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THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S IMAGES OF THE WORLD ARENA: THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

by
James M. Handelman

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Political Science)
in The University of Michigan
1973

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Harold K. Jacobson, Chairman
Associate Professor Robert Hefner
Professor A. F. K. Organski
Associate Professor William E. Zimmerman IV

TO MY PARENTS

who sacrificed for me,
supported me, and
encouraged me throughout
this arduous project

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I undertook this study because it was thought that a critical analysis of the Secretaries of State since World War II might shed much additional light on why American foreign policy evolved the way it has in the past twenty-five years. The more I scrutinized the topic, the more I became aware of the nuances, complexities, demands, and pressures that were thrust upon the Secretaries. I also learned of the difficulties that scholars have had in separating the influence of the environment from that of the individual himself. Moreover, I began to appreciate the influence of the other social sciences--sociology, economics, and psychology--in helping to explain why actors in various environments may act the way they do. Lastly, I became cognizant of the information explosion and the input overload with which Secretaries of State have had to cope. This has led to a healthy skepticism of government. Beyond this, the research has suggested that in too many instances there has been a plethora of verbiage and a paucity of solutions to the massive problems of the United States.

For much of this research I have had great assistance. I wish to thank the Rackham Graduate School for a grant and two National Defense Loans. Furthermore, I am grateful to the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution of the University of Michigan (Robert Hefner, Director) for financial, typing, and xeroxing assistance. My coders Harold Williams, Donna Hoff, Burt Livingston, and Ursula Conway also provided valuable aid. In addition, the Computer Assistance Program under the direction of Professor Bruce Bowen and guided by J. J.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study focuses on the public statements of American Secretaries of State during the period from 1946 to 1970. It is an attempt to describe how the Secretaries of State have talked about world politics. On a more analytical level the purpose is to evaluate Secretaries of States' public statements over time and to compare the conceptual perceptual framework of one Secretary with another. Finally, the purpose of the study is to draw from these comparisons inferences about the relative weight of various factors that might affect Secretaries of States' views of world politics.

The data base for the study includes public pronouncements by Secretaries of State George C. Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, and William P. Rogers. The primary source of data was material found in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin. This material consisted of (1) written speeches, (2) interviews, (3) congressional testimony, (4) letters to Congressmen and other officials, (5) press conferences, (6) lectures and public statements. Books by and about the Secretaries of State were not coded but were used as background material.

There are several reasons why the public pronouncements of Secretaries of State seem worthy of study. Important officials and their statements may give some clue to their personal attitudes.

The fact that there is a reasonable consistency in their public pronouncements might indicate this. The ideas expressed do not seem to change radically over time. But even if the statements do not necessarily reflect personal attitudes, what Secretaries of State say is politically important. Either taken at face value or viewed as sometimes subject to interpretations, these statements are regarded as sources of important cues and clues by both domestic and foreign audiences. Lastly, the statements provide a picture of the world--as seen by Secretaries of State--presented to both the American public and the rest of the world.[1]

The above advantages seem to outweigh the disadvantages of utilizing public pronouncements. These disadvantages include the facts that the Secretary did not write all these speeches, did not read the speeches in advance, changed some of the speeches, and did not agree with every idea stated. Moreover, not all the speeches that he made were recorded in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin. The Press Conferences were the only spontaneous public pronouncements and "clarifications" were sometimes later issued.

A. State of the Literature

1. Early Efforts: Institutional and Psychiatric Studies

Most early work on content analysis dealt with evaluations of Nazi propaganda and Alexander George's Propaganda Analysis--A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II was the seminal work in the area.[2] This study was important not only in constructing ways of using content analysis as a research tool but also more importantly in pointing to the tools as an aid in developing a

research perspective. In terms of studying the Secretary of State, authors have tended to use historical and psychological methods to ascertain why a particular man acted on a certain issue. Two of the works in this arena are Don K. Price, The Secretary of State and Norman A. Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition--American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century.[3] Personality studies also attempted to analyze important decision-makers and were helpful in making progress toward understanding motivations of important leaders. Two of the important endeavors--Louis Edinger, Kurt Schumacher, A Study in Personality and Political Behavior and Arnold Rogow, James A. Forrestal, A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy, illustrated the uses of psychiatry and psychology in the analysis of high level decision-makers.[4]

2. Biographies, Memoirs and Analyses of the Policies of the Secretaries of State

In-depth studies of the individual Secretaries of State have also contributed to an awareness of the complexities of the various Secretaries of State. Here Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall (three volumes), Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy--The Role of the Secretary of State as seen by Dean Acheson, John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles, and Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, A Reappraisal, demonstrated the possibilities of analyzing important men in a scholarly manner.[5] Books by the Secretaries of State Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation and John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change, for example, gave insights into the mind of the leader, himself.[6]

3. Comparative Studies and Model Building

More recently, scholars have attempted to build upon these

efforts and do comparative studies and/or utilize theory and model-building to try to analyze Secretaries of State and other important government officials. In the first of these, Milton C. Lodge--Soviet Elite Images Since Stalin--observed the views of important Russian leaders by analyzing their statements in certain newspapers and journals.[7] At about the same time, James A. Rosenau--"Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"--was hoping to develop a paradigm for studying politics and their leaders and listed five significant variables--idiosyncratic, role, systemic, governmental, and societal--that might give greater insight into how politics operate. The mix of these variables might conceivably suggest whether the polity was open or closed, democratic or totalitarian, and developing or developed.[8] H. K. Jacobson and W. E. Zimmerman--The Shaping of Foreign Policy--further analyzed these variables while Kenneth Boulding--The Image--and John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith--Image and Reality in World Politics--tried to tie perceptions of world politics to reality.[9]

Similarly, Fred Greenstein--Personality and Politics and "The Impact of Personality on Politics, An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," James D. Barber--"Two Weak Presidents"--and James D. Barber--The Presidential Character were constructing models to try to determine under which circumstances the personality (idiosyncratic) variable would be important, while Robert Jervis--"Hypotheses on Misperceptions"--was scrutinizing the consequences of not properly observing.[10]

During the 1960's, both Charles McClelland and Ole R. Holsti had been working on an analysis of foreign policy crises. C. A.

McClelland--"Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises--Quemoy and Matsu"--and Ole R. Holsti--"The Belief System and National Images--A Case Study"--had been trying to utilize content analysis to aid in the evaluation of specific situations (events) and personalities.[11] This effort culminated in David J. Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard R. Fagen--Enemies in Politics.[12] In that book the authors looked at theoretical dimensions of the idea of the enemy and applied these ideas to (1) Dulles and Russia, (2) Nkhrumah's Ghana and the politics of ideological justification, and (3) Castro's Revolution. Lastly, they helped provide an important framework for this thesis by helping to point out the importance of the enemy and helping to define the term.

B. Definitions of Friends, Enemies, Neutrals

The state of the literature provided the starting point for this study. Next, we will define certain terms and attempt to operationalize them. In the introduction to their book, Finlay, Holsti and Fagen noted that,

> . . . it is clear that in the practice of politics men do make distinctions between friends and enemies, that they act upon these distinctions and that their actions have consequences for the course and conduct of political life.[13]

This study, a comparative analysis of the public pronouncements of these Secretaries of State, is concerned with a description of the various Secretaries of States' views and how they vary in terms of media, audience, and object nation. It is understood that these individuals in government perceived friends, enemies, and neutrals. This author hopes to learn how they involed images of friends,

enemies, and neutrals, for what purposes, and with what consequences.

An image helps orient the Secretary to his environment, defines it for him, and helps identify its salient characteristics. These images also take on increased importance because "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[14]

The label "enemy" is attached to whoever or whatever is perceived as threatening. The "enemy" is also the antagonist. As Holsti, et al., noted:

> "What is an enemy?" Militarily the answer is clear. It is the armed forces of a nation with which there is overt or latent hostility which might lead to war. Politically an enemy . . . refers to those who are in "opposition" or those who oppose our power aspirations and ends. . . . Socially the enemy consists of one's foes, those whom we feel are trying to attack us, or those toward whom we have ill-feelings or hatred.[15]

Furthermore,

> Minimally, the symbol of the enemy is a convenient means for intimidating and damning opponents and antagonists. . . . More importantly, images of "we" and "they" are significant in establishing one's own identity, in legitimizing actions and programs, and providing rationales and models for attaining goals. Invoking the enemy makes it possible to moralize by counter-example.[16]

In addition,

> Insofar as a political system requires combat with an antithesis, its unity and cohesion are dependent upon the existence of enemies; if they are not present, they must be created, or the social and political edifice of control weakens or disintegrates or changes into a new and unpredictable form.[17]

For purposes of this endeavor, ENEMIES are those countries with communist governments against which the United States has been aligned since 1947. The effect of images of enemies is greater polarization of good and evil. FRIENDS are those countries with which the United States has been allied formally since World War II.

The alliance might be through NATO, SEATO, or through a bi-lateral treaty. Friends have capitalistic economic systems, receive American foreign aid, cooperate with the United States in the United Nations, and are generally trusted by America.[18] NEUTRALS are those countries that have proclaimed themselves to be neutral, attended the Bandung Conference of 1955, and were viewed as neutrals by the United States during a large part of the period 1946-1970. Neutrals may or may not have a capitalist economic system, support the United States infrequently in the United States, and received foreign aid from both FRIENDS and ENEMIES (capitalist and communist) countries. All neutralist countries are former colonies.[19] Lastly, decision makers frequently talk about nations as the "other guy" and there is surface validity as to whether the "other guy" is a friend, enemy or neutral.

The following countries were included as objects of the Secretaries of States' observations:

FRIENDS	NEUTRALS	ENEMIES
Great Britain	India	North Korea
France	Egypt	North Viet Nam
West Germany		China
South Korea		Russia
South Viet Nam		
Taiwan		

Countries selected for scrutiny were chosen on the basis of number of times the countries were mentioned in speeches in the pretest and the Marshall Secretaryship and the span of attention by the Secretaries of State. The greater the number of times a particular country was mentioned, the higher the likelihood of being chosen. Similarly, North Viet Nam was selected over Cuba because there were more speeches toward North Viet Nam over a longer period of time than

toward Cuba.[20] Constraints of time and money mandated the number of countries studied as twelve. The number of countries in the friends, enemies, and neutrals categories was decided on the proportion of speeches in the pre-test and the Marshall Secretaryship devoted to each category of object-countries.

We will observe the images of the various Secretaries of State toward these nations on various dimensions described in detail in Chapter II. We will analyze these perceptions to see if the views of the Secretaries of State change and to compare the world views of one Secretary with another. Then we will venture into the most speculative part of the dissertation, drawing inferences about factors that might influence Secretaries' views of the world. Attention will be focused on the personality, office, and situational variables.

C. Definitions of the Personality, Office, and Situational Variables

> There is a great deal of political activity which can be explained adequately only by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved.[21]

The Secretary's personally developed world outlook has a pronounced impact on his statements about world politics. If a Secretary of State has a distinctive view at the outset of his tenure in office and maintains it over time, then I assume the personality variable is important. His views made in public pronouncements can be evaluated and compared.

It is assumed that personality characteristics are not randomly distributed in institutional roles, that personality characteristics are as important as social characteristics in influencing

behavior, that individual actors may have great impact on specific events, and that individuals with varying characteristics may tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations.[22] Beyond this, social characteristics are many times revealed through personal characteristics. They can thus be interpenetrable. Moreover, sometimes it will be necessary to scrutinize the individual's private domain of wife, career, and past friends to better understand the influence of the personality variable.

When and under what circumstances is the personality variable important? In this thesis the "Great Man" theory of Sydney Hook, the theory that the individual is unimportant, and points in between, will be analyzed.

As Greenstein suggested,

> The likelihood of personal impact varies with the personal strength of the actor.
> There is greater room for personal variability in the peripheral than in the central aspects.[23]

That is, new situations or situations of lesser importance (as perceived by the Secretary of State) leave room for greater personality influence than core issues or crucial issues.

Furthermore,

> The more demanding the political act--the more it is not merely a conventionally expected performance--the greater the likelihood that it will vary with the personal characteristics of the actor.[24]

> Ambiguous situations leave room for personal variability to manifest itself . . . or completely new situations, very complex situations, or contradictory situations in which there are no familiar cues.[25]

> The more emotionally involved a person is in [a situation], the greater the likelihood that his personal characteristics

will affect his personal behavior.[26]

Besides incorporating Greenstein's ideas into the study, this author will adapt Barber's analysis of the Presidential character to the study of Secretaries of State.[27] In The Presidential Character Barber probed the characters, styles, and world views of recent American presidents from Taft to Nixon, and examined each in terms of their psychological backgrounds and reactions to various situations.[28]

As Bill Moyers noted in a review in the Saturday Review,

> The book is an effort to see the man whole--not as some abstract embodiment of civic virtue, some scorecard on issue stands, or some reflections of a faction, but as a human being like the rest of us, a person trying to cope with a difficult environment.[29]

In attempting to determine whether the President makes his environment or is passively made by it, Barber evaluated Presidential performance. Presidential performance was analyzed by observing how actively a President exercised power, and whether or not he gave the impression he enjoyed his political life.[30] In doing the study, Barber constructed a four-fold classification scheme--deciding whether Presidents were active-negative, passive-negative, passive-positive, or active-positive.[31]

The active-negative desires power but does not get pleasure from using it, and when he makes a mistake he is twisted with guilt. Perhaps, worst of all, he cannot laugh at himself. The active-negative is compulsively-active, is motivated by anxiety, and has difficulty controlling his more aggressive emotions.[32] Moreover,

> He is highly suspicious--feels constantly called on to defend his policies as though [these] policies were his manhood . . .

> . . . feels he is all alone, trusts only his mind, and . . . takes defeat as a personal insult.[33]

In a similar way, the passive-negative does not enjoy power. The passive-negatives, in Barber's analysis of Coolidge and Eisenhower, do not enjoy politics, are motivated by painful sense of duty, do very little, retreat from demands, and emphasize civic virtues and vague principles.[34]

The passive positives tend to be cheerful, "tail-wagging" Presidents who spend more time trying to get people to love them than to achieve something. According to Barber, Taft and Harding not only were "receptive, compliant, and other-directed," but also searched for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative.[35] In addition,

> They are not qualified for high office, although they are personally attractive, and while they achieve little, they enjoy the adulation that comes with the office.[36]

Lastly, the active-positives want most to achieve results. They do a lot and appear to enjoy doing it. They were more productive.[37] Concomitantly, as Robert Sherwood noted in The Nation,

> Active-positives had a healthier view of life, enjoyment of power and high self-esteem. . . . But this doesn't mean that they are any less dangerous in foreign affairs.[38]

Thus, even though Barber fails to take into account political orientation in his analysis, fails to indicate how one selects which childhood experiences are the important ones, uses only sources that will support his model, and ignores the possibility that the active-positive type might be the result of ideological convictions rather than psychological make-up, his four-fold classification

paradigm may be a useful one in studying the Secretary of State.

