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CONCEPTIONS OF DISPOSITIO IN ANCIENT RHETORIC

by
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PREFACE

It is with deep appreciation that I wish to acknowledge the inspiration and assistance I have received from various sources in completing this study. At the beginning of the research period I was particularly encouraged by the fellowship granted me by the Rackham School of Graduate Studies.

This area of research was possible, initially, only through the intensive course work in classical theory under Dr. Elbert Harrington at the University of South Dakota and Dr. William M. Sattler at the University of Michigan, where background understandings were developed. For helpful suggestions and materials I should like to thank Dr. Harry Caplan and the late Dr. Russell H. Wagner, and two of the original dissertation committee members: Dr. Winton H. Beaven and Dr. Bruno Meinecke.

Finally, I owe my sincere thanks for the scholarly direction and friendly encouragement exerted by the graduate committee members: Dr. William M. Sattler, Dr. Hayden K. Carruth, Dr. Claude A. Eggertsen, Dr. N. Edd Miller, and Dr. Norman E. Nelson.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

The five traditional divisions of ancient rhetoric that have persisted and exerted varying influences on rhetorical theory and practice include: inventio, dispositio, memoria, pronuntiatio, and elocutio. Of these, dispositio, as related to the doctrine of "probability," received the major emphasis in the first rhetorical treatise presently known: the Art of Rhetoric, written by the Sicilian Greeks, Corax and Tisias. Since that time, references to the concept of dispositio have appeared in most subsequent treatises on rhetoric and public address.

The special rhetorical meanings assigned to the concepts of inventio, pronuntiatio, memoria, and elocutio[1] by the earliest classical rhetoricians are maintained by students of rhetoric today with but minor changes in the interpretations of details. There is, however, no such clear understanding of the classical concept of

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[1] "Classical rhetoric as a whole assumes a fivefold division: (1) inventio, the gathering and analysis of material; (2) dispositio, the arrangement, sequence, or movement in the large; (3) elocutio, the diction, choice of words and their combination in phrases, clauses, and sentences; (4) pronuntiatio, delivery; (5) memoria, memory." From Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York: Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 21.

dispositio. Narrowed interpretations of the term, criticism of rhetoric teachers who perverted the use of dispositio, vague or associative meanings, and consideration of the functions of dispositio under inventio have caused confusion in categorizing the principles relating to this concept of rhetorical theory.

This study attempts to present an accurate and detailed description of the use of the term dispositio as it was conceived and explained by selected writers in the field of rhetorical theory, in ancient Greece and Rome. The reconstruction and analysis of the body of principles included under this rhetorical concept will cover the major rhetoricians from Corax, in whose work the term dispositio first appeared about 466 B.C., to Quintilian who in A.D. 90 completed twelve books on rhetoric that assembled the most comprehensive historical and interpretative materials on dispositio now known. Since Quintilian's compilation of information on patterns of dispositio served as a reference for most subsequent treatments of the concept, Quintilian appears to be a satisfactory concluding point for this study of dispositio.

Each of the rhetorical works of the major rhetoricians from Corax to Quintilian will be analyzed by applying the following questions:

I. From what point of view was rhetoric approached by the writer?

II. Did the author criticize or praise any previous treatments of dispositio?

III. What is the author's interpretation or concept of dispositio?

A. What is his stated purpose of this over-all plan or scheme of dispositio?

B. What is this over-all plan in terms of: subject matter, the theme, the audience, speech purpose, kind of speech, or mode of proof?

C. What is the relative importance given dispositio as compared to the other four classical canons?

IV. Is the primary emphasis on dispositio in terms of a "plan-of-the-whole" speech, in terms of "arrangement" of invented materials, or in terms of "parts"?

V. When a scheme of "parts" is used:

A. How many "parts" or divisions are used?

B. What is the function of each "part"?

C. What is the arrangement of each "part" and "subpart"?

D. What is the relation of modes of proof to each "part"?

While this study is in progress, the author hopes to evolve certain general considerations, including: the general notion each author expressed regarding dispositio: the pre-Aristotelian pattern of dispositio: the change, if any, exerted by Aristotle on the general pattern of dispositio: the variations in definitions or uses of the term dispositio: and the possibility of an author merging two or more schemes of dispositio.

Significance of the Study

Russell Wagner, in his article on "The Meaning of Dispositio," was one of the first persons in the field of speech to emphasize a need for intensive study of this concept, long neglected both by speech teachers and critics. Observing that we have no word for dispositio in English, that we have no definition of the broad meaning of dispositio, and that we have no collection of the principles of dispositio from which to work, Dr. Wagner concluded:

"The rediscovery of these principles would not be easy, but it would be highly serviceable."[1]

Dispositio as a classical concept has not been studied in a detailed manner as have the other rhetorical concepts of modes of proof and delivery as completed by Irving J. Lee, "A Study of the Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory with Special Reference to Invention, Arrangement, and Style";[2] William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric";[3] James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory";[4] Charles P. Green, "Conceptions of Rhetorical Delivery";[5] Douglas Ehninger, "Selected Theories of Inventio in English Rhetoric";[6] and

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[1]Russell Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," Studies in Honor of Alexander M. Drummond (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1944), p. 293.

[2]Irving J. Lee, "A Study of the Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory with Special Reference to Invention, Arrangement, and Style" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Speech, Northwestern University, 1938).

[3]William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Speech, Northwestern University, 1941).

[4]James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Speech, University of Michigan, 1935).

[5]Charles P. Green, "Conceptions of Rhetorical Delivery" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, School of Speech, Northwestern University, 1948).

[6]Douglas Ehninger, "Selected Theories of Inventio in English Rhetoric, 1759–1828" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Speech, The Ohio State University, 1949).

Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry.[1]

This study of dispositio will, therefore, add to the rhetorical literature on classical concepts, as dispositio is analyzed more definitively than it has been heretofore. At present, students of rhetorical theory tend to make some generalizations about a "classical" concept of dispositio without assembling and assessing data from the major rhetorics. A collection of the classical rhetorical principles related to dispositio also may help to eliminate the barrier to specialized speech knowledge produced by the absence of a common interpretation for the concept of dispositio.

Other Studies

There are no known studies in English which deal with dispositio as a broad concept, though Dr. Wagner attempted to illustrate the types of information about dispositio available in selected writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Dr. Wagner emphasized the fact, however, that he made no attempt to describe completely even one rhetorician's approach to this second canon of rhetoric.[2]

Studies referring to dispositio from the narrowed viewpoint of "number of parts" as treated by selected authors are available in the form of master's theses by Marilyn Hewlett,[3] H. M.

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[1]Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry ("University of Colorado Studies"; Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1948).

[2]Russell Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 293.

[3]Marilyn Hewlett, "An Analysis of Theories of Speech Arrangement as Developed by Selected Ancient Rhetoricians" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Speech, State University of Iowa, 1947).

Adkinson,[1] and Ramon Irwin.[2] In addition, Mr. Irwin published an article in the Quarterly Journal of Speech which tabulated the number and order of parts of speech in selected works of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle.[3]

Several German writers have treated aspects of dispositio in an interpretative way, as the concept related to other principles of rhetoric.[4] Another German philologist, Karl Barwick, attempted to reconstruct the systems for arranging parts of a speech, as advocated by Aristotle, Cicero, Plato, Theophrastus, Isocrates, and Theodectes.[5] This study, however, did not interpret the broader meaning of the concept of dispositio, the use to which these so-called "plans" were designated, or the types of speaking and speakers to which they applied. Further, the study did not refer

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[1]H. M. Adkinson, "The Principles of Arrangement as Developed by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Winans" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Speech, University of Southern California, 1931).

[2]Ramon Irwin, "A Survey of Principles of Disposition in Speech Making" (Unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Speech, Cornell University, 1937).

[3]Ramon Irwin, "The Classical Speech Divisions," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXV, No. 2 (February, 1939), 212–13.

[4]Friedrich Solmsen, "Drei Rekonstruktionen zur Antiken Rhetorik und Poetik," Hermes, 67 Band (1932), Heft 2, 133–54; Wilhelm Süss, "Ethos: Studien zur älteren griechischen Rhetorik," published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Giessen, Berlin, 1910; George Thiele, Hermagoras: Ein Bietrag zur Geschichte der Rhetorik (Strassburg: Karl J. Trubner, 1893); and Christianus Walz, Rhetores Graeci, IV (Tubingae: J. G. Cottae, 1833), 12–13.

[5]Karl Barwick, "Die Gliederung Der Rhetorischen Pathos Und Die Horazische Epistula Ad Pisones," Hermes, 57 Band (1922), Heft 2.

to the significance of Aristotle's detailed treatment of the rules and cautions on arrangement of parts of the speech in Book III of his Rhetoric, after Aristotle had previously indicated he had broken with his predecessors in considering the parts important.

A passing consideration of dispositio from the viewpoint of arrangement of "parts" of a speech is to be found in a recent collection of essays on rhetoric, oratory, and language.[1] Two studies of the concept of dispositio as taught by John Ward[2] and Richard Whately[3] also have been published recently.

Definition of Dispositio as a Rhetorical Concept

Dispositio is defined in this study as the selection, arrangement, and adaptation of invented materials into a functional pattern of organization. As soon as the subject matter has been discovered through the inventio process, selection of materials for a specific speech situation will follow, with the necessary apportioning, amplifying, coloring, eliminating, or construction into new combinations.

Arrangement and ordering of the invented materials may occur through the designated parts of a speech, each part of which

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[1] William Samuel Howell, "Renaissance Rhetoric and Modern Rhetoric: A Study in Change," The Rhetorical Idiom, edited by Donald C. Bryant (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), pp. 64-66.

[2] Bert E. Bradley, "John Ward's Concept of Dispositio," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXIV, No. 4 (November, 1957), 258-63. This article was based on a Ph.D. dissertation at Florida State University, 1955.

[3] Clarence W. Edney, "Richard Whately on Dispositio," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXI, No. 3 (August, 1954), 227-34.

has a specific function and content. Or, the system of arrangement and ordering may apply only within the parts.

Adaptation of invented materials to produce the functional pattern of organization known as dispositio may be evolved according to the audience, the speaker, the purpose, or the subject matter. Cicero clarified this function of dispositio when he wrote that it was the duty of a speaker not only to dispose subject matter in a certain order, but also "according to the weight of the matter and the judgement of the speaker."[1] Cicero observed that he adapted his own arrangement to the object of the inquiry and to the audience.[2]

Dispositio, as defined in this paper, may be for the purpose of aiding the speaker in the presentation of a specific speech, in preparation for a specific speech situation, or for both. The term comprehends several terms used by classical and contemporary rhetoricians such as structure, "partes-system," pattern, taxis, analysis, arrangement, composition, collactio, distribution, "planned-adaptation," and organization. Since there is no single English word that may be used for this amplified definition of dispositio, three terms will be used frequently to discuss certain aspects of the concept: "partes-plan," "arrangement," and "plan-of-the-whole."

The "partes-plan"

This phrase refers to a system for grouping invented materials into an arbitrary number of parts of a speech. Usually the

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[1] Cicero De Oratore II. lxxvi.

[2] Ibid. II. lxxvii.

introduction, discussion, and conclusion are included, though the number of suggested parts may vary from three to ten.

In interpreting dispositio as a "partes-plan," the parts become the core around which a speech is developed: logical, pathetic, or ethical proofs are developed for each part. The relation of parts appears to be of little importance and often the parts function in intellectual isolation and without emotional sincerity or even integrity. This plan is usually used to teach a method of speech preparation.

The plan of "arrangement"

The most familiar translation for dispositio is "arrangement," among contemporary students of rhetorical theory.[1] This term implies that a predetermined system of ordering points of a talk should be the core for organization of a speech. This predetermined order is the final guide for the molding, distributing, and shaping of the parts, subparts, or issues of a talk into an ordered whole. The number of parts, kinds of content, purpose of the talk, type of audience, or judgment of the speaker would be incidental, if considered at all.

The "plan-of-the-whole"

This term indicates an awareness of the speech situation and the variable conditions it involves, as an attempt is made to select, order, and adapt invented materials into a functional pattern of organization. The speech pattern thus emerges as a pervasive plan of organization determined by the special circumstances inherent in

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[1]Russell H. Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 1; and Clarence W. Edney, "Richard Whately on Dispositio," p. 227.

each speech situation, rather than by fixed rules, and usable both in preparation and delivery of speeches.

It is difficult to translate dispositio into English, unless we solve the problem as did the translators and rhetoricians in the case of inventio. The solution was to settle on the term invention, giving it a special rhetorical meaning. Dispositio might be rendered in English as disposition, but first the full rhetorical meaning needs to be sought in the classical rhetorics.

Plan of Organization

The organization of this study will include five additional chapters: (II) "Pre-Aristotelian Conceptions of Dispositio," (III) "Aristotle's Conception of Dispositio," (IV) "Dispositio as Interpreted in Rhetorica ad C. Herennium," (V) "Interpretations of Dispositio by Cicero," and (VI) "Quintilian's Conception of Dispositio."

This plan of organization will provide the framework for the study of dispositio as conceived and explained by the major rhetoricians of ancient Greece and Rome. This study should add to the rhetorical literature of the second canon of rhetoric, as the function and scope of the body of principles included under dispositio are analyzed.

CHAPTER II

PRE-ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF DISPOSITIO

It is important to analyze the conceptions of dispositio held by pre-Aristotelian rhetoricians because of the protests they evoked among subsequent speakers and rhetoricians. These incomplete, and often unscientific, explanations of dispositio later aroused protests against teachers who placed undue emphasis on mechanical rules for speech disposition, as the ethical, logical, and philosophical training of their pupils was neglected. It is necessary to review each of the major pre-Aristotelian rhetorical writers if one is to understand, completely, the significance and adequacy of these protests and criticisms.

Theories of Corax and Tisias

Corax and Tisias, two Sicilian teachers of rhetoric during the fifth century B.C., composed the first work on rhetoric, which is also thought to be the first theoretical work of any kind developed in the Western world. The actual manuscript of their Art of Rhetoric, written about 465 B.C., has been lost. Also lost is the only source known where the exact contents of this Art of Rhetoric were tabulated: Aristotle's Synagoge technon. Only Cicero's report as to what Aristotle's lost work on rhetoric said of Corax and Tisias is now available, together with isolated references

from Aristotle, Plato, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, and the author of Prolegema ad Hermogenem.[1]

In a forged letter of introduction to the first writing on rhetoric now extant, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, it is asserted that Corax was the author of the first rhetoric. The anonymous author of this treatise claimed that but two works on rhetoric were then available to him as references: ". . . one of them is my own. I refer to the treatise that I wrote for Theodectes, the other is the work of Corax."[2]

Aristotle described Corax and Tisias as the first men to propose a theory of rhetoric, according to Cicero's Brutus. Aristotle is quoted with reference to forensic oratory in Sicily after the Peloponnesian wars when the tyrants were expelled and restitution of private property was being sought through the courts. Cicero reports Aristotle as saying:

> Corax and Tisias the Sicilians, with acuteness and controversial habit of their people, first put together some theoretical precepts: that before them, while many had taken pains to speak with care and with orderly arrangement, no one had followed a definite method or art.[3]

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[1] W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical Fragment in Relation to the Sicilian Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," The Classical Review, XVIII (Feb., 1904), 19. See also Cicero Brutus xii. 46, translated by G. L. Hendrickson, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1942); and Cicero De Inventione II. ii. 6, translated by H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1949).

[2] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1421a, translated by E. S. Forster in The Works of Aristotle, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), Vol. XI.

[3] Cicero Brutus xii. 46. Undoubtedly this quotation is from Aristotle's lost Synagoge technon since the statements do not appear in any of his extant works.

From this statement purported to be from Aristotle's authentic historical work on rhetorical writers, the assumption is made that the parts of a speech suggested by Tisias and Corax were forensic in origin, prepared as a clear and simple handbook for the general uneducated masses interested in retrieving their own lands.

The Prolegema ad Hermogenem contains a comment on Corax's desire to produce the impression of fairness and plausibility in legal speaking, through his scheme of persuasion. Fairness and plausibility are characteristics that Aristotle also assigned to these early rhetoricians.[1]

Recent studies support the view that all speaking appeared to be forensic, during the era when this rhetoric was composed, since the courts were filled with land disputes.[2] John W. H. Atkins agrees with the other scholars about the Art of Rhetoric's function to teach legal pleading when he writes: "The main concern of these teachers had been with the subject matter of finding arguments and their most effective arrangement."[3]

"Partes-system" point of view

Corax and Tisias were promoters of the art of rhetoric by parts, according to Plato, who traced the "partes-system" from

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[1]W. Rhys Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism (New York: Longmans, 1928), p. 35.

[2]Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset, An Abridged History of Greek Literature, translated by George Hornblower (New York: Macmillan, 1904), p. 280.

[3]John W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticisms in Antiquity (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 19. See also Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VII (Feb., 1921), 20; and Christianus Walz, Rhetores Graeci, IV, 12.

Corax and Tisias, through Thrasymachus, to Theodorus. The exordium was the first of nine parts, followed by narration, proof, probabilities, confirmation, after-confirmation, refutation, after-refutation, and conclusion, or recapitulation.[1]

Corax and Tisias are also named by Aristotle as rhetoricians who promoted the art of rhetoric by a formula of parts, organized into a technical manual devoted to forensic speaking. Corax is mentioned in the Rhetoric,[2] while Tisias is named in Sophistical Elenchi among the rhetoricians who promoted the "parte-system":

> . . . who discovered principles rhetorical but made little progress, but men who are not celebrated (receiving as it were, by succession from many who promoted art by parts) have increased it: Tisias after the first authors, by Thrasymachus after Tisias, Theodorus after him and many others, and have brought together many particulars, wherefore it is of no wonder that the art has a certain multitude of precepts.[3]

Twentieth-century scholars of speech criticism have substantiated the fact that Corax and Tisias developed a rhetoric based on

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 266d, translated into English by Lane Cooper in Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, Symposium, Republic, Laws (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric II. 24. 11, translated by Lane Cooper (New York: D. Appleton Co., 1932).

[3] Aristotle Sophistical Elenchi 183b, translated by W. A. Pickard, The Works of Aristotle, Vol. I, edited by W. D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1937). This statement would imply that Tisias played a more important part than Corax in the field of written rhetoric, but W. Rhys Roberts offers the suggestion that the Art of Rhetoric probably was often revised and enlarged upon by Tisias and other students of Corax. (W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical Fragment in Relation to the Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," pp. 18–19.)

a "partes-system" and that a narrowed concept of dispositio was the only canon of rhetoric emphasized. Bromley Smith concluded that Art of Rhetoric laid the substructure of rhetoric, resting it upon orderly arrangement of arguments based on probability.[1] W. Rhys Roberts asserted: "These early Sicilian advocates . . . paid much attention to the orderly divisions of a speech, from proem to peroration."[2]

There has not been complete agreement on the number of parts advocated by Corax and Tisias. Using the Prolegema ad Hermogenem as a source, along with the methodology of historical reconstruction, Christianus Walz concluded that Corax wrote suggestions for speeches to be given in the forum and court which might have five parts: prooimion, diegesis, agon, paakbasis, and epilogos.[3] Another German author, Hamberger, insists that there were seven divisions to the Corax pattern of dispositio and he uses as proof the writings of Cicero, Sopratros, Troilus, and others who drew information from the lost work of Aristotle which had included a history of all the rhetorical systems preceding Aristotle. These seven divisions attributed to Corax by Hamberger were prooimion, prokataskeue, prokastasis, katastasis, agones, parekthesis, and epilogos.[4]

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[1] Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," p. 20.

[2] W. Rhys Roberts, "The New Rhetorical Fragment in Relation to the Rhetoric of Corax and Tisias," p. 18.

[3] Christianus Walz, Rhetores Graeci, IV, 12.

[4] Peter Hamberger, Die Rednerische Disposition in der Alten TEXNH PHTOPIKH (Paderborn: Druck and Verlag von Ferdinand Schoningh, 1914), p. 38.

Bromley Smith attempted to resolve this conflict on the number of parts in Corax's rhetoric when he pointed out that the first three items listed by Hamberger are synonymous, and that katastasis is so nearly like diegesis that the number really is five.[1]

Recent scholars of rhetorical theory have accepted the five-part theory of arrangement of materials for the Corax rhetoric, as propounded by Walz and Bromley Smith, and have accepted the fact that dispositio was narrowly conceived as a "partes-system."

Popularity of views of Corax and Tisias

Plato, who had the opportunity to observe the popular acceptance of the Sicilian rhetoric when Tisias was in Athens with Georgias about 427 B.C., attests to the popularity of the work. Even Lysias and Isocrates were listed among Tisias' students during that period, causing Plato to observe mockingly through his mouthpiece, Socrates: "I cannot help feeling that his is a wonderfully mysterious art which Tisias has discovered or whoever the gentleman was, or whatever his name or country may have been, who was the discoverer."[2]

Every rhetoric after the first one in which the "partes-system" was introduced by Corax and Tisias has contained references to a "partes-system." These references may be merely historical, often meager or critical, but wherever they continue to appear in rhetoric there is the underlying assumption that a pattern of dispositio can be taught.

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[1] Bromley Smith, "Corax and Probability," p. 20.

[2] Plato Phaedrus 273c.

The Views of Plato

Plato's approach to rhetoric, as to all knowledge, was negative and critical, for he lived in an age when the most popular approach to truth was negative. The intellectuals of his day found it necessary to rid the public mind of prejudices, false concepts, and dogmas, before a reliable search for knowledge based on truth could be developed. In this connection George Grote observed that Plato was "more ingenious in pointing out difficulties than successful in solving them."[1]

Though Plato wrote no formal rhetoric, his attitudes on the subject are reflected in several works, principally the Phaedrus and Gorgias. Plato opposed rhetoric as a form of persuasion and attacked rhetoricians who taught their students how to defraud, cheat, and mislead. Forensic oratory, particularly, came in for his criticism, since Plato believed that if a man were guilty he should give himself up to justice and take the penalty.[2] Plato attacked rhetoric when it opposed philosophy as a "way of life," and doubted the accurate efficiency of rhetoric as opposed to the study of mathematics, insisting that "there never is or never will be a real art of speaking which is unconnected with the truth."[3]

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[1] George Grote, Plato and Other Companions of Sokrates (London: John Murray, 1867), I, 366. The dates usually accepted for Plato are 428-347 B.C.

[2] Plato Gorgias 500, translated by Lane Cooper in Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, Symposium, Republic, Laws (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948).

[3] Plato Phaedrus 271d. For other comments on Plato's concept of the relation of truth to speaking, see Everett Lee Hunt,

Plato's criticism of emphasis on "partes-system"

Plato conceived of the main function of speech as "leading souls by persuasion"[1] and believed that anyone who professed to persuade an audience made himself responsible for the welfare of that audience. "Every one of our acts," reasoned Plato, "should aim at good effects."[2] It is in the Gorgias,[3] particularly, that Plato expressed doubts that the purported good motives in speaking were always for the good of the public, and were concerned with whether the people would become better or worse as a result of a speech. All of the sophists, including Gorgias, were condemned for the "false rhetoric" of the day that Plato felt was unconnected with absolute truth.

Throughout Plato's earlier years, he had despised both rhetoric and rhetoricians. When he wrote the Phaedrus, however, he was ready to admit that there might be a genuine and useful art of rhetoric. Yet the approval of rhetoric is limited, for he says: ". . . I do not think the quest of it lies along the paths of Lysias and Thrasymachus."[4]

Lysias was a famous rhetor of the day who taught his pupils by emphasizing a "parte-system" for composition and delivery of

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"Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James A. Winans (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1925), pp. 3–60; and Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education, VI, No. 3 (June, 1920), 32–53.

[1] Plato Phaedrus 271d.

[2] Plato Gorgias 500.

[3] Ibid. See also George Grote, Plato and Other Companions of Sokrates, II, 123.

[4] Plato Phaedrus 269d.

speeches. In the Phaedrus, Plato had his mouthpiece Socrates query Phaedrus, who had but recently returned from Lysias' school of rhetoric. Immediately, Socrates asked young Phaedrus about the processes of dividing things by classes and parts, as taught by Lysias: "That of dividing things again by classes, where the natural joints are, and not trying to break any part, after the manner of a bad carver."[1]

Socrates inquired if anything of importance were included in the teaching of rhetoric, aside from Lysias' "parte-process" which brought scattered particulars into one idea and defined particular things to be explained. Phaedrus admitted that the use of specified parts and correct ordering of these parts appeared to be the core of the "niceties of the art of rhetoric"[2] as taught by Lysias.

The Phaedrus then lists the seven divisions of the "partes-system" as taught by Lysias, Hippias, Prodicus, and Protagoras after being originated by Theodorus, and as written in the books of rhetoric.[3] The divisions included: Introduction, Testimony, Proofs, Probabilities, Confirmation, Further Confirmation, and Recapitulation or Conclusion.[4]

It was noted in passing that Theodorus' rhetoric told "how refutation and further refutation must be accomplished, both in accusation and defence,"[5] and all rhetorics "seem to be in general agreement concerning the conclusion of discourses, which some call recapitulation, while others give it some other name."[6]

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 265e.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 266d.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 266e.

[6] Ibid., 267a.

"Partes-system" is taught as a complete rhetoric

Plato believed that the "partes-system" was unduly emphasized by teachers who substituted it for the whole area of rhetorical study. Teachers, not realizing that the "partes-system" was but a preliminary approach to the broad subject of rhetoric, appeared to be encouraging students that they could be successful orators if they learned only these parts. An analogy between a physician and an orator was developed in the Phaedrus, to illustrate the danger of such teaching: The physician might know how to apply drugs and get the desired results, but would not know how to make everyone else a physician. In like manner, a rhetor might know how to apply these preliminaries of the "partes-system," but be ignorant of the true nature of rhetoric and believe that through them he was teaching rhetoric.[1]

The analogy continued to illustrate that a physician needs to perform a thorough and systematic analysis of a patient before giving diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, a speaker must go through a systematic and thorough analysis of his audience to learn the "nature of souls" before he selects his arguments for that audience. Plato reasoned that, after a speaker had discerned the kinds of souls, or men, in an audience, then he must see how these people operate in practice and how each man will be persuaded by each kind of argument. Only after a speaker learns all this about an audience can he decide what arguments are needed, in any particular audience situation.[2] Unless a speaker knows that audience-analysis and audience-adaptation are principles of rhetoric which

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 268a, b.

[2] Ibid., 270, 272.

must precede a structuring of parts, he is as a "blind man," says Plato.[1]

Some teachers, according to the Phaedrus, are ignorant enough to believe "that the persuasive use of these details and the composition of the whole discourse from them is a small matter which their pupils must supply of themselves."[2] On the other hand, the Gorgias implies that some teachers are not merely ignorant of the true breadth of rhetorical principles, but are deceptive and hypocritical enough to teach the "partes-system" as a complete system of rhetoric because they are paid well to teach such a system.

"Partes-system" fails to consider responsibility of speaker

Plato believed that the mechanical "partes-system" for teaching rhetoric repudiated the importance of a well-informed and intelligent speaker, who knew the truth of arguments and how to organize and adapt those arguments to an audience, as he sought its goodwill.[3] This intelligent speaker would have the responsibility to find and use a principle of order, in presenting his topics, according to Plato. He would have the responsibility of deciding for any given audience

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 270.

[2] Ibid., 269c. Plato's condemnation of the pretensions and excesses of the sophists is analyzed in full detail by Edwin Black, "Plato's View of Rhetoric," The Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLIV, No. 4 (December, 1958), 361–74.

[3] Plato Phaedrus 264, 270–74, 259; and Gorgias 500. See also Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," pp. 42–45; and William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," Speech Monographs, XIV (Research Annual, 1947), 56–57.

how he could best classify particulars under a general head, or break up universals into particulars; he would have the intelligence to classify his subjects with reference to their definitions and according to the possibility of debate upon them. Plato intimated that no mechanical system of parts could be expected to fulfill this function of a speaker. Yet an intelligent speaker would be expected to make up for lacks in the "partes-system": the lack of definition of terms,[1] the lack of adequate introductory material, and the lack of coherence between topics.[2]

The orator-philosopher who could perceive order in many levels of existence was favored by Plato over a mechanized "partes-plan" for ordering a speech, as the Greek concluded:

> I am a great lover of these processes of division and generalization; they help me to speak and think. And if I find any man who is able to see unity and plurality in nature, him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a god.[3]

Plato's constructive suggestions for dispositio

After rejecting both the narrowed concept of dispositio as arranging parts and the teachers who concentrated on the teaching of such minutiae, Plato explained his ideal system of rhetoric, which included his concept of disposition for the whole discourse. This over-all plan is presented as an individual matter for each speaker in each situation, based upon the speaker's judgment, the analysis of the audience, the purpose of the speech, and the nature of the speech occasion. There is no distinction between an "ordering of the whole"

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 263.

[2] Ibid., 264.

[3] Ibid., 266.

in rhetoric and in other realms of philosophy. Plato's goal for the "plan" or "order" which exists in the mind of each speaker or philosopher was truth.

After an over-all "plan-of-the-whole" is conceived, each speaker must adapt his argument to the specific audience from which he hopes to gain acceptance of the truth. Plato used the phrase "knowing the nature of souls" to designate the audience-analysis process, maintaining that after a person knows all kinds of souls then he must decide how each soul could be persuaded, by which kind and order of arguments. Only after this complete process of analysis can a speaker decide the disposition, or arrangement and divisions, of his arguments.[1]

Selection of truths to be presented in a speech is not altered by this analysis of "the nature of souls." The process merely aids the speaker in disposing the truths that he sees, so that they will become clearer and more persuasive to the particular kind of soul that is listening. Continuing in the same vein, Plato noted that there were variations in kinds of speeches and speech purposes, as well as in "kinds of souls," and that a student should know them all before effective plans for arranging arguments can be developed for specific audience situations. Plato summarized the prerequisites for an over-all plan of dispositio and the necessity for a preliminary analysis of the audience before specific discourses are developed with one concise paragraph of advice for the speaker:

> When he has learned to tell what sort of man is influenced by what sort of speech . . . and has also distinguished the favorable occasions for brief speech or intensity, and all the classes

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 268–72a.

of speech which he has learned, then, and not till then, will his art be fully and completely finished.[1]

Opinions in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

The unknown author of the first work on rhetorical theory now extant, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, wrote his book of principles which could be applied to speaking or writing, in order that "we shall have many clever expedients to enable us to make speeches according to the rules of art in private and public suits and in conversation with others."[2] The author's system of dispositio appears to be the greatest single element in the rhetoric, which is representative of the pre-Aristotelian Sophistic practices.[3]

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[1] Plato Phaedrus 271d–272a.

[2] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1455b, translated by E. S. Forster, Vol. XI. This translation will be used for all future citations.

[3] The date of the composition most frequently given for this anonymous rhetoric is c. 340–330 B.C. See A. S. Wilkins, Introduction to Cicero's De Oratore (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1870), I, 38; and E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric (London: The Macmillan Co., 1867), pp. 412–13.

Another group of critics place the manuscript after Aristotle's death, making it the beginning of the third century B.C. See H. Rackham in Aristotle, Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936), II, 258, who explains it is the work of an author "basing his works on that of Aristotle, whose classificatory method he adopts with modifications, but keeping on the plane of practical utility." See also Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, translated by E. M. Forster (noted in footnote 2 above) in which the translator claims the anonymous writer was a Peripatetic, writing before 300 B.C.

Whichever date is accepted, Wilkins notes on p. 38, ". . . it may fairly be taken as a type of Sophistic rhetoric, as this was generally taught at the time of its most complete development." It

The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum did not presuppose any intellectual facility for finding, selecting, ordering, or arranging proofs among the speakers for whom the rhetoric was written. The basic assumption appears to be that if a prospective speaker knew the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum he would be able to compose and effectively present any of the seven specific kinds of speeches discussed in the treatise. The author of this rhetoric indicated no recognition of any other treatise on rhetorical theory, nor any other plan of dispositio.

