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QUINE'S THEORY OF REGIMENTATION

by
Spencer David Carr

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ABSTRACT

QUINE'S THEORY OF REGIMENTATION

by
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In Chapter Five of Word and Object W. V. Quine sets forth for the first time an explicit theory of regimentation. I take Quine's theory of regimentation to be a set of doctrines concerning the replacement of linguistic items with other linguistic items. The theory lays down conditions governing such replacements and makes claims concerning the benefits of such a procedure. The more familiar term 'paraphrase' is also available to us since Quine wants to say much the same thing both about moves from ordinary to highly technical regimented languages and about ordinary paraphrasing.

I first treat three examples of regimentation in order to see how Quine brings his doctrine to bear upon particular problems. I take as representative the problems associated with referential opacity, proper names and propositions. Quine's treatment of these problems has met with some criticisms, and for the most part I defend the way in which he uses regimentation to solve the problems. On the other hand, the reader is referred to an appendix in which I argue at some length that Quine's actual account of referential opacity is defective.

Quine's efforts to characterize regimentation consist both in straightforward description and in the presentation of several models. I discuss Quine's explicit characterization of regimentation, or paraphrasing, and argue that this characterization does not fit any of the models which he has provided for our understanding. Neither paraphrasing with the aim of disambiguation, nor the paraphrasing of the ordered pair, nor ordinary everyday paraphrasing (the three models I discuss) fit the characterization he has previously given us.

The most serious problem is that Quine is committed to evaluating paraphrases without any appeal to meaning concepts. There must be some significant relationship between two sentences if they are to be paraphrases of one another, but it cannot be one of meaning. Quine appeals to a notion of fulfilling the same purpose. I argue that Quine must be specific about what purposes are involved, and I discuss various candidates. None, however, seem to be both of the relevant sort (for Quine) and free from semantic contamination. I conclude, then, that Quine has not provided us with a way of distinguishing adequate from inadequate paraphrases without appealing to meaning concepts.

Finally, it is suggested that if we do need to incorporate semantic concepts into a criterion for adequacy, there might follow grave consequences for some of the claims Quine makes for regimentation. In particular, given one plausible sort of criterion, there arise serious difficulties for some of Quine's claims concerning regimentation as it bears on (a) ontological commitment, and (b) simplicity of theory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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CHAPTER ONE

REGIMENTATION IN ACTION

1. Referential opacity

This thesis deals with certain aspects of the program Quine calls "regimentation." The primary aim of this first chapter is the modest one of presenting this program at work. I have selected three representative problems and have tried to show how Quine's program proposes to deal with them. The really interesting features of regimentation, it seems to me, are the sometimes ambitious claims that Quine goes on to make for regimentation, but in this first chapter I take a basically uncritical view; I attempt only to exhibit examples of the minimal sorts of things Quine wants regimentation to be able to do. The plan is now to present the program, later to analyze it critically and finally to evaluate some of its more ambitious claims.

Although the purpose of this chapter is primarily expository in nature, some controversial issues will arise. The difference between the problems we now turn to and those we will see later is that these first problems arise for Quine even if we wholeheartedly accept his approach. Only later will we turn to the problems dealing with the approach itself and its more extended applications. Problems of the first sort, which might be called "internal," can still be controversial, though I will argue that, of the controversy that there has been, most has been misdirected. For the most part, I will defend

Quine against his critics at this "internal" level. We now turn to an examination of the program at work in individual cases, accepting for now, at least, that the program as a whole is sound.

Quine introduces regimentation as a way of handling particular problems, "vagaries," that arise in natural languages and, in particular, English. The particular vagary which most concerns Quine and which has excited perhaps the most response in the literature is that of opacity. Quine first introduced the notion as early as 1943,[1] and in Word and Object four full sections (##30-32, 35) are devoted specifically to it. In between, Quine has produced several articles which attempt to come to grips with this problem.[2]

Perhaps the best way to introduce the problem of opacity is in terms of three inter-related issues: (a) The Law of Substitutivity of Identicals, (b) the roles played by certain referring expressions, and (c) the relation of these expressions to certain peculiar contexts (e.g., those of propositional attitudes and of quotations) which may arise in sentences.[3] The problem, in brief, is that certain plausible

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[1] W. V. Quine, "Notes on Existence and Necessity," Journal of Philosophy, XL (1943). Reprinted in Leonard Linsky, ed., Semantics and the Philosophy of Language.

[2] See especially Quine, "Reference and Modality," in From a Logical Point of View. Also "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" and "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," both in The Ways of Paradox. The latter article first appeared in Journal of Philosophy, LIII (1956).

[3] It should be noted that not everyone will read Quine as I here present him. Interpreting Quine's work on opacity is not always easy, and a full scale defense of my presentation would have to be fairly lengthy, besides not throwing any light on the particular problems discussed here. I do, however, make some interpretive remarks in the appendix.

assumptions about (a) and (b) in the contexts referred to in (c) seem to lead us to undesirable consequences. For example, it seems at first reasonable to suppose that the principle concerning substitutivity is true, that to replace a term that refers to an object by another term with the same reference will not serve to change the truth value of the sentence in which the original term occurs. (This is to say, more correctly, that the new sentence produced by the replacement of the original term will not differ in truth value from the old one.) From here on, read 'substitutivity salva veritate' for 'substitutivity'. In other words, a rose by any other name should smell as sweet as it does with the name that it has. But natural as this assumption is, it lets us down in the following, now classic, case:

(1) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.

Substituting identical for identical from the truth 'Cicero=Tully', we obtain:

(2) Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline.

But (2) may be false at the same time that (1) is true. An older, and even more classic, case is the inference from 'George IV wished to know whether Scott is the author of Waverly' to 'George IV wished to know whether Scott is Scott', given that Scott is the author of Waverly. These are examples of contexts of propositional attitudes.

Another type of case in which the substitutivity principle fails us is in quotation contexts. Thus, ' 'Cicero' has six letters' will not retain its truth value if we replace 'Cicero' with 'Tully'.

What are we to do about such counterexamples to our "law"?

In any such case in which a law is under fire from alleged counter-examples, we have at least three prima facie options. (a) We may give up the law in its entirety, writing it off as a lost cause. (b) Thinking that there is too much of value in our law, we may try to amend it so as to take account of the counterexamples. This will constitute an attempt to explain why it is that our law fails to hold in these cases; if no such explanation is forthcoming, then this option will amount to no more than a listing of the cases in which the law fails to hold, which listing could more profitably be seen as an attack upon the law rather than a defense of it. (c) We may formulate some sort of an attack upon the counterexamples, discrediting them in some way or other. An example of such an approach would be an attempt to demonstrate that any interpretation of a context, say, that refused substitutivity is somehow meaningless or suspect to such an extent that it should be disregarded.

It is best to see Quine as taking option (b), though it is not necessary to do so. There is no need here to distinguish between explaining why a law is no longer acceptable and explaining why the law is still good given a slight modification. Does Quine finally accept the Law of Substitutivity? Yes and no. Certainly not in its old, unemended form when applied to natural languages, for this form is open to conclusive counterexample. On the other hand, it seems more correct to say that Quine attempts to formulate the law in a more defensible form, rather than to say that he abandons it altogether in favor of a new one. I present (a) and (b) as separate options (there is a distinction), but if this is a borderline case,

nothing hangs on our being able to tell which side Quine comes down on.

His solution lies in an attempt to explain the failures in terms of the role of the referring expression in question. If an expression is used in a sentence "purely to specify its object" for the rest of the sentence to say something about, we can say that it occurs in a purely referential position.[4] He then goes on to claim that "when a singular term is used in a sentence purely to specify its object, and the sentence is true of the object, then certainly the sentence will stay true when any other singular term is substituted that designates the same object."[5] This claim provides a necessary criterion for a term's having pure reference; if a term refers purely to its object, we can call the position in which such a term occurs a purely referential position, and substitutivity must hold. If substitutivity fails, it must follow by contraposition that the position is not purely referential. It is apparent that we can go on to classify modes of containment (i.e., contexts into which we can imbed terms or sentences) in terms of the effects they can have on the referentiality of terms which occur in them. Quine "call [s] a mode of containment ϕ referentially transparent if, whenever an occurrence of a singular term t is purely referential in a term or sentence $\psi(t)$, it is purely referential also in the containing term

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[4] Word and Object, pp. 141-42. In "Notes on Existence and Necessity" essentially the same account is given in terms of "purely designative occurrences."

[5] Word and Object, p. 142.

or sentence $\phi(\psi(\underline{t}))$."[6] If this condition is not met, as for example in quotation, then we say either that it fails of referential transparency or that it is referentially opaque.

Quine's terminology may require a little digesting. Here is how it fits together. The most basic distinction, in that the others are defined in terms of it, is that between a term's having or not having pure reference within a position. To say that a term has pure reference at a position is just the same as to say that it occurs in purely referential position or that it has a purely referential occurrence at that position. Quine talks in all these ways. Whether a position is purely referential or not depends upon how we classify the term occupying it with respect to the pure/impure distinction. Now for every position which a term may fill there is a corresponding context in which the position is located. Thus, in 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline', 'Cicero' occupies the position of the blank in the context 'Tom believes that _____ denounced Catiline', and 'Cicero denounced Catiline' occupies the position left blank in the context 'Tom believes that _____'. Often it will develop that only certain aspects of contexts will interest us. For our purposes the fact that it is Tom who is said to believe something will be irrelevant, and we will accordingly leave out this extraneous information and speak more economically of belief contexts in general as a mode of containment. In this way we classify contexts according to their most interesting features. These modes of containment we

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[6] Ibid., p. 144.

classify as either transparent or opaque. If a mode of containment causes a term which was originally in purely referential position in the contained position to occur in a position not purely referential, then the mode of containment is opaque. If it does not interfere with the referentiality of the position, then it is transparent. As an illustration, 'Cicero' occurs in purely referential position in 'Cicero denounced Catiline'. But when this position is imbedded in a belief context, or mode of containment, as in 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline', Cicero might no longer occur in purely referential position. It no longer occurs in purely referential position in the case in which we refuse to allow substitutivity of identicals for it. In such case, its referentiality will have been interfered with, and we accordingly call the mode of containment "opaque." It is this distinction between transparency and opacity that most concerns Quine. In particular, he is interested in those modes of containment which can be interpreted as being either transparent or opaque.

Perhaps this is the appropriate place at which to issue a disclaimer. In presenting Quine's account of opacity as I have, I do not mean to give the impression that I accept it as presented. On the contrary, I believe that Quine's account of opacity in terms of pure reference is seriously infected with confusions. I refer the reader to the appendix for a critical examination of this account. I have chosen to relegate such an examination to an appendix for the reason that it is not strictly relevant to the task that opacity represents for regimentation. I have nevertheless included such an

appendix on the belief that though Quine's account of opacity is well known, what I consider to be its grave defects often seem to go unnoticed. But even if I am right in rejecting Quine's explanation of opacity in terms of pure reference, it will not follow that there need be anything wrong with Quine's solution for the problem of opacity.

Quine's solution to the problem concerning our "law" is to admit that the principle of substitutivity as stated breaks down, but to hold that we can characterize its failures in such a way that we see why the law breaks down where it does, can keep the law for the remaining cases and, in general, keep what value there is in the law. He proposes, then, to amend the law to read: if a term has pure reference to its object in a given sentence, then any term which refers to the same object can be substituted for it without the sentence changing its truth value. The unmodified law breaks down where it does because in just those cases, the term being replaced does not have pure reference. This is clearest, I think, in the case of quotations. Since 'Cicero' in ''Cicero' has six letters' does not refer to Cicero at all, we do not expect to be able to insert 'Tully' and retain the sentence's truth value. Here the fact that Cicero=Tully is just irrelevant to what the sentence is about. We just should not expect the law to work when we take a good look at this case.

If this works, then Quine's appeal to opacity has solved the problem over the principle of substitutivity. (But see my appendix.) Apart from our puzzles over substitutivity, though, what makes this whole matter worth worrying about at all, a vagary, is just that the

same sentence can be given either an opaque or a transparent interpretation. For example, we might hold that 'Cicero' in 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' is purely referential. This would mean that it merely picked out an individual whom Tom believes to have denounced Catiline. In which case, 'Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline' would follow, since 'Tully' picks out the same individual. But the sentence can also be interpreted so that it be true that Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline and yet false that he believes Tully denounced Catiline, as when he explicitly denies that Tully denounced Catiline, insisting that it was Cicero. Quine calls this first case an instance of the transparent sense of belief. In the second case, the belief is said to be opaque. In so saying, we use Quine's terminology without committing ourselves to his account of it. This leaves us with a genuine case of ambiguity.

This being so, let us now turn to Quine's suggestions for clearing up the vagary. He emphasizes that we need both the transparent and the opaque senses of belief so that the problem is one of making it clear when we are using which. "In general, what is wanted is not a doctrine of transparency or opacity of belief, but a way of indicating, selectively and changeably, just what positions in the contained sentence are to shine through as referential on any particular occasion. A way of doing that is to agree to localize the failure of transparency regularly in the 'that' of 'believes that' and the 'to' of 'believes to' and not in the 'believes'."[7] This means

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[7] Ibid., p. 149.

that we decide to rephrase belief sentences when necessary so that all the terms of the sentence that are in non-referential position will follow the 'that' or the 'to'.

(1) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.

(2) Tom believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline.

(3) Tom believes Cicero and Catiline to be related as denouncer and denounced.

In (1), both 'Cicero' and 'Catiline' appear in non-referential position, both following the 'that'. In (2), 'Cicero' has been moved out to a referential position, while 'Catiline' remains referentially impure. In (3), both 'Cicero' and 'Catiline' occur in purely referential position, the non-referential position being localized to that position following the 'to'. The problem we had, then, with sentence (1) before we accepted this method of localizing opacity is solved. Now it is clear that we can substitute 'Tully' for 'Cicero' in (2) and in (3), but not in (1). We could substitute another name for 'Catiline' only in (3). Surely no exception can be taken to this convention for sorting out the interpretations.

One result of this new notation is that it tends to undermine the terminology of different senses of belief which Quine falls into now and then. Once we see that we can shift 'Catiline' as well as 'Cicero' in and out of referential position, several questions arise about the nature of the belief involved. If we do want to distinguish types of belief here, it is obvious that the belief of (1) is opaque. Apparently (3) reflects the transparent sense of belief. I say "apparently," for there is still something that follows the 'to', but let us stick to singular terms for now. Now the belief of (2) was

just what we had earlier called transparent, but what are we to say of it now? It seems that it is transparent with respect to Cicero and opaque with respect to Catiline. Do we want to say that 'belief' here has two senses? Surely not--this sentence is not ambiguous. Does Tom perhaps have an opaque belief about Catiline and a transparent one about Cicero? Of course this is just silly; there is only one belief in question. Why should we call it one sort of belief as opposed to the other? To call the sense of belief of (2) either sort is to make an arbitrary decision and one that has no import. The status of the 'believes' is not in question, but only the roles played by 'Cicero' and 'Catiline'. Once our convention for localizing failure of transparency is taken from the 'believes' to the 'to' or 'that', we see that there is no point in distinguishing senses of belief, as Quine does.[8] As I argue in the appendix, opacity and transparency are notions that do not apply to senses of belief. This would hardly be of even passing interest except for the fact that Quine sometimes gets some mileage out of this confusion, as when he talks about positions remaining the same regardless of how they are filled. Such talk makes it look as if the meaning of the (in this case) main verb determines the referentiality or non-referentiality of the position, which in turn gives the impression that we have a notion of a transparent/opaque distinction apart from the pure and simple failure/non-failure of substitutivity distinction (at the term level).

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[8] See Ibid., p. 145.

The technique Quine introduces for localizing failure of transparency for statements of belief is adaptable for all statements of propositional attitudes. But there are certain other modes of containment which may or may not lack transparency which are not so easily handled. These are modes of containment like 'the commissioner is looking for _____' and 'Ernest is hunting _____'. These sorts of cases Quine neatly (for the most part) paraphrases into expressions which do contain a verb of propositional attitude. The first example is expanded into 'the commissioner is endeavoring to cause himself to find _____'; the second into 'Ernest is endeavoring to cause himself to shoot _____'. These versions seem to be adequate paraphrases, and treating them in this way allows us to localize failure of transparency for them just as we did for the original statements of propositional attitude. So every time that we meet up with a mode of containment that can be construed as either transparent or opaque, we paraphrase the sentence (if need be) containing the mode into a sentence which contains a propositional attitude. In this way the ambiguity can be resolved.

But all is not yet sweetness and light. For consider the sentence 'Tom believes that someone denounced Catiline'. Here we have ambiguity of scope as well as of opacity/transparency. Upon resolving the first ambiguity, one interpretation will be 'Someone is such that Tom believes that he denounced Catiline'. Here we have a conflict; on Quine's account of indefinite singular terms,[9]

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[9]See Ibid., section 31.

'someone' must be interpreted as occurring referentially. But by Quine's convention for sorting out referential positions, the position of 'he' here must be in non-referential position since it follows the 'that' of 'believes that'. But the pronoun 'he' refers back to the 'someone', so if 'someone' fills the position of the object of belief in the transparent sense, then so must 'he'. It is obvious that 'someone' and 'he' must be in the same referential boat, but one of Quine's doctrines puts them in the one boat, and another puts them in the other. Rather than scrap either doctrine, Quine takes the view that such constructions are illegitimate. He bans pronominal cross reference from inside opaque constructions to an indefinite singular term outside the construction. But it is not just that such constructions conflict with these two Quinean doctrines. Quine claims that such constructions lead to difficulties in their own right. The particular problem he has in mind is placed by Geach in a somewhat more complex setting, and I will now quote at some length from him.

> Let us suppose that Johnson is acquainted with a social figure, Ralph de Vere, and a shopkeeper, Jenkins; unknown to Johnson, Ralph de Vere and Jenkins are one and the same man.... Now Johnson may be quite incredulous when told that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper. In that case, we can find an interpretation of "x" in the category of proper names such that the formula:
>
> (9) x is a man, and Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve that x is a shopkeeper, and x is the same man as Ralph de Vere
>
> becomes a true proposition when "x" is read thus. On our hypothesis this is obviously the case; for (9) will come out true if we read "x" as "Jenkins." Accordingly the following proposition will also be true:

(10) For some x, x is a man, and Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve that x is a shopkeeper, and x is the same man as Ralph de Vere.

Quine, as is well known, would reject propositions like (10) as ill formed. His reason for doing this is as follows. If (10) were well formed, (10) would be validly inferred from:

(11) Jenkins is a man, and Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve that Jenkins is a shopkeeper, and Jenkins is the same man as Ralph de Vere.

Quine would admit (11) to be well formed. On the other hand, he would say, (10) is equivalent to:

(12) For some man x, Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve that x is a shopkeeper, and x is the same man as Ralph de Vere.

And obviously in the case supposed there could be no man x such as to make (12) true. Only Ralph de Vere is the same man as Ralph de Vere; and it is not the case that Johnson both disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve this. But if (10) is well formed, (10) and therefore (12) must be true propositions if (11) is true. Since in fact (11) could be true whereas (12) could not, (10) and (12) cannot be well formed propositions: a quantifier outside and oratio obliqua clause cannot bind a variable within the clause.[10]

We can make Geach's problem look a little more familiar by reading (10) and (12) (they are equivalent on Quine's view; it is just more apparent that (12) must be false) as "Someone is such that Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere is a shopkeeper and does not disbelieve that he (the someone) is a shopkeeper, and he (the someone) is the same man as Ralph de Vere." Here we have a clear case of pronominal cross reference from within an opaque construction to a singular indefinite term outside of that construction. So the

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[10] P. T. Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 155-57.

problem is that (11) describes a situation that might obtain; (10) is validly inferrable from (11), and (12), which cannot be true, is equivalent to (10). There are a number of steps that this result depends upon, and it is obvious that we can avoid this particular problem by attacking any of these steps. Quine, we have seen, avoids it by rejecting (10) altogether as not being well formed. Geach, on the other hand, denies that (10) is equivalent to (12). Leonard Linsky, when he deals with this problem, argues that (10)-type statements are certainly meaningful and (tacitly) accepts that they can be equivalent to (12)-type statements. He attempts to analyze (10) and (12)-type statements in such a way that they can be true.[11]

Geach's argument that (10) and (12) are not equivalent is based upon his contention that (a) 'for some x, x is a man.....' cannot in general be translated as (b) 'for some man x, ...'. In effect, then, he rejects Quine's handling of the relationship between restricted and unrestricted quantifiers. Geach gives a strange argument to support this claim.

> According to this accepted view [of quantifiers], we may treat the proposition:
>
> (1) Heraclitus bathed in some river yesterday, and bathed in the same river today
>
> as equivalent to:
>
> (2) Something (or other) is a river, and Heraclitus bathed in it yesterday, and Heraclitus bathed in it today
>
> or, using 'bound variable' letters, as equivalent to:

---

[11] Leonard Linsky, Referring, pp. 110-14.

(3) For some x, x is a river, and Heraclitus bathed in x yesterday, and Heraclitus bathed in x today.

Now by parity of reasoning we may analyze:

(4) Heraclitus bathed in some water yesterday and bathed in the same water today

as equivalent to:

(5) Something (or other) is water, and Heraclitus bathed in it yesterday, and Heraclitus bathed in it today

or again to:

(6) For some x, x is water, and Heraclitus bathed in x yesterday, and Heraclitus bathed in x today

> . . . it seems reasonable to assume that . . . we may assert the additional premise "Whatever is a river is water" or "For any x, if x is a river, x is water." Now given this premise, (5) or (6) is inferrable from (2) or (3). But clearly this premise would not warrant us in inferring (4) from (1): it is notorious that (1) could be true and (4) false. Hence the above analysis of (1) and (4), which stand or fall together, must be rejected.[12]

Now (4) is certainly stronger than any of (1), (2) or (3), but I am chiefly concerned about the additional premise that Geach uses to derive (5) and (6) from (2) and (3). The word 'is' is well known for its logical trickery, and it seems that Geach has fallen victim to it here. I want to agree that (4) says more than (1), (2) or (3), but claim that (5) and (6) are ambiguous as between an interpretation which is equivalent to (4) and one which will follow from (2) or (3) with the aid of the additional premise. Let us look at that premise. The 'is' here cannot be the 'is' of identity, for it is just false that a river is identical to any volume or mass of water. The sense in which it is true that whatever is a

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[12] Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 150-51.

river is water is that rivers are logical constructions of a sort out of water or, more simply, that rivers are composed of water. Now if we so read the 'is water' of (5) and (6), then (5) and (6) can be deduced from (2) and (3) plus the additional premise. But now (5) and (6) are not equivalent to (4). This is not to defend Geach against Quine, however, for (5) and (6) are equivalent to (4) when we take 'is water' in the sense which it has in 'That stuff is water', however that sense is to be analyzed. Since in the context 'something is water', the latter interpretation is more natural, I see nothing wrong or even misleading with the commonly accepted move from (4) to (5) or (6). The problem arises when after the shift we go on as Geach does to read 'is water' as the same 'is water' of 'if x is a river, then x is water'. This reading is all right in itself, but now it is no longer equivalent to (4); to claim that this procedure invalidates the move from (4) to (5) or (6) is just to commit the fallacy of equivocation. Though Quine would certainly not approve of this talk of "senses," I conclude that Geach's way out of our Jenkins dilemma, claiming that (12) is not deducible from (10), leads nowhere.

Linsky discusses this same problem using a different example. Shifting to our example, Linsky begins with the claim that (10) just is, as a matter of fact, meaningful. "[Quine's] approach, however, will not do. The reason is that the quantifications which Quine wishes to prohibit are certainly not nonsense . . . since these statements are perfectly intelligible . . . , it must be false that quantification into referentially opaque contexts always produces nonsense."[13] Since

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[13]Linsky, Referring, pp. 111-12.

he buys the inference from (10) to (12), Linsky is committed to defending (12). Thus, "I wish to suggest that being identical with something or other under the scope of a verb of propositional attitude is logically a more than dyadic relation. The air of paradox occasioned by [(12)], I suggest, results from a failure to make explicit the nature of this relation and the possibly suppressed terms it involves. A first attempt (surely inadequate) towards removing the paradox along these lines might analyze...."[14] Linsky goes on to suggest an analysis for his example. For ours, his treatment would give us something like this for (12): "For some man Ralph de Vere, Johnson disbelieves that Ralph de Vere under the designation 'Ralph de Vere' is a shopkeeper, and does not disbelieve that Ralph de Vere under the designation 'Jenkins" is a shopkeeper, and Jenkins is the same man as Ralph de Vere." Under this analysis, Linsky would claim, there is an object which satisfies the sentence form, namely Ralph de Vere.

Now I am not unsympathetic to this sort of an approach. But what I find interesting here are passages from Linsky which miss their Quinean mark. They tend to indicate that Linsky misses the point of what Quine takes to be his enterprise. He is involved in an entire program, and it will be sad if it turns out that his critics have not correctly assessed his aims before slinging their arrows. For instance, Linsky's whole attack upon Quine's rejection of (10) rests on (a) the intuition that (10) is meaningful, and (b) the

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[14] Ibid., p. 113.

extremely vague and halfhearted attempt, which is admitted to be inadequate, to show (12) to be palatable. (b) surely cannot stand alone, and (a), I am sure Quine will want to say, is just irrelevant to his purposes. In support of this, consider the passage in which, immediately after ruling out 'Someone is such that Tom believes he denounced Catiline', he cheerfully concedes that "an idiomatic equivalent" of it remains legitimate.[15] It is difficult to see how, if the meaningfulness of an ordinary language expression is at issue, Quine could argue that the equivalent of a meaningless expression could be meaningful. In view of the stress Linsky puts on showing that, allegedly contra Quine, such constructions do make sense, these remarks from the defendant are disconcerting. They suggest that Linsky (Geach to a lesser extent) and Quine are arguing at cross-purposes.

Let me draw together the conclusions of this section. Opacity present Quine with two related problems: first, it seems to foul up the principle of substitutivity and, second, it produces ambiguity. The account of pure reference is Quine's attempt to explain what is going on in these cases. If it works, we can save the principle of substitutivity in some form and explain why certain sentences are ambiguous. It is the special task of regimentation not to explain, but to resolve the cases of ambiguity. Quine's proposal does resolve the ambiguity, but at the cost of declaring a seemingly acceptable sentence to be illegitimate. Geach's attempt

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[15]Quine, Word and Object, p. 150.

to avoid this consequence fails. Linsky's attempt is not really a completed one, but his criticisms seemed to rest upon what I suggested in conclusion was a misunderstanding of Quine's program. In the next chapter I propose that this is the case and that few of Quine's critics have been able to come to grips with his work for this very reason.

2. Proper names

Opacity is just one kind of vagary which the use of singular terms is subject to. Another sort is that of possible failure of reference. It often happens that we use a singular term such that there is no object which it designates even though it purports to designate one. This use can be either witting or unwitting. The primary difficulty, as Quine sees it, is that failure of reference can create truth value gaps--sentences which are neither true nor false. Not all occurrences of such terms will create such gaps, but some will. Of these sentences:

(1) Pegasus flies

(2) Homer believed in Pegasus

(3) Pegasus exists,

Quine takes (2) to be true, (3) to be false, and allows that (1) may be neither true nor false. (1)-type sentences are troublesome for the reason that Quine wants to establish canons of deduction which will be as simple as possible; if (1) is neither true nor false and if Quine's logic is to handle it, then his logic must be complicated by the addition of a third truth value.

Geach belittles Quine's worries here, accusing him of being "obsessed" with the fear that a definite singular term should fail to have reference, when in the event that this does happen, as it occasionally does, all we have to do is to make a few adjustments and revisions in our system.[1] Now it is not unusual for philosophers to be caught worrying about "problems" for which the non-philosopher is completely unable to feel any sympathy, but here either Geach is displaying a surprisingly low degree of tolerance for a fellow philosopher's problems or he is just misreading the situation. Of course Quine will revamp his theory about the world (i.e., the totality of sentences that he believes true) if it turns out that a term, which he previously thought had reference, has no reference. This is normal procedure. Quine's problem is what to say about sentences containing this term once the discovery is made. Are the sentences false? If so, then they can play a certain role in deductions; if they lack a truth value, then, as Quine's logical theory stands, they cannot. Science may not need the sentence 'Pegasus flies', but this fact will not assure that we will not run into it, only that we will not run into Pegasus. It is a meaningful sentence and, as such, must have some sort of status.

The other problem concerning denotationless singular terms that concerns Quine is their relationship to the concept of a purely referential position. He is concerned to argue that all sentences which contain such terms in purely referential position are neither

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[1]P. T. Geach, "Review of Word and Object" in Philosophical Books, Vol. II, no. 1 (1961), pp. 15-16.

true nor false, such as (1). "There is just something wrong about admitting that 'Pegasus' can ever have purely referential position in truths or falsehoods; for the intuitive idea behind "purely referential position" was supposed to be that the term is used purely to specify its object, for the rest of the sentence to say something about."[2] If a term like 'Pegasus' seems to occur in purely referential position and yet fails to have a reference, then it seems we must be stuck for an answer concerning its truth value for nothing has been specified for the rest of the sentence to be about. Thus, in 'Homer believes that Pegasus flies' we have no trouble with the opaque rendering, for 'Pegasus' is then gobbled up by the predicate 'believes-that-Pegasus-flies' which is predicated of Homer (see next section). The transparent rendering, 'Homer believes Pegasus to fly', becomes neither true nor false since it, unlike the opaque version, purports to say something about Pegasus. There is perhaps more of a temptation to call this transparent version true rather than neither true nor false than there is in the case of, say, (1). Perhaps this can be attributed to the fuzziness of our notion of a sentence's being "about" something. Usually we put the singular term which most concerns us, the one the sentence is primarily "about," at the beginning of a sentence, in subject position. 'John hit Mary' is about both John and Mary, of course, but we are more apt to say, if forced to make a choice, that it is about John than we are to say that it is about Mary. It is obvious that this

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[2]Quine, Word and Object, pp. 176-77.

temptation to be swayed by some notion of "aboutness" must be resisted. There should be no more temptation to say that 'Pegasus is believed by Homer to fly' is true or false than there should be for 'Pegasus flies', and we know that we will want 'Homer believes Pegasus to fly' and 'Pegasus is believed by Homer to fly' to be in the same boat with respect to truth value.

This seems to hold together fairly well: if a term occurring in purely referential position fails to refer, the containing sentence will lack a truth value. Quine's next task is to show that all sentences which use 'Pegasus' and which can be said to be either true or false use 'Pegasus' in non-referential positions. The sentence that causes the most trouble is (3). Here we want to say that the sentence is false, and yet there seems to be no evident reason for counting the occurrence of 'Pegasus' here as not purely referential. That 'Pegasus' does not refer is not sufficient reason, for it also fails to refer in (1), but it occurs in referential position there. It is enough that it purports to refer, and to account in a satisfactory way for (3), we would need an independent argument of some sort for the claim that the 'Pegasus' of (3) does not even purport to refer. Also, it satisfies the substitutivity criterion; if 'Pegasus exists' were true, then any term with the same designation as 'Pegasus' could be substituted salva veritate in that position. On the other hand we have a great deal of trouble making sense of quantifying over this position. For example, applying existential and universal generalization to the position '_____ exists' gives us (Ex)(x exists) and (x)(x exists). What these formulas intend seem harmless

enough, but there are anomalies. What does it mean to say "There exists an 'x' such that it exists"? As Quine suggests, we seem to have an embarrassment of riches.[3] But surely we want to be able to say of anything that it exists. Can we manage it in canonical notation without the double talk? Again, (x)(x exists) seems trivially true, but we reach a falsehood if we try to instantiate to 'Pegasus exists'. But if Pegasus occurs in purely referential position we should be able to make this inference. These are some of the problems that this position in particular can raise for the canonical notation.

So the problems are that the use of singular terms (1) threaten to leave us with truth value gaps, and (2) threaten the applicability of the concept of purely referential position. These problems are compounded by the fact that by just looking at a given sentence we cannot tell whether they will arise; we must first learn whether or not the singular terms it contains actually have reference. These problems arise within ordinary language. If any of the sentences we have been looking at are accepted at face value as meaningful as they are, then Quine's logical system will have to deal with the problems.

Quine suggests the following procedure so that his logic can avoid these problems.

> Think of 'a' as a singular term, and '...a...' as any sentence containing 'a' in purely referential position. By the substitutivity of identity, since the position is purely referential,

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[3] Ibid., p. 176.

> (1) (x)(if x=a and ...x..., then ...a...).
> I shall suppose 'x' foreign to the sentence represented by '...a...'. (Otherwise take another letter.) But then (1) is equivalent, by the elementary logic of quantification, to:
> (2) If (Ex)(x=a and ...x...) then ...a... .
> Conversely, moreover,
> (3) If ...a... then (Ex)(x=a and ...x...);
> for, if ...a... then a=a and ...a... . Now (2) and (3) combine to show that '...a...' is equivalent to '(Ex)(x=a and ...x...), which contain 'a' only in the position '=a'.
> This shows that the purely referential occurrences of singular terms other than variables can be got down to the type '=a'. It does not show the same for variables, for see the manifold occurrences of 'x' needed in '(Ex)(x=a and ...x...)' itself; but no matter, since the singular terms that raised problems were not the variables.
> Now an interesting thing about our being able to manoeuvre those singular terms into a standard position '=a' is that '=a' taken as a whole is in effect a predicate, or general term; and general terms raise none of the problems that singular terms raised. What suggests itself is that '=Pegasus', '=mama', '=Socrates', etc., be parsed anew as indissoluble general terms, no separate recognition of singular terms 'Pegasus',[4] 'mama', 'Socrates', etc., being needed for other positions.

So singular terms, when they cause trouble, can be paraphrased in such a way that they are incorporated into general terms. Sentences (1), (2) and (3) become

(1a) (Ex)(Px and x flies)

(2a) Homer believes (#x)Px, or
(Ex)(Px and Homer believes x to exist)

(3a) (Ex)Px,

where 'P' is read in all cases as '=Pegasus' or 'is-Pegasus'. The problem with (1) was that it previously had no truth value. Now it is straightforwardly false. (3) turns out false, as we wanted it to, but it now has the additional virtue of not raising problems about

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[4] Ibid., pp. 178-79.

the reference of singular terms, since it has none (except for the variables). The two renderings of (2) are settled without any discomfiture. I here ignore any problems that might arise in Quine's attempt to make other non-purely referential instances of 'Pegasus' fit a propositional attitude model.[5]

One important restriction that this proposed analysis of singular terms must adhere to is that it apply only to those singular terms which contain no internal structure which we might wish to perpetuate. This reparsing, then, can apply only to logically simple singular terms, in other words, to proper names. The need for this is obvious; the analysis throws the entire singular term into a predicate position which is forever closed to us. Quine's predicates are themselves logically simple.

Quine's results here have not gone without criticism. Geach has argued[6] that, because Quine analyzes them as descriptions, he completely misrepresents the nature and workings of proper names. He attributes to Quine the view that proper names are disguised definite descriptions. Here Geach is discussing the account Quine gives in Methods of Logic, in which he carries out the elimination of singular terms by construing names as descriptions and then getting rid of all descriptions. In Word and Object Quine has shifted his strategy. There he eliminates proper names by parsing them as predicates and later deals with the remaining singular terms. This approach has the

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[5]See Ibid., pp. 179-80.

[6]In P. T. Geach, Mental Acts, pp. 67-68.

virtue of avoiding the appearance of having adopted Russell's analysis of proper names as descriptions. (Geach, by the way, fails to notice this difference and falls into error, giving the old Methods of Logic account in a review of Word and Object.)[7] In Methods of Logic Quine had to create the same kind of predicate, 'is-Pegasus', e.g., in order to construct the appropriate description into which the name was being paraphrased. Since Geach's criticisms are directed at this predicate, his remarks remain relevant to the Word and Object approach.

> Now suppose somebody chooses to call her dog "Cerberus," and introduces him under that name: "this is Cerberus." A follower of Quine 'insists' on parsing "Cerberus" as a predcate. Later on, he says of another dog: "here is another Cerberus." On Quine's view, this would be merely a factual mistake, which the owner could suitably correct by saying "No, there's only one Cerberus." Would it not then be in place to ask the owner how she knows there is only one Cerberus? and is not this plainly a silly question, in fact? As the owner intended "Cerberus" to be used, such expressions as "here is another Cerberus" or "there are several Cerberuses" are not just false statements--they are excluded altogether as moves in the language-game played with "Cerberus." The owner did not, then, mean "Cerberus" as a predicate; and it is useless to 'insist that it be' one--this insistence is insistence upon playing a different game with the word, and is irrelevant to the owner's use of it.[8]

So Geach's case rests on an appeal to the ordinary use of proper names, showing that this use is not the same as that for predicates. Let us now turn to consider the following passages taken from a section that Quine labels "Conciliatory Remarks":

> A conspicuous way in which our reparsing of names as general terms deviates from ordinary usage, as distinct from ordinary

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[7]Geach, "Review of Word and Object," p. 15.

[8]Geach, Mental Acts, pp. 67-68. See also Herbert Hochberg, "On Pegasizing," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVII, (1956-1957), pp. 551-55.

> categorizations of usage, is in its closing of truth value gaps.
>
> ...general terms frequently obey laws that seem accountable to the meanings of the terms and not to contingent fact; witness the law of symmetry of the relative term 'cousin', or of transitivity of 'part'. One might equally well recognize uniqueness--anyway in the weak sense of 'one at most'--as similarly implicit in the very meaning of certain general terms, viz., ones like 'Socrates'. Such general terms might on that very account be denominated, more particularly, names.[9]

In this second passage Quine denies that his view cannot allow for uniqueness. One might counter that introducing the notion of a general term, the meaning of which implies uniqueness of reference, tends to break down the singular/general term distinction, but such a complaint will not bother Quine. He has long claimed that the distinction is purely a grammatical one and not a matter of how many objects a term may be true of. And whether a term fills the 'F' or the 'a' position of 'Fa' is just the sort of thing he has in mind here.

But the first passage quoted is more interesting. Geach has accused Quine of not accurately reflecting ordinary use, but here Quine confesses freely that his proposal is counter to ordinary use, claiming that such deviance is perfectly all right. Quine, then, is not trying to accurately reflect ordinary usage, while Geach's criticisms suppose that he is.

To be fair to Geach, it should be said that Quine's position is not so clear in Methods of Logic as it later comes out in Word and

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[9]Quine, Word and Object, p. 182.

Object. Still, he is not off the hook entirely. Quine just never quite says that names are descriptions, even in Methods of Logic. Always he says things like "we can treat" or "we can construe" names as descriptions. It is incautious to go from such claims to attributing to the author the view that names are descriptions. Assuming that John Searle has Quine in mind as an example of what he calls the "second view," he makes this same jump in his article "Proper Names."[10]

Geach criticizes Quine's parsing of names again in Reference and Generality, claiming that "Quine's thesis that names are theoretically dispensable is pretty well empty." Here is the entire passage.

> It would, for example, be entirely useless for Quine to protest that, since he uses a symbolic language from which all proper names are eliminable, the "x" in a proposition of the form "For some x, F(x)" is not a proper name variable; for this symbolic language contains methods of proof in which a conclusion is treated as inferable from a premise "For some x, F(x)" because it is inferable from a line "F(x)", and here "x" is handled as an ad hoc proper name. Moreover, Quine frequently refers to interpretations of letters like "x" and "y", and surely assigning an object to a letter as its interpretation differs only nominally from treating the letter pro hac vice as a proper name of the object. Indeed, in one passage, when speaking of assigning an object to a letter as its interpretation, Quine uses the actual expression: "'x' is reinterpreted as a name of that object." In the circumstances, Quine's thesis that names are theoretically dispensable is pretty well empty.[11]

Geach has shifted his ground. Perhaps recognizing that appeals to ordinary language will not do, he claims that Quine has failed to eliminate names because they are smuggled in through the variables of

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[10] In Mind, LXVII (1958), as reprinted in Charles Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language, p. 157.

[11] Geach, Reference and Generality, pp. 160-61.

quantification. What are we to say of this?

