

## THE MACRO IMPACT OF SHORT-TERMISM

STEPHEN J. TERRY

Department of Economics, University of Michigan and NBER

R&D investment reduces current profits, so short-term pressure to hit profit targets may distort R&D. In the data, firms just meeting Wall Street forecasts have lower R&D growth and subsequent innovation, while managers just missing receive lower pay. But short-termist distortions might not quantitatively matter if aggregation or equilibrium dampen their impact. So I build and estimate a quantitative endogenous growth model in which short-termism arises naturally as discipline on conflicted managers and boosts firm value by about 1%. But short-termism reduces R&D, and the social return to R&D is higher than the private return due to standard channels including knowledge spillovers and imperfect competition. So at the macro level, short-termist distortions slow growth by 5 basis points yearly and lower social welfare by about 1%.

KEYWORDS: Heterogeneous firms, agency conflicts, earnings manipulation.

### 0. INTRODUCTION

MANAGERS OF THE LARGEST FIRMS in the U.S. economy face relentless scrutiny of their short-term profits. The managing director of McKinsey & Company recently summarized the situation, writing “the mania over quarterly earnings [profits] consumes extraordinary amounts of senior executive time and attention.” Commentators have long suspected that short-termist profit pressures lead managers to sacrifice investment, innovation, or even financial stability.<sup>1</sup> In this paper, I quantitatively study the impact of short-term profit pressures or “short-termism” for firms and the economy.

Each fiscal period, public firms must disclose their profits. Small armies of analysts forecast profits, and the financial press widely reports consensus forecasts for a given firm. During earnings season when profits are revealed, firm performance is routinely compared to these short-term targets. Around 90% of recently surveyed U.S. managers report pressure to meet short-term profit targets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)), and the pattern of firm profits in the data supports this notion. Figure 1 plots the distribution of forecast errors, realized profits minus consensus analyst forecasts, for a large panel of U.S. public firms in recent decades.<sup>2</sup> Two facts stand out. First, firm profits bunch just above forecasts or at zero in the error distribution.<sup>3</sup> Second, relatively few firm-years

---

Stephen J. Terry: [stephenjamesterry@gmail.com](mailto:stephenjamesterry@gmail.com)

I benefited from discussions with many including Gadi Barlevy, Nicola Bianchi, Nick Bloom, Brent Bundick, Mike Dinerstein, Simon Gilchrist, Adam Guren, Bob Hall, Tarek Hassan, Nir Jaimovich, Aubhik Khan, Bob King, Pete Klenow, Ed Knotek, Huiyu Li, Ivan Marinovic, John Mondragon, Monika Piazzesi, Jordan Rappaport, Itay Saporta-Eksten, Julia Thomas, Chris Tonetti, Jon Willis, Toni Whited, Anastasia Zakolyukina, and a range of seminar and conference participants. I gratefully acknowledge funding as a SIEPR Bradley Fellow. A previous version circulated as “The Macro Impact of Firm Earnings Targets.”

<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Stein (1989), Haldane and Davies (2011), Schwenkler, Duarte, and Lee (2019), Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015), Rahmandad, Repenning, and Henderson (2014), Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2014), Kanodia and Sapra (2016), Markoff (1990), Mayer (2012), Michie (2001), Almeida (2019), Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017), or Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018). The quote is from Barton (2011).

<sup>2</sup>Section 1 and Appendix B provide more information on the data.

<sup>3</sup>Figure 1’s pattern is neither novel nor fragile. Marinovic, Ottaviani, and Sorensen (2012) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) overviewed analyst forecasts, while Derrien and Kecskés (2013) and He and Tian (2013) linked the level of analyst coverage to innovation at firms. Burgstahler and Chuk (2017) emphasized that




FIGURE 1.—Profit forecast error distribution. *Note:* The forecast error histogram above is drawn from a 2003–2018 sample of 4703 U.S. public firms for a total of 30,090 firm-year observations. Ninety-eight percent of the sample lies within the bounds above,  $\pm 0.5\%$ , and 3% of the sample lies within the bin at or just above zero forecast errors. Realized profits are pro forma fiscal year earnings, forecast profits are median analyst forecasts at a 4-quarter horizon, and forecast errors (realized minus forecast profits) are expressed as a percentage of firm assets. Profit variables are from IBES, and firm assets are from Compustat.

display narrow misses. Figure 1 suggests some form of systematic pressure to meet profit targets.

In the face of short-term profit pressure, long-term investments like research and development (R&D) provide a choice target for manipulation, since they equal around 60% of profits for a typical firm.<sup>4</sup> While R&D's benefits may appear much later or fail to materialize altogether, the costs are borne today through lower profits. Some firms must therefore choose between R&D cuts or meeting targets. Almost half of surveyed U.S. executives report a preference to reject a positive NPV project over missing their analyst target (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)).

Drawing on a data set of millions of analyst forecasts, combined with long-term investment, innovation, executive compensation, and stock returns, I build on an empirical literature in finance and accounting by comparing U.S. public firms just meeting and just missing targets (Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991), Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010), Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016), Almeida, Ersahin, Fos, Irani, and Kronlund (2021), Almeida, Fos, Hsu, Kronlund, and Tseng (2022)). Firms just meeting have lower R&D growth and subsequent patenting, consistent with opportunistic cuts. Moving to other measures, CEOs just missing receive lower total compensation and then depart their firms more often. Conditional upon even a narrow miss, their firms exhibit lower stock returns. Managers appear justified in fears of missing profit targets.

the discontinuity is robust. See Garicano, Lelarge, and Van Reenen (2016), Gourio and Roys (2014), Chetty, Friedman, Olsen, and Pistaferri (2011), Daly, Hobijn, and Lucking (2012), and Allen and Dechow (2013) for similar bunching in other contexts.

<sup>4</sup>This is the mean ratio of R&D to profits in my Section 1 data set.

Motivated by such evidence, this paper pursues two questions. First, why does short-term pressure exist? Instead of insulating managers, firm owners and boards appear to implicitly tolerate or explicitly impose short-term pressure. I argue that, at the micro level, short-termism disciplines managers and boosts firm value. Second, I ask whether short-term pressures matter quantitatively, since aggregation or equilibrium might reduce their quantitative relevance. My answer is yes. Short-term discipline on managers reduces R&D. But the social return to R&D is higher than the private return, due to standard channels including both positive knowledge spillovers in innovation and less than full appropriation of surplus by imperfectly competitive firms (Jones and Williams (2000)). As a result, short-termism causes meaningfully lower U.S. growth and welfare at the macro level.

I start with a toy model describing micro-level short-termism. R&D creates long-term benefits for firms. But managers get private benefits from R&D. These benefits, akin to empire building or prestige motives because R&D increases the scale of the firm under the manager's control, push managers towards overinvestment from the firm's perspective. Broadly related tendencies towards overinvestment in some form, whether through activities such as capital accumulation or external mergers and acquisitions, are a traditional object of study in corporate finance (Jensen (1986), Nikolov and Whited (2014), Glover and Levine (2017)). In response to this agency conflict, firm boards optimally choose costs for managers missing short-term profit targets.<sup>5</sup> In equilibrium, such short-termism fully undoes incentive conflicts and lowers R&D to its value-maximizing level. So discontinuous short-termism is optimal for firms as a form of cost discipline. This result proves true even though profit targets come from rational analyst forecasts and even though profits contain non-fundamental noise.

The toy model lacks features needed to confront microdata and provide quantitative macro insights. So I extend the toy model into a general equilibrium structure with heterogeneous firms. Firm R&D yields innovation of new goods varieties and positive innovation externalities in the endogenous growth tradition (Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991)). Heterogeneous firms face persistent, fundamental shocks and non-fundamental profit noise. Analysts observe firm fundamentals, understand manager incentives, and rationally forecast profits. Managers with private benefits from R&D also possess private information about current profit noise while making decisions about R&D and non-fundamental accounting or "accruals" manipulation of profits. Firm boards solve a constrained problem, choosing short-termist incentives to maximize firm value. Short-term incentives lower R&D levels and generate misallocation through opportunistic cuts. In general equilibrium, a stationary distribution of firms generates aggregate balanced growth and influences a representative household's welfare.

I structurally estimate the model with the simulated method of moments (SMM). The parameters govern not only familiar objects like the persistence and volatility of firm shocks or the R&D elasticity of innovation but also manager preferences governing the extent of agency conflicts and the resulting short-termism. I target moments computed in my microdata. The covariance of sales, profits, R&D, and forecast error series helps identify parameters governing fundamentals, while the extent of bunching at the zero forecast error threshold helps identify the degree of short-termism and hence manager conflicts.

---

<sup>5</sup>The study of agency or governance conflicts in models of innovation and growth is an expanding area of study, with multiple important contributions in recent years (Iacopetta, Minetti, and Peretto (2019), Iacopetta and Peretto (2021), Celik and Tian (2022)).

I estimate meaningful firm heterogeneity through a combination of persistent fundamentals and profit noise, R&D elasticities in line with conventional estimates, and manager conflicts leading optimally to moderate short-termism in manager compensation.

Counterfactuals comparing the estimated economy to one with no short-term incentives reveal micro and macro impacts. At the micro level, short-termism boosts mean R&D costs by 2.4% since R&D raises the likelihood of missing targets. The extra discipline boosts firm value by over 1%, a substantial motive for firms to either explicitly impose or implicitly allow short-termism. At the macro level, distorted R&D creates negative innovation externalities not internalized by firms. A U.S. economy without short-termism would feature around 5 basis points more growth each year—raising output by about 0.25% over each five-year period—and an increase of more than 1% of consumption-equivalent welfare. For some comparison, recent quantitative estimates place the welfare costs of business cycles at around 0.1–1.8%, the static gains from trade around 2.0–2.5% or more, and the welfare costs of inflation near 1%, figures in the same order of magnitude as the costs of short-termism.

Unpacking the zero forecast error threshold in the model yields two further insights. First, bunching and threshold effects increase with manager private information.<sup>6</sup> Although bunching is absent without short-termism, providing a tell-tale detection mechanism, bunching also reflects higher manager ability to evade targets. So the quantitative impact of short-termism does not necessarily increase with observed distortions at forecast error thresholds. Quantitative counterfactual analysis in my model consistent with the global behavior of firms offers substantial information beyond that contained in my local reduced-form estimates of short-term distortions for firms. Second, short-termism generates endogenous selection at the zero forecast error threshold. Firms with higher fundamentals can better afford opportunistic cuts and are therefore overrepresented among firms just meeting targets. A model extending mine with more substantial information frictions might therefore rationalize discontinuous stock market reactions to meeting short-term targets. My structure is therefore consistent with the idea that some short-term profit pressure arises in practice from capital markets and information frictions, a long-espoused theoretical view (Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)).

In a range of robustness checks, I first investigate changes to the innovation function allowing for either long-lived R&D capital or unobserved heterogeneity in R&D project quality. I then conduct multiple exercises such as varying each model parameter, re-estimating with different time windows, subsamples, or alternative variable definitions, and even allowing for a fraction of R&D to be conducted by private firms without incentive conflicts. Although the exact quantitative magnitudes vary, my checks reveal qualitatively similar impacts from short-termism.

Overall, my analysis suggests that the benefits of liquid capital markets, transparent reporting, and disciplined managers are not free. Closely associated short-termist behavior creates a nontrivial drag on growth and welfare.

Section 1 analyzes short-term targets in the data. Section 2 analyzes a toy short-termism model. Section 3 introduces my quantitative model. Section 4 estimates the impact of short-termism. Section 5 provides further discussion and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains details on the baseline quantitative model. Appendices

---

<sup>6</sup>The term “bunching” refers to a disproportionate mass of firms just above rather than just below profit targets, and the term “threshold effects” refers to differences in outcomes such as R&D investment between firms just meeting and just failing to meet profit targets. Both of these patterns are local to the zero forecast error threshold.

in the Supplemental Material (Terry (2023)) contain details on the data (Appendix B), extended models (Appendix C), and the estimation and quantitative analysis (Appendix D).

## 1. DATA

I draw on two main data sources. First, I exploit millions of profit forecasts at the firm-analyst-fiscal year level from the Institutional Broker's Estimate System (IBES) database. Realized values of firm "Street" profits accompany analyst forecasts in IBES.<sup>7</sup> I also use Compustat data from annual U.S. public firm income statements. Linking the IBES and Compustat data sets results in a panel of around 11,000 firm-fiscal year observations with consensus analyst forecasts, Street realizations, and various firm financials. Around 1500 firms from 1990 to 2018 are available in the combined panel. My sample primarily consists of larger firms, which together conduct about 51% of U.S. R&D expenditures in 2018. I also, where possible, link to Execucomp executive pay and career data, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) stock return data, and USPTO patenting outcomes from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). Appendix B of the Supplemental Material provides further detailed information on my data, variable definitions, and sample construction, with descriptive statistics in Table B.I.