Order of arrangement emphasized

The greatest emphasis in this early rhetoric appears to be on the detailed arrangement of topics and words within the subdivisions of the seven kinds of speeches, though there is a lack of consistent numbering, ordering, or naming of the main divisions. Rather than one over-all plan, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum evolved seven separate systems of arrangement, adapted to the audience affected by each of the seven kinds of speaking: persuasive, dissuasive, eulogistic, vituperative, accusative, defensive, and inquisitive.

Not only was "arrangement" the most important aspect of speech preparation—it was also the aspect needing attention first, according to Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. As the manuscript stated:

> In the first place you must divide up your subject matter according to the general system of division in which you have been instructed, and decide what you must treat of first, secondly, thirdly and fourthly.[1]

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might be considered as typical of sophistic rhetoric with emphasis on "parts," which Aristotle criticized in his Rhetoric I. 1, and as did Plato in his Phaedrus 265e.

[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1445b.

This emphasis on ordering and arranging becomes almost an obsession with the author of this treatise as he lists rule after rule for the correct order and placement of parts, subparts, and topics under those subparts. At one point in the work he goes so far as to discuss the arrangement of words, saying:

> I will treat next of the manner in which the words must be organically arranged in the various kinds of oratory, and which parts must be put first and how they must be treated.[1]

The author's treatment of dispositio as a placement of these parts or words of a speech are treated most directly in Chapters XXIX through XXXVIII. Though the term dispositio was never used, indirect treatment of this concept was scattered throughout the book under such items as "Elements Common to Every Branch of Oratory" (Chapter VI), "The Proem" (XXIX), "Narration" (XXX), "Confirmation" (XXXII), "The Arrangement of Materials" (XXXI), "The Epilogue" (XXXVIII), and single chapters on each of the seven kinds of speeches.

Application of arrangement to types of speaking

The three traditional branches of speaking are discussed in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (deliberative, epideictic, and forensic), with a fourth type labeled inquisitive added. To simplify the information on arrangement as found in this treatise, the following outlines were prepared as a synthesis of the topics or subject matter to be included in each of the branches of speaking.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1436a.

Deliberative speaking includes persuasive and dissuasive speaking, with the following content suggested for each part. For the persuasive speech:

I. PROEM

A. If there is no prejudice against us personally in our speech:

1. Lay down our proposition at the very beginning.

2. Exhort our listeners to pay attention and give our words a hearing.

B. If any prejudice has been created against us in previous speeches:

1. Anticipate judgment of your audience.

2. State your proposition.

3. Exhort your hearers to pay attention.

C. Narratives of facts are arranged in the proem as follows:

1. If actions are few in number and well known, include them in the proem so it will not be too short.

2. If actions are too numerous and not familiar, present them in connected form and show that they are just, expedient, and honorable so the story is plain and gets attention of the audience.

3. If facts are unimportant and unfamiliar, insert reports, predictions, or explanations in the proem.

a. Clearness of narration is dependent on arrangement of words and facts (1438a):

(1) Mention first the facts that have occurred, are occurring, or will occur.

(2) Arrange subsequent events in their proper order.

(3) Refrain from desertion of subject upon which we have undertaken to speak, and talking on some other subject.

II. CONFIRMATION (of facts already mentioned) (1438b)

A. If statement of facts is believed as soon as made, all proofs are omitted and:

1. Appeal to justice is first, if it is possible to have such an appeal (1439a).

a. Explain your statements in relation to justice, or its contrary, or what has been judged to be just.

b. Next, cite examples similar to cases of justice you are instancing.

c. Produce examples of what is regarded as just under certain circumstances.

d. Next, quote maxims and enthymemes of different kinds.

e. Finally, iteration (1439a).

2. Appeal to the expedient.

3. Appeal to the honorable.

4. Appeal to the pleasant.

B. When proofs are needed to confirm, the facts are arranged:

1. First, the opinion of the orator is mentioned or customary course of events must be indicated (1438b).

2. Following this, we must cite examples and any point of similarity must be introduced to support what we are saying (1438a).

3. Next, we must cite maxims (1439a).

III. ANTICIPATION (of contrary arguments) (1439b)

A. Minimize the arguments of your opponents.

B. Amplify your own arguments.

IV. CONCLUDE, with an iteration by:

A. Using forms of arguments, or

B. Enumerating or recommending a certain course, or

C. Questioning or irony.

For the dissuasive speech, the arrangement and ordering of content is similar to that of persuasive speeches, except in the proem and after the proem. Proper content for these two parts of a dissuasive speech should be arranged as follows, according to Rhetorica ad Alexandrum:

I. PROEM

A. In the first place, state the views you intend to oppose.

B. Add, one by one, the other parts of the proem.

II. AFTER THE PROEM

A. First, bring forth each of the points of the previous speech separately, and show that the recommendations of your adversary are not lawful, or expedient, or the like (1440a).

B. Amplify your own contentions and minimize those of your adversary.

C. Introduce maxims and enthymemes.

D. Refute anticipations.

E. And, in conclusion, imply iteration (1440a).

Arrangement and ordering of all materials according to a predetermined system is stressed particularly for the two kinds of epideictic speaking discussed in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum: eulogistic and vituperative speaking. The order for introduction of materials within the subparts of the speech appears to be as important as the arrangement of the parts or subparts. As this outline indicates, there is no decision left to the speaker as to which materials are to begin a speech and which should end it. The eulogistic and

vituperative speeches should have materials ordered as follows, according to Rhetorica ad Alexandrum:

I. PROEM

A. First, state your propositions (1440b).

B. Refute misrepresentations (as in persuasive speaking).

C. Exhort your hearers to give their attention.

II. NARRATION

A. Genealogy of the subject of the speech has "first place after the proem" after the distinction of good qualities of our subject are made outside and within the sphere of virtue (1440b).

1. Mention his ancestors (1441a):

a. If they were good men and true:

(1) Mention them from earliest times to the present.

(2) Give brief accounts of some glorious achievements by each.

b. If only the earliest were good men:

(1) Mention the early ancestors as above.

(2) Omit the undistinguished with a plausible excuse.

c. If only the later ones were men of repute:

(1) Omit the earlier ones with an excuse.

d. If none of the subject's ancestors were distinguished:

(1) Insist on consideration of the man's personal nobility.

2. Next, describe his habits and way of life.

a. Early years:

(1) Describe them.

(2) Conclude with an enthymeme or maxim.

b. Early manhood:

(1) State the subject of the eulogy.

(2) State his subject.

(3) Amplify his achievements of character.

(4) Compare notable achievements of character.

(5) Use maxims and enthymemes.

(6) Give iteration or conclusion (1441b).

c. Full manhood:

(1) Treat the achievements of the speaker.

(a) Set forth and amplify his justice.

(b) Treat wisdom and amplify it.

(c) Treat courage and all other noteworthy qualities and amplify.

(d) Repeat and summarize what you have said.

(e) Bring the whole speech to a conclusion with a maxim or enthymeme (1441b).

III. RECAPITULATION

Following the discussion on arrangement of parts for deliberative and epideictic oratory is the explanation of the arrangement system for forensic speeches. Forensic speaking had been the only type considered in the earlier rhetoric of Corax and Tisias, so it is interesting to note that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum gives it only as much emphasis as the other branches of speaking. Topics are arranged under four parts for the forensic speech labeled accusation, and under three divisions for the forensic speech labeled defense, as follows:

ACCUSATION

I. PROEM

A. First, set forth action which is to be subject of accusation or defense (1441b).

B. Exhort your hearers to attention.

C. Conciliate or win good will.

D. Narrate facts (1442b).

II. CONFIRMATION

A. Use proofs, if facts are disputed by opponents; by consideration of justice, expediency, and the like if they are admitted.

1. First, put testimony and admissions made under torture, if there are any (1442b).

2. Next, confirm statements, if they are credible, by maxims and enthymemes (1442b).

III. ANTICIPATION

A. Anticipate the arguments to be urged and anticipate what they are likely to say.

IV. PERORATION

A. Recount the charge.

B. Summarize the whole story of the case.

C. If possible, instill a feeling of hostility or indignation in the jury, towards the opponent (1443b).

DEFENSE

I. PROEM

A. Prepare the same as in the accusing speech, but eliminate mention of accusations.

II. REFUTATION

A. Set forth and refute opinions of the other speaker; discredit his witnesses and his testimony.

B. Take care of anticipations from opponent's speeches (144a).

III. PERORATION (Iteration)

A. Enumerate the points, or

B. Make the division, or

C. Ask additional questions which bring credit or discredit on your opponents, or

D. Use simple questions (1444b).

E. Always include means to dispose the judges favorably toward you and unfavorably toward your opponents (1445a).

After a detailed description of the arrangement of six kinds of speeches found in the three main classes of speaking classified as deliberative, epideictic, and forensic, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum concludes with a short description of arrangement to be followed in a seventh kind of speech, the inquisitive. This type is said to occur in connection with the other types, but is particularly useful in dealing with contradictions: by adducing plausible pretexts to make action appear reasonable, by setting forth and inquiring into utterances opposed to justice or legality, by amplifying results of your inquiry, and by reiteration for the audience.[1] The short treatment of arrangement in inquisitive oratory is concluded with the statement:

> By arranging topics thus we shall be able to employ all the various kinds of oratory according to the rules of rhetoric.[2]

This statement, together with the preceding outlines of the arrangement systems presented for each of the seven kinds of speeches, illustrates the emphasis of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum xxxvii.

[2] Ibid., 1445b.

The emphasis remains on proper arrangement or ordering of materials within the subdivisions of the parts of a talk.

Functions of the divisions

From the outlines of the proper arrangement of materials for the seven kinds of speeches, it will be noted that the proem and peroration (sometimes iteration or recapitulation) were common to the seven types of speaking. It will be noted that there are four divisions for each of the seven types of speech, either stated explicitly or implied in the discussion of the proem, confirmation, anticipation, and peroration. Throughout the treatise, the functions of the four parts remained the same, though there were differences in naming, arranging, or selection of topics, as the speaker adjusted to the audience's acceptance of ideas.

The function of the proem is described as preparation of the audience to be disposed in the speaker's favor. It should present a declaration of the subject in a summary manner for the benefit of the ignorant; it should exhort the audience to pay attention; and it should gain good will toward the subject or cause being presented, according to the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.[1]

Selection of topics to accomplish these three named purposes was said to be dependent upon an analysis of the audience, to discover if the listeners were well-disposed, indifferent, or ill-disposed toward the speaker.[2] Then, arrangement of these topics, as the chart indicates, could also vary with the kind of speech as well as the disposition of the audience toward the speaker.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1436a.

[2] Ibid.

Narratives of facts were included as a part of the proem, whether the actions being described were few in number and could insure "that this part of the speech may not of itself be too short"[1] or whether the actions were numerous and were thus related to "win the attention of the audience."[2] After the two chapters on narration and narratives of facts which have been summarized in the chart, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum indicated once again that he did not intend these two to be separate divisions of a speech when he concluded the discussion: "We shall now know how to arrange narratives of facts in our proem."[3]

Statement also is included as part of the proem. There are always twofold divisions of subtopics for the statement, though the topics for the statement may vary in descending order of usefulness, according to the author, who explains:

> One can say that one can oneself do one thing and another: that this man cannot do a certain thing but that man can: that this man can do a certain thing and something else: that neither can one do a certain thing oneself nor can anyone else do it: that one cannot do a certain thing oneself but that someone else can: that one can do ONE thing oneself but that the other person cannot do something else.[4]

After the proem, the next division of a speech considered by this rhetoric was confirmation, the purpose of which was to confirm facts by adducing proofs, or if the facts were believed as soon as they were made, to confirm facts by an appeal to justice, lawfulness,

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1438b.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 1434b.

expediency, and honorableness. It was urged that topics of this division be arranged in the following order without deviation:[1] (1) statement of opinion of the orator or statement of customary course of events to show that what we are asserting, or something similar to it, is what usually happens; (2) cite examples, and any point of similarity which might support what we are saying; (3) cite maxims; (4) if we introduce probabilities and examples, we must end with maxims and enthymemes.[2]

In addition to a set order for these topics in the speech division labeled confirmation, an iteration and a statement of what is to follow is required after each of these four topics. These two subdivisions were considered necessary since they are the only devices by which a speaker can connect one division of his talk with another and "keep up the thread of the speech."[3]

The third division of a speech, anticipation, should favorably dispose the audience toward the speaker by demolishing in advance all arguments against your person, according to Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. Three methods were set forth by which a speaker might accomplish his purpose: (1) by setting a single argument against another if yours is the stronger argument; (2) by setting several against several; (3) by setting many arguments against your opponent's one.[4]

It can be observed in the accompanying outline on arrangement for the various types of speeches that this division of anticipation

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1438b.

[2] Ibid., 1439a.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 1439b.

is absent in the eulogistic, vituperative, defensive, and inquiring speeches and that the topics of anticipation vary in any other types of speeches according to the facts, laws, point of view of your opponent, and ambiguity of statement involved.[1]

The fourth and last division of a speech, variously referred to as iteration, peroration, or recapitulation, was treated in Chapter VI as one of the "Elements Common to Every Branch of Oratory." In the preceding outline, the emphasis on iteration as a division of the speech and also as a necessary element within all divisions of the speech may be noted. The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum explained at the beginning of Chapter XX:

> Iteration is a means of briefly reminding one's hearers. It must be emphasized both at the conclusion of a division of a speech and at the final conclusion. In recapitulating, we use iteration in the form either of a division or of the recommendation of a certain course or of asking questions or of an enumeration.[2]

In keeping with the central theme of audience adaptation, the treatise adapts iteration to a speech that is short, long, or of moderate length. If it is desirable that the speech be long, the author of the treatise advises:

> In each division of the speech you must iterate and make your iteration brief: while at the conclusion of your speech you ought to recapitulate as a whole all that you have dealt with in detail, and treat the subject generally. In this way your speech will be of a sufficient length.[3]

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1443a.

[2] Ibid., 1443b.

[3] Ibid., 1434b.

The divisions of the speech are also considered if the speech is to be shortened, for this treatise suggests in such case: "You must do away with the brief iterations in the divisions of the speech and only employ iteration in your final conclusion."[1]

As the outline indicates, peroration rules may differ in each kind of speech, either for the proper order of iteration or for the proper method of favorably disposing the audience. Usually the author concluded each set of rules on the peroration with the suggestion: "By these means then we shall in the preparation of our speech win favor for ourselves and disfavor for our opponents."[2]

The proper contents of the seven "partes-systems" discussed include all logical, pathetic, and ethical appeals[3] considered most expedient for disposing an audience favorably. Like Aristotle, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum treated the three major branches of oratory: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic. Like Aristotle, he considered the deliberative to have the most difficult organizational pattern, and to be the one most often used in all private conversations and public harangues.[4]

There is substantial agreement with Aristotle in the description of the proper contents of the four divisions, even when re-enumeration or recapitulation of arguments is mentioned. The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, unlike Aristotle, considers the proem as being common to every kind of speech and suitable to all occasions.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1434b.

[2] Ibid., 1446a.

[3] Ibid., vii–xii, xiv–xv, xxxiv.

[4] Ibid., 1425.

Relation of audience adaptation to divisions

The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum devised a detailed plan of divisions for a talk that included suggestions on how to accomplish audience adaptation as an aid to gaining conviction of that audience. The over-all purpose for audience adaptation was to gain "an appearance of truth" or to "win favor for ourselves and disfavor for our opponents,"[1] according to the anonymous author. Throughout the manuscript, the adjustment of the divisions of a speech to gain audience acceptance of ideas is evident.

An entire chapter of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is devoted to methods for adjusting the length of a speech to an audience.[2] To prolong a speech, for instance, there is the suggestion that in each division there can be an explanation of the nature of contents and an explanation of the grounds of the speaker's ideas. The rhetorician adds:

> In each division of the speech you must iterate and make your iteration brief; while at the conclusion of your speech you ought to recapitulate as a whole all that you have dealt with in detail, and treat the subject generally. In this way your speech will be of sufficient length.[3]

To shorten a speech, for instance, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum also reverted to speech divisions as he explained:

> . . . and you must do away with the brief iterations in the separate divisions of the speech and only employ iteration in your final conclusion.[4]

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1445a.

[2] Ibid., xxii.

[3] Ibid., 1434b.

[4] Ibid.

The suggestions on adapting the length of a speech to the audience are concluded with the hint that a speaker wishing to make a speech of moderate length should select the parts to which he wants his audience to pay particular attention, and should make special iterations at the end of these parts.[1]

Another aspect of audience adaptation particularly emphasized was the favorable disposition of the audience toward the speaker. The proem is identified as the division in which the speaker should begin to influence the audience by summarizing to benefit the ignorant.[2] In this speech division, the speaker also is urged to gain attention by considering subjects of greatest interest to the immediate audience: those of nearest concern: those thought most just, honorable, expedient, easy, and honest; and those of a most alarming nature.[3]

The treatise offers the advice that it is superfluous to talk of goodwill if an audience is already well-disposed, but if it is neither well- nor ill-disposed toward you, it is good to use flattery in the proem. "Flatter them," says the author, "saying it is their custom to judge the speeches which they hear with fairness and distinction."[4]

If an audience is ill-disposed toward a speaker, however, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum urged that a speaker state in the proem that he knows such a prejudice exists against him and he can prove it is groundless. The advice follows:

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1434b.

[2] Ibid., 1436a.

[3] Ibid., 1436b.

[4] Ibid.

> You must then make a brief defence in your proem. . . . You must say the judgement passed upon you was unfair and that you have been the victim of party plots. If judgement is to be passed, you submit to the judgements of the present audience, and if proved you have wronged the state . . . you consider yourself worthy of death.[1]

In considering still another element of audiences, the information they already have on a given topic, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum had this to say:

> If actions about which we are speaking are few in number, and well-known to the audience . . . if they are unimportant and unfamiliar, we ought to insert bodily into the proem the recounting of facts from beginning to end, including nothing extraneous, but merely relating bare facts.[2]

Later, the author of this pre-Aristotelian rhetoric asserted that in the confirmation division of a talk, all proofs should be omitted if statements are believed as soon as they are made in a speech.[3]

A section of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum describes the methods by which feelings of envy, hostility, friendship, gratitude, or pity might be created in an audience, through the proem of a deliberative speech. To arouse pity, for instance, the proem should include a mention of any friendship or cause of pity, a statement that the audience is unworthy to suffer misfortune, a description of your adversary's bad plight, or a statement of the advantages which most other people enjoy and of which the speaker was deprived.[4]

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1437a.

[2] Ibid., 1438b.

[3] Ibid., xxxii.

[4] Ibid., 1440a.

In epideictic speeches, some of these materials that arouse emotional reactions in an audience are placed in the proem,[1] but the important facts on genealogy follow the proem. The genealogy may be included under the three divisions of "early years," "early manhood," and "full manhood," instead of the usual four parts, writes the unknown author, since the purpose is to prove the justice, wisdom, and courage of a man.[2] In either instance, the elements related to audience-adaptation are developed in terms of the divisions or parts of a speech.

The same importance is given to placement within divisions, when suggestions are made for gaining goodwill of an audience in forensic oratory. The proem must include the conciliation of goodwill, states this early Greek rhetorician, as he lists items suitable for a proem that would impress a jury favorably toward the speaker.[3]

Among the many suggestions for adapting to a specific audience situation there is not a single hint that a speaker might possess the necessary judgment to choose his own methods of adaptation. Rather, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum sets forth in detail the topics to be covered in various divisions of the speech, in any given circumstance: if justice and legality are in a speaker's favor, or if the speaker's wrongdoing is negligible;[4] if a person is accused of reading speeches or practicing them beforehand;[5] if a speaker

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1440b.

[2] Ibid., 1440b–1441b.

[3] Ibid., 1442b.

[4] Ibid., 1444a.

[5] Ibid.

desires to create envy against his opponents;[1] or if elegance is desired.[2]

The foregoing illustrations from Rhetorica ad Alexandrum indicate that audience adaptation is treated comprehensively.

Isocrates' Theories

Isocrates, fourth of the Attic orators of Ancient Greece, opened his school of rhetoric at Athens about 392 B.C. and continued teaching there for over half a century. Until his death at the age of ninety-eight, he vigorously exerted his influence on Greek internal and international affairs, through his teaching, his essays, tracts, lectures, and letters. His influence on rhetorical theory and practice continues to be studied.

Isocrates conceived of speaking from the level of state affairs and saw its greatest usefulness as a tool of effective citizenship. He understood the political life of his day for which he was training his pupils to participate, for the reason that he was an active participant in that political life. He presented speeches before the Athenian courts on subjects such as inheritances, damages, assaults, and deposits, from 403 to 393 B.C.[3] He wrote scholarly

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[1] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1445a. The author here explains that envy is very near to hatred.

[2] Ibid., xxii.

[3] R. C. Jebb, "Isocrates," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XIV, 9th ed., 877–81. Forensic speeches of Isocrates are listed as: "Claim to an Inheritance," "Action for Damage" (Or, "Concerning a Team of Horses"), "Action for Assault against Lochites," "Actions

works to plead for a monarchy,[1] to explain the duties of a monarchy to his subjects,[2] and to explain his position as a rhetoric teacher among the sophists of his day.[3]

There were political writings by Isocrates that dealt with the diplomatic relations of Greece with Persia[4] and others that pertained only to the internal affairs of Greece.[5] And finally, there were letters to Philip asking him to undertake command of the Greeks in a war against Persia,[6] to the daughter of Jason who might establish a popular government,[7] to Archimadamus for deliverance from internal feuds,[8] and to the ruler of Heraclea on the Euxine.[9]

From his vantage point as a practical political philosopher, Isocrates defined speech as "the surest index of a sound

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to Recover a Deposit," and "Special Plea against Callimachus." English translations of all extant works by Isocrates are available in three volumes entitled Isocrates, translated by George Norlin (Vols. I–III: London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1928).

[1]Isocrates Nicholas Speaks: of Duty to the King.

[2]Isocrates Letter to Demonicus, To Nicholas.

[3]Isocrates Against the Sophists and Antidosis.

[4]Isocrates Panegyricus and Philippus.

[5]Isocrates On the Peace, Areopagiticus, Plataicus, and Archidamus.

[6]Isocrates To Dionysius.

[7]Isocrates To the Children of Jason.

[8]Isocrates Letter to Archidamus III.

[9]Isocrates To Timotheus.

understanding."[1] Because of his effectiveness in making that definition a practical approach to all speaking, Isocrates numbered among his pupils some of the most successful forensic, panegyrical, and political orators of the period.[2]

Though Isocrates wrote no formal rhetoric,[3] an understanding of the practical viewpoint from which he approached the teaching of rhetoric may be obtained from his letters and speeches, especially Against the Sophists and Antidosis.[4]

Philosophical nature of rhetorical instruction

A liberal education was the first prerequisite for men desiring to become good speakers, according to Isocrates. The famous Greek teacher asserted that rhetorical instruction should be

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[1] Isocrates Antidosis 68.

[2] R. C. Jebb, "Isocrates," pp. 877–81. Among the Attic orators who were students of Isocrates were Isaeus (forensic): Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Acharnae (political): and the panegyrical orators who each year won the speaking contest established in honor of the Prince of Caria. Eminent men who were trained in the school of Isocrates are also mentioned by Cicero in Orator xiii. 42: Brutus viii. 32: and Cato Maj. v. 13.

[3] There is a reference to a lost Art of Rhetoric by Isocrates, according to the translator of the Loeb edition, George Norlin. See Isocrates, trans. George Norlin, Vol. I, Introduction, xxx.

[4] Twenty-one speeches or discourses and nine letters or fragments are now extant; Against the Sophists and Antidosis are the works relating most closely to the subject of rhetoric. Antidosis and Panathenaicus are largely autobiographical. See "Isocrates," Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. XIV, 877–81, and George Norlin in the Introduction to Art of Rhetoric, Vol. I, xi and footnote on xi.

philosophical in nature and built upon a broad, general education if it were to prepare a student for the active service of the state. Such instruction should be adapted to the ability and aptitude of each student and should develop the individual's judgment on a variety of matters relating to speaking and audiences.

Isocrates predicted that an ethical man with such liberal education should be able to prepare a speech adapted to any audience situation, without the aid of a set of rules. As a speaker should be able to discover the rhetorical possibilities of any subject through training and judgment, he should be able to choose the best elements of all the available proofs, arrange these properly, and not miss what the audience demands.[1]

This very ordering of his notions on the responsibilities of a speaker might express his conception of the order in which the process of speech preparation is evolved: finding all available proofs; selecting, arranging, and then adapting these proofs. Or, it may have been merely an amplification of his conception of effective speaking as a blending of natural ability, liberal education, and formal rhetorical training.

Isocrates believed that there could be no absolute knowledge or science by which a man "can know positively what he should do or what he should say."[2] He discredited the speakers who learned

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[1] Isocrates Against the Sophists 16–18. This last statement might indicate that Isocrates was familiar with the necessity for the broader use of dispositio, interpreted as "arranging elements within a whole," but none of his available writings or speeches give a clue as to how he interpreted the term "elements."

[2] Isocrates Antidosis 261; Against the Sophists 16; and Helen 5.

their rhetoric from the rule-makers without ever learning to adapt to a specific speaking situation when he wrote, "Oratory is good only if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment."[1]

This attitude was expressed again in Panathenaicus where Isocrates described formal training as playing but a minor part in the making of a successful man or speaker, since the discipline of rhetoric could not teach anyone to know exactly what to do in all crises and contingencies of life. He posed the question in this latter work, "Whom, then, do I call educated?" and answered:

> First, those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who possess a judgment which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action.[2]

A summary of the views of Isocrates on the philosophical nature of rhetorical instruction would not be complete without the mention of his emphasis on ethical qualities of a speaker. Even though topics of ethical proof are included within the speech, the moral qualities of the speaker were of utmost significance, Isocrates explained. At one time he wrote that "words carry greater conviction when spoken by men of good character," and added, "The argument of a man's life is furnished by words."[3]

Pervading the major works of Isocrates is an emphasis on the need for speakers of high moral character. Throughout, one

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[1] Isocrates Against the Sophists 13.

[2] Isocrates Panathenaicus 30.

[3] Isocrates Antidosis 278.

finds a stress on noble themes, stress on persuasion toward lasting moral values, and frequent references to development of nobility of character and thought.[1] Isocrates claimed that bad men were never happy for if they were not detected by others they could not escape their own consciences. He stressed that a good name was the greatest inheritance to one's child, and that "the stronger a man's desire to persuade his hearers, the more zealously will he strive to be honorable."[2]

The importance of ethical values in speech training is summarized by Isocrates in the last of his orations when he observes:

> If I could show that I was more concerned when discoursing on the subject of virtue about doing justice to the theme than about the symmetry of my speech . . . and that, too, knowing well that the lack of due proportion in my speech would detract from my own reputation. . . . Nevertheless I bade farewell to expediency and chose justice instead.[3]

To summarize the order of teaching rhetorical concepts, as advocated by Isocrates, seven items must be included: an introduction to rhetorical theory, explanation, outlining, revising, oral presentation, criticisms, and study of speech models.[4]

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[1] Isocrates Antidosis and Against the Sophists. See also William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 57; and "Isocrates," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XIV, 11th edition, pp. 877–81.

[2] Isocrates Antidosis 255.

[3] Isocrates Panathenaicus 86.

[4] Isocrates Against the Sophists; and "Isocrates," Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XIV, 877–81.

Criticism of "partes-system" or mechanical divisions

Isocrates was familiar with the "partes-systems" of the most popular sophists of his day, since he numbered Gorgias, Prodicus, Theramenes, and Protagoras among his teachers.[1] There are, however, no direct statements in the twenty-one discourses and nine letters of Isocrates now extant to offer evidence that Isocrates advocated or even condoned teaching speech by a "partes-system." Consistently, he attempted to refute the claims of the sophists who pretended to be capable of teaching their pupils by rules or "partes-systems." He complained, always, that the older rhetoricians who wrote Arts of rhetoric were more interested in facility with systems than in honesty of character.[2]

Throughout his lifetime, Isocrates seemed to preclude the slightest possibility of hard and fast rules for dispositio, or any other part of the creative process of rhetoric. At the very outset of his career as a teacher, he presented his dialogue Against the Sophists as an illustration of the principles and methods he intended to apply in his new school of rhetoric. In this work he claimed to prepare young men for the duties of public life, as did the other sophists, but he discredited contemporary teachers who supplied their students with ready-made rules or devices, and taught rhetoric as a cut-and-dried system.[3] Again in Helen[4] and Antidosis,[5] he echoes his conviction that the minds and characters of men could

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[1] George Norlin, Isocrates, Introduction, I, xi–xv.

[2] Isocrates Against the Sophists 19–21.

[3] Ibid., 16–17.

[4] Isocrates Helen 5.

[5] Isocrates Antidosis 271.

not be educated by set rules or schemes. In the Antidosis, which is actually an attack on rival sophists who stressed the "partes-system" as their method of teaching rhetoric, Isocrates asserts:

> For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his power of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course.[1]

In the same address, Isocrates disclaimed any affinity toward specific ordering of speech parts, then asked the court judge to read from two of his earlier orations which were the very antithesis of the current style where:

> . . . each part is always in accord and in logical connection with that which goes before: but in this, on the contrary, I detach one part from another, and breaking up the discourse, as it were, into what we call general heads.[2]

From the time when he began his career as a teacher of rhetoric until he wrote his last treatise on rhetoric, Isocrates refuted the sophist theory that a system of speaking could be taught and made effective for all occasions. Isocrates claimed that natural talent and experience were of equal importance with such theories.

Use of "partes-system" by Isocrates in his orations

There is evidence that Isocrates was familiar with the terminology of the system. His speeches also furnish evidence that he used the "partes-system" in the preparation and delivery of his own public addresses.

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[1] Isocrates Antidosis 271. [2] Ibid., 68.

In the last of his orations, Panathenaicus, he checked himself after a long explanation and denial of the false stories and criticisms that had been leveled against him, with the observation: "I perceive that I am being carried beyond the due limits which have been assigned to an introduction. . . ."[1] Several hundred words later, he noted: "I have now finished what I wished to say by way of prelude about myself and others, like the chorus as it were, before the contest."[2]

He recognized his use of digression when he talked, though he was noncommittal in his acceptance or rejection of it as a necessary element in the preparation of a speech. When he apologized for shortening his praise of Agamemnon in the Panathenaicus, he also added:

> But I observe, on the other hand, that the discussion of things which lie outside the scope of the subject is not approved but is thought rather to be confusing, and that while many misuse digressions there are many more who condemn them.[3]

After this statement, Isocrates continued with a lengthy recital of praise for Agamemnon, asserting that he thought such would bring applause from the cultivated men in the audience, though it was a digression from his text.[4] In closing the same address, Isocrates indirectly referred to the recapitulation step when he

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[1] Isocrates Panathenaicus 33.

[2] Ibid., 39. This is comparable to Aristotle's Rhetoric III. 14, in which the proem is compared to the prelude of a flute player.

[3] Isocrates Panathenaicus 74.

[4] Ibid., 86.

remarked that he would end abruptly: ". . . for to review in detail the points which have been made is not in keeping with discourses such as this."[1]

These examples from the last oration of Isocrates serve to illustrate his familiarity with a narrowed interpretation of dispositio as a "partes-system" and his personal use of the "parte-system" in delivering speeches.

Persistence of "partes-system" as Isocratean tradition

It is possible that gossip is confused with fact in the biographies and the late compilations of the rhetorical theories of Isocrates: in the prefix to an essay on Isocrates by Dionysius of Halicarnassus; in that of Photius; in Plutarch's Lives of the Ten Orators; the anonymous Life, often thought to be Zosimus; and an article by Suidas.[2]

Friedrich Solmsen is the foremost contemporary scholar who refers to the "four-part-system" of Isocrates and develops the theory that it was not until Aristotle that there was a break with the "parte-system" of teaching rhetoric.[3] He uses Dionysius as

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[1] Isocrates Panathenaicus 266.