The office variable is assumed to be an intervening variable, and to be taken as a constant for purposes of this study. The office is a filter and the background has an impact on events funneled through the bureaucracy and the position. It is assumed that the office is stable, static, and given. Included in the office variable are a set of status partners--(1) the President and his staff, (2) Under-Secretaries of State, (3) State Department, (4) relevant Congressional Committee Chairmen, (5) the General Public. There also are demands, expectations, history of diplomacy and information that are funneled through the office. These events are limiting experiences and tend to trap the Secretary of State. It is also assumed that the socialization process around the Secretary of State is uniform.[39] Because this is assumed to be true, frequency of statements is not a clue to the strength of the office.

Although Presidents may be active-negative, passive-negative, passive-positive, or active-positive, it seems likely that Secretaries of State are usually active-positive. That is, they usually show an orientation toward productiveness as a value and an ability to use their styles flexibly and adaptively. Furthermore, they show an enthusiasm for the job, try to develop mastery over the situation, and are goal-oriented.[40] Secretaries of State may follow the President on all issues, may approve only on foreign policy issues, or may have their own ideas on certain issues. The Secretary of State, however, serves at the pleasure of the President and will usually agree with the President on issues of major importance, or resign, or in the majority

of cases will be asked to resign. The "special recruitment" process by which Secretaries of State are chosen seems to cull out in this time period all but the active-positives--but especially the passive-negatives.

> Passive negatives do not enjoy politics, lack the experience and flexibility to perform effectively as political leaders, have a tendency to withdraw and escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles and procedural arrangements.[41]

There is a continuum on the active-positive scale that can be measured. The frequency, intensity, and object of the public statements provide the evidence that indicate at least some willingness to discuss issues and decisions. The office demands a certain degree of activity and certain decisions have to be made. Thus, by examination of the evidence reviewed, the activity of Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, Rusk and Rogers can be compared.

Secretaries of State make more speeches than the President. The President may also have more latitude than the Secretary. Whereas the President has data funneled and collapsed, the Secretary of State is overwhelmed by data and becomes engrossed in details. Thus, Barber's paradigm seems applicable to this endeavor.

The situation variable is the "outside event" variable. It would be an important determinant if a certain event or series of occurrences changed a Secretary of State's views temporarily or permanently. Differences in frequency of speeches, geographic concentration of interests, intensity, and change in status all would point to the importance of the situation variable.

In addition, interpretations of trends of a longer period of

time might lead to the importance of the situational variable. For instance, ambiguous, neutral images under Marshall, followed by hardening of (i.e., more hostile) images under Acheson and Dulles, followed by a moderation (i.e., less hostile) under Rusk and Rogers would suggest that the pressures of situations would indeed be important.

D. Difficulties, Disclaimers, Caveats

The problems of separating personality, office, and situational variables are immense. B. F. Skinner has suggested that personality and office factors cannot be separate, but we must assume that they can and try to interpret and prove the difficult or impossible.[42] Because the variables are interrelated, the task of trying to separate them cleanly cannot be the major thrust of this work but political scientists must deal with the problem. Furthermore, neither personality theory nor role theory is up to the task. Psychiatric biographies of Kurt Schumacher and James Forrestal were criticized as being unicausal and unidimensional, generalizing only on the basis of one person and a few selected events, and excluding a multiplicity of factors that might have contributed to the individual's perception.[43] Macro and trend analysis are criticized for being too unicausal and unidimensional, and excluding the individual. Even Greenstein, Erikson, and Coles admit that they still cannot predict the circumstances under which office overwhelms personality and vice-versa.[44] Besides this, situational factors are also sometimes interspersed in the office (role). Short range situational factors such as role ambiguity, role conflict, and role change along with conflict

between office (role) and personality factors may also be part of situational components.

The assumptions might also create problems. This study is considering public statements and interpreting personally motivated behavior from them. Some statements are for short range public reaction and others are for longer term and it is difficult to separate and evaluate them adequately. Besides this, we can only speculate on the differences between private documents versus public documents and those things that are not recorded at all because they are too sensitive. Moreover, we do not differentiate between those statements made for short range Congressional reaction versus those made for Presidential reaction, statements for personal power, prestige, and status, and statements for personal psychological adjustment reasons.

All we have available for analysis are the public pronouncements. And even here there are problems. Not all the speeches of the Secretary of State are recorded for the period; nor were accurate records kept; nor were they all written by the Secretary of State (but were sanctioned speeches or statements that the Secretary of State allowed to be issued under his name).

Lastly, we are trying to analyze, interpret, and attribute reasons where none may have been. The causal relationship may form a different pattern from the one we may think to be valid. We are looking back at the past twenty-four years and attempting to make some sense of what really happened and why--told from the public pronouncements of the five Secretaries of State. Yet as C. V. Wedgewood noted: "We know the end before we consider the beginning, and



we can never wholly recapture what it was like to know the beginning only."[45]

In spite of the above caveats, it is necessary and important to describe the Secretaries of States' views toward Friends, Enemies and Neutrals and attempt to make meaningful inferences from the data. It is also important because the state of the world in the years 1947-1970 and almost all that happened during them was wholly novel within the experience of those who had to deal with it and the individual Secretaries who were leaders then played a vital part in setting the main lines of American foreign policy for many years to come. It is hoped that this study will provide some new insights into that critical era.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]Robert North, Content Analysis (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1963).

[2]Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1959); Frank Auld and Edward Murray, "Content Analysis: Studies of Psycho-therapy," Psychological Bulletin, 52:377-395.

[3]Don K. Price, The Secretary of State (New York: Columbia Press, 1962); Norman Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition--American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

[4]Louis Edinger, Kurt Schumacher--A Study in Personality and Political Behavior (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1965); Arnold Rogow, James A. Forrestal, A Study of Personality, Politics and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1963.

[5]Forest Pogue, George C. Marshall, 3 vols. (New York: The Viking Press, 1966); Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy --The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson (New York: Odyssey Press, 1969); John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954); Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles--A Reappraisal (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962).

[6]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969); John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

[7]Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Images Since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

[8]James A. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," pp. 27-93, in R. Barry Farrell, Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

[9]Harold K. Jacobson and William E. Zimmerman, The Shaping of Foreign Policy (New York: Atherton Press Controversy, 1969); Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith, Image and Reality in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

[10]Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969); Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," pp. 74-94 in Aaron Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); James D. Barber, "Clarifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two

'Weak' Presidents," pp. 94-121 in Aaron Wildavsky, op. cit.; James D. Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," pp. 239-255 in James A. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1969).

[11]Charles A. McClelland, "Action Structures and Communication in Two International Crises," pp. 473-483 in James A. Rosenau, op. cit.,; Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," pp. 543-551 in Rosenau, op. cit.

[12]David Finlay, Ole R. Holsti, and Richard Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1967).

[13]Ibid., p. vi.

[14]Stupak, op. cit., pp. 111-118.

[15]Finlay, et al., op. cit., p. 1.

[16]Ibid., p. 19.

[17]Ibid., p. 22.

[18]Bruck Russett and H. R. Alker, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[19]India was a former British Colony. Egypt was under the tutelage of Great Britain until 1954.

[20]U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vols. xxviii-lxiii, 1953-1970.

[21]Greenstein, in Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 74.

[22]Ibid., pp. 76-80.

[23]Sydney Hook, The Hero in History (New York: John Day, 1943); ibid., p. 86.

[24]Ibid., p. 86.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., p. 87.

[27]Barber, The Presidential Character.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Bill Moyers, "What Manner of Man in the Big White House?" Saturday Review (August 5, 1972), pp. 49-51.

[30]Barber, The Presidential Character.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Robert Sherill, "Review," The Nation, CCXV, No. 1 (July 10, 1972), pp. 21-22.

[33]Ibid., p. 22.

[34]Ibid.; Moyers, op. cit., p. 50.

[35]Sherrill, op. cit., p. 22; Moyers, op. cit., p. 50.

[36]Moyers, op. cit., p. 50.

[37]Sherrill, op. cit., p. 22.

[38]Ibid., p. 22.

[39]In 1949, Secretary of Defense James A. Forrestal committed suicide. It is likely that the pressures from the office had a strong impact on him.

[40]Barber, op. cit., p. 12.

[41]Ibid., p. 13.

[42]B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: A. Knopf, 1971).

[43]Edinger, op. cit.; Rogow, op. cit.

[44]Greenstein, op. cit.; Erik Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968); Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1950); Robert Coles, Eric Erikson--The Growth of His Work (New York: Little, Brown, 1970).

[45]C. V. Wedgewood, William the Silent (New York: Norton, 1955), p. 35; also quoted in Acheson, op. cit., in the Apologia Pro Libro Hoc.

CHAPTER II

DATA TECHNIQUES

In this chapter we will discuss content analysis, speech and situation selection, dimensions and their selection, factor analysis, and "efficacy" and "basis of conflict." We will select, define, and try to operationalize the variables so that a comparison of the world views of the various Secretaries can be made.

A. Content Analysis

In this study, the Secretaries of State gave 1406 speeches, cited other countries, praised and damned them, and attempted to justify their positions. It was decided that content analysis was the best method of evaluating the data from these public pronouncements. Content analysis is used in the social sciences as one means of studying communications--its nature, its underlying meanings, and its dymanic processes. Procedures aim to be exact and repeatable, to minimize any vagueness or bias resulting from judgments of a single investigator.[1] Content analysis has been successfully used in the twentieth century to analyze newspapers and propaganda themes and to examine the results of psychiatric interviews.[2] In the past twenty years, content analysis has been employed to study small group behavior, the psychological state of suicidal individuals, historical documents, and various values of culture and society.[3]

The advantages of content analysis include:

(1) Time, labor and expense can often be saved when the researcher can go directly to the heart of his analysis, bypassing preliminary field work, experimentation, or commissioning of documents.

(2) When massive data are required, beyond the scope of a single new study, existing content materials frequently provide sources.

(3) Available data afford the only means of studying certain kinds of problems--such as historical events.[4]

(4) Certain verbal and other symbols can be easily sifted from public pronouncements and other data that can be scrutinized and compared.

On the other hand, certain pitfalls await the researcher who employs the technique of content analysis. The disadvantages of content analysis include:

(1) Materials are often incomplete.

(2) Data may lack validity and reliability.

(3) Data from differing sociotemporal contexts may not be directly comparable. There may be changes over time or methods of selection.

(4) The data that come to the researcher in a form he does not fully understand may not fit his definitions of the concepts under scrutiny. He may be unfamiliar with the circumstances under which the communications originally took place. The content may also depend on whether the document was written for public or private consumption, and any statement may depend upon the audience or be

subject to interviewer bias.[5]

(5) One statement may have to be coded for many categories or on many dimensions. The communicator may not have had that many ideas in mind when the communication was made.

(6) The number of units including the objects, topics, and responses have to be analyzed in a manageable fashion and the communication may not always be in the proper form.

(7) If the total record of communications is included, space problems may result.

In content analysis the researcher is attempting to break down perceptions and hoping to observe orientations, actions, and characteristics. In doing this he wants to explain the relationship between the communicators, recipients and the patterned content of the communications themselves.[6] The methods for arriving at interpretations are less certain than other methods and there is much discussion and confusion about the kinds of inferences which are appropriate or valid.[7]

Nevertheless, these interpretations shed light on historical change and the dynamic processes of communicative interaction. They often go behind the meanings of the language to the underlying social structure of the group or the psychological state of the individual.[8] Thus, even though these complex techniques may be applied blindly, content analysis can be a very useful tool.

B. Speeches, Tenure, Situation Selection

This useful tool was employed in interpreting public pronouncements of the Secretaries. Speeches given by the Secretary of

State and recorded in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin on substantive issues provided the data base. Speeches in which the Secretary of State welcomed a new ambassador, dedicated the new State Department Building, and gave speeches on internal matters to his bureaucratic personnel were omitted (N = 71). Non-substantive speeches included ceremonial, non-target, and retirement speeches. In a few cases there were some difficulties in deciding whether a speech was related to a theme of the study. In those cases a panel of three coders, including the author, decided whether or not to include the speech in the data base. The following summary (Table 1) indicates the number of speeches given by each Secretary of State.

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE
"IN OFFICE" AND "OUT OF OFFICE"

Secretary of State	In Office	Out of Office	Total
1. George C. Marshall	107	1	108
2. Dean Acheson	283	10	293
3. John Foster Dulles	524	20	544
4. Dean Rusk	375	10	385
5. William P. Rogers	40	0	40
TOTAL[9]	1329	41	1370

Thus, the total number of speeches coded was 1370. Because there were missing data and duplication (i.e., statements in Press Conferences that were later "clarified" in "Press Releases"), the total N was 1406.

The theme was the unit of analysis. Because the number of

speeches for many countries (i.e., India, North Viet Nam) and for many variables was too low for fruitful analysis and generalization, speeches were broken down into themes.[10] On the basis of the pre-test of twenty items, it was learned that there were on the average about four themes per page. It was decided simply to code every theme. The total number of speeches in the data base was 1406 and the total number of themes equaled 5435.

Furthermore, it was decided that each Secretary of State's tenure should be divided into four quarters.[11] We wanted to compare each Secretary with the others and two slices did not give enough comparison and eight slices reduced the number of themes to a much too low level. Since each Secretary served about the equivalent of a multiple of a six-month period, that time period, or a multiple, was selected as one-quartile. In this way, Secretary of State Marshall served two years; Acheson served four years; Dulles held office for slightly longer than six years; Rusk was Secretary for eight years; and Rogers (in this sample) was Secretary for one year. Thus, for Marshall each quartile was six months long; for Acheson each quartile was one year long; for Dulles each quartile was one and one-half years long; and for Rusk each quartile was two years long. William P. Rogers only made forty speeches in his first year and his tenure was not broken down into quartiles. (See Table 2.)

