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THEORIES OF THE EMOTIONS IN THE OLD STOA

by
Robert Joseph Rabel

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Classical Studies)
in The University of Michigan
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....1

CHAPTER 1: DISPOSITIONAL AND OCCURRENT TERMS IN STOIC PSYCHOLOGY.....5

CHAPTER 2: THE PHYSICAL BASIS FOR DISPOSITIONS.....34

CHAPTER 3: THE EMOTIONS AND THE STOIC THEORY OF INDIFFERENTS.....54

CHAPTER 4: THE EMOTIONS AND THE STOIC CONCEPT OF VALUE.....98

CHAPTER 5: EMOTIONS AND CAUSES.....122

INTRODUCTION

Though often translated by the vague term 'affection', the Greek word pathos has no precise English equivalent, because it groups together a number of concepts not usually associated in our language. The present work is an investigation of the term's meaning in the psychological theories of the Old Stoa, where 'emotion' is perhaps the best that we can do.

The meaning of Stoic theories about the emotions can, I believe, be best understood not only through discussion of the various definitions which the Stoics applied to the pathe but also through detailed discussion of the things which cause emotions. Chapter 1 introduces most of the basic themes which recur throughout this thesis and distinguishes the emotions from the dispositions or states of the soul which cause them. This is the first sense in which emotions have causes; they result from permanent or lasting traits of character.

Chapter 2 examines in detail the physical basis for these theories in order to distinguish further the emotions from their causes, while chapters 3 and 4 relate these questions to the Stoic theory of moral worth. Here the question is: are the pathe good, evil, or indifferent to goodness and evil? The answer to this question hinges upon recognition of a multiple level-of-discourse model which I develop and attribute to the Stoics, whereby all emotions have a place on an indifferent level-of-discourse but yet at the same time are good or evil on a second,

moral level. For contrary to the views of most commentators there is no special sphere of action or emotion which is totally divorced from considerations of morality. Chapter 5 discusses emotions and causes further and demonstrates that emotions are caused conjointly by states of the soul and by the external objects to which the emotions are directed.

We cannot hope to understand any philosopher or philosophical school apart from the appropriate historical context, and in this regard, I have attempted to prove, especially in chapters 1 and 4, that Aristotle is a dominant influence upon the Stoics. The influence of Aristotle upon the Hellenistic philosophers has been demonstrated with great success by David Furley in the case of the Epicureans, though the value of his approach has not been sufficiently appreciated in the case of the Stoics.

Since they dealt with fundamental questions about man's emotional nature, there is a certain timelessness about Stoic philosophy of mind which invites comparison with the rival theories of other philosophers, both ancient and modern. Though there is an ever present danger of reading too much of modern philosophy into the ancients, the writer can only hope not to have gone too far in this direction. No precise or clearly formulated principles of methodology can prevent such errors, and the Stoics were sophisticated thinkers with a manner of ap-

proach which can only be appreciated when we realize that they asked the same basic questions about the emotions that any philosopher must take up in the difficult realm of the philosophy of mind.

Stoic fragments are cited from von Arnim's Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, abbreviated as SVF in this text.

CHAPTER 1

DISPOSITIONAL AND OCCURRENT TERMS IN STOIC PSYCHOLOGY

This first chapter deals with just one aspect of my thesis on Stoic theories of the emotions: the distinction between pathos (which in this psychological context is best translated as 'emotion') and hexis ('disposition'). It is important to make this distinction as will be shown below. Some commentators, both ancient and modern, have ignored it, and as a result have given confusing accounts of a coherent psychological theory.

Examples from two of the most recent works on Stoicism may serve as illustrations. First of all, John Rist thinks that the pathe are "diseases and mental illnesses" of the soul. I.G. Kidd says that the pathos is to be equated with a "diseased or disease-like state"[1]. I will argue, however, that there are two quite different mental phenomena which must be distinguished here: 1) that the pathe[2] are occurrences in the soul of determinable duration[3] and 2) that they are related, in a fashion to be discussed below, to certain items in the external world which can be said to serve as their causes. Diseases of soul, on the other hand, ought properly to be understood as hexeis. They are dispositions, traits of character or qualities of soul, which also stand as cause to effect in their relation to the pathe. The view of Rist and Kidd not only ignores the transitory nature of the pathe, but also obscures the clear lines of Aristotelian influence operating upon the Stoics.

The chapter itself falls quite naturally into five

parts. In the first two, I examine certain relevant views of Aristotle and Gilbert Ryle on the question of dispositions. Thirdly, Stoic views on the pathe are discussed, followed, in the fourth section, by an examination of the kinds of words used to designate pathe and hexeis. The approach of these two sections is twofold, involving discussion of the different roles played by these two entities in the Stoic theory of causation, and an account of the words used to designate them. Lastly, I examine the relationship between a pathos and a particular kind of hexis- a disease of soul. It is this relationship, a causal relationship and not one of identity, which critics such as Galen, Rist, and Kidd have ignored.

1

As Rist notes, the phrase "post-Aristotelian philosophy" is coming to be used of philosophy which is dominated by Aristotle and not merely posterior to him.[4] This in itself might seem to justify beginning any account of Hellenistic philosophy with Aristotle, but there is an even more important reason in that Aristotle's doctrine about dispositions presents an early example of the pathos-hexis distinction, which the Stoics later developed in more detail[5].

The Categories helps to prevent any confusion between the two kinds of entities by positing a categorical difference: pathos (which includes the emotions) is one category, while hexis (disposition) is a part of the cate-

gory of quality[6]. In Chapter 8 four basic kinds of qualities are distinguished: 1) dispositions or states (hexeis) and conditions (diatheseis)[7]; 2) capacities (dunameis); 3) affective qualities (pathetikai poiotetes); 4) shape and external form[8]. What concerns us here is the application of classes 1) and 3) to the qualities of the soul.

A state lasts a long time and is hard to change. The examples given are: branches of knowledge, virtue, justice, and temperance. Moreover, to be just is not to be affected in any way, but to have a certain quality. A condition (diathesis), on the other hand, seems to differ from a state in being of shorter duration, and more easily changeable[9]. The discussion of the hexis is quite brief in the Categories, and can with profit be supplemented by several points made about states in the Nicomachean Ethics.

In this ethical context, Aristotle assumes that the virtues such as justice must be constituents of one of three classes: pathos, dunamis, or hexis (1105b20), after which the first two are rejected as possibilities. The pathe are defined by example (Aristotle's usual procedure in dealing with them) as: fear, boldness, envy, joy, love, etc., occurrences which are categorically different from hexeis, since they are ways in which the soul is affected. The fact that, for various reasons, virtue cannot be a pathos or a dunamis leads Aristotle to conclude that it is a hexis concerned with choice (1106b36), one by which a man is said to be (or to be qualified as) good and per-

forming his proper function (1106a21ff.). One outstanding fact about the hexis, which Aristotle points out (1106 a6), is that we are not said to be moved in accordance with it, but to be disposed in a certain way[10]. Thus, a man is said to be just if he has the disposition to perform just actions, and likewise in the case of the other virtues. Moreover, it is clear that Aristotle keeps this pathos-hexis distinction in mind as an important principle of classification, and on these grounds excludes 'shame' (1128b10ff.) from the list of the virtues, for it is a pathos.

The third type of quality mentioned in the Categories is the so-called 'affective quality' of which there are two forms: 1) that which is productive of an affection of the senses; and 2) that which is produced by an affection. The first kind (e.g. the sweetness of honey) can be put aside for the moment. The second, however, is of more importance (9b9ff.):

> Paleness and darkness, however, and other colorings are not called affective qualities in the same sense as those just mentioned, but because they themselves have been brought about by an affection. That many changes of color do come about because of an affection is clear: when ashamed one goes red, when frightened one goes pale, and so on... When such circumstances have their origin in affections that are hard to change and permanent, they are called qualities.

Skin color does not comprise the entire class, of course. The interesting example, which Ackrill chooses to discuss, is 'irascibility', a quality obviously brought about by the pathos 'anger'[11]. I doubt, however, whether Aris-

totle would wish to maintain that the pathos is hard to change and permanent in the sense that the irascible man is always feeling angry. Rather, prolonged and repeated instances of anger eventually cause a man to be characterized by the quality 'irascibility'.

Ackrill objects that the congenital causes of irascibility should be left to the physiologist or psychologist to consider, and that Aristotle should be content with the observation that the irascible man is one who is prone to suffer the affection anger[12]. This criticism may well be to the point, but it must be remembered that both Aristotle and the Stoics (as I will show below) were interested in the ways in which hexeis and affective qualities are formed[13].

The major point thus far is that both hexeis and affective qualities should not be confused with pathe. They are categorically different. I will demonstrate below that the Stoics held a similar view.

2

Before moving to the Stoics, I would like to present another matter by way of introduction. This is a summary of the discussion of dispositional and occurrent terms found in Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind. There are some parallels to Stoicism, but also some significant differences, which will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

Ryle distinguishes feelings from dispositions, and a great part of his work is taken up with criticisms of

philosophers who, he feels, construe dispositional terms as occurrent or episodic terms. The two most common examples of dispositions, given often by Ryle and others, are brittleness and elasticity. When reported of objects, they do not describe events nor episodes, but rather function in law-like statements describing what would be likely to happen under certain circumstances. Thus, by describing glass as brittle, we are stating what would be likely to happen if it were struck by a hard object. Likewise, an elastic object is likely to contract after expanding. But the predication of a disposition is not, to Ryle at least, the predication of an event[14] (op.cit.p. 117):

> When a cow is said to be a ruminant, or a man is said to be a cigarette-smoker, it is not being said that the cow is ruminating now or that the man is smoking a cigarette now. To be a ruminant is to tend to ruminate from time to time, and to be a cigarette smoker is to be in the habit of smoking cigarettes.

In the same way, Ryle describes dispositional terms such as 'vanity' as being of a different sort from those which report feelings or occurrences (p.87):

> To put it quite dogmatically, the vain man never feels vain. Certainly, when thwarted, he feels acute dudgeon and when unexpectedly successful, he feels buoyant. But there is no special thrill or pang which we call a'feeling of vanity'.

In other words, to be vain, according to Ryle, is to have the disposition to experience certain feelings under certain circumstances and to provide an observer with a license to expect or predict the future occurrence of

such feelings.

Feelings and dispositions to experience feelings are only a small part of the large class of dispositions and occurrences which Ryle describes. But these limited branches are the two most closely related to Stoic emotional theory.

I wish to argue that the Stoics made a similar distinction, one which both Rist and Kidd have ignored. Diseases of soul are dispositions or hexeis, and not pathe at all.

3

The Stoics believed that the pathe are certain kinds of movements of soul. Let me discuss this point briefly before taking up questions about the causal relationship which they have to dispositions.

The simple definition of a pathos proves its occurrent nature (SVFIII.377):

> A pathos is an excessive impulse... The pathe are movements of soul contrary to nature.

The fact that the pathe are movements of soul is stressed in a number of fragments, and is beyond doubt one of their prime characteristics (SVFIII.378, 384, 425).

Though more often characterized by example than by definition, all of the pathe fall into four main classes which are said to be generic. These are pain, pleasure, desire, and fear[15], four different kinds of movements or episodes.

Pain and pleasure are caused (in a manner still to be explained) by the presence of objects or states of affairs which the percipient mistakenly regards as goods or evils (SVFIII.387, 388, 393). Being irrational and somehow inappropriate responses to these objects or states of affairs, they involve mistaken judgments and are, the Stoics say, to be entirely extirpated (SVFIII.445, 446,447 448). This is the key to the Stoic doctrine of the wise man. He does experience emotions (SVFIII.431), but these are eupatheiai, since they involve no mistakes about what is really good and evil[16]. Complementing pain and pleasure are the emotions of desire and fear, which are caused by the expected presence of such falsely conceived goods and evils.

Falling under these four generic heads are what the Stoics called the specific pathe. Investigation of these provides the best introduction to a discussion of the relationship holding between emotions and objects in the Stoic theory of causation.

First of all, the terms pain, pleasure, desire, and fear designate the generic pathe, as we saw above, and the ways in which they differ from the specific pathe can best be explained in the following manner. By saying that someone is or has experienced one of the former, I have said a number of things about his psychological state. I have said, first of all, that an irrational occurrence has taken place in his soul. Secondly, since the pathe

never befall the wise man, and since all mankind is divided into wise men and fools (SVFIII.544), I have described the patient's disposition as being that of the latter class of humanity. What I have not described, however, is the object or state of affairs which caused the pathos, beyond designating it as a supposed good or evil. But no description of the object in question can be acquired through an analysis of a term designating a generic pathos. Thus, though desire is desire for something and pleasure is pleasure in something, the nature of the object is left unspecified.

Thus far, I have only stated, and not yet attempted to prove that the pathe have a special causal relationship with external objects, and this relationship can only be understood through a study of the specific pathe[17]. Let us look at several examples of these and try to understand the point of the distinction.

I. Desire is a generic pathos, caused by the expected presence of some falsely conceived good. Two of its species (eide, SVFIII.397) are: 1) anger (orge), which is desire for vengeance from the wrongdoer, and 2) thumos, which is anger in its early stage.

II. Pleasure is a generic pathos, caused by the presence of some falsely conceived good. Two of its species (SVFIII.401) are: 1) asmenismos, which is pleasure in unexpected goods, and 2) epichairekakia, which is

pleasure in the misfortunes of one's neighbors.

III. Fear is a generic pathos, caused by the expected presence of a falsely conceived evil. Two of its species are: 1) deima, which is the fear characteristic of a suspicious person,and 2) oknos, which is the fear of a future activity (SVFIII.409).

IV. Pain is a generic pathos, caused by the presence of a falsely conceived evil. Two of its species are: 1) eleos, which is the pain arising from another's misfortune, and 2) odune, which is pain that is piercing and sharp (SVFIII.414).

These are only a few of the specific pathe defined and discussed by the Stoics, but they are sufficient to illustrate the point which I believe is being made. This is that the designation 'specific pathos' serves two purposes. The first, and less problematical, is to provide the description of a particular stage or quality of the emotion. This is best seen in the definitions for thumos and odune above. Here the emphasis is still on the description of the movement of soul and its characteristics, as it was in the case of the generic pathe (cf. note 16). The second purpose served is a more sophisticated one, and important for the Stoic theory of causation.

As was mentioned above, emotions have a special re-

lationship to external objects. This was described by Kenny in the following manner (op.cit.p.60):

> It is not in general possible to ascribe a piece of behaviour or a sensation to a particular emotional state without at the same time ascribing an object to the emotion.

Kenny then claims that the relationship between emotions and their objects is not a contingent one, but that emotions are necessarily related to their objects[18]. For the Stoics at least, the nature of the relationship would seem to be a function of the description employed to designate the emotion, and the second use of the classification of specific pathe is to reveal the kind of object to which the emotion is directed. Thus pity is pain at another's misfortunes, while anger is desire for vengeance on the wrongdoer. Here, though not in the case of the generic pathe, the word used to designate the emotion also yields an account of the object. The Stoics have perhaps avoided the trap into which Kenny has fallen by making the emotion-object relationship contingent upon the description as generic or specific pathos (cf. note 18). For example, a pathos described in generic terms, e.g. simply as 'pain', provides no account of the object, which does indeed follow if the pathos is described in specific terms, e.g. as'pity'.

It is, of course, difficult to judge precisely how the Stoics handled (or would have handled) all of the problems about the emotion-object relationship, and our evidence is, as usual, meagre. But Stobaeus provides what

I believe is a summary of the points made in the above paragraph (SVFIII.394):

> Of the pathe, some reveal that to which thay are directed, such as pity, envy, spite, and shame. Others reveal the peculiar nature of the motion, such as grief (odunen) and dread (deima).

It needs now to be demonstrated that these objects are causes of the pathe, producing them with hexeis (or dispositions) serving as co-causes. Again the purpose is to further distinguish the pathe from hexeis.

There seem to have been two types of causes at work in the production of the pathe, and indeed of all physical events. They were described by Chrysippus as principal causes on the one hand, and auxiliary causes on the other (SVFII.974). In a passage which is usually discussed in relation to the fate-free will controversy, Chrysippus (De fato 42-43) distinguishes and defines these causes. An auxiliary cause for a motion or action is the external stimulus which evokes a certain response in an agent. But this response is itself conditioned by the character or set of dispositions of the agent himself, and this is why people often have different responses to the same situation. Thus, to use the example of Chrysippus, a cylinder, or top, is characterized by volubilitas, a dispositional term indicating that it would move if set in motion by an external force serving as auxiliary cause. Volubilitas is a quality of the cylinder and the principal

cause of its motion. This is further explained in the following way:

> In the same way... as a person who has pushed a roller forward has given it the beginning of motion, but has not given it the capacity to roll (volubilitatem), so a sense impression when it impinges will it is true impress and and as it were seal its appearance on the mind, but the act of assent will be in our power, and as we said in the case of the roller, though given a push from without, as to the rest will move by its own force and nature...- provided that the nature of the distinction and difference between causes is understood.
> (Loeb translation)

By explaining dispositions as causes, the Stoics (and perhaps Aristotle also) would seem to differ from Ryle. This question will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2 when I take up the largely physical questions about what is happening in the soul when an individual is experiencing a pathos, or is irascible or greedy. (Having a disposition will be seen to be the result of a proper or improper tension in one's psychical air currents. Compare this with Ryle below and see note 13.) But let us explain these two types of causes in more detail, beginning with the auxiliary cause.

The object of a pathos is its cause in this auxiliary sense. An example more closely related to psychology than the movement of a top or cylinder might be of some help here. For example, we might say that Plato is an irascible man, whose proneness to anger is evident whenever he thinks of someone who claims to teach virtue through rhetoric, such as Isocrates. Here irascibility is the

principal cause of the pathos anger, directed at the object of the emotion, Isocrates, serving as the auxiliary cause. Kenny claims that the relationship between emotion and object is a non-contingent one and, therefore, that the object cannot serve as cause. This leads him to attempt to differentiate causes from objects in the following way (op.cit.p.71):

> When the burnt child dreads the fire, the object of his fear is the fire which he is here and now afraid of; but his present fear is the effect of his past experience...

I can find no hint in the fragments attributed to the Stoics that they ever attempted to distinguish causes from objects of emotions, nor any hint of the belief that the contingency or non-contingency of the relationship was ever an issue in the question of determining causes.

The same is true in the case of the relationship between hexeis and pathe. Here again, it is often held that because the relationship between a disposition and its manifestation is a necessary or non-contingent one, it cannot be causal. On this line of argument, what the Stoics called a principal cause would not be a cause at all. Volubilitas, it would then be argued, is non-contingently related to the action described by the verb volvere and, therefore, not its cause. Such, I believe, would be the type of approach used by a philosopher such as A.I. Melden[19]. It is similar to Kenny's in the case of the emotion-object relation, and is probably subject to the same

criticisms. A far more interesting approach is that taken by Ryle.

