THE EDUCATION OF PUBLIC OPINION.

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Pericles, in his immortal panegyric upon the Athenian people, describes as accomplished fact in Athens a state of affairs which every philosophical expounder of democracy has pictured as an ideal. "An Athenian citizen," said the man whom Grote describes as having enjoyed for forty years an unparalled moral and political ascendency over them, "An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household; and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy."[1]

It is not inappropriate, I think, to invite this audience of cultivated men and women, peculiarly fortunate in the enjoyment of those educational advantages which only a free, enlightened and generous commonwealth can offer, to consider for a few moments some aspects of the relation in which the individual citizen stands to the development of public opinion and to the conduct of public business in a democracy.

The political vitality and integrity of a modern state must rest, in the last instance, upon the character and clearness of the political opinions held by men who are without official station. No administrative vigor and no legislative wisdom can long survive in the vacuum of public ignorance and indifference. A supporting body of opinion is essential to the conduct of legislative or administrative policy, and a serious and high-principled opposition is necessary to prevent its exaggeration and abuse. The basis for this observation lies

1 Thucydides, translated by Jowett, 1:119.

in the constitution of human nature itself: it is amply illustrated by history. Political action on the part of a community or a state is the result of the interplay of these two forces, the propelling and the resisting. Taken together and increased by the religious and the moral sentiments of the people, these political beliefs and tendencies to act constitute what is known as public opinion. It is a subtle, powerful and sometimes terrible force. Like the mountain stream which ripples softly in the sunlight, giving no sign of the foaming and destructive torrent into which a sudden cloudburst may transform it, so public opinion, patient, and long suffering, at times seeming even dead, is capable of being roused to fury and to resolute resistance by some flagrant abuse of power or by an unprincipled violation of accepted standards of action. Sir Robert Peel hardly measured its breadth and depth when with cynical insight he described public opinion as "that great compound of folly, weakness, prejudice, wrong feeling, right feeling, obstinacy, and newspaper paragraphs."

Public opinion is not very old. It is the child of the art of printing, of modern education, of modern means of communication, of modern democracy. Printing and education made it possible. Steam and electricity have developed it enormously. Democracy has caused it to grow through exercise. As democratic tendencies and habits have spread, as the circle of human information and human interest has widened, as the means of communication between man and man and between man and the world about him have expanded and multiplied, the complexity of public opinion has greatly increased; and, while the difficulty of arousing it has diminished, the difficulty of directing it has increased many fold.

As a matter of fact we shall enter upon the twentieth century under unprecedented political conditions. Most early democracies were in reality oligarchies. Modern theoretical democracy was quite as often oligarchical in fact. Jefferson, like Aristotle, contemplated democracy and human slavery side by side. But now the level of average intelligence and

of education has been so raised, and man's power over nature has so multiplied the possibilities of political, moral and religious sympathy and cooperation, that for the first time in history the stage seems to be adequately set for the working-out of the impressive drama of democracy. The builders of the American republic were, most of them, theoretical democrats; but the forces which they controlled and the means by which they controlled them were to an unsuspected extent oligarchical. More than one election in old New York, as so often in the history of England, turned wholly upon the alignment of a few great families. The French revolutionists came to be theoretical democrats, but woe to the leaders of an opposing faction whose opposition took on the form of action! To-day the situation in the United States is notably different. If men are held here in political bondage, so called, it is because they put the shackles on themselves. Accurate description of their condition must always use a reflexive verb. Freedom of speech and of opinion are so well established and so uniformly acquiesced in that public declarations and acts of a kind which one day cost More his head on Tower Hill or drove Roger Williams from Massachusetts Bay, are now permitted in Boston and in Chicago without restraint, or any call to accountability, despite the fact that they may tend to cost the lives of American soldiers and sailors serving under the flag half way round the world. In the long run it is better so. A safety-valve is as necessary as a steam-chest.

This state of affairs has come about through the slow process of social and political evolution. The Estates which underlay the entire legal structure of the Middle Ages and gave form to its political history, dissolved and gave way to more mobile and less definite social classes. These, in turn, have so interpenetrated each other that, in the United States at least, their significance has disappeared, and a single body politic, through which flow unending convection currents, has taken their place. No artificial class distinctions can long prevail in a society like ours, of which it is truly said to be

often but three generations "from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves."