Let us first suppose that we have as a premiss of a proof the line '(Ex)Fx' and that we infer some lower line 'Fx' from this premiss. Is this 'x' of 'Fx' here handled as a proper name, as Geach claims? He does not elaborate on this point, but Geach cannot mean that all unbound variables in a proof play the role of a proper name. For if we infer 'Fx' from the premiss '(x)Fx', 'x' is certainly not playing the role of a name since we can infer (x)Fx from Fx and we cannot infer it from, say, Fa. Quine keeps track of the status of his variables by "flagging" the free occurrences of variables that are introduced by existential instantiation. Geach must mean, then, that flagged variables play the role of proper names in Quine's proofs. Certainly there is a parallel between what we are allowed to do with proper names and what we are allowed to do with the 'x' of 'Fx'. But this is not to say that the flagged variables play the same role as do names. One crucial difference is that 'Fa' (with interpreted 'F' and 'a') is a sentence, whereas 'Fx' is not. Geach's examples of Quine's assigning interpretations to letters all deal with instances of open sentences, which are not truly sentences at all. 'Open' is here used syncategorematically.[12] So Quine is free to say, that given any sentence, he can paraphrase it so that it contains no names, and it is sentences, what can be true and false, which concern us.

It is difficult to explain just what role is being played by

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[12]Quine, Word and Object, section 27.

flagged variables. But this is because the relationship between inferred lines of a proof and the proof's premisses is a purely syntactic one. The premisses will normally have some sort of interpretation; if there is a free variable in the premiss (of course it could not be flagged), the premiss is then a function (in the mathematical sense of that word), and there is no call to interpret 'x' apart from that function 'Fx' in which it occurs. The proof procedure is a method of obtaining valid conclusions from premisses. Naturally we are interested in premisses and conclusions that are interpretable. But flagged variables will occur in neither the premisses nor the conclusion of an argument; they are introduced and made to disappear along the way. The whole point of flagging a variable is to let us know what sorts of further inferences are possible for the line containing it. There is simply no motivation for interpreting the lines with flagged variables at all. To do so would introduce a non-syntactic relationship between lines of proof, which is just what Quine should like to avoid doing. The proof can do all we ask of it with just the notion of certain syntactic relationships.

Geach, then, confuses the status of open sentences with that of lines of proof. Quine will want to reinterpret the 'x' of an open sentence as a proper name.[13] This will produce a sentence, from which, of course, the proper name will be eliminable. To put the point strongly, lines of proof with flagged variables are not only not open

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[13]See Quine, Methods of Logic, pp. 90-91.

sentences, they need not be interpreted at all. And anyway, even if, after all this has been said, a critic still wants to call flagged variables names, Quine can agree to let him do so with no loss to his program. For he is not committed by his program to eliminate or reparse all proper names, but only those which give rise to the difficulties that bother him. If flagged variables are names, then so be it; they are of a harmless variety which we could easily tolerate.[14]

A more likely sort of complaint is that names are smuggled in, not by way of the variables, but by way of the predicates. This sort of objection can be aimed at Quine's thesis when it is couched in terms of eliminability, for if the claim is that names are eliminated, then "they" cannot be allowed to reappear in another guise. The issue here, of course, is when it is fair to let this 'they' take 'names' as its antecedent. But we have seen that in Word and Object a more conciliatory Quine prefers to talk in terms of reconstrual rather than of elimination. In effect, he is admitting that we still have proper names, or a class of terms that we can with some motivation or profit continue to call names, all right, but that they are handled in a new way which avoids some old problems.

There is, then, a sense in which it is true that Quine's claim is empty. For he never claimed to introduce a language in which nothing did the individuating that proper names do in natural languages. His claim in Methods of Logic was essentially that descriptions could be made to do the same job. In Word and Object the claim

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[14] On this point, see Word and Object, p. 178, for Quine's comments regarding singular terms and variables.

is rather that specially introduced predicates along with the variables and operators of quantification theory can do the job. And he remarks that we can say that the category of names has not really been dissipated but only construed as general terms--in the grammatical sense of 'general term'. We can even call these new predicates 'names' if we wish.

Hochberg sees a dilemma here.[15] He argues that without some sort of guarantee we could never know that the uniqueness condition holds for Quine's predicates. But if we do not know this, then they are not doing the work of proper names. If we do have such a guarantee, then we have merely introduced proper names at the predicate level. Quine, we have seen, embraces this second horn willingly enough. What he wants to deny is the conclusion that Hochberg infers from it, that then we have no philosophic gains. It is not clear whether Hochberg believes that we have the same problems after paraparaphrase as before or whether we have a set of new ones. He seems to claim both, but to argue only for the second. I have already tried to show how Quine's paraphrases do clear up the problems that originally prompted the paraphrasing. As for the new ones, Hochberg is worried about (a) our being able to understand undefined predicate terms when the property associated with the predicate is not exemplified, and (b) our being able to tell when such a property is exemplified. The answer here is that we can understand and know when to apply such predicates in just the way in which we understand

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[15] Hochberg, "On Pegasizing," pp. 551-55.

and can apply proper names. There is no problem here, or rather, no new problem. If, e.g., Searle's account of proper names as a "peg on which to hang descriptions" is to be accepted, then Quine's predicates can have the same "loosely analytic" relationship to ordinary descriptions without being identified with any number of them. This parallel between Quine's new predicates and the old category of proper names will be one of the motives for retaining the idea of a category of names as a subset of general terms.

3. Propositions and propositional attitudes

We have seen how Quine has proposed to come to terms with the problems associated with opacity and proper names by establishing an artificial notation in which the problems will not arise. It has been the particular problems raised by issues such as these that have determined the form that Quine's logical notation takes. Thus, in Word and Object Quine demonstrates the ambiguities of scope and opacity and adopts quantificational notation in order to handle them. Problems with names and other singular terms led to the elimination of the singular term[1] as a part of the canonical form. With singular terms having been eliminated, the forms of Quine's language are reduced to predication, quantification (operators and variables), and truth functional connectives.

From here on, while we will still be concerned with adequate paraphrasing, a new dimension comes into play. Assuming that we have

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[1]See Quine, Word and Object, section 38.

solved most of the problems due to the form of the language involved, problems remain concerning how we are to fill in these forms. In other words, given our regimented forms, what vocabulary of general terms shall we count as predicates and what universe of objects shall we assume for our variables to range over? All along, of course, we have taken the answers to many of these questions for granted. This was necessary if we were to argue that the canonical form of a sentence could take the place of the original version of that sentence. We assumed, for example, that we would want to include persons as values of variables in order to deal with proper names. The same project led us to introduce special sorts of predicates, such as 'is-Pegasus'. Our interest now shifts, then, from the general forms of our language to particular concepts, both of the properties with which our predicates are associated, and of the entities over which we will want to allow our variables to range.

Quine himself characterizes the innovations we have so far looked at as "bland." He apparently considers the suggested paraphrases to be unproblematic, and I have tried for the most part to support this view. Quine does not see the problems we are about to consider to be nearly so unproblematic, however. What we have here are real substantive issues, concerning which we can only weigh in the balance the pros and cons and over which there can be real disagreement. Of course, one of the reasons Quine thinks this is that he thinks that these issues will more directly influence the ontology to which we are committed than did the issue over proper names. This matter is certainly crucial, and it will be discussed in Chapter IV.

One new aspect of these problems is that the question will not be one solely of making sure that our canonical notation can be used to say anything we can say in ordinary language, but of seeing to it that it can be used to say anything we will want to say. There will be things that Quine will insist we should not want to say at all and, so, things we need not worry about our canonical notation leaving out. Indeed, if our canonical notation makes it impossible to say something that we should not wish to say, this fact becomes another point in its favor.

Let me interject here a brief explanation of my terminology. When I refer to the canonical forms of Quine's language I mean the particular forms (predication, quantification and truth functions, as it turned out) that can combine to produce meaningful sentences. Before our discussion of proper names, 'Fa' was a canonical form of the language; it is not any longer. The (a) canonical form of a sentence is just what we get when we paraphrase it into Quine's artificial notation, that is, the language itself. I sometimes refer to this language as the canonical notation.

To illustrate this new sort of problem and the special issues accompanying it, let us consider Quine's treatment of propositions and propositional attitudes. For the rest of this section I will take 'believing that _____' as a paradigm example of propositional attitude. It may be recalled that we encountered the locution 'believing that _____' in #1 in dealing with opacity. It will be helpful to return to our discussion there, picking up with the decision to paraphrase 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' as either

(1) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, or (2) Tom believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline, localizing the referential opacity in the 'that' and the 'to' of 'believes that' and believes to'. What this conclusion meant was that we could not reach into these positions; they are closed to us, logically simple. Thus we might have gone on to represent (1) as 'Btp, where B=believes, t=Tom and p=what it is that Tom believes (say a proposition). By the results of the previous section, we then get (Ex)(Ey)(Tx and Py and Bxy). (2) might then be represented as 'Btca', where c=Cicero and a=what is believed true of Cicero (say an attribute). Then we get (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(Tx and Cy and Az and Bxyz). So though it was not so spelled out, our account of #1 tacitly utilized what many persons have wanted to call propositions and attributes, i.e., took them as values of variables for a fully regimented version. Now, however, we want to take a second look at abstract entities and, in particular, at propositions. Quine wants to argue that there is something wrong with the notion of a proposition and that we should not count them in the universe of entities ranged over by our variables.

It will be helpful at this point to distinguish various aspects of regimentation. There are, first of all, the actual canonical forms of the language, i.e., the allowable constructions. For Quine, these can be reduced to predication, universal quantification, and a single truth function.[2] Sometimes problems with ordinary language can be cleaned up just by elimination of a particular kind

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[2]See Quine, Word and Object, section 47.

of ordinary language construction. An example of such a case was the elimination of proper names. By reducing proper names to a special sort of predication, some of the problems peculiar to this sort of construction were eliminated. Once we are reduced to Quine's canonical form, though, we still have the problems of what predicates to allow and what to accept as values of variables. The second issue is one of ontology; the first might be called one of ideology.[3]

The problems we have over the status of propositions will not affect the basic constructions as we have them set forth. Nor, of course, is it the case that restricting ourselves to canonical form will avoid the problems. Given the basic constructions of our regimented language and the constructions of ordinary language, the difficulties over propositions exist on both sides of a paraphrase. If the concept of a proposition is suspect at all, it is suspect whether we use 'proposition' to refer to the suspect entities in ordinary language or whether we take these entities as values of our variables in a regimented sentence. This means that arguments for and against the use of the concept of a proposition will be independent of issues of canonization; that is, the arguments will be equally telling whether they are given in the context of a discussion of regimentation or in some other context.

Our discussion regarding propositions will, however, have an indirect effect upon our adoption of regimentation. If we decide not to allow our variables to range over propositions, we will be restricted

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[3]Following a suggestion of Quine's. See his From a Logical Point of View, pp. 131-32.

in the ways in which we can paraphrase certain ordinary language sentences. But of course acceptance of a canonical notation will depend a great deal upon how easily the sentences of ordinary language can be made to fit it. So if rejecting propositions has dire effects upon the paraphrasability of ordinary language sentences, this will work against the adoption of our canonical language.

We can drop talk of propositions, we now assume, from ordinary language without any effect upon statements of belief, say, since most statements of belief do not use the term 'proposition'.[4] But when we paraphrased 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' into 'Tom believes that-Cicero-denounced-Catiline', we were treating 'believes' as a two placed relation relating the two entities Tom and that-Cicero-denounced-Catiline. This second entity seems to be the sort of thing that philosophers have wanted to call propositions. It might be suggested that, after all, 'that Cicero denounced Catiline' occurs in the ordinary language version, and why should it not be considered a reference to a proposition if its canonical version is? Quine's answer is that there are many terms and phrases of natural languages which do not refer to entities and that the "logic" of natural languages is just so chaotic that one can either claim or deny a reference to propositions with impunity. There is no way to settle the issue. The glory of our regimented language is that we <u>can</u> tell; accepting a proposition as a value of a variable constitutes reference

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[4]Quine will deny this, for he believes that many philosophers tacitly make use of illegitimate concepts without recognizing that they do. So they might drop 'proposition' from their vocabulary and still make illicit use of the concept.

to a proposition.[5] So if the arguments over whether to accept propositions seems at first to be independent of our accepting a canonical language, our decision will still have its consequences for the language, consequences which are farther reaching than those the decision has for ordinary language.

We turn now to Quine's discussion of, first, propositions and, then, propositional attitudes. There has been a great deal of literature on these questions, of course, and I will not try either to recount any of it or to argue for or against propositions. Instead I will merely try to trace Quine's approach to see where it leads him. Here we are not so much interested in propositions as such, but in how Quine's views about them will affect his paraphrases. He begins with two assumptions: (1) that we will not want to make use of concepts that we can make little or no sense of, and (2) that we will not want to use any more concepts or recognize any more entities than is absolutely necessary. One prerequisite for making sense of a concept is that we have some sort of a reasonable standard of identity for those entities which can be said to fall under it. His section 42 of Word and Object[6] is devoted to arguing that, in fact, we have no such criterion for identifying propositions. It is argued that all attempts to derive a satisfactory criterion of identity have rested upon the notion of synonymy. Since we have been unable to make sense of this notion (#16), such formulations are of no help.

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[5] See below, Chapter IV, section 2.

[6] Parenthetical references in the following discussion are all to sections of Word and Object.

This objection is then generalized into an argument against <u>any</u> account of propositions. Roughly, it is argued that it is necessary that any theory of propositions be interlingual; we must be able to express the same proposition in different languages. But this implies that there is a "really" right way to translate sentences from one language into another, that we can make sense of a synonymy relation existing between sentences of different languages. Naturally, since Quine claims to have shown (##15, 16) that this is not the case, this result counts against any notion of propositions. This, then, provides motivation for not talking about propositions.

Next, Quine goes on to argue that we do not have any need to talk about propositions (#43). He argues that they are not needed as translational constants (there are no such things), as constants of philosophical analysis ("even if synonymy concepts were in good shape, they would be out of place here") or as truth vehicles (we can use eternal sentences [#40]). This leaves but one claim to the philosopher who would defend propositions, that they are needed as objects for the propositional attitudes. Quine devotes a full section (#44) to this claim, most of it spent in searching for some other objects for them. He rejects both the suggestion that we take classes (the condition for identity is too weak) and the suggestion that we take eternal sentences (this involves us in problems of identity conditions for languages) as their objects. He considers Scheffler's inscriptional approach, noting that it seems to provide the most satisfactory candidate, but also that it cannot handle quantification over these objects. Without going into

any discussion of Scheffler's view, or why it has this defect, it turns out that the defect has the consequence that we will be unable to say things like "Paul believes something that Elmer does not" and "Eisenhower and Stevenson agree on something (nothing)." Quine's view seems to be that these sorts of sentences are rather trivial and that we can, with only a slight loss, agree to forgo them. But if we are prepared to give up quantifying over propositions, then there is no reason to count them as values of variables in our canonical notation. There is no need to see 'that-Cicero-denounced-Catiline' as a term. In thus restricting the range of our variables, we shift this burden onto our predicate terms. This means that 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' is paraphrased as 'Tom believes-Cicero-denounced-Catiline'; its form is 'Fx', where 'x' can take Tom as a value and 'F' is read as the single placed predicate 'believes-Cicero-denounced-Catiline'[1]. This, then, is Quine's final solution to the problems raised by propositions and propositional attitudes. There are no such things as propositions, and propositional attitudes are logically unstructured, or simple.

This last step represents a new phase in Quine's treatment of his regimented language. For the first time we are asked to accept paraphrases that have the result of barring us from saying something that we might wish to say. It is true that Quine's handling of opacity rendered certain ordinary language expressions illegitimate, but there was no loss suffered since what these expressions were meant to say could be said in other ways. But

here there is no such escape. Quine has taken what must be seen as the very radical step of claiming that there are ordinary language expressions which are meaningful, can be true or false, and can play a genuine, if limited, role in describing the world, and which must be thrown out because they cannot be expressed in the canonical notation. In describing the situation in this way, I do not mean to imply that this cannot or should not be done. I mean only to emphasize that so doing is a radical departure from what we have previously done with respect to opacity and proper names.

What room is there to disagree with Quine's conclusion? Previously it could be objected either that a paraphrase that went through was not adequate or that there were sentences that could not be paraphrased at all. The second sort of objection would seem to be out of order in this case since Quine concedes that we have some (slight) loss here. Without taking time to argue for it, I claim now that attempts to show those paraphrases which will now go through to be inadequate will fail. Quine can still hold that one can do with the new canonical form of the sentence what one wanted to do with the original. When it is considered how Quine packs his predicates, I think it is clear that the adequacy of the canonical language (on any reasonable account of "adequacy") for these sentences is, as was urged for other paraphrases, unproblematic. There remain his premisses, both of which are surely defensible, and his attack upon propositions themselves.

Assuming again that we have no quarrel with Quine's attack upon propositions, let us return to this matter of the canonical

notation requiring us to make a sacrifice in what we might want to say. A critic might want to argue that the necessity of such a sacrifice is in itself sufficient to show that the program of regimentation has not yet been made good. He could argue that on Quine's own ground rules, we need to show that any ordinary language sentence can (a) be adequately paraphrased, or (b) be shown undesirable in itself or unneeded. But to argue as Quine does that a sentence is "pretty trivial in what (it) affirms" or "useful only in heralding more tangible information" is not to show that occasionally we do not want to affirm something trivial or use a sentence only to herald more tangible information.[7]

I find such an attack inconclusive. It begins with the claim that, in principle, a canonical notation should not rule out of order something we might want to say. It is an appeal to a need to say trivial things at times, and it might incorporate an attempt to show some of the consequences of Quine's view to be not so trivial. These are not implausible appeals. But even if it were true that Quine has us ruling out things that are important, it need not be true that this should never be done. The problem seems to be over the idea of needing a locution. We can have a precise notion of what we need in the way of locutions only in so far as we know what we want to do with language. In any sort of enterprise we have an array of goals, ranging from what we consider essential, through what we consider important, to the less important, and down

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[7]See Quine, Word and Object, p. 215, where Quine wrestles with this problem (and perhaps, some would say, his conscience as well).

to the clearly optional. If we so desired, we could demand of a canonical notation that it accept any ordinary language sentence, refusing to sacrifice anything. This would be to overlook the fact that we appealed to a canonical notation in the first place in order to avoid problems that arose in our ordinary language. By refusing to accept any canonical form that sacrifices any of ordinary language, we are left with at least some of the problems that we began with. (This assumes that no canonical notation will be so ideal as to keep all the advantages of natural languages as well as avoiding all their problems.) We have a scale of problems to balance against a scale of goals. Quine can reply that one can retain proposition-talk in order to keep the option of quantifying over propositions, but that in so doing one has let back in the problems associated with propositions. Quine clearly thinks that this is a bad bargain; others will disagree.

The upshot of these considerations is that, given the program that regimentation has set for itself, the fact that the canonical notation rules out our saying something is not in itself a sufficient condition to discredit it. A justification of the notation will consist in showing that the inconvenience of giving up on a particular goal is more than balanced by the elimination of certain problems that bothered us in the pursuit of that goal, and perhaps others, as well. We can see that this was also true with respect to our discussions of opacity and proper names, though the matter never came up since either we were able to come up with suitable paraphrases or we assumed that Quine could do so for the trouble spots we skipped over.

What conclusions can be drawn at this point? We have seen that regimentation is a method of paraphrasing natural language sentences into an artificial language. It is introduced in order to deal with particular problems that arise within a natural language. The use of a canonical form of a natural language sentence or term need not conform to the use of the natural language version itself. Quine's paraphrases are clearly not meant as ordinary language analyses. This means that critics of particular paraphrases who have based their objections to certain paraphrases upon appeals to ordinary language (e.g., Linsky on opacity, Geach on proper names) are misguided. They are not playing by the ground rules laid down by Quine. Given this fact, it may look as though it will be very difficult to establish that a given paraphrase will not be adequate, provided only that it does solve the particular problem involved. Finally, it need not even be true that we must be able to supply a canonical version for every meaningful natural language sentence.

We have now seen what sort of thing counts as a paraphrase and what kinds of problems motivate the search for a paraphrase. With this background, the next two chapters will go on to examine in more detail the relationship between a natural language sentence and its canonical form.

CHAPTER TWO

REGIMENTATION CHARACTERIZED AND MODELED

1. Characterizing regimentation

Reduced to its barest essentials, regimentation as we have seen it is a program for replacing troublesome expressions of a language with alternate expressions of another language, one especially constructed so as to avoid the problems that arose with the expressions of the original language. In one sense of the term 'program of regimentation', it is true of any language that proposes to solve the problems in question along these lines; usually, however, I use 'regimentation' to refer to Quine's particular program. As such, it represents not only certain forms of expressions supplemented with a stock of general terms and a policy restricting the range of its variables, but in addition a set of "aims and claims" for that program. It was impossible to display Quine's program only in its bare essentials; dealing with cases necessitated our coming to recognize particular problems. Solving these problems involved not only working within Quine's language but, finally, some kind of an intuitive grasp of the relationship that must hold between two sentences if one is to be a (Quinean) paraphrase of the other. To this extent we have already been exposed to some aims and claims. In Chapter IV I propose to be more systematic in our coverage. What will take up our attention in this chapter will be an attempt to

analyze in some detail the relationship that Quine claims holds between a sentence and its paraphrased, or regimented, versions.

Some terminological remarks are in order here. We regiment languages by replacing troublesome forms of the language with new forms. We can paraphrase a sentence S by replacing it with a sentence S' that consists only of the improved (canonical) forms of expression. I call S' variously the paraphrase, the regimented version, or the canonical version of S. Casting a sentence into the forms of a canonical language is one way of paraphrasing. But the notions are more closely connected than even this would indicate since the proposed program of regimentation stands or falls with the paraphrases it enables one to make. One has successfully regimented a language if and only if one can successfully paraphrase sentences in their precanonical form into sentences cast in canonical form; whatever good a program of regimentation will do will depend upon how sentences behave when cast into regimented forms, i.e. when paraphrased. This means that discussions of regimentation very often boil down to a discussion not of the relationships between forms of languages, but to a consideration of the relationships between sentences. This is why I tend to use 'regimentation' and 'paraphrase' interchangeably in many contexts. An example: Quine's regimentation of ordinary English does away with proper names in favor of special predicates. This elimination can be described as part of a regimentation of the forms of English. On the other hand it can also be described as a guide for paraphrasing every English statement containing a proper name into some sentence which does not contain any.

It makes no difference whether we speak of regimenting forms or of paraphrasing sentences, so long as we remember that a large part of the proof of any regimental pudding will be in our taste for its sentences.[1]

I now propose that the following chapters of this work be taken as the continuation of a dialogue between Quine and certain of his critics. Quine originally opened the dialogue by presenting (over a period of years) various paraphrases, i.e., by replacing troublesome expressions of a language (usually English) with alternate expressions of another language, one especially constructed so as to avoid the problems that arose with the expressions of the original language. His critics have often responded by leveling a particular sort of charge at him. Linsky, we saw, protested that Quine's regimentation of belief contexts were inadequate since they had the consequence that sentences like 'There is someone such that Tom believes that he denounced Catiline' were nonsense, whereas every English speaker can understand sentences like these. Again, we saw that Geach complained that construing proper names as predicates did not adequately capture the way in which they were used in a language. Furthermore it was open to anyone to argue that Quine's treatment of 'proposition' could not possibly be an adequate account of the role it plays in language since in ordinary language we can use the concept of a proposition to say some things that just cannot be said on Quine's account. A common reaction, then, has been to

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[1]For more on the priority of sentences, see below, Chapter III, section 1.

proclaim that Quine's paraphrases are inadequate as analyses of ordinary language.

Quine's reply can be summed up quite succinctly. It is that he has been completely misunderstood by such critics; his paraphrases were never intended as ordinary language analyses, and they should not be judged as such. It is usually irrelevant that aspects of ordinary usage are not reflected in his paraphrases and, where it is not irrelevant, it is generally an asset of the paraphrases (as when the paraphrase of proper names eliminated truth value gaps).

This much of our dialogue, at least, is explicit in the literature. I now imagine Quine's critics to take the following line. You say your paraphrases are not ordinary language analyses. Fair enough, but tell us how we are to take them. We know what sorts of criteria we can use for judging the correctness of ordinary language analyses; what, then, is the status of a Quinean paraphrase, and what is the criterion for a good paraphrase on your account?

Quine's answer to this response is explicitly spelled out for the first time in Word and Object, especially section 33, though there are helpful hints scattered throughout the book. If the critics of Quine are to maintain a dialogue, it is incumbent upon them to attempt to come to grips with Quine's elaboration of his program. It must be determined both whether Quine gives a full and consistent account of regimentation and whether he provides an adequate criterion for telling good paraphrases from bad. These tasks, then, set the program for the remainder of this work.

We are now ready to look at the general characterization Quine gives of paraphrases and of the paraphrase relationship. The first

thing that must be kept in mind is the close connection between Quine's paraphrases and the very ordinary sort of thing that we do in everyday life and which we call 'paraphrasing'.[2] It is true that when a philosopher like Quine is through, the sentence in canonical form may look very unordinary and even exotic, but the fact that all of the unordinary expressions are explained in ordinary language assures us of a link. We have a continuum. We can paraphrase into expressions more or less ordinary. " . . . Paraphrasing into logical symbols is after all not unlike what we all do every day in paraphrasing sentences to avoid ambiguity. The main difference apart from quantity of change is . . . the motive."[3] This fact can be overlooked, as when it is argued that since Quine is concerned with moving from natural languages to artificial languages, methodological remarks concerning the relationship between natural language sentences must be irrelevant. If paraphrasing into logical symbols is comparable to everyday ordinary language paraphrasing, then conclusions we reach concerning the relationship holding between an ordinary language expression and an adequate paraphrase for it will be relevant to that holding between an expression and its canonical form. Furthermore, insofar as we think of ordinary language paraphrases in terms of the theory of meaning, any conclusions we reach will bear on Quine's famous views of meaning and translation.

This brings us to the next point that Quine wants to insist

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[2]See below, section 4 of this chapter.

[3]Quine, Word and Object, p. 159.

upon, that the relationship between a sentence and its canonical form is not that of synonymy. This may lead to a stumbling block. It is obvious that Quine cannot use any notion of synonymy to explicate the paraphrase relationship for he rejects such notions as incoherent. But it is not so obvious that others, who do claim to understand meaning concepts, might not profit from the introduction of such concepts here. This raises the problem of finding common ground for argument. For it may be claimed that it avails little either to attack or to defend Quine by assuming doctrines unacceptable to him. The answer to this is that it will not avail much for Quine, to be sure, but that it may avail much for others. I will, then, occasionally make references and appeals to concepts belonging to the theory of meaning. I will make these references and appeals as intuitive as possible so as to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. I acknowledge here the qualification that such appeals will not be directed to confirmed Quineans. One exception to this qualification is to be noted. It will not tell against the force of challenges to Quine to make good certain notions <u>without</u> an appeal to concepts of the theory of meaning.

There is more to Quine's rejection of synonymy here than at first meets the eye. It is not just his characteristic refusal to use the concept of synonymy that is at work here. He invites us to consider a sentence S, its canonical form S', and S'', which is the result of replacing the technical logical notation of S' with semi-ordinary language in accordance with the way in which the logical symbols were originally explained. We are not to think of either S' or S'' as being synonymous with S. All right, but Quine allows that

" . . . S' might indeed naturally enough be spoken of as synonymous with . . .[S'']."[4] I take it that the 'naturally enough' is not meant to confer Quine's blessing upon this locution, but only to concede that S' and S'' are related in such a way that people who do think that synonymy is a concept worthy of the name would tend to call this a relation of synonymy. (This admission is undoubtedly tied to a view, which passages in Quine suggest at times, that there is no difficulty in understanding what is involved in stipulative meaning.)[5] But not even this much can be said for the relationship holding between S and either S' or S''. If this is right, then Quine means that even within the framework of a theory of meaning, S and S' need not be synonymous though, presumably, they might be. Does this undermine any connection between regimentation and the theory of meaning at which I hinted above? In a way, it does. Quine puts regimentation and ordinary language paraphrase in the same boat; now he separates regimentation from meaning concepts. The clear suggestion is that Quine analyzes ordinary paraphrasing so that it is less relevant to meaning concepts than we might have been inclined to suppose. It remains to be seen whether or not the gap can be bridged.

But if the relationship is not one of synonymy, what can it be? "Its [S'] relationship to S is just that the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with the help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him

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[4] Ibid., p. 160.

[5] See From a Logical Point of View, pp. 25-26.

by using S' instead of S. We can even let him modify his purposes under the shift if he pleases."[6] Furthermore, "the speaker is the one to judge whether the substitution of S' for S in the present context will forward his present or evolving program of activity to his satisfaction."[7] If it seemed difficult in Chapter I to find fault with Quine's paraphrases, it might now seem quite hopeless, for so long as he is the paraphraser, he has the final say. Anyone who is dissatisfied, however, is welcome to start his own game. There are here two possible ways to interpret this last characteristic of the program. 'The speaker is the one to judge' can be taken to mean simply that he is in the best position to know; that, although he might be mistaken, he probably will not be. On the other hand, it might be taken to mean that his acceptance of a paraphrase is just what a paraphrase's being good consists in. Can the speaker be wrong in accepting a paraphrase?

This ties in with the claim that "there need be no unique analysis."[8] (This is of course to be separated from the issue over synonymy; the two are independent.) Whether there is a uniquely right analysis is linked to the matter of purposes. Quine supports his claim with an appeal to different inquiries at hand. Some purposes will call for one paraphrase; others will need different ones. We can go on to ask, however, whether there will be a uniquely right

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[6] Quine, Word and Object, p. 160.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 161.

analysis given one particular purpose at hand. Does Quine want to rule out this kind of uniqueness? The answer is yes. We shall see that for Quine, various and mutually inconsistent analyses can prove equally satisfactory. Let us now ask whether, given that a man has particular purposes, he can be wrong about whether the paraphrase satisfies them. Presumably, he cannot be wrong about whether the paraphrase satisfies _him_, but it certainly seems possible to distinguish this question from that of whether his _purpose_ is satisfied. Quine says that "the notion of there being a fixed, explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in the speaker's mind is gratuitous."[9] Can the same be said of purposes? Are there fixed, explicable and perhaps yet unexplained purposes in the mind that a paraphrase might or might not objectively meet, regardless of whether the speaker will accept the paraphrase? Quine does not discuss the purposes we might have in the context of particular paraphrases nearly so much as he should; as a result, this question is just not clearly faced. Sometimes, as in discussing the ordered pair, he seems to allow for an objectivity; at other times the suggestion seems to be otherwise, as when he discusses ambiguity. There may be a good reason for this ambivalence. I leave the issue hanging, pending further investigation.

Finally, we must note the important proviso that under paraphrasing we retain the right to shift back and forth as we may choose between S and S'.

> For an endearing trait of canonical notation is that they do not bind; we can vacillate between two, opportunistically

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[9] _Ibid._, p. 160.

> enjoying their incompatible advantages. What modern logicians call definitions are instructions for doing just that. Thus we can cleave theoretically to a canonical notation in which there are no singular terms but variables, but at the same time we can define relative to that notation, a shorthand use of the other singular terms after all.[10]

Again, "it is one of the consolations of philosophy that the benefit of showing how to dispense with a concept does not hinge on dispensing with it."[11]

It may at first be difficult to see how to reconcile this last "endearing trait" with one aspect of Quine's earlier account of a successful paraphrase. Recall that he allowed that while the speaker's purpose was crucial, that purpose could be modified under the paraphrase. Quine does not spell out just what modifying one's purpose under the shift amounts to. One prima facie possibility is that this proviso is meant to enable us to call the following situation an instance of a successful paraphrase. Suppose a philosopher-scientist has a theory in which sentence S plays a certain specified role, let us say, that of helping to explain phenomenon p. We ask him to render S into our canonical language. As he prepares to do so, he modifies, i.e., he changes, his purpose; he is no longer interested in explaining p, but gains a new purpose, say, explaining q. He then produces S' as a rendering of S, and S' is adequate because it fills this new purpose, i.e., it helps to explain q. What do we want to say about this? One consequence of characterizing this as a successful

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[10] Ibid., p. 188.

[11] Ibid., p. 190.

rendering is that any canonical sentence can be a rendering of any ordinary language sentence, though perhaps Quine will accept this. But it also means that we lose the right to go back and forth between the two languages. For we will not be able to shift from S' back to S unless we also shift our purposes back, S having been devised with a different purpose in mind. The need for this last shift, I submit, makes the whole procedure a little too "shifty." Furthermore, this takes us further from Quine's notion of doing the same thing as S; if one's purposes have changed under the rendering, what sorts of things can S' and S be doing that can be called the same? Only, it seems, things as broad and as uninteresting as, e.g., playing a role in the theory or fulfilling some purpose.

Perhaps, though, there is a reading of 'modifying one's purposes' that will not have these consequences. On our way to seeing what else Quine might mean, it will be helpful to distinguish explicitly between two kinds of purposes involved in a paraphrase. When we paraphrase S as S', let us call that purpose served by S as well as by S' 'purpose-1'. The new version, S', will also have another purpose, purpose-2, which will be the point of the paraphrase itself. If the original sentence was ambiguous, then purpose-2 of the paraphrase version is to block the ambiguity. Purpose-1 must be common to both versions; purpose-2 can be fulfilled only by the paraphrase. The satisfaction of purpose-2 is what makes the new sentence the preferred one.

I have taken Quine's modified-purpose passage as if it allowed us to start with a sentence S that is being used to fulfill a

particular purpose-1 and switch to a paraphrased version S' that fulfills some other purpose-1. The paraphrase is accounted good because we have switched our purposes-1 under the shift from S to S'.

But perhaps this is not being fair to Quine's intentions. It may be that he is thinking of the situation that faced us during our consideration of propositions. There we began with a particular purpose-2 (that of avoiding reference to propositions), and satisfying this purpose-2 had the effect that we had to give up certain purposes-1. This might conceivably be called 'modifying one's purposes under the shift'. Unfortunately though, it is not the same shift in the two cases. Quine's passage makes it clear that here he is speaking of modifying a purpose (presumably a purpose-1) in order to legitimize a shift from S to S'. With respect to propositions, though, this is not what is going on. There, a shift in purposes-2 occasioned the <u>loss</u> of purposes-1. It was under the shift from referring to propositions to not doing so that we had to modify (?) purposes-1. Furthermore, it appears that Quine believes that his program suffers (at least to some degree) from the loss of purposes-1 associated with the sentences we have to abstain from, but in the modified-purpose passage there is no hint of any loss, but rather a celebration of freedom, freedom from an overly strict conception of how to evaluate paraphrases. So I find the interpretation of Quine's remarks as a reference to what went on in his treatment of propositions dubious, but if this <u>is</u> what Quine means, then one requirement that does not change is that if we modify our purposes under the

shift, we must be careful not to shift the purpose back when we return to nonregimented forms. After having paraphrased away propositions, Quine can go on to say things like "The proposition that snow is white is true" for he has shown, if we accept his analysis, how the truth-vehicular purposes of 'proposition' can be fulfilled by eternal sentences.[12] But he cannot go on to say "Eisenhower and Stevenson agree on something," for he has not shown how this can be paraphrased. When in the course of regimenting proposition-talk, he modified his purposes so as to give up such constructions, he lost the right to go back to these constructions in their unregimented forms. Otherwise, of course, nothing is ever given up, whereas Quine concedes that the results of regimentation can cause us to lose the right to say certain things.

This completes our discussion of Quine's general characterization of regimentation. Usually, however, this characterization is supplemented by appeals to various phenomena which are meant as illustrations of the kind of activities Quine has in mind. One of these appeals is to paraphrasing done with an eye to the particular problem of ambiguity. Another is to an example taken from the mathematical logicians--the paraphrase of the ordered pair. A third appeal, and the last I shall consider, is not to any particular problem but just to ordinary paraphrasing itself, for whatever purpose. After considering the more particular problems that ambiguity and ordered pairs may present, then, we shall see what can be said about

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[12] Ibid., section 43.

the problems associated with ordinary paraphrasing itself, abstracted from any particular problems that paraphrasing may be concerned with at any particular time.

2. The ambiguity model

In the process of characterizing regimentation Quine often draws parallels between the regimenter's canonical renderings and the ordinary paraphrasing that is normally done in ordinary language to aid communication. We have already seen "that paraphrasing into logical symbols is after all not unlike what we all do every day in paraphrasing sentences to avoid ambiguity. The main difference apart from quantity of change is that the motive in the one case is communication while in the other it is application of logical theory."[1] He also refers to the "importance of taking as the paradigmatic situation that in which the original speaker does his own paraphrasing, as laymen do in their routine dodging of ambiguities."[2] These quotes seem to establish that canonical paraphrases are meant to be similar in important ways to the paraphrasing that is done to avoid ambiguity. Elsewhere Quine seems to imply not just that this latter kind of paraphrasing is similar to regimental paraphrasing, but that it provides us with an example of regimentation. It is a special case of regimentation. Among the examples of regimental paraphrases he lists both "the . . . transitory paraphrasing of ambiguous terms, simple or

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[1] Quine, Word and Object, p. 159.

[2] Ibid., p. 160.

composite, for getting over a sudden block in communication" and "the resort to variables and parentheses to clear up structural ambiguities."[3] It seems, then, that we can take the paraphrasing of ambiguous sentences as a model for regimentation. The value in this move is that although regimentation is a technical notion introduced by Quine, ordinary paraphrasing is a familiar one; we know, or think we do, what is going on in these cases. It is only natural to expect this familiarity to aid us in understanding the more technical notion, as indeed Quine does when he appeals to it.

But since it is Quine who is appealing to the paraphrasing away of ambiguities, we had best begin by looking at what Quine says about ambiguities and the paraphrases we use to resolve them. His treatment of ambiguity is found in ##27-29 of Word and Object. The problem with ambiguous terms is that they can be clearly true of and false of an object at the same time. This ambiguity can go on, according to Quine, to affect sentences, changing their truth value over a period of time under variations of circumstances of utterance. I do not know why Quine does not go on to say that it can also have the consequence of making the same sentence both true and false at the same time. If 'light' can be at once both true and false of a dark feather, then why cannot 'This is a light feather' be at once true and false? Would he not accept ''light' is true of this feather' as a paraphrase of 'This is a light feather'?

The reason why he does not is probably connected to the fact

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[3] Ibid., p. 157.

that Quine never in Word and Object uses 'ambiguous' in reference to sentences. This is startling in view of the naturalness of speaking in terms of ambiguous sentences, and I do not think it is an accident, even though Quine never explicitly refuses to extend the notion of ambiguity of terms, syntax, or scope to sentences. He says that ambiguity of terms, for example, can infect their containing sentences, but he does not say what it is that these sentences become infected with. The natural step is to extend the notion of ambiguity to sentences, though Quine says only that it can cause them to have changing truth values in changing conditions. I will use the term 'ambiguous sentence'; this will not prejudice any issues for I will use it simply to refer to those sentences which change truth values as Quine describes, that change being due to the ambiguity of some contained part or structural relationship.

At any rate, whether we accept Quine's stopping place or not, we are left with a description of the problem involved, but not one of ambiguity itself. We can account for the problem we have with certain sentences by appealing to ambiguity, but we cannot identify ambiguity with that problem since the problem arises in cases where there is no ambiguity, as Quine notes:

> Nor is even the variation in the truth value of a sentence from occasion to occasion necessarily to be laid to ambiguity. 'The door is open' changes its truth value with the movements of the door, such is the force of the present tense; and it varies in truth value simultaneously from door to door, such is the referential instability of the singular description. Yet to count any of its four words

> or their combinations as ambiguous[4] on that account would not be typical use of 'ambiguous'.

So we cannot define ambiguity for sentences in terms of truth values changing under changing circumstances. Quine does not specifically take note of it, but likewise we cannot define ambiguity for terms with respect to their being at once both true and false of some objects, since there are ambiguous terms which do not meet this standard. 'Assignment', which suffers from the process-product ambiguity does not, and neither do proper names although Quine counts them as ambiguous (though I should not).

