Gaza Yet Stands

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Informed Comment LLC



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Messenger: Gaza yet stands, but all her Sons are fall'n,
All in a moment overwhelm'd and fall'n.
Man: Sad, but thou knowst to Israelites not saddest
The desolation of a Hostile City.
Messenger: Feed on that first, there may in grief be surfet.

MILTON, SAMSON AGONISTES

1. Gaza in Modern History

October 23, 2024

The world's eyes were riveted to the video coming out of the Gaza Strip in 2023-2024 during Israel's massive total war on the small territory, still under Israeli occupation according to the International Court of Justice ruling of July 19, 2024. The Israeli assault was the most intense warfare thus far in the twenty-first century. The gut-wrenching violence of Hamas on October 7, 2023, rightly received wall-to-wall coverage, but the subsequent Israeli carnage and its victims were downplayed by the major corporate news organizations. Still, Palestinians and those sympathetic to them were able to get the word, and more importantly the video, out, via social media apps such as TikTok and "X" (formerly Twitter) — though, in contrast, Meta's Facebook algorithm allegedly deliberately suppressed news of Palestine. Some international outlets, such as Qatar's Al Jazeera and Turkey's TRT World also reported comprehensively on the conflict. The Arabic press covered the situation on the ground in Gaza in a far more detailed manner than did the Western or Israeli mass media, though Haaretz and +972 Mag published some excellent work. United Nations and aid agencies also presented masses of information, which was too little attended to by most journalists. A strong generational divide emerged in Europe and the United States, since older people got their news from the corporate media, whereas the young were more likely to see it in less curated form on their smart phones. Those paying attention were often outraged and disheartened that a high-tech genocide could be perpetrated against a people in the full view of the world and the great Powers in the

twenty-first century. His unthinking and unstinting backing for the deadly Israeli campaign contributed to the unpopularity of President Joe Biden among the youths, which was among the considerations that led the Democratic Party to dump him as their candidate in 2024.

This book collects my public commentary about Gaza since 2006 and through the fall of 2024, for *Salon*, the Nation Institute's *Tomdispatch* and *The Nation*, *Truthdig*, and my own site, *Informed Comment*. Since for all its virtues, journalism generally does a poor job of providing the historical background and deep context for current events. I have therefore made a choice of pieces that shed light on the background and significance of the hot war that began in October 2023. Key inflection points, such as the fateful 2006 elections, which Hamas won, and the Israeli military campaigns of 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and subsequent years are discussed. The lawfare of the Palestinians with the United Nations and the International Criminal Court are traced over more than a decade, an issue that reemerged powerfully in 2023-2024. The health and economic impact of Israel's cruel and illegal blockade of the Gaza civilian population is detailed. The Israeli sniping at unarmed protesters during the Great March of Return in 2018-2019 is considered. The rise of the extremist Israeli far right to power in Israel, which set the stage for the Gaza genocide, is traced, from the declaration that sovereignty is invested only in Israel's Jews (79 percent of the population) to increasingly racialist pronouncements in 2023.

Some of this writing was informed by my visits to Israel and East Jerusalem, and I am grateful to my Israeli and Palestinian interlocutors. I am an academic scholar of the Middle East, and despite the current events focus of these analyses, they inevitably reflect my own training and practice as a historian, including my extensive work on colonialism and Arab nationalism. They underline my conviction that the internet is itself a sort of postmodern archive, and that historians cannot afford to avoid commenting on an increasingly rapid news cycle.[1] My treatment is distinctive in that I take into account the impact of these events on the wider Middle East, and the importance of Iran and its allies, one of the focuses of

my scholarship.[2] Inevitably, these essays reflect my decades of involvement in the Middle East, giving them a perspective different from North American and European observers with a more North Atlantic set of concerns.