The first effect of this new condition is that, theoretically at least, individual choice displaces status as the force directing public action. The citizen now throws his influence as he wills and not as his fixed relation to his fellows dictates. He has no such fixed relation. Modern legal and social organization makes him employer and employed, debtor and creditor, public servant and private citizen, all at once or in startlingly rapid succession. His individual importance is vastly increased as his points of contact with other individuals or with groups multiply. He becomes less and less a cog on a blindly driven wheel and more and more a living cell in a living body. His political and social health and strength influence the health and strength of countless others. He can not, if he would, cut himself off from them and live. There is no greater illusion and none more at war with the very spirit of democracy than that under whose spell public concerns are neglected and despised and one's immediate private and family interests exalted as the sole business of life. Liberty and property are social creations. Without society they could not exist. Without a well-ordered society they are not safe. Who shall order society well or ill? The time is happily past when that question can be answered in more ways than one. But let us press the question of responsibility home: there is no abstraction, no independent creation called state or government, which can order society. These are but names for one aspect or one agency of ourselves. We paraphrase the dictum of Louis XIV and thank him for it—"The State—we are it!"

Burke pointed straight at the typical bad citizen when he described those "who think their innoxious indolence their security." The man who submits to public imposition to save trouble or trifling expense, or who pays to be "let alone," or who, priding himself upon his integrity and business success, affects to "despise politics," is contributing his mite to the degradation of government and to the tearing down of

the structure so laboriously and so painfully builded by the fathers. John Hampden's ship money was but a few paltry shillings; not to have resisted its payment might have altered the course of English history. It is only when we "place every one his private welfare and happiness in the public peace, liberty and safety," as Milton puts it, that we exercise our privilege and perform our duty as members of society.

The relation in which the individual stands to the development of public opinion is a matter which requires analysis. It is not quite so simple as appears at first sight. Theoretically, when a question is to be decided or a public attitude taken, each individual examines and weighs the evidence and the arguments for and against a given policy, and arrives at his own independent conclusion. A count is then made, by ballot or otherwise, and the action or proposal which is supported by a majority of those expressing themselves is supported or endorsed. Each citizen appears to have the same part to play as his neighbor, and the same influence to exercise in determining the result. As a matter of fact, however, the process is a quite different one.

Bagehot has an interesting passage in which he shows how large a factor unconscious imitation is in the making of natural character. "At first a sort of 'chance predominance' made a model, and then invincible attraction, the necessity which rules all but the strongest men to imitate what is before their eyes, and to be what they are expected to be, molded men by that model. This is, I think, the very process by which new national characters are being made in our time. * * * A national character is but the successful parish character; just as the national speech is but the successful parish dialect, the dialect, that is, of the district which came to be more—in many cases but a little more—influential than other districts, and so set its yoke on books and on society." [2] It is obvious that when we speak of the Age of Elizabeth or the Napoleonic era, we mean something very like this. We are describing or

2 Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, p 36, 37.

recalling types, tendencies and standards, which, particular or even individual in their origin, spread themselves, through the working of imitation conscious or unconscious, over an entire people for a generation or more. When we come to direct public opinion and to study its genesis, we are surprised and astonished to find how small a share the ordinary individual has in making up his own mind; and while claiming independence, how largely he is dependent on forces and influences with which the student of psychology and of history is very familiar. This is due, in the first place, to the very small part which genuine thinking plays in the life of any of us. We are a bundle of reactions, and those reactions which are systematically directed by serious and sustained thought are not very numerous. Except for the purpose of living up to our reputation as human beings and for emergencies, most of us could get on very well with considerably diminished brain surface. Dr. Maudsley put the matter correctly when he said: "To say that the great majority of men reason in the true sense of the word, is the greatest nonsense in the world; they get their beliefs as they do their instincts and their habits, as a part of their inherited constitution, of their education, and the routine of their lives." The part which we thoughtlessly attribute to thought in guiding our beliefs and our actions, is really played, for the most part, by feeling and by imitation. We grow up Republicans or Democrats, Presbyterians or Episcopalians; we do not reason ourselves—as a rule—into the one form of belief or the other, be it political or religious. We find our way naturally into a group or class by reason of hereditary tendencies, family example or influence, and that impalpable ether of surrounding opinion, which, despite its impalpability, regulates so much of our mental breathing. Then we energetically support our faith-formed convictions with *ex parte* reasons which appeal to the intellect. Like the Schoolmen, the motto of most of us is *Credo, ut intelligam.* We believe first and defend our beliefs afterwards.

