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# THE WESTERN FRONTIER OF WEST PAKISTAN,

# A STUDY IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

by
Saida K. Karamat

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of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Michigan
1958

Doctoral Committee:

Professor George Kish, Chairman
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Associate Professor Stanley D. Dodge
Professor Kenneth C. McMurry
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The Western Frontier of West Pakistan, A Study in Political Geography.

Saida K. Karamat

This dissertation analyzes various factors affecting the western frontier of West Pakistan: its geographical location, its physical setting, the people of the frontier, its historical evolution, its defects and strong points and the present day political problems connected with it.

A study of the physical conditions shows that this frontier is not a complete physical barrier but is pierced by the important Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan passes through which have come most of the past invasions on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Thus the defense of this frontier is of the utmost importance to the country.

This frontier does not separate the ethnic or linguistic groups but cuts through them. Astride this frontier live the so-called independent tribes. The tribal resistence to integration into their respective countries on both sides of the Durand Line has been a factor of instability along the frontier. During the British period the fanatical opposition of the tribes to an alien rule combined with the poverty of their resources led to frequent tribal raids.

The history of the frontier has been a constant struggle for the occupation of the Hindu Kush by both the rulers and invaders of the subcontinent. The Hindu Kush in Afghanistan, by giving control of important routes from Central Asia often provided a better frontier than the present western frontier. During the British period, the region of the Hindu Kush, the modern Afghanistan, emerged as a buffer state between rival British and Russian empires. The Indo-Afghan frontier which was demarcated in 1893-96 and which has remained intact up to this day gave control of the passes on the frontier to British India but was a poor ethnic boundary dividing tribal territory between Afghanistan and British India. This was unavoidable in view of the transitional nature of the entire region between the Indus and

the Hindu Kush.

After the departure of the British, the western frontier with all its problems has been inherited by Pakistan. The tribal raids which used to be a nightmare for the British frontier administration have ceased. The study of the Pakhtunistan issue indicates new tendencies which might upset the stability of the frontier in the future. Moreover, Russia which was considered as a potential threat to the security of the subcontinent in the past has become all the more dangerous since the swing of China towards communism. Pakistan is a weak successor of the former British empire and is unequal to the task of defending her frontier by herself. For integration of the tribes on both sides of the frontier, for development of tribal areas, for stabilizing the present frontier, and for the effective defense of this frontier against any possible Russian infiltration, a voluntary merger or close politico-economic cooperation between the states of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran would seem desirable.

Frontispiece. From National Geographic Society's map of southwestern Asia. Scale, 1:7,500,000. (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1952).


AFGHANISTAN
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BALUCHISTAN
KHARAN
MAKRAN
Registan
Dasht-i-Margo
Hyderabad
Karachi
Mouths of the Indus
Ras Ormara
Ras Jaddi
Ras Muari
Sonmiani Bay
Kirthar Range
Great Indian Desert
Khash Desert
Samarkand
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Quetta
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Mirpur Khas
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Islamkot
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Jamesabad
Digri
Tando Muhammad Khan
Mirpur Sakro
Gharo
Keti Bandar
Kotri
Jamshoro
Sehwan
Dadu
Moenjodaro
Larkana
Ratodero
Jacobabad
Kashmor
Kandhkot
Shahdadkot
Garhi Khairo
Mehar
Dokri
Nasirabad
Jhatpat
Dera Murad Jamali
Sibi
Harnai
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Bolan Pass
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Lasbela
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Karachi
Malir
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Shahbandar
Kharan
Nushki
Dalbandin
Nok Kundi
Yakmach
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Nag
Turbat
Kech
Gwadar
Pasni
Ormara
Las

**To my parents**

# PREFACE

Some eleven years ago the western frontier of West Pakistan was popularly referred to as the North-West Frontier. The responsibility for its defense lay with the entire British India. Since the liberation and partition of the subcontinent the legacy of its defense has been inherited by Pakistan alone. The importance of this frontier lies in the fact that the passes in it provide the only important overland links between the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the rest of Asia. Almost all the invasions of the past came from across this frontier; consequently, the duration of most of the empires of India depended upon their ability to keep a firm hold on the western gateways.

In the past this frontier oscillated between the Oxus and the Indus rivers, depending upon the patterns of the empires of India and central or western Asia. During the closing decade of the nineteenth century, the frontier was scientifically demarcated. Nevertheless, its defense has continually posed problems.

History shows that threat to this frontier has almost invariably come from across the Hindu Kush Range. However, every age has met this challenge in a slightly different way and has solved comparatively new sets of problems connected with the frontier's defense.

The formation of Pakistan marks a new era in the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The departure of the British from the subcontinent and loss of many British colonies has led to a change in the pattern of power arrangements in Asia and the world

at large. Under these new political conditions, Pakistan is obliged to solve problems of the defense of the frontier in a slightly different manner. Since the survival and very existence of Pakistan may depend upon how well she is able to defend her western frontier, it is necessary that this frontier be studied in the various aspects of political geography.

Any such study must be based on an analysis of factors affecting the frontier: its geographical location, its physical setting, its defects and strong points, the people who are responsible for its defense, its historical evolution, and the present-day problems connected with it. I have attempted a study of these aspects of the frontier. On certain occasions it has been necessary to correlate this study with conditions and events in Europe and Asia which had a hand in shaping the frontier. In other instances greater stress has been laid on the frontier tribal areas of Pakistan. However, in view of the vastness of the subject, it was not desirable to place equal emphasis on all aspects or on all sections of the frontier. For example, the Iran-Pakistan frontier which has been less of a problem area has not been presented in as much detail as the Durand Line or the Pakistan-Afghan frontier.

A special emphasis has been placed on a study of the patterns of past invasions and the general historical evolution of the frontier. So long and continuous has been the history of the frontier and such a deep imprint has it left on the area that any understanding of the present-day political problems is virtually impossible without a general acquaintance with the historical events which have shaped this frontier.

Much of the research that has gone into the compilation of this paper was done in various libraries. I have lived in Pakistan

all my life and am acquainted with some of the problems which she faces today. Thus I was able to use my own judgment in selecting the significant aspects of the material available on the subject. I have purposely refrained from making any predictions about the future, for even today the well-known saying of Lord Curzon of Kedleston that "no man who has read a page of Indian history will prophesy about the frontier" holds true. Nevertheless, I have tried to suggest a few remedies that might be adopted to overcome some of the problems connected with the frontier today.

Most of this paper was written in Washington, D.C., where I was able to avail myself of the material and research facilities of the Library of Congress. Thanks are due to the Library of Congress staff who helped me in the location and use of the material on this subject. I am also grateful to the embassies of Pakistan and Afghanistan in Washington, D.C., for the use of their libraries and material.

I am grateful to Professor George Kish, the chairman of my doctoral committee, who assumed the difficult task of directing the work on this paper while I was in Washington. Without his help and encouragement I could never have completed this paper. Thanks are also due to the other members of my committee, Professors Douglas D. Crary, Stanley D. Dodge, K. C. McMurray, and William D. Schorger for their help and valuable criticism.

I am grateful to Mr. Duilio Peruzzi for his assistance in the selection and preparation of some of the maps included in this paper and also to many other friends in the Geography Department who devoted their valuable time in reading parts of the manuscript. I am particularly indebted to Dr. L. A. Peter Gosling for his valuable comments and the use of some of his pictures of the Khyber Pass

and of Afghanistan which he took on one of his recent tours of southern Asia. I am also thankful to Mr. Martin Dulgarian, Mr. William Frazer, Mr. George Macinko, and Miss Jane Manchester, whose help in proofreading was invaluable.

Finally I must acknowledge the debt of gratitude I owe to the U.S. Education Foundation (Fulbright Program) and the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies, University of Michigan, for granting me fellowships which made my stay in the United States possible. My visit in this country has been most delightful--thanks to my friends and teachers whose kindness I shall never forget.

Saida K. Karamat

TABLE OF CONTENTS


| | Page |
|---|---|
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| CHAPTER | |
| I. PHYSICAL SETTING | 7 |
| Description of the Frontier | 7 |
| Mintaka Pass to the Kabul River | 7 |
| Hindu Kush Range | 13 |
| Kabul River to Domandi on the Gomal River | 16 |
| The Khyber Pass | 17 |
| The Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal passes | 20 |
| Domandi to Koh-i-Malik Siah | 21 |
| Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Arabian Sea | 24 |
| Climate and Vegetation | 26 |
| The Northern Mountainous Section North of the Kabul River | 29 |
| The Middle Section between the Kabul and the Gomal Rivers | 32 |
| The Baluchistan Frontier | 36 |
| Summary | 39 |
| Economic Resources of the Frontier | 39 |
| Agriculture | 40 |
| Minerals | 44 |
| Industries | 44 |
| Communications and Their Strategic Implications | 46 |

CHAPTER Page

II. THE GUARDIANS OF THE FRONTIER . . . . . 56
The Nation . . . . . 56
Physical Types . . . . . 58
Language . . . . . 59
Religion and Its Role . . . . . 63
The Tribal Area . . . . . 65
Non-Pathan Population of the Frontier . . . . . 72
The Pathans . . . . . 75
The language of the Pathans . . . . . 76
The origin of the Pathans . . . . . 76
The characteristics of the Pathans . . . . . 79
Religion . . . . . 81
Tribal organization . . . . . 82
Pakhtunwali, or the tribal law of honor . . 83
Jirga . . . . . 84
Distribution of the Pathan tribes . . . . . 88
Yusafzais . . . . . 88
The Mohmands . . . . . 91
Afridis . . . . . 92
Orakzais . . . . . 94
Bangash . . . . . 94
Turis . . . . . 94
Wazirs (or Waziris) . . . . . 95
Dawaris . . . . . 97
Bhittanis . . . . . 97
Khattaks . . . . . 97
Bannuchis and Marwats . . . . . 98

CHAPTER Page

The Baloch or Balochis . . . . . 99

Summary . . . . . 103

III. THE MAKING OF THE FRONTIER . . . . . 104

Greek Invasion and the Early Indian Empires . . . . . 106

The Rise of Islam . . . . . 116

The Sultanate of Delhi . . . . . 120

Invasions from Central Asia . . . . . 121

The Mogul Period and the Frontier . . . . . 124

Nadir Shah's Invasion . . . . . 128

Durrani Empire and the Rise of Afghanistan . . . . . 130

Fall of the Durranis and the Rise of the Sikhs in the Punjab . . . . . 134

The British Period in India and the Russian Expansion in Central Asia . . . . . 138

Struggle for the Frontier Begins . . . . . 142

British and Russian rivalry in Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan . . . . . 144

Struggle for Herat--Russian interest in central Asia . . . . . 145

Relations with Afghanistan . . . . . 148

The First Afghan War and the Temporary British Occupation of the Hindu Kush . . . . . 151

Effects of the war and the Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush . . . . . 154

British Foreign Policy and the Conflicting Schools of Thought . . . . . 159

The Forward Policy and the Second Afghan War . . . . . 162

The Second Afghan War . . . . . 164

CHAPTER Page

The Treaty of Gandamak--the British retain the strategic points . . . . . 165

Emergence of Afghanistan as a Buffer State and the Demarcation of the Russo-Afghan and the Indo-Afghan Frontiers . . . . . 167

The Russo-Afghan Frontier . . . . . 169

The Durand Line or the Indo-Afghan (now Pakistan-Afghan) Frontier . . . . . 170

Defects of the Durand Line . . . . . 171

IV. THE PAKHTUNISTAN QUESTION . . . . . 177

Struggle for Self-determination . . . . . 177

The Role of the Frontier . . . . . 180

The Eve of Partition . . . . . 181

Question of the Validity of the Durand Line . . . 185

Status in the Past . . . . . 186

The Present Status of the Durand Line . . . . . 192

Pakhtunistan . . . . . 194

Tribal Areas after Partition . . . . . 205

Tribes and the Pakistan Constitution . . . . . 205

Representation for the Tribal Areas . . . . . 206

Withdrawal of the Regular Troops . . . . . 207

Economic Progress . . . . . 208

Industries . . . . . 209

Education . . . . . 210

Health . . . . . 211

New Highways . . . . . 211

V. CONCLUSION . . . . . 215

APPENDIXES . . . . . 225

APPENDIX


I. PICTURES OF THE KHYBER PASS AND THE HINDU KUSH RANGE . . . . . 226

II. DURAND LINE AGREEMENT--1893 . . . . . 230

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 234

## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


| FIGURE | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Physical features | 9 |
| 2. | Reference map | 12 |
| 3. | The Vale of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass | 19 |
| 4. | Quetta and its passes | 23 |
| 5. | West Pakistan, administrative divisions, 1946 | 28 |
| 6. | Climates of West Pakistan according to the classifications of Trewartha, Koppen, Thornthwaite, and Blair | 31 |
| 7. | Temperature and rainfall of some of the important stations along the western frontier of West Pakistan | 34 |
| 8. | Communications in West Pakistan and Afghanistan | 50 |
| 9. | Languages of West Pakistan and Pashto-speaking areas of Afghanistan | 61 |
| 10. | Distribution of tribes along the frontier | 71 |
| 11. | Pathan tribal distribution on the North-West Frontier | 90 |
| 12. | Empire of Alexander the Great | 108 |
| 13. | Mauryan Empire under Asoka about 250 B.C. | 111 |
| 14. | India about A.D. 150, showing the Kushan Empire | 113 |
| 15. | The Gupta Empire at the close of the fourth century | 115 |
| 16. | The conquests of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna | 119 |

| FIGURE | | Page |
|---|---|---|
| 17. | The empire of Muhammad Bin Tugluq in 1335 | 123 |
| 18. | The Mughal Empire at the end of the seventeenth century; i.e., during the reign of Aurangzeb | 126 |
| 19. | Indian Empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani, 1773 | 133 |
| 20. | The Sikh territories at the end of the First Sikh War, 1846 | 136 |
| 21. | India in 1836 | 139 |
| 22. | Russian and British advance during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries towards the Hindu Kush | 158 |
| 23. | Proposed Pakhtunistan state | 197 |
| 24. | The Khyber Pass near Ali Masjid (Pakistan) | 227 |
| 25. | The Khyber Pass near Landi Kotal (Pakistan) | 227 |
| 26. | The Bamian Valley in the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan) | 228 |
| 27. | The Kabul River near Jalalabad (Afghanistan) | 228 |
| 28. | The Surkhab River gorge in the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan) | 229 |
| 29. | The Hindu Kush near Charikar (Afghanistan) | 229 |

# INTRODUCTION

Some twenty-three miles south of Pillar XII, which is erected on the Sarikol Range of Pamir, lies the beginning of the "North West Frontier." Pillar XII, which is made of cobblestones in the shape of a pyramid eight feet high, is located at latitude 37° 20' 5" N. and longitude 74° 24' 50" E.[1] It was erected by a joint Anglo-Russian commission in September, 1895, on the left bank of a tributary of the Tegermen-Su River, one mile from its mouth. Pillar XII is the last among the pillars which carry the Russo-Afghan frontier from the eastern end of Lake Victoria (Wood's Lake) to the Chinese frontier. How it came to be erected at this location is historically significant because, with the eleven other pillars, it has for over sixty years effectively separated the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent from Russia.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, two large empires, the British and Russian, moved closer to each other as they absorbed new territories. The British added province after province to their Indian empire. In 1843 they had annexed Sind, and by 1849 they were in effective control of the Punjab and the trans-Indus territories up to the tribal foothills. The states of Chitral, Kashmir, and Kalat accepted British paramountcy. Although the two Afghan wars of 1839 and 1879 did not result in the occupation of

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[1] C. U. A. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931), Appendix V, p. cxciv.

Afghanistan, they did succeed in bringing its foreign relations under British supervision for many years.

During the same period the Russian empire was moving gradually southward. Georgia, the valley of the Syr Darya, Samarkand, and Bukhara were annexed. The Akhal Oasis was captured by Russia in 1881, and Merv passed under her control in 1884. Thus during the last quarter of the nineteenth century the British and the Russian empires were face to face along a line north of the Hindu Kush. By interposing neutral territory between their empires, they indicated a desire to avoid an armed clash.

According to the St. Petersburg Convention of 1907, Russia and Britain recognized the status of Afghanistan as a buffer state. This convention was, however, preceded by a number of treaties regarding the demarcation of the frontiers of Afghanistan.[1] The Russo-Afghan boundary line was precisely defined from the Hari Rud River to Lake Victoria in a treaty signed by the British and the Russian governments on July 22, 1887. It was realized after the demarcation of this frontier[2] that, unless it was carried from the eastern end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier, no continuous and effective buffer could be established between the two empires. An agreement regarding the demarcation of this section of the frontier was, therefore, made in 1893.

According to another agreement between the British and the Afghan governments, the latter agreed to the delineation of this

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[1] For a discussion of the immediate causes which led to the signing of these treaties, see Chapter III, pages 167-71.

[2] This frontier was scientifically demarcated from Zulfiqar on the Hari Rud to Khamiab on the Oxus, beyond which point Oxus serves as the boundary up to Lake Victoria.

section of the Russo-Afghan frontier, and also consented to make certain adjustments of territory which required the exchange of some Afghan territory located north of the Oxus for the Russian territory to the south of that river. This arrangement simplified the demarcation of the frontier and left a narrow strip of land referred to as the Wakhan in the possession of Afghanistan. The demarcation of the northern boundary of Afghanistan from the eastern end of Lake Victoria to the Chinese frontier was undertaken by the Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Commission on July 22, 1895. This section of the boundary passes through one of the most inhospitable and rugged terrains in the world. The commission reached the valley of the Aksu River on August 15, 1895, where the eighth pillar was erected. From this point the boundary was carried eastward for two miles, thence it turned southeast for six miles. It is here that the twelfth and last pillar was erected by the Anglo-Russian Pamir Boundary Commission. The line passing Pillar XII reaches a spur of a branch of the Sarikol Range,[1] which it follows as far as Peak Pavalo Schveikovsky on the Sarikol Range and forms the frontier of the Chinese territory.

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[1] The Sarikol Range is one of the two longitudinal ranges forming the eastern limit of the Pamirs. The eastern range is called the Muztagh Ata, which is higher than the Sarikol Range located at a distance of thirty to forty miles towards its west. The trough between the ranges is referred to as the Sarikol Valley. The Sarikol Range separates the Little and the Taghdambash Pamirs. Continuing southwards and circling around the head of the Taghdambash Pamir, it joins the Karakoram Range. This range, although lower than the Muztagh Ata and subsidiary to it, forms the watershed between the two drainage systems of Asia--one leading to the Oxus and Aral and the other to the Tarim River and Lop Nor. S. G. Burrard and H. H. Hayden, A Sketch of the Geography and Geology of the Himalayan Mountains and Tibet (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), p. 136.

The Pamir Boundary Commission gives the following description of the junction of the empires of Russia, China, and Afghanistan:

> From sixth mile a rugged and inaccessible spur of Sarikol range carries the boundary into the region of the perpetual ice and snow to its junction with the main range. Here amidst the solitary wilderness, 20,000 feet above sea level, absolutely inaccessible to man and within the ken of no living creature except the Pamir eagles, the three great empires actually meet. No more fitting junction could possibly be found.[1]

It is about twenty-three miles south of this junction and south of Pillar XII in a wild mountainous area that the Durand Line begins, near the Mintaka Pass. Between the Mintaka Pass and the "junction of the three empires" is the narrow Wakhan district of Afghanistan.

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[1] M. G. Gerard, T. H. Holdich, R. A. Wahab, and A. W. Alcock, Report of Proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission (Calcutta: Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing of India, 1897), p. 25. Since at the time of demarcation of the boundary line the boundary was not actually carried to the first Chinese post at Bayik, but was instead carried to Pillar XII from where it could get no farther, the inaccessible peak of the Sarikol Range formed an undemarcated area between the Chinese and the Russo-Afghan frontier. Fraser-Tytler, in his book on Afghanistan, makes this point clear in the following lines:

> "The position then was that the Russo-Afghan line had reached a point pillar XII on a ridge of the Sarikol range from where it could get no farther. About twenty-three miles due south beyond the inaccessible peak and across the Taghdambash Pamir was the Mintaka Pass and the beginning of the Durand line and east south east and about 15 miles away was the first Chinese outpost at Bayik. The area inside the triangle was a no man's land and somewhere within it the three empires actually meet."

W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, a Study of Political Developments in Central Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 330. The Chinese control over all the area lying to the east of this point is much more effective now than it was at the time of the demarcation of the frontier and consequently the junction of the U.S.S.R., China, and Afghanistan is an undeniable reality now.

The Afghan frontier turns west from Pillar XII and follows the northern ridge of the Sarikol Range bordering the Taghdambash Pamir. It then curves southward over the Wakhjir Pass to join the present Pakistan-Afghan frontier, which is also known as the Durand Line (Frontispiece).

The demarcation of the Durand Line was carried out in fulfillment of the agreement of November 12, 1893.[1] The demarcation of the Indo-Afghan (now Pakistan-Afghan) frontier, as defined in the above-mentioned agreement, was divided into sections and was carried out for the most part by joint Anglo-Afghan commissions during the years 1894 and 1896.[2]

The section of the western frontier which separates Iran from Pakistan was originally defined between the princely state of Kalat, which had accepted the British paramountcy, and Iran.[3] With the

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[1] Signatories of the agreement were Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the government of India, and Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan. According to it both parties agreed not to exercise interference in each other's territories lying beyond the line.

[2] Agreement regarding the Afghan-Kurram frontier was concluded in November, 1894; an agreement concluded in April, 1894, defined the boundary line from the Hindu Kush to the vicinity of Nawa Kotal. The Afghan Baluch frontier from Domandi to Koh-i-Malik Siah was demarcated in 1894 and 1895. A small section in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass which was left undemarcated was finally completed in 1919 after the Third Afghan War.

[3] From a point on the Gwattar Bay to Kohak the frontier was settled by Major General Goldshmid, the British commissioner, in 1871. From the Koh-i-Malik Siah the line was defined by the Anglo Persian Boundary Commission in 1869, and the southern portion of it was demarcated by pillars up to the Tahlab River. From there to the Koh-i-Malik Siah the boundary is governed by the agreement of 1869 and the supplementary agreement concluded in May, 1905. This section of the frontier is not referred to as the Durand Line.

promulgation of the Establishment of West Pakistan Act of 1955 and the consequent merger of Kalat and other princely states into the West Pakistan Province, this boundary is now the common boundary of Iran and Pakistan.

In 1947 the Indian subcontinent freed itself of British rule. It emerged, however, not as a single country, but as the two independent dominions of India and Pakistan. West Pakistan, by right of its location, inherited the former North West Frontier of India (which now forms her western boundary). Consequently, upon her now rests the responsibility of its defense. "Frontiers," says Lord Curzon, "are indeed the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations."[1] The western frontier of West Pakistan in view of its location is indeed a "razor's edge" frontier on which hangs the future of southern Asia. Since this frontier can prove to be the first and the last in a struggle to keep the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent free from invasion or infiltration from the north, it deserves a careful study from the point of view of political geography. The physical features, economic resources, ethnic considerations, historical background, and the present political developments all influence the nature and character of a frontier. Examination of these factors will disclose the nature of the frontier and its importance in the planning of an effective defense for the entire Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

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[1] Lord George Nathaniel Curzon (Lord Curzon of Kedleston), Frontiers, the Romance Lecture delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, Oxford, November 2, 1907 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907), p. 7.

# CHAPTER I

# PHYSICAL SETTING

## Description of the Frontier

The western frontier of West Pakistan is roughly 1,900 miles long. It traverses different kinds of terrain as it links the desert shores of the Arabian Sea with the snowy heights of the Pamir. The diversity of relief and climate has been responsible in assigning different strategic importance to its different sections. It will be convenient to study this frontier in the following four sections on the basis of their physical features:

1. Mintaka Pass to the Kabul River
   a. Hindu Kush Range
2. Kabul River to Domandi on the Gomal River
   a. The Khyber Pass
   b. The Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal passes
3. Domandi to the Koh-i-Malik Siah
4. Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Gwattar Bay on the Arabian Sea

### Mintaka Pass to the Kabul River

For its first few hundred miles, the Pakistan-Afghan boundary follows the crest of the Hindu Kush (Fig. 1). Starting a little west of the Kilik Pass where the Sarikol Range joins the Karakoram-Hindu Kush system, the boundary follows an uneven trend from east to

Figure 1. Physical features. From Middle East Map, SSO-22-1/57.


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70

Figure 1

west for about one hundred miles until it reaches a point (about 37° N. and 72° 35' E.) overlooking Kala Panja[1] on the Ab-i-Panja or Upper Oxus River (see Fig. 2). Here the width of the Afghan territory between the Russo-Afghan and the Pakistan-Afghan frontiers is the narrowest, and less than ten miles separate Russia from Pakistan. From near Kala Panja the boundary bends southwest and follows the axis of the Hindu Kush. It then extends about another hundred miles to the Dorah Pass, which connects Ishkasham in the province of Badakhshan (Afghanistan) to Chitral, in Pakistan (Frontispiece). Within this hundred-mile stretch are the highest peaks of the Hindu Kush. North from Trich Mir a perpendicular butress projects from this range and deflects the Oxus to the north. Sad Istragh (24,170) is the highest peak located on the crest of the range. Trich Mir and Rakapushi, which surpass it in height, are located away from the crest of the range on one of its spurs.

Southwards from Dorah, a spur of the Hindu Kush defines the boundary for another fifty or sixty miles. This spur separates the Chitral River, known as Kunar River after it enters Afghanistan near Arnawai, from the Bashgul River of Afghanistan and forms as effective a mountain barrier as the main range of the Hindu Kush. The boundary then crosses the confluence of the Chitral and Bashgul Rivers at Arnawai and follows the crest of another prominent spur of the Hindu Kush which has sometimes been referred to as the Hindu Raj Range. Starting from near the Darkot Pass this branch of the Hindu Kush culminates in the vicinity of the town of Kunar in Afghanistan, and defines the Pakistan-Afghanistan boundary between Arnawai and the Mohmand Hills. The frontier then follows an

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[1] Also spelled as Qala Panja.

Figure 2. Reference map. From C. Collin Davies, Map of the North-West Frontier of India, 1908, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 71.


BOKHARA
AFGHAN TURKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
KASHMIR
PUNJAB
RAJPUTANA
BALUCHISTAN
CHAGAI
MEKRAN
SIND
Hindu Kush
Koh-i-Baba
Koh-i-Safed
REFERENCE
100 0 100
MILES

Figure 2

irregular and undemarcated line through the Mohmand territory and after crossing the Kabul River it touches the famous Khyber Route at Pakistan's advanced post of Landi Kotal (see Frontispiece).

Hindu Kush Range

Up to this point the Pakistan-Afghan frontier generally follows the crests of the Hindu Kush Range and its branches. The Hindu Kush Range has played a very significant role in shaping the course of Afghan and Indo-Pakistan history.

The Hindu Kush Range is described as "a flat-backed watershed (often falling to less than 17,000 feet above sea level) with a surface scoured by glaciers and indented by lakes."[1] It is the westward continuation of the Karakoram Range, and it was not until 1906 that the trigonometrical survey proved that a single range runs from Tibet to Afghanistan although it is identified by the two names.[2] The eastern section is called the Karakoram and the western section is referred to as the Hindu Kush.

The main range of the Hindu Kush forms the Pakistan-Afghan boundary from near the Mintaka Pass to the Dorah Pass. Southward from this point the branches of the Hindu Kush define the frontier up to the Mohmand Hills. In the vicinity of the Dorah Pass at the head of the Bashgul River, the Hindu Kush leaves the frontier and crosses Afghanistan in a general westerly direction

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[1] T. H. Holdich, India (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1905), p. 67.

[2] The range does not change its name at any particular feature but it has been decided for the convenience of reference that the water-parting between the rivers Hunza and Gilgit will form the dividing line.

and gradually diminishes in height until, opposite Kabul, it is 15,000 to 20,000 feet high. Farther west it continues at an ever-diminishing altitude and under different names until in the vicinity of Herat.[1] It runs out in a series of low ridges in the Hari Rud Valley.

The Hindu Kush has had different names. It is the Parnasos of Aristotle. It was also called the Indian Caucasus by the Greeks of Alexander's army. In A.D. 1334, Ibn-i-Batuta, a Moslem traveler, referred to it as Hindu Kush--a name which has replaced all former names. "The mountain is called Hindu Kush," he writes, "because so many slaves, male and female, brought from India die on the passage of this mountain owing to the severe cold and quantity of snow."[2] There are various other interpretations of this name, which in Persian means Hindu killer. Major Rannell, one-time surveyor general of Bengal, believes that the term "Hindu Kush" was probably a corruption of the name "Indian Caucasus."[3] Ibn-i-Batuta's explanation is, however, believed more widely in India and Pakistan, and Fraser-Tytler believes it to be the best explanation.[4]

The Hindu Kush Range, though regarded as one range by the Afghans, is made up of two distinct parallel ranges. Their proximity and parallelism are, however, striking. Sir Thomas Holdich expressed the view in 1906 that both the crests are a part of one

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[1] The name Hindu Kush is generally used and will be used throughout this study to refer to the entire range of mountains which, starting from the water-parting of the rivers Hunza and Gilgit, traverses Afghanistan for six hundred miles from east to west.

[2] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 4.

[3] Burrard and Hayden, op. cit., p. 19.

[4] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 4.

upheaval. He further points out that this flat-topped range has, according to many geologists, a softer top, compared to its walls. The less resistant top becomes excavated by drainage and a longitudinal valley develops in time; thus the two walls on the side appear as two separate ranges.[1]

One range or two, flat-backed or scoured by glaciers, the Hindu Kush Range has served throughout the ages as a "Great Divide"[2] between central and southern Asia. Pierced though it is at a number of places, the passes are not easily crossed. The waves of immigration which entered India in the past from central Asia came not as often through the passes as by outflanking this range in the west near Herat. Here the branch ranges diminish in height, losing their effectiveness as a barrier. After establishing themselves in Afghanistan, the invaders were often successful in crossing into the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent through easier passes in the present Pakistan-Afghan frontier. The strategic considerations have, therefore, been responsible for the occupation of the Hindu Kush and Afghanistan by the Indian or central Asian empires. The struggle for the control of the Hindu Kush has spanned centuries; and so long as empires rise and fall, the Hindu Kush will most probably retain its strategic significance.

The section of the Pakistan-Afghan boundary formed by the Hindu Kush is pierced by few passes of importance.[3] In the north

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[1] Burrard and Hayden, op. cit., p. 20.

[2] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 3.

[3] Many passes shown on the small-scale maps of this section of the Hindu Kush are of minor importance because of their altitude and inaccessibility. Starting from the north they are: Karamsar, Baroghil, Ochili, Kach, Kholgaz, Khanitza, Agram, Dorah, Mandal, and Showal.

the Baroghil and Dorah passes are of some importance because they remain open for several months in summer. Most of these passes, however, are located at high altitudes and the approaches to them are on difficult and rugged terrain. The spur of the Hindu Kush which defines the boundary south of the junction of the Chitral and Baroghil rivers up to the Mohmand territory has the important passes of Lawsai, Shandur, and Darkot. Some of these passes have been utilized by small invading forces in the past, but no major invasion on India has come through them.

The passes in the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan through which the routes converge on Kabul are of greater strategic importance because they are the first to be crossed and controlled by forces advancing from the north and the west. Bamian, Shibar Nil, Haji Gak, Chahardar (or Qipchak), Khwak, and Ak Robat are some of the better known passes in the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan.

## Kabul River to Domandi on the Gomal River

The Hindu Kush section of the frontier is followed southward by a section which is lower in average elevation and is pierced by a number of passes which are easier to negotiate than the passes in the northern section.

South of the Mohmand territory lies the Kabul River. The Kabul River passes through such rugged and impassable defiles that it does not offer a convenient trade or military route between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as would appear by just looking at the map. In fact, the road between Peshawar and Kabul for the greater part of its length avoids the Kabul route. Because of their steepness the riverbanks are seldom used.

## The Khyber Pass

The boundary line on crossing the Kabul River reaches the historic pass of Khyber (Fig. 3), which is located about fifteen miles south of the Kabul River. The center of the pass lies at approximately 34° 6' N. and 71° 5' E. The name of Khyber is also applied to the hills through which the pass runs. The average elevation of the connecting ridge is 3,400 feet, but it rises to 6,800 feet in the Tartara Peak.[1] On either side of it are the sources of two streams, one flowing northwest to the Kabul River and the other southeast towards Jamrud. The beds of these streams form the Khyber defile.[2]

Starting about ten and a half miles west of Peshawar, near Jamrud, the pass twists through the hills for about thirty-three miles in a northwesterly direction until it debouches at Dakka in Afghanistan. The important points enroute are Jamrud (1,670 feet), Ali Masjad--a village ten and one-quarter miles from Jamrud (2,433 feet), and Landi Khana (2,488 feet). Six miles beyond Landi Khana lies Tor Kham, where the pass enters Afghan territory.

Through the Khyber Pass[3] runs the road which links Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, with Peshawar and the rest of West Pakistan. Today, as in the past, the caravans from Afghanistan and beyond can be seen marching through this pass, their camels laden with merchandise which they sell and exchange in the bazaars of Pakistan's frontier.

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[1] His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council (published under his authority), The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XV (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 299.

[2] Ibid.

[3] For the picture of the Khyber Pass and of some other passes in Afghanistan see Appendix I.

Figure 3. The Vale of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. From O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan, a General and Regional Geography (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 446. 1: Old administrative boundary. Solid lines show railways and broken lines show important roads. Areas over 8,000 feet high are shaded. L.K. stands for Landi Kotal, and A.M. for Ali Masjid.




