself that she has more than others. There is a self-sacrificial quality to such acts. It seems that she projects her own feelings of resentment onto others and denies herself and her needs so as to remain in the good graces of the other and avoid guilt. In contrast to her overt wish to release, she sometimes sees authorities as unjust. In story 2 underlying resentful feelings surface: Rules are made for the convenience of administrators and they (students) were getting screwed. It's great to see this awareness evolving; an awareness that their rights were being violated." She has some dim awareness of her resentment, but minimizes it: "In the past, more so than now, I felt I deserved other relationships than the kind I was having, but I wasn't expressing it clearly then." One suspects that she may continue to experience this resentment but feels more comfortable seeing it as something she "used" to feel.

In this vein, freedom is highly valued also and seems connected with these same feelings of being coerced

and controlled as a child: ". . . (Freedom) is meaningful to me because of the realization of the freedom I never thought I had as a child. The freedom to follow my potential." The moral value of "freedom" can thus be seen as an intellectual equivalent of a childhood wish to be free to grow in her family. Further displaced expression of this sense of having been controlled is found in her answer to story 3: ". . . (The captain) has military authority but it's like playing God with someone else's life. I'm sure he has technical authority to do that. He's a person telling another person to get killed. Nothing in him gives him that kind of superiority. . . . It's a phoney, arbitrary superiority--the parent is larger, the teacher is supposedly smarter." While she resents authority, she needs to continue to do what is expected of her so as to remain acceptable. Vicariously, however, she expressed her rebelliousness. For instance she is proud of her husband for his ability to stand up to authority. He led demonstrations on campus and wrote a paper on classified research "exposing" the administration. In her own life, however, she needs to act in an acceptable manner to authorities: In story 6, for instance, she would report the ghetto lawbreaker "knowing that the police would expect reporting this information." Being good thus takes precedence over rebelling openly on her own.

Indeed, a major focus of her morality is on the way external authority will respond to her behavior. The

process of internalization has not been completed and she has no internal, reliable code of ethics to follow. Being acceptable to her parents is the predominant consideration in all moral issues. She described one actual moral issue in her life as involving the decision to live with her future husband despite her parents' disapproval. In another situation she was having trouble handling a class as a teacher. The principal was willing to let her withdraw but she agonized over whether her parents would approve or not. Issues of right and wrong boil down to parental judgment: "It wasn't so much whether (leaving) was right or not, but my parents would find out." Internalization has proceeded sufficiently so that she experiences guilt but she cannot exert sufficient control to direct her own moral behavior. For example when she was eight, she admired a bathing cap at a local pool, and took it when its owner left it unattended. She knew it was wrong and felt guilty despite rationalizations she constructed to justify taking it. But she could not bring herself to give the cap back. Instead she wore it to the pool weekly until the owner recognized it and made her give it back. She punished herself by not returning to the pool all summer.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mrs. D is the oldest child of a respected judge and a homebody mother. She has one brother and two sisters. As the oldest child, she was expected to take care of the others and if something went wrong, "I was sort of to

blame." She felt forced into caring for her siblings and felt that she had to be the best behaved because she was older. She saw nothing of value in being in this responsible position: "Lots of times I didn't like the responsibility. Often I wished I had an older brother to take care of me." In general she seems to have felt a lack of support from her mother. Mother is seen as demanding and unfair. She was told to do things because her mother "said so" and one of her early memories pictures mother forcing her to eat a sandwich that was making her sick to her stomach. Mother never encouraged her to expand her horizons, such as by continuing playing the piano or dating boys. Mother was afraid of many things and Mrs. D feels that mother's concerns were passed on to her: "Mother is a nervous, tense person. She'd lie awake at night worrying about things that might happen." Mrs. D feels her mother was over-protective, largely because she was unable to assert herself in her own life: "She has so much potential. If only she'd stop over-protecting us kids and find other ways of focussing her concerns. I always felt she needed other stimulations than being around us all the time."

Despite this over-protectiveness, she does not feel she was ever close with her mother. She could not talk about things she felt to be important and constantly looked for involvement with women she felt to be interested in her. Indeed, two individuals she admired were teachers who encouraged her to pursue her musical talent, unlike mother,

who did not encourage her. Her earliest memory is of a loved grandmother singing to her: "There was just a feeling of contentment, of happiness. Just a feeling that she loved me." Mother was not so regarded.

Her early images of father, on the other hand, are loving and admiring: "Once my parents took me on a trip I remember my father pulling me out of the water on to the raft. It was a game. It was fun and I really liked my father. He was really strong." Father was idealized until he disappointed her:

> Up through college my father was my hero--my ideal male. I viewed him as very warm, as someone who took a lot of interest in us, and talked to us a great deal about abstract issues. Discussions during dinner (were) very stimulating intellectually. . . . But he changed. He had a serious illness--a kidney operation and it took him years to recover. He didn't have any energy and his humor turned cynical and bitter. . . . I couldn't believe this was happening to my father. I couldn't accept it.

Rather than facilitating greater autonomy from parental objects, however, this disillusionment pushed Mrs. D into a search for a better oedipal object, since her father had failed her. In her husband she saw a better father. She views her husband as a savior: "I feel very free to express how I'm feeling to my husband. He makes a free atmosphere. My parents were full of shoulds and oughts and my husband isn't at all. Whatever has changed for me I can date from the time I started dating my husband." She feels that he accepts her anger and encourages her assertiveness, unlike her parents: "I wasn't reinforced for these things. They curtailed my independence in high school." She admires her

husband's values and identifies with him, but has not been able to internalize them to any great extent. Her childlike, dependent relationship with her husband is a repetition of her oedipal relationship to her admirable, stimulating father. Her increasingly angry feelings about authority, seen above in the moral dilemma stories reflect her hurt and anger over the perceived rejection by father.

4. Summary of Moral Development

Her self-effacing, "empathic" morality has clear roots in parental demands for selfless, "good" behavior. She recalls being a "goody-goody" child who never expressed angry feelings. The mother's over-protectiveness and worrying made her fear self-assertion and encouraged the maintenance of a childlike identity. All angry, self-interested feelings seem to have been turned into their opposite in her conscious values so as to maintain parental sanction. When father disappointed her, it appears that the anger became displaced as cynicism about the intentions of authority, and some of the earlier reaction-formations began to wear off. Whereas her resentment was originally turned into self-effacement as a child, after her disillusionment, she began to flout her parents' expectations (quitting her job, living with her future husband). As Anna Freud (1958) notes, however, such adolescent rebelliousness ordinarily does not rid the individual of the infantile relationship to the parents. It merely transfers this relationship elsewhere. Mrs. D has not been able to individuate from her

parents and her morality reflects this by virtue of the lack of a reliable internal referent. A new object (husband) has partially replaced the old parental objects, but her concern for external support remains in her life, and in her value code.

Mrs. D's values reflects her personality in general. Deferring to others ("empathy") is a way of denying her own narcissism which is not acceptable to her superego, but which has become defensively inflated by her feeling of not having received needed narcissistic supplies from her mother. Grandiose goals reflecting this narcissism survive (she wishes to author a book about something "Really important.") Her object relations appear superficial and reflect a childlike alteration of good bad images of others. Empathy is required by her reaction-formations rather than flowing out of mature object relations. And she tends to see in others those feelings she cannot acknowledge in herself, which limits the scope and accuracy of her empathy. She has an incompletely internalized superego, in which the need for parental approval is dominant over any strongly principled sense of right or wrong. Control of impulses is required to maintain the love of parental objects which results in her reaction-formed pro-social values. Some hostility is expressed via the role of the martyr/victim, and her identity is dominated by this image of herself as an innocent victim of parental persecution. Yet she continues to manifest the passive expectant behavior of her childhood,

rather than actively getting what she wants. She is angrily rejecting early identifications with the parents and replacing them with dependence on her husband, which however has not granted her any further autonomy from infantile object relationships.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mrs. D describes her mother as domineering, overprotective and as a woman who could always think of reasons not to be assertive. In addition she felt mother to be too preoccupied to be interested in her welfare. Father, on the other hand, was seen as her oedipal hero through adolescence, until he became ill and disappointed her. It seems clear that she experienced a great deal of pressure from these parents to be a good girl who was self-effacing, unassertive and willing to sacrifice for others. Out of this interpersonal nexus come values extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice, being concerned about others' feelings before ones' own and a muted wish for "freedom" from coercion. But she was never able to internalize the values of her parents entirely, focussing instead on pleasing them so as to maintain the love they bestowed upon her when she was good. It seems that the parents did not expect or encourage the development of internalized principles or autonomous behavior. Being anything other than a good little girl was apparently not valued by them. Fearing rejection she could only express her rebellion and anger by involving herself with a substitute father dedicated to anti-authority radical

politics. But this rejection of her rich father was not a resolution of her oedipal feelings which remained frozen in an hysterical character structure sealed over before adolescence. Her moral reasoning resonates from the base of this "little girl" hysteroid character position.

B. Mr. E--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 290

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

Mr. E argues in story 1 that Mrs. W was wrong because:

> She was breaking the law, legally, and one would assume that usually Mrs. W is a woman of integrity who would not show such racial bigotry as displayed here and would, at least, not stoop to letting untruths--No vacancy! Furthermore, if Mr. J is a good tenant, chances are the other roomers will not be quite as viscious (sic) and may not cease their patronage after all.

This and other responses in this story were scored as stage 3 on Kohlberg's dimensions A, BII and E.

In story 2, he feels that Fred must obey the principal: "He has little choice unless he is to suffer more unpleasant consequences." This was scored at stage 2 on Kohlberg's BI dimension.

In story 4 he is against stealing because: "We may render someone else helpless by taking from them something they need as well as have use for later." This was scored as level 3 on Kohlberg's BII dimension.

In story 6, he is uncomfortable prosecuting a community leader: ". . . by working with the man and getting him to turn himself in, perhaps the court could be

influenced to letting (sic) the non off/or a minimal sentence." This response was scored as stage 3 on Kohlberg's G dimension.

2. Moral Orientation

Mr. E's morality centers around the need to be a martyr. He feels a need to forego gratifying his needs in deference to those of others. For instance, he initially opposed the war in Viet Nam and was going to refuse to fight, but a woman suggested that this was selfish and he entered the army, feeling that it was wrong to consider his own safety above that of others. He believed that "sacrificing" himself was preferable to endangering the lives of others through resisting the draft. His admiration for dedication to others is reflected in his view of a person with moral integrity. He described his old landlady who was ". . . living alone with very little money but she was always doing things for others. . . . She gave up marriage twice and nursed her father until he died. She also adopted one of her young sisters when asked and never complained. The feelings most of us would have never showed."

For Mr. E the role of martyr promises a state of innocence for someone feeling perpetual guilt: "My life is built around a sense of generalized guilt. I never knew when I was supposed to feel guilty. I find myself weighing alternatives before and after doing anything and feeling guilty no matter what I did. I can leave almost any situation feeling I'd done something wrong." Hence his morality

has been shaped to please others and be on the "good" side. Most of his answers to the Kohlberg stories had a naive, platitudinous aura. In story 1, for instance, he states: "I see no reason for discriminating in housing. I don't understand discrimination. I believe in a basic law of human rights. Mr. Jones is human so he deserves no preferential or other treatment from others. . . . The democratic idea is 'one man, one vote.' Each man is equal and deserves the same opportunity." Everything should be fair and equal, but he does not believe that individuals should assert themselves to obtain such rights. Hence if the discriminating landlady were truthful to Mr. Jones, it would be acceptable to discriminate: "I'm one of those persons who will do anything if it's explained to me first."

In his moral code, injustices are focussed upon but the individual must accept the injustice without asserting himself. In story 2, for instance, he extolls "free speech" but doesn't want Fred to make trouble over it. He is irate about the army story (number 3) but balks at any assertive response. Rather than being angry and assertive, he must be "nice" and tolerant. But Mr. E carries niceness to the point of caricature, which suggests that it is the result of defensiveness. In his case it appears to be the result of an early, pervasive character-forming reaction-formation. The following story suggests this reaction-formed quality. In contrast to a sadistic sargeant who would wake his men by making a racket with a metal swagger stick, Mr. E would wake

his men by sweetly whispering to them that he was going to turn the lights on in a few minutes.

Mr. E's role of the pleasing innocent martyr functions to protect him from feeling anger, which frightens him greatly. After leaving the army, for instance, he was getting the "run-around" when looking for jobs. He felt he was being discriminated against as a veteran but needed to control his anger because: ". . . if I lost control I'd screw myself. They'd use it against me and write it up in report. I wouldn't get what I wanted." Fear of his rage is so intense that he must immobilize himself. He recalls being yelled at unjustly in the army: "I was so angry that I couldn't see anything but a curtain of black and red. I almost blacked out." He also had spells such as these when his father was yelling at him. Unable to express anger directly to others, he diffuses it into a general feeling that the world mistreats him. He is innocent and all others are guilty. For instance, he feels that the injustices perpetrated by officers on soldiers are not the fault of those individuals alone but the fault of all people who "buy products from Honeywell."

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mr. E is the oldest child of impoverished tenant farmers who had inadequate food and clothing for much of their lives. He felt brutalized both by economic conditions and by his father, who in public life was a man of exemplary morals who quit several jobs in sympathy with

oppressed individuals. At home, however, father was seen as a brutal man who he felt blamed him for everything that went wrong in the home, and beat him often. For instance, he recalled being blamed for hitting a rock with the power lawn mower when he was ten. Father acted as if he had done it purposely and shook him and spanked him. He felt victimized by father's unjust expectations: "I was only a kid and the weeds were so high I couldn't see anything." Another time father blamed him for losing his watch, and for making a hole in a paint can in the garage. He did not recall being responsible for these things but could not get his father to listen to him. He also recalls situations in which father deprived him of things that were subsequently given to his sublings. For instance, father refused to let him have a convertible car but gave one to his sister. In part, because he was so frightened of his father, anger was out of the question. He recalls that he was beaten severely if he expressed any anger toward his father.

But more than this, he was encouraged to blame himself and focus on giving things to others rather than taking for himself. Once when he was punished, he ran away from home. On his return he was forbidden any dinner by father. He felt hatred for his father but his mother suggested he be concerned about the others in the family rather than himself. He recalls her saying: "If you think father doesn't love you, can't you pretend you love him for the sake of the family?" His martyr morality can be seen to have its genesis

in taking the role of martyr in his family, apparently at the behest of his parents. He was expected to take abuse and alter his feelings such that his anger and concern for himself was replaced by concern for others. As another example, mother was sick once and father expected him to take care of his siblings in addition to working in a factory after school, and finishing his high school homework in time to go to bed early. He had to take care of the kids but was not allowed to go out with friends at night. He felt isolated from peers, forced to stay with his family, and discouraged from dating. He had very few friends and spent most of his time reading social protest novels. In all his relationships it seems as if he has maintained the role of the one who is wrongly abused. He felt that several of his roommates used him, mistreated him, and then left him. Similarly, a girl friend "abandoned" him and married someone else. It seems clear that he expects and covertly encourages this form of treatment form others: "If I get close to others, I'll get the screw."

He feels that from the moment he was born, he was seen as an inconvenience to his parents. They had little money, he was an added expense, and his mother had to quit working when he was born. He felt his parents held it against him for the rest of his life. To pay them back, he had to serve as "slave labor" in the family and "practically raised" his younger brother and sister by himself.

In contrast to his fear and hatred of his father,

he felt admiration and gratitude toward his mother: "she is the one I had the most time with. She provided some basic security. She is consistent. There are very few exceptions with her, and she's very perceptive. It seems as if she can read minds and predict things." Mother would mediate between him and father, but as noted above, she influenced him to sacrifice his feelings for the good of the family. He sees her as having been a martyr in her own family and often did things for them she wished not to do: "She is something of a 'minor martyr.' She always gave others the feeling they were hurting her by doing what they wanted in opposition to her." As a disciplinarian he felt that she would punish him because of things he did to hurt or disappoint her. He has an early memory of "accidently" breaking a mirror she loved: "I remember feeling bad before the spanking. Something had to cause her to cry; then the spanking hurt. I decided that the spanking was for hurting my mother. Later I decided that most of the disciplines she gave me were because I disappointed her." Out of such experiences an external morality dedicated to maintaining love was born. Matters of principle, right and wrong, etc., never became salient in their own right. Because the relationship with mother was all he had, his morality reflects a predominant identification with mother as martyr. His relationship with her was intense, and he felt that she was his only playmate. He never saw his father, who held two or three jobs at once and slept during the afternoon.

Closeness to mother could also be painful, however, for often she was vindictive and hostile. Once he was trying to get her attention while she was ironing by putting his hand on the ironing board. He was certain that she saw his hand, but she burnt his finger and acted innocent, saying: "Gee, I didn't see your hand." It seems that he developed a masochistic way of relating to her as well as to father. Being hurt appears to be his dominant mode of relating to others.

He idolized and idealized mother, seeing her as having a mixture of ideal maternal and paternal characteristics. He described her as being intelligent, clever, honest, sincere and strong: "She was able to face many tragedies and coped with things better than father, who ignored things. Even in extreme poverty mother came up with something special for the holidays. She made home repairs while father was gone, managed the family budget, and made all the professional and occupational plans for the kids." But mother's "strength" was often used to direct and control him. She wanted him to be a teacher and he felt he could not oppose her will directly. Instead, he did not claim an exemption for education and allowed himself to be drafted. He then "found himself" in social work after getting out of the army, thereby not having to take responsibility for directly opposing mother's wishes. In general it seems that his assertive, oppositional tendencies could be expressed only through accidents. Indeed, he speculated

that many of the accidents that occurred in his life (power mower, brush, etc.) were not entirely accidental. If he "accidently" damaged the property of his parents, then he would not have to take responsibility for his angry wishes. In addition, as documented above, harming himself appears to be a prime outlet for his anger.

Harming himself also seems to have been a long-standing pattern for forcing the parents to notice him and involve themselves with him. For instance, he has an early memory (age two) of crying for father to stop the car and father refusing. He got sick and vomited on himself, which forced father to stop the car. He could only get attention and have his needs noticed in the role of a pitiful victim. Even now when he gets angry, Mr. E throws his own belongings around and destroys them.

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, Mr. E's self-effacing morality functions 1) as a means of controlling his anger by directing it against himself, 2) as a means of being an innocent martyr who need not feel guilty and 3) as a means of maintaining himself in the good graces of others who he feels will love him only if he is meek and self-punitive. He has internalized harsh, punitive superego standards which mirror the masochistic relationship he had with both mother and father. He is brutalized by his superego much as he felt himself to be abused by his parents. His predominant identification is with mother, but she is not so much a loving

presence as a stable, strong, reliable rock upon which to anchor his identity. There is a lack of a loving component to his morality, despite his need to consider others first. Pervasive early reaction-formations have transformed his anger into overconcern for others to the exclusion of self. His object relationships continue to be masochistic and his identity centers around being an innocent child who has done no harm and deserves love. His narcissism is blocked from manifesting itself as a positive sense of accomplishment and can be expressed only in feeling himself to be an abused martyr, innocent of all wrong-doing, and justified in feeling a self-righteous hatred of others who abuse him. He has not been able to break free of the early relationships with parents and has been unable to find new models for identification. His dominant tie is with mother and he finds it difficult to be autonomous of her. His involvement with her suggest a predominantly preoedipal attachment. He has poor impulse control and turns all his anger inward which interferes with his adaptive efforts especially in the realm of assertiveness. Whatever empathy he feels for others is based on a felt requirement to care about others. His actual ability to understand the feelings of others is limited however since his behavior is based on masochistic forms of object relations based on the motive to hurt and the need to be hurt. Mutuality in relating is limited because even in the "secure" relationship with mother, hurting and being hurt played a dominant role.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mr. E's self-effacing, passive martyr stance in moral issues can be seen to be based upon extreme pressure from his family to avoid assertiveness and be the family martyr. He idolized his mother, herself a long-suffering martyr and felt himself abused by his publicly morally upright father, who seemingly bullied him in a way reminiscent of the way he was treated by his own father on whose land he toiled as a tenant farmer. Being a martyr thus represents an identification with his beloved but powerful mother who "ran the roost." To be loved by mother he had to comply with her demands, which included the desire to choose an occupation for him. Since she was the only stable object in his life, this compliant stance was taken over, although with a great deal of underlying hostility knowing that he would be beaten by father if he showed anger, Mr. E developed a character structure based on reaction formations against narcissistic impulses and all self-assertiveness. This reaction-formed quality remains in his moral reasoning.

C. Mrs. F--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 343

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story 1 Mrs. F argues that Mrs. W is wrong ". . . mainly because in the long run she jeopardizes her own self." She also argues that by refusing Mr. J the room ". . . she jeopardized her own right of having a rooming house due to the legal implications. These responses were

scored at level 2 on Kohlberg's E dimension.

Mrs. F argues in story 2 that the principal is ". . . obligated to Fred to resolve the issue in a satisfactory way, since he initially sanctioned the publication . . . I believe that agreements should be honored or resolved satisfactorily." This was scored as a stage 3 response on Kohlberg's F dimension.

A response to story 4, although unscorable according to Kohlberg's criteria is illuminating nonetheless. She believes that cheating would be harder for her than stealing ". . . because it would require one to be directly deceitful to an individual person, tho (sic) it would depend on who I had to steal from."

A response to story 6 was scored as stage 4 on Kohlberg's BIV dimension. She argues that the social worker must report the man ". . . because not reporting it sanctions behavior he undoubtedly deplores and which would eventually disintegrate the community."

2. Moral Orientation

Mrs. F's morality is characterized outwardly by strict emphasis upon being true to oneself in one's decisions and uninfluenced by pressure from others. To a large extent, this autonomous stance appears to function as a defense against strong needs to be accepted and taken care of by others however. For instance, in story 1 she thinks Mrs. Webster is wrong in discriminating because "she's not even making the decision on her own thinking but

basing it on someone else's prejudices." She is upset by Mrs. Webster's "essential dishonesty to herself." But when asked about the importance of honesty, the focus changes from pleasing oneself to pleasing and being accepted by others: "I believe in honesty as a value . . . it catches up with you in the end--people are eventually going to catch up with you--you'll be lowered in their estimation . . . or you're going to get in trouble with somebody." In general, her moral thinking is characterized by these sorts of conflicts, reversals, and contradictions. She is also ambivalent about being concerned for herself as opposed to being concerned about others, and expresses it in abstract, intellectual terms: "I think it's almost an instinct--self interest. In our society there's a conflict--you learn to look out for the other guy but non-verbally the message is to look out for yourself." On a more personal level, this conflict is exemplified in the way she describes the importance of empathy, another basic value for her. Again in story 1 she emphasizes the importance of empathizing with the plight of those who have been discriminated against, like Mr. Jones. She perceives the development of her need to be empathic in the following manner: "Knowing what it felt like was an important experience. I've always been able to empathize with people on the out." Her empathy is therefore limited to concern for those who are victims, which, as will be seen below, is the way in which she experiences herself. Towards those not victimized, i.e., not

identifiable as sharing her plight, she is punitive and unempathic. For instance she is in favor of prosecuting Mrs. Webster: "I feel that people should pay for their prejudices." In story 5 if she were to confront the hypothetical exam cheater with his misdeed and he were unresponsive to her attempts to help him, she'd turn him in ". . . to let them know when they do that there are consequences." On the other hand, if the student needed the scholarship and confessed to making a mistake, she would not turn him in. Her position depends on the individual's "victim" status and her attitudes shift instantaneously from being forgiving and empathic to being angry and punitive. She seems to have some awareness of this conflict between being naively accepting and hypercritical: "I'm too critical of people, too analytical. I tend to project standards I have for myself on to other people which leads to disappointment usually. I tend to be naive. I trust people too much. It gets me into trouble." In her life that part of self which is trusting and which wants acceptance and love from others has lead her to become disillusioned and hurt and she has therefore attempted to obliterate this childlike trusting aspect of self through the institution of her cynical, self-reliant philosophy: "The naive would automatically trust rather than not trust. That's what happens when you live in society--too bad. People want to trust people and its disillusioning when you find out you can't."

It is clear that she feels that her victimization

has come at the hands of (parental) authority. She is acutely sensitive to issues of coercion and power: She believes the principal is wrong in story 2, for instance, because of his unfair exercise of power: "Children and students have few if any rights. They're almost like an oppressed class. They are unequal to the principal and he has power over them." She clearly identifies with children as victims. Similarly she feels that it is unfair for the captain to decide who goes to blow up the bridge (story three): "No one has infinite wisdom and therefore can't determine the fate of others." Suggested here is her fear of being in a position of dependence on others.

Her ambivalence about power and control are also clear. On the one hand, she wishes to exert power in situations, if she believes that it will work. For instance in story 6, she emphasizes that her decision about dealing with the ghetto thief would be based on what her efforts could accomplish: "If I could do more good for him with counseling than his being in prison, then I would take that responsibility." (i.e., to refuse to report him) But she is concerned about the use of power in her own hands, as well as in others'. In her job, for instance, she feels that she has power to make decisions that affect others' lives: "I'm very uncomfortable with it--with the power, because the consequences could be detrimental (and) . . . once the decision is made, I have little control over the consequences that follow."

She has attempted to resolve her ambivalence over the issue of power and powerlessness in an intellectual manner: "People assume they have little power, even over their own lives, but I think people have as much power as they allow themselves to have." She has come to believe that individuals can free themselves from oppression by realizing that they can make choices and that they are responsible for their behavior. Taking responsibility gives meaning to life: "It's the only way to make sense of why you're here. It takes the arbitrariness out of why things happen." This intellectual solution occurred to her at the height of her feeling of helplessness, when her father refused to give her money to go to school (a signal event in her life to be described in detail below) "I developed this philosophy when I felt acted upon--with no control over my life-depression, despondency and uselessness. The only way to get out of it was to take responsibility and I had a certain amount of freedom and power as a result."

In summary, Mrs. F's values reflect the operation of strong defenses against the need to be accepted and loved by others. Such dependence is seen as a powerless state which she denies by asserting the need to be autonomous and uninfluencable in her decisions. She further counteracts the feeling of powerlessness through abstract intellectual arguments which dictate that life is meaningful when one takes responsibility and thus transform the feeling of powerlessness into an illusion. She clearly sees herself

as a victim and feels that she has been hurt because of her "naive" dependence on others. Since her values are inundated with conflict and represent intellectual attempts to resolve emotional concerns, they are lofty and unreachable. Her superego is unyielding and punitive and directed toward vengeance. It is a hostile internal voice that is rarely accepting or loving or trustworthy. Her emphasis upon autonomy gives an initial impression of internalized morality based on a firm sense of integrity and responsibility. Her form of autonomy is based on a counter-dependent stance rather than reflecting a core of autonomous morality, however. Underneath her intellectualized values, the need for acceptance and external validation surface as the basis of her morality.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mrs. F is the oldest child of a struggling middle-class family that never had much money. She felt that her parents were unusually strict: "We had to be in bed earlier than everyone else we knew. . . . We couldn't have any gum or soda. We had to finish everything on our plates or we couldn't get up from the table. We had chores to do even when we were young and had to take more responsibility than other kids did." Responsibility was emphasized in the home, but it was felt to be an unfair burden, rather than a positive, self-enhancing expectation. She resented being responsible and felt victimized. As a disciplinarian her father used physical punishment or screamed loudly and in

response she experienced "feelings of being really small and powerless--a sick feeling in my stomach--nervous and ashamed." The important sense of powerlessness is thus linked directly to the relationship with father.

Even as a child her responses to this power conflict were ambivalent. Behaviorally she would rebel rather than knuckle under to paternal pressure. They lived on a farm and she recalls setting fires in the chicken coops: "I knew it was dangerous and would get me in trouble. But I was drawn by the element of excitement and danger, and also because I knew it was strictly forbidden. It was one way of getting back at my parents. They were strict." Despite this overt rebellion she was greatly influenced by parental expectations and concerned about pleasing them. Her own developing standards reflected an over-compliance with parental expectation. For instance, she became so rigid and perfectionistic about her schoolwork, an area stressed by her parents, that they commented on her scrupulousity: "By the time I got to high school, they told me I'd taken it to an extreme."

Maximal conditions for her ambivalence held in the family. Her parents were warm and loving but also demanding and strict. She was afraid of father but also had a warm erotic relationship with him as a child: "Before taking our baths we would run around without clothes and sit in his lap. I liked him to pick me up. I remember him smiling and laughing, strong, warm." Another memory is of

his picking her up: "I'd straddle his chest with my legs. I was singing a song I made up. I remember being high up in the air, having him hold me, being happy and I liked it that he was paying attention to me instead of mother." She and father often had "intimate" discussions together, talked politics, did photography: ". . . in high school it got to the degree that mother was jealous--but not in a sexual way." Her denial notwithstanding, it appears that she maintained an erotic, oedipal relationship with father through adolescence. Her good feelings about this relationship came to an abrupt halt when father told her he didn't have enough money to send both her and her brother to college and that since he was a boy it was more important for him to go. For years she attempted to please father by being a tomboy and this decision was a disillusioning blow:

> I was as good at sports as my brother. I had to be to play with father. If I'd been crummy at frisbe or football he'd have gotten annoyed with me, so to gain his approval I got as good as the boys. That's why I got really angry when my brother got to go to school and I didn't. My brother wasn't interested in school and I got all A's.

She devoted herself to pleasing father and he let her down. In this light her struggle to minimize her expectations about care and support from others is comprehensible. She was naive and trusting of father and felt betrayed, which is reflected in her morality which emphasizes cynical mistrust of others and the requirement of being staunchly independent.

Emphasis on independence is also traceable to

conflicting feelings and messages in the family. She feels that her parents encouraged early independence but then began to curtail its expression: "I went away to camp when I was young. It made me independent. . . . When I was 15 I went abroad to Malaysia as a foreign student. I had to make decisions about things no one could help me with. When I came back I was so used to being independent I clashed with my parents constantly. They saw it as rebellion. I saw it as my ability to make decisions." For the most part, she felt that father supported her autonomy: "He always reinforced the way I was. It was OK to fight for what I wanted. He treated me like an adult who could make decisions on my own. . . ." On the other hand, she felt mother was opposed to her being independent: "Mother was upset about me going out on my own. She said I would sleep around when I got to school. She accused me of the intent to do that. It wasn't true. She chose that because she knew it would make me angry. She was upset about losing me and threatened to withhold money they had promised." Aside from this clinging to her, she felt that mother was distant and uninvolved: "Until I went to school I never realized girls talked to their mothers. . . . She doesn't get close to people easily and is guarded in her emotions." When things would go wrong, mother would blame herself for being a bad mother. Not only is there a lack of strong identification with mother but mother represents a devalued negative model of powerlessness and ineffectualness. This view of mother

has been translated into a general view of women as "dull, superficial and overly dependent on men."

Her conflict over dependency-autonomy is reflected in current object relationships as well. On the one hand, she described several unsatisfactory relationships with men where she felt the other was not nurturant enough: "My need for affection was higher than they could fulfill. I needed other people." She likes the relationship with her husband precisely because he grants her "autonomy" to have her dependency needs satisfied in other relationships: "We're both very independent. I feel I could come and go as I wanted and pursue my own friends, interests and career goals." That the feeling that her "need for affection" cannot be satisfied in one relationship is labeled "autonomy" by her is further proof of the defensive function served by her autonomy.

Mrs. F's belief in autonomy and assertiveness is strikingly different from the passivity of the other threes. Her autonomy appears to reflect continued attempts to please father as well as to protect herself from potentially hurtful human contact, however, and therefore is suggestive of conflicts similar to those of the other threes. The other threes have employed reaction-formations against their assertiveness and have devoted themselves to others in order that they might "get." Mrs. F on the other hand, has defended against her need to get from others through the development of a counter-dependent autonomy. Though

defended against differently, the need to be loved by others and the feeling of being unfairly treated remain the dominant dynamic components of her morality, just as they are for the other threes. And like the other threes, she has been unable to separate from over-protective parents.

Father stressed independence as a value and she pursued it to please him, just as she become a tomboy to gain his favor. Her strong oedipal attachment continued through adolescence and was halted by his rejecting her academic aspirations. Rather than working through this disappointment however, she became cynical about trusting others and developed intellectual countermeasures to obliterate the disappointment. Philosophically she denied the sense of powerlessness she felt and asserted that she was powerful. She followed father's values of autonomy and cynically denies that one can trust others. But she has been unable to give up the internal relationship to father and the need to please him remains a dominant motive in her life. Unlike Mrs. D who sought a substitute object to replace the rejecting oedipal father, Mrs. F has attempted to deny that her father could be replaced or should be. In neither case, however, has the oedipal relationship been given up.

4. Summary of Moral Development

Mrs. F values independent, autonomous activity and helping victims of oppression. Underneath these values however is dependence upon the favor of important others and a wish to be a good little girl who pleases everyone.

The conscious moral stance thus represents an attempt to deny facets of her functioning which she is ashamed of. But because of her dependence upon parental sanction in the moral realm, Mrs. F has not developed an autonomous moral position, her belief in independence notwithstanding. Strict parental superego values have been swallowed whole and even made more severe in the service of courting parental approval. Her tough, analytical, cynical mode of reasoning seems to differ from that of the overtly compliant other threes, but this stance appears to be a defense against hysterical, "good-girl" inclinations which father would not approve of.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Organization

Mrs. F describes her parents as strict and often unfair in their demands on her. She felt powerless in relation to her father whom she also idolized as a warm, loving "playmate." Mother, on the other hand was seen as overprotective and yet distant. To please father she had to be a boy and so hid her dependency needs under a veneer of assertiveness and intellectuality. However such tactics also failed to win her father, who wouldn't pay for her schooling because she was a girl. On the surface these parents (at least father) valued and encouraged autonomous behavior but on closer examination actually demanded behavioral compliance which she gave in the form of quasi-hostile overcompliance with parental expectation. Her oedipal disappointment resulted in the formation of an obsessive

("masculine") overlay on top of her essentially hysterical character organization. Voices from both these levels of character organization can be heard in her moral reasoning.

II. Summary of Stage Three

In his revised scoring manual, Kohlberg defines stage three in summary fashion: "Orientation to mutual or shared norms of being good or pro-social and of concern for others. An orientation to stereotypical natural or good motives, roles or personality types. Orientation to what others expect, think or approve in the situation" (1972, p. 7). As will be seen below, our threes do function in accordance with this summary by Kohlberg, yet in ways that transcend Kohlberg's conceptual framework. In addition to Kohlberg's emphasis on the formal, logical properties of stage three thinking, this account focusses on the emotional factors associated with such reasoning with particular emphasis on the operation of dynamic conflict and defenses against that conflict that are reflected in the moral realm.

In consonance with Kohlberg's description the moral reasoning of the threes was found to focus on being empathic to others and upon being a kind, considerate person concerned more for others than for the self. The most striking finding about the threes, however, was that there was a considerable disparity between this conscious wish to be loving and unselfish, and less amiable vengeful impulses that are being defended against a level of analysis not

pursued by Kohlberg. The threes consider themselves to have been the victims of injustice at the hands of their parents and experience themselves as innocent martyrs who continuously get involved in situations where they feel used and abused. Often they suffer these injustices in self-righteous silence yet their anger is expressed in disguised fashion. Mrs. D and Mr. E have dealt with their intense anger through the use of long-standing reaction-formations. They are overly nice, compliant and unselfish. They are also passive and decidedly masochistic in their interactions with others, and can be passive-aggressive. They go out of their way to please others and constantly feel that they do not receive the reward they deserve. They dream and fantasize about ideal relationships based on romantic notions of love and are disappointed when others do not live up to these ideals. Mrs. F, on the other hand, has not subjected her anger to reaction-formation. She extolls the virtues of empathy, as do the others, but her rage and feelings of injustice are given more direct expression in her cynical, sarcastic cold demeanor and judgmental assessment of others. Indeed, Mrs. F gives expression to the unacceptable feelings that Mrs. D and Mr. E cannot express directly. Analogously, she sees herself as one who needs little from others rather than as a martyr and she does not appear to be masochistic as are the other threes. Yet like the others her personality and morality are dominated by the need to be accepted and approved of by others and she sees herself as a victim.