One interesting thing to notice here is that 'assignment' is a general term as well as not being simultaneously true and false of some objects. Yet Quine says that it is ambiguous. Now most will agree with me when I claim that 'hard' is ambiguous, but Quine denies that it is. Let us pause a moment to compare 'assignment' both with 'light' and with 'hard'. We can all agree that 'light' is straightforwardly ambiguous, for the reason that it can be simultaneously true and false of the same object. Quine goes on to argue, though, that without this reason there can be no justification for declaring a general term to be ambiguous. His claim is that there is no way to separate generality (i.e. its being true of diverse types of things) from ambiguity apart from the test of being simultaneously true and false of the same object. 'Light' is ambiguous since

> (1) (Ex)(x is a feather, and x is light, and x is not light)

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[4] Ibid., pp. 131-32. It is strange in the light of this passage that Quine does not go on to recant an earlier claim that the shift in reference we find in proper names constitutes ambiguity.

can be true. But there are no true sentences like

(2) (Ex)(x is a chair, and x is hard, and x is not hard), or

(3) (Ex)(x is a question, and x is hard, and x is not hard).

So we cannot, on Quine's line, call 'hard' ambiguous. But with respect to 'assignment' there are no true sentences of this form either:

(4) (Ex)(x is a process, and x is an assignment, and x is not an assignment)

(5) (Ex)(x is a product, and x is an assignment, and x is not an assignment).

The question of how Quine can consistently deny that 'hard' is ambiguous while granting the process-product ambiguity of 'assignment' naturally arises. If we can separate the ambiguity of 'assignment' from its generality (its being true of diverse types of things), then we should be able to do so for 'hard'. Perhaps, however, Quine has just not noticed that 'assignment' is in the same boat with 'hard' and not with 'light' and would be prepared to reverse himself on the status of 'assignment'.

Quine is evasive on the question of what ambiguity is, as opposed to the question of when ambiguity is instanced. He is very careful to stop short of <u>identifying</u> ambiguity with the truth value problem, or even the 'true of' problem. Thus, he says only that "ambiguity may be manifested in that the term is at once true and false of the same things." The 'may be' leaves it open that there might be ambiguity that is not so manifested, but his refusal to concede any reason for saying that 'hard' is ambiguous implies that we could have no other indication of ambiguity in such cases. Yet he acknowledges that there are other factors at work in the following

passage (which picks up from the last long quote):

> The shifting of the reference of 'the door' and of the truth value of 'The door is open' with circumstances of utterance are accounted normal to the meanings of the words concerned, whereas ambiguity is supposed to consist in indecisiveness between meanings. Our reflections in Chapter II encourage us little in distinctions of this kind; having no present technical need of the notion of ambiguity, however, I shall not try to improve the boundary, but will just go on using the word as a non-technical term where it seems appropriately suggestive.[5]

The suggestion is that people often appeal to meaning intuitions to justify judgments about ambiguity. Quine gives such appeals the back of his hand, as he must, and the result is that we are left without an account of ambiguity, either for terms or for sentences.

How serious is this lack? Quine implies that what is lacking is a boundary, that he has stopped short of drawing a clear line between the cases in which fluctuating truth values are laid to ambiguity and those in which they are not. But the problem is not just at the boundary. Given the clearest imaginable case of ambiguity, we are still not told what it is that is happening. As it stands, 'ambiguity' is just undefined and unaccounted for. It is a hypothetical property postulated to explain why 'light' can be at once true and false of the same object. As such, it is of no more use than a more famous "explanatory" property once attributed to opium. Perhaps, after all, Quine can go on "using it as a non-technical term where it seems appropriately suggestive" for some purposes, but if 'ambiguity' is not a technical term, 'regimentation' and 'paraphrase' are. If the ambiguity model is to be of any help in understanding these technical

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[5] Ibid., p. 132.

terms, we must have some sort of account both of ambiguity itself and of what must be true of paraphrases that can successfully resolve ambiguities. In the absence of any Quinean account, we are left only with our intuitions of what seems appropriately suggestive. So let us go on to see what is "appropriately suggestive."

It is readily apparent why Quine likes the ambiguity model. The reason is that if a paraphrase successfully eliminates the ambiguity of some original sentence, then the new sentence cannot be synonymous with the old one. If it were synonymous, it would retain the same ambiguity. Since we <u>can</u> paraphrase away ambiguities, the relation that holds between the two sentences in question cannot be that of synonymy, and yet the new sentence must be capable of doing what the original did. And this pretty well sums up the paraphrase relationship as Quine introduces it as a technical notion.

But the model is not as happy as it might be. On a normal, intuitive, account of ambiguity,[6] an expression is said to be ambiguous when it has more than one meaning. In the paradigm case, the ambiguity is said to be resolved when we replace the ambiguous expression with one that has only one of the meanings. Reference to the particular relation of (total) synonymy is avoided on this account, but if Quine has won a battle here, he has certainly lost the war. When he says that the expressions will not be synonymous, he is taking note of the truth that the two will not have the same meaning (=have

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[6]See, for example, John Hospers, <u>An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis</u>, pp. 14-16, or I. M. Copi, <u>Introduction to Logic</u>, pp. 90-92.

all their meanings in common). But just showing that this is true will not suffice, for Quine's opponent, accepting the offer to appeal to an intuitive account of ambiguity, may want to insist only that the two sentences must share one common meaning. In view of the problem of individuating the meanings of a single word, the appeal to one meaning of a word (out of many) must be even more abhorrent to Quine than that to the meaning of a word (as opposed to the meanings of other words). Whichever is worse, the choice of either commits one to talking in terms of concepts belonging to the theory of meaning.

One wonders about some of the locutions Quine uses in discussing ambiguity. He speaks of a sentence as resolving ambiguity "by dint of resisting some alternative interpretations."[7] How is 'interpretation' to be spelled out here? I suggest that an "intuitive" method of spelling it out would land us in more talk about meaning. Again, Quine says that "we can make sense of 'pretty little girls' camp' in any of five groupings . . . . "[8] I take it that making sense of an expression in five ways is not meant to imply that there are five senses (=meanings?) that the expression has. Then we need some explanation of what it is to make sense of an expression in one way and not in some other. Without some account of these locutions we are simply left up in the air.

The problem is that ambiguity as it is normally taken is a concept belonging to the theory of meaning. Quine's discussion of the ambiguity of terms can be seen as a halfhearted attempt to give an extensionalist account of ambiguity using 'true of' as its basis.

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[7]Quine, Word and Object, p. 159. [8]Ibid., p. 137.

This, notice, helps to explain his reluctance to extend 'ambiguity' to sentences; for Quine will not want to say that there are objects which sentences can be true or false of. Now a notion of ambiguity can certainly be defined along these lines, but such a notion, useful as it might be for regimented languages, would not at all correspond to our more familiar notion. And it is this notion that Quine claims to be explicating, and it is this notion that he wants to use to characterize regimentation. The conclusion must be either (a) to argue ad hominem, that until Quine presents his own account of ambiguity that does not make use of concepts which he considers unintelligible, he cannot appeal to that notion to characterize regimentation, or (b) that, more generally, if the resolution of ambiguity is to serve as a model for regimentation, then further argument will be required to support the claim that (partial) synonymy need not hold between a sentence and its paraphrased version. The more seriously we take the ambiguity model as it now stands, the more reason we have to believe that some such meaning relation must hold.

3. The ordered pair as model

If the ambiguity model is meant to serve as a paradigm for the paraphrasing of sentences, Quine's treatment of the ordered pair leaves no doubt that it is to serve as a paradigm for the paraphrasing of terms.[1] Although 'ordered pair' is specially introduced by mathematicians as a technical term (this will have important consequences as we shall see later), it seems at first plausible to think that this

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[1] Quine, Word and Object, section 53.

kind of term should bear the same relationship to its paraphrased versions as do other more common sorts of terms. The fact that it is introduced for specialized purposes may even prove to be an advantage, for we are apt to have a better grasp of the concept involved than we would have if an ordinary language term were involved. Discussion of the term 'proposition', for example often suffers from the fact that while it is often considered to be a technical term devised by philosophers for certain purposes, it is also a term with an established use, whatever it may be, in ordinary language.

A Quinean paraphrase is always in response to a problem; he refuses to "scratch where it doesn't itch." Here is the problem as Quine sees it. 'Ordered pair', he says, is a <u>defective noun</u>, i.e., it is normally used only in a limited number of the usual term positions.[2] It is strange that Quine does not do more than he does to show that the term really is defective in this sense. Perhaps the fact that the term is a technical one makes this more of a problem since, as such, its occurrences are already quite restricted. What Quine shows is that we are not sure what sort of object an ordered pair is. He insists that an ordered pair be an object, but we do not know what object or even what kind of an object to count as an ordered pair.

> Yet it is central to the purposes of the notion of ordered pair to admit ordered pairs as objects . . . . Ordered pairs must be available on a par with other objects as members of classes.[3]

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[2] See <u>Ibid</u>., p. 244, for Quine's account of this notion.

[3] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 258.

The problem, then, is for any ordered pair x and y, written '$\langle x,y\rangle$', to paraphrase '$\langle x,y\rangle$' into some other term that will do what we wanted '$\langle x,y\rangle$' to do and that will make it clear what object is in question. This done, we will become clear on the nature of ordered pairs. Such a procedure is said by Quine to be paradigmatic not only of paraphrasing but of philosophical analysis (or explication) in general.[4]

There are certain distinctions that should be kept in mind by anyone discussing the notion of an ordered pair. The distinctions are simple enough in themselves, but the special nature of this topic is such that it is more difficult to observe them in this setting. By way of comparison, consider the expression 'the dog Fido'. It is clear that we must distinguish between the general term 'dog' and the proper name 'Fido'. Furthermore, there must be no temptation to confuse either term with any particular canine object that the composite term might be used to refer to. We have the parallel composite expression 'the ordered pair $\langle x,y\rangle$'. One way, and I believe it would be Quine's way, to analyze this expression is to say that 'ordered pair' is a general term, that '$\langle x,y\rangle$' is the name of a particular ordered pair, and that the whole expression refers to a particular object, which corresponds to the canine object Fido in our first example. And, to repeat, Quine's problem is that unlike the case for dogs, we are very unclear about what ordered pairs are.

Does Quine consistently observe these distinctions? As for

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[4] Ibid., pp. 258-59.

the first one, he explicitly claims that both 'ordered pair' and expressions of the form '$\langle x,y \rangle$' are defective nouns. When it comes to paraphrasing, he concentrates on the latter. What he does, as we shall see, is to show that every expression of the form '$\langle x,y \rangle$' can be paraphrased adequately. This seems sufficient to take care of the general term as well, for if we can paraphrase each expression of the form '$\langle x,y \rangle$' as some term referring to a familiar object, then any occurrence of 'ordered pair' can be paraphrased by the appropriate general term for this familiar sort of object. Given Quine's account of defectiveness, it does seem that a general term and proper names for the objects of which the general term is true will agree in defectiveness. So, for example, if it turns out not to make sense to ask if ordered pairs are $\emptyset$, then presumably it will also not make sense to ask if the ordered pair $\langle x,y \rangle$ is $\emptyset$. I am not now thinking of predicates like, say, 'rare'. Of course it is prima facie possible to ask if ordered pairs are rare, but not if the ordered pair $\langle x,y \rangle$ is rare, but this asymmetry holds also between 'dogs' and 'Fido' without making either of these latter terms defective. In general whatever problems we have in making 'ordered pair' fit term positions that normally accept general terms we should also have in making proper names for ordered pairs fit those positions normally open to proper names. What has to be watched for here, though, is the temptation to treat 'paraphrasing the ordered pair' sometimes as 'paraphrasing 'ordered pair'' and sometimes as 'paraphrasing expressions of the form '$\langle x,y \rangle$''. Quine does not clearly distinguish the roles these two expressions play, but so far as I can see, there

is nothing in his handling of them to suggest that he is not clear on this distinction.

On the other hand, his discussion does suffer from a failure to consistently separate the terms we use to refer to ordered pairs and the objects these terms are supposed to refer to. In short, Quine is guilty of a term-referent confusion. He says that "a particularly clear-cut case of the latter sort [of defective noun] is provided by the ordered pair, a device for treating objects two at a time as if we were treating objects of some sort one at a time."[5] But what is it that is "a device for treating objects" in a certain way? Even if Quine does not here imply that an ordered pair _is_ a defective noun, it is clear that the device referred to is a linguistic one, a term. It is the _term_ '$\langle x,y \rangle$' that is used as Quine describes. But later when he goes on to ask what an ordered pair is, he does not give an answer along linguistic lines--he starts to search for a nonlinguistic object in the world that corresponds to the term, one that the term refers to. But if an ordered pair is just a linguistic device with a certain use, then there is no call to look further for any objects apart from any additional arguments that ordered pairs are _referring_ linguistic devices. And if they are eventually determined to be referring devices, it seems unlikely that the objects they refer to would be ordered pairs, i.e., themselves, or other linguistic items. Notice that if Quine were consistent about calling ordered pairs linguistic devices, then the name for a particular

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[5] _Ibid._, p. 257.

ordered pair would be ''⟨x,y⟩'', and the composite expression corresponding to 'the dog Fido' would be 'the ordered pair '⟨x,y⟩'' and not 'the ordered pair ⟨x,y⟩'.

This is not just a careless slip on Quine's part. The same confusion is manifested elsewhere. For example, in another work Quine moves easily from talk of the utility of ordered pairs and the role played by ordered pairs to the question of "what things such pairs are."

> Its utility is always the same; it is a way of handling two things as one, while losing track of neither. Commonly the ordered pair of x and y, whether these be numbers or other things, is called ⟨x,y⟩. I have not said what things such pairs are, and traditionally the question is skipped; what is important is what they do.[6]

Again, clearly the object whose utility is referred to is a linguistic item; it is the use of the linguistic item '⟨x,y⟩' which provides us a way of handling two things as one.

There is a reason why in both instances Quine begins with talk of linguistic items and only later shifts to talk of nonlinguistic objects. His discussion starts well enough with a reference to the utility of a particular kind of term. The important thing is the use of the terms, i.e., "what they do." So what do they do? Remember from our discussion of propositions that it is Quine's view that if we use a term so that in canonical form we must take its (alleged) objects as values of variables, then we are committed to saying that there exist some objects corresponding to the term, for the term to refer to. And we do have to take ordered pairs as values

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[6] Quine, "Foundations of Mathematics" in The Ways of Paradox, p. 26.

of variables. So Quine is committed to saying that the use of the terms under discussion is to refer to objects. It is under pressure of his criterion for ontological commitment that Quine shifts from a discussion of the utility of terms to a search for nonlinguistic items. One not committed to such a criterion need feel no such pressure. It is open for such a one to deny that '$\langle x,y \rangle$' refers to any object at all, unless we count "treating $\underline{x}$ and $\underline{y}$ as one while losing track of neither" as a particular way of referring to the objects denoted by 'x' and 'y'. Then, of course, '$\langle x,y \rangle$' is a referring term, but there is no need to look for any nonlinguistic objects other than $\underline{x}$ and $\underline{y}$, and the problem of analyzing the utility of ordered-pair-terms becomes one of analyzing the special sort of reference involved rather than a search for more objects. Quine's criterion is a reflection of the view that "the quantifiers are encapsulations of those specially selected unequivocally referential idioms of ordinary language."[7] But there is no reason why one could not consistently reject Quine's criterion for ontological commitment and claim that the fact that the criterion has the consequence of committing us to the view that there is an object corresponding to an ordered pair '$\langle x,y \rangle$' is evidence for this counter claim.

My claim, then, is that we can explain Quine's term-referent confusion by seeing it as a reflection of a conflict between (a) the partial realization of the truth that there are not objects that are ordered pairs, but only ordered pair $\underline{\text{terms}}$ (that happen to be used to

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[7]Quine, $\underline{\text{Word and Object}}$, p. 242.

treat the in general unproblematic objects x and y), and (b) his independent criterion for ontological commitment. I have not argued that ordered pairs are nonreferring terms (nonreferring, that is, in the sense specified above), but if we take this view, it helps explain Quine's confusion of a distinction that one would ordinarily certainly expect him to get right.

Before we can paraphrase expressions of the form '$\langle x,y \rangle$', we must be clear about the purpose they fulfill since any adequate paraphrase version must fulfill this same purpose. The purpose that ordered pair expressions serve has already come out in our previous discussion; they are used for "treating objects two at a time as if we were treating objects of the same sort one at a time," or for "handling two things as one while losing track of neither." These characterizations are pretty rough. They try to capture in ordinary language the force of the fact that what is important for mathematicians is that the following postulate hold:

(1) If $\langle x,y \rangle = \langle z,w \rangle$, then $x=z$ and $y=w$.

The problem of the paraphrase

> is a neat one, for we have in (1) a single explicit standard whereby to judge whether a version is suitable.
>
> There are many solutions. The earliest, put forward by Wiener in 1914, ran (nearly enough) as follows: $\langle x,y \rangle$ is identified with the class $\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$, whose members are just (a) the class $\{x\}$, whose sole member is x, and (b) the class $\{y,\emptyset\}$, whose sole members are y and the empty class.[8]

The advantage of this shift is that $\{\{x\}, \{y,\emptyset\}\}$ refers, untroublesomely, to a readily identifiable class while conforming to (1).

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[8] Ibid., p. 258. For typographical reasons, here and below I substitute '$\emptyset$' for 'Λ', the term Quine uses to refer to the null set.

As it was in the case of the ambiguity model, it is apparent why Quine likes the example of the ordered pair. The main point is that the original term and its paraphrased version are not synonymous. This is supposed to be clear since the latter refers unequivocally to a class and the former does not.

What can we say about the meaning of the term '$\langle x,y \rangle$'? One currently popular way of defining meaning for terms (words) is in terms of the contributions they can make to the meanings of sentences.[9] To say just this much is not to say a great deal. This notion of word meaning obviously presupposes an adequate account of sentence meaning, and the notion will prove fruitful only in so far as we are able to successfully characterize the various contributions words can make to sentences, as we can now do only in a very limited number of cases, if any. Still, this type of account is an attractive one, and it seems to agree with our intuitions in many cases. On such an account it seems natural to say that two terms have the same meaning when they can make the same contribution to any sentence in which they are placed. Furthermore, we can go on to distinguish between the meaning of a term in isolation (apart from any sentential context) and the meaning that a term has in a particular context. The meaning of a term in isolation will be a function of the contribution it can make to the meanings of all the sentences in which it might occur. The meaning of a term in a particular sentence will be the particular contribution it makes to that particular sentence. So a term might

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[9] See W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language, pp. 36-39. Also, Donald Davidson, "Truth and Meaning" in Synthese, XVII.

make different sorts of contributions to different sentences, and its meaning in isolation must reflect all these possibilities.

This distinction, by the way, accords well with our natural intuitions. We do speak of an ambiguous term being used in a sentence in which it can have only one meaning, the term in isolation having more than one meaning, the term having but one in the context of the particular sentence. Furthermore, if we are given an ambiguous term within a sentence that does not dissolve the ambiguity, we do not say--except in the case of puns--that it has two or more meanings in that sentence, but that it could have, or could be interpreted as having, either of the two or more meanings. In other words, even if the context of a sentence is not sufficient to make clear what contribution an ambiguous term is making to it, we still want to separate its meaning in isolation from its meaning in the present context. So if I utter 'I am going to the bank' in a situation such that 'bank' retains its ambiguity, we do not identify the meaning in isolation of 'bank' with the meaning of 'bank' in this particular utterance. We do distinguish these two different ways of speaking about a word's meaning.

Taking this general approach to term meaning and utilizing the distinction just drawn in the previous paragraph, we might consider the following possible way of linking Quine's account to meaning. We might claim that the reference to a class might not be present when what is normally a proper name for a class is used as a paraphrase for an ordered pair. One might suggest that although $\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$ can be used to refer to a set, it is not so being used

when it is used to "treat two objects as one . . . ." If this were the case, it could still be claimed that in the context in which the paraphrase version finds itself, it did have the same meaning as the original term. The suggestion is that it is only in isolation that the two terms diverge in meaning. This, however, would be to overlook the necessity of seeing the new term as a class term. For it is only what we know about classes and, in particular, what we know about the criteria for the identity of classes that enables us to know that the paraphrase version fulfills (1). So if in the context of the paraphrased version the term '$\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$' did not refer to a class, per the suggestion now under consideration, we could not know that the paraphrase was adequate. But we can know this, so the term is being used to refer to a class in this context. It is the properties that we independently know classes to have that enable us to make the paraphrase; we cannot repudiate the reference to classes since it is the properties of classes which we are relying on all the while.

Let us pursue this matter in another direction by taking a closer look at the way in which ordered pair terms prove useful. As Quine points out, their primary use comes in handling relations (considered extensionally). Suppose that we wish to define any relation as the set of objects for which the relation holds and that we are considering the two placed relation is adjacent to and two objects, a and b. We can ask whether or not the relation holds between a and b, and the answer is either yes or no, and that is the end of it. We can unequivocally define the relation as the set of

all (unordered) pairs of objects that are adjacent to each other. But suppose we are considering the relation distrusts, and the objects Jones and Nixon. Here, because of the asymmetrical nature of the relation, we do not have an end of the matter if we know only that the relationship of distrusting holds between Jones and Nixon. With distrusting, unlike the case for adjacency, specifying the objects between which the relation holds will not be sufficient to define the relation extensionally, for we are unable, so far, to distinguish between Jones' distrusting Nixon and Nixon's distrusting Jones. The problem is solved by asking not whether the relation holds between the pair Jones and Nixon, but by asking first whether it holds between the ordered pair ⟨Jones, Nixon⟩ and then whether it holds between the ordered pair ⟨Nixon, Jones⟩.[10] The linguistic device '⟨x,y⟩' enables us to refer to Nixon and Jones at once, while keeping track of both individual objects so as to distinguish the relation's holding in one direction from its holding in the other. The reason why this device works is simple; whereas the use of the term '{x,y}' is indistinguishable from that of the term '{y,x}', we have decreed that the use of '⟨x,y⟩' be distinguishable from that of '⟨y,x⟩', so that we can use

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[10] Ultimately, we can paraphrase 'R is true of ⟨x,y⟩' as '⟨x,y⟩ is a member of S', where S is the set of all ordered pairs of which R is true, thus completing the process of defining the relation in set terminology. We have, then, the following paraphrase versions:

1. Jones distrusts Nixon
2. Distrusting is true of ⟨J,N⟩
3. Distrusting is true of {{J},{N,∅}}
4. ⟨J,N⟩ is a member of S.

Here we are interested in the move from (2) to (3).

the one or the other to refer to the objects x and y, depending upon the circumstances. So if x distrusts y, we say that the relation is true of $\langle x,y \rangle$, i.e., it holds between x and y in that direction, and if it is y who distrusts x, we say that it is true of $\langle y,x \rangle$. We can now define the relation of distrust in terms of what it is true of. There is not the ambiguity there was before the introduction of the ordered pair.

What I wish to emphasize is that apart from Quine's criterion for ontological commitment, there is no pressure to regard the linguistic device '$\langle x,y \rangle$' as referring to some special object. The natural view, it seems to me, is to regard it as a particular way of referring to the familiar objects x and y. This way of viewing the situation removes one of Quine's motivations for paraphrasing ordered pairs (for there is no longer any puzzlement over what things these ordered pairs are), but it does not yet remove the challenge to face up to the claim that we can paraphrase here (for whatever reason) adequately enough without a synonymy relation.

To examine this claim, we must examine the way in which the paraphrased version of the ordered pair meets the problem of defining relations extensionally. Suppose we have the case of, say, Jones distrusting Nixon without Nixon distrusting Jones, and the problem of defining the relation in terms of the objects it holds between. As before we cannot simply say that the relation is true of the set $\{\text{Jones, Nixon}\}$. So we say that it is true of the set $\{\{\text{Jones}\}, \{\text{Nixon},\emptyset\}\}$, and not of the set $\{\{\text{Jones},\emptyset\},\{\text{Nixon}\}\}$. The linguistic device '$\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$' has enabled us to refer to Jones and Nixon at

once while keeping track of both individual objects so as to distinguish between Jones' distrust of Nixon and Nixon's possible distrust of Jones. This is just what the original version of the ordered pair did, as Quine will agree; both versions must do this. But to say in the first case, that the relation of distrusting is true of $\langle$Jones, Nixon$\rangle$ and to say, in the second, that the same relation is true of $\{\{\text{Jones}\},\{\text{Nixon},\emptyset\}\}$ is to say the same thing. To say either is just to say that Jones distrusts Nixon. Why then are we tempted to say either that there is no meaning relationship at all or that, at least, there is no synonymy?

One reason is supposed to be that in the former case, we referred to an ordered pair and in the latter we referred to a set. I have already suggested that we might be suspicious of claims that in the former case we are referring to any objects except for x and y. But the same considerations apply in the latter case as well. What reason is there to say that when we talk about a relation being true of an <u>unordered</u> pair $\{x,y\}$, we are referring to some object other than x and y? Only, it seems, Quine's criterion for ontological commitment. Why not simply recognize different ways of referring to the objects x and y? We use 'x' and 'y' to refer to x and y singly; we use '$\{x,y\}$' to refer to them as if they were one when it is convenient; and we use '$\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$' or '$\langle x,y\rangle$' to refer to them as if they were one while simultaneously keeping track of them as individuals. It is true that we use these last linguistic items in term positions; this is not to say that we are thereby committed to there being any stray objects other than x and y floating around.

This is not to deny that after paraphrasing the ordered pair as a set we are referring to a set (we earlier saw that we were), but only to call into question what it is to refer to a set. Referring to the set $\{x,y\}$ is a way of referring to or, more noncommitally, a way of treating the objects x and y. Furthermore, this view of things does not mean that Quine's suggested paraphrase is of no value. It means only that the economy to be gained is not one of the objects we are committed to, but one of referential idioms. I do not mean to disdain this contribution, but it does need pointing out that one reason for saying that we do not have sameness of meaning has evaporated. Pre- and postparaphrase versions make the same contribution of referring to the same objects in the same way. We can say that in the first case we referred to an ordered pair and in the second to a set, but upon analysis it turns out that both of these come down to the same thing--a particular way of referring to the objects x and y. Referring to the set (pair) of x and y is not to commit ourselves to some object other than x and y.

So if Quine wants to rest his claim that there is no meaning relationship here on the claim that we are referring to sets in the one case but not in the other, then it should be made clear that this latter claim is meant to follow from the criterion of ontological commitment. It is not only the motivation for paraphrasing the ordered pair that follows from an acceptance of the criterion for ontological commitment, but also one reason for thinking that there is no meaning relationship holding between the two sides of the paraphrase. If one does not believe that the range of the variables of

canonical notation determines the objects to which one is committed, then it will not follow that we are referring to different objects in the two paraphrase versions.

Still, there are reasons for thinking that we do not have a synonymy relationship when we paraphrase ordered pair terminology into set terminology other than the supposition that the expressions as wholes have different referents. One might agree that both sorts of expressions are used to refer to the same untroublesome objects and still hold that on the way (as it were) to making this reference different meanings come into play. For example, it can be argued that although both '$\langle x,y \rangle$' and '$\{\{x\},\{y,\emptyset\}\}$' are used to refer to x and y (and not to any other mysterious objects), the latter expression also makes a reference to the null set in the course of "referring to x and y in a certain way." This is fair enough, but it needs pointing out that this strategem seems to involve the same dubious move that we saw in Quine's discussion of the ambiguity model. I am referring to this inference: (a) S and S' are adequate paraphrases of each other, (b) S and S' are nonsynonymous, hence (c) questions of meaning are not relevant to judging the adequacy of paraphrasing. Consider the following passage.

> We do not claim synonymy . . . . We fix on the particular functions of the unclear expression that make it worth troubling about and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. Beyond those conditions of partial agreement, dictated by our interests and purposes, any traits of the explicans come under the head of "don't cares." Under this head we are free to allow the explicans all manner of novel connotations never associated with the explicandum.[11]

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[11] Quine, Word and Object, pp. 258-59.

But while pointing to the "don't cares" may establish non-synonymy between paraphrases, it does not establish that paraphrasing is totally unconcerned with meaning relationships. What Quine actually concludes from the appeal to the "don't cares" is that paraphrasing the ordered pair is not a matter of "the uncovering of hidden meanings." But if the ordered pair is to provide us with a paradigm of Quinean paraphrase, meanings, hidden or otherwise, must not play any essential role at all. Just pointing out that we are interested in some but not all of an expression's functions may establish that we need not insist upon synonymy through paraphrase; it certainly does not show that the "partial agreement" needed will not require meaning relationships. But Quine's apparent identification of the concept of synonymy with the concept of meaning in general leads him to ignore this crucial question. In particular, if Quine's treatment of the ordered pair is to provide us a model for paraphrasing, then it must not turn out that the necessary partial agreement involve any kind of an overlap of meaning.

Is there such an overlap? First of all, it seems that if the introduction of the new expression '$\emptyset$' in the paraphrase version is evidence that there is some difference in meaning, then the fact that the terms 'x' and 'y' appear in both versions should constitute evidence that there is some carry-over in meaning as well. Both 'x' and 'y' are of course variables; we are interested in expressions of the <u>form</u> '$\langle x,y \rangle$', e.g., '$\langle$Nixon, Jones$\rangle$', '$\langle$the President, the local grocer$\rangle$'. Now we may later want to consider the suggestion that we can under certain conditions paraphrase '$\langle$Nixon, Jones$\rangle$' as '$\langle$the

President, the local grocer⟩', but that is not the model we are considering here. We are considering, rather, paraphrasing '⟨Nixon, Jones⟩' as '{{Nixon},{Jones,∅}}' and '⟨the President, the local grocer⟩' as '{{the President},{the local grocer,∅}}'. And in these cases, it is clear the knowing that these paraphrases are adequate will depend upon terms like 'Nixon', 'Jones', 'the President', and 'the local grocer' having the same meaning on each side of the paraphrase. This is an oversimplification. The fact that Quine's brackets and wedges encase the same terms does not establish that these terms could not change meaning across paraphrase; but it does show that Quine does not mean for the ordered pair model to depend upon this possibility. The meanings of the encased terms are obviously relevant to the meanings of the entire expressions of both sides of the paraphrase. What we (and Quine) have done is to leave these encased expressions alone and to operate on the remainder of the expressions. Quine gives us no reason to suppose that the variables he uses might be replaced with different terms without affecting the value of the paraphrases; without such a reason each one of his examples exhibits an overlap in meaning, i.e., there are elements on each side which are interpreted as having the same meaning on both sides. The issues that arise with respect to paraphrasing and referential terms, their meaning and reference, are no more relevant to the ordered pair model than to ordinary language paraphrasing. Thus, if it can be correct to paraphrase '⟨Nixon, Jones⟩' as '⟨the President, the local grocer⟩', then it will also be possible to paraphrase 'Nixon is in Florida' as 'The

President is in Florida'. This matter I propose to discuss later.[12]

The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that even if we grant Quine some motivation for paraphrasing the ordered pair and his doctrine of ontological commitment, his model presupposes that synonymy holds between elements on each side of the paraphrase and hence that there is an overlap of meaning between ordered pair expressions and their paraphrases. Quine has not yet provided us a model for paraphrasing that does not involve a tacit appeal to meaning relationships.

4. Paraphrasing

But apart from any particular problems Quine might have in accounting for 'ambiguity' in, say, an appeal to paraphrasing away an ambiguity, his use of 'paraphrase' and its grammatical forms in these and other contexts deserves some scrutiny in and of itself. We might first ask whether this use is an ordinary one or whether the word is introduced as a technical term. It seems that it need not be wholly either. It might be that Quine takes what is essentially the ordinary sense of 'paraphrase' and modifies it only slightly--so that an alternate term, say 'rendering', could be said to be a paraphrase of 'paraphrase' itself. This characterization of course will be of no help until we have settled our understanding of 'paraphrase'. It is not difficult to establish that Quine does not see his use as wholly divorced from the ordinary use of the word. He insists that his paraphrases are very much like what we would ordinarily call paraphrases.

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[12] See below, Chapter III, section 2.

The reader can review the passages, previously cited from pages 160 and 161 of Word and Object for confirmation. But whether or not Quine views 'paraphrase' as a technical term or not is of little import here; for even if he does, it is still the case that he uses our ordinary notion to tie the technical term into his program. Either way, it follows that we must examine the ordinary use of the term 'paraphrase'. Here, at least, it is true that if the philosopher has not ended up with ordinary language, he has used it to get to where it is he has ended up. Technical terms cannot always remain uninterpreted, and a satisfactory interpretation requires previously understood locutions.

So we go on to ask what the connection is. Quine says that the main differences are quantity of change and motive.[1] The context here clearly indicates that by 'change' he must mean 'typographical change', and surely the degree of typographical change is theoretically unimportant. Likewise, variations in one's motives do not seem crucial to any distinction. If we can say that the motive of ordinary paraphrasing is always communication, we can also say that the motive varies between, say, the elimination of vagueness on the one hand and the blocking of ambiguities on the other. As Quine constantly points out, paraphrasing, both his and the ordinary sort, can be for many different purposes, but regardless of the purpose (it might even be part of a game) and how that purpose might affect the result of a paraphrase, what we have in the end remains a paraphrase. It can still

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[1]Quine, Word and Object, p. 159.

be true that changes in purpose can affect various (non-essential) properties of the paraphrase.

Instead of first looking for differences between Quine's paraphrases and the more ordinary sort, we might try to determine first some common denominator that they share. What immediately suggests itself as being common to all instances of paraphrase is the replacement of one linguistic expression with another. This would seem to constitute a necessary condition of a paraphrase. Is it sufficient as well? We have seen that it is not (in section one of this chapter); there must be a carry-over in function as well. The paraphrased version must be able to carry on the business that the speaker was about when he used the original expression. So we may take the following to be a reasonably satisfactory characterization of a paraphrase for Quine: the replacement of one linguistic expression with another such that the useful purposes of the first can be accomplished with the other.

We will continue this investigation by examining our ordinary, everyday notion of paraphrasing. First, though, it is necessary to lay some groundwork for our discussion. It is necessary, to begin with, to remind ourselves of the distinction drawn between two kinds of purposes involved in a paraphrase. Recall that in the first section of this chapter we let purpose-1 be that purpose served by the original remark as well as by the paraphrased version. The new version, we said, will have the secondary purpose, purpose-2, which is the point of the paraphrase itself. If the original sentence was ambiguous, then purpose-2 of the paraphrased version is to block the

ambiguity. Purpose-1 must be common to both versions; purpose-2 can be fulfilled only by the paraphrase. The satisfaction of purpose-2 is what makes the new sentence the preferred one.

Much will hang on this distinction of purposes, and it is worth noting that Quine must accept it, on pain of admission that paraphrasing is a pointless exercise. For purpose-2 will just be our answer to the question "Why paraphrase sentence S into sentence S'?" In ordinary language the reason will generally be a defect in S, but it need not be. For regimentation the reason will often be a positive advantage of S', where S raises no particular problem but only lacks the extra advantage that S provides. In either case, any reason for paraphrasing is to be identified with purpose-2.[2]

Second, it is possible to make several claims about paraphrases and the procedures for evaluating them. We will want to be clear on some of the more important of these. One can claim or deny that there is any absolutivity in evaluating a paraphrase. By 'absolutivity' I mean the view that there is some absolute goal or ideal toward which a paraphrase strives. This view denies that evaluating paraphrases is merely relative, asserting that either a paraphrase meets the ideal or it does not, and that it is either adequate or inadequate accordingly. The absolutist claim is that

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[2]Perhaps this is as good a place as any to apologize for the chaotic use of the word 'purpose' in this section. I refer now to purpose-1. The problem is that Quine never comes to grips with the concept despite its importance for understanding his program. He provides us with examples and discussions of purposes-2 (see Word and Object, p. 221, for example), but not of purposes-1. I hope to show in the next chapter that this latter kind of purpose can (and must) be handled in a more orderly fashion.

adequacy is like pregnancy and not like obesity. This issue is independent of the uniqueness issue. By 'uniqueness claim' I mean the claim that there is at most one adequate paraphrase for any sentence. The uniqueness claim is that adequacy is like matrimony; finding a paraphrase is like finding a wife. An absolutist could hold that there is just one or that there might be more than one paraphrase that could reach his ideal. One who believed in uniqueness would probably be an absolutist as well, but he would not have to be. He could choose to count as adequate only the best possible paraphrase, however he might try to decide when he had that one. Few persons today would want to argue for either absolutivity or uniqueness with respect to ordinary paraphrasing, but there is more of an issue over the claim of objectivity. Objectivity, here, is the doctrine that in paraphrasing there is something to be right or wrong about, that there are standards for good and bad paraphrases even if these standards cannot supply us with absolutely or uniquely correct paraphrases. The objectivist claim is that choosing a paraphrase is not like choosing one's favorite flavor of ice cream. Both absolutivity and uniqueness imply objectivity; objectivity is the weakest of these three notions. To be an objectivist is to claim that there are standards; to claim absolutivity or uniqueness is to claim something further about the nature of these standards. Tied in with these issues is the claim for immunity. Immunity is the doctrine that the paraphraser who paraphrases his own remarks is immune to criticism from others. If there is no objectivity, then there must be immunity, for if there is nothing to be right or wrong about, then there can be no criteria

(criteria for what?) to appeal to in criticism. On the other hand, there might be objectivity with immunity, as there would be for example if there were criteria, but, if you will, no public criteria, no criteria available to an outside critic. One may be immune from criticism if he claims he has a headache, but he will still be right or wrong about it.

Noticing that the need for a paraphrase can arise under many different kinds of circumstances, I propose to focus on two important aspects of possible circumstances, and catalogue the following cases:

1a. A paraphrases A's own remarks for C, which remarks C has heard[3]
b. A paraphrases A's own remarks for C, which remarks C has not heard
2a. B paraphrases A's remarks for C, which remarks C has heard
b. B paraphrases A's remarks for C, which remarks C has not heard

There is, in addition, this possible case.

3. Someone paraphrases some sentence S completely apart from any notion of S's context or status.

I propose to discuss these kinds of ordinary paraphrases with the following questions in mind. (a) What are the important differences among these cases? In particular, (b) How much, and what kind of, freedom of paraphrasing is there in these cases, and (c) How are any differences that we might find among these cases related to Quine's

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[3]When I say that C has heard a remark, I mean not only that he has heard it, but that he has not forgotten it and that the original remark is available to him and can be compared by him to the paraphrase that the paraphraser offers. Saying that C has not heard a remark simply means that such a comparison cannot be made although C can know that there was an original remark whose paraphrase he is being presented with.

appeal to ordinary paraphrasing to explain the nature of his program of regimentation?

When we ask for a paraphrase of a sentence that we have just heard, as in 1-a, the implication is often that something is the matter with the sentence.[4] The purpose-2 of the paraphrase is to correct the inadequacy. Thus, if A utters the sentence 'That is a light bird', the paraphrase is expected to make it clear whether the bird's weight or coloring is at issue. In many such cases purpose-1 is just ignored, as when A follows up with 'I am talking about its weight', a sentence which certainly cannot by itself fulfill the typical purposes of 'That is a light bird'. In other cases it will not be clear whether purpose-1 is retained, as when A provides us with 'That bird cannot weigh more than a pound'. At any rate the first impression is that the speaker has a great deal of leeway in this sort of case, primarily because it seems most anything goes just so long as purpose-2 is fulfilled. But it must be noted that when it is apparent that purpose-1 has dropped out under the shift from sentence S to sentence S', we are very reluctant, if indeed we ever do at all, to describe S' as a <u>paraphrase</u> of S. Instead we say that S provides an explanation or elucidation of S. The reason we do not call this case a paraphrase is obvious; even on Quine's terms S' is supposed to be capable of <u>replacing</u> S, while fulfilling the same purpose. But here we need both S and S' to fulfill our purpose.