My forecast error measure for a given firm-year is the realized value of Street profits minus median analyst forecasts from the start of the same fiscal year, scaled by firm assets. This measure, plotted in Figure 1, guarantees comparability with existing empirical work and reflects the need to normalize by some measure of scale.<sup>8</sup> Profit bunching just above forecasts suggests that firms near targets may engage in some behavior(s) to avoid small misses. If so, firms just meeting short-term targets may differ on observables from firms just missing. Motivated by this logic, I compare firms that just meet and just miss, applying a standard regression discontinuity estimator in Table I to various outcomes of interest by estimating a local linear regression

$$X_{jt} = \alpha + \beta f e_{jt} + \gamma f e_{jt} \mathbb{I}(f e_{jt} \geq 0) + \delta \mathbb{I}(f e_{jt} \geq 0) + \varepsilon_{jt}.$$

Here,  $X_{jt}$  is some outcome of interest for firm  $j$  in year  $t$ , and  $f e_{jt}$  is the associated forecast error. The estimate of interest,  $\hat{\delta}$ , represents the local difference in the conditional mean of  $X$  between firms just meeting relative to firms just missing short-term analyst forecasts. Note that, where appropriate, I first demean outcomes by firm then year, controlling for both permanent heterogeneity across firms as well as business-cycle effects.

Panel A examines firm investment. Column (1) reveals that R&D growth is 4.4% lower for firms just meeting targets. An alternative intangible investment measure (selling, general, and administrative expenditures, or SG&A) includes advertising and various other nonproduction expenses.<sup>9</sup> Column (2) reports that SG&A growth is 3.5% lower for firms just meeting targets. The R&D and SG&A discontinuities are moderately large, each reflecting a drop relative to one standard deviation of around 20%. By contrast, in column (3), growth in tangible investment does not precisely vary across the threshold. An

<sup>7</sup>Street earnings, over which firms possess more discretion, are more widely followed than the GAAP profit measures reported in Compustat (Bradshaw and Sloan (2002)).

<sup>8</sup>Bunching in forecast error distributions such as that in Figure 1 relies on neither the precise forecast horizon nor the scaling measure (Burgstahler and Eames (2006)).

<sup>9</sup>Work highlighting this intangible investment measure includes Eisefeldt and Papanikolaou (2014), Peters and Taylor (2017), and Gourio and Rudanko (2014).

TABLE I  
OUTCOMES AT THE ZERO FORECAST ERROR THRESHOLD.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Investment Growth	R&D	SG&A	Capital
Mean Chg. at 0 Threshold (p.p.)	-4.44 (1.55)	-3.51 (1.01)	-2.00 (1.53)
Standardized (%)	-17.5	-23.9	-4.6
Fixed Effects	Firm, Year	Firm, Year	Firm, Year
Observations	10,664	10,664	10,664
Panel B: Subsequent Innovation Growth	Raw Patenting	Market-Valued Patenting	Cite-Weighted Patenting
Mean Chg. at 0 Threshold (p.p.)	-23.0 (7.16)	-5.61 (3.36)	-1.15 (0.605)
Standardized (%)	-32.1	-13.1	-15.5
Fixed Effects	Firm, Year	Firm, Year	Firm, Year
Observations	3646	3646	3646
Panel C: CEO's, Returns	CEO Pay	CEO Turnover	Stock Returns
Mean Chg. at 0 Threshold (p.p.)	3.63 (1.67)	-2.83 (0.836)	4.44 (1.81)
Standardized (%)	6.2	-12.2	-
Fixed Effects	Firm, Year, Executive	Firm, Year	Market Adjusted
Observations	24,448	24,448	50,579

*Note:* Estimates are mean predicted differences for the outcome in p.p. for firms just meeting to just missing forecasts. Standardized values scale estimates by the outcome's residualized standard deviation and multiply by 100. Standard errors are clustered by firm. Local linear regression discontinuities estimated with a triangular kernel and optimal [Calónico and Farrell \(2020\)](#) bandwidth. Running variable is forecast errors, pro forma profits minus median analyst forecasts relative to firm assets from a four-quarter horizon (Panels A and B) or one-quarter horizon (Panel C). Investment measures are in growth rates. R&D is research and development. SG&A is selling, general, and administrative expenses. Capital expenditure is spending on plants, property, and equipment. Patenting is patents issued by the firm in the subsequent four years, with measures in growth rates or differences. Raw patenting is the inverse hyperbolic sine of patents. Market-valued patenting is patents' market value to assets. Citation-weighted patenting is patents' citation weights to firm assets. CEO pay is log total compensation for CEOs and CFOs. CEO turnover is an indicator for CEO or CFO turnover in the following year. Returns are standardized cumulative market-adjusted stock returns in a 10-day window to the earnings announcement.

accounting digression is useful. Tangible investment in column (3), creating straightforward assets, is not immediately subtracted from profits but instead gradually expensed as depreciation. Under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), firms immediately subtract R&D (and SG&A) in columns (1)–(2) from profits ([FASB \(1974\)](#)). So R&D or SG&A cuts mechanically boost short-term profits, while cuts to capital expenditures have less impact.

How might firms cut R&D practically? Compustat does not break down R&D, but NSF business surveys do. About 40% of 2008 internal U.S. R&D budgets were materials, specialized equipment, or facilities, with the rest spent on staff.<sup>10</sup> By cutting supplies or reducing facilities costs, a firm can quickly cut large portions of R&D, hampering its innovation, while staff cuts can yield even more cost reductions. But even if real cuts

<sup>10</sup>See Table 6 of the 2008 Business R&D and Innovation survey, entitled "Domestic R&D paid for and performed by the company, by type of cost, industry, and company size: 2008."

to research inputs are possible, one might worry that Panel A's R&D results reflect creative accounting. This sort of manipulation is constrained by the fact that R&D budgets outlined above primarily reflect nonproduction expenses, difficult to reclassify in a way that avoids subtraction from current profits. Still, Panel B turns to external measures of innovation—not directly subject to profit pressure—based on patenting. Patent grant lags are heterogeneous and sometimes lengthy. So I consider patenting over the next four years, but Appendix Table B.II verifies that the exact horizon is not crucial. In column (1), new patent growth is 23% lower for firms just meeting targets. But patent counts, though transparent, do not incorporate quality information. Column (2) reports that growth in the value of patents, measured using stock market event studies, is lower by 5.6% of assets for firms just meeting targets. Column (3) reveals that citation-weighted patenting growth relative to firm assets is 1.2% lower for firms just meeting targets. The declines in patenting outcomes just above targets are meaningful, reflecting drops relative to one standard deviation ranging from about 15–30%.

Panel C examines manager outcomes and firm stock returns, both perhaps linked to the short-term incentives of firm decisionmakers. Columns (1) and (2) use data on outcomes for CEOs and CFOs at the executive-firm-fiscal year level. Column (1) reveals that managers' total mean compensation is 3.6% higher when just meeting targets. In column (2), their likelihood of turnover or departure from the firm in the following year is 2.8 percentage points lower, relative to a mean of 12.3 percentage points. Column (3) examines standardized cumulative abnormal stock returns in a 10-day window to the firm's financial statement, with a moderately large increase of 4.4 percent for firms just meeting targets.

Three comments are useful. First, Table I does not present causal evidence. Discontinuities are not “the effect of meeting a profit target” but instead serve as an endogenous detection mechanism. Second, although I present results in one location with a standard discontinuity estimator, findings of anomalous outcomes for firms around profit targets are not entirely novel. An accounting literature documents “earnings manipulation” including apparent R&D cuts around targets.<sup>11</sup> Discontinuous manager pay and stock returns also link to an empirical literature.<sup>12</sup> Third, disaggregated reduced-form facts do not immediately map to aggregate conclusions. Such facts represent local, relative variation which could mechanically average out at the aggregate level, does not rationalize short-term incentives, and does not provide general equilibrium counterfactual analysis of an economy without short-term incentives. I now turn to building a model filling these gaps.

## 2. SHORT-TERMISM AS OPTIMAL COST DISCIPLINE

A toy model shows that apparent short-termism can arise through optimal cost discipline on managers with agency conflicts. Consider a single firm for two periods,  $t$  (today) and  $t + 1$  (tomorrow). The firm profits from products with mass  $M_t$  today and  $M_{t+1}$  tomorrow. R&D investment  $W_t$  innovates new products  $M_{t+1}$  through

$$M_{t+1}(W_t) = \bar{\xi} W_t^\gamma,$$

<sup>11</sup>See Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard (1991), Roychowdhury (2006), or Gunny (2010) for seminal contributions to this empirical strategy.

<sup>12</sup>See MacKinlay (1997), McNichols (1989), Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009), Matsunaga and Park (2001), Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen (2017), Asch (1990), Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013), Larkin (2014), Murphy (1999), Murphy (2001), Oyer (1998), Jenter and Lewellen (2020), Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, and McInnis (2009), or Jenter and Kanaan (2015).

where  $\bar{\xi} > 0$  and  $0 < \gamma < 1$ . The firm takes as given cash flows  $\bar{\pi} > 0$  per product, the real interest rate  $R > 1$ , and the mass  $M_t$  today. Firm value  $V(W_t)$  is

$$V(W_t) = \bar{\pi}M_t - W_t + \frac{1}{R}\bar{\pi}M_{t+1}(W_t).$$

Today’s profits are cash flows plus accounting noise:

$$\Pi_t = \bar{\pi}M_t - W_t + \nu_t, \quad \nu_t \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2).$$

Noise  $\nu_t$ , with CDF  $F_\nu$  and PDF  $f_\nu$ , is unobservable when R&D  $W_t$  is chosen. Outside analysts observe the product mass  $M_t$  and make a profit forecast

$$\Pi_t^f = \bar{\pi}M_t - W_t^f$$

linked one-for-one with an R&D forecast  $W_t^f$ .

A risk-neutral manager chooses R&D. Their board-determined compensation is a fraction  $\theta_d > 0$  of firm value net of a short-termist clawback  $\theta_\pi \geq 0$  when profits fall below the forecast  $\Pi_t^f$ . The manager receives a private benefit  $\phi_e > 0$  from R&D, representing research prestige or empire building. The manager’s objective, without loss of generality normalizing  $\theta_d = 1$ , is

$$V_m(W_t|\theta_\pi, W_t^f) = \bar{\pi}M_t - W_t + \frac{1}{R}\bar{\pi}M_{t+1}(W_t) - \theta_\pi\mathbb{P}(\Pi_t < \Pi_t^f) + \phi_e W_t.$$

The probability of missing a short-term profit target  $\mathbb{P}(\Pi_t < \Pi_t^f) = \mathbb{P}(\bar{\pi}M_t - W_t + \nu_t < \bar{\pi}M_t - W_t^f) = F_\nu(W_t - W_t^f)$  increases in R&D  $W_t$ .

Consider an equilibrium with rational forecasts and optimal compensation defined as a triple  $(W_t^*(\theta_\pi), W_t^f(\theta_\pi), \theta_\pi^*)$ .  $W_t^*(\theta_\pi)$  is a schedule of manager R&D choices,  $W_t^f(\theta_\pi)$  is a schedule of analyst R&D forecasts, and  $\theta_\pi^*$  is optimal board-chosen short-term incentives. Equilibrium requires that (i) manager R&D optimizes their payoffs with  $W_t^*(\theta_\pi) = \arg \max_{W_t} V_m(W_t|\theta_\pi, W_t^f(\theta_\pi)) \forall \theta_\pi$ , (ii) analysts forecast rationally with  $W_t^f(\theta_\pi) = W_t^*(\theta_\pi) \forall \theta_\pi$ , and (iii) board-chosen compensation maximizes firm value with  $\theta_\pi^* = \arg \max_{\theta_\pi} V(W_t^*(\theta_\pi))$ .

