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The University of Michigan, Ph.D., 1972
Political Science, international law and relations

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SOME CORRELATES OF FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES AMONG U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

by
Andrew Kermit Semmel

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
1972

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Harold Jacobson, Chairman
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PREFACE

My interest in the study of conflicting foreign policy goals had been originally aroused by the repeated contradictory remarks made by foreign policy officials over U. S. objectives in Indochina. These conflicting judgements, in a fundamental sense, seemed to discredit, for even the casual reader, the prevailing conceptualization of foreign policy as a "rational" process. More basic internal strains and stresses had to be boiling beneath the surface of an external unity, typically referred to as policy consensus. The spectre that the foreign policy structure, in its behavior, was, somehow, less than the sum of its parts seemed all too real.

Most of the accounts of bureaucratic in-fighting or dissensus over policy goals have tended to give most attention to inter-department rivalry. The decentralization thesis of U. S. foreign policy-making which posits dissensus and competition as a way of bureaucratic life unfortunately gives very little attention to the origins of intra-agency attitudinal disagreements. And only scant empirical evidence has ever been gathered to verify that this attitudinal fragmentation does, in fact, exist.

It seemed plausible, therefore, to expect that, like "the Navy way," "the Army way," or "the Air Force way," within the Department of State there would be a "Europe way," a "U. N. way," or a "Country-Mission way." That is, in the same sense that rival military branches within the Department of Defense perceive the real world through colored

lenses, attitudes within sub-units of the State Department would divide along functional or task lines as well. The results of our investigation tend to confirm this expectation.

I would like to express my appreciation to the individual members of my dissertation committee for their patience and assistance in reading and commenting upon this study. In particular, Professor Harold Jacobson has been most helpful in securing research funds, offering critical feedback, and proffering encouragement along the way. At the State Department, both Mr. Pio Uliassi and Ms Dorothy Barker of the now-defunct Division of Academic Relations in the Bureau of External Research provided valuable logistical support in setting up and arranging for the execution of the project. Mr. Fred Sackstedter at the U. S. Mission to the United Nations offered his time and advice in carrying out that phase of the research.

But, by far, the most welcome and most useful encouragement and criticism came from my wife, Marsha, who, despite much that remains to the contrary, kept wisely insisting that the most important quality of any written work be that it is readable and understandable. It is to her that this dissertation is dedicated.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is an attitude study of a limited number of foreign service participants in the Department of State who are involved in the making and execution of United States foreign policy. It is not a study of any single participant nor of any decision, nor is it an analysis of the wisdom or foolishness of any single participant's behavior or of any one decision. Rather, it is an empirical study of the organizational or environmental settings in which these participants operate and the ways and extent to which these settings contribute to or are associated with the development of their members' foreign policy perspectives, attitudes, and behavior.

We are interested in providing answers to the following two questions: (1) Why do some Foreign Service personnel in the Department of State hold certain attitudes towards specific foreign policy questions while others do not?; and (2) What accounts for these attitudinal differences? For research purposes, these two questions presume attitudinal variation, although it is possible that little or no difference exists. The object of this study, therefore, is to identify which variables or cluster of variables most adequately explain or are associated with specifically defined foreign policy attitudes; or, should there be little discernible difference among individual participants, to explain this phenomenon.

Unit of Analysis

A scanning of the literature relating to the joint problems of foreign policy making and attitude formation reveals a marked dissensus about the proper and most fruitful level and unit of analysis. For our purposes, the level of analysis is the organization--the Department of State--within which the unit of analysis--the individual participant--holds membership, operates, and behaves. In a social-psychological sense, we want to determine how the intersection of selected individual-type and organization-type variables interact and influence the formation of attitudes among these foreign policy participants. Stated differently, we want to focus on the matrix of selected individual-organizational attributes and make judgements about how they affect the basic foreign policy dispositions of these officials.

Although it is stating the obvious to say that all foreign policy behavior can be reduced to individual actors or to varying forms of social interaction among them, it is not true that all foreign policy can be adequately or thoroughly explained by the study of individuals alone--there would always be some unexplained remainder. Despite this, the individual participant unit and the organization level of analysis have an appealing, even compelling, rationale behind them. First, individuals, not states or organizations or international systems, or any other collectivity or abstraction, are the principal and final action-component by which alternatives are raised and decisions are made and implemented. It is they who make threats and receive ultimata, who trust and mistrust, who compete and cooperate. However, it would be misleading and incomplete to simply know the attitudes, expectations, values or behavior of these participants without having an appreciation of the organizational context within which they develop and operate.

For this reason, analysis of foreign policy attitudes must consider the role of specific social environmental factors that circumscribe and influence each member's cognitive and evaluative outlook as well as the common pressures that are exerted on all members. In this way, it is more proper to speak of the "individual-as-member" than simply the "individual-as-actor." We have to be interested, then, in how both individual and collective-type variables interplay and effect the attitudes and behaviors not of individuals but of individuals-as-members of foreign policy groups. Of particular importance are the immediate organizational structures, the task environments, the social settings, the political cultures, and the career context in which these participants work.

The second basis for selecting the individual as the principal unit of analysis is a more pragmatic one. Individuals can be counted and their attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and expectations noted, recorded, and analyzed. A variety of empirical techniques and methods are available for describing and explaining most of these characteristics. Although the scope of generalization from findings with this unit may be more limited than generalizations from other, higher levels of analysis (such as the international system), explanation is not necessarily sacrificed; in some instances, it may be enhanced. And if the problems of access to and availability of participants in and among relevant organizations or nation-states were solved, this unit could be an especially rewarding one for foreign policy and international relations research. Moreover, if we are interested in the analysis and dynamics of change at this level and higher, the proper focus, it seems, should be the unit that is changed, that perceives change, is affected by it, and must respond to it.

Still, the individual unit of analysis means different things to different people. Waltz, in discussing contrasting theories of war, for example, singled out three levels of explanation: natural man; the state; and the inter-state system.[1] The first focuses on the aggressive instincts and elevates basic human motives above other possible explanatory variables; we do not intend to adopt this interpretation of the individual. The second of Waltz's general theories concentrates on the structural, economic, or political controls inherent in any state system and the anxieties and frustrations they induce on individual drives; we will not deal with this second explanation either. The third formulation stresses how the interactions of states predict to state behavior; if recast in the form of attitudes and images among individual members of different states, this point of view holds that under certain environmental conditions an individual will adopt attitudes and images that are traceable to the process of acquisition itself. That is, an individual's attitudes are a function of the common experiences of those with whom he identifies, as well as his own unique experiences. It is in this latter expanded version of the individual as an explanatory variable that we are interested.[2]

Some Prior Assumptions

In a broader sense, research at this level and unit of analysis stems from several important prior assumptions. The first assumption is that most foreign policy can be explained in terms of intrasystem factors, whether they be institutional or non-institutional, collective or idiosyncratic, social or individual. Our focus will be on only one link in the lengthy chain of internal factors which can affect the character and content of foreign policy--on decision participants who

occupy foreign policy roles and who act as gate-keepers in the reception of cues and in the making and administration of external policies.

Our second assumption is that the foreign policy "goals" of states are, for the most part, non-random in their distribution. These "goals" are often less likely to generate disagreement among contending factions within a state than are the methods of implementation devised to realize them. This is one way of saying that goals and methods--ends and means--are inextricably knotted together and can be separated only with caution.

A third assumption stems from the belief that lower and middle echelon participants in state foreign offices have widespread influence on foreign policy outcomes and on foreign policy methods. It is probably true that on any single decision at any one point in time, these participants have little overall clout or weight. But, it is also probably true that over time, over administrations, and across different substantive and procedural decisions, these "off-stage" members of foreign policy bureaucracies can have a considerable influence and "say" on what the long-term direction and content of foreign policy may be. This is especially true with respect to routine, incremental, non-crisis decisions that involve little supervision from the top, and where the expertise and information at the middle and lower organizational levels is required.[3]

A final assumption is that individuals working in largescale organizations are neither "free agents" nor automatons; there is always some room for self-determination and choice, although the range and kind of self-directiveness is always circumscribed by the parent organization. Understanding the correlates of foreign policy attitudes of policy participants may reveal not only their policy orientations but also

their disposition to others with whom they must deal. The determinants of these attitudes may shape the way in which these participants perceive, act, and react to others, how they evaluate others' intentions, others' goals, and so on. In a much broader sense, they undoubtedly have an indirect influence on the foreign policy attitudes of mass publics as well. And, if any recommendations are to be profferred, a fuller understanding of the underlying correlates of foreign policy attitudes or the fundamental premises on which policy is based would make such proposals more credible.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[2]Throughout this thesis, I will avoid using the terms "decision-maker" and "elite" as much as possible. The former implies that we can always identify who the decision makers are or even that each decision can be traced to human origins; the term elite on the other hand is overworked and carries with it too many value connotations. It is misleading because it connotes an unusual combination of skills and other attributes that in reality probably do not exist. Utilizing the term in this way detracts from the fact that each participant must contend with the push and pull of everyday pressures and demands; I prefer to think that these individuals, minus the information and the organizational means to utilize it, are not vastly different from the population at large. Therefore, I prefer to utilize the term participant.

[3]Geoffrey Vickers has expressed the same view: "The question of who makes a decision is still important but less so than the question of who contributes to its premises. Channels of communication become more important than channels of command.", Towards a Sociology of Management (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 183.

CHAPTER II

ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF DECISION MAKERS

In this chapter, I will briefly sketch a variety of research strategies and formulate from them a line of inquiry that can be used to investigate the questions we have asked. Following this, I will then: (1) Select an appropriate research design to define our research parameters; (2) Describe the sample respondents on whom subsequent analysis will be done; (3) Describe and compare the four task environments in this study from which our sample is drawn; (4) Offer several contending explanations regarding the formation of foreign policy attitudes; and (5) Describe and discuss some features of the overall foreign policy orientations of these participants. Subsequent sections will present and interpret the findings of our study in light of the evidence from our data analysis.

Empirical and behavioral research, like any research, involves successive, competing, and often contradictory approximations of reality. These approximations derive not only from uncontrollable factors such as access to or the reliability and validity of information but also from controllable factors such as the researcher's decision to choose one research strategy over another.[1] The ontology of a researcher's initial decision-making is as critical a factor in much research as the epistemology underlying it. Whatever his decision, the choice of one model to the exclusion of others necessarily harbors its own peculiar assumptions, directs attention to select pieces of

information and provides a rationale for avoiding others; each, in turn, steers the analyst towards certain variables and away from others. In focusing on foreign policy participants in the Department of State, there are, at least, four generic models that have gained some currency and some utility; although not meant to be exclusive, these models--or frames of reference--are: (1) The personality model; (2) The strategic model; (3) The organization model; and (4) The politics model. I will summarize the main features of each.

The Personality Model

The prototype of the personality model is the paranoid or, to be more kind, the individualist. He is primarily motivated to act in ways which are need-fulfilling responses to personality-related, internal demands. This model attempts to relate certain pre-dispositional or pre-formed latent and/or manifest personal characteristics to attitude formation and foreign policy behavior. It pays close attention to atypical or unique behavior at single points in time or to grossly inconsistent behavior over time. Explanatory variables are regarded endemic to the individual and are assumed traceable to personal needs, drives, or inhibitions which are somehow externalized onto the job environment, the assigned task, or the international system. Attitudes and behavior, then, are conceptualized as functions of need-fulfilling, personal or psychic demands linking a string of individual experiences that can range from familial authority structure[2] and child-rearing practices to religious training or adolescent deprivations.[3] In short, attitudes and behavior are deemed to be largely a function of a much broader and prior personal history, ideology, or even psychopathology. Typically, such models are utilized for compiling an in-depth dossier-

like study of individuals in key positions,[4] for putting together psycho-biographical accounts, or to construct modal personality typologies applicable to a larger number of persons;[5] they can also be instrumental in studying the "collective effects of individuals and types on the functioning of political institutions," such as is found in the literature of national character.[6]

It is questionable how much this model can explain or predict. That is, it is doubtful how much it can add to the study of aggregate foreign policy behavior without unduly confounding the analytical matrix with difficult to measure and difficult to validate idiosyncratic variables. It is true that the phenomenology of the data can be an important asset in post-facto, single case studies where the principal participants are known and/or are small in number. Research on behavioral styles,[7] operational codes,[8] analysis of repetitive patterns in public expression,[9] or other particularistic aspects of known participants employ selective features of this model; personality analysis also could be highly useful in studying specific situations which are historically unique--such as revolutions--or where decision making is permanently or temporarily concentrated in one person. Yet, the phenomenological nature of the data can be liability if the objective is to generalize and compare across a large number of individuals and a large number of decision occasions. Furthermore, this model tends to ignore the fact that foreign policy making takes place in multiple series of interactions among participants, between participants and organizational structures, between participants in different governments, and the like.

Although we have no evidence, it seems reasonable to assume that personality factors are more important determinants of attitudes and

behavior when the individual is strategically located or when the organization to which he belongs is more flexible or less stable. Internally, there are fewer professional and career constraints and fewer collegial inhibitions acting upon him. Both the Department of State and the Foreign Service--the main professional career association of career foreign affairs personnel--are stable and resistant to change. The range and diversity of sanctions that each can apply to its members can neutralize or minimize the effects of individual differences. Since our focus here is on foreign policy participants located in the middle and lower levels of the Department, where role expectations are more fixed and where career pressures are more intense, it seems appropriate that our analysis can proceed with minimum attention to personality variables.

In summary, this model is better suited to an intensive one-man or few-men focus and offers less in the way of detecting regularities or commonalities among individuals under similar and dissimilar decision situations. This seems especially true in the Department of State where work situations are highly structured, where sanctions are pervasive, and where tasks are mostly routine and relatively unambiguous.[10]

The Strategic Model

The participant in this model can be characterized as a "statesman." Accordingly, he behaves in ways calculated to consistently optimize or at least maximize the best interests of his country. He is the "rational" judge called upon to make responses and render decisions to difficult situations by way of a careful assessment of the marketplace of international and domestic events. As we shift from the personality to the strategic model, we shift our focus from personal

motivations and idiosyncracies to the external dynamics and stimuli of the international system. Behavior is seen as a rational response to the existing international political ecology and to environmental stimuli. Explanation in this model proceeds from the response to the stimuli by first revealing what the intent of the response was and how it could represent a justifiable choice, given the nature of the stimuli.[11]

Decisional calculations are rooted in the classical economics notion of the ratio of costs to benefits, the object being to keep the ratio as small as possible. Stated otherwise, behavior is purposive and predicated on the assumption that given the constraints and limitations the situation imposes on the decision process and on decision participants, a most rational response can still be made.

But the term "rational response" is ambiguous, as experiments in "Prisoner Dilemma" and games of "Chicken" have demonstrated;[12] rational responses to an adversary's stimulus/action, when cooperation is not possible, can result in game scenarios which lock the contestants into polices and courses of action that can be mutually disadvantageous to both parties. In addition, the strategic model not only assumes a relative homogeneity and consistency of attitudes and perceptions about external events, but also a general consensus that specific actions are best-suited to attain supposedly agree-upon ends. Here, the accent is on means, not ends, for ends are conceptualized as a function of situational determinants. This model also eliminates powerful sets of variables such as organizational structures, group pressures, and personal commitments which are themselves often variable and odds with each other. The model moreover is overly mechanistic since it views man as a reacting rather than an initiating participant.

The fundamental problem with the strategic model, then, is its inability to deal with the variation and instability of attitudes and behavior, as well as the changing motives among individual participants. Like the personality model, it fails to consider strongly enough the interactive or social character of foreign policy making. It assumes or offers as given an idealized decisional participant and does so against a backdrop which pictures decision situations as having clear-cut response alternatives and where the steps from information-received to response-made is largely unincumbered by institutional settings or collegial differences. Under such restrictions, it is questionable whether enough is known of the range of decisional options, of the adversaries' range of responses, of the quality of information received, as well as whether optimal solutions can reasonably be known--even post hoc.[13] Surely, a cost-benefits model of a participant, if it is to fit the totality of decisional circumstances, must involve a broader and more inclusive net.

The Bureaucratic Model

The prototype of this model is the "bureaucrat." He is motivated to act according to his perceptions of the values and expectations of significant others in his work environment. He derives satisfaction from doing tasks and in getting things done; the act of finalizing unfinished work is often times as rewarding as the content of the work being done. In the process, the bureaucrat is sensitive to collegial relationships and apprehensive that others might dissaprove of any marked deviation from the prevailing norms of the organization and of the immediate work group. This model accents task-related variables and de-emphasizes ego-related factors. It stresses organizational factors

and the "need for organizing social conduct in the interest of administrative efficiency."[14] In so doing, it directs attention to how established routines, standardized patterns of behavior, policy contingencies, and delegated responsibilities relate to the formation of attitudes and behavior.[15]

The individual operates inside the boundaries of determined structural, normative, and cultural response patterns and does so mostly through formalized channels of activity. Organizations are defined as purposeful bureaucracies bent on achieving policy outcomes by "reducing the variability and spontaneity of individual human acts;"[16] that is, by increasing the predictability of individual behavior. The model focuses on the organizational instruments required to minimize unpredictability of behavior through a variety of maintenance-related sub-structures and control devices designed for these purposes. The system of rewards and punishments is central to these functions and are made known, meted out, and applied for the purpose of reinforcing positive behavior and punishing negative behavior. The attitude structures of the individual members, then, are largely a function of the organization and the work environment and of adult socialization experiences; the latter sensitize the member to the standards, rules, and professional norms and expectations of the group. Thus, "what can be done" and "what should be done" are both well-defined and circumscribed for new and incumbent members alike.

This model is a persuasive one. It singles out the individual's immediate environment, the living system which he must accept, adapt to, or leave; it is the environment in which he spends most of his time. It is the organizational setting, taken as a whole, which mediates between the external environment and the personal idiosyncracies of the

participant. In this way, both external factors and personal dispositions can be effectively modified to the point where performance variability can be reduced and made more consonant with overall organizational requirements. Degrees of adaptation or organizational conformity are likely consequences.[17] Moreover, this model seems particularly fitted to the analysis of participants in lower positions in the organization, for it is here where role-type factors seem to play a more important part. It is here, where the range of behavior is most constricted, and where professional and collegial pressures are more active determinants of attitudes and behavior.

The overriding difficulty with this model is its failure to consider the tug-of-war between individual and organizational goals. It assumes, instead, that the purposive character of explicit foreign policy organizations is identical with those of their members. The model fails to resolve the elusive problem of decisional responsibility as well; like the strategic model which explains decisions in terms of the situation, this model explains action or inaction in terms of organizational rules and other constraints restricting individual behavior. It is probably more accurate to assume some mix between pre-organizational experiences and those acquired during membership. The effects of learning and of socialization experiences on individual attitudes must be considered powerful determinants, but they alone cannot nullify the full blend of experiences that preceeded them.

The Politics Model

The fourth model is best typified by the "politico" or the "politician." The politician perceives his role or job to be one of adjustment, compromise, and bargaining; he actively engages himself in

these processes as an advocate of some personal belief or some group interests. He is motivated to act in ways which seek to preserve, or promote, or promulgate his organization or group preferences; his motivation to act, however, has a double edge in that while working for the group preferences, he keeps a sharp eye alert for promoting personal and career interests as well. Whereas the individual participant in the bureaucratic model tended to be a conformist, the participant in this model is more of an operator and an advocate.

The politics model contends that policy is made in the fluid context of multiple personal and organizational goals, in cross-cutting value systems, and in constantly changing inter- and intra-organizational alliances.[18] Policy is viewed as a product of a non-zero-sum distribution of power and influence and responsibility, and the competition and negotiation for jurisdictional or vested interests are all presumed to occur within a consensual framework that is accepted as a necessary and integral part of the decision process.

Unless there is complete value and goal agreement among the varying participants, this model is most unlike the strategic model. The ability to rationally adapt to a situation as well as the ability to bargain persuasively is what gets decisions made and policy outcomes implemented. In other respects, this model is closer to the personality model for it incorporates ego-oriented as well as task-oriented assumptions of behavior.

Because of his role in the decision process, the individual is conceptualized as a cautious and self-conscious participant, for his behavior is oriented in ways measured to increase certainty and minimize risk. He is keenly aware of the strength of precedent and the difficulty of achieving major policy changes; the reality of this awareness tends to dilute personal preferences and to retard otherwise

creative initiatives. The upshot of this results in a somewhat contradictory or paradoxical decision participant: he is vigorous and persistent in advocating non-controversial group positions, but complacent in proposing precedent-breaking options. The real danger, of course, with respect to foreign policy is that this janus-like participant may come to accept these procedural and substantive patterns or norms as inevitable and acceptable responses to decisional necessities.

In this model, outcomes differ only slightly from past outcomes and participants tend towards dissatisfaction only incrementally. The assumption of the model is that it is preferable to "win" than to "lose" decisional disputes although "winning" is weighed differently than "losing;" a participant can be better assured of steady progress in his career without "wins" than he could without any "losses." In short, it is preferable not to lose than it is to try and win and run the risk of losing. Given the assumptions of this model, this means that participants tend to select only those initiatives that have neither a high chance of positive return nor a high probability of negative return; instead, they choose those which Simon and March have termed "satisficing" alternatives,[19] those which neither place individual careers on the line nor abruptly challenge on-going organizational orthodoxies. The liabilities of such modalities of behavior are all too obvious.

A Partial Model

To repeat, we are investigating some of the factors that may correlate with certain foreign policy attitudes held by a defined set of foreign policy participants. The four participant models outlined above

provide a suggestive basis for the selection of an appropriate research framework to do so.

The framework we are adopting here is a partial synthesis of the bureaucratic and politics models. Integrating select aspects of both models enables us to bring together both individual or self-oriented factors and to retain bureaucratic or task-related variables without unnecessary sacrifice to either. In so doing, we are saying that, for our focus on men located below the top, a recognition of both the larger contextual or organizational factors and the more immediate, self-directed interests of constituent members is important.

Both these models, in contrast to the personality and strategic models, interpret attitudes and behavior in predominantly institutional terms. The politics model attributes behavior, for example, to the more or less volitional attempts of participants to attain self or sub-group goals through the performance or investment in given tasks. The bureaucratic frame of reference stresses the pressures and rules of compliance which promote stability and continuity of learning experiences; the main source of these controls is found in the social, structural, and role requirements of the organizational setting as well as the standards used to accept or reject certain kinds of behavior.[20] In each, the formation of foreign policy attitudes are hypothesized to take place during membership or participation in foreign policy organizations. Attitudes, therefore, stem from a participant's membership and commitment not only to the broader organizational structure but also to membership and involvement in narrower, more proximate task-oriented sub-groups. In short, our synthetic framework includes both the participants' concern for "getting things done" and his interest in "getting his way" in the policy process.

We feel that the politics model, which accounts for and accents the differences and conflicts among individual participants and sub-groups, is an accurate description of the policy process; we also feel that most foreign policy behavior, like organizational behavior in general, is largely structured, habitual, and consensual. The gap between these two descriptions of the rendering of foreign policy decisions can be closed by choosing and integrating those variables from each model which represent areas of overlap. Thus, it is our view that attitude and behavioral differences within the Department of State have become acceptable and legitimate so long as they occur and do not drastically alter the organizationally-defined limits of what is permissable. In other words, attitudinal diversity is tolerated and even encouraged when there are mechanisms set up to handle or mollify their impact on individual and organizational activities. For our purposes, this is a satisfactory response to the differing emphases of the politics and bureaucratic models; with this, we are able to deal with, and relate the emphasis on individual and sub-group differences of the politics model and the stress on individual adaptability and conformity of the bureaucratic model. How much and in what areas this diversity or homogeneity exist among foreign policy participants is an empirical question and we will search for an answer to it.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missle Crisis," American Political Science Review, 62: 3, (September, 1969), pp. 689-718 and Bert Rockman, "A 'Behavioral' Evaluation of the Critique of Behavioralism," paper presented at the September meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 1969.

[2]See, for example, Alexander George and Juliette George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (New York: John Day, 1956).

[3]Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton, 1958) and Gandhi's Truths (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969).

[4]Ole Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study" Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6: 3, (1962), pp. 244-252; Arnold Rogow, James Forrestal (New York: McMillan, 1963).

[5]Theodor Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality, (New York: Harper, 1950); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960); Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in James Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51-109.

[6]See, for example, Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthenum and the Sword, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946); Alex Inkles and Danial Levinson, "National Character, The Study of Modal Personality and Socio Political Systems," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd. ed. (Reading, Massacheusetts: Addision-Wesley, 1959).

[7]See, for example, James Barber, "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two Weak Presidents," Journal of Social Issues, 24:3 (1968), pp. 51-80.

[8]Alexander George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly, 13, (1969), pp. 190-222.

[9]Holsti, op. cit.

[10]For the most comprehensive review and summary of the literature linking personality research and politics see Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics, (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

[11]Representative writers include Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), and Arms and Influence (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966); Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); and Herman Kahn, On Escalation (New York: Praeger, 1965). Hans Morgenthau's well-known "Rational Statesman" exemplifies this model's participants in many ways; see Politics Among Nations 3rd. ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960), p. 5.

[12]See Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), and Fights, Games, and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960).

[13]See James March and Herbert Simon's discussion of rational decision making in Organizations (New York: John Wiley, 1959).

[14]Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy and Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 60.

[15]The behavioral theory of the firm presented by Richard Cyert and

James March offers a comprehensive summary and critique of the literature relevant to the bureaucratic model; see their Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

[16]Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations, (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 199.

[17]Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley, 1964) and Jon Barret, Individual Goals and Organizational Objectives (Ann Arbor: Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, 1970). Both offer full discussions on the problems of organizational integration and conformity.

[18]A host of writers have recently made this general model the most popular among political scientists. Representative writers include Richard Neustadt, Presidential Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1961), and Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign Policy Consensus," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3, (1959), pp. 361-382, and To Move a Nation (New York: Delta Books, 1967); Also, see Charles Linblom's "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review, 19, (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.

[19]March and Simon, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

[20]We recognize that a "certain amount of conformity" or consensus is important for any organization or society to function and achieve its objectives; we also feel that a "certain amount of diversity" is important to counteract whatever deadening effect homogeneous behavior might have on individual and organizational performance.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

To recapitulate, we are interested in the foreign policy attitudes that are held by foreign policy participants in the Department of State. Thus far, we have sketched out the problem, chosen the proper unit and level for our analysis, summarized several possible generic-type participant models, and presented an argument for selecting a syncratic frame of reference. We will now elaborate on this frame of reference and then attempt to articulate, in more detailed terms, the research design of this study.

