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STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN ORGANIZATIONAL CAREERS: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF PROMOTION IN THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE

by
Theodore Libby Reed

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Sociology)
in The University of Michigan
1972

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PREFACE

The acquisition of knowledge is at its best a social process. While learning about the ins and outs of the Foreign Service I have enjoyed the advice, assistance, and support of many.

Many individuals connected with the Department of State aided the inquiry. Some provided critical comment on my ideas. Others provided access to the needed information. Nell Riemer, Ernie Ruehle, Jack Harr and Charles Bray were among the key links with the Department and the Foreign Service.

My first inquiries into the Department were conducted under the guidance of Don Warwick who has remained a perceptive colleague, critic, and friend. The members of the dissertation committee have provided helpful suggestions and evaluations during the research process. Pat Crecine has been much more than a Chairman. He has provided abundant financial and intellectual support. More important his continued interest in the project via telephone and letter during the past two years has been critical in pushing it to completion.

Substantial research and programming assistance has been expended by many. Among those who have contributed much to the work have been Dan Ayres, Jeff Berger, and more recently Don Manson and Nancy Suci. The typists who have struggled through several drafts of my ideas deserve much commendation. They include Debby Sellers, Katherine Anderson, and Shirley Zimmerman.

Financial support has been provided by the National Institute of Health, The Institute for Public Policy Studies, The New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, and the Cornell University

Office of Sponsored Research.

Kay, Shipherd and Kelly have waited longer and been more patient during this endeavor than I deserve...

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of promotion in the Foreign Service of the United States. Computer simulation techniques are used to describe promotion decisions and to identify the variables which influence these decisions. The analysis documents how the Foreign Service bureaucracy determines who gets promoted and when. Those officers who succeed realize their ambitions and rise to the top of the Foreign Service career ladder. They join that group of higher Civil Service who provide expertise for the execution of important foreign policy decisions within the general limits established by the American political and economic structure. Those who are promoted less rapidly may enjoy the comforts of expatriate existence, an honorable profession, and the duties and responsibilities of a middle level manager.

Substantive foreign policy decisions are not considered in the discussion which follows, but the operation of the Foreign Service is an important element in those decisions. Like other organizations the Department of State is extremely hesitant to provide outsiders with information about its processes about policy determination. Like others involved in the day-to-day exercise of power, they clearly recognize the existence of conflicting interests and goals and the important protection provided by privacy. The same procedures which deny outsiders access to information about substantive foreign policy decisions also operate to influence the inputs to those decisions within the organization itself. Because one of the major inputs comes from the perspective and knowledge of Foreign Service Officers there are, nevertheless, substantive implications in the study of Foreign

Service careers.

Although the precise relationships between general policy and day-to-day decisions are unclear, we do know that the underlying assumptions and consensus about policy in the Department of State are to a large extent uncodified. Where general goals have been stated, they cannot be easily operationalized. In such a setting, the personnel involved in decision making and the orientations which these personnel bring to the decision making become particularly important bases for continuity. Among those who are bearers of this historical tradition members of the Foreign Service Officers Corps are among the most important. Although it is difficult to say they are responsible for the development of the institution, they remain its primary defenders. Their knowledge and interpretations of international events are critical information inputs. Their support, either outspoken or tacit, is essential for successful pursuit of any particular policy objective. Their orientation is critical to the resolution of any substantive policy decision.

Those who participate in the critical day-to-day decisions of the department are not selected at random. These people may be considered the output of the Foreign Service, a bureaucratic organization designed to manage the careers of Foreign Service Officers. Because the Foreign Service is constrained to use universalistic criteria in its promotions, the organizational decisions which place some people rather than others in critical decision making positions must be built into the very structure and procedures of the Foreign Service. In the absence of overt and major policy differences among members of the Department on most issues, it is difficult to talk about significant differences in political orientation. At the same time it

is possible to identify those rules and procedures used in the promotion process which militate against the development of wide ranging debate between competing views of foreign policy, buttressed with the necessary organizational power to make the alternatives effective.

The result of long term development within the organization of the Foreign Service has been the creation of a corps of foreign affairs executives who share substantially the same perspective on American foreign relations. The Foreign Service and the Department of State are well equipped to preserve their hegemony. Like many other large scale organizations the certainty with which they pursue their policies is more reflective of their effectiveness in buttressing their central technologies than it is of substantial public or internal organizational agreement over their objectives and procedures. In some quarters this hiatus is considered a crisis of substantial proportions. The central purpose of the discussion which follows is to explain the social dynamics which contribute to this crisis. The focus is on the organization which appears unresponsive to pressures for change from external forces. The discussion of promotion mechanisms is intended to identify the organizational dynamics which contribute to the maintenance of internal consensus and the elimination of internal sources of dissatisfaction and dissent.

Foreign Service was chosen as an object for this study for several reasons. Some preliminary investigation in the Department of State revealed that the Foreign Service has been able to maintain a relatively high degree of internal uniformity. Several technical characteristics made it traditionally appealing for study. First, the Foreign Service as an organization draws upon participants who are only partially socialized. Foreign Service Officers come primarily

from a liberal arts college background and receive their specific training and orientation during a long sequence of assignments and training akin to that found in an apprenticeship model. Second, because of the uniformly high qualifications required for entrance into the Foreign Service it was felt that ability, in a generalized sense, could be excluded as a major explanatory variable. Third, there is very little lateral movement into or out of the Foreign Service. Thus it presents the social researcher with a relatively stable population, a closed system in which the ramifications of policy and policy changes could be traced over a number of years. Finally, the population of the Officer Corps was relatively small, seldom exceeding thirty six hundred individuals at all levels of the Service. This meant that a study of the organization, while logistically challenging, did not present major sampling and data analysis problems. These technical features, combined with the critical role of Foreign Service Officers in the development and execution of substantive foreign policy make them a particularly appealing focus for the study of organizational behavior and organizational careers. The empirical investigation is described in the five chapters which follow.

The second chapter outlines the context for the study. The reader is provided with some important background on the conception and development of the Officer Corps and the Career Service. The complex relationship between the Foreign Service and the Department of State is described in some detail. The chapter also depicts the operation of the Foreign Service as an organization with its unique culture. The impact of the organization and culture on the career system is identified. Finally, I set forth five bodies of theoretical work which have bearing upon the later discussion. Many

of the insights built into the later simulations are drawn from this body of literature.

The third chapter describes the structure and dynamics of promotion within the Foreign Service: the formal procedures used by annual Selection Boards, the outcomes of the Foreign Service promotion process (as the result of a political contest within the Department of State bureaucracy), and the operational definition of merit used by the Foreign Service Selection Boards. In this section are included general discussions about many of the organizational features of the promotion process.

The fourth chapter discusses the elements included in the seniority model. This model, used a basis for comparison with the final Selection Board's model described in Chapter 6, assumes that Foreign Service promotions are based on seniority criteria alone. The results of the simulation and its degree of correspondence with observed promotions are also presented. Chapter 5 develops a similar model, this time using a variety of background characteristics to generate simulated promotion. The discussion describes the model in considerable detail and provides an evaluation of its success in describing Foreign Service promotion. In the last chapter, I outline a model for Selection Board promotion decisions which approximates the complex decision making process as closely as possible. In addition to the general description of the model and its comparison both with previous models and actual promotions, the final chapter includes a brief interpretive discussion and statement about further directions for research.

Chapter II

THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

The Foreign Service (referred to FS for brevity's sake hereafter) of the United States in its present form is the result of a complex historical process. The dynamics include the changing role of the United States in world affairs, shifts in the domestic power relations within a rapidly expanding and industrialized society, and the particular interests and goals of those directly involved in the conduct of foreign affairs. At each point during this development, the composition and structure of our overseas representation has responded, often slowly, to these societal forces. Because the FS is a result not only of contemporary political reality, it is helpful to briefly review those elements in its history which are germain to contemporary events.

BACKGROUND OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

The Origins and Development of the Foreign Service

In the period immediately following national independence, we can recognize some of the first and abiding conceptions of how the nation should handle its foreign affairs. During that time, diplomatic and counselor functions were not incorporated into any formal organizational structure, but were handled primarily by individuals appointed by the Chief Executive and responsible directly to him. As Arthur G. Jones notes in his brief survey of the history of foreign affairs personnel systems, American representatives overseas were not only independent to a large extent from the functioning of the domestic operations in the Department of State, but in addition were not part of a career foreign service such as that which we find today. Not

until 1856 did Congress provide the rudiments of a "rational" structure within the Department of State to supervise and administer the work of representatives abroad.[1] From these modest beginnings, numerous modifications were made in successive years. From these arrangements a series of principles were developed which provide a foundation for the present organization.

The FS of the United States itself is often dated with the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924 which sought to establish "a Foreign Service which will be flexible and democratic; which will attract and retain the best men we have; which will offer reasonable pay, reasonable prospects for promotion, and reasonable provision against want when old age comes to a faithful servant who has served long and ably."[2] The Rogers Act represented the culmination of the efforts by the National Civil Service Reform League whose avowed purpose was to remove governmental service from the arena of political patronage. For the first time in the FS selection and promotion were to be dependent upon merit. Political criterion were to be eliminated. A number of other principles were considered essential for a foreign affairs personnel system at that time. In response to the abuses which arose when American representatives spent long periods of time in a single post, the principle of rotation was established. Individual officers both received broader experience (presumably enabling them to better represent United States interests) and, at the same time, were effectively discouraged from "going native." As a further consequence of this change, the rank-in-person principle was established. Unlike the Civil Service, in which rank was a function of position, it became necessary to establish a different principle within the FS - one in which rank was attached to the

individual rather than the position. This increased the flexibility of the FS administration which could now re-assign personnel to meet the overall staffing needs of the Department and without undue influence on the individual's career.

The results of several other changes introduced in the 1924 Act were less enduring. In an attempt to improve conditions in the Service and to thereby provide attractive career opportunities for capable young men and women, the Rogers Act increased salaries, improved retirement regulations and benefits, and various allowances (representation, travel, educational, etc.) were increased. Prior to this time, the costs of a career in the diplomatic or counselor service often outweighed the remuneration received; the result was to place our overseas representation in the hands of an economic elite with sufficient private means to underwrite these expenses. The image of an elite FS Officer Corps was not changed by these alterations.

Other details of the Rogers Act provided administrative structures and established a career ladder with nine major ranks. The merit principle was applied by the establishment of an examination process for the evaluation of aspiring entrants to the service. Many of these administrative arrangements still operate. The basic principles underlying the formulation of the Rogers Act - merit, rank-in-person, career, professionalism and job rotation -- remain central to the definition of the FS of the U.S. in the 1970's.[3]

From the perspective of those currently in the FS, the Act is seen as equally important, although somewhat different dimensions are considered salient.

> The Rogers Act and the implementing orders were major steps in creating a stable service that offered career opportunities, protection against political meddling, high standards of

> appointment, retention and advancement, relatively attractive financial rewards, and opportunities for appointment to the highest diplomatic post for officers of conspicuous ability. . . . Initial entry was to be confined essentially to young persons appointed at the bottom level and . . . higher vacancies were to be filled by promotion from within on the basis of relative merit and standing in the Service.[4]

The basic principles established in 1924 were updated by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, which still provides the basic statutory foundation governing the operations of the service. The official objectives of that act are stated as follows:

> (1) to enable the Foreign Service effectively to serve abroad the interests of the U.S.; (2) to insure that the officers and employees of the Foreign Service are broadly representative of the American people and are aware and fully informed in respect to current trends in American life; (3) to enable the Foreign Service adequately to fulfill the functions devolving on it by reason of the transferred Department of State of functions heretofore performed by other government agencies; (4) to provide improvements in the recruitment and training of personnel of that Foreign Service; (5) to provide that promotions leading to positions of authority and responsibility shall be on the basis of merit and to insure the selection on an impartial basis of outstanding persons for such positions; (6) to provide for the temporary appointment or assignment to the Foreign Service of representative and outstanding citizens of the U.S. possessing special skills and abilities; (7) to provide salaries, allowances and benefits that will permit the Foreign Service to draw its personnel from all walks of American life and to appoint persons to the highest positions in the service solely on the basis of their demonstrated ability; (8) to provide a flexible and comprehensive framework for the direction of the Foreign Service in accordance with modern practices in public administration; and (9) to codify into one act all provisions of law relating to the administration of the Foreign Service.[5]

As in the case of the Rogers Act, the Foreign Service Act of 1946 was intended to provide a basic core of commissioned Foreign Service Officers selected by entrance examination, and holding their commissions from the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. This group was to furnish the essential core of our nation's representation abroad. It was to be supported by a staff corps at both officer and clerical levels, and both groups were to

be statutorily protected from political patronage and interference.[5]

Given this general conception of the purposes of the FS Officer Corps, we are provided with only the broadest of outlines for how such an organization is to operate within the context of the Department of State and other governmental agencies which maintain regular and continuing operations overseas. To understand its operations, it is clearly necessary to go beyond the legal history. How did the drafters conceptualize the career system? How was it to be administered? Although discussion of the specific details will be reserved for a later time, it should be noted that by the time the 1946 Foreign Service Act was passed, the major outlines for both structure of the FS career and the process of its administration had already been established. The 1946 Act in effect codified existing practice; it did not provide a new direction but only a reasonably flexible framework within which the FS could continue to operate. A second set of questions, however, needs greater consideration at this time; for hidden within the broad language of the 1946 Act were the germs of a two-decade long debate over both the proper functions of the FS and the Department of State itself.

The Foreign Service in Post World War II Foreign Affairs

In the period immediately following the second World War, there was a significant growth in the size of the American foreign affairs community and most of this growth occurred outside the bounds of the American FS and even outside the control of the Department of State. Long debates recorded in various commission reports put forth differing explanations concerning the proper role of the Service.[6] Should it be a small group of highly skilled officers involved in the traditional reporting, representation and intelligence functions

traditionally associated with diplomacy? Or, on the other hand, should the Department develop both in extent and in expertise to provide an administrative and program direction structure for all overseas operations? These questions about the proper role of the FS remain unresolved, in part because they ignored the political realities which operated to define both the size and the function of the Officer Corps. by limiting the options available to the Service.

Trained in and valuing the traditional diplomatic arts, many in the post-World War II FS were hesitant to become involved in the expanding informational, foreign aid, and military program which resulted from American hegemony after that conflict. At the same time, those seeking an expanded international presence went outside the FS and the Department, establishing new agencies more responsive to their particular demands. By the early 1950's the FS was both a numerical and a political minority in the American foreign affairs community. The legacy of these developments is the presence of several autonomous personnel systems for those involved in overseas operations. Most obvious is the ubiquitous presence of the military. Functionaries in foreign economic aid and informational activities remain outside the framework provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Within the Department of State and the general framework of the FS itself, we find additional divisions. The FS Staff and FS Reserve Corps represent a codification of ad hoc arrangements developed prior to the passage of the 1946 Act. As Elden points out in his study of the evolution of personnel systems, although the FS Officer Corps was to be the nucleus of the FS, designed to remain a constant size permitting orderly entry, promotion-up, and separation-out procedures, these two auxiliary corps of clerical and administrative-technical personnel were also needed

to bring continuity and specialized knowledge to the Service. The FS Staff and FS Reserve categories were designed to meet these functions. Staff Officers included primarily clerical and administrative staff but also a few permanent functional specialists. As an outgrowth of the FS Auxiliary Corps which had been established during the war, both the career system and the administration were patterned after the Civil Service system rather than the procedures envisioned for FS Officers. FS Reserve Officers operated under yet another system and generally were viewed in much the same light as temporary attachés needed for the staffing of departmental posts overseas.

The Foreign Service and the Department of State

The Foreign Service Officer Corps supplies only part of the personnel needs of the Department of State and an even smaller proportion of those charged with the conduct of U.S. policy overseas. Within the Department of State itself, several categories of personnel may work interchangeably. Because of their experience overseas, many FS Officers are called upon to fill positions within the Department which require either specialized knowledge of a country and its problems or particular functional skills. Both regional (e.g., Europe, Near East and South Asia) and functional (e.g., Intelligence and Research and Security and Consular Affairs) bureaus within the Department (in Washington) have large proportions of FS Officers in these kinds of assignments. Other positions, primarily those in the administrative and personnel work, are also occupied by members of the FS Officer Corps but for a somewhat different reason. In these cases, service in managerial positions is considered an important part of the training of younger and middle aged officers who will eventually be moving into program direction and executive assignments in overseas posts.

TABLE 1

Distribution of Employees of the United States Government Engaged in activities outside the United States, January 1963*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

Agriculture	1,152
Commerce	743
Defense	110,376
Health, Education & Welfare	586
Interior	1,169
Justice	510
Labor	107
Post Office	1,460
State	
Foreign Service Officer Corps	2.432
Other, including AID & Peace Corps	1,263
Treasury	618
Subtotal	147,416

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

American Battle Monuments Commission	388
Federal Aviation Agency	1,012
Housing and Home Finance Agency	232
Panama Canal Company	14,849
Selective Service System	194
U.S. Information Agency	8,274
Veterans' Administration	1,005
Virgin Islands Corporation	521
Other Agencies	1,329
Subtotal	26,762
Grand Total	174,178
American Citizens	61,523
Nationals of Other Countries	112,655

* Sources: Organization of Federal Executive Departments and Agencies Senate, Committee on Government Operations, 1964 and John E. Harr, The Anatomy of the Foreign Service, 1965

In these functions, members of the FS Officer Corps are very often interchangeable either with civil servants or members of the FS Staff or FS Reserve Officer Corps. One notable exception seems to be the personnel office which is primarily staffed by members of the FS. Personnel work is universally recognized as an important locus of power and a critical function for the Officer Corps as a whole.

The joint staffing of the Department by FS and Civil Service personnel often is the source of organizational conflict. Because the principle of job rotation which operates in the FS is not included in the Civil Service, particular assignments are viewed from quite different perspectives. Furthermore, we often find friction when comparable departmental positions are staffed by Civil Servants who are older than their FS counterparts. These problems are not unique to this organizational setting. In the private sector low-level management positions are often the locus of an overlap between two essentially different career systems. In industry, as well as in the State Department, status and age differences increase the magnitude of potential conflicts.

Overseas, another set of personnel systems operates to produce similar conflicts. In many cases, there is considerable duplication in the functions performed by employees of the Department and other American agencies. The single largest category of overseas personnel is that employed by the military. In addition, a wide variety of governmental agencies from the Department of Commerce to the Department of Treasury and Department of Justice have either Civil Service or their own overseas personnel service. Here again there is opportunity for intermittent conflict over the appropriate division of labor. The distribution of power in Washington, rather than

optimization of personnel resources overseas, often determines the resulting mix.


THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE: ORGANIZATION AND CAREER SYSTEM

Formal Organization and the Statutory Career System

The evolving definition of the FS, both the administrative structure which governs the operation of the Service as a distinct personnel system within the Department of State, and the essential components of the career system itself, have grown slowly out of the particular historical forces. The functioning of the FS in 1970 closely follows the quidelines of the 1946 FS Act. Forces which brought these structures into existence and the debates which whirl around their maintenance or change now operate within the context established by the 1946 Act. Today, as then, the principal functions of the FS administration are those functions associated with the development and maintenance of the FS career system - in particular, the administration of entry procedures, of promotion-up and of retirement and selection-out. These functions are not performed by the Department of State but by a separate FS administration. Although the FS maintains a statutory independence, it is nevertheless physically located within the DOS, and most of its personnel are assigned to DOS positions. Tables 2 and 3 graphically describe the formal organizational structure of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The governing bodies for the direction of the Service include the following: (1) The Director General who, under the general supervision of the Deputy Under-secretary of State for Administration, is charged with the administration of the Service. The position is reserved for a senior member of the Officer Corps. (2) Supervising the


TABLE 2



* A SEPARATE AGENCY WITH ITS DIRECTOR REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY AND SERVING AS PRINCIPAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

TABLE 3

ORGANIZATION



operations of the Director General and developing the policies and procedures for the selection, assignment, rating and promotion of FS Officers is the Board of the FS. Under statute, the Board is composed of senior members of the Department of State, the Director General and the appropriate representatives from other governmental departments such as Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. To a considerable extent, recent modifications in this governing board have been modified in recent years to reflect the fact that the FS provides personnel primarily for the DOS. (3) A Board of Examiners for the FS is charged with the supervision and conduct of examinations given to candidates for appointment as FS Officers, and is generally charged with the examination of all persons who wish to enter the Service. (4) The promotion functions of the Service are handled through the annual appointment of Selection Boards, one for each class of officers. Selection Board assignments are often prized by members of the Service, for they are composed of those who have distinguished themselves in their own careers. In addition to the Foreign Service members all Boards include at least one "public member." Members seldom serve for more than one year. The Selection Board rankings of officers in each class provide the basis for promotion decisions of the Director General and other statutorily appropriate officials. Staffing of the FS administrative structure has been critical for the development of the career system. Both in statute and in practice, these functions are designated as FSO positions.

The Career System

As indicated above, the structure and dynamics of the FS can be described by looking both at the formal administrative structure and at the nature of the career system. To talk about a FS career in

this sense is very different from talking about the career of a particular FS officer. In the latter case, one refers to the particular sequence which an individual officer follows during the period in which he is in the employ of the FS; tracing the initial examination processes, the eventual acceptance into the ranks of the Officer Corps and then the overlapping sequences of assignments and promotions in personnel rank which denote the officer's advancement through the organizational hierarchy. To refer to a career system, however, is to identify the generalized processes through which FS officers may pass. As indicated earlier, four major processes need to be focussed upon: examination and entry, assignment, promotion, and finally the processes of selection-out, retirement or separation from the ranks of the FS. The career system of FS Officers, a relatively small but important group, is very different both in its purpose and in its operation from the career systems which operate for other categories of DOS and overseas personnel. Each category of Departmental personnel - FSO's, FS Staff, FS Reserve, USIA and AID Officers, and the Civil Servants - operates according to a somewhat different plan. Although complex, this arrangement, in which a variety of "career systems" operate simultaneously in a single organization, is more the norm than the exception in complex bureaucracies.[7] A unique feature of the FS is the extent of FS autonomy from the Department to whom it provides most of its personnel. This independence insures significant leverage on the development of U.S. foreign policy. If only implicitly and indirectly the control over the careers of FS officers is the major vehicle for the exercise of that leverage.

The principal avenue for entry into the FS is at the bottom and, like the commissioned officer structures of the military, has served

to make the FS an essentially "closed" career system.[8] There are many reasons for emphasis on entry at the bottom of the FS. First, because the FS maintains a system whereby promotion is governed by rank in person rather than the particular position to which one is assigned, the patterns of mobility throughout the Service are significantly affected by both rates of intake of new personnel and (for lateral entry officers) by the levels at which those personnel come into the career pattern. As Arthur Jones points out in his study, THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS:

> Any substantial intake of personnel at intermediate, middle or higher levels is to be resisted, since lateral entry deprives those within the career structure of promotional opportunities and eventually would result in a loss of recruitment sources [although] this does not preclude all lateral appointments . . . they should not be made in such numbers as to jeopardize the morale of those entering at the bottom and thereby discourage other candidates from entering at that level in the future.[9]

The Career System: Its Formal Organization

Those in the FS have other reasons for supporting the principle of entering at the bottom, as Jones correctly recognizes. In concurrence with most studies which examine the informal culture of the FS, he reports that members of the FS firmly believe that the business of diplomacy and the conduct of foreign relations "require a devotion to duty, a willingness to forego personal preference, the ability to adapt to a variety of (unique) environmental and work situations, and the acquisition of knowledge and skills within the institutional setting itself."[10] The only experience considered directly relevant to these activities is gained in the FS. Therefore, it is believed that these objectives and requirements can best be met by bringing into the Service young persons with superior intellectual skills and a set of desirable personal qualities at the lowest levels, and

providing them with the necessary training as they proceed through their careers. The resistance to the admittance of several hundred officers through lateral entry during the 1950's gives some idea of the intensity with which FS Officers support this principle.[11]

Entry

The determination of appropriate admission criterion and the application of these criterion, both lie within the legitimate perview of the FS administration. A flow chart depicting the career of the typical officer is included in Table 4. The 1924 Rogers Act included a codification of existing procedures, the basic outlines of which are still in operation today. In accordance with the merit principle, entry into the lowest ranks of the FS is based upon a competitive examination, open to all interested persons, and administered at various points around the country. If the candidate successfully passes this examination and is able to meet a variety of other requirements pertaining to such factors as age and physical well-being, he or she may proceed to an oral examination with members of the Board of Examiners. In the course of oral interviews, these examiners attempt to ascertain the candidate's appropriateness for work in the FS on a number of "personality" dimensions, the contents of which remain extremely difficult to specify. A brief study conducted in conjunction with the Herter Commission Report attempted to identify those elements which influence the judgments of the FS examiners, and the results of this inquiry are included in Table 5.[12] (see attached table)

There is no doubt that the procedure whereby the majority of members of the Officer Corps enter into the lowest ranks and then proceed throughout their lifetimes through the career system of the FS has important consequences.[13] It greatly restricts the influence of

TABLE 4

FLOW CHART OF MODEL CAREER

STAGES IN CAREER DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

1 Normal in-take of Junior Officers primarily class 8
(To be supplemented by lateral entry appointments at higher classes according to service needs.)

2 PROBATIONARY AND TRAINING STAGE

	Junior Officer Program (2-3 Years)
BOC-WLT	Rotating Functional Assignments *(including U.S. and field)*

3 Designation of Functional and Geographic Specialization(s)

4 SPECIALIZATION STAGE (8-12 Years)

A/L-AO-PA	Administration	MCT
A/L	Consular Services	MCT
A/L-D/UN	International Organization Affairs	MCT
A/L	Public Affairs	MCT
A/L	Cultural Affairs	MCT
A/L	Political Affairs	MCT
A/L-LS	Labor	MCT-LR
A/L	Intelligence and Research	MCT
A/L-UET	Economic Affairs	MCT
A/L-BC	Commercial Affairs	MCT-CR

5 BROADENING STAGE (2-3 Years)

CI	SO	Broadening assignments *(Differing from functional and area specialization but capitalizing where possible on specialized background)*
EM	WC	
IAS		

6 LEADERSHIP STAGE
Assignments to key positions involving policy formulation and/or program direction *(including advanced specialization)*

KEY TO FULL-TIME IN-SERVICE TRAINING COURSES

AO Administrative Operations Course
A/L Area/Language Training
BC Basic Commercial Course
BOC Basic Foreign Service Officer Course
CI Counter-Insurgency Course
CR Commercial Rotation Training Program
EM Advanced Executive Management Training
IAS Harvard Seminar in International Affairs
LR Labor Rotation Training Program
LS Labor Seminar
MCT Mid-Career Course in Foreign Affairs
PA University Training in Public Administration
SO Senior Officer Course
UET University Training in Economics
D/UN U.S. Diplomacy and the United Nations
WC War College
WLT "World" Language Training

Adapted from CDC Chart of July 19, 1962

TABLE 5

AVERAGE RANK OF ELEMENTS INFLUENCING AN EXAMINER'S JUDGMENT*

Element	Average Rank +
Personal leadership potential	4.74
Intellectual power and brilliance	4.75
Effectiveness in interpersonal relations	6.03
Mental flexibility and receptivity to new information and points of view	6.25
Ability to fit into an organization and be a team member	6.53
Willingness to sacrifice personal interests for the needs of the service	7.34
Ability to organize and present complex data effectively	7.47
Self-confidence	7.62
Potential for managerial effectiveness	8.03
Willingness to make and carry through on difficult and unpopular decisions	8.03
Ability to persevere and overcome obstacles	8.28
Ability to plan ahead and consider long-range consequences	8.62
Persuasiveness	8.75
Ability to negotiate effectively	10.46

ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS SUGGESTED

Element	No. of Times Suggested
Knowledge of the United States	3
Substantive knowledge	3
Representiveness, appearance	3
Sense of honor	2
Integrity	2
Sensitivity to political factors	1
Knowledge about job	1
Attitude toward foreigners	1
Feeling for people	1
Sense of dedication	1

* N = 33 members of Oral Examination Panels + 1 = most important 14 = least important

outsiders on the Service, thereby decreasing the openness of the Officer Corps to many kinds of external inputs. More important, it facilitates the development of a strong FS culture and a relatively uniform orientation toward the important dimensions of foreign affairs activities among FS Officers themselves. These matters will occupy a central part in later discussions.

The Career

Promotion-up or the control of an individual officer's mobility through the FS career system is one of the most important functions statutorily within the perview of the FS administration. The career system of the Officer Corps at the present time includes 10 hierarchically arranged ranks or grades with statutory limits placed on the number of officers in each.[14] (see Table 6) At each successive grade

TABLE 6

DISTRIBUTION OF GRADES

Career ambassador	career appointments
Career minister	"supergrades"
FSO-1	senior officers
FSO-2	
FSO-3	
FSO-4	midcareer officers
FSO-5	
FSO-6	
FSO-7	junior officers
FSO-8	

(class) level, an officer moves upward in the complex stratification system. Promotion to a higher grade is important for several reasons. First, it is accompanied by an increase in salary. Secondly, because such advancements are usually accompanied by assignments to increasingly important positions, promotion is directly associated

with increasing status for the individual officer. Finally, the rate at which an officer proceeds through each successive grade attains symbolic importance as an indicator of his favor or disfavor in the eyes of both his colleagues and those above him in the Department. The officer who proceeds rather slowly can expect a career filled with relatively less prestigeful appointments and perpetually lower rank than his or her peers. In contrast, an officer who is promoted more rapidly than the average can look forward generally to a career of challenging and exciting positions and, in the long term, to ambassadorial level assignments.

Through the lower grades of the career, the promotion of FS Officers tends to be automatic. Although their personnel files are examined in detail, those in grades FSO-8 and FSO-7 have always been considered to be junior officers, whether or not that name was officially applied to them. This period has been seen as probationary; it has usually been the time when Officers and the FS itself mutually decide whether the match is appropriate. By the time officers reach the mid-career stage, beginning with grade FSO-6 and proceeding up to grade FSO-3, the annual promotion reviews become increasingly more stringent. Members of the FS Selection Boards (those boards convened annually by the Director General of the FS to review each officer for promotion or non-promotion) look more closely at the record of each officer. Quantifiable criteria become less adequate, finer nuances separate the "angels from the archangels." By the time members of the Officer Corps reach the senior level at which time they are in grades FSO-2 and FSO-1, yet another set of considerations becomes dominant. On the one hand, the Senior Boards review relatively young officers who are conceivably eligible for promotion to the two

"super" grades - Career Minister and ultimately Career Ambassador. Among the many attractive candidates, they must select those with the most promise. On the other hand, Selection Boards at the senior level must also review the now extensive personnel files of those officers whose promotion more slowly at lower ranks brings them nearer to the age of retirement as they reach the senior officer level. For these men and women, the critical questions revolve around whether the FS should employ procedures which exist in the regulations for selecting these individuals out of the FS before normal retirement time. Throughout their careers individual officers are very aware of the importance of promotion decisions. Much of the informal conversation of the Department and interaction between members of the FS revolves around the subtle attempts by these capable and ambitious men and women to find out where they stand, to improve their standing relative to their peers, and to thereby affect their own careers.

The complexity of the promotion criteria themselves greatly complicate the mobility games of FS Officers. Annual efficiency reports, turned in by supervisors, are considered an important input. Perhaps more important are the assignments which an officer receives throughout his career - assignments made by potential superiors and personnel officers, in conjunction with anyone they wish to consult. Because one of the stated rationales behind the existence of the career service is the flexibility in the assignment of personnel around the world, it can be a poor reflection on an officer to object to an assignment which, although important in the overall mission of the Department, might bring him less visibility and less critical experience than another position. Inside the FS positions are continually re-evaluated within the informal culture as officers assess

the degree any assignment may contribute or detract from one's mobility. Thus, assignments also become a part of the larger process by which each detail in the career of an individual officer becomes fraught with potential significance for the determination of his life chances. The location of assignment, the functional designation of the assignment, the distribution of training assignments, and the overall pattern of assignments for any individual officer assignment decisions are central to an understanding of the career system.

Much more will be said about the operation of promotion within the FS, for it is the central focus of this study. Control over the promotion process is but one of several functions delegated to the administration of the FS. Although it may be one of the more important functions, it is only one through which members of the FS may exercise their influence on Department of State personnel composition and hence the outcomes of American foreign policy decisions.

Retirement and Separation

One of the principal legacies of the pre-1924 period, built first into the Rogers Act and then later into the Foreign Service Act of 1946, was a great deal of concern over the issue of retirement and correspondingly with the benefits due to an officer upon retirement. Prior to the formal establishment of the FS, it had been extremely difficult for an individual without private means to undertake the costs entailed by travel, education of children, and representation functions in conjunction with official duties. To eliminate these restrictions, major changes were introduced to provide financial remuneration for the rather unusual expenses incurred by those serving overseas. These and other benefits made it possible to democratize the Service and avoid the stigma that only a person of private means

could accept an appointment.[14] In part because retired FS Officers had a unique set of skills, it was also necessary to provide them with an alternate means of support upon retirement, for other remunerative occupations were often unavailable.

By 1946 it was also recognized that if officers were provided with an opportunity for relatively early retirement with attractive benefits, then this would have an important impact upon the opportunities for promotion-up among those remaining in the Service. I have discussed some of the theoretical issues which underly this process in a separate paper.[15] It is sufficient at this point to recognize that both the long-term financial security of FS Officers and the opportunities for promotion among young officers are affected by the retirement policies established by the FS administration. Generally, both pressures push toward a Service which facilitates early voluntary retirement. Although retirement and voluntary resignation, particularly during the early years of an officer's association with the FS, are the major sources of attrition, the career system of the FS also recognizes another principle, that of selection-out, which can have an important effect on rates of attrition and thereby rates of promotion. Like the military, the FS has adopted the principle of "promotion-up or selection-out" as a protection against the accumulation of large numbers of officers whose performance in assigned tasks is considered inadequate.

Because of the stigma attached to selection-out of the FS, both Selection Boards and the Director General have been hesitant to utilize this procedure to the full extent authorized in the law. Nevertheless, it is critical to understand the existence of this option if one is to explain the behavior of Officers whose performance

is judged marginal by the FS. Although there is little reason to believe that selection-out operates as a motivational factor in improving the performance of individual officers, it is clear that those threatened with selection-out are often pressed into the acceptance of the least desirable assignments available to FS Officers in exchange for tacit agreement that they will not be selected-out of the Service prior to the time when they can receive retirement benefits.

There is no reason to believe that the anxieties of financial and psychological insecurity associated with retirement in other sectors of the economy are not present among members of the FS. As elsewhere, the possibility of continuing employment after retirement remains one of the few viable alternatives to FS benefits. The increase in the activity of American business abroad in recent decades has meant some change in the external employment possibilities available to FS Officers. Both junior and senior officers who have left the Service are now found in the employ of American corporations overseas. These officers bring with them a knowledge of particular conditions which is a scarce commodity. On the other side of the coin, these employment possibilities have almost certainly prompted many while still in the Service to avoid unnecessary antagonizing of potential future employers.

The Culture of Foreign Affairs: Differentiation and Stratification within the Foreign Service

One of the first and most lasting contributions of Sociology and Social Psychology to the study of organizations has been their identification of the importance of informal norms in the operation of complex organizations. These norms develop in a variety of ways reflecting the particular power dynamics operating in the organization

and in the society at large. They may operate to make the organization more efficient in the eyes of its top management; on the contrary, the values which are maximized by different participants in an organization may seriously conflict with the goals and values of those in other portions of the organization. When one has the opportunity to examine the operation of the Department of State from a distance, one of its most distinctive features is the presence among FS Officers and those with whom they come into contact, of a distinctive culture. The FS culture is particularly noticeable for it is markedly different from that which prevails in other organizations and particularly from that which is found in other branches of the federal bureaucracy.

Because it is difficult to describe even the admininstration of the FS without some reference to this culture, many of its most pervasive elements (e.g., the ranking of assignments, and behavioral expectations) have already been included in the discussion. At the same time, to talk about the culture of the FS in reference to its administrative structure is to reverse the order of importance, for in many ways both the administrative structure and the definition of the FS as a career system represent legal codification of existing practice. My reasons for discussing the culture of the FS are threefold. First, it is important to identify some of the major elements of that culture and its origins in the larger social structure. Secondly, some of the structures within the organization of the FS operate to perpetuate particular elements in the culture of the FS. Particularly important are those structures which undergird the uniform socialization experienced by members of the Officer Corps. Finally, this culture is related to the overall functioning of the Department of State. Both the operation of the career service and the

substance of the policy decisions are influenced.

In many ways it has been difficult for students of the FS to identify the particular dimensions of the FS culture, even though the general outlines are most apparent. One of the most widely read (and controversial) studies was printed in January 1967 under the title SOME CAUSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. The report, prepared by Chris Argyris, a Yale organizational psychologist at that time, attempted to identify the norms and values which operated within the FS and to outline some of their consequences for the operation of the Department of State. After synthesis of considerable material, Argyris was able to identify the following norms and values as determinants of FS Officer behavior:

1. Interactions involving members of the FS are guided by a tendency to withdraw from the open discussion of interpersonal difficulties and conflict. More important, this also led to the avoidance of substantive issues which might, if discussed openly, create conflict or interpersonal embarrassment.

2. Not only did people tend to withdraw from the discussion of interpersonal difficulties and conflict, but Officers felt that it was expected of them that they should not be open about interpersonal problems or substantive issues that could be threatening to people, especially to either superiors or peers.

3. Although there is, in fact, a great deal of competition between members of the FS, strong norms existed to encourage mistrust of and withdrawal from aggressive or openly competitive behavior.