For an illustrative parameterization, Figure 2 plots firm value  $V(W_t)$  in the light black line, manager equilibrium payoffs with optimal short-termism  $V_m(W_t|\theta_\pi^*, W_t^f)$  in the medium blue line, and counterfactual manager payoffs with no short-termism  $V_m(W_t|\theta_\pi = 0)$  in the thick gray line as functions of R&D  $W_t$ . The left dotted vertical line locates value-maximizing R&D satisfying the optimality condition

$$1 = \frac{1}{R}\bar{\pi}\bar{\xi}\gamma W_t^{\gamma-1}. \tag{1}$$

The marginal cost of R&D on the left of (1) equals the discounted marginal profits from R&D on the right. A manager’s optimal R&D choice satisfies

$$1 - \phi_e + \theta_\pi f_\nu(W_t - W_t^f) = \frac{1}{R}\bar{\pi}\bar{\xi}\gamma W_t^{\gamma-1}. \tag{2}$$

Manager private benefits  $\phi_e$  lower the net marginal R&D cost on the left of (2). So with no short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi = 0$ , the right dotted vertical line in Figure 2 indicates that




FIGURE 2.—Manager versus firm incentives. *Note:* The figure plots firm versus manager incentives in an illustrative parameterization of the toy model. The horizontal axis is R&D expenditures. The thin black line is firm value. The medium-weight blue line is manager payoffs with short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi^*$  chosen optimally by the firm. The heavy gray line is manager payoffs with no short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi = 0$ . The left dashed vertical line indicates optimal R&D choices for firm value and for the manager with optimal incentives. The right dashed vertical line indicates the optimal R&D choice for a manager with no short-term incentives.

R&D exceeds the value-maximizing level. But short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$  offset this force, since at the margin R&D raises the probability of missing the profit target. In equilibrium with optimal short-termism  $\theta_\pi^* > 0$  and rational forecasts, the manager’s R&D choice matches the value-maximizing choice. The value-maximizing and manager R&D optimality conditions (1) and (2) fully coincide in equilibrium when

$$\theta_\pi^* f_v(0) = \phi_e.$$

Optimally, therefore, short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi^*$  vary proportionally with the agency conflict’s size  $\phi_e$ , exactly offsetting manager’s private benefits from R&D and imposing cost discipline through a profit target that fully recovers value maximization. Note that the restriction to discontinuous short-term incentives does not impose a binding constraint on the board’s contract structure in this toy model, since full value maximization can be achieved through the resulting decline in the level of R&D.<sup>13</sup>

So short-termist profit targets can optimally preserve firm value, placing cost discipline on managers who privately prefer to invest more in R&D. Firm boards can use widely available analyst forecasts as a convenient tool for this discipline, either explicitly through compensation as modeled above or implicitly by declining to shield managers from exter-

<sup>13</sup>Two technical comments are in order. First, firm value  $V(W_t)$  neglects manager compensation without loss of generality after allowing for a fixed component of compensation ensuring mean-zero manager pay without impact on risk-neutral manager choices. Second, a well-behaved equilibrium requires sufficiently small manager private R&D benefits  $\phi_e$  and sufficiently high profit noise  $\sigma_v$ . In this case, R&D  $W_t^*$  varies weakly with forecasts  $W_t^f$ . The result is single crossing with existence and uniqueness of R&D choices coinciding with forecasts for a given  $\theta_\pi$ . The concavity of firm value in R&D, inherited by the board objective, then delivers a unique optimal level of  $\theta_\pi^*$ . Both comments also apply to my full quantitative model as well. In practice, equilibrium existence failure is straightforward to numerically detect through cycling in manager R&D choices and analyst forecasts, and I discard such parameterizations in my quantitative work.

nal pressures. But the toy model is incomplete in two dimensions. First, in endogenous growth models, the social returns to R&D are often higher than the private returns. For example, more R&D today and more ideas reduce future innovation costs, a positive externality absent in the toy model. Second, the toy model lacks some quantitatively realistic features which will be needed to confront my firm microdata, such as persistent heterogeneity, private manager information, and accounting-based tools for profit manipulation. I now present a general equilibrium endogenous growth model with these features.

3. QUANTITATIVE MODEL OF SHORT-TERMISM

Time  $t$  is discrete with no macro uncertainty. A household, a final goods sector, heterogeneous intermediate goods firms run by managers under board discipline, and forecasting analysts all optimize in general equilibrium. The economy expands with a variety measure in the endogenous growth tradition of Romer (1990). For reference, Table II provides a summary of key model definitions and equations, each later fleshed out in further detail.

TABLE II  
MODEL SUMMARY.

Panel A: Aggregates	
Household preferences	$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{c_t^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$
Final goods production	$Y_t = L_t^{1-\alpha} \int_0^{Q_t} z_{jt}^{1-\alpha} x_{jt}^{\alpha} dj$
Variety growth	$Q_{t+1} = M_{t+1} + Q_t$
Panel B: Firms	
Variety innovation	$M_{kt+1} = \bar{\xi} W_{kt}^{\gamma} Q_t^{1-\gamma}$
Persistent demand	$\log z_{kt+1} = \rho \log z_{kt} + \zeta_{kt+1}, \zeta_{kt+1} \sim N(0, \sigma_z^2)$
Profit noise	$\varepsilon_{kt} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ (obs.), $\nu_{kt} \sim N(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$ (unobs.)
Profits definition	$\Pi_{kt} = M_{kt} \pi_{Mkt} - W_{kt} + \nu_{kt} Q_t + \varepsilon_{kt} Q_t + A_{kt}$
Payouts	$D_{kt} = \pi_{Mkt} M_{kt} - W_{kt}$
Firm value	$V_{kt} = [D_{kt} + \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_{kt} V_{kt+1}]$
Stationary distribution	$F(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt})$
Panel C: Managers	
Compensation	$D_{kt}^M = \theta_d (-W_{kt} + \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_t (\pi_{Mkt+1} M_{kt+1})) - \theta_\pi \mathbb{I}(\Pi_{kt} < \Pi_{kt}^f)$
Flow in RN preferences	$D_{kt}^M + \phi_e W_{kt} - \phi_a (\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t})^2 Q_t$
Panel D: Analysts	
Rational forecasts	$\Pi_{kt}^f = \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{kt}   z_{kt}, M_{kt}, Q_t]$
Panel E: Boards	
RN over firm value	$\int v(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}) dF(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}), v(\cdot) Q_t = V(\cdot)$

Note: Each panel in the table presents a list of key definitions and expressions within the model relating to a particular level of aggregation or economic agent.

### 3.1. Household

A representative household at time  $t$  owns final goods firms, intermediate goods firms, and land, solving the consumption-savings problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{B_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{C_t^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} \quad \text{s.t.} \\ C_t + B_{t+1} = B_t R_t + P_t^L L_t + D_t^{\text{Final}} + D_t^{\text{Int}} \quad \forall t \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Preferences satisfy  $0 < \beta < 1$  and  $\eta > 0$ . Savings  $B_{t+1}$  in period  $t$  in a one-period bond yield real interest rate  $R_{t+1}$ . Land is in exogenous fixed unit supply  $L_t = 1$  with price  $P_t^L$ .  $D_t^{\text{Final}}$  and  $D_t^{\text{Int}}$  are payouts of the final and intermediate goods sectors. Household optimal savings satisfy

$$\frac{1}{C_t^\eta} = \beta R_{t+1} \frac{1}{C_{t+1}^\eta}, \tag{3}$$

linking a constant rate  $R$  to the macro growth rate  $g$  under balanced growth.

### 3.2. Final Goods

A competitive final goods sector statically maximizes profits, solving

$$\max_{\{x_{jt}\}_j, L_t} L_t^{1-\alpha} \int_0^{Q_t} z_{jt}^{1-\alpha} x_{jt}^\alpha dj - P_t^L L_t - \int_0^{Q_t} p_{jt} x_{jt} dj. \tag{4}$$

The first term is numeraire gross output  $Y_t$  with a constant returns technology combining land  $L_t$  in share  $0 < 1 - \alpha < 1$  under price  $P_t^L$  with an expanding continuum of varieties  $j \in [0, Q_t]$  of intermediate goods used in quantity  $x_{jt}$  with price  $p_{jt}$ . An exogenous demand shock  $z_{jt}$  described below shifts the marginal product of and hence demand for each good  $j$ . Final demand for intermediate  $j$ , substituting  $L_t = 1$ , is

$$x_{jt} = z_{jt} \left( \frac{\alpha}{p_{jt}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}. \tag{5}$$

Constant returns yield zero equilibrium payouts from the final goods sector.

### 3.3. Intermediate Goods

A unit mass of firms  $k \in [0, 1]$  innovates and produces new intermediate varieties for sale to the final goods sector. Innovation of a new variety entitles a firm to one-period monopoly patent protection.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>The one-period monopoly protection used here is clearly a simplification, although versions of the model with longer-lived monopoly protection bear substantial similarity to a version of the model with long-lived R&D capital analyzed below in Section 5.2.

*Static Monopoly.* Firm  $k$  arrives in  $t$  with a mass of previously innovated products  $M_{kt}$  under monopoly patent protection. All goods  $j$  in this portfolio are subject to the same firm-level persistent exogenous demand shock  $z$  following

$$\log z_{kt+1} = \rho \log z_{kt} + \zeta_{kt+1}, \quad \zeta_{kt+1} \sim N(0, \sigma_z^2), \tag{6}$$

where  $0 < \rho < 1$  and  $\sigma_z > 0$ . Firms face identical marginal production costs  $\psi > 0$ . Firm  $k$  solves the good- $j$  static monopoly pricing problem

$$\max_{p_{jt}} p_{jt} x_{jt}(p_{jt}, z_{kt}) - \psi x_{jt}(p_{jt}, z_{kt}). \tag{7}$$

Given isoelastic demand in (5), optimal prices follow a constant-markup rule  $p_M = \frac{\psi}{\alpha}$ . Optimal monopoly profits per variety are proportional to a firm’s demand shock

$$\pi_{Mkt} = p_M x(p_M, z_{kt}) - \psi x(p_M, z_{kt}) = (1 - \alpha) \alpha^{\frac{1+\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \psi^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} z_{kt},$$

and total monopoly production profits for firm  $k$  are  $M_{kt} \pi_{Mkt}$ . A competitive fringe with common demand shock  $z = 1$  produces all off-patent varieties with pricing at marginal cost  $p_C = \psi$ , resulting in zero profits for such goods.

*Dynamic Innovation.* Firm  $k$ ’s R&D investment  $W_{kt}$  yields innovation of new varieties next period with mass

$$M_{kt+1} = \bar{\xi} W_{kt}^\gamma Q_t^{1-\gamma}, \tag{8}$$

where R&D productivity and the R&D elasticity of innovation satisfy  $\bar{\xi} > 0$  and  $0 < \gamma < 1$ . The current aggregate variety mass  $Q_t$ , boosting innovation through a positive externality in (8), evolves with the collective R&D investments of firms via

$$Q_{t+1} = M_{t+1} + Q_t, \tag{9}$$

where  $M_{t+1} = \int_k M_{kt+1} dk$  is the total newly innovated mass at  $t + 1$ .

*Firm Profits.* Firm  $k$ ’s profits are production profits net of R&D costs adjusted for accounting noise and manipulation:

$$\Pi_{kt} = M_{kt} \pi_{Mkt} - W_{kt} + \nu_{kt} Q_t + \varepsilon_{kt} Q_t + A_{kt}.$$

Above,  $\varepsilon_{kt} \sim_{\text{i.i.d.}} N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$  is noise observable to the firm when decisions are made,  $\nu_{kt} \sim_{\text{i.i.d.}} N(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$  is noise unobservable to the firm when decisions are made, and  $A_{kt}$  is accounting or accruals manipulation.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>A rich literature on accruals manipulation in accounting emphasizes that real outcomes such as R&D are not the only tools available to managers for profit manipulation and that substitution between accruals manipulation and other distortions may matter quantitatively (Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008)). To economize on state variables, I model  $A_{kt}$  as a static choice, although richer dynamic models of accounting manipulation exist (Zakolyukina (2018), Terry, Whited, and Zakolyukina (2023)).