In some instances, I have taken advantage of this opportunity to carry out slight revisions to some of the essays, which were often originally written under tight deadlines, in order to clarify points or correct minor infelicities and errors. I have also added some citations where I think they may be of use to readers, or where the original hyperlinks are now dead. The bulk of the material, however, is presented here in print as it originally appeared on the internet, with all the advantages of an immediate, fresh reaction to developments and all the disadvantages of the fog of war. My rationale for collecting these essays into a book is that the internet is not very good at indexing itself, and observers such as Cory Doctorow have argued that the results of major search engines have declined in saliency because of the malign impact of advertising and search engine optimization schemes. Further, shadow-banning of Palestine-related postings has become a widespread practice on social media. In a revenge of the codex book on the internet, assembling these pieces into a book is the only way to allow them to be found reliably and read sequentially.

Gaza's story in the decades after 1948 has been one of shrinking horizons and ever-increasing misery. It was not always thus. Gaza has, despite its small extent, been an important trade and cultural crossroads for millennia. The literature on it is vast and this chapter is not the place for a detailed history. In the way of setting the context for these essays, let me instead offer an impressionistic overview and some vignettes, along with some limited citation of works that may be of use to general readers seeking more information.

Gaza was on the route between kingdoms in the Levant – Phoenicians, Canaanites, Syrians, later Israelites – and Pharaonic Egypt and was likewise on the way of invading Pharaohs who took and ruled those regions for centuries. Its harbor in ancient times,

Maiumas, connected the Mediterranean with the Near East. It was considered a prize by ancient monarchs. The Iranian prince, Pakur (Pacorus I) of the Parthian kingdom of Iran took it briefly from Rome in 40 BC. The people of Gaza adopted Christianity in large numbers from the 300s AD, giving up the worship of their local god Marnas, whom they had identified with the Cretan Zeus. Christian Gaza produced Greek-speaking theologians, philosophers and rhetoricians under the influence of Alexandria, who built early churches such as that of St. Porphyrius in 425.[3]

The Prophet Muhammad's father, Abdallah (who died in the late 560s AD), was said to have traded up to Gaza from western Arabia. Gaza became part of the Muslim empires from 636, and over the centuries its inhabitants gradually adopted Islam, though Christianity continued to have a significant presence.[4] As a trade and strategic route, it was viewed as an important possession by the sultans who ruled it, each in turn. On Dec. 29, 1516, it was taken from the Egyptian Mamluks by the Ottoman armies of Selim I and remained a district (*qaza* or *sancak*) of that empire, ruled from Istanbul, for four centuries. Local merchants, artisans, peasants and Bedouins strove to extract value from the area's resources, including the trading routes that ran through it. They sometimes came into conflict with Ottoman governors striving to monopolize those resources. The harsh governor Mehmet Pasha Kurd Bayram, appointed by the Sublime Porte over Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza in 1701, doubled taxes and attacked recalcitrant peasants and Bedouin, including in Gaza. His campaign was said to have resulted in 200 deaths, and he displayed the heads of nine rebels in Jerusalem. In May of 1703 the entire region rebelled, and a citizens' council took over Jerusalem, establishing what sounds like a mini-republic for two years until Ottoman reinforcements could make their way from Damascus and reassert the sultan's administration.[5]

In the nineteenth century, another set of challenges was mounted to the rule of Istanbul, this time from the authoritarian, modernizing Ottoman vassal state of Egypt, which invaded the Levant in 1831. The new Egyptian order, with its administrative

centralization, taxes, and expropriation of resources, provoked a rebellion in Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza in 1834. The well-ordered Egyptian military commanded by Ibrahim Pasha quashed it within a matter of months, engaging in harsh reprisals against notables, sheikhs and clergymen who had supported it. The anti-Egyptian forces had their revenge in the late 1830s, when Egypt was forced from the region by the European Powers and a returning Ottoman army, with which the locals sided.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the Ottomans centralized their administration of the area and adopted policies that favored the growth of local big landlordism, which disadvantaged village farmers and urban artisans.[6] From 1850, the whole region of the Middle East began experiencing substantial population growth, which continues to this day in some countries, including Palestine. This growth created challenges for farming families, since because of Islam's inheritance laws each child got a portion of the estate, which shrank in each generation. Many village farmers ended up landless over time, forced to become sharecroppers on the increasingly large estates of the big landlords favored by reformed Ottoman land law.