4. In those cases where agressiveness was identified, it was defined as appropriate to judge that individual negatively but not to him.[16]

As one reflects upon these norms, they are not strikingly different from those which one finds in any upper middle class, professionally based organization. Although one can only speculate about the origins, one does not have to identify the source of these patterns within the Department to identify the process by which they reinforce both traditional organizational forms and traditional beliefs concerning the substance of foreign policy. Andrew Scott's hard-hitting and perceptive article on formal organization and informal culture in the Department of State nicely documents how these and other norms prevent members of the FS from developing a new perspective on both the conduct and substance of policy.[17]

Argyris' identification of some of the values which prevail in the FS concerning effective human relationships provides another point of departure. Three values which he identifies are quite apparent, as one interviews the participants themselves:

(1) There is a widespread feeling that the substantive side of the organization is paramount. In conjunction with that belief is the feeling, (2) that human beings are most effective when they are rational and least effective when they become emotional or allow others to do so. Finally, Argyris was able to identify some important feelings concerning leadership and hierarchy. (3) Effective leaders were considered by FS perconnel generally to be directive and controlling in their relationship with subordinates. The discrepancy between this behavior and the value placed on it and the verbal responses to questions about appropriate leadership style were quite striking.[18]

As one reviews these values, the parallel with the values which also dominate other "professional" organizations is quite striking. The emphasis on directive and controlling leadership is certainly

congruent with the expectations of other institutions of the society. The importance of rationality and the minimization of cathectic and evaluative modes of interaction in favor of the cognitive are not as pervasive in the general culture, but are certainly stressed in the white upper middle class setting from which the majority of officers are drawn. The emphasis on some substantive and goal oriented matters, doubtless reinforced by both self-recruitment and the initial selection process, is similar to the status system of other organizations dominated by professionals. The monopoly of knowledge and training opportunities, as in the case of other professions, provides a major bulwark against the encroachment of outsiders into the particular system of positions and privileges.[19]

It is important to acknowledge the extent to which position and privilege are central values in the FS. From the days before a formal structure was developed, both the members of the diplomatic and counselor services and those upper class reformers with whom they joined in pressing for a career service, have considered it essential for officers to be both well educated and well bred. Today it is still legitimate to talk about the emulation of British models of diplomacy, although somewhat gauche to speak of "breeding" and "elite" education as appropriate criterion for inclusion in the FS Officer Corps. Universalism in the form of competitive examination has replaced good breeding as a criterion for acceptance; but, as less privileged strata in our society have come to realize in recent years, universalism need not challenge the preservation of privilege.[21] The emphasis on particular types of substantive skills, with its roots in an educational system still more available to the privileged, serves to preserve the class bias of the Department, albeit in extremely subtle

ways.[22]

It is extremely difficult to point to the direct consequences of the FS culture in the development and implementation of American foreign policy. Particularly in the United States, where the dynamics of class interests are poorly understood, the connections, long and complicated as they are, are particularly difficult to demonstrate. At this point, my purpose is not to demonstrate these connections but merely to suggest that as a corrective to previous work on the FS we entertain the hypothesis that given the disagreements within our nation about the direction of American foreign policy, it is plausible to ask what in the backgrounds and experience of those who serve in the FS of the United States might lead them to adopt a perspective which is not shared by others. This is not to say that all individuals within the FS accept this culture with equal enthusiasm. To argue such is to misunderstand the concept. But it is legitimate to say that the presence of these norms and values creates particularly strong pressures to adapt for each officer who wishes to ignore them or to counter them.[22]

It is very difficult, for example, not to recognize that in fact a political assignment in an important Western European or Soviet Bloc post will in all probability further one's advancement within the FS career system to a greater extent than a comparable assignment in a small Latin American republic. Similarly, a FS Officer interested in rapid advancement in his career must recognize that in most cases political and hence substantive work is considered more important by those on the Selection Board than is administrative or consular, i.e., non-substantive work. Although an officer may personally disagree with the culture of the FS, the Service itself controls important rewards and sanctions over those who express such disagreement - in

the choice of the assignment, in the manner in which they work with their fellow officers, or in their views toward the substance of foreign policy.

FOUR POINTS OF REFERENCE: General Analytic Perspectives and the Focus of the Study

To adequately understand the central themes of the analysis which follows, it is necessary to have not only some background on the functioning of the American FS but also to understand more clearly the diverse analytical perspectives which guide the inquiry. The major theoretical insights into the structure of the FS decision-making process (as it affects promotions) are obtained from three traditions in the study of bureaucracy: general systems theory, a behavioral theory of organizations, and the bureaucratic conflict and politics model. In addition, a number of theoretical pieces contribute to our understanding of occupational careers. Although the promotion models are largely the product of empirical evidence, the general insight from each of these four perspectives has been a useful guide in the research project. Combined, the insights of these analytic frameworks provide a stronger basis for explanation than is possible with any single theory. The most salient details of each perspective are listed below.

General Systems Theory

In recent years open systems theory has been widely used in the analysis of organizational phenomena. With its emphasis on the interrelatedness of organizational units, boundary transactions between formal organizational units, and the entropic process, this perspective has succeeded in freeing many from the blinders imposed by the highly structural orientation which was excessively preoccupied with formal and official procedures. It has also provided a useful balance

to the students of micro-processes who failed to understand the importance of organizational environment and other macro phenomena.[23] Several empirical studies discussed in the later chapters have enabled us to understand the interrelationships between bureaucratic requirements and career systems.[24]

The open systems literature, rather than providing concrete and testable hypotheses, provided a heuristic guide and basis for assessing the credibility of reports by Department of State respondents concerning the complex interrelationships between the several units whose inputs, outputs, or other boundary transactions affect the outcome of the decision processes. To the extent that these variables are important for decision makers, they will be included in the model.

Behavioral Theory of Organization

The theoretical contributions of the Carnegie-Mellon School of organizational theorizing have a major influence on the structure of the formal simulation model employed to describe the FS promotion processes. The goal of the simulations is to reproduce not only the final output, but also to explicitly describe the procedures, processes, and decision rules which operate to transform informational inputs (career data) into organizational outputs (allocations of promotions). The work of the Carnegie group provides several useful precedents.

First, the premises of satisficing and uncertainty avoidance, particularly as utilized in the models of March and Cyert (1963), Clarkson (1962), Crecine (1969), and Wildavsky (1964), closely approximate the orientations of decision makers both in the Selection Boards and within the Office of the Director General of the FS. The considerations affecting promotion decisions, as these premises suggest, are several stages removed from the larger policy questions and tend

to be governed by decision-making rules which are common in a wide variety of organizational settings.[25]

Second, some of the more interesting theoretical questions raised by the systems theorists and others concerned with macro problems rather than the micro-dynamics of bureaucracy are brought into sharp focus by the Carnegie approach. By developing a model which documents and accounts for regularized and standardized behavior, Crecine and others are beginning to isolate those points at which the satisficing model does not generate accurate predictions, thus facilitating the study of organizational adaptation.[26] Their elaborations have identified new sources of constraint on organizational performance not included in earlier theoretical work. These constraints -- many of them external to the focal organization -- operate in both the rank ordering and final promotion of the officers to significantly reduce the domain of possible model designs.[27]

The Bureaucratic Politics Model

The consideration of the power dimensions and their role in the structure of organizations and the development of decisions is now almost commonplace in organizational theorizing, following the seminal works of Selznick (1949), Dalton (1959), Crozier (1964), and Allison (1971). These men form a nucleus of theorists who recognize the importance of power dimensions for understanding more fully both the motivations of participants in decision making and the limits to their rationality.[28] Although their work lacks more general and abstract theoretical development, the insights have several practical implications for this study.

(1) They help to explain why those involved in the administration of promotions are content to tolerate the divergence between the

official model and the actual practices which seem to influence promotion. The present situation is truly a negotiated order, in which the various interest groups involved in the promotion process have developed procedures which fairly accurately represent the balance of political interests in the situation.[29] (2) It makes clear that the present situation not only has political implications, but it also suggests the need for identification of the partisans in the promotion processes if we are to explain changes over time. (3) The lag between the desires of the larger foreign affairs community and the responsiveness of the FS is much more understandable if one can see the present order as the delicate consensus between competing forces, where the top policy makers represent only one interest.

The bureaucratic politics model also has important implications for why one chooses an essentially structural rather than psychological level of explanation. As Crozier points out, the evolution of these mechanisms for making organizational decisions on promotion need not be the reflection of changes in the personal orientations or motivations of individuals, although long-term socialization patterns may be important in a very general sense. Unlike Merton who hypothesized the development of a "bureaucratic personality," Crozier suggests that such assumptions are unnecessary. We need to make only minimal assumptions about the motivations or psychological attributes of these bureaucratic actors. Any adult member of the society might respond to these pressures in a similar fashion. They are merely employing rational bureaucratic strategies, given their positions in the organization and their own self-interests.[30] This is not to say that the competition and conflict within the organization are without bounds. As Roger Hilsman has clearly pointed out in his discussion of

the foreign policy consensus, there are clear reasons for negotiation and the development of consensus among the participants in the foreign policy generation process.[31] As in other settings, political conflict is conducted in accordance with a normative framework.

Organizational Careers

Although possibly less generic in scope than those which apply to organizations, the insights of occupational sociologists have direct bearing upon the study of FS promotions. For the Department of State to continue its operation, career needs must be meshed with organizational requirements. Even in the case of the FS, with its emphasis on the merit principle, openings for advancement depend not so much on individual merit as upon the complex dynamics which affect the availability of openings at each successive stage in the career ladder.

Career systems have other important consequences as well. In the case of the FS of the United States, both legal statute and de facto operations place considerable control over the definition of rules and procedures within the hands of the members of the profession itself. One need not raise issues about professional determination of client interests to recognize that such a relationship can have important consequences for the non-permeability of organizational boundaries. From the perspective of the organizational theorist it is important to understand those structural mechanisms and belief patterns which facilitate the maintenance of this autonomy. The level of detailed information about the manner in which the FS operates should provide an excellent opportunity for the study of these dynamics.

A variety of studies have focused on individual careers within organizations similar in some respects to the FS. Morris Janowitz, in his work on the American military services, uses the distribution of

officers on background variables such as nativity, regional origin, and educational background, as indices of the increasing isomorphism between civilian and military sectors. This evolution, he argues, has been prompted by the development of common technological problems, rather than any conscious change in sources of military recruitment.[32] Bernard Mennis, in a study of political desk officers in both the Defense and State Departments, uses similar demographic information as an independent variable to explain the unanticipated degree of homogeneity in military and Foreign Service perspectives, as measured in a number of attitudinal scales.[33] Segal and Willick, in a comparative study of FS and military elites, use the same basic indices to discuss the adaption of these organizations to the broadened base of recruitment.[34] Finally, in a British setting, Kelsall uses similar variables, with particular emphasis on educational background and father's occupation, to talk about the changing recruitment base in the English Higher Civil Service.[35] Behind each of these studies has been the assumption that the changing composition of these various career services is both intrinsically important and is critical for understanding the changing processes of decision making.

Relatively little attention has been devoted to examining the impact of careers on the orientations of these officers. Most of the studies cited above fail to provide us with any clear indication of how these demographic factors operate to effect differential access to top positions. Of more importance, they tell us little about how career experiences affect the perspective which these senior officials bring to decision-making situations. For example, to know that those of WASP-Southern-West Point background are less dominant in today's army than previously, tells us little more than that social composition

has changed. It does suggest that skills are differently valued, but it provides little information about the difference in orientations, and hence difference in policy outcomes, which might result from the changed recruitment base. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that social origins make a great difference, particularly when mediated by many years of adult socialization, the development of an organizational ideology, and imposition of numerous structural constraints on the decision makers.

The weaknesses inherent in looking solely at background factors are acknowledged by Janowitz and others. PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER includes a section on career and development and recognizes the significance of three model career patterns - routine, prescribed, and adaptive - within the military services. For example, Janowitz found that those following an "adaptive" career were more likely to become members of the elite nucleus than were those following either of the other two modal patterns. His brief, and rather anecdotal discussion of career development, suggests that both the nature and sequence of positions held during an officer's career may be more important for understanding the modern military elite than the study of social origins. Unfortunately, few have taken up the challenge to study these organizational careers in greater detail.

Some of the most promising theoretical work investigating the importance of career structures and development has utilized strikingly different perspectives. Generic to the "career system" in the organizational context are several parameters which significantly determine career patterns. Of particular interest for this dissertation are a few studies which have focused on the processes of career mobility, especially career timetables,[36] studies of the factors

contributing to differential promotion among members of the same cohort,[37] and Harrison White's analysis of vacancy chains.[38]

A Critical Index of Organizational Dynamics: Promotion in the Foreign Service

In addition to providing information related to the 4 theoretical traditions discussed above, there are three more general reasons for examining promotion in the FS as the central focus of this dissertation. First, it provides an opportunity to study the organizational dynamics of career systems and to later utilize the changing decision rules employed in the promotion process as an index of organizational change. Secondly, because of the manner in which promotion decisions are made, this focus enables us to test a series of hypotheses concerning the relative value of various FS assignments and thereby to better describe the substantive content of the FS culture. Finally, as part of a preliminary examination of the relationship between the FS and the decisions which guide American foreign policy, it should be possible to derive some tentative conclusions concerning the skills and orientations of those who rise to the top of the FS establishment as opposed to those who didn't and the public more generally.

One of the consequences of the systems perspective on organizations has been emphasis on the output of complex bureaucracies and the accurate monitoring of that output. The systems theoretic perspective provides us with fewer guidelines for explaining the dynamics of organizational input which are responsible for observable output patterns. The decision rules employed in the promotion of FS officers are in this case a prototype of the critical organizational variables which have to be examined in explaining fluctuations in the output,

in the immediate case, Foreign Service promotions.

To the extent that these decision rules guide the behavior of the actual decision makers on the Selection Boards, they must be the focus of inquiry if we are to successfully analyze the reasons for the particular promotion patterns which we observe as organizational output. Many of the fluctuations in the numbers of officers promoted can be attributed to some of the peculiar dynamics which arise at that interface between a career system and the manpower needs of a large-scale bureaucracy. Other changes in that output can be attributed to the content of the decision rules themselves. This has been a perennial problem for those members of Congress who have tried to change the composition of the FS Officer Corps. Only as one begins to identify such organizational variables can we meaningfully begin to talk about processes of organizational adaptation and change. Such knowledge is also essential for understanding the complex dynamics of career systems operating within an organizational context.

In this study, assignment processes are considered an exogenous variable. But, at the same time, a good deal of qualitative evidence including the writings of those who have participated and interviews with those directly involved in the promotion process suggest that the patterns of assignments which distinguish an officer's career are critical in assessing the rate of his promotion through the grades of the FS career structure.[39] The relative value of various functional and post assignments is not, however, specified in the promotion precepts. Instead, we find a situation in which most officers in the FS, and to a large extent those serving on Selection Boards, implicitly rank functional assignments in a manner which is significantly determined by the informal culture of the FS.

Finally, although it cannot be explored in the context of this particular dissertation, one of the principal guidelines behind this study has been the abiding interest of the author in the reasoning which lies behind the making of the many and often minute decisions which constitute American foreign policy. Although many of the larger parameters within which these decisions are made do not lie within the control of the members of the Officer Corps, it would be extremely difficult to carry out a foreign policy whose general outline conflicted with the values and perceptions of the members of the FS. These values and perceptions, as mentioned above, are clearly determined by more than one's experience in the FS. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that experience in the work place has a critical impact in shaping the beliefs and orientations of the members of any profession. In fact, one of the explicit purposes of any profession is to provide a framework within which decisions are made - an ideology which allows the unsupervised professional to filter out some aspects of his environment and to place greater reliance on others. To be sure, the patterns of experience which each individual officer has had greatly influence the way in which he or she looks at the world. It is no accident that some of the most significant dissent on the general direction of American foreign policy comes from those officers fresh from experience in the developing nations. Similarly, we should not be surprised that those whose careers included a term of service within the personnel administration of the Department and the FS were among those most critical of the existing manpower policies. Thus, it seems appropriate to explore the extent to which the experiences which each FS Officer accumulates during the course of his career may influence his judgment as he rises to more senior ranks.

These, in capsule form are some of the major emphases to be explored in the following chapters. In the discussion which immediately follows, the perspective developed for the analysis of FS promotion processes is explored in greater depth. Other studies of relevance are utilized to demonstrate to the reader that although this embodies a very particular focus and includes considerable detail, in fact, the overall results which are being portrayed have applicability in a variety of settings.

Chapter III

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE PROMOTION PROCESS

In the preceding chapter we provided considerable background on the operation of the Department of State and its semi-autonomous career system, the FS, which provides manpower for the overseas operations of the Department. In this chapter we shall focus much more explicitly on the promotion process within the FS. This description begins with an overview of the formal promotion procedures. The inquiry then proceeds to a brief literature review and discussion of the outcomes of promotion in the FS. The dimensions used in the analysis of careers, e.g., Foreign Service norms and bureaucratic constraints, generally do not consider the formal procedures for evaluation and promotion central to the inquiry. Several questions are raised about the actual influences on final promotion decisions. Particular attention is placed on the definitions of "merit" and "career" within the context of FS administration and the FS career system. The chapter concludes with an introduction to three models of FS promotion processes.

FORMAL PROCEDURES IN THE ANNUAL SELECTION BOARDS

With some important modifications, the general outlines of the FS promotion process were prescribed and described in a departmental order from the Secretary of State on June 9, 1924. It provided for the annual convening of a board of review of high-ranking FS Officers for the purpose of examining the record of all personnel and providing a report to the appropriate body on the "relative standing of officers and employees."[1] The most fundamental character of the FS promotion system still remains the competitive ranking of all officers

within each class level. The officers highly ranked as a result of this process are effectively recommended for promotion by the annual selection-out procedures. The end product of these annual selection board evaluations, a "rank order register," provides the basis for the annual promotion and selection-out decisions.[2] The number actually promoted or selected-out depends upon a wide variety of factors - most notably budgetary consideration and particular manpower requirements. The Selection Boards themselves consider none of these factors when making their decisions.[3] Three factors are included in their decisions: (1) the annual precepts (formal evaluation rules and procedures), (2) the remarks at their convening by the Deputy Undersecretary for Administration (which emphasize particular precepts), and (3) the personnel files of each individual officer. These files contain annual efficiency reports filed by supervisors, an evaluation every two or three years by a member of the FS Inspection Corps, and the occasional reports on officer performance voluntarily submitted by end users.

According to the statutory provisions, the Secretary of State annually appoints Selection Boards varying in size from five to eight members, to review for promotion all members of the Officer Corps. One such Selection Board is appointed for each grade.[4] Generally, the Boards are composed of senior members of the Corps, and experience on the Boards is highly valued. When they convene each fall, they are given two major sources of guidance for the performance of the task which will occupy them for several months. First, they are presented with the detailed "precepts" according to which each officer has been evaluated by his superior or superiors. Second, they are addressed by the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration whose speech highlights the particular aspects of the precepts considered important

by the Department for development of the FS Officer Corps. Together, these items provide the major policy guidance for the selection. Included in Appendix A are copies of the Selection Board precepts and the introductory address for the year 1967.

The task of each Board is to compare all officers in the class assigned to it and to rank them in order for promotion to the next class. The first step is to sort out all officers ineligible for promotion because they have not served sufficient time in class.[5] The procedure is as follows:

> The task of each Board is to compare all officers in the class assigned to it and to rank them in order competitively on the basis of merit for promotion to the next class. The first step is to sort out all officers ineligible for promotion for the reason of not having served sufficient time in class. . . .
>
> Each Board member reads a substantial number of performance files selected at random in order to form an impression of the range of performance for the class. The member then must read all cases and, working independently, assign a rating of from 10 (highest) to 1 (lowest) to each case. If the class is large, the cases can be broken down into segments at random, the cases in each segment to be considered and rated in turn by each member. Because the scores of the Board members must have comparable weight, a distribution pattern has to be worked out in advance, so that the number of ratings at each of the ten levels that a Board member can assign is limited. Usually, this means that a member can give a 10 rating to only 10 percent of the class, a 9 rating to only 10 percent, and so on.
>
> The scores of the five members are totaled for each case, and the cases are then grouped according to composite scores ranging from five (for cases given only a 1 rating by all five members) to fifty. Obviously, in a class of 300 or more officers, there will be a large number of cases that will have duplicate scores. Thus, if there are five cases each having a score of 47, the Board will rank them in order thus breaking the tie. Each member assigns a rating of from 5 (highest) to 1 (lowest) to the five cases and the officers are "rank-ordered" according to composite scores.
>
> These detailed rank-orderings are required only at the high and low levels. The Board must come to a judgment as to the "cut-off" line in the rank-order register. All officers whose scores place them above this line are considered by the Board to merit promotion at the time of the Board's deliberations. The line does not determine the actual number to be promoted. This is decided administratively on the basis of budget and available

positions after the Board's work is done. However, this administrative cut-off line does not change the rank-ordering.

Ties must be broken in all score groups above the cut-off line and in the lowest 10 percent to produce a detailed rank-order for these high and low groups. All other officers are listed alphabetically in various percentiles; between the cut-off line and the 75 percent point, between 75 percent and the midpoint, between the midpoint and 25 percent, and between 25 percent and 10 percent. In recent years, the Boards also have been required to list all officers deemed to have fallen in the selection-out zone.

Although the members give their ratings independently, they have an opportunity to revise their ratings at least once before final determination and to discuss cases as a group. They must also examine the cases ineligible for promotion to see if any merit a waiver of the minimum time-in-grade rule or placement in the selection-out zone. The major change to cut the work load of the Boards, set forth by Circular No. 69, eliminated the practice of having every Board member read every file. The Department sets percentages for the "top" and "bottom" groups for each class in advance. Two Board members, one of whom must be from the Department of State, read every case, placing cases in the top or bottom groups. All cases so placed by one of the two original readers are then considered by the entire Board. The other cases are given no further consideration for that year. There is an automatic review for any officer whose file has not been considered by the full Board three years in a row.[5]

As might be suspected, in a situation where each Selection Board is expected to review the cases of between 200 and 700 officers in the same class, meaningful ranking becomes quite difficult. These persons have been working during the past year in a wide variety of posts - both overseas and within the U.S.; furthermore, there has been considerable disparity in the duties which they are expected to perform. On the basis of material in individual personnel files, the Selection Boards are expected to produce a uni-dimensional rank-ordering in approximately three months, a difficult task to say the least. Until recently, the problems of the Selection Boards were eased because they did not need to consider the fit between promotions and the manpower of the the Department. The almost impossible demands placed on the Boards led to important adaptations; important because they end up

profoundly affecting the output of the FS. These adaptations will be discussed at length below.

The formal procedures just described are not the result of historical accidents, but represent the outcome of intensive political bargaining within the governmental structures. Much of this bargaining has taken place within the walls of the Department of State itself, as the administration of the FS attempted to work out the details of the 1946 FS Act in conjunction with its own interests, the changing international situation, and the pressures from those outside the "guild" (as the FS is sometimes known). In large measure, the parameters of the promotion process utilized in the FS for the past 20 years were established in the statutory provisions of the 1946 Act. The particular synthesis represents the balance of political and social forces operating at that time. The account of the dynamics surrounding the drafting of the Act relies heavily on the case study entitled "The Foreign Service Act of 1946" developed by Harold Stein.

Two features of the 1946 Act are particularly important for understanding present day implications of the statute. First, the outlines and specific provisions of the 1946 legislation were written either by members of the Officer Corps or by others within the Department of State sympathetic to the career system and the general perspective of the Service. Most of the initial draft developed by members of the Office of FS Personnel, was retained in the final Act. In a time when there was rather significant change in the nature of our foreign affairs operations, considerable debate within the Department about the proper role of the FS, much resistance within the Bureau of Budget to the maintenance of the FS "guild," and numerous other objections from departments with overseas operations, a relatively

small handful of officers was able to steer a statute through the legislative process which placed considerable control over the future of the FS within the hands of FS Officers themselves.

This is not to say that some within the FS did not find the provisions objectionable. Many objected, for example, to the various lateral entrance provisions put into the draft and the final versions of the Act. At the same time, the rather close-knit and influential group of senior FS Officers had their interests well represented by the drafters of the legislation. The major objectives of the Act, as Stein points out, were the objectives of the core of FS Officers. The specific provisions of the Act focused around "the necessity for building around a competent and disciplined, but protective and privileged, corps composed of 'generalists' who would handle our political relations with many countries."[7] In particular battles, both within and outside the Department, the drafters fought diligently to preserve a system in which members of the Officer Corps retained a majority of the positions. As a result, a career service was preserved, based on principles such as entry at the bottom, the provision of significant privileges and benefits, and internal control of administrative and promotion processes.

THE OUTCOMES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE PROMOTION PROCESS: POLITICAL CONTEST IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUREAUCRACY

A number of recent studies suggest it is difficult to describe the dynamics of the promotion process from an aggregate analysis of promotion patterns in the FS. Four separate studies provide some basis for concluding, however, that some of the older traditions of the FS Guild have been preserved.

In the first study, one of a series of reports to the House

Committee on governmental operations, documents the differences between promotion of lateral and traditional entrants. FS Officers entering in the typical examination process (i.e., competitive examination and entry at the lowest rank of the Service) were more rapidly promoted than those officers who entered laterally. The report of the Subcommittee concludes in its review of the promotion system that "the system presently being employed has had the effect of giving the pre-Wriston FS Officers [those who entered through the examination route] a 75 to 1 promotion advantage over the integrated officers [those who entered laterally] in the first Selection Boards since the implementation of the Wriston report."[8] Somewhat similar results are reported in John E. Harr's study, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAREERS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE, which drew its data from the early 1960's.[9] Clearly, when one examines promotion rates of those who entered via the traditional route compared with those who entered the FS via the lateral entry route, those in the former category are still highly favored by the promotion system. Those who have studied this phenomenon point out that the preservation of these patterns is often inconsistent with the development of a dynamic FS.

A recent paper by Segal and Willick pursues a somewhat different theme.[11] Following the lines established in earlier studies (of higher civil servants both in the United States and Britain and of senior military personnel of general or admiral rank), they attempt to ascertain the social class backgrounds of senior military and FS officers.[10] Going beyond earlier work they ask, what conditions in the organization affect class composition at senior officer levels?[12] By using college of undergraduate education, Segal and Willick are able to demonstrate that during a period in which the FS had been

continually pressed to democratize both its selection and promotion procedures, those who are graduates of Harvard, Yale and Princeton still occupy a large proportion of the positions available within senior grades. The authors conclude that during periods of organizational stress, the administrators of career services attempt to preserve the integrity - i.e., traditional definition - of the Service by promoting those whose generalized training would least dispose them to challenge the traditional structures.[13]

The patterns of promotion within the FS become more complex when one looks at mid-career officers (those in grades 6, 5, 4 and 3). A study done in the late 1960's by Harry Feinstein attempted to ascertain how the merit principle applied to the rate of promotion of mid-career officers.[14] To his surprise, he found that those promoted more rapidly in the earlier period - from FS-06 to FS-05 and FS-05 to FS-04 - were not necessarily those whose time in class was shorter for the promotions to FS-03 and then to FS-02. In fact, there was considerably more equalization than he expected. Although this certainly did not apply to all officers, it was the case for the overwhelming majority. Feinstein concluded that if in fact one could expect an officer of merit at one point in his career to continue to demonstrate such ability at other times, then the merit principle did not seem to be a major explanatory principle when one looked at the careers of mid-career officers. Seniority, i.e., the use of compensatory promotions for early delays and vice versa, appeared to account for much more of the variance during this period.[15]

A final survey presenting information on the outcome of the FS promotion process is an examination of the first officer cohort to enter the Corps after the passage of the 1946 FS Act.[16] These

individuals, who entered the Service in 1947, were distributed over four classes when the survey was conducted in April 1966. Of the initial 222 officers who entered during that year at the bottom of the FS career ladder, 92 or 41.6 percent had resigned or been separated by the time of the survey. The remaining 130 officers were distributed between classes 4, 3, 2 and 1. (see Tables 1 and 2)[17]

As one looks carefully at the data, it becomes clear that in time all officers in the FS are promoted; but, at the same time, there is considerable difference in the time which officers spend in each class before promotion to the next. As one might expect, the officers who, in 1966, were in Class 1, spent fewer years on the average in each class than did those who entered in the same year, but in 1966 were still in Class 4. This suggests that promotion within the FS reflects a combination of the seniority and merit principles to generate the existing distributions.

It is unclear exactly how promotion patterns such as those described above are related to the formal procedures outlined in the 1946 Act - the specific precepts for evaluation, and the particular procedures used by the annual Selection Boards. To understand these connections, it is necessary to look more closely at how merit becomes defined in the FS promotion process. Furthermore, we must examine the operation of the seniority principle and its relationship to the notion of career. As suggested earlier, by looking at the organizational context within which these decisions are made and at the orientations of the particular actors involved in the decision making, we can begin to identify the procedures which produce the observed outcomes. More important, the examination begins to disclose why actual practices diverge from those formally outlined at

TABLE 1

1966 Distribution of Officers in the 1947 Cohort

PROGRESS OF THE PRESENTLY ACTIVE FOREIGN
SERVICE OFFICERS WHO ENTERED ON DUTY IN 1947

No. of Officers & Their Pres. Class	Prom to Class	YEARS OF PROMOTIONS																				Ave. Yrs. in each Class	Ave. Yrs. in Class from Cl. To-
		47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66		
	5			7	10	2																2.7	2.7
	4					2	13		2			2										2.9	5.6
	3								1		5	8	4		1							4.3	9.9
	2													5	8	1	4	1				3.5	13.4
	1																	3	4	8	4	4.3	17.7
	5			5	32	25																2.7	2.7
	4					3	15		11			24	9									4.	6.7
	3										5	6	10	11	17	8	5					3.5	10.2
	2														1	2	4	18	11	12	14	4.	14.2
	5			3	15	22	2															3.5	3.5
	4						4		4			8	19	4	2	1						6.6	10.1
	3												3	2	4	1	10	8	9	3	2	5.3	15.4
	5					7																4.0	4.0
	4											1		1			2		1			9.5	13.5

TABLE 2

STATISTICS ON THE 1947 COHORT

Class	Original Class No. of Officers who E.O.D. in 1947 at Class "6"	No. of Officers who have resigned or separated, by class	% of Officers Resigned or Separated	No. of Officers Remaining on and their Present Class	% of Remaining Officers by Class as compared with Original (222)	Av. Age of Rem. Officers by Class as of 1-1-66	Av. No. of Years Rem. Officers to reach their Present Class	% Breakdown of the Remaining (130) Officers in Their Present Class
6	222	37	16.7					
5		35	15.8					
4		15	6.8	7	3	44.6	13.5	5.9
3		5	2.3	42	18.9	45.5	15.4	32.3
2				62	27.9	46.5	14.2	47.7
1				19	8.6	46.4	17.7	14.6
	222	92	41.6	130	58.4	45.7		100

the outset of this chapter.

WHAT BECOMES AN OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF "MERIT?"

"Higher vacancies were to be filled by promotion from within on the basis of relative merit and standing in the Service."[18] The principle of merit was established in the Rogers Act of 1924 as a guiding precept of the career service. Several abuses in the FS led early civil service reformers to emphasize the merit criterion. Political meddling in the appointment of foreign affairs officers was of particular concern. In addition, poor remuneration meant that private means rather than ability became the criterion for appointment.

Only recently have the limitations of merit principles become apparent. Merit criteria employed still restricted entry to members of the elite who were able to afford the liberal education necessary to pass tough written and oral examinations. The democratization of the Service did not automatically result from the establishment of merit criteria. Today the Service still recruits from the exceptionally talented, but at each stage the talent pool far exceeds the number chosen. An operational definition of "merit," as it relates to the FS promotion process, is not a question of finding adequate talent and conspicuous ability for the conduct of foreign relations. The FS is certainly not lacking on either of these grounds. We must then begin to ask why the merit principle continues to play such an important role in the process of evaluation and promotion.

Efficiency Reports and the Subculture of the Foreign Service

What is the relationship between formal merit criteria and promotion decisions? The personnel files of individual officers are augmented each year by the inclusion of efficiency reports prepared by supervisory officers, evaluations of FS inspectors, data from

Washington-end users, and other information relating to performance. Those on the Selection Boards are directed particularly to give their attention to three factors covered by these personnel records.

First, they are to consider the growth potential of each officer, looking particularly at such factors as intellectual caliber, breadth of vision, executive ability, leadership and self-development efforts. Secondly, they are to consider the quality of the officer's past performance; particular attention here is devoted to such characteristics as the quality and timeliness of work, initiative, judgment, ability to communicate - both orally and in written work - versatility and language skills. Finally, members of each Selection Board are to assess the personal characteristics and qualifications of the individual as a representative of the FS. Here, assessment is to focus on such characteristics as conduct, character, service discipline, relationships with others, adaptability and representational ability of the officer and his or her family.

Is it possible to make ranking decisions using these criteria? If one were to examine a cross-section of the American population on these characteristics, vague though they are, it might be possible to combine the many elements into a uni-dimensional estimate of merit. Even in the FS, a generally unfavorable impression created on a number of these dimensions would alert the reviewing officer to weaknesses in the individual's record. Similarly, if the individual rated received laudatory evaluations on each of these dimensions, then special action would be appropriate. Generally such evaluations are very difficult in the Officer Corps. First, the FS is already a select population. Second, there are strong informal norms operating within the Service to prevent either extremely favorable or unfavorable

evaluations;[19] there tends to be little variance in the annual efficiency reports. As John Harr points out in his study of FS careers, "The overwhelming tendency for supervisors is to avoid the polar extremes and to bunch their evaluations within the middle to relatively high numerical factors."[20]

Among the many consequences of the low variance in the merit ratings is the orientation which FS Officers develop toward assignments outside the mainstream of the Departmental work.

> Repeated pleas transmitted to . . . [those in charge of assignments] to assign 'good' senior FSO's to AID - especially the Alliance for Progress - went unsatisfied. The officers simply were not available. CIA is shunned because it is feared that the security cloak may make time spent there a blank in a man's career. For different reasons, the situation is similar in the case of other agencies. One never knows who is going to write one's efficiency report in Agency X, and whether he will understand the requirements of the FSO promotion system. An allied fear is that members of the State Department promotion boards may not be equipped to appreciate the value of experience in certain other agencies. (emphasis mine)[21]

If this system of evaluation does not provide adequate bases for differentiating between officers, why is it maintained? Why has the system not been changed? Although it is difficult to identify causes, it is quite clear that the maintenance of the evaluation system does not conflict with the interests of all parties involved. Reports of the 1971 Task Force on Reorganization in the Department and a perceptive article authored by Donald Warwick, have both pointed out that the principle of supervisor evaluation based on these criteria has operated to encourage the passivity of FS Officers.[22] Andrew Scott has pointed out in his brief article, "The Informal Culture of the Foreign Service," that there is considerable hesitation among members of the Officer Corps to openly or actively disagree with the decisions of superiors.[23] In an atmosphere where individuals hesitate to

disagree with a supervisor who provides the annual evaluations, it is not surprising that distance in interpersonal relations and a lack of firmness in policy matters seem to characterize the contemporary FS.[24]

Presented thus far have been a brief outline of the formal prescriptions of the promotion process, and some discussion of how these prescriptions actually operate - in other words, how the notion of "merit" becomes operationally defined. In many ways, the formal prescriptions do define quite accurately the manner in which the promotion process operates. There is an annual review of the record of each FS Officer. Selection Boards are appointed annually with one board reviewing the records of all officers in each class. The personnel files do provide a major focus in these annual evaluations, as do annual efficiency reports written by each officer's superior giving evaluations on those dimensions listed in the precepts. A rank order register is prepared for each class, and this register provides the order in which officers are promoted. The actual number promoted is dependent of course upon the administrative decisions of the Office of the Director General according to budgetary, statutory and manpower constraints. At the same time, however, the prescribed promotion process is too general and too devoid of political content to enable us to understand the differential promotion rates which have repeatedly been the subject of discussion, both within and outside the FS.

As I have just suggested, the operational definition of merit is critical. By examining the content of the selection precepts and the efficiency reports based upon those precepts, one begins to develop a sense of why the formal prescriptions are hopelessly inadequate for understanding many of the dynamics of the promotion process. There are two reasons why this is so. First, as John E. Harr has

pointed out in his study for FS careers, "the Selection Boards have found it very difficult to balance all the factors they were asked to take into account in ranking officers competitively within their class."[25] Many qualitative dimensions are reviewed in both the precepts and the efficiency reports. It should not be surprising, given what we know to be the limits on human decision-making capacity, that the evaluation task has been extremely difficult.[26] Secondly, as the FS experiment in the use of quantitative (numerical) ratings has demonstrated clearly, the annual evaluations received by the Selection Boards exhibit very little variance. To rank officers, the Selection Boards have either been forced to find variation in the efficiency ratings or have had to find other criteria on which to base their evaluations of individual officers.

Organizational Constraints: Bureaucratic Structure and the Definition of Merit

The organization of the promotion process in the FS itself has important implications for the distribution of promotions. Clearly, some of the most important organizational constraints are those already discussed. At the input side we have the efficiency reports; at the output side, the necessity for the rank ordering of officers within each class. Of course the processes which we observe are derivative of these relationships. The FS experiment in the use of numerical ratings for officers was an attempt by some well intentioned administrators to more meaningfully implement the formally established procedures. The experiment failed, in large part because informal norms within the FS proscribe this form of evaluation. As a consequence of this failure to develop quantitative measures, those on the Selection Boards developed other evaluative criteria as a

legitimate means for transforming a multi-dimensional, undifferentiated input into a uni-dimensional output.

Another device which aids in the evaluation and ranking process has been the introduction of a seniority principle. How does seniority fit with merit? An adquate evaluation according to the promotion precepts can only be completed once an officer has had sufficient time in class for his/her performance to be adequately assessed. In practical terms, this principle has been used as the explanation for the introduction of "time in class" rules. Although the length of time which an officer is expected to spend in a given class before he or she can be considered for promotion, has varied considerably over the years, the net effect of this organizational device has been to substantially reduce both the number of officers who must annually be reviewed with elaborate care, and at the same time to reduce the number of officers who must be hierarchically ranked for the rank-order register. Although officers are reminded that exceptions can be made to time-in-class rules, the general expectations among members of the FS suggest that such exceptions are seldom anticipated even in the case of meritorious service.

It seems plausible to argue in light of this situation that whatever the political orientation of those who serve on these Selection Boards, the difficulty of transforming the input of the promotion process to produce the desired output will drive individual members of the Selection Board to find some criterion by which to differentiate between officers and on which to base their particular rank-order decisions.