Ryle argues that when we inquire into the nature of a cause we are seeking an event. And dispositions, he holds, are neither events nor causes, but explanations. For Ryle, an explanation for an action in terms of character cannot be any sort of causal explanation (op.cit.p. 88-89). The Stoics, of course, would not accept such a limitation on the definition of a cause and, to return to Chrysippus' example, would consider volubilitas the principal cause of the action designated by volvere. In the same way, irascibility would be the principal cause of anger. Ryle, on the other hand, argues in the following way (p.88):

> We ask why the glass shivered when struck by the stone and we get the answer that it was because the glass was brittle. Now 'brittle' is a dispositional adjective; that is to say, to describe the glass as brittle is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about the glass. So when we say the glass broke when struck because it was brittle, the'because' clause does not report a happening or a cause; it states a law-like proposition. People commonly say of explanations of this second kind that they give the'reason' for the glass breaking when struck.

The Stoics would assert that the brittleness is the principal cause in the above example, while the stone is merely the auxiliary cause.

The above analysis, with all of its complications, was meant to illustrate a relatively simple point. In addition to being occurrences or motions, the pathe are effects of hexeis, and also have a special causal relation-

ship with external objects.

Furthermore, the pathe take place over a determinable period of time, or, as Wittgenstein said of the emotions, have genuine duration. This is quite natural, especially given their close relationship to external objects and circumstances. For one becomes afraid in those circumstances which seem to put one in the presence of an evil (SVFIII.482).

Aristotle had noted in the Categories the transitory nature of the pathe, and had excluded them from the category of quality (9b19ff.):

> But those circumstances that result from something that easily disperses and quickly gives way are called pathe, for people are not in virtue of them said to be qualified in any way. Thus a man who reddens through shame is not called ruddy, nor is one who goes pale through fright said to be pallid. Rather he is said to have been affected somehow.

Again Ackrill is critical on this point (op.cit.p.106):

> He seems to be saying that if Callias is temporarily red-faced or bad-tempered it would not be right to answer the question 'what is Callias like?' by saying that he is red-faced or that he is bad-tempered. This is a fair point but it hardly justifies the conclusion that temporary high colouring or bad temper is not a quality at all.

Whether Aristotle was correct to exclude the emotions and their temporary physical manifestations from the category of quality is beside the point for us, but to be angry is not necessarily to be irascible. In the same way, to perform a particular just action is not necessarily to have a just disposition. The fact that the Stoics also excluded the pathe from their conception of what it is to

be a quality will be proved in chapter 2, and will be of the greatest importance in chapter 5.

A pathos, then, is a response from an agent to a given external stimulus, but a response which is itself conditioned and partly determined by the soul's dispositions. But both reinforce each other, and one must smoke a number of cigarettes before one becomes a cigarette smoker. The longest fragment which describes this process is one preserved by Cicero (SVFIII.424):

> Ex perturbationibus (=Greek pathe, cf. SVFIII.381) autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quae vocant illi (= the Stoics) nosemata... Intellegatur igitur perturbationem iactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide in motu esse semper; cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteravit et tamquam in venis medullisque insedit, tum exsistit ; et morbus et aegrotatio... eaque oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia. Nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina quae sanaret eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, exsistitque morbus et aegrotatio, quae inveterata evelli non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; similiterque ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas...

Here we see the pathos 'desire for money' eventually hardening into the disposition 'avarice', which will obviously give rise to other such pathe in the future. Supporting this picture of the pathos-hexis distinction given in Cicero is a fragment preserved by Stobaeus (SVFIII.421) where diseases of soul are discussed and said to be kinds of tendencies(euemptosian). The two examples which most closely connect with my thesis are irascibility and avarice.

In passing, I must again point out certain simi-

larities between the views of Aristotle and those of the Stoics. In the context of a discussion of moral responsibility, Aristotle argues (EN1114a3ff.) that we are responsible for our characters, since it is through activities of certain sorts that they are formed. Through acts of injustice, for example, we acquire a bent towards such actions in the future. Once the disposition is formed, however, it might be difficult or impossible for a given individual to change from vice to virtue or from injustice to justice, but he had the choice originally. Whether Aristotle was correct or not in assigning moral responsibility to agents on this basis is not a very important question at this point. But one need only read again the above fragment in Cicero to notice the similarities[20].

The Stoics would certainly accept Aristotle's conclusion that hexeis are "productive of the very things by which they are brought about (EN1114b26ff.)." The wise man, however, will not experience desire in the presence of money because the disposition of soul, in this case avarice, is not present.

4

Fragments such as SVFIII.423 indicate thoughtful axamination of our uses of language to bring out the pathos-hexis distinction:

> Ut sunt alii ad alios morbos procliviores (itaque dicimus gravedinosos quosdam, quosdam torminosos, non quia iam sint, sed quia saepe), sic alii ad metum, alii ad aliam perturbationem; ex quo in aliis anxietas, unde anxii, in aliis iracundia dicitur,

> quae ab ira differt, estque aliud iracundum esse, aliud iratum, ut differt anxietas ab angore; neque enim omnes anxii, qui anguntur aliquando, nec qui anxii, semper anguntur, ut inter ebrietatem et ebriositatem interest, aliudque est amatorem, aliud amantem.

A further subject which ought at least to be mentioned at this point, though here the evidence is even more meagre than usual, is the possibility that the Stoics may have attempted to distinguish and classify generic and specific dispositional terms, as they did in the case of the pathe[21]. A specific dispositional term, then, would be one reporting the tendency toward a specific action, emotion, or circumstance. Thus 'cigarette-smoker' reports a tendency toward smoking cigarettes, while 'irascibility' reports a tendency toward anger, and volubilitas to the action designated by the verb volvere. On the level of the specific disposition (as was true in the case of the relationship between the pathe and their objects), there would be what Kenny calls a necessary or non-contingent relationship between the disposition and the occurrence which it causes. Now in these cases, we might notice that the description designating the specific hexis could then be translated into one reporting an appropriate generic hexis, whereby the relationship between disposition and occurrence becomes merely contingent. For example, notice the following diagram:

irascibility- -anger. Here the relationship is what Kenny would call non-

contingent.

intemperance-- anger. Here the relationship would be merely contingent.

In this context, notice SVFIII.379:

> Omnium autem perturbationum fontem esse dicunt intemperantiam, quae est tota mente a recta ratione defectio... Quem ad modum igitur temperantia sedat adpetitiones... sic huic inimica intemperantia omnem animi statum inflammat... itaque et aegritudines et metus et reliquae perturbationes omnes gignuntur ex ea.

This fragment can, it seems to me, be read on at least two different levels. On the most straightforward level, it seems a mere pious platitude, warning us of the dangers of excess and intemperance, but something more is suggested. For if intemperance is taken as a generic hexis, then it would be contingently related to each of the four generic pathe and to their species. Thus while the specific hexis 'irascibility' causes the pathos 'anger', intemperance would also cause anger, though here the relationship would be merely contingent.

That the Stoics would attempt to classify generic and specific hexeis seems reasonable in light of a similar classification of the pathe, but to commit them to this doctrine would not be wise given the lack of hard evidence. It would probably be an example of what Richard Robinson calls "misinterpretation by inference".[22]

5

We are now in a better position to judge the truth of the equation of pathe with diseases of soul, mentioned

on page 6. Prior sections of this chapter have cited the reports of Cicero and Stobaeus equating these diseases of soul with certain kinds of hexeis. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that in the case of Aristotle and the Stoics at least hexeis stand in a causal relationship to the pathe. Galen provides a most illustrtaive example of how these two quite different mental phenomena can become confused.

In SVFIII.465 Galen tells us that Chrysippus was fond of comparing the health and sickness of the soul with that of the body. On this basis, Chrysippus recommended that physicians of the soul be skilled also in the therapy of the body (SVFIII.471). Remembering what was said in section 3 above, we must read the details of the analogy which Chrysippus set up (SVFIII.465):

> Chrysippus says that it (the soul of the vicious person) has a condition like bodies ready to fall into fever or diarrhea or some other such thing at any small chance cause.

This analogy fits the causal relationship set up above between hexeis and pathe in the soul. Disease of soul is ill-formed disposition. The chance cause which brings about fever in the body parallels the auxiliary cause of the pathe: the external circumstance or object to which we react. Finally, fever in the body is like pathos in the soul. But Galen objects (SVFIII.465):

> I do not understand his view, how he says that those who are ready for diseases are not already diseased, while those who are now diseased are not wholly

diseased.

The point which Chrysippus is making, of course, is that a diseased soul (one with ill-formed dispositions) tends to experience pathe (which are analogous to fevers and other such symptoms of disease) at any chance (auxiliary) cause. Bodily symptoms can indicate physical disease in the same way that pathe can indicate diseases of soul.

That Galen had an insufficient grasp of the pathos-hexis distinction (or perhaps chose to ignore it) is evident to any reader of his own peri pathon. After producing a typical Stoic or Aristotelian list of the pathe, Galen adds (3.7):

> In my opinion, even not being able to help loving or hating anything at all to excess is a pathos.

The Stoics would probably classify this state as the hexis intemperantia discussed above, and not at all as a pathos.

This Chapter has attempted to establish that the pathos-hexis distinction is a basic one in Stoic psychology, and has incidentally taken up some of the characteristics of each, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Its emphasis has been on language, physics, and the philosophy of mind. Chapter 2 will take up the largely physical questions of what phenomena in the soul are designated by these two terms.

1. Rist, John, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge 1969)pp.26 and 36 (cited below as Rist) and Kidd, I.G., "Posidonius on the Emotions" in Problems in Stoicism, ed. Long, A.A. (London 1971)p.214.

2. Both Rist and Kidd cite only one passage in the literature which seems to support their equation. This is Cicero Fin.III.35 (rejected by von Arnim as a Stoic fragment). Here Cicero talks of the perturbationes (pathe) as morbi. I hope to prove in the appendix to chapter 3 that the difficulty is with Cicero, who did not understand the distinctions discussed in this chapter. When the history of Stoicism is finally written, I believe it will be seen that much confusion arose in the tradition regarding the Stoics with Cicero and Posidonius.

3. Cf. Wittgenstein, L., Zettel, ed. Anscombe, G.E.M. and von Wright, G.H. (Berkeley 1967)no.488:
   "Continuation of the classification of psychological concepts. Emotions. Common to them: genuine duration, a course. (Rage flares up, abates, vanishes, and likewise joy, depression, fear.)"
   The Stoic pathe are pain, pleasure, desire, and fear. They share the characteristics mentioned above, characteristics not shared by hexeis.

4. Likewise, cf. Long, A.A., "Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics" BICS 15(1968)p.73:
   "I am persuaded that the direct influence of Aristotle on Stoic ethics has been greatly underrated... I believe it can be shown that Stoic ethics owes more than some of its formal treatment and terminology to Aristotle; that the Stoics borrowed many concepts, sometimes altering their language, from the Peripatetics, and consciously developed or diverged from others."
   While agreeing with this sentiment, I will later be critical of Long's account of the Stoic doctrines, which, he believes, are borrowed from Aristotle and the Peripatetics.

5. As was mentioned on page 7, I am interested here in Aristotle's account of the hexis, or disposition. Aristotle seems never to have clearly formulated a doctrine of the pathos. In this regard, cf. de Vogel, C.J., Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Critical Texts v.3 (Leiden 3rd. ed. 1973)p.168:
   "Before Zeno, the notion of pathos... was used but not precisely defined by Aristotle... Zeno was the first to develop a full doctrine of the pathe, to define the notion precisely and give it a very important place as well in theoretical

as in applied ethics."

6. Despite the seeming clarity of the categorical difference between pathos and hexis, there are at least two points about Aristotle's account which ought to be noticed: 1) he first calls affections qualities (9a28), but proceeds to deny that they are qualities. The first must be a mistake on Aristotle's part. Cf. Ackrill, J.L., Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford 1968) p.106; 2) on occasion, a word used to designate a pathos can also be used to designate a hexis. Thus Aristotle uses the word orge (10a1) to designate a quality. Ackrill is right to translate this as 'irascibility' (ibid.p.27), and not as 'anger' since clearly a quality of the soul and not a pathos is being spoken of. This need cause no real confusion, since a word such as orge can have both a dispositional and an occurrent sense. Cf. Hardie, W.F.R., Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford 1968)p.96.

7. As will appear below, the terms hexis and diathesis were given technical senses by the Stoics to denote different kinds of qualities; however, the Stoics made quite a different use of diathesis, but this is the subject of chapters 2 and 3. Carneades used to maintain that the Peripatetics and the Stoics taught the same doctrines, using different terminology. Cf. Rist (op.cit.p.1). It might be more accurate to say that the Stoics often took over Aristotelian terminology, but altered its meaning. I think that the truth of this statement will emerge at various points in this thesis.

8. This fourth kind of quality is unlike the rest in that it seems not always to be dispositional in nature. This fact prompts Hardie (op.cit.p.99) to remark:

> "There is thus an important way in which Aristotle's fourth kind of quality is a different kind of predicate from the rest: it is, or in certain contexts may be, non-dispositional. One further remark may be made at this point. Locke's use of the terms 'primary' and 'secondary' suggests, and was doubtless meant to suggest, that the fact that something has a certain disposition depends on facts which are not of this form, or facts about the non-dispositional nature of things."

This remark is the germ of chapter 2 of this thesis, where it will be suggested that an object's dispositional properties (hexeis) depend upon states (scheseis) of the object which are not of this form,

or facts about the non-dispositional nature of things. Cf. also Armstrong, D.M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind (London 1968)p.82.

9. Rist (op.cit.p.3) believes that the Stoics were attempting to make a distinction which Aristotle makes here between hexis and diathesis, only they reversed the meanings of the two terms:
> "In the Categories Aristotle distinguishes hexis from diathesis on precisely this ground, whereas the Stoics (oddly) prefer diathesis, but intending the sense of the Aristotelian hexis. For them, apparently, diathesis suggests rigidity, fixity of purpose."

One of the purposes of chapters 2 and 3 is to attempt to elucidate the distinction between hexis and diathesis on quite different grounds from those used (I believe mistakenly) by Rist.

10. The Stoics adopted this distinction. The pathos will be defined below as a movement of soul, while hexis is a disposition or state, of which disease of soul is a species. Rist and Kidd, by failing to see this point, have both misunderstood a basic distinction in Stoic psychology, and failed to see traces of Aristotelian influence operating upon the Stoics.

11. Pathe are, in some sense, causally productive of hexeis. Aristotle summarizes this relationship in EN1114b26ff. with the remark that hexeis are themselves causally productive of the very things by which they are brought about. It cannot be stressed too often that, for the Stoics, the relationship between a disease of soul and a pathos is a causal relationship and not one of identity.

12. Op.cit.p.106.

13. As a qualification, I wish to note here that there is no evidence that the Stoics attempted to distinguish affective qualities from other sorts of dispositions.

14. What is unclear to me is what Ryle believes to be the basis for attributing a disposition, such as elasticity, to an object. Cf. Langford, G., Human Action (New York 1971)p.43:
> "But physical things have the dispositional properties which they have only because their physical state is what it is... The molecular structure of rubber or the state of molecules in hot metal can be described independently of the

dispositional properties that result from them. And there is no reason to suppose that human bodies possess the dispositional properties... independent of their physical states..."
It will be argued in chapter 2 that the Stoics believed that an object's dispositional properties ultimately depend upon facts about its state in the broader sense of the term: that its hexeis depend upon its scheseis. Cf. also Hardie (op.cit.pp. 109-110).

15. Perhaps the most common of all errors regarding the Stoics (and one that is still repeated today) is the belief that the Stoic apathy is something similar to Epicurean ataraxia, i.e. some sort of impassiveness or absence of feeling. For example, see MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics (New York 1973)p.106. This thesis will later advance and defend the heretical notion that qua movements of soul the pathe are indistinguishable from the eupatheiai. What this means will not become evident until Stoic terminology is explored in more detail.

16. The pathe and eupatheiai are described in the following terms:
1) Pathe:
hedone which is alogos eparsis.
epithumia which is alogos orexis.
lupe which is alogos sustole.
phobos which is alogos ekklisis.

2) Eupatheiai:
chara which is eulogos eparsis.
boulesis which is eulogos orexis.
eulabeia which is eulogos ekklisis.
Cf. SVFIII.391-420 for the pathe, and SVFIII.431 for the eupatheiai. Questions about the wise man's pains will be taken up in chapter 3.

17. Modern literature on the philosophy of mind also speaks of the emotions as a class of feelings related to external objects. Cf. Kenny, A., Action, Emotion, and Will (London 1964)p.60. It is the nature of this relationship which is hotly disputed today. The next several pages of this thesis contrast the Stoic account of that relationship with that found in Kenny. I believe that the Stoic account is more in accord with common sense, and less open to charges of philosophical absurdity than Kenny's theory.

18. Kenny hopes to demonstrate that the relationship be-

tween emotion and object is a necessary or logical one, and that, therefore, the object must be distinguished from the cause of the emotion. For, in order to be a cause, the cause must be only contingently related to its effect. This approach is ably criticized by J.R.S. Wilson in his Emotion and Object (Cambridge 1972)p.42. I will argue below that the Stoics would not have accepted Kenny's analysis. Likewise, Wilson attempts to refute Kenny's claim that either necessity or contingency can lie in the relationship between emotion and object; rather the terms 'necessity' or'contingency' can only characterize the description of the relation. Thus p.23:

> "A statement asserting a connection between two particular items should surely be extensional. That is, the truth of such a statement should not depend on the particular descriptions employed to refer to the items in question. But the modal value of a statement does depend on the particular descriptions employed. That is, if any statement asserting a connection between two items was necessary, this would be by virtue of the particular descriptions chosen to describe those items, and it would always be possible to substitute some other description of one of the items which would render the statement contingent."

19. Cf. Melden, A.I., Free Action (London 1961)p.182ff.

20. Interestingly enough, Aristotle himself had, at one point, compared a vicious state of character to a disease. Cf. EN1114a14ff. Hardie (op.cit.p.175): remarks:

> "...He goes on to compare a vicious state of character to a disease which, once contracted, must run its course. He does not mention the dissimilarities between a bodily illness and a faulty state of character. But Aristotle would not expect to be held down to every suggestion which is made in a discussion conducted in the form of dialectical moves and counter-moves."

Though Aristotle did not take up the suggestion, the Stoics certainly made much of it.

21. Thus Ryle (op.cit.p.118) speaks of single track and multi-track dispositions, explaining the difference in the following way:

> "There are several different reactions which we expect from an elastic object, while there is, roughly, only one sort of behaviour which we expect from a creature that is described to us as

a ruminant... In short, some dispositional words are highly generic or determinable, while others are highly specific or determinate..."

22. Robinson, R., Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford 2nd. ed. 1953)p.3:
"One of the most frequent and difficult tasks of the interpreter is precisely to determine what the author thought his words implied, as opposed to what the words imply to us... If... it seems an overwhelming probability to us that p does imply q, that is little or no evidence that Plato did mean q when he said p."

