MORALITY, MORAL COGNITION, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE:

A CRITICAL, HUMANIST REVIEW

by

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PREFACE: REFLEXIVE STATEMENT AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this thesis has been a long journey. Early in the American Culture Program, I took on a sociological orientation. My curiosity about the relation of the Protestant ethic and social Darwinism to modern ideology led me to think about a sociology of knowledge capable of judging the material consistency of popular knowledge. My composition has been contemporaneous with my change from lawyer to teacher. For twelve years, I counselled and represented poor people, seeing the way "the system" treats those with the least resources for protecting themselves or fighting back, day after day. It became clearer to me that the problems of poor people were not 'legal' but political and I was directly forbidden from assisting them to do precisely what was needed to marshall and express their power politically. I wanted to understand why empowerment was so distant and elusive. The clients who expressed (and with whom I shared) cynicism about "the system" often mixed in religion when waxing philosophical. I learned much about the politics of poverty and powerlessness from those who shared their ideas and from those who only shared their troubles, but I still have much to learn.

My ambivalence as a practitioner of law was reflected in avoidance of its express themes throughout my master's studies, which teaching may grant me the opportunity to remedy. My experience could not, however, have failed to influence this work. Perhaps it was, too, the scrupulousness of legal research which impelled my attempt to seek all sources reasonably available to me and to diligently cite all which impressed me as bearing on some aspect of my subject.

This work proceeded symbiotically with my studies toward certification

as a secondary teacher along with review of my teaching major, mathematics. My familiarity with Freire and Giroux derived from my earlier participation in the Michigan Progressive Educators' Network. PEN deepened my appreciation of the mission of education and of my spouse's work as an educator. As a student of pedagogy, I encountered the humanist theories of Dewey, Maslow, Rogers and others, and the schemas of Piaget and Kohlberg which imparted a unifying moment to my writing. While my research surpassed the survey in my education and psychology courses, I am thankful for the sympathetic introduction to humanist pedagogy provided, especially by Dr. Kenneth Wahl of Saginaw Valley State College.

My immersion in social theory enabled me to move on a theoretical level into the realm of pedadogy, to embrace the progressive humanism which reemerges periodically there, expressing the value of human development and autonomy and the relationship of critical, independent reasoning to learning. This sense of coherence helped me weather the certification curriculum, which failed to address the content of teaching in a critical way, while it has provided substantial practical exercise in the field.

My discovery of Piaget's work, **Structuralism** came late in my writing. The required psychology courses had plunged from Piaget into Kohlberg and a diffuse, confused and self-contradictory treatment of moral development and values. Around the same time, I was discovering that critical theory had made inroads into the fields of education and cognitive psychology. The progression from Kant to Durkheim, to Piaget, to Kohlberg had its complement of a Marxist hermeneutics - but scarcely a synthesis relating the individual to history. I regretted, late in the work, my slim familiarity with Hegel. I have an intuitive sense of what he seems to be about, in materialist terms, that is, an asymptotic approach to 'truth' which is made

by the very agency that truth concerns, human existence. The theorist of Marxist humanism, Raya Dunayevskaya, who died this June, had insight into the radical self-transcendence of Hegel's thought. Piaget, Marx and Hegel seem involved in a non-Euclidean dance which challenges philosophy and science to a supple, dialectical epistemology of self-becoming humankind. I cannot pretend to present such a human science here, only to ponder its existence as a moral force, indicating some strands in the dialectical synthesis.

It is my feeling that my thesis should serve as a critical review of sources interpreted or culled to the purposes of a synthesis. There is a measure of fortitude to be gained from the crossing of boundaries, whether disciplinary, temporal, intellectual, political, or linguistic; and an explicit record of the composition of any resulting synthesis elaborates nerve connections toward enlightenment.

A single structure encompassing the dominant world system and individual cognitive development became clearer to me as I proceeded. The work is a beginning. There is much left to be done. I did not treat morality on an intimate level, treating the potent moral feelings, for example, of those who protest against nuclear weapons or against US aggression in the third world. The moral reasoning on the part of activists needs to be examined in detail and viewed in its moral battle with the ruling elite - or in its isolation, as the case may be. Researchers such as Milton Rokeach, Robert Coles and Kenneth Koniston made earnest efforts to understand but worked without a scientific schema for value-based moral judgment and without a dialectical method in which to identify the conflicts in which activists struggle; or to identify the opposed, immoral agents, from corporate boards to 'pacification' by napalm and assassination, to blood on the streets of Chicago and red files held by 'private' thought police.

In a nation where dialectical understanding is so pervasively blocked, it is important to begin connecting the cognitive roots of progressive social activism and the broad national sentiment and commitment to charity, organizations to assist victims of disease and disaster, and so on. The sincere, moral endeavors of a plurality of Americans are related in a complex way to the politics they, by and large, scrupulously avoid. The same person who (unknowingly influenced by decades of progressive politics and dialogue on the politics of the personal) is an advocate for self-determination on the part of handicapped persons may express moralistic outrage at the struggle of nonheterosexuals for civil rights, at demands for affirmative action, or at the defiance of non-white, non-Christian peoples around the globe, denouncing "US imperialism" for denying them self-determination. The left must come to grips with the cognitive dimension of such contradictions. My thesis leads to the empirical premise, rarely made, that moral judgments may indeed be made on rational terms; that we need not deal perennially in relatives. Once this premise is accepted within the semiotic I have advanced, even if disagreement with it is merely bracketted, investigation can proceed toward understanding how resistance, compassion, powerlessness, depoliticization, <u>ressentiment</u>, ideology and dysinformation, love, and work interact within a coherent structure, in the environment of an immoral social system.

Anti-systemic thinkers scarcely emerge unscathed. One consequence of living in bourgeois America, conscious of the utter moral duplicity of dominant society in terms not merely of personal hypocrisy, but of the brutal, bullying force wielded around the world by the fortress state of capitalism, is the tension of residing outside the psycho-social norm of bourgeois standards, relations, language, emotions, ambitions, and general self-definition. Some neo-Freudians come close to stating the problematic of

such an existence in a society which is schizophrenic - and which, given the commodification of daily life, formally distorts those who do not adjust to the schizophrenic norm. A total view of morality is needed to reconstruct a perspective from which the human dimensions persisting in our society and world society can be appreciated, fostered, and developed onto higher cognitive-moral levels.

My primary acknowledgment is owed to Joan Marie Sabourin, who encouraged me to begin my studies for a master's degree. She knew, as I was rediscovering, that my dearest endeavor involved learning and writing and had an inkling about my need for a closer, more honest connection to intellectual discovery and expression than the law provided. Her criticism of my writing was always apropos. Unfortunately, her clarity and practical effectiveness as a teacher have not pierced my mode of composition, though her example, working with minority and non-traditional students in the areas of chemistry and mathematics, lights my course toward becoming a teacher. Her endurance of my evenings as a pupil and scholar and of long hours stolen to construct this position paper culminating my studies is a mark of devotion and nurture without which this thesis could not have been realized. The arrival of our son, Paul Benjamin, also deepened my perspective, while casting turbulent winds in the path of this work.

The theme of religion deserves more words, relevant to its centrality in this thesis. For me, a nonbelieving jew, religion was a distant theme. Yet its discourse was visible to me among local activists, Domincan sisters akin in outlook to the 'subversive' Maryknolls and Jesuits whose exchange with Latin American liberation theology has partaken of historical moment, challenging the righteousness of the United States. It was first with unease and then growing attraction for the science of social analysis that I entered

Dr. Wilfred Marston's course on religion in America.

It is Dr. Maxine Baca Zinn to whom I am most indebted for my progress through this work. Her understanding and encouragement have accompanied me past the various obstacles, including my turgid composition. Her listening and concise guidance are responsible for what clarity, purpose and order are visible here, while any failures to communicate are mine.

All of the American Culture faculty have had a part in this work. Dr. William Meyer's vision of the United States in world perspective as well as his evocation of American political philosophy enabled a broadened inquiry on my part. Dr. Nora Faires' vibrant synthesis of social history, Dr. Gregory Water's compassionate treatment of literary America, and Dr. Kenneth West's infectious love of historical understanding and of teaching itself; Dr. Zinn's critical scientific discipline and Dr. Marston's portrayal of the human endeavor of sociology had a deep impression on me, affirming the meaningfulness of social science and theoretical inquiry.

In addition to the above persons, I would like to thank Sandra Reist, who introduced me to C. Wright Mills; Rabbi Sherwin Wine, who opened my understanding to humanist thought; Alfred McClung Lee, who introduced me to humanist sociology; Harold Norris, who helped maintain a critical view of the law; Maria Elena Castellanos, who helped sharpen my appreciation of dialectics; Geraldine Tubbs, who deepened my understanding of poverty in America; ACTION, the Winnebago, Santee Sioux and Omaha Tribes of Nebraska, the Legal Services Corporation, the Saginaw Welfare Rights Organization, and many individuals, who gave me the opportunity to examine social conflict at close range, Peter Haidu, for helping me coallesce a functional understanding of semiotics; and Sr. Ardeth Platte and Sr. Carol Gilbert, for an enhanced view of local politics and social justice activism.

CHAPTER 1: A CRITICAL, HUMANIST VIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

Morality is the understanding of right and wrong conduct consistent with basic human values. It embodies the collective human interest in pursuing what is right rather than what is wrong. The general purpose of my thesis is to develop a critical epistemology of morality within the perspective of global society. It is not a particular morality but a universal one which I shall examine. Humankind is its subject and object and the vision of a better world is its motive. This purpose includes premises, issues and approaches which I will describe presently, along with the organization of my thesis and its dialectical method.

My conclusion, stated as a semiotics of knowledge about society, is that what can be scientifically identified as a universal morality is a sphere of reasoning logically, psychologically, and politically connected to critical understanding of the world. This sphere, closed under consistency-maintaining formal, dialectical operations, co-exists, in conflict, with its logical complement. The latter consists of ideological production, whose 'closure' can only be assured by contradictions maintained by myth connected to global domination by ruling classes or agencies. These forms of social 'knowledge' may be viewed from polar vantages. For instance, universal moral reasoning may be seen as 'emancipating' or (covertly in terms of its imposition upon the primacy of property) 'totalitarian'; as 'revolutionary', or 'subversive'. The complementary range may be seen as "false consciousness" and "systemic immorality" or as 'nature' and 'righteousness', among numerous equivalents. Within the complementary knowledge set, there is a directed attack upon what I have labelled universal morality or moral reasoning, with the aim of preventing the latter's spread or general acceptance among the populace. One

objective of morality may be seen as unveiling the immorality of or contradictions within the other forms of social 'knowledge'. This formula might be articulated in the opposite direction, for the entire field is mobilized by a struggle for legitimacy, leading to the opposite terms in which what I label morality and its complement (itself arrogating the name, 'morality') are identified. There is, I will show, a dominant global structure which depends upon potent ideological functions for its perpetuation and claim to epistemological, moral, and political legitimacy. Seen from the perspective of this ruling structure, the phenomena which I treat in this thesis as moral are 'subversive.' The directed opposition to what I treat as universally principled moral dissent is one factor which may be comprehended from either side, although with diametrically opposed meaning, by 'anti-communism'. (I use a lower-case 'c' to expand the concept modernly beyond identification with a particular political entity.) Since I write from the viewpoint of a US citizen, with a focus on the insertion of this nation in the global system, another term offers itself for a similar connotation. The connection of 'Americanism' with 'anti-communism', in the fabric of ideological struggle for a legitimated knowledge about the world, presents the hypothesis of a civil religion, contending with what, in my own point of view, is a morality of social change for human liberation. Thus, there is a symmetric structure of relations between contending forms of social understanding and the cognate field of popular cosmology or totalizing understanding comprising religion.

The thesis is divided into this introductory chapter and three others corresponding to three phases or aspects of my argument, which, according to the dialectical method I employ, are not rigidly confined to these chapters. The first, treated principally in chapter two, is a description of the moral structure in which contemporary social relations are defined on the largest

possible scale, that of a dominant, global political-economic system. The second aspect, treated principally in chapter three, is the social psychology of moral reasoning, based upon cognitivist concepts of individual development, and its relationship to the semiotics of social understanding discussed above. The third aspect, treated implicitly throughout and in chapter four as a synthesis of moral human agency, is the politics of moral understanding including the judgment of political-economic orientation in respect to the objects of a universal, principled morality.

The following points explain my premises and objectives in more detail, along with a demonstration of the dialectical method, which is treated more explicitly in chapters two and three. Since this method involves each element of exposition in relation to the whole, viewing the dynamic interpenetration of, and contradictions between the parts of an organic structure, my treatment will follow a dialogical course, juxtaposing historical contradictions, engaging opposing interpretations, and portraying the internal relations of my subject from different perspectives.

1. Morality is a dimension of knowledge about the social world. To ask what morality is, what it means about the world, and how it interacts with social structure is to mediate between popular and scientific understanding. My thesis is human-centered, reflexive, and critical in perspective and dialectical in method, in the manner of humanist sociology.

Humanist sociology may be defined by its critical view of sociological knowledge, in pursuit of the integrity of human knowing. Thus, a humanist sociologist writes, "sociological analysis inevitably implies values." This being so,

sociology ought to conceive of itself as a critical

> discipline. . . . a discipline which explicitly searches for truth in the value realm with regard to social issues. . . . a discipline which self-consciously seeks to understand what is the right thing to do with regard to social issues. . . .
>
> The critical sociologist . . . seeks truth in both realms of fact and value. In doing so, sociologists must seek to become free of social distortions of truth. . . . they must free themselves from self-deception. Sociology is critique of society, [which] involves the pursuit of self-awareness (McKelvey 1984: 287-88).

Furthermore, "critical sociology . . . seeks to transform" society in the direction of what it understands to be right. Since sociology should culminate in political action, and since the latter, in turn, enhances understanding, "there is a dialectical relation between critical theory and political action" (McKelvey 1984: 288-89).

Humanist sociology may also be defined in terms of its human-centered quality or focus on the value of human life and self-determination. As McKelvey summarizes other humanists, "humanist sociology is a sociology committed to uplifting the human condition"; and "humanist sociologists participate in the construction of a just social order through social and political action . . . an important dimension" of which is "consciousness raising, for the consciousness of people must be transformed if they are to see through the ideologies which give legitimation to existing injustices" (1984: 298). As Alfred McClung Lee writes in a definitive work on humanist sociology,

> the great challenge of social science is the development and wide dissemination of social wisdom and social-action techniques that will enable more and more people to participate in the control and guidance of their groups and their society. In meeting this challenge, social science stimulates and nurtures the fuller development of individual potential (1973: 6).

2. Morality is a diffuse phenomenon. If it is to be

identified with any notion of a social institution, the latter would be the historical structure of human understanding itself. However, for historical evidence, I have chosen religion as a cognate object of study. Religion provides a popular language for understanding the world and partakes in moral dialogue as fully and autonomously as any social institution. Therefore, in chapter two, I treat the interpenetration of religious and moral thought and the political moment of each amid the global foundations of social conflict.

3. To comprehend morality as a dimension of social structure, I explore in chapter two the meaning of society in the broadest terms possible, in reference to a world system. Morality can then be considered in not only ideological but material reference to all humankind and history, making the fullest use of morality as a form of knowledge about the world.

4. Since social conflict determines ideologies and affects the intersubjectivity of social beings, seeing morality in the context of ideological discourse including repressive religion, civil religion, patriotic nationalism, individualism, alienation and the commodification displacing human values, the Protestant ethic, and anti-communism is central to my approach. Various ideologies claim for themselves moral righteousness as well as objective truth. The universal morality which I postulate to be consistent with an accurate, value-laden understanding of the world is inescapably a participant in the battle for political-economic control and moral legitimacy, raging as violently as ever in today's world between a dominant elite and the historical movement for popular self-determination.

5. I seek an interpretation of the common identification of moral concerns consistent with a macrostructural perspective. Rather than a taxonomy of moral concerns appropriate in a micro-analysis, I want to relate fundamental principles of morality to the pursuit of moral aims at any level. It is absurd to focus on 'private' concerns, however, and ignore the gross moral anatomy of global society, a focus characteristic of ideological obfuscation of systemic realities. To connect the individual with society and relate the human proportions of morality in social structure, I will investigate in chapter three the normative capacity to make moral sense of the world and its cognitive development, as a dependent variable of social structure.

6. My interpretation and synthesis follows the express intellectual lineage from Kant to Durkheim, to Piaget, to Kohlberg, adding the historical science of Marx and its contemporary development in critical theory, particularly represented by Broughton. Kant articulated universal moral principles. Durkheim conceived of society and its moral dimension as sui generis, an organic commonweal beyond a mere collection of individuals. Piaget related cognitive development and realization of rational autonomy to higher moral thinking. Kohlberg further developed the structure of moral development and suggested the political relevance of moral reasoning, in particular of principled autonomy and social justice at the highest stage of moral judgment. Marx implicitly employs universal moral values as the measure of social conditions and productive relations. Broughton, among others searching for a science of human growth and social conflict through the radical remaking of moral-political signification, stresses the

threshold of liberation from class domination suggested by Kohlberg's flawed theory and by other developments in the theory of knowledge.

7. Culminating in chapter four, my purpose is to show that morality, historically and consistently interpreted, reveals a critical, politically significant understanding of the world and measure of it in terms of human welfare. Insofar as systemically-based oppression conflicts with human values, morality, as social knowledge, is in conflict with the dominant order, from which it motivates change. Cognitive-moral development is affected by the social environment and its structured inequality, to which autonomous, principled moral judgment, in turn, presents a political threat. The threat of collectively achieved, higher moral development is perceived by the elite ruling an immoral social order. Differential or retarded moral development in society may be attributed as an effect of countervailing ideologies and 'moralities', calculated to suppress not only dissent itself but the very development of human potential to comprehend the factual and moral bases for dissent and political resistance. Ironically, this schema is most effective at the political-economic center of the global imperialist system, enabling the ruling elite to concentrate its wealth and power as well as the resources of the central population upon world domination.

8. Science is not "value-free." It reveals systemic oppression of the world's peoples. Thus, Marx wrote, the point is not merely to understand but to change the prevailing system which treats the many as ends of the few, denying the basic value of

human beings as ends in themselves. I avoided the term, "sociology of knowledge," because institutional social science often makes this pursuit into a psychologizing away of critical social knowledge and into an apology for the status quo. My purposes are, rather, of the nature of Marx's and Engels' **German ideology** (1970), Mills' **Sociological imagination** (1959), or Gouldner's **Coming crisis of western sociology** (1970), reflexively transforming the sociology of knowledge into the sociology of sociology, uniting investigator with the collective interest of present and future humankind.

Morality as dialectical knowledge of world society.

My pursuit of morality spans philosophy, politics and economy, psychology, sociology, history, and "genetic epistemology" (Piaget 1967: v; Mischel 1971). My approach is more historical than philosophical, although it has sources in German philosophy, and more sociological than psychological, although it deals with cognitive development. Interpretive theory mediating between human values and world society defines my discipline. My sources include: Marxism; semiotics; feminism and social exegesis in the voices of other oppressed groups; humanist enclaves within the sciences; and liberation pedagogy and theology.

Dialectics involves an intellectual sensibility to contradictions; a fullness in interpreting history and culture in light of the dynamics of human possibility and social change (Marcuse 1960). For instance, contradictions germane to my investigation fail to be noted in undialectical

attempts to analyze the effect of social environment upon cognitive and moral development:

> People in "primitive" cultures rarely develop formal operations, though they develop through the Piagetan states up to formal operations in the manner of other children. This is to be expected given their very concrete life. What is there in primitive environments to encourage the development of formal operations? What adaptations are demanded by the physical and social environment? According to Kohlberg (Kohlberg and Mayer 1972 [Development of the aim of education, Harvard Educational Review 42, No. 4, November]) only one half of the American adult population fully develop formal operations and only 5 percent attain the highest stages of moral thought (Wadsworth 1978: 116).

Due to their failure to reason dialectically, neither the author nor Kohlberg himself (to my knowledge) perceives the latent issues obscured by the presumption that cultures are in all respects either primitive or advanced. They fail to ask in structural terms why so few Americans reach Kohlberg's highest, "post-conventional" stages of moral reasoning. And they fail to admit the reality of moral conflict in the material world into their inquiry about moral development. Thus, they miss the issues involved in asking, as I do in this thesis, whether American society is a "primitive" environment which does not induce (or which demands the absence of) substantial attainment of the highest stages of either cognitive development or moral thought. Thinking at Kohlberg's stage five may be "much more salient" in the US than (roughly thrice that) in Mexico or Taiwan, among "middle-class urban boys" and more prevalent than moral thinking measured by express, rational ideas in two "isolated" communities in Turkey and Yucatan (Kohlberg and Gilligan 1972: 162-3). However, we lack comparative data on structures of moral reasoning between and within developed and developing first and second world societies. I will consider structural factors in modern society affecting the quality of moral development, for which cognitive development is a necessary but not a sufficient condition (Kohlberg and Gilligan 1972: 164). I hope to establish a basis for studies of the differentials between

classes of people within the same social environment.

Dialectical reasoning and dialogical inquiry are essential for openness to the collective becoming of human understanding, to describe human reality, past, present, and future. She or he who would understand is part of what is to be understood. There is a confluence of signification about the historical momentum of human realization, akin to what Hegel called "the self-thinking idea" (Dunayevskaya 1973: 4). Marx, a moral seer, analyzed the world, stressing change toward human emancipation. He identified human misery with the struggle between its conditioning and overcoming, integrating theory and practice and connecting the 'is' with the 'ought'. Marx reconciled Hegel to the liberation of humankind from alienation from its human ends by an exploitative social system.

How are knowledge, moral consciousness and reasoning, and the politics of a community for human liberation related? Humanist sociology is felicitous: we seekers of understanding are ourselves evidence of human situation, desire, and will, limitation and potential. Seeking knowledge, we embody an aim which is analogous to and allied with the general human purpose of understanding the world. Religion evinces people's basic need to explain the world of which they are part. It is knowledge which informs human will, empowers human passions and virtues and enables the development of a working community. It is also knowledge which, as does religion sometimes, helps discern and define human ends and leads toward self-determination, individually and collectively. The negation of dialectical understanding underscores the historical parallel between understanding and liberation: most knowledge which informs human action is of a kind which does not recognize its *own* quality. Law, anti-communism, capitalist economic moralism, and ethnocentrism are forms of "false-consciousness", proceeding without critical self-knowledge.

In chapter two, I explore the meanings of society and world structure for a science of morality. An adequate notion of the social totality is necessary, to identify moral questions. The argument, idealistically and thus insolubly articulated by liberals and conservatives, between "freedom of the individual" and the "social collective" or, alternatively, between 'liberty' and 'equality' is a dilemma posed by the ideologically conditioned want of an epistemological basis for an adequate moral dimension. The possibility of a humanist science of society goes hand in hand with the possibility of identifying responsible human behaviors and expanding the scope of moral judgment, even when there seem to be insurmountable problems in linking definable institutions with individual behavior. At the center of world capitalism,

> The American emphasis on individual rights and freedom appears to have had high cost - cultural blindness to the significance of social structure and the dynamics of that structure (de Lone 1979: 77).

As de Lone notes, in particular for the theory of child development, that blindness has an arresting effect on social science. The blindness he describes is a deficit of moral structure, expressed in the ideological superstructure of American society. The meaning of an "emphasis on individual rights and freedom" must be sought in the uses of myth and ideology in the United States. The obscurity of society in our national consciousness is related to the substitution of the myth of the nonexistence of conflict for the teaching of history. Collective human agency in politics is a taboo in American education (Holzman 1986).

When the evidence of moral outrage and response is accounted for, we recognize an uncontrovertible moral voice which need not be attired in the intellectual systems of ethics or developmental psychology. The material concerns of American literature, from Melville to William Burroughs; the outcry of religious observers of industrial society; the hortatory of

'revolutionary' newspapers and the cooler irony of independent investigative reporting, among diverse pockets of resistance to the ruling order, appeal to what Norma Haan calls "An interactional morality of everyday life" (1983).

But popular morality is suppressed, as literature exemplifies. Called cynical by orthodox literary critics, Mark Twain expounded a passionate critique of the dominant social order, including the imperialism practiced by industrial nations among non-white peoples. Due to the discrediting of radical criticism in the US, the poignant messages of a principal writer are generally unacknowledged and his work is misinterpreted (Foner 1966). Literary discourse abstracted from history perpetuates the lie of the apolitical nature of art. Honestly presented, the tradition of writing against the grain incurs anti-communist fury, demanding that our heritage be excused with alibis of individual and therefore tolerable deviance, from romantic retreat to misanthropic gloom; that students be told that generations of writers profoundly concerned with the rapacity, inhumanity, and degeneration of capitalism's world were comprised of lonely artists exploring the innermost soul and the meaning of life apart from any material reality. Otherwise, the leftist sentiments of half America's literary men and women would openly contend in the inquiring minds of youth with the anti-communist cant to the effect that artistic freedom and individual yearning for free expression are synonymous with "the free enterprise system", a phrase distinguished by some state legislatures to describe required school curricula.

Moral perception has a basis in the creative recognition of social dynamics and change. Moral contemplation of change in the material world, disciplined by a dialectical vision of real life and uninhibited by allegiance to existing circumstances, is revolutionary (see Getzels and Jackson 1962: 157-9). There is a parallel, interpreted in the dichotomy

between adjustment to convention and moral vision, in the Kantian, Nietzschean conception of morality as self-overcoming (Kaufmann 1974: 213).

The connection between knowledge and interests of the human community is ignored in the positivism of American thought. Philosophy faces irrelevance in a society where rationalization is offered up as knowledge so that people may be instrumented with ideology to serve as means for others' ends. Knowledge of society is secreted by the interests which condition it. Critical theory's self-conscious social inquiry (Habermas 1971) attempts to recover an understanding of society crucial for clear perception of human ends. Seeing through illusion is particularly necessary for the political moment of moral inquiry:

> The critique of social heteronomy, of modes of social organization and of beliefs sustaining them, which subject individuals to universal regimentation by anonymous social processes, is intrinsically linked to the emancipatory intentions of theorizing activity in critical theory and has inspired the latter's studies on authority and critique of the institutions of bourgeois life. It has ultimately guided an indictment of technology and science as vehicles of a progress so irresistible and beyond the reflective control of those carried along by it, that progress appears as irresistible regression and makes communal reflection and decision about the direction of such progress impossible (Misgeld 1976: 164).

Unless social inquiry is identified with human ends, it will fail to account for the intrigue between the creation of knowledge and interests contrary to such ends. The investigation of society is not an undertaking, the good faith behind which can be taken for granted. Those who facilitate exploitation seek knowledge not for sharing but for withholding. To control other persons, it is important to maintain the world generally in ignorance, in particular, of the ways in which power is wielded in society. Joseph Scimecca makes the contrast explicit, defining humanist sociology by its "study of human freedom and of all the social obstacles which must be overcome in order to insure this freedom" and by its concern for the insurance and maximization of freedom, implicating social science directly:

> unlike traditional sociology . . . humanist sociologists seek to use the knowledge of human beings they uncover to benefit people (1981: 1-2).

Religion as an institutional sanctuary for moral reasoning.

Max Horkheimer indicated that, as a precipitate of daily life under modern capitalist rationalism, morality embodies a political moment, having "survived insofar as men are conscious that the reality to which they yield is not the right one" (1978: 38). Thus, the moral constitution of society may be gauged in terms of resistance to a dominant reality. While religion serves the existing order in some contexts (Gouldner and Peterson 1962: 50; Gouldner 1970: 135), in other contexts it holds powerful moral authority for renunciation not merely of normative values but of the worldly authority and ideology which reproduce prevalent anti-moral attitudes. Religion is a realm in which Toennies' concept of Gemeinschaft perseveres, in contrast to the rationalized order elsewhere in modern society (see Pappenheim 1959). My examination of the moral dimensions of resistance to the dominant order will concentrate on religion, excluding sites such as education, the family and the workplace.

In addition, structural differences in experience typified by categories such as gender (Dinnerstein 1976; Gilligan 1982; 1983) and 'race' (Baldwin 1963) embody a resistant dialectics of moral cognition.

Morality, humankind, and the global social system.

The largest context of an inquiry about morality is a concern seldom stated in empirical research, that of making the world of humankind a better one, a world where the universal realization of human potential, love,

community, and self-determination is primary, premised in a social structure exhibiting these values. Embodying equity in a dynamically human dimension, such a society would be axiomatically just and democratic. It is difficult to find a more elegant statement for its fundamental principle than the "practical imperative" in Kant's Metaphysics of morals to "act so that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only" (Kant 1959: 47; Meyer 1972: 158). This principle, implicit in Marx's analysis of history and class struggle, informs the treatment of morality by classical and modern social science represented by the work of Durkheim, Piaget, and Kohlberg. I will adopt the generalized formula that all persons be treated as ends in themselves, never as means to an end, as the kernel of principled, universal morality. (Indebtedness to Kant's formulation of a rational, meta-ethical standard does not imply agreement with the idealist context of his moral philosophy. See Dewey, 1942.)

The study of morality demands an understanding of society in the broadest terms possible. Mere observation of social behavior generally deemed to involve the theme of morality will not elucidate the moral structure of society. Our thoughts on morality are preemptively implicated in larger schemes which we cannot ignore.

What is essential is a historical, dynamic perspective which subsumes the fundamental insights of Durkheim but accommodates the contradictions which render idyllic any genuflection toward the basic harmony of a given society. We live in a world society, the large scale conflicts in which are more often ignored than not by social science. Sometimes a passing notice belies the systemic forces lurking beyond the expeditiously contained approach to "social problems." It is necessary to question the degree to which social relations and institutions can be said to exist in a conceptual

pyramid specified by human attributes. There is a world system which transcends the restricted notion of society as the human totality larger than its members in which the science of society was classically conceived. Social organization partakes of the character of geological formations evolving through time, particularly in those respects in which they bear seemingly inexorable power. Two examples, of many, are the system of guided missiles clustered across the Northern Hemisphere, 'assuring' "mutual destruction" and the system of global finance.

Morality and the sphere of ideology.

One use of myth in class society is the anti-communism which isolates and anathematizes the critique of the dominant class and system. Ideology functions to encode cultural messages which obscure social understanding. The evidence for this phenomenon is akin to that of classical psychoanalysis in its diagnosis of mental processes substituting coded images for a repressed reality.

For example, while there is little controversy over the fact that we live in a society which embraces a particular economic system, to wit, capitalism, speech identifying that system by name (unless used by a recognized representative of the system itself) is suspect. Knowledge of the system is private. In many cases, popular knowledge is seen as either the power to destroy or actual destruction (for example, of the effect of advertising or discrepancies in the wages or salaries of workers). Acknowledgment of the very concept of 'system' is subversive: to categorize is to mimic linguistically the freedom to change. The system postures as Nature itself. It is no mystery that Hegel, whose idealist foundation for conservatism conflicts with the force of his own exposition of dialectic, is

scarcely known in the United States: such a philosopher is bound to call up others to set him upright.

The "left Hegelian" who did so is censured in the US, his name banned from public use. Elsewhere, public discourse accommodates critical views of capitalism and acknowledges the contributions of capitalism's premier critic. In the US, a populace whose bonded mentors preside over virtual non-exposure to Marxist thought associates Karl Marx by reflex with the Evil evoked by primitivist religion. Indeed, religion intermingles with a civil religion of anti-communism. In an atmosphere of individual survival where loyalty to the existing order is a requirement applying a special burden to intellectual production such as teaching, writing or political office-holding, discretion is a measurable part of valor (Sweezy 1987; Yates 1987). Unlike the psychologist who subsumes Freud's fundamental contributions to personality theory without calling herself "a Freudian"; unlike the physicist who needn't take on Einstein's name to acknowledge his place in the development of modern science, the social scientist who goes beyond deferential mention of the central figure of Marxism; who engages in scholarship based upon Marx's work and treats the issues articulated by other thinkers whose work is based upon Marx as if those issues represented enduring concerns of human existence worthy of practical consideration is likely to be labelled a 'Marxist'. Marxist thought will not be considered in general deliberation of social options - except as evidence of a "present danger." It doesn't matter that the substance be solid or undebatable. Nor is the choice to study work habits in order to advise a corporation how to make its employees work harder a matter of 'fact'. For, far from the campus diag, the state legislature and the local board of education, revolution has been, is being, and will be made for reasons which were compellingly explained by one who refused to isolate his analysis of the world from the profound belief that it would be changed

by humankind.

The label 'Marxist' is often applied to those who provide education for political empowerment. The civil rights struggle offers potent examples. In the late 1950's the Highlander Center developed a "Citizen Education Program", later assumed by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, teaching "over 10,000 Blacks in 12 Southern states to learn to read well enough to register to vote." The response to Highlander's efforts in adult education demonstrated the national lingo of subjugation: "By 1959, officials in Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Georgia were set on closing this 'communist training school, teaching methods and tactics of racial strife.' The Tennesseee General Assembly quickly passed a resolution 'to Investigate the Subversive Activities of the Highlander Folk School'" (Highlander Center: A half century of radical education in the South, 1986). Countless similar scenarios could be recited.

Anti-communism is a vehicle for prevarication in maintaining global hegemony. The Reagan administration is infamous for lying to disguise or deny its true policies and conduct, to garner public acquiescence and to intimidate political opponents (McMahan 1985; Bennett 1986; Green 1987; Martin and Lang 1987; Story of a contra named David 1987). A dramatic example of dishonesty calculated to manipulate public sentiment toward the view that good and evil are epitomized by the United States and the USSR respectively was the administration's persistency in accusing the latter of intentionally destroying what it knew to be a passenger-laden airliner, while withholding information that the USSR erred and that aggressive espionage schemes by the United States contributed to that error ("Superpower games", 1986).

The development of moral understanding.

Piaget combined the insights of structure and dialectics on new theoretical ground, linking knowledge of the world with cognitive development of the knower. At the developmental apex, autonomous moral reasoning in accord with universal principles coincides with moral investigation itself. Hegel's self-thinking idea dialectically approaches the dynamic relationship of its content to reality, that is, to truth, comprehended as relational and in motion. With Marx's materialist adjustment, dialectical thought approaches truth as it develops as the collective knowledge of humanity discerning its own conditions, with moral import realized as political self-determination. Cognitivist and humanist psychologists intimate a progressive structure of human development interacting with the social environment. Some sociological ramifications have been investigated by educational theorists and researchers who have, for instance, positively evaluated the impact of democratic, autonomous, self-actualizing teachers upon young persons' development of similar personal dimensions. Such evidence is rarely culled to the analysis of social structure and conflict - or to relate a structure of human values to a hypothesis that beyond the evils of oppression and alienation rests the potential for a better world. Making that connection, from a value-laden perspective, is a principal purpose of my thesis.

In chapter three, I look to cognitive psychology for a model of moral cognition. The material dimension of morality consists in history and struggle, in the existing past, present and future relations and conduct among human beings and the institutions which shape their lives and the world. It is my purpose to make cognitive psychology dialectical and revolutionary (see Broughton 1981b, 1985) by using its insights to explain differential apprehension of the world order. The dialectical understanding in which Marx's critique of capitalist society is revealed, the revolutionary

dedication of the oppressed peoples of the third world, and class-consciousness in industrial society are critical faculties for moral understanding and action.

Morality can be defined, but the problem of moral cognition involves development of understanding of the world at a critical, interpretive level. Without the autonomy and formal processes for thinking critically, moral cognition is impossible, for an immoral world will merely be seen, in accord with ruling ideology, as "the way the world is." Interpretation cannot proceed, even in the most "good-hearted" person, without the intellectual habits of searching for deeper meanings and the big picture (Paul 1986). Without critical appreciation of the need to ground thought in material relations, overcoming deeply instilled myths will remain an unfulfilled condition of understanding.