> The selection boards are expected to give weight to specialization, to inter-agency assignments, to long-term training assignments, to personality attributes, to linguistic accomplishments,

> to long-term service Washington. They are asked not to place a man low in the rankings just because he was promoted very recently, as they might do in order to make room at the top for others who had not been promoted in a number of years. On the contrary, they are to speed very able officers through the ranks. How can they balance all these factors equitably when they have a limited number of rewards to dispense? How are they to compare, say, a budget and fiscal officer who is competent in his work, who wants to stay in it, and is not qualified for other work, with a generalist who has demonstrated competence in economic and political work: How are they to compare an expert in international finance with a general economic reporting officer?[27]

Given these expectations, it is not surprising that the definition of merit used in the evaluation of FS Officers begins to assume dimensions which permit members of the Selection Boards to perform their organizational task. As the Herter Commission Reports of 1962 pointed out, "Unlike most other organizations, public and private, the FS ranks all officers against one another according to highly generalized criteria and without specific regard to Department needs at each successively higher level."[28] (emphasis my own)

The Foreign Service has long maintained a rather vague but nevertheless distinctive image of what constitutes the "good" FS Officer; and, given the definition of a rank-order register, it has been possible to preserve this ideal under a Service guided by the merit principle. As pointed out in the previous chapter, there is a widespread belief that the best way to get ahead in the FS is in the general area of political work. For those not sharing these views when they enter the Service, there are pervasive and subtle pressures which operate to build and reinforce this orientation. Traditional functions and traditional career lines provide a far more secure route for upward mobility in the FS than do innovative patterns.[29] This is reinforced by the strength of the FS culture and the composition of the Selection Boards themselves.

Interviews with those involved in the personnel and promotion processes within the FS provided important clues to understanding how Selection Boards generate rank-order lists. Because they are restricted to information available within the officer's personnel file, it was not possible in cases of doubt to solicit informally the information about particular officers which would provide another basis for evaluation. At the same time, however, available within the file of each officer is a complete history of his or her FS career, including the time and place of all assignments, information on functional tasks performed, records of training and language skills, background information on place of birth, education and previous work history, and other miscellaneous items used in the assignment process. For the individual FS Officer, the importance of assignments during the course of his or her career is outweighed in importance only by the promotion system.[30]

Assignments, unlike promotions, are very much within the purview of political pressure and maneuver. Despite the norms of openness to Service anywhere in the world, members of the Officer Corps are very aware how assignments influence careers. There is considerable jockeying to avoid the least desirable posts and assignments and to gain those which are considered more advantageous for one's career.[31] Reputation and the informal network of the Department play an extremely critical role in the assignment process. For that reason, the history of assignments in a rather complex way provides an index of standing in the FS. This portion of the officer's record provides major guidance in the allocation of promotions - official rhetoric not withstanding.

This is not to argue that there is a direct and simple relationship between the pattern of officer assignments and promotion. Indeed,

one of the reasons that the system remains is that the relationships are so subtle.[32] It is well known that lateral entrants into the FS fare less well before the Selection Boards than those who entered at the beginning of the FS promotion ladder. A Herter Commission review of the 1960 rankings of the Selection Board revealed that about five times as many officers with both a political and geographical specialization appeared in the highest 10 percent as in the lowest; whereas, in contrast, almost twice as many of those who specialized in administration or intelligence and research appeared in the lowest tenth as in the highest.[33] The general statistics tend to be well known and in response to these statistics, considerable political pressure had been placed on the FS to change the distribution of officer promotions, to promote lateral entrants more rapidly. At the same time, there has been no challenge to the notion that merit competition among officers should be the basis upon which members of the FS are evaluated for promotion. What I propose is that we examine more closely how "merit" is defined within the FS and why it is defined in that manner. Such an examination is implied in the models described below.

One might ask if this approach does not seem to imply a willful, non-compliance by the FS with the initial provisions written into the statutes governing promotion in the FS. How could such a system ever be considered legitimate? On the contrary, members of the FS see themselves above crass political games; they merely apply the most adequate definition of merit which can be established. What I hypothesize, however, is that this system and the definition of merit which rewards political officers and is consistent with other unique Foreign Service values are directly responsible for the promotion outcomes which have been observed. The FS promotion process is, like

many institutions in our society, based on universalistic principles and yet generates outcomes with highly political parameters, i.e., outcomes which, unlike the merit principle, are not universally accepted as legitimate by all those affected.

In summary, among the various alternatives which would have enabled the Selection Boards to bridge the gap between the input which they were given and the output which they were expected to produce, the Selection Boards have relied extensively on the career histories of particular officers and on the seniority principle as bases for their decisions. I have argued, as well, that in the presence of a strong informal culture within the FS, and a history in which those most closely approximating the traditional "good" FS Officer were most rapidly promoted, it should not be surprising that assignment histories are important.

Selection Board Composition: Organizational Socialization and Group Dynamics

Some of those who drafted the legislation governing promotion processes appear to have been generally aware of the public accountability issue raised when a group of public employees is a completely self-perpetuating body.[34] For that reason, a number of provisions were built into the initial legislation which guaranteed outside input - both at the top of the FS administration in the Board of the FS, and in the Selection Board for each class (composed of 5-7 persons). The concept of the "public member" grew from recognition that some form of general public accountability was needed even when promotion was based on "merit" criteria. Although important in itself, the issue of the public member raises more generic questions concerning the composition of the Selection Boards.

Given the vagueness in formal definitions of "merit," it becomes rather important which individuals are chosen to serve on the annual Selection Boards. Generally, two characteristics are important in the selection of Board members. First, whatever the functional or geographical specialty of the officer, a very serious attempt is made to select from among those available for assignment the officers who most closely fit the image of "the good FS Officer." Some attempt has been made particularly in recent years to make sure that these officers are somewhat representative of the different functional skills and area specialities required by the Department of State. The other characteristic of Selection Board members is their seniority. Selection Board members must be at least one class above that group which they are ranking, and generally they are drawn from the top grades in the Service.

Why does it make a difference which groups are represented on the Selection Boards? First, as noted above, because the precise criterion which enable the Selection Boards to rank officers are not clearly specified, those serving on the boards exercise considerable discretion. Second, given this latitude, we can expect Selection Board members to reward officers with those characteristics they consider most important. Because these officers are considered among the best according to the general evaluation criteria, we might expect them, whatever their age, to be among the most likely to defend the traditional conception of the FS.[35] Third, because the officers chosen to serve on the Selection Boards have considerably more seniority than the average, we might well expect them to have more completely assimilated the subculture of the FS than would be the case of a younger officer. The literature on organizational socialization suggests

that those deeply involved in their professions at the later stages of their careers exhibit high congruence between the personal values and the professional values.[36]

The members of the FS are cognizant of orientations among Selection Board members. The resistance to assignments which take them out of prescribed career patterns, for example administrative or consular assignments for a mid-career or senior Officer, or detail to another agency, is justified on the grounds that members of the Selection Board will tend not to give them as much credit for off-beat assignments as they would receive when favorably evaluated for performance of more traditional, better understood duties.[37] The greater rates of promotion of political officers are also interpreted as a consequence of Selection Board composition in which the striving to find seemly competent members of the FS to serve on these Boards has traditionally led to an over-balance of political officers in these positions. As the following table suggests, the actual outcomes of the promotion process suggest that some of the more traditional functions are heavily represented in the Selection Board composition. (see Table 3)

As mentioned above, the drafters of the 1946 FS Act took into account the political pressures to avoid a self-perpetuating Service by the inclusion of at least one public member on each Selection Board. The issue for those who sought to prevent the self-perpetuation of the FS "guild" was one of public accountability. The presence of the public member guaranteed, at least procedurally, some possibility for the representation of non-FS interests in the ranking decisions.

Any evaluation of the success of the public member system must deal with two factors which mitigate the effectiveness of the

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CDC SKILLS AND RATING BY SELECTION BOARDS

	Upper 10%		Lower 10%		
Primary Skill	Units	%	Units	%	Units Total
Political Area Specialty (1960)	59	83	12	17	71
Political Area Specialty (1961)	50	71	20	29	70
Economic Area Specialty (1960)	19	70	8	30	27
Economic Area Specialty (1961)	16	64	9	36	25
Other Political Specialties including General (1961)	26	63	15	37	41
Intelligence Research (1961)	18	58	13	42	31
Other Political Specialties including General (1960)	21	54	18	46	39
Other Economic Specialties including General (1961)	37	53	33	47	70
Other Economic Specialties including General (1960)	36	51	34	49	70
Consular (1960)	31	51	30	49	61
General Administration (1961)	18	50	18	50	36
Public Affairs (1960)	9	47	10	53	19
General Administration (1960)	14	47	16	53	30
Miscellaneous (1961)	3	43	4	57	7
Consular (1961)	34	46	40	54	74
Public Affairs (1961)	8	36	14	64	22
Intelligence Research (1960)	11	34	21	66	32
Miscellaneous (1960)	3	30	7	70	10
Specialized Administration (1961)	18	25	54	75	72
Specialized Administration (1960)	16	21	59	79	75

Source: Program Management and Planning Staff, Department of State

arrangement. The first is selection. Very often, because of the extensive time requirements, public members are retirees from other government agencies or the private sector who have had some experience or interest in foreign affairs. Generally, those selected by the administration of the FS to perform these roles accept the basic premises upon which the FS operates. Articles which appear periodically in the Department's in-house publication, written by the public members of Selection Boards, suggest that there is general support from these individuals of the seriousness with which members on the individual Selection Boards approach their task.[39] Competitive ranking within a class, the definition of "merit," and the uni-dimensionality of the output of the ranking process are seldom questioned.

The second factor mitigating the effectiveness of the public members is the situation in which they find themselves. As in most small, task-oriented groups, there are considerable pressures for conformity. Particularly during those times when there was only one public member on each Board, the social psychological dynamics of the group situation could be expected to increase the pressures for conformity. In general, the public members are unfamiliar with the mechanics of the Selection Board system, lack the experience of their fellow members with the general evaluation system, and have difficulty understanding the subtle relationships between assignment and promotion. In the face of these pressures, it should not be surprising that they look to the more experienced FS Officers for guidance. Lacking concrete alternatives, it is difficult to avoid the pressures for cooptation which the arrangement contains.

In sum, we find that the Selection Boards which play such an integral role in the promotion process, tend to reflect in composition

those portions of the FS most wedded to the traditional conception of the FS Officer. With the acquiescence of the public members, these officers engage in a very serious and careful evaluation. In the course of this evaluation, merit is very concretely defined, to reflect the honest efforts of these men and women to promote only the most qualified. The latent consequence of this procedure is the distribution of FS Officer promotions which was discussed above.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS: BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE AND THE DEFINITION OF CAREER

In the discussion of FS promotion, there has been very little consideration of how the operation of the Selection Boards and the career system of the FS articulate with the manpower needs of the Department of State. This lack of attention results not from oversight but from the amazing lack of interface between the promotion process and the manpower needs of the Department during most of the period covered by the study. Only recently have planners within the Department and FS Administration been able to develop a system of career forecasting and job projection which have made it possible to begin to merge these two systems.

Nevertheless, it would be highly inaccurate to examine the FS promotion process as if it operated in a vacuum. For the independence which the FS enjoys can hardly be described as accidental. As in any organization which perceives itself to be in conflict with those in the immediate environment, the administration of the FS has expended considerable energy in protecting the central technologies which it considers vital for institutional preservation.[40]

One type of independence which has characterized the promotion process has been the operation of promotion without significant input

from the immediate manpower needs of the Department. The most significant impacts of those manpower needs have been on the overall size of the FS and on the presence of specialists within its ranks. Neither of these developments, although they have posed problems for the promotion system, has led to a significant alteration of that promotion system. Other adaptations, such as the development of extensive training programs, and the existence of the FS Reserve Officer Corps, have been in direct response to the particular needs of American overseas representation. Both have operated as buffers to the Officer Corps itself by absorbing officers who could not be suitably placed and by providing manpower without expanding the Career Service respectively.

The consequence of this divorce has been a situation in which the FS administration rather than external clients has been able to largely determine the dimensions according to which officers were ranked for promotion. The significance of particular assignments, which I have argued is critical for understanding differential promotions, is determined by the FS. When the criteria of the FS could not be changed, whole new organizations were established to handle the new functions - most notably AID and USIA. The fact that prized skills in the FS may not be highly valued elsewhere (and vice versa) is clearly recognized by officers who consider even temporary assignments to other agencies where their evaluators will not be members of the FS Officer Corps. Compared with other public sector organizations, the FS Adminstration and the Office of the Director General are able to exercise an unusual degree of control (in the broadest sense of that term) over the composition and orientation of the FS Officer Corps.

In a situation of perceived conflict between the goals of an organization (in this case, the Administration of the FS) and the goals

of outsiders (in this case, the Department of State, other agencies with overseas presence, and other branches of the government), autonomy from environmental control is a hard-won commodity. The independence which the FS enjoyed during the decades of the fifties and sixties was in large part insured by the careful work of those who drafted the 1946 Foreign Service Act. The whole conception of a career service as developed in the 1946 Act was focused on the need for the FS to be independent of environmental pressures in order to develop high caliber overseas representation for the United States. With the exception of several individuals in the Bureau of the Budget, very few governmental officials either recognized or were concerned about the potential difficulties which might arise if no clear connection were established between specific manpower needs of the Department of State and the career system of the FS.

The debate which centered around two provisions of that Act is illustrative in this context. First, under the Foreign Service Act of 1946 two additional categories of FS personnel were placed under FS Administration. The first, the FS Staff category, had effectively been in operation for a long period of time. Its purpose was principally to provide a personnel system which was somewhat more flexible than that established under the Civil Service for personnel whose careers were spent largely overseas. The second category, that of the FS Reserve Officer, also had its precedent in the Auxiliary, developed during the war and in the immediate post-war years. At the same time, the development of the FS Reserve established another set of principles and in effect provided another buffer for the FS Officer Corps. Reserve Officers were not hired to spend whole careers in overseas work, but nevertheless possessed skills needed by government agencies (in

particular, the Department of State) for the execution of their operations. One of the important consequences of the FS Reserve system has been somewhat different, however. The existence of the FS Reserve has provided the Administration of the FS with an important buffer to lessen the discrepancy between manpower needs and available skills within the FS OfficerCorps. When the Department has new manpower needs, FS Reserve Officers have been hired to fill those positions, thus taking the immediate pressure off the FS to establish some clear connection between its promotion policies and the needs of overseas staffing.

A second set of provisions in the 1946 Act involved lateral entry of officers into the career service, again to provide the FS with skills needed to fill Departmental manpower needs. Lateral entry positions were not a new concept with the FS, for the initial idea had been stated even prior to the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924. At the same time, the potential for lateral entry had never been realized. Only when one understands the structure of a career system and the basic relationship between vacancies at any level in the Service and promotions from lower grades in the Service, can one begin to comprehend the resistance to lateral entry. The FS has effectively nullified the potential utility of lateral entry as a means for bridging the gap between available manpower skills and requirements. The only time when lateral entry provisions were utilized to any extent, during the Wriston program in the mid-to late-fifties, the resulting shock in the FS was sufficiently great to continue to have ramifications 15 years after the point when these officers were admitted.

Two important observations come from this brief discussion. The first is a recognition that the relative independence and autonomy

which we find in the operation of the promotion system of the American FS is the result of a sequence of actions by those within the FS itself designed to assure just this kind of autonomy. The savvy with which this process was developed was a true testimony to the ability of the Officer Corps. The second lesson is less directly related to the promotion process. This is merely a recognition that, given a career service, there are a great many constraints which such a service places upon manpower flexibility and adaptability.[41] It is almost inconceivable that those involved in the initial selection of FS Officers could anticipate 30 years in advance the needs of the Department of State for top-level program direction. In this situation, it is not surprising that the Administration of the FS has felt it necessary to preserve the promotion process from the fluctuating manpower needs of the Department. For given such a structural definition and the size of the FS, it is almost impossible to meet those changing needs from the manpower of the FS Officer Corps.

In summary, one begins to see the inadequacy of examining particular promotion decisions from a perspective which places major consideration on short-term dynamics. It is very important to understand the manner in which the definition of a "career system," the definition of "merit," and the actual operation of bureaucratic structures sharply constrain the arena of political controversy. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that these constraints are by no means haphazard. Members of the FS Officer Corps are generally quite aware that the definition of a career service gives them an important measure of control and an important tool for the management of the careers of individual officers. This helps to explain why this central technology and its associated ramifications are so vigorously

defended by members of the Officer Corps. In general, the change to a merit promotion system, the inclusion of public members on the Selection Boards, and the overall increase in the size and complexity of the FS have been accepted with grace by most of those in the Officer Corps. Even those who resisted these changes most stoutly, have come to recognize that in many essential respects they have increased the legitimacy of the FS in the eyes of the general public while, at the same time, not challenging the central tenents of the FS "guild."

HOW DO WE STUDY ALL THIS?: An Overview of Promotion Models

Social scientists have used several perspectives to describe the generation of organizational outcomes. Graham Allison identifies three.[42] First, bureaucratic outputs are interpreted as the result of rational policy considerations. According to this model, the alternatives are detailed, the effects of each alternative are evaluated, and that policy is chosen which produces the greatest good.[43] In the case of FS promotions, our interviews suggest that this model is inappropriate. There is, to be sure, considerable talk and not a small amount of organizational effort devoted to the discussion of these criteria. At the same time, it leaves a great deal to be desired if we are to understand and to eventually develop a systematic theory of bureaucratic functioning.

A second formulation discussed by Allison envisions the policy outcomes as the product of domestic and organizational politics.[44] Generally, analysts of this school begin by identifying the relevant political positions and organizational locations of the various participants. From this perspective, the outcome or final policy decision is a compromise reflecting the persuasive abilities and

relative political strength of the partisans.[45] In the discussion presented above, there has been considerable emphasis on FS promotion as a political process. Nevertheless, a perspective which uses organizational politics in the short term, as is true in most policy analysis, fails in two important respects. First, it does not recognize that in any political situation the range of debate and argument and the eventual compromise all take place within highly prescribed boundaries and according to clearly understood processes. Second, it fails to acknowledge that these processes themselves - the mode and the context for any political conflict - are also important determinants of the outcomes. To understand, for example, the relationship between assignment and promotion in the FS, one cannot look solely at the Selection Boards but must consider (1) the culture of the FS, (2) the content of the annual evaluations, (3) the composition of the Selection Boards, and (4) the ability of the FS to manage careers by evaluating assignments without external intervention.

A third view discussed by Allison is reflected in the work of analysts who identify the major constraints on policy alternatives as a by-product of bureaucratic organization. In this view the constraints and orientations of the participants in their organizational roles receive paramount consideration. The outcome reflects the particular organizational blinders and the structural inflexibility available to the decision-maker. In many ways, this third perspective offers some of the greatest insights into the problem to be investigated. At the same time, however, it is a mistake to understand organizational constraints apart from political considerations. The structure of the FS career can be considered an organizational constraint upon the flexibility in the assignment of personnel within the

Department of State. From the perspective of the individual officer, the career system can be considered a constraint on the nature of work which he is permitted to perform.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to consider the career service an organizational process over which no one has power to influence outcomes. The Officer Corps in its present form has many defenders - both within the Department of State and from among the ranks of the FS. Given the "reality" of life, the existence of the career service and the legitimacy of the concept provide helpful buffers to pressures from outside the Department. One seldom finds an organization whose bureaucratic structure and standard operating procedures meet the needs of no members and no clients.

In the models of the FS promotion process which are presented in succeeding chapters, I have combined the second and third perspectives outlined by Graham Allison. They also rely heavily on a behavioral theory of organization, identified with the work of the Carnegie-Mellon School. The work of the Carnegie group provides several useful precedents. Our goal, it will be recalled, is to model not only the final output of organizations, but also the procedures, processes and decision rules used to transform the informational input (career data and efficiency reports) into organizational output (rank-ordering of officers in each class). The premises of satisficing and uncertainty avoidance, particularly as utilized in the models of March and Cyert (1963), Clarkson (1962), Crecine (1969), and Wildavsky (1964), closely approximate the orientation of those involved in the individual Selection Boards.

At the same time, in order to understand the actual parameters used in the decision-making process (why seniority, why assignment

histories?), it is essential to look at the larger political issues which operate within this microcosm. Interestingly enough, those involved in the promotion processes themselves were far more cognizant of these political dynamics than I had initially expected. There was also considerable awareness of the operation of bureaucratic constraints both within the career service as a whole and as they affected individual officers.

The Models of Foreign Service Promotion

The review of the literature on the FS promotion process and extensive interviews with those involved in the FS Administration have provided a list of parameters to be included in the analysis and hundreds of hunches and hypotheses to be tested. Three models describing FS promotion are employed in the analysis. Two of them, a seniority and background model, have been developed to explore two of the major alternatives said to operate either in conjunction with or in preference to a merit promotion system. The third, a process model based both in interviews and insights from literature on organizational decision making, includes decision-making routines and parameters which closely resemble operations in the Selection Boards themselves. In this latter model, I have attempted to document both process and outcomes.

Seniority Model:

Interview evidence and written material on the FS career system both reaffirm theoretically based hunches concerning the importance of seniority as a major variable in the promotion process. For individual officers, time in grade before promotion is an important indicator of standing in the FS. As John Harr points out in his study of career development in the FS,

> All FSO's are well aware of the approximate length of time one should spend in each grade. For the great majority the fear is not one of languishing in grade until the point of automatic selection-out is reached but of exceeding the average time in grade, for this is read as a clear sign that one is on the way to becoming a member of "out-group" instead of the "in-group."[46]

Furthermore, very few officers experience very rapid mobility.[47] As the Feinstein Study reveals, during the mid-career years, rapid promotion to one grade tends to be balanced with slower promotion to the next or vice versa.[48] These observations lead us to expect that a simple seniority model, in which officers of a particular cohort or grade are promoted when they reach the average time in class, should account for a large proportion of the variance in FS Officer careers. Based on the sketchy evidence now available, we would further hypothesize that the differences found at later stages in the FS career are attributable to small variations in seniority at the time of promotion for each stage in an officer's career. Thus, we expect one who is consistently promoted slightly more rapidly than the average rate to reach pinacle of the FS, whereas his counterpart who is consistently promoted more slowly than the average might be expected to retire long before he has reached the top grades in the Service.

As mentioned above, seniority conflicts with an open merit system. But pressures of general morale in a career service and the absence of more precise and meaningful criteria on which to base merit promotions together have led to the adoption of a seniority principle. In general terms, the seniority model operates as follows:

1. It is characterized by annual iterations which are parallel with the annual review and evaluation process.

2. The model works from a cohort base. The objective is to

follow through the career histories of a group of officers which has entered the FS during a single year. This group is referred to as a cohort.[49] Unlike using a particular class or grade as a base for analysis and for comparative purposes, the cohort remains a stable reference point over a long period of time. If a class base were used, the population being analyzed would change annually as some are promoted out of the particular class and others moved into it.

3. A variety of seniority indices are used. Verbal descriptions of the FS promotion process which refer to seniority are generally imprecise about the particular measure employed. Those who referred to seniority during the interviews also used different indices. Calculations for the years 1960-1962, included in John Harr's study of career development in the FS, utilized a number of measures in their computation.[50] Five indices of seniority taken from these different sources have been employed in the model. They include age of the officer, time in the FS, time in the Department of State, a service computation time (represents adjustments for previous governmental service), and the amount of time which an officer spends in each class or grade.

4. Given the enormous problems involved in amassing longituninal data on FS careers, the averages for seniority are calculated on a less than ideal base. The population includes all officers serving in November 1969. Thereby excluded is data on all those who have been separated from the Service, and all cases in which information on early FS careers is not included in the public record. Such missing data are, as one might expect, more frequent the further one goes back into the history of the Officer Corps.

The specifics of the seniority model are included in Chapter IV,

describing the outcome of the simulations using seniority princples.

Background Model:

Social background has long been considered an important variable in the analysis of elites.[51] Although the roots of the tradition are difficult to trace, the focus of studies in this tradition appear to be two-fold. At a most general level, the claim of inadequate representation has often supported the claims of contenders for elite positions. The objective is to ascertain the extent to which civil servants are broadly representative of the general population. Several studies of higher civil servants have focused on the extent to which the state was indeed dominated by a particular segment of the society. Kelsall's study, HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN BRITAIN, is one of the best in this tradition. A number of American studies have attempted similar analyses.[53] A second objective of many social background studies, to identify the consequences of particular recruitment patterns, has not been achieved. Ralph Miliband's, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY, has most successfully gone beyond limits of narrow empirical tradition to ask the sweeping questions about the operation of the state which make such data meaningful.

The inquiry into the social backgrounds of FS Officers focused initially on recruitment patterns. FS critics sought to change recruitment patterns on the theory that major reorientations in the character of the Service would follow. More recently, attention has focused on the relationship between social background and the attainment of senior positions in the FS. Segal and Willick, in their article, "The Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns in Agencies Under Stress," found the proportion of Career Minister appointees holding bachelors degrees from Harvard, Yale or Princeton to have

increased in recent years even though the overall proportion of recruits from these backgrounds declined. Interviews with members of the Service suggest that these relationships are recognized by members of the Officer Corps.

The model which employs social background variables as the principal predictors of career patterns within the FS uses multiple indices of social backgrounds. "College of undergraduate education," "major field of study," and "region of birth" are used as indicators of pre-Service background. Unfortunately, many of the traditional measures used in the study of social class are not available for the inquiry. Like other models, the calculations are based on an annual iteration representing the yearly officer review. Again, the cohort rather than the class or grade of an officer, provides the basic unit for comparison. The data are restricted by the inclusion in calculation only of those officers who were present in the FS in November 1969. Specific details of the model are included in the general discussion presented in Chapter V.

Selection Board Model:

The task in the development of the selection board model is not only to explain in greater detail the process by which ranking decisions are made, but also to increase the precision of the fit between the simulation and actual promotion outcomes. As a result, elements of both seniority and background models are included in the selection board model. Interviews suggest that seniority principles do have an important influence on the probability of promotion in any given year; and, although they are less important than previously assumed, background variables are also used in Selection Board decisions. Nevertheless, the particular sequence of assignments which

characterize an officer's career are critical for explaining variance in promotion rates, particularly in those situations when efficiency report information provides an insufficient base for evaluation.

The manner in which assignments influence promotion outcomes has been only vaguely understood. There is widespread acceptance in the FS of the rightness of a balance between good and bad assignments for all.[54] At the same time, even for those who consider themselves generalists, there are clearly modal career patterns. All officers are expected particularly during mid-career years, to develop expertise of some sort. For some, this expertise may be reflected in the development of an area specialty, complete with special language training, and possibly even a leave of absence in a university setting. For others, a functional specialty may be developed. During all this time the norms concerning rotation and the distribution of good and bad assignments are still applied. The result is a very complex pattern of assignments for which it is difficult to identify modal career and tracking patterns.

Despite the complexity, internal stratification within the FS makes each assignment critical for the individual officer. From the perspective of a Selection Board, the particular matrix of assignments provides an index of the officer's reputation. It is only at the senior level in the FS that the precepts themselves begin to reflect these distributional requirements. For those being considered for promotion to Career Minister, "The precepts state that typically such an officer will have developed his exceptional qualities in one or more of the major functional fields of the FS . . . and will have had experience in synthesizing the several functional areas. He probably will have been assigned to another agency and have taken

senior training in the course of his career, and his career 'will have been more noteworthy for initiative than for caution.'"[55]

The Selection Board model is constructed to closely approximate the annual review process. As a result, the basic probabilities of promotion are determined by seniority criteria. Beyond that point, these probabilities are adjusted in accordance with the officer's record. The particular officer assignments and the background characteristics of each officer are considered and the basic promotion probabilities determined by seniority criteria are adjusted upward or downward in light of these data.

The weights given to specific assignments, both within the traditional FS posts and to outside agencies or training positions, has been determined empirically. Both the narratives on the FS and the "shop talk" of the officers themselves are interspersed with references to particular incidents which have affected promotion outcomes, both in the short term and over the course of individual careers. The modal patterns outlined by Janowitz in THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER - the routine career, prescribed career, and innovative career - all have their counterparts within the FS.[56] Cases of sponsorship by important ambassadors or senior officials in the Department are as present in the FS as they are in other occupational settings. Visibility clearly influences the desirability of positions. Some training assignments carry with them high prestige and an implicit promise for a bright future. Others may either provide a vehicle for shunting particular individuals into specialties, or may serve as fringe benefits for those less rewarded by frequent promotion. One can review a whole catalogue of specific hypotheses concerning the significance of particular assignments; the simulation makes it possible to generalize

upon these individual experiences and untested hypotheses, and to begin to develop general principles about the operation of the FS as a career system.

CHAPTER IV

THE SENIORITY MODEL

From all sources there are important indications that seniority is one of the major components determining promotion rates in the American FS. Statistical summaries cited in the previous chapter are evidence of significant regularities in the seniority of officers at each level in the Service.[1] The precepts used by the Selection Boards themselves include a variety of time-in-class prescriptions which, although they set only the outside limits, suggest seniority is an important dimension in promotion considerations.[2] Interviews with personnel administrators and those involved in Selection Board processes also suggest the importance of seniority. Finally, and certainly as convincing as other pieces of information, there is a substantial body of theory on organizational behavior and decision-making processes which suggests that the complex ranking task facing the annual Selection Boards must rely on calculations of seniority and other easily quantifiable indices of officer eligibility for promotion.[3]

At the same time, seniority does not, and was not expected to be, the sole determinant of promotion. To look only at seniority is to ignore many of the interesting variables influencing promotion in the Officer Corps. For this reason the seniority model presented in this chapter is but a rough approximation of FS promotion dynamics. Through it we can see how promotion in the FS would operate were it determined solely by the specified seniority criteria. Does seniority produce a career system substantially different from the real world? Where is the seniority model weakest? The data from the seniority model help answer these questions and, in turn, help to focus the inquiry which follows.

The seniority model as conceived here implies a highly circumscribed task for Selection Boards and their place in the FS promotion process. If we could explain a large part of the variance in promotion outcomes using seniority, very practical questions could be raised about the actual contributions of the annual evaluation and review process. Were it possible to generate the same results, using only seniority criteria, then in fact there is no reason why promotion could not be more adequately handled through the development of relatively simple computer programs. If, on the other hand, the results of the seniority model are significantly divergent from actual promotions, then it may be fruitful to expand the model to include additional variables.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SENIORITY MODEL

The definition of "seniority" as used by members of the FS is seldom precise. In the context of the same interview, a respondent may refer to seniority several times, each time using a different referent. To decrease the complexity of the seniority model, an attempt was made to find a common definition on which to base calculations. The result of this exploration was the specification of five indices of seniority. They are as follows:

1. Time since entry into the FS: In the minds of many officers and in some of the statistics calculated on FS promotion, seniority of an officer is measured from the time at which he entered the FS. Generally, I have referred to this date of entry as the cohort year. Although officers may enter at several points during a given year, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the year of entry provides an important referent for members of the Officer Corps.

2. Time since entry into the Department of State: Although

the point at which one entered the FS is most often the critical referent, for a variety of reasons many of the Officers who join the FS via the examination route spend some time in the Department of State prior to entry. For these officers it is reasonable to expect that their additional experience should in some way give them an advantage in the promotion process over their colleagues lacking such credentials upon their formal entry into the Officer Corps. For those whose entry into the FS marks their first experience in the Department of State, these dates should coincide. If this reasoning is correct, time since entry into the DOS should be a slightly better indicator of promotability than time since entry into the FS, without previous Department service taken into account.

3. Service computation time: The "SERV-COMP" seniority measure is basically a further refinement of the time since entry into the FS calculation. As in other branches of governmental service, those with previous experience in the armed forces or other governmental agencies often adapt more quickly during the first years.

4. Age: A number of statistical studies reveal that during the past 15 years the average age of officers in each grade has varied only slightly. Although age was not mentioned in interviews as an important index of seniority, it was felt that this might be a consequence of the relatively homogeneous age of entering cohorts, rather than the fact that age was not an important variable. For these reasons, it too was included.

5. Time in class: Given the frequency of its mention in both formal interviews and in formal discussions with members of the FS, one would expect that time in class overshadowed all other indices of seniority. Time in class refers to the time which an officer spends

in a particular class or grade before his promotion to a higher rank. Members of the Officer Corps are acutely aware of when they reach and pass the average time in grade for a particular grade. Because the attainment of the most desired ranks at the top of the Service is dependent on the cumulative effects of promotion at a rate slightly more rapid than the average in each grade, it is understandable why such calculations are important in the eyes of individual officers. The promotion precepts themselves specify minimum time in grade before promotion and likewise maximum time in grade before an officer must be selected out of the FS. Particularly surprising about calculations for time in grade is the absence of hard data specifying precisely what are the distributions which prevail. Instead, FS Officers calculate their average time in grade by specific reference to other individuals. If individual A, who appears to be a "comer" in the Service, spends only four years in Grade FSO4, whereas individual B, whose career is somewhat less spectacular, spends seven years in the same grade, then the individual-to-individual comparisons necessary for self-evaluation are made possible. Through a series of such comparisons, an officer develops some notion of his relative standing in the Service.

Five seniority models are generated, one employing each of the indices described above.

The actual decision-making situation in which these various measures are employed has already been discussed in general terms. Because it is not the purpose of this model to replicate the decision processes employed in the Selection Boards, no attempt has been made to develop a simulation which corresponds in detail to the decision process described by Selection Board members. The general logic of

the simulation does, however, have a rough correspondence with the logic employed by Selection Board members as they review the files of individual officers. A variety of organizational constraints lead us to expect that the model as defined is probably one of the major sets of relationships comprising decisions of Selection Board members. It will be recalled that those constraints are as follows:

1. Time pressure: the officers are expected to go through a large number of personnel files and observe a good deal of material in a relatively short period of time.

2. The volume of information: although officers are directed to pay particular attention only to the last five years of performance evaluations, the individual officer files contain great amounts of material which are supposed to have bearing on the ranking decisions of both individual members and the Selection Boards as a whole.

3. Precision of the information: most of the evaluations are presented in prose form, and although there are a number of common dimensions on which each officer is ranked, the nature of those dimensions and the flexibility with which a rating officer may respond means both that the Selection Board member is forced to compare officers who may be rated on slightly different criterion, and to somehow incorporate a great deal of imprecise (purposefully so) information into a composite rating for each individual. Numerical or other quantitative data are generally scarce.

4. Because the DOS is a public bureaucracy and therefore must be accountable to outsiders for its decisions, there is increased pressure upon members of the Selection Boards to develop criteria for evaluation which can be externally justified. Rank-ordering based on Gestalt impressions is difficult to justify. The pressure for the

development of quantifiable rationale is accentuated. Previous congressional interest in promotion of FS Officers can only make this pressure more salient.

The seniority model must operate within several constraints. To make it compatible with the actual Selection Board decision-making situations, only information which is actually available to the Selection Board members is used in the model. A number of pieces of information related to seniority are available. First, the annual precepts generally include some mention of minimum and maximum time in class. The purpose of these specifications, to specify the range within which other than seniority criterion may be employed, means that this information is not used in the seniority model itself. Second, in the personnel folder of each officer is that information from which each of the seniority indices can be generated. More precisely, each officer file includes the date of entry into the FS, date of entry into the DOS, the Service Computation date, the age of the officer, and the time at which the officer was promoted to his present class. Members of the Selection Board need not perform the precise calculations necessary to establish the officer's seniority on each of these measures in order to understand his or her relative position in the group of officers being rated. For example, if most of the officers being considered for promotion in a particular class entered the FS during the year 1955, then it would readily be apparent to the Selection Board member that someone entering before 1955 had greater seniority and someone entering after 1955 had less. This information becomes an important part of the simulation in the seniority model.

Frequently the precepts themselves or the Deputy Undersecretary's introduction contain guidelines for members of the Selection

Boards which are related to the issue of seniority.[4] In recent years, for example, there has been considerable emphasis on the promotion of highly qualified but youthful officers. At other times there has been greater emphasis on the important seasoning effects of age. Although these guidelines are important for a general process simulation of the Selection Boards (and will therefore be included in the Selection Board model), the seniority model as developed does not take account of these variations in the precepts. Finally, both the annual promotion precepts and the directions to Selection Board members place great emphasis on a variety of merit criteria. These too are excluded from the seniority model, but are variables in the simulation of Selection Board processes.

As indicated previously, the outputs from the Selection Boards are in the form of a rank-order register for each FS grade. The most important feature of these rank-orderings is their unidimensionality. They do not represent actual promotion decisions; the administration of the FS makes those decisions using the rankings provided by the Selection Boards. Promotions rather than rankings are considered as output because the rankings are unavailable for research purposes.

THE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE

There are several reasons for the development of a model of FS promotion which uses only seniority as a predictor. Most important is our intention to fully explore the consequences of a conceptually simple model which both the literature on organizational behavior and the interviews with members of the Officer Corps suggest could be extremely powerful. By developing a positive model, it is possible to follow the consequences of a specific set of decision rules and to compare the outcomes of that model with the actual promotions. The

predictions of the seniority model are compared with the actual promotion outcomes later in the chapter. The various goodness of fit tests described give an overall summary of the relationship between models and actual promotions and provide a benchmark for comparison of the alternative and yet complementary models.

The simulation relies primarily on logical rather than mathematical caluclations. The sequence of binary decisions brings us closer to a fit with the actual processes employed in the promotion process than does a mathematical model which assumes interval level data for its operations. The appropriateness of mathematical techniques is called into question by the various assumptions which make these techniques so powerful. The analytic power of the logical model, in contrast, is a result of the chains of binary decisions. The relative absence of constraints, for example the short term independence of the promotion and assignment processes, in the decision processes is reflected in the lack of feedback at different stages in the annual review process.

FORMAL SENIORITY MODEL

The processes included in the formal model of promotion using seniority criteria are presented in two forms. The verbal flow chart (see Table 1) is abstracted from the general principles discussed above and the interviews with participants in FS promotion decisions. A more detailed model is presented in Table 3, as a non-verbal flow chart from which the actual computer program was constructed. For reader convenience, stages in the verbal flow chart are sequentially numbered and corresponding points in the non-verbal flow diagram are labeled with the corresponding number. (see Table 3)

Following the method of presentation used by Crecine,[5] the

TABLE 1

VERBAL FLOW CHART

1. input data:
   data for each officer is put into the decision process.
   includes: dates of entry into the department and the foreign service, date of birth, and dates of promotion to each class.