CHAPTER 2

THE PHYSICAL BASIS FOR DISPOSITIONS

The first chapter explained certain distinguishing marks of dispositional and occurrent terms in Stoic psychology. The purpose was to elucidate the difference between the pathos and the hexis, terms which I have chosen to translate as 'emotion' and 'disposition'. Though quite distinct psychological phenomena, they are often confused in the secondary literature on the Stoics. The pathe, as it was shown, are movements of soul, caused conjointly by external objects and situations on the one hand and by defective and ill-formed dispositions on the other. This chapter will attempt to develop the physical basis of that theory. I believe that Samuel Sambursky was right in his judgment that the Stoics founded basic principles of ethics upon those of physics.[1]

This chapter falls into three main sections. The first will demonstrate that there are at least two different senses which can be assigned to the Stoic technical term hexis. One sense is a usage whereby at least some qualities (including those which are character traits of the soul) are said to be hexeis themselves. The second is a meaning of the term which has been discussed in detail by Sambursky, whereby hexis emerges as the 'unified structure' of a body. (Sambursky confines his attention to the second sense without seeming to notice the first.) The second section places hexis within the Stoic category of disposition (pōs echon). While on strictly grammatical grounds it might be assumed that

hexeis comprise the entire class of entities within the category of disposition, such is not the case. Thirdly, I will draw together and summarize in schematic form the conclusions reached from study of the psychological fragments in chapter 1 and the physical fragments in chapter 2.

1

The Stoics viewed the physical world as a combination of inert matter and fiery pneuma, which gives qualities to it, both animate and inanimate. The pneuma is the source of what the last chapter called principal causes (cf. SVFII.340) and qualities. When we set a cylinder moving, the principal cause of its motion is the quality volubilitas. Likewise, when a stone falls, the principal cause of its downward motion is the quality heaviness. Objects have their qualities by virtue of the pneuma which pervades them, which in the appropriate circumstances is the hardness of iron or the color of silver, for example (SVFII.449). Later, I will explain what these appropriate circumstances are.

Pneuma provides qualities to inorganic substances, and also to the human soul, but this second type of pneuma is somewhat drier and hotter than the first. Though having a different mix from something such as iron, the soul too is described as being pneuma in a certain state, and is said to have a certain tension (tonos,II.806). It is one of the purposes of this chapter to describe the

role of this tension in Stoic physics.

In chapter 1, I described the pathe and called them movement of soul, perhaps leaving the implication that there is only one type of movement to be considered in the life of the soul. In fact, the soul itself, being pneuma in a certain state, has a certain type of motion called tensional motion[2]. Due to a lack of relevant information in the surviving fragments, it is very difficult to construe the details of the operation of this special sort of motion, but Sambursky offers what seems a probable reconstruction[3].

Tensional motion seems analogous to wave motion in certain respects, consisting, as it does, of an inward and an outward motion[4]. The motion outward is said to be productive of magnitude and quality, while the inward motion guarantees an object's oneness and unity[5]. But I referred above to two different uses of the technical term hexis. These must now be explained in some detail.

First of all, Plutarch informs us that qualities are pneumata and hexeis (SVFII.449). This is immediately followed by the assertion that they are tensions of air (tonous aerodeis). Taking these two statements together, we could probably conclude that the quality produced in a given object depends not only upon the mix of the pneuma (e.g. that of the soul is drier and hotter than other things) but also upon the peculiar tension appro-

priate to a quality or a group of qualities. The result of this theory is a picture of individual qualities consisting of certain mixes of pneuma, in various states of tension.

Being air currents in tensional states, qualities are described as material objects and matter in a certain state (SVFII.400). Thus the soul itself, for example, is described as matter in a certain state; moreover, virtue is a state of the soul and a hexis (SVFIII.307), and the four cardinal virtues are variously described as hexeis (cf. SVFIII.265ff.). The same applies to the diseases of soul described in chapter 1. For example, irascibility is the soul in a certain state of tension. What this leads to is our first use of the term hexis: eacs quality is matter in a certain state of tension.

Further, there is a second use of the term, which has been studied in some detail by Sambursky (though he seems unaware of the first).

Sambursky calls hexis (op.cit.p.9) "all of the qualities which define the physical state of a certain body- its mechanical, thermic, electrical,optical properties". In this sense of the term, each body is held together by one hexis (SVFII.474), which guarantees that all of its constituent parts "sympathize" with one another and form a unified whole. These parts are in sympathy and characterized by hexis if, when one of them is affected, the others are somehow affected also. This

state is to be contrasted with that of objects formed from conjoined or separable elements, where this sympathy does not exist.[6]

The pneumatic state of tension, which is the overall state of the body, is well illustrated by Galen on the analogy of the bodily muscles. In a long fragment (SVFII.450), Galen introduces a discussion of muscle tension by first positing a case in which an object is moved in one direction by a given force. It will obviously move in that direction, if the force is strong enough. If, however, another force is added to move the object in the opposite direction, the resulting motion will be determined by the vector sum of the two opposing forces. Galen then suggests the case where an object is acted upon by equal forces in opposite directions; in this case, it will remain in the same spot. Thus a man swimming upstream against a strong current will remain stationary, if the force of the current exactly counterbalances that of his muscles in the process of swimming. Likewise, a bird flying upward, Galen says, might seem for the moment to be remaining in the same spot. This is because the tension of its muscles exactly counterbalances the downward pull of its body. Deprive it of its muscles, and it will fall. The conclusion finally reached by the Stoics, and explained in terms of such analogies, is that tensional motion is a combination of two motions which is at the same time also

a form of rest[7]. Moreover, in the words of Chrysippus (SVFIII.473):

> And still in the same way as tensions in the case of the body are spoken of as good and bad tensions... in virtue of our ability or lack of ability in those functions accomplished through them, so tension is spoken of in the case of the soul, i.e. good and bad tension (eutonia kai atonia).

This general overall good or bad tension in the soul is obviously a characterization of its overall state, and is entailed by the notion, explained above, that one body is held together by one hexis. Naturally, this overall strength or weakness of the pneumatic tension stands in a causal relationship to our activities, as explained in chapter 1. Thus Galen tells us that Chrysippus, at least, blamed wrong action and pathe on bad tension and weakness of soul (SVFIII.473), just as good action arises from the proper tension.

This then is the second use of the term hexis: to describe the sympathy existing among the constituent elements of a physical body. But if each of these constituents is itself an air current in a certain state of tension, as Plutarch says (p.37), then each quality obviously involves a hexis of its own. Take, for example, the color 'green'. It is a specific sort of pneuma, with a definite mixture of fire and air, in a certain state of tension. In this sense, an object obviously has as many hexeis as it has qualities.

These are the two senses of the term hexis: one designating the overall state of a body, and the other des-

cribing the pneuma of each individual quality. The above discussion of Stoic physics seems to illustrate a point made at the end of chapter 1 regarding single and multi-track dispositions.

Take, for example, a single track disposition such as 'irascibility', the example which constantly recurred in chapter 1. It is a quality of soul and, therefore, a certain mixture of pneuma in a certain state of tension, illustrating the first use of the term hexis. But if there are two senses of the term, the question naturally arises concerning the description of the soul's overall state. We are, I believe, looking for a dispositional term general enough to be considered as describing the overall state of the soul. In physical terms, we have seen this referred to simply as good or bad tension. In a psychological context, these could well be the the intemperantia and temperantia discussed in chapter 1 and said to be the source of all of the pathe and eupatheiai.

That the overall state of the soul can be named by words denoting character traits, or generic dispositions, seems to be the thesis of J. Gould[9]:

> The air current in every body is always in some state of tension. When it is strong enough to do what is fitting this tension is called strength and power, and as manifested in different circumstances, this power is one of the four virtues- self-control, courage, justice, or temperance. The weakness of soul, which explains the occurrence of emotions comes about when the tension is relaxed.

Gould's thesis then is that there is only one tension in

the soul and, presumably, only one hexis as well which appears under different names in different circumstances. Plutarch tells us that something such as this is the case for Zeno, but that (SVFIII.255):

> Chrysippus... by his opinion that corresponding to each several quality a virtue is formed by its own distinctive attributes of quality, unwittingly stirred up a swarm of virtues...[10].

The purpose of this rather lengthy discussion of the physical term hexis is that we see reproduced the distinction discussed in chapter 1 between single and multi-track dispositions. Thus when explaining the occurrence of a particular pathos such as anger, there would seem to be three possible avenues of approach. Take again chapter 1's example of Plato's anger with Isocrates. If asked to give the cause of it, one could, of course, point to Isocrates, the object or auxiliary cause. Secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, one could explain the anger by reference to a particular quality of Plato's soul: irascibility, which would be the principal cause of the pathos. Finally, reference could be made to the overall state of the soul, to intemperantia, that quality which explains all pathe. Explanations of the second and third kind are explanations in terms of single and multi-track dispositions respectively.

Sambursky, as we saw, discusses the concept of hexis only in so far as it denotes the overall state of

a body. This is one legitimate use, but an object has as many individual hexeis as it has qualities. Volubilitas is a hexis, though it in no way names the overall state of the cylinder or top.

2

Hexis can be translated as 'state', but this is an ambiguous term which does not adequately cover what we mean by describing the virtues, say, as states of the soul. This section will discuss an ambiguity in the English word 'state' along with a corresponding ambiguity in the Greek words translated by 'state'. These are two: hexis and schesis. An examination of them will show that the Stoics made a distinction between states which are active powers and those which are not. The virtues and the diseases of soul which are the special subject of this thesis are states of the first kind[11]. But the best approach to this subject is through a brief discussion of the four Stoic categories.

There were four categories recognized by the Stoics: substance, quality, disposition, and relative disposition (SVFII.369ff.)[12]. The relationship of these categories to one another, and especially that of quality to disposition, is a very vexing problem. There is even a question as to whether the Old Stoa formally acknowledged a theory of four categories[13]. This last problem need not concern us at all. All Stoics recognized such things as dispositions. We need to determine what sorts of things

these are.

In his reconstruction of the Stoic categories, Rist lists the following as examples of what fall under this head[14]:

> Apparently dispostions included times ('yesterday'), places ('in the Academy'), actions, lengths ('three cubits'), colours ('white') and others. The category seems to include conditions or states of particulars. If this is so, disposition is a category dependent on the category of quality.

How it follows that disposition is a category dependent on quality from the fact that it includes conditions or states of particulars is difficult to see. But on the basis of this list of examples Rist concludes (p.53):

> In brief then to introduce the category of disposition is to place the existing object (category one), which is an individual entity (category two), in a particular spatio-temporal situation (category three, disposition).

But as Rist himself had just noted on the preceding page (p.52):

> According to Porphyry, whose accuracy we have no reason to doubt, the soul was described by the Stoics as an air-current in a certain disposition..., while in Sextus we read that virtue is the <u>hegemonikon</u> (the ruling part of the soul) in a certain disposition.

That both the diseased tendencies which give rise to the <u>pathe</u> and also the virtues should belong in the category of disposition, if anywhere, is clear. Gould[15] confused <u>pathe</u> with <u>hexeis</u>, but did see that virtue is a disposition and belongs in the third category.

It seems to me that there is at least a <u>prima facie</u> oddity about lumping virtue together with 'being in the

Academy' as examples of dispositions, unless one is at the same time willing to give an account of how the two differ. Both could, of course, be roughly covered by the term 'state'[16], but virtue involves something more. It is indeed a state of the soul, but a state which is also a causal power characterized by certain forms of activity called virtuous activity. Likewise, the pathe-causing character traits discussed in chapter 1 serve as the principal causes of the pathe. It would be expected that these states of the soul involve something more than its "spatio-temporal situation", as Rist puts it, and when we turn to the fragments, this is indeed what we find. The Stoics recognized two different kinds of states or dispositions which comprise the third category: those which are causal powers and those which are not[16].

Simplicius tells us (SVFII.393, p.130) that, for the Stoics, hexeis are characterized by the activities which arise from them. Rist, on the other hand, says that there is not a scrap of evidence that the Stoics regarded dispositions as active powers[17]. This statement is a curious one in light of his explicit mention of virtue as an example of a disposition. For what is an active power, if not virtue? He seems refuted by what was argued in chapter 1 about dispositions as causes, by Simplicius above, where hexeis are said to be characterized by certain forms of activity, and by the statement of

Plotinus (SVFII.443, p.146 line 22) that the category of disposition was at least sometimes regarded as an active power (phusin drasterion). But within the category of disposition, the Stoics seem to have made a distinction between the concepts of hexis and what appears to have been the more generic term schesis. These two general terms answer roughly to our two examples of 'virtue' and 'being in the Academy', both of which fall into the category of disposition. A discussion of states which are active powers and those which are not can be begun, perhaps, by considering Plato's views on the dispositional terms 'health' and 'virtue'. These are dispositions which are active powers, and Plato's treatment of them establishes the proper historical and philosophical context for consideration of the Stoics.

In the Republic, Plato considers virtue in general and justice in particular, and argues that they are to be considered as goods even apart from their consequences. Justice is defined as a certain condition of the soul's three parts, and is valued even apart from its causal power as a state which results in just activity. M.F. Burnyeat[18] sees a close similarity between virtue and health in Plato's account:

> According to dictionary definitions, health is soundness of body or that condition in which functions are duly and efficiently discharged, so it is not just a contingent generalization that the body is "that which is made better by health and is disabled by disease"... For underlying the conventional connection between the term "health" and

> a certain bodily condition is a natural connection between that condition, whatever it may be, and the efficient discharge of functions. It is this interplay of nature and convention which is responsible for the statement "health is good or beneficial" appearing to be non-contingent and non-trivial.

Moreover, Burnyeat holds (p.230) that since there is a certain 'imprecision' between the state and the activities by which it is characterized virtue is not a disposition at all. It seems that Burnyeat would only regard virtue as a disposition were it defined in terms of certain activities[20]. The Stoics rejected this strong thesis, and substituted the weaker expression "characterized by certain forms of activities"[21]. The importance of this point for my thesis ought to be evident. In chapter 1, I spoke of character traits as principal causes of the pathe. These hexeis are characterized by various forms of activity, but not defined in terms of them; rather, they are defined as air currents in various states of tension.

It is a fact then that certain members of the category of disposition are active powers, while others are not. And there seem to have been two terms employed to bring out this difference: hexis and schesis. I hope to show that schesis is a broad term, almost the equivalent of the English 'state', while hexis has the notion of being a state that is also a causal power. Sometimes it appears in the fragments as if the two are mutually exclusive, while in others hexis seems a species of the

generic schesis[22]. This ought not really to cause any confusion, since it is clear that states which are causal powers can also be considered as states simpliciter without reference to their causal powers. Thus, in the context of Plato's theory of justice we can speak of justice, and in fact of any virtue, simply as a state of the soul apart from its role as the cause of virtuous activity. For the Stoics, virtue is an air current in a certain state of tension and thus can be called a schesis. In its role as a causal power, however, virtue is a hexis which is characterized by virtuous activities. Our longest surviving statement of this theory is preserved by Philo (SVFIII.244), where both virtue and 'being in the Academy' could be considered examples of scheseis in so far as they simply answer the question pōs echon?. But virtue and the diseases of soul are also causal powers. That hexeis are scheseis which are also causal powers is the Stoic position as it is explained by Stobaeus (SVFIII. 111): [23]

> Of the goods, some consist in motion (en kinesei), and others consist in state (en schesei). These are examples of those that consist in motion: joy... Others consist in state such as well-ordered peace. Of those that consist in state (en schesei), some also consist in disposition (en hexei) such as the virtues, but others consist only in state.

In chapter 1, I explained that the pathe are irrational movements of soul. The emotions of the wise man, however, are eupatheiai, and one of these is the joy mentioned above, a good that consists in motion[24]. Of those

that consist in state, some are also causal powers and therefore referred to as hexeis.

3

Section 2 has taken us a long way from Rist's statement that dispositions are not active powers. Those which are active powers also have a place within the category of disposition, and it is these with which we will be concerned through the rest of this thesis. The above quotation from Stobaeus has introduced questions about the moral status of emotions, and such questions will preoccupy us through the next several chapters. It would be well to conclude by summarizing what we have learned thus far about the moral value of the various psychological phenomena.

I. Goods

A. Some consist in state (en schesei).

B. Some consist also in disposition (en hexei):

1) the virtues.

2) character traits which are the causes of the eupatheiai.[25]

C. Some consist in motion (en kinesei):

1) the eupatheiai.

II. Evils

A. Some consist in state

B. Some consist also in disposition:

1) the vices.

2) the diseases of soul.

C. Some consist in motion:

1) the pathe.

1. Cf. Sambursky, S., Physics of the Stoics (New York 1959)p.115. See also the sentiment of Cato expressed in Cicero's De finibus, and cited on p. 107 of Long's Hellenistic Philosophy:
   "The remarkable coherence of the system and the extraordinary orderliness of the subject-matter have made me prolix. Don't you find it amazing, in heaven's name?... What is there which is not linked to something else so that all would collapse if you moved a single letter? But there is nothing at all that can be moved."

2. Cf. SVFII.447ff. for the concept of tonike kinesis.

3. Sambursky (op.cit.p.29).

4. ibid.p.21:
   "The essence of this theory... was to conceive of hexis- the synthesis of pneuma permeating the body- not as a static phenomenon but as a dynamic process prevailing within a continuous medium and "of a corporeal nature"".
   Ryle maintains that structural properties such as his example of 'brittleness' cannot properly be considered as causes. For the Stoics, dispositions are both events and causes. Volubilitas, for example, is a special sort of tensional event.

5. Cf. Watson, G., Stoic Theory of Knowledge (Belfast 1966)p.16. Another account of the nature of tensional motion is given by F.H. Sandbach in The Stoics (London 1975)p.77 in the following way:
   "These two opposed motions, whose sum results in stability, might be understood in three ways. First, part of the air might move outwards while an equal part moved inwards... Secondly, the whole of the air might move outwards at one instant and inwards at the next, giving what we should call a vibration. Thirdly, there may be no change of place at all, but the 'movements' are what we should call 'forces'acting upon the air."

6. Cf. Sextus Empiricus cited in Sambursky (op.cit. p.118):
   "Unified bodies are such as are controlled by a single hexis similar to that of plants and animals; those formed of conjoined parts are such as are composed of adjacent elements which tend to combine into one main structure, like cables and turrets of ships... In the case of bodies formed from conjoined or separable elements the parts do not sympathize with one another, since if all

> the soldiers, say, in an army have perished the one who survives is not seen to suffer at all through transmission: but in the case of unified bodies there exists a certain sympathy, since, when the finger is cut, the whole body shares its condition."

7. It follows that both hexeis and pathe are events in some sense. Contrast this with Ryle's position (op.cit.p.125)
   "Dispositional statements are neither reports of observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no incidents."

8. Cf. Sambursky (op.cit.p.11), and Plutarch (SVFII.449).

9. Gould, J., The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Leiden 1971)p.36.

10. This is the Loeb translation of De virtute morali 441b.

11. Cf. Armstrong, D.M. (op.cit.p.82-86) who discusses dispositional and non-dispositional states.

12. hupokeimena, poia, pōs echonta, pros ti pōs echonta.

13. Cf. Gould (op.cit.p.107).

14. Cf. Rist, J., "Categories and their Uses", Problems in Stoicism, p.51.

15. Gould (op.cit.p.107).

16. Perhaps there is need of some qualification here. Virtue is a causal power which produces virtuous activity as its effect. 'Being in the Academy' is not a causal power except per accidens. For Isocrates' being in the Academy could be the cause of Plato's anger.