Culture reproduces personality structure, for instance, socializing people with a fetish for unnecessary goods. Dissent and criticism are repressed by ideological means. Once we recognize such processes of social reproduction as detours from self-realization, self-determination and the treatment of all persons as ends in themselves, we can connect the cognitive makeup of persons with the conditions for human development. The environment either includes or excludes morally autonomous, rationally critical, self-actualizing persons; it either furnishes or witholds the basic needs for healthy development, from good nutrition to critical education (see de Lone 1979). Inequality perpetuates itself in diverse ways, but it does not do so inevitably or ineffably. People acting ahistorically and individually can neither stop war, oppression or exploitation nor enslave nations. Without dialectical thinking, the substance of society can scarcely be comprehended, much less be subjected to moral scrutiny.

The highest moral development is related to a combination of high order

cognitive functioning and altruistic concern for others and, however wary social scientists may be of so stating, characterizes the politics of the left and, if the cognitive epistemology of Piaget is extended, validates it (Peck and Havighurst 1960; Lind, Hartmann and Wakenhut 1985; Modgil and Modgil 1985). If morality is a form of human knowledge refering to relationships in the real world, it is reasonable to seek in it the attributes of scientific truth. A dialectical approach to these issues is to ask what morality is not, what impostors arrogate its authority, and what conditions generate self-contradictory or ineffectual notions of morality.

Moral values and social structure.

Beginning with Durkheim's sociology of morality reflects my view of morality as a primary source of meaning. I agree with Durkheim that morality is a dimension of social structure as well as a realm of popular understanding and that morality serves a reconstructive function - given an adequate conception of human ends. Nietzsche's view of morality (1966, 1967) helps to situate this focus. Two basic issues define contrasting approaches to morality. First is the distinction between a mystifying or false morality, for Nietzsche, the "slave morality" of "good and evil," to which he applies the concept of <u>ressentiment</u>, and the morality consistent with material reality, for Nietzsche, the "master morality" which represents the unbounded human spirit. The second distinction is between a concept of morality as a meaningful facet of rational being and one which emphasizes the derivative, false consciousness known as 'morality', bracketing any meaningful sense of morality in favor of what is seen as a more 'realistic' view of society. Marxist structuralists such as Althusser can be read to construe the "false consciousness" of popular ideation to be exhaustive, excluding an autonomous

morality.

Durkheim has trouble making and abandons the first distinction. For him, morality is salutary for the society to which it relates. Because of this, Durkheim emphasizes the positive value of morality in itself and its meaningfulness in a prospective sense, adopting the emic structure as the etic content. Durkheim served as a foundation for Piaget's schema of moral development by way of contrast. Piaget rejected Durkheim's

> notion that the individual development of moral consciousness is only an epiphenomenon of social development, and that the moral subject is only a passive organism shaped by his social environment and indoctrination (Hartmann 1985: 280).

Piaget and Kohlberg follow Durkheim in the second distinction and are not concerned with the first distinction in terms of a sociology of knowledge. Rather, they break down this distinction from the standpoint of cognitive function and development. While they do not treat inferior cognition as false consciousness, cognitivists generally hold that moral autonomy lies beyond conventional thinking and that principled moral reasoning about social relations reflects a potential for personal development beyond the ideological constraints of the status quo. Kohlberg explicitly identifies such cognitive-moral development with political reasoning and democratic virtue consistent with liberal ideals of social justice (Hartmann 1985: 282; Weinreich-Haste 1985; Broughton 1985). My aim is beyond Kohlberg's liberalism (see Broughton, e.g. 1985); but Kohlberg's monumental contribution to moral inquiry is broadly acknowledged (Scharf 1978; Lind, Hartmann and Wakenhut 1985; Modgil and Modgil 1985).

(Nietzsche presents a difficult mediation between left and right (Dannhauser 1974; Marcuse 1955; 108-112; Hartmann 1985: 294). He offers a significant gloss on the interpretations of consciousness linking Freud, Reich, Marcuse, Adorno, and Rokeach (1973). Nietzsche's flawed

socio-political perception distinguishes his view of morality; but he poignantly relates the demystification wrought in the wake of Freud and Marx (for instance, by Reich and Adorno) to moral ideology. While his treatment is aristocratic, Nietzsche discerned the relevance of moral development to social class and condition and to self-realization. His concept of ressentiment could have informed Reich's Mass psychology of fascism (1970), although Reich does not mention it. The fascist personality interpreted by Reich is, consistent with my thesis, a product of capitalist social reproduction evincing the want of autonomous reasoning and is the analogue to Nietzsche's "slave morality," bounded by ressentiment reacting against an unlived freedom. Moreover, Nietzsche's differentiation of moralities, between an organic understanding and an inverted, degenerate "false consciousness," furnishes direction for further pursuit of the issues in this thesis. Ranulf's analysis of ressentiment motivating punishment in bourgeois society (1964) and Nordstrom, Friedenberg, and Gold's study of ressentiment in secondary schools (1967) suggest the possibilities for such work.)

Piaget and Kohlberg have been criticized for omitting to relate the individual to social processes, notably by John Broughton, who teaches developmental psychology at Columbia University's Teachers College. Broughton defends - and critiques Kohlberg and Piaget, searching for an "anti-ideological, critical psychology," which he, as I do, perceives to depend upon a radical inquiry, modifying the developmental structuralism and epistemology of the Piagetan tradition (Broughton 1978a, 1978b, 1981a, 1981b, 1985). Confirming the convergence which my own inquiry suggested (influenced by the concurrency of this work with my studies toward certification as a secondary teacher), Broughton notes that

> the only unified and cohesive critical position that has been taken

> with respect to Piaget is the one grounded in the Marxian and neo-Marxian theory that relates intellectual creations to production and ideology. . . .
>
> Several writers, especially in the educational curriculum field . . . have expressed the hope of an imminent synthesis of Piaget and Marx. Many others, particularly cognitive psychologists . . . have endorsed the compatibility of the two approaches, apparently on the basis of their shared Hegelianism, with its dialectical view of the subject-object relation, and its epistemology of active transformation of nature . . . Piaget [1970, 111-127] offers his own outline of a possible rapprochement based on a structuralist interpretation of Marxism. . . (1981b: 406).

Broughton describes the complementary nature of Piagetan and Marxian theory:

> the ideology-critics of cognitive-developmentalism inspired by Marx have been found lacking in precisely that area, the accounting for truth and its development, which Piagetan theory has made its major objective. It was as a consequence of this realization that the possibility was proposed of a mutual enrichment between cognitive-developmental and ideology-critical perspectives, the one progressive and universalizing, yet mystifying, the other historically concrete and demystifying, yet relativistic (1981b: 406-407).

In an earlier article, Broughton stated the similarities between the Piagetan perspective and Marxism in a manner suggesting the former's internal tension between its liberal and radical moments:

> The Kohlberg/Piaget approach, perhaps by virtue of some of its structuralist features, has commonalities with Marxist approaches . . . . For example, both believe in structural development through a kind of Hegelian dialectic towards an ideal form. Both believe that development is something different from change, occurring at the level of "deep structure." Both believe in science, in empirical study as a material path to objectivity. Both believe that knowledge involves a constructive interpretation of reality, not just a testing of a priori hypotheses. Finally, both reject the typical liberal views that (in the general domain of reason) knowledge is relative, that (in the specifically moral domain) there is no "practical reason," and that morals are purely subjective (1978a: 303).

The politics of moral understanding.

How can the potential of humanity as an end in itself be realized, without a universal dialogue which does not merely exchange the currency of existing instrumentalities but delves critically beyond all currently

perceptible contradictions to evolving conceptions of what it means to be human? When people collectively seek self-determination in a dialogical, critical fashion, they can advance, as Habermas outlines, towards a comprehension of reality beyond that which prevails in the absence of a common process of critical dialogue. (Bourgeois democracy, as that of the US revolutionary period and the parliamentary social democracy of progressive European states, is not entirely bereft of the virtues indicated here, and the contradictions between contemporary monopoly capitalism and liberal democracy comprise a vital issue of our time.) If such dialogue reinterprets current circumstances as Marxism does, so as to impel a reevaluation of reality in its relation to human good, to the interests of a world premised upon the 'end' value of each person, then it furnishes an epistemology of structural morality. Understanding at the highest level of cognitive-moral development challenges the prevailing axioms of existence and becoming. It is the sort of understanding which invests knowledge of what we wish for our children with the love which connects them to us. It is not merely the abstract knowledge of one who consciously does something wrong but the connected knowledge of the destruction of self which accompanies that wrong. It is this engaged knowledge, expanded to the ramifications of social structure in respect to all persons. It is knowledge that all people are not merely interconnected but interpenetrating (Broughton 1985).

From description of a world society in which immorality is structurally identified with domination, oppression, suppression and genocide; with inequality, exploitation and alienation, a moral critique can be distilled. It emerges in popular, philosophical, religious and political voices. Morality offers resistance to hegemonic control and itself absorbs the focus of suppression. Ruling ideology reproduces and maintains conditions antagonistic to general moral and political criticism and struggle but also

aims a concentrated attack to discredit and silence the moral voice of resistance. In the United States, this kernel of ideological control (private and public) targets the kernel of popular intelligence and morality, under the state-supported "civil religion" of anti-communism. General insight is obstructed and higher cognitive-moral functioning in the form of the critique of capitalist social structure is locked up, in a sense, literally, as the population is insulated from past and ongoing criticism of capitalism. As a result, all other social knowledge is rendered, at least in part, irrelevant and false. Understanding is to morality and resistance as its suppression is to immorality and domination.

Moral cognition is congruent with reflective, dialectical understanding and thus to higher cognitive-moral development and human becoming. To the ruling ideology, the 'good' is identical with the prerogatives of bourgeois society. Resistance and revolution are considered evil. While most agree about the banalities of domestic crime, its interpretation in bourgeois ideology emphasizes the criminality of victims and exonerates the self-perpetuation of bourgeois privilege, from genocide committed against third world workers to maintain capital's opportunities for exploitation, to the police murder of an Eleanor Bumpers, resisting eviction. The immorality of society and its ruling principles would be evident to a population predominantly consisting of persons exhibiting Peck and Havighurst's rational-altruistic level, Kohlberg's stage six of moral reasoning, or Richard Paul's "strong-sense" critical thinking - or persons with revolutionary consciousness in the Marxist sense.

However, people do not suddenly emerge, fully achieving their cognitive potential. Most people never complete the developmental path through stages determined by the structure of rational thought and understanding. But there is vast room for environmental influence. Cognitive psychology is

inextricably implicated in the construction of society. The mental operations of ideology, for example, must involve the parameters of cognitive development. Bourgeois society's censure of dissent and suffusion of conduits formerly occupied by cultural phenomena with self-serving literalism, negating human autonomy and obfuscating human needs, provides a bulwark against the exercise of cognitive function beyond what is instrumental to preservation of existing social relations. Most schools, families and churches function so as to serve the social reproduction of a population which is unpracticed in seeking new meanings or imagining a transformed reality; in appreciating the historical nature of meaning and reality. Bourgeois democracy remains secure from the will of the people, for political existence itself for the great majority remains in latency. "Moral education" is either for or against human liberation. Either it raises cognitive-moral levels or, like bourgeois moralism and anti-communism (identifying moral reasoning and protest as evil), it impedes development, fostering an environment in which critical, dialectical thinking is discouraged and most people fall short of the human potential measured by Piaget's and Kohlberg's highest stages.

My thesis discloses under the concept of morality a signified materiality, rather than an ideological artifact. This social fact of moral structure corresponds to a measurement of the dynamics between conditions of exploitation and alienation and of self-determination; to the dimension of human realization.

The importance of my effort may be in sighting the needs for empirical investigation. Without a problematic for testing data on moral structure, such investigation would lack theoretical guidance. Science does not advance without 'intuitive' prospects to guide the search for 'facts' (Harris 1979). A totalizing theory of morality leads to new articulations for interrogating

the people and institutions around us and to recognition of new dimensions in everyday life and the mechanisms which maintain and direct it, as well as those which may change it. Interpretation and reconcilation of past treatments to precipitate a coherent reading of the social organism can proceed together with basic research to find out how people make up the moral dimension of history (see Broughton 1981b: 407).

For any generalized elements of character, particularly among those whose acquiescence in the moral structure of the society and nation is required to permit that structure's continuous reproduction and to enable its dynamics of historical agency, there is a material basis. The expediency of certain values respecting the family, status of women, and the nation for Hitler's Germany remains a quintessential example of the relationship of the personal to the political-economic. Wilhelm Reich's psychology of fascism, "not a political party but a specific concept of life and attitude toward man, love, and work" remains a lucid contribution to the interpretation of personality in the light of social structure (Reich 1970: xxv).

Morality and the politics of science.

Not all social scientists evince the same values in their profession. A dichotomy can be perceived, based upon the logic of access to knowledge. Information may be used for the self-determination of society's members in general or it may be used to enforce their subjugation by a dominant class. The search for understanding can serve the largest interest of social understanding by a potentially all-inclusive number of people or it can serve exclusive groups whose interests entail the restriction of information and of intellectual skills for social understanding. This dichotomy suggests opposed moral forces, although it is important to recognize the subtle, unconscious

ways in which scientists may serve these ends (Lee 1978: 89 and passim; Lynd 1939).

Science is not "value-free". Examination of contemporary society should demonstrate the gravity of the moral dimension for social science. Contending explanations of the capitalist world system do not fail to make moral claims, explicitly or otherwise. Apologists for the status quo resort to judgment of the different worth of persons differing in role and status in the economic and social make-up of society, based upon a static, essentialist view of political-economy. Wealth and the goods of society are produced by persons and institutions (business corporations, primarily) which are successful and wealthy, not by those - the ideology holds - who toil in necessarily inferior postions. From classical economics to the George Gilders and Milton Friedmans who people President Reagan's bureaucracy of ideological plutocrats, the popular rationalizations used by the ruling class have changed little except in their cautious pandering to the self-satisfied senses of the expanding middling 'class'. The moralism based upon diligent, individualistic survival in a hard (and inexorably uncollectivizable) world, proclaims a natural order in which suffering is unattributable to behavior susceptible to moral blame, except for that of the sufferers themselves. The epochal theories of sometimes sincere, sometimes misunderstood social scientists were found becoming to those they circumstantially celebrated, such as Andrew Carnegie (McCloskey 1951). But history exposes struggle through which oppression is both imposed and ejected, in which human effort is divided on the battlefield over a system of exploitation by those who control the means of production, of those who do not. Collective human agency is an established fact and the conservative argument from nature entails a confusion of type in classifying social processes.

Facts are not earnestly sought in the social ontology of conservative

ideologues (Wolff 1968). The theorists of a natural economic order are closed-minded to empirical study. Their resort to scientistic rationalization is belied by their antagonistic posture toward the interpretive development of facts into social understanding. As the history of reform in the United States attests, contact with social problems through the intimacy of commitment to attenuate human suffering has been a consistent experiential source of enlightenment on the structural reasons for poverty and other conditions of oppression. Characteristically, such enlightenment informs leftist and liberal politics but is excluded from conservative politics.

Those who promulgate myths to disguise the behavior of those who dominate society form a class of intellectual warriors, presently occupied by neo-conservatives and their neo-liberal mimics in the functional redundancy of political ideology. The 'knowledge' presented by this class of ideologues is merely a reflection, created of rationalizations and alibis offered up as truth for the public's credulity. But the "social scientists" who articulate the most palatable and passable "explanations" of the world perform in a vast enterprise whose product pretends to the breadth and function of culture itself (Barthes 1968; 1972). This enterprise synthesizes a whole cloth of imaginary relationships between the individual and the real world, extending bourgeois consciousness to become for all persons in the society, the legitimate understanding of that world, usurping the ground for appropriate class consciousness and its conflicting knowledge of the world and concomitant moral awareness (Althusser 1971).

Morality represents a mode of tension in this milieu. Resistant popular morality contends with a powerfully orchestrated mass culture integrated with the socio-economic and political requirements of the capitalist system. In modern society, there is no sanctuary from the cultural ramifications of technology and human engineering in their most insinuating forms, from the

curtailment of the religio-political spirit of the masses to definition of the most intimate behavior. The containment of religion perceived in the Reformation by Tawney (1926) epitomizes the moral intimacy of struggle between human identity and growth and the increasingly subtle demands of world-system capitalism for social control.

The paucity of moral autonomy and critical perspective coincides with the more profound forms of social control which intrude into individual motivation prior to the development of cognitive structures for moral reasoning. The cognitive-moral structure of Americans is directly related to a culture influenced to the point of organic reconstruction by an exploitative and manipulative social order. While individual character is not absolutely determined by the nature of society, a substantial proportion of individuals never develop into agents of a potential humanity which, empowered and self-determining, can participate in collective behavior for social change. The average person sustains certain moral integrity within a narrow field, well inside the perimeter of conflict definitive of class society. As we shall see with religion, powerful arenas for growth and resistance are available to revitalize individuals who glimpse the daylight from inside the cave.

CHAPTER 2: RELIGION AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE OF MORALITY IN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A. Society: An introduction to the social totality.

My objective in this chapter is to describe morality as a value-laden, historical dimension of the social structure encompassing the modern world, securing a coherent interpretation of the traditional identification of moral concerns. Durkheim's description of society sui generis, in terms of a cultural continuum characterized by a community of social relations and exchanges, provides a necessary foundation for the concept of society as structure. This classical structuralism precedes the disembowelled scholasticism of some later structuralists aptly criticized by Harris (1979). Unlike later structural-functionalists, Durkheim did not abandon the moral quest of social science. As critical dialogue will bring out, however, he failed to recognize either the scientific extension of his concept of society to the entire human community or the central moral import of the conflicts he perplexedly rejected as unamenable to scientific consideration.

In developing the moral structure of society beyond Durkheim, I will concentrate upon the quality of moral understanding as knowledge of the functions and consequences of global political-economic relations. As a human project towards comprehending the world in its totality, in terms of human values, religion presents a historical medium for study of moral understanding.

Emile Durkheim concluded that:

> Outside or beyond individuals there is nothing other than groups formed by the union of individuals, that is to say, societies. Moral goals, then, are those the object of which is society. To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest. . . . the domain of the moral begins where the domain of the social begins (Durkheim 1973a: 59-60).

Durkheim's argument for the logical necessity of a social entity beyond the mere sum of individuals, as the subject of social science and, specifically, of a science of morality, was a critical step for the study of social structure. Durkheim has been accused of introducing to sociology the status quo-affirming myopia of structural-functionalism (see Durkheim 1973a: xviii; 1963: ix) and the idealist subjectivism of structural anthropology (Harris 1979: 166-67). However, his work serves a fundamental need in social science, the vivid and enduring identification of society itself as scientific fact.

It is difficult and of questionable value to judge one of the classical originators of a new science in light of a critical view of the mainstream of twentieth century sociology. The critique of both the founders and the structural-functionalists, such as Parsons, Merton and the ranks of near-famed names such as Berger and Lipset whose retreat toward the political right defined the academic contingent of nineteen-eighties' neo-conservatism, involves an element of the ethic of science which is often honored in its breach. Science ought to pursue knowledge and understanding at the deepest levels, with the broadest implications. That Durkheim neglected, in particular, the inconsistencies in his superficial treatment of conflict is less damning than the studied, elitist closed-mindedness to be found in the established sociological field. Nevertheless, Durkheim's formulations portray an unrealistically flat world, while their seminal value remains unfulfilled.

Ernest Wallwork assessed Durkheim's work, which might be seen retrospectively as the source of structural-functionalism but which, more significantly, cemented for social science and Western thought generally a "cultural conception of society . . . which entails viewing society as an interrelated system of shared beliefs and values" (1972: 221-22). Wallwork summarized the need to revise Durkheim's theory:

Contrary to some of his critics, Durkheim's structural functionalism

> does not deny the existence of conflicts and tensions within society. . . . But Durkheim's structural functionalism, like other variants of this contemporary social theory, stresses order, stability, and equilibrium at the expense of conflict, along with its value for the social system as a whole and for the realization of ethically desirable goals, is unjustifiably muted [sic]. Contemporary conflict theorists are thus quite correct in arguing that the merits of structural functionalism need to be supplanted by a strong dose of Marx (Wallwork 1972: 188).

Wallwork's confounding of values emerging through conflict with values affirmed by the social system should be noted. Nevertheless, while not a conflict theorist, Wallwork highlights intentional and unintentional perspectives on values within social science. He captures what Durkheim missed of the value-laden dimension of sociology and the ethicality proper to social science which have often been excluded as inappropriate due to the "value-free" nature of scientific inquiry.

The myth of "value-free science" is belied by an analysis of the power of knowledge, the distribution of which describes a class breakdown of society. The human dimension of social science may be approached by the conditions for and consequences of unrestricted inquiry and dissemination of knowledge, which entail the distribution of power in society.

> [the] human power developed by physical science is widely regarded as at least a potential opportunity and resource for all mankind. But can the social sciences make this claim? Suppose certain men gain the power to predict and control variables in the behavior of other men, could we then assume without further reflection that such knowledge is a power which all mankind could share?
>
> . . . the adage that knowledge is power requires extensive redefinition in social science, for the kind of power that comes from the scientific knowledge of things is <u>physical</u> power <u>over</u> those things. In order to share freely among ourselves the fruits of psychological research, the fruits themselves must make possible the kind of power which mutually enhances both giver and receiver - that is, power <u>through</u> people. It is difficult to see how most current interpretations of "the scientific method" in the social sciences would permit the study of mutuality between scientist and subject (Hampden-Turner 1971: 3).

Durkheim's nondialectical treatment of organic society did contribute to the perversion of sociology towards legitimation of the dominant order. Many of those viewed today as intellectual leaders explicate, justify and bless the

status quo in the fashion of apology and with the effect of lending ideological force to extremely exclusory processes of socio-economic control. As I will argue, relating social knowledge to the common interest of those who are ruled, such an "intellectual" product amounts to obfuscation which does the opposite of enhancing social understanding and which additionally enforces a social order in which open critical inquiry may provoke violent or forceful repression by private or public agents. The latter conduct may consist in the subtlest secret policing of access to employment or direct deprivation of liberty or physical safety. (See, generally, Lee 1973, 1978.)

Profound truth and error are intertwined in Durkheim's notion that morality rests in the individual's consonance with collective purposes of society. The unaddressed tensions in his conception of society as a moral structure confirming human's gregarious needs and determining a rational discipline for living in the human collective demand a comparison between his thought as prescription and as description. In Durkheim's specification of the role of the nation, the midpoint in the moral hierarchy of family, nation and humanity, description succumbs to prescription (1973a: 76-77). The ingenuousness of this transition differentiates the early social structuralist from later, apologist structural-functionalists. Perhaps the operative factor in Durkheim's moral structure is that a human being does not attain self-realization "except on the condition that he is involved in society" (1973a: 68). This principle has been explored in humanist psychology and is intimated by various directions of social prescription and critique. Insofar as the prescriptive side is derived from the observation of effective values supporting individual growth and social harmony on the descriptive side, Durkheim's work can be a constructive contribution toward a more dynamic model of society. Without his discernment of what makes society

meaningful as a whole, in terms of society's own resilience and bountifulness, such insights might remain amorphous and unanchored. Thus, while Marx also urged the existence of social structure in relating the unrelenting exploitation of one class by another, he may have failed to articulate for unreceptive ears the embodied coherence of everyday life. We must be wary not to canonize the academy of science as the sole source of truth. The Puritan leaders of colonial times and the Great Awakening - as well as many sincere fundamentalist Christians today - have perceived the moral interconnectedness of society as a potential force for good. The boundary between a polarized view of reality - especially one neglecting the humanity of those who do not neatly fit the patterned harmony so deeply desired - and idealism may not be well-defined.

Attachment to social groups, critically interpreted, constitutes a superior paradigm for logical development of a moral science. However, Durkheim inconsistently separates out self-serving behavior as 'amoral': "We certainly cannot pass adverse judgment on those acts aimed solely and uniquely at sustaining life . . . . such acts are morally neutral" (1973a: 55-56). But what of normalized participation in domination and exploitation which make up the structure within which all but the most isolated individuals behave? In a sense, the classical sociologist was not sufficiently (or consistently) sociological. Only in reversion to the commonplace surpassed by fundamental scientific thinking could Durkheim suggest that patterns of individual conduct might lie outside the organic interaction of society. Thus, we are left to seek a moral structure in which to judge such acts of "personal interest" as discharging striking workers or becoming a scab; producing television advertisements which exploit consumers and contribute to a web of artificial culture which socializes people to accept exploitation as essential reality and to interpret their own

acquiescence and manipulation as the enjoyment of life itself; or producing toys that mimic the extremes of brute violence and beligerance; or generally participating in economic production which does not respect or serve human values. Nor does Durkheim grant us a model for comprehending commission of wrongdoing by the state.

One basic problem with the 'society' of classical social science is that the structure of society rests beyond human ethology, beyond the culture of any human collective. Social structure embraces institutions in the material life of societies which comprise a world order. The world order has a life of its own, interconnected with human lives but functioning at a qualitative remove by virtue of the dimensions of power and inequality which characterize this meta-structure. Dynamically viewed, this structure is history. It contains both the makeup of human civilization and the forces for its destruction.

Synchronically viewed, this structure consists of relations defining the actual performance of political organization and economic production and its systems of property and exchange. Between the functioning of a world-spanning system and identification within a human community, there is a qualitative breach ill-accounted for, if at all, within classical social science. A bank executive may indeed appear, for want of traditional scientific criteria indicating otherwise, a decent and moral human being and yet be linked, in his work, to the starvation of third world children, the poisoning of third world populations, or the unemployment of first world workers. It is this type of dilemma which unites moral and social science and which demands a cross-dimensional study of human phenomena.

B. The unfinished science of morality and Durkheim's dilemma between 'is' and 'ought'

Durkheim recognized the obstacles social science faces, externally and internally:

> If there is to be a social science, we shall expect it not merely to paraphrase the traditional prejudices of the common man but to give us a new and different view of them; for the aim of all science is to make discoveries, and every discovery more or less disturbs traditional ideas. . . . the scholar must resist being intimidated by the results to which his researches lead, demanding only that they be conducted scientifically (1938: xxxvii).

In his classic on method, Durkheim conducted a running argument with "common sense", individualistic ideology. Indeed, George Catlin's introduction attacks the late author's presumed errors of a "collective conscious" (elsewhere modernly criticised) and indications for a science of morals. Durkheim is recognized for correcting the perverse individualistic atomism of Herbert Spencer (1938: xxiv) and is anachronistically associated with the mystical nationalism manipulated by the Fascists (1938: xxviii). Catlin's reading betrays the artificial boundary between scholarship, politics and morality. An informative history of German sociologists' pretensions to "value neutral" science during a period inclusive of the World Wars raises haunting questions whether social science can exist without the connection between 'is' and 'ought' (Papcke and Oppenheimer 1984). The 'objectivity' severing that connection is an illusion which Durkheim strived to avoid. His moral stance opposed the bourgeois and liberal ideologies which joined with frank business anti-intellectualism to berate the 'tyrannical' implications of the social collective; to deny not merely the existence of a social organon from which individuals constructed their identities and meanings but the existence of any public interest other than that of the supposedly inexorable force of economic competition represented by "the free market." Durkheim's eloquent articulation of social facts, refuting individualistic

fallacies which still obstruct critical social science, remains enlightening.

The question of a distinction between 'individual' morality and social evil, injustice, or institutional wrongdoing, in the context of post-Durkheimian social science, is related to the problem of enlarging moral description and prescription by the scope of moral scrutiny at the level of external "coercive power" beyond the individual whose 'substratum' is "either the political society as a whole or some one of the partial groups it includes such as religious denominations, political, literary, and occupational associations, etc." (Durkheim 1938: 2-3). Evidence for deconstruction of such a distinction is omnipresent. For example, children react to living "in a world of prior and potential nuclear violence" with

> feelings of anxiety, helplessness, and bitterness or outrage at the arrogance of adults who would endanger the lives of all. Some express resentment at the hypocrisy of adults who (as a class) are seen preaching against children's aggression and then waging war. Others attribute drug use to disinterest in school and long rage goal-setting to the sense of futurelessness created by the nuclear threat (Ressler 1986: 49).

My task is to provide a fuller critical apparatus applying a science of morality to contemporary society. Durkheim's pioneering scientific perspective is subsumed, as I proceed to relegate smaller, limited conceptions of morality to the largest 'substratum', the plenary source of all social facts of moral import, whether perceived as personal or institutional. It is instructive to note how Durkheim viewed the problem with sufficient clarity but substituted an idealist, self-contradictory solution for a scientific as well as morally responsible one.

Durkheim's difficulty was asserting a priority among family, nation, and humanity, which "represent different phases of our social and moral evolution, stages that prepare for, and build upon one another" (1973a: 74). Durkheim proceeded, aware of contradictions but not of how they evidenced the very societal superstructure which he too readily presumed not to exist.

Durkheim perceived, erroneously I will argue, that:

> in contrast with the nation, mankind as source and object of morality suffers this deficiency: there is no constituted society. It is not a social organism having its own consciousness, its own individuality, and its own organization. It is only an abstract term by which we designate the sum of states, nations, and tribes, which in their totality constitute mankind (1973a: 76).

He proceeded to find the nation state to be "the most highly organized form of human organization in existence," notwithstanding the possibility that "a state embracing the whole of humanity" might arise in the distant future (1973a :76). Definition of 'state' and "constituted society" is a theoretical concern beyond the needs of my thesis. It was, however, Durkheim himself who taught that social facts make up social institutions, which make up society; that:

> one can . . . designate as "institutions" all the beliefs and all the modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity. Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning (1938: lvi).

The technique of deconstruction, from post-structuralist cultural theory originated by the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida (see Culler 1982), permits us to take apart Durkheim's view of the state as the most highly organized form of human organization. Tapping Marxist analysis of the state, we can view it as a terrain where class conflict is waged and which is predominantly controlled by the capitalist class. Thus, the state, while subject to the claims of the most general class of people, is not organized of the general group of humanity within its borders but is often quite hostile to that group, advocating the interests of the few and powerful. Indeed, the characteristics of the unprivileged mass of humanity inside the state's borders unite it with the unprivileged masses elsewhere in the world, whose claims to human rights and emancipation from class exploitation sound in the universal values of life, justice, and freedom from treatment as the means to the ends of a dominant class. By criticizing idealized distinctions

and realigned differences, causing a construct such as 'nation' to disclose its internal contradictions, we can arrive at a perspective in which Durkheim's distinction between individual state and humanity becomes less significant.

Durkheim was too modest in addressing the dimension of his subject matter, society. Long before his own century, the world had been interjoined and inextricably held in a dynamic system of human intercourse on many levels, including the involvement of state and commercial as well as cultural institutions. No more than was a nation merely the sum of its inhabitants, was the world that travel, conquest, trade, plunder, merchantilism, and the subjugation of distant people had wrought merely "the sum of states, nations and tribes." The world, whose structure Marx, Engels, Lenin, and their intellectual heirs have named, was and is precisely what Durkheim needed to complete the puzzle of moral structure: "a social organism having its own consciousness, its own individuality, and its own organization." Perhaps we could be more lucid calling the world of humanity a 'meta-society', but the consequence for social science is no different.

Thus, Durkheim exhibited a fatal flaw as well as an axis where macro-theory might have intersected his fine science of humanity, answering concerns which he felt deeply, asking how there can be a morality for humankind:

> conduct is moral only when it has for its object a society having its own structure and character. How can humanity have such a character and fill such a role since it is not a constituted group?
>
> So it seems that we are confronted here with a contradiction. On the one hand, we can scarcely help conceiving of moral ends that are loftier than national goals; on the other hand, it seems quite impossible that these loftier ends can be embodied in a human group perfectly adequate to them. The only way of resolving this difficulty, which troubles public thinking, is to seek the realization of the human ideal through the most highly developed groups that we know, through those closest to mankind as a whole, but without confusing the two - that is to say through the efforts of specific nations (1973a: 76-77).

The cautious theorist was at odds with the moral scientist, yet he failed to assimilate the fruit of his own greater powers of observation as he indulged the latter faculty to describe the contradictions which haunted him:

> The problem of whether humanity ought to be subordinate to the state, cosmopolitanism to nationalism, is . . . one of those which arouses the greatest controversy today. There could not be a graver issue, since the orientation of moral activity will be altogether different and moral education understood in almost contrary fashion, depending on the group to which priority is accorded.
>
> . . . this argument is persuasive: increasingly those moral objectives that are most abstract and impersonal, those that are farthest removed from all conditions of time and place and race are also those which emerge as pre-eminent. . . . the nations themselves are joined in even greater social organizations. Consequently, the moral objectives of society have been more and more generalized . . . . There seems no reason to assign certain arbitrary limits to such a continuous progressive development. Now mankind's goals are still higher than the loftiest national goals. Then should not supremacy be accorded the objectives of mankind in general? (1973a: 75-76).

As we have seen, Durkheim declines to do so. My purpose in visiting his dilemma, apart from its inspirational value, is to lay stress on the structural dimension. Rather than a positive ideal of higher moral order, our portrait will be of the immense structure in which conflict describes the human condition - and in which the morally astute social knowledge Durkheim yearned for is itself a bone for contention.

Durkheim leaps from a perceived scientific dilemma into idealistic digression in which he ponders the superiority of nations which coexist peacefully rather than conflicting aggressively; in which:

> the state commits itself as its main goal not to expanding, in a material sense, to the detriment of its neighbors, not to gaining greater strength than they, or to becoming richer than they; but to the goal of realizing among its own people the general interests of humanity - that is to say, committing itself to an access of justice, to a higher morality, to organizing itself in such a way that there is always a closer correspondence between the merit of its citizens and their conditions of life with the end of reducing or preventing individual suffering (1973a: 77).

It is worth pondering not only the words of this thinker and educator but the eclipse of understanding which was synchronous with his ascending humanism.

Durkheim wanted a dialectical method capable of confronting contradictions, of reorganizing themes from which opposites merged, of connecting parts with a yet unknown whole. He had elsewhere observed that it was the forced division of the labor which assailed social solidarity (Durkheim 1933), a critique which, had it been pursued further towards the understanding of social structure, might have permitted a broader morality, assuming "a critical posture toward . . . society's hegemonic institutions and classes" (Gouldner 1970: 250-51).

C. Searching for social structure at a level totalizing the moral interest and goals of humankind

The dialectical method developed by Marx and continuing Marxist thought best identifies my method and represents the illuminating aspects of other interpretive, critical traditions which inform this study. "Dialectics is a way of thinking which brings into focus the full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world." Proceeding "from the system inwards, dialectical research is primarily directed to finding and tracing four kinds of relation: identity/difference, interpenetration of opposites, quality/quality, and contradiction." (Ollman 1986: 42-46).

The dialectical view obviates any need to start with a taxonomy of moral and immoral action. Rather, all things reputed one way or another are deemed part of a moral system or the moral component of a larger system. As with religion, the truth content of morality must be seen within the totality of social knowledge, with as little prior "distortion" by "scientific classification, comparison, explanation, [or] interpretation" as possible (Troeltsch 1977: 88-89). Even nonreflexive parochial and authoritarian perspectives emphasizing the proscription of others' conduct are evidence of moral structure.

Sensible defenders of the 'right' to abortion do not deny that abortion is a moral question. "Pro-life" opponents of abortion isolate, and stress the immorality of, the act of abortion as an overriding political imperative. Their primary objective, despite their earnest, if ill-contrived efforts to educate others on their point of view, is to reestablish the criminality of abortion, using the power of the state to command obedience to the moral precept they urge, or exact punishment for failure to do so. However, the morality of abortion cannot be separated from the contexts in which it is elected by individuals, or from issues as broad as affordable health care and nuitrition, the economics of childcare, the prevalence of teenage pregnancies and the quality of family life in a "trickle down" economy. Carol Gilligan contrasted women's perspectives on the morality of abortion. The most advanced,

> third perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt. Thus a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships - an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction - informs the development of an ethic of care. This ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are interdependent (1982: 74).

Perhaps as significant is the cultural void left by the substitution of individualism primed with intense fetish of commodities for community born of human interaction and not driven by the ideological motors of the consumer marketplace. That life itself becomes a commodity in the scheme of (post-) modern capitalism can scarcely be unrelated to some of the feelings expressed by the "pro-life" faction.

