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A CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE

by
Vance Robert Kasten

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Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Frithjof H. Bergmann, Chairman
Associate Professor Carl Cohen
Assistant Professor Stephen P. Stich
Professor Charles Tilly

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PREFACE

My original interest was in moral and empirical issues involving violence, but these issues seemed unduly elusive. Much of the difficulty appeared due to the fact that people who have dealt with those issues have employed differing concepts of violence and, in some cases, even unclear or misleading ones. My interest turned to the concept of violence itself because I felt that it needed investigation before many important moral and empirical questions could be satisfactorily dealt with.

I owe great thanks to my principal advisor Professor Frithjof Bergmann for his support, not only during my shift in direction, but throughout the entire project. My good friends James Muyskens, Warren Kleinberg, and Robert V. Hannaford also were of great help. I would like to thank, as well, all the members of my dissertation committee for their significantly constructive suggestions: Professors Carl Cohen, Stephen Stich, and Charles Tilly, in addition to Professor Bergmann.

Two special and deep debts must be acknowledged. My wife Kathe has provided unstinting and abundant support, from maintaining my spirit to doing the typing, along with help in discussing and editing. The late Professor Arnold S. Kaufman taught me that hard and clear thought on

political and social matters was not doomed to uselessness, but rather was to be taken as a moral imperative--and a joyful challenge, as well.

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INTRODUCTION

Theoretical interest in violence has exploded during the last few years. Although many of the causes of this explosion could be traced to the bewildering appearance and reappearance of violence in the 1960's, one might wonder why theoretical interest was not aroused to anywhere near a similar degree during previous historical periods which were also violent. Why now do periodicals from The Journal of Philosophy to TV Guide offer feature articles and entire issues on violence? Why was the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence formed?

In this essay I will not theorize about the causes of this interest. Rather, I want to abstract from these expressions of interest a conception of what it is they are expressions of interest in. In this paper I want to analyze the concept of violence. I will consider what, if any, are the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for properly including anything in the category of violence.

A moment's reflection or a quick glance into a dictionary is likely to produce the cautionary response that 'violence' is, after all, ambiguous, or that the concept of violence, to use the Wittgensteinian metaphor,

is like a rope which has no single strand of meaning running throughout its entire length. Consequently, I will limit my task to explicating that concept of violence which I will variously call the ordinary, the everyday, the normal, or the central sense of violence. Whatever this sense is, it is the one which is chiefly employed in recent discussions of violence. It is the sense which is employed by the man in the street when he worries about the dangers of violence to his family, by the politician when he considers its dangers and its advantages to his position, by the sociologist who wonders why some parts of the world have so much more of it than others, or by the psychologist who has similar questions about individuals. Whatever this sense of violence is, it connotes what people are generally asking about when they ask questions such as these: What causes violence? Is it justified? What is the role of violence in social change? Is violence irrational? Is it anti-social? Is it self-defeating? It is that concept of violence which is the subject of this work.

Even this notion of violence is a complex one. It includes both descriptive and normative dimensions. Analyzing the descriptive conditions is the primary goal of the first two chapters of this paper, while the third is concerned with articulating the normative aspect of the concept of violence. The concept of violence is also complex because it involves reference to both a process and a result, a topic which will also be covered in the first two chapters.

One approach to analyzing violence might be to describe a number of phenomena, actual or hypothetical, which are sufficiently diverse and yet which would generally be agreed to be violence. One could then look for the common elements in these cases and attempt to generalize a conception of violence from them.

However, the approach I will employ will be to examine existent conceptions of violence put forward by behavioral scientists and, what few there are, by philosophers. After delineating such conceptions or key aspects of them, I will test the soundness of these proposals for the various conditions by measuring them against real or hypothetical cases which are intuitively deemed to be violence. This should provide a starting point which is more thoughtful and more coherent than that provided by merely delineating examples. The dangers with random examples are that something may be missed and that what is included may lack sufficient interest and richness. By beginning with conceptions, it should be possible to focus the examples around specific questions, a procedure which is likely to increase their usefulness.

There are, to be sure, dangers with this approach. In the first place, it will not be possible to consider even all those conceptions which are unmistakeable conceptions of violence. My principle of selection has been to deal with some proposals which intuitively seem to be interesting and which seem to have something characteristic to offer to the enterprise. This principle is admittedly

arbitrary, but less arbitrary than selecting examples. Secondly, some conceptions of violence are buried in other conceptions, such as those of aggression, force, and coercion. Most of these conceptions of violence will be overlooked. I am inclined to think that violence has too recently been given the independent conceptual status it deserves.

Sometimes explicit definitions will suffice to give a thinker's conception. But sometimes it is clear that an explicit definition is inadequate to articulate his conception in view of the other things which he says about violence and in view of characteristic ways in which he uses the term 'violence.' To set forth his conception, I will freely appeal to these other resources as well. And, of course, where there is no definition as such, I will rely on such resources.

These various conceptions of violence are deliberately treated <u>as if</u> they involved proposals for explicating the central sense of violence. This method renders irrelevant any objections based on the possibility that the original author may have intended to discuss a non-central sense of the term or to legislate a totally new sense. Though a failure to employ this special approach might be more misleading at some points than at others, it applies to all cases.

Material which is not philosophical is included for several reasons. One is that there are very few philosophical conceptions of violence. Another is that many of

the non-philosophical ideas are of intrinsic interest. They are, furthermore, frequently different from one another, and these differences should be a rich source of material, as well as an indication that an analysis should be undertaken.

The analysis of the concept of violence presented in the first three chapters should have helpful implications for other issues. The fourth and final chapter draws some of these implications for general moral questions about violence and for the more particular issue of the relationship between violence and coercion.

CHAPTER I

HANNAH ARENDT AND THE DESCRIPTIVE CONDITIONS OF VIOLENCE

> It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminological language does not distinguish between such key terms as power, strength, force, authority, and, finally, violence--all of which refer to distinct, different phenomena and would hardly exist unless they did. To use them as synonyms indicates not only a certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough; it has also resulted in a kind of blindness with respect to the realities they correspond to.
>
> --Hannah Arendt[1]

i. Introduction

This examination of the concept of violence begins with the reflections of Hannah Arendt. Much of what Miss Arendt says is striking and, therefore, thought-provoking. She does not, to my knowledge, offer an explicit definition of violence, but I will treat her claims as if they were meant to perform the same task, either directly or indirectly. That such treatment does not grossly misrepresent her position is indicated by passages like the one quoted above which reveal her concern with this particular task. It is also indicated by her use of such phrases as "X is 'inherent in' violence" or "violence is distinguished by X" and by her employment in key passages of such words as "always" and "of necessity."

In some cases it is certain that she is offering what I will describe as a necessary condition for violence. In a few other cases this is not as clear, but it is also not clear that she is doing something else either, such as merely indicating common characteristics of violence.

The bulk of the relevant material for this chapter was first presented in an article entitled "Reflections on Violence."[2] Much of that material has since been incorporated into a book, On Violence,[3] which adds pertinent thoughts from older works but nothing substantially new. The older works include Between Past and Future, On Revolution, and The Human Condition,[4] where remarks on violence are scattered about in contexts dominated by other concerns. Although there is some danger that what she says will be distorted when lifted from the context, this danger is mitigated by the recurrence and consistency of several key themes in widely divergent contexts. These themes can be labeled the conditions of dramatic character, of implementality, of instrumentality, of muteness, of destructiveness, of illegitimacy, of inauthoritativeness, and of arbitrariness. The first four will absorb most of the effort in this chapter. The last four are either quickly disposed of or better discussed elsewhere. Nevertheless, they will be mentioned briefly in order to do justice to the scope of Miss Arendt's conception of violence.

ii. The Dramatic Condition

The following passage might well appear to be unimportant to a conception of violence, though failure to deal with it is a source of trouble for many conceptions: "To resort to violence in view of outrageous events or conditions is enormously tempting because of the immediacy and swiftness inherent in it. It goes against the grain of rage and violence to act with deliberate speed...."[5] The relevant point has to do with the swiftness and immediacy which is claimed to be inherent to phenomena of violence. The point is intuitively convincing, but it is difficult to put with sufficient precision. If the point is true, then it is a necessary condition of violence that it be swift and immediate.

One problem with evaluating this proposal is that it is not clear what kinds of things are to be considered swift and immediate when something is a case of violence. It will be argued in the next chapter that violence necessarily involves the bringing about of injury or damage. Then "swiftness" would refer, to use the most general category, to the processes or to crucial aspects of the processes by which such results are realized, while "immediacy" points to the way in which the results emerge from these processes.

Another part of the problem is that swiftness and immediateness are relative notions. The claim that swiftness is a necessary condition of violence seems to call forth difficult queries like "How swift does it have to be?"

or "Swift relative to what?" In spite of these difficulties, the condition is an important one as illustrated by the following examples. Consider two different ways in which a small church in Dresden could be reduced to piles of rubble. It could be done by a direct hit with a large bomb in an air raid, or it could be done by Wolfgang Untergang spending most of his waking hours for ten years in carefully dismantling the church brick by brick and placing the bricks in piles. With some ingenuity, the resultant states of the former church would not differ in ways that would account for our considering the first method to be a case of violence, but not the second. The relevant difference in the cases is just that the reduction to rubble is much faster in the first case.[6]

One might also compare the damage to physical health brought about, on the one hand, by poisoning an individual's food with a chemical which attacks the lungs with, on the other hand, maliciously manipulating him to become a heavy smoker in order to injure his lungs. One would hesitate to consider the second case to be an example of violence, sinister though it may be, whereas there is little or no hesitancy in thus considering the first case. Again, one of the major relevant differences in the cases is that the first is relatively quick--a matter of minutes or hours--and the second is quite slow. Another relevant difference in his latter pair of cases is the immediacy with which the damage is realized: the poison attacks the lungs almost directly, but the damage due to heavy smoking is mediated

by the development of cancer.

Finally, the condition of relative swiftness (and immediacy) would seem to account for discomfort over a remark made by Christian Bay: "Confinement or imprisonment is considered physical violence only if and to the extent that it damages the individual's health, physical or mental."[7] The damage to health which results from confinement usually comes about too slowly to warrant such cases being cases of violence.

These examples show that there is a point to Miss Arendt's remark. She would be right even if she were to claim, in the more formal language adopted here, that relative swiftness and immediacy belong to the set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for violence. Note that the formulation has already been altered by the insertion of 'relative.'

What neither the examples nor the revised formulation do accomplish is to answer questions as "How swift does it have to be?" or "Swift relative to what?" I am not convinced that there are general answers to such questions or even that there are <u>any</u> beyond an appeal to intuitions. Therefore, I am not convinced that the condition in question can be formulated any more sharply than it is above. However, some considerations are relevant to the issue. If one thinks of relative swiftness as a continuum, there is a point above which, if other conditions are met, certain cases will be cases of violence. In addition, beyond such

a point increased swiftness by itself does nothing to enhance the claim to violence, nor, I think, the degree or intensity of violence. Thus, a small church could be destroyed in a second by an explosive bomb, in twenty minutes by an incendiary bomb, and in several hours by a motorcycle gang with crude implements. These are all cases of violence, and if there is any sense in considering them to differ in degrees of violence, that sense does not lie in the difference in time it takes to realize the destruction. There seems also to be a point below which there is no temptation to consider something to be a case of violence. There are probably ranges in the middle where there is hesitancy in our judgments. Suppose Untergang has some partners and it takes them six months to wreck the church, or one month, or a week. Are these cases of violence? Somewhere in these time intervals is the range of unclarity. These cases do not yet seem to have reached the point on the swiftness continuum which they would pass if Untergang invited a sizeable motorcycle gang over and they took care of the thing in a night. Thus, we see that uncertainty about the relative speed of the process is correlated with uncertainty about whether that process is an instance of violence. This kind of correlation lends some support to the general contention at issue: that violence must necessarily be relatively swift.

Uncertainty also exists about what could be called mixed-speed cases. Suppose Untergang works on the church brick by brick for three years until he comes to the point

where one more brick pulled from the bottom will cause the rest of the building to come crashing down. The pulling of that brick and the attendant consequences seem a clear candidate for violence. But what about Untergang's entire activity? Were the three years a preparation for violence, or are they to be included as part of the violence itself? The first alternative is quite plausible, but our response to the second is uncertain because we are not sure how to evaluate the relative swiftness of the entire project.

Another consideration is that swiftness appears to be relative to the nature of the agent. Ten hours is very slow, almost too slow, for a bomb. Similar damage in the same amount of time is a much stronger candidate for being a case of violence if it is brought about by a couple of teenage vandals with hatchets. Finally, swiftness may be relative to the nature of the object of violence. It will usually take longer to bomb out a nation's economic resources than to bomb out a single factory.

I am inclined to think that immediacy can be handled in much the same way as swiftness. Here, too, a continuum is useful because "immediacy" in Miss Arendt's statement suggests an all or nothing criterion. Miss Arendt points to the "classical example" of "Billy Budd, striking dead the man who bore false witness against him...."[8] There is in this case the virtual immediacy of violence in the murder. Yet, it would still be a case of violence if it had taken Claggart half an hour to die. His death would not be immediate and so his murder would not be, although they

would be direct results of Budd's action. If Claggart were to get up and lunge at Budd and then, missing him, fall into the sea and drown, the connection with Budd's action would be indirect; Budd's action, though violent, would not be the violence of murdering Claggart.

It is the presence of swiftness and directness which gives violence its dramatic overtones and which will from this point on be identified as the dramatic condition for violence.[9] To overlook the fact that the normal concept of violence has such overtones, as many have done, is essentially to equate violence with its characteristic results: injury or damage.[10] This equation is openly admitted by John Lawrence, whose conception will be looked at in the next chapter, and it is implicit in many of the other conceptions considered there. Neglecting the processes by which the results of violence are brought about dulls the metaphorical nature of such phrases as "hidden violence," "quiet violence," "covert violence," and the like.[11] Recent concern in America for violence is not a concern for all the processes by which injury or damage are brought about. A quick glance at the work of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence confirms this fact.

iii. The Implementality Condition

Miss Arendt begins the second paragraph of "Reflections on Violence" with a claim that is unusual in the literature on violence: "Since violence--in distinction

from power, force or strength--always needs implements (as Engels pointed out long ago[12]), the revolution in technology, a revolution in tool-making, was especially marked in warfare."[13] If this aspect of violence is one of the ways in which it is to be distinguished from power, strength, and, especially, force,[14] then it is indeed important.

Assuming that Miss Arendt does not substitute "instrument" for "implement" but retains it for the instrumentality or means-ends aspect of her conception, then the following passages show that she does think implements are necessary for violence:

> There exists, of course, a large literature on war and warfare, but it deals with the implements of violence, not with violence as such.[15]

> It is indeed one of the most obvious distinctions between power and violence that power always stands in need of numbers, whereas relying on implements, violence can up to a point manage without them.[16]

> Violence, we must remember, does not depend on numbers or opinions but on implements, and the implements of violence share with all other tools that they increase and multiply human strength. Those who oppose violence with mere power will soon find out that they are confronted not with men but with men's artifacts, whose inhumanity and destructive effectiveness increase in proportion to the distance that separates the opponents. Violence can always destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows that most effective command, resulting in the most instant and perfect obedience. What never can grow out of it is power.[17]

To say that violence always needs implements is not to say that violence always is an implement; the latter will be dealt with below. To avoid confusion the following terminology will be used: violence needs implements

(implementality) and is an instrument (instrumentality). This is the apparent policy of "Reflections on Violence," though not that of the other works; yet careful attention to the context will enable the reader to avoid confusing these two claims.[18]

The claim of implementality requires that all actual or possible cases of violence are cases in which implements are needed. The idea of needed, consistent with the Arendtian passages, seems to be that implements are actually used in all cases of violence. However, this conceptual claim does not require that for every case of violence there must be something which can be identified as the relevant implement. That would be a stronger requirement. At issue is merely whether there must be an implement in every conceivable case of violence. In many cases of violence it is not difficult to conceive of and identify the relevant implements: the knife which ends a family quarrel, the rock on the floor of the Ann Arbor Bank alongside the shattered window glass, the atomic bomb which devastated Nagasaki.

In many cases of violence, like those above, the conceived of and identified implements have the character of pieces of hardware. "Those who oppose violence...will soon find out that they are confronted...with men's artifacts..."[19] In fact, something like the notion of a piece of hardware seems virtually inseparable from the notion of implement. This is true of at least most of Miss Arendt's examples. It is this notion of the hardware-ness of implements which

is a source of difficulty.

There are cases which are clearly cases of violence but for which it seems difficult or at least odd to conceive of something as being the relevant implement. Compare the violence of beating the soles of a captive's feet with a bamboo stick with that of beating him in the face with your fists. The bamboo is clearly an implement, but the condition also demands that your fists be conceived of as implements. Although we do speak of "using one's fists," we normally do not think of fists as hardware or artifacts. It is even stranger to talk about implements in such cases as a protester hurtling himself through the glass door of a government building,[20] or in such logically possible cases as murdering someone merely by intensely wishing this result.

What these cases show is that if Miss Arendt's implementality condition requires that violence involve pieces of hardware, then it must be rejected. If, on the other hand, the condition merely requires that the process of bringing about the characteristic results of violence involve some existents, then there seems to be no objection to retaining it. These existents could be called the means of violence. As aspects of violence, they are theoretically distinguishable from other existents such as the agent or the victim. However, to equate implements with means is an unwarranted expansion of the former notion. Implements are best considered to be a certain kind of means, namely those which have a hardware-like character. Since Miss

Arendt's examples and comments involve implements of this character, her version of this condition for violence is not satisfactory. Although the more general version in terms of means appears sound, such a condition does not help to distinguish violence from other kinds of actions.

iv. The Instrumentality Condition

The examination now turns from the proposed implementality condition for violence to the quite different condition of instrumentality. Miss Arendt explicitly holds that "violence is by nature instrumental; like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the end it pursues."[21] What this position entails is that violence cannot be an end in-itself. That is, to paraphrase her ensuing discussion, there will be no cases where "there is no answer" to the question "and what is the end of violence?"[22] As Walter Benjanim phrased it, "Violence can only be found in the realm of means."[23]

Miss Arendt indicates that the instrumental nature of violence is a conceptual point.[24] That is, all cases of violence are cases where violence is a means to something else. Furthermore, this requires that in all cases of violence there is at least a potential end toward which the violence is a means. It must always make sense to ask "What is this end?" And though it would make sense to answer "We don't know" or "We didn't achieve our end," it would not do to respond "There is no end" or "There is no <u>other</u> end."

It is obviously true that there are some, indeed a great many, cases of violence in which violence can be considered to be a means. This instrumental nature may well be the most important characteristic of violence in such cases. The violence of war can be instrumental to territorial grabs, territorial defense, population control, "the glory of the state," political order, and so forth. The violence of severely beating another human being can serve such ends as robbery, self-defense, coercion, soul-saving, and on and on. It is clear that at least some cases of violence are cases in which violence is instrumental.

Yet, I would like to argue that the view of violence as inherently instrumental is too narrow in that it mistakes the species for the genus. While much violence is instrumental, there are at least two classes which are not: senseless violence and expressive violence. If the case for the non-instrumentality of these two kinds of violence can be established, instrumentality will be eliminated as a necessary conceptual condition.

Senseless violence is simply violence which is completely unreasonable--both to observers and to the perpetrators. It is violence without an end or purpose. This needs to be made explicit, I think, for the phrase "senseless violence" is often a reproach applied to cases of instrumental violence which do have a clear sense, but which one happens not to like. Then, too, it is sometimes

used of instrumental violence which is deemed woefully inadequate for its intended end. Senseless violence has none of these meanings here. Neither is it anything as bizarre as violence which is uncaused or even as violence which serves no psychological, psycho-biological, even bio-chemical functions.

Senseless violence is probably fairly common. Even a good deal everyday violence is senseless. Consider the violence which frequently arises in family quarrels or in fights between very close friends or in the astounding number of cases of child abuse. In many of these cases the perpetrator feels that he didn't mean to do it. He is completely baffled by the question "Why did you do <u>that</u>?" He frequently feels guilt and embarrassment because he realizes that such violence is something which, in moments of self-control, he does not ever want to do or even to intend to do. Not all senseless violence is of an everyday character. It might well be that sometimes rioters who burn their own homes, driven only by the crowd spirit, are perpetrating senseless violence. When Charles Whitman went berserk and shot thirteen people to death from the University of Texas tower in August of 1966, his action could have been called senseless violence. His action had a cause, perhaps, but that did not give it a reason, still less a reason in terms of some end or purpose. It is the latter which is needed for making violence instrumental.

Plausible as these cases of senseless violence might seem, certain psychological theories would deny this

plausibility. These theories probably deserve more attention than they can be given here. The objections are triggered in the hypothesis that there are unconscious or sub-conscious motivations for our acts. If this hypothesis is expanded into the claim that all acts are the result of motivation (conscious, sub-conscious, and/or unconscious), and thus that none are unmotivated, and if it is strengthened by two essentially philosophical propositions, namely that all motives, including unconscious ones, have an end or purpose and that violence is an act, then it seems as though there could in fact be no such thing as senseless violence.

Two things can be said in response, in addition to noting that the hypothesis of unconscious motivation as a general view of human action might simply be false in some cases. One is to question the steps which go from 'motive' to 'end or purpose' and from there to 'sensible' or at least to 'non-senseless' in the sense indicated by the examples given above. The second is to suggest that even if these moves are legitimate, there might still be cases which exemplify what Arendt considers the characteristic danger of violence: "...that the means overwhelm the end."[25] If the means overwhelm the end by being immensely out of proportion, by being monstrously irrelevant, or by being inconsistent with it, then, if the means are acts of violence, there seems good reason to consider the violence senseless and to have great uneasiness about

considering it to be instrumental. Thus, for example, if someone had an unconscious desire for superiority over his brother, it would be a senseless act of violence to murder him. He can't achieve the end--superiority--unless he has a brother; his act of violence takes away precisely that possibility. Or suppose someone beats his wife to make her love him. One can easily imagine cases in which violence is out of proportion or irrelevant or even virtually inconsistent with the desired end.

In can be concluded, then, that even with the objection cases of violence exist which are at least more properly considered senseless than instrumental and which may be senseless and not instrumental at all. I would opt for the second conclusion, but concede in the face of the objection that it would take some time to deny the legitimacy of the moves from 'motive' to 'sensible.' Even with the weaker conclusion, there are cases of a degree and kind where the means so overwhelm the end, where the "instrumentality" is so distorted, that the notions of means and ends either are useless or the means ceases to be a means and becomes the end. Either way, the instrumentality of violence effectively disappears while the violence remains violence.

The condition also fails because of the possibility of expressive violence. Expressive violence has a point, but it does not have an end or a purpose other than itself; it is not instrumental.

Charles V. Hamilton deals with the expressive/instru-

mental distinction:

> It is important to point out that what we have been witnessing in the United States in the last five years have been acts of expressive violence. These are unplanned eruptions resulting from built-up frustration and rage. They are, for the most part, quite spontaneous. They result in burning, looting, and sniping, and they wax and wane depending as much on the weather as on anything else. They knock over liquor stores and furniture stores and snipe randomly at policemen and firemen. The catalyst is usually some provocative face-to-face confrontation with a symbol of oppression....
> .....
> The latter [instrumental violence] is planned; it is calculated. It does not depend on the weather, but rather it seeks to build sanctuaries of support in the community, so that the violent actors can be protected in the indigenous setting. It does not knock over a liquor store or a furniture store; it knocks out a communications system. It does not snipe randomly at firemen or policemen; it deals in selective retaliation.[26]

Hamilton has a case here but he has not driven it home. He needs to say more than that the violence is the result of frustration and rage; all kinds of violence could be caused in this way. And whether or not the violence is unplanned is surely irrelevant to its expressiveness.