17. Rist, J., "Categories and their Uses" (op.cit.p. 53).

18. Burnyeat, M.F., "Virtues in Action", from Vlastos, G., Socrates (New York 1971)p.232.

19. This 'imprecision' between virtue and the activities which it causes is one of the subjects of chapter 3.

20. ibid.p.229.

21. Cf. SVFII.393: charakterizesthai... tais ex heautōn energeiais.

22. In this regard, compare SVFIII.111 with II.393.

23. Cf. SVFIII.111 in conjunction with II.443.

24. These goods are not those which consist in tensional motion, but are temporary occurrences rather than dispositions.

25. That there are traits of character which cause the eupatheiai is only assumed up to this point, but is the subject of explicit proof in chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

THE EMOTIONS AND THE STOIC THEORY OF INDIFFERENTS

Unfortunately, there is little information available about Zeno's views on the emotions. His initial contributions to the theories discussed in chapters 1 and 2 are difficult in the extreme to make out. It would be very helpful, of course, if we could isolate and then discuss the thoughts of Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus on the theories explained in the preceding two chapters and in those that are to follow. But that is impossible, as can be illustrated by the fact that Zeno's views on the pathe fill only two pages in von Arnim's collection of Stoic fragments. This chapter will not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of Zeno's psychology, nor one of Chrysippus'. It will, however, start with the former and end with the latter, using their explicitly recognized views as points of departure into the theories of the group of philosophers simply referred to as'the Stoics'in our sources.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the place of the pathe in the Stoic theory of moral value, along with the place of the diseases of the soul. This subject was recently introduced by the quotation from Stobaeus on page 48. The question is: are the pathe and diseases of soul good, bad, or indifferent as to goodness or evil? Since they are irrational movements of soul and befall only the fool, it is safe to assume that they are not goods. But this assumption leaves open the other

two possibilities. Are the pathe evils, or are they indifferent? Similar questions arise in the case of the eupatheiai. Since they are the emotions of the wise man, they are certainly not evils, but are they necessarily goods, or are they sometimes goods and at other times indifferents. Are there, indeed, a class of non-moral emotions which are neither good nor evil? At first sight, this would seem to be a relatively simple question, for the Stoics were most famous in antiquity for the doctrine that virtue is the only good and vice is the only evil, while all else is indifferent. With the exception of virtue and vice, everything can be used well or ill, the Stoics taught, and is therefore neither good nor evil (SVFIII.117):

> What it is possible to use well or ill is not good. Wealth and health can be used well or ill; therefore, wealth and health are not good.

If that were the final Stoic thought on the matter, this would be a short chapter. We would simply conclude that: 1) virtue is good; 2) vice is evil; 3) all else is indifferent, and it would follow that the emotions are indifferents, since they certainly are neither virtues nor vices[1]. But the theory is not quite so simple, for it is often said that not only is virtue good but whatever partakes of virtue. Likewise, not only is vice bad but whatever partakes of vice (cf. SVFIII.70, 76, 106). And this point is confirmed by a number of fragments which go

on to list other goods besides virtue and other evils besides vice (cf. SVFIII.95ff.). The first question that must be taken up, therefore, is about the class or classes into which the emotions of the wise man and fool fall. In other words, do they partake of virtue and vice and thus become goods and evils, or are they always indifferent. This is a more confusing question than it might at first appear, for the evidence seems to be contradictory.

I would like to begin with an initial statement of the contradictory nature of the evidence, and then present what I believe to be the solution. The Stoics, I believe, originally made a relatively simple point, perhaps based on (or at least influenced by) their understanding of Aristotle's distinction between kinesis and energeia. This account was later misunderstood by most of the doxographers upon whom we rely for our information. Secondly, the confusion of the doxographers will be explained. The Stoics were not merely splitting hairs about word meanings in the manner of Prodicus when they discussed human emotions and distinguished the good from the bad, as Alexander of Aphrodisias thought (cf. SVFIII.434). Rather, they put forward the thesis that every emotion is either good and indifferent or bad and indifferent depending upon who is experiencing the emotion and the perspective from which it is viewed. I will speak of this perspective as a matter of level-of-discourse, a notion

which seems to me to be a most valuable one with which to study Stoic theories of the emotions, and it will be employed frequently throughout the rest of the thesis. It is best to explain what I mean by it at the beginning of this chapter.

The first level-of-discourse will be that of indifference. Here are to be found all emotions, objects, and actions in the world. For they can (in a manner to be explained below) be viewed in such a way that they are indifferent to goodness and evil. On the second or moral level-of-discourse are found virtue, vice and all of the goods and evils. The details of the working of this model will be laid out as I discuss each of the goods and evils of the soul, beginning with emotions.

I

ORIGINAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

We know that Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, developed a theory of moral indifference. Consequently, much that has been written on his psychology centers upon where in the scheme of good-bad-indifferent the emotions are to be found. The answers which have been given to this question are indeed various. Pearson writes[2]:

> What position do the _pathe_ occupy in the classification of goods. Zeno classified _hedone_ and therefore presumably the other _pathe_ among the _adiaphora_... The result of this discussion is that Zeno and Cleanthes did not classify _lupe_ and _phobos_ with _kaka_, and therefore Wachsmuth cannot be right in attributing to Zeno a passage in Stobaeus where this classification is implied... The entire

> subject of the relation which the emotions bear to the classification of agatha and kaka is extremely obscure, and the ancient authorities are not only defective, but, as we have seen, contradictory.

Pearson then proceeds to give his own view that pleasure is an indifferent, in contrast to the view of Zeller and Heinze that it is an evil (kakon). In sum, Pearson recognizes that the evidence seems contradictory.

Other commentators have taken a slightly different approach, indicating that for them the scheme of good-bad-indifferent has a certain vagueness about it which made it easy prey for enemies of the Stoa. This is the approach of Kidd, Gould, Long, and Pohlenz. They provide a range of examples of how commentators have attacked problems in the Stoic theory of indifferents, and ought to be cited briefly.

First of all, Kidd remarks[3]:

> Plutarch digs up a quotation of Chrysippus, where the latter permits the use of customary language to the extent of calling 'preferred things' (proegmena), 'goods' (agatha), as long as one understands the meaning of what one is saying. Plutarch deduces from such evidence that sometimes to the Stoa proegmena are 'goods', sometimes 'indifferents'. The Stoics seem to have been untechnical in their use of language on occasion, no doubt when forced to argue with opponents in their opponents' language.

A.A. Long expresses agreement with this view[4]:

> In fact the Stoics are not always consistent in their use of 'good'... It is highly probable, as Mr. I.G. Kidd has suggested, that the Stoics used words sometimes in a technical sense and sometimes more generally... But the problem is knowing when they are using what sense.

Further statements of Pohlenz and Gould provide a good

introduction to the historical context into which Zeno introduced his theory of indifferents. First of all, Pohlenz says[5]:

> Mit dierer Lehre wollte Zenon der animalische Physis des Menschen Rechnung tragen und gleichzeitig die Position wahren, auf die es ihm allein ankam, die Selbstherrlichkeit und Selbstgenügsamkeit des Logos. Aber erkauft war dieser Gewinn durch einen scharfen Schnitt innerhalb der menschlichen Natur und durch eine doppelte Wertung, die eine Gefahr für die Reinheit des Lebenszieles und für die Einheitlichkeit der Lebensführung bedeuten konnte. So hat gerade diese Lehre den Gegnern eine willkommene Angriffsfläche geboten und auch dazu geführt, dass sich schwere Zweifel innerhalb von Zenons eigener Schule erhoben. Die Akademiker wie Polemon wandten ein, dass Zenon mit den 'von der Natur bevorzugten Dingen' im Grunde die äusseren 'Güter' nur unter anderem Namen wieder einführe...

Gould relates Zeno's problem to Academics, Peripatetics, and Cynics[6]:

> ... Chrysippus was obviously trying to mediate between two traditions. On the one hand, he wished to preserve what appeared to him true in the Cynic teaching, namely, that only what is good in an unqualified way can bear the ascription 'morally good'. On the other hand, he deplored in Cynic thought the doctrine that everything other than the morally good is, from the point of view of value, indifferent. And the contemporary Academic and Peripatetic schools which emphasized the value of natural goods such as health and strength seemed to him to espouse an eminently sensible view... In thus attempting to preserve what appeared to him true in both these traditions Chrysippus... undertook an impossible task'.

The final two quotations give one interpretation of the historical situation. The view is that the Stoics were forced into an impossible position by trying to embrace contradictory theses in their theory of indifferents. On the one hand, we know that Zeno was a Cynic in his youth

and embraced the Cynic doctrine that the only good is virtue and the only evil vice while all else is indifferent. Virtue and vice, of course, are qualities of the soul, and an individual in possession of them needs nothing else. This view explains the excesses of a character such as Diogenes the Cynic.

A different view was taken, Cicero tells us in Book V of the Tusculan Disputations, by certain Peripatetics who argued that there are other goods and evils in addition to virtue and vice. I wish to avoid most of the complicated questions about what the Cynics and Peripatetics mentioned by Cicero meant by their theories of moral value. (Nor do I intend in this and the following chapter to give a complete account of the Stoic theory of indifferents.) All that needs to be noticed now is the rather simple point that both the Cynics and Peripatetics seem concerned with picking out those classes of qualities and entities that can be called good, bad, or indifferent. They seem to differ, however, on the question of which classes of qualities and entities fall into which of the three groups. Thus 'health' and 'wealth' are admitted to be goods by the Peripatetics[8], a position which would be denied to them by the Cynics.

The Stoic view has often seemed not to be so clear. They are believed by some to be trying to embrace both positions simultaneously: sometimes to agree with the Cynics that nothing can be considered good except virtue

and nothing evil except vice, and on other occasions to be giving in to the Peripatetics by saying that pleasure, health, wealth, etc. are goods.

A tacit premise in this argument is the assumption that the mutually exclusive nature of the Cynic and Peripatetic theories of what is good, bad, or indifferent must also apply in the case of the Stoics. What I mean by this can be explained in the following way.

Sextus Empiricus was a Greek sceptic, concerned with the differing views which the philosophers had taken on the question of the moral value of pleasure, and the implications of these differing views for scepticism. He remarks at one point that Epicurus had called pleasure a good, others had called it an evil, and the Stoics had referred to it as an indifferent. Sextus then seems to assume that its appearance in any one of the three categories precludes such appearance in either of the other two, and the contradictions among the schools give him ground for the suspension of judgment (Ad.math.XI.74), for:

> It is impossible for the same thing (to auto) to be by nature opposite things- at once good, bad, and indifferent.

This statement by Sextus seems to provide a good avenue of approach to the Stoic theory of indifferents and to questions about the moral value of the pathe, eupatheiai, and the dispositions which cause them.

I believe that the Stoics would have accepted as

true the premise of Sextus, but Plutarch, as Kidd noted above, in his essay "On the Contradictions of the Stoics" digs up statements to the effect that there are indifferents which are also goods. This leads Kidd to the conclusion that the Stoics were only speaking loosely and making concessions to popular usage.9

In so far as I have been able to determine, nobody has yet argued for a strict interpretation of the Stoic theory of indifferents, whereby we would suppose the Stoics to be arguing that there are certain things which are good and indifferent or bad and indifferent, despite the fact that nothing can be good and indifferent or bad and indifferent. I have formulated the doctrine in a particularly paradoxical fashion as the Stoics were accustomed to do, and the above wording conceals much that will not become clear until I have explained completely what I mean by speaking of a distinction as to levels-of-discourse.

There are two seemingly disparate matters which we must get through by way of providing a groundwork to the solution of the above paradox. The first of these is a brief summary of John Rist's discussion of "Appropriate Acts" in his book Stoic Philosophy. The second is an article by D.W. Hamlyn entitled "Behavior".

II

GROUNDWORK FOR A SOLUTION

Seneca says (SVFIII.84,p.21,l.19) that whatever we do we do out of virtue or vice, and the meaning of this is clear and confirmed by a number of fragments. It does not mean that certain of A's actions are good (katorthomata) while others are evil (hamartemata) as virtue or vice is being manifested by A on a given occasion, but simply that A is either a good or a bad person and that all of his actions are accordingly good or bad. It is said a number of times (e.g.SVFIII.557-566) that the wise man does everything that he does in accordance with virtue and that all of his actions are morally good and complete (telika, cf. SVFIII.106), words that will be discussed in detail in this and the following chapter.

If every action of the wise man is good and every action of the fool is evil, and if all mankind is divided into these two classes, there would seem at first sight to be no room for action that is indifferent to virtue and vice; nevertheless, the Stoics speak of such action on occasion (cf. SVFIII.501). This problem has, I believe, been attacked on the right grounds by Rist.

A

RIST ON APPROPRIATE ACTS

One chapter in Rist's book deals with appropriate acts on the one hand and with virtuous and vicious acts on the other. The point of the chapter can be briefly stated, and its importance seems to be very great for Stoic studies. Rist argues that appropriate action is

not a distinct class of entities as opposed to virtuous and vicious action. Rather, every appropriate action is either virtuous or vicious depending upon the moral disposition of the agent. The criterion used to judge the appropriateness of an action is different from that used to judge its goodness or evil. Thus (op.cit.p.98):

> 1) Talking can be done morally and appropriately. In this case it is a teleion kathekon and a katorthoma.
>
> 2) Talking can be done immorally and appropriately.[10] In this case it is a meson kathekon and a hamartema.
>
> 3) Talking can be done immorally and inappropriately. In this case it is a para to kathekon and a hamartema.

Perhaps a further example will make this clearer. Suppose that A and B both get sick and call a doctor. Suppose further that Ais a virtuous person and B is a vicious person. In this case both A and B will have performed an appropriate action (because you ought to call the doctor when you get sick), but since A is a virtuous person his action is a katorthoma, while since B is vicious his action is a hamartema. The point is that both A and B can perform appropriate actions, which are judged in terms of their reasonable chance of success in achieving their ends; it is, however, quite another question whether an action is good or evil, and the criterion used to deter-

mine this is quite different. This depends upon whether the person who performs the action is virtuous or vicious.

Now talk of all action as virtuous or vicious at first sight seems to contradict a number of Stoic fragments where it is asserted that all action is virtuous, vicious, or neither. In regard to this third class, Rist argues (op.cit.p.100):

> In other words our proposal is that when the Stoics said that all acts are either virtuous or vicious or oudetera, they intended oudetera to suggest that acts which by definition are neither virtuous nor vicious are thus in particular cases either virtuous or vicious.

Again, the point is that the moral disposition of the agent determines the moral value of the act, which could also be described as appropriate or inappropriate on quite different grounds.

The words used by the Stoics to describe virtuous and vicious actions ought to be noticed. (Had Rist studied them more carefully he would have avoided certain mistakes about the moral status of the emotions.) Actions of these two classes are denoted by morally evaluative words which refer not only to certain actions but also to the moral disposition of the agent. Thus Stobaeus says (SVFIII.501):

> And of acts, they (the Stoics) say that some are virtuous activities (katorthomata), others vicious activities (hamartemata), and others neither. Virtuous activities are for example: acting wisely (phronein), acting modestly (sophronein), acting justly (dikaiopragein), feeling joy (chairein)..., all things which are done in accordance with right

> reason. Vicious activities are: acting foolishly (aphrainein),... feeling pain (lupeisthai), feeling fear (phobeisthai), stealing and whatever is done contrary to right reason. Neither virtuous nor vicious are the following: speaking, asking, answering,walking... etc.

Dikaiopragein refers to the virtuous disposition of the agent and to all of those actions that can be referred to as just actions. Likewise, aphrainein describes not only the vicious disposition of the agent but also all of the actions that can be referred to as foolish actions. The third class, on the other hand, does not include such morally evaluative terms. (It should be noted for future reference that the fragment of Stobaeus makes no distinction regarding what we normally think of as the contrast between action and emotion.[11])

The chapter of Rist's marks an advance in thought on the Stoics which can best be perceived through comparison with the views of an earlier critic such as Pohlenz on the same subject. For Pohlenz believed that the Stoics recognized two separate spheres of human action: 1) die Geistesnatur; and 2) die animalische Physis and that katorthomata and hamartemata are virtuous and vicious actions of man's spiritual nature. He further believed in the possibility of action which simply has no reference to man's spiritual nature. Thus (op.cit.vol.Ip.129):

> Ob ich einen Strohhalm aufhebe oder nicht, ist allerdings auch für diese völlig belanglos. Anders steht es aber mit der Sorge für unsern Leib und seine Gesundheit.. Denn diese ist uns mit dem Selbsterhaltungstrieb von der Natur eingepflanzt,

> und ohne Essen und Trinken können wir nicht existieren, kann also auch der Logos nicht funktionieren. Essen und Trinken gehören darum auch für den Weisen zu den sittlichen Aufgaben.

Furthermore, Pohlenz wrongly believed that the katorthoma is an action carried out for morally good motives, while the kathekon is carried out for other than moral motives (p.130):

> Ohne jeden sittlichen Wert sind Handlungen, die aus äusseren Motiven vollbracht werden.

On the same page, Pohlenz goes on to explain his view that the kathekon forms a middle region in which the average man can prove himself similar to the wise man. Certainly it it is true that the kathekon can be performed by anyone regardless of his moral disposition, but Rist seems to be right in his view that the kathekon, and indifferent action in general, does not comprise a third distinct class of actions performed for other than moral motives. By failing to see that all action is virtuous or vicious and thus has reference to man's spiritual nature , Pohlenz was prevented from seeing the thesis which will be argued for below: that all motions of all classes of humanity are moral or immoral when judged on the moral, or second, level of discourse. But this is to anticipate conclusions which have not yet been argued for.

The first part of our groundwork is complete. We have seen Rist's point that every occurrence of every action is either virtuous or vicious, though an action can also be judged as appropriate or inappropriate on quite

different grounds having to do with the likelihood of its achieving its end. Rist, however, never asks the question of what constitutes an action for the Stoics nor spends time studying the words which the Stoics used to describe actions. But more of this after the second part of the groundwork.

B

HAMLYN ON BEHAVIOR

In an article entitled "Behavior", which first appeared in Philosophy in 1953[12], D.W. Hamlyn attempts to make several points about what he regards as the difference between speaking about activity and speaking about movement. He goes on to say that he will use Aristotle as a contributor to his discussion, since he is less worried about what Aristotle actually said than about the relevance to his own thesis of what he takes Aristotle to be suggesting. (This is good policy. R.G. Collingwood spoke disapprovingly in his Autobiography of those critics who would translate the Greek word trieres as 'steamboat'; then when you go on to point out to such critics that the characteristics of steamboats are nothing like the characteristics of triremes, they answer that this only goes to prove what strange ideas the Greeks had about steamboats[13].) Hamlyn uses the words 'activity' and'movement' as translations of what Aristotle may have meant by energeia and kinesis respectively. According to Hamlyn, Aristotle believed the following (p.60):

> One of the distinctions which Aristotle makes is between *energeia* (activity) and *kinesis* (movement). *Kinesis* is itself said to be an *energeia*, but one which is incomplete (*ateles*), while *energeia* in the proper sense is... activity of the complete. The sense of 'complete' may be given here by saying that an activity is something that is carried on for its own sake, which contains its end in itself, and not, as in the case of movement, for the sake of something outside of itself. *Kinesis*, Aristotle says, arises out of a *dunamis* (a potentiality) and may lead to a *hexis* (a state or disposition). The *energeia* itself is the realization of that *hexis*.