Gaza under the later Ottomans not only had a governor of the *sancak* but also a local administrative council. With the first attempt to establish an Ottoman parliament, in 1876, Gaza's council was asked to send a delegate to the short-lived parliament in Istanbul.[7] One of the province's governors in the 1870s and early 1880s, the Jerusalemite Yusuf Diya' Efendi, had studied at the American missionary school, Robert College, in Istanbul, and was fluent in French, English, Greek and Ottoman Turkish as well as Arabic.[8] In 1893 Gaza City developed its first municipal council, with the mayor being Mustafa Muhammad al-`Ilmi. This family provided several mayors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, one of whom studied at the al-Azhar seminary in Egypt and became a scholar in his own right, as well as an inspector of Gaza's schools. Other mayors derived from big landlord families in Gaza City's hinterland, who often also engaged in commerce. The last of these Ottoman mayors, Sa`id al-Shawa, served 1907-1917, and was, like

many other Gaza notables, a member of the Ottoman Committee for Union and Progress. When the British invaded in 1917, they imprisoned him briefly for his closeness to Istanbul.[9]

In the second half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, farmers around Gaza grew wheat, barley, dates, olives and oranges, as well as cultivating bees for honey.[10] Bedouins in the area exploited marginal land that was unsuited for agriculture or did not receive enough rainfall, but which provided occasional pasturage for their goats, sheep, horses and camels. They traded meat and milk products for the grain of the peasants, though occasionally they took a shortcut through the bargaining process and instead raided village storehouses. Pastoralists, hard to police, also sometimes targeted the flocks of other Bedouins and engaged in feuds.

In the late nineteenth century Gaza City developed some industry. Gatt explained that "the pottery industry forms a separate quarter of considerable size on the western slope of the upper town, north of the road that leads out to the sea. There are about 16 workshops, each with three ovens and four wheels."[11] Potters depend on clay with special qualities, which Gaza provided. Their work also requires a vigorous athleticism. Gatt wrote, "The worker sits on the floor next to it, drives the lower wheel, which is much larger than the upper one, with his feet, and forms the clay with his hands on the upper wheel into large and small dishes." Families pitched in to work together in the workshops rather than hire laborers. "Children bring the clay and put the half or fully formed dishes in the workshop to dry," and women and girls worked as well. Dishes and pots were fired in locally made stone ovens. "During firing, a man sits at the lower entrance and continually throws chopped straw or brushwood into the lower compartment; this takes five to six days with interruptions." The aspect created by this lively manufacturing struck Europeans acquainted with their own smokestack industries as familiar: "When several kilns are in operation at the same time, the smoke billows as in many European factory towns." The distinctive grey-black Gaza dishes were more durable than those produced elsewhere in the

region, and were prized and sought after, being exported by sea and over land. Bedouin and peasants bought them. Camel caravans transported them to Jerusalem, where they were displayed in front of Jaffa Gate, and further abroad up to Akka. Gazan potters were able to produce ceramic wares inexpensively, contributing to the demand for their goods, and although few were rich, none were needy.

Weaving was just as important an industry, with some 100 workshops, Gatt wrote, but less visible. He wrote that one found as many as six or more looms in each workshop. “The weaver sits in his pit all day and works just like weavers in Europe do.” Linen weavers located their workshops in the Bani `Amr quarter. Wool weavers needed a less complicated set-up, while cotton weavers needed more sophisticated equipment. Gazan cotton weavers produced colorful fabrics in red and black or blue and yellow, which were used by women in Bethlehem to make their festive dresses. The weavers obtained local wool, but had to import flax and cotton from Egypt, since local peasants did not grow those crops. While men tended to work the looms, women often were the wool spinners, using spindles, since in Gaza at that time there were no spinning wheels. The weavers and spinners of Gaza were already facing stiff competition from European factory-made imported cloth, which was “ridiculously inexpensive.” Like Nablus, Gaza produced soap, having access to local potash and lime brought in by Bedouin merchants, as well as village-produced olive oil.[12] Increasingly, cheap European manufactured goods led to the de-industrialization of Gaza, as they did in much of the global south.