What Hamilton needs to drive his point home, and what the very idea of expressive violence needs to sustain itself, is the idea that expressive violence is an end in-itself. The point of expressive violence is merely to exist. It is not senseless, however, because it has a point. Nor is expressive violence instrumental. Surely if the point of it is simple to be expressive, it can not be considered a means to that end, a means to itself. The means-end distinction would collapse if we allowed such descriptions.

One might argue that it is fogging the issue to say that expressive violence is an end in-itself, or is its own point. Consider middle-aged Joel, frequently unemployed, humiliated by welfare workers. He firebombs the grocery store in his neighborhood, even though it means that he will now have to walk a mile to get groceries. We could well imagine his firebombing to be a case of expressive violence all right if, in some way, that is what he intends it to be. Let us, for the sake of the argument, take it that his firebombing was expressive of his rage against the forces which he holds responsible for his generally miserable life. But note that when we do this what we discover is that expressive violence is merely a special case of instrumental violence: Joel's firebombing is a means to the end of expressing his rage. All so-called expressive violence, the objection generalizes, is merely violence which is instrumental to expression.

Nonetheless, I think the expressive/instrumental distinction can be made and maintained and the objection overcome. A good way to insist on it might be to compare Joel to James, also hypothetical. James is a self-conscious member of a paramilitary group. He firebombs the only neighborhood bank, but he does it, let us assume, simply to distract the attention of the police while his fellow members do something more important in a nearby area. James's firebombing is a decoy; it is clearly a case of instrumental violence.

It looks as if we can say similar things about the

two cases, but some of these apparently similar things are deceiving. For example, we can way that Joel expressed his rage by firebombing and that James distracted the police by firebombing, but these are not the same. Joel expressed his rage in the very act of firebombing; James distracted the police by means of firebombing. The two notions are not interchangeable. We cannot say of James that he distracted the police in the act of firebombing. James firebombed the bank in order to distract the police; there is something strange about saying that Joel firebombed the grocery as a means for expressing his rage. His firebombing is that expression; James's is not in itself the distraction of the police.

Instrumental violence, because it is merely a means, can fail to attain its end. Expressive violence cannot fail to be expressive. A given act of violence can be both: it can be, for example, expressive of rage and it can also be instrumental for convincing someone else (or even yourself) that you are enraged. The two are very close, but a given act can be successfully expressive and fail to be persuasive. 'To express' does not mean 'to (attempt to) convince or persuade.' If Joel wheels in the firebomb and runs away, he has expressed his rage as much if the thing does $15,000 worth of damage or $.15. Yet he may well have failed to convince someone else that he was enraged. If James does only $.15 worth of damage or even a hundred times as much, the chances are that it will be instrumentally inadequate, that it will not be

instrumental in distracting the police. Instrumental violence is judged as to its effectiveness by criteria of efficiency. Expressive violence is judged as to its effectiveness by aesthetic criteria. Instrumental violence is logically and empirically distinct from its goal. There is no such distinction for expressive violence. There is surely no <u>other</u> goal for it other than itself, and that is to say, in effect, that it is not a means. It is not that expressive violence is a special kind of means; it is simply not a means at all.

In conclusion, three species of actual violence have been found: instrumental, expressive, and senseless. The conceivability, not to mention the actuality, of the latter two species is a sufficient refutation of any insistence on instrumentality as a necessary condition for violence.

v. The Muteness Condition

The discussion of expressive violence leads to a closely related issue, the alleged inherent muteness of violence. Miss Arendt clearly thinks that violence is in itself non-speech, that it is mute, as is shown in the following scattered quotations:

> Marx's glorification of violence therefore contains the more specific denial of <u>logos</u>, of speech, the diametrically opposite and traditionally most human form of intercourse. Marx's theory of ideological superstructures ultimately rests on this anti-traditional hostility to speech and the concomitant glorification of violence.[27]

> The point here is that violence itself is incapable of speech, and not merely that speech is helpless when confronted with violence.[28]

> Only sheer violence is mute....[29]

> The point is that under certain circumstances violence, which is to act without argument or speech and without reckoning the consequences, is the only possibility to set the scales of justice right again.[30]

Miss Arendt's concept of speech must be understood before the validity of the muteness condition of violence can be examined. Speech and action are for her the distinctly human modes of being. She says the rest best herself:

> Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: "Who are you?" This disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in both his words and his deeds.... Without the accompaniment of speech, at any rate, action would not only lose its revelatory character, but, and by the same token, it would lose its subject, as it were; not acting men but performing robots would achieve what, humanly speaking, would remain incomprehensible.
>
> ...it is also true that man's capacity to act, and especially to act in concert, is extremely useful for purposes of self-defense or of pursuit of interests; but if nothing more were at stake here than to use action as a means to an end, it is obvious that the same end could be much more easily attained in mute violence, so that action seems a not very efficient substitute for violence, just as speech, from the viewpoint of sheer utility, seems an awkward substitute for sign language.
>
> In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities.... This disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to "what" somebody is--his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide--is implicit in everything somebody says and does.[31]

The important ideas in these and related paragraphs rest on the defining characteristic of speech as revelatory of the human person who speaks.[32] Therefore, in the light of expressive violence, it seems the muteness condition

simply does not always hold. I can see no way in which Joel could not be said to reveal himself, to disclose who he is in his act of expressive violence. Indeed, the point of expressive violence is to reveal. No logical barrier exists to having the content of such revelation be one's own self.

Acts of senseless and instrumental violence may be revelatory, in addition to being senseless or instrumental. It is a central contention of some theorists that much collective violence is primarily expressive in nature. Charles Hamilton makes this point. So does Robert M. Fogelson in his article "Violence as Protest." Fogelson goes so far as to claim that the urban riots of the 1960's were "articulate."[33] Charles Tilly, looking at mid-nineteenth century France, but claiming much broader historical validity, remarks:

> The case of France has one more contribution to make to the general discussion of protest in modernization: it illustrates the deeply political character of collective violence. I say "political" not only because violent incidents shook many French regimes, but also because they grew so regularly out of peaceful attempts to change local or national arrangements of power, because they so frequently expressed the moral indignation of ordinary people at what they considered to be violations of their rights and because the central government itself watched collective violence so intently and sought so jealously to maintain a monopoly on violent means of coercion. If so, the common sociological portrayal of collective violence as passionate irrationality misses its most striking features. Hannah Arendt's dictum that "Violence is dumb" does not apply to her principal case, France itself. There, collective violence found its tongue. Martin Luther King's phrase "Riots are the language of the unheard" comes closer to the truth.[34]

If Tilly is right, his conclusions are very damaging to

Miss Arendt's position, as he himself notes.

One might respond that this line of argument only shows that violence can reveal the "what" and not the "who." But if the unique identity of a person (the "who") is not identical with his collection of needs, talents, shortcomings, and so on (the "what"), then this response will be effective only if the nature of the "who" is explained and differentiated from the "what." I cannot find this explanation in Miss Arendt's discussion. Consequently, the privileged way in which speech reveals this "who" also remains obscure if it is conceived in a way so that the examples given above would not count.

In short, it seems to me that there can be communication in violence. This communication like that in words can be used to achieve certain ends or to reveal persons. The latter has just been discussed. In the fourth chapter it will be noted that violence in some circumstances is an implied threat. While probably not all violence is communicative and much of it is not in a revelatory sense, some is. That is enough to defeat the muteness condition.

vi. Other Conditions

Miss Arendt's conception of violence has other aspects, some of which are important to complete any plausible set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for violence. What follows is a skeletal mention of these other Arendtian aspects, together with reasons for tabling or dropping them at this

point.

Miss Arendt regards violence as exclusively destructive: "And the distinction between violent and non-violent action is that the former is exclusively bent upon the destruction of the old, and the latter is chiefly concerned with the establishment of something new."[35] The claim that violence is necessarily destructive will be discussed in the next chapter, as will the issue of intentionality hinted at by the phrase "bent upon." My main point here is that it will not do to insist that violence be exclusively destructive. That would be inconsistent with the idea of instrumental violence; it would make cases like knifing an attacker to preserve your own life to be cases of violence and of nonviolence. In addition, the point of expressive violence is in the establishment of something new: namely, the communication of a message.

Miss Arendt suggests that violence is illegal or immoral: "Not that the great men of the American Revolution could have been ignorant of the great force which violence, the purposeful violation of all laws of civil society, could release."[36] Here is the suggestion that violence is either inherently illegal and/or that it is inherently illegitimate. Both views have been held with more forthrightness and persistence, and they will be discussed in the third chapter.

Two of Miss Arendt's discussions of authority and violence[37] suggest that violence is necessarily without authority. This suggestion could be taken as roughly the

same thing as an illegitimacy condition. She does not seem to suggest that violence is always in some way directed against authority, and there is good reason for avoiding that suggestion. Cases of violence exist in which authority is not the object. The Hobbesian state of nature is a wild example; a more common example is a violent fight between close friends.

Miss Arendt also suggests violence is unpredictable: "Moreover, all violence harbors within itself an element of arbitrariness."[38] From the ensuing discussion we learn that 'arbitrary' means 'unpredictable' and, furthermore, that what is suggested is something like violence necessarily has unpredictable consequences. Although the suggestion is universal in form, the context is a discussion of highly-developed technological warfare. At best the suggestion should be limited to these sorts of cases. Either it is simply false with regard to many cases of violence, or it is a consequence of a general philosophical view of the unpredictability of all events, in which case it does nothing to distinguish the violent ones from any others. It surely does not fit well with the idea of instrumental violence.

vii. Conclusion

This examination of Professor Arendt's rich conception of violence has shown that violence cannot be claimed to be necessarily instrumental nor inherently mute. It is not exclusively destructive nor must it be directed against

authority. The process of violence need not involve implements, as that notion is normally conceived, though it does employ some sort of means in producing its characteristic results. Though this last-mentioned necessity does not help distinguish violence from other actions, the important condition of dramatic character does. Although Miss Arendt's conception involves other conditions which are plausible for an adequate conception of violence, they are not among her distinctive suggestions and so will be discussed below. This chapter also identified major categories within the normal concept of violence: senseless, instrumental, and expressive violence. An awareness of this conceptual richness should help in examining other theoretical conceptions of the nature of violence.

Notes

[1]Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XXIII, No. 1 (1969), p. 15.

[2]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," pp. 1-31.

[3]Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970). Since this book appeared after this essay was first written and since it adds nothing new of significance for the issue, it will generally be ignored in the text in favor of the earlier sources.

[4]Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press, 1968); On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1965); The Human Condition (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books of Doubleday & Company, 1958).

[5]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 24.

[6]Intentions will not do because we could easily imagine that Untergang's intentions were as maliciously destructive as those of the bombardier.

[7]Christian Bay, The Structure of Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 94n.

[8]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 24.

[9]John P. Spiegel, "Toward a Theory of Collective Violence" (unpublished paper delivered to the American Psychiatric Association Divisional Meeting on Violence and Aggression, Chicago, November 15-16, 1968), p. 4. Spiegel, the Director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, remarks in his conceptualization of violence that "A...defining feature is concerned with timing and tempo, usually expressed as 'explosiveness.'" He is one of the few theorists in addition to Miss Arendt who seems to have taken explicit notice of the dramatic condition. The only reason for choosing one way of labeling over the other is that "explosiveness" tends to conjure up certain kinds of violence--bombings, shootings, smashings--while not fitting as well with others--poisonings, smotherings, and so on.

[10]See the second chapter.

[11]John Lawrence, "Violence" (unpublished paper read in part to the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, May 7-9, 1970), p. 5.

[12]Friedrich Engels, "The Force Theory" ("Gewaltstheorie"), in Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Dühring), trans. by Emile Burns (London: Martin Lawrence, Ltd., 1934). The context in Engels does little to help clarify the sense of this claim. The word "Gewalt" in the original is rendered both as "violence" and, in the overwhelming majority of cases, including the reference in question, as "force." One could argue, then, that either the reference is unfortunate or that the Burns translation is. If the latter is the case, then the reference seems inspired, appearing as it does in an over-all context of complaint about failures to make precisely such distinctions.

[13]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," pp. 1-2.

[14]See note 12. It is, furthermore, one of the great disappointments of "Reflections on Violence" that the alleged distinctions between violence and force are developed no further beyond a pronouncement than they are in this passage. Much is made of the violence/power distinction, but the violence/force connection is usually considered to be much closer.

[15]Ibid., p. 2n.

[16]Ibid., p. 15.

[17]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[18]For example, in The Human Condition, p. 178, she writes, "...power cannot be stored up and kept in reserve for emergencies, like the instruments of violence...."

[19]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," pp. 19-20.

[20]Thus, for example, the following conversation is what we might expect as the prosecution prepares its case:

Prosecutor: And what weapons (implements) did the protester employ in breaking the window?
Detective: None, sir.
Prosecutor: Come on. How did he do it?
Detective: He threw himself through it.
Prosecutor (incredulously): You mean he used himself?
Detective: I suppose you could put it that way, sir.

[21]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 18; also p. 2 and p. 32. See also Between Past and Future, pp. 111-112; The Human Condition, p. 122, pp. 204-205.

[22]That power can be an end in-itself, whereas violence cannot, is one of the ways in which they are claimed to be different by Miss Arendt. See "Reflections on Violence," pp. 18-19.

[23]Walter Benjamin, "Zur Kritik der Gewalt," In Zur Kritik der Gewalt und andere Aufsatze (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965). I would speculate that this aspect of Miss Arendt's conception of violence could be traced to this source. At the very least, she knows Benjamin's life and his work, and she has lectured on it (e.g., in Freiburg im Breisgau in the spring of 1967).

Benjamin's conception of violence is quite interesting, especially in its explication of the point at issue. He holds that violence is always a means by being either law-preserving or by being law-establishing: "Alle Gewalt ist als Mittel entweder rechtsetzend oder rechtserhaltend." (p. 45) I will not pursue this view here, partly because it must be considered to concern itself with the essentially special case of the politico-legal order or else it must be expanded by analogy and/or metaphor to a more general view.

[24]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 18.

[25]Ibid., p. 33; see also p. 2.

[26]Charles V. Hamilton, "Violence and Race in the U.S.A.: An Assessment" (unpublished paper presented at the seminar Pacifism and Violence--Their Uses and Limitations as Instruments of Change held by the International Association for Cultural Freedom in Bergenstadt, West Germany, Nov. 14-17, 1969), p. 3. The paper and its central idea were suggested

to me by Mr. Jay Whitman and made available to both of us by Professor Mihailo Markovic, who attended the seminar. While the expressive/instrumental distinction is very important, I do not think it exhausts even the field of actualities.

[27]Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 23.

[28]Arendt, On Revolution, p. 9.

[29]Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 25.

[30]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 24.

[31]Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 158-159. All of the fifth chapter is worth reading in this context.

[32]Here is a good place to remark that the issues of the instrumentality and muteness of violence are merely small parts of Professor Arendt's central social philosophical concepts of making and acting. In The Human Condition violence seems to be a making or a "fabrication"; it very clearly is not considered to be an action (pp. 112, 122, 125, 133-134, 159-160). The conditions of muteness and instrumentality appear to apply to violence because it falls into the category of making. Yet to deny that violence is an action is to go against the way we usually think and talk about it: the phrase 'violent action' does not seem at all odd.

[33]Robert M. Fogelson, "Violence as Protest," in Urban Riots: Violence and Social Change, ed. by Robert H. Connery (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, 1969), p. 44.

[34]Charles Tilly, "The Changing Place of Collective Violence," in Essays in Theory and History: An Approach to the Social Sciences, ed. by Melvin Richter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 164.

[35]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 11.

[36]Arendt, On Revolution, pp. 87-88.

[37]Arendt, Between Past and Future, p. 92; also On Revolution, p. 30.

[38]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 2.

CHAPTER II

THE DESCRIPTIVE CONDITIONS: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

i. Introduction

This chapter brings to a conclusion the analysis of the descriptive conditions of violence, an analysis which recognizes both the process and the result. The major issues dealt with are the following: Does violence essentially involve injury or damage or destruction? Must it be intentional? Are limits to be placed on the conceivable objects of injury of damage? Are limits on the degree of injury or damage required? Is violence inherently physical? Does violence necessarily involve a disruption of order?

The basic approach will be to begin with important explicit definitions of violence and to consider the issues which arise from comparing them to each other. The primary entry under "violence" in the venerable Oxford English Dictionary is as follows:

> 1. the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause damage to, persons or property.[1]

Along similar lines, Webster's Third New International Dictionary has the following definition:

> 2. exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse.[2]

Joseph Roucek, a sociologist writing in the 1950's, before

most of the other individuals quoted here, offers this definition:

> 3. Violence is the willful application of force in such a way that it is physically or psychologically injurious to the person or group against whom it is applied.[3]

The entry in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language stresses the purpose of the act:

> 4. physical force exerted for the purpose of violating, damaging or abusing.[4]

Many behavioral scientists follow this stress. Thus, Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr offer this definition:

> 5. "Violence" is narrowly defined here as behavior designed to inflict physical injury to people or damage to property.[5]

And Jerome Skolnick defines violence as follows:

> 6. ...violence is the intentional use of force to injure, to kill, or to destroy property.[6]

Finally, John Spiegel, the Director of the Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, claims the following about violence:

> 7. .../It/ is characterized by acts of physical force aimed at the severe injury or destruction of persons, objects or organizations.[7]

Other thinkers stress the outcome rather than the process, especially the aspect of purposefulness or intentionality. John Lawrence is well aware of the difference in stress:

> 8a. .../My definition/ reflects a crucial philosophical choice; rather than characterizing violence by uniquely distinguishing traits, I have made "violence" synonymous with "doing serious harm."[8]

However unfortunate it may be, he has done just that, if one considers the way he uses the term through his paper. His

explicit definition, however, lacks the claimed synonymy:

> 8b. "Violence" shall be defined to mean: "the entire class of actions which result, or are intended to result, in serious injury to life or its material conditions."[9]

E. V. Walter clearly shows the same emphasis in his remarks:

> 9. ...the term "violence" will be restricted to the sense of destructive harm.[10]

And H. L. Nieburg agrees when he defines political violence:

> 10. ...acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance....[11]

Still others with a similar stress restrict the object of injury in their definitions. Frederic Wertham claims that violence is only directed against persons:

> 11. Violence is destructive physical action against another person.[12]

Newton Garver expands this definition, but he echoes its core:

> 12. So violence in human affairs amounts to violating persons.[13]

With references to Indian traditions, Unto Tähtinen notes the suggestive Jain definition of "himsa," or violence:

> 13. "Himsa means injury to 'vitality'...."

I will treat all these definitions as attempts to get at the central idea of violence. It is important to remember that this idea is at issue because there are other senses of the term 'violence.' Most of them are related to this central idea in that they latch on to some aspect of it and expand it so that the resultant sense will cover phenomena which the central idea will not. The violence of natural events (e.g., floods, tornadoes, avalanches), the violence

of someone's feelings or passions, the violence of a color scheme or of a socio-economic arrangement, the violence of an individual's movement--all these kinds of violence have something in common with the central concept of violence, though they also differ in important ways. Therefore, it will not be the task of this essay to provide a definition which covers all these kinds of violence.

ii. Force and Violence

It seems important to note here that I do not consider the idea of force to be helpful in an explication of violence. To rely on the notion of force is to provide a source of potentially vast confusion. The literature dealing with the relationships between force and violence manifests a virtual exhaustion of the logical possibilities. Its existence is partly, though only partly, explained by the fact that force is a genuinely ambiguous concept with different and independent senses which are clearly recognized. Violence, on the other hand, seems to me to involve a single central notion, though one which can be extended in various ways.

In the first place, as the famous phrase about overthrowing the government "by force or violence" indicates, the two notions are often treated as virtually identical. There are entries for both in the Oxford English Dictionary which permit such treatment. Then, too, there is the well-known difficulty of rendering the German 'Gewalt' satisfactorily into English. It can be translated as either 'force' or as

'violence.' For example, the important sections on "Gewaltstheorie" in Engels' Anti-Duhring are entitled "The Force Theory" in at least one English translation[15] but referred to as "The Theory of Violence" in the English version of Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth.[16] Even a man with such strong analytic tendencies as T. D. Weldon reveals no suggestion of a distinction between the two.[17] It does seem that there is a fairly clear sense of 'force' which means virtually the same as the central sense of 'violence.' In this sense, of course, the idea of force would be of no help in explicating the concept of violence.

Some, however, have made force and violence conceptual opposites. Perhaps the most notorious version of this ploy is found in Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence. Unhappy that the terms 'force' and 'violence' are used interchangeably to refer to acts of radically different consequences, Sorel remarks

> I think it would be better to adopt a terminology which would give rise to no ambiguity, and that the term violence should be employed only for acts of revolt; we should say, therefore, that the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which a minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order.[18]

Sorel is proposing linguistic legislation here, but it is not uncommon to hear echoes of what he says in other usages. (Generally, of course, Sorel's phrase "in which a minority governs" is ignored by these usages.) I only note that the logical possibility of treating force and violence as incompatible has been instantiated. Such treatment again means that the notion of force would be of minimal help in

explicating violence.

Still a third possibility involves explicating the notion of force in terms of violence. Some definitions retain force as a "more general concept" than violence, defining force "as the actual or threatened use of violence."[19] Other definitions, perhaps somewhat esoteric, treat force as a kind of violence. This is recognized in an entry under "force" in the Oxford English Dictionary: "spec. in Law: Unlawful violence offered to persons or things."[20]

The fourth and last possibility is to define violence in terms of force. Except perhaps for treating the two as equivalent, this possibility is the one commonly used. It appears in many of the definitions of violence set out at the opening of this chapter (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7). Newton Garver, for example, explains it well in his article "What Violence Is."[21] It will appear again in the proposals of John Dewey and Robert Paul Wolff discussed in the next chapter. In this possibility, unlike the previous three, 'force' generally has the sense of 'energy'[22] which, as Sidney Hook notes, "...is a purely physical concept."[23] As such, it merely tells us that in violence some change is brought about in the world, that something happens. This much can be captured in other ways and so employing this sense of force offers no particular help.

In addition, it seems to me that the plausibility of some definitions of violence in terms of force--instances of this fourth possibility--is too greatly enhanced by the ambiguity of 'force': on the one hand, it means something

like applied energy and, on the other, something very much like violence. 'Energy' could be substituted for 'force' in the definitions at the beginning of this chapter, though I suspect that might make them a bit colorless. Doing this in definitions given by Dewey (unproductive force[24]) and Wolff (illegitimate force[25]) enlarges the category of violence to include many, many acts which would intuitively be excluded. Such qualifications as "against someone's will"[26] will not alter this result in a sufficiently satisfactory way. Hence, from a descriptive point of view, these definitions are not even plausible unless they trade on the ambiguity of 'force.' But to trade on it is to invite circularity.