*Manager.* A risk-neutral manager at each firm decides R&D  $W_{kt}$  and manipulation  $A_{kt}$ . Board-determined compensation includes an equity share  $\theta_d$  of firm payouts, without loss of generality normalized to 1, and  $\theta_\pi \geq 0$  units clawed back if profits  $\Pi_{kt}$  fall below an analyst profit forecast  $\Pi_{kt}^f$ . The manager receives private benefits  $\phi_e > 0$  from R&D while bearing a quadratic private cost of accounting manipulation scaling with  $\phi_a > 0$ . The time- $t$  manager decision solves

$$\max_{W_{kt}, A_{kt}} -W_{kt} + \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_t(\pi_{M_{kt+1}} M_{kt+1}) - \theta_\pi \mathbb{P}(\Pi_{kt} < \Pi_{kt}^f) + \phi_e W_{kt} - \phi_a \left(\frac{A_{kt}}{Q_t}\right)^2 Q_t. \quad (10)$$

The first three terms are mean equity and short-term compensation. The remaining terms are private payoffs.<sup>16</sup>

*Analysts.* A mass of risk-neutral analysts receives private payoffs from accurately predicting profits. Analysts observe a firm’s demand shock  $z_{kt}$  and variety mass  $M_{kt}$ . The analysts do not observe either component of profit noise  $\varepsilon_{kt}$  nor  $\nu_{kt}$ . Analyst payoffs decline in mean squared prediction error. Their rational forecasts are

$$\Pi_{kt}^f = \arg \min_{\Pi^f} \mathbb{E}[(\Pi_{kt} - \Pi^f)^2 | z_{kt}, M_{kt}, Q_t] = \mathbb{E}[\Pi_{kt} | z_{kt}, M_{kt}, Q_t]. \quad (11)$$

*Board of Directors.* Given manager R&D policies, themselves dependent on short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , firm value is the expected discounted value of payouts satisfying

$$V(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t) = \left[ \pi_{M_{kt}} M_{kt} - W_{kt} + \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}(V(M_{kt+1}, z_{kt+1}, \varepsilon_{kt+1}, Q_{t+1}) | z_{kt}) \right]. \quad (12)$$

Under balanced growth, by exploiting homogeneity, firm value  $V$  can be written in stationary form  $V(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t) = Q_t v(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt})$ . Let  $F(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt})$  be the unconditional firm stationary distribution from a given choice of  $\theta_\pi$ . The board of directors of each firm commits to an optimal contracted level of short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi^*$  to maximize the unconditional mean of firm value, solving

$$\max_{\theta_\pi} \int v\left(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt} | \theta_\pi\right) dF\left(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt} | \theta_\pi\right). \quad (13)$$

Recall that Section 2’s toy model analysis revealed that this sort of discontinuous short-term incentive  $\theta_\pi$  linked to analyst forecasts can be fully optimal for boards and induce value-maximization by managers. The extended quantitative model, however, includes features such as manager private information about noise—information exploited through R&D manipulation near analyst profit targets—which imply that the discontinuous incentives considered here are not necessarily fully optimal. The board’s optimization problem is therefore a constrained contracting choice, albeit under constraints motivated naturally by both simpler theory in Section 2 and empirical evidence in Section 1. With no

<sup>16</sup>Formally, I assume the compensation contract’s flow payoffs at the end of  $t$  are  $\theta_d(-W_{kt} + \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_t(\pi_{M_{kt+1}} M_{kt+1})) - \theta_\pi \mathbb{I}(\Pi_{kt} < \Pi_{kt}^f)$ , normalizing  $\theta_d = 1$  in (10). When  $\theta_\pi = \phi_e = \phi_a = 0$ , manager policies maximize firm value at equilibrium interest rates. Since under this timing manager time- $t$  policies affect only time- $t$  payoffs, the problem is formally static but fully nests value maximization without specification of manager preferences beyond risk-neutrality.

agency conflict, the manager's equity share alone induces value maximization with optimal short-term compensation  $\theta_\pi^* = 0$ . With manager private R&D benefits  $\phi_e > 0$ , boards may impose short-termist incentives  $\theta_\pi^* > 0$  to optimally constrain R&D.

### 3.4. *Equilibrium and Solution*

Appendix A defines and characterizes stationary general equilibrium with balanced growth. Equilibrium involves prices and quantities for intermediate goods, final goods, and land, aggregate growth and interest rates, manager R&D and manipulation policies, analyst profit forecasts, a stationary distribution of intermediate firms, short-term compensation contracts, and aggregate quantities such that (i) final goods demand for intermediates and land solves (4), (ii) intermediate goods monopoly prices solve (7), (iii) manager policies solve (10), (iv) analyst forecasts solve (11), (v) short-term incentives solve (13), (vi) the stationary distribution is consistent with manager policies and exogenous shocks, (vii) the interest rate satisfies (3), (viii) the growth rate is consistent with manager R&D policies and the stationary distribution, and (ix) markets clear while aggregate quantities, growing at a common rate, satisfy a resource constraint. Appendix A verifies that balanced growth is compatible with the model, yielding a growth rate for all macro quantities equal to the growth rate  $g$  of varieties  $Q_t$ . Appendix D of the Supplemental Material describes my numerical solution algorithm exploiting a computationally intensive “outer loop, inner loop” approach. Below, I sometimes drop firm and time notation in the model where obvious from context.

### 3.5. *Manager Policies*

Figure 3 plots mean manager R&D (top row) and manipulation (bottom row) policies as fundamental shocks  $z$  (left column) and noise shocks  $\varepsilon$  (right column) vary under my baseline parameter estimates with short-termism (thick blue lines) and a counterfactual with no short-termism and  $\theta_\pi = 0$  (thin black lines).<sup>17</sup> Higher persistent fundamentals  $z$  cause R&D increases with and without short-termism (top left). The two R&D policies are not identical, but their profiles overlap in deviations from their respective means. Fundamentals  $z$ , observable to forecasting analysts, have less direct impact on managers' ability to meet targets. So mean manipulation policies are flat across  $z$  (bottom left). By contrast, profit noise  $\varepsilon$  is observable to managers but not analysts. Without short-termism, managers optimally ignore noise (right column). With short-termism, managers with small absolute noise understand that profits are near targets and therefore face higher incentives to opportunistically cut R&D (top right) and boost manipulation (bottom right) to reduce the likelihood of missing.

So, in summary, short-termism influences R&D in two ways. First, R&D exhibits excess sensitivity to noise, causing volatility and misallocation in a manner akin to financial frictions.<sup>18</sup> This excess sensitivity manifests itself through the opportunistic dips in manager R&D policies for small values of noise in the top right panel of Figure 3. Second, short-termism raises the ongoing possibility of a profit miss, increasing mean R&D costs while

<sup>17</sup>Figure 3 innocuously omits  $M$  and  $\nu$ . First, the variety mass  $M$ , observable to analysts and incorporated into forecasts, does not impact manager payoffs or policies in equilibrium. Second, the component  $\nu$  of profit noise, unobservable to the manager ex ante, does not influence policies directly.

<sup>18</sup>See two important contributions studying R&D volatility in Barlevy (2004, 2007).




FIGURE 3.—Manager policies. *Note:* In all panels, the lightweight black line is manager policy with no short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi = 0$ , and the heavier blue line is manager policy chosen with optimal incentives  $\theta_\pi^*$ . The top row plots manager R&D policy, and the bottom row plots manager accruals manipulation policy. The left column reports mean policies for a given value of the fundamental shock  $z$ , expressed in percentage deviation from mean. The right column reports mean policies for a given value of the observable noise shock  $\varepsilon$ , expressed in percent of mean production profits. All policies are expressed as deviations from mean in the associated parameterization of the model. The policies are smoothed and computed from the baseline parameter estimates from Panel A of Table III.

depressing mean R&D levels. More explicitly, a manager’s overall marginal cost of R&D  $W_{kt}$  from differentiation of their payoffs in (10) is given by

$$1 - \phi_e + \theta_\pi \frac{\partial}{\partial W_{kt}} \mathbb{P}(\Pi_{kt} < \Pi_{kt}^f).$$

This marginal R&D cost expression is made up of the physical cost of R&D, one, net of private benefits  $\phi_e$  and augmented—when there is short-termism with  $\theta_\pi > 0$ —by the expected marginal loss of compensation from a higher likelihood of missing the analyst profit target. When averaged across the cross-section of managers, this final term results in a higher mean cost of R&D causing a lower average level of R&D, a shift in mean costs which I quantify in my counterfactual analysis below.

#### 4. QUANTIFYING SHORT-TERMISM’S IMPACT

This section structurally estimates the model and computes the quantitative impact of short-termism at the micro and macro levels.

##### 4.1. Structurally Estimating the Model

I solve the model annually, externally calibrating parameters for household risk aversion ( $\eta = 2$  with CRRA preferences), household patience ( $\beta$  delivers a real return of

TABLE III  
 BASELINE MODEL RESULTS.

Panel A: Estimated Parameters	Symbol	Estimate	(Std. Error)
R&D elasticity of innovation	$\gamma$	0.4184	(0.0292)
Profitability persistence	$\rho$	0.9197	(0.0258)
Profitability volatility	$\sigma_z$	0.1117	(0.0065)
Observable profit noise	$\sigma_e$	0.1977	(0.0362)
Unobservable profit noise	$\sigma_v$	0.0623	(0.0045)
Manager private R&D benefits	$\phi_e$	0.0915	(0.0074)
Manager private accruals cost	$\phi_a$	1.9857	(0.9410)

Panel B: Moments	Data	(Std. Error)	Model
Std. deviation of sales growth	0.4249	(0.0102)	0.1675
Correlation of sales growth, profit growth	0.2616	(0.0098)	0.5326
Correlation of sales growth, R&D growth	0.1745	(0.0123)	0.6673
Correlation of sales growth, forecast error	0.1282	(0.0085)	0.2575
Std. deviation of profit growth	0.8490	(0.0101)	0.7722
Correlation of profit growth, R&D growth	-0.0364	(0.0093)	-0.0085
Correlation of profit growth, forecast error	0.5486	(0.0102)	0.6719
Std. deviation of R&D growth	0.3092	(0.0052)	0.2151
Correlation of R&D growth, forecast error	-0.0246	(0.0093)	-0.0649
Std. deviation of forecast error	0.6637	(0.0099)	0.5639
Prob. of meeting forecast	0.5473	(0.0041)	0.5721
Prob. of just meeting to prob. of just missing	1.7852	(0.0516)	2.0166

Panel C: Quantitative Impacts	
Mean R&D cost increase from short-term pressure	2.4363 %
Mean value loss without short-term pressure	1.2525 %
Welfare gain without short-term pressure	1.1473 %
Growth gain without short-term pressure	4.7 b.p.

*Note:* Panel A's SMM parameter estimates use efficient moment weighting. Panel B's data moments use a 2003–2018 Compustat-IBES panel of 2510 firms for 16,575 firm-years. Model moments use a 25-year simulated panel of 5000 firms. Moment units are proportional (0.01 = 1%). Standard errors are firm clustered. Panel C's mean increase in R&D costs is the estimated percentage rise in marginal investment costs due to short-term pressure  $\theta_\pi > 0$ . The mean value loss is the counterfactual change from baseline in firm value after elimination of short-term pressure (setting  $\theta_\pi = 0$ ). The welfare gain is the counterfactual consumption-equivalent welfare gain. The growth gain is the counterfactual increase in aggregate growth, relative to the baseline 2%. Units in Panel C are in percent (0.1 = 0.1%) or basis points (1 b.p. = 0.0001) as indicated.

$R = 6\%$ ), the land share ( $\alpha$  chosen to deliver a 20% markup), and marginal production costs ( $\psi$  normalizes mean production profits to 1).<sup>19</sup>

*Simulated Method of Moments.* I then structurally estimate seven remaining parameters listed in Panel A of Table III via SMM. These parameters govern the innovation and profitability processes and manager's private payoffs. Panel B of Table III lists the 12 targeted moments computed in the Compustat-IBES micro data from Section 1. I target the

<sup>19</sup>Note that the precise identity of the fixed factor  $L_i$ , for example, land versus labor, does not qualitatively matter in the context of this model's environment, which lacks features such as population growth. However, the convention of referring to the factor as "land" rather than labor allows for the perhaps more palatable use of moderate implied markups of 20% (recall that  $1/\alpha$  is the gross markup, where  $1 - \alpha$  is the land share) rather than those which might otherwise be mechanically linked to the labor share (e.g., note that a labor share of  $1 - \alpha = 2/3$  would imply a 200% markup).

covariance matrix of sales, profits, R&D, and forecast errors. The model lacks a natural normalizer such as tangible capital. So I use sales, profits, and R&D in growth rates, a natural choice in a growth model, together with percentage forecast errors scaling raw forecast errors by the average magnitude of forecasts and profit levels.<sup>20</sup> I also target the probability of meeting forecasts, together with the ratio of the likelihoods that a firm just meets a profit forecast versus just misses. Here, “just” refers to a window of  $\pm 10\%$ . Accounting regulations changed meaningfully with 2002’s Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act. My baseline estimation therefore uses only the 2003–2018 post-SOX period with about 17,000 firm-years of data on around 2500 firms. I pair my empirical panel with a simulated panel, computing identically defined moments within each. The estimated parameter vector  $\hat{\theta}$  solves the SMM problem

$$\min_{\theta} (m(X) - m(\theta))' W (m(x) - m(\theta)), \quad (14)$$

where  $m(X)$  is the data moment vector and  $m(\theta)$  is the simulated model moment vector. I use the asymptotically efficient weighting matrix  $W$ , cluster standard errors by firm with the asymptotic formulas in Hansen and Lee (2019), and employ a global stochastic optimization routine for (14).