World War I marked the beginning of the end of the cosmopolitan Gaza that had existed for millennia.[13] The Ottomans, afraid of Russian expansionism, threw in with Germany and Austria. The war did not go well during its first two years for France, Russia and Britain, which suffered massive losses on the battlegrounds of Europe. Their publics quickly became disillusioned with the hundreds of thousands of casualties and interminable trench warfare. The British government decided to attempt to make progress in the Ottoman front so as to give the weary public some victories. This

initiative at first faltered as well, with a disastrous invasion of Iraq.[14] They also suffered a defeat at Gallipoli. The British, however, regrouped, and by 1917 they had taken Baghdad and Jerusalem. They had confronted the Ottoman contingents at Gaza in two major battles, which devastated the city.

At the Versailles Peace Conference after the war and more specifically at its San Remo satellite conference, Britain was awarded a League of Nations Mandate over Iraq and Palestine. Mandates were envisaged by the League of Nations as a temporary guardianship, such that the mandatory power had the responsibility to train up their wards for independent statehood. This plan, however paternalistic and imperialist, did give birth eventually to the new independent nations of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Togo, Rwanda and Tanzania. The Mandate of Palestine, however, did not lead to a state of Palestine in the same way.

In 1917, the British cabinet had been convinced by London Zionists, proponents of turning Judaism into a form of nationalism that sought to colonize a territory, to issue the Balfour Declaration to Lord Rothschild, saying, “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." It was a ridiculous pledge, since no such home for the Jewish people (even if the British then thought about it more as a community center than a new nation-state) could have avoided injuring the rights of the indigenous Palestinians. The British rulers of hundreds of millions of Asians and Africans thought nothing about moving people around to suit their imperial interests, and even at one point considered transporting millions of Punjabis to Iraq to relieve what they saw as India’s dangerous population pressure. In 1915, two years before the tragic Balfour Declaration, 683,389 Arabic-speaking natives dwelled in the territory that the British would call Palestine, about 81,000 of them

Christians and the rest Muslims. There were only 38,752 Jews, most of them recent immigrants from Russia and Europe permitted to come into these provinces by the Ottoman sultan, some as pilgrims or retirees.[15]

The British in Palestine created a province of Gaza, separating it from the Bedouin-dominated area of Beersheba and the Negev, and permitted its notable families to administer it, though some refused to cooperate with the foreigners and others were distracted by local clan-based political faction-fighting. The war-time food crisis passed, probably helped more by the "highly fertile" land of Gaza than by laissez-faire British economic policies. Still, growing landlessness and poverty kept much of the population on the edge.[16] The influx of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, whom the indigenous viewed as illegal aliens sponsored by an illegitimate colonialism, created tensions. People in Gaza, as in the rest of Palestine, demonstrated annually against the Balfour Declaration. The Jews who colonized Palestine (their words) established a Jewish National Fund to buy land, which it forbade ever after to be sold to a non-Jew. The Palestinian population, in a largely agricultural country, doubled from 1915 to 1947, with multiple children splitting up the family farm in each generation, which had the effect of turning many Palestinian proprietors into very small farmers or landless laborers. At the same time, Jewish immigrants took six percent of the best land off the market. A riot against Jews in 1928 in Jerusalem had echoes in Gaza, where the 54 Jews who lived there were threatened by a mob. The former mayor, Said Shawa, and his clan intervened to protect the Jews. Some mayors in the 1930s, Filiu explained, undertook improvements, establishing a new hospital, a park, and a fancy neighborhood near the beach. He says that the French tourist magazine, *Le Guide Bleu*, in 1932 praised Gaza City's lively markets, its antiquities such as the ancient mosque, and its good communications, since it lay on the rail link from Haifa to the Suez Canal. It put Gaza City's population at 17,480, more than four times larger than Khan Younis. Deir al-Balah and Rafah were small.[17]

The pledge of the Balfour Declaration took on a significance beyond the relatively small Zionist movement in the 1920s and 1930s, with the rise of virulent European fascist movements that made Jew-hatred a centerpiece of their projects. Polish anti-Jewish measures and the antipathy to immigration in the United States caused Jews seeking to emigrate to go to British Mandate Palestine. The Jewish population there had swelled to about 175,000 by 1931. By 1939 it had nearly tripled to over 457,000.[18] These Jewish immigrants were refugees from an unprecedented paroxysm of murderous European racism, not for the most part committed Zionists with a program for settler colonialism. Once in Palestine, and given the horrors of the 1940s, however, some of them became available for mobilization by the ideological Zionists. This enormous influx of displaced Europeans created conflicts with indigenous Palestinians.