Force and violence have been treated as identical, as incompatible, and as being each definable in terms of the other. 'Force' is dangerously ambiguous in that it can refer to the neutral notion of energy or to something very close to violence if not actually identical with it. The result of all this for a conceptual analysis of violence is a good deal of genuine confusion. Since I think it possible to analyze violence without the concept of force, it seems best to avoid reference to it.

iii. The Condition of Injury or Damage

There is little doubt that violence has to do with injury and/or damage and/or destruction. All the definitions given at the beginning of this chapter concur in this view,[27] which I will seek to refine in the rest of this

chapter.

Before proceeding, this view can be made less cumbersome by dropping the explicit mention of destruction, for in the relevant sense destruction is merely a limiting case. Destruction is the limiting case of injury when the injury is fatal. It is the limiting case to damage when damage is complete or total: when the thing damaged is annihilated. Violence can occur short of this outer limit, of course.[28] Firebombing a building can be an act of violence even if the building is not destroyed. Bludgeoning a person may still leave him a person and it may not; either way it is an act of violence.[29]

Finally, it should be noted that 'injury' most appropriately refers to detrimental effects to persons and perhaps to other sentient creatures as well. 'Damage,' though a somewhat looser term, will be used to refer to detrimental effects to things other than sentient creatures.

Holding that violence somehow always involves injury or damage, the question now is how it does so. One of the most important senses of this question is whether injury or damage must actually occur for a case to be a case of violence or whether it will suffice if such a result is merely intended by the agent. I will attempt to show, first, that there is an issue here, and then I will try to develop arguments designed to show that an affirmative answer should be given. That the answer to this question is not obvious can be seen, first of all, in salient differences among the definitions set out in the opening of this chapter.

Definitions 3, 8a, and 9 through 13 appear to demand that injury or damage actually occur: "...destructive physical action against another person." (11) But definitions 4, 5, 7, and 8b allow that there could be cases of violence without actual injury or damage: "...actions which result, or are intended to result, in serious injury...." (8b) Finally, definitions 1, 2, and 6 are ambiguous in the face of the present question, though it seems slightly more natural to read them as in agreement with the first group.

Looking at certain cases produces no obvious answer. Cases in which injury or damage actually does occur are not difficult; they will unanimously be considered cases of violence. But cases suggested by definitions like 4, 5, 7, and 8b are more troublesome, as will be seen below.

I am inclined to think that for a case to be a case of violence, injury or damage must occur. Although injury or damage is "somehow involved" in cases simply by virtue of being intended, that involvement is not enough to yield cases of violence.

The only explicit argument I have found for this position is given by John Lawrence. He argues that the "injurious results" are "what is important" about violence, in the sense that they "form the basis of concern about violence."[30] But this argument is less than satisfactory. Although the injurious results of violence are what is important about it to many people, they are neither the only important thing about violence nor are they important to everybody. They are no doubt the most important aspect to

the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and to the man on the street when he is on the street. They are, however, considerably less important to the man on the street when he is in his reading chair or sitting before his television set; here the dramatic aspects of violence are what is important to him. Political sociologists might find the propensity of violence to induce or preclude social change more important than the injury or damage it involves. Psychologists might be interested in the motivational patterns behind acts of violence, and so on. It is apparent that the argument given by Mr. Lawrence does not establish the claim that it is necessary that injury or damage actually occur.

Fortunately, there are other arguments for this claim. Again, it sems helpful to look at cases as though they existed on a continuum. At the upper limit of this continuum is the actual occurrence of injury of damage. (There might be a continuum of the degree of injury or damage, but that is a different continuum and has to do with different issues.) Below that upper limit, there is no occurrence of injury or damage, but cases vary in the degree to which such occurrences are close calls.

Let us suppose all the cases on this continuum share the following characteristics: Jeb is the agent and he intends to shoot Matt to death. In general, it seems that the higher up on the continuum a case is, i.e., the closer the call, the more tempting it is to consider that case to be violence. At the upper limit, there is no doubt. If

Jeb kills Matt or if he merely wings him, shattering his shoulder blade, then we would not hesitate to label that as violence. Toward the other end of the continuum, there is little or no inclination to affix that label. However earnest Jeb's purpose or intention, his attempt at carrying it out might be so ill-conceived as to not even stand a chance at realizing the injury or damage. He might only have a toy rifle; should he get Matt in its sights and pull the trigger, we would not be at all inclined to consider this a case of violence. If he has a real gun but it fails to work, that is a closer call, but our inclination to consider it as violence is not very strong. If the bullet whizzes past Matt's ear, that is quite a close call indeed, and it is much more tempting to consider it a case of violence and much more difficult to decide whether or not to do so.

Such examples on the continuum seem to show three things. First, it is not enough for violence merely that the behavior so designated have as its aim the bringing about of injury or damage. This behavior may not stand a chance at effecting injury or damage, and, when it does not, it also does not stand a chance at being considered violence in the normal sense.[31] Something more is needed. Second, in the cases considered and those like them, if injury or damage is actually brought about, then it is a clear case of violence. Third, the difficult cases are those in which the "something more" might be thought of as the closeness of the injury or damage. It is admittedly

hard to decide about some cases; but though such determinations are both rough and complicated, we do make them. The closer we determine the call to be, the more tempting it is to consider the case to be one of violence.

We are still left with the possibility that the close call cases might appropriately be considered cases of violence. If they can be, then it is not a necessary condition of violence that injury or damage actually occur, but merely that its occurrence be a sufficiently close call. However, it seems to me that the language we use to talk about violence indicates that actual injury or damage is a necessary condition and that it also makes provisions for categorizing those cases in which injury does not quite come about.

Imagine a parent complaining to the school principal that "A gang of boys committed violence against Jimmy and injured him." The complaint might be viewed as somewhat redundant perhaps, though it is informative to state that Jimmy was injured and not merely that something of his was damaged. Suppose, however, that she says, "A gang of boys committed violence against Jimmy and almost injured him." This suggests that the gang's violence involved something other than injuring Jimmy and states, in addition, that they almost injured him. But should the principal ask what else the gang did besides almost injuring Jimmy and discover that they did nothing, then the complaint by Jimmy's mother seems very odd. The complaint does not

seem redundant, nor does the second conjunct seem to be merely a spelling out of the more general first conjunct. It seems close to a self-contradiction.

What we want to say about this second complaint, and what our language makes provision for saying, is that the gang attempted violence against Jimmy, but that they failed in their attempt. (It might be, of course, that they merely threatened or pretended the violence, but such cases are not even cases of attempted violence, let alone of actual violence.) This is how the close call cases are best characterized: they are cases of attempted violence or intended violence. When we describe a case as attempted violence and say nothing more about it, we are implying that is was not a case of actual violence and that the reason it was not is because no injury or damage occurred. Attempted violence is not a kind of violence any more than attempted victory is a kind of victory or attempted learning is a kind of learning.

If it were otherwise, if violence encompassed both cases of the actual occurrence of injury or damage and cases where injury or damage was a close call, then we would want to mark the difference between them. 'Attempted' might do for the close call cases. But what would be used for those were injury or damage occurs? At present there is no provision for them. 'Real violence' or 'true violence' or 'genuine violence,' besides being emphatic redundancies, would simply serve to support my claim that cases of close calls are not really cases of violence. 'Achieved violence'

might do were it not for the fact that we do not use that term, whereas 'attempted violence' is natural, common, and has a clear sense. 'Successful violence' refers not to the realization of injury or damage, but rather to the success of violence as a means for some other end. In short, cases where injury or damage occurs are marked by calling them simply 'violence' and in no other way; those where injury or damage is only a close call we mark with something like 'attempted violence.' By so speaking we show that we reserve the concept of violence for cases in which there is actual injury or damage. The occurrence of injury or damage does seem to be a necessary condition for violence.

We can say of someone that he intends violence. We say this when we believe that he intends to injure someone or damage something. We can also say that he intends to frighten or amuse someone by committing an act which would be a close call if injury were intended.[32] For example, Jeb might try to scare Matt by purposely sending a bullet whizzing past his ear. Here we would not say that he intends violence. To intend violence is not to intend a close call; it is to intend injury or damage. And so it would seem that the result should not be considered violence unless the injury or damage is brought about.

Very often when we write or talk about violence, expecially when we moralize about it or warn against it, we employ such phrases as "the injury which violence brings" of "the damage wrought by violence." These phrases often

carry the suggestion that the consequences are extrinsic to the violence itself, though related to it. One might be tempted to read back from this that the injury or damage of violence is always extrinsic rather than intrinsic, as I have maintained. To read back to this conclusion is to make too much of an ambiguity present in the phrases. There are at least three separate kinds of things these phrases could refer to. They could refer to injury or damage brought about by means of violence. One could, for example, damage a university president's reputation or his economic well-being by means of violence, even though the relevant violence is directed against the R.O.T.C. building and not the president's person or property. These phrases could also refer to injury or damage resulting because of violence. Though this phrase itself is ambiguous, it has the common and important sense of referring to counterattacks by the victims of violence and their allies. Thus, the violence of student dissent brings about damage to university budgets by state legislators or it brings about the beating, even killing, of students by police or National Guardsmen. This, one is told, is the consequence of violence. Finally, such phrases can refer to the injury or damage brought about in the violence.

In the first two senses of these ambiguous phrases, the injury or damage is extrinsic to the violence in question, though that violence might be causally related to it. The injury may or may not occur, but that it

sometimes does not occur does not warrant the conclusion that violence need not involve some injury or damage. In the third sense, the injury or damage is intrinsic to violence. That it must be present in violence is a conceptual fact. This fact is the claim of the present section.

iv. The Intentionality Condition

Must violence be intentional? Definitions 1, 2, 8a, 8b, and 9 through 13 request no such condition, whereas the others seem to do so: 3 ("willful"), 4 ("for the purpose of"), 5 ("designed to"), 6 ("intentional"), and 7 ("aimed at"). And Hannah Arendt, as was remarked at the end of the previous chapter, seems to tie such notions as "bent upon" or "purposeful" closely to violence.

Each of these characteristics is notoriously difficult to analyze in and of itself, and attempts to do so would probably show that they do not all amount to precisely the same thing and perhaps even that no two of them are identical. Merging the condition of intentionality with the previous condition, it could be said that a necessary condition for violence is that intended injury or damage actually occur. This form roughly captures the sense of the proposed condition found in the springboard definitions. It might be worth mentioning that those definitions supporting the proposal are offered mainly by social scientists, not philosophers, and so the various differences among them might not be so serious as they could be taken to be.

The question "Must violence be intentional?" is not a clear question. One might take the question to ask whether a necessary condition of violence is that it be intended by the agent; that is, the agent must think of his action as a piece of violence. But it is clear that the agent could be mistaken in his judgment, and he could commit violence without thinking he was doing so. Taken in this somewhat unusual sense, then, the intentionality question is to be answered in the negative.

The most natural way to make the question of intentionality specific is to ask whether or not the injury or damage which occurs must be intended. That is a beginning, but there are at least two significant and different ways in which the question can be made still more specific. The first way takes the question to be "Must the injury or damage which occurs be, in all major respects, just such injury or damage which the agent intended to occur?" The second way of further specifying the question is harder to formulate: "Must it be that the agent intended <u>some</u> injury or damage to occur, even though the resultant injury or damage differs in important respects from that which the agent intended?"

Turning from the questions to a consideration of relevant cases, I will first describe the possibilities and give an example of each and then consider the conclusions which may be drawn. In all the cases, of course, it is assumed that all the other conditions for violence are met.

(a) There are cases in which the injury or damage which occurs is in all major respects that which the agent intended. We have no hesitation about considering all these cases to be cases of violence. It is violence if Jeb kills Matt when he is intentionally shooting at Matt in order to kill him.

(b) There are cases in which the injury or damage which is actually brought about is different in at least some major respects from that which the agent intended, though the agent did intend some injury or damage, and that which occurred is somehow the result of his intention. Some of these cases would normally be considered violence.

Such cases might be described as accidents or as mistakes.[33] John Austin, in the course of delineating the distinction between 'accident' and 'mistake,' describes what could well be taken to be two cases of violence:

> You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, fire: the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and find to my horror that it is <u>your</u> donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and say--what? 'I say, old sport, I'm awfully sorry, etc., I've shot your donkey <u>by accident</u>'? Or '<u>by mistake</u>'? Then again, I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on it, fire--but as I do so the beasts move and to my horror yours falls. Again the scene at the doorstep--what do I say? 'By mistake'? Or 'by accident'?[34]

The first shooting is by mistake and the second by accident, of course.

(c) There are cases like those described in (b) except that the injury or damage which is actually brought about differs to such a great degree from that which was intended

that we would not call them cases of violence. Whereas in those described in (b) we might well speak of accidental violence or of mistaken violence, in these cases we would speak of an accident or a mistake as opposed to violence. We can imagine a robber shooting at the pursuing detectives but hitting instead a power line which falls on the neighboring buildings and causes a fire that burns down a whole city block.

It is worth noting that the difference between (b) and (c) does not rest in the negligence of the agent. No matter how much care the donkey-shooter or the robber has taken to see that only the injurious or damaging results which each intended are brought about, he might be unable to avoid the consequences which have been described. On the other hand, there are conceivable variations on all these cases in which we would claim that the agent was negligent. Consequently, the distinction between being negligent and not being negligent is one which cuts across the distinction between being and not being violent.

(d) Cases exist in which the agent did not intend to bring about any injury or damage but did so nonetheless. These are not cases in which the resultant injury or damage could be said to be detached from the intention of the agent, for there is no such relevant intention. At least some of these cases would be described as accidents or mistakes, as opposed to violence. We can imagine a man backing his car out of the driveway and running over his young son. The injury of his son might well be called an

accident or a mistake, but it would not plausibly be called violence in the normal sense of that term.

(e) There are cases like those described in (d) which would ordinarily be described as violence. The kinds of cases which come to mind are those in which the agent is in a drunken rage, a drugged stupor, or a psychotic condition. In at least some of these cases the agent has no intention to injure or damage, for he could not really be said to have anything in mind. His mind might be empty or it might be such a blur of intentions that we would not really say that he has it in mind to do what he does.

(f) There are cases like those described in (d), except that we hedge or vacillate in our intuitions about whether or not they are properly called violence. Consider a man who brandishes his shotgun in order to impress his son. In a tale too often told, the gun goes off. Sometimes it seems as though we want to call this kind of case an accident or a mistake as opposed to violence, and sometimes it seems as though the accident or mistake is so tragic or so immediate that we want to describe it as violence. Then we would speak of accidental violence, for example, with no feeling of conceptual oddness.

In the course of wrestling with this kind of case, I have discovered that those with whom I have discussed it offer opposing or internally vacillating characterizations. Neither they nor I have been able to come up with a reason which would decisively settle the issue. Some interesting material manifests this vacillation, or at least its weaker

form, the hedge. In Firearms and Violence in American Life, a staff report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, the preparers include a chapter entitled "Firearms and Accidents."[35] Though this chapter appears in Part II, "Firearms and Violence--Cause, Contribution or Coincidence?," it contains not a single instance of the word 'violence' or even the much wider term 'violent.' Subsequent chapters, by contrast, are replete with them. It seems as though the Commission, as well, is unsure about how to characterize at least some cases of the present variety.

(g) Cases can be found in which the attribution of intention to injure or damage to the agent suffices to make us call them violence, and the denial of any such intention suffices to quell our inclination to so describe them. If we attribute to the man backing his car out of the driveway the intention to injure his son while making the injury look like the result of an accident, then we will want to describe his action as violence. We can also imagine him with the same intention but bringing about the injury of his young step-daughter, against whom he had no such designs. A mistake, perhaps, but mistaken violence.

These seven kinds of cases should provide sufficient material to deal with the question at issue, the question of an intentionality condition for the concept of violence. It can be noted that (a), (b), (e), and (g) are violence, whereas (c) and (d) are not. And (f) describes the troublesome type about which we hedge or vacillate in our classifi-

cation. If our labeling intuitions are accurate, then what conclusions can be drawn?

If the question of the intentionality condition is asked in the first specific sense--Must the resultant injury or damage be the same in all major respects as that which the agent intended?--, then the answer is clearly negative. Cases (b) and (e) yield this result. Case (b) is violence, but the resultant injury or damage is significantly different from that which the agent intended. Case (e) is violence, but we would not say that the agent intended any injury or damage.

It can be seen, secondly, that sometimes we do not require that the result be intended at all in order to identify a case as violence. The cases delineated in (e) yield this result.

However, sometimes we do treat intentionality as one of the set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for violence. Case (g) is the source of this conclusion. The distinction between cases of violence, like those in (g), and cases which we would not call violence, like those of (d) and perhaps also (c), rests on nothing more or less than the attribution of a certain kind of intention to the agent.

The conclusion drawn from (g) does not require that we must also admit that intentionality is a necessary condition for those cases where the result is <u>not</u> different from the intention. For even though we sometimes do consider cases like those described in (g) to be violence because the

result was in all major respects that intended by the agent, we can always conceive the result to be somewhat different from that intention (or the intention itself to be somewhat different) and yet remain convinced that we are dealing with violence.

Finally, we have seen that we are sometimes unsure about whether intentionality is a necessary condition for violence. Case (f) illustrates the cases which belong here. In attempting to draw the line between cases (b) and (c), I was forced to be content with the vague remark that at some point the result became so different from the intention that it was no longer comfortable to consider the phenomena in question to be violence. Some cases between (b) and (c) would yield an uncertainty similar to that which strikes us when faced with those in (f): if a guerrilla's pipe bomb goes off in his briefcase as he is on his way to plant it at the police station, we probably would not all agree in calling his destruction violence, and we might even waver in our own minds.

In short, these conclusions about intentionality have been reached:

(1) The injury or damage need not be the same as that intended;

(2) Sometimes the injury or damage need not be intended at all;

(3) Sometimes the injury or damage must be intended;

(4) Sometimes we are unsure about whether it is necessary that the injury or damage be intended.

No doubt it has long since struck the reader that there is something unsatisfactory about asserting both the second and the third conclusions: claiming that sometimes intentionality is a necessary condition for violence (third conclusion) and that sometimes it is not (second conclusion). Yet it would seem that if it is admitted that even sometimes intentionality is not considered a necessary condition, that settles the issue. Then it must be said that intentionality simply is not a necessary condition for violence, period. To say this, however, is to leave as unaccounted for those cases described in variety (g). Since I can think of no way to account for them in such a way as to overturn the third conclusion--that sometimes intentionality is a member of the set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for violence--, the following proposal seems to be the most accurate way to describe the results obtained: there are two different species of the conceptual genus "violence in its central sense." The species are differentiated in that one of them does not require intentionality as a necessary condition for its proper application, whereas the other one does. In short, violence is not a homogeneous concept.

Other considerations could be found to support a single answer, either affirmative or negative, to the intentionality question. Although I do not think that any of them are decisive,[36] it will be helpful to discuss one which pushes toward a negative answer. It points to the extremely wide range of cases in which we use terms like

'violent' and 'violently.' Since it is certainly true that in many such cases we would not attribute any intention to injure or damage to the agent, it might be thought to follow that there should be no intentionality condition in an explication of the concept of violence. What the facts on which this argument is based really show, however, is that there is a natural, comfortable application of terms like 'violent' and 'violently' well beyond the range of the natural, comfortable application of 'violence' in its central sense. They perhaps also show that there are senses of 'violence' which are not odd, but which are different from the sense which is being investigated here. I do not want to deny this, but I do not want to allow it to breed confusion.

'Violent' and 'violently' carry such a large number of possible meanings that it would be a long task to go after all of them. I can mention a couple, however, which are instructive in that they could be employed with ease in cases which would not be called violence in the sense at issue. Sometimes they mean something like 'other than from natural causes,' as when we say that someone died violently. We might say, to be sure, that the case (for example, a mountain-climbing accident) is a violent accident, but we would not easily say that it was accidental violence. Sometimes 'violent' and 'violently' simply indicate swift change, thus emphasizing the nature and way in which the results emerge from the process and/or the manner of executing the action described. We might even say that someone lost in his thoughts picked a flower violently. Though we might use

the adverb, we would not normally use the substantive in this case, unless we were deliberately employing a metaphor. Appealing to cases where the terms 'violent' and 'violently' apply with comfortable naturalness in order to establish conceptual points about violence in its central sense is a move which can be seriously misleading. As an argument for throwing out the intentionality criterion for violence, this appeal fails.

Thus even in its central sense, violence appears to be a generic concept with two species: in one of them we require the intention to injure or damage on the part of the agent and in the other one we do not.

v. The Objects of Violence

Differences in conceptions of violence suggest yet another question: should limitations be placed on the objects of injury or damage appropriate to the concept of violence? Of those definitions noted at the beginning of this chapter, definitions 2 and 4 appear to place none whatsoever. Definitions 8a, 9, and 10 might be read in the same way. They might also be read to suggest some restriction, 8a and 9 because of their use of the term "harm" and 10 because of its explicit interest in political violence. Tähtinen (11) notes that Jain thought limits violence to injury to "vitality." John Lawrence offers a somewhat similar, though also somewhat expanded, boundary in his explicit definition (8b): "injury to life or its material conditions." John Spiegel states the objects of violence may include "persons, objects

or organizations."(7) Definitions 1, 5, and 6 importantly shrink Spiegel's class of "objects" to "property." They also include injury to persons, though definition 6 might be taken to include other sentient beings as well. Finally, definitions 3, 11, and 12 apparently restrict the object of violence to persons.

I will argue for some limitation. The boundaries of the limitation most obviously include people as conceptually appropriate objects of the injury or damage involved in violence. From this central focus, I will expand the boundaries to include beings which are considered to be very much like people in the way they think and feel and also to include objects which bear the following relationship to people: when these objects are injured or damaged, some person's interests are thereby negatively affected. I will then argue that this relationship should be restricted to include only certain kinds of interests.

First, it seems clear that some limitation should be accepted. There are cases of injury or damage which would not be considered violence. Furthermore, if we take essentially the same cases and make changes only in the object of injury or damage, the alteration could change our judgment and put the new cases into the category of violence. For example, it would not be violence to set off a test bomb in a cave, thereby damaging the rock formations. By contrast, it could well be violence if there were people in the cave. And we would probably consider it violence if there were property--a communications relay center, perhaps--

but no people. Then, too, it is difficult to consider as violence the sawing in half of a tree or the lopping off of some of its branches--provided no other relevant factors are introduced. But most cases of sawing people in half or of lopping off their limbs would surely classify as violence. Additional factors could make some cases of sawing trees in half qualify, too. The men of a rival town might eliminate the symbolic ancient oak in the town square. Although all these cases involve injury or damage, only some of them are cases of violence. That some of them are not indicates that the concept of violence involves a limitation on the conceptually appropriate objects of injury or damage which it will encompass.

Granted that there are to be restrictions on the conceptually appropriate objects of the injury or damage of violence, what are they? The word 'victim' connotes a special category of possible objects of injury or damage. In fact, I shall argue that for every case of violence, there must be a victim.[37] Otherwise there is no violence, even though there may be injury or damage. Few would contest that people count as victims. None of the source definitions suggests that people are not appropriate objects of violence. It also seems to be the case that in the central of normal sense of violence only people uncontestedly qualify as victims, though other things may be the object of injury or damage of violence if they involve a certain relationship to some person or persons.