In choosing to fuse together select aspects of the politics and bureaucratic models, we are, in a direct sense, raising a question central to both social theory and political practice: What is the relation between the individual member and the demands of the organization(s) to which he belongs? The question is an important one and much of contemporary thinking about public policy and organizational behavior has focused, to one extent or another, on it. Basically, the problem can be stated in terms of costs and gains where the individual's goals and the organization's objectives, pulling in different directions, are such that neither can be fully attained without some cost to the other. A second question, stemming from the first, asks how organizational objectives can be reached and, at the same time, enable members to achieve whatever goals they may be seeking? Argyris has posed the same question:

> How is it possible to create an organization in which the individual may obtain optimum expression and, simultaneously, in which the organization itself may obtain optimum satisfaction of its demands?[1]

Here, we are less interested in the integration of members into an organization or in the problems of organizational effectiveness. Instead, we are more interested in discovering some underlying factors which are salient enough to organizational members that they lead to the shaping of their foreign policy attitudes.

The distinction between organization objectives and individual goals leads to a second and, for our purposes, more relevant inquiry about individual goals. Larry Mohr has suggested the useful bifurcation of organizational objectives into "transitive" and "reflexive" goals.[2] The former refers to the organization's contribution to or input into its environment and the latter designates the organization's concern for its own internal welfare. This dichotomy is a suggestive one for conceptualizing individual goals as well. Individual members of organizations--whether private or public--have a complex set of plural goals which pertain to both organizational outcomes and to the members themselves. For the individual member of public organizations, transitive or <u>external</u> goals are those which refer to policy outputs, that is, to the outward thrusts of internal decision-making. They can be labelled his policy preferences or non-preferences. These external goals usually contain some normative content and often imply some scalar meaning in terms of "more or less" preference or degrees of "rightness" or "wrongness" or "goodness" or "badness" of decisional alternatives. Reflexive or <u>internal</u> goals of the individual, on the other hand, are more inwardly-oriented and preferred or not preferred according to how they effect the internal environment and personal standing of the member. These goals are more career-oriented, instrumental, and relate

more directly to the self-interests of the individual; they are not necessarily opposed to the individual's external goals. The external goals include preferences for policy options while internal goals include preferences for a range of benefits available to the individual from the organization--such as salary, seniority, status, and work satisfaction.

With this dichotomy reduced and redefined at the individual level, we suspect that where the external goals of a participant dominate over his internal goals, the model exemplified by the "bureaucrat" or, perhaps, the "statesman" is most closely approximated. When the individual's internal goals are weighted more heavily than his external policy preferences, we suspect that the "politician" is the more representative type. (The "individualist" is difficult to categorize within this schema.) In most cases, members of organizations hold both external and internal goals; that is, members are both "bureaucrats" and "politicians" and are concerned both with "fitting in" and "making out" during their membership in the organization. The exact balance between the two generalized goals depends on the nature of the organization, its avowed purpose, its recruitment program, managerial system, the individual himself, and a host of other important factors. It is probably accurate to say, though, that in most public or governmental organizations, members waver somewhere between the two. We assume, therefore, that individual foreign service personnel in the Department of State are no exception.

In the Department, for example, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA)--the "company union" and principal in-house agency for Foreign Service personnel--represents the most important instrument for safeguarding and advancing it's members internal goals. The

Association maintains responsibility for regulating its membership, for setting the qualifications and requirements for entry and promotion, and for determining the structure of the career service as a whole. Each of the functions are explicitly reflexive but have a bearing on the external goals of the individual as well. It would be misleading to separate the one from the other, for there is continuous interaction between the two. Together with the Department's stated objectives of advancing and protecting the national interests of the United States through diplomatic means, the activities of the Foreign Service provide a general framework within which members begin to define and balance their internal goal preferences with their external policy preferences.

We are not so much interested in the extent to which an individual identifies with the former or accepts the latter; we merely want to assert that to study the development and content of foreign policy attitudes of members in the Department, attention must be given to the fact that public servants are also private servants. Internal goals and external goals are rarely separable, for one invariably impinges upon the other, sometimes enhancing, other times compromising the other. It is this mix between internal and external preferences which we assume can account for part of the diversity of foreign policy attitudes among foreign policy participants. And, it is this basic argument that prompts our paying closer attention to the kinds of tasks and the variety of internal characteristics and settings of the Department of State and Foreign Service. Do they have any relation in any way to the foreign policy attitudes of foreign policy participants? This question gives rise to the core assumption underlying this study:

> **The external goal preferences (attitudes) of foreign policy participants in the Department of State are associated with their organizational experiences; external goals and internal goals are**

related.

Foreign policy participants are defined as those individuals who, by virtue of their occupying foreign policy roles, have or can have some legitimate impact on the policy process or on policy outcomes. Organizational experiences automatically imply membership and are defined broadly to include such things as specific task assignment, organizational location, rank, years of service in the Department, and the like.

The theory of attitudes or attitude formation utilized here may be called a "functional" one.[3] That is, attitudes are learned, retained, or altered according to some function they serve for the individual. For example, adjusting to group standards or to patterns of behavior may serve the function of easing tension and anxiety, of attaining desired rewards or avoiding unwanted sanctions. As in our previous discussion of conformity, attitudes may be knowingly learned or unknowingly internalized by a participant. Either way, attitudes are held and serve the purpose of reaching a desired goal, of maximizing some reward or minimizing some penalty. According to Fishbein, an attitude is "a learned disposition to respond to any object in a consistently favorable or unfavorable way."[4] It becomes habitual if it is positively reinforced and changes when it conflicts with the holder's view that some desired goal is jeopardized. For a foreign service official, the more important determinants of rewards and sanctions are the Department which structures and sets the rules, the Foreign Service which regulates career membership, and the less formal collegial relationships and functional settings which helps define work activities. These parameters are what circumscribe and give direction to the participant's goal preferences and non-preferences.

The most directly pertinent source of insights linking the formation of attitudes and organizational experiences is found in the scattered literature of adult socialization.[5] Unfortunately, little empirical research has been done on the external goal preferences of members of large public policy organizations. Those which exist are mostly suggestive. By socialization, we mean the process of acquiring "...the knowledge, motives, feelings, skills, and other traits expected in the groups of which they [persons] are or seek to become members."[6] Our usage is not confined to the deliberate efforts of organizational agents to inculcate certain attitudes. Socialization of members may take place outside of the design or intent of the organization; the "products" may be largely unintended.

The research on adult socialization is quite diverse but the fundamental theme is that human personalities and personal goals are non-constant, that they change over time as people meet and adjust to new social and interpersonal learning experiences. Stated differently, an individual's perspectives are not fixed as they are continuously tested against new experiences. Earlier experiences may be important but they may also be "situationally specific;" Scheutz's statement that an individual's definition of a situation is "the sedimentation of all man's previous experiences" and that it is "biographically determined" implies that his current attitudes are best seen as resulting from some indeterminate mix of his earlier and most recent experiences.[7] At any rate, there are several studies which do conclude that membership in varying organizations has a significant influence on the individual's readiness to perceive as well as his disposition to act in given situations. This seems particularly true where the social structure of the organization is such that group norms and loyalties are assiduously

cultivated and highly resistent to change. Where occupational communities exist in relative isolation from the larger environment which envelops it, the potential for membership socialization is even greater. The Foreign Service is a particularly vivid example of this isolation.

The process of socialization involves the gradual adoption of sets of perceptual coding "rules" which facilitate the interpretation and assignment of meaning to incoming information; behavior may be formed by the rules no matter what the real world may be. Indeed, one rationale for the institutionalization of a common set of coding rules in public organizations is that without them, the organization would operate in a chaotic and inefficient way. How common these rules are can be investigated, in part, by looking at organization-wide factors and/or select sub-organization characteristics. The former process of attitude formation may be called "organizational socialization" if coding rules of members are relatively common throughout the organization; the latter process can be termed sub-organizational or task socialization when coding rules are associated with certain identifiable parts of the organization. As is the case in many public organizations, members are regularly rotated from job to job; in this situation, common to the Foreign Service, attitudes may regularly change to fit the job or task circumstance. In this case, the term "sequential socialization" seems appropriate. A final type of socialization process correlates pre-organizational characteristics with certain identifiable sets of coding rules and this might be called "anticipatory socialization."

These several broadly defined types of (adult) socialization suggest that there may be plural factors at work leading to attitude differences or minimizing attitude variation. We can, then, identify three separate clusters of factors which could help explain the

development of participant attitudes towards foreign policy. The first are the common factors (organizational socialization) which are shared by all members of the organization and operate as organization-wide standards to which each member must take cognizance. These include the principal control mechanisms, rules, professional ethos, managerial forms, and other pervasive features of the organization. In the Department of State, these would include many of the personnel and managerial procedures and practices set up to evaluate, promote, re-assign, and/or select out incumbent members. It would also include those organization-wide cultural and ideological characteristics that define for all new and veteran members, the general limits of behavior and the normative structure of the Foreign Service and the Department.

The second cluster of variables are specific factors (sequential or task socialization); these are not shared by all members of the organization, only by a structurally or functionally defined subset of members occupying roles within defined sub-groups of the organization. Here, the division of labor and the specialization of function are linked to different sub-units of the Department described as having different task responsibilities, sub-cultures and contrasting group patterns of behavior. Membership, structure, functional responsibility, even relative status, may all differ among sub-units within the same organization. Each of these factors would operate and coexist with the common factors outlined above. The problem is to identify and compare these plural sub-units and then to determine whether or not they differ on each of these--or other--factors.

The third set of independent variables are the pre-organizational (anticipatory socialization) factors which members have at the time of their entry. This explanation of attitude formation is

more straight-forward; certain social and economic background characteristics may pre-dispose a foreign service officer to hold a particular foreign policy attitude or to behave in a particular way. The more the backgrounds are alike, the less likely there will be conflicting viewpoints and the more likely there will be more homogeneous attitudes. These factors would include the usual demographic and biographic characteristics such as age, religion, education, religious affiliation, and the like.

For the sake of roundness, we will investigate these three alternative explanations. The first and the second look at the common and the specific factors influencing the member's foreign policy attitudes while the third will focus on the participants' prior characteristics. The degree to which the member's external goal preferences or foreign policy attitudes are associated with: (a) the common, organization wide features of the Department or Foreign Service, or (b) the specific attributes of his sub-unit, or (c) his pre-organizational experiences may tell us much about the formation of foreign policy attitudes among formal foreign policy participants. We are most interested in "testing out" the second (b) possible explanation; we'll discuss it first.

Sub-Unit as an Explanatory Variable

The first alternative and the explanation in which we are most interested reads as follows:

> E-1: The external goal preferences (attitudes) of foreign policy participants in the Department of State are associated with the attributes of their specific task environments; external goal preferences are a function of specific sub-unit experiences of the participants.

In defining "task environment," we accept that put forward by Thibault

and Kelly as "a problem, assignment, or stimulus-complex to which an individual or group responds by performing various overt and covert operations that lead to various outcomes."[8] Drawing upon the vast literature of learning theory and the sociology of knowledge[9] as well as role theory[10] and studies of conformity,[11] this explanation links the formation of attitudes to the day-to-day task experiences of the foreign policy participants. The demands and pressures of the task environment play a continuing part in developing the member's role perspective and his external goal preferences. The specific task assignment provides him with an organizational point of reference and a basis for political identification; these include his colleagues who share many of the formal responsibilities of his sub-unit. It also includes the sub-unit's memory, best represented by its files and by the collective memory of those officials with lengthy service in the sub-unit. Each of these factors help prescribe and describe for members the roles they must fill and the expectations they should have.

When task assignments frequently change as they do in the Foreign Service under a program of periodic rotation, the effects of specific task environments on external goal preferences may be washed out, since changing assignments introduce changing, even competing, external goal perspectives. Thus, members moving into and out of numerous task environments within the Department become organizational "transients" who must repeatedly adjust their frame of reference, and shift their allegiance as they assume new task responsibilities. This, of course, places an added premium on the member's adaptibility for it is ordinarily far easier to retain a prior role and perspective than to internalize a new one. But, it has become part of the learning repertoire of a foreign service officer that he expects and plans to

adjust to the new perspectives of a new assignment. Downs has stated the point more precisely: "As individual advocates shift positions, the policies they espouse tend to alter so as to conform to the official responsibilities of their current jobs."[12] Although we are not investigating attitude changes, we do make the assumption that these shifts do occur and that current attitudes can be detected and measured at any point in the rotation cycle.

We are saying that organizational sub-units harbor identifiable external goal perspectives and that members of one sub-unit are likely to hold goal preferences that are more consistent within than they are between different sub-units. As one Foreign Service Officer put it:

> One finds a competitive situation most of the time. Every bureau looks at its issues from its own standpoint; even though you deal with officers who have served in other bureaus, there is a certain responsibility that we all must protect. We must protect the U.S.'s national interest from this standpoint.

When a member is re-assigned to a new sub-unit, he typically does three things to learn his new job: (1) he reads the files of the new sub-unit, particularly those which refer to the role and functions of his predecessor; (2) he learns how the sub-unit operates, who does what, through whom, and how it is done; and (3) he begins to master and activate the contacts and sources of information required to satisfactorily handle his job--both inside and outside of the new sub-unit. Most learning, therefore, takes place on the job and other incumbents within the sub-unit become primary referents for assisting his adjustment to the new work environment. Success for these participants is defined in mastering these job requirements and in not allowing his area of responsibility to get "worse" than it was at the time of his entry into the sub-unit. One important consequence of on-the-job learning therefore seems to be to nullify the effects of job

rotation and to promote the development of a curator mentality with respect to pre-determined task requirements; continuity is more important than creativity.

The main independent variables which we will utilize in "testing" this first explanation are: (1) the organizational sub-unit in which the participant is a member; (2) the cumulative kinds of formal diplomatic task experiences which make up the career profile of each official; and (3) the patterns of interaction--inter-personal contacts and sources of information summed together--which a member encounters in the performance of his job. For example, we want to answer the question: Do individual participants presently working or those having predominant foreign policy experience in bilateral (or multilateral) sub-units of the Department tend to prefer conducting U. S. foreign policy in bilateral (or multilateral) channels? Do they prefer international-oriented solutions to inter-nation problems? Are they more or less willing to support proposals to strengthen the United Nations or to advocate unilateral initiatives to reduce international tensions? Each of these questions will be explored further in a latter chapter.

Organization-Wide Factors as Explanatory Variables

The second possible explanation, in a sense, builds upon the first for it magnifies each of the specific environmental factors to more commonly shared organization-wide variables.

E-2: The external goal preferences (attitudes) of foreign policy participants in the Department of State are dependent upon common organization-wide features; external goal preferences are a function of common experiences.

This explanation implies that experiences commonly shared by all members of the Department or Foreign Service will tend to override and minimize the effects of specific task socialization. It assumes that there is

little or no significant variation in goal preferences between members of different sub-units. Like E-1, this explanation builds upon the findings of a variety of learning theories; but where E-1 focuses on the more immediate task settings, this formulation stresses a "top down" approach. That is, attitudes towards foreign policy questions are hypothesized as a function of certain organization and professional givens with which each member must come to grips; these factors are not peculiar to any one sub-unit in the Department because they are common to members of all sub-units.

Because most interpretors and critics of the Department and the Foreign Service have paid attention to this explanation, it is an inviting one.[13] They most frequently explain the Department's lack of initiative or boldness or openness by reference to its large size, its complicated structures or its excessive dependence on professional and/or career role definitions. Within the Foreign Service, there is a deep-seated pride in esprit de corps, professionalism, and mission that permeates throughout all the ranks. A similar high regard for the stringency of entry and self-governance is, however, matched by a dislike for the cumbersome evaluation procedures and the detailed methods used to determine upward mobility; there is also a mixed pride in the Service's identification of rank with the officer rather than with the position he occupies. Each of these ideo-cultural attributes of the Foreign Service gives special meaning and identity to its members; each contributes to an organizational and professional ambiance which helps mold the norms, expectations, and attitudes which members, especially career-conscious members, must adapt. As with E-1, a participant's external goal preferences develop out of adjustments to collegial expectations, through personal ambitions, and beliefs about

the historical image of the Service and the Department. The main difference between E-1 and E-2, then, is that professional considerations play a greater role in determining membership attitudes towards foreign policy.

Here, we are saying that organizational socialization acts as an influence process through which members learn the principal values, expectations, and external goal preferences dominant in the Department and the Foreign Service. Rotation among assignments should have only slight impact on altering the perspectives of members since other Department-determined factors are now the reference point(s); tasks are now defined in terms of the larger group. One Foreign Service Officer unequivocally put it this way:

> There are basically three things which most concern Foreign Service Officers: (1) Our personal careers; (2) Foreign policy; and (3) The bread and butter issues such as salary, allowances, and so forth. I would definitely say that this order is correct; maybe the second concern should be third.

With E-2, members are defined as "permanents," no matter what position they occupy or responsibility they handle. The adjustment to new assignments, the making of new contacts, and the learning of new "ropes" are all subsumed under the general rubric of common concerns and experiences.

The describing variables which we will use in "testing" E-2 are: (1) the rank of the participant in the Foreign Service; (2) the length of service in the Department; and (3) the length of service in the Foreign Service. If we detect little or no variation in the foreign policy preferences of participants in the Foreign Service, we have some grounds for concluding that some overall factors are operating to influence members' like-mindedness. If we find that attitude variation is associated with rank location or years in service, we can, then,

conclude that these variables are not unimportant factors in the formation of attitudes.

Pre-Organization Factors as Explanatory Variables

In this third explanation, we want to "test" whether measured foreign policy preferences can be traced to the antecedent experiences of organizational members.

E-3: The external goal preferences (attitudes) of foreign policy participants in the Department of State are traceable to social-economic backgrounds or recruitment practices; external goal preferences are a function of prior Departmental experiences.

The logic of this explanation is clear: if the Department is composed of relatively homogeneous groups tied together by common educational, generational, or class backgrounds, it is reasonable to expect that the policy orientations of individual members would be similar in many ways. If their backgrounds were diverse, we could then hypothesize that their external goal preferences would differ and we could then anticipate conflicts among them.

The assumption built into E-3 is that pre-organizational socialization and learning play the crucial role in determining a member's external goal preferences. Participants have a certain "attitude potential" that they bring with them into the Department where it then finds expression in organizational behavior and decisional activity. A corollary to this explanation is that the Department or the Foreign Service is engaged in "selective recruitment" practices which operate to induct some and screen out others, and thereby control its cultural and ideological composition.[14] To a certain degree this is always the case, although common socio-economic background does not necessarily mean that each individual will hold common goal preferences.[15]

The leap from social background to external goal preferences is, of course, a long and risky one and although much can be explained by correlating the one with the other, some caution may be necessary where the study involves a limited sample.

This explanation, furthermore, assumes that attitudes are relatively fixed and enduring. Therefore, we would anticipate that the rotation of assignments would have little impact on the foreign policy goals of participants in the Department. E-3 is a more static explanation in that it harbors no assumption of learning and adjustment to the job since organizational and sub-unit variables are assumed to bear no important relationship to the development of policy preferences. One Foreign Service Officer expressed this view in his own terms:

> You should remember that a good number of Foreign Service Officers came into the Department when good jobs were scarce after the war, at a time when the effects of the depression in the thirties and the war in the forties were dominant in the minds of most of us. When we got what looked like steady and important employment, we wanted to hold on to it, and we also wanted to prevent another world war. Of course, the McCarthy problems arose soon after we all came in and it had a real deadening effect on how we saw ourselves.

The background variables which seem appropriate to "test" out this explanation include the following: (1) the amount of education of the participant; (2) the time when the participant received his education; (3) the participant's age; and a variety of other demographic and biographic background variables. Age and the time of a participant's formal education are important because they may coincide with identifiable historical periods in which members may have acquired an enduring set of foreign policy attitudes.

If put into a flow or process chart, the relationship among these several variables for each of the three contending explanations might look like Figure 1. All the different segments of the Chart have

been discussed and should be clear except for, perhaps, the bi-directional arrows connecting "behavior" with "attitudes." It would be difficult to argue that there is a one-to-one relationship between attitudes and behavior or that the one can always predict to the other; the best that can realistically be said is that attitudes, when reliably measured and verified, are a credible indicator of behavior (and vice-versa) in much the same way that GNP is a useful indicator of a nation's economy. It would also be difficult to argue that there is a simple one way, non-symmetrical, causal relationship between the two; in large




Figure 1.--Main clusters of variables for E-1, E-2, and E-3

organizations with highly restrictive control systems, behavior may "cause" the formation of certain attitudes, or they may have no influence at all. As in most social science research, the problem of indicator validation remains a knotty one. The two-directional arrows are intended to convey this uncertainty; typically, behavioral data do

not accompany attitude data in most surveys; regretably we follow this tendency.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Chris Argyris, "The Individual and Organization," Administrative Science Quarterly, 2, (1957), p. 24.

[2]Larry Mohr, "The concept of Organizational Goal," (unpublished Paper, Institute of Public Policy Studies: University of Michigan, August 1970).

[3]See Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion Quarterly, 1960, 24, pp. 163-204; M. Brewster Smith et al., Opinions and Personality (New York: John Wiley, 1956); and Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The International System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 93-117.

[4]Martin Fishbein, "Attitude and the Prediction of Behavior," in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley, 1967).

[5]This list is only a selected one. Orville Brim and Stanton Wheeler, Socialization After Childhood (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Kenneth Prewitt et al., "Political Socialization and Political Roles," Public Opinion Quarterly, 30:4, (Winter, 1966-67), pp. 569-582; Warwick, op. cit.; Heinz Eulau, "Socialization of American State Legislators," Midwest Journal of Politics, III, (1959), pp. 188-206; Howard Becker et al., Boys in White (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1961). For a summary of the literature see Richard Dawson, "Political Socialization," in James Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1966), pp. 1-84.

[6]Donald Warwick, "Adult Socialization and Personality," in Stanley Seashore and R. McNeill (eds.), The Management of Crisis: Metropolitan Government and the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Free Press, forthcoming).

[7]Alfred Scheutz, Collected Papers I and Collected Papers II (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1962).

[8]J. W. Thibaut and H. H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley, 1959), p. 158.

[9]For an interesting and stimulating discussion getting straight to the point, see Paul Breer and Edwin Locke, Task Experience as a Source of Attitudes (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1965).

[10]Seymour Lieberman, "The Effects of Changes in Roles on the Attitudes of Role Occupants," Human Relations, 9:4, (1956), pp. 385-402.

[11]For example, see Solomon Asch, "Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgements," in G. Swanson et al., (eds.), Readings in Social Psychology (New York: Henrey Holt, 1952), pp. 2-11.

[12]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), p. 268.

[13]The number of works and writers are too numerous to fully cite but see the following: Toward a Modern Diplomacy, A Report of the American Foreign Service Association, 1968; John Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971); John Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Chris Argyris, Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State (Department of State Occasional Paper: Institute for International Systems Research) No. 2, (1966); and any of John K. Galbraith's many works relating to foreign policy, especially his novel, The Triumph (New York: Signet Books, 1968).

[14]Bernard Mennis, when comparing political officers in the Department of State and the Department of Defense, for example, found that selective recruitment in DOD accounted for more of the differences in policy attitudes than did some form of internal socialization, "An Empirical Analysis of the Background and Political Preferences of American Foreign Policy Decision Makers," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1967).

[15]See the discussion in Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing "Social Background in Elite Analysis," American Political Science Review, 61, 2, (June 1967), pp. 428-445.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION

The Sample

The day-to-day work of the Department of State is done in five large, heavily-staffed geographic or regional bureaus and ten so-called "functional" or non-geographic bureaus. In addition to their internal roles, each geographic bureau is responsible for coordinating the activities of the numerous bi-national field missions located in the national capitals and principal metropols of the countries to which the U. S. is diplomatically represented. With only one major exception, the non-geographic bureaus have no equivalent field missions as such and much of their duties are formally confined to the Department itself. This sole exception--the Bureau of International Organization Affairs--is operationally responsible for coordinating most of U. S. multi-national relations both in the field and the Department. In this brief summary, we have described three structural and functional distinctions in the Department of State that are important in our research: (1) Geographic and non-geographic bureaus within the Department; (2) Departmental and field agencies and their responsibilities; and (3) Bi-national and multi-national forms of diplomatic representation.

Respondents for this study were chosen with the above three distinctions in mind. They were drawn from four different organization sub-units of the Department: two of the sub-units are bureaus, one a geographic, the other a non-geographic, and the other two are both field

missions, one a bi-national country post having mostly bilateral responsibilities, and the other an intergovernmental organization field mission having primarily multilateral duties. The first bureau in the Department is the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR), the most visible and "prestigious" geographic bureau among the five regional bureaus; the other bureau is the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) which oversees the full range of U. S. diplomatic affairs in the numerous international organizations to which the U. S. belongs. The two field missions include first, the United States Mission to Italy (USMI), the principal bilateral diplomatic post linking the United States government to that of Italy; the second field post is the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN), the largest and best known multilateral field mission connecting the United States government with the United Nations in New York City.

The choice of USUN is straightforward and was determined mostly by the limited number of possible multilateral field missions from which to choose, by its geographical accessibility, its perceived receptiveness to social science research and by its adequate sample size. Aside from this, USUN is the principal U. S. field mission with predominantly multilateral field duties. The selection of USMI, on the other hand, is less clear. Presumably, any American bi-national post in Europe would have sufficed; USMI, however, satisfied each of the requirements of our study: (1) on paper, it was large enough to guarantee an adequate sample; (2) it was, in most respects, a model bi-national post, having numerous agencies attached to it, located in an important and increasingly prosperous country, and engaged in what must be regarded as traditional diplomatic representation; and (3) access to the officers at the Embassy seemed more certain than it did at the other bi-national European posts which met our other requirements. The sample includes,

then, two parallel, though presumably different "horizontal slices" of the total structure of the Department of State. It includes individual participants located in two different bilateral task environments, one in the Department, the other in the field; it also includes participants in two separate multilateral task settings, again one in the Department, the other in the field. When "sliced" "vertically," the sample includes participants in the Department and participants in the field.