The need for acceptance is the most significant dynamic factor in the threes' lives. They have experienced a certain degree of love and care from their parents and had particularly close relationships with the opposite-sexed parent. Despite this security the threes felt cheated of something, as if the parents had not kept some undefined promise. Relationships with their parents were intense and often stormy, and strong unresolved oedipal feelings interfere with their growth. Indeed the threes have been unable to break free of intense oedipal involvements. For the most part they feel themselves to have been rejected by an opposite sex parent who promised them more than was given. Their resulting disillusionment in this parent has had a singular effect on their later development.

One result of the injustice of the oedipal situation has been a breakdown in the process of internalization. They are over-socialized and base their actions on parental expectation in hopes of receiving love and support. Threes know how to please authorities but their moral behavior does not emanate from an internalized sense of right and wrong. They run their lives by the conscious adage to love others and be empathic, but they have not internalized this or any other principle completely. Their continuing need to be accepted, loved and rewarded by others eclipses any devotion to principle, or need to strive for moral integrity. They feel themselves to be worthwhile as people if others like them, and they will change their behavior

instantaneously to court this love, which gives their moral behavior a capricious cast. Their allegiances switch depending upon whether an authority is loving and protecting them or not.

A. Family Dynamics

The most striking commonality in the threes' perception of their parents is the sense that one or both parents had a great deal of difficulty in allowing their children to be autonomous. They tended to inhibit the child's natural inclinations to individuate by prohibiting autonomous behaviors.

The parent-child relationships had a parasitic tinge, as if the parents needed their offsprings to remain children for their own gratification. Often one motivation for this symbiotic clinging to the child seemed to be the resulting feeling of safety, security and control in interacting with the child, as opposed to dealing with more powerful adults. Mrs. D and Mrs. F saw their mothers as extremely over-protective and strict and expressed anger at this stifling closeness. They felt that this over-protectiveness was not loving but rather an expression of their mothers' own insecurities and neurotic needs. Mr. E felt his mother could not allow him to make decisions on his own.

The threes had intense, sexualized relationships with the opposite-sex parent and tended to portray this parent as one with great powers and abilities. They admired and loved these oedipal objects and felt that they had won

the competition with their oedipal rival. Yet they also feared that this rival was jealous of their good relationship with the other parent. They described the relationship with the same-sexed parent as distant and lacking in warmth or closeness.

The parents of threes tended to rely on guilt-induction and withdrawal of love as tactics to encourage socialized behavior in the child. In general these parents communicated that misbehavior was wrong because it hurt them and made them unhappy. A bad child was defined as a child who inflicted pain upon a self-sacrificing parent. One or both of the parents of threes tended to enact a martyr role in the family, thus modeling the tactic for the child. Moreover, these parents, more than others described in the sample, were uncomfortable with hostility to the extent that they virtually prohibited its expression, and encouraged their children to be meek, compliant and unassertive. Being a "good" child was a cardinal virtue and they made their love and approval unusually important by punishing the child through guilt-induction and withdrawal of affection. As a result the child came to value their love beyond all else. If the child wished to continue being loved, they had to be obedient. In this manner these parents made it difficult for the child to develop an internalized sense of self-worth, since they made sure that their own external approval or disapproval would become of singular importance to the frightened child. Their prohibitions

against assertiveness served further to interfere with the child's achievement. As noted above Mrs. F's situation was more complex because the parent rewarded independent behavior, at least overtly.

By prohibiting anger, these parents encouraged their children to maintain idealizations of them that have remained difficult to overcome. And once the threes found that their parents were not perfect, they were terribly disappointed and frightened. Their disillusionment was particularly intense and generated a great deal of anger and vengefulness. The parents made themselves into omnipotent gods in the eyes of their children and let the children believe that if they were good they would have all the love and affection they required. But the parents could not make good this promise and when they failed to be gods, their children were bitter and hurt. The children felt tricked and turned away from their parents in anger. Indeed the threes described themselves as being more distant from their parents in the present than the rest of the sample. But rather than giving up the search for omnipotent, all-loving objects, the threes have continued their search elsewhere, without being able to see that their expectations are unrealistic or that their parents are neither as good or bad as they believed at one time or another. The fact that the threes continue to search for ideal objects indicates that they have been unable to free themselves from the infantile relationship with their parents. Hence

they seem bound for disappointment in their relationships with others as well.

Another vestige of the childhood relationship with their parents is the continued expectation that authorities will be benevolent parents. They believe that as long as they are cooperative and self-effacing the authority will protect and love them. However, since few authorities are capable of being ideal "good parents" (no matter how hard some try!) the threes are constantly disappointed in authorities. As noted above, Mrs. F has gone further and asserted that no authorities are benevolent.

B. Empathy and Object Relations

Empathic concern for others is the central moral value espoused by threes. In practice, however, their actual empathy for others is limited. Their concern for others is similar to that of an obedient child who wishes to win the love and admiration of his parents. It is empathy in search of a reward--caring for others so that they will love you. Moreover, threes need to see themselves as good and innocent and they achieve this status by emphasizing concern for others in their pronouncements about morality.

Threes see themselves as the innocent victims of injustice, and equate their life experience with that of visible "victims" such as racial minorities. The feelings in others they empathize with are the feelings of being oppressed and persecuted. Empathy with non-persecuted others is rare, however. Casting themselves in the role of

the innocent martyr who is persecuted, they claim the right to be self-righteously enraged at the persecutors, a right they cannot grant themselves in their direct interactions with their parents and others in general. This anger at the persecutory authorities undercuts the obedient child role they enact publicly. In reality the threes are extremely angry, resentful individuals who have subjected their anger to reaction-formation or diffused and generalized it. Their avowed interest in others' feelings represents a defensive type of empathy which actually gives little importance to the real feelings of others. On the contrary, this empathy serves more to convince themselves and others that they are not angry people. Mrs. F represents the clearest example of this underlying rage. She talks of the importance of empathy but is an angry, cynical, bitter woman whose feelings are not hidden under the veil of reaction-formation.

In reality the threes are not concerned about others' feelings, but with obtaining love and affection for themselves. They feel they must claim to be uninterested in their own welfare so as to obtain the love of important others. The fleetingness and superficiality of their empathy is evident in the ease with which it is given up if they see no reward forthcoming. To be sure, the threes are more empathic than the twos. They can, unlike the twos, empathize with more than an individual's immediate self interest, safety, and security. They are sensitive to the

less primitive needs for interpersonal love. But like the twos, empathy for the threes reflects their own dominant need state. The twos need more basic things from their interactions and the threes admit people into their world more readily and perceive people as more complex entities. Thus the threes' empathy is dominated by somewhat more developed narcissistic considerations than the twos. But theirs is not an empathy based on mutuality, as is the case with the fours, as will be seen below.

The threes' object relations are characterized by a tendency to see others either as overly good or bad. People are not seen to display complex mixtures of traits. They view others through childs' eyes that idealize, romanticize or villainize. Their representations of others are vivid and alive, in contrast with the representations of the twos, which were flat and lifeless. Object relationships are of great importance to threes but their perceptions are distorted by their need for love. A part of the vibrancy of their images of others is supplied by a defensively originated exaggeration of the good/bad qualities of others. They are particularly drawn to others seen as benevolent authorities but these idealizations seem to break down quickly. They search for a bond with others who are seen as good for them and set up parasitic relationships which are characterized by a lack of mutuality. They often take a subservient, child role in such relationships. In this role they obtain a certain amount of masochistic

gratification, for they constantly feel themselves to be used, manipulated and hurt by the omnipotent other and then feel justified in being angry. This submissive role repeats the relationship they feel they have had with their parents and represents an attempt to master traumas which originated in the parent-child relationships from their past. In particular they attempt to master oedipal disappointment. New objects in their lives are expected to undo the harm done them by the rejecting oedipal parents, yet their masochism requires that they suffer in the new relationship. They suffer as martyrs and thus attempt to force the other to feel guilty and give them the love they need. But because their relationships with others are overshadowed by their intense, unresolved feelings about their parents, they are rarely satisfied with the newer relationships, which end up looking too much like the old, unsatisfactory relationship with the parents.

Despite overt "compliant child" behavior, threes seem to have difficulty establishing rapport with others. Beyond superficial compliance, they were guarded, distant and withholding of feelings in the interview with me. I found them to be the most difficult subjects in the sample to communicate with. They were passive-aggressive, secretive and aloof, which is consistent with their perceptions of themselves as children who preferred dreaming and fantasizing to interacting with peers. As children, relationships

with parents were much more intense than those with any other people, in part due to the over-protectiveness of the parents.

C. Identity Formation

The threes have progressed further than the twos in the development of identity. Threes have no confusion about self-other boundaries and have formed strong, although self-limiting identifications with their parents. But only limited aspects of parental behavior are available to them. Primarily they have identified with the martyr parent who has sacrificed his or her own identity so that others would be happy. Threes are over-socialized and repress large aspects of self. They cannot allow themselves to be overly active, assertive or autonomous and must struggle constantly to deny self-interested motives. Only pleasing, pro-social aspects of self are available for their identity. In contrast, Mrs. F has rejected the martyr parent and identified with the parent valuing autonomy.

Their identity formation seems to have been frozen before adolescence. Erikson (1959, p. 120) describes one stage of identity formation as involving a conflict between play identification versus oedipal fantasy identification. Children at this preschool play age can begin to experiment with new identities in their play. When oedipal conflict is over-valent, however, their play will be dominated by oedipal themes. It seems that our threes were over-protected by their parents and were obsessed with an

idealized view of these parents, who did not allow them the freedom to experiment via play with other identities. The threes withdrew into fantasy and avoided peer group interactions which might have facilitated the development of an autonomous identity. Their parents remained giants in their lives and oedipally tinged fantasies occupied most of their playtime.

As a result, adolescence was not a period of redefinition of identity for them. Rather they had calcified, limited identities as adolescents and asserted themselves grudgingly in an attempt to reject their parents. They looked for new objects and attempted to run away from their unresolved oedipal feelings. However, as Anna Freud notes (1958) adolescents who attempt to individuate by running away physically or emotionally do not come to terms with infantile parental representations and do not succeed in freeing themselves of this unconscious parental dominance. Consequently the threes repressed much of the past and idealized objects in the present. But there was no reorganization of identifications during adolescence and then retained the reaction-formed, martyr identities of childhood (Mrs. D and Mr. E) or the prematurely autonomous identity of earlier years (Mrs. F). In a sense then, the identity of the threes can be said to have been foreclosed in Erikson's sense. The early oedipal conflict in identity has persisted and has interfered with later growth in self. The threes also demonstrate a striking lack of future

orientation which again suggests that their identities are dominated by the representations of past experience. Their choice of occupation, for instance, seems to represent the translation of their innocent martyr childhood identities into a social role. Their choice of social work as a profession was not made as a result of new identifications or reworking of serviceable old ones. Rather social work represented an attractive role for a pro-social martyr. More generally, the threes did not conceptualize themselves as growing and changing. They talked about growth in a platitudinous manner but were not very insightful about their past lives and seemed relatively satisfied with themselves as they were at present.

D. Superego Development

The threes show more extensive superego development than the twos. A certain amount of internalization has occurred and they do consider others when faced with moral decisions. Pro-social expectations have become dominant in their morality but they feel forced to be concerned for others or do so out of defensive motives. The need for love and affection continues to be over-valent, hence they are not individuals committed to principle or moral integrity.

Their superegos are harsh and unyielding and demand good behavior at all times. They experience guilt readily and tend to punish themselves for real or apparent offenses by turning anger on themselves, or through masochistic behavior. Their martyr stance functions to stave off superego

attack by denying that they are angry or self-interested individuals. Their superegos seem more severe than the parental standards which formed the basis of the development of their values.

Their actual moral behavior is superficially pro-social but is oriented toward receiving a reward of affection from others. They experience guilt often but their behavior does not seem to change, since their intense need for approval never abates. They tend to be self-righteous in condemning the crass motives of others, which reflects a punitive superego and which supplies a pro-social outlet for anger.

Their relationship with their parents can be seen to have influenced this development. The parents encouraged the children to idealize them and preferred to be seen as kindly giants who never erred rather than as fallible human beings. They used guilt and love withdrawal as weapons against their children to force compliance. Hence continued acceptance by the parents became the children's most important consideration. What resulted was a grudging concern for others in the context of a reaction-formed morality attuned primarily toward pleasing authority. The parents' inability to present themselves as human and their need to over-protect their children thus interfered with the development of an internalized morality and sense of integrity. In the end, being loved is more important to the threes than having a sense of moral integrity.

The ego-ideals of the threes reflect their oedipal idealizations and need to be good children. They expect perfection of themselves and cannot live up to the image of a person without anger or personal needs. As a result, their self-esteem suffers. They cannot be perfect and are constantly guilty. Their superegos are punitive but not very loving and thus they do not feel especially good about themselves when they are "good." They lack a basic sense of self-respect and have no strongly internalized sense of self-worth. They feel good about themselves only when others love them. Hence they must court external validations of their worth constantly.

Their parents taught them to consider the needs of others before their own. Hence narcissistic gratification cannot be sought openly. Masochistic gratification and subsequent feelings of superiority at being an innocent martyr are the only avenues of gratification open to them. They need to enjoy themselves secretly since their superegos oppose open gratification of their needs. The only way they can be grandiose about themselves is in the role of martyr and the only outlet for feelings of anger and competitiveness is through self-righteousness. Narcissistically they have developed further than the twos, who do not acknowledge the needs of others, yet in the end, others are merely potential "good parents" to them. Hence the needs of others have limited importance to them, and they do not involve themselves in mutual relationships.

E. Ego Development and Character Organization

The threes show greater ego development than the twos. Self boundaries are well-established, object relations are maintained at a relatively high level of functioning and their defenses allow them to adapt well to the demands of everyday life. They are a bit over-socialized however, and they find it difficult to give expression to impulses, especially anger or self-interest. Their defenses are more sophisticated and complex than those of the twos. Threes rarely are deniers or projectors, but rely upon reaction-formations, intellectualizations and higher level repressions.

The thinking of the threes is unimpaired in terms of distortions of reality. They are intelligent, well-read, articulate individuals who are a bit naive and simplistic in their assessments of social situations. Their thinking is rife with conventional cliches and they seem unreflective. Mrs. F sees herself as an intellectual but is quite rigid in her thinking, and like the others, seems a bit naive, despite her jaded, cynical exterior. In response to early oedipal conflicts they have developed hysterical character organizations to repress and deny unacceptable sexual and aggressive urges. Being good, compliant and self-sacrificing thus serves as a camoflage to cover underlying wishes to become autonomous and express feelings openly. This character position is reflected in moral reasoning that focusses on being nice to others and ignoring their own needs.

CHAPTER 5

KOHLBERG'S STAGE 4: INTEGRITY BEARERS

I. Interviews

A. Mrs. G--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 383

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story 2 Mrs. G argues that the principal is wrong because "Fred had already received his permission and had met his conditions. Fred kept his part of the bargain. The principal did not. An agreement should apply equally to all parties." This response was scored as level 4 on Kohlberg's F dimension. In the same story she defends Fred's right to publish: "Freedom of speech, youngsters are taught, is a right guaranteed by the constitution." This was scored under Kohlberg's E category as stage 4 reasoning.

In story 3 she argued that the captain has the right to order a man on the mission: "The captain has a responsibility first, to the army who needs great manpower, second, to his company as a whole, and third, to the individual members of his company. He has the authority. That is why there is only one captain in a company." This response was scored on Kohlberg's D dimension as stage 4 reasoning.

She believes that the cheater must be reported in

story 5 because of the ". . . unfairness to other contenders. Cheating is always wrong." This was scored at level 4 on Kohlberg's F dimension.

At this point a note is in order about the status of the stage 4 subjects in this sample. As will be seen below, these 4's exhibit a moral orientation not predicted by Kohlberg, a finding of some significance for evaluating Kohlberg's theory as a whole.

I wish to attempt to counter any objections made to my interpretations of this material before they arise, so that there are no misunderstandings about the sequence of analysis of the data, proper scoring, etc.

First of all, it is important to know that these subjects had their Kohlberg protocols scored well before being interviewed by me for the moral orientation portion of the study. At the time of scoring, done incidently in conjunction with an independent rater, I had no inkling that the fours' moral orientation was anything other than what Kohlberg has described in his writings (e.g., 1958, 1963, 1964). I expected them to focus on "law and order" issues in fairly conventional fashion, just as they seemed to do in the Kohlberg interview portion of the study. Mrs. Hodnefield, (my fellow rater) and I were well satisfied that these subjects were indeed 4's by Kohlberg's new scoring criteria (Kohlberg, 1972). When I began to interview these subjects, however, I soon discovered that law and order was not the most basic facet of their moral

orientation. On the contrary, they were much more committed to a "rights and responsibility" form of moral code stressing integrity, acting in accordance with internalized principles, etc. When I went back to the original protocols to see if Mrs. Hodnefield and I had made a systematic error in scoring their responses, I found that according to Kohlberg's criteria they were indeed fours. What I also found, however, was that much of the response material generated by Kohlberg's own stories was not scorable according to his precise criteria and was therefore "ignored." Upon reviewing this "unscorable" material however I found the "missing" investment in integrity. My understanding therefore of the discrepancy between my analysis of the 4's, and Kohlberg's view of their morality is that Kohlberg has arbitrarily limited the focus of his scoring system to a small portion of the data generated by his own instrument. In so doing he loses other important data that bear upon the subjects' actual moral orientation. In line with my argument with Kohlberg from the beginning of this thesis, I believe this oversight by Kohlberg is caused by his overvaluation of rationality and logic and his lack of appreciation for the affective, unconscious and irrational aspects of moral functioning that are present in everyone's moral functioning. I should also mention that the stage 5 subjects' responses were rechecked by me in a similar manner to insure accurate scoring according to Kohlberg's criteria. My contention is that anyone using Kohlberg's system of scoring

as stated in his revised 1972 code book would score these subjects in the same manner.

2. Moral Orientation

Independent decision-making is of central importance in Mrs. G's moral reasoning, and is related to a strong sense of moral responsibility. In story one, she argues that one reason Mrs. W is wrong is: "because she's letting someone else dictate to her what to do. . . . If I'm in a situation where someone is telling me what to do I want to base my decision on what I think is right."

A related aspect of her moral reasoning is a strong emphasis on individual dignity:

> Whether a person is black or white doesn't reflect what kind of person they are . . . I think you should judge the individual rather than the group. I worked with welfare clients and was upset with blanket statements about "people who are on public welfare." People differ. It bothers me to see people classified as a particular group. I'm very concerned about the individual. . . . Each person is an entity in himself. And you should make an individual decision about how you want to deal with that person.

While she is generally opposed to dictating what others should do, she also believes that this must sometimes be done (as in the case of open housing laws). She has strong feelings about the importance of law, feeling strongly opposed for instance to disregarding laws that one disapproves of: "Instead, one should seek change within the system." In part, she sees the function of law as protective: "Laws are set up for protection for the greatest number of people." The organizing function of law is central

as well as the beneficial results brought about by laws: "Most laws are designed for the protection of the greatest number of people. Laws should change depending on the changing needs of people. By breaking the law one is taking the risk of endangering the structure of laws. If someone says 'I disagree with the law and will break it to change it,' someone else could say the same. It may lead to a cycle and lead to damage. This leads to a breakdown of trust in the government. One of the functions of government is the protection and care of rights. If people no longer trust the government to take care of rights, it could lead to chaos."

She feels an obligation to obey laws in part because she holds herself responsible for all acts she commits. For example she recalled how her husband rejected avoiding the draft because of his feeling that if he refused to go, then: "someone less capable of controlling what happened would be sent in his place." There is even a hint of parentalness in her attitude in the sense that she seems to feel a little <u>more</u> responsible than others and feels a responsibility <u>for</u> others. This sense of responsibility is a central facet of her morality: "He would have been evading a responsibility by running away. . . . If he left, he was shifting legal and moral responsibility on to someone else who might be less able to handle it. Both of us tend to feel responsible for other people."

Another major tenet of her morality is the view

that there is a reciprocity between rights and responsibilities: "People should have freedom to make their own choices but at the same time their decisions should not harm the rights of other people:" And it is law that makes this system work: "Other people's rights should be safeguarded through a series of laws. If I reserve rights for myself I can't prohibit rights to others. My rights are not unaffected by others. I'm not an isolated person." To exemplify this conflict she told of the difficulties she and her husband had in both going to school. They tried to balance rights and responsibilities for both of them and worked out a compromise: "If I would find money for childcare, he'd find money for living. If there is a conflict I'd drop out."

In story two similar themes are stressed. She faults the principal for allowing the parents to influence him and for setting a bad example with the students. More generally: "free speech is a right guaranteed by the system; a way of communicating changes legally and responsibly." In story three, she returns to the theme of responsibility: "I believe in reasons for a chain of command. It determines who is responsible for a particular action. You need a leader or system of leaders to make decisions. Without this it would be pretty chaotic." A system of interlocking rights and responsibilities thus serves to order social reality and avoid chaos.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mrs. G is the oldest child of a career soldier who now runs a business in a small community and a mother who stayed home and involved herself with her children. Father's army job necessitated constant moves from army base to army base and many periods of his absence from home. She was given a great deal of responsibility as a child for taking care of her brother and sister and in general her parents expected her to take responsibility for her own behavior. Despite some resentment about father's absence and the constant moving, she recalls her childhood as a happy time and has many fond memories of involvement with both parents and friends.

Discipline in the home was geared toward teaching integrity and responsibility. Once when father was stationed in France she ran away from home and then denied it when the French maid tried to tell her mother about it in broken English. The maid finally gave up trying to explain but: "I felt so bad and guilty. I kept waiting for someone to come and say 'you're lying,' but no one did. Finally I came to my mother and confessed I had lied. Mother's reaction was not anger but extreme disappointment. She had worked so hard to teach me about 'my word.'" Being a responsible agent was thus of paramount importance to mother.

Punishment was geared to maximize this sense of responsibility. When she had done something wrong she herself was asked to impose a suitable punishment. Once she

stayed out too late with a boy friend before the prom and she imposed the punishment of having to stay in her room for two weeks: "mother asked if I should be able to go to the prom. I said yes and they agreed it was O.K. But as it got closer I began to feel I shouldn't go and I didn't go. I cried about it but I knew I wasn't really punishing myself for breaking the rules." It is clear that a strong internalized conscience was developing through this process. Her self-imposed punishment might even have been somewhat more severe than her parents' actual expectations.

An important perception is her feeling that her parents cared a great deal about her welfare and that their rules reflected this caring: "We moved so often, they never had time to find out who they wanted us to associate with or where to go. They had to rely on knowing where we were. They didn't know where to start looking for us or when to start worrying about us. They were not rigid but they needed to know. They were very concerned about what happened to us." How different this form of parental concern is, in contrast to the unconcern of the parents of the twos and the overprotestiveness of the parents of the threes. Her parents communicated their concern for her welfare but also set up a structure in which she would be a responsible agent.

Her parents also communicate their respect and trust through such arrangements: "They were also stressing 'we trust you to be where you say you'll be.'"

Her basic attitude toward her parents is one of acceptance and good will, but she does betray a tinge of resentment about her strict upbringing, a tinge she is guilty about. She was not allowed to challenge mother's authority directly; "I'm your mother and you should do it because I say so." Thus any disagreement would have to be expressed less directly. In part this was expressed through erratic performance in school. As she reports it, she did well most of the time but always "goofed off" one semester. Her parents had a single-minded attitude about doing well in school and were opposed to other frivolous activities. In high school she recalls doing poorly in physics because she was involved in a school play: "They told me if I had other things to do other than schoolwork I couldn't do it. Just school and church. This threat of restriction carried through my four years of high school. . . . Almost every year I wouldn't be putting effort to get grades one period." Her parents believed in work rather than play, in control of impulse rather than expression, a theme in keeping with her emphasis on order, organization, and control. Her mode of protest was to let them down: "Once after a move I could see no reason for, I didn't work that semester. When the grades came out it showed. My parents were perceptive enough to see why I hadn't worked."

For the most part, however, she feels good about the way her parents raised her, even though at the time things angered her: "They tended to ask me what punishment

I thought appropriate. I sometimes felt angry at them for making me make a decision about my own restriction. In doing that I had to make a decision about whether I deserved punishment . . . I started recognizing my own problem areas and had to start taking responsibility for my own issues."

Being on her best behavior was not only motivated by a need to be a responsible moral agent, however. Being a serviceman's child also had a significant influence: "I grew up with the distinction of being called an army brat. We were the oddities and I used to feel I was being singled out, that people were looking at me expecting bad behavior, vulgar language. They were judging me by applying a label rather than looking at my behavior."

In her recollections mother surfaces as a pillar of honesty--a woman true to her word. Once a neighbor woman was having an affair. The mother, babysitting for the neighbor's children, refused to lie for her, if her husband should come home. When in fact the husband did return home, she told him the truth.

Moral integrity is particularly important to her as reflected in her view of her parents, and her image of a person with integrity sheds light on how that concept developed for her. She described her brother-in-law, who is honest and

> tells the truth as he sees it. If he promises something, he delivers on it. He doesn't compromise his principles and believes there is a right and wrong in most things. . . . At the same time he believes those who disagree feel strongly on their side. He had arguments with my husband about the war but never

> attacked my husband's sincerity. For such an emotional topic he was able to discuss it objectively. Sometimes he makes me angry because he's too sure in his own mind what's right and wrong. I don't know if I enjoy that sureness.

This form of integrity is based upon standing up for beliefs and thus maintaining personal integrity but also there is respect for others and a sense of their integrity. "He argues all the time but always leaves learning something. I've never seen him put anybody down."

Again the control of impulse enters in--being objective, not arguing ad hominem, etc. Here such control is in the service of respect for people. This is an important facet of her personality. Impulse is controlled not only because of superego pressure. Rather, respect for others has become a value in its own right and angry impulses are controlled because others' feelings are valued highly. This is a reflection of mutual object relations based on respect and non-conflicted empathic concern for others.

As noted above, there is a theme of caretaking, of being concerned for others, imbedded in her concept of responsibility. Even as a child this was clear. One of her heroines was Sherry Ames, student nurse, who was constantly helping others; "and was always getting involved with other people." Similarly she respects her parents for: "always being involved in community affairs and with young people." When asked why she thought she came to value helping others she thought immediately of her responsibility for much of the care of her younger brother and sister. In part because

of the way this responsibility was presented, she felt it to be mostly an honor rather than a burden: "I liked being considered responsible enough to do it."

In general she was treated like a responsible, trustworthy person, and taking responsibility helped her feel actively in control of her environment. She remains fearful about loss of control: "I remember my first pregnancy. I was not well and my husband made all the decisions because I was being irrational. I didn't like this period of my life because it left me feeling I didn't have much control. I like to have a say in what happens." Being responsible for others is a way for her to feel that she can act on the world in an effective way. If others are taking care of her, then she feels helpless and vulnerable. Hence to be responsible was to minimize anxiety about control issues. In addition, she obtained a great deal of support and reinforcement from her parents for being responsible and in control of herself.

A sense of order and control is also provided to her by religion. Both she and her parents are religious and she and her husband have a formal church membership. She explained that given their transient life her parents: "tried to look for consistencies for us and the Church was an important one."

Although she respects her parents and has accepted most of their decisions on her behalf there were times that she felt her parents' concern for her bordered upon

coerciveness. When she expressed an interest in social work, they threatened to withdraw financial aid. She asserted herself and prevailed however. Now she is able to see the situation with understanding and empathy for them:

> I felt they were going back on something they taught me--"make up your own mind." Now that I'm beyond that stage I see other things. They don't understand community organization and they also have traditional views of what a wife and mother should be. However, she still sees something praiseworthy in their attitude: "When I said 'you're trying to dictate to me' they stepped back and said that wasn't what they were trying to do."

Here one gets a sense both that her parents were responsive to what she said to them (they backed off) and also that she does seem to need to protect their image. Criticizing her parents is clearly traumatic.

Saying "no" to parents seen as loving can represent the possibility of giving up a safe, protected role in the family. To persevere in her career objectives, Mrs. G needed to have a firm sense of evolving ego identity based on a faith in her own abilities and a certainty about her goals. In her development, Mrs. G seems to have incorporated and expanded upon principles her parents exemplified (being true to oneself and responsible for one's decisions) and stuck to them even when there was parental opposition. Tests such as these are indicative of whether a person has been able to make principles "their own" in terms of actively making difficult decisions. Indeed it appears that Mrs. G is less rigid about her principles than her parents, who at times seem almost "too" honest, etc.

Mrs. G's attitudes about authority reflect her more

abstract views on the reciprocal relationship between rights and responsibilities. While she rejects blind rebellion against authority and attempts to change "the system" legally, Mrs. G is committed firmly to achieving change in the social system, in areas where she feels that existing conditions are unacceptable. For instance: "When my husband was in Viet Nam I worked for welfare; getting people together to change the system from working within it. I also helped organize a skills cooperative. I looked for ways I could change the system from working within it."

Mrs. G's early memories reflect the richness of her early experiences and the complex representations she has of primary objects. Father, in her memories, is a man to be depended upon--a stable, reliable "rock." In one memory, she is three and screaming because she is on a swing and a poisonous snake is underneath: "I remember father being so calm. He told me to stop screaming and stay put so they could decide what to do. I felt terror, and a sense of impatience. . . . I was impatient with everyone standing around. I know I expected father to solve the problem."

The sense of parentally sanctioned responsibility also appears in her memories. Significant is their trust in her and her resulting pride:

> I remember the day they brought my brother home from the hospital. . . . They put the baby in my arms and said "this is your brother and you have to take care of him." I remember my sister at my side looking and my telling her not to put her fingers in his eyes. I was taking responsibility already. . . . It was a baby we hadn't expected. It was kind of a thrill. The

> responsibility was a pleasant feeling. It was the first time I was told I had to help. I felt very grownup and trusted.

Mother is recalled as being quite empathic and as treating her with great love and respect. In one memory, she had a fragile doll which mother kept for her away from little sister, who was too young to play with it carefully:

> I remember asking mother to get the doll down so I could play with it. I trusted mother to take care of the doll. I was concerned about sister getting near the doll. I was very excited that mother let me stay in her bedroom to play with the doll. I remember her treating the doll as if it were a real person and treating my concern for the doll as being worthy of some consideration, (as if to say) "of course you're concerned; sister won't get the doll."

Mother surfaces in these memories as a warm, loving, and just person with a real sensitivity to her needs.

Father is recalled as taking care of her, but also as being proud of her:

> I remember once he took me fishing when I was three. I hooked a sandshark and wanted to get it into the boat. I remember it pulled me so that all that was left in the boat were my feet. He grabbed on to me and yelled at me to let go, but he also complimented me--"that's a very nice big sandshark. I don't know what we'll do with it, but it's nice." I was excited and very proud of the sandshark. I was a little upset because he wouldn't put the fish in the boat but I was pleased and felt I was a big girl. He wasn't angry but concerned and worried about me. He was afraid he couldn't grab me in time.

As in the other memory of father, there is a hint of consternation at him, but this is balanced by warm feelings. In general these memories are vivid, fresh, and pulsing with life. There is intense interaction with father, who is seen to express a full range of complex affective states. There is a balance of positive and negative

feelings and things are never oversimplified. This is a reflection of mature object relatedness.

Another memory of father is important in that it represents a range of feelings she had at various times about his long absences:

> Father had contracted malaria in World War II. He then went out hunting and they brought him home shivering and delirious. I couldn't recognize him. Mother had neighbors stay with us while she went with him to the hospital. I was afraid he'd never come back. I was also irritated that he could scare us so badly. Daddies shouldn't get sick. They should always be healthy and capable. They are the ones in charge. But he didn't know us and it was very frightening. What did this mean for the rest of our lives?

First of all she is concerned about his welfare. This man matters to her a great deal. In part he is supposed to be strong and take care of her and be in charge. But also he is supposed to be there for her, and not away in a hospital. She undoubtedly feared for his safety while he was away in the Army as well as being frightened that he might not return or that he wouldn't know them. Implicitly a fear of abandonment (being left at the neighbor's) is communicated as well as a sense of slight irritation. She didn't want her daddy to go away, or be less than invincible. In part because of the quality of their relationship when he <u>was</u> there (close, warm) and partly because of her fear of being angry at her parents, the anger is underplayed and minimal. But there is a level of conflict over her anger, as noted above. Her focus on "change" can be seen as an expression of this discontent. Indeed it was "the system" which forced her daddy to be away. She places

the blame on the system rather than on him, a safer alternative in terms of the management of her anger.

Another revelatory memory is of her father at his father's funeral. She felt very badly, mostly because her father cried. She never saw that before; "I felt very badly for him and stunned that he could cry. I didn't picture that as possible. I didn't listen to the sermon or eulogy. I was only looking at father trying to make him feel better." She needs father to be strong, but there is also great empathy for father. She is taking care of him in this memory.

While Mrs. G is generally positive about her upbringing, she did feel that her parents were a bit too strict. Indeed it seems that she is saddled with an overscrupulousness about rules and a lack of spontaneity and tolerance for impulse expression. She has to be grownup at all times and this means stifling other legitimate parts of self. She talked about feeling military life to be authoritarian and rigid, for example, about dress codes. But when her husband was in service she saw the relaxation of these rules and didn't like the results: "When we were in Georgia the dress code had been eliminated. The wives were wearing jeans and cutoffs and they looked horrible. In fact when I'm in jeans I feel a little uncomfortable." Indeed it appears she never felt comfortable being a "kid."

In her experience, however, authority has been seen as just and flexible. Once she recalls discussing some

"silly" army regulations with father, who took her to the provost martial for an explanation. She recalls he detailed the reasons for the rules: "The valid reasons were strong enough for me to accept it." Another time she opposed a rule that children couldn't use the commissary because once mother was sick and she couldn't get the groceries she needed; "Dad wrote a letter to the Department of the Army and on that basis they changed the rule." Another instance of the system being responsive to reasonable dissent was when father was stationed in the South. Her brother had serious allergies and mother argued that he should be allowed another assignment so his family could come with him. The Army responded to this request and sent him elsewhere. She learned that bureaucracies can be reasonable and that a responsible means of approaching change can lead to change.

Situations such as these led her to admire and respect her father's integrity and via identification to make this a core aspect of her identity. Her image of father is a well-rounded one, however. He is not idealized but is clearly admired. Most important to her is his integrity--he is his own man. He is well known in the community and is on city council, but he ran against the "organization" candidate and won easily. Thus he is independent and not responsible to the big organization. She admires his independent and sometimes unpopular stands on council. Standing up for what is right is of crucial importance to him and to her and gives a sense of integrity and self-esteem.

She sees herself as a minority of one in her community organization program where she is constantly arguing for seeking change within existing rules.

Father's honesty is unimpeachable. In his business (small, independent) he does the best workmanship possible and stands behind it. She also admires the amount of time he puts in with youth. He's active in boy scouts and the Church Youth Group. He is a man who devotes himself to others as well as to his needs and is a good model for her of a moral person. And she is able to empathize with him. She sees that he enjoys the recognition he gets. Everyone knows and likes him: "This is very important to him after so many years in the military. It's nice to be recognized when you walk in a store." The costs of his strict moral stance are apparent to her also: "If the shop is full he worries. If it's empty he worries. He doesn't really relax. He has ulcers. It's a depression era mentality." Father is bottled up and can't express feelings easily and, it is implied, is at times stifled by his strong sense of responsibility.