Figure 3

The Kurram, Tochi, and Gomal passes

South of the Khyber the boundary follows the crest of the Safed Koh Range (Fig. 1). This range runs in a east-west direction. It separates the Kabul and the Kurram river basins and forms the watershed between the Surkhab River or the Valley of Jalalabad in Afghanistan and the Kurram River in Pakistan. The highest point of this range (Sikaram Sar Peak, 15,620 feet) forms the extreme northwestern corner of the Kurram Agency. A little south of this point the Kurram River pierces the range near the Piewar Kotal Pass and provides a gateway between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Fig. 1 and Frontispiece). Cutting across the head of the Kurram River near the Piewar Kotal Pass, the boundary follows the southern watershed of the Kurram River until it reaches the northern border of the Waziristan Agency. From this point the boundary turns towards the west for some distance and separates the Khost Province of Afghanistan from the Waziristan Agency (Fig. 2). It then turns towards the south through a confused mass of the Wazir hills which merge with the Sulaimans, and defines the western border of the Waziristan Agency until it reaches Domandi on the Gomal River. The Tochi River, entering Waziristan a little west of Maizar and flowing in a west-east direction to join the Kurram east of Lakki, also provides a pass in the western frontier (Fig. 1). The Gomal River provides another route between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is possibly the oldest trade route on the frontier, for both the Gomal River and the Zhob tributary are mentioned in the "River Hymn" of the Rig-Veda, under their Sanskrit names of Gomati and Yavyavati.[1]

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[1] L. W. Lyde, The Continent of Asia (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1933), p. 344.

The general elevation of the frontier from the Kabul to the Gomal varies from 6,000 to 11,000 feet. Here are also located four of the five major passes on the frontier. This section generally consists of a confused mass of hills and mountains which form a link between the ranges of the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas with the Safed Koh, the Sulaimans, and the Kirthar Ranges.

## Domandi to Koh-i-Malik Siah

From Domandi on the Gomal River to Chaman the boundary line follows a general southwest direction. The line is very irregular and is much indented because it defines many local agricultural interests. The Khojak Range (Toba Kakar Range) forms the main chain of hills in this section. Chaman is the terminal of the railroad which links it with Jacobabad and Karachi via the Bolan Pass which is one of the important passes in the frontier (Fig. 4).

From Chaman the boundary turns towards the south until it reaches a point opposite Iltiaz Kariz. From there the boundary turns towards the west and continues approximately in the same direction for about three hundred miles until it reaches the Koh-i-Malik Siah (6,390 feet), which marks the junction of the three states of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This junction is described by Holdich as the "apotheosis of desolation."[1] The boundary in this section traverses the desert of Helmand and partly defines the watershed of the river of the same name in Afghanistan. The drainage towards the south of this watershed is received by the Hamun-i-Mashkal swamps (Frontispiece).

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[1] T. H. Holdich, op. cit., p. 29.

Figure 4. Quetta and its passes. From O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan, a General and Regional Geography (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 431. Areas over 10,000 feet are shaded black. Broken line shows Zhob Valley road.


KANDAHAR
80 MLS.
AFGHANISTAN
Pishin Lora
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PISHIN
Zhob
6000'
ZARGUN
QUETTA
KHALIFAT
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SHAHRIG
HARNAI P.
MURDAR
BOLAN P.
2000'
NUSHKI
SIBI
Dardan
500'
Nari
Bolan
SUKKUR
120 MLS.
KALAT
67E
0 10 20 MLS.
0 10 20 30 KMS.

Figure 4

## Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Arabian Sea

From Koh-i-Malik Siah to the Arabian Sea the boundary separates Iran from Pakistan. From Koh-i-Malik Siah it follows the main watershed of the Mirjawa Range which limits the drainage into the Mirjawa River on the north. From the point where the Mirjawa River joins the Tahlab River, the latter river becomes the boundary up to Pillar XI (28° 14' 20'' N., 62° 39' 20'' E.), which is erected on the edge of the right bank of the Tahlab watercourse. It is one mile east of the Gorani date grove. From this point the boundary turns south to cross the Hamun-i-Mashkal swamps, which receive the combined drainage of the Mashkal and Rakhshan rivers (Fig. 2). The boundary line continues southward following a minor watershed of the Siahan Range, located four miles east of the Bonsar (Shrindor) Pass on the main road connecting Isfandak with Jalk. The boundary then turns eastward for some distance following a subsidiary range and curving around Kohak. It then reaches a point on the Mashkal River a little west of the junction of the Mashkal and Rakhshan rivers. From this point southward the boundary curves sharply until it reaches the Kaluchi River and follows its course to Ispikan. From Ispikan southward the boundary zigzags for more than a hundred miles till it reaches a point on Gwattar Bay (located midway between the Dasht and the Chil rivers) near the tiny fishing port of Gwattar. Originally this boundary was defined between the state of Kalat, which had accepted British paramountcy, and Iran. According to the Establishment of West Pakistan Act (1955), Kalat and other

princely states were merged into the West Pakistan Province, and this boundary became the direct boundary of Iran and West Pakistan.

The stretch of the boundary from Domandi to Gwattar Bay generally traverses comparatively low-lying areas. This section of the boundary is backed in the distance by the Sulaiman and the Kirthar ranges which compensate somewhat for the factor of low relief. The Sulaimans are believed to belong to the Himalayan system of upheaval.[1] They cover about 250 miles between the Gomal River in the north and the Indus in the south (Fig. 1). Described as the "great series of echelonned ridges" by Spate,[2] the Sulaimans have a general elevation of 6,000 to 7,000 feet. The Takhat-i-Sulaiman (meaning Soloman's throne),[3] which is the highest peak of this range, is located about thirty miles south of the Gomal River and is 11,000 feet high. Locally it is known as the Kaisar Garh. At approximately 30° N., the Sulaimans begin to swing westward until they reach the Central Brahui Range. The Sulaimans do not form a watershed; the rivers on its eastern and western side drain equally into the Indus. It is the rivers on its western slopes which, making their way to the Indus, carve out extraordinarily narrow gorges so characteristic of this range.

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[1] D. N. Wadia, Geology of India (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1953), p. 20.

[2] O. H. K. Spate, India and Pakistan, a General and Regional Geography (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 422.

[3] This name was probably given to the peak by the Moguls. According to one of the popular stories Solomon married an Indian girl and as he was flying back with her he set his bride on this peak for a moment so that she could have a last look at her homeland.

These clefts connect Baluchistan[1] with the rest of the country. The principal routes are through Gat, Zao, Chuharkhel, Dahana, and Saki Sarwar passes.

South of the Sulaimans is the Kirthar Range, which separates the lower Indus Basin from Baluchistan (Fig. 1). The Kirthars form an almost continuous chain varying in height from 4,000 feet in the south to 8,000 feet in the north, broken only by a few gorges. From the point where the Mula River debouches into the Kachhi Plain, the range is a series of parallel ridges which decrease in height as they extend to Cape Monze, a little west of Karachi.

## Climate and Vegetation

Climate, in addition to relief, has played an important role in determining the most vulnerable section of the frontier. The northern section, with its high mountains and passes which are blocked by snow for a part of the year, has always discouraged the passage of sizable bodies of troops. In the south, the extreme aridity of Baluchistan has served to block invasions in that area, despite the lower elevation of its frontier. The middle section of the frontier has always been considered of greater strategic importance since a more favorable climate there makes passage across the frontier easiest.

However, all along the frontier the rigors of climate and the uncertainty of rainfall, resulting in the failure of crops, have

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[1] Former province of Baluchistan (see Fig. 5). For the convenience of reference the names of old provinces have been used occasionally in this study. According to the Establishment of West Pakistan Act of 1955 all the former provinces were incorporated into a single unit of West Pakistan Province.

Figure 5. West Pakistan, administrative divisions, 1946.


DIRECT BRITISH ADMINISTRATION
PRINCELY STATES
TRIBAL AREAS
BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL
PROVINCIAL
STATE
DISTRICT TRIBAL AGENCIES
100 0 100
MILES
U.S.S.R.
CHINA
KASHMIR
NW FRONTIER PROVINCE
PUNJAB
AFGHANISTAN
BALUCHISTAN
SIND
INDIA
IRAN

Figure 5

been greatly responsible for the tribal raids on the more fertile plain areas. The punitive expeditions which the governments had to carry out in the past resulted in the alienation of the tribes and thus added to the defense problem of the frontier.

The western frontier of West Pakistan covers more than ten degrees of latitude. Because of its location, large sections of it come under the influence of the monsoons in summer and of western disturbances in winter. However, none of these systems affects the frontier region with its full force. The monsoon rains are precarious and undependable. The western disturbances, which belong to the Mediterranean system of cyclones, travel over Iraq and Iran and are comparatively feeble when they reach this area. Climatologists like Koppen, Blair, and Trewartha have broadly classified the frontier as a region of arid or semiarid type of climate (Fig. 6). The location and altitude have, however, considerably influenced the climate of its different sections.

Climatically, the frontier divides into three broad sections:

1. The northern mountainous section, north of the Kabul River.
2. The middle section, stretching roughly from the Kabul River to the Gomal.
3. The Baluchistan frontier, or the frontier between the Gomal River and the Arabian Sea.

## The Northern Mountainous Section North of the Kabul River

This section includes the territories of Chitral, Dir, Bajaur, and Swat. The Hindu Kush along with its spurs forms the principal mountain range in this section and is everywhere jagged, precipitous,

Figure 6. Climates of West Pakistan according to the classifications of Trewartha, Koppen, Thornthwaite, and Blair. Based on K. S. Ahmad, "Climates of West Pakistan," Pakistan Geographical Review, VI (No. 1, 1951), Plate 1.


TREWARTHA
BSH
H
BSH
BWH
BWH
BSH
BSH TROPICAL SUBTROPICAL STEPPE
BWH TROPICAL SUBTROPICAL DESERT
H UNDIFFERENTIATED HIGHLANDS
KOPPEN
Dfb
ET
BSks
BWhw
BWhw
BShw
BWhw ARID
BSks SEMI ARID DRY SUMMERS
BShw SEMI ARID DRY WINTERS
ET TUNDRA
Dfb COLD HUMID WINTERS
THORNTHWAITE
E'
D'
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DB'd
EB'd
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DA'w SEMI ARID, TROPICAL
FA'd DESERT, TROPICAL
DB'd SEMI ARID, MESOTHERMAL
EB'd DESERT, MESOTHERMAL
E' TUNDRA
D' TAIGA
BLAIR
MT
STH
STS
ID
STS
ID MIDDLE LATITUDE DESERT
STS LOW LATITUDE STEPPE
STH HUMID SUBTROPICAL
MT MOUNTAIN

Figure 6

and arid. This region has a subtropical continental highland type of climate.[1] The whole area generally has cold, snowy winters and receives rainfall in autumn and spring. The monsoonal influence is very weak and rainfall varies from fifteen to twenty inches. About two-thirds of the total rainfall takes place in winter. In Chitral, for instance, the average rainfall received is only 4 inches for the six months from May to October, out of which nearly 3 inches fall in the first and the last months while the rest of the year receives a rainfall of 13 inches.[2] At Drosh the mean maximum and mean minimum temperatures for January are 45.7° F. and 31.4° F., respectively, and for July they are 96.7° F. and 73.5° F., respectively (Fig. 7). At the highest altitude precipitation in the form of snow and fog is common. The autumn rains are brought by the western disturbances.

## The Middle Section between the Kabul and the Gomal Rivers

This section includes the tribal areas of Mohmand, Khyber, Tirah, and Waziristan, and also the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. This region has two wet seasons, one in late summer when the monsoons from the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea bring rain, and the other in winter when there are cyclonic rains which, although meager in amount, are very important

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[1] K. S. Ahmad, "Climatic Regions of West Pakistan," Presidential Address, Geography, Geology, and Anthropology Section of the Third Pakistan Science Conference held at Decca in 1951, Pakistan Geographical Review, VI (No. 1, 1951), 19.

[2] Ibid.

Figure 7. Temperature and rainfall of some of the important stations along the western frontier of West Pakistan. The bars show rainfall. The dotted lines show the mean minimum and the solid lines the mean maximum temperature.


DROSH
PARACHINAR
BANNU
FORT SANDEMAN
QUETTA
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30
10
J F M A M J J A S O N D
DROSH
PARACHINAR
BANNU
FORT SANDEMAN
QUETTA
NOKKUNDI
PANJGUR

Figure 7

for winter crops and wheat cultivation. In the vicinity of Peshawar and in the tribal areas the total yearly precipitation ranges from 12 to 25 inches. The districts of Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan (Fig. 5) receive a slightly heavier rainfall in summer. The rainfall generally decreases towards the lower outer hills and towards the south. At Parachinar the rainfall is 29.25 inches (Fig. 7). In Kohat the mean annual precipitation is about 18 inches. Miranshah and Wana in the south receive about 13 inches and 12 inches, respectively. The annual range of temperature in this region is great. The summers are hot. The thermometer rises from 100° and 106° F. in the north to 115° and 120° F. in Dera Ismail Khan in the south. At Parachinar the mean minimum temperature in each of the winter months from December to February is below freezing, while the mean maximum temperatures are between 50° F. and 55° F. In June, the hottest month, the mean maximum temperature is about 87° F. The maximum annual range of 90° F. has been recorded at Peshawar and Kohat.

The winds are usually westerly in winter, and they bring occasional cyclones. Towards the end of June the westerly winds die down, the weather becomes close, and the spasmodic advances of the monsoons occur.

The average annual precipitation is precarious and the droughts are not infrequent, both in winter and summer.

Barren, sun-scorched, jagged hills support only infrequent bushes, acacias, dwarf palms, and coarse grasses. The tints of purple and gray of the bare strata of rocks form the general color scheme of the area. Yet this region is not completely devoid of natural beauty. Soft green beauty marks the slopes and vales wherever water is available. Natural landscape beauty in these areas is measured to a large extent in altitude. The

picturesque upper slopes of the Safed Koh rival the Swiss Alps. On its southern flanks are found stands of pine, deodar, and other timber trees. Waziristan, which has been referred to as a miniature frontier Switzerland,[1] has hidden in the recesses of its mountains many valleys of great natural beauty "where we find spreading poplar and ilex in all the robust growth of an indigenous flora."[2] The beauty of the river valleys with fruit gardens, mulberry trees, pastures, and green fields is enhanced by contrast to the background of wild barren hills. Except for these valleys (many of which are seasonally dry, but which swell up suddenly during the rainy period), barren and sun-scorched ridges are the rule. This section of the frontier has a semiarid or steppe-type climate.[3]

## The Baluchistan Frontier

The Baluchistan frontier traverses a region of greater aridity and more severe climate than the middle section of the frontier. Baluchistan for the most part is outside the influence of the monsoons. The northwesterly winds prevail both in winter and summer. They are piercingly cold in winter and scorchingly hot in summer. The rainfall in the whole of Baluchistan and all along the border is scanty. The region becomes drier towards the west and assumes true desert characteristics in the vicinity of the Koh-i-Malik Siah. The rainfall varies from about 7 to 10 inches in the east in Quetta-Sibi region to less than 5 inches in western Chagai. It is equally scanty along the Pakistan-Iran frontier.

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[1] Holdich, op. cit., p. 80.

[2] Ibid., p. 81.

[3] According to Koppen's classification.

The rainfall in Baluchistan is mainly caused by western depressions. The rain is confined principally to the winter and spring months. In the Quetta-Pishin area the rainfall is between 5 and 10 inches. Humidity is exceptionally low. The climate in this area is very favorable for fruit gardening. The weather is practically dry when the fruit ripens. In the vicinity of Quetta and Chaman are some of the finest fruit orchards in the world. Quetta receives a mean annual rainfall of 9.44 inches, of which 7.65 inches occur from December to April. January and February, the rainiest months, get 1.94 inches and 1.98 inches, respectively. Compared to this the July secondary maximum has only 0.46 inches.

In the upper highlands the heat is never intense, the mean temperature at Quetta in July being only 79° F. Except at Chaman, the diurnal range is highest in November. In winter the temperature frequently drops to below freezing. The icy northwest winds (called locally "Gorich") prevail in winter. The mountainous character of the country affects the direction and force of winds. These partake largely of the character of draughts which traverse the funnel-like valleys with great force. In the vicinity of the hills in the plain areas, however, the heat is as intense as in Jacobabad.[1] "O God, when thou hadst created Sibi and Dadhar, what object was there in conceiving hell?" says a native proverb.

Towards the west the climate becomes drier. The driest and hottest regions of Pakistan are in the extreme west. In Chagai, Bad-i-Sad-o-Bist-Roz (the wind of 120 days), so well known in Iran and Seistan, blows steadily from the northwest from the middle of

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[1] Jacobabad is considered as having the hottest climate in the summer in the whole of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. The highest temperature that has been recorded there was 126° F.

May to the middle of September[1] and is scorchingly hot. Its exact direction in this area and in Seistan is 334° W. and three degrees on either side of that bearing is its greatest deviation.[2]

This wind marks the one constant feature of the climate of western Baluchistan. Sand dunes in this region are widespread and prevail over whole areas. Nok Kundi has a mean annual rainfall of less than 2 inches, of which 1.37 inches fall in January and February. The mean minimum temperature for January is 38.6° F., while the mean maximum for July is 103.3° F. (Fig. 7). Life is hard and population is sparse; the density in Chagai being less than two persons to the square mile.

Some climatologists have classed most of Baluchistan as desert. However, in spite of the aridity of climate and scarcity of water over large areas, it cannot be classed as true desert except in the areas where the salt of the deeper layers through capillary action gives rise to "Kavir" formations and discourages the growth of vegetation. For the most part this area has a dry steppe-type of climate. "Absolutely barren desert," says Holdich, "is rare in southern Asia."[3] The native term for these open but not completely barren spaces throughout Baluchistan and Afghanistan is "dasht." There is a fairly constant vegetation of scrub, chiefly wormwood, and a profusion of low growing plants and flowers which appear after the spring rains.

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[1] Ahmad, op. cit., p. 25.

[2] G. P. Tate, The Frontiers of Baluchistan, Travels on the Borders of Persia and Afghanistan (London: Witherby and Co., 1909), p. 165.

[3] Holdich, op. cit., p. 58.

Considering the whole of the Baluchistan frontier, the vegetation is everywhere xerophytic[1] and usually scanty. Much of the hill country is covered with open scrub. In the extreme west aridity increases and only the spring rains bring the earth to life. In this season bright flowers and grass carpet the wide stretches of land. The Saluaiman Range in the east occasionally shows magnificent scenery in Takht-i-Sulaiman area. On its higher slopes forests of juniper, wild olive, pistashio, laurel, myrtle, and edible pine (locally known as "Chilghoza") are common.

## Summary

The climate all along the frontier varies from the continental highland type in the north to the dry steppe and true desert type in the extreme west. There are, however, varying degrees of aridity. Except for the river valleys, water is generally scarce and limits the natural vegetation. Human activities are closely related to the inadequate and fluctuating regime of the rainfall pattern and to the harshness of other climatic elements.

## Economic Resources of the Frontier

The economic resources of the frontier[2] are too meager to be the object of any major invasion from outside. However, they

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[1] Spate, op. cit., p. 425.

[2] Only the economic resources of the frontier tribal areas will be studied here. The tribal belt stretches almost all along the frontier. For the definition of the tribal belt, see Chapter II, page

have greatly influenced the life of the tribes living along the frontier. The system of subsidies to the tribes, which was first introduced during the Mogul period, is carried over to this day. It is intended to ensure some measure of economic stability in the area, which in spite of its poor resources has great strategic value. Any financial weakness of the government resulting in possible neglect of the tribes can give rise to intrigue and unrest all along the frontier.

## Agriculture

Agriculture and pastoralism are the major occupations of the people inhabiting the frontier. Often these two occupations are supplemented by petty trading, handicraft, and small cottage industries. The scarcity of rainfall, the scanty amount of good soil, and the rigors of winter force the people to migrate from one area to another. This movement of the people is indeed transhumance. Nomadism in its true form exists in Chagai.

The section lying north of the Gomal River receives better than average distribution of rainfall, but large areas in the vicinity of the Baluchistan frontier receive less than 5 inches per year and consequently are unsuited to cultivation. Generally, meager rainfall marked by great variations from the annual average result in frequent droughts. Therefore, sustained agriculture requires irrigation. The plains of Peshawar, Bannu, Marwat, and Kohat, lying east of the tribal territory, are well irrigated and produce good crops every year.

Canal irrigation is important in the Quetta-Pishin and Sibbi regions. The Quetta region is known for its indigenous method of irrigation, called Karez. Karez is a system of underground tunnels

which sometimes tap a spring but usually catch the supply of sub-soil water at the foot of hills in the alluvial fans. These tunnels or galleries have the advantage of preventing the loss of water, which is so highly valued in these areas, from evaporation.

The tribal areas (Fig. 2) are usually hilly and the soil cover over large areas is thin. The percentage of area under cultivation in this section is necessarily small. Valley bottoms are the areas best suited to cultivation and form the richest agricultural areas. In summer the rivers bring large supplies of water and flood the fields on both sides, providing them with fertile silt and moisture. This supply of water is dependent on the rains received in the upper courses of the rivers and, therefore, is not always dependable. Large areas along the frontier are dependent only upon rainfall for cultivation. In the hilly regions, particularly in Baluchistan, the fields are sometimes surrounded by embankments three or four feet high by which the rainfall is caught as it descends from the gravel slopes bordering the valleys. The areas under cultivation are thus divided into abi, i.e., the land that is permanently irrigated, and khushkaba, i.e., dry crop lands which include land subject to flood cultivation (sailaba).

The wet-crop cultivation differs from the dry-crop in that in the former the land is first watered and then plowed, after which the seed is broadcast. For future irrigation the fields are subdivided into smaller plots; in the latter wheat, barley, and other spring crops are sown with drill, and they depend on the spring rains for future moisture. The failure of rain in the dry-crop areas leads to the failure of crops. In fact the whole tribal belt can be classed as a distressed area. The region cannot support its relatively dense

population on local resources alone.[1] This condition has always made the tribesmen dependent on outside sources for their income. They have raided the richer plains below and migrated to distant cities as traders, merchants, and money lenders in lean years. A system of regular subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by the government, military employment, rail and mail contracts, and the introduction of cottage industries have greatly helped to improve the standard of living in the frontier areas.

Recently considerable attention has also been given to the improvement of agriculture and irrigation in the tribal agencies and areas. There are usually two harvests: the spring harvest and the autumn harvest.[2] The spring or rabi havest is usually sown from October to January and is reaped in April and May. The rabi crop is dependent upon both the spring rains and irrigation. The kharif or autumn harvest in most areas is dependent upon flood water brought by the Indus and various mountain streams.

The variety of crops grown is extensive. The main spring crops are wheat, barley, gram, and beans, while the main autumn crops are jowar (Andropogon sorghum), maize, mung, oilseeds, and tobacco. Melons are grown in most of the frontier areas, including the drier sections of Baluchistan where the summer melons give hope to the weary and thirsty travelers. Two varieties of melons are grown here; i.e., Garma, or the summer melon, and Sarda, or

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[1] Spate, op. cit., p. 436. Population in 1951 of the 27,242 square miles of agency territory was 2,460,000--over 90 to the square mile.

[2] The spring harvest is known in Baluchistan as sparali or sarav and as rabi elsewhere; the autumn harvest is known as mane in Pashtu and kharif elsewhere; in Baluchistan it is also referred to as Sawanri.

the winter melon. The sarda melons are considered to be of better quality and can be preserved for a long time. This variety is supposed to be the same as is grown in Kandahar. Some cotton and rice is grown in canal-irrigated areas in the valleys. The tobacco cultivation has also increased considerably over the past decade.

The staple food throughout Makran is dates, which are known for their excellent quality. Though all the trees belong to the species phoenix dectyliera,[1] they are distinguished locally by hundreds of names. The harvest lasts from July to September, when men and cattle are said to live on little else but dates.[2] Wheat is the staple food of the other sections of the frontier. Meat is consumed in good quantities.

Fruit is extensively grown in the highlands. The principal fruits are grapes, apricots, peaches, nectarines quinces, plums, and cherries. The climate all along the frontier is ideal for the cultivation of fruits which find a ready market in the plain areas. The Quetta and Chitral areas are particularly known for the excellent quality of fruit grown. At present there is no appreciable fruit canning industry but prospects are good.

The tribal area is also known for Artemisia, which is an herb of great medicinal value. After partition the revenue from this plant increased from Rs. 2,000,000 in 1951 to Rs. 4,500,000 in 1953.[3] The demand for this plant has now dropped because of overproduction

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[1] Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series, Vol. I (Bombay: The Times Press, 1907), p. 185.

[2] Due to the excessive use of dates in the diet, night blindness is common in Makran.

[3] Pakistan Publications, 1954 Pakistan 1955 (Karachi: Feroz-sons, 1955), p. 269.

throughout the world. Mulberry trees are also grown in the tribal areas and in the Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

Besides agriculture, cattle-rearing, flock-owning, and camel-driving are important occupations. Horses of Baluchistan are well known for their breed. Camels are used extensively in western Baluchistan for transportation where the modern means of communication are not well developed. Northward from Baluchistan, however, the camel is gradually replaced by the bullock. Goats and fat tailed sheep are reared in large numbers and are a source of skins and hides and coarser quality wool, which is excellent for carpet-making.

## Minerals

The frontier area is unimportant in the production of any strategic minerals. Some antimony is mined in Chitral. Coal of inferior quality is found in the Shahrigh and Harnai areas near Quetta. Some oil is produced at Uch, in the tribal area of Baluchistan, but it is of inferior quality. Rock salt is mined in Kohat and at other sites. Until recently, this region has been neglected as a natural resource producer, but current geological surveys and mineral prospecting may uncover deposits that will alter its existing economic role.

## Industries

There are no large-scale industries located in the tribal areas, although factories are springing up fast in the districts adjoining them on the east. Since partition a scheme of cottage industries development has been operating successfully in these areas. There are four training centers: one at Alizai for mazri

work, the second at Batkhelo in Malakand for woolen textile and rug-making, the third at Wana for metal-working, and the fourth at Parachinar for seri-culture. Six other centers are proposed to be set up shortly at the cost of five hundred thousand rupees.[1] Great attention is being paid to the propagation of mulberry trees, rearing of silk worms, and the production of silk seed, et cetera, on a modest scale in the respective areas. Technicians are being trained to work in the woolen factories of Dera Ismail Khan Division. The government has also awarded stipends to tribal people interested in the silk industry and has also awarded a lump sum grant of Rs. 250 each for the purchase of rearing and reeling equipment. A silk farm and a reeling section were set up at Parachinar where training is being given to scholarship students every year.[2]

The importance of this 1,900-mile-long frontier lies not so much in the resources of the area through which it passes or the industries located here, but in what lies behind it on the plains of Pakistan and India. It is as the guardian of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent that this frontier merits a careful geographic study in spite of its rather rugged terrain and poor resources.

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[1] West Pakistan Year Book, 1956 (Lahore: Public Relations Department, West Pakistan, 1956), p. 156.

[2] For a more detailed account of the economic progress achieved in the frontier tribal areas after the formation of Pakistan, see Chapter IV, pages 208-12.

## Communications and Their Strategic Implications

The study of the relief, climate, and economic resources brings into focus the relative importance of the middle six hundred miles of the frontier from the Kabul River to the Bolan Pass. North of this section, the Hindu Kush Range and its branches form a fairly formidable barrier to communications. The few passes in this section are located at great altitudes. The Kilik (15,800 feet), the Baroghil, the Nuksan, and the Dorah are some of the mentionable passes. The Dorah connects Faizabad (Afghanistan) with Chitral in Pakistan, whence a route leads to Nowshehra and Malakand. All of these passes are, however, impracticable for big armies.

The southern section of the frontier from the Bolan Pass to the Arabian Sea traverses a region of lower relief. However, the scarcity of water, lack of good means of communication, bareness of land, inhospitability of climate, all render this section impracticable for mass communications.

The middle section of the frontier is the keystone of the defense of the frontier. In this section, which varies in altitude from 6,000 to 11,000 feet, are located the important passes of the Khyber, the Kurram, the Tochi, and the Bolan. Almost all the important invasions on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in the past came through the passes in this section of the Durand Line.[1] The high mountains

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[1] It should be noted here that the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent is protected in the north by the lofty Himalayan Mountains, and by high and thickly forested mountains in the east. On the south it is surrounded by the sea, which had an isolating effect until the beginning of the sixteenty century. The northwestern frontier was the only vulnerable part of the subcontinent. The defense of these passes has always posed a problem for the various governments of the country.

of the northern section and the aridity in the southern have discouraged invasions from those directions. Today the passes in the middle section are protected, as they were in the British period, through the establishment of "cantonments" (military posts), and the strategic lines of communication leading to these from the interior.

After the formation of Pakistan the regular units of Pakistan forces were withdrawn from the tribal areas in the vicinity of the Durand Line as a gesture of good will to the frontier population. The cantonments are now mostly garrisoned by irregular militia recruited from the tribes. This is a definite advance over the system introduced by the British because it reflects the friendly disposition of the tribes towards the present government. Quetta, Fort Sandeman, Ladha, Thal, Wana, Miran Shah, Parachinar, Landi Kotal, and Peshawar, et cetera, are all strategically located and are suitably garrisoned to check any hostile advance from beyond the Durand Line.

Most of these places are well connected by roads and railroads to the network of communications in Pakistan. The railroad branch lines from Khyber, Landi Kotal, Thal, Bannu, and various other points run in a general east-west direction and cross the Indus by bridges to join the main railway line which runs in a north-south direction along the eastern bank of the Indus (Fig. 8). This railway line connects Peshawar with Karachi. One of the important branch lines connects Quetta through the Bolan pass and Jacobabad to Rohri on the main Peshawar-Karachi line. Another line connects Quetta with Sibi via Harnai and Khanai and thus avoids the Bolan Pass. From Khanai a branch line runs to Fort Sandeman. An important railway line runs from Quetta to Chaman through a tunnel in the Khojak Range. Chaman is located on the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and is about seventy miles from Kandahar in Afghanistan. From

Quetta a railway line runs west via Nushki to Zahidan on the Pakistan-Iran frontier (Fig. 8). Besides its strategic value this line serves the local commercial interests as well.

There are numerous roads which connect various points on the frontier with the network of highways in Pakistan. An important road links Peshawar to Kohat and leads thence to Bannu and Dera Ismail Kahn. At Bannu it makes a junction with the important circular road through Waziristan, which passes through Razmak, Jandola, and Tank. A branch of this road goes to Wana. From Jandola the road continues to Fort Sandeman, which in turn is connected by road to Quetta, Chaman, and Kandahar. A road from Quetta runs west via Nushki and Saidak to Zahidan and is thus connected with the road system in Iran.

In short, the lines of communication are so constructed along the frontier that they are suited to quick troop movements.

The mountainous nature of the greater part of the western frontier virtually eliminates it as a major battlefield per se. In such a region the military success of fighting does not depend upon the size of the army itself, but upon the adaptability of the troops and strategy to the terrain. The force of an enemy attack on the frontier is likely to be diminished through the employment of surprises,[1] which, in view of the difficult terrain, can be successfully achieved through the concealment of troops and material. The mountain features are so located along the frontier that they can be effectively utilized by the defensive force as a support for its flanks with the result that the frontal area can be strengthened with

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[1] K. U. Kureshi, "The Natural Frontier of Pakistan," Pakistan Geographical Review, VII (No. 1, 1952), p. 40.

Figure 8. Communications in West Pakistan and Afghanistan.


ROADS
RAILROADS
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
100 0 100
MILES
TERMEZ
MAZAR-I-SHARIF
GHORBAND
CHARIKAR
KABUL
MALAKAND
LANDI KHANA
PESHAWAR
BANNU
TANK
GHAZNI
KUSHKA
HERAT
FORT SANDEMAN
TO LAHORE
KANDAHAR
FARAH
CHAMAN
QUETTA
SIBI
ROHRI
ZAHIDAN
KUHAK
KARACHI

Figure 8

the greatest economy of force. The physical nature of the surface is likely to render the enemy's logistics inadequate.

An important locational factor of the Pakistan-Afghan frontier is that Pakistan possesses control of the passes on the Durand Line. Any defensive battle fought towards the east of this frontier will lack the advantages the mountainous terrain can afford.

The age of ballistic missiles and atom bombs has considerably changed the conception of war and strategy. Any major war will most probably be the result of bi-polar strategy, in which case none of the countries involved in an offensive or defensive war will stand alone. It is also possible that in view of the possibility of total destruction of the world, another major war may never take place, but as long as there is more than one state in the world, clashes and small-scale wars may still be expected. In any such war the control over the passes will still be a great advantage to Pakistan. Important still are the passes lying over the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan, because control over them can put a central Asian power in a strong offensive position. For this very reason it has been the effort of both the invaders and defenders of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and the routes which connect Afghanistan with Russia or Central Asia on the one hand, and with Pakistan on the other. Control of the Hindu Kush depends on control of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, which forms the buffer state between Russia and Pakistan, has been described as follows:

> It [Afghanistan] is a country of extremes, of high barren plateaux and wide open stretches of sun-baked desert, of narrow fertile valleys, and rocky mountain spurs. . . is a treeless windswept country, where in winter an icy blast blows off the high ridges, and in summer whirling "devils" of sand and dust sweep across

> the open plains stirred by a hot wind which in the desert country of Sistan reaches a velocity of over 100 miles an hour.[1]

The most important single factor in the relief of Afghanistan is the Hindu Kush, which dominates the entire country in a series of subsidiary ranges breaking off from the main ridge to the north and south. The passes over these ranges are few and are difficult of access. The mountainous terrain of the country brings into eminence the strategic importance of the three foci in Afghanistan; i.e., the cities of Kabul, Herat, and Kandahar. Faizabad and Maizar are less important. These towns are connected by roads to each other and are also accessible from Russia and Pakistan. However, motorable roads in the country are few and far between; hence, their great strategical value.

Kabul, which is the capital of Afghanistan, is located at an altitude of 6,000 feet in a gorge of the Kabul River, and enjoys a sheltered position. It owes its eminence to its strategic position. Routes from different directions converge here. A road crossing the Hindu Kush via Charikar, Ghorband Valley and Shibar Pass connects it with the Russian railhead of Termez (Fig. 8). The other routes to Termez are through difficult passes over the Hindu Kush. Kabul is linked by road to Herat in the west and Kandahar (via Ghazni) in the south. It is linked by road (via Jalalabad) to Landi-Kotal in Pakistan. Thus, Kabul seems to be the converging point of routes from all four directions of the compass.