The sample population for each of these organizational sub-units included only Foreign Service Officers (FSO) and Foreign Service Reserve Officers (FSR). Members of the Foreign Service Staff (FSS), the Civil Service (GS), political appointees, and members of other governmental agencies were explicitly excluded from the relevant population. A random sample of officers was taken from the defined population of the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs because the number of participants was too large to warrant a full, comprehensive sample. On the other hand, the total memberships of both USUN and USMI were comparatively small so an effort was made to interview all relevant participants. In every instance, the population included the full distribution of officers ranging from the highest rank (rank one) to the second lowest rank (rank seven); no effort was made to control for the functional cone of the participants nor for the mode of entry into the Foreign Service. The final sample numbered seventy-six (n=76). Tables I and II summarize the distribution of the sample according to major descriptive categories.

The figures in Tables I and II indicate that more than two thirds of the participants (71%) were drawn from the two Departmental bureaus; thus, the "vertical slice" is heavily skewed in favor of the Department. The bilateral sample (49%) and the multilateral sample

(51%), however, are approximately the same; thus the "horizontal slice" is statistically, at least, more comparable then the "vertical." The

TABLE I

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPANTS: ORGANIZATION SUB-UNITS

Sub-Unit	Number of Participants	Percent
Bilateral	37	49%
EUR	28	37%
USMI	09	12
Multilateral	39	51%
IO	26	34%
USUN	13	17
	N=76	100%

proportion of FSO's to FSR's is very high as is the proportion of political officers to the remaining functional cone categories. The

TABLE II

DISTRIBUTION OF PARTICIPANTS: CAREER SERVICE AND CONE

	Number of Participants	Percent
Career Service		
F.S.O.	67	88%
F.S.R.O.	07	09
Other	02	03
Functional Cone		
Political	46	62%
Economic	15	20
Administrative	05	07
Consular	02	03
Other	08	09
	N=76	100%

first imbalance is due, in part, to the fact that only a few Foreign

Service Reserve Officers populate the sub-units sampled; although there are several in IO and USUN, most FSR's can be found in other functional bureaus of Department. As for the high representation of political officers, an examination of the personnel sheets of the sub-units sampled shows that, together, they are heavily staffed with officers in this cone. Table III below compares the rank distribution of our sample and further compares it to the overall distribution of FSO's and FSR's that are drawn from 1968 figures. This Table shows that the distribution

TABLE III

RANK DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE PARTICIPANTS

	(-Hi-) Ranks (-Lo-)									
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Totals
Number	1	3	13	21	16	14	6	2	0	= 76
Sample Percent	1%	4%	17%	28%	21%	18%	8%	3%	0%	= 100%
1968 Percent	1%	9%	14%	22%	21%	15%	10%	9%	3%	= 100+%

of career ranks is largely clustered in the middle levels between ranks two and five. A comparison of our sample with the full distribution of officers in 1968 shows they nearly parallel one another; each if visually displayed, would look like an inverted football standing on one end--the Foreign Service, in short, is inflated in the middle ranks and our sample very much mirrors that mid-level bulge.

Finally, in Table IV, we have grouped the participants into four rough age "cohorts." It is clear from the Table that our sample is largely middle-aged, since about three-fourths of the participants are

between the age of thirty-one and fifty. This was expected, since junior officers typically serve their first and often their second assignments abroad where only a small portion of our sample was taken. Ordinarily, age and rank would seem to be identical and of course there is some similarity; but differences do exist because lateral entrants and specialists come into the Department at different ages, age at entry varies, and differing rates of upward promotion all tend to distort their similarity. Therefore, in our analysis, we will treat these two related variables separately.

TABLE IV

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE PARTICIPANTS

	Age			
	26-30	31-40	41-50	51-60
Number	7	31	26	12
Percent	9%	40%	34%	16%

In setting up the project, the point of contact in the Department was the Academic Relations Division of the Office of External Research in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The samples were taken from personnel lists made available by the Department. Elaborate care was taken at all times to legitimize the study and to safeguard the anonymity of the participants. Several persons in the Department were initially consulted and given a copy of the research prospectus and questionnaire in order to elicit suggestions, criticisms, and encouragement. After that, a very small pre-sample was selected and interviewed for the explicit purpose of judging the adequacy of the

questionnaire, the receptivity of the project, and to field suggestions on interview procedure and/or the need for any revision. In a number of cases, questions were reworded and some were deleted while others were added. The pre-sample was too small for a pre-sample, post-sample reliability test.

Three main steps were taken to legitimize the study and to gain the cooperation of those participants selected in the sample: (1) First, the Director of the Office of External Research consented to sending out a memorandum to each of the chosen respondents describing, in broad terms, the general outline of my research; (2) This was, then, followed by a letter detailing the study's objectives and further describing, in more careful terms, the kinds of information being sought, the questionnaire to be used, and, again, the main purposes of the project. This served to clarify and reinforce the message in the initial memorandum from the Director; and (3) Each of the respondents was telephoned for the purpose of setting up a suitable time and place for the interview.

All but one officer contacted consented to the interview. Three members in EUR and two in IO, for varying reasons, no longer occupied the positions listed in their respective bureaus; in two of these five cases, their replacements were interviewed in their place. At USUN, time constraints and unpredictable scheduling did not permit interviews with two officers; likewise, in Rome, time and prior commitments of three officers prohibited interviews.

The average length of the interviews was fifty-seven minutes and the range was from twelve to ninety minutes. All the interviews were conducted in the Winter and Spring of 1970 and took place in the geographical and organizational setting of the participant. The

interviews were all conducted face-to-face and in all but a few cases, they occurred in the offices of the respondent. For the most part, the participants were cordial and frank, some even enthusiastic while others appeared dubious, if not suspicious, of the research and its intended purpose. What effect each of these perceptions may have had on the participants' responses is problematic and difficult to ascertain.

The Questionnaire

The interview schedule was divided into three different parts designed to collect three separate but theoretically connected kinds of data. Part I was designed to obtain basic demographic, biographic, political, and career data that were otherwise not available in the Department's Biographic Register; much additional data such as the participants' previous assignments and educational level were gathered from this source. This portion of the questionnaire also included some questions about the respondent's initial and continuing attraction to the Foreign Service and a short battery of open-ended questions structured to elicit their self-perceived foreign policy attitude change over the years. This part of the questionnaire contained both open-ended and close-ended questions.

Part II included a number of open-ended questions concerning the participant's view of his job, his work environment, the Department as a whole, and the Foreign Service. Just as importantly, some questions were designed to pinpoint each participant's external policy preferences (those he evaluates positively) and his non-preferences (those he evaluates negatively) with respect to U. S. foreign policy since the end of World War II. Most of the data derived from this section pertain to the sociology of the work/task setting as it is perceived by the

participant. Additional objective data about the work environment has been collected and will supplement those acquired from this section of the questionnaire.

Part III was a twenty-five item, self-administered attitude scale constructed for this study and designed to measure the generalized external policy preferences (attitudes) or dispositions of the participants. Each officer was given a six-alternative, Likert-type response scale having no neutral choice; on each item, he was asked to either agree or disagree strongly, moderately, or mildly. Upon completion, he was requested to return it to a prearranged collection point. This latter form of voluntarism unfortunately resulted in a reduced sample size, for twelve participants (16%) failed to complete and return this portion of the questionnaire; this, in spite of several calls and reminders to do so. Thus, with respect to the attitude scale, we will be dealing with a reduced N of sixty-four (64), which does not include those missing data on single items not answered by individual participants. The items, themselves, were general, hypothetical foreign policy statements of the "The U. S. should..." or "The U. S. should not..." variety. Two items were dropped because they did not discriminate among the participants well enough to retain; that is, the standard deviation of these two items were too small to keep, meaning that almost all the respondents were answering them in the same way. The final number of single items in the reduced scale, then, is twenty-three.

When taken as a whole, the attitude scale is a measure of the respondents' "international" disposition. Eleven of the statements were worded such that an agree response would indicate a member's "international" orientation; positive responses to the other twelve

items would indicate a non-international disposition. A higher cumulative mean score on these items, therefore, would be interpreted as a stronger disposition towards internationalism than would a lower average score. By internationalism, we mean a willingness to cooperate with other nations, a disposition to perceive international agencies and organizations as credible channels for conducting U. S. foreign affairs, and solving inter-nation problems, a willingness to begin tension-reducing moves, support for proposals to strengthen the United Nations, and a readiness to redistribute the wealth and resources of the United States to other parts of the world.

The attitude scale was written for this study and has been broken down into several sub-scales: (1) Diplomatic Channeling. This indicates a preference for bilateral or multilateral means of conducting U. S. foreign relations; (2) Strengthen the United Nations. This sub-scale measures the participants' support for two different proposals to increase the political and financial viability of the world organization; (3) Cooperation. This simply indicates a member's preference for dealing with international problems through military or non-military cooperative means; (4) Constraint. This measures attitudes towards non-belligerent unilateral initiatives in international politics; and (5) Share. This sub-scale indicates a willingness to participate and share in the redistribution of U. S. knowhow and technology.

Each of these sub-scales was constructed by combining theoretically consistent single items into separate indices. We used two complimentary procedures for determining the scalability of the items in each of the sub-scales. The full scale was first factor analyzed to ascertain the degree of structure among the items.[1] We wanted to decide whether the items which were theoretically similar were also alike in their factor

loadings; that is, did individual participants tend to respond to each of the sub-scale items in the same way. Factor analysis can be a useful exercise not only for visualizing the degree of structure among the items but also for making post hoc decisions about the structures that

TABLE V

Scale Items and Summary Response Data

ITEM	NUMBER	MEAN	S.D.	%INT.	%NON-INT.
Item 1*	62	3.48	2.11	33.8%	66.2%
Item 2	61	3.97	2.14	54.1	45.9
Item 3	64	3.70	2.01	61.0	39.0
Item 4*	64	5.09	1.78	75.1	24.9
Item 5*	62	3.10	2.08	33.9	66.1
Item 6	62	3.69	2.22	62.9	37.1
Item 7*	63	4.79	1.97	61.3	39.7
Item 8*	57	5.16	1.93	66.6	33.4
Item 9*****	63	2.21	1.53	88.9	11.1
Item 10	62	3.92	2.25	53.2	46.8
Item 11*	58	4.07	1.92	46.6	53.4
Item 12*	56	2.82	1.64	21.4	78.6
Item 13	62	3.94	2.35	56.5	44.5
Item 14*****	64	1.95	0.90	96.9	03.1
Item 15	63	4.49	1.96	42.8	57.2
Item 16	60	3.08	1.67	75.0	25.0
Item 17*	63	3.21	1.94	31.8	68.2
Item 18*	57	3.88	1.68	37.3	52.7
Item 19	62	4.21	2.20	46.7	53.2
Item 20	59	4.80	2.08	35.6	64.4
Item 21*	62	5.84	1.62	87.2	12.8
Item 22*	61	4.46	1.88	63.7	44.3
Item 23*	63	4.56	2.06	63.5	44.5
Item 24	61	3.30	1.97	68.9	31.1
Item 25	58	3.81	2.14	55.2	44.8

* = An agree response indicates a non-international response.
***** = Deleted from the full scale.

A high mean score on the starred items indicate a higher international direction; a high mean score on the non-starred items indicate a non-international direction; the possible range is one to seven.

it does yield.[2] In most of the constructed indices, the items tended to load on the same factor, giving some confidence in our theory that the

individual items were tapping the same attitudinal information. In others, we combined, deleted, and revised our sub-scales according to both theory and structure. However, on each of these sub-scales, several other items not initially included, also loaded on the same factor; in this situation, we decided not to include them on the same dimension. This admittedly arbitrary decision was made where the excluded items did not make any intuitive or theoretical sense; hence, we decided to rely more heavily on theoretical input than on the statistical ordering of the factor loadings.

The two items in the "Strengthen the United Nations" sub-scale did not load very heavily on the same factor. The items do, in fact, represent two different proposals for changing the United Nations: the one calls for increasing the independent authority of the Secretariat and the office of the Secretary-General and the other recommends that the U. N. have the power to impose non-punitive taxes on member states. In our analysis, therefore, we will treat these two items both as a combined index and also as separate proposals.

The second procedure we utilized to judge the scalability of the items involved computing inter-item correlations to determine the degree of consistency between the item responses.[3] Here, we recoded each of the items into an agree-disagree dichotomy and computed bivariate inter-item Tetrachoric R measures of statistical association between the items in each of the sub-scales. R is similar to the statistic "phi" which is equivalent to the difference between the major and minor cross-products, standardized by the square root of the product of the marginals--when the variables are bivariate and normally distributed. The inter-item R's in each of the sub-scales are displayed in the following series of tables; the number in the rows and columns represent the individual

items from the attitude scale as they were numbered. (See the Appendix).

The correlations between the several items are not consistently high, but this may be as much an indication of the respondents' heterogeneous attitude structure as it is our measuring instrument. Indeed, several respondents commented on the difficulty of giving unqualified responses to fixed, close-ended questions. This difficulty

TABLE VI

FIVE SUB-SCALES: INTER-ITEM CORRELATIONS (R)

Diplomacy

	2	11	15	22
2				
11	.38			
15	.31	.61		
22	.01	.44	.52	

Cooperation

	1	5	6
1			
5	.49		
6	.37	.76	

Strengthen-U.N.

	3	20
3		
20	.36	

Constraint

	4	16	18
4			
16	.49		
18	.36	.75	

Share

	24	25
24		
25	.42	

is attributable, in part, to the hypothetical wording of the individual policy statements in the attitude scale. If the items were written in a less general format or if they referred to more specific policy situations, the respondents' ambivalence (and inconsistency) might, in all probability, have been lessened. At any rate, the size of the R's are mostly high enough and certainly in the correct direction to warrant our treating them as constituent elements of the same sub-scales.

With the exception of the data from the attitude scale, most of the remaining data are categorical and ordinal. Therefore, use of

percentages, rankings, means, and frequency counts will be made. For our measures of association, we will calculate gamma coefficients to determine the degree and direction of relationships between the set of variables in our three explanations and measured foreign policy attitudes.

Two important limitations having a direct bearing on the interpretation of our results must be discussed. The first limitation stems from the relatively small sample size; this restricts the kinds of statistical "tests" that can be made on the data. Therefore, we will be more interested in "important" or "substantive" significance than in statistical significance. This problem is compounded by the fact that the total sample was drawn from a single organization, meaning that differences within and across the sample subunits might not be expected to be large. We will rely heavily, then, on judgement in interpreting our results. Were we to have drawn two large samples from more disparate agencies of the Department, say, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or the Peace Corps and one of the geographic bureaus, our expectations about attitude differences between members between them would have to be revised. As in any research of this sort, the sample size, the population(s) chosen, and the objective of the research all have a determining role in interpreting the results.

The second limitation has to do with the program of job rotation within the Foreign Service. Job rotation is a systematic attempt to periodically re-assign participants to new jobs, new responsibilities, and new task settings. Its intended purpose is to generate a more cosmopolitan foreign policy attitude structure among members of the Service, as well as to distribute the talent and experience throughout the Department. It is designed to blunt the assumed effects of task

(sub-group) socialization on the long-run development of foreign policy attitudes and behavior. If effective, rotation would have the effect of reducing attitude variance, since it is designed to broaden task experiences and thereby generate shared foreign policy goals and commitments among participants; we would, then, expect little difference among the participants on each of the sub-scales discussed above. We will be paying closer attention to this problem in a later chapter.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See John Robinson et al., Measures of Political Attitudes (Survey Research Center, Institute of Social Research, Ann Arbor, Mich.: September 1968), p. 17.

[2]See for example, Rudolph Rummel, "Understanding Factor Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 1967, pp. 444-480 and "Some Dimensions in the Foreign Behavior of Nations" in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd. ed., (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 600-621.

[3]Robinson, op. cit., Chapter 1.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATIONAL SUB-UNITS: DESCRIPTION

In the previous Chapter, we selected four Department sub-units for the purpose of measuring and comparing their members' orientations towards specific foreign policy questions. We chose these units with some theoretical reason in mind. We presumed that each sub-unit had peculiar characteristics which, when compared to the others, would reveal some interesting environmental similarities and dissimilarities that could relate to their members' foreign policy attitudes. If the sub-units were identical in every way, there would be little reason for investigating each of them, since only one would suffice. For example, if we were to sample the attitudes of members of one Chapter of the John Birch Society or a Chapter of the World Federalist towards the United Nations, the findings within each group, though important in themselves, would be highly predictable and, hence, not so theoretically revealing. When less homogeneous groups are sampled, the findings derived from their members' attitudes are not only important but also theoretically interesting--though the criterion of "how much variation" to expect might have to be relaxed. The more homogeneous the within-group characteristics, and the more heterogeneous the between-group, the greater should be the expected differences in their members' attitudes. In our study, we want to discover those significant internal sub-unit characteristics which could contribute to attitudinal differences between the participants in what is otherwise a fairly homogeneous unit.

Are there features in each of these four sub-units that can justify our treating them as separate groups? Eugene Litwak,[1] Richard Hall,[2] and others have offered some compelling reasons for studying organizations according to their internal variation and disequalities. Each has noted that both the structures and the functions of many organizations are so diverse that they often operate at cross-purposes with one another. These authors have suggested that a needed point of departure for studying organizations is to focus on internal variation by devising a set of comparable categories by which to compare different segments. This seems to be a reasonable strategy to follow. Therefore, in discussing, describing, and comparing the four organizational sub-units of the Department, we will proffer a set of general categories or attributes that will enable our distinguishing one sub-unit from another.

We do not have to go to the usual lengths of verifying that each of the four units are organizationally separate--their boundaries are both bureaucratically and functionally well-defined. Instead, we will suggest four broad categories. These include both the characteristics attributed to them by their membership and those characteristics attained regardless of their members' perception of them. Thus, both attributed and attained characteristics will constitute the units of comparison.

The set of comparative categories we will utilize include the following: (1) Functional Responsibility. This singles out the prescriptive or assigned task responsibilities of each subunit as well as its on-going diplomatic functions. Equally important, this attribute includes the "target" diplomatic object--a country or an international organization, for example--to which each sub-unit's activities are principally aimed and responsive; (2) Interaction Mode. This attribute

looks at the kinds and amount of inter-personal contacts and sources of information in which members of each sub-unit are engaged in the course of their job. It is concerned with who interacts with whom and what meaning these interactions may have on the formation of attitudes among the members themselves; (3) Structural Features. This attribute is more properly an organizational given and includes such features as number of personnel, operational mode, the degree of bureaucratic rigidity, number of sub-divisions, and others; and (4) Reputation or Status. This refers to the relative standing of each of the sub-units in the eyes of its members This signals each unit's perceived "clout" or relative weight within the Department of State; at minimum a sub-unit's reputation has a bearing on the participants' preferred place to work.

The first and the third categories are self-evident and require no elaboration; the second is crucial and will be treated more extensively in a later Chapter. The last attribute--departmental status--seems out of place with the others but is an integral part of the description of any organization, including the State Department. Intra-department status is important since it is inextricably tied to the internal recruitment and rotation process, and to the quality and distribution of officers throughout the Department. It has been argued in several places that the selective recruitment of individuals into an organization[3] can have a crucial influence on its short-term and long-run composition, style, ideology, and behavior; the same logic of selective recruitment and placement within an organization seems equally compelling, if not more so. Peter and Hull, for example, have constructed a "grand" theory of organizational behavior and discontent based solely on the logic, method, and consequences of internal placement and movement of personnel.[4] Specially skilled or uniquely qualified

officials concentrated in one or a few sub-units of an organization can undoubtedly effect that sub-unit's standing within the whole structure. A highly reputed sub-unit attracts a better pool of people than a lowly rated one; those sub-units enjoying a high positive reputation will derive added benefits by drawing in good, skilled people and thereby reinforce its advantageous position vis-a-vis the remainder of the organization. Speaking of the State Department, George Kennan, who knows the importance of recruitment, forcefully illustrates the point in this comment:

> Let me control the personnel and I will control policy for the parts of the machine that recruits, hires and fires and provides people can soon control the entire shape of the institution and of foreign policy.[5]

Sub-unit reputation is a critical descriptive feature of the State Department because the individual bureaus retain a measurable amount of control over the re-assignment process. The procedures for internal job placement for officers between the Foreign Service ranks of three and seven enable each bureau to negotiate it's personnel needs with the Department's Career Management and Assignment Division (CMA). The process is a long and cumbersome one but it involves continuous interactions between CMA and the various bureaus in the form of information exchanges. CMA actually makes recommendations or "allocations" to each bureau which are then accepted, rejected, or bargained over. CMA's decisions are based upon existing vacancies, the number and qualifications of the officers available for re-assignment, evaluation of the officer's files, previous assignments, and his professional preferences. Placement decisions ultimately are designed to balance out the division of assets among the bureaus but, in the final analysis, the bureaus retain a considerable degree of control over

personnel distribution. Those bureaus which are highly reputed and those which are functionally in the mainstream of foreign policy are more likely to find their personnel requests filled than are those bureaus with less reputation or those thought to be performing less salient foreign policy tasks.

To repeat, we are not testing any of our explanations of attitude formation with these four categories; a larger number of sub-units within and/or across organizations would be required. Instead, we are attempting to isolate some important distinguishing characteristics of each sub-unit for the sake of comparison. Since most of the respondents interviewed in this study have served in numerous task environments in the Department, the descriptions they offer are based on a wide-range of experience. For the most part, the descriptive information for this section was gathered, summarized, and evaluated from the participants' responses to the following open-ended question:

> As far as you know, is there anything about this Bureau (Mission) that is noteworthy in so far as it is different from any other Bureau (Mission) in which you have served or about which you know?

A number of less subjectively derived data were also collected and added to the perceptions of the respondents; these include most of what we referred to above as attained characteristics.

The Bilateral Slice: EUR and USMI

Bureau of European Affairs (EUR). The Bureau of European Affairs is, according to one of its members, "the best bureau, the best managed, the best run, and the best peopled" in the Department. This reputational statement is not a purely existential one for it is shared by virtually every member of the Bureau who responded to the question. This widespread feeling of "espirit de corps" in EUR heightens the sense

of uniqueness or fortune that its members have in their membership. With the exception of the more crises-prone East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau, which has recruited and required talent from all segments of the Department, the personnel in EUR see themselves as the most exceptional, if not the most important, bureau of the Department.[6]

This introspection and self-perception is traceable to a number of diverse factors, not the least of which is the widely known fact that EUR is the oldest geographic bureau of the Department and historically the most prestigious. Whether bureau longevity can influence individual behavior is problematic although Downs has suggested that greater age and prestige tend to make a bureau more stable and less flexible than younger and less prestigious bureaus.[7] When asked about the bureau and how it related to career development and aspirations within the Foreign Service, a typical response was:

> EUR is a good place to serve, a good place to gain good experience, a good place to meet and know the right kind of people, a good springboard into a good future position.

This career perspective was especially prominent among younger foreign service officers and acknowledged as a giyen among the older, more experienced participants.

Each of the above is not an insignificant attribute of EUR nor is each unrelated to the composition of its membership. Because it enjoys a high intra-departmental status rating and because it is a very attractive place to work, recruitment of personnel into EUR is far less difficult and more selective than in other subunits. It is, for example, much easier to recruit highly talented persons into EUR than say, into the Bureau of African Affairs, where there have been fewer persons willing or interested in serving. This larger pool of available manpower permits not only a greater selectivity but also means that

selection can take place among comparatively higher qualified and more motivated personnel. EUR's status, then, must be interpreted as a key asset in its capacity to meet its responsibilities. Perhaps, this is what one member of EUR meant when he described this bureau as possessing "more professional shine" than the other bureaus of the Department. Thus, membership in EUR over time may be more stable than membership in other bureaus, if work attraction and professional interests are considered.

In addition to selectivity and continuity, EUR is unique for another more visible reason--it coordinates the Department's diplomatic affairs with the countries of Europe. This diplomatic target area looms large in the eyes of the U. S. foreign policy participants for the problems and history of Euro-American relations are broad in range, many in number, and complex in kind. More than any other geographic area, the ties between the U. S. and Europe are based on the perception within the Department that the conduct of diplomacy can be carried out on the basis of relative equality and understanding; part of the reason for this shared diplomatic frame of reference is that the pervasive aid-donor or dominant-subordinate relationship that exists between the U. S. and most of the rest of the world does not exist in the same way between the United States and most European countries. While countries in other geographic areas of the globe--and hence other geographic bureaus in the Department--are grappling with the problems of economic development, technical assistance, and the general difficulties of re-distributing global resources, EUR has been concentrating on the development of economic ties, fostering trade relations, reinforcing strategic and defense commitments, and overseeing other problems related to these regional ones. And, since the Soviet Union and most of the remaining

Communist bloc countries fall within the geographical jurisdiction of EUR, the problems that arise in EUR are often the most sensitive, the most encompassing, and the most enduring.

Aside from the substantive problem focus, the kinds of interactions--interpersonal contacts and sources of information--between members of the bureau and their counterparts in European countries are comparatively different from those of other bureaus. That is, the quantity of interactions may not differ from bureau to bureau but in EUR the quality is perceived to be markedly distinct. As several participants put it, official counterparts in European countries are more qualified, better trained in diplomatic interchange, better educated, and better tutored in diplomatic propriety than are official counterparts in most other regions; they also noted that these counterparts with whom they must deal, tend to share many of the same cultural values of the members of the U. S. Foreign Office. One very high-level foreign service officer summarized this by saying:

> It is far easier to deal with people who can keep the record straight and who are on top of their job.

The implication of this statement is clear: those with whom members of EUR must typically interact are perceived to be highly skilled counterparts.

The job of members of EUR is made easier for a second, though presumably less personal, reason. The foreign offices in most of the European countries--whose members are frequently in contact with those of the Department of State--more closely resemble the internal structure and mechanics of the U. S. Department of State than do those of smaller countries with less institutionalized governments. Structural arrangements such as a well-developed system of functional specialization, division

of labor, hierarchy, and standardized rules of behavior render interchange between members of the Department of State and these foreign offices more predictable, if not more reliable; in the same way, the professional career systems in many of the European foreign offices are similar to those of the U. S.--advancement is through achievement not ascription and is built upon years of accumulated professional experience and movement up through the ranks. Although the operational and ideological environments vary from foreign office to foreign office, the degree of co-variation in structure and process between the Department and the corresponding foreign offices in European countries is greater than with Foreign Offices in other geographic areas.[8] If this is a valid generalization, and several participants in EUR strongly suggested it is, then members of this bureau can perform their tasks knowing that officials in other foreign offices share, in many important ways, the same kinds of organizational and career pressures as they. The key point here is that members of EUR regard these characteristics of their principal counterparts and counteragencies in Europe as significant attributes relating to the planning and operational activities of their job.