I do not for a moment intend to convey the impression that we should hold no belief and take no action for which an impartially reasoned theory can not be given. Such a doctrine would bring civilization to a standstill through paralysis; for the average individual has neither the capacity nor the opportunity to examine in a sternly judicial fashion the beliefs and the tendencies to act which come surging through his experience. But I urge that we look the facts in the face; "render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's," namely, give the feelings and the imitative instinct their due. When we do this we shall come nearer to understanding how that public opinion of which we and our neighbors are a part, is formed and how it may be and is changed or developed. Otherwise we shall lose sight of the all-important fact which Montesquieu long ago pointed out, that as society grows older the individual influences the community less and the community shapes the individual more. Indeed, formal education itself is neither more nor less than this shaping of the individual by the community, and the bending of him to its traditions, its habits, its convictions,—in short, to its will. The conscious reason of any individual, as compared to the sum total of his apparently rational but really extra-rational possessions, is in the position of the apex of an inverted pyramid. One is forcibly reminded by it of the way in which Hume and Mill undertake to explain our belief in an external world, from the momentary flashes of a given conciousness.

It is an illusion of some writers on democracy that the march of public opinion moves on with the evenness and the regularity of an army on parade. The contrary is the case. If from some distant planet we might be so endowed as to view public opinion pressing forward in the United States, we should find its skirmish line serried and broken. Here on one side of the field some daring and creative leader has dashed ahead and occupied an exposed height with his small band of followers, and is calling upon the troops to follow

and to join him. But they, interested in other directions, are a long time in hearing and a still longer time in heeding his call. We readily recognize that it has been after this fashion that the movements for the reform of the civil service and of the ballot were set in motion; it is in this way that one needed political reform after another will be brought about. A little leaven will leaven the whole lump. In so far Matthew Arnold's discouraging doctrine of the remnant has some significance for us.

It is true, as Le Bon says, that the advances of civilization are due to the small phalanx of eminent men, which each civilized people possesses. Least of all can a democracy hope to succeed without an *élite* of its own. Only we must see to it that this *élite* is recruited from talent or capacity for public service of whatever kind, and is not artificially limited by conditions of birth or of wealth. In this respect I like to think that our practice is in advance of our rather shabby theory as to equality. Nature knows no such thing as equality: it is a human invention thrown up as an artificial barrier against selfishness and tyranny. The law of life is the development of the heterogeneous, the dissimilar, the unequal: it tends away from the dull inefficiency of uniform equality toward the high effectiveness of well-organized differences. Destroy inequality of talent and capacity, and life as we know it stops. Democracy becomes unthinkable. The corner-stone of democracy is natural inequality, its ideal the selection of the most fit. Liberty is far more precious than equality, and the two are mutually destructive. If all the hills and mountains of Europe were levelled off, it would result in producing a barren, dismal plain some nine hundred and odd feet higher than the present shore line. The beauty and the productiveness of a continent would be gone. If all the wealth of the United States were divided equally among the population, it is estimated that we should each possess a capital of about $1100. Industry would be reduced to the lowest level ever known in modern times, everything which makes

life agreeable would go out of it, and we should all be driven to a conflict and struggle for a bare subsistence to which the state of primitive war described by Hobbes would be as nothing.

In practice, however, we are more reasonable. Our human delight in achievement thrusts our book-made theory aside, and we cheerfully recognize leadership and public benefaction, though we know we could not have done as well. A sort of race or national *pietas* is an excellent trait to cultivate, and we need rather more of it than less. The most inspiring and impressive happening of the past eventful twelve-month, is the respectful and almost unprecedented tribute paid by a democratic people to the quiet sailor-statesman who has been their ambassador to the court of the public opinion of the civilized world under circumstances of great difficulty and embarrassment. This tribute ennobles the people who have delighted to pay it, and it whispers to us that after all the only equality we really believe in is equality of rights and of opportunity.

The individual who realizes what public opinion is and what is his own proper relation to it has, then, two things to bear in mind (1) what he does not know and (2) who knows it. It is his duty so to master some field of human interest and activity, however humble or however small, that he can as to it offer something to his neighbor worthy of imitation and of rational acceptance. It is his duty, too, to seek the best and highest models for imitation and rational acceptance in fields apart from his own, and to recognize excellence and fitness wherever found and to defer to them. The crude and dangerous notion that any citizen is as well-fitted as his neighbor for any public post is not a tenet of democracy, but of ochlocracy, rule by the mob.