2. basic seniority rules: (parameter identification) these rules are developed during the first overview of officer files. The Selection Board members establish some idea of what kinds of information can be used in the calculation of seniority.

3. application of seniority rules:
   each officer is compared with others on a number of "seniority" dimensions. Initial sorting of officers takes place according to the various criteria, e.g., time since entry into the Department, age . . .

4. initial parameter estimation:
   once officers are evaluated on the seniority dimensions, some notion of the "average" time for promotion is generated. These means are used as the initial parameter estimates. This provides the members of the Selection Board with some base for making actual decisions about promotability or non-promotability of individual officers.

5. comparison of individual officer with estimates:
   each officer is compared with the parameter estimate for the particular seniority dimension. Depending on how he/she compares, the officer is either promoted or passed over for promotion until the next year.

   i.e.,

   exceeds the parameter estimate?

   yes

6. promotion decision:
   promote officer, will be considered in the future by Selection Board for the subsequent grade/class.

   no

   do not promote officer, consider again next year.

TABLE 2

VARIABLE DICTIONARY FOR THE SENIORITY MODEL

Variable*	Definition
Model Inputs	
$EODFS_i$	Date of entry into the DOS
$EODDEPT_I$	Date of entry into the FS
$SERVCOMP_i$	Service computation date (EODFS corrected for previous governmental service)
$BIRTH_i$	Birth date
$ACTGRADE_{ih}$	Actual class or grade for officer i in year h
DOG_{ik}	Date when promoted to grade k
COHORT	Cohort, year of entry
$COHORTN_j$	Number of officers in cohort
NUM	Number of cohorts
Accounting Variables	
TCA_{ik}	Time between entry into the DOS until Grade k
TCB_{ik}	Time between entry into the FS until Grade k
TCC_{ik}	Time between service computation date until Grade k
CPC_{ik}	Age when promoted to Grade k
APC_{ik}	Time between last promotion (k-1) and promotion to Grade K
Parameters	
$MTCA_k$	Average time in the DOS until promotion to Grade k
$MTCB_k$	Average time in the FS until promotion to Grade k
$MTCC_k$	Average time since service computation date for promotion to Grade k
$MCPC_k$	Average age until promotion to Grade k
$MAPC_k$	Average time between promotion to Grade k-1 and promotion to Grade k
Model Output	
$SIMGRTCA_{ih}$	Simulated grade for officer I in year H based on TCA seniority measures

Table 2 continued

$SIMGRTCB_{ih}$	Simulated grade for officer I in year H based on TCB measures of seniority
$SIMGRTCC_{ih}$	Simulated grade for officer I in year H based on TCC measures of seniority
$SIMGRCPC_{ih}$	Simulated grade for officer I in year H based on CPC measures of seniority
$SIMGRAPC_{ih}$	Simulated grade for officer I in year H based on APC measures of seniority

* i - refers to officer
j - refers to cohort
k - refers to class or grade
h - refers to year since entry, expressed in equivalent form

variables used in the development of the formal model are classified into four basic types:


(1) Model Inputs: these represent information available to decision-makers prior to the decision-making situation. In this case the information is available in the personnel file of each officer and includes such information as date of entry into the FS, birth date, and time of promotion to each class/grade.

(2) Accounting Variables: are variables used to store the results of calculations made by the decision makers. For each officer, such information is generated on each of the five seniority indices. These variables are much more precisely calculated in the formal model than in the decision-making which takes place in the Selection Boards. They include seniority information for each officer for each index, for each grade.

(3) Parameters: are identified in interviews and from theoretical literature. The value of each parameter is empirically determined.


TABLE 3

NON-VERBAL FLOW CHART FOR SENIORITY MODELS




1. Input data

Table 3 continued




3. Computation of Individual Seniority Indices (accounting variables)

Table 3 continued



4. Parameter Estimates calculation of average time for promotion to each class/grade k.

Table 3 continued



2. and 5. Application of Seniority Rules

6. Promotion Decision

(4) Model Outputs: are the values of promotion decisions. Because there are no alterations in the promotion decisions after the first calculations, the model is non-recursive, and the first output generated is the final outcome for the individual officer. These outcomes take the form of a particular class/grade assignment for each officer for each year.

A complete dictionary for the variables employed is included in Table 2.

BEHAVIOR NOT INCLUDED IN THE SENIORITY MODEL

Positive models like the one described above are abstractions from the complex real world they attempt to describe. Although this permits the identification and isolation of the major explanatory variables, any inferences about the real world on the basis of the model must be tempered with some knowledge of its limitations. Data limitations affect the conclusions in three ways.

1. The data used for parameter calculation and model testing include only those officers on duty in December 1969. Conclusions about promotion in any cohort are based only on information about those officers who have remained members of the Service.


2. Because data are not available for those who has left the Service, the seniority model makes no provisions for separation. It assumes that promotion and non-promotion are the only alternatives. The appropriate number of iterations for each officer is set by the number of years between date of entry into the Foreign Service and the 1969 date when the data were collected.

3. Missing data are not evenly distributed. Incomplete assignment histories, as one might expect, are more prevalent the further one goes into the history of individual careers. This results in

considerable over-representation from more recent cohorts for all parts of the model which draw conclusions about the lower grades in the FS.

Other elements of the FS promotion process were intentionally excluded from the model. All three models simplify the actual promotion dynamics by eliminating a major element in the decision process - the conversion of rank-order lists to actual promotion decision. Table 4 presents the differences schematically.

TABLE 4



In fact, promotion within the FS goes through a two-step process: (1) review and ranking of Officers by Selection Boards, and (2) the decisions about promotions by the Office of the Director General. The flow of these decisions is represented by the broken lines in the diagram. Between input and output there are two decision points. Decisions affecting the distribution of promotions among members of the Officer Corps are largely made in the Selection Boards. The Office of the Director General must base promotions on the rank-order established by the Selection Boards. It does determine the cut-off points for promotions in each class. Decisions influencing overall rate of promotion are made in the Office of the Director General in accordance with budgetary and manpower requirements. Distributive policies provide the major focus of the dissertation. Logically it is not necessary to look at actual promotions, but only at the rank-order lists.

Unfortunately, rank-order lists are unavailable and actual promotions must be used for testing the model.

Because distributive decisions reside primarily within the Selection Boards, it is not critical to include the decisions of the Office of the Director General in the simulation, and it is possible to develop a model which follows the path indicated by the solid lines in Table 4. At the same time, it is recognized that the separation is somewhat arbitrary. In the case of the seniority model, the relative position of the seniority parameters is unaffected because of this definition, but the absolute time spent in any grade is significantly influenced by the number of promotions available to the Service as a whole.

SENIORITY MODEL - GOODNESS OF FIT

The fit between a process model and the particular mechanisms which it attempts to describe can be measured in two ways: (1) does the model yield outcomes which are similar to the real world phenomena which it purports to describe?; (2) does the model reach these conclusions using the same mechanisms as the corresponding real world decision system?[6] The evaluation of all three models employs both sets of criteria.

When comparing seniority model process with that used in the real world decision situation, one must conclude that at best this description is a partial model. The comparison of simulation and real world decision situations is necessarily both complex and, according to traditional statistical criteria, somewhat imprecise.

Several techniques have been established to provide checks on process validity. First, the model was developed from extensive interviews with the participants, thereby providing a guarantee of some

rough approximation between model and the real world situation. Process can further be monitored through an examination of outcome errors. Where model and real world outcomes differ, we can be certain that there is a lack of process correspondence, although the reverse is not necessarily true. The divergence may result from two kinds of inaccuracies. First, it may reflect a shift in overall decision rules. In this case, if we find upon inspection that promotions in the model lag behind those in the actual annual evaluations, then we might conclude that there has been a policy shift encouraging the promotion of other officers. Because such variables are exogenous to the model, clearly the process does not sufficiently reflect the real world situation and our description fails to include some relevant decision parameters.

There are other sources of process error, however, which may result from the continuation and elaboration of existing policies. In evaluation of the model according to years of service, we find increasing discrepancy between the model and actual promotions, the longer an officer remains in the Service. These discrepancies may result not from changes in overall promotion policies but rather from an inadequate statement of existing policies or from the exclusion of other criterion which become increasingly important the longer an officer remains in the FS. It is also anticipated that seniority becomes decreasingly important as the Selection Boards gather more career data for use in their evaluations.

The analysis of model outcomes presents an easier problem. A number of statistical techniques have been employed to evaluate both the absolute and relative predictive power of the five seniority indices. A comparison of the outcomes of the three general models

(seniority, background and selection board) is also possible. Two tests of goodness of fit are employed in this analysis. First, using the regression program developed in the SPSS program package, the model generated decisions are considered a function of the actual decisions. Second, R^2 statistics are calculated to measure the ratio of variances explained by the simulation.[7] (See Appendix E).

The following diagrams indicate the result of these tests. The comparison of the various seniority measures, the analysis of individual cohorts, and the analysis of the particular power of the models for officers serving various amounts of time are included in the following pages.[8] (see Appendix C).

CONCLUSIONS ON SENIORITY AND FS PROMOTION

Two questions were asked at the beginning of this chapter which we are now in a position to answer. First, how do the outcomes of a model based on seniority differ from the pattern of Foreign Service promotions observed in the real world? Second, where is the seniority model weakest? Where is it strongest? What can this tell us about the operation of seniority in the Foreign Service career system? Data on the goodness of fit between the seniority model and real world promotions have been aggregated in two ways. Tables 5 and 6 graphically summarize these analyses. Table 5 presents the analysis on a cohort-by-cohort basis. Table 6 shows how the model compares with actual promotions for varying periods of service.

An examination of Table 5 provides evidence for some of our most important conclusions. Promotions generated by the seniority model when regressed on actual Foreign Service promotions account for a significant proportion of the variance in the latter. This variance ranges from a low of 17 to a high of almost 80 percent. (see Table 7)

TABLE 5



A Comparison of R² Statistics
on Five Indices of Seniority
for Cohorts 1947 - 1968
TCA
TCB
TCC
CPC
APC
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
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TABLE 6



Comparison of R² Statistics
on Five Indices of Seniority
for Years of Service from
one year to 24 years
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Year 11
Year 12
Year 13
Year 14
Year 15
Year 16
Year 17
Year 18
Year 19
Year 20
Year 21
Year 22
Year 23
Year 24
.00
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
.80
.90
1.00

TABLE 7

Mean R^2 values for evaluation of Seniority Model

	TCA	TCB	TCC	CPC	APC
analysis by year of entry	.25189	.25445	.26197	.21179	.27239
analysis by cohort	.59264	.56855	.62098	.41474	.64952

There is considerable variation within this range. For cohorts entering the Foreign Service between 1947 and 1964, the model closely approximates observed cohort promotion patterns. For the large group of officers in those cohorts entering after 1964, the model, as constructed, shows considerably less promise. The same is true for the cohorts entering in 1945 and 1946. Of the five seniority indices employed in these comparisons, time in class (APC) generally yields results closest to the actual promotion pattern. The seniority index based on the age of an officer (CPC) is clearly the least reliable predictor. With the exception of the last index, the measures of seniority appear to yield quite similar results in this statistical comparison.

With this information we can begin making choices between some of the many interpretations put forth in the accounts of Foreign Service Officer promotion. Not only are FSO's generally correct in ascribing to seniority a far greater role than one might expect given the "official" promotion precepts, but they appear to have isolated correctly the time in class index of seniority as the critical measure.[9]

At the same time there are many instances where the seniority model appears much less adequate as a predictor of Foreign Service promotions. Both for early cohorts (1945 and 1946) and for those

groups entering the Service since 1964, the general seniority model does not explain as much of the variance in officer promotion rates. During the mid-1940s, promotion was generally slower than during the period of the 50s and early 1960s. While during the late 1960s, there were substantial changes in the duration of Junior Officer status. The amount of time spent in the lower grades was significantly shortened during these years. A model which took such variations into account, through the development of "year-specific" seniority rules, might substantially increase the predictive power of a seniority model. Such modifications are to be included in later analyses.

The R^2 statistics which emerge in the analysis of seniority as it applied over time to officer cohorts, yield much more ambiguous results. (see Table 6) Generally, there is a tendency for seniority to become less important the greater the number of years an officer remains in the Service, but the curve is quite irregular suggesting that some other variables or artifacts of the data have an important influence on the actual outcomes. As was the case in the cohort-by-cohort analysis, the time in class index (APC) comes closer to meeting the actually observed promotion patterns. The index based upon the age of an officer (CPC) predicts less well than the other measures. As before, the similarity in the predictive power of the various indices is more striking than are the differences which are expected given the collinearity of all but APC and CPC models. The fit between the outcomes of the seniority model and actual Foreign Service Promotions, when summarized in this manner, is less impressive than in the case of the cohort aggregation. These differences are reflected in the relative magnitudes of the R^2 statistics.

These patterns observed in Table 6, suggests several possible

conclusions. Whatever the artifacts of promotion which produce the wide fluctuations in predictive power of the model during the first twelve years of an Officer's career, it is quite clear that the promotions of more senior FSO's are not significantly dependent upon seniority. Given the reasons why seniority is considered an important criterion for decision making in the Selection Boards, then it is not surprising that more extensive data on an Officer's capabilities increasingly provide either alternative bases for promotion decisions or important supplementary guidelines which could substantially reduce the relative importance of seniority as a critical element in these evaluations. The wide fluctuations in the predictive strength of the model for the early years of an Officer's career are more difficult to explain in general theoretical terms. The most plausible account of this outcome may be related to the disjunction between the "multi-class" composition of any cohort and the "one-class" assumptions built into the seniority model. In the real life situation, limitations on the number of promotions mean that a cohort is promoted in several batches. After two or three years, for example, all FSO-8's will be promoted to FSO-7's. Comparable parameters are not included in the seniority model. Officers in that model are promoted during the year when their seniority is closest to the average of those promoted to the next class (or grade). Consequently, model promotions are much more continuous than those observed in the Foreign Service itself and the fit between model and actual promotion patterns fluctuate as these cycles overlap. The large standard deviations from the mean observed during the early years further support the hypothesis.

Further analysis would be necessary to establish the validity of the other major hypothesis. Given the disproportionate contribution

from more recent cohorts, particularly to the first five or six years in the years-of-service analysis, it is quite probable that the same factors which led to a decline in fit observed in Table 5 contribute to some of their irregularities observed in Table 6 as well.

Any overall evaluation of the seniority model leads to the conclusion that seniority is an important determinant of Foreign Service promotion pattern. Artifacts of the seniority model based on highly aggregated data do not provide sufficient clarification of cohort, year-of-service, or particular annual variations to permit a thorough discussion of the specific mechanisms by which the seniority principle operates.

CHAPTER V

BACKGROUNDS MODEL

When members of the Foreign Service Officer Corps join the Service they already exhibit numerous differences in qualifications, skills, and social connections which either facilitate or impede their rates of mobility in the Officer Corps. These background characteristics are particularly important for understanding FSO careers. Initially, attention was directed to these variables by popular accounts and stereotypes of the Foreign Service Officer. The attacks upon the Foreign Service during the McCarthy period identified it as a haven for those from elite Eastern Schools (particularly Harvard, Yale and Princeton) who lacked the perspective of main street, U.S.A. and hence were not only soft on communism, but generally unfit to represent American interests abroad. In fact, Congressional criticism of Foreign Service recruitment processes was sufficiently strong to call forth public reprimand and periodic review of Foreign Service recruitment and intake processes. Congressional leaders sought to "democratize" the Service through the recruitment of officers from a broader spectrum of American society.

Interviews with members of the Foreign Service and particularly those involved in the administration of personnel, provided further documentation of the importance of an officer's background to his later career development. Among Foreign Service Officers, there was understandably less concern about the elite character of the Corps, but nevertheless, considerable awareness of the importance of social background as a determinant for later success in the Service. Our interviews with Foreign Service Officers themselves suggested that the relationship between background and later success in the Foreign

Service was not simply the result of attendance at Harvard, Yale or Princeton. Other background characteristics were suggested.

For example, it became quite clear that during earlier years in the Service, those with military experience, particularly overseas duty as commissioned officers, adapted more quickly than their peers who entered the Foreign Service directly from the college experience, and with little knowledge of United States government operations abroad. Still other variables, such as field of specialization and level of graduate training, were mentioned during these interviews as determinants of officer career patterns. In many cases, the background variables were associated with individual officers and only through numerous discussions did these factors emerge as more general phenomena affecting mobility in the Service. Very few of those interviewed had any sense of how these background variables influenced the majority of Foreign Service Officers. At the same time, they remained reasonably certain that one should examine social backgrounds in any longitudinal analysis.

The academic literature on careers and career systems includes many references to the ascribed characteristics which I include in my general background index. Morris Janowitz in his study of the professional soldier spent a chapter discussing the social origins of the military elite.[1] Like the Janowitz analysis, the data available on Foreign Service Officers allow us to focus upon nativity, and to some extent upon social strata. Unlike officers in the military, members of the Foreign Service have been drawn more from suburban and urban than rural backgrounds. Like the military, one has the strong impression that the religious identification of most Foreign Service Officers is probably Protestant, although there is some

evidence to suggest the predominance of practicing Catholics among some segments of the overseas community. Unfortunately, data have not been collected on these variables and such information is difficult to glean from the records used by the annual Selection Boards in their review and selection process.

Segal and Willick have focused their analysis primarily on the college identification of Foreign Service Officers. They conclude that even in the early 1960s, graduates of Harvard, Yale and Princeton still occupy a large proportion of the positions available within the senior grades.[2]

In conclusion, both the practical considerations of decision makers and the more academic analysis suggest the importance of social backgrounds for the analysis of Foreign Service career patterns. Studies of the Civil Service and the military provide some concrete data for those branches of government service and support the general hypothesis that background characteristics are an important determinant of career patterns.

LIMITS AND ADVANTAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BACKGROUNDS MODEL

The backgrounds model described herein is designed to explore the utility of the theoretical perspective suggested above. By developing a separate model we can test the implications of the assumption that the background characteristics of Foreign Service Officers are used as the principal basis for the annual promotion decisions of the Foreign Service Selection Boards. The formal elaboration of a model based on these variables allows us to ask questions such as the following: (1) How would the Foreign Service Selection Boards operate if promotion were determined solely by the backgrounds criteria specified in the model? (2) Does the use of backgrounds criteria as

a sole explanatory variable produce a career system substantially different from that observed in the real world? (3) Where does a backgrounds model appear to have its greatest strengths and weaknesses? The general descriptive theory of organizational processes outlined in the earlier chapters leads us to hypothesize that background characteristics are probably more important during the early years of an officer's career and weaker explanatory variables as the Selection Boards have other data on which to base their decisions. Consequently, we would expect the seniority model to most closely approximate real world promotion decisions during the earlier years of Service. Generally we anticipate that the goodness of fit will become increasingly attenuated the longer an officer stays in the Foreign Service, but never disappear as an important factor even for senior diplomats and administrators.

The desire to compare different models of Foreign Service promotion is a second reason for the development of a model in which social background characteristics are the only variables. Like the seniority model described in the previous chapter, the simulation of Foreign Service careers using background characteristics as a basis for annual promotion decisions allows us to generate a bench mark for the comparison of alternative theories. The purpose of the model from this perspective is to provide data for answering the question, "Can we better describe Foreign Service career patterns by looking at the background characteristics of officers and assuming that these characteristics serve as the basis for actual promotion decisions or alternatively, can these patterns be better described using the seniority model outlined in the previous chapter for the Selection Board's model outlined in the chapter which follows?"

There are at the same time several liabilities in the development of a background model which assumes that Selection Boards use only background characteristics in their annual promotion decisions. The foremost disadvantage is the acknowledged lack of correspondence between the model as outlined below and our understanding of the operation of Selection Boards gained from interviews with observers and participants. The result is a model which combines some of the major elements of the review procedure used by the Selection Boards with a hypothetical set of concrete decision parameters, derived not from detailed examination of substantive Selection Board decisions but instead from public discussion, Foreign Service interest and the theoretical literature which focuses on the outcomes of the Foreign Service promotion process and concentrates on one particularly sensitive set of variables (social backgrounds) which could affect the outcomes.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BACKGROUNDS MODEL

Foreign Service Officers talk frequently about the importance of social background, the significance of social connections and other factors which could be classified as background characteristics. But they seldom were able to identify concrete measures for the terms they employed. In this respect, their discussions of background characteristics were consistent with the interviews as a whole. They provided many rough hypotheses and suggestive themes but relatively little concrete data. Nevertheless, it was possible to surmise from these discussions that a number of operational measures might be used to discuss the social backgrounds of Foreign Service Officers. For example, undergraduate college was frequently mentioned as a source of and an indicator of an officer's political and social connection. Some felt that Officers who belonged to social register families had an

additional advantage in the Foreign Service. On the other hand, at least one observer has argued that the attribution of high social standing to one's peers in the Foreign Service reflects more a wish to be identified with groups of high social standing than it does the actual social profile of the Foreign Service itself.[3]

The backgrounds index used for this model includes eight variables selected first because a review of previous literature and actual interviews with Foreign Service Officers suggested that they may be critical measures of social background, and second, because these data were available for analysis. The limitations of the available data should not be underestimated in evaluating the results of the backgrounds simulation. For example, two types of information which would be particularly valuable for the anlysis of social class background were not included.

The simulation includes no measure of either (1) the presence or absence of social register connections or (2) the social class background of the families from which these officers have come (e.g., father's occupation). Some of the indicators used in the model may serve as surrogates for such variables, but as in all studies which attempt to identify social origins or social/political orientations, the background characteristics serve only as a rough approximation of the perspective which these officers bring to their work, and the social networks within which they operate. The eight variables finally selected for inclusion in the backgrounds simulation are as follows:

1. College of undergraduate degree. As indicated above, there has been considerable emphasis of the importance of Harvard, Yale and Princeton ties for later success in the Officer Corps. The implicit assumption has been that those attending other schools either lacked the necessary academic preparation for success in the Service or more

likely lack the necessary social resources and connections to facilitate their advancement in the Service. The development and/or maintenance of social connections rather than academic preparation is emphasized for two reasons. First, the Foreign Service uses an extremely rigorous examination process which calls upon officers to exhibit skills and a general breadth of knowledge which is subsequently untapped during their actual service. In some ways, the Foreign Service probably draws a population which is over-qualified whatever their undergraduate preparation and for this reason academic skill is less important as a basis for later differentiation. Secondly, diplomacy has long been identified as an occupation reserved for the elites of a nation and although this has diminished since World War II, as a result of the increasing need for specialization and the complexity of international relations, this image is carefully preserved and cultivated within the Foreign Service itself. One thus is led to hypothesize that the importance of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, for example, lies not in the excellence of the academic experience which they can provide, but rather in their identification as upperclass institutions. The critical elements then become exposure to the values, and life style and social connections with the upper class, both within the U.S. and internationally. It is this exposure which becomes the underlying dimension for our classification of undergraduate colleges. For this analysis, undergraduate colleges were coded according to the relative proportions of their student bodies with social register connections during the period when these officers were in college - the late forties and 1950s.[4]

2. College of graduate degree. The same underlying dimension identified for the ranking of undergraduate college was used in the

ranking of colleges from which Foreign Service Officers received graduate degrees. Although there tends to be a close correspondence between the rankings of undergraduate and graduate schools, there are several changes from the order used on the first dimension. Relatively few Foreign Service Officers entering the Officer Corps during the 1950s had completed graduate degrees. Nevertheless, for those having such an experience - attendance at elite universities or schools providing specialized training in diplomacy - this variable becomes an important consideration.

3. Sex. Although the sex of each Foreign Service Officer was separately identified as a variable for inclusion in the backgrounds analysis, it has to be excluded in the final background index for none of the women entering during the 1950s remained in the Foreign Service by 1968.

4. Highest degree. The contribution of education beyond the bachelor's level to later promotion in the Foreign Service has not been clearly identified heretofore. Interviews suggest that master's work, particularly if taken in a field closely related to the practice of diplomacy may be highly valued. At the same time, there is no great importance attached to Ph.D. work for Foreign Service Officers. The increasing emphasis on specialization particularly in economic and commercial affairs during the middle 1960s may necessitate some revision of this general hypothesis.

5. Undergraduate major. The content of the Foreign Service exam and the general knowledge valued by the sub-culture of the Foreign Service suggests that those with undergraduate majors in the humanities or Social Sciences should be among the most successful members of the Foreign Service. Again there is little hard information on

which to base these predictions, but the continuing high status of the generalist in the Officer Corps lends support to the general hypothesis that those with a highly specialized or technical training are probably at a disadvantage. These general conclusions together with some data on the distribution of undergraduate majors among Foreign Service Officers provided the basis for the scheme used in the coding of undergraduate majors.

6. Graduate field. Many of the same considerations employed in the development of a coding scheme for undergraduate major, were used in the development of comparable groupings for graduate fields. Of increased importance, however, for graduate fields, are the development of some specialization in areas such as international relations or economics. Here again, there is generally high value attached to work in the social sciences and those humanities which have direct bearing upon international relations such as history or linguistic skills. Once again, the final scale was developed with some general knowledge about the distribution of fields among selected groups of Foreign Service Officers.

7. Previous governmental work. Two analytic dimensions are included in this social characteristic, but unfortunately it is impossible to include them separately given the form in which data are available. First, there was considerable emphasis in the interviews upon the utility of previous work experience for the initial adjustments of Foreign Service Officers. Many of those with whom this was discussed mentioned the initial advantage which accrued to those having military experience. As a result of that experience (particularly as officers), they were able to gain an understanding of how the government operates, and of how to work within a large scale bureaucracy.

For many this also provided an opportunity to watch the Foreign Service in operation. A further dimension of previous work experience was also mentioned during the interviews. Many, particularly those with military training, had spent some time overseas. These officers generally were considered to have more realistic, and less "idealistic", expectations about their work as FSO's. They joined the Foreign Service with the full knowledge of the manner in which the organization operated and therefore were both more likely to accept the existing parameters and to understand the dynamics of both the Foreign Service and American overseas representation. We hypothesize that this variable will have its major influence during the early stages of the Foreign Service Officer's career.

8. Natality. Although there is very little concrete evidence to support the proposition, the Foreign Service is hypothesized to have drawn most of its most "successful" officers from the cosmopolitan northeast. In part, this may reflect initial selection procedures. If regional orientation is important after initial selection of the Foreign Service Officers, then we would expect those outside the northeast to continue to be at a disadvantage throughout their careers. The measure of natality employed, taken from the regional classification used in social security numbers, is probably a better reflection of residence during high school years than residence at birth. To the extent that these are the formative years in developing an individual's perspective on the nation and its international context, this is probably a better reflection of important regional differences than would be place of birth.

The relative importance of each background variable was empirically determined through the use of correlation and regression analysis

(utilizing "dummy variables") and each variable, appropriately weighed, (with the exception of sex as noted above) was included in a general background index. The contribution of each variable to that general index reflected its contribution to promotion throughout the Foreign Service Career. The composite background index thus developed was used as the basis for the simulation explained below. Thus, one model was generated which incorporated all of these indices, and each individual was assigned a background score reflecting the extent to which each of these individual variables determined his background identity at the point when he entered the Foreign Service.

OFFICER BACKGROUNDS AND THE ROLE OF SELECTION BOARDS

The relevance of the social backgrounds of officers in the annual review and promotion process has been largely ignored by previous students of officer careers and Foreign Service administration. In large part, our hypothesis that background characteristics play any role is based on the following inferences.

1. The information which is included in the individual background index is (with the exception of our measure of natality) identical to that which appears in the concise statement of officer background and experience described above. The general form of this statement is included in Appendix B. The importance of this statement and the information appearing therein is described in Chapter III.

2. Generally, the Foreign Service Selection Boards have little information on which to base promotion decisions in the earlier years of their careers. The data on social backgrounds provides one of the few sources of information which can be employed by reviewing officers as they attempt to differentiate between individual office and develop a rank order listing for use in actual promotion decisions.

Because this model is not intended as an exact replication of the information used by the Selection Boards, the simulation itself differs in several respects from the annual review process. The most notable divergence is in the use of an empirically determined background index level for promotion to each class and the subsequent modification of these levels resulting from interim feedback in the simulation process. The net result of the decision process is in the production as output of a rank ordering of officers similar to that generated by the actual Selection Boards.

Like the Selection Boards, the model operates using annual iterations. It also follows the general decision making process used by the Boards in their review of officer files. The officers in each class are considered as a body and a rank order list is prepared from that review. The following schematic diagram (see Table 1) graphically compares the processes employed in the background simulation and those utilized by the Foreign Service Selection Boards themselves.


THE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE

The objectives of the analysis described below are two-fold. First, it is our intention to simulate Foreign Service promotions over an 18 year period which will allow us both to develop a base line for comparison with other models and to determine the extent to which background characteristics are a central feature of Foreign Service career patterns. Secondly, the analysis attempts to replicate not only outcomes but also the procedures whereby those outcomes are generated. In this particular case, the analysis attempts to replicate those procedures used by the annual Foreign Service Selection Boards in their determination of promotion decisions.

The simulation itself, is dependent on several levels of

TABLE 1

Schematic comparison of annual simulated and actual decision making operations used by the Foreign Service selection boards to determine the appropriate number of promotions



preliminary analysis. A brief review of this work provides the setting for understanding the model. The first stage in the overall analysis strategy involves the identification of background characteristics which are relevant to Foreign Service promotion. The initial list of such possibilities is derived from both interviews with participants and observers and from earlier attempts at analysis and description. Next, operational measures of these characteristics are identified and developed. Third, the relationship between each of these variables and an officer's rank in the Foreign Service is empirically determined. Fourth, the preliminary estimates developed from this analysis are used as the basis for the development of individual background indices. Each officer is given a background index score reflecting the relative contribution of his background to later promotion. Fifth, the simulated promotions (based on an annual iterative model) are generated using individual background indices as the basis for rank ordering (and implicitly promotion). This simulation represents as closely as possible the procedures followed by the annual Selection Boards, assuming that background characteristics were their sole consideration. Finally, the results of the simulated Selection Board process are compared with actual promotions through the use of several goodness of fit tests.

These last two steps are described more fully in the verbal flow chart presented in Table 2. The procedures described in Table 2 were developed from interviews with observers and participants in the annual promotion process. In those cases where decision making rules are unidentified or not developed as precisely as needed for the simulation process, general theoretical insights about decision making have been applied. From the verbal flow chart we have developed a non-verbal flow chart used in the construction of the actual computer

TABLE 2

VERBAL FLOW CHART: BACKGROUNDS AND FOREIGN SERVICE CAREERS

1. Input data: Data from individual officers for the given year is read into the decision process. They include those variables identified as model inputs in Table 4.

2. Background evaluation rules: Rules for the assessment of the backgrounds of individual officers are developed during the first overview of officer files when board members develop initial parameters and parameter estimates.

3. Development of background index: Individual officers are rated according to their backgrounds. Using information from 1 and the general rules from 2, the selection boards formulate indices for individual officers. A composite index is developed during this rating which operates for each yearly evaluation throughout the officer's career.


4. Initial parameter estimation: Using background scores developed in 3, an index is developed for each class (grade). As a first approximation, this index is equivalent to the mean ($\bar{x}$) index for all officers promoted to a particular class (grade).

5. Initial simulation estimates: Based upon preliminary background index levels necessary for promotion to each class, simulated promotions are generated for individual officers for the particular year being examined. Given these initial estimates, would the officer be promoted in an annual simulation?

no

yes

Table 2 continued



program. This flow chart included as Table 3 can be compared with the verbal flow chart. The different stages in the decision making process as represented in the two flow charts are identified within a common set of numbers.

The variable abbreviations used in the non-verbal chart (see Table 3) are included in the variable dictionary. (see Table 4) As in the last chapter, these variables are categorized according to the standardized format described by Crecine.[5] The four categories of variables: model inputs, accounting variables, parameters, and intermediate calculations and outputs, are identified in Table 4. A more complete description of this classification scheme is presented in Chapter IV.


THE CONTEXT OF THE BACKGROUNDS MODEL


Descriptive models like the backgrounds simulations described above are necessarily abstractions from the complex real world which they purport to describe. On the one hand, this abstraction permits the identification and isolation of major explanatory variables. On the other hand, any inferences about the real world based upon such a model must be tempered with a knowledge of its limitations. A number of limitations can be identified.


Those variables used as indices of officer backgrounds serve only as an approximation of what they are designed to reflect. This problem is to some extent minimized by the fact that those involved in the Selection Boards themselves use the same indices.

2. In the empirical analysis used to determine the preliminary weighings for each background variable, it was necessary to develop coding schemes which reflected the particular concerns of the study. For example, undergraduate college was coded not according to size of

Table 3
Non-Verbal Flow Chart: Backgrounds




α
TACT_h + TACT_h/10 TSIM_h ?
yes
no
TACT_h - TACT_h/10 TSIM_h
yes
no
Δ
ACT = k
k= 2,11,1
indiv = i
i = 1,992
DIF_ik = ACT_ik - SIM_ik
TACT_hk = TACT_hk + 1
TDIF_hk = TDIF_hk+DIF_ikh
TDIF_hk 0?
no
yes
CLBKXX_k = CLBKX_k + (TDIF_hk/ TACT_hk)
CLBKXX_k = CLBKX_k - (-TDIF_hk/ TACT_hk)
ε
β


B
year = h
h = 50,68
officer = i
i = 1,992
yes
no
h = 99?
no
GRCHG$_h$ = 1 ?
yes
SIM$_{ih}$ =
SIM$_{i(h-1)}$
ACCX$_{ih}$ =
BKDX$_{ih}$ *
RELYR$_h$



k = CLASSh
CLBKXXh ACCXih ?
no
SIMih = SIMi(h-1) (not promoted)
yes
SIMih = SIMi(h-1)+1 (promoted)
TSIMh = TSIMh + 1
TACTh = TACTh + GRCHGih
end

TABLE 4

VARIABLE DICTIONARY FOR BACKGROUND MODEL

Variable	Definition
Model Inputs	
$HIDEG_i$	-Highest degree of officer, measure of formal educational attainment
$UGDEG_i$	-Officers undergraduate degree, if any
$UCOL_i$	-Undergraduate college, if any
$GCOL_i$	-Graduate college, if any
$PREVEX_i$	-Previous governmental work experience
$UCOLMAJ_i$	-Major field, undergraduate
$GCOLMAJ_i$	-Major field, graduate
$REGION_i$	-Region of country, nativity
SEX_i	-Sex
$COHORT_j$	-Year of entry into Foreign Service
$COHORTN_j$	-Number of years in cohort
$BIRTH_i$	-Birthdate
EODDEPT	-Date of entry into Department of State
$EODFS_i$	-Date of entry into Foreign Service
$SERVCOMP_i$	-Service computation date
$RELYR_{ih}$	-Number of years since entry for officer i, at year h
$CLASS_{ih}$	-Grade or class of officer i, at year h
$YEAR\text{--}_{ih}$	-Actual year of record for officer i, at year h

Table 4 continued

Variable	Definition
Accounting Variables	
$NGRADE_k$	-Total number of FSO's to reach grade or class k
$BKDX_i$	-Weight on background index for Officer i
$PCLX_{ik}$	-Index level for officer i to be promoted to grade K (partial contribution of officer i to CLX_k)
$TSIM_h$	-Total number of simulated promotions in year h
$TACT_h$	-Total number of actual promotions in year h
$GRCITG_{ih}$	-Grade change indicator for officer i, in year h
$ACCX_{ih}$	-Total background score for officer i, in year h
DIF_{ik}	-The difference between actual and simulated promotions for officer i, in class K
$TDIF_{hk}$	-Total difference (for all officers reaching class KO between actual and simulated promotions, for class K
Parameters	
$CLBKXX_k$	-Corrected index necessary for promotion to class/grade K
Intermediate Calculations - Outputs	
SIM_{ih}	-Simulated grade (class) for officer i, in year h
ACT_{ih}	-Actual grade (class) for officer i, in year h

Table 4 continued

Note: Subscript references are as follows:

i - refers to an individual Foreign Service Officer

j - refers to a cohort

k - refers to a class or grade

h - refers to the number of years of service (since entry into the Foreign Service)

student body which would assume that size was the major underlying dimension of importance, but instead was coded according to the proportion of social register members enrolled in the student body during the late 40s and early 1950s. Such a coding scheme was based on the assumption that the social connections developed during the undergraduate educational experience provided the critical dimension for the use of this information by members of the Selection Boards. Two possible sources of error can intrude at this point. First, the choice of underlying dimension may be an incorrect one. The reasons for this choice were described in my discussion of each particular variable. A second source of error arises from the difficulty inherent in categorizing any such variable as school of undergraduate education, once an underlying dimension has been identified. The more complex (and more often interesting) social background variables provide much greater measurement difficulties.

3. The expense of data collection and analysis made it necessary to severely limit the population used in both initial parameter calculation and the final simulation. For this model, those included are officers who entered the Foreign Service between the years 1950 and 1960, who were still on duty in the department in December of

1969. The limitations of any analysis based on this sub-population should be obvious.

First, empirically estimated inferences of parameter values and conclusions about promotion in any cohort are based only on information about those officers who have remained as members of the Service. The promotion decisions made by Selection Board members in any year included not only those who are present in the Service, but others who have since departed. It is difficult to estimate the effect which these limitations have upon our generalizations. Secondly, because data are not available for those who have left the Service, the backgrounds model makes no provision for separation. It assumes that promotion and non-promotion are the only alternatives and that attrition has not produced excessive distortions in the distribution of background variables. Third, as mentioned in Chapter IV, missing data are not evenly distributed. Incomplete assignment histories, as one might expect, are more prevalent the further one goes into the history of individual careers. This results in considerable over-representation from more recent cohorts for all parts of the model which draw conclusions about the lower grades in the Foreign Service.

4. In Chapter IV, the more general limitations of all three models were discussed and summarized in the schematic diagram labelled Table 4. Those limitations apply to the backgrounds model as they did to the seniority model and will also apply to the Selection Board model described in Chapter VI.