Herat is another important focus of routes in Afghanistan. It is located in the northwest of Afghanistan where the Hindu Kush and its branches run out in a series of low ridges and give way to

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 12.

the Hari Rud. Herat is located in the Valley of the Hari Rud and is connected with Russia, Kandahar, and Kabul by a number of routes. The routes radiate from here: to the railhead of Kushka (Russia) via the Ardwan Pass, to Meshed in Persia, and to Merv along the Valley of the Hari Rud. It is connected by a difficult track over the Hindu Kush to Kabul (a distance of 250 miles). Another route links it with Kandahar in the south via Farah and Girishk. Kandahar in turn is connected with Kabul via Ghazni.

Kandahar lies in the Valley of the Helmand in the south. South of it lie the desert areas of Baluchistan. It lies on the road to Quetta in Pakistan and is also connected by road to Herat and via Ghazni to Kabul.

The longer but more convenient routes from Russia to Pakistan are from Kushk to Herat and then to Kandahar via Farah to Grishk; and from Kandahar via Ghazni to Kabul. On the route from Kandahar to Kabul, Pakistan is accessible through a number of passes such as the Bolan, the Tochi, the Kurram, and the Khyber. The most convenient route to Pakistan runs from Kabul to the Khyber Pass via Jalalabad. The shorter routes from Russia to Pakistan radiate from Termez, but, as has already been pointed out, they lie over the difficult passes of the Hindu Kush, almost all of which converge on Kabul.

The following are the approximate distances between the important points:

1. From Merv via Kushka to Herat the distance is 280 miles. From Herat to Kandahar the distance is 380 miles. From Kandahar to Chaman it is 70 miles, and from Kandahar to Kabul it is 290 miles.

2. From Termez via Khwak Pass (260 miles) to Landi Khana the distance is 550 miles. From Termez via Ak Robat Pass (300

miles) to Landi Khana it is 530 miles. From Kabul to Peshawar the distance is 190 miles, and from Kabul to Kohat through the Kurram Pass it is 230 miles.

At present, communications in Afghanistan are poorly developed. There are no railroads in the country, and the roads are poor. This factor, combined with the rugged and mountainous terrain of the country, which necessitates extended lines of communication, has often been responsible for turning her spaces into a barrier. However, the military strength and resources of a great power in Central Asia will not find these obstacles insuperable and will eventually wear down Afghan resistance.[1] Once a Central Asian power is established in Afghanistan (today similar results can be obtained through alliances and extending influence through economic aid, etc.) roads and railways can be constructed in such a way that they will link Central Asia and the Oxus Valley with Pakistan and thus with the Indian subcontinent.

In case Afghanistan does not happen to be strong and friendly towards Pakistan, the only alternative left for the latter will be to direct her maximum effort towards the defense of the passes on the Durand Line which are connected by rail and in some cases by motor roads to the rest of the country.

In the case of a large-scale conflict, however, strategy may be quite different and the frontier may be bypassed, but in any such combat Pakistan probably will not stand alone. But it must be emphasized that in case of any small-scale clash the frontier and its land communications can play a very important part. The lines of

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[1] Major D. H. Cole, Imperial Military Geography, General Characteristics of the Empire in Relation to Defence (London: Sifton Praed and Co., Ltd., 1933), p. 368.

communication in Pakistan are so constructed that troops may be easily mobilized. Pakistan Air Force units have also been stationed at important points like Rawalpindi, Peshawar, Quetta, as well as at other points along the frontier. Airplanes can, no doubt, play a very important part in a combat, but the value of air action should not be overestimated in these areas, because it is handicapped by the nature of the terrain. Flying has to be carried out at great altitudes because of hills and air pockets; consequently accuracy of aim is hard to obtain. Paratroop landings are possible on a small scale, but in case of such landings the adaptability of the force to the terrain, rather than its size, becomes more important. The tribes living in the hills are adept guerrilla fighters who have jealously guarded their hills over the centuries against any hostile attack. The success of any defense plan of the future based on this frontier will rest to a large extent on the loyalty of the tribesman towards the newly born Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

## CHAPTER II

## THE GUARDIANS OF THE FRONTIER

Responsibility for the defense of a country depends upon its people. West Pakistan, responsible for the defense of her western frontier, has a population of over thirty-three million inhabitants. Of this total some two and a half million live in the tribal belt. During the British period the tribal area was regarded as a problem area because of the hostile attitude of its population to the government. The formation of Pakistan marks an entirely new era, not only in the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, but also for the tribes who are assuming greater and greater responsibility for the defense of the western frontier of West Pakistan.

An attempt will be made in this chapter to study the tribes, their distribution, and characteristics. A brief review of the pattern of physical types, languages, and religions in the entire country will serve as a background for a more detailed study of the tribes.

### The Nation

Only ten short years ago Pakistan emerged as a new state on the map of the world; yet its mountains and valleys can boast of having cradled one of the oldest civilizations of mankind.[1] Because

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[1] The origin of the Indus Valley civilization is placed at a little before 2300 B.C. Sir Mortimer Wheeler, The Cambridge History of India, Supplementary Volume (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922), p. 4.

of its location, this land has been trodden more frequently by immigrants and invaders than the Indian subcontinent. Time and again it has stood the first impacts of invasions from across the present western frontier and it is here that a great fusion of races has resulted in producing a people who were classified by the British as the "martial" races and formed the backbone of the then British Indian army.[1]

Repeated waves of immigrants came to the Indus Valley in Pakistan through the mountain passes in the northwest and by the routes across Baluchistan. In the remote past, migrations were slow, persistent movements of whole tribes with women, children, and cattle. The first important people to enter Pakistan in this manner were the Aryans, who first settled in the Indus Valley in the period of the Rig-Veda (1200 B.C.) and gradually spread over the whole of northern India, constantly pushing the former Dravidian inhabitants towards the south. In time these slow tribal movements gave way to organized expeditions of armed men. These expeditions are believed by some to have been motivated by the desiccation of a once-fertile land in Turkistan and Persia during a period between the first and ninth centuries A.D. These expeditions brought Caucasian races from western Asia and the Mongolo-Altaic group of the Mongolian race from central Asia and added to the diversity

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[1] "The North West Frontier of India . . . lies through a region whose inhabitants have been recruited throughout the ages by invading warlike races. Except for the Gurkha mountaineers of Nepal, the best soldiers of the Indian army are drawn from this region, from the Rajputs, the Sikhs, the Panjabi Musalmans, the Dogra mountaineers north of the Punjab, and the Pathan mountaineers west of the Punjab." Sir Halford J. MacKinder, "The Subcontinent of India; the North West Frontier," The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922), p. 27.

of the existing Indo-Aryan stock. The Greek, Hun, Scythian, Muslim and various other invasions, many of which never reached beyond the eastern boundary of West Pakistan, have also added considerably to racial heterogeneity in Pakistan.

## Physical Types

Despite this great intermixing of races, definite physical types can still be distinguished. Following are some of the broad physical types found within the country:

1. The Indo-Aryan type is believed to have settled in West Pakistan in the earliest historical times of the Rig-Veda. They came mostly from Bactria, making their way over the passes in the Hindu Kush.

2. The Turko-Iranian type is found in areas lying mostly west of the Indus River, including the former provinces of the northwest frontier, Baluchistan, and the districts of the Punjab lying west of the Indus (Fig. 5).

3. The Mongoloid type is found in parts of Kashmir and Gilgit. This physical type has been produced by the invasions of the southern Mongolian races from Tibet and China.

4. The Scytho-Dravidian type is found mainly in the former province of Sind. It is believed by some that this broad-headed scythiac element was introduced in this region during the period of Scythian (Caka) rule in western India (A.D. 120-380), but many trace the origin to a more remote period.

Besides the broad physical types mentioned above, traces of Greek, Arab, and various other types can also be detected. Along the Makran coast are to be found some Negroes brought there in the past as slaves by the Arab traders. About six million

immigrants, or mahajrin, who migrated to Pakistan from different parts of India after the partition will lead to a further racial complexity within the country.

## Language

Diversity of speech, like diversity of race in Pakistan, can be attributed to the various invasions from the northwest. Except for the Brahui language, spoken mostly in Baluchistan and believed to belong to the Dravidian family of speech,[1] most of the other languages belong to the Indo-European or Indo-Aryan family of languages. The languages spoken nearer the frontier west of the Indus (Baluchi and Pashto) belong to the Iranian group (Fig. 9). The Pisacha languages of the Kabul Valley, Chitral, Swat, and Gilgit, et cetera, are the mixed languages which presumably have been overlaid with Iranian as a result of the later invasions.

The other main languages spoken in the country are Punjabi, Lahnda, Sindhi, Kashmiri, and Kohistani (Fig. 9), which also belong to the

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[1] The large island of the Dravidian Brahui speech in Baluchistan amidst the Indo-Aryan languages has always aroused the curiosity of ethnologists. The existence of this language in the area is all the more surprising because it is spoken by a people who are not Dravidians. Various theories have been put forward to explain this apparent discrepancy. It is generally believed that the Brahui tribal system, which does not insist on social exclusiveness and allows recruitment from outside, might have been responsible for the intermixing of races to the extent that a Brahui today can be racially classified as belonging to the Turko-Iranian type instead of the Dravidian. The existence of this language in Baluchistan has also given rise to various theories explaining the presence in this area of the Dravidians in the past. According to one theory the Dravidians came from the west, while according to others their presence was the result of the racial drift or overflow from the north and the east.

Figure 9. Languages of West Pakistan and Pashto-speaking areas of Afghanistan.


LANGUAGES
BALUCHI
BRAHUI
KASHMIRI
KHOWAR
KOHISTANI
LAHNDA
PASHTO
PUNJABI
SHINA
SINDHI
100
0
100
MILES
U.S.S.R.
CHINA
KASHMIR
INDIA
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN

Figure 9

Indo-Aryan group of languages. Punjabi is spoken mostly along the eastern frontier of Pakistan from Sialkot to Bahawalpur; Lahnda is spoken mostly in the western Punjab (a former province of West Pakistan). Change from Punjabi to Lahnda is very gradual. It is almost impossible to fix a definite boundary between these two, but the seventy-fourth degree of east longitude can be used as an approximate conventional dividing line.

Sindhi is spoken mostly in Sind and neighborhood and is closely connected to Lahnda. Its vocabulary borrows freely from Persian.

Kashmiri is spoken mostly in Kashmir and is closely allied to the Lahnda or the western Punjabi.

Kohistani is the old language of the Indus and Swat-Kohistan. It is now nearly superseded by Pashto. Only a few tribes still employ it. Like Kashmiri it has a Shina basis covered by an overlayer from the western Punjab.[2] Khowas is spoken in Chitral.

Urdu, a mixture of Persian and northern Indian languages, is the state language of West Pakistan and serves as a convenient lingua franca over the greater part of the country.[3]

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[1] His Majesty's Secretary of State for India in Council (published under his authority), The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1908), p. 362.

[2] Ibid., p. 371.

[3] "Urdu" means the language of the camp. It was developed during the Mughal period. It is called the language of the camp because it developed through the contact between the Indian and Persian-speaking soldiers.

## Religion and Its Role

About 85 percent of the people of West Pakistan are Muslims. The remaining 15 percent are the followers of Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, and various other religions. For all practical purposes the notes of racial and linguistic diversity are drowned in a much louder note of religious harmony for the greater part of the population.

In Western countries, where race is considered to be of great importance, it is sometimes difficult for people to understand the significant part religion plays in the daily life and political struggles of a people in other parts of the world. The struggle for Pakistan was a political struggle which derived its force from religion. The two main religions in prepartition India--i.e., Islam and Hinduism--represented two conflicting ideologies and two vastly different ways of life.[1] The differences which ultimately led to the partition of the

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[1] Mr. Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, expressed his views on the matter in the following words:

> "It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not the religions in the strict sense of the word, but are in fact, different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and it is the cause of most of our troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions."

Quoted by Joseph Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 26; from Jamil-ud-Dinahmad (ed.), Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Lahore, 1942).

subcontinent into the twin states of India and Pakistan have been very well summed up by Victor Bayley in the following lines:

> Thus the presence of two great religions in India must be thoroughly well understood. These are the Hindu religion with its social structure based on caste, and the Mohammedan religion with its wide internationalism grouped within the fold of Islam. Unless this religious division of the peoples of India is firmly grasped, there can be nc understanding of the country. It does not matter that a Punjabi is different from a Madrassi and they do not understand one another's speech. If they are of the same religion, there is at once a bond between them which is stronger than the racial division, and, on the other hand, if they are of the different religions, there is an antipathy which adds to the estrangement of an alien folk. Any disunity there may be in India is far more the result of there being two antipathetic religions, than from the two hundred or more different races and tongues.[1]

The purpose of the above quotation is not to dwell on the old religious differences which existed between followers of the two main religions in the past; rather, it is to emphasize that the struggle based on the differences which led ultimately to the formation of Pakistan bound the Muslims of India closer to one another in the pursuit of a cause than ever before. The years prior to the birth of Pakistan saw more than the struggle of a people to achieve a homeland for themselves; they saw the evolution of the Muslims of India into a coherent nation. These people shared in common the memories of a glorious past and of their achievements in the fields of government, art, science, and culture. They also shared together the memories of the humiliations of a foreign rule which meant greater hardship for them (since they were the ruling class before the coming of the British) than for the Hindus, for whom the coming

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[1] Victor Bayley, Is India Impregnable? (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1941), p. 85.

of the British meant only a change of government. The coming into existence of Pakistan meant the crowning of the efforts of the Muslims, who had fought not as the Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis, Balochis, Kashmiris, or Bengalis, but as Muslims.[1] The ten years that have gone by since the birth of Pakistan have proved beyond doubt that the Pakistanis are a coherent nation despite their racial and linguistic diversity, and that whatever they have achieved thus far is the result of a common effort by a single nation with a common history of triumphs and struggles.

## The Tribal Area

This general study of the people of West Pakistan provides the background for a more detailed study of the people living in the tribal areas along the western frontier. Such a study is necessary because these areas were considered hostile to the British government in the past and were therefore regarded as problem areas from the point of view of defense. Today, in spite of the marked change in their attitude toward their present government,

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[1] "Islam does not divide life into watertight compartments; it claims the entire allegiance of its followers. Hence it is all pervading in character and affects all aspects of human activity. As a consequence the uniformity of all Muslim peoples is far more striking than their diversity. This is true, to a remarkable extent, of Muslims of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent as well; the impress of Islam on them is deep and real, and they are no unworthy members of the large Muslim fraternity. Their outlook on life, their way of living, their tastes and inclinations are essentially Muslim and their long domicile among a people with a different outlook, tradition and culture has not affected the essentially Muslim characteristics of Indian Islam." I. H. Qureshi, The Pakistani Way of Life (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1956), p. 5.

these tribes are still not completely integrated in Pakistan. Many of them live on both sides of the Durand Line and have kept their way of life and their tribal system intact over the centuries in spite of the pressures from the empires of India or central Asia.

The tribal belt[1] extends more or less all along the frontier though it is less well defined beyond the Dera Ismail Khan Division. Part of it was acquired by the British after the Sikh Wars of 1846 and 1849 and part as a result of the Afghan Wars. In Baluchistan, most of the tribal territory was leased from the Khan of Kalat. The strip of tribal territory varied in width from about thirty miles in the vicinity of the Khyber Pass to about two hundred miles at Sibi.[2] Tribes of northern areas were included in the princely states[3] of Chitral, Dir, and Swat, known together as the Malakand Agency (Fig. 5). Rulers of these states had considerable influence over the tribes and were responsible for tribal behavior. In Baluchistan the territory was administered through contact with the tribal chiefs.

The tribes of the middle section of the frontier, living between the Kabul and the Gomal rivers, were, however, harder to control on account of their intensely democratic organization. It is in this area that about two-thirds of the British Indian Army

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[1] The tribal belt is sometimes referred to as Yaghistan, "the land of the unruled."

[2] According to the 1951 census, the tribal population is estimated at 2,647,156. This estimate was based on a small sampling of the tribesmen. James W. Spain, "The Pathans of the Tribal Area," in Stanley Maron (ed.), Pakistan Society and Culture (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 135.

[3] These and other princely states in British India had accepted British paramountcy.

was stationed in "cantonments" for what has been termed as border police work; i.e., to prevent the tribal raids in the British-administered districts. These raids were motivated partly because of economic reasons and partly because of the fanatical intolerance of the tribes to even the slightest control from an alien "kafir" (infidel) government.

The tribal area between the Kabul and the Gomal rivers was divided into a number of agencies, the Khyber Agency, the Kurram Agency, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan (Fig. 2).

The tribal area for centuries has served as a sort of buffer between the empires of India and Persia. Despite this pull from two sides, the tribes have been able to hold their own in their hills. During the British period the tribal belt served as an inner marchland. The tribesmen were considered as British subjects and the government was theoretically responsible for defending them in case of an attack from outside. However, they were practically independent in the management of their internal affairs. The regular laws of the government were not introduced here. The administration was carried out by means of jirgas, or tribal assemblies, and the code of honor of the tribes. The Khassadars, or non-uniformed tribal levies, were employed for picket and patrol duties with the consent of the tribes. A system of subsidies to the leading tribal maliks, or chiefs, was introduced. This money was spent by the maliks with the consent and according to the wishes of the tribes. Such subsidies were considered necessary in view of the economic poverty of the tribal areas.

According to the Establishment of West Pakistan Act (1955), all the provinces, princely states, and tribal areas of West Pakistan were incorporated in the West Pakistan province. Despite this merger no major change has taken place in the pattern of

administration of these areas. The area is still divided into agencies, although a new agency called the Mohmand Agency was created in 1952 to deal with the affairs of the hundred thousand Mohmands living north of the Kabul River. The administration is still carried out by the government by means of jirgas, or tribal assemblies, the pakhtunwali, or the Pathan code of honor, and the Frontier Crimes Regulations (first introduced in 1901 during the Curzon administration) under which the jirgas selected by the political agents of the Pakistan government are authorized to carry on trials according to the laws more applicable to the tribal area. The system of subsidies which was introduced by the British is also kept intact. It must be observed here, however, that after the departure of the British the tribal raids have almost completely ceased. Furthermore, the tribes have given every indication of their loyalty to Pakistan and their willingness to assume greater responsibility in the administration of the country. Formation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with ethnography, religion, and ideals common to the tribal belt and the rest of the country has put an end to many problems of the British period. Today the regular units of the Pakistan Army have been withdrawn from the frontier cantonments as a gesture of trust in the tribes, and special representation has been given them in the provincial and central assemblies. This marks a step toward closer cooperation of the tribes and the rest of the country.

Many more years may be needed before these areas are completely integrated into Pakistan. The government of Pakistan has done much during the past ten years to raise the standard of living and to improve the economic status of these areas. A more detailed discussion of these improvements and the constitutional status of the tribes will be included in the chapter on Pakhtunistan. Here we shall only discuss the distribution and characteristics of the tribes

living in Pakistan along the Durand Line. Aside from political considerations, a study of these tribes is a fascinating study of a brave people. In the following pages, an attempt will be made to study briefly the tribes and their distribution along the frontier. Such a study will provide a background for the Pakhtunistan question.[1]

The population of the frontier can be divided into three groups: Baloch, Pathan, and non-Pathan. Baloch tribes live mostly in the former province of Baluchistan. Most of the old provincial boundaries were administrative and not ethnic boundaries. Within Baluchistan were found a large number of the Pathan tribes, and the northwestern frontier included various non-Pathan tribes as well. The races and languages all along the frontier gradually merge into each other and it is difficult to draw a hard and fast line separating non-Pathan from Pathan and Pathan from Baloch. The affinity of race is not always a criterion of language, and the converse is still more true. According to Davies, "what approximates more clearly to an ethnic boundary between Pathan and Baloch runs from near the town of Chandhwan in Dera Ismail Khan district, through Thal Chotiali and Sibi to Chaman."[2] North of this line dwell mainly the Pathan tribes which occupy the trans-Indus territory all along the frontier up to Swat Kohistan. The non-Pathan tribes are found mostly in the mountain fastnesses of Chitral and Swat Kohistan. The Baloch tribes are found along the Baluchistan frontier roughly to the south and west of the line referred to above (Fig. 10). These

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[1] See Chapter IV.

[2] P. C. Collin Davies, The Problem of the North West Frontier, 1890-1908 With a Survey of Policy Since 1849 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1932), p. 41.

Figure 10. Distribution of tribes along the frontier.


BALOCH
PATHAN
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
100 0 100
MILES
U.S.S.R.
CHINA
Indus R.
NON-PATHAN
KASHMIR
Kabul R.
AFGHANISTAN
Chenab
Sutlej
INDIA
Indus R.
IRAN

Figure 10

three main divisions of the frontier tribes will be discussed separately in the following pages.

## Non-Pathan Population of the Frontier

Very little is known of the original inhabitants who lived in the trans-Indus territory before the Pathan migrations. The Gabris, Safis, and Maujaris, who, according to the local traditions, lived in Kohat, and the Pothi of Marwat Plain are merely legendary names. No trace of the original inhabitants remains today. We will therefore examine only those non-Pathan tribes who are living in the area now.

The non-Pathan tribes are usually referred to as Kohistanis by the Pathans. Khands of the Peshawer district and the Tirahis of Tirah are believed to be aboriginals. The Afridis of Tirah and Khyber are believed by many to have descended from the racial stock established in Tirah in very early times. Among the hills of Dir, Swat, and Panjkora are to be found remnants of very early settlers; Torwals and Garhwi tribes reside in the higher ranges of Swat and the Bashkari in the Panjkora Hills. In Jandol and Maidan are found various other tribes of Kafir descent that are comparatively recent converts to Islam and are now reckoned as Pathan tribes.

The Chitralis form the most important non-Pathan group along the frontier. Their origin is rather obscure. However, they appear to be composed of different racial elements. Migrations from Pamir, Wakhan, and central Asia in the past seem to have added to the racial complexity of the people. Traces of Mongolian blood are attributed to the Chinese invasions in the past. Some

sections of the population--i.e., the Ahmadzadas--are believed to be of Aryan descent.[1]

The present inhabitants of Chitral are divided into three strata--Ahmadzadas, Arbabzadas, and Fakir Miskin--which are social and not racial distinctions. The Fakir Miskin (literally "poor beggars") form the majority of the population and are the tillers of the soil.

The Chitralis call their country Kho and their language Khowar, which is the lingua franca of Chitral and is related to the Iranian Gulchah languages spoken north of the Hindu Kush.[2] The Chitralis are mostly Muslims. Their conversion is recent, dating from early in the fourteenth century to the sixteenth century. As a result, many primitive beliefs and customs survive to this day.[3] Unlike the Pathan tribes, religious fanaticism is markedly absent among the Chitralis.

In martial qualities the Chitralis do not compare favorably with the Pathans and according to Davies are dangerous only when they have the advantage of overwhelming numbers.[4] There are conflicting opinions on this point and on the matter of the general characteristics of the Chitralis. As in most of the frontier areas, life in their territory is subordinate to the law of the survival of the fittest. However, much has been written about the laughter- and song-loving Chitralis and about their engaging light-heartedness.

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[1] The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. X, p. 303.

[2] Davies, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

[3] The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. X, p. 303.

[4] Davies, op. cit., p. 59.

During the British period Chitral was ruled by the Mehtar of Chitral, who had accepted British paramountcy. In all tribal matters concerning Chitral the British dealt with the Mehtar of Chitral, who had considerable influence among the tribes.

Chitral, according to the Establishment of West Pakistan Act (1955), has been incorporated in West Pakistan Province along with all princely states.

Southeast of Chitral lie Dir, Swat, Bajaur, and Bunner. All these states have now been integrated into West Pakistan. They are inhabited mainly by the Pathan tribes who drove the non-Pathan tribes across the Indus. Mention must be made here of the Swati tribes, who have no connection with the Swat Valley. They live mostly in the Swat Kohistan in Hazara and claim Pathan descent, but in reality are very heterogeneous in origin.[1] Swatis are reputed to be excellent fighters.

The Gujars also live in large numbers in Dir, Swat, and Bajaur and speak mainly Pashto though on the border of Dir and Asmar they retain their own "Indian" speech.[2]

Before the formation of Pakistan the colonies of Hindus and Sikhs formed an important non-Pathan element on the frontier. Most of the Hindus and Sikhs migrated to India after the partition. In the past they played a very important part in the economic life of the frontier. They were mostly merchants and money-lenders who controlled frontier trade. Their place has now been taken by wealthier tribesmen and by Pakistani businessmen from the plains areas.

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[1] Ibid., p. 61.

[2] The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XIX, p. 166.

## The Pathans

If a line were drawn extending from near the town of Chandhwan in the Dera Ismail Khan district to Chaman through Thal-Chotiali and Sibi, it would serve roughly as a convenient line separating the Baloch from the Pathan tribes.[1] North of this line the Pathan tribes occupy most of the trans-Indus territory up to Swat Kohistan; to the south and west of it live the Baloch tribes.

The terms "Pathan" and "Afghan" have been used interchangeably in the past by some authors. It is therefore necessary to explain both of these terms. The word "Pathan" is believed to be an Indian corruption of Pakhtana, the Pashto speakers. The Pashto- and Pakhto-speaking people live on both sides of the Durand Line and describe themselves as "Pakhtuns," another form of the word "Pathans." There is, however, a tendency to refer to the Pathans under Kabul jurisdiction as Afghans. The term "Afghan" also includes any citizen or inhabitant of Afghanistan irrespective of his racial affiliations. Within Afghanistan are included the Hazaras, Tajiks, Turks, Dehgans, Usbegs, and other races. The tribes on the east side of the Durand Line, now included within Pakistan, are referred to as Pathans or Pakhtunes.[2]

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[1] See page 69.

[2] In the predominantly non-Pathan areas of Dir and Swat, the term "Pathan" is used to describe status alone and has no racial significance. Anyone possessing a share in the tribal estate has a voice in the tribal and village councils and is referred to as a Pathan. If this share is lost, he is then called a fakir and has to forfeit the name of Pathan, and loses his voice in the councils. The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. XIX, p. 160.

## The language of the Pathans

The dominant language of the Pathans is Pashto, which belongs to the Iranian branch of the Aryan family of speech. It has two main dialects, a hard or northeastern one which is called Pakhto, and a soft or southwestern one which is referred to as Pashto. The dividing line of these two dialects, according to the Imperial Gazetteer of India, runs westward from Thal through the Kohat District almost to the Indus, but then turns northward, and the speech of the Akhora Khattaks is the soft Pashto.[1] Thus Pakhto is spoken in Bajaur, Swat, and Bunner by Yusafzai, Bangash, Orakzai, Afridi, and Mohmand tribes, while the Khattaks, Wazirs, Marwats, and various minor tribes in the south speak Pashto. This division of language roughly corresponds with the kind of tribal system of the Pathans: Pakhto-speaking Pathans have a tendency to an oligarchic form of government while the soft Pashto-speaking branch is democratic in organization.[2]

## The origin of the Pathans

Different theories have been put forward to explain the origin of the Pathans. They have been traced to the Copts, Jews, Armenians, Rajputs, and others. Most of these theories, however, are subject to considerable doubt. The Hebraic descent theory has received wide interest in the past.[3] The Pathans themselves claim to have

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[1] Ibid., p. 165.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Davies observes that the traditions of a people are useful in that they throw light on national characteristics and often on their origin, "but the Afghan claim to Hebraic descent," he says, "is supported only by wild facticious genealogies. It is the outcome of a

descended through Qais from Saul, King of Israel. There is nothing save certain facial likenesses,[1] some Biblical names,[2] and a few customs[3] to support the theory. The language of the Pathans, on

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widespread custom among Mohammadans, by which they claim or invent some connection with the Prophet or with noted personages whose names occur in the Koran or other sacred writings." Davies, op. cit., p. 42. The Pathan traditions refer to Syria as their home whence they were carried away by Nabuchadnezzar and planted in different parts of Persia and Media from whence they moved eastward to Kabul and Kandahar. They also claim that they were in Ghor at the time Prophet Mohammed arose in the seventh century.

[1]It has been observed that the Pathans have a long curved nose which is a characteristic semitic feature. But a Jewish, or rather a Hittite, nose is quite widespread and is a characteristic of races which in no way can be associated with the Jews. Kashmiris, for instance, are also described as having a great facial likeness with the Jews but are not of Jewish origin at all. Ibid.

[2]The use of the so-called Jewish names is common among the Pathans. Indeed, the Jewish names are quite common among the Muslims, who believe in the Biblical traditions and regard Moses and Christ as the prophets of God. The so-called Biblical names were quite common even in the time of the prophet Mohammed. Any theory based on the resemblance of names is, therefore, not a sound one. According to Oliver, the early tribal names are not the same as the contemporary Jewish names. Edward E. Oliver, Across the Frontier, Pathan and Biloch (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1890), p. 97.

[3]Some of the Pathan tribes have peculiar customs which are suggestive of the Levitical law. The customs such as the "Passover-like" practice of sacrificing an animal and smearing the doorway to avert death and calamity, the placing of the sins of the people upon a heifer which is driven out into the wilderness in the manner of the Biblical scapegoat, the stoning to death of the blasphemers, the periodical distribution of land by lot, the rites of circumcision, and the purification, etc., have all been put forth to support the Hebraic descent theory.

Some of the above customs, especially the last two, are very common among the Muslims. The stoning to death of blasphemers

the other hand, has nothing in common with Hebrew or Chaldaic and belongs to the Aryan subdivision of the Indo-European languages.

Whatever scientific research has been done in this field shows the Pathan to be of the Turko-Iranian type with a considerable mixture of other physical types found beyond the Indus. There is, first of all, an underlying substratum of a tall dolichocephalic leptorrhine element with light skin, eye, and hair colors.[1] It seems that the arrival of this race coincided with the early period of Aryan migrations to India. This mainly Aryan substratum has been overlaid by other racial elements from later invasions. The second important racial strain is that of brachycephalic race with the long and frequently aquiline nose, light complexion but medium hair and eyes.[2] This element seems to be allied with the Dinaric race of Eastern Europe. These people are believed to have come from Russian Turkistan. The Mongoloid element also seems to be present in some sections of the population. The traces of an autochthonous race of short stature, dolichocephalic head, medium nose, broad face, and brown complexion, nut-brown eyes and hair, are also found.[3]

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has also been practiced by the Muslims in the past. It should also be observed here that the customs such as the use of the scapegoat cannot be traced to Israelites alone.

These theories are, therefore, too inadequate to enable us to label the Pathans as being of Jewish origin. Some of the recent research shows that varied racial elements have gone into the composition of the Pathans and the neighboring tribes.

[1] W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, a Study of Political Developments in Central Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 49.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

## The characteristics of the Pathans

Any generalization about the Pathans and their characteristics is apt to be misleading because the various tribes live under different conditions and hence differ slightly from each other in their customs and habits. The majority of them, however, claim a common descent, speak the same language, practice the same religion, and are known for their love of liberty and bravery. A common law of vendetta and a common tribal law[1] regulating the relations between clan and clan and between various tribes are other ties. These ties, though frail, do exist, and give the Pathans, despite their division into tribes, clans, sections, and subsections, the semblance of a people who are basically the same.

The Pathans of the hill tribes are usually tall, fair skinned, and have ivory complexions. Their features are well shaped and good looks are common. Except for a few valleys where plenty of water is available for irrigation, the bare hills of the frontier provide but a marginal existence to the Pathans. Life in the hills is as much a struggle between man and nature as it is between man and man. The frontier, therefore, is the place where the survival of the fittest is a real feature of daily life. The very word "Pathan" in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent is considered an embodiment of all that is most courageous and most manly. "Pathans," says Vincent,

> are proud to a degree, self-reliant only as their life can make them, hardy beyond measure and absolutely tireless. Their physical fitness would be incomprehensible if one did not consider

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[1] The tribal law which is called Pakhtunwali is not based on Islamic law or Sharia but has evolved through time to meet the needs of society; however, some aspects of this law--i.e., badal and Jihad--even though administered rudely, are inspired by the Islamic law.

> the climate and country they live in, which allows no weaklings to survive. They have been known to cover in twenty-four hours, sixty miles afoot or a hundred and fifty on horseback, and that on a mere handful of food such as would not make a single dish for a European. With them it has been said that there is no old age as we understand it, no period of increasing senility, but only death as soon as they can no longer endure the full hardships of their life.---Taken as a whole, the frontier tribes are unquestionably among the hardiest men on earth, and so much the more redoubtable foes when war is afoot.[1]

This then is the frontier man who has lived in the hills for centuries and who is known to be extremely brave and utterly reckless concerning his own life.[2] "One cannot but admire," says Davies, "his proud bearing and resolute step, his martial instincts and dependent spirit, his frank open manners and festive temperament, his hatred of control, his love of country and his wonderful powers of endurance."[3] It is said of him that when he goes out into the world, he clothes himself in arrogance and that he does not make distinction between persons and is not awed in the presence of high authority. Writes Oliver,

> Even when he leaves his native heath behind he takes his manner with him. He will come down, a stalwart manly looking ruffian with frank and open manners, rather Jewish feature. . . . He is certain to be filthy and he may be ragged, but he will saunter into a Viceregal durbar as proud as Lucifer and with an air and manner a diplomatist might envy. Not in the least like any other Indian subject.[4]

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[1] Arthur Vincent, The Defence of India, in India of To-day Series, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 45.

[2] C. F. Andrew, The Challenge of the North-West Frontier (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1937), p. 60.

[3] Davies, op. cit., p. 48.

[4] Oliver, op. cit., p. 224.

Pathans are good fighters by instinct and the geographical location of their country has never allowed these qualities to become dormant. Their inherent independence is one of their marked attributes. Those of them who enrolled in the army won the admiration of the British. "By Jove, sir," was the remark of an essentially British officer,

> "If I could not command a British regiment, I would ask for nothing better than to lead a Punjab one." The regiment probable contained [remarks Oliver] more Sikhs than Pathans, but the sentiment applies to both, and represents fairly enough the feeling that would inspire a soldier.[1]

Along with courage, the Pathan considers hospitality as the first among the virtues. He is known at times to entertain lavishly even to the extent of going into debt.