In a similar way we had to choose which specific situations or events should be included in this sample. These events were utilized in such a fashion so that it was possible to measure the temporary or permanent impact of a particular event. That is, if a

TABLE 2

SECRETARIES OF STATE: TENURE AND LENGTH OF QUARTILES

Secretary of State	Length of Tenure	Length of Quartile
1. George C. Marshall	1947-1949	6 months
2. Dean Acheson	1949-1953	1 year
3. John Foster Dulles	1953-1959	1 1/2 years
4. Dean Rusk	1961-1969	2 years
5. William P. Rogers	1969-1970	-------

particular perception increased or decreased greatly on the scale (0.4), then that event might have had impact. The fifty-seven events were chosen from the World Event Interaction Survey done by Charles McClelland. In using content analysis of the New York Times during the 1950's to analyze American foreign policy toward Formosa, McClelland demonstrated the utility and appropriateness of matching events and individuals.[12] Many of the events used in that study were employed in this endeavor. Other events were added to the list by discerning from the New York Times Index those events mentioned more than ten times and listed as among the top ten events of the year in the World Almanac. The events began with Aid to Greece and Turkey in March 1947 and go up to the Chinese Cultural Revolution in October 1969. Corroboration of the importance of certain events was obtained from The United States in World Affairs and Information Please Almanac.[13] It was decided that there would be at least one important event during each quartile of every Secretary's tenure (except Rogers). The choice of other events was determined on the basis of evidence from

the New York Times Index and the other documents. The fifty-seven events are thus reference points against which to observe speeches and themes. If an event or a group of events were related to a secretary's perception of an object country or an issue, then it is possible to examine some of the reasons why an event may have had a temporary or permanent impact. (This can be measured by means of coding done by content analysis or by analysis of the results of the coding.)

C. Factor Selection and Examples

The speeches and the themes in those speeches were content analyzed on a one to seven scale. Number "4" was the neutral point. Thus, for the Friendship-Hostility dimension, the chart appears:

	Moderately		Neutral		Moderately	
Friendship	2		4		6	Hostility
1		3		5		7
Extremely		Somewhat		Somewhat		Extremely

The data is considered ordinal. The importance lies not in the assignment of a "2" or "3" to a speech or theme but in the trend or cumulative effect.[14] The seven-point scale was used for all the categories (factors) according to which the Secretaries of States' views concerning countries were coded. (See Table 3.)

Ten of the categories from Table 3 were taken from Charles Osgood's Measurement of Meaning and Holsti, North, et al., Content Analysis.[15] On the basis of the twenty pre-test items, it was decided to construct Win-Lose, Permanent-Transitory, and Simple-Complex as additional categories. Each category was employed wherever it was judged relevant.

TABLE 3

CATEGORIES ON WHICH THE SECRETARIES OF STATE VIEWED COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

Categories	Categories
1. Friendship-Hostility	8. Dominant-Submissive
2. Trust-Suspicion	9. Cooperative-Unilateral
3. Win-Lose	10. Confident-Fearful
4. Strong-Weak	11. Involvement-Noninvolvement
5. Active-Passive	12. Satisfaction-Frustration
6. Simple-Complex	13. Permanent-Transitory
7. Good-Bad	

Friendship-Hostility was considered a synonym of amity-enmity. Secretaries tended to look at countries in terms of those they liked and those they disliked. It is assumed that one is usually friendly to allies and hostile toward enemies. For instance, Dean Rusk on March 7, 1966, said that

> We believe that our relations with Mexico have never been better. In early 1964 our two countries were successful in settling the chamizal dispute. . . . Mexico is . . . a show window of the Alliance for Progress.[16]

The above theme received a "1" (extremely friendly) on the Friendship-Hostility dimension. How a Secretary of State feels about a country we would assume to be related to his policy perspectives toward it and whether he considers it friendly or not will certainly bear on this.

Likewise, whether the Secretary of State trusts or is suspicious of a country is part of his image of the country. In a sense, trust-suspicion is an indication of whether the Secretary considers the object country's statements and actions to be credible and in the

interests of the United States. A score on the suspicion side of the scale would indicate a skepticism on the part of the Secretary. For example, George Marshall on June 11, 1947, said that,

> There could be no more fantastic misrepresentation, no more malicious distortion of the truth than the frequent propaganda assertions or the implications that the U.S. has imperialist aims, or that American aid has been offered in order to fasten upon the recipients some form of economic domination.[17]

The above theme received a "7" (extremely suspicious) on the Trust-Suspicion dimension.

In a similar way, win-lose represents a continuum of optimism-pessimism. This category looks at the Secretary's views of the eventual outcome of the interaction. Throughout the research it was evident that for various reasons the Secretaries attempted to build up the opponent and be pessimistic about the eventual outcome. Beyond this, a Win score also meant that either the Secretary believed that the United States would come out ahead vis-a-vis the object nation or gain support, influence, prestige, wealth, or status while a Lose score would signify a pessimistic view of an outcome that might be manifested in a loss of territory, prestige, support, or influence. It was also indeed possible to have a losing position with an ally (i.e., French withdrawal from NATO). An illustrative case occurred on May 26, 1952 when Dean Acheson said that,

> To work with and to develop this combination of power which is essential to our survival, we must develop policies and programs which are broader than our own immediate interests. We must develop policies and programs which are broad enough to include the interest of those who want to associate with us. . . . Force alone cannot solve the problems we are dealing with. But the force we are building is absolutely necessary to prevent our adversary from attempting by force to resolve these issues in their favor.[18]

The above theme received a "2" on the Win-Lose dimension.

In the same vein, Dean Rusk on December 31, 1962, said that,

> We will give additional attention to the growing process of political consultation in NATO. . . . We want to have a better understanding of policy and, to the extent possible, coordinate our efforts.[19]

That theme also received a "2" (moderately optimistic) on the Win-Lose scale.

The Strong-Weak category was an evaluation of the object country's military and economic capability. It was to a great degree an appraisal of what the Secretary of State thought the object country could do. It also had as an integral part his view of the object country's Gross National Product. Countries with a high GNP usually were considered strong militarily. For example, on July 2, 1956, John Foster Dulles said that,

> The forces of despotism are more highly organized than ever before. Already they control 1/3 of the human race, and they openly proclaim their ambition to extend their system throughout the world. So far, their gains have come through the use of violence, or the threat of violence. . . . No nation has accepted communism voluntarily.[20]

This speech received a "1" (very strong) on the Strong-Weak dimension.

And on November 1, 1968, Dean Rusk observed that,

> When you look at the source of the violence--these young people coming in from North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam and Laos, obviously the way to get peace is to stop that which has been interrupting the peace and that means that these people who have been coming South to seize the country have to stop doing it.[21]

This, too, received a "1" (very strong) on the Strong-Weak scale.

Active-Passive was a coding of a country on a scale of

dynamism-quietude on the world scene. It looked at the Secretary's perception of the country's participation in the world. Was the country doing its share in the UN? Did the country contribute to world peace? Did it manifest a revisionist or status quo foreign policy? Did it get along well with its neighbors? Did it try to impose its ideology or will on others by persuasion, subversion, or force? Was the country helping the United States to get out of a war, negotiate, or mitigate conflict? All these aspects were considered on this scale. A good illustration occurred on November 12, 1962 when Dean Rusk noticed that,

> The communist regime in Cuba with the complicity of its Soviet members has deceived the hemisphere, under the cloak of secrecy and with loud protestations of arming for self-defense, is . . . establishing an offensive military foothold in the heart of the hemisphere.[22]

That theme received a "1" on the Active-Passive scale. Active-Passive in this sense is defined in a different way from the use of active-passive discussed in Chapter I regarding personality.

The Simple--Complex scale indicated the Secretary's view as to whether a problem relevant to a target country had a logical, easily defined solution or was tortuous, complex, and difficult to resolve. The former--those amenable to solution--were labeled "simple." The others were designated "complex." Those problems that were viewed as soluble in three or fewer steps were also seen as "simple" while those which required four or more steps were seen as "complex." Illustrative of this was a speech given by Dean Rusk on August 10, 1964 in which he noted that,

> . . . We do have many problems that arise out of this great

> confrontation between communism and the free world. This is the underlying crisis of the day. The contest is between the U.N. kind of world order on the one side and a communist world revolution kind of world order on the other.[23]

This theme received a "2" (moderately simple solution) on the Simple-Complex dimension.

In some speeches there was so much information that we coded on several dimensions per theme. As an example, on November 6, 1968 Dean Rusk suggested that,

> The present struggle out there is not just over the Republic of Viet Nam, but over Southeast Asia as a whole. The threat to Southeast Asia is not mitigated by the fact that the communist world may not be a puppet of Peking. For Mao and Ho have both preached the same doctrine of militant communism and have promised the same techniques of expansion through so-called "wars of national liberation."[24]

This multiple coding presented some difficulties but a panel decided that the mean score would count as the one entered. Fortunately, agreement was high. On the above theme the panel assigned a "1" to the Strong-Weak dimension, a "7" to the Friendship-Hostility dimension, and a "7" to the Trust-Suspicion scale.

Lastly, active-passive was defined separate from the events and simple-complex was discovered to be unrealted to activism-pessimism.

D. Factor Analysis

Because the analysis of all thirteen dimensions would have involved an inordinate amount of work and duplication, a factor analysis was performed so as to ease the process of selection into a smaller number of categories. The factor analysis determined that there were only three separate factors.

TABLE 4

FACTORS AND NUMBER OF STATEMENTS
ON THE THIRTEEN DIMENSIONS

Factors	Number of Statements
Factor I	
1. Friendship-Hostility	1706
2. Good-Bad	1746
3. Confident-Fearful	1776
4. Trust-Suspicion	1393
5. Win-Lose	568
6. Satisfaction-Frustration	1051
7. Permanent-Transitory	772
Factor II	
1. Strong-Weak	1255
2. Active-Passive	868
3. Dominant-Submissive	692
4. Involvement-Noninvolvement	1207
Residual (Factor III)	
1. Cooperative-Unilateral	1494
2. Simple-Complex	1426

In the factor analysis the computer first gave the total correlation matrix, then the characteristic roots, then the characteristic column vectors, the characteristic roots, the factor matrix, communality estimates, the varimax factor rotation with criterion values and differences, the transformation matrix, the oblimin factor rotation with criterion values and differences, vector convergences, and number of iterations, then a normalized solution (reference structure V), then transformation matrix lamda and diagonal matrix D, Primary Pattern P, transformation matrix 7, the correlations between

Primary Factors and the contributions of primary factors and the Primary Structure S. The Primary Structure S is the final solution in the factor analysis and shows the correlations between and among the thirteen variables (see Table 5).

Those factors with high positive correlation scores are found in Factor I, those with high and medium positive correlation scores under the second heading are found in Factor II, and those with negative correlation scores under the first heading and with a low positive score--under +0.40--under the second heading are the Residual or Factor III.

All 1406 speeches and 5435 themes were utilized in the factor analysis. The per cent of variance explained by Factor I is 57.4 per cent and by Factor II is 17.7 per cent.[25]

In order to select out the six variables that were to be analyzed in the study, we employed five criteria: (1) correlation score, (2) number of statements, (3) representativeness of the factor, (4) facility in drawing inferences, (5) interest of the results. The difficulties that the coders encountered with some of the dimensions were also considered. Since those dimensions in Factor I were interchangeable with each other it was decided to select those that were slightly different in meaning. The higher the correlation score and the greater the number of statements, the better the chance that a particular variable had of being selected. Interest, representativeness, and facility in drawing inferences were determined on the basis of the twenty pre-test items, an analysis of the Marshall Secretaryship, and information from the coders on the validity of the

TABLE 5
THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE THIRTEEN VARIABLES

A.	By Total	1	2
1.	Friendship-Hostility	0.92006	-0.40755
2.	Good-Bad	0.92108	-0.27899
3.	Strong-Weak	0.03344	0.63077
4.	Active-Passive	-0.33805	0.91481
5.	Dominant-Submissive	-0.56743	0.81450
6.	Cooperative-Unilateral	-0.83152	0.39175
7.	Simplex-Complex	-0.27518	0.24259
8.	Confident-Fearful	0.89111	0.00390
9.	Involvement-Noninvolvement	-0.10737	0.50985
10.	Trust-Suspicion	0.91539	-0.32744
11.	Win-Lose	0.96748	-0.24986
12.	Satisfaction-Frustration	0.90661	0.01562
13.	Permanent-Transitory	0.87454	-0.11284
B.	Divided by Heading		
	Factor I	1	2
1.	Friendship-Hostility	+0.92066	-0.40755
2.	Good-Bad	+0.92108	-0.27899
3.	Confident-Fearful	+0.89111	+0.00390
4.	Trust-Suspicion	+0.91539	-0.32744
5.	Win-Lose	+0.96748	-0.24968
6.	Satisfaction-Frustration	+0.90661	+0.01562
7.	Permanent-Transitory	+0.87454	-0.11284
	Factor II	1	2
1.	Strong-Weak	+0.03344	+0.63077
2.	Active-Passive	-0.33805	+0.91481
3.	Dominant-Submissive	-0.56743	+0.81450
4.	Involvement-Noninvolvement	-0.10737	+0.50985
	Residual or Factor III	1	2
1.	Cooperative-Unilateral	-0.83152	+0.39175
2.	Simple-Complex	-0.27518	+0.24259

dimension's results. Where there was controversy as to which factors to select, the panel of coders voted on the choices. The number of dimensions selected for analysis in the study was determined on the proportion in each factor. Thus, the original matrix had seven categories in Factor I, four categories in Factor II, and two categories in the Residual. Because we decided to analyze six categories in all, it was considered appropriate to select three categories from Factor I, two categories from Factor II, and one dimension from the Residual. The final six dimensions chosen for study were:

Factor I	Factor II	Residual
1. Friendship-Hostility	1. Strong-Weak	1. Simple-Complex
2. Trust-Suspicion	2. Active-Passive	
3. Win-Lose		

There were five coders including the author. Although three different people coded Dulles' speeches, generally each person coded all the speeches of a different Secretary of State. On a pre-test of twenty items, the intercoder reliability of the four other coders was between .85 and .92. My scores correlated at between .83 and .92 with the other coders. Thus, the five coders agreed on at least 75 per cent of the coding and sometimes as high as 90 per cent.[26] Although there were biases in the coding, it is believed that the overall results reasonably reflect the various Secretaries of State's views.