The macro growth rate is not a target moment, since my overidentified estimation might not match the targets perfectly. I instead normalize to exactly match the growth rate. Mechanically, within problem (14) for given parameters  $\theta$ , I iteratively compute the R&D productivity level  $\xi(\theta)$  delivering a desired macro growth rate in general equilibrium. As a baseline, I match the round, conventional value of 2% for real U.S. per capita GDP growth, exploring alternatives below. Note that only the estimated model must match the target growth rate. The growth rate varies freely during counterfactual exercises. Appendix D of the Supplemental Material provides further details on my estimation and computational approach.

*Identification.* Identification depends on the mapping from parameters to moments. The degree of short-termism in compensation increases in the manager’s agency conflict  $\phi_e$ . Figure 4 plots selected simulated moments varying  $\phi_e$  around my baseline estimate. With higher  $\phi_e$  and hence more short-termism causing R&D cuts to boost profits, the correlation between profit and R&D growth declines (top left). Since higher short-termism raises the marginal cost of R&D, growth in investment opportunities and the firm’s sales is less correlated with R&D growth (top right). With more short-term incentives, managers meet their short-term profit targets more often (bottom left). Bunching around the profit target also increases in short-termism (bottom right). So the estimated manager agency conflict  $\hat{\phi}_e$ , and hence the extent of short-termism, depends upon both R&D and forecast error patterns.

Identifying the remaining parameters is straightforward. Appendix Figure D.2 plots selected comparative statics. Sales growth volatility increases in fundamental persistence  $\rho$  which generates more dispersion in investment opportunities, realized innovation, and hence sales growth (top left). When fundamental volatility  $\sigma_z$  increases, R&D and sales growth correlate more strongly due to larger fundamental shifts (top right). Profit growth

<sup>20</sup>More precisely, for sales, profits, and R&D, I compute growth rates  $2 \frac{X_{jt} - X_{j,t-1}}{|X_{jt}| + |X_{j,t-1}|}$  for firm  $j$  in year  $t$ . Percentage forecast errors are  $2 \frac{\Pi_{jt} - \Pi_{jt}^f}{|\Pi_{jt}| + |\Pi_{jt}^f|}$ . Both measures follow formulas introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and are conveniently bounded between  $-2$  and  $2$ .




FIGURE 4.—Identifying the agency conflict  $\phi_e$ . *Note:* The figure plots selected simulated smoothed target moments on the agency conflict parameter  $\phi_e$ , varying the value above and below the baseline estimate in Panel A of Table III.

volatility mechanically increases in observable profit noise  $\sigma_e$  (middle left). Forecast error bunching declines in unobservable profit noise  $\sigma_v$ , since managers cannot as narrowly control realized profits (middle right). A higher R&D elasticity of innovation  $\gamma$  drives more sensitivity of R&D to fundamentals and hence higher R&D growth volatility (bottom left). Higher accounting manipulation costs  $\phi_a$  drive firms to manipulate profits with R&D instead, leading to lower sensitivity of R&D growth to sales growth (bottom right).

*Baseline Estimates.* Panel A of Table III reports baseline estimates and standard errors. Each parameter is precisely estimated. The R&D elasticity of innovation  $\hat{\gamma} \approx 0.4$  is similar to those estimated in Blundell, Griffith, and Windmeijer (2002) or Terry, Whited, and Zakolyukina (2023). High fundamental persistence  $\hat{\rho} \approx 0.9$  and moderate conditional volatility  $\hat{\sigma}_z \approx 10\%$  compare closely to the estimates in Gourio and Rudanko (2014) and Hennessy and Whited (2007), both of which are also based on dynamic firm models and Compustat data. At around  $\frac{\hat{\sigma}_e^2}{\hat{\sigma}_e^2 + \hat{\sigma}_v^2} \approx 0.9$ , the high estimated fraction of profit noise observed by managers suggests substantial information asymmetries. Due to their private benefit, managers perceive marginal R&D costs  $\hat{\phi}_e \approx 9\%$  lower than the fundamental R&D cost, one. In response, board-chosen short-term incentives are moderately large at  $\theta_\pi^* \approx 1.3\%$ , so missing a profit target is as costly for managers as a one-time loss of 1.3% of mean production profits. Finally, manipulation costs of  $\hat{\phi}_a \approx 2$  are moderate, implying that boosting reported profits by 10% relative to mean is as privately costly to managers as a one-time loss of around 1% of mean production profits.

*Model Fit.* Panel B of Table III reports data moments, standard errors, and simulated moments. Constrained by the overidentified, nonlinear estimation, the model fits well overall. First, the model matches all moments' signs, including the difficult-to-match

coexistence of slightly negative correlations between the R&D and profit/forecast error series—generated by opportunistic R&D cuts—with the overall positive correlation of R&D and sales growth from fundamentals. Second, in the simulation, I assume that noise shocks flow through production profits and are hence measured in both sales and profit growth. As a result, although the model’s sales growth volatility still is not quite as high as in the data, its cross-correlations are realistically meaningful.<sup>21</sup> Third, because of short-termism, the model reasonably matches the volatility of forecast errors together with distortions near the zero threshold.

#### 4.2. *The Impact of Short-Termism*

Panel C of Table III reports the quantitative impact of short-termism at the micro (first two entries) and macro (last two entries) levels. I compare various outcomes in my baseline estimated model with short-termist incentives to meet profit targets ( $\theta_\pi^* > 0$ ) to a counterfactual no short-termism economy without short-termist incentives (constraining  $\theta_\pi = 0$ ).<sup>22</sup> The first quantity of interest, about 2.5 percent, is the mean increase in managers’ marginal R&D cost from short-termist incentives. This value,  $\theta_\pi^* \int \frac{\partial}{\partial W_{kt}} \mathbb{P}(\Pi_{kt} < \Pi_{kt}^f) dF(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt})$ , can be compared to the fundamental R&D cost, one. Recall that manager private R&D benefits,  $\hat{\phi}_e \approx 9\%$ , are larger. So boards only partially reverse overinvestment tendencies, an optimal choice since short-termism also causes damaging opportunistic R&D cuts.<sup>23</sup> But compared to a world with unconstrained managers, short-termism substantially increases R&D costs. The second quantity reveals that in a no short-termism counterfactual with  $\theta_\pi = 0$ , firms lose around 1.25% of mean value. The mean (median) firm in my data loses around \$189 (\$34) million, a significant but not overwhelming sum compared to an estimated 3% loss from CEO turnover frictions (Taylor (2010)) or 6% loss from manager cash incentive conflicts (Nikolov and Whited (2014)). The loss also compares closely to a short-termism effect of around 1.5% of value estimated by Celik and Tian (2022) in an exercise inspired by an earlier version of my paper.

The final two macro quantities reveal that growth increases by 4.7 basis points and that social welfare increases by a consumption-equivalent 1.1% per year with no short-termism. Firms do not internalize the positive externalities from R&D on future innovation embedded in (8), nor do they fully appropriate the surplus created by their new varieties due to markups. So rational short-termist manager discipline prevents increased macro growth and welfare. The magnitudes are quantitatively meaningful but not excessive. Growing at the faster rate produces about 0.25% extra output after five years. Short-termism’s 1.1% welfare implications are somewhat smaller or comparable to the estimated costs of business cycles at around 2% (Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin, and Smith (2009)), trade gains at 2.5% or higher (Melitz and Redding (2015), Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2015)), inflation costs at around 1% (Lucas (2000)), or costs from irrational investors at about 5% (Hassan and Mertens (2016)).

<sup>21</sup>A robustness check below verifies that this noise measurement convention is not crucial.

<sup>22</sup>Note that, in this no short-termism counterfactual, I maintain the presence of estimated empire building agency frictions with  $\phi_e > 0$ . An alternative strategy for counterfactual analysis in this context, considering a case of full manager value maximization with no short-term incentives and no agency conflict, would instead commingle the impact of short-term incentives themselves with the impact of underlying agency conflicts and therefore obscure the effect of short-termism.

<sup>23</sup>Recall that in the toy model, absent manager private information creating forecast error bunching, the board can more tightly control managers and fully reverses agency conflicts.

TABLE IV  
SUMMARY OF ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND EXTENSIONS.

	R&D Cost Increase, %	Mean Value Loss, %	Welfare Gain, %	Growth Gain, b.p.
Baseline estimates	2.4363	1.2525	1.1473	4.7
Gaussian mixture noise	10.422	1.4623	1.1955	4.9
Project quality shocks	2.5012	0.6030	0.5525	2.3
Long-lived R&D capital	0.8741	1.3822	1.1901	4.9
Matching R&D to profits ratio	2.3230	1.0055	0.9338	3.8
Matching GDP per capita growth	2.0036	0.8700	0.7757	3.3
Matching TFP growth	2.0416	0.4378	0.3684	1.8
Longer estimation window	1.4973	0.7268	0.6604	2.7
High R&D intensity sample	4.8841	1.7146	1.4658	6.0
Low R&D intensity sample	1.7764	0.5741	0.4977	2.1
SG&A investment measure	0.7671	0.5333	0.5022	2.0
Noise in profits only	1.0463	0.7170	0.6633	2.6
Allowing for unlisted firms	2.4729	1.0683	0.9405	3.9

*Note:* Key results from various model robustness checks and extensions summarized in Section 5. The increase in R&D costs is the mean estimated percentage rise in marginal investment costs due to short-term pressure  $\theta_{\pi}^* > 0$ . The mean value loss is the counterfactual change from baseline in firm value after elimination of short-term pressure (setting  $\theta_{\pi} = 0$ ). The welfare gain is the counterfactual consumption-equivalent welfare gain. The growth gain is the counterfactual increase in aggregate growth, relative to the baseline 2%. Units are in percent (0.1 = 0.1%) or basis points (1 b.p. = 0.0001) as indicated.

## 5. DISCUSSION, EXTENSIONS, AND ROBUSTNESS

This section presents further discussion, model extensions, and robustness checks. For reference, Table IV presents a quantitative summary of key counterfactual results computed in each of the relevant model extensions or robustness checks, with further details and discussion in both the main text and various online appendices.

### 5.1. *The Forecast Error Distribution*

Three analyses shed light on the quantitative role of the forecast error distribution.

*Unobservable Noise and the Zero Forecast Error Threshold.* Starting from Table III's baseline (circle dot), Figure 5 varies the degree of noise unobservable ( $\nu$ ) versus observable ( $\varepsilon$ ) to managers while fixing total noise  $\sigma_{\nu}^2 + \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2$ . With less information, managers cannot as precisely manipulate profits near targets. So the likelihood of meeting targets (top left) and the size of bunching (top right) decline. R&D growth is always lower for firms just meeting targets, but as managers become less informed the magnitude of the R&D threshold distortion declines (middle left). One might suspect, since threshold effects decline with more unobservable noise, that short-termism's overall impact declines. This intuition is incorrect. Less-informed managers are more cautious, leading to more uniform R&D distortions reducing the sharpness of identifiable threshold effects. But more uniform cuts lead to larger impacts on aggregate growth (middle right), welfare (bottom left), and mean firm value (bottom right). Two implications are immediate. First, although threshold effects serve as a detection mechanism, short-termism's quantitative impact does not increase directly with the size of the observed reduced-form distortions. Appropriate interpretation of these reduced-form facts requires a quantitative model and




FIGURE 5.—Unobservable noise, the threshold, and macro impacts. *Note:* Horizontal axes vary unobservable noise  $\sigma_\nu^2$  with total noise variance  $\sigma_\nu^2 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2$  and other parameters held constant at baseline estimates from Panel A of Table III. The circles mark the baseline estimates. Model outcomes are smoothed. The top row reports simulated target moments. The middle left panel reports the mean absolute drop in R&D growth just above the zero forecast error threshold, that is,  $|\mathbb{E}(\Delta \text{R\&D Growth} \mid \text{Just Meet}) - \mathbb{E}(\Delta \text{R\&D Growth})|$ . The middle right and bottom panels report the increase in aggregate growth, the consumption equivalent welfare gain, and the mean value losses in a counterfactual with no short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi = 0$ .

counterfactuals rather than back-of-the-envelope aggregation.<sup>24</sup> Second, since the model lacks a natural normalizer such as tangible assets which would allow for direct comparability, I do not directly target Section 1’s empirical R&D growth discontinuities. Figure 5 reveals that this choice is conservative, since my baseline estimates lie to the far left of the graph with smaller impacts of short-termism.

<sup>24</sup>Intuitively, simple aggregation of the reduced-form estimates does not capture the overall impact of short-termism because short-termist incentives reduce the mean R&D level in the model for firms both above and below profit targets, since unobservable profit noise will cause some firms with R&D cuts to still lie ex post below their targets. This common or mean effect is differenced out in the inherently relative reduced-form differences captured between firms just meeting and missing.