My concern is the moral structure of society, relative to any given index. Abortion, historically and anthropologically, is a matter of personal

interaction in the socio-economic system. The history of women aborting their own children precedes the industrial age. Personal decisions about the function of one's body and the context of future needs were well-integrated in the consciousness of women in societies where the scarcity of goods and the direct proportion of labor needed for survival were (and are) immediate facts of the environment. Sustaining one's productive role in the existing community was a sound 'moral' objective. In the case of contemporary conduct in the throes of subsistence so marginal as for survival to be a daily uncertainty, the conduct of wealthy nations and their economic agencies cannot justly be abstracted from any "moral scrutiny" pointed towards indigenous individuals (see, for example, Lappe and Collins 1978, 1982; Lappe, Collins and Kinley 1981).

In the US, we can contrast an abortion elected in spite of adequate income and other resources to support an expanded family or household to one elected by an impoverished woman struggling to subsist. The latter case evokes the larger schema of structural morality concerning poverty. The first evokes a different schema in which abortion for 'selfish' reasons may, in point of social fact, be symptomatic of a want of social connectedness; of a general consciousness of responsibility to others (cf. Bellah et al. 1985). Opposites interpenetrate. Scientific concern differs from that of the moralist. It does not analyze in order to pronounce judgment upon individuals but attempts to evaluate the entire social framework implicated. One person's exercise of personal freedom may, along with other personal and collective evidence, suggest the social fact of a disturbing moral order in society. A rigorous view of bourgeois notions of freedom may disclose persons enslaved to a social system which obstructs human fulfillment and its requisite development of community. As Durkheim established, we are required to ask what social totalities are to be held morally accountable. The dialectical

breadth of moral understanding is not peculiar to the theory of capitalism. Classical Greece gave it expression, as in Aeschylus' Oresteia (1953).

Traversing to a more direct concern with systemic matters, how do social institutions, particularly the most powerful and autonomous ones, conduct themselves and relate to human civilization? If we experience an immediate recognition of moral import where the acts of individuals are concerned, and if our given knowledge is to have *any* consistency, we must be morally aroused when social institutions and systems commit similar acts, usually with enormous magnification. Certainly war is a matter of moral concern, as are the genocide in Hitler's Germany and the sole examples of populations attacked with nuclear weapons. Similar, more recent actions by our own government, such as the bombing of Cambodia and other events during the US war in Southeast Asia and the killing of noncombatants in Lebanon, Libya and, by proxy forces, througout Central America, face ideological obstacles to moral examination, in the minds of many citizens. Yet, through the collective memory of many people, long lists of contemporary institutional conduct susceptible to moral scrutiny could be compiled.

D. A sketch of the world in moral perspective

Sources

A moral indictment of evils on the institutional plane would fill many volumes and a reasonably complete bibliography of existing sources would be a monumental task. The most I can do here is to indicate the magnitude of the subject. Many volumes have been written, some dealing with expansive issues, some with succinct ones such as the 1951 "Petition to the United Nations for relief from a crime of the United States government against the negro people" (Patterson 1970). Direct moral indictments, however, may not proliferate in

the world of accessible publications. The political tract approaching the precision and impact of the **Communist Manifesto** for contemporary US society has not been written, although there are many more books for the ordinary reader providing a critical view of our social system than the homogenous pablum of American mass culture would seem to allow. The problem with published sources is that a relatively miniscule reading public either aware of or open to critical viewpoints ill supports more visibility for social criticism to the left of the bourgeois liberalism represented by the inaccurately labelled 'left' of the Democratic Party (excluding less than a handful of actual Congressional leftists, for example). A work which deserves endurance as a popular edition on the derivation of class society's modern appearances (Piven and Cloward 1982) may easily disappear as the "passing fancy" which typifies the fetish of commodities, books included, in our capitalist economy. Scores of books by small, progressive publishers are unknown to librarians and chain bookstores. The most stalwart progressive, independent weekly analysis on public affairs provided by the **Nation** reaches a tiny fraction of the US population. As for newspapers, the overtly political organs of a small array of parties on the left would be treated as jailbait by the preponderance of Americans, who receive daily news from the behemoth media industry. Unknown are the myriad newspapers overtly associated with points on the European political spectra, which inform a working class which exhibits greater indicia of procedural and substantive democracy than in the US. (Norton and Ollman, 1978: 367-405, provide a lengthy "Teaching Materials" list of periodicals and other sources of radical criticism.) Other sources include popularly written books and journalism on current events.

Thirdly, literature has been long discounted as devoid of political-economic content, a rude prevarication wrought by intellectually secluded teachers and a zealously patriotic education establishment (see

Giroux and Purpel 1983). The greatest of American writers were embroiled in the arguments of a national morality. Benjamin Franklin, often taken as the epitome of business initiative and individualism as components of an "American character" was subjected to bitter satire in Herman Melville's **Israel Potter** (Bellah et al. 1985: 33). Yet Melville, not merely a figure in world literature but a profound critic of American society and values, is generally represented by works whose rich texture is easily manipulated to the aim of presenting artistic idiosyncrasy and the plight of the individual. To link a work such as **Bartelby the scrivener** to Marxist themes in an American public school would be a heresy scarcely to be feared from teachers well-sheltered in their own education from critical perspectives on the existing order of society.

Nevertheless, literature, often in forgotten and long discarded volumes, articles the moral struggles of Americans against social ills, particularly those instanced by structural changes, from industrialization to the corruption endemic in a plutocracy now so transparent as to have disappeared beyond the veils of bureaucracy and 'pluralism.' A number of studies treat the extensive 'political', 'economic', and 'social' literature of our nation's last hundred years; but this agency of art as popular resistance to injustice is not a standard theme in lessons on American literature (see Aaron 1961; Blotner 1966; Hartwick 1934; Milne 1966; Rideout 1956; Schneider 1965; Taylor 1942). Another facet of critical writing is comprised of intellectual histories and biographies, including the works of literary critics such as Van Wyck Brooks, Dwight MacDonald, Grandville Hicks, Malcolm Cowley, Max Eastman, Edmund Wilson, and F. O. Matthiessen, who were cognizant of arguments and sentiments in conflict with the mainstream. American literature has been a powerful vehicle for displaying the contradictions and tensions in society (Leo Marx 1983; Aaron 1965; Horton and Edwards 1967).

The wealth of African-American literature and criticism is an invaluable source of social evidence. Its import can only be suggested here by a few names, giving eloquent testimony on the evils of racist, oppressive social structure: Langston Hughes, W. E. B. Dubois, Richard Wright, James Baldwin, Chester Himes, John O. Killens, Malcolm X, Alice Walker, Toni Morrison, and hundreds more. Non-'white' authors portray a reality which pervades American life but is excluded from the dominant perspective. Many 'fictitious' tales of racial hatred, fear and anger contribute more to understanding class oppression in the US than does the average social science text.

Radical publications present a refined social criticism to which the vast majority of the US reading public is hardly ever exposed. M. E. Sharpe, South End Press, Monthly Review Press, Praeger, Bergin and Garvey, Marxist Educational Press, International Publishers, Urizen Books, Pantheon, Beacon Press, Orbis, New Left Books, and myriad small presses as well as a number of university presses regularly furnish social criticism on the structural level, giving evidence and analysis of institutional wrong and of the evil of institutions and systems themselves.

World systems

It is difficult to classify the evils of social structure without a general moral topography of society. The contemporary moral environment, however, is outlined by the world system of political-economic domination and its focus in US private and public institutions, including the imperial state. In terms of structure, the question is what attributes of society compose the infrastructure determining its moral aspect. The US, as a society, performs a special role as the kernel of an algebra of modern states and societies. It is at the center of a world system, as the most pronounced

source of power and process among the relations of worldly institutions.

A naive and commonplace conception of history presents the contradiction of focusing upon the play of power - the rule of monarchs and the conflict of nations; the booty of war and the wealth of conquest - and ignoring the patterns of development and change which transcend the borders and duration of regimes. Glorifying the aggressive explorations of merchantile and imperial states, this naive history obscures the growth of systemic exploitation and its qualitative change into a transcontinental meta-institution in a world richly interconnected and polarized by the application of force, extraction of wealth, and transformation of diverse cultures under well-defined relations of economic domination. On the level of historically differentiated societies, the classic statement of developing relations through the unequal accumulation of property traversing various forms of expropriative production is that of Marx's Capital (1967: 1, 761-64). Marx described the emergence of capitalism, an economic system founded upon the organized taking of property by the class owning the means of production, from the class coerced into laboring for an incomplete return for its efforts. In Marx's study of capitalism, the method of dialectics revealed the root of economic relationships in historical processes in which the characteristic structure of relations in a given society is transformed. Thus, the vastly inferior status of the industrial worker to that of the capitalist represents the materialization of class society, based upon a history of exploitation and the virtual enslavement of the working class to a livelihood dedicated to the accumulation of another's wealth. Society consists in change and metamorphosis under conditions of conflict in which classes struggle between poles of oppression and revolution. Historically, capitalism arose in Western Europe, which progressively asserted itself by force toward conquest and the economic subjugation of foreign lands, in a

general pattern which may be denoted by the terms 'center' and 'periphery', the latter consisting of South and Central America, Africa, and parts of South and Southeast Asia (Sweezy 1981: 71-73).

The structure of inequality and exploitation among nations in the modern world is expressed in world-system theory. Thus, the world may be seen as arranged within a system of dominance, in which leading capitalist powers exhibit conditions of economic privilege and independence, while dependent countries are exploited for their resources and generally "subjected to the self-interest of the dominant leader nations" (Hunter 1985: 49). Within this theory of an interconnected world order for capitalist functioning, the dominance of the United States is a central, consistent observation. A rising rate of exploitation, that is, growing inequality between periphery and center, is characterized by a declining standard of living for the masses (all conditions taken into account and interpreted relative to the lack of self-determination and alternative forms of goods) and increased political repression in the periphery. "Unemployment, often reaching 30 to 40 percent of the labor force; misery; malnutrition; even starvation" are the results of this dynamic in which politics and economics, culture and technology are inextricably joined (Sweezy 1981: 83-4).

The history of central accumulation and peripheral underdevelopment articulates the theme of imperialism. The US received the baton of world dominance upon the advantageous development of industrial and finance capitalism, coupled with violent competition and decline of former leading powers during the early years of the Twentieth Century. Imperialism also embraces the dynamics of hegemony in a world torn by dependent nations' struggles for liberation from exploitation as well as by the polarity between the US and USSR, the world's noncapitalist superpower (Sweezy 1981: 81). While US leadership in the capitalist world may not be as complete as it was

directly after World War II, the US position recedes from one of unapproachable domination of transnational capitalist enterprise.

A restricted, ahistorical understanding of imperialism (eg., Pratt 1950) identifies the US experience as a limited episode, minor relative to the imperialism of Great Britain, France, and Germany, for example, at the end of the Nineteenth Century, involving the taking of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, in accord with the expansionist views current in Washington. These included the rudest sort of racism justifying the right of an Anglo-Saxon nation to substitute its governance for that of supposedly 'uncivilized', non-'white' peoples (Beisner 1968; Hobson 1965). Mark Twain, relatively unknown to a nation which claims him as one of its greatest writers, published bitter satire condemning the iniquities of empire (Foner 1966) and numbered among the Anti-Imperialist opposition to the US policy of expansion during this period.

Hobson's seminal Imperialism identified the felt need of advanced capitalist national economies to forcibly insinuate themselves into weaker nations whose natural resources and labor could be ravaged for profit by private enterprise, insured by the might and wealth of the imperial power. His 1902 edition informed Lenin's progression from the Marxist analysis of capitalism (1965 [1920]). Lenin's observations led to the views that imperialism is an inevitable development of monopoly capitalism, whose birth quickened with the industrial development prior to World War I, and that the distinct development of finance capitalism brought with it a world-wide capitalist financial structure which represented a historical stage of economic domination not susceptible to abatement by political whim. Lenin identified the war of 1914 to 1918 as:

> imperialistic (that is, an annexationist, predatory, plunderous war) on the part of both sides; it was a war for the division of the world, for the partition and repartition of colonies, "spheres of influence" of

financial capital, etc. (1965: 4).

The ascending United States joined its declining imperial allies in this project. Lenin noted this phenomenon as a symptom of the general, rapid growth of capitalism in its progressive stages:

> In the United States, economic development in the last decades has been even more rapid than in Germany, and for this very reason, the parasitic features of modern American capitalism have stood out with particular prominence (1965: 151).

The history of the modern world in its largest forms and most inclusive institutional arrangements was conventionally submerged in bourgeois atomism and positivism. The latter closetted political-economic structure within the pretended naturalism of classical and neoclassical economics, leaving the self-serving fabric of legitimized political discourse to outline the shape of episodal nationalism or history according to the ruling classes of Western Europe and North America. The transformations of finance capitalism and bureaucratic corporations led to the demise of colonial imperialism in the form developed spectacularly by Great Britain, to be supplanted by neo-colonial forms involving patterns of central power 'investment' supported by local ruling elites. US empire-building did not begin with the Spanish-American War: the United States itself was part of a larger history of capitalist evolution (Williams 1966; Zinn 1980; Kiernan 1980). It continues as an increasingly predominant element of conduct of the American state and society. Structures arose from diverse parts of the US political-economy to sustain an imperial policy increasingly dependent upon the coordination of diffuse cultural factors, including virtually all resources within civil society as well as covert and overt violent agencies (Woddis 1967; Chomsky 1985). Farhang writes, we recognize an imperialist system, not from its formal constitution as such, but from "the actual exercise of its power, the nature of its objectives, and the practical

consequences of its policies." In sum, "one must focus on the conditions and relationships that constitute a system of privilege, namely, inequity, dependence and exploitation" (Farhang 1981: 56).

One trait of the new imperialism in which the US became the foremost power was the reduced significance of the military in the control of terrain and the enforcement of debts. While US control once was asserted principally by military force to collect debts for the benefit of banks, "in more sophisticated times and with advanced internationalization of the banks, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the main enforcer." And, while bringing "noncapitalist nations into the imperialist network" once was the role of loans and economic, political and military pressure,

> in the era of decolonialization and wars of national liberation, the various forms of intervention are designed for the most part to prevent the separation of the peripheral nations from the core - to hinder delinking from the imperialist system (Magdoff 1986: 3).

Thus, an institutionalized process of domination, entailing severe austerity and political subjugation for the peasantry of underdeveloped nations, secured by means of local tyranny supported materially, technically, and politically by agencies of imperialism (typically the arms of the US military, covert operations, and other executive functions), presents a facade of legality, tranquility, order, and rational capitalist management. But the violence inherent in subsistence conditions and murderous suppression of any democratic organization presents a world 'order' chronically ready to explode, continually rife with armed conflict. As Loxley summarizes, there is "no evidence that IMF programs have ever shifted income in favor of the poor" (1984:30).

The US context of moral structure

While my specific concern is the United States, its hegemony in the world comprises a total moral context. A similar analysis might be made of lesser capitalist powers such as France and Great Britain today. However, our own society was not merely shaped by the modern structure of transnational capitalism but became that system's center and remains what all factions term the Western 'superpower'. At the height of the US foreign economy halfway between World War II and the present, the US utterly dominated world trade and direct investment. In 1960, US "foreign investments accounted for almost 60 percent of the world total" (Magdoff 1969: 56). The primary agency of modern imperialism is the private transnational corporation, initially, almost exclusively a North American phenomenon (Gilpin 1975; Magdoff and Sweeny 1971; Shoup and Minter 1977). Samir Amin articulates an intriguing perspective on the era inclusive of the two World Wars, at the culmination of which the US became the leading world power:

> The period as a whole (1914-1945) was like a Thirty Years' War between Germany and the United States for the succession to declining British hegemony (1980: 232).

What emerges is a coherent picture of a world-wide political-economy resident in a power structure ruled by a few capitalist nations and their constitutive economies, ruling classes and military, dominated by multinational, monopolistic corporations and investment banks, and moderated and serviced by a network of regulatory organizations. This picture is alien to the official descriptions of social institutions and to the formal, mythical self-definitions through which current history is generally presented. Yet the immensity of these structural phenomena, for instance, the extent of domination of the world economy from 1945 until around 1970 by one nation and, increasingly, by a small number of multinational corporations, belies the reality of a world system that is passively if not actively denied

in the ideology which shapes popular North American consciousness of world and nation. The magnitude of this system and its impact upon every aspect of social existence coerce us to acknowledge the infrastructure of an intensely interdependent world society; a meta-society in which coldly obtrusive institutions interpenetrate the diffuse productive forces, upon which depend every people of the world in the least amount of open contact with any other people. This system is no less physical and space-filling, in a sociological way, than the international interchange of money or the reconstitution of the atmosphere and other factors of world ecology by modern production and consumption. The fact that some nations exist partly outside the imperialist circle does not impair the delineation of a world system. Both contractual and belligerent relations, focused amid continous processes of resistance, revolution, suppression, and counter-revolution as well as maintenance, co-option, dependency, and uneven development, bring all nations within a field of conflict and interaction in which self-determination is a privilege of the super-powerful, as is the prerogative to deny it to others striving to be free of that power.

Having sketched the improvident edifice of world social structure, I return to the level of violence and inequality which will permit this exposition to take on greater significance in terms of moral structure.

A view of morality in process

A survey of research and interpretation will provide a sketch of imperialist practice. The dynamic connecting world social structure with the history of political and economic forces culminating in modern transnational capitalism (imperialism) is the unequal economic development of nations. In contrast to the conventional ideology of independent national development at different rates, the unitary world economic order reveals the

interdependently differential development of a capitalist center and exploited periphery. The term "underdeveloped nation" embodies the connection between the development of the advanced Western and Northern economies and their plunder of less powerful, technologically less organized, non-merchant lands. The 'original' points of advancement in the process of rationalized civilization abide a moot issue. What is significant is that European nations, later joined by North America, accumulated great wealth for the founding of dominant nation status in an incipient world economy and that that accumulation was at the expense of other nations, whose category expanded to the limits of the military and commercial resources of competing imperial states. As a result of a structure of dominance over and predation upon the lives, labor, wealth and resources of conquerable peoples, the latter were integrated into a parasitic system in which independent development was precluded and internal fashioning of political-economies and cultures was inexorably commanded by imperial power and under imperial influence (Baran 1957). The process continues under neocolonial forms of imperialism:

> The imperialist system . . . is characterized by the acceleration of accumulation and by the development of productive forces in the center, while in the periphery these latter are held back and deformed. Development and underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin (Amin 1980: 252).

It would be impossible to outline the process of unequal accumulation accurately without mentioning the role of chattel slavery in the development of modern capitalism, a theme of peculiar importance for the phenomenal development of the US from British colonies to peerless agricultural, industrial and financial power (Fox-Genovese and Genovese 1983; Aptheker 1966). As Manning Marable wrote,

> Black people in the US are the direct product of massive economic and social forces which, at a certain historical juncture, forced the creation of the early capitalist overseas production of staples (rice,

> sugar, cotton) for consumption by the Western core. The motor of modern capitalist world accumulation was driven by the labor power of Afro-American slaves (1983: 24).

American society, imbedded in the historical course of capitalism, is the subject of polarity in the interpretation of the contemporary world. The capitalist statement involves a particular short circuiting in its denial of history. World conflict derived from the project of world domination in the sphere of imperial transactions is attributed alternately to world communism ("Marxism-Leninism") and to the allegedly, truly imperialist USSR. This myth flies in the face of any considered view of history, if there is any meaning to historical analysis for the illumination of human civilization as a material process. We might digress on the method of dialectics in the history of society, as Fox-Genovese and Genovese (1983) felt compelled to do in utilizing Marxist categories for historical analysis against the grain of conservative social science. But the evidence speaks clearly at this vantage in our argument. Is it of no significance, for interpretation of the issue of revolutionary Nicaragua in the 1980's - claimed by the US government in its clumsy manoeuvre of ideology to be evidence of Soviet expansion - that

> Major US military intervention in Central America began . . . in 1854, when the United States navy bombarded and destroyed San Juan del Norte, a port town in Nicaragua. . . . It was an act of revenge. . . . a yacht owned by the American millionaire Cornelias Vanderbilt had sailed into the port and an official had attempted to levy port charges on it.
>
> . . . In the first third of this century, we sent military forces into Cuba, Panama, Mexico, and Honduras and occupied Haiti for nineteen years [where] under President Wilson, we reinstituted slavery, burned villages, destroyed, tortured, and left a legacy which still remains, in one of the most miserable corners of . . . the world. . . . The United States invaded Nicaragua repeatedly, finally leaving behind a brutal, corrupt, and long-lasting military dictatorship, the regular consequence of U.S. intervention.
>
> . . . There's vast starvation throughout the region while crop lands are devoted to exports to the United States. There's slave labor, crushing poverty, torture, mass murder . . . (Chomsky 1985: 15-17).

US marines were sent to Central America and the Carribean twenty times between 1898 and 1920. Between World War II and 1983, US

> military or paramilitary interventions have been carried out in Greece (1946-48), Korea (1950-53), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Lebanon (1959), Cuba (1961), Vietnam (1964-75), Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1973), Lebanon and Granada (1983). In every case the purpose has been to defend the status quo against revolutionary nationalist regimes perceived as a threat to U.S. imperial (i.e., economic and/or geopolitical) interests (Sweezy and Magdoff 1983: 2-3).

This resume of intervention encompasses only part of the profound enterprise of violence and oppression which is the manifest policy of the United States, in maintaining the capitalist world order. For instance, the principal ten recipients of US economic and military aid, between 1973 and 1977, the purchasers in 37 percent of all US weapons sales ($18.2 billion) were "determined by internationally recognized human rights organizations" to hold the "ten worst human rights records" (Thomas 1984: 94). As Chomsky and Herman (1979) document, presenting categories of institutional conduct securely within the domain of moral judgment beyond the intellectualized legerdemain of capitalist apologetics, the US has functioned as the hub of neofascist terror - of murder, torture, and every crime against humanity, directed against Third World peoples in order to protect the self-interest of multinational capitalist profit. The key operative relationships between policy and interest in the conduct of US hegemony are investment and profit on the part of US multinational corporations (Petras and Zeitlin 1968; Magdoff 1969; O'Connor 1971; Shoup and Minter 1977; Farhang 1981; Pearce 1982). Chomsky connects US policy and process, in behalf of class society on the world scale, with inescapable moral facts:

> The better the climate for business operations, the more American aid . . . . US policy is in fact based on the principle that human rights are irrelevant, but that improving the climate for foreign business operations is highly relevant. . . .
>
> Now how do you improve the business climate in a third world country? . . . You murder priests, you torture peasant organizers, you destroy popular organizations, you institute mass murder and repression to prevent any popular organization. And that improves the investment climate. So there's a secondary correlation between American aid and the deterioration of human rights (1985: 21).

Yet another layer of parasitic oppression and inhumanity results from the organic functioning of multinational, monopoly capitalism and its continuous reproduction of gaping socio-economic inequality registered in the working and living conditions of impoverished majorities. The Multinational Monitor, an independent, non-commercial monthly, has investigated numerous aspects of the human effects of transnational corporate conduct. The dumping of pesticides in the Third World is a profitable modus operandi for the chemical industry (July, 1980). While multinationals repatriated quick profits from Marcos' Philippines, 68 percent of Filipino households were officially defined as below the poverty level (February, 1981). Two percent of the Guatemalan population owns 65 percent of the land, primarily devoted to export cash crops such as coffee, cotton, sugarcane, beef and bananas. Much land lies fallow, while two thirds of the population of seven million work as farm laborers or own subsistence plots, with over 500,000 peasant laborers migrating seasonally (Nairn 1981). Percapita consumption of beef fell 41 percent in Costa Rica, 38 percent in El Salvador, and 13 percent in Guatemala and Nicaragua between 1960 and the mid 1970's, while 90 percent of the cattle raised at low-cost for export were destined for the US, primarily the fast food business. Two thirds of Central American forest lands have been cleared, largely for grazing (Holden 1981). US computer firms have helped automate the oppressive tools of the South African police state (Conrad 1982). Third World women paid as much in a day as female assembly line workers earn in an hour in the US are employed by US multinationals engaging in "offshore sourcing." As "the unseen assemblers of consumer goods such as toys, the hardware of today's 'Microprocessor Revolution', and designer jeans, [they] make up eighty to ninety percent of the millions of workers in" multinational-controlled plants and domestically owned, subcontracting factories (Fuentes and Ehrenreich 1983). Conditions resemble the factory

system of employing single young women during the early decades of the industrial revolution, mimicking the capital accumulation based upon African slavery (see Ware 1964).

E. Moral understanding and social understanding

Moral scrutiny is overwhelmingly invoked at the level of operant controls in the world order, dwarfing concerns of limited perspective. For instance, the morality of the taking of life is a basic paradigm. Homicide has many forms and contexts, from manslaughter while driving and inebriated to wife-beating, to young Black men shot by police and children killed by children; from cost-effective tolerance measured in the lives of industrial workers to the premeditated mob violence of hate groups. The aerial killing of noncombatant peasants in the rebel-controlled areas of El Salvador, funded and managed as a new model for US imperial military policy, "low-intensity warfare" (Arensen 1986), surpasses the conventional reach of homicide as a moral category of limited perspective. The expansion of such categories is a characteristic of critical and radical perspectives. The notion of police violence, for example, invokes an expanded language to which persons of an authoritarian or conservative outlook want access. On the global level, a similar idea is that of killing people whose circumstances of oppression connects them with revolution or national liberation. Rather than this idea communicating moral content to a person 'interpellated' (Althusser 1971) within the ruling ideology, its very naming communicates the 'subversive' or radical character of the namer. The imaginary relationship of the unconscious member of the noncapitalist class to his or her actual conditions of existence heralds the morality of the police or the evil of communism,

precluding the language for a coherent concept of moral community. Thus, were we to take the limited categories of moral conduct and the concomitantly restricted field for moral scrutiny as definitive of morality, we would encounter contradictions of both subjective and objective natures. We would lack a way to talk about basic moral categories with universal application, for instance, to victims of imperial aggression and industrial pollution as well as of street crime. Furthermore, the ordinary mechanism of such restriction - the functioning of dominant ideology - would engage us in internal contradictions. Thus, North American church groups giving sanctuary to refugees from rightist persecution in El Salvador and Guatemala might be seen, in the expanded perspective, as saving the lives of innocent people victimized by repression, while they might be easily seen as opponents of the status quo. In the restricted perspective consistent with taking limited moral categories as definitive, the sanctuary workers might be denominated immoral as well as law breakers. The very boundary of such moral analysis not only denies the fact of repression and the moral virtue of saving lives but urges the finding, in an eclipsed world view, of wrongful conspiracy with mythical evils (e.g., "world communism", "Marxism-Leninism" or "Soviet expansionism") such as the ruling ideology uses to interpellate a plurality within its guard.

In conventional thought, we see movement from the particular to the general. Editorials in the commercial press in the 1980's chastise what they mistakenly identify as "liberalism's" attempt at a moral critique of social structure and institutions, declaring that a serious moral stance would entail abandoning such pretense for what amounts to an authoritarian concern with individual righteousness. The vices connected with poverty receive obligatory mention: irresponsibility and sexual abandon, laziness, disrespect for property and authority, the incapacity to delay gratification, and

ignorance. We cannot deny the moral tenor, in some mode, of matters popularly and definitively seen as moral ones. However, the ideological view is not one which opens current history to moral interpretation. It tends, instead, to exclude questioning outside its prescribed level. What can be the focus of morality, where the facts most demanding of judgment are shut outside the judgment of a plurality or majority subjected to ideological distortion?

On the contrary, dialectical reasoning proceeds from the whole to the part. The conventional view, dialectical reasoning reveals, does not, after all, hold the value and integrity of human existence to be the measure of good and evil. Rather, it is hegemony itself which postulates value, and its needs are ideologically maintained beyond the judgment of ordinary men and women. Ironically, the reduced, conservative image of private morality cannot serve as the moral perspective of independently thinking, ethically aware persons. It is the resentful moralism of dependent (heteronomous) minds, suited to condemning themselves and other individuals but not to drawing rational conclusions about the world in which they live, onto which the ruling bourgeois ideology projects the myth of being 'free' and 'democratic'. The truth interpenetrates the myth as its opposite. The oppression expressed as violence eluding popular condemnation is also the oppression of the central capitalist society's popular moral spirit. The perspective of the oppressed, of the peripheral Other in the sense of humanity elsewhere, belies the moral turbulence and confusion, the suppression and denial of moral thought at the center (see Ollman 1986). The equation of the well-being and moral being of the US and its people and big business, the identification of Americanism, the "free enterprise system," and right-wing, fundamentalist moralism are old ideological themes current in the 1980's. So is the condemnation by business spokespersons of mainline church organizations for

"passing moral judgment on economic issues" (Bergman 1986). By considering the whole of human society and its interrelations and historical structures, we proceed toward understanding the world, in full measure of our humanity. A taxonomic treatment of moral analysis being beyond my scope, it suffices to show that, as human beings, we do combine epistemological and moral concerns in an understanding of the world.

What field exists for human understanding always consists in social context. Language itself is affected by the larger, ordering structures of society. The moral implications of the most highly integrated geo-political-economic relations are thoroughly represented in language, or more precisely, in the concealed intermediary, self-signifying levels of language as myth (Barthes 1967:89-92; 1972). The category in cultural analysis in which the dialectical critique of capitalist society beginning with Marx meets contemporary critical theory is ideology, which may be described as:

> a message which starts with a factual description, and then tries to justify it theoretically, gradually being accepted by society through a process of overcoding (Eco 1976: 290).

Social institutions, partaking of hegemonic ideology, compose a cultural order which conflicts with human attempts to transcend the ubiquitous language of the ruling system, particularly in the US, the central capitalist society. Barthes' seminal insight into class society, conflict and semiotics provides a juncture for critical social theory:

> Statistically, myth is on the right. There, it is essential; well-fed, sleek, expansive, garrulous, it invents itself ceaselessly. It takes hold of everything, all aspects of the law, of morality, of aesthetics, of diplomacy, of household equipment, of literature, of entertainment. Its expansion has the very dimensions of bourgeois ex-nomination. The bourgeoisie wants to keep reality without keeping the appearances: it is therefore the very negativity of bourgeois appearance, infinite like every negativity, which solicits myth infinitely. The oppressed is nothing, he has only one language, that of his emancipation; the oppressor is everything, his language is rich, multiform, supple, with

> all the possible degrees of dignity at its disposal: he has an exclusive right to meta-language. The oppressed makes the world, he has only an active, transitive (political) language; the oppressor conserves it, his language is plenary, intransitive, gestural, theatrical: it is Myth. The language of the former aims at transforming, of the latter at eternalizing (1972: 148-149).

The manipulation of public opinion, both inside and outside US society, towards the legitimacy of visible imperial policy and towards the bourgeois mythical schema erected to enroll citizens peacefully in the project of capitalism plays an important role in sustaining the world order of inequality and domination.

> It is one of the many mystifications of capitalist ideology that in the name of "security," "freedom," "defense against Communist subversion," and so on, there has been a stream of ideology from the outer to the periphery that is aimed at reinforcing the most nonparticipatory, authoritarian structures and outlook in the latter (Thomas 1984: 126).

Particularly for domestic class control and rationalization of domestic inequality and suffering, the assault of ideology against consciousness aims at concealment of the holistic picture of imperialism. Ideology and repression work together, through the institutions that pervade Americans' lives (Irons 1971; Althusser 1971: 127-186). The monopoly publishing industry participates as an agency of bourgeois cultural production and participant in capitalist exploitation. Both direct and indirect control and censorship of information guard the imperial interpretation of the world. The state itself participates in the ideological role of the so-called "free press," as dysinformation produced by "intelligence agencies" such as the CIA is inserted both in domestic media and in the third world press, the latter well under the control of US imperialism (Gutto 1983 and see Landis 1982).

F. Religion and social understanding

Discourse on social understanding does not exist outside the mediations of a culture reproduced continually in the reflection of its ideology. We shall explore this in respect to religion. Between the insights of Marx and Engels' German ideology (1970) and the rigorous structuralism of Althusser, however, space exists for resistant consciousness. In terms of counter-mediation within specific frames of existence, the home and family, the workplace, the workplace, schools, political organizations, communities of difference such as urban Blacks, women, and gays and lesbians, and others do offer alternative respite and critique. Perhaps the most potent such space in the US, in terms of popular strength, coherence and articulation of a resistant moral view of the world is the phenomenon of religion. Progressing from general sociological considerations to the history of capitalism and contemporary US society, my focus will remain on Protestant Christianity and on Catholicism, the largest religious denomination in the United States. My concern is with the differential aspects of religion generally as a field of human experience rather than with the characteristics of the various religions. Thus, resistant activities including the participation of persons of different religious characteristics are important for the significance they share in common, for those involved and for society. Also, it is superfluous to treat Judaism, in any case a problematic theme for American society, or religions other than those of the vast plurality of our religious nation.

The theological plane is an unavoidable source for understanding the world, particularly for a holistic, humane appreciation of the mundane social order with its imperfections and injustices, a problem which Max Weber called that of theodicy, for which "theoretically pure types" of solution were stated (Weber 1963: 138-39). Most solutions involve other-worldly salvation

or intervention, to which I will return, to view the contradictions within religious ideology and the dominant production of culture. Weber also observed:

> To the extent that a religious ethic organizes the world from a religious perspective into a systematic, rational order and a cosmos, its ethical tensions with the social institutions of the world are likely to become sharper and more principled. A religious ethic evolves that is oriented to the rejection of the world . . . . Indeed, the very tension which this religious ethic introduces into the human relationships toward the world becomes a strongly dynamic factor in social evolution. (1963: 209-10).

As a general empirical matter, consistent principles applicable to social systems and pertaining to justice in society can be deduced from the world's religious authorities (Sigmon 1984).

Durkheim's approach was consistent with his proto-structuralism. Religion is distinguished not so much by its elements or taxonomy as by its function of explaining the universe. Durkheim, attributing to humankind the faculty and need for a cosmology, found religion to represent the dynamic collective of human understanding: religion is "an essential and permanent aspect of humanity" (1965: 13). Thus, he responded, through the sociology of knowledge, to problems of individualistic epistemology instanced by want of a conception of society as a field of relationships larger than society's parts. Durkheim's is a more theoretical schema of society than Weber's, but ends with a less developed image for comparison with modern religious experience. For Durkheim, personally and phylogenically, science succeeds and replaces religion.

However, Durkheim saw the endurance of the collective thoughts integrated in religion. As Giddens writes,

> The persisting elements of religion concern the necessary moral character of all social relations and the preeminence of society as the fount of all that makes man human. . . . Religion has two essential ideational components: on the one side the provision of moral ideas and moral regulation, and on the other the creation of a cognitive framework whereby the world can be understood conceptually. The ideals of moral

> individualism become the core of the first. the second becomes more and more the province of science (Giddens 1979: 105).

In what must be one of the most intellectually warming conclusions to a classic of social science, Durkheim evoked Kant, denying any contradiction between science on one hand and morals and religion on the other:

> the two forms of human activity really come from one and the same source. Kant understood this very well, and therefore he made the speculative reason and the practical reason two different aspects of the same faculty. According to him, what makes their unity is the fact that the two are directed towards the universal. Rational thinking is thinking according to the laws which are imposed upon all reasonable beings; acting morally is conducting one's self according to those maxims which can be extended without contradiction to all wills. In other words, science and morals imply that the individual is capable of raising himself above his own peculiar point of view and of living an impersonal life. In fact, it cannot be doubted that this is a trait common to all the higher forms of thought and action (Durkheim 1915: 494).