This suggests that we might take the conjunction of S and S'

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[4] I disregard the case where the fault lies with the hearer.

to form a sentence that might be called an adequate paraphrase of S. In our first example, then, 'I am referring to its weight' will not do as a paraphrase, but 'That is a light bird and I am referring to its weight' might count as one. Both kinds of purposes are then satisfied. This seems to let us count a wider range of phenomena as paraphrases on Quine's account of a paraphrase.

There is another reason why, in 1-a, A has quite a free hand in paraphrasing. It is that C has S as well as S' to work with in trying to understand A. Compare this to 1-b, where there is no such aid. Here, I claim, A has much less freedom in paraphrasing. In the first place, C's asking for a paraphrase now carries no suggestion that anything is wrong with the original. So A cannot be much more or much less specific or do very much hedging without misinforming C about the nature of S. If a politician issues a statement, S, and immediately "paraphrases" it as S' so that his hearers can compare the two statements, S and S' can be taken together to indicate his views and he is in no danger of misleading his hearers if S' is not particularly "close to" S. But if he waits a week and offers S' as a paraphrase of S, and they are not very close, then he is well on the way to opening up his own credibility gap. Suppose S = 'I am available to run for the Senate', and S' = 'If I receive the governor's endorsement, score well in the polls, and if the incumbent does not seek reelection, then I might well choose to run'. If S' follows on the heels of S, we can perhaps accept it in some weak sense as a paraphrase, but if it comes a week later, we say that the politician is merely hedging. If the purpose of the paraphrase in this last case

is to inform a third party what was said, then S' will not do at all. By the way, this talk of "closeness" and the use of the phrase 'more or less' does not in itself commit us to the view that there is no one uniquely correct answer, although it does tend to push us away from absolutivity since it suggests that we would be willing to call various paraphrases more or less adequate (rather than just adequate or inadequate), ranking them relative to each other.[5] But all I want to argue now is that A has more leeway in 1-a than in 1-b, and that this difference is primarily related to a difference in purpose-2. In support of this, notice that for 1-b a direct quotation would be perfectly in order if A could provide one, while it would be useless for 1-a.

With respect to purpose-1, Quine seems to claim that A has a great deal of leeway here as well. "The speaker can be advised in his paraphrasing, and on occasion he can even be enjoined to accept a proposed paraphrase or substitute another or hold his peace; but

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[5]It may seem implausible to hold that paraphrases can be more or less adequate without there being any conception of an absolutely adequate paraphrase. The situation is familiar enough for other phenomena, of course. People are more or less obese without our having any conception of absolute obesity. But with paraphrasing, we have a standard or model to begin with, one that we can "aim at." If we can be more or less adequate in our aim, does it not make sense to speak of hitting it? It does not have to make sense, for this reason. The issue will hang on the nature of the criteria for judging paraphrases more or less adequate, and the criteria themselves might be non-absolutistic in nature. So, to take a particularly clear case, if one of the criteria for an adequate paraphrase is (increased) length of paraphrase versions, then paraphrases can be more or less adequate (long) without there being any possibility of an absolutely adequate paraphrase. I do not know whether there would be any plausible criteria of this nature; here, I am discussing the logical relations between the concepts of absolutivity and objectivity.

his choice is the only one that binds him . . . . The real point is simply that the speaker is the one to judge whether the substitution of S' for S in the present context will forward his present or evolving program of activity to his satisfaction."[6] This gives A a great deal of freedom of one sort--immunity from the criticism of others, but it does not imply that he has freedom from error, that he cannot be said by one who has the requisite knowledge to be objectively mistaken in his choice of a paraphrase. The reason why we cannot tell that A is wrong is apparently that only A can know what his purpose-1 is, what his present evolving program of activity is.

It is possible that there is a confusion lurking here. It is one thing to claim that there can be no uniquely correct paraphrase since purposes can change, and another to claim that, given a particular purpose-1, there is no uniquely correct analysis. Quine claims both, I am sure, but they need to be clearly separated. Similarly with the question of the propriety of correcting a paraphraser. Is the purpose-1 given to us? If so, it seems we are in as good a position to judge the paraphrase as he is. If we do not know the purpose at hand, then of course we cannot render judgment. Is there anything more to the speaker's immunity here than his privileged access to his own purposes?[7] But we sometimes do know what the purposes of others are (as when they tell us what they are up to). In

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[6] Quine, Word and Object, p. 160.

[7] A negative answer to this question is hinted at occasionally. See Ibid., pp. 242-43.

these cases, then, the speaker must lose his immunity. If the speaker can judge it, so can we, for he has no more to work with than we do. Given a purpose, then, the evaluation of a paraphrase is an objective matter; there are criteria for telling when purposes are met which can be spelled out with varying degrees of success, purpose by purpose. Still, it seems that in general there need be no uniqueness, for many sentences might fulfill the same purpose. In general, too, there need be no absolutely correct paraphrases; many purposes can only be more or less satisfied without there being any conceivable absolute goal. The only thing that changes when a speaker withholds his purpose is the susceptibility of his paraphrase from the criticism of outsiders. For he can apply the same criteria as we were going to when we had all the information necessary for a judgment; so objectivity remains.

It remains of course for Quine to object, if he would wish, that we can never get down to "knowing another's purposes." For, it might be urged, how would we get to know A's purposes? Supposing some independent argument to the effect that nonlinguistic data could not get us to that point, it might be argued that he could not just tell us his purposes since our understanding of whatever sentences he might use to inform us of them would depend upon our understanding the purposes behind them. So to understand any purpose in the required sense presupposes our knowing some other purpose in that sense, and so on. The claim that there is no immunity, given a

purpose, is an empty one.[8]

In reply to the objection that we cannot know another's purposes, I am tempted to provide a Moorean "hands" argument, confident that the reader will by now know of many purposes aimed at in the first two chapters of this work. Premiss: The reader knows the purpose behind the use of at least one prior sentence of this work. Conclusion: It is possible to know the purposes behind the uses of some sentences. The problem with such arguments is that while they may reinforce, they are not likely to persuade. But surely more persuasive arguments are not needed against this sort of objection. It might be tempting to dismiss this as another manifestation of Quine's skepticism over meaning, but the line we are considering (I do not attribute it to Quine) is much more radical than that. Quine doubts that we can intelligibly use concepts like that of analyticity and that of synonymy to discuss our sayings, not that we cannot understand them. And the radical line of argument under consideration, if it works at all, works to show that we never understand what others say. Surely no more need be said about this.

Of our catalogued cases, Quine's view of paraphrasing in general is best typified by 1-a. There is the following evidence for this claim:

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[8]An interesting question is what Quine would say about the speaker and his own paraphrase. Does he know his own purposes? Are his purposes things that are such that he can examine them to see whether or not they are satisfied? It seems that affirmative answers are required here before Quine need admit to objectivity, to there really being something for A to be right or wrong about.

> Hence the importance of taking as the paradigmatic situation that in which the original speaker does his own paraphrasing, as laymen do in their routine dodging of ambiguities. The speaker can be advised in his paraphrasing, and on occasion he can even be enjoined to accept a proposed paraphrase or substitute another or hold his peace.[9]

The paradigmatic aspect of first person paraphrasing is explicitly claimed, and it seems that if there is a person C present to receive a paraphrase at all, he is presumed to be in possession of the original nonparaphrased discourse as well, else on what basis is it that he can "advise or enjoin." He might have knowledge of the paraphraser's purpose and judge the paraphrase version on that basis alone, but Quine's language, both on page 160 and in his discussion of indirect discourse,[10] suggests that he takes this information to be generally forthcoming from one's exposure to the original bit of discourse.

It is his view that in such cases as 1-a the paraphraser has a considerable amount of freedom in his choice of paraphrase, or at least that he enjoys a kind of immunity of criticism from others. This immunity is supposed to result from the unique relationship between a speaker and his purposes. When we turn to consider examples 2-a and 2-b, we find that for Quine there is also an indeterminacy that must infect second person paraphrases, or indirect quotation.[11] Quine believes that there is an indeterminacy wrapped up in any paraphrase and, being systematic, he apparently wants to

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[9] Ibid., p. 160.

[10] See Ibid., pp. 211-20, and below, Chapter III, section 2.

[11] Ibid., pp. 211-20.

pin this phenomenon to something common to all paraphrases. For the paradigm 1-a, Quine holds that the indeterminacy is due to problems over purposes. This leads him to give a particularly peculiar account of indirect quotation. "In indirect quotation we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, and then we say what, in our language, is natural and relevant to us in the state thus feigned."[12] By "state of mind" Quine seems to have an all inclusive notion in mind, one including one's beliefs, perceptions, moods and dispositions. It appears that he wants to say what he does here because if we know his state of mind well enough, we will know the purposes of his remark and can then make a remark that will also meet that purpose. So Quine's view is that just as our immunity in 1-a was due to the inability of others to know speaker's purposes, the indeterminacy of indirect quotation is due to a paraphraser's inability to accurately reproduce in his own mind the speaker's purposes.

Now this has an initial plausibility for 2-a; it could be that S failed to make clear what A intended by it (we suppose this to be part of his state of mind), and B can then decide what A meant by it and produce S' to aid C in seeing A's intentions. But there is the same problem here that we encountered earlier; the more that S' accomplishes over and above what S does the less likely we are to say that S' is a paraphrase. And this fact is reflected, I think,

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[12] Ibid., p. 219.

in Quine's insistence that we must be able to go back and forth from paraphrase to original.

But Quine's account fails completely as a description of what goes on in cases like 2-b. In order to keep the parallel to 1-b (as he sees 1-b), he introduces a projection from the paraphraser into the mind of the original speaker. Now it may be true that, as Quine claims, there can be no absolutely correct paraphrase in these cases (so long as we are ruling out direct quotation), but this is not due to our inability to know the speaker's state of mind. It does not take a great deal of reflection to satisfy ourselves that one's state of mind is not usually, at least, at issue in indirect quotation. Contrary to what Quine's view would imply, there is nothing at all self-defeating about saying "I have no idea what was going through his mind, but what he said was that . . . " or "I do not care what you were thinking, what you said was that . . . . "

Suppose that in 2-b B thinks that A was lying. He then projects himself into A's frame of mind and, being a truthful man, he paraphrases S as, perhaps, not-S. This is surely unfair. Perhaps B must also feign the disposition to lie, in which case, he might produce an acceptable paraphrase. But what if B only suspects that A may be lying? If Quine's account is correct, B is faced with a serious difficulty in producing an accurate paraphrase for he will not know what sort of frame of mind into which to put himself. But in fact we know from experience that such uncertainty is not a matter of concern when we are paraphrasing. With the possible proviso that the speaker be indeed speaking (using) English, if a speaker

utters an English sentence, we can conclude that he said something and can usually reach a general agreement on what he said. I do not believe that this possible proviso gives up too much. Even supposing that knowing that an utterance is an utterance in English is to know something about the speaker's state of mind, Quine's indeterminacy was supposed to result from our being unable to tell what his purpose was from among the many purposes a particular sentence can be used for and not from our being unable to tell whether it is being used qua sentence at all. That is, Quine's account of the indeterminacy presupposed that we understood the utterance as an English sentence.

It might look as though such an account is unavailable for cases like 3-a, for here there is no person made available to us so that we may reach a conclusion concerning his state of mind. (If so, this will not count against Quine's account itself, since it is offered for handling indirect quotation and 3-a is not an example of indirect quotation.) But he could say that for 3-a type cases what we do is to imagine what a person's position and state of mind might be if he were to utter the sentence in question, and then say what we would say if we were in that position and state of mind. This seems implausible in and of itself, and it has the further drawback of leaving us with an intolerable degree of latitude. Without a fixed speaker for reference, there seems to be no objective check at all, whereas we can and do recognize that people can err in 3-a type paraphrases, even if their erring consists in their being too far down a scale consisting of degrees of adequacy. But this adequacy

will not depend upon some hypothetical state of mind. Furthermore, if it be objected that what we did was to abstract the various purposes-1 a speaker might have in using the sentence and ensure that these be retained, I answer that what we might know about purposes solely on the basis of the sentence is better characterized as knowledge about the sentence and not knowledge of possible states of minds.

The main point here is that we can distinguish between (a) what a speaker means by a sentence, and (b) what that sentence means apart from how the speaker may be using it. Sometimes we want a paraphrase to make clear what the speaker means; and here, surely, the speaker is in privileged position. At other times we want the meanings of the words themselves brought out by the paraphrase. 3-a type cases cry out the most loudly for this word-oriented account. It is obvious that although in each case what we ask for is a "paraphrase," we are asking for different things, and we will have different criteria for a successful paraphrase. Indirect quotation is primarily concerned with this latter, word-oriented, case, which Quine assimilates to cases like (a). The charitable approach would seem to be to restrict Quine's account of paraphrasing to those like (a), even if he himself does not make this restriction. He does, of course, have strong arguments concerning the indeterminacy of the other sort of paraphrase, though what these arguments show is yet to be settled.

It is perhaps worth meeting the objection that the distinction between a word's having a meaning and a person's meaning something by

a word cannot be made since the meaning of any word depends upon what people mean by it. To argue thusly, however, is to commit the fallacy of division--the reverse of the fallacy of composition--and perhaps also to run afoul of a type-token confusion. For it does not follow from the fact that the meaning of a word (type) is determined by the use the language community makes of it that the meaning of a word (token) is determined by the use the particular speaker wants to make of it on that particular occasion. And in cases 1-a,b and 2-a,b what we are paraphrasing are word (actually, sentence) tokens.

I have been concerned with showing that Quine's account of 1-a cannot be generalized to other sorts of paraphrasing and that the indeterminacy that Quine claims for 1-a should not rub off on the other kinds we have looked at. Furthermore, I have tried to give reasons for thinking that there is not so much indeterminacy in 1-a type paraphrasing as Quine claims there is. While conceding that there is indeed room for variation in 1-a, I have maintained that there are still criteria for telling us when we have a good paraphrase and when we do not. The actual degree of freedom cannot be specified except with respect to particular purposes in particular cases, so we have not really come to grips with Quine on this issue.

Before leaving this discussion of ordinary paraphrases, assuming that I have not succeeded in showing that Quine's characterization of 1-a in general leaves too much room for freedom, it may prove interesting to compare 1-a type paraphrases to the paraphrases Quine

needs to make, those within philosophy and science. One of the cases we looked at in Chapter I was that of proper names. One of the sentences we examined was 'Pegasus flies'. And Quine paraphrased this sentence. But he did not first use the sentence himself for some purpose-1 and then paraphrase it for some purpose-2. He simply took the sentence as an example, in isolation, and paraphrased it. What purpose-1 the sentence might have had just never came up, so there was never any question of having to know a speaker's purposes. And the same holds true for the other examples. This suggests that the paraphrases that Quine is interested in as a philosopher more closely resemble example 3-a than they do 1-a. At other times, though, it seems that it could prove most helpful to paraphrase a sentence as another philosopher uses it and not in isolation. In such a case Quine's doctrine of immunity must be taken as prescriptive and not descriptive, for no amount of sincere protestation to the effect that "the speaker is the only one to judge" will serve to protect the philosopher from his critics.[13] Of course a philosopher may paraphrase a sentence that he himself has used (and not just mentioned as an example). Then, assuming my previous objections answered, Quine might be correct in his account. But now it turns out that the sorts of paraphrases that Quine himself makes are not of this type. They conform rather to 3-a. But Quine takes 1-a as his paradigm; he needs, then, to show that his account of 1-a can be extended to other, more common, sorts of paraphrases and, in particular, to his examples

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[13] On this point, see C. F. Presley, "Review of Word and Object" Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XXXIX (1961).

before his appeal to paraphrasing as a nontechnical notion can be taken to support his characterization of regimentation.

CHAPTER III

REGIMENTATION AND ADEQUACY

1. Quine and the use of sentences

Traditionally, investigations in the philosophy of language have centered around the concept of meaning. Stated like this, there can be little or no complaint; when we ask what makes a language what it is, it seems that much of the answer must inevitably be in terms of meaning. The problem is that philosophers have tried to analyze meaning by searching for entities with which to identify meanings. Prominent theories of meaning have at one time or another identified meanings with concepts, ideas, images, dispositions, objects, and relations between objects and words. It cannot be denied that the matter of what meanings are is very obscure, and if any of the identifications just referred to could be made good, no doubt something important would be accomplished. It is now generally recognized, though, that no such identification can be made good, and further that there seem to be no other sorts of entities that can even plausibly be considered as candidates. The conclusion, then, is that there are no such entities as meanings.[1]

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[1] See, for example, J. L. Austin, "The Meaning of a Word" in Philosophical Papers; W. P. Alston, "The Quest for Meanings," Mind, LXXII. Also see L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, sections 1-64, 431-64, 491-570.

But if there are no such things as meanings, what becomes of the task the philosopher of language has set for himself? Before, his job was to pick out whatever it was supposed that meanings were and to reach his conclusions from a careful study of them. But now it seems there is nothing to study. Following the lead of Wittgenstein, many philosophers have reinterpreted their task as one of examining the use of whatever expression is at issue. The general argument, if one is ever supplied, seems to be that if there is no entity which we can call a meaning and which can be associated with a word that has that meaning, then all there is that is left to examine is what it is that speakers do with the words. Philosophers can either abandon the study of language or turn their attentions to the uses that are made of language.

Granted the shift of attention from meanings to uses of expressions, the question of how we are to describe this shift arises. Some will argue that meaning is to be identified with use.[2] Others will call for a weaker sort of relationship, defining meaning as some function of use.[3] J. N. Findlay has argued, on the other hand, that the examination of the use of language could never elucidate meaning on the ground that the notion of the use of an expression presupposes that of its meaning.[4] Most contemporary philosophers of language, whether or not they think that use can be used to profitably define

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[2]Perhaps Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, section 43.

[3]For example, Alston, "Meaning and Use," Philosophical Quarterly, XIII. Reprinted in G. H. R. Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning.

[4]J. N. Findlay, "Use, Usage and Meaning," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXXV. Also in Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning.

'meaning', do hold that there is at least an intimate connection between meaning and use. But there are some who go on talking about uses of language without attempting to relate their work to the theory of meaning. Quine pretty clearly falls into this last group.[5]

Consider the following passages, all drawn from Word and Object.

> There is the work of paraphrasing ordinary language into the theory. This job . . . will usually present little difficulty to one familiar with the canonical notation. For normally he himself is the one who has uttered as part of some present job, the sentences of ordinary language concerned; and he can then judge outright whether his ends are served by the paraphrase. (p. 159)

> A foggy appreciation of this point is expressed in saying that there is no dictating another's meaning; but the notion of there being a fixed, explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in the speaker's mind is gratuitous. The real point is simply that the speaker is the one to judge whether the substitution of S' for S in the present context will forward his present or evolving program of activity to his satisfaction. (p. 160)

> It would have been wrong if paraphrase carried a synonymy claim; but it does not (#33). A paraphrase into canonical notation is good insofar as it tends to meet needs for which the original might be wanted. (p. 182)

> But likeness of meaning is not my aim (cf. #33). One could still hold that (7) well enough serves any purposes of (9) that seem worth serving. (p. 214)

> It is once more relevant to remind ourselves that paraphrase makes no synonymy claim. It only co-ordinates the uses one makes of diverse theories for diverse advantages. (p. 250)

> We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words 'analysis' and 'explication' would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the

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[5]Quine does try to construct a worthy theory of meaning in Chapter Two of Word and Object, but it turns out to fall far short of being adequate, and Quine abandons the task in despair.

> unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. (pp. 258-59)

The notion of linguistic expressions having uses is not one that is normally associated with Quine, it is to be admitted. But in these passages he speaks of linguistic expressions serving ends, forwarding programs of activity, meeting needs, serving purposes, being made use of, and filling functions. Surely it is no jump at all from saying that expressions do these things to saying that expressions are used (by speakers) to do these things. And if expressions are used within a language community to do certain things, then it is true that they have these certain uses.[6] To speak of a use of x is to speak of a ternary relation holding between x, (in this case) a person, and a purpose of that person. Perhaps Quine would not feel comfortable with the new locution, but he seems committed to accepting the idea that if we want to meet a need or fill a function, it will suffice that we have a linguistic expression that can be used to meet that need or fill that function. The thrust of this discussion is that, so far as we have yet seen, there are no important differences between the purposes of which Quine speaks and the uses which concern meaning-as-use theorists.

Furthermore, of the passages cited, the last five explicitly contrast our ability to use the expression with a concept of the theory of meaning, either meaning itself or synonymy. In other words,

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[6] For another view, see C. K. Grant, "On Using Language," in Philosophical Quarterly, VI.

Quine resorts to the notion of an expression's purpose-1[7] (or use) in just those cases in which he is afraid that we might more naturally appeal to meaning. Although he does appeal to use, clearly Quine does not intend to put this notion forth as an elucidation of meaning. His rejection of the theory of meaning stands and is not meant to be compromised by reference to use. On the other hand, meaning-as-use people will accept the terminology of 'use' as an analysis of meaning and are usually willing to allow themselves to slip back into "meaning-talk" with the understanding that what they say can always be spelled out in terms of use.

Both sides might be willing to concede that shifting attention from meaning to use is an example of paraphrasing. We paraphrase 'meaning' into 'use' terminology, reserving the right to switch back and forth when it is convenient to do so. What is particularly interesting about this case is that it involves the paraphrasing of notions that are central to most accounts of paraphrasing. This means that we can turn the question of the relationship between use and meaning back onto the question of what constitutes a good paraphrase. But since we use the notions of use and meaning to explain paraphrasing, we can easily find ourselves going in circles. If we start with a Quinean view of paraphrase, we can say that

> (a) Meaning is to be explicated in terms of use, and since the paraphrase relationship carries no synonymy claim, there is no analytic relationship between the concepts of meaning and use.

If we do not accept a Quinean view of paraphrase, we are free to

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[7]For an explanation of this term, see Chapter II, section 1.

say that

(b) Meaning is to be analyzed as (or as a function of) use, and so Quine's account of paraphrasing in terms of use and apart from meaning is inconsistent.

We have a circle, but it is not difficult to see where we ought to break it. Our intuitions about meaning are basic; if those intuitions can be put in order and do turn out to be a function of use (in particular, the kind of use that Quine makes use of), then Quine's account of regimentation, appealing to use and abjuring meaning, is just wrong as it stands (though the damage need not be irreparable). On the other hand, we cannot rule out of hand any meaning-as-use account on the ground that it is inconsistent with Quine's account of paraphrasing. It is up to Quine to make his program square with an adequate account of meaning, whatever that might turn out to be.

Now for our purposes of understanding the relationship between the concept of meaning and Quine's program, it will not settle the issue if we determine just that meaning is indeed a function of use. The reason is that Quine may choose to spell out 'use' in such a way that the particular kind or kinds of uses that are relevant to meaning will not be the kind that he is appealing to. To avoid such an inconclusive result, I propose to <u>begin</u> (in the following section) with Quine's uses, or purposes-1, to see whether in fact they correspond in some way to our normal intuitions about meaning. It is apparent that we will have to spell out in some detail which possible uses Quine might have in mind. I will argue that when we do fill in the details concerning what it is we are using various expressions to do,

we will find that either (a) Quine's uses do parallel important meaning concepts, or (b) Quine's paraphrases will not go through, for the reason that without the meaning parallel they cannot have the same uses. But before we get on to this long and involved task, there are some further preliminary matters to be dealt with.

For reasons that go beyond those of convenience, I want to carry on the following discussion with a consideration of sentence-sized units of language, as opposed to terms or theories. Though Quine himself nearly always uses sentence-sized examples (even when dealing with problems that can be localized to terms), it will be best to try to show that restricting our discussion to sentences does not prejudice our case against Quine. Consider first a term t such that it causes us trouble enough to make us turn to a canonical form. It is not necessary that we introduce a competitor term t' to take its place, though we might want to do so. It will be sufficient if we can show that for every occurrence of t in any sentence S, we can render S as sentence S' such that t does not occur in S'. There may or may not be some term t' in S' such that we can associate t' with t. There need be no one-to-one correspondence between the terms of S and those of S'. On Quine's account, showing that S' can do the work of S shows that we need not be bound by the vagaries that may accompany t. This means that for rendering terms we are not, in theory, bound to discuss the jobs that terms do. Although in practice, examining the jobs that sentences do may involve examining the jobs that terms contained in those sentences do, we have shown that rendering terms is reducible to rendering sentences. Hence we need not

consider terms separately from our consideration of sentences.

This is a consequence both of Quine's "doing the same job" requirement and of the fact that the use of a term is not generally an end in itself but a means for doing the job done by the sentence that contains it. In other words, in order to perform completed linguistic acts, we need linguistic units of at least sentential magnitude, and the acts (jobs) Quine is ultimately interested in will be of this type.

It might not be so obvious, however, that we can do justice to activities characteristically carried on with larger than sentence-sized linguistic units. A theory, for example, is described by Quine as a "fabric of sentences."[8] Suppose that we have a problem with theory T and wish to render it into theory T'. Let us say that T is composed of sentences S_1, S_2,....S_n. Then it seems that T' might consist of sentences S'_1, S'_2,....S'_n such that there is no sentence to sentence correspondence, and so long as this is possible we might fail to account for it if we concentrate on sentences rather than theories. For, necessarily, if we restrict ourselves to the rendering of sentences, there will always be a sentence to sentence correlation when a theory is regimented.

I offer here no knockdown argument to show that we can always dispense with theories in favor of sentences, but there are at least these considerations. First, every rendering of a theory that is

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[8]Quine, Word and Object, p. 11.

handled sentence by sentence is still a rendering of that theory.[9] Any theory can be rendered in this way (provided its contained sentences are all renderable), even if in fact a better rendering might be possible which is not of this sort. Studies of such renderings will be just as relevant to the nature and necessary characteristics of the application of the canonical notation to theories as will any others. What must be true of any rendering of a theory will certainly be true of these. In other words, special cases can prove enlightening. Second, there is a real difficulty in studying examples of theories rendered into versions which do not have a one to one correspondence of sentences. Quine does not offer any examples; he fails to mention that there need not be such a relationship, and he himself sticks to the rendering either of sentences or of terms. This fact, besides depriving us of examples, in itself indicates that he does not believe that restricting examples to sentences in any way damages the case for regimentation. These two considerations do, I believe, give us reason to suppose that it is not unjust to consider regimentation at the sentence level and some justification for conducting our study of purposes-1 at this level. There is some sort of a conflict here, though, and this issue will come up again near the end of section three and again in section four of this chapter.

One last thing. Since this entire chapter depends upon the assumption (accepted by both Quine and myself) that sentences are used to do things with, perhaps it should be explicitly acknowledged

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[9]It is true of course that this same relationship holds between terms and sentences or, for that matter, terms and theories. Every rendering of a sentence term by term is still a rendering of that sentence. But I am not claiming that we must operate at the level of sentences, but only that it is permissible to do so.

that there have been those who would deny that this is true.[10]

Sometimes it is argued that sentences do not have meanings as words do, and then, of course, if meaning is identified with use, they have no uses either. The evidence for this claim is generally an appeal to what we normally say about sentences, and it is generally true that we seldom inquire into the meanings of sentences. We very seldom say things like "The meaning of that sentence is . . . ." Here Russell's remark is relevant; when the President is assassinated we do not say that a high ranking public official has been killed; but this does not mean that it would not be true to say it.[11] Fortunately, such appeals to ordinary language are no longer very popular. There are obvious reasons to be cited to explain the paucity of meaning-talk with respect to sentences without having to deny the meaningfulness of such talk.[12]

Ryle, though, does not deny that sentences have meanings; he infers from the fact that they do have meaning the conclusion that meaning for sentences cannot be a function of use, since sentences do not have uses. Ryle draws analogies to support his conclusions. He compares sentences and words to pies and their ingredients and to a

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[10] See G. Ryle's "Ordinary Language," Philosophical Review, LXII, reprinted in V. Chappell, ed., Ordinary Language. Also Grant, "On Using Language," and D. Schwayder, "Uses of Words and Uses of Language," Theoria, XXVI, and in Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning.

[11] Searle calls this 'the assertion fallacy'. See his Speech Acts, pp. 141ff. Unfortunately, I have lost track of the Russell quote.

[12] Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 141ff. Also, Alston, "Meaning and Use," pp. 148-49 in Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning.

play and roles in the play. These analogies and the conclusion drawn from them have been criticized elsewhere,[13] but there is a confusion lurking in Ryle's handling of the question that I have not seen brought out anywhere. In "Ordinary Language" Ryle sums up his argument by saying "Sentences are things that we say. Words and phrases are what we say things with."[14] This is clearly meant to reinforce the part/whole analogies by contrasting the nature of sentences on the one hand and words and phrases on the other. The same argument is found in his "Use, Usage and Meaning."[15] The trouble is that the verb 'say' is ambiguous. If I am asked to say a word, then 'say' is being used to mean the same as 'utter'. Anything I have said, I have uttered. But if I say that snow is white, then I have said something but I have not uttered that snow is white. I have said it, and I have stated it, but I have not uttered it. Out of context, 'say' is ambiguous between uttering and saying (that). When Ryle says that "sentences are things we say," 'say' must here be taken to mean 'utter'. We utter, but do not state, sentences. When he goes on to say that words and phrases are what we say things with, 'say' means 'state'. We do not utter things with words and phrases; we do this with movements of the tongue and mouth. On the other hand, we do state things with words and phrases. So Ryle's argument comes down to this: sentences are things we utter; words and phrases are what we state

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[13] See White, "The Use of Sentences," in Analysis, XVII.

[14] Ryle, "Ordinary Language," p. 34 in Chappell, ed., Ordinary Language.

[15] Ryle, "Use, Usage and Meaning," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XXXV, and also in Parkinson, ed., The Theory of Meaning.

things with. The contrast that Ryle is attempting to reinforce breaks down. For it is clear that we also utter words and phrases, and it becomes much more plausible to hold that sentences, as well as words and phrases, are what we state things with. The plausibility of the contrast rested upon our supposing that a sentence is not used to say things (=utter sentences) since it is the sentence (thing) itself, whereas sentence components <u>are</u> used to say things, being only parts of the whole. But the part-whole relationship that exists between sentences and their components is irrelevant to the issue. If 'say' means 'utter', then neither sentences nor sentence components are used to say things. If 'say' means 'state', then both are. The part-whole analogies still stand and are to be criticized independently, but the "summary" in terms of 'saying' is just a red herring.

C. K. Grant offers another reason why sentences cannot be said to be used to do things.[16] It is his contention that we can never be said to use something to do something unless we could have used something else to do the same thing. He concedes that when we have two or more synonymous sentences, having a choice among them, we can say that the one we choose is being <u>used</u>. But in general this is not the case. He argues that we cannot adequately separate a statement from the sentence "used" to state it. So when we wish to make a statement, generally there is available only one sentence the utterance of which will constitute making that statement and, thus lacking choice, we cannot be said to be <u>using</u> the sentence. This analysis of the use of an

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[16]Grant, "On Using Language."

expression makes it at least a quaternary relation, one holding between a person, an action and two (or more) expressions. This is in itself an implausible account. It implies that if there are two sentences we can use to perform an act and one is suddenly, for whatever reason, lost to us, we have also lost the right to say that we are using the one remaining sentence. But this sudden loss of one sentence does not seem essential to the relationship we are interested in, the one holding between speaker, act and the remaining sentence. The relation we are interested in remains unchanged, and I can see no motivation for refraining from the more natural terminology of uses. So even if Grant were correct about the ordinary use of the word 'use' (I think he is not), there is nothing to stop us from making the natural extension of the term to the cases in which there can be no choice of sentence. This would hardly be extension enough to warrant our calling the result a technical term, though of course we could without great loss if we so desired. So much, then, for the objection that sentences do not have uses.

2. The adequacy criterion I

Quine constantly reminds us that when we render a sentence S into canonical form, the resulting sentence S' need not be synonymous with S.[1] What is important is only "that the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using

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[1] See the passages quoted above on pp. 108-109.

S' instead of S."[2] Recalling the distinction between purposes-1 (those being fulfilled by using S) and purposes-2 (those that S' is meant to fulfill in addition to the purposes-1 of S), made above in section one of Chapter II, it is clear that Quine is insisting here that purposes-1 be met by S'. Let us call a paraphrase that meets this condition 'adequate'. If a proposed paraphrase also succeeds in fulfilling the desired purposes-2, then we can say that it is also 'successful'. For the remainder of this chapter we shall be concerned with the question of what must be true for a paraphrase to be adequate. The matter of the success of paraphrases will be treated in the final section.

We have already seen that Quine uses the notion of using a sentence for a purpose in his account of regimentation. In particular, he uses it to formulate a criterion of adequacy for paraphrases. Independently of his program of regimentation, however, Quine rejects any appeal to the theory of meaning. What I now wish to show is that his adequacy criterion, stated in terms of sentence uses, can be seen upon examination to rest upon or to be reducible to concepts of the theory of meaning. An example of the sort of argument I mean to be presenting is my discussion of the ambiguity model. Quine's account of disambiguation did not, on the surface at any rate, use any concepts belonging to the theory of meaning. It was only when we examined what adequacy with respect to disambiguation amounted to that it became clear that meaning concepts were being appealed to. It turned out

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[2]Quine, Word and Object, p. 160.

then that Quine could not appeal to disambiguation because an adequate account of that notion rested on the theory of meaning. Our task now is to examine Quine's appeal to sentence-uses in the same way.

We can begin with this, Quine's first formulation of the adequacy criterion:

> I S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead of S.

This criterion relativizes both to purposes and to persons. Making this explicit and simplifying somewhat, we obtain:

> Ia For a particular person and a particular purpose of that person, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if that person can fulfill his purpose by using S' instead of S.

The relativization to persons is unnecessary. So long as we relativize to purposes, paraphrases will either meet or fail to meet these purposes regardless of the particular speaker involved. Even if it is true that the speaker in question is the best placed to judge paraphrases, given a particular purpose, the adequacy of a paraphrase will not depend upon the person who has the purpose. Furthermore, since the adequacy relation is symmetrical (we can always shift back and forth between paraphrases), we can simplify further:

> Ib For purpose P, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if both S and S' can be used to fulfill P.

Now to use a sentence to fulfill a purpose is to use it to do something, and to do something is to perform an action. This is all perfectly acceptable so long as we do not adopt an overly narrow view of what constitutes an action. Accordingly, where it is convenient I

will speak either of using sentences to fulfill purposes or of using them to perform actions, using these locutions interchangeably. This is to say that since Quine's criterion has us interested in what sentences are used for, we are, ipso facto, interested in the acts that sentences can be used to perform. So we also have this version:

Ic For any act A, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if both S and S' can be used to perform act A.

The biggest problem in evaluating this criterion as it stands is that there are a great many entirely different sorts of things that one can do using sentences, and Quine does not make it clear in general which kinds of things he has in mind. If he has certain sorts of activities in mind, then he has not told us what they are nor what it is for two sentences to be usable to carry on these activities. If he really does not mean to restrict the relevant sorts of things, then trouble might arise when we get down to examining actual cases. For example, suppose that we are using some sentence S for some purpose that requires that it be synonymous with some other sentence. Then any paraphrase of S into another sentence S' requires that S' also be synonymous with the original sentence. So S and S' must themselves be synonymous. Now obviously the particular purpose we chose here is such that accepting such a purpose in the first place involved us up to our necks with meaning concepts. Quine can rightly object that he has no such purposes in mind. But it is possible that certain purposes can more subtly presuppose meaning concepts. If and when this happens, Quine must be ready to disavow these purposes. He cannot openly disavow meaning concepts and at the same time allow his failure

to spell out the relevant purposes of paraphrases conceal the fact that the notion of adequacy with respect to these purposes tacitly depends upon an appeal to such concepts.

But there is another reason why Quine himself needs to take an interest in spelling out some form of I, one that has to do with a conflict between Quine's actual use of regimentation and his characterization of the program. When he is talking about the program he says that he is concerned with particular occasions of sentence utterances or inscriptions, i.e., sentence tokens.[3] This emphasis has the clear consequence that any sentence could on some occasion be the paraphrase of any other if we choose our purposes and set up the occasion carefully enough. Now Quine will probably accept this consequence. But if he does, he needs to explain how it is that we can also paraphrase sentence types, which is exactly what he himself does all the way through Word and Object. As I had occasion to point out once before (at the end of Chapter II) the Quinean paraphrases we examined in Chapter I were not concerned with particular utterances or inscriptions of sentences but, in general, of sentences (types) abstracted from any particular situation.

Granted that this is Quine's own practice, how is it that paraphrases of sentence types can be evaluated? The problem is that sentence types have neither particular occasions nor, it would seem, particular purposes associated with them the way sentence tokens do.

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[3]For example, he speaks of sentences "uttered as part of some present job" and of "the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with." Word and Object, pp. 159-60.

It is clear, though, that adequacy must involve satisfaction of purposes. Clearly what is happening is that Quine is appealing to purpose-types, associating one purpose (or more) to each sentence type. The argument here can be put in the form of a dilemma, assuming only that Quine actually does paraphrase sentence types. Either Quine associates particular purposes with these sentences or he does not. If he does not, then there can be no grounds for evaluating such a paraphrase as either adequate or inadequate, for we could always imagine sets of situations and purposes such that any suggested paraphrase could be either adequate or inadequate. If he does associate particular types of purposes with the sentence type to be paraphrased, then he can evaluate the paraphrase, but not by applying some form of (I), but by applying some form of an adequacy criterion that incorporates the particular purpose or purposes that Quine has already associated with the sentence. So either the adequacy of Quine's paraphrases can not be evaluated at all or the adequacy criterion must be spelled out purpose by purpose. Quine does evaluate paraphrases of sentence types; in doing so he implicitly admits that we need to spell out I with respect to particular purposes.

What kinds of things, then, are we likely to be wanting to use sentences for? At perhaps the most general level of purposes we characteristically use language for, we might say that we use sentences in order to say things. With this kind of purpose in mind, Quine's criterion for adequacy becomes:

> II For the purpose (act) of saying something, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can be used to say the same thing.

As we saw in our discussion of Ryle in the previous section, 'say' is an ambiguous verb. So is the expression 'to say the same thing'. Given any sentence that is used to say something, we can say the same thing either by producing the same sequence of words (giving us two tokens of the same sentence type) or by producing another sentence (type) which bears some special relationship to the original sentence. The difference is that between direct and indirect quotation, between 'saying "--"' and 'saying that --'.

It is readily apparent that the first interpretation is unavailable to us, even if we waive the problem that we do not use sentences to utter things. If writing (speech) is in question and we are dealing with different tokens of the same type, then there will be no typographical (phonetic) difference between S and S' at all, and no rendering will have taken place. So S and S' need not 'say "--"' the same thing in order to qualify.

The second alternative lands us in the question of indirect quotation, or indirect discourse.[4] We have already looked at Quine's account of this phenomenon, and his treatment in terms of projecting to the speaker's state of mind and saying what is natural for us in that state of mind has been found wanting. Perhaps we can get a

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[4]There is this difference between indirect quotation and paraphrasing. When we paraphrase S into S' we simply produce S' and let it replace S. Generally when we indirectly quote a person, we use the locution "X said that _____" and place S' into the blank with an appropriate change of verb mood. To say that S and S' can be used to say the same thing is to say that we can place S' within the indicated locution form to correctly report on what another person had said when he uttered S.

little clearer on this question, if we look at some of the different kinds of conditions under which we would be prepared to concede that a person had used a sentence S' to report correctly on what another person had said using another sentence S, thus demonstrating that S and S' can be used to say the same thing.

The paradigm case arises when we are prepared to say that S and S' are completely synonymous, or if one does not believe in complete synonymy, when S and S' are as synonymous as we could ever wish two sentences to be. Good examples of such synonymy for sentences are those arising from syntactic relations. For example, let S be 'John kicked Mary' and S' be 'Mary was kicked by John'. Then you can say "John kicked Mary" and I (correctly) report that you said that Mary was kicked by John.