[2] George Norlin, "Isocrates," Introd. to Vol. I, xi.

[3] Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology, LXII (January, 1941), 38, 49; LXII (April, 1941), 185, 190. The same references to an Isocratean tradition of "parts" are made by Friedrich Solmsen, "Drei Rekonstruktionen zur Antiken Rhetorik und Poetik," Hermes, 67 Band (1932), Heft 2, 133–54; and by Konrad Barwick, "Die Gliederung Der Rhetorischen Pathos Und Die Horazische Epistula Ad Pisones," Hermes, 57 Band (1922), Heft 2, 1–62.

his primary source, rather than any of the extant writings of Isocrates in which the Greek described his teaching methods and explained his philosophy of rhetoric. Those who refer to the Isocratean "partes-system" also overlook the writings of Aristotle, a most reliable source among contemporaries of Isocrates. Aristotle and Isocrates were teaching rhetoric in Athens at the same time, and it was from Isocrates that Aristotle quoted more often than from any other single man.[1]

It is also possible that confusion has resulted from a study of the structure of the speeches of Isocrates, most of which have a four-part plan of organization, or from the assumption that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum was similar to the system taught by Isocrates. The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is the most complete extant rhetoric as it was used by the Greek sophists before Aristotle,[2] but the present analysis of Isocrates' speeches illustrates influences other than sophistic, in his total concept of rhetorical training.

Conclusions

There appears to be no single pre-Aristotelian pattern of rhetorical theory that emerged to exert its influence on all of the

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[1] Aristotle refers to many aspects of Isocrates' teaching but does not mention the "parte-system." See Rhetoric III. vii, ix, x, xi, xvii, xviii. Cicero admits that he incorporated all of the best of Isocrates and describes teaching methods and students of Isocrates in De Oratore II. iii, x; Orator xiii. 42; Brutus viii. 32; and Cato Maj. v. 13.

[2] William M. Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 56. For other references to the use made of this work, see Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, ed. by W. D. Ross; also E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 331–32, 412–59.

major rhetors and orators of the period. Rather, the contributions on rhetoric were written from widely different points of view and expressed varying emphases. There was no general agreement among these writers on the purposes for speaking, the desirable qualities of the ideal speaker, the basic canons of rhetoric, nor the methods of speech preparation.

None of these early rhetoricians used the term dispositio, though all of them expressed interpretations or denunciations of speech elements encompassed by the concept as it is defined in this paper.

Corax and Tisias

1. The authors of the earliest rhetoric set down a simple, concrete, easily comprehended plan of persuasion, to assist the masses who were required by Sicilian law to plead their own land disputes. This Art of Rhetoric by Corax and Tisias introduced dispositio as the major emphasis.

2. Interpreting dispositio from the narrowed concept of "arranging parts," the first rhetoric arbitrarily established a five-part system. The five parts needed in all plans of persuasion were designated as prooimion, katastasis, agones, parekthesis, and epilogos.

3. This "partes-system" of arranging materials for persuasion presupposed that rhetoric could be taught. The Art of Rhetoric, of which the "partes-system" was the core, appeared to put primary emphasis on a speaker's training, with no mention of his intellectual or moral qualities.

4. Popularly accepted by the masses during the lifetime of Corax and Tisias, the Art of Rhetoric with its system of instruction

based on "parts" continued to exert influence on later writers of rhetorical treatises. In a like manner, the principles contained in Art of Rhetoric continued to serve as a basis for training outstanding orators of the fifth century B.C., if one accepts as evidence the meager and somewhat remote research sources presently available.

Plato

1. Perceiving the function of all speech as "leading souls by persuasion," Plato criticized rhetoric as taught in the Athens of his day and propounded his own ideal system of rhetoric based on truth.

2. Plato criticized teachers who substituted instruction on the "partes-system" for a complete rhetorical system and criticized the students who accepted such instruction as more than a preliminary investigation.

3. Plato did not distinguish between an "ordering of the whole" in rhetoric and in other realms of philosophy. In rhetoric, however, he conceived of an over-all plan of selection and organization of arguments based on development of the individual speaker's ability to know and adequately judge the needs of various audiences, occasions, and kinds of speeches.

4. The goal for the "plan" or "order" which exists in the mind of each speaker should be truth, according to Plato. Audience-analysis, or knowing the "kinds of souls," should aid the speaker in disposing the truths that he sees so they become more clear and persuasive to that particular kind of soul that is listening.

5. Plato listed no particular number, order, nor nomenclature for individual parts of a speech. He assumed that his speaker would be an intelligent, moral, broadly educated man with good judgment, who would be capable of devising the particular plan necessary for any specific speaking situation.

6. Plato influenced the future consideration of dispositio as a "partes-system," through his attacks on it in his Gorgias and Phaedrus. For more than two centuries after his death, his residence became a repository for his manuscripts and a meeting place for scholars who came to read his works.

Rhetorica ad Alexandrum

1. This treatise by an anonymous author is the earliest rhetoric now extant and is representative of one of the rhetorical systems taught by the Greek sophists before Aristotle. The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum presented a completely detailed rhetoric based on clever expedients for disposing an audience favorably, through proper disposition of subject matter and emotional appeals.

2. The author's system of dispositio evolves as being the greatest single element in his principles of rhetoric. Interpreted as the division, ordering, and arranging of parts for a speech, the dispositio pattern was evolved for the purpose of aiding speech delivery. Rather than one over-all plan, the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum developed seven separate patterns of divisions or "partes-systems" adapted to the audiences affected by each of the seven kinds of speaking: persuasive, dissuasive, eulogistic, vituperative, inquisitive, accusative, and defensive.

3. Arrangement of topics and words within the subdivisions of a talk received greater emphasis than the four major division "parts." There was a lack of consistent naming, ordering, or numbering for the major divisions; only the proem was treated as being common to all types of speeches and suitable to all occasions.

4. The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum appears to have written his rhetoric on the assumption that a speaker familiar with its contents would be able to compose and effectively present any of the seven specific kinds of speech. There is no indication that a speaker needed any special intellectual qualities or education to aid him in finding, selecting, ordering, or arranging proofs. The topics listed as appropriate for each division of a talk were expected to be complete enough to cover all contingencies. Should necessity demand adaptations to a particular audience situation, choices were allowed among the topics listed within a division; however, no original topics would be permitted.

Isocrates

1. Isocrates expressed his views on rhetorical theory and training from the viewpoint of a teacher and active participant in the political life of Greece. He attempted to prepare men for duties of citizenship and hoped to produce results of lasting value, in forensic, deliberative, and epideictic speaking.

2. The suggestions of Isocrates for "arranging the various elements" were presented for the man with native ability and a liberal education who desired to learn how to choose and arrange elements necessary for any given audience. This might be interpreted

as a "plan for the whole," except that the reader is not informed what Isocrates defined as elements.

3. Isocrates was acquainted with a rhetorical system which put unusual emphasis on parts, and on the arrangement and function of these parts. There is evidence that he used this "partes-system" in the delivery of his own speeches.

4. The writings of Isocrates on the specific concept of dispositio are difficult to interpret, since they are not consistent with his own practice in speech-making. Isocrates expressed disdain for any "system" of hard-and-fast rules for a creative process and believed it was impossible to find a "partes-system" that would be applicable to all types of speaking. He claimed that he avoided rules and systems, as he trained students who became Attic orators in the fields of forensic, political, and panegyrical speaking. In none of his writings on speaking is there evidence that he used a "parte-system" in teaching.

5. Writers who refer to the Isocratean system of four or more parts have formed judgments on the basis of analyzing the divisions into which the speeches of Isocrates fall; or, they have accepted statements of men who professed a familiarity with the teaching methods of Isocrates.

CHAPTER III

ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF DISPOSITIO

The Rhetoric of Aristotle has been called the most definitive treatise on rhetoric known to Ancient Greece and the greatest single work in the literature of speech.[1] Aristotle appears to have reorganized and developed rhetorical knowledge and principles, when he founded his Lyceum in Athens and compiled his discourse on speaking. Written about 335 B.C.,[2] the Rhetoric became for

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[1] E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 37–8. William Sandford refers to the Rhetoric as "the most authoritative pronouncement upon the subject in classical times." See William Phillips Sandford, English Theories of Public Address 1530–1828 (Columbus, Ohio: H. L. Hedrick, 1931), p. 16. Lane Cooper referred to Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric as "one of the world's best and wisest books" in his translation of Rhetoric, p. vii.

[2] E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 37–42. Cope states that Athens is determined as the place where the Rhetoric was written, for it contains references to events and persons known there but perhaps not known outside Athens. This limits the date of composition to two periods when Aristotle resided in Athens, from 367 B.C. to 347 B.C., and from 335 B.C. to 322 B.C. Cope tends to favor the beginning of the second period as the date of composition. The 335 B.C. date is given by Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset in An Abridged History of Greek Literature, p. 336; this is the date at which Aristotle founded his Lyceum or Peripatetic school. J. E. Sandys in his Introduction, p. xix, to the Jebb translation of the Rhetoric sets the date at 335 B.C., on the same basis as Croiset and Croiset.

generations, a resource for speakers and for teachers of speech.[1]

From the Rhetoric one needs to discover the theoretical structure of the canons of rhetoric as Aristotle conceived them. The principles relating to dispositio, particularly, will serve as a basis for determining what change, if any, Aristotle gave dispositio. The treatise should also serve as a basis for distinguishing between Aristotelian theory and Aristotelian "tradition." It should be valuable to study Aristotle's inferences on dispositio as they become a part of his total synthesis of the practical "things as they are" with the hypothetical "things as they should be." Written in the manner of a philosophical survey,[2] the Rhetoric introduced Aristotle's doctrine of rhetorical proofs as one of the components of a functional philosophy.

Although Aristotle did not define dispositio specifically, we may seek in his Rhetoric his criteria for selection, adaptation, and arrangement of the materials of speeches.

Aristotle's Point of View in Writing

It was from the viewpoint of the teacher that Aristotle compiled his Rhetoric, suggesting as does his Poetics, a collection of

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen (New York: Random House, Inc., 1954), p. xiii.

[2]Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 8. Solmsen calls Aristotle "a man with philosophical training who has learnt in Plato's school to look for the form and principle common to many individual specimens." See Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen, p. xvii.

lecture notes for his select students who were seeking a liberal education in his Lyceum.[1] Possessing the best education Athens could offer[2] and having access to earlier sophistic writings and teachings,[3] Aristotle assimilated, reshaped, and expanded previous systems of rhetorical instruction, to provide a practical book for his pupils. An American scholar of Aristotle began a description of Aristotle's methodology in compiling the Rhetoric by noting:

> He brought together all that was worth keeping in the earlier and current Greek textbooks; rejecting their trivial

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen, p. xx; and Lane Cooper's translation of the Rhetoric, pp. xx–xxi.

[2]Son of a physician to Amyntas II of Macedon, Aristotle completed his education in Athens. After being attached to his master Plato for eighteen years, Aristotle tutored Alexander's son Philip for ten years. He enjoyed the royal friendship, which made money available for research, books, and travel. For other details on Aristotle's education see Alfred and Maurice Croiset, History of Greek Literature, pp. 335–36; E. M. Cope's Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 38–42; and J. E. Sandys, History of Classical Scholarship (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934), I, 81–82.

[3]Aristotle takes all due account of earlier sophistic rhetorics known to him and of his own experiences in the schools of Isocrates and Plato, says W. Rhys Roberts, adding: "His repeated references either to 'the present day writers on rhetoric' generally, or to specified teachers and theorists, are enough to show that he has faithfully reviewed the rhetorical field of his own and previous days. And in the light of current shortcomings he lays down the true philosophical principles of rhetoric . . ." (W. Rhys Roberts, Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism, pp. 34–35). Aristotle's access to sophistic writings and teachings is referred to in several other works: E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 40–45; Elbert Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, pp. 2–3; and Alfred Croiset and Maurice Croiset, History of Greek Literature, pp. 335–36.

> novelties, he supplied the details they lacked; and taking what they gave and he added, he cast the whole into a pattern that has not yet been bettered.[1]

During the fourth century B.C., interest in poetry and imaginative literature had declined amidst the political turmoil of the Greek State and was replaced by an interest in national issues, noble causes, and political responsibilities. The law court took the place of the theatre as the center of public life, and as a result, "attention was directed anew to the task of improving public speech, fresh impetus being given to the study of oratory in general."[2]

To shed light on Aristotle's point of view concerning persons who would profit by rhetorical training, we look at the opening sentence of the Rhetoric where he declared:

> Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic; for both have to do with such things as fall, in a way, within the realm of common knowledge, things that do not belong to any one science. Accordingly, everyone to some extent makes use of both Dialectic and Rhetoric; for all make some attempt to sift or to support theses, and to defend or attack persons. Most people do so, of course, either quite at random, or else merely with a knack acquired from practice. Success in either way being possible, the random impulse and the acquired facility alike evince the feasibility of reducing the processes to a method; for when the practised and spontaneous

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by Lane Cooper (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932), p. xviii.

[2]J. E. Sandys, History of Classical Scholarship, I, 81. Sandys noted, however, that little of the systematic, logical, and comprehensive planning given to other phases of Greek education was evident in the study of oratory until Aristotle and Isocrates began to realize the educational and political values of rhetorical training.

> speaker gain their end, it is possible to investigate the cause of their success; and such an inquiry, we shall all admit, performs the function of an art.[1]

Another important aspect of Aristotle's point of view in writing was his definition of rhetoric. Aristotle claimed "Its function is not so much to persuade, as to find in each case the existing means of persuasion."[2] This definition is in direct contrast to the pre-Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as the "art or faculty of persuading"; it caused a theory or system of finding universal truths to replace a rulebook of specific persuasive devices. Essentially, rhetoric was the art of giving effectiveness to truth, as Aristotle defined it.[3]

Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as "finding all of the available means of persuasion" clearly places the emphasis of his

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by Lane Cooper, I. 1. 1354a. The Lane Cooper translation will be used for all quotations from Aristotle in this paper.

[2]Ibid., 1355b.

[3]Interpretations of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric vary little. Lane Cooper prefers to believe that the one legitimate means of persuasion is reasonable argument. He asserts that Aristotle puts the emphasis on the nature of the person to be persuaded and the means by which it is possible and just to persuade him. Cope construes the definition of rhetoric given by Aristotle to be a definite break with pre-Aristotelian rhetoricians (E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 28); Baldwin asserts the definition to be one that would cause truth to prevail (Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 5, 9); Harrington recognized the aspect of ethics in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric in that "all available truths" would reveal what was good and bad for men. He concluded, however, that Aristotle's aim was not truth, but to expose inconsistency or inaccuracy (Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, pp. 3–4).

rhetoric on proof.[1] From the outset, Aristotle was emphatic in stating, "This art consists of proofs alone—all else is but accessary."[2] To aid in selecting the best methods of persuasion for any audience, Aristotle collected a variety of approaches to proof. He produced an expanded analysis of the three kinds of speaking,[3]

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[1]Elbert Harrington noted that "the distinction Aristotle made between science and opinion really determined his rhetorical theory" (Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, p. 11); Solmsen says, "A system of 'proofs' may be called the core of Aristotle's Rhetoric" (Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric, p. 39); Baldwin calls Aristotle's emphasis "an application of proof to people" (Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 9); and Cope concurs with the other classical scholars who believe Aristotle's primary emphasis was on modes of proof (E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 5).

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1354b. It is interesting to note that Aristotle expanded his notions on proofs, or the logical science of inferences based on proof, in a series of volumes: Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, and Sophistical Elenchi.

[3]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 3, 4. To illustrate the comprehensiveness necessitated by a study of the three kinds of speaking, see Cope's Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 1408. Sophistical rhetorics dealt almost exclusively with forensic oratory, the branch concerned with the minute, personal, private interests of persons. Deliberative oratory concerned itself with the wider, more general interests of general assemblages who were interested in the future, and more universal affairs. Deliberative assemblages would be more difficult to analyze than the one auditor (the judge) in forensic speaking. The deliberative assemblage decides on its own future and wants all the proof possible that the proposal is for its own best interests. Forensic speaking concerned itself with past actions. Panegyrical speaking was, properly speaking, concerned with the present; it is the praise or blame of persons or deeds.

the kinds of subjects,[1] the causes of human emotions,[2] differences between youth and old age,[3] the nature of happiness,[4] the definitions of good things,[5] ingredients of wrongdoing,[6] and lines of argument.[7]

These materials of rhetoric were arranged under four "canons" of rhetoric, rather than under "parts of a speech" as they had been in earlier treatises. Aristotle's "canons" were: inventio, elocutio, pronunciatio, and dispositio (arrangement), in that order.[8]

Aristotle's Criticism of Writers of Technical Manuals

In the opening paragraph of his Rhetoric Aristotle began his criticism of the early sophists who had composed technical rhetorics based on "partes-systems." Immediately after defining the scope of rhetoric, Aristotle asserted:

> Now hitherto authors of "Arts of Speaking" have built up but a small portion of the art of Rhetoric truly considered; for this art consists of proofs (persuasions) alone—all else is but

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric I. 4. 1359a.

[2] Ibid., II. 10. 1368b–1369b.

[3] Ibid., 12. 1388b–1390b.

[4] Ibid., I. 5. 1360b–1362a.

[5] Ibid., 6. 1362a–1365b.

[6] Ibid., 9. 1368a.

[7] Ibid., II. 23. 1397a–1400b.

[8] Books I and II of the Rhetoric are concerned with inventio: what the means of persuasion may be. Book III begins with an analysis of "diction" in its widest sense of elocutio (style) in chapters 1–12; pronunciatio (delivery) is included under "diction." Chapters 13–19 of Book III are devoted to dispositio, from the narrowed interpretation of "arrangement."

> accessory. Yet these writers say nothing of enthymemes, the very body and substance of persuasion, and are concerned in the main with matters external to the direct issue. Thus the arousing of prejudice, of pity, of anger, and the like feelings in the soul, does not concern the facts, but has regard to those who decide. Consequently, if trials were everywhere conducted as at present they are in some cities—and especially in those that are best-governed—pleaders who were guided by the handbooks would have nothing to say: for by common consent the laws should forbid irrelevant speaking, and some courts, as that of the Areopagus, actually do forbid it.[1]

Aristotle's criticism of technical manual writers continued throughout the three books of the Rhetoric, as he rebuked these writers for the special emphasis they placed on speech "parts," for their adherence to the mechanical application of these "parts," their failure to consider artistic proofs, their use of commonplaces, and their emphasis on but one kind of speaking.

Mechanical application of parts condemned

Aristotle objected to "parts" or divisions which were not applicable generally to any and every kind of speech. Likewise, he objected to divisions that were neither distinct in function, in method, nor in place.

Aristotle carefully outlined the defects of current handbooks on rhetoric which were based on "partes-systems" and slanted

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1354a. Solmsen noted the similarity of attacks by Plato and Aristotle on current systems that propose the successful, popular devices slanted toward flattery (Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen, Modern Library, Inc., pp. xv–xvi). The eighteen years that Aristotle spent as a student of Plato may account for this similarity.

toward moving the listeners to pity, revenge, or similar emotions. First of all, he argued:

> . . . It is clear that our authors of handbooks, in attempting to define the proper content of the Proem, the Narration, and the other divisions of the speech, and the like, are dwelling upon irrelevant matters, for their rules have to do, simply and solely, with the production of a certain mental attitude in the judge.[1]

To illustrate the undesirability of applying "partes-system" rules for emotional appeals to all speeches, Aristotle takes an example from legal pleading. He wrote:

> . . . The man who is to judge should not have his judgement warped by speakers arousing him to anger, jealousy, or compassion. One might as well make a carpenter's rule crooked before using it as a measure. And obviously in a dispute there is nothing to do beyond showing that the alleged fact does or does not exist, has or has not occurred. The question whether it is important or trivial, the question whether there is justice or injustice, so far as the legislator has not defined these points, that is precisely what the judge is there to decide; he is not supposed to learn his lesson from the disputants.[2]

Aristotle's belief that all speeches have but two indispensable parts and all other divisions are unnecessary is repeated in the third book of the Rhetoric, when Aristotle begins to discuss the topic labeled arrangement. "A speech has two parts,"[3] he stated, adding:

> Necessarily, you state a case and omit to prove it, or prove it, or prove a case without first stating it; one who

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1354b.

[2] Ibid., 1354a.

[3] Ibid., III. 13. 1414a.

> proves must have something to prove, and one who advances a statement does so for the sake of proving it. In Rhetoric we must call these two processes, respectively, Statement and Argument. The current division is absurd; surely 'Narration' of the facts is a part of the forensic speech alone. In an epideictic speech, or in a political, how can there be a 'Narration' like the one so-called?[1]

The proem is not considered an essential part of all speeches, according to Aristotle, since its distinctive task is to make clear the end and object of your work. "Hence," he concluded, "if your matter is plain and short, a proem really should not be employed."[2]

Aristotle followed this assertion with several illustrations of proems used "in the nature of antidotes"[3] against the defects of the speaker, his subject, his audience, and against the strength of his adversaries. All of these proems that are aimed at rendering an audience receptive, at giving the impression of the speaker as a good and just man, or at diverting an audience's attention are "extraneous to the speech,"[4] Aristotle concluded. Continuing his attack on the lack of applicability of the proem to all speeches, or even to first position in a speech, Aristotle added:

> They are for the audience . . . that is weak enough to accept an utterance beside the point; and if audiences were not what they are, there would be no need for any proem beyond a summary statement of the matter in question; . . . And further, if the hearer's attention must be caught, this may have to be done in all parts of the speech; the interest throughout is more relaxed that just when you begin to listen—so it is absured to

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 13. 1414a–1414b.

[2] Ibid., 14. 1415a.

[3] Ibid., 1415b.

[4] Ibid.

> prescribe that the thing should be done at the outset, when everyone listens with most attention.[1]

The part of the speech labeled narration by the manual-writers of his day was also criticized by Aristotle for lacking universality of application. In the epideictic speech, he noted, narration needs to be intermittent throughout the talk and not confined to one place or a part, designated narration.[2] The rules that demand a rapid or long narration in an epideictic speech are likewise absurd, he asserts, for a mean needs to be found. To illustrate his contention, Aristotle employed the analogy of the baker who was asked if he was to make the bread hard or soft. The customer asked why the bread couldn't be made just right.[3]

Use of narration is less frequent in forensic speaking than in epideictic, claims the author of the Rhetoric. Even within forensic oratory itself, he noted, the defense needs less narration than the accuser, because:

> Here you have to contend that the act did not occur, or that it did no harm, or that it was not unjust, or that it had not the importance alleged. So you must not waste time on a fact you admit, unless your story will bear on the contention that, granted the act, it was no injustice or the like. Further, speak briefly of events as past and gone, except where representing them as present will excite pity and indignation.[4]

Narration has the least application to deliberative speaking, Aristotle advised his readers, "since no one can 'narrate' what is

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 14. 1415b.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 1417a.

yet to be."[1] He attempted to clarify his statement by explaining:

> Here, if there is narration at all, it must be of the past, with a view to better plans for the future.[2]

After concluding his remarks on the inadvisability of using narration as a part for all speeches, Aristotle introduced his next criticism of "partes-systems" with the bold statement: "A refutation of your opponent is no separate division of the speech."[3] The explanation follows that in both deliberative and forensic speaking, if you are the first speaker you should first present your own argument and present arguments opposing anticipated objections. Refutation needs to become, in this case and in all others, a part of argument. As argument, it pervades the entire speech.[4]

Interrogation, likewise, has no set place in the arrangement scheme, says Aristotle. Rather, he contends, it needs to be employed when an opponent can be made to look absurd.[5] There is also an implication that the division of recapitulation does not have universal application to all speeches by the very nature of its definition as "a summary review of your proofs."[6] Since some speeches do not even attempt demonstration of proofs, recapitulation could not become a required part.[7]

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 16. 1417b.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 1418a.

[4] Ibid., 17. 1418b.

[5] Ibid., 18. 1419a.

[6] Ibid., 19. 1419b.

[7] Ibid. E. M. Cope finds this same implication in Aristotle's criticism of speech parts that lacked universality of application. See E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 334–35.

Emphasis on forensic oratory condemned

The writers of technical manuals of his day seemed to conceive of rhetoric as the practice of using specific arbitrary divisions or "partes-systems" for putting one judge in a favorable state of response. Aristotle thus had a sound basis for his criticism of the manual-writers who systematized the art of litigation but who neglected other aspects of oratory. He theorized that the forensic branch was preferred by them, because deliberative oratory was of more general interest and thereby lent itself less to trickery.[1] He added that deliberative oratory was ignored by sophistic handbook-writers for:

> They all aim at a systematic treatment of the art of pleading, because the forensic branch gives a better chance to introduce matters that are foreign to the issue. The deliberative branch, that of the statesman, since it deals rather with communal interests, affords less room for trickery. In a debate upon communal interests, the judges decide questions which really touch them as individuals, so that nothing more is needed than to prove that affairs are as the advocate of a given policy states; but in forensic speaking this is not enough and it pays to win the audience over (by working on their emotions). . . . And hence in many places, as we have said above, the law forbids irrelevant pleading. In deliberative assemblies, the judges themselves take care of that.[2]

Aristotle summarized his objections to the emphasis placed on forensic speaking with the statement: "Rhetoric is not confined to any single and definite class of subjects."[3] Following this statement, the Rhetoric includes a detailed description of the three

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1354b.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 1355b.

kinds of oratory in terms of the three kinds of hearers addressed;[1] the "elements" of the forensic, epideictic, and deliberative speeches;[2] the three "ends" of speaking;[3] and the proper subjects and proofs for the three kinds of speaking.[4]

Throughout this first book on the scope of rhetoric, Aristotle emphasized the need for a speaker to know all the facets of the three kinds of oratory. With such rhetorical knowledge, together with a theoretical structure for finding all available proofs for any given speech situation, Aristotle believed a speaker would be aided in finding universal truths. "It is clear, then," he concluded, "that our handbooks have limited the art to extraneous matters; and it is clear, too, why they have leaned to forensic speaking."[5]

Failure to stress artistic proofs condemned

Aristotle's emphasis on proofs as the core of his rhetoric has been explored in this paper under the section "Aristotle's Point

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 3. 1358b.

[2]Ibid. "Elements," according to Aristotle, included exhortation and discussion for deliberative speeches; accusation and defense for forensic speeches, and praise and blame for epideictic.

[3]Ibid., 1359a. The "ends" of a deliberative speaker are advantage and injury; the aims of a judicial pleader are justice or injustice; the ends of epideictic speakers are honor or dishonor.

[4]Ibid., 4. 1359b, to 15. 1377b. This section of the Rhetoric includes the contents and types of artistic and inartistic proofs and contains the following: a psychological analysis of the components of happiness, fame, reputation, good fortune, desirable intellectual faculties; a discussion of greater goods and less, virtue and vice, causes of wrongdoing and pleasure; and a classification of motivations leading toward right or wrong acts.

[5]Ibid., 1. 1355a.

of View in Writing." It is to be expected, therefore, that Aristotle should show deep concern over the neglect of artistic proofs[1] by the writers of technical manuals of his day who developed a system of speaking that could be imparted by a set of rules.

Whenever men effect persuasion through speaking, he explained, that persuasion is based on a system of ethical, emotional, and logical proofs.[2] These proofs are either artistic or inartistic.

Of the artistic proofs there are but two kinds used by speakers—the enthymeme and the example.[3] Though the enthymeme is the most effective among the various forms of persuasion,[4] Aristotle noted that "the authors [of technical manuals] tell us nothing about artistic proofs—nothing, that is, about the way in which one is to become a master of the enthymeme."[5]

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1354a, 1354b. Artistic proofs are defined as those means of persuasion discovered through the speaker's own efforts. Inartistic proofs include all of the other proofs not supplied by the speaker's efforts but existing beforehand, such as witnesses, admissions under torture, and written contracts. For expanded definition, see the Rhetoric I. 2. 1355b.

[2]Ibid., 1356a.

[3]The enthymeme is Aristotle's term for a rhetorical syllogism. Its inferential process may or may not be valid. It usually appears with one proposition of a complete syllogism suppressed, and has probabilities as its premises. See Rhetoric I. 2. 1356b, I. 2. 1357a, I. 2. 1358a, I. 9. 1368b, II. 1. 1378a, II. 18. 1391b, II. 20. 1393a, II. 20. 1394a–1394b, II. 22. 1395a–1397a, III. 10. 1410b, III. 17. 1418b, and III. 18. 1419a. See also James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," pp. 69–70, 224, for an expanded interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the enthymeme.

[4]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 1. 1355a.

[5]Ibid., 1354b.

A contemporary writer on the enthymeme, as it was developed in Aristotle's Rhetoric, reminds us that the enthymeme is actually the focal concept of the Rhetoric.[1] It is the artistic proofs with which the enthymeme is most closely connected, McBurney acknowledged, and the enthymeme became the instrument of all three artistic proofs.[2] The concept of the enthymeme as the "body and substance of rhetorical persuasion" also pervades all three books of Aristotle's Rhetoric,[3] as Aristotle discussed sources of proofs, proper subjects, and methods for discerning truths.

The complete analysis of proofs placed the responsibility on the speaker and his ability to find proofs. Aristotle asserted that since the enthymeme, and likewise the example, must deal with matters that are variable[4] and human actions that are uncertain,[5] the speaker must have command of all broad rhetorical principles.

Instead of a manual consisting solely of rules on effecting emotional appeals in an audience,[6] Aristotle says that persuasion calls for a man "who can reason logically, can analyze the types of human character along with the virtues, and, thirdly, can analyze the emotions."[7]

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[1]James H. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," p. 7.

[2]Ibid., p. 33.

[3]Ibid., pp. 69–70.

[4]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 2. 1357a.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., 1356a.

[7]Ibid.

Aristotle Presents a Theoretical Method of Analysis

Earlier rhetorics supplied their pupils with manuals of ready-made topics, arguments, and "partes-systems," from which the pupils chose, combined, and memorized. Aristotle, on the contrary, developed a methodology by which he categorized some generally useful ideas on rhetoric, from which the Greek youth in his Lyceum would abstract and select arguments, then exercise judgment in arranging them for any given audience. Aristotle theorized:

> . . . We must first of all have by us a selection of arguments about questions that may arise and are suitable for us to handle; and then we must try to think out arguments of the same type for special needs as they emerge; not vaguely and indefinitely, but by keeping our eyes on the actual facts of the subject we have to speak on, and gathering in as many of them as we can that bear closely upon it: for the more actual facts we have at our command, the more easily we prove our case; and the more closely they bear on the subject, the more they will seem to belong to that speech only instead of being commonplaces.[1]

The theoretical structure of rhetoric was developed by Aristotle for the varied "questions that may arise," as he abstracted the underlying causes of human conduct, defined, generalized, deduced, proved, or deleted. His rhetorical structure served as the frame of reference for the method of teaching he formulated in terms of the four canons: inventio, elocutio, pronunciatio, and dispositio.

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric II. 22. 1396b.