Notables and townspeople in Gaza joined in the strikes and demonstrations of 1936-1939, the "Great Revolt," which protested British colonial rule and the policy of allowing in thousands of European Jews. The uprising was begun by Ezzeddin al-Qassam, whom the British killed late in 1935, making him a martyr. Militias proliferated among Palestinians and immigrant Jews. The British military allied with the Haganah, one of the local Jewish militias, in putting down the revolt. Nevertheless, in May 1939 the Colonial Office under Malcolm MacDonald put forward a White Paper that laid out a plan to halt Jewish immigration and to create a Palestinian state by 1949 that would contain a Jewish minority.[19]

Instead, the British after World War II announced that they would abruptly depart Palestine. The Zionist militias took advantage of this looming power vacuum, undertaking attacks on British and Palestinian targets in hopes of reversing the MacDonald White Paper. The Mandate fell into civil war. A shockingly unbalanced and anti-Palestinian U.N. General Assembly advisory plan for partition issued in late 1947 made things worse by raising the hopes of the ambitious Zionists that they could defy expectations that they would become a model minority in an independent Palestine and instead establish a state for themselves on a territory far greater than the 6

percent they had managed to purchase and settle. As the civil war unfolded, the commanders on the ground were emboldened and began deliberately chasing out the Palestinian population. Joel Beinin, reviewing the findings of Israeli historian Benny Morris, observed that in July of 1948 the Arab Affairs director of the leftist Zionist Mapam party, Aharon Cohen, received a copy of a report from military intelligence. It explained why 240,000 Palestinian Arabs had fled from the regions awarded to the Jews by the 1947 U.N. General Assembly partition proposal and another 150,000 left the Jerusalem region and territories suggested for the Arab state. Beinin wrote, "Cohen was upset to read the report's conclusion that 70 percent of these Arabs had fled due to 'direct, hostile Jewish operations against Arab settlements' by Zionist militias, or the 'effect of our hostile operations on nearby (Arab) settlements.'"[20] The leftwing Mapam politicians had not aimed for this ethnic cleansing, but politicians by then were not in control of events on the ground.

Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, with a little help from Iraq, came into the war, though often with relatively small forces. The sheer number of troops on each side was roughly equal. The green Arab troops, however, were no match for the well-organized Zionist forces some of whom had served in the anti-Nazi resistance or in the British Army, and who obtained good weaponry from Czechoslovakia. Jordan seemed mainly interested in grabbing the West Bank for itself and did not otherwise pose much of a challenge to the Zionists. The bureaucrats of the corrupt Egyptian government sold off equipment on the black market that should have gone to soldiers at the front. By the time of the 1949 Armistice, some 750,000 Palestinians had been ousted from what became Israel. In the south, around 250,000 of them were expelled to Gaza, where they swamped the 80,000 locals, becoming 70 percent of the population in what now was referred to as the Gaza "Strip," five miles wide and 28 miles long.[21] They never received any compensation for the property they lost or for having been made permanent refugees.