FIGURE 6.—Selection local to the threshold. *Note:* Both panels plot the simulated conditional mean of the indicated outcome across bins of the given percent forecast error on the horizontal axis. The lightweight black line is the counterfactual model without short-term incentives  $\theta_{\pi} = 0$ , and the heavier blue line is the baseline estimated model with short-term incentives at the parameters in Panel A of Table III. The top left is the innovation in the AR(1) fundamental shock process  $z$ . The top right is firm value  $v$ .

*Selection at the Zero Forecast Error Threshold.* Figure 6 plots the conditional mean of various outcomes as a function of forecast errors for the baseline estimates with short-termism (heavy blue lines) and the no short-termism counterfactual (thin black lines). With short-termism, firms just meeting targets are better. Their innovation or shock  $\zeta$  in the fundamental  $z$  process (6) is higher (left panel), as is their level of  $z$  (unplotted). This pattern arises, even though  $z$  is observable to forecasters, because firms with higher fundamentals have larger baseline R&D budgets. Manipulating R&D is proportionately easier, so such firms are overrepresented among those just meeting targets. The endogenous selection force, absent without short-termism, has two important implications. First, selection clarifies the finding of R&D distortions for firms just meeting targets. Intuitively, such firms should experience persistently worse outcomes, but that intuition is incomplete. Since such firms are also better on average, opportunistic R&D cuts and innovation declines do not persist (see Appendix Figure D.3's dynamic plots). Their revenues and profits are also persistently higher. So a large macro impact of short-termism does not require persistently poor outcomes for firms just meeting targets. Second, selection can help rationalize higher stock returns for firms just meeting targets, seen empirically in Table I. The right panel of Figure 6 reveals that, under short-termism, firms just meeting targets have higher market value. Some care is required here. In the current model, outsiders observe fundamentals  $z$ , so higher market value is already priced into markets and absent from returns. But recall that not just the level of  $z$  but also the innovations in  $z$  in the left panel are higher for firms just meeting targets. So a model with extended information frictions or learning might easily generate information revelation and hence stock return reactions.

*Flexibly Matching the Forecast Error Distribution.* My baseline targets the shape of the forecast error distribution near zero rather than the distribution's global shape. As a robustness check, I estimate a model with a more flexible Gaussian mixture distribution of unobserved noise  $\nu$  targeting the weight on nine intervals in the forecast error data. Table IV reports the quantitative impacts of short-termism in this case, while Appendix Table D.I reports further results and Appendix Figure D.4 plots the implied forecast error and noise distributions. The extension fits the full forecast error distribution better, but the quantitative impact of short-termism is similar to baseline.

### 5.2. Does the Model's R&D Structure Inflate Magnitudes?

I estimate two extensions of the model with alternative innovation functions.

*Project Quality Shocks.* One might worry that R&D payoffs vary due to heterogeneity in underlying project quality about which managers possess more information than outsiders. If so, opportunistic R&D cuts might disproportionately be borne by low-quality projects, dampening short-termism's impact. So in Appendix C of the Supplemental Material, I generalize the innovation function (8) to

$$M_{kt+1} = \xi_{kt} \bar{\xi} W_{kt}^\gamma Q_t^{1-\gamma}, \quad (15)$$

where  $\log \xi_{kt} \sim_{\text{i.i.d.}} N(-\frac{\sigma_\xi^2}{2}, \sigma_\xi^2)$  are i.i.d. unit mean lognormal shocks to R&D project quality observed only by the manager of firm  $k$  at time  $t$ . Appendix Table D.II reports new estimates, model fit, and counterfactual magnitudes for this model extension, with counterfactual magnitudes summarized in Table IV. I estimate a meaningful degree of heterogeneity in project quality, with a log standard deviation of  $\hat{\sigma}_\xi \approx 5\%$ . The quantitative impacts of short-termism are dampened somewhat from the baseline but remain significant with over half a percentage point of lost consumption-equivalent welfare. Short-termism remains potent for two reasons. First, the baseline persistent shock  $z$  already creates heterogeneity in R&D payoffs. Second, the selection highlighted above applies here. Firms with higher project quality  $\xi$  have higher baseline R&D riper for manipulation. So high-quality projects, not low-quality projects, bear much of the brunt of opportunistic R&D cuts.

*Accumulated R&D Capital.* Growth models typically link innovation to R&D flows as in my baseline (8). But in other models, R&D flows into an accumulated capital stock with depreciation and diminishing returns (McGrattan and Prescott (2014), Peters and Taylor (2017), McGrattan (2020)). One might worry that, omitting a role for R&D capital, my model inflates the impact of opportunistic cuts to R&D flows. So in Appendix C, I generalize the innovation function (8) to

$$M_{kt+1} = \bar{\xi} S_{kt}^\gamma Q_t^{1-\gamma}, \quad (16)$$

where the R&D stock  $S_{kt}$  evolves over time according to

$$S_{kt} = (1 - \delta)S_{kt-1} + W_{kt}. \quad (17)$$

This model nests my baseline when R&D depreciation is  $\delta = 1$ . But work estimating R&D capital depreciation suggests lower rates at around  $\delta = 0.35$  (Li and Hall (2016)). Appendix Table D.III reports multiple results. The first column duplicates my baseline R&D flow model estimates and target empirical moments. The second column reports moments for a model imposing  $\delta = 0.35$  but otherwise fixing my baseline parameters. This version of the R&D capital model fits poorly due to excessively volatile R&D flows. So the third column reports results for a re-estimated R&D capital model with  $\delta = 0.35$ . R&D capital generates endogenous persistence, so I estimate lower persistence and volatility of  $z$ . The marginal benefit of R&D is also higher with long-lived capital, that is, the "user cost" declines. The re-estimated model requires a higher agency conflict  $\phi_e$  to generate large enough short-term incentives to counteract this force and match observed profit bunching. On net, counterfactuals reveal short-termism impacts similar in size to baseline, as summarized in the counterfactual results in Table IV.

### 5.3. Other Robustness Checks

This subsection provides a range of additional quantitative robustness checks.

*Varying Parameters.* Appendix Table D.IV varies the value of each parameter one standard error in both directions from Table III's estimate. There is some moderate variation in the impact of short-termism at the micro or macro levels, but my qualitative conclusions remain unchanged.<sup>25</sup>

*Matching the R&D to Profits Ratio.* The size of R&D versus profits matters for the degree of R&D-based profit manipulation in the model. I do not target the empirical ratio, 59%, but the value in my baseline, 67%, is reasonably similar. Nevertheless, Appendix Table D.V reports model results after slightly lowering the R&D elasticity of innovation  $\gamma$  to exactly match the empirical R&D to profits ratio. The quantitative impacts of short-termism, also summarized in Table IV, are only dampened slightly from baseline.

*Matching Different Macro Growth Rates.* I normalize R&D productivity to match the round macro growth rate of  $g = 2\%$  in my baseline. The model lacks population growth, so the closest data equivalent is arguably the quite similar U.S. per capita GDP growth rate averaging 1.9% per year. But one might instead target U.S. aggregate TFP growth, more aggressively stripping out observable sources of growth with a value of 1.24% per year.<sup>26</sup> Appendix Table D.VI reports results for two re-estimated models targeting these observed growth rates for GDP per capita (first column) and TFP (second column), with a summary of counterfactual magnitudes presented in Table IV. Unsurprisingly, the model estimated with GDP per capita growth rates yields results quite similar in magnitude to baseline. Also unsurprisingly, since the growth rate and hence the quantitative importance of R&D decline drastically when targeting TFP growth, the model in this case reveals somewhat smaller quantitative impacts of short-termism in absolute terms.

*Estimating on a Longer Time Window.* My baseline relies on a 2003–2018 time window after the 2002 SOX legislation tightened U.S. accounting standards. Appendix Table D.VII reports detailed results from estimating the model using data in a longer 1990–2018 window, with counterfactual magnitudes summarized in Table IV. Short-termism's impact is slightly weaker including the earlier period, consistent with an accounting literature suggesting that profit manipulation with tools like R&D is more common in the current post-SOX period (Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008)).

*Estimating on High- and Low-R&D Intensity Samples.* R&D should be mechanically more useful for profit manipulation for firms with large baseline R&D budgets. Appendix Table D.VIII reports detailed results for models estimated on two samples of firms: those with above and those with below median R&D-to-sales ratios. Table IV presents a summary of key counterfactual impacts in this case. In the high-R&D sample, profit growth and forecast errors vary negatively with R&D growth, and forecast error distortions are larger. Naturally, the high-R&D estimates imply larger impacts of short-termism than baseline and vice versa for the low-R&D sample.

<sup>25</sup>In Table D.IV, I also report a set of two robustness checks in which I increase and decrease the curvature of the private accounting cost function away from my baseline quadratic specification in (10), again finding little qualitative difference in the impact of short-termism.

<sup>26</sup>The per capita GDP figure comes from the NIPA accounts over 1960–2020, and the TFP growth figure comes from John Fernald's baseline TFP growth series over the 1947–2021 period.

*An Alternative Measure of Intangible Investment.* Appendix Table D.IX reports detailed estimates, model fit, and counterfactual magnitudes replacing R&D spending with SG&A spending, an alternative intangible investment proxy. Table IV presents a summary of key counterfactual impacts in this case. The impacts of short-termism remain qualitatively similar to baseline.

*Noise in Profits Only.* In my baseline, profit noise flows from production sources and appears in measured sales and profits. Appendix Table D.X reports detailed estimates, model fit, and counterfactuals assuming that noise only appears in profits. Table IV presents a summary of key counterfactual impacts in this case. This model fits more poorly, with not enough correlation between sales growth and forecast errors. Nevertheless, the impact of short-termism is qualitatively similar.

*Allowing for Unlisted Firms Without Short-Termism.* My baseline results might be overstated if short-term incentives are weaker for privately held companies (Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015), Bernstein (2015)). This line of reasoning is easy to exaggerate, omitting forces such as internal benchmarks or implied IPO distortions. And since U.S. private firm financials are confidential, quantitative analysis is difficult. Nevertheless, Appendix C of the Supplemental Material extends the model with an exogenous fraction  $p_{\text{private}}$  of fully value-maximizing private firms. When  $p_{\text{private}} = 0$ , this model nests my baseline, and when  $p_{\text{private}} = 1$ , short-termism is absent. Appendix Table D.XI sets  $p_{\text{private}}$  in two ways, presenting detailed results. Over my sample period, publicly listed firms conducted an average of 79% of total U.S. private R&D spending.<sup>27</sup> In the first column, I set  $p_{\text{private}}$  to match this fraction. Since individual private companies do more R&D than short-termist public companies,  $p_{\text{private}} \approx 7\%$  is smaller than their R&D share  $100 - 79 \approx 20\%$ . In this case, the impacts from short-termism are only slightly muted relative to baseline, a result summarized in Table IV. The second column of Table D.XI naively sets  $p_{\text{private}} \approx 20\%$ , equating the fraction of private firms with their R&D share. This crude approach results in an implausibly high R&D spending share for unlisted firms but arguably serves as an upper bound on their impact. The impact of short-termism is smaller but remains meaningful.

## 6. CONCLUSION

I argue that short-termist incentives arise naturally as discipline placed on managers. However, my results highlight a potential distinction between the micro and macro impacts of short-termism. For firms, short-termism can improve value by restricting R&D expenditures by managers. But at the aggregate level, short-termism can lower growth and welfare because the social returns to R&D are higher than the private returns. My calculations therefore support some long-voiced concerns about short-termism.

In light of my findings, some discussion of policy implications seems natural. First, and most obviously, the mean increase in the marginal cost of R&D—and the associated decline in the level of R&D—due to short-termism in my model pushes R&D further down and away from a socially optimal level, a shift which likely increases the size of the R&D subsidy which would be required to align firm and social objectives. In this sense, my analysis reinforces traditional arguments in the endogenous growth literature about the potential welfare gains from subsidies to R&D (Jones and Williams (2000)). Second, since

<sup>27</sup>The 79% value is the mean ratio of total Compustat R&D spending to total U.S. private R&D spending in the NIPA accounts across the years 2003–2018.

the expensing of R&D in profits as defined by U.S. GAAP leads to a strong tradeoff between short-term profits and long-term investment, my results suggest potential gains from designing accounting standards and manager compensation structures with specific attention to their implications for innovation and growth. Almeida (2019) offered a wide survey of the lively academic debate in finance and accounting about potential changes to both manager compensation and accounting concepts in light of evidence on short-termism. For example, capitalization rather than expensing of R&D or the introduction of manager incentives based on longer horizons are oft-proposed changes. However, I emphasize that such changes (i) may be difficult to implement either from a political economy perspective or simply because of inertia, and (ii) may involve unintended consequences such as changes in the overall informativeness of accounting statements and therefore the average cost of capital for firms. A full analysis of optimal policy in this context therefore lies beyond the scope of this paper.