The analysis of Aristotle's philosophical approach to teaching has been made by Solmsen who wrote:

> Where lies the superiority of Aristotle's philosophical rhetoric over the art of persuasion and success as taught in the professional schools? What makes his system more philosophical, more scientific, more exact? . . . he starts in the case of each emotion with a precise and carefully worded definition which at once indicates under what conditions this emotion may be aroused and what kind of people are amenable to it. This is good scientific method, and a speaker possessed of such knowledge should be able to analyze a given situation and to decide what passion should be aroused (or allayed) and how this could be done.
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> . . . Even more philosophic is the new doctrine of rhetorical proof. No one before Aristotle would have dreamt of the syllogism, for the simple reason that the syllogism had not yet been discovered. . . . What his precursors had done was to give their pupils a large number of arguments, all of the same time—so at least Aristotle suggests—without yet being able to abstract or formulate a type. Here lies the difference between a hack-rhetorician unable to raise above the practical details and a man with philosophical training who has learnt in Plato's school to look for the form and principle common to many individual specimens.[1]

Aristotle considered sources of human behavior in collecting a body of knowledge that might be useful to a speaker desirous of disposing his audience favorably.[2] Since rhetoric finds its end in judgment, Aristotle reasoned, "The speaker must not merely see to it that his

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen, pp. xvi–xvii. For expanded explanations of this point of view, read Friedrich Solmsen, "Tracing of Aristotelian and Peripatetic Influence on Later Rhetoricians," American Journal of Philology, LXII (April, 1941), 169–90; and "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," pp. 35–50.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 9. 1366a to I. 13. 1373b.

speech will be convincing and persuasive, but he must give the right impression of himself, and get his judge into the right state of mind."[1]

In his detailed discussion of emotions,[2] Aristotle clearly established criteria for selecting, arranging, and adapting pathetic proofs for specific audience situations. His scope of analysis in the Rhetoric included anger and mildness,[3] love and hatred,[4] fear and confidence,[5] shame and shamelessness,[6] benevolence and lack of it,[7] pity,[8] indignation,[9], envy,[10] and emulation.[11]

Aristotle continued to furnish the speaker with the necessary framework for securing audience adaptation by classifying types of character as related to times of life, and states of fortune. The

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric II. 1. 1377b.

[2]Lane Cooper observed that "when he objected so vigorously to existing handbooks for their pre-occupation with 'non-artistic proofs,' we are hardly prepared for Aristotle's own attention to them in the present treatise, which probably deals more systematically with the means of arousing emotion in the audience than did any of its predecessors. His extended treatment of the emotions is partly an inevitable concession to practice, for the orator must deal with an audience, and an audience necessarily is emotional; you may work on their emotions in a better way or a worse, but neglect them you cannot" (The Rhetoric of Aristotle, translated by Lane Cooper, pp. 3–4).

[3]Aristotle Rhetoric II. 2. 1378a–1380a.

[4]Ibid., 4. 1380a–1382a.

[5]Ibid., 5. 1382a–1383b.

[6]Ibid., 6. 1383b–1385a.

[7]Ibid., 7. 1385a–1385b.

[8]Ibid., 8. 1385b–1386b.

[9]Ibid., 9. 1386b–1387b.

[10]Ibid., 10. 1387b–1388a.

[11]Ibid., 11. 1388a–1388b.

character of age is analyzed with listings of the excellences of youth and age,[1] followed by character analyses of the well-born,[2] the wealthy,[3] the men in power,[4] and the poor and powerless.[5]

None of the topoi as they related to audience-adaptation were organized or arranged in a set pattern for the speaker. Aristotle re-emphasized that his purposes of speaking, and characteristics of human emotions was to provide an inventory "from which speakers may draw their means of persuasion in deliberative, epideictic and forensic oratory."[6]

Aristotle Produces a "Plan-of-the-Whole" Speech

There is no definition of dispositio by Aristotle, but there is in the first two books of the Rhetoric a plan of organization for the whole composition, as approached from an analysis of the kinds of audiences, and the kinds of proofs. This preliminary "plan-of-the whole" was considered essential before the final selection, arrangement, amplification, and "coloring" or proofs could be accomplished for a particular audience in a specific speech situation.

In much the same manner as the opening chapter of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle discussed the three kinds of proof pervasive to all speeches, the major types of rhetoric, and

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric II. 13–14. 1389b–1390b.

[2] Ibid., 15. 1390b.

[3] Ibid., 16. 1391a.

[4] Ibid., 17. 1391a–1391b.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 18. 1391b.

the purposes for speaking.[1] Then a system of topoi was produced as an aid in ascertaining propositions peculiar to each kind of speech. These topoi which might be derived from examples, enthymemes, or commonplaces[2] were similar in nomenclature and purpose to the "Elements Common to Every Branch of Oratory" and "Proofs," designated as chapters VI and VII of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The most discernible differences between the two treatments of topics was that Aristotle suggested they were common to the entire speech. The author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum insisted they be confined to a specific part of the speech, with an explicit ordering of topics within that division.

In Aristotle the topoi were sources or "lines of argument" to serve as a guide to the orator in selecting and organizing his facts for a given audience situation. In the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum the topics were materials that had been selected by the author and then ordered into arguments for the speaker's use in particular parts of the speech. For instance, rather than suggesting topics of virtue from which a speaker might draw pathetic proofs throughout his entire speech, Rhetorica ad Alexandrum selected specific topics of

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric I. 2. 1355b–1356a. See also Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1421b, where the author indicates that the three classes of deliberative, epideictic, and forensic oratory will be discussed individually: "We shall treat them most conveniently if we take each separately and enumerate their qualities, their uses, and their arrangement."

[2]General commonplaces are detailed in Aristotle's Rhetoric II. 19. 1392a. Proofs common to all rhetoric are discussed in the Rhetoric III. 20–26. 1393a–1403a.

virtue and placed them within the narration of a forensic speech, following the proem.[1]

More details on the planning and analysis of the whole speech must precede the arranging of specific parts, according to Aristotle. He noted that among other things, this "plan-of-the-whole" must rest on analysis of: (1) the nature and number of motives from which men do wrong, (2) the states of mind in which men do wrong, (3) the characters and situations of those toward whom they do wrong, (4) the distinction between equity and justice, (5) the degree of wrong and injustice, and (6) inartificial proofs.[2] General pathetic proofs should be developed from these criteria, claimed Aristotle, for

> . . . particular points about a witness—as whether he is friendly, hostile, or impartial—of good, bad, or indifferent character—and such-like distinctions must be argued from commonplaces of the same sort as those from which we take our rhetorical syllogisms.[3]

Later, the Rhetoric stated that throughout all speeches it is important for the speaker to appear as an honorable sort of person, and that the judges should be put in a receptive mood.[4] This favorable disposition of the audience, another aspect of dispositio, is considered as being necessary in the speaker's "plan-of-the-whole," according to Book II, because ". . . men have not the same views when they are friendly and when they hate, when they are angry

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric II. 1–12. 1377b–1389b.

[2]Ibid., I. 10–15. 1368a–1377b.

[3]Ibid., 15. 1375b.

[4]Ibid., II. 1. 1377b.

or placid, but views wholly different or different in a large measure."[1]

Aristotle then categorized the methods of gaining goodwill and listed topoi from which the speaker could choose: topics of moral states, of feelings, ages, and fortune. The speaker's choices from these topics would determine how the intelligence, virtue, or goodwill of a speaker might be expressed throughout the speech.

With this emphasis on the arousing of goodwill, pity, and justice as a major consideration in planning the over-all speech pattern, Aristotle elevated these virtues to first-class pathetic proofs. The manual-writers and proponents of the "partes-system" had relegated them to respective "parts" of a speech.[2]

Although his conception of rhetoric must be inferred from Aristotle's discussion of the subject, in essence, he says the parts of a speech are not the essential features of arrangement.[3] Baldwin asserts that in the sections where Aristotle's philosophic approach most nearly approximated the rules of the manuals, Aristotle was attempting "to inculcate the habit of adaptation to the feelings of an audience."[4] In the final analysis, his views on the construction of a "plan-of-the-whole" were the result of a synthesis of his observations on how speakers had been able to persuade.[5]

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric II. 1. 1377b.

[2]Ibid., 1378a.

[3]Russell H. Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 4.

[4]Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 19.

[5]For additional support of this conclusion see R. C. Jebb, "Rhetoric," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th edition, XXIII (1875–1899), 234.

Aristotle Introduces Arrangement as the Third Canon of Rhetoric

Aristotle briefly discussed "parts" of a speech in the final twenty-three pages of Book III of his Rhetoric under the canon of arrangement. Book III opened with the explanation:

> The provinces of study which conern the making of a speech are three: (1) the means of effecting persuasion; (2) the style (language, diction); (3) the right ordering of the several divisions of the whole. We have already dealt with the sources of persuasion, and have shown why these are but these three.[1]

After twelve chapters on style, with diction considered as a part of it, Aristotle begins the first of six chapters on arrangement or taxis, the limited view of dispositio.[2] In these few chapters,

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric III. 1. 1413b.

[2]Ibid., 13. 1414a. Baldwin refers to the meager and perfunctory discussion on parts of a speech as "hardly more than a rehearsal of those definitions and counsels which were already familiar in teaching and apparently in manuals, and which were to be handed on by later tradition. Its importance is therefore primarily historical. It has little other significance, little of Aristotelian discernment and significance" (Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 33–34). Solmsen contends chapters 13–19 of Book III on parts of a speech are not characteristic of Aristotle's approach and "may rather be regarded as the first stage in the process of fusion between the two rival systems. There are good reasons for assuming that Aristotle in that section is reproducing a system of the alternative 'Isocratean' type" (Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 46). A similar view is expressed by Cope (E. M. Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, p. 331).

Russell Wagner infers from Aristotle's discussion of parts of a speech that "they are not the essential features of arrangement . . . and after Aristotle is fairly launched in the subject . . . the discussion consists almost wholely of principles of adaptation" (Russell H. Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 4).

Aristotle rounded out his interpretation of dispositio that had begun with a treatment of "planning the whole speech" and "favorably disposing audiences."

The outline of Aristotle's suggestions on arrangement will indicate that Aristotle was not advocating a set of rules or a "partes-system" but was, rather, attempting to guide his students into arriving at the most suitable selection and arrangement of proofs for any given audience. The famous Lyceum teacher generalized on essential parts, criticized the nonessential, defined and differentiated, deduced and distinguished common errors in the use of the parts. Similar to his broad approach to rhetoric and to "composition of the whole," Aristotle's treatment of arrangement seemed to include all possible means toward effective rhetoric. Or, as a classical scholar observed recently, Aristotle collected a variety of ideas "simply to serve as an inventory of generally useful ideas that in some way or other can help the orator to shape and organize his facts."[1]

Dispositio, in its narrowed interpretation as arrangement of parts, was introduced to readers of the Rhetoric with the statement: "A speech has two parts. It is necessary to state the subject and then prove it."[2] These two were commonly referred to as statement of case and proof, both by pre-Aristotelian writers and by Aristotle. Aristotle claimed that they were the only two that were appropriate to every speech[3] and explained the essential aspects of the two parts as the following outline indicates:

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts with Introduction by Friedrich Solmsen, p. xix.

[2]Aristotle Rhetoric III. 13. 1414a.

[3]Ibid.

I. The Two Essential Parts of a Speech Are (1414b):

A. Statement of Case (Narration)[1]

1. It is not always advisable to make the whole narrative continuous or the case may be hard to keep in mind (1416b).

2. The narration should be broken into main points, throughout the speech.

3. Facts of the narration well-known to your listeners should be eliminated.

4. It should be neither long nor short, but including enough to make the facts of the case plain and important (1417a).

5. It may be briefly repeated throughout the talk, to credit yourself or discredit your opponent.

6. It should depict character, and moral purpose, with causes added if any detail appears incredible.

7. Political oratory has little use for narration at the beginning, since no one can narrate what has not yet happened.

8. Maxims may be employed here (1418a).

B. Proof of Case (Argument)

1. Proofs bear directly upon the question in dispute and fall under one of four heads:

a. The speaker maintains that the act was not committed and he proves it.

b. The speaker proves the act did no harm.

c. The speaker maintains the act was less than alleged.

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[1]The common rendering of this term by the term narrative is confusing, Baldwin explains. To Aristotle, and to the Romans using the term narratio, the term was essentially the "statement of facts" as it is called in a modern lawyer's brief (Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 34–35).

d. The speaker maintains the act was justified.

2. In epideictic speeches, the case is developed by arguing the deed was noble or useful.

3. In deliberative speeches, the case may be argued that:

   a. A proposal is impracticable.

   b. A proposal is unjust, though practicable.

   c. The proposal will do no good.

   d. The proposal will not be as important as its proposer thinks.

4. Maxims may be employed in argument (1418a).

5. Refutation of opponent's argument may be given, before starting your own (1418b).

   a. It may be an attack of the whole case or the most successful or vulnerable points in it.

In his discussion of narration, Aristotle steered away from the "parts" concept and considered narration as a type of content that should be distributed throughout the entire speech.[1] Like the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle accepted feelings, emotions, and passions as pathetic proof elements inherent in the narration of deeds or things in the past. Aristotle warned against putting all of the facts of the narrative together in a string, however, lest the proof becomes difficult for the listener to remember and causes confusion. At the same time, Aristotle warned that the length of a narration should be adapted to the subject, the occasion, and the audience.[2] Specifically, he advised that many actions already known by the audience need not be described in detail.

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 16. 1416b.

[2] Ibid.

Narration should not be considered an indispensable division for all speeches, according to Aristotle, because it is most specifically adaptable to forensic speech.[1] "If we adopt all such divisions," he wrote, "we shall be following Theodorus and his school, who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and preliminary narrative. . . ."[2]

Aristotle noted that narration might be used in a deliberative speech to relate the past, if such narration would assist the hearers in planning for the future.[3] He also admitted that it might be necessary to employ narration in a panegyric speech under at least seven circumstances: (1) if the incident could thus be made more simple, rapid, and short;[4] (2) if the speaker were describing people who were not well known; (3) if the facts could thus be made clearer and as important as the speaker wished them to be; (4) if it could aid in describing the virtue of the speaker or the wickedness of his opponents; (5) if it included only the past events or actions likely to excite pity or indignation; (6) if it had a moral purpose[5] and included moral maxims which had to be used in both narration and proof;[6] and (7) if it could be drawn upon what was emotional by introducing the well known.[7]

Though these possible uses of narration were included in his Rhetoric, Aristotle emphasized his stand that the listener rather than

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 13. 1414a.

[2] Ibid., 1414b.

[3] Ibid., 1414a.

[4] Ibid., 16. 1417a.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 17. 1417b.

[7] Ibid., 16. 1416b.

the ordering of various "parts" of a speech was the prime concern of the speaker. The speaker for whom Aristotle wrote his Rhetoric was expected to be capable of analyzing audiences and determining for himself how much narration should be used and where it should be used.[1]

In analyzing the part of a speech labeled proof, Aristotle noted that the establishment of a speaker's own case and refutation of his opponent's case were both parts of proof. Hence, refutation, amplification, and digressions were all discussed as methods of handling proof; all needed to be adapted to both the audience and the speech purpose. In deliberative and forensic speaking, among the several kinds of proof listed as usable in refutation were: contrary argument or proposition, contrary syllogism, or instance of objection.[2] Even if refutation could be a separate speech division, Aristotle pointed out that it would be impossible to state an exact ordering for it in all types of speeches. The natural order for the first speaker in assembly or law courts would be: (1) State your own case; and (2) refute the arguments of your opponents, in advance.[3] If the anticipated arguments of the opposition were strong and numerous, however, these arguments should be dealt with before the speaker put forward his own proofs. For, as Aristotle explained: "One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make; and for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary.[4]

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric III. 16. 1416b.

[2]Ibid., 17. 1417b.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., 1418b.

One may conclude that dispositio, as pertaining to the refutation, should include both the disposition of proofs and the favorable disposition of audiences toward the speaker. No definite rule could determine the type or arrangement of refutation in a speech, for the audience and previous speaker would be the determining factors.

Amplification is largely determined by the speech purpose, according to Aristotle. In epideictic speaking it is used to prove that things are honorable and useful.[1] In deliberative oratory, amplification may be employed to prove that certain consequences will not occur, or that the results your opponent recommends will be unjust or inexpedient if they do occur.[2] There is no set place or arrangement for amplification, which may take the form of examples, enthymemes, moral maxims, and laudatory episodes which are scattered throughout the speech.

Digressions, like all other proofs, are considered best by Aristotle when they are arranged or disposed throughout the entire speech, since they are not equally adaptable to all kinds of speaking. In the deliberative speech there are limited landing places, or pauses in the main argument, that would allow for digressions, according to Aristotle. In forensic speeches, on the other hand, he notes there are abundant chances for attacks on opponents, for praise of oneself, or appeals to the feelings through the interpolation of episodes. Epideictic speeches, too, offer more than one place for the introduction of topics of laudatory digressions.[3]

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 17. 1417b.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Consistent with his philosophy of proofs found in Books I and II, Aristotle's discussion of proofs in Book III of the Rhetoric is written in the form of a rebuttal to some rhetoricians of his time who considered their "partes-systems" as the only method for disposing or arranging proofs in a speech. Aristotle repudiated the claim that any parts other than the statement of case and proof of case were essential to any speech.

However, Aristotle recognized that two additional parts, the proem and the epilogue were popular with most speakers, so he also admitted them to a possible pattern of arrangement. Conceding that "at the most the parts are four in number,"[1] Aristotle presented the following suggestions for the proem and epilogue:

I. Introduction (Proem) (1414b).
   A. In Panegyrical speeches, Introduction may include:
      1. Prelude of what is to follow.
      2. Praise or censure.
      3. Advice to do or not to do something (1415a).
   B. In forensic speeches, Introductions usually:
      1. Attempt to incite or remove prejudice.
      2. Attempt to secure goodwill of listener (1415b).
      3. Attempt to gain or distract attention.
      4. Are used if case is weak or looks weak.

II. Epilogue (1419b).
   A. The four parts of an epilogue include:
      1. Making audience well disposed toward you and ill disposed toward your opponent.

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric III. 13. 1414b.

2. Magnifying or minimizing the leading facts.
3. Exciting the required state of emotion in your hearers.
4. Refreshing the memories of the audience by summary of point-against-point, or by following the natural order of the arguments as they were presented (1420a).

The first part to be discussed in great detail by Aristotle was the proem or exordium, defined by him as the "beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry, and the prelude in flute playing; for all these are beginnings, and as it were a paving of the way for what follows."[1] It was the proem of panegyric speeches that resembled the prelude most, since there the speaker could give the keynote and then attack the main subject of controversy, as Isocrates did in the proem of Helen. The sources for attack in panegyric speeches were listed as: (1) praise, (2) blame, or (3) appeals to the hearer, if the subject treated was paradoxically difficult or commonly known.[2]

In the forensic speech, however, Aristotle asserted that the proem must provide an inkling of the subject and purpose of the talk so that the listeners would not be kept in suspense. He observed that attention is lost if subject and purpose remain undefined.[3] Aristotle made the concluding observation that if the subject was quite clear or was unimportant, then the proem was not necessary.[4]

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 14. 1414b.

[2] Ibid., 1415b.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 1415a.

Aristotle concluded that the proem of a deliberative speech would differ from that of the forensic, since in the former the hearers would be familiar with the subject and would require only relative comments to minimize or magnify the importance of it.

In Aristotle's time the proem was used to supply special remedies in case of inattention, unfavorable disposition, or lack of interest, according to the Rhetoric. Aristotle observed, however, that since the audience's attention is least likely to lag at the beginning of a speech,[1] a speaker should attempt to engage and keep the audience's attention throughout the speech. This refuted the theory of those rhetoricians who felt that pathetic proofs must be relegated to one or two special parts. The basic assumption underlying Aristotle's analysis of the proem is that all men do not listen merely to be instructed of the facts in the case, but listen with prejudices that must be overcome or worked upon to the speaker's benefit. The information on selection and arrangement of content within the proem appeared to be an attempt by Aristotle to describe what might be used to eliminate these prejudices or suspicions of the audience, whether they were the result of spoken or unspoken accusations.

The final part of a speech, the epilogue,[2] was discussed in much less detail than the proem. Beginning with "the natural order of things," Aristotle noted that an epilogue was composed of four parts with the specific materials aimed toward: (1) disposing the

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[1]Aristotle Rhetoric III. 14. 1415b.

[2]The epilogue is also called peroration, iteration, and recapitulation by other rhetoricians.

hearer favorably toward oneself and unfavorably toward the adversary, (2) of amplifying and depreciating, (3) of exciting the emotions of the hearer, and (4) of recapitulations.[1] Recapitulation was considered a part of the epilogue, but Aristotle warned that it should occur only after proof, amplification, and the arousing of the emotions and not in the proem, as other rhetoricians wrongly advise.[2]

Remembering that Aristotle considered the statement of case and proofs as the only necessary parts of a speech, with the proem and epilogue allowable only as aids to the memory,[3] it is not surprising that his treatment of the epilogue is brief. As in his consideration of other speech divisions, he leaves to the discretion of the speaker the selection and ordering of the particular proofs of the epilogue, noting that many variations are possible as adaptations are made to particular audiences.[4]

The most common problems observed in the application of rules and speech parts are discussed in Book III of the Rhetoric and may be outlined in this form:

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[1] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 19. 1419b. This proposed ordering of the content of the epilogue is in substantial agreement with that of the text of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. E. M. Cope also noted the similarity of the two works in the description of the usual and proper content of this division in his Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 322, footnote. The discussion of the epilogue is similar to Quintilian's under enumeratio and affectus, and also compares favorably with treatments by Cicero in De Inventione I. 52. 98, and by the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium.

[2] Aristotle Rhetoric III. 19. 1419b.

[3] Ibid., 13. 1414b.

[4] Ibid., 19. 1419b.

I. Misuses in the application of "parts" include:

A. The attention step of the Introduction is used, even when everyone is listening with most attention (1415b).

B. Points are repeated frequently in the Introduction (1419b), for:

1. The Introduction does not state a subject so the point to be judged is quite plain.

2. Arguments by which your case has been proved are not summarized clearly.

C. Forms of proofs are related to "parts," rather than to kinds of speaking.

1. Argument by example is best suited to deliberative speaking.

2. Argument by enthymeme is best suited to forensic speaking (1418a).

D. Digressions are used in all kinds of speaking:

1. Deliberative oratory affords little chance for leisurely digressions, unless your set purpose is to divert the hearer's attention (1418a).

E. "Reply to the Opponent" is used as a separate division of the speech, rather than a part of argument.

1. It does not precede the presentation of your own arguments (1418b). (The Topoi are referred to as a source for refutation techniques.)

F. Interrogation is used always, but needed only when the opponent can be made to look absurd (1419a).

G. Jests and irony are used always, but needed only when appropriate and becoming to the person using them (1419b). (The Poetics is referred to as a source for classification of jests.)

The reader must reconstruct the Aristotelian notions on the various parts of a speech, by sifting through the numerous examples of misuse and abuse which he cited from other rhetoricians. His arguments against unwise use of the proem, epilogue, narration,

digression, interrogation, refutation, and proof are offered in a haphazard, repetitious, and often incomplete manner. There appears to be a valiant attempt to encourage the speaker to consider his speech in terms of audience and purpose, letting the "parts" come where they will. Aristotle employed in this section of his Rhetoric the teaching psychology of the swimming instructor who presents his preparatory "plan-of-the-whole" for good swimmers to learn and use. But there must be, of necessity, some negative advice[1] for the less adept pupils who are likely to drown, when away from the doting teacher. Aristotle's original "plan-of-the-whole" apparently was his basic constructive philosophy on speech disposition. The negative advice pertaining to selection and adaptation of proofs in the speech "parts" seemed to be for the benefit of the speakers who were likely to become sidetracked by erroneous, though popular, plans of arrangement.

Conclusions

Behind Aristotle were varied rhetorical experiences as a student and teacher in the Athens of the fourth century B.C., as he formulated the theoretical structure of his Rhetoric. He analyzed, criticized, compared, and generalized, as he established the basic philosophical principles of his Rhetoric from which the following conclusions are drawn as they relate to his interpretation of dispositio:

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[1]Aristotle's advice on how to select, order, and adapt materials within the parts, or for the parts, appears to be an attempt to state and illustrate the criteria of the selection, adaptation, and arrangement of the materials of speeches. See Russell H. Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 5.

1. Aristotle's Rhetoric was composed for the select students of his Lyceum who were anxious to perform the duties and activities of citizenship in the Greek state. It presupposed a Greek mind capable of selecting, abstracting, and judging the proofs most suitable for any audience situation.

2. Aristotle criticized the manual-writers of his day who used a "partes-system" as the core for their rhetorical teaching; relegated pathetic and ethical proofs to designated "parts" of a speech; confined their rules to forensic speaking, and provided ready-made arguments to be applied under all circumstances.

3. Aristotle's Rhetoric differed from previous rhetorical writings in organizing materials under three canons (inventio, elocutio, dispositio) and in defining rhetoric as "finding all of the available means of persuasion."

Invention received the primary emphasis in the Rhetoric, Books I and II. Of Book III, twelve chapters were devoted to elocutio, and the final three chapters were devoted to dispositio, in its narrowed aspect of arrangement.

4. There is no definition of dispositio in Aristotle's Rhetoric so that his notions must be inferred from his discussions of: the broad plan of "the speech as a whole"; the narrowed concept of disposing the materials in "parts" of a discourse, which he labels arrangement; and techniques for favorably disposing an audience.

Aristotle conceived of composing a speech in terms of a broad, adaptive "plan-of-the-whole," before the process of arrangement for speech delivery is to be applied. His master plan for the composition of the speech was based on a system of topoi,

from which a speaker needed to find, select, and adapt his proofs for a particular audience situation. The topoi, as sources of arguments, were in contrast to the restrictive topics contained in the technical manuals that were not adaptable to every subject, judge, speaker, or audience.

Proofs became the core of Aristotle's rhetorical theory and were considered a function of the whole discourse, rather than being relegated to a "part" or a division. For the first time, appeals to goodwill, pity, injustice, and other basic emotions were elevated to the function of first-rate pathetic proofs, in Aristotle's Rhetoric.

5. Rather than proposing one "partes-system" for preparing a speech for delivery, Aristotle appeared to offer an inventory of varied methods and materials that would guide his students in making their own decisions on the disposition of proofs when delivering the three kinds of speeches.

Statement of case and proof were listed as the two parts necessary to all kinds of speeches; the proem and epilogue were listed as natural to most kinds of speeches and therefore admissable. These four parts were described in terms of the kind of speaking, the function of the auditors, the time available, the content selected from the topics, and the changing course of arguments. Criticisms of current rules for the proem and epilogue were main items in this discussion.

Narration was treated in a detailed manner as a type of content which should be distributed throughout the entire speech. This repudiated its usefulness as a "part," as used by the manual-writers.

Refutation, amplification, and digression were considered as methods of handling proof. Reasons are listed to prove the impracticability of using these three in all speeches.

6. Aristotle's inclusion of a discussion on "parts" is regarded by some contemporary rhetorical critics as the first step in a fusion between two rival rhetorical systems. This writer concludes, however, that the discussion of "parts" at the end of the Rhetoric actually established for speech delivery criteria for effective application of certain "parts." Aristotle actually deemphasized the universal application of "parts," as he analyzed, redefined, rejected, and limited the proper content and employment of "parts."

7. A substantial agreement between Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and the Rhetoric of Aristotle is noted in the description of the proper contents of the four divisions common to both rhetorics, even where re-enumeration or recapitulation of arguments is discussed. The treatises differ, however, in the method used to discover the proper contents: Aristotle listed general topoi or sources of proof, from which each speaker might select, adapt, and arrange his proofs for each division of the speech; the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum listed, specifically and finally, the special topics needed in each "part" of the speech.

The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, in treating the proem as being common to all seven types of speeches and suitable to all occasions, differs from Aristotle who claimed it was not a necessary "part" at all times. The treatise Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is unlike Aristotle in the statement that the narration must always be brief so that the listeners may remember what is said.

The contents of Aristotle's Rhetoric and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum may be categorized under the three major branches of speaking named by Aristotle as: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Of these three, Aristotle and the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum agreed that deliberative speaking was the most difficult type of organizational pattern and also the type of speaking used most frequently.

CHAPTER IV

DISPOSITIO AS INTERPRETED IN RHETORICA AD C. HERENNIUM

The Rhetorica ad Herennium has attained a foremost place in the history of literature and language: as the oldest Latin rhetoric preserved in its entirety, as the earliest work in Latin prose completely preserved, and as the first rhetoric to include memoria and status. This treatise on the theory of public speaking addressed to Gaius Herennius is an example of the rhetorical system taught at Rome during the days of Marius and Sulla, and in the youth of Cicero.

The Graeco-Roman education of the first and second centuries A.D. appears to have been a combination of Hellenist civilization and Roman traditions. The Greek methodology known as the progymnasmata[1] was modified by the Romans until there became: (1) the elementary school, which prepared the child in reading, writing, and easy arithmetic, along with knowledge of basic athletic events: (2) the grammaticus, or middle school, which had grammar as the foundation

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria I. 3. These included the suasoriae, dramatic monologues put into the mouth of some well-known person, and the contraversiae or mock trials, in which students acted as prosecutors, defendants, and advocates. See also W. M. Smail, Quintilian on Education (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), pp. xxxii–xxxiii.

subject but also included composition, essay-writing, music, mathematics, physical and vocal training; (3) the school of rhetoric, usually begun at the age of fourteen, which included further graduated exercises in composition culminating in declamation, reading of prose with special attention to analysis and criticism, and lectures on the formal theory of rhetoric.[1]

The anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium[1] has preserved the "Greek art of rhetoric in a Roman

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[1]M. L. Clark, Rhetoric at Rome (London: Cohen and West, 1953), pp. 7–17; Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926); and Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956). Differences between the older tradition of Greek education and that of the early Romans began to disintegrate at the beginning of the second century B.C., when Rome became the center of a world empire and the Greek teachers of rhetoric and other subjects migrated to the city. As early as 161 B.C., the strong nationalistic spirit of the Romans had caused the Senate to expel all teachers of rhetoric and philosophy from the city, yet it was apparent that the Romans continued to become familiar with the Greek theories of rhetoric and higher education. In a letter to Titanias, Cicero even admitted his own interest in Greek rhetorical training with the observation: "When I was a boy, I remember that a certain Plotius was the first to teach rhetoric in Latin. Everybody was crowding to his school: the keenest students of oratory were getting lessons from him, and I was disappointed at not being let to go there myself" (Brutus 79).

[2](Cicero) Rhetorica ad C. Herennium, translated into English by Harry Caplan, The Loeb Classical Library (London: William Heinemann, 1954), Introduction, pp. vii–xv. In answer to those who claim Cicero as the author, Caplan explains that Cicero does not refer to any work of his which might be thought to be this, nor do Sefvius, Victorinus, nor Cassiodorus in their listings. Internal evidence points to the date 91 B.C. as the date of the composition of De Inventione, which would make it likely that it was composed before Rhetorica ad Herennium, and, as Caplan concludes, even the thought

dress,"[1] as it was taught to Roman schoolboys during the second decade of the first century B.C.[2]

Point of View of Rhetorica ad Herennium

This practical Roman rhetoric was formal in arrangement, clear and concise in style, and systematized in a manner that made

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and style of Rhetorica ad Herennium are unworthy of the mature Cicero. Caplan concluded along with Spengel, Ramsay, Mommsen, Blass, and Wilkins that it is wisest to ascribe the work to an unknown author.

Wilkins noted (M. Tulli Ciceronis. De Oratore, with introduction and notes by Augustus S. Wilkins, 3d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893, pp. 51–52) that Rhetoricum ad C. Herennium Libri Quattour, though printed among Cicero's rhetorical works and ascribed to him by Jerome, could not have been written by Cicero. Wilkins gives "four reasons sufficient to notice: (1) that this work cannot have been written by Cicero before De Oratore, for he speaks of his early rhetorical writings as rough and unfinished (De Oratore 1. 2), whereas the treatise Rhetorica ad Herennium is complete in all its parts; (2) nor can it have been written after De Oratore, for the view which is taken of the value of formal rhetoric is entirely at variance with that which he there frequently expresses; and besides, we have no reference whatsoever to any such treatise either in his letters or in the summary sketch of his literary productions given in De Div. ii. I. 1; (3) the circumstances of the author as described by himself at the beginning of the work are very different from those of Cicero at any period of his life; (4) Quintilian, although frequently quoting from the fourth book, preserves with regard to it what Kayser calls 'malignum silentium,' and other writers when quoting Cicero's Rhetorica always seem to have in view the De Inventione and not the Rhetorica ad Herennium."

[1]Rhetorica ad Herennium, Intro., p. vii.