But Quine rightly points out that the worth of some paraphrases positively relies upon the fact that the sentences are not synonymous, as when we paraphrase ambiguities away. Let S be 'Flying planes can be dangerous' and S' be 'It can be dangerous to fly planes'. Thus, you say "Flying planes can be dangerous" and I (perhaps correctly) report that you said that it can be dangerous to fly planes. I will simply repeat here what I urged in our discussion of ambiguity, that the success of this sort of procedure depends upon the sharing of a meaning in common, a notion which quite clearly falls within the theory of meaning. This notion of sharing a common meaning rests upon the possibility of sentences having more than one interpretation. One of the sentences, in this case S, can have more than one interpretation. For this reason, S and S' are not synonymous, but if the paraphrase

is to be adequate, then S' must have the same meaning that S had when it was being used originally.

These cases are straightforward. Whether the relationship is one of synonymy or one of sharing a meaning in common, we are dealing with meaning concepts, and there must be other ways of saying the same thing if this purpose can be available for the adequacy criterion. And, indeed, there are other cases in which we are generally willing to say that two persons said the same thing.

We often report upon what others say leaving out inessential or uninteresting information. Consider this somewhat liberalized version of saying the same thing. Someone says "John owns a mare" and I, reporting on this, say that he said that John owns a horse. There might be reason to object to my lack of thoroughness, but there need not be, as when the sex of the animal is plainly not of interest. Here it is obvious that S and S' are not synonymous. Nor do they even share a meaning in common, at least not in the sense in which that notion was explicated above in terms of more than one available interpretation, for neither one is ambiguous. But I can fairly report that what was said was that John owns a horse, because this is indeed a part of what was said. It <u>was</u> said, though indeed, more than that was also said. The fact that more was said as well does not mean that the portion I reported on becomes somehow "unsaid." This claim amounts to the following: we are allowed to use the "saying that" locution for weaker and weaker implications of a statement. By this I mean that if the speaker utters 'John owns a mare', he (normally) says that John owns a mare, that he owns a horse, that he owns an animal and that he

owns something.

Another way to see this is to see that the speaker might have said what he did by uttering the sentences 'John owns a horse' and 'The horse is female'. Here we can clearly report on what he said truly, though incompletely, by using S'. The admittedly strong feeling that my report of what was said must be incorrect is due to the strong presumption that when one asks what a person said, one wants to know all of what he said. When this presumption is removed, there is no reason to find fault with S'. With respect to Quine's criterion, there is no reason why the purpose we might want to carry over from S to S' might not be just saying only part of what S was used to say. This would indeed be one way of increasing the simplicity of a theory.

But we have still made no escape from meaning. Though S and S' are not synonymous, it is clear that there is a meaning relationship holding between them that justifies this paraphrase. Our disinterest in part of what was said enabled us to ignore part of the meaning of S, but still we can say that the meaning of S' must be included in that of S. The notion of meaning inclusion as I use it can be explained in the following way. Linguists attempt to explain semantic relationships between expressions in terms of semantic components. We recognize a similar meaning relationship between 'man':'woman' and 'bull':'cow'. The following is an example of how (semantic) componential analysis would account for this.

> From the proportion man:woman::bull:cow, we can extract four components of sense; we will refer to these as (male), (female), (adult-human), (adult-bovine). At this stage of the analysis, if one were actually analyzing the words on the basis of proportional equations, (adult-human) and (adult-bovine) would be

> regarded as single components. But as soon as we restate the proportion man:woman:child::bull:cow:calf . . . we can extract the further components (adult) and (non-adult). No one of these components, it should be observed, is assumed to be an ultimate component (a 'prime'): It is conceivable that, by bringing forward for comparison other words of English and setting up further proportions, we should be able to factorize (human) or (male) into 'smaller' semantic components . . . . Eventually we might hope to describe the sense of all the words in the vocabulary in terms of their ultimate semantic components. Assuming that the proposed analysis of the few English words given above is correct as far as it goes . . . , we can say that the sense of man is the product of the components (male), (adult), and (human); that the sense of mare is the product of (female), (adult) and (equine); and so on.[5]

Given this attempt to characterize meanings in terms of semantic components, the inclusion metaphor seems quite appropriate. If we suppose the meaning of 'mare' to consist of at least the semantic components (female), (adult) and (equine), and that of 'horse' to consist of at least (equine) and no component not also contained in the meaning of 'mare', then the metaphor seems quite a happy one.[6] This account of semantic components is suited to words, rather than to sentences, but it is not difficult to see how the meaning relationship between 'mare' and 'horse' will carry over to the relationship between S and S', so that we can say, derivatively, that the meaning of S' is included in that of S. Once again, the 'saying that' approach, while avoiding synonymy, has depended upon some weaker meaning relationship, in this case meaning inclusion.

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[5] John Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, pp. 471-72.

[6] This notion of meaning inclusion must not be confused with what Lyons sometimes calls 'meaning inclusion', or hyponymy, which is a relation of inclusion of extensions rather than of intensions. See Ibid., p. 453.

But we have yet to consider the strongest case that can be made for claiming that two sentences can be used to say the same thing without having a meaning relationship holding between them. Let us consider first the fact that Quine argues against a synonymy claim by pointing out that, under paraphrase, indicator words are often replaced with terms having specific reference.[7] Thus we can paraphrase from 'I am hungry' to, say, 'S.D.C. is hungry'. And these sentences are not synonymous, though in the proper context they can be used to say the same thing. Here, the key words are 'in the proper context'. The force of this example, of course, lies in the fact that the meaning of a sentence, as this notion is usually construed, is abstracted from any particular context of utterance or inscription. The notion of an action, though, is not like this. The agent and context of any action is crucial to an analysis of that action. Because the nature of a speech act such as 'saying that --' is such that it is a function of both meaning and context, the claim is that alterations in context can allow sentences with different meanings to be used to say the same thing.

All this can be seen as part of a more inclusive set of phenomena. We can get the same kind of situation without using indexical terms. For example, we might paraphrase 'The dean is out of town' as 'The chairman of the hospital board is out of town', claiming that both sentences can be used to say the same thing. All we need do is broaden the notion of context from questions of what is

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[7] See Quine, Word and Object, pp. 160, 227-28.

true about the particular utterance to questions of what is the case in the world at large in order to describe this in the same way as we did Quine's example: as two sentences with different meanings being capable of being used to say the same thing because of facts about the context. The only difference is that the facts in this latter case are about the world in general and not about the particular occasion of the utterance. So the broader issue here seems to be one of the effect that substitution of identicals has upon the usability of a sentence for saying the same thing. For indexicals and pronouns in general are just one species of definite referring expressions and, in fact, the meaning of indexicals like 'I' and 'this X' are generally analyzed along the lines of 'the speaker' and 'the X such that....' So our problem is one of referring expressions in general.[8]

There is, by the way, no parallel problem for predicate expressions. If we paraphrase a sentence by replacing a predicate expression with another expression that makes the same predication as did the first, then we are assured not only that S and S' can be used to say the same thing, but also that the two sentences are synonymous. If 'fat' and 'obese' are adjectives that are used to predicate the same property of objects, then 'Tom is fat' and 'Tom is obese' are synonymous. The fact that it may be difficult to tell when two predicate expressions are usable for making the same predication does not

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[8] On the analysis of indicator expressions see Word and Object, pp. 101, 113; and sections 34, 36. Also, Searle cites an unpublished work, P. Postal's "On so-called pronouns in English," in support of the view that pronouns are forms of the definite article in the deep structure.

adversely affect the truth of this conditional.

This point suggests the possibility of the following argument. Quine needs to characterize adequacy for saying the same thing apart from appeals to meaning relationships. Just showing that the referring expressions of sentences can differ in meaning and still be used to say the same thing is not sufficient. So long as we are dealing with the familiar subject-predicate type sentence, it must be true that regardless of how we specify the subject referred to, we must predicate the same property of that object. At the least then, saying the same thing seems to require sameness of meaning with respect to predicate expressions. But let us put this aside and go on to see what we can say about the meanings of sentences as wholes.

What can we say about sentences that differ only in the substitution of identicals? We must admit first of all that, assuming the referring expressions substituted <u>are</u> identicals, it is very natural to say that if anyone produced a token of one, the other could be used to report upon what was said. Thus, in a case in which we all have the relevant background information, if you say that the President is in Florida, I can say that you said that Nixon is in Florida. The value of my report on your saying is dependent upon this shared background knowledge. What happens when the presumption of this shared knowledge proves unjustified? We run into various problems. If you are under the impression that Humphrey is President and say that the President is in Florida, then my report is certainly misleading, albeit through no fault of mine. The unhappiness of this state of affairs is brought out in the problems such a report gives

one who is aware of your difficulties over identifying present Presidents. He will press me on my report: "Did he say that Nixon was in Florida, or only that the President was?" The answer, of course, is that what you said was that the President was in Florida.

It is tempting to think that 'say' might in this last case be used in the direct quotation sense, which is being resorted to as the result of failure of indirect quotation. This would be wrong. If we could produce a synonymous definite referring expression, it would prove satisfactory. If this is not immediately obvious, it is once we consider the case of paraphrasing across languages. Here, precisely the same problem can arise, the person who wants to press me on my report can ask the same question for the same reason, and yet there can be no question of using direct quotation. We must rely on synonymies.

We can imagine all kinds of questions over shared background knowledge. If I am an amnesia victim, for example, it seems you could not correctly report on my remark that I am hungry by saying that S.D.C. was hungry. If that was what I had said, my doctor could consider it a sign of a major breakthrough of my having remembered my name or, at least, my initials.

Here we have been discussing problems of identification, but it should be pointed out that relevant background knowledge of different sorts can have the same kinds of effects. For example, so long as you believe that all ravens are black, I can fairly report that you said that the girl's hair was black when you utter the sentence 'Her hair was the color of a raven'. Here we can lump together

all the sorts of background knowledge that one can have and treat them all the same. There is, however, one kind of knowledge that can always be presumed on the part of the speaker, and that is the knowledge that one must have to be a speaker of the language the sentence was uttered in. And this simply means that we can always substitute elements on the basis of meaning equivalence.

In contrast to our previous cases, if one says that Tom is fat and objects to the accuracy of a report that he said that Tom was obese, it can only be that he takes 'fat' and 'obese' to differ in meaning at least to some degree. This suggests that saying the same thing is a matter of producing synonymous sentences. For we have seen that one can always challenge an indirect quotation that rests on substitution either of nonsynonymous identicals or of nonsynonymous predicate expressions, whereas one cannot challenge one that involves only the substitution of synonymous predicate expressions. But if this is so, I need to explain why we quite naturally extend the "saying the same thing" locution to utterances of nonsynonymous sentences.

When a person says something, he takes responsibility for the truth of what he says. He also takes responsibility for any implications of what he says. (We can be responsible for things of which we are unaware.) What else? If he is willing to assert some other statement then he is responsible for any implication the two statements have jointly. This is what is happening when we substitute identicals in reporting on one's saying. We are depending upon the speaker's willingness to accept some other statement, and we are

drawing an implication from the conjunction of the two statements. We are putting words (in this case an identity statement) in his mouth. The fairness of such indirect discourse depends upon whether he is willing to accept such words. Since there is no piece of shared background knowledge that can be presumed for every case, and since we are discussing the relationships between individual sentences, in order to ensure that we do not misreport we need to stick to synonymous sentences. This matter of joint implications, though, is an important one, and it will rise again in the next section.

Let us return to our earlier example. You say that Nixon is in Florida, and I say that you said that the President is in Florida. Suppose I know that Nixon is President, but that you do not believe it. (You are a very bad loser, let us say.) Obviously, your failure to accept the truth of the necessary identity statement renders my report unhappy, at the very least. If you <u>had</u> accepted the identity statement, my report would not have misled, and we could then say that the substitution of identicals involved in my report was justified on the grounds that such freedom conveniently enabled me not to have to worry about the exact wording you had originally used. But given the actual unhappiness, is my report just plain wrong as it stands? It is. You can justly claim that I have not accurately reported what you said. Is my report, then, wrong in this case only, or will it also be incorrect even when you accept the identity statement? In other words, do we want what a person says to be a function of background knowledge as well as of his words and their meaning? I think we do not. When we know a person's words (qua sounds), we know

what he has uttered; when we know their meaning, we know what he has said. What it is that has actually been said will not be affected by other statements that the speaker holds true, though what he implies will be.

This means that the habit of extending the 'saying the same thing' locution to utterances of nonsynonymous sentences is just a convenient manner of speaking and is not intended in its strict, what I take to be its literal, sense. Evidence for this claim is (a) our tendency, when pushed, to say things like "Well, what he really said was..." and then revert to a synonymy relation (perhaps direct discourse), and (b) the right of a speaker to claim that he is being unfairly reported on when the context is such as to make a difference. When the context is such that it makes no real difference, then there is no need to object. But because he could in principle lodge an objection, it is best to view these looser cases of indirect discourse in the same light as we would if one were to report on another's utterance by saying "It is as if he had said that...." In our example, of course, it will only truly be as if you had said that the President was in Florida when you also believe that Nixon is President.

Why is it, we may well ask, that all the above considerations seem to lead us to the view that saying the same thing depends upon synonymy?[9] Quine's criterion has led us away from an explicit dis-

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[9]An interesting discussion of when two utterances constitute the same "saying" can be found in L. J. Cohen's The Diversity of Meaning, pp. 141-52. Cohen places more stress upon the particular wording of sentences than would I, but his conclusions substantially agree

cussion of meaning and toward a consideration of acts. But in the particular case of saying the same thing, we have in the course of our discussion come back to meaning after all. This suggests that it may not be possible to clearly separate answers to the question "What is it that determines the meaning of a sentence?" from answers to the question "What is it that determines what a sentence can be used to say?" As Searle puts it,

> There are, therefore, not two irreducibly distinct semantic studies, one a study of the meanings of sentences and one a study of the performances of speech acts. For just as it is part of our notion of the meaning of a sentence that a literal utterance of that sentence with that meaning in a certain context would be the performance of a particular speech act, so it is part of our notion of a speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of which in a certain context would in virtue of its (or their) meaning constitute a performance of that speech act.[10]

Saying something is, I take it, uncontroversially a speech act in the sense Searle means. Notice, too, the reference made here to context. Abstracting from context, we need synonymy to make certain two sentences can be used to say the same thing; making use of

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with those reached here. See in particular p. 142, where he argues that "you look tired" said to Smith cannot be the same saying as "Smith looks tired" since the latter suggests that the speaker knows the name of the man who looks tired.

[10] Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 17-18. If this is right, then there must be some account of how it is that sentence meanings and speech acts like saying something are analytically related. Various theories of meaning might be appealed to in order to explain the relationship. One way would be an appeal to the rules governing the utterances of sentences in an attempt to show that these rules determine both the meaning of a sentence and the acts that sentence can be used to perform. But there may be other ways. If meanings can be derived from speech acts or vice versa, then there is no prima facie reason why an acknowledgment of this relation could not be incorporated into any particular theory of meaning.

context (or shared background knowledge) when we can, we can sometimes avoid the practical need for synonymy.

The gist of this discussion is that the usability of sentences to say the same thing depends upon meaning relationships. I have spent as much time as I have with the problems of reference because I have seen them emphasized by Quineans in argument. On the other hand, apart from the special case of indexicals, I am not aware that Quine ever relies on this appeal to the problems of reference to avoid meaning claims in general for paraphrasing. As for the particular matter of indirect discourse, Quine's position is unclear, and this is probably due to the fact that there has been so much new work produced on this question lately that it will take some time to digest and fully evaluate the results. In Word and Object, Quine attempts to analyze indirect discourse apart from meaning by talk of projecting to the speaker's state of mind and saying what seemed natural for oneself to say in such a state. Since then, however, he seems to have altered his view.

In a very interesting and important article,[11] Donald Davidson suggests a new analysis of locutions of the form 'X said that _____' where the blank is filled with a sentence. Among the interesting items of Davidson's analysis is the result that the 'that' of indirect discourse is a pure demonstrative which has the function of pointing out not a sentence, but an utterance. This has the result that when we say what another said, we must actually say it (i.e., say what he said), and then say that he said it. On this line, there are two

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[11] D. Davidson, "On Saying That" in Davidson and Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W. V. Quine.

steps to indirect discourse: (a) making us "samesayers" and (b) saying that we are samesayers. Furthermore, and this is what is important for us here, Davidson urges that for any such report to be correct, we must use a synonymous sentence in the indicated locution.[12] This, of course, is Davidson speaking. But Quine, in replying to Davidson, has this to say:

> This is the point of his samesaying relation. It is not supposed to be intelligible except as indirect discourse in ordinary language is intelligible. It merely packages the problems of indirect discourse that we are not worrying about.[13]

This seems to accept Davidson's view of the logical form of indirect discourse without accepting the view that synonymy be appealed to as Davidson has it. But if, as Quine says, the samesaying relation (i.e., that of saying the same thing) does not make sense, then it cannot be appealed to in any formulation of an adequacy criterion. The notions of saying the same thing (for persons) and usability for saying the same thing (for sentences) do belong to the theory of meaning, and this fact is reflected in Quine's rejecting (in the last quoted passage) these notions for the same kinds of reasons he rejects synonymy and other meaning concepts.

If Quine freely and consistently admits that "saying the same thing" is a concept of the theory of meaning, then of course he would not adopt this as a purpose relevant to regimentation, and then much of the argument here has been, in an ad hominem sense, unneeded. If he would occasionally appeal to such a purpose, then he owes us an

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[12] Ibid., p. 171.

[13] Ibid., pp. 334-35.

account of samesaying that is semantically uncontaminated.

But, in fact, there is reason to think that Quine often does have purposes like 'saying that --' in mind for his adequacy criterion. In a recent work Quine has this to say about his canonical notation:

> I have stressed how much our austere little standard grammar potentially encompasses. Its lack of tense, its lack even of names and all complex terms, detract none from its adequacy. Still I cannot claim that it is adequate to all purposes of cognitive discourse: that everything can be said in a language comprising just these constructions and variables and a finite lexicon of predicates.[14]

It is clear that the purposes of which Quine speaks are purposes-1 since they are to be common to both pre- and postparaphrase versions of discourse. Hence the adequacy which he here analyzes in terms of what can be said is just the notion which we have been investigating. Usually when Quine is examining regimentation with respect to adequacy, it is just not clear what he takes its adequacy to consist of. He will say that we can or cannot make a certain paraphrase and, while one may suspect that his decisions depend upon the meanings involved, it is never said why it is that we can (cannot) "make do" with the paraphrase version. But the just cited passage indicates that (1) at least at times Quine is appealing to the notion of what a sentence can be used to say, and (2) he does not seem to notice that such an appeal may be impossible to reconcile with his scruples concerning concepts belonging to the theory of meaning.

This discussion provides a good example of the type of

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[14]Quine, Philosophy of Logic, p. 31.

argument I mean to be presenting and serves as a model for understanding the status of much of what will follow. I do not by any means claim to have demonstrated or proved that the concept of indirect discourse presupposes meaning concepts. Nor do I claim that the semantic concepts that I have tried to link with indirect discourse or samesaying are in perfect order and unexceptionable, certainly not in the light of Quine's sophisticated attacks on the theory of meaning. I have tried to appeal to the intuitions that most of us hold about these matters to show that this particular reading of the adequacy criterion is unavailable to Quine in the absence of any further elaboration or argumentation. Quine can reject the purpose if he wishes (as he need not), or he can reject the account of samesaying provided here (as he needs to do if he accepts the purpose). This type of appeal to meaning concepts, then, is not intended to convince those who are Quineans on meaning. I take it that a necessary condition for such a convincing would be the formulation of an entire theory of meaning.

There are two separate appeals that my discussion generates. One is to non-Quineans who are interested in getting what is of value out of regimentation. For it is generally thought, I believe, that one can adopt Quine's views on regimentation while rejecting his skepticism about meaning. Quine himself encourages this attitude.[15] Basically, what he wants to say is that there are relationships between sentences that skeptics and believers (in meaning concepts)

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[15]See above, Chapter II, section 1.

will differ over, but that the relationship between his paraphrases are not like this; meanings just are not relevant here, but rather purposes (acts). So the believer and the skeptic should be able to paraphrase together in harmony. What I have tried to show is that one particular appeal to a purpose has ended up talking about meaning after all, so that one who accepts some sort of traditional meaning intuitions will not want to go along with Quine's claim that no meaning relations need hold between paraphrases.

The other appeal is to Quine himself, to make good some version of an adequacy criterion apart from an appeal to meaning concepts. We have supposed that he appeals to the purpose of saying something. But the notion of what a sentence can be used to say seems to rest upon the notion of its meaning. If we spell out the adequacy criterion in this way, then, Quine owes us an account of 'saying that' that does not rest upon meaning concepts. Quine's discussion of indirect discourse can be seen as such an account, though an inadequate one.[16] In the absence of a meaningfree account of saying, the adequacy criterion must be spelled out in some other way, and we shall go on in the next section to see how Quine might try to deal with this second appeal.

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[16]It is interesting to notice that he offers his account independently of any justification of regimentation. He does not seem to see any need for using his account of indirect discourse to justify the paraphrase relationship as used to characterize regimentation.

3. The adequacy criterion II

Rather than trying to consider individually all the different things we can do with language, it will prove more economical to consider whole classes of these things. One particularly broad classification of acts done using language is the tripartite classification introduced by J. L. Austin in his How to Do Things with Words. There he distinguishes locutionary, perlocutionary and illocutionary acts, summarizing his results like this:

> We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense. Second, we also said that we perform illocutionary acts, such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c, i.e., utterances which have a certain (conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading.[1]

Others have accepted the terminology and the general outlines of Austin's distinctions, but have wanted to draw the line between the locutionary and the illocutionary somewhat differently.[2] They have suggested that we use the term 'locutionary act' to refer to utterances qua utterances and not just to the utterances of sentences which have a certain meaning. For them, a locutionary act is the mere production of the sounds (or script) that make up the sentence in question. This is not merely a terminological dispute, for the

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[1] J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 108.

[2] See Alston, Philosophy of Language, pp. 34ff., and Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 23ff.

analysis of an illocutionary act hangs in the balance, as well as the question of the relationship between the meaning of a sentence and the illocutionary act it is used to perform. For our purposes here, I propose to adopt the modified Austinian classification, though for these purposes nothing hangs on this choice; my only concern is that we do not let any important type of linguistic act escape our net. Later we will consider some acts which do not seem to fit within this classification, but they will be suggested by some that do.

On this classification we can immediately exclude the following version of the adequacy criterion:

> III For the purpose (act) of performing locutionary acts, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can be used to perform the same locutionary act.

The reason why this criterion can be excluded is that we have already dealt with it. This approach collapses into the 'saying "--"' approach. If S and S' can be used to perform the same locutionary act, then they are just the same sentence and no paraphrasing has taken place.

We can give a general characterization of perlocutionary acts in terms of the effects of locutionary acts (though Alston uses the term 'perlocutionary' to describe the bringing about of effects that have nonlinguistic causes as well as those which are caused by locutionary acts). Building this notion into Quine's criterion, we get:

> IV For the purpose (act) of performing perlocutionary acts, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can be used to perform the same perlocutionary act.

It should first be admitted that this is not the sort of approach one would expect a defender of regimentation to adopt.

But it is a possible approach and for the sake of thoroughness it should be considered here.

First let me make note of the fact that there are available to us two independent ways of showing that a suggested adequacy criterion is not available to Quine. The one which I have emphasized the most consists in showing that the suggested criterion makes use of concepts belonging to the theory of meaning. This line was taken in rejecting the 'saying that --' criterion. Another way of excluding possible criteria is to show that the acts in question are just clearly not the sorts of jobs Quine has in mind for the regimenter. We rejected the appeal to sameness of locutionary act potential for this reason. I think that considerations of both sorts weigh against any attempt to spell out the criterion using perlocutionary-type purposes.

It is at once clear that most perlocutionary acts are not even likely candidates for our criterion. Regimenters are just not interested in whether or not a sentence and its paraphrase can both be used to get a person to do something, or to irritate, amuse, bore, or impress him. These sorts of effects are not relevant to a regimenter's program. But even if we could not dismiss them out of hand for this reason, they would not sit well with Quine's program. The problem is that the degree to which two sentences will share the same potential for, say, amusing a person, or getting him to do something, will fluctuate wildly depending upon hearer and circumstances. But it is clear that Quine's paraphraser is not meant to be at the mercy of such fluctuations. Quine does not want the adequacy of the

paraphrase to depend upon what sort of reaction it gets from a hearer.

If it is clear that the examples of perlocutionary acts I have given will not do, it may not be so obvious that none will. There is one sort of perlocutionary act which stands out as a more likely candidate. Suppose we are impressed with the insight that language is often used to convey information to hearers, to get them to believe that, say, p. This might lead to the following criterion, which is not so evidently irrelevant to Quine's purposes.

IVa For the purpose (act) of getting a hearer to believe that p, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can both be used to get the hearer to believe that p.

This may not be so obviously irrelevant to Quine's purposes, but actually this particular purpose was especially chosen to illustrate three distinct problems that appeals to perlocutionary effects as purposes can raise. (i) For one thing, we still have the problem of <u>fluctuation</u> with us. Quine might be able to use S to get one of his undergraduates to believe that p, while the most obvious candidate S' for a paraphrase of S would fail, not necessarily through any failing of S' itself, but as a result of, let us say, a bad day on the part of the student. The point is that this sort of criterion places too much weight on the shoulders of the hearer. The problem of fluctuation is that the paraphraser cannot know ahead of time whether the paraphrase will be adequate regardless both of how ideal S' may seem as a substitute and of how well the same paraphrase may have worked in the past. The relationship between S and S' must be a tighter one than this. Quine himself would want to insist that the

regimenter is not at the mercy of the hearer (reader) when the adequacy of a paraphrase is to be judged.

In an attempt to save IVa, one might try to cut down on the dependence upon the individual hearer's reactions. This sort of move, though, will run into trouble over meaning concepts. For consider how one might try to cut down on this dependence. If we wish to make it as certain as possible that both S and S' can be used to get a hearer to believe the same thing, the best way is simply to ensure that S and S' mean the same thing. Of course one <u>can</u> get persons to believe the same thing using sentences with different meanings. One way would be to rely upon background information that the hearer has available to him. But the farther that S and S' are from meaning the same thing, the more the hearer needs to depend upon background knowledge, the greater will be the "leap" he needs to make, the less likely it is he will be able to make it, and the greater the fluctuation we have. The problem of fluctuation, then, might <u>possibly</u> be tamed (I do not say that it would), but only by introducing some sort of meaning relationship. We have a direct relationship (though not in each, or even in any given, case) between the potential of two sentences to get a hearer to believe the same thing and the degree of synonymy that holds between them, and accordingly an inverse relationship between the fluctuation of perlocutionary act potential of two sentences and their degree of synonymy. Since the essence of a perlocutionary act is the bringing about of some effect, any perlocutionary act candidate must suffer from this same dilemma. We simply cannot rely upon one sentence's ability to consistently have the same effects

as another.

But even if we could tame this first problem, there are two other features of this particular purpose that are difficult to square with Quine's account of regimentation. (2) Distinguishable from the problem of fluctuation is that of externality. The point here is that even if the paraphraser could count on a regularity of perlocutionary act potential, and could identify the relevant effects, the fact is that the effects are "out in the open." It is open for anyone to verify the adequacy of the paraphrase. But according to Quine, the paraphraser is the only one to judge his paraphrase. This gap between Quine's account of his program and the appeal to perlocutionary acts for the adequacy criterion seems to be a necessary one. If the paraphraser is the only one to judge his paraphrase, then the criterion cannot lie with the effects that sentences have. Looking to perlocutionary acts eliminates the supposed privileged position of the paraphraser.

(3) Yet a third special difficulty with IVa is that the effects in question are not only external to the paraphraser, they are internal to someone else. The speaker loses not only his privileged position, but even the common public access he would have for effects to be found outside the minds of others. In this case, then, the speaker might well not ever know the adequacy of a proposed paraphrase, given only an uncooperative hearer. Surely these considerations have led us a long way from the cases of regimentation Quine points to for examples, and, equally surely, the bringing about of effects in hearers cannot be the kinds of purposes Quine has in mind.

These considerations leave us with the third sort of linguistic act, that labeled 'illocutionary acts'. The consideration of this class is more difficult than that of the previous two for the reason that there is no general characterization of illocutionary acts as there were for locutionary and perlocutionary acts. In the absence of such a characterization to build into our criterion (the class of illocutionary acts is nearly always defined by example), all that can be done is to consider the most promising examples. No claim for completeness can be made, only one for a determination to consider the strongest candidates.

It is clear that Austin held that 'saying that --' was a (complete) locutionary act.[3] On the modified classification we accepted above (page 143), however, it is an illocutionary act, though one of a very low level of specificity, since in saying something a person could at the same time be warning, suggesting, ordering, or any number of other, more fully specified, illocutionary acts. We have, then, already examined and rejected one sort of illocutionary act on the ground that it belonged to the theory of meaning. Other illocutionary acts, even (especially) those generally cited as paradigms, are clearly not suited to Quine's purposes. These include promising, ordering, asking and commending.[4] But we are still faced

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[3]Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Lecture VIII.

[4]Here and throughout I consider only broad classes of acts, so that warning, for example, is but one example that needs consideration. We will not need to distinguish warning A that p from warning B that q, etc.

with a bewildering array of illocutionary acts from which to choose purposes for the criterion. Austin claimed that there were over a thousand illocutionary verbs. Even assuming that there is not a different act for each verb, how can we possibly get down to a manageable number of candidates? We can, I suggest, save a great deal of time and effort by considering first what general sort of activity it is that Quine wants to get on with and then seeing what more particular acts (illocutionary or otherwise) are most characteristically identified with the more general activity.

Well, what business is it that Quine is most interested in getting on with? He is interested in getting on with the business of science. This becomes most apparent when he is dealing with questions of ontological commitment. As we shall see later in more detail, questions of ontology are to be decided with respect to the needs of science. Given this concern for science, what sorts of linguistic acts are needed for science? Or, perhaps better, which acts are most appropriate to the working scientist? I suggest that science is most often characterized as a matter of making predictions and giving explanations. Let us, then, follow up this clue with an examination of the suggestion that for S' to be an adequate paraphrase of S, S' must be able to be used to make the same prediction as S. If this will not work, we can then examine the claim that for the rendering to be adequate, S and S' must play similar explanatory roles in the theory in question. These suggestions can be formulated like this:

V For the purpose (act) of predicting, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can be used to

make the same prediction.

VI For the purpose (act) of explaining, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can play the same explanatory role in the theory that is in question.

There is a reason why the formulation of VI does not parallel those of I-V. It will be brought up and discussed later.

I suppose that it will be granted that if two sentences are synonymous and if one can be used to make a certain prediction, then the other can also be used to make that same prediction. So this very strong meaning relationship is a sufficient condition for two sentences' having the potential for making the same prediction. The question is whether it, or perhaps some weaker relationship, will also be a necessary condition. Suppose that we want to make the prediction that the temperature of a particular liquid in a particular test tube will reach $32^{\circ}F.$ at time t. What must be true of any sentence that can be used to make this prediction? For one thing, it must make a reference to the particular liquid in question. Referring to an object is an obvious necessary condition for making a prediction about it. By this same requirement the sentence we use to make the prediction must contain references to a particular test tube, a particular temperature and a particular time. Furthermore, it must say that a certain relationship exists among the items referred to. There will be many different ways in which we might carry out the references needed, though it is more difficult to see alternative ways in which we can say that the relationship in question holds. As baffling as reference may be at times, we are far better equipped both with intuitions and conceptual tools here than we are with

predication, whether single- or multiplaced. But what must be true is that any sentence which can be used to make this prediction must be capable of being used to do these things, for this is just what making this particular prediction consists in. Just which parts of a sentence are doing which jobs may not be clear; this is not important. It is important that the jobs are being done. What we should notice now is that one of the necessary jobs is saying that a certain relationship holds. If this is right, then predicting is just a special case of 'saying that --'. So by the argument of the previous section, a necessary condition for two sentences being used to make the same prediction is that a certain meaning relationship hold between them. They need not be synonymous, but they must be related in one of the ways discussed in the previous section.

V, as we have taken it, is a special case of II. It has been concerned with what it is for a sentence to be used to make a prediction. This kind of use has to do with the performance of an illocutionary act, that of predicting. But often, especially within scientific theory, we speak of a different sort of prediction. We say that a sentence is used to predict something not if it can be used to perform the illocutionary act of predicting it, but if it can be conjoined with other sentences to yield the prediction in question. That is to say that we can infer the relevant sentence (one that can be used to perform the relevant illocutionary act) from the conjunction of our sentence and certain other sentences. If this were the sort of prediction a regimenter might have in mind, his criterion would take this form:

Va For the purpose (act) of yielding a prediction, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S' can be used in conjunction with some other sentences $S_1, S_2, \ldots S_n$ to yield the same prediction as S can be used in conjunction with $S_1, S_2, \ldots S_n$ to yield.

Let us abbreviate the conjunction of sentences $S_1, S_2, \ldots S_n$, using the letter 'C'. Then according to Va, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S just in case the conjunction of S' and C entails P, and the conjunction of S and C entails P, where P is the desired prediction. By exportation the paraphrase will be adequate just in case S' entails that C entails P, and S entails that C entails P. In this case, the question of whether or not the criterion presupposes meaning concepts comes down to the question of what must be true of S' and S if they are to have at least one logical implication in common. This question is one of examining the relationship between meaning and entailment. In particular, is it a necessary condition for S' and S to have a logical consequence in common that there be some sort of a meaning relationship holding between them?

This question has received quite some attention in the literature in recent years, the discussion arising out of consideration of the so-called paradoxes of strict implication.[5] What has seemed paradoxical to many is that it should turn out that a sentence which has no relevance or meaning relationship with another should strictly imply (or entail) that other sentence. But if we define the relation of entailment in the usual way by saying that P entails Q just in case

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[5]For a good account of the problems here and some bibliographical references, see G. Hughes and M. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic, pp. 335-39.

it is impossible that P be true and Q be false at the same time, then it does turn out that there need not always be a meaning relationship for there to be an entailment relation. By this definition P entails any statement if P is internally inconsistent and, hence, always false and never true when Q is false. Likewise if Q is necessarily true, then for any other statement it will be impossible that P is true and Q is false.

It has been claimed that such a result shows that the definition of entailment does not capture the notion of 'entails' that we generally have in mind, and there have been attempts to improve the definition by adding conditions, generally to the effect that P must be relevant to Q if P is to entail Q. But there does not seem to be much doubt that apart from P's being contradictory or Q's being necessarily false, if it is to be true that it is impossible that P be true and Q be false, then this truth must depend upon meaning relationships holding between P and Q. That is, contingent statements can entail one another only if there exist between them definite meaning relationships. Saying this simply turns our attention to entailments which are not paradoxical; it does nothing to clear up the paradoxes associated with other entailments. Any theory of entailment must reach some conclusion about these other cases; a theory of entailment cannot simply sweep aside the paradoxes. But we can. Here we are not trying to develop a theory of entailment, we are only considering what must be true of two sentences if they are to have the kinds of uses in which Quine might be interested. And for the purpose of yielding a prediction it is

clear that an internally inconsistent statement is of little or no use. For yielding predictions, we want not just valid arguments, but sound ones. And no contradiction can serve as a true premiss. Furthermore, there can be little point in yielding a prediction that is itself a necessary truth. In my example, since I used exportation, the prediction is not itself the conclusion (so long as C is non-empty), but the consequent of a conditional which we are now supposing to be a necessary truth. But this conditional will be a necessary truth only when P is itself necessary or when C is internally inconsistent. We are reduced to deriving either predictions which are necessary in themselves or ones that are dependent upon inconsistent antecedents. Even assuming that either of these cases can ever be a useful enterprise meriting the label 'predicting', it is clear that for the purpose of yielding predictions the vast majority of cases will involve contingent statements. It is not open for Quine to say that one <u>can</u> use sentences to yield predictions sans meaning relationships, for the special cases we are now considering are not only special, they are degenerate, and they can certainly never account for the vast majority of interesting cases of yielding predictions.

I have said that there is not much doubt that if P is consistent and Q non-necessary, a necessary condition of P's entailing Q is that there be a meaning relationship holding between them. This is conceded by most, since the whole problem with the paradoxes is supposed to be that in this case there is no such meaning relationship (relevance). Quine, of course, will deny that there must

be such a relationship, so it may be helpful to make some further comments on the situation.

What follows from the fact that one sentence implies another? One obvious suggestion is that, by the very nature of entailment, the conclusion must be "implicit" in the premiss. Thus, Hare argues that "it is now generally regarded as true by definition that (to speak roughly at first) nothing can appear in the conclusion of a valid deductive inference which is not, from their very meaning, implicit in the conjunction of the premisses . . . . It has been argued, convincingly in my opinion, that all deductive inference is analytic in character; that is to say, that the function of a deductive inference is not to get from the premisses 'something further' not implicit in them, . . . but to make explicit what was implicit in the conjunction of the premisses."[6] Hare then goes on to modify this, claiming that there can be nothing in the conclusion that is not said implicitly or explicitly in the premisses, except what can be added solely on the strength of definitions of terms. The suggestion is that a necessary condition for P to entail Q is that Q be implicit in P, or even "implicit in P by the very meaning of P." But for this suggestion to be of any use to us we need to be able to understand what it is for Q to be implicit in P, and there is no plausible explanation of this relationship apart from an appeal to implication, which is what we wanted to explain in the first place. To say that Q is implicit in P is just to say that Q can be validly inferred from P. It will not do to try

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[6] R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 32.

to spell out implicitness in terms of, say, informativeness, saying that the conclusion must not give us any "new" information. If this claim is meant to be a psychological one, then it is plainly false; we can derive informative and important conclusions from the conjunction of uninformative premisses. If it is not psychological, then we can only be dogmatizing, insisting that the conclusion simply could not be "new" since it is an implication of the premisses. The only criterion we could have for a conclusion's newness in the non-psychological sense is that we cannot derive it from the premisses. So what Hare says is true, though unhelpful as it stands.

We might try to define 'implicit in' in terms of meaning. Accepting an intuitive account of meaning, we would then have an independent account of entailment and one that would suffice to show that Va is not available to Quine. This would not be an unreasonable approach; it is not implausible to suggest that when we say that P is implicit in Q we often mean that Q says the same thing as does P (and perhaps some more as well). But we need not take this route. Borrowing again from the discussion of 'saying that --', I want to claim that cloudy as the relationship between meaning and implication might be, there is every reason to suppose that the two are intimately connected. Also, it seems a truism to say that what a sentence implies will depend upon what it says. Let us see if this feeling can be justified.

One way to formulate a necessary condition for two sentences having a common implication is to canvass all the sufficient conditions. If the canvassing is complete, then the disjunction of these sufficient

conditions will comprise a necessary condition. Taking this tack, it is clear that one sufficient condition for this is that the two sentences be synonymous. Also, if they share a meaning, then they will have the same implications when they are both used with that particular shared meaning. Again, it seems that if the meaning of one is included in the other, then they will both imply any sentence that the included sentence alone will imply. A closely related case of this is that in which although neither the meaning of S nor that of S' is included in the other, the meaning of some other sentence which implies a fourth sentence is included in both. These are some of the obvious ways in which two sentences can have the same implication. If there are no other ways, then the disjunction of these sufficient conditions yields a necessary condition, every disjunct of which uses some concept belonging to the theory of meaning.

One reason for thinking that there are cases of sentences with (a) no meaning relationships and (b) a common implication is our habit of speaking of "implication" in the following kind of example. The conclusion C to be drawn is 'X will attend the football game on Saturday'; we might quite naturally say that both S (=It will not rain on Saturday) and S' (=X's relatives will not visit on Saturday) entail C, despite the fact that there are no meaning relationships holding between S and S'. What has happened here, though, is that we have omitted another premiss on which the conclusion depends, as we normally do in everyday affairs. In the first case, we have omitted something like "When it does not rain, X attends football games on Saturdays'. When we apply exportation, we see what the actual implications of S

and S' are. They are conditionals, the antecedents of which are entirely different, changing the thrust of the conclusion.