Mother is seen as reserved, and slow to meet people, unlike father who is quite gregarious. She now works, but she didn't work until the children were on their own because she felt the kids needed her influence in the home. Implied is a sense of mother having a strong, accurate sense of what the children needed and deferring her own needs until later. But again mother is not playing the martyr. She also seems

to give legitimate place to both her needs and the needs of others. Mother is totally honest, like father, and is perseverent but: "not the worrier my father is." She also is quite attentive to her husband's needs: "Sometimes dad makes bad decisions in business but she accepts the blame for these things." Father is at times unrealistic in business but can't admit it so mother takes the pressure off him. She is not as trusting as father and: "checks on a person's reasons first before taking what people do at face value. She's also a check on dad's impulsiveness." She appears to be a solid, supportive, empathic mate. She too is active with youth--in church and 4-H groups. She attempts to understand mother from mother's perspective. Mother did not adapt well to their transient life, in Mrs. G's view: "She would have been happy to remain in the same town." But mother does not hold this up to father in times of conflict. At some point one begins to wonder whether her glowing portrait of her parents is not a bit forced and reaction-formed. We know that she has difficulty criticizing them.

But Mrs. G has a balanced view of mother also: "She was very happy being a mother but lived for what her children did. She was very unhappy when the children moved out." As we know, she also tried to hold on to the children somewhat. Mother is also seen as: "very rigid about her beliefs. It's wrong to drink, so the church should use grape juice for sacraments. She offers my husband a drink

because she knows he likes it but she still won't offer me a drink and is uncomfortable if my husband does have a drink." In the realm of affect, mother gets emotional over the "little things" but over big things is logical. She sees herself as sharing this trait. Again there is a sense that the rigidity of this value structure interferes somewhat with expression of affect. But Mrs. G also senses that mother is becoming less rigid now, about new life-styles, etc. She sees that her parents have grown in their relationship, and are more open about feelings now than before. Both mother and father surface as growing, vital people, who live full lives. Mrs. G considers them friends now: "I'm always proud to introduce them to my friends. They are 'good people,' always attentive to what is going on, and comfortable with a wide variety of people."

It seems that she has been able to separate from her parents and evolve an autonomous identity which has retained valuable aspects of parental values and personality. Her friendly relations with parents also suggest relatively successful autonomous adaptation. Her need to maintain control, to be in charge, etc., <u>do</u> seem to interfere with experiencing other affective states such as dependence, etc.

Mrs. G's own identity reflects integration and a constant sense of growth and change. She sees her life as a process of alteration: "I was outgoing and gregarious as a child but a little self-righteous--'my way is right.'

It took me a long time to see alternative viewpoints as acceptable. I always got along with adults and made a good impression on them. I was a little patronizing to younger kids--'I'll take care of you.' But this was not always appreciated. Honesty was something I had a hard time learning but I finally internalized it. (Why?) I don't know if I was testing my parents or rebelling. So many things did change that maybe I was testing to see what stayed the same."

Her self-image is a complex balanced one:

> I'm very concerned for the individual person rather than the mass of people. Each person I deal with has a degree of importance to me and I feel a deep sense of responsibility for others. But I tend to assume responsibility for others that they may not want me to assume. . . . I'm also not as self-assured as I'd like other people to believe. I like to present a very cool, objective approach to the world. I also tend to spend a lot of time thinking about decisions before I make them. I'm not good at fast decision-making. I'm very self-analytical and tend to be self-critical. I work to present the appearance that I'm sure about what I'm doing. I don't believe in manipulating people but I can do that, so I have to watch that. I sometimes lead people to believe that what I want done is what they want to do.

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, Mrs. G's morality is based on being responsible for her own behavior, standing up for what she believes in, and being responsive to the needs of others. These principles are strongly internalized and lead to a sense of integrity and self-worth when followed. There are some signs that punitive superego standards still influence her moral behavior in that she continues to be somewhat

rigid and self-critical. It appears however that she is moving toward increased superego autonomy at present. She has strongly positive identificatory links with both parents and has been able to supplement them with new identifications such that identity development is proceeding continually. She has continued since childhood to need to exert order and control over her life, perhaps in part because of her experiences of moving constantly due to father's job. To exert control, she has become a totally self-governing individual who also seeks to care for others and in that way maintain control over her life and perhaps deny any neediness or dependence. The need for order and control is also reflected in her belief in an orderly government by law, and her involvement in Church. Internally, her psychic life is dedicated to impulse control to the extent that she lacks spontaneity and betrays a certain rigidity and stubbornness. However, she has a great deal of insight about herself and <u>seems</u> to be in the process of moving toward a greater inner freedom. She is also dedicated to change on a societal level, and seems to believe that change can occur within the system because that has been her experience, especially in relation to her father and the army. She is strongly identified with both parents, especially father, as moral agents, but is able to take a clear look at their failings. She has some difficulty feeling angry with them or criticizing them however and tends to idealize them. In her relationships with others

she appears to interact with mutuality and empathy. She values others' needs along with her own and holds complex, affectively toned perceptions of others as multifaceted, unique, "live" entities.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mrs. G describes her parents as being scrupulously honest, upstandingly "moral" individuals who take responsibility for their actions and taught her to do the same. She sees them as a bit rigid and unyielding over principles however (e.g., mother thinks that grape juice should be used in place of wine in church rituals). She also communicates the sense of having been loved and respected by her parents and she recalls her childhood in warm, loving terms. Interactions with her parents led to the expression of a wide range of affective states. On their part, however, it seems that they wanted her always to be a tidy, controlled responsible "adult." Being a child--i.e., untidy, mischievous, uncontrolled, spontoneous, etc., was not tolerated, or so it seems from her recollections. Moreover she was not allowed to challenge maternal authority and father always showed her a "good" reason for his rules, which has resulted in a stance toward authority that might be seen as somewhat oversocialized. It also appears that she was angry and frightened about father's absences from home and has been unable to deal with these feelings entirely.

This type of family history has led to the development of a morality steeped in positive identifications with

loving superego elements of her parents as well as a dedication to standing up for what she believes to be right. Her moral vision of control via duly constituted authority betrays anxiety over lack of structure and fear of the open expression of impulse. She has not been able to angrily rebel against her parents openly and seems to fear and wishes to control open rebelliousness in others. She also tends to establish relationships with others that are maternal and subtly controlling, which in the moral realm suggests that some of her "empathy" for others functions to put her in an "adult" controlling position. Despite these areas of conflict, which have left her with a somewhat inflexible, oversocialized compulsive character structure, Mrs. G's morality seems grounded primarily in healthy interpersonal relationships in her family. Hence her dedication to helping others and to standing up for her own rights appear to be relatively conflict-free in comparison with other subjects in this sample.

B. Mr. H--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 431

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story 1 Mr. H argues in favor of open-housing laws: "There are probably a lot of people who would be influenced by such a law. Since the law is consistent with constitutional considerations, the State did the right thing to pass the law. It will probably go a long way toward solution of the problem. "This response was scored on Kohlberg dimension A as stage 4 reasoning.

In the same story he argues that Mrs. W

> . . . has the right to make certain kinds of discriminations about who lives in her rooming house. However, I think these should be consistent with boarders' constitutional rights. In the case of Mr. Jones I don't think she should exclude him on the basis of race, whether it be direct, indirect, rationalized, or whatever.

This response was scored as level four on Kohlberg's I dimension.

In story 2 he argues that the principal is wrong, because "Fred has the right of freedom of the press. The principal, in ordering him to stop, is attempting to deny him this right. I think he is wrong to do this. The problem that this poses for the principal is one he will have to live with." This response was scored as level four reasoning on Kohlberg's E dimension.

In story 4, Mr. H argues that stealing is wrong because it ". . . violates general rules of an orderly society that does justice to its individuals by others." This was scored on Kohlberg's I dimension as stage 4 reasoning.

In story 5 he believes that the social worker should report the cheating even if the student is from a poor family: "Social worker has numerous obligations to rules, including example, fairness to all eligible students. Social worker can empathize with this difficulty but should work with it in other ways that are appropriate." This was scored as level 4 reasoning on Kohlberg's F dimension.

2. Moral Orientation

Mr. H approaches moral dilemmas by focussing on

what he sees to be the basic underlying moral issue involved. His emphasis is upon rejecting tempting expedient solutions and behaving in a manner consistent with moral principles. In story one, for instance, he argues: "It's important for her (Mrs. W) to be aware of the larger issues so with that information she can decide how she can deal with the small dilemma. When you don't think about the larger issues that perpetuates the damage. Otherwise it's easy to rationalize them away and this just makes the problem worse." He disapproves of expediency because he sees that it leads to harming someone: "One guy comes out ahead at the expense of someone else. Someone has to get hurt for that system to work."

Often he justifies his principles on legal grounds. In story one, again, he argues against discrimination as follows:

> 'Constitutional rights is a good justification. We have to have rules to live by to solve conflicts.' The organizing and controlling functions of law appeal to him: 'The law is the procedural part of the matter. We have to have a way of pursuing and operationalizing. That's where the law comes in. It's a way of communicating that resolves certain kinds of conflicts.'

His ultimate allegiance, however, is not to rules but to internalized, consistent principles: "It's the individual's obligation to be consistent and follow his own conscience toward what's good for mankind." Indeed his devotion to principle is strong enough that he would sacrifice himself rather than betray a principle: "In a conflict, if someone has to be sacrificed--why not me?"

It seems clear that for him law and internalized principle function to maintain order and safety in a potentially chaotic world. He is particularly concerned about physical harm. In story two, for instance, he argues that without law and free speech: ". . . people's existence would be threatened. People would be killed. Certain classes or races would be eliminated."

In his view, authorities have a great deal of responsibility for safeguarding the rights and lives of others and are servants of the law rather than its architects: Again, in story two: "The principal is in the position of interpreting the law, of negociating people's rights and options, not dictating them. He has to follow the framework set up by law. He doesn't write the law." All individuals, including those in authority, thus are seen to have interrelated series of rights and responsibilities.

In his view, human action ideally is dominated by a sense of fair play which insures equitable treatment for all:

> Everybody is faced with taking options that are immediately satisfying and good for the moment. These options are hard to resist because they are set up to play into people's narcissistic thinking. But if you take these options all the time you grow into a person where the whole issue of fair play doesn't put any guiding light. You learn to compromise yourself and become insensitive to where others are at and what others' needs are.

In actual moral dilemmas in his life, he has struggled with these same issues. For instance, he was opposed to the war in Viet Nam and had several legal means of

avoiding the draft:

> But if I got the deferment some other bastard was going to get it in my place, probably some black guy from a ghetto . . . I was having a hard time justifying making myself an exception to the rule. I would be putting myself outside the realm of peers and colleagues. I think I felt a need to act in a way I'd expect other people to act, given the options they have.

He refused his legal deferments and went to his draft board and calmly explained his objections to the draft. They counselled him to take his deferments and he refused.

His reasoning about this issue is instructive, for his basic opposition to the war was based on a strong emotional reaction dating back many years:

> What if I went into service? I might have to kill. I knew I wouldn't be able to do that. (Why?) I can remember as a kid developing an attitude about hunting and fishing. I don't like to see animals suffer and killed. As a kid I went hunting with my grandfather. It used to make me sick. It was senseless: animals would suffer.

Upon the foundation of this emotional reaction, his legalistic arguments against the war were built:

> I decided I wasn't going to have anything to do with it. I wasn't going to go in the army or try for deferments, not showing up for induction. The point I was trying to make was that the draft is illegal. I see a conflict in the law--over constitutional rights versus the right to raise an army. Also international law-Nuremburg. I had read these things and it fit my thinking, but I saw it as a legal issue after I made the decision.

Hence the legal justification for his anti-war position was constructed to make rational a more basic, emotional reaction. This is not to say that his legal argument is "mere" rationalization but only that for him legal constructs are employed <u>on top of</u> emotional concerns. It seems that he feels on safer ground under the friendly control of legal

sanctions than under the sway of strong emotional reactions rooted in his past.

Whatever his reasons, however, he took a principled stand and won in the end. The draft board did not draft him, even when he refused to carry his draft card. He recalled the situation with a feeling of pride: "I felt good about carrying through." But it does not seem that his action was motivated by a wish to feel good about himself. On the contrary, he feels a strong <u>obligation</u> to act in such a manner:

> If you do something for expediency to stay on the good side you lose in the long run. If a person proposes something to me that's bad but if I do it for expedience, he "runs a test" and is allowed to get away with it and will repeat it on a larger scale. If it's a bad idea <u>you</u> should stop it. It will be even harder for the next guy.

This sense of obligation exerts strong pressure on him in the form of guilt if he does not act in accord with his principles. For example he described circumstances at work where administrative decisions were rendered and the affected people were given no explanation: "They were trying to pressure a guy out of the organization. It was a matter of non-action on my part. People would leave with very bad feelings. It left them with feelings of inadequacy about their own abilities. I knew that wasn't the case with this guy but didn't get a chance to say anything to him."

Indeed his ideals require a type of sainthood which is reflected in his description of a person whose integrity

he admires:

> He sees everybody as a really good person, as an intelligent put-together person who has the ability to give life direction and do good in the world. He sees the other person's case. He puts up a good fight to change things but does so by being able to assess where the other person is at so he can communicate with him. . . . He's a pacifist in every sense of the word. That's something you have to achieve. . . . He started out from poverty and lack of education and used his life situation, used the assets for positive change.

Striving for moral perfection through continued growth is a basic guiding ideal. Again, the chief sins he sees are narcissism, hostility and aggressiveness, which is reflected in his portrait of a person he does not respect: "He's a very political animal who uses his own knowledge of organizations to better himself. He uses other people a great deal and when his own power is threatened he will go to any length to do others in. He scars people for life." There is compassion in this portrait however: "He's quite narrowminded and quite unhappy. It's hard for him to feel good in himself. He compromises himself and never takes a stand."

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mr. H is the youngest of three boys. His father is a successful engineer, and his mother a housewife. He describes a feeling of closeness and love in his family and a great deal of respect for the integrity of both his parents. He sees them both as being uncompromising and even a bit rigid in their demands that he be responsible but feels that they were also capable of being flexible and admitting their errors.

He felt that there was a great deal of structure in his family life: "Consistency was always important to me. My father was a relatively rigid disciplinarian. What was good and bad was clear-cut and this eliminated the need for much strict discipline but it was there if needed." As he got older, he felt that discipline was oriented increasingly toward educating him about the consequences of his actions in an atmosphere of open discussion: "The older I got the more it (discipline) became straightforwardly impressing me with the consequences not only for me but for other people. This created discussion and he would make an argument to me about what I'd done. That came from me asking questions too. I didn't get "I'm older and wiser stuff from my parents." He felt that while the rules were fairly rigid, there was always room for compromise: "A couple of times I really came on with an argument. I felt they were being unfair and they changed their minds."

Hence discipline became an interaction conducive to learning and growing which led to mutual respect. The demands were clear and difficult to fulfill however. Great emphasis was placed on responsibility. He had chores, etc., from an early age. Their philosophy was: "Do work, then get privileges-accept responsibility. If you shirked responsibility you were letting other people down." He felt that this emphasis on responsibility was conducive to self-respect and growth: "They didn't hand me things and didn't do things for me. They didn't solve my problems or advocate

for me. It was just as well I did that for myself."

It is clear that Mr. H has great admiration and respect for his father and has identified with many of father's traits. Indeed father refused to fight in World War II: "He's sensitive to issues of violence and feelings about how to deal with people and how to get things accomplished." He feels he has been influenced greatly by father: "The thing that impressed me is that he's the kind of person that doesn't get terribly involved in situations unless he gets involved in a way that allows him to be a very integral part of that situation. If he does something, he doesn't back out. I'm sure this is instilled in me. If you feel some way, don't walk away from a good fight."

In his early memories, father is viewed as a kindly protector who provides a sense of safety in frightening situations: "My parents took us to a rodeo and we were sitting out on the grass and some animal escaped. One of the bulls was running over people, running through the crowd. I remember clearly being swept away by my father--being carried off--and he put me behind something or on top of something. It was a secure kind of feeling." Father's presence seems powerful and almost magical in this memory. He also recalls being on a camping trip, sleeping in a tent during a downpour:

> We were being drowned by this torrential rain and everything was terrible and rotten. But my father kept cracking jokes one right after another and we were all laughing. It's a warm sort of feeling. I remember

feeling relaxed and a mixed feeling of being insecure about being away from home but a positive feeling about his being there.

Mr. H's portrait of his father is complex and emotionally involved:

> He's a rather materialistic person. He was affected very much by the depression and lived through a lot of poverty. What is a sense of accomplishment to him is accomplishment in terms of his work. He started with nothing and has gotten everything he's gone after. . . . He was a very success-oriented person who accomplished things very early in his life. He gives off this sense of self-confidence--is steady and secure. He knows where he's at and won't debate that issue with anybody. I've tried to provoke him but he's not interested in debating an issue beyond a certain point where a common ground has been identified. He'll point out the common ground and has no interest in trying to change your mind. I think that's pretty cool! He's very soft-spoken and a loner, sort of. He doesn't get into a lot of things with groups and spends his free time in very individual things although he's very willing to share those things. He's an emotional person, although others don't see this. . . . We've had a very strong relationship and very productive--but it's unspoken. I enjoy being around him and he with me. . . . There's a feeling of happiness to spend time with my father.

The portrait of mother is similarly full and well-differentiated. Yet while his involvement with mother is apparent, it is clear that the relationship with father is more intense:

> Mother was born and raised on a farm--a down-home country girl who spent a good deal of her life rebelling against the situation at home. The way she dealt with leaving her family was to leave them--a real psychological separation which was hard for her. She fought it. She's kind of a self-sacrificing person in terms of her family. She sees herself extending herself beyond the limit for her family-staying home with kids, etc. She's a very involved person even after the kids were away from home. She was always doing things in the community. . . . She was always around and there for all my organized activities. I think she sees herself as an unfulfilled person who would have liked to have done more. . . . She had an ambition to become a nurse and could have if she wanted to. The separation of the

> kids from the family was very hard for her and hard for us. . . . Now we'll talk about things like issues--the things I'm doing or she's doing, political ramifications. . . . This was an enjoyable thing. I view it as very warm.

In his early memories, mother is portrayed as loving and empathic. He recalls at three her leaving for three weeks to take care of a dying aunt:

> When she left, I remember being very upset about that. I didn't cry. I understood why she was leaving and where she was going. It was just the feeling of missing her. I can remember her explaining it: "You know this has to happen and I don't like it." When she came home I can remember she reacted very emotionally, especially to me. . . .

Mother's support and love are reflected in another memory: "When I went to school the first time I recall it as being a rather pleasurable event. I was talking to my mother about it prior to the time. I remember her telling me things I was going to be doing. I can remember her saying how well-prepared she thought I was to go to school--all the things I could do."

Despite perceiving himself as having two supportive, protective, loving parents, a fear of violence is represented in his early memories paralleling his fear of aggression in the moral realm. In his earliest memory, he is visiting his grandfather's house and is very upset and insists on going home because grandfather was shooting birds. He was afraid of the noise and also recalled a basic upsetting feeling: "Grandfather was a rather unthinking type person--very concrete. He proceeds through life on a simplistic level (with) no awareness of what happens around

him. I have the feeling he was expounding on birds being miserable and useless and have to be done away with." In another memory, one of his brothers accidently hit the other on the head with a ball bat: "It cut his face and I was afraid he was really hurt and I can remember my mother taking care of him and taking him off to the doctor." He has no memory of being hurt himself and sees his aversion to suffering based on a basic inability to cope with it. He stated that one of his moral aims was:

> . . . stopping and not allowing to go on--suffering--the hurting of people--physical or emotional. . . . I feel a strong sympathetic feeling for whatever is suffering. Also a strong reaction of anger to the thing that is causing the suffering. (Why do you think you feel this way?) I was raised in a way that was very sensitive to people suffering. I was also raised in a way very isolated from suffering. I can't say I was exposed to it. I never really learned to cope with it--I don't have the defenses.

It seems likely that his fear of destructiveness is itself in part a defense against his own anger. This concern over control of his own hostility is suggested in the following remarks about the expression of anger:

> I've always buried it, internalized it (internalized?). There are times I get angry at myself instead of someone else. I internalize my feelings about someone else until I have a recognizable discomfort. In the last five years I've displaced it, then I get uncomfortable about it. I was not taught to deal with anger appropriately. I was told by my mother it was not nice to be mad. . . . I was not to have angry feelings so I buried them.

Indeed it seems plausible that much of the structure he sought in his emotional life served the partial function of controlling his impulses, much as he views legal structures as a means of controlling anti-social

behavior. Such dynamics are reflected in early career aspirations. He wanted to be an engineer (like his nonviolent father) to: "build structures of a more romantic nature." He also wanted to be a dentist: "It's prestigious . . . and you have to be extremely compulsive. I always saw myself as a perfectionist in that sense." He also wanted to be a minister: "a person who really deals with people--helping people." The avoidance of active self-assertion is seen by him as a basic character style:

> I come across different than I am. If I really want to get myself across it's a struggle. . . . There is an inadequacy in communicating to people that I have a sense of direction. . . . I don't play as active a role as I could. (Why?) Probably to avoid conflict. I can be overwhelmed by somebody asserting themselves. If I'm involved in conflict, I'm anxious. I manipulate others to avoid conflicts.

As a child he recalls being fearful of direct action: "I was also a very cautious person--thinking about how reckless people seemed to be . . . I always thought (and worried) about proceeding without enough forethought. I was someone who knew what was coming next and getting a sense of security out of that." He also recalls being a team player and taking a back seat to others' desires in team sport even though he was skilled. There is also a sense that he felt a certain superiority in his role. He was small but never self-conscious about it: "I think I felt rather good about being small. I'd think 'this is something I can do and bigger people can't.'" He also assigned other players to positions:

> I remember taking the back seat for the sake of tranquility. If another person felt better about where he wanted to play then he'd do better. I assessed where others were at with their skills. I remember emerging out of this pattern as very much a leader. But I would get a little insecure and had to be a little "off-center" to assess what was going on.

This concern over self-assertion seems not to have interfered markedly in the development of his identity, however. His positive feelings about and identifications with his parents did not prohibit him from synthesizing past and present relationships into a new viable social role. His decision to enter social work represents the integration of early identifications with later relationships and feelings. He started out in Natural Science, with his father's full support. His interest in the ministry, in part spurred on by mother, revolved toward an interest in interacting with people and toward political issues. From there he feels he was influenced by friends in school to investigate social sciences. He sees his decision to enter social work as a means of obtaining gratification by helping others toward growth and thereby growing himself: "I like the direct dealings you have with people on a one-to-one basis along with the idea of being a professional in a situation where I have skills and resources to help people that need that kind of thing . . . I see helping people as people moving through the same process that I went through myself in terms of an expanding of my own resources for dealing with the world and dealing with other people. Helping people go through this process makes them more fulfilled, more

flexible, and have more resources."

4. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mr. H describes his parents as fair, loving, highly principled and as perhaps a bit rigid in the realm of rules. He feels that they were a bit over-controlling in the affect realm but generally approves of their mode of dealing with him and recalls his childhood as a happy, warm period of his life. It appears that his father in particular practiced a form of inductive disciplining (Hoffman, 1970) that focussed on helping him see the consequences of his actions and take responsibility for himself. He seems to have identified strongly with his father's passifistic position vis-a-vis aggression and is a bit frightened by and preoccupied with fantasies of physical injury, which may represent the remnants of early castration fears not entirely worked out. Mother surfaces as a loving devoted woman who tended to martyr herself to others and not actualize her potential to the extent she might have. It appears that he has identified both with the loving and self-abnegating aspects of mother's personality.

His moral code appears to be based on good object relations in the family and generally appears to be relatively conflict-free, although to be sure his dislike for violence, inclination to martyr himself, idealized view of his parents, etc., all suggest over-socialization and consequent fear of self-assertiveness. Indeed his decidedly compulsive, cautious, "uptight" character structure can be

seen as a consequence of this over-socialization at the hands of his parents.

C. Miss I--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 430

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story 1 Miss I argues that the State has a right to pass open-housing laws: "All citizens' rights--all citizens and all rights-trust be protected by (unfortunately) some formal, organized power structure."

This was scored as stage 4 reasoning (shading into stage 5) on Kohlberg's A dimension.

In story 2 she argues that Fred should be allowed to publish his dissenting opinions: "An individual, even if not of voting age, shares the same rights (including and probably especially first amendment) as a "full participant in society." This was scored as level four reasoning on Kohlberg's E dimension.

In story 6 she argues that the social worker should report the cheating:

> Getting the guilt exercised doesn't preclude the fact that the student may not be the brightest/neediest (since her test results are invalid). . . . The cheating must be reported--and a new and rather ad hoc method of choosing the recipient established. What I would like to see is a new test--and the student-cheater retake it along with everyone else.

This response was scored as level four on Kohlberg's F dimension.

2. Moral Orientation

One aspect of Miss I's morality focusses upon a

belief in the inherent worth of individuals. In story one, for instance: "All human beings share the quality that they're human and on that basis discrimination is wrong." She views all people as sharing basic attributes: "Having known and met people, having been abroad, I've seen that people are not all that different, besides personal things. People share certain desires--happiness, peace, satisfaction, love." Discrimination is also injurious to the individual who practices it, for he is "lacking the opportunity to know someone whose friendship would be valuable." Discrimination is destructive also in that it: ". . . gives a false sense of self." Moreover, if Mrs. W in the story is not bigoted herself, then she violates her own values and sense of integrity by allowing her boarders to dictate her position.

However, in her view, many individuals do not respect the rights of others and do not value integrity sufficiently. More often, the strong prey upon the weak and in order to curb such strife, laws are needed: "Certain people are less powerful and less skillful in interpersonal dealings. Therefore, everyone's rights have to be protected by some collective things (laws)." The same theme is articulated in regard to stealing (story four): "It's depriving someone of what's theirs. It's getting back to a person's rights. Interpersonal relationships are political. There are innate inequalities between people. That's why the political and legal structure are needed."

Laws serve, therefore, as a means of control over exploitation. Indeed, the needs for organization, order and control underlie other general beliefs in her value system. For instance, in story two she justifies free speech as a means of insuring predictability: "There's general benefit to everyone if all opinions are expressed. Part of it is knowledge, predictability. If you know where someone is coming from, you can predict what they'll say or do."

And while she is adamant about the importance of exercising one's own rights and protecting those of others, she does not advocate using illegal methods of achieving such ends. On the contrary, her emphasis falls on exercising her rights more than attacking others who might deny rights. In story two, where the principal tells Fred to stop publishing, she would have him work within the law to exercise his right of expression rather than directly challenging the principal's repression. In part, her justification is prudential--she is no martyr: "I'm not a champion of causes. The issue between Fred and the principal is <u>expression</u> not <u>repression</u>." In regard to the authority, then, her position is to reject his stand but not directly challenge it.

This position is consistent with her belief in "playing by the rules." In story five, for instance, she disapproves of the needy student who cheated: "This person has exploited a situation. That person may not be the most qualified. People who played the game right did not

exploit others and are not at a fair advantage." In this context, it can be seen that "the rules" provide organization, deter exploitation, and are the basis for a sense of integrity.

In moral dilemmas in her own life, devotion to maintaining her own integrity in situations where such a stand might not be prudent surfaces as her basic moral inclination. For instance, she was once tutoring disadvantaged kids and was faced with the choice of staying on the job under morally intolerable conditions so as to get a needed recommendation for college; or quitting and feeling she stood up for her principles and fought an injustice. She felt the program director had misrepresented the tutorial program to the staff and kids. It was supposed to be unschool-like but actually took the form of kids and staff filling out endless forms and rating sheets that the director was using in his own academic research project. They tried to reason with him but he used "all available means" to quell the staff unrest, including using personal knowledge of their private lives against them. If she quit, however, she would not be playing by the rules and would be hurting her chances for good recommendation for school. It was a difficult decision, as reflected in her sense of being catapulted into a choice without a full sense of control over the decision process:

> I left. In my head I was thinking--I've never been fired before--I could have had a good recommendation, my parents were against my moral position. . . . Was I a leader? I was apparently. I found that frightening.

> People did look to me for guidance. I was acting not on my best interests but the best interests of the students.

Another conflict involving her integrity materialized around searching for an apartment. There were not many good rooms available, but she happened upon an ideal one, only to be told by the landlord that he didn't rent to Jews because they were pushy and obnoxious. There was a conflict for her: "In my mind I said 'keep your mouth shut, you can pass (as a non-Jew).'" But she was unable to do this for it would be compromising herself. She was indignant and told the man off: "It's shocking that someone hates you for one part of you. I was standing up for me (by not taking the apartment) against something <u>that</u> wrong. I'm not pushy and obnoxious and I pay my rent."

3. <u>Genesis of Moral Position</u>

Miss I is the oldest child of a district attorney and a housewife. She was always her father's favorite, in whose eyes she could do no wrong. She portrays family life as close, loving, but somewhat infantilizing. Outside the family she was assertive and came to value being "different." In college she involved herself with a clique of girls who were also "different." Despite her investment in being autonomous, she does not see herself breaking her continued dependence on her parents.

Discipline in her home centered around shaming her for misdeeds and communicating that she was being irresponsible. For instance she recalls taking some copper animals

in a supply store: "Mother caught me at it and made me put them back in front of the man. I was ashamed and guilty. My father is a district attorney who believes what is legal is right and they were disappointed that I didn't know it was wrong."

Her parents had clear expectations that she know what was "right" and follow through on it. If she did not, she felt a great deal of discomfort. In some instances she felt the expectations were excessive. For instance, she recalls her mother telling her the "facts of life" when she was nine or ten. She told one of her girl friends what mother had said, and this girl's mother complained to Miss I's mother: "I felt very confused and upset about being punished. Mother said it was not something to tell someone else. She presumed I knew something that I didn't in fact know. The assumption was 'you should know better.'"

If she displeased her father, he would often react by withdrawing: "When I was a freshman in college I was on a "truth" kick and so when mother asked me about smoking dope, I said yes. My father heard this and didn't talk to me for two weeks. I was very upset and tried to get back in his favor." Hence to misbehave was to court rejection, a potent threat because, as will be seen below, she felt father lavished praise and love on her most of the time and supported actively most things she did. She is able to empathize with her father's position in the "dope" incident however: "Father and I would have long discussions about

the judicial process. This (incident) created conflict in his mind. Not only that he thought it was wrong but he had to prosecute other peoples' kids for it." Despite the pressure from father, she was able to continue to do what she felt was right and appropriate, although this required a change in tactics. Since father indicated his feelings were hurt by her behavior, she found a way to protect his feelings: "I decided the "truth" kick was wrong and hurt them. If something didn't arise, then I didn't have to say anything."

It appears that her parents often made their feelings (of hurt, disappointment, etc.) a focal point in conflicts. She recalls shopping with mother when she was eight or nine. They were in a crowded store and mother tried to keep her close: "I didn't want to hold her hand but she grabbed at me. I told her to drop dead. She cried and didn't talk to me the rest of the day."

Despite these pressures she was able to develop ways of handling her parents--especially father. His standards were unyielding but she learned how to cope with his strictness: "Father always wanted to shield and protect me. . . . He was completely respected by everybody--a moral, righteous individual but I soon learned he was the biggest pushover in the world."

In large measure, however, she idolized her father as a moral man with a great deal of integrity. She is proud of him and has clearly internalized the structure if

not the content of his morality. Indeed her father was the person she chose as most representative of moral integrity:

> He is somewhat inflexible, which makes it hard for him and others. There are no exceptions or deals--he doesn't go with the flow. He's completely honest and gets satisfaction in knowing this. He's fair and doesn't consciously do anything wrong to anyone. He does what he thinks is right. . . . In his day he was quite the civil libertarian--on McCarthy's list. He's a self-made kind of person. He blockbusted in Massachusetts, when Jews were not allowed. I'm very much like him."

This identification is clear in her mind and has had a singular effect on the development of her identity: "I'm often considered very distant by gentlemen. I'm often inflexible, stubborn, and I won't give in. For a girl I'm thought too intelligent for my own good. I can be pushy and sometimes tactless." And like father she puts great stock in having principles. Indeed in describing someone without integrity, she emphasizes his lack of principles: "He was very 'into' the most expedient thing--maneuvering the system so that it's best for you--'what's good for me justifies everything.'" Father always played by the rules and she must also.

In general she felt a great sense of security in her family. She was valued and loved and she felt the family was close: "My parents are very private. There's not much hugging, kissing or 'honey-dearing.' But you could obviously tell they liked each other. And both enjoyed my brother and I extremely." She does feel that her parents were unable to empathize with some problems she did have, however. In high school she was upset about being large and feeling unattractive. She characterizes herself as "a

beautiful soul in a large body":

> High school was a complete bore and they couldn't understand why. My father was "blind"--"I'm the best, most beautiful." Mother tried to help, often incorrectly. She'd take me with her and try to be pals--to weight-loser things for adult ladies. I needed a pal but it would have been better to have a friend my own age.

Father's idealization of her overlooked points of concern and mother's well-meaning efforts to help were not appreciated because they did not demonstrate an accurate perception of her needs.

Her feelings about mother are complex, a blend of love and admiration, and disappointment and mild contempt:

> I really like my mother. She is extraordinary--a totally affective person. Everyone loves her. She's a good soul who cares about everything although she doesn't often intellectually express it. . . . She's incredibly kind and generous with her time . . . and appeals to all kinds of people. And she's funny; not cynical or satirical but "Bill Cosby" type humor--good natured. She's also insecure and powerless against my father. She keeps no emotional distance from anything.

In many ways, Miss I feels her mother failed her as a model: "She taught me how to knit when I was four. She's not a very good teacher because she can't tell you what to do. You have to watch her. It was hard to learn and frustrating. Finally my brother taught me and I realized that I couldn't learn much from mother but I wanted to emulate her and do what she did." She wanted mother to help her develop a feminine identity, but was constantly disappointed in mother's efforts. Indeed, as a caretaker, mother came in a distinct second to grandmother, with whom the family lived:

> She cooked great food and smelled like sugar cookies. She was the best babysitter. . . . With her I felt I got individual attention. With my parents, the punishment was different and I didn't get attention all the time because you live with them, they don't show the complete joy of taking care of you as a grandparent does.

Her attachment to her parents is an intense one, especially to father, and she does not see herself ever breaking free of this type of involvement. In one memory, the idea of loosening this child-parent bond is upsetting:

> I remember father said I couldn't sit on his lap any more. I was twelve and too big. I was sad and hurt--it was a rejection. . . . In general father showed unfaltering loyalty and affection. No matter what I did there was always support for it. He thinks I'm the best at everything; he keeps my letters in his pockets to show friends. . . .

She now gets money from them to live on and feels guilty about it: "I'm getting older. It's not fair that I take so much money out of his income . . . but I'll never be independent. I have a great sense of obligation toward them. I won't compromise my basic principles, but. . ."

These and other statements indicate that she has developed a morally autonomous but emotionally dependent position in relation to her parents. Her strong identification with her father has lead to the institution of a consistent, well-internalized moral code based on the value of her own integrity, yet her parents' practice of linking the concept of misdeed to hurting their feelings seems to have fostered an emotional dependence on them which she can not and does not wish to break. In addition, she feels "under obligation" to her parents--the sign of a tie fused

by guilt as well as love. This tie of guilt can be seen to have developed out of her parents' disciplining style. Another source of her emotional dependence on her parents appears to have been the lavish praise and affection given her by father. Clearly it is difficult to give up an object who sees one as perfect and flawless. It is clear, for instance, that no other man could compete with her idealized oedipal father, the district attorney, for her affection.