[2]Based on internal evidence, Caplan assigns 88–82 B.C. as the time of writing (Introduction to Rhetorica ad Herennium, pp. xxvi–xxvii).

it particularly adaptable for teaching purposes.[1] The author prefaced his work on the theory of public speaking with the injunction: "Theory without continuous speaking is of little avail: from this you may understand that the precepts of theory here offered ought to be applied in practice."[2]

The task of the public speaker was described as the capable discussing of matters relating to citizenship and the securing of agreement among listeners, in three kinds of causes: epideictic, deliberative, and judicial.[3] Invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery[4] are the faculties a speaker should possess, and all of these faculties can be acquired through theory, imitation, and practice.[5]

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium, Introduction, p. vii. See also Volkmann, Rhetoric, pp. 33–36, and Quintilian Institutio Oratoria III. ii. 18. Wilkins ascribes to the truly practical approach of the work, adding: ". . . it well deserves the great popularity as a manual in the middle ages, to which the number and excellence of the extant MSS continue to bear witness" (Introduction to De Oratore, p. 54).

[2] Rhetorica ad Herennium I. i. 1.

[3] Ibid., ii. 2. Epideictic is defined as being devoted to the praise or censure of some particular person; deliberative consists in the discussion of policy and embraces persuasion and dissuasion; judicial is based on legal controversy and comprises criminal prosecution, civil suit, or defense.

[4] Ibid., 3. Invention is defined as the devising of true or plausible matter that would make the case convincing; arrangement is the ordering and distribution of matter; style is the adaptation of suitable words and sentences to the matter devised; memory is the firm retention in the mind of the matter, words, and arrangement; delivery is the graceful regulation of voice, countenance, and gesture.

[5] Ibid. Theory is defined as "a set of rules that provide a definite method and system of speaking. Imitation stimulates us to

Rhetorica ad Herennium appears to represent the work of an eclectic schoolmaster intent upon collecting the most suitable rhetorical material for his students. Some of his materials and methodologies originated with the Peripatetics, some with the Stoics, and some with the pre-Aristotelian manual-writers who organized their rules around a "partes-system."

Like the Peripatetics, the author arranged his treatise according to the canons of rhetoric: invention, disposition, and elocutio. A Peripatetic influence is also evident in the attempt to combine rhetoric and philosophy in Rhetorica ad Herennium, much as Aristotle and the early Peripatetics had done.

The Stoic influence appears to be the strongest single influence in the text, since that is the scholastic school of philosophy which systematized rhetoric as a logical study until invention became the core of the rhetoric. Status, which made its initial appearance in the rhetoric, also became part of invention as a logical process for the testing or evaluation of proofs.[1] In contrast to the Stoic school which de-emphasized the aspects of style and delivery, the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium devoted the entire fourth book, or over one-half of his entire rhetorical treatise, to the subject of style.

No Greek authors are mentioned by name throughout the entire book; all historical examples are taken from Latin rather than

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attain, in accordance with a studied method, the effectiveness of certain models in speaking. Practice is assiduous exercise and experience in speaking." This explanation is similar to that of Plato (Phaedrus 2691) and Cicero (De Oratore I. v. 15).

[1]C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 49–52.

Greek history, and the preface to the first book criticizes Greek textbooks as impractical and pedantic.[1]

A fair conclusion might be that the writer was heir to several structural schemes for rhetoric and that his text represents a synthesis of these schemes within the four books.[2] It is also a fair conclusion that the grammaticus student would learn the formal, systematized rules for finding and ordering the necessary proofs of the speech in Books I and II, since his chief concern was composition. The more mature and experienced student, at the final stage of his education in the school of rhetoric, would learn to abandon rigid rules in favor of his own judgment about particular circumstances of the audience, proofs, speaker, and opponent's case. The chief concern of the mature student would be preparation for actual speech delivery, as it was theoretically and philosophically discussed in Book III.

"Parts" Function to Aid Speech Composition

The author of Rhetorica ad Herennium interpreted the "parts" of a speech as a function of inventio, rather than of dispositio.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium I. i. 1.

[2] Harry Caplan, in his Introduction to Rhetorica ad Herennium, pp. xv–xxv, discussed the several philosophical schools and their rhetorical schemes to which the author had access. Caplan concluded that, in the discussion of judicial oratory, pre-Aristotelian and Peripatetic schemes were fused (Intro., p. xviii). Barwick (Hermes, LVII, 1922, pp. 1ff.) agrees with Caplan, but Friedrich Solmsen ("Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 46) tends to suggest that Rhetorica ad Herennium actually attempted to do justice to both pre-Aristotelian and Peripatetic systems. Cicero (De Oratore I. 142) and Diogenes Laertes (VII. i. 43) also point out the tendency of early Roman teachers to attempt to do justice to both systems.

In indicating how speeches could be "adapted to the theory of the speaker's function,"[1] and in order to make the subject of adaptation easier to understand,[2] six "parts" were introduced as aids to selecting and evaluating appropriate proofs when composing a speech.

As the first and greatest emphasis was placed on "parts," proofs no longer became a central function of the entire speech as they had been with Aristotle and his Peripatetic followers. Ethical, pathetic and logical proofs became merely content elements for designated "parts" of the speech. The six "parts" deemed necessary to the inventio process in all types of public speaking were to be arranged in the order of: Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion.[3]

Judicial oratory is considered most difficult

As in pre-Aristotelian manuals of speaking, the judicial or forensic speech receives the major emphasis. Since it was impossible to treat all of the important topics of rhetoric at once, Rhetorica ad Herennium first considered the topics in order of difficulty. The unknown author noted:

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium I. ii. 3.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., iii. 4. "The Introduction is the beginning of the discourse, and by the hearer's mind is prepared for attention. The Narration or Statement of Facts sets forth the events that have occurred or might have occurred. By means of the division we make clear what matters are agreed upon and what are contested, and announce what points we intend to take up. Proof is the presentation of our arguments, together with their corroboration. Refutation is the destruction of our adversaries' arguments. The Conclusion is the end of the discourse, formed in accordance with the principles of the art."

> There are three kinds of causes: Epideictic, Deliberative, and Judicial. By far the most difficult is the judicial; that is why in the present Book, I have disposed of this kind first of all. Of the five tasks of the speaker Invention is the most important and the most difficult.[1]

Beginning with judicial oratory, Rhetorica ad Herennium devotes almost half of his rhetoric to detailed rules on the aims, nature, ordering of arguments, and possible faults of each of the "parts" of a speech, as these "parts" are adapted to inventio. The following outline should serve as a device for comparing this author's theories with those of other rhetoricians, in the gradual development of the theories on dispositio. In Books I, II, and III, the discussion of "parts" for judicial oratory may be outlined as follows:

I. INTRODUCTIONS, to be appropriate, should consider:

A. The kind of cause: honorable, discreditable, doubtful, and petty (I. iii. 5).[2]

B. The nature of causes that determine Direct Opening or Subtle Approach (I. iv. 6).

1. The Direct Opening cannot be used: when our case is discreditable, when the hearer has been won over by previous speakers of the opposition,[3] or when the

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herrenium II. i. 1.

[2] Rhetorica ad Alexandrum uses three slightly different terms to designate four "kinds of causes"; namely, just, expedient, honorable, and pleasant (1438b, 1442b). Most rhetoricians added a fifth kind, obscurum (Cicero, De Inv. I. xv. 20), and Quintilian included six (Institutio Oratoria IV. i. 40).

[3] Aristotle emphasized the need of an exordium if the case "was weak or looked weak" (Rhetoric III. 14. 1415b). He objected generally to "parts" which were not applicable generally to every kind of speech (Rhetoric I. i. 1354b).

hearer is wearied by listening to previous speakers (I. vi. 9–11).

C. The aims of an introduction: receptiveness, favorable disposition, and attentiveness (I. iv. 7).[1]

1. Receptive hearers are gained by: briefly summarizing the cause.

2. Attentive hearers are gained by: promising to discuss important, new, and unusual matters that appertain to the commonwealth, or to the hearers themselves, or to the worship of almighty gods: and by enumerating points we are to discuss.

3. Favorable disposition of hearers[2] is gained by: discussing our own person, the person of our adversaries, that of our hearers,[3] and the facts themselves (I. iv. 7–8).

D. The common faults of introductions: labored, intemperate style, banality, outdated usage, applicable to many causes or many speakers, capable of being turned against the speaker, and without intimate connection with Statement of Facts (I. vii. 11).

II. The NARRATION (Statement of Facts) may be composed after consideration of:

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[1]This theory and the listing of aims is found first in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1436a: Aristotle noted that, though most rhetorics of his time supplied remedies for lack of attention, interest, or unfavorable disposition, he felt that attention was least likely to lag at the beginning of a speech. He included receptiveness under attention in discussing the exordium (Rhetoric III. 14. 1415a–1415b).

[2]This is similar to Aristotle (Rhetoric 1415b). In Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the ordering of items for favorable disposition of hearers in judicial oratory is: attention, goodwill, and narration of facts (1442b).

[3]Aristotle categorized the methods of gaining goodwill throughout the speech, together with a detailed analysis of the moral status, emotions, ages, and fortunes of men (Rhetoric II. 1. 1377b–1378a).

A. The three kinds of Statement of Facts:

1. Narration directed towards victory in causes in which a decision is to be rendered.

2. Incidental Narrative introduced to gain credit, incriminate the opponent, or the like (I. viii. 12).

3. Narrative used in practice exercises, whether based on either:

   a. Facts, in the form of legendary tables, historical or realistic narratives.

   b. Persons, with diverse traits of character such as austerity and gentleness, hope and fear, distrust and desire, hypocrisy and compassion, or sudden joy and unexpected disaster (I. viii. 13).[1]

B. The three essential qualities of Statement of Facts:

1. Brevity is accomplished if:

   a. Speaker begins at place he needs to begin.

   b. Speaker does not try to recount from the remotest beginning.

   c. Summary of facts is substituted for details.

   d. Digressions are prevented.

   e. Unnecessary details or incidents are deleted (I. ix. 14).

2. Clarity is accomplished if:

   a. Facts are set forth in the precise order in which they occurred.

   b. Language is not confused, involved, or unfamiliar.

   c. Shifts are made to another subject.

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[1]The proper content of the narration as explained above is included as part of the proem in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1438a–1438b.

d. Facts are brief and thereby easier to follow (I. ix. 15).[1]

3. Plausibility will result if:

a. Facts are expected, natural, and usual.

b. Specific and accurate account is kept of time involved, standing of persons involved, motives in planning, and advantages offered by the scene of action (I. ix. 16).

III. The DIVISION needs to tie the speech together by:

A. Making clear what the speaker and his opponents agree upon.

B. Clarifying what remains contested.

C. Explaining the points the speaker will discuss.

1. The number of points should not exceed three.

2. Brief and complete exposition of each point is necessary (I. x. 17).

IV. PROOF and REFUTATION, the most important divisions of the discourse, rest upon:

A. An understanding of the Types of Issues presented by the cause:[2]

1. Conjectural (questions of fact) which include:

a. Probability of defendant's guilt.

b. Comparisons.

c. Signs.

d. Presumptive proof.

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[1]Aristotle (Rhetoric III. 16. 1416b) refutes the injunction of brevity in favor of a proper mean; Cicero (De Inventione 1. xx. 28) accepts the rule for brevity; Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1437b makes suggestions so the proem will not be too short.

[2]Cicero (Brutus 60. 217) repeats this rule and illustrates with Curio, who announced three points but often added a fourth or missed the third. See also Quintilian (II. xxx. 47; and IV. v. 24).

e. Subsequent behavior.

f. Confirmatory proof (II. ii. 3, to viii. 12).

2. Legal questions as to the interpretation of the law should include six subdivisions in the following order:

a. Letter and Spirit.

b. Conflicting statutes.

c. Ambiguity.

d. Definition.

e. Transference.

f. Reasoning from Analogy (I. xi. 19, to xiii. 24).

3. Judicial questions involve admitted facts and the question thus becomes one of right and wrong with two main divisions:

a. Absolute: when the act is defended per se.

b. Assumptive: when the act is defended by the introduction of extraneous circumstances (I. xiii. 24, to xv. 25).

B. An understanding of the distribution and handling of deductive arguments through:

1. The proposition.

2. The reason.

3. The proof of the reason.

4. The embellishment.

5. The résumé (II. xviii. 27, to xxix. 46).[1]

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[1]This entire section on proofs is at variance with Aristotle's emphasis on ethical, logical, and pathetic proofs. Aristotle named the enthymeme and the example as the only kinds of artistic proofs (Rhetoric I. ii. 1356b). Rhetorica ad Alexandrum would admit only maxims and enthymemes as artistic proofs in forensic speeches, in addition to testimony and admissions made under torture (1442b), but considers supplementary proofs similar to these in Rhetorica ad Herennium in chapters 7 (1428a) and 14 (1431b).

V. The CONCLUSION is composed after an analysis of:

A. Functions to be performed at the end of a speech:

1. Summing up, or recall, of points made in the speech (II. xxx. 47).

2. Amplification[1] to stir the listeners through use of commonplaces (II. xxx. 48–49).

3. Appeal to pity (II. xxxi. 50).

This outline of the discussion of judicial oratory found in Rhetorica ad Herennium helps the reader to understand how the Roman author accomplished a curious blending of elements from rival rhetorical schemes. Like the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, the unknown rhetorician who composed Rhetorica ad Herennium developed separate "partes-systems" for various kinds of speaking. However, the writer considered only judicial, deliberative, and epideictic speaking, as did Aristotle, instead of the seven kinds listed by the author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.

The five "parts" designated for judicial (forensic) speech most closely resemble the "parts" Cicero proposed for forensic speaking his his De Inventione. Cicero, however, had proof and refutation as two separate "parts"; Rhetorica ad Herennium considered proof and refutation as a single division.

It may be noted from the outline on judicial oratory as presented in Rhetorica ad Herennium that provisions were made to

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[1]The theory of amplification was first formed for the epideictic speech and given prominence by Isocrates. See Rhetorica ad Herennium, footnote, p. 146; Plato Phaedrus 276a; Cicero Part. Orat. xv. 52; and Cicero De Inv. I. liii. 100, to liv. 105. Cicero noted amplification might also be used in the Introduction of a speech. The commonplaces correspond to those listed in Aristotle's Rhetoric I. xiv. 1374b–1375a.

adapt the "parts" to immediate audience needs. Whereas Aristotle had objected to "parts" that were not generally applicable to all kinds of speeches, the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium included such "parts" and then added several methods by which each of these "parts" could be adapted to specific audiences.

The four "kinds of causes" that aided a speaker in determining appropriateness of introductions are similar to the causes described in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, De Inventione, and Rhetorica ad Herennium. The specific aim of "favorably disposing the hearers" is treated similarly by Aristotle, but Aristotle emphasized the need for favorable disposition, goodwill, and attention, not merely in a "part" such as the introduction, but throughout the speech.

The narration is not found as a discrete "part" for a judicial speech except in Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero's De Oratore, Orator, and De Inventione. The proper content of the narration as listed in Rhetorica ad Herennium is considered a part of the proem in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and as a part of proof in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Statement of facts and proof are two "parts" that receive primary emphasis and comparable descriptions in Aristotle's Rhetoric, Cicero's De Inventione, De Oratore, and De Partitiones Oratore, and finally in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.

The conclusion was considered an essential "part" for all judicial speeches in Rhetorica ad Herennium, as it was considered essential in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, in all of Cicero's rhetorical works except De Oratore, and in Quintilian's rhetorical treatise. The functions required of the conclusion were similar in all of the rhetorics named.

It is important to note that in the Rhetorica ad Herennium ethical and pathetic proofs are explained with reference to specific

"parts" of the speech. This is in striking contrast to the position of Aristotle who conceived of these modes of proof as applicable to the speech as a whole.

Deliberative oratory receives minor emphasis

Following the detailed description of the "parts" of a speech necessary in judicial oratory which covered 159 pages, the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium gave an analysis of the "parts" of deliberative oratory[1] in two and a half pages. Suggestions presented for composing a deliberative address may be outlined briefly as follows:

I. The INTRODUCTION may be by the same means as in a judicial case (III. iv. 7).

II. The STATEMENT OF FACTS, though not a required part, has Advantage as an end.

A. Topics of Advantage include:

1. Security: Might of Armies, fleets, arms, engines of war, or manpower or Strategy of money, promises, dissimulation, accelerated speech, and deception.

2. Honor: The Right, as evidenced in wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance; The Praiseworthy, as evidenced by the opinion of the proper authorities, our allies, all our fellow citizens, our descendants (III. iii. 7 and III. ii. 3, to iv. 7).

III. PROOF and REFUTATION are based on topics of Advantage (see above) and on rules for developing an argument artistically (Book II).

IV. CONCLUSIONS are the same as for judicial causes, except that more examples from the past are presented (III. v. 9).

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[1]Deliberative oratory was either of the kind in which the question concerned a choice between two courses of action, or of the kind in which a choice among several was considered (Rhetorica ad Herennium III. ii. 2).

This outline portrays a consideration of deliberative speaking in Rhetorica ad Herennium as brief as that found in Quintilian. It also indicates that there are no specific differences in the proper functioning or arrangement of the "parts" in deliberative and judicial speeches. Though narration had been included as a necessary "part" for judicial oratory, its functions appear to be included under statement of facts in deliberative oratory.

Most similar to this system of arrangement of "parts" was that named by Aristotle who admitted a comparable structure of four "parts." Aristotle, however, required proof and statement of facts and observed that the introduction and conclusion were not always necessary; the Rhetorica ad Herennium required the introduction, proof, and conclusion and made statement of facts an optional "part." Both Quintilian and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum presented the introduction as a required "part" but neither rhetorician differentiated in the function or arrangement of this part for deliberative oratory, as compared to judicial.

Epideictic oratory rules are flexible

Epideictic speaking, like deliberative, receives only a sketchy treatment in the Rhetorica ad Herennium "because it presents itself seldom in life."[1] However, the author explained that even if

[1]Rhetorica ad Herennium III. vii. 15. This lack of emphasis on other than judicial oratory is interpreted by Harry Caplan as "evidence of the dominant position which the judicial kind, with its status system, held in Hellenistic rhetoric. Despite the Epicurean notion that only epideictic speaking was amenable to rules, the judicial kind was in fact the easiest to systematize, even as it was by far the most often employed in Hellenistic times" (Rhetorica ad Herennium, footnote, pp. 172–73). See Quintilian III. iv. 1ff. and Volkmann, pp. 19ff., on discrepancies between this author's treatment and that of Aristotle (Rhetoric I. iii. 1358b).

epideictic speaking is seldom employed by itself, judicial and deliberative speeches often devote extensive sections to praise or censure.[1] An outline of the rules presented for the "parts" in epideictic speaking indicates that most details relate to the introduction as follows:

> I. INTRODUCTIONS may be drawn from four sources (III. vi. 11).
>
> A. From our own person:
>
> 1. If we speak in praise, we shall say that we are doing so because of a sense of duty, because ties of friendship exist, or from goodwill; or from a sense of appropriateness.
>
> 2. If we speak in censure, we shall say that we are justified in doing so, because of the treatment we have suffered; or that we are doing so from goodwill, because we think it is useful that all men should be apprised of wickedness and a worthlessness without parallel; or because it is pleasing to show by our censure of others what conduct is pleasing to ourselves.
>
> B. From the person being discussed:
>
> 1. If we speak in praise, we shall say that we fear our inability to match his deeds with words;[2] all men ought to proclaim his virtues; his very deeds transcend the eloquence of all eulogists.
>
> 2. If we speak in censure, we shall, as obviously we can by the change of a few words, and as I have demonstrated just above, express sentiments to the contrary effect (III. vi. 11).

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium III. vii. 15.

[2] Isocrates was aware of this technique (Panathenaicus 36 and Panegyricus 13). In the latter work he declared, "I notice that the other speakers in their Introductions mollify their audience and make excuses for what they are going to say . . . some saying that it is hard to find words to match the greatness of the deeds."

C. From the person of the hearers:

1. "If we speak in praise, we shall say that since we are not delivering an encomium amongst people unacquainted with the man, we shall speak but briefly, to refresh their memories; or if they do not know him, we shall try to make them desire to know a man of such excellence; since the hearers of our eulogy have the same zeal for virtue as the subject of the eulogy had or now has, we hope easily to win the approval of his deeds from those whose approval we desire."

2. If it is censure "we shall say that since our hearers know the man, we shall confine ourselves to a few words on the subject of his worthlessness; but if they do not, we shall try to make them know him, in order that they may avoid his wickedness; since our hearers are unlike the subject of our censure, we express the hope that they will vigorously disapprove his way of life" (III. vi. 12).

D. From the subject matter itself:

1. If we praise, we shall say that we do not know what to praise in particular; we fear that in discussing a number of things we shall pass by even more; and add whatever will carry like sentiments" (III. vi. 12).

2. If we censure, the sentiments opposite to those above are drawn.

II. The STATEMENT OF FACTS may vary with speech situations:

A. If the Introduction is developed as explained above, none is necessary.

B. If there is occasion for this part, follow the instructions for Stating the facts in Book I (viii. 12, to ix. 16).

III. The DIVISION sets forth the things about a man that are praised or censured, in the following order:

A. External circumstances.

B. Physical Advantages.

C. Then, we shall return to External circumstances (III. vii. 13–15).[1]

IV. CONCLUSIONS are to be brief, in the form of a summary at the end of the discourse (III. vii. 15).

Though epideictic oratory was considered a distinct kind of speaking in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria, as well as in Rhetorica ad Herennium, the "partes-plan" presented in the latter is not comparable to that found in the other two rhetorics. The description and functioning of required "parts" for an epideictic speech, as revealed by the outline, are most similar to the four "parts" considered admissible for all speeches by Aristotle. Aristotle used the term proofs to cover the functions of the part labeled division in Rhetorica ad Herennium. In contrast to Aristotle, however, ethical and pathetic proofs are restricted to the four "parts" rather than being pervasive to the whole speech. In contrast, Aristotle considered the "parts" an aid to arrangement or disposition of the speech rather than an aid to composition or invention, as conceived by the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium.

Arrangement Functions for Speech Delivery

Arrangement follows inventio in this work as the second canon and the less difficult part of rhetoric.[2] The Roman word

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[1]The details on birth, genealogy, habits, and achievements parallel the rules for "qualities outside and inside the realm of virtue" required in epideictic speeches by Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1441a–1441b).

[2]Rhetorica ad Herennium III. viii. 15. In the Peripatetic rhetorical structure, style followed inventio, and dispositio was placed

arrangement was introduced in Book III to refer to the dispositio process of ordering all topics so there would be a definite place for each in the delivery, or oral presentation, of the speech.[1] This arrangement process for the speech "as a whole" needed to recognize both the general principles of rhetoric and the necessary adaptations based on a speaker's judgment.

Effective arrangement of the speech "as a whole" and of the individual arguments will arise from the principles of rhetoric, explains the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium, only when:

> . . . we observe the instructions I have set forth in Book I—to use the Introduction, Statement of Facts, Division, Proof, Refutation, and Conclusion, and in speaking to follow the order enjoined above. It is likewise on the principles of the art that we shall be basing our arrangement, not only on the whole case throughout the discourse, but also of the individual arguments, according to Proposition, Reason, Proof of Reason, Embellishment, and Resume, as I have explained in Book II.[2]

In arranging the proof and refutation of individual arguments, particularly, the author stresses the necessity of proper ordering. With proof and refutation, the treatise asserts it is appropriate:

> . . . to adopt an arrangement in which: (1) the strongest arguments should be placed at the beginning and at the end of

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third. Actually, style received greater emphasis and more space (Book IV) than any other part of rhetoric, though it is placed last among the canons (see Introduction, p. xx).

[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium III. ix. 16. In the Peripatetic system, "parts" were treated under dispositio and not as elements of inventio as in this rhetorical treatise. In the pre-Aristotelian manuals on rhetoric and in the treatises of the Peripatetic school, dispositio was a function for both speech composition and speech delivery.

[2] Ibid.

> the pleading, (2) those of medium force, and also those that are neither useless to the discourse nor essential to the proof, which are weak if presented separately and individually, but became strong and plausible when cojoined with the others, should be placed in the middle. . . . (3) And as for the rest, since what has been said last is easily committed to memory, it is useful, when ceasing to speak, to leave some very strong argument fresh in the hearer's mind.[1]

Though a speaker should understand and apply some specific rules for arrangement in delivering a speech, according to Rhetorica ad Herennium, the anonymous Roman author of the treatise added that a speaker often might find it advantageous to depart from rules of rhetoric and rely on his own judgment.[2] The speaker's judgment on the needs of the particular circumstances might change the ordering in several ways. As, for example:

> . . . if we should begin our speech with the Statement of Facts, or with some very strong argument, or the reading of some documents or if straightway after the Introduction, we should use Proof and then the Statement of Facts; or if we should make some other change of this kind in the order. . . . Indeed, if the ears of our audience seem to have deafened and their attention wearied by the wordiness of our adversaries, we can advantageously omit the Introduction, and begin with either the Statement of Facts are some strong argument. Then, if it is advantageous, for it is not always necessary, one may recur to the idea intended for the Introduction. If our causes seem to present so great a difficulty that no one can listen to the Introduction with patience, we shall begin with the Statement of Facts and then recur to the idea intended for the Introduction.

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium III. x–xi. 18.

[2] Ibid., ix. 17. See Isocrates putting forth a similar plan based on the speaker's judgment in Antidosis 271, Against the Sophists 16, and Helen 5. Quintilian devoted Book VII to presentation of a similar plan.

> If the Statement of Facts is not quite plausible, we shall begin with some strong argument. It is often necessary to employ such changes and transpositions when the cause itself obliges us to modify with art the Arrangement prescribed by the rules of the art.[1]

The entire discussion on arranging materials to fit the circumstances appears to develop dispositio in its broadest and fullest meaning: as the selection, judging, and ordering of arguments for the whole speech; and as the selection and ordering of individual arguments in preparation for delivery of a speech within a sphere of particular circumstances.[2] The unknown author of the first Roman rhetoric closed his discussion on properly arranging a speech with the striking analogy that was pilfered by later rhetoricians. "The arrangement of topics in speaking," he concluded, "like the spraying of soldiers in battle, can readily bring victory."[3]

Conclusions

This rhetorical treatise addressed to Gaius Herennius has historical importance as the oldest Latin rhetoric preserved in its entirety. Composed about 86–82 B.C. by an unknown author,

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[1] Rhetorica ad Herennium III. ix–x. 17.

[2] Ibid., x–xi. 18.

[3] Ibid., x. 18. Professor Caplan observes, in a footnote to this passage, that Quintilian V. xii. 14 calls this the Homeric disposition from Iliad IV. 297–98: "And first he [Nestor] arrayed the horsemen with horses and chariots, and behind them the foot soldiers many and valiant, to be a bulwark for battle, but the weaklings he drove into the midst."

Rhetorica ad Herennium is an example of the rhetorical system found peculiarly adaptable for teaching Roman schoolboys during Cicero's youth. Books I and II presented a view for the beginning student whose chief concern was speech composition by systematizing rules for finding and ordering proofs. Books III and IV were developed for the mature and experienced student who would learn to abandon rigid rules and use his own judgment in the delivery of a speech.

A study of this technical manual that combines various Greek rhetorical schemes causes us to conclude:

1. The Rhetorica ad Herennium used illustrations and narrations from Latin sources, usually contemporary, as it attempted to clarify and expand the precepts of public speaking as they related to everyday duties of citizenship.

2. This rhetoric placed the greatest emphasis on judiciary (forensic) oratory as had the pre-Aristotelian manuals on rhetoric. Deliberative and epideictic oratory received only minor considerations as types of speaking used less frequently than judicial.

3. No single system of dispositio of an earlier origin is followed in the philosophy, structure, or content of Rhetorica ad Herennium. Rather, this work represents a synthesis of several Greek rhetorical structures.

A Peripatetic influence is evident in the author's attempt to combine theory and practice. The arrangement of the treatise according to canons, among them dispositio, also reflect Peripatetic practice.

Unlike the Peripatetic writers, proofs in Rhetorica ad Herennium were considered in terms of the "parts," rather than as a function of the whole speech.

A Stoic influence is evident in the systematization of rhetoric into a logical study, until inventio became the core of the rhetoric. In the Rhetorica ad Herennium, materials usually considered under dispositio and related to content and arrangement of "parts" of a speech are placed under inventio to give that canon greater emphasis.

Unlike the Stoics, however, this work considered delivery as a canon. Dispositio became related to delivery in Book III of Rhetorica ad Herennium.

The development of separate "partes-systems" for various kinds of speaking in Rhetorica ad Herennium is similar to the dispositio analysis in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The three kinds of speeches analyzed are the ones named by Aristotle, however, rather than the seven kinds listed in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum.

This Roman treatise on rhetoric discussed "kinds of causes" as aids in determining the uses of "parts," in the manner of the earlier Greek work addressed to Alexander. In Books III and IV, it also followed the suggestion of Plato in recognizing the value of a speaker's judgment, as opposed to hard and fast rules for dispositio.

4. In developing his system of rhetorical training, the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium synthesized interpretations of dispositio in terms of "partes-systems," in terms of planning the speech "as a whole," and in terms of arrangement.

The major emphasis, almost half of the completed rhetoric, was devoted to six "parts" as they were adapted to invented materials for the purpose of selecting and evaluating proofs in speech composition. The six "parts" suggested by Rhetorica ad Herennium

include: introduction, statement of facts, division, proof, refutation, and conclusion. Only the introduction, statement of facts, and conclusion were discussed for all three kinds of speaking: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Lengthy and detailed rules were given for the five "parts" deemed necessary in judicial oratory. Only sketchy discussions on the "parts" needed in deliberative and epideictic oratory were included in the rhetoric. Little differentiation is made in the function or arrangement of "parts" for the three kinds of speaking, though the number and labeling of "parts" may vary somewhat.

Ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs became elements in the "parts" of a speech, instead of becoming pervasive elements of the speech "as a whole."

Arrangement was the Latin term used in Rhetorica ad Herennium to refer to dispositio in its fullest and broadest meaning: in terms of selecting, judging, and ordering proofs for the speech "as a whole," and in terms of selecting and ordering individual proofs in preparing for delivery to a specific audience.

5. Skill in oratory was defined in Rhetorica ad Herennium as a combination of art, imitation, and exercise. In the treatment of arrangement, there was an evidence of the blending of these three elements; rigid rules for "parts" were followed by suggestions for studying speech models and for exercising the speaker's judgment. This rhetoric urged strongly that the student of rhetoric begin his studies by composing speech exercises within a framework of rigid rules; later, he could exert his judgment in adapting for particular audience needs, as he developed in speech maturity and experience.

6. No earlier interpretations of dispositio are criticized in Rhetorica ad Herennium, though there are general criticisms of the pedantic and impractical Greek textbooks on rhetoric and other subjects.

CHAPTER V

INTERPRETATIONS OF DISPOSITIO BY CICERO

Cicero was the typical orator writing on oratory. In Rome, during a period when rhetoric was the chief way to success[1] and a part of the intellectual background of all educated Roman citizens, Cicero emerged as the greatest orator of the era. In the very prime of his life he wrote six major rhetorical treatises "giving us the ripe results of his experience."[2]

Shortly before Cicero's birth, all teachers of rhetoric and philosophy had been banished from Rome by senatorial edict. By 92 B.C. all Latin schools of rhetoric were closed as a precaution against revolutionary democratic tendencies and Greek influences which were characteristic of these institutions.[3]

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[1] Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, p. 21.

[2] A. S. Wilkins, Introduction B to De Oratore. C. S. Baldwin noted that two thousand years after his death he is heralded as "the most eminent orator of Roman Civilization, who wrote more than any other orator has ever written on rhetoric; and historically has been more than any other an ideal and model" (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 37). Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956), p. 223, concluded that his writings produce a "whole" for rhetorical rationale: a plan for theory, a plan for obtaining the heights of the ideal orator, and a method for rhetorical criticism.

[2] Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian (Oxford: The Clarenden Press, 1926), pp. 59–69.