Mere damage to non-sentient beings, even were it to

be total, is not in and of itself sufficient for violence. It might be suggested that we are perpetrating violence when we carve up a tree to make a table, shatter a rock for its minerals, or blow up an island to obtain information, and, consequently, that such objects are conceptually proper objects of violence. I consider that such cases are metaphorical or at least that they employ quite a different sense of violence from the one at issue. This other sense, often marked by the locution 'to do violence to,' seems to require little more than bringing about some significant change. This is not the sense of violence people are interested in when they worry about violence or discuss its role in political change.

Either we do not consider injury to sentient beings other than people, even though it be fatal, to be in and of itself violence or else the appropriateness of such consideration is contested. It would seem that if anything besides people could straightforwardly be considered victims, certain animals could be. Yet few feel it natural to speak of the violence brought upon termites and mosquitoes by poison. Dissent rises as we move up the chain of being. But it still seems safe to suggest that most of us would find it odd to consider what goes on in slaughterhouses as violence. Some in our society disagree and this point is contested in other societies. In Tähtinen's discussion of Indian thought, it is clear that violence, defined as injury to "vitality," includes injury to creatures with as much "vitality" as ants and mites. That such beings, too, are

conceptually appropriate victims is embodied in the religion and daily habits of the society.

Thus, if an object of injury or damage is not a person, we either do not normally consider it to be a victim of violence or we disagree about whether it should be so considered. When we are in agreement about refusing to consider such objects as victims, the obvious implication is that they fall outside this category. What account can be given for the cases of disagreement? I suggest that the key involves an anthropomorphization of the object in question. If we think of the injured objects as being very much like people in what they think and feel--or if we in some way take them to actually be people, as do some religious traditions--, then we will correspondingly treat them as possible victims, regardless of any relationship they might or might not have to real people. This is true not only for sub-human beings, but also for super-human beings: spirits, demons, angels, gods, God, and so forth.

Thus, the conceptually appropriate victims of violence include people and things thought to be very much like people in the way they think and fell--products of considerable anthropomorphization.

Although the victims of violence are appropriate objects of violence, we surely acknowledge other things as appropriate objects. Much of the recent concern about violence, for example, has been about bombing buildings, burning automobiles, even breaking windows. Often these objects of damage have been the subject of concern, even when no

direct physical injury to people is involved. It takes but little effort to extend this category to vengeful shootings of the family dog, burning the draft board's files, defoliating the enemy's fields, vandalizing the laundromat's washing machines, and so on. However, unless there is a certain relationship between these objects of injury or damage and people, we do not normally consider such cases to be violence. Blowing up an abandoned and isolated building would probably not be considered violence. The same could be said about setting off atomic bombs in the desert. Nor does violence normally include burning a trash pile, poisoning rats, hunting wild dogs. The difficult thing is how to characterize the relevant relationship.

One attempt to get at this relationship is indicated in the definitions which began this chapter and also in other literature.[38] This is to consider these objects as being in some sense or other the property of the people involved. Now surely we do consider a person's property as a conceptually appropriate object of violence, be that person an individual, or be they an organization, or be they "a people" or "a public," as when we speak of violence committed against public property. But as a general account of the crucial relationship between objects and people for violence, this has at least two difficulties.

The first is that it is not at all clear what sense of property should be involved, though it does seem clear that some senses will be inadequate. For example, the

sense developed in legal positivism will fail because some of the kinds of cases described would surely be cases of violence even if there were no law to declare and decide that the injured or damaged objects were someone's property. Violence did not first come upon the scene with the Romans nor even with Hammurabi. Perhaps a less formal sense of property, such as the recognition by custom of certain rights and privileges vis-à-vis the object might do. Or perhaps one might have to move to a philosophical idea, such as mixing one's labor with the object (Locke) or embodying one's will in it (Hegel). Suffice it to say that getting the right sense of 'property' could prove to be difficult. It would have to be a fairly wide sense.

The second difficulty is that merely having the injured or damaged object be someone's property is not sufficient to place it in the set of conceptually appropriate objects of violence. If a demolition team blows up Cyrus Magnate's building just as he has hired them to do in order to make room for a new parking lot, the act would not be considered violence. On the other hand, if Diamond Dave's henchmen blow up Magnate's building, that would probably be considered an act of violence. The important difference between the cases is that in those of violence, the owner's interests are negatively affected by the injury or damage. There are problems with relying on this difference. One is that of analyzing 'being in someone's interests.' It can just be remarked that affecting someone's interests negatively does not require that he believe his interests

to be negatively affected. The blowing-up of Magnate's building by Diamond Dave's henchmen could affect Magnate's interests negatively even though, by some quirk of fate, Magnate never believes that it did. He might, for example, think it good riddance, not realizing that a realtor was about to offer him a large sum of money for it.

A more important problem is determining when someone's interests are negatively affected by the injury or damage to some object so that such an act falls into the category of violence. Robert Paul Wolff remarks that the "customary distinction between violent and non-violent modes of social interaction" seems to rest on two distinctions. The second one he mentions seems relevant to the present problem: "...the objective distinction between those interests which are central or vital to an individual and those which are secondary or peripheral."[39] "Central or vital" seems a bit too strong, and I would therefore prefer to replace it with something like 'of considerable importance.' People can get along in much the same fashion as before after being the victim in many cases that we would agree were violence: the injury or damage, then, need not negatively affect their central or vital interests. But unless this injury or damage negatively affects interests of some importance, we would hesitate to call it violence. We hesitate to do so if a baseball comes crashing through the window from a neighborhood game on the street, but not if a rock does the same thing from a passing car. The difference might partly be explained by the attribution or denial of intention to

the agent, but it would also seem partly explained by the fact that we would feel additional and more important interests to be negatively affected by the rock thrower than by the home-run king on the block.

Not only must interests affected be of relative importance, but we also demand that the importance be appropriate in relation to the injured or damaged object. This appropriateness can be derived from many different sources: legality, morality, custom, religion, and so forth. A few cases illustrate these two qualifications on interests. The two qualifications, of course, merge into one complex one: interests affected negatively in cases of violence must be appropriately important.

Suppose Diamond Dave has his men blow up Cyrus Magnate's building, but suppose this time Dave believes, correctly, that this will result in positively affecting Magnate's interests in some clear-cut way, such as saving him money in the following fiscal year. Still, we would probably claim that he had indulged in violence. What important and appropriate interest of Magnate's would be negatively affected? I suggest that we would find it in the interest he has by virtue of ownership; he has an interest in avoiding the violation of his right to decide if his building may be damaged. Diamond Dave violated that right and so negatively affected the attendant interest. There seems little doubt that we regard such interests as important and appropriate, for even the smashing of windows is deemed violence.

Interests in property rights are not the only ones we

consider appropriately important. The slashing of a major painting or the bombing of a medieval cathedral or the desolation of a spot of great natural beauty might well be considered violence. Aesthetic interests of considerable and appropriate importance could be held to be negatively affected, though it might be hard to spell out whose they were and how much or in what sense they were of considerable and/or appropriate importance. Similarly, religious interests might be negatively affected in the violence which destroys a shrine or a sacred place, though it be of little aesthetic value and though it not be anyone's property.

On the other hand, some interests can be ruled out because they are irrelevant to violence. Imagine someone who has a sentimental or an aesthetic interest in the preservation of an old one-room country schoolhouse. That his interest would be negatively affected would not be enough to make the county's razing of the structure an act of violence. It probably would not be enough because we would not think the interest of considerable enough importance. Yet his interest might be very important, as would be clear when he goes into shock upon learning of its destruction. Then our response would probably be to consider the importance of his interest to be inappropriate. We would feel that "he took it much too hard."

Perhaps the reason why people are uncontestedly appropriate objects of violence is that we do not doubt that interests of appropriately considerable importance are negatively affected when violent injury is brought upon them.

Some people, like leaders of the Inquisition or the witch trials, might not think so; the victims might not even think so themselves, as apparently some of the Zulu murdered by the despot Shaka in the nineteenth century did not.[40] In the face of such potential counter-examples, however, it seems sufficient to remark that we think these people are wrong in their judgments about whether their victims' or their own interests are negatively affected.

These cases illustrate the thesis that for every case of violence there is a victim. Violence is committed <u>against</u> a victim or victims, though it may be committed <u>on</u> something else as well as directly on the victim. The victim is either a person who is himself injured or whose interests of appropriately considerable importance are otherwise negatively affected by the injury or damage to some other object.

The cumbersome conclusion is that we should restrict the conceptually appropriate objects of the injury or damage inherent in violence to two classes: (1) victims, people or beings thought to be very much like people in important respects; and (2) objects whose injury or damage would negatively affect some victim's interests if those interests are of appropriately considerable importance. There are admittedly problems with this characterization. It is very rough in some areas, especially in saying what "appropriately considerable importance" is. Nevertheless, it should be quite serviceable.

vi. The Degree of Injury or Damage in Violence

While the majority of the conceptions which begin this chapter say nothing about the degree of injury or damage involved in violence, four thinkers apparently demand that only injury or damage of some relatively high degree be permitted to count. John Spiegel (7) countenances only "severe injury or destruction," and John Lawrence (8a and 8b) "serious harm" or "serious injury." Frederic Wertham (11) would have violence be "destructive physical action," and E. V. Walter (9) speaks of "destructive harm." The question now is must violence involve serious injury or damage?

Injury or damage might be said to be serious in three quite distinct ways. 'Seriousness' might refer, first, to the relatively high degree of importance attached to the interests of the victim. Secondly, it might refer to the relatively high degree of negative effect on the relevant interests. Thirdly, it might refer to a relatively great amount of injury or damage to the object itself (person or otherwise).

If the question is taken in the first sense, i.e., a relatively high degree of importance must be attached to the interests of the victim, the question must be answered affirmatively. I would probably be thought to be overdoing it if I complained about violence after someone slipped into my house, ripped up and scattered newspapers from the last few days, and then quietly left. Should he repeat the performance, however, by using the draft of my thesis, my

complaint is likely to be taken at face value. The thesis is more important to me than are the papers.

If the question is taken in the second sense, i.e., the relevant interests must be greatly affected, then no general answer can be given. This is primarily because the various ways in which we can describe someone's interests allow for radically different answers. Consider the violence of breaking three windows in the General Motors building. If we say that the relevant interest affected is GM's desire to lose as little money as possible, then it is clear that this interest is not greatly affected by the violence described. If we say that the relevant interest is GM's obsession to never take a loss, then that interest is greatly affected; it is an all or nothing affair and does not admit of degrees. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that violence often affects more than one interest of the victim.

If the question is taken in the third sense, i.e., that the damage or injury to the object must be severe, then the question must be answered negatively. It is most likely this sense that the minority who insist on it as a condition for violence have in mind. The answer seems both simple and surprising, but I can read my own intuitions and descriptions of current events in no other way. Take the case of rock-throwing students attacking a bank. Their heaved missiles could (1) not come within ten yards of the bank; (2) hit it, but knock off only tiny chips from some bricks; (3) break a few windows; or (4) make the walls come tumbling

down.

Result four puts the case indisputably within the category of violence. I have argued above that when there is no injury or damage--result one--there is not a case of violence. By present standards, result three would be considered violence without much dispute. Yet the damage is not nearly as serious in the third result as it is in result four. We can imagine a gradual lessening of the degree of injury or damage toward a result like that of two. Result two is a borderline case in reference to its being deemed a case of violence. At the same time, it seems clear that the injury or damage in two could hardly be considered serious. So in result three we have a borderline case of seriousness of injury or damage coupled with a very clear case of violence. In result two we have a reasonably clear case of lack of seriousness and a borderline case of violence. It would also seem that somewhere between results two and three we could find a reasonably clear case of violence in which it is also reasonably clear that the injury or damage involved is not severe, assuming that three is not such a case. Perhaps only one window in the bank need be broken or else a single door cracked, though it remains quite functional.

This suggests that there is some minimum threshhold of injury or damage which must be crossed before the concept of violence becomes appropriate. This threshhold varies from case to case, though in general it seems to decrease as the relative importance of the interest affected

negatively increases. Thus for the damage which the sandlot hero does with his baseball to be considered violence will take more than just a broken window. It might take such serious injury or damage as cutting the baby by the glass from the window before we would speak of his violence, even though we might continue to admit that his action was accidental. Yet were a student to break only the glass in a trophy case--damage which is clearly minor--it would swiftly be tagged as violence. Much more important interests are believed to be negatively affected by the student's actions than by the parallel destruction wrought by the baseball player.

It seems that though violence involves negatively affecting an interest of some importance, it need not do so by inflicting serious injury or damage. Sometimes these two notions get confused, even to the point where we speak of violence which involves no injury or damage but which merely challenges an important interest.

vii. The Physical Nature of Violence

One last difference remains among the definitions which opened this chapter: for some violence is physical. Actually, this issue is made up of two aspects. The first is whether violence must have physical results. Graham and Gurr (5) limit violence to "physical injury to people or damage to property." One of John Lawrence's conceptions (8b) might be taken in this sense as well: "injury to life or its material conditions." Two thinkers explicitly deny

that the resultant injury or damage of violence need be limited to that which is physical: Roucek (3) allows psychological injury and Tähtinen (13) injury to "mental vitality" as well as physical.[41] Garver, too, insists on results of violence which are not physical, an insistence for which his definition leaves plenty of room. None of the others place any explicit restriction on the character of the result.

The second aspect is whether violence must involve physical processes: "physical force" in definitions 1, 2, 4, and 7, or "physical action" in definition 11. Nobody explicitly claims in his definition that the process can be other than physical, though some do not claim that it must be either. In their ensuing discussions, both Garver and Tähtinen talk of violence in a way which does violate such a restriction on the process, and Roucek defines force as "...physical or intangible power or influence to affect change in the material or immaterial world."[42] Since Roucek's conception of violence is, in effect, simply injurious force, he might well be taken to dissent along with Garver and Tähtinen.

The sense of 'physical' involved here is the rough, everyday one; what is physical is opposed to what is mental, psychological, moral, spiritual, or even economic. Fortunately, therefore, the view that everything--or nothing--that exists is in some sense physical or the mind-body identity theory need not be considered. Whatever our metaphysics, we would probably want to make some kind of distinctions

covering roughly the same kinds of different phenomena as the terms 'physical,' 'mental,' 'spiritual,' and so on mark out in everyday life.

It should be noted that these two physical aspects, process and result, are not logically tied to each other. Physical processes like slapping, hitting, and kicking can result in non-physical injury, for example, in mental injury. And though it is perhaps less common, it does not seem logically impossible that physical injury or damage could be the result of non-physical processes. Destruction by fiat is at least conceivable. More prosaic are the physical deteriorations which follow economic reverses, psychological rebuffs, moral slights, or spiritual excommunications.

As a final preliminary, the nature of pain must be considered. Pain is to be considered a kind of injury in and of itself, whether or not it is accompanied by other injuries. It would be injurious, in the sense of harmful, to torture a person by electric shock, even though all that happens to his body is that certain parts of his nervous system get a good workout. Secondly, although all pain is mental rather than physical in the sense that it is felt or experienced, we also make distinctions between physical and psychological (or moral or spiritual) pain. Accordingly, physical pain will be considered to be a kind of physical injury, mental anguish to be a kind of mental or psychological injury, and so on.

Having said all this, is violence, in the normal or central sense which has been pursued through these pages,

a concept to be limited to physical processes or physical results or perhaps to both?

The subject of this essay is violence only as a physical concept. It is limited, at least by decision, to concern for results which are physical. This limitation is indicated by the recurrent examples of injury to sentient beings: physical pain, cuts, bruises, burns, gashes, punctures, breakages, snappings, shatterings, poisonings, and death. It is also indicated by examples of physical damage to buildings, equipment, possessions, and other physical objects. This limitation of results has been accompanied by a limitation to physical processes: shooting, stabbing, exploding, bombing, burning, beating, kicking, and so on. This latter limitation is not by decision, however, but is a reflection of the way my age looks at the world, at how in fact physical injury or damage can be brought about. If we believed that such results could be brought about by voodoo or even that psychological rebuffs were a direct cause of a person's heart attack, then there would be no objection to including such processes in the notion of violence here under investigation.

This limitation can be defended on two grounds. First, it is violence as such a physical concept that is the concern of our age. It is the concern of the man on the street--unless he makes a special indication otherwise, usually by explicitly modifying his use of the word 'violence' with some adjective like 'psychological' or 'moral.' It is the concern of social scientists and politicians. One need

but page through the reports to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The sense of violence I am seeking is central because it is the object of such concern.

Second, should one drop this limitation, it is not clear where one is to stop. In particular, it is not clear how one is to stop short of simply equating violence with injury or damage.[43] With this limitation, as has been seen in the previous chapter, some boundaries are intuitively drawn. Not all physical injury or damage, however sinister, is violence. Even death, should it result from old age or disease, is not violence except under highly exceptional circumstances. Sun, rain, changes in temperature can bring a building into disarray without anyone inquiring into the causes of this "violence."

There are, admittedly, advantages to speaking of such things as psychological violence and economic violence. 'Violence,' with its dramatic overtones and its urgency, enables the kinds of injury or damage to which terms like 'moral violence' refer to strike the mind and the conscience with greater impact. In particular, they provide a tactically and normatively sound balance to discussion of the legitimacy of employing physical violence, violence as normally conceived, when dealing with injury or damage which results from various forms of omission, whereas the sense of violence analyzed here refers only to commissions. Finally, there is some indication that these other senses are becoming more and more common and that we

are feeling more comfortable with them. It may be that soon they will no longer sound metaphorical or extended, as they once did so decisively to my ears.

The limitation, then, is in a way a decision as much as it is a claim about the "true" concept of violence. The reader's linguistic intuitions will have to pass judgment on whether the moral issues surrounding violence are helped in the long run by a tightening-up rather than a loosening of the concept of violence itself.

viii. Disruption of Order and Lack of Control

Before drawing the various strands of this and the previous chapter together into a conclusion, two final options must be considered, although I will reject them: first, violence somehow involves the disruption of order and, second, violence is somehow essentially uncontrolled. They are treated at this point because they do not appear to be at issue among the conceptions from which I have been drawing my concerns in the foregoing parts of the chapter, though both characterizations have appeared in the literature on violence.

The first option holds that a distinguishing characteristic of violence is that it somehow or other involves a disruption of order. The notion of disruption is explicitly mentioned but once in the source definitions, and then by H. L. Nieburg (10). Jerome Skolnick, who offers definition 6, remarks later in his discussion that "...<u>the</u>

concept of violence always refers to a disruption of some condition of order; but order, like violence, is politically defined."[44] Chalmers Johnson, looking at the matter with an overriding concern for revolution, claims:

> ...we may define violence as action that deliberately or unintentionally disorients the behavior of others. Violence is either behavior which is impossible for others to orient themselves to or behavior which is deliberately intended to prevent orientation and the development of stable expectations with regard to it.[45]

And, finally, Robert Paul Wolff remarks that one of the two genuine distinctions on which rests the customary distinction between violence and non-violence "...is the subjective distinction between the regular and accepted and the irregular or unexpected uses of force."[46]

There is, to be sure, at least one sense in which violence inherently involves a disruption of order. All violence involves change and thus leaves the order or things in the world different from what it was before the violence. This chapter has said something about the nature of this change. Clearly, however, that violence involves disruption of order in this sense is a different and less interesting claim than that advocated by theorists like Skolnick and Johnson.

The notion of order which these men have in mind is apparently something like the social order, the regular and accepted ways in which people deal with each other in a society. As Johnson puts it, "Violence...is a contingent concept dependent upon the prior existence of a system of social action within which it takes place."[47] Violence,

then, is to be characterized as violating the norms of the system of social action, as dealing with people in irregular, unexpected, and disorienting ways. It is in this interesting sense that violence is claimed to be inherently disruptive of order.

Three observations are in order before proceeding. The first is that the option does not claim that inherent to violence is a goal of disrupting the social order. The second is that although acts which disrupt the political order would count as violence in this view, they are not the only acts which would. The system of social action is much broader than the system of political action. Skolnick's suggestion that order is politically defined is either misleading or else it makes violence much too narrow a concept.[48] The third observation concerns the status of this view. Skolnick seems to indicate that disruption of order is only one of the defining characteristics of violence and that other conditions would have to be met as well. Chalmers Johnson, on the other hand, appears to take it to be a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for violence. I need not pursue this here and attempt to decide who is right, for I will try to show that both positions are wrong.

It is my position that disruption of order in the interesting sense is not a necessary condition for violence because not all behavior which we deem violence disrupts. It also seems clear that some disruption is not violence.

Therefore, disruption is not a sufficient condition for violence.

Taking the latter issue first, it is most telling against the proposal in question that even the political order can be disrupted by actions such as sit-ins and marches, which are classically regarded as non-violent. The social order, in a more general sense, can be disrupted by obtaining mass conversions in a new religion, by wearing unusual clothes, by developing new technology, and so on. None of these, however, is violence in the straightforward sense of the term. Johnson himself states that

> It [violence] may range in form and intensity all the way from gratuitous insults to lunatic acts or criminal behavior directed against other members of the system (e.g., murder or banditry), and from sub-insurrectionary protest movements (such as civil disobedience, politically-motivated fasts and sit-down strikes) to full-fledged rebellion or revolution. Similarly, the effects of violence may vary from a degree of personal tension to the impaired efficiency of large groups of people, and from political instability to the total destruction of the system.[49]

It is clear that Johnson includes in this list actions which both classically and intuitively are not to be regarded as violence. Johnson could, of course, defend himself by claiming the right to define 'violence' as a technical term for whatever purposes he wants. (His purpose here is to say something about revolutionary change.) I will not quarrel with this defense, provided that neither he nor someone else attempts to view this definition as an explication of the way we normally employ the concept of violence, for that it is surely not.

Turning to the suggestion that disruption of order is a necessary condition for violence, it seems that it confuses an empirical claim--and at that a dubious one--with a conceptual claim. For the fact that in our society violence is an irregular, unexpected, unaccepted, disruptive form of dealing with others does not entail that this is what violence means. It is certainly imaginable that a social or a socio-political order could be built on violence, though it might make life nasty, brutish, and short. The world has in fact seen such systems brought to realization. One is vividly portrayed in E. V. Walter's fascinating study of the Zulu in Terror and Resistance. Totalitarian societies in our century have been based on violence, and various forms of violence have been common modes of social interaction throughout history. War is still expected, accepted, and not necessarily disruptive of society; a society's organization might be one geared for war. Yet, if anything qualifies as violence in the normal sense of the term, war does. The notion that violence is the ultimate arbiter of social disagreement may or may not be false, but it is not a self-contradiction. If disruption of order were a necessary condition of violence, then it would seem self-contradictory to claim that order could be imposed and maintained by means of violence.

Since, in conclusion, not all violence disorients or disrupts, violence is not inherently disruptive. Some violence has these characteristics and some does not. Since some disruption is clearly non-violent, disruption

is not a sufficient condition of violence. The option that a uniquely distinguishing characteristic of violence is that it somehow or other involves a disruption of order is, therefore, to be rejected.

H. L. Nieburg writes, "The distinction between 'violence' and 'force' (one uncontrolled, the other controlled) was common in Pre-Laswellian literature."[50] This description of violence as inherently uncontrolled is certainly very vague, for a number of aspects of violence might be claimed to be uncontrolled: the process could be uncontrolled in terms of its speed or the amount of energy involved; the result could be uncontrolled in terms of the degree of injury or damage produced, the kind of injury or damage, the identity of the victim, and so on.