I do not want to obscure one very important point. The source of the difficulty that the regimenter has here is traceable directly to the wording of Va, which has us using both S and S' in conjunction with the same set of sentences. We are not allowed to make any adjustments under paraphrasing other than the replacement of S with S'. If we could make adjustments in C as well, there would be no difficulty in getting sentences with no meaning relationships to entail (in conjunction with other sentences) the same sentences. In the example above, of course, our use of exportation avoided this issue by sticking C into the conclusion itself. Just because exportation is a legitimate principle of logic, however, it is open for anyone to use this same principle, restore C to the status of a premiss and raise the possibility of altering the make-up of C. We can still say, as I do here, that the procedure of altering C (as well as S) is illegitimate in the sentence format we have adopted, but we will certainly want to return to this possibility later.

There is one other line to be considered. It might seem that all of the cases of our canvassing have <u>informal</u> entailment at the back of them. For example, I claimed that cases of meaning inclusion provide us with examples of entailment which, unfortunately for the regimenter, presuppose meaning concepts. An example might be

(1) John owns a mare
Therefore, John owns a horse

But, it may be urged, such an informal entailment is just what a

scientist (or anyway a philosopher of science) would want to avoid. He would add premisses until he obtained a formal entailment between premisses and conclusion. So the regimenter takes instead the following as his paradigm:

(2) John owns a mare
All mares are horses
Therefore, John owns a horse

And this, it will be claimed, is a formal deduction. Whereas the validity of the informal argument clearly depended upon the meaning relationships holding between 'mare' and 'horse', the validity of this new argument clearly does not. 'John owns an x; therefore, John owns a y' is not a valid argument form, whereas 'John owns an x; all x's are y's; therefore, John owns a y' is.

It may be tempting to say here that while the validity of (2) will not depend upon the meanings of 'mare' and 'horse', its soundness will, for the reason that we can be justified in adding the new premiss only on the basis of what we know about the meanings of these terms. But Quine will ask us to compare (2) with

(3) Socrates is a man
All men are mortal
Therefore, Socrates is mortal,

and then ask us to justify the claim that the second premise of (2) is true by virtue of meanings in some sense in which the second premise of (3) is not. And anyway, it is clear that we would have to account for arguments like (3) in their own right even if the soundness of other arguments did turn out to depend upon meaning relations.

But the fundamental problem with the appeal to formal entailments is not with the nature of the additional required premisses, but

with the nature of the terms that must remain in the argument form if it is to be valid. Clearly not all the terms of an argument can go the way of 'mare' and 'horse' in an attempt to escape an appeal to meaning. If they could, we would have no form left at all; a sequence consisting entirely of term variables would come to nothing. What happens of course is that logicians eliminate all but a few very basic terms such as 'and', 'if...then...', 'all', 'some', etc., the so-called logical constants.

What can we say is accomplished by such a manoeuvre? Evidently what will have been accomplished will depend upon some difference between terms like 'mare' and 'horse' on the one hand and those like 'all' and 'some' on the other. That there must be some difference is clear, but it is exceedingly difficult to pin down any important difference in kind.[7] But whether or not we can eventually find the clear distinction between logical and nonlogical terms that logicians sense is there, the recourse to formal deduction that is being considered here will be of no help unless it turns out that the new deductions do not depend upon the meanings of logical terms as the original informal deduction was seen to depend upon the meanings of nonlogical terms.

Now the point of moving from (1) to (2) was that in (2) we did not need to associate the meanings of 'horse' and 'mare' to their terms in order to judge the validity of the argument. That we did not need the meanings was shown in that we could replace these terms with

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[7]See C. H. Whitely, "The Idea of Logical Form," Mind, LX.

term variables and still know that the argument was valid. But this is just what we cannot do with the logical terms of (2). The meaning of the word 'all' in the second premiss of (2) is crucial. If the premiss were to the effect that only some horses were horses, the argument would be invalid. It seems then that the move from non-logical to logical entailment will not provide us with examples of entailment that do not depend upon meaning. For Quine's view on this problem, consider the following passage:

> Logical truths are such that they not only are true but stay true even when we make substitutions upon their component words and phrases as we please, provided merely that the so-called "logical" words '=', 'or', 'not', 'if-then', 'everything', 'something', etc., stay undisturbed. We may write any statements in the 'p' and 'q' positions and any terms in the 'thus and so' positions, in the forms cited above, without fear of falsity. All that counts, when a statement is logically true, is its structure in terms of logical words. Thus it is that logical truths are commonly said to be true by virtue merely of the meanings of the logical words.[8]

I do not claim that in this passage Quine himself concedes anything. It is only "commonly said" that logical truths are true by virtue of the meaning of logical words. But it does seem clear that he accepts that the contrast between truths logical and nonlogical is not in terms of one but not the other having to do with meanings, but in terms of <u>which</u> words' meanings are relevant. The point is that we are back where we started. Quine can consistently claim that neither formal nor informal entailments depend upon a meaning relationship. A non-Quinean on meaning will claim that just as the validity of (1)

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[8] Quine, <u>Methods of Logic</u>, p. xv. Of course what Quine says about logical truths being true by virtue of meaning carries right over to talk of formal arguments being valid by virtue of meaning.

relies heavily upon the meaning relationship between the nonlogical terms 'mare' and 'horse', the validity of (2) rests on the meaning of 'all' and the meaning relationships between universal and singular judgments.

It is not actually argued here that informal entailments or formal ones rest upon meanings. But if one accepts the intelligibility of meaning concepts at all, it is quite natural to hold that arguments such as (1) depend upon meaning concepts. (It is, in fact, just as natural as the tendency to say that 'All mares are horses' is analytic.) What I am arguing is that the appeal to the formal sort of entailment to avoid the problems connected with meaning is of no help. The last cited passage indicates, I think, that Quine would accept this conditional: if we want to explain informal entailment in terms of meaning relations, then we should want to explain formal entailment in terms of meaning relations (only restricting our interest to a smaller class of terms).

I conclude that neither an appeal to entailment nor, within this appeal, a move to logical entailment gives a non-Quinean any reason to think that the adequacy criterion does not rest upon meaning relationships when we take prediction-yielding as the purpose to be incorporated into the adequacy criterion. For yielding a prediction rests squarely on the entailment relations of a sentence and these, on any intuitive account of meaning, will depend upon the meaning of the sentence.

But if predicting is not a purpose that is available for Quine's adequacy criterion, then perhaps explaining is. And, in fact,

I think that this particular purpose is one that the regimenter would be most likely to appeal to, for reasons which I will bring out later. I have been writing as if the defender of regimentation has been pushed back from purpose to purpose, but, in all fairness, it may be that he has been waiting here for us all the while. Actually, though, I think it most likely that the defender has not in general seen the need to occupy the position of defending any particular purpose. That there is such a need I will argue in the final section of this chapter.

Before examining this approach, however, it is necessary to point out a grammatical curiosity that will have some bearing on our discussion. If two sentences predict the same thing, then they make the same prediction. But if two sentences explain the same thing, they need not make the same explanation. Two scientists may be in agreement about what they want to explain (e.g., the origin of man), but put forth different explanations; that one proves to be "incorrect" does not mean that it was never an explanation in the first place. But it makes no sense to say that they might put forth different predictions to predict the same thing. Notice that "saying that" is like predicting. It would make no sense to say that two persons might put forth different _____ in order to say the same thing. The blank indicates that there is no "saying that" analogue to 'prediction' or 'explanation'. Notice that if we fill the blank with 'sentences' and interpret 'say' as 'say "--"', we get a truth. Also, if we use 'state' rather than 'say', we have the term 'statement' available to put in the blank, and this substitution will likewise yield a truth. But explaining is not the only linguistic activity that fails to fit this

pattern. Describing is another. It not only makes perfectly good sense, but it is usually the case that if two persons (or sentences) describe the same thing, they will give different descriptions of it. The significance of this anomaly is that once again we have more than one approach embodied in a single formulation of a criterion. The ambiguity is brought out in these formulations:

VIa For the purpose (act) of explaining, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can both be used to make the same explanation.

VIb For the purpose (act) of explaining, S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S and S' can both be used to explain (perhaps differently) the same thing.

On one reading of VIa, by now an uninteresting one, we can take explaining to be an illocutionary act, as in "He explained that p." This is merely another horse of the "saying that" color. To explain that one missed the plane is just to <u>say</u> under certain conditions that one missed it. The conditions must be such that saying that one missed the plane will help explain some other fact, such as why one was late. This is to distinguish explaining <u>that</u> x (an illocutionary act) from explaining x; to explain that one missed the plane is not to explain one's missing it, but to explain something else. So explaining that p is a <u>species</u> of saying that p. It is saying that p in the course of explaining (not explaining <u>that</u>) something else. Notice that to say that one explained that x presupposes something to be explained and tells what the explanation given was. To say that one explained x explicitly says what was explained, but gives no hint as to the actual explanation resorted to. This leads us into a second reading of VIa. On this interpretation, we can say, as we did

with predicting, that to use S to explain something is to use it in conjunction with other sentences C such that an appropriate relation holds between S and C on the one hand and what is explained on the other. This reading, too, has already been handled by the treatment of predicting.

The reason why the approach embodied in the second interpretation of VIa can be so easily disposed of is that on most accounts, explanatory models parallel the model for predicting. This view, while not unchallenged, has some claim to be called the accepted view.[9] Under it, it is generally held that just as combining S with other (true) sentences such that the conjunction implies a conclusion C enables us to predict that C, so this same process will count as an explanation for C.[10] When, as is most often the case, we are interested in recurring phenomena, it is clear that the same "interanimation of sentences," as Quine puts it,[11] serves both to predict future

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[9]See C. Hempel, "The Theoretician's Dilemma," Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, II, especially pp. 37-38. Also C. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, "The Logic of Explanation," Philosophy of Science, XV, as reprinted in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Science. In this volume, see especially pp. 322-23. For another view, see I. Scheffler's "Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, VII, and reprinted in A. Danto and S. Morgenbesser, eds., Philosophy of Science. One aspect of Scheffler's disagreement, however, seems to rest upon confusing the purposes of yielding a prediction and performing the illocutionary act of predicting.

[10]A qualification is necessary. For there to be a satisfactory explanation, restrictions are necessary upon the premisses of the model. The question of these restrictions is, of course, crucial; it involves such issues as the distinction of lawlike and non-lawlike generalizations. But these problems will not affect the form of the model itself.

[11]Quine, Word and Object, section 3.

such occurrences and to explain all such occurrences, whether past, present or future. So, as was the case for yielding a prediction, serving as an explanation will hang upon entailment and, hence, meaning.

Incidentally, evidence for at least the appropriateness of taking the above position with respect to the relationship between prediction and explanation in a discussion of Quine is to be found in the following passage.

> Explanation and prediction are roughly correlative. Since an explanation implies what it explains, it would have sufficed for prediction if it had been what we started with. Conversely, most knowledge that sanctions a prediction serves also as an explanation for what it predicts if what it predicts comes true.[12]

The deductive model of predicting and explaining consists of a set of premisses on the one hand and a conclusion on the other. The explanation for the "grammatical curiosity" commented upon earlier is that 'prediction' refers to what it is that is predicted, i.e., the conclusion, whereas 'explanation' refers to the premisses used to explain and not to what it is that is being explained. So if the conclusion remains the same and the premisses are changed, we have the same prediction if predicting is at issue, but not the same explanation if explaining is. Of course if just one premiss of an explanatory deduction is replaced by another which has an appropriate meaning relation to the original and enables the deductions to parallel each other, then we do not speak of different explanations. For example, if we exchange 'John kicked Mary' for the premiss 'Mary was

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[12]Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, p. 74.

kicked by John' the explanation itself is not altered. I imagine that we would justify such a verdict by an appeal to meaning, but it is not important here that we be able to establish criteria for individuating explanations.

We have considered all of what I consider to be the most likely candidates for spelling out Quine's criterion in terms of sentential relations, but the two interpretations of VIa do not bring out why it is that the appeal to an explanatory role is the most plausible for Quine. The reason is this: we can replace the premisses of an explanatory deduction wholesale. We can give entirely different explanations of the same phenomena, those explanations playing the same explanatory role (in that they explain the same thing) as required by VIb. This strong sense of different explanations has not yet been broached, since in the sentence format we have been using we cannot accommodate such wholesale replacement of premisses. The problem is that explanatory power is a property of groups of sentences, not of sentences individually, and limiting ourselves to adding one sentence to a predetermined set of sentences just does not give us enough room. That is, given a set of sentences to which we can add just one more and a conclusion that must be drawn, a minimal "content" of the required sentence is already determined. Quine himself does not address himself to this problem, for although he occasionally says things to the effect that theories are the basic unit of significance, when he discusses regimentation he never suggests that anything more is involved than a sentence by sentence

replacement, even when we are involved in whole programs of activity.[13]

But suppose for now that we do allow that we can paraphrase whole theories over into other theories such that there is no sentence to sentence correlation between them. Then can we say that such a paraphrase is adequate if it explains the same phenomena that the first explained? On the face of it there can be no objection to this procedure. Scientists do replace theories with other theories and a necessary condition for such a replacement is that the new theory explain what the original theory meant to explain. So far there is no reason why this condition cannot be called a condition of adequacy, and the success of such a replacement could be said to depend upon other criteria (increased power or simplicity). Still, there is a serious objection to assimilating this perfectly sound scientific procedure to Quine's account of paraphrasing. The problem lies in reconciling our concept of an explanation with the requirement that we be able to go back and forth between paraphrase versions. For even though it is true that we can entertain different explanations of the same phenomena (and consider and discuss them, and change our minds about which to accept), we cannot simultaneously accept them both and switch back and forth between them as convenience dictates. A claim for uniqueness is built into every explanation. Many factors may go into an explanation; but there cannot be two (correct) explanations for some fact, even if we are often unable to

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[13] Quine, Word and Object, #34 passim, but especially the previously quoted passages from p. 160.

decide between two candidates.[14] The scientist can replace theory T with theory T', but he cannot "reserve the right to go back and forth between them as he pleases," as Quine's account of paraphrasing suggests he should be able to do.

Why is it that Quine's account of paraphrasing breaks down at this point? The reason is tied to a more general point which I shall now try to draw out. Quine's presentation of regimentation depends almost entirely upon his appeal to the concept of paraphrasing. While I have tried to show that this notion will not do the work Quine wants it to do, I certainly do concede that the appeal is an appropriate one. But paraphrase is a relationship holding between sentences, not theories. Explanatory power, however, is a relationship between theories and phenomena. We tried to set up a workable notion of explanatory power for sentences, but it proved inadequate. On the other hand, we can paraphrase theories on a sentence by sentence basis, but we have no idea of what a massive paraphrase, theory by theory, would be. We know what it is to replace one theory with another, but now we have no need for the notion of a paraphrase. The reason for the breakdown of Quine's account, then, is the holdover of a normal requirement for paraphrasing sentences misapplied to a replacement of theories.

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[14] There can be different kinds of explanations (or orders, or levels, of explanation), but these will not be competing with each other; or, if they are, the competition will be at the philosophic and not the scientific level. In what way might appeals to desires and brainstates be in competition with each other as explanations of actions?

At root, the problem is that there are two incompatible strands at work to make Quine's program attractive. The presentation of Quine's position involves both these strands. (a) Regimentation is really quite innocuous, just like ordinary paraphrasing, and (b) there is no meaning relation involved, for all we require is sameness of purpose. The first claim is accompanied by many examples and demonstrations; the second is generally ignored. But we saw that the purpose we needed was explanatory power. The conflict is that (a) has to do with sentences and (b) with theories. Here the twain do not meet.[15]

I want to make two points by way of summary. First, there are several reasons why in interpreting Quine we must accept (a) and assume that Quine just does not feel the need to spell out his purposes within the adequacy criterion. His uses of examples, his constant references to sentences in discussing the program, and his failure to relate theory to paraphrasing all point in the same direction.[16]

Second, I accused Quine in the last chapter of a chaotic use

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[15]There is an additional complication here that involves Quine's own peculiar use of the term 'theory'. On this point, see below, Chapter IV, section 3. There it turns out that for Quine there can be one-sentence theories. This fact does not affect our discussion here, though, since the only contrast this discussion needs is that between replacing sentences singly and replacing them in groups of two or more, so that there is no sentence to sentence correlation. If we replace one one-sentence theory with another, we still have a sentence to sentence correlation, which is all that need concern us here.

[16]Actually, he does discuss theory with respect to regimentation (in Word and Object, section 47), but even here, he discusses only the ways in which the sentences and terms of theories are to be restricted.

of purposes-1. By this I meant that by not spelling out a precise notion of relevant purposes-1, it was possible for him to gain additional currency through appeals to purposes which could be taken in various ways depending upon which ways were convenient at the time. This chapter has shown, I believe, that we can distinguish between various purposes that sentences can have and between the purposes of sentences and of theories. We have seen the difficulties that Quine's program meets when we do make these distinctions. In brief, these difficulties turn out to be that the suggested purposes either (1) involve us in meaning concepts, (2) are irrelevant to Quine's own avowed interests, or (3) violate other requirements that Quine wants to make on paraphrasing. What generally happens, I am afraid, is that purposes that run into trouble on one of these three counts are used to show that the other two are reasonable.

4. Some further moves

There are still some moves open to the defender of regimentation. One move that Quine might make at this point is to simply point to his paraphrases, claiming that there just is not the kind of meaning relationship there that I have argued that there is. As I am representing this reply, the argument goes like this: no matter what your arguments, the meaning relationship is not there and so your arguments must be wrong. It is more obvious that the relationship you argue for is lacking than it is that your arguments are any good. This would be accompanied, it is to be supposed, with familiar claims about the unintelligibility of the theory of meaning.

To meet this challenge, it is necessary to take the challenger at his words; we must examine some sample paraphrases. Drawing upon the work of Chapter I, let us consider the following paraphrases, each of which we accepted as adequate in that chapter. Recall that (1) 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' was paraphrased first as (1a) 'Tom believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline' and then as (1b) 'Fa', where a=Tom and F=believes Cicero to have denounced Catiline. (1a) and (1b) differ in that the logical form is made explicit in the latter; (1b) denies us the right to apply any logical operations upon what is predicated of Tom. Also, (2) 'Pegasus flies' was paraphrased as (2a)'(Ex)(Px and Fx),' where P=is Pegasus and F=flies.

Asking only that we bring to these paraphrases the same sort of meaning intuitions that we did for the discussion of this chapter, I suggest that the very reason we were willing to accept these paraphrases at the time is to be found in an analysis of the meaning relationships between the originals and the paraphrased versions. When Quine got us to agree that (1a) and (1b) could be used for whatever we wanted (1) for, what we did was to assure ourselves that (1a) and (1b) had the same meaning as (actually, in this case, had a common meaning with) (1). This, as we later saw, is a quite natural thing to do when asked to evaluate <u>paraphrases</u>. My claim here is that people who do think that meaning concepts are intelligible will agree that they are applicable in these cases; furthermore, they will agree that it was this applicability that underlay the acceptances in the first place even though Quine did not ask them to evaluate the paraphrases in these respects.

In my opinion the strongest sort of example Quine can point to on the present move is that of (2). For he can say, with considerable force, that on his opponents' account of meaning, the truth value of a sentence will be an intimate function of its meaning. Surely if we can say that the status of a sentence with respect to truth value has changed under paraphrase, its meaning must have changed. And still, we can agree that the original and the canonical version can be used to do the same thing in the relevant respects. And, the argument might go, the relationship between (2) and (2a) is just like this. They can be used to do the same thing (we all agree), but they do not share the same truth value.

The problem with (2) was that we were not sure whether to call it true or false. Since this uncertainty tended to foul up any application of a two-valued truth functional logic, Quine paraphrased (2) as (2a) so that the new version was clearly false. We went along with the paraphrase then, so we have the problem of explaining how the paraphrase can be adequate even though our position with respect to the sentence's truth value was altered by the paraphrase. So I take the Quinean to be arguing that since the status of the original with respect to truth value has changed, the two versions cannot have the same meaning. This is more obvious, it may be claimed, than any suspect appeal to meaning intuitions can be, and so the arguments of the last two sections must be in error.

There is no doubt that there is some intimate connection between the meaning of a sentence and its truth value. For example, it is surely the case that if S and S' have different truth values,

then they cannot have the same meaning. This is the force behind the argument we are now considering. It needs pointing out once again, though, that the Quinean view of paraphrase has it that there need be no meaning relations at all between the sides of a paraphrase. So if we grant that our hesitation over the truth value of (2) and our certainty with respect to that of (2a) indicates a real truth value difference, we thereby concede only that there is some divergence in meaning, not that there are no important meaning relationships left. The truth value difference between, say, p and not-p is surely attributable to a difference in meaning, but that is not to rule out that there is still a great deal in common between them, semantically.

How much do we want to say there is in common? Surely a great deal indeed. In terms of being usable to say something, (2) is uncontroversially capable of being used to say that Pegasus flies. What is (2a) good for saying? Apparently, it can be used to say that something exists which is Pegasus and that Pegasus flies. At the very least, then, it seems that both (2) and (2a) can be used to say that Pegasus flies. (2a), it happens, can also be used to say that Pegasus exists. When one considers the present confusion felt over possible senses of 'exists' and over presuppositions and implicit and explicit sayings, it is not completely obvious that we want to say that (2) and (2a) differ in meaning at all. (If we decided that they did not, then we would be faced with a problem of further clarifying or changing our present concept of a truth value.) But accepting that they do differ, certainly there is left a hard core of meaning overlap

reflected in the fact that there is something that they both can be used to say. (2a) is used to say the same thing as (2) was used to say; and they differ in that (2a) can be used to go on to say something else as well. Furthermore, it was the fact that they can be used to say the same thing that originally led us to accept Quine's paraphrase as adequate.

There is yet another alternative. One might agree that we need to spell out (I), but choose to spell it out in terms of purposes that are much more broadly construed than those we have examined. Quine often reflects pragmatic tendencies; what happens when we build into the adequacy criterion a generally instrumentalist principle? We can try for example:

> VII S' is an adequate paraphrase of S if and only if S' will "carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part, linking things, satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor," at least as well as S (or perhaps in the same way as S).[1]

This is just one of many ways in which we might try to spell out the criterion, catching the spirit of the "doing the same thing" principle without mentioning specific activities that can be tied to semantic concepts. Earlier we saw that not mentioning meaning directly was not sufficient to guarantee that meaning concepts were not being tacitly appealed to. But it is also true that refraining from mentioning the more specific purposes we have discussed here will

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[1]The language of this formulation is taken from William James' famous essay, "What Pragmatism Means," in Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth, p. 49.

not suffice to insure that these more specific purposes are not tacitly being relied upon. And it is a failure to see this that motivates this last suggestion. For how is it that a sentence might carry us prosperously from any one part of our experience to any other part? Only by being usable to say certain things, to predict, to explain, to yield predictions, etc. This is just how sentences manage to carry us prosperously, etc. Here the defender of regimentation is in the position of one who claims that a set of tools could be used to build a house without either driving nails, or planing surfaces, or laying brick, or . . . and so on. So it is really of no use either to refuse to spell out the adequacy criterion or to spell it out at a level of activity more general than that of what sentences do when they contribute to the higher level activity.

So I claim that it is a gaping hole in the regimenter's program that he has not tried to spell out the nature of the relationship between S and S' or to set forth what must be true in order for that relationship to hold. The first is usually left at far too general a level, while the second is ignored altogether. It is of some interest, then, that John Rawls, in a prepublication manuscript of a forthcoming book on ethics, introduces several definitions and proceeds to make the following claims for them:

> We are not to think of the definition of goodness (or any of the several definitions) as preserving sameness of meaning; we are not to take the statement of the definition as an analysis, that is, as a statement of concept identity. Rather, the definition is proposed as a replacement schema, as a rule which correlates with each statement containing 'good' or 'better than' another statement not containing those expressions . . . . The essential point is that we are to

> think of the definition as providing a replacement (substitute) for the notion of goodness by means of which we can do everything we want.[2]

Note that this is not so strict as Quine must have it--it is left open whether or not the definition must preserve a meaning or perhaps some other meaning concept. But the interesting feature of Rawls' discussion is that he goes on to list the criteria for deciding when a definition is a good one. There are four necessary conditions. The definition must preserve (1) truth value, (2) logical relations, (3) psychological propensities, and (4) ethical purposes. A definition of 'good', for example, preserves psychological propensities if when men desire good X's they also desire X's with the properties the definition correlates with goodness. A definition preserves ethical purposes if when we substitute the definition for the defined term in a sentence, the new sentence has the same illocutionary force as the old one, i.e., can be used for giving advice, commending, etc., if and only if the original can so be used.

This particular set of conditions, we can see, is not available to Quine. For one thing, he explicitly holds that truth values may change under rendering. For another, there will be great difficulty in spelling out the remaining conditions without using meaning concepts. This will be all right for Rawls, perhaps; he only wants to deny that his definitions need preserve sameness of meaning, not that they will not involve meaning concepts at all. But Quine needs the stronger claim.

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[2]John Rawls, "Goodness as Rationality."

I offer this last brief discussion only as an example of what might be done toward describing criteria for a successful paraphrase, or rendering. Just as Rawls could not stop short with the claim that his definitions did not preserve sameness of meaning, but nevertheless provided adequate substitutions (i.e., paraphrases), neither can Quine.

CHAPTER IV

REGIMENTATION AND SUCCESS

1. The claims of regimentation

Reduced to its bare essentials, regimentation is a program for replacing troublesome expressions of a language with alternate expressions of another language, one especially constructed so as to avoid the problems that arose with the expressions of the original language. In one sense of the term 'program of regimentation', it is true of any language that proposes to solve the problems in question along these lines; here, however, I use 'regimentation' to refer to Quine's particular program. As such, it represents not only certain forms of expression supplemented with a stock of general terms and a policy restricting the range of its variables, but in addition a set of "aims and claims" for that program. Also, in line with Quine's own propensities, I have taken the liberty of extending the notion of regimentation so that it covers paraphrases within the same language. There is no distinct line between paraphrasing from English to English and paraphrasing from English to Quine's regimented forms, and even if there were, the philosophical issues would be the same on both sides of that line. So we make the natural extension.

It was impossible to display Quine's program only in its bare essentials; dealing with cases necessitated our coming to recognize particular problems. To this extent we have already been exposed to

some aims and claims. In this section I propose to be more thorough.

Now if the results of the last chapter are correct, then Quine misrepresents his program on a very fundamental point. He believes that there need be no particular semantic relationship between the two sides of a paraphrase, and I have given reasons for thinking that there must be one if the remainder of his account is to be coherent. But if Quine is mistaken on this point, then it can fairly be suspected that some of the claims he makes for his program will be affected since he makes them while under a misapprehension about his program. For the rest of this final chapter we will assume that there is a definite meaning relation holding between any sentence S and its paraphrase version S'. But this assumption is not strong enough. Showing just that some meaning relationship must hold between paraphrase versions is enough to discredit Quine's meaning-free account, but it will not be sufficient to show that any of his claims for regimentation will not go through. In order to show this we have to say more about what particular meaning relation exists between the paraphrases. For the most plausible purposes examined in Chapter III, we most often came back to one particular meaning concept: the usability of two sentences to say the same thing. I propose to adopt this notion as part of a sample adequacy criterion to see what consequences such an adoption has for Quine's claims for regimentation.

This adoption does not commit me to the view that all paraphrases from any sentence S to some other sentence S' must meet the condition that S and S' be usable for saying the same thing. On the contrary, I have accepted Quine's point that the adequacy criterion

must be relativized to purposes, and one might choose purposes that would not essentially involve the saying (that) of anything at all, e.g., a perlocutionary act. But I have argued that if we stick to purposes that are congenial to Quine's work and remain true to the rest of his account of paraphrasing, then we are driven back to the problem of what the two sentences under consideration can be used to say.

What follows for the claims of regimentation from the assumption that any adequate paraphrase of S must be capable of being used to say the same thing as S? Are there any claims that lose their plausibility under this restriction? Let us now proceed to canvass the claims of regimentation.

For there to be any motivation for our program there must first be some problem which, it is alleged, the program can solve, or at least some aim we have that we cannot fulfill within the noncanonical language we are using. I have been able to distinguish eight different aims we might have, all of which Quine claims can be done only within his canonical form, or if not only within it, then at least better within it than without.

1. To serve as a general aid to communication (p. 157).[1] This is probably the simplest sort of aim we might have and, philosophically, the least interesting. We saw this sort of thing when we were concerned lest opacity create problems of ambiguity, that ambiguity interfering with communication. We take an expression that

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[1]Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers refer to Word and Object.

interferes with communication (e.g., through vagueness or ambiguity) and replace it with one that does not so interfere. This much is uncontroversial, even if the account of what is going on under such a replacement is not.[2] As Quine points out, this sort of thing is not uncommon within a natural language; we often paraphrase away ambiguities and tighten up vague terms. Here the idea has merely been extended so that the paraphrase brings us to non-natural language forms. This is why I say it is perhaps the philosophically least interesting claim. Least interesting to us, since its problems exist independent of any peculiarly philosophical use of regimentation.

2. To understand the referential work of language (pp. 157-58). There are two ways in which we might "understand the referential work of language." First, and most importantly, we might come to better understand what it is for an expression to refer. Regimentation will not produce this sort of understanding, and I do not think that this is the claim Quine wants to make. The basic problem with this claim would be the same one which faces any attempt to read off some hidden feature of the world from a model of the world. The feature that we are interested in may actually be in the world and it may also be part of the model, but just knowing that it is in the model will not help us conclude that it is in the world. We can infer that it is in the world only if we know that the model is a good one with respect to this feature. But the only way to know this is to

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[2]See above, Chapter II, section 2.

know that the model should have this feature, which means that we know that the feature is indeed in the world as well. This same problem arises if we try to take a regimented language as a model for understanding natural languages. We could not conclude that some feature of reference, say, was present in a natural language from the fact that it was present in our regimented language unless we previously knew that we were correct in setting up the regimented language so that it had that feature. And if we knew this, we would not be learning it from the model language. Apart from an independent awareness that a feature is in the world (language), we have no check on the reliability of our model, barring only some kind of previously established harmony between model and world that might be guaranteed us by God. This fact does not, of course, tell against the possible value of regimentation as being suggestive of accounts of reference or of its eventually coming to play a role in the representation of some adequate account.

A more modest suggestion would be that, given an intuitive account of reference, or just some independent account, regimentation can help us understand which expressions and constructions carry reference under which conditions in ordinary language. It may even help us to isolate different kinds of reference. It is not easy to evaluate this claim. The difficulty is that Quine's work takes him back and forth between natural language sentences and proposed paraphrases so that it is difficult to isolate the contribution to understanding made by the canonical notation. Presumably, the account of opacity is an example of how regimentation aids us in "analytic studies

of reference." Let us consider what must be Quine's most important result--the distinction between pure and impure reference and its relatives. What is significant to note here is that this distinction was drawn from the natural language side of the paraphrase. The introduction of regimented forms presupposed the validity of the distinction; its intent was to sort out cases in terms of the distinction. The conclusion to be drawn is that the "aid to understanding" provided by the canonical notation was primarily that attendant to its value as a general aid to communication. This contribution, of course, is not to be denigrated.

3. To clarify our conceptual scheme (pp. 158, 161). This claim is not much elaborated upon, the reader being left to decide for himself why Quine thinks that regimentation clarifies our conceptual scheme. The clues are scattered throughout Word and Object. The main point is that "conceptualization on any considerable scale is inseparable from language" (p. 3). Again, Quine identifies the mastering of parts of our conceptual scheme with the mastering of the use of words and particular linguistic devices (p. 192). Regimentation is a reforming of language. The reason why communication is aided is clear; we use language to communicate. But we also conceptualize in language. Hence to clarify our language is to clarify our conceptual scheme. Given, then, a not unfashionable account of conceptual schemes in terms of linguistic devices, it seems that simplification and/or clarification of these linguistic devices amounts as well to a streamlining of our conceptual scheme. This aim, we see, is closely related to the first aim.

4. To discover ultimate categories (p. 161). Quine's discussion of this claim makes it clear that he believes it follows fairly directly from the third claim. Just as to improve on one's canonical form is to clarify and simplify one's conceptual scheme, "the quest of a simplest, clearest overall pattern of canonical notation is not to be distinguished from a quest of ultimate categories, a limning of the most general traits of reality" (p. 161). That is, Quine identifies the categories of the most effective and economical conceptual scheme with the ultimate categories of reality. Here, then, we have Quinean metaphysics. It is interesting that Quine makes this an aim of regimentation. Previously, metaphysicians have claimed that we could discover the ultimate nature of reality through examining the logical form of language (e.g., the early periods of both Wittgenstein and Ryle), but that program has generally been thought to have been discredited. Yet here is Quine claiming that the program is still a valid one. Of course Quine is not wed to various atomist conceptions that underlay the programs of Wittgenstein and Ryle, and his defense would surely involve his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction. In short, his approach is on an entirely new level of sophistication. This is not the place to take up the question, but it is interesting to see how the wheel has turned.

These first four claims can be grouped together for our purposes since they are all rooted in claim #1. It takes other (sometimes controversial) claims to get from #1 to #3 and #4. But there is no reason that I can see why one could not accept these four claims if he incorporated a samesaying relation to the adequacy

criterion. No one of these claims depends on there not being such a relationship. There might be other objections to the moves from language to conceptual schemes to the ultimate categories of reality, but nothing I have done here will tell against them. So barring these possible objections, I wish to claim that insofar as Quine's characterization of paraphrasing goes, these claims will go through even with the assumption we are now making with respect to the adequacy criterion.

5. To apply logical deduction (p. 158). This is the other main use of regimentation that I wish to endorse. One of Quine's primary concerns has to do with theoretical deduction. As a logician, his belief that the logic of natural language is too chaotic to be of use to philosophers in any systematic way leads him to place emphasis upon having our canonical notation adapted to logical theory. The idea is that it is not now (nor probably ever will be) possible to set up canons of deduction for a natural language given its many different kinds of constructions and its sometimes fantastic subtleties and complexities. Our canonical notation is by comparison extremely clear and simple. So we set up canons of deduction for our artificial language, and when we want to apply logical deduction to a natural language sentence, we paraphrase it into the canonical form, for which we have canons of deduction. As a result we have available to us all the techniques for deriving and testing conclusions that are available to quantification theory. This is certainly one of the most important aims that regimentation can claim to fulfill. In the sense of 'logical form' in which it refers to the way an expression behaves under deduction, this particular purpose can be said

to reveal the logical form of ordinary language expressions.

6. To dissolve philosophical puzzles (p. 260). It is Quine's claim that regimentation serves to solve particular philosophical problems by showing how the expressions which raise them can be dispensed with. Having been puzzled by the nature of propositions, for example, we showed in Chapter I, section three, how we might dispense with the notion in favor of that of eternal sentences. On Quine's view, that is all that there is to the philosophical problem of propositions. Any paraphrase which shows how we can dispense with a given notion thereby dissolves all the philosophical problems raised by that term. Needless to say, this view is controversial. I cannot accept this view of philosophy, but I have nothing to say here against it.[3]

Conciliatory remarks are nearly always less interesting than contentious ones, so I have kept my comments on those claims for which I have more sympathy to a minimum. There are two remaining Quinean claims, however, which I wish to examine in light of our modified adequacy criterion. By way of introduction to these claims, recall that while we have often concentrated on ordinary language paraphrasing, Quine spends a great deal of effort in an attempt to establish that, for science, we can replace ordinary language altogether in favor of an austere, canonical, form that is severely limited in its

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[3] On this issue, see R. Stoothoff, "Elimination Theses," Mind, LXXVII. Also, Strawson, "Carnap's views on constructed systems versus natural languages in analytic philosophy," in Schillp, ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, and Carnap's reply in the same volume.

available constructions. Suppose now that we grant all that Quine says about the constructions we need; there still remain two questions. As he himself puts it,

> Once we have said of a proposed theory that its constructions are to be predication, quantification, and the truth functions, we have settled just the logic of the theory. Questions then remain not only of its vocabulary of general terms, but also of its universe of discourse: the range of values of its variables of quantification. (p. 232)

Both of these issues can be seen as part of a single problem of simplifying theory. We will want the simplest possible theory, both with respect to the predicates we use and with respect to multiplicity of objects.

What simplicity with respect to the latter amounts to is easy enough; ceterus paribus, the fewer objects we assume the simpler our theory. This question of assuming objects, moreover, has received much treatment in its own right under the label "ontological commitment." So I will consider Quine's claim concerning ontological commitment separately in the next section, and then turn to consider what kind of simplicity claims can be maintained for a theory, given equinumerosity of objects.

2. Ontological commitment

The claim that regimentation has the advantage of solving problems of ontological commitment is by far the most discussed of all the claims Quine makes for regimentation. Not, of course, that Quine claims that his program can tell us what things there are; the claim is that the program enables us to tell what a theory expressed in it

says there are. Presumably it will be up to science to provide the theory to express in canonical form. The problem is that ordinary language is not perspicuous; it is often extremely difficult to determine whether or not a particular one sentence theory, say, is committed to the existence of some disputed object or type of object. We will all agree that 'The ball is round' is committed to the existence of a ball, but is it committed to the existence of a property, i.e., roundness? In ordinary language, it is claimed, there is just no way to settle this. Quine's program provides a way of settling it. "In our canonical notation of quantification, then, we find the restoration of law and order. Insofar as we adhere to this notation, the objects we are understood to admit are precisely the objects which we reckon to the universe of values over which the bound variables of quantification are to be considered to range."[1] In a nutshell, the claim is that when we carry regimentation all the way to quantificational form, we need only examine the values of our variables to determine what our theory is committed to.

I do not pretend that the brief sketch above is adequate. There are many problems over how Quine's criterion is to be formulated with precision. I have sloughed off problems over theories, the difference between theories and persons being ontologically committed, differences between being ontologically committed to entities and types of entities, and various problems over how Quine's various

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[1] Quine, Word and Object, p. 242. See also Quine, From a Logical Point of View, pp. 13-15, 103.

formulations are to be reconciled.[2] But I think that the general form of the claim is sufficiently clear to guide our discussion here.

One distinction that I do want to make here, though, is one that corresponds to two uses of regimentation with respect to ontological commitment. Sometimes we want to use regimentation to make explicit some ontological commitment that is in some suitable sense not explicit, as for example when we wish to convict some philosopher of an ontological commitment that he is unwilling to own up to or when there is just no way to settle the case for ordinary language. In such cases, the criterion requires that we paraphrase the theory T in question into quantificational form. If we are successful (i.e., he agrees that we have adequately paraphrased his theory) we can say that since the quantified version is explicitly ontologically committed to, say, x's and it is the paraphrased version of T, then we see that he (as well as T) was ontologically committed to x's all along, even though it was perhaps not immediately apparent. The ontological commitment has been made explicit. And we can say this when the commitment was hidden from us all along, when it seemed probable all along, or when the ordinary discourse in question was just indeterminate, giving us no indication to move in either direction.

The other use I have in mind is the use of regimentation to avoid ontological commitment. Presumably this is something that any

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[2] See C. Chihara, "Our Ontological Commitment to Universals," Nous, II, R. Cartwright, "Ontology and the Theory of Meaning," Philosophy of Science, XXI, and A. Church, "Ontological Commitment," Journal of Philosophy, LV.

theoretician should be concerned with in the interest of simplicity. Simplicity of objects is of course only one aspect of the simplicity of a theory, one aspect of which we spoke at the end of the last section. Here, we take a theory T and paraphrase it into some preferred form T' such that T was ontologically committed to some x's and the paraphrased version is not so committed. We have not made explicit the ontological commitments of T, but we have paraphrased it so as to avoid its ontological commitments. This avoidance use of regimentation presupposes that we can tell what ontological commitments are embodied in both T and T', else we could not properly be said to make use of this technique, but could only blunder about sometimes reducing and sometimes adding to our ontological commitments. Given Quine's account of how we can make ontological commitment explicit, it must be the case that either (1) T and T' are both in quantificational form, are committed to different objects, and are related by the paraphrase relation, or (2) they can be paraphrased into quantificational form such that the explicit commitments of the quantified versions are different and they are related by the paraphrase relation. Thus while (a) There is a possibility that John will come, can be paraphrased as (b) (Ex)(x is a possibility that John will come) to make explicit an ontological commitment to a possibility, (a) can also be paraphrased as (c) It is not certain that John will not come, to avoid such a commitment. Our success in avoiding this commitment is made plain by paraphrasing (c) as '(Ex)(x is John and not Cx)', where C=certainly will come.