Crassus and the two Scaevolae had discouraged Cicero from attending a Latin school of rhetoric even before the edict in 92 B.C. Instead, the Roman schoolboy's education was developed by a group of men: Phaedrus, the Epicurean philosopher; Diodotus, the Stoic; Archias, the poet; L. Aelius Stilo, Rome's greatest teacher of Roman literature and history; Philo of Larissa, who headed the Academy in Rome; and finally Molo of Rhodes.[1] The study at Rhodes rounded out the Roman orator's student years, completing a typical cycle of Graeco-Roman education then in vogue. Perhaps no Roman knew Greek theories better, nor knew more of them, nor experienced the dual heritage of Roman and Greek rhetorical theories and practices to such a great extent.[2] These aspects of his early education may provide explanations for his eclectic tendencies and may furnish a background for his proposed plan for educating the ideal orator.[3]

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[1]Cicero Brutus 308–16. See also M. L. Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome, pp. 21–22. Tenney Frank has commented that it is as though Cicero made his curriculum to suit his needs and temperament and then sought the teacher who could help him attain what he demanded (Life and Literature in the Roman Republic, p. 131). Besides his daily declamations and rhetorical compositions, Cicero's education included daily visits to the forum to hear Crassus, Antonius, Sulpicius, Cotta, and Hortensius.

[2]Aubrey Gwynn, Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian, p. 77. See Tenney Frank, Life and Literature in the Roman Republic, pp. 196, 219. Frank concluded: "A shelf of books has been written upon the Greek sources of Cicero's ideas, and if one were to discuss the manner in which Cicero's own experiences modified those ideas before he accepted them for his own use one would ask for a second shelf of at least equal in length."

[3]Wilhelm Sigismuta Teuffel, History of Roman Literature, Revised and enlarged by Ludwig Schwabe, Translated from the fifth

In Cicero's Rome, "rhetoric was not in a settled state. Rhetoricians were beginning to teach philosophy, and philosophers were beginning to teach rhetoric."[1] Because rhetoric was one of the chief ways to success in the courts and in political life, there was a need for a practical approach to rhetorical training, and a danger arose that an emphasis on schemes of oratorical techniques might best answer the need. Cicero produced a compromise whereby both philosophy and rhetoric were necessary for the training of the speaker.[2]

Cicero's Criticism of Manual-Writers

Speech divisions were the core of the teaching scheme in Cicero's earliest work, De Inventione, as they had been in the technical manuals. However, in his more mature work, De Oratore, Cicero expressed the criticism that many rhetoricians did more harm than good by teaching oratory by rule of thumb,[3] and by use of stock

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German edition by George C. W. Warr, Vols. I, II (London: George Bell, 1891), I. 43–47. Sattler, "Some Platonic Influences on the Rhetorical Works of Cicero," Quarterly Journal of Speech (April, 1949), p. 169, noted that Cicero is singled out as the greatest of the Roman eclectics in both philosophy and rhetoric. See also Teuffel, I, 84.

[1] Elbert W. Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method, p. 21. See also G. L. Hendrickson, Introduction to Brutus, iii (Cicero Brutus, English translation by G. L. Hendrickson: London: Heinemann, 1939); and M. L. Clarke, Rhetoric at Rome, p. 9.

[2] Cicero Orator iv. 13; v. 17. Translated by H. M. Hubbell (London: William Heinemann, 1939), pp. 315, 317. Compare Cicero's statements with Phaedrus 279.

[3] Cicero De Oratore II. xix. 77–81.

phrases. The rules that Cicero considered particularly misleading, impractical, or superfluous were those that designated four, five, six, or seven parts "into which one distributes every speech."[1]

Cicero's objections to rules that implied an orator could be trained by means of a scheme of tricks based on a "partes-system" are found throughout his later rhetorical writings. The four major reasons for Cicero's objections are repeatedly expressed: (1) rules in the "partes-systems" are too inflexible; (2) the rules are too restrictive; (3) the systems, themselves, fail to allow for a speaker's judgment developed through experience and a liberal education.

When particular proofs or appeals are restricted to openings and statement of cases, for instance, Cicero argued that a natural order or clear order is often lost.[2] Often attention can be gained better by the whole argument than by the speaker's opening allegations, Cicero asserted, adding:

> . . . in requiring the statement of cause to be plausible, lucid, and brief, they advise us well; but in deeming these qualities more appropriate to such division than to the address as a whole, I think they are greatly mistaken.[3]

Explaining that the traditional order of exordium, narratio, and subsequent parts might at times appear to be the "natural order" for a given speech situation, the speaker's judgment must be the final determinant of which parts should be used, and how the parts should be used.[4] It is the speaker who must select and adapt

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[1] Cicero De Oratore II. xix. 79.

[2] Ibid., II. xix. 81.

[3] Ibid., II. xix. 83.

[4] Ibid., lxxv. 308, to lxxvi. 310.

rules for speech divisions and parts that will best serve him as a first step toward proper arrangement,[1] according to Cicero, if his own education and experience are to be a part of his speech skill.[2] The final emphasis must be on the speaker, Cicero believed, if the training of an orator was to rise above a rigid scheme for using "partes-systems."

Cicero's Definition of Rhetoric

Cicero's failure to present a specific definition of rhetoric is surprising when one considers that he composed more than any other single writer in the field of rhetorical theory, created an orator's ideal program of educational reform, and wrote the first history and criticism of Roman oratory and orators. Cicero seems to accept the theory of Aristotle that rhetoric is essentially the act of giving effectiveness to truth,[3] yet his disproportionate emphasis on delivery

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[1] As in his De Inventione (I. xiv. 19) and in Rhetorica ad Herennium (I. iii. 4), Cicero proposed six divisions in De Oratore (II. xix. 80): exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, refutio, and peroratio, and included both Greek and Latin terms to designate the traditional divisions. Only four parts were discussed, however.

[2] Cicero De Oratore II. lxxvi. 307–10.

[3] Ibid., I. xix. 86–87. A. S. Wilkins concluded: "Cicero seems to wish to indicate that he is going back, behind the current school treatises on rhetoric, which were at once shallow and pedantic, to the more sound and scientific early authorities" (Introduction to De Oratore, translated by A. S. Wilkins, p. 4). Baldwin expressed a similar conclusion in Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 46, as does Sattler, "Some Platonic Influences on the Rhetorical Works of Cicero," p. 168.

indicates that he considers as most effective the art of rhetoric that gives greatest effectiveness to the speaker.[1]

Perhaps Cicero's failure to present a precise definition of rhetoric springs from his notion that oratorical excellence might spring from art, from practice, or from nature. Further, he realized oratory was considered "great" in terms of its own age. For that very reason, a rhetoric could not be invented, defined, and perfected in one era, but had to be developed and perfected over the ages, according to Cicero.[2]

Though lacking a formal definition of rhetoric, De Oratore consistently keeps in view a single purpose: to aid those interested in playing the part of loyal Roman citizens in the assemblies and the law courts.[3]

The Scope of Cicero's Rhetorical Writings

In composing his six major rhetorical treatises, Cicero approached the subject from the viewpoint of a practiced orator, an acute critic, and an eclectic rhetorician. All presently extant, the works of Cicero dealing with rhetoric together with the approximate date of composition include: De Inventione, 86 B.C.: De Oratore,

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[1] C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 5.

[2] Cicero De Oratore II. xxii. 93.

[3] Ibid., I. viii. 30–35.

55 B.C.; De Partitione Oratoria, 54 B.C.; Brutus, 46 B.C.; Orator, 46 B.C.; and Topica ad C. Trebatium, 44 B.C.[1]

A brief outline of Cicero's oratorical and writing activity, as categorized by Jebb, may clarify the lifetime scope of his interest in oratory. The periods of Cicero's activity were:

I. Earlier schooling to beginning of his career as a political orator (81–66 B.C.):

   A. Presented seven orations against Verres for extortion and misgovernment of Sicily.

   B. Wrote De Inventione.

II. Period of greatest political power, lasting until just before his banishment (65–59 B.C.):

   A. Oration presented "For the Manilian Law."

   B. Four brilliant and vehement speeches against Catiline.

   C. Oration, "For Muraena," to defend Muraena against bribery.

   D. Oration, "Poet Archias," to support the poet's claim to Roman citizenship.

III. Period after his return from banishment until departure to Cilicia (57–51 B.C.):

   A. Wrote De Oratore, three books.

IV. Return from Cilicia until his death (50–43 B.C.):

   A. Pleaded case of Quintus Ligarius, who was accused of treachery to Caesar.

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[1]These dates were assigned by C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 37–61. Teuffel's (History of Roman Literature, pp. 297–99) approximate dates coincide except for De Partitione Oratoria to which he assigns a date between 45 and 46 B.C. R. C. Jebb ("Rhetoric," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., XXIII, 233–37) gives De Partitione Oratoria the date of 45–46 B.C., as do Rackham, Teuffel, Thonssen, and Baird, rather than putting it closer to the composition date of De Oratore, as did Baldwin.

B. Oration, "For Marcellus," to thank Caesar for allowing Marcellus to return to Rome.

C. Composed fourteen Philippics, directed against Antony.

D. Wrote Brutus, the Orator, De Partitione Oratoria, De Optimo genere oratorum, and Topica.[1]

Dispositio as a Concept in Cicero's Writings

Cicero's rhetorical writings are so varied in emphasis, purpose, and scope that his concepts of dispositio might evolve more clearly for the reader if his rhetorical writings are analyzed separately. There is no apparent attempt on the part of Cicero to resolve conflicts relating to the teaching of dispositio; there is no attempt at consistency in interpreting this canon of rhetoric;[2] there is little or nothing original on dispositio that he added to the previous rhetorical writings.[3]

Collocatio was the Latin term which Cicero used for the second canon of rhetoric, referred to as dispositio in the Greek

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[1] R. C. Jebb, "Rhetoric," Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., XXIII, 233–37.

[2] M. L. Clarke (Rhetoric at Rome, pp. 66–71) has made an interesting study of Cicero's lack of consistency in composing his own orations according to the rules he attempted to establish in his rhetorical writings.

[3] Solmsen has analyzed the Aristotelian elements in De Oratore ("Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," Classical Philology, XXXIII [January–October, 1938], 390–404); Sattler cited evidence of Plato's influence in the works of Cicero ("Some Platonic Influences on the Rhetorical Works of Cicero," pp. 164–69); and Hubbell noted the Isocratean influences (The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius, and Aristides).

Cicero's failure to make any original contributions in his works on rhetoric is observed by Harrington ("Rhetoric and the Scientific Method," p. 28).

rhetorics. This canon followed inventio, after which there were considerations of elocutio, memoria, and pronunciatio in most of his writings on rhetoric. Dispositio (collocatio), together with the other canons of rhetoric, was applied to deliberative, judicial, and epideictic or "display" oratory.

It would be tedious and unprofitable to discuss and quote all allusions to dispositio made by Cicero, since most of the theories will have been those of rhetoricians previously discussed in detail in this paper. Rather, an analysis of the dispositio conceptions of Cicero will be made in summary form, with indications made of comparisons discerned between Cicero and other rhetoricians.

De Inventione

First in order of composition,[1] the treatise De Inventione had a "partes-system"[2] as the core of its teaching, as had earlier Greek technical manuals on rhetoric. Apparently, the work added nothing new to the conception of dispositio; "parts" were annexed to inventio, as they had been in Rhetorica ad Herennium, while the designated functions and rules for these "parts" were similar to those found in rhetoric where the "partes-system" was treated as a function of dispositio.[3]

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[1] Cicero De Oratore I. ii. 5. All subsequent quotations from De Oratore, De Inventione, Brutus, Orator, and Topica will be from the Loeb Classical Library editions.

[2] Like De Oratore and Rhetorica ad Herennium, the six divisions included are exordium, partition, narration, confirmation, refutation, and peroration.

[3] Solmsen ("Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 49) noted the primary emphasis on "parts" of a speech in De Inventione. He concluded: "It is clear, however, that the use of the 'parts of

Cicero considered only inventio and then abruptly ended his work after he had concluded his detailed discussion on refutation. He declared:

> Now that I have presented the principles on which arguments can be made in every kind of speech, enough has, I think, been said about Invention, which is the first and most important part of rhetoric. Therefore, since one section has been brought to completion in this and the preceding book, and this book has grown to a great length, we shall leave the other topics. . . .[1]

The six "parts" were to be applied to three classes of oratory, according to Cicero,[2] although three-fourths of the rules applied only to forensic speaking, before the courts. In any event, Cicero explained that after the main points or "issues" of a case were determined, the separate divisions (parts) must be considered in the order[3] outlined below:

I. The exordium, which brings the mind of the auditor into a proper condition to receive the rest of the speech:

   A. If a study is made beforehand of the five kinds of cases: honorable, difficult, mean, obscure, and ambiguous (I. xv. 20).

   B. If the two species of exordium are properly applied: the introduction and insinuation[4] (I. xv. 20, to I. xvii. 25).

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speech' as the principle of structure and organization in the section on inventio constitutes an important departure from the original Peripatetic system; in fact we have to regard it as a 'contamination' with the alternative Isocratean tradition."

[1] Cicero De Inventione II. lix. 178.

[2] Ibid., I. v. 7.

[3] Ibid., xiii. 19.

[4] In Rhetorica ad Herennium, the terms used for these species are principium or direct, and insinuatio.

C. If it has marked dignity and avoids the common, general, interchangeable, tedious, unconnected, out of place, or contrary (I. xviii. 25–27).

II. The narrative, which is an exposition of events that have occurred or are supposed to have occurred, including:

A. The kind that contains the just, the case, and the whole reason for the dispute.

B. The kind in which a digression is made beyond the strict limits of the case for the purpose of attacking somebody.

C. The kind that is done solely for amusement (I. xix. 27).

D. The kind that explains a case at law (I. xx. 28).

III. The partition (propositio) renders the entire speech clear and perspicuous:

A. If the statement of topics is brief, complete, and concise.

B. If, throughout the speech, sections are completed one after another, as they have been planned in the partition (I. xxii. 31–33).

IV. The confirmation (proof) marshalls arguments, authority, and support to the case through:

A. Attributes of persons: name, nature, manner of life, fortune, habit, feeling, interests, purposes, accidents, achievements, and speeches (I. xxiv. 34, to xxv. 36).

B. Attributes of actions: place, opportunity, time, occasion, manner, and facilities (I. xxvi. 37, to xxvii. 41).

C. Argumentation that is probable or irrefutable, as drawn from the prescribed topics (I. xxix. 44, to xxx. 50).

D. Inductive or deductive reasoning (I. xxxi. 51, to xli. 78).[1]

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[1] After completing this description of six "parts" of an oration in Book I, Cicero asserted in Book II that confirmation and refutation needed further detailed treatment. Thus he added materials on "issues" applicable to these parts of a speech, as applied to forensic oratory (II. iii. 11, to lix. 178).

V. The refutation uses arguments to impair, disprove, or weaken confirmation (proof) in our opponent's case:

A. If the same sources of invention used by confirmation are utilized for fallacious, self-evident, farfetched, and strong arguments (I. xlii. 78, to li. 96).[1]

VI. The peroration concludes the entire speech in three parts:

A. The summing-up.

B. The indignatio, or exciting indignation or ill-will against the opponent.

C. The conquestio, or the arousing of pity and sympathy (I. lii. 98, to lvi. 109).

As the outline illustrates, there are striking comparisons between De Inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium in arrangement, in functioning, and in description of the "parts" necessary in a speech. The two rhetorics arrange "parts" under inventio, emphasize forensic oratory, and develop ethical and emotional proofs only in connection with the parts of a speech.[2] It is in the final section that Cicero's work bears the closest resemblance to pre-Aristotelian manuals on rhetoric and to Rhetorica ad Herennium. In this section, fifteen methods of arousing pity are discussed in relative order of merit, as they are assigned to the peroration of a speech.

De Inventione is Cicero's only rhetorical work that has a "partes-system" as the core of its teaching. Its value was repudiated by Cicero in later life as a work of his youthful period.

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[1] Cicero noted in this section that Hermagoras put the digression as the next part of a speech, adding: "If anyone thinks this is a proper division of a speech, he may follow Hermagoras' rule" (I. li. 97). He asserted, further, that he disapproved of digressions, praise, and vituperation as separate parts (I. li. 97).

[2] Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 57; and Solmsen, "Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 49.

De Oratore

The fullest interpretation of dispositio is found in De Oratore, whose three books represent Cicero's most mature and complete approach to rhetoric.[1] Based on the five canons of rhetoric,[2] this treatise reintroduced the three modes of proof basic to the Aristotelian system in the form of three probations. Thus, all proofs became pervasive to the entire speech and not confined to the "parts" as they had been in De Inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium.[3] This reintroduction of a broadened theory of proofs caused the canon of inventio to become the chief emphasis in De Oratore.

Cicero's total concept for dispositio in this work includes emphasis on preparation for both extempore and manuscript speaking in terms of: (1) a plan "of the whole speech"; (2) arrangement, interpreted as planned adaptation; and (3) "parts," as an incidental aid to achieving a "natural order" in forensic speaking.

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[1] There has been general agreement that this is Cicero's most mature, finished, and perfected work among such scholars as: A. S. Wilkins, Introduction to De Oratore, pp. 1–3; Russell Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 286; J. S. Watson, Introduction to De Oratore, p. 142; and Harrington, Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, p. 24. Cicero had withdrawn from the courts and the Senate, after his recall from exile, and devoted his time to study and writing of De Oratore.

[2] A. S. Wilkins, Introduction to De Oratore, pp. 8–26; and A. M. Hubbell, Introduction to De Oratore, pp. vii–x.

[3] Sattler described the reversion to the Aristotelian tripartite system of proofs as Cicero related ethos to it, noting that only sections dealing with forensic speaking dealt with proofs in terms of "parts" ("Conceptions of Ethos in Ancient Rhetoric," p. 61). Solmsen noted, in detail, a similar reversion to Aristotle's treatment of pathos, whereby appeals to the audience were not confined to the "parts."

Like Aristotle's Rhetoric this work was presented from the point of view of the speaker, with the complete training of the public speaker focused on the man. There is not, however, a trace of the textbook-writer who had formulated an instructional system for rhetoric in De Inventione. De Oratore presents, rather, Cicero's proposal for his universal program of studies.[1] Among all of the studies recommended, rhetoric is never of prime importance.

With the stated purpose of giving his brother, Quintus, a discussion on the functions of an orator, Cicero used the dialogue form[2]

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[1]The preface to Book II of De Oratore summarizes Cicero's scheme of education as consisting of: (1) the education usually given in the Roman schools of grammaticas, where philosophy, mathematics, music, literature, rhetoric, geometry, and astronomy were taught (I. 8–12, 187); plus (2) a supplementary course of higher studies that he proposes and names politor humanitas (II. 72). Nothing is said about elementary pupils in De Oratore, perhaps because of Cicero's typical Roman feeling that the parent was responsible for the child's early training. In contrast, Quintilian's program in Institutio Oratoria includes the typical Greek scheme of elaborate details for the elementary student.

[2]Characters in the dialogue included: (1) Crassus, tutor of rhetoric for Cicero when he was a boy, mouthpiece for Cicero's views in this dialogue, and one of the most eloquent Roman orators before Cicero; (2) M. Antonius, the father of Cicero's contemporary in the consulship, equal to Crassus in oratorical ability and opposed to theory; (3) P. Sulpicius Rufus, considered one of the grandest and most tragic orators heard by Cicero, but lacking in knowledge of the law, literature, and philosophy; (4) C. Aurelius Cotta, characterized by deliberate, accurate balancing of his arguments; (5) Q. Mucius Q. F. Scaevola, appearing only in the first book as a successful legal expert who belittled rhetoric and the need for a liberal education; (6) Q. Lutatius Catalus, associate of Marius in the consulship who possessed integrity of character but lacked force and passion as a speaker; and (7) C. Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, an advocate skilled in witty, humorous, spontaneous oratory.

as a framework for the exposition of theories on rhetoric from several points of view. Through seven characters in the dialogue, Cicero emphasized the importance of having something to say, as well as knowing how to say it. Through them, he emphasized the desirability of combining two main disciplines of the ancient world: rhetoric and philosophy. There is nothing creative about De Oratore,[1] though Cicero clarifies the thoughts of earlier rhetoricians and relates them to contemporary speaking in Rome.

Cicero did not present a specific definition of dispositio.[2] From the unsystematic and often unrelated conversations of De Oratore, his concept of dispositio appears to emerge as the process of selection, arrangement, and apportionment of proofs. This process depends on the types of logical, ethical, and emotional arguments: the kind of speech: the kind of hearers; the qualities of the speaker; and the purpose of the speech. The final outcome of the dispositio process "must be adapted to the ears of the multitude, for charming or urging their minds to approve of proposals, which are weighed in no goldsmith's balance, but in what I may call common scales."[3]

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[1] C. S. Baldwin (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 39) and Harrington (Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of Inquiry, p. 28) drew this same generalization.

[2] C. S. Baldwin (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 52) expressed regrets that Cicero gave so little definitiveness and specific advice toward the achievement of that sequence in which Cicero himself excelled.

[3] Cicero De Oratore II. xxxviii. 159. Russell Wagner concluded from this: "Dispositio, then, according to Cicero, is the adapting of the product of inventio to the particular situation at hand" ("The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 288).

It is the speaker who must exert the final judgment and prudence in adapting and arranging speech materials for a special occasion, says Cicero, as he adds: "Even determining how we should arrange the particulars that are to be advanced in order to prove, to inform, to persuade, belongs peculiarly to the orator's discretion."[1]

Early in Book I of De Oratore, Cicero staked out the ordering of the canons in his rhetorical scheme when he observed:

> . . . since all the business and art of the orator is divided into five parts, he ought first to find out what he should say; next to dispose and arrange his matter, not only in a certain order, but according to the weight of the matter and the judgement of the speaker.[2]

The three generalizations that may be made about Cicero's treatment of dispositio in De Oratore are: (1) there must be a "plan-of-the-whole" based on a preliminary analysis known as status and the three modes of proof; (2) the plan of "arrangement" must be based on proper emphasis as a first step in ordering, but must not be restrictive; (3) a system of "parts" may aid in achieving a "natural order" of proofs.

For determining the "plan-of-the-whole," Cicero explained in great detail the function of status as evaluating the kind of case, the pivotal issue and its source, together with an explanation of the cause for dispute. Status as a logical system, subjoined to inventio, was a method of judging arguments,[3] and was to pervade

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[1] De Oratore I. xxxi. See also II. lxxv. 308.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Cicero De Oratore I. xxx. 132–I. xxxviii. 157. Note Baldwin's more detailed analysis of status in Cicero (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 51–52).

the entire speech. As a matter of fact, pathetic and ethical proofs were expected to be as pervasive as logical proofs, according to Cicero. The three proofs "should be interfused throughout the whole of the structure of our speeches like the blood in our bodies,"[1] he claimed, and should be progressive rather than merely in a series.[2]

The real problem in arrangement, asserted Cicero, is the weighing of arguments to determine the most effective emphasis and sequence. In general, dispositio (arrangement) has to consider how to make the most of the stronger points without seeming to slur the weaker; whether the proof will prevail more readily through argument or through appeal, through direct proof or through refutation; how to cover retreat in position by making sure that the case, if it cannot be won, shall at least not be damaged. Placement of arguments, proportion of space, and progressive iteration of main points are major considerations of arrangement to gain emphasis.[3] Strongest arguments should be put first and last, the introductory remarks should be carefully adapted, to the plaintiff, the defendant, the case, and the judges,[4] and, to avoid undue emphasis, refutation should be considered with constructive arguments.

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[1]Cicero De Oratore II. lxxvii. 310. See also II. xix. 83 and II. lxxvi. 312.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., II. lxxvi. 309. Cicero explained: "I myself, indeed, in collecting proofs, make it a practice rather to weigh than to count them. . . ."

[4]Ibid., II. lxxvii. 313, lxxviii, and lxxix. 320–25.

In nine chapters of Book II, Cicero presented a synthesis of views he had collected for properly disposing the "parts"[1] of a speech. He emphasized that though the "partes-system" appeared to be a natural order for ordering proofs in a forensic speech, particularly, it should not be followed slavishly. From the wordy and often confusing dialogues of De Oratore, the following outline has been developed to present a hint as to Cicero's theory on use of "parts":

I. The exordium should possess the following qualities:
   A. Appropriateness to the case at hand.
   B. Favorable opening impression.
   C. Epigrammatic, pointed, carefully planned sentences.
   D. Humor, but never of a forcible or fighting nature (II. lxxvii. 317).
   E. Clear statement of content: statement of whole matter to be discussed, or an approach to the case similar to "preparing the ground" (II. lxxviii. 318).
   F. Proportionate to the importance of the facts.
   G. Adapted to one's opponent or one's client, if a formal opening is proper.
   H. Capable of gaining attention of judge and making him receptive[2] (II. lxxix. 324).
   I. Connected to the speech so it does not appear to be an appendage (II. lxxix. 325).

II. The narratio should be composed according to these rules:

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[1]Cicero De Oratore II. lxxvi–lxxxvi.

[2]Cicero explains that for the judge this attention quality has no greater place in the introduction than in other parts of the speech, but audiences are more receptive at the start.

A. There must be briefness, clarity, and ordinary language.

B. The chronological order of events must be kept, with no digressions.

C. The order of events is not given if the facts are already well known or if the narrative material has been used by your opponent.

D. Stress of points that will occasion suspicion or accusation should be avoided (II. lxxxi. 330).

III. The statement of case (divisio) should not be observed in all speeches, for:

A. Usually it envisages the exact point of issue and must then be given.

B. Often the divisio needs to be observed throughout the speech (II. xix. 81–83).[1]

C. Only the strongest arguments should be selected (II. lxxvi. 310).

IV. The proof (confirmatio) of materials will vary with each speaking situation:

A. If the point of argument is clear, your case is supported by proofs that demolish your opponent's arguments and establish your own (II. lxxxi. 331).[2]

B. Arguments may be rounded off by enlarging upon your own or arousing the feelings of the judges, or calming them down.

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[1] In referring to manual-writers, Cicero added at this point: ". . . in requiring the statement of the case to be plausible, lucid, and brief, they advise us well; but, in deeming these qualities more appropriate to such statement than to the address as a whole, I think they are greatly mistaken" (II. xix. 83).

[2] Cicero emphasizes that arguments of proof and refutation must be together; one without the other type is useless.

C. Separate rules need not be applied to deliberative or epideictic oratory, for the rules of forensic are common to both the others (II. lxxxii. 333).[1]

D. Materials will vary according to the needs of expediency of moral worth.

E. Seemingly inevitable or impossible proofs will not be admissible.

F. Appeals through emotional proofs should prevail throughout the speech (II. lxxvi. 312).

G. Strongest proofs should come first and strongest supporters should be quoted first, but outstanding resources should be preserved for the peroration (II. lxxvii. 314).[2]

Book II, and Cicero's discussion of dispositio by means of "parts," was closed abruptly with the statement, "I have given you my view in regard to the discovery and arrangement of topics. . . ."[3] The outline indicates Cicero's philosophy that it was the speaker—not a manual of ready-made rules—that must determine the content and arrangement of "parts" for forensic speeches. Cicero's comments on parts relate only to the desirable characteristics of each of the four "parts."

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[1]This generalization indicates a knowledge that separate sets of rules were preferred for each type of oratory (Aristotle Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Rhetorica ad Herennium); it also indicates that the rules he was presenting for "parts" had been related only to forensic speaking.

[2]Suggestions on the peroration or conclusio have been quoted already in conjunction with ethical and pathetic proofs, strength, and emphasis of arguments (II. lxxvii. 314).

[3]Cicero De Oratore II. lxxxvi. 350.

De Partitione Oratoria

The most complicated and unusual structural pattern for dispositio is found in Cicero's mature essay, De Partitione Oratoria.[1] In it, the canons of rhetoric[2] were considered first, as functions of the speaker. As the second canon, Cicero proposed an analysis of the dispositio of the speech, based on four "parts": principium (introduction), narratio (statement of the case), confirmatio (proof of the case), and peroratio. Finally, Cicero introduced the concept of collocatio (arrangement) applied to both content and delivery, attached to inventio,[3] and determinant of the "plan-of-the-whole" speech.

Collocatio was the term Cicero applied to the theory of arrangement, based on the nature of the speech or the "object of inquiry."[4] Cicero introduced his conception of arrangement immediately after a consideration of the functions and resources of a speaker by saying:

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[1] Russell Wagner, "The Meaning of Dispositio," p. 286. De Oratore is the second mature work, according to Wagner. Cicero wrote this detailed and scientific essay on rhetoric for the instruction of his son, near the end of 46 B.C., when Cicero was at his leisure in Rome. It was proposed as a complete system of rhetoric as De Oratore and Rhetorica ad Herennium had been. See also H. Rackham, Introduction to Partitiones, p. 306.

[2] Invention, dispositio, style, delivery, and memory, in that order.

[3] A. S. Wilkins (Introduction to De Oratore, pp. 57–58) analyzed the structure of the treatise in a similar manner. Quintilian, however, interpreted matter and arrangement as functions of invention; delivery and words were functions of expression, and memory was a fifth part having a common influence on the others.

[4] Cicero De Partitione Oratoria iii.

> . . . both matter and language have to be found and have to be arranged—although the term "invention" is used especially of the matter and "delivery" of the language, but arrangement, though belonging to both, nevertheless is applied to invention.[1]

Cicero's son is then described as asking if a speaker can always keep to the desired plan of arrangement, to which Cicero replies: "Certainly not: the prudent and cautious speaker is controlled by the reception given by his audience—what it rejects has to be modified."[2] Earlier, Cicero had implied that he adapted his own oratorical arrangement to the object of the inquiry.[3]

Four "parts" are named as necessary to dispositio: "Two of them, the statement of the facts and proof, serve to establish the case, and two, the exordium and peroration, to influence the mind of the audience."[4]

An outline of the detailed characteristics that Cicero described for the four required "parts" of a speech follows:

I. An introduction secures friendly feeling toward the speaker, intelligent and attentive hearing, through:

   A. Extolling our own merits, or worth, sense of duty, good faith, justice, and the like.

   B. Diminishing, diluting, or weakening the opponent's character, heritage, or cause.

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[1] Cicero De Partitione Oratoria i. 3.

[2] Ibid., iv. 15.

[3] Ibid., iii. 1.

[4] Ibid., ii. 4. The placement of proofs to gain goodwill and give a feeling of goodness is repeated again in ix. 495. This functioning of ethical and pathetic elements in terms of designated "parts" is similar to such elements described in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Rhetorica ad Herennium.

C. Stating the issues of the case in a few statements, and in an order so they will not be easily confused.

D. Adapting arguments made in peroration of previous speaker.[1]

II. The statement of case must be the base for the establishment of belief; therefore:

A. Clarity and convincingness of statement are necessary.

B. Facts narrated must be in accordance with the persons, times, and places.

C. Surprise, suspense, unexpected issues, dialogues between people, and emotional exhibitions will gain maximum attention (I. ix. 31).

III. Proof falls into two divisions:

A. Confirmation, which varies according to:

1. Reality, for which inference is the valid method.

2. Identity, for which definition is valid.

3. Qualities, for which ratiocination is valid (I. ix. 33).

B. Refutation, which is based upon:

1. Denial of the whole as imaginary or untrue, or

2. Pointing out that results will not follow from assumptions, that fallacies exist, that there are incongruities with other statements, undesirable qualities in witnesses, and the like (I. xiv. 51).

IV. The peroration falls into two divisions:

A. Amplification of facts and words (viii–xv).[2]

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[1]Cicero De Partitione Oratoria viii. 28–30.

[2]Cicero precedes a discussion on how amplification can be accomplished with the reminder: "Enlargement not only occurs here in the peroration but also in the actual course of the speech opportunities occur, when something has been proved or refuted, for turning aside to amplify" (I. xv. 53). Harrington noted that Cicero's interpretation of amplification included enlarging on a theme but also exalting a theme, which concerns pathetic proof (Rhetoric and the Scientific Method, p. 27).