## Religion

The Pathans are the followers of Islam, and, except for the Turis of the Kurram Valley, belong to the Sunui Sect. The Pathans consider themselves to be very staunch believers in their faith, but their knowledge of the basic principles of Islam, however, is not always perfect. They are fanatical in their beliefs and many tribes are greatly under the influence of the mullahs,[2] who exercise a degree of influence which is almost unknown among nations of the West. "If there be any religious cause at stake," writes Vincent, "or if the mullahs or any other agents have succeeded in persuading the

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[1] Ibid., p. 10.

[2] Priests. "Mullah does not hold a very high position by virtue of his calling. His status is the result of a highly individualistic outlook of both Islam and Pakhtan society." James W. Spain, "The Pathans of the Tribal Area," op. cit., p. 140.

tribesmen that such is the case, the latter's moral courage and doggedness are trebled at once."[1] The religious factor has, therefore, been exploited by many a mullah and tribal chief, and has been the cause of many an outrage in the past against the British government. Islam has always been the greater loyalty to the Pathan tribes, who are no respecters of frontiers when they feel that "Islam is in danger." Their loyalty to Islam was the main reason which made them, despite their hatred of control from either side, more sympathetic toward the Kabul government than toward the British government. Today the loyalty and good will of the tribes toward Pakistan is very much dependent upon the ties of a common religion with the rest of the population of the country.

## Tribal organization

Regardless of their many civic virtues, the Pathans are not a united people. They are divided into different tribes, clans, and subclans which are almost constantly feuding with each other. Nothing save the danger of a common enemy can unite them.

The basic unit within each major tribe is the Khel. At one time Khel probably formed an expanded family group, but today the size of each Khel has grown to the point that the members of a Khel are linked to it and to its policies without any consciousness of blood ties. Within Khel the basic family division is Kabal (sometimes called Kor).[2] The chief or leader of each group is called a

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[1] Vincent, op. cit., p. 43.

[2] Spain observes that the importance of family ties is indicated by the existence in Pashtu of more than seventy kinship terms running to such detailed specifications as "daughter's husband's father's brother." Spain, op. cit., p. 138.

malik, and the most important among the maliks of a tribe is referred to as the leading malik.

Their tribal society is very much like the early Roman society of ancient times, in which every member of the republic was a soldier and a law-giver.[1]

The Pathans are great believers in equality among individuals and among the members of the tribe. Everyone in the Pathan society has the opportunity to rise to the leadership of the tribe. But the chief or the malik is regarded by them only as a delegate for tribal purposes, with a little authority, "but in no other respect superior to the humblest radical of them all."[2] This inordinate pride is one of the marked characteristics of the Pathans. The emphasis on equality is also reflected through one of their old customs of Vesh (the redistribution of the tribal land every thirty years), which prevented any tribesman from getting too powerful and from exploiting his neighbors.

## Pakhtunwali, or the tribal law of honor

A Pathan tribesman perhaps loves nothing better than to dispense his own justice and to redress his own wrongs. He considers the taking of revenge as his sacred duty. Since law enforcement is necessary in any society, the tribes have evolved their own code

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[1] The Pathan tribal system has been compared to various other such systems in the world. "The Pathans of the borderland," writes Pennel, "remind very much of the Scottish clans of the days of Border chivalry. Like so many mountain races they have an intense love of the country and impatience of control." T. L. Pennel, "The Tribes of Our North West Frontier," The Imperial Asiatic Quarterly Review and Colonial Record, XXX (Nos. 59, 60), 69.

[2] Oliver, op. cit., p. 10.

of honor, or Pakhtunwali, which regulates their daily life and tribal affairs.

Nanawati, melmastia, and badal are the three main elements of the Pathan code of honor. Nanawati is the law of asylum, according to which asylum must be given to all fugitives, and even to bitter enemies if they come as suppliants. According to melmastia he should show hospitality and protection to every guest. The badal imposes upon him the responsibility of wiping out insult with insult; i.e., "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." This last element in the Pathan code of honor is the main cause of feuds and vendettas which may last for generations. The root cause of most of these feuds is zar, zan, or zamin; i.e., gold (money), woman, or land. In theory, the system of the tribal law (unwritten) is complete and there is no more lawmaking. In case of doubt, however, interpretation is provided by the jirga or tribal council.

Jirga.--In the tribal areas the jirga, or assembly, settles most community business, both public and private, and interprets the tribal code of honor. A jirga varies in size depending upon the importance and urgency of the occasion. It can consist of just two or three reputable members selected by the political agent to try a case involving a tribesman and a resident of the settled districts. In matters of greater importance it may consist of all the adult male members of the tribe. A variety of controversial matters dealing with the daily life, intertribal relations, et cetera, are settled by a jirga.

Every member of the jirga has the right to put forward his point of view. The whole issue at hand is argued out in the open, but in the end the majority has its way and the decision of the jirga is considered to be the decision of the whole tribe. The decision of

the jirga is considered binding; anyone disobeying it may have his house burned down or his sheep confiscated. The sanctity which is universally accorded the jirga is indicated by the fact that hardly ever does it break up in a fight.[1]

In the past, the Pathan jirgas were the only bodies which were recognized by the British government for purposes of negotiation and treaty. This arrangement was different from the one followed in Baluchistan, where agreements made with the tribal chiefs were considered sufficient. It is an accepted fact that the agreements once entered into by a genuine tribal council are generally kept.

A lot has been written about the characteristics of the Pathans. A vast amount of literature, sometimes of unequal value, exists in the English language concerning them. The accounts of various authors differ considerably from each other, depending upon the duration of their stay on the frontier and upon the nature of their contact with the Pathans. Those officers and scholars who had the opportunity of knowing the Pathans intimately and of appreciating the odds a Pathan has to face, just to survive in his inhospitable mountains, speak very highly of them and have a sympathetic attitude toward their "vices."[2] "The mother's prayer is," writes Oliver, "that her son may grow up a successful thief; not perhaps so shocking as it seems, for it is only another form of petition for daily bread."[3] Davies too writes about the poverty of the frontier resources in the following lines:

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[1] The jirga has the power to enforce its decision through the tribal lashkar; i.e., army or police.

[2] "His Vice is sometimes by Action dignified." Oliver, op. cit., p. 225.

[3] Ibid., p. 226.

> We can never hope to solve the Frontier problem until the tribesmen are able to gain a livelihood without being forced to raid the settled districts. So long as the hungry tribesmen inhabit barren and almost waterless hills, which command open and fertile plains, so long will they resort to plundering incursions in order to obtain the necessaries of life. . . . The very fact that, from 1849 onwards the British have sought to coerce the inhabitants of Waziristan by means of blockades proves that the country is not self-supporting, and that the tribesmen are soon faced with the grim spectre of starvation. When writers describe the Pathan as having the lawlessness of centuries in his blood, what they really mean is that he has been forced by his environment to play this role in the drama of life. Environment has definitely shaped the national character of the frontier tribesmen. It has produced a race of men who are the most expert guerilla fighters in the world: it has made them hardy mountaineers, . . . it has developed in them a freedom born of their windswept mountain sides. . . .[1]

A word of explanation is also needed concerning the various unfavorable epithets used by certain authors about the Pathans. They have been referred to as treacherous, cold-blooded, and murderers, et cetera. It would be but fair to admit that some of these epithets can be applied to certain individuals among the Pathans, but it would be wrong to apply them to the whole body. Most of these epithets were the result of bitter feelings which arose because Pathan tribes resisted any foreign interference in their territory. It can be said in favor of the British that the interference on their part was probably motivated by strategic considerations rather than through their greed for territory. Whatever the motive, this interference bred among the Pathans the feelings of mistrust and hatred toward the British. These hostile feelings combined with the poverty of their country led to a series of raids in the administered districts. Since feuds and wars do not always bring forth what is best in the human

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[1] Davies, op. cit., p. 179.

nature, it is quite possible that the Pathans gave the impression of being treacherous and coldblooded murderers. It is interesting to quote here a paragraph by John Morley, quoted by C. F. Andrew in his book on the frontier. Talking about the unnecessary interference of the British in certain areas, he says:

> First you push on your territories, where you have no business to be and where you had promised not to go; secondly your intrusion provoked resentment, and resentment means resistence. Thirdly, you instantly cry out that the people are rebellious and their act is rebellion. . . . Fourthly, you send a force to stamp out rebellion; and fifthly, having spread bloodshed, confusion, and anarchy, you declare with hands uplifted to the heavens, that moral reason forced you to stay: for if you were to leave, this territory would be left in a condition which no civilized Power could contemplate with equanimity or with composure. These are the five stages of the "Rake's Progress."[1]

Some of these stages of the "Rake's Progress" have most certainly been responsible for the "bad behavior" of the tribes in the past.

The steps taken by the Pakistan government toward the integration of these tribes will be discussed in the chapter on Pakhtunistan. Here it should suffice to say that the problems in the way of economic and other developments are many: the tribes still feud with each other, life after dusk is not quite safe among their hills even today, and they still love to kill and plunder for fun and because of necessity. The fact that there have been no raids in the plains areas for the last ten years indicates that something has been achieved in the way of economic development and that a better understanding between the people and the government has been achieved. A beginning has been made, and it seems that the circumstances were never so congenial for the development and reform as they are today.

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[1] Andrew, op. cit., p. 67.

Distribution of the Pathan tribes

The Pathans have not evolved anything in the nature of a central authority. Every tribe with its own jirga is a unit in itself and therefore it is necessary to get ourselves acquainted with some of the important tribes in this area (Fig. 11). It should be noted here that with few exceptions all these tribes are known for their excellent fighting qualities.

Yusafzais.--Between Mohmand and Chitral and west of Hazara lie the territories of Dir, Bajaur, Swat, and Bunner, which are inhabited mostly by the Yusafzai Pathans (Fig. 11). The Yusafzai Pathans formed a branch of the Khakhai branch of the Pathans, who are believed to have migrated into this area from around Kabul in the fifteenth century.[1] They were followed by the Ghoria Khel branch of the Pathans, who reached Khyber in the opening years of the sixteenth century. The Yusafzais occupied most of the area lying between the Swat and the Indus rivers after having pushed the original occupants across the Indus River. The Yusafzais finally became permanently established in this area after they defeated the Ghoria Khel, who had attempted to oust the Yusafzais. The Yusafzais and Mandnar Pathans[2] form the bulk of the population of this area. The

[1] According to Oliver, Timur's grandson established himself as ruler at Kabul in 1470 and, on finding the tribe hard to manage, took the first opportunity to entrap and slay some seventy of their headsmen, sparing the remainder on condition that the whole tribe clear out of Kabul. They did so and by stages moved to Peshawar and begged from Dilzakas the permission to occupy some land in the area. Later the Dilzakas were driven across the Indus by these new immigrants and so were the Swatis at a later date. Oliver, op. cit., p. 217.

[2] Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Yusafzais separated into two great divisions, the first known by the general name Yusafzai, and the second as Manazzai after Yusaf's nephew.

Figure 11. Pathan tribal distribution on the North-West Frontier. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 75.


PATHAN TRIBAL DISTRIBUTION
ON THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER
AFGHANISTAN
PUNJAB
KAFIRS
CHITRAL
DARD TRIBES
AKOZAI
YUSAFZAIS
BAJAUR
SWATIS
MOHMANDS
SHINWARIS
JAJIS
AFRIDIS
ORAKZAIS
BANGASH
KHOST
KHATTAKS
MAHSUDS
MARWATS
BITTANNIS
LOHANI
GANDAPUR
SHERANIS
MANDO KHEL
BIRMAL
BARWESH KHEL

Figure 11

Mandnar Pathans live mostly in the Yusafzai Plain of Peshawar, while the Yusafzais, who are now known by the names of their sections and subsections (having lost their original designation), occupy the hilly country towards the north.

The Yusafzais are believed by many to be the best specimens of their race.[1] They are known to be frugal and abstemious, yet extremely hospitable. Even the smallest village possesses its hujra, or guest house.

The Mohmands.--By the middle of the sixteenth century the three tribes of Ghoria Khel--the Daudzais, Khalils, and Mohmands--had established themselves in the plains of Peshawar after having driven the remaining Dilzaks across the Indus. Of these, the Mohmands form the most important branch. This tribe occupies territory on both sides of the Durand Line (Fig. 11).

The Mohmand tribes included in Pakistan can be divided into the Kuz (plain) Mohmands, who live south of Peshawar within the district boundaries, and the Bar (hill) Mohmands, who live among the bare stony hills that rise abruptly from the plains of the northwest between the Kabul and the Swat rivers. The country of the Mohmands is poor in resources. During dry, bad crop years the Mohmands have been forced to raid more prosperous adjoining areas. The Mohmands were constantly at strife with the British, and, according to Oliver, between 1885 and 1860 they were charged with

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[1] The Yusafzais of Bunner are particularly well known for their physical courage and hospitality. Those living in the low-lying areas of Swat Valley have a weaker physique because of an unhealthy climate.

no less than 125 outrages.[1] The Mohmands are considered to be excellent fighters.

Mohmand domestic customs are very much akin to those of the Yusafzais, but they have no hujras, "an institution which to the Pathan 'Young-blood' corresponds to the English notion of a club, the want of which, in a Pathan's opinion is to stamp a tribe as little better than savages."[2] They, however, differ from the other Pathans in that they have hereditary chiefs.

Tribes affiliated to the hill Mohmands are also located in this area. They are mostly agriculturists and are numerically insignificant. Two such clans are Dawezai and Utmanzai. The Mallagories and Safis can be included among the vassal clans.

Afridis.--Around Khyber and along the Safed Koh Range in Tirah live the Afridi tribes, who hold possession of the Kohat and the Khyber passes because of their position (Fig. 11). Afridis are classed as the bravest among the Pathans and many and varied are the legends woven around these frontier heroes. The "Afridi is perhaps the Pathan," writes Oliver, "whose manliness and manner most strongly prejudice Englishmen in his favour--with not unhandsome face, a self possessed, independent and almost courteous manner."[3] MacGregor describes him as a "fine, tall athletic highlander whose springy steps, even in traversing the dusty streets of Peshawar, at once denote his mountain origin."[4]

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[1] Oliver, op. cit., p. 149.

[2] Ibid., p. 249.

[3] Ibid., p. 183.

[4] Ibid., p. 184. Quotation from MacGregor.

Afridis are excellent fighters. Despite their interclan disputes, they were always united in their hostility toward the British. In fact, they have always opposed all efforts to curb their liberty. Although they rarely fight their neighbors, their internal feuds occupy a great part of their lives,

> . . . possibly for the same reason that an Irishman at a fair or an English navvy on Saturday, is not really happy until he has broken a head or given or received a black eye! So a feud to an Afridi is the one pleasure that makes life tolerable. It has been described, as to him the salt of life.[1]

This love of fighting caused many Afridis to enlist in the Indian Army, where they won reputations for bravery and fidelity.

There are different versions of the origin of the Afridis. Some authorities have identified them with the Apartae of Herodotus, others consider them to be of Pathan origin. Authorities like Sir Aural Stein believe, however, that there is present among the Afridis a racial element belonging to a much earlier period.

The Afridis are divided into several distinct communities. Of the eight chief khels or clans six are usually spoken of as the Khyber Afridis. One of their clans, Aka Khel, is included in the Peshawar Vale and is not included in the group mentioned above. The Adam Khels, the most numerous of any of these clans, occupy the hills between Peshawar and Kohat. These hills form a great wedge of country extending from the tribal territory almost to the banks of the Indus. This clan is often referred to as the Kohat Pass Afridis. The importance of the tribal territory occupied by the Afridis is great not only because they hold the keys to the two gateways to Pakistan, but also because their land forms the connecting link between Peshawar and Kohat.

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[1] Ibid., p. 186.

Orakzais.--Along the southern slopes of Tirah live the Orakzais. They hold the Khanki, Khurmana, and the Kirman valleys, the Samana Ridge, and parts of the Kohat district along the foothills (Fig. 11).

Although aborigines are present, the Orakzais are the major group. Only ethnically, however, are they distinct. Politically they form six main divisions, and religiously they are divided into Shiahs and Sunnis. Consequently, the British mediated many religious feuds. The Orakzais are intensely individualistic, and there seems little likelihood that they will unite them into a single fighting force.

Physically, they may not be rated as highly as the Afridis, but they are robust and wiry-looking mountaineers. The most warlike of the Orakzai tribes is the Lashkarzais. Orakzais are influenced by the mullahs and are consequently fanatical in their beliefs. They, like most of the frontier tribes, were hostile toward the British.

Bangash.--The Bangash tribe occupy a stretch of the country from the Indus along the Miranzai Valley of Kohat up the southern parts of the Kurram Valley (Fig. 11). Almost the whole of this tribe is included within the administered districts. The Bangash are essentially agriculturalists, known for their hospitality. Because of their geographical location they are the victims of the raids from the hilly country. They are good warriors.

Turis.--West of Tirah lies the Kurram Valley. In the upper part of the valley, the Turis are the most powerful tribes. The Turis themselves claim to have come from Iran. Since the pressure of migration has generally been from the west in this area, it is very likely that Turis came from Afghanistan and its vicinity.

They are believed to have pushed the Bangash tribes eastward in order to occupy the upper Kurram Valley. Turis are mostly Shiah Muslims. This factor--i.e., the fear of the Sunni majority--has been responsible for their greater cooperation with the British in the past.

The Turis are strong and hardy people. They are known for being profusely armed. They are good fighters and moss troopers. They are also democratic and are divided up into both religious and political parties. The Kurram Valley, which they occupy, forms one of the important gateways of Pakistan.

Wazirs (or Waziris).--Between the Kurram and the Gomal lies the Waziristan Agency. Except for the Kurram and Tochi valleys, Waziristan is a tangle of hills and nullahs (narrow valleys with spasmodic flow of water) and is difficult of access both from the east and the west. For administrative purposes it is divided into two sections: Northern Waziristan and Southern Waziristan. The two great Wazir tribes, the Mahsuds and Darwesh Khels, share the greater part of the country among themselves. The Dawaris are of non-Pathan origin and live in the Tochi Valley, while the Bhittanis occupy the territory stretching along the eastern border of Waziristan from Gomal to Marwat (Fig. 11).[1]

The Mahsuds live around Kaniguram in the heart of Waziristan and have a long-standing feud with the Bhittanis, whose territory is interposed between the Mahsuds and the administered districts. On all other sides they are surrounded by Darwesh Khels, who are astride the Durand Line (Fig. 11). The Mahsuds have three branches: the Bahlolzai, Shaman Khel, and Alizai. The Mahsuds and Derwesh

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[1] The Dawaris and Bhittanis are not considered as Wazir tribes.

Khels are together referred to as Waziris and are a brave and hardy people, "in their own way independent and patriotic, and in the presence of the common enemy, hardly less united than the famous Compatriots of Tell."[1] The Wazirs have long maintained their independent existence and had remained free from British control. The inaccessible nature of their country has helped preserve their independence. Most of the Waziris, like various other Pathan tribes, are nomads and move to the hills in summer and migrate to the plains in the administrative districts in winter. They probably migrated from around Birmal Hills at the close of the fourteenth century and settled down in Waziristan.

The Wazirs are excellent fighters. Every man is adept at guerrilla warfare. Their raids into the British-administered districts were a nightmare of the border administration. "The Wazirs," writes Barton, "are more fanatical, less easy to handle; they have been less accessible to British influence. Since 1852 the Indian Government has been compelled to invade their country on seventeen occasions--the operations of 1919-20 were the most desperate and costly in the history of the frontier."[2] Since the Wazir tribes are also found in Afghanistan across the Durand Line, they could not be effectively outflanked by the British.

The Wazirs are intensely democratic. The arrangement whereby the land is divided among the different sections induces a number of intertribal feuds.

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[1] Oliver, op. cit., p. 103.

[2] William Barton, India's North West Frontier (London, 1932), p. 53.

Dawaris.--In the northern part of Waziristan in the Tochi Valley live the Dawaris, believed to be of a non-Pathan origin (Fig. 11). The very word "Dawari" in Waziristan is used as a word of reproach because a Dawari is notoriously unwarlike and, therefore, an object of contempt to more warlike neighbors. They are harried by the Waziri marauders, from time to time, who have a proverb that one Waziri with a stick is equal to one hundred Dawaris. The Dawaris also have a reputation for being filthy and addicted to opium-smoking and other narcotics. Their territory is of strategic value because it is one of the routes often used in the past by invaders. The Dawaris, however, are considered to be diligent, hard-working, and patient cultivators.

Bhittanis.--On the eastern border of Waziristan, between Gomal and Marwat, live the Bhittanis, who have land in the tribal territory as well as in the administered districts (Fig. 11). Their country is poor in resources. They are good fighters and feud with the Mahsuds who pass through their territory in order to graze their cattle and herds in the plains areas in the administered districts.

Khattaks.--One of the great tribes of the settled districts is that of the Khattaks, who occupy the territory from Bannu through Kohat and along the Indus as far north as Akhora in the Peshawar district. The tribe can muster about 32,000 able-bodied men, of whom more than one-third are in the Peshawar Vale.[1] The country of the Khattaks is generally barren, mountainous, and dissected by brackish streams. Except for an occasional olive patch, the vegetation

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[1] Ibid., pp. 49-50.

is scarce. In Kohat and surrounding areas, however, salt is found in the valleys and a lot of Kattaks work as salt carriers. The Khattaks have lived in the administered districts for over eighty years, and although they have fought with their neighbors often, such activities on the whole have been on the decline. A large number of Khattaks had accepted employment in the British Indian Army and were excellent soldiers and good citizens. Besides their martial qualities the Khattaks are known for their hospitality, their dances, and pipe-playing. Their most marked peculiarity is that unlike other Pathan tribes their hereditary chiefs have great influence among them and are considered as the leaders of the people. In many cases they exercise feudal rights.

Bannuchis and Marwats.--In Bannu district dwell the Bannuchis and Marwats. The Bannuchis claim to be of Pathan origin, but they are the most "mixed and hybrid" of all border tribes. The intermarriages with the Hindus and other tribes have produced a strange mixture of people depicting a variety of color, stature, and dress. They are described by Davies as of "poor physique, cowardly, untruthful and bigoted."[1] In spite of their degraded character they make good agriculturists and prompt taxpayers. The women are known for their beauty.[2]

In the Dera Ismail Khan District, the Pathans form only one-third of the population; the rest are primarily Balochis. The important Pathan tribes north of and around the Takht-i-Sulaiman are Khasor, Baloch, Kundi, Gandapur, Mian Khel, and Babar. The Shirani tribes live on both sides of the Takht-i-Sulaiman.

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[1] Oliver, op. cit., p. 150.

[2] Davies, op. cit., p. 67.

The Kakars, Tarins, Panis, and Shiranis are important tribes living in Quetta, Harnai, Peshin, Thal Chotiali, Bori, and Zhob. These places were all included in the provinces of Baluchistan before the promulgation of the 1955 one-unit act.

Among the people who migrate to tribal areas in winter, the Powindahs are the most important. They are mostly traders and sell and exchange merchandise in the bazaars of Peshawar and the frontier. They sometimes go as far as Bombay and even Rangoon.

## The Baloch or Balochis

Except for the northern section from Gomal to Peshin, which is occupied mainly by the Pathans, the rest of the Baluchistan[1] frontier is occupied by the Baloch and the Brahui tribes. The Baloch are the biggest racial group along the Balochistan frontier, followed by the Brahuis.

The word "Baloch" means "nomad" or wanderer, and is coupled by Ibn-i-Haukal and others with the word Koch. The Balochis assert that their country was formerly Allepo and that they are descended from Mir Hamra, the son of Hazrat Imam Hussain, prophet Mohammed's son-in-law. They state that they had to fly from their homeland after Hussain, with whom they had sided, was killed at Karbala by Yazid, the second Ummiyah Khalif (A.D. 646). They first settled in Seistan and Kiram in Iran, from whence they gradually moved to Makran, Baluchistan, and the Sulaimans.[2]

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[1] For the convenience of reference, the name "Baluchistan" will be used here to denote the country formerly included in the province of Baluchistan (see Fig. 5).

[2] A. W. Hughes, The Country of Baluchistan, Its Geography, Topography, Ethnology and History (London: George Bell and Sons, 1877), p. 29.

Whatever their origin, the Baloch are believed to have taken up a position in close proximity to Makran in the seventh century A.D. Hence they gradually moved eastward, and in the fifteenth century we find them settled in Kachhi.

The Balochi people and the Baluchi language conveniently divide into an eastern group and a western group. The main difference in the dialects is the greater frequency of Persian words in the western branch. Pashtu and Brahui are other, but less important, dialects spoken in the northern districts.

The majority of the eastern Balochis live in the Sibi district (in the Tehsils of Jhatpat and Usta Mohammed and Sibi) and the tribal areas of Marri and Bugti. Small numbers are also found in Loralai, Kachi, and other districts. The main tribes comprising this group are: Bugti, Dombki, Khetran, Megasi, Mari, and Rind.[1] The Rind tribes are subdivided into four subtribes; namely, the Buledi, the Jamali, the Khosa, and the Lashari Rinds.

The western division comprises the Balochis of the western regions. The majority of them are found in Makran. They also live in Kharan, and Chagai, and are scattered in other districts in small numbers. The main tribes of this group are Cichki, Kandi, Rais, Rekhshani Rind, and Sagur.[2]

The Brahuis follow the Balochis in numbers. Their origin is controversial. They are believed by some to be of Scythian origin while others trace their origin to the valleys of the Elburz Mountains and consider them to be of the same stock as the Balochis.

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[1] Agha M. Y. Ahah, Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. II, Baluchistan (Karachi: Manager of Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1952), pp. 83-86.

[2] Ibid., p. 84.

Both the Balochis and the Brahuis have, however, been classified as Turko-Iranian in race. The majority of the Brahuis live in the Sarawan and Jhalawan divisions and are identified on this basis.

The Sarawan Brahuis are found mainly in the Sarawan district. Small numbers are found in the districts of Chagai, Quetta-Peshin, and various other districts.

The Jhallawan Brahuis are found mainly in the Jhallawan district. Small numbers are also found scattered in other Baluchistan districts along the frontier, especially in Kharan, Quetta-Peshin, Chagai, Sibi, Loralai, and Zhob. They are found along the coast of the Arabian Sea as well. The main tribes of this branch are Bizanjao, Haruni, Mamasani, Meugal, Nichari, Pandrani, Sajdi, and Zahri.[1]

The Balochis and Brahuis, like the Pathans, are organized into tribes, each having its clans, sections, and subsections. There is, however, one distinction between the two tribal systems. The Pathan tribal system is ethnic. This factor of common ancestry is considered more important than the other binding ties like a common vendetta, a common pasture, and a common inheritance. The Baloch tribal system (the Brahui and the Baloch tribal systems are very similar), on the other hand, is very much of a political institution. The common vendetta takes the place of common descent and an alien is admitted to the membership of the tribe after his participation in any blood feud which the tribe may have at hand. Such feuds, however, have decreased tremendously in the past fifty or sixty years.

Another difference between the Pathan and the Baloch tribal system is that the Pathans are intensely democratic and do not, as a rule, have hereditary chiefs. Their tribal chiefs are not absolute

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[1] Ibid.

rulers. The Balochis, on the other hand, are organized in such a way that their hereditary chiefs or tumandars wield considerable power and influence over the tribes and in some cases they even enjoy feudal rights. "The Baloch," says Oliver, "is as loyal to his chief as a Highland clansman to a McIvor."[1] The success of the Sandeman policy during the British period lay in the understanding of the Baloch tribal system. The whole tribes were thus brought under effective control by mere contacts with their chiefs. Such a policy naturally did not extend to the more northerly Pathans whose individual love of freedom makes them restless under a feudatory rule.

The Balochis, like the Pathans, are the followers of Islam but they are less fanatical. Both the Balochis and Pathans abide by a peculiar code of honor in which the most sacred duties are "to recognise as inviolable the person of one's guest, to exact an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, and to wipe out dishonor by shedding blood."[2] The Baloch method of warfare, however, differs from that of the Pathans. Although they have fought openly on many occasions, the Pathans are known better for their guerilla warfare. The Baloch on the other hand are organized expressly for offensive action and their method of fighting is a bold frontal attack. The Balochis are excellent fighters and war is looked upon by them as "the first business of a gentleman, and every Baloch is a gentleman."[3] An average Baloch is physically powerful, hardy, bold, and manly, and is described by various authors as truthful and faithful

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[1] Oliver, op. cit., p. 24.

[2] Davies, op. cit., p. 46.

[3] Oliver, op. cit., p. 24.

to trust. They are described by Holdich to be the equal of the Pathans as fighters.[1] Their bravery and gallantry won admiration of the British, who had to send expeditions against them on more than one occasion.

## Summary

In short, the main actors on the frontier stage--i.e., the Pathans and the Baloch--are men of courage and both have held their own as freemen through centuries of turmoil. "If never united, they should always be free" is a familiar saying among them. These tribesmen now are citizens of Pakistan. Pathan tribes have, however, received the greater attention of the government and of the historians in the past than the Baloch tribes. The reason lies partly in the nature of their tribal organization and partly in the fact that in the past the Pathan tribes were sympathetic towards the Kabul government against the British and were harder to control.

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[1] T. H. Holdich, India (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1905), p. 51.

# CHAPTER III

## THE MAKING OF THE FRONTIER

Before discussing the present-day problems connected with the frontier, it is necessary to glance through the pages of history to see the shifting patterns of empires between the Caspian Sea and the Bay of Bengal over the past centuries. In these patterns and in the forces which caused one empire to take the place of the other lies the secret of the vexed frontier problem of today.

The present frontier is not a chance growth but has evolved through centuries of political struggle between the empires of India and those of western and central Asia. The political events of the past hundred and fifty years which culminated in the demarcation of the western frontier and in the emergence of Afghanistan as a buffer state are comparatively recent. The struggle for western gateways to India has gone on over the many centuries preceding the British period. Instability has been the keynote of the story of this frontier, which frequently oscillated between the Indus and the Oxus.

A regular cycle can be detected in the pattern of most of the invasions from the west. Periodically a race of conquerors established themselves in the valley of the Oxus River. After a pause there was an impulse to move forward either through the passes of the Hindu Kush or by outflanking the mountains in the west where they merge into low-lying hills. During the second stage of their advance, the conquerors established themselves south of the mountains and controlled the whole of the Hindu Kush and the strategically

located city of Kabul. After a pause, there came the third stage when they marched through the passes in the western frontier towards the fertile Indus Valley and the plains of northern India beyond. Once established in India,[1] the invaders shifted the center of sovereignty to India and there was a gradual breaking away of the areas north of the Hindu Kush from the Indian section.

The waves of invaders which thus entered India from time to time became part of the body politic of the country and for some time resisted fresh invasions from the northwest. Thus empire after empire was shaped in India. However, it must be kept in mind that all invasions did not result in the establishment of new empires At intervals India was unified under a strong leadership capable of resisting the onslaught of the invasions from the west. Periodically India reversed the usual pattern of invasion by extending its boundaries far beyond the Indus Valley in an effort to find a frontier on which to rest a stable empire. In short, the northwestern[2] frontier of India, or the present western frontier of West Pakistan, has seen two kinds of forces sweeping across it; i.e., the forces of central or western Asia directed toward the occupation of the plains of India, and the Indian forces moving towards the Hindu Kush to find a more durable frontier. This cycle was repeated frequently in the period between 500 B.C., when history first raised its curtain, and A.D. 1750, which marked the last major invasion of

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[1] For convenience of reference the term "India" will be used to denote the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent prior to the partition in 1947.

[2] Pakistan's western frontier actually formed India's northwestern frontier and was popularly referred to as the "North West Frontier." At many places in this chapter Pakistan's western frontier has been referred to as the northwest frontier.

India from the west. It is interesting to study the historical events of this period and to watch the western frontier of India shift from one position to another between the Indus and the Oxus.

## Greek Invasion and the Early Indian Empires

One of the earliest recorded events of history in this area is Alexander the Great's invasion from across the frontier in 323 B.C. Starting from Macedonia eastward he conquered all the countries he passed through, including the modern Afghanistan, and advanced on India[1] through the passes in the western frontier in 323 B.C. The Beas River was the farthest limit of his advance before he set out on his return journey to Macedonia. Thus for a short time modern Iran, Afghanistan, and the greater part of West Pakistan formed part of the Macedonian Empire of Alexander, which included most of the Middle Eastern countries of today (see Fig. 12). His death in 323 B.C. led to the break-up of his empire. After a period of unrest in Europe, Seleucus, one of his generals, was able to extend his control over the greater part of his empire, including Bactria; but

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[1] "There was nothing to arrest his army between the point they had reached (south of the Hindu Kush near Kabul) and the Indus. The local chieftains had indicated their submission. All along the north side of Kabul, however, lay the hills whose inhabitants in their rock citadels, in the valleys of the Kunar, Panjkora and Swat were unschooled to recognise an overlord and as prepared to give trouble to any one who tried to incorporate them in an imperial system as their Pathan successors of the later days. But it was not Alexander's way to leave unsubdued region beside his road . . . after a few months' fighting the tribes generally had submitted to Alexander and the strong places were in his possession." E. R. Bevan, "Alexander the Great," in E. J. Rapson (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, Vol. I (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922), pp. 351-55.

Figure 12. Empire of Alexander the Great. From G. A. Smith and J. G. Bartholomew (eds.), Atlas of the Historical Geography of the Holy Lands (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), p. 4.




Figure 12

farther toward the west he found a strong India under Chandragupta Maurya which checked his advance in that direction.

About 250 B.C. Chandra Gupta's grandson, Asoka the Great, extended his rule towards the west of the Indus to include the greater part of the region of the Hindu Kush, or the modern Afghanistan, in his empire. The northwestern frontier of India then roughly corresponded to the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line (Fig. 13).