It is apparent that these two uses of regimentation are

different. The issue is over what we say about the commitments of S once we have paraphrased it into S'. Do we say that since S' is not committed to x's, then, perhaps despite appearances, neither was S? Or do we say that while S may have been ontologically committed to x's, S' is not and so we have avoided the commitment? Does regimentation enable us to avoid evil or only the appearance of it? On the "avoidance" claim, the paraphrase relation need not preserve ontological commitment; on the alternative "explicitness" claim it does.

These two possible contributions of regimentation are not always clearly separated. Searle, for example, has Quine vacillating back and forth:

> By paraphrasing into the notation of the second we prove that the commitment in the first was apparent and not necessary. It is not that the first clearly contains a commitment which is not contained in the second but rather that it appears to contain such a commitment and by paraphrasing the original we show that this was merely an appearance.
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> The commitments to abstract entities in the second of the above two statements are unnecessary. There is no need for any such commitment because any sentence like (2) can be paraphrased into a sentence like (1). And is not this just another way of saying that the commitments are only apparent and not real? . . . the criterion shows us that in (1) we are rid of the unwelcome commitments of (2).[3]

In this last passage Searle attributes to "the imaginary philosopher Q" the view that there is no real difference between avoiding ontological commitments and showing them to be only apparent and not real. Whether or not the real Quine would hold this, there is a real problem with the suggestion. Suppose we affirm theory T which is, let us say, ontologically committed to x's. We are happy enough

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[3]Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 108-09.

with T until one day someone discovers that we can paraphrase T as T', a theory not committed to x's, so we adopt T'. Is this to say that before the paraphrase was discovered we only appeared to be committed to x's? Surely not. We really are ontologically committed to x's until we have the paraphrase. Afterwards, we allow for now, we may not be, but then we have indeed rid ourselves of an ontological commitment and not just the appearance of one. Surely, on Quine's considered view, mathematics today is truly committed to the existence of classes, even if in the future we will be able to paraphrase all of mathematics so that we are not so committed. Again, Quine believes that until we paraphrase ordered pairs as sets, we really are committed to the existence of ordered pairs. We are tempted to think that the initial commitment is only apparent when we concentrate upon cases in which both sides of the paraphrase are familiar and we readily go back and forth between them. After we have once paraphrased ordered pairs as sets, we can claim that speaking of ordered pairs does not ontologically commit us to them (for we have a paraphrase ready at hand), but the original paraphrase did rid us of that commitment. Quine's view must be that once we show by paraphrase how to dispense with a commitment we are once and for all rid of it. Future appeals to that same paraphrase do not rid us of the commitment anew, but rather make explicit the fact that when we use the original unparaphrased version we are no longer committed to what we were before. The commitment in the original version is only apparent.

Throughout much of Chapter VII of Word and Object Quine is

concerned with avoiding ontological commitment by means of devising paraphrases, but the clearest statement of this program is in an earlier work of Quine's. After considering the case in which a person might utter a "theory" for frivolous or make-believe reasons ("Once upon a time . . ."), he goes on to say that "another and more serious case in which a man frees himself from ontological commitments of his discourse is this: he shows how some particular use which he makes of quantification, involving a prima facie commitment to certain objects, can be expanded into an idiom innocent of such commitments."[4] This passage, in which Quine explicitly distinguishes between the commitment of a discourse and the commitment of a person, provides a possible answer for the question of whether Quine sometimes confuses the two claims I have distinguished. It might seem at first that he does, for in the cited passage he seems to shift back and forth between "ontological commitment of the discourse" and "prima facie ontological commitment," i.e., real and apparent commitment. But if we suppose that 'prima facie ontological commitment' and 'apparent commitment' are predicates not of discourses but of persons, the passage (and all other relevant passages I can find) makes good sense. A piece of discourse S has a given ontological commitment. One who utters S thereby assumes a prima facie commitment to the same entities to which S is committed. If the speaker can paraphrase that S into S' such that S' does not share that commitment with S, we say that the speaker's commitment was only apparent, though the commitment

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[4] Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 103.

of the original piece of discourse S was real enough. So the explicitness approach applies primarily to the ontological commitments of discourse; the avoidance approach applies to the commitments of persons. To sum up, persons avoid ontological commitment to x's by shifting from a piece of discourse which the criterion (explicitness approach) tells us is committed to x's to one which the criterion tells us is not. Regimentation provides both the alternate discourse and the quantified forms for each side of the original paraphrase.

The conclusions we reached in Chapter III, if they are allowed to stand, prove fatal to the avoidance claim. This result is the conclusion of an exchange between Quine and William P. Alston. First, Quine states the avoidance claim. Alston argues that it must be impossible to avoid a commitment in this way since if S' is an adequate translation of S it will have the same logical consequences as S and hence the same ontological commitments.[5] Quine's reply is that Alston has misunderstood the relationship between S and S'. He denies that S' is meant to be a translation of S or that there is any synonymy relationship between them. As a result, there is no reason why S' cannot be a paraphrase of S and yet have different commitments.

Chihara, incidentally, thinks that this can be settled in Quine's favor by an appeal to the distinction we just made between the commitments of a person and those of a discourse.[6] This is a misunderstanding of the problem. The key to the disagreement between Quine and

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[5] W. P. Alston, "Ontological Commitments," Philosophical Studies, IX.

[6] Chihara, "Universals," p. 27.

Alston lies in the nature of the paraphrase relation. Even making the persons/discourse distinction, in order for a person to avoid an ontological commitment it is necessary that there be two sentences, one a paraphrase of the other, such that they embody different commitments. The question is whether the paraphrase relation is such that this situation is possible. What Chihara's distinction does let us do is to reconcile the two different claims for regimentation that concern ontological commitment.

I want to urge that the considerations discussed above in Chapter III give us good reason to suppose that the issue must be settled in favor of Alston. Those considerations do not positively establish the conclusion that Quine is wrong, but they strongly suggest that there can be no relationship between two sides of a paraphrase that will be both strong enough to render the paraphrase adequate and weak enough to enable the two sentences to have different commitments. Synonymy is only the extreme case. Synonymy as a paraphrase relation would ensure preservation of ontological commitment, but Quine claims that he does not need this relationship. Where he goes astray is in supposing that he is therefore completely out of the woods; he neglects the fact that there are weaker relationships that are closely related to synonymy that might still preserve ontological commitment and which he might need for his paraphrase relationship depending upon his purposes at hand. To take a particularly perspicuous example, it was argued (Chapter II, section 2) that paraphrasing away ambiguities required some such weaker relationship, such as having a meaning in common. It seems clear, though, that if a

disambiguating paraphrase is adequate, the new sentence must not only share a meaning with the old, but it must be used with that same meaning in its new context. But if this is true, if they are used in the same sense in the context of the paraphrase, they must have the same commitments in that context. It seems that if synonymy ueberhaupt preserves ontological commitment ueberhaupt, then synonymy within a given context will preserve commitments within that context.

Let us see what happens when we consider the avoidance claim taken in conjunction with an adequacy criterion that incorporates a samesaying condition, the condition which we found recurring most often when dealing with Quine-like purposes-1. The question then becomes: is it possible that we can paraphrase from S to S' such that S and S' can be used to say the same thing and such that S' does not embody an ontological commitment that S does embody? Only if this is possible can we paraphrase to avoid ontological commitment.

In the last chapter I argued that there was a looser and a stricter sense of 'saying the same thing'. The stricter sense, which I claimed was basic, involved the production of synonymous sentences. Again, it is surely clear that two sentences cannot be synonymous and embody different commitments. But even the weaker sense of samesaying cannot be reconciled to the avoidance claim. We said that two persons could in this sense be said to say the same thing if they made the same predication of the same objects even though they might refer to these objects in different ways. This involves synonymy of predicate expressions, but not of referring terms. But in order to be committed to an object, it is necessary only that one refer to it in any way at

all; any reference to an object will serve to commit one to the existence of this object. Hence, substituting nonsynonymous referring terms which refer to the same object will not affect the ontological commitment to the object in question. And, of course, if we do drop a reference to an object under paraphrase, we cease to have "said the same thing."[7]

There is at least one reason, though, for thinking that an appeal to our earlier conclusions about saying the same thing will not cut much ice here. Our analysis of what it is to say the same thing centered on ordinary, humdrum sayings and when we are ordinarily justified in identifying two of them as being tokens of the same type. Now it may seem to some that two sayings could have the same commitments with respect to the objects that would concern an ordinary speaker (and hence qualify as the same saying on this score) and yet have different commitments on what might be called a higher, distinctively philosophical or metaphysical leve. Thus, it might be urged

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[7]A minor problem here is that when I say "The man behind the desk looks tired," you might (loosely) say the same thing by saying "Nixon looks tired," where the latter utterance avoids a commitment to desks. Obviously, no one will argue that the two utterances are used to say the same thing about a desk, though they are used to say the same thing about Nixon. Indeed, we are not likely to say that either is about the desk. Perhaps we need a relativized notion of (loose) samesaying, one relativized to what it is that is being talked about. A plausible way to proceed to make this notion precise might be to take a grammatical approach. For example, we could say that sentences are "about" any objects that are referred to by noun phrases that are not dominated in the tree of a generative grammar by any other noun phrases. This criterion would have the (desired) result that noun phrases used to identify the referents of other noun phrases would not be considered as what the sentence is about.

that two sentences could be used to say the same thing in that they would have the same empirical import and still embody different commitments. Thus, in the example cited earlier, it would not be claimed that there was any change in empirical import in the shift from (a) 'There is a possibility that John will come' to (c) 'It is not certain that John will not come', but only a change in one's philosophical or metaphysical position.

The first point to make is that this would be a distinctively non-Quinean move. The conscious and wholehearted tendency to identify scientific and philosophic questions as part of the same enterprise is a consistent theme throughout all of Quine's writings. He insists that there is no fundamental distinction, and certainly no clear line, between the philosophic and scientific enterprise. What difference there is is one of breadth.[8]

The second point to make is that this non-Quinean move does not touch the basic semantics of the situation. Just as it remains true that if two sentences have the same empirical import they will have the same empirical commitments, so it is true that if they have the same philosophical import, they will have the same philosophical commitments. This non-Quinean appeal is not to an alleged ability of sentences to have different meanings and yet to be usable for the same purposes; it is to an alleged bifurcation both of meanings of sentences and of acts one can perform using these sentences. The talk of "levels" is essential to this move. In moving from S to S',

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[8]See Quine, Word and Object, p. 161.

something must stay the same in order to make the paraphrase adequate, and something must be altered in order to make it successful. At the commonplace empirical level we have a dilemma. If what remains the same is what is said, then the commitment remains the same. So if the paraphrase is adequate, it is not successful, and if we deem it successful, we have a reductio to prove that it was not adequate after all. Postulating a philosophic level escapes the dilemma. What remains the same is the saying and the commitment at the empirical leve; what changes is the saying and the commitment at the philosophic level.

In his discussion,[9] Alston assumes that sentences like the aforementioned (a), (b) and (c) mean the same and he argues that given this fact no appeal to a special metaphysical commitment can work. Given the same meaning, they will have the same empirical and metaphysical commitments, or force, I here imagine that someone avoids this argument by denying the assumption that the meaning is the same and arguing that while the empirical aspect of meaning is the same, the metaphysical aspect is not. This pushes the appeal back a level, and we no longer can assume sameness of meaning to show the appeal misguided. What remains to be done, of course, is for someone to make sense of this notion of a special philosophical level of meaning. This task would involve more than just establishing the claim that there are specifically philosophical positions that are not empirical or scientific. It would involve showing that making

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[9]Alston, "Ontological Commitments," pp. 10-11.

empirical or scientific claims can commit one to certain of these philosophical positions. Furthermore, given such a demonstration, it will still be necessary to show that the philosophic commitments of sentences like (a) are not the same as sentences like (c). This program has not been carried out, and in the absence of any such program the position as stated remains far too amorphous to admit of serious criticism. And without such a program the appeal is hopelessly obscure; we have neither theory nor intuitions to support the postulation of metaphysical levels of meaning. Appealing to such a level as a support for some other doctrine certainly smacks of desperation.

Alston's complaint (he is echoed by Searle) regarding avoidance rested upon an assumption concerning adequacy for paraphrases. We have seen that this assumption was justified. It is left to Quine to formulate some version of the adequacy criterion that will be neither too weak nor too strong.

Notice the relationship between my dissatisfaction and Richard Cartwright's.[10] Cartwright challenges Quine to formulate the criterion for ontological commitment itself as applied to quantificational forms in terms that do not belong to the theory of meaning; this is necessary if Quine's program can even make the explicitness claim. At least it is necessary on Quine's ground rules. This is one way to criticize Quine by appealing to meaning concepts. My challenge, though, is of a different sort. It affects the avoidance claim in particular,

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[10]Cartwright, "Ontology."

in that even if we allow Quine synonymy, he cannot have the avoidance claim. Cartwright argues that Quine cannot formulate this one particular purpose-2 without using meaning concepts; I am claiming that a formulation of adequacy for paraphrases (which hangs upon purposes-1) requires meaning concepts and that because this is so, this particular purpose-2 is not available to Quine. If I am right, then the avoidance claim cannot be made (by anyone). If Cartwright is right, then neither can the explicitness claim be made (at least not by Quine).

3. Simplicity

We turn now to a discussion of the claim that one way in which a paraphrase can be successful is by simplifying theory. This claim is first made on page 158 of Word and Object: "Now certain such departures [from ordinary language] have yet a further purpose that is decidedly worth noting: simplification of theory." But just what it is that is being claimed here is not clear, since it is not immediately clear just what is meant by either 'theory' or 'simplification'.

What, to begin with, is meant by 'theory'? It might be that Quine means to be referring to a formalized deductive theory. Such a theory would be expressed in some formal language of quantification and would be deductively closed. An interpretation (or model) could then be assigned to the theory so that we would have an interpreted theory, one that could be true in certain assigned domains and false in others.[1] A less restricted view of what counts as theory might

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[1] Chihara, in "Universals," discusses this sort of theory in connection with Quine's discussion of ontological commitment.

focus on the functions of one or more sentences. Thus, some may suggest that a theory is a body of sentences that has the function of explaining or aiding our understanding of phenomena.[2] Less restrictive still, some are willing to count as theory any class of statements. As an example of a theory, Searle (in another connection) cites the conjunction of statements embodying (stating) all scientific knowledge.[3] But since the term 'scientific' might make this circular as a suggested account of theory, we can drop it and simply refer to the conjunction of statements embodying all knowledge. Searle is interested in "true" theory, but we need not be, so let us include "false" theory, so that our conjunction includes all statements. Ducking problems over the individuation of theories, let us just say that it is obvious that on this line there will be many different and useful ways to divide up this unwieldy class and admit that any subset of this wider class will itself count as a theory. Thus there can be one sentence theories, theories dealing with the most superficial aspects of the least interesting phenomena and other sorts of theories that we might in other circumstances and for other reasons find totally unacceptable, and unacceptable for reasons not necessarily related to the truth values of their component sentences.

Quine's own most careful discussion of theoryhood in Word and Object is in section three, in which he speaks most often of theory as an "interanimation of sentences." In general, for Quine, a theory

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[2] C. G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, pp. 70-71.

[3] Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 109-10.

will be a set of sentences with a certain relationship (interanimation) holding among them. Fortunately, we need not be clear on the exact nature of the relationship; for our purposes it is sufficient to see that Quine counts as theory both a chapter on chemistry and "the immemorial doctrine of ordinary enduring middle-sized physical objects."[4] Furthermore, he goes on to say that "in an obvious way this structure of interconnected sentences is a single fabric including all sciences, and indeed everything we ever say about the world; . . . However, some middle-sized scrap of theory will embody all the connections that are likely to affect our adjudication of a given sentence."[5] This last remark recognizes both the pull we feel to call the totality of scientific knowledge 'theory' and the practical necessity of carving up this totality into manageable hunks. In fact, Quine's requirement that the sentences of a theory be interanimated in a certain way is best seen as a guide for making practical divisions within the "single fabric including everything we ever say about the world," rather than as a strict necessary condition that a body of sentences must meet if it is to count as a theory. The interanimation account is not intended to separate theory from non-theory, but to separate sub-theory from sub-theory within theory. So if a man believes only a few isolated, un-interanimated, sentences to be true, these sentences still constitute his theory of the world, impoverished though the theory be. So I take Quine to be taking the same general

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[4] Quine, Word and Object, p. 11.

[5] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

line with respect to theory as did Searle.

This fact does not come out clearly in Word and Object itself, but we do have Quine's own testimony to this effect; he defends himself specifically against any narrower interpretations of 'theory' in the following passage.

> In Word and Object and related writings my use of the term 'theory' is not technical. For these purposes a man's theory on a given subject may be conceived, nearly enough, as the class of all those sentences within some limited vocabulary appropriate to the desired subject matter, that he believes to be true.[6]

I say that Quine takes the same general line as does Searle, but whereas Searle talks of a conjunction of statements, Quine refers not to statements but to sets of sentences. For Quine, a theory is to be identified with a certain set of sentences.

This identification needs to be examined in some detail, for it is clear that what the scientist normally calls a theory is not to be identified with a set of sentences even though it may be embodied some way within such a set. For one thing, it is part of a normal, non-Quinean, theory of theoryhood that the same theory can be couched in different sets of sentences. One advantage accruing to Quine's view is the ease of individuating theories; if the sentences differ, then they constitute different theories. Those who would defend the intuitive notion of theory have the difficulty of providing alternative criteria for individuating theories. When the sentences are different, what is it that constitutes the sameness of theory? What

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[6] From Quine, "Replies," in Davidson and Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections, p. 309.

remains the same?

We can best examine this question by looking at various ways in which it might be possible for different sentences to embody the same theory. I can think of three different types of situations in which we might want to say that the same theory was embodied in two different sets of sentences. First, when dealing with a formalized deductive theory, if we could take different sets of sentences as axiom sets and come up with the same totality of theorems in either case, we might want to say that we had the same theory embodied in a different set of sentences, counting the axiom set and rules of inference as the set of sentences embodying the theory. But even apart from the fact that this is neither what Quine says he means by 'theory' nor what the scientist means by 'theory', this example skirts the issues involved. The issues between Quine's view and the ordinary view of theory is, given a set of sentences, whether or not that set can be identified with the theory it embodies. The option that this example of a formalized theory presents is one of how many sentences ought we to count in the set in the first place. And this option can be expressed in either Quinean or non-Quinean terms. For Quine, the question is "Do we identify the theory with the axiom set and rules of inference or do we identify it with the set of its axioms, inference rules and theorems?" Set in non-Quinean terms, the question is "Do we want to say that the entire theory is embodied in just the axioms and inference rules or by the set of sentences that includes the theorems as well?" This makes it clear, I believe, that the issue over the general nature of a theory is neutral as to the question of

how we are to characterize a formalized deductive theory with respect to its axioms, inference rules, and theorems.

Another situation in which we are tempted to say that different sentences embody the same theory depends upon a general sort of vagueness that nearly always characterizes talk of theories. It is clear that for various reasons, psychological, historical or whatever, certain aspects of any given theory will be considered more important than others. So if two theories agree on what are generally held to be their more important aspects and differ only over certain details, it could be said that they are "essentially" the same theory. This, however, is not so much a shift from one standard of identifying theories to another, but a loosening of whatever standard it is that we want to use. And for this reason, this case, too, is neutral as between a Quinean or a non-Quinean account of theoryhood. So even if we want to identify a theory with a set of sentences, we can loosen the criteria so that two theories which agree on the "important" sentences could be said to be essentially the same theory. Clearly this procedure is not of interest to us.

But there is a third sort of case which may be of considerable interest to us. Suppose that we identify a theory T with a set of sentences consisting of $S_1, S_2, \ldots S_n$. What are we to say of theory T', consisting of $S_1', S_2', \ldots S_n'$ where each sentence S' means the same as the corresponding sentence S? On Quine's view the theories are not the same, but intuitively, we want to say that this is wrong, that the mere fact that different sentences are involved is not sufficient grounds for saying that the theory associated with one is not identical

to the theory we associate with the other. Quine will want to insist, though, that there is no "theory" above and beyond the sentences themselves.

It will not be lost upon anyone that this kind of a disagreement is not new to us. It is exactly parallelled by the more familiar dispute over whether there is anything in common (say, a proposition) between two sentences that are said to mean the same thing. Looking at the problem in this way, we can see that the dispute between two views of theoryhood is essentially the same as the dispute between Quinean and non-Quinean views of meaning. Quine's refusal to admit any theory beyond or behind a set of sentences is a natural consequence of his refusal to admit any abstract notion of a proposition that exists apart from a sentence. If one rejects Quine's view of propositionhood, one will reject his notion of theoryhood. An appeal to meaning relations, then, if it works for sentences, can be used to provide criteria for individuating theories apart from the sentences used to set forth the theory. And since I have already asked the reader to concede an intuitive grasp of semantic concepts, I am asking for no more here than what has already been supposed to have been granted.

But given that Quine is operating with a peculiar notion of theory (one not shared by scientists), the question arises whether this peculiarity will seriously affect the claim to simplify theory. For if by 'theory' Quine means a set of sentences and scientists mean something else, it may well be suspected that the claim that regimentation simplifies theory will likewise be understood in different ways.

Is there any way we can reconcile the two notions of theory so that Quine's claim will be of interest to one who does not accept his view of theory?

The fact is that there are points of contact between the two views. One very important one is that every theory can be expressed in a set of sentences, even if we choose not to identify the theory with that set.[7] It need not concern us that there may be problems over verifying whether a given theory is adequately expressed in a set of sentences. Once we do satisfy ouselves, we have a set of sentences which can then be treated in the prescribed way. So even though we do not want to identify a theory with a set of sentences, it is not as if there were no set of sentences which could be associated with the theory. Of course it is crucial that there be at least one such set since regimentation is, after all, a program for replacing linguistic items with other linguistic items. Quine identifies theories with sentences, so to paraphrase theory is just to paraphrase sentences, a particular linguistic unit. We do not identify theories with sentences, but we can easily speak of paraphrasing theory when we paraphrase a set of sentences that expresses a theory. Indeed, this will be the only way it can make sense to speak of the regimentation of "theory" at all.

There will be another point of contact as well, but an

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[7]This very plausible thesis might conceivably be denied by some. If so, the weaker thesis that every theory that we know of can be expressed in a set of sentences or the even weaker one that nearly every theory that we know of can be so expressed should do. Cf. Searle's principle of expressibility, Speech Acts, pp. 19-21.

elaboration of it must await a discussion of what simplicity is. It is a commonplace that scientists prefer a simpler theory to one that is not so simple, provided both explain the phenomena equally well. But while scientists can usually agree on which of two or more theories is the simplest, philosophers have more trouble deciding what it is that makes one theory simpler than its competitors. Quine both reaffirms the commonplace and reflects the confusion felt over the actual analysis of simplicity.

> Consciously the quest seems to be for the simplest story. Yet this supposed quality of simplicity is more easily sensed than described. Perhaps our vaunted sense of simplicity, or of likeliest explanation, is in many cases just a feeling of conviction attaching to the blind resultant of the interplay of chain stimulations in their various strengths.[8]

What is meant by 'simplicity'? While it is difficult to get any substantial consensus, it is at least obvious that there is more than one kind of simplicity that we can be interested in.[9] I have no intention of trying to sort out the issues over how to separate different kinds of simplicity, but despite their other disagreements, most writers on simplicity are united on one point. That point can be summed up by saying that the simplicity which is of interest to scientists and which is of the most importance to the philosophy of science is not notational. Beyond this, there will be disagreement, but the conviction is widespread that features of notation in themselves (i.e., shapes and arrangements of inscriptions) are not crucial

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[8] Quine, Word and Object, p. 19.

[9] See S. F. Barker, Induction and Hypothesis: A Study of the Logic of Confirmation, Chapter ix. Also, Richard Rudner, "An Introduction to Simplicity," in Philosophy of Science, XXVIII.

to the simplicity of theories, though they may be for certain conceptions of simplicity for notations, I suppose. Quine's discussion indicates that he shares this view of simplicity, for he speaks of simplicity as the minimizing of "such factors as multiplicity of objects, swiftness of interim change of quality and position, and, in general, irregularity of natural law."[10] These factors would seem to be independent of notational factors. The first of these, of course, we dealt with under the heading "ontological commitment."

It is of interest that despite the fact that two entirely different conceptions of theory were adopted at the beginning, our ensuing discussion of simplicity of theory will not be entirely at cross-purposes, and we may well ask why. The reason is that while Quine's theory is to be identified with a set of sentences, simplification of theory, even for Quine, is not a matter of simplifying sentences, whatever that notion would amount to. (Presumably it would amount to some form of notational simplicity since the sentences we are interested in are inscriptions.) To simplify theory is to minimize factors such as "multiplicity of objects," etc. Given this view of simplicity it is obvious that what is important about a theory is what it says or can be used to say about these factors. So despite the peculiar criterion for the identity of theories with which Quine begins, the aspect of the theory which is relevant to his own notion of simplicity is just that aspect which others would, in the first place, have thought crucial to the identity of a theory. And this is the other point of contact between the two

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[10] Quine, Word and Object, p. 19.

notions of theory that I mentioned earlier.

It will also be of interest to compare Quine's characterization of simplicity with his earlier description of theory. A man's theory consists of the sentences he believes to be true; among the truths that we hold will be truths of logic as well as truths of chemistry, geography, etc. Thus in speaking of interanimation Quine says

> If some of the connections count more particularly as logical or as causal, they do so only by reference to so-called logical or causal laws which in turn are sentences within the theory. The theory as a whole [consists of] a chapter of chemistry, in this case, plus relevant adjuncts from logic and elsewhere.[11]

Not surprisingly, "theory" contains logical theory. But later, when he discusses simplicity of theory, he mentions only the factors of "multiplicity of objects, swiftness of interim change of quality and position, and, in general, irregularity of natural law." These factors will affect our valuation of sentences dealing with chemical and geographical data, but not of those sentences embodying our logical theory.

It may seem that I am quibbling and, indeed, I do not mean to be taking Quine to task here. He is merely reflecting the normal tendency to identify what we call the problem of "simplicity" with the study of the problems scientists face qua scientists, and not the problem that logicians face when they too seek simplicity for that aspect of the total fabric that is their domain of study. Strictly, as we now treat 'theory', simplification of either chemistry or

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[11] Ibid., p. 11.

logic would count as simplification of theory. But let us use the term 'scientific simplicity' to refer to the unanalyzed notion of simplicity that guides scientists rather than logicians.[12]

There are at least two reasons for supposing that when Quine says that regimentation aids in "simplicity of theory," he means to be talking about what scientists normally concern themselves with when they take into account questions of simplicity. The first is that Quine does discuss this kind of simplicity, mentioning only the factors of interest to the scientist, and then later claims that regimentation increases simplicity of theory without any explicit disclaimers. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the natural assumption is that 'simplicity' refers to the same property in the two cases. The second reason is found in the following passage.

> The same motives that impel scientists to seek ever simpler and clearer theories adequate to the subject matter of their special sciences are motives for simplification and clarification of the broader framework shared by all the sciences. Here the objective is called philosophical, because of the breadth of the framework concerned; but the motivation is the same.[13]

There are at least two different ways of construing this passage, one of which tends to support the claim that regimentation increases the scientific simplicity of theories. What is the broader framework shared by all the sciences? The construal which has Quine

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[12] I do not mean to beg any questions to the effect that there either are or are not important differences in kind here; I leave it open that the difference between scientific simplicity and logical simplicity might not be a difference in the nature of the simplicity involved, but only one in the difference of subject matter.

[13] Quine, Word and Object, p. 161.

claiming scientific simplicity as an aim of regimentation interprets 'broader framework' as a reference to terms like 'fact', 'possibility', 'proposition', etc., which find their ways into all branches of science. Since these terms can occur within a chemical theory, it is not prima facie implausible to suggest that a chemical theory which uses such terms is simplified by a simplification of these concepts. We shall soon find occasion to discuss this passage more fully.

These are reasons for thinking that Quine does claim increased scientific simplicity for theories expressed in his regimented language. On this reading the claim is that if we take a theory T and paraphrase it (adequately) into theory T', T' might be scientifically simpler than T. Having made this clear, I now wish to go on to do two things. First, I want to show that it is unclear whether Quine does make this claim, that despite his earlier discussions he sometimes means to refer to something quite different when he uses the term 'simplicity of theory' and that at other times what he means is just unclear. As a matter of interpretation, so far as the text of Word and Object goes, he may or may not claim that scientific simplicity can be increased by regimentation. Secondly, I want to show that if Quine does mean to make this claim, the results of the last chapter are sufficient to demonstrate that the claim is false. Regimentation cannot yield this sort of simplicity.

Let us now return to the "broader framework" passage. It can surely be plausibly maintained that one aspect, at least, of the broader framework shared by all the sciences is our logical theory, i.e., our canons of deduction. Modus ponens is as much a part of the

chemist's repertoire as it is of the philosopher's or the logician's, even if the latter two are likely to pay it more attention. So this is a second way to interpret Quine's reference to a broader framework shared by all the sciences. In support of this reading, it should be noted that, at least at times, this is exactly what Quine does have in mind when he refers to "simplicity of theory." For example:

> Simplification of theory is a central motive likewise of the sweeping artificialities of notation in modern logic. Clearly it would be folly to burden a logical theory with quirks of usage that we can straighten. It is the part of strategy to keep theory simple where we can, and then, when we want to apply the theory to particular sentences of ordinary language, to transform those sentences into a "canonical form" adapted to the theory. If we were to devise a logic of ordinary language for direct use on sentences as they come, we would have to complicate our rules of inference in sundry unilluminating ways. For example, . . .[14]

Here Quine is obviously referring to logical theory, or canons of deduction. So if this is all he ever means by 'theory' when he is discussing simplicity, then our problem of interpretation is solved. If he sometimes means something else, then our problem is complicated further. Before going on to examine this question, let us be sure that we are clear on what is going on here. We have theory T (or sentence S, if you prefer). We paraphrase that theory into canonical form, thus simplifying theory. But it is not our original theory T that is rendered more simple by regimentation; it is our logical theory which we can now apply to T in its regimented form. Were it not for regimentation, we would need a very complex system of rules of inference to apply to T; given regimentation, theoretical deduction

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[14] Ibid., p. 158.

is simple. And Quine specifically calls this 'simplification of theory', i.e., logical theory.[15]

This way of describing things does not abandon the view of theory as a single fabric of sentences. What is being relied upon is our ability to divide our total fabric in a reasonable way into subtheories that we can call, say, 'T' and 'logical theory'. Our total theory cannot be simplified without some portion of it being simplified; here we are simply insisting that we can tell whether total theory is simplified by virtue of simplification of one subtheory or by virtue of simplification of another. I am not denying that the subtheory most naturally called 'logical theory' can be made simpler as a result of the regimentation of the rest of total theory.

One of the reasons why we will not want to count logical simplicity as a case of scientific simplicity is that it does not affect the part of theory that a scientist concerns himself with. Consider a chemist with a chemical theory T and a logical adjunct L. He wants to "paraphrase" T into T' such that T' is simpler than T. Quine offers a program for paraphrasing T into T' such that L can be made simpler. Notice that Quine's simplicity claim, here interpreted as paraphrasing T as T' so that L can be simpler, does not purport to offer an adequate paraphrase such that one side (T) is simpler than the other (T').

But there is another way of reading 'broader framework' that

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[15]See also Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 165.

does affect that part of total theory that concerns the scientist. This is the construal referred to above on pages 213-214, which takes the mention of a broader framework to be a reference to terms (like 'fact', 'possibility', etc.) which find their way into all branches of science.[16] The suggestion is that economizing and streamlining these concepts will count as simplifying theory since terms like these are used in formulating theory. Simplifying this subset of a theory's terms will count as simplifying the theory. This seems to be more like what the scientist might have in mind since it is actually his theory (and not the logician's) which is being simplified under paraphrase. So the simplicity we are now considering affects the appropriate (for the scientist) theory; does it also affect it in the appropriate (for him) way?

Unfortunately, the conclusions of the last chapter are sufficient to show that it cannot. The stumbling block is the restriction we found it necessary to place on the relationship holding between the two sides of a paraphrase. Remember that we are supposing that any plausible account of the adequacy criterion will finally come down to the notion of two sentences being used to say the same thing. What a theory says is surely pretty much a direct function of what its sentences individually say. Assume, then, a paraphrase from T to T' which is adequate, i.e., which is such

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[16]The boundary of this class is deliberately left vague; there need be no precise distinction. It may be helpful for some to think in terms of what have been called "topic-neutral" terms, or if not topic-neutral, then perhaps "topic-indefinite." Perhaps some other noncontroversial examples would be 'change', 'identity', 'disposition' and their cognates.

that the sentences of T' can be used to say the same things that the sentences of T could be used to say. Assume further that T' is scientifically simpler than T. This means that T and T'

(a) do not ascribe the same complexity to the world,[11]

(b) do not organize the entities comprising the total extension of the theory in the same way,[12] and on Quine's line,

(c) give different answers with respect to multiplicity of objects and swiftness of interim change of quality and position.

Looking in particular to (c), if T and T' give different answers with respect to multiplicity of objects and swiftness of interim change of quality and position, then they are just being used to say different things with respect to what things exist and with respect to their properties and relationships. And this contradicts our assumption that the paraphrase was adequate. The problem is a very fundamental one; if two sentences (theories) say the same thing, then they say the same thing about those aspects of the world which are crucial for simplicity.

To sum up, the scientific simplicity of a theory is a function of what is said by that theory, and this is why the claim that regimentation can further the simplicity of a theory is out of place. Logical simplicity is also a function of what is said, but of what is said by a logical theory. So there is no reason why, say, a chemical theory could not be regimented in such a way so as to enable some

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[11] Barker, Induction, p. 170.

[12] Rudner, "Simplicity," p. 114.

other (logical) theory to be made more simple. Notational simplicity, on the other hand, is not a function of what is said, but of the inscriptions (utterances) used in the saying, so we might be able to make a theory notationally simpler across paraphrase. It is only when (if) Quine claims that the paraphrasing of a theory can make that same theory itself scientifically simpler that we need to take issue with him. By way of illustration, note that we are likewise not free to claim that logical theory can be simplified by a paraphrase of itself. For then we would have logical theory L and a paraphrase version L' such that the paraphrase is adequate and such that L' is simpler than L. But this will not work for logical theory any more than it did for chemical ones, for if we grant that the paraphrase is adequate, we say that L and L' can be used to say the same thing, and if we also go on to say that the latter is simpler, we thereby take away with one hand what we have just given with the other.

Let me try to draw together some conclusions. Quine has presented a program for solving several different sorts of problems. I have made complaints at two levels. At one level, because Quine does not allow an adequacy criterion to make use of semantic concepts, no claim for regimentation can be upheld. The reasoning here is simple. Every use of regimentation involves a paraphrase and, without meaning concepts, we have not been provided with any satisfactory account of the difference between adequate and inadequate paraphrases. But if there is no such distinction, we have no grounds for ever rejecting a paraphrase or even for deliberating over one. This is clearly not

compatible with Quine's practice. We must conclude that there is such a distinction. Now either (a) the whole program should be junked, (b) we can yet find an adequacy criterion that avoids the problems over meaning, or (c) we can just decide to accept an adequacy criterion formulated with the aid of meaning concepts.

I am not prepared to adopt (a). The results of Chapter I should be sufficient to demonstrate that there is a helpful role to be played by Quinean regimentation. (B), of course, is an open ended project. Anyone is at liberty to provide a meaning-free version of an adequacy criterion that is consistent with the rest of the program. That I have not been able to do this is no guarantee that it will not be done. But if we tentatively suppose that a satisfactory result is not forthcoming along these lines, there is no reason why non-Quineans on meaning cannot adopt an adequacy criterion that will prove satisfactory for their needs. What work has been done indicates that synonymy of sentences would be too strong a condition for an adequacy criterion. It is my belief that some version in terms of saying the same thing or being unable to say the same thing would be closer to an adequate account.

And this brings us to the second level of criticism. Given that we accept some such adequacy condition, which of Quine's claims are affected? My answer has been that one interpretation of the simplicity claim cannot be upheld and one use of regimentation for avoiding ontological commitment collapses. These results are not fatal to the program as a whole. Other less controversial claims remain intact, and I have no intention of downgrading these. There

is no need to throw out the baby with the bathwater.

APPENDIX

REFERENTIAL OPACITY[1]

1. Terms

First, let us take a brief look at a side issue. Quine likens our excusing occurrences of terms in quotations from substitutivity to our excepting the occurrence of 'mary' in 'summary'.[2] But, it may be asked, need we count these "occurrences" as occurrences at all? Of course this matter is one of finding a criterion for identifying terms (or words?). Quine says that for his purposes words are to be counted identical if they sound alike (or look alike if writing is in question).[3] Presumably, then, Quine's view is that the 'sum' of 'The sum of 2 plus 2 is 4' looks like the 'sum' of 'summary', so we count them both as the same term. Strictly speaking, this is not what we are looking for. We want criteria to tell

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[1]This appendix presupposes points argued for in Chapter I. Let me repeat here a warning made there about the controversial nature of my interpretation of Quine. Nevertheless, I do claim that my interpretation is the most natural reading of the text of Word and Object. If one wishes to reject this reading, then he can see my charges as arguments for the necessity of finding a new coherent reading of what Quine says, one that is not open to the criticisms made below. On the issue of interpretation, see my interpretive comments below in section 3.

[2]Quine, Word and Object, p. 144.

[3]Ibid., p. 130. This cannot be our ordinary notion of sameness for words, since it has the consequence that I cannot both write and speak the same word. Any final account will have to bridge the gap between writing and speaking.

us, for any given x, whether x is a term. Quine here offers a criterion rather for telling when two terms are the same term. Still, the two questions are related, and Quine's willingness to count the 'sum' of 'summary' and the 'cat' of 'cattle' (another one of Quine's examples) as the same terms as 'sum' and 'cat' implies that the former pair are terms. This suggests also that he would be willing to count the 'tle' of cattle as another term (which happens not to occur on its own), or even the 't', the 'l' and the 'e'. At least, I do not see any reason to stop short of admitting these last entities as terms, given that we will accept the 'cat' of 'cattle'. Quine's very use of the example implies in another way that he regards the 'mary' of 'summary' as a term, since it is terms which we must decide whether or not to except from the law. If we can decide to except an occurrence, then we must be able to decide not to except it--which, on the formulation of the principle of substitutivity, would commit us to substituting term for term. Earlier on,[4] Quine notes that wordhood is a problem, but dodges it by claiming that the word 'word' has a (common) denotation good enough for his purposes. In the very next paragraph, without shifting gears at all, he slides easily into talk of terms, rather than of words. There is plenty of time to shift gears between page 14 and page 130, of course, but I can find no criterion offered for termhood that leads to regarding 'sum' in 'summary' as a term.

At any rate, the point here is that one might want to say

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[4] Ibid., p. 14.

that although the sequences of letters 's-u-m' and 'm-a-r-y' do appear in 'summary', the terms 'sum' and 'mary' do not. The parallel claim for quotation contexts would be that the term 'Cicero' does not occur in ''Cicero' has six letters', though of course the term ''Cicero'' does.[5] There is, I think, a real disagreement here, which might surface at other times as well, but it is one which need not concern us here. Quine will go on viewing the 'sum' of 'summary' and the 'Cicero' of ''Cicero' has six letters' as terms, but he will see that the first "somehow do not count," while he can spell out the quotation cases to avoid the appearance of a term.[6] The important point is that whether we see ''Cicero'' as containing a term which does not have pure reference or whether it is seen as containing no term at all, the law of substitutivity will not apply.