E. Efficacy and Basis of Conflict

Before leaving the question of methods and data, one other point needs to be considered and this concerns definitions of

"efficacy" and "basis of conflict" and how they are used in this study. Because they were different kinds of categories from the above thirteen categories, they were not amenable to factor analysis. (1) Efficacy is the ability of a country to carry out or implement what it says it will do. Countries with high efficacy are perceived to have a relatively high Gross National Product, a good military force, and the potential and ability to carry out what it says it is going to do. (2) The perception of the basis of conflict between the United States and Russia was also studied. Differences between countries can be due to differences in political and economic systems (ideology); differences in military and economic capability (power); and differences in control of territory or influence upon or over other nations (spheres of influence).

We have now looked at content analysis as a scholarly tool. In addition, we have discussed how speeches and themes were selected for study, how tenure was broken down into quartiles, and how situations were selected for inclusion. Lastly, we have looked at factor selection and have considered some of the reasons for including efficacy and basis of conflict within the scope of the endeavor.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]Clarence Stoll, "Content Analysis," p. 371 in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. III (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

[2]Ibid., pp. 371-372.

[3]Ibid., pp. 372-373; Ole Holsti, Robert North, Content Analysis (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1963).

[4]Stoll, op. cit., pp. 373-374.

[5]Ibid., pp. 374-376.

[6]Ibid., p. 376.

[7]Ibid., pp. 376-377.

[8]Ibid., p. 377.

[9]"Out of office" means before and after tenure. There were only four speeches after tenure and they were made by Dean Acheson.

[10]In many cases the N was too low in speeches for useful evaluation while other times it was adequate. Throughout the thesis, unless the word "speeches" is used, themes are indicated. Thus, observations, themes, statements, and perceptions are synonyms.

The data of the speech or statement listed in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin is the date that the speech or statement was in the Bulletin and not the date that the speech or statement was given.

[11]The computer program used was OSIRIS II. That particular program found it very difficult to handle coding and ordering by year. The choice then was between equal time periods, equal quartiles, or equal number of speeches. It was decided that "equal quartiles" was the best choice.

[12]See Footnote 11, Chapter I.

[13]New York Times Index, 1947-1970; Richard Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1970 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947-1970); Information Please Almanac (New York: Dan Golen, Paul, et al., 1947-1970); United States Foreign Policy, 1947-1970 (24 vols.; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office).

[14]Charles Osgood, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

[15]Ibid.; Holsti, North, op. cit.

[16]Dean Rusk, "The Chain of Common Interest Uniting the United States and Mexico," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LIV, No. 1393 (March 7, 1966), p. 365.

[17]George C. Marshall, "A Stable and Prosperous World Is Important to America," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XVII, No. 416 (June 11, 1947), p. 84.

[18]Dean Acheson, "Force of Joint Military-Diplomatic Power for Peace," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVI, No. 674 (May 26, 1952), p. 815.

[19]Dean Rusk, "News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1227 (December 31, 1962), p. 997.

[20]John Foster Dulles, "The Contest Between Freedom and Despotism," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, No. 888 (July 2, 1956), p. 3.

[21]Dean Rusk, "News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LIX, No. 1534 (November 18, 1968), p. 524.

[22]Dean Rusk, "American Republics Act to Halt Soviet Threat to Hemisphere," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XLVI, No. 1220 (November 12, 1962), p. 720.

[23]Dean Rusk, "Some Thoughts on the Conduct of Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LI, No. 1311 (August 10, 1964).

[24]Dean Rusk, "Transformation in Asia and the Pacific," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LIX, No. 1532 (November 4, 1968), p. 463.

[25]1.0 eigen values are chosen most frequently as cutoff in the number of factors by convention, and it was done here. Raymond B. Cattell, Factor Analysis (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952); Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis (New York: Van Nostrand, 1964).

[26]This thesis focuses upon public statements as we lack codable information about what happens in executive session.

CHAPTER III

AGGREGATE DATA OF THE VARIOUS SECRETARIES OF STATE

In this chapter we analyze the aggregate data as the basis for later comparison of the individual Secretaries. In order to do this, we will look at the Secretaries' views of countries generally and specifically and will examine tenure relationships, audience usage, and geographic concentration of interests. In addition, we will analyze the Secretaries of States' images in terms of the six dimensions, the object countries analyzed, and perceptions of efficacy and the basis of conflict. In nearly every case we are interested in the total number of observations by the four Secretaries of State--Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk--and, where possible, those of Rogers.[1]

The analysis began with these questions:

1. How do Secretaries look at Friends-Enemies-Neutrals?
2. How does time in office affect the Secretaries' perceptions?
3. To whom do the Secretaries talk?
4. What are the Secretaries' country interests?

A. Secretaries' Perceptions of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals

As can be seen from data in Table 6, Secretaries of State have tended to focus on the enemy.

TABLE 6

PER CENT OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE IN TERMS OF FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX WITH REFERENCE TO FRIENDS-ENEMIES-NEUTRALS

Dimension	Friends	Enemies	Neutrals	Total
Friendship-Hostility (N = 654)	26.3	65.0	8.7	100.0
Trust-Suspicion (N = 579)	23.7	69.1	7.2	100.0
Win-Lose (N = 184)	11.3	85.3	3.4	100.0
Strong-Weak (N = 398)	27.4	66.8	5.8	100.0
Active-Passive (N = 223)	15.7	78.9	5.4	100.0
Simplex-Complex (N = 432)	18.3	72.9	8.8	100.0

Since there are twelve countries in the sample, and six are friends, four are enemies, and two are neutrals, the "fair share" would be 50 per cent to friends, 33 per cent to enemies, and 17 per cent to neutrals. Thus, there is a large overattention to enemies and underemphasis on friends and neutrals.

There are several plausible explanations for the emphasis that the Secretaries have given to enemies. They place great attention on them because conflictual relationships tend to be the most visible and troublesome, while cooperative and neutral relationships cause less concern. Only statements about problems causing difficulties of some importance appear in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin. The Secretary of State is the top foreign policy adviser to the President. Minor problems do not generally reach his desk and only

situations of great and/or lasting concern need his decisions. Only the tip of the iceberg tends to be made up of crisis situations involving countries with whom the United States has been having difficulty. And countries with whom America has had many insoluble problems usually are enemies (see Chapter I). These countries tend to become the impersonal manifestation of the Thou, the They and the Other that provide resistance to demands, pushes, and desires of another country.

The international political system consists of countries with different sets of core interests and different political and economic systems. These countries compete and conflict in many areas. The system is variously described as bi-polar, balance of power, and hierarchical.[2] In each arrangement there are dominant nations, client nations, middle powers, and oppositions. Nations, like people, do not operate in a vacuum. Where opposition develops to plans, moves, and desires, the other side is identified as a competitor and where the circumstances involve many important problems and/or deteriorating circumstances, the resistance becomes the enemy. Thus, high visibility and the importance of crucial conflictual problems in world affairs point to some of the possible reasons why the Secretaries of State allocate such a large proportion of time to the enemy.

This research tends to confirm the importance that Secretaries attach to the concept of the enemy. In this study, about two-thirds to three-fourths of the speeches were directed at enemies, about one-fifth were devoted to friends, and less than one-twelfth were allocated to neutrals.[3]

B. The Effects of Time in Office on the Secretaries' Perceptions

1. General Effect.

As can be seen from the data in Table 7, Secretaries' views fluctuate. In the aggregate there was a leveling off in the third quartile. However, the attention paid to enemies rose again in the fourth quartile, and to its highest level.

TABLE 7

PER CENT OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE IN TERMS OF TENURE ON FRIENDS-ENEMIES-NEUTRALS.[4] IN GENERAL AND BROKEN DOWN BY PER CENT TO NEUTRALS

a. Total

Quartile	Friends	Enemies	Neutrals	Total
Quartile I (N = 195)	31.8	63.6	4.6	100.0
Quartile II (N = 204)	30.0	66.2	3.8	100.0
Quartile III (N = 222)	23.4	60.0	15.6	100.0
Quartile IV (N = 117)	23.3	70.0	6.7	100.0

b. Per Cent Devoted to Neutrals

Quartile	Per Cent to Neutrals
Quartile I (N = 195)	4.6
Quartile II (N = 204)	3.8
Quartile III (N = 222)	15.6
Quartile IV (N = 117)	6.7

The large increase in attention to neutrals in the third quartile of tenure might be due to several possible causes. The Suez Crisis occurred during the third quartile of Dulles' tenure. The

crisis lasted several months and Secretary Dulles made many speeches about Egypt, a neutral in this study, during that period. Because Dulles gave so many speeches in his tenure (N = 524) and because of this he gave such a large per cent of the speeches (nearly 40 per cent) in the sample, his attention to Egypt in 1956 might easily have accounted for the large increase in the per cent of speeches devoted to the neutrals.[5] Another possible explanation is that the longer the Secretary of State is in office, the more moderate his views become. (The data indicate that this seems to be valid only through the third quartile of tenure.) A more moderate view might come to have an important place in the perceptual framework of the Secretary. That is, in the early stages of his tenure, the Secretary only sees "good guys" and "bad guys," with little or no room for the neutrals or the nonaligned. In addition, the Secretary is still learning his job and being socialized, and tends to concentrate on only the most threatening situations. This concentration includes enemies, then friends, and only in a tertiary way, neutrals. By Quartile III many of his positions have become known and he has solved or mitigated the most threatening problems. He has more time for neutrals in that quartile and problems with them can move from the periphery to center stage.

To what can one attribute both the decrease in the total number of speeches and the devotion of time to neutrals in Quartile IV? One plausible explanation is that the Secretary is getting ready to leave office. He might vacation more, work less hard, or be ill (i.e., as was Dulles). In addition, since most of his positions and perceptions are well-known, fewer of his speeches might be placed in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin. Moreover, Quartile IV coincided

with the last part of the President's term in every one of the Secretaries of State studied.[6] As the President gets ready to leave office, he too tries to avoid crises. Lastly, the President tries to mediate those problems that can be solved and postpone the other problems. Problems with neutrals were either solved or mitigated in Quartile III or are postponed. All this might be reflected in the number and kind of speeches that the Secretary delivers in Quartile IV.

The slight increase of attention to enemies in Quartile IV may be due to the fewer speeches, crises that cannot be solved or postponed, the result of many fewer speeches to neutrals, or certain events that occurred coincidentally in Quartile IV.

2. The Six Variables

In terms of specific variables, Secretaries of State usually have looked at the world in an either-or way. That is, the perceptions have tended to be simplistic and bipolar. Perhaps a reason for this is the relatively recent entrance of the United States into world diplomacy. Only since World War II has the United States taken the lead as a dominant power. Because this is true, Secretaries of State have not yet had time to develop nuances in foreign policy images. Besides this, a large percentage of the statements have been proclaimed in the first two quartiles of tenure when the Secretaries of State are mainly trying to paint a broad sweep of policy positions without worrying about technicalities and shades of meaning.

In a similar way the data in Table 8 point to the Secretaries of State looking at the world in a bipolar way.

A "fair share" would be 14.3 per cent in each segment of the seven-point scale. Thus, the "fair share" for the two ends of the

TABLE 8

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY IN TERMS OF TOTAL TENURE BROKEN DOWN BY THEMES AND BY SPEECHES

a. By Themes (N = 1706)

Very Friendly (1 + 2)	Moderate and Neutral (3 + 4 + 5)	Very Hostile (6 + 7)
40.8 (N = 696)	23.8 (N = 406)	35.3 (N = 604)

b. By Speeches (N = 666)

Very Friendly (1 + 2)	Moderate and Neutral (3 + 4 + 5)	Very Hostile (6 + 7)
29.3 (N = 195)	24.2 (N = 161)	46.6 (N = 310)

scale, "very friendly" (1 + 2) and "very hostile" (6 + 7) would be expected to receive 28.6 per cent of the pronouncements each and "Moderate and Neutral" (3 + 4 + 5) would be expected to receive 42.9 per cent. Some probable reasons for the over-representation at the ends of the continuum (1 + 2; 6 + 7) are the Secretaries of States' tendencies to focus so much on enemies, then friends, and lastly neutrals.[8] Moreover, the pessimism of the various Secretaries might also play a part. The large number of themes and speeches contributed by John Foster Dulles may have further affected the findings. As will be shown in Chapter VI, Dulles tended to look at the world in an either-or way more than others and generally maintained these perceptions throughout his tenure.

Concomitantly, because Secretaries tended to articulate about four themes per speech, and in these data there are nearly three times as many themes as there are speeches, in those greater number

of themes there is a greater likelihood of "friendly" perceptions than in the speeches. That is, a particular speech might have a hostile tone, but some segments of it might have "friendly" perceptions. And this might possibly suggest why there is a higher per cent of "very friendly" images in the themes than in the speeches.[9]

By breaking down the data into quartiles, it is possible to bring additional supportive evidence to illustrate the bipolar (either-or) view of the Secretary of State's perceptions and one instance in which Secretaries of State manifested increasing moderation.

TABLE 9

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY IN TERMS OF TENURE (QUARTILE I VERSUS QUARTILE III)--TOTAL AND BY MODERATE NEUTRAL (3 + 4 + 5)

a. Total

	Very Friendly (1 + 2)	Moderate and Neutral (3 + 4 + 5)	Very Hostile (6 + 7)
Quartile I (N = 443)	48.1 (N = 213)	19.4 (N = 87)	32.3 (N = 143)
Quartile III (N = 385)	34.3 (N = 131)	35.4 (N = 133)	31.5 (N = 121)

b. Moderate and Neutral

Quartile I	19.4 (N = 87)
Quartile III	35.4 (N = 133)

Thus, in both general and specific terms Secretaries of State focused on enemies, tended to see the world in bipolar terms, and tended to show increasing moderation (in many instances, i.e., usually until Quartile III).

The Secretaries of State, however, do not observe object nations in this way in regard to at least two factors. They have tended to view countries as both Strong and Active. In both cases more than 70 per cent of the statements were in the two extreme positions of "moderate" and "extremely" active (strong). This may have occurred because the Secretaries might possibly have tended to build up other countries and portrayed them as more powerful (than they really believed they were) so that they could ask for a higher military and diplomatic appropriation. Secretaries of State may also have adopted the "worst hypothesis" notion, thereby creating an opportunity to take a "forthright" stand. Both in testifying before Congressional committees and appearing in Press Conferences these men have to defend their policies and do not want to be accused of being "wishy-washy" or weak. Perhaps to counteract this, the Secretaries of State may have taken an aggressive policy describing target nations as strong and active.[10]

C. The Secretaries' Audiences and Regional Interests

1. Audience

The 789 speeches made by the Secretaries of State were delivered to eight kinds of audiences: (1) Press and Newspapers, (2) Foreign Groups, (3) Executive Branch, (4) Civic Groups, (5) Academic Groups, (6) Professional-Business Groups, (7) Audio-Visual Media, (8) Veterans.[11] As can be seen in Table 10, the three types of audiences that the Secretaries of State utilized the most were the Press, Foreign Groups, and the Audio-Visual Media, and the three types of audience that were utilized the least were Veterans, Professional, and

Civic Groups.