Americans' 336,281 churches with combined membership of 134,817,000 souls indicate a splendid degree of religious sentiment (US Bureau of the Census 1982: 54). A religious service can be profoundly moving, in spite of the holding of different religious beliefs or, if possible, none at all. (One of many personal experiences was a radio broadcast of a special service, led by the President of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod on October 30, 1983, in commemoration of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birth. The gentle, lucid summary of Luther's message, the choir and brass, the moral force of an untrivialized faith in the human potential for goodness poignantly combined with a sense of Luther's dwelling in history, in overwhelming beauty and pathos - perhaps "the sentiment of a heartless world".) The unsurpassed interior grandeur; the basic integrity of professed Christian social morality; the beauty of classical church music; the incomparable timbre of human voices remarked by Thomas Mann in **Doctor Faustus**; the primordial intelligence and idyllic poetry of faith, humility and goodness, articulated by a skilled preacher; the compassionate

egalitarianism of simple, rhapsodic language unabashedly aimed at the heart; the vision of unjealous, perfect love all fulfill a definitive human need for collective and communal aspiration, as Marx himself was eloquently aware ([1843b]). This merged affective and cognitive dimension of daily life is permitted social expression, by far most freely and predominantly, in the explicitly 'spiritual' realm of community life. Except for far less subscribed aesthetic, political, vocational and humanitarian spheres - and apart from the family which Durkheim viewed along with the state as a reservoir contiguous with the moral strength of society (1973: 68, 75-5) - the spiritual interrelations of men and women have little other space in which to develop, in the superlatively individualistic and privatized United States. (Compare Marx [1843a].)

The relation of religion to the modern secular norm witnesses a differential ontology and cosmology (i.e., theodicy), of which the spectra induced by evangelical, fundamentalist politics has been a dramatic example (see Hadden 1984.) Injustice is a basic concern of religious thinking, particularly when we bypass the plane of religiosity to view the rational attempts to apply religious perspectives to worldly conduct. In the prerational religious plane itself, however, the superposition of metaphysical categories onto the everyday world reflects the social reproduction of injustice. The immediacy and eloquence of sociological expression in Marx's Introduction to a Contribution to a critique of Hegel's Philosophy of right uniquely informs and inspires us:

> . . . **man makes religion**; religion does not make man. Religion is indeed man's self-consciousness and self-awareness so long as he has not found himself or has lost himself again. But man is not an abstract being, squatting outside the world. Man is **the human world, the state, society. This state, this society produce religion which is an inverted world consciousness, because they are an inverted world.** Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement,

> its general basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human being in as much as the human being possesses no true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly a struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion.
>
> Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.
>
> The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of tears of which religion is the halo.
>
> . . . The criticism of religion disillusions man so that he will think, act and fashion his reality as a man who has lost his illusions and regained his reason; so that he wil revolve about himself as his own true sun (emphasis in original; [1843a] 1972: 11-12).

Thus, as the original sociologist of knowledge, Marx encompasses Durkheim's subsequent operational definition of social facts and theory of religion as a society's popular cosmology, structurally legitimated by its cohesive function, as well as Durkheim's chiliastic anticipation of rational society. (Marx also encompasses the conflict perspective evident in the broodingly transcendental and proto-deconstructionist dialectics of Nietzsche. See Nietzsche 1966: 100-102; Rank 1950: 185-88; Spivak 1976.) What Marx supplied (and holds in reserve for the enlightenment of bourgeois social science) is an analysis of conflict as the historical opposition of classes within the productive, material structure of society. Furthermore, whatever the obstacles of language and method which his writing presents, Marx is misrepresented as "a mortal enemy of religion," which he considered "not as an evil but as a necessary human reaction to oppression and misery," as the Critique's context of his famous statement on religion illustrates (Sweezy and Magdoff 1984: 3). As we proceed, we must place in perspective even the ascetic rationalism of Marxian theory. In the dialogue between Marxist and liberation theology's social analysis and action that has begun to mature in the early 1980's, the need remains for "individual transcendance of immediate

reality," on which Bunl and Fiehrer elaborate:

> Rubem Alves, one of liberation theology's deepest thinkers, says "Religion is the memory of a lost unity and the nostalgia for a future reconciliation. Under the surface layers of happiness and peace which it proclaims, religion always presupposes an I unreconciled with its destiny" [From paradise to the desert: Autobiographical musings, in **Frontiers of theology in Latin America** (MaryKnoll: Orbis, 1979).] This insight speaks to the ultravictimized segments of the world economic system who can recall the fragmentation of age-old beliefs and quasicommunal structures. It should speak to those troubled evangelicals who see U.S. society and all Western civilization in a total crisis but who are lured by the siren song of Gospel Reaganism. But it should also speak to the rest of us who feel exiled in a time not our own (1985: 17, 19-20).

In his psycho-anthropology of religion, the early anti-psychiatrist, Otto Rank, while deeply concerned about contradictions between material and spiritual life, recognized the political role of Jesus as a failed liberator and the revelation in the origins of Christianity of intrinsic human values characterized by democratic regard for all persons and love as the basis of community. Rank viewed the collective moral regime of religion to be in continuing conflict with principles of patriarchy, liberal, bourgeois democracy, and Nietzschean <u>ressentiment</u> (1941). Weber stressed the alternative of religious values to the material order in his category of world-rejecting religion, to which early Christianity, viewed with less sanguine rigor than Rank's, belonged (1963: 270). The political-economic aspect of world rejection must be stressed. For, while the immanence of material life in some sustaining form remains, collective adherence to rejection of its dominant forms establishes alternative relations for human society. While Mahayana and particularly Zen Buddhism, among religious philosophies having influence upon the modern critique of Western material life, differ from the extreme form of world rejection Weber observed in Buddhism, detailed study of the significant moral perspective of these Eastern religions lies beyond my focus.

Weber's seminal contribution to the sociology of religion includes his noted analysis of the relationship of religion to the developing economic order of capitalism (1958; 1963). The elasticity of religious ethical laws with respect to economic practices entailed in the changing secular order is basic to the adaptibility of religion. Religion, however, has held a historical role in the formation of a moral order to some degree in conflict with a world molded by forces with no (nonideological) claim to a righteous order for humankind. Organic, material engagement of religious superstructure is required, beyond, for instance, the individual ethical and economic insight of Martin Luther, who considered interest and profit to be connected to the immorality of selfishness and urged frank regulation, during the gestation of capitalism, which he viewed as a moral crisis (Forell 1954: 27-31; Althaus 1972: 108-11). A quintessential example and antecedent of contemporary North American religion and society is Calvin's Reformed Christianity and the social order his church and movement achieved in Sixteenth Century Geneva. In his **Institutes**, Calvin declared the accommodation of divine will, in a civic order at once egalitarian and sternly disciplined. In this practical community, religious intelligence and faith, as totalizing ideology, secured a moral regime integrating the personal and collective in the type of emic system (in large part conscious: see Harris 1979: 37-38) which best exemplifies Durkheim's notion of social cohesion and Toennies' distinction of Gemeinschaft, the social bonding of whole persons based upon intrinsic human qualities (Pappenheim 1959: 66-67).

The Calvinist theodicy meshes with the praxis of community, invoking the righteousness of God mediated through Christ. The individual member of society is called within the community of the righteous as a matter of intrinsic motivation, primarily an internalized rather than externally

enforced morality. The perimeter of this morality, in theory or practice, does not provide a satisfactory perspective on the whole society of our time. Nor is there a simple explanation of the paradoxical contrast in popular cognition, between the depth of the Reformists' connection to a Godly order, suffused with parochialism and individualism and the extroverted, good-works ethic of Catholicism, historically engaged with a broader, more compassionate concept of the human community. Religiosity does not answer for all operative dimensions, which include matters of class, social context, and knowledge-based criteria for moral perspective and action.

As Calvin's Protestantism arrogated to itself a definite relation to civil society, the conflict between religious consciousness and state authority was sometimes blurred. Nevertheless,

> the Puritan belief in predestination was regarded by authorities everywhere as dangerous to the state and as hostile to authority, because it made Puritans skeptical of the legitimacy of all secular power (Weber 1963: 204).

This Dakin confirms, as the result of justification by faith, through imputation of the righteousness of Christ. God alone is the source of righteousness; humans are imperfect and repeatedly err. They cannot become personally justified, for their imperfection is irremediable. However, by internalizing faith in authority beyond that of human beings, they realize liberty from a merely human order. Even in respect to God's law,

> Christian liberty consists in emancipation from the Law. The Christian must rise above the Law and think no more of obtaining justification by it. . . . he still has need of it, but its sole function now is to teach, exhort, and urge toward good. However, it is no longer recognized by his conscience before the judgment seat of God. . . .
>
> Further, Christians do not now obey . . . as if compelled by legal necessity, but, being free from the yoke, they voluntarily obey the will of God (Dakin 1946: 73-74).

As for human regulations,

> From this high vantage ground, Christians have fallen if they allow themselves to be bound with the chains of laws and constitutions at the pleasure of men. Even more emphatically [Calvin] writes,

> "Since by means of this privilege of liberty believers have derived authority from christ not to entangle themselves by the observance of things in which he wished them to be free, we conclude that their consciences are exempt from all human authority" ([Institutes]III.xix.14; Dakin 1946:76).

Derivation of righteousness from a single, superior - if supernatural - source of worldly moral intelligence and fortitude and dependence upon constant dedication to that foundation parallels a coherent, rational, egalitarian, generalizable (i.e., extendable "without contradiction to all wills"), and intrinsic morality, one pillar of a moral structure embracing world society. The humble acceptance of higher moral authority in such an ethical unity can sustain a kernel of moral knowledge unencumbered by a psycho-economy overdetermined by ideological or material interests:

> The doctrine of justification by faith . . . lifts salvation free from the efforts of men, cuts it loose, certainly not from the necessity of obedience, but from its success or failure, and even liberates the sinner from his moods. His ground of salvation is in no sense in himself but in the impregnable rock of God. He fears for his own obedience but has no doubt of the divine faithfulness. The righteousness is not his but Christ's and he believes that Christ was able to obey. Hence of the quality of that righteousness there can be no question. Hence salvation is first acceptance with God through Christ and afterwards obedience and service, and not vice-versa. All the obedience is but the expression of the sinner's appreciation and gratitude (Dakin 1946: 69).

In contrast, and while Calvinism informs a bourgeois political-economy sustained by individualistic ideology, the secular, bourgeois atomism described by Bellah et al. to characterize the individualism of contemporary US society, to which: "the only morality that is acceptable is the purely contractual agreement of the parties: whatever they agree to is right" (1985:39, passim), will not sustain an at once internalized, organic and coherent, universal morality.

The lack of public mindedness, the permeating retreat from the public to the personal, the overwhelmingly reported preoccupation with personal concerns in American life were remarked by Pappenheim (1959: 54-56),

examining the alienation of human effort and commodification of labor-power and daily life described by Marx. (For an early synthesis situating the family in economic structure, see Zaretsky 1976.) Pappenheim, who significantly answers Mannheim's (1936) incredulity respecting the alienation of intellectual and creative work, writing and teaching in particular, affirms the moral calibre of Marx's critique of capitalism's indifference to the human dimension; its reduction of humankind to a means for material gain; its structure of property relationships pervading the life of society and preying upon the moral potential of human community. The historical specificity of alienation, of the estrangement between humans, under capitalism, can be expressed in religious terms:

> "The essence of sin," Paul Tillich wrote, "is disbelief, the state of extrangement from God, the flight from him, the rebellion against him . . . . Man is bound to sin in all parts of his being, because he is estranged from God in his personal center . . . . His intellectual power is as distorted and weakened as his moral power . . . . Intellectual endeavor can as little attain the ultimate truth as moral endeavor can attain the ultimate good. He who attempts it deepens the estrangement" (Pappenheim 1959: 111, citing Paul Tillich, **Biblical religion and the search for ultimate reality**, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956, 55.)

Pappenheim argues that Tillich is misunderstood if interpreted to postulate a universal human alienation and distinguishes Tillich's concept of sin from a non-structural, "less tormenting" concept of sin, used in the plural for indulgence in forbidden pleasures. Tillich's concept is sociological and dialectical in its relation of the individual to an organic whole to which both moral coherence and social knowledge refer, as social processes in which the individual participates. (See, also, Troeltsch 1931: 585-86).

My intent has been to intimate, in a theodicy of Western religion, the dimension of moral structure distinct from the entrenched authority of social institutions other than religious ones. I focused on Calvin as a seminal thinker of Protestant Christianity, which is a major source of religious,

moral, and other cultural characteristics of US society. Before proceeding to contemporary moral conflict in macro-structural perspective, my hypothesis respecting religion should be recalled. As an agency for a popular institution of social knowledge (Robertson 1970: 194-223; Durkheim 1915: 21, 478), religion operates as the primary social institution treating the duties of humankind to one another, within the context of a universal moral imperative. Moral reasoning is not dependent upon religious belief or cosmology, as George Washington recognized, only to caution in his farewell address, appropriately for American society, that:

> Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure [perhaps an allusion to the Unitarians who were to follow in the Presidency], reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle (Bellah 1967: 425).

By and large, in contemporary society, this cultural watershed of morality is an unconscious correlative to more visible religious expression. For the religious mainstream, morality is indeed associated with religious expression and feeling, which in turn are statistically correlated to a personal, moralistic concept of sin or evil. As Bellah et al. (1985) and in somewhat different vein, Lasch (1979) and Slater (1976) suggest, cultural factors other than religion, including 'alienation' (variously construed) and individualism dominate in producing a moral vacuum in North American culture. Religiosity, if anything, negatively correlates to appreciation of universal moral principles such as those valuing human rights and justice (Glock and Stark 1965; Stark and Glock 1968, 1970; Rokeach 1970, 1973; Allport 1965). Religion, as dramatized by the modern fundamentalist sects and religious politics on the left and right, has been relegated to a subordinate, dormant status in a culture heavily dominated by the fetish-laden insinuations of capitalist production, the post-modern analogue to the conquest of religious space noted by Tawney (1926).

Nevertheless, religion, historically and in its contemporarily polarized residue, remains the cultural thread for ethical discourse. In the absence of a prominent social sphere in US society, only the family offers a similar ground for Americans to attach a popular understanding of moral obligation. So long as unions and the work context generally, politics, schools and the law, among other institutions, are severely circumscribed in their moral contexts and atomized presence as well as by their linkage to ruling ideology, religion is unique in its organizing potential for popular resistance. Contrasts with European capitalist societies demonstrate the exceptionality of US society: consider the formative influence upon British political-economic structure of the neo-Marxian ideas expressed by Tawney (1920) and Carr (1951).

What involves religion in my primary theme is the developing realm of religion as a human agency for principles of justice and social morality which integrate the larger world society which Durkheim failed to construct, as he struggled with the science of morality as value-based knowledge of the human community. To the extent religion serves other than moral ends, such as vesting an authoritarian basis for capitalist domestic control, repression and ideology, I view such functioning as evidence of a derivative and overdetermined image of religion, as described by Marx, and treat the infrastructural and primary superstructural stimuli, which themselves inform our thesis of a total moral (or immoral) structure of society. It should be noted that even fundamentalist religious politics accepts a concept of structural sin and immoral social structure, however vociferously these are denied in the New (and old) Right rhetoric with which the religious right has been nominally associated (see Bromley and Shupe 1984). To the extent that either a theodicy based on active moral knowledge or unencumbered ethical

principles themselves represent a relatively weak signal in the totality of human discourse and cultural practice in America, we have evidence of a resistant institution posing a moral alternative to the moral status of the world order.

As we have seen, religious thinking and belief offer evidence of moral structure as a "collective consciousness," sometimes in conflict with institutions expressing the will and interest of different or exclusive classes of society. Civic harmony is an express need on the part of the mass of humanity, no matter what condition of subjugation or oppression they experience. Religious theodicy offers a source of knowledge of the human community and its social factuality in a collective fabric, sui generis. Religion has historically served as a vehicle for change, for resistance and protection, for collective interests in conflict (as well, in overdetermined form, as one for maintaining the status quo.) Fundamentally, religion may be seen as politics, encoded by and large through ideological layers of time. The biblical origins of Western religion in Judaism and Christianity have been seen this way and continue to so inform struggles against dominant power in society. Writes Rauschenbusch:

> If we want to understand the real aims of Jesus, we must watch him in his own times. . . . He spoke for his own age, about concrete conditions, responding to the stirrings of the life that surged about him (1907: 49).

(See Gutierrez, 1973; Miranda, 1974; and Tabb, 1986.) The growth of industrial capitalism in this country, politically conditioned by national independence declared in the year Adam Smith's Wealth of nations was published, begins a recent history of struggle over the morality of social structure in which the vocabulary of religious belief and theodicy has saliently figured.

Troeltsch (in his consummate if dated study of Christian denominations

and social teaching) commented on Christian Socialism,

> which claims to present the demand of Gospel for brotherhood . . . [and] rejects the glorification of the prevailing bourgeois order as one which represents a relative Natural Law which owes its necessity to the fact of sin, and its character of a Divine appointment to the Divine permission. Taught by the modern science of the State and of Society, and by the experiences of everyday life, Christian Socialism sees clearly one thing which Calvinism (which was moving steadily in the direction of Christian Socialism) did not see: that the possibility of a spiritual and ethical development depends entirely upon the substructure of a healthy collective social constitution, and that spiritual factors are very closely connected with physical and economic factors (1931: 726-27).

Having alluded to the currency of the new academic social science of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries - and of the concomitant awareness of social struggles during the growth of industrial capitalism, Troeltsch focused on the parallel of religious enlightenment to the dialectical, reflexive sociology of knowledge by which, as we have observed, Durkheim's moral science needs amendment:

> The old Christian theories of the nature of Society have been handed down through the centuries . . . and until the present day are continually being repeated, with a naive ignorance of the world situation, in spite of the wholly altered practical position in Christian ethics. Thus Christian Socialism alone has broken through these theories, and forced men to think out afresh the social ethic of Christianity and its relation to the actual changes in the social order. It has laid bare the worm-eaten condition of the previous conventional Christian ethic, which, at its best, offered something for the ethics of the family and the individual, but which, on the other hand, had no message for social ethics save that of acceptance of all existing institutions and conditions . . . (1931: 727-28).

The failure of religious ethics to assert its proclaimed superior righteousness, by consistently challenging those institutions, is parallel to the failure of sociology to do the same and to the capitulation of founding insights in social science to structural-functionalism and the political-economy of conservative instrumentalism. Both sociology and religion partake of the character of "state ideological apparatuses" conditioned by the capitalist state, which maintains class domination for reproduction of exploitative economic relations (Poulantzas and Miliband

1972: 250-53; Althusser 1971). My approach is Gramscian, in opposition to the rigidity of Althusser's structuralism. Gramsci observed the similarity of religious populism to radical social knowledge and perceived Marxism as a "crowning point" of the movement of intellectual and moral reformation derived from the Reformation of Luther and Calvinism (Gramsci 1971: 394-95; see also Rauschenbusch 1907: 7-8). While cognizant of the tensions implicating religion in the repressive regime outlined by theorists such as Althusser and conceived in the German ideology (Marx and Engels 1970), Gramsci's contribution lives in his conception of organic intellectuality among the resistant masses and the ongoing struggle for apprehension and definition of the social order, between oppressor and oppressed. Religion figures prominently in popular, emancipatory philosophy, articulating this resistance (1971: 323-329).

Gouldner's critique of sociology charged functionalism - the fate of modern sociology which has become, in effect, a state ideological apparatus or instrument of ruling ideology - with treating values "as transmissibles rather than emergents" (1970: 423). Unfortunately, Gouldner fails to articulate the emergent quality of a sociology of morals, in spite of his attempt to participate in a reflexive, radical sociology. Thus, his discussion of morality bogs down in the pertinacity of his critique of classical and academic sociology, with his constant portrayal of 'morality' as a category of hegemonic ideology and reduction of early theory (particularly Durkheim's) to the incipient functionalism fully materialized in Talcott Parsons and other targets of C. W. Mills' stirring broadside (1959). Yet Gouldner remarks Durkheim's earnest promise of a sociology of morals in contrast to the conspicuous failure of "Academic Sociology" to develop the same which, insightfully, he attributes to the likelihood that the investigation of moral values would undermine the illusion of their

autonomy from the whole structure of society (1970: 140-41). Seeing Durkheim as the originator of "value-free" social science, Gouldner perceives the transmutation of sociology from Comte to Durheim as that from an express "religion of humanity" to "a conception of the social order, which premised that society itself was the godhead and that social order depended on the creation and maintenance of a set of moral orientations that were essentially religious in character" (1970: 134-35). Altogether, Gouldner seems to paint a self-contradictory portrait, in his adroit but overbalancing perspective. He seemingly describes Durkheim's metacognitive advance as a moral retreat, denying the emergent quality of informed moral reasoning as social science bearing human values. Gouldner's metaphoric designation of Durkheim's attempted positing of humankind's interest in social coherence as 'religious' exhibits the former's pejorative view of religion as an irrational drive susceptible to 'sublimation'. Rather than affirm the inchoate moral-structural vision which Durkheim pursued and which Gouldner's contemporaries under critique do not, while searching for the reasons for Durkheim's lapse into what may be read as appeasement of the status quo, Gouldner faults Durkheim anachronistically for amoral instrumentalism. Certainly, Durkheim's **Moral education** (1973) raises troubling and stimulating questions which continue to ride the dilemma between individual freedom and responsibility to the social collective (see Kohlberg 1983, but see Gordon 1985: 264-65). Nevertheless, Gouldner notes the emerging rapport between Marxism and religion, according more 'complex' regard for religion's transformative potential as social knowledge (1970: 452).

Returning to Troeltsch on Christian Socialism,

> all the interior problems of the Christian ethic . . . have been reawakened. Once again we are faced with the question: how far is it at all possible for
> the faculty of thought and of the Ethos, of faith and of the world outlook, to oppose the natural processes of social development, and to

> overcome and shape them, both from within and from without? Is it possible that ideal laws of the Ethos and of the Divine "nature of Humanity" can overcome, or at least affect, the ordinary natural laws of social development? Can it be, after all, that that which is humanly possible [here Troeltsch most closely paraphrases and summarizes Marx] forms the limit of that which is ideally necessary? Is there, in fact, any real hope of a Christianity for the majority of mankind? (1931: 728).

As Troeltsch observed, development of a meaningful, functioning moral viewpoint is dependent upon conscious knowledge of the contemporary social environment and its moral implications. This is confirmed by the experience of religious activism and progressive leadership in the age of industrial and monopoly capitalism. Walter Rauschenbusch, a New York City Baptist minister, professor, Christian Socialist and prophet of the Social Gospel who became absorbed with the problems of the urban working class in the 1890's depression, expressed the meaning of religion for social existence in the analysis of moral forces in everyday life. A historical perspective is essential for understanding "the real aims of Jesus," he wrote in the words, quoted above, of one tempered by the labor movement. (See Gutman 1976: 96.) For Rauschenbusch, the new realm of sociological knowledge was focused by comprehension of the evolution of social organization and institutions. Implicitly turning Comte on his head, Rauschenbusch wrote that "the modern socialist movement," the struggle of those involved in class conflict and in the interpretation of the actual relations of society's members and institutions, as opposed to their ideological portraiture, is the "first, intelligent, concerted, and continuous effort to reshape society in accordance with the laws of social development" (1907: 195). Rauschenbusch understood the prophetic concept of "social regeneration," by which religion "outran the political intellect by many centuries" (1907: 195), but also

comprehended the differences between church and prophecy and the contradictions between the established social order and the "revolutionary moral power" of Christianity. Whereas Comte constructed a humanistic religion of social science (Aron 1968, 1: 114-124; Gouldner 1970), Rauschenbusch perceived social knowledge engaged in the improvement of human conditions to be affectively and intellectually integrated by "the moral intuition awakened by religion" (1907: 198). The Gilded Age, which bore a generation of sociological literature, paralleled the articulation of the Social Gospel in a wealth of fictional works relating the social problems caused by industrial and monopoly capitalism to Christian ethics (Hart 1950: 166-68; Commager 1950: 171). Kansas minister, Charles Sheldon's In His steps ([1896] 1967) is a stirring and surviving example.

In a synchronous journey through theological and secular dialogues on the world's moral condition and structure, we would encounter perspectives more or less distanced from the literal 'truths' of religion, reflecting emic or etic perspectives (Harris 1979: 32) though not necessarily limited by the orientations classified in Weber's ideal types (1956). James Cone urges the etic position of Feuerbach and Marx, interpreting theology as anthropology and revealing "what theologians mistake for God" (1975: 40) to be latent human nature: "Theology arises out of life and thus reflects a people's struggle to create meaning in life" (1975: 43), which Cone connects to the urging of Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach:

> The philosophers have only <u>interpreted</u> the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to <u>change</u> it [quoted in Cone 1975: 254, n. 9 and 1986: 42].

In a later writing, Cone focuses on the volatile world structure of the 1980's:

> It has been within the context of the churches and the religions of the poor that black and third world theologies have begun to reread the Bible. In this rereading many of us have begun to speak of the

"hermeneutical privilege of the poor" and of "God's bias toward the poor." Although Latin theologians have done the most exegetical work to demonstrate the biblical option for the poor [footnote omitted], a similar concern is shared by most third world theologians. Suh Nam-Dong, an interpreter of the Minjung theology of South Korea, may be quoted as an example:

> "Theological activities do not end with the exposition of biblical texts on salvation or liberation of people by God. In the Bible, the Exodus, the activities of the prophets, and the event of the Cross offer new insights, but these texts ought to be rediscovered and reinterpreted in the context of the human struggle for historical and political liberation today (quoted from Towards a theology of Han, in Kim Yong Bock, ed., **Minjung theology: People as the subjects of history** (Singapore: Comm'n on Theological Concerns of the Christian Conf. of Asia, 1981), 53-54; Cone 1986: 41).

An earlier American writer, Jane Addams, known for her successful efforts to link reflexive social investigation with empowerment through the community centered settlement house, disclosed the political basis of religion from an emic perspective:

> Jesus had no set of truths labelled "Religion." On the contrary, his doctrine was that all truth is one, that the appropriation of it is freedom.
>
> . . . there is a distinct turning among many young men and women toward . . . simple acceptance of Christ's message. They resent the assumption that Christianity is a set of ideas which belong to the religious consciousness . . . to be proclaimed and instituted apart from the social life of the community. They insist that it shall seek a simple and natural expression in the social organism itself (Addams 1965: 40-41).

G. The immorality of contemporary world social structure

The structure of the world today has an immoral face. It is based upon dominance of much if not all of the world's wealth and many if not all of its peoples by 'impersonal', private economic institutions, backed by state organs representing the interests of those institutions. This support, operating behind a facade of democracy, takes the form of uncontrovertably

immoral conduct: the systemic denial of human rights, from covert political manipulation toward the end of popular disfranchisement to the calculated assassination of populist political leaders, intellectual workers fostering conditions for populist democracy and publicists of human rights violations; to genocide committed against noncombatant populations in centers of popular rebellion or territories out of the control of imperial client-states. Scarcely any shade of violence, abuse or iniquity in between is omitted. The principle of class dominance depends upon the entire panoply of human wrongs and stands in moral dichotomy to transcendent principles of morality, beginning with the intrinsic value and centrality of all life. Dominance and repression, as principles of the world social order, demand the practical consequence of subjugating the value of innumerable lives and the human dignity and worth of classes of people to the property interests of the controlling economic institutions. The latter include the legal constructs of capitalist instrumentation which substantially order civil (and bellicose) life on this planet, particularly business corporations and financial institutions involved in foreign investment and the higher strata of the capitalist class and its brokers of organized power. The protection and reproduction of the system itself meshes with its exploitative production of wealth, which thrives in the humanly unproductive areas of armaments and demand stimulation. Repression, institutional violence, and usurpation of, particularly, the center's domestic cultural production are coordinated alternatives for negating the development and expression of human values, understanding, and organized emancipatory conduct which would threaten the structure of class domination. That domination is currently in crisis both globally and within domestic US culture and society.

Mische and Mische (1977), writing without explicit dependence on the Marxist analytical tradition but with clear neo-Marxist allusions, while failing to deal adequately with superstructural conflict, offer a refreshing synthesis of moral and religious value on a structural level as well as respite from the "hermeneutic circle" of critical, dialectical social theory (see O'Neil 1972: 262-63). The Misches avoid explicit adoption of a class analysis, yet effectively affirm the existence of class struggle, though arguing its "bias" as a concept, to the effect that:

> elite rule is only based upon some self-seeking motive of "haves" to preserve their power by preserving the status quo, [missing] the other side of the powerlessness of national leaders to radically reorder present corporate priorities (1977: 187).

We can gain more from a detailed look at this work's positive merit than from a self-serving exercise in rejoinder through a point-by-point treatment of Marxist theory. The Misches' failure to derive the world order they describe from the material relations of production marks the pragmatic as well as macrostructural emphasis of their work, which articulates their moral thesis with instructive clarity. The authors base their structural hypothesis on the concept of the national security state, a type which describes both superpowers and also characterizes the general contemporary state engulfed in the fiscal, commercial and military interpenetration and competition, in an existing world order "of dependent relationships between allegedly independent sovereignties that are dominated by raw economic, monetary, and military power rather than by law" (1977: 64).

The authors' objective is to outline progress, largely through 'grass-roots' and enlightened associational 'networking' and political action, towards a different, moral world order

> of relationships determined by law and based on universal social justice for all persons; an order whose operative principles embrace the centrality and sovereignty of the human person (1977: 64).

Particularly because the Misches write in the nontheoretical language of 'grass-roots' people and of both religious and nonreligious social activists generally cognizant of the world order of dominance and oppression which informs my thesis, it is important to situate their contribution both critically and sympathetically within a post-Durkheimian science of morality.

The question of legality is outside the scope of this thesis, in which I have stressed the moral perspective of the social totality. Nevertheless, the authors' succinct recognition that, despite all efforts to rationalize hegemonic conduct under the trappings of law and apart from the superstructural dependency of law itself (Tigar and Levy 1977; Kairys 1982), the world order does not abide by law extrinsic to the functioning of material, political-economic relationships, is an important one. This fact of lawlessness is profusely substantiated by current history, but suppressed by the powerful ideologies justifying the status quo to privileged working class majorities in the dominant nations, above all, the US. (It is the erosion of that privileged working class, particularly unionized industrial workers in the US, which marks an era of crisis domestically as well as world-wide.) Thus, the Misches supplement their characterization of a moral social order with the rational dimension of undissembled legality, ultimately expressed in functioning decisional and effective legal institutions on the world order (1977: 193-94; compare Durkheim 1973a: 76, 1915: 494).

Durkheim related morality inextricably to society, which is the "only possible goal of moral conduct" (1973a: 93; and see 1915: 473). Morality consists in surpassing individual human nature (1915; 1973a). Morality, then, is a value-oriented measure of society itself. For Durkheim, as we have seen, the questions of contingency or mutability of such value are obscurred by his myopic view of the epistemology of social facts. As the evidence of transnational imperialist structure and the Misches' construct of the

"national security straitjacket" show, Durkheim's moral structuralism can be epistemologically founded at the level of world society, of humanity itself. Despite the inadequacies of the authors' analysis of hegmonic power and, thus, of their populist proposals, their juxtaposition and linkage of macro-structural moral principles and world-system theory embody a meaningful moral science made logically self-consistent by its explicit totalization for all humanity and the encompassing social structure.

As did Troeltsch, Rauschenbusch, Gouldner and the liberation theologists (see Tabb 1986; Buhl and Fierher 1985; Sweezy and Magdoff 1984; Hertz 1984; Kovel 1984; Shaull 1984), and as was distantly approached in Durkheim's pursuit of a value-based social science (1915: 469-96), the Misches noted the connection between Christianity and Marxism:

> Through mutual involvement in the Liberation Movement, each is discovering that some of its most dearly held tenets are held in common, e.g., the dignity and value of the human person and the rightful role of the human person as "co-creator"/"subject" of history. The fact that the Liberation Movement has provided a meeting ground and basis for furthering such Marxist-Christian dialogue is in itself an important step in building a more viable human community. Continued efforts to develop a shared ethic and philosophic approach are of critical importance in laying the foundation for a more human world order (1977: 179)

National Liberation pertains to the array of strategies correlative to third world peoples' demands that "'the development <u>process itself</u> be consistent with humanizing goals'" (1977: 178, citing Freire 1970, 1973). The "concern for human values as a criterion for economic decision making" and for decisional procedures as well restores a holistic, ethically vested field of social understanding reflecting the collective human interest of vast majorities of people presently denied self-determination in the shaping and function of the conditions in which they live. These majorities, in spite of pervasive national mythology to the contrary, include the people of the US. As power is dramatically polarized in the order of class domination, so

knowledge, particularly moral knowledge, has been truncated, corresponding to the powerlessness of the masses whose conditions of exploitation and repression structurally define a world order bereft of moral rectitude. Gramsci and modern cultural theorists such as Freire, Giroux and Aronowitz can assist identifying the material and mental practices in the daily life of dominated social classes. The evolving harmonization of Marxism - seen as the dialectically self-developing, critical, historically conscious, emancipatorily reflexive comprehension of human conditions as consequences of dynamic social relationships - and Christian social ethics - seen as the articulation of universal human values in the systemic context of social relations and indicating the moral dimension of human emancipation from oppression and other structural evil - is a movement toward recovery and advance of human knowledge which is a precondition for collective perception of and contest over the distribution of power in society.

The Misches' "strategies for a just world order" (1977: 277-329) appear to fall short of what might overcome the tremendous force and the pervasively subtle instrumentalities of the powers which rule US society and which impose their dominance over most of the world, including the setting of competitive conditions in which any alternative, non-capitalist national society (or domestic non-profit enterprise) must survive (see 1977: 148-154; Burbach 1984; Castro 1984; Chomsky 1985; Munslow 1983; Schirmer 1986; Wallis 1985; Werner 1985). This is especially true for the authors' apparent trust in institutional change, particularly toward eliminating what the authors see as the primary obstacle to a new world order: the absolute sovereignty of individual states in a system

> in which nations vie <u>against</u> one another in the protection of their own interests, and, thereby, threaten human survival and obstruct human fulfillment (1977: 239).

But, as other authors who cite the modern rapprochement of Christianity and

Marxism indicate, the tendencies and projections of activism for social justice in different thematic and geographical contexts represent the engaged consciousness of many.

Both in the authors' deemphasis of repression, ideological obfuscation, and other negative factors affecting the unconscientized majority and in their concern for the morally truncated knowledge and power of the elite, noted above, their practical and humanistic orientation is buttressed by theoretical interrogation of the limits of hegemonic ideology and the contours of popular and intellectual resistance (Gramsci 1971; Freire 1970, 1973; Aronowitz and Giroux 1986; Cherryholmes 1985; Giroux 1981, 1983; Gottdiener 1985).

What Mische and Mische, alluding to Latin and Sanscrit etymologies, describe as "authentic religion" relates the epistemological quality of moral science and the converse, religious character of the sociology of knowledge to an active morality consistent with the structural principles of justice and the centrality of life over property. Authentic religion

> is concerned with a vision and celebration of the essential relatedness and oneness of all existence. It points toward a potential and destiny that transcend the immediate evidence of brokenness and incompletion. Authentic religion is developed in the humble awareness of participation in reality and meaning greater than self and beyond measurable physical, social, political or economic relationships. It is a consciousness that carries with it a sense of accountability . . . to the greater whole in which one is co-participant (1977: 333).

Here is not some vague or supernatural essence, but a potentially collective conscious awakened and inspired by the full human measure of moral awareness and will. Richard Flacks' characterization of the 'activist' as a social type, pursuing a moral vision enlarged to global dimensions, presents a parallel to authentic religion in wholly secular terms. Arguing for reflexive, value-based social science, Flacks proposes

> as a working proposition that were it not for the influence of socialism, anarchism, pacifism, radical democracy, and related

> ideological currents on activists, intellectuals, artists, preachers, and teachers, there would be precious little in American culture that socializes its members (below the elite level) for social responsibility (1983: 353).

Despite Mische and Mische's retreat from enunciating the components of struggle against the world order from a revolutionary perspective, they render a subtle but clear explanation of the lack of progress toward a new moral order, which goes beyond their fullest analysis:

> true religious values are "subversive". The deepest spiritual values of most major religions, if promulgated and lived, would subvert the ability of independent sovereign states to survive the multiple competition in the present lawless global arena. The love of neighbor, in practice, the search for truth in practice could rock the foundations of today's national security structures (1977: 229).