BACKGROUNDS MODEL - GOODNESS OF FIT

The goodness of fit computations reported in the following discussion are designed to facilitate the comparison of two grade distributions -- those generated by the simulation (hereafter referred to

as "predicted" grades) and the real world grades to which officers were assigned in any given year (hereafter referred to as "actual" grades). The materials summarized in Tables 5, 6, 7, and Appendix D allow us to directly compare the outcomes of two decision processes -- those of the simulation and those of the real world Selection Boards. In addition, careful analysis of these outcomes helps us to draw inferences about differences and similarities in the procedures which characterize the two decision situations. Several measures of goodness of fit are used to precisely specify these relationships. The fit may be tested in two ways.

The examinations of the outcomes yielded by the backgrounds model and the relationship of these outcomes to those observed in the real world provides the first test. The use of a process model further implies that the simulation can be tested through a comparison of the procedures (decision rules) employed in the simulation with the corresponding real world decision system.[6] The extent to which the simulation replicates the real world decision making processes is our first subject of consideration. As in the case of the seniority model, one must conclude that the situation described in the background model is at best a partial approximation of the real world decision making situation. Using the same checks for process validity described in Chapter IV, it is possible to develop a rough basis for comparison of the three simulations. In developing the backgrounds model, we attempted first to identify the critical decision parameters affecting the evaluation of Officer backgrounds and then to approximate as closely as possible the manner in which this information was used by members of the Selection Boards. The review of the somewhat scanty literature on the subject together with interviews of Foreign Service

TABLE 5



Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Year 11
Year 12
Year 13
Year 14
Year 15
Year 16
Year 17
Year 18
Year 19
Year 20
Actual
APC
R^2 Statistics for comparable APC models are included for all years.
R^2 Statistics for the match between Undergrounds Model and Actual Promotions, for years 1 - 20.

TABLE 6



Key:
Background
APC
* R^2 Statistics for comparable APC model are included for all cohorts
R^2 Statistics for the match between Background Model and Actual Promotions, for cohorts 1950 - 1960. *
1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951
1950
1.00
.90
.80
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
.10

TABLE 7

Mean R^2 and beta values used for evaluation of backgrounds model

	mean R^2	mean beta
analysis by years of service	.44	.61
analysis by cohort	.22	.46

Officers both knowledgeable and directly involved in the promotion process provided the principle basis for the definition of the backgrounds model processes. Furthermore, it is recognized that the techniques used for specification of the decision process may reify the procedures employed in the Selection Boards.

A second technique used to check process validity is derived from a monitoring of outcome errors. Where the outcomes of the real world promotion decisions and those which result from the simulation are found to differ, we can be relatively certain that there is a lack of correspondence in the process employed, although the reverse is not necessarily true. The observed divergence between model and real world outcomes may be the result of two kinds of inaccuracies: either it may reflect a shift in overall decision rules or it may indicate that variables exogenous to the model but relevant to the decision-making situation have not been included in our simulation description.

Process error resulting from inadequate statements of existing

policies or from the exclusion of other criterion (which become increasingly important the longer an Officer remains in the Service) account for the generally decreasing goodness of fit observed in Table 5.

There are several reasons to expect that both sources of error (inappropriate assumption that there is a continuation and elaboration of existing policies and the exclusion of real world decision parameters) may contribute to the misfit between the model and actual promotion processes. First, let us identify those patterns revealed in Tables 5 and 6 which suggest that the same decision rules may not be applicable for all categories of Foreign Service officers as their promotions are traced over time. In Table 5 we observe a steady decline in the relationship between simulated promotions and actual promotions (as measured by the R^2 statistic) for those officers with increasing longevity in the Service. Theoretically, it makes sense that background characteristics which were so critical during the early years of the Service should be replaced by other criteria for promotion in the later years. Promotion rules which place sole emphasis on social backgrounds can be expected to less accurately reflect decision processes for later years. Concomitantly, this also suggests that important real world decision parameters are increasingly being excluded from the decision rules in this model. In Table 5 we can also observe considerable fluctuation in the fit between simulated and real world promotion decisions, particularly in year 6, although the fluctuations are not as marked as those found in the seniority model based on time in class (identified as APC model).

The techniques developed for the comparison of model outcomes, are better developed than those used to describe the fit between actual

and simulated decision processes. A number of statistical techniques have been employed to evaluate both the absolute and relative predictive power of the background model. The strength of this model compared with the other two provides a relative measure of goodness of fit. Tables 5 and 6 include (see broken line) a comparable measure from the seniority model for comparative purposes. As in the case of the seniority model, two tests of goodness of fit are employed in this analysis. First, using the regression program developed in the SPSS package, the model generated decisions are considered a function of the actual decisions. (See appendix C)

Second, R^2 statistics are calculated to measure the ratio of variances explained by the simulation (R^2 statistics have been employed extensively in the evaluation of simulation of outcomes.[7] The diagrams labelled 5 and 6 indicate the results of these statistical analyses. As with the seniority measure discussed in previous chapters, the analysis is broken down by cohort and by the number of years served by each officer. Tables 8 and 9 are included in Appendix D. They contain the statistics computed from the regression of model estimates on observed Foreign Service promotions. Technical details on the seniority model are included in Appendix E.

CONCLUSIONS ON BACKGROUNDS AND FOREIGN SERVICE PROMOTION

As in the case of the seniority model the simulation of Foreign Service promotion based on background criteria is designed to provide insights and hopefully concrete answers for several general questions. First, we are interested in examining the extent to which the outcomes of a model based on background characteristics differ from the pattern of Foreign Service promotions observed in the real world. Second, we are interested in examining where this model has its greatest strengths

and weaknesses. Finally, what can this model tell us about the operation of the Foreign Service career system? To provide at least preliminary answers to these questions, we relied primarily on the statistical measures of goodness of fit graphically illustrated in Tables 5 and 6. The first of these tables (5) describes how well the backgrounds model operates for each successive year in the career of Foreign Service Officers to account for the distribution of grades among members of the Officer Corps. In this case, data are aggregated for all officer cohorts entering in 1950-1960 and the analysis of fit between the model and actual promotions is computed for each year of service. For example, for all officers who have served five years we have compared the promotions generated by the simulation with the actual promotions and find that the measure of background characteristics developed accounts for approximately 46 percent of the variance in actual promotions. In the latter table, (6) the data are aggregated by cohort and the basis for comparison becomes the relationship between the actual and simulated grades for all officers entering the Foreign Service in a given year, for all years of service. For example, we find that the simulation employing the background index accounts for approximately 26 percent of the variance in promotions over all years for those entering the Foreign Service in the year 1958.

The starting point for our preliminary conclusions comes from the results of aggregation by years of service and by cohort. Because the model begins by establishing initial and simulated promotions at the same point, we could anticipate the close match which in fact is observed in the first year of service as presented in Table 5. Our general hypothesis, that background characteristics slowly decrease in importance (and therefore in the amount of variance which they

should explain) for each successive year in service is not as clearly supported as we would expect. The sudden drop in the fifth, sixth and seventh years of service was not anticipated. At the same time, it is interesting to note that another depression, its low point in year 6, was also observed in the analysis of the seniority data. Generally, in comparison with the seniority model, we find the general curve for the backgrounds model fit to be much smoother.

A second possible hypothesis suggested by previous literature,[9] that social backgrounds once again become important during later years in the Foreign Service career, is not clearly supported by the results. Although there is slight improvement in the proportion of variance explained by the background model in the later years of the career, the change is certainly not dramatic. At the same time, the slight increase observed suggests that further refinements in the background index to place greater weight upon those portions of the index considered important for later promotion might yield different results.

As in the case of the seniority model, it is somewhat more difficult to draw clear conclusions from data aggregated by cohort. In part, this reflects the fact that later cohorts include much larger proportions of younger Foreign Service Officers than do earlier cohorts. Generally, however, it is possible to say that there appears to be some minor cohort effect which is not accounted for in the background model. An analysis of the deviant cases, in particular the experiences of the cohort entering in 1954, would probably clarify the unique events which have affected the careers of each cohort. Generally, there are no clear theoretical reasons to explain the relatively

poor fit between the backgrounds model and the actual promotions when aggregated by cohort. Further investigation along the lines just suggested will be necessary.

Although not as clear cut and unambiguous as one might hope, the results of the comparison of background model with the actual promotions do suggest that the variables included in the background index and the procedure employed in the development of the simulation may have identified some of the critical variables for the explanation of Foreign Service careers. These variables, like those described in Chapter IV, are included as part of the more general Selection Board model, the description of which follows in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER VI

THE SELECTION BOARD'S MODEL

The simulation describing promotion processes which is described in this chapter is based upon insights from the seniority and backgrounds models. At the same time, it is more comprehensive than the previous models for it attempts to include information about officer assignments at each stage in the promotion process. The Selection Board's simulation attempts to replicate real world Selection Board processes and promotion decisions within the limitations of data availability and access to information about decision processes in the Boards. The final shape of the simulation has been determined by both theoretical insights and from the incomplete and often conflicting description of promotion processes gained during interviews with participants and observers. Many of the sources of the insights and their practical applications in the development of the simulation model have been discussed previously, particularly in Chapter III.

Our contention has been that, ceteris paribus, this model would be a better predictor of Foreign Service career patterns than either of those previously discussed. There are two reasons underlying this hypothesis. First, the Selection Board's model is considerably more comprehensive than either the seniority or backgrounds model, because it includes important information about assignment histories of officers. On the one hand, the information about assignment patterns provides Selection Board members with important data about the qualifications of officers being considered for promotion. Thus, each career assignment provides reviewing officers with an opportunity to examine the ability of an officer to carry out assignments at higher levels.

At the same time, assignments are also an important training ground. The development of skills and the perspective necessary for working at higher levels in the Foreign Service is imparted primarily through on the job training. On the other hand, the inclusion of career variables is important because assignments like promotions reflect the reward structure of Foreign Service. Within the general bounds provided by norms of worldwide availability, assignment patterns reflect independent evaluations of an officer's ability and acceptability to the higher level managers in the Foreign Service who determine other assignments (the "halo" effect).

A second reason for our contention that the Selection Board's model should more closely approximate actual Foreign Service promotions is that the inclusion of career variables permits the development of a model in which the variables and processes used in the simulation closely approximate those which have been identified in the workings of the Foreign Service Selection Boards themselves. To the extent that these variables and processes are correctly identified and built into the simulation, this model should tell us something not only of outcomes but also of the substance and procedure of promotion mechanisms themselves. Through identification of these operating procedures we are better able to understand both the complex forces which lead to particular promotion outcomes and the dynamics of organizational change.

The Selection Board's model is not a model of Foreign Service careers or career patterns but a model of organizational behavior. Although guided by theory as well as empirical investigation of Selection Board functioning, the model attempts to be descriptive. Because it does not include variables which could potentially produce

changes in the standard promotion procedures, it does not attempt to be predictive except insofar as the premises remain stable. In describing as accurately as possible the manner in which promotion decisions are made within the Foreign Service, the model does not deal with the question of how such decisions should be made and to that extent is not normative in its focus. The more general discussion and speculation about why Foreign Service Selection Boards operate in this way are included in Chapter III.

The Selection Board's model includes the same parameters and constraints as those which govern the operations in the real world Foreign Service Selection Boards. Although it is impossible to completely describe the organizational set within which the Selection Boards function, several important features of the decision making environment can be identified.

1. The knowledge possessed by Selection Board members about the officers under review is limited to that which appears in the personnel folder. Unlike post and function assignments, promotion decisions are presumably made solely on the basis of the written record.
2. The Selection Board's model operates within the assumptions of an annual promotion review. This review includes the following considerations.
   (a) In the review of personnel information on each officer, the most recent assignment and performance reports are weighed most heavily,
   (b) background, time in class, and career history information are concisely summarized for reviewing officers,
   (c) the outcome of Selection Board deliberations is a rank

order of officers in each class, and

(d) officer promotions are based on their position in the rank order list with the actual number promoted from that list externally determined in the office of the Director General.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL

In the description of Selection Board decisions the identification of the characteristics (parameters) and techniques used to estimate parameter values become critical elements. Theoretically, the choice of characteristics is second in importance only to the definition of the general decision making process. In the particular structure they may be of primary importance in the determination of both model processes and model outcomes. As the reader will recall, the most significant impact of the decision model developed herein is that the model recognizes decision makers have to limit their evaluations to a small subset of variables. From the evidence gathered during interviews, it becomes clear that the long annual evaluations of officers are less important for promotion decisions than are assessments of seniority (relative to others in his class), his background (particularly important during the early years of service), and his history of assignments. Beyond this general classification -- seniority, background, and career experience -- the choice of specific model characteristics becomes critical. There are several stages to the specification of model details: (1) those characteristics (parameters) to be used in the model must be identified, (2) these general concepts must be operationalized to allow the use of logical or mathematical decision criteria, (3) the relative importance of each parameter must be estimated,

generally through the use of dummy variable regression analysis, and (4) the actual promotions need to be simulated and then modified if necessary to reasonably approximate the observed patterns experienced during the years described in this study.

Among the many potential variables which could be included in the Selection Board simulation, a subset has been chosen on the basis of our interviews with Selection Board participants and observers of the Selection Boards. The career variables selected for the model were mentioned frequently in both the literature and the interviews.[1] Included from the previous models described in Chapters IV and V, are (1) information on time in class, recomputed annually and (2) the background index, itself combining distinct background variables in varying proportions.[2] Twelve variables are used to identify relevant aspects of career experience. Each of the twelve variables is described in the following section.

1. Region or bureau assignment. Foreign Service posts are located in five major regions: American Republics (ARA), Europe (EUR), East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EA), Northeast and South Asia (NEA), and Africa (AF). In addition, Foreign Service Officers may serve any number of bureaus or central offices in the Department of State (Washington), be detailed to other executive branches of the government, or assigned to a variety of international organizations such as the various branches of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or even to NATO, EECE, or other specialized international bodies. Assignments are rotated on the average of every three to five years and although officers may develop regional specializations, there are strong norms regarding the importance of worldwide service.

Although periodic rotation through domestic assignments is required by law, Foreign Service officers spend most of their time in overseas posts.

2. Primary skill or function. In addition to post assignment (regional or bureau) Officer assignments are usually identified by function as well. Several distinct functions have long been considered critical for diplomatic work--representation, negotiation, and the gathering of intelligence--but until the last twenty years, all tasks were performed by generalists and specialization was rare. The increasing scope and complexity of American overseas involvement has contributed to the further specialization and differentiation of functions entrusted to the Foreign Service. In response the Officer Corps has begun to classify, assign, and promote on the basis of specialized knowledge and expertise.[3] This first took the form of distinction between diplomatic and consular officers as the latter were included in the Career Service. Prior to that time, consular work had been the avocation of expatriate businessmen and xenocentric American elites. Later growth in our overseas involvement resulted in further specialization so that by the late 1960s, officers were expected to identify special interests in one of four major areas--political, economic, administrative, or consular--or in one of the more specialized fields such as commercial or labor work, international organization, intelligence and research, public and cultural affairs, etc. These general categories are used in the model. Since the period described by this research, the Foreign Service has moved to establish major subdivisions and separate career ladders for those serving under the 4 major task divisions.

3. Sponsorship. As in any career system, service under prominent

members of the Officer Corps provides an additional advantage to competent officers when reviewed by the Selection Boards.[4] To operationalize sponsorship, we have identified those serving in executive offices under senior departmental officials. Although this measure does not permit us to identify all potential sponsorship situations, it does include a large proportion of those positions wherein sponsorship could operate and thereby affect the careers of Foreign Service Officers.

4. Regional specialization. Given present political alignments, assignment to some regions provides an officer with greater visibility, specialized knowledge and experience than does a tour of duty in other geographical areas. Furthermore, one's view of the American role in international affairs can be significantly influenced by such experiences. For example, specialization in African affairs may provide an Officer with fewer skills of central value in the department than a focus on European affairs, all other things being equal. Alternatively, some of those interviewed felt that advancement in the Foreign Service was facilitated by not becoming too closely identified with any one geographical area. Thus, although one's visibility might be improved by repeated assignment to the same region, the high value placed upon the perspective of the generalist suggests that the value of highly visible assignments in the same region may decline if it conflicts with notions about appropriate assignment patterns for those identified as generalists. A person is considered to have developed a regional specialization for this analysis, if he has spent five or more years in a region.

5. Regional experience. The regional distribution of assignments through the course of an officer's career has also been identified as an important constituent of career mobility in the Foreign

Service. To explore the effect of variation in assignment patterns, the number of years of experience in each region has been identified as a separate variable and included in the analysis for the Selection Board's model. This measure permits us to identify only the distribution of assignments and not the sequence in which that distribution occurs. It is recognized that the sequence of assignments is critical, but it has been impossible to develop an accurate measure to reflect the dimension of "balanced" assignment history at this time.

6. Position function. As mentioned earlier, each assignment for a member of the Foreign Service can be identified not only by its geographical or regional location but by its functional content as well. The functions used to identify particular positions in the Foreign Service are identical to those used in the identification of functional specialization described under 2, primary skill or function.

7. Bipolarity. One of the striking and yet difficult to specify features of the department is the extent to which it utilizes a political orientation which assumes East-West conflict and conceptualizes bilateral relations in terms of this bipolarity. The significance of this bipolarity has been felt by many Foreign Service Officers whose careers were either terminated or significantly truncated because their analysis of particular political situations was divergent from that of their superiors. If in fact, this dimension is critical to the department, then we would anticipate that those officers agreeing with this perspective might have some advantage over those who did not share this orientation. On the assumption that the Department of State would not assign officers lacking this perspective to posts in which this bipolarity was most critical, we have identified a number of geographical and functional assignments which we would

anticipate would be reserved only for those who had already demonstrated their acceptance of a political outlook which sees the East-West (Communist-Capitalist) bipolarity as the central issue governing America's international relations. If these assumptions are in fact correct and our interviews suggest they may well be, then we would expect those who have served in these positions to be promoted more rapidly than their peers.

8. Length of assignment. The length of assignment variable was established to determine how long an Officer has been in his present assignment at the time of the annual Selection Board review. The variable is included because a number of the officers interviewed identified it as an important procedural element affecting promotion probabilities. Without an adequately elaborated and documented review of an Officer's performance from his superior for the most recent year of service, Selection Boards are less likely to rank an Officer highly and thereby assure his promotion in any given year. Thus the Officer who has only recently been assigned and lacks the requisite supervisor rating is less likely to be promoted than his peers who have spent one or two years at the same post. To the extent that those making Officer assignments are concerned about the career of an Officer, they will usually make changes in assignment only in the year immediately following a promotion.

9. Assignment outside the department. Assignment outside the traditional positions reserved for Foreign Service Officers has always been considered risky by members of the Officer Corps. On the one hand, it meant that supervisors unfamiliar with the technicalities of the annual review process were charged with writing the recommendation.

From the perspective of the Service, it meant that the Officer was receiving something less than ideal training for higher Foreign Service positions, all other things being equal. The inclusion of outside assignment as a variable reflects its repeated mention as an important determinant in Selection Board decisions.

10. Senior training. For those reaching the upper levels of the Service, assignment to one of several senior training programs serves both to broaden the perspective of the Officer and as an indicator that the Officer is expected to move into those positions where such a perspective becomes critical. A number of senior training assignments are identified and included in a generalized index of Senior training. The existence of a preferred senior training assignment (there are clear differences in the prestige accorded to different assignments) in an Officer's record indicates to the Selection Boards that senior officials in the Service or the Department consider the particular individual senior officer material. This person is usually promoted more rapidly than his peers.

11. Time since last training detail. Training is considered an important part of the Foreign Service Officer career, whether it is derived from on the job experience or from a distinct training program which is considered a full time assignment. Several factors affect the evaluation of special training details. In many cases such as in senior training described above, the assignment to a training detail is considered as a reward and an indicator of future rapid promotion. At other times, training may be considered a fringe benefit with no clear relationship to promotability. On the other hand, a career bereft of training assignments, is considered undesirable. A final consideration affecting the influence of training and promotion

is the fact that officers are seldom promoted immediately after a stint in training. Like those who have recently changed assignment, or are assigned to positions outside of the department, these Officers lack the requisite supervisor ratings to place them high on the rank order list for promotions. In this analysis only the length of time since last assignment is considered, and the relationship is hypothesized to be slightly positive.

12. Number of training assignments. Under ceteris paribus assumptions, those Officers with the greatest number of career training assignments might be expected to have the greatest probability of rapid promotion in the Foreign Service. In this dimension, the number of training assignments is summed for each individual for each year in his career.

13. Time in Class. Time in class index is that used for the model in Chapter IV. A description of the variables included in that index can be found in the discussion of the model characteristics.

15. Grade or class. The dependent variable of the simulation is the grade of the officer at any point in his career. Although for the purpose of the analysis and the initial estimation of parameters, grade was considered a continuous interval variable, in fact the intervals between promotions are not equal, and the annual probability of promotion for any individual officer is a step function. For example, it is highly unlikely that an officer no matter how highly qualified will be promoted two years in succession. Critical differences in rates of promotion hinge upon an accumulation of small incremental decisions affecting an officer's rate of promotion. For example, the decision whether to promote an officer after four years in a grade or after five years in the grade can be of critical

importance in determining an officer's rate of career mobility.[4]

The Decision Making Process

The procedures used in Selection Board decisions have been extensively discussed in previous chapters. The seniority and background models employed elements of the real world decision situations. The outlines of those models were also guided by general hypothesis from the literature on bureaucratic decision making. The distribution of promotions produced by these simulations while providing a base for comparison with the present model (Selection Board) was expected to differ substantially from real world outcomes, because it proceeded from assumptions which excluded important inputs to the decision making process. In the case of the Seniority Model, it was assumed that only seniority was the sole consideration. For the Background Model it was assumed that information on officer backgrounds was the only data used in the development of rank order listings by the Selection Boards. These simulations provided an opportunity to explore the implications of two competing models of career system. Furthermore, the development of these two simulations allows us to compare the Selection Boards goodness of fit both with the real world data and with two other theoretically plausible models. In the Selection Board simulation, the three sets of variables are combined, yielding a more complicated picture of Foreign Service Selection Boards than was the case for the models described in Chapters IV and V.

Data Preparation and the Empirical Estimation of Parameters

Data preparations for the Selection Board's model occurred in three stages. The first described in Chapter IV included the identification of several measures of seniority and an empirical comparison of the promotion patterns developed using each index. From this comparison, we have selected time in class as a measure of seniority to be included as one component of the Selection Board model. Chapter V describes the second element in the Selection Board's model, a background index. We have used the composite index developed for the background simulation. Finally, the Selection Board's model includes a number of variables which describe elements of Foreign Service career assignments. These variables have been identified earlier under the discussion of Selection Board model characteristics. The identification of parameters and the empirical estimation of parameter values for use in the simulation involve considerable preliminary analysis of the data. The general procedure for the investigation was as follows:

First, a number of career dimensions were identified from interviews and theoretical information. These are the variables described in the discussion of model characteristics. Second, extensive information processing was necessary to develop empirical estimates used as initial values in the simulation period. Much of the information used for constructing these indices is nominal level data. Other dimensions required some data transformations of other types. For the nominal level data, the development of unidimensional scales involved the identification of important differences between nominal categories, the use of dummy variable regression techniques to develop estimates of relative weights which could be assigned to each possible

value, the aggregation of these weights into a compostie score (for each officer on each dimension for each year in which the officer serves), and the inclusion of these composite scores in a second regression equation to provide empirical estimates for the relative weights to be assigned to each of the twelve dimensions in the final simulation. The third step in the analysis involved the development of the simulation, following as closely as possible those processes employed by the Selection Boards. This includes the annual review of officers according to the parameters defined by the model and the generation of a rank order list from which promotions are determined. The final step is the application of goodness of fit tests to determine how well the distribution of promotions approximates the pattern observed in the real world.

The procedure used to develop empirical estimates of parameters is one of the most important phases of the analysis. In the discussion of modal characteristics, I have identified fourteen variables to be used in the development of the Selection Boards simulation. Two of these variables, the seniority measure (time in class) and the composite background index, have been extensively discussed previously. The parameters and the empirical estimates of their importance are critical for the structure of the Selection Boards model. In the following discussion, the reader sill find an extensive description of how these model characteristics are measured, of how their relative contributions in the final model are determined, and further information necessary to understand the significance of the results.

1. Region or bureau assignment (REGION) The information available to Selection Board members on officer assignments includes data on the region of assignment (if the officer is serving in an overseas post)

or the bureau of assignment (if the officer is on duty in the State Department in Washington or is detailed to another governmental agency). A regression analysis employing dummy variable is used to assess the relative influence of each region on the class (or grade) of an officer. This analysis provides annual data on the overall relationship between each region/bureau and the grade of an officer and is compiled for all officers for each year they served in the Officer Corps. From this estimation procedure each person is assigned a REGION score equivalent to the beta (standardized regression) coefficient of the particular regional assignment for those in the first, second, etc. year of service. In this, as in other analyses, these initial parameter estimates are based on the analysis of a 50 percent sample of officers.

This REGION score was further modified before inclusion in the final simulation. When similar scores were computed for all variables used in the Selection Boards model, a regression analysis with fourteen independent characteristics as independent variables was used to determine the relative weight given to the region/bureau assignment. The year-by-year results of this regression (the "weighting" factors) are included in Appendix G.

2. Primary skill or function (PRISK). The primary skill variable identified the specialization of the individual officer. As indicated in the discussion of model characteristics, there are four major and several minor functions with the overwhelming proportion of officers identify themselves as political specialists. The analysis procedure has been described in general terms above. In this case (1) particular specialties are identified, (2) the relationship between specialty and grade in the same year was assessed using regression

analysis, (3) PRISK scores were given to each officer based on his particular specialty, and finally (4) the overall weighting factor for all PRISK scores in each year was computed in a final regression analysis in which PRISK was included with the other thirteen dependent variable.

3. Sponsorship (SPONSOR). The coding procedure used for the determination of the SPONSOR score was among the most complex, for the development of the index necessitated the combination of information from several distinct sources. There is a considerable body of anecdotal material describing the intricate situations in which sponsorship operates. The prototype is the case of the young officer who impresses the Ambassador (and maybe even marries his daughter - but that of course isn't included in his file). Subsequently, he is given choice assignments and increasingly responsible positions which of course accelerate his rate of promotion. While such stories may be dramatic there are at the same time many occasions for less dramatic forms of sponsorship. But how can these be identified? The final coding included as cases of sponsorship all situations in which an officer (unfortunately no distinction was made between senior and junior officers) served in close proximity to a senior member of the Department or an important Ambassador. For purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that sponsorthip operated for all officers serving in such positions. The relative contribution of such beneficince from the many possible assignments was assessed in a regression analysis, with the grade of the officer as the dependent variable. Based on this analysis annual sponsorship scores were assigned to the officers. Finally, these scores were weighted in another regression analysis in which the SPONSOR score for the officers was included with the other

thirteen variables as a predictor of officer grade.

4. Regional specialization (REGSPEC). The final index of regional specialization was based on information about the total number of years of service spent by each officer in each region. (For this analysis Departmental assignments were excluded.) This involved (1) the calculation of total time spent in each region by each officer, for each year of service, (2) the identification of five years or more of service in a region as an indicator of regional specialization (the designation of five or more years of service is consistent with other descriptions found in the literature), (3) the assignment of individual regional specialization scores to each officer, for each year, for each region (generated again through the use of regression analysis with dummy variable techniques), and finally (4) the assignment of a final weighting factor to REGSPEC, as determined in the fourteen variable regression analyses described earlier. The relative weights assigned to this variable are given in Appendix G.

5. Regional experience (REGEX). The procedure for the development of values for the REGEX variable closely approximates that described above in general details. For this variable, the number of years of service in each region was calculated - for each officer for each year of service. This number was used to develop a REGEX score and the final contribution of REGEX to the simulation was a weighting of this score in proportion to the beta weight of the REGEX variable when compared with others in the final fourteen variable regression analysis. The weighting for each year of service is presented in Appendix G.

6. Position/Function (POSKF). Each officer assignment includes two elements of importance for the Selection Board evaluations. First,

it is a geographical assignment, already discussed as the REGION variable. Second, and as important, it is a function assignment. An officer may be assigned to any of the four major functional areas of a post, to an executive position, or to one of the several minor functional specialties. Because the number of political positions is far smaller than the number of officers who identify themselves with the political specialty, the actual functional assignments are an important variable in the Selection Board decisions. The procedure used to determine the importance of functional assignments is similar to that described above for the other variables. First, the relative contributions to an officer's grade were assessed. The values derived from these regression analyses (one for each year) were then assigned as POSKF scores. For example, all officers who had political assignments during their sixth year in the Officer Corps, were given the same POSKF score for that year. These scores were finally weighted by the inclusion of the POSKF variable in a final regression analysis with the other thirteen factors used in the promotion decisions of the Selection Boards. Appendix G gives the annual weighting factors.

7. Bipolarity (BIPOLAR). Bipolarity is one of the more difficult (and to some extent speculative) variables included in the analysis. The objective was to assess the importance of the East-West or capitalist-socialist conflict for the perspective of departmental employees. Particularly during the era of the fifties, this bipolarity was etched into the minds of FSOs by Senator Joseph McCarthy's attack on the Department of State. There is again considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that an Officer's devotion to this modern version of the holy crusade was critical for his promotion. One of the few ways in which a member of the Selection Board could ascertain this

"loyalty" was through the examination of an Officer's assignment history. A coding scheme was devised which assumed that for those who had served in critical posts the bipolar view of the world was dominant. For example, those serving in Eastern Europe, Moscow or Hong Kong, are presumably more likely to already possess or quickly learn this orientation. Once these posts were identified, their relative contributions to career mobility were empirically determined through the use of regression analyses with dummy variables. From these analyses BIPOLAR scores were assigned to each officer for eacy year of service. Finally these scores were weighted by the includion of BIPOLAR in a regression analysis with other variables determined to be critical for Selection Board decisions.

8. Length of Assignment (ENASG). As mentioned in the discussion of model characteristics, a period of outside assignment is considered detrimental to rapid promotion, thus an officer with several years of experience outside the Department of State is placed at a relative disadvantage. To determine the significance of this variable for the development of parameter estimates we again used two sets of regression analyses. First, all assignment posibilities were coded according to this dimension. A set of regression analyses was used to determine annual scores for each individual based on this coding. A second regression analysis was used to assess the weight to be given to OUTASG for the final simulation. The weighting for each year of service is given in Appendix G. Here, as in the other variables, further refinement (for example differentiating between high prestige outside assignments to the White House or military coordination and lower prestige assignments such as the Peace Corps,) might have increased the significance of this relationship. In later years, it appears

that senior training and other coordinative assignments may have a positive, rather than a negative influence on career mobility.


10. Senior Training (SRTRAIN). Selected senior training assignments have long been considered harbingers of successful careers. First, all training assignments were coded to identify those of highest esteem. Then using regression analyses individual scores were determined for those with senior training experience. Finally weightings were developed for the variable in the second (14 variable) regression analysis, permitting us to thereby estimate the contribution of approximately one dozen top training assignments to the judgments of Selection Board members.

11. Time Since last Training Detail (TSLAST). The time since an Officer's last training detail, measured in years, was considered by several of our more perceptive informants to have a curvilinear relationship both to promotion in any given year and to general mobility in the Service (the central dependent variable in this analysis). The importance of this dimension was determined by including it with the other thirteen independent variables in a regression analysis.

12. Number of Training Assignments (TRAINO). The number of training assignments during a Foreign Service career is expected to have some effect on the mobility of the individual officer. The TRAINO value assigned to each individual (for each year in which he worked) corresponded to the number of training assignments which the person had held up to that time. The score was then weighted by the inclusion of the TRAINO variable in a regression analysis with the other determinants of the Selection Board decisions. The results by year are reported in Appendix G.

TABLE 1

Overview of Model and Real World Isomorphism



Details of the Simulation Model

The description of the Selection Board's model is presented in a format similar to that employed in the previous two chapters. The verbal flow chart Table 2 describes in greater detail the exact processes used in model development. The variable dictionary (see Table 3) defines the terms used in the flow chart (see Table 4), from which the simulation program itself is developed.

Potential Refinements

Although the model as developed parallels real world procedures in its overall dimensions, it is extremely difficult to identify let alone replicate some of the actual decision processes affecting Selection Board outcomes. Many of the most significant problems occur in parameter definition and in the calculation of parameter estimates. Although the dimensions identified for incorporation into the model have been identified by participants and arm chair theorists alike (both those in the Officer Corps and in academia), there is little of the concrete data or even hypotheses necessary for the development of initial parameter estimates. Guesstimates, time, and financial limitations often dictated the final choice of which parameters were selected for final inclusion. For example, although functional titles for various positions are clearly identified, these titles do not necessarily provide a full measure of the functional skill being developed by an officer. An FSO with a consular assignment in Hong Kong or Eastern Europe is properly evaluated differently than someone with a similar title stationed in Ottawa, Liverpool or Mexico City. Those in the former assignment provide important data on the popular response to Mainland Chinese and Eastern European governments respectively. Those in the latter posts have much less sensitive and

TABLE 2
VERBAL FLOW CHART

1. Records from officer selection work sheet which identify major categories for evaluation of officers. Included is material on the 12 variables used in the model.

2. Rules for rating each officer on the 12 variables, general precedents for the importance of each facet of assignments. These rules are included in the precepts, in the address of the Deputy Undersecretary, and in the long experience of officer members in the culture and career system of the foreign service.

3. Using information from (1) and (2) the selection boards establish a rough rating for each officer on each of the 12 dimensions.

4. Rules for determining the contribution of each variable to a general ranking for each officer, otherwise known as the "weighting factor". These rules come from the precepts, DUS address and previous experience in the Service.

5. Using information from (3) and (4) individuals are rank ordered in preparation for decisions about promotion.

6. Rules determining promotion from the rank order list, i.e., the cutoff point for promotions. The rules come from both formal instructions to the Selection Boards in the precepts and DUS address and from informal instructions from the office of the Director General re: number of openings at each class level. Past experience also serves as an important informal guideline.

Table 2 continued




Table 2 continued

VARIABLE DICTIONARY FOR SELECTION BOARDS MODEL

VARIABLE	
MODEL INPUTS	
$REGION_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual bureau or regional assignment
REG_h	Individual region or bureau index
$REGP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of region to promotion
$PRISK_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from officer specialty for functional skill
PRI_{ih}	Individual specialty for function index
$PRIP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of specialty/function to promotion
$SPONSOR_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual sponsorship index
$SPON_{ih}$	Individual sponsorship index
$SPONSP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of sponsorship to promotion
$REGSPEC_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual regional specialization index
$REGS_{ih}$	Individual regional specialization index
$REGSP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of regional specialization to promotion
$REGEX_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual regional experience index
$REGE_{ih}$	Individual regional experience index
$REGEP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of regional experience to promotion
$POSKF_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual position skill/function index

Table 2 continued

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
$POSF_{ih}$	Individual position/skill function index
$POSFP_{h}$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of position skill/function to promotion
$BIPOLAR_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual bi-polarity index
$BIPOL_{ih}$	Individual bi-polarity index
$BIPOLP_{h}$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of bi-polarity index to promotion
$LENASG_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual length of assignment index (mainstream I)
$LENAS_{ih}$	Individual length of assignment index
$LENASP_{h}$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of length of assignment to promotion
$OUTASG_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from annual outside assignment index (Mainstream II)
$OUTAS_{ih}$	Individual outside assignment index
$OUTASP_{h}$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of outside assignment to promotion
SRTRAIN	Individual contribution to promotion from annual senior training index
$SRTRG_{ih}$	Individual senior training index
$SRTRGP_{h}$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of senior training to promotion
TSLAST	Individual contribution to promotion from annual time since last training assignment index (MIDTRAIN I)
TSLA	Individual time since last training assignment index

Table 2 continued

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
$TSLAP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of time since last training assignment to promotion
TRAINO	Individual contribution to promotion from annual number of training assignments index (MIDTRAIN II)
$TRNO_{ih}$	Individual training assignments index
$TRNP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of number of training assignments to promotion
$BACKDX_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion from background index as developed in the background model
$BKDX_{ih}$	Individual background index
$BKDXP_{ih}$	Overall service proportional contribution of background to promotion
$TICLASS_{ih}$	Individual contribution to promotion of annual time in class index as developed in the seniority model
$TICS_{ih}$	Individual time in class index
$TICSP_h$	Overall Foreign Service proportional contribution of time in class to promotion
ACCOUNTING VARIABLES	
$2SUMDX_h$	Size of SUMDX for the lowest officer in the top quartile of each annual ranking
$TSIM_h$	Total number of simulated promotions in year h
$TAZT_h$	Total number of actual promotions in year h
$GRCHG_{ih}$	Grade change indicator officer I in year h
DIF_{ik}	The difference between actual and simulated promotions for officer I in class K

Table 2 continued

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
$TDIF_{hk}$	Total difference (for all officers reaching class K in year h) between actual and simulated promotions for class k in year h
$SUMDX_{ih}$	Empirically determined index for each officer used in the calculation of the final rank-order list during year h
$QSUMDXX_{hk}$	Size of $SUMDX_{ih}$ for the lowest officer in the rank order list to be promoted in year h (a corrected figure adjusted to annual variations in the rate of promotion)
INTERMEDIATE CALCULATIONS - OUTPUT	
SIM_{ih}	Simulated grade (class for officer I in year h)
ACT_{ih}	Actual grade (class) for officer I in year h

Note - subscript references are as follows:

i - refers to an individual Foreign Service officer

j - refers to a cohort

k - refers to a class or grade

h - refers to the number of years of service (since entry into Foreign Service)

Table 3
Non-Verbal Flow Chart: Selection Boards




Table 3 continued





Table 3 continued



critical assignments given the dominant values of the department.

Another set of parameter estimation problems is possibly more ambiguous, even for those inside the department. Although a Foreign Service Officer would readily tell you the differential importance of the consular assignments described above, it is much more difficult for him to tell you how much effect those assignments have on an officer's career and his chances for promotion in a given year. For example, should parameter estimates be calculated with a zero, one, or two year lag between assignment and effect on promotion? The calculations used for this model assume the significance of assignment is felt the same year in which the officer holds that assignment i.e., lag time is not considered significant. The importance of any particular assignment for later career advancements is directly accounted for only by variables such as regional experience or regional specialization. If particular sequences of assignments are critical for later promotions, as one could reasonably anticipate, the parameter estimates and therefore the final simulation reflect this only if an officer has been promoted in the year of a particular assignment.