1. Disconnected words, coinages, synonyms, compounds, and metaphors (above all) make the facts seem more numerous and vivid.
2. Topics from which statements may be taken to gain credence include: love of Gods, love of country, love of parents, friendliness, and generosity (I. xvi. 56).

B. Enumeration (recapitulation) is required in judicial oratory, by the prosecutor (xvii. 59):

1. When he distrusts memory of the audience,
2. When he can strengthen his case by setting forth his main arguments,
3. When there is no suggestion he is "parading" his power of memory (xvii. 60).

As in De Oratore, Cicero's discussion on the "parts" of a speech presupposes a speaker capable of exerting his judgment to select the necessary and most effective proofs for any given circumstance. The emphasis appears to be on the presentation of general rhetorical principles and varied circumstances which each judicial speaker must analyze in terms of his relationship to his audience, and his proofs.

Brutus

The dialogue Brutus adds nothing significant to Cicero's theories on dispositio, but it certainly illustrates what little emphasis he gave this canon as he developed his theoretical structure for rhetorical criticism. Dispositio is the subject of not more than five sentences in this first comprehensive history and criticism of oratory[1]

[1]Written sometime during the first quarter of the year 46 B.C., Brutus was dedicated to Cicero's friend Brutus, who was one of the participants in the dialogue along with Atticus and Cicero. Cicero

that analyzes the speaking of two hundred Roman orators against the five canons of rhetoric.

Beginning with the first Roman orator and ending with Hortensius, recently buried, Cicero criticized qualities lacking in an orator's works or qualities showing skill of application. Criticisms emphasize style and delivery, except in rare instances.

Among the few sentences of criticism relating to arrangement, one reads that Gaius Gracchus often showed brilliant exordiums, but lacked perfection on endings.[1] Curio was called "disorderly in arrangement," because he would announce three points and add a fourth, or omit a third: yet he was a great orator because of excellent diction.[2] Crassus was mentioned as the speaker who always had carefully planned exordiums,[3] while Galba's oratory received praise because of his perorations.[4]

Only one orator, Antonius, was praised in the Brutus for his over-all arrangement. Cicero wrote:

> . . . nothing relevant escaped his attention, and it was all set in proper place for greatest force and effectiveness. Like a general with his cavalry, infantry, and skirmishers, he knew how

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used Brutus as a mouthpiece to express his despair over certain of his political failures. his forebodings about the future of Rome, and his public defense of the defeated Pompeians. In this treatise, too, is a detailed description of Cicero's own schooling and rhetorical training (lxxxviii. 305, to xcii. 319), from which a reader might well conclude that the primary motive for writing Brutus was to demonstrate the correctness and effectiveness of Cicero's own schooling and theories on oratory. See G. L. Hendrickson (Introduction to Brutus, pp. 1–11) for more details on the background of the treatise.

[1] Cicero Brutus xxxiii. 126

[2] Ibid., lx. 216–17.

[3] Ibid., xliii. 158.

[4] Ibid., xxxiii. 127.

to place his material in the most opportune parts of his discourse.[1]

Brutus may be compared to Cicero's Orator, where but passing attention was given to the second canon of rhetoric, dispositio.

Orator

Scant note is made of dispositio in one of the last of Cicero's works, Orator, which appears to have rounded out his planned "unity for rhetoric." The three books of De Oratore developed a foundation of theory: Brutus contained a comprehensive historical criticism of oratory and orators: and the Orator delineated the training of the ideal orator, at the same time it served as a defense of Cicero's own oratory.[2]

The training of the ideal orator is discussed in the Orator within the framework of the five canons,[3] though collocatio (dispositio)

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[1]Cicero Brutus xxxvii. 139.

[2]Cicero Orator i. 3. H. M. Hubbell relates (Introduction to the Orator, pp. 297–98) that this is actually a book of controversial issues. The "Attici" had developed as a group opposed to the Asiatic, ornamental style in speaking: Brutus and Calvus were among the prominent orators in the group. The "Attici" position on a "plain and lucid style, neglect of rhythm, and infrequent use of emotional appeal" was criticized by Cicero in Brutus. Brutus, member of the "Attici," replied to the criticisms and hurled charges against orators using the florid, figurative style and against Cicero, particularly, for his exuberance, verbosity, frigidity of wit, and rhythmical cadences. To all of these charges Cicero replies in the Orator, using extensive quotations from his own speeches in defense. Orator was composed at the end of the year 46 B.C.

[3]The canons were listed in the following order: inventio, collocatio, elocutio, actio, and memoria. They were limited to deliberative and forensic oratory.

and inventio are treated briefly, since they are "not marked by the highest praise but are rather fundamental and shared in common with other pursuits."[1] There is the implication throughout the Orator that a student trained in the Academy[2] would have the necessary judgment to achieve an acceptable disposition of proofs in any given circumstance. Cicero's "ideal orator," then, would not be particularly concerned with explanations about dispositio which "depend more on foresight than on eloquence."[3]

In the light of Cicero's interpretation of the "ideal orator," it should not be surprising to find but one paragraph of the total 238 paragraphs in the Orator devoted to the topic of dispositio. In its narrowed interpretation of arrangement, this paragraph appears to be a compact sketch of a "plan-of-the-whole," as Cicero declares:

> The results of his invention will be set in order with great care. The orator will certainly make fair "porches" and gorgeous approaches to his oration. And when he has gained attention by the introduction, he will establish his own case, refute and parry the opponent's argument, choosing the strongest points for opening and closing, and inserting the weaker points in between.[4]

Topica

Originated as an attempt to clarify the use of Aristotle's Topica[5] for forensic oratory, Cicero's Topica went far beyond his

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[1] Cicero Orator xiv. 44.

[2] Ibid., i.

[3] Ibid., xiv. 44.

[4] Ibid., xv. 50.

[5] Cicero Topica i. 1–5. Cicero assertedly composed his Topica at the request of Gaius Trebatius Testa, a jurisconsult of repute who had served with Caesar in Gaul, upon Cicero's recommendation. H. M. Hubbell, in translating this work by Cicero for the

original plan[1] and added deliberative speaking, concepts referring to testimony, and "parts" of a speech.

Four "parts" of a speech were designated by Cicero in this treatise as aids to arranging topics for the speech "as a whole": introduction, narrative, proof, and peroration. Some of the topics, he explained, are proper to each part and some are of use to all alike.[2] "The proper topics," he continued,

> . . . must be used in the introduction to make the audience well-disposed, receptive, and attentive. The narratives must receive similar treatment in order that they may look to their goal, which is to be plain, clear, credible, restrained and dignified. Though these qualities should prevail throughout the whole speech, they are more characteristic of the narrative.[3]

Loeb Classical Library, noted that it had little resemblance to the Topica of Aristotle. Some topics presented by Cicero are also presented in Aristotle's Topica, but more of them are found in Aristotle's Rhetoric (II. xxiii). "The same topics, classified according to the same scheme, are given as Cicero's own" (Introduction to Topica, p. 377).

Teuffel (I, 299) simply refers to this as a rhetorical work wherein Cicero attempted to explain Aristotle's Topics for the use of forensic orators. C. S. Baldwin lists this work among "seven works dealing entirely or merely with rhetoric" (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, p. 37).

[1]Cicero Topica xix. 72. Here Cicero apologizes to Trebatius for going beyond the original plan.

[2]Ibid., xxv. 97. This statement reflects a theory of proofs in relation to "parts" as he expressed it in De Oratore, where all types of proofs were pervasive to the whole speech or arranged in "parts," according to the judgment of the individual speaker. Topics were interpreted by Cicero, according to the Aristotelian tradition, as sources of proofs or arguments.

[3]Cicero Topica xxvi. 97–98.

The division labeled proof did not need specific explanation, according to Cicero, since it was "accomplished by persuasion . . . and covered in what was said about the whole theory of oratory."[1] Cicero added that a peroration should make particular use of amplification, by exciting listeners.[2] Rules pertaining to arousing emotions in the peroration or in other speech "parts" could be found in other books, Cicero asserted, as he closed his discussion of "parts" somewhat abruptly.[3]

There is, thoughout the work, the implication that systems of rules or schoolboy rhetorical exercises are but necessary preludes to Cicero's own philosophical approach for the intellectually and oratorically gifted.

Conclusions

Cicero became the greatest orator of his day, the first orator to write extensively on rhetorical theory, and the author of the first historical criticism of oratory and orators during an era when oratory was the key to political and legal success in Rome. His superior liberal education had provided him with a breadth and depth of rhetorical knowledge about Greek and Roman rhetorical theories and practices that would be difficult to surpass.

Beginning his writings on rhetoric in 86 B.C., Cicero produced six major treatises in which he approached rhetoric from the viewpoint of an experienced orator, an acute critic, and an eclectic rhetorician. His writings appear to produce a "master plan" for

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[1] Cicero Topica xxvi. 98.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., 97–98.

rhetorical rationale that includes considerations of speech theory, precepts for attaining the ranks of the ideal orator, and a method of criticism of oratory. Cicero failed to get down to the job of instruction, however, even when professing to write works to teach an approach to speaking to his son or one of his friends. There is no indication on the part of Cicero that he is interested in mass education.

It was from a critical point of view rather than from an instructive one that Cicero surveyed oratory. Much in the manner of Plato, he criticized the past and present, the Greeks and the Romans, the orators, politicians, and even certain systems of rhetorical instruction. The detailed analysis of each of the major rhetorical works dealing mainly or entirely with rhetoric, permit several generalizations to be made about Cicero's interpretations of dispositio.

1. In each of Cicero's six rhetorical works, dispositio (collocatio) is referred to as one of the five canons of rhetoric and is always placed in secondary position, following inventio. In none of the treatises does the canon dispositio receive major emphasis.

2. Cicero restructured the canons by placing under inventio some of the materials commonly associated with dispositio.

In De Inventione, a system for identifying all proofs in terms of six "parts" was placed under the canon inventio as it had been in Rhetorica ad Herennium. Thus expanded, inventio received the major emphasis.

In De Oratore, "parts" became associated with status as a function of inventio in determining the "plan-of-the-whole." In De Partitione Oratoria, arrangement as a function of the "speech as a whole" was considered a part of inventio and delivery, while the

canon of dispositio related only to the speaker's function and was developed through four "parts."

3. Cicero limited his discussions on dispositio and the other four canons to forensic and deliberative oratory. Forensic oratory was considered almost exclusively in De Inventione and De Partitione Oratoria, while throughout his treatises Cicero took most of his illustrations and explanations from the field of forensic speaking.

4. Cicero repudiated the notion that separate sets of rules, "parts," or principles needed to be established for each of the types of oratory, as they had been established in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle's Rhetoric, or Rhetorica ad Herennium.

5. There is little consistency in the development of the concept of dispositio (collocatio) in Cicero's six rhetorical works. De Oratore, his major and most mature work, interpreted dispositio broadly in terms of: (1) a "plan-of-the-whole," based on status and placed under inventio; (2) arrangement, in terms of planned adaptation: and (3) "parts," as incidental considerations to aid in achieving a "natural ordering" of proofs.

Orator dismissed dispositio in one paragraph that implied the desirability of a planned adaptation of the speech "as a whole." Topica designated four "parts," to perform the function of arranging the speech "as a whole."

In De Inventione, a "partes-system" was the greatest single emphasis, functioning in relation to inventio. De Partitione Oratoria interpreted arrangement as a function of the speech "as a whole" under inventio and related "parts" as a function of the speaker under dispositio.

Negligible attention was afforded the concept of dispositio in Brutus. In criticizing several hundred Roman orators, Cicero used not more than five sentences to complete his comments on two exordiums, one peroration, and two over-all plans of "arrangement."

6. Cicero's four rhetorical treatises mentioning "parts" indicate no consistency in the number of "parts" proposed as aids to disposing, ordering, or arranging elements of the speech.

De Inventione used six parts as the very core of its rhetorical system: exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, refutio, and peroratio. De Oratore proposed the use of the same six "parts," but failed to discuss narratio, and included the functions of refutio as a necessary part of confirmatio.

De Partitione Oratoria and Orator suggested four necessary "parts" for the structure of a speech: principium, narratio (statement of case), confirmatio, and peroratio. Topica also proposed four: introduction, narrative, proof, and peroration.

7. Cicero showed little consistency in the use of terms applied to one given "part," or in the stated function of a "part."

Principium, exordium, and introduction were used to refer to the first "part" of a speech; Cicero described the same function for this "part," regardless of the term applied.

Divisio and narratio were both used to refer to functions usually placed under statement of the case. Cicero also uses the term statement of the case.

Confirmatio is the term used in De Oratore and De Partitione Oratoria to include the functions usually ascribed to refutio and confirmatio.

Peroratio, or peroration, is used in all treatises to designate the final "part" of all speeches. The functions of the peroratio are similarly described in all treatises using this "part."

8. Cicero makes an obvious attempt to restore the Aristotelian tradition of the five canons of oratory based on tripartite proofs, rather than a "partes-system."

The return to the Aristotelian concept of three proofs pervasive to the entire speech and not confined to or restricted to "parts" was apparent in De Oratore, De Partitione Oratoria, Topica, and Orator. In each of these treatises, proofs were described as being most often adaptable to a certain "part," but also adaptable to other "parts," or pervasive to the speech as a whole.

The Aristotelian tradition of the speaker with a liberal education, capable of exerting the final judgment in selecting, proportioning, arranging, and emphasizing proofs appropriate to any given speech situation is implicit in all of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, except the youthful De Inventione. The natural order of "parts," where considered, was to be used only as a speaker's preliminary guide.

The attempt to restore the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition was also obvious in the frequent quotations from Greek orators and rhetoricians in all of Cicero's works, in his favorable criticisms of Greek models of oratory in Brutus, and in his interest in re-establishing Aristotle's little-known Topica.

9. Cicero criticized schemes of oratorical training based on "partes-systems" in all of his rhetorical works, except the early De Inventione. The objections repeatedly expressed were: (1) rules in "partes-systems" are too inflexible; (2) such rules are too

restrictive; (3) "partes-systems" fail to recognize the value of a speaker's judgment, developed through experience and a liberal education.

10. Cicero added nothing original to previous rhetorical writings on dispositio, though but one of his works bears an obvious resemblance to another rhetoric.

Cicero's De Inventione and the Roman work Rhetorica ad Herennium are very similar in their emphasis on a "partes-system" as the core of their teaching, in their emphasis on forensic oratory, and in their arrangement of "parts" under inventio. In many divisions of the two treatises, the same precepts are conveyed in nearly the same, if not exactly the same, language.

CHAPTER VI

QUINTILIAN'S CONCEPTION OF DISPOSITIO

Quintilian was an outstanding teacher of rhetoric in Rome at the time he composed his twelve books called Institutio Oratoria on the teaching of rhetoric. Culminating a long development in rhetorical education, Quintilian's work appeared in A.D. 95, at a time when the rhetoricians had a secure hold over the Roman educational system.[1] Apparently prepared for teachers and thus including a survey of the complete scope of rhetorical theories and methodologies, Institutio Oratoria approached teaching from the viewpoint of developing speaking skills in individual students.

Based upon his definition of oratory as "the science of a good man speaking well,"[2] Quintilian wrote his volumes on rhetoric from

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[1] Appointed by Vespasian to hold the first appointment as professor of rhetoric at Rome, Quintilian served from A.D. 70 to A.D. 90 under the three emperors, Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian. He also gained praise and fame as a pleader in the courts in Rome where he had observed the elder Seneca at the peak of his oratorical power and influence, says William M. Smail, Quintilian on Education (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), pp. vi–viii. See also C. S. Baldwin (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 62, 76, 85); Aubrey Gwynn (Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian, p. 181); and M. L. Clarke (Rhetoric at Rome, p. 100).

[2] This "good man" theory is outlined in the Preface of Book I: "The orator whom we are educating is the perfect orator who can be no other than a good man; that is why we require of him not

the rich store of practical knowledge he had acquired as a teacher in a public educational system that had demanded both intellectual and moral discipline, after the Great Wars.[1]

Quintilian's Point of View in Writing

Claiming to have written this treatise at the request of his students, he says that the book is not one that will help a man teach himself. All of the precepts and treatises on the art of rhetoric are useless, he asserted, unless the aspiring student had intelligence, courage, gracefulness, power of voice, health, and adequate

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only merely eminence in the art of speaking, but also every moral virtue" (Preface, 9. 18). In Book II. xx. 4 the notion is again developed: "The art which we are trying to teach and which we cherish as an ideal is a virtue, because it is that true rhetoric which belongs to the true." Reiterated many times in the text, Book XII. 1. 1 opens with: "Let us assume that our orator is the man defined by Cato as a 'good man able to speak:' but above all, that he is what Cato puts first in his definition as being essentially the more important and noble, a good man."

[1]Because early Roman tradition had expected parents to be responsible for the education of their children, standards lagged far behind the standard of education in Greece. After the Great Wars, Romans who had been made aware of their intellectual shortcomings made a vigorous new start by importing Greek teachers and Greek literary texts. Vespasian tried to promote virtue, good health, and good conduct in the public schools as well as in civil life, by opposing vice and luxury. Degeneration of teaching of rhetoric at this time was noted by Tacitus in a dialogue, also by C. S. Baldwin (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, chap. iv).

Other details on the declines in oratory resulting from the use of hired pleaders in professional law courts and other causes are presented by Aubrey Gwynn (Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian, pp. 188, 248–49) and William M. Smail (Quintilian on Education, p. xi).

instruction.[1] Concluding his statement that training in speech must vary according to the individual student's abilities, Quintilian commented: "These instructions therefore are not written for him to whom talent is wanting, any more than treatises on agriculture for barren ground."[2]

After making it clear that his rhetoric was not meant for students of feeble intellect, Quintilian outlines the material for oratory as everything that might come before an orator for discussion.[3] He adds:

> . . . the man who can duly sustain his character as a citizen, who is qualified for the management of public and private affairs, and who can govern communities by his counsels, settle them by means of laws, and improve them by judicial enactments, can certainly be nothing else but an orator.[4]

The basic assumption of Quintilian is that his student of rhetoric will be the perfect orator, as a result of both nature and learning, the learned excelling the unlearned[5] even before audiences of persons altogether uneducated.[6] He also admonishes the student that a desire for total effectiveness and expediency must be the first consideration, rather than the authority of a teacher, if there is a variance between a teacher's rule and something discovered effective. Throughout his speaking, Quintilian urged the speaker to make

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria, translated by John Selby Watson (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1856), Vols. I–XII, Preface, p. viii.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., II. xxi. 4.

[4] Ibid., Preface iv.

[5] Ibid., II. xix. 1.

[6] Ibid., V. xiv. 28.

deviations from the regular and settled order of his Institutio, if the speaker can become more effective or expedient.[1]

Quintilian's Criticism of Arts of Rhetoric Based on Rules and "Partes-Systems"

Like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, Quintilian criticizes the oversimplified rulebooks or "Arts of Rhetoric" by which a man was supposedly able to gain all of the necessary information on successful speech-making. Early in the Institutio, he comments:

> . . . I would not have young men think themselves sufficiently accomplished, if they have learned by art some of these little books on rhetoric, which are commonly handed about, and fancy that they are thus safe under the decrees of theory. The art of speaking depends on great labour, deepest sagacity, and readiest judgment. But it is assisted by rules, provided that they point out a fair road, and not a single-wheel rut. . . .[2]

The rigidity of rulebooks is scoffed at, as Quintilian describes the typical "system":

> . . . commencing with the proem, and what must be the character of it, saying that the statement of facts must come next, and what rule must be observed in stating them; that after this must come the proposition, or as some have preferred to call it, the excursion; and then that there must be a certain order of questions; adding also other precepts, which some speakers observe as if it were unlawful to do otherwise, and as if they were acting under orders.[3]

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria II. xiii. 135.

[2] Ibid., xiv. 136–37.

[3] Ibid., xiii. 134.

Quintilian claimed that he rarely found rules that could not be shaken or wholly overthrown by exceptions. "Rules," he said, "must generally be altered to suit the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, and necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator is discretion, because he must turn his thoughts in various directions according to the different bearings of his subject."[1]

Dispositio as a Necessary Category of Rhetoric

Quintilian recounts that in the whole art of rhetoric, as it was explained by most of the greatest teachers, five canons have served as the foundation: inventio, dispositio, expression, memory, and delivery. Noting that some writers would like to shorten it to consist of matter and words, he justifies the inclusion of dispositio by explaining that "it is not only of consequence what we say and how we say it, but also where we say it. . . ."[2] He uses several analogies to impress his students with the importance of dispositio. In the preface to Book VII, he writes:

> But just as it is not sufficient for those who are erecting a building merely to collect stone and timber and other building materials, but skilled masons are required to arrange and place them, so in speaking, however abundant the matter may be, it will merely form a confused heap unless arrangement be employed to reduce it to order and to give it connexion and firmness of structure.[3]

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria II. xiii. 134.

[2] Ibid., III. iii. 1.

[3] Ibid., VII. Preface i.

Another analogy used to emphasize the importance of dispositio began with an observation:

> For the fact that all the limbs of a statue have been cast does not make it a statue: they must be put together; and if you were to interchange some one portion of our bodies or those of other animals with another, although the body would be in possession of all the same members as before, you would have none the less produced a monster. Again even a slight dislocation will deprive a limb of its previous use and vigour, and disorder in the ranks will impede the movements of an army.[1]

Quintilian then lists a few of the undesirable results, when proper attention is not given to dispositio after the inventio process of finding proofs has been accomplished. If oratory lacks proper dispositio, it will end in confusion, he asserts,

> . . . like a ship drifting without a helmsman; will lack cohesion, will fall into countless repetitions and omissions, and like a traveler who has lost his way in unfamiliar country, will be guided solely by chance without fixed purpose or the least idea either of starting-point or goal.[2]

Quintilian's Definition of Dispositio

Quintilian conceived the second canon of rhetoric as the necessary ordering, partitioning, and arranging of proofs without which inventio is useless. Dispositio is thus linked to inventio, as it is in practice, and is considered "equally as pervading in the whole speech and in its parts."[3]

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. Preface ii.

[2] Ibid., Preface iii.

[3] Ibid., III. ix. 1.

Even in defining the art of dispositio, Quintilian noted that the concept would not be difficult if one could lay down specific rules that would suit all subjects. However, he realized that through all the centuries the best teachers of rhetoric had attempted only to point out the road to their students and trust those students "to rely upon their own sagacity, keep their eyes open, and exercise their powers of judgment."[1]

To further delineate his notions on the responsibility of each speaker to provide the form and order for his own speech, Quintilian speaks of the desirable end of arrangement:

> This end will be attained if we note what best suits each position, and take care that the words which we place together are such as will not clash but will mutually harmonise. Thus different facts will not seem like perfect strangers . . . but will be united with what precedes and follows by an intimate bond of union, with the result that our speech will give the impression not merely of having been put together, but of natural continuity.[2]

The order of which Quintilian speaks is the proper arraying of topics in such a way that what follows coheres with what precedes. Partition is the separation of an individual whole into its elements. Arrangement is distribution of things and parts to the places which it is expedient they should occupy for the given speaker at a given time.[3] In clarification, Quintilian adds:

> And it is not enough to arrange the various parts: each several part has its own internal economy, according to which one thought will come first, another second, another third, while

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. Preface iv.

[2] Ibid., VIII. x. 17.

[3] Ibid., VII. i. 2–4.

> we must struggle not merely to place these thoughts in their proper order, but to link them together and give them such cohesion that there will be no trace of any suture: they must form a body, not a congeries of limbs.[1]

Quintilian's over-all concept of dispositio, as it is explained in Book VII of his Institutio Oratoria, evolves as a system for analysis of a case into its component topics and questions, after the scheme of finding the status or main issues of the whole case has been accomplished.[2] The method of inventio known as status assisted the dispositio of all kinds of proofs throughout the speech. The method is based on the assumption that the speaker is familiar with every circumstance of the case: facts, themes, and propositions, both from the speaker's and from the opponent's points of view.

The speaker must first decide if it is a question of fact or law, according to Quintilian's general suggestions, and then deal first with points that differ in character.[3] The weakest points are always handled first, and if a speaker yields any facts the yielding is handled first.[4] Like Aristotle, Quintilian suggests than an

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. x. 16.

[2]Quintilian's status is typical of the "method" used in teaching, whereby the essential character of a case is determined by means of a preliminary survey of all materials. This status or general forecast of the whole trend of a speech was so important to the ancients that they developed the highly classified pedagogical device known as status, according to C. S. Baldwin (Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, pp. 74–76). In any event, status made the dispositio process an easier one in that the main issues were determined.

[3]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. i. 20.

[4]Ibid.

analysis and ordering of proofs should go from the common to the particular, and from the well known to the less familiar.[1] It is also a good idea, he says, to note what was admitted both by your opponent and by yourself, and then dispose of the admissions, leaving only the fact you wish to have believed.[2]

After these preliminaries, the general status of the case is determined by a series of questions based on (1) facts of the case and (2) points of law, such as the following:

I. Facts of the case:
  A. Of conjecture:
    1. Of persons:
      a. What has been done?
      b. What is being done?
      c. What is likely to be done? (Book VII. ii. 2.)
    2. Of facts:
      a. What actually has been done?
      b. What were the motives of the act? (Book VII. ii. 2.)
      c. How does the case compare with the case of the adversary?
      d. How do individual arguments of the case compare? (Book VII. ii. 9.)
    3. Of intention:
      a. Did the accused intend to do the deed?
      b. Did he actually do it?

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. i. 28.

[2] Ibid., 32.

c. Did he actually do it? (Book VII. ii. 57.)[1]

B. Definition:

1. "The order to be followed in definition is invariable. We first ask what a thing is, and then whether it is this" (Book VII. iii. 9).

C. Qualities of nature and forms of things, including questions of moral obligation, lunacy, cruelty to a wife, etc.

II. Points of law:

A. Letter and intention of law:

1. "As a rule, questions of equity are best introduced at the beginning of a case, since there is nothing to which judges give more ready hearing" (Book VII. i. 63).

2. If case is weak in point of law, it is best to secure goodwill by dealing with questions of equity first (Book VII. i. 63).

B. Contrary laws or contrary provisions within a law:

1. Are they of a similar nature?

2. Does the contradiction turn on time or quality? (Book VII. vi. 2–4.)

C. Syllogisms:

1. If it is right to do a thing once, is it right to do it after?

2. If the law grants a privilege with reference to one thing, does it grant it with reference to another?

3. If a thing is legal before a certain occurrence, is it legal after it? (Book VII. viii. 2–5.)

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[1]Noting that Cicero preferred to treat motives before persons, Quintilian advises that, if the circumstances of the case do not point strongly in either direction, he would prefer dealing with persons, but expediency may make it desirable to reverse the order (Book VII. ii. 39–40).

D. Ambiguity:

1. Among other things, this may arise as a result of the arrangement of words, which makes it doubtful what the exact reference of some word is, or if there is a word in the middle of the sentence which may be referred either to what precedes or what follows (Book VII. ix. 7).

The extended analysis of various types of causes based on questions listed in the preceding outline is illustrated profusely by examples. It is here that numerous controversiae of Greek and contemporary declamation schools are introduced, along with a detailed original one composed by Quintilian, to illustrate the numerous and varied patterns of analysis.[1] Quintilian advises that, though the whole case must be analyzed, and the subdivisions require arranging in the order appropriate to them, a method of arrangement cannot be devised except in reference to each definite and specific case.[2] Further, he notes,

> . . . the order in which the facts are stated may either contribute to or detract from the credibility of our case; for consistency and the reverse depend to a very great extent on the way the circumstances are arranged.[3]

Because of the infinite number of these circumstances, and the kinds of cases to be analyzed, Quintilian concludes that it is impossible to teach or categorize everything that can be accomplished by an art. Rather, he says, the teacher needs to demonstrate daily by using model cases, the natural order and connection of parts, so the

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. iii. 30–34.

[2] Ibid., x. 5–8.

[3] Ibid., ii. 57.

student may gain experience and judgment to aid him in dealing with other cases of the same character.[1]

To clarify his argument that practice and observation, rather than rules, will aid the art of speech arrangement, Quintilian draws analogies from other fields of art:

> For example, what painter has ever been taught to reproduce everything in nature? But once he has acquired the general principles of imitation, he will be able to copy whatever is given him. What vase-maker is there who has not succeeded in producing a vase of a type which he had never previously seen?[2]

Even more than upon the teacher or a system of rules, the scheme of dispositio for the whole speech, and for its subordinate parts, is dependent on the speaker's ability to fit his proofs to suit the judgment of his audience, asserts Quintilian. To illustrate the learner's role, he cites the example of the physician who teaches his student the dangers against which he must be on guard, the treatment usually adopted for various diseases, and the symptoms by which diseases are recognizable. Quintilian adds, however,

> . . . he will not be able to communicate to his pupil the gift of feeling the pulse, or appreciating the variations of colour, breathing, and temperature: this will depend on the talent of the individual. Therefore, in most instances, we must rely on ourselves, and must study cases with utmost care. . . . For the most effective, and what is justly styled most economical arrangement of a case as a whole, is that which cannot be determined except that when we have the specific facts before us.[3]

The importance of having each speaker formulate his own methods, ready for immediate use in disposing arguments, is stressed

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. x. 8.

[2] Ibid., 9.

[3] Ibid., 9–11.

by Quintilian when he suggests that the gift of arrangement is to oratory what generalship is to the war.[1] In one case, the skilled commander must know how to distribute his forces, must realize how many troops he should retain for counterattacks, and how dispositions should be made by land and by sea. In a speaker, this gift of arrangement or generalship consists of:

> . . . the power to determine when the exordium is necessary and when it should be omitted; when we should make our statement of facts continuous, and when we should subdivide it; when we should begin at the very beginning, when, like Homer, start at the middle or the end; when we should omit the statement of facts altogether; when we should begin by dealing with the arguments advanced by our opponents, and when with our own; when we should place the strongest proofs first and when the weakest; in what cases we should prefix questions to the exordium, and what preparation is necessary to pave the way for these questions; what arguments the judge will accept at once, and to what he requires to be led by degrees; whether we should refute our opponent's arguments as a whole or in detail; whether we should reserve emotional appeals for the peroration or distribute them throughout the whole speech; whether we should speak first of law and equity; whether we should first advance (or refute) charges as to past offences or the charges connected with the actual trial; or, again, if the case is complicated, what order we should adopt, what evidence or documents of any kind should be read out in the course of our speech, and what reserved for a later stage.[2]

This pragraph summarizes the chapter headings of the entire book on dispositio, as discussed by Quintilian from a broad, philosophic, and selective point of view, for the mature speaker who must adapt to real-life situations.

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria VII. x. 13.

[2] Ibid., 11–13.

"Parts" Become a Function of Inventio

Since all of Quintilian's Progymnasmata[1] preparatory exercises are considered as a part of inventio, or finding and selecting proofs, the traditional "parts" of a speech usually found as dispositio are placed under inventio. Quintilian considers these "parts" as one of the means by which the several causes are to be managed, according to places, circumstances, and characters. As such, they are placed under inventio, preceding the core of his inventional theory, status. Quintilian asserts that the use of "parts" becomes a way of ordering facts and managing the narrative, thus aiding in establishing the logical and pathetic relationships of your proofs to previous or later proofs.

Three of the six books on inventio are encyclopedic discussions of "parts" of a speech as they might be used in narratio,

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[1] In keeping with the Roman admiration for Greek learning during this era, Quintilian develops his system of education for training the ideal orator after the Greek educational scheme known as Progymnasmata. This scheme consists of a series of preparatory exercises beginning with the narratio, progressing to loci communes and theses and loci, ending with suasoriae and controversiae. The Institutio Oratoria then concludes with a general discussion of principles and suggestions for the mature speaker with a liberal education behind him who needs to learn about real-life speaking situations.