Egypt served as the caretaker for the Palestinians of Gaza for the succeeding decades. The Strip suffered from being cut off from its

agricultural hinterland, which was usurped by the Israelis, and from its traditional trading markets in what became Israel and the West Bank, a separation that contained the origins of its long-term food insecurity. Egypt co-administered the territory, the population of which had been rendered stateless, with the U.N. Relief and Works Agency.[22]

During the 1967 Six Day War, which Israel's leadership launched in hopes of humiliating Egypt and vastly expanding its territory, Tel Aviv's armies captured Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. By the 1970s, powerful elements of the Zionist establishment in Israel had decided to attempt to colonize the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). In Gaza, Israeli economic policies, including restrictions on water use, began a process of "de-development."[23] While Egypt recovered the Sinai Peninsula with the 1979 Camp David Accords, the latter functioned as a separate peace. With the largest, best-armed and most capable Arab army out of the game, Israel could do as it pleased with the Palestinians in the OPT, and its hardliners pleased to colonize them and annex their land. Some Israeli governments at some points, as with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1993 or Ehud Barak in 1999-2000, showed a willingness to compromise and to seriously consider a Palestinian state (though a very weak one that Israel could be sure to dominate). Their wiser instincts were overruled, however, by the rising Israeli right wing, embodied at first in the Likud Party. The rise in political power of conservative Jews from the Middle East (mizrahim), many of whose families had been expelled by mobs after the dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948, shifted the country to the right. So too did the arrival in the 1990s of a million Russian and other immigrant Jews from the old East Bloc, many of whom were hungry for living space and resources and opposed relinquishing the West Bank and Gaza.

Inside Gaza under Israeli occupation, a hothouse atmosphere of resistance grew up. Large numbers of people gave their loyalty to the umbrella group of secular and leftist parties, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had many grassroots organizers and which sponsored institutions such as al-Azhar University (a secular

school not related to the Egyptian seminary). The PLO, led by the Fatah Party, recognized Israel in 1993. Palestinians in Gaza were and are religiously and politically diverse. Hamas's narrow victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestine Authority has created an image of fundamentalism as more hegemonic in Gaza than it is, in part because of winner-take-all electoral rules. Aaron N. Bondar observed of the 2006 elections, "there were 170,021 votes for Hamas (Change and Reform) candidates in North Gaza and 146,818 votes for Fatah candidate; a total of 390,194 votes were cast. Hamas, despite receiving only 44 percent of the vote, gained 100 percent of the seats."[24]

The Muslim Brotherhood, a fundamentalist organization dedicated to political Islam, founded in Egypt in 1928, had established a small branch in Gaza in 1936. It was a decidedly minority taste for most Palestinians. Palestinian politics has often had a secular, nationalist or leftist overtone. Practicing Muslims among Palestinians were usually moderate traditionalists rather than fundamentalists, and mystical Sufi orders remain active in Gaza.[25] The Brotherhood gradually built a following, however, by constructing a network of mosques, clinics, soup kitchens in desperately poor Gaza, supplementing the work of UNRWA and other aid organizations.

A group drawn from the Brotherhood formed the core of the radical Hamas organization, founded in 1987. In response to Israeli strikes on Gaza and Tel Aviv's strangling of its economy, the Hamas paramilitary, the Ezzeddin al-Qassam Brigades, began conducting reprisal attacks on Israel in the 1990s. The non-state militia was straightforwardly committed to violence as a form of resistance, and it made no distinction between military and civilian targets. Hamas played a part in torpedoing the 1993 Oslo Accords, which it viewed as fatal to its maximalist (and wholly unrealistic) demands for an overthrow of Israel, with a series of high-profile attacks on civilians. In response to provocations and attacks by the government of Ariel Sharon, including the de-development of the Gaza economy, it engaged in another round of terrorist operations from 2000, killing

hundreds of Israelis, though Israelis killed far more Palestinians with air strikes.[26]

Hamas was, however, capable of concluding and honoring a truce with the Israelis for a year or more at a time (sometimes it was the Israelis who violated such understandings). The extended family unit of the Palestinians is the Hamulah or clan, and Hamulahs make up a republic of cousins bound by loyalty, honor, and feuding with other clans. The impoverishment of these clans made it easier for Hamas to penetrate and tame them. It has been argued that Hamas subdued the Hamulahs in part through violence and in part through mobilizing them into an informal judicial system for settling conflicts.[27] Where even one member of a Hamulah joined Hamas and was subsequently killed by the Israelis, that person's male relatives – brothers, uncles and cousins – would feel a responsibility to declare a blood feud and take revenge on Israel.