Finally, EUR ranks among the largest regional bureaus in the Department. Its large size, according to one participant, means that "there are more positions needed, more layering to handle our tasks, and less intimate relationships; EUR is more bureaucratic." The membership of the bureau is equal to about one-third the entire population of all the geographic bureaus and is the largest except for the inflated membership of the East Asian and Pacific Bureau. However, the rate of growth of EUR, relative to the other four geographic bureaus, is slower and this may indicate a growing awareness and concern within the

Department for non-European countries and the flood of new problems arising in them and between them and the U. S. A second possible explanation for this slower rate of personnel growth in EUR is that the process of decolonization has had no large-scale impact on the manpower needs of EUR; if anything, the demise of the European-dominated colonial system and the emergence of new "independent" states eased the burden of EUR which, prior to these simultaneous processes, was responsible for these foreign territories as well. EUR has remained nearly constant over the past decade while regional bureaus jurisdictionally responsible for areas undergoing unprecedented rapid change have had to adjust and revamp their organizational and personnel needs. The major changes that EUR has had to make over the past two and a half decades have been mostly substantive ones relating to economic and security rather than to political affairs. This pattern of change represents an important attribute of this bureau because any adjustments of outlooks or views towards U. S.-European relations have been afforded the luxury of gradualism and incrementalism; it has been spared the demands for rapid reorientation and readjustment characteristic of other geographic and functional bureaus.

United States Mission to Italy (USMI). The United States Embassy in Rome is one of twenty-six Embassies that are directly responsible to EUR in the State Department. The Embassy or Mission functions as the Department's operational field unit linking the U. S. government with the Italian government. In many respects, USMI is a representative European field mission; it has responsibility for coordinating the numerous civilian personnel located throughout the country and for integrating the nearly thirty governmental agencies represented in Italy and at the Mission. And, like thirteen of the other sixteen

Ambassadorships in Western Europe, USMI had a non-career man as Chief-of-Mission. It's diplomatic functions, though varied and numerous, are, for the most part, mostly traditional and routine; it represents the U. S. government to the Italian government, engages in bilateral negotiations when necessary, provides consular services, gathers intelligence, and prepares field reports and memoranda. Like the other bilateral posts in Western Europe, USMI is engaged in the traditional mode of diplomatic interchange--the country-to-country dyadic relationship.

Members of USMI are less concerned with the problems that typically arise from an aid-donor relationship--problems which oftentimes consume and engulf the time and energy of members of other bilateral posts in developing countries and in multilateral posts at international organizations. Instead, they can busy themselves by paying close attention to commercial and business investments, inter-nation trade, and military-strategic affairs. Since the U. S. has had friendly and influential relations with the Italian government in the post-war period, the execution of the Mission's tasks has a long and well-developed method of operation. In-coming officers at the Mission merely plug themselves into its on-going functions, read the files, learn their contacts, and attempt to keep their particular responsibility on an even keel.

The two principal problems handled by members of the Mission--in addition to safeguarding and promoting the commercial and economic interests of the U. S.--are those dealing with strategic-security affairs and those concerning the activities of the Communist Party of Italy (CPI). Italy is a strong partner of the U. S. in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and anchors down the western defenses of

the Mediterranean; strategic considerations which are, in part, coordinated at the Embassy dominate much attention in preserving and promoting the cooperation and compliance of the Italian government. Close attention is also given the CPI for it ranks as the largest indigenous Communist party in Western Europe and its influence within Parliament has been steady, while its chances for increased political power have been increasing over the years. Research and reporting the activities of the CPI, therefore, have been assigned less than casual attention. In addition to these important tasks, the ties between the Vatican and the U. S. constitute a unique and added responsibility. Italian membership in the European Economic Community and other regional organizations, moreover, render it an important cog in the European integration movement--a movement which, if successful, has far-reaching implications for U. S. economic and political influence throughout the world. Each of these functions, then brings USMI into the heart of bilateral diplomatic interchange with officials of the Italian government and society.

In total membership, USMI ranks as the third largest bilateral post in Europe; the total country representation--when personnel in all seven posts in the country are summed--ranks it second in size only to the U. S. Mission in West Germany. USMI, then, is comparatively large by European (and other area) standards. It's large membership is somewhat deceiving, however, in that only about twenty-percent of the personnel at the Embassy are Foreign Service officials; this is the lowest percentage of Foreign Service people in any of the five largest bilateral posts in Europe. The contrast between the large total membership and the small proportion of Foreign Service personnel reflects the pluralistic composition and diverse functions of the

Mission. Approximately thirty U. S. governmental agencies are represented at USMI and this accounts for both the disproportion of non-Foreign Service personnel and the far larger number of non-State Departmental representatives. This, of course, complicates and adds to the problems of administering and coordinating the multi-functional role which the Mission performs. According to several participants, this task pluralism has led to inefficiency of operations and to poor functional coordination and has tended to upset the otherwise well-defined, but informal operational environment of the Mission. In all, there are seven different sections of the Embassy if MAAG, FAO, and USIA are counted; the administrative section of the Embassy is the largest, perhaps because of the Mission's large size and the number of other satellite posts throughout the country.

The small percent of Foreign Service personnel in USMI has promoted the Chief of Mission to rely heavily on them to carry out the important tasks. Thus, many of the key functions are delegated downward from the top and, despite the diversity and number of agencies and career services, the Foreign Service still retains the bulk of the important day-to-day diplomatic operations. The delegation of tasks and the importance of U. S.-Italian relations has led most of the participants at USMI to perceive their "job [to be] very prestigious, secure, well-paying, and intensely competitive." Membership in USMI, like that in EUR is regarded by incumbents as a high status position and a good springboard to a future preferred assignment. In terms of reputation, status, and mode of diplomatic conduct, USMI is a microcosm of EUR; it differs greatly, however, in its smaller size, its more informal structure and mode of operation, its day-to-day task responsibilities, and, of course, its geographical location. Because of the physical and

bureaucratic detachment from the Department, the principal non-collegial contacts and sources of information for members of USMI are with Italian nationals--both with local employees at the Embassy and with official and non-official counterparts in the Italian government, business, journalism, and society. In a later section we will show that members of USMI have more extra-national interactions per person than do members in each of the other three organizational sub-units in the study.

The Multilateral Slice: IO and USUN

Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO). The most drastic difference between IO and the organizational subunits we have already described is the perceptions among members of it's relatively low status and reputation in the Department. One respondent expressed the feelings of his fellow officers like this:

> I would think that in the Department of State we are not one of the most important bureaus. There is no great attraction among Foreign Service Officers for service in IO because it doesn't develop any particular skills except those necessary in IO, but little for elsewhere.

The general feeling that IO is insulated from the mainstream of departmental activity and diplomatic intercourse is pervasive within the bureau and, in some parts, is deep-seated. IO's relative standing and reputation in no way measures up to EUR within the Department nor does it provide the variety of attractions or the independence of behavior that serving in the field ordinarily offers. Rather, membership in IO seems to combine the worst of two occupational worlds: individual participants must operate in the stricter and more closed environment of the Department and at the same time must adjust to the realization that multilateral diplomacy--as it has been and is practiced--is not the main business of the Department. These perceptions are enveloped and deepened

by their awareness that the functional tasks which members perform do not enjoy a high priority among those instrumental in directing the conduct of U. S. foreign policy. The impact that these perceptions of IO have on career and career development is apparent from the many responses to this point; one participant volunteered that "IO is simply not a good place to move from when it comes to promotion." Thus, the professional rewards and internal goals that a member might derive from service in IO are perceived to be far short of those expressed by members holding positions in other subunits such as in EUR or, perhaps, USMI.

Once again, the relation between subunit reputation and recruitment is not unimportant. The range of choice for recruiting new personnel into IO is considerably less than that of more prestigious sub-units since demands/requests for IO positions are not equal to the supply. IO, then, for many members who have served in it, is seen as a way-station, a temporary hitch to endure before moving onto another assignment. For others, the so-called "IO-types," service in this bureau has been a worthwhile and productive career experience and they have spent major portions of their career working in it. Nonetheless, both attractors and detractors are sensitive to its isolated role within the Department and the Foreign Service. In addition, there are a far larger number of Civil Service (GS) and Foreign Service Reserve Officers (FSR) in IO than in, say EUR; one reason for this is that IO has tended to retain former Civil Servants "wristonized" in the mid-1950's and to attract specialists and academics who have had an interest in uniting theory and practice with respect to international organizations, cross-national cooperation, and international law.

Operationally, IO is both a geographic and a functional bureau.

It is considered by some members as a "regional bureau for the world" since its operational purview, through U. S. membership in numerous international organizations, is global in scope. Others described the bureau in strict non-geographic terms and pointed out that it has no client states as do geographic bureaus, but directs its activities toward international rather than regional concerns. This operationally "schizophrenic" image of IO led one member to describe it as "the most unpopular bureau in the Department because we get involved in things that others think we ought to stay out of." This perception that IO meddles in and overlaps with other sub-units' affairs is, undoubtedly, a consequence of the kinds of problems with which it deals--inter-governmental, cross-regional, and, within the Department itself, inter-bureau. One participant concluded that, because of the ambiguous and fuzzy task requirements placed upon members of IO, it is "no wonder that our opinions and views are broader, hazier, and less focused" than others dealing with more specific and more clearly defined issues. In IO, then, generalists who can adapt to changing situations and can move from job to job and make use of multiple skills are a greater resource than are specialists who are trained to handle more limited tasks. Not only must members of IO adjust to a kind of second class organizational and functional status in the Department, but they also must be able to adapt themselves to the fluid needs of the bureau; thus, flexibility is perceived to be more important in getting the bureau's work done than is expertise.

Important distinguishing characteristics of IO are the target groups and individual counterparts towards whom its principal activities are aimed. The main groups and individuals are typically national delegations and individual representatives who comprise the membership

of a large number of intergovernmental organizations. IO's contact with delegates within these organizations, however, is done indirectly through established multilateral field missions and individual participants assigned to them to monitor, report, and represent the U. S. government. Thus, members of IO, like those in EUR, do not usually or directly interact with counterparts in other states nor are they typically dependent upon them for information to assist them in performing their job. Most of this "contact work" is done in the field by members of specially constituted delegations and/or by members of permanent missions. One important difference does exist, however; members of EUR regularly seek information from local embassies and missions represented in Washington or New York while members in IO do so far less frequently.

When asked about their counterparts in intergovernmental organizations, many members of IO commented that they generally lacked a full appreciation of the complexities of international problem-solving, did not have the necessary technical, administrative, and diplomatic skills and were inadequately equipped to handle the detailed and specialized skills needed in the conduct of diplomatic interchange. The perceived "equality" between members of EUR and their European counterparts has no equivalence among members of IO with respect to their counterparts in intergovernmental organizations; the "intellectual" and "social distances," to use Quincy Wright's illuminating terms,[10] are far greater between the latter than between the former. The reasons for this are many, but they include most importantly the practical problems of wrestling with plural-membership organizations which are perceived to obstruct more than resolve international problems.

The substantive focus of IO is largely economic and administrative. This is clearly reflected in the excessive amount of time spent on

constructing and bargaining over the budgetary contributions of the U. S. to various intergovernmental organizations. Despite the fact that IO employs only about three percent of the Department's employees, it consumes, through budget appropriations, approximately one-third of the Department's entire budget; most of this money goes to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. Truly, IO should be and can be best measured by its administration of dollars, not by its political decision-making. When political matters arise, IO acts as a middleman between the interested groups within the government, often performing the final role of passing on instructions to the U. S. Mission at the United Nations. As one member put it: "There is nothing like a political crisis in IO, although we discuss vital political and security matters that are on-going here and at the U. N." More often, the crises are financial or administrative--over budget allocations, committee compositions, or organizational reforms at the U. N., for example. IO, then, is more properly conceived as a funnel through which U. S. policy moves; it is the action and coordinative component of the Department of State as far as international organizations are concerned.

Finally, the structure of IO is largely determined by its main preoccupation--the preparation, negotiation, and administration of the budget. Far smaller than each of the regional bureaus, it has responsibility for coordinating seven multilateral missions, four Congressional Group Missions and an estimated 430 international conferences per annum; it also supervises the U. S. contribution to more than thirty different intergovernmental organizations. Among other things, this functional diversity has contributed to considerable structural fragmentation; a floor plan of the Department, for example, would show that IO is located in numerous non-contiguous locations, adding, no doubt, an additional

element of fragmentation to this bureau. Much of the remaining structure and activity of IO, aside from political and economic matters, is devoted to the administration and recruitment of personnel for various international and regional conferences. Thus, members of IO spend a large part of their time on intra-bureau and intra-departmental matters and over forty percent of the personnel and half of its six subdivisions are directly invested with these responsibilities. Even though the scope and range of IO's activities are broad, much of their tasks tend to be handled within the bureau or in combination with other sub-units of the Department.

United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN). This multilateral field mission is one of seven that is supervised by IO; it is the largest, the most visible, and undoubtedly, the most well-known of the seven. Among field missions in general, USUN is an anomaly; it has on its staff five resident Ambassadors--the only mission to do so--with the Chief of Mission who has been a formal, if infrequent, participant in the President's Cabinet. Moreover, USUN virtually has an entire Departmental bureau (IO) devoted to it since it is the principal multilateral field mission of the U. S. And, since USUN is the only mission that is located in the U. S., its proximity to Washington means that its operations are closely linked with the Department, to say nothing of the local press, various non-governmental organizations, and public opinion with which it must continuosly deal.

Members of the Mission regard employment at USUN with mixed feelings. On the one hand, several participants viewed their membership as an attractive assignment primarily because the work setting was more informal and open and the work more challenging than other settings in the Department; they also felt that the Mission enjoyed a greater degree

of independence in its policy role than did most other field posts. On the other hand, some members lamented that the skills required in multilateral diplomacy in general and at the U. N. in particular were not readily transferable to other assignments within the Foreign Service. Others who expressed dissatisfaction with USUN cited such nuts-and-bolts dislikes as the financial, transportation and physical problems of New York City as well as the fact that service there does not provide the same attractive benefits and allowances that service in a foreign bilateral post does. One of the striking features of the Foreign Service and the Department of State is that there is no international organization specialty, no separate training for members entering work in various international organizations. Even though U. S. membership in intergovernmental organizations has grown rapidly over the past two decades and even though the salience of such organizations has increased as newly independent states joined them, there has been no commensurate effort to professionally equip U. S. foreign affairs personnel for service in this area. Service in USUN and in other multilateral posts is often looked upon as a transient experience, a short-term assignment that must be endured before moving on to a preferred geographic position.

Many of the members of USUN, then, expressed misgivings about the value their service there might have on their future career development. This perception contrasts to those of members of other, typically smaller, missions to the U. N. For many of these officials, an assignment at their country's U. N. Mission is viewed as a prerequisite for advancement through the ranks or as an opportunity for a good next assignment.[11] The broad range of contacts, the legislative experience that is acquired, the diplomatic skills learned, and the public

visibility that is attained are frequently seen as career prizes by these delegates--though apparently not by members of USUN. In sum, USUN is perceived to be a good position but mostly for its non-career and/or task-related characteristics; employment there is perceived a hindrance in terms of career and job development.

USUN has, according to several participants, little of the hierarchial rigidity of the Department and little of the functional specificity of a bilateral field mission. The eight sub-divisions in USUN are similar to those of bilateral missions although their functions are broader and less well-defined. USUN is more loosely structured and operationally more flexible because its various sections are fairly independent of each other; therefore, there is less perceived cross-section rivalry and working at cross-purposes in USUN than in bilateral missions. One member stated it this way:

> The atmosphere is more free-wheeling here, there is less the layering and less the clearance problem at USUN than at State and at most field Missions.

Job specifications and role prescriptions are, then, less well-articulated and less fixed; spontaneity and innovation are highly valued assets in problem solving and there seems to be less concern or need for performing routine tasks such as drafting field reports to the Department.

Since the size of USUN is comparatively small, its members must be able and willing to adapt themselves to the full spectrum of tasks that arise at the Mission. This task requirement has been magnified over the past decade as the size of USUN has lagged behind the rate of growth of the U. N. Members of USUN, therefore, must wear several functional hats if the needs of the Mission are to be met.

The most idiosyncratic attribute of USUN is its distinctively

multilateral role in the conduct of U. S. foreign policy. Counterparts of USUN members at the U. N. are more numerous, more diverse in their interests and backgrounds, and potentially more troublesome in their roles as co-equals than are the counterparts of the other subunits we have described. Of the four sub-units, only members of USUN hold a joint membership and regularly interact with their principal counterparts; that is, they have a shared functional and structural interest and framework with one another. Joint membership not only suggests greater physical proximity among different nationals, it also suggests that interaction between them is more likely to occur and to occur more frequently. It is these factors--common functional interests, shared structural frame, close proximity, and increased opportunity for interaction--that have been singled out as crucial factors in reducing cross-national differences and in promoting cross-national cooperation and integration.

The inter-personal contacts of members at USUN show a bimodal pattern: the one mode represents contacts with international civil servants in the U. N. Secretariat and with counterparts in other missions in New York, the other shows contacts with members of the Department, especially members of IO. In terms of policy participation, this means that USUN has one foot in New York and another in Washington; nonetheless, it seems that most of the organizational or policy battles are waged in the Department and not among members of the Mission. USUN members indicated that their policy roles tend to fall somewhere between the extremes of taking "marching orders" from Washington and the equally unlikely description that the Mission is another State Department.[12]

Members of USUN are more frequently in direct person-to-person contact with members of other national delegations at the United Nations

than are members of IO. This has resulted in some role dilemmas for USUN members that are not present in IO. Given the sweeping changes in the U. N. and the international system in general, the role of USUN has become more ambiguous and more ambivalent. Members are still called upon to play "top sponsor" in a period of diminishing superordination while at the same time are asked to play down an obviously reduced interest in the U. N. Members of IO need not directly face this ambiguity. A telling comment from a member of IO expressed the difference between task roles in these two sub-units:

> We [in IO] have a more practical view than the people in USUN because we do not have to confront our counterparts directly as they do and because we are more constrained by the budget and by Congress than they are.

The special relationship that is presumed to exist between IO and USUN is often marred by the significantly conflicting pulls and tugs of varying demands on their respective memberships. Whereas the former are more Department-oriented, members of the USUN tend to be both inwardly- and outwardly-directed.

INTERACTIONS: CONTACTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Earlier in this chapter, we singled out interactional mode as an important attribute that might have some relation to a sub-unit's orientation to foreign policy; similarly, interactions could tell us something about the influence process contributing to an individual member's foreign policy preferences. By interaction mode, we mean the cumulative sum of individual interpersonal contacts and sources of information which are encountered and relied upon in the course of handling the routine tasks of a particular job. When aggregated and summed by subunit, contacts and information source can provide a useful "interaction profile" for comparative purposes. Subsequently, we will

look at the relationship between individual interactions and attitudes towards selected foreign policy questions. Here, we are interested in comparing and contrasting the average interaction scores for each sub-unit.

Each respondent was asked to rank-order the most frequent interpersonal contacts and the most frequent sources of information he experienced on his job. The first two responses for each type of interaction were coded and weighted equally. In both cases, the code categories were scaled such that a lower numerical value would indicate a contact or an information source which was organizationally immediate or internal to the participant's task setting; that is, it could have occurred within the task sub-unit of the individual or with members of other agencies interested in the same substantive policy area. Higher valued numerical codes indicated a more expansive and less immediate interaction category; these would include interactions with non-governmental members of the press or academia or with counterparts in other governments, governmental delegations or institutions. In addition, two coding schemes were used, the one a routine ordinal scale without weights, the other, a weighted scale which assigned greater value to non-governmental and extra-national interactions. In either case, the higher a sub-unit's mean score (computed by summing all interactions per sub-unit and dividing this figure by the number of participants responding) the less dependent are its members on more closely regulated contacts and information in the Department or within the U. S. government; it would indicate a "less restricted" interaction profile. Conversely, a lower average interaction score suggests that members are more dependent upon or exposed to contacts and information within the Department or among governmental agencies; it would indicate

a "more restricted" interaction profile for a sub-unit. Table VII compares and ranks each subunit for each type of interaction.

TABLE VII

INTERACTIONS: MEAN SCORE AND RANK* FOR EACH SUBUNIT

	CONTACTS		INFORMATION**	
	UNWEIGHTED	WEIGHTED	UNWEIGHTED	WEIGHTED
EUR	2.00 (3)	2.64 (3)	2.80 (3)	3.11 (3)
USMI	3.00 (1)	4.82 (1)	3.34 (2)	4.31 (2)
IO	1.79 (4)	2.14 (4)	2.75 (4)	3.06 (4)
USUN	2.68 (2)	4.18 (2)	3.40 (1)	4.47 (1)

*Ranks are indicated by the numbers within the parentheses.
**The mean scores for information are consistently higher because there are five code categories; there are only four categories for contacts.

Both types of interactions have a similar pattern across the four sub-units, even after non-governmental and extra-national interactions are weighted more heavily. With the exception of the exchange of position between USUN and USMI, the sub-units are ranked identically. It is not surprising that the two field missions have a more diverse and less restricted interaction profile than the two departmental bureaus; this is consistent with the major tasks of a field assignment--reporting, intelligence-gathering, and representation. It is very surprising, however, that when we combine the individual scores for the two bilateral sub-units and for the two multilateral sub-units, we find higher mean scores for the former--although those for information are quite similar. Given the functional responsibilities of both IO and USUN, we would have expected the opposite. This finding is largely determined by the comparatively low interaction scores for IO, which,

for both contacts and information, negated the otherwise high mean scores for USUN. Once again, this points out the comparatively insular position of IO within the department and the comparatively cosmopolitan position of USUN in the field. In organizational boundary terms, Table VII strongly suggests that field missions tend to be far more "permeable" than departmental bureaus, with USMI and USUN the most "permeable," and IO the least.

We tabulated only the frequency of certain kinds of interactions and did not give attention to the content or the medium through which they occurred. However, Gary Best's findings about the pattern of contacts and information exchange among national delegates at the United Nations and among members of bilateral posts in national capitals can assist us.[13] Among other findings, his interviews with seventy-eight national delegates to the United Nations show the following clear-cut differences: 86% of the delegates felt they had more extra-national contacts at the U. N. than at bilateral posts; that the contacts were more personal (82%); less formal (82%); and that they occurred more frequently without regard to rank or status (83%). Best also found that 76% of the sample respondents felt it was easier to exchange information at the U. N., including "off the record" information, while another 76% said that the U. N. milieu was a more fertile setting for the interchange of information than those of bilateral posts. The data from our interviews show that members of one bilateral post, USMI, experienced more varied contacts and with the exception of USUN, more diverse sources of information than did members of the other sub-units. This contrary finding can be cleared away easily; interactions at USMI, though more varied and more frequently cross-national, were, nonetheless, largely confined to individuals and officials of one country. Interactions at USUN--as Best's figures clearly show--were not only

cross-national in kind but, perhaps more importantly, involved a larger number of delegates from a variety of national delegations representing different countries--something our interaction data only indirectly reveal. Thus, our data do not show this qualitative aspect of the quantitative difference between the number and variety of extra-national contacts for members of USMI and USUN.

At any rate, the mean scores and ranks in Table VII add an additional dimension and shed some more light on the interaction attribute which we feel is important in comparing the different task environments of the four sub-units. In a later Chapter, we will look more closely at the relation between contacts and sources of information (interactions) and the foreign policy preferences of individual foreign policy participants.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Eugene Litwak, "Models of Organization Which Permit Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, 67, (1961), pp. 177-184.

[2]Richard Hall, "Intraorganizational Structural Variation: Applications of the Bureaucratic Model," Administrative Science Quarterly, 7:3, (December 1962), pp. 295-308.

[3]The literature is rich in examples, but see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Galaxy Books, Oxford University Press, 1959); Karl Deutsch et al., France, Germany and the Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1967). Most of the research utilizing some form of survey or interview data generally focus on selective recruitment or recruitment practices of organizations or groups.

[4]Laurence Peter and Raymond Hull, The Peter Principle (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1969).

[5]Cited in John F. Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 140.

[6]One Foreign Service Officer handling placement within EUR remarked that "Vietnam has served to kill the Foreign Service. It changed personnel strategies around because we had to train so many for service in Viet Nam. We have to defend our policy there, you know." Whether this temporary "mal-distribution" of talent will permanently effect the Foreign Service is difficult to say; it undoubtedly has had a short-term effect.

[7]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), pp. 18-22.

[8]See, for examples, Henry Kissenger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), 2nd. ed., pp. 261-275, and Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: The Viking Press, 1965).

[9]This holding action was labelled by James Thompson this way: "At State, the average 'desk officer' inherits from his predecessor our policy toward Country X; he regards it as his function to keep that policy intact--under glass, untampered with, and dusted--so that he may pass it on in two to four years to his successor. And such curatorial service generally merits promotion within the system." This, Thompson called the "curator mentality" in the Department, "How Could Vietnam Happen?," Atlantic, April 1968, p. 50.

[10]Quincy Wright, A Study of War, abridged edition, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), Chapter 19.

[11]See John Cates, "Repeat to USUN for Info," Foreign Service Journal, 45, October 1968, pp. 36-39, 45; and Richard Pederson, "National Representation in the United Nations," International Organization, 15, 1961, pp. 256-266.

[12]See Arnold Biechman, The "Other" State Department (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968).

[13]Gary L. Best, "Diplomacy in the United Nations," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1960).

CHAPTER VI

RESULTS: FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES

In the previous Chapter, we described several attributed and achieved characteristics of the four Departmental sub-units in order to validate our contention that the Department of State is not a structural and functional monolith. More importantly, this description will enable us to explore the relationship between the different task environments and the foreign policy attitudes of their respective memberships. In this Chapter, we will begin focusing on the foreign policy orientations of participants by presenting some general descriptive findings applicable to the sample as a whole. In the following Chapter, we will augment this discussion by presenting and analyzing additional data that are more directly concerned with specific foreign policy attitudes.