Further refinements would be possible in a formulation of decision rules themselves. As presently established in the simulation, a rather elementary set of procedures is used to make decisions about promotability or non-promotability of each officer. The decision rules are assumed to be constant for officers at all stages of their careers, the variability being attributable to the empirically determined weights assigned to each variable for each year of service. The real world situation is doubtless more complex, for different decision rules are applied depending upon the grade of the Officer and the particular career pattern which his record reveals. In

addition, the importance of assignments themselves changes from year to year. Further experimentation with models which vary decision rules, for example, applying different rules to junior, mid-career and senior officers, may reveal that these variations can improve our descriptive model.

GOODNESS OF FIT

The adequacy of the Selection Board simulation can be evaluated in two ways. First, do the procedures and variables employed in the simulation closely approximate those used in the Selection Boards themselves? Second, are the outcomes of the two processes similar? Reliable procedures for comparing the subtle details of the decision making process are lacking, therefore we are limited to comparison of large-scale and relatively obvious details for the first part of this evaluation. A number of statistical measures are commonly used to compare model outcomes with those observed in the real world. For this reason, conclusions for this second part of the evaluation can be stated with great precision.

Process validity has been checked at several points in the analysis of Foreign Service promotions. Preliminary descriptions of Selection Board operations were verified through subsequent interviews with participants and several observers assigned to personnel offices of the Department. The final model is an abstraction of this complex decision making process. Both the descriptive literature on Foreign Service promotion and our interviews identified many procedures which did not affect the major dynamics of Selection Board activity. For example, although there are distinct and separate Boards making promotion recommendations for each class, each Board uses the same general

guidelines for making promotion decisions. For this reason many of our informants felt that an accurate description of the promotion process need not include different models for each Selection Board. This reification, further compounded by specification of decision rules in uniform mathematical and logical form, provides the most significant identifiable deviation from the real world decision processes.

By monitoring the difference between actual and simulation outcomes, it is possible to draw further inferences about the process validity. The relative stability in the proportion of variance explained (compare the slope of R^2 statistics curves for different models in Table 4) suggests that inadequacies in statement of existing decision rules are not cumulative over time. At the same time, poorly operationalized decision rules or the exclusion of other important variables reduced the overall magnitude of fit as measured by divergence between the R^2 statistics.

For our second evaluation, model outcomes are compared with both the real world promotion decisions and the promotions simulated by the other two models. As in the goodness of fit test used for the two earlier analyses, two procedures are employed in this study. First, using the regression program provided in the SPSS analysis package, the distribution of grades which results from model generated decisions (simulation outcomes) is considered a function of the actual decisions (Selection Board outcomes). Second, R^2 statistics are calculated to measure the ratio of variances explained by the simulation.[5] The Tables labelled 4 and 5 present the results of these statistical analyses. As in the previous discussions, the results are presented by cohort and by years of service. Tables 9 through 10 are included in Appendix F. They contain a statistics computed from the regression

TABLE 4




R^2 Statistics for the match between the Selection Boards Model and Actual Promotions, for years 1 - 19.
* R^2 Statistics for Comparable Subgroups and APC models are included for all years.
Selection Boards Model
Subgroups Model
APC (Seniority) Model
Year 1
Year 2
Year 3
Year 4
Year 5
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 10
Year 11
Year 12
Year 13
Year 14
Year 15
Year 16
Year 17
Year 18
Year 19
1.00
.90
.80
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
.10

TABLE 5


1.00
.90
.80
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
.10
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
R^2 statistics for the match between selection boards Model and Actual Promotions, for Cohorts 1930 - 1960.*
* R^2 Statistics for comparable Backgrounds & AFC models are included for all years.
Selection Boards Model
Backgrounds Model
AFC (Seniority) Model

of model estimates on observed Foreign Service promotions.

TABLE 6

Mean R^2 and Beta Values for Evaluation of Selection Boards Model

	mean R^2	mean beta
analysis by years of service	.63	.42
analysis by cohort	.72	.52

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis are discussed in two parts: commentary on the results of the Selection Board's model and a comparison with the other two simulations.

The goodness of fit test results presented in Tables 4 and 5, suggest several conclusions about the mechanics of promotion in the Foreign Service. By comparing the results of the three models, we observe that the inclusion of career variables in the third (Selection Boards) simulation has generally not improved the fit between simulation and real world promotion outcomes. Because both time in class and background index were included in the final model as two of the fourteen variables, it is possible to compare the significance of these variables with the other measures of career experience discussed earlier in the chapter.

The empirically determined parameter estimates provide the basis for this comparison. As the data presented in Appendix G, Table 2 reveals, the background index and time in class measures are the second and fourth most important variables in the regression analysis

used to estimate parameter weights. The variables and the relative absolute magnitude of their contributions to the Selection Board decision model are included in Table 7 below.

TABLE 7

Relative Absolute Magnitude of Contribution to Promotion Decisions in the Selection Boards Model*

PRISK	20.3
TICLASS	19.7
SRTRAIN	19.2
BACKDX	15.4
REGEX	10.0
POSKF	9.6
OUTASG	9.5
REGION	8.7
REGSPEC	8.6
TRAINO	7.0
LENASG	6.7
SPONSOR	6.3
TSLAST	5.5
BIPOLAR	4.0

* based on mean beta weights for all years of Service.

These results do not point to the overwhelming significance of the newly added career variables, but several features of the career experience do have important effects. Changes in measurement and decision procedures conceivably improve the results still further. This kind of refinement is clearly one of the next steps in subsequent analyses.

One of the striking although difficult to interpret results of the goodness of fit comparison is the marked dampening of fluctuation in the R^2 curve which characterizes the Selection Board model when compared with the other two. (see Table 5). Two interpretations of the results are possible, although this analysis does not permit an adequate testing of either hypothesis. Conceivably the inclusion of more variables means erratic fluctuations revealed in

the earlier (especially seniority) models have been cancelled out by the incorporation of new elements in the simulated decision process. This corroborates interview material suggesting that promotion decisions in the Foreign Service use several dimensions and do not rely on any single variable. It also confirms the oft repeated assertion that substantive career and background information have an influence only after the initial decision parameters have been established using more common bureaucratic decision rules such as those based on time in class. A second possible interpretation identifies the lower fluctuations and relatively slow decay of the Selection Board's model curve (Table 5) with the response of this model to non-repetitive external events affecting the promotion. Although these factors are exogenous to the Selection Board's model, the interplay of the variables which are included eliminates the problem of cumulative error which affects the other two simulations.

When the unit of analysis for goodness of fit is the cohort (year of entry), rather than number of years served, the Selection Board model fares decidedly less well than time in class, but substantially better than the simulation in which promotion decisions were based solely on background variables. Comparisons using a cohort base were included primarily to identify cohort specific differences within each model. For this reason, it is difficult to draw substantive conclusions about the weakness of the Selection Board's simulation relative to the other two models without far more specific knowledge than is available in an analysis proceeding at this level of aggregation. It is clear however that the lower fit of the 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1958 cohorts is somewhat parallel to the results of the time in class (seniority) model, thus suggesting that later analysis should try to

identify and estimate the effects of unique experiences for these cohorts.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The narrative and analysis presented in the preceding chapters is part of a larger and continuing work on the determinants and consequences of Foreign Service careers. The objectives of that larger study are three-fold. First, it will attempt to accurately identify the structures and describe the processes which are used to make decisions about the promotion of Foreign Service Officers. Secondly, the study seeks to account for the influence of political partisans and bureaucratic institutions which provide the context for the promotion decisions themselves. Many of these forces operate within the Selection Boards themselves. Others have their influence primarily through the definition of information considered by the Selection Boards. Less easily defined are the determinants of bureaucratic structure and the standard operating procedures of the Department of State. The third focus of this general study is on the consequences of this decision making apparatus. Selection Board procedures certainly influence who gets promoted, and when in the Officer Corps. Also important, however, are the implications of these outcomes for the direction of American foreign policy.

Many aspects of this overall analysis remain imperfectly articulated in the preceeding chapters. As a result, any discussion of the substantive conclusions must clearly distinguish between those which are well confirmed and supported by the evidence on the one hand, and those of a much more speculative and exploratory nature on the other. In the summary and conclusions which follow, both speculative insights and results of more rigorous analysis have been

presented for the reader.

Change and Competing Images of Tomorrow's Foreign Service

The general picture presented of the Foreign Service describes it as a relatively small self-administered group of higher civil servants. Their predecessors included both persons from the American upper class and from the more marginal band of expatriot business men who served as unpaid fee-collecting counsels, representing American commercial and shipping interests in the major ports of the world. The amalgamation of diplomatic and consular services and the development of a small career civil service followed soon after the American involvement in the First World War. The new Service was dominated by those from the diplomatic branch who recruited new personnel from among the talented generalists produced by the nations leading colleges. By the time of World War II, the size of the American overseas presence had multiplied considerably. But the Foreign Service Officer Corps grew only slightly, and then only under duress.

Modernizers have repeatedly pressed for further democratization of recruitment and initial admission procedures for the Service. Furthermore, they stress the need for more specialized skills to manage and expand the increasingly complex network of American governmental and private institutions overseas. The Foreign Service reaction to these events and the resulting structure of the Service are analyzed in some detail. The competition between the traditionalists and modernizers is an important influence on the organization which shapes Foreign Service careers.

Although still somewhat speculative, the description of the contest between groups favoring quite different visions of the Service has been presented in the narratives of chapters two and three.

Internally the differences are clear, but the long term significance of the opposing positions and the final resolutions remains vague. It is understandable why the traditionalists seek to maintain their control of the Service administration. For many, the reasons for participation in the conflict are doubtless limited to short term bureaucratic self-interests and self-preservation. For others, the identification with diplomatic work in the old tradition is critical, for diplomacy continues to be a suitable occupation for the gentleman-generalist. Awareness of the status implications of changes in the present conception of the Officer Corps influences the behavior of those from elite backgrounds and also those from the middle class, for whom diplomatic work has provided a status at least equivalent to that of the independent professions.

The composition of the reform movement is more heterogeneous. The continued funding of reform interests by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others, suggests that the definition and composition of the Officer Corps is of vital concern to those with active interests in American overseas expansion. Groups inside the Service who remain the most active are typically concerned with the declining appeal of a Foreign Service career and the diminished role of the Foreign Service, both in the shaping and in the day-to-day direction of American foreign policy. Their conception of a career emphasizes executive responsibilities and program direction while dodging the issue of specialization, while many of the outsiders pressing for reform see the continuation of a generalist corps as anachronistic. Recent development of separate political, administrative and economic tracks within the Service represents a concession to those pressing for greater specialization.

Glimpses into this conflict permeate the discussion earlier in this study. During the period examined, primarily 1950-1968, the competition between the different groups resulted in a promotion process nominally governed by the precepts, evaluative procedures, and universalistic assessment advocated by the reformers. Yet, as I have explained, practices governing Foreign Service promotions diverge considerably from these prescriptions. In the process of day-to-day decision making, a number of organizational and political arrangements contribute to the overwhelming dominance of the traditionalist perspective.

The Process of Promotion

The greater part of the thesis analyzes not the dynamics of this conflict between modernists and traditionalists, but the procedures by which the Selection Boards made their promotion decisions. The account begins with a discussion of the bureaucratic and normative constraints on decision makers, borrowing heavily from the theoretical insights of the Carnegie-Mellon tradition. Three alternative, albeit complementary, models of the Foreign Service promotion are offered, combining the insights of these decision making theorists with earlier writings on the Foreign Service and participant interview data. The first model operates as if seniority were the sole determinant of Foreign Service careers. In essence, it assumes that all officers are treated alike irrespective of differences in background, careers, or ability. All are promoted when they reach a median seniority level. The implications of this assumption are explored by simulating promotions using seniority as a basis for the decisions. Officers are promoted at regular intervals, and the five different indices of seniority yield slightly different results. The distribution of grades which emerges,

as previous simulated grades are corrected to reflect each year's promotion decisions, is annually compared with actual rank distributions (identified by analysis of historic promotion patterns). The second model follows a similar procedure but assumes that background characteristics rather than seniority are the critical and only variables governing promotion. Again, the results of the simulation based on these assumptions are compared with the historical record to determine how well the model accounts for observed promotion patterns. In the third model, we have assumed that seniority and background are in fact important but are only two of a number of variables which contribute to promotion decisions. Here again, the results are compared with historic promotion patterns to determine how well the model describes both processes and outcomes of the 1950-68 period.

Who Gets Promoted When and How: Some General Conclusions About the Outcomes of the Promotion Process

What substantive conclusions can be stated about the Foreign Service promotion process at this stage in the analysis? Several results can be reported with some confidence and a number of new possibilities are now available for further study.

At the most general level, we can conclude that all three models are able to explain large portions of the variance in the promotion of Foreign Service officers. Used as the only predictor of promotion decisions, the time in class variable comes closer to describing the actual FSO careers than any of the other seniority measures with which it is compared. (See Chapter VI, Tables 5 and 6). The empirically determined weight given to this variable in the Selection Board's simulation (see Table 8 in Appendix F) further supported the view of Department of State informants and conclusions of the literature

on bureaucratic decision making. Seniority is considered an important determinant of Foreign Service promotion in both analyses. The reasons for its inclusion in a model of Selection Board decision making can be found in Chapter III. Administrative convenience (standard and quantifiable operating procedures), pressure for the use of seniority by many in the Foreign Service, and the desire of top Foreign Service administrators to assure the admission of only time-tested officers to senior position have all contributed to this outcome.

Similarly the background index (incorporating eight variables), when used as the basis of the simulation, results in a distribution of promotion decisions quite similar to the actual promotion outcomes. Here again knowledgeable informants and written accounts of the promotion process were used to identify background parameters. The empirical weighting of variables in the preparation of the background index (using regression techniques) provides the closest detail of the substantive findings. The model itself used these estimates and the resulting background index for the generation of the simulated promotions. The regression analysis identified high positive relationships between grade and (1) undergraduate attendance at Harvard, Yale, Princeton or other non-Ivy prestige colleges,[1] (2) graduate work at a prestige non-Ivy League university or possibly Harvard, Yale or Princeton, (3) childhood residence in the mid-Atlantic or New England states, (4) an undergraduate major in languages, and (5) previous governmental experience. The high negative relationships between grade and variables included in the background index are identified as (1) graduate work in a foreign language, history, or law, (2) attendance at a "non-prestige" undergraduate college, and (3) childhood residence in the mid-west or Pacific states. (The complete set of data weights used

in the backgrounds models, including those variables for which there was no strong relationship, can be found in Appendix G, Table 1). Many stereotypes and several hypotheses of previous studies are tentatively confirmed by these results. But more detailed analysis will be needed to provide sufficient empirical data for a detailed test of many of the propositions suggested by both the literature and our Department of State informants.

The Selections Board model also produced promotion outcomes which correspond reasonably well to the actual distribution of grades among Foreign Service Officers. Here again by disaggregating the results and looking at the elements included in the simulation, we are able to identify substantial variation in the relative importance of the 14 variables included in the model. The significance of primary function (function of specialty) is particularly noteworthy, especially for those who have been in the Foreign Service for more than ten years. (For a definition, see discussion of model characteristics in Chapter VI). Although this finding comes as no surprise to members of the Officer Corps, this is the first time the proposition has been tested in a systematic study. Similarly, the importance of critical senior training assignments is well understood for those familiar with the Foreign Service. Appointment to one of the few prestige senior training assignments has long been considered the mark of those elected for promotion to the top ranks of the Service and the results confirm its significance, especially for mid-career Officers. There was surprisingly little relationship between grade and the substantively interesting but complex variables - sponsorship and bipolarity. For both items beta weights derived from regression analysis remain close to zero. Fluctuations exhibit no regularity which can easily be

interpreted, even by post-hoc theorizing. It is unclear whether the lack of significant relationship is a function of coding difficulties or is an accurate description of real world events. (The results for all variables used in the model, by year, are presented in Appendix G, Table 2).

Another important argument presented in the theoretical discussion has also been supported by the findings reported above. It is quite clear that the Selection Board's precepts do not totally define parameters used in Selection Board decisions. As many of the informants within the Department of State suggested, the voluminous material included in the annual evaluations may be primarily supplementary to the more universal and easily quantifiable promotion criteria like time in class. This does not eliminate the possibility that there are significant positive relationships between the detailed written evaluations themselves and the variables used in the analysis, but it does suggest that the evaluations may be either reflective of background or career variables on the one hand or almost totally extraneous on the other. The utility of annual evaluations, as suggested earlier, may contribute more to low risk taking and assurance of organizational compliance than to promotion decisions.

More analysis is needed before it is possible to accurately describe the influence of many important substantive variables on the Foreign Service promotion process. Although these issues are central to the larger study of Foreign Service Careers, they are only a subsidiary focus for the present inquiry. The major outcomes of this investigation have been a description of the decision making process and the generation of promotion decisions which closely approximate those of the real world Foreign Service Selection Boards. The

moderate success of the three decision making models is in large part a reflection of the accuracy with which that decision making process has been simulated.[2] With these basic models now developed, the implications of several concrete substantive hypotheses can be explored through the modification of both the decision making process and changes in the initial parameter estimates (reflecting refinements in coding or estimating techniques).

The outcomes of the three simulations, as indicated above, provide but one measure of accuracy in the modeling of decision making processes used by the Selection Boards. Even the best of models cannot compensate for inappropriately coded inputs or inadequately identified variables. As a result, any quantitative conclusions about the accuracy of the decision process simulated in the Selections Board model, are heavily dependent upon substantive content. At a less exacting level however, this study has been able to identify and codify for the first time many elements of the decision making process which are comparable to those found in other organizational settings. The development of regularized decision making procedures, the use of easily comparable data (preferably quantitative), the reduction of complexity through the selection of relatively few critical variables - all these are patterns observed recurrently in the organizational literature. These decision processes have been described in general theoretical terms in Chapter III and in more precise form in Chapters IV, V, and VI. In each case, the objective has been to identify how the general structural constraints which govern decision making in organizations operate in very specific settings. The next step is to describe more closely the output of these decisions and to identify how particular elements of the organizational decision making process influence

those outcomes and indirectly the world beyond the organization.

Alternative Perspectives on the Analysis of Careers

Several students of organizational behavior have, in recent years, attempted to examine the dynamic relationship between bureaucratic hierarchical organization and individual careers. Through their study of organizational careers they have probed the insights afforded by this type of longitudinal data to understand the internal and external forces affecting changes in organizational structure, control and ideology. This study of Foreign Service Officer careers has built upon many of the insights developed by others, while at the same time experimenting with a somewhat different perspective which emphasizes the particular decision making mechanisms which govern career patterns.

The work of Harrison White, who develops what he calls systems models of mobility in organizations, is among the more exciting of these recent analyses. White is interested, for theoretical reasons, in the movement of vacancies rather than the movement of persons through the organization. Although this interest differs to some extent from that which I have enunciated, his work has been an important source of insights, for it has identified some of the major organizational constraints on the careers of individuals, on the one hand, and has discussed the determinants of vacancy rates and patterns of vacancy movement, on the other.[3]

This study of the Officer Corps does not make jobs (assignments, in the Foreign Service) central to the analysis as is the case with the vacancy model. Instead we are interested primarily in the personal rank of Officers as a measure of their mobility in the Foreign Service hierarchy, while recognizing that promotion is often influenced by

assignment. The freedom to promote, independent of assignment, is an important attribute of the Foreign Service career system, particularly in light of the limitations imposed on careers in most large scale organizations where upward mobility is a function of job vacancies rather than seniority, assignment history, or the idiosyncrasies of Selection Board rules and procedures. For this reason, although there are certainly modal sequences of assignment, the immediate identification of a "vacancy" to be filled depends on changes in the statutory regulations governing the number of officers in each class (grade), the rate of attrition from that class (because of retirement, promotion, or involuntary separation), and the rank of the particular Foreign Service Officer relative to his peers in the class from which he is to be promoted. Conceptually this makes the study of Foreign Service careers far simpler than the careers of churchmen discussed by White. Practically, attention is placed not on the available vacancies, but on the ranking of each officer relative to his peers. This difference can be readily observed by comparing the discussions of Foreign Service Officers, who talk about time in class and functional specialty, with the speculations of civil servants in the same office, whose talk centers around who is about to retire from which particular job, and where are they opening a new office which will create new employment opportunities (vacancies).

Despite these obvious differences, there are similarities between the systems described by White and those discussed herein. In both analyses, the careers of men are considered the chaotic byproducts of the dynamics of vacancies over long time periods. There is no question that at a macro level promotions to the next highest grade are dependent on the vacancies at that level.

As I have indicated in previous work, the presence of a large bulge of officers in upper mid-career levels has increased resignations among junior officers in recent years because of the discrepancy between promotion opportunities expected and those actually received.[4] Similarly, one of the consequences of the creation of two super grades (Career Minister and Career Ambassador) has been the increase in length of the vacancy chains created thereby, thus permitting additional promotions all the way down through the Service as the vacancies traveled down the line. But while these effects have been discussed previously, they have relatively little bearing on the central issues under discussion except to the extent that changing rates of rates of promotion from one class to the next are the result of overall vacancies in the higher class. Changes in the proportion of individuals from a class who can be promoted, do provide us with important information about the criteria for competitive ranking. For example, when very few officers are promoted, this should enable us to identify which among those with the appropriate seniority have the other desirable characteristics necessary for promotion -- something which is very difficult to discern when almost everyone who reaches the median seniority level is automatically promoted irrespective of other qualifications or qualities. There is no doubt that the organizational dynamics which set these vacancy rates -- resignations, budgetary allocations, and Foreign Service "need" estimates -- are important for a more complete view of the service career and its determinants. These, however, must be left for later analysis.

Organizational socialization too has been touched upon in the analysis, although again the present findings represent only preliminary inquiries into a subject whose typography has yet to be adquately

described. In the discussion of Selection Board composition and orientation, in Chapter III, it was pointed out that the selection of Board members helped assure the dominance of the traditionalist perspective in promotion decisions, thus aiding the perpetuation of a distinctive culture in the Foreign Service. Although the research which describes the operation of organizational socialization has not been discussed at length, one can see the importance of the process for determining the composition of the Officer Corps. The relatative uniformity in the ranking of functional and geographic assignments, the homogeneity of supervisor ratings on the annual efficiency reports, and the continued use of traditional criteria for promotion in the face of external pressure, are all dependent upon the existence of a common normative structure in the Service. Given the increasing diversity of individuals admitted through the democratized intake procedures, we would expect greater diversity, not greater agreement on the traditional norms. The process of organizational socialization -- generated by the acknowledged training function of early years in the Service, frequent rotation which leaves the Service as the only constant in the work environment, the isolation of the expatriot existence, and the pressure toward conformity reinforced by the annual evaluation system -- is a critical link for explaining both promotion processes and outcomes.

Universalism and the Definition of Merit

One part of this analysis which appears to have widespread implications for the development of new analytic perspectives on organizational functioning is included in the discussion of merit as the basis of Foreign Service promotion. In an era where universalistic norms have been a keystone of bureaucratic organization, the operationsl

definition of merit principle becomes critical. Yet surprisingly this issue has not been central to the work of organizational theorists who generally assume that all parties in an organization share a common definition of how such principles are applied in day-to-day operations. The one scholarly group which has kept this problem central in its work has been the school whose primary focus is on the issues of industrial conflict, for contests over the definition of such rules often become the basis for complex legal definitions and complicated negotiation.

In this analysis I have discussed extensively how the Selection Boards define "merit." Political meddling in the appointment process has been excluded, as intended by the framers of the 1924 Rogers Act. In its place, promotions in the Officer Corps are presumably determined by the broad and difficult guidelines set forth in the precepts governing Selection Board operation and the assessments of officers included in the annual efficiency reports. Yet because the task of producing a unidimensional ranking of officers in a class (grade) is so complicated few people understand what determines Foreign Service promotions. Those who understand the most about the process speak the least about universalistic principles, and most about bureaucratic politics. To test the insightful hunches of savvy Foreign Service officers and other perceptive observers I have attempted to describe in detail how merit is defined by the Selection Boards. The next step is to further analyze the consequences of this definition. Only when these processes are better understood can the citizenry begin to apply a definition of merit which meets their needs rather than the needs of powerful elements in the bureaucracy and its external allies. Similar analyses of organizational decision making have been initiated in many

bureaucracies -- federal regulatory commissions, private corporations, and even in institutions of higher learning. It is hoped that the guidelines for analysis presented herein will further this inquiry, removing the ideological mist from our view of organizational functioning and making available to all people knowledge previously the private preserve of the few.

FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER II

[1]Jones, Arthur G. THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study, No.1, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965.

[2]Jones EVOLUTION, pp. 16-17.

[3]There are several accounts of the details surrounding the passage of the Rogers Act which provide a flavor for the political controversies of the period. The central work is by William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, entitled THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS (Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, July 1961. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.) See also Graham H. Stuart, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: A HISTORY OF ITS ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PERSONNEL (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1949), and Special Committee of the National Civil Service League, 1919 .

[4]Jones, EVOLUTION, pp. 18-19.

[5]THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1946 (P.L. 79-724; as amended to December 1968) Department of State (Washington, D.C: U.S.G.P.O., 1968).

[6]Some of the major reports and commission studies recommending changes in some part of the Foreign Service are as follows: The Chapin-Foster Report, 1945; The Report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission), 1949; The Rowe Commission Report, 1950; The Brookings Report, 1951; The Wriston Report, 1954; the Syracuse University Report, 1959; The Brookings Report, 1959; The Steiner Report, 1961; The Herter Commission Report, 1962; The Report of the Committee on Research and Development of International Institutions, 1964; The Report of the American Foreign Service Association, 1968; The Macomber Report, 1971.

[7]See Frederick C. Mosher, "Careers and Career Services in the Public Service," PUBLIC PERSONNEL REVIEW, January 1963, pp. 46-51; Peter Blau, DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963).

[8]For a discussion of open and closed career systems in another setting see: Kanter, Arnold, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND BUREAUCRATIC COMPLIANCE: CHANGING ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES, paper delivered at Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago 1971.

[9]Jones, EVOLUTION, p. 46.

[10]Among the studies which have commented on the existence and content of a Foreign Service culture are the following: Andrew M. Scott, "The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture," INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Spring 1969; John E. Harr, THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969); Chris Argyris, SOME CAUSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Center for International Systems Research, Department of State, Report No. 2, January 1967);

and Donald P. Warwick, Marvin Meade, and Theodore L. Reed, THE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY: STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (in press); Jones, EVOLUTION, p. 46.

[11]NINTH INTERMEDIATE REPORT: FOREIGN SERVICE PROMOTIONS UNDER THE WRISTON PROGRAM. A Report to the House Committee on Governmental Operations, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, January 23, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1956).

[12]Regis Walther, ORIENTATIONS AND BEHAVIORAL STYLES OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 5, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965.

[13]A number of recent papers have focused on the phenomenon of organizational socialization. Among them are the following: Donald P. Warwick, "Adult Socialization and Personality," manuscript to appear in THE MANAGEMENT OF CRISIS: METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, by S. Seashore and R. McNeill, eds.; Howard Becker and Anselm Strauss, "Careers, Personality and Adult Socialization," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 62, November 1957; Vernon K. Dibble, "Occupations and Ideologies," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 68, No. 2, September 1962, pp. 229-241; Orville Brim and Stanton Wheeler, SOCIALIZATION AFTER CHILDHOOD (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967); and Gail MacColl, "Fitting the Individual to the Organization: Recruitment, Selection, Socialization, Promotion," (mimeo) 1971.

[14]There have been minor administrative variations in the details of the career system, but the basic dimensions have remained constant since the passage of the 1946 Foreign Service Act.

[15]Theodore L. Reed, "Organizational Careers: Exploration of an Organizational Perspective for the Study of Careers and Career Systems," Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, Discussion Paper No. 13, April 1970.

[16]Argyris, SOME CAUSES . . ., Chap. 1.

[17]Scott, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE . . .

[18]Argyris, SOME CAUSES . . ., pp. 10-13.

[19]For an analysis of professions, professionalization, and the role of professions, see, Edgar S. and Jean C. Cahn, "Power to the People or the Profession - The Public Interest and Public Interest Law," YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 79, 1970; Carol A. Brown, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCCUPATIONS IN HEALTH TECHNOLOGY, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1970.

[21]Ralph Miliband, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (New York: Basic Books, 1969), especially Chap. 3; Leon Mayhew, "Ascription in Modern Societies," SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1968), or Pierre L. van den Berghe, "The Benign Quota: Panacea or Pandora's Box," THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGIST, 1971, Vol. 6 (supplementary issue), pp. 40-43.

[22]If the reader desires suggestive evidence for such speculation, he or she should re-read the list of elements considered important in the judgment of FS examiners who conduct the personal interviews which are a component in FS selection (Table 1). A rudimentary knowledge of the social conditions which produce these personal attributes will make clear the extent to which they necessarily skew the composition of the FS Officer Corps.

[23]Walter Buckley, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967); Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS, (New York: John Wiley, 1966).

[24]James D. Thompson, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. 2, pp. 409-423; James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interaction Process," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 23, February 1968; William R. Dill, "The Impact of Environment on Organizational Development," in Sydney Mailick and E.H. VanNess (eds.), CONCEPTS AND ISSUES IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962); and Richard L. Simpson and William H. Gulley, "Goals, Environmental Pressures, and Organizational Characteristics," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 27, June 1962.

More recent work has attempted to apply this perspective to a detailed study of organizations. Some of the more promising monographs are the following: Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), and Joan Woodward, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965).

[25]Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW (Spring 1959), pp. 79-88; Herbert A. Simon, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1965); James March and Herbert A. Simon, ORGANIZATIONS (New York: Basic Books, 1958); R.M. Cyert and J.G. March, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Joseph A. Litterer, ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1969).

[26]John P. Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); J.P. Crecine, "A Computer Simulation Model of Municipal Budgeting," MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol. 13, No. 11, July 1967, pp. 786-815.

[27]For further discussion of organizations as constraints sets, see: Donald P. Warwick, "An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Study of Comparative Foreign Policy," paper presented at a Conference on Comparative Foreign Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1967; J.P. Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING, especially

Chap. 2; and O.A. Davis, M.A.H. Dempster, and A. Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (September 1969), pp. 529-547.

[28]J.G. March and H.A. Simon, ORGANIZATIONS.

[29]Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 63, No. 3, (September 1969), pp. 689-718.

[30]Michael Crozier, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), especially p. 261ff; Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp. 195-206.

[31]Roger Hilsman, STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956).

[32]Morris Janowitz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (New York: Free Press, 1960).

[33]Bernard Mennis, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKERS, Doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 1967.

[34]David R. Segal and Daniel H. Willick, "The Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns in Agencies Under Stress," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 27, No. 6, (January/February, 1968).

[35]R.K. Kelsall, HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN BRITAIN (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).

[36]Julius A. Roth, "The Study of Career Timetables," in Barney G. Glaser (ed.), ORGANIZATIONAL CAREERS (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 35-49.

[37]Glaser, ORGANIZATIONAL CAREERS.

[38]Harrison C. White, CHAINS OF OPPORTUNITY: SYSTEM MODELS IN ORGANIZATION (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Harrison C. White, "Introduction: The Intercalation of Mobility Events," (draft mimeo), October 1967.

[39]Interviews with Department of State personnel, 1969 and 1970.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

[1]Jones, Arthur G., THE EVOLUTION OF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS FOR U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 1, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965, p. 18.

[2]The rank order register includes the names of all (or most) officers in each Foreign Service grade or class, listed unidimensionally in order of preference for promotion. If 10 promotions are available for those in Class X, then those ranked 1-10 receive those promotions. The Selection Boards are responsible for the generation of the rank order listings. The Director General and Administration of the Foreign Service are authorized to decide how many within each class are to be promoted, but are constrained to follow the order determined by each Selection Board.

[3]There has been significant change in the last five years, designed to improve the congruence between Foreign Service promotions and the needs of the Department. The introduction of the "cone" system is intended to facilitate the development of closer correspondence between FS output and DOS manpower requirements.

[4]The number of grades or classes (the words are used interchangeably) in the Foreign Service has varied slightly over the years. Presently, the lowest grade in the Service is Foreign Service Officer 08 (FSO-8). The grades proceed up to FSO1 and then to the two "super-grades," first Career Minister (CM) and finally Career Ambassador (CA). Special procedures are used for evaluation and selection of officers to the two super grades. Specialized procedures are also used for junior officers, grades FSO-8 and FSO-7.

[5]John E. Harr, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAREERS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 3, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965, p. 61.

[6]Functional Boards and "cones" have been recently established in the Foreign Service, but their long-term effect cannot yet be adequately evaluated.

[7]Harold Stein, "The Foreign Service Act of 1946," in Harold Stein (ed.), PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1952), p. 674.

[8]Report 1663, "Foreign Service Promotions Under the Wriston Program: A Report to the House Committee on Governmental Operations," 84th Congress, 2nd Session, January 23, 1956, p. 2.

[9]Harr, CAREERS, pp. 65-69, 70.

[10]R.K. Kelsall, HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN BRITAIN (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), Morris Janowitz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (New York: Free Press, 1960); Matthews, Donald R., THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKERS (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); David T. Stanley, THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1964).

[11]David R. Segal and Daniel H. Willick, "The Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns in Agencies Under Stress," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 27, No. 6 (January/February, 1968).

[12]As elsewhere, it is assumed that those who occupy senior positions within the state bureaucracy should be representative of a broad cross-section of the American population. A strong but unstated hypothesis in these studies is that such representativeness is necessary for a truly democratic society.

[13]Segal and Willick, "Traditional Career Patterns . . ."

[14]Harry Feinstein, "A Study of the Pattern of Promotions from Class FSO-6 to FSO-3 of Foreign Service Officers," (private copy), January 1969.

[15]Feinstein, "Pattern of Promotions . . ."

[16]Francis X. Ready, "1947 Cohort Study," (private copy).

[17]Ready, "1947 . . .", pp. 2 and 3.

[18]Jones, EVOLUTION, p. 19. There are of course preferences for liberal arts generalists, but in recent years those with directly relevant specialized training have been recruited in greater numbers.

[19]Chris Argyris, SOME CAUSES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Center for International Systems Research, Department of State, Report No. 2, January 1967).

[20]Harr, CAREERS, p. 59.

[21]Harr, CAREERS, p. 49.

[22]Donald P. Warwick, "Performance Appraisal and Promotions in the Foreign Service," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, July 1970, pp. 37-45; DIPLOMACY FOR THE 70's: A PROGRAM OF MANAGEMENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Washington, D.C.: U.S.G.P.O., 1971).

[23]Andrew M. Scott, "The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture," INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Vol. XIII, No. 1, Spring 1969.

[24]These characteristics are in no way unique to the Foreign Service, although they may be more pronounced in this setting. The pervasiveness of such orientations is one of the major targets of recent developments in the field of public administration. See: George H. Frederickson, "Recovery of Structure in Public Administration" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Governmental Studies, 1970); George Frederickson and Frank Marini, "New Public Administration: Its Relevance for Schools and Curricula," paper prepared for meeting NASPAA, Boulder, Colorado, April 1971.

[25]Harr, CAREERS, p. 99.

[26]James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, ORGANIZATIONS (New York: John Wiley, 1958), esp. Chap. 6, "Cognitive Limits on Rationality."

[27]Harr, CAREERS, p. 77.

[28]Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, PERSONNEL FOR THE NEW DIPLOMACY, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962 (also known as the Herter Commission), p. 90.

[29]Janowitz's distinction between routine, prescribed, and innovative career patterns could be applied to the Foreign Service. Innovative patterns in the military are usually associated with the adaption of new technological devices which improve war-making capacity. The same technological imperatives are largely absent in the Foreign Service.

[30]Harr, CAREERS, p. 25.

[31]Harr, in CAREERS reports a classic case of "artful dodging" of an undesirable assignment on pp. 50 and 51.

[32]The subtlety employed is illustrative of highly valued skills present in the Foreign Service.

[33]Herter Commission, p. 90.

[34]Stein, THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT .

[35]For a discussion of the traditional conception, see Segal and Willick, "Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns . . ."

[36]Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967) present a general theoretical discussion of the reasons for the congruence between the values and perspectives of individuals and the organizations in which they work.

[37]Harr, CAREERS, p. 49.

[38]Harr, CAREERS, p. 73.

[39]See Herbert Bratter, "A Public Member Looks at the Selection Boards," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, March 1965, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 30, 31, 49; Jack K. McFall, "An Inside Look at a Selection Board," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL (Sept. 1958), Vol. 35, No. 9, pp. 41-44, 48, 49; Marvin L. Frederick, "A Public Member Looks at Selection Board Procedures," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL (Feb. 1957), Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 30, 31, 39; and James S. Thompson, "An Outsider Looks at the Foreign Service," FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL (March 1953), pp. 18-20.

[40]James D. Thompson, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (New York: McGraw-Hall, 1967).

[41]Theodore L. Reed, "Organizational Careers: Exploration of an Organizational Perspective for the Study of Careers and Career Systmes," Discussion Paper No. 13, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan (mimeo).

[42]Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 63, No. 3 (September 1969), pp. 689-718.

[43]Max Weber, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, see for the discussion of the model of bureaucracy in its classic form.

[44]These issues are briefly touched upon in Chapter II in the discussion of Crozier's seminal work, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON.

[45]See William Gamson, POWER AND DISCONTENT, for a more complete elaboration of a terminology and conceptual framework which makes this type of analysis useful.

[46]Harr, CAREERS, p. 57.

[47]Theodore L. Reed, "Human Inputs to Foreign Policy Decision Making," (Mimeo), December 1968.

[48]Feinstein, PROMOTION PATTERNS .

[49]For a more detailed explanation of the concept of the cohort and its utility in longitudinal analyses, see Norman Ryder, "The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 30, No. 6, (December 1965), pp. 843-861.

[50]Harr, CAREERS, p. 68.

[51]Lewis S. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 61, No. 2, (June 1967), pp. 428-445.

[52]Kelsall, HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS .

[53]Janowitz, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, Segal and Willick, "Traditional Career Patterns," and David R. Segal, "Selective Promotion in Officer Cohorts," THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY, 1967.

[54]Harr, CAREERS, p. 50.

[55]Harr, CAREERS, p. 65.