Her object relations outside the family reflect the effects of these dependent ties. For long periods she was hesitant about interacting with others. For instance, she felt more comfortable writing letters to camp friends because: "I didn't have to maintain a relationship up close." One relationship with a college friend was definitely symbiotic: "It was almost like being married. People mistook us for each other. We were bright and hung up on the same kinds of things . . . problems in relating to men. She was my 'trial' person--doing things for me. I was her 'rock.' I would watch to see how things formed around her." In her relationship to men, on the other hand, she often took a powerful nurturing role: "I often got into weird relationships with short men. It was culturally defined that we couldn't be attracted. I was their confidant. I listened and they'd tell me about their relationships with girls." In such a role it seems that she was able to identify herself as one of their women by proxy and yet occupy a safe, controlling position both physically and emotionally. In

college she also involved herself in a clique of women:

> I lived on a floor of twenty girls separated from the rest of the dorm. We enjoyed the company of women more than men. Men were peripheral. Men were shared. Few of us had boy friends. It was very incestuous, ingrown and uncomfortable. We would attract men because we were interesting people. It was like a literary salon-books, music, politics, drugs, sex, parties.

It seems clear that she maximized her feelings of safety and control by involving herself in this form of group relationship. Indeed her need to dominate and fear of losing this position appears as a long-standing motif in her emotional life. For instance, she recalls that going to nursery school was traumatic because of: "having to readjust to a new group, when I was a 'big wheel' in my own group on the block. I was bigger, tougher, louder, the best football player, etc."

This need for dominance seems to relate to her moral vigilance against exploitation. It is as if she has developed an intellectual solution to her emotional problem over the need to dominate. She provides control over her impulses through a moral stance that prescribes a legal structure to insure that the weak are not dominated by the strong. The worship of just authority implicit in this attitude appears to be a displaced expression of oedipal idealization of the father.

Her need to dominate appears in part to be grounded in issues surrounding the development of her sexual identity. She describes an intensely competitive relationship with her brother: "My brother and I were very rough. One

of our greatest pastimes was watching wrestling on TV. It ended up in a lot of batterings. I did not have a 'prissy-little girl-doll' kind of upbringing. At an early age I knew I'd never be what was defined as cute and bouncy." She needed to do everything he did. For instance, he was very involved in Hebrew school, so:

> I went to Hebrew school for twelve years. My brother was very religious. I'm a cultural Jew. . . . I was interested in the history and the culture. There was a sense of being something special and different knowing another language others didn't know. My parents didn't want me to go. It was important for my brother to go but not for me. To my grandfather boys were more important. To him I was cute but not important.

Hence, standing up for herself and being unique, different and interesting, are motives related not only to a strong identification with father but also to competitiveness with her brother. Indeed, this wish to be different was expressed as early as the seventh grade, when she wanted to be a simultaneous translator at the U.N.: "Languages fascinate me and I'm very good at them. What appealed to me was the foreign aspect-travel, meeting different kinds of people. It was exciting and exotic and not what others want to be. In fact, I think that's what appealed most. . . ." Her desire to be "different" may also gain impetus from the wish to please her father, who was himself "different," and who always reinforced her for being so.

Turning again to her dominance and aggressiveness, she views these traits as partially defensive: "Behind certain kinds of aggressiveness is uncertainty and confusion.

. . . I'm not as cold as I appear. I'm trying to let people know I'm approachable. 'Try to find out about me as a person. Don't accept on face value what you see.'"

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, Miss I's morality is a strongly principled one based on a dedication to human rights and protecting the weak from exploitation. Personal integrity, standing up for one's beliefs, but also playing by the rules and upholding law are of central importance. Her morality shows signs of strong superego influence but these imperatives are fairly well-integrated and are now mostly ego-syntonic and lead to a strong sense of self-worth. She does not appear to be overly burdened with guilt or overly judgmental of others. Her morality focusses more on what she should do rather than dictating right action to others.

This moral stance is clearly linked to strong identifications with her father, a district attorney. Indeed, her investment in the law seems attributable in part to her admiration for father--a fair, totally honest administrator of the law. She views father as a protector--as someone who approved of all that she did. In his life, he dedicated himself to being honest and fair and on several occasions stood up for what he believed even when to do so was not to his advantage. She recalls father encouraging her to stand up for her beliefs in similar fashion. An index of the degree to which this injunction to stand up for oneself is internalized is her recounting of the incident

where she quit the tutorial program over her parents' objections.

This moral autonomy is not matched in the interpersonal realm, however. She feels it impossible to be independent of these parents who were so protective. Additional pressure can be seen to emanate from their practice of emphasizing how her "bad" behavior hurt them. It seems that such emphasis on others' feelings has facilitated the development of a sensitive, empathic view of others, as evidenced in the complex portrait she drew of her parents and others significant to her. In terms of actual object relations, however, while her view of others is well-differentiated, her actual relationships show conflict around the issue of dependence/independence and power concerns are prominent in her dealings with most others. Issues of dominance and submission also contribute to sexual identity conflicts. Her conception of herself as a woman is also influenced by the highly charged competitive relationship with her brother and her disappointment in mother as an adequate model. While in part she achieves a sense of self-esteem by acting with moral integrity, it seems that the need to stand up for her values at times shades into the need to aggressively demonstrate that she is different and slightly superior to others. As she herself recognizes, this assertive grandiosity serves defensive purposes and hides a more basic feeling of insecurity and a wish to be liked and accepted. And her grandiosity and underlying insecurity can be linked

historically to her father's distorted idealization of her as "superwoman." Such parental idealizations help build unrealistic grandiose self-images in children that the children themselves cannot really accept and cannot use adaptively, but are "stuck with."

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Miss I continues to view her father in oedipally idealized terms to a certain extent. He is the embodiment of just, honest authority--a district attorney who makes no deals and treats every one impartially and fairly. She realizes however that this stance is somewhat rigid and self-limiting and has almost been able to go beyond it in her own moral development. On his part father idolized and narcissistically cathected her--seeing her as "the most beautiful and most intelligent." Part of such idealization was infantilizing however, as it seems that father did not want to lose his little girl to adulthood. While she identified almost feverishly with his moral integrity, still a major impulse in the moral realm continues to be the wish to be approved of, as father equated moral wrongdoing with the sin of hurting his feelings--the onus of which she has not entirely eradicated herself. Hence her morality if relatively autonomous but subtly imitative of father's staunch conservatism, just as her object relations appear to be "free and liberated" but are in reality dependent and childlike. No man is good enough to replace her father, who is a God to her in the moral realm, this father worship is

codified as a yearning for law, organization and control over chaotic impulses. Her dedication to the law appears as a loving submission to the oedipal father, although to be sure, she has also fought against this submissive inclination (e.g., in the pot-smoking incident).

Her oedipal conflict has not been resolved and has lead to the institution of a character structure with compulsive and dependent features. In the realm of object relations, primitive fantasies about relating to mother and father are acted out (e.g., the "group" she lived in at the dorm, the symbiotic relationship with the other girl) which suggest other pre-oedipal features of her character that are not germaine to the present discussion.

II. Summary of Stage Four

In his scoring manual Kohlberg summarizes stage four reasoning as follows:

> Orientation to society's point of view, to the perspective of the generalized other or the majority, and to maintaining a stable social system and one's own character. . . . A consideration of consequences for the group or society including the impact of the act upon the general expectations of members of society (Kohlberg, 1972, p. 7).

In his dissertation (1958) Kohlberg defines the stage in finer detail. Here he labels it as "authority and rule maintaining" in focus:

> Type three (i.e., stage four) represents an "identification" with authority and the social order, . . . Such "identification" is expressed in tendencies to actively maintain the social order, and to punish the self and others if they do something which is a violation of that order, . . (Kohlberg, 1958, p. 247).

He goes on to describe traits of stage four subjects similar to those described as the 'authoritarian personality,' e.g., punitiveness, demand for conformity, acceptance of violence in the service of a just cause. He describes the parents of his stage four subjects as teaching respect for the social order, and his fours as having little sense of natural rights beyond rights that an individual earns for himself.

Among all the stages examined in this study, the stage four interviewees differed most radically from the type of moral orientation expected on the basis of Kohlberg's stage description noted above. While it was clear that the importance of law and maintaining legal institutions was a facet of the morality of each subject, "law and order" was <u>not</u> the major area around which their morality centered, nor did their moral reasoning hinge on logical arguments about the justifications for maintaining law. That is to say that the type of stage four reasoning detailed by Kohlberg <u>was</u> present to a certain extent in their thinking, but was organized around other constructs. Thus when their reasoning was explored in greater detail in the interviews, it became evident that the fours' "law and order" orientation was <u>subordinate</u> to a <u>more basic</u> belief in the importance of balancing individual rights with individual responsibility for one's own action. Obeying law, then, was seen as a form of individual responsibility. Fours believe in the importance of "playing by the rules"

and not letting expedient motives deter them from taking a course of action consistent with their belief in what was "right." Hence their morality is based on devotion to maintaining a sense of moral integrity by acting in accordance with abstract moral principles that in the course of development have become a central aspect of their identities. Thus the fours in this sample were devoted to maintaining a sense of moral integrity rather than maintaining the social order, as Kohlberg would have it.

To be sure, the fours' devotion to an orderly, law-abiding society was found to relate to themes important on a psycho dynamic level--for instance the need to maintain control over impulses and avoid the chaos or anarchy of situations where such controls were lacking. Fours developed strict and somewhat unyielding controls over their own impulses and saw the utility of doing so. Their belief in law appears, then, to be the philosophical extension of this belief in and need for internal control, as well as a displacement of their need to honor the oedipal law-giving father. Indeed, on a personal level, the fours' internal controls are clearly overdeveloped, as evidenced by a lack of spontaneity in their behavior, a point to be pursued in greater detail below. Analogously, their belief in acting in accordance with their principles in the moral realm has resulted in a certain "determination" which some might view as rigidity. Indeed, it appears that Kohlberg has taken such a view of the stage. The findings of this study

indicate a more complex explanation, however. For the fours, a clear hierarchy of values has developed such that integrity is more important than gratifying other needs. Thus they are willing to forego pursuit of narcissistic and self-aggrandizing goals in order to maintain the self-esteem and firm sense of identity pursuant to "moral" action. They reject "ends justify means" arguments and are wary of dictating to others what is "moral." In contrast to Kohlberg's description, the fours in this sample were decidedly not punitive, demanding of conformity, or approving of violence in the service of a just cause. They <u>are</u> somewhat rigid, but less so than Kohlberg seems to believe.

Moreover, their belief in law does not appear to be based <u>entirely</u> on a need to obey authority uncritically or to identify with authority, an implication that Kohlberg draws from their reasoning. While the need to obey the oedipal father does come into play in their moral lives, these fours <u>do</u> disagree with authorities, and seek to find morally acceptable means of responding rather than challenging authority via questionable moral modes. On occasion they even oppose their parents. In other words, they do not see immoral behavior on the part of others as giving them license to do "whatever necessary" to change the system, as do the fives, as will be seen below. The fours' disagreements with authority and "the system" are not acted out in rebellious modes, nor do they accept the dictates of authority or law merely because of any inherent rightness

associated with these institutions. They generally take a critical stance toward law and focus on the function of law rather than believing in the sanctity of any body of laws. Hence their view of law and order accommodates the notion of change and modification. In Kohlberg's description, the reasoning of fours is seen as consistent with a status quo position resistant to change. This is not the case with the fours in this sample, all of whom reported incidents in their lives where they opposed the legal system and the "status quo." But they opposed in a way that enhanced their integrity and also in a way that was not geared toward obtaining narcissistic gratification for being a leader, a radical, etc. Essentially they view the exercise of their morality as a private matter and are not controlled by the need to get approval from others for their behavior. Indeed they all report situations in which their moral behavior was not approved of by significant others. What Kohlberg's conception of stage four overlooks is the centrality of moral integrity and the importance of the internal locus of the fours' morality.

A final facet of the fours' morality not dealt with in Kohlberg's conceptualization is the fours' emphasis on human dignity as a central moral value. Kohlberg asserts that fours have no sense of natural rights. But for these fours, rules and laws are seen to function so as to insure that people's natural rights are protected and that they are not exploited by others. Again, the fours' "law and

order" orientation functions in the service of a more basic goal. Kohlberg, by analyzing the structural properties of moral reasoning, does not explore content issues in sufficient detail to discover the interaction between content and form. At stage four, this interaction is crucial for understanding the moral position. Indeed as can be seen in my moral orientation section, Kohlberg's structuralist analysis ignores the most salient data. It seems crucial to me, therefore, to analyze both the content and structure of moral arguments and codes. More will be said about the inseparability of structure and content in the next chapter.

A. Family Dynamics

Fours describe their parents as being morally scrupulous individuals with strong principles and beliefs and as dedicated to acting on their principles in a consistent manner. These parents were clear about what the rules were and seem to have been consistent about punishing transgressions. For the most part, they were willing to explain the reasons for the rules and encouraged their kids to ask questions and disagree openly. If the child could come up with a convincing argument, then the parents were willing to change. Hence, the discipline encounter for fours took the form of a dialogue such that both parents and kids had input into the system. In the case of Mrs. G, she was even expected to devise punishments for herself as a way of developing a greater sense of responsibility. Rules were not given an immutable status and were usually grounded in

functional considerations. One of the most striking perceptions of the fours was their conviction that the rules served a protective function and that making rules was one way their parents demonstrated their concern and love for them. This perception is particularly significant when contrasted to the two's view of their parents, who did not make many rules and who were too busy to be bothered with them.

However it must also be pointed out that the focus saw their parents as rigid and stubborn in the moral realm, which suggests that the picture they present of their parents, as detailed above, is somewhat idealized. In reality it appears that the honesty so characteristic of these morally upright parents is somewhat over-scrupulous and therefore suspect as a conflict-free production. Indeed one senses a reaction-formed quality to this honesty, reminiscent of anal children who angrily comply with parental dictates by following the letter of the law so as to violate its spirit. Indeed these parents are <u>not</u> seen as <u>emotionally</u> honest with themselves, a sign that their honesty is a complex trait emanating from conflicted motivations.

The disciplining done by the fours' parents however tended to focus on harm done to others rather than on "breaking a rule," at least to a greater extent than the parents of our other subjects. The functional consequences of behavior were the focus of their interventions around rules, rather than obedience <u>per se</u>. Unlike Kohlberg's description of parents of fours as primarily teaching respect

for the social order, the parents of our fours emphasized interpersonal consequences of action and clearly this is one way the fours learned to be sensitive to the protective functions of law and the consequences of their behavior on others. This form of discipline has been called "induction" by Hoffman and has been linked experimentally by him to a variety of variables in moral development (Hoffman, 1970). The parents also stressed the child's responsibility for his behavior and linked the concept of rights to that of responsibility. These kids were expected to be responsible at an early age and were rewarded with respect and encouragement when they were. Hence responsibility came to have a positive value associated with it and quite early became a central aspect of the child's identity. The child's progress was of central concern to the parents, and increasingly the kids were trusted to do more for themselves. The fours also report that their parents took pride in their own "responsible morality" so the kids saw real life examples of how moral integrity and self-esteem could be mutually supportive. These parents also believed in standing up for their rights and modeled this behavior often. On the other hand it is clear that these parents also expected their children to be adults and seemed to negatively sanction "childish" traits like impulsiveness.

In addition, the fours viewed their parents as exercising a "just" authority and thus came to believe that authority need not be unfair and capricious. This

perception did not prevent the fours from opposing and rebelling against their parents but it did set the groundwork for a relatively flexible view of authority and the exercise of power. These early positive interactions around power issues can be seen to have helped the fours deal with power in such a way that as adults they are relatively free of conflicts around power, as compared with the rest of the sample. As noted above, however, the continued need to idealize oedipal figures makes them somewhat conservative in the moral realm.

Another central perception of the fours is that they were loved and valued by their parents. Family interactions were described as warm and pleasurable. The family was seen as a safe, dependable, happy environment. More than any other stage, the fathers of fours were seen as actively involved in the discipline encounter and served as the major object of identification for both men and women. The clearest general perception of these fathers was that they were protective, loving and had great moral integrity, although they were also seen as being somewhat rigid and inflexible. The mothers were also seen to have moral integrity, and were seen to be strikingly gentle, loving, and supportive.

These parents also devoted time to working in their communities with children's groups, which was true of no other parents described in the sample. This interest in other kids seems to have been an outlet for these parents' empathy and love for children. In their own lives the

fours experienced this sensitivity as a clear parental interest in and awareness of their needs. Another unique aspect of these parents of fours was their involvement in organized religion. Religion was an important aspect of life and this was communicated in such a way that the kids were given encouragement and freedom to be religious in ways that fit into their evolving identities. This positive function of religion was not expressed by other subjects in the sample. On the other hand, another aspect common to the practice of Western religions was present in these parents' behavior. The fours described their parents as extremely anxious about and intolerant of open expression of sexual and aggressive impulses.

Thus the fours' views of their parents were fairly well-balanced. They were aware of problems their parents experienced, and were able to articulate aspects of parental behavior which irked them. Specifically, the fours saw their parents, especially fathers, as somewhat rigid and overly scrupulous in their own lives. The fathers were seen to have some difficulty showing feelings openly although they were not characterized as unfeeling or cold. Mothers tended to be seen as somewhat clinging. As their kids matured, the parents had some difficulty in relinquishing their role as parents and fought battles with their kids over separation issues. Mrs. G and Mr. H seem to have resolved these issues with their parents, with whom they are now "adult friends." Miss I, as noted above, has

continued to have great difficulty separating from her parents, who in their own right seem to need to hold on to their children. But even in this case it is clear that these parents have encouraged their kids to be morally autonomous and have been fairly consistent in defending this belief.

B. Empathy and Object Relations

Unlike the threes, whose empathy was given a superordinate moral status and was traceable to conflicts around issues of being loved, controlling aggression and the like; the empathy of fours seems to flow naturally from their capacity for mutuality in relating to others. Unlike the threes, the fours felt no obligation to be concerned about others; rather, this empathic orientation seemed to be an integrated part of their everyday dealings with others. In discussing others' behavior they routinely tried to understand this behavior from the others' perspective. Especially in their portraits of their parents, the fours demonstrated a sensitivity to the feelings of others as well as a sophisticated understanding of the types of "life history" motives likely to influence behavior on conscious and unconscious levels. Thus they were aware of things about their parents' past that would likely influence their current behavior and feelings. They were insightful about the kinds of conflicts their parents had and how they attempted to resolve them. Even in describing individuals they did not respect (for instance in discussing people that they

felt did not have moral integrity) there was a demonstrated sensitivity to the motives and feelings likely to influence such behavior. In addition, their descriptions of others clearly indicated emotional investment in other people. The fours are interested in and care about people and are able to allow these feelings to show in a natural way, indicative of a comfort with feelings of closeness about others.

The object representations of the fours were striking in the complexity and fullness of their portraits of others. All the people they described were seen as individuals whose individuality, uniqueness and humaneness was clearly visible. These people came through as alive, vital and dynamic. The fours were able to maintain the contradictory traits and attitudes of others in their view of them, avoiding oversimplified or caricatured perceptions. Mrs. G and Mr. H in particular described ongoing object relations with significant others that suggested high level interdependent functioning. Miss I, in contrast, seems to have remained related to her parents in terms of earlier modes of functioning and this dependency seems to have been carried forth into her current object relations, which reflect ambivalent feelings about closeness. Hence, while Miss I's view of objects as complex, unique entities and her capacity for empathy match that of the other fours, her actual ongoing object relationships reflect conflicts in that area. As a group, however, the object relationships of the fours approximated mutuality in Erikson's sense more

than any other stage in the sample.

The relatively mature capacities for empathy and object relatedness of the fours can be linked genetically to the good relationships they report having with their parents. It is clear that they were loved and respected and that their parents were empathic and sensitive about their childrens' needs. These parents demonstrated an interest in the welfare and growth of their own and other children, and seemed to be able to balance the giving of structure and guidance with the ability to allow their children to grow increasingly more autonomous.

C. Identity Formation

As a group, the fours seemed to have more of a sense of the changes in their development than other subjects. They remembered more of what they were like as kids, had more psychologically sophisticated notions of their conflicts and means of adapting to them, and seemed to be more aware of the changes they went through during adolescence. In general, it seems that they are more aware of how they have integrated past and present experience in the formation of current identity. They also seemed to be more insightful about themselves in the present and tended to view their development as continuing toward fairly well-articulated goals. As a group, they seem to know where they came from, where they want to go, and why. They have a clearer sense of the process of choosing a career, and why social work is something they are invested in. And in

building their identities, they have been able to integrate basic early identifications with parents with later adolescent and adult identifications without needing to please or defy parents via occupation choice.

To be sure, this process of identity development did not proceed smoothly. The fours all encountered manifest conflict with their parents during middle and later adolescence. Mrs. G's parents opposed her going to social work, Mr. H's father wanted him to be an engineer, and Miss I's parents continued to cling to the dependent bond between them. Mrs. G and Mr. H "had it out" with their parents, however, and seem to have been able to make autonomous choices that pleased them and which did not lead to deterioration of their relationship with parents. On the contrary, it appears that they have been able to get beyond the childhood relationship with their parents and develop a new form of relatedness to their parents as adult friends. The need to rebel and to break infantile ties seems to have been gratified through the development of an autonomous identity, rather than through exaggerated rebellion or dependence on parents.

D. Superego Development, Narcissism and Self-esteem

One of the most striking facts about the fours' moral careers is the pervasive identification with the father as an embodiment of moral integrity. While mothers were also identified with as moral agents, it is clear that fathers were the <u>most</u> important object involved in the

child's moral education. This identification with the father is even more striking in comparison with the identificatory patterns of the other subjects in this sample. In general, fathers were relatively unimportant as moral models, and neither parent was seen to embody a concept of moral integrity.

The fathers of fours, however, defined themselves by their morality. They had clearly articulated, consistent principles that they acted upon even in situations that might not be advantageous to them. They stressed standing up for one's beliefs, but in a way that seemed geared more toward an inner sense of integrity and self-respect than toward being "seen" by others as a moral person. They stressed devotion to internalized principles that transcended popular external ethics. Moreover, these fathers seemed not to be retributive, vindictive or especially self-righteous in the exercise of their morality. They emphasized individual responsibility to the self rather than a belief in dictating moral law to others. Their moral codes were firm and even rigid, however, and could cause internal trouble if not followed.

In tracing the moral development of the fours, it appears that there was the expected conflict over internalizing principles. All the fours recall incidents where they disobeyed the moral dictates of their parents. The parents were insistent but seemed not to be punitive or destructive in their demands and the kids developed somewhat

rigid facsimilies of parental moral codes. Mrs. G, for instance, recalls being self-righteous and judgmental as a child, which also seems to have been true for Miss I. Mr. H describes a general rigidity and compulsiveness as a child which seems likely to have extended to the moral sphere. As they grew, the fours seemed to have been able to tone down the severity of their initial moral imperatives such that none of them appeared to be unusually guilt-ridden as children. During adolescence, these fours seem to have been able to evolve a more sophisticated abstract rendering of parental identifications, such that they identified with the form of parental moral choice-making, although not necessarily with the specific content of parental morality. Thus the fours devoted themselves to standing up for what they believed right, a clear paternal moral imperative, even in cases where there was substantial disagreement with that very model over the content of a moral issue. In this sense it appears that moral internalization has reached a level of abstractness beyond that of other subjects in the sample. The form of parental morality has been internalized and integrated with the content of their personal morality that has evolved through development. This morality governed by highly abstract, generalized moral principles has been integrated also with evolving identity representations such that the fours' morality forms a significant portion of their self-concept. The self-concepts of other subjects were not so dominated by moral considerations.

As a result, the fours' self-esteem is regulated by attempts to act in accordance with a morality that is ego-syntonic and generally devoted to growth. The severity of superego dictates has receded for fours and expectations appear to be realistic and well within the individual's moral grasp. For example, each four related at least one difficult moral dilemma they had faced as adults and resolved in a way that led to a sense of integrity. Such incidents were rarely reported by other subjects.

Power needs and narcissistic, self-aggrandizing motives are opposed by the fours' moral principles such that they cannot feel comfortable taking advantage of others or in other ways not "play by the rules." Yet while narcissistic/exploitative gratifications are not tolerated, other more mature forms of narcissistic gratification are available. The fours' sense of moral integrity represents such a form of self-esteem with goals and actions which are in the service of just, compassionate treatment of others. Hence "moral integrity" is a form of narcissism which accords the object world nearly equal status and which is not grandiose in focus or function. The resulting narcissistic gratification--self-respect or integrity--is a highly evolved form of pleasure which enhances the integrity of the self and the growth of identity. More than any other subjects in the sample, the fours moral development approaches what is referred to in the psychoanalytic literature as superego autonomy. More will be said about these

considerations in the final chapter.

Fours do experience problems around the issue of control of impulse, however. If anything, their controls are too strong, too global, too unilateral and inflexible, especially in the area of aggression. They have difficulty in expressing anger openly and their personalities reflect a certain lack of spontaneity and noticeable compulsivity, a point to be explored at greater length below. Such compulsive control invades their moralities to a certain extent also. While highly principled, like their fathers they appear to be overly scrupulous and given to excesses of self-control.

The existence of highly internalized, consistent, abstract moral principles has not made resolving moral conflict easier for the fours. On the contrary, their moral anecdotes communicated a sense of intense struggle surrounding moral conflict. They were tempted to give up their moral stance and take the easy way out; they experienced pressure to accede to a majority opinion, or to listen to their parents; but in the end they acted in accordance with their principles without knowing what would come of it. This type of decision process indicates their ability to mediate between impulses and reality constraints and arrive at a morally defensible solution. It also indicates that the fours' moral behavior is relatively free of the dominance of unconscious conflicts, as is more the case with most of the other subjects in the sample.

The orientation of the fours' moral code is also strikingly different from that of the rest of the sample. The fours' values focus on positive goals and states--integrity, compassion, etc. They strive for moral excellence, and theirs is a "Master Morality," in Nietzsche's terms. The morality of twos, threes, and fives, on the other hand, is more like a "Slave Morality" which is grounded in a sense of injustice, deprivation, and wishes for retribution. And as noted above, fours tend not to judge others harshly but rather focus their moral energy on improving themselves. This is another way of saying that <u>much</u> of the rigidity and punitiveness of primitive superego functioning has disappeared from their moral behavior.

On the other hand it seems at times that the fours place a greater importance on maintaining their personal integrity than upon dealing with injustices they see in the world at large (e.g., Miss I's passive stance vis-a-vis the principal who prohibits free speech). It seems that each four is willing to accede to injustice on the grounds that they must act within the law. While I am <u>not</u> arguing that they ought to advocate or engage in illegal activity, I am saying that they appear to be too willing to use legality as an excuse for not engaging in a more active search for constructive opposition to injustice. This tendency appears to be most characteristic of Miss I, although it can be detected in the other fours as well. Psychodynamically, such a tendency can be seen as emanating from an oedipal

conflict over asserting oneself against authorities.

E. Ego Development and Character Organization

There is much evidence of strong ego functioning in the stage four subjects. As noted above, they are able to make adaptive decisions in situations where impulse, reality and moral values are at cross purposes. The fours appear to have a great deal of ego strength in that sense. Moreover they have considerable "observing ego" available to understand their own behavior and set an increasingly insightful course for the future. Their identities and moral codes reflect smooth operation of the "integrative" function of the ego, and in general it appears that they are able to use their considerable intelligence adaptively. Defensively, their style is predominantly obsessive/compulsive, as they utilize intellectual devices and somewhat rigid control mechanisms to keep impulses in check. These defenses do not reach pathological proportion, however. For instance, while they use intellect defensively, the fours used rationalization less frequently in justifying moral behavior than did twos, threes, or fives. And while their emphasis on control has led to a lack of spontaneity and a certain general "tightness," they are not pathologically over-socialized or tyranized by their controls.

On a subjective level, the fours seem to be the most intelligent subjects in the sample, in terms of the sophistication of their use of logical operations, their general mode of conceptualization, etc., an observation

which contradicts Kohlberg's view of the direct relationship between moral reasoning in his schema and intelligence. Moreover, the fours were most noticeable in the ego skills they had developed for using intelligence adaptively rather than for raw intelligence alone, which suggests that the relationship between morality and intelligence is more complex than envisioned by Kohlberg's use of raw IQ scores as an index of intelligence.

Characterologically, the focus have evolved on obsessive-compulsive organization to control aggression and please oedipal parents. While they have resolved oedipal feelings to a greater extent than other subjects, it is clear that the need to honor and obey the oedipal father has resulted in a characterologic "tightness" which inhibits the expression of all save the most sublimated impulses.

CHAPTER 6

KOHLBERG'S STAGE 5: MORALIZING IDEOLOGUES

I. Interviews

A. Mr. J--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 486

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

In story one Mr. J argues that Mrs. W is wrong in discriminating because: "It is morally wrong to refuse service or material to a person on the basis of race. In order to correct social injustice, it is unavoidable that some individuals suffer in some way while that injustice is being corrected." This response was scored on Kohlberg's dimension E as stage 5 reasoning. In the same story Mr. J presents his views on law: "It is a moral and legal issue, not a legal one. Laws are not necessarily morally right--they are devised by imperfect humans." This was scored as stage 5 on Kohlberg issue A, as was the following response: "The state has an obligation to the citizens (all) to try to prevent and illeviate (sic) prejudice and discrimination, in order that justice is shared by all people."

The underlying rational core of stage 5 argumentation is reflected in the following response to story one. He argues that it would be just to take Mrs. W to court:

> One must determine which is the greatest evil--
> 1) refusing Mr. Jones the room because he is black
> 2) causing Mrs. Webster to suffer as a result of her

> boarders' prejudice. By refusing Mr. Jones the room, Mrs. Webster is theoretically causing the whole black community to suffer. By taking Mrs. Webster to court, Mr. Jones is only causing one person, Mrs. Webster, to suffer.

This response was scored as stage 5 on Kohlberg's BIV dimension.

In story 3, he argues that the captain cannot order anyone to go on the mission:

> The captain cannot make the decision between life and death for any of his men. The only fair method is to allow each man to make his own decision. The conflict between fairness and survival must be dealt with within each man's mind. In this situation, fairness means letting each man decide for himself. It is important because each man's life is at stake.

This was coded as stage 5 reasoning on Kohlberg's H dimension.

> In story 6, Mr. J argues that the social worker should report the thief: "If the social worker has been honest in helping the people in the ghetto, then he must continue being honest by reporting a dishonest act. He should have faith in the mutual trust he has with the people, and let that trust work for him in the hope that the people will understand why he reported the man."

This answer was scored as level 5 reasoning on Kohlberg's BIII dimension.

2. Moral Orientation

The good of the larger whole is a major focus in Mr. J's morality. He sees Mrs. W in story one harming the whole black community by discriminating, for instance. And: "It's harming her in terms of moral growth." He experiences an explicit obligation to be moral and he bestows a high status upon moral motives: "Respect for other

people is more important than making money--its people versus materialism. Maybe not in this case because its survival but it's morally right to give him the room." Thus a high standard of conduct is expected of others as well as of himself, with no excuses (like survival) accepted. In addition, he refers to an implicit concept of moral truth: "I can see the reasons why prejudices develop but the reasons are erroneous." More will be said about his concept of moral truth below.

Beyond this, he sees self-respect as a crucial issue in moral dilemmas. It is important to have one's self-respect based on something true and positive. Accordingly, he suggests that prejudice develops where:

> The need for your own self-respect is built on the power you have over others. Self-respect then has a false base. Its only valid when you have someone you have power over. In complete solitude you have no self-respect. It's not erroneous in terms of workability--that's why it's perpetrated. It is erroneous for the individual--robbing him of real security. If security is born out of power over others--there is no real security for anyone.

Hence the search for security is central; and stable, "non-erroneous" self-respect is the cornerstone of security for him. To achieve this ideal state of security, he requires a form of perfection of himself and others: "In order for people to relate in a truly loving manner, each individual's security has to be born solely out of that individual rather than his relationship with other people." He strives toward ideal states (e.g., "relating in a truly loving manner").

Further instances of his orientation toward perfection and ideal states are found in story one. In discussing discrimination:

> Respect for life is all that we have at this point. The world is getting smaller and there are more people. It's essential for people to get along. Real care and understanding is needed. It's important because I'm aware of a possibility of a better world. Because there is a possibility, it's important to pursue that.

So the perfectability of man, and harmony between all men is a central underlying moral theme in his thinking, as in his life as a whole: ("People have described me as a perfectionist.")

An aspect of this perfectionism is a wish to structure human interactions in such a way that exploitation is banished. Indeed, he is unusually sensitive to issues of exploitation. For instance he related a story of a supervisor of his not dealing with a reasonable request of a black client. The client was laid off work because of an injury, his insurance check hadn't arrived, and he needed to buy food for the family:

> I tried to work the rules around to give him the money but couldn't. I told the supervisor of the situation. She explained the rules. . . . She sounded really indifferent. I sat there with my head on the desk. I wanted her to show some consideration . . . I felt physically tired and wanted to strike something with my fist. I was really angry, then I wanted to cry. I felt a deep sense of despair and some hate toward my supervisor.

The intensity of his reaction is striking, as is his judgmental condemnation of the supervisor. It appears that he felt powerless in the situation. Authority and rule were unyielding and his reaction is to feel extreme anger and

depression. Rather than seeing the issue in rational terms, as Kohlberg suggests is the proclivity of fives, he is flooded with highly charged affects. Such a response would not be predicted by Kohlberg if I understand his position on the role of affect in the moral realm.

Mr. J seeks escape from this imperfect world:

> Whichever way you turn there is always an imperfection. That bugs me. I've had a recent interest in "spiritual development" which would lead to a more hassle-free existence. I've been reading in Taoism, Transcendental Meditation, etc. I'm throwing it together and developing something on my own--some form of daily meditation.

The realm of meditation is one where the imperfect can be assaulted--in privacy. The "hassle" of dealing with others and the resulting powerlessness he feels can be transcended. It is a realm where control is possible. This resolution is reflected in his moral thinking where everything is given a quasi-philosophical status.

His idealism is represented in his defense of free speech, which:

> helps provide for the dissemination of information . . . thereby allowing people to make real choices as to what is best for them. It helps perpetuate freedom generally and allows for people living out their lives as they see fit. It can lead to the self-respect "thing." Freedom of speech allows for the freedom to develop your own ideas and thereby build a framework for yourself by which to live. Self-respect comes from doing it yourself and leads to a certain power over self. People can't manipulate you completely. It leads to an inner strength or peace. (story two)

Mr. J's emotional reactions to feeling powerless play a significant role in his moral determinations. In story two: "Fred shouldn't obey. He wouldn't respect

himself if he didn't protest. I think he'd feel stepped on, weak, angry, hateful, physically violent, fatigued. He'd feel wishy-washy; as though he didn't deserve the friendship and respect of those who agreed with his views." Interesting is his proclivity to focus on affective dimensions of the situation. Clearly these feelings have some impact on the way he judges the situation. Once again we find evidence that affective reactions play a significant role in the moral reasoning for this stage 5 subject.

Mr. J's perfectionism has further implications in his moral thought. His penchant for "moral truth" leads to a position in which he defines as true and right what he believes in. While conflicted about allowing Fred to publish prejudicial statements in the paper, for instance, he argues that: "He can't publish it because it's counter to all respect for life. The act of publishing that is an act of violent aggression against himself and the rest of the world. The text would be primarily hate. Attitudes born out of fear are erroneous. Fear is erroneous." He is aware of the inconsistency of his position but this awareness does not temper his treatise on the erroneous and hateful nature of prejudice.

Mr. J tends to fall into spontaneous philosophizing when concrete issues are being discussed. He thus has moved from the specifics of the situation with Fred and the principal to a level of abstraction where he discusses why people fear doing the right thing and what they should do

about it. There is a sermonizing tone to his discussion:

> If they really had a compassion for life and a concept of its temporariness, then they wouldn't have to fear death. Death is just another step in existence. And fear perpetuates lack of respect for others. Fear goes along with power relationships--a power based on setting oneself up as superior to others. . . . Fear is the feeling that someone other than yourself has the power of life and death over you; whereas someone with true self-respect realizes his own security. This provides for the acceptance of death.