Perhaps the most prominent sense of 'uncontrolled' which would appear to be relevant here is that the agent is not able to insure that the results he produces are in all major respects the same as those which he intended. When the claim that violence is inherently uncontrolled incorporates such a meaning, it seems clear that it is false. In some cases of what we would surely call violence, the result <u>does</u> match the intentions of the agent, though in others it does not. An examination of the various varieties of violence discussed in the fourth section above should yield conceivable cases of both kinds.

Since some cases in which violence is controlled would also, as a matter of empirical fact, require that the agent control the amount and direction of energy, it follows

that violence cannot be accurately defined as "an uncontrolled expenditure of energy which results in injury or damage."[51]

Sometimes the ambiguous claim about the uncontrolled nature of violence is asserted as meaning that the agent in a case of violence is engaging in action which will get out of hand. Those who claim that violence is self-defeating often seem to be saying something like this. Hannah Arendt remarks that the danger of using violence is that it tends to "overwhelm" the end.[52] Her claim here is not a conceptual point, but it is a good indication of the kind of thing which one might be tempted to turn into a conceptual claim. Yet when the claim is a conceptual one, it seems clear that it is false. One can imagine cases in which violence does not get out of hand, in which it is indeed an effective means and even the most effective means available, in which it need not have any ultimately damaging psychological effects on the agent nor will it necessarily produce retribution. The claim discussed here is plausible as an empirical claim, and even then it is sometimes true and sometimes false.[53]

One might respond to what has been said by insisting that it is humanly impossible to control the future and so violence must necessarily be uncontrolled. If 'control' and 'guarantee' mean something like 'possess a reasonable assurance that you can produce what you want and only that,' then the claim on which this rejoinder is based is undoubtedly false. If they mean something like 'possess an

absolute and indubitable assurance that...,' then the claim raises difficult metaphysical and epistemological issues which will not be pursued here. If this latter claim is true, then not only is violence inherently uncontrolled, but so is non-violence. Consequently, being uncontrolled (or being controlled) will not serve to distinguish violence from phenomena which are not violence, and thus this characteristic is useless for analyzing the concept of violence.

The claim that violence is inherently uncontrolled, then, is either false or useless, and so it cannot serve as a necessary condition for explicating the concept of violence. The claim that violence is inherently disruptive fares no better with regard to that purpose.

ix. Conclusion

Violence in its central sense refers to processes which result in at least some minimum degree of harm. This harm might be direct injury to persons or it might be injury or damage to objects. It is characterized by a negative effect on interests of appropriately considerable importance to a person who can be said to be the victim of the violence. It has been noted that the minimum degree of harm sufficient for violence may vary from case to case, in part dependent on the nature of the victim's interests, and that what is an "appropriately important" interest may also vary. It has also been remarked that it is physical injury or physical damage which is involved in violence. I

noted, however, that this result is in good part a decision as much as a finding, though a decision bolstered by theoretical considerations of some significance.

As for the nature of the processes which produce the definitively characteristic results of violence, I find them to be relatively swift and/or to produce their results with a relatively high degree of directness. These characteristics are the major contributors to the inherent dramatic quality of violence. Consideration of the alleged intentionality of violence revealed that even in its central sense, violence appears to be a generic concept encompassing two species: one of these species is distinguished in that it requires some sort of intention to harm on the part of the agent, whereas the other one does not. Though it was nowhere argued, I should note that an underlying assumption of the entire discussion is that there <u>is</u> an agent in each case of violence and that the processes of violence are commissions by an agent.

I have also rejected various hypotheses about the nature of violence and will mention here only some of the most important. Although disruption of order is often a concomitant effect of violence, it is not a defining characteristic of it. Then, too, violence is not necessarily political in character, in any straightforward sense of that notion. Violence is not inherently uncontrolled, nor is it inherently controlled. The mere intention to produce harmful results is not, in and of itself, violence. Violence is not inherently instrumental to some other end, though

it can be thus instrumental. Nor does violence require implements to produce its characteristic results, though it is probably the case that there is always something in the process of violence which could, in a broad sense, be designated as the means to such production.

Violence is the subject of much moral controversy. In the following chapter my attention will turn to the normative aspects of the concept of violence.

Notes

[1]Oxford English Dictionary, 1933, Vol. XII, p. 222.

[2]Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961, p. 2554.

[3]Joseph S. Roucek, ed. and author of the relevant chapter, "Violence and Terror," in Social Control (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 330.

[4]The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1969, p. 1431.

[5]Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, ed., Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Signet Books by New American Library for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969), p. xvii.

[6]Jerome Skolnick, The Politics of Protest (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1969), p. 6.

[7]Spiegel, "Toward a Theory of Collective Violence," p. 6.

[8]Lawrence, "Violence," p. 7n.

[9]Ibid., p. 7.

[10]E. V. Walter, Terror and Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 7-8. Why Mr. Walter insists on qualifying "harm" with "destructive" is quite baffling. 'Constructive harm' seems a contradiction in terms. And what he has to say about violence in his book makes it clear that 'destructive' cannot mean only 'totally destructive,' but also must mean 'injurious' as well.

[11]H. L. Nieburg, Political Violence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 13.

[12]Frederic Wertham, A Sign for Cain: A Study of Human Violence (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 3.

[13]Newton Garver, "What Violence Is," in Violence in America: A Historical and Contemporary Reader, ed. by Thomas Rose (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, 1969), p. 7.

[14]Unto Tähtinen, Non-violence as an Ethical Principle (Turku, India: Turun Yliopisto, 1964), p. 55. Tähtinen quotes Umaswami, Tattvāthādhigama Sūtra, Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. II, p. 141.

[15]Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, trans. by Austin Lewis (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1907).

[16]Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. by Constance Farrington, with an Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968), p. 64n.

[17]T. D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1953), esp. pp. 50-56.

[18]Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans by T. E. Hulme and J. Roth (Toronto: Collier Books of Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1961), p. 171. See also H. L. Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," American Political Science Review, LVI(December, 1962), p. 867n.

[19]Graham and Gurr, Violence in America, p. xvii. Emphasis mine. See also Harold I. Lief, M.D., "Contemporary Forms of Violence," in Violence in the Streets, ed. by Shalom Endleman (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968), p. 49.

[20]Oxford English Dictionary, Vol IV, p. 419.

[21]Garver, "What Violence Is," pp. 5-6.

[22]See, for example, John Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," in Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy, ed. by Joseph Ratner (New York: Modern Library, 1939), pp. 493-494. See also Robert Paul Wolff, "On Violence," Journal of Philosophy, LXVI(Oct. 2, 1969), p. 604.

[23]Sidney Hook, "Violence," in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by Edwin R. Seligman, XV(New York: Macmillan Company, 1934), p. 264.

[24]Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," pp. 488-489.

[25]Wolff, "On Violence," p. 606.

[26]*Ibid.*

[27]Another definition of this genre is given by John Dewey in "Force, Violence and Law," pp. 488-489.

[28]E. Victor Wolfenstein claims that "...an act of violence is one in which a man is intentionally killed by, or on the orders of, another man." *Violence or Non-violence: A Psychoanalytic Exploration of the Choice of Political Means in Social Change* (Princeton: Center of International Studies of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1956), p. 3. It is far from clear that he himself sticks to this "root idea" throughout his discussion, though it is clear that it is far too drastic and narrow for the normal concept of violence.

[29]Sigmund Freud wrote, "All activities that rearrange or effect changes are to a certain extent destructive...." This was in a letter to Marie Bonaparte, May 27, 1937, explaining the "instinct of destruction." The letter can be found in *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, by Ernest Jones, III(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1957), p. 464. Except, perhaps, for changes which are creations *ex nihilo*, he is right. But he is using a much broader notion of destruction here than that relevant to the issue in the text.

[30]Lawrence, "Violence," pp. 4-5.

[31]I avoid here, of course, such descriptions as would have us talk about the violence of the would-be perpetrator's character or personality or of the violence done to moral principles or virtues by having such intentions, however far they are removed from being realized. Violence in these senses is clearly different from the sense I am after and may well even be metaphorical.

[32]This complicated locution is used because it is not clear if a case is really a close call if the intention or purpose is really one of avoiding injury or damage, though not by much. Unlike violence, close calls do not easily fit as the objects of intentions or purposes. They result, rather, when something like violence is intended but narrowly fails to be brought about.

[33]That they are different does not entail that there could not be cases which have aspects of both. I might make a mistake in claiming that a given micro-organism has such-and-such characteristics because I put the wrong slide under the microscope by accident.

[34]J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," in The Philosophy of Action, Alan R. White, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 27n.

[35]George D. Newton and Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Violence in American Life (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, a staff report, n.d.), pp. 25-32.

[36]For example, an affirmative answer is supported by the facts that we rarely use the phrase 'intentional violence' and that we often label an act 'violence' to attribute blame to the agent. But 'intentional violence' is sometimes used when it does not seem redundant; and even in some cases in which 'violence' is used to attribute blame, the source of the blame may be in the carelessness or negligence of the agent and not in his intention.

[37]There are, of course, victims in other categories of cases as well: disasters, accidents, famines, etc.

[38]For example, Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. by S. W. Dade (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), Part I, Section 3, especially paragraphs 44 and 90; also Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. by T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952). Dade reads those sections in this way, though Knox does not. Dade's version certainly seems more plausible and idiomatic, though his is a somewhat looser translation. Hegel himself uses "Zwang" (force, coercion) and "Gewalt" (violence, force) throughout these sections. At crucial points, e.g., paragraph 90, it seems clear that "Gewalt" is best translated as "violence," which Knox, for all his greater literalness, fails to do.

For interesting, though critical, remarks on the possibilities of "property" covering the relation we are seeking, see Robert S. McNamara, S.J., "The Ethics of Violent Dissent," in Urban Riots, ed. by Connery, pp. 145-150.

[39]Wolff, "On Violence," p. 612.

[40]See E. V. Walter's discussion in Terror and Resistance. Some of Shaka's subjects, for example, went to their arbitrarily determined public executions with songs of joyous praise for their leaders.

[41]Tähtinen, Non-violence as an Ethical Principle, p. 55.

[42]Roucek, Social Control, p. 330.

[43]It seems to me that this is the result which appears in John Lawrence's paper "Violence."

[44]Skolnick, Politics of Protest, p. 5.

[45]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 8.

[46]Wolff, "On Violence," p. 612. Unfortunately, Wolff does not explain in what sense he takes this distinction to be subjective.

[47]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 8.

[48]See below, Chapter III, Section iv.

[49]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 10.

[50]Nieburg, "The Threat of Violence and Social Change," p. 867n.

[51]My good friend Dr. Warren Kleinberg has urged me to accept this definition during our helpful conversations.

[52]Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," p. 33. See also On Violence, pp. 80-81.

[53]Should the reader want examples, he can consult any number of sources, though perhaps the richest in terms of quantity is the collection of articles on history and sociology in Graham and Gurr, Violence in America.

CHAPTER THREE

NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE

i. Introduction

The major purpose of this chapter is to explain and defend the claim that violence has an inherent negatively normative dimension. I will begin by considering the views of John Dewey, Sidney Hook, and Robert Paul Wolff, all of whom acknowledge a normative aspect of violence. What will be important are those proposals which either are proposals for explicating this dimension or which could be treated as if they were explicative proposals. I will ultimately reject their views, however, and will propose my own, defending it first by citing positive evidence and then by attempting to defeat possible objections of some significance.

ii. John Dewey and the Non-productivity of Violence

I will begin with John Dewey's proposal that the normatively negative dimension of violence is captured by making "non-productivity" an essential aspect of the concept. During World War I Dewey attempted to distinguish violence from force/energy/power in a way which relies on

invoking a normatively negative dimension as inherent for violence but not for the others.[1] Some twenty years later in Liberalism and Social Action,[2] he talks about violence in a way which does not seem to be consistent with his earlier analysis and which seems to be more in the vein of "everyday language." Since, unfortunately, he does not offer an analysis of violence in the later work, I will limit my presentation to his earlier views. Some of the insights in Liberalism and Social Action may be helpful in criticism of his earlier analysis.

The basic concept for Dewey's analysis is force, in the sense of energy. This concept denotes, he says, "...effective means of operation; ability or capacity to execute, to realize ends."[3] I will confine myself to the actualized cases, to the employment of effective means, and ignore the capacity sense of these terms. Dewey goes on to offer such examples as the following: "It is force by which we excavate subways and build bridges and travel and manufacture; it is force which is utilized in spoken argument or published book."[4]

Force, energy, and power can all be neutral terms, according to Dewey. It is clear that what he means is neutral in a normative or moral sense. Dewey also claims that energy and power can be normatively positive terms when they denote effective means for bringing desirable ends into existence.[5] He does not say that force can have this normatively positive dimension, though it can be normatively negative; violent force can be equated with

violence.[6] For the neutral sense of his basic concept, I will use the composite term 'force as energy,' except when quoting.

Force as energy becomes violence when the latter's neutral dimension is shifted to a negative one. Dewey's explicit definition is as follows: "Energy becomes violence when it defeats or frustrates purpose instead of executing or realizing it."[7] He continues by saying, "When the dynamite charge blows up human being instead of rocks, when its outcome is waste instead of production, destruction instead of construction, we call it not energy or power but violence."[8] 'Power' or 'energy' can denote means which are effective or productive of desirable ends. 'Force as energy' denotes means which are effective or productive of ends, whether desirable or not. 'Violence' denotes means which are unproductive or counter-productive.

It might be objected that non-productivity as a means does not necessarily represent a normatively negative dimension. This objection might stick in a context of ordinary language, but not in the context of Dewey's normative theory. To fully demonstrate this would be a large task, though the point is sufficiently indicated in the following passage:

> The criterion of value lies in the relative efficiency and economy of the expenditure of force as a means to an end....What is thought of as brutal, violent, immoral, is a use of physical agencies which are gross, sensational and evident on their own account, in cases where it is possible to employ with greater economy and less waste means which are comparatively imperceptible and refined.[9]

For Dewey, then, violence, being non-productive by definition, is inherently normatively negative; for him it is immoral.

It seems to me that non-productivity does not capture the negative dimension belonging to the normal or everyday concept of violence. The first major reason why it does not is because the question as to whether or not violence is non-productive is an empirical question and not a question about the concept of violence. It is often claimed that violence is inefficient and thus wasteful as a means. It is also often claimed that violence is even counter-productive, leaving its perpetrators worse off with regard to their ends or purposes than if they had done nothing, because of the backlash which violence can produce.[10] But both these claims about the non-productivity of violence are factual claims, claims about what happens in the world when violence is used. One decides whether or not an act is an act of violence and can then decide whether or not it is non-productive by looking at its real or hypothetical results and perhaps also by comparing these results with alternative means. One does not first determine whether or not it is an act which is non-productive and then, on that basis, decide whether or not it is an act of violence. Dewey's analysis would have us do the latter.

To do the latter produces counter-intuitive results in two directions. That these results flow from accepting the Deweyan proposal for the analysis of violence consti-

tutes the second major reason for rejecting that proposal.

There are cases which we would normally not hesitate to consider cases of violence, but which might turn out not to be violence in the Deweyan analysis. Consider what he says about war, for example:

> Unless war can be shown to be the most economical method of securing the results which are desirable with a minimum of the undesirable results, it marks waste and loss: it must be adjudged a violence, not a use of force.[11]

But suppose that war can thus be shown to be the most economical method of securing the results which are desirable in a particular case. This status has often been claimed for wars and acts of war. The claim that bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the most efficient alternative for all concerned was not rare.[12] Yet it seems preposterous to deny that this bombing was an act of violence. We judge acts to be violence without comparing the relative efficiency of various alternatives. Furthermore, should such a comparison show top relative efficiency for these acts, we would hardly be inclined to deny that they were acts of violence and assert that they were merely acts of force as energy.

As another example consider some of Machiavelli's advice to the princes. He advocates that a prince

> ....must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful; for, with a very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring bloodshed and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions carried out by the prince injure only individuals.[13]

From such advice it could be concluded that Machiavelli advocates some violence because it is productive of ends--the ends of the prince and the ends of the community. One might say here that the action was productive on the whole, but there is no suggestion that the advocated violence is anything other than violence. It seems intuitively obvious that there should be no such suggestion.

Finally, the claim that violence is the only effective means for achieving desired and/or desirable ends should be dealt with. It follows from Dewey's analysis that this claim is self-contradictory, but surely we do not think the claim self-contradictory or even conceptually odd. In fact, sometimes we think that a particular claim to this effect is true. When we do not think it is, we do not argue about language but about the probable effectiveness of the alternative means which all would agree were non-violent or about the actual ineffectiveness of the proposed violence for the end in question.

The second direction in which counter-intuitive results follow from the alleged non-productivity of violence is that it would require us to consider as cases of violence many acts which we ordinarily would not. Classic cases here are cases of passive resistance, of sit-down strikes, of economic boycotts. Consider, for example, the consequences if an attempt to use passive resistance fails. It is then as least unproductive; it may even be counter-productive. When that happens, the consistent Deweyan response is "It must be adjudged a violence." Such a

judgment, it seems clear, would be a mistake. If the criterion of value for a means lies in its relative efficiency and if means which are inefficient are considered violence, then it would even be possible to consider requests, moral arguments, pleadings, writing pamphlets, and running for public office to be acts of violence.

Finally, Dewey's analysis of violence as non-productive force does not specify for whom violence is non-productive. He could possibly be taken to mean that violence is non-productive for the agent, the victim, or on the whole, that is, with regard to all concerned, directly or indirectly. If I was correct in the previous chapter, violence is always counter-productive to the victim, in that it negatively affects his interests. If this, and this alone, were what Dewey meant, then I would have no serious quarrel with him. But the evidence is strongly against this interpretation. It is my impression of Dewey's moral philosophy that he wants non-productivity to be a function of all the consequences. It is also my impression that in some of what he says it is hard to get away from interpreting him to mean that non-productivity is to be spelled out with reference primarily, if not solely, to the agent. The kind of thing which leans toward this interpretation is that he says violence is frustrating of <u>purposes</u> or non-productive of <u>ends</u>. Against both these ways of tying down non-productive, my objections to his explication of violence will stand.

iii. Sidney Hook and the Illegality of Violence

Sidney Hook makes a considerably different attempt at articulating the normatively negative dimension of violence in his article on "Violence" in the 1934 edition of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Hook's explicit definition is short and to the point: "In the social context violence may be defined roughly as the illegal employment of physical coercion for personal or group ends."[14]

Before delving into this definition, it will be helpful to note what Hook does not consider violence to be:

> It must be distinguished from force,[15] or power, which is a purely physical concept having direction and intensity but, apart from human ends, no intention, and also from might, which has legal sanction and which expresses itself in the imposition of physical constraints as well as in the use of less conspicuous but more effective social pressures, such as discriminatory economic, cultural and administrative measures.[16]

He then goes on to note that might, even as physical coercion, raises no problems of social ethics but merely problems of expediency. Physical coercion or the threat of it is the nature of the state, in Hook's opinion.[17] The implication is that violence does raise such problems and is in its very nature normatively negative. The contrast of violence with might and force clearly suggests that what is wrong with violence is not inherent in physical coercion. What is wrong with violence is that it is illegal. It is inherently illegal, that is it is illegal by (Hook's) definition, so it therefore always carries a normatively negative dimension with it.

One might take "illegal" rather loosely or else along Thomistic lines, so that it means something like illegitimate. In that case, the position at issue becomes like that articulated by Robert Paul Wolff and discussed later. Although there is some ambiguity in Hook's remarks, on the whole he seems to be more hard-headed, almost positivistic, about "illegal." What is illegal is merely that which is ruled out by the law or at least that which has not been ruled in. The law in question is merely the law with proper procedural credentials and established by an accepted government.

It follows from all this that not only are there no legal acts of violence but there could not be any; the very notion is self-contradictory. Yet these implications are at best false. There have been, for example, legal systems based on an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and, at a higher level of generalization, violence for violence. One might not think that this is a good legal system, but it is nonetheless a perfectly conceivable and sometimes actualized legal system. If 'legal violence' were a self-contradictory notion, then violence could never be punished in such a system. What clearly seems to be required for justice here, however, is that legal violence be visited on those guilty of illegal violence. And what this requires conceptually is that whether an act is an illegal act or not is irrelevant to the question of whether or not it is an act of violence.

Some theorists have defined the state as the monopo-

lizer, perhaps via law, of violence. "The state is a formal institution which seeks to acquire and legitimize a legal monopoly on violence," according to H. L. Nieburg.[18] This conception may be wrong, in that it is too narrow, but it is not absurd, as Hook would have it. His own notion of might seems to be an attempt to hide the violence of the state under a euphemism; at best it seems like an exclusion of violence from the tools of government, an exclusion which is certainly not found in the real world in any great abundance.

It should be pointed out that the Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to declare war and so make it legal. It seems difficult to deny that war is violence. Although the Vietnamese War is illegal and World War II was legal, it seems preposterous to suggest that only one of them is a piece of violence. One could go on to haul out stock examples: capital punishment, police responses to riots and demonstrations, military boot camps, and so on, not to mention the Terror of the French Revolution and the Nazi final solution.[19] The point of all these examples is that they are acts of violence about which it is sensible to inquire as to their legality and for which a good case can often be made for their genuine legality. Since there are also plenty of acts of violence which are clearly illegal, the net result is that whether an act is legal or illegal is irrelevant to whether or not it is an act of violence. That being so, illegality cannot serve as a conceptual condition for violence and so cannot serve to

explicate the normatively negative dimension of that concept.

iv. Robert Paul Wolff and the Illegitimacy of Violence

In his frustrating article "On Violence,"[20] Robert Paul Wolff defines violence as "...the illegitimate or unauthorized use of force to effect decisions against the will of others."[21] Since he himself claims that this definition incorporates a normative dimension,[22] and since the notion of force employed is a neutral one,[23] the key question is whether the notion of illegitimacy[24] can capture the normatively negative dimension of violence.

Before this question can be answered, the concept of illegitimacy must be clarified. According to Wolff, legitimate acts are acts sanctioned by what he calls "de jure authority"; to be thus sanctioned is, in the strict sense, to be authorized. Illegitimate acts are therefore acts which are not authorized. These include, but are not limited to, acts which are proscribed by de jure authority; acts which are neither proscribed nor sanctioned are also unauthorized. De jure authority refers to the right to command and to be obeyed in those commands; herein lies the normative thrust. Acts of violence are, therefore, acts which are not authorized by someone who has the right to command that such acts be done or avoided and the right to be obeyed in his commands.[25]

There are several problems with Wolff's account.

It contains a potentially dangerous ambiguity. Its reliance on the notion of commanding in the explication of legitimacy would unduly restrict the category of violence. Restrictive, too, is its tendency to think of authority in solely political terms. The most serious problem, however, is that Wolff provides no clear account of the kind of right involved in de jure authority. Since he also rejects the seemingly plausible candidates for this right, his account eventually seems empty. It is helpful, however, for it forces consideration of various kinds of illegitimacy in relation to violence.