[56]Janowitz, PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, esp. Chap. 8, "The Elite Nucleus."

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

[1]John E. Harr, "The Development of Careers in the Foreign Service," FOREIGN AFFAIRS PERSONNEL STUDY #3, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965, esp. pp. 57 & 68; Theodore L. Reed, "Human Inputs to Foreign Policy Decision Making", (mimeo), December 1968; Harry Feinstein, "A Study of the Pattern of Promotions from Class FSO-6 to FSO-3 of Foreign Service Officers", (private copy) January 1969.

[2]See Appendix A.

[3]James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, ORGANIZATIONS, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), especially Chap. 6, "Cognitive Limits on Rationality."

[4]See Appendixes A and B.

[5]John P. Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF MUNICIPAL BUDGETING, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), pp. 56, 79, & 105.

[6]Crecine, pp. 111.

[7]R^2 statistics have been employed extensively in the evaluation of simulation outcomes. Some review of this is included in Crecine, p. 116 through pp. 117.

[8]Tables 8 through 17 are included in Appendix C. They contain the statistics computed from the regression of model estimates on observed Foreign Service promotions. Technical details on the seniority model are included in Appendix C.

[9]Harr, CAREERS, p. 57.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

[1]Morris Janowitz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 79-104.

[2]David R. Segal and Daniel H. Willick, "The Reinforcement of Traditional Career Patterns in Agencies under Stress," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 27, No. 6, January/February, 1968.

[3]Roland Egger, "Ashes to Ashes - Dust to Dust," PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, Vol. 33, No. 4, July/August, 1971, pp. 463-473. In this discussion Egger discusses several recent books on the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

[4]Gene R. Hawes, "The Colleges of America's Upper Class," SATURDAY REVIEW, November 16, 1963, pp. 68-71.

[5]John P. Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING: A COMPUTER SIMULATION OF MUNICIPAL BUDGETING, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969).

[6]Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING, p. 111.

[7]Crecine, GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING, pp. 116-117.

[8]Segal and Willick, op. cit.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

[1]An extended discussion of the relevant literature is included in Chapter III. The most valuable general discussion can be found in John E. Harr, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAREERS IN THE FOREIGN SERVICE, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study, No. 3, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965.

[2]These variables, described in Chapter V, include: college of undergraduate degree, college of highest graduate degree, sex, highest degree, undergraduate major, graduate field; previous governmental experience, and natality. Appendix G, Table 1 lists these variables and the weight given to each in the development of the background index.

[3]Political specialists are considered the prime beneficiaries of this identification for they tend to be promoted more rapidly than their colleagues in other functional specialties. For a more complete discussion see Chapters II and III.

[4]Also mentioned in: Theodore Caplow, THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE, New York: Basic Books, 1958; and Morris Janowitz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, especially Chapters 7 and 8.

[5]As Crecine correctly points out, this is a long list of variables for a decision maker to consider. Conceivably, one possibility is that some are not considered important, but interviews suggest that the decision makers attempt to develop a "gestalt" or general impression as a basis for their decisions.

[6]See Appendix E.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII

[1]For explanation of coding scheme, see general description under section entitled "Model Characteristics" in Chapter V.

[2]Within the general guidelines outlined by verbal descriptions of the Selection Board decision making process, other models could be developed which, in reprospect, might improve the fit between simulated and actual promotion outlines. It is quite apparent from a quick comparison of the model outcomes in Table 4, that at some point the Selection Board's model does less well than the others. A simulation which included substantive career or background variables only after taking the time in class into account might well produce better results.

[3]Harrison C. White, CHAINS OF OPPORTUNITY, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

[4]Theodore L. Reed, "Organizational Careers: Exploration of an Organizational Perspective for the Study of Careers and Career Systems," Discussion Paper No. 13, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan, 1970. (Mimeographed).

APPENDICES

-- Selection Board Precepts (FAMC 533) for 1969 Selection Boards

-- Address to the Selection Boards (1969) by the Under Secretary of State, Elliot L. Richardson

APPENDIX A

Foreign Affairs Manual Circular

UNIFORM STATE/USIA ISSUANCE

SUBJECT: Precepts for the 1969 Selection Boards of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency

State FAMC -533
USIA Circ. 354D and 358F

August 21, 1969

I. Convening of the 1969 Selection Boards

A. This circular transmits the approved Precepts for the State Department's Twenty-third Selection Boards and the U. S. Information Agency's Seventeenth Selection Boards to be convened September 4, 1969, and September 15, 1969, respectively.

B. All eligible Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service Reserve officers of the Department will be reviewed by the Department's Selection Boards under joint State/USIA precepts, with the exception of Foreign Service Reserve officers identified as domestic within the meaning of 3 FAM 561. 2b(2).

C. All eligible Foreign Service information officers, Foreign Service Reserve officers, and Foreign Service Staff officers (except those Staff employees reviewed by Agency Specialist and Technical Panels) of the U. S. Information Agency will be reviewed by USIA Boards under joint State/USIA precepts.

D. Junior officers of the Department and USIA in Classes 7 and 8 who are in probationary status will be evaluated by a separate Probationary Officer Selection Board convened semiannually.

II. Eligibility for Promotion

A. The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration and the Assistant Director, USIA (Personnel and Training), have approved the following statements defining the time-in-class required for promotion eligibility.

1. Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service information officers and Foreign Service Reserve officers of Classes 2 through 5 who have one year in class as of September 1, 1969, shall be eligible for promotion.

2. Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service information officers, and Foreign Service Reserve officers of Class 6 and nonprobationary Class 7 who entered their present class prior to March 31, 1969, shall be eligible for promotion.

3. Foreign Service Staff officers of USIA of Classes 1 through 3 who have one year in class as of September 1, 1969, and of Classes 4 and below who entered present class prior to March 31, 1969, shall be eligible for promotion.

4. The 3-year time-in-class requirement for promotion of Foreign Service officers of Class 1 to the class of Career Minister remains as stated in 3 FAM 562.2.

5. The 3-year time-in-class requirement for promotion of Foreign Service information officers of Class 1 to the class of Career Minister for Information remains as stated in MOA V-B 1146.3.

B. Officers who do not meet these time-in-class requirements will not be reviewed by the 1969 Selection Boards.

III. Significant Changes

A. Reflecting the recommendation of the 1968 Selection Boards, the time-in-class eligibility criterion for officers of Class 6 and nonprobationary Class 7 has been set at roughly 6 months.

B. Involuntary Retirement

1. Department Officers

This year (1969) the criteria for involuntary retirement on the basis of low rankings will be as follows: An officer will become subject to involuntary retirement if he is ranked in the low 5 percent of his class by the current Boards and was previously ranked in the low 3 percent by the 1968 Selection Boards.

2. USIA Officers

Under the provisions of Public Law 90-494 Foreign Service information officers and Foreign Service Reserve officers with unlimited tenure employed by USIA are subject to involuntary retirement. The criteria for involuntary retirement of Foreign Service information officers and Foreign Service Reserve officers with unlimited tenure employed by USIA are in the final stages of consideration and will be published separately. In order to provide the basis for involuntary retirement, the Precepts instruct the Agency's Selection Boards to rank the lowest 10 percent of the FSIO's in each class and to include in the low ranking list those Reserve officers who rank with the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in each class.

IV. Cancellation

This circular is automatically canceled June 30, 1970.

Enclosure:

Precepts for the 1969 Selection Boards

PRECEPTS FOR THE

1969 SELECTION BOARDS

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GENERAL DIRECTIVES TO ALL SELECTION BOARDS

I. A. Major Responsibilities of Selection Boards

1. The first major responsibility of the Boards is to identify those officers who by demonstrated performance and evidence of potential for utilization at higher levels of responsibility merit recommendation for promotion. Requirements opportunities, and types of service vary at the different career stages and class levels, but this combination of meritorious performance and potential, regardless of the function to which the officer has been assigned, must be encouraged and rewarded.

2. The second major responsibility is to identify those officers who, on the basis of performance and potential, rank in the lowest percentiles of their class in comparison with fellow officers of the same class. The Boards should also identify those officers whose performance during the last rating period did not meet the standard required and who, therefore, warrant consideration of denial of the next regular within-class salary increase.

B. Scope

The Department's 1969 Selection Boards will review the records of all eligible FSO's in Classes 1 through nonprobationary 7. They will also review the records of all eligible FSR's of the Department in the same classes, except that Reserve officers whose service has been and is likely to be exclusively in the Department will be reviewed separately under the provisions of 3 FAM 566.

The USIA Boards will review the records of all eligible Foreign Service information officers and Reserve officers of the Agency in Classes 1 through nonprobationary 7, and Staff officers of Classes FSS-1 through FSS-6 not reviewed by Agency Specialist and Technical Panels.

C. Factors to be Considered by the Boards in Evaluating Officers

1. General

In considering officers, the Boards should constantly bear in mind the fact that the Service wishes to encourage and advance officers who display courage, creativity, and initiative. The Service needs in its upper ranks officers whose careers have been marked more by creative effort, even though occasionally resulting in mistakes, than in cautious, unquestioning adherence to norm or precedent resulting in an unblemished record of routinely satisfactory work. It also needs officers who have exhibited keen intellectual curiosity beyond the bounds of official business and developed comprehension in depth of the varied forces at work in the countries and areas to which they have been assigned. Only by recognizing these qualities at every stage of an officer's career can the Boards ensure a continuing flow of our best qualified officers to fill senior positions.

2. Performance

a. In evaluating the records of officers, the Boards should confine themselves to performance during the past five years, or since an officer's last promotion, except in those instances where effective evaluation cannot be made without reviewing the earlier performance record. This might be the case when an officer has been rated for all or the major portion of the last five years by the same rating officer, when it appears an officer may be ranked in the lowest percentiles of his class, or when an officer is approaching maximum time-in-class.

b. In determining the ranking of officers to provide promotion for the most fully qualified, positive recognition should be given to those who have demonstrated good judgment, initiative, self-reliance, adaptability, Service discipline, and the acceptance of responsibility.

c. Boards should place heavy weight on demonstrated evidence of strengths or weaknesses in supervisory or executive ability and of potential for leadership. Supervisory and executive ability becomes increasingly important as an officer advances through the middle grades of the Service, and is of crucial importance in promotion to Class 2 and above. It must be recognized that only a very few outstanding officers achieve the rank of Career Minister and that only a relatively small number of officers achieve the rank of Class 1. The senior levels of the Foreign Service should be staffed by officers who have demonstrated outstanding leadership qualities or potential for leadership. An officer who performs the substantive aspects of his assignment in a superior manner and who concurrently demonstrates executive and managerial skills should be given a high rating. Conversely, an officer whose skill, knowledge, and understanding of his particular field is of a high order, but who is deficient as a supervisor or as an executive, should be reviewed very carefully, particularly with regard to potential, before being recommended for promotion to the senior grades. In such cases, a recommendation for promotion should be made only where an officer's degree of attainment is so exceptional that he is deemed to merit advancement solely on the basis of his expertise and his prospective use as a specialist in nonsupervisory positions.

d. The Department's Boards should be careful not to place undue weight on the type of position or function to which an officer is assigned. In the present-day Foreign Service, officers must often be assigned, particularly in the United States both within the Department and on detail to other agencies, to positions involving responsibilities outside the stream of traditional diplomatic and consular work. If an officer can sucessfully handle such duties, thereby increasing his usefulness to the Service, this should redound to his favor.

e. Single unfavorable episodes of the past should be appraised as to lasting importance, and failings which have been overcome should be discounted. To give undue weight to past reports of defects which have already been considered by previous Boards and which an officer has corrected would be patently unfair to the officer concerned. Boards must be as sensitive to records reflecting improved performance as they are to those showing deterioration. Boards should also deliberate carefully before placing an officer in the lowest percentiles on the basis of a single performance report or on the comments of only one rating officer. In such cases, the Boards should be alert to the possibility of a personality clash and resulting bias and should seek additional insights by consulting the appropriate Bureau or Area (through the Performance Evaluation Division or, in the case of USIA, the Foreign Service Personnel Division) and checking the file of all evaluation reports prepared by the rating officer that is maintained by the Performance Evaluation Division or, in the case of USIA, the Foreign Service Personnel Division.

3. Potential and Seniority in Class

The key criterion in determining an officer's suitability for promotion is the degree to which he has shown potential to perform at a higher level. The evaluation of potential involves assessment of the officer's ability, personal qualities, drive, judgment, imagination, and particularly a demonstrated capability to perform effectively at a higher level and to assume broader and increased responsibilities. Seniority in class is, of itself, relatively unimportant, and an officer should not be recommended for promotion simply because he is approaching maximum time-in-class. At the same time, an officer should not be denied recommendation for promotion otherwise merited solely because he is approaching maximum time-in-class.

4. Personal Qualities

To merit recommendation for promotion, officers should demonstrate certain attributes and attitudes which are regarded as general Service requirements. Among these are integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, willingness to accept responsibility, dependability, adaptability, and good judgment. Officers are also expected to demonstrate a maturely disciplined attitude toward the Service and their role in it. Boards should be specifically alert to any indication of an officer's unwillingness to accept a hardship or other undesirable assignment, or unwillingness to place the needs of the United States before personal preferences or convenience.

A positive example of dedication and disciplined attitude toward the Service is that shown by officers currently serving in Viet-Nam. Boards should be aware of the fact that a number of these officers have volunteered for this service, but whether the assignment is the result of such action or not it entails hardships imposed by separation from family and service in a difficult and, in many cases, dangerous environment. The files of officers serving in Viet-Nam should be reviewed carefully, and positive credit should be given in the case of those officers who have successfully coped with this difficult assignment.

The above consideration should be applied as well to officers serving in other crisis areas.

5. Conduct and Suitability

The standards of conduct and suitability for an officer in the Foreign Service are high. His reputation and that of his family must be above reproach whether they are serving in the United States or abroad, but most particularly abroad where as representatives of the United States their conduct comes under close scrutiny. An officer's wife is expected to support and enhance the ability of the officer to perform effectively in his assignments abroad.

6. Equal Opportunity

a. It is axiomatic that all officers be accorded equal treatment without regard to race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.

b. No officer shall be penalized because he has made a formal or informal equal employment opportunity complaint or has been a witness for a complainant.

7. Nature and Type of Service

Officers who are required to compete with one another either by function or class should be considered as officers of equal status without regard to such factors as method of entry into the Service, previous employment status, or whether service has been primarily overseas or in Washington.

8. Basic Levels of Service

a. At Class 2 and above, officers are expected to have attained a high level of competence in at least one of the major functional fields of foreign affairs work and to have demonstrated broad and versatile abilities in such fields as executive leadership, policy formulation, public relations, legislative liaison, and interdepartmental or joint staff work.

b. Officers in Classes 3, 4, and 5 are expected to have attained a high level of competence in one or more of the functional or geographic areas of foreign affairs work. The ability and willingness of officers to learn and to develop competence in one or more specialized programs or in broad functional fields are important elements in evaluating these mid-career officers. The fact that an officer's assignments and experience have made him proficient in only one functional specialty should not detract from his promotional opportunities. On the contrary, if he has performed in an outstanding manner in a single function and demonstrated the potential to perform at higher levels, such performance should be recognized. Recognition of officers with supervisory and executive leadership is also highly important.

c. Officers in Classes 6 and 7 must be evaluated more on their general qualities, learning ability, adaptation to Foreign Service life, and potential to move on to greater responsibilities and challenge.

9. Out-of-Track Assignments

Department officers, particularly when assigned to the Department but also in overseas assignments, may be assigned to serve in a function outside their primary career field. Such assignments, commonly referred to as "out-of-track assignments," are designed to broaden the officer's experience in the Service and to fill specialized positions which are difficult to categorize under traditional functional specialties. They should be regarded as a normal part of an officer's career development. While serving in such assignments, officers are considered for promotion purposes in their primary career field. It is essential that they not thereby be placed at a disadvantage in relation to their colleagues assigned to primary track positions. The Boards should recognize that experience gained in out-of-track assignments represents a valuable contribution both to the Service and to the officer's own Service potential. They should, therefore, give full and positive credit for demonstrated adaptability and ability in these assignments.

10. Assignments to Other Agencies

In recent years it has proved desirable to assign an increasing number of officers to tours of duty outside their parent agencies. This has involved details not only to other Federal agencies involved in foreign affairs activities, but also to international organizations, to United States Government agencies with an exclusively domestic orientation, including those particularly concerned with the problems of the inner city, and to nongovernmental educational, industrial, and commercial institutions.

The experience derived from tours of duty within this concept of expanded Foreign Service activities should be considered a normal part of an officer's career development. Officers selected for such assignments should be given full and positive credit for demonstrated adaptability, general usefulness, and ability to serve as representatives of the Foreign Service. The Boards should recognize that the experience gained by an officer while serving in such assignments represents a valuable contribution both to the Service and to the officer's own Service potential.

Rating officers in other agencies or in nongovernmental organizations are usually inexperienced in the use of Foreign Service performance rating forms. While all practicable means are used to obtain adequate evaluations on officers assigned to other agencies, the appraisals may in some cases differ in format and scope from those on officers rated by Foreign Service supervisors. As a means of dealing with this problem, the Department has arranged for Foreign Service Inspectors to write rating reports on many of its officers who are detailed to other agencies in the United States after on-site interviews with the officers and their supervisors. These reports (similar to those prepared by Inspectors on Department officers assigned to other agencies overseas) should be used by the Boards to ensure that officers on such assignments are not penalized by inadequate coverage of their work.

11. Training Assignments

Boards should seek to ensure that an officer assigned to an extended training program is not placed at a disadvantage in the Board competition because his file does not contain a documented record of accomplishment comparable to that of his colleagues on regular assignments. Such training is an important element in career development; selection for it presumes that an officer has distinct potential, and a record of successful completion should be viewed as a distinct credit to the officer.

12. Inspectors' Reports

Independent evaluations by Foreign Service Inspectors constitute an important and valuable supplement to regular reports by supervisors. Because of the movement of officers and the fact that posts are only inspected every two or three years, the number of Inspectors' reports in individual officers' files will vary. When a post is inspected, an Inspector's report is prepared on every officer who is present at the post. If the Inspector concurs with the evaluations contained in efficiency reports which have been submitted by the post, he may limit himself to noting this fact plus making recommendations with regard to assignment and promotion. If he does not concur with the post's evaluation or has additional observations to make, and in instances where a report has not yet been prepared at the post, he will prepare a full report.

13. Medical Information

Boards should not be influenced by any diagnosis or prognostication by rating officers regarding medical problems, physical or psychiatric, which may appear in the performance files. Under existing regulations, detailed comments on medical problems should not be included in Evaluation Reports; although there may be included brief comment indicating the existence of a problem and its effect on an officer's performance or potential. The final evaluation of indicated medical problems should be based on information provided by the Office of Medical Services. Any Board which requires medical information should request such information through the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division, or in the case of USIA officers, through the Chief, Foreign Service Personnel Division.

14. Absence

Absence due to illness, to military service, or to other authorized activity, including LWOP approved by the Department or USIA, will not prevent a Selection Board from reviewing and ranking an officer, if his prior record is sufficient to provide a basis either for recommending his promotion or for placing him the lowest percentiles of his class. In these cases, whenever prior performance material is inadequate to permit a valid projection of competence, the officer should not be rated.

D. Involuntary Retirement of Foreign Service Officers of the Department

1. The Department relies in part on the involuntary retirement system to achieve a constantly improving Foreign Service Officer Corps--one composed entirely of the most able, well-qualified officers. While involuntary retirement is applicable only to Foreign Service officers, high performance standards are applicable to Reserve officers as well as to Foreign Service officers. Selection Boards by identifying, among all of the officers whom they are rating, those Reserve officers whose performance warrants their ranking in the lowest part of their class can provide valuable information which can be used as a basis for appropriate administrative action.

2. Any Foreign Service officer in Classes 1 through nonprobationary 7 shall be presumed not to have maintained the performance standard required for his class when he has been ranked in the low 5 percent of his class by the current Selection Boards and previously in the low 3 percent of his class by the 1968 Selection Boards. Any Foreign Service officer so designated will be considered for involuntary retirement in accordance with the provisions of 3 FAM 731.4.

   In computing the lowest 5 percent of a class, those Foreign Service officers who are non-rated and all State Department Reserve officers shall be excluded from the class population.

3. Among the grounds for placing an officer in the lowest percentiles of his class are marginal productivity, consistent weakness in carrying out assigned tasks, excessive preoccupation with detail, procrastination, and well-documented occurrences of situations in which personality problems have clearly prevented an officer from working cooperatively and harmoniously with his superiors, colleagues, or subordinates and as a result limited the effective performance of his assigned tasks. At the same time, a low ranking by a Selection Board does not necessarily represent a judgment of unsatisfactory performance in an absolute sense, but may reflect the Board's determination that the officer does not measure up relatively to the majority of officers in his class.

   Boards should be alert to the possibility that imputation of lack of team spirit, uncooperativeness, and the like has been used by supervising officers to conceal what are, in fact, policy differences or personality conflicts. The Department and USIA value willingness to express and defend one's views, and an officer should not be penalized simply because he has voiced opinions not shared by his superiors.

   While potential for greater usefulness is a vital factor in ranking an officer in the upper groups, lack of potential is not per se sufficient grounds for ranking an officer in the lowest percentiles. Specifically, Boards should not rank officers in the lowest percentiles because they are approaching mandatory retirement or maximum time-in-class.

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2. Any Foreign Service officer in Classes 1 through nonprobationary 7 shall be presumed not to have maintained the performance standard required for his class when he has been ranked in the low 5 percent of his class by the current Selection Boards and previously in the low 3 percent of his class by the 1968 Selection Boards. Any Foreign Service officer so designated will be considered for involuntary retirement in accordance with the provisions of 3 FAM 731.4.

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   While potential for greater usefulness is a vital factor in ranking an officer in the upper groups, lack of potential is not per se sufficient grounds for ranking an officer in the lowest percentiles. Specifically, Boards should not rank officers in the lowest percentiles because they are approaching mandatory retirement or maximum time-in-class.

4. Involuntary retirement is not a substitute for separation on charges when the situation calls for the latter course of action. In this connection it should be noted that the Foreign Service Act provides for a hearing by the Board of the Foreign Service in any case where separation is proposed for cause. Cases of this nature in which action has not been taken previously should be brought immediately to the attention of the Director General of the Foreign Service.

5. In the event that a Board finds any reference in Officer Evaluation Reports to the fact that an officer was previously ranked in the low percentiles of his class, that he was adjudged to be substandard by a previous Selection Board, or that administrative action was taken to deny him a within-class salary increase, the Board shall immediately call this fact to the attention of the Chief of the Performance Evaluation Division or, in the case of USIA officers, to the Chief, Foreign Service Personnel Division, so that the reference may be removed. The Board shall disregard any such references in rating the officer concerned.

   The sole exception is when the file contains information indicating that the officer specifically requested or consented to the inclusion of material containing such references.

E. Involuntary Retirement of Foreign Service Information Officers and Unlimited Reserve Officers of USIA

1. In order to provide the basis for involuntary retirement of Foreign Service information officers and Agency Unlimited Reserve officers of Classes 1 through nonprobationary 7, the Agency's Selection Boards are required to rank the lowest 10 percent of the Foreign Service information officers of each class and the Unlimited Reserve Officers ranked with the lowest 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class.

   In computing the lowest 10 percent of the FSIO's of the class, those FSIO's who are non-rated and all Reserve officers shall be excluded from the class population.

2. While involuntary retirement does not apply to Limited Reserve and Staff officers of the Agency, the same high standards of performance expected of Foreign Service information officers and Unlimited Reserve officers do apply to them. The Agency's Selection Boards will identify those Limited Reserve and Staff officers who rank with the lowest part of their class as a basis for appropriate administrative action.

3. The instructions and guidance for placing an officer in the lowest percentiles of the class contained in paragraphs I D 3, 4, and 5 will be followed by USIA Selection Boards.

F. Denial of Within-Class Salary Increase

Section 625 of the Foreign Service Act provides for a within-class salary increase on July 1 of each year for FSO's, FSIO's, and FSR's whose services meet the standards required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who have been in class for a continous period of 9 months or more.

A decision to deny an officer the next regular within-class salary increase may be based on a finding by the most recent Selection Board that the officer's services during the last performance rating period did not meet the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service. Reasons for such a finding may include a low rate of productivity, lack of initiative or resourcefulness in carrying out assigned duties, consistently poor judgment, serious weakness in meeting supervisory responsibilities, or low ratings on other factors in the Officer Evaluation Report, which in the Board's judgment cause the officer's over-all performance during the last rating period not to meet the required standard. The relative ranking assigned an officer by a Board does not determine whether he should be denied the next within-class salary increase. In any case in which an officer is recommended for denial of within-class increase a separate statement of reasons shall be prepared.

G. Knowledge of Information Not in Personnel Files

If a Board member has personal knowledge concerning an officer being rated which is not in the record but which the Board member believes is pertinent to an evaluation and should be considered, he shall make that information available to other Board members in a signed memorandum. The original of this memorandum will be forwarded to the Chief of the Performance Evaluation Division, or, in the case of USIA officers, to the Chief, Foreign Service Personnel Division, and will subsequently be included in the officer's personnel file.

H. Quality of Reports

The effectiveness of any personnel evaluation system depends primarily upon the attitude of supervisory personnel toward the system and the degree of their conscientiousness in complying with the spirit as well as the letter of the instructions for preparing reports. The Selection Board system can only be as good as the evaluation material placed before the Board for review. Again this year, a copy of evaluation reports prepared by an officer as a rating officer will be maintained in a separate file. These reports will be available to Boards evaluating the rating officer and also to those evaluating the officers whom he has rated. Because evaluation of subordinate personnel and the preparation of reports at required intervals is an important responsibility of supervisors, the Boards are requested to identify those officers who have prepared particularly high quality evaluation reports during the last rating period, as well as those who have prepared particularly poor reports reflecting marked carelessness or negligence, personal bias or prejudice, or marked inconsistencies between Part I and Part II of the Officer Evaluation Report. In the case of officers rited for particularly poor reports, the Boards will prepare individual written statements citing the deficiencies.

I. Summary

The Boards should confine their review primarily to the last 5 years of the record or since an officer's last promotion, appraising:

1. The quality of the officer's performance;

2. His growth potential;

3. His personal characteristics and qualifications as a representative of the United States.

An officer must be judged on the basis of established strengths and weaknesses in each of these categories, but undue emphasis should not be placed on one to the exclusion of the others. All three must be considered together in arriving at an over-all evaluation.

Many factors enter into an appraisal of an officer for promotion. Among the most important factors are:

1. Performance

Knowledge of work
Productivity
Quality and timeliness of work
Judgment
Ability to communicate (oral and written)
Dependability
Language skill
Representational ability

2. Potential

Intellectual caliber
Breadth of vision
Executive ability
Leadership
Self-development efforts

3. Personal Characteristics

Character
Conduct
Service discipline
Relationships with others
Adaptability
Industry and drive
Thoroughness
Initiative, resourcefulness, creativity
Patience
Versatility

J. Approval of Findings

The Director General of the Foreign Service or the Assistant Director, USIA (Personnel and Training), may accept the findings of a Selection Board in toto, or they may return any findings or any list or lists for a review by the Selection Boards if they question procedure or conformity with the Precepts. The work of each Selection Board will be concluded when the Board has been adjourned by the Director General of the Foreign Service, or in the case of USIA Boards, by the Assistant Director, USIA (Personnel and Training).

APPENDIX A

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL STATE DEPARTMENT BOARDS

II. A. BOARD I

1. Prepare a rank-order list of those Foreign Service officers whom the Board considers qualified for promotion to the class of Career Minister in accordance with the attached special Precepts listing Career Minister qualifications. In preparing this list, Board I need not concern itself with the eligibility requirements as stated in 3 FAM 562.2. The Career Minister Review Board will apply the eligibility requirements of 3 FAM 562.2 and will consider the list along with the rankings of previous Boards and other available information in making its recommendations for promotion to the rank of Career Minister.

2. Prepare a rank-order list of the upper 25 percent of officers reviewed at Class I (FSO and FSR) which will include those officers designated as qualified for promotion to Career Minister. This list will be used in considering Class I officers for assignment to key positions in the United States and abroad and in considering Reserve officers who apply for lateral entry appointment as Foreign Service officers.

3. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. Within this list a line will be drawn indicating the lowest 5 percent of the FSO's rated in the class. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSO or FSR who is ranked in the low 5 percent. The Board should be careful not to rank in the lowest percentiles an officer who is performing competently merely because imminent retirement, medical problems, or age or time-in-class signify lack of potential.

4. Prepare a list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

5. Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Boards.

6. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is being criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports, the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies.

7. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

8. The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

ANNEX TO APPENDIX A

PRECEPTS FOR THE TWENTY-THIRD SELECTION BOARDS

CAREER MINISTER QUALIFICATIONS

A Career Minister is expected to possess exceptional experience, ability, and personal characteristics which qualify him to serve in key executive and policy positions in Washington and abroad, such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and above, Chief of Mission, Deputy Chief of Mission at Class 1 missions, United States representative to international organizations, and similar key positions in the Department of State and other United States Government departments and agencies.

A Career Minister is expected to have a high sense of public service, complete integrity, mature and disciplined judgment, good presence and personality, a first-rate mind, and a driving desire for accomplishment. Typically, he will have demonstrated unusual leadership and command talent, a penetrating insight into the foreign affairs process, an outstanding policy sense, a high degree of executive proficiency, superior competence in planning and conducting negotiations, and well-developed skill in oral and written expression.

He will be expected to have a comprehensive knowledge of the key governmental programs in the foreign affairs field. His perspective will encompass the complete range of interests and functional considerations that are pertinent to foreign affairs decisions. His stature will have developed to the point where his outlook is not colored or influenced by bureaucratic or parochial considerations.

He will not only be a person knowledgeable in foreign affairs, but also one well versed in the current issues and problems of the American domestic scene.

His spouse is expected to possess qualities which will support and enhance the ability of a Career Minister to perform effectively in key executive and command posts to which he may be assigned abroad.

Typically, the qualifications described above will have been developed in one or more of the major functional areas of the Foreign Service, e.g., economic, political, administrative, consular, intelligence, labor, commercial, public affairs, cultural affairs, international organization affairs.

As he approached the senior levels of the Foreign Service, a Career Minister would normally have been assigned responsibilities of an executive and policy nature requiring synthesis of the several functional areas. At one point in his career development, he would probably have been assigned to another department or agency, such as Defense, Commerce, Labor, A.I.D., USIA, or ACDA, which has major programs or is otherwise heavily involved in the international field. It is likely that he was a participant in the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy or one of the war colleges or another institution of learning for an academic year or longer. His later assignments would have included Chief of Mission, or Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officer at a major consulate general, or Deputy Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, senior Foreign Service Inspector, or similar positions of high policy and executive responsibility, not only in the Department of State, but in other U.S. Government departments and agencies as well.

His earlier career will have been more noteworthy for initiative than for caution. It will have been marked more by creative effort resulting in superlative accomplishment and occasional mistakes than by unquestioning adherence to norm or precedent resulting in an unblemished record of routinely satisfactory work. He will have exhibited keen intellectual curiousity beyond the bounds of official business and will have developed comprehension in depth of the political, economic, and sociological forces at work in countries and areas to which he has been assigned. He will have shown capacity to understand and to converse and get along well with foreign nationals in and out of government circles. Blended with this there will have been consistent evidence in his performance of purposeful and effective effort to advance our national objectives. He will have demonstrated complete awareness of the scope of the senior positions he has occupied and of the new dimensions of diplomacy in the 1960's in both the substantive and management-administrative fields.

There is no fixed minimum or upper limit to age for appointment as Career Minister. The age will depend upon the rate of an officer's development and on whether he is prepared for the demands that will be made of Career Ministers.

The President and the Secretary of State are seeking a group of Career Ministers capable of carrying out any assignment involving U. S. foreign affairs anywhere in the world. Promotion to the rank of Career Minister will not be used as a reward for past performance; it will only be used as recognition of promise to meet future challenges with extraordinary skill and dedication. Accordingly, it is essential that these high qualifying standards be set and that they be maintained unwaveringly.

APPENDIX B

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL STATE DEPARTMENT BOARDS

II. B. Board II

Class 1 should be considered the normal apex of the Career Service. At the Class 2 level, executive ability and leadership, breadth and depth of knowledge, and demonstrated potential for further growth and broader utilization are important factors in determining promotability.

1. Functional Panels, Class 2

The initial review of officers in Class 2 will be conducted on a modified functional basis. The Board will divide into two panels to review files which will be divided into the four major functional categories: Administrative, Consular, Economic and Commercial, Political, plus a Special Professional category. The Chief, Performance Evaluation Division, will provide each panel with a list of officers by function in a breakdown which will provide an approximately equal workload for each panel.

An officer is identified for competition in a particular functional specialty on the basis of his primary skill as determined from information concerning his experience and qualifications. Thus, even though an officer may be temporarily assigned to a position or job outside his primary career field (paragraph 9 of the General Precepts), he will be considered in the primary functional specialty with which he is identified.

The Special Professional category includes those FSO's and FSR's whose records are difficult to compare with the records of their colleagues assigned to the more traditional Foreign Service functions. Doctors engineers, scientists, technical economists, attorneys, etc., are examples. In many instances the number of officers to be reviewed in a special category will be very small. In such cases, evaluation of an officer's promotability must be based primarily on his demonstrated performance and potential in his specialty, rather than on competition with a significant number of other officers.

At the conclusion of the review of Class 2 officers by functional specialty each panel will prepare the following, and they will then reconvene as a full Class Board:

a. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who on the basis of performance and growth potential are ranked in the upper 25 percent of the functional groups. The base figure for computing the upper 25 percent is the total number of officers at Class 2 in a particular function. The number will be furnished by the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division.

b. Prepare a rank-order list of these FSO's constituting the low 15 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in each function. The list should also include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, have been given an equivalent ranking. The total number of FSO's rated in the function is the base figure for the computation.

c. The panel considering the Special Professional category will not rank-order officers to provide for an upper or lower percentage. Instead, the panel will identify those officers whose performance and potential warrant recommendation for promotion and who should be reviewed by the Class Board in competition with their class colleagues. The panel will also identify those officers whose records indicate that they should be reviewed by the full Board with their class colleagues who have been ranked in the lowest 15 percent by the other functional panels.

d. Prepare a list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the panel not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The panels will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

e. Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in their files. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by a panel.

f. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports the panel will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies. All lists, recommendations, and reports prepared by the functional panels shall be forwarded to the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division.

2. Class Board II

The Board will evaluate on a class competition basis the officers placed by the functional panels in the upper 25 percent and the lowest 15 percent of each functional group and those officers from the Special Professional function who have been identified for review in the highest and lowest groups.

a. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 20 percent of all officers of Class 2. The Board will identify on its rank-order list a point above which it recommends all officers be promoted.

b. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. Within this list a line will be drawn indicating the low 5 percent of the FSO's rated in the class. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSO or FSR who is ranked in the low 5 percent.

c. Prepare a consolidated list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of the next within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

d. Prepare a consolidated list of officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in their files. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Board.

e. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

f. The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX C

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL STATE DEPARTMENT BOARDS

II. C. BOARDS III, IV, AND V

In determining the promotability of officers in these grades important factors are depth of knowledge and attainment, demonstrated competence, and capability to master increasingly complex subject matter. Early identification and recognition of emerging executive and leadership skills are also important beginning at Class 4.

Under the concept of career stages and specialization particular attention should be given to the identification of officers for promotion from Class 3 to Class 2 -- "selection into" senior level. To qualify for promotion to Class 2, officers should have clearly evidenced executive and leadership skills and should have demonstrated the potential to direct and coordinate broad programs of a single or multifunctional nature. At Classes 3, 4, and 5, the Boards should carefully evaluate the cases of outstanding specialists who are able to supervise and coordinate the work of others and who are exceptional in the depth and breadth of their understanding of their particular field.

1. Functional Panels, Classes 3, 4, and 5

The initial review of officers in Classes 3, 4, and 5 will be conducted on a functional basis. Each Board will divide into two panels to review files which will be divided into the four major functional categories: Administrative, Consular, Economic and Commercial, Political, plus a Special Professional category. The Chief, Performance Evaluation Division, will provide each panel with a list of officers by function in a breakdown which will provide an approximately equal workload for each panel.

An officer is identified for competition in a particular functional specialty on the basis of his primary skill as determined from information concerning his experience and qualifications. Thus, even though an officer may be temporarily assigned to a position or job outside his primary career field (paragraph 9 of the General Precepts), he will be considered in the primary functional specialty with which he is identified.

The Special Professional category includes those FSO's and FSR's whose records are difficult to compare with the records of their colleagues assigned to the more traditional Foreign Service functions. Doctors, engineers, scientists, technical economists, attorneys, etc., are examples. In many instances the number of officers to be reviewed in a special category will be very small. In such cases, evaluation of an officer's promotability must be based primarily on his demonstrated performance and potential in his specialty, rather than on competition with a significant number of other officers.

At the conclusion of the review of officers by functional specialty each panel will prepare the following, and they will then reconvene as full Class Boards:

a. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 25 percent of the functional group (35 percent for officers in Class 5). The base figure for computing the upper percentages is the total number of officers in a particular function and will be furnished to each Board by the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division. The panel will designate a number of officers from this list, up to a maximum percentage to be specified by the Office of the Director General, whose performance and potential within their functional fields is superior and warrants promotion without further class competition. It should be emphasized that this number is not to be considered a quota; the panel may designate a smaller number than the percentage furnished by the Office of the Director General. This percentage, reflecting analysis of manpower requirements and resources, will in all cases be only a portion of the total number capable of being promoted within any specific function.

b. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSO's whom the panel ranks in the lowest 15 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in the functional group. The list should also include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, have been assigned an equivalent ranking.

c. The panel considering the Special Professional category will not rank-order officers to provide for an upper or lower percentage. Instead the panel will identify those officers whose performance and potential warrant recommendation for promotion and who should be reviewed by the Class Board in competition with their class colleagues. The panel will also identify those officers whose records indicate that they should be reviewed by the full Board with their class colleagues who have been ranked in the lowest 15 percent by the other functional panels. Because of the small number of officers in some of the specialist categories reviewed by the panel it is impractical for the Office of the Director General to specify any percentage of officers who should be promoted without further class competition. However, recommendations for promotion of FSO's and FSR's referred to Class Boards III, IV, and V by the panels considering the Special Professional category will be considered in the same manner as referrals of functional promotees by the other functional panels.

d. Prepare a list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the panel not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The panels will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

e. Prepare a list by class of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in their files. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by a panel.

f. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports the panel will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiences.