It is as if he attempts to explain away his own fears philosophically.

While he has a need for perfection, it is clear that in his own eyes he fails to live up to these impossible expectations. The contradiction over free speech for "opponents" is such a case. How does he deal with such conflict?:

> I feel a disgust for myself because I wasn't allowing him the free speech I was allowing myself. But I wouldn't take any action while I would have taken action if he had published anti-war material. I would try to laugh off my reaction to his not being allowed to publish. This would be born out of fear of my own moral degeneration. I feel I would have lost something of value in myself by not caring whether he would be able to publish. I'd talk about it with my wife and let her know I was disgusted with myself. It would be a "cop-out" but it would help.

It seems that he handles such conflicts through superego attack: (I'd be disgusted with myself). Once he feels guilty and bad, he can then carry on in an unchanged way. A confession, although clearly a "cop-out" would assuage his conscience sufficiently for him to forget about the behavior he was initially guilty about such that he could easily repeat the act again. Hence confession is sufficient to placate his superego. The next step in his

dealing with the conflict is a rationalized solution: "At the same time I couldn't feel justified fighting to get his things published. I would be doing something morally right fighting for his free speech but doing something morally wrong by trying to provide for his influencing others, because his whole approach to life would be wrong. I'd be very confused." What we see here is a manifest conflict between his moral philosophy in the abstract (i.e., devotion to social welfare, etc.); and his feelings and actions once confronted by real dilemmas. Mr. J's morality code functions as an ideal that he cannot live up to in "real life."

His sermonizing about truth and right conduct are pervasive. In story 5, he opposes cheating because it is dishonest: "And anything based on dishonesty will reap dishonesty. His education will be tainted by the dishonest act and therefore will be incomplete." Furthermore, the scholarship should be given to the right person: "Giving it to the right person would mean the program was based on truth and truth perpetuates truth." It is as if he attempts to convince himself as well as others of the rightness and suitability of his morality.

More on truth:

> Truth allows for compassionate interaction. There is no truth that contradicts that. People's perceptions are imperfect. It's not impossible for people to attain ultimate truth, but people have neglected the opportunity to pursue it because they get too bound up in worldly interaction and affairs. That means primarily relationships with other people. One can find security in communication with another and that security allows for development toward the truth. On the

> other hand, most people [with whom] one interacts block that development.

Again, power conflicts in interpersonal relationships are seen to block one's growth. Where people threaten each other:

> They are guarded and the relationship is born out of fear. Interaction is then most like a game--lots of joking, dodging revelation of true emotions and therefore trying to gain some sort of power over the other so you feel more secure in their presence. Power is very salient but it's in error. Sometimes I feel rotten because I use power to mistreat others. Other times I feel good because I need it. I need to feel good and take power. . . . Sometimes I feel frustrated because I can't show another person what personal inner strength I have and I feel afraid sometimes. I feel easily manipulated.

So the power dimension is one that gives him a great deal of difficulty. He both wants power and feels that this wish is immoral and destructive. His conflict over this issue makes it difficult to be consistent in the moral realm.

These basic conflicts interact clearly in actual moral dilemmas he recalls. He remembers plagiarizing a paper in college and getting an A:

> I joked a lot about it and I wasn't interested in the subject. I told myself it didn't matter. I felt conflict but it didn't prevent me from doing it. I felt guilty when I handed it in and got an A. I also took a test for somebody for $5. It was a big joke. I didn't feel as bad about that. There was a certain amount of status for this in the group I socialized with--a fraternity.

Here we can see that low-level rationalization and peer approval was sufficient to support these acts, but another incident demonstrates how he can draw upon high-level moral principles to justify his actions. He recounts a situation

in which he was receiving a fellowship based on his income, and if his wife worked, he was expected to report this information to the government. But when his wife was employed he decided not to report it:

> That was conflictual; my own honesty and self-respect versus not having enough money to live on. I rationalized it all by being angry at the Nixon Administration. If I get through school it means one more social worker willing to fight for social programs. It got to a point where it didn't consciously bother me. I told myself I earned the money and I deserved it. I worked so hard to get into graduate school.

Hence a "universal" principle of social welfare was called into play to justify an action he saw as self-serving. He felt "guilt" and then was able to perpetrate the deceit with a relatively clear conscience. Here is a clear example of how moral judgment need have no relationship to moral behavior. Indeed, a highly abstract moral argument about social welfare is used to justify an act undertaken for entirely self-serving reasons. So we see that Mr. J's level five reasoning exists as an ideal philosophy seeking perfection in the world. He rarely uses this abstraction in his day-to-day life unless it is put in the service of rationalizing his behavior.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Mr. J gives few descriptive details of his family life. His mother appears to have been the most important figure in his home. Her values were strict and she punished misbehavior severely through power assertions and various guilt-inducing maneuvers. Mr. J felt he was close

to father when he was young, but feels misunderstood by him currently. He rebelled against father's "materialism" in his adolescence and joined the Peace Corps. Being away from mother was apparently traumatic and in recent years he has drawn closer to her via mystical religious philosophy. She fervently wanted him to be a priest.

Guilt issues for him are associated with sexual conflict in his childhood. Indeed, his earliest memory of guilt is about masturbating. He recalls going behind a bush in the front yard and; "taking a piss. I felt secretive, afraid, somebody would catch me and indecent." He struggles over the expression of impulse, with expression associated with guilt. A later derivative of the conflict occurred when he smoked cigarettes with friends in sixth grade. He remembers feeling: "immoral and degenerate."

It is clear that he felt his parents cared about his well-being (he was punished for staying out later than he should or for going too far away from home)but he felt strongly that love would be withdrawn if he were bad: "I'd cry from the idea that mother was spanking me. I thought I was losing my mother's love. I'd wish I hadn't done what I did but I wouldn't feel ashamed." This suggests that there was something of a breakdown in the internalization process, that the focus remained more on the horror of the punishment (loss of love) than on the misdeed itself. And even though he describes himself as an obedient child, there is a flavor of rebellion in the incidents he recounts.

In fact there even seemed to be an element of humiliation in the punishment: "When we'd really done something wrong there was a real break in the love. We'd have to stay in our room for a while. They would allow us to approach them for love and they'd give it. But they'd never seek it out. I was very afraid they'd still be mad. I was unsure of her love (mother) but needed it very badly."

A major aspect of this discipline relationship is the sense of powerlessness he felt: "I was overtly submissive when she'd say 'I'm going to spank you.' I don't know whether I resented it or not. We were trained to think their actions were the right ones. They were law and you couldn't fight that." His concerns about powerlessness and being controlled by authority in the moral realm thus have clear links to his personal history. In his family, he learned to <u>pretend</u> to comply with parental dictate, but was able to rebel in clever ways. One form this covert rebellion took was pretending to do the things his mother asked such as brushing his teeth and washing his feet: "I was only rebellious in those little ways. I was pretty much a model kid--clean, neat, courteous, basically the way they wanted me to be. The overwhelming feeling was that I was glad to get their approval. It made me feel happy to make them proud of me. It was comforting."

His powerlessness in relation to mother is striking. He recalled that often his older brother would lie to mother about what he'd done:

> I felt wronged. Mother didn't know who to believe. If it was bad enough both of us got a spanking or a scolding. I often caught it whether it was my fault or not. I felt hurt and angry and powerless. When I first got angry I'd yell back at her a little but that was such an offense that it would turn into cowering. She'd say "don't talk to your mother like that."

Clearly this was also humiliating and he developed an intellectualizing defensive strategy to cope with this situation: "When I was a teenager I wouldn't shed tears. I'd be more controlled and say more 'how do you know?'; more reasoning than blurting out pure feeling."

So his intellectualizing seems to have been instituted to express feelings of anger and injustice at mother in a way which did not lead to an all-out attack on her part or his. He was not allowed to be openly angry, so he had to temper this affect through intellectual means. Currently he gets angry at those he knows well by raising his voice and being sarcastic or by brooding: "With others I'll try to think of something 'intelligent' to say to show them what they did was stupid or ridiculous or wrong."

The link between his valuing "perfectability" and his concern for justice and the underdog have clear roots in his feelings about his family:

> Three or four years ago I got really mad at them. I was yelling and shedding tears about racism, middle-class life-styles, society's indifference to people. I was coming down hard on their beliefs, trying to convince them of my beliefs. I was still using reason and trying to outwit them. At the end it got down to more personal, emotional statements. They reacted violently, mentally and verbally. They got up and stood in front of me while I was sitting and were yelling at me. They showed real disapproval of me and shock at

> what I was saying. (I said to them) "If I can't find any other way to fight for the dignity of people, I'll get out on a street corner and make speeches."

Clearly the dignity of man included his own dignity which he felt had been compromised many times in interactions with his parents. Displacing his feelings about them onto discourse about social issues did not serve to temper their reaction to him, however; "They were deliberately trying to show how shocked they were. They wouldn't approve of me."

In this emotional atmosphere he came to value receiving love from others, which necessitated curtailing all overt aggression. This formula has become a dominant part of his ego-ideal. Thus the person he admires most is his wife, who is:

> really considerate of other people and has a lot of compassion and she's honest. She has a high respect for all life; reverence may be a better word. She has concern even for the smallest form of life; concern for the smallest little plant. She won't step on a worm and this is carried over and magnified in relationships with other people.

This ego-ideal is saintly, lofty, and difficult if not impossible to live up to. In addition, this ideal appears to represent his fantasy about an ideal mother: one who would be loving, compassionate and not powerful, unlike his own frightening mother.

Mr. J struggles to be an exemplary individual, if not a saint. As noted above, mother wanted him to be a minister: "Being ethical is very important, as is being honest and not misrepresenting myself or my actions to others. Being able to care, to have compassion is also

important, as is living up to my full potential, not only in career or personal life. . . ." Thus to please mother, he had to be a moral superman. Such expectations led to his perfectionism: "I'm a perfectionist--at school, at work. I want things to be perfect. It's even true on the job I have now as menial as it is." He constantly feels that he is imperfect: "During the school year I had to write gobs of papers. I was frustrated because I didn't have time to perfect a paper. I wanted to get every detail right but I always had to rush through it and I'd always wonder if it would be good enough." The interpersonal realm is also frustrating because of imperfections: "I get upset about relations with others--about mistreating others and myself. I mistreat myself by not allowing myself to be happy; by not allowing myself to feel things. I intellectualize to the exclusion of feelings. It's cheating myself."

This is another important insight into his moral thought and general functioning. The realm of intellect is preferred to that of emotion. Perhaps he feels there is greater safety and more control in the realm of intellect. Through the intellect things can be perfected and base emotions, needs, insecurity, etc., can be eliminated. But more generally his moral position can be seen as an intellectual attempt to deal with emotional issues. The abstract theorizing serves in part to remove him from the realm of emotional conflict. The intellect prescribes a "true" course. Hence for this five, intellect in the form

of sophisticated theoretical thinking is a tool to dominate the emotional passions and imperfections of the world. Intellect exerts a control over human affairs much like his meditation exerts control over his personal affairs.

We have noted that his parents actively encouraged the development of perfectionism. They were subtle in their demands, however: "It wasn't a matter of actively pushing for perfection. It was a matter of reinforcing those almost perfect things I did. I got approval, attention, and praise. It was lavish in comparison with my brother. I always did a more complete job." So to be perfect was to bask in the affection and love of his mother, whose love was all the more important because it could be withdrawn quickly if there were transgressions. Moreover, mother's investment in his being perfect served to calcify his ego-ideals at a grandiose level. As Schafer (1968) and Jacobson (1964) note, purposeful disillusioning of childhood grandiose ideals is necessary for these ideals to take on a more useful, realistic shape.

More of mother's power manipulations arose in regard to religion: "Mother was very religious. For a high school boy I was very religious, because mother pushed me into it. I was in choir, an officer in the youth group, etc. I did it, but I did it as a puppet." He is angry and insulted over his perceived powerlessness.

He finally dropped out of the church in college and mother was angry and very disappointed in him. He seems to

have tried to resolve this conflict over religion by rejecting organized religion and embracing a mystical religious consciousness intimately linked with mother:

> Recently, within the last year (since being married), I've drawn back to a spiritual "thing." I'm against all organized religion. It's a very personal thing, not to be evangelized. I resented the pressure from mother. My rights were being infringed upon. There is still tension. Mother is still disappointed. Recently she was pleased I was becoming spiritually oriented. She was hoping I'd be a minister at one point.

He has found it most difficult to separate from his powerful but loving mother. As soon as he left her for another woman, he linked himself to her anew via spiritualism. Strong regressive wishes are suggested by this series of events.

Responsibility occupies a central place in his political philosophy as well as his life generally: "In college I developed a deep sense of responsibility for prejudice and racism--the oppression of blacks. I felt responsible as a member of the system that produced the problem. I knew I was able to do something to alleviate the problem and I should." His identification with blacks as a persecuted minority is apparent.

To alleviate some of his guilt he went into the Peace Corps but left after six months because he felt guilty about thinking more about social problems in the USA than in the country he was placed in. Some of his guilt seems to relate to the underlying motives that spurred him into political activism: "I want to work as a representative and an 'enabler' for a group of repressed people. It could

involve political activity--running for office; confronting various political forces or building my own political force." The wish to bring the evil system down seems to be a displacement of his anger at his powerful mother. Being a leader and the powerfulness and grandiosity attached to such a position appeal to him, but also make him feel guilty, due to his needs to be saintly so as to receive mother's praise and love.

His early memories reveal themes of passivity, loneliness and helplessness in relation to mother, as well as concerns over separation. His earliest memory is of being alone waiting for his brother and cousin to return from school. He feels sad. He also recalls being taken to kindergarten. He was afraid of the new environment and of leaving his mother: "She was trying to be unwillingly cold to me. I resented that." Another memory is of mother failing to meet him at the appointed spot after school to take him home: "I ran all the way home crying and climbed into my bed, which was still a crib. Then she showed up. I remember the feeling of comfort that her presence gave me."

Memories of father are interesting in that they contrast markedly with his present feelings. One memory is of father carrying him into the house from the car, where he had been sleeping: "I was annoyed at having to go into the house but there was also the sense of comfort and content at being in his arms." He also recalls father bringing him a china horse to replace one he'd broken: "I was

so happy I cried. I hugged his legs and wanted to cling to him for a long time. I saw him as the ultimate giver and I really felt a lot of love coming from him too."

A preoccupation with nurturance and supplies runs throughout his memories. He also recalled Christmas mornings when father would bring out the stockings with gifts and spending time at a cottage: "A great aunt was there who loved kids and us especially. She was the provider of good times--money for donuts, ideas for recreation, good things to eat."

These are the memories of someone addicted to parental love; of one who has tasted it and wishes to hold on to it at all costs. His parents could be loving but he had to submit to control especially of his impulses to maintain this love. Clearly it was a bargain he resented and his resentment surfaces in the form of acting out (urinating in bushes, cheating on tests) and his values--helping the oppressed and the perfectability of society. The feeling he carried away was that if he were perfect he'd get unconditional love. However, the bond between mother and child, from his mother's point of view, is an iron-clad one between master and slave. He recalls her once saying, "you came from my womb and belong more to me than to anyone else." Quite literally he feels himself akin to a slave forever bound to his master; capable of getting great love and praise when he does what is expected and having love withdrawn when he acts "wrongly," i.e., against the wishes of the master.

Because of his great need for love and approval, caused in part by the overly close bond with mother, the "good" is defined as that which mother approves of, hence he never outgrew the need for external validation in addition to internalizing this exacting voice and demanding perfection of himself. For perfection means love.

His interpersonal style became a way of attracting others to him by being "cute" and noticeable. One suspects it is a certain waiflike quality, of one who needs and is looking for love, a sensitive soul who needs friends. He recalls always being involved in clubs, sports, social events throughout school: "It gave me a real sense of belonging and security." He recalls the family moving often and the great sense of insecurity this caused:

> There was emotional strife every time we left our old town. I always had close friends. The last move was really bad because I was in love with a girl and was really depressed. . . . She was very pretty--the first girl I went steady with. My first love affair. She was very popular--a status symbol. There was also emotional involvement. . . . My parents approved of her highly. We were members of the same church, had the same value system and they were a step above us socially.

The yearning for love and closeness with father, seemingly so present in early memories, is lacking in his current view of father:

> My father is traditional, conservative, hard-working, loyal, honest, and uncommunicative. I can't talk to him about things that matter. He tends to ignore them, and tends to let emotions build up and then tries to "act them away." My relationship with him is almost nil right now. Our value systems and life styles are very different. . . . I regret it and I wish it was different. I wish I could talk to him about things that matter to me and him. . . . I think he's disappointed and

> can't understand me. He wants me to be like my brother, or like I was when I was 21--very concerned about outward appearance, desirous of a good-paying job, hard-working, accepting things as they are. He probably thinks I'm unrealistic; that I've been brainwashed by things I've read and heard; that I'm too romantic."

The sense of pressure to be what the parents want is unmistakable: "They think it's stupid being in school. Mother is jealous of my wife and very possessive. She spent her life raising her children." But there was less pressure from father than mother: "He never did show much affection but showed love by providing for us." But father never forced him to do what he wanted. "It's your life" was father's motto and in the end: "he would never reject me no matter what I did." So there was a measure of security always available but if he did what he wanted he had to face their disappointment. Love was never withdrawn totally but became a powerful weapon because of this possibility.

The relationship with mother is clearly more intense and conflicted for him:

> She's very emotional, sensitive and unlike my father. She feels every inch of her emotions and expresses them by crying a lot. She's very communicative but she could never discuss her problems with him. He didn't respond. She has used me as a consoler--a replacement for her husband. She is compassionate, very religious and quite intellectual for a person with little education. She's very family-oriented and very close. And musical. Music affects her and she presents a symphony of ideas and emotions.

Breaking away from her was very difficult: "I strive for independence very hard. The more she clung the more I pulled away or tried to. Our relationship was intellectual and spiritual. The spiritual is still very

important. She is clairvoyant." Mother would "speak to him" when he was away from home and he would feel better. He describes having a difficult time in the peace corps, having difficulty communicating with foreign people, etc.: "One night I felt like crying. I woke up the next morning with a new attitude. I was raring to go, excited. I came to find out that mother had "tuned in" on my problems and that gave me the confidence to go on." Hence the bond to mother is experienced in mystical terms. This also reinforces the image of mother as being incredibly powerful and magical in his eyes--truly not an individual to cross. The pressure mother exerted on him was itself incredible: "She unlike my father would push me in different directions. It was subtle pressure. She was quite supportive if I had problems. More recently she is become disappointed in me and doesn't understand me. . . . But she's jealous of my wife. Her career was raising children. Recently she said that I belong more to her then anyone else because I came out of her womb."

It is this kind of pressure which accounts for his feelings of powerlessness and wishes to perfect the world and remove oppressed people from their plight. He wants to be powerful, capable and to "exist" in the face of mother's pressure. His own assessment of this situation is revelatory: "I regret that my parents were as possessive and protective as they were. It made me fearful of new experiences. It was possessive in that it denied me certain

freedoms to grow more in my attitudes and my thinking. But a sense of security was part of that protectiveness." Hence he felt that security came at some cost to his growth and development as an individual.

His image of himself as a child is also informative: "As a kid I was shy, cautious, oversensitive and cute, so everyone said. I was smart, and made friends easily. I would somehow attract people to make the first move."

Another general theme is worthy of mention. Women (mother) are clearly magically powerful in his eyes and he experiences a wish for more contact with men, probably to undo this influence. In part we see this in the early longings for father but also in his childhood heroes--two sets of brothers in town who were athletes and town heroes. They were nice to him. He remembers the younger brother in particular as being especially nice to him: "He lead us to his comic books." Perry Como was another hero: "I liked his voice. He was very easy-going and smooth, warm." Robin Hood was another idol: "He was strong, he was good and he was always doing something for somebody else." And of course he robbed from the rich (powerful) and gave to the poor (powerless). But again his self-description is the most articulate expression of his inner tensions and ways of dealing with them: "I'd like to be outwardly at peace with myself and the world, as well as inwardly. I'd like to be the kind of person others are attracted to because of his serenity. I'd also like to be more dynamic. I'd like

to inspire others and spur them on to action."

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, Mr. J's morality is dominated by perfectionistic ideals which focus on eliminating power conflicts between individuals, and in individuals attaining an internally based state of self-respect and peace. He strives for a platonic form of moral truth, which is actually dictated by himself, and preaches this morality in a self-righteous, judgmental manner. While these standards are exemplary in the abstract, they do not function to control and guide his actual behavior. In terms of genesis, they reflect intense, punitive superego pressure and a pervasive sense of guilt. He tends to see moral and other issues abstractly and takes a highly intellectual stance toward conflict. Generally he is able to rationalize his behavior in accordance with his perfectionistic principles even when his motives are actually self-aggrandizing and power-oriented. Often his guilt functions to sanction and excuse his unacceptable behavior in that by punishing himself via guilt he then can accept and not change his behavior. His ideal standards thus serve as an intellectualized candy-coating that covers over his impulse life.

Many moral issues center for him around the theme of coercive, abusive authorities attempting to manipulate and coerce essentially innocent, powerless minorities. He has intense feelings of anger and injustice about such situations to the point that he experiences some difficulty in

controlling himself. Much of his behavior around authorities is subtly rebellious and angry (e.g., cheating on exams, taking money under false pretenses from the government) and reflects both his fear of direct expression of anger and his wish to displease authorities.

It is clear that Mr. J has experienced himself as powerless and impotent in relation to his mother, whom he tried to please on the surface by being cute, clean, and compliant. He continues to fight against her but also is drawn toward her via fantasies of mystic union. Mr. J values self-respect above all else, perhaps because he so obviously lacks it himself. His grandiose, unrealistic ego ideals of saintliness are as difficult to realize as are the harsh dictates of his highly internalized but self-destructive superego. His self-righteousness and judgmentalness surface as signs of the punitiveness of his morality and his constant need to defend himself from internal onslaught. He attempts to deal with his emotional problems in the intellectual realm via philosophizing, as if he believes he can resolve these conflicts if the attendant feelings are separated and dealt with as pure ideas.

While his punitive superego pressures him, his morality is not totally internalized. Indeed, much of his superego pressure is ineffectual in influencing his actual behavior and enters ex-post-facto. Primarily he seems motivated by self-aggrandizing, narcissistic power considerations and by a general need to be loved by others, which he

accomplishes by being "cute" and by appearing appropriately guilty for his misdeeds. More generally he seems to have difficulties with action and autonomy. Being mother's favorite and "confidant" also appears to have made resolution of oedipal feelings most difficult and in general he seems to long for an infantile, dependent relationship with both parents. His main means for dealing with conflict appears to be to attempt to avoid feelings via intellectualization and attempt to escape to some inner form of peace and tranquility. In general it appears that he had a great deal of difficulty during the "initiative" phase in identity development (Erikson, 1950) and has dealt with conflicts on that level through passive, quasi-magical modes of mastery. He is quite insightful about his own dynamics but seems incapable of using this insightfulness for growth at this time.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Mr. J describes his mother as a powerful, domineering, possessive woman who has continued to hold on to him through his adolescence and early adulthood. He felt forced into submission by her, and experienced her as condemning him for expressing any sexual or aggressive impulses. Subtly mother demanded perfection from him and withdrew love when he did not obey her. Father, on the other hand, was viewed as loving and protecting when Mr. J was young, but as uninterested and aloof as he matured. Apparently, formulating rational arguments seemed to placate mother--or at least it functioned as a means of discharging feelings that

could not be expressed openly in the family. Thus Mr. J developed a facility for rationalizing and intellectualizing so as to appear to be the saint his mother needed him to be. His moral code stressing selfless service to humanity can thus be seen as an attempt to achieve such sainthood, and placate his mother who wanted him to be a priest. But his morality also centers around vanquishing oppressive authority, a proclivity that is clearly a displacement of his anger at being so helpless in the hands of his powerful, magical mother. His wish for peace and tranquility appear then as a representation of the wish for cessation of unpleasant impinging stimulation. It is unclear what the father's role is in all this. Now Mr. J expresses a certain contempt for his father's values and a sense of emptiness which suggests that he wanted much more than he felt he received from his father. This yearning for love is also represented in his moral philosophy as a search for self-esteem. Characterologically it appears that the stimulating, frightening closeness with mother has precluded oedipal resolution. Instead he experiences an internal war between narcissistic impulse and superego dictate, which has left its mark on his character organization, which appears hysterical in nature, like our threes, save that his conflicts center more around issues of identity consolidation. Involved in a preoedipal relationship with another, however, he has been unable to individuate fully. It appears that his conflicts involve every sphere of his life, not the least of which is

the moral sphere, and interfere with smooth functioning at all levels of adaptation.

B. Miss K--Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 518

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

Miss K's response to story one was not scorable according to K's criteria but her answers give a clear view of her strongly principled stance. She believes Mrs. W is wrong because ". . . she lied; she was dishonest; she discriminated against the man because of his race; she committed an illegal act; she pandered to the racist attitudes (threats) of her other roomers." Her social welfare attitude is clear in the following: "The state ought to attempt to cut off all opportunities for individuals and businesses to practice racism in any ways possible even if it cannot actually legislate attitudes and emotions."

In story 2 she argues that Fred should publish despite the principal's ban: "The principal's 'reason' for the order appears to be in conflict with the actual situation of stimulated learning that occurred as a result of the paper and Fred ought to illustrate his values to the principal rather than acquiesce to the order." This response was scored as stage 5 reasoning on Kohlberg's BIII dimension.

In story 2 she argued that the issue is very complex:

1) If the captain believes in his duty as an officer, i.e., one who gives orders to obtain the greatest

benefit at the least cost, he should not go himself because he would be acting out of the pride of self-sacrifice rather than the duty of saving most of the men (may be saving them).

2) If the captain isn't obsessed with such a duty but still feels that one man has to die to save the rest, he should include himself in a chance draw of lots to see who gets to go back to the bridge. His ability to lead a good retreat doesn't give him a greater right to life.

3) If he believes in risk-taking and possible survival for all the men; doesn't want to play God and believes that war is absurd anyway, he should lead the retreat without sending anybody back to the bridge. . . . Military structure has given him the authority to make such an order (i.e., to order a man to blow up the bridge); if it is not in conflict with his moral judgment, he should do it, but if his moral judgment intercedes, he should not assume the "authority" of his role as an officer. He then has no more right to do such an act than that of a man among men.

This lengthy response was scored as stage 6 reasoning on Kohlberg's issue H and stage 5 reasoning on Kohlberg's issue BIV. Her stage 6 answer is amplified as follows: "Both of them (i.e., sick man and troublemaker) have an equal right to refuse because their right to possible survival supercedes all obligations and should not be conditioned by either 1) future duration of survival--i.e., the sick man will die soon anyway or 2) their contributions to 'society' --i.e., the troublemaker is a thief; the sick man is "good."

There are also stage 6 elements in her answer to story 4: "Stealing involves an interaction or exchange between 2 individuals (for example) where one forces or compels the other to do something he is not willing to do, or does it secretly and against the express desire of the other; in this case, it is the exchange of property or

money. No such interaction of compulsion can be considered intrinsically morally right." This was scored as level 6 on Kohlberg's I dimension.

In another response to this story she argues:

> To willfully lie and misrepresent yourself to another person in order to obtain advantages for yourself is a reflection of your judgment of the value of that other person--that he is merely a tool of your own self-interest; you are, in effect, destroying his worth as a person. In turn, to misrepresent yourself to another person is to destroy your own value as an integral human being.

This was scored as level 6 reasoning on Kohlberg's F dimension.

Another trend in Miss K's reasoning should be mentioned at this point. Despite the strong presence of stage 5 and even stage 6 reasoning, Miss K also reasons along stage 2 lines periodically.[1]

For instance in story 7 she argues that the most important consideration involved is not moral but rather an issue of personal preference. Accordingly, if Mrs. D

> . . . dislikes aspects of the job or the place and would just as soon take another position (regardless of monetary reward), this should be her primary concern: not the success of the social services department; not the success of the clinic; not the opinions of the

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[1] To be sure, Kohlberg has pointed out that all subjects will show some "spread" on their reasoning about various issues. Indeed he cites this as one reason for coding stories on a variety of moral issues (A through J in his coding schema--see Appendix C). However, as will be seen below, stage 5 subjects, even those not accurately classified as 5/2 reasoning show an inclination to use stage 2 arguments. I shall argue below that this inclination reflects a basic "weakness" in stage 5 reasoning, or if you will, reflects pervasive conflict underlying their logical argumentation.

> medical staff--there are other people in the world to do jobs like these. In effect, her primary responsibility should be to herself--where she most wants to be.

After lengthy deliberation, Mrs. Hodnefield and I decided to code this response in a somewhat novel manner. We saw the moral issue as Kohlberg's BIV dimension and scored it as a mixture of stages 5 and 2 reasoning. This type of argumentation was not idiosyncratic to her alone, however. As we saw in Mr. J's moral reasoning in actual moral dilemmas in his life (e.g., the fellowship money) he too uses a mixture of 5 and 2 reasoning. An even clearer example of the use of 5/2 reasoning is provided by Mr. L (see below) who relies upon this form of argumentation.

2. Moral Orientation

Miss K's initial moral stance is to view the pursuit of individual needs as subordinate to the pursuit of "what is right." For instance, in discussiong Mrs. W in story one: "I couldn't say there was any morality in saving her life (by refusing the room). She had to commit an immoral act to survive. She'll have to deal with it." She believes that people have an obligation to consider the "moral context" before their own needs and if they opt for the latter they will pay with guilt. There is a certain hardness and judgmental quality to her evaluation of this situation.

A related moral consideration is being one's own agent. Indeed she felt that the worst thing Mrs. W did was:

"Not confronting her other tenants with her right to rent to whoever she wanted to. She let them overpower her and she was not determining her own morality." There seem to be two components of this position. One is a power issue--not being manipulated or coerced by others. The other is related but seems to deal with integrity--the need to be responsible for one's own moral behavior.

Her concept of moral responsibility includes a belief in refusing to avoid moral conflict by taking an easy way out. In story one: "By lying she's taking the easy way out. If you're being strictly ethical or moral by a particular code it involves taking a difficult route." There is a sense in which this demanding moral position is undercut, however, which suggests that she experiences conflict around the maintenance of her demanding morality. This conflict is illustrated as follows: "Being honest about my own feelings is most important. I don't think much of a morality or ethical system that doesn't jibe with a person's particular feelings about an issue." The unclarity of this statement suggests confusion. She seems to be saying that morality and feelings should coincide but has said above that looking out for oneself is not a moral act. I believe that this statement is an accurate reflection of the conflict she experiences over attempting to apply the "social welfare" philosophy she espouses.

While she believes in taking the difficult moral course, she also is insistent about standing up for her own

rights and getting her needs gratified: "One of the most important things is standing up for yourself and being honest with yourself about what you want and need--standing up for yourself in terms of not letting yourself be pushed around by people or influenced and not letting others get in the way of what you want and need yourself."

But she sees a moral dimension to such actions; they are not governed solely by self-interest: "It indicates self-responsibility for your own actions--'I did it and am responsible for it.' Being responsible for what you do indicates self-respect and liking for oneself. Until you start out from the basis of liking yourself, relationships with others will not be good."

Like Mr. J, she sees self-respect as an extremely important state of mind, related to morality and other interactions with others: "In terms of me, liking the self has to come first (before liking others). If I can't like myself, then I don't think I can like others and can't get what I need and what I want. I can't have a sense of peace within myself." Liking for self is thus related to getting what she needs. And her needs are defined almost exclusively in terms of being loved. This may be a denial of other needs (power, assertion, etc.) because she has a unidimensional concept of need: "The basic needs are feelings of love--being loved--family love, and from that, a sense of security; and love of friends which gives a sense of individuality. . . . My family <u>has</u> to like me but with friends,

you're special to them and this gives you an individuality in relation to them."

There is confusion in her mind, however, about whose needs are most important, hers or others'. In other terms, she isn't sure whether self-love or love of others should come first and this confusion makes moral decisions difficult for her. In story one, in reference to Mrs. W she states:

> She's not acting from her needs but from others. I do that myself--not acting on my own needs but on others. (Why?) I was religious when I was thirteen to fourteen. One thing constantly being brought up is that a Christian gives; the feeling of sacrifice; turn the other cheek; help the other guy; others come first before me. Maybe that thing got drummed into me. I wanted to be a good person and you get there by helping others. Now I've dropped formal religion but without realizing it, it carried over. In all my relations with people I really fulfill their needs before my own.

Hence her insistance on fulfilling her own needs represents an attempt to combat an ego-dystonic religious morality she is attempting to rid herself of. Here we can see that she has philosophical as well as psychological doubts about her moral code.

Another basic moral tenet is her belief in human dignity. The purpose of law in her mind is to insure that people:

> "are being respected for who they are." (Why is this important?) Because they're human. Because they have a right to it. Without that kind of thing it goes back to no social order where people cannot live and survive. People have to operate within certain limits and there is a greater measure of individuality and freedom when there are those limits (i.e., respect for others' dignity). Without that limit we can't expect the group to survive. In order for an individual himself to be

> whole and survive and get his wants and needs satisfied, it definitely goes back to self-liking and self-respect. Therefore a person who would like and care for others would tend to acknowledge those limits. The result is that the group is protected and survives and at the same time the individual can be most fulfilled himself. (Why is the group important?) Because we are a group and always will be. If a lot of my needs come from getting things from others, it's important. If I'm OK and not getting from others they're important to me because they fulfill my needs and I fulfill theirs . . . I couldn't be a hermit, because I like and need other people for me to feel good. . . . Sharing the way they feel about me reinforces the way I feel about myself.

This is a very sophisticated way indeed of saying that if one respects others then one will receive their love, which for her is so essential. Her yearnings for self-esteem, security and love are clearly stated here, as they are only loosely covered over by discussions of "human dignity." This is not to say that she does not "really" believe in dignity but that the affective states associated with that value differ among people and are important to view in their own right. Thus her concept of human dignity differs from that held by the fours, in that hers is based on a need for love, while the fours' is based on a striving for integrity. This is another example of how the gratification of her needs and the impulse to be moral conflict for her.

She also <u>expects</u> those in authority to share her moral perspective. The principal in story two, for instance, is wrong because he is: "violating his responsibility in terms of the students. . . . He is in a position of a model for the students."

It can be seen how weighty this sense of responsibility is. Her conscience is a great burden, felt through

the great demands it makes upon her and on others: "If you have a belief, you're responsible to yourself to express it even when there's disagreement." In addition, she is extremely perfectionistic: "I don't like complacency. I think it can be destructive. I don't like people not using their potential. Complacency is letting others think for you. (Why not do that?) It's important for maintaining your self-respect." Here she bases a moral position on the criterion of a psychological state--i.e., personal well-being and self-esteem. It is as if she cannot divorce her affects from the rationalistic philosophy she has come to adopt.

In conflict situations, she is tempted to martyr herself and devote herself to others' needs, but struggles against this impulse. In the second story, she would not buck the principal if it meant she'd be expelled: "Realistically I don't think I'd be the martyr. I'd feel angry and betrayed and that I'd lost a battle." Her impulsive first answer to this question however was to consider getting expelled. This conflict is debilitating because her values are so demanding. Indeed, she would save herself, but as seen above, would feel defeated and somewhat guilty. She will not sacrifice herself but her values almost demand it. She cannot feel good about herself whichever alternative she chooses, which explains her vacillations, rumination, and general preoccupation with self-esteem. Given this conflict she cannot love herself consistently. The conflict here seems to emanate not so much from her moral

code as from her ambivalent incomplete internalization of this partially ego-dystonic code.