Wolff sometimes limits violence to acts which are proscribed by someone with the right to do so, whereas he sometimes includes all acts which have not been authorized, that is, have not been commanded. This ambiguity may seem small, but it can be dangerous. It appears to lead Wolff into a striking inconsistency. Appealing to the Kantian idea that everyone has a fundamental duty to be autonomous, he argues that no one has the right to command another person to do something or to refrain from doing something.[26]

If his Kantian argument is correct and no one has the right to authorize acts of force, then no one has the right to "legitimize" them and so remove them from the realm of violence. The inference to be drawn here is that all acts of force (i.e., virtually all acts) are acts of violence. Wolff draws such a conclusion with reference to political acts: "If 'violence' is taken in the strict sense to mean 'an illegitimate or unauthorized use of force,' then

every political act, whether by private parties or by agents of the state, is violent, for there is no such thing as legitimate authority."[27]

On the other hand, if Wolff's Kantian argument is taken to show that no one has the right to proscribe acts of force, then no one has the right to "illegitimize" them and place them into the category of violence. Here the inference must be that no acts of force are acts of violence. Wolff himself does not make this claim in such a general form, but he does in effect agree to it by remarking, "Descriptively speaking the attack on Hitler's life during the second World War was a act of violence, but one might perfectly well deny that it was violent in the strict sense, on the ground that Hitler's regime was illegitimate."[28] The Hitler regime is not a special case here: "Men everywhere and always impute authority to established governments, and they are always wrong to do so."[29]

The difference between conceiving illegitimate acts as those which are merely unauthorized and as those which are proscribed leads to this striking inconsistency when coupled with Wolff's Kantian anarchism: all acts are violence and none are. The anarchistic argument is not at issue here, but it has been employed only to highlight the fact that there are two different conceptions of violence in Wolff's article and that they are importantly different. Wolff himself generally employs the proscriptive version, but he is also very fond of the conclusion that all acts of force are acts of violence, which conclusion is a

non-sequitur in the proscriptive version. To insist on both versions will generate an incoherent result.

Another problem with Wolff's account is that his definition of violence as illegitimate force plus his explication of illegitimacy in terms of actions proscribed by someone with the right to do so lead to making violence logically dependent on the presence of certain kinds of commands. This would seem to commit us to the view that it is logically impossible for the person in authority, or at least for the highest person in authority, to commit an act of violence; but that is absurd. The idea of commanding one's self rarely makes sense, and those cases in which it does--cases of conflicting aspects of a personality, for example--will not suffice to overcome the difficulty pointed out here. Furthermore, Wolff's view would seem to commit us to not speaking about violence when there are no commands or proscriptions which are relevant to the action. But it is surely possible to imagine cases which we would admit were cases of violence to which commands are irrelevant. The murder of one person marooned on an unclaimed, hitherto uninhabited island by a stranger who is also cast up there might be such a case. Though one way to obtain legitimacy is as the result of a command, there surely seem to be other ways. It is more plausible to consider legitimate actions to be those done by someone with the right to do them than to limit ourselves by insisting that this right have one special source.

The difficulties mentioned in the previous paragraph

are related to a faulty tendency in analyses like Wolff's[30] to restrict violence to a political context. He tends to treat violence as those acts of force proscribed by a legitimate state: "Thus murder is an act of violence, but capital punishment by a legitimate state is not."[31] Such treatment makes the concept of violence too narrow. It seems clear that brutally beating another person or burning down his house are acts of violence even if they are not proscribed by the state. They are acts of violence even if there is no state. Violence did not come into existence only after states did, nor simultaneously with them. Surely the Hobbesian state of nature is replete with violence, but it has no state. In fact, it may well be (and is, if Hobbes is right) that states came into being at least partly to regulate and minimize violence. Even in some of Wolff's own examples, reference to the state would seem irrelevant and use of the term 'political' strained.[32]

Political violence is simply violence with political ramifications and relevance;[33] to have such ramifications and relevance has no bearing whatsoever on whether an act is to be properly considered an act of violence. To have such ramifications may well have much to do with why an act is improperly considered violence--or non-violence--for the term's inherent normative dimensions make it a ready tool for tactical purposes. But tactical purposes are beside the present issue.

Despite the problems discussed so far, Wolff has an important idea for articulating the normative dimension of

the concept of violence: the concept of illegitimacy. The problems can be avoided by reformulating the core of his explication of illegitimacy as follows: an act is illegitimate if it is performed by someone who lacks the right to perform it. The issue now focuses on the kind of right involved.

Wolff abruptly dismisses the proposal that violence involves acts performed by persons lacking a legal right.[34] This rejection is correct for essentially the same reasons given above is discussing Sidney Hook's definition.

A broader kind of right is that possessed by de facto authorities, and employing it yields the following definition of violence: "...the use of force in ways that are proscribed by those who are generally accepted as the legitimate authorities."[35] Wolff rejects this "associated sense" of violence because it is purely descriptive.[36] His reasoning is correct in important ways, though the notion of illegitimacy involved takes on a normative coloring when looked at from within a system: acts proscribed by de facto authorities are acts which are not to be done because they are thus proscribed.

This sense of legitimacy nonetheless fails to explicate the concept of violence. Relying on it would make it self-contradictory to say that the authorities had sanctioned the use of violence, but saying this could make very good sense and, in some cases, is probably true. This result appears not only if we look at a society from the outside, but it is also perfectly conceivable from within the

relevant society. A political leader, a general, a minister, can authorize, even command, the shooting down of social unacceptables or the mob destruction of their property, and he could have his commands carried out and generally accepted as legitimate. Should a follower respond to such an order by asking his fellows "Is he ordering that we commit violence?," he is not likely to be rebuked with failure to understand the language. He is far more likely to be answered with "Yes, but in this case violence is legitimate." The evidence of history is that the follower will rest satisfied with such an answer. It seems clear that what is to be said about such cases is that acts of violence receive de facto legitimacy, not that such acts are not acts of violence because they are thus legitimated.

Much the same result is reached if de facto legitimacy is expanded to mean being in accord with the conventional or generally accepted social norms, whether or not there are accepted authorities who authorize or proscribe the relevant actions. Chalmers Johnson writes, "Violence is 'anti-social action,'...a contigent concept dependent upon the prior existence of a system of social action within which it takes place."[37] It is, however, even more than conceivable that there could be societies which generally approve of at least some acts of violence: dueling, headhunting, continuous war, brawls, and so on. Henry Bienen writes, "Violence can be legitimate or institutionalized violence, as in pastoral tribal feuds, knighthood jousts, clan feuding."[38] It is true, not self-contradictory or

conceptually strange, that some societies are enthusiastic about some acts of violence. Consequently, if *de facto* legitimacy refers to those rights granted by accepted authorities or to those rights imbedded in conventional norms, then some acts of violence have this legitimacy and some do not. Violence cannot, therefore, be considered to be inherently illegitimate in this sense.

The remaining plausible candidate for the kind of right relevant to legitimacy is a moral right. There is a strong version to this notion and a weak one. The strong version is that someone has a moral right to do an act if that act is morally justified. The consequence of the strong version of a moral interpretation of legitimacy is that violence is conceived as morally unjustified force. The weak version of this possibility is that an act is legitimate if there is no *prima facie* moral claim against it. Acts of violence would then be acts against which there are *prima facie* moral objections. Thus, they are illegitimate because no one has a *prima facie* right to do them. It is unmistakeable that the kind of right Wolff thinks is possessed by *de jure* authority and which thereby leads to genuine legitimacy is a moral right.[39] The problem is that it is completely unclear as to what he has in mind by a moral right.

He seems to reject both the strong and the weak versions. "Consider, for example," he says, "a question now much debated: when is it permissible to resort to violence in politics? If 'violence' is taken to mean an *unjustified*

use of force, then the answer to the question is obviously never."[40] His logic is valid, and he rightly rejects that version for violence. The reasons I feel Wolff is right are implicit in the explanation of my proposal. He also says,

> If 'violence' is construed in the restricted sense as 'bodily interference or the direct infliction of physical harm,' then the obvious but correct rule is to resort to violence when less harmful or costly means fail, providing always that the balance of good and evil produced is superior to that promised by any available alternative.[41]

Something very much like this "obvious but correct rule" is in order if violence is illegitimate because of the absence of a moral right as weakly conceived. Yet although the weak conception seems to be employed in this sense of violence, Wolff claims here that this sense is "restricted," and he elsewhere calls it "wrong-headed,"[42] though he does not spell out the reasons for his judgment. It seems to me, however, that something like this weak version of moral legitimacy is a correct idea for explicating the concept of violence, though I will not rely on the notion of a right.

Since Wolff rejects both the strong and the weak sense of moral right, one must look further for his own view. This presumably is contained in his answer to his own question about the justifiability of violence:

> If 'violence' is taken in the strict sense to mean 'an illegitimate or unauthorized use of force,' then every political act, whether by private parties or by agents of the state, is violence, for there is no such thing as legitimate authority.[43]

This answer, of course, does not answer the original question, and, of immediate importance, it sheds no light on what kind of moral right Wolff thinks could confer legitimacy, whether or not it actually does. It is not clear if there is a sense of moral right different from the strong and weak senses of that idea. If there is, Wolff needs to tell us what it is or at least offer some criteria for its employment. He does neither, and so I conclude that he has no clear sense of moral right in mind. It is this failure which makes his own account of violence ultimately frustrating. It is frustrating even to himself, for he goes on to make the preposterous claim that "the question of the appropriateness of violence simply dissolves" since the concept of violence rests "on the unfounded distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political authority."[44]

Though Wolff's account of violence is ultimately unsatisfactory, it has been helpful in stimulating thought about various kinds of legitimacy. One can agree with him in rejecting the notions of legal rights, de facto rights, and moral rights in the strong sense as proposals for articulating the normatively negative dimension of the concept of violence. Although he rejects the weak sense of moral rights, whereas I shall come to accept something like it, his article is suggestive in pointing to this possibility as well.

v. Violence as *Prima Facie* Morally Negative

Having rejected important alternatives, I turn now to a delineation and defense of my own position on the normatively negative aspect of the concept of violence. In this section I will explain what I think can correctly be claimed about that aspect. In the section which follows, I will support my position with arguments relating to the characteristic ways in which we employ the concept of violence. Sections seven and eight deal with possible objections to my views.

The concept of violence involves the condition that violence is *prima facie* morally wrong or bad. That is more or less to say that for any two situations which are alike in every respect except that one includes violence, the situation without violence ought to be preferred. Violence, in and of itself, is something that one should do without. I shall refer to the content of this condition as the morally negative dimension of violence.

There is a fairly clear, if fairly rough, intuitive recognition of what is meant by saying that something is morally bad or wrong. I am inclined to think that what is thus recognized is both broader and vaguer than many ethical theorists would have us believe. But since I do not want to criticize them here, nor even to dissect the "true meaning" of various moral concepts, I shall be content with the rough, intuitive sense of the relevant notions for my claim.

That violence has such a morally negative dimension is compatible with different views as to what constitutes a proper account of the morally negative. Thus Dewey and Nietzsche or Wolff and Sartre might disagree about which phenomena are properly considered violence because they disagree about what counts as being morally negative, but they nonetheless could be taken to agree that there is such a dimension to the concept of violence. This area of agreement is all I am concerned to claim here.

The claim that violence is inherently only prima facie bad or wrong means that it is logically possible to override this moral dimension. For example, it is compatible with my view that violence could be considered to be morally good or even morally obligatory because it serves as a means to a morally positive goal; the goodness of that goal could override the inherent badness of violence. The view set forth here merely requires that before a case of violence can be properly judged as morally good or morally neutral, some morally positive aspects must be found to compensate for the morally negative ones always present in violence. It is even compatible with my position to claim that the inherent negative moral dimension of violence is always or never overridden, but such claims must either appeal to a different conception of violence from the one I claim to be the normal one[45] or else to something about the cases in question in addition to the mere fact that they are cases of violence.

My position is narrower than the view that violence

is not intrinsically valuable.[46] That view makes it possible for violence to be intrinsically neutral, like energy, or intrinsically morally negative, like murder. I do not agree that violence is a morally neutral concept.

The position I am advocating also differs from those usages which treat 'violence' merely as an epithet, i.e., as a term which has only a morally negative meaning. Such usages are either mistakes, abuses of language, or metaphors. The concept of violence does not involve a moral condition alone, for it also include descriptive conditions, as is demonstrated in the first two chapters.

Since violence is a concept involving both moral and descriptive conditions, one would like to be able to say something about the relationships between both kinds of conditions. This would be a complex and difficult job, however, and will not be attempted in this essay. I will be content to merely indicate some possibilities: the descriptive conditions might logically entail the moral condition; they might entail it via a special (e.g., a deontic) logic; the nature of the descriptive aspects might be thought to provide a good reason for asserting the existence of the moral dimension; or our recognition of the descriptive conditions might psychologically cause our recognition of the moral condition; and so on.

vi. Some Evidence For My Proposal

This section will look for evidence to support my view of the morally negative dimension of violence in the

ways in which we characteristically employ the concept of violence. I will look first at the common claim that in spite of the fact violence is useful or understandable, it cannot be condoned. Then I will consider how we are likely to react to remarks like "There is nothing wrong with violence!" Finally, I will consider the implications which surround the commonly asked question "Can violence be justified?"

Sorting out linguistic intuitions which support my claim of the existence of the morally negative dimension of violence is difficult because of a large over-kill in our rhetoric. After descriptions of an instance of violence and acknowledgement of its causes, reasons, and achievements, one expects the response "But I can't condone violence." The response is almost, but not quite, automatic.

Because such responses are not absolutely automatic, relevant linguistic intuitions can squeeze in. Someone might say, "I admit that this is violence, but nevertheless I think that it was good." We may disagree with him, but not because he has contradicted himself. And we will appeal to something other than the agreed-upon fact that this was a case of violence to support our disagreement, just as we will expect him to do in support of his approval for it. "Violence is violence, you know!" won't serve us as an objection. The issue is whether or not the inherent morally negative dimension has been overridden, not whether or not it exists.

When someone takes the opposite line and says there is nothing wrong with violence, we supply qualifications: "He means *if* it serves to overthrow tyranny, to prevent further violence, to keep black people in their place, or if it is perpetrated against witches, Russians, students, policemen...." Supplying these qualifications in effect acknowledges that violence is *prima facie* morally negative.

Other linguistic evidence can be found. In the past several years the literature has been threatened with over-population of the question-species "Can violence be justified?" The importance of this question here is not to be found in its abundance, but rather in the fact that it makes sense. That this question makes sense indicates two things. First, it indicates that violence is inherently at least *prima facie* bad and thus *needs* justification. One asks for justification only where guilt is suspected. Secondly, it indicates that it is at least logically possible for violence to get the needed moral justification. This shows that the morally negative aspect of violence is only *prima facie*. If this were not the case, then notions like the following would be self-contradictory: justifiable violence, (morally) excusable violence, violence which is on the whole good.

vii. A Possible Counter-Argument: The Relativity of Violence

In this section and the one which follows, I want to consider sources of possible objections to my view. In

simplest terms, these sources are found in the general claim that violence is somehow a "relative" concept and in the more specific observation that people who should know what they are talking about do not appear to acknowledge the existence of the morally negative dimension of the concept of violence. If I can refute these objections, that will add indirect support to my position.

It has been claimed, especially by those concerned with political violence or the history of violence, that violence is a relative notion. Jerome Skolnick, in his report to the National Commission, puts the point this way:

> ..."violence" is an ambiguous term whose meaning is established through political processes. The kinds of acts that become classified as "violence," and, equally important, those which do not become so classified, vary according to who provides the definition and who has superior resources for disseminating and enforcing his definitions.... The definition of the winner usually prevails.[47]

William Kornhauser says, "...what is violent action in one period of history becomes acceptable conflict at a later time."[48]

This claim might tempt one to form a modified "one man's meat, another man's poison" objection to my contention that violence carries an inherent morally negative dimension. If the same or the same kind of act is considered morally good at one time and morally bad at another, or if it is considered good by some people and bad by others, then violence is accordingly considered sometimes good and sometimes bad. That it is sometimes considered good[49] shows that it cannot be inherently bad.

Most cases which give rise to the various relativity claims in the first place are cases in which the morally negative dimension is acknowledged, but overridden by other considerations. For example, the beating up of students by the police is not considered violence because those judging find it to be on the whole good. Yet most of them probably do feel that they would prefer keeping students in their places in other ways. If they admit that the act has at least this morally negative dimension, weak though it may be, and that the act satisfies the other conditions for violence, then it follows from my contention that they are making a conceptual mistake in refusing to call it violence. It may be violence which is justified, but it is violence nonetheless.[50]

But even avoiding such cases, it can still be said that the objection misses the point of the relativity claims quoted above. These claims indicate that the same (kind of) act is considered violence by different people at different times. But this relativity depends on the <u>lack</u> of relativity in the meaning of the concept of violence. The reason, or at least one of the reasons, why someone considers an act to be violence is precisely because he would think it morally negative, all other things being equal. The objection misinterprets the passages as saying that violence is sometimes considered good and sometimes bad. For those cases which cannot be explained away by the presence of overriding considerations, all one can infer from those passages is that the same (kind of) act

is sometimes considered violence and sometimes not.

One might respond here that there is something wrong with the same or same kind of act being considered sometimes violence and sometimes not. This response depends on there being something wrong with thinking the same or same kind of act to be sometimes prima facie wrong and at other times not. This last claim poses a very difficult issue and will not be argued here. If it is correct, then in disagreements about whether a given act is an act of violence, one side must be wrong, a position which is perfectly compatible with, though ignored by, the original relativity claims.

If two people disagree as to whether a case is an instance of violence or not, though they agree about what happened and about the consequences of what happened, their disagreement is likely to rest on disagreement concerning moral factors. For example, Dewey and an ascetic might disagree about whether a given case which involved the frustration of the agent's desires is a case of violence: Dewey might think that it was because violence is morally negative and frustrating one's desires is in and of itself a bad thing; the ascetic might not think that the case was violence because, although he agrees violence is morally bad, he views the frustration of desires as in and of itself morally good. Thus, even if everyone agreed that violence is inherently morally negative, they might still disagree about what things are morally negative or even about what it means for something to be morally negative. My

view of the morally negative dimension is deliberately meant to be neutral with regard to such disagreements.

The claim that violence is a relative concept is compatible with my claim that it possesses a morally negative dimension. For although phenomena which are identical or similar in all important respects are sometimes considered violence and sometimes not, this difference can be correlated with a difference about whether or not such phenomena are considered morally negative in character. If there were not such a correlation, then my claim about the concept of violence would have to be re-examined.

viii. Another Counter-argument: Some Authorities Do Not Agree

A second objection to my contention about the morally negative dimension of violence might be phrased like this: many people who have given thought to violence, even experienced it, do not condemn violence, do not even merely condone it, but glorify it.[51] These advocates of violence show no recognition of any morally negative dimension in violence. If there were such a dimension, especially an inherent one, they should be sensitive to it.

I admit that some may show no recognition of the inherent morally negative dimension of violence. What is to be argued in this section is that virtually all of those prominently cited as advocates of violence do show this recognition in some way or other. That they do constitutes indirect support for my contention.

I can, of course, only select from the literature. I will consider views from the following areas: the revolutionaries, the Realpolitiker, those who think violence is creative, and the theorists of innate aggression.

I will begin with Georges Sorel as a revolutionary who might be expected to reject my claim about the morally negative dimension of violence. Although his views are not easily interpreted, I think he does show at least some recognition of this dimension. More orthodox revolutionaries recognize this more clearly in ways to be mentioned later.

In one of his characteristic remarks, Sorel says, "And so I am not at all concerned to justify the perpetrators of violence, but to inquire into the function of violence of the working classes in contemporary Socialism."[52] This seems to admit that violence is something which inherently needs justification. If his investigation itself avoids the justification issue (which it is very far from clear that it does), one might well expect him to employ the results of his wertfreie inquiries very smoothly in a justification. Sorel clearly relishes what he thinks violence can do, but he no doubt does so for reasons which would override the morally negative dimension of violence (if he thought there were one) with little difficulty.

It seems clear that Sorel thinks that, all other things being equal, violence is instrinsically bad,[53] but sometimes instrumentally good. It has historical value if

it is an expression of class war, i.e., if it increases the class consciousness of the proletariat. Nothing seems to to this as well as violence, if anything else does it at all.[54] It seems to me that the claim of historical value is a justificatory claim, and that perhaps makes it a claim to moral value--perhaps historical value is the only real moral value. Finally, Sorel's attempt at a distinction between violence and force seems to be nothing more than a distinction between violence of which he approves and that of which he does not, the distinguishing criterion being what violence will do for its perpetrators and, via them, for society.[55] In these various ways one can detect a recognition on Sorel's part of the weak but inherent morally negative dimension of violence--despite the silly things he himself sometimes says, let alone the many more said about him.

Although such recognition is enough to support my position, a clearer one is found in more common revolutionary thought: Thomas Paine, Saint-Just and Robespierre,[56] Marx and Engels, Lenin, Sorel, Frantz Fanon, Sartre,[57] Marcuse, Malcolm X, and Eldridge Cleaver. This is that violence is justified, morally justified, on either of two grounds. The first is, essentially, as a just punishment or retribution for the moral evil perpetrated by the establishment, be it government, economic class, social class, racial group, or whatever.[58] This moral evil is frequently described, in whole or in part, in terms of the violence perpetrated by the establishment. This, surely, is one of

the thrusts of the slogan "Violence is as American as apple pie." It does not suggest that violence, in and of itself, is morally good or morally neutral; quite the opposite.

Secondly, revolutionary violence is justified in that its result, or at least its intended result, is mitigation or abolition of social evils.[59] Revolutionary violence is often considered morally justified because it will mean less violence in the long run. When there is a description of the ultimate goal of the revolution, violence finds no place in it.[60] When there is no positive description, it is generally clear that one negative demand is made on the ultimate goal, and that demand is the abolition, if possible, of violence. Sometimes this demand is explicit;[61] at other times it tends to be implicit, as in some of the literature of the recent New Left. The important thing here is that these justifications assume or imply an inherent morally negative dimension for violence.

The Realpolitiker are classically and notoriously represented by Niccolo Machiavelli. The adjective extorted from his name carries, at a minimum, an apparent denial of the morally negative dimension of violence. I will try to show briefly that linguistic history has been unfair to him. I will also claim, but not try to show here, that conclusions similar to those I develop about Machiavelli's position could be established for other defenders of hard-headed power politics.

The core of Machiavelli's position relevant to the issue at hand is contained in one sentence: "It cannot be

called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, betray one's friends, be without faith, without pity and without religion; by these methods one may indeed gain power, but not glory."[62] The morally negative dimension of violence is clearly acknowledged. All other things being equal, Machiavelli would certainly rather avoid violence. But Machiavelli, being the realist that he is, is well aware that all other things are not equal.

In the first place, political considerations like survival and power might make considerations of morality trifling by contrast. Henry Bienen writes, "For Machiavelli, violence could be legitimated because crimes committed by political actors fell under the judgments of history, not morality...."[63] Even if the judgments of history are not a kind of moral judgment, that does not mean that they are the only relevant judgments. Moral considerations would also remain for Machiavelli, even if they are relatively unimportant.[64] The moral guilt connected with violence may be incurred to gain survival or power without being any the less moral guilt. Furthermore, one might argue that "the judgments of history" are really a kind of moral judgment. If so, legitimizing violence via them would also recognize the inherent morally negative dimension of violence: historical considerations would override this dimension.