Quintilian indicates that his system of Progymnasmata includes general, constructive, and realistic exercises, as well as admonitions to the young readers who might otherwise allow themselves to be taught in a manner in which they will never speak. He outlines his plan of rhetorical training as being theory coupled with practice, noting that some of the Progymnasmata exercises rightfully assigned to rhetoric had been used by grammar teachers (Institutio Oratoria III. iii. 8; ix. 1; viii. 70; and I. ix. 1–6).

suasoriae, controversiae, and the other schoolboy exercises of rhetoric. They will be discussed in some detail so that the reader may compare Quintilian's comments on the use and ordering of "parts" with the comments of other rhetoricians who might discuss the same "parts" under dispositio.

The first exercises of the Progymnasmata are labeled narratio and are limited to historical, often imaginary descriptive declamations in which the natural order of events is suggested by Quintilian.

In Book III, Quintilian discusses three other exercises: (1) loci communes, essays on this or that type of character; (2) theses, set passages on value of evidence, justice, or injustice; (3) loci, abstract themes including comparisons. The plans for these three are dependent on the status or state of a cause[1] and resolve themselves in speech plans dependent on reasoning and those dependent on legality.[2]

After the student masters these first four simple types of rhetorical exercises, the species devoted to praise or blame are analyzed; these are similar to the Greek schoolboy's suasoriae. Then, the rules are suggested for order in the forensic and deliberative oratory on suggested subjects having great resemblance to the Greek exercises called contraversiae. Quintilian's comments on the proper order and number of parts in practice orations for the three main divisions of oratory have been outlined from Book III, as follows:

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[1]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria III. vi. 1–102.

[2]Ibid., 86.

I. Panegyric or laudatory eloquence (praise or censure)

A. In praising gods:

1. First, express a general veneration for the majesty of their nature (III. vii. 10).

2. Then, eulogize the peculiar power of each and their inventions that are beneficial to men.

B. In praising men:

1. First, praise antecedents to birth of a man: parents, country, or ancestors.

2. Then praise his natural genius shown in early years, his advancement in learning, and his course of conduct (III. vii. 10–17).

II. Deliberative oratory (persuade and dissuade)

A. Exordium is not required, because whoever consults an orator is already well-disposed to hear him (III. viii. 8). Commencement of a speech should resemble exordium, though, for one must avoid abruptness. Goodwill should be obtained in this part.

B. Statement of facts may be introduced but is not necessary on a private subject of discussion. Statements setting forth the order of circumstances are indispensable (III. viii. 10). "We must always speak first on that point which might be a subject for deliberation even if other circumstances were detached from it" (III. viii. 20).

III. Judicial oratory (attack and defense)

A. Divisions are five: exordium, statement of facts, proof, refutation, and peroration (III. ix. 1). Partition and proposition fall under proof, for partition is but a species of questions and not a part of the speech as a whole.

1. Digression is not a part of the cause if it is in the cause.

2. Refutation must be a division for proof establishes while refutation overthrows (III. ix. 5).[1]

Following the suggestions on number of parts, Quintilian begins an encyclopedic discussion of various "parts" of the speech in his typical manner of citing Greek practice, terminology, and theory on each point, that of the past and contemporary Roman rhetoricians, and finally making clear his own notions on each topic.[2] He concedes that Book IV is more important and more difficult than the preceding books, for he considers in it the items upon which each speaker must exercise his own judgment and selectivity: (1) the purpose of the exordium, (2) proper form of statement of facts, (3) what constitutes the force of proof, and (4) powers of the peroration.[3]

It will be noted in the following outline prepared on suggestions for the "parts" of the oration as they are detailed in Book IV that Quintilian considered "parts" a device for ordering, selecting,

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[1]This outline of the kinds and contents of parts in the three types of speeches is comparable to that of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, it will be noted, though it is not as detailed. Quintilian purposely avoided subdivisions, even though he realized he might be criticized for giving too little consideration to this description, for he felt that a teacher who was not affected did not need to split his teaching into minute distinctions. He wrote: "Excessive subdivision is a fault into which many rhetoricians have fallen . . . but the way which I follow is far shorter, and for that reason plainer, and will not fatigue his language by proportioning it out into minute particulars" (III. ix. 21).

The disagreement with Aristotle is obvious in the denial of a need for exordium or statement of facts for the deliberative branch, as well as in the inclusion of refutation as a necessary part for judicial oratory (Aristotle Rhetoric II. xxvi. 3; III. xiii. 4; xvii. 14).

[2]Quintilian Institutio Oratoria IV. i. 6.

[3]Ibid.

amplifying, partitioning, and even finding all three proofs: logical, pathetic, and ethical.[1] Used in this way, the "parts" are not merely aids to inventio but necessary devices for his system of inventio. These are not again treated under dispositio, but remain always as a fundamental process of inventio. As such, Quintilian admonished the student throughout his discussion of parts to refrain from attempting to apply the suggestions without exercising judgment. Quintilian complains that logicians and others in public life attempt to examine subjects with the purpose in mind of discovering and judging what is right. The orator, on the other hand, must compose his speeches to suit the judgment of others, frequently speaking before the uneducated who need to be aroused and excited or they can never be impressed with what is true and just.[2] The speaker must be free to exercise his judgment when speaking before an audience, rather than being tied to rules, "like children imitating copies set them, and, as the Greeks proverbally express it, 'taking constant care of the coat which their mother has given them.'"[3]

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[1] See Irving J. Lee ("A Study of the Emotional Appeal in Rhetorical Theory with Special Reference to Invention, Arrangement, and Style," p. 101) on Quintilian's use of pathetic appeals. He wrote: "All-important in Quintilian's doctrine of affectus is the place of the address to the feelings in the development of the speech. That role is best studied in connection with the functions of the exordium, narrative, and peroration." See also William M. Sattler ("Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric," pp. 149–54), where evidence of ethical appeals confined to parts of the speech are discussed as part of inventio.

[2] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria V. xiv. 29.

[3] Ibid., 30.

Regularity of art as indicated in special, unchanging ordering of "parts" of a speech is criticized by Quintilian, for it prevents a speaker from amplifying, varying, and diversifying his reasoning; it causes the speaker to sound as though he is using manufactured words and ideas, fashioned by his teacher. He notes that Demosthenes had very few evidences of this rigidity, adding:

> Yet the Greeks of our own day (the only respect in which they act less judiciously than ourselves) bind their thoughts as it were in chains, connecting them in an inexplicable series, and calling themselves, in these points, imitators of the ancients; but if they are asked whom they imitate, they will never answer.[1]

At another point in his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian makes it clear that his suggestions for these "parts" are not to be followed slavishly, but the speaker should pursue a middle course, "ordered to suit the interests of the cause."[2] He points out:

> . . . it is men who do not speak in the forum themselves that give these directions; and their systems of rules, which they have composed at leisure and ease, are disturbed by the necessary confusion of battle. For almost all authors, who have set forth methods of speaking, as a kind of mysteries, have bound us not only to certain subjects but by fixed laws as to the form of expressing them.[3]

This statement concludes the discussion on "parts" and the chapters on inventio of which they are a part.

The following outline includes the major suggestions that Quintilian presented as a "guide" to be used in developing the eight "parts" of a speech, in the three types of oratory:

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[1] Quintilian Institutio Oratoria V. xiii. 59.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

I. Exordium

A. This part should be the entering wedge into a subject, to produce a good effect on a judge before he understands what the cause is.

B. It must not be assumed that the judge is thoroughly acquainted with the case; the speaker must aid the judge in preparing to listen more readily.

C. To prevent exciting an unfavorable feeling in the judge, the speaker must take care not to appear insolent, malignant, overbearing, or reproachful toward any man or body.

D. The beginning should include information on the advocate of the opposite party, on the character of the prosecutor, and the character of the adversary, along with praise of the judge (IV. i. 10–17).

E. The speaker needs to discover and amplify the favorable points usable in the exordium as "they become manifest to the pleader when he understands the nature of the cause" (IV. i. 27).

F. Pathetic proofs are usually arranged "in the exordium so that the kind feelings of the judge should be touched, but cautiously and modestly, while in the peroration one may give full scope to the pathetic, may attribute fictitious speeches to our characters, and may evoke the dead and produce their children—attempts which are not made in the exordia" (IV. i. 28).

G. Brief and clear statements help secure the attention of the audience if they think you will not detain them long, or enter upon matters foreign to the subject (IV. i. 34). However, a speaker should not dispense with rendering the judge attentive (IV. i. 37).

H. Generally, the speaker should turn from what is prejudiced to that which is favorable (IV. i. 44).

I. The exordium might not always be necessary for the judge might already be prepared for the talk, the subject may require no introduction, or the nature of exordium is found in other parts of the speech (IV. i. 73).

J. The final item in the exordium ought to be a statement as to whether the sequel will proceed with a statement of facts or proceed to proofs since "the commencement of the statement of facts will even be lost upon audiences if they are not aware that such statement is begun" (IV. i. 76–79).

II. Statement of facts

A. This part is not always necessary if the causes are so brief as to require only a proposition rather than a statement, or if the parties are agreed about the fact so the dispute concerns only the law (IV. ii. 4–9).

B. The statement of facts need not always be in second position following the exordium (IV. ii. 24).

C. Statement of facts, also called narration or statement of case, is an account of a thing done or supposed to have been done, adapted for persuasion (IV. ii. 31). It must be lucid, brief, and probable, "for there are many narratives true which are not probable, and many probable which are not true" (IV. ii. 34).

D. Content of this division is based upon the kinds of causes (IV. ii. 63–131).

E. Frequent repetition of the statement of facts belongs more in schoolboy declamations than in the forum (IV. ii. 128).

F. Items need not be refuted in the order in which they occurred but should be related in the order that would be best for the cause, the nature of the case, and the occasion (IV. ii. 83–84).

G. No digression should be made from the statement of facts (IV. ii. 102).

H. The speaker should address himself constantly to the judge, using no character but his own; and exciting no feelings unless the nature of the case justify it (IV. ii. 103).

I. There is no exact rule on what should be at the very end of the statement of facts, for though a legal argument can be brought down to the point where a question

arises, this cannot always be done in the case of the defendent (IV. ii. 132).

III. Digressions

A. No part should be designated for digression (IV. ii. 15, 16, 17).

B. Subjects often permit digressions in many places, but ". . . no part of a speech ought to be more closely attached to any other part, than the proof is to the statement; unless indeed the digression be intended either as the end of the statement or as the beginning of the proof" (IV. iii. 5).

C. There is no set order for digressions; the rules that state digressions should follow statement of facts are a result of the declamatory ostentation of the schools where displays of eloquence attempt to please the judges, without due consideration of causes and what these particular causes demand (IV. iii. 2–3).

IV. Proposition

A. The proposition has no place as a separate division of a speech, after the statement of facts (IV. iv. 1).

B. The commencement of any proof, wherever it may be, is considered a proposition and thus may be "advanced not only in stating the principal question, but sometimes even to introduce particular arguments . . ." (IV. iv. 1–9).

V. Partition

A. This need not be a separate division for a speech but rather an appendix to the proofs or a preparation for them. When used judiciously, it contributes to clarity, agreeableness, and attention (IV. v. 22).

B. Enumeration of the speaker's own proposition or those of his adversary, according to the order of presentation, may be included in partition (V. v. 1). Ordered enumeration may not always be advisable, for often it is better to pretend that your observations are conceived on the spur of the moment. Or a startling statement might be more readily trusted if it penetrates the judges' minds without warning (IV. v. 5).

C. Too many partitions should be avoided anyplace in the speech, for a speaker should avoid a too-precise or jointed division of materials which would tend to detract greatly from the whole speech (IV. v. 25).

D. It is important that the order of partitioning be as follows: (1) distinguish between what is admitted and what is disputed; (2) list admissions of your case and that of your opponents; (3) list your propositions and those of your opponents (IV. v. 28).

VI. Proof

A. This division is always required, no matter which of the other five parts of a judicial speech may occasionally be unnecessary (V. Intro., v).

B. The ordering of proof is less important than the causes and kinds of argument, except: ". . . when the disposition of the arguments must be such as the nature of the cause requires; a rule, with but one exception, that our series must not descend from the strongest to the weakest" (V. xii. 14).

C. Arguments used in this division are to be selected by the speaker from a series of topics or causes Quintilian introduced in fourteen chapters, rather than from ready-made arguments or commonplaces used by student declaimers (V. i–xii. 17).

VII. Refutation

A. Refutation has a proper function as the fourth place in judicial pleadings (V. xiii. 1).

B. The speaker must find the main point of dispute (V. xiii. 52).

C. Ordering of refutation most likely to be suitable for prosecutors include: (1) support of your own allegations; (2) refutation of what is brought against them (V. xiii. 53).

D. Defendents should begin refutation by answering objections to their cases (V. xiii. 53).

VIII. Peroration

A. This is not always a necessary part of the speech, though it serves a usefulness in summing up headings in order to refresh the memory (VI. i. 1–2).

B. The division is often labeled completion, conclusion, recapitulation, or enumeration.

C. Recapitulation may be made in other parts of the speech, if the cause is complex or needs numerous supporting statements (VI. i. 8).

D. The peroration is not necessary if the cause is short and simple (VI. i. 8).

E. Several perorations may be necessary if a complicated speech is concerned with several causes (VI. i. 54).

F. Pathetic appeals are pervasive to the entire speech and not confined particularly to the peroration (VI. ii).

IX. Discussion

A. Discussion (also termed altercation, reply, or disputation) has no place in the "parts" of a speech since "it depends on invention alone, and can have no concern with arrangement . . ." (VI. iv. 1).

B. Order of any replies should be according to the plan of the arguments in the speech: "The strongest should be placed first and last: for the former dispose the judge to believe in him, and the latter to decide in his favour" (VI. iv. 22).

It is apparent from this outline that Quintilian placed the greatest responsibility for success in disposing the "parts" of a speech on the judgment of the speaker. Though the discussion on "parts" was introduced to aid the beginning student in finding and ordering suitable proofs for preparatory exercises, specific rules or techniques were avoided. Instead, Quintilian indicated that the speaker possessing broad knowledge, wide experience, and noble character would be able to determine the most appropriate and effective disposition of proofs, aided by a general consideration of "parts."

Conclusions

During a period when rhetoric was the core of the Roman educational system, Quintilian prepared his Institutio Oratoria as a survey for teachers of that discipline. Quintilian developed a practical outline of training for "the science of speaking well," together with indictments of the corrupted rhetorical practice of his time.

The Institutio Oratoria presents the most detailed, comprehensive encyclopedic treatment of dispositio presently available. The twelve books could well serve as a major reference work for comments and illustrations on the theory and practice of ancient Greek, early Roman, and his own contemporaries' ideas on dispositio. Quintilian's own notions on dispositio can be summarized briefly as follows:

1. Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria approaches the subject from the viewpoint of an experienced teacher who believed that rhetoric could not be self-taught. His work on the teaching of rhetoric in a public educational system stresses continuous training from early childhood to adulthood.

2. Dispositio becomes one of five major elements of oratory, as it was among the Peripatetic writers. However, Quintilian places dispositio immediately after inventio, the place filled by style in Aristotle and other Peripatetics. There, dispositio (arrangement) is defined as ordering, arranging, partitioning, and cohering the invented proofs for the sake of expediency and continuity for the audience. This includes ordering and arranging the several "parts," internal economy of these "parts," and the arrangement of words.

4. The purpose of all speaking, as delineated by Quintilian, is to give effectiveness to truth, and though epideictic, deliberative, and forensic oratory are mentioned generally, only forensic speaking is discussed in detail in Book VII where dispositio or arrangement of arguments is analyzed.

5. Quintilian's conception of dispositio has two facets: (a) the preparatory rhetorical exercises for beginners, in which "parts" function for inventio as one aid in finding and selecting proofs; and (b) the broad, philosophic approach for the mature speaker who must be the final determinant for both the speech "of the whole" and its "parts," after he has studied the case and its causes, exerted his judgment on all invented materials: and then analyzed the most expedient ordering for a given time.

For the youth entering upon Progymnasmata exercises in narratio, loci, communes, and theses, "parts" are introduced to aid in finding pathetic, logical, and ethical proofs for each type of exercise. Three of the six books on invention are discussions of eight "parts" of a speech. Particular suggestions for the order and number of these "parts" in practice orations are similar to those given in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and Rhetorica ad Herennium, though the actual analysis of desirable practice in application of the "parts" is more general than that found in the anonymous manuscripts. After the student mastered a pattern of "parts" for practice orations, Quintilian produces an encyclopedic discussion of "parts" that is presented so that each pupil may exercise his judgment and selectivity on the purpose of the exordium, the proper form of statement of facts, the strength of proof, and the powers of the peroration.

Quintilian's over-all concept of dispositio in Book VII presupposes a "good man" with a liberal educational background and

good judgment who is capable of determining the proper dispositio functions of ordering, partitioning, and arranging proofs and "parts," for any given case. This broad vision of dispositio is dependent upon the determination of the status or central crux of the argument, through analytical questions about the facts of the case and the points of law. Status assisted disposition of all kinds of proof, but the ordering of proofs was seen to vary according to the plan of analysis used.

In discussing dispositio for speeches in real-life situations, Quintilian considered proofs pervasive to the entire case—rather than in terms of the ordering of ready-made arguments which are confined to a certain "part" of the speech.

6. Quintilian makes extensive use of illustrations from both ancient and contemporary Greek and Roman orators, to aid the mature speaker in formulating an effective pattern of dispositio. Precepts of Greek and Roman rhetoricians are analyzed, criticized, and rearranged in Institutio Oratoria in relation to the concept of dispositio.

7. Throughout the treatise, criticism is launched against those impractical men who prepare rigid rules on rhetoric, against students who were led to believe that by learning rulebooks they had learned rhetoric, and against teachers who insisted on speech exercises unrealistic in nature.

Specific unchanging rules for dispositio are not possible, according to Quintilian, for each cause, audience, and situation will require varied disposition of proofs.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The general conclusions of this study undertake to present a concise analysis of the concept of dispositio from the time it appeared in the Art of Rhetoric by Corax and Tisias about 465 B.C. until it received its most comprehensive treatment six centuries later in the rhetoric of Quintilian. These conclusions are an attempt to categorize the specific findings about dispositio outlined at the end of each chapter in connection with nine rhetoricians of ancient Greece and Rome: Corax and Tisias, Plato, Isocrates, the unknown writer of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Aristotle, Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium's anonymous author, and Quintilian.

A study of the complete, original treatises by each rhetorician under consideration, as well as a study of historical and critical data, allow the following general observations to be made:

1. All three aspects of the amplified definition of dispositio presented at the outset of this study are included by one or several of the classical rhetoricians included in this study. These aspects include: (a) a "plan-of-the-whole" speech, based on a central theme and emerging as a pervasive plan of organization determined by special circumstances inherent in each speech situation, rather than by fixed rules; (b) a system of "arrangement," or an arbitrary scheme for ordering proofs which determine the organization structure for a speech; and (c) a "partes-plan," or a predetermined system of from

two to ten "parts" that largely influences the kind and placement of logical, pathetic, and ethical proofs.

2. There was no single, distinct "classical" interpretation of dispositio among the earliest Greek and Roman writers.

Corax and Tisias based their Art of Rhetoric on a "partes-system" and a sequence for arrangement of materials under the five parts, both of which were to be applied rigidly in all plans of forensic oratory.

Plato conceived of "ordering of the whole" in speech, as in other realms of philosophy, based on truth as it exists in the mind of the speaker.

The anonymous author of Rhetorica ad Alexandrum presented seven "partes-systems" for dividing, ordering, and arranging proofs in the seven kinds of speaking: persuasive, dissuasive, eulogistic, vituperative, accusation, defense, and inquisitive. These "partes-systems" and the arrangement of all topics and words within the "parts" were the core of this rhetoric.

Isocrates, in his rhetorical writings, indicates the need for arranging the various elements of a speech into a "plan-of-the-whole." His own orations indicate an awareness of the terminology of a "partes-system" and the use of such a system.

Aristotle's conception of dispositio may be inferred from his Rhetoric as a "plan of the whole speech" based on an unobtrusive sequence or pattern determined by the relations of ideas in space, time, logic, or causal relation. After the primary process of speech composition was accomplished through proper disposition of proofs into this "plan-of-the-whole," Aristotle presented advice for delivery of judicial, deliberative, and epideictic speeches, based on

selective patterns of arrangement that were assisted by speech "parts," or divisions.

The author of Rhetorica ad Herennium synthesized interpretations of dispositio to include: (a) arrangement, defined as the selecting, judging, and ordering of proofs when composing the speech "as a whole": and (b) the selecting and ordering of individual proofs in preparing the delivery of a speech for a specific audience. Of these two, the major emphasis in this rhetoric was on the first aspect where six "parts" were adapted to the total inventio process in the composition of deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory.

Cicero places dispositio (collocatio) second among the five canons of rhetoric in each of his rhetorical works. Limiting his interpretation of dispositio almost exclusively to forensic oratory, with but minor consideration of deliberative speaking, Cicero showed little consistency in the development of dispositio in his six works. De Oratore, his major and most mature work, interpreted dispositio broadly in terms of: (a) a "plan-of-the-whole" speech, based on status and placed under inventio; (b) arrangement, in terms of planned adaptation; and (c) "parts," as incidental aids toward achieving a "natural ordering" of proofs.

Cicero's Topica named four "parts" that were to aid a speaker in arranging the speech "as a whole." His Orator implied the desirability of planned adaptation for the speech "as a whole," as dispositio was discussed in a single paragraph. A "partes-system" was the greatest single emphasis in De Inventione, though the "parts" were categorized under inventio in the treatise. De Partitione Oratoria interpreted "arrangement" as a function of the speech "as a whole" under inventio and placed a consideration of "parts" under dispositio, as a function of the speaker.

In Brutus, Cicero disposed of dispositio in five sentences, as he commented on two exordiums, one peroration, and two over-all plans of arrangement.

Quintilian's conception of dispositio included two approaches to the preparation for forensic speaking: (a) the rhetorical exercises for beginning students in which "parts" function under inventio as an aid in finding and selecting the ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs; and (b) the broad, philosophic discussion for the mature speaker who must be the final judge for both the speech "of the whole" and its "parts," after he has studied the status of the case, or the central crux of the argument. Three of the six books on inventio are devoted to discussion of "parts" of a speech: as they might be chosen and applied in practice orations, and as they might be selected and adapted for real-life speaking situations.

3. The functions and attributes of dispositio, as the term is defined in this study, do not receive a uniform, distinct "classical" placement, in the earliest rhetorical treatises.

"Parts" become a function of the canon of inventio in Rhetorica ad Herennium, in Cicero's De Inventione, and in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria. "Arrangement" was a function of inventio in Rhetorica ad Herennium and in Cicero's De Partitione Oratoria, while it became a separate canon in Aristotle's Rhetoric and in Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria.

A plan of the speech "as a whole" was discussed as a function of the canon of inventio in Rhetorica ad Herennium, in Cicero's De Oratore, and in his De Partitione Oratoria.

4. Discussions of dispositio varied among classical rhetoricians according to the purpose for which their treatises were

conceived and according to the persons for whom they were intended.

Two of the earliest Greek pre-Aristotelian writers and two of the earliest Roman writers produced manuals that presented rigid, unvarying rules, supposedly self-contained and capable of being self-taught. The manuals, approaching dispositio from the narrowed interpretation of a "partes-system," furnished ready-made arguments, restricted pupils from making changes in content or ordering of "parts," and relegated all ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs to respective "parts" of a speech.

Of these four manual writers who had "partes-systems" as the core of their teaching, Corax and Tisias composed the Art of Rhetoric for uneducated Sicilian landowners who needed to learn to plead their own cases in land disputes, and the anonymous Greek composed Rhetorica ad Alexandrum for the masses who desired to learn expedient means for influencing an audience favorably. The Rhetorica ad Herennium by an anonymous Roman and Cicero's early De Inventione were prepared for Roman schoolboys interested in learning how to compose oratorical exercises.

In contrast, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero (in all of his works except the youthful De Inventione) wrote for pupils who were liberally educated and capable of exerting mature judgment in adapting dispositio to various speech situations, within the general philosophical and theoretical framework of rhetoric. Even Quintilian's comprehensive treatment of "parts" in the six chapters of his work that related to schoolboy exercises indicates that the rigid rules were to be abandoned as a pupil develops maturity and judgment in adapting for specific audience needs.

None of these five latter rhetoricians conceded that the principles of rhetoric could be self-taught. Aristotle seemed to appear the most optimistic on the possibility of teaching principles of dispositio, indicating that a speaker might always produce the desired psychological effect in an audience, by a properly constructed speech.

5. The relative emphasis given to the concept of dispositio varied among the classical rhetoricians studied.

Corax and Tisias' Art of Rhetoric, the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, Cicero's De Inventione, and Rhetorica ad Herennium had dispositio, from the narrowed interpretation of a "partes-system," as the major and almost sole emphasis. Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilion elevated dispositio to the importance of a canon of rhetoric but failed to attach particular importance to it. Aristotle and Quintilian emphasized inventio; Cicero emphasized elocutio and declamatio, as they gave effectiveness to the speaker.

In none of the classical rhetoricians studied is the canon of dispositio given major emphasis. The rhetoric by Corax and Tisias and the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum had certain aspects of dispositio as the core of their teaching, yet canons were not introduced as such until Aristotle's Rhetoric. In the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero's De Inventione where "parts" are the major emphasis, they are placed as a function of inventio.

6. In the rhetorics studied, there was no consistency in the order in which dispositio appeared among the canons.

Aristotle introduced dispositio in third position, following inventio and elocutio. Cicero and Quintilian placed dispositio immediately after inventio, as the second canon of rhetoric.

7. Classical rhetoricians influenced future considerations of dispositio as a "partes-system" through their attacks on manuals that presented oversimplified "partes-systems" as the core of rhetorical teaching. Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Quintilian, and Cicero criticized the manuals because: (a) they were based on the assumption that rhetoric could be self-taught: (b) the rigid rules allowed for no exercise of a speaker's judgment in adapting to specific audience needs: (c) the placement of the chief, or sole, emphasis on a narrowed conception of dispositio as "parts" caused other important canons of rhetoric to be ignored.

8. There was little consistency among the rhetoricians studied, nor within the writing of one rhetorician, in the labeling, ordering, content, or functioning of "parts" where they were related to the concept of dispositio.

The first Art of Rhetoric by Corax and Tisias established a five-part scheme needed in all plans of persuasion: prooimion, katastasis, agones, parakthesis, and epilogos. Plato and Isocrates indicated familiarity with terminology of a "partes-system" but listed no particular number, order, or nomenclature of "parts" as desirable.

The Rhetorica ad Alexandrum presented seven separate systems of "parts," adapted to the audiences affected by the seven kinds of speaking: persuasive, dissuasive, eulogistic, vituperative, inquisitive, accusative, and defensive. The proem and peroration (sometimes called iteration or recapitulation) were common to the seven kinds of speaking. There were at least four "parts" for each of the seven types of speech, either stated explicitly or implied. The functions of the four "parts" remained the same throughout the

treatise, though there were differences in naming, arranging, or selection of topics for the "parts." In addition to the proem and peroration, the proper "parts" included confirmation (proof) and anticipation (narration, statement of proof) and where all logical, ethical, and pathetic appeals were placed in terms of favorable audience disposition.

Aristotle's description of the proper contents of the four most popularly used "parts" shows substantial agreement with the description in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, even where re-enumeration of arguments is maintained. Aristotle, however, considered statement of case and proof as the only two essential "parts" of a speech, admitting the proem and epilogue as usable. "Parts" were but a minor consideration in Aristotle's Rhetoric, as one of the many varied methods and materials that he inventoried, to guide his students in making their own decisions on the disposition of proofs. The core of Aristotle's Rhetoric was his theory of proofs, and these were considered a function of the whole discourse and not merely of a "part."

Almost half of the Rhetorica ad Herennium is devoted to rules on six "parts" of a speech as they were adapted to invented materials in selecting and evaluating proofs in speech composition. The development of separate "partes-systems" for various kinds of speaking in Rhetorica ad Herennium follows the analysis of "parts" in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum. The three kinds of speeches analyzed are the ones named by Aristotle, however, rather than the seven kinds listed in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum; namely, deliberative speeches, judicial speeches, and epideictic speeches.

Rhetorica ad Herennium discussed only the exordium, statement of facts, and conclusion for all three kinds of speaking. Though

there is little differentiation in the function of "parts," the labeling of the required "parts" in Rhetorica ad Herennium varied as follows: judicial oratory was to include an introduction, narration, division, proof and refutation, and conclusion: deliberative speeches included an introduction, statement of facts, proof and refutation, and conclusion; epideictic oratory needed an introduction, statement of facts, division, and conclusion.

Ethical, pathetic, and logical proofs were relegated to "parts" of a speech in Rhetorica ad Herennium, as they had been in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum and the Art of Rhetoric by Corax and Tisias.

Cicero's four rhetorical treatises mentioning "parts" indicate no consistency in the number or labeling of "parts" proposed as aids in disposing, ordering, or arranging elements of a speech.

Principium, exordium, and introduction were terms used to refer to the first "part" of a speech; the function of this "part" remained the same, regardless of the term used. Divisio, narratio, and statement of case were used by Cicero to refer to functions usually placed under statement of case. Confirmatio also includes the function of refutio, in Cicero's De Oratore and De Partitione Oratoria. Peroratio or peroration is the term used to designate the final "part" of all speeches, the functions of which were similarly described in all speeches.

De Inventione used six "parts" as the chief emphasis of its rhetorical system: exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, refutio, and peroratio. De Oratore proposed the same six "parts" but failed to discuss narratio and included refutio as a function of confirmatio.

The latest of Cicero's rhetorical works, Orator, as well as his Topica and De Partitione Oratoria, suggested four necessary

"parts" for structure of a speech: exordium, narratio (statement of case), proof (confirmatio), and peroration.

The three proofs were considered pervasive to the entire speech and not confined or restricted to "parts," in all of Cicero's works except De Inventione.

Quintilian introduced a comprehensive discussion of eight "parts" of a speech, to aid the beginning speaker in finding and ordering suitable proofs for preparatory exercises in composition of oratory. This general consideration of "parts" that avoided specific rules or techniques was offered as a "guide" to the mature speaker of broad knowledge, wide experience, and noble character who needed to rely on his own judgment to determine the most effective and appropriate disposition of proofs. As such, "parts" were included under inventio and based upon status.

Quintilian's analysis of strengths and shortcomings in ordering and arrangement of proofs for the three types of oratory was presented in terms of eight "parts": exordium, statement of facts, digressions. proposition, partition, proof, refutation, peroration, and discussion. However, statement of facts and proofs are the only "parts" that Quintilian considered essential to all kinds of speaking.

9. Quintilian became the first of the classical rhetoricians to present a comprehensive discussion of the broad and the narrowed interpretations of dispositio as identified with teaching speech delivery and composition. His encyclopedic description included citations on theory, terminology, and practice from the Greek and Roman rhetoricians with whom he was familiar; a list of problems involved in providing for students a few "guides" related to the canon of dispositio; and a detailed clarification of his own notions on varied aspects of dispositio.

Quintilian anticipated difficulties among future teachers if rules for dispositio became too rigid to allow for necessary adaptations and interrelations between inventio and dispositio, or if speakers were not allowed freedom of choice in providing desirable form and order to their speeches.

10. Disposition should be the rhetorical term employed by students and teachers of rhetorical theory and practice to include the three major components in selecting, arranging, apportioning, amplifying, and adapting proofs into a functional pattern of speech organization. The major components may be described in terms of: (a) the "plan-of-the-whole" speech; (b) the arrangement of the whole speech or its parts; (c) the "partes-plan" employed, if there is one.

This amplified definition of disposition, based as it is on the conceptions and explanations of the canon by nine of the major classical rhetoricians, can be applied both to speech composition and speech delivery. If it is to maintain a special rhetorical meaning, the term disposition should describe a distinct function and yet be closely related to invention in theory, as it is in practice where the two canons often function simultaneously.

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