I also emphasize that, despite the title, the paper studies only one category, profit pressures on public firm managers, of a broader set of short-termism mechanisms. A partial list includes behavioral forces such as reference dependence (Kőszegi and Rabin (2006)), short manager career horizons (Narayanan (1985)), inflexible heuristics for hurdle rates or payback horizons (Poterba and Summers (1995)), or dividend-smoothing pressures (Lintner (1956), Wu (2018)). Existing work explores these topics, but most remain promising for further quantitative analysis at either the micro or macro levels.

## APPENDIX A: BASELINE MODEL

This appendix offers theoretical details for the baseline model.

### A.1. *Equilibrium*

A stationary general equilibrium on a balanced growth path is a collection of

1. intermediate goods prices  $p_{jt}$ ,
2. intermediate goods quantities  $x_{jt}$ ,
3. land prices  $P_t^L$ ,
4. land quantities  $L_t$ ,
5. real interest rates  $R_{t+1}$ ,
6. growth rates  $g_{t+1}$ ,
7. aggregate savings  $B_{t+1}$ ,
8. aggregate consumption  $C_t$ ,
9. aggregate intermediate goods production costs  $X_t$ ,
10. aggregate R&D investment  $W_t$ ,
11. aggregate intermediate goods firm payouts  $D_t^{\text{Int}}$ ,
12. aggregate final goods firm payouts  $D_t^{\text{Final}}$ ,
13. aggregate gross output  $Y_t$ ,
14. aggregate variety masses  $Q_t$ ,
15. a schedule of intermediate goods firm value functions  $V(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t | \theta_\pi) = Q_t v(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt} | \theta_\pi)$ ,
16. a schedule of intermediate goods firm manager policies for R&D  $W_{kt}(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t | \theta_\pi)$ ,
17. a schedule of intermediate goods firm manager policies for accounting manipulation  $A_{kt}(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t | \theta_\pi)$ ,
18. a schedule of analyst forecasts for intermediate goods firm profits  $\Pi_{kt}^f(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, Q_t | \theta_\pi)$ ,

19. a schedule of stationary distributions of normalized intermediate goods firm states  $F(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}|\theta_\pi)$ , and
20. a realized short-term incentive level  $\theta_\pi^*$  for intermediate goods firm managers, such that
  1. final goods firms optimize their land demand with  $L_t$  solving (4) given  $P_t^L$  and  $p_{jt}$ ,
  2. final goods firms optimize their intermediate goods demand with  $x_{jt}$  solving (4) given  $P_t^L$  and  $p_{jt}$ ,
  3. aggregate gross output  $Y_t$  satisfies the production technology in (4),
  4. aggregate final goods payouts  $D_t^{\text{Final}}$  are equal to the objective in the static profit maximization problem (4),
  5. taking as given final goods demand (5), monopoly prices  $p_{jt}$  for newly innovated intermediate goods  $j \in (Q_{t-1}, Q_t]$  solve the profit maximization problem (7),
  6. competitive prices  $p_{jt}$  for off-patent intermediate goods varieties  $j \in [0, Q_{t-1}]$  are set to marginal cost  $\psi$ ,
  7. for all candidate short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , and taking as given analyst forecasts  $\Pi_{kt}^f$ , intermediate goods firm manager R&D policies  $W_{kt}$  solve their optimization problem (10),
  8. for all candidate short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , and taking as given analyst forecasts  $\Pi_{kt}^f$ , intermediate goods firm manager accounting manipulation policies  $A_{kt}$  solve their optimization problem (10),
  9. for all candidate short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , and taking as given intermediate goods firm manager policies  $W_{kt}$  and  $A_{kt}$ , analyst forecasts  $\Pi_{kt}^f(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, Q_t|\theta_\pi)$  rationally satisfy their mean squared error minimization problem (11),
  10. for all candidate short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , and taking as given intermediate goods firm manager policies  $W_{kt}$  and  $A_{kt}$ , intermediate goods firms value functions  $V(M_{kt}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}, Q_t|\theta_\pi)$  satisfy the Bellman equation (12),
  11. for all candidate policies of short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi$ , the stationary distribution  $F(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}|\theta_\pi)$  is consistent with manager policies and exogenous shocks according to

$$\begin{aligned}
 & F(m, z_{kt}, \varepsilon_{kt}|\theta_\pi) \\
 &= \int \mathbb{I}\left(\frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t} \leq m\right) F(z_{kt}|z_{kt-1}) F(\varepsilon_{kt}) dF\left(\frac{M_{kt-1}}{Q_{t-1}}, z_{kt-1}, \varepsilon_{kt-1}|\theta_\pi\right), \quad (18)
 \end{aligned}$$

where  $F(z_{kt}|z_{kt-1})$  is the exogenous transition distribution for  $z_{kt}$  implied by (6),  $F(\varepsilon_{kt})$  is the exogenous distribution for  $\varepsilon_{kt} \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ , and  $M_{kt}$  is the new variety mass innovated by the manager R&D policy  $W_{kt-1}$  together with the innovation function (8),

12. realized short-term incentives  $\theta_\pi^*$  are chosen by firm boards optimally under commitment, taking as given induced manager policies  $W_{kt}$ ,  $A_{kt}$ , stationary distributions  $F$ , value functions  $v$ , and analyst forecasts  $\Pi_{kt}^f$ , in order to maximize mean firm value according to (13),
13. payouts from the intermediate goods sector  $D_t^{\text{Int}}$  satisfy

$$D_t^{\text{Int}} = \int_0^1 D_{kt} dk,$$

where  $D_{kt}$  is the flow payout for intermediate goods firm  $k$  in equation (12),

14. land markets clear with  $L_t = 1$ ,  
 15. aggregate intermediate goods consumption of gross output  $X_t$  satisfies

$$X_t = \int_0^{Q_t} \psi x_{jt} dj,$$

16. aggregate R&D investment expenditure  $W_t$  satisfies

$$W_t = \int_0^1 W_{kt} dk,$$

17. aggregate consumption  $C_t$  satisfies the resource constraint

$$Y_t = C_t + X_t + W_t,$$

18. aggregate varieties  $Q_t$  evolve according to (9),  
 19. the growth rate of varieties is constant, satisfies

$$g_{t+1} = g = \frac{Q_{t+1} - Q_t}{Q_t},$$

and is equal to the growth rate of all macro aggregates, and

20. real interest rates  $R_{t+1} = R$  are constant and satisfy the household savings optimality condition (3).

Without loss of generality, manager compensation does not enter firm value functions  $v$  nor the resource constraint. A fixed component of manager compensation does not affect risk-neutral manager policies but normalizes the expected discounted value of manager compensation to zero. Similarly, a lump-sum transfer from risk-neutral managers to households does not affect manager policies but sets aggregate manager consumption to zero each period. These choices reduce notation and avoid conflation of the mechanical impact of short-termism with impacts induced by manager policy changes.

## A.2. *Balanced Growth*

This subsection shows that balanced growth at a common rate  $g$  is compatible with the model. I will use the conventions  $m = \frac{M_{kt}}{Q_t}$ ,  $z = z_{kt}$ ,  $\varepsilon = \varepsilon_{kt}$ ,  $v = v_{kt}$  to denote stationary variables, dropping firm and time subscripts and, in the case of the variety mass  $m$  and similar variables, normalizing by  $Q_t$ . Now, recall that the final goods market clearing condition is given by

$$Y_t = C_t + X_t + W_t.$$

Assume that the growth rate of aggregate varieties  $Q_t$  is constant. Let the growth rate of any aggregate  $Z$  be written  $g_Z$ . Output consumed in the production of intermediate varieties  $X_t$  satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} X_t &= \int_{Q_{t-1}}^{Q_t} \psi x_{jt} dj + \psi \int_0^{Q_{t-1}} x_{jt} dj = M_t \int \psi x_m(z) dF(m, z, \varepsilon) + Q_{t-1} \psi x_c \\ &= g_Q Q_t \int \psi x_m(z) dF(m, z, \varepsilon) + \frac{1}{1 + g_Q} Q_t \psi x_c \propto Q_t, \end{aligned}$$

where  $x_m$  is the monopoly quantity produced and  $x_c$  is the competitive amount produced. Aggregate R&D  $W_t$  satisfies

$$W_t = \int_0^1 W_{kt} dk = \int_0^1 w_{kt} Q_t dk = Q_t \int w(m, z, \varepsilon) dF(m, z, \varepsilon) \propto Q_t.$$

Total output  $Y_t$  satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= L_t^{1-\alpha} \int_0^{Q_t} z_{jt}^{1-\alpha} x_{jt}^\alpha dj = M_t \int z^{1-\alpha} x_m(z)^\alpha dF(m, z, \varepsilon) + Q_{t-1} x_c^\alpha \\ &= g_Q Q_t \int z^{1-\alpha} x_m(z)^\alpha dF(m, z, \varepsilon) + \frac{1}{1+g_Q} Q_t x_c^\alpha \propto Q_t. \end{aligned}$$

By the final goods clearing condition plus the proportionality relationships derived above, we have that  $g_Y = g_X = g_W = g_C = g_Q = g$ , that is, on a balanced growth path all the aggregates will grow at the same rate  $g$ .

#### REFERENCES

- AGHION, PHILIPPE, AND PETER HOWITT (1992): "A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction," *Econometrica*, 60, 323–351. [1883]
- ALLEN, ERIC J., AND PATRICIA M. DECHOW (2013): "The 'Rationality' of the Long Distance Runner: Prospect Theory and the Marathon," Working paper, SSRN 2342396. [1882]
- ALMEIDA, HEITOR (2019): "Is It Time to Get Rid of Earnings-per-Share (EPS)?" *Review of Corporate Finance Studies*, 8, 174–206. [1881,1906]
- ALMEIDA, HEITOR, NURI ERSAHIN, VYACHESLAV FOS, RUSTOM M. IRANI, AND MATHIAS KRONLUND (2021): "Do Short-Term Incentives Affect Long-Term Productivity?" Working paper, SSRN 3412538. [1882]
- ALMEIDA, HEITOR, VYACHESLAV FOS, PO-HSUAN HSU, MATHIAS KRONLUND, AND KEVIN TSENG (2022): "Do Short-Term Incentives Hurt Innovation?" Working paper, SSRN 3663903. [1882]
- ALMEIDA, HEITOR, VYACHESLAV FOS, AND MATHIAS KRONLUND (2016): "The Real Effects of Share Repurchases," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 119, 168–185. [1882]
- ASCH, BETH J. (1990): "Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 43, 89S–106S. [1887]
- ASKER, JOHN, JOAN FARRE-MENSA, AND ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST (2015): "Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?" *Review of Financial Studies*, 28, 342–390. [1905]
- BABER, WILLIAM R., PATRICIA M. FAIRFIELD, AND JAMES A. HAGGARD (1991): "The Effect of Concern About Reported Income on Discretionary Spending Decisions: The Case of Research and Development," *Accounting Review*, 66, 818–829. [1882,1887]
- BARLEVY, GADI (2004): "The Cost of Business Cycles Under Endogenous Growth," *American Economic Review*, 94, 964–990. [1894]
- (2007): "On the Cyclicity of Research and Development," *American Economic Review*, 97, 1131–1164. [1894]
- BARTON, DOMINIC (2011): "Capitalism for the Long Term," *Harvard Business Review*. [1881]
- BARTOV, ELI, DAN GIVOLY, AND CARLA HAYN (2002): "The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Earnings Expectations," *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 33, 173–204. [1887]
- BEBCHUK, LUCIAN A., AND LARS A. STOLE (1993): "Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?" *Journal of Finance*, 48, 719–729. [1884]
- BERNSTEIN, SHAI (2015): "Does Going Public Affect Innovation?" *Journal of Finance*, 70, 1365–1403. [1905]
- BHOJRAJ, SANJEEV, PAUL HRIBAR, MARC PICCONI, AND JOHN MCINNIS (2009): "Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts," *Journal of Finance*, 64, 2361–2388. [1887]
- BLUNDELL, RICHARD, RACHEL GRIFFITH, AND FRANK WINDMEIJER (2002): "Individual Effects and Dynamics in Count Data Models," *Journal of Econometrics*, 108, 113–131. [1898]
- BRADSHAW, MARK T., AND RICHARD G. SLOAN (2002): "GAAP versus the Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings," *Journal of Accounting Research*, 40, 41–66. [1885]