Sometimes Machiavelli recognizes this dimension of violence in a more direct manner:

A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the

> charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful; for, with a very few examples, he will be more merciful than those who, from excess of tenderness, allow disorders to arise, from whence spring bloodshed and rapine; for these as a rule injure the whole community, while the executions carried out by the prince injure only individuals.[65]

The admitted moral badness of violence is overridden on the grounds of avoiding greater evil in general and greater violence in particular--this time via stability and power. We would expect to hear this same agrument from other Realpolitiker. It would fit nicely into the mouth of Hobbes' sovereign, for example, though it would be somewhat less stark.[66] To argue in effect that violence is justified because in some cases it avoids greater evils is, of course, tantamount to acknowledging that violence is prima facie morally negative since it needs such justification.

Another important group of thinkers consists of the advocates of creative violence, including Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Sartre, Fanon, and Norman Mailer.[67] Albert Camus's The Rebel[68] is probably the best sustained analysis of this position. Though there are great differences among these thinkers, the core idea they share is that violence can be creative. For example, it can create meaningfulness, authentic personhood, masculinity, excitement, or art. These things are sometimes conceived of as ends to which violence can be a means; sometimes these things are considered to be inherent to the relevant violence and so are thought to be realized in the act of violence itself, not

by means of it.

Nevertheless, it does not follow that the advocates of creative violence show no recognition of the morally negative dimension of violence. I want to indicate some reasons for believing that they do recognize this dimension. These reasons are general and may not individually apply to all the advocates of creative violence. Though I do not mean to provide a complete analysis for any one of those advocates, I do think that such an analysis could be provided.

In the first place, it is common for the advocates of creative violence to use, though not always to articulate, a distinction between violence which is advocated and that which is not. Violence which is advocated is described in terms of its kind, its victims, its perpetrator, or the circumstances in which it is brought forth. For example, the perpetrator must be from a certain socio-economic class,[69] must act out of certain motives, or must be in a state of "lucidity."[70] In short, it is common for them to advocate violence which is creative (or expressive) and not to advocate, and even to deplore, that which is not. The creativity of advocated violence overrides the morally negative dimension which they find in non-creative violence, i.e., in all violence unless it has this special "saving" feature. The creativity of violence is its justification, and without it violence is unjustified--which means at least that it ought not be preferred.

It is also common, secondly, for the advocates of

creative violence to paint a pretty bleak picture of the way things are in the world and, at the same time, to adamantly refuse to acknowledge anything beyond the world. We could expect them to agree with Camus that "in the world of today, only a philosophy of eternity could justify nonviolence."[71] Because the world is as it is and because there is no acceptable philosophy of eternity,[72] they opt for violence. But in doing so, they give the distinct impression that they would rather have things other than they are, and thus that they would rather be able to get along without violence. In the world as it is, violence is sufficient and often necessary to eliminate dismalness; this is its justification. Thus, one gets the impression that the advocates of creative violence are very much concerned to justify the violence which they advocate and, therefore, that at least implicitly they are keenly aware of its morally negative dimensions.

Some seem to hold views very much like those Camus ascribes to the Russian terrorists of the late nineteenth century: "It is possible to believe that they too, while recognizing the inevitability of violence, nevertheless admitted to themselves that it is unjustifiable. Necessary and inexcusable--that is how murder appeared to them."[73] To hold that violence is unjustifiable is to hold that it is at least inherently morally negative.

Finally, another interpretation might fit some of the glorifiers of violence and still be compatible with my view. One could interpret some of them as deliberately

flouting the morally negative overtones which the term 'violence' has. In a sense such deliberate flouting recognizes this dimension, for it is a response to it. One can produce plausible hypotheses why someone would employ this kind of tactic: he might be trying to shock the reader out of his lethargy or to encourage his boldness; he might be appealing to his sense of irony by claiming that only revolutionary violence, for example, is really violence, whereas the destruction of life and the quality of life by the system is merely "force."[74] This line of interpretation could, I think, be carried out quite successfully for Georges Sorel's Reflections on Violence,[75] and it might work for others as well.

Most of the advocates of creative (expressive) violence recognize the morally negative dimension inherent in all violence in ways somewhat like those which have just been sketched. In so doing, they become authorities for the contention under consideration and not for objections to it.

Recently, interest in violence has revived among those we can call the theorists of innate aggression. I will deal with them briefly here by confining myself to the position of Konrad Lorenz because he has been the most influential and probably the most sensible proponent of the ideas which have stimulated such interest.[76] One might claim that Lorenz has shown that there is an instinct for violence in man, that it serves useful functions, and that, therefore, violence cannot be inherently bad.

In the first place, of course, the argument involves a non-sequitur. It would not follow from the existence of an instinct for violence that violence is not inherently bad; if sin is original, it is none the better for that fact. Nor does the conclusion follow from the statement that violence serves useful functions, for all that might show is that the moral goodness of these useful functions is such that it overrides the inherent morally negative character of violence in and of itself.

Secondly, both premises of the objection are inaccurate interpretations of Lorenz. Lorenz holds that there is an instinct of aggression in man, not an instinct of violence.[77] Lorenz is at some pains to distinguish them. 'Aggression' turns out to be a semi-technical term for Lorenz, and his view seems to be that violence is aggression gone haywire; that is, violence is aggression which does not serve useful functions but rather interferes with them.[78] This, of course, is a denial that violence serves useful functions. Lorenz tries to account for violence either as an accident or as an abnormal case of aggression due to abnormal circumstances or as the resultant product of the instincts of aggression and fear.[79]

The appeal to Lorenz as an objection to my claim about the existence of a morally negative dimension for the concept of violence is a failure. Although a similar appeal made to other biological authorities might avoid the difficulties of relying on inaccurate premises, it is not likely that an argument will be found which at the

same time escapes being a non-sequitur.

I could appeal to other types of authorities to confirm my claim that violence is morally negative. The advocates of non-violence, for example, would provide a rich source, though it would be difficult to get to the bare conceptual issues. The neutralists, too, would provide support, as a perusal of the language of both reports and editorials in the news media would quickly show. I will be content, however, with having sketched ways in which this dimension is often recognized by those who might be thought to deny its existence.

ix. Conclusion

In this chapter I have claimed and supported the view that violence has an inherent normatively negative dimension: it is *prima facie* morally bad or wrong. I have also argued that violence is not merely a moral concept, but that it has descriptive dimensions as well; these have been the subject of the first two chapters.

I have argued that the normatively negative dimension is not to be captured by the explications of the purportedly inherent non-productivity, illegality, or illegitimacy of violence. The arguments against these explications were produced in the opening sections of this chapter. Although I could appeal to the proponents of these explications as authorities who acknowledge that there is some such dimension, there is no need to do so since I later showed that those who might be thought hostile to such an acknowledgement

nevertheless often do in effect make it. Another source of possible objection, the claim that violence is a relative concept, was also examined. Finally, I put forth some positive linguistic evidence for the truth of my claim.

Thus, to the descriptive conditions arrived at in the first two chapters, the normative condition of prima facie moral badness or wrongness can be added. This completes my explication of the normal or central sense of the concept of violence.

Notes

[1]Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," pp. 486-498.

[2]John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1935), pp. 62-65 and 78-93.

[3]Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," p. 488.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]See, for example, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 78.

[7]Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," p. 488.

[8]Ibid., pp. 488-489. The purpose of force as energy is apparently considered to be blowing up rocks, production and construction, respectively.

[9]Ibid., p. 492. It is interesting to note that this passage recognizes a dramatic element in violence which is not recognized in Dewey's explicit definition, but which I have argued above is an inherent aspect of violence.
The best full account of Dewey's normative theory is his Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[10]Dewey himself makes such a claim in Liberalism and Social Action, p. 86. There his claim seems to be clearly empirical in nature, although it looks like a very strong,

even law-like claim about the world. It is also undoubtedly false.

By contrast see Graham and Gurr, Violence in America, p. 783, for just one example of a common belief that violence can be productive. Many articles in that volume attest to this fact.

[11]Dewey, "Force, Violence and Law," p. 496.

[12]For example, see various articles in Edwin Fogelman, ed., Hiroshima: The Decision to Use the A-Bomb (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964).

To claim that something is the most efficient among alternative means and yet clearly an act of violence is both plausible in itself and conclusive against Dewey. Dewey would only be interested in the relative efficiency of alternative means which are genuine alternatives, live options. He would have no truck with merely wished-for alternatives.

[13]Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. 60.

[14]Hook, "Violence," p. 264. It is worth noting that the successor to that encyclopedia, the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, published in 1968, does not contain an entry for 'violence,' nor even for 'force.' This deficiency is strange given the vast concern for violence occasioned by the dramatic events of the 1960's. Here is not the place, however, to speculate on the causes of such surprising omissions.

[15]Here, of course, he is following Dewey, as one would expect given their biographies.

[16]Hook, "Violence," p. 264.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Nieburg, Political Violence, p. 99. See also the ensuing discussion. See also Walter, Terror and Resistance, pp. 49-53.

[19]For still more, see E. V. Walter, "Power and Violence," American Political Science Review, XVIII(June, 1964), pp. 350-360, and Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, p. 64.

[20]Wolff, "On Violence," pp. 601-616.

[21]Ibid., p. 606.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Wolff's definition of force is simply "...the ability to work some change in the world by the expenditure of physical effort." Ibid., p. 604.

[24]Since Wolff treats 'illegitimate' and 'unauthorized' as equivalent terms, the discussion can be justly simplified by using only one of them.

[25]This summary is based on pp. 603-604 and on p. 607, especially the remark there that "Violence would be a use of force proscribed by the laws or executive authority of a genuinely democratic state." That is, violence would be such a use if such a state were legitimate. See also p. 606: "Thus, murder is an act of violence, but capital punishment by a legitimate state is not; theft or extortion is violent, but the collection of taxes by a legitimate state is not."

[26]Ibid., p. 607. Incidentally, Wolff seems to feel that it is by this argument that he has shown the notion of legitimacy or legitimate authority to be incoherent, and thus that the same fate befalls the notion of violence. See pp. 607-610. But this feeling is mistaken. The notions would retain their coherence. Claims to legitimacy, the right to command or proscribe, and the attendant claims to have an act of force removed from the realm of violence or placed into it--these claims are not made incoherent by Wolff's Kantian argument. They are, if that argument is decisive, shown to be always false. They are false because one has a more fundamental duty, a duty incompatible with the rights thus claimed. That such claims are false does not make them incoherent.

[27]Ibid., p. 608.

[28]Ibid., p. 606. Emphasis mine.

[29]Ibid., p. 608; see also the pages which follow.

[30]See also Jerome Skolnick's tendency toward a political definition in The Politics of Protest, pp. 3-8.

[31]Wolff, "On Violence," p. 606.

[32]Ibid., pp. 609 and 613.

[33]See Nieburg, Political Violence, especially his definition of violence on p. 13.

[34]Wolff, "On Violence," pp. 606 and 608.

[35]Ibid., p. 606. Emphasis mine.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, p. 8.

[38]Henry Bienen, Violence and Social Change: A Review of the Current Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press for the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs, 1968), p. 52.

[39]Perhaps he wants a "politico-moral" right or a right of political morality. I avoid discussing this option because it is not clear that such rights would differ from ordinary moral rights and because I have argued that whether or not an act is of a political nature is irrelevant to whether or not it is an act of violence.

[40]Wolff, "On Violence," p. 608.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid., p. 606.

[43]Ibid., p. 608.

[44]Ibid.

[45]The Gandhian conception of violence, for example, seems to be a more expanded conception than the normal one; it is, if anywhere, in the added expanses that the absolute prohibition, or at least the justification of that prohibition, must be found. See, for example, Tähtinen, Non-violence as an Ethical Principle.

[46]This contention is an expansion of Merleau-Ponty's statement that "...it is certain that neither Bukharin nor Trotsky nor Stalin regarded Terror as intrinsically valuable." Humanism and Terror, trans. by John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 97.

[47]Skolnick, Politics of Protest, p. 4.

[48]William Kornhauser, "Conflict, Order, and Change at Berkeley" (Unpublished discussion paper), quoted by Bienen in Violence and Social Change, p. 106. Bienen gives his full approval to Kornhauser's remark.

[49]This objection would be valid if the terms were taken in their neutral sense rather than in the sense of 'good.' 'Good' is more striking.

[50]It might well be argued that such a conceptual mistake is also a moral error.

[51]Even so sensible a thinker as Hannah Arendt speaks in such terms. See "Reflections on Violence," p. 25.

[52]Sorel, Reflections on Violence, p. 59. See also p. 58.

[53]Ibid., pp. 111, 182, and 190, and Edward Shils's introduction, p. 17n.

[54]Ibid., pp. 90-91, 115, and 249.

[55]Ibid., p. 171.

[56]See E. V. Walter, "Policies of Violence: From Montesquieu to the Terrorists," in The Critical Spirit: Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, ed. by Kurt Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).

[57]See Jean-Paul Sartre's introduction to Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth.

[58]See Bienen, Violence and Social Change, p. 73; V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution (New York: International Publishers, 1968), pp. 28 and 68; Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 40, 44, 309, 311, and Sartre's introduction; Herbert Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," Partisan Review XXVI(Winter, 1959), pp. 118-119; Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, 1967), pp. 160-162; Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice (New York: Delta Book by Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 3-17 and 120-137.

[59]See Bienen, Violence and Social Change, pp. 73-74; Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, pp. xviii-xix, 35, 97, and 107-111; Lenin, State and Revolution, pp. 68 and 74-75; Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," in Ethics and Society, ed. by Richard T. DeGeorge (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books of Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 139-141, 145-147; Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, the entire argument of the chapter "Concerning Violence," esp. p. 61 but also pp. 125 and 147-148 and Sartre in Fanon, p. 21.

[60]For example, Robespierre writes this: "What is the goal to which we are heading? The peaceful enjoyment of liberty and equality; the reign of that eternal justice of which the laws are graven not on marble and stone but in the hearts of all men, even that of the slave who forgets them and of the tyrant who denies them." in Walter, "Policies of Violence," p. 144. See also Herbert Marcuse, "Ethics and Revolution," pp. 133-134 and 140.

[61]See Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror, pp. 2 and 98; Marcuse, "Notes on the Problem of Historical Laws," pp. 118-119. A classic example is V. I. Lenin: "We set ourselves the ultimate aim of destroying the state, i.e., every organized and systematic violence, every use of violence against man in general." In State and Revolution, p. 68. See also pp. 74-75.

[62]Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses, p. 32; see also pp. 36 and 183-185.

[63]Bienen, Violence and Social Change, p. 74.

[64]To deny this would contradict passages I cite from The Prince.

[65]Machiavelli, The Prince and The Discourses, p. 60; see also p. 65.

[66]See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by C. B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 235, 256, 264-265, and 268-270. The difference in starkness is that Hobbes tends to talk of the infliction of violence by the sovereign as being on those who in some way have "deserved" it--though I don't think he is committed to that limitation--and also that he rules out the sovereign's rightful ability to make someone perpetrate violence on himself. Neither of these mitigating strains appears in Machiavelli's remarks. See also Walter, "Power and Violence," for interesting remarks on Chinese and Indian Realpolitiker, as well as on Hobbes and Machiavelli.

[67]One can probably find relevant passages throughout the works of Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, Camus, Sartre, and Fanon. The latter is especially insistent in his The Wretched of the Earth. Mailer offers suggestive remarks in "Talking of Violence," in Violence in the Streets, ed. by Endleman. A good many writers on the violence of juvenile delinquents offer similar explications and/or explanations of that violence. See J. Bronowski, The Face of Violence (Cleveland: World Publishing Compnay, 1967), or some of the articles in Readings in Juvenile Delinquency, ed. by Ruth Shonle Cavan (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964).

[68]Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. by Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, 1956).

[69]Fanon seems to argue this way. He does not advocate, but rather deplores, the violence perpetrated by the "settlers." Nietzsche deplores it in "Untermenschen," though this "class" is not a socio-economic one. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1954).

[70]Camus demands this of his rebels, as Dostoyevsky seems to of his underground man. See Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes From the Underground, trans. by Constance Garnett (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1960).

[71]Camus, The Rebel, p. 169.

[72]Nietzsche, of course, does have a philosophy of eternity, but he does not invoke it in a justification of non-violence.

[73]Camus, The Rebel, p. 169.

[74]Sorel, Reflections on Violence, p. 171.

[75]For an interpretation which could be considered to be along these lines, though one which goes much further and which does so in a much more somber fashion, see T. E. Hulme's "Reflections on Violence," reprinted as an appendix to Speculations, ed. by Herbert Read (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1924). This essay is apparently the critical introduction to Hulme's original translation of Sorel's book, though it does not appear in the edition I have previously cited.

[76]Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. for Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1966).

[77]W. P. Ashley-Montagu and some of the contributors to his book of critical articles on Lorenz have seriously misinterpreted Lorenz on this point. See W. P. Ashley-Montagu, ed., Man and Aggression (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

[78]See Lorenz, On Aggression, pp. x-xii, 44, and 233.

[79]See The New York Times, January 22, 1970, pp. 39 and 75.

CHAPTER IV

USING THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENCE: SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS

i. Introduction

In this chapter I want to draw some implications from my analysis of the concept of violence, indicating ways in which that analysis may be useful. First, I will look at the particular issue of violence and coercion, especially the assertion that violence is always coercive. Next, I will examine the claim that violence is incompatible with the free expression of ideas. Finally, I will consider some general moral questions about violence.

ii. Violence and Coercion

Various suggestions that the concept of violence can be equated with such notions as aggression, force, or serious harm have been considered above.[1] Although the assertion that violence and coercion are identical is counter-intuitive, the claim that violence is inherently coercive is not uncommon. For example, Christian Bay writes, "Actual physical violence is considered coercive regardless of whether the victim succumbs and complies--and coercive to the highest degree."[2] Robert A. Dahl asserts the following, more restricted, view: "The ultimate case of

coercion is taking B's life," where 'B' is a variable standing for anyone other than the agent.[3]

In order to deal with the relationship between violence and coercion, the nature of coercion must be clarified. Since the discussion will focus on the views of Professor Bay, his conception of coercion is important:

> ...coercion...means (a) the application of actual physical violence or (b) the application of sanctions sufficiently strong to make the individual abandon a course of action or inaction dictated by his own strong and enduring motives and wishes.[4]

By including violence in his definition of coercion, Bay seems to be begging one of the questions at issue: unless he is giving a stipulative definition, it is far from clear that violence can be absorbed into the notion of coercion. Consequently, it will be helpful to indicate other conceptions of coercion. According to Dahl, coercion "...is a form of power that exists whenever A compels B to comply by confronting him only with alternatives involving severe deprivation."[5] Robert Nozick's more rigorous analysis of coercion requires that someone <u>threaten</u> another with undesired consequences in a successful attempt to prevent him from doing a particular act.[6]

These definitions of coercion provide the basis for the discussion which follows. It is not my purpose to refine them; rather, I want to indicate why violence should not be identified with coercion and why it is inaccurate to claim that violence is inherently coercive.

One way to identify violence with coercion is to claim that the <u>meaning</u> of coercion can be captured by the

notion of violence. Christian Bay makes such a claim, though he allows that coercion can also mean "the application of sanctions sufficiently strong...." On the basis of his above definition, we should be permitted to replace locutions involving 'the application of violence' with parallel locutions involving the term 'coercion.' The non-identification of coercion and violence demonstrated below implies that Bay's meaning claim is false. I want to argue here that it represents an important confusion.

This confusion involves our categories for describing the different aspects of an act. Coercion is an act with a characteristic end. Although violence can be an act with an end, there are certainly cases in which violence is a means to another end. A common variety of such cases are those in which physical violence is a <u>means</u> to the end of coercion. Bay himself writes, "Physical violence is usually a potent means of making potential victims take heed...."[6] "Mac coerced Bud in order to coerce him" seems both silly and uninformative. "Mac committed violence against Bud in order to coerce him" is both sensible and informative; coercion is <u>the</u> end. Violence may be <u>an</u> end (itself requiring lower-level means), but it is at most a subordinate end. To claim that a description of a subordinate end could and does mean the same as a description of the end to which it is subordinated is to confuse the categories for different aspects of the same act. This confusion indicates that the meaning claim is unsatisfactory.

A complete identification of violence and coercion

could avoid the claim of an identity of meaning. It would require all cases of coercion to be cases of violence and all cases of violence to be cases of coercion. But the first conjunct of this requirement is clearly unsatisfactory. Mr. Bay identifies the difficulty in the context of his definition. Since he allows that coercion can involve either violence or a certain kind of sanction, and since not all sanctions are acts of violence, there will be cases of coercion involving sanctions which are not cases of violence. Such classical non-violent actions as threating an economic boycott or a hunger strike could coerce an employer to change his hiring practices or legislators to seriously consider prison reform. Some coercion is striking because it avoids violence. A guerilla condemned to death might be coerced into revealing a stockpile of weapons by the offer of a reprieve. If coercion is conceived as either Dahl or Nozick define it, only slight modification would preserve the validity of my objections.

As noted above, Sidney Hook defines violence as "...the illegal employment of physical coercion for personal or group ends."[7] Although his definition is a more restricted view because of its insistence on physical coercion, it remains unsatisfactory. I may tie you up to prevent you from doing what you want. Yet I may treat you very gently, and you might be relieved that I did not perpetrate violence against you.

Mr. Bay does hold, however, that all cases of violence are cases of coercion: "Actual physical violence is...coer-

cive to the highest degree." This represents the most interesting conflation of the ideas of violence and coercion. After formulating a plausible version of Bay's argument, I will note a possible objection to this view that he himself acknowledges. Then I will argue that his position is faulty because it seems to rest on a narrow psychology, because it does not cover an important class of cases which Bay would admit were cases of violence, and because the concept of violence employed by Bay is unsatisfactory. I will then consider another possible argument for the view at issue. This argument, however, will be seen to involve the important confusion between a sanction and the possible consequences of a sanction.

Bay asserts the following:

> Physical violence...always interferes with the actual victim's own strong motives and wishes. With the possible exception of confirmed masochists, we may assume that every human being strongly desires physical integrity and inviolability.[8]

Taking 'interferes' in the spirit indicated by Bay's original definition of coercion, the following argument can be made: all cases of physical violence are cases of coercion because they involve making the individual abandon a course of action or inaction dictated by his own strong and enduring wishes for physical integrity and inviolability. If 'interferes' does not mean something like this, but merely something like 'conflicts with,' then the notion of coercion would be inflated beyond its normal and useful dimensions.

Of course, if there are confirmed masochists whose

motives and wishes include being the victims of violence, then it will be false that all cases of violence are cases of coercion. I do not want to rest my criticism of Bay's view on this possibility, however, because it is peripheral in its importance.

Nevertheless, Bay's argument does seem to be based on a narrow psychology of the motives and wishes people do, or at least could, have. He does not seem to consider the consequences suggested by such views as those of the later Freud, for example.[9] Freud might well admit the existence of strong motives for physical integrity. Yet he might also be taken to claim the existence of other strong motives for the violation of physical integrity. (This might be part of what is involved in the "death instinct.") If both kinds of motives are present in human beings, then Bay's view would require that both the perpetration of physical violence and the failure to perpetrate physical violence are coercive. But that is absurd, or at least it makes the notion of coercion useless. One need not even appeal to complete psychological theories to make the present criticism. Consider the concrete example of a captured revolutionary who is being tortured. One can believe with Bay that the revolutionary's strong motives require that this violence not be wrought on him. Yet it is also believable that this revolutionary could have even stronger motives, such as aiding the revolution by becoming a martyr or protecting his fellow revolutionaries. Consequently, he might be able to follow a course of action dictated by his desire

for his own physical integrity only by abandoning a course of action dictated by his stronger desire not to betray the revolution. If he endures the torture, it would be misleading to say that the violence was simply a case of coercion. It would be more coercive if he avoided the violence and betrayed his friends. It even seems plausible to suggest that he would be coerced only if he yielded, for reasons connected with the sanctions argument below.