TABLE 10

PER CENT OF SPEECHES BY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE DEVOTED TO VARIOUS AUDIENCES

Press	Foreign Groups	Executive	Civic	Academic	Professional	Audio-Visual	Veterans	Total
44.8	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.8	3.4	14.2	3.5	100.0

N = 789

Nearly three-fifths of all the speeches were given to the Press and Audio-Visual Media by means of Press Statements and Press Conferences. The Secretaries of State try to win public support by utilizing the Press and the Audio-Visual media. This is the primary way that they communicate with the American people. About one-seventh of the statements are to Foreign Groups. Secretaries travel frequently and have continually attempted to communicate with foreign elites and mass publics in order to explain American interests and legitimate United States actions. Thus, the Secretaries are frequently on the BBC, CBC, and/or interviewing with LeMonde, Pravda, and the Economist, hoping to gain sympathy and support from foreign groups. On "Meet the Press," "Face the Nation," and "Issues and Answers," Secretaries of State similarly use the audio-visual media (i.e., television) in this country to improve the image of the administration in power and to try to explain American policies and legitimize them. In these appearances on television, about one-tenth of all the statements articulated, the Secretaries repeated, delineated, elaborated,

or said in a different way what was announced to the Press or some group the previous week.[12]

2. Region.

Another way of discerning to whom a Secretary talks is to look at geographic concentration of interests.

TABLE 11

NUMBER OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE IN TERMS OF REGION ON FRIENDS-ENEMIES-NEUTRALS BY NUMBER AND BY PER CENT

Region*	Friends	Neutrals	Enemies	Total
a. By number				
USSR	43	7	98	148
China	20	6	35	61
Europe	108	28	42	178
South East Asia	26	3	64	93
Rest of Asia	36	6	91	133
Latin America	10	11	34	55
Middle East	18	0	49	67
Africa	2	2	7	11
Total	263	63	420	746
b. By per cent				
USSR	29	5	66	20
China	33	10	57	8
Europe	61	15	24	24
South East Asia	28	3	69	12
Rest of Asia	27	5	68	18
Latin America	18	20	62	7
Middle East	27	0	73	9
Africa	18	18	64	2
Total	35	8	56	100

*Europe includes all the countries of Western Europe and Eastern Europe except Russia.

South East Asia includes Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma.

Rest of Asia includes India, Pakistan, Japan, Korea, and Indonesia.

The Middle East refers to parts of North Africa and includes

Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt, and Afghanistan and the countries of Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Africa includes the entire continent except those countries placed in the Middle East.

About one-fifth of all the speeches were directed at Russia. The 29 per cent of these references that are in the Friend category might possibly be the result of various thaws, attempts to implement Charles Osgood's Gradual Reduction in Tensions philosophy, discussions on such issues as the fur trade or other non-strategic goods, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.[13]

Although Secretaries of State have made more speeches to Europe than any other region, the data indicate that the Secretaries appear to have been very concerned with Russia. Because most of the crises and events since World War II have, directly or indirectly, involved Russia, most Secretaries of State have had to be concerned with the Soviet Union's initiatives--real or imagined.

On the other hand, since 1950 China has been important to the United States only intermittently. American interest in China was heightened during the Korean War 1950-1953 and from 1963-1970. Between 1953-1963 (and some would say during the Korean War), China has been viewed as a junior power or pawn to Russia.[14] The place to look to find control was Russia, not China. The Viet Nam War and Peking's increasing power have slowly changed America's perceptions of China's role in the world. Now China is also envisaged as very powerful.

The large number of speeches on South East Asia were most likely due to the American involvement in the Viet Nam War. The friendly declarations were usually directed to South Viet Nam, while

the hostile articulations were intended for North Viet Nam. During the time span, 1946-1969, very few speeches were made about Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma. Speeches to the "Rest of Asia" were mostly directed to Japan, Taiwan and Korea.

The large number of speeches directed toward Europe reflected American concern about that continent. World War II was for the United States in many ways a war for Europe. In 1946 the United States wanted Western Europe to get back on its feet.[15] Every Secretary since then has been involved with the continuing stability and growth of Europe.[16] Great Britain, France, and West Germany--three of America's strongest and staunchest allies--are in Europe. Many of the speeches have referred to these three but the other allies and neutrals also received attention. The references to the enemy have included references to: (1) Warsaw Pact nations, (2) problems with Great Britain and France during the Suez Crisis, (3) problems with Great Britain over Kenya and Tanganyikan independence and with France over Indo-China and Algerian independence, (4) DeGaulle withdrawing France from N.A.T.O. and generally being perceived as a "nuisance" by Dulles and Rusk.[17]

The speeches toward Latin America have dealt with Guatemala (1954), the Alliance for Progress (1961-1968), Peron in Argentina (1945-1956), and Castro in Cuba (1959-1968), while the focus of attention in the Middle East has been with the unfortunate interplay of oil, Israel, and Egypt.[18] The small number of speeches vis-a-vis Africa has demonstrated the recent independence of most of the African countries and also American willingness to let the new countries maintain ties with the metropole, usually European friends. During the time period studied, the Congo Crisis (1960-1962) and Nkhrumah's Ghana (1957-1968),

because of the possibilities of Russian and/or Chinese influence in the area, were two situations of utmost interest to American decision-makers.

D. The Secretaries' Country Interests

1. The Six Variables

In talking to these audiences the Secretaries of State discussed the object countries, envisaging these countries as friendly and/or hostile, trustworthy or suspicious, and solutions to their problems as simple or complex. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 12 Secretaries of States' feelings of friendship and hostility were rather closely related to the country's status vis-a-vis the United States. That is, there is a tendency to be friendly to allies and hostile to enemies. This table is important because it illustrates where friendly and hostile statements were directed.[19]

Concomitantly, Table 13 summarizes the Secretaries' perceptions toward Russia, China, Egypt, India, West Germany, Great Britain, and France measured in terms of the six variables.

These findings have generally illustrated:

1. Most of the speeches of the Secretaries of State with respect to Russia and China have fit into the two most hostile categories (6 + 7). This suggests that more than three-fifths of the time Secretaries perceived the Soviet Union and China as Very Hostile and Very Suspicious.

2. West Germany was viewed as the most helpful, trustworthy, and friendly of the European allies. Great Britain ranked second and France ranked third. (Helpful means supportive in NATO and in general. See chapters on the individual Secretaries of State.)

TABLE 12

NUMBER OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE ON TARGET COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY BY NUMBER AND BY PER CENT (FOR TOTAL)

Country	Friendship					Hostility		Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
a. By number								
Great Britain	12	13	4	0	2	0	0	31
France	6	18	7	2	0	0	0	33
West Germany	21	35	1	1	0	0	0	58
South Korea	11	15	0	1	0	0	0	27
South Viet Nam	3	11	2	0	0	0	0	16
Taiwan	9	16	1	0	0	0	0	26
India	4	6	2	0	3	0	0	15
Egypt	1	9	5	7	15	7	0	44
China	0	2	0	3	3	36	61	105
Russia	0	2	11	20	71	99	88	291
North Korea	0	1	0	0	0	2	17	21
Total	67	128	33	34	94	144	166	666
b. By per cent								
Great Britain								5
France								5
West Germany								9
South Korea								4
South Viet Nam								2
Taiwan								4
India								2
Egypt								7
China								16
Russia								44
North Korea								3

3. Nearly one-half of the speeches mentioning neutrals were found in the middle parts of the continuum. This suggests that the Secretaries of State have tended to speak about India and Egypt in moderate tones. (Also see Table 12.)

4. About three-fourths of the speeches toward Russia and two-

TABLE 13

PER CENT OF SPEECHES OF SECRETARIES OF STATE TOWARD INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX

Country	Friendship-Hostility (N=666)	Trust-Suspicion (N=588)	Win-Lose (N=185)	Strong-Weak (N=408)	Active Passive (N=232)	Simple-Complex (N=458)	Mean
Great Britain (1 + 2)	80.6	76.0	50.0	85.0	83.3	50.0	70.0
France (1 + 2)	72.7	52.2	60.0	58.8	28.6	40.9	52.2
West Germany (1 + 2)	96.6	95.9	100.0	81.1	10.9	46.2	71.8
India (3 + 4 + 5)	85.7	41.7	0.0	33.3	40.0	75.0	45.8
Egypt (3 + 4 + 5)	61.4	36.8	20.0	92.9	36.4	31.6	46.5
Russia (6 + 7)	64.3	79.0	73.5	0.6	0.0	25.9	60.2
China (6 + 7)	92.4	83.9	97.8	2.9	0.0	17.3	73.2
Russia (1 + 2)	--	--	--	68.0	85.8	--	--
China (1 + 2)	--	--	--	45.7	93.8	--	--

thirds of the speeches about China were in the two categories labeled "Very Strong" and "Very Active."

5. Furthermore, the concern with Russia was so extensive that nearly one-quarter of the speeches categorized by region and about two-fifths of the speeches on the Friendship-Hostility scale were devoted to that country. Similarly, about one-sixth of the speeches and nearly one-fifth of the themes were aimed, directly or indirectly, toward China.

2. Efficacy

Another way of evaluating the Secretaries of States' world views is to examine their estimation of a country's efficacy, where efficacy is the perceived ability of a country to carry out or implement what it says it will do. Countries with high efficacy are perceived to have a relatively high Gross National Product, a good military force, and the potential and ability to carry out what they say they are going to do.

TABLE 14

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE IN TERMS OF EFFICACY VIS-A-VIS TARGET COUNTRIES. TOTAL AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES ARE INCLUDED

	Efficacy			
A. Total				
	High	Medium	Low	Total
Total	218	150	74	442
Per Cent	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

B. Individual Countries Per Cent in High Category

Friends		Enemies	
1. Great Britain (N = 15)	80.0	1. Russia (N = 162)	89.9
2. France (N = 12)	8.5	2. China (N = 62)	33.8
3. West Germany (N = 21)	48.0	3. North Korea (N = 21)	28.8
4. South Korea (N = 21)	12.6	4. North Viet Nam (N = 36)	19.0
5. South Viet Nam (N = 39)	12.6		
6. Taiwan (N = 25)	24.0		

Neutrals

1. India (N = 11) 9.9
2. Egypt (N = 14) 7.2

TABLE 15

NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE TOWARD SOUTH KOREA, SOUTH VIET NAM, AND TAIWAN ON "ABILITY TO WITHSTAND OUTSIDE THREATS"

	High	Medium	Low	Total
South Korea	0	8	9	17
South Viet Nam	1	9	29	39
Taiwan	2	6	16	24

Russia, a nuclear power with a high GNP, emerged with the highest efficacy and the most respect by the Secretaries of State. Nearly all the perceptions about Great Britain, France, West Germany, China, and North Viet Nam that were not in the "high" efficacy column were to be found in the "medium" efficacy section.[21] The power of South Korea, South Viet Nam, and Taiwan was considered at best medium. These countries had to ask for economic and military aid from the United States. Thus, the Secretaries believed these three allies had a "low ability to withstand outside threats" and a concomitant low efficacy.

Furthermore, Secretaries of State considered both Egypt and India to have medium efficacy, with India being perceived as slightly stronger. Lastly, North Viet Nam and North Korea were considered to be "highly capable" (high efficacy) in about one-fifth of the speeches and generally stronger than South Viet Nam and South Korea.

3. "Basis of Conflict"

A final way of discerning the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States is through a comparison of the Secretaries of States' views of the "basis of conflict" between them. Differ-

ences between countries can be due to differences in political and/or economic systems (ideology); differences in military and economic capability (power); and in differences in control of territory or influence upon or over other nations (spheres of influence). As can be seen from the data in Table 16, Secretaries viewed ideology as the primary cause of the "Basis of Conflict."

TABLE 16*

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF THE SECRETARIES OF STATE ON THE ISSUE "BASIS OF CONFLICT" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

Ideology	Power	Spheres of Influence	Total
79.6	15.8	4.6	100.0
Total (N = 221)			

*The basis of conflict was studied only between the United States and Russia.

This view might possibly be due to the "hard line" views of Acheson and Dulles (see Chapters V and VI). Acheson and Dulles tended to view the Soviet Union with extreme hostility and maintained these views over time. Books by both Acheson and Dulles also provide evidence that they saw ideology as a prime reason for the conflict between the two countries.[22]

E. Theoretical Perspective

In this study we are interested in the interplay of personality and situational variables upon the documents given by the Secretaries of State in their public pronouncements. The position variable was included as a filtering variable and was a constant. A major underlying

assumption of the research is that the Secretaries' preconceptions are reinforced by events and that they selectively perceive targets and selectively forget.[23] These overt and covert preconceptions include three elements. Firstly, in his public statements the Secretaries are reacting to objects. In this aspect the objects include nations, audiences, and situations. The Secretaries interact with objects on the basis of how they perceive the United States has handled the object, or a similar class of objects, in the past and their own perceptions of the object. Secondly, the Secretaries of State are trying to build political and social solidarity. In their daily work they must interact, try to win and gain support from, and build coalitions with the President, Congress, various audiences (including the Press and the Audio-Visual Media), foreign groups, and various factions. Some public statements then are cues to the object nation while others are meant to build support and construct coalitions at home or with other allies. A few statements might possibly be meant to divide and conquer while others are articulated because the object nation expects the pronouncement. Thus, the Secretaries tend to be cognizant of a game, a type of strategy, in their interaction. Thirdly, the Secretaries of State are dealing with their own psyche. There are too many demands upon their time. They are spokesmen for the President; they appear before Congressional committees; they are the chief diplomats and must appear before various audiences to explain, clarify, gain support for certain actions and defend others. In addition, they must learn to be expert at budget-making, dramatizing needs, and diplomatic management.[24] Moreover, they must act in spite of the insecurities of the office. Beyond this, they need to simplify the world,

sublimate certain aggressive feelings, and try to adopt a flexible Weltanschauung. Because humans tend to identify the world in terms of self (malevolent-benevolent), Secretaries of State have to consciously attempt to weigh evidence and decide issues on their "merits," so long as these decisions conform to perceived United States national interest.[25]

In many ways it is difficult to simplify a complex world. The international politics of the period 1947-1970 included many elements of anarchy, in which there was no law for ascendancy and dependency and in which many revisionist nations thought it acceptable to act unilaterally to rectify a situation they thought unbalanced. Although there was a functioning United Nations and regional organizations operative during the period under scrutiny, there were still inadequate methods of settling disputes between in-groups and out-groups. Of more than 140 nations on the globe, many had internal strife and the Secretaries of State of the United States were usually drawn into the disputes.