For the conduct of public business the party system has been devised and slowly perfected, until in England and in the United States it has reached a high degree of organization and efficiency. Its influence in shaping, in controlling

and in expressing public opinion is so enormous that it deserves most careful consideration.

Political parties had their origin in personal interests which it was desired to transform into public policies, and they are very far from having lost that characteristic today. Yet they, and they alone, make popular government possible, and the individual has a duty toward them which is neither fulfilled nor commuted by the denunciation of party abuses or by cynical contempt for party limitations and shortcomings. Men must cooperate, and to cooperate for political purposes is to be a member of a political party. One may be a member of a party formally and so hope to exercise some influence upon its policies, or he may support it generally without professing allegiance to its public declarations or loyalty to its leaders. In the latter case, he destroys almost all chance of being heard concerning constructive policies and measures, and in return gains perhaps something in the power of free and destructive criticism; although I think this on the whole doubtful. In any event, he makes, in my judgment, a distinct sacrifice and impairs his influence as a factor in shaping public opinion. I assent cordially to the doctrine that a political party is a means and not an end, and to the claim that the upright and conscientious citizen will at times be forced to separate himself from his party associations because of his objection to some party policy or to some party representative. But I hold that this ought to be an unusual and abnormal act, and never taken without due regard for a sense of proportion and after careful weighing of the probable influence of the act upon remote as well as upon immediate ends. It is not infrequently good judgment in politics to bear those ills we have rather than fly to others that we know not of.

As a practical matter, it has been a distinct gain to our American politics that during the past twenty years there have been influential individuals and groups, and influential journals, which have professed and acted upon a policy of

independence of party. This is particularly true where has been discovered that basest device of partisans, an open or concealed alliance of the party organizers of both parties against political virtue and disinterested public service. In such a case, a guerrilla warfare on behalf of virtue and decency is about all that is possible, and it ought always to be waged unceasingly. The inveterate independent does a public service so long as his independence is certainly based on principle and is without suspicion of personal feeling. He must, however, resign himself to being effective only through criticism, and at the risk of his critical habit becoming censoriousness and querulousness. The public quickly resent either. If he is able, now and then, to accomplish any constructive work in the field of legislation, his agent will prove to have been either the political party he has lately left or the political party he has not yet joined.

But an extension of the policy of acting in small, indefinite, swiftly evaporating groups, outside of the large party organizations and in opposition to them, would be a distinct loss and a danger to our political system. An independent vote which must be reasoned with and convinced, and which is able to turn the scale of success now in one direction and now in another, is a most admirable political stimulant. It spurs the parties on to their best efforts, and exerts an influence out of all proportion to its numbers. Yet to disintegrate political parties in the interest of cross-voting of all kinds and on all occasions, would be disastrous. To see to what it would lead one has only to watch the kaleidoscopic changes in the government of France, based upon successive votes in the Chamber of Deputies, or to recall the intrigues by which Bismarck was accustomed to build up a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag. In this matter, as in others, it is not wise to overlook the saying of Aristotle, in his *Politics:* "Two principles have to be kept in view, what is possible, what is becoming; at these every man ought to aim." To fail to see the possible in politics in the pursuit of the becoming, is

to forbid accomplishment. Such an one is like the Horatian rustic:

> Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille
> Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.

On the other hand, to fail to see the becoming in clutching at the possible, is to fall into the habit of opportunism, of shifting compromise, which can only end by reducing principle to interest. The true spirit of compromise, as marked off from the spurious, will consider, with Aristotle, both the possible and the becoming, and it will be manifested by "a wise suspense in forming opinions, a wise reserve in expressing them, and a wise tardiness in trying to realize them."[3]

Political parties, like armies, need leaders, and leaders develop for them. Whether the leader be competent, patriotic and responsible, or ignorant, selfish and irresponsible, depends upon circumstances. In the latter case, he is that now familiar and ominous product of our political system, the Boss, of which public opinion cannot too soon take proper account. Where the Boss is most powerful, we may observe in practical operation a system of government which is unknown to our laws, and which under the fair forms of democracy has reverted to oligarchy of the most brutal and grasping type. It bullies the weak, overawes the timid, bribes the ambitious, and buys outright the stubborn opponent who shrewdly takes that way of making himself valuable to it. A Boss never leads; he drives. The distinction between a political leader and a political Boss is perfectly clear. The leader studies only the public good and party success as contributing toward it. He draws to himself the strongest, the wisest and the best of those who bear his party's name. He urges forward talent and capacity; he represses presuming ignorance and self-seeking. He rests his case upon his capacity to persuade and to convince the people. By sheer intellectual strength and vigor of will he attracts men to him and to his policies. So Hamilton and Jefferson, so Lincoln and Douglas, so Gladstone. The