Bay's argument can also be attacked by pointing out difficulties presented for it by cases of deadly violence. They do not ever seem to be cases in which an individual could be coerced to do something. This is also true if doing something is conceived of negatively. Bay might respond, for example, that murdering someone coerces him into abandoning a course of action or inaction dictated by his strong desire for physical integrity. However, although this course of action is not carried out, it seems silly to claim that the victim himself abandoned it. If there is any individual who abandoned it, it could only be someone who was left alive. Thus, the victim of deadly violence would not be himself coerced.[10]

Finally, the argument found in Bay for the claim that violence is inherently coercive appears to suffer from a faulty conception of violence.[11] Although Bay does not define violence, he implies in the argument under scrutiny that violence interferes with the victim's strong desires for "physical integrity and inviolability." The condition for violence suggested there appears to be explained and

slightly expanded in the following remark: "Confinement or imprisonment is considered physical violence only if and to the extent that it damages the individual's health, physical or mental."[12] Although this conception of violence is still too broad according to the analysis of the first three chapters, the important difficulty here is that it is too narrow.[13] It appears to permit only injury brought directly on the victim. It was shown above, however, that violence can also involve injury or damage to other "objects" than the victim himself.[14] Though the victim's interests must be negatively affected, his physical integrity need not be violated. This difference is significant because there could exist cases of violence, according to my analysis, which would have no effect on the victim's course of action and which therefore would not be cases of coercion. Someone might commit violence against another by shooting his livestock or burning his summer cottage. The victim might never discover that his cattle are missing; he might remain firm in his resolution never to use his cottage again. In such cases it is clear that the relationship of violence to coercion is contingent and not, as Bay's remarks suggest, necessary. It is also clear that cases exist in which this contingent relationship is not actualized. These conclusions should be expected, for the definitive result of violence is injury or damage, whereas the definitive result of coercion is a modification of behavior. Since sustaining an injury is not in and of itself a way of acting, it is odd to claim that even direct violence to the

victim is itself inherently coercive, "...even if the victim does not comply or does not even try to comply."[15]

Robert Dahl's more restricted claim of the inherent coerciveness of violence involves a different kind of mistake: "Coercion, then, is a form of power that exists whenever A compels B to comply by confronting him only with alternatives involving severe deprivation. The ultimate case of coercion is taking B's life."[16] But taking B's life, it should be obvious, is in no way confronting him with alternatives of any kind. Therefore, it would seem not to be a case of coercion at all. Taking B's life may be the ultimate in severe deprivation, and so confronting him with only that alternative unless he does X might be said to be the ultimate in coercion; but bringing about that alternative would seem to occur for cases like those just described when the attempt at coercion has failed precisely because A could not get B to comply.

It is instructive to note that this kind of mistake is generalized by considering violence always to be a coercive sanction. As Nozick points out, violence may in some cases be understood by the relevant parties as an implicit threat that more violence will follow if the victim does not succumb.[17] But violence need not function is this way. Nozick offers the following example:

> If a drunken group comes upon a stranger and beats him up or even kills him, this need not be coercion. For there need have been no implicit threat of further violence if the person didn't comply with their wishes, and it would be difficult for this to be the case if they just come upon him and kill him.[18]

Bay writes that sanctions are "inducements" which "...can consist in the possibility of...punishments...."[19] Actual physical violence is different from the possibility of physical violence, and the kind of possible violence relevant to an inducement and thus to coercion is violence which is promised or threatened unless the individual succumbs to the coercion.

In conclusion, arguing that violence is inherently coercive because violence is a coercive sanction is unsatisfactory because it ignores the useful distinctions between promising and fulfilling a promise, between threatening and carrying out a threat, between expressing or promulgating a sanction and executing it--in short, between a sanction and its potential consequences. Bay's more direct argument for the claim that all cases of violence are cases of coercion also fails, as does an appeal to a definition which is not merely stipulative. Thus, although it can and does play important roles in cases of coercion, violence need not be coercive.

iii. Violence and the Free Expression of Ideas

It has been said that violence is to be condemned because it is incompatible with the free expression of ideas. The argument frequently takes the form of asserting that violence is out of place in certain contexts--for example, a democratic society, an academic community, a scientific enterprise--because of this alleged character-

istic.[20] Yet the precise nature of the alleged incompatibility is seldom spelled out. In this section I want to examine some possible interpretations of this argument.

A strong interpretation is possible: violence necessarily interferes with the free expression of ideas. It is important to note that this version suggests no qualifications on the kinds of violence or on the motives of its perpetrators. Whether anyone has seriously held this view is difficult to tell due to the ambiguity of the original claim; but the vehemence with which that claim has been invoked against particular threats of violence--a vehemence often manifested in the use of such all-or-nothing terms as 'incompatible' or 'never'--suggests that at least sometimes in the heat of battle, this strong interpretation of the argument is at stake. As a general argument, however, it is unsatisfactory in a number of ways.

Although violence can interfere with the free expression of ideas in quite a direct manner, it is not always necessary that it do so. Direct interference could take the form of damage to such vehicles of expression as books or microphones, or it could involve injury to the expressers. But it is possible that the potential interference of most kinds of violence can be circumvented; it is even possible that some such violence will lead to an increase in the free expression of ideas. Suppose a professor is knocked to the floor at the beginning of the term and the manuscript of his next book is burned before his eyes. One result of this violence might be that he will

not be able to spend the term reading his manuscript aloud. Some ideas might, therefore, be lost and so not freely expressed, but they need not be. He might have a carbon or a photographic memory; he might even develop a more open classroom manner which would allow the free expression of all his ideas plus those of many students. His students might not have been allowed to express their ideas but for the violence which opened the term.

To be sure, some violence necessarily interferes with the free expression of ideas, given certain plausible assumptions. If the victim had ideas which he would have expressed, then deadly or otherwise incapacitating violence will interfere in the manner at issue. Although this truism may be relevant in some contexts, these kinds of violence have not often been at issue in America during recent campus disorders or political demonstrations.

Some violence can interfere indirectly with the free expression of ideas. For example, it might produce distraction or inconvenience, or it might produce a climate of fear. But distraction or inconvenience can often be surmounted, and it is hardly a necessary truth that people are intimidated by violence.

Furthermore, some violence is unrelated to the free expression of ideas. A university vice-president might be beaten up for his money, a department secretary raped, a trophy case smashed. It is hard to see what ideas would necessarily or even contingently have their expression interfered with, and it is also easy to imagine such acts

of violence resulting in the expression of some ideas which otherwise would not have been expressed.

The result of all this is that sometimes violence interferes with the free expression of ideas and sometimes it does not. It seems possible, in fact, that sometimes violence may stimulate and increase the free expression of ideas. Consequently, this strong interpretation of the claim that violence is incompatible with the free expression of ideas is false. At the very least, the claim needs to be limited to special kinds of violence. A satisfactory general argument against violence, however, would seem to require weakening the claim to state that violence usually interferes with the free expression of ideas or that it has a tendency to do so. Empirical information would then be sought--which to my knowledge has not been done--and even then the argument would have to be wielded with circumspection.

The claim mentioned at the beginning of this section could be interpreted in a more plausible but still powerful way: employing violence <u>to persuade</u> interferes with the free expression of ideas.[21] The argument against violence based on this interpretation has the virtue of eliminating irrelevant kinds of violence, but it is still difficult to evaluate. Its meaning is still imprecise, in part because it could involve reference to <u>attempting</u> to persuade by violence or to <u>actually</u> persuading.

Viewing the argument first as an attack on attempting to persuade by violence, several interpretations are still

possible. If the key claim means that the general practice of trying to convince by violence will prevent the expression of some ideas or will make the expression of ideas more difficult than it otherwise would have been, then it could be examined empirically, and attention could be paid to the kinds and degrees of restrictiveness resulting from such employment of violence. A general practice of violence might produce fear, hostility, rigidity, distraction, preoccupying concern with self-defense, and so on. These things can all be psychological barriers to the free give and take of ideas, even to the ability to think of ideas to express. The argument would become quite complex because of the number of such possible results of violence and because psychological reactions to attempted intimidation vary greatly from person to person; yet the argument will usually be effective.

A less common interpretation would assert that the general practice of violence would eliminate <u>all</u> expression of ideas. This claim, however, seems empirically false unless it is limited to violence which would annihilate or incapacitate all the possible expressers of relevance.

If the claim means that <u>any given</u> attempt to convince by violence will make the expression of ideas more difficult than it would have been without violence or prevent the expression of some ideas, then although it will often be true, it is at least conceivable that for some cases it would be false. I could add to the above example of the professor whose notes were burned the idea that those who

burned them were trying to persuade him to use a different teaching method. Then, too, attempts to persuade by violence might fail miserably; they might increase the boldness of the opponents of the perpetrators in maintaining their ideas and the attentiveness of those who are receiving them. Interference with the free expression of ideas as conceived in this interpretation is a contigent result of violence. This result may be brought about often enough to justify a general policy against violence, but it will not always be decisive in response to particular acts or threats.

If, however, the attempt to convince by violence takes the special form of perpetrating violence against those who express ideas, or certain ideas, then the argument can be made very tight. This can be done by taking the free expression of ideas to involve the absence of <u>any</u> constraint. Since violence necessarily has a negative effect on the victim's interests,[23] it seems plausible to conceive of this special use of violence as a constraint. Consequently, any given attempt to convince by such violence will necessarily interfere with the free expression of ideas. Yet this interpretation is applicable precisely for those cases in which ideas have already been expressed. Such apparent paradoxicalness suggests that the original argument is imprecise in still another way: the concept of freedom involved is either unclear or ambiguous or both. I merely mention this difficulty here; I do not want to tackle it. Elsewhere in this section the free expression

of ideas is taken to mean that the expression of ideas is neither prevented nor made more difficult than it otherwise would have been.

I should add that with either interpretation of 'the free expression of ideas' a general practice of this particular employment of violence will probably function as a special case of the general practice of persuading by violence discussed above. Such a practice seems bound to produce a climate of intimidation which would at least be a constraint if not also an effective deterrent to the free expression of ideas. Considerations of degree would again be important here.

Finally, two particular kinds of violence merit special attention in the context of attempting to persuade by violence. The first of these is deadly violence. On the one hand, it is necessarily true that deadly violence will prevent the free expression of ideas by the victim. On the other, it is also necessarily true that deadly violence will fail to persuade the victim to believe any idea, though its effect on others is contingent.

More interesting is the category of expressive violence,[24] especially because some violence could be taken to express ideas. If some violence makes it difficult or impossible to express <u>other</u> ideas, as it certainly sometimes does, to suppress some expressive violence is itself incompatible with the free expression of ideas. In such cases the reference to the free expression of ideas is a reference to a dilemma, not just to a condemnatory principle. If

the violence in question is suppressed, the free expression of ideas is interfered with; the same result ensues if the violence is not suppressed. Clearly, then, other factors must be made relevant to a helpful evaluation of such violence than the mere fact that the free expression of ideas has been hindered. (Some factors might include the quality of the ideas or their quantity or the likelihood of future free expression.) Furthermore, it seems possible that some violence which is expressive of ideas might be such as to not make impossible or even difficult the free expression of ideas by other means. It would be rare, for example, that throwing a rock through a bank window would hinder such expression.[25] In such cases the argument in question would be directly self-defeating. Supposed condemnation of violence solely on the grounds of interference with the free expression of ideas would, were it rigorously pursued, amount to a justification of such violence. The justification would be even greater if the violence led to an increase in freedom of expression.

Returning to the original argument, it was noted that it could be interpreted as claiming that actually persuading by violence interferes with the free expression of ideas. If this claim means that someone is coerced by violence to believe something which he otherwise would not have believed, then the claim is necessarily true and the argument sound. Yet violence need not be thus coercive.[26] If you beat me up to persuade me that you are stronger or nastier than I am, I may well be persuaded. But your

violence would normally be said to be evidence for my new belief; only under unusual circumstances would I be said to have been coerced into believing such things about your character.[27] Furthermore, your violence might persuade a by-stander, but not me; neither he nor I would be coerced into believing something we would not otherwise have believed. Since I might continue to express in undiminished fashion my belief that I am nastier than you are, your violence, though persuasive to someone, would not interfere with the free expression of ideas. Consequently, if the claim is interpreted to involve violence merely as the source of persuasion, then it is not always true that violence interferes with the free expression of ideas.

Three things should be noted about the preceding investigation. The first is that in many ways it only begins to examine the claim that violence is incompatible with the free expression of ideas. What it means for there to be a free expression could be analyzed more rigorously. There are even more interpretations of the claim at issue than have been considered here. Some might take it as asserting that violence merely tends to interfere with the free expression of ideas, that it might so interfere, or that under some circumstances it often interferes. My examination is only a beginning in that it points to the need for empirical investigations to test the strength of some important interpretations. It barely mentions the possibility of violence as a means of eliminating various obstructions to the free expression of ideas. Secondly,

the discussion shows that the issue is not a single issue or a simple one. If one adds to this the result that many strong interpretations of the original claim are either unsatisfactory or are limited to special contexts--a third noteworthy point--, then one becomes suspicious of the sweeping ways in which the argument is often wielded in practice. This is not to deny the value of many interpretations nor even the decisiveness of some. It is, however, to ask for more care, for treating the argument as it deserves and not as an absolute dogma.

iv. Some General Moral Questions

If my analysis of the nature of violence is substantially correct, it should be clear that many interesting and important questions about violence are not going to be answered in any satisfactory way by peering into the concept of violence alone. What I have in mind as interesting and important questions are those like the following: Is violence irrational? Is violence self-defeating? Is it anti-social? Is violence actually ever justified? What good could it possibly do? Can it be controlled? Is violence a feasible political tactic? Can it be eliminated? The moral which my investigation of the concept of violence suggests is that to answer many if not all these questions in any helpful way will require, in addition, analyzing other relevant concepts or embarking on significant empirical investigations or, most likely, both.

Suppose we were to ask whether the slaying of a tyrant

is morally justified, even though it is clearly a case of violence. An adequate answer would seem to rely crucially on developed moral conceptions of the nature of man and of society, as well as on developed moral theories about which things are valuable and which are not. Then, too, it would seem crucial to know what the results of this act of violence would be--in addition, of course, to the absence of the particular tyrant. Will the tyrant merely be replaced by another tyrant? Will there be severe dislocations in the society? What will be the subtler effects on the quality of life? One is suspicious of any general empirical claims about the results of eliminating tyrants by violence, and sufficient knowledge of the results for a particular case would be complex and difficult to get, even if one could get them. Yet such knowledge seems a prerequisite for answering the original question, as does some plausible method for evaluating the expected results.

We have seen some thinkers who have defined violence so as to in effect--and perhaps in intent--provide answers to some of these questions: for example, it has been claimed that violence must result in severe injury or damage and that violence is inherently disruptive and coercive.[28] In general, however, my investigation has found such attempts mark out a sub-class within the category of violence but avoid other phenomena which our intuitions place in that category as well. Thus, although such attempts provide answers, they do so in ways which are not only self-fulfilling but also misleading.

A related point of some significance is that there is no peculiar moral problem of violence. This does not mean that there is no problem of violence, but it does mean that the moral problems about violence are not unique to it. It would seem, then, that there is no point in attempting to devise an "ethic of violence" as opposed to other ethics and, especially, as opposed to a general ethical theory. Thus, there would be, on the one hand, no point in trying to develop an ethic of violence by turning other evils into violence so that one could make quantitative comparisons in the hope of generating ethical decisions about the use of violence;[29] nor, on the other hand, does there seem to be a need to search for special justifications for the use of violence which are different from those necessary for anything which is essentially harmful to persons and in and of itself bad.[30]

Since violence necessarily involves bringing about something bad, the key moral question is the one of its justification: for it to be morally justified it must also bring about something good which outweighs the bad. Determining this might be very difficult, but the difficulty does not seem to lie in anything peculiar about violence. The bad intrinsic to violence--harm to persons via the negative affecting of their interests--is also brought about by other phenomena, including some classical types of non-violence.[31] Some bad is contingently related to violence: for example, the fear it produces in those not directly affected, which is probably in part a product of the dramatic

character of violence. But fear, of course, has other sources too. Some have argued that a negative effect of violence is the change it produces in the agent.[32] How one weighs all these factors against whatever possible good may result from violence is a difficult problem, not of violence alone but of ethics in general.

Since violence not only is in some way inherently bad but is also an act, a commission, it raises the hoary ethical problem about whether one should do something bad in order that good might result. But this problem as well is not peculiar to violence. St. Paul raised it about sin, and it has since been raised often about violating one's duties, especially such duties as telling the truth and obeying the law. Since the negative results of deliberately doing something bad are more certain than the positive results, the tendency is to demand that the positive results be clear and preponderant. In general, commissions are censured more than omissions in spite of equally harmful results. Violence does not stand alone with regard to this problem either.

In short, the moral problems surrounding violence point to the need for a general moral system which would permit comparative evaluations of negative results, some of which will always attend violence, with positive results which might also ensue. Such a system is not likely to be generated by meditating solely on the concept of violence.

v. Conclusion

Perhaps the most important implication of this analysis of violence is that many significant questions about violence cannot be satisfactorily answered by appealing to that idea alone. This conclusion may seem obvious by now, but I have had to argue in many ways against those who think differently. It was shown in the third chapter that violence is inherently *prima facie* morally negative. But as this chapter has shown, that fact does not by itself yield a solution to many moral problems of either a general or a particular nature concerning violence.

The first two chapters yielded a description of violence as relatively swift and direct and as resulting in at least some minimum degree of physical injury or damage which negatively affects interests of considerable importance belonging to the victim; sometimes the production of this result must be intentional, but sometimes it need not be. There is nothing in this description which will generate a decision for many questions about whether violence should be employed or not. Nor is there anything which will yield automatic answers to many questions about violence asked by psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. The analysis of the concept of violence at most suggests possibilities for the role of violence in social change, in exercising power, in producing anxiety and hostility, and so on. As was demonstrated in the early sections of this chapter, answering many of the important moral and non-moral questions will involve both reflection on related concepts

and the seeking of empirical information. I hope that my analysis of the concept of violence will play a helpful role in dealing with these issues which go beyond it.

Notes

[1]The issue of violence and aggression was discussed in Chapter III, Section viii; violence and force in Chapter II, Section ii; and violence and serious harm in Chapter I, Section ii, and Chapter II, Section vi.

[2]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 93.

[3]Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 33.

[4]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 93.

[5]Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 33.

[6]See Robert Nozick, "Coercion," in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, ed. by Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 441-443. Nozick carefully spells out a set of seven individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an accurate account of one person's coercing another into not doing a particular act.

[7]Hook, "Violence," p. 264. See above, Chapter III, Section iii.

[8]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 94. This is the only passage in Bay which promises to bring the view at issue beyond the status of a definition which is merely stipulative or unsatisfactory in ways indicated above.

[9]For a good presentation of the relevant views of Sigmund Freud, see An Outline of Psychoanalysis, trans. by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1949), especially Chapter II. Particularly interesting are Freud's views on violence in "Why War?" This remarkable letter can be found in Sigmund Freud, Character and Culture, ed. by Philip Rieff (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 134-147. The letter was written in 1932 in response to an invitation from Albert Einstein to exchange their views for the Internal Institute of Intellectual Co-operation under the auspices of the League of Nations. Also of relevance is Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. by James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 1961.

[10]This somewhat weird argument against Bay's abandonment version could probably be circumvented by an improvement in his conception of coercion. But such improvement would not enable us to say that someone could coerce a person into performing an action by means of deadly violence.

[11]Since Bay does not offer an analysis of violence, my criticism is directed at the concept he employs.

[12]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 94n.

[13]Bay's conception does not acknowledge a dramatic condition, for example. See above, Chapter I, Section ii.

[14]See above, Chapter II, Section v.

[15]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 94.

[16]Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 33.

[17]Nozick, "Coercion," p. 444.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Bay, Structure of Freedom, p. 89. Emphasis mine.

[20]This argument was actually employed, for example, in a resolution of one of the highest ranking faculty groups at the University of Michigan, the Senate Advisory Committee on University Affairs, in the spring of 1970.

[21]This interpretation was suggested to me informally by both Professor Carl Cohen and Professor Robert Hannaford.

[22]In an unpublished paper entitled "Democracy and Disorder," Professor Arnold S. Kaufman argued that there is no special reason for rejecting disorder as a political tactic in a democracy. He argued, that is, that disorder is no more unjustified in a democracy than it is under other forms of government. While he points out that this does not mean that disorder is therefore morally justified, he also notes that its moral suitability may be much greater than many think (p. 15). Although he is concerned with disorder rather than with violence per se, much of what he says could be relevant to violence as well. Some disorder is clearly violent, and Kaufman himself defines disorder so that it "...implies an intentional harm...." (p. 1)

[23]See above, Chapter I, Section iv. It may be true, as an essay in Time magazine had it ("Violent Protest: A Debased Language," Time, May 18, 1970, p. 15), that violence is a crude way of expressing ideas because it sometimes

lacks specificity. It is not true, however, as the essay would also have it, that "Violence is, essentially, a confession of ultimate inarticulateness." Whatever "ultimate inarticulateness" might plausibly mean, some violence is surely not such a confession. A food riot, an attack on the draft board files, trashing an ROTC building--these forms of violence can express ideas with both clarity and forcefulness.

[24]See above, Chapter II, Section v.

[25]It is easy to supply a context in which such an act would be one of expressive violence. It could take place during a protest involving clearly defined grievances and motives on the part of the protesters.

[26]The general claim that violence is inherently coercive was discussed in the previous section.

[27]This kind of persuasion by violence, persuasion which is not a necessary result, makes its appearance in contexts more significant than those of the example in the text. Violent guerilla theater or protest might well work in such a fashion, and, I would venture to suggest, so might (and so has) war.

[28]For example, see above, Chapter II, Sections vi and viii, and Chapter IV, Section ii.

[29]Howard Zinn, "Violence and Social Change in American History," in Rose, Violence in America, pp. 79-80. Zinn's attempt at an ethic of violence by converting other evils into violence seems to me correct in acknowledging the need for a way of comparing the results of violence with other results of other means or with the results of doing nothing. To turn other evils into violence, however, would seem to deal with this need in a somewhat backward way and in a way which would eliminate violence as the particular kind of phenomenon which we now take it to be.

[30]J. M. Cameron, "On Violence," New York Review of Books, July 2, 1970, p. 24. Unfortunately, Cameron does not tell us in what way the justification for violence must be special or what 'special' is to be opposed to.

[31]See Wolff, "On Violence," pp. 610-612. Wolff argues that "...the doctrine of non-violence is merely a subjective queasiness having no moral rationale." (page 610) If violence is understood roughly as I have analyzed it above, Wolff has a point. He rests his view on the claims that some non-violent tactics produce serious injury and that those ultimately responsible bring about such injury indirectly and so do not face up to their own role in this production.

[32]It has been argued that this is a necessary result of engaging in violence, but there is nothing in the central concept of violence itself which lends support to such an argument.

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