The superego pressure behind her morality is omnipresent. All behavior is immediately turned into self-criticism--either good or bad. Hence stealing is wrong primarily because: "Stealing is self-demeaning. . . . If I have to steal there is something inadequate about me. I can't deal with myself and respect myself and others."

Her sense of responsibility borders on a preoccupation. In the cheating story, she focuses on her obligation as a social worker. She can't take his responsibility away from the cheater, but must try to help him. But if he doesn't listen, then other measures are dictated: "My responsibility to him would stop when he says 'I'm not listening.' Responsibility to oneself is most basic."

As noted above, her values put great pressure on her to serve others' needs before her own. Consequently she may feel virtuous but deprived. Especially where being loved is concerned, she is vulnerable to this conflict. An incident at work exemplifies these conflicts. A recent graduate of a drug program at work stayed on as a paraprofessional, but was technically still classified as a client. She got involved in a "dating relationship" with him, knowing that it was probably wrong: "I was attracted to the guy. I probably should have cut it off but he pursued me and was successful. . . . I was responding to my own needs and I didn't consider him as a client. . . . I was doing something

impulsive and spontaneous. I took the risk anyway." There was a conflict with her supervisor who demanded she end it: "It boiled down to professional responsibility versus what I wanted." The supervisor was very disappointed in her: "Her trust in me and my professional integrity were at stake." She agreed with her supervisor but: "other emotional needs were conflicting--liking him, wanting him to like me. Although it was nebulous, I felt I still had violated professional ethics. I felt guilt and badly. . . . I couldn't explain why it happened. It got to the point of maybe losing my job, my placement, my recommendation." Hence if she follows her moral sense, then she feels deprived of "love." If she opts for love (i.e., gratifying more basic non-moral needs), she feels guilt and lack of self-respect. Again we see that while her moral philosophy is perfectly logical and consistent, she cannot put it into practice consistently.

3. Genesis of Moral Position

Miss K gave few descriptive details about her parents or family life, other than that her father had aspirations to be a lawyer but never followed this up, and that her mother passively submitted to father's brutality at home. Apparently there were numerous fights, and she, as the oldest child, on several occasions attempted to intervene on her mother's side. She felt mother was approving and loving but basically ineffectual in dealing with father's violence. Miss K recalls there being a strict religious atmosphere in the home with an emphasis on control of

impulses and devoting oneself to the needs of others.

Discipline in the home was strict and focussed on self-control and stifling sexual and aggressive impulses. Miss K recalled one incident in particular when she was an adolescent, where mother screamed and yelled at her because she had participated in a kissing game at a party.

As noted above, one aspect of her moral orientation is a harsh but incompletely internalized superego. The parental discipline pattern bears on this development. They were guilt-inducers:

> I can't remember being punished very much. Usually they would tell me what I did wrong--enough to elicit guilt feelings and that was the end of it. I don't think they expected me to confess. I'd just go plunk in my room and get over it. I'd feel part hurt and part angry but I don't think I was any less inclined to do it. I felt more hurt and angry than that I was doing something wrong. But I was such a good kid. I rarely did things wrong. I was the oldest.

Her parents demanded to see her feel guilty but seemed not to pursue matters any further. In particular they seemed not to emphasize responsibility or change in behavior. Rather than learning moral "lessons" from them, she was able to control herself enough to be a "goody-goody." It seems that she actually felt it was unfair and that she hadn't in fact done anything except getting caught. Hence internalization did not become complete. Indeed it is possible that her being so good as a child was a reaction-formed response to parental expectation. She gave them surface compliance as they expected and no more.

Another important facet of child-rearing was

calling attention to parental virtues: "They would talk about things in terms of what they were doing and hold themselves up as examples. My father is impeccably honest in terms of money, but not feelings--'When you work, you work and come on time, with no days off. You buy what you need and not what others expect you to have. If you can't pay for things, then don't buy'." Father surfaces as rather self-denying and self-righteous, but also as having integrity and a commitment to internally motivated independent action. But she seems to emphasize his up-tightness and non-giving in terms of feelings more, suggesting a sense of deprivation of close contact with father. He was a good model of integrity for her but seems to have been distant and a bit frightening and unpredictable.

She recalls parental fights when she was four or five:

> I remember father getting violent and screaming. He would sometimes hit her. On one occasion at night I woke up and saw what was happening. I felt hurt and it scared me--her running around the table. I didn't get into it. . . . There was nothing I could have done. But I would have interceded to stop it on mother's side. I did this a lot when I was older--around fourteen or fifteen. . . . Once he was really out of control, on the verge of hitting her. I started screaming at him, that he was a maniac. Then he got angry at me. I felt she was being run over by him. He was in complete control of her.

It appears that she identifies with mother's masochistic helpless position vis-a-vis men and takes this position herself. Indeed she recalls always getting herself in situations with boys where they teased her. She liked the attention but felt out of control, as mother was with father.

It is clear also that she respects her father: "In my family I grew up having a great deal of respect for my father in certain things. I felt a lot of conflict and a lot of respect. Both my mother and father were important to me in being models."

Her image of a person with integrity represents dissatisfaction with herself as well as fantasies of an ideal father:

> A cousin of mine is a very honest person and very persistent. He knows what he wants and goes after it despite any obstacles. . . . He's not materialistic and yet he knows how to enjoy what he likes. He has a very positive attitude toward himself and other people. He's good at what he does, living up to his potential and is a creative person. He cares about people a lot and has a very good relationship with his wife. There's a lot of love and tenderness there. He's assertive and ambitious and yet he never puts himself in a position of exploiting and using others. He's very sensitive to others and very understanding.

It seems she wishes she were more assertive and yet hopes to be able to accomplish this without becoming exploitative. Indeed, exploitation is a most salient issue to her. A person without integrity is: "exploitative, power oriented and uses other people to get their own ends." And yet she is attracted to men like this. In the incident where she was dating a client (detailed above) the man in question seems to have been exploitative and perhaps reminiscent of her violent, powerful father: "He's not a person I want to be involved with. I don't approve of him; he's very slick. . . . He's a rake, a scoundrel type. . . . But at first he didn't show me that part of himself. I believed in the other part he showed me--being honest, happy,

carefree, imaginative, charming and attentive." But her naiveté in the matter is no explanation since even after discovering what he was "really" like, she remained interested enough to risk her professional career. She can't explain it rationally and we must therefore look to the unconscious. It appears that she is being manipulated and used and one suspects there is an element of masochistic surrender involved for her. She feels drawn by him, and unable to exert her own will. He is a spellbinder, an image close to that of the sadistic, unloving but attractive oedipal father. Furthermore, he appears to be a man that father might well disapprove of in the same way her supervisor disapproved; "She said I deserved more and asked what was with me being involved with that sort of guy." Her reaction to the supervisor's opinion was ambivalent: "part of me says whoever I want to be involved with is my business. I'll learn how to handle it. But part of me says there's something to that." There seems to be an element of rebelliousness in this object choice. She is telling a parental substitute (the supervisor) not to interfere with her autonomy. She says 'I know best' but also is aware that the supervisor may be right and there is some hidden reason for her fascination with the man. It is uncertain what her reasons are, but it <u>is</u> clear that she supports the rebellious stance of her siblings. Her brother married a black girl which upset her parents tremendously. She was solidly on brother's side and argued his case hard and long with her

parents. Indeed this vignette was related immediately after the one about her involvement with this client, suggesting a continuity of the rebellion "theme." As a child it appears that her "goody-goody" stance served as a mask to cover over rebellious, power-oriented aggressive impulses.

She also struggled with narcissistic/exhibitionistic impulses as a child: She wanted to be a dancer or an artist: "Or on stage, the center of attraction." She later pushed this aside because: "I wanted to be involved with people." Again a sublimated ideal is substituted for a more narcissistic one. She must strive for the good of others first rather than giving priority to her own immediate exhibitionistic needs.

In high school another shift occurred, in a slightly rebellious but socially acceptable direction: "I wanted to be a lawyer as in TV things--fighting, standing up for what you believe, helping people, fighting against the system." The underlying assertive, narcissistic impulses are thus given limited expression in conjunction with the urge toward rebellious autonomy (anti-system). By being a social worker it seems she has pushed down some of the assertiveness and opted more for the good-girl, "helping people" aspect. Law was also attractive because it was father's aspiration to be a lawyer. He would have been proud of her. So she chooses something more in line with mother's character, perhaps in retaliation against the brutality shown to mother. She joins forces with mother (the meek and

powerless) against the brutal oppressor, to whom she is also attracted.

In early memories, mother surfaces as loving and reliable. In her earliest memory: "I had put my left arm in the washing machine wringer and mother caught me in time. My little arm was all black and blue and I was lying in the hospital on a stretcher, thinking I was on an ironing board. I wanted my brother." Her earliest memory of mother is of mother fighting with father: "I didn't want her to be hurt. I probably wanted to protect her." Next is a recollection of a pregnancy: "I remember her being big and touching her and her telling me she was going to have a baby. . . . She was being understanding to me and wanting to understand and comforting me. If there was ever something I didn't know about, she would comfort me in that way."

An early memory of father was also positively toned:

> He was reading to me--having me sit next to him. He was reading to me from a big book, I was following along, filling in words. I recall the feeling of having him be there with me and sharing with me. And it wasn't me sitting there passively, but doing it; showing I could do it too. He cared about me and was proud.

The next memory is of his anger, however, which seems to have made a deep impression upon her: "It's a fighting one --his being angry, losing control, losing his temper."

Her happiest memory reflects the dominant theme of being loved by a man: "Being in a situation where someone was loving me--the beginning of a feeling--a magic and uncertainty. . . . Mostly with guys I've gone out with.

There was something magical about it--almost imaginary. I know it won't last; it's a momentary kind of thing." This memory has an aura of romantic fantasy about it, which again seems to point toward adolescent oedipal idealizations of knights on horseback, "true love," and the like.

Her saddest memory is also instructive:

> My parents fighting with each other. (What was the impact?) It had the effect of making me learn to control my feelings. I can't express anger. It also had the effect of making me like mother--being controlled, being put down, being dominated. . . . There are instances where I let myself be persuaded. I have certain needs and allow them to be put aside. . . . I don't want to dominate someone else either.

Insight is there but does not resolve the conflict.

Perhaps the most telling statement about her past is the following: "I was scared of father's anger. I was not able to express to him what I felt, like to say 'I hate you,' but probably more than that, 'I want you to love me.' I felt he didn't express it. . . . There was a lack of physical affection." Father gave a lot to her in terms of encouraging her learning and he was a good model of integrity. But she felt a lack of love and was afraid of him. Father was also difficult to deal with because of the rigidity of his beliefs: "He is hard-assed, very rigid, doesn't like the idea of change and doesn't want anybody messing up his belief system. He's very closed up about his feelings . . . and is proud. He turns hurt into anger and refuses to believe in love. He probably believes in survival. Love doesn't exist. . . . He often denied love in general or was denying it for mother, brother, and me.

He's very spontaneous . . . and is not too concerned about how others think about him." What surfaces is her wish to be loved by him and her feeling of rejection.

Her image of mother is much less ambivalent:

> She's always been a good person--concerned, loving and warm, showing affection and physically responsive. She treated us as individuals--wanting us to be independent and self-reliant. She's a quiet, shy person who used to be submissive but has changed a lot. She's very open, not so much with feelings but wanting to know new things, new ideas and is not at all rigid or inflexible. She's a little overly worrysome. Nothing means more to her than her children. I had a protective relationship with her. I would protect her from knowing about my sex life because if she knew she'd fall apart or melt. . . . When I reveal things she gets worried that somehow I'll be hurt.

This closeness with and protectiveness of mother may further explain some of her difficulties in making a total individuated break from her parents. One also suspects that her protective feelings represent acting in a nurturant role so as to counterbalance her own dependency needs. After all, mother was dependent on father and allowed herself to be controlled, so dependency does not appeal to her.

Her semi-masochistic relationships with men have their genesis in her familial relationships. She was close with her siblings especially her brother: "He enjoyed teasing me and I'd feed right into it, with him and other guys. I would react to things they wanted me to and he'd be gleeful. I did enjoy it somewhat too. I guess it was attention; he knew I was there. When he was little I was very protective of him. I'd fight for him and protect him."

She also recalls liking being the good child.

Brother called her a "goody-goody," a characterization she accepts as accurate:

> As a child I was a premature middle-aged lady. I was the oldest, always being good and doing what was expected. But I was in a superior position. I was the one who knew how to do things and do things right. I was very stubborn and easily teased. That's partly still true of me. I had very dogmatic ideas of right and wrong.

In another vein: "I never felt neglected and was on a pedestal. It was very important what others thought of me. . . . My idea of good was performing in the way my parents expected me to. Now it's changed to living up to my own values. They helped me go; they encouraged me to go and were completely supportive." Except as we have seen, she still is struggling with a largely unconscious emotional dependency on them, which has not been entirely erased, especially in her relations with men, of which we have a detailed specimen in her tale of the client/boy friend.

Moreover, in her own eyes she tends to set up emotionally dependent relationships with others:

> I was involved with a small tight group of people. We were together 24 hours a day . . . I thought of it as emotional paralysis. I couldn't get out. I felt angry and wanted to get out but I didn't say anything. I was paralyzed by the bond. I was so controlled it never occurred to me. After a year we all split in different directions. I confronted myself and decided I'd have to be more independent and behave more independently.

Clearly there was a great deal of anger at being so completely controlled, but she was afraid to express it, probably because to be angry implied rejection: "Up until this year I haven't been confronted by the idea that it's

important to express your feelings if you're angry or scared."

Her final summation of her personality is important: "I expect a lot of myself and others. My expectations of others are out of line with reality. Sometimes I pride myself on being logical and rational, but a lot of decisions I make are impulsive. Maybe when I'm being rational my expectations come into play and conflict with what I want on a gut level. When I've made important decisions, they've been impulsive things. . . . Most of the time I basically feel I like myself but at times I defer to others, maybe because I was always deferring to my parents as a child."

4. Summary of Moral Development

In sum, Miss K's morality reflects a thorough-going conflict between strict adherence to doing what is right, principled, honorable and in the best interest of others' needs on the one hand, and gratifying her own needs, desires and wishes on the other. The morally principled side of her morality is dedicated to attaining a state of integrity and self-esteem via responsible moral action, but the strictness of these principles, and the level of self-sacrifice they represent to her, and the degree to which they are associated in her mind with her parents' somewhat over-demanding expectations, all make it difficult for Miss K to act in a manner consistent with her principles. She experiences her morality as burdensome and unfairly demanding, which it appears to be, since it is dominated by a

punitive, demanding incompletely internalized ego-dystonic superego. Because she resents her own morality and the parental power it is based upon, she periodically since childhood has found it necessary to act out rebellious and angry impulses. Such acting out appears to have increased during adolescence and has at times taken the form of "immoral" behavior in her own eyes, characterized by self-destructive components. Thus when she acts out, she hurts herself more than others in terms of reality consequences (e.g., the client/boy friend), deflated self-esteem, and intense guilt. Her anger is thus directed toward herself, and in this way she punishes herself for her "misdeeds," just as in her family the appearance of guilt was sufficient to placate her parents. Her anger is also held in check via longstanding characterological reaction-formations which take the form of sweet, compliant, and somewhat submissive behavior particularly in response to sadistic and exploitative men. In part this masochistic stance represents an identification with her weak, submissive but loving mother, who apparently accepted father's hostility in a passive manner.

Her strict morality is insufficient to keep all of her impulses dormant, however. While she struggles against power-oriented manipulative urges, it appears that these impulses influence her behavior somewhat. In addition, while she has attempted to shut off narcissistic/exhibitionistic expressions, they too have not been controlled

entirely. Therefore she suffers from frequent guilt and lowered self-esteem. And since her moral system is not entirely ego-syntonic, she rarely feels a sense of integrity when exercising it. She does not obtain gratification from exerting self-control or being responsible, for she feels these behaviors are expected by others (parent, etc.) in order to obtain love. Lacking a firmly internalized locus of self-esteem, she needs constant reassurance from others that she is worthwhile and loved.

It is clear that Miss K took mother's side in the power struggles in the home, but still wished to receive love from father, whom she continues to admire. Indeed, she herself described her main goal in life as "receiving love from a man." Her object choices to the present appear to have been dictated by a desire to find someone exploitative and powerful like father. Indeed, her submissiveness and masochism seem to represent being like the object father chose to love (i.e., mother). Clearly then, Miss K continues to experience intense oedipal conflicts which lead to acting out in her interpersonal relationships and professional life. In relation to father and other men she also acts on pre-oedipal impulses to surrender and be controlled and engulfed.

It also seems clear that Miss K is extremely insightful about her own behavior, although she doesn't appear to be able to use these insights productively. It also appears that she uses insightfulness as a way of

rationalizing her behavior in order to avoid change, much as highminded principles are used to justify self-aggrandizing motives by Mr. J. Miss K is also capable of less conflicted object relations and more adaptive behavior. She is quite intelligent, although as noted above, tends to use this defensively in quasi-philosophical rationalizations of her conflicts.

5. Summary of Family Dynamics and Character Development

Miss K views her parents as having engaged in a sado-masochistic battle all the years she can remember. Father is recalled as physically brutal and menacing. She sees him as espousing firm moral principles but as being rigid and generally "tight" in the affect realm. Father used to hold himself up to the children as a moral ideal, but would then apparently lose control of his anger and beat his wife in full view of the children. Mother on her part was submissive and masochistic and seemed to court this assaultive behavior of her husband. Miss K recalls her mother as a loving, gentle yet ineffectual soul. Both parents were firm about prohibiting the expression of impulse, especially sexuality and tended to use guilt-inducing tactics to force superficial compliance with their dictates. No further internalization was expected or encouraged, according to Miss K.

Given these family dynamics, her social welfare morality is a comprehensible product. Beyond learning a

"turn the other cheek" religious philosophy, the seeming injustice of father's brutality visited upon her martyred mother was probably a vision sufficiently powerful to engage her protective impulses. Hence in the moral realm she wishes to take care of everyone and vanquish the oppressors. However in order to do so, she must make herself a martyr who rejects all "personal" narcissistic gratifications. Therefore she is in perpetual conflict over exercising her social welfare morality, for she feels it is unfair that she must subordinate her self-interest to the "general good." Another problem lies in her oedipally determined need to masochistically surrender to men in the image of her father. Hence there is an internal counter pressure that pushes her to martyr herself; to allow herself to be used and abused. An hysterical character structure with prominent masochistic features has been set down to combat this basic intrapsychic and interpersonal conflict.

II. Summary of Stage Five

In his thesis Kohlberg (1958) summarizes stage five reasoning as follows:

> An orientation to social welfare and social contract consistent with the rights and welfare of individuals. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general rights and in terms of standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is socially agreed upon, right or wrong is a matter of personal values and opinion. The result is an emphasis upon the social point of view, but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms

> of rational considerations of social utility. Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract are the binding elements of obligation, in the context of considerations of welfare (Kohlberg 1958, 259 pp.).

In linking stage five thinking with general personality considerations, Kohlberg notes that stage five is: "an impersonal, rationalistic orientation to morality which largely excludes the self's sentiments" (Kohlberg, 1958, p. 260).

In his discussion of stage five, Kohlberg emphasizes the rational element in the thinking of subjects employing this type of moral reasoning. More sophisticated moral arguments are presumed to be employed than at earlier stages and in general the individual's morality is seen to be dominated by logical, intellectually sophisticated reasoning. The interview findings on stage five subjects do not support such contentions, however. On the contrary, while it is true that stage five subjects use highly abstract reasoning in the moral realm, much of this reasoning is used for defensive purposes and in fact much of the moral behavior of fives from their own accounts is dominated by irrational, unconscious motives which steer them toward self-defeating behaviors demeaning of their self-esteem and integrity. Moreover, despite the fives' intellectual sophistication in discussing moral issues, it was extremely difficult to separate intellectual arguments about abstract moral issues (free speech, etc.) from strong feelings related to dynamically significant historical conflicts in their personal lives. For no other subjects was the expected linkage

between moral reasoning and dynamically significant affective states as apparent.

In addition, among fives more than any other subjects in the sample there was a pronounced disparity between moral reasoning or judgment and actual moral behavior. On the basis of Kohlberg's writing, such a finding would not be predicted. On the contrary, Kohlberg has asserted that those higher on his moral development scale are more likely to act in a moral manner than lower subjects. Presumably this contention was borne out experimentally in a Milgram type experimental design (Reported by Kenniston, 1968). But for these fives there was a clear conflict between their reasoning and behavior in the moral realm, a conflict clearly traceable to its genetic roots, as will be seen below.

The fives did not appear to be more intelligent than the fours, another expectation drawn from Kohlberg's writings. In fact, the fives seemed to use much of their intellectual skills defensively. Indeed, they consciously admitted to rationalizing constantly in the moral realm as a way of attempting to avoid guilt. It was also clear that by expressing emotional conflicts in abstract, intellectual moral terms they were attempting to avoid direct expression or awareness of painful feelings.

Another expectation based on Kohlberg's writing is that fives should show a greater degree of internalization of moral principles than stage four subjects. The interview

data indicated however that in comparison with the fours, the fives showed less complete, more conflicted internalization of principles. The fives developed demanding principles of concern for social welfare and the needs of others in conjunction with self-sacrifice and moral integrity but are unable to put these laudable principles into action. Indeed much of their reported behavior is indicative of resentment of the strictness of their own values and rejection of the parental models upon which these principles were based.

The fives avowed concern for social welfare is demonstrably over-determined and reflects dynamic conflict as well as the operation of various defensive strategies. For instance, being concerned about social welfare is a representation of the fives' need to be "good," innocent, selfless individuals who are not concerned about their own needs in the moral realm. In part, then, being socially "concerned" is a continuation of their reaction-formed stance which serves to deny narcissistic needs and designs, as well as reflecting the workings of punitive superego demands. While this is in no way a criticism of the principles they espouse, it is a description of the use to which they put such principles and their reasons for so doing. Hence their morality functions to attempt resolution of superego--id conflicts and as such reflects the classical neurotic conflict described in structural terms by Freud (1923), Fenichel (1945) and other psychoanalytic writers.

To be sure, all moral positions probably are over-determined and are reflective of conflict on some level. What is being suggested is not that the fives are unique but that the specific conflict experienced by fives in their emotional lives is given clear expression in the moral realm to the extent that the fives' morality is based more on conflict than adaptive considerations. This contention will be documented in detail in the next chapter. Another way of putting this is to say that dynamic conflict interferes more with the fives' moral lives than it does for fours and possibly threes and twos as well. For, as noted above, the fives' abstract morality does not facilitate their achieving a sense of integrity but rather occasions self-defeating behaviors required by punitive superego demands. Hence the fives cannot live up to their principles, which in their own right appear to be consistent.

A more general point about Kohlberg's stage five is in order at this point. The genre of "five" reasoning described by Kohlberg lends itself to the use of a variety of defensive, conflict-dominated operations such as the ones detailed above. Because of the abstractness and idealism of the position it need not serve as a functional morality and can therefore be put to different psychic "uses." Another "use" of stage five reasoning will be explored below in discussion of the so-called 5/2 regression.

On a philosophical rather than psychological level, I believe we can detect inherent problems in stage 5 moral

argumentation, which make this sort of philosophy attractive, "useful" but also self-defeating to those with character structures like our fives. While "Social Welfare" argumentation as described by Kohlberg appears on the surface to be logical and consistent on a philosophical level, it is a form of reasoning that is likely to come to grief once a real person attempts to live by it. By holding up the general welfare as the superordinate ideal, self-interest or narcissistic investment becomes a denigrated ideal or at least a "second-class" ideal. In this hierarchy of values, then, there is no synthesis of narcissistic and object-related "moral" motivations. Hence if one wishes to put this philosophy into practice, one must denigrate narcissism, which is not healthy for people to do as Freud and others have told us. Hence if this philosophy is followed, it can lead only to intrapsychic conflict in practice. As we have seen, our fives could not put it into practice without feeling they were cheating themselves. The most this philosophy allows is that one denigrate the self but bask in the self-righteous glow of martyrdom. Incidentally, my analysis here parallels Nietzsche's characterization of socialists and Christians as "poor in life" and has some points in common with Hegel's critique of Kant (a forerunner of Kohlberg).

A related consideration involves the reasons that such a philosophy is so attractive to people like our fives. One answer is that it is a philosophy of sainthood--a moral

system that immediately bestows accolades on he or she who follows it. It is a royal road to heaven--a path eagerly pounced upon by those who are tormented by punitive accusing superegos, and who come from families where religion is used to control people (as both Mr. J and Miss K describe their backgrounds). In addition, five reasoning is logical and abstract, which is compelling to individuals who have learned how to intellectualize to avoid superego censure. Moreover, by virtue of being so abstract and logical, it is a philosophy that seemingly takes affect out of the moral realm--clearly a bonus to people like Mr. J and Miss K who have such difficulty keeping their feelings out of moral issues (not surprisingly, given their family backgrounds).

Another reason stage 5 reasoning is attractive is that it clearly labels the "good guys" and "bad guys" in the moral realm. It is especially easy to "get the goods" on evil administrators and other authorities (parental objects) whom one can villify all the while basking in the innocence and self-righteousness of victimhood. Moreover, because five reasoning does not hold the law as sacred, it gives license to determining which laws one likes, a potential form of nihilism that easily leads to abuse. Let us not forget that Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin were all avowedly "humanistic" Marxists in the mold of Marx's early humanism (Marx, 1846). Napoleon wished to "unify" the world and even Hitler had some primitive notions about unification, although some were expendable to him, as is inevitably the

case with grand schemes of forceful unification. What I am ultimately saying on a political level, then, is that stage 5 reasoning is fine in the abstract (such as in philosophy books) but once put into practice can lead to serious, and inevitable abuse [Sartre: "All radicals are destined to betray the very principles they fight for."] Questions as to alternatives are not really germaine to this discussion.

To return to Kohlberg's characterization of stage 5 thinking I believe that the abstractness and idealism of stage 5 thinking also centers around psychological concerns not envisioned by Kohlberg in his writings on this stage. The fives in this sample discuss ideal states with primary emphasis upon attaining interpersonal and intrapsychic equilibrium and security and upon attaining self-esteem and integrity. The intensity of their quest for self-esteem and their self-descriptions clearly indicate that stage five subjects do not generally feel good about themselves, especially in comparison with stage four subjects. Hence, again in contrast to the logic of Kohlberg's developmental theory, the stage five subjects experience doubt and conflict in the moral as well as interpersonal realm not experienced by the stage four subjects.

The idealism of these fives can be viewed from yet another perspective. The fives tend to philosophize around any issue and feel comfortable in the realm of ideas. Indeed, they are articulate, bright and adept at manipulating verbal formulas and ideas, which gives them a great deal of

intellectual power. They are kings in the realm of ideas. In the realm of action, however, they feel themselves to be considerably less powerful or in control. Indeed the fives expressed strong feelings of powerlessness in relation to parents and authorities and tend to combat them through philosophical arguments about human rights, exploitativeness of authorities and the system, etc. They rebel and fight their parents in the safer realm of ideas.

Their manipulation of ideas resembles the activities undertaken usually during middle and late adolescence in the service of developing a WELTANSCHAUUNG (Jacobson, 1964). However, the adolescent philosophizing of the fives continues to serve defensive rebellious purposes and has become part of their defensive structures and they have been unable to give it up. And like much adolescent philosophizing, their thinking is often unrealistic, self-righteous, extremely judgmental and quasi-totalitarian in the narcissistic overvaluation of their own beliefs and opinions as moral "fact" or "Law." The fives' search for perfection is in part a search for absolution and surcease of guilt and as such is doomed to failure, for their standards and goals are unrealistically demanding of themselves and others.

Because of (1) the pervasiveness of dynamic conflict in the interpersonal realm and (2) because stage five reasoning is sufficiently abstract to be corruptible stage five thinking is more unstable than that of the other stages studied in this sample. There is constant pressure to

regress to stage two (narcissistic) functioning because standards and expectations demand too much and give too little in the way of self-esteem or narcissistic gratification. There are a variety of ways of dealing with this conflict between narcissistic impulses and punitive superego demands, which may explain Kohlberg's observation that there is more variation in stage five thinking than any other stage. For purposes of clarity in this presentation, the 5/2 regression will be dealt with as a separate but related stance to the general stage five position.

A. Family Dynamics

The fives have strongly conflicted perceptions and feelings about their parents. On the one hand, they felt that they were loved by their parents and believed their parents were concerned about their welfare. They feel, however, that this love was not unconditional. In order to be able to count on parental love, they had to be "good" and please their parents. If they were not good, then love would be withdrawn and used as a power-tool to extract compliance. The parents had rigid moral standards and expectations, especially about impulse control and the fives learned how to give the <u>appearance</u> of being innocent and good and how to verbalize the "correct" formulas. By "showing" contrition and guilt they were able to manage their parents. The five ability to use high-minded moralistic rationalizations was given great impetus from such interactions as was the skill of expressing rebellion in covert

ways. However, the fives also internalized these demanding parental voices and therefore had to contend with unrealistic superego demands in the absence of external demands. In particular, it appears that the opposite-sex parent for both Mr. J and Miss K took on primary disciplining responsibility and was also the most punitive and self-righteous parent. Mr. J and Miss K felt coerced and pressured by this powerful opposite-sex parent and experienced a sense of helplessness and fear in response to them. But they also felt submissive and desirous of fusion with this parent. Therefore in later years both experienced a conflict between rebelling against this parent or "joining" them in some way. These ambivalent feelings complicated their oedipal feelings to the extent that they have been unable to resolve their oedipal attachments and go about the business of forging an autonomous identity. The opposite-sex parent also made separation difficult by demanding submissiveness and actively opposing autonomy. In Mr. J's case, his mother was clearly seductive and seemed to feel that she "owned" him because she bore him. Miss K is more in touch with feeling a deprivation of love from her father than a strong oedipal attachment, but the dynamics appear to be similar.

Both feared rejection from this powerful, attractive parent and therefore learned to find ways of pleasing that parent and thereby obtaining love. An internal locus of evaluation thus never came into full operation even though the fives report that the opposite-sex parent was a

morally upstanding individual whom they respected and wished to emulate in the moral realm. Rather than striving for integrity however, the fives were preoccupied with obtaining love from without. Hence they are more concerned about self-esteem than integrity and do not feel themselves capable of obtaining either without clear external sanctioning. They are overly concerned about parental and other external evaluation and have not developed reliable or realistic ways of evaluating themselves. As noted above, the standards they do use to evaluate themselves are overly severe and demanding, representing as they do archaic superego demands untempered by later experience. In this vein, it is clear that the parents of fives used religious doctrine in a coercive, guilt-inducing manner.

The same-sex parent is portrayed as loving but as ineffectual in relation to the other parent by both Mr. J and Miss K. Indeed, Miss K even felt sorry for her mother and protective toward her. The same-sex parent was seen by them as loving but not as an attractive model. Identifications with this parent are present but weak and conflicted. Hence identification with the same-sex parent as a means of resolving oedipal conflicts was not feasible for them. Instead they continue to be burdened by oedipal conflicts and their diverse derivatives. Specifically, in their adult lives, the fives in our sample experience intensely charged value conflicts with their parents and strong injustice feelings which have become associated with most authorities.

By opposing "the system" they give vent to angry feelings that they could not afford to express more directly to parents.

B. Empathy and Object Relations

Fives talk about the importance of being empathic toward others but in the form of abstract philosophical discourse. They feel that they "ought" to be this way, as a result of superego dictate. In practice, however, their empathy for others is limited although certainly not non-existent. An individual's feelings are seen to be irrelevant in moral conflict and they are drawn toward applying general principles. What they do say about others' feelings, however, is rather shallow at times and dominated by their own general feelings of injustice. For instance their descriptions of their parents show periodic streaks of insightfulness and empathy but are dominated by unresolved oedipal feelings toward the parents which interferes with a sensitive understanding of their parents as people in their own right, instead of "PARENTS." The fours, in contrast, seem to have a less conflict-dominated view of their parents, which results in a greater capacity to empathize and understand. It seems that the fives have difficulty empathizing with non-parental objects for similar reasons. Their conflicts interfere with their perceptions of all objects, including themselves.

The fives are quite insightful about their own feelings however, and it seems clear that they possess the

abilities necessary for empathic understanding of others. It seems, though, that they are not capable of using these potential skills. For the most part they are preoccupied with their own strong feelings and perhaps in part for that reason they are relatively uninterested in others' feelings except in a "theoretical" way.

Their descriptions of others are at times sophisticated and appreciative of the complexities of human behavior but are lacking in the sense of "liveness" and vibrancy so characteristic of the fours' object representations. In terms of actual interactions, it appears that the fives are unusually attentive to power considerations and discrepancies and as quite dependent. Mutuality in object relations is not a state they seem to understand or strive for, except in the most abstract intellectual terms. And while they value power in the interpersonal realm they often find themselves being manipulated and used by others. They appear to have learned, by their own accounts, how to make themselves attractive to others but in part this means submitting to others in a rather dependently even masochistic fashion. It appears that they feel most comfortable in the role of willing victim who then is justified in feeling wronged and abused. This pattern is particularly true of Miss K.

In their descriptions of important object relations the fives portray themselves as passive, extremely dependent and as having great difficulty with self-assertion other

than through covertly rebellious activities. They do appear to be impulsive and given to acting out conflict in their everyday behavior, however. These two facts further suggest that unresolved oedipal conflicts influence their relatedness to objects.

In general the fives have a highly stylized view of human interactions which focuses on obtaining self-esteem and security and which is expressed as part of a sophisticated philosophy of human nature, which however betrays their narcissistic problems and preoccupations.

C. Identity Formation

As noted above, the parents of fives were not utilized as healthy models for identity development. These parents did not encourage or allow their children freedom of choice in terms of occupation, instead attempting to determine the direction their children took. In part because of this pressure, the fives have experienced a great deal of difficulty separating from their parents. Adolescence, typically a time when individuals re-experience oedipal conflicts (Jacobson, 1964; Freud, 1958; Blos, 1968) seems to have been a most difficult period for them. On the one hand they attempted to separate via rebellion, mostly in terms of opposing "the system" and by making object choices noxious to their parents. On the other hand, however, they did not feel themselves ready to individuate, and re-experienced intense submissive needs toward the powerful parents. Somewhat speculatively we may consider that they

"resolved" the conflict by resolutely remaining "stuck" in adolescent turmoil rather than moving on to adulthood or back to childhood. It seems that they have obtained a certain amount of gratification via their rebelliousness and wish not to have to relinquish this and become adults. On the other hand, because of oedipal conflicts it seems that they have been unable to relinquish their parents as primary objects. Moreover, they give no indication of being able to form new identifications leading toward a solidification of identity. And they have not been able to reorganize their earlier ambivalent identifications with parents. Accordingly they appear to be lacking in a sense of purpose or overriding direction. Instead they sift around looking for love, security, peace, and tranquility, wishing to avoid conflict at all cost. To be sure, they have devoted a great deal of energy toward forming an abstract Weltanschauung, but these "philosophical" efforts seem not to have been integrated with decision-making and acting in the world. Indeed, their moral and world philosophies represent a realm of their experience which is isolated from other spheres of their lives. Hence their form of adolescent philosophizing seems not to have lead to any solidification of identity, largely I would suggest because their standards and expectations are untempered by current experience.

D. Superego Development/Narcissism and Self-esteem

The superego development of stage five subjects has been influenced by pervasive dynamic conflicts. More than

other stages, the fives experience painful anxiety over the clash of narcissistic impulses and moral inclinations. In structural terms, the fives' superegos ids and egos are in conflict. Parental superego models were rigid, punitive and hostile and demanded moral perfection in exchange for love. Parents emphasized control of all impulses and encouraged the experience of guilt in their children. Indeed guilt rather than integrity was the focus of the parents' moral vision and as a result the parents' morality functions as an ego-dystonic almost ego-alien internal force that the fives have swallowed under pressure. Because the parents demanded good behavior in exchange for love, the pursuit of love came to be the dominant motivating force in their children's lives. In terms of moral orientation, then, the fives are more concerned with obtaining support and love from important others than with maintaining a sense of integrity. Structurally what this means is that there is a lack of loving superego components in their morality in Schafer's (1960) terms, and their locus of evaluation is partially external. Self-esteem is thus primarily based on being loved rather than loving the self.