- BUDISH, ERIC, BENJAMIN N. ROIN, AND HEIDI WILLIAMS (2015): "Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence From Cancer Clinical Trials," *American Economic Review*, 105, 2044–2085. [1881]
- BURGSTALLER, DAVID, AND ELIZABETH CHUK (2017): "What Have We Learned About Earnings Management? Integrating Discontinuity Evidence," *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 34, 726–749. [1881]
- BURGSTALLER, DAVID, AND MICHAEL EAMES (2006): "Management of Earnings and Analysts' Forecasts to Achieve Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises," *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, 33, 633–652. [1885]
- CALONICO, SEBASTIAN, AND MAX H. FARRELL (2020): "Optimal Bandwidth Choice for Robust Bias Corrected Inference in Regression Discontinuity Designs," *Econometrics Journal*, 23, 192–210. [1886]
- CELIK, MURAT A., AND XU TIAN (2022): "Agency Frictions, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations," Working paper, SSRN 3319148. [1883,1899]
- CHETTY, RAJ, JOHN N. FRIEDMAN, TORE OLSEN, AND LUIGI PISTAFERRI (2011): "Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence From Danish Tax Records," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126, 749–804. [1882]
- COHEN, DANIEL, AIYESHA DEY, AND THOMAS LYS (2008): "Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods," *Accounting Review*, 82, 757–787. [1892,1904]
- COSTINOT, ARNAUD, AND ANDRÉS RODRÍGUEZ-CLARE (2015): "Chapter 4. Trade Theory With Numbers: Quantifying the Consequences of Globalization," in *Handbook of International Economics*, 197–261. [1899]
- DALY, MARY, BART HOBIJN, AND BRIAN LUCKING (2012): "Why Has Wage Growth Stayed Strong?" *Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter*. [1882]
- DAVIS, STEVEN J., AND JOHN HALTIWANGER (1992): "Gross Job Creation, Gross Job Destruction, and Employment Reallocation," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107, 819–863. [1897]
- DERRIEN, FRANÇOIS, AND AMBRUS KECSKÉS (2013): "The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence From Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage," *Journal of Finance*, 68, 1407–1440. [1881]
- EDMANS, ALEX, VIVIAN W. FANG, AND KATHARINA A. LEWELLEN (2017): "Equity Vesting and Investment," *Review of Financial Studies*, 30, 2229–2271. [1887]
- EISFELDT, ANDREA L., AND CAMELIA M. KUHNEN (2013): "CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 109, 351–372. [1887]
- EISFELDT, ANDREA L., AND DIMITRIS PAPANIKOLAOU (2014): "The Value and Ownership of Intangible Capital," *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*, 104, 1–8. [1885]
- FASB (1974): "Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 2," Financial Accounting Standards Board. [1886]
- GARICANO, LUIS, CLAIRE LELARGE, AND JOHN VAN REENEN (2016): "Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence From France," *American Economic Review*, 106, 3439–3479. [1882]
- GIGLER, FRANK, CHANDRA KANODIA, HARESH SAPRA, AND RAGHU VENUGOPALAN (2014): "How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency," *Journal of Accounting Research*, 52, 357–387. [1881]
- GLOVER, BRENT, AND OLIVER LEVINE (2017): "Idiosyncratic Risk and the Manager," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 126, 320–341. [1883]
- GOURIO, FRANÇOIS, AND NICOLAS ROYS (2014): "Size-Dependent Regulations, Firm Size Distribution, and Reallocation," *Quantitative Economics*, 5, 377–416. [1882]
- GOURIO, FRANÇOIS, AND LEENA RUDANKO (2014): "Customer Capital," *Review of Economic Studies*, 81, 1102–1136. [1885,1898]
- GRAHAM, JOHN R., CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, AND SHIVA RAJGOPAL (2005): "The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting," *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 40, 3–73. [1881,1882]
- GROSSMAN, GENE M., AND ELHANAN HELPMAN (1991): "Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth," *Review of Economic Studies*, 58, 43–61. [1883]
- GUNNY, KATHERINE A. (2010): "The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence From Meeting Earnings Benchmarks," *Contemporary Accounting Research*, 27, 855–888. [1882,1887]
- GUTIÉRREZ, GERMÁN, AND THOMAS PHILIPPON (2017): "Investmentless Growth: An Empirical Investigation," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Fall, 89–169. [1881]
- (2018): "Ownership, Concentration, and Investment," *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*, 108, 432–437. [1881]
- HALDANE, ANDREW G., AND RICHARD DAVIES (2011): "The Short Long," Bank of England Speech. [1881]
- HANSEN, BRUCE E., AND SEOJEONG LEE (2019): "Asymptotic Theory for Clustered Samples," *Journal of Econometrics*, 210, 268–290. [1897]
- HASSAN, TAREK A., AND THOMAS M. MERTENS (2016): "The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment," *American Economic Review*, 107, 1059–1103. [1899]

- HE, JIE JACK, AND XUAN TIAN (2013): "The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of Innovation," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 109, 856–878. [1881]
- HENNESSY, CHRISTOPHER, AND TONI M. WHITED (2007): "How Costly Is External Financing? Evidence From a Structural Estimation," *Journal of Finance*, 62, 1705–1745. [1898]
- HONG, HARRISON, AND MARCIN KACPERCZYK (2010): "Competition and Bias," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125, 1683–1725. [1881]
- IACOPETTA, MAURIZIO, AND PIETRO F. PERETTO (2021): "Corporate Governance and Industrialization," *European Economic Review*, 135, 1–28. [1883]
- IACOPETTA, MAURIZIO, RAOUL MINETTI, AND PIETRO F. PERETTO (2019): "Financial Markets, Industry Dynamics, and Growth," *Economic Journal*, 129, 2192–2215. [1883]
- JENSEN, MICHAEL C. (1986): "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," *American Economic Review*, 76, 323–329. [1883]
- JENTER, DIRK, AND FADI KANAAN (2015): "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," *Journal of Finance*, 70, 2155–2184. [1887]
- JENTER, DIRK, AND KATHARINA LEWELLEN (2020): "Performance-Induced CEO Turnover," *Review of Financial Studies*, 34, 569–617. [1887]
- JONES, CHARLES I., AND JOHN C. WILLIAMS (2000): "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Economics of Investment in R&D," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5, 65–85. [1883,1905]
- KANODIA, CHANDRA, AND HARESH SAPRA (2016): "A Real Effects Perspective to Accounting Measurement and Disclosure: Implications and Insight for Future Research," *Journal of Accounting Research*, 54, 623–676. [1881]
- KASZNIK, RON, AND MAUREEN F. McNICHOLS (2002): "Does Meeting Earnings Expectations Matter? Evidence From Analyst Forecast Revisions and Share Prices," *Journal of Accounting Research*, 40, 727–759. [1887]
- KOGAN, LEONID, DIMITRIS PAPANIKOLAOU, AMIT SERU, AND NOAH STOFFMAN (2017): "Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 132, 665–712. [1885]
- KÓSZEGI, BOTOND, AND MATTHEW RABIN (2006): "A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121, 1133–1165. [1906]
- KRUSELL, PER, TOSHIHIKO MUKOYAMA, AYSEGUL SAHIN, AND ANTHONY SMITH (2009): "Revisiting the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles," *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 12, 393–402. [1899]
- LARKIN, IAN (2014): "The Cost of High-Powered Incentives: Employee Gaming in Enterprise Software Sales," *Journal of Labor Economics*, 32, 199–227. [1887]
- LI, WENDY C. Y., AND BRONWYN H. HALL (2016): "Depreciation of Business R&D Capital," NBER working paper 22473. [1903]
- LINTNER, JOHN (1956): "Distribution of Incomes of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings, and Taxes," *American Economic Review*, 46, 97–113. [1906]
- LIU, LAURA XIAOLEI, TONI M. WHITED, AND LU ZHANG (2009): "Investment-Based Expected Stock Returns," *Journal of Political Economy*, 117, 1105–1139. [1887]
- LUCAS, ROBERT E. (2000): "Inflation and Welfare," *Econometrica*, 68, 247–274. [1899]
- MACKINLAY, A. CRAIG (1997): "Event Studies in Economics and Finance," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35, 13–39. [1887]
- MARINOVIC, IVAN, MARCO OTTAVIANI, AND PETER N. SORENSEN (2012): "Forecasters' Objectives and Strategies," *Handbook of Economic Forecasting*, 2, 690–720. [1881]
- MARKOFF, JOHN (1990): "A Corporate Lag in Research Funds Is Causing Worry," *New York Times*, January 23. [1881]
- MATSUNAGA, STEVEN R., AND CHUL W. PARK (2001): "The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO's Annual Bonus," *Accounting Review*, 76, 313–332. [1887]
- MAYER, COLIN (2012): "'Short-Termism' Is a Very British Problem," *Financial Times*, July 19. [1881]
- MCGRATTAN, ELLEN (2020): "Intangible Capital and Measured Productivity," *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 37, S147–S166. [1903]
- MCGRATTAN, ELLEN, AND EDWARD PRESCOTT (2014): "A Reassessment of Real Business Cycle Theory," *American Economic Review: Paper and Proceedings*, 104, 177–182. [1903]
- McNICHOLS, MAUREEN (1989): "Evidence of Informational Asymmetries From Management Earnings Forecasts and Stock Returns," *Accounting Review*, 64, 1–27. [1887]
- MELITZ, MARC J., AND STEPHEN J. REDDING (2015): "New Trade Models, New Welfare Implications," *American Economic Review*, 105, 1105–1146. [1899]
- MICHIE, JONATHAN (2001): *Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences*. Fitzroy Dearborn. [1881]
- MURPHY, KEVIN J. (1999): "Executive Compensation," *Handbook of Labor Economics*, 3, 2485–2563. [1887]

- (2001): “Performance Standards in Incentive Contracts,” *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 30, 245–278. [1887]
- NARAYANAN, M. P. (1985): “Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results,” *Journal of Finance*, 40, 1469–1484. [1906]
- NIKOLOV, BORIS, AND TONI M. WHITED (2014): “Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates From a Dynamic Model,” *Journal of Finance*, 69, 1883–1921. [1883,1899]
- OYER, PAUL (1998): “Fiscal Year Ends and Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect on Business Seasonality,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113, 149–185. [1887]
- PETERS, RYAN H., AND LUCIAN A. TAYLOR (2017): “Intangible Capital and the Investment-q Relation,” *Journal of Financial Economics*, 123, 251–272. [1885,1903]
- POTERBA, JAMES M., AND LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS (1995): “A CEO Survey of US Companies’ Time Horizons and Hurdle Rates,” *Sloan Management Review*, 37, 43–53. [1906]
- RAHMANDAD, HAZHIR, NELSON P. REPENNING, AND REBECCA M. HENDERSON (2014): “Making the Numbers? “Short Termism” & the Puzzle of Only Occasional Disaster,” Harvard Business School working paper 11-033. [1881]
- ROMER, PAUL M. (1990): “Endogenous Technological Change,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 98, S71–S102. [1883,1890]
- ROYCHOWDHURY, SUGATA (2006): “Earnings Management Through Real Activities Manipulation,” *Journal of Accounting and Economics*, 42, 335–370. [1882,1887]
- SCHWENKLER, GUSTAVO, DIOGO DUARTE, AND KYONGHWAN LEE (2019): “The Systemic Effects of Benchmarking,” Working paper, SSRN 2646791. [1881]
- STEIN, JEREMY C. (1989): “Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 104, 655–669. [1881,1884]
- TAYLOR, LUCIAN A. (2010): “Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence From Structural Estimation,” *Journal of Finance*, 65, 2051–2087. [1899]
- TERRY, STEPHEN J. (2023): “Supplement to ‘The Macro Impact of Short-Termism,’” *Econometrica Supplemental Material*, 91, <https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA15420>. [1885]
- TERRY, STEPHEN J., TONI M. WHITED, AND ANASTASIA A. ZAKOLYUKINA (2023): “Information versus Investment,” *Review of Financial Studies*, 36, 1148–1191. [1892,1898]
- WU, YUFENG (2018): “What’s Behind Smooth Dividends? Evidence From Structural Estimation,” *Review of Financial Studies*, 31, 3979–4016. [1906]
- ZAKOLYUKINA, ANASTASIA A. (2018): “How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates From a Dynamic Model,” *Journal of Accounting Research*, 56, 5–44. [1892]

---

*Co-editor Charles I. Jones handled this manuscript.*

*Manuscript received 13 June, 2017; final version accepted 6 May, 2023; available online 16 May, 2023.*