Successive Israeli governments also used Hamas for their own purposes, to keep the Palestinians politically divided and to weaken the PLO, and to represent themselves as defending the Israeli public from (largely ineffectual) Hamas rockets. The Israeli economic boycott devasted the small Palestinian middle class in Gaza, the only force that potentially had the resources to resist Hamas, and some proportion of which favored the secular-minded PLO.

Notes for Chapter 1

[1] See e.g. Juan Cole,"Blogging Current Affairs History," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46 (July 2011): 658-670; Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): Juan Cole, *Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East:*

Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt's `Urabi Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
[2] Juan Cole, *Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi`ite Islam* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002)

[3] Jean-Pierre Filiu, *Gaza: A History*, trans. John King (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-16.

[4] Ibid., 17-34.

[5] Adel Manna, "Eighteenth-and Nineteenth-Century Rebellions in Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24, 1 (1994): 51-66, at 52-56.

[6] Ibid., 60-63.

[7] Alexander Schölch, "An Ottoman Bismarck from Jerusalem: Yusuf Diya' al-Khalidi (1842-1906)," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 24 (Summer 2005): 65-76 at 69.

[8] Malek Sharif, "A Portrait of Syrian Deputies in the First Ottoman Parliament," in *The First Ottoman Experiment in Democracy*, edited by Christoph Herzog and Malek Sharif (Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2010), 285-311 at 300-301.

[9] Nasir al-Suwayr, "Ta'rikh baladiyyat Ghazzah," *Sama al-Akhbariyyah*, 4 September 2016. https://tinyurl.com/5n6s77xu

[10] `Arif al-Arif, *Ta'rikh Ghazzah* (Jerusalem: Dar al-Aytam, 1943), 287-292.

[11] This and further quotes from G. Gatt, "Industrielles aus Gaza," *Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins*, 8 (1885): 69-79 at 70-71 and following. See also Alexander Schölch, *Palestine in Transformation, 1856-1882* (Washington, D.C. Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993).
[12] For the Palestinian soap industry see Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

[13] Rashid Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonialism and Resistance, 1917–2017* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2020); James Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Third edn. 2014); Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents* (New York: Bedford/ St. Martin's, Tenth edn. 2020)

[14] Juan Cole, "British policy towards the Iraqi Shiites during the First World War," *Journal of Contemporary Iraq & the Arab World*, 15, 3 (2021):285-304.

[15] B.C. Busch, *Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–21* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 22; Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 12.

[16] Ilana Feldman, *Governing Gaza; Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 1917-1967* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 131-133.

[17] Filiu, *Gaza*, 40-43.

[18] "Demography and the Palestine Question," *Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question*, https://www.palquest.org/en/highlight/294/demography-and-palestine-question-i

[19] R. Orzeck, "Normative geographies and the 1940 Land Transfer Regulations in Palestine," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 39 (2014): 345-359.

[20] Joel Beinin, "No More Tears: Benny Morris and the Road Back from Liberal Zionism," *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP), 230 (Spring 2004), https://merip.org/2004/03/no-more-tears/;

citing Benny Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 83-102.

[21] Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Second edn., 2013); Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: WW Norton, Second edn. 2014).

[22] Feldman, *Governing Gaza*, 135-140; Filiu, *Gaza*, 57-121.

[23] Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

[24] Aaron N. Bondar, "Breaking down the 2006 Palestinian elections vote-by-vote," *ProgressME Magazine*, Mar 15, 2016 https://medium.com/progressme-magazine/breaking-down-the-2006-palestinian-elections-vote-by-vote-cfc0ca2fd444

[25] Ala' al-Muqayyad, "Al-Tasawwuf fi Ghazzah: Tariq al-hurub min 'din al-siyasah' ila din al-ruh," *Raseef*, June 21, 2016. https://tinyurl.com/598hynej

[26] Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas* (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2010); Tarek Baconi, *Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of the Palestinian Resistance* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2018), chapters 1-3.

[27] Abdalhadi Alijla, "The (Semi) State's Fragility: Hamas, Clannism, and Legitimacy," *Soc. Science*, 10, no. 11 (2021): 437-455.