On this interpretation, to say that a movement is incomplete is to say that it is carried on for the sake of something outside of itself. Thus I might move my hand to the mail box in order to put the letter in (to use Hamlyn's example). The end then is something outside of the movement which the movement brings about. Or, Hamlyn maintains, I could move my hand to the mailbox and, when asked to explain, I might say that I did it because I wanted to, and thus refer to the final cause (p.60). Explanation of the latter sort is explanation in terms of activity, which provides the reason (p.60). Activity is complete because its final cause is in itself. Movement, on the other hand, is incomplete, because the end is beyond the movement.

But movement can also be described in terms of activity. If Hamlyn is interpreting him correctly, Aristotle would be maintaining that *kinesis* can alternatively be described as *energeia*, through the addition of *hexis*. Hamlyn continues (p.60) that whenever it is possible to

speak of a person's activity (energeia), it is also possible to speak of his movement (kinesis). The two descriptions are different and do not serve the same purpose.

Hamlyn is careful to note (p.62) that making a distinction between kinesis and energeia does not involve making a distinction between different entities or, in this case, different acts, but rather consists in talking about the same entity or act, e.g. mailing a letter, in two different ways, one complete way which describes the intention or reason for which the act was carried out, and one incomplete (ateles) way that does not describe the intention. This is the second necessary part of the groundwork.

At the risk of presenting these matters in a somewhat confusing order, I have given the groundwork which I have used in trying to understand the Stoic view of the place of the emotions in the framework of moral value before presenting my answer itself. As anyone who has ever worked with philosophical fragments knows, it is extremely difficult or impossible to understand fully the meaning of a fragmentary report on a particular view, unless one first has some idea of the question for which that reported view was meant to serve as answer. The questions which I posed to myself were: suppose the Stoics tried to incorporate the Aristotelian distinction between kinesis and energeia into their theory of moral value. How would they have understood it, and where

would the two concepts fit into the scheme of good-bad-indifferent? The answers to these questions are: 1) the Stoics did in fact have an interpretation of Aristotle's meaning which was much like Hamlyn's; 2) the distinction provides the best approach which I have yet found to the place of the emotions in the Stoic theory of indifferents, and to the purpose of the indifferent classification itself.

III

SOLUTION

Let us return to the Stoics to see what value, if any, they assign to the emotions in terms of goodness or evil, remembering that, as Pearson noted, the evidence seems contradictory on this point. Close study must be given to those fragments in which the Stoics discuss goods, evils, and indifferents. The goods and evils with which we will be primarily concerned are those of the soul, and in particular the emotions. But the Stoics recognized three classes of goods and evils, about which something must first be said.

In addition to those of the soul, there are external goods and evils and those which are neither of the soul nor external (SVFIII.97). This tripartite division recalls a similar division of the Peripatetics. According to the account in the fifth book of the Tusculan Disputations (V.30,85), the position of the Peripatetics is presented as also involving a tripartite division of

goods and evils that included: 1) those of the soul; 2) those of the body; and 3) those which are external. The Peripatetic position, as here explained, is that there are certain bodily and external goods which can be described as goods without reference to the disposition of the individual enjoying them (cf. note 8). Aristotle and the Peripatetics, we are told, were willing to describe what were commonly referred to in antiquity as 'the goods of fortune' (health, wealth, beauty, etc.) as goods simpliciter.

Likewise, the Stoics can be found referring to such things and events as 'life' and'having children' as goods (SVFIII.101). But on other occasions life is said to be indifferent as to goodness and evil (SVFIII.117). Here again, given life as both good and indifferent, we seem to encounter the same contradiction seen in the case of the emotions. It is this contradiction which led Rist to refer to things which are really good as opposed to those which are only $goods_1$, and makes Kidd speak of Stoic reluctant consent to popular terminology. Virtue is the only real good, we are told by Rist and Kidd; therefore, indifferents cannot be good in the same sense of the term. I wish to argue that these Stoic indifferents are good in a way which allows for no contradiction or ambiguity. For when they are considered on the moral level of discourse, their very description includes reference to the moral disposition of an agent, to virtue or vice them-

selves.

I will work through to a solution using the goods and evils of the soul as the basis for the argument. In chapter 2, I mentioned the article of Burnyeat entitled "Virtues in Action" in which it is argued that for Plato there are three factors to be considered in determining the nature of ethical virtue: that virtue involves right action on the basis of what is thought and felt. This triad of thought, feeling, and action seems to have a place in Stoicism also. Though we are primarily interested in the emotions, the other two concepts must enter into our evaluation of goods and evils of the soul.

That the triad was recognized by the Stoics we learn from what appears to be a direct quotation from Chrysippus preserved by Plutarch (SVFIII.85):

> For not only are the pathe perceptible along with their species[14] such as pain and fear and the like, but it is also possible to perceive theft and adultery and the like, and in general ignorance and cowardice and the many other vices; and not only joy (charas) and good deeds and many other right actions but also knowledge, courage, and the rest of the virtues.

This fragment is important in distinguishing some of the goods and evils of the soul. Where diseases of soul are to be found in the scheme will not be discussed until we have answered the questions about the place of the emotions.

The problem now to be solved is: how are we to understand the thought that the emotions can be either

katorthomata, or hamartemata, or indifferents? Sextus Empiricus gives it as the Stoic view that pleasure is an indifferent, while a number of other fragments speak of emotions which fall under the first two headings (SVF III.459 and 501)[15]. How do emotions which are indifferents differ from those which are katorthomata or hamartemata? Moreover, how do these last two differ from each other? For the Stoics were constantly being criticized in antiquity for what was regarded as a failure to explain how the emotions of the wise man differ from those of the fool (cf. SVFIII.434 and 439).

The explanation which I am about to provide has, I believe, the merit of being able to explain how commentators such as Plutarch and Alexander of Aphrodisias could become confused on this point. I wish to argue that qua kineseis the emotions of the wise man and those of the fool have no characteristics which distinguish them one from another, while qua energeiai those of the wise man are good and those of the fool are evil. Once this is understood it is clear that, contrary to the opinion of Alexander (SVFIII.434), the Stoics are not merely splitting hairs in the manner of Prodicus when they distinguish the emotions of the wise man from those of the fool. For things that may be exactly alike qua kineseis may be different qua energeiai.

Katorthomata and hamartemata comprise what we think of as action and emotion. Stobaeus provides the best in-

formation about which actions and emotions are considered goods and evils (SVFIII.104):

> Of the goods of the soul, some are diatheseis, others hexeis and not diatheseis, and others neither hexeis nor diatheseis. All of the virtues are diatheseis. Hexeis alone and not diatheseis are the practices (epitedeumata) such as prophetic skill and things like that. Neither hexeis nor diatheseis are the activities (energeias) in accordance with the virtues such as an act of knowledge, the use of moderation, and things like that. Likewise of the evils of the soul, some are diatheseis, others hexeis and not diatheseis, and others neither hexeis nor diatheseis. All of the vices are diatheseis. Hexeis alone are the tendencies such as enviousness, grief, etc., and in addition the diseases and moral weaknesses such as greed, drunkenness and things like that. Neither hexeis nor diatheseis are the activities in accordance with the vices such as an act of ignorance, an act of injustice, and things like that.

The non-dispositional terms (those which designate neither hexeis nor diatheseis) are the first subject of discussion here. They include the emotions of the wise man and those of the fool. After determining their moral status and answering possible objections which might be brought against the thesis, we will study the place of the dispositional terms in the Stoic theory of moral value.

These non-dispositional terms (designating actions and emotions) are distinguished from their counterparts (the dispositions) in being transient in nature, while hexeis and diatheseis belong to the wise man or fool whether they are being exercised or not[16]. This is explained in the following way (SVFIII.103):

> Of the goods, some belong to all wise men and

> always, others do not. Virtue and wise impulse and wise perception and the rest belong to all wise men and always. Joy (charan) and gladness and wise walking (phronimen peripatesin) do not belong to all wise men nor always. Likewise also in the case of the evils, some belong to all fools and always, and others do not. Every vice, and ignorant impulse, and ignorant perception and the rest belong to all fools and always. Pain and fear and ignorant answering do not belong to all fools nor always.

Pain (a pathos) and joy (an eupatheia) will pass in a relatively brief period of time. This is natural given their close connection with external objects and situations, but a person remains irascible even during the intervals between periods of anger. This temporal distinction is the one used by Aristotle in the Categories as the basis for the exclusion of the affections from the category of quality.

The point to be proved is that qua kineseis the movements of the wise man and those of the fool are indistinguishable, while qua energeiai those of the wise man are good and those of the fool are evil.

What distinguishes the joy (chara) of the wise man from the pleasure (hedone) of the fool? Alexander of Aphrodisias claims that the Stoics have no answer for this question (SVFIII.434), because chara is the same thing (tauton) as hedone. Both are examples of eparsis, a particular kind of motion of soul. That no distinguishing feature can be found should not be surprising, since in so far as both are examples of the motion eparsis they are indifferents[17].

Plutarch directs the following criticism against the Stoics (SVFIII.439):

> Whenever, being refuted by tears and trembling and changing of skin color, they speak of biting pains (degmous) and perplexities (suneorseis:) instead of pain and fear, they seem to be contriving justifications and avoidances of fact that are sophistic and not philosophical, arising out of names.

The context of this remark is also not difficult to see. Plurarch does not understand how there can be any difference between the virtuous and the vicious man if their actions and the manifestations of their emotions are identical. He and Alexander are confusing indifferent motion with morally evaluated activity.

In SVFIII.104, all goods and evils of the soul are said to be diatheseis, hexeis, or energeiai. It is my thesis that all of the pathe and eupatheiai appear as energeiai when evaluated morally and as kineseis when considered as indifferents[18].

The moral value of human action is not determined simply by the proper quantitative or qualitative mixture of kineseis. With this in mind and remembering Hamlyn's interpretation of Aristotle's kinesis-energeia distinction , we should read the following notice in Stobaeus (SVFIII.106):

> Of the goods, they say that some are complete (telika), others productive, and others both... Joy, good cheer, confidence, wise walking are only complete goods. All of the virtues are both complete and productive... Likewise in the case of the evils, some are productive, others complete, and others both... Pain, fear, theft, ignorant

> asking and things like that are complete evils only. The vices are both complete and productive evils.

While kinesis refers to movement that can belong to anyone, energeia refers to a good or an evil, complete in the sense that it designates not only a movement but also the moral disposition of the agent. Thus it does not make sense to say with Rist, Kidd, and Long that the Stoics are being vague or loose in their terminology in speaking of other goods and evils of the soul in addition to virtue and vice. For the very word energeia that denotes action and emotion has as part of its reference the moral disposition of the agent, virtue or vice.

If every pleasure, for example, can be viewed as a kinesis which is an indifferent or as an energeia which is good or evil, it becomes clear that commentators have mistakenly judged the Stoic theory of indifferents to be serving the same purpose as that served by the Cynic and Peripatetic classifications discussed at the beginning of this chapter. In the case of the latter two, the terms good, bad, or indifferent pick out different classes of entities whereby occurrence under one head precludes occurrence under the remaining two. But the Stoics, I believe, were concerned with understanding the different ways in which the same entities can be designated, that is, with or without reference to the moral disposition which is either virtue or vice. Thus talk about'pleasure'

as good or evil is talk about activity, while talk about pleasure as indifferent is talk about motion.

IV

OBJECTIONS TO THE SOLUTION

The objection might be raised, however, that there ought to be a difference in the movement of the wise man to set him apart from all others, and that the Stoics must have recognized such. The style in which the movement is made or the quantity or quality of the emotion itself ought to be a necessary index to, or a logically related outcome of, the agent's moral disposition. R.P. Haynes might raise objections like the above. He sometimes talks as if the mere excessiveness of the emotion makes it irrational, and as if the moderate nature of a second emotion makes it an eupatheia[19]. Now the Stoics certainly defined the pathos as an excessive impulse, but it would be a safe assumption that, unless Stoic psychology is very defective on this point, the fool also has emotions and impulses which are not excessive. But what makes all of them vicious is the vicious moral disposition of the agent, and not any feature or features of the movement themselves. The Stoics would be firmly in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle in taking this view.

M.F. Burnyeat[20] discusses the relationship between virtue and action in Plato's early philosophy in a manner that ought to recall the indifferent nature of all movement in Stoicism. Burnyeat takes the Charmides as one of

his examples with its discussion of the virtue sophrosune. This dialogue takes up the question whether Greek words denoting traits of the moral character have a primarily adverbial significance denoting a manner or stlye of behaving. The difficulty with the definitions proposed for sophrosune (such as 'quietness') is that they point to certain features of the behavior that can be identified without prior assessment of the agent's character. According to Burnyeat, Plato would not have recognized the existence of such stylistic features that define any of the virtues. If this is indeed his view, as seems likely, Plato would be in disagreement with Ryle who argues that behaving judiciously means "behaving as a judicious person would behave". According to Burnyeat, Plato would argue in the following manner (p.218):

> More important, discovering how judicious people typically behave would at most show whether an action was done in the way a judicious man would be expected to do it. The task of deciding how, in response to a given occasion, a judicious man would actually do it, though a theoretical one, might call for the good judgment requisite in judicious practice itself. (Similarly, there may be occasions when how to do a thing modestly can only be determined by consulting or watching someone whose modesty is independently attested.) It is a further question again whether, in acting as a judicious man would, an agent is behaving judiciously; for that his action must be informed by good judgment, not merely endorsed by it.

In these terms the judicious behavior of the Stoic wise man is informed by good judgment. I believe that by calling the kineseis of both the wise man and the fool indifferent the Stoics were allowing for the possibility

of behavior that is endorsed, but not informed, by wisdom. This sort of behavior would certainly be expected on the part of those who are advancing to wisdom but have not yet attained it. Take an example such as the following.

Suppose that we have someone called A, who is advancing to wisdom. Certainly one method he might follow in learning to become a wise man would be to watch one (B) in action. In this way, he would learn to behave as a wise man would behave. Suppose further that A has followed B and studied him for a period of time sufficient to allow him to learn and imitate B's responses to most typical life situations. In this case, A's behavior would be endorsed by wisdom, but certainly not informed by it. The kineseis of A and B would then be identical, at least in those situations in which A was acting in a manner endorsed by wisdom. Nevertheless, the energeiai of A, the man advancing to wisdom, would be vicious, while those of the wise man would be virtuous. This would seem to be Aristotle's view also[21]:

> For one might do what is just without any purpose at all or knowledge of the good, but from an irrational impulse, and yet do this rightly and in accordance with right reason (I mean he may have acted in a way that right reason would command); but all the same this sort of conduct does not merit praise.

If then the Stoics are allowing for the possibility of behavior that is only endorsed by wisdom in their under-

standing of the kinesis-energeia distinction, we can make good sense out of a passage of Sextus Empiricus attributing the following view to the Stoics[22]:

> But in fact every work which seems to be done by the wise man is found to be a work common also to the unwise; if, for example, we count honouring parents as a work of the wise man, or rendering back a deposit to those who have entrusted it, or any thing of this kind, we shall also find men who are not virtuous doing any of these things. So there is no work (ergon) of the wise man whereby he shall differ from the not wise... They (the Stoics) say that all of the works are common to all men, yet they are distinguished by their proceeding from an artistic or from a non-artistic disposition.

Sextus seems to be criticizing a formulation of the kinesis-energeia doctrine in this statement and in what follows. For he goes on to argue that (202) the Stoics have given us no grounds whereby the wise man may be distinguished from the fool. Sextus intends this as a criticism, obviously sharing the view spoken of in the beginning of this section, that there ought to be some detectable differences in the style, movement, or duties of the wise man. In thus criticizing the Stoics, he seems to provide further support for my thesis about the kinesis-energeia distinction.

In his recent book, Hellenistic Philosophy, A.A. Long mentions Sextus' criticism only to reject it out of hand. According to Long, we certainly have at least one test that can be used to distinguish the wise man from the fool, for the Stoic sage is free from all passion.

Emotions such as anxiety, dread, desire, and elation are all absent from his disposition. The wise man does experience emotions, but these are good states such as joy. From this Long sets up the following test (p.207):

> The absence of passion and the presence of the qualities just enumerated provide an objective measuring-stick for sorting out possible sages from other men. Added to the tests already mentioned, they set up a canon of excellence which could within limits be vouched for by an observer if any candidiates were forthcoming. It is not surprising that Stoic philosophers themselves did not pass the examination and knew of none who had done so.

Long's test seems to me to be question-begging. He argues that we may recognize the wise man by whether he experiences the emotions of the wise man. Likewise, the fool is recognized by the presence of irrational emotional states. But as Sextus points out, ta erga are the common property of all, and I have shown that kineseis have no features that allow the moral to be distinguished from the immoral. We would need independent confirmation of whether a candidate is a wise man or a fool before we could confidently assert that his emotions are those of the former or of the latter.

Moral disposition then is the essence of goodness and makes virtuous energeiai from indifferent kineseis. How the Stoic view would differ from Aristotle's theory of the mean is well expressed by J.L. Stocks in his criticism of the doctrine of the mean[24]:

> We are asked by Aristotle's principle to accept this ruling: that these desires and emotions are

> in themselves neither good nor bad, but are material, in itself neutral, out of which, by certain different arrangements and adjustments to environment, what we call goodness or badness is made: that the positive achievement which we call goodness comes, not by the elimination of certain factors as bad, or by the introduction of some new factor which is the soul of goodness, but simply by the right arrangement and adjustment of these materials.

The Stoic view of action, of course, is that the soul of goodness is introduced into kineseis, making them energeiai. How does the walking of the wise man, then, differ from that of the fool? The one is good and the other is evil (SVFIII.103), in so far as they are energeiai, but there is no special spring to the step of the wise man to differentiate his kinesis from that of the fool[25], for as indifferents there is no distinguishing mark. The same principle applies to pleasure and to the other emotions.

What this discussion demonstrates about the Stoic view of actions in general and of emotions in particular can be summarized in the following two principles:

1) Any kinesis, when considered apart from its moral hexis (i.e. diathesis), is neither good nor bad but indifferent.

2) There is no necessary, or logical, connection existing between any kinesis and its moral diathesis[26]. Two identical examples of kinesis may be distinguished only when evaluated as energeiai.[27]

As these two principles imply a distinction between

moral and other kinds of hexeis, they provide a good introduction to the next section of this chapter, which will consider the place of the dispositional goods and evils in the Stoic framework of moral value. The energeiai have been examined. It remains to consider the hexeis and the diatheseis.

V

HEXEIS AND DIATHESEIS

Perhaps the best beginning here would be to recall the relevant part of the fragment from Stobaeus which began the discussion about emotions and actions (SVFIII. 104):

> Of the goods of the soul, some are diatheseis, others hexeis and not diatheseis, and others neither hexeis nor diatheseis. All of the virtues are diatheseis. Hexeis alone and not diatheseis are the practices (epitedeumata) such as prophetic skill and things like that... All the vices are diatheseis. Hexeis alone are the tendencies such as enviousness, grief, etc., and in addition the diseases and moral weaknesses such as greed, drunkenness and things like that...