After the break-up of the Maurya Empire the Greek kingdom of Bactria was temporarily able to extend its control over northwestern India but could not long resist the pressure of the Yu-Chi[1] from the north, whose coming marked the end of the Greek rule in Bactria and northwestern India. The Yu-Chi established themselves in the Oxus Valley in the second century B.C. Their intermingling with settled city dwellers of Bactria produced the Kushans, who captured most of the Hindu Kush region and extended their control over northwestern India. The most famous of the Kushan kings, Kanishka, combined the greater part of Afghanistan and northwestern India (or West Pakistan) in his empire. The northern frontier of his empire extended to Khotan and Kashgar (see Fig. 14).

After a lapse of some six hundred years the people of India reasserted themselves. The rising of the Gupta Empire of India, which at its height had extended its northwestern frontier up to the Indus River (see Fig. 15), threatened the Kushan Empire from the south. In the north the Kushan Empire had to face a fresh wave

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[1] According to Fraser-Tytler, the Yu-Chi were not Mongols, and were possibly of the same stock as the Iranians and kin to the Kuchas of the Gobi whom Hsuan-Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim, encountered on his journey westward in the seventh century A.D. W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, a Study of Political Developments in Central Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 20-21.

Figure 13. Mauryan Empire under Asoka about 250 B.C. From R. P. Palmer (ed.), Atlas of World History (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1957), p. 118.


MAURYAN EMPIRE
under Asoka
about 250 B.C.
MILES 0 50 100 200 300
Mauryan Empire
Archaeological sites
SOGDIANA
BACTRIA
(HINDU KUSH)
(KARAKORAM MTS.)
PAROPANISADAI
GANDHARA
Taxila
ARIA
ARACHOSIA
Harappa Site
Birthplace of Gautama Buddha 563? B.C.
Kapilavastu
KOSALA
PUNDRA-VARDHANA
Patalipatra
Rajagriha
Champa
MAGADHA
VANGA
Tamralipti
AVANTI
Sanchi
Ujjain
SURASHTRA
Bharukaccha
Godavari
ANDHRA
KALINGA
Kistna
SATIYA KERALA
Kanchi
CHOLA
PANDYA
(Arabian Sea)
(Bay of Bengal)
Copyright by Rand McNally & Company. Made in U.S.A.

Figure 13

Figure 14. India about A.D. 150, showing the Kushan Empire. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 15.


KHOTAN
KUSHAN EMPIRE
KAPICA
GANDHARA
KASHMIR
MARU
SIND
WESTERN
SATRAPS
AVANTI
MAGADHA
SURASHTRA
ANDHRA
KINGDOM
KALINGA
APARA SAMUDRA
PURVA SAMUDRA
CHOLAS
CHERAS
PANDYAS
SIMHALA
INDIA c. 150 A.D.
Probable Boundaries
Kushan Empire
Western Satraps
Andhra Kingdom

Figure 14

Figure 15. The Gupta Empire at the close of the fourth century. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 19.


KASHMIR
TIBET
NEPAL
KAMARUPA
PUNDRA VARDHANA
KARNA SUVARNA
SAMATATA
YAUDHEYAS
ARJUNAYANAS
MALAVAS
ABHIRAS
SURASHTRA
MAHAKOSALA
VAKATAKA
PALLAVAS
CHOLAS
CHERAS
PANDYAS
SIMHALA
THE GUPTA EMPIRE
AT THE CLOSE OF THE
FOURTH CENTURY
Probable Boundary under Chandragupta II
Southern Campaign of Samudragupta

Figure 15

of conquest from central Asia. Ephthalites or White Huns appeared towards the north of the Oxus and after defeating the Kushans established themselves in Bactria. Their advance towards India can be followed stage by stage: a hundred years after their capture of Bactria, the Huns extended their control over the Hindu Kush and the Kabul River Valley. The next step brought them across the frontier to northwestern India, where they ruled for a brief period until the people of India rose against them in the sixth century.

## The Rise of Islam

Until the seventh century A.D., wave after wave of invaders coming from across the frontier were absorbed in the vast subcontinent of India with the passage of time. Although they may have had some cultural impact on India, little of it can now be distinguished from what is commonly regarded as Indian culture. But in the seventh century A.D. the power of Islam began its rise in Arabia to the west. The followers of Islam carried their faith in all directions. The missionary work carried out in parts of northern India (which are now included in West Pakistan) after the invasion of Debul (modern Karachi) and earlier along the frontier introduced a creed into India which, unlike others, resisted absorption into the immense Hindu body of the subcontinent. This factor, combined with the overwhelming majority of the Muslims in the northwest, ultimately led to the partition of the subcontinent into the twin states of India and Pakistan in 1947.

The rise of Islam in the seventh century did not, however, change the usual pattern or cycle of history in India and adjoining countries on the west. During the next three and a half centuries the Turkish rulers who had overpowered the Persians were themselves

dominated by the powers of Islam. By the middle of the eighth century (during the time of the Abbasids) the Turks were finally won over to the side of Islam. This meant that some of the major sources of invasions of India were now in Muslim hands.

During the ninth and tenth centuries the Muslim influence kept on increasing in Sind, Punjab, and over the territories now included in West Pakistan. But these areas were still under the control of the Hindu Rajput dynasties of India. Raja Jaipal of the Punjab was the last among the Hindu kings to extend his dominion over parts of Afghanistan. However, in the vicinity of Ghazni he came in contact with a small principality of the Yamini or Ghazni dynasty which was to have tremendous impact on the destiny of the subcontinent later on. Mahmud, the third monarch of this dynasty, was the first important Muslim invader to come from across the present western frontier of Pakistan. His twelve invasions between 1001 and 1026 carried him as far south as Kathiawar. But Mahmud only extended his empire over the Punjab. Thus, for a brief period a large section of northwestern India (now West Pakistan), Afghanistan, and Iran formed part of the empire of Mahmud Ghazni (see Fig. 16). The western frontier of his empire extended up to the Caspian Sea and included Hamadan and Isfahan. Mahmud's invasion marked the beginning of the era of the Muslim rule over India. From the eleventh century to the middle of the nineteenth century India, or parts of it (in particular the areas now included in West Pakistan), remained almost constantly in Muslim hands. During this period the Sultans of Delhi, the Mughals, and the Durranis (Afghans) ruled over India or parts of it.

Figure 16. The conquests of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna [or Ghazni]. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 25.


THE CONQUESTS OF
SULTAN MAHMUD OF GHAZNA
CASPIAN SEA
GILAN
DIHISTAN
TABARISTAN
JURJAN
RAIY (Annexed in 1029)
HAMADAN
Kazvin
Teheran
Hamadan
Kashan
KUHISTAN
ISFAHAN
Isfahan
Yezd
KHWARIZM
(Annexed after Expedition in 1017)
THE GHUZZ DESERT
Bukhara
Samarkand
TRANSOXIANA
Syr Darya
Kashgar
Aru Darya
SAGHANIYAN
TIRMIDH
KABADIAN
Balkh
KHURASAN
Meru
Sarakhs
Meshed
Nishapur
Hari Rud
R. Murghab
JUZJANAN
GHARSHISTAN
Herat
GHUR
ZABULISTAN
ZAMINDAWAR
BUST
Kandahar
R. Helmand
SISTAN
Kirman
KIRMAN
FARS
Shiraz
Bushire
PERSIAN GULF
GULF of OMAN
MUKRAN (In revolt 1029)
Kiz
ARABIAN SEA
Quetta
Mastung
Nushki
(Walishtan)
Sibi
Kalat
Khuzdar
KUSDAR
(Tributary State after Expedition of 1011)
SUMRAS
R. Indus
THAR or INDIAN DESERT
CHAUHANS
Bikaner
Jaipur
Jodhpur
Udaipur
Kabul
Ghazna
Peshawar
KASHMIR
Punch
Jhelum
R. Jhelum
R. Chenab
LAHORE
Lahore
Amritsar
Jalandhar
R. Ravi
R. Sutlej
Bhatinda
Thanesar
Multan
MULTAN
Bahawalpur

Figure 16

## The Sultanate of Delhi[1]

After Mahmud's invasion the Turkish races, whose westward advance had been checked for some time by the Arabs, resumed their march once again. This time they built up an empire extending from the borders of China to Anatolia, the area where they finally found a permanent home. Southward they beat against the defenses of the Ghazni Empire and finally were successful in acquiring control over the Hindu Kush. The next step led Mohammad of the Ghori dynasty to establish his rule over northern India and Delhi. The Ghori dynasty soon gave way to the Turkish slave dynasty[2] which marked the beginning of the era of the Sultanate of

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[1] "It is really for convenience sake," writes Powell-Price, "that we speak of the Sultanate of Delhi to distinguish the Muslim dynasties which ruled over an ever increasing portion of the whole of India from the succeeding empire of the Mughals. But though the Sultanate ruled at times over an extent of the country as large as was ever under the control of the Mughals there are differences which are important and need to be stressed. In the first place, unlike the Mughals the Sultanate of Delhi included several dynasties whose connection with each other was not that of family relationship or even race. There was the first dynasty known as the Slave dynasty because the first ruler Kutb-ud-Din Aibak was by origin a Turki Slave. This was followed by the Khilji Turks who had settled in Afghanistan, the third were also Turks, Karauna Turks, the Tughlaks. Then come the Sayyids who claimed to be of Arab descent while the 4th dynasty were the Afghan Lodis." J. C. Powell-Price, A History of India (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1955), p. 117.

[2] Kutb-ud-Din Aibk, the founder of the dynasty, was elected sultan by the amirs at the death of Muhammad Ghori, and the name of his dynasty refers to his origin as a slave. "The custom of using slaves as officials and generals was common among the rulers of the countries on the other side of the Hindu Kush. They formed corps of adherents whose loyalty could be relied on, and the name

Delhi (1206). This lasted until 1526 when Ibrahim Lodhi, the last sultan, was finally defeated by Babur of the Mogul dynasty.

The Sultanate of Delhi saw its ups and downs during the three hundred years of its power. At times the empire did not extend much beyond northern India but at its height during the reign of Mohammad Tughluq (1325-1351) it included almost the whole of India, including the Deccan. The northwestern frontier of India then lay along the trans-Indus foothills corresponding somewhat to the boundary of the administered districts of the northwest frontier province of British India (see Fig. 17).

## Invasions from Central Asia

Mention must be made here of the two major invasions which came during this period from central Asia. One was the Mongol invasion of 1212, which came during the reign of the Sultan Altutmish (1211-1236) and was headed by Genghis Khan. The other invasion was that of Tamerlane, the Barlas Turk, which came in 1398. These invasions, however, did not have any far-reaching effect. The Mongols, in spite of their control over the passes of the Hindu Kush, never seriously tried to establish an empire in India. Tamerlane's invasion, however, dealt a severe blow to the already weakened Sultanate of Delhi. After this the Sultans of Delhi ruled only over

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involved no disgrace. They were the king's servants and when they proved their worth were raised to equality and often married the ruler's daughters. The equality taught by the religion of Mohammad had much to do with the recognition of their special position. Originally recruited from captives taken in war, they were later chosen from slaves bought in the market but these too were generally the spoils of war and almost always of good stock." Ibid., p. 118.

Figure 17. The empire of Muhammad Bin Tughluq [also spelled Mohammad Tughluq] in 1335. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953).


KASHMIR
HIMALAYA MOUNTAINS (QARACHIL)
LAHORE
KALANAU
SULTAN
SARSUTI
HANSI
DELHI
Delhi
UCH
SIVASTAN
BUDAUN
OUDH
KANAUJ
Gwalior
KARA
LAKHNAUTI
BIHAR
KAMARU (KAMARUPA)
MALWA
Ujjain
GUJARAT
DEOGIR
JAJNAGAR (ORISSA)
Warangal (Sultanpur)
Gulbarga
TELINGANA
Sindabur (Goa)
DVARA SAMUDRA
MABAR
Manjarur (Mangalore)
Jurfattan (Kannanore)
Calicut
Madura
Kawlam (Quilon)
SAYLAN
THE EMPIRE OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ IN 1335
Outer Boundary
Independent Areas
Provinces thus DVARA SAMUDRA

Figure 17

petty principalities for some time, but the empire fell an easy prey to the Moghul (also spelled as Mughal) invasion from the northwest in the first quarter of the sixteenth century.

## The Mogul Period and the Frontier

Babur, the founder of the Mogul Empire, defeated the last Sultan of Delhi, Ibrahim Lkodhi, in 1526,[1] and thus established the Mogul Empire in India. Babur's advance towards India and the rise and fall of the Mogul Empire conform very well to the regular pattern of Indian history. Having been driven from his principality of Farghana by the Uzbegs, Babur marched south through the Qipchak Pass to the Ghorband Valley and after a brief struggle captured the strategically located city of Kabul and the greater part of Afghanistan. From his military base in Afghanistan he marched on India, where he founded his empire. After the establishment of the Mogul Empire in India the center of sovereignty shifted from Kabul to Delhi and the territories of the Hindu Kush merely became an outpost of the Empire of India.

By the time of the death of Babur's grandson, Akbar the Great (1603), the northwestern frontier of India extended over the Hindu Kush to include both Kabul and Kandahar. Until the end of the seventeenth century (the reign of Aurangzeb) the Moguls were able to keep their hold over Afghanistan (Fig. 18). The greater

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[1] Babur's first attack on India came in 1519 but ended in disaster chiefly owing to the shortage of supplies and adverse weather conditions. On his return to Kabul he captured Kandahar and carried out a number of expeditions against the tribesmen on the eastern frontier of his empire, whom he refers to as Afghans. He also established an alliance with them by marrying a Yusafzai lady.

Figure 18. The Mughal Empire [also spelled Mogul] at the end of the seventeenth century; i.e., during the reign of Aurangzeb. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 51.


THE
MUGHAL EMPIRE
AT THE END OF
THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Approximate Boundaries
European Settlements thus – Madras (British)
In Revolt – RAJPUTS
RAJPUTS
JATS
MARATHAS
POLYGARS
R. Indus
Panipat
Delhi
Agra
Allahabad
Patna
Chandernagore (French)
Calcutta (British)
Tributary Chiefs of Gondwana
Surat
Diu Is. (Portuguese)
Bombay (British)
Goa (Portuguese)
Calicut
Cochin (Dutch)
Pulicat (Dutch)
Madras (British)
Sadras (Dutch)
Pondicherry (French)
Tranquebar (Danish)
Negapatam (Dutch)

Figure 18

part of Afghanistan was thus included in the Indian Empire of the Moguls, and was even referred to as Lesser India. However, after the reign of Babur, the Moguls had to struggle constantly to keep their hold over Afghanistan. Thus, because of its strategic importance to India, Afghanistan continued to be a battleground for approximately two hundred years. Akbar the Great (1565-1603) unceasingly tried to regain control over Kandahar, an approach to India which outflanks the breat barrier of the Hindu Kush. Persians seized it in 1558 and Badakahshan was occupied by the Uzbegs twenty-six years later. This increased the danger to Kabul. One of the measures which Akbar took before he recaptured Kandahar was to strengthen his hold over his line of communication by subduing the tribes of the frontier. He also introduced the system of allowances to the Afridis for keeping the passes open. This system was continued by the British and is in use up to this day.

During the reigns of Jahangir (1605-1627) and Shah Jahan (1627-1659) Kandahar changed hands many times.[1] Shah Abbas of Persia captured Herat from the Uzbegs. This remained in Persian possession until seized by Abdali Afghans in 1716. Gradually the Mogul hold over their empire beyond the Hindu Kush weakened, and in 1648 the imperial troops withdrew from the Oxus Valley and retired to Kabul. This showed the weakening of the Mogul empire and opened the way for invasions from the west and the capture of the Hindu Kush. Kandahar was seized by the Persians. Efforts of Aurangzeb, the seventh Mogul emperor (during whose reign the

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[1] Under Jahangir the struggle for Herat continued. In 1622 it was captured by the Persians. In 1629 Shah Jhan took the city. He also sent an expedition to Badakhshan and his son Murad was successful in capturing both Balkh and Termez, which remained in the possession of the Moguls until 1647.

empire reached its greatest extent), to oust them from the places they had occupied failed. The frontier tribes around the Khyber rebelled during the reign of Aurangzeb and threatened whatever hold the Moguls had over the region of the Hindu Kush, or the modern Afghanistan. This rebellion was not settled until 1675. Aurangzeb's great distrust of his fellow men had led to a greater centralization of governmental responsibility during his reign. He had to fight incessantly with the Marathas, Sikhs, and various other sections of the population whom he had alienated through his religious and governmental policies. Within his lifetime the signs of decay could be detected on the edges of his empire and after his death in 1707 his weak successors were unequal to the task of holding the empire together. Between 1701, the year of Aurangzeb's death, and 1857, when the British formally took over the government of India after the mutiny, the story is one of continuous disintegration in the empire of the Moguls. Less than twenty years after Aurangzeb's death the empire had ceased to extend over the south and the Deccan, while the great nobles were setting up as independent rulers in the very heart of India itself. The stage seemed almost set for the entrance of an invader from the west.

## Nadir Shah's Invasion

The invasion of Nadir Shah of Iran[1] came in 1739 during the reign of the Mogul Emperor Mahmud Shah. As a preliminary to an

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[1] Nadir Shah at one time was a chieftain in the Persian army and was known as Nadir Quli Beg. He emerged as a leader during the struggle against the Ghilzai rulers, who had temporarily established themselves on the Persian throne on the decline of the Safavi dynasty. Nadir Shah drove out the last Chilzai ruler, Ashraf, from

attack on India, Nadir Shah captured Ghazni, Kabul, Khyber, and Peshawar, which were no longer under the Mogul jurisdiction, and thus acquired control of the important routes leading to India before he set out towards Delhi. The Mogul emperor was defeated at the battlefield of Karnal, and Nadir Shah moved to Delhi. A treaty was signed between Mahmud and Nadir Shah according to which Nadir Shah retained control of the territory laying to the north and west of the River Indus. Nadir Shah's empire fell in the face of the rise of the Durranis in Afghanistan.

Up to this point in history we find that northwestern India (present West Pakistan) withstood more invasions and saw changes of government much more frequently than did the territory beyond Delhi. It was included about as many times in the middle eastern or central Asian empires as it was in the Indian. Except for a few brief periods, India was never completely united under a single power; there were always "many Indias" in India. The western frontier of India oscillated quite frequently between the Indus and the Oxus, depending upon the state of empires in India, Persia, and central Asia. No frontier was ever demarcated before 1893, but the region of the Hindu Kush throughout its history formed a region of transition through which central Asia merged into southern Asia. After the death of Nadir Shah of Persia it emerged as the separate state of Afghanistan, whereas formerly it had formed a part of the empires of western and central Asia or India. With the foundation of Afghanistan some two hundred years ago arose the problem of

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Persia and restored Tahmasp on the throne. In 1736, however, he assumed the title of Nadir Shah and proclaimed himself king. He then set out eastward on his expedition to India.

its frontiers; and the question of its eastern frontier (Pakistan's western) turned out to be the most stubborn to solve, just as it had been in the past.

## Durrani Empire and the Rise of Afghanistan

The kingdom of Afghanistan was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah of the Sadozai family of the Abdali tribe.[1] He was elected king after his arrival in Kandahar.[2] He assumed the title of Dur-i-Durrain (meaning: the pearl of pearls) and began on the consolidation of his empire. After capturing the historical city of Kabul, he embarked on the conquest of India. His invasion of 1749 was not successful, but he attacked India again the next year and met with little resistance from the Mogul king. The Moguls surrendered the trans-Indus territories and the province of Sind to Ahmad Shah in order to save the capital. On his return to Afghanistan, he expanded his empire towards the north and northwest. By 1750 he had assumed direct control of the most of Afghanistan. He invaded India in 1756 and again in 1761.

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[1] Among the Abdalis the leading sections were the Populzais and the Barakzais, of which the most important families were the descendants of Sado and Muhammad. The descendants of these two men, the Sadozais and Muhammadzais, have been the principal actors on the Afghan stage during the past two hundred years.

[2] Formerly he served in the army of Nadir Shah of Persia, and on account of his ability as a military man he won for himself a high position. During his last days Nadir Shah, who had both Persian and Afghan officers in his army, suspected the loyalty of his Persian officers and ordered their arrest. But the information leaked out and the Persians attacked Shah's camp and murdered him. Ahmad Shah Abdali, who was very close to the Shah, had to flee to Kandahar in the face of the Persian opposition.

By 1756 the Mogul Empire had become very weak and the Marathas (Hindus) were in power over the greater part of India. It is the Marathas, therefore, who fought Ahmad Shah when he advanced towards Delhi in 1761--"the issue being then as it is today whether Hindu or Muslim should dominate India."[1] The Marathas were completely defeated and Ahmad Shah acquired control over the Punjab. In 1762 he defeated the Sikh Army at Lahore and also annexed Kashmir. Thus the Afghan Empire reached its greatest extent during Ahmad Shah's reign. The western frontier of his empire, which included most of northwestern India (modern Pakistan), lay beyond the Hindu Kush (see Fig. 19).

The empire of Ahmad Shah did not last very long, but the fact that the Afghans were the last among the invaders to establish an empire over the areas now included in Pakistan is the root cause of many a political controversy of today.[2]

The greatest contribution of Ahmad Shah Durrani to the history of Afghanistan is not the vast extent of his empire, but his giving to his people of diverse racial stocks the semblance of a nation under his strong leadership. After his death the boundaries of Afghanistan saw considerable changes from time to time under the pressures from the surrounding countries. These did not materially affect the idea of nationhood which had taken root during the reign of Ahmad Shah.

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 63.

[2] See Chapter IV: "The Pakhtunistan Question."

Figure 19. Indian Empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani, 1773. Adapted from C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 53.


INDIAN EMPIRE
OF
AHMAD SHAH DURRANI
1773
KASHMIR
AFGHAN
SUPREMACY
SIKHS
NEPAL
OUDH
BIHAR
BENGAL
MUGHAL
TERRITORY
ROHILLAS
RAJPUTS
SINDHIA
MARATHA
CONFEDERACY
HOLKAR
GAIKWAR
BHONSLA
OF
BERAR
SIND

Figure 19

## Fall of the Durranis and the Rise of the Sikhs in the Punjab

After the death of Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1773 followed a period of feuds and rivalries between the various claimants to his throne. In 1826 Dost Mohammad of the Mohammadzai family came to the throne. One of the objectives of Dost Mohammad was to regain the territories which were lost to the empire during the years of anarchy which had followed Ahmad Shah Durrani's death. Among the territories which he wanted to recover, the one in the possession of the Sikhs had first priority in his mind. This is partly because Ranjit Singh had now brought Peshawar and other trans-Indus territories up to the frontier foothills directly under his control (Fig. 20), and his power could prove a threat to Dost Mohammad's newly acquired empire. Another reason, according to Fraser-Tytler, why Dost Mohammad considered the recovery of the territory under the Sikhs so important was that it involved the liberation of his fellow countrymen from the Hindu yoke, and such a victory would enhance his own prestige as champion of Islam. Dost Mohammad sent an expedition against Ranjit Singh under his son Mohammad Akbar, who defeated the Sikhs in a fierce fight which took place in the vicinity of Peshawar.

> The Amir might have followed up his victory but he deemed it more advisable, however, to seek the intervention of Lord Auckland, newly arrived Governor-General of India, in settling the differences between himself and the Sikh ruler. Accordingly in the spring of 1836 Dost Mohammad wrote to Lord Auckland congratulating him on his assumption of office, and asking his advice on how to deal with the Sikhs. This letter opened the door to British intervention in Central Asia.[1]

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 74.

Figure 20. The Sikh territories at the end of the First Sikh War, 1846. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 65.


SIKH TERRITORIES
AT END OF
FIRST SIKH WAR 1846
Sikh Territories
Other Boundaries
Chitral
Gilgit
Skardo
KASHMIR
Kabul
Leh
Srinagar
Peshawar
Attock
Ghazni
AFGHANISTAN
Kohat
Rawalpindi
Kandahar
Kalabagh
Chilianwala
Jammu
Chamba
R. Chenab
Kangra
Dera Ismail Khan
R. Indus
R. Jhelum
Amritsar
Lahore
Jullundur
Sobraon
Aliwal
Simla
R. Ravi
Ferozeshahr
Ludhiana
Mudki
Patiala
Ambala
Quetta
Dera Ghazi Khan
Multan
PROTECTED CHIEFS
Sibi
R. Sutlej
Hardwar
Dadar
Kalat
BALUCHISTAN
BAHAWALPUR
Delhi
Shikarpur
Sukkur
Bikaner
Khairpur
Muttra
Agra
RAJPUTANA
SIND
Jaisalmer
Ajmer

Figure 20

This brings into focus the political changes which had taken place in India in the meantime.

After the death of the Mogul emperor Aurangzeb the internal dissensions as well as the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah had led to the weakening and disintegration of the Indian Empire of the Moguls. The Marathas and various states had started asserting themselves against the authority of Delhi. There seemed only two courses open at the time: first, invasions from the west and the establishment of a new empire on the ruins of the Mogul Empire; or, second, the rise of some Indian power strong enough to weld together the broken pieces of the vast Mogul Empire and to resist the attacks from the west. As far as the first course was concerned, a beginning had been made by Persians and later by the Afghans under Ahmad Shah Abdali. Could Afghanistan have succeeded in time to establish an empire in India is a question which can only be speculated on because history chose the second course. In other words, India did present a united front to the inroads from the west and thus checked the motion of the wheel of invasion which had started rolling towards India in the eighteenth century.

This unification of India was brought about in a completely different way from what was known to the subcontinent before. It was done by the British, who came by sea and not by the old oft-trodden routes across the frontier. After establishing themselves in India in the seventeenth century, the British gradually extended their territory until, by 1836, they were in possession of the greater part of the country (see Fig. 21). It was in 1836 that they heard of the clash between the Sikhs and the armies of Dost Mohammad. For about one hundred years the Indian subcontinent was unified under one ruler and formed a part of a far different kind of empire. British India, like various other Indian empires, had the power to resist

Figure 21. India in 1836. From C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 61.


TIBET
DOST MUHAMMAD
KABUL
RANJITSING
OF
LAHORE
BAHAWALPUR
NEPAL
R. Brahmaputra
RAJPUTANA
OUDH
AMIRS
SIND
BHUTAN
ASSAM
SINDHIA
OF
GWALIOR
BIHAR
REWA
BENGAL
BURMA
CUTCH
GAIKWAR
KATHIAWAR
BHONSLA
OF
NAGPUR
BERAR
NIZAM
OF
HYDERABAD
MYSORE
CEYLON
INDIA
IN
1836
Approximate Boundaries
British Territory
Cis-Sutlej States under
British protection

Figure 21

and even to turn the tide of invasion from the west. What made British India different from earlier empires was that the British Raj was founded in a novel way and it ended in an equally unprecedented fashion. The invaders and rulers did not become absorbed in India. Thus, while India was quite strong under the British, its strength was not entirely the result of the efforts of the people of India. The differences of race, religion, language, color, and technical knowledge kept the British to the end, even under the best circumstances, a people alien to the land. This circumstance added newer complications, political and cultural, to an already complex situation.

## The British Period in India and the Russian Expansion in Central Asia

The East India Company was first established in Surat in 1612 during the reign of the Mogul emperor Jahangir, but it was not until the death of Aurangzeb (1707) that the weakening of the Mogul empire gave the European companies an opportunity to compete for territorial gains. The British East India Company was in the end successful in gaining control of the Indian subcontinent. The power of the company expanded gradually over the years and was exercised for some time under the name of the Mogul emperors, who continued to rule for about a century and a half after the death of Aurangzeb over an ever-diminishing territory. In the beginning the position of the East India Company was that of a mere diwan (or vassal) of the Mogul emperor.[1] However, as it acquired more territory and power

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[1] This status persisted until 1756. Clive paid tribute for Bengal to the Emperor Shah Alam because there was danger that

over the years, many of the provisions indicating the company's subordinate position were dropped.

By 1792 the company's farthest expansion northward was Bengal. Outside Bengal their possessions were few and isolated. By the end of the century the company's authority extended up to southern Punjab in the northwest. Madras Presidency was also added to its possessions. In 1813[1] the East India Company formally asserted its claims to sovereignty, although it was not until 1825 that the name of the late Emperor Shah Alam was replaced by that of the company, and the phrase on the governor-general's seal proclaiming him as the servant of the emperor was removed. For all practical purposes, therefore, the company had become the ruler of the subcontinent by 1835, though northwestern India (now included in West Pakistan) still lay outside British jurisdiction (Fig. 21).

The final decision that the imperial rank should no longer be recognized after the death of Bahadur Shah came just nine

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the crown would take over the sovereignty if it appeared to be openly exercised. This policy was also carried out by Warren Hastings for a period. Even when the company ceased to pay tribute to the emperor the coinage was still struck in his name and the governor-general's seal bore the phrase that he was the servant of the emperor. It was also made clear by the company in 1773 that the Sepoy officers were "not . . . subjects of Britain, but aliens and natives of Hindustan." H. H. Dodwell, "Development of Sovereignty in British India," The Cambridge History of India, Vol. V (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922). Quoted from Forrest, Selections from the State Paper of the Foreign Department, p. 189.

[1] In the act renewing the company's privileges in that year the territorial acquisitions were continued under its control "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the crown of the United Kingdom etc. in and over the same." Cambridge History of India, Vol. V, p. 595. But at what moment that sovereignty came into being still remained a riddle.

months before the Mutiny of 1857. After the mutiny, India came under the direct administration of the British Crown.

## Struggle for the Frontier Begins

The events between 1835 and 1857 are of particular interest to a political geographer; during these years the British extended their control beyond the Sutlej River over northwestern India (now West Pakistan). Both commercial and imperialistic motives are said to have underlain the British advance towards the northwest; but it is interesting to note that the pattern of their advance conforms very well to that of some of the earlier empires of India and was considerably motivated by strategic considerations. Their each step forward had to be followed by another as they unconsciously probed northwestward through the plains of India to find some physical barrier which could prove a stable and durable frontier for their newly acquired empire.[1] The Hindu Kush, which had provided a stable frontier for many an empire in the past, lay not too far off when they reached the trans-Indus foothills in the middle of the nineteenth century. Whether or not to occupy Afghanistan or the region of the Hindu Kush was one of the major problems that occupied the government of India during the next century.

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[1] It should be noted here that except for her northwestern frontier India had well-defined and natural frontiers on all other sides. In fact, the mountains like the Himalayas in the north, and the sea on the remaining sides tend to make India a unit in itself, quite separate from the rest of Asia. In the east, too, the mountains along the Burma-India frontier are high, densely forested, and difficult of access. The northwest alone had a comparatively less well defined frontier and the easier passes allowed trade relations with other countries and gave access to hostile armies.

The problem itself was not a new one, but it seemed much more dynamic during the British occupation; this period ushered India into the modern age during which distances constantly shrank with the increasing speed attained by newer and improved means of communication. Therefore, events in Europe and in the countries far beyond the Indu Kush became important in determining every British advance or retreat beyond the frontier foothills.

The country which affected these policies most and made the British conscious of the strategic importance of Persia, and especially of Afghanistan to the security of their Indian Empire, was Russia. She too, like Britain, was absorbing newer territories beyond her frontiers. As the two powers absorbed kingdom after kingdom and principality after principality their frontiers came closer together, often creating considerable tension. That both powers regarded each other with suspicion cannot be doubted. The Russians considered the British as probable rivals in the central Asian trade,[1] while the British regarded every Russian advance in Asia as a possible threat to the security of their Indian Empire. The history of the nineteenth century is consequently a history of moves and countermoves on the part of Russia and Britain which finally resulted in the emergence of Afghanistan as a buffer state and in the demarcation of its frontiers. The events which led to

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[1] Many British travelers had traveled over the Middle Eastern countries up to the Caspian Sea with a view to studying the possibilities of trade with those countries and had compiled very optimistic reports. Alexander Burns, who later was sent as British envoy to Dost Mohammad's court at Kabul, was one of the travelers who had studied the possibilities of trade with the countries beyond the Indus. The Russians regarded this activity with great suspicion, because they regarded the central Asian markets as their own just share in trade.

the laying down of the frontier had their beginning early in the nineteenth century.

By the close of the eighteenth century the British had acquired control over the greater part of India and had extended their power up to the Sutlej River in the northwest. Beyond that, the Punjab, Kashmir, and the trans-Indus territory were under the direct administration of the Sikh king, Ranjit Singh.[1] Beyond the tribal hills lay Afghanistan, torn with strife and dissension following the death of Ahmad Shah Durrani.[2] Sind and Baluchistan no longer paid tribute to Afghanistan. Persia at this time was in a comparatively stable position with its frontiers extending over Georgia and Caucasus. The Uzbegs[3] had settled down as peaceful agriculturists. The Russian territory lay beond the Aral Sea and, farther away in Europe, Napoleon's power was at its zenith. This political structure will have changed considerably when it is viewed at the end of the nineteenth century. The pressures responsible for changing it made themselves felt in the very first decade of the nineteenth century.

## British and Russian rivalry in Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan

The first attempts of the British to safeguard the western gateways of India came in 1803 when they entered into an Anglo-

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[1] Ranjit Singh, who had been appointed governor of the Punjab by Zaman Shah Durrani, had become independent during the period of unrest in Afghanistan.

[2] It was divided among at least three rulers; i.e., Kabul under Dost Mohammad, Herat under the rival Sadozai ruler Kamran, and Kandahar under Kohkandil of the Mohammadzai family.

[3] See page 124.

Persian Alliance. According to this the latter agreed to check any possible French attack from the west. That these fears were not completely unfounded is attested by the peace of Tilsit signed between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander of Russia, according to which they both agreed to join forces against the British and attack India through Persia. This scheme, although it never materialized, had due effect on the British, who had hitherto been oblivious to the strategic importance of the countries adjoining their Indian Empire. It became clear to them that control of Persia, and in particular of Afghanistan, by any power hostile to Britain could prove a menace to the safety of their Indian Empire. During the next century, therefore, the efforts of the British were directed mainly towards keeping Persia and Afghanistan outside the sphere of influence of the rival powers. Complications arose on account of the faulty technique adopted to achieve that end; for it seems that for a long time the British did not understand either the people or the political thinking of the countries they were dealing with.