3 Morley, On Compromise, p. 94.

political Boss, on the other hand, is below the horizon from which the public good is visible. Party success is his highest aim, and party success is interpreted in terms of his personal supremacy. He surrounds himself with the weak and obedient, with those whose conscience is held safe prisoner behind the bars of ambition and of desire for gain. He bases his hope of victory upon effective political machinery, upon a lavish expenditure of money, and upon promises of preferment. His arguments are alternately exhortations and threats. If victorious, his first thought is the aggrandizement and enrichment of himself and his family, and, if possible, of some of the more important of his followers. If defeated, he is at once in secret communication with his triumphant adversary for such share of the spoils as will serve to support him and his until the next contest occurs. More than one State and not a few cities can frame a particular visage in this outline. What is to be done with the Boss?

First, try to understand why he exists. The Boss is the joint product of two factors—the checks and balances in our constitutional system, and the modern alliance of business and politics.

A written constitution is a device to fix man's political judgment and to protect it from his political passions. Our own Constitution may well be called marvellous in view of what the century has seen. But its structure, particularly as imitated in the several commonwealths, while making parties necessary, has also made it easy for them to be abused. Mr. Ford in his interesting book on the *Rise and growth of American politics* has laid proper emphasis upon this much neglected fact and so helps us to see clearly that something more than ordinary human perversity is at work in producing the Boss. "The influence moulding all the conceptions, the idea regulating all the contrivances of those ardent politicians and able young lawyers [who framed the Constitution], intent upon obtaining some practical result to their labors, was the Whig doctrine of checks and balances of authority through distribu-

tion of the powers of government."[4] Unrestrained power and undivided responsibility were, therefore, lodged no where. The shadows of decaying absolutism were still dark and fearful. So it happened that in the Constitution central power was checked by power in the commonwealths, the executive by power in the legislature. Without some unifying force this machinery would work with difficulty, if at all. There were many clashes and much crimination and recrimination while precedents were being made and policies established. Political parties grew up to provide, outside of the legal framework of government, the initiative, the control and the responsibility for which no adequate constitutional provision was made. So it happens that the people have created for themselves extra-Constitutional assemblies and conventions, constituted according to party rules and respecting party beliefs, in which are framed the declarations of policy which are then submitted to the voters for arbitrament. In this respect the United States is far in advance of Great Britain, where party policies are still largely framed, as was once the case here, by legislative representatives.

No mind can picture the chaos which would result if county officers, state officers, and national officers, acted as each might will, without harmony of principle or unity of plan. One would defy another, executive would antagonize legislature and legislature executive: the wheels of government would either stop or they would revolve with a rapidity which would enable their revolution to be recognized as such in the historical sense. What force or power acts as governor on all this complicated machinery, regulates its speed, brings about harmony of its parts, and so effectiveness in its operation? I answer, party organization. As extra-conststutional as the British cabinet, it is like that body, the power which directs and controls the government. That which the framers of the Constitution would not permit in the government, has grown up outside of it. This is the real basis for the peculiar place

4 Ford, *Rise and growth of American politics*, p. 51.

occupied by the American political parties, and it ought never to be lost sight of in estimating the meaning, the abuses, and the necessary limitations of party action.

But these powerful party organizations with their abundant opportunities for advancement to power and to fame, have attracted the ambition of men whose aims and methods are not worthy ones. Such men are the raw material for the Boss, be it in ward, city, county, or state. To manufacture the finished Boss out of this raw material requires the possession of something, power or patronage, which may be sold. Public officers were the first valuable counters in the game, public privileges are the second. The principle of civil service reform must be so pressed forward and extended that the public offices shall be torn from the grasp of the Boss and his office-holding oligarchy and returned to the people to be alloted to worthy candidates, of whatever political creed, on the basis of merit alone. That is the only possible principle of civil service administration which is consistent with democracy.