In political dialogue itself, "human-religious values are 'subversive'," because, if "widely implemented as criteria for public policy, they would subvert" the capacity of sovereign but interdependent nations to survive the competitive military and economic balance of power toward which the "national security state" framework is oriented (1977: 209). To the insight that morality and authentic religion (encompassing the search for true social understanding which informs morality's application to the material world) are subversive, the authors fail to juxtapose the profound and permeating ideological influences and other hegemonic forces of repression and suppression, to a degree even neo-Gramscian theorists concede to obstruction of anti-hegemonic struggle. The Misches do not readily admit the measures of violence and psychological tyranny found in the periphery and center in different proportions, in the modern order of imperialism. Still, the authors use the word 'subversive', intending its undiminished efficacy in suggesting the context of somber malevolence accompanying the peremptory identification of 'subversion' and 'subversives' by the ruling class and its authoritarian servants. (See Barthes 1967: 25-26.) The Misches' continue:

> To allow the free and full implementation of fundamental human/religious

> values such as the primacy of individual conscience, or the centrality and inviolability of the individual person, would subvert the "logical" mobilization for national security values. The subversion [sic] power of other religious values is also clear. What if the people, spurred on by their religious faith and spiritual growth, insisted that national leaders design policies that would embrace the solidarity of all humankind; or the responsibility <u>in justice</u> to every member of the human family; or a commitment to embrace truth whatever and wherever it may be, even when embarrassing to the government? What would happen? The answer is quite simple: the nation-state, as presently constituted, could not survive. Its economic and monetary institutions would collapse. Chaos would reign. Thus, today's national security elites have little choice but to utilize rhetoric, political harassment and national security ideologies to silence vocal advocates of such values (1977: 229).

The label and relation of 'subversion' is not a mere semantic matter. It is a matter of torture, secret imprisonment, and violation of human rights on a massive scale, directed precisely against those persons, including many religious, labor, and political leaders and educators, who subject the ruling order to moral critique (e.g., see Chomsky and Herman 1979; Lernoux 1980). From Central America, where domination by US "interests" is under revolutionary challenge in the 1980's, refugees flee violence and assassination - an estimated 200,000 Salvadorans and Guatemalans since 1980, seeking safety in the US and elsewhere. Some are received by religiously connected US citizens, morally committed to civil disobedience calculated to save lives - lives which are threatened by the policy and with the complicity if not direct intent of the US government. US sanctuary workers face arrest, prosecution, and long imprisonment.

> What lies behind this strong move of the federal government against grass roots church people - lay and clergy?
>
> In every case the refugees arrested were persons who had fled the violence in their homeland, violence which has taken over forty thousand Salvadoran and twenty thousand Guatemalan lives since 1980. . . .
>
> In every case the refugees had lost children, brothers or sisters, parents, relatives, or friends to soldiers or death squads and had a well-founded fear of prosecution," believing they would be killed if they did not flee. This is the wording of the Refugee Act of 1980, the U.S. law which says refugees who flee to this country under those conditions shall be granted asylum . . . .
>
> In every case the refugee family is voluntarily sharing their story, speaking to interested groups in the area of their sponsoring church

> about the situation which caused them to flee their homeland. (It is their message about a violent, repressive government and military - funded in significant part by the United States - that probably led to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents singling them out for arrest in the government crackdown on the sanctuary movement (Burks 1986: 293).

Burks adds that some 50,000 Christians in 160 churches across the United States have joined the sanctuary movement, in defiance of the US government's attempt to silence its Central American victims and to stiffle domestic dissent, for which it can rely upon federal judges willing to accept the offical characterization of politics and violence in Central America. 'Subversion' is an emotionally loaded word, depending upon the class-affiliation of the hearer. For the US business oriented bourgeois (as for the Argentine, for example, in the 1985 film, the "Official Story") or the well-indoctrinated "middle-class" person, a 'subversive' is equivalent to a 'Communist' bent on overthrowing everything bourgeois life and sentiment value. But for the North American dissenter, perhaps a past protestor against the war in Southeast Asia; perhaps the victim of secret "police red files", denied employment through semi-private channels for investigating 'subversives'; or for any person driven by strong moral conscience to disobey authority in pursuit of universal ethical principles, these words stand for the authoritarian threats and deeds of suppression and punishment, against those who defy the prerogative of those in power to mold the 'truth' and command unquestioning allegiance. US governmental suppression of the left has a long history (see, for instance, Preston 1963).

The failure of moral courage to 'subvert' injustice, however, also has its price. 'Subversion', as the Misches explain, goes in two directions:

> in the very failure to respond and speak out against human injustices, true religious values are successfully subverted by the values of national self-interest. To condone, or silently abide, lying, stealing, false pride, hate, murder, violence or injustice on the part of the state (regardless of the national security rationale being used), while condemning it in individuals, is to feed a cancer that will eat away at

> the flesh and soul of spiritual life till there are but dead bones and emptiness - a spiritual vacuum impotent to inspire faith in God or to motivate human behavior on the side of life and humanization (1977: 230).

It is important to recognize that the authors here describe a social-psychological pattern or social fact, to use Durkheim's concept. The authors explain one of the salient dilemmas of American culture, the ubiquity of religion and professed Christianity and moralism (Bellah et al. 1985: 219; Williams 1980: 2) in contrast to the massive acquiescence and, if political form can be distinguished by passivity or failure of will, democratic complicity in the structural immorality of the nation-state, as described by inquiry into the world order dominated by the US. (Compare Lens 1983.) The population of the imperialist center has entered a collective, Faustian complex; a moral schizophrenia akin to that collective illness named by Karen Horney (e.g., 1937), an early and brilliant if subdued critic of the social ethics and psychological defects of modern capitalist culture. (A related concept, adding another dimension to the analysis of mass failure of moral responsibility is that of existential psychiatry, the double-bind. See Laing 1969.) The Misches indicate the dual operations of authentic religious tendencies being subverted and the harmful substitution of religious movements aimed at "personal salvation or growth at a time when the crises are global and communal as well" (1977: 228, 230). I will return again to this theme.

Lastly, the Misches' lucidly connect social understanding and morality, intimating that truth-seeking is inherently integrative, combining rational intelligence with a morality based upon the value and interrelatedness of all life:

> The authentic religious impulse . . . is actively truth-seeking in both a deeply personal sense and in its mode of participation in the human community.
>
> To be truth-seeking is to be empty and open. [Compare, respectively,

> Zen Buddhism, (Watts 1957), Freire's dialogical pedagogy (1970), Rogerian teaching (Rogers 1961), and Barthe's "writing degree zero" (1967b).] It is to trust that persons are called to love, unity, justice, truth (words used to describe God) and that these can be realized if we do not allow self-centered attachments to obstruct the way. To be truth-seeking is to be able to assess our most cherished assumptions and move beyond idolatrous attachment to them, including an excessive attachment to nationalism and ideology (1977: 343-44).

However, formal education and humanistic educational goals are subordinated to "national security needs," including inculcating the belief in young citizens that their country is superior to others. True education, as authentic religion, would be subversive:

> In the present nation-state structure, to effectively lead students out toward universal love and to have students really seek the truth in studies of history and comparative government, to have them explore a universal application of a human ethic, to have them truly seek solutions to problems that will work to the common good of humankind rather than the immediate benefit of their own nation, would be labeled subversive. Teachers cannot expect to be successful in teaching an ecological ethic when they must defend or remain silent about the massive ecological destruction rendered in the name of national security by their nation against another in "foreign" and "enemy" lands. Teachers cannot expect to be effective in teaching brotherhood or sisterhood when they must defend or be silent about their nation's war policies, armaments sales and expenditures, and injustices perpetrated against brothers and sisters in other nations in the name of "national interests."
>
> . . . only when educators . . . are freed from the psychological, political or community pressures which make such teaching a "subversive" activity will they be able to truly approach holistic educational goals (1977: 225-26).

C. Wright Mills wrote:

> The very enterprise of social science, as it determines fact, takes on political meaning. In a world of widely communicated nonsense, any statement of fact is of political and moral significance. All social scientists, by the fact of their existence, are involved in the struggle between enlightenment and obscurantism. In such a world as ours, to practice social science is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth (1959: 178).

If we expand Mills' term, "social scientist," to include all potential sharers of social understanding, democratically pursued (in the manner of authentic religion or of humanist, reflexive sociology), then we can understand how the possibility of knowing the truth divides humankind in

accord with the political-economy of class society, between enlightenment and obscurantism. Similarly, religious theodicy may be divided between authentic religion including emic understandings of human universals and instrumental religion, mixed heavily with ruling ideology and the mass psychologies of oppression.

Thus, in a holistic view of the world system speaking to anti-hegemonic sentiments and incorporating if not elaborating on a class analysis of world economic structure and its implications for morality, the Misches synthesize a perspective of moral values based upon social justice on a global scale, founded on value-laden knowledge on a similar scale. It is religion, or "authentic religion", which cements the knowledge of a globally interrelated human community and the centrality of life with the moral import of affirming these truths and of actively relating them to knowledge of the existing inhumane and unjust global social structure and its component institutions and ideologies. Authentic religion and truth-seeking do not prevail in US society, due to social tensions which may be summarized in the character - and ruling class characterization - of humanist values and truth-seeking as 'subversive', 'dangerous' and appropriate grounds for suppression. Plenary cultural reproduction of nationalism and other ideological tenets comprising a civil religion of the status quo polarize the popular imagination and consensus, so that 'subversive' learning, discourse and belief encounter omnipresent and deep-seated obstruction and countervailing hegemonic obfuscation as well as repression.

'Religious' phenomena - major churches, movements and sects, and interpretive webs - joining personalist religiosity and capitalist ideology - are widespread in US society, presenting the dangers Mische and Mische noted and informing a civil religion which seizes the national forum and even the

identity of moral knowledge, dislodging and expatriating authentic religion and morality into the penumbra of 'subversion', where the latter are received and defined by opinion formed through hegemonic apologetics, nationalism, individualism, anti-communism, 'consumerism', sexism, racism, parochial self-righteousness and religious exclusivism, anti-semitism and other forms of xenophobia and hate-mongering which comprise the watershed of mythic metalanguages of oppression, congruent with and instrumental to the capitalist order. I cannot, in this thesis, treat the historical dichotomy of religious phenomena, in which various popular and institutional elements assume the role of sustaining an unjust social order. My stress is on the genuinely transcendant status of certain 'universal' principles shared by religion and moral thinking. The obstacles to the latter evince hegemonic intrusion, ideologically overdetermining (without renaming) aspects of popular religious experience. It is significant, however, that the politicos of hegemony, the corporate Right and its ideologues, have developed material relationships with the religious Right which serves so aptly to police popular discourse and opinion against 'subversive' encroachments. Negative correlations exist between both radical or progressive political opinions and the structural moral principles discerned by Kant and other observers of religious ethics and described by the Misches, and conventional religious experience (Stark and Glock 1968, 1970; Glock and Stark 1965).

Rokeach has written that organized religions teach contradictory beliefs,

> on the one hand . . . mutual love and respect, the golden rule, the love of justice and mercy, and to regard all men as equal in the eyes of God. On the other hand . . . that only certain people can be saved . . . that only certain people are chosen (1970:15).

Rokeach borrowed from Gordon Allport a typology of religious orientation which parallels the Misches' distinction of individualistic from "authentic"

religion:

> The extrinsic outlook on religion is utilitarian, self-centered, opportunistic and other-directed. The intrinsic, in contrast, includes basic trust, a compassionate understanding of others so that "dogma is tempered with humility" and, with increasing maturity, "is no longer limited to single segments of self-interest" (1970: 21).

Rokeach applied this typology to empirical findings that religious persons tend to be less humanitarian, more intolerant towards racially or ethnically different persons, and more punitive toward "criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals," and persons with psychological difficulties. Those who identify themselves as members of religious organizations "express more intolerance . . . than do non-believers - or even [in his studies in England] Communists" (1970: 16). Although he failed to inquire into the relationship between secular social structure and religious orientation, Rokeach's conclusion confirms the moral demography suggested by the Misches' analysis of the world order's effects upon religion:

> The fact that religious people are more likely to express antihumanitarian attitudes, bigotry and anxiety . . . may . . . be interpreted as the end result of the emergence of the extrinsic rather than the intrinsic orientation toward religion. They also suggest that, in most people, the extrinsic orientation dominates (1970: 22-23).

The evidence on nonbelievers and Communists suggests a greater degree of freedom in these respondents from a world view based upon the economic opportunism and self-centeredness which capitalist ideology holds necessary for worldly survival. The dehumanizing premises of capitalism entail the acceptance of structural social sin as the social norm. Are anti-humanitarian beliefs the consequence of an extrinsic outlook on religion or is the latter a concomitant of an amalgam of anti-humanitarian attitudes, which generally occur together? It appears that the world view impressed upon citizens of the United States, at the kernel of world imperialism, tends to be manifested in 'extrinsic' religious orientation. The overwhelming public approval of capital punishment - which is opposed on principle by only about one ninth of

the population, based upon a recently taken and well-publicized poll fairly consistent with others in the last few decades - distinguishes the US, one of few modernized nations retaining the death penalty. Harsh punishment and revenge are thematic traits of authoritarian thinking. Further, legal conflict over the constitutionality of the death penalty has stressed findings that those who approve of it tend to be biased, as jurors, for the prosecution with less tolerance or appreciation of civil liberties than those excluded from juries due to their principled opposition to capital punishment. See **Grigsby v Mabry**, 569 F Supp 1273; 52 US Law Week 2151 (1983). Similarly, studies repeatedly suggest that under half of all Americans support freedom of speech and assembly, the right to due process of law, and other legally established elements of civil liberty in the US and that fewer persons yet are tolerant of unpopular groups' exercise of those rights (UPI, **Saginaw News**, Jan. 2. 1984).

A treatment of anti-communism as the heart of contemporary US civil religion as well as dialectical inquiry into the psychology of ressentiment (Nietzsche 1966, 1967; Kaufmann 1974; Spivak 1976; Reich 1970; and compare Dworkin 1983) suggest that the traditional denominational orthodoxy and the fundamentalist and new Christian Right each manifest the cultural overdetermination described in Marx's **Contribution to a critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of right"**, augmented by modern ideology designed to contain a population otherwise open to questioning and dissent. (It may be said that the Reagan administration has perfected the big lie and orchestrated propaganda mill which so well served Hitler, beyond the obvious cues of fascism and into the camp of bourgeois democracy.) The concept of overdetermination, adopted by some Marxist theorists of ideology (that is, radical sociologists of knowledge), is explained in the translator's glossary to Althusser's **For Marx**:

> Freud used this term to describe the representation of the dream-thoughts in images privileged by their condensation of a number of thoughts in a single image . . . or by the transference of psychic energy from a particularly potent thought to trivial images . . . Althusser uses the same term to describe the effects of the contradictions in each practice . . . constituting the social formation . . . on the social formation as a whole and hence back on each practice and each contradiction (Althusser 1977: 252-53).

Remembering Althusser's earlier definition of ideology as "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (1971: 162), we can associate status quo-serving religious expression with overdetermination of the contradictions between human solidarity and desire for fulfillment as generalizable moral claims, the exploitative, alienating relations of capitalist production, and the larger structures of imperialism, including its demands for passive complicity, intimated by Mische and Mische. The authoritarian moralism and self-righteousness of the religious and secular Right attempt to resolve the contradictions of poverty, crime, disease, imperial warfare, joblessness and indescribable alienation - conditions commanded under modern capitalism in crisis - through the lofty pretensions of two-party demagoguery, business boosterism, and the refined appeal of commercial advertisements, which swallow the legitimacy of culture itself, regurgitating capitalism's ersatz aesthetic of commodity fetishism. An 'extrinsic' or personalist moral and religious orientation condenses unarticulated ideas in a trivial but subjectively satisfying one, one which, unlike in Freud's conception, has a shared, social existence among a community of believers. At the same time, the resolved image imaginatively reconstitutes the social formation, as "an expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering . . . the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions," yet, an illusion (Marx 1843b).

It is necessary to refer the reader to Althusser's sometimes strained

but seminal pursuit of the operations of ideology (1971: 127-86) and his specific discussion there of religion. However, his later treatment of overdetermination relating social institutions within the dominant order offers further illumination, assisting my attempt to distinguish a non-hegemonic form of religion accessible by a science of morality:

> Are not all historical societies composed of an infinity of concrete determinations, from political laws to religion via customs, habits, financial, commercial and economic regimes, the educational system, the arts, philosophy, and so on? However, none of these determinations is essentially outside the others, not only because together they constitute an original, organic totality, but also and above all because this totality is reflected in a unique internal principle, which is the truth of all those concrete determinations (emphasis in original; 1977: 102).

Authentic religion is associated with a morality based upon general principles of justice and values which are constitutive of human integrity, reflexively defined, standards themselves subject to evolution in the pursuit of truth. It is itself engaged in truth-seeking, in order to apply its vision of community to real conditions. Liberation theology, the sanctuary movement, clergy in opposition to Apartheid in South Africa, civil disobedience against nuclear armament and other commitments undertaken with known risk to life and liberty, upon dialogical personal growth through knowledge of worldly relationships tempered by a community of faith, committed to social justice and human values demonstrate the distinct, moral, historical agency of authentic religion as the antithesis of that described by Marx (1843b) and Althusser. There is a similarity to the explicit mission of early social science, not only to understand contemporary civilization, but to direct its improvement or at least ameliorate its conditions of inequality and injustice - in which sociology was by some regarded as synonymous with socialism.

In contrast, the infrastructural connections of religious, moral and ethical ideology can be seen in the organic totality, the whole social formation of the capitalist order. Religion in the form of an imposed

"protestant work ethic" was in conflict with workers' and labor activists' moral perception of capital, during the industrialization of North America (Gutman 1976; Rodgers 1978). Christianity, American individualism, and capitalism are coupled with the work ethic by the New Right, which argues that "liberalism, not they [sic] are really are really the crass materialists" and that it is "liberals" who "deny the spiritual and moral dimensions by rewarding the indolent and penalizing the hardworking" (Hunter 1981: 128-29). Not only are the ends of the ruling class reflected in the individualism of conservative religious and ethical ideologies but the ruling class is active in promoting such ideology, both for direct social control and for artificial increase in the ranks of political conservatism, aimed at a state agenda such as that of the Reagan years, characterized by wholesale insinuation of corporate aims into the mechanisms of government. The political apostles of the Christian Right have received substantial funds from a broad spectrum of corporate America (Koenig and Boyce 1985). While the relationship between the Christian Right and the actual political front of corporate capitalism is complex and at times tenuous (Bromley and Shupe 1984), the ideologues and apologists of the latter have sought out the opportunities for an errant popular political strength which alliance with conservative working-class religion provides. Thus neo-conservative struggle for popular legitimacy, on the terrain of religious thought on economic morality, has been part and parcel of the ideological program of the Reagan era (Kelly 1983; Magrass 1984).

Vocal accusations of 'subversion', consistent with the Misches' thesis, have been uttered by the US administration against authentic religion in the form of liberation theology, as the neo-conservative pursuit of political-religious legitimacy moved into the realm of an epochally

pro-capitalist governmental administration and its attempt to exact allegiance for the projects of imperialism. The well-known profusion of rhetoric in theological territory by President Ronald Reagan and members of his administration has been the subject of continual critical commentary. The general appeal to an overestimated popular audience of Moral Majority members and other fundamentalists (Bromley and Shupe 1984; Brownstein 1986; Magrass 1984) can be distinguised from the more concerted apologetics for current US "anti-communist" campaigns, military and otherwise, to suppress or overturn revolution for national liberation from US transnational domination. An example of the administration's orchestrated propaganda program was the December 16, 1983 meeting with foreign policy staff members of the US Catholic Conference, organized by Robert Reilly, the White House liason to American Catholics, and involving presidential aides and State Department officials including Elliot Abrams, "human rights" chief, and Kenneth Adelman, "arms control and disarmament" director. Some religious leaders were not favorably impressed:

> One church participant complained about "simplistic . . . pure propaganda" presented by a former Maryknoll sister who now repudiates the work of her order, an ex-Sandinista intelligence officer and John Lenczowski of the National Security Council. Lenczowski argued that liberation theology is a major source of subversion in Latin America. "I was frightened by the ideological rigidity of the speakers chosen by the administration," said one church official (Askin 1983b).

Reilly, a career proselytizer for the Right, made his view of proper church doctrine clear in an interview with the National Catholic Reporter:

> (On international issues) I would hope that the church would understand that there is no greater enemy of the heavenly kingdom than the earthly kingdom. Whenever the Marxist-Leninists try to build their earthly kingdom, they do it by destroying the heavenly kingdom. I would hope the church would speak out more forcefully on the irreconciliable antagonism between religion and Marxism-Leninism (Askin 1985c).

That is to say, the churches should restrict religion to being a hegemonic instrument in the form of Marx's "opium of the people," as an ideological

bulwark against emancipation of people from oppression, so that the earthly inheritance of the poor and powerless shall never come (see, too, Magrass 1984; Askin 1983a; Rocha 1983). This is the Reagan administration's theodicy of the rich - which, from appearances of conflict between the Vatican and US Bishops and Latin American theologians and priests, the current Pope seems to have obliged.

The jointed rhetoric of religious anti-Communism did not originate with the Reagan administration any more than did US sponsorship of the neo-colonial, Latin American regimes in which liberation theology emerged, after the Second Vatican Council and the Medellin Conference (see Milovanovic 1985) and long struggle by the working classes oppressed by US multinational interests. A self described evangelical Christian and professor of theology, Franklin Littell perceived the dichotomy which informs my thesis, arguing that it is a myth that America has been a Christian nation and also a myth that religion and the state have been separated (1962; and see Bellah et al., 1985: 219-22). America, Littell contended, has not found its way to a free, pluralist religion but to a civil religion in which secular interests "claim Christianity to be the bulwark of private property and the guard against communism" (1962: 162; and compare Bellah 1975: 124-125).

Liberation theology, for a couple of decades in Latin America with growing influence both in the periphery and in the capitalist center (the US sanctuary movement being a prime example of the latter), constructs a demythologizing world perspective intimating the suffusion of political-economic polarization within the integument of religion. That polarization is congruent with the Marxist concept of class struggle. Liberation theology marks a comingling of Marxist social analysis and Christian ethics, which has escaped neither sympathetic church leaders nor leaders of capitalist hegemony. Brazilian Bishop Pedro Casaldaliga eloquently

revealed both sides of this perspective in an interview published in the National Catholic Reporter:

> The church, consciously or unconsciously, when it loses its evangelical conscience, ends up being manipulated, serving the status quo, alienated. But when it recovers this conscience, it scandalizes, scares and frightens - as it did Nelson Rockefeller when he came to Latin America as a special envoy for Richard Nixon in 1969.
>
> Rockefeller later concluded that it would be very convenient for U.S. policy if the conservative religious sects were to spread, while at the same time the brakes were applied to liberation theology. In his own words, the Catholic church was no longer a trustworthy ally of the U.S. because it was provoking social destabilization. In other words, liberation . . . .
>
> For a new society, a new man is needed. The church concerned itself with souls, but not always with people. Liberation theology has been discovering more and more the importance of the community, of people, helped by Marxist analysis (Rocha 1983).

H. Truth, conversion, moral confrontation and the unity of theory and practice

Knowledge of human conditions nourishes understanding of social relationships and structure, an understanding with conversional and transformative power. Literature contains poignant examples of conversion, from Joseph Conrad's allegorical Heart of Darkness to Charles Dickens' unwittingly socialist oeuvre, including the near perfect conversion story, A Christmas Carol. Conversion of a kind has been the consistent experience of individuals of middle-class background who engage in social investigation or reform, out of compassion for less fortunate people or a sense of justice (Addams 1965; Frank 1949; Bremner 1956). Demonstration of the transformative experience of working-class life, when engaged in a community of shared struggle, is ubiquitous.

A social environment marked both by extreme inequality and the violent tyranny typical of the neo-colonial periphery can be the scene for polarizing

conscientization. El Salvador was conducive to the rise of liberation theology, engaging people in critical learning and personal change. During 1973, a once exclusive Jesuit school took students

> on field trips in sociology courses to see the reality of poverty that they and their families had hitherto been blind to. The school magazine pointed out the conflict of values they had learned in school with those they found at home. Some of the parents reacted.
>
> . . . the secular papers took up the cry of Marxism, and before the month was out the attorney general of the republic had begun an investigation and called various Jesuits to testify about what was taught in the school (Brockman 1982:42).

This conflict was one of many conversional experiences for Catholic Archbishop Oscar Romero, assassinated on March 23, 1980 after the killing of many teachers and religious leaders in El Salvador. His broadcasted speech that day included an appeal "to the men of the army, and in particular to the ranks of the Guardia Nacional":

> Brothers, you are part of our own people. You kill your own campesino brothers and sisters. And before an order to kill that a man may give, the law of God must prevail that says: Thou shalt not kill. No soldier is obliged to obey an order against the law of God. No one has to fulfill an immoral law . . . . The church, defender of the rights of God, of the law of God, of human dignity, the dignity of the person, cannot remain silent before such abomination. . . . In the name of God, and in the name of the suffering people whose laments rise to heaven each day more tumultuous, I beg you, I ask you, I order you in the name of God: Stop the repression (Brockman 1982: 217).

Romero believed that the church had a duty "to speak the truth in the face of lies, to undo ambiguities." He realized that those in the church who spoke out and acted against structural inequality, injustice and repression were persecuted "because the truth is always persecuted." And he recognized that persecution of the church was justified, by the government, in the name of anti-communism (Brockman 1982: 28-29). The character of truth facilitated in the popular church of Latin America is indicated by a letter of Romero's:

> "The most acute form of violence on our continent and in our country is what the bishops at Medellin called 'institutionalized violence' . . . the product of a situation of injustice in which the majority of men and women . . . are deprived of what is needed to live."
>
> This violence is expressed in the day-to-day working of a system that

> takes as normal that progress is possible only by using most of the people as a productive force managed by a privileged minority. Those responsible are both the international structures that condition the national economic structure and those who jealously hang onto their privileges, even by violent means. Responsible also are those who sin by omission, by doing nothing in favor of justice.
>
> "Usually arising parallel to institutional violence is repressive violence, that is, the violence used by state security forces in the measure in which the state tries to contain the aspirations of the majority, violently stifling any show of protest at the injustice we have just mentioned." This violence is unjust because with it the state defends an unjust system and hinders any chance for the people to use their right to govern themselves and to find their way toward institutional justice (Brockman 1982: 129).

The Latin American Catholic Church has been divided over the structural analysis of social strife and over the characterization of priests who work with the poor as communists and fomentors of revolution, while US support of repression of those seeking justice is well-evidenced (Lernoux 1980). Lernoux documented assassination, torture, and arrest of Christian clergy and lay leaders between 1964 and 1978 in Latin America as well as the participation of US multinational corporations in exploitation and repression itself:

> most Latin Americans take for granted: that U.S. foreign policy is run by corporate business.
>
> Thanks largely to United States congressional investigations of the past eight years, that assumption has been amply justified; it can now be seen that many of the men who approved counterinsurgency training for the Latin-American military, assassination courses for the police, and CIA activities against democratically elected governments were also pillars of the U.S. business community (Lernoux 1980: 204).

In its function of obscuring the true nature of the world and both the factual and moral quality of events on a global scale, anti-communism has been a North American civil religion, or, rather, "the state religion for Christians of the U.S. empire," in which dissidents and movements for social change as well as "Neutralism regarding the false theology and demonology of the Cold War" express non-belief and therefore invite repression (Collum 1982: 21).

The connection of social injustice on a world scale with the condition of the poor has travelled from the Latin American to the North American

Catholic leadership (see National Conference of Catholic Bishops 1986). The final version of the NCCB pastoral letter on the US economy is permeated with self-contradiction, between its rejection of the profit motive as opposed to human needs and an improper basis of economic production and its idealist supposition that ethical appeal to corporate and political leadership could reorient capitalism toward "a just international order" and "the common good" which transnational corporations "along with governments and their multilateral agencies, are supposed to serve" (1986: 124). Despite this myopic avoidance of the reality of class struggle - or shrewd circumlocution designed to instruct the spiritual leaders of the lay masses and initiate a basis of independent questioning, the several versions of the pastoral letter have consistently incurred anger and denunciation on the part of US business and neo-conservative ideologues, as ignorant meddling outside theology.

The Vatican of Pope John Paul II and its leading anti-communist ideologist, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, enjoins morality and moral perception of injustice from application to anything beyond individual conscience and sin. The possibility of immoral social structure or institutions is denied and denounced as a sinful thought in itself, characteristic of the Marxism which informs liberation theology; as a notion which attenuates the dogma of individual moral and spiritual capacity (see Kovel 1985; Ratzinger 1986; John Paul II 1981, 1984). Vatican perceptions of social morality conflict with the perspective of Marxism on the human subject and on the function of morality as "always a class morality" until class contradictions have been overcome and forgotten (Friedrich Engels, Anti-Duhring, quoted by Kovel 1985: 19-20). Kovel's defense of Marxist theory from the Vatican's charge that it denies the human subject and moral transcendence offers a close analysis, concluding with the hypothesis that the hierarchical Catholic Church is faced, in liberation theology, with a critique of its historical role in

oppression, a critical confrontation with the makings of a new reformation, relating Marxism to the spiritual dimension of life. On the possibility of "a really human morality which transcends class antagonisms", projected by Engels, Kovel reasons that the basis for such a morality "has to be the universality denied by class morality." He includes in his structural critique "the class morality of the proletariat itself:"

> even if the morality of the proletariat may be more universal than, and so superior to, that of the bourgeoisie, this fact does not, nor should it, justify any and every crime in the name of the revolution (1985: 20).

By its use of Marx's name and accusations of heresy, hegemonic anti-communism aims at closing the channels of truth. Rather than being essentially anti-communist, anti-communism is the enemy of the structural truths which Marxist analysis helps reveal. It is, in other words, not a reply or reaction to revolutionary praxis, but an essential part of the class struggle itself, by way of ideological obstruction of and psychological warfare against social understanding on the part of the exploited. The function of anti-communism as the normatively subscribed state religion of Americans becomes clear from a dialectical examination of discourse on current issues, whenever it approaches the manifestations of structure. In an article on the difficulties of and upsurge in social research by US scholars in Latin America, it is observed that where repressive regimes rule, such as in Guatemala, scholars are subject to death threats as well as severe government restrictions on research. Further, peasants hesitate to answer questions because "they have suffered so much repression, they are afraid," while,

> by comparison, most scholars report that Nicaragua is relatively safe - despite the fact that the U.S. government has issued a "traveler's advisory" concerning dangerous conditions there.
>
> "That is mostly propaganda," says Thomas Walker, professor of political science at Ohio University. "Nicaragua is one of the few Central American countries where the U.S. Ambassador does not have a

bodyguard."

While most researchers say that the US government has placed few obstacles in the way of traveling to Central America, some report that American customs officials detained them and confiscated their research materials when they returned from Nicaragua.

The explanation in the following paragraph of the article says more by way of omission, when connected dialectically with recent history - and says more about the calculated 'objectivity' of the article, than is related literally:

> "They have a right to confiscate material temporarily, in order to translate it and see if you are bringing subversive or pornographic items into the United States," Mr. Walker says. "Very few academics are bringing in subversive or pornographic items. It's just a way of hassling people."

By the foregoing analysis, however, we can recognize the character of 'subversion' in any straightforward information on a surviving, functioning, popularly governed socialist nation, particularly one under attack by the US administration, in a locale which the US has for most of its sovereign existence considered by 'doctrine', and treated, as an appropriate and necessary object of political-economic domination.

Since a number of researchers sense a need to "set the record straight - because the record consists of newspaper accounts or the offical line from Washington," "the newspaper accounts often superficial and the government information tendentious," they document "the devastation, suffering and violence that is going on today," rather than such topics as kinship and folklore. The experience seems to politicize the researchers, a matter reported with journalistic (and editorial) finesse:

> "A lot of U.S. scholarship on Latin America is being written not necessarily from a Marxist point of view, but from a nationalistic one," says Mr. Rosenberg. "Academics who work in Latin America tend to internalize the general Latin American fear of U.S. intervention."
>
> "Some of us argue that the scholarship that is being written today, which is more political and more applied, is still good scholarship," Mr. Diskin says.

So, academics internalize fear - rather than observing the reality of intervention; and the truth - which is political - is suspect for suggesting,

as the pregnant conclusion of intellectual work, that Latin Americans might have reason to fear the United States. Even reporting the same in plain English is 'subversive'. Bellah et al (1985) might respond that the quoted scholars are searching, in vain, for a language to express moral sensibility aroused by responsibility to a human community or center of values beyond individual self-interest. But the pall of controversy over scarcely spoken issues resounds on more than one level of confrontation:

> Says Charles Millett, professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville: "Some of the political research today is analytical and scholarly, and a good deal is not. It is research where you write the conclusions in the United States, and then go down to Central America to do the fieldwork."

The author adds:

> Scholars are also becoming more politically active. They are testifying before Congressional committees for - and more usually against - U.S. policies in Central America, speaking to community groups, writing newspaper and popular accounts of the situation in Central America.
>
> "I've never seen so many scholars who have become political activists as in Latin American studies," says Mr. Carmack. "It's a way of paying back a debt to the people we have studied."
>
> . . . The Guatemala Scholars Network . . . "tries to represent the knowledgeable people in the United States who can make available to the American public the kinds of information the U.S. government either belittles or plays down," says Ms Ehlers, who edits the network's newsletter (Winkler 1985).

Yakes (writing an opinion piece in the same fairly 'liberal' publication, which regularly reports on anti-apartheid activities on college campuses, on the troubles of theologians too progressive for the Vatican to endure teaching at Catholic universities, and on the miserliness of the Reagan administration in respect to education) describes "knee-jerk anti-communism" masquerading as objectivity, in academia:

> There is a connection between the two ideological constructs [anti-communism and value-free science]. Anti-communism requires for its effective penetration of mass consciousness a conservative and apparently apolitical scholarship. Scholarship that is value-laden - that is, political - would reveal anti-communism for what it is: the ideology of our ruling elite. Science that takes values (politics) as given cannot analyze those values, and therefore cannot explain or, more important [sic], challenge them, which is exactly what the powers that

> be want. Value-free scientists proclaim that "radical" science (which in actuality seeks to explain the things that value-free science ignores) is not science at all. It is value-laden and politics is built into its structure, thereby, according to them, rendering it hopelessly biased. The very concepts that a radical might use to study apartheid, such as exploitation, capitalism, imperialism, ruling classes, and probably racism, as well, are inherently political (value-laden) and hence cannot constitute the terms of scientific discourse. Needless to say, these same concepts brand their users communists (Yates 1986).

Winkler, perhaps in deference to the subtle atmosphere of suppression Yates discusses, wrote that US scholars 'internalized' Latin Americans' fear of US intervention. Were she writing about the concern of scholars studying North American cities for the victims of street crime, she would not have used circumlocution or exhibited such neglect of the reality - in order to avoid valuing the phenomenon of urban crime. The menacing US administration which is the proximate cause of Latin Americans' fears, justified by a viciously continuing history of force and repression which Winkler omitted to mention, is a 'subversive' fact. The relation of anti-communism in the US to US ownership of the issue of imperialism was lucidly stated by Yates:

> Nowhere in the industrialized world is anti-communism more the official, state-sponsored ideology than it is in the United States, and nowhere are academics as subservient to state interests as they are here.
> . . . Among the reasons that anti-communism is our official ideology is that it serves to camouflage U.S. imperialism, to maintain the absurd fiction that we are the world's good guys. When we portray communists as the embodiment of evil, we relieve ourselves of the duty to establish the morality of our own actions. They are bad; we oppose them; therefore we are good. The government has repeated this formula, in various guises, and drawn into its net our major institutions - the media, labor unions, much of religion, and education - through repression, through co-option, and through the blandishments of money and prestige (Yates 1986).

Ruling ideology is entangled at every node of cultural discourse. Yates illustrates hegemonic usurpation of moral and intellectual fora at a level which stifles independent thinking and inquiry. Concurring with C. Wright Mills (<u>supra</u>), Collins and Danaher, after examining events in Nicaragua, found that the truth is unavoidably value-laden and the values it communicates are condemnatory of the dominant world order:

The truth is that the Nicaraguan government, despite its errors, is flexible and responsive to the needs of the poor majority. This is the real "threat" posed by the Nicaraguan revolution. If Nicaragua is allowed to establish an example of government serving the poor rather than the rich, it could provide "dangerous" lessons for millions of poor people around the world who now suffer under US-backed regimes (1986).