Struggle for Herat--Russian interest in central Asia.--The first Russian advance came from the Caucasus, the greater part of which at that time was under Persian control. Persia was defeated in an armed clash and had to agree to terms laid down in the treaty of Gulistan, signed in 1813. By this treaty Russia acquired Georgia and a part of the Caucasus. Persia was deprived of the right to keep her warships on the Caspian. Further pressure from Russia resulted in another clash between the two countries, which ended in the treaty of Turkmanchai signed in 1828, under which Russia established control south of the Caucasus. These victories resulted in increased Russian influence at the Persian court. Persia now tried to seek compensation for her lost territories through the

conquest of Herat in Afghanistan. Such a conquest by Persia would probably have been much less objectionable to the British had they been sure that Persia was undertaking it without any Russian encouragement. However, John McNeill, the British envoy in Persia, found it to be otherwise, and he wrote Lord Palmerston, the British foreign minister, that he regarded it of utmost importance to the security of India that Herat should not become available to any power which might obtain control over the counsels of the Shah. The measures the British took in this regard show their earnestness to keep Persia from gaining control of Herat. McNeill was not successful in his efforts to dissuade the Shah (who was under the influence of Count Simonich, the Tsar's envoy at his court) from undertaking the siege.[1] The siege of Herat lasted for about nine months. British Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger played a very important role in strengthening the forces of Kamran[2] and in defending Herat. In the end, however, the Shah lifted the siege and McNeill's assistant at the camp of the Shah was able to send him his final report, dated from "Near Herat, at 26 minutes past ten o'clock am on 9 September: The Shah has mounted his horse and is gone." Count Simonich, his mission having failed, returned to Russia.

This could not have been attained without direct pressure from Great Britain; with Russia at his back, the Shah could not be dissuaded from the conquest of Herat by anything short of the fear

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[1] McNeill, realizing the importance of Herat, had written to Lord Auckland to send a force with the Afghan permission to the relief of Herat. This force was headed by Eldred Pottinger, whose help proved extremely valuable during the siege.

[2] See footnote 1, page 143.

of war with England. The instructions which McNeill received from Palmerston and which were conveyed to the Shah contained just this threat. The letter is worth quoting because it shows the Foreign Minister's understanding of the strategic implications of the capture of Herat by Persia at that time and also his technique of dealing successfully with Russia:

> You are instructed to proceed to the Shah [ran the letter] and to declare to him explicitly that the British Government cannot view with indifference his project of conquering Afghanistan.
>
> That the British Government must look upon this enterprise as being wholly incompatible with the spirit and intention of the Alliance which has been established between Persia and Great Britain. That consequently if this project be persevered in, the friendly relations which up to this time have so happily subsisted between Great Britain and Persia must necessarily cease; and that Great Britain must take such steps as she may think best calculated to provide for the security of the possessions of the British Crown.[1]

This letter had its due effect and the British were successful in refusing a foothold in Herat to a rival power.

It is necessary at this point to look at the entire situation from the Russian point of view as well. The Russians regarded

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[1] Earlier McNeill had induced the Shah to accept his mediation with the ruler of Herat. But when the Shah rejected the proposals of a treaty of peace and resisted all efforts on the part of McNeill to keep him from invading Herat he broke off relations with Persia and started on his journey across Persia to the Turkistan frontier. He had not yet arrived in Tehran when he received Lord Palmerston's letter of May 21, 1838. Stoddart, McNeill's assistant, reached the Shah's camp bearing his letter on September 11, 1838, and clarified the situation in person by explaining that the British would go to war with him if he did not raise the siege of Herat. "Palmerston to McNeill, 21 May 1838," Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan (London: Printed by J. Harrison and Son, 1893), p. 114.

with great suspicion the activity of the British travelers who over the previous half-century had covered the Asian countries to the Caspian Sea and beyond and had compiled optimistic reports about central Asian trade. This is apparent from a Russian dispatch of October 20, 1838, in which a reference is made to the

> . . . indefatigable activity displayed by English travellers to spread disquiet among the people of Central Asia, and to carry agitation even into the heart of the countries bordering on our frontier whilst on our part we ask nothing but to be admitted to partake in fair competition the commercial advantages of Asia. English industry, exclusive and jealous, would deprive us entirely of the benefits which it pretends to reap alone, and would cause, if it could, the produce of our manufactories to disappear from all the markets of Central Asia: Witness the remarks of Burnes, and the tendency of English travellers who have followed his steps on the road to Bukhara, and to the very gates of Orenberg.[1]

This probably was one of the causes underlying Russian moves to gain influence at Tehran and also in Afghanistan. In their own estimation they were trying to keep the British out of central Asia, who in turn were trying to keep Russia away from India. This seems to be the main factor underlying the Anglo-Russian policy of the nineteenth century.

Relations with Afghanistan.--Reference has already been made to Dost Mohammed's letter of 1836 to Lord Auckland asking his advice in dealing with the Sikhs. Lord Auckland had answered saying that it was the policy of the British government not to interfere in the affairs of other independent states. But he admitted that he was

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[1] "Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Russian Ambassador in London, 20 October 1838," trans. from French, Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan, op. cit., p. 269.

willing to send an envoy to Dost Mohammed's court to discuss with him the possibilities of the development of the Indus Basin with a view to promote trade with the adjoining countries.

Alexander Burns, who had traveled earlier beyond the western frontier to study the possibilities of trade with other countries, was now appointed British envoy to Kabul. But before he reached Kabul in September, 1837, the nature of his mission was changed from one of commercial negotiations to one of political intelligence in view of the reports regarding the Russian influence at Tehran and the Shah's plan of the conquest of Herat. At the time of the arrival of Burns, the plans of the Shah to attack were still in abeyance, and it would seem logical that the efforts of the British government should have been spent to secure the friendship of Dost Mohammad in order to stem the tide of Russian influence. But the instructions that Burns received from Sir William Macnaughton, the foreign secretary to the Governor General of India in Council, contained no mention of Russia and emphasized only "the honour and just wishes of our old and firm ally Ranjit Singh" (who at one time was the governor of the Punjab in the service of the Afghan kings). The emphasis on the "just wishes" of the Sikh king deprived the mission of the possibilities of bargaining and thus establishing a basis of friendship with Dost Mohammad which seemed desirable in face of the danger of attack on Herat. The situation was made all the more difficult because of the arrival of the Tsar's envoy to Kabul. Dost Mohammad, however, seemed eager to win the friendship of the British. The recovery of Peshawar from the Sikhs was still Dost Mohammad's main ambition.

Realizing the strategic importance of Afghanistan and the desirability of keeping it outside the hostile Russian influence, Burns wrote to Lord Auckland discussing the different sides of the political

issue. He expressed the opinion that if steps were taken to meet Afghan wishes with regard to Peshawar, Afghan gratitude would make it easy to form a league among the Sunni Moslems of Bukhara, Kunduz, Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul, "which under British guidance would arrest the designs of Russia and Persia."[1] Burns further pointed out that the stability of the Sikh Empire depended on the person of Ranjit Singh alone, and that British intervention in the settlement of Peshawar would prevent Dost Mohammad from seeking alliance with Russia and would thus put an end to the intrigue which could prove so injurious to British interest.

The governor-general, Lord Auckland, however, insisted that Dost Mohammad should make overtures for peace and endeavor to appease the feelings of the powerful soverign whom he had offended and at the same time to "relinquish alliances with any power to the westward."[2] If he did that he could be sure of the continuance of the British good offices but not otherwise. Burns was also instructed that if Dost Mohammad "should prefer to incur all the hazards of his position rather than to accept our good offices upon the only therms which seem to be just in regard to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, your Mission will in that case solicit its dismissal and retire upon Peshawar."[3]

Burns's mission failed. However, he stayed in Kabul until April, 1838, and, when he left for India, Dost Mohammad, disappointed

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 96.

[2] "W. H. Macnaughten, Esq. to Captain Burns, January 20, 1838," Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan, op. cit., pp. 476-77.

[3] Ibid.

with the British, was trying to establish an alliance with Russia through Vichovich, the Tsar's envoy. Herat had been attacked by the Shah, and Eldered Pottinger had reported that the defense of Herat was in a deplorable state and could not last longer than the end of April. The Kandahar Sardars had also entered into alliance with the Shah. To let Burns's mission fail at such a critical time shows only the shortsightedness of the British Indian government, since by so doing they deliberately offered an opportunity for the penetration of Russian influence in Afghanistan. Ignoring all this, the British later placed all the blame on Dost Mohammad for being friendly towards Russia. His removal from the throne and replacement by another ruler became the sole British objective, which was not changed even after the seige of Herat was raised by Persia in 1838. Shah Shuja of the Sadozai family (who at one time was ousted by Dost Mohammad and was spending his days in exile in India) was chosen to replace Dost Mohammad.[1]

## The First Afghan War and the Temporary British Occupation of the Hindu Kush

The first British step towards the replacement of Dost Mohammad was a tripartite treaty with Shah Shujah and Ranjit Singh. The treaty was concerned with certain arrangements between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shujah after the latter had established himself in Kabul. No reference was made as to how he should do this. On Macnaughten's suggestion, Ranjit Singh agreed to act with the British

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[1] "Burns to Macnaughten, June 2, 1838," Correspondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan, op. cit.; quoted by Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

and to help in the restoration of Shah Shujah. The British forces designed to support Shah Shujah set out from Ferozpore in the Punjab in December, 1838, and reached Quetta in April, 1839. Here they were joined by troops from Bombay which had been raised especially for Shah Shujah. After a stay of about three months in Kandahar, the troops marched towards Kabul. Dost Mohammad sent a contingent under his brother to fight Shah Shuja, while he moved out to defend the capital. However, on finding himself surrounded by treachery, he fled to the north and crossed the Hindu Kush by the Bamian Pass. Shah Shuja was now established as the king of Afghanistan in August, 1839, after an exile of thirty years. Herat lay outside his jurisdiction.

All this seemed to have satisfied both Macnaughten and the Governor-General, who, in their own estimation, were successful in replacing a hostile ruler by a friendly one. Dost Mohammad made one more attempt later to fight the British and to regain Kabul, but finally gave himself up to the British and was sent into honorable exile in India. Macnaughten, who was now the British envoy at Kabul, wrote a letter to the authorities in India a few months later urging them to treat Dost Mohammad kindly because ". . . we ejected Dost who never offended us, in support of our policy of which he was the victim."[1]

Everything apparently worked out the way the British wanted. By 1840 the British cantonments and living quarters started taking a more permanent shape. The British were virtually masters of the country of the Hindu Kush, which had immense strategic importance, and Shah Shujah ruled only in name.

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[1] Ibid., p. 113.

The replacing of one ruler by another had not proved too difficult a task, but to maintain Shah Shuja on the throne required the constant assistance of the British troops. This and the various other factors were making the British occupation rather unpopular in Afghanistan. The British do not seem to have sensed this feeling of discontentment among the people or were too careless to attach much importance to it. Fraser-Tytler says of Macnaughten:

> One can imagine that having spent so much of his service in the province of Bengal, Macnaughten had come to think that the temperament of all Asiatics was cast in a similar mould and founded the pliant submission of the Bengali Babu with differential but implacable hostility of the Afghan chieftain.[1]

By the spring of 1841 disaffection was spreading around Kabul. The first manifestation of the desire to get rid of the foreigners occurred in November, 1841, when the rebellious chief attacked the house of Alexander Burns and massacred him and his companions. The days that followed saw the British forces blockaded in the midst of hostility on all sides. The Indian soldiers deserted the British troops. Macnaughten and various other officers were killed. According to Powell-Price, there

> . . . perished a whole brigade, horse, foot and artillery, one British battalion, three Indian battalions, four Indian cavalry regiments, six huns of horse artillery and a regiment of Shah Shujah's, with some sappers and miners, the greatest disaster which had ever befallen the Company's forces in India, due to bad leadership and political incapacity.[2]

Only a few men struggled on to the hill of Gandamak and only a prty of six mounted officers reached Fatehabad, some twelve miles

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Powell-Price, op. cit., p. 524.

from Jalalabad. "But they were weak after seven days of desperate fighting with neither sleep nor food and every man's hand was against them. Only one Dr. Brydon, got through to Jalalabad to tell the tale of Sale's Brigade."[1] And thus ended the first attempt of the British to occupy the country of the Hindu Kush. In autumn of 1842 the British forces re-entered Kabul and burnt and sacked the city of Kabul--"a wound that rankled for fifty years." Having thus restored, at least in their own estimation, the prestige of the British, they left Afghanistan and allowed Dost Mohammad to continue his interrupted reign.

## Effects of the war and the Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush

The First Afghan War is of great importance in the frontier history because it had immense and far-reaching effects on the later political events. The aftereffects of the war are summarized very well by Fraser-Tytler in the following lines:

> But as we look back on this period in the story of the Hindu Kush we can see that so great an upheaval as the First Afghan War could not pass and die down and disappear leaving no trace behind. The ripples of that most disastrous adventure spread far and wide till they infected every Afghan all along the miles of frontier from the Pamirs to the Persian desert with a suspicion and instinctive dislike of Europeans and their ways, so strong as to prevent closer contacts for many vital years to come. They spread into India and into the hearts of many a sepoy of the Bengal army, who learnt for the first time that his British masters were not invincible. And they spread far and across Asia and Europe till they echoed in St. Petersburg, where the counsellors of the Tsar advised their master that the British were pushing on towards the markets of Samrqand and

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[1] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 118.

> Tashkent and the great cities of Transoxiana, and that he had better see to it that he was not forestalled.[1]

The war and its aftereffects could have been avoided if the British Indian government had exercised greater patience and had not lost sight of the broader issues of its foreign policy.

The First Afghan War set a fresh Russian wave of conquest in motion in central Asia. The years between the first and second Afghan wars saw the two great powers in Asia--the British and the Russians--absorbing territories beyond their frontiers.

The British conquered the Punjab in 1849 after the death of Ranjit Singh, the respect for whose "honour and just wishes" had made any political bargain with Afghanistan so difficult just a few years before. Thus they came to inherit by right of conquest all the territory which at one time had belonged to the Sikh king. This included the trans-Indus territories (Fig. 20), with some tribal populations as well. Earlier in 1843 they had occupied the province of Sind. These conquests can hardly be justified on any but strategic considerations. The smaller states lying beyond the British empire could prove a source of weakness in case of a major attack from the west. This, and the urge to find some natural or man-made barrier on which to base a more permanent frontier, compelled them to move forward until they reached the frontier foothills after the conquest of the Punjab, and there they halted for some time. In time the British came to realize, like many a ruler before them had, that the Hindu Kush was the key to the defense of India and on its ridges alone could a stable frontier of India be based. This realization

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[1] Ibid., p. 120.

found its expression in a renewed British forward policy of the 1870's which resulted in another attempt on their part to occupy Afghanistan. This step was partly the result of the Russian advance in central Asia which had followed the First Afghan War.

In 1842 the Russian frontier still lay beyond the Sea of Aral. By 1847 the Russians had extended their control up to the lower reaches of the Sir Darya, and by 1853 they had assumed control of the whole waterway for a distance of 280 miles from its mouth. In 1854 a Russian expedition penetrated into the Valley of Ili. The Russian advance was temporarily checked by the Crimean War, but by 1863 her frontier extended along the line of the Sir Darya to Chimkent and then eastward to the south of Lake Issik-Kul and to the Tien Shan mountains. Tashkent was captured in 1865. Samarqand was taken in 1868 and was included in the Russian province of Turkistan, whose Governor Kaufman played an important political role in the central Asian events of that time. In 1869 Bukhara was annexed; this brought Russian influence right up to the banks of the Oxus and in very close proximity to Afghanistan (Fig. 22).

The Russians were probably compelled to conquer newer territories for reasons similar to those which had forced the British to absorb one Indian state after another in their realm. Russia was advancing through the vastnesses of central Asia apparently to protect what she had already acquired. Since there was no formidable power and no physical feature strong enough to arrest her forward movement, she too was unconsciously advancing towards the barrier of the Hindu Kush.

Figure 22. Russian and British advance during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries towards the Hindu Kush. Modified from W. K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, a Study in Political Developments in Central Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 128.


CASPIAN SEA
RUSSIAN ADVANCE
PERSIA
HINDU KUSH
KASHMIR
AFGHANISTAN
PUNJAB
1856
TIBET
1825
NEPAL
SIND
RAJPUTANA
1792
BENGAL
ARABIA
CENTRAL INDIA
CENTRAL PROVINCES
1825
ARABIAN SEA
1856
HYDERABAD
1825
BAY OF BENGAL
MADRAS
CEYLON
RUSSIAN & BRITISH ADVANCES
TOWARDS THE HINDU KUSH

Figure 22

## British Foreign Policy and the Conflicting Schools of Thought

In the years following the First Afghan War, the question of political strategy regarding the frontier formed an important part of the election campaigns and party platforms in England. Heated discussions were carried on in the House of Commons regarding the possible courses the British policy could follow in Afghanistan. Two schools of thought developed and both of them marshaled their arguments in support of their views.

The extremists among the adherents of the noninterference policy advocated a British withdrawal to the Indus River. Sir James Outram, one of the exponents of the noninterference policy, wrote a lengthy memorandum dealing with the defense of India and stated that "the natural and impregnable frontier of our Empire is the Indus."[1]

The other school of thought favored a forward policy and advocated an advance to Quetta if not to Herat. In his memorandum, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who was a strong exponent of the British forward policy and had served with distinction in the First Afghan War, put forth arguments in favor of a more positive policy towards Afghanistan and Persia. He regarded the Russian position on the Oxus as a threat to the security of India. Emphasizing the strategic importance of Afghanistan, he suggested that measures should be taken by the government of India to strengthen Afghanistan against any aggression from Russia with a view to safeguarding India. Some of the measures that he suggested included paying a subsidy to the Amir, military assistance, and establishment of a permanent British

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[1] Minute of February 8, 1854, quoted by ibid., p. 130.

envoy in Kabul. All these steps were suggested with a view to increasing British influence in Afghanistan and to counteracting any further Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush.

Since these opposing schools of thought made a part of the platforms of rival political parties in England, the changes of government very often meant a reversal of an existing foreign policy in India.

After the First Afghan War the British policy towards Afghanistan was one of complete noninterference in her internal affairs. This policy was later labeled as the policy of "masterly inactivity," and was probably a reaction to that of Lord Auckland's which had led to war with Afghanistan. This policy had strong adherents in Governor-General Lord Canning,[1] John Lawrence, and Captain (afterwards Lieutenant-General Sir Harry) Lumsden who had served with distinction in Sind.

The policy of nonintervention in Afghan affairs remained in effect until 1875 or until the end of Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty. It gave Dost Mohammad an opportunity to consolidate his empire and to conquer Herat. When he died in 1863, the succession passed on to his youngest son Sher Ali, whom he had himself nominated as his heir. It was not until 1868, however, that Sher Ali was able to establish himself on the Kabul throne after subduing his rival brothers.[2]

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[1] Lord Canning set forth his views regarding the British policy in Afghanistan in his Minute in 1857. He emphasized that under no circumstances which he could then foresee should the British government interfere with the internal policy of Afghanistan and should never attempt to send any troops in that country except with the permission of the Afghan government.

[2] During the period of rivalry that followed the death of Dost Mohammad, the British government did not interfere at all in Afghan

By this time Russia had occupied Bukhara and was pushing her frontiers even farther ahead. In 1873 the Khan of Khiva was reduced to vassalage, so that only Merv and Oxus separated Russia from Afghanistan. This Russian advance formed a subject of negotiations between Russia and England in 1873 and resulted in an agreement according to which Russia agreed to respect the northern frontiers of Afghanistan.[1]

Sher Ali was much disturbed by the fresh Russian advance in central Asia which had brought Russian influence to the doors of his country. He sent an emissary to the viceroy, Lord Northbrook, to discuss with him the political situation and to ask for a definite statement of British policy in case of an invasion of Afghanistan by an outside power. The emissary was told that Russia had agreed to respect the northern frontier of Afghanistan according to the agreement of 1873 and that therefore the British government did not anticipate any attack on Afghanistan from that direction. On the insistance of Afghanistan that the British give a definite statement of policy, in case an attack did come in spite of all the Russian promises to the contrary, the British clearly evaded the question. Lord Northbrook was advised by the British Secretary of State to tell the Amir "that the question is . . . of such importance that the discussion of it should be posponed to a later opportunity."[2] This was a very

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affairs. But when Sher Ali finally established himself as the ruler, the government of India showed its readiness to recognize him and enter into a treaty of friendship.

[1]It should be noted here that the northern frontier of Afghanistan was not too well defined at that time. It was agreed as a result of the negotiations that the Oxus should serve as the northern frontier of Afghanistan, but the section between the Oxus and the Hari Rud was rather vaguely defined in the agreement.

[2]Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 135.

weak statement in view of the fact that the British would have been forced to repel any invasion of Afghanistan by a hostile power, out of considerations of defense of their own empire. This reply led to Sher Ali's estrangement from the government of India, for it can be understood that sitting in Kabul he could not easily disregard the possibility of an invasion from across the Oxus.

## The Forward Policy and the Second Afghan War

In 1874 the British cabinet which had supported the nonintervention policy in Afghanistan was replaced by the one headed by Disraeli, whose party advocated a forward policy. However, the nonintervention policy remained in force until 1876 or until the end of Lord Northbrook's Viceroyalty. Northbrook, in spite of the new secretary of state's insistence, advised the government against seeking the appointment of a British envoy at Kabul. Lord Northbrook was succeeded in 1876 by Lord Lytton, whose arrival marked a change in the British policy towards Afghanistan.

From the very outset, the establishment of the British officers at Herat to serve as a listening post became Lytton's main objective, for which purpose he opened up correspondence with Sher Ali. It seems that by now the British government (which had so lightly treated Sher Ali's request for a statement of their policy in case of a Russian attack from the north) was feeling the necessity of having their officers in Herat to warn against any possible Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush. The Amir, however, refused to have the British officers in his country on the plea that he could not guarantee their safety. Later the Peshawar negotiations between Sir Lewis Pally, the Viceroy's representative, and Nur Mohammad, the Amir's representative, failed. They were mainly intended to

seek through negotiations the appointment of a British minister at the Amir's court in return for a not too definite promise of help in case of an attack from Russia. The reason for the failure was Afghanistan's refusal to receive a British envoy at the court, which was the primary British condition for the continuance of good relations between India and Afghanistan.

The failure of negotiations did not immediately lead to war. A period of uncertainty followed during which a steady correspondence developed between the Amir and General Kaufman, the governor of the Russian province of Turkistan. But the political events in Europe now took a different turn and had their repercussions in Asia. In summer of 1877 war broke out between Russia and Turkey and the prospects of the future control of the straits by Russia led to an increased tension between England and Russia. England had massed her troops in Malta and war seemed imminent in 1878, but the tension subsided after the peace was signed between Russia and Turkey, and Disraeli returned to England bearing "Peace with Honour." Had Russia and England gone to war in 1878, it would have been fought in Asia too, and the fate of Afghanistan would have been solved by force of arms. Russia was quite alert to such a possibility. In 1877 she captured Khiva. In the summer of 1878 General Kaufman dispatched a mission headed by General Skobelev, with a view to discussing with the Amir the political relations between Russia and Great Britain and the bearing on Afghanistan. Sher Ali tried to stop the arrival of the mission but the matter had passed beyond his control. The Russian mission was received in the durbar (court) on July 26, 1878. By this time the danger of war between Russia and England in Europe had passed away and the arrival of the Russian mission at Kabul only gave the Indian government an opportunity to

make an effort to give India, in Lord Lytton's words, "a scientific frontier."

Lord Lytton wrote to Amir informing him that Sir Neville Chamberlain was proceeding immediately to Kabul to discuss some urgent political matters with him. On not receiving a reply until September 21, Major (afterwards Sir Louis) Cavagnari was ordered by the government of India to proceed towards Kabul with a small escort. He was refused permission to enter Afghanistan by the Afghan outpost commander at Ali Masjid. The British then decided to make forceable entry into Afghanistan. The British forces were set in motion on November 21, 1878, and thus began the Second Afghan War. Once again the British were moving towards the Hindu Kush and this time with a determination, as is apparent from Lord Lytton's official correspondence of this period, to bring the whole country under the direct control of the British. Outposts at the Oxus were to protect against any further Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush and to give India a safer and a more durable frontier.

## The Second Afghan War

The dispatch of the Russian mission had formed the subject of a correspondence between Britain and Russia and the latter had shown a willingness to withdraw her mission from Afghanistan if the British would agree to continue the earlier agreements between the two countries regarding Afghanistan. The British concurred and the mission was withdrawn on December 17, 1878.

The British forces which were dispatched in November continued their advance from Khyber, Kurram, and Quetta, and faced little opposition as they marched towards Kabul. The Amir was

left without the promised Russian support against the British. He entrusted the defense of Kabul to his son Yaqub Khan. He himself advanced towards Russia to put his case before the Tsar but was persuaded to return to his own country where he died at Mazar-i-Sharif in February, 1879.

## The Treaty of Gandamak--the British retain the strategic points

By the middle of January, 1879, negotiations for a settlement were opened with Yaqub Khan and were concluded without much difficulty by May. The principal clauses of the treaty, known as the Treaty of Gandamak, were that Afghanistan should conduct her foreign affairs according to the wishes of the British government and that the Amir should receive a permanent envoy at Kabul or elsewhere in Afghanistan as required. The British retained control of the Khyber Pass, the districts of Kurram, Pshin, and Sibi. They also agreed to pay the Amir a subsidy of 60,000 pounds per year. The British apparently seemed to have succeeded in getting what they wanted.

But many who knew the Afghans better predicted that all was not over. Their fears turned out to be right because before long the Afghan love of independence manifested itself in its usual way. On September 3, a body of mutinous Afghan soldiers attacked the mission. The mission's escort resisted, but a few hours of fighting resulted in the massacre of the entire mission and of all but a few men of the escort. Thus ended the second British attempt to control Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush.

The British forces which had not yet dissolved after the Second Afghan War were ordered once again to march to Afghanistan under General Roberts' command. They were successful in capturing

Bala Hisar on October 12, after a decisive engagement with the Afghan forces. Yaqub Khan abdicated and was removed to India. General Roberts now resumed direct control of the country and started setting the government in order. For some time the British seemed to be in complete control of the country of the Hindu Kush, but the people were not pacified. Early in December the Afghan forces collected in the Maidan Valley to regain possession of Kabul. It was with much difficulty and with the help of the troops from India that the British were successful in retaining control of Kabul, and the rest of the country. They could probably have continued to hold it if they had wanted to. The continued occupation of Afghanistan in face of the stubborn opposition from the people was not only proving embarrassing and difficult, but also a serious drain on the economy of India. Lord Lytton's government, in its anxiety to avoid the consequences of occupation suffered by Lord Auckland's government, was now looking for someone to whom they could entrust the government of Afghanistan.[1] They found such a man in Sardar Abdur Rahman Khan, son of Sher Ali's elder half-brother, Mohammad Afzal Kahn.

Amir Abdur Rahman was recognized Amir at a durbar held midway between Charikar and Kabul, and twelve days later the British forces pulled out of Afghanistan unmolested. The Amir was told that Kandahar was not included in his domain but that he was free to take Herat, which at that time was under Sher Ali's second son,

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[1] Lord Lepal Griffen was sent up in March to undertake "diplomatic and administrative superintendence of affairs and negotiations or in other words to find someone to whom charge of Kabul and surrounding country could safely be entrusted." Ibid., p. 149.

Ayub Khan.[1] The British retained control of the Khyber and Kurram, the two main approaches from India to Kabul, and later also of Quetta and Sibi,[2] as had been settled according to the Treaty of Gandamak. The Amir undertook not to have any direct dealings with any foreign country, and in turn the British government assured him "that if the Amir would follow British advice in his external relations, Her Majesty's Government would, if necessary assist him to repel unprovoked aggression." This provision brought the Afghan foreign policy under British supervision for the next forty years, or until it was revoked in 1919.

## Emergence of Afghanistan as a Buffer State and the Demarcation of the Russo-Afghan and the Indo-Afghan Frontiers

The most important event of the closing decade of the nineteenth century was the demarcation of the Russo-Afghan and Indo-Afghan (Durand Line) frontiers. More than one circumstance was responsible for the precise placing of the Afghan boundaries. The most important reason was the desire on the part of both Russia and England to avoid a direcf clash by keeping their frontiers farther apart from each other. The demarcation was spurred by the fresh Russian advance in central Asia.

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[1] For some time the British planned to transfer Herat to Persia but the negotiations did not succeed. Kandahar was entrusted to Sardar Sher Ali, a member of the Sadozai family, who accepted the British suzerainty. The idea underlying all this was that Afghanistan as a unit should not exist. Central Afghanistan was still being ruled by the British when they finally found a suitable person to be entrusted with the responsibility of ruling Afghanistan.

[2] See footnote 1, page 168.

The Second Afghan War, like the first, was followed by a renewed Russian advance towards the Hindu Kush. Russia had brought Khiva within her fold in 1873. She captured Akhal oasis in 1881 after defeating the Turkmen forces at Gok Toppe. Merv oasis alone remained outside the Russian domain. Of the three empires, only Persia had a claim to the sovereignty of Merv, although her hold was weak. In 1881 an agreement concerning the Russo-Persian boundary to Luftabad was signed which included Merv in Persia. But after a pause of three years (which was probably a reaction to the British withdrawal from Kandahar following the overthrow of the Disraeli government by Gladstone's),[1] Russia captured Merv on February 14, 1884. This renewed Russian advance brought the frontiers of Russia closer to India and closer still to Afghanistan. To the British, who saw Merv being swallowed by Russia in spite of the agreement of 1881, it became abundantly clear that the agreement of 1873 whereby Russia had promised to respect the northern boundaries of Afghanistan could also be ignored by her in the future. The British could not afford to see Herat, which lay only two hundred miles away from Merv and had immense strategic value, come

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[1] Gladstone's government had pledged to undo what Disraeli's government had achieved through their forward policy. We have already seen that Kandahar was placed under Sher Ali after the Second Afghan War. Sher Ali, however, did not survive as a ruler after an attack on his territory from the rival chief of Herat and the subsequent desertion of his troops, and was allowed to relinquish control of Kandahar and to return to India. Heated discussions were then carried out in the House of Commons in England regarding its future. Some advocated a direct control of Kandahar by the British; the others wanted the British to give up even Quetta and Sibi, which they had retained after the Treaty of Gandamak. Finally the British government decided to retain Quetta and Sibi and to hand over Kandahar to Abdur Rahman. This retreat from Herat probably slowed the Russian advance towards Merv for some time.

under Russian control. In fact, it became very clear during the last decade of the nineteenth century that both England and Russia had absorbed the maximum territory on their respective sides and that they were face to face across the Hindu Kush. Both the powers seemed desirous of avoiding a direct clash which could result through any slight advance by either power. There seemed no better way of accomplishing that than by keeping their frontiers from coming in direct contact with one another. Thus emerged the buffer state of Afghanistan. But to avoid any dispute regarding the sovereignty of Afghanistan it was necessary to define her frontiers in more precise terms than had hitherto been done and to place them on the ground wherever necessary.

## The Russo-Afghan Frontier

The joint Anglo-Russian Commission started working on the demarcation of the northern frontier of Afghanistan in 1884. The protocol embodying the final agreement was signed on July 22, 1887. The demarcation of the frontier was not an easy matter, and a number of incidents including the Russian absorption of the Panjdeh oasis (which brought her up to the banks of the Hari Rud) threatened the breakdown of negotiations, but patience and diplomacy on both sides won the day and the Russo-Afghan frontier was finally demarcated and remains unchanged to this day after the lapse of some seventy years.[1] It should suffice to say her that, according to the Anglo-

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[1] For a more detailed description of this frontier and its extension eastward from Lake Victoria to the Sarikol Range see the Introduction.

Russian Convention signed at St. Petersburg in 1907,[1] Russia agreed to accept Afghanistan as lying outside her sphere of influence. This meant that Russia could not have an direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan but could deal with her only through the British government. This arrangement remained in effect until 1919, when the Third Afghan War ended the British control of Afghan foreign affairs.

## The Durand Line or the Indo-Afghan (now Pakistan-Afghan) Frontier

The important sections of the Persian-Afghan boundary were demarcated in 1872 and 1888. The next inevitable step was the demarcation of the Indo-Afghan frontier. Negotiations regarding the boundary line were carried out between Sir Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of the government of India, and Amir Abdur Rahman. The final draft of the agreement containing the description of the boundary line and accompanied with a map was signed on November 12, 1893. The work of actual demarcation was carried out by the joint Anglo-Afghan Commission between 1894 and 1896.[2] It should be noted here, however, that the British continued their hold

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[1] These negotiations started in June, 1906, between the British ambassador, Sir Arthur Nicolson, and the Russian foreign minister, Mr. Isvolski, and were intended to place Anglo-Russian relations in regard to Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet on a firm basis. Afghanistan, Persia, and Tibet were not invited to participate in these negotiations, which caused considerable resentment on the part of Afghanistan later when the final draft of the agreement was presented her for approval.

[2] The description of this 1200-mile-long frontier starting from near Mintaka Pass to the Koh-i-Malik Siah is given in the first chapter.

on the Khyber, Kurram, Quetta, and Peshin areas which were occupied by them according to the Treaty of Gandamak.

By the agreement of November 12, 1893, signed between Sir Mortimer Durand and Abdur Rahman, both the parties agreed not to exercise interference in each other's territories lying beyond the line.[1] According to the Anglo-Russian convention of St. Petersburg (1907) the British government undertook not to annex or occupy any part of Afghanistan and not to interfere in the internal administration of the country. Thus with all her frontiers demarcated and well defined and with the assurance from both England and Russia to respect her boundaries, Afghanistan emerged as a buffer state in the first decade of the twentieth century. She proved a factor of statibility in central Asia. Her frontiers have remained unaltered to the present day.

