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Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member

U.S. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE: RECENT POLICY HAS INCREASED COSTS TO CONSUMERS BUT NOT OVERALL U.S. ENERGY SECURITY

REPORT

PREPARED BY THE

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