This Chapter, then, reports on two general dimensions of our sample's overall attitude structure; they include both individual self-perspectives and policy-perspectives, and together form what we call foreign policy perspectives. Self-perspective refers to each officer's self-perceived view of his progress, growth, and role as a policy participant, and policy perspective refers to each member's evaluation of U. S. foreign policy as it has been conducted in the recent past. We define a foreign policy perspective as the accumulated set of ideas and actions a participant learns, acquires, and utilizes as a guide in coping with the routine and non-routine tasks of his foreign policy job.[1] A perspective can provide an underlying rationale for behavior by

enabling each member to define, however tentatively, a frame of reference within which he operates on a daily basis. Thus, a participant may learn that steady career progress is best assured by "keeping one's head low" or by "rolling with the punches;" if interested in promotion, he would likely behave in ways that would increase his chances of career mobility. Or, a participant may find himself at odds with his colleagues over specific policy proposals; if so, he might retain his personal views, attempt to sway others to his position, or accommodate himself to the views of his co-workers. Some perspectives are stable and resistent to change regardless of the fund of experiences a participant encounters; others are likely to undergo frequent, if not continuous, change. It is our contention that perspectives are traceable, in part, to job experiences and that the process of learning and accepting a foreign policy perspective can not be separated from membership in the Foreign Service and participation in the Department of State.

To repeat, a member's self-perspective refers to those self-expressed views towards foreign policy and the foreign policy process that are regarded important because they relate to his evolving role as a foreign policy participant. A member's policy perspective, on the other hand, refers to his affective orientation to actual U. S. foreign policy conducted since World War II. Together, these two views form only a part--albeit a salient part--of a member's foreign policy perspective.

Designed to tap some dimension of learning on the job, these two dimensions refer to an element of "change" in a member's foreign policy perspective; neither, however, empirically measures attitude change as such. Since we collected no time-series data on individual preferences or views, we have no objective measure of attitude shifts over time.

However, we did attempt to generate "change" data despite the fact that our data-collection took place at a single point in time. To measure changes in self-perspectives, we asked each member to judge whether his foreign policy outlook had undergone any significant revisions since he first entered the Foreign Service. In asking this question, we were attempting to gauge each member's self-perceived change or growth during the span of his service. Our primary concern was the direction and the content of self-expressed change rather than the frequency, the functions, or the correlates of it.

In measuring policy-perspectives, we devised a more complicated coding process; this involved fitting each member's positive and negative evaluations of U. S. foreign policy into known temporal frames. For example, if a participant responded that he disliked the initial decision to begin strategic bombing of North Viet Nam, the coded equivalent time period would be (early) 1965. If a respondent cited for approval all the policies of the Truman administration, the matched code would be the period between 1945 and 1951. When coding responses like these into equivalent time periods is done for each participant, a rough chronological profile of positive and negative responses can be constructed for the full sample. Such a profile may show that most members share fundamentally similar standards of policy evaluation; moreover, these standards can be important for they may be used by participants in judging present policies. Thus, by inference we may also determine what policies and which periods tend to act as positive and negative referents in the foreign policy perspectives of members in this study--and, perhaps, of members of the Department as a whole.

Self-Perspectives

An incoming Foreign Service Officer enters the Foreign Service with certain prior expectations and anticipations about himself, about the Foreign Service, the Department of State, and about the world and the parts of it with which he may be called upon to deal. Each officer's expectations, presumably, differ from the next and once membership is attained and assured, each encounters a variety of learning experiences that may either reinforce earlier expectations or lead to their adjustment. This learning and adjustment process may continue throughout a member's association with the Foreign Service, since he may face repeated situations which call into question or run counter to some of his antecedent expectations--most of which were acquired "second hand," that is, through means other than direct participation. These prior views about the foreign policy process may not necessarily correspond to those learned while actively engaged in it; similarly, earlier expectations about career development may not correspond to actual career progress. In each case, a participant can stubbornly cling to past impressions or adjust his prior outlook(s) to those experiences he encounters "first hand."

These experiences, then, can play an important part in moving a member to adapt or adjust his previously "untested" or second hand assumptions about policy and the policy process. What probably happens is that most members are neither able nor willing to abandon or retain all their pre-conceived expectations; nor are they capable of altering the organizational environment which may clash with them. Out of this dissonant situation, new expectations may develop and collide with the old and result in a revised perspective towards one's job, foreign policy, the international system, and so on. We anticipated these

changes among Foreign Service personnel because such "expectation discrepencies" seem to be pervasive in most organizations and are not limited to any one profession or occupation. Studies of medical students,[2] state legislators,[3] Peace Corps volunteers, and college students[4] all tend to confirm this general tendency among diverse organizational populations.

In our study, we wanted to know whether similar processes occurred within the Foreign Service, among its members. Therefore, each participant was asked the following question:

> Can you say that your general views towards foreign policy have changed in any way since you first came into the Foreign Service? (If so, can you articulate them?)

Seventy-one percent (71%) of those who responded (n=73), indicated that their views or perspectives towards foreign policy had changed--one way or another--during their years in the service; the remaining twenty-nine percent (29%) indicated that their views had remained at least relatively stable.

Those who responded affirmatively to this question were then asked to specify or recount the "content" of their self-perceived change. The responses were grouped into the four inclusive categories listed in Table VIII.

"Personal development" refers to those responses which included maturity, the acquisition of new technical or language knowhow, and other personal skills that participants singled out as significant personal changes. The code category "policy content" indicates those acknowledged changes referring to a policy or policy trend that marked a major shift in the self perspective of a participant. Nearly half of the respondents (48%) remarked that the most discernible shift they had undergone over the year was their difficulty in adjusting to the

hazards of innovation in the established policy process. Some members linked their difficulties to "the complicated and inefficient means by which bureaucratic decision-making is handled." Many in this group pointed out that they had learned more facts, acquired additional information, and gained much practical experience in working through channels and, had thereby, learned to "live with" the obstacles to

TABLE VIII

CATEGORIES OF SELF-PERCEIVED CHANGE

Type of Change	Percentage
Process; Operations	48%
Foreign Policy Options	38%
Personal Development	10%
Policy Content	4%
(n=52) Total	100%

making and executing creative policy. In many cases, these respondents expressed a growing tolerance for these impediments and an increased resignation about their role and about the limited range of policy behaviors open to them. These participants remarked that the institutional structures and processes within which they had to operate jarred them from their rather simplified image of the policy process, made creativity more difficult, and forced them to adopt a revised perspective of what was possible. These members, in short, did not regard themselves as very efficacious.

The code category "Foreign Policy Options" in Table VIII is a summation of four separate sub-categories of acknowledged changes: (1) more realistic; (2) more idealistic; (3) more optimistic; and (4) more pessimistic. Each of these descriptive categories refer to a change in

a member's perception of what he could accomplish and what he perceives can be done within the Foreign Service. The modal response for this category--and for the question as a whole (31%)--was the feeling that members had become progressively "more realistic" in their normative outlook towards foreign policy. That is, thirty-one percent of those participants who perceived a self-change noted that their perspective on foreign policy had become more pragmatic, less incautious, and increasingly tolerant of the needs for compromise or accomodationist solutions to foreign policy problems. A typical response of a mid-career officer exemplifies this attitude quite well:

> I've gotten a realistic appreciation of what is possible as opposed to what is ideal by learning the workings of foreign policy and by learning that it is difficult for one person to influence policy--here and abroad.

Stated differently, this respondent is more ready now than at the time of his entry into the Foreign Service to accept and, perhaps, justify the limits and constraints on what he and others could do and accomplish. The fact that this modal response showed few differences across age groups or ranks suggests that this portion of the members' self perspectives is learned early and retained throughout the career. Very few respondents indicated that their foreign policy outlook had become more optimistic (3%; n=3), more idealistic (1%; n=1), or more pessimistic (2%; n=2) about their role in policy making. These overall distributions strongly suggest that, for many participants, the idealism and enthusiasm they <u>may</u> have carried with them into the Foreign Service may have dissipated with their continued involvement in the policy process.

Clearly, there is a resemblance between the self-perceived changes in a member's outlook towards what he feels is possible and his

changing views towards what he thinks can be done. Several participants, indeed, linked the two together; for example:

> I was a bit more idealistic but have become more realistic. Certain things I would like to see done I now realize I can not do and can not be done or it takes pains or time to do, either because of bureaucracy or the myriad of elements involved in every situation.

This respondent has moved towards what he terms a "more realistic" perspective in order to bring into line the discrepencies between his past and present expectations. This includes an alignment of his role in contributing to policy outputs and his adjustment to the structure and mechanics of the policy process itself. Accepting what amounts to a professional self-image, then, seems to involve, for many participants, an assimilation of new ideas and behaviors that enable adjustment to a variety of occupational circumstances which collide with prior expectations about career service.

If by foreign policy perspective we mean both the ideas and the behavior which constitute it, then we mean that one is linked with the other. That is, changing ideas about one's role in the policy process or about bureaucratic operations in general can effect a change in one's behavior as well; similarly, learned behavior can effect changes in cognitive content through a reverse process. From our discussion of the changes in self-images, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that many participants have revised their expectations downward in order to cope with actual working conditions in the Foreign Service as they have experienced them. It also seems plausible to conclude that this adjustment process has led many members to more willingly accept the established cultural patterns of behavior and historical standards of the Department and the Foreign Service, and thereby to strengthen and reinforce them--at a time when numerous analysts inside and outside

the Department have urged a major overhaul.[5]

Policy Perspectives

In this section, we will attempt to identify those periods and target areas of post-war U. S. foreign policy to which members are positively or negatively oriented. That is, we wanted to know each participant's evaluation of the "successes" and "failures" of U. S. foreign policies since World War II. In so doing, we collected additional affect data regarding individual preferences and non-preferences for U. S. policies towards different geographical areas and towards different types of political-economic systems. In other words, these data reflect the temporal (what period; which years), the spatial (what regions; which areas), and the developmental (developed or developing political systems) policy preferences of the members of our sample. Each response indicates not only the historical but also the cognitive and affective framework and policy referent to which members look for cues in assessing their evolving policy preferences. To "get at" these evaluations, we asked each respondent the following open-ended questions:

> Is there any policy, program, or disposition taken by the United States since the end of World War II that pleases you very much or with which you agree very much?
>
> Is there any policy, program, or disposition taken by the United States since the end of World War II that displeases you very much or with which you disagree very much?

These two questions, particularly the second, evoked more discomfort and hesitation from the respondents than any other question in the entire interview schedule. Whatever the reasons for the discomfort and subsequent equivocation, it is very noteworthy that over twenty percent of those sampled could not cite a single "policy,

program, or disposition" taken by the U. S. during the past twenty-five years with which they disagreed strongly enough to mention; about twenty-five percent could register only one example with which they disagreed, and several of these were appended with qualifiers. On the contrary, all the respondents could recall at least one "policy, program, or disposition" taken by the U. S. which he or she approved; there were no participants who could not offer at least one example for the approval half of the question.

This response scenerio was quite startling in as much as Foreign Service Officers are supposed to be fully abreast of the history of U. S. foreign policy and to be continuously evaluating contemporary policies in the light of past policies. The apparent explanation--if there is a single explanation--for this curious response reaction possibly lies in the nature of the Department and the Foreign Service as a social and career system, rather than in the individual participants themselves. It is quite probable that members of most large public institutions, when asked questions similar to these, would equivocate, hedge, or be reluctant to "criticize" their parent organization. Indeed, Chris Argyris' well-known study of effectiveness in the Department of State also found similar patterns of behavior among Foreign Service Officers whom he observed in close interpersonal situations.[6] He, too, speculated that the tendency on the part of most participants to withdraw from hostility and to avoid openness amongst themselves was probably attributable to macro-organizational factors rather than to the individuals themselves.

Some of the more noticeable responses to these questions include the following sample:

I can't think of anything to comment upon. We haven't got very much

to be ashamed of.

Our foreign policy has been for the most part good; it is the execution of it that is wanting at times.

There were even more evasive responses such as the following:

Hindsight is twenty-twenty. It's pointless for me to deal with this. The full record isn't available so who can be sure why we did what we did, when we did it; the archives aren't open yet.

I'll stay away from this one.

These direct quotations are not necessarily reflective of all the respondents, for several eagerly welcomed an opportunity to recite their own interpretation of the past failures and successes of U. S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, the pattern does point out the uncertainty many participants had in answering these complementary questions. Whether or not a similar hesitancy is translated into the work pattern of these participants is hard to determine but we do suspect that this single sociological datum is of more than casual importance.

The three histograms that are displayed below show the frequency distributions for the aggregated preferences (positive affect) and the non-preferences (negative affect) of members on each of the temporal, geographical, and developmental policy dimensions. In each Figure, there is an unmistakably clear unimodality which shows a relatively high degree of consistency and agreement among the sampled participants.[7]

Temporal Evaluations. The two-sided histogram in Figure 2 represents the aggregated distribution of individual preferences (approval) and non-preferences (disapproval) grouped into eight equal time intervals from the end of World War II to the present. As indicated earlier, we first recoded the participants' responses to the two policy perspective questions and then fitted them into coincident three year time periods. By transforming the responses to temporal

codes, we intended to identify those periods of U. S. foreign policy which cognitively and affectively represent to the participants the ways foreign policies should and should not be conducted. Present preferences and non-preferences about past policies and behavior, in other words, may offer good--if imprecise--indicators of preferences and non-preferences about present policies and behavior.




Figure 2:--Temporal Evaluations: Percent distribution of positive (n=91) and negative (n=56) responses.

An interpretation of the univariate distribution in Figure 2 leaves little doubt that members overwhelmingly approve of U. S. foreign policy as it was conducted during the immediate post-war period, particularly in the years between 1947 and 1949. Over eighty percent of all approval responses referred to policies which originated during the middle years of the Truman administration. Termed by Gabriel Almond the "utopian romantic" and the "imaginative" stages of American foreign policy,[8] this period unmistakably dominates the overall distribution of approval scores. On this point, at least, scholars and practitioners

seem to be agreed: Almond and Hans Morgenthau,[9] for example, have each characterized this period as that which spawned the intellectual genius from which grew all the major ideas of post-war U. S. foreign policy. It was during this time that the cornerstone of most post-war policy thinking was laid: the United States began to see its national interests inextricably linked to wide-ranging commitments abroad and pursued them under such descriptor labels as containment, foreign assistance, military security alliances, and interventionism. From our data, then, it is possible to conclude that the principal positive policy referents, for these respondents, are those which were designed over twenty years ago.

The disapproval responses, on the other hand, show a different temporal pattern. Slightly over half of all these responses (reduced n=56) mentioned policies conducted between 1964 and 1966. The policies most frequently cited dealt with U. S. military intervention abroad, particularly those decisions relating to the rapid build-up phase (massive troop commitments, strategic bombing of North Viet Nam) of U. S. involvement in Indochina. If the preceding three year period is added to 1964-1966, then about three out of every four negative affect responses referred to decisions made during the first six years of the 1960's. Except for the three year period in the mid-fifties, the bulk of the negative responses are temporally more proximate. Indeed, the foreign policies of the U. S. during the 1950's did not appear to evoke feeling of affect one way or another among these participants; this decade, then, for the most part, has little affective importance to our sample.

Both the approval and the disapproval frequencies have a clear unimodal pattern. One generalization seems in order: the more recent

the empirical or referent policy decision, the more the participants were unable to evaluate it positively; the more distant--at least for the period between 1947 and 1949--the referent policies, the more they were ready to evaluate them positively. A rounded discussion of the meaning of this dimension will follow our description of the geographic and developmental policy dimensions.

Geographic Evaluations. The approval and disapproval frequencies of affective responses towards U. S. policies implemented in varying geographic areas of the global system over the past quarter century are pictured in Figure 3. The responses are grouped into eight




Figure 3:--Geographic Evaluations: Percent distribution of positive (n=105) and negative (n=91) responses.

categories, seven representing distinct geographical regions and an eighth representing international organizations. The approval scores

are, predictably, concentrated in one target area--Western Europe. This modal regional response set, when coupled with the pattern of temporal evaluations, strongly reaffirm the strength of the overall positive affect for the policies pursued towards Western Europe during the early stages of the "cold war." The involvement of the U. S. during this period was both extensive and intensive in and across several European countries; experimentation and imagination in policy planning and execution were combined to generate a host of creative new policies and programs aiming at economic recovery and political viability in this target region. Indeed, the degree of consistency among the positive responses is quite strong; four out of every five participants agreed in their favoring U. S. relations with the European target area.

The negative or disapproval responses, however, mostly refer to two non-European, non-Western target regions: South East Asia and South America. While there is a concern for U. S. policies towards non-European countries in general, the most frequently cited policy area was the very visible U. S. involvement in Viet Nam; members citing these policies singled out for disfavor their feelings that during the middle and later years of involvement in Viet Nam, policies were based upon wrong assumptions and/or faulty calculations. Similar, though more general, doubts regarding U. S. policy in South America and the Caribbean abound. Unlike the approval responses, the disapproval scores were quite diffuse; there is more consensus about U. S. policies towards Western Europe than there is about policies towards other regions of the world. We can offer only a hesitant conclusion from these responses: these participants tended to positively evaluate policy towards those regions which are culturally, economically, and politically most similar to the U. S. and to negatively judge the conduct of those

policies directed towards those areas not similar to the U. S. In the first case, the respondents tended to feel that U. S. policy was generally correct, charitable, and well-intended. In the latter case, many believed U. S. policy to be frequently incorrect, opportunistic, and misguided. Such a profile suggests a dissatisfaction with the conduct of U. S. policy in the so-called third world areas--a dissatisfaction that has its counterpart among academic foreign policy analysts as well. This, then, brings us to the third and final policy dimension.

Developmental Evaluations. In Figure 4, we further collapsed geographic regions into developed and underdeveloped political systems and present approval and disapproval frequencies for each. Once again,




Figure 4:--Developmental Evaluations. Percent distribution of positive (n=71) and negative (n=61) responses.

the pattern of grouped responses is a clear one: most participants agree with the conduct of the U. S. towards developed countries while only a few can not accept them as preferred courses of action. On the other hand, about three of every four negatively coded responses referred to actions aimed primarily at countries or areas we classified as developing political systems. (The code category "Both" represents an approval or disapproval response which has reference to both developed and developing countries or target areas and could not be coded

in one category to the exclusion of the other.)

Among the positive responses, most participants confined their responses to economic recovery programs, U. S. support for European integration, and to a variety of economic and military assistance policies aimed, once again, primarily at Western European countries. Others, however, were more explicit in their negative responses, particularly towards those policies relating to developing countries; "prone to gimmickry," "shooting from the hip," "abusing our foreign aid program" are sample comments that expressed several members' feelings about U. S. sponsored policies and programs in the developing parts of the global system.

These responses not only reveal an important pattern of grouped evaluations among these participants, they also illustrate the changing character of U. S. foreign policy. The markedly skewed distribution of positive responses towards the developed regions (mostly Western Europe) has no parallel for the developing areas towards which there is widespread disaffection. In interpreting these data and the full interviews, it was evident that many participants explain these temporal, geographic, and developmental differences as misapplications of policies demonstrably successful in Western Europe during t_1 to other areas under different circumstances facing different problems during t_2 or t_3. Once again, Morgenthau's summary statement offers a similar conclusion but from a more impressionistic point of view:

> If one should characterize American foreign policy in a sentence, one could say that it has lived the last decade or so on the intellectual capital which was accumulated in the famous fifteen weeks of the spring of 1947 when the policy of containment, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan fashioned a new American foreign policy, and that this capital has now been nearly exhausted.[10]

Both the "intellectual capital" and its "exhaustion" about which

Morgenthau writes are interestingly evident in the pattern of positive and negative affect responses we have shown and described above.

Some Conclusions

These data tend to show that the basic tenets and rationale behind U. S. post-war economic and security policies provide a lasting and ready-made "tested" foreign policy model which, because of its "success," has become an important referent in the policy perspectives of members of the Department. This model has had an active part in post-war policy deliberation but, to judge from our data, its applicability to wider areas and diverse political systems is becoming increasingly suspect. The overall model--dubbed by one participant, the "Marshall Plan Mentality"--was set early and passed on to later "generations" of foreign policy participants who are beginning to doubt its universal validity.

We noted earlier that foreign policy perspectives develop out of a complex assortment of experience-related factors which can influence the norms, values, ideas, and behaviors of individual policy participants. The more important "on-the-job" factors may derive from environmental attributes and organizational patterns that are part of the job setting with which members must interact. And if, as Andrew Scott suggests, "The central problem of the Department is cultural rather than organizational,"[11] then crucial aspects of this cultural setting must include the established standards by which past, present, and presumably future policy is evaluated More importantly, for individual participants these standards provide an existing frame of reference against which they can judge their personal evaluations and to which they can adjust them when necessary. In our study, it is clear that

these Departmental standards include each of the outstanding elements of the post-war model: economic interventionism, aggressive containment, and selective security arrangements. In this sense, our data tend to confirm what is already known through other means.

Foreign policy perspectives can not be divorced from the professional context of the Department. An important part of this context is the firm belief that "The only experience that is relevant to the activities of the Department is experience gained in the Foreign Service."[12] This belief is widespread among participants and helps to explain how established standards of evaluation, the attitudes of colleagues, and how cumulative organizational memory can influence the evolution of foreign policy perspectives. Stated otherwise, what is most important for policy participants is what they learn and acquire on the job, not what they bring to the job. Thus, for many participants a shift from "what is desirable" to "what is feasible" is a frequent and necessary one.

Summing up, the two aspects of foreign policy perspectives with which we have dealt include the following: (1) The members' self-perspective. This self-image manifests itself in a combination of a sense of low efficacy in policy making and an evolving realism towards the perceived limits of individual activity and influence in the policy process; and (2) The participant's policy perspective. This is revealed by a fairly clear-cut but possibly fading dependence on a single foreign model that was devised and first implemented over two decades ago. Together, these perspectives are shared by a substantially large proportion of officers who depend on a policy rationale from a past era and, at the same time, are increasingly resigned to their own changing role and function. Indeed, in the latter case, this resignation has lead

at least one officer to judge the Department's role in the whole foreign policy process as "peripheral;" there are similar, though less categorical, sentiments expressed by fellow participants.

There is, then, a considerable consistency among the respondents on both our measures of self- and policy-perspectives which suggests a fairly common pattern of role development and similar standards of policy evaluations. Although the bulk of our findings point to a small variation in member perspectives, it may be safe to speculate that, should this variation persist and spread, the Foreign Service in the next several years might be characterized by increased dissonance. And this dissonance is apt to revolve around substantive issues as well as in-house, career-related matters. Our interviews, however, only suggest this tendency, they do not predict it.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See, for example, the discussion provided by Howard Becker et al., Boys in White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 33-49; and Howard Becker and Blanche Geer, "The Fate of Idealism in Medical School," American Sociological Review, XXIII, (February 1958), pp. 50-56.

[2]Becker et al., op. cit.

[3]James Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1965).

[4]See, for example, Kenneth Keniston, Young Radicals: Notes on Commited Youth (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968).

[5]Some more recent suggestions include: Andrew Scott, "The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture," International Studies Quarterly, 3:1, (March 1969), pp. 1-11; John Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory (New York: Basic Books, 1971); and John Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1969).

[6]Chris Argyris, Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness Within the Department of State (Department of State Occassional Paper No.

2: Institute for International Systems Research, 1966).

[7]In each dimension, there were numerous responses which could not be coded; for example, several participants generalized their responses such that no time period, no geographic, or system-type categorization was possible. This reduced the "N" in each histogram.

[8]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. xii-xiii.

[9]Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 3.

[10]Ibid., p. 3.

[11]Scott, op. cit., p. 7.

[12]Ibid., p. 3.

CHAPTER VII

RESULTS: FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES

This Chapter continues to describe and analyze the foreign policy attitudes of our sample respondents. Unlike Chapter Six where we found a considerable convergence among Foreign Policy perspectives, we expect to find, here, attitude differences that correspond to the different task sub-units in our study. And unlike the two general measures of foreign policy perspectives we utilized in the last chapter, our indicators of foreign policy attitudes in this section will include responses to more specific foreign policy-related questions.

This Chapter, therefore, presents the results of our data analysis relating to the three alternative explanations of attitude formation which we have already discussed in Chapter Three. In the following pages, each explanation will be handled separately and data relating the various descriptor variables of each explanation to the different attitude sub-scales will be presented and discussed. Each section will be bracketed by a brief discussion of the theoretical basis for our expecting a certain relationship on the one hand and an interpretation and discussion of the findings on the other. Following this, we will summarize by comparing the relative potency of each of the three explanations that we are examining.

The Attitude Sub-Scales

In Chapter Three, we described the foreign policy attitude scale

that was administered to each member of the sample. The full scale was factor analyzed and resulted in five different sub-scales or indices tapping attitudes towards different, though closely-related, foreign policy questions. In the data analysis which follows, the sub-scales represent our dependent variables, the foreign policy attitudes in which we are interested. For each sub-scale, we recoded responses to individual items according to a pro-international or a non-international preference. In the sub-scales with two separate items, the number of code categories is three: (1) no international endorsement; (2) a single international endorsement; and (3) an international response to both items. For the sub-scales having three and four items, the number of code categories are four and five respectively. In every case, the recoded responses are ordinal level and wherever possible ordinal measures of association will be utilized to determine the relationship between the different independent variables and the five attitude sub-scales. We will, in addition, make use of frequency and percentage distributions.

In Chapter Three, we cautioned that the meaning of any statistic depends on the particular sample whose attitudes are measured and on the hypotheses being tested. Consequently, although the data displays which follow contain mostly low-strength statistics, interpreting them as indicating a weak relationship may be too hasty and too harsh. Given the fact that the participants are all members of the same career service and the same foreign policy organization and have encountered many of the same professional and diplomatic experiences, any attitude differences can still be interpreted as substantively important, even if not statistically significant.

Likewise, it can be asked whether our use of a close-ended

attitude scale was the most appropriate instrument for gathering and measuring policy-related attitudes of public officials. There is scattered evidence which suggests that in-depth, open-ended, or free-format interview schedules may be more suited to "elite" sampling than forced-choice schedules.[1] Indeed, forced choices may conceal rather than reveal the true meaning of a hypothesized relationship. Although we will return to this methodological problem in the concluding chapter, it should be clear at this point that we regard the substantive meaning of our statistical measures to be governed more by the hypotheses being tested than by any rigid standard of statistical interpretation.