The rigidity of the fives' superegos has been influenced by parental rigidity. It appears that the parents did not alter or tone down their moral expectations of their children as they grew toward adulthood. Therefore the children had no model of an adaptive, flexible superego system. An additional complication is the degree to which the

fives resent their parents' love-withdrawing, guilt-inducing power assertions and have consequently refused to accept parental standards or their <u>own</u> moralities completely. They developed elaborate defensive maneuvers designed to "fool" their parents and their own superegos into believing that everything they did was moral and unselfish. They learned how to use high-minded verbal formulas to please others; they became adept at giving "moral" reasons for acts undertaken for clearly self-aggrandizing motivations; they became moralistic and self-righteous and preached "moral obligation" to others; and they developed intellectual conceptions of "integrity," "concern for others," etc., which served to identify them as "righteous folk." These formulations however served mostly defensive purposes and rarely were put into action. Their dedication to abstract principle did not result from identification with a moral model with integrity, as with the fours. And the fives' principles seem to have minimal effect on their actual behavior. Indeed it seems that the fives have found it necessary throughout their lives to act out their anger at parents through covert rebelliousness which at times bordered on immoral behavior (e.g., Mr. J's urinating in the bushes). They felt the appropriate guilt, confessed to others to feel better, and then <u>continued</u> to act in the same manner. Hence guilt for fives does <u>not</u> appear to have any effect on actual behavior. The fives feel badly about what they do because they were taught to <u>show</u> these feelings. On one

level change is difficult for them because it is blocked by largely unconscious conflict between superego and id systems. On another level, they do not wish to change because they feel themselves to have been the victims of injustice and therefore they deserve compensation.

The fives' superego configuration is comprehensible in terms of their handling of oedipal conflicts. They have not been able to resolve oedipal feelings via strong identifications with same-sex parents. Their state of continued oedipal conflict is consistent with their incompletely internalized morality, their punitive superegos, their periodic preoccupation with pre-oedipal impulses (dependence, power, etc.), and the lack of development of a reliable integrity system governing their morality. These facts reinforce the psychoanalytic hypothesis that resolution of oedipal conflicts is of signal importance in the development of morality both in the primary oedipal years and during the second individuation process of adolescence (Blos, 1968).

Another way of viewing the fives' conflict is in terms of a narcissistic problem. They did not experience sufficient gratification and love from their demanding parents and definitely felt insecure in the love-withdrawing atmosphere in the home. As a consequence they have not been able to give up earlier childhood narcissistic positions which ordinarily are left behind when narcissistic growth proceeds. In addition it appears that their parents

were very harsh in condemning narcissistic trends and preoccupations in their children. Hence the fives attempt to mask their self-preoccupation but it surfaces in their functional disinterest in others and emphasis on getting what they deserve for themselves. But because of intense superego pressure they are forced to disguise their narcissism with moral "frosting."

Their narcissistic "fixation" is reflected in the state of their ego-ideals, as well. These ideals are primitive and unrealistic in their emphasis on omnipotence and omniscience. Naked power wishes are rationalized and denied in intellectual fashion but have not been obliterated or gratified. Their self-righteousness and grandiosity about their own moral values also suggests the defensive function of these ideals. Most of the narcissistic needs of fives have been funneled into this "moral grandiosity," as opposed to the twos, who openly seek gratification on a more basic, less pretentious level. Because of their highly developed punitive superegos, however, the fives cannot acknowledge their desires and needs on this gross amoral plane. For them, everything has to be justified by a higher "moral" purpose. It is also worthy of mention that the ego-ideals of fives represent fantasies about ideal parents, which reflects fixation at early levels of value development (Jacobson, 1964; A. Reich, 1954).

E. Ego Development and Character Organization

In general the fives are intelligent and capable of basically adaptive functioning. However there has been an over-development of intellectual verbal skills for defensive purposes, as noted above. Hence they do not utilize their intelligence and ego skills fully. One problem is in the moral realm where there is a lack of integration of moral reasoning and moral behavior. Their intellectual moral philosophy functions as an island isolated from the mainland of their actual behavior. They experience some difficulty in planning and solidifying their identities largely because of the intrusion of the dynamic conflict between id and superego in their psychic economies. This conflict drains energy that could be used adaptively in other spheres in their lives. Their egos are "caught" in the middle of superego-id conflict and have ambivalent "allegiances" to each "combatant." Hence their great intellectual potential is not utilized fully. Because of their narcissistic fixation and superego problems, their egos are under siege, much as is the case during adolescence (A. Freud, 1958). Impulsive, rebellious, fickle, narcissistic behavior surfaces as a result, because their egos are not strong enough to curtail periodic "impulsive" episodes. In this sense their character structure resembles that of a classical "impulse neurotic" (cf. Shapiro, 1965).

The main difference between fours and fives in terms of ego and intelligence is that the fours seem to have more

conflict-free ego available than do fives. Functionally, then, the fours seem able to use more of their intellectual potential for adaptive purposes. This again suggests that Kohlberg's exclusive focus on gross I.Q. as a measure of intelligence is a mistake that interferes with a fuller understanding of the complex relationship between intelligence and moral development.

The fives are also insightful about themselves but in a way that does not appear to be helpful in modulating their behavior. Hence, as with numerous other aspects of their functioning, the fives' self-insight exists in an isolated intellectualized form.

III. Kohlberg's 5/2 Retrogression: Machiavellians

A. Mr. L--interview; Kohlberg Moral Maturity Score = 447[1]

1. Representative Kohlberg Dilemma Responses

Mr. L's responses to the Kohlberg stories betray the 5/2 split even at a time when he was most clearly using stages 5 and 6 reasoning. For instance, in his response to the first story, he is attentive both to pragmatic-hedonistic and abstract moral considerations. He argues that Mrs. W is wrong because her act ". . . 1) unnecessarily inconvenienced Mr. Jones. 2) It contributed to the reinforcement

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[1]Mr. L's score of 447 technically falls into Kohlberg's stage 4. However as will be seen below, he achieves this score because he reasons simultaneously at stages 5 and 2, and the latter scores pull his average down. Since there was no evidence of any stage 4 reasoning in his protocol, I decided to view him as a 5/2 reasoner, rather than as a "4".

and growth of racism--which contributes to the inhibition of the potential of minorities to achieve their desired ends and corrupts the rational and moral fibers of the majority." The stage 2 tinge to the first part was judged unscorable however and the response was coded as a mixture of stages 5 and 6 reasoning on Kohlberg's BIII dimension. Mr. L goes on to argue in stage 5 terms that Mrs. W has the right to determine who lives in her rooming house ". . . only insofar as her decisions (or discrimination) are based on rational and just grounds."

In story 2, Mr. L gives more stage 5 arguments, this time on Kohlberg's D dimension. He argues that Fred should obey the principal's order "only if it can be demonstrated that his publication presents clear and present danger to the effective and 'profitable' operation of the school."

In story 4, clear stage 2 responses emerge. For instance, Mr. L argues that a judgment about who "did worse," Karl or Bob, ". . . would depend on the relative circumstances of the store owner and the old man." Greater punishment to one ". . . depends on damage done." Both these responses were scored as stage 2 reasoning on Kohlberg's dimension BII.

The admixture of 5 and 2 arguments occurs in several places in Mr. L's protocol, rendering his answer unscorable. For instance, he argues in story 6 that the social worker should feel no responsibility to report the thief: "To do so he would likely sacrifice the trust of the community and

this trust is more important than his report to the police which could simply be denied by the confessee." The line between pragmatics and principles is difficult to draw in this case.

It is perhaps worth noting at this point that the simultaneous appearance of 5 and 2 reasoning contradicts Kohlberg's notion that the 5/2 position represents a temporary "retrogression" to nihilistic thinking by adolescents involved in identity conflict. In his responses to the stories Mr. L shows himself capable of giving both 5 and 2 responses and one suspects he could give other stage responses as well, depending on the audience hearing his remarks. Nowhere in his writings does Kohlberg evidence any comprehension of such moral fluidity.

2. Moral Orientation

Mr. L's answers to the Kohlberg questionnaire were unique in this sample in that there was a noticeable shift in response on the written questionnaire and the interview. While there were elements of stage two in his original questionnaire as seen above predominantly his reasoning was stage 5, as reflected in his moral maturity score. In the interviews however, his reasoning is entirely stage 2 and his perspective on the shift is also clarified.

In the interviews there is a total rejection of the larger focus in moral issues. Conflicts boil down to conflicting needs of individuals and the only valid end or goal is maximizing happiness. In conflict, one must decide

who will be harmed more. For instance, in the case of Mrs. W: "She has a right to a decent existence. He (Mr. J) has a relative right to live where he chooses. . . . If he has other choices about where to live, she'd be right."

He recognizes this position as a shift from earlier feelings:

> I recognize a fairly objective change in my attitudes. I used to be "the great contextuator"--believing in the overview--a moral consciousness (i.e., his "former" stage five views). It was very abstract: to weaken the moral fiber of the "glob" (society, etc.) is dangerous. This was a very abstract, theoretical discussion like Thomas Acquinas. I'm not there now. Now there's just Mrs. W and Mr. J and they both have rights. . . . I was raised in a Catholic family. My father is a fundamentalist. They had their "glob." They had something for everything. The priest had an answer for everything.

Many facets of this position bear examination. First is the tonality of the statement. He derides himself for being so foolish as to believe in a moral superstructure. He treats it as an aberation of a young mind, as will be seen below. Beyond this is the statement that anyone who believes in this is foolish and misguided. Moral reality is defined by his perception--a fact he willingly and smugly admits. We also get a notion of the meaning of his former "moral career." A meaning and order was imparted to everything in such a grand system.

His method of dealing with moral conflict is also striking. He can "con" himself into believing anything. Asked how Mrs. W would feel if she was against discrimination personally, he said: "She'd feel very badly for a time and then she'd forget it. It helps a person to

forget. I'd rationalize 'what can one man do--impotence.' Also I'm inconsistent. Sometimes I'll argue on the level of the 'glob' and other times not." This seems to be a totally conscious manipulation of his values to fit the situation.

His position about principle is perfectly clear and related with great pride. Indeed he told me he teaches this in his classes and enjoys the tension he causes in the students: "If I were threatened (role-playing Mrs. W) I could lie. I wouldn't justify lying because one can define lying to perpetuate harm or good. I'd have no trouble lying. It's not my job to change the world. If I want to change the world then I do it in a policy position, like in my job." Principles are thus flexible and can be made to fit the situation. Moral principles are subordinated to his self-interest and can be used to serve it.

Concern for others does come into the picture, but in a way clearly linking it to self-interest. He would not take Mrs. W to court: "It's a scared, threatened woman who wants to be happy. Why smash her world? I wouldn't want mine smashed. 'Do onto others.' It works. It's workable. 'You pat my back, and I'll pat yours.' It's the only way people can live in the same space. I can get profound about this--the "happiness calculus," etc., but that's bullshit. I was in philosophy." Indeed, he <u>is</u> adept at playing with words and concepts.

Mr. L's goals are not to hurt others but rather to aggrandize himself and to attain power. He respects power

and loves exercising it. He believes for instance that the principal in story two should govern his tactics on what would be most prudent to do. If there is great pressure from the parents, his bosses, he better shut the paper down. If there isn't much pressure he can deliver a speech to the parents about how they should learn free speech principles from their kids. He would help the kids get their due also: "We'll do your thing another way--we'll get it in a different way. You're darn right I'm being deceptive--I won't be oppressed. I'd make a great guerrilla war fighter." The grandiosity of the vision of his own power and importance are striking.

He does believe free speech is good: "because it permits progress. It helps people to communicate freely. I value reality. It's the only good thing we have. . . . It allows us to get at reality. There is a craving I feel that anything that is good is real." On one level what this means to him is that what is good for him is real for everyone--an attitude which is consistent with both his five and two arguments, and which reflects the dictatorial bent to his character. It is clear that he would like to be in a position to define and enforce "reality" for everyone.

His love for exercising power is omnipresent but not entirely acceptable to him: His first response to the situation of Fred publishing segregationist views is: "I'm a man of position and power (speaking for the principal) I want to use that power. I don't agree with your views.

I've got some clout and I'll use it. I don't give you permission to publish. That's my gut reaction--let me think. . . . 'You have permission if you can solicit and allow alternate views'." The struggle over the use of power is clear. His first impulse is to blindly use his power, but then he decides to be fair and consistent. Hence it appears that he is not entirely comfortable with his power wishes. He gives a quick explanation which however smacks of "finesse": "It bothers me to think I might be power-hungry. I would like to believe I would not start defining reality for everybody. It presumes omniscience--that somebody knows. I don't believe that's how reality is. It would bother me to act the role I KNOW. I hope I would be criticized and would listen." But even here it is assumed he would do it and then listen to reason. But he might not, even in his own estimation. Indeed, he realizes he hates criticism: "It's hard for me to listen. I bristle. I have to work at that but I think it's valuable to work at that. But I've never liked criticism and I've been extremely competitive, blossoming from a large family (twelve kids)."

Another related feeling is getting what is coming to him. In the scholarship cheating story he empathizes with the other contestants: "I may have had a chance for that. I may have won it. I earned it, it's mine. You earn what you get. I would blow the whistle because it's not something I would like to happen to me. I would not like to be cheated out of something. Of course I've also

cheated a lot in school, because I wanted the god-damn grade."

In the ghetto situation (story six) he would keep quiet because "exposing him would jeopardize my work. I value my work to the extent that I wouldn't report it. What's more important, the job or the work? I'm not sure which. I value not valuing the job. But I eat and need things like everyone else. I'm not above opting for the job." Here he gets involved in an abstract philosophical discussion of the difference between the job and work and thus avoids any and all feelings about the concrete situation.

A more general view of his functioning around conflict comes in a tangential statement about his work in policy planning. When he does analysis, it is predicated on a personal value position which he attempts to hide: "It wouldn't be effective (if I made my values known) I want power but I don't 'print' this, especially around powerful people. . . . I've got to think, 'gee that's awful, what happened to the fact-gatherer?' There should be a conflict but I don't feel it. (How do you experience conflict?) I don't--one way or the other it's going to be decided. I preclude conflict by being able to rationalize any course of action." Again this is said with great pride and smugness, betraying his pervasive narcissism. The power, superiority, etc., over others pleases him and he is gratified when he can put one over on someone with principles.

3. Genesis of Moral Orientation

Mr. L came from a large Catholic family, where he was the second oldest of twelve kids. In this religious family he heard about guilt and sin all the time but it seems that he knew how to act guilty enough to get himself off the hook. Indeed he claims to have made a conscious effort to eradicate guilt from his life. When asked to describe a situation where he felt guilty, he said:

> I have a temper, I get mad. I get into situations where I do not want to compromise. It hurts my wife to tears. . . . If I hurt her, I feel guilty then. But maybe it's just sorrow or sadness. Maybe I'm just sad because I value her happiness. It makes me happy. It makes me happy to give gifts. Hopefully it does something for her. If I'm guilty and sad I want to make up to get rid of those feelings. Valuing the other person--I'm not naive enough to believe that's how I react. I'm selfish and power hungry. I feel guilty about being selfish but by God, you better think a hell of a lot of yourself. I would demand that of my subordinates. A person who thinks nothing of himself will let himself be stepped on and then will think nothing of stepping on others.

It seems that he experiences no guilt in part because he has developed no internalized principles other than the pursuit of his own happiness. He elevates this narcissistic quest to a moral status and will do anything to achieve it.

This amoral position developed early. He remembers with fondness an incident in sixth grade, where he was doing well in math. One of the girls in class complained to the teacher that he couldn't be getting the grades he was without cheating: "And she was right. I was very competitive. But that teacher loved me and she wouldn't believe it. I remember being very happy about that. I could have

been competing for the affection of the teacher." Even then he was calculating, to use one of his favorite self-descriptive words. Once in school a girl's dress ripped and the boys all giggled: "I did not let the teacher see me giggle about the girl's dress ripping. I saw the teacher looking. I was very calculating. She said--'see (Mr. L) isn't doing it,' to the other boys. I felt very good; 'boy, did I get away with it. Boy, you guys got caught, ha ha.'" This gloating and seeing others as chumps has a defensive tinge to it.

Why was guilt never a salient part of his experience? Why were principles never internalized? In part it was because sanctions were absolutistic and entirely externalized. No mention of his feelings was ever made in a disciplining context. Sin was a frequent subject around the house: "Masturbation was highest on the list of sins, like sexual things in general." The major form of sanction was always:

> Is that a way to treat your mother? . . . Her way of control was no discussion of other people, don't protest, just don't do this to your mother. Mothers have these rights, feel these things. Everything was directed toward mom. She worked so hard, had a difficult life. There was no discussion of natural feelings, no attempt to be objective. I've made a conscious effort to be done with all of this guilt business. Its dysfunctional. . . . If I feel guilty I make a conscious effort not to be. I rationalize. I'm pretty good at that.

But he was also able to cope with mother and thus could avoid guilt since no principles were ever stressed save for doing what mom wanted: "I've always considered myself

fairly conniving. I always come out looking good, especially with mom. For her I could do no wrong." The ability to get others to respond sympathetically is an essential ingredient in this position. Mom was "the law" but he could charm her with his conniving.

How would he feel when mother was "carrying on, crying with worry?": . . .

> At this moment she's unhappy and it's my fault. Sometimes I'd get mad. I had the right to do as I pleased. I thought it was an imposition, creating dependency. . . . The older kids dealt with this by being around less. . . . Guilt makes one disgusted with oneself. I felt very imposed upon . . . I'd get mad at myself. I made a dumb mistake. I never make me guilty. Others do. I can make me not guilty with an apology here, the right words there, to get the recognition that you were forgiven. I'd organize the appropriate story or alibi. . . . I could second-guess them and have my story ready. Guilt didn't have much of a hold on me. It wouldn't drag on; it was very transient.

He became a master at reading others and telling them what they wanted to hear. The lack of internalization of principle is clearly stated: "I see guilt as living up to what others expect; when I hadn't met expectations of others, not my own." His devotion to his own happiness represents an attempt to be uninfluenced by the external world and its needs, expectations and demands. Since his mother was herself very narcissistic in that goodness and badness were real to her only insofar as they affected her feelings, if he could finesse her, he didn't have to feel guilty. Hence there was no real pressure to internalize any principle other than 'keep mother happy' which he apparently was able to do quite well. Hence little or no internalization took

place, which has had a strong effect on his object relations as well as moral and identity development, as will be seen below.

How did he learn this pattern so well? The example of his older brother was instructive: "He was very undiplomatic. He didn't know when to say I'm sorry, etc. I knew when. Consequently he got all the physical punishment and I got all the verbal punishment." When he did get caught at something Mr. L didn't feel any real remorse although he would act appropriately guilt ("running to the priest about guilt"): "I felt anger mostly. I thought in hate terms. Dad got this anger. I would hate him. . . . They were transitory feelings--anger, disgust, humiliation."

But he admired his brother and was in awe of his power: "He was always very strong, always a step ahead in strength and physical prowess. I always let him take leadership. It always seemed to fall that way. He had stamina that never stopped. I always followed his lead." His need for power seems to be related to his feelings about brother as well as parents, whose only rule was: "Obeying whoever is in charge. Don't ever question teachers, nuns, the bus drivers." He got around these power deficits and thumbed his nose at those he duped, but there still seems to have been a basic resentment about the position he was put in.

He sees that he learned how to get around mother by learning from brother's negative example: "I suppose I learned as much by his action as inaction. They wouldn't

take any lip and they reacted to his stubbornness. He never cried and it was easier if someone would cry. They said that." But he was also able to appeal to his mother's fine sense of humor and he was able to top hers, even if she were angry: "I'd have her 'soaped' so well by the time dad came home it would be too late."

He learned how to "soap" authorities from the time in the fourth grade where he stayed after class to wipe boards off: "Things seemed to follow. It took no wizard to figure things out. I knew what she liked to hear." He also pulled off a coup at his conscientious objector hearing at the draft board, where: "I finessed my way into it. People do respond to voice, articulateness and gesture more than to what one is saying. I showed determination and forthrightness. I was coached in those things as a debater. I don't see how they could have accepted my argumentation. They were under pressure to reject my appeal and then they were finessed." The above story was also related with great smugness.

His image of integrity is also narcissistically tinged. He respects his older brother because he does what he thinks is right: "He thinks about right and wrong more than most people. . . . I've not given that enough thought. I just did what was authorized. Entailed in that is a sensitivity and consciousness of effort. One must try to discern for himself. You can't depend on models from without." Here we see one problem in self-development occasioned by

his environment. He needs to fight constantly against external pressure but then can't allow himself to learn much from others, since it all must come from self. But all that can come entirely from self is a narcissistic ethic. He learned to finesse the appropriate adults but at great cost to his self-development, as will be detailed below.

The moral person doesn't take anything for granted, but questions everything, in his eyes. Again this scrupulosity against external influence is comprehensible in terms of his family experiencs. Analogously he has no respect for his father, who never questioned anything: "He believes in the Bible." He seems to impute weakness and influencability to this stance. It is giving in to external authority.

He admires people who know how to manipulate others for power, but only if they have a "higher" end in mind. Thus during the Watergate hearings he was furious at John Dean because: "He's failed to take one more step. He had no purpose other than influence and power and no credentials to influence the direction of policy. People like McGeorge Bundy and Bobby Kennedy combine the ability to finesse, to say the appropriate thing, but also managed to say 'I've got a purpose.'" I pointed out that the Deans believe they have a purpose too and asked if it matters what the purpose is. He responded that one should strive for the general good and: "The good is how I define it. This is how everyone behaves."

His worship of brute power is reflected in his

boyhood idol--a wrestler called "Mister Michigan": "He was big and brawney and strong and indestructable. He was the good and the pure and the great." This body narcissism is also an element of his admiration of John Kennedy: "He was a beautiful person--pretty, nice to look at. Johnson wasn't."

He had no direction in terms of career other than that "I wanted to be powerful. I was always told to be a lawyer but never entertained it seriously. This bothered me about myself--seeing people who knew what they really wanted. Now I'm just beginning to define the area I want power in. . . . I've fallen into it--the opportunity was accidental."

The lack of meaning relates to indefiniteness of self-concept, to a lack of nurturing identifications, and to a primitive overemphasis on power needs. It reflects a primitive identity in which there is a certain lack of connectedness to the external world. More about this will be said below.

In school he was bothered about not: "having something to stand for." He felt his power needs were not legitimate in themselves and tried out the priesthood; ("mom said I ought to be a priest"); "A priest has a purpose from here to eternity." He spent two years in seminary searching for meaning but he became disgusted: "It was not in me to seek for meaning. I wanted other things--power and influence . . . which was not legitimate there."

Why did he do it?

> It was a gift. It pleased everybody. It pleased my mom and gave me a purpose. I need to be dedicated to something. But I was finessing myself trying to convince myself that if only I did this I'd be legitimate. I expected the spontaneous generation of purpose in life but that doesn't exist. . . . I also was on the bench on a winning team. . . . I've always wanted to be on the winning side--the powerful side.

It may also well be that by joining the priesthood he was attempting to undo guilt over his power manipulations and finessing of people.

Getting into social work was also seen as being a good guy, part of his life-long con job on the world. Actually it was easy for him to get in and he fell into this also. He was armed with his "social good" philosophy--another manifestation of his con job. But he was disappointed in the classes and unimpressed by the teachers and other students:

> I had my models. If you'd only follow them. . . . I was trained academically to state problems in certain ways--model building, the moral world as a model. In part it was the influence of the Catholic Church which organized the moral world to where every detail of life was covered. Also the analytic tradition in philosophy and the metaphysical philosophy at the seminary. . . . I can't believe I really believed all that. I was just finessing myself; trying to convince myself so as to draw some very rigid or very clearly defined delimited world view. Something that had answers. . . . I pass it off as growing up--maturing.

Having such a peripheral relationship to the object world, purpose and meaning are hard to come by. Immediate gratification is greatly preferred over delay. Furthermore the lack of internal organization makes planning difficult. His definition of self is pristine and consciously shielded

from most external influence.

His early memories reflect the intense bond with his older brother and the narcissistic identification with this powerful other. It is only the naked power that seems to matter however, not any more subtle traits. In one memory he recalls he and his brother wearing matching coats. His parents are indistinct and all that sticks out is the matching coats. It was pleasant because he was with his brother. Also he recalls brother was taller but the coats were the same.

His inability to experience feelings in usual ways is also captured in a memory: "I remember my dad pulling me out of a whirlpool in a river. I remember saying how scared I was and I would never go in again and then a few minutes later going in again. I remember saying I was scared but I never felt it. People were excited and it seemed like I should be scared." It is as if feelings are seen as things that are for others. They are for show and for effect but they are not experienced as part of the self. It is as if he is an observer of his own affective states, something like H. Deutch's "as if" personality.

A memory of mother stresses stability: "Mother ironing in front of TV with Kate Smith on . . . I got very used to finding mom ironing in front of Kate Smith. It was good to find mom there. I became used to it. It was a 'this is the way things are' type of feeling."

Another memory is of finessing his way out of

having hit another kid. He recalls making up a story for mother's benefit, knowing he was finessing her and feeling good to see her consoling him and being on his side.

Father is recalled as slightly ridiculous. Father for instance tried to discourage him from smoking by giving him a puff: "I remember choking the proper number of times. It was very calculated. I was supposed to be doing this because it was a lesson. I remember doing the job well. He was convinced. But I never did smoke much. I wasn't convinced by the experience but maybe there was a wish to fulfill father's desires." It is probably also true that he felt great disappointment in father for not giving him more in terms of loving direction and interest. But he buries all such feelings and does not experience them consciously at all.

In line with his own speculation about wishing to please, there is a sense in which he seems to need to be seen as good, almost angelic, and he will go to extremes to accomplish this, e.g., the two years of seminary that he hated. There seems to be a loss of control over the process since in his zeal to come across as "good" he ends up doing things to achieve this purpose which he may not actually want to do. It is as if his adaptive stance of manipulator leaves him open to being manipulated, especially because he has no values and beliefs of his own. He finds himself buffeted about by circumstance.

More on his insensitivity about feelings: His saddest memory is of: "The first time I was old enough to miss mom and young enough for it to bother me." He also recalls his grandmother dying: "Everybody was sad, so I was sad. But what do kids know of separation and sadness?" The lack of understanding of feelings implied here is striking. He seems to be trying to deny that feelings exist. In part this emotional shallowness is defensive in that it protects the self from the onslaught of intense and painful feelings. The result of this early pervasive character defense has been that in reality he has not developed essential skills for understanding, processing and using feelings; a handicap which interferes significantly in his relationships with others.

In general his portraits of others are abrupt, flat and lacking in life. But an image of his family environment emerges. The parents adopted three children and claimed publicly that it was because the children were homeless. But they told him the truth. They needed the cash. So he had a first-hand lesson in "coming off well" in public so as to disguise self-aggrandizing motivations. Mother was also adept at finessing people. He sees her as: "outgoing, energetic, personable, sophisticated and able to deal with people. She is very diplomatic and knows at times certain comments are called for; if you want to get ahead you have to do certain things." It seems then that his primary identification is with the "worldly wise" aspects of mother's

character. Correspondingly there is a lack of identification with father, except in that Mr. L appears to be every inch as absolutistic morally as his father, albeit in the service of different moral systems.

Father was seen as:

> Quiet, passive, with not much formal education but very sharp. But he's not prone to letting people know what he knows. He's a fundamentalist but is not prone to make a point of it with mom and has always harbored ill feelings about it. He believes in eating right and sleeping right--early to bed, etc. He is very closed in discussions and is kindly but distant. . . . Dad holds things in and then bursts out.

He seems to feel both a lack of relatedness and a lack of respect for father, who is seen as rather too passive and controlled by mom.

What was it like being the second oldest of twelve children? In part it was "cozy" because there was always someone around, although he palled around exclusively with his older brother. But beyond this, he felt a resentment about there being so many children, some of whom didn't even belong in the family by virtue of birth. He felt a certain deprivation of his needs. He wasn't nurtured enough: "It was just too much in a large family. Why were there so many people? I wish now there had been fewer mouths to feed. Why couldn't things have been better for me? There was a lot of friendship and learning to share but it's no fun, always wanting one more scoop of ice cream. There were all sorts of limitations. There isn't enough."

Narcissistic self-preoccupation and power needs can be seen to be stimulated by such a family situation,

especially since he did not feel that the parents really cared about his feelings. The most he could hope for was to avoid punishment and get a laugh out of mother once in a while through his antics. This stance translated directly to his interactions with others and became characterlogically entrenched: "I was relatively selfish but outgoing. I made friends easily but did things to benefit me. I finessed people and avoided blame. I always managed to get that something extra. I got along. I was always a character--entertaining people."

The unconscious wish to be the only loved child with all needs gratified underlies much of his morality and general behavior. And this eventuates in somewhat of a conflict which he himself sees: "I need to be somewhat in charge. I seek power and authority but I need to be accepted and liked." He is also conflicted about these power needs: "I'm the kind of guy who can finesse, control, orchestrate a situation to my own ends, although I try not to make that a fundamental factor in my life. I try to define some limits as to where or when, with whom and why. . . . I distinguish work and personal life--friends and colleagues. It's an easy line to draw but I find myself slipping in and out."

We can see that he struggles with the power issue. In a sense, a pervasive guilt may well underlie this conflict. Furthermore, his need to be good in others' eyes is after all a way of not being "bad" so much. Indeed much of

his character armor can be seen to function as a complicated defensive structure to wall out intense primitive guilt. Indeed some of his amoral bravado can be seen as a pervasive reaction-formed defense against shame and guilt occasioned by sinning against an absolutistic, fundamental religious morality steeped in sin and damnation.

4. Summary of Moral Development, Family Dynamics and Character Organization

In sum, Mr. L's morality is based on the pursuit of his own advantage and happiness and the conflict-free use of any means available to achieve these ends. He is adept at using highly principled arguments about the "general good" when they serve his purposes--i.e., getting something for himself, justifying something he did or gaining the approval of authority. Hence his moral reasoning fluctuates between stage two and stage five reasoning on Kohlberg's scale, depending on circumstances. These shifts are achieved consciously and are justified by arguing that no one is really concerned about anyone but themselves and that people who have moral principles are either fools or in self-deception. Hence he needs to believe that his moral position is the only correct one, which suggests that he is not as guilt-free about his behavior as he would like to believe. He rejects all external pressures and believes that values must come entirely from within. It appears on the surface as if there has been no superego development at all and that he is incapable of feeling guilt, not unlike many psychopathic

personalities. His need to be on the "winning team" by joining the clergy, however, suggests that he needs to be absolved of his sins. His entire personality functions to shield him from the absolutistic morality of the Catholic Church and his authority-maintaining parents. In part he achieves this by blunting all of his feelings so that he feels little. Indeed his character armour requires the use of most of his ego skills and energy. The resulting primitive narcissistic position is devoted to acquiring power and nutriment. But his constant attempts to rationalize his position as the "only TRUE way" again suggest he has doubts and feels guilt at a deeply unconscious level. More consciously he has reservations about his lust for exercising pure power.

The lack of reliably internalized principles seems to have developed in response to parents who believed only in obeying authority. He learned that to get along in his world he had to "manage" his mother. He soon learned how to finesse her. Indeed it appears that mother was charmed by his manipulations and probably covertly encouraged him to be devious. One problem however was his sense that mother did not care about his feelings--only hers. Bad was defined as anything that reflected badly on her. Hence her narcissistic self-preoccupation furthered a similar development in his personality. And being one of twelve children he learned the importance of getting all he could himself. These circumstances had a retarding effect on his identity

development, however. He has a history of having difficulty finding goals and meaning in his life since all he has are primitive ego-ideals that value size, power, strength and cunning--i.e., means rather than ends. His total self-preoccupation leaves him without social goals. Since his narcissism is so total, all that matters is himself. Connecting himself to society via a work identity has thus proved most difficult. It appears that his strong narcissistic drives for power, prestige and pleasure operate without sufficient ego development to provide control or direction. Most of his ego is used for defensive purposes--i.e., denying guilt, manipulating others' responses, etc., and thus little is left to guide and orient him. He is like an engine without an engineer.

Despite his worship of power, and grandiosity about his manipulative skill, and obvious intelligence, Mr. L is buffeted about by experience and has little sense of purpose or direction. Actually he experiences a great deal of anxiety because of this lack of internal structure and wishes that the world could be made more simple. This simplification is attempted in his moral philosophy, which reduces everything to the pursuit of pleasure.

His interactions with others reflect retardation of object relations and a shallowness of feeling. He needs to manipulate and control others but has little understanding of what feelings are like to experience. Hence he is adept at manipulating others but has little capacity for empathy

--a problem which has clear roots in his relationship with a mother who could or would not attend to feelings in others.

IV. 5/2 Psychodynamic Summary

In sum, his mother's totally narcissistic view of the world (only her feelings counted) and her subtle encouragement of psychopathic conniving, in conjunction with religious "assaults" against sinful behavior, primarily sexual infocus; have all combined to force him to decathect the threatening object world and protect himself behind thick character armor that lets nothing in. Living in a huge family, he never got enough and therefore had to devise ways of "making out." Apparently all of his ego skills were pushed in this direction leaving him little ego functioning available for growth and development of self-structure. Father seemed almost peripheral in this family. Because of the intensity and pervasiveness of narcissistic injury in this narcissistically fundamentalist home, his character was set down prematurely along extremely primitive lives. It is structured in a way reminiscent of Kohut's (1971) description of narcissistic personality disorders, with prominent psychopathic features (see Shapiro's (1965) description of psychopathy).

Kohlberg conceptualizes the transition between stages four and five as a difficult one which can lead to retrogression to earlier modes of moral reasoning:

> Our developmental research . . . suggests that the confusion of ethical and cultural relativity is part of an extreme ethical relativism characteristic of a transitional phase in the movement from conventional to principled morality. In about 20% of college youths, the transition from conventional to principled thought is marked by extreme relativism accompanied by an apparent retrogression to stage two instrumental hedonism. . . . But our longitudinal study shows that all our extreme relativists eventually moved on to principled stages. . . . This suggests that relativism, like much philosophy, is the disease of which it is the cure; the very questioning of the arbitrariness of conventional morality presupposes a dim intuition of non-arbitrary moral principles. A purely conventional person can accept the relativity of the rules of his group because he seeks nothing more. Intense awareness of relativity, however, implies a search for, or a dim awareness of, universal principles in terms of which conventional morality seems arbitrary (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 180-181).

Kohlberg sees other potential resolutions of the 5/2 dilemma:

> The metaethical questioning which appears typically as a transitional phase in the movement from stage 4 to stage 5 does not always lead directly to stage 5 thinking. Instead, it may generate a number of ideologies whose common feature is an exaltation of the self or of an ideological group as the supreme end from which all "moral" directives should be derived. While our work suggests that such college student ideologies are usually short-lived transitional phases, there is no doubt that under some social conditions such ideologies become stabilized orientations. At their moral worst, these ideologies declare themselves "beyond good and evil," and the examples of Hitler and Stalin force us to take this amorality seriously; at their best, they celebrate a moral conscience little distinguishable in its principles from the stage 3 or 4 moral sense, but held it as the sacred possession of an inner self whose moral integrity comes before both community welfare and rational discussion. We do not consider such ideologies as independent moral stages, however, because they come in many forms and are usually unstable and transitional, but most importantly because they do not represent new modes of normative ethical reasoning. They employ stage 2, 3, or 4 modes of ethical judgment, though they may give them unconventional content (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 203-204).