But there is one danger to be aware of here. If one does not hold that the 'Cicero' of ''Cicero'' is a term, then there is not even a prima facie problem over substitutivity concerning ''Cicero' has six letters', and Quine's account of pure reference will not even be relevant to it. This being the case, we should not let Quine's account of quotation contexts in terms of pure reference take any credit for clearing up a problem here. Of course, if 'Cicero' in the above context is to be counted as a term, then some explanation regarding failure of substitutivity is called for, and perhaps Quine's

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[5] J. G. Kemeny takes this line in his review of From a Logical Point of View in Journal of Symbolic Logic, XIX, p. 137.

[6] See Quine, Word and Object, pp. 143-44.

will fit the bill.

2. A possible confusion

It is not so clear in the case of typical propositional attitudes as it is in quotation contexts, that the term in question fails to have pure reference. Quine reaches the conclusion that terms in the context of a propositional attitude can fail to have pure reference on the strength of his claim that it is certain that purely referential positions will preserve substitutivity. If in a given case substitutivity fails, we have the evidence we need that the occurrence in the position was not purely referential and, hence, that the law should not have been expected to hold. Now this way of putting things makes the whole procedure appear to be circular, and just this claim has been recently made by Professor Linsky.[7] Linsky's appraisal of Quine's work on opacity is sharply critical. Much of the following sections will be spent studying Linsky's account of what is going on in Quine on opacity.

Linsky sees Quine as "determined to defend" the principle of substitutivity, which with some moderation would express the view I set forth in Chapter I. He goes on to say that "according to Quine, positions in sentences for which the principle of substitutivity is not a valid mode of inference are 'referentially opaque' ones. They are positions such that expressions occupying them do not succeed in referring to anything, although the very same expressions will refer

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[7]Leonard Linsky, Referring, Chapter VII.

in other, referentially open, positions."[8] But this is a very serious misreading of Quine's true position. This reading implies that if a term fails to have pure reference, then it has no reference at all, whereas Quine never issues such a blanket statement. If we accept Quine's handling of termhood, and Linsky does, then quotation gives us examples of impurely referring expressions which, indeed, have no reference. But we must not look too hard or long at this sort of example, even if Quine has called it paradigmatic of referential opacity. For 'Giorgione' in 'Giorgione was so-called because of his size' also occurs in an opaque context, and it surely has reference. Quine will insist that it has reference, but not pure reference. So to have pure reference is not just a matter of actually referring, but of referring in a certain way. To fail to have pure reference is not necessarily to fail to refer, but only to fail to refer in that particular way.

Despite the fact that Linsky's study appeared seven years after the publication of Word and Object, all of his references are to Quine's earlier works, and there are indications that Linsky's error may have resulted from concentrating too much on these earlier works. A discussion of Word and Object might have turned up the following passage (example (1) is a quotation context, while (2) is not):

> Example (2), even if taken in the not purely referential way, differs from (1) in that [the term in question] still seems to have far more bearing on [its object] than [the

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[8] Ibid., p. 101.

> terms of (1)] has on [its object]. Hence my cautious phrase 'not purely referential', designed to apply to all such cases and to affirm no distinction between them.[9]

So the true negation of 'purely referential' is neither 'impurely referential' nor 'not referential', but rather 'not (purely referential)', the last predicate being applicable both in cases where there is no reference and in cases where there is. Quine wants two categories for occurrences of terms: purely referential and not purely referential. The latter will contain all sorts of left-overs and otherwise heterogeneous sorts of occurrences. I shall for convenience, however, use the term 'impure reference' to refer to what the members of this second group have in common, that is, lack of pure reference.

Linsky's misreading of Quine emerges in a counterexample he proposes to Quine's analysis. He argues that surely 'the person who holds the office of president of the United States' in 'The person who holds the office of president of the United States was administered the oath of the latter office by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court' is an instance of a term's having pure reference. His confidence seems to be based solely upon the fact that it does indeed refer to its object. But this is like our 'Giorgione'-sentence. If the latter sentence is no counterexample, then neither is Linsky's. When we go on to spell out Quine's notion of pure reference in more detail, we will see why he does not consider the 'Giorgione'- sentence a counterexample. The same considerations will apply to Linsky's

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[9]Quine, Word and Object, p. 142.

example.[10]

3. Circularity

The question is now one of pinning down the particular way in which a term must refer if it is to have pure reference. Linsky challenges Quine to make good this notion apart from his criterion of failure of substitutivity. This is surely a reasonable challenge. One point of introducing the concept of opacity was to explain why we should not expect substitutivity of identicals to work in certain sentences. We are left with no explanation at all if it turns out that the only thing that distinguishes opaque and transparent modes of containment, nonreferential from referential positions and occurrences, turns on substitutivity. Now, if Linsky's characterization of pure reference (as examined above) were correct, then he would have the independent characterization that he is looking for. That characterization would be in terms of having reference and, with respect to substitutivity, it would be a very effective characterization. For, to be slightly facetious, we would not expect that a term which had no reference at all (better, did not purport to have a reference) could be replaced at all by a term which purported to name the same object, let alone while retaining the same truth value. Of course, then the explanation would not apply to all the cases of failure of substitutivity that we would want it to apply to, e.g., the 'Giorgione'-sentence.

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[10] Linsky, Referring, p. 104.

But as it is, Quine's handling of pure reference should at least rouse some suspicions. The fishy part is that the moment Quine introduces the notion of pure reference, he immediately installs the failure of substitutivity as criterion for it without any apparent supporting argument. Here are the key passages.

> An occurrence of the name in which the name refers simply to the object disignated, I shall call purely designative. Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely designative, and that the statement depends not only upon the object, but the form of the name. For it is clear that whatever can be affirmed about the object remains true when we refer to the object by any other name.[11]

> When a singular term is used in a sentence purely to specify its object, and the sentence is true of the object, then certainly the sentence will stay true when any other singular term is substituted that designates the same object. Here we have a criterion for what may be called purely referential position: the position must be subject to the substitutivity of identities.[12]

An interesting question concerns the sort of justification that could be given to support the last sentence of the first quote and the first sentence of the second. One would have thought that that claim was at least part (depending upon how 'pure reference' is finally unpacked) of the very claim at issue. Surely the locutions 'it is clear that' and 'certainly' will not take the place of argument here. But these two sentences, unsupported as they are, do go to show that Quine does not see himself as defining pure reference in terms of substitutivity. This is further substantiated in the

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[11] Quine, "Notes on Existence and Necessity," p. 78. Virtually the same wording appears in "Reference and Modality" in Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 140.

[12] Quine, Word and Object, p. 142.

passage that immediately follows the last quoted passage, in which Quine says that a position's being not purely referential is reflected in the failure of substitutivity.

In making this interpretive claim, I am siding with Linsky and Kemeny[13] and against Church[14] and perhaps Føllesdal.[15] Church clearly believes that the distinction between pure/impure reference is the same as that between substitutivity/nonsubstitutivity. Føllesdal himself defines a purely referential position in terms of substitutivity, but it is not clear that he is committed to the belief that Quine must be interpreted in this way, though the suggestion is clearly present.

I should like to make the following points in defense of a Linsky-Kemeny interpretation. (1) Quine specifically says that he calls an occurrence of a name purely designative (referential) if the name refers simply to the object designated.[16] The Word and Object account is a little messier, but he first introduces as a vagary of reference two different ways in which a term can be used; either to simply refer to its object or not to simply refer to its object. He then argues that if a term is used in the first way,

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[13]Kemeny, "Review of Word and Object."

[14]A. Church, in his review of "Notes on Existence and Necessity" in Journal of Symbolic Logic, VIII.

[15]Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Quine on Modality" in Davidson and Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections.

[16]See the passage just cited from "Notes on Existence and Necessity"; also Quine, The Ways of Paradox, p. 158.

then by the nature of this kind of reference, substitutivity will hold. In other words, Quine argues from pure reference to substitutivity. They are two different notions for him.

(2) If a nonreferential position is defined as one for which substitutivity does not hold, then what can Quine be up to in passages like this: "I do not disallow failure of substitutivity, but only take it as evidence of non-referential position."[17] Surely he does not mean to be saying that he only takes failure of substitutivity as evidence of failure of substitutivity. To make sense of passages like this, there must be an account of nonreferential positions that does not appeal to substitutivity itself.

(3) The question is one of how Quine thinks of the expression 'purely referential position'. What does it mean for him? Surely the following offhand remark from the entirely different context of his attempt to eliminate names is revealing on this score. "The intuitive idea behind 'purely referential position'," he says, "was supposed to be that the term is used purely to specify its object, for the rest of the sentence to say something about (#30)."[18] The "intuitive idea" behind purely referential position, then, is not substitutivity.

That it is not difficult to read Quine differently on this point I attribute to the utterly complete confidence he places in

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[17]Quine, Word and Object, p. 151. Also From A Logical Point of View, p. 140, The Ways of Paradox, p. 158, and "Notes on Existence and Necessity," p. 78.

[18]Quine, Word and Object, p. 177.

the substitutivity criterion and perhaps to what I take to be an ambiguity in the term 'criterion' itself. (Compare Wittgenstein's use of this term.)

We are given these brief attempts at an independent characterization of pure reference.[19]

(a) a term has pure reference when it refers simply to the object it names

(b) a term has pure reference when the statement in which it occurs depends only upon the object and not the form of the name

(c) a term has pure reference when it is used in a sentence purely to specify its object

Note, first, that the subtle shifting of position by the adverb in (a) and (c) is significant. The placing of 'simply' in (a) strongly suggests that to refer simply is to refer in a certain way, for example, to refer in a noncomplex manner. (A less plausible, and quite trivial reading would have it that a term has pure reference if it refers simply to the object it names and to no other objects.) But I take the import of (c) to be that a term has pure reference when the only role it has is to refer to its object; pure reference, not unnaturally, is reference unpolluted by any other tasks that a term might have in the sentence. Our earlier conclusion that to have pure reference is to refer in a certain way is true only if 'in a certain way' is construed generously enough so that "merely referring," i.e., referring and doing nothing else, is a <u>way</u> of

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[19](A) and (b) are drawn from "Notes on Existence and Necessity," p. 78, and <u>From a Logical Point of View</u>, p. 140. (C) is the version of <u>Word and Object</u>, p. 142.

referring. That we are justified in taking this to be what Quine means is supported not only by the general rule that says we should put more weight upon later formulations, but also by the fact that Quine nowhere talks about a different kind of reference. We do not have two different kinds of reference, but the same kind of reference twice, once by itself and once coupled to some other role the referring expression has in the sentence in question.

With respect to (b), I take it that to say a statement depends upon a term means in this context that its truth value depends upon it. Now Quine nowhere restricts the notion of 'form of a name' that we find in (b). He apparently means for it to account for both of these cases:

(1) 'Cicero' has six letters

(2) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.

Obviously, that 'Cicero' is spelled with six letters is a fact about that word's form, and the truth of (1) depends upon this. It is less obvious that the form of 'Giorgione' is crucial to the truth value of (2). In order to make (b) apply to (2), we must read 'name' in a broader sense than we would need to for (1). (B) will apply to (2) only if we take a name to be any term referring to a person (or thing) and different terms referring to the same person as different forms of the same name. The point at which the change in form from 'Giorgione' to 'Barbarelli' will affect the truth value of the sentence is in some sense a little deeper, but it will certainly be dependent upon such a change in form, as 'form of a name' has just been explained. But now Quine is using 'form of a name' so that any

typographically significant change will count. At this point it should be clear that Quine's account is in trouble; for to change the form of a name will just be to substitute a term with the same reference. With a little filling in at the gaps, (b) becomes: a term has pure reference when the truth value of the statement in which it occurs depends only upon the object and not the form of the name (=the term used to refer to it). This is to say that the term has pure reference when the truth value of the sentence in which it occurs depends only upon the object and substitutivity does not fail for it. Clearly we are in a circle. I conclude, then, that (b) does not lead to the independent characterization which Linsky seeks.

Let us turn back to (c), since we now take that to correctly embody what Quine intended in (a). Here pure reference is defined as a term's merely referring to its object (and doing nothing else). This definition makes no use of substitutivity. Let us now try to get from this definition to a criterion in terms of substitutivity. Suppose that we have a sentence which contains a term t that serves some other function as well as that of referring to its object. Suppose also that we have another term t' such that the two terms are identicals, that t=t'. All that this last piece of information tells us is that the two refer to the same object. So there can be no guarantee that if we substitute t' for t, t' will be able to carry on the same extra-referential task that t did. This establishes that if we have impure reference, we have failure of substitutivity, for, if need be, we could always introduce a term that did nothing but refer to the object in question. Our stipulation would ensure that the

referential task would be picked up, but not the other. By contraposition, where we have substitutivity, we will have pure reference. I submit that on the surface this is a plausible suggested reconstruction of an argument to link up pure reference with substitutivity and that the entire account seems to accomplish two things. It gives us an independent characterization of pure reference, and it gets us from that characterization to something like Quine's substitutivity criterion for pure reference in a reasonable step.

For this to work, we need the notion of 'playing a role in a sentence'. I do not want to try to give a satisfactory analysis of this notion, but a brief demonstration will serve to illustrate, on an intuitive level, how Quine wants to use it. He does use it, perhaps only implicitly at times,[20] though explicitly at others.[21] Consider 'Giorgione was so-called because of his size'. Here, 'Giorgione' refers to Giorgione (Barbarelli). But it also serves as an antecedent for 'so' (compare: 'Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size'). After substitution 'Barbarelli' can do the purely referential work of 'Giorgione', but it cannot pick up the additional role of serving as antecedent for 'so' without altering the truth value of the sentence. We have, then, a paradigm case of failure of substitutivity because (a) the original term played more than a purely referring role, (b) the relation of being identicals guaranteed only that the second term would have the same reference,

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[20]See Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 140.

[21]See Quine, Word and Object, pp. 152-53.

and (c) the second term was unable to pick up the other role of the original term without altering the containing sentence's truth value.

Apart from minor quibbles that may be raised,[22] there remains a serious difficulty in squaring my suggested account of what Quine is doing here with what he actually goes on to do later. I have viewed Quine as showing that if we do not have pure reference, then we do not have substitutivity, in other words, that substitutivity is a sufficient condition for pure reference. It may already have been noticed, though, that this is not the claim that Quine makes in the passages I quoted on page 229. He claims there that substitutivity is a necessary condition for pure reference as, on reflection, it is obvious he must. For if substitutivity is to serve as a criterion for pure reference in the way Quine wants it to, it must be a necessary condition of pure reference. This is precisely how Quine wields his criterion; time and again he concludes that since substitutivity fails, therefore the term in question cannot be occurring in purely referential position. Yet he nowhere argues that a failure of substitutivity must indicate lack of pure reference. He says 'certainly' and 'it is clear' that given pure reference, we will have substitutivity, but these words themselves will not persuade. He has yet to show that there cannot be cases of pure reference which fail of substitutivity, and this is just to say that an appeal to the presence of impure reference will not explain failure of substitutivity.

To tie up some loose ends, what this shows is that taking

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[22] See below, section 4.

"used purely to specify its object" as an independent characterization of pure reference will not do the job Quine wants it to do unless we make the assumption that substitutivity holds over terms with pure reference, which is just the question at issue. It seems then that at least part of the plausibility of Quine's account rests on the plausibility of the claim that substitutivity is a sufficient condition for pure reference and the possibility of confusing necessary and sufficient conditions. Both (b) and (a-c), then, fail to provide us with an adequate and independent account of pure reference, adequate, that is, to Quine's purposes.

It might be thought that an examination of the examples Quine gives could lead us to some other sort of independent characterization, one that Quine does not explicitly formulate. Linsky tries this approach and concludes that the distinction between pure and impure reference is a logical mirage, that we could not recognize any such distinction without using failure of substitutivity as a criterion.[23] This seems correct. What is it that quotation, the propositional attitudes, the logical modalities and contexts which refer back to the form of a name, say, are supposed to have in common? Only it seems, that they refuse substitutivity. This means that we are back in the circle of saying that the principle of substitutivity holds except in those cases in which it does not hold. Linsky's charge is justified, even though I feel that he himself did not try hard enough to make Quine's account work in order to justify his

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[23]Linsky, Referring, pp. 105-06.

confidence in this conclusion. Of course I have examined only the accounts of pure reference as given in (a-b-c). Given Quine's exposition, this is the obvious place to begin. I have heard it suggested that the only way to make sense of Quine's distinction is in terms of modal concepts, which would involve, I take it, a shift of emphasis from the roles of referring terms in positions to the nature of certain sorts of positions themselves. This seems promising; the important distinction, it seems to me, is not one between opacity and transparency, but one between those modes of containment that can take only a transparent or (exclusive 'or') an opaque interpretation and those that can take either one. At any rate, I do not propose to go further into questions such as these. Besides the fact that we may have some trouble deciding how much is a working out of Quine's distinction and how much is a new distinction altogether, so far as making sense of what the text of Word and Object gives us, the burden is on Quine.

4. Some other related problems

I claimed to have shown that where we have substitutivity, there we also have pure reference as Quine definies it in (a-c). It is quite obvious that 'substitutivity' here carries a universal force; when we said that substitutivity held for a term in a sentence, we meant that for any identical we chose to substitute for the term, the truth value of the sentence would remain the same. But now it seems that this universality is not the only condition we need; in order to characterize the notion Quine needs, it seems that we require the

notion of either possibility or necessity. Linsky cites this example:

(a) Alcibiades is the most notorious Athenian traitor.

(b) Everyone believes that Alcibiades is honest.

(c) ∴ Everyone believes the most notorious Athenian traitor is honest.[24]

The argument is invalid, and Quine will want to explain this in terms of an illegitimate substitution into an opaque context. But on what grounds can we declare (b) to be referentially opaque? It is false, and no substitution of an identical for 'Alcibiades' will alter its truth value. It just so happens that under no designation does everyone believe Alcibiades to be honest. Linsky suggests that an appeal to possibility can make the substitutivity criterion work here.

> We can change the definition . . . so that a sentence can be said to be . . . referentially transparent, not if a change of truth value does not occur, but only if a change of truth value cannot (as a matter of logic) occur when one name is replaced by another name for the same thing in that sentence. According to this definition, (b) is referentially opaque. We have only to imagine a possible world in which humans are less suspicious of their fellow men, and in which six-months-old babies are fully informed about the world in which they live.[25]

One attempt to avoid this appeal to possibilities is the following. It might be argued that opacity is after all a property of contexts and that surely there is some pair of co-designating terms, substitution for which would change the truth value of (b). In other words, even if we cannot use 'Alcibiades' to show the opacity, we could find two other appropriate and carefully selected

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[24] Linsky, Referring, pp. 106-07.

[25] Ibid.

terms such that substitutivity would fail. This would establish the referential opacity of (b), revealing that we should not have been substituting in this context for 'Alcibiades'. But there is an answer to this. For Quine, the same context can be either transparent or opaque, depending upon whether the term inside the context has or fails to have pure reference. Thus,

> A construction that may be transparent or opaque is the belief construction 'a believes that p'. Thus suppose that though
> (7) Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline,
> he is ill-informed enough to think that the Cicero of the orations and the Tully of De Senectute were two. Faced with his unequivocal denial of 'Tully denounced Catiline', we are perhaps prepared both to affirm (7) and to deny that Tom believes that Tully denounced Catiline. If so, the position of 'Cicero' in (7) is not purely referential. But the position of 'Cicero' in the part 'Cicero denounced Catiline' considered apart, is purely referential. So 'believes that' (so conceived) is opaque.[26]

Quine goes on to say that if we do accept substitutivity here, then we take the context to be transparent. If the position of 'Alcibiades' is purely referential in (b), then its context must be taken as transparent since 'Alcibiades' occurs in purely referential position in 'Alcibiades is honest'. But again, for Quine, substitutivity is our criterion for purely referential position. Just as whether or not we could substitute for Cicero in (7) determined the transparency or opacity of the context of (7), it is the behavior of 'Alcibiades' which must determine the status of the belief context of (b). Failure of substitutivity in (b) for some other pair of terms would show only that the position then had to be opaque, not that it was opaque

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[26] Quine, Word and Object, p. 145.

in (b).

In that it affects any attempt to characterize extensionality, this problem is not peculiar to Quine. It is peculiar to him (and his followers) in that he does not have recourse to the logical modalities. Quine cannot accept Linsky's solution for he holds that any appeal to necessity, e.g., that a change of truth value cannot (as a matter of logic) occur, is senseless. He might, of course, accept the substitution that gives us (c) from (b), thus taking the argument to be valid. In my view, this cure is much worse than the disease.

All of the previous section was based upon the presumption that Quine must define pure reference independently of substitutivity. This presumption is based upon our idea of what it takes to satisfactorily incorporate counterexamples into laws. Suppose that this requirement be waived, or that we have some other purpose in mind, and that we did define pure reference, and hence opacity, in terms of substitutivity. As argued, the appropriate notion of substitutivity includes the notion of possibility (or necessity), which is a logical modality. Linsky argues that this must be illegitimate apart from Quinean scruples over modality. "Our definition of referential opacity employs the concept of logical possibility. But logical possibility is a notion which we want to characterize as referentially opaque. We have therefore entered a vicious circle."[27] This seems to be a clear error. Would Linsky wish to rule out the

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[27]Linsky, Referring, p. 107.

following definition as being viciously circular? "A long word $=_{def}$ a polysyllabic word." If this is a bad definition, it is not because we have used a long word to define 'long word'. Similarly, if Quine now sums up his account by saying "I believe that referential opacity . . . ," he has not somehow vitiated his viewpoint because he has expressed it within a referentially opaque mode of containment. There is no reason why constructions which exhibit referential opacity cannot be used to define referential opacity. A definition becomes circular when it uses the word being defined (or one so close to it as to be unhelpful) to define that word itself. Certainly 'logical possibility' is nowhere near having this relationship to 'referential opacity'; it is merely an inconsequential accident that modes of containment featuring logical possibility exhibit opacity. So this circle is not vicious, though any such definition remains circular (in that it uses 'substitutivity') in the other sense in which Linsky claims that it is circular.

It is interesting to note just how far Quine's confidence in his substitutivity "criterion" takes him. Linsky cites the first occurrence of 'Cicero' in ''Cicero' is a designation for Cicero' as a counterexample to Quine's criterion, claiming that the substitution of 'Tully' (or of any other term t such that t=Tully) for it must leave the truth value of the sentence unchanged. But the first occurrence of 'Cicero' in this sentence, Linsky claims, is not a purely referential one.[28] This citation of Linsky's without any

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[28] Ibid.

further substantiation or comment is strange, for Quine specifically deals with such cases. Speaking of the sentences that he has numbered

(8) 'Tully was a Roman' is true, and

(9) 'Tully' refers to a Roman,

he says that "despite the opacity of quotation, these occurrences of the personal name are clearly subject to substitutivity of identity salva veritate, thanks to the peculiarities of the main verbs involved."[29] From this he draws the conclusion that these occurrences of the term 'Tully' are in purely referential position, which, given Quine's definition of referential position, is to say that the terms in question have pure reference. What are we to say of this? Surely the truth is that in (9) ''Tully'' refers (purely) to a name, but that the 'Tully' occurring within ''Tully'' has no reference at all. If 'Tully' had any reference here, it would be to a man, but the sentence is about a name; it says nothing at all about a man. Yet Quine claims not only that 'Tully' has reference, but that it has pure reference. We have seen that Quine allows that terms with impure reference might not refer at all, and this seemed all right, but now we discover that he counts as terms with pure reference terms which paradigmatically do not refer. This is partially concealed by his switch to talk of the referentiality of positions, rather than of the reference of the terms contained by the positions. We can draw

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[29]Quine, Word and Object, p. 146. Quine expands his comments on this phenomenon in From a Logical Point of View, p. 141.

these conclusions: either (a) Quine has forgotten that he originally defined pure reference apart from substitutivity and has let himself slip into treating the criterion as a definition, or (b) we have here an application of the criterion which reduces the criterion's claim to have anything to do with reference to absurdity; (c) when it comes down to cases, Quine chooses circularity over incoherency, by which I mean that incoherency that met our attempts to define pure reference apart from substitutivity.

5. Opacity and indefinite terms

Since we have been examining a vagary of reference, we have naturally enough been attending to referring expressions. But we have also been attending to the positions in which such expressions can occur. Of particular interest have been those positions in which a definite referring expression might occur either purely referentially or not purely referentially. What happens when we take such positions and place indefinite singular terms in them? Quine shows (#30) how the position after 'The commissioner is looking for' might or might not be taken as purely referential. The question now is what to say about the position when it is filled thusly: The commissioner is looking for someone.[30] Quine argues that we no longer have any choice; that the position must now be interpreted as purely referential.

> But if we put an indefinite term into it, say 'someone', we cease to be free to choose between two interpretations. To

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[30] I follow Quine in taking 'someone' as my example of an indefinite singular term.

> make proper sense of 'The commissioner is looking for someone' we have to think of the position as purely referential. For who is this person the commissioner is looking for? The chairman of the hospital board, i.e., the dean.[31]

Quine obviously thinks that it is legitimate to extend the purely referential/not purely referential distinction to the positions which contain indefinite singular terms and that when we do make this extension the nature of indefinite terms is such that all positions containing them must be taken to be purely referential. I want to conclude our consideration of opacity by examining these two claims.

Suppose we first consider a position which must be taken to be purely referential, say 'Tom kicked _____'. No matter what singular definite referring term we place in the position, substitutivity will hold for it. Since the position is unequivocally referential, there would seem to be no harm in saying that 'someone' occurs in purely referential position in 'Tom kicked someone'. We could extend the notion of a purely referential position in this way so that these positions could contain indefinite terms and could be <u>referential</u> by virtue of the referential role of the definite referring terms that <u>could</u> fill the position. Then we could usefully go on to ask what effect such positions have on indefinite singular terms.

There are a few positions which must be taken to be not purely referential. '_____ was so-called because of his size' is one, I take it. The only reason for hesitation here at all is that

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[31] Quine, <u>Word and Object</u>, p. 146.

though it be false that Tom was so-called because of his size, it might easily be that there is no term denoting Tom that came to denote Tom because of his size. This would mean that no substitution of identicals would change the truth value of the original sentence. Here we have Linsky's problems over the need to introduce modalities.[32] But it certainly seems clear that we must call this position nonreferential. There is also the position of ''_____' has seven letters', given Quine's handling of quotation contexts and excluding special cases.[33] Just as before, granting that these positions must always be nonreferential, there seems to be no reason to refrain from saying that indefinite terms can be placed in these positions. We can then go on to ask what happens when we do put indefinite terms in those positions.

Before examining the crucial case in which a position can be taken to be either purely referential or not, let me make a brief aside. Quine's answer to the question of what the effect is of filling nonreferential positions with indefinite terms is that nonsense is produced. This may be implied in the previous citation when Quine argues that to make (proper) sense of sentences with indefinite terms, these terms must be taken to occur in purely referential position. The same conclusion is later made explicit. "The nonreferential status of the subject position in (4) [Giorgione was so-called because of his size] excludes 'someone' from that position, and rightly;

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[32] See above, pp. 238-241.

[33] See Quine, Word and Object, p. 146.

'Someone was so-called because of his size' is nonsense."[34] Quine never considers sentences like ''someone' has seven letters', but the sentence surely makes sense.

An academic point here concerns the grounds there are for denying that 'Someone was so-called because of his size' makes sense. On the model of the original 'Giorgione' sentence, if this sentence has a meaning at all, it must mean what 'Someone was called 'someone' because of his size' means. And this, while false, makes sense. It could even be true if we imagine some implausible circumstances and an imaginative namer with a sense of humor. On what grounds, then, can we call the sentence in question nonsense and still affirm the meaningfulness of the following sentences?

Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.
Giorgione was so-called because of his size.
Giorgione was called 'Someone' because of his size.
Someone was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.
Someone was called 'Someone' because of his size.

Actually, there might be some grammatical restrictions on the contained terms (e.g., that they must be definite referring terms) that could block the necessary transformation from going through in this case, but I do not know that there are any nor do I see any reason why there must be.

Returning to the issue that chiefly concerns us here, what can we say about the position of indefinite terms when inserted into positions which can be either purely referential or not when filled with definite referring terms? In general, when there is a question

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[34] Ibid., p. 153.

about the referential status of a position, we must answer with respect to the definite term that fills it. When the position contains an indefinite term, we cannot test for substitutivity of identicals because the indefinite term does not refer to anything. In our previously considered examples, this was all right for there was no question about the positions' status. Here, though, there is. We cannot just look at the status of the position when it is filled with a singular referring term to get an answer, for we can get either answer. And there is, as yet anyway, no reason to take either one over the other.

Quine makes an interesting point[35] when he argues that the opaque treatment of a sentence makes the truth value of that sentence depend upon what epithet is used to designate the sought person, and that such a distinction is inapplicable where the sought person is not designated. This is true, but it does not go far enough; transparency is just the other side of the coin. If the test for opacity is inapplicable, then so is the test (it is the same test) for transparency. Quine seems to be arguing from the inapplicability of one side of his distinction to the correctness of applying the expression for the other side. It is somewhat like arguing that since truth is inapplicable to questions, all questions are false. In fact, the whole concept of truth value is inapplicable to questions.

Here is another, fuller, analogy. Suppose we call a house 'happy' if and only if the people who occupy it are happy. Suppose

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[35] Ibid., p. 146.

also that we know that no matter which persons occupy a house, they will be happy if the house has a large family room. Suppose finally that anyone occupying the house will be unhappy if the house has a small family room. If a house has a medium-sized family room, the people may be either happy or not. Now we consider what to say about a house which is stocked not with people but only with inanimate objects. So long as we are dealing with houses which contain either large or small family rooms, we can make sense of calling empty houses happy or unhappy. But when we consider houses with medium-sized family rooms, we need some sort of test; such houses can be either happy or unhappy. But there is no such test available to us. Given the way we have set things up, it makes no sense to call such houses happy or unhappy. We were able to extend the original concept of a happy house to apply to some unoccupied houses, but not for those with medium-sized family rooms.

In order to speak coherently of indefinite terms as being in purely referential position, then, Quine needs to characterize purely referential positions independently of what we can do with definite terms when they occur in these positions.

Quine does put forth what we may call the "existential generalization test" for referential position, which depends upon variables occupying positions rather than definite terms.[36] According to this criterion, one cannot quantify into an opaque construction. Consequently, if in a given case we <u>can</u> quantify into a construction, then

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[36] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 166.

that construction must be transparent, and the position a purely referential one. This provides us with a test of something, all right, but it cannot be a test for a purely referential position. The problem still remains that pure reference has been defined in terms of positions' containing definite terms, whether we accept the definition of (a-c) or one using substitutivity. So long as the original notion is defined in this way, no number of additional tests can help unless we take the further step of incorporating the tests into a broader definition of a purely referential position or unless we have some argument to link the new tests to the original notion. I do not deny that what the substitutivity test and the existential generalization test pick out are important nor that what they pick out are unrelated; but only that they both pick out purely referential positions as previously understood. Neither do I wish to deny that when once we understand the relationship between substitutivity and the existential generalization test, it might prove very valuable to reformulate the concept of a purely referential position. It appears that Quine does not see things in this light. At any rate, he extends the concept of a purely referential position to positions containing indefinite terms some time before offering the existential generalization test, and this alternative test purports to explain the same phenomenon of referential position from "the point of view of variables." There is no hint that the notion itself is being changed or enriched in any way.

Perhaps one explanation of why Quine thinks he can always legitimately speak of indefinite terms occurring in purely referential

position can be found in his habit of speaking of transparent and opaque senses of 'believe' or 'look for'. Such talk can be harmless enough when seen in the right light, but it could seduce one into believing that these verbs can have either "sense" (as a part of their meanings), regardless of what sorts of terms follow in their wake. What must be remembered is that the only sense given to "the transparent sense of 'looking for'" is in terms of whether or not the terms denoting its objects have pure reference.

Perhaps another contributing factor is the lack of a term to apply to all and only those modes of containment which can be taken to be either transparent or opaque. With such a term at hand, it would have been easier to notice that opacity and transparency do not properly apply to modes of containment when their positions are not filled with definite terms. For we would have the new term to continue to apply to modes of containment which do not contain definite terms, and we might not feel the need to insist that every instance of a mode of containment be either transparent or opaque.

So far, then, I have argued that Quine's attempt to speak derivatively of indefinite terms occurring in referential or non-referential positions will not work if we focus our attention on some property of the positions themselves. This is so because the status of some positions is variable, depending entirely upon the role or roles of the definite terms occurring in the position. If we want to formulate some derivative sense of referential and nonreferential position for indefinite terms, and we want this derivative notion to parallel the original, then it seems that we will either

have to look at the role played by the indefinite terms themselves in such positions or else devise a new way of involving definite referring terms in the positions. I propose to formulate a distinction for occurrences of indefinite terms that will parallel the referential/nonreferential distinction for definite terms. It surely involves the second alternative I have just suggested; I am uncertain whether the distinction also marks a difference in the roles played by indefinite terms themselves.

Suppose that we say that an indefinite term occurs in purely referential position when, for any definite term that makes the sentence true when substituted for the indefinite term, substitutivity of identicals will hold for that term. Another way of putting this is to say that an indefinite term occurs in purely referential position if we can answer the invited question "Who?" or "Which one?" correctly by providing any term which designates the proper object. This kind of approach is hinted at by Quine's treatment of 'The commissioner is looking for someone',[37] in the course of which he argues that 'someone' must occur in referential position. Quine's view here seems to be that we can always answer the question "Who is the commissioner looking for?" by citing either the chairman of the hospital board or the dean. But is this correct? Instead of answering the question "Who?" with "The chairman of the hospital board, i.e., the dean" as Quine does, why not answer "The chairman of the hospital board, whoever he may be"? If this latter answer is a genuine

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[37] Ibid., p. 146.

alternative possibility, then it seems that substituting 'the dean' for 'someone' might not yield a true sentence.

In fact, Quine is committed to recognizing that the answer to "Who?" in our present example need not be "The chairman of the hospital board, i.e., the dean." Let me explain why this is so by presenting an example. Suppose I experience some administrative difficulty and that I am directed to the dean for relief. It is now true that I am looking for the dean. But it can still be false, Quine admits, that I am looking for the chairman of the hospital board, even though the dean=the chairman. But it follows from the fact that I am looking for the dean that I am looking for someone. Given that it is false that I am looking for the chairman, then it must also be wrong in this case to answer the question "Who am I looking for?" with "The chairman." The point is that if 'I am looking for someone' is true by virtue of the truth of 'I am looking for the dean' (taken opaquely), then we cease to be free to answer "Who?" by supplying just any term with the correct reference.

This seems to give us a clear-cut distinction. The use of 'someone' invites the question "Who?" Sometimes 'someone' occurs in a position such that the correctness of the answer to the question depends only upon the person designated. Then we say that the position is purely referential. When the answer to the question depends upon the term used to designate the person, we can say that the position is not purely referential.

There is one problem that arises with this way of seeing things. I have tried to develop this criterion for distinguishing the referential

status of positions containing indefinite terms from a hint of Quine's concerning the question "Who?" We must recognize, though, that there are uses of the term 'someone' that clearly do not invite this question. Consider the sentence 'Everyone loves someone' in the only sense in which this might be true. Clearly to ask who it is that everyone loves would be to make a very stale joke. But as we have seen, the question "Who?" is often relevant. These two different uses of 'someone' can lead to ambiguity, as in (1) I believe that someone is a spy, and (2) The commissioner is looking for someone. The intent of (1) can be either merely that I believe that there are spies or that I believe of an individual that he is a spy. Only in the latter case can we reasonably ask "Who?" "Who?" by itself implies that there is more information to be drawn out, whereas in this first, weak, sense nothing is being withheld. The question asks for a definite term to specify the particular objects in question. But on the weak interpretation of (1), the speaker does not imply that he knows of any particular objects that make his claim true. On the stronger interpretation of (1), however, he does, and it is entirely appropriate for us to inquire into the identity of the object.[38] As for (2), the commissioner could be looking for the dean or he might be stranded on a desert island searching for inhabitants.

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[38]Quine's own treatment of indefinite singular terms supports this. He calls them "dummy singular terms." They are "dummy" because they do not carry a presumption of reference to some one object distinguished from its fellows. To ask the question "Who?" is to ask for such distinction to be provided. It asks for the dummy term to be replaced by a definite referring term. See Quine, Word and Object, section 23.

This ambiguity is ambiguity of scope,[39] though it sometimes takes some fancy paraphrasing to make this clear.[40]

I said earlier that Quine holds that indefinite singular terms require referential position. This is not quite right. Where the question "Who?" is relevant, he holds that the position must be referential. But where the question is not relevant, it turns out that Quine believes that we are free to take the position as either referential or not.[41] The question now arises: what difference does it make how we take such positions? Originally, taking one or the other option committed us either to allowing to to disallowing substitutivity for the contained definite terms. I have suggested that for indefinite terms the decision commits us either to rejecting or to accepting certain answers to the question "Who?" It is unclear what difference is made whether we count these positions as referential or not when the question "Who?" is irrelevant. Quine does not claim that there is any ambiguity left once we have decided that the scope is such that the question "Who?" is irrelevant. He says that such sentences make sense "either way," i.e., referentially or not, but these ways are not individuated for us. We do not know what it is to take such a sentence in one way as opposed to the other.

It could be that Quine's willingness to take them "either way" is a reflection not so much of a genuine option, but of an

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[39] See Ibid., section 29.

[40] See Ibid., section 32.

[41] Ibid., p. 147.

indifference born of irrelevance. The following reflections perhaps provide some motivation for this suggestion. Opacity is a vagary of reference, which is a relation between words and objects. The substitutivity criterion specifically presupposed the referring relationship between words and objects. Since indefinite terms do not refer, we had to extend the notion of a purely referential position for them, but we could do this since by reference to the truth values of sentences we could relate indefinite terms to definite referring terms (i.e., relating 'someone' to those definite referring terms which made the sentence true when substituted for 'someone'), thus indirectly linking indefinite terms with objects. But we do not have even this weaker link to objects when we are considering the "non-Who?" uses of 'someone'. The relationship between these words and objects is much weaker, and the realization that with such examples we are suddenly much further away from paradigm cases of reference may be sufficient motivation to convince us that we need not try to relate them to the phenomenon of referential opacity.

Let me close this rather lengthy section by illustrating its conclusions using another familiar example. Suppose it is true that Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline. Whether we give this an opaque or transparent reading, it will remain true that Tom believes that someone denounced Catiline. Resolving the ambiguity of scope in this last formulation gives us these two versions:

(a) Tom believes th + there is a denouncer of Catiline, and

(b) Tom believes that someone denounced Catiline,

where we now disassociate from (b) the possible interpretation made

explicit in (a). (B) remains ambiguous. Using Quine's method of resolution, let us have (b) unambiguously express the opaque reading and use

(c) Someone is such that Tom believes him to have denounced Catiline

to express the transparent version. For reasons paralleling the 'I believe that there are spies' example, "Who?" is not an appropriate response to (a), though it is for (b) and (c). For (b) we answer "Cicero, whoever he may be," and for (c) we can answer "Cicero, i.e., Tully." By this, I mean that for (c) we can answer "Who?" using any term that refers to the proper individual.

Appending 'whoever he may be' and 'i.e., Tully' to our answer is a pretty rough way to distinguish these answers. Another way of seeing both that the answers are different and how they differ is in the following way. If we give a simple one word reply "Cicero," we are for (b) using 'Cicero' in nonreferential position and for (c) using it in referential position. To see this we need only reflect that the 'Cicero' of our one word reply does not occur in isolation; it is only for the sake of convenience that we have dropped the context 'Tom believes that _____ denounced Catiline' from around our shortened reply. And we know that 'Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline' has two interpretations depending upon how we interpret the role of 'Cicero'. No wonder, then, that the answer to "Who?" has two different interpretations.

This being so seems evidence enough that (b) and (c) in themselves do constitute distinct interpretations. Because we answered

"Who?" by replacing 'someone' with a term, and the correctness of our answer for (c) depends only upon the referent of the term and for (b) upon the form of the term as well, it seems reasonable to say that the original distinction between purely and not purely referential positions is still with us, but that, contra Quine, indefinite terms can occur in either sort.

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