The five attitude sub-scales we have constructed are the following:

1. Diplomacy: This sub-scale measures generalized preferences for conducting U. S. foreign policy through bilateral or multilateral (international organization) diplomatic channels; it includes four separate items.

    1. Most, but not all, non-military aid from the U. S. should be administered through some international agency designed for that purpose.
    2. On the whole, it would be better for our national interests to deal with other countries on a bilateral than on a multilateral basis.
    3. We should rapidly expand our efforts to settle all political and economic differences with other countries through some international means such as the world court or the U.N.
    4. The U.S. should neither increase nor expand the number and the kinds of problems it has been taking to the U.N.

2. Cooperation: This index measures preferences for handling problems of international security through military strength (deterrence) or through some forms of inter-nation cooperation; it includes three single items.

    1. One positive way of strengthening international security is to keep the United States militarily stronger than every other nation.
    2. If an international police force were created, the U.S. would be wise to retain a large military force so that we will be able to cope with any external problem when we feel we must.
    3. The U.S. should attempt to place greater reliance on collective dialogue and discussion than on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to potential aggressors.

3. Constraint: This index measures attitudes towards unilateral initiatives for reducing international tensions as well as the perception that constraints exist which inhibit such initiatives: it, too, includes three separate items.

    1. Low-risk initiatives toward unilateral reduction of arms may be a demonstration of good faith by the United States but such moves would probably invite others to seek advantage from any momentary military imbalance.
    2. Any unilateral initiatives towards easing relations with an adversary should be made only when there are absolute guarantees of reciprocity by that country.
    3. Most military involvements of the U.S. after World War II can be described as decisional situations in which uncontrollable external events largely pre-determined our course of action, leaving very few options available for consideration.

4. Strengthen-the-U.N.: This scale includes two separate items, the first explicitly advocating increasing the executive powers of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and the second, giving the U.N. the power to impose non-punitive taxes on member states.

    1. In working through the U.N., we should seek to expand the range of independent authority of the Secretariat and especially the role of the Secretary-General.
    2. The United Nations should be strengthened by giving it limited power to impose non-punitive taxes on its member states.

5. Share: This sub-scale measures attitudes towards U. S. sharing and exchanging technical knowhow and combatting physical and environmental problems with any country interested in such interchanges; it includes two items.

    1. A general framework for U.S. foreign policy in the developing world should primarily aim at combatting physical and environmental insecurities, irrespective of the political relations a country has with the U.S.
    2. In order to increase international cooperation, the U.S. should offer to share all its peaceful atomic and technological knowhow with any country wanting to engage in exchange of this kind.

In the remainder of this Chapter, we will present summary findings pertaining to the three explanations. At the outset, it should be clear that we are most interested in E-1, which explains attitude formation in terms of the specific task environment, particularly those experiences that are learned on the job. Therefore, we will be discussing E-1 most thoroughly, but only after we present our findings

relating E-3 and E-2 to the various sub-scales we have described above.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND POLICY ATTITUDES (E-3)

Unlike the two general explanations which follow, this explanation of the formation of foreign policy attitudes does not include any organizational experiences as determining factors. Instead, E-3 postulates that foreign policy attitudes have pre-organizational origins and that they can be traced to varying aspects of the participants' biographic background. One important variant to this widely used theme, however, is that individual members, because of certain prior experiences, are more or less disposed or ready to adopt attitudes which actual membership in an organization brings out. Much of the research on decision-makers, decision-making, elites, power structures, and the like (in different political cultures), has tended to capitalize on the logic of this approach, especially by associating certain demographic and biographic background characteristics with attitudes, opinions, and behavior. The evidence that is available is quite impressive and extensive and therefore makes this explanation an inviting one.[2]

One of the problems, of course, in utilizing social background factors in a small sample such as ours is that they are virtually unlimited in number and variety; typically, meaningful relationships can only be discovered when one or more variables are controlled for. In our case, we would be dealing with a prohibitively small sample, where "deviant" cases would have a disproportionate influence in determining statistical relationships. With this caveat in mind, we will be concerned with the following selected indicators of previous experiences: (1) The participants' date of birth (Age); (2) The amount of education

(Number of academic degrees); and (3) The time when the first academic degree was conferred. The remaining background data we collected were so heavily skewed towards one of the code categories--for example, Religion (Protestant), and Ideological Self-Identification (Moderate-Liberal)--that analysis did not seem too valuable.

Theory and Description

In very abbreviated terms, the theory or logic behind this explanation is "the conviction that the political decision-maker's behaviors and decisions are influenced by his personal life experiences."[3]

When we compare our small sample to Harr's much larger mail survey of 1966, the distribution of key social background characteristics is remarkably similar.[4] In categories such as region of birth, early childhood residence, religious affiliation, and even ideological self-identification, no single category within each variable differs from Harr's by more than five per cent, an interesting comparison given the fact that the earlier survey counted nearly six hundred respondents or about twenty percent of the total foreign officer corps. This similarity illustrates that the social background characteristics of the members sampled in the four departmental sub-units in our study are fairly representative of the Foreign Service as a whole. While no inferences to the larger professional body is permissable, it can be said that the aggregated membership in the four sub-units mirrors that of the full corps of officers.

The distribution of personnel in any organization, or its parts, reveals something about its external recruitment policy as well as its internal allocation or assignment of personnel. If certain background characteristics of those externally recruited matched perfectly with

specific foreign policy attitudes, the recruitment pattern of the Department or Foreign Service would solely determine the distribution of attitudes among its members, and hence the policy dispositions of the full membership. The homogeneity or heterogeneity, similarity or diversity of attitudes, then, would be totally dependent on the means used to attract and/or select new members and induce them to stay. In the past, the Department and the Foreign Service have justly been accused of a policy of selective recruitment and of arbitrary inducement to only a small, select portion of the American social structure. The membership of the Foreign Service, in short, was far from democratically chosen and resembled, instead, a closed, specialized clique. Today, however, numerous reforms, particularly those stemming from the recommendations of the Wriston Commission Report,[5] have led to a broader infusion of Civil Servants and a wider spectrum of the American population into the Foreign Service. One result of these changes has been that the Foreign Service has become increasingly diverse and more representative of a larger segment of the population.

In Chapter Five, we noted that the internal distribution of personnel in any organization may lead to effects which are at variance with an otherwise representative policy of external recruitment. This can happen when individual members with particular attributes either gravitate or are channeled to certain sub-parts of the organization while those with other attributes go to another sub-part, and so on. In such cases, it is possible that the full membership or the defined population can be recruited and be representative of a heterogeneous external population even though it can still be unrepresentative at the crucial working or bureau level; in such an instance, there would be more inter-group than intra-group differences.

In most cases, the distribution of personnel at the working level is more important than the overall distribution at the organization level. Thus, if there is some relationship between social background and attitudes (and behavior), then it is worth knowing whether or not the internal distribution is uniquely patterned. For this explanation of attitude formation (E-3), knowledge of this distribution is essential. An examination of the social origins of the participants in the four sub-units shows that there are no major across-unit differences that would pull us in the direction of interpreting any attitude differences among them solely to pre-organizational attributes. This is to say that even if there are attitudinal differences among the four sub-units, the comparative similarity of their social compositions cannot account for those differences. This does not discount the utility of E-3, for specific attitudes may still correspond to certain individual social characteristics.

Table IX presents gamma coefficients for each of the descriptor variables and the five attitude sub-scales. Each independent variable has been recoded in several ways to yield different coefficients; in the table (and in those which follow) we will present measures of association between both the grouped and the ungrouped independent variables and the different sub-scales. In some cases where the differences are so small, we will neither display nor elaborate on them.

An examination of the size and the direction of the coefficients in the table offers very little evidence that the pre-organizational characteristics of the members in this study are associated with the foreign policy attitudes or external preferences we have measured. Indeed, not only are most of the relationships weak, many are also in the opposite direction from what we expected. In several cases,

TABLE IX

Association Between Prior Experiences and Five Attitude Sub-Scales (E-3)

	Sub-Scales				
	Diplomacy	Cooperation	Constraint	Strengthen-UN	Share
Age[1]	-.015 (62)	.023 (62)	.165 (62)	-.111 (59)	-.275 (58)
Age[2]	.047 (62)	.105 (62)	.196 (62)	.025 (59)	-.039 (58)
Education (Amount)	.225 (61)	-.010 (61)	.066 (61)	.022 (58)	-.211 (57)
Education (Time)[3]	-.016 (59)	-.076 (58)	.104 (59)	.100 (56)	-.190 (55)
Education (Time)[4]	.119 (59)	.349 (58)	.435 (59)	.225 (56)	.223 (55)

All entries are gamma coefficients

[1]Dichotimized at age 40
[2]Trichotimized at ages 25, 35, 45
[3]Divided at years 1949, 1950-1959, and 1960 to present
[4]Divided at year 1955

members' attitudes seem to be almost randomly distributed for each of the independent categories. This was true even when we divided and regrouped the descriptor variables in different ways. Our expectations were that for each of the associations, younger officers would have more international external goal preferences than older officers; that those with more formal post-secondary education would prefer international options more than those officers with less; and that those officers who received their education more recently would tend to score higher on each of the sub-scales than those whose formal education occurred at an earlier date. Each of these expectations are based on relevant findings from a vast number of surveys, most of which measured foreign policy attitudes and opinions of mass publics.[6] But, since we are interested in pre-organizational experiences as stated in E-3, the type and location of the sample are not as important as their backgrounds. In effect, organizational experiences are controlled for in E-3.

Age. We found very little association between the age of the participants and their preferences for any of the options in any of the sub-scales. Whether we dichotomized at age thirty, or forty, or divided age into three or more age groupings, we found that date of birth has no discernible relationship to any of the attitude indices. Indeed, the only reasonably strong association in this row is between age (dichotomized at age forty) and the "Share" sub-scale. This coefficient and two others are all in a negative direction; therefore, our expectation that younger officers would proportionally have higher international scores is unfounded. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, although only to a small degree. One possible explanation for this contrary finding may be the growing cynicism and doubt about the role and the effectiveness of the United Nations, its specialized agencies,

and even about the role of the United States in its involvements abroad.[7] Such doubts, though not new by any historical standards, are nonetheless a recent phenomenon and may, in microscopic form, be visible in these few statistical associations.

Amount of Education. Like age, an officer's formal education has no strong relationship with most of the attitude scales we constructed. Our expectation that more education would correlate highly with positive preferences for multilateral diplomacy is seen in the moderate gamma in that row, cautiously affirming similar findings from research on public attitudes. The same can not be said for the participants' attitudes towards the "Strengthen-the-UN," "Cooperation," and "Constraint" sub-scales; in each of these relationships, the degree of association is weak and unpatterned.

As with age, there is a noticeable correlation between this variable and the "Share" index; once again, the relationship is in a negative direction. Thus, those officers who have fewer years of formal education--as measured by number of academic degrees--tend to prefer exchanging technical knowhow with other countries more than their colleagues having more academic degrees. The remaining coefficients in this row are all weak.

Time of Education. One of the drawbacks in utilizing "Amount of Education" as a pre-organizational variable is that it treats education as a static variable; that is, it does not include, for example, the historical time period during which an individual is formally exposed to academic life. (It also excludes the quality of the education, the nature of specialized instruction, and so on.) Ideas are evolutionary and subject to frequent change, textbooks are revised and new volumes are written, while the important problems that arise in one era are not

always those that emerge in another. Quite predictably, learning circumstances are altered as new evidence is found, and as counter-theories are developed. We have no hard data to verify our contention that educational content and experiences have, in fact, changed over the years but a perusal of different international relations texts, sociological readers, or even diplomatic accounts of the cold war written over the past two and a half decades would supply compelling evidence that our thinking, data, and values have changed. Perhaps, foreign policy attitudes are somehow related to these presumed academic changes; perhaps, they are not.

Here, we are utilizing "Time of Education" as an indicator of an officer's academic background experience. We anticipated that those officers who are more recent graduates would be more international-minded. As Table IX shows, this expectation does not always hold. However, we did find this to be true when we bifurcated time of education at the year 1955. Our calculations yield four fairly strong coefficients: the "Cooperation," "Constraint," "Strengthen-the-U.N.," and "Share" sub-scales are all associated with this independent variable in a positive and impressive way. The difference between "Amount of Education" and "Time of Education" is quite interesting. More academic experience in institutions of higher learning is more strongly associated with positive preference for multilateral diplomacy than is the relative recency of scholastic training.

Just the reverse is true for each of the remaining sub-scales. As the last row shows, each relationship increased noticeably in a positive direction; the inescapable conclusion from this comparison is that more recent graduates (in our sample) are more international-minded than those who received their undergraduate education prior to 1955.

Proportionately, those who graduated before 1955 tend to reject the international options slightly more than they accept them, while those who graduated after 1955 tend to favor these options much more than they reject them.

In terms of the three different independent variables we utilized, Time of Education is the most important correlate of international attitudes, in so far as it is strongly associated with four of the five sub-scales. Only the sub-scale "Diplomacy" deviates from this general tendency. And, with the exception of the "Share" index, preferences for international-oriented alternatives are randomly distributed across all age groups.

ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND POLICY ATTITUDES (E-2)

The locus of explanation in this section shifts from the personal background characteristics of the participants to the organization, that is, to the Department and the Foreign Service. It contains organizational attributes to which all members, during their membership in the Foreign Service, are exposed and share as a common set of relatively similar experiences. In particular, these experiences are derived from the comprehensive, standardized system of rewards and sanctions that are built into the Foreign Service as a professional career service.

It is difficult to relate administrative procedures or "careerism" to actual policy attitudes although there are legions of accounts of its effect on behavior, particularly on conformity, timidity, and sycophancy. With this problem in mind, we have operationalized common experiences in terms of length of service and career rank. The principal independent variables, then, are the following: (1) The career

rank of the participant; (2) The number of years in the Foreign Service (or year of entry); and (3) The number of years in the Department (or year of entry). Each indicator measures a relative "amount" of learning or exposure time to Departmental rules, standards of operation, career pressures and constraints; none of these variables are precise enough to include the kinds of specific exposures or unique experiences that E-1 will attempt to do.

Theory and Description

The principal argument of E-2 is that organizational experiences and professional career constraints function as social prisms which, when effective, bend divergent foreign policy attitudes into predictable and/or homogeneous attitude and behavior patterns. Stated differently, the character of the organization shapes and molds the character, attitudes, and behaviors of its members. Supporting evidence for this explanation can be seen when attitudes are found to be either uniform throughout the sample or throughout a defined attribute of the full sample. Even though all organizations are internally diverse, system-wide features such as evaluation, promotion, and re-assignment processes are not. These common characteristics of the Department may be the most important correlates of foreign policy attitudes.

A distribution of policy attitudes can be interpreted in terms of "how much" organizational experience or even "at what level" they occur. Participants at higher ranks may differ from those below them because they have more at stake or because they assume certain role commitments not demanded of members at the junior or middle levels. Writing about the military establishment, for example, Janowitz noted that "Higher rank means longer organizational experience, greater

commitment to the organization, and more selecting out of deviant perspectives."[8] At the middle levels, an officer is faced with critical career dilemmas since his chances for advancement are uncertain and his opportunities for outside employment are restricted. This is a common problem for all officers at mid-grade and above because it is at this level that a successful career is often made or broken. All this may, of course, create anxiety and self-appraisal which can lead to pressures for conforming to Department standards and traditional attitudes. Junior officers confront a similar, though less uncertain problem (all things being equal): they, too, are unsure of moving up through the ranks because of overcrowding in the middle, while jobs outside the Department may offer more attractive rewards with fewer restrictions. Because of these unique concerns at all three career levels, it is plausible to hypothesize that each level may breed a different pattern of foreign policy attitudes.

All officers, regardless of rank, are exposed to a fairly common set of system-wide experiences. The Foreign Service conforms to a classical bureaucratic pattern whereby commitment by the member is to the service rather than the position or program; rank is in the man, not the position; all members are cycled through a similar rotation and assignment pattern; many receive common, in-service training at the Foreign Service Institute; and entry into the Service is at the junior level following comprehensive screening examinations. Each of these common structures and processes may function to reduce the diversity of attitudes and to contain any disturbing effects that working or bureau-level loyalties might otherwise have on behavior. But the most important of these system-wide attributes, in terms of an individual's experiences, is the formal procedures that are set-up to administer

promotion and evaluation of fellow officers. This process may include yearly efficiency reports based on more than a score of dimensions, reports of Foreign Service Inspectors, as well as inputs from peers and other "touring" personnel. The frequency of evaluations and the constancy of being observed cannot escape the attention of those who are interested in upward or even lateral mobility. This formal system of evaluation and promotion is supplemented by an informal system of rating fellow officers, since frequent interaction among foreign service officers is made possible by the small population of the Service. In such a professional career service, it is often the opinions, perceptions and judgements of others that really matter. All this may lead to the kinds of uniform self-perspectives towards one's job and one's role in the job that we sketched out in the previous Chapter. Whether or not it also leads to similar foreign policy attitudes is the main concern of this section.

Returning to place or position in the hierarchy of the Foreign Service, rank membership and years of service can signify common career experiences. Years in the Foreign Service or in the Department represent accumulated socialization experiences acquired and learned over time and, perhaps, during similar historical periods. Those officers who entered the Foreign Service at the peak of the Cold War period may have internalized certain foreign policy attitudes which stayed with them virtually unchanged through time. The orthodoxies of one era may stay with a particular set of officers in another era and be highly resistant to any new orthodoxies that may arise or call the former into question. Tradition, precedent, past learning experiences can each have a durable effect on attitudes across time. Rank, length of service, or date of entry, then, may offer us some important cues to the formation

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and existence of foreign policy attitudes.

It should be pointed out that the attitudes we collected are for a specialized purpose and do not necessarily allow for a "best" test of the very inviting hypothesis that individuals who hold certain policy attitudes are those who are promoted more rapidly or evaluated more favorably. This may be a very plausible test to make but our data are inadequate and incomplete for that purpose. Other attitudes and behaviors which may be associated with rates of promotion should be gathered.

Very little reconstruction of these descriptor variables was necessary although we grouped them, again, in varying ways to derive different measures of association with the attitude sub-scales. These measures are found in Table X.

Rank. The twenty coefficients in the table do not show any unusually strong relationship between standard organizational variables and the particular set of foreign policy attitudes we have measured. There are, in all, only four coefficients larger than $\pm .2$. We were especially surprised that rank membership tells us so little about who holds which policy attitudes. Difference in rank, though it signifies relative standing in the Foreign Service "pecking order," apparently has little meaning or relation to the formation of attitudes towards the policy items in the sub-scales. This holds true even after we control for those participants who were members of the Foreign Service Reserve and for those who entered laterally at a higher grade level. And, when we controlled for all members who entered the Foreign Service through channels other than the examination and entry-at-the-junior-level route (for example, through "Wristonization" or lateral entry), neither the strength nor the direction of the associations changed much. These

TABLE X

Association Between Organization Attributes and Five Attitude Sub-Scales (E-2)

	Sub-Scales				
	Diplomacy	Cooperation	Constraint	Strengthen-UN	Share
Rank[1]	-.112 (62)	.085 (62)	.043 (62)	-.033 (59)	-.206 (58)
Rank[2]	-.065 (62)	-.104 (62)	.017 (62)	.175 (59)	.024 (58)
Foreign Service Entry[3]	.202 (62)	.163 (62)	.115 (62)	.262 (59)	-.086 (58)
Department Entry[3]	.130 (62)	.173 (62)	.037 (62)	.429 (59)	-.170 (58)

All entries are gamma coefficients

[1] Rank variable is divided between levels three and four

[2] Rank variable is grouped three ways: Levels two and above; Levels three and four; and Levels five and above.

[3] Both variables coded at five year intervals

participants, therefore, tend to hold foreign policy attitudes which are not dramatically different from those of the "majority."

If we look at the within rank cell percentage response distributions for each of the bivariate relationships and then compare them across ranks for each sub-scale, we do find some slight differences, although they are far too small to be even substantively significant. Percentagizing this way, we find that higher ranked members tend to prefer international-oriented alternatives in each of the "Diplomatic," "Constraint," and "Share" indices. We also find that participants in the middle grades consistently tend to be less internationally-directed than members in the higher and, to a less extent, the lower levels. Indeed, in the "Constraint" and "Share" and even the "Diplomacy" sub-scales, there is a slight but discernible curvilinear relationship among the high, middle, and junior rank levels. This, in part, helps account for the consistently low correlations because gamma coefficients do not explicitly reveal curvilinearity. This pattern of responses among mid-career officers may be related to the peculiar anxieties and uncertainties of the middle level; at least one writer on the subject has hypothesized that mid-careerism correlates highly with preferences for the status quo and for non-controversial and safe options.[9]

Length of Service. The number of years in the Foreign Service and the number of years in the Department provide no more convincing an explanation than does rank membership. Both variables, however, correlate fairly well with the "Strengthen-the-U.N." sub-scale, meaning that members with fewer years of service tend to prefer the proposals dealing with the United Nations more than those having more years of membership. In our recoding, the best overall dividing point for separating attitude differences among participants is the year 1960.

Those who entered the Foreign Service or the Department after 1959 tend to support these proposals more frequently than those who entered prior to that year. The same can be said for the relationship between Foreign Service entry and preferences for multilateral diplomacy as a general solution to external policy problems. In the remaining cases, the coefficients are mostly weak and positive except for those in the "Share" sub-scale which are mostly weak and negative.

In a sense, these findings should not have been so surprising and might have been anticipated. Many of the participants flatly pointed out that such status variables as rank membership and years of experience and seniority in the Foreign Service are poor indicators of role, participation, and responsibility in policy formulation. Officers in the higher ranks do not always hold the important or sought-after jobs, while promising younger officers sometimes do. According to one candid comment: "Rank means very little in the Foreign Service; attractive jobs and assignments are held by people in all ranks." Indeed, most of the participants in this study felt that the system of evaluation and promotion was capricious and variable. When we asked the sample about the criteria for "success" or quick mobility in the Foreign Service, only about eleven percent of the responses (n=124) cited personal qualifications, requisite skills, or special abilities. More often, they referred to inter-personal and collegial contacts and behavior. Nearly seventy percent of these responses, singled out such criteria as "getting along with others," or "working within the system," or "open-mindedness and flexibility in goals," or even "being in the right place at the right time, with the right people." Although these responses represent a blend of fatalism and cynicism about the administration of the Foreign Service, they do, nonetheless, provide

some additional evidence that rank membership is not as systematically determined, nor as standardized or even as fair as is customarily thought. Our findings tend to confirm this generalization in so far as foreign policy attitudes are concerned; very few of the foreign policy attitudes we measured are associated with individual or grouped rank membership variables.

In summing up, E-2 is based on the assumption that rank and years of service are system-wide features of the organization that lead to similar kinds of experiences which, in turn, lead to the learning of similar attitudes. In terms of career development, it assumes that evaluation and promotion procedures are based on common standards that are applicable to all members in a comparable way. In fact, this is only partly true, and this may account for the unpatterned distribution of attitudes that we found. To the contrary, individual officers are acutely aware that the evaluations which are weighted most heavily in administrative decisions pertaining to their careers are those which are submitted by superiors and colleagues working in the same bureau and the same section as they. Thus, even though the organization or system of rank determination is centralized and standardized, the process of evaluation is decentralized and fragmented along the lines of the work environments. The work setting, because it is the source of the most crucial information pertaining to promotion and re-assignment seems to play an important role in career development and mobility. With respect to the limited number and kinds of attitudes we have measured, the potency of involvement in the work setting may be a stronger explanation than professional career constraints. The following discussion entertains that possibility.

SUB-UNIT ATTRIBUTES AND POLICY ATTITUDES (E-1)

This explanation asserts that foreign policy attitudes among foreign policy participants are associated with specifically identifiable experience attributes of the immediate task environment in which the members work. While E-2 focused on experiences that were shared by all members, this explanation stresses specific kinds of task-related experiences that fall along structural and functional lines. For the purpose of data-making and analysis, we operationalized task experiences by collecting the following four variables: (1) The organizational sub-unit in which the participant is currently a member; (2) The cumulative profile of assignments in the Department since entry; (3) The inter-personal contacts the participants typically have in the performance of their present jobs; and (4) The sources of information participants depend on to meet their task responsibilities.

The second variable above includes the first. We traced the career assignments of each member of the sample from the time he entered the Department until his present assignment; that is, we have constructed a career experience profile for each member and have labelled it "Diplomatic Experience." By diplomatic experience, we mean the relative mix in the number of years each participant has served in bilateral and multilateral organizational sub-units of the Department. The resulting variable or index is an ordinal scale containing four categories referring to combinations of more or less bilateral and multilateral diplomatic experience. This variable, then, enables us to include historically-based career data rather than utilizing only contemporary on-the-job experience data. We are able, therefore, to broaden our definition of experience to include a rough longitudinal, participant-oriented datum.

Through index construction, we created a "new" composite variable by combining the third and fourth variables listed above. We recoded each member's inter-personal contacts and his recorded sources of information into a single interaction profile called "Interactions." The final code categories consisted of three levels of interaction: (1) Those participants who have a low level of interaction (parochials). These officers have an interaction profile which is restricted, for the most part, to their immediate colleagues and/or to other governmental agencies of the U. S.; (2) Those participants having an intermediate level or variety of interactions (intermediates). These members' interaction profile is not confined to colleagues or other agencies but extends to non-governmental persons and members of other nation-states or international organizations; and (3) Those participants who have a high level and variety of interactions (cosmopolitans). These individuals engage in more external, other-national contacts and rely on more diverse sources of information than members of the other two code categories. Like diplomatic experience, this variable can provide us with a useful, if general, index of a critical on-the-job experience-related attribute; they differ in so far as the former is historically cumulative and weighs each assignment equally while the latter is a measure of a single attribute of the present assignment—interactions.

We have, then, five separate variables which give operational meaning to what we have termed experience-related attributes of organizational sub-units. We have utilized three of these in our analysis: Diplomatic Experience, Interactions, and Organizational Sub-Units. We expect the association between each of the independent variables and the five attitude sub-scales to be greater the more multilateral the mix of diplomatic assignments and the more varied or

cosmopolitan the interaction profile of each member. The third variable—organizational sub-units—is cut two ways: vertically, we expect members in the two multilateral sub-units to be more international-directed on each of the sub-scales than members of the two bilateral groups; horizontally, we anticipate that members in the field would be more disposed to favor international options than members of the Department.