## Defects of the Durand Line

Out of all her frontiers, the eastern and southern or the Indo-Afghan (now Pakistan-Afghan) frontier kept posing problems. The cause of this, according to Fraser-Tytler, lies in the fact that the Durand Line

> . . . was the concrete symbol of compromise the manifestation of a policy which whatever its merits, was not carried to its logical conclusion. The British in refusing to obey the law of political and strategical development by a physical occupation of the natural frontiers of India[2] had to take the consequences of such a refusal. They solved the major problem but in such a way that they set up for themselves a minor problem which has defied solution ever since.[3]

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[1] For the full text of the treaty, see Appendix II.

[2] The Hindu Kush.

[3] Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 188.

This problem was the tribal problem, which, though not a new development in the history of India, became more dynamic during the British period. The British first inherited the trans-Indus territory and a part of the tribal area in 1849 from the Sikhs after the Sikh Wars, and annexed, besides Khyber, the districts of Kurram, Peshin, and Sibi after the Second Afghan War in 1879. This brought the independent tribes officially under British jurisdiction. The Durand Line was demarcated in 1893. Except for a few adjustments, it separated the territory then under British control from that of Afghanistan and was officially regarded by both parties as a full and satisfactory settlement of all principal differences of opinion which had arisen between them in regard to the frontier.[1] But this international frontier had many strategic and ethnographic defects, which if avoided could lead to an earlier maturity of the frontier. It cannot be lost sight of, however, that the transitional nature of the whole region between the Indus and the Hindu Kush would make the attainment of a line perfectly satisfactory to both the parties almost an impossibility.

The main defect of the boundary line was that it divided many tribes into two sections, with one part under the Kabul jurisdiction and the other under the British; for instance, Birmal tract of Waziristan (which was peopled by Darwesh Khel Waziris, large numbers of whom were included in the British sphere of influence) was handed over to Afghanistan. The Durand Line also cut the Mohammand tribal area into two parts. Such an arrangement was probably based

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[1] C. U. A. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931), p. 257.

on political rather than ethnological considerations, for if the Amir had not been promised the Birmal tract it is likely that he would have refused to enter into any agreement regarding the boundary line. Barton considers the exclusion of the Kunar Valley from the British sphere of influence and the "denial of a strip of territory from Lalpura to Safed Koh which would have made possible the partial encirclement of Tirah"[1] as other strategic defects in the frontier because the "settlement [of the frontier] left our tribal area open to political penetration from Afghanistan, it made control of the storm centre of Bajaur difficult of the Mohmands still more so, it left the Afridis their bolt hole into Afghanistan, the whole frontier was open to arms traffic."[2]

With all its defects from the ethnological and strategic point of view the frontier gave Britain control of the passes in the foothills so that she was not completely dependent upon the attitude of Afghanistan for the security of her Indian Empire. To the Afghans the demarcation of the frontier meant an international guarantee for the continued existence of their country, but it also meant the end of their dreams to recover the areas which at one time (and not too remote in the past) had been included in the empire of Ahmad Shah Durrani (Fig. 19).

The tribal area which the British acquired during a century and a half's struggle was of immense strategic importance to the defense of India. The tribes, however, remained hostile towards the British till the very end. This was partly due to the fact that

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[1] Sir William Barton, India's North West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939), p. 65.

[2] Ibid.

the British for a long time did not understand the tribal people and their values and, although they did succeed in keeping the main lines of communication open through the force of arms and by the payment of subsidies, the British never succeeded in bringing the tribes under their direct administration. It has already been pointed out that these tribes had been practically independent in their mountain fastnesses throughout the centuries and owed but shadowy allegiance from time to time to India, Persia, or Afghanistan, depending upon the circumstances. Always they hated and defied any imperialistic control of their territory.

What made the British different from other rulers of India was that they were not absorbed in India. The differences of race, religion, culture, and language kept them, even under the best circumstances, a people alien to the land. In their dealings with the tribes, too, their religion proved a great disadvantage to Britain because the tribes were fanatically against a kafir ("infidel") rule and the British were unable to win them over to their side as Babur or many other Muslim kings of India had done before. It has even been argued that the independent tribes had their sympathies with Kabul. This is, however, just half the picture. The whole picture will show that not only the frontier tribes, but the entire Muslim population of India and especially of northwestern India had their sympathies with the Amir of Kabul. This is because, to the followers of Islam, their religion has often been a greater loyalty than any other binding factor. This is proved by the Khilafat movement of 1920 in which several thousand Indian Muslims emigrated into Afghanistan as a protest against the British who, along with their

allies had supported a Greek invasion of Turkey.[1] Turkey at that time still held the banner of Khilafat.

The Khilafat movement was just one manifestation of the rising nationalism in India which had its beginning towards the close of the nineteenth century and culminated in the formation of the two independent states of India and Pakistan. On the departure of the British, Pakistan came to inherit the northwestern frontier. In fact, the long years of struggle for Pakistan saw the Muslims of India and particularly of northwestern India (which, except for a hundred years of British rule, had almost constantly been in Muslim hands

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[1] "Seldom if ever can Great Britain's reputation for fair play and good faith have stood lower in Indian estimation than it did at this time." Fraser-Tytler, op. cit., p. 198. Barton describes the Khilafat movement in his own way in the following words: "Moslem India broke into angry recriminations over the vindictive peace terms the Allies sought to impose on prostrate Turkey. The Khilafat or pro-Turkish party, in alliance with Congress, raised Moslem resentment to fever pitch. . . . Another result was the hijrat movement. Thousands of misguided Moslems were led to believe that it was a crime to live any longer under British rule, responsible as it was for the downfall of the empire of Khilafat. India had become a Darulharb (abode of war), it was their religious duty to give up everything and go on pilgrimage (hijrat) to a Darul Salam (abode of peace), to a land of true believers. Those who decided to make the sacrifice moved across into Afghanistan through the Peshawar district and up the Khyber. Their example and the fanatical preaching of mullahs led thousands of Pathans from the Peshawar district to sell their lands for a song and follow the vanguard of the earlier pilgrims up the Khyber into Afghanistan. The unfortunate exiles were soon disillusioned; the Kabul government had no use for the dupes of the Indian political agitator. They had to return in the blazing heat of the summer to their own villages; many died on the way. . . . Government was exposed to a good deal of criticism for allowing the movement to develop, especially on the Frontier." Barton, op. cit., pp. 156-57. (I do not agree with Barton's translation of the word hijrat as "pilgrimage." It means only migration. Pilgrimage can only be performed by going to Mecca.)

since the eleventh century) united for a single cause--the establishment of Pakistan. At the time of partition, the tribes were given the right to choose the state they wanted to join and they decided by an overwhelming majority to join Pakistan. The formation of Pakistan has one advantage from the point of view of frontier policy which neither the British nor the Hindus could ever enjoy. That advantage is that between the rest of the population of Pakistan and the tribal areas existed a tie of common suffering over the years under the British rule, a common religion and a common pride in their achievement of Pakistan, which could not have been founded without the efforts and cooperation of the tribal population.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE PAKHTUNISTAN QUESTION

The Pakhtunistan question which concerns the formation of an independent state within the territory now included in Pakistan is closely tied to the question of the validity of the Durand Line as well. Any discussion on Pakhtunistan must, therefore, refer to the political developments which led to the formation of Pakistan and to the engagements and treaties regarding the frontier during the British period.

### Struggle for Self-determination

The opening years of the twentieth century saw the rise of nationalism in India. The Indian National Congress was founded in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. In its beginning years the Congress was the major political party in the country and its efforts were mainly directed towards securing parliamentary institutions for India and toward greater association of the Indians in the administration. In those days the Congress by no means had a specifically Hindu character, and both the Hindus and the Muslims participated in its deliberations. But with the passage of years the orthodox policy of some of the Hindu leaders like G. B. Tilak alienated the Muslim population. Signs of this tendency were apparent even in 1905, when in the Benares session of the Congress, the number of the Muslim delegates present was only seventeen out of a total

of seven hundred fifty-six. The Muslims also disliked the Congress policy of supporting the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1905, which had given greater representation to the Muslims in the eastern section because of their majority there. With a view to safeguard their rights in the prospective municipal and other elections, the Muslims of India organized a separate political party in 1909 known as the Muslim League. The League advocated separate electorates for the Hindus and the Muslims.

The Minto-Morley reforms which gave representation to the Indians in the Viceroy's Executive Council and introduced separate electorates for the Hindus and Muslims are looked upon by many as a first step toward the self-determination of the subcontinent. The Montague-Chalmsford reforms introduced in 1919 after the first world war and the Government of India Act of 1935 are milestones on India's road to independence. Some of these reforms were the result of the concerted efforts of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. The measures which the people of India adopted in order to gain the right of self-determination varied from the movements of nonviolent noncooperation to the Khilafat movement[1] and occasionally to revolts and armed violence.

However, after 1916, the year of the Lucknow pact, the struggle for independence assumed a dual character; i.e., (1) the struggle for the independence of the country, for which both the Hindus, who were in majority, and the Muslims, who constituted approximately one-fourth of the population, were both striving, and (2) the struggle on the part of the minorities and in particular the Muslims (who were the biggest minority in the country) to safeguard their political rights.

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[1] See Chapter III, pages 174-75.

This struggle for independence became more and more intense as the eve of liberation drew nearer. The estrangement between the two major communities increased too. The period between 1920 and 1940 is referred to by Dr. Ambedkar[1] as a "period of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace."[2] During this period the Congress party became almost wholly a Hindu party and the Muslim League emerged as the representative political party of the Indian Muslims. Both parties were in disagreement on a number of basic issues[3] and represented conflicting interests of the two communities. So deep indeed had the animosity grown between the two parties that when the Congress ministries resigned in 1939 as a protest against the British declaration regarding the participation of India in the second world war, the League sponsored a "day of deliverance" which was celebrated by the Muslims all over India. In 1937 the Muslim League passed its famous Lahore resolution, in which a

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[1]Dr. Ambedkar was one of the prominent politicians of India. He was the representative of the "untouchable" class in India. He served for many years as a minister of the central cabinet of India after the partition.

[2]Dr. Ambedkar gives a list of Hindu-Muslim riots which took place between 1920 and 1940. He estimates that in Cawnpur in March, 1931, between 400 and 500 persons were killed. In Bombay province between February, 1929, and April, 1938, there were 210 days of rioting causing 560 deaths and 4,500 injuries. In Bengal 35,000 women were abducted, causing thousands of casualties. The riots of 1947 were the severest of all, causing thousands of casualties. B. R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India (Bombay: Thakar and Co., Ltd., 1946), p. 152.

[3]The Congress Party was opposed to the separate electorates, whereas the Muslim League strongly advocated the separate electorates which ensured the safeguard of the rights of the Muslim minority.

separate state of Pakistan for the Muslims of India (who were in majority in the Northwest India and in the Bengal) was demanded.

Economic, religious, cultural, historical, and various other causes are said to have been responsible for the friction between the two communities. However, as the subcontinent with all its dissentions was struggling along the road to independence and partition, the frontier area also had problems with which to occupy itself.

## The Role of the Frontier

Until 1901 the Northwest Frontier Province (Fig. 5) formed a part of the Punjab. During the Curzon administration this was made a separate province. This step was presumably taken because it was felt that this strategically important area had not received the attention it deserved from the provincial government with its headquarters at Lahore. For many years, however, it had been the policy of the British government to exercise a more rigid governmental control over this area than elsewhere in the country. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Northwest Frontier Province was divided into two sections; i.e., the districts which were under the administrative control of the government and were popularly referred to as "the province," and the tribal territory, in the internal affairs of which the government did not interfere.

The reforms of 1909, and later the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1919, were not introduced in the province. If these steps were intended to keep the province secluded from the independence movements which were sweeping through the rest of the subcontinent, they did not succeed; the Indus could not be of much use as an

impenetrable barrier to the movement of ideas from beyond.[1] In their efforts to get their due share of reforms and to free themselves from foreign rule, the people of the frontier linked themselves more closely to the political movements in the rest of the country. From the present-day point of view, therefore, the separation of the province proved to be a blessing in disguise in that it helped to bind the frontier areas more closely to the rest of the subcontinent. Even the tribal areas took part in the Khilafat movement[2] and later in the noncooperation movements sponsored by the Indian National Congress. Abdul Guffar Khan organized the Khudai Khidmatgar party, which was officially linked with the Indian National Congress. This remained the most influential party in the area until a little before partition, when the Muslim League platform, which advocated the establishment of a separate state for the Muslims of India, won the overwhelming majority.

The reforms of 1919 were finally introduced in the province in 1932. The Government of India Act of 1935 was applied to it in 1937, thus making it an autonomous province like other such units in the country.

## The Eve of Partition

After 1937 the Pakistan movement became very strong. The success of the Muslim League in elections for the Central Legislative Assembly held in 1945, in which the League won every Muslim

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[1] Abdul Qaiyum, Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier (Bombay: Hind Kitab Publishers, 1945), p. 28.

[2] See footnote 1, page 175.

seat, made it quite clear that the formation of Pakistan could not be long delayed. Both the Indian National Congress and the British were reluctant and slow to accept this solution. It was decided, however, that the partition would come into force only if the provinces concerned voted for it. The Punjab and the Bengal had to be partitioned; the west Punjab and the east Bengal with their Muslim majority were included in Pakistan, while the east Punjab and the west Bengal with their Hindu majority joined India. Sind voted in favor of joining Pakistan. In Baluchistan the Shahi jirga (representing all jirgas or tribal assemblies) and the nonofficial members of the Quetta Municipality unanimously decided to join Pakistan.[1] In the Northwest Frontier from July 6 to 17, 1947, a referendum was held in face of a boycott by the Congress Ministry under a referendum commissioner, Brigadier J. B. Booth. The outcome gave an almost 99 percent decision in favor of Pakistan. Some 289,244 votes were cast in favor of joining Pakistan and 2,874 for India.[2]

No referendum was held in the tribal territory, but the tribes were told by the Viceroy that since the British were leaving, it was up to them to negotiate a new arrangement with the succeeding authority.[3] Sir George Cunningham, the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province at that time, reported in the Manchester Guardian in 1951:

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[1] V. P. Menon, Transfer of Power in India (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 388.

[2] Ibid., p. 389.

[3] [Afghanistan Information Bureau], Pakhtunistan, the Khyber Pass as the Focus of the New State of Pakhtunistan, an Important Political Development in Central Asia (London, 1949), p. 132.

> Early in November the jirgas (some of them two thousand strong) of every big tribe up and down the frontier gave me their solemn assurance, confirmed by written agreements that they wished to remain part of Pakistan and to continue the same relations as they had with the British.[1]

Also Robert Trumbull of The New York Times revealed in May, 1949, the text of a ten-line treaty signed with seals and thumb prints by scores of tribal chiefs which, according to him, read in part as follows:

> We proclaim that we are a part of Pakistan and we promise that in case of need we will to the best of our ability help Pakistan if called upon by the Pakistan Government.
>
> The Government of Pakistan will continue to bestow on us the allowances and other benefits which we are now receiving.
>
> The internal management of the tribes will remain as before.[2]

Thus, Pakistan was formed with the full approval of the people now living in the country. The people of the frontier and the tribal areas were as much the architects of their new state as any other people living in Pakistan. In fact many a politician who had seen the fanatical opposition of the Pakhtuns to any imperialistic or un-Islamic control, saw in the formation of Pakistan an answer to the age-long aspirations of the Pathans along with the Muslims of India.

As partition approached, a new development took place in the frontier politics. Afghanistan put forward a scheme for the formation of an independent state for Pathans living in Pakistan. Furthermore, Afghanistan proclaimed that she did not regard the Durand Line as the valid international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

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[1] Manchester Guardian (London), February 2, 1951.

[2] New York Times, May 22, 1949 (Report by Robert Trumbull).

Both these claims have been severely criticized on legal and moral grounds. Before we proceed to study the implications of the Afghan stand and to criticize the very foundations on which the Pakhtunistan issue has been based during the past ten years, it will be necessary to look at the whole situation purely from the point of view of Afghanistan. By so doing we will be able to discover the link between the present and the past and will find that intangible though the claims of Afghanistan may be, they are in nature neither altogether new nor completely unexpected.

Afghanistan put forward her claims for the formation of Pakhtunistan on the eve of the partition of the subcontinent. In those early and difficult years Pakistan was weak, her government was new and inexperienced, her economy was under great pressure on account of the immigration of millions of refugees from India, her army was not completely organized, and her very survival was open to question. Under such circumstances Afghanistan wasted no time in expressing her desire and support for the formation of an independent state for the Pathans on the east of the Durand Line, although the boundaries of this proposed state were not clearly defined.

Many believe that such a step was taken by Afghanistan to ensure against possible future dismemberment of Pakistan which was considered probable in the face of conflict over Kashmir and war between India and Pakistan. In that case, the Afghan claim for an independent state adjacent to her eastern frontier could have proved a step toward recovering part of a country which at one time was ruled by an Afghan king.[1] Another possible reason for this ambition

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[1] Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Afghan king, was the last among the great conquerors to come from across the frontier and to extend his empire over most of the territory which is now included in Pakistan (Fig. 19).

can be found in the location of Afghanistan, which is a land-locked country and is therefore very much dependent on Pakistan for her overseas trade.

But, however pressing the needs of Afghanistan, or however great her ambitions may be, they seem to be aimed at the sovereignty of Pakistan, which has survived and has become stronger with the passage of every year. Under such circumstances it would have been advisable for Afghanistan to give up her advocacy of Pakhtunistan. Instead, she made Pakhtunistan the main issue of her foreign policy, which has been responsible for considerable tension between the two countries.[1] This merits an examination of what Pakhtunistan means and how sound the arguments advanced in favor of this proposed state actually are. However, the advocacy of Pakhtunistan is closely linked with the question of the validity of the Durand Line.

## Question of the Validity of the Durand Line

The Durand Line was repudiated by Afghanistan when the Afghan House of Representatives asserted in July, 1949, that it recognizes "neither the imaginary Durand nor any similar line."[2] Afghanistan bases her attitude toward the frontier on two points. Firstly, that between the Durand Line and the former district boundary was interposed the tribal territory in the internal

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[1] Although unsubstantiated, it is strongly believed in various political circles that India has been secretly backing the Afghan claims in order to divert Pakistan's attention from the vital Kashmir issue.

[2] [Afghanistan Information Bureau], Pakhtunistan, p. 123.

administration of which the British government did not interfere. Therefore, the Durand Line did not become an international frontier.[1] Secondly, Afghanistan maintains that the treaties regarding the Durand Line were the treaties between the two parties; i.e., the British and the Afghan governments, and that with the withdrawal of the British from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, all the treaties regarding the boundary line have become invalid or extinct.

To answer these objections, it is necessary to see whether or not the Durand Line was regarded as the valid internationsl frontier in the past by the two parties concerned, namely the British and the Afghan governments.

## Status in the Past

The agreement regarding the demarcation of the frontier was signed in 1893 between Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan and Sir Mortimer Durand, who represented the British government. According to the treaty, both the parties pledged to respect the sovereignty of each other's state. It was agreed that

> The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond the line on the side of Afghanistan and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.[2]

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[1] Letter to the Editor by Najib Ullah, ambassador of His Majesty the King of Afghanistan, Royal Afghan Embassy, London. The Times (London), November 8, 1955.

[2] "Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.K.E., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing

In 1901 Amir Abdur Rahman's eldest son, Amir Habib Ullah, succeeded him to the Afghan throne. In 1905 a treaty was signed between Sir Louis W. Dane, representing the British Mission to Kabul, and Amir Habib Ullah, reaffirming the agreement which had existed between the British Government and Amir Abdur Rahman. In an agreement drawn on March 21, 1905, the Amir agreed that

> His said Majesty does hereby agree to this that, in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the treaty regarding internal and external affairs and the engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, Zia-ul-millat-wa-din, who has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealings or in any promise.[1]

Amir Habib Ullah was shot dead in 1919. He was succeeded by Amir Aman Ullah, who led his forces against the British in what is known as the Third Afghan War with a view to freeing his country's foreign policy from British control and to uniting his people under his leadership in war against the British. Although the war resulted in the defeat of the Afghan forces everywhere, the treaty of peace signed between the British government and Afghanistan recognized Afghanistan as a free and independent country with a right to shape

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the Govt. of India on the other part., 1893." C. U. A. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, Vol. XIII (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931), p. 256. For the full text of the treaty see Appendix II.

[1] "Treaty with Amir Habib Ullah Khan continuing the agreements which had existed between the British Government and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, 1905." Ibid., p. 282.

her own foreign policy in any way she desired.[1] According to Article V of this peace treaty (also referred to as the Treaty of Rawalpindi), which is quoted below, the Afghan government accepted the Durand Line as the valid frontier between the two countries and also consented to the demarcation of a small section of the boundary line which had been left undemarcated in 1895 on account of some disagreement regarding the location of certain points.

> The Afghan Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the late Amir. They further agree to the early demarcation by a British Commission of the undemarcated portion of the line west of the Khyber, as the British Commission may lay down. The British troops on this side will remain in their present positions until such demarcation has been effected.[2]

The Peace Treaty of 1919 did little more than open up the diplomatic relations between the two countries after the Third Afghan War. It was followed by another treaty signed between the two governments establishing friendly and commercial relations. According to this treaty both the powers agreed to "certify and respect to each with

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[1] In a letter attached to the Treaty of Peace signed at Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919, the Chief British Representative, Indo-Afghan Peace Conference, assured the Chief of Afghan representative of the complete liberty of Afghanistan in internal and external affairs. "My friend [runs the letter], if you will read the Treaty carefully, you will see that there is no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have told me that the Afghan Government are unwilling to renew the arrangement whereby the late Amir agreed to follow unreservedly the advice of the British government in regard to his external relations. I have, therefore, not pressed the matter: and no mention of it is made in the Treaty. Therefore, the said Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs." Ibid., p. 288.

[2] "Treaty of Peace between Illustrious British Government and the Independent Afghan Government. Signed at Rawalpind, August 8, 1919." Ibid., p. 287.

regard to the other, all rights of internal and external independence."[1] According to Article II of the same treaty, which is quoted below, both parties agreed to respect the Durand Line as the common boundary between the British India and Afghanistan.

> Article II: The two High Contracting Parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the Treaty concluded at Rawalpindi on the 8th August, 1919, corresponding to the 11th Ziqada, 1337 Hirja, and also the boundary west of the Khyber laid down by the British Commission in the months of August and September 1919, pursuant to the said Article, and shown on the map attached to this Treaty by a black chain line; subject only to the re-alignment set forth in Schedule 1 annexed, which has been agreed upon in order to include within the boundaries of Afghanistan the place known as Tor Kham, and the whole bed of the Kabul River between Shilman Khwala Banda and Palosai and which is shown on the said map by a red chain line. The British Government agrees that the Afghan authorities shall be permitted to draw water in reasonable quantities through a pipe which shall be provided by the British Government from Landi Khana for the use of Afghan subjects at Tor Kham, and the Government of Afghanistan agrees that British officers and tribesmen living on the British side of the boundary shall be permitted without let or hindrance to use the aforesaid portion of the Kabul River for purposes of navigation and that all existing rights of irrigation from the aforesaid portion of the river shall be continued to British subjects.[2]

Again in 1930, after the accession to the throne of King Mohammad Nadir Shah of Afghanistan, notes were exchanged between the British government and Shah Wali Khan, the Afghan minister in London. In these notes both parties reaffirmed the validity of the treaty

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[1] "Treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan Establishing Friendly and Commercial Relations, Kabul, Nov. 22, 1921," Article I. Ibid., p. 288.

[2] Ibid., Article II, pp. 288-89.

concluded at Kabul on November 22, 1921. The British note read in part as follows:

> We have agreed that it is desirable, in view of the recent accession to the Afghan throne of His Majesty King Muhammad Nadir Shah, to reaffirm the validity of the Treaty concluded at Kabul on November 22nd, 1921. . . . I accordingly have the honour to place on record that it is our understanding that these Treaties continue to have full force and effect.[1]

The Afghan reply read in part as follows:

> I have the honour, in reply, also to place on record that it is our understanding that these two Treaties continue to have full force and effect.[2]

In 1934 Afghanistan became a member of the League of Nations and later of the United Nations and thus pledged itself to respect the sovereignty of the other states. The sovereignty of the other states is linked very closely with the preservation of their frontiers which, once negotiated and laid down, cannot be denounced as can many other instruments of international agreement. They are ascertainable at any time by geographical survey, and are unalterable save by bilateral agreement or force majeure.

The demarcation of the Durand Line and all the later agreements connected with this boundary line prove that it was accepted by Afghanistan and by the British government as the valid international frontier between Afghanistan and the British India.

So far as the tribes were concerned, they were legally considered as under British jurisdiction and received allowances from

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[1] "Mr. Arthur Henderson to His Highness General Shaw Wali Khan. London, 6th May, 1930." Ibid., p. 305.

[2] "His Highness General Shah Wali Khan to Mr. Arthur Henderson. London, 6th May, 1930." Ibid.

the government of India,[1] although they were quite independent with regard to the internal management of their affairs. They were bound to the government of India through multiple treaties with regard to the protection of highways and matters of defense. The transitional nature of the whole region and the fact that the boundary line in some cases divided a single tribe into two sections led to some complications. At times no effective control of the tribes was possible without the cooperation of the governments on both sides of the border. This, to some extent, was responsible for keeping alive the interest of both countries in each other's tribal territory. It is wrong to assume, however, that these tribes were under Kabul jurisdiction before the British period. In fact, the tribes never accepted any control from Kabul in spite of their sympathies with Afghanistan against the British "kafir" (infidel) government. The tribes which live astride the Durand Line in Afghanistan have always been as

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[1] "Most food and all manufactured products are obtained [in the tribal areas] from the settled districts. The means to pay for them come chiefly through the traditional government subsidies supplied either in direct cash payments for keeping peace or through employment in the scouts or Khassadars which are tribal levies.

"The subsidies are not paid to individual tribesmen but to leading maliks of the tribes or khels, each of whom is responsible for a particular number of his people and specific geographic area. The malik distributes the money as he sees fit, and his position as receiver of the government funds is vital to his prestige. The system would seem to invite corruption and injustice, but in fact works very well. The malik is chosen to receive the subsidy because of his power and influence, which depends on the satisfaction and allegiance of his group of followers. Unless all are convinced that the use to which the money is put is just and equitable, satisfaction and allegiance rapidly disappear. So does the malik's power and influence." James W. Spain, "The Pathans of the Tribal Area," in Stanley Maron (ed.), Pakistan Society and Culture (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 148.

independent in the management of their internal affairs as the tribes on the Pakistan side and they have not evolved anything in the form of a central authority over the centuries--each tribe forms a unit in itself.

The location of the tribal territory in British India in no way affected the validity of the international frontier in question, which was proclaimed as such by both the parties concerned and served as the dividing line between the two countries for over half a century.

## The Present Status of the Durand Line

It now remains to be discussed whether or not the withdrawal of the British power from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent affected the validity of the frontier.

In spite of the complexity of international law regarding the succession of one state by another and absorption of authority, it is quite specific on the issue of the boundary lines.[1] It should suffice to say here that with regard to the treaties generally, the position of Pakistan is regarded as essentially similar to that obtaining in the case of succession in consequence of absorption (Sec. 82). The ruling of the international law regarding the boundary lines in case of succession in consequence of absorption is as follows:

> . . . According to the principle res transit cum suo onero, treaties of the extinct state concerning boundary lines, repairing

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[1] A comprehensive legal discussion on this point is included in Oppenheim's International Law in the chapter on the "Changes in the Condition of International Person." L. Oppenheim, International Law, a Treatise, Volume I, Peace (8th ed., ed. by H. Lauterpacht; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955).

> of main roads, navigation on rivers, and the like remain valid, and all rights and duties arising from such treaties of the extinct state devolve on the absorbing state.[1]

Thus, from the point of view of international law the Durand Line is still the valid frontier between the two countries concerned; i.e., Pakistan and Afghanistan. This view has also been shared by the British government on a number of occasions. Mr. Philip Noel Baker, the secretary of state for commonwealth relations, gave the following statement on June 30, 1949, regarding the status of the Durand Line after the withdrawal of the British power from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent:

> His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom have seen with regret the disagreements which there have been between the Government of Pakistan and Afghanistan about the status of the territories on the North West Frontier. It is his Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand Line is the international frontier.[2]

Sir Anthony Eden, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, declared in March, 1956, in the House of Commons that:

> The view of Her Majesty's Government which was also the view of our predecessors in office, is as follows: In 1947 Pakistan came into existence as a new sovereign, independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government regard her as having with the full consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pashtu speaking people concerned, both in the administered and non-administered areas succeeded to the exercise of powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India on the

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[1] Ibid., p. 156.

[2] Great Britain, 5 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (Commons), CDLXVI (1948-49), 1491.

> North-West Frontier of the subcontinent. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas East of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier with Afghanistan. Her Majesty's Government are confident that there is no outstanding question between Pakistan and Afghanistan which cannot be settled by peaceful means on the basis of the legal position as I have now stated it. . . .[1]

The SEATO powers also affirmed the validity of the Durand Line in March, 1956, in Article 8 of the final communique issued by the council, in which it was stated that the treaty area referred to in Articles IV and VIII of the treaty includes the area up to the Durand Line, which is the frontier of Pakistan.

## Pakhtunistan[2]

The second most important political development in the Pak-Afghan relations during the last ten years is Afghanistan's advocacy of an independent state for the Pathans or Pakhtuns of Pakistan. This proposed state is popularly referred to as Pakhtunistan. The proposal was first put forward by Afghanistan on the eve of partition. Towards the end of 1947 Najib Ullah, who was later appointed as the Afghan ambassador to London, went to Karachi to put forward his claims in front of the Pakistan government officials. His proposals were firmly rejected. The first official statement from the governor-general, M. A. Jinnah, regarding the former North West Frontier Province was made on June 30, 1948:

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[1] Ibid., DXLIX (1956), 1367.

[2] Also referred to as Pushtoonistan and Pathanistan.

> It is obvious that the Pakistan Constituent Assembly can only frame a constitution wherein the Frontier will be an autonomous unit and in which the Frontier people will be their own masters, regulating their own social cultural and educational matters besides the general administration of the Province as a unit of the Pakistan federal government like any other province or unit of Pakistan.[1]

However, during the years that followed, Pakhtunistan became the chief issue of the Afghan foreign policy, which created considerable tension between the two countries.

Pakhtunistan has meant different things at different times,[2] and the territory claimed for it has also changed considerably over the past few years. In the beginning only the tribal territory was claimed; later, however, the semiofficial Afghan publications included maps showing the whole of the former provinces of Baluchistan and the northwest frontier, approximately half the territory of West Pakistan, in Pakhtunistan (Fig. 23).

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[1] Dorothea Seelye Franck, "Pakhtunistan: Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land," Middle East Journal, Vol. 6, 1952, p. 52.

[2] This situation was very well summed up by Prime Minister Liqat Ali Khan in his statement in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in January, 1950:

> "I regret to say that we have still not been able to discover what precisely the Government of Afghanistan want and why. At first they requested that the name of the North West Frontier Province and certain areas in Baluchistan may be changed to Pushtoonistan, so that the racial identity of the inhabitants of the Province may not remain in doubt. Then they began to demand that the tribal area on this side of the international boundary known as the Durand line, should be declared a sovereign state under the name of Pushtoonistan and that North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan should be incorporated in it."

Director, Advertising Films and Publications Department, Government of Pakistan, Karachi (produced by), Prime Minister's Statement in the Constituent Assembly, January 9, 1950.

Figure 23. **Proposed Pakhtunistan state.**


PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
MILES
U.S.S.R.
CHINA
Indus R.
KASHMIR
Kabul R.
Chenab
Sutlej
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Indus R.
IRAN

Figure 23

Afghanistan, however, claims (as is indicated in the Afghan Ambassador's letter to The Times)[1] that she is not interested in the territory of Pakistan. Afghanistan asserts that her support of an independent state for the Pakhtuns or the Pathans of Pakistan is based on kinship and natural links between the people of Afghanistan and the Pakistani Pakhtuns. She also claims that racially and linguistically the Pakhtuns are different from the rest of the Pakistanis and hence form a separate nation which should have a separate independent state for itself. Afghanistan also asserts that it is the Pakistani Pathans who themselves want to form an independent state and that Afghanistan is a mere supporter of a just cause. Afghanistan further states that her support for Pakhtunistan is based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter, confirmed by the laws of the United Nations, one of the main provisions of which is "the respect for the right of the people to choose the form of government under which they will live and have the sovereign Rights of self-government restored to those who have been forceably deprived of it."[2] The validity of the Afghan assertions must be examined. As regards the race and language issue, the Afghan argument seems rather incomplete or one-sided. In Pakistan a number of racial elements can be detected. In addition to Pashto, which is the language spoken in the vicinity of a large section of the frontier, three or four different languages are spoken in the country. Similarly, in Afghanistan the greater portion of the population is composed of races other than

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[1] "First of all, I want to make it clear that Afghanistan does not want to extend its influence over Pakhtunistan nor does it seek the return of Pakhtunistan territories to Afghanistan." Afghan Ambassador's letter to The Times (London), November 8, 1955.

[2] [Afghanistan Information Bureau], Pakhtunistan, p. 123.

Pakhtuns (or Pathans). The Tajiks, Tatars, Uzbegs, Hazaras, and Kafirs are the important racial groups found in the country. Besides Pashto, which is spoken in the vicinity of the Durand Line, Persian and Turkish languages are spoken over the greater part of the country. Race or language alone can hardly serve as a criterion for nationhood in many parts of the world. There are many more links which can bind the diverse racial elements and language groups in a country and give them the semblance of a nation. Just as in Afghanistan, the people of different races and languages stand together as Afghans, so in Pakistan the various people, including the Pathans, owe allegiance to a common flag of a country which they themselves have created. The struggle for the creation of this nation has provided a bond so strong that not only does it bind the people of West Pakistan together but also provides a link between the eastern and western wings of the country which are located about a thousand miles apart and have no physical connection with each other. It is true that many passages can be quoted from writers who have described the separatist tendencies of the Pathans[1] and have predicted that they cannot be hoped to link themselves

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[1] The following quotation from Barton can serve as an example:

> "Contrast Bannu with a third of its Hindu population in flight from the terror created by the Faqir of Ipi and his followers, with the tumultuous welcome given by thousands of young Pathans a month or so earlier, to Gandhi, the little naked Faqir of the Hindu Bania caste, for which the Frontier Pathan had up to then merely a patronizing half contemptuous tolerance. Twenty thousand Pathans rent the welcome with the shouts of 'Malang baba zinda bad' (Long live our beloved Faqir). Why, one might ask, should Pathans in their thousands pay homage to this Hindu ascetic and to his Hindu colleague Pandit Jawahir Lal, Nehru? Is it not because of Gandhi's success in forcing the mighty British Empire to yield to the Congress attack? In other words, is it

permanently with prepartition India. The Pathan love of liberty is well known and has changed little over the centuries. It must be observed, however, that the writings which recorded the separatist tendencies of the Pathans belong to a period when the writers did not yet foresee the division of India and the subsequent formation of Pakistan, which if seen aright is really an answer to all that the Pathans wanted. Today they are the independent citizens of an Islamic republic and not of India.