Just now the sale of public privileges is proving more profitable than the peddling of offices. This is due to the close alliance between business and politics which has grown up in this country since the Civil War, and which has been helped on amazingly by the necessity of securing legislative sanction and administrative protection for the thousand and one large enterprises of a semi-public character which have developed all over the country, but particularly in and about the rapidly growing centres of population. These enterprises are very profitable, they begin to make returns at once. Men of affairs are eager to embark upon them; they will be a public benefit. What more stimulating to a legislature than the hint that the projectors of a given undertaking, for which a public franchise is asked, are good party men, and what return more natural on their part than a handsome contribution for campaign purposes to the Boss who has dropped the hint? These are "business methods" in politics, and they are far more dan-

gerous to freedom than the more overt and dramatic forms of treason. The one question which should never be heard in pure politics is the same question which should never be heard in a university; it is the business man's question—will it pay? Ask, is it right, is it just, is it wise, is it necessary; but never ask, will it pay?

Let me cite an interesting example of the working of this business principle in politics. The scene is laid in New York, where a legislative committee is making inquiry concerning some aspects of the municipal government. In the witness chair sits Richard Croker, a private citizen in the eye of the law, but in fact the unchallenged monarch of a community of three and a half millions of people:

"Then we have this," Mr. Moss [counsel for the investigating committee] suggested, "that you participate in the selection of judges before they are elected, and then participate in emolument that comes of their judicial proceedings?"

"Yes, sir," Mr. Croker answered.

"And it goes in your pocket?"

"Yes, that is my own money," the witness asserted.

"And the nomination of the judges by Tammany Hall in this city is almost equivalent to an election is it not?" Mr. Moss asked.

"Yes."

"So that, if you have a controlling voice in the affairs of your party and secure the nomination of true men, you may be sure that at least in the Real Estate Exchange and in the firm of Meyer & Croker you will as a true Democrat get some of the patronage?"

"We expect them at least to be friendly," Mr. Croker answered, deprecatingly.

"And get a part of the patronage?"

"Yes, sir."

"So you are working for your own pocket?"

"All the time, and you, too," the Tammany leader answered in a firm tone.

"Then it is not a matter of wide statesmanship, or patriotism altogether with you, but it is wide statesmanship, patriotism and personal gain mixed up?" Mr. Moss remarked.

"It is 'to the victor belongs the spoils,' was the only reply Mr. Croker could make, but it was brimful of meaning.[5]

This is likely long to remain the *locus classicus* as to the relation between modern politics and modern business. Its principal is of wide application; its extraordinary features are its brutal frankness, its naive unconsciousness of wrong-doing, and the fact that the offices whose control is avowed ought to be the most sacred in our entire government, those of the judges of the Supreme Court. The less of such "business" we have in politics, the longer we shall have any politics to engage in.

In this brief discussion, it is quite impossible to follow the formation of public opinion through its various phases. The part played by the press, by the pulpit, and by the platform, each needs study. The fact that men frequently act not as individuals but as groups, in taking part in determining the policy of a still larger group, is of great significance and of much practical importance. The so-called labor vote, the Grand Army vote, the Irish vote, and other groups, are cajoled and humored because of this fact. Many members of such a group have already abdicated any independence they may have possessed, in joining it, and are thenceforward counted as part of the faithful following of a group-leader who trades and sells or stampedes his followers, as circumstances may determine. The effect of increasing toleration is also very marked. It aids in securing that full hearing and that suspension of judgment which always make for wisdom of decision and for sanity of action. But I have now set out the main facts to which I desired to direct attention. My argument has aimed to show the necessary dependence of individual well-being upon social and political health, the responsibility which rests upon every individual to promote that health, and the factors, individual

5 New York *Tribune*, April 15, 1899.

and party, which are at work in the process. That the party system has a stable foundation and that the parties have just claims upon us, I hold most strongly. That the system is, and perhaps always will be, liable to abuse, is self-evident. That the Boss must be displaced for the leader at all hazards, goes without saying. To accomplish this, the first step is relentless Boss punishment at the polls. The second step is to take away his capital by establishing a reformed and democratic civil service and by putting a stop to his ability to dispose of public privileges for personal or for party gain. The third step is to relegate business principles to business, and to confine politics to ends properly political.

All this again comes back to the point from which we started, the individual citizen. There is no trench in which he may hide, no bomb-proof to which the weapons of responsibility will not follow him. Are *you* politically alert? Are *you* politically honest? If not, you are a bad citizen and a corrupter, however innocent, of public opinion. If so, the standard which you set is a high one, worthy of imitation by your neighbor. You are doing something to educate public opinion.