In particular, we are interested in the association between each descriptor variable and two sub-scales, "Diplomacy" and "Strengthen-the-U.N." For the first, we expect that members would prefer those diplomatic channels with which they are most familiar. For the second, we suspect that participants more experienced with the U. N. would be the strongest advocates (attitudinally) of reform, since it is they who are most familiar with the U. N.'s weaknesses as an effective world body.

Theory and Description

We noted earlier that of the three alternative explanations, we are most interested in this one; that is, we expect E-1 to be the "strongest" explanation of foreign policy attitudes.

The principal thesis underlying E-1 is that certain foreign policy attitudes are traceable to specific participative task experiences. The view that participation in or the features of a job setting is related to the content of an individual's attitudes and behavior is one which is held by practitioners and analysts alike. The latter, in particular, have argued that actual participation or experience in settings or situations leading to increased interactions among isolated, neutral, or even hostile individuals can have the effect

of breaking down barriers and changing attitudes in a more favorable direction. More communications, increased cross-national exchanges, additional official contacts, cross-cultural travels, and other routine and non-routine, official and non-official interactions among individuals can lead to or be associated with the development of more favorable attitudes towards each other or towards some mutual task.[10]

This same view also holds that members of a particular group tend to become advocates for that group's main goals and spokesmen for its established modes of conduct. Over time and with more experience in the group or in similar groups, the variation in members' attitudes and external preferences towards the group's dominant activities becomes smaller. Thus, in this study, members of bilateral (multilateral) sub-units and/or members having a more concentrated bilateral (multilateral) diplomatic profile would tend to prefer conducting U. S. foreign policy in the bilateral (multilateral) diplomatic way; in general, we would expect them to be less international in their foreign policy orientations.

Of course, in either case unpleasant experiences, unrewarding interactions, disturbing job encounters and any number of on-the-job experiences can lead to the opposite result of altering favorable attitudes or reinforcing negative attitudes. Thus, it is conceivable that the more cosmopolitan an individual's interaction profile or the more (or less) varied his diplomatic experiences, the less international-oriented he is apt to be; we are, of course, hypothesizing just the opposite.

Table XI presents the findings for this alternative explanation. In every case—except for two very interesting and revealing correlations under the "Strengthen-the-U.N." column—the measures of associations are in the expected direction, though, once again many are weak. Initially,

TABLE XI

Association Between Task Environment and Five Attitude Sub-Scales (E-1)

	Sub-Scales				
	Diplomacy	Cooperation	Constraint	Strengthen-UN	Share
Interactions	.101 (58)	.049 (58)	.304 (58)	.198 (56)	.01 (54)
Cumulative Experience	.316 (62)	.208 (62)	.166 (62)	-.280 (62)	.441 (58)
Bilateral-Multilateral	.321 (61)	.257 (61)	.112 (61)	-.505 (60)	.597 (57)
Department Field	.275 (61)	.264 (61)	.160 (61)	.132 (60)	.194 (57)

All entries are gamma coefficients

at least, we must offer a positive, if hesitant, verdict on the substantive importance of E-1.

Interactions. One of the clearest findings from the figures in the table is that variations in interactions do not correlate strongly with most of the attitude sub-scales. The first row, then, offers little support for the hypothesis that more and diverse interactions (contacts + sources of information) lead to more international foreign policy attitudes. If these data show anything, it is that "parochials" and "cosmopolitans" hold fairly similar attitudes for each of the sub-scales. The sole exception to this is the comparatively higher gamma between interactions and the "Constraint" index; this scale measures the participants' readiness to accept or reject proposals calling upon the United States to unilaterally initiate moves designed to lessen international tensions. We expected but did not find similar relationships with the remaining sub-scales; we can, therefore, conclude that interactions--as we have measured them--are a poor indicator of the foreign policy attitudes of members of this study.

It should be noted, however, that our measure of interactions does not include the type (formal or informal) of interactions, the task situation in which they take place (cooperative or competitive) or even the extent of satisfaction that members have with them. Each of these refinements, if added to our analysis, could possibly generate different findings. Nevertheless, our conclusions must stand on the basis of our actual operationalization.

Department-Field. In contrast to interactions, the three career experience variables exhibit stronger measures of association with the sub-scales. It is interesting to note that members assigned to the two field missions tend to prefer the international options more

consistently than their colleagues in the two Department sub-units. This difference might be accounted for by the higher, more cosmopolitan aggregate scores of USUN and USMI that we reported in Chapter Five; it also could be understood by reference to the more cooperative task situations (particularly at USUN) and the less formal work settings of the two field posts, which we also described in Chapter Five. The more open task environments and the more cooperative or conjunctive task settings in the field, therefore, seem to lead to slightly more favorable international external preferences on some of the sub-scales. This cautiously suggests that although interactions do not associate well with our dependent variables, that certain kinds of interactions which are more crisply measured, may.

Diplomatic Experiences. Far more interesting than the above are the two remaining career experience variables, one measuring the cumulative diplomatic career assignments, the other the current diplomatic assignment. In both cases, the correlations are consistently stronger, although neither correlates well with the "Constraint" sub-scale. Surprisingly, both descriptor variables show a strong negative association with the "Strengthen-the-U.N." index, an interesting finding which we will explore more fully below.

Members assigned to multilateral sub-units or who have career records with several years multilateral service, more often prefer programs which involve technical and scientific exchanges with other states ("Share"); members of bilateral sub-units have fewer preferences for such exchanges, as do members with fewer years diplomatic experience in multilateral units of the Department.

A crucial part of our investigation and one central to E-1 involves the interpretation of the correlations between present and

cumulative diplomatic experiences and the index "Diplomacy." Here, we are asking a question central to the "politics" model of decision-maker behavior: Do members of bilateral (multilateral) groups prefer conducting U. S. foreign policy through bilateral (multilateral) channels or through means that are not associated with their diplomatic sub-unit? If we find the former example to be true, we can, with some confidence, conclude that organizational location and group affiliation play an important role in influencing members' foreign policy attitudes. If, however, these attitudes are randomly scattered across or within the organizational groupings, we can, with equal confidence, conclude that occupational and organizational locus have little influence on determining foreign policy attitudes.

The table shows that all three job or diplomatic experience variables have a positive and moderately strong relationship to the "Diplomacy" sub-scale. Together, these statistics provide some evidence that foreign policy preferences are traceable to a participant's organizational, task, and/or experiental frame of reference. These data also offer partial support for the hypothesis that members of organizations tend to positively perceive and prefer those aspects of their organization environment which relate more directly to the activities and objectives of their particular work setting.[11] In this case, activities refer to procedural choices for carrying out U. S. foreign policy. This correlation between sub-unit and attitude preferences furthermore helps to explain such common Departmental identity tags as "IO types" or "Eurocrats"--terms which do not always endear but which are partly accurate labels for those who wear them.

This finding is all the more interesting in light of another pertaining to members' attitudes towards the proposals for strengthening

the United Nations. Both diplomatic experience variables correlate negatively with the "Strengthen-the-U.N." index; moreover, both coefficients are quite high. This is an intriguing result since we anticipated that more professional experience with multilateral diplomacy would correspond to a greater willingness to champion recommendations intended to improve and restructure the world organization. This expectation is based on the belief that members working at, with, or through the U. N. are more aware that its "failures" and shortcomings can be traced, in part, to a weak, decentralized authority structure and to inadequate independent financing. We expected these participants to agree more readily that structural and financial remedies were needed to overcome some of the U. N.'s basic weaknesses and that they would be supportive of such changes. As our findings show, however, these expectations are not only not confirmed, they are also in the opposite direction. In short, members whom we described as bilateral participants as well as those having more service exposure to bilateral diplomacy tend to support these proposals more than multilateral participants and those with more multilateral experience.

At first look, this interpretation seems to suggest that members more closely involved with the U. N. are likely to be its most consistent critics and antagonists of reform. This conclusion, however, is only partly correct. A closer examination of the responses to both items composing the sub-scale reveals an important point which helps clarify some of the attitude differences across the four groups. The important difference is between members of IO and USUN; a numerical breakdown of the supporters (pro) and the non-supporters (con) of each proposal is presented in Table XII.

Participants in USUN overwhelmingly support the proposal for

increasing the executive powers of the Secretary General of the United Nations and there is strong support for this proposal among members of EUR as well. The only sub-unit which opposes such a reorganization is IO. Although there is no strong advocacy in any of the sub-units for the (radical) proposal which would give the U. N. the power to levy non-punitive taxes on members states, members of IO, once again, stand out as the main opponent of such a change. Indeed, if we were to sum together the supportive (pro) and the non-supportive (con) responses for

TABLE XII

Numerical Responses to Two "Strengthen-the-U.N." Items

	(Item 3) Secretary-General				(Item 20) Finances			
	(pro)	(con)		(%pro)	(pro)	(con)		(%pro)
EUR	18	8	=	69%	9	15	=	38%
USMI	5	3	=	63%	4	4	=	50%
IO	8	13	=	38%	8	19	=	29%
USUN	8	1	=	89%	4	4	=	50%

each of the sub-units for both proposals, each would register better than half of their members in favor; the sole exception to this pattern is IO whose members offered two negative responses to every positive one.

Clearly, the negative correlations between the two diplomatic experience variables and the "Strengthen-the-U.N." index are largely attributable to the attitudes of members of IO rather than to members of USUN. Our initial hypothesis that those participants most deeply involved with the U. N. would also be its principal advocates of reform is, then, partially valid. Our finding indicates that there is unlikely

to be any strong advocacy for these changes in the U. N. among members of IO, the principal intra-governmental spokesman for U. S.-U. N. relations. Such an advocacy, if it exists or were to exist, is more likely to come from USUN, a much smaller and presumably less influential sub-organization unit of the Department.

AMPLIFICATION ON E-1

In the above sections, we found that job location, task environment, and diplomatic experience were more helpful in explaining the formation of attitudes towards specific policy questions than were a variety of other independent variables in E-2 and E-3. In this final section of the Chapter, we will amplify upon part of this finding by taking a second and slightly different look at the responses of the sub-units to the attitude scale. In the preceding analysis, we relied heavily on the use of ordinal measures of association which, unfortunately, can mask grouped differences which frequency tables and percentage distributions can often reveal. Our collapsed codes for the five sub-scales prohibited our calculating average response scores for each sub-unit. In this section, we will make use of average scores by retaining the original fourteen items of the sub-scales and also the twenty-three items of the full attitude scale (including, of course, the fourteen). In so doing, we keep their original interval scale and can, thereby, compute average sub-unit responses for both sets of items. Instead of an agree-disagree response to two or more items in a sub-scale, we can sum individual responses and calculate mean scores per sub-unit. From this, we can further compare the scores of the four sub-groups.

If the different sub-unit mean scores are nearly identical, we can conclude there are small inter-unit attitude differences among them;

if the average sub-unit scores vary a great deal, we can conclude that members of one group (as a whole) tend to hold foreign policy attitudes different from those of another. The greater the discrepency between the sub-unit means, the greater is the difference in their respective foreign policy attitudes; conversely, the smaller the differences, the greater the likemindeness among the four groups.

To be consistent with E-1, we expect USUN's "average" member score on both sets of items to be the highest, followed by IO, USMI, and EUR respectively; when combined, we also expect that the two bilateral groups and the two Departmental groups would each have lower average international scores than the combined averages of the two multilateral sub-units and of the two field missions. The tables which follow illustrate that these expectations are, for the most part, confirmed in our data.

TABLE XIII

Mean International Scores for Each Sub-Unit on Two Sets of Items[12]

	FULL SCALE*		SUB-SCALES**	
	Mean Score	Difference from Population Mean	Mean Score	Difference from Population Mean
EUR	90.04	- 5.79	51.51	- 3.94
USMI	93.62	- 2.21	56.12	+ 0.67
IO	96.63	+ 0.83	55.00	- 0.45
USUN	111.11	+15.28	70.43	+14.98

*Population Mean=95.83 **Population Mean=55.45

In the full scale, both EUR and USMI have mean scores below the population mean of all respondents in the sample, while IO and especially USUN scored above it, as expected. This large a difference above the

population mean leads us to the conclusion, once again, that members of USUN are more international-minded than members of the remaining sub-units. With the fourteen items making up the sub-scales, the picture shifts slightly; the average scores of the two Department groups fall below the population mean while the average scores for the two field missions are higher. Again, USUN ranks far above the other groups in the degree of its international disposition.

For both sets of items, our expectation that the multilateral and the field "slices" would be more internationally oriented than the bilateral and Departmental "cuts" are both met. The "typical" USUN member registers the highest cumulative score on both sets of items while those in IO and USMI answer fairly similarly, though far below those in USUN. In both cases, EUR's "average" participant scores the lowest among the "average" members of the four sub-groups.

The same general findings can be illustrated in percentage or proportional terms as well. Although we are dealing with very small "N's," percentage breakdowns may reveal additional information about our sample respondents that other analyses cloud. The table below divides each sub-group at the respective population means and lumps together the percent of those in each group who are above this mean and those who are below.[13]

These data again indicate the collective differences among the sub-units for both sets of items. Members of USUN, on the whole, have higher aggregated international scores than do most of the respondents in the entire sample. The sole exception to this finding is the cumulative score of a member of the Mission who had served the bulk of his career in a regional bureau and who had been on the job at USUN for only one month. As far as the sub-scales portion of Table XIV is concerned, USUN

is the only group which has more than half its members registering cumulative scores higher than the population mean; none of the other sub-units exceeded this figure.

TABLE XIV

Percentage of Respondents Above and Below the Mean for Each Sub-Unit

	FULL SCALE				SUB-SCALES			
	EUR	I.O.	USUN	USMI	EUR	I.O.	USUN	USMI
ABOVE MEAN	32%	58%	89%	50%	29%	47%	100%	50%
BELOW MEAN	68%	42%	11%	50%	71%	53%	--	50%
	N=25	19	9	8	N=24	19	7	8

Equally important is the interesting fact that members of both IO and USMI seem ambivalent in their attitudes towards questions relating to internationalism. This is more easily understood for members of USMI since their activities are infrequently and only indirectly linked to the United Nations and to the on-going conduct of multilateral diplomacy. The same can not be said for participants in IO; their responsibilities are both directly linked and continuously involved with the U. N., with multilateral diplomacy, and with U. S. activities in all international organizations in which the U. S. is a member state. Yet, much of their time is consumed by rival internal demands such as congressional appropriations, Departmental budgeting and intra-governmental and intra-departmental bargaining and negotiation. It's comparatively moderate scores and the unpatterned international disposition of its members suggest that IO is first a Departmental

bureau and second a multilateral bureau and that its first task responsibilities are internal to the Department, not external to its various multilateral field missions.

These findings and those which particularly related to the "Strengthen-the-U.N." index spell out for us the fissure that apparently separates IO and USUN. They certainly call into question the widely held view that members of both multilateral sub-groups hold attitudes that are consonant with one another. We also have to question the accuracy of the commonly held view that IO represents the firmest intra-governmental lobby on behalf of U. S. support of the U. N. and international problem-solving;[14] this view does not correspond to our results.[15]

CONCLUSION

It should be clear that a full and more rounded analysis of the antecedents of foreign policy attitudes is more complicated than the set of bivariate statistics and frequency tables we have presented. To do so would not only require a far larger sample of participants but also a more complex analysis of multiple combinations of social background, organizational, and task-related variables.[16] Our comparatively small sample size, however, prohibits any meaningful multi-variate analysis. Moreover, in the absence of any longitudinal attitude data, the task/role-attitude relationship and the effects of the former on the latter is, like most attitude studies, shrouded in uncertainty. Our conclusions would be strengthened if across-time attitude data showed that changes in foreign policy attitudes varied with shifts in roles or positions within the Department. Based on our tentative findings and from other studies,[17] we can expect that natural role or task changes

would lead to the formation of new attitudes and behavior--via the media of changed reference groups, exposure to new task responsibilities, and adjustment to new vested concerns.

To conclude, we have found that the task experience variables in E-1 offer us a more satisfactory set of factors for explaining why members of the Foreign Service hold the kinds of policy attitudes they do. While the degree of association, the attitude distributions, percentages, and average scores are not, in every case, so strong or convincing that they put our mind to rest on the question, they do offer a generally more consistent or "better" explanation of foreign policy attitude formation than do the sets of variables in both E-2 and E-3. The principal exception to this generalization is the important relationship between "Time of Education" and several of the measured attitude sub-scales. Our overall conclusion, then, suggests to us that the pull of the immediate task environment is stronger than the pull of the full organization or the influence of social background in the determination of foreign policy attitudes. Although this finding may not be valid for all foreign policy issues--as, indeed, it is not true for all participants--it seems to be valid for the particular Foreign Policy questions we have measured.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See, for example, Robert Putnam, "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, LXV:3, (September 1971), pp. 651-681; and Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[2]A very useful summary of the literature and a comprehensive bibliography can be found in Richard Merritt, "The Comparative Study of Elites," Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNalley, 1970), pp. 104-139.

[3]Donald Mathews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1954), p. 2.

[4]See the various tables presented in John Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 171-188.

[5]U. S. Department of State, Towards a Stronger Foreign Service. Report of the State's Public Committee on Personnel, Department of State Publication No. 5,458, June 1954.

[6]Citations are too numerous to mention but see, for example, the excellent compilation of studies by John Robinson et al., Measures of Political Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, September 1968), and Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science Review, 61:2, (June 1967), pp. 428-445.

[7]One participant remarked that a less cynical and more optimistic view prevailed during the 1950's, "when there was still hope for the United Nations and the U. N. system." The same thought was similarly expressed by Inis Claude when he wrote:

> "The question of our attitude toward the world organization should be put to us after we have accumulated a considerable experience of losing rather than winning in the United Nations, of having it conduct programs of which we disapprove, of...activities that we think damage rather than serve our national interests.,"

The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 38.

[8]Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 239.

[9]Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little Brown, 1967), pp. 99-100.

[10]The literature and research on these related hypotheses are almost unlimited in number. See, inter alia, Chadwick Alger, "United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVII (Fall, 1963), pp. 411-426; "Non-Resolution Consequences of the United Nations and their Effect on International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V, (June 1961), pp. 411-426.; Ingrid Eide Galtung, "Are International Civil Servants International? A Case Study of UN Experts in Latin America," Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association, Inaugural Conference,(Von Gorcum, Assen, Netherlands, 1966), pp. 198-209; Robert Angell, "The Growth of Transnational Participation," Journal of Social Issues, 23:1, (1967), pp. 108-129; and many others.

[11]Once again, Downs has expressed this relationship quite well:

> "Each official tends to exhibit biased attitudes toward certain of the specific policies and alternative actions that his position normally requires him to deal with. These attitudes will result from his biases in favor of policies that advance his own interests and the program he advocates, and against those that injure or simply fail to advance those interests or programs."

Downs, op. cit., p. 77.

[12]We are dealing with two separate population means that are both weighted towards EUR and IO since these two sub-units have far larger "N's" than USMI and USUN.

[13]We have calculated similar mean percentage tables for age (E-3) and rank (E-2) for the sub-scales only. In both cases, there were no significant differences across ranks or across different age groupings.

[14]See, for example, Robert Keohane, "Institutionalization in the U. N. General Assembly," International Organization, 3:4, (1969), pp. 859-896.

[15]The conventional view of IO's support for internationalism, however, finds some support in the following table which contains Intensity Scores for each sub-unit. Intensity Scores indicate the strength of a member or a group's commitment to internationalism. They are computed by dividing the total number of responses (1 through 7) into the number of "Strong" and "Moderately Strong" international endorsements for each item. The larger the resulting quotient, the stronger or more intense is the group commitment to internationalism; the possible range, of course, is 0.0 to 1.0.

Intensity Scores

Bilateral		Multilateral	
EUR	USMI	IO	USUN
.246	.279	.313	.475

These Scores suggest although IO in the aggregate is not strongly international in orientation, that certain members of the sub-unit are.

[16]Edinger and Searing, for example, tried to forecast attitude distributions in their French and German sample by searching for such combinations of background and adult socialization variables. Their findings are not inconsistent with our own; in their German sample, for example, they concluded:

> "The five background categories which predicted the greatest number of German elite attitudes...were all related to adult socialization experiences during the preceding 14 years."

Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis," American Political Science Review, 61:2, (June 1967), pp. 428-445.

[17]For a particularly useful study, see Seymour Lieberman's longitudinal research on the effects of role transitions on attitude changes among workers; as individual roles shifted in and out of pro-management (foreman), pro-labor (steward), and when they remained static (worker), attitudes towards management, the union, and company programs varied with the immediate role being occupied, "The Effects of Changes on the Attitudes of Role Occupants," Human Relations, 9:4, (1956), pp. 385-402.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

In this study, we have explored the relationships between foreign policy attitudes and a variety of independent variables. When we first asked each participant to express his judgements about past policies of the United States, we discovered a remarkable degree of consensus, but when we measured individual attitudes towards present, hypothetical policy questions, this consensus tended to break down along task and bureaucratic lines. This suggested to us that there was some systematic distribution of attitudes within the sample and that it was possible to differentiate among these attitudes by focusing on some basic information about the organizational and task experiences of each member.

In Chapter Six, we found that members of the four sub-units were largely agreed in their positive evaluations of U. S. foreign policy conducted over the past two and a half decades, which indicated to us a shared set of policy referents from which to draw lessons and upon which behavior may be based. Whether these policy evaluations are purely affective or involve some mix of affect and cognition is unclear but the pattern of temporal, geographic, and political system responses that we collected all seem to spell out a fairly common set of policy standards that members utilize in evaluating the conduct of U. S. foreign policy.

In the previous Chapter, we expanded this investigation by analyzing the relationship between some specific foreign policy questions

and three different sets of independent variables: (1) Task-related experiences; (2) Career-related variables; and (3) Pre-recruitment, individual social characteristics. The bulk of our findings lay in this chapter. Each of the independent variables was separately cross-tabulated with every participant's expressed attitudes towards different foreign policy questions; thus, we were able to detect not only the direction but also the extent of each participant's international disposition. We measured the latter disposition by each participant and each sub-group's preferences for cross-national exchanges, for multilateral diplomacy, for a stronger United Nations, for checking the role of the military in problem-solving, and by a readiness to initiate unilateral moves for joint international behavior.

Our main objective was to ascertain which set of factors offered the most satisfactory explanation of the formation and distribution of individual and grouped foreign policy attitudes. Our conclusion, stated at the end of the previous chapter, is that task-related experiences are better indicators of foreign policy attitudes than either of the other two sets of factors. Stated otherwise, a member's working group or his task location within the Department of State has a stronger influence on his attitude disposition than do either the larger organization or his social background.

The Four Sub-Units

The most perplexing sub-unit among the four we studied is, without doubt, IO. Our findings run against the grain of "conventional wisdom" about IO. Its aggregate interaction score, which ranks last among the sub-units, tells us that IO's primary attention and activity is intra-departmental and bureaucratic; its "average" participant

international score varies greatly among its members and is consistently lower than expected when compared with members in USUN and even those in USMI; moreover, its disposition is ambivalent towards the United Nations and equivocal towards multilateral diplomacy, two orientations which belie its formal diplomatic responsibilities. One plausible explanation for this orientation is that IO is pressured by several cross-cutting and overlapping demands made upon it. On the one hand, it is pulled by its internal role as the principal agency vested with responsibility for the coordination of U. S. policy in the multilateral diplomatic area; on the other, it is pulled by its external role in the administration of U. S. policy in the field--rivalled, in part, only by the influence of USUN, its principal field mission and first among unequals. In addition, IO tends to be the center of much activity by those who espouse a more vigorous and expanded involvement of the U. S. government in multilateral organizations but is also the target for others who wish to de-emphasise U. S. participation. Buffeted by these several cross-pressures, it is, perhaps, understandable that IO has no clear attitude profile.

Similar cross-pressures do not characterize the other three sub-units. Several members of USUN, indeed, prefer a more aggressive or expansionist role for the U. S. in the United Nations system and are more willing to play an activist part to attain that objective. This objective is not new, for it has long-standing roots at the mission. The consistent pattern of firm support for the hypothetical policy statements points to a clear-cut international profile for this field mission. USUN's collective attitudes are the most unambiguous of the four sub-groups we studied.

Advocates of a strong U. S. commitment to the United Nations and

to multilateral organizations in general should note the important discrepency between IO and USUN; given our results, it would be prudent for these reform-minded advocates to recommend a shift of authority to USUN as well as an increase in its independence of operation. They might also seriously consider a proposal to establish a new centrally-based agency within (or outside) the Department to coordinate U. S. participation in all multilateral organizations. Such an agency could provide a stronger voice in support of multilateral diplomacy and internationalism and could possibly become a more determined lobby before Congress and within the Department on behalf of international-oriented solutions to problem-solving.

While the dispositions of members of USUN are clearly evident, those of USMI, like IO, are somewhat more ambiguous and mixed. There is no discernible pattern in the expressed responses to the policy items among the comparatively small number of participants in this bilateral field mission. Of course, the small number of respondents in this single field mission prevents us from generalizing to other bilateral foreign-based posts. Coupled with the responses of USUN, those of USMI alert us to the possibility that the more open and less bureaucratically structured work setting of field missions can lead to more international-directed attitudes among their members.

Like USUN, the foreign policy attitude profile of EUR is more clear-cut but considerably less internationally-oriented than each of the remaining sub-units. This conclusion does not always hold as evidenced by EUR's generally favorable views on the proposal for increasing the executive powers of the Secretary-General of the U. N. Nonetheless, when we compare across the several sub-scales and with the other sub-units, the participants in EUR are much less ready to

substitute international-type solutions for bilateral remedies or to replace multilateral diplomacy for bilateral diplomacy.

These findings also press us to reconsider our initial decision to divide diplomacy into a bilateral-multilateral dichotomy. Others, such as Stephen Kertesz who has offered a list of thirteen classes of diplomacy, have pleaded for a more exhaustive and discriminating classification system than we now have.[1] Indeed, when we group IO and USUN together as multilateral sub-units and then compare their (a) group interaction scores and ranks, (b) their structures, (c) size, (d) their day-to-day operations, and (e) their international attitude scores we derive two sub-unit profiles with more differences than similarities. Utilizing these categories, it becomes apparent that IO more closely resembles EUR than USUN, suggesting, once again, that IO's Department anchor is more important than its multilateral sail.