CHAPTER 3: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

A. Values, ideology, and dialectics.

History and consciousness.

Chapter two concerned the moral dimension of reality, evinced in global social structure, its internal relations, dynamics, and actors. Proceeding from the viewpoint of a reflexive, humanistic sociology and therefore with the objective of collective understanding, my inquiry included a parallel view of ideology and the obfuscation of popular understanding. This bivalent approach is indicated by the dialectical method, discussed in chapters one and two.

Moral cognition is not merely prescriptive but descriptive of human values and ends as relations in the material world. Demonstration of a world comprehensible in moral terms serves ontological and epistemological purposes. As moral understanding of the material world is consistent with critical social science, I continually touch on the historical agency of social knowledge itself. The world we aim to comprehend effects the tools by which we may comprehend it. In particular, history explains the development and distribution of moral understanding, just as it explains the parameters of knowledge instrumental to capitalist production (Braverman 1974; Marx and Engels 1970). As critical theorists have urged, macrostructural study of ideology without reference to the human subject does not provide us with a total picture; it does not illuminate the prospect of human liberation which underlies the moral integrity of Marx's analyses of history and society. Therefore, in chapter three, I will explore the potential for a critical

psychology linking hegemonic structures with the dynamics of personal existence, in particular, with the development of moral cognition.

Cognitive psychology holds a view of the parallel development of rational and moral thought which I shall adopt as a foundation for a critical epistemology of moral knowledge. Jean Piaget, influenced by Kant and Durkheim, contributed a structuralist schema for understanding cognitive development. Others, including the "third force" of humanist psychology which had a progressive impact upon education and Piaget's dedicated exponent in the moral field, Lawrence Kohlberg, are of central importance in situating individual autonomy and realization of human potential within the historical struggle for emancipation from structures of oppression. But it is radical cultural theory, including the critical pedagogy of Giroux and others, which reveals the possibility of changing social conditions, the dialectics of development beyond prevailing social reality, towards Marx's humankind making its own history and people creating new meanings of self and community.

Principled moral reasoning is defined in terms of values, value-based reasoning, and concepts of justice which develop in individuals, under the multifarious influences of a complex society which affects moral and intellectual growth on various levels. If we go beyond positivism, interpreting significant human factors in society both historically and structurally in terms of such generalizations as we can derive about social dynamics, we can substantiate the view that individual development is other than a matter of fortune. It should not need stating that individual differences are not predetermined by convergent forces toward an inexorable result. However, this omnipresent caveat in social theory tends to become the seal and banner of anti-theoretical, anti-intellectual and anti-sociological rhetoric, under the rubric of scholarship or in the naive voice of popular

American individualism. Thus, we may vividly portray the ways in which democracy in the US is illusory. We could show that evidence supports predictable conclusions about citizens who are not registered to, or do not vote, suggesting the narrowing of political options to ones which do not provide encouraging alternatives to those in the less privileged half of American society (see Schattschneider 1960). The works of Mills and Domhoff and more recent research slay the American myth of a classless society (reiterated in social studies textbooks) and reveal enclaves of economic and political power which effectively curtail populist, democratic efforts almost all of the time and exclude third party efforts at working class politics, so that not even a British-style Labour Party, not to mention the variety of popular European leftist parties, is approached here. Still, a North American with the ideological make-up of a typical small business person or of many industrial workers with consumption-oriented lifestyles (see Bellah et al., "lifestyle enclave", 1985: 335) and household income well over the US household mean ($19,074 in 1981, US Bureau of the Census 1982: 429) may acknowledge such matters and yet retort that that anyone can run for office, that there is no express class, occupational or economic restriction on the freedom of any thirty-five year old born in the US to run for the presidency, and, above all, that no unmovable obstacle stands in the way of millions of citizens who do not vote in local or national elections. Those who have argued issues of social justice including the perspective of the 'other', the poor, victims of racism and sexism and others excluded from economic security, for example, recognize the use of these "undeniable facts" to rationalize denial of structural hypotheses drawn from the interpretation of data, as to the existence of ruling circles which shape and determine US politics and policy far beyond the electoral access of the vast majority.

There is much that is patently illogical in the standard ideology about

US democracy which accompanied the capitulation of US social formation to the demands of finance and monopoly capitalism. Still, protest since the embrace of social Darwinism by Gilded Age tycoons to the effect that business is the government of the United States (a progressively truer concomitant of maturing capitalism; see McMahan 1987) receives forgotten nods and little other attention in a nation where history is treated as irrelevant; where its constitutive part in critical understanding renders its study 'subversive' (and where the vocabulary of critical social theory is, to ears and eyes honed from kindergarten on anti-communism, a clarion warning the American mind to brace itself against subversive 'propaganda'). Contrasts provided in the global arena provide leverage for dialectical critique. Voting, the favorite definitive mark of 'Western' democracy, elsewhere has been made a duty whose omission is punishable under law. Far from so doing, government in the US maintains obstacles to voting as well as structures which contradict the supposed ideal of majority rule. Broad awareness of existing contradictions leads to perceiving the structures modulating the half-truths of self-serving descriptions of political democracy in the US. Still, taking the perspective of a poor, elderly, Black American who declares that she does not vote because it does not appear to make a difference for the manner she is treated whether Republicans or Democrats win is an insurmountable task for many white, non-poor Americans.

But to fully counter the denial of social forces - accompanied by the doctrine that granting collective, interpersonal processes the status of scientific fact works a denial of individual freedom - may entail a presentation in depth of the study of society, in effect, the 'argument' of a rigorous introduction to social science. (Compare the problematic reception of structuralism in the US, noted by Piaget, 1970.) Another approach proceeds by dialogical intervention with strictures of thought blocking an open

consideration of human development. We must first appreciate the deeper truth behind the ideology against granting significance to effects of social structure, from the restricted reality of bourgeois democracy to the social causes of crime, another target of conservative obscurantism (see Ryan 1976.) This germ of truth consists in the paucity of community, in the lack of an appreciation of social collective, in the want of a general domain of public interest in US culture. Culture follows the economic order in its exclusion of the collective entity as a matter of faith in ruling ideology. The most powerful, actually existing collectives are those of monopoly capitalism and its political instrumentalities, private enclaves, inter-corporate linkages: an incestuous structure of personnel and resources intersecting with institutions such as the military, law and education, usually presumed to serve a 'harmonious' public interest.

In fact, little in the public sphere unequivocally serves the North American population as against private interests. Compared with other developed nations, we have very little public transportation. Medicine is a private industry which Americans distrust and fear with reason. It is a difficult struggle in the US to maintain any fragment of commonwealth, from roads to education. Utilities are almost exclusively privately owned monopolies. The lay-out of cities and suburbs is privately designed, with minimal public input restricted to 'technical' concerns, for the optimal exploitation of profitable conditions, a prerogative of the ownership of property. The very image of daily reality is composed by business in nearly every detail, for the succinct purpose of exploiting the worker-consumer, the general member of society - from birth to death. The most refined artistic effort is found in advertising, which has become entertainment in itself: the very thing-in-itself antithetical to the means capitalism manufactures out of the most essential human characteristics is reduced to capital's servant. We

are reminded repeatedly of the ethic of private ownership of capital and land, of the ubiquity of profit, and subliminally if not blatantly of the pervasiveness of wage slavery. Our dignity and ethics themselves are for sale. Our welfare system is more miserly and punitive than any in Western Europe, where "social security" embodies the universal right to a social wage. More than anywhere else in the world perhaps, men and women in the United States are islands adrift in a hostile sea, deaf to the continent of humankind, unmindful that they might be those "for whom the bell tolls."

With so little positive experience (outside impoverished ghettos) of community, of an engaged collective identity, of a commonwealth, a shared cooperative enfranchisement in society - all these notions being appropriated by the antagonistic, ruling, owning, managing class and reserved for its structures for control and rationalization of productive life, resources, human 'inputs', and a full environment of goods, Americans fail to see the society sui generis which intrigued Comte and Durkheim and was recognized in some form from ancient times. The dialectical storm of modern philosophy and science has been excluded from the intellectual experience of the great mass of North Americans. Amid their bittersweet ressentiment and barely acknowledged subjugation in a heartless world, Americans refuse to admit the possibility of affective fulfillment in the social field, long displaced by the tawdry fetishism of individual possession, of separation, of hatred. In the early 1960's, a song preached that "love makes the world go around," and a few lonely skeptics wore buttons which read, "Hate." There is a fierce but repressed dichotomy in the American soul, the semiotics of a destroyed culture and banished spirit (to which the radical Black movement of the 1960's replied with affirmation of 'soul'.) Veiled antagonism; competitiveness touted as productivity; defensive greed and insecurity; reduction of everything to zero-sum exchange; and the all-devouring

cash-nexus reign. Love is subversive; pacifists are imprisoned; reductive, individualistic moralism and capitalist self-rationalization walk hand in hand, denying the interpenetration of human lives. Commitment to other human beings becomes the fear of connection, as other persons are twisted into means, and life itself is shorn of meaning, and love shredded in the papermill of deceit which links our society, toiling under contradiction after contradiction, until the human mind is drugged asleep, rarely to approach understanding, which is also subversive and forbidden.

Nature versus nurture, interactionism, and the dialectics of environment.

The world American society daily reproduces is one in which the individual receives little sustenance. The controversy over the primacy of either heredity or environment is a false one. For, as environment changes, its relative impact does, too. But, for North Americans, environment does not nurture the human being, foster development or self-actualization, or engage the individual in the making of her own history. On the contrary, human development is inimical to conditions of structural inequality - the relations of capitalist production which define the material circumstances of American life - and vice versa. If development of 'inherited' potential were truly an aim of the social collective - an inclusive collective taking all persons equally as ends in themselves; if humanity rather than property were the central principle, there would be human development of another order than is seen in the US today.

Thus, while the 'environmental' view was once (positivistically) seen as the progressive one, the dominant historical reality has been the developmental influence of a staid 'heredity': the political-economic environment reproduced by capitalism, an immoral order marked by severe

inequalities, abundant poverty and unemployment, and the dehumanizing lessons of ruling ideology. It is, in such a world, a perverse and squalid contribution that environment will make - not necessarily for all individuals - but for the general condition of humankind. Thus we seek a social psychology of emancipation.

My inquiry has involved a history revealing the immoral structure of imperialism. Giroux writes about the suppression of history, in order to suppress moral consciousness. The separation of values from facts and "the American public's deepening commitment to an ever-expanding network of administrative systems and social control technologies" is related, Giroux argues, to "the present crisis in historical consciousness". Giroux finds little room, amid our ideology of positivism, for "the development of an active, critical historical consciousness (1981: 44-45; see, also, Gedo, 1978)." Positivism purports to extract a world view from the evanescence of history but actually suppresses the historical consciousness which could unmask the forms of social domination which parade as 'fact' and 'commonsense'. The latter not only structure Americans' views of the world but reproduce the order of domination, with minimal critical intervention by the populace. Invoking the Frankfurt School, Horkheimer in particular, Giroux writes that "the flight from history is, in reality, the suppression of history." His double-edged meaning can be seen in the context of social reproduction, in which humans are precluded from making their own history as a result of the denial of their unachieved capacity to change the world. If the condition of the world; its systems and structures are facts about the 'nature' of the world rather than processes, then human emancipation through understanding and action is contrary to fact. The very language for criticism of existing conditions and relations is denied by such 'facts'; by the "common sense" of positivism; and "human action grounded in emancipation in

all spheres of human activity" is denied. Instrumentalist "social engineering" is offered as a replacement, while the denial of historical consciousness "represents the essence of the prevailing hegmonic ideology" (1981: 45). Positivism further undermines the value of history by fostering an undialectical, one-dimensional view of the world; by denying the world of politics and vision of the future; and by denying that "human beings can constitute their own reality and alter and change that reality in the face of domination" (1981: 45). Giroux describes the ideologically constructed calibre of social intelligence prevalent in the US:

> Rather than comprehending the world holistically as a network of interconnections; the American people are taught to approach problems as if they existed in isolation, detached from the social and political forces that give them meaning. The central failing of this mode of thinking is that it creates a form of tunnel vision in which only a small segment of social reality is open to examination. More important, it leaves unquestioned those economic, political, and social structures that shape our daily lives. Divorced from history, these structures appear to have acquired their present character naturally, rather than having been constructed by historically specific interests (1981: 45-46).

Referring again to Max Horkheimer's Eclipse of reason (New York: Seabury, 1974), Giroux points out the consequences of paralyzing critical reflection on meaning and value in the dynamics of human society: "it is the contradiction between the existent society and the utopian promise of a better life that spurs an interest in both history and historical progress." But suppressing human longing "for justice and a better world" usurps "the meaningfulness of history and an historical consciousness," leaving us with "a mode of reasoning that makes it exceptionally difficult for human beings to struggle against the limitations of an oppressive society." More succinctly, the dominant ideology has no place for "a historical reality in which man is able to constitute his own meanings, order his own experience or struggle against the forces that prevent him from doing so" (1981: 46).

Giroux, a professor of education, proceeds to analyze the response of

conventional educators who perceive the crisis in history education as an academic rather than a political one. An extended view of Giroux's critical pedagogy is beyond this thesis, but the invaluable message of his writings for educational practitioners charged with the mental, moral, and political development of new generations must be noted. To explore environmental effects, even in the enlightened cognitive vein which appreciates the interactive role of heredity, as if environment were a sphere of freedom and flexibility - the tabula rasa which the infant mind was once thought to be, only to be inscribed with individual circumstances - ignores the historical character of the social environment as a dynamic product of class conflict and relations of inequality. Reproduction of the environment for human development is both a significant part of reproducing the totality of relations in society and an inescapable foundation of personal history for all of a society's members. The concept of an environment commensurable with unrestricted human development depends upon the intermediate concept of an emancipatory social environment, itself freed from structural restraints on human development. As Giroux suggests, such an environment is the antithesis of the prevailing milieu for the development of critical cognition and moral consciousness in the United States.

As Aronowitz, Giroux, and others intimate, North American society may be seen as a negative factor which abates positive factors, including a general human 'heredity' for greater intellectual and creative depth and diversity than are accommodated by schools, families or the public, which is trained to view nonconformity, inquisitiveness and independence of mind as rebelliousness and a threat to "American values." Thus, the concept of an "either-or" basis for human development in heredity or environment is deconstructible through observation of a social environment which actively impedes such development. Further, the argument applies to the modern,

interactionist view (due to Piaget but often bereft of his structuralist insight) to the extent the larger society is treated as, in effect, as rigid a genetic fact as heredity itself.

Although an extended treatment of the processes of impedence is beyond this thesis, several salient mechanisms have been exposed to an abundance of criticism. The television and cinema industries do much to anesthetize the mental potential of the nation. The irony of the English and probing dichotomies of, for example, films by directors such as Ingmar Bergman, Akira Kurosawa, Fellini and Bunuel and the darkly romantic directors of many East European films are foreign in more than a geographical sense to the ordinary American audience. Thus, the Ashkenazic Jewish background which links a director such as Woody Allen to these varied cultural hedges against capitalist ersatz cultural production may bring the recognition of an esoteric order but not the national popularity which simultaneously distinguishes leading foreign actors - who, unlike US 'stars', participate in serious film drama. (French, Swedish, and Italian actors readily come to mind.) Just as the work of a Lena Wurtmiller would scarcely attract a budget in the US, the performer whose 'career' depends upon pandering to a thoroughly depoliticized audience perpetually distracted from both historical reality and critical reflection would scarcely fit the demands of (or risk a lucrative public image on) such film-making.

The myth of an apolitical literature has already been mentioned. A significant number of the publications produced in the US are written by recipe, precisely to conform to the characteristics of a group of consumers. So-called 'romances', the gossip newspapers sold in supermarkets, USA Today, and that paragon of knee-jerk Americanism, the Readers' Digest, are examples of the reduction of reading to a process of reflecting the 'self' of mass culture. As Jay Rosen writes,

> He who does not write, [Jonathan] Culler suggests [in Structuralist poetics (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1975)] is doomed to be "written" by the system. That is, he becomes the product of meaning-making as industry rather than a producer of meaning that is in some (still controversial) sense his own. One might take this hint from Culler and say that he who does not read (in the fully active sense promoted by Barthes) is condemned to "be read" by the text. The market researchers and their accomplices posing as authors are the real readers in the culture industries: they read for everyone else. The book that is calculated to sell (before it is written) and does sell does so because it successfully "reads" its audience. The audience, therefore, does not have to read the book: it has already been read (1984a:43).

Albert Speer's observation that during the Soviet shift at Spandau prison, guards read Dostoevski while during the US shift, guards read comic books yields a quintessential commentary on American society.

Perhaps the most blatant and persistent influence is advertising. Television ads are the most elaborately constructed and richly executed. Today, celebrated artists and performers of any description, even a symphony orchestra, may deliver a commercial message in a decidedly artistic medium. The content is the diametric opposite of art "for art's sake." It is art subdued and harnessed to create "consumer demand," the ultimate creative purpose of humanity reconstructed into a means for profit on the part of monopoly capital. The usurpation of human will and desire toward a conformity of behavioristically controlled preferences in which 'freedom' becomes apolitically interpreted as a choice between brands or varieties of goods has long been part of the critique of capitalist ideology. The direct use of art, not merely in the musical and graphic production but openly, as if not merely the mode but the message itself were definitive of art, escalates the appropriation of language and meaning by the ruling order. We no longer need or want the insight that business is the government in America, as Van Wyck Brooks urged, for Americans have come to believe that business is America, indeed, society and civil culture itself, and that freedom is capitalism. If the FBI spies on Catholic Bishops who oppose nuclear armament (McManus 1987)

and burglarizes, infiltrates, and interferes with the mail of organizations of citizens opposing US militarism in Central America (Beck 1987; Gordon 1987; Ozer 1987), it is only American 'freedom' which is being protected. For being fully realized in America, freedom is only assailed by dissent. Attack upon the system which constitutes 'freedom' represents freedom's nemesis, communism and, specifically (since the ideological impact of unattached concepts is unreliable), the Soviet Union.

The language of persuasion has been appropriated by business and disembowelled to the point that it creates feelings "you have not intended to feel," as Rosen wrote in reference to the Bell Telephone advertising phrase, "reach out and touch someone" (1984b: 161). Alienation from work product breeds alienation from use-value, while the irrelevancy of use-value promulgates the irrelevancy of human value.

In the context of the cultural and individual entropy of human cognition, will, and affect, political dissent becomes the unreadable text and thus the self-exposed 'subversion' which provokes an automatic alarm amid a populace which has been written and whose freedom has already been read and defined by the ruling system. Such cultural programming was allegorically represented in the film, "The Invasion of the Body Snatchers", a dysutopia in which the population (worldwide in the late 1970's remake) is taken over by emotionless doubles (which steal the biological identity and lifeforce from a person's spiritual being during sleep) who embody a homogenously collective will (perhaps intended to parody communism, being a poetic conceit typical of anti-communist ideology), stunningly demonstrated when an unconverted soul is recognized by emotional cues visible but no longer accessible to the mass, which points at the unconquered soul and howls in eerily transfigured unison. This image aptly describes the larger social context of radical dissent in America - and the dearth of political expression as well, among a substantial

quasi-bourgeois, ideologically-defined class largely responsible for reproducing the dominant environment in which the human mind develops in the United States.

Lastly, advertising teaches a simpler axiom to most Americans, young and old, many times each day. Lying, dishonesty, and deception are acceptable and attractive, commercial advertising demonstrates. There might as well be no truth; and there is no sense in searching, for anything may be artfully asserted, so long as it is a means to commercial gain. Where falsehood is appropriated and legitimated in plenary fashion, can truth retain any hold as an end in society? Even 'science' is a means, well-supported in any university department, so long as profit can be sighted and a line item for longterm "research and development" justified. Thus, producers of consumer goods benefit from an atmosphere continuously reproduced, not merely by advertisements for a particular make or kind of commodity but by the total schema of advertising, in which people are subjected to intensive reeducation at a level of subliminal programming, alienating them from the actual perimeter of human needs and values. The highest 'selling' popular entertainers contract for many times an average worker's lifetime wages to advertise 'goods' which humankind could (once again) do wholly without, to its benefit. Michael Jackson, himself a highly promoted 'commodity', served Pepsi-Cola (which he personally refrained from consuming) for a reputed 15 million dollars (Center for Science in the Public Interest 1986), while another top-selling singer, Whitney Houston, served the rival Coca-Cola. Product and advertising promotion have intermixed to near identity in the area of commerical television programming for children, in which products advertised in 'sponsoring' commercials are incorporated in the content of the 'entertainment' itself, an extension of the advertising proper sandwiching the featured 'program.' The result is not merely a vapid show which

conditions children to want the toys which inhabit their world of entertainment but a form of enculturation which teaches children the identity of selling strategy and thinking about the world and insulates them from imaginative forms which inculcate critical and independent interpretation and interrogation of the world (see Engelhardt 1986). Thus, the inherent proclivity of children for philosophical thought is reduced to narcissism and opportunism.

The political and psychological ramifications are pervasive. Mass media perpetuate the submersion of real issues and dialogue in favor of image, 'credibility', and the likes of "faith in the presidency." The objects of US policy are parodied in scenarios produced for an uncritical public and even for their representatives, caught between the executive realpolitik of empire and the fairyland worldview of the electorate - characterized by collapsed cognitive processes - as a Nation editorial suggests:

> "Puppet" is an overused term of political abuse, but it applies to the contras with absolute accuracy. Over the past five years the Reagan Administration has performed plastic surgery on its creation at regular intervals. In 1981 the contras were a gang of Argentine-trained commandos; in 1982, in a Fort Lauderdale hotel room, the C.I.A. grafted on five civilian directorate members; in 1985 the current troika was set up, and it is now coming apart at the seams. . . .
>
> The sickness of U.S. foreign policy is to regard other countries alternately as playthings and as mirrors for our soul. Nicaragua has become a sort of Fantasy Island, which Washington has populated with creatures of its imagination. With each successive incarnation of the contras, the question has been whether they would sell in Congress, not whether they represented anything inside Nicaragua (Nation 1987).

Thus does the evil of imperialism become banal and monotonous in the reproductive circuitry of capitalism's 'democratic' society.

B. Conflict theory and intimations of the cognitive psychology of moral development for a radical social psychology.

The principal theory linking the history of social relations and conditions with a perspective valuing human freedom, dignity and self-fulfillment, a 'moral' perspective, that is, "which can be extended without contradiction to all wills" (Durkheim 1915: 494, citing Kant), is that of Karl Marx. The Frankfurt School and later critical theorists through Henry Giroux, critics of imperialism from non-Marxists to post-Marxian and popular writers, from Lappe and Collins and the Misches to Liberation Theology and the US Catholic bishops, all embody to some extent a conflict analysis derived from Marx's theory of capitalism including principles of exploitation, alienation, class stuggle, ideology, and liberation. "Marxism-Leninism" may have become in not only the mass media but among the bourgeois left (the pedestrian version of what Tom Wolfe called "radical chic"), the catchword for the antichrist in world politics (see nearly any UPI or AP 'news' article treating Central America in recent years and see Paul Berman's sophistic and pretentious, 'balanced' treatment of Nicaragua, which initiated a flurry of responses in the left press, 1986). But, whatever Lenin's personal failings, his extension of Marxist theory to imperialism remains the foundation of the world system theory of dependent development, essential for a holistic view of global relations and conflict (Currier 1987: 34-35). Marxism also furnishes the basis for a structural perspective in social science, consistent with dialectical reasoning, in which social phenomena are seen within the entire framework and history of material relations. But Marx's pursuit of structure in society in an intellectual tradition which Bertell Ollman (1976) identifies as the philosophy of internal relations, describing an inexorably interconected world, may seem to exclude moral consciousness, with its focus on individual psychology.

Human liberation from oppressive conditions through the struggle for a more just society, beyond the grossly inequitable structure of capitalism and modern imperialism, is the emphasis of Marx's morality. Marx

> recognized that education alone will not transform man [sic]. He saw that man is to a large extent determined by his practice of life, and that if man wants to change he has to change the very circumstances which imprison him (Fromm 1964a: iii).

Fromm, Marxist-humanists and recent writers on the conjunction of Marxism and religion defend Marx's positive conception of the spiritual side of men and women (see Fromm 1964b). Still, and in spite of the humanist perspective of Marx's 1844 writings (Marx 1844), the content and very existence of a Marxist morality or ethics are elusive and problematic (Ollman 1976: 40-51). Briefly, Marx views any morality as an ideological product of specific social relations and as a symptom of the artificial distinction between facts and values. Thus, classical and neo-classical economists distance their 'scientific', 'objective' conclusions from their human consequences, resulting in the contradiction of moral values by the putative 'facts' of political-economy. Thus, in the Chicago school of Milton Friedman, "government is the source of social injustice" as "'growth-oriented policies' must be associated exclusively with 'market forces'," and

> the highest compliment paid to a strategy is that it is "hardheaded," and thus in pleasing contrast to the sentimentality of churchmen whose nostrums would, if put into practice, further depress the very people they profess to champion (Cockburn and Pollin 1987: 246).

An establishment of morality within the ideology of individualism contrasts with the banishment of morality from the spheres of institutional performance (see Ollman 1976: 47 and Marx 1844, and see Friedman 1968). These complementary processes have characterized the ruling ideology during critical historical moments in the development of capitalism: the Protestant Reformation; the struggle for control in 17th Century England; the migration of Protestantism to New England; the Gilded Age; and the current crisis of

transnational finance and monopolization, confronting third world revolution. The Vatican, which allied itself to "Western democracy," can at once respond to third world bishops' calls regarding the debt crisis affecting US and European banks and hard-pressed third-world economies, stating that:

> Debt servicing cannot be met at the price of the asphyxiation of a country's economy and no government can morally demand of its people privations incompatible with human dignity (DeCormis 1987),

and on the other hand censure liberation theology in its efforts to raise the critical consciousness of oppressed people. The Pope is attempting to rescussitate primitive elements of religiosity to detract from the growing focus on higher moral reasoning derived from independent and critical development of ethical themes in religion. A Vatican offical stated, regarding John Paul II's setting aside a special year devoted to Mary,

> "Today, many people, especially the young, think that being a Catholic means to be part of an unending debate over church doctrines or the church's stand on global issues of peace and justice" . . .
>
> The pope wants to change that by stressing the importance of what they describe as popular devotion. . . .
>
> After the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) fashioned modernizing reforms, local church leaders have abandoned processions and pilgrimages because they were considered "primitive", the official said. "But with it, we also have lost the warmth and simplicity associated with traditional religious life" (Koo 1987).

The "Polish Pope," a suave anti-communist, epitomizes the role of authoritarian, extrinsic religion in articulating ideological alternatives for, as well as mediating the unconcealable and insuppressible moral dilemmas of, the hegemonic order.

The analysis of alienation, which embodies Marx's conception of human nature in capitalist society (Marx 1844; Ollman 1976: 74; and see Pappenheim 1959), is part of an implicit ethical critique of capitalism and of orthodox social science. The moral impact of Marx and the ensuing radical critique within and without the various scholarly disciplines of philosophy, sociology, economics, history, and political science is marked by the

recognition of change in social relations, particularly those of production but also those for reproducing the enveloping conditions of society and by the recognition of emancipation from exploitative relations and oppressive conditions in the struggle of people making their own history, materializing their status as ends rather than means. In describing conditions of suffering and analyzing the responsible structures of domination, Marxist analysis reveals inhumane, immoral circumstances and their causative dynamics, without formal ethical pronouncement (though with compassion and indignation.) Rather, as the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach states, the point is to change the world. Indeed, the world is not static, however enduring the status quo. Class struggle (and in Marxist-Leninism, national liberation) is the reality of the dynamics involved in what the ruling ideology and conventional social science describe as 'stability' and 'order'. For Marxism, fact and value do not reflect mutually exclusive and distinct modes of reality. The recognition of the injustices of capitalism is thus implicit in dialectical perception of the whole fabric of world society, in which the lives of the multitude are shaped, constrained and curtailed through the power of capitalist institutions, and the few who control them, over the mode of production.

Whether those holding a Marxist or radical perspective tend to exhibit higher levels of moral consciousness and reasoning remains an empirical question, to which there is some ground for an answer in the affirmative. Such grounds persist in studies of authoritarianism and attitudes in respect to the human rights of others. While I have alluded to the political correlations of such attitudinal clusters, it is not the purpose of my thesis to accumulate or summarize such studies. It is instead my purpose to provide a theoretical critique to allow for a more dialectically conscious and holistic construction of such studies, so as to include realistic appraisal of actual human conditions in focusing on and evaluating personal

manifestations of moral sentiment or reasoning (compare Hampton-Turner 1970). As the frustratingly mechanistic and atomistic studies reported in conventional social science show, the submersion of "empirical science" in exceedingly narrow technique and without a realistic context for interpretation results in the inability to reach beyond a circular inconclusiveness. For example, Gutkin and Suls (1979) find so small a tendency for endorsers of the "ethics of personal conscience" to "show greater maturity in moral reasoning" as to preclude any conclusions about the relationship between "moral maturity" and political orientation. Meanwhile, the profile described by Kemp in a radical publication reveals a typical pattern, which writers who fail to admit their own point of view frequently find ideological ('scientific') reasons not to interpret outside the framework of their narrow, quantitative, detached problematics:

> In his ground breaking 1977 study of homophobia, social psychologist Kenneth Sherrill profiled the typical social/political attitudes of the homophobic mind. He found that homophobes are deeply racist and sexist, abhor non-conformity, reject feminism and abortion rights, uphold "patriotic values" and fear anything different or "foreign" - all in all a fair description of the Reaganite social and political agenda (Kemp 1987).

Lawrence Kohlberg's career-long study of moral reasoning retains the enduring virtue, amid its defects, of attempting to connect developmental stages of moral judgment with conduct of life in the actual world; with moral truth, for which he suffers the philosophical critique of committing the "naturalistic fallacy" (see Kohlberg 1971). Kohlberg's difficulty results from insufficient connection of the materials, methods, and knowledge used in his work to human conditions, social relations and historical patterns. However, within the self-limiting paradigm of conventional social science, the seminal worth of Kohlberg's work for a radical psychology of moral development cannot be appreciated. Instead, his theory may be rejected wholesale on the basis of quantitative arguments following upon incestuously

blindered operational definitions and methods almost calculated to ignore the world at large (see Wonderly and Kupfersmid 1980). Thus, the author of a textbook on the psychology of adolescence finds support to write of Kohlberg that:

> Critics have . . . argued that it is really not true or fair to say that the higher the stage, the greater the level of morality. Stage six reflects liberal and radical political reasoning. Does this mean that liberals are more advanced morally than conservatives? It has little basis in moral fact [cites to Gutkin and Suls 1979 and Wonderly and Kupfersmid 1980] (Rice 1984: 478).

While other theorists of moral development may not distinguish themselves with the perseverence and longevity and the ontological, transformative claims of Kohlberg, some do share the reflexive ethical aims represented in such claims. Thus, Kay (1970, 1975), Peck and Havighurst (1960), Rokeach (1973), and their intellectual benefactor, Piaget (1932) sought the path to the highest moral development and a world inhabited by individuals who evince principled rationality. Rice's uncannily brief and sober pronouncement deserves note. The highest of Kohlberg's moral stages is stage six in the third level, the "postconventional, autonomous, or principled level" at which "there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups:"

> **Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orientation.** Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons (Kohlberg 1971: 164-65).

Concerning Rice, on Kohlberg: moral development theorists reflect their own rational processes in their hierarchies of moral reasoning, which are by

and large similar at their apexes. It is of interest that a textbook author should spontaneously interpret Kohlberg's highest stage as reflecting "liberal and radical political reasoning" and, as quickly, repudiate the significance of his remark, without evoking concepts he treats elsewhere or discussing the self-identification of leading writers such as Kohlberg (Weinreich-Haste 1985) and Rokeach with liberalism. The heritage of Piaget and the affinity of Piagetan pedagogy to that of John Dewey seem to assure at least an implicit identification left of center for most cognitivist moral psychologists. Piaget's and Kohlberg's moral structuralisms suffer from the liberal myth of objectivity (Sullivan 1978). It is of no consequence for Kohlberg what outcome an experimental subject chooses for a test dilemma in classifying the reasoning used by stage. Mine is a radical hypothesis, that the content of moral reasoning is relevant to the stage of the reasoning, and thus that Kohlberg's theory, differently articulated, does assist our study. (Rice's juxtaposition of liberals and radicals demonstrates the common ignorance of the radical critique of liberalism - see Broughton, 1985 - and illustrates the multilevel problems in interpreting theory.) Alluding to studies based on psychological testing with no proven relevance to a coherent perspective of the real world as a person of superior moral maturity and reasoning would, putatively, see it, Rice and those whose views he summarizes state there is little reason in fact to think that "liberals are more advanced morally than conservatives." But, if we focus on radicals (since liberals eschew the unity of form and content, of fact and value, of theory and practice), we would find that they deem their view more advanced morally (without necessarily using that language), not because they are morally superior individuals but because their perspective of the world reveals moral imperatives of a superiorly principled and universal degree. For instance, third world peoples ought to be allowed to pursue self-determination without

US intervention to prevent that from occuring: a clear analysis requires discarding the idealistic jargon of anti-communism and looking at the facts of institutional violence and oppression. Or, to permit denial of human rights to homosexuals is to condition the means for life itself upon the caprice of unrestricted hatred: moralistic phrases cannot erase the facts that such persons exist and suffer from persecution and discrimination. The radical perceives the global nuances of smaller events because of a critically profound way of thinking which dialectically searches for contradictions, extended relations and the interpenetration of opposites.

The developmental psychologists, implicitly arrogating to themselves the highest level of moral reasoning, do not always pursue their own most significant insights relating their taxonomies of moral judgment to the social context. In particular, the insight that reasoned and principled thinking is often critical of the established order, of inequality, of convention, of conformity, and authoritarian behavior ought to be explored in respect to matters within both the experimenter's and the subject's vicarious experience and knowledge of contemporary events, with an examination of moral judgments including the perspective of the experimenter. Some social scientists prefer to have their cake and eat it too, as if they could truly acknowledge the meaningfulness of moral development, and yet shield their work from the history of humankind. The ruling hegemony holds out the challenge, "dare you judge our ideology, our political camp as morally inferior? dare you suggest that the richest and most powerful are not also the wisest and most virtuous?" The social scientists tacitly reply, we will not ask those questions (compare Gouldner 1970: 141). At the same time, they appear to value precisely the virtues which contradict the selfish individualism, the possessiveness and avarice, the competitive aggressivity of the ruling ideology concerning human nature, and of the reality of

hegemonic conduct. Abstract fantasies such as Kohlberg's paradigms are presumed to be 'objective' for the very reason that they are unreal. They are made to avoid the essentially political character of real human situations and conditions; but they cannot: the druggist hoarding the medicine which would save the life of Heinz' wife represents the ideal of Gesellschaft in a money economy, enforced by the state. How can morality be tested at all, if the value basis of factual data is denied when the moral position of any observer including the scientist's is inextricably implicated; when the scientist is by reality obliged to demonstrate the very trait he or she is testing?

Despite all this, a closer viewing of cognitive psychology is warranted because its perspective on individual development complements our hypothesis about the relationship between social understanding and principled morality on one side and between uncritical susceptibility to ideological manipulation and dependent, conforming moralism on the other. Furthermore, the intellectual tradition of Piaget offers a social genetics of cultural reproduction in the moral context suggesting the environmental conditioning of restraints on individual development toward higher cognitive and moral stages.