The first move here will be to determine how these two dispositional terms differ from one another. The virtues are diatheseis, and since this is not a thesis on the Stoic concept of virtue, the diatheseis will be considered only in so far as it is necessary to distinguish them from the hexeis, of which the diseases of soul are a form.

On occasion, the Stoics referred to the virtues and vices indifferently as either hexeis or diatheseis (com-

pare SVFIII.266ff. with Stobaeus above), and there is no real problem in this so long as we remember that both are dispositional terms designating active powers and principal causes. However, when they wished to contrast the virtues and vices with other sorts of dispositional terms, they called them diatheseis, seeking to make a particular point.

As in the case of actions and emotions, I believe that there is a distinction in levels-of-discourse at work. The point to be proved is that hexeis, as contrasted with diatheseis, have a place on the first level-of-discourse and, therefore, are indifferents. In addition all of them are goods or evils on the second level. The moral diatheseis alone are different from hexeis, actions, and emotions in that they are to be found only on the second level. They have no status as indifferents.

Simplicius distinguishes these dispositional terms in the following manner (SVFII.393)[28]

> They (the Stoics) say that hexis can be tightened or loosened but diatheseis are capable of neither increase nor of diminution... Similarly, the virtues are diatheseis, not because of their specific stable properties, but because they cannot be intensified and do not admit of increase. But skill (techne), even if it cannot vary easily, is not a diathesis. They seem to understand hexis as a range of variation of a state and diathesis as the extreme case, whether it... can easily change or not[29].

That the virtues are extreme cases entails the odd Stoic doctrine that all virtuous actions are equally virtuous

and all vicious actions equally vicious. For the *diatheseis* are extreme cases and those *energeiai* for which they serve as principal causes will themselves be extreme cases. Thus 'justice' is a *diathesis* and the cause of all action that can be named 'just action'. *Hexeis*, on the other hand, admit of increase and diminution. Consequently, it makes perfect sense to say that one man is more irascible than another or has more skill, but it does not make any sense to say that one man is more virtuous than another or more vicious. One is a wise man or a fool, but there is no range of variation within the two categories[30]. The four virtues are wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance (SVFIII.264), while the four vices are ignorance, injustice, cowardice, and intemperance. This is all that needs to be said about the concept of the *diathesis* for the moment.

Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrated that there exist tendencies to the *pathe* in all fools, and that these are called 'diseases of soul' and *hexeis* (SVFIII.104). Furthermore, wise men have emotions also, and if the psychological mechanisms of the two classes of humanity are to be the same, there must also exist in the wise men tendencies to *eupatheiai* which would be *hexeis*. And this is indeed what we find in the fragments.

SVFIII.104, which provides the most complete list of the goods and evils of the soul, refers to the diseases as tendenceis (*eukataphorias*). Corresponding to them in

the list of the goods of the soul are the epitedeumata, which include such things as prophetic skill, and as we learn from SVFIII.294 philomousia, philippia, and philokunegia. With the meagre evidence that has survived, there is little that can be said for certain about this type of hexis, except that it includes tendencies to both emotions and actions of various sorts. A man who is 'found of the hunt' can be counted on not only to perform certain actions when out in the field but also to experience certain emotions. Stobaeus proceeds in SVFIII.294 to claim that only the wise man has these epitedeumata. This obviously does not mean that vicious men never like to go hunting, or solve geometrical problems, or ride horses, but only that their exercise of these pursuits is at most endorsed by (and certainly never informed by) wisdom. In addition to the epitedeumata and the eukataphoriai, we ought to take notice of one other form of hexis.

This is techne with which Simplicius contrasts the diatheseis above. The precise significance of this term is even more difficult to grasp than in the case of the epitedeumata, to which techne is in some way related (cf. SVFIII.294), but it certainly includes such hexeis as the'prophetic skill'mentioned above.

What I hope to have gained from this discussion is not a complete picture of all the types of hexeis recognized by the Stoics nor of their exact relationships to

one another. This would be a thesis topic in itself. Suffice it to point out that the Stoics did recognize tendencies to both actions and emotions in both wise men and in fools.

Up to now, I have just mentioned three types of hexis and discussed one way in which they differ from the diatheseis, mainly that they admit of a range of variation. But there is another distinction which can be drawn, one which is even more important for the purposes of this thesis.

The hexeis can be viewed as either goods and indifferents or evils and indifferents. Section III demonstrated that all actions are indifferents when seen as kineseis and as goods or evils when seen as energeiai. This corresponds to the difference between the first and second level-of-discourse. It would seem to be the Stoic view also that all hexeis have places on the first and second levels, and that this differentiates them from the diatheseis (virtues and vices) which are to be found only on the second. Thus the tendency to 'fondness for horses' would be indifferent on the first level and good or evil on the second according to the moral disposition of the person possessing the tendency. In this case, the practice of an indifferent epitedeuma becomes an euepitedeuma in the case of the wise man (cf. SVFIII.502). In the same way, techne is described as an indifferent (SVFIII.127), though it obviously is a good techne in

the case of the wise man and an evil in the case of the fool. These then are two of the ways in which the hexeis differ from the diatheseis.

How precisely we are to understand the virtues and vices operating upon the hexeis and making them good or evil is difficult to determine. The Stoics seem to have taken to metaphor to describe the relationship. For it is said that the technai are altered by virtue, made unchangeable, and themselves become quasi-virtues. All of the evidence points to the hexeis being indifferents on the first level and goods or evils on the second.

VI

CONCLUSION

The one notion of the Stoics by which they were especially well-known in antiquity is that the only real good is virtue and the only real evil is vice. It ought to be clear by now that this is not merely a pious or trivial maxim, but rather it conceals the levels-of discourse distinction which has been outlined in this chapter. All goods and evils, with the exception of the moral diatheseis, are also indifferents. But it would be self-contradictory to say that virtue can be used well or ill or is in any way indifferent[31].

APPENDIX

DISEASES OF SOUL IN THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS

This chapter began with the observation that Zeno invented the moral scheme of good-bad-indifferent in Stoic philosophy. But just how much of the orthodox theory is his is difficult to determine. There are signs, however, that later Stoics may have changed his terminology and perhaps substantially altered his psychology . This appendix briefly explores one such sign.

There seem to me to be certain discrepancies between books III and IV of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, which are explainable on the assumption that Cicero is using Zeno as his basic source in book III and Chrysippus in book IV. If this is the case, we can see one area in which the two were at odds. Not wishing to push this thesis too far, I have relegated it to this appendix.

In book III, Cicero puts forward a view which equates disease of soul (morbus) with emotional perturbation. This certainly is not part of the terminology of emotions which has been developed in the course of this thesis. Our theory equates disease of soul with the tendency or disposition to such emotional perturbation, and makes these diseases character traits rather than occurrent movements.

Cicero has just put forward the view that the literal translation of the Greek term pathos would be the Latin morbus, and continues (III.4):

> omnis autem perturbationes animi morbos philosophi appellant.

Diseases of soul are here equated with emotions, and the fact that book III repeatedly refers to our four generic *pathe* as diseases aids the belief that some Stoic or Stoics did make this equation, though not the author of the theory discussed in this thesis. That this may have been Zeno himself is possible from SVFI.207, where, in referring to the *pathe*, Cicero tells us that Zeno wished the wise man to be without these diseases (*morbis*). Now the view is maintained throughout book III that the *pathe* (*perturbationes*) are the diseases of soul, but notice what happens in book IV.

Here the viewpoint is quite different, and part of this book has been used to reconstruct the theory discussed in chapters 1 through 3 (cf. SVFIII.424). Cicero introduces a new distinction which was not previously made. In book IV, the *perturbatio* is distinguished from the *morbus*, though the two were earlier equated. Now they stand in a causal relationship rather than one of identity (cf.p.22). Since there is some reason for believing that Zeno is being used as the source for book III, we might conclude that Chrysippus is being used as the source for book IV. This inference gains support from the occurrence of Chrysippus' name immediately preceeding the passage which distinguishes *perturbatio* from *morbus* (IV.10,23).

Cicero tells us that Chrysippus spent much time in comparing diseases of soul to those of the body. In his view, these diseases are hexeis and character traits and not emotional perturbationes. Though Zeno's view may have been in disagreement, Chrysippus' theory is a more common one, adopted in more modern times by a number of philosophers. Thus C.H. Whiteley makes the following comparison between bodily disease and traits of character [32]:

> The comparison between traits of character and diseases is here apt. Various symptoms which a patient exhibits are attributed to one 'disease' to which we give a name: 'influenza' is distinguished from the shivering, high temperature, weakness, and catarrh which are its symptoms as something present in the organism which is their common cause...

Compare this with the view which Galen attributes to Chrysippus on page 26.

1. Virtues and vices are *diatheseis*, while the *pathe* and *eupatheiai* are activities of the soul (cf. SVF III.104-106).

2. Pearson, A.C., *Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* (London 1891)p.46.

3. Kidd, I.G., "Stoic Intermediaries and the End for Man", *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. Long, A.A. (London 1971)p.159.

4. Long, A.A.,"Carneades and the Stoic *telos*", *Phronesis* 12(1967)p.66.

5. Pohlenz, Max, *Die Stoa* v.1 (Göttingen 1959)p.122.

6. Gould, J. (*op.cit.*p.178-179).

7. Cf. also Bréhier, E., *Chrysippe et l'ancien stoicisme* (Paris 1951)p.228.

8. Thus Aristotle also remarks (EN1129b3) that the 'goods of fortune' are always goods *simpliciter*, but not always good for an individual.

9. Rist's solution seems no more satisfactory to me (*op.cit.*p.11):
> "Their proposition 'the only good is virtue'... is very far from the absurd paradox it is usually supposed to be. It means that to confuse the goodness of the moral life with any other of those things which are commonly called goods is to make a category mistake of dangerous proportions. To avoid doing this, the Stoics were prepared to exclude the word 'good' from technical discussion on everything except virtue. One might ask how else they could insist on this distinction. It was not open to them to use subscript or subscript numbers in the way a modern philosopher might if he wished to make the same point. The Stoics could not write that 'Virtue is good' while 'Health is $good_1$'".

10. I have taken the liberty of substituting 'immorally' for Rist's 'non-morally', since it is his thesis that every performance of a *kathekon* is either virtuous or vicious.

11. I will argue in chapter 5 that the Stoics considered actions such as walking, talking, etc. to be ingredients in the *pathe* and *eupatheiai*.

12. The article will be cited in this and the following

chapter as it appears in The Philosophy of Mind, ed. V.C. Chappell (New Jersey 1962) p.60ff.

13. In a nutshell, this and the following chapter are attempts to prove that Hamlyn and the Stoics saw 'steamboats in Aristotle'.

14. This is an obvious reference to the doctrine of generic and specific pathe discussed in chapter 1.

15. There can be no dispute on this point. All goods and evils of the soul are either diatheseis, hexeis, or energeiai (cf. SVFIII.105). Since the pathe are neither hexeis nor diatheseis, they must be energeiai, and as such are either katorthomata or hamartemata.

16. Cf. chapter 1, note 3.

17. Compare SVFIII.119 which talks about indifferent motion, that of the finger, with SVFIII.627 where it is said that the finger motion of the wise man benefits wise men everywhere and is therefore a good. When Cicero translates the kinesis-energeia distinction into Latin, it comes out as motus-actio (SVFIII.108 and 134).

18. I will postpone until chapter 4 discussion of the two Stoic fragments which unambiguously explain the kinesis-energeia distinction (SVFII.497 and 498). There I will be more directly concerned with the Stoic theory of indifferents.

19. Haynes, R.P., "The Theory of Pleasure of the Old Stoa", AJP 83(1962)pp.412-419.

20. Op.cit.p.215ff.

21. MM(A34), quoted in Hardie (op.cit.p.237).

22. Cf. Sextus, "Against the Ethicists"199, Loeb translation.

23. Op.cit.pp.205-207.

24. Stocks, J.L., Morality and Purpose (London 1969) p.87.

25. Something like this may have been in the mind of Marcus Aurelius when he made the following observation (VII.67):
"It is possible to be an exceedingly divine man

and to be recognized by nobody".

26. This principle seems to follow from what was said in this section, but it will not be the subject of explicit proof until we consider the concept of 'value' in the next chapter.

27. For the purposes of this thesis, these two principles will be applied only to Stoic psychology, though I believe they would be valid in physics also.

28. This is cited in Sambursky (op.cit.p.138)

29. Inexplicably, Rist (op.cit.p.3) refers to this passage in support of his contention that diathesis "suggests rigidity, fixity of purpose".

30. Cf. SVFIII.527 and Rist (op.cit.p.81ff.).

31. Cf. Sextus, "Against the Ethicists",61.

32. Whiteley, C.H., Mind in Action (Oxford 1973)p.47.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMOTIONS AND THE STOIC CONCEPT OF VALUE

This chapter deals with several questions left aside in the last for the purposes of simplification; however, in exploring the Stoic concept of value, it isolates another characteristic of the emotions and is, therefore, of interest. From what was said in the last chapter, there would seem to be two possible approaches to Stoic psychology, and this chapter will attempt to secure some clarity of the concepts involved in each. The first would be to study the emotions as indifferent movements (kineseis) of soul, which in a sense would be to see them in an abstract way. What I mean by referring to indifferent movement as abstract can be illustrated in the following way.

In the concrete world of human agents, souls experience pathe or eupatheiai according to the moral disposition of a particular agent. Eupatheiai are good activities of wise men, and pathe are evil activities of fools. The discussion of emotions as indifferents takes a quite different approach, isolating one element of the moral emotion- its appearance as a particular kind of movement- to the exclusion of the diathesis. In fact, our attention up to this point has been concentrated almost entirely upon what characteristics the emotions of the wise man and those of the fool have in common. Thus chapters 1 and 2 investigated the surviving descriptions of motions of soul as specifically named, occurrent terms in both Stoic psychology and physics.

Then they were contrasted with the dispositional terms.

In addition to their descriptions simply as indifferents, this chapter will consider a further characteristic of motion in general and of motion of soul in particular: the possession of value or disvalue. Devotion of so much space to the concept of value may seem excessively pedantic, since the topic at first seems to have only the most tenuous of connections to Stoic psychology , and since so little information has survived. I will try to demonstrate, however, that unless we get some notion of how the idea of value is related to emotional theory confusions about things that are good and evil and how they differ from indifferents will certainly follow.

An example of how the concept of value seems to me to be misused can be found in Rist (op.cit.p.49). Rist puzzles over the fact that chara (the pleasure of the wise man) is not to be found in any of the surviving lists of things with value, or things to be preferred. Moreover, he makes statements such as the following (p. 46):

> Haynes thinks that Zeno and Cleanthes place pleasure in the class of what is indifferent in respect of good and evil. This is a little misleading; what they must have placed in this class are good pleasures.

This statement reveals a fundamental misconception, and there is good reason why Rist cannot find chara in any list of indifferents. For indifference and value (axia)

are characteristics of kineseis, while chara of course is an energeia. The last chapter provided the basis for distinguishing two levels of discourse. Here it is necessary to make explicit several points about the relationship between these two levels.

First of all, it was implied in the last chapter that the two levels are logically independent. By this I simply mean that no inference is possible from the assignment of indifferent status to an object, motion, or situation to the goodness or evil of that object, motion, or situation. This premise is the counterpart of the Stoic doctrine that the indifferents are the common possession of the wise man and the fool. This chapter will work to establish the logical independence of the two levels through consideration of value. Since value is a characteristic of indifferents, no inference is possible from a thing's possession of value or disvalue (apaxia) to its goodness or evil. My position may be outlined in the following way.

Burnyeat (op.cit.p.230) argues that a term can be considered a dispositional term only when its issue is fixed for any occurrence of the conditions of its actualization. Therefore, he holds, as we saw in chapter 2, that given the "imprecision" between it and the activities by which it is characterized virtue cannot be considered a disposition at all. In this, he is coming near to the Stoic position, since the Stoics recognized

this imprecision (though they did not consider it a reason to exclude the virtues and vices from the class of dispositions).

I would reconstruct the Stoic position in the following terms:

Dikaiosune implies only dikaiomata.

Adikia implies only adikopragemata.
(cf. SVFIII.502).

Logical inferences can sometimes be made from the presence of hexeis to the occurrence of certain forms of kinesis or what Sextus called erga in the last chapter (cf.p. 83). Thus certain inferences can be made regarding the actions and emotions of someone with the hexis philokunegia, but no analysis of a moral diathesis such as 'justice' can yield more thanthe unhelpful 'just action' as the description of the effect. (This is the source of the imprecision which Burnyeat speaks of.) If the analysis of a moral diathesis such as 'justice' were to yield the description of a particular kinesis or ergon, or if any inference were possible from these indifferents to a moral diathesis, then the logical gap between the two levels would be bridged. But this sort of inference the Stoics believed to be impossible.

The problems to be dealt with are three in number. First of all, there is a conflict in our sources whether the Stoics attributed value (as distinct from goodness or evil) to the emotions, and I wish to establish that the

eventual solution of this difficulty in no way affects their status on the second level. This means that questions about value are logically independent from questions about goodness and evil. Secondly, it remains to be proved that the assignment of value to indifferents complicates but does not contradict anything that has been said thus far. Thirdly, it would be proper to defend the contention of the last chapter that the Stoics presented their thoughts on morality and indifference in such a way that they seemed to be making Prodicean word distinctions. This thesis can be defended from explicit statements about the manner in which the Stoics discussed kinesis (first level indifferent) and energeia (second level moral concept).

The chapter falls into two sections, and the first is divided into three parts. These discuss the three classes of indifferents recognized by the Stoics: things with value in the first, things with disvalue in the second, and things which are absolutely indifferent in the third. The purpose is to determine into which of the three classes human emotions fall. An important point to keep in mind here is that indifferent kineseis, and not moral or immoral energeiai, have value, disvalue, or are indifferent even to value. (This, of course, is why Rist fails to find chara in any list of things with value, for it is an energeia and not a kinesis.)

A second purpose of this first section is to prove

in detail the contention that any ascription of value in no way affects goodness or evil. I wish to prove that the Stoics believed value to be attributable to a kinesis or ergon on the basis of observable behavior. (Section IV of chapter 3 demonstrated that goodness and evil cannot be so determined.)

The second section attempts to provide further proof for the levels-of-discourse distinction, using the few explicit statements that have survived regarding the difference between kinesis and energeia.

I

Before the discussion of things with value, a few words are in order about how I use the words 'logical' and 'contingent' relationships.

Chapters 1 and 2 talked about motions of soul and hexeis, and showed that the latter are the principal causes of the former. For example, 'irascibility' is the principal cause of the motion 'anger'. Here the logical relationship existing between the hexis and its characteristic motion is evident. Yet the Stoics were willing to grant that a hexis can stand in a logical relationship to to a motion or event, without compromising its status as a cause. This, of course, is just the point denied by Ryle[1]. Thus both intemperantia and 'irascibility' are principal causes of'anger', though the former has a contingent and the latter a logical relationship to the effect. However, the possibility of such

a logical relationship between hexis and motion in no way affects the twin principles of page 85. For both are indifferents on the first level, and any logical connections existing between and among such entities present no such problem. All the Stoics denied is the possibility of such inference from an indifferent to a moral diathesis.