Yet, more than others, the Secretaries of State must collapse the world into a meaningful array of objects, targets, and audiences. The evidence indicates that in simplifying the world the various Secretaries of State have tended to overreact. It seems as though there was no such thing as a balanced view. The personal-situational variable inevitably exaggerates situations, symbols, and events.

This simplification tended to make the Secretaries of State look at the world in terms of enemies and friends. A simple term, ideology, was used to differentiate them. FRIENDS were those countries that the Secretaries of State saw as good and manifesting positive, favorable traits. The selective perception and selective forgetting made it easier to omit the idea that many countries perceived

to be FRIENDS were ruled by dictators. These countries were FRIENDS because it might possibly be in the national interest of the United States to be FRIENDS with them at the time in question. ENEMIES were those countries that the Secretaries of State saw as bad and manifesting negative, unfavorable traits. Because Secretaries tended to overreact and exaggerate, they tended to make extreme statements toward ENEMIES. The preconceived views of certain countries reinforced these overreactions. Thus, perceptions of hostility toward Russia and China created the conditions for more hostility toward Russia and China. Secretaries of State then had to justify these statements and did so. They sometimes tended to be inflexible and attempted to cover the weaknesses of friends.

Crisis and the perception of crisis also affected the Secretaries of States' outlook. Crises with enemies are threatening, usually cause great attention, and cannot be deferred. That is, possibly, one of the reasons why conflicts with enemies accounted for more than two-thirds of the statements of Secretaries. On the other hand, crises with friends are deferrable. Negotiation and compromise can usually occur and disputes can frequently be settled or muted.[26] Secretaries of State usually allocate time and energy to neutrals only in time of urgent crisis or after problems with enemies and friends have been ameliorated.

In a similar way, we are interested in the way the same event or a similar class of events are interpreted. Because of different motives various Secretaries of State selectively perceive and interpret the same set of data differently. In order to increase appropriations for the State Department or to focus attention on a certain country, it is possible that a Secretary might dramatize a situation.

In this study, for instance, Secretaries tended to build up target countries' efficacy, strength, and activity. Their job was to use the largest dispersed bureaucracy in the history of mankind to manage the foreign affairs of the chief post-war superpower. But the same policy by a friend and an enemy might be interpreted quite differently. Lastly, Secretaries of State might use/not use triggering events to dramatize situations. In this period, for instance, Secretaries of State did not get the United States directly involved in the conflict during the Suez Crisis, the Indo-China War (1947-1960), the Algerian War, the India-Pakistan War, and the Biafra-Nigeria War, but did get the United States directly involved in the Indo-China War (1961-1970), the Lebanon Crisis (1958), and the Dominican Crisis (1965). Selective perception involves the question of perceived national security. But when is a situation invòlving "known communists" or "known subversives" severe enough to get the United States involved? Some possible reasons why the Secretaries of State did/did not involve the United States in a conflict might be selective perception, perceived national interest, history of diplomacy in the region, psyche of the decision-makers, the balance of power at the time, comparative strengths of the military, proximity of elections, risk-taking philosophy, favorable/unfavorable milieu for action, attempt to take tough stands to appease domestic critics, and luck.[27]

In a majority of cases, Secretaries of State have also demonstrated the ability to learn over time.[28] When they first became Secretary of State, they had certain preconceptions about the world. They made many speeches and tried to reduce their insecurity and to

manage conflict by simplifying the world. Furthermore, they tended to rely on historical precedents and the advice from the bureaucracy to implement policy. Here selective perception and selective forgetting came into play. They tended to overreact badly and, through experience, usually became more flexible. The Secretaries became better known, better understood the important problems, and spoke less frequently. Through their tenure they frequently adapted but most of the time focused on areas of the world most important to them and to the United States--Europe, Russia, and South East Asia--giving much attention to enemies and friends and very little to neutrals.

The dimensions used in this study to describe the Secretaries of States' attitudes are continua and not absolutes. Still a pattern usually emerged from the sequence of speeches during crises and throughout the tenure. The variables were factor analyzed into three separate factors. The first is the Ethnocentric Factor (in-group; out-group) and includes the dimensions of Friendship-Hostility, Trust-Suspicion, and Win-Lose (optimism-pessimism). In this thesis we take a limited view of Ethnocentrism:

> Ethnocentrism is based on a permissive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups . . . and a stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups.[29]

> We emphasize ingroup-outgroup (Friendship-Hostility, Trust-Suspicion, Win-Lose) stereotype simplification, and the dichotomization and omit any reference to hierarchical, authoritarian relationships.[30]

The second is the Power Syndrome factor and consists of the dimensions of Strong-Weak and Active-Passive. The Residual factor is the Degree of Openness of Conflict factor and consists of Simple-Complex. The

studies on the authoritarian personality assumed that these factors go together.[31] However, Secretaries of State behavior mode from this research suggests that the factors are separate. In the rest of the study we will analyze the effects of this separation and evaluate the influence of the three factors, the six dimensions, and the relative importance of both the personality and situational variables.[32]

F. Conclusions

Thus, in this chapter we have looked at the aggregate data in order to place the study into perspective. In looking at Secretaries of State we have learned that these decision-makers have focused on enemies, then friends, and thirdly neutrals. Moreover, Secretaries have tended to be skeptical, pessimistic, and suspicious and thought of other countries as strong and active. These foreign policy leaders also were socialized and in some cases there was a slight tendency to become more moderate until the third quartile. Lastly, in speaking before various audiences, Secretaries of State tried to gain public approval, support and legitimization of the then contemporary foreign policy.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]The following programs and techniques were also attempted and either did not provide useful information, did not work, did not work as well as intended, or findings from these research tools were beyond the scope of the thesis: (1) partial correlations, (2) multiple regression, (3) coral analysis, (4) Automatic Interaction Detector, (5) Lead-lag, (6) Analysis of Variance, (7) multiple classification analysis, (8) multidimensional scaling, (9) causal analysis. Attitudinal, perceptual, hostility, and residual indexes were also constructed.

[2]Morton Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bi-Polarity and Other Models of International Systems," The American Political Science Review, LI (September, 1957), 684-95; A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958).

[3]Robert-Strause-Hupe, Protracted Conflict (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, 1960).

[4]These data include some duplication of speeches in press conferences and later "clarifications."

[5]It is possible for a neutral to become an "enemy" in the Secretary's perceptions. It seems likely that Dulles in 1956 saw Egypt as an enemy (see Chapter V). This view of Egypt as an enemy might have been a short range situational factor.

[6]The selection of speeches that are placed in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin and the fact that "Quartile IV coincided with the last part of the President's term in each of the Secretaries studied" are two limitations of the study.

[7]The findings on themes for Friendship-Hostility support this. Per Cent of Themes of Secretaries of State on Friendship-Hostility on Tenure:

Quartile I	(N = 443)	27.8 Per Cent
Quartile II	(N = 413)	25.9 Per Cent
QuartileIII	(N = 385)	24.2 Per Cent
Quartile IV	(N = 352)	22.1 Per Cent
Total	(N =1593)	100.0 Per Cent

[8]There may or may not be friendly perceptions of enemies and/or hostile images of allies, but these considerations ought to be mentioned. The fact that six of the countries in the sample are friends, four are enemies, and two are neutrals ought to make very little difference in the evaluation because we are concerned with "extreme" bipolar views and these are reflections of actual perceptions and not artifacts of the data.

[9]Similar findings hold for Trust-Suspicion, Win-Lose, and Simple-Complex:

Per Cent of Observations of Secretaries of State on Trust-Suspicion, Win-Lose, and Simple-Complex in Terms of Total Tenure (by Themes)

	Very Trustworthy, Optimistic, Simple (1 + 2)	Moderate and Neutral (3 + 4 + 5)	Very Suspicious, Pessimistic and Complex (6 + 7)
Trust-Suspicion (N = 1393)	35.1	25.2	40.7
Win-Lose (N = 568)	35.4	18.0	46.1
Simple-Complex (N = 1426)	34.3	37.6	28.1

Because Secretaries were pessimistic as to outcome and found solutions slightly easy to achieve, there was slight deviation on those two dimensions.

[10]In 71.5 per cent of 1308 themes, Secretaries observed target nations to be Very Strong (1 + 2), while in 80.4 per cent of 866 themes they observed target nations to be Very Active (1 + 2).

[11]Press and newspapers refers to the written press and includes non-scholarly publications and magazines. Audio-visual media refers to radio, movies, and television. Civic groups refers to those like the League of Women Voters, Citizens League, Block Clubs, and Improvement Associations.

[12]The data are available from the author.

[13]Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

[14]Peter Calvocaressi, International Politics Since 1945 (New York: Praeger, 1968); John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (4th rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1971).

[15]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 26-54.

[16]Per Cent of Speeches of Various Secretaries of State Toward Europe:

Marshall	(N = 108)	73.7
Acheson	(N = 283)	16.4
Dulles	(N = 525)	21.2
Rusk	(N = 375)	11.6

[17]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 229-241.

[18]The highest ratio of Enemy-Friend pronouncements occurred in

the Middle East (18:49 = 2.7). This might have happened because Dulles was very unhappy with Egypt during the Suez Crisis and his 17 speeches during his third Quartile might have affected the outcome. Also because the number of speeches toward the Middle East was lower than toward the Soviet Union, Europe, South East Asia, and the Rest of Asia, the results might be an artifact of the data. Furthermore, nearly the same ratio occurs with respect to South East Asia (26:64 = 2.5) and Rest of Asia (36:91 = 2.5). Lastly, the ratios do not take into account neutrals and this might have an effect on the outcome.

[19]The high number of hostile speeches toward Egypt is the result of Dulles' images of that country during the Suez Crisis. Also, the computer did not process the speeches toward North Viet Nam. The differences between Table 11 and Table 12 are that: (1) Table 11 looks at region and Table 12 looks at target countries in terms of Friendship-Hostility. (2) Table 11 includes some duplication of categories. (3) Table 12 looks at only those specific countries in the sample while Table 11 looks at Latin America and Africa and would thus tend to reduce the per cent of speeches devoted to a specific country. Thus, one would have to eliminate speeches for Latin America, Africa, part of Rest of Asia, and part of Europe to make the two tables equitable. (4) Countries considered to be enemies were generally perceived as hostile and this may have tended to color the results of Table 12.

[20]Because Secretaries of State viewed other countries as strong and active, these two dimensions deviated from the norm in many areas. To rectify this, Russia (1 + 2) and China (1 + 2) were determined instead.

[21]See the chapters on individual Secretaries.

[22]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Signet Books, 1969); John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Change (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

[23]F. Allport, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1955).

[24]H. J. Eysenck, Dimensions of Personality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind: Investigation into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[25]I. L. Janis, Psychological Stress (New York: John Wiley, 1958); Anna Freud, The Ego Mechanisms of Defense (New York: International Universities Press, 1946); J. C. Dollard, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939).

[26]R. C. Hodgson, The Executive Role Constellation (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[27]David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

[28]J. E. Deese, The Psychology of Learning (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958).

[29]Theodor Adorno, J. D. Levinson, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950).

[30]Ibid., p. 150.

[31]John P. Kirscht and Ronald Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967); Harold Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1962).

[32]Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1967).

CHAPTER IV

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

A. Introduction

In 1947 George C. Marshall, a professional soldier, became Secretary of State. In his tenure, he attempted to build a strong, non-communist Europe and maintain a powerful America. Truman wanted Marshall because he (Marshall) was personally so well-suited for the position. As Pogue had noted,

> Conservative in habits and thoughts, he was able to adapt to the demands of a changing world. Born in an era which spoke often of responsibility, duty, character, and integrity, he was marked by the so-called "Victorian" virtues. A natural reserve, simplicity of living, aloofness of manner were strengthened by his austerity of life.[1]

Furthermore, he lost his temper less frequently and became less vindictive about world problems than did the other Secretaries of State. In addition, "He was pragmatic--tinkering with what he had until it worked better. . . ."[2] And he was admired by Congress.

> Marshall's right combination of tact and firmness--and the magnificent way he handled a very delicate and also very arduous task won plaudits from the members of the House.[3]

B. Marshall's Views of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals

1. General Relationships

These views can be discerned by an analysis of the data. Because George C. Marshall--in my sample--made only 108 speeches and

only 160 statements and because the crises tended to occur early in his term, the results deviated substantially from the mean.

TABLE 17

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS (THEMES) OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE C. MARSHALL ON VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX COMPARED TO THE NORM

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship 1	2	3	4	5	6	Hostility 7	Total
Marshall	3.4	28.2	20.5	19.7	24.8	3.4	0.0	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

Marshall (N=117); Total (N=1706)

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Marshall	2.1	29.3	16.4	17.9	29.3	5.0	0.0	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	18.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

Marshall (N=140); Total (N=1393)

c. Win-Lose

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Marshall	6.3	40.0	23.2	24.9	4.2	1.4	0.0	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

Marshall (N=95); Total (N=568)

d. Strong-Weak

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Marshall	12.7	66.5	16.4	1.3	0.6	2.6	0.0	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Marshall (N=158); Total (N=1255)

TABLE 17--Continued

e. Active-Passive

	Active						Weak	Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Marshall	17.6	73.6	7.5	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	100.0
Total	26.2	54.2	9.5	6.8	0.8	2.1	0.5	100.0

Marshall (N=59); Total (N=866)

f. Simple-Complex

	Simple						Complex	Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Marshall	4.5	23.1	12.3	10.4	45.9	3.9	0.0	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

Marshall (N=115); Total (N=1426)

The majority of Secretaries of State tended to perceive the world in a polarized way. They viewed countries either as very friendly or very hostile. On the other hand, George Marshall tended to envisage countries in a moderate or neutral way. This dislike of extreme statements tended to conform with his previous behavior and training as a soldier and bureaucrat--where extreme opinions are discouraged.[4] Moreover, the Cold War was just beginning and the circumstances may have called for just the kind of cautious, moderate statements that Marshall was proclaiming. This cautious attitude prevailed during his entire term. (See Table 18.)