All lists, recommendations, and reports prepared by the functional panels shall be forwarded to the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division.

2. Class Boards III, IV, and V

Class Boards for Classes 3, 4, and 5 will evaluate only those officers placed by the functional panels in the highest and lowest percentage groups including those officers referred by the functional panels as functional promotees.

a. Review and compare the files of those officers designated by the functional panels for promotion without further competition, to ensure that a general standard of excellence is maintained among the functional promotees. These officers will head the list of officers recommended for promotion by the Board, unless it makes a specific written determination that an officer should not be retained in this group of functional promotees. While the Board may thus drop an officer from the group of functional promotees, it may not add any officer to this group. An officer removed from this group shall be reviewed and rank-ordered with the rest of his class colleagues.

b. Prepare a consolidated rank-order list of the officers who on the basis of their performance and growth potential constitute, in combination with the list of functional promotees, the upper 20 percent of the officers in Classes 3 and 4 and the upper 30 percent of officers in Class 5. The base figure for computing these upper percentages is the total number of officers in the particular class; this will be furnished by the Chief, Performance Evaluation Division. Each Board will identify a point on its rank-order list above which it recommends all officers be promoted.

c. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSO's whom the Board ranks in the lowest 10 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in their class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. Within this list a line will be drawn indicating the lowest 5 percent of the FSO's rated in the class. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each officer who is ranked in the low 5 percent.

d. Prepare a consolidated list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

e. Prepare a consolidated list by class of officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Boards.

f. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

g. Each Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

h. The Boards may endorse any statements or recommendations made by the functional panels or may prepare their own statements plus any additional statements or recommendations determined necessary at the Board level.

APPENDIX D

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL STATE DEPARTMENT BOARDS

II. D. BOARDS VI AND VII

FSO's and FSR's in Classes 6 and 7 will compete only by class and will not be considered in functional competition. Important factors in determining promotability at this level are Service attitude, depth of motivation, quality of performance, adapability, and potential. The Boards should carefully evaluate an officer's potential to master a specialization as well as to develop along broader and more diversified lines.

The testing process from which most officers of Classes 6 and 7 have emerged is a stringent one and is based on the policy of identifying as early as possible those officers who should move rapidly out of Class 8 and probationary Class 7 into Class 6 and further into their careers. The Department's policy is to offer attractive career opportunities to dynamic, high-caliber young people, to identify them early and move them forward to the mid-career level. In the case of officers who have entered the Service at the FSO-8 and FSO-7 levels, they have been considered carefully by Junior Officer Selection Boards, and their promotion from a probationary status represents a determination that the officer has successfully completed the final phase of the examination or observation process and is ready for full career status. While the files of some of the officers at Classes 6 and 7 may be relatively sparse, the Boards may assume that these officers have been tested and found capable and that the decision now necessary is which of these officers in full career status should be advanced at this time. Potential must be carefully evaluated in reaching this decision, and positive weight should be given to clearly evidenced potential for broader utilization in the Service. The Boards should bear in mind that the Department's policy is to move along rapidly capable junior officers to take full advantage of their abilities in more responsible positions at the mid-career level.

1. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 40 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 6 and the upper 50 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 7. Each Board will identify on its rank-order list a point above which it recommends all officers be promoted.

2. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSO's rated in each class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, have been given an equivalent ranking. Within this list a line will be drawn indicating the lowest 5 percent of the FSO's rated in the class. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSO and FSR who is ranked in the low 5 percent of the class.

3. Prepare a list of those FSO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

4. Prepare a list by class of officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Boards.

5. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is criticized for a poorly prepared report the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies.

6. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

7. Each Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX E

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL USIA BOARDS

III. A. BOARD A (Class 1)

1. Prepare a rank-order list of those Foreign Service information officers whom the Board considers qualified for promotion to the class of Career Minister for Information in accordance with the same Special Precepts as those given by the Department of State to its Selection Board I which reviews Class 1 Foreign Service officers for promotion to the Class of Career Minister (Annex to Appendix A). In preparing this list, Board A need not concern itself with the eligibility requirements as stated in MOA V-B 1146.3. The Review Board for Career Minister for Information will apply the eligibility requirements of MOA V-B 1146.3 and will consider the list along with the rankings of previous Boards and other available information in making its recommendations for promotion to the rank of Career Minister for Information.

2. Prepare a rank-order list of the upper 25 percent of officers reviewed at Class 1 (FSIO and FSR) which will include those officers designated as qualified for promotion to Career Minister for Information. This list will be used in considering Class 1 officers for assignment to key positions in the United States and abroad and in considering Limited Reserve officers who apply for lateral entry appointment as Foreign Service information officers.

3. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSIO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSIO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSIO who is ranked in the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. A written statement of reasons shall also be prepared on each FSR ranked with the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. An officer whose over-all record when judged in comparison with other officers in the class warrants a low ranking should not be omitted from the list because of such factors as imminent retirement, medical problems, age, or time in class. However, the Board should be careful not to rank in the lowest percentiles an officer who is performing competently merely because of such factors.

4. Prepare a list of those FSIO's and FSR's whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

5. Prepare an alphabetical list of officers who were reviewed but not ranked in either the upper 25 percent or in the low 10 percent "zone" of the class.

6. Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Board.

7. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is being criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports, the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies and that statement will be referred to the Selection Board reviewing the record of that officer for use in rating him for promotion or selection-out.

8. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

9. The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX F

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL USIA BOARDS

III. B. BOARD B (Class 2)

The primary task of Board B is to identify those Class 2 officers who should be promoted to Class 1. Executive ability and leadership, breadth and depth of knowledge of the Agency's programs, and demonstrated capacity to head a Class A mission abroad, or one of the major organizational elements in the Agency, are important factors in determining promotability to Class 1.

Each of the following specific instructions must be completed before Board B is dismissed:

1. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 20 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 2. The Board will identify on its rank-order list a point above which it recommends all officers be promoted.

2. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSIO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSIO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSIO who is ranked in the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. A written statement of reasons shall also be prepared on each FSR ranked with the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. An officer whose over-all record when judged in comparison with other officers in the class warrants a low ranking should not be omitted from the list because of such factors as imminent retirement, medical problems, age, or time in class. However, the Board should be careful not to rank in the lowest percentiles an officer who is performing competently merely because of such factors.

3. Prepare a list of those officers whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to meet the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

4. Prepare an alphabetical list of officers who were reviewed but not ranked in either the upper 20 percent or in the low 10 percent zone of the class.

5. Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Board.

6. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is being criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports, the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies, and that statement will be referred to the Selection Board reviewing the record of that officer for use in rating him for promotion or selection-out.

7. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

8. The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX G

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL USIA BOARDS

III. C. BOARDS C AND D (Classes 3 and 4 and FSS-1 and 2)

In determining the promotability of officers in these classes, important factors are political sensitivity; depth of knowledge and attainment in the information, cultural, or administrative fields; demonstrated competence; understanding of United States objectives, policies, and programs; knowledge of an ability to interpret the American way of life and the cultural achievements of the United States; and demonstrated professional knowledge, creativity, and imagination in one or more communications media or in other Agency functions; early identification and recognition of emerging executive and leadership skills are also important beginning at Class 4.

Under the concept of career stages and specialization, particular attention should be given to the identification of officers for promotion from Class 3 to Class 2-- "selection into" senior level. Before promotion to Class 2, officers should have clearly evidenced executive and leadership skills and should have demonstrated the potential to direct and coordinate broad programs of a single or multifunctional nature.

At Classes 3 and 4 the Board should carefully evaluate the cases of outstanding specialists who are able to supervise and coordinate the work of others and who are exceptional in the depth and breadth of their understanding of their particular field.

Each of the following specific instructions must be completed before Boards C and D are dismissed:

1. Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 20 percent of the officers reviewed at Classes 3 and 4 and FSS Classes 1 and 2. Within each of the rank-order lists the Board will identify a point above which it recommends all officers be promoted.

2. Prepare a rank-order list of those FSIO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSIO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve and Staff officers who while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSIO who is ranked in the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. A written statement of reasons shall also be prepared on each FSR and FSS ranked with the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. An officer whose over-all record when judged in comparison with other officers in the class warrants a low ranking should not be omitted from the list because of such factors as imminent retirement, medical problems, age, or time in class. However, the Board should be careful not to rank in the lowest percentiles an officer who is performing competently merely because of such factors.

3. Prepare a list of those officers whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

4. Prepare an alphabetical list of officers who were reviewed but not ranked in either the upper 20 percent or in the low 10 percent zone of the class.

5. Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Board.

6. Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is being criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports, the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies and that statement will be referred to the Selection Board reviewing the record of that officer for use in rating him for promotion or selection-out.

7. Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

8. The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX H

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

DIRECTIVES TO INDIVIDUAL USIA BOARDS

III. D. BOARD E (Classes 5, 6, and 7 and FSS-3, and below)

Class 5

In determining the promotability of officers in this class, important factors are political sensitivity; depth of knowledge and attainment in the information, cultural, or administrative fields; demonstrated competence; understanding of United States objectives, policies, and programs; knowledge of and ability to interpret the American way of life and the cultural achievements of the United States; demonstrated professional knowledge, creativity, and imagination in one or more communications media or in other Agency functions; and early identification of executive and leadership skills. At Class 5 the Board should carefully evaluate the cases of outstanding specialists who are able to supervise and coordinate the work of others and who are exceptional in the depth and breadth of their understanding of their particular fields.

Classes 6 and 7

Important factors in determining promotability at this level are service attitude, depth of motivation, quality of performance, adaptability, and potential. The Board should carefully evaluate an officer's potential to master a specialization in the information and cultural fields, as well as to develop along broader and more diversified lines.

The testing process from which most officers of Class 6 and 7 have emerged is a stringent one and is based on the policy of identifying as early as possible those officers who should move rapidly out of Class 8 and probationary Class 7 into Class 6 and further into their careers. The agency's policy is to offer attractive career opportunities to dynamic, high-caliber young people, to identify them early and move them forward to the mid-career level. Officers who entered the Service at the Class 8 and 7 level have been considered carefully by Junior Officer Selection Boards, and their promotion from a probationary status represents a determination that the officer has successfully completed the final phase of the examination or observation process and is ready for full career status. While the files of some of the officers at Classes 6 and 7 may be relatively sparse, the Boards may assume that these officers have been tested and found capable, and the decision now necessary is which of these officers in full career status should be advanced at this time. Potential must be carefully evaluated in reaching this decision and positive weight should be given to clearly evidenced potential for broader utilization in the Agency's Foreign Service. The Boards should bear in mind that the Agency's policy is to move along rapidly capable Junior officers to take full advantage of their abilities in the mid-career level, and as they demonstrate development, move them into more responsible positions.

Each of the following specific instructions must be completed before Board E is dismissed:

(1) Prepare a rank-order list of the officers who, on the basis of their performance and growth potential, are ranked in the upper 30 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 5 and FSS-3, the upper 50 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 6 and FSS-4, and the upper 60 percent of the officers reviewed at Class 7 and FSS-5 and below.

(2) Prepare a rank-order list of those FSIO's constituting the low 10 percent of the total number of FSIO's rated in the class, but to include those Reserve and Staff officers who, while not figured in the computation, rate an equivalent ranking. A written statement of reasons shall be prepared in the case of each FSIO who is ranked in the low 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. A written statement of reasons shall also be prepared on each FSR and FSS ranked with the 10 percent of the FSIO's in the class. An officer whose over-all record when judged in comparison with other officers in the class warrants a low ranking should not be omitted from the list because of such factors as imminent retirement, medical problems, age, or time in class. However, the Board should be careful not to rank in the lowest percentiles an officer who is performing competently merely because of such factors.

(3) Prepare a list of those officers whose over-all performance during the last rating period is considered by the Board not to have met the standard required for the efficient conduct of the work of the Service and who are, therefore, recommended for denial of their next regular within-class salary increase. The Board will prepare a written statement in support of each recommendation for denial.

(4) Prepare an alphabetical list of officers who were reviewed but not included in either the upper rank-order list or in the low 10 percent zone of the class.

(5) Prepare a list of any officers who could not be rated as a result of insufficient documentation in the file. Absence for the reasons indicated in paragraph 14 of the General Precepts does not necessarily prevent an officer's consideration by the Board.

(6) Prepare a list of rating or reviewing officers who should be commended or criticized for the quality of reports prepared on subordinates. In each case where an officer is being criticized for a poorly prepared report or reports, the Board will submit a separate statement citing specific deficiencies and that statement will be referred to the Selection Board reviewing the record of that officer for use in rating him for promotion or selection-out.

(7) Prepare recommendations concerning the policies and procedures to be followed by subsequent Boards, including comments concerning the adequacy of the present system of evaluating officers.

(8) The Board is requested to make specific recommendations or suggestions with respect to training or assignment regarding any officer or groups of officers when, in its judgment, such recommendations will improve his or their future use in the Service.

APPENDIX I

PRECEPTS FOR THE 1969 SELECTION BOARDS

OATH OF OFFICE

FOR MEMBERS OF BOARDS AND PANELS AND FOR OBSERVERS

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will, without prejudice or partiality, perform faithfully and to the best of my ability the duties imposed on me as a member of a Selection Board; that I will preserve the confidential character of the personnel records used by the Board; and that I will not reveal to any unauthorized person information concerning the deliberations, findings, and recommendations of the Board. So help me God."

ADDRESS OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO 1967 SELECTION BOARDS (as reported in the Department of State Newsletter, September 1969, pages 4 & 5)

RICHARDSON ADDRESSES BOARDS; URGES CAREFUL EVALUATION

Under Secretary Elliot L. Richardson has called upon the 1969 FSO/R Selection Boards to make their evaluations with the new demands of foreign policy in mind.

Mr. Richardson, who also serves as Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service, was the speaker at the convening of the Twenty-Third Selection Boards on September 4.

In his remarks the Under Secretary expressed Secretary Rogers' deep appreciation to the group.

The Secretary was unable to attend the opening session because he was at a meeting at the Western White House in San Clemente, California.

"You are embarking upon a most important endeavor -- judging the capabilities of the Foreign Service's most valuable resource, its people." Mr. Richardson said.

"President Nixon in his address here on January 29 said that ours was the best career Service in the world. He also said it is important to the future of this country that the morale of the career Service be kept at its highest possible level. The work you are about to undertake will play an important role in achieving this objective."

Mr. Richardson noted that President Nixon has the "closest familiarity with the Foreign Service."

The President's interest has been manifested in many ways -- including the selection of many Chiefs of Mission from the career Service. Sixty-three percent of the present Ambassadors have been selected from the career Foreign Service, the Under Secretary added.

Secretary Rogers also has taken a deep interest in the Foreign Service and recently designated the Under Secretary to serve as Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service.

Mr. Richardson thanked the Selection Board members for contributing their time to evaluating the performance records of FSO/Rs.

"As you know, this Administration is committed to an overall re-examination of the foreign affairs establishment," he told the group. "The evergrowing complexity of foreign policy is creating new demands and imposing new requirements which you should keep in mind in your evaluations.

"We look forward also the rise of exceptional young officers into positions of higher responsibility. We also seek to encourage a greater interchange of talent within the Department, with other Government agencies, and between us and universities, foundations and the like.

"The Selection Boards should, therefore, be careful to insure proper recognition for those officers who have been serving in other agencies and in areas other than the traditional diplomatic ones. No officer should be penalized because of the type of assignment he has received or because he may be working for supervisors not familiar with the valuation process in the Department of State.

"The Selection Board System over the years has become a highly regarded institution within the Foreign Service, respected for its objectivity and fairness by those who entrust their careers to it. The judgment of its members is thus a key factor in the morale of our colleagues and the maintenance of the Service's excellence.

"Your work will not be easy. For you will have to identify not only excellence but also those who are the least competitive.

"The rank-ordering of officers in the low reaches of their classes should be based not on transitory factors or on single episodes, but on a total evaluation of their performance. The careful pruning of career personnel, unique to the Foreign Service, is designed to assure a vital, dynamic corps of senior officers.

"The Under Secretary commended the Foreign Service Officers for their distinguished records, thoughtfulness, intelligence and extraordinary dedication."

He also reviewed the rise of the United States to positions of leadership during World War II. During the war years the United States had attained "massive military superiority" and had contributed large amounts of economic assistance to other countries, he noted.

Now, with a general belt-tightening of the Nation and with reduced amounts of money available for foreign aid, the United States has to rely to a greater extent on diplomacy to attain its leadership, Mr. Richardson said.

"The Foreign Service must remain a highly competitive system," he said. "Competition keeps the Service vital and alive. One cannot stand back and progress in the Foreign Service -- this is not only

its strength but attraction to outstanding and ambitious men and women."

The speaker urged the members of the Selection Boards to recognize officers with "special talents."

Mr. Richardson invited the members to bring various matters to the attention of the Board of the Foreign Service.

"We welcome your views and suggestions and we would be grateful for your observations and comments," he told them. "We stand ready to be of any possible help."

NAME	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

PRIMARY CAREER FIELD | SECONDARY CAREER FIELD | FIRST CAREER PREFERENCE

AGE	CLASS	DATE OF CLASS	FEDERAL SERVICE COMP. DATE	E.O.D. FOR. SER.	CLASS AT E.O.D. F.S.	MS	DEP C	DEP A	EDUCATION MAJOR	DEGREE	YEAR

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY	S A S	S A R	DATE	TEST S	TEST R	DATE	IN-SERVICE TRAINING COURSE	DATE

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF LAST 10 ASSIGNMENTS

E.O.D.	POST	POSITION TITLE	PROMOTION CLASS	PROMOTION DATE

FORM DS 1209 12-68	DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICER SELECTION BOARD WORK SHEET	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

APPENDIX C

-- Tables IV-8 to IV-17, Goodness of fit statistics for seniority measures

TABLE IV-8

Statistics computed from a Regression of Seniority Model Estimates on observed FSO Promotions, for cohorts 1945-1968 using SIMGRTCA (Time in the Department of State) as the seniority index

COHORT	b	SIMGRTCA beta	R^2	N/DF
1945	.17052	.41896	.17553	1013
	.51981	.76212	.58082	1699
	.55749	.79736	.63578	2204
	.51255	.75912	.57626	905
	.53894	.80077	.64123	1539
1950	.52741	.76870	.59090	2476
	.54476	.77218	.59267	1089
	.50497	.75747	.57376	773
	.53795	.88199	.77790	180
	.53062	.77006	.59299	1601
1955	.53596	.78766	.62041	1206
	.62533	.81648	.66664	1792
	.71022	.84427	.71280	1620
	.70526	.84554	.71494	753
	.77396	.82191	.67553	575
1960	.79991	.83453	.69644	785
	.81295	.85611	.73292	1269
	.75476	.82691	.68378	843
	.65732	.81574	.66542	708
	.79689	.78583	.61753	527
1965	.57856	.72538	.52617	728
	.55322	.72425	.52454	855
	.45448	.59678	.35615	662
	.51287	.54059	.29224	64

TABLE IV-9

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for cohorts 1945-1968, using SIMGRTCB (time in the Foreign Service) as the seniority index

	SIMGRTCB			
COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1945	.17200	.42147	.17763	1013
	.49190	.76256	.58150	1699
	.52497	.80447	.64717	2204
	.47814	.76776	.58945	905
	.43422	.80007	.64011	1539
1950	.47107	.76933	.59187	2476
	.46576	.76417	.58395	1089
	.44934	.77056	.59377	773
	.44682	.84121	.70763	180
	.46937	.76422	.58403	1601
1955	.50599	.78860	.62188	1206
	.54967	.79216	.62751	1792
	.60475	.83066	.69000	1620
	.60243	.83531	.69775	753
	.66939	.80462	.64742	575
1960	.70305	.81375	.66218	785
	.78878	.83536	.69782	1269
	.66876	.78731	.61986	843
	.62806	.74879	.56069	768
	.74505	.76368	.58320	527
1965	.56824	.68727	.47234	728
	.56372	.71385	.50958	855
	.42919	.53792	.28936	662
	.54940	.51713	.26743	64

TABLE IV-10

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions, for cohorts 1945-1968 Using SIMGRTCC (service computation time) as the seniority index

		SIMGRTCC		
COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1945	.17185	.42326	.17915	1013
	.50905	.76196	.58058	1699
	.56179	.81410	.66276	2204
	.50214	.76449	.58445	905
	.51747	.80207	.64331	1539
1950	.49594	.77891	.60670	2476
	.48063	.76471	.58478	1089
	.48148	.78086	.60974	773
	.47461	.82508	.68076	180
	.46830	.76018	.57787	1601
1955	.52136	.82012	.67259	1206
	.62372	.84083	.70699	1792
	.67595	.86467	.74766	1620
	.68571	.85906	.73798	753
	.73706	.86768	.75287	575
1960	.72909	.86402	.74654	785
	.70013	.87119	.75896	1269
	.63835	.85308	.72775	843
	.59440	.80174	.64278	708
	.74548	.86829	.75392	527
1965	.60144	.81957	.67170	728
	.52959	.75026	.56289	855
	.45196	.67002	.44893	662
	.49105	.57775	.33380	64

TABLE IV-11

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for cohorts 1945-68, Using SIMGRCPC (age) as the seniority index

		SIMGRCPC		
COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1945	.16918	.42302	.17895	1013
	.39297	.59740	.59740	1699
	.35533	.56734	.32188	2204
	.36295	.59587	.35506	905
	.43129	.64376	.41443	1539
1950	.40686	.62782	.39415	2476
	.40806	.65442	.42827	1089
	.37510	.62305	.38819	773
	.37726	.76037	.57817	180
	.38300	.65300	.42641	1601
1955	.44097	.70603	.49848	1206
	.48065	.68743	.47256	1792
	.51541	.69691	.48568	1620
	.52273	.67866	.46058	753
	.67803	.73162	.53527	595
1960	.45962	.69875	.48875	785
	.47783	.72460	.52505	1269
	.41970	.68957	.47550	843
	.33993	.60856	.37035	708
	.47354	.69340	.48080	527
1965	.30915	.55646	.30965	728
	.25192	.53664	.28798	855
	.21952	.46964	.22056	662
	.28457	.50993	.26003	64

TABLE IV-12

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for cohorts 1945-1968, using SIMGRAPC (time in class) as the seniority index.

	SIMGRAPC			
COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1945	.17173	.42353	.17938	1013
	.52592	.76917	.59162	1699
	.57631	.81616	.66612	2204
	.54587	.79737	.63581	905
	.53465	.80053	.64084	1539
1950	.53281	.79739	.63583	2476
	.49890	.74648	.55723	1089
	.50403	.76426	.58410	773
	.52000	.88435	.78208	180
	.48203	.76728	.58871	1601
1955	.54231	.82523	.68100	1206
	.61733	.83226	.69266	1792
	.68823	.86803	.75348	1620
	.70110	.85043	.72323	753
	.70796	.86625	.75039	575
1960	.67777	.87365	.76326	785
	.68760	.89376	.79881	1269
	.62216	.86776	.75301	843
	.60633	.83716	.70084	708
	.72729	.87595	.76730	527
1965	.61723	.83769	.70172	728
	.53601	.77714	.60394	855
	.51593	.75140	.56461	662
	.54162	.68737	.47247	64

TABLE IV-13

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for year since entry into the foreign service. SIMGRTCA, time in the department of State, is used as the seniority index.

ENTRY YEAR	b	SIMGRTCA simple R beta	R^2	N/DF +1
1	.97691	.98051	.96140	243
2	.95311	.87580	.76703	1694
3	1.04306	.71307	.50874	1077
4	1.03170	.75742	.57368	1138
5	1.01739	.95697	.91578	1206
6	.99807	.62274	.46614	1302
7	.99435	.99580	.91354	1281
8	.08891	.19899	.03960	1349
9	.65306	.77904	.60690	1311
10	.07506	.19083	.03642	1216
11	.48746	.66144	.43751	1204
12	.48292	.65603	.43037	1171
13	.02254	.07922	.00628	1135
14	.01278	.04342	.00189	1046
15	.66501	.33270	.11069	957
16	.55244	.38006	.14444	887
17	.01120	.04201	.00176	945
18	.42613	.20934	.04382	872
19	.00110	.00303	.00001	789
20	-.00315	-.00990	.00010	665
21	-.00045	-.00147	.00000	604
22	.00719	.64322	.00101	591
23	.18626	.05529	.06517	531
24	.01387	.04771	.00228	529
25	.01647	.06324	.00400	460
26	.01027	.03797	.00144	402
27	.01655	.09017	.00813	379
28	.01521	.06422	.00412	308

TABLE IV-14

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for year since entry into the Foreign Service. SIMGRTCB, time in the Foreign Service, is used as the seniority index

SIMGRT^{CB}

ENTRY YEAR	b	simple R beta	R^2	N/DF+1
1	.98016	.97174	.94427	243
2	.98954	.87423	.76428	1694
3	1.14749	.70396	.49556	1077
4	1.17476	.75633	.57204	1138
5	1.02468	.95632	.91455	1206
6	1.19721	.70899	.50267	1302
7	1.00871	.95784	.91745	1281
8	.08597	.17913	.03209	1349
9	.65565	.77849	.60605	1311
10	.05857	.14595	.02130	1216
11	.48864	.65972	.43522	1204
12	.48522	.42913	.42913	1171
13	.02255	.07867	.00619	1135
14	.01212	.02939	.00086	1046
15	.67574	.39537	.15632	957
16	.50031	.41365	.17110	887
17	.01475	.05487	.00391	945
18	.46544	.23007	.05293	872
19	-.00092	-.00260	.00001	780
20	-.00337	-.01044	.00011	665
21	.00077	.00244	.00001	604
22	.00951	.04473	.00200	591
23	.54834	.27958	.07816	531
24	.01517	.05156	.00266	529
25	.01539	.05900	.00348	460
26	.00970	.03579	.00128	402
27	.01603	.08721	.00760	379
28	.01561	.06593	.00435	308

TABLE IV-15

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for year since entry into the Foreign Service. SIMGRTCC, service computation time, is used as the seniority index.

ENTRY YEAR	SIMGRTCC b	Simple R beta	R^2	N/DF+1
1	.96227	.96348	.92830	243
2	.82392	.90326	.81587	1694
3	.74925	.73556	.54106	1077
4	.57531	.66758	.44566	1138
5	.96150	.95366	.90946	1206
6	.62831	.66698	.44486	1302
7	.94548	.94916	.90091	1281
8	.13811	.33077	.10941	1349
9	.64136	.78750	.62016	1311
10	.11560	.31605	.09989	1216
11	.47976	.67686	.45514	1204
12	.47578	.67409	.45439	1171
13	.05280	.19394	.03761	1135
14	.05763	.15035	.02260	1046
15	.41541	.43262	.18716	957
16	.37277	.43860	.19237	887
17	.02437	.09340	.00872	945
18	.27765	.27107	.07348	872
19	.01681	.04853	.00236	789
20	.00277	.00885	.00008	665
21	.00572	.01887	.00036	604
22	.01234	.05911	.00349	591
23	.40450	.25239	.06885	531
24	.01572	.05393	.00291	529
25	.01631	.06289	.00396	460
26	.00970	.03579	.00128	402
27	.01603	.08721	.00760	379
28	.01561	.06593	.00435	308

TABLE IV-16

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for year since entry into the Foreign Service. SIMGRCPC, age, is used as the seniority index.

ENTRY YEAR	SIMGRCPC b	Simple R beta	R^2	N/DF
1	.95351	.97183	.94445	243
2	.99381	.98449	.96923	1694
3	.74362	.72393	.52407	1077
4	.58029	.45214	.45214	1138
5	.87524	.90334	.81602	1206
6	.23916	.31753	.19983	1302
7	.76641	.82591	.68213	1281
8	.04019	.01037	.01101	1349
9	.55438	.70943	.50329	1311
10	.03599	.10735	.01152	1216
11	.39998	.59983	.35980	1204
12	.40631	.60538	.36649	1171
13	.02281	.08927	.00797	1135
14	.02430	.07149	.00511	1046
15	.11930	.20802	.04327	957
16	.13627	.23224	.05394	887
17	.01456	.05943	.00353	945
18	.05266	.08925	.00797	872
19	.00431	.01401	.00020	789
20	.01141	.04112	.00169	665
21	.01330	.04859	.00236	604
22	.01715	.08697	.00756	591
23	.10164	.15881	.02522	531
24	.01794	.06729	.00453	529
25	.02111	.08689	.00755	460
26	.01413	.05616	.00315	402
27	.01793	.10091	.01018	379
28	.01594	.07052	.00497	308

TABLE IV-17

Statistics computed from a regression of seniority model estimates on observed FSO promotions for year since entry into the Foreign Service. SIMGRAPG, time in class, is used as the seniority index

SIMGRAPC

ENTRY YEAR	b	Simple R beta	R^2	N/DF
1	.97233	.96235	.92613	243
2	.77527	.88972	.79160	1694
3	.68987	.75160	.56490	1077
4	.60929	.70258	.49362	1138
5	.94481	.95348	.90912	1206
6	.62207	.69364	.48113	1302
7	.90757	.94287	.88900	1281
8	.15330	.37896	.14361	1349
9	.63945	.79235	.62782	1311
10	.12930	.00972	.12724	1216
11	.47872	.68514	.46942	1204
12	.47352	.67877	.46073	1171
13	.05899	.21836	.04768	1135
14	.07458	.20109	.04044	1046
15	.39330	.49083	.24092	957
16	.35694	.45099	.20339	887
17	.03017	.11795	.01391	945
18	.28986	.32771	.10739	872
19	.02946	.08609	.00741	789
20	.00888	.02894	.00084	665
21	.01402	.04706	.00221	604
22	.01549	.07493	.00561	591
23	.23470	.20905	.04370	531
24	.02060	.07205	.00519	529
25	.02001	.07844	.00615	460
26	.01395	.05235	.00274	402
27	.01719	.09425	.00888	379
28	.01841	.07852	.00617	308

APPENDIX D

-- Tables V-8 and V-9, Goodness of fit statistics for background model

TABLE V-8

Statistics computed from a regression of Background Model estimates on observed FSO promotions, for year since entry into the Foreign Service*

Year of Service	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	21
2	1.00	1.00	1.00	81
3	.99	.96	.92	81
4	.89	.86	.79	81
5	.70	.68	.46	125
6	.45	.48	.23	125
7	.76	.76	.58	406
8	.68	.78	.62	406
9	.65	.79	.63	595
10	.54	.69	.48	595
11	.50	.67	.46	732
12	.41	.58	.34	732
13	.31	.51	.26	760
14	.23	.40	.16	760
15	.18	.32	.10	777
16	.13	.28	.08	777
17	.11	.26	.07	782
18	.12	.29	.08	782
19	.14	.32	.10	720
20	.10	.28	.08	720

* based on cohorts entering the FS from 1950-1960

TABLE V-9

Statistics computed from a regression of Background Model estimates on observed FSO promotions, for cohorts, 1950-1960

COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF
1950	.31	.51	.26	1165
1951	.31	.50	.25	977
1952	.31	.50	.25	977
1953	.21	.39	.15	808
1954	.19	.35	.12	191
1955	.27	.39	.16	742
1956	.27	.42	.18	1184
1957	.33	.49	.24	1875
1958	.33	.51	.26	1514
1959	.31	.52	.27	732
1960	.36	.53	.28	506
all columns	.39	.55	.30	738

APPENDIX E

Interpretation of SPSS Regression Statistics

R^2 - the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the regression equation (185)

Standard error - is the standard deviation of the residual since the mean of the residual is zero, the standard error can thus be considered the typical size of a residual. Because the residual is the difference between the prediction of the actual value, the standard error is thus the typical error in the prediction.

Fration is the ratio of the two mean squares (for equation residuals) measures the significance of the regression equation representing more than mere chance. For proper interpretation of F-level, consult a table giving probability of obtaining a given F by mere chance. (The proper degrees of freedom are included in output.)

B - regular regression coefficient

Beta - normalized regression coefficient, also the path coefficient

Standard error of B - measures significance of regression coefficient. The range of the regular regression coefficient should be interpreted as B±S, where S is the standard error.
If S is much smaller in magnitude than B, then the sign of the regression coefficient may be interpreted with confidence.
If S is nearly as large as B, then the coefficient should be used with care since there is a significant chance (at least 16%), that the true regression coefficient is of the opposite sign as the calculated value, due to random errors in the data.

APPENDIX F

-- Tables VI-9 and VI-10, Goodness of fit statistics for Selection Boards Model

TABLE VI-9

Statistics computed from a regression of Selection Boards Model estimates on observed FSO promotions, for year since entry into the Foreign Service.

Year of Service	b	Simple R beta	R^2	N/DF+1
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	648
2	.99	.99	.99	648
3	.81	.87	.76	745
4	.56	.78	.61	745
5	.46	.71	.50	850
6	.35	.63	.40	850
7	.32	.57	.33	937
8	.28	.54	.29	937
9	.27	.53	.28	965
10	.30	.57	.32	965
11	.27	.53	.28	821
12	.25	.52	.27	821
13	.26	.53	.28	596
14	.26	.51	.26	596
15	.27	.53	.28	332
16	.27	.52	.27	332
17	.27	.53	.29	245
18	.25	.51	.26	245
19	.26	.55	.30	180

TABLE VI-10

Statistics computed from a regression of Selection Board Model estimates on observed FSO promotions, for cohorts 1950-60

COHORT	b	beta	R^2	N/DF+1
1950	.51	.64	.42	1488
1951	.46	.65	.42	1262
1952	.47	.62	.39	1035
1953	.49	.75	.37	226
1954	.51	.73	.54	1025
1955	.46	.73	.53	1486
1956	.54	.75	.57	2165
1957	.61	.73	.53	1913
1958	.59	.68	.47	890
1959	.67	.78	.60	638
1960	.65	.81	.66	882

APPENDIX G

TABLE I

RELATIVE WEIGHTS FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE BACKGROUND MODEL

VARIABLE	AVERAGE WEIGHTING*
HIGHEST DEGREE	.18
UNDERGRAD DEGREE	-.30
UCOLPR HYP	.54
UCOLPR IVY 7SIS	-.01
UCOLPR OTHER REG	.47
UCOLPR NOREG	-.49
GCOLPR HYP	.28
GCOLPR IVY	.11
GCOLPR REG	.54
GCOLPR NOREG	.45
PREV GOVT WORK	.19
UCOLMAJ HIST LAW	.11
UCOLMAJ LANG	.20
UCOLMAJ SOC SCI	.16
UCOLMAJ OTHER HUM	-.32
UCOLMAJ SCI MATH	.16
GCOLMAJ HIST LAW	-.41
GCOLMAJ LANG	-.56
GCOLMAJ SOC SCI	.10
GCOLMAJ OTHER HUM	.11
GCOLMAJ SCI MATH	.16
NEW ENGLAND	.24
MID ATIANTIC	.36
CONFEDERACY	-.02
MIDWEST	-.18
PACIFIC	-.34

* Best weights from a sample of the total FSO population

APPENDIX G
TABLE II
RELATIVE WEIGHTS FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE SELECTION BOARDS MODEL

Absolute $\bar{X}$	VARIABLE	YEAR OF SERVICE/YEAR SINCE ENTRY																		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
8.7	REGION	.34	-.07	-.07	--	.05	.08	-.16	.09	.05	.01	.03	.16	-.01	.17	.11	.04	.01	.12	.09
20.3	PRISK	.01	-.04	-.01	-.05	--	.17	-.06	.01	.31	.30	.34	.12	.26	.33	.33	.33	.38	.37	.43
6.3	SPONSOR	.02	.10	.20	--	-.04	.04	.10	-.10	-.04	.10	-.02	.08	.02	--	--	.11	.06	.11	.06
8.6	REGSPEC	.07	.05	.06	.18	.30	.16	.31	-.09	-.07	-.01	-.03	-.03	--	.09	.05	-.02	.06	.03	-.02
12.0	REGEX	-.06	--	--	.26	.18	-.17	-.13	-.13	.03	-.03	.01	.02	-.01	.07	.20	.11	.02	.21	.27
9.6	POSKF	.37	-.01	-.24	.07	.23	.17	-.02	.12	-.02	--	-.04	.05	.08	-.02	.14	.18	--	.04	.03
4.0	BIPOLAR	.04	.07	-.01	.06	-.01	.02	-.13	.02	.05	-.05	--	.06	.01	.10	.08	.03	--	--	-.03
6.7	LENASG	.15	.00	.48	.16	.03	.13	.05	-.11	.02	.01	-.07	--	-.01	.05	--	.01	--	--	--
9.5	OUTASG	-.48	--	--	--	-.14	.09	.16	.01	-.05	.02	.06	.12	.02	.11	.16	.08	.12	.08	.10
19.2	SRTRAIN	--	--	--	--	--	--	.25	.36	.31	.15	.21	.20	.19	.15	.13	.11	--	.23	.21
5.5	TSIAST	.08	.05	-.10	--	.06	--	.04	.10	.02	--	.07	.07	.02	-.01	.14	.07	.12	--	.09
7.0	TRAINO	--	--	.08	.07	.07	.06	.19	.11	.11	.06	.06	.11	.06	.05	-.02	.10	.19	--	--
15.4	BACKDX	.06	.06	--	.09	.10	.21	.30	.20	.12	.21	.17	.20	.16	.15	.10	.10	.19	.21	.29
19.7	TICLASS	--	.51	-.34	-.28	-.28	-.08	--	.08	.07	.10	.19	.23	.23	.22	.24	.23	.26	.20	.21

APPENDIX H

GENERAL INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS

1966-7	Interviews with all program managers in the Administrative section of the Department of State re: relations with bureaus and Foreign Service posts. (C.20 interviews)
1967	Interviews with client of administrative programs, two interviews in each regional and functional bureau. (C. 20 interviews)
1969	Ten interviews with members of the DOS personnel staff, 4 interviews with officers of the American Foreign Service Association.
1970	Five interviews with personnel officers in the Department, two interviews with Selection Board members.

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