The point here to be made can be summarized in the following way:

> There is no logical relationship between the preferred status of an object, motion, or situation[2] and the goodness or evil which that object,motion, or situation might have on the second level-of-discourse. (The assignment of value does not preclude possession by both wise men and fools.)

A

Let us begin then by considering those things with value.

In the first class of indifferents, sc our sources tell us, some things have value (axia), or, what seems to amount to the same thing, preferred status (SVFIII.117). Distinctions about value are what Seneca is referring to when he says that there are discrimina (SVFIII.120) among the indifferents. While none of them are good or bad (SVFIII.118), some of them have value which makes them capable of arousing our appetition (SVFIII.119). Take, for example, techne, one of the indifferent hexeis

discussed in the last chapter. There is little doubt that Cicero is correct when he tells us that techne, or ars, is a hexis that is to be preferred in itself (per se) (SVFIII.189). In other words, value is a characteristic of the indifferent qua indifferent.

At this point, I wish to avoid discussion of the exact meaning of 'value' in Stoic philosophy. Source material is very scarce on this subject, and the matter is obscure. The point that seems clear enough, however, is that value is a quality that belongs to at least some of the things on the first level-of-discourse. This point is easy enough to demonstrate because things with value belong to both wise man and fool.

Examples are health, wealth, pleasure (hedone), strength and things like these (SVFIII.117), objects and motions (in the case of pleasure) which are sufficient in themselves to arouse our appetition. In speaking of indifferents in themselves the Stoics are probably thinking of these things as abstract in the sense explained in the beginning of this chapter. Thus while eulogos eparsis is a good pleasure and alogos eparsis is an evil pleasure, eparsis in itself is an indifferent with value (at least according to SVFIII.117). Here a contradiction arises, for SVFIII.155 mentions pleasure among the indifferents not to be preferred. The implications of this contradiction will be explored in part C.)

While the words used to describe indifferents contain no clue regarding moral worth, they are sufficient in themselves to indicate the presence or absence of value. In keeping with this level-of-discourse distinction, Cicero uses the Latin motus when speaking of motions which have value (SVFIII.134), while actio is used in the case of those which are good or evil (SVFIII.108).

B

In addition to those with value, some indifferents have disvalue (apaxia), and others are valueless. In the class of those with disvalue, which are to be rejected (SVFIII.127ff.), problems of interpretation arise which must be solved if the logical independence of the two levels is to be maintained.

Examples of things with disvalue are death, poverty, pain (ponos), etc. (SVFIII.117), objects, motions, and situations to which we are disinclined. This seems clear enough, but there is one problem about pain which raises difficulties for the theory of logical independence.

Diogenes Laertius records it as the Stoic view that there are only three eupatheiai corresponding to the four pathe. What is missing from his list is any emotion of the wise man corresponding to the fool's pain (SVFIII. 431):

> They say that there are three eupatheiai: joy (charan), caution (eulabeian), and wish (boulesin).

Cicero provides the rationale for this belief in the argument that no pain befalls the wise man since its presence is inconsistent with the proper functioning of the soul (Tusc. Disp.III.7ff.).[3]

While it is likely enough that certain Stoics did hold the view found in Cicero and Diogenes Laertius, such could not have been the position of any Stoic who accepted the level-of-discourse distinction. First of all,that pain never befalls the wise man contradicts the report in Sextus (p.83) that the erga are the common possession of all mankind, while the wise man is distinguished only by his artful disposition. Furthermore, if no indifferent admits of inference regarding the moral diathesis, then pain cannot admit of such inference either. For if indifferent contractions (sustolai) of soul befall only the fool, then each such motion is necessarily an evil on the second level, and the Stoic maxim that "only virtue is good and vice is evil; all else is indifferent" ought to be emended to read "only virtue is good and vice and pain are evils; all else is indifferent".

Perhaps it might be argued that the Stoics failed to see the implications of their own theory when discussing pain and unanimously agreed that only fools feel pain. Fortunately, there is some surviving evidence that this is not the case.

SVFIII.574 explains that the wise man feels pain

(algein), and Cicero himself provides evidence that the view which he attributes to the Stoics was not shared by all of them. It seems that Chrysippus was constantly criticized by Carneades for his approval of the Euripidean verses (Tusc. Disp.III.25):

> Mortalis nemo est quem non attingat dolor
> Morbusque; multis sunt humandi liberi,
> Rursum creandi, morsque est finita omnibus.
> Quae generi humano angorem nequiquam adferunt:
> Reddenda terrae est terra, tum vita omnibus
> Metenda ut fruges. sic iubet Necessitas.

If the wise man feels pain, it is unclear to me why this should not be an eupatheia. Seneca maintains that there are certain goods which are in materia infelici expressa (SVFIII.115), and the pain of the wise man ought certainly to be among these.

The conclusion remains firm, therefore, that no logical inference is possible to the goodness or evil of any of the emotions from their possession of value or disvalue. There remains the third class of indifferents, which is even more interesting for this thesis.

C

The third group consists of what is absolutely indifferent, or indifferent even to value. For this reason, they arouse neither our appetition nor our disinclination. One example of this state (though one we need not dwell upon) is the following: whether the hairs on the head are odd or even in number (cf.SVFIII.118). This is a situation which is absolutely indifferent.

Fortunately, there are other surviving examples and at least one of them deserves special mention, since it is an example of an absolutely indifferent motion. There are two sources here, both of which express the idea in almost identical terms. It was obviously a favorite example of the Stoics.

Diogenes Laertius explains it in the following terms:

> stretching out or contracting the finger. (SVFIII.119)

Stobaeus reads:

> stretching out the finger this way or that. (SVFIII.118)

These motions are indifferent to value, and what is true of them would also be true of pleasure if, as Sextus maintains (SVFIII.153), it is an indifferent not to be preferred. But yet Diogenes Laertius, as we saw, says that pleasure is to be preferred. There seems no ready solution to this contradiction, outside of the recognition that the Stoics may have differed on this point. But what are the real implications of this disagreement?

If the argument of this chapter is correct, it follows that the presence or absence of value in the emotions does not affect their status as good or evil activities of the soul. This point would certainly not be granted by all commentators. Thus Haynes (op.cit.p.413) says:

> While Zeno and Cleanthes agree in placing pleasure

> within the class of the adiaphoron in respect of good and evil, Cleanthes apparently goes further in denying that pleasure has any value whatsoever. However, if the Stoics classify all pleasures as absolutely indifferent, a distinction between good and bad pleasures will be untenable... Certain kinds of pleasure, then, are to be avoided and it is a mistake to treat all pleasure as absolutely indifferent.

I believe, rather, that the indifferent status assigned to pleasure and to the other emotions has nothing to do with their goodness and evil. This follows from the logical independence of the two levels, and Haynes would seem to be wrong in maintaining that their moral status depends upon any facts about their indifferent status. To prove this point, we need only observe what happens to absolutely indifferent motions on the second level-of-discourse, and then apply the conclusions reached from the study of the three kinds of indifferents to the problem of pleasure.

Here Plutarch again provides the much needed evidence in another of his many attempts to prove a Stoic contradiction. Stobaeus (SVFIII.118) told only half the story above: stretching out the finger is an absolutely indifferent motion, but the results of what can happen to such a motion on the second level-of-discourse are explained by Plutarch in the following way (SVFIII.627):

> If one wise man anywhere will stretch forth his finger wisely, all of the wise men in the world are benefited.

This statement is presented as a direct quotation from Chrysippus, and seems sufficient in itself to confirm the

thesis that even absolute indifference furnishes no clue to, nor has any part in determining, goodness or evil. It is a vicious activity when the fool stretches forth his finger, while the wise man's activity is good.

The logical gap between the two levels, for which the last chapter laid the groundwork and which this chapter has confirmed in the case of value, is important in the matter about the conflicting evidence regarding the value of pleasure. Questions about the value of emotions must not be confused with those about their moral status. As it is, there seems no ready solution to the problem of the value of pleasure, but the implications are not what Haynes supposed.[4]

Mention of some further implications of the level-of-discourse distinction will serve to introduce the second major section of this chapter.

Stuart Hampshire[5] makes several points about language and its relationship to reality which help to clarify the Stoic theory of indifferents. He argues that any application of language to reality involves the differentiation of particular "so and so's" and that there is no independently identifiable ground in reality that provides a basis for the distinctions which we make in speech. Rather, the necessity of speech requires our agreeing to share certain fixed viewpoints. But Hampshire argues that we should not think of the elements

about which we speak as already marked out for us independently of the established methods of identifying certain kinds of things. For in different systems of thought and speech reality will be divided along different lines.

It seems evident that the Stoics were aware of these points about the application of thought to reality and were primarily interested in speaking about the world from two different levels and dividing it in two different ways. Thinking along the same lines, Hampshire makes the following observation (p.14):

> We may explain why one type of discourse involves discriminating elements in reality on a particular principle that would be out of place in another type of discourse serving a largely different need... The notion of different types of discourse is always recognized and used even outside philosophy.

Even more important for the Stoic level-of-discourse theory is a point which will receive fuller attention in the second section of this chapter (p.19):

> But when we consider that every identification of something as a so-and-so allows also that the same thing should also be classified as a thing of some other kind, it becomes evident that 'the same thing' can always be counted as two or more different things, if we once suppose ourselves to be counting just things, rather than things of a particular kind. Reality cannot be divided into so many- even infinitely many- different things in such a way that, in counting the things that there are, I have some means of not counting 'the same thing' twice.

This last point seems to repeat what the Stoics believed about those things which count as indifferents under one description, and as goods and evils under another. Hampshire's point is well made, and the belief was obviously

shared by the Stoics that on any multiple level-of-discourse model it is possible to count 'the same thing' more than once, "if we once suppose ourselves to be counting just things rather than things of a particular kind". This repeats emphatically what the last two chapters have argued in some detail: that the Stoic level-of-discourse model does not count entities on one level to their exclusion on the other.

An important step in Stoic criticism was taken by Rist, who correctly saw that the difference between the kathekon on the one hand and virtuous and vicious action on the other was not one of material entity. Rist, however, failed to see the general assumptions about indifference and morality that prove his own theory, and consequently produced a very confusing picture of the theory of emotions, leading to attempts to place good pleasures among the indifferents. Likewise a mistake seems to have been made by Sextus, who argued that the same thing (tauton) cannot fit into more than one of the three categories of good-bad-indifferent.

The Stoics seem to have recognized that objects and motions in the world are not given to us in divisions in such a way that they fall naturally into only one of the three classes. Rather, we grasp reality in one way and assign to it qualities such as value on the first level-of-discourse, while other principles apply on the second level.

II

The last chapter proposed one possible explanation for the confusion which developed in the minds of later commentators about the Stoic theory of indifferents. Perhaps *if* the Stoics had argued for the *kinesis*-*energeia* distinction in as confusing a way as did Aristotle, misunderstanding would have resulted. Thus Hamlyn remarks on Aristotle (*op.cit.*p.62)

> One of the troubles about the distinction as Aristotle made it is that it sounds as if it is a material distinction, one between different kinds of entity... But where activity is exhibited, it is not necessarily inappropriate to talk of movements, but it will be so to do so in the same context, in the same universe of discourse. To represent the distinction as one between two kinds of entity is misleading, for sometimes the distinction might better be put as one between terms belonging to different modes of talk.

This section will attempt not only to establish the Aristotelian context of the Stoic discourse theory but also to demonstrate that the Stoics presented it in a manner that made it a natural subject of confusion. It is one thing simply to reject the criticisms of Plutarch and Alexander of Aphrodisias but another to explain how their confusions developed.

If this level-of-discourse theory really is Stoic, then we would expect to find some fragments which identify it more explicitly. Since this is a thesis about human emotions, any discussions of the *kinesis*-*energeia* distinction are especially welcome. In the remainder of

this chapter, I will argue that the Stoics adopted the same interpretation of the kinesis-energeia distinction that Hamlyn was later to formulate. Whether they were correct or not in their understanding of Aristotle is a question which I hope to avoid, since I am concerned with the Stoics as philosophers and not as historians of philosophy.

Two fragments of Stoic thought preserved by Themistius (SVFII.497 and 498) furnish three important insights: 1) they preserve the Aristotelian context of the Stoic discourse theory; 2) they shed light on the theory itself; and 3) they provide one possible explanation for the confusion in the tradition. It would be best to present the two fragments and then take up each of these three points in order. While it is unfortunate that we have to rely so much upon two fragments, their importance is immense.

SVFII.497:

> Plotinus and the Stoics in addition, shifting to the principles of Aristotle, say that motions (kineseis) are common to both doing and suffering (tou poiein kai tou paschein).

SVFII.498:

> And motion, Iamblicus says, the Stoics do not understand very well. They say that the incomplete (ateles) is spoken of in the case of motion not because it is not activity (energeia)- for they say

> that it surely is activity -but because it has a next step and a next step, not so that it eventually becomes activity (for it already is activity),but so that it may accomplish something else which is after it. These things the Stoic say.

First of all, the Aristotelian context of the theory is clearly presented in 497 and assumed in 498, the report of Iamblichus' judgment that the Stoics misunderstood Aristotle's theory of motion. De anima 431a6 records the view that:

> Motion is activity of the incomplete (ateles). Activity simpliciter is different, activity of the complete.

As far as Iamblicus was concerned, the Stoics misunderstood this. But what is the meaning of the Aristotelian thesis?

J.L. Ackrill[6] systematically attacks the interpretations which have been offered in order, he says, "to stimulate, not to close, discussion of the problem". Thus what Aristotle meant is still questioned today, but this is not an issue here. All that needs to be demonstrated is that the Stoics and Hamlyn agree on a common interpretation. Whether they are correct or not is an interesting question for the general history of philosophy.[7]

Secondly, the fragments deserve some explication. Both the Stoics and Hamlyn believe that the incomplete

(ateles) is spoken of in the case of motion because motion is not intelligible in itself. Thus Hamlyn argues (p. 60):

> No movement is in itself and by itself intelligible. It is always possible to ask why it was made... To say that a movement is incomplete is to say that it is done for the sake of something outside itself. Its final cause is not in itself.

The Stoics expressed this same idea by arguing that motions have distinguishable steps which accomplish something after themselves.

A second common point of interpretation has to do with what motions and activities have in common rather than with what distinguishes them. According to Hamlyn (p.62):

> In any context, then, in which it is possible to describe a person's behavior, it seems possible also to describe the movements exhibited by him. Such descriptions do not serve the same purpose, and do not belong to the same level of generality.

The Stoics seem to have believed (and to have assumed Aristotle's agreement) that descriptions of motions and those of activities are not descriptions of different entities. For motion is activity but, in the terminology of this thesis, a component of the first level-of-discourse. Thus 'the same thing' can be counted as two or more different things depending upon the level from which one is speaking.

This last point aids in understanding the criticisms of doxographers such as Plutarch and Alexander of Aphrodisias about Stoic theories of the emotions. Thus Alex-

ander argues (SVFIII.434):

> Pleasure (hedone), joy (chara), gladness (euphrosune), and delight (terpsis) are the same thing (tauton) in substance and meaning. Prodicus attempted to apply a different meaning to each of these names as did the Stoics, calling joy a rational elation (eparsin), pleasure an irrational elation...

Alexander is correctly interpreting half of the picture. As motions of soul, pleasure, joy, gladness, and delight are indeed the same thing. It is only as activities that they differ, with pleasure irrational activity, joy a rational activity, and gladness and delight species of the generic eupatheia joy (cf. SVFIII.432).

The admission that motion is activity must have puzzled the doxographers. How, then, could the Stoics argue that motions of soul differ from activities? And since hedone and chara are both motions of the same sort, the Stoics, they thought, must be making distinctions which have no basis in reality.

How such confusions might arise becomes intelligible once one is aware of the level-of-discourse theory.

1. Thus Chrysippus argues in the De fato(43) that the volubilitas of the cylinder is the principal cause of its motion. Ryle would argue, on the other hand, that volubilitas is an explanatory notion and not a cause at all. Cf. Campbell, K., Body and Mind (New York 1970)p.66:
   "A mental condition, as a disposition to a pattern of behavior, can of course by a cause of events, even mental events,in other people. What is out of the question is that mental events, processes, or conditions should play a role in producing the behavior which is a manifestation of that mental event, process, or condition."
   This view denies that what the Stoics called the principal causes are causes at all. It allows causal status only to what they called auxiliary causes.

2. "Poverty', for example, cannot be referred to as an object or motion.

3. Cicero's argument that any pain is inconsistent with the proper functioning of the soul may have some merit and may have been the view of some Stoics. I will attempt to prove that it was not the view of Chrysippus or any Stoic who believed in the level-of-discourse distinction as it is presented in this thesis. Some commentators have needlessly confused the issue. Thus Rist argues (op.cit.p.49):
   "But while it makes sense to oppose a rational buoyancy of the soul to an irrational, it is understandable that the Stoics could not treat a 'rational contraction'of the soul as a eupatheia. It would have been unnecessarily paradoxical, not to say foolish,of the Stoics to argue that any pain is per se even a preferred state."
   That the moral status of such states has nothing to do with their status as preferred or rejected states is the argument of this chapter.

4. One final observation about value is in order here, though it raises questions which I am unable to answer with my incomplete understanding of the Stoic theory of non-moral value. I have maintained that the value of indifferents in no way implies goodness or evil. The trouble is that Stobaeus makes the inexplicable statement (SVFIII.128):
   "None of the goods is to be preferred on account of the fact that the goods have the greatest value (axian)."
   This statement implies a gradation of value from that of the goods to that of the indifferents. I agree with Long ("Carneades and the Stoic telos",p.66)

that:

"The kind of *axia* which 'indifferent' things possess differs fundamentally from the *axia* possessed by 'good' things".

5. Hampshire, S., *Thought and Action* (New York 1959).

6. Ackrill, J.L., "Aristotle's Distinction between Energeia and Kinesis", *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Bambrough, R. (London 1967) p.121ff.

7. Recognition of the debate between the neo-Platonists and the Stoics on this point seems not to have made its way into the modern literature on the *kinesis-energeia* question.

CHAPTER 5

EMOTIONS AND CAUSES

This final chapter investigates the possibility of a causal role for impulse and emotion in human action. Up to this point, I have been concerned with the pathe and eupatheiai as motions and activities and with their relationship to the hexeis and diatheseis which cause them. But there is at least one other piece to the puzzle which must be set in place. Do the pathe and eupatheiai serve as causes of other sorts of behavior? What I mean by this can again be illustrated using the example of Plato and Isocrates.

Suppose that Plato becomes angry at Isocrates' entrance into the Academy. This is the only case which we have considered thus far, and the accounts in chapters 1 through 4 are sufficient to explain the psychological operations at work. Plato's irascibility is the principal cause of the emotion anger, and Isocrates is the external, auxiliary cause. But now suppose that, in anger, Plato crosses the Academy grounds and assaults the unfortunate rhetorician. Then, while the anger is one form of behavior (kinesis on the first level-of-discourse and energeia on the second), there seems to be another form of behavior to be explained: the walking which terminates in the assault. The question now to be answered is: what is the relationship between an emotion such as anger and an activity such as walking? Or in more general terms, do the emotions of the wise man and fool serve as causes of other sorts of behavior which we normally think of as

their manifestations in action[1]?