Furthermore, as both sets of tables demonstrate, Marshall made no statements at all in the extreme (number 7) category, less than 5 per cent of his statements in the very suspicious (pessimistic [number 6]) category, and less than 7 per cent in the extreme (number 1) category. Because he was so moderate, although responsible

TABLE 18

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE C. MARSHALL ON VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX, DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE (3+4+5) AND NEUTRAL, AND EXTREME (6+7)

a. Friendship-Hostility (N=117)

Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
31.6	65.0	3.4	100.0

b. Trust-Suspicion (N=140)

Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
31.4	63.6	5.0	100.0

c. Win-Lose (N=95)

Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
46.3	52.3	1.4	100.0

d. Simple-Complex[5] (N=115)

Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Nuetral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult (6+7)	Total
27.6	68.5	3.9	100.0

for only 6.2 per cent of all the themes delivered on the Friendship-Hostility dimension, George Marshall made 24.9 per cent of the strictly neutral (number 4) statements and 22.0 per cent and 13.8 per cent respectively of the mildly cautious (number 3 and number 5) statements.

Beyond this, Secretary Marshall had images of countries as slightly trustworthy, strong and active. He saw problems as slightly

complex to solve and was optimistic regarding outcomes. That is, Marshall saw solutions as slightly difficult to achieve (more than three steps). In most instances, the strong deviations from the mean have tended to focus attention on Marshall's moderation and caution. The Secretary believed that America could help alleviate hunger and hoped that containment would prevent Russian gains. He therefore was optimistic about outcomes while, at the same time, acknowledging Russian strength.

2. Specific Relationships

On the basis of fewer than twenty specific references to allies--Great Britain, France, and West Germany--it is possible to suggest that Marshall viewed them as friendly, trustful, somewhat active, and strong. He was optimistic regarding outcomes and thought the problems to be soluble. Lastly, he made a relatively high number of neutral statements (45 per cent), considering these countries were allies, and envisaged them as moderate.[6]

Judging from the 42 statements directed toward Russia, Marshall seemed to view her in more moderate tones than did the other Secretaries of State. He had images of the Soviet Union as slightly hostile, slightly suspicious, moderately strong and active, and solutions to problems as neither simple nor complex. Also he was neither optimistic nor pessimistic regarding outcomes.

Although responsible for only 4.2 per cent of all the Trust-Suspicion statements, Marshall articulated 22.0 per cent of the "slightly" suspicious (number 5) statements. Even with regard to

Russia, this interesting phenomenon is demonstrated in observing that 77.8 per cent of Marshall's statements toward that country on Trust-Suspicion were in the "slightly" suspicious category. Thus, this further reinforces the picture of Marshall as speaking in moderate and neutral tones.

TABLE 19

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON RUSSIA ON THE VARIABLE TRUST-SUSPICION

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Marshall	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	77.8	11.1	0.0	100.0
Total	0.4	1.4	3.0	1.3	15.8	39.8	38.4	100.0

C. The Effect of Time in Office on Marshall's Perceptions

Time in office also affected Marshall's world views. Because Cold War issues demanded immediate attention, Secretary Marshall made a very large percentage of his speeches in the first Quartile of his tenure. During that Quartile important discussions took place concerning (1) the revitalization of Europe, (2) restraining communist influence in France and Germany, (3) four-power control of Berlin, (4) plans for the de-Nazification of and proposals for the future government of Germany.

During Marshall's tenure, the United States began to aid Greece and Turkey; America initiated the Marshall Plan for the revitalization of Europe; George Kennan wrote the famous article on Soviet conduct which set the framework for the policy of containment;[7] the Russians

TABLE 20

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON TENURE IN QUARTILES

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Marshall	37.7	29.6	22.0	10.7	100.0
Total	29.7	28.6	20.1	21.6	100.0

Marshall (N=160); Total (N=2557)

abetted the overthrow of Masaryk in Czechoslovakia; and the Russians blockaded Berlin for nearly one year. During the second quartile, Marshall made statements on several of the above-listed important events and on (1) communist infiltration in Eastern Europe, (2) currency reform in Germany, and (3) problems in Yugoslavia. By the third quartile, many of his views were understood. Although he protested the overthrow of Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, Marshall still made fewer declarations in Quartile III than he had made in the previous two quartiles. By Quartile IV, he was a known quantity; it was near the end of President Truman's first term and Marshall was planning to resign the office of Secretary of State; and relatively few crises occurred.

D. Marshall's Perceptions Concerning Region and Audience

1. Region

A Secretary of State allocates his time to crisis problems and those problems of continuing concern and during his tenure Marshall spoke exclusively about Russia and Europe. In relation to the other

Secretaries, Marshall had unique regional preoccupations, but like them he followed events. In this sample, Marshall articulated 160 statements or 6.2 per cent of the total. Yet he was responsible for 19.4 per cent of the statements toward Europe and 7.8 per cent of the statements toward Russia.

TABLE 21

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON REGION*

	Russia	Europe	Rest of World	Total
Marshall	26.3	73.7	0.0	100.0
Total	20.9	20.2	58.9	100.0

Marshall (N = 160); Total (N = 2557)

*The totals do not add up to 100 per cent on the aggregate because there are other regions of the world to which Marshall did not address himself.

The attention to Europe is easily seen in Table 21. The problems of 1947 and 1948 were those of Europe. India and Pakistan were just gaining independence, while Great Britain's colonies of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Nigeria and France's colonies of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco were still in the control of the metropole, and Japan was still recovering from World War II. Marshall wanted primarily to revitalize Europe and to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining territory and advantages on that continent.

Marshall, although directing a higher per cent of his declarations toward Russia than did the other Secretaries of State, focused

less on the enemy overall. The lines of the Cold War had not hardened and he directed only 63 per cent of his statements to the enemy. There were some statements directed toward and about the Warsaw Pact Countries of Eastern Europe, but the vast majority of statements on Europe were concerned with Great Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy.[8]

2. Audience

George Marshall spoke about these countries mainly through Press and Newspapers, Foreign Groups, and Executive Audiences. He made such a large number of statements to Foreign Groups because he was overseas often and he wanted to gain approval for his plan to rejuvenate Europe economically, the European Recovery Program. Furthermore, although responsible for 6.2 per cent of all the pronouncements, the Secretary enunciated 13.0 per cent of the statements to Foreign Groups. It thus seems as if the number of statements usually given to the Press and Newspapers was instead made to Foreign Groups. Lastly, it seems likely that he spoke to Executive groups frequently to try to get the government bureaucracies to implement the programs of Point 4, the Marshall Plan, and working within the United Nations and other suprarational organs.

Because he thought that "he lacked the florid touch and the flair for self-dramatization," and because television was in its infancy, he used the audio-visual media less than did the other Secretaries of State.[9] In addition to this, it is possible that Marshall believed that he had done his duty vis-a-vis the Press and thought

TABLE 22

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON AUDIENCE--COMPARED WITH THE NORM

	Press	Foreign	Executive	Civic	Academic	Professional	Audio-Visual Media	Veterans	Total
Marshall	32.7	31.4	19.5	6.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	2.5	100.0
Norm (Total)	44.8	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.8	3.4	14.2	3.5	100.0

Marshall (N = 160) Total (N = 2557)

that that was sufficient to communicate with the public.

E. Marshall's Views of Target Countries

1. Efficacy

One way of analyzing Marshall's views of a country's ability to carry out its policy aims is by utilizing the concept of efficacy. Countries, like Germany, were regarded with a low efficacy rating because they had emerged from World War II as poverty stricken and militarily weak. Although responsible for only 3.5 per cent of all statements about efficacy, George Marshall made 6.8 per cent of the "low" efficacy ratings. Furthermore, he attributed low efficacy to countries 33.3 per cent of the time as compared to 16.7 per cent of the time for the aggregate. This might possibly be due to the strength of the countries of Europe in 1947-1949 and the propensity of the other Secretaries to build up target countries.

TABLE 23

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON EFFICACY*

	High	Medium	Low	Total
Marshall	40.0	26.7	33.3	100.0
Total	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

Marshall (N=15); Total (N=442)

*Because there were only 15 statements in the sample, the results should be read with some caution. All samples with an $N < 30$ should be read with caution.

Finally, Marshall saw Russia as having "high" efficacy two-thirds of the time and "medium" efficacy one-third of the time (N=9). It seems likely also that Marshall did not adopt the "worst hypothesis" position. He thus tended to see countries as having a wide range of abilities to carry out policies.

2. Basis of Conflict

In a similar way, it is possible to evaluate the differences in basis of conflict. George Kennan and others have suggested that differences between the United States and Russia stem from differences that always exist between two great power centers. The conflict would exist, they maintain, even if the United States and Russia were both communist, capitalist, or fascist. In addition, in some of his writings Kennan suggested that ideology can have considerable importance.[10] Morgenthau, Faulkner, MacKinder and other geopolitical thinkers have proposed that having "spheres of influence" or territory to control, influence, or exploit is a sign of a great power.[11]

TABLE 24

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON THE ISSUE "BASIS OF CONFLICT" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

	Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Marshall	75.0	12.5	12.5	100.0
Total	79.6	15.8	4.6	100.0

Marshall (N=8); Total (N=221)

Marshall, Secretary of State during the early period of the Cold War, saw the conflict as emanating from differences between the ideologies of the American system and the Russian system. The USSR was threatening Europe not because they were strong (although that played a part); not because they wanted to control or influence territory (although, undoubtedly, that was important, too); but primarily (in Marshall's thinking) because they were communists. Evidently by 1947, the desire to work in friendship and harmony with the Soviet Union had changed to moderate hostility and suspicion.[12]

F. The Effect of Personality and Situational Variables on Marshall's Views

Marshall's attitudes toward Great Britain, France, and West Germany were formed long before he became Secretary of State. A long military career--including administrative positions in World War I and World War II--had helped shape and hone his world outlook. The data indicate that his views toward the European allies remained stable during all four quartiles of his tenure. In addition, he deferred to and played a subservient role to the President.[13] A mature bureaucrat, Secretary Marshall tended to bide his time and let decisions emerge. This great sense of timing was pointed out by a staff officer who observed that, "He stuck to his job and did the best that he could, playing politics with the rest of them, and ultimately proved himself as good as the best."[14] Moreover, Marshall's attitudes toward Russia remained relatively constant over time. He continued to see Russia as moderately hostile, moderately suspicious, strong and active throughout his term of office.

In the same way the personality variable can be influential in certain kinds of ambiguous, emotional, or new situations. Marshall was Secretary at the beginning of the Cold War when the lines between the United States and Russia had not yet hardened. In many areas he had some freedom of action. Moreover, as Barber noted, personality can be important on an active-passive dimension.[15] Sometimes a man can be active without being a forceful initiator, innovator, or anticipator of events. In another sense the activity may be in terms of his resolve, stability, and timing. Except for the Marshall Plan, Marshall's activism was more likely manifested in his resolve, stability, and timing than in his innovations and anticipations.

Another way to measure activity might be to discern the number and intensity of recorded statements. In my sample, Secretary of State Marshall made 160 statements over a period of four quartiles, for a mean of 40 statements per quartile. Since his tenure was two years long, he gave a mean of 80 statements per year. This would be fewer statements per quartile than any other Secretary of State, fewer statements per year than any other Secretary, and near the bottom of number of speeches per year. (See Chapters V through VII.) Marshall was also more moderate in his tone than any other Secretary. Because of the "special selection" factor, "passive" types are culled out from the kinds of people recruited. That is, "passive" types do not seem to have the enthusiasm for the job. They tend to be dependent and have low self-esteem.[16] Yet Marshall, on the basis of this method, in playing a subordinate role to President Truman, was the least active Secretary of State studied. (He may have been active, however, in advising the President.)

Concomitantly, certain situations and events also influenced Marshall. During the third quartile of his tenure the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade happened. These crises seemed to make it necessary for the Secretary to speak out. Once the crises passed, in the fourth quartile, the Secretary made fewer statements. It is thus possible to suggest that outside situational factors provided a stimulus that caused the Secretary of State to make more statements than he normally would. In addition, the geographic concentration also pointed to the importance of situations. Here enemy preoccupations trigger a greater amount of attention and Marshall allocated 63 per cent of his speeches toward enemies.

TABLE 25

NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE MARSHALL ON RUSSIA ON VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION--DIVIDED INTO QUARTILES

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Friendship-Hostility	1	1	6	0	8
Trust-Suspicion	1	1	7	0	9

Of the two variables that are studied here that had influence on Marshall, the personality variable had greater impact. It is thus argued because his attitudes toward Europe and Russia did not change over the tenure and because his resolve, sense of timing, and stability were very important. The pragmatic way in which he handled the Cold War and the Marshall Plan were both indicative of his determination and

his sense of fair play. In 1947 he noted that,

> Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.
>
> It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. . . . The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations. . . .[17]

The situational variable was important during the Czechoslovakian Coup and the Berlin Blockade. Thus, the personality variable was more important in Marshall's outlook than the situational variable, but was somewhat less important in one quartile.

G. Other Considerations

George Marshall tended to speak in moderate terms. Although he was Secretary of State during the beginning of the Cold War, the lines had not yet hardened. Thus, George Marshall had great freedom of action. The American public permitted Marshall this latitude of action. As Gabriel Almond learned: "So long as there is no immediate, sharply defined threat, the attitude is vague and indefinite."[18] Furthermore,

> On questions of foreign policy Americans tend to react with formless and plastic moods which undergo frequent alteration in response to change in events. The characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluctuating response.[19]

In this respect, Greenstein has noted that individuals can influence events in spontaneous, central, and emotional situations.[20] Furthermore, ambiguous situations leave room for personal variability

to manifest itself. The three types of ambiguous situations that he mentioned included: (a) complex situations in which there are a great number of cues to take into account, (b) contradictory situations in which different elements suggest different structures, and (c) completely new situations in which there are no familiar cues.[21] During Marshall's term, situations were complex and because the United States had become a superpower relatively recently, situations were completely new with no precedents upon which to draw. Secretary Marshall was thus able to take advantage of these new situations and assert his personal method of handling problems.