C. Contradictions and self-transcendency in humanist psychology, towards a dialectical cognitivism.

1. Piaget.

Developmental and cognitive psychology and the psychology of ethics are broad areas, well beyond the scope of an inquiry such as mine. Recapitulation

in even a summary fashion would yield a survey rather than a directed inquiry. Several decades of formulation, refinement, and revision are spanned by the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, their collaborators and constructive critics, and contemporary researchers and theorists. My task will be satisfied by a review of several basic points of commonality, sufficient to indicate the conjunction of social structure and the individual, in which the articulation of macro-structural conflict and ideological control and of resistance in act and perception can be related across the artificial barrier between society and personality.

Piaget's thought is seminal in several respects. His intellectual creativity encompassed a range of concepts, express and implicit, and pivotal critiques which ground an open inquiry into the contextual development of human beings, particularly in the cognitive and moral areas. Piaget's theories lend substance for extension of a macro-sociology of morality beyond artificial disciplinary borders in the following ways.

(1) Piaget's investigations deal with the material world and his conclusions are scientifically based upon verbal behavior mediating mental structure and views of the real world. As such, without so naming itself, Piaget's work deals with the subject matter of ideology and might as well be considered a contribution to a dialectical sociology of knowledge as the content of the uniquely named domain of "genetic epistemology" (see Kaplan 1971; introduction by David Elkind, in Piaget 1967: v-xiii; Piaget 1952, 1971, 1985).

(2) Piaget's work and much of that of his successors is not positivistic (as is much current 'theory' or methodology behind educational practice, for example) but is interpretive and, to the extent any structure in the outer world is concerned, dialectical. Hence, Kohlberg perseveringly links his taxonomy of moral development, the 'is', with prospective moral vision, the

'ought'. Piaget's theory of structuralism strengthens the complementarity of the concepts of structure and dialectics and their usefulness as methods for theoretical synthesis (1970: 120-28).

(3) Rather than being atomistic or positivistic, work of and based upon Piaget is structuralistic. Piaget was concerned with (and was a seminal proponent of) the concept of structure, which embodies as fundamental "(a) the idea of wholeness"; "(b) the idea of transformation"; and "(c) the idea of self-regulation" (Hawkes 1977: 16; Piaget 1970: 5). The specialized concept of structure (and structuralism), as explained by Hawkes, describes a view of the world which appears consistent with Marx's dialectics, in that the apprehension of 'structure' necessitates a dialectical approach. (It is important to differentiate the several meanings and connotations of 'structure' to be found in social science, especially when these overlap. The concept intended in structuralism is specialized by the complexity of its theoretical, epistemological foundation.) In particular,

> The structure is not static. The laws which govern it act so as to make it not only structured, but <u>structuring.</u> Thus, in order to avoid reduction to the level merely of passive form, the structure must be capable of <u>transformational</u> procedures, whereby new material is constantly processed by and through it (Hawkes 1977: 16).

(4) Piaget personally exhibited a dialectical range which is implicit in his definition of his subject matter. He does not respect disciplinary boundaries, as is exhibited by his pertinent treatment of Durkheim's view of morality, particularly in **Moral education** (Durkheim 1973a). Piaget invokes Ferdinand de Saussure's distinction "in linguistics between the static or synchronistic point of view and the genetic or diachronistic point of view" in his critique of Durkheim's pedagogical application of moral theory:

> from the static point of view the Durkheimian theory of duty is unassailable, and to describe the facts in terms of inter-individual psychology would only complete the sociological description without

> altering it. More exactly, these two descriptions are parallel, or imply one another. As against this, however, Durkheim has drawn from his profound static analyses a genetic sociology that was bound to be hypothetical, and it is on this point that psychologists and sociologists risk having to part company (Piaget 1932: 382).

Kohlberg (1983: 64-69) renders a less charitable version of Moral education, emphasizing the "hidden curriculum" which results from Durkheim's perpetuation of an allegedly emotional, irrational essence of morality, in contrast to the developmental rationality of Dewey and Piaget. Kohlberg finds Durkheim's pedagogical project of reconstructing a small society in the classroom to be most effectively realized in Soviet socialization in collectivist attitudes at the level of behavioral conditioning, a characterization which exemplifies the faulty extension by Durkheim of synchronistic insights to the diachronic concerns of pedagogy.

(5) In finding moral and cognitive development to be interrelated, Piaget refused to afford ontological stature to a differentiation between fact and value. In common with his successors, Lawrence Kohlberg in particular, Piaget described as a superior moral posture one which transcends reference to existing, external authority and which permits the person's openness to altruistic, rational thought to be the measure both of moral and of general cognitive growth. While Piaget's orientation was neither political nor sociological and while his sometimes simplistic view of the cooperative (as opposed to authoritarian) regulation of modern society was uninformed in respect to the subtleties of conflict and domination (1932: 324-25), his basic dichotomy of "two moralities" reflects the existential and historical movement toward liberation: a path from external direction to independent, democratic, egalitarian development of human individuals, without a predetermined human essence such as inhabits the conservative view of human evil necessitating the imposition of a legal order definitive of a reductive human ethical structure. (The mediatory range of religion, for instance,

intellectual Calvinism, between an open, dialectical and humanistic view of the person and a closed, conservative materialism raises fascinating questions which I am unable to explore here.) Thus, Piaget's implicit measure of both the person and of a just society is the real development of rational and just-thinking people making their own history.

(6) This humanistic, democratic, emancipatory view is not only historical - that is, diachronic - in form but is inextricable from content with an undeniable socio-political moment:

> In conclusion, then, we find in the domain of justice . . . that opposition of two moralities . . . . The ethics of authority, which is that of duty and obedience, leads . . . to the confusion of what is just with the content of established law and to the acceptance of expiatory punishment. The ethics of mutual respect, which is that of good (as opposed to duty), and of autonomy, leads . . . to the development of equality, which is the idea at the bottom of distributive justice and of reciprocity. Solidarity between equals appears . . . as the source of a whole set of complementary and coherent moral ideals which characterize the rational mentality (Piaget 1932: 324).

(7) Consciousness of self, Piaget wrote, results from perception of contradictions between self and others, from experienced opposition, from dialogue, and from the practice of cooperation - which is also a product of self-consciousness (1932: 400). Thus, an interpersonal and transformative praxis, unified with evolving theoretical understanding, is implied.

(8) Piaget defends moral equality as a component of individual differentiation, self-realization, and increased cooperation; not as a cause of conformity and homogeneity. Thus, he deconstructs the ideology of individualism with its self-contradictory factors limiting human development and both reveals and refutes conservative social Darwinism which holds that "'evolution' in the sense of progressive organization is necessarily bound up with a society based on constraint" (1932: 402-404).

(9) Piaget further develops the "parallelism existing between moral and intellectual development"; the "kinship between logical and ethical norms,"

along with the unity of thought and action or, in effect, of theory and practice. His eloquent and remarkable analysis is based upon a view of reality as structure and process, dynamically acted upon by dialogically attained knowledge with transformative power:

> to speak of directed evolution and asymptotic advance toward a necessary ideal is to recognize the existence of a something which acts from the first in the direction of this evolution. But under what form does this "something" present itself? Under the form of a structure that straightway organizes the contents of consciousness, or under the form of a functional law of equilibrium, unconscious as yet because the mind has not yet achieved this equilibrium, and to be manifested only in and through the multitudinous structures that are to appear later? There seems to us to be no doubt as to the answer. . . . Such is the a priori: it is neither a principle from which concrete actions can be deduced nor a structure of which the mind can become conscious as such, but it is a sum-total of functional relations implying the distinction between the existing states of disequilibrium and an ideal equilibrium yet to be realized.
>
> . . . social life is necessary if the individual is to become conscious of the functioning of his own mind and thus to transform into norms properly so-called the simple functional equilibria immanent to all mental and even vital activity (1932: 404-408; and see Piaget 1970).

2. Piaget and cognitivist illumination of moral development.

Piaget-based stage theories of moral development are significant for a structural theory of morality. These psychological schemas complete the nexus between structural themes such as the ideological concomitant of class struggle and the individual who normatively exhibits the ideational indicia of alienation, commodity fetishism, and an internalized, imaginary representation of the real conditions of existence - or who exhibits critical social understanding and independent moral reasoning. The theory of moral development espoused by cognitive psychologists is compatible with the Marxist view that the normative thought structure of individuals arises under the influence of material relations defining the social environment (see Kohlberg et al. 1983: 53-59). As Marx's concept of history accommodates the liberation of human potential, so do the highest moral stages of the

psychological theorists. Thus, Kohlberg's post-conventional level of moral judgment entails being

> able to take a prior-to-society perspective in which the priority of valuing life over property could be shared from the point of view of Heinz or the druggest equally [at stage five]. This hierarchy is reversible and equilibrated in the sense that it could be taken by persons in any of the social roles given in the Heinz dilemma. At Stage 6 reversibility would become the <u>self-conscious</u> <u>operation</u> of moral musical chairs in making just choices (Kohlberg et al. 1983: 103).

The "prior-to-society perspective" ressembles the dialectical view of history and society intended by Marx (see Ollman 1986). Such a view inquires into the source of contradictions in the contemporary world in relations which are historical, cultural products, not 'natural' forces - as capitalist relations of production are represented to be, in ruling ideology. While the moral content of social contradictions may escape the analyses of the more disciplinarily restrictive of the cognitivists, the latter help illuminate an appreciation of that content through dialectical analysis.

Thus, the cognitivists' theories are helpful in conceptualizing, as a matter of personal history, the differentials evinced among individuals' cognitive and moral functioning, consistent with the neo-Gramscian, post-Frankfurt School considerations of the struggle between ruling ideology, including its overdetermined religious and moral auxilliaries, and resistance in the forms of critical cognition and principled, universal ethical reasoning. While it is not my object to explore the intellectual history of the controversy over the place of the personal subject in cultural theory after Marx, this thesis is an attempt to interpose a foundation for, or insert the beginnings of, a continuum of material content for dialectical analysis, from world system to human individual. In this effort, Piaget's explanation of the structural site of the subject, including accommodation of Althusser's structuralist reformulation of Marxist dialectics, provides

excellent guidance:

> for Marxism, in contrast to idealism, to <u>think</u> is to <u>produce</u>, thought being a kind of "theoretical practice" which is not so much the work of an individual subject as the outcome of interactions between the subject and his personal environment, into which social and historical factors enter as well; it is in this light that Althusser interprets Marx's famous passage where "the totality of the real" . . . is said to be "in reality a product of thought and conception." . . .
>
> The chief objection urged against [Althusser] is that . . . he has too low an estimate of things human; but if the values of the "person" (often regrettably confused with those of the ego) are taken to be less important than the constructive activities of the epistemic subject, the characterization of knowledge as production is in agreement with one of the best established traditions of classical Marxism (Piaget 1970: 125-27).

The epistemic subject is described by Piaget as:

> that cognitive nucleus which is common to all subjects at the same level. . . . the always fragmentary and frequently distorting grasp of consciousness must be set apart from the achievements of the subject; what he knows is the <u>outcome</u> of his intellectual activity, not its mechanisms. Now after such precipitation of the "me," the "lived," from the "I," there remains the subject's "operations," that which he "draws out" from the general coordinations of his acts by reflective abstraction. And it is these operations which constitute the elements of the structures he employs in his ongoing intellectual activity.
>
> . . . on the plane of knowledge (as, perhaps, on that of moral and aesthetic values) the subject's activity calls for a continual "de-centering" without which he cannot become free from his spontaneous intellectual egocentricity. This "de-centering" makes the subject enter upon, not so much an already available and therefore external universality, as an uninterrupted process of coordinating and setting in reciprocal relations. It is the latter process which is the true "generator" of structures as constantly under construction and reconstruction. The subject exists because . . . the being of structures consists in their coming to be, that is, their being "under construction" (1970: 139-40).

(It needs mentioning that the controversy over Piaget's structural 'subject' and its subsumed themes remains a vital one in humanist Marxism, where it partakes in a hermeneutic circle whose intricacies lie beyond our thesis. See Scharf 1978 and cited works of John Broughton, for example.)

As Rokeach (1973), among others, makes clear, the highest level of cognitively defined moral development is a process of continuing growth. This open-ended stage, perhaps best summarized in Peck and Havighurst's (1960) rational-altruistic person, parallels the dialectical unfolding of history to

the evolving perception of social conditions, justice, and human rights which informs movements for human liberation and self-determination. The intellectual dynamics of transformative dialogue are variously but harmoniously described by Gramsci (1971); Freire (1970, 1973); Norton and Ollman (1978); Shor (1980); Giroux (1981, 1983); Giroux and Purpel (1983); and Aronowitz and Giroux (1985), among others. Piaget's foregoing formulation of "directed evolution and asymptotic approach," quoted from **The moral judgment of the child** (1932), and other works including **Structuralism** (1970; and see 1976; 1985) stand as lucid and concise statements of dialogically intersubjective, self-regulating and directing, reflexively developing intelligence as may be found. It remains to his intellectual progeny to describe on the level of social structure, the ways in which unrestricted human inquiry and growth transform material reality - or rather, vest the (diachronistic) processes by which (synchronistic) structure is changed (see Piaget 1970: 127-28).

The radical theorists named above are sustained by the cognitivists' findings, through the examination of contradictions, the negation of negation, and other dialectical techniques. For instance, findings (by Kohlberg, for example) of a predominantly low level of cognitive and moral reasoning functioning as a norm in US society (and elsewhere) represents the negation of human potential shown by contexts in which, for some persons, higher levels of development are achieved. While an essentialist and conservative view would posit without further intellectual effort that the inevitable range of individual potential is thus proven, dialectical inquiry requires rigorous interrogation of the historical totality, to discover plausible explanations for the limitation of human development by specific relations and circumstances. Ample explanation exists. A controlled environment can produce intellectual growth well beyond what may be expected

of children, without such intervention. The differential possible, were such improved conditions the norm for our society, is not measurable, but is none the less real. Furthermore, the intensification prevailing in a nourishing society would produce qualitative change, perhaps a new concept of humankind. The moral and cognitive aspects of development are inextricably linked, where the cooperative, collective advance of human realization is concerned.

3. Towards a content- and value-laden cognitivism.

When we make the social content of moral analysis explicit, its consistency with a radical view of political-economy emerges. The cognitive and humanist psychologists, the latter represented by Maslow and Rogers, held out hope by way of moral education calling for compassionate, democratic, rational processes exposing students to self-actualization and the respect for human dignity which Durkheim also regarded as an essential component of morality. Humanism has often been the response of varied thinkers to the relations defining capitalist society. Durkheim described the theories of Herbert Spencer which inform the ideology of American business (see Hofstadter 1955; McCloskey 1951), as "crass commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange" (1973b :44). Max Weber, while unsympathetic to Marx's analysis, had an uncomplimentary view of capitalism and its effect on the human spirit, which he characterized in his famous image of an iron cage (1958: 181-83). Karen Horney examined the insecurity, hostility, and anxiety produced by a culture "economically based on the principle of individual competition" (1937: 284). Cognitive and humanist psychologists generally acknowledge that conformity and acceptance of the status quo are correlated with a lower level of both cognitive and moral development than are critical questioning of and principled challenge to authority, a trend parallel to that noted above in

respect to Reformed Christianity and its rationally internalized ethics.

Maslow observed the conflict between adjustment to "the world of reality" entailing the "continued, successful rejection of much of the depths of human nature," and the "self-actualizing person" and recognized the causative interconnection of "the good person and the good world" which "make each other" (1962: 133, 105). His rare stroll outside psychology to observe the relationship between personal growth and social context includes his view that:

> Much disturbance in children and adolescents can be understood as a consequence of the uncertainty of adults about their values. As a consequence, many youngsters in the United States live not by adult values but by adolescent values, which of course are immature, ignorant and heavily determined by confused adolescent needs. An excellent projection of these adolescent values is the cowboy, "Western" movie, or the delinquent gang (1962: 192).

But Maslow displaces judgment of the adult norm of inchoate moral development, observed by the cognitivists, onto the adolescent. The "uncertainty of adults about their values" is symptomatic of a norm of extrinsic, unreasoned, conforming attitudes and a poor level of conceptualization. Maslow's statement may be updated by noting the popular, jingoist support for the Reagan Adminstration's 'adolescent' actions, including the naval shelling of the civilian population in Lebanon, the military invasion of socialist Granada, the bullying, terrorist war of counter-revolution against democratic, socialist Nicaragua, the attempted assassination of libya's head of state by an air attack killing and maiming many civilians, and considerable support for secret operations to circumvent Congress in pursuing imperialist policies including the unlawful maintenance of "freedom fighters", actually US mercenaries charged with overthrowing Nicaragua's dangerous exhibit of self-determination (Bennett 1986; Kornbluh 1987; Scott 1987). (Regarding the "Reagan Doctrine of paired counterrevolution and the "rolling-back of Communism," see Acharya, 1987.) We

might include the placid public acquiescence to systematic use of state power to intimidate and punish critics of the Reagan Administration and its international conduct.

Maslow ponders that a society or culture may be "growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting" (1962: 197) but retreats from any consideration of social structure in relation to individual development of the potential for 'humanness'. He stops short of inquiring what sort of society would facilitate self-actualization by more than a fraction of its members. Yet educational researchers using his theoretical constructs have discovered a correlation of self-actualizing students with self-actualization on the part of their teachers, suggesting that the qualities of human fulfillment and democratic personality may be transmitted to other persons in some social contexts (Combs 1982; Farmer 1984). It has been suggested that the cognitive growth of women is related to conditions of emancipation and that such psychological growth can be effected in an educational setting (Erickson 1978).

Peck and Havighurst found parental influence to be paramount, suggesting the primacy of the family as an institution for ideological control or, in the case of rational-altruistic persons, for nourishment of independent thinking and moral reasoning. These two authors view moral and social education as properly aimed, therefore, at succeeding generations, given the relative few who exhibit the highest level of moral development. Peck and Havighurst describe the conscience of the rational-altruistic person as a set of internalized moral principles accessible to rational questioning and testing, freely interacting "with the ego functions and with the impulse life," and changing and deepening "in wisdom as new experiences are encountered" (1970: 171). The rational-altruistic person faces moral dilemmas through perception of material relations and

> is concerned about the real effects of each possible action, not with abstract verbal labels such as "truth", "honesty", or "loyalty." . . . he seldom tries to justify himself by hypocritical talk of high principles or by self-righteous rationalization. Most of the time he is straightforwardly and honestly aware of what he is doing, and what effects it will have. He has a great degree of self-acceptance. This enables him to criticize specific shortcomings he may demonstrate without fearing so intense and general a sense of guilt or moral worthlessness that he cannot stand to risk any self-criticism (1960: 172).

(Kohlberg would replace the neo-Freudian notion of internalization with the interactionist, developmental scheme of stage-wise transformations, with rigor out of which he faults Piaget himself for the latter's inclusion of the contrast between heteronomy and autonomy, 1976). Peck and Havighurst recognized the incompatibility between the rational-altruistic apex of their hierarchic taxonomy and the intolerance expressed by many American parents in regard to the very same values which condition the upbringing of intellectually independent and rationally principled children (1960: 191-93). Rokeach utilizes the method of dialectics in confronting experimental subjects with contradictions between values implied by their responses, in his surveys of moral principles (1973). He acknowledges change of attitude to be a normative element of his method of study (see Ollman 1987).

Clues for improved human development in the moral, as well as other areas, are available and would become more evident in the dialogical growth of practice and theory. The problem is not knowledge of factors but the policy of a society and superstructure of cultural institutions dedicated, not to the self-actualization of all persons, enabling their fullest human contribution in remaking the world, but to the fashioning of adults who will not question the unspoken premises of class society; who will have the strictly delimited skills to perform instrumentally as human means to the ends implicit in those premises (see Magrass 1984: 138-39). Mere humanist education or even narrowly applied notions of dialectical education in

critical thinking will not alone transform many individuals, beyond the obstructions to moral development endemic in US society. Giroux, who treats the theoretical range of studies of socialization in schools and of critical intervention in the classroom, finds a "deep structure of domination" entrenched in the human personality, as a manifestation of ideology which has "hardened into nature" (1981: 108).

CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS A SYNTHESIS OF A SCIENCE OF MORALITY AND A POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC EMPOWERMENT.

Wilhelm Dilthey's obscurity reflects the positivist, anti-dialectical bias of the English-speaking world. Dilthey related philosophical understanding to guidance of life in society, shares ground with Marxism and existentialism and influenced the Frankfurt School and the use of hermeneutics in sociological analysis as early as Weber and Troeltsch. His intimation of the progressive conscientization of society's members through the pursuit of knowledge leads to the further recognition that the growth of consciousness is inimical to an order based upon exploitation and inequality because it informs human understanding and will:

> The crucial process by which philosophy could, in Dilthey's view, promote its essential aims was reflection which leads to more critical awareness of oneself, one's activities and the values and aspirations of a whole community. 'Philosophy', he wrote, 'is the developing consciousness of what man does in his thinking, creating and acting.' . . . 'Progress in philosophy' . . . 'lies in the growing consciousness the human mind, seen as a whole, has of its doings, goals and presuppositions.' He made the same point about communities and cultures: 'The highest achievement of philosophy is to make the culture of an age conscious of itself, and, by clarifying it systematically, heighten its power.' . . . 'It is the function of philosophy to make conscious the impulses of a culture and so make its goals clear, strengthen its will power and formulate the ultimate generalizations of its acquired concepts' (Rickman 1979: 45).

Reading "people" for "culture" helps recognition that consciousness is a site of political struggle. In chapter four, I will examine the political dimension of moral understanding, including the application of moral judgment to political ideation. Ultimately, moral action includes moral-cognitive development itself, given its prerequisite social environment. The responses of political ideologies to human development and self-determination are polarized, in accord with their consistency with or antagonism towards

universal human values.

We have viewed the content of moral thought, the distinction between right and wrong, as a dimension of the material world based upon the existential, historical value of human life. The a priori quality of this value is no impediment for social science, once the latter affirms the value of any life-affirming endeavor. Such endeavor, comprising most of the project of human civilization, is based upon the value of life itself. The study of society is also so based, once it recognizes the struggle for liberation and self-realization by the world's peoples, the drive for perpetuation of privilege by capitalists and autocrats of various ilk, and the value of knowledge for human empowerment. Either class would affirm the desire and struggle for life, although death has a pervasive role in the conflict. The aim of a society's folkways and mores is meeting the needs of human existence (Sumner 1906).

Philosophy has a profound impact on the question of right conduct. It articulates ways of thinking and meaning which not only inform social science at a fundamental level but also reflect the unwritten and unarticulated tradition and culture of human communities (Dewey 1942; Gramsci 1971). A focus is given by Kant's examination of ethics (Kant 1959, 1963; Modgil and Modgil 1985). We seek a moral science which is rationally consistent with our understanding of the world, since moral science must interpret the moral dimension of that world. Our understanding is derived through a dialectical process which recognizes reality to be historical and interconnected, dynamic and structured. A static morality which identifies rules based upon discrete 'facts', actually artifacts of an atomistic, mechanistic, insufficiently reflective and critical thought process, will not serve. Such a morality can never be sustained through the highest rationality as a description of the world in terms of a morality for all people. Anything less than a morality

for all people, Kant implied, would presuppose a more fundamental choice, with moral (or immoral) consequences, favoring some persons as primary in will or in their condition of freedom. It is important to remember the latter point as a moral gauge for contending world views.

Morality is based not upon specific rules but on principles of reasoning and universality. Social scientists including Durkheim, Piaget, Kohlberg and if we view his intentions for universal emancipation and self-realization, Marx reflect Kant's characterization of morality, as does Christian theology, where much of the most turbulent moral thought today finds its forum. The controversy within Christian authority which accompanies current strife in the world is embroiled, implicitly or explicitly, in the contrast between a principled, reasoned morality and doctrinaire moralism.

Among philosophers of ethics, Kant articulated a concise principle that no person should be treated as a means; that all persons should treat other human beings as ends in themselves. His further articulation of universality, that moral maxims are only those which can serve as universal laws guiding all wills, reinforces the meta-ethical principle that every person is an end. The human dignity of every person is equally valued and no moral standard should prevail which directs any human will in a fashion which cannot be extended to direct any other human will. This principle, which is essentially similar to the morality projected by Mische and Mische and that generally contemplated by social and behavioral scientists concerned with morality, from Durkheim and Piaget to Peck and Havighurst, Rokeach, and Kohlberg (see Kay 1972; Modgil and Modgil 1985; and Hartmann 1985), comprehends a substantial amount if not all of human behavior, particularly social conduct and the conduct of institutions - which is humanly and collectively evolved and directed.

The meta-ethical nature of Kantian principles is of substantive and

procedural significance for reflexive, humanist social science. Habermas, correcting Kohlberg's stage six by identifying it as a stage of reflection, qualitatively different from the lower five "stages of development", notes that the person (eg., experimental subject) functioning at the highest stage of moral reasoning is at the same level of competence and discourse as the experimenter and partakes equally in an open-ended pursuit of understanding. "To the extent that they basically share the perspective of the interviewer, who is a moral psychologist," Habermas writes of "respondents who handle moral dilemmas from the standpoint of a postconventional participant in discourse,"

> their moral judgments no longer have the form of utterances which are naively generated with the help of an intuitive understanding of rules. Postconventional experimental subjects are drawn into the business of moral psychology - that is, the reconstruction of the underlying moral intuitions of everyday life - to the point where their moral reasoning no longer <u>mirrors</u> a pretheoretical knowledge that is unreflectively expressed but <u>explicates</u> potentially theoretical knowledge. Principled moral judgments are impossible to make unless the person in question has taken a step or two toward the reconstruction of his moral intuitions. In short, principled moral reasoning . . . has the signification of moral-theoretical reasoning. As postconventional thought leaves the world of traditional norms behind, it operates in the same arena in which moral theorists debate their issues (Habermas 1985: 6).

This insight corresponds to Habermas' theory of communication and democracy and to the dialogical pedagogy and democratic practice described in the works of Paulo Freire. It is also critical for a dialectical view of cognitivist stage theories of development. William Kay (1970: 72-92) stressed the heuristic value of the theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny - its narrow validity aside - for explaining the social significance of the various stages of cognitive and moral development. In terms of the individual of advanced moral development, Piaget's, Kohlberg's, or Kant's principled, autonomous person, we may recall Freud's famous statement that the child is the parent of the adult and suggest that phylogeny (that is, the future)

recapitulates ontogeny as well. For, given the interchangability of Habermas' experimenter and subject, the acknowledged continuum of development, and the effect study has upon the subject (see, for example, Ollman 1987 concerning the study of class consciousness), discourse on moral understanding embodies separate but connected moments of teaching and learning, collective investigation, and political communication. Insofar as discourse accompanies and is therefore the mode of rational, openly deliberated and examined, collective behavior, moral reasoning, theoretical-practical moral discourse, and the conduct of democratic society are one.

Reactionary commentators, focusing on a contemporary deficiency in personal morals, have bewailed the 'immorality' coddled by liberals and anyone to their left and called for a return to values represented by religious piety, the authoritarian family and nationalistic patriotism. To a critical reader, it seems ironic that they mention neither the killing conducted with the support of the US government to secure political-economic hegemony in the world (anything is allowable, "to fight Communism"), nor the immense apparatus by which domestic narcissism and possessiveness are caused to prevail over the individual morality supposed to be a foundation of American, capitalistic society. It has been sufficient to treat the profound and far-reaching principles of a humanist, rational morality. The latter, placed in historical context and applied dialectically, prepares a framework for an algebra of human behavior in world context, without separation of the moral dimension from that of historical reality. Indeed, without such a perspective, we cannot begin to look critically at individual behavior.

Understanding the dynamics of society requires an investigation of social structure, human and institutional interdependency, and global forces and events of the most potent dimensions - the kind of processes and relations which conservative pundits choose to ignore. This contrast between

left and right is suggestive of a differential in stage or level relative to Piaget's, Kohlberg's, and Benjamin Bloom's hierarchies of cognitive development and reasoning. Dialectical reasoning came from philosophy, particularly from philosophers concerned with organizing and defining human understanding of the world in its totality. From certain pre-Socratics to Vico, to Marx's argument with Hegel (see Hyppolite 1969), to Dilthey and the Twentieth Century trialogue between existentialism, hermeneutics, and Marxism, philosophy has invested social theory as the higher calculus has invested empirical science (natural and social). It is left to try out the fit of moral principles with the furthest reaching historical analysis, to give firm meaning to what philosophy transmits to the political life of society. Without such investment of moral theory and dialectical understanding, human politics consistent with democratic aims is impossible, a proposition consistent with the cognitivists' discussion of rational, principled morality (see Lind, Sandberger, and Bargel 1985).

The Kantian principles I have identified offer no intrinsic resistance to application beyond the individual will. On the contrary, principled moral reasoning is ideal for the description of circumstances at the highest order of interactive institutions, systems and collectives, as we have seen implicitly in viewing the global order. Clearly, assassination, slavery, and other gross deprivations of human rights violate the fundamental principle of respect for every person as a free being. Confrontation of political expression with violence in any form (including the use of legal authority) emerges as a violation of human rights, so that political expression can be seen to be a human right through examination of situations in which it is denied. Further, it may be seen that economic rights are inextricably connected and merely facets of human actualization (beginning with physical health and safety) and fulfillment. If the politics of a society is

unavailable as a sphere for the popular control of economic conditions, to secure equity which respects the human dignity of all persons, then the rules upon which such a politics is in fact based are inconsistent with moral principle. It is the undemocratic politics of a society structured by inequality, premised upon the principle - rationalized in the moral field by ideological moralism - that some persons will be treated not as ends in themselves but as means to structural objectives of privileged agents within the society.

If a social order, such as that of the United States, is dependent upon the deception of the mass of people, and upon their apathy, conformity, inaction, uncritical acceptance, and conscious or unconscious complicity in exploitation, bullying, and deprivation of others' human rights, then that society has serious defects in its moral structure. It is not democratic, because perceived political freedoms are meaningless if their very perception is circumscribed psychologically and ideologically so as to admit no real alternatives to the prevailing order and conditions. The level of reasoning exposed in political cognition is significant. Presented with the democratic tendencies of parliamentary government, with its continuity of opposition leadership in and out of state control, the changeability of control, its rendering control of policy subject to plebescites on issues and on competency of policy-makers measured by moral standards among others, US citizens are likely to remain unmoved. The latter are instructed to believe that the proliferation of presidential candidates in the US, for example, represents greater democracy, since it is 'easier' without continuity of leadership and party philosophy "to become president." The standards for democracy itself are reduced to narcissistic fallacy. Those who come close to a realistic aspiration to become President or enter Congress are an exceedingly small number, limited by an environment of wealth and position.

One might say, their personal constitutions are 'written' by the conditions of power. The majority would be served by a coherent party politics in which a realistic political philosophy could be developed, fleshed out with long-term and short-term goals for the common welfare. To reason this far requires the ability to move one's mental focus from the self in order to generalize a concept of political freedom which is meaningful not only for the general public well-being but for one's individual reality, which partakes of and is shaped by general social conditions. We may recall Althusser's definition of ideology as an imaginary representation of one's relation to actual conditions. Imagination has a worthy place, particularly when engaged with rational, creative goals. But as the receptacle of socially instrumental myth perceived to be individually held knowledge, the ideologically constructed belief system of the individual in our society represents the antithesis of critical, independent thought and of knowledge made one's own through active self-understanding and reflection.

There is a potential for a synthesis in cognitive psychology, educational philosophy, and critical theory evidenced by the continuing dialogue on moral development as focused by Piaget and Kohlberg (see Scharf 1978, Modgil and Modgil 1985 and Lind et al. 1985); the study of critical thinking and education represented by Richard Paul, director of the Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique at Sonoma State University (see Paul 1984, 1986, 1987, n.d.); and the critical and feminist pedagogy of Henry Giroux (see works under Giroux and under Aronowitz) and a number of other educational theorists currently writing in publications such as the **American Journal of Education, Social Studies, Social Education** and **Harvard Educational Review** (see, for instance, Maher and Rathbone 1986; Lesourd 1986; Fleming 1986; Tetreault 1987; Shor 1986; Greene 1986;

Britzman 1986; and James Bennett's bibliographical essay on corporate and government domination of US education, 1987). A synthesis of Piaget and Marx, Broughton notes, has been suggested, particularly by writers in the field of educational curriculum (Broughton 1981b: 406), which encompasses the articles cited. In a similar vein, C. A. Bowers has written that liberal, performance oriented educational technicians, neo-Marxists, and the 'neoromantic', "alternative free-school Rousseauists" of the '60s and '70s are linked by "confluences of value judgments" more profound and significant than their differences. "Their theories," Bowers writes, "lead to conditioning students to expect change, to view self-realization and expression as the highest form of humanity . . . and to hold a rationalized, social engineering attitude toward existential and social problems" (Mandell, 1986, quoting C. A. Bowers, **The promise of theory: Education and the politics of cultural change**, New York: Longman, 1984, 26).

For such a synthesis to arise, the progressive 'resistance' must engage in critical, self-developmental discourse on practice, at a level which is accessible and inviting and neither accusatory nor patronizing. Humanist educators, including teachers, administrators and university instructors, influenced by progressives from Pestalozzi to Dewey to Benjamin Bloom, William Glasser (1969), and John Goodlad (1984) and advised by the pragmatic creators of modern programs to reconstruct school environments with the aim of educating all students, demonstrate an area as open as any to the project of moral restructuring of society, as a function of equitable cognitive development. The hiatus perceived between such a statement and realization of the constructive relationship between theory and practice which it envisions is partly the result of the insularity of radical theory and politics in US society. If the moral vision of the left, against structural inequality and class exploitation and for a democratic, equitable society which uses all

resources for the common good, represents cognitive as well as moral advance over the morality of the existing structure of society, then the burden of, as well as the competence for initiating and maintaining dialogue with the most compassionate, altruistically employed and dedicated, democratic, reflectively open, intellectual laborers (by profession or otherwise) rests with the left itself.

Critical thinking in the "strong sense," which Paul (1984, 1987) argues to be integral to development of a just and moral as well as critically reasoning personality is what I have presented as dialectical reasoning. Piaget also maintained that true education is inseparable from the development of the mind, that is, of the cognitive and moral aspect of the human organism. Further, this process of development is structurally interconnected with the social environment and its dynamics (Piaget 1973). Similarly, Robert Kegan argues that Kohlberg identifies the development of Knowing, including moral growth, with "Psychobiological development" and compares Kohlberg's stage theory with Carl Rogers' stages of therapy, measured by self-actualization and autonomy (Kegan 1985: 168-70; and see Rogers 1961).

This brings us, catalyzed by Piaget's mediation between individual subject and social collective, toward the significance of moral development both as a personal process and as a standard for the social order. Our discovery is consistent with a dialectical projection of "cognitive epistemology" (Piaget's and his successors' designation intimating a historical, sociological psychology of knowledge). Cognitively developed, critically rational, principled moral reasoning is tantamount to understanding society actively, dialectically, and reflexively, in the largest context of one's own humanity, that is, in the world historical context. It is reasonable to ask, then, whether such a level of moral

development presupposes sophisticated knowledge of social structure on the global scale. The response reveals the essential treatment of knowledge, morality, and understanding as processes. Richard Paul argues there to be "an intimate connection between critical thinking, moral integrity, and citizenship," distinguishing critical thinking in the "strong sense," essentially dialectical reasoning (Paul 1986: 1). Paul continues:

> The "good-hearted" person who lacks intellectual virtues will act in a moral way only when morally grasping a situation or problem does not presuppose intellectual insight. Many if not most moral problems and situations in the modern world are open to multiple interpretations, and hence do presuppose these intellectual virtues (Paul 1986: 1-2).

In this paper, the dialectical, critical reasoning Paul describes elsewhere is operationalized in terms of the "intellectual-moral virtues essential to that mode of thinking and being," which "are intellectual (epistemological) humility, courage, integrity, perseverence, empathy, and fair-mindedness" (Paul 1986: 5).

Paul has described the dialectical nature of reasoning needed to comprehend the world of reality:

> What is called for is dialogic, point-counterpoint, argument for and argument against, scrutiny of individual event against the background of this or that global "totalizing" of it into one's life. What is called for is liberating, emancipatory reasoning, the ability to reason across, between, and beyond the neatly marshalled data of any given technical domain. Because it cannot presuppose or restrict itself to any one system or technical language or procedure, it must be dialectical. That is, it must move back and forth between opposing points of view. It must consider how this or that situation might be handled if we looked at it in this way, or how if we looked at it that way, of what follows from this construal and what from that, of what objection can be raised to this and what objection to that.
>
> . . . dialectical reason . . . alone creates the possibility of becoming intellectually, emotionally, and morally autonomous persons (1984: 11-12).