Kohlberg's description of the 5/2 "retrogression"

indicates that he sees this phenomenon as a temporary regression from principled reasoning back to stage two or three reasoning during a period of difficulty in adolescence. The interview material on Mr. L, however, indicates that both five and two positions have coexisted since childhood, when he used to tell authorities what they wanted to hear to get what he needed from them. It is only that at this point in his life Mr. L is more willing and/or able to talk about the essential two hedonism which dominates his thinking and acting in the world.

Another surprise is the primitiveness of the character structure associated with this genre of moral reasoning. Based on Kohlberg's description, one would expect to see an adolescent experiencing transitory identity problems. Instead what this case reveals is a life-long ego deficit and primitive development in most spheres of personality not unlike the dynamic picture presented by psychopathic characters and narcissistic personalities. That someone with such a primitive character development could give stage five answers is indicative of how suspect totally cognitive descriptions of morality are.

Another point worth mentioning is that the stage two part of the 5/2 split does not exactly resemble stage two thinking. Indeed Mr. L attempts to elevate self-interest to a highly principled status and argues that it is the only viable moral position. Twos, on the other hand, are basically uninterested in the moral realm. Hence

the 5/2 position does not actually coincide with any of the other stages described by Kohlberg, and therefore deserves to be considered as a moral position in its own right. Kohlberg's contention, quoted above, that there are several variants of the position further reinforces the notion that it is a separate moral position. Indeed in these times one sees daily examples of 5/2 reasoning in government officials in the form of the so-called "Watergate Morality."

A. Family Dynamics

Like Mr. J, Mr. L's mother is seen as the most powerful parent. She controlled the discipline in the house and was the "boss" in general. Like other five parents, she used guilt-indiction as a primary disciplining technique but personalized it such that bad was defined as doing anything that might hurt her feelings. The focus was thus very personal and no abstract principles seemed at all important. Mother's was an absolutistic morality whose only principle was to obey her. Moreover, mother encouraged Mr. L to connive, misrepresent, and "soap" others so that he was given a mixed message about what she expected. In fact it appears that she covertly encouraged him to act out rebelliousness for her. On the other hand, he describes her as being a very strict Catholic who believed one should be guilty about everything. He developed pervasive ways of avoiding guilt, mostly through "finessing" others and himself through the use of fancy rationalized rhetoric. A problem in the relationship with mother was

that she seemed to be so self-preoccupied that his feelings did not matter to her. Indeed the only way he seemed to exist for her was when he could make her feel something--either amusement at his antics, or guilt and anger over his "sins." Father in contrast is seen as ineffectual, somewhat laughable and extremely rigid in his own right. Father is also seen as a devote of obeying authority without question. There is a sense of deprivation which adheres to his portrait of family life. He was only one of twelve kids, and the parents were narcissistic and "out to make a buck" (e.g., by taking in foster children for the money). He had to make noise to get heard and developed a character style geared to milking others for all he could get. These dynamics are similar to those in "two" families but via identification with a fast-talking mother he developed a more adaptive means of dealing with deprivation. He became a wheeler-dealer who could get attention from mother and goodies for himself.

In contrast with parents of fives, Mr. L's parents were more narcissistic, more authoritarian and less involved. Five parents have some moral integrity while Mr. L's parents appear to have none. Indeed he recalls what connivers they were with pleasure. Five parents abhor narcissism while 5/2 parents appear to bask in it. The structure of this 5/2 family is more primitive than that of the fives and not at all geared toward principled morality. As noted above there was no pressure from the family to

internalize principles. On the contrary it was in the family that he learned how to tell others what they wanted to hear. On the other hand, he was assaulted by a religious morality devoted to the concept of sin and parents who seemed not to recognize his feelings at all. Under this assault a primitive character structure was hastily set up which blocked further development in all realms of personality functioning.

B. Empathy and Object Relations

Mr. L shows himself to be almost totally ignorant about human emotions. He often finds himself a spectator to his own affective states and is not sure what feelings are supposed to feel like. It appears that in developing his defensive character armor, feelings had to be left out of the picture, probably because they were too intense and could not be controlled effectively by his already overburdened ego. He indicates that mother was insensitive to his feelings and therefore the starting place of empathy the mother-child relationship, was barren ground for him. Mr. L is insightful about how to manipulate people to get what he wants but seems not to want to or be able to understand how others feel. His own feelings are dominated by grandiosity, narcissistic self-glorification and intense wishes for power. Indeed much of the time Mr. L appears to be an emotionally dead person searching for intense experience. At this point he has desensitized himself sufficiently that it takes a great deal to make him feel

anything. And at this point it appears that he is actually lacking in the ego skills necessary for accurate empathic involvement with others. He knows what others want to hear in the way a psychopath "knows" (Shapiro, 1965).

His actual abject relations revolve around manipulating others. Hence they exist as objects to be used. It is almost as if people are not real or alive for him. His descriptions of others are dull, flat and lacking in involvement, as if he were describing comic book characters. He is sufficiently preoccupied with himself that others have no space in his psychic life except insofar as they can do something for him. His object relations are much more primitive than those of stage five people and even more regressed than the twos in this sample. His revealing self-portrait seems to burst out of him in a way he himself does not really understand.

C. Identity Formation

Mr. L appears to have identity difficulties reaching back to extremely early traumatic experiences in his family. To protect himself against assault, he desensitized himself and seemingly never experienced involvement with others in a way that he could feel. His emotional deadness on the one hand and rampant, cocky narcissism on the other suggest fixation at a relatively early level of personality development. Intellectually he differentiates objects well, but emotionally he is like an infant who "knows" only his own gross feelings of pleasure or unpleasure. In effect Mr. L

has not emotionally differentiated the rest of the world from his global narcissism. His object relations are clearly pre-oedipal in focus, centering as they do around issues of power and control.

One of the identity problems he experiences is a lack of guidance and direction. Because his self-concept is so global and loose and because he has not been able to accomplish any useful identificatory links with objects, he is left without a sense of purpose in life and consequently is buffeted about by "fate." He has not developed a sense of agency or learned much about long-term planning or decision-making. Instead he searches for ways of exercising naked power. Indeed he has no more sense of direction than a lost child or infant. He is total drive with little or no ego to control it, since all his ego is used for his pervasive defenses. The fact that he "does well" by external criteria does not mitigate against this severe identity problem.

Mr. L's identity development is much more primitive than that of the fives who predominantly experience adolescent identity conflicts. Indeed Mr. L's identity problems appear to be more severe than that of the twos, who have some direction, sense of themselves and ability to feel and relate. Others exist for twos but not for Mr. L.

D. Superego Development/Narcissism and Self-esteem

Mr. L shows no <u>overt</u> signs of superego development. He has waged a constant war in his life against guilt

feelings and while it seems that he is probably very guilty about his ruthlessness, such unconscious guilt does not do more than make him try to "soap" others all the more so as to feel that he is good. McCord and McCord (1956) describes this unseen superego in psychopathic personalities. For him, to be approved of is to put something over on mother and gain her admiration. Since mom believed in making herself happy and placating authority, he developed no internal principle at all. He did learn how to use moral sounding arguments adaptively, however. It seems that he is talented at knowing what others want to hear. More generally he is now sensitive to what ethical positions are in vogue and is adept at reading sub-cultures and groups, assimilating their ethics and using this knowledge to his own advantage. Again this type of ego-functioning is reminiscent of psychopathic functioning (Shapiro, 1965). However, it is clear that he uses morality rather than being moral. His is a total amorality--an amiable but ominous nihilism, well-recognized as dangerous by Kohlberg himself in his writings on this "stage." His aspirations are for total power and he believes he defines what is right. His personality thus has demagogic potential.

Mr. L's primitive, global narcissism has been mentioned. It appears that he derives self-esteem by being powerful and manipulating others. Indeed his ego-ideals are the most primitive possible. He worships size, power, strength, beauty, and had not developed any superego values

to balance his evaluative life. His self-esteem does not emanate from any sense of integrity or worth. Indeed it seems probable that Mr. L actually believes he like everyone else is worthless. But he feels good when he is powerful and this nutriment is what he survives on.

Superego development, like other areas of development, is more primitive than that of either stage five or two. Indeed it appears that Mr. L has no internal checks against his wish to exploit others, unlike either fives or twos, who are not generally exploitative or power-hungry. It should be mentioned however that it does not appear that Mr. L is invested in harming others when he uses them. It is almost as if they exist only as material for him to use in his search for power and nutriment.

E. Ego Development

Virtually all of Mr. L's ego resources are used for defensive purposes. He is extremely clever and crafty in his interactions with others and adept at arguing with others persuasively. He is the consummate "con man." But the guiding function of the ego is not available to him and despite all his conniving, he is unable to steer a course in life. In terms of raw intelligence he appears to be on a par with the fives and definitely higher than the twos or threes in the sample, another indication of the minimal importance that raw intelligence has for moral functioning.

Mr. L's character structure is well-armored and seemingly impermeable. Dynamically his personality bears

some similarities to psychopathic characters and narcissistic character disorders. The seeming stability of this character position argues for viewing the 5/2 phenomenon as a stage in its own right, in contrast to Kohlberg's view of it as a transitory phenomenon. Nowhere in his moral schema does Kohlberg have a satisfactory place for psychopathic-like moral reasoning, which indeed appears to represent a combination of stages two and five reasoning.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter will be divided into two sections: the first detailing specific findings about the psychodynamic properties that were found to be characteristic of each Kohlberg stage investigated, and the second exploring more basic issues relating to moral development in general.

Our findings as to the psychodynamics underlying each stage were as follows: Our stage two subjects described home environments in which narcissistic parents seemed uninvolved in their lives and were especially insensitive to their physical safety. The parents insisted on the observance of but few rules and generally avoided any emphasis upon moral principles. In response, the children maintained a narcissistic, unprincipled level of functioning, geared to little more than having their needs gratified. They were able to differentiate themselves only incompletely from objects, and showed little empathy for others and primitive forms of object relatedness. Defenses centered around denials and other primitive mechanisms, and identity development did not proceed far. Superego structure was underdeveloped and ineffectual in influencing moral

decisions. In general our twos were pre-ambivalent insofar as moral issues were concerned.

Our threes showed more pronounced conflict and ambivalence. They recalled their parents as having been loving but decidedly overprotective. They were encouraged to be dependent and childlike, and the rules at home stressed obedience to authority rather than to principle. On the surface, then, our threes dedicated themselves to gaining love and approval from others by showing themselves to be more interested in the welfare of others than in their own. Underneath this exemplary, "good child" exterior, however, we found buried antagonistic and rebellious feelings given expression in fantasies of avenging injustice and vanquishing oppressive authority. Psychodynamically we found a conflict between urges to idealize oedipal authority figures and, out of disappointment, to attack these "heroes." Our threes dealt with these conflicts through reaction-formations, thereby giving expression to these opposing tendencies. In terms of identity-development, we found conflict around self-expressive urges, which also had its parallel in overactive superego censure of narcissistic trends. Object-relations and empathy were more advanced than in the case of our twos, but showed signs of the above-mentioned conflict. In general, moral decisions became matters of pleasing parents or opposing them, rather than acting in consonance with principle.

Our fours, in contrast to what was expected in

light of Kohlberg's formula, described home environments typified by love and respect shown them by their parents, in conjunction with expectations for responsible behavior. Parents devoted themselves consistently to clearly articulated, demanding codes of behavior. In response, our fours became willing to sacrifice immediate narcissistic gains for a more long-lasting sense of integrity. Their superegos, though at times rigid, were the most internalized in our sample. Indeed the four continued to idealize parental authority, yet more than other subjects, were able to rely on internalized principle in moral matters even if this meant coming into conflict with parental attitudes. Our fours showed more extensive and less ambivalent object relatedness and corresponding capacities for empathy, along with more autonomous identity development. In sum, their approach to moral matters was based on principle and devotion to maintaining integrity at the cost of immediate narcissistic gain. We found these fours to be less rigid, less authoritarian and less dependent upon the letter of the law than Kohlberg's description suggested they would be. Indeed it appeared that their moral orientation is more accurately described as devotion to "rights and responsibilities" than to "law and order."

Our fives also departed from their Kohlbergian portrait. They described their parents as religious moral purists opposed to all narcissistic impulse and especially to sexual gratification. Transgressions were punished by

harsh superego attack. Our fives learned to protect themselves by learning to voice articulate intellectual rationalizations for their actions so as to placate their parents and fool their overly active superegos. However they were unable to give up narcissistic goals and found themselves "acting out" in consonance with these aims in uncontrolled fashion. Indeed more than our other subjects, our fives describe situations where they contradict their social welfare philosophies in terms of actual moral decisions, only to justify themselves ex post facto intellectually. Strong, persistent, oedipally based neurotic conflict was seen to underlie this behavior in all cases, such that they found themselves rebelling against parental dictate. We found this oedipal conflict to be impeding their current object relations and capacity for empathy, as well as interfering with identity development. Morally our fives seemed in constant battle with their ambivalently internalized superegos. Our portrait of the fives differed from Kohlberg's in our emphasis upon the genesis of defensive intellectualizing trends in the moral realm, a perspective ignored in Kohlberg's overly cognitive approach.

Our 5/2 subject also departed from Kohlberg's portrait. Rather than representing a variant of adolescent identity conflict causing temporary regression, our subject showed clear signs that his conflicted orientation had become an encapsulated part of his personality early in life. His parents were childishly narcissistic and subtly

supported psychopathic manipulativeness towards others. He learned how to use people to gratify his needs and never developed a capacity to empathize with others or to experience his own feelings. Treated by parents as no more than their narcissistic extension, he learned how to tell others what they wanted to hear. Hence when necessary he was able to make pious moral pronouncements steeped in concern for social welfare, believing not a word of his own rhetoric. Object-relations, ego development and identity have remained on an undifferentiated narcissistic level. Moral conflict for him has no meaning and requisite superego structures have failed to develop.

Moving now to more general considerations, it will be recalled that Kohlberg would have us focus on cognitive development as the central variable in moral development. In our interviews, however, we found that moral reasoning is an inseparable part of a gestalt composed of the various facets of personality organization we investigated. Our subjects' past experiences within their nuclear families, their preferred modes of relating to objects, their defensive and character structures, superego organizations, etc., all "fit" and were seen to be comprehensibly related to the way in which they reason about abstract moral issues. Indeed these data tend to suggest that any effort to delimit an area of human functioning as "moral" is impossible to support.

Secondly, we found that Kohlberg's emphasis upon cognitive rather than affective factors was misplaced. Our subjects' feelings were clearly a central part of the evolving gestalt and could not be handled merely as a subset of cognitive operations. Indeed in the case of our stage five subjects we found that irrational, affectively laden reactions tended to be the most basic reactions to moral dilemmas which were only afterwards subjected to intellectual restructuring. Our stage five subjects provided clear examples of the use of intellectual defenses to cover over and distort more basic affective responses. We also found that in focusing on cognitive factors alone Kohlberg's moral dilemma questionnaires overlook a great deal of important data about how moral situations are perceived and evaluated. Especially in the case of our stage four subjects we found that this extra information from Kohlberg's own questionnaires was valuable in understanding the dynamics underlying this stage.

Kohlberg has also claimed that the way subjects reason about moral dilemmas is predictive of how they will behave in actual situations. In consonance with other studies of the relation between moral reasoning and behavior (e.g., Maccoby, 1968; Hoffman, 1970) we found on the contrary that moral reasoning is often quite misleading as a predictor of what individuals will actually do in real dilemma situations. Especially in the case of our stage five subjects, we found that moral reasoning as verbalized

on Kohlberg's questionnaire was consciously applied ex post facto to rationalize behavior undertaken for other less rational reasons. Indeed we found that subjects themselves tended to view their moral behavior as being motivated by irrational rather than rational considerations, again in contrast to Kohlberg's expectations.

A further finding was that Kohlberg's conception of cognitive functioning itself is overly simplified. Kohlberg tends to overvalue the importance of IQ and has not broken cognitive functioning down into relevant ego functions or skills. Coming as they do from similar socioeconomic backgrounds and having attained comparable levels of intellectual functioning by virtue of having been admitted to a school of graduate education, our subjects did not seem to vary widely as to IQ. However subjects of each stage showed specifiably different intellectual functioning in terms of the strength of ego functions such as the synthetic function. And once character organization was included as a variable, the mode of moral reasoning employed by our subjects became much more comprehensible as a product of their growth as individuals in all realms of personality.

Perhaps the most controversial of Kohlberg's claims about moral development has been his contention that his stages represent an invariant and universal sequence. In particular his schema has been advanced to take issue with "cultural relativistic" arguments about inherent differences in the moral codes of various cultures. In opposition to

such views, Kohlberg has argued for the existence of a universal pattern of moral growth determined less by the vicissitudes of cultural existence within any given society, and more by an ideal form of growth transcending any particular culture. While there was some tendency toward such a hierarchy in the early stages of his schema, we found that stages four and five did not conform to that pattern. Indeed if anything these stages appeared in reverse form, directly contradicting Kohlberg's expectations. While the fives gave evidence of the reasoning associated with stage five membership, their actual reported behavior in real moral dilemmas betrayed morality greatly at variance with their principles. Indeed it was clear that their reasoning was formed on the basis of the functioning of clear ego-defensive operations geared to disguise the existence of narcissistic impulses which impelled them to disregard their avowed concern for others. This conflict was found to have been operational since early childhood, as it was generally reflected in their earliest memories and could be traced to the manifestation of clear dynamics within the family. Our fives all reported severe religious training in the family and an atmosphere of punishment and repression surrounding the expression of narcissistic impulse. Our fives were taught to deny their own needs and serve others and abide by moral formulas extolling a social welfare mentality. However they also learned that their parents would willingly accept articulate, well-reasoned

arguments extolling a disinterested universalist moral perspective. Hence our fives were actually rewarded for utilizing their intellectualizing defenses. However such formulas did not circumvent superego pressure and also did not actually allow for much gratification of narcissistic impulse. Our fives therefore tended to act out their narcissistic strivings through rebellious behavior and then attempt to justify themselves after the fact in terms of their abstract morality.

Similarly our findings are not in accord with Kohlberg's predictions in regard to the so-called 5/2 retrogression. In the first place our developmental data indicated that Mr. L has manifested both the five and two orientation, at least in germ form, since earliest childhood, thus casting doubt on Kohlberg's contention that the position represents a temporary regression from higher level functioning during adolescence. Indeed, on the contrary, we found Mr. L to function at an extremely primitive level not at all consistent with hypotheses of an Eriksonian "identity crisis" concurring in an otherwise "normal" adolescent personality matrix. Our 5/2 subject proved to be the most primitive on all psychodynamic dimensions. His personality organization was closely parallel to that expected of a psychopathic individual, which also points up the lack of classification of this common condition within Kohlberg's schema.

Virtually all of Kohlberg's critics have pointed to

the lack of a convincing explanation of how and why individuals progress through his stages. More generally, Kohlberg has been criticized for not providing a clear statement about causal factors which influence moral growth. In his defense it can be said that in his later writings he has looked to "role-taking" as a causal variable, yet it is still unclear exactly what is meant by this concept, and Kohlberg has not offered any experimental evidence to buttress his claim that role-taking is vital to moral development. Our study found complex patterns of family interaction to be intimately related to the development of resultant styles of moral reasoning. Kohlberg has asserted (1963) that we cannot rely on the concept of identification to aid in our study of moral development. He concludes that the laboratory research on this topic is inconclusive. In the first chapter, I pointed out that Kohlberg utilizes an unsophisticated "laboratory" definition of identification. I suggested that laboratory studies never attempt to measure identification as a varied, complex clinical entity but rather operationalize it into a simple parameter suitable for efficient experimental usage. In our study we found clear statements from subjects themselves as to the importance of identification in the development of their moral codes, and more importantly, we saw that different types and levels of identificatory involvement held sway in each of the Kohlberg stages. Our findings tended to parallel and flesh out Schafer's (1968) distinction between

"introjection" as a more primitive and "identification" as a more mature form of internalization. In our sample we found that our 5/2 subject was engaged in the primitive partial interjection and projection of hostile, narcissistic parental images, hence modeling behavior after the "real" parent was rare if at all extant. Our stage two subjects had progressed to a level of projective narcissistic identification with their narcissistic parents in such a way that an interaction between somewhat differentiated subject and object was seen to take place, unlike the virtually undifferentiated introjective involvement engaged in by our 5/2. Our threes in contrast jumped to more sophisticated modeling behaviors where self and parent were clearly distinct and the motive to be like the admired parent was clearly present. Moreover we found that these identifications were ambivalently tooned, as the parents were seen as loving yet also as hostilely overprotective. Our fives practiced similar identificatory patterns as the threes, but saw their models as powerful, punitive superego figures. Our fours, in contrast, were able to achieve positive identifications with the most adaptive features of parental behavior. These identifications were integrated with earlier ideals and images and were organized into highly abstract moral and non-moral principles that allowed them to achieve a relative autonomy from parental expectation found nowhere else in our sample. In a sense, then, for our fours the principles embodied by their models

came to be more important than ongoing behavior on a day-to day-basis which resulted in their being able to ignore parental pressure when the latter conflicted with these principles.

We also found that the way in which parents interacted with their children, the way they controlled feelings, expressed love and the like, fit well with the child's eventual mode of moral reasoning. As Hoffman (1970) found, parental empathy, and the tendency to hold children responsible for the consequences of their behavior, were both found more often in the families of our fours than fives, or in any of the other Kohlberg stages. Consistency about rules and the ability to be flexible in cases of conflict were also more characteristic of the parents of our fours. We also found that these parents were more insistent in their demands for pro-social behavior and generally for the adaptive control of impulse. Though this tended to make our fours somewhat rigid and stubborn about moral matters, it also provided the groundwork for their devotion to principle.

It could be argued by Kohlberg that all of these traits are merely ways in which role-taking is taught in the family. Indeed it is probably true that roles vis-à-vis other people, involvement with authority, etc., are inculcated via such interactions. However this sort of cognitive approach ignores the affective quality of these relationships. A general orientation to self, to objects,

to feelings, etc., is set down within these familial interactions that is far more than cognitive. We were able to infer that the individual's character structure was given its impetus towards solidification from these modes of relating. Once again we argue that the totality of all aspects of personality functioning rather than one isolated aspect (i.e., the intellective) is the central variable in studying moral development.

Based on these findings I believe we may conclude that uni-dimensional theories of moral development such as Kohlberg's are inadequate for a comprehensive understanding of something as complex as moral reasoning. It would seem that only a theory cognizant of both cognitive and affective factors can further our knowledge in this area.

APPENDIX A

Kohlberg's Moral Issues

A. Law as a standard of obligation

B. Punishment and guilt

- BI punishment and guilt/shame
- BII spontaneous judgments of blame and personal moral worth
- BIII obligation and duty, conflicting right and wrong, the moral and the legal
- BIV decision-making stances: responsibility and evasions of decision

C. The affectional system: activities, duties and traits which persons in a family or friendship role are supposed to have

D. Respect for persons and personal authority

E. Civil rights

F. Relations of contract, trust and exchange

G. Functions of punishment: expiation and preventive-rehabilitative

H. The moral worth of human life

I. Property rights.

APPENDIX B

Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Stories as Presented to Subjects

It should take about an hour to respond to these questions. However, some people do prefer to spend more time in order to fully clarify their responses, and you may spend as much time on them as you wish. The only requirement is that you write your responses before discussing the material with anyone else.

There are no "right" or "wrong" answers to these questions. What is important is that you answer each question fully enough to indicate the reason for deciding one way or another.

If you are unable to fit your answer into the space provided, you may use the back of the page or add your own pages. IF YOU ADD PAGES, PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT THEY ARE FIRMLY ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL OR MARKED WITH YOUR NAME OR NUMBER.

Your responses will be treated with complete confidentiality.

PLEASE RETURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (by next week's class at the latest).

If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at . I can usually be reached during the evening.

Many thanks for your participation in this project -

Libby Kelley

FORM C

XI Mrs. Webster's Rooming House

When her husband died five years earlier, Mrs. Webster converted her house in Springfield, Massachusetts into a rooming house which would hold seven roomers. The rent from the rooming house provided her with just enough money to make ends meet.

All of her roomers were white and Mrs. Webster knew them very well. They had told her that if she ever rented a room to a Negro they would move out. If this happened she would receive much less money than the small amount she now received. But she also knew that if she refused a Negro a room she could get into trouble because the Massachusetts open housing law made it illegal for her to refuse to

rent a room to a person because of his color.

A young black man, Mr. Jones, had just received a job in town. He had looked around the town all one day without success and toward evening noticed the sign, "Room for Rent," in front of Mrs. Webster's house. When he asked Mrs. Webster about the room, she told him that she had just rented the room and that there were no more left. In fact, there were two vacant rooms in her house at the time.

(adapted from a true incident)

XI

1. Was it right for Mrs. Webster to refuse to rent a room to Mr. Jones?

   Why or why not?

   a. Some states do not have open housing laws. If there was no law in Massachusetts, would it be right for Mrs. Webster to refuse to rent a room to Mr. Jones? Why or why not?

   b. Does the fact that there is a state law making it illegal for Mrs. Webster to refuse the room to Mr. Jones influence your decision? Why or why not?

2. Was the state right to pass such an open housing law? Why or why not?

3. Should Mrs. Webster have the right to say who lives in her rooming house?

4. Would it be right for Mr. Jones to take Mrs. Webster to court if he knew her situation? Why or why not?

5. Supposing the races in this situation were reversed, i.e., Mrs. Webster is a Negro lady with all Negro boarders, who have told her they will move out if she rents to a white person: would it be alright in this case for Mrs. Webster to refuse to rent to some one white? Why or why not?

6. Do you think the open housing law should apply equally in this case? Why or why not?

7. Should a Negro landlady have the right to say who lives in her house? Why or why not?

8. If this Mrs. Webster refuses to rent to a white person, would it be right for the latter to take her to court? Why or why not?

XII THE HIGH SCHOOL NEWSPAPER

Fred Berger, a senior at Kitsap High School, near Seattle, Washington, thought of putting out a mimeographed newspaper for students which would express many of his strong feelings. In particular, he wanted to voice his opposition to the war in Viet Nam and to many of the school's regulations, like the one forbidding boys to wear long hair. Fred was a consistent high honor student and one of the three chosen by the faculty as "outstanding students." He was also a student council representative and a regional winner of a "What Democracy Means to Me" contest, which was sponsored by a national patriotic group.

Before publishing his newspaper, Fred asked his principal for permission. The principal agreed on the condition that Fred submit all his articles to him for approval. Fred agreed and began to submit his articles. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal did not think about the great attention that Fred's newspaper would receive. Students read the paper eagerly and began to organize against the hair regulation and other school rules. Many classes were spent talking about the paper and rallies were held before and after school. Furthermore, many parents who favored the Viet Nam war phoned the principal and angrily told him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published.

As a result of the commotion, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing the newspaper. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

(adapted from a Saturday Review article of February, 1969)

XII

1. Was the principal right to order Fred to stop publishing his paper? Why or why not?

   Does the fact that the principal made an agreement with Fred and then broke it affect your decision? Why or why not?

   Does the fact that the principal is the highest authority in the school affect your decision? Why or why not?

2. Should Fred obey the principal's order? Why or why not?

3. In the first place, should Fred have been allowed to

publish a paper in his school that was critical of the school and society? Why or why not?

If Fred, in his newspaper, argued in favor of dropping nuclear bombs on North Viet Nam and China and also argued strongly that Negroes, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans were inferior to whites and should be segregated, would that affect your decision? Why or why not? How?

FORM B

V. In Korea, a company of Marines was way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and blew it up, with the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; there would be about a 4 to 1 chance he would be killed. The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably not get back safely and he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

1. Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? Why?

2. What is the best justification for saying it is right to send someone besides himself?

   Why or how do you say it is right to save more lives in this case, when it means ordering someone to his death?

3. What is the best, or most important reason for saying it is wrong to send someone else, when ordering someone else will save more lives?

4. Does the captain have the right or the authority to order a man if he thinks it best to? Why?

5. Would a man have the right to refuse such an order? Why?

6. The captain has a family the men do not. Should that enter into his decision? How?

   If he is going to pick someone to go, how should he pick someone? Why?

7. There is some conflict between fairness and survival here. Which is more important or how can he deal with

both here? What does fairness mean anyhow and why is it important?

VI. The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. He thought he should pick one of his two demolition men. Both of these men were trained to use dynamite to blow up bridges or fortifications at the least risk to themselves. One of the demolition men had a lot of strength and courage but was a bad troublemaker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up and wouldn't do his work around camp.

The second demolition man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enough to do the job.

1. Should the captain send the troublemaker or the sick man? Why?

2. Whose life is worth more, the troublemaker or the sick man? Why is that?

3. The captain knows the sick man has a family, the troublemaker doesn't. Should that enter into the decision? Why?

4. The captain knows that the sick man was a scientist in civilian life who was doing valuable biochemical research toward a cure for cancer. Should that enter into the decision? Why?

5. Does the captain have more right to send one man than the other from the point of view of fairness? Why?

Who has more right to refuse to go, the sick man or the troublemaker? Why?

VII. Two young men, brothers, had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Karl, the older one, broke into a store and stole $500. Bob, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Bob told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500 to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he loaned him the money. So Bob and Karl skipped town, each with $500.

1. If you had to say who did worse, would you say Karl did worse to break in the store and steal the $500 or Bob did worse to borrow the $500 with no intention of paying it back? Why?

2. Which would you rather do, which would make you feel worse stealing like Karl or cheating like Bob?

3. When people say their conscience bothers them what do they mean?

   What does someone do when his conscience bothers him?

   Do some people have more conscience than others?

   Where do you fit there?

   Do you think your conscience should be the basis of making a decision, or should you think of other things?

4. What was the worst thing about what Karl did in stealing? Why?

5. What was the worst thing about what Bob did in cheating the man? Why?

6. Does that enter into deciding which was worst? Why?

7. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store or steal anyhow?

8. Bob deceived the old man and agreed to do something he didn't. Why shouldn't someone do that anyhow?

9. Does the law enter into your decision in this case?

10. Both men are caught and brought before the judge. Should one be given more punishment than the other? Why?

K I[1] At closing time on the last day of school in a metropolitan high school, the winner of a valuable college scholarship stops by the office of the school social worker. The student confesses to having cheated on the scholarship exam, having gained access to the material prior to the testing date. Although somewhat guilty, the student concludes during this brief contact that he/she will live with the guilt and accept the scholarship. The student then leaves, making a comment about being "glad to have gotten that off my chest." There is no possibility of further direct contact between the social worker and the student, since the student is leaving the area that day.

1. Should the social worker report the cheating? Why or why not?

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[1]The last three stories were compiled by Miss Kelly and administered along "Kohlbergian" lines.

2. Suppose the student is from a poor family and has really struggled to get through high school while working almost full time. Should this affect the social worker's decision (about reporting)? Why or why not?

3. Should it affect the decision if the student was an extremely bright person who might very well have won the scholarship anyway? Why or why not?

4. Should it affect the decision if the student had not been doing well in school and there was almost no possibility of his/her winning the scholarship without cheating? Why or why not?

5. If the student comes from a wealthy family who could easily support him/her through college; while the runner-up is a hard-working, poor, but bright student, who has no hope of going to college unless he/she can obtain financial aid; should this affect the social worker's decision? Why or why not?

K II A "community organization" worker in a deprived urban ghetto has been able to develop extremely good rapport with the residents, many of whom have commented that they feel able to trust him in a way that has not been true for previous social workers they have known. Community efforts facillitated by the social worker are making good progress in getting better service from various agencies and greatly improving community/police relations.

In the course of casual conversation, one of the local men lets the social worker know that he was responsible for a recent jewelry store burglary which has received a lot of publicity in the area. He states with pride that he is quite sure he will never be found out by the police.

1. Should the social worker feel any responsibility to report the man to the police? Why or why not?

2. If the man is a bright and capable local leader who may be of great help to the whole community, should this be weighed by the social worker in deciding what to do? Why or why not?

3. Should the social worker's decision be affected if the man is a local "troublemaker," suspected of numerous local crimes, for whom the community has been trying for a long time to get enough evidence to bring to trial? Why or why not?

4. Do you think the social worker would feel any differently if the man confessed to a murder instead of a

robbery? Do you think he should act any differently if this was the case? Please state your reasons in response to both questions.

5. Should the social worker's decision about reporting or not reporting the man be affected if the police had in fact already picked up a local teenager as a suspect and it looked as if he was surely going to be convicted on circumstantial evidence, with the likelihood of a severe sentence? Why or why not?

K III Mrs. Davis has been head of the social service department in a large metropolitan hospital for one year. She has been extremely successful in gaining the confidence and cooperation of the medical staff, who previously had a low opinion of social workers. They see Mrs. D. as an intelligent and competent person and have increasingly turned over more and more responsibility for non-medical decisions to the social service department.

Recently, Mrs. D. has been working hard to establish a desperately needed drug and alcoholic clinic. The decision-making medical personnel have been dubious about the project, and Mrs. D. discovers that much of their doubt stems from racial stereotyping, such that they think "those people" will not make good use of such a program. Mrs. D. judges that her chances of getting the program approved are about 50/50.

At the same time, a local citizens group is working on ways of influencing the hospital to give better service to the area residents, including the drug and alcohol clinic. Mrs. D. knows that this group, quite recently formed, is not yet knowledgeable enough to bring pressure to bear in the right places in order to push through special funding for the clinic before it is too late. However, she judges that there is a 50/50 chance of their achieving this goal if she quits her job at the hospital and works with the group as a consultant. (The group has indicated no willingness to accept "outside experts," except for Mrs. D., whom they know and trust through their contacts at the hospital.)

If Mrs. D. joins with the group, it would involve a large personal financial sacrifice, and might also risk the loss of the new, positive image of social work at the hospital, since many of the doctors would interpret her joining the local citizens group as a kind of betrayal, a "turning against" the rest of the hospital staff.

(Based on a true situation.)

Should Mrs. D. continue trying to get the program approved by the medical staff, or should she leave the hospital and join with the citizens group? (It is not possible for her to do both at once.) Please indicate in your response what factors you think should be considered in making a decision and which ones are <u>most important</u>.

APPENDIX C

Kane Moral Development Interview

A. Review of Kohlberg stories: Probe responses to capture personal. Meaning, clarify ambiguity, concretize abstractions. Elicit affective responses to stories as well as any free associations.

1. Remember current or recent moral dilemmas from own life--what were issues, feelings, resolution?

2. Remember experiences of being guilty, ashamed. Moral outrage at someone else doing something wrong. How did parents respond to transgressions --What was discipline like? What rules did parents stress, what was most important to them?

3. Description of person admired most--"a moral person"--integrity--how closely do you approximate this? How about a person not respected? If no one person, then what traits?

4. Heroes, heroines, ambitions, ideals during childhood. What people did you want to be like then and now?

5. Goals and values most important now--how did this get to be important to you? Accomplish in your life?

Religion, Politics, Occupation

Religion — salience to life now--in past. Changes in beliefs--reflect on why important to parents? Any conflict?

Politics — relevance to life now--in past how active? In what ways?

Occupation — how did you decide? Other things considered. What about it appeals to you? How does occupation utilize your values? What about you is expressed in activities of a social worker? Relevance of parents in this realm?

Family Background

1. Early memories -2 earliest, 2 mother, 2 father. Happiest, sadest, most striking memories. Anything else important in childhood not covered. What likes as a child?

2. Describe parents in detail--atmosphere in home, nature of their relationship. Which parent most like? Favorite? Disappointments and resentments? Any changes in this atmosphere or in relationships?

3. Sisters and brothers; friends--what were you like as a child. Relevant memories of school, dating, etc. Love relationships.

4. What are your sharpest insights about yourself?

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