There are a few more inconsistencies in the arguments concerning race and language. First, the areas claimed for Pakhtunistan are not inhabited by the Pathans alone. Chitral, Dir, and Swat are mainly non-Pathan areas and Baluchistan is inhabited mostly by the Balochis. This claim to non-Pathan areas suggests that the official Afghan support may be the result of a desire for an independent outlet to the sea rather than self-determination of the peoples.[1] Moreover, Afghanistan's advocacy for the formation of an independent state for the Pathans, or Pashto-speaking people within the territory of Pakistan, will be inconsistent unless it includes a similar arrangement for the Pakhtuns, or Pashto-speaking people

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not an expression of their antipathy to alien rule? The astonishing paradox is explained by the fact that Pathans want national freedom irrespective of forms of government; if the little Bania helps them by his political mysticism to break the framework of British rule in India, they will accept his alliance to that extent; no more. They would never adopt the socialism of Jawahir Lal Nehru; they would never submit to Hindu rule in India."

Sir William Barton, India's North West Frontier (London: John Murray, 1939), pp. 186-87.

[1] Middle East Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 36.

living astride the Durand Line in the Afghan territory (Fig. 9).[1] In fact, the Afghan racial argument can very well be used against her.

As regards the right of the people to choose the form of government under which they will live, it has already been pointed out that Pakistan was formed with the full consent of the people who had been striving for the achievement of a homeland for years. The tribal areas, of their own accord, joined Pakistan by giving written undertaking to the effect that they wish to be a part of Pakistan and that they want to continue the same arrangements with the Pakistan government with regard to allowances, et cetera, which they had with the British government in the past.

Although Afghanistan has given a good deal of publicity to the formation of what has been termed as Pakhtunistan Assembly in Tirah, those who have visited the frontier areas are almost completely unanimous in their views that there is no movement among the people of the frontier for the formation of an independent state and that they are quite satisfied with their present status as the citizens of Pakistan. Numerous quotations can be cited in proof of this. Several more recent observations by experts who had the opportunity of studying the frontier areas over a long period of time will be recorded here:

> As regards Pakhtunistan [says Sir Olaf Caroe, late governor of the North-West Frontier Province, who recently visited Pakistan and the frontier areas] the nearer you get to the Frontier the less it means. I did not actually go to the Khyber, but I went into Mohmand country, I went into Dir, Swat and up the Kurram and into both Waziristan Agencies and they just laughed at it. You hear a lot about it in London, quite a lot in Karachi, a certain amount in Lahore, very little in Peshawar and next to

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[1] Peter Mayne, Narrow Smile, a Journey Back to the Western Frontier (London: John Murray, 1956), pp. 155-56.

> nothing in Waziristan. The only practical effect is occasional long range sniping. A few bright characters go into spaces like Jalalabad and take a little Afghan money and then indulge in some long range sniping at some port or other, and it is not regarded seriously at all. . . . I think that this Pakhtunistan business, although it does not at present appeal to the tribes a bit--in fact they laugh at it--has a great nuisance value on the large international stage.[1]

Regarding the tribal territory, James W. Spain observes in his article on the northwest frontier of Pakistan that in a series of conversations with tribal maliks he asked each, "Who are you?" "Who is your leader?" "What is your country?" In each case, he observes,

> . . . the replies were the same. The man gave his name, his clan, tribe and the name of the leading malik or the political agent. All concluded "I am a Pakhtun." Attempts to rephrase the question were of no avail. Not until they had been asked specifically what they thought of Pakistan, Afghanistan and "Pakhtunistan" did the maliks reply in national terms. All affirmed loyalty and support to Pakistan.[2]

> The author himself travelled freely in Waziristan, Kurram, Afridi, and Mohmand territory and saw no sign of pro-"Pakhtunistan" elements or recent disturbances.[3]

Therefore, Afghanistan's advocacy of Pakhtunistan does not seem to be based purely on humanitarian considerations. This is apparent from the dual nature of Afghanistan's foreign policy toward

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[1] Sir Olaf Caroe, "The North West Frontier Revisited," address delivered by Sir Olaf Caroe to East India Association and the Overseas League, May 16, 1956, The Asian Review, LII (No. 191), 210-11.

[2] Spain, Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 32.

[3] Ibid., p. 36.

Pakistan. On the one hand Afghanistan repudiates the validity of the Durand Line and on the other it advocates the formation of an independent state stretching all along the Durand Line from Chitral to the Arabian Sea. The implications of this policy are summed up, though not too scientifically, in a pro-Pakistan pamphlet (most probably put out by the Pakistan government) in the following lines:

> Its [Afghanistan's] very effort at proving the invalidity of the Durand Line gives its whole position away. Afghanistan is an independent country, and must have clearly defined boundaries. If its eastern border is not on the Durand Line where else is it? Afghanistan cannot say that it is somewhere to the west of it, for that would result in ceding some of its own territory. Nor can it say that it is somewhere to the east of it, for that would mean annexing some of Pakistan's territory.
>
> . . . If Afghanistan is sincere in advocating Pakhtunistan only for the benefit of Pakistani Pakhtuns, it should say that the territory between the Durand Line and the river Indus should be given over to Pakhtunistan. It should actually insist on the validity of the Durand Line. But it does not do any such thing. Neither does it define the boundaries of Pakhtunistan. Why? The conclusion is again inescapable. Its real object is to grab as much of Pakistan's territory to the east of the Durand Line as possible.[1]

That, more or less, seems to be the cause underlying the Pakthunistan problem. A political geographer cannot help but observe that the Durand Line passes through a transitional geographic region. It is at best a frontier drawn by man and has many defects. The problem partly lies in the fact that, in nature, transitional zones rather than lines separate one region from another and the Durand Line has been drawn through such a zone; in fact, it divides a zone into two sections. Any attempt to remedy the ethnographic and other

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[1] [Embassy of Pakistan], Pakhtunistan Stunt (Washington, D.C.: The Embassy, 1954).

inconsistencies will not be successful without sacrificing the sovereignty or existence of one of the countries concerned.

However, this boundary line with its small defects has lasted for over sixty years and it can become more mature with the passage of years. Any attempt, other than bilateral negotiations, will most probably mark an era of unrest in this part of the world which will not necessarily end in the demarcation of another such line. In short, it can be safely maintained that whereas it is almost impossible to obtain a flawless boundary line in this region from physical, ethnolographical, or linguistic points of view, the present boundary line, if respected, can prove a factor of stability and basis of mutual cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This cooperation is, moreover, required in order to integrate successfully the tribal area in the respective states on both sides of the Durand Line which in turn will make the boundary line more mature and more effective. The process of integration has been going on for a long time, sometimes even against the wishes of the tribes. A complete integration will probably be unavoidable as the more progressive influences penetrate the area in the future. The formation of Pakistan marks a new era, in that it has been successful in encouraging and even luring the tribesmen into assuming greater responsibility in the government of the country. But these efforts will not encourage the maturity of the frontier unless such arrangements are also carried out by the Afghan government in her tribal territory. Cooperation between the two countries will in fact be the most ideal situation to work toward the tribal welfare. This will also ensure peace and progress in both countries. A brief review of the constitutional, economic, and educational progress made in the tribal areas of Pakistan will reflect the attitude of the tribes toward their

present government and will refute the assertions of the supporters of Pakhtunistan.

## Tribal Areas after Partition

### Tribes and the Pakistan Constitution

According to the Establishment of West Pakistan Act (1955), all the princely states and provinces of West Pakistan, including the tribal area of Baluchistan, the Punjab, and the North-West Frontier Province, and the states of Amb, Chitral, and Swat were integrated into the Province of West Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan, however, refers to the tribal areas of West Pakistan as "special areas" and contains provisions regarding their status and government. According to Article 104 (1) of the Constitution, the executive authority of the Province of West Pakistan extends to the special areas but no act of Parliament can be enforced there unless the governor of the province is authorized to do so by the previous approval of the president. The other sections of the same article provide that the governor may also make regulations for the peace and good government of the special area with the previous approval of the president. The president, moreover, may give the governor suitable directives from time to time. The president is also authorized to order that the whole or any part of the special areas shall cease to be a special area. Before taking such an action he must ascertain the views of the people concerned in an appropriate manner.

The administration of the special areas, although carried out by the governor of the province, is ultimately the responsibility of the president. Constitutionally the whole of the tribal area is

regarded as the integral part of Pakistan, although the tribes are given considerable amount of autonomy in the management of their affairs.

The system of local administration has changed but little since the establishment of Pakistan. The government still pays allowances to the tribal maliks and works through the jirga (tribal assembly) system. The political agents, who belong to the Central Civil Service of Pakistan, are responsible for the settlement of intertribal disputes and for matters involving the nontribesmen. It is their responsibility to supervise medical and educational services. They are also responsible for the security of the agency concerned.

## Representation for the Tribal Areas

For the first time in history, the tribal areas have been given representation in the Constituent Assembly in the country.[1] The election of the representatives of these areas, however, posed a problem which has been described by Sir Olaf Caroe as follows:

> . . . The tribal system is very much alive in the Pathan tribal belt, tremendously alive, and it is probably more organised and tightly knit than any tribal system anywhere. They have their own system of democracy which is all public and in the open. When there is opposition in Jirga the opposition will be overborne, unless it is strong enough to overbear. The whole thing is argued out and the majority opinion gets its way either by

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[1] "The Pakistan government have embarked [says Caroe] on a most interesting new venture, that of admitting tribal representative in Legislatures both at the Centre and in the West Pakistan Province. Some view this move with apprehension, but the tribesmen seem to like it and their verdict is amunga hagg ursed, we have got our rights." Sir Olaf Caroe, "A Frontier Revisited," Pakistan Quarterly, IV (No. 4, 1956), 13.

rude eloquence or by force, or threat of force if necessary but the decision as given is the decision of the whole tribe unanimously. Well now, that does not work in with the ballot box. How are you going to get these people to find their representative in Parliament? I believe the right way to do it is what was tried in Waziristan. . . . You have the Jirga in the ordinary way, the political Agent tells them they must send a member for the legislature. "Go away," he says, "and come back in an hour or two or three hours time or to-morrow and tell me who your representatives are in your own way." And this is what they did this time in Waziristan in a most orderly manner. They came back made a man stand up and said "here is our representative." . . . But ballot boxes; they distrust secrecy and do not understand them.[1]

## Withdrawal of the Regular Troops

Shortly after the partition, the government of Pakistan almost completely withdrew the British-established garrisons and regular army units from the tribal area as a gesture of good will and trust which was hailed as such by the tribes. It should be noted that about two-thirds of the British Indian army during peacetime was employed on the western frontier. Today, the defense of the frontier is entrusted to the tribes themselves. Every agency has its own military organization known as the "scouts," who are under the control of the political agent, and perform military as well as police functions. These forces are very often referred to as irregular forces and are commanded by the regular army officers of the Pakistan military forces. Large numbers of Khassadars, nonuniformed tribal levies, are also employed by the Pakistan government. Their main function is to guard the roads and highways and perform other police duties in the area. Because of the

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[1] Asian Review, Vol. LII, No. 191, pp. 211-12.

withdrawal of the regular army units the number of scouts and militia on the frontier has increased considerably.[1] The employment in the irregular troops has helped the tribes financially too and has bound them more closely with the rest of the country than ever before. Since this system requires a definite return for the money spent, it marks an advance over the system during the British period.

## Economic Progress

The tribal areas, except for the valleys where water is available, are mostly hilly, dry, and unproductive. Life on the frontier is as much a struggle between man and man as it is between man and nature. Since the partition, the tribal areas have received the special attention of the government of Pakistan. In West Pakistan, an all-around development of the tribal territory of the frontier is in effect. Many minor irrigation and land-reclamation schemes have been completed which have made large areas cultivable and productive. A scheme for reclamation of 60,000 acres of wasteland has recently been approved and a similar scheme for Kurram Agency will bring 96,000 acres of land under cultivation.[2] The new five-year national plan (1955-1960) makes provisions for an expenditure

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[1] The Kurram Militia, according to Sir Olaf Caroe, has increased to 2,000 against 1,300 during the British period. The two Waziristan militias are about 4,000 each aginst about 3,000 during the British period. Khyber Rifles and Zhob Militia have 3,000 against about 1,600. This increase in the militia was necessary because the regular troops of the Pakistan forces have been withdrawn. Caroe, Asian Review, op. cit., pp. 206-7.

[2] "Protection and Integration of the Tribal Population of Pakistan," International Labour Review, LXXXV (January, 1957), 75.

of over thirteen million rupees on thirty-five irrigation projects. The big Warsak multipurpose dam, which is being built in the Mohmand Agency for the benefit of the whole nation, will provide the tribal areas with hydroelectricity and water for irrigation. The employment of tribal labor in the construction of the dam is a good source of income in that area. Fruit farming and the cultivation of tobacco have been encouraged and the acreage under these crops has increased considerably over the past few years. Since the possibilities of extending irrigation are limited, areas have been acquired in Thal and some other newly developed territories for the settlement of the tribesmen. In fact, the program of settlement is in progress in the Thal area of the Punjab.

## Industries

Since there is little opportunity for the development of large-scale industries, the cottage industries have been encouraged.[1] With a view to promoting these industries, the Pakistan government has given scholarships and arranged for vocational training of tribesmen. Training centers have been opened at Alizai (for mazri-work), Batkhela (for woolen textile and rug making), Wana (for metal work), and Parachinar (for sericulture). The woolen textile mill at Bannu has helped to stabilize the income of the sheep breeders of the tribal areas.

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[1] See Chapter I, page 44.

## Education

Great progress has been made in the field of education. Rs. 1,433,000 were spent on education in the tribal areas during the budget year 1954-1955 as against 114,000 during 1947-1948. Some 4 million rupees were specially earmarked in 1951-1952 for the construction of school buildings.[1] Between 1947 and 1955 the number of schools increased from 65 to over 310 (including 275 primary schools) and the number of students rose from 6,000 to 25,000. Almost all higher schools have been provided with hostel facilities. In addition, 70 adult education centers have been established. Under the schemes for higher education 104 tribal students studied at the University of Peshawar during 1954 and another 39 were undergoing technical courses in medicine, economics, engineering, agriculture, rural extension, animal husbandry, wool and textile technology, et cetera, at various national institutions.[2]

Sir Olaf Caroe, who was the governor of the North-West Frontier Province during the British period and who recently visited the tribal areas, says in his article in the Pakistan Quarterly that in the establishment of the University of Peshawar and in the great expansion of higher schooling he saw perhaps the greatest advancement since 1947 and the best guarantee that the Pathans will be able to rise to the occasions that face them.[3]

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[1] International Labour Review, LXXXV (January, 1957), 75.

[2] Ibid., p. 76.

[3] Caroe, Pakistan Quarterly, op. cit., p. 66.

## Health

Rs. 1,180,000 were spent for the maintenance of the medical aid institutions. Up to 1954 Pakistan had spent a total sum of 3,240,000 rupees on the maintenance of medical institutions. In 1954 there were 65 hospitals and dispensaries in the tribal area. Out of these 6 were mobile dispensaries and 9 were private.[1]

## New Highways

At a cost of 2,300,000 rupees, 1,450 miles of existing roads were being maintained. Up to 1955, 700,000 rupees had been spent on the construction of village roads. The present five-year development program visualizes an expenditure of 13,000,000 rupees on road-building.[2] The building of roads and railroads is one of the most effective ways of integrating the tribal areas because the development of the means of communication ensures a greater contact with the rest of the country.

In short, it should suffice to say here that before the foundation of Pakistan the areas now included in West Pakistan in many respects were the underdeveloped areas in the prepartition India. Since partition, Pakistan has embarked on a program of construction and industrialization which is turning an almost completely agricultural country into one with a semi-industrial economy. The frontier areas (including the administrative districts) which were the most underdeveloped areas in the prepartition India have received

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[1] International Labour Review, LXXXV (January, 1957), 76.

[2] Ibid.

the special attention of the government of Pakistan and it has been rightly observed by many that the "problem area" of British India has become one of the model units of Pakistan.

The standard of living in the tribal areas has improved. Safety on the roads has increased tremendously; the crime rate, which is usually considered an index to the economic prosperity of the area, has shown considerable decrease since partition.[1] The tribal raids into plains areas, which were a nightmare of the British administration, have not been heard of since the formation of Pakistan. Many independent tribes have shown their willingness to join the administered areas. As early as 1952 Amb (the smallest of the original frontier states) brought 48,000 of its people under the direct administration of Pakistan. And on September 27, 1953, 35,000 Gadun tribesmen were incorporated into Pakistan.[2] The devotion of the tribes to Pakistan was also manifested by their action in Kashmir.

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[1] The number of murders dropped from 1,116 in 1947 to 627 in 1951, with corresponding decreases in other categories of crime. Spain, Middle East Journal, VIII (1954), 33.

[2] "Thirty-five thousand of the toughest fighters in Pakistan settled down to normal rural living to-day when Gadun tribesmen voluntarily became a part of the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Thus they ended a sovereignty guarded for more than 2,000 years with rifle and dagger in Himalayan mountain passes as high as 10,000 feet.

"The most significant commercial effect of the transfer of sovereignty was the end of a lucrative smuggling operation. Now the extensive crops of opium poppies will be sold directly to the Government. . . . Beginning tomorrow all they grow is to be purchased by the National Government and processed for legitimate medical sale.

"The benefits inherent in the rest of provincial life will begin for them this week. This afternoon the chief minister told them that fresh wheat seeds would be given to them,

Those who are acquainted with the history of the frontier know that the tribes cannot be kept in peace against their will or forced to live under a control they dislike. The British had a hard time in controlling the tribal territory along the frontier, but today the tribesmen themselves guard the gateways of Pakistan even when the regular troops of the Pakistan Army have been withdrawn. Had the tribesmen wanted to form a separate state for themselves, they could have risen long ago against the Pakistan government (which cannot be compared in strength to the former British government). There is hardly a visitor who has traveled in these areas without observing that the Pakhtunistan question is more the manufacture of the Afghan government than a reality. The tribes themselves are more concerned about affairs in Kashmir. All this does not mean that the frontier has ceased to be a problem area. Economically the tribal areas are still far from self-sufficient. The efforts of the last ten years have scattered schools, hospitals, cottage industries, and irrigation projects over the entire area. This has been done at the expense of the central government without any revenue return from the tribal territory. In many ways, therefore, the area is an economic burden on the government. Efforts are being made

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schools would be constructed, roads tarred and homes built to replace cave and straw dwellings.

". . . There the first of the several schools was dedicated for 200 children who will begin to learn the three Rs with which their forebears had little familiarity. Within a few weeks a bazaar will be opened and a road completed. The road will connect with a main artery over which the tribe's wheat crops will be taken the 100 miles to Peshawar, the capitol of North-West Frontier Province, where tribesmen will sit in legislative assembly to help frame laws."

John Callahan, "Tribesmen Accept Rule of Pakistan," New York Times, September 28, 1953.

to realize some return for the money spent by providing employment for the tribesmen in frontier militia and by establishing government-sponsored cottage industries. A complete integration of tribal territory will be an answer to many economic and defense problems connected with the frontier today but many more years and a good deal of patience will be required before such a result can be obtained. A beginning in this direction has already been made, and it seems that the circumstances were never more conducive for such a step than they are today.

# CHAPTER V

## CONCLUSION

The preceding study of the different aspects of the western frontier of West Pakistan shows that its importance lies in the fact that it contains the important Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal, and Bolan passes. These provide the only important overland links between the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the rest of Asia. Almost all past invasions of the Indus Valley and the plains of India beyond have come through these passes--passes which today are in the possession of Pakistan. To the east of the Indus there is no physical barrier of any importance to check the advance of hostile forces until the Burmese frontier is reached. The control and defense of these passes is, therefore, of the utmost importance to the safety of Pakistan and of the entire Indian subcontinent.

Even more important than these frontier passes of Pakistan are the passes of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan. The Hindu Kush is a much stronger barrier to any hostile force from the north than are the frontier foothills of the Pakistan-Afghan border. The control of the passes in the Hindu Kush range can give a hostile power a strong offensive advantage. Therefore, it has been the aim of both the defenders and invaders of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and thus the routes which connect Afghanistan with Russia or central Asia on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other.

Almost all the invaders who came from across the frontier in the past have strengthened their hold upon the Hindu Kush as a corollary to an attack upon the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Invaders like Alexander the Great, Kanishka, Mahmud Ghazni, Mohammad Ghori, Babur, Nadir Shah, and Ahmad Shah Durrani all advanced on India from their military bases in Afghanistan. Many of these invaders and their successors were able to establish huge empires in India and were able to resist temporarily the fresh waves of invasions from central or western Asia. On a few occasions a strong and unified India was able to reverse the usual pattern of invasion. The Indian Emperor Asoka (250 B.C.), for instance, was able to consolidate the whole of India under his rule. He pushed the frontier of his empire over the Hindu Kush to safeguard the western approaches to his empire and to give it a more stable frontier than the Indus provided. The Mogul emperors also carried out extended struggle to retain control of Afghanistan and in particular of such important foci of routes as Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. The duration of the empires of India in the past often depended upon the control of the Hindu Kush; the loss of this control encouraged fresh waves of invaders from central or western Asia.

The region of the Hindu Kush, or modern Afghanistan, throughout history has been a region of transition through which central and southern Asia were united. Before its emergence as a separate state in the middle of the eighteenth century, it formed part of a central Asian, a western Asian, or an Indian empire. Its emergence as a separate state did not change its strategic location or its role as a transitional region. During the nineteenth century its existence was as much dependent upon political events in central Asia and in the Indio-Pakistan subcontinent as it had in the past.

The British, who had united the whole of India under their control, were twice in control of the Hindu Kush during the nineteenth century, but political expediency rather than lack of power made them accept the present western frontier of West Pakistan as the valid frontier between Afghanistan and British India.

Russian expansion in central Asia was one of the main factors which determined British policy towards Afghanistan and the frontier. During the nineteenth century the British, after having captured huge territories in India, were pushing the frontiers of their empire westward towards the Hindu Kush in order to find a stable and natural frontier for their newly acquired empire. In the meantime Russia, too, had absorbed new territories in central Asia, and, in the absence of any strong physical feature in the way, also directed her advance towards the Hindu Kush. By the middle of the nineteenth century the British and the Russian empires opposed each other across the Hindu Kush. However, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century both powers realized that any further advance might produce a direct clash. To avoid such a development they agreed to interpose a neutral country between their empires. According to the St. Petersburg Convention of 1907 both Russia and Britain recognized the status of Afghanistan as a buffer state and pledged to respect her sovereignty. The Russo-Afghan and the Indo-Afghan frontiers were demarcated during the last decade of the nineteenth century. These frontiers have remained intact up to this day.

Viewed from the position of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, the Indo-Afghan frontier (the Durand Line) was the result of a compromise; strategic considerations would have demanded an occupation of Afghanistan. The Durand Line, however, was the best line available under the circumstances. One of its good points was that it

generally followed mountain crests and other well-defined physical features, and gave control of the last passes in the mountains to British India, so that even if India did not control the passes in the Hindu Kush she was not altogether at the mercy of Afghanistan for her defense against a possible attack from across the Hindu Kush.

One of the natural disadvantages was that Afghanistan as an independent country (though her foreign policy was controlled by the British for about forty years) had the option of harboring within her frontiers a power which might be a threat to the security of British India.

The other disadvantage was the tribal problem. The Durand Line, although generally following the mountain crests and other well-defined physical features, was a poor ethnographic boundary. Its main defect was that it cut across a tribal zone. In some cases single tribes such as the Mohamands and the Darwesh Khel Waziris were divided into two sections with one half lying under Afghan jurisdiction and the other under British. As a result, free intercommunication and in certain cases hostile influences could not be effectively checked at all points along the frontier. This situation, however, could hardly be avoided in view of the transitional ethnographic nature of the entire region between the Hindu Kush and the Indus. The problem became all the more complicated because tribes under British jurisdiction, like those under Afghanistan, did not accept any control or interference in the management of their internal affairs. The rugged and inhospitable terrain of their territory and the lack of economic resources, however, kept them dependent on the plains areas for their livelihood. The failure of rains led to many tribal raids. In order to ensure political and economic stability along the frontier, the government subsidized the

tribes. However, in view of the hostility of the tribes (in particular of the Pathan tribes) to the British Kafir (infidel) government, the Pathan tribal areas along the frontier were regarded as problem areas. Two-thirds of the peacetime British Indian Army was stationed in frontier military posts to check tribal raids in the administered districts.

The departure of the British and the formation of Pakistan marks a new era in the history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Some of the problems connected with the frontier and its defense have changed in nature or have disappeared, while others remain to be solved. A solution to these problems is of great importance to the survival of Pakistan.

As far as the Pathan tribes are concerned, they are even today administered (as they were during the British period) through political agents and tribal jirgas or councils. The regular laws of Pakistan are not enforced in tribal areas. The tribes have considerable autonomy in the management of their internal affairs according to their code of honor or the Pakhtunwali which regulates the daily life and the intertribal affairs of the whole area. However, the religious, ethnographic, and cultural unity between the tribal areas and the rest of the population of Pakistan has removed many obstacles in the way of future integration with the tribes. The tribes, who took part in the struggle for freedom from the British rule, feel themselves as much the architects of Pakistan as any other people living in the country. They voluntarily entered into treaties with the government of Pakistan. In these treaties they declared their intention to remain citizens of Pakistan. Much has been done during the past ten years in the way of delegating governmental and defense responsibilities to the tribes and towards the development of the economic resources of the area. The tribes, for the first time in

history, have been given representation in the provincial and central assemblies of Pakistan. The British established garrisons and the regular units of the Pakistan army have also been withdrawn from the frontier cantonments as a gesture of trust in the tribes. Today the defense of the passes is entrusted to the irregular tribal militia and the Khassadars or nonuniformed tribal levies who are under the command of the regular officers of the Pakistan army.

A complete absence of raids in the administered districts (which used to be a nightmare for the British frontier administration) and the voluntary participation of the tribes in Kashmir action shows the friendly disposition of the tribes towards Pakistan. There are indications that, as new means of communication are built and progressive ideas penetrate the region, the tribes will become completely integrated into Pakistan. But this will require political stability along the frontier which can result only from persistent efforts of Pakistan on a long-term basis and also from the efforts of Afghanistan to integrate the tribes on her side of the Durand Line. Unless the tribes are completely integrated on both sides of the Durand Line, they will constitute a factor of instability along the frontier.

It should also be understood by the two countries concerned that any territorial ambitions (such as the Pakhtunistan issue) or efforts to forcibly change the present frontier can only result in the weakening of both countries and might lead to interference by a third and stronger power. However, the boundary line with its small defects has lasted for over sixty years. If respected, it can prove a factor of stability in southern Asia.

The most effective way to solve the minor tribal problem is by means of a closer cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Such an arrangement between the two countries is also needed for a number of other reasons besides tribal welfare and integration. It

is desirable in view of the dependence of Afghanistan on Pakistan for her trade, and is badly needed for the purposes of defense and survival of both the countries.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country and is therefore dependent on Pakistan for her overseas trade. Afghanistan's trade in karakul with the United States, for instance, passes through the port of Karachi. Moreover, every year hundreds of caravans from Afghanistan and even from beyond enter Pakistan, their camels laden with merchandise which they sell and exchange in the bazaars of the frontier. Thousands of Powindahs[1] of Afghanistan migrate to Pakistan every winter in search of pasture and petty trade. During the cold season they can be seen in almost every town in Pakistan. From the point of view of political geography Afghanistan seems to be an incomplete state. It is only through greater cooperation with Pakistan that she can overcome some of the handicaps which her geographical location imposes upon her. On the other hand, it is to the advantage of Pakistan to have a strong, friendly, and prosperous Afghanistan, able to uphold her sovereignty and thus resist any hostile influences.

This question of frontier defense brings into focus the whole political map of the world which is obviously different from the one belonging to the pre-World War II era. The study of the differences between the two maps brings to light the changed political conditions which can influence the frontier:

Great Britain emerged victorious from World War II, but the demand for self-determination of her colonies led to the detachment of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and of many other territories in

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[1] See Chapter II, page 99.

Asia from her empire, with the result that Britain cannot be considered a determining factor in the shaping of Asia.

Russia, on the other hand, emerged stronger and more vigorous. The swing of China towards Russia has made the latter all the more formidable in Asia.

Opposed to this, the United States started taking a more active part in world politics and assumed the leadership of western democracies. Her mutual security pacts with the countries of Europe and Asia and her economic aid programs show her determination not to let the U.S.S.R. absorb the weaker Asian countries. These programs are mainly intended as a measure towards her own security because control of the Asian countries might put Russia in a stronger offensive position relative to the United States.

Today, therefore, the world seems to be divided into two major power groups; one headed by the United States and the other by the U.S.S.R.

In warfare and strategy space has once again become an extremely important factor. It seems that the survival of a country in the future may very well depend upon her size. States seek to overcome the disadvantages of small size in various ways. They form defense and economic alliances. They merge and federate their states in order to attain a larger size and to quicken the pace of economic development by combining their economic resources.

In view of the possible total destruction of the world in case of a major clash (involving Russia and the U.S.A.) there is a tendency among the nations to settle their political differences through the pressure of world opinion rather than by resorting to force. Peaceful penetration or extension of political influence have at the present successfully replaced the wars although the possibilities of

small-scale wars involving small countries cannot be completely ruled out.

In the light of the above developments, it seems absolutely necessary that the present frontier of West Pakistan should be respected and stabilized by the countries which share it. Any unrest or clash between these countries will lead to the weakness of all of them and will allow an outside power to step in. The most probable power is the U.S.S.R.

It is possible that with her huge resources and territories Russia has no ambition to occupy any of these countries. However, with the industrial development of Soviet Central Asia, it is possible that the future commercial demands of these areas will direct her attention towards the warm-water port of Karachi, the capital of Pakistan. The main routes from Russia to Pakistan lie through Afghanistan. Any Russian attack or military penetration into Pakistan will have to come through that country. The very survival of Afghanistan in the future might depend upon how well she resists the pressure from the north. To be able to resist, it is necessary that a closer politico-economic cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan should be brought about. This, combined with the support of the western democracies, will form a strong bastion of defense for southern Asia.

It should also be noted that the control of Iran can also give Russia access to some of the routes to Pakistan. In the modern age the dry stretches of Baluchistan will probably not be as great an obstacle in the way of a hostile force as they were in the past. Control of Iran can also give Russia an access to the Persian Gulf. In that case the western frontier can be outflanked and Pakistan can be attacked from the sea.

An ideal arrangement, therefore, will be a closer politico-economic cooperation between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. The extremely cordial relations between Iran and Pakistan make such an arrangement very desirable. Three countries together can form a good politico-economic unit with a bigger space, more manpower, better resources, and greater influence in world politics.

Historically, culturally, and ethnographically these three countries have much in common. They have formed part of a single empire on more than one occasion in the past. At the present it will be hard to advocate a complete merger of these states because they are at different stages of economic and social development, but any scheme advocating a close politico-economic cooperation between them will be a sound one for the security of all of them. The first step towards such a cooperation will require a respect for each other's frontiers and sovereignty, for feuding and fighting over issues of smaller importance may jeopardize their very existence.

The makers of the policies of these countries should realize that the withdrawal of the British from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent marked the end of the western imperialism and that Russia with her control over the "heartland" is a powerful and dynamic neighbor. There is a very strong possibility that she will (as the central Asian powers in the past did) try through military force or through the communist infiltration to get some of the benefits which the occupation of these countries will bring her. A strong defense against any such possible encroachment will be a strong politico-economic cooperation between the countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. It is obvious that, even while standing together as a single group, these countries will still be weak against the formidable might of Russia and must therefore link themselves (in whatever manner they consider proper) with the western democracies.

# APPENDIXES

# APPENDIX I

## PICTURES OF THE KHYBER PASS AND THE HINDU KUSH RANGE

PLATE I



Figure 24. The Khyber Pass near Ali Masjid (Pakistan).



Figure 25. The Khyber Pass near Landi Kotal (Pakistan).

## PLATE II



**Figure 26. The Bamian Valley in the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan).**



Figure 27. The Kabul River near Jalalabad (Afghanistan).

# PLATE III



Figure 28. The Surkhab River gorge in the Hindu Kush (Afghanistan).



Figure 29. The Hindu Kush near Charikar (Afghanistan).

# APPENDIX II

## DURAND LINE AGREEMENT--1893

Agreement between His Highness Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G.C.S.I., Amir of Afghanistan and its Dependencies on the one part, and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, representing the Government of India on the other part,--1893.

Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India, and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding, and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows:--

(1) The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness's dominions, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown in the map [not reproduced] attached to this agreement.

(2) The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India.

(3) The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Waziri country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh.

(4) The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated wherever this may be practicable and desirable by Joint British and Afghan Commissioners, whose object will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map [not reproduced] attached to this agreement, having due regard to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier.

(5) With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British Cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tilerai water. At this part of the frontier, the line will be drawn as follows:--

From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Shaiobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass half way between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khwaja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory, and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

(6) The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal differences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any differences of detail such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the officers appointed to demarcate the boundary

line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments.

(7) Being fully satisfied of His Highness's good will to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.

H. M. Durand.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan.

Kabul;

12th November 1893.

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