While Paul's purposes and context differ, his description is consistent with Marxist descriptions of dialectic. (See Norton and Ollman 1978; Ollman 1986. Paul is concerned with teaching children to think critically while Ollman is concerned with the college teaching of Marxist theory.) While the approach

typified by Hyppolite (1969) does not serve to situate the philosophical background from, most notably, Hegel and Marx in the practical context and while Marcuse's (1960) treatment of Hegel in the framework of Marxist social theory presents a generous but abstract account, their emphasis on process, contradiction, and unrestricted reference to dynamic totality, among other facets of dialectical reasoning is consistent with Paul's notion. Paul assists me to assert that the morality I have defined is more dependent upon intellectual processes which themselves characterize personal, intellectual 'virtues' than upon any quantitative measure of knowledge or intelligence.

Thus, a person hearing his or her government call a small nation a Communist threat and learning that the government supports military force to upset that nation's ruling system need have no sophisticated reserve of information to ask herself rhetorically certain questions before coming to any conclusion such as acceptance of the official version. The person may ask about the size of the nation and about its history and may inquire into her own government's attitude toward the regime previously in control of the nation, perhaps a brutal military dictatorship similar to those still in power elsewhere, supported by her government. The main points are the quality of autonomous interpretation of all available information and the processes exhausted before drawing any conclusion, perhaps itself no more definite than a reservation of judgment with a resolution to investigate further, or a conditional judgment made upon explicit assumptions. Moreover, critical intellectual processes evolve through exercise. Thus, the diachronic process of moral-cognitive development itself underlies the reflective processes Paul describes.

Morality and class consciousness.

The Hegelian reverberation between world and idea suffuses my denouement without spiriting my method away from explanation of the material world. Continually developing, self-adjusting knowledge is both the constitutive subject and the objective mental image of moral thought. Ollman writes that each person is situated within the categories of class society and the objective place, function, and interests of the person's objective class, determining the objective aspect of (or 'imputed') class consciousness (Ollman 1987: 67). While class consciousness involves the working-class individual's organic integration in the capitalist socio-economic structure and is thus a "theory-laden expression" in Marxist analysis (1987: 70), Ollman stresses the impossibility of defining it in reference to a single person or time. Class consciousness:

> is much larger than the mind or understanding of any individual and much longer than the present moment. It is the class, its interests and self-understanding, in the context of the situation[,] especially its interaction with opposing classes, that constitute it as a class, and all this as it has developed, is developing, and will continue to develop into the future (1987: 74).

Class consciousness thus exhibits a growth-oriented psychological field which, consistent with the historical and dialectical nature Marxist theory assigns to social reality, represents progressive understanding of oneself and the world, without either dispensing with moral vision or encapsuling moral knowledge and judgment in a separate epistemological field or reflective category.

It may be objected that proffering class consciousness as a parallel to moral functioning militates against the posited universality of moral reasoning. Pope John Paul II's ecclesiastic indictment of liberation theology and of the concept in social morality of structural sin appears to ride on two fundamental critiques. First, moral responsibility is said to be

inextricably a matter of personal make-up and accountability. Attributing moral wrongdoing to institutions is said to negate the personal will upon which the operation of rectification and redemption is based. Secondly, concerning the distinction of powerful elites, the condemnation of the behavior of a social class is said to negate the universal significance of Christian redemption and moral worth as well as the principle of the fellowship of all human beings. While the depth and range of the Vatican's analysis leave much to be desired (except from the viewpoint of ruling-class ideology and anti-communism) these issues are profound and legitimate concerns in moral understanding on a material as opposed to a spiritual level. Spiritual questions are also raised by the Vatican and are given etic interpretation, rather than excluded, in the scientific process enunciated by Durkheim, Weber, Rauschenbusch, and Troelsch, among sociologists sympathetic to the deeper religious aspects of culture. The levels are not mutually exclusive. The named scientists and theological social theorists and critics who do embrace the larger scope of collective and institutional moral wrongs - including a number of distinguished liberation theologians, scholars and clergy who have incurred the scrutiny of Rome in the 1980's - share a compassionate, inclusive, and sensible notion of the human community and a cognitively advanced understanding of the dependence of the structure of the modern world upon formidable institutions, including governments, corporations, and international political-economic agencies as well as upon classes exploited by and seeking emancipation from those institutions.

The negations noted in the Vatican's reactionary, sophistic analysis are correctly so identified but, in dialectical thinking, carry a different significance than they do in the rigid, synchronic, Aristotelian logic of the Vatican. It is true, for instance, that the directors of transnational corporations and other groups of capitalists and their sycophants may be

cited for particular 'sins' which in their practical nature have involved not merely collective processes but a developed history of progressive structures of such processes, resulting in institutional conduct which has consequences as severe for humanity as any morally suspect activity. Indeed, it is the general perception of those toward whom the Vatican's as well as right-wing 'Christian' ideologues' censure is aimed, as it is the view presented in chapter two of this thesis, that the overwhelming amount of wrongdoing, injustice, and humanly caused death, suffering, and deprivation in the world is of the character of institutional immorality or "structural sin." Human accountability is mediated by evolved structures which represent consistent immoral functions on the part of elites. The CIA; the World Bank, IMF, and other 'development' agencies; the capitalist financial and monetary system in its entirety; the production of goods based upon profitable manipulation of artificial needs among prospective consumers (including poor and starving people whose lives may be sacrificed to the sale of, for instance, infant formula or Coca-Cola) rather than upon actual human needs such as health care, transportation, housing and education; the "military-industrial complex;" the "national security state," securing not domestic liberty but the enslavement of foreign populations to domestic corporations' ends; the imperial US presidency, established in its sanguine continuity of purpose beyond interference by "democratic process;" institutional racism, sexism, homophobia, anti-semitism, and other instrumental modes of denying the humanity of structural inequality's essential panoply of victim classes; all these and more are structures of evil. They entail a process and history of inspissated moral failure and neglect of human responsibility, in career upon career of complacent conformity, "company men," obedient patriots, shrewd managers, practical people, dedicated followers, self-aggrandizing bureaucrats and self-righteously greedy adventurers in business individualism

and corporate myopia alike, loyalists and fanatics, men for whom the lives and limbs of inferior beings "in the way of progress" are but the cost of doing business - and toadying imposters such as Milton Friedman whose vulgar rhetoric, eg.:

> Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officals of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible (Friedman 1968: 114),

veils private realms of knowledge in self-serving ideology (see Anderson 1987). Thus, although institutional policy and practice amounts to outright mass murder, often no individual actions alone can be identified with so gross a deed, many thousandfold beyond the harm inflicted in any domestic police case.

Yet individual responsibility exists and is connected with that of many others, through a self-perpetuating institutional structure. Just as an unsafe factory will disable industrial workers and pesticides will poison farmworkers and consumers; as IMF lending conditions will lead to starvation and violent suppression; as outsourcing and shutdowns will impoverish American families; as racism will produce an underclass (though the Right would simply deny the poor the right to have children); and sexism will deny the human worth of women; support of dictators will assure the slaughter of thousands struggling against oppression; and the pursuit of higher rates of profit will perpetuate poverty and obscene wealth, wrong conduct can be and has been the sum result of complex structures serving the interests of a few and treating others as a means to those interests, implying a subordination of the human needs and worth of those others.

As for the negation of redemption and 'spiritual' worth on the part of members of elites, the Vatican and other sophistic opponents of class-structure analysis stop short of the next order of negation. No member

of an elite class is to be condemned in human essence or treated otherwise than as a Kantian end, an autonomous human being. This does not, however, imply the rightfulness of class structure or the human practices which express and maintain it, and thus the treatment of millions of others as means rather than with respect for their human dignity. While the treatment of criminality may proceed as with any transgression of human rights, redemption and transformation remain in the sphere of human understanding, compassion, and will. It is not to be presumed (as it is by the logic of the Right) that an individual has a human right to remain a member of the exploiting class, a theme underlying the reasoning of many anti-Communist emigrants from Cuba and other lands where socialist revolution has disinherited the privileged elite. The Vatican authors imply that being part of an elite is a matter of human essence; an expression of nature's process of 'selection', if any social interpretation is to be made. The social status and function of capitalists and allied classes, however, are well-defined in Marxist terms (which is precisely one reason why that clarity of social definition remains 'Marxist', that is, 'subversive' - rather than becoming part of the normative social understanding, which provides no such clarity although it enjoys the popular and authoritative stature of 'science.')

This does not preclude an individual proprietor of capital from operating in a fashion which is nonexploitative. This occurs and perhaps some 'Christian' business people suggest the possibility of realizing Charles Sheldon's conception of the social gospel. However, the shape of capitalist hegemony through history has been different; and the motion of monopoly capital towards total domination of the world economy (another 'Marxist', 'subversive' fact excluded from conventional expertise, however blatant the evidence) is antithetical to the vicissitudes of individual ownership and control of capital. The system is itself a meta-institution whose

demonstration of relative values, means and ends is clear. It does not treat human beings with respect, as autonomous individuals, and abides instead the contrary principle that property is primary and life secondary. The system reifies this principle within its structure. The corporate 'persons' which perform in lieu of human beings as fully empowered agents in the economic world are themselves property, yet property deeply invested with an elite human culture, a culture of selfishness and greed, blindness to human needs, material 'success', gross inequality, and an inflated individualism - whose ideology contradicts its very dependency on a well-maintained social order. This system affects every avenue of human endeavor, including the conditions of individual economic behavior, to a profound degree, marshalling that behavior toward the project of reproduction of the social structure. As other change within the system, change of the conditions defining that structure is necessarily social in character (another subversive fact, whether expressed in terms of class-consciousness, social morality, labor politics, the public interest or collective good, or revolution.)

Recalling Ollman's insistence on the collective nature of class-knowledge evokes a parallel to the corporate nature of elite structure and practice. Anti-communism has evinced a career of class war against the collective interest of the masses; and 'communism' has often proven itself to be no more than the recognition of that collective interest. Thus, the very radicals responsible for the strength of labor unions were ejected from them, as political contest over control of the productive process was co-opted and abandoned. The civil rights struggles of Afro-Americans were fought, an integral part of class war, with the theme of anti-communism closely allied to elite rationalization, while communists and radicals have been prominent among those who made an ultimate commitment to the principle of equality.

Red-baiting remains the elite's ideological weapon against dissent and protest against imperialist practices and policy: "WASHINGTON - A cold, rain-filled wind and charges of being manipulated by Marxist revolutionaries swirled around an estimated 75,000 marchers Saturday during a protest of U.S. policies toward Nicaragua and South Africa. . . ." (Beck 1987b). Ollman's quotation from Marx and Engels demonstrates the connection between a functioning morality in class society and practice based on the self-knowledge, encompassing in form all social knowledge, of class consciousness:

> "The question is not what this or that man or even the whole of the proletariat at the moment considers its aim. The question is what the proletariat is, and what consequent on that being, it will be compelled to do" (**The holy family**. Translated by R. Dixon. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956, 53; quoted in Ollman 1987: 63).

As Ollman writes,

> individual consciousness is more likely to reflect the restricted appearances of private life - and to that extent to show less awareness of one's place in the capitalist system - than group consciousness, rooted as it is in the function and interests of the class (1987: 86).

Similarly, moral consciousness is benefitted by the process of cooperative discovery of meaning and learning about the world - a concept of acquiring knowledge whose practical exclusion from general education has long been noted by non-radical critics (Rogers 1961; Glasser 1969; Goodlad 1984). Social reality is predominently represented by the collective experience of people communicating and working together and struggling for self-empowerment toward a more human social and world order.

Critical experience, given some of the intellectual virtues Paul describes, may mimic if not actually constitute dialogue. The situation of persons of extraordinary intellectual honesty in influential public office can be transformative, as more than one US Supreme Court Justice has proven. The experience of President Reagan's Surgeon General, Everett Koop, is

demonstrative. Initially welcomed by the Right for his outspoken opposition to abortion, Koop earned its wrath for his statements against the tobacco industry and in support of early sex-education in schools and of the use of condoms to abate the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Responding to the conservative attack, Koop stated in an interview:

> "A great many people in the pro-life movement and some political conservatives have not been able to face the fact that we are facing the greatest health threat this country has ever had since its inception . . .
>
> "What people don't understand is that I am the Surgeon General of men and women, of whites and blacks, of old and young, of heterosexual and homosexual, of married and unmarried, of moral and immoral. I have to tell it as it is and I can't just pick sides" (Young 1987).

Dr. Koop's pronouncements address the range of real circumstances. Regarding AIDS, he delivers a "message in four parts," abstinence, monogamy, certainty about multiple sex partners, and failing these, the use of condoms. Responding to real conditions, his perception of self according to principle, as the Surgeon General of all under his jurisdiction, irregardless of personal description or behavior, is accurate, providing a rare example of critical thinking and moral responsibility in action. Koop's example indicates the potential of moral cognition to reach enlarged conceptions of human community, through practical action wedded to dialectical examination of reality, so that a principled morality may be construed in respect to an identified world of diverse but interrelated lives, each equally deserving treatment as an end, in this case, of public health policy. Class itself can, to some degree, be transcended thusly, showing the power of unalienating praxis. "To understand" as Piaget urges, is "to discover" (1973: 20). In contrast to a principled, rational morality, the end of public health according to the moralistic dictation in which the Reagan administration often indulges implies that human worth is only resident in the practice of sexual abstinence until monogamous marriage and that no moral obligation - or

an obligation appropriate in respect to less worthy persons - is due those who veer from this course. What pretends to be morality thus exhibits the negation of moral principle on the metacognitive level.

The moralistic view of individual conduct is related to the counterproductive attempt to extract by non-dialectical reasoning a will, individual or collective, behind institutional immorality. For Marx, there was no point in directing blame. Critical theory since Marx has deepened our appreciation of the complexity of structure and process in the determination of social phenomena; of the scintillating relations of synchronic and diatonic moments which resist description by sequential logic. Without denying the moral responsibility of persons and institutions, we can emphasize the significance of moral insight for the motivation for change. Cognitivists and articulators of Christian morality whose sensibility to structural social evil has wrought companionship with Marxist social analysis place the need for moral action in the perspective of an inner sense of what is right and of growth in humanness, both potential features of collective as well as individual processes of understanding and continuing inquiry.

The connection of moral consciousness with class consciousness benefits from the dependence of understanding the latter upon understanding class society, that is, the world of capitalism, in its entirety (Ollman 1987). On the other hand, class, as an organic attribute reflects the cultural, intellectual, historical bonds of human community, including the creation of moral knowledge (see Bodmann and Spohn 1982: 18). Expansion of the self-consciousness of class through the world population, with elites distinguished by their ideologies and defined by class war, presses the evolution of moral understanding towards emancipation and (in Marx's denotation of relationship to capital) a classless society. The political activism which comprises a moral stance in the US, the heartland of an

oppressive world system, though sometimes dangerous and a risk to life and liberty, is a mild foil to the task of the revolutionary fighting against institutional violence, for self-determination. Our responsibility is great, however. While North Americans are slowly impoverished, materially and culturally (although the latter poverty is advanced and profound), the lives of men, women, and children are dealt with as deadwood in the way of profit, across the globe. Amitav Acharya writes that the Reagan Doctrine "is the first truly global doctrine of containment," in which the older goal of "preventing Communist revolutions against [US] client regimes" is joined with that of "overthrowing existing Communist-installed regimes," rolling-back "communism from the third world:"

> The moral dilemmas of the Reagan Doctrine become further apparent when one looks at the composition of the so-called "freedom-fighters" to whom American support has been pledged. The contra rebels of Nicaragua include elements of the notorious Somocista national guard. The fighting muscle of the Kampuchean resistance is the genocidal Khmer Rouge. Jonas Savimbi's Angolan resistance is closely aligned to the apartheid regime in South Africa . . . . It is not clear how the United States could reconcile its support for such groups with its proclaimed objective of promoting freedom and democracy in the third world (1987: 28-29, 35).

North Americans are living in a cataclysmic time. Around us, the struggle for liberation marks a critical moment for the system at whose center we rest. US citizens are the subject of containment and repression of cognitive and moral growth and self-realization, while in the world around, stark circumstances work a facile education in the outline of morality in world society. We live in the cave of a police state mentality, 'fortunate' to be unneedful of actual police state conditions. We are the house slaves of the world, blinded by bourgeois obscurantism and ideology. Therefore, our task is one of education, to subvert the moral lies which infuse our material and ersatz collective existence, to release the humanity inside us and preserve that in each other and around the world.

Ollman remarks that the study of class consciousness inevitably affects class consciousness and becomes "an ingredient in the process by which [respondents] come to understand" the social world (1987: 91). "Conducting research in the orthodox mode,"

> remaining tied to traditional disciplinary forms and norms, effectively retards the development of class consciousness, whether one intends the result or not (1987: 93).

On the other hand, as the intrusion of a researcher sensitive to class structure may furnish enhanced opportunities for dialogue, "conducting a study of classes and class struggle from the perspective of class consciousness," can have a radicalizing influence (Ollman 1987: 92, 93). Habermas' comments on the parity of researcher and interviewee are apropos. The researcher, preferably of group consciousness, enters the discourse for fuller understanding of the world. If the researcher uses reductive, positivist formulations which deny people's power to create interpretations outside those of conservative academia, he or she will inhibit the growth of understanding, while guiding a process of inquiry and self-expression through open-ended reasoning will reinforce and further personally meaningful exploration of reality. This reasoning may be extended to any intervenor, for instance, a reporter, political aspirant, external member of the working class, or a new member of the group.

Destroying the myths of objectivity and value-free science permits understanding how scholars and people generally learn from contact with others, simultaneously affecting the latters' own learning environment. This symmetry suggests a radical method partaking of humanist educational technique as well as social theory. The models of liberation theology and critical pedagogy synthesize a holistic community of learners and doers, recapturing the unity of unalienated moral, intellectual and active life -

and political being.

The study of elites must be integrated into social knowledge. What do corporate managers do to maintain the system? How is profit made, in terms of human conduct and consequences? I have merely presented a framework for a macrostructural understanding of morality as a perspective of social knowledge. To apply and develop this framework, we need to learn answers to questions about specific conduct and its moral status. Nice methodology may not serve this purpose consistently. Study of the social effects of institutional practices entails a combined study of legal, financial, and social, economic and political organizations, relationships and practices. Involvement of the views of people affected and an 'interdisciplinary' outlook nourish an investigation which can be communicated meaningfully to persons outside a narrow academic field and perspective. Thus, the identification of intermediary observers, such as clergy, police, lawyers, social workers and people with any expert or skilled point of view, as well as an opening to members of affected classes, such as welfare recipients, school children, prison inmates, and litigants in appropriately defined cases may be needed to furnish a holistic approach to a problem. However quantitative data may be used, it will be essential to involve these persons in a more personal, qualitative fashion.

The core of capitalist structure is its exploitation of labor. The center of the capitalist ideology of human freedom, harboring truths needing dialectical interpretation, is individual economic adventurism and its counterpart of self-realization within corporate structures. The contradictions of exploitation and freedom have received little treatment on the left, but are susceptible to study by a critical moral sociology and politics. When the benefits of social organization are recited, often in the

context of an ahistorical derivation of the modern state, the 'evils' of "individual freedom" described concern outright killing and theft. Yet, in terms of modern political-economy, reaching from the earliest beginnings of world trade, it is the "individual freedom" to exploit economic goods and processes, not the most 'democratic' form of crime, which is of greatest import to the shaping of dominant institutions. The keen sensitivity of the small business and professional middle class in the US to capitalist themes of freedom connected with economic activity needs to be reconciled, theoreticallly and empirically, with the human values associated with emancipation and radical democracy. (Similarly, recent events in the Peoples' Republic of China should motivate not a vulgar Marxist reparte, but original inquiry into the dimensions of human difference, expression, creativity and productive relationships. Otherwise, Marxist theory and critical morality may stand accused of hindering human realization by its own version of ressentiment. See Dannhauser, 1974: 23-26, noting Lukacs' interpretation of Nietzsche's thought as a "polemic against Marxism", and Nietzsche, 1966: 115-18. Not only the ruling ideology but much earnest bourgeois sentiment in the US would concur with such a reading of Nietzsche's words on democratic levelling. An honest response accommodating that sentiment is wanting, explaining in part the distance of radical discourse from the popular text of American culture.)

That studies of power and wealth have not been effectively distributed in educational channels is partly the fault of critical social scientists who have not adequately striven to create alternative public media and school curricula to correct the American diet of mystification. The task is also one of organizing the information and intelligence of diverse persons, particularly that harbored by the poor and working class. Ollman's project of radical study of class consciousness is all the more important because it

reaches an essential component in understanding the details of a system whereof information has become a private matter in proportion to the size and power of its corporate members. The communication, for instance, between poor people and social workers, lawyers, police and court personnel, upscale acquaintances, business people, and among themselves includes a mass of uncompiled data, of vignettes of the way the system works, of deep, raw social understanding otherwise inaccessible to investigators or the general public. Such data needs to be interpreted, to inform moral and political consciousness.

We need a taxonomy of human wrongs, encompassing in a consistent approach anti-social behaviors recognized by criminal and civil law and the deprivations of life, liberty and other human rights within the prerogative of imperialism and its subordinate instrumentalities. Normative law serves not only the establishment of social order but also the legitimation of political authority integrating the various tasks of reproducing social relations, including those which are both exploitative and beyond the express intent of positive law. Thus, law cannot be confused with moral imperative sui generis. Law functions, on the contrary, to preserve the distributive 'justice' intrinsic to the ruling order. Human rights and, in general, the larger standards of morality in the world are incommensurable with common (national and subnational) legal institutions. Even the Nuremberg trials, in which the insulation of the moral accountability of (primarily) men from the practice of state power was challenged, were conducted under the plenary power of victorious states. Atrocities committed by the victors received no similar attention. When a state practices class war against its citizens, using secret imprisonment, torture and assassination as well as lesser crimes, there is no vested authority to uphold personal responsibility. While murder without political motive is the superlative

offense in the penal taxonomy, torture and killing of 'subversives' by soldiers and "death squads" comprise not a definite offense but an act overlapping the prerogative of power situated in class. Thus, Argentine soldiers rebelled as a political (not a 'criminal') expression on a level with but across the political boundary from, state terror, in response to the new regime's political decision to scrutinize human rights violations on the part of military subordinates following orders, and secured impunity as a political remedy. The killings of civil rights activists in Greensboro, North Carolina, enabled by both local and federal law-enforcement officials' intentional conduct, have been suggested to exemplify an incipient role of fascist groups in the US as "death squads" (parallel to that of the counterrevolutionaries and national police of third-world dictatorships, trained in the US). The normative legal process broke down at all levels, upon identification of the crime as one perpetrated by fascist, self-described patriots sanctioned by agents of the state, against victims who were members of a Marxist political party, that is, 'subversives' under surveillance by the state - which had used infiltration of the fascist group to incite and assist in the crime itself.

Additional examples from the economic crimes of which poor people are the primary victims supplement these examples to demonstrate that rather than providing a flawed but essentially rational, principled basis for human justice, legal institutions profoundly distort the measure of moral conduct in accord with their implicit provisions for repression of political enemies of the social order. It might be said that no truely human dimension of politics can exist wherever repression is conceivable. Then, economics is not the only 'discipline' in which self-serving abstractions describe the limits of legitimized study and formal intelligence (see Anderson 1987). Positivism, as elsewhere, serves as a sergeant of arms to defend the 'science' of

politics from the ravages of dialectical reasoning.

Towards a morality of politics.

Those deferential to the personal authority of, or heedful of social and professional intimidation by political conservatives may respond to studies correlating indicia of higher moral development and political attitudes with the question-begging caveat that such studies cannot be valid if they result in finding a liberal or radical orientation to be characterized by more principled moral reasoning (see Rice 1984: 478). But, since those by the Frankfurt theorists, many studies epistemologically open to such a conclusion have suggested the same to be true. Lind, Sandberger and Bargel summarize this evaluation well:

> we hypothesized that conscious adherence to democratic values would correlate with moral-cognitive structure. The results shown . . . are in line with this hypothesis. Though egalitarianism is only a prerequisite concept and not necessarily indicative of a fully developed democratic consciousness . . . students who support a reduction of social inequality - even at the cost of material wealth - show less preference for lower stage reasoning. This can be taken as an indicator of higher moral development. Humanistic values and the request for "democratization of all areas of life" seem to be at the heart of advanced moral development. . . . In our sample, students with humanistic and democratic orientations show the clearest preference order of the six stages of moral orientation. The group of students disagreeing with democratization shows less discrimination between the stages of morality in evaluating arguments. In other words, this latter group possesses less decisional competence for making morally substantiated judgments (1985: 74).

The ramifications for democratic politics are further indicated by the authors:

> Our integrated study of styles of reasoning, ego functioning, and values suggests that ego strength (tolerance of ambiguity, hope for success, internal control cognition), content and structure of moral judgment behavior, and positive valuing of democratic ideals are all interrelated. These findings, as well as those from other studies, provide insight into the importance of the cognitive component in democratic behavior. Hence, they clearly demonstrate that . . . "the tolerance of opposing viewpoints and the appreciation of the utility of such views for social change is an important organizing principle for the character-rooted democratic personality." Moreover, they suggest

> that the acquisition of abstract values may be considered a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the development of democratic personality (1985: 75).

Tolerance of opposing viewpoints does not preclude but is essential for study of their cognitive and moral import. When we observe the actions of the Right, we may see that such tolerance is often affected to disguise undemocratic intentions. Intolerance is characteristic of the most vulgar manifestations of the Right and also of the suppressive police functions of state power wielded by the Right and the tactics of the most politically sophisticated elements of the Right, both calculated to curb dissent and maintain the 'credibility' of ruling ideology. The Right's intolerance is a tool of class war against the potential of democratic power based upon class-consciousness.

As monopoly capitalists pay themselves multi-million dollar incomes to reward their shaping of the world's dominant productive and distributive system, conservatives proclaim that the rich have no responsibility for or duty toward the impoverished masses. While capitalists extol their own power and rationality, the Right proclaims that the most the world can expect is to benefit from the immense inequality promised by a system premised on human selfishness and hunger for power. From political-economic conservatism emerges the practical axiom that human worth is dependent upon competitive success in gaining individual material advantage over others, that is, success precisely in treating other human beings as means to one's own selfish ends. The result of institutionalizing such a principle and sustaining a social structure based upon it is the legitimized destruction of human values, rights, and lives themselves. Here, a moral semiotics emerges. Paul notes that:

> Piaget rightly identifies uncritical thought with a tendency toward egocentrism, and critical thought with a tendency toward reciprocity. He is aware of but nowhere develops the recognition that egocentrism of

thought tends to develop into and partially merge with sociocentrism of thought:

> "The child begins with the assumption that the immediate attitudes arising out of our own special surroundings and activities are the only ones possible. This state of mind, which we shall term the unconscious egocentricity (both cognitive and affective) of the child is at first a stumbling-block both to the understanding of his own country and to the development of objective relations with other countries. . . . "(quoting Jean Piaget, The development in children of the idea of the homeland and of relations with other countries. International Social Science Bulletin 3(No. 3, 1951): 561-578; Paul, n.d.)

The question of differential cognitive development should be related to a moral classification of human activity. Material reward in US society and its prerequisties of personality structure should be studied, pursuing the cognitive make-up of bankers, corporate executives, entrepreneurs, speculators, and various professionals, classified by work structure, income, and power relations. Investigatory techniques and criteria, unlike Kohlberg's moral dilemmas and rating of responses, should be relevant to experimental subjects' lives, be descriptive of actual social conditions and encompass interpersonal values and dialectical reasoning (compare Paul 1987: 127-28; Dobert and Nunner-Winkler 1985; Oser and Schlafli 1985). Persons within lower statistically scaled units in the distribution of wealth and income should be similarly studied, using multiple methods of inquiry. Do teachers, nurses, and social workers evince higher cognitive-moral development than business people who 'earn' a hundred times as much? Why or why not? In what sense if any can it be said that the latter "work harder" than teachers, nurses, or fast-food workers or migrant farm laborers? Can it be said that moral classifications of work exist; that some people devote their principal efforts to conduct calculated to enrich themselves, however they may rationalize what they do, while others strive for sustenance and modest comforts; and that some people devote their efforts to success measured primarily by enhancement of the well-being of other persons or motivated

primarily by love for others or by self-fulfilling creative energies allied to human values? Social science, to gauge these qualities, must become more human and more pedestrian, more conversant with the common voice. There is a common language and intelligence for such concerns, part of the intellectuality of every person affirmed by writers as diverse as Gramsci, Freire, Rogers and Glasser. This language, however, is not legitimized by the pervasive framework of conventional social knowledge which, contrary to the very calculus of business profit, asserts that business unequivocally serves human needs, frequently extended to the absurdity seldom contested in the public domain that business creates all wealth as well as sufficient opportunity for people to earn a livelihood through productive work. These myths contradict the general experience of people in the world of work and the ordinary knowledge people have of cooperative ways of doing things as well as of the primary efforts they devote to work which enriches others. The civil religion equating democracy with capitalism and competitive individualism with the natural, human essence of economic production also contradicts the moral knowledge and reasoning of the working class (Yates 1987).

Part of the naturalistic imagery of capitalism is the view that humankind is essentially evil. This part Hobbesian, part Spencerian construct entails a mythology of superior adventurers driven to accumulate wealth and power. Political-economic conservatives have argued at least since the quickening of the industrial revolution that it is wrong and foolish to attempt to design a society based upon the notion of democratically cooperative human beings. There seems to be a leering allusion to the "captains of industry" and finance when such ideologues urge with the verisimilitude of compassion that men and women are not capable of so functioning. Yet, we must respond, for ideology is but a counterfeit of the

engaged language of dialectic. It is precisely the rich and powerful, the few and elite, the defended sponsors of conservative sophistry who behave in the fashion of which all humankind is accused, in respect to those so accused (the former included if true self-respect is also taken as a victim). Further, the elite cooperate and collectivize their power and influence, although the rationalized society they create around them does not provide sanctuary from the pervasive alienation, in both Marxist and existentialist senses and within Toennies' concept of Gesellschaft, which is intrinsic to the depersonalizing, dehumanizing, psychopathogenic machinery of class society.

Morality is not so complex as to elude definition. Kay writes that "morality is simply the action of the man [sic] who having reasoned compassionately, acts on his convictions" (1970: 87). Kay's definition is in express agreement with the cognitive developmental emphases of Kohlberg's stage-six principled morality, Peck and Havighurst's "rational-altruistic personality" and Piaget's highest moral stage of equity. A parallel exists between domination of the world by greed and prejudice, force and suppression, bondage and pillage, where moral underdevelopment appears to have the advantage, and the prevailing 'excellence' in the pursuit of wealth among those who command world society. In contrast, teachers, clergy, health care and social workers, researchers and technicians dedicated to improving the general quality of life, and persons in numerous callings, or not 'gainfully' employed, who exhibit a principled, authentic morality in work, politics and "personal life" represent human values which are not operative at a structural level in the wielding of institutional power in a society based upon inequality. There is a social division on grounds of moral reasoning, between those who actively, knowingly and willingly contribute to the direction of a bellicose structure whose overriding purposes are the

sustenance and expansion of the wealth and power of capital in opposition to the popular masses, and those whose lives are relatively detached from that structure and who are morally opposed to it, despite the practical need to pay taxes, consume goods, and even hold jobs in transnational corporations. A finer classification might indicate situation and conduct in respect to measures of material separation from and concerted moral action against the ruling system.

My structural perspective of morality, given a cognitivist, dialectical standard and analysis of class society on a world scale, may be summarized in the demography of cognitive development. Researchers have consistently observed the relative infrequency of principled moral reasoning in the population. The overwhelmingly popular support for the death penalty peculiar to the United States is evidence of moral judgment functioning at a level below that of Piaget's formal operations or abstract, reflective thought and scarcely reaching Kohlberg's level of conventional morality (stages three and four). It is typical for support of the death penalty to be explained in a manner mirroring the wrongdoer's want of respect for human life: the murderer did not consider the rights of his victim; therefore he does not deserve to have his human rights considered and ought to be killed himself. We may characterize the emotionality of such a response as revenge on a vicarious, collective level; but a deeper analysis can be made in terms of moral reasoning, or rather, the lack of any formal, principled reasoning in attempts to justify capital punishment. The moral judgment of death penalty advocates seems symptomatic of Kohlberg's stage two. At the first stage, a respondent follows right conduct to avoid harm to himself; at the second, a system of mutual avoidance of harm is constructed. Ressentiment has been advanced as an explanation of this instance of lex talionis (Ranulf

1964). This would be consistent with its background of bourgeois ideology, which reifies, in its theory of retaliation, the denial of material, social conditions of crime (Marx 1853; Murphy 1985).

Prior to the Reagan administration's premeditated attempt on the life of Muammar el-Qaddafi (see Hersh 1987), visiting the lost-and-found office of the city police department, I saw posted on the wall a xerox copy of a photograph of Qaddafi with a target superposed, its bull's-eye near the temple. A barrage of propaganda largely transmitted intact from the administration to the media, to the public, had created a populace sympathetic to the intent behind this image and, perhaps, capable of accepting the assassination attempted. Such acceptance was readily accorded other beligerant acts of the administration in Lebanon, Granada, and Nicaragua and is in all likelihood anticipated by the secret policy-makers in the administration, relative to the invasion of Nicaragua to overthrow the Sandinista government which has appeared to be the hankering desire of the Right throughout Reagan's presidency.

Thus, the insulation of the conduct of imperialism and world hegemony through exploitation and suppression from moral scrutiny and political challenge is achieved, in part, through the underdevelopment of cognitive and, thereby, moral functioning; through the reproduction of a society where autonomous, principled moral reasoning is little practiced or understood. Such a society reproduces personality structures ill-equipped to present such a challenge and, simultaneously, those which sustain the operation of the system. One subtlely but amply inculcated message is that there is no other system and there is no other than the particular "human nature" upon which it is premised. The order of morality in society is a function of human development as a social process managed by the ruling institutions, although substantial resistance in the form of alternative, higher moral development

does occur. To sustain an order of dominance and structural inequality, a mode of inferior moral development which accepts the voice of authority without independent reflection is most suitable. A people exhibiting principled moral reasoning would not quietly submit to that order, an order which such people are struggling against in all parts of the world.

One purpose of studying morality is to permit a more fully human understanding of the world to enter into the environment of human development and social history. There may be reason, in extending Marxist tools of understanding - the farthest reaching and most humanly transformational in social science - to welcome a more Hegelian concept of dialectic, as a guide to linking the subject to history of the social organism. More inclusive perspectives on the human community relative to ethnicity and 'race'; gender; sexual orientation; economic status; and handicap represent cognitive and moral growth in which intersubjectivity and interdependency have belied the social, dialectical construction of personality. Activism such as providing sanctuary for victims of US policy and dictatorial regimes in Latin America holds the potential for a broader experience of human interrelation and responsibility. In the rationalizations of the Right we find a consistent self-distancing from the facts which induce realization of human interconnection and global community. As Thomas Merton observed in respect to nuclear weapons whose threat to world population is clearly immoral (irrespective of the frequent myopia of activists as to the global causes of violence), a moral response is remarkably weak in the population at large:

> Take . . . the willingness of the majority of 'believers' to accept the hydrogen bomb with all that it implies, with no more than a shadow of theoretical protest. This is almost unbelievable, and yet it has become so commonplace that no one wonders at it any more. The state of the world at the present day is the clearest possible indication that the whole human race is full of sin - for which responsibility becomes more and more collective and, therefore more and more nebulous (Merton,

n.d.).

Perhaps; but collective responsibility and human freedom are dynamic and collateral processes. Seeking understanding, we must risk our theoretical beliefs as well as our human faith in the reality of principles whose actuality is primarily poised in the moment of history.

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