At the same time, these bureaucratically-determined features of IO's task environment--supervision, coordination, departmental bargaining and budget preparation for the U. S. multilateral program--may be more salient in determining attitudes than the influence of the target actors, organizations and institutions to which it aims its policy outputs. If this is so, and our results suggests it may be, then the "deviance" of IO's aggregated international scores can be more easily understood.

Given the plausibility of this revised description of IO, a distinction is worth making between "collective diplomacy" and "bureaucratic bargaining." The former, which more closely describes the activities of USUN, involves regular interaction and collaboration between and among diverse national delegates in a task setting that is conducive to and even requires conjunctive problem-solving.

Bureaucratic bargaining, on the other hand, more adequately describes the principal task context of IO where interaction, problem-solving, and collaboration with other national representatives occur far less frequently and are not generally part of the regular task requirements. Thus, USUN and IO differ on a host of crucial organizational and functional factors and this discussion is intended to point out the pitfall in our initial decision to lump them together into a single multilateral category. Our unanticipated findings and our comparatively moderate-to-weak measures of association may be traceable to our overlooking this important distinction between the two sub-units, a distinction which we buried by the convenient devise of categorical inclusivity. This distinction between the two sub-units, helps us to reconcile and explain the fact that members of USUN and IO have different foreign policy preferences.

Some Recurring Problems

Throughout this study, we have offered several disclaimers that were intended not as apologia but rather as lessons learned in the course of our research. In particular, we have raised the difficulties experienced in measuring "elite" attitudes with a close-ended scale, a measuring instrument which we suspect, but have no hard evidence, would produce a low test-retest reliability score. Indeed, nearly one third of the respondents independently expressed some hardship in responding to one or more scale items without some qualification or some additional or more specific information with which to make a response. Presumably, these respondents experienced some uncertainty or anxiety in responding to items which were hypothetical and general. Our general impression is that attitudes, or opinions for that matter, are not very stable among

participants and are apt to be "situation-specific" and "context-dependent" and that as the situation and the context change, responses to the items are likely to change also.

An alternative design for tapping the same information would be to utilize an open-ended format with a careful and systematic coding scheme; such a design would likely evoke less anxiety and generate fewer non-responses than the closed scale. It would also allow the researcher to probe and detect both the broader orientations of the participants and to get at their values and cognitions as well as their evaluative preferences. It is our view that this design is a preferable one to a closed design for interviewing and measuring the foreign policy orientations of foreign service officials.

This problem is mostly methodological and is accompanied by a conceptual one which involves the predicting of policy outcomes and individual behavior from known attitudes and attitude distributions. The main difficulty here stems from the haziness that surrounds the attitude-behavior relationship.[2] We are dealing with more than a measurement problem for both attitudes and behavior must be learned and each may be learned independent of the other; causally, either can influence the other. Attitudes can influence behavior through the following chain: membership in new sub-units, followed by the assumption of new tasks and the taking on of new vested interests can lead to a change in a participant's attitudes and subsequently to some behavior modification. The reverse process can occur as well: a participant's enrollment in a new reference group and his assumption of new role functions can lead to new behavior relating to these functions and, finally, to attitudes that are consistent with this behavior. In short, the attitude-behavior interface can be conceptualized as bi-directional.

In explaining attitude formation, there is no easy way out of this cul de sac; a start would be to gather both behavior and attitude data from large samples and at different points in time.

At the same time, prior knowledge of attitudes towards an issue or issue-area may not accurately predict the outcome on that issue.[3] It is entirely possible that attitude convergence may be followed by behavioral divergence or that consensual behavior on an issue be preceded by attitudinal disagreement. Moreover, knowing the distribution of attitudes does not necessarily tell us anything about the influence process relevant to policy making. Influence, as we noted earlier, is largely dependent upon each group or each participant's actual or perceived weight within the Department. Familiarity with the distribution of attitudes may not always predict outcomes because not all attitudes have the same importance in different task settings or even within the same setting. In short, it is important to know who holds which attitudes, which sub-unit and which participants and how much influence each group or individual has on any particular issue.

Despite these agonizing questions which envelop much of survey research, the interview procedure remains an indispensible data-making technique and attitudes a crucial indicator (or predictor) of behavior--and vice-versa. Knowing the attitudes of participants gives us valuable clues to understanding more about not only how they are acquired but also what manifestation they are likely to have in the foreign policy process. In our study, our best prediction of such behavior--the one which we judge to be wrong the fewest number of times--is to base it on the member's specific task location rather than his social background or his rank, for example.

A final problem is our inability to firmly assert that the

foreign policy attitudes learned in one task setting are transferable to other task locations. Without time series data, we cannot offer a clear statement on attitude stability or attitude change across different task environments; we can only assume, given our results, that change is likely to occur. In fact, our data point to different conclusions: first, we found that longer service in multilateral or bilateral diplomatic sub-units leads to expected foreign policy attitudes consistent with the diplomatic functions of these settings; and second, we concluded that a participant's immediate work environment tends to shape his views towards foreign policy. When the two coincide, a member's foreign policy preferences are quite likely to be explained with either or both experience variables.

However, the present sample can be reinterviewed at a second point in time after each respondent is rotated to a different task location.[4] Failing this, or in concert with it, new participants occupying the same positions as those in our sample could be interviewed utilizing the same interview schedule employed in this study. The panel-type study might provide evidence for or against the important proposition that attitudes acquired, say, at USUN are carried over to new settings where they presumably can have some impact on policy as well as on the attitudes and behavior of other colleagues. Interviewing new participants in the same slots could show that comparable attitudes exist among different participants holding the same positions at different time periods; if so, our confidence in the importance of task environment on attitude formation would be strengthened. We would then be compelled to downgrade the role of individual-based variables for these job occupants. From our findings here, we would anticipate that individual career officers--those mostly "off-stage" or invisible--are

more apt to be influenced by their role or their work environment than by idiosyncratic or organizational factors.

Relation to the "Politics" Model

If we can attach some meaning to our general finding that the pull of task environments on attitude formation is a strong one, we find it compatible with the view of foreign policy-making sometimes called the "politics" model. This model describes policy outcomes as a product of competition, conflict, and bureaucratic bargaining among defined groups or individual advocates who claim to represent different perspectives on policy issues. A basic feature of this policy process model is that individual preferences tend to originate in the position the individual occupies. As it has been put: "Where you stand depends upon where you sit."[5] Thus, membership in a given task location or prolonged experience with one kind of diplomatic function may help fashion a frame of reference which can serve as a cognitive prism through which information and options are customarily viewed and interpreted. One possible consequence of selective frames of reference may be distortion and bias towards external goal preferences and behavior. In some cases, a decisional occasion may be interpreted more in terms of an existing frame of reference or attitude structure than on its merits or its facts.

Thus, it is not surprising on a given issue such as Portugese colonial rule in Angola or Mozambique that a Portugese desk officer would be less sympathetic to independence movements in either colony than a corresponding desk officer in the Bureau of African Affairs or even a member of USUN. In the same way, it is not unusual that a (average) member of USUN would be more supportive of multilateral diplomacy than a (average) member of, say, EUR. Larger generalizations

such as the "military mind," the "Navy way," or the "diplomatic mind" represent collective dispositions which, like those of the Portugese desk officer, have their origins in bureaucratic memory and in recognizable organizational structures, roles, and responsibilities. From our study, we have concluded that there is no single diplomatic mind but several diplomatic minds and that this diplomatic pluralism is traceable, in part, to separate task environments in the Department and to cumulative patterns of experience in one role or another.

Individual officers tend to pay more attention to those messages, problems, and responsibilities that are most salient to them. This selective attention becomes more discernible as the attention distance, in terms of issues and problems, is farther removed from the individual participant. The same can be said for different working groups within the Department. Looking at both the individual officer and the sub-groups from this point of view, the resulting mix of perceptions is one involving individual advocates operating within bureaucratic advocacies; thus, the process of selective attention can occur simultaneously for the individual officer and his working group inside the Department.

For members of our sample who are positioned below the top strata of the Foreign Service, participation frequently involves supportive activity for superiors who need their confidence to get their job done in negotiations with other interested parties. This interaction between superior and subordinate takes place largely within the working group and can become confined to it when disagreements between working groups are customary and intense. Allegiances of individual officers, therefore, are not necessarily to any "rational" process or to any single organizational or strategic goal or even to any agreed-upon policy stance; rather they are quite often fragmented along task and

organizational lines, such as the four sub-units and the several organizational "slices" we introduced in this study. Failure to support one's group position can be equated with insufficient support of one's superior which, in turn, can be tantamount to internal friction and antithetical to collective group interest and morale. Cohesive forces within and across each sub-unit, however, exist to guard against these internal group disagreements. We have previously discussed the importance of efficiency reports at the bureau level, but there are informal collegial pressures at work as well. Each contributes to a participant's integration into the group and to his assimilation of its prevailing policy frame of reference.

Officers having extensive experience in one bureau or whose diplomatic careers are patterned consistently in one task area may develop identifiable external goal preference over time; for incumbents in new task locations, new roles, expectations, and group histories must be learned and adjustments must be made away from prior roles, expectations, and group histories. It is simply easier for these participants to adjust to a new task setting and to adapt to new group-based frames of references than it is to resist and risk possible negative sanctions from that group.

The fuller importance of this discussion on attitude formation is its effects on foreign policy. Attitudes are not simply derived from some rational calculation of policy options or from some comprehensive strategic goal[6] in which participants, regardless of location, are in agreement. Instead, the many centripetal forces internal to each working sub-group make it wiser for individual members to respond to the divergent pulls and tugs of their immediate work setting. If this is valid, it may be rational for members to advocate sub-unit goals even

when they do not add or correspond to those of the Department; thus, what can be rational for the member at the sub-unit level may not be equally rational at the full organization level, and vice-versa.

All this is not to imply that attitude fragmentation or interest diversity is necessarily always functional or dysfunctional, positive or negative, only that each may have its genesis in factors having little relationship to "rational" policy considerations. In one instance, fragmentation may be an asset, in another a liability. Even bureaucratic or sub-unit self-interest is not inherently dysfunctional or negative for it may generate novel initiatives to an otherwise frigid policy orthodoxy.[7] Decisions, then, are not necessarily products of the relative quality of competing points of view, but of the relative weights of opposing factions representing those views. If diversity operates to raise and air new options, it can facilitate and enhance the decision process; when it stifles and suffocates a decisional situation with narrow, special interests, it can impede and complicate that process. Either way, the general findings that organizational location has an importance influence on attitude formation and, hence, on fragmentation, offers some valuable evidence in support of the so-called "politics" mode.

International Attitudes-Their Meaning

From the beginning, we have not said whether we interpreted a participant or a sub-unit's international disposition to be positive or negative, hopeful or unfortunate. Our interest has been to assemble our data and detect co-relationships and/or patterns among them. We have avoided the more normative question of the meaning or importance of international attitudes, in part, because the term international(ism) is

surrounded with ambiguity and uncertainty; from the literature, it is clear that there is little consensus about its meaning in international politics.

An international disposition may mean that its holder generally prefers alternatives to unilateral and bilateral diplomacy, supports viable restraints on military activities, espouses the sharing of global resources, the building of strong transnational organizations, and the furthering of cooperation and collaboration among states. These are the meanings which we assigned to the term in this study. We intended it to refer to such inter-related foreign policy goals as the increased harmonization of actions among states, the strengthened capacity to manage interactions among them, and a dedication to the mobilization and re-allocation of world (U. S.) resources to depressed areas. Support for multilateral diplomacy, for a stronger United Nations, or for a redistribution of resources, therefore, is interpreted by us to be a crucial early and necessary step in the long process of fostering accommodationist behavior and more community interest among states. Moreover, it is important that this process occur at the decision-maker level and within recognized decision-making organizations, for it is here where the lead must be taken and sustained if further collaboration and joint problem-solving with other states is to take place. Thus, the attitudes towards foreign policy questions among foreign policy participants are most important in speeding or facilitating increased cooperation among states.

But international(ism) attitudes may indicate something quite different to others. It may mean support for increased intervention abroad, more penetration of one political system into another, the

preservation of the nation-state system by the big powers, or even the control of global resources through the covert "medium of international organizations." Some observers view multilateral organizations as institutions which function to legitimize an international system of separate but unequal states, maintain established power and dominance relationships among them, and operate so as to mask these influence and control relationships behind the facade of multilateralism.[8]

We are confident that the participants in this study interpreted the international options in our attitude scale in the former, more conventional way, although we have no sure basis for knowing this; the problem of inter-subjective meaning is inherent in much of the social sciences and is particularly noteworthy in survey research. Our confidence is buttressed by responses to a separate open-ended question which asked each member to express his opinion on the efficacy of multilateral diplomacy in U. S. foreign policy; the response pattern points to an interpretation of the international options we believe consonant with our intended meaning. All but one of the responses (n=125) cited the precarious nature of "going the international route," the difficulties created by "conflict of interests" in multi-national bodies, the "lack of control" and predictability over outcomes, or the restrictive and "cumbersome rules and procedures" which impair effective decision-making. These responses indicate a remarkable degree of consensus that multilateral diplomacy options invite unnecessary risks that are more easily controlled in bilateral and unilateral diplomacy. With this consensus, it is all the more interesting that so many members override their fears and support or prefer multilateral diplomacy, and related international goals. Once again, with these additional data, we feel assured that the participants interpreted the attitude scale in the

manner we intended.

Looking to the future, we can not say that the immediate prospects for a stronger U. N., or for increased reliance on multilateral diplomacy, or advocacy for more international alternatives to bilateral diplomatic conduct are especially bright. Although our study is a limited one, we selected two sub-units in which members were expected to hold strong international attitudes. We found this to be valid only for members of USUN; throughout the remainder of the sample, we found no widespread support for international alternatives. Going beyond our data, we believe that other sub-units in the Department and other agencies in the national security system are, for the most part, disinclined and disenchanted with multilateral solutions to international problems. Typically, the U. N.'s failures are accented while its successes are accepted with nodding indifference; at the same time, its programs are over-sold to member states and its dependence upon its membership is lauded as consistent with political realism.

Our conversations with individual officers pointed to their feelings of uncertainty and unpredictability about multilateral diplomacy. They explained that U. S. foreign policy objectives pursued through pluralistic international bodies can be too easily re-shaped, defeated, or unfulfilled. This is an interesting revelation, for the same officers applauded a similar pluralism and fragmentation in the Department of State as a necessary, though problematic, feature/safeguard in national problem-solving. The crucial difference is, of course, the setting and the perceived risks in the former and the perceived opportunities and advantages in the latter.

Finally, it is our conviction that the pattern of U. S. attitudes towards each of the issue-areas in our attitude scale may not only help

determine the success or failure of "international" behavior but also influence its progress and development; these attitudes will undoubtedly shape the future of inter-state cooperation. It is our feeling that international-directed attitude changes, especially among key bureaucratic members of important states, are the key to success and progress in international cooperation and collaboration. Among the more important of these are those which are held by U. S. foreign policy participants.

Externally, then, the international attitudes we have measured offer a useful indicator of the disposition of the U. S. towards questions of international problem-solving. They provide both an indication of present preferences and a possible strategy for assessing change in the future. Internally, the distribution of foreign policy attitudes across the sub-units in the Department of State lends some empirical support to the "politics" model of foreign policy making. Together, the internal-external nexus illustrates an important link between foreign policy and international relations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Stephen Kertesz, The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 6-7.

[2]See, for example, Martin Fishbein, "Attitude and the Prediction of Behavior," in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley, 1967), pp. 477-492.

[3]For example, James Rosenau found that "elite" preferences for foreign aid was followed by severe restrictions; see James Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[4]When access to and the availability of participants prevents or limits interviewing, an alternative experimental design would be to devise man and man-machine simulations or other forms of gaming to produce both attitude and behavior data. To cite one innovative example, see Philip Burgess and James Robinson, "Alliances and the Theory of Collective Action; A Simulation of Coalition Processes," in James Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 640-653. The authors combine and compare attitude and simulate-derived data in their research.

[5]This phrase is borrowed from Graham Allison who, in turn, attributed it to Don Price; "Conceptual Models of the Cuban Missle Crisis," American Political Science Review, LXIII:3, (September 1969), p. 711.

[6]Graham Allison's attack on the "rational" model is consistent with our own; op. cit., pp. 689-718; for a strong dissent to the "politics" model, see Robert D. Krasner, "Are Bureaucrats Important?," Foreign Policy, 7, (Summer, 1972), pp. 159-179.

[7]Out of self-interest and self-preservation, an agency may strongly support novel diplomatic ventures which, during ordinary times, it might oppose. For example, NASA's recent (1971) strong support and advocacy for cooperation with the Soviet Union can be traced, in part, to its internal bureaucratic self-interests, not so much to its avowed internationalism. Without new contracts or new projects NASA's budget and prestige within the federal bureaucracy is likely to decline and atrophy. Bureaucratic self-interest, in this case, can generate incentives for moving an agency and a state towards, rather than away from, increased international cooperation with another state. See the short article by John Noble Wilford "Cooperation in Space" in the New York Times, December 6, 1971.

[8]There are a variety of works dealing with this general theme. See, inter alia, Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review, 1969); Andrew Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft (New York: Random House, 1967), especially Chapter V, pp. 140-155; and International Dependency in the 1970's (Cambridge, Massacheusetts: African Research Group, February 1970).

APPENDIX

The full interview schedule contains three separate sections. The first section aimed at collecting a combination of biographic, career, and self-image data. The second part was used to gather job, job-related, and policy evaluation information. The final portion of the questionnaire is an attitude scale that was self-administered; it was the principal instrument utilized for collecting and measuring foreign policy attitudes.

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Part I.

First, I would like to ask you about some biographic information that I'm unable to obtain in the Biographic Register.

(A.) Where did you live during most of your childhood?

1. On a farm
2. In a small town
3. Moderately sized town or city
4. Suburb of a large city
5. In a large city

(B.) What occupation did your father have while you were growing up? Was he self-employed?

(C.) What is your present religious preference? Was this the religion in which you were raised?

(C.1) Do you now consider yourself:

1. Deeply religious
2. Moderately religious
3. Not very religious
4. Basically opposed to religion

(D.) Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or Independent? If a Democrat or Republican: Do you consider yourself:

1. A strong Democrat

2. Not so strong Democrat
3. Not so strong Republican
4. A strong Republican

(D.1) Have you ever changed party affiliations? If so, why did you change and when?

(E.) Do you generally consider yourself a Conservative or a Liberal?

(E.1) Do you identify as a:

1. Strong Conservative
2. Not so strong Conservative
3. Not so strong Liberal
4. Strong Liberal

(E.2) Have you ever considered yourself a Liberal (a Conservative)? If so, why did you change and when?

(F.) What is it that first attracted you to the Foreign Service?

(F.1) Over the years, what has most attracted you to the Foreign Service, or to put it differently, why haven't you decided to leave?

(F.2) If you had to single out any one thing you dislike most about the Foreign Service, what might that be?

(G.) Could you say that your views have changed in any way since you came into the Foreign Service?

(G.1) Can you say your views have changed in any way since you came into this Bureau (Mission)?

(H.) Were you originally assigned to this position or did you request assignment? Why did you request (were you assigned) this particular assignment?

(I.) Do you generally prefer a Bureau or a Field assignment?

(I.1) Would you generally prefer a Geographic or a Functional Bureau assignment?

(I.2) In what functional "cone" are you now?

(J.) Through what mode of entry did you come into the Foreign Service?

Part II.

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about your job, the kinds of problems you handle and about your views of the decision process in the Department of State complex.

(A.) How would you describe your job as a member of the Foreign Service here in-------; ie., what are the typical and more important

things you do here?

(A.1) As far as you know, is there anything about this Bureau (Mission) that is noteworthy insofar as it is distinguished from any other Bureau (Mission)?

(B.) What would you recommend to an incoming Foreign Service Officer in order to become a good and successful officer, to move rapidly, to get good jobs, and the like? (Qualifications and interpersonal relations?)

(C.) How do you see yourself, ie., what role do you see yourself playing as a member of the Foreign Service? And, is this the role you want to play?

(C.1) What do you like and dislike most about your present job?

(C.2) There has been some talk of dissatisfaction within the Foreign Service and the Department among Foreign Service Officers. Is this true and why?

(D.) I'm interested in the kinds and sources of information with which you deal. On the whole could you rank the important and more frequent sources of information for you?

(E.) I'm also interested in the variety of contacts you have. With whom do you deal in the day-to-day performance of your job? Could you rank them in importance and frequency?

(F.) In the formulation and execution of foreign policy, different segments of the Department (Mission) occasionally take different, often competing positions. How does this happen and are there any examples that come to mind (with regard to your job)?

(F.1) How are such disagreements typically resolved?

(G.) In the conduct of American foreign policy, there seems to be a preference for bilateral or even unilateral diplomacy--particularly with regard to the big issues. If this is true, how can you account for a general reluctance to utilize multilateral channels to conduct foreign policy (U. N.)?

(G.1) Is this changing? What would such a change mean?

(H.) As far as you are concerned, is there any single position or disposition taken by the U. S. since World War II that pleases you very much?

(H.1) Conversely, is there any single position or disposition taken by the U. S. since World War II that displeases you very much?

(I.) What are some of the most important things that an individual must learn and do when he first becomes a member of this Bureau (Mission)?

(J.) Are there any so-called rules of the game that a member of this Bureau (Mission) should observe in order to get the cooperation of his fellow members?

(K.) Do you think the questions I asked you were appropriate ones? Do you think I should have asked you additional questions?

Part III.

Below are twenty-five statements referring to different aspects of U. S. foreign policy. The statements vary in complexity and in generality; you are asked to judge each statement not on its level of complexity but rather on whether or not you agree or disagree with it. Immediately beneath each statement you are asked to indicate your agreement or disagreement and also whether or not you agree or disagree strongly, moderately, or mildly. Please mark an "X" on the line that most corresponds to your choice. (There is space on the last sheet for comments.)

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1. One positive way of strengthening international security is to keep the U. S. military stronger than every other nation.

AGREE: _____ _____ _____ DISAGREE: _____ _____ _____
strong moderate mild strong moderate mild

2. Most, but not all, non-military aid from the U. S. should be administered through some international agency designed for that purpose.

3. In working through the U. N. we should seek to expand the range of independent authority of the Secretariat and especially the role of the Secretary-General.

4. Low-risk initiatives toward unilateral reduction of arms may be a demonstration of good faith by the U. S. but such moves would probably invite others to seek advantage from any momentary military imbalance.

5. If an international police force were created, the U. S. would be wise to retain a large military force so that we will be able to cope with any external problem when we feel we must.

6. The U. S. should attempt to place much greater reliance on collective dialogue and discussion than on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to potential aggressors.

7. In view of the U. S.'s overwhelming financial support, it is only fair that we have the greatest voice in determining U. N. policy.

8. In order to strengthen its deterrent effect against nationalization of U. S. property abroad, the U. S. should act to set a precedent by implementing the Hickenlooper Amendment when applicable.

9. A fundamental principle of U. S. foreign policy should be that we actively cooperate with any country regardless of ideological or political differences so long as the aim is the general reduction of international tension.

10. Intervention in civil wars abroad should be the sole preserve and device of the collective decision of the world body not of a single nation.

11. On the whole, it is better for our national interests to deal with other countries on a bilateral than on multilateral basis.

12. Arms and arms races do not cause international conflicts; rather it is the nature of international conflicts which causes the proliferation of arms and the arms race.

13. If necessary, we ought to seriously consider slowing down the pace of our living standard so that we can cooperate with other states in creating a more equitable standard of living for every person in the world.

14. It is possible to engage in long-term and continuous cooperation as well as to have successful international agreements without the prior elimination or weakening of fundamental ideological differences among states.

15. We should rapidly expand our efforts to settle all political and economic differences with other countries through some international means such as the U. N. or the world court.

16. Generally speaking, most other countries can be trusted to uphold their agreements and commitments to the United States.

17. It is unrealistic to expect to eliminate international conflicts because the nature of the international system has within it irreconcilable conflicts of interests.

18. It may be sometimes wise to assume trust and good faith toward another country, but it is better for U. S. interests to play-it-safe by taking a less trustworthy and more circumspect attitude in dealing with other countries.

19. All developed countries, including the U. S., should involuntarily have to contribute a small, fixed annual minimum percentage of their G.N.P. to a monetary development pool from which developing countries can draw.

20. The United Nations should be strengthened by giving it limited power to impose non-punitive taxes on its member states.

21. Any unilateral initiatives towards easing relations with an adversary should be made only when there are absolute guarantees of reciprocity by that country.

22. The U. S. should neither increase nor expand the number and the

kinds of problems it has been taking to the U. N.

23. Most military involvements of the U. S. after World War II can be described as decisional situations in which uncontrollable external events largely pre-determined our course of action, leaving very few options available for consideration.

24. A general framework for U. S. foreign policy in the developing world should primarily aim at combatting physical and environmental insecurities, irrespective of the political relations a country has with the U. S.

25. In order to increase international cooperation, the U. S. should offer to share all its peaceful atomic and technical knowhow with any country wanting to engage in exchanges of this kind.

Comments:

* * * *

The attitude scale created numerous response difficulties for several members of the sample. Many found the items too general to answer without comment and felt compelled to add qualifications or explanations of their specific response(s). Several participants commented that their response "depends on the problem and the circumstance;" others remarked that an agree-disagree response dichotomy was insufficiently inclusive to capture the complexity and the practical nuances that typically envelop the kinds of problems included in the scale.

In all, we received an 86% return rate on the self-administered part of the full interview schedule. Thirty-four respondents (52%) added qualifications or comments to specific items and twenty-eight members of the sample (43%) felt it necessary to volunteer some general remarks on the back of the questionnaire. Together, then, about 65% of all the respondents who returned the attitude scale appended some general and/or some specific written comments. The general comments varied from praise

to criticism about the items but the bulk of the commentaries were written to clarify or state conditions to the answers that were given. The list below gives a breakdown of the twenty-five items and the number of comments that the respondents gave to each.

Question #	# of Add'l Comments	Question #	# of Add'l Comments
1	6	14	4
2	6	15	13
3	7	16	8
4	6	17	8
5	8	18	10
6	6	19	8
7	7	20	7
8	12	21	6
9	8	22	4
10	12	23	6
11	10	24	8
12	7	25	13
13	15		

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