First of all, there has been occasion to notice that emotions are often found in lists of activities along with others such as walking, talking, asking, answering etc. Notice, for example, a typical list of actions found in Stobaeus (SVFIII.501):

> Of acts, they (the Stoics) say that some are right actions, others wrong actions, and others neither. These are examples of right actions: being wise (to phronein)[2], being moderate, acting justly, feeling joy (chairein)... walking wisely (phronimōs peripatein), all things whichever are done in accordance with right reason. Examples of wrong actions are: doing wrong, feeling pain, feeling fear (to lupeisthai kai to phobeisthai), stealing, and in general whichever things are done contrary to right reason.

This list provides a starting point for consideration of any causal role for impulse. For if feeling pain, feeling joy, acting justly, and stealing are all activities, the conclusion would be, if once we assume emotions cause actions, that some energeiai cause other energeiai.

That emotions cause actions commends itself as a thesis because of its simple common sense nature. In both English and Greek, it makes good sense to say that we do things because of our emotions, or that Plato's anger caused him to cross the Academy grounds and assault Isocrates. So clear does this notion seem that some commentators have assumed without argument that the pathe and the eupatheiai serve as causes. Thus Long explains[3]:

> The governing principle is the seat of consciousness and to it belong all the functions which we associate with the brain. One of these functions

> is what the Stoics called 'impulse','a movement of soul towards or away from something'... Impulse is a movement which the soul may initiate on receipt of some impression (phantasia). Together, impression and impulse provide a causal explanation of goal-directed animal movements.

All of the factors involved in my introductory example are given place and explanation in Long's model. Thus Plato's governing principle can be qualified as intemperate and considered the principal cause of the pathos 'anger'. The auxiliary cause, of course, is Isocrates, and the walk across the Academy (the 'goal-directed animal movement') is caused by the anger. Such a summary would also seem to cover the causal theory assigned to the Stoics by Sandbach[4]:

> In the first place, a passion is 'an excessive impulse (or drive)'and the exact nature of what was meant by the word horme (impulse of drive) is not easy to grasp. In children and animals it must be seen simply as a desire to do something, which will unless hindered be followed by movements in the psyche that will effect bodily action. In an adult, however, it is associated with an act of assent and a judgment.

On this view, the fool's pathe and a wise man's eupatheiai involve assents, judgments, and, for example, desires to do things which, unless hindered, will be followed by the doing of those things. Thus anger (the desire to strike out at someone) causes the striking out. Sandbach's view would seem to be indistinguishable from Long's. Both assume that the emotions are effects of dispositions and causes of further actions called 'goal-directed animal movements', or'bodily actions'.

If this view is correct, then the basic psychology of human actions in the Stoics has some similarity to that of the Epicureans. Thus,Lucretius discusses the interaction between body and soul and clearly thinks of psychic thought and emotion as the cause of bodily action with soul atoms giving thrust to the body and propelling the limbs in various directions,while acting as a cause. One example out of many may be cited (III.161ff.):

> Haec eadem ratio naturam animi atque animai
> corpoream docet esse. ubi enim propellere membra,
> corripere ex somno corpus mutareque vultum
> atque hominem totum regere ac versare videtur,
> quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus
> nec tactum porro sine corpore, nonne fatendumst
> corporea natura animum constare animamque?

Obviously, we are to understand the thrust and touch of soul atoms as the cause of bodily movements.

The initial plausibility of a causal account of impulse seems strengthened by such fragments as SVFIII.169:

> They (the Stoics) say that what moves impulse is nothing but the impulsive presentation (phantasian) of what is obviously fitting, and they say that impulse is motion of soul towards something... Someone would rightly define rational impulse saying that it is motion of soul towards something of those things involved in doing (en tōi prattein).

If Sandbach and Long are correct, the motion of soul which constitutes the impulse or emotion is a private, psychic experience to which the patient obviously has some sort of privileged access. We would then be compelled to understand this private experience as the cause of observable behavior or 'goal-directed animal movement'. Thus, attributing anger to someone would in-

volve inferring from effect to cause (from bodily movement to pathos or eupatheia).

The basic problem with this simple and straightforward theory about impulse is that it seems to introduce a new type of cause for which there seems to be no evidence in the fragments. Chapter 1 argued that there are two types of causes, principal causes and auxiliary causes, and that principal causes are dispositions. This means that both hexeis and diatheseis can serve as principal causes. Thus Plato's irascibility is the cause of his anger, just as the disposition volubilitas is the cause of the motion of a cylinder. But how can Plato's anger be a principal cause, since it is not a disposition? Given their theory of causes, the Stoics would clearly be contradicting themselves if they held that some energeiai cause other energeiai.

This chapter will not attempt a complete explanation of all of the difficulties involved in the relationship between emotion and action, but will suggest an answer somewhat like that used to explain the kinesis-energeia distinction in chapters 3 and 4, where it was argued that the two terms were not used to designate different entities but were different ways of describing the same entities. The final conclusion of this chapter will be that emotions do not cause actions at all. Rather, emotions include what Long called 'goal-directed animal movements' as parts of themselves and not as their effects.

Applying this conclusion to the list of activities cited in Stobaeus, we find that an emotion such as chara does not cause an activity such as phronime peripatesis, but that the latter, when it occurs, is a part of the former. This solution is the only one I know which preserves the coherence of the Stoic theory of causation. The evidence which supports this view is meagre, but it does exist.

The chapter falls into two parts. The first is destructive in intent, demonstrating that the Stoics did not introduce the concept of pathos in order to provide a causal account of other sorts of behavior[5]. Margaret Reesor's interpretation of the Stoic theory of causation will be examined and found to be inconsistent not only with other evidence that has survived but also with some which she herself uses[6]. Though I might seem to be excessively critical of Reesor, her explanation of how the emotions might have been meant to serve as causes is the most detailed and systematic known to me,and is the obvious theoretical basis for the views of Long and Sandbach. It deserves full treatment also because it illustrates mistakes that are made when the very basic pathos-hexis distinction is ignored.

The second section briefly studies what I call the 'ingredients' of an emotion, among which are those actions which others have supposed the emotions to cause.

I

Reesor, like Long, begins with two types of causes. About the first, the auxiliary (or as Reesor calls them 'initiating')causes, there is little to dispute. It is the second which I believe she has misrepresented, but this problem will be taken up after other preliminary remarks.

The auxiliary cause of our actions are the external objects which we perceive or, perhaps, our perceptions and conceptions of those objects[7]. Reesor expresses this point in the following way (p.288):

> If a man should push a round body, the push would be the initiating cause, but the roundness of the object would be the principal cause of its movement. Similarly, a visual object would be the initiating cause of sight, but the assent (adsensio= sugkatathesis) would be the principal cause, and would be free to accept or reject the object... A visual object or representation would also be an initiating cause.

About principal causes, the argument is not quite so simple, but Reesor's first step is clear enough and uncontroversial. She recognizes that these causes are qualities and gives the Stoic view about quality in the following terms (p.286):

> Each quality can be described as a substratum "in a certain disposition", or as a substratum with a qualification. For example, the soul is"pneuma in a certain disposition" (pneuma pōs echon, 2.806), and virtue is "reason in a certain disposition" (hegemonikon pōs echon, Sext.Emp.Eth.2.23).

This is the same as the account of quality given in chapter 1, where qualities were defined as dispositions and

distinguished from the events and processes for which they serve as causes. And these events and processes, which are the effects of the dispositions, include the impulses, pathe, and eupatheiai. That Reesor at least at one point recognizes that qualities are dispositional in the above sense is clear from the following (p.287):

> The qualities were powers capable of producing an effect, or responsible for a predicate... Practical wisdom, soul, and moderation, as we have seen, were qualities.

This much is plain, then: qualities are dispositions, capable of producing their effects in conjunction with auxiliary causes. Moreover, most of the examples which Reesor gives of qualities as dispositions are consistent with this identification. For example, she speaks of moderation (a moral diathesis), breakability (p.289), and roundness as qualities capable of producing effects. Unfortunately, other examples seem inconsistent with her own analysis. Two of these are found in a footnote on p.286, which takes its evidence from Iamblicus:

> In 2.826 assent (sugkatathesis) and impulse (horme) are said to be qualities of the intelligence.[8]

On this basis, Reesor assigns the same causal role to impulse that she does to dispositions such as moderation and breakability. (Presumably, she means that both anger and irascibility, events and dispositions, can serve as principal causes.) This causal role assigned to assent and impulse follows from statements such as the following (p.289):

> "This gem is broken" and "Cypselus will not reign at Corinth" were possible events. The predicates "is broken" and "will not reign" follow from the principal causes "breakable" and "assent" (sug-katathesis), since "breakable" is the cause of "is broken" and "assent" is the cause of "will not reign". Because the events may never be realized, no initiating causes are involved.

This use of assent and impulse as principal causes has implications for Stoic psychology which must not be ignored. Since the pathe and eupatheiai are impulses, one implication, if Reesor is correct, is that the emotions can be principal causes; yet this seems impossible for reasons now to be explained in more detail.

I would like to proceed by first noting the very close relationship which the Stoics saw holding between physics and psychology[9]. So fond were they of using examples from physics to illustrate problems in ethics and the philosophy of mind that the difference between the two types of causes in relation to the mind was often spelled out through analogies with inanimate physical bodies. Two examples ought to be sufficient to illustrate the difficulty of using impulses and emotions as principal causes.

The first, taken from Cicero's De fato and referred to a number of times already, is also mentioned by Reesor. In it, Chrysippus uses the volubilitas of the cylinder as the cause of its motion when struck by the lash. But notice again that the volubilitas is a quality of the cylinder and a disposition. Secondly, the resulting move-

ment is the effect of the conjunction of the two types of causes. Nowhere in the analogy is it said that the motion could serve as the principal cause of another event.

The second example is taken from SVFII.979 where the causal explanation of the downward motion of a stone is given. First, a push or other force is responsible for its being released from a height, and the heaviness is then the principal cause of the motion. Again the effect to be explained is a movement which results from the interaction of external causes with a disposition, or quality, of the object.

The analogy between physics and psychology is a very close one. For as the first four chapters have demonstrated, human actions are the effects of external causes in conjunction with dispositions (both hexeis and diatheseis) of the human soul. The pathe and eupatheiai are activities and occurrences in the human soul and not its dispositions; therefore, they cannot serve as the principal causes of any further actions, motions, or states of affairs. Nor can any impulse fill this role.

Principal causes, then, are hexeis and diatheseis only, and never motions or other such occurrences. The volubilitas of the cylinder, the heaviness of the stone, and the character traits of the human soul provide causal explanations for actions. In keeping with this, chapter

I argued that Aristotle and the Stoics would have refused to admit that objects are qualified by their affections (pathe). The relevance of this point to the subject under discussion now ought to be clear. Reesor was correct in her analysis in so far as she argued that principal causes are qualities but failed in attempting to include impulse and pathos in the category of quality.

In fact, Reesor has only one solid piece of evidence identifying impulses as qualities, and this deserves some attention. It is the remark of Iamblichus on page 130 that assent and impulse are qualities of the intelligence.

Now if it is true that each impulse is a quality, there can be no possible objection to their serving as principal causes. But in order to accept my view which excludes the individual impulses from the category of quality I do not have to argue that Iamblicus is simply incorrect in this instance. All I need do is to place the fragment in the proper philosophical context.

Suppose, rather, we take the fragment as the simple assertion that the potentiality for or the disposition to impulse is a quality of the intelligence. This gives sense to Iamblichus' assertion on page 130 that allows it to be consistent with the Stoic theory of causation, and with the role of the disposition as principal cause. That this is the proper interpretation of the fragment is, I believe, clear from two other important pieces of information. The first is SVFIII.169, where Stobaeus main-

tains that the Stoics called the hormetike hexis (that from which our impulses arise) 'impulse' (horme). This might seem a puzzling assertion, since it seems to involve a needless confusion of the pathos-hexis, occurrence-disposition,distinction. But obviously the context in which the meaning is to be understood is one where the Stoics are cited refering to impulse as a quality of the intelligence, such as in Iamblichus. It seems to follow, then, that when Iamblichus calls horme a quality of the intelligence he is referring to the hormetike hexis, to a disposition,and not to the individual impulse.

The second fragment is SVFIII.103, where the claim is made that 'wise impulse' (phronimen hormen) is a good which belongs always to the wise man, while chara is a good of temporary duration which does not always belong to him. Unless the Stoics are here caught in a flat contradiction in the space of several words (since chara is itself an example of a wise impulse), the meaning must be that while the hormetike hexis, the disposition, is always with him, the individual impulses and instances of chara come and go (cf. page 29, note 6)[10] Thus the only solid piece of evidence which Reesor has to support the notion that individual impulses are qualities of the intelligence vanishes.

If then the emotions were not introduced in order to provide a causal account of human action or some class of human actions, it is incumbent upon me to provide an

alternative explanation of how an emotion such as chara is in fact related to an activity such as walking. If the two do not stand in the relation of cause to effect, what sort of relationship do they have?

II

The Stoics taught that a pathos is a judgment (SVF III.393 and 456) and also that it is an excessive impulse or irrational motion of soul. On Sandbach's interpretation cited in the beginning of this chapter, this irrational motion takes the from of a 'desire to do' something which is causally productive of the doing of that thing. Hence Plato's anger is the desire to strike out at Isocrates, which then causes the striking out, a second motion. It has been demonstrated sufficiently, I hope, that this model makes nonsense of the Stoic theory of causation. In fact, Sandbach, Reesor, and Long seem to be multiplying entities unnecessarily. I propose, rather, that Plato's striking out is a part of his anger and the irrational motion of soul mentioned in the definitions of the pathe, and not the effect of that anger at all. This becomes clear through study of the components or ingredients[11] which the Stoics recognized in the emotion: 1) a judgmental component and 2) a behavioral component.

A pathos is a judgment which is mistaken. For example, fear is an irrational opinion regarding the expected presence of a supposed evil (SVFIII.391), just as

the desire for money involves the mistaken judgment that it is a good (SVFIII.391). In addition to this judgmental element, the impulse, or behavioral component, can take the form of various sorts of activities which are, therefore, parts of the pathe. Herein lies the key to the problem posed at the outset of this chapter. Returning to the list of activities found in Stobaeus on page 124, I wish to maintain that chara is not causally related to an activity such as phronime peripatesis; that is impossible. Rather, walking is one possible component of a pathos or of an eupatheia. This conclusion gains support, first of all, from the fact that the Stoics defined walking as an activity of the soul (SVFII.836,1.42). On Sandbach's view, it ought to be a bodily activity, but there is no evidence that the Stoics recognized a class of bodily activities; therefore, there is nothing of which the emotions and impulses can be causally productive. Likewise, the cylinder that is set in motion by its volubilitas could not, in the process of moving, be the principal cause of another event or process.

Chrysippus argued that the emotions are perceptible (SVFIII.85, aistheta). This was obviously meant to be taken quite literally. The knowledge that someone is experiencing an emotion does not involve inference from effect to cause (from observable behavior to an emotion which serves as the cause of the behavior).

The Stoics would seem to fall under Wilson's (op.cit.

p.8) description of philosophers who advance anti-causal theories of the emotions:

> As I said in Chapter 1, many recent writers in the philosophy of mind have advanced anti-causal theses, particularly with regard to the relation between mind and behavior. For example, they have tried to show that explanation of behavior in terms of desires, emotions, motives, etc. is not a form of causal explanation. Defects in this discussion can often be traced to an unduly restricted idea of what counts as a causal explanation.

While it would obviously make sense to say that X jumped because of his joy or that Plato assaulted Isocrates because he was angry, the Stoics seem to have taken these forms of behavior as ingredients in the emotions named, and not as their effects. Their restricted and technical use of the word 'cause' precluded their thinking of any emotion as a cause.

There is no contradiction in the fact that the Stoics sometimes referred to emotions as judgments and at other times as irrational motions of soul, for these are the two ingredients. On my interpretation, Andronicus is speaking quite literally when he calls fear 'flight from an expected evil' and desire 'pursuit of an expected good' (SVFIII.391).

Plato's anger, then, involves both the judgment 'this is a bad rhetorician' and a movement of soul which can take the form of an activity such as walking.

The Stoics were famous in antiquity for the doctrine that the pathe are to be extirpated entirely. This

chapter has, I hope, given a novel slant to the meaning of this doctrine. They condemned the pathe not for what the pathe cause because they cause nothing, but for what they are.

1. Actions such as walking are certainly cited as manifestations of the emotions, but are they the effects of the emotions? This is the question to be answered in this chapter.

2. There is an ambiguity which must be explained here. Phronesis is a disposition of soul (in this case a diathesis), while the act of being wise seems to have been called phronimeusis (cf. SVFIII.104 and LSJ s.v. aphroneusis). The infinitive phronein can indicate the dispositional or the occurrent sense of 'wisdom'. It is clearly the latter which is meant here, since activity is under discussion.

3. Hellenistic Philosophy, p.172.

4. Sandbach, F.H. (op.cit.p.64).

5. A qualification mentioned before can bear repeating again. While the pathos cannot function as a principal cause, it is open for it to serve as auxiliary cause in at least two different ways. First of all, it is possible that my anger be the auxiliary cause of another's reactions to my anger. Secondly, my perception of my own anger may be the auxiliary cause of another action of mine, such as the attempt to conceal the anger. But I can find no surviving evidence in the fragments of any extended treatment of the pathe as auxiliary causes.

6. Reesor, M., "Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy", Phoenix 19(1965)p.285ff.

7. It is not clear to me whether it is the object which is the auxiliary cause in the case of human behavior or the perception of the object. If the Stoics had a preference for one of the two, it has not come through in the surviving fragments. In this regard, compare SVFIII.169 with II.974, p.283 line 18.

8. Stobaeus (SVFIII.171) explains the difference between assent and impulse by saying that assent is to a proposition, while impulse is to the predicates contained in the proposition. Assent to a proposition seems to be the first element in an emotion, followed by a movement of soul which is the second element. Notice that Stobaeus does not claim that assent causes impulse.

9. Sambursky (op.cit.p.115) discusses the fact that Stoic ethics is founded upon Stoic physics.

10. Long ("Aristotle's Legacy to Stoic Ethics",p.81) likewise fails to see that the same term can have both a dispositional and an occurrent sense:
> "Seneca asserts that the good man always feels gaudium (Ep.mor.LIX), but Diogenes Laertius denies the permanence of chara. One may be wrong or the Stoics may have differed on the point."

Long does not see the third alternative: that the joyful disposition belongs always to the wise man, while the individual impulse comes and goes. The wise man does not feel joy during every moment of his existence. (He would soon grow tired of it.) The wise man feels joy when the appropriate auxiliary causes are present.

11. Talk of ingredients is perhaps vague, but I do not know how to improve upon it. Bertrand Russell (The Analysis of Mind (London 1921)p.284) uses the expression in asserting that:
> "... The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other according to a certain pattern".

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