From another point of view, Marshall was overwhelmed by events and had to simplify the array of targets, nations, and problems into a meaningful array of symbols and audiences. Like the other Secretaries, he had to build his political and social coalitions, react to objects, and come to terms with his own psyche. Yet his personal strength, the strong Congressional and public coalition supporting his foreign policy objectives, and the support from the President all made it much easier for Marshall to make moderate public pronouncements. Because he had such a high sense of self-esteem and had the respect of a large majority of the population in the United States, he could exaggerate less, dramatize and build up enemies less, and let decisions emerge.

Moreover, even though conditions did not improve substantially during his term, and there was some deterioration in the Berlin Blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the civil war in China, Marshall continued to make moderate and neutral pronouncements. Thus, the situation may have called for less moderation and Marshall, with his

strong personality, was strong enough to resist the pressures to over-react wildly.

This moderation can also be seen in his medium ethnocentricity and his perception of target nations as strong and active (Power-Syndrome), but not to such a great extent as later Secretaries of State. All this can be reflected in Marshall's interpretation of the importance of the man vis-a-vis the position. He had had much experience in the army, yet he believed that the individual can make a difference.[22] A Secretary of State can do more than merely respond to a stimulus. In his view, a man is duty-bound to utilize pragmatism, resolve, and timing to bring about good policy. A good man should cooperate, work together with others, and build an effective coalition in implementing policies.[23] Countries, too, ought to cooperate.

Perhaps, his having thought of himself as "non-political" may have contributed to Marshall's perception of the position. Two people may observe the same situation and are likely to interpret it quite differently. Marshall just might have looked at the anarchistic world of 1947-1949 and seen the threats from Russia, hunger, and disease and selectively perceived the way to mitigate the massive problems through pragmatic, resolute policies. It is possible to speculate then that Marshall may have slowed down the Cold War. In spite of substantial evidence that conditions in many parts of the world were deteriorating and, in spite of some evidence that the Soviet Union was attempting to take advantage of these conditions, Marshall continued to make consistently moderate, cautious statements. He may thus have been attempting to keep the lid on many potentially explosive situations and

adopting a type of "low profile."

A Secretary of State is a type of juggler. He is a man interacting in a milieu with many clients. Frequently it is impossible to please all the groups and constituencies. How the Secretary of State sees himself, sees his position vis-a-vis his clients, sees the world, and reacts to events is very important. Ambiguous and emotional situations leave room for more personal influence. Yet the same set of data can be subject to varying evaluations. Personal needs, overt and covert preconceptions, needs to distract from one issue to another, and estimate of object nation's motivations all may come into play. "Who is doing what, how, why, to whom, and for what reasons" have to be analyzed and decisions made as to future responses. And the Secretary of State, as the chief foreign policy spokesman in the United States (in most instances), has to communicate with domestic and foreign audiences, allaying fears, giving cues, and trying to legitimize American foreign policy.

H. Conclusions

From the analysis of the data in this chapter, it is possible to conclude that George Marshall, a product of a long Army career, two world wars, and the perceived betrayal by the Russians in 1945-46 of a united world, was an important Secretary of State.

> His quiet appraisal of the international conflict . . . was characteristic of the man. Aware that he worked within the grand sweep of history, he proposed to approach his task with calm determination.[24]

Because the Cold War was just beginning, the lines had not yet hardened and Marshall's combination of tact and firmness gave him a

sense of resolve, stability and timing. He was not nearly so pessimistic in his views of the world as were later Secretaries and did not adopt the "worst hypothesis" position. In addition, he focused less on enemies and was concerned with fewer countries than were later Secretaries of State. Because many of the problems of the Cold War needed immediate attention, Marshall made a great number of speeches in the first quartile. Still, he delivered fewer speeches total and per quartile than did any other Secretary of State. Evidence indicated that he was most successful in dealing with the problems of European economic recovery and the Berlin Blockade. Tenacious, practical, patient, and quiet, Secretary Marshall helped set the tone for the high office of Secretary of State in the post World War II era. A fitting tribute was paid to him by Henry Stimson and was representative of the feelings of many who served under him. Stimson said to Marshall: "I feel that you are one of the most selfless public officials that I have ever known."[25]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall (3 vols.; New York: Viking Press, 1963), Vol. II, p. xv.

[2]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 347.

[3]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 151.

[4]Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier and Political Power (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Bureau of Government Affairs, 1953).

[5]George Marshall viewed countries as strong and active. He, like the other Secretaries of State, was not moderate on these two variables.

[6]The total number of statements is below thirty and the results should be interpreted with caution. Data are available from the author. Totals do not add precisely to 100.0 because of rounding.

[7]George Kennan ("X"), "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXIV, No. 4 (July, 1947), 566-582.

[8]The personality factor may also be important here. A Secretary has certain preferences and his preconceptions include areas with which he is familiar and comfortable.

[9]Pogue, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 185.

[10]Kennan, op. cit. Also see George Kennan, Russia, the Atom, and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

[11]Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), 4th ed.; Harold U. Faulkner, American Economic History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), 8th ed.; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among the Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 4th ed.; Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); H. J. MacKinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, 23:421-444 (London, 1904); H. J. MacKinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study of the Politics of Reconstruction (London: Constable, 1919).

[12]E. C. Rozwenc and K. Lindforth, Containment and the Origins of the Cold War (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1967), pp. 1-47.

[13]Barton Bernstein, The Truman Administration (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Harry Truman, Memoirs (2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1955).

[14]Pogue, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 120.

[15]James D. Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[16]Ibid., p. 13.

[17]George Marshall, "Marshall Plan--Commencement Address at Harvard University," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 407 (June 15, 1947), 1159-1160.

[18]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 53-63. Also see Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 34-94, 141-154.

[19]Ibid., p. 53.

[20]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," in Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 77-87.

[21]Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[22]Pogue, op. cit.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., Vol. I, p. 349.

[25]Ibid., Vol. II, p. 427.

CHAPTER V

DEAN ACHESON

A. Introduction

Dean Acheson, a lawyer who had been active in the upper levels of the Treasury and State Departments since 1934, became Secretary of State in January, 1949. The period before and during World War II may have been among the forces that contributed to making him a strong anti-communist, fearful of nuclear war, and a firm supporter of the American military as the best way to maintain peace. In his autobiography of his years in the State Department, for instance, he noted that, "Overshadowing all loomed two dangers--the Soviet Union's new found power and expansive imperialism, and the development of nuclear weapons."[1]

Statements in his autobiography show clearly how he viewed communism and the Soviet Union. In one statement he observed:

> Of course, we opposed the spread of communism; it was the subtle, powerful instrument of Russian imperialism, designed and used to defeat the very interests we [supported]. . . .[2]

Somewhat later he added:

> For generations, Russia had aimed to dominate Asian peoples. . . . The Soviet Union was now a superpower, unabashedly hostile to us, operating all over the world through fifth columns.[3]

Acheson was opposed to not only the Russian form of communism but also to the Chinese form of communism. He especially disliked the propaganda battle that the communists were fighting. In vigorously defending his actions during the Korean War against the communists,

Acheson pointed out that,

> It was not hard for skillful Soviet and Chinese propaganda to turn this unrest (in 1951) into anti-Americanism. Despite American sympathy, helpful political intervention, and large material aid for these areas, the advantage of the propaganda battle was heavily on the side of the big lie, for . . . no weapon is so effective and so cheap to those in whose systems of politics morality plays no part.[4]

He felt that in dealing with Stalinist Russia he was dealing with a militarily provocative power and thought that a strong American military was the best way to maintain peace. In reflecting upon his years of public trust Acheson observed that, "The service engraved on my mind a conviction . . . that the hope of the world lies in the strength and will of the United States . . . and its good judgment as well."[5]

In spite of the perceived provocations by Russia, Dean Acheson also tried to avoid war with the Soviet Union. As David McClellan stated, "Even after the North Korean attack on South Korea, Acheson took the lead within the administration in opposing any action that might bring on war with . . . the USSR."[6]

All these ideas of Acheson were implemented through a foreign policy of "containment" which aimed to stop communist advances throughout the world.[7]

B. Acheson's Views of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals

1. General Relationships

Dean Acheson was Secretary of State for four years and my sample includes 283 speeches and 366 statements during his tenure in office.

In these speeches and statements Acheson focused on enemies slightly more than two-thirds of the time and tended to perceive countries in general as very hostile and very suspicious. Although responsible for 8.6 per cent of all the statements on the Friendship-Hostility scale, Acheson articulated 15.0 per cent of the "very" hostile pronouncements.[8] On a "fair share" or "fair proportion" basis Acheson was Secretary for about 18.2 per cent of the time. So a proportion of 15.0 per cent that he gave on Friendship-Hostility is not much less than the expected proportion.[9] Yet it is believed that a Secretary ought to be compared more on the ratio of his statements with those of other Secretaries' responses than on the basis of "fair" proportion. On that basis, Acheson was overrepresented on the hostility side of the Friendship-Hostility variable. In fact, he was more hostile toward target countries than any other Secretary (see Table 27). The environment in the Stalin era tended to be hostile to the United States during this period of the Cold War and Acheson tended to react and perceived other countries with hostility, suspicion, and pessimism. That is, he saw target countries as more suspicious than any other decision-maker (see Table 27 and Appendix A-2).

TABLE 26

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS (THEMES) OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship					Hostility		Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Acheson	18.5	6.2	4.1	1.4	8.2	4.1	57.5	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

Acheson (N=146); Total (N=1706)

TABLE 26--Continued

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Acheson	14.0	11.6	2.3	1.2	3.5	8.0	59.4	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	18.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

Acheson (N=86); Total (N=1393)

c. Win-Lose

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Acheson	31.3	13.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	50.0	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

Acheson (N=166); Total (N=568)

d. Strong-Weak

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Acheson	83.8	6.0	3.8	0.0	1.7	2.1	2.6	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Acheson (N=234); Total (N=1255)

e. Active-Passive

	Active 1	2	3	4	5	6	Passive 7	Total
Acheson	84.7	6.8	3.4	0.0	1.7	0.0	3.4	100.0
Total	26.2	54.2	9.5	6.8	0.8	2.1	0.5	100.0

Acheson (N=157); Total (N=866)

f. Simple-Complex

	Simple 1	2	3	4	5	6	Complex 7	Total
Acheson	54.2	10.0	0.8	1.6	6.7	10.0	16.7	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

Acheson (N=166); Total (N=1426)

Furthermore, as Table 26 illustrates, Acheson tended to be either pessimistic or optimistic, tended to see the target countries as very strong and very active--stronger and more active than any other Secretary of State (see Appendices A-4, A-5)--and tended to envisage problems between the United States and object countries as either very amenable to solution or difficult to solve. This tendency to discern the world in terms of either-or (bipolar) on Win-Lose, Simple-Complex, and somewhat less on Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion is shown in Table 27. He saw solutions with object countries as easier to achieve than did any other Secretary of State (see Appendix A-6).

TABLE 27

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), AND EXTREME (6+7)

a. Friendship-Hostility (N=146)

Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
24.7	13.7	61.6	100.0

b. Trust Suspicion (N=86)

Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
25.6	7.0	67.4	100.0

c. Win-Lose (N=166)

Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
45.2	0.0	54.8	100.0

TABLE 27--Continued

d. Strong-Weak (N=234)

Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
89.8	5.5	4.7	100.0

e. Active-Passive (N=157)

Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
91.5	5.1	3.4	100.0

f. Simple-Comples (N=166)

Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult (6+7)	Total
64.2	9.1	26.7	100.0

This tendency to see the world as being either simple or complex might possibly have meshed with his conceptual outlook. At first he thought that many problems, such as the Korean War, could be easily solved. Later, as he became socialized, Acheson learned that many problems were not amenable to logical formulations. As McClellan noted regarding Acheson's simplistic thinking:

> Acheson's misjudgment . . . seems to have derived from wishful thinking. Such a lack of realism is not at all rare. Psychologists have noted a general disposition in individuals to exaggerate gratifying features of one's environment and to overrate the probability of desirable events. . . .[10]

Thus, in discerning target nations generally, Secretary Acheson tended to see them as hostile, suspicious, very strong and very active. In addition, he tended to be either pessimistic or optimistic regarding conditions and thought that in most cases solutions were easy to achieve.

2. Specific Relationships

Acheson's views toward specific countries were similar to his

general views. He tended to see all countries (except South Korea, Taiwan, and India) as strong and active.[11] As Table 28 shows, he perceived West Germany and Great Britain as quite friendly and trustworthy and France and Taiwan as somewhat friendly and trustworthy, and South Korea as hostile and suspicious.[12]

TABLE 28

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD WEST GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN

	MEAN SCORE	
Country	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
West Germany	1.5 (N=6)	2.0 (N=4)
Great Britain	2.5 (N=8)	1.0 (N=4)
France	3.0 (N=4)	3.0 (N=3)
Taiwan	4.0 (N=2)	4.0 (N=2)
South Korea	7.0 (N=8)	7.0 (N=4)

Furthermore, all of Acheson's statements toward West Germany (N = 4) and toward Great Britain (N = 4) were in the Very Trustworthy (1 + 2) categories, while none of the statements toward France (N = 3) was in those categories.

Similarly, Acheson saw the two strong enemies, China and Russia, as very hostile and very suspicious. (See Table 29.) Beyond this, all of his statements toward China (N = 4) were in the very suspicious (6 + 7) category.

Acheson was hostile to Russia and thought of Russians as "primitive."[13] He believed that, "The other world superpowers appeared

TABLE 29

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD CHINA AND RUSSIA

Country	Mean Score	
	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
China	7.0 (N= 8)	7.0 (N= 4)
Russia	6.7 (N=32)	6.9 (N=23)

determined to push the process in the belief that chaos was the state preparatory to communism."[14] Concomitantly, Acheson was not enthusiastic about the Soviet methods of negotiation. In that case Acheson ascertained that, ". . . to the communists negotiations are war by political means to achieve an end unacceptable to the other side."[15] Beyond this,

> . . . the Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiations--that is, by a series of mutual concessions calculated to move parties desiring agreement closer to an acceptable one. Theirs is a more primitive form of political method. They cling stubbornly to a position, hoping to force an opponent to accept it. When and if action by the opponent demonstrates the Soviet position to be untenable, they hastily abandon it.[16]

And on one occasion Acheson paraphrased Sir William Hayter to explain his understanding of the Soviet bargaining method. Acheson noted that,

> . . . the Soviets rely on the proper basis of international policy, the calculation of forces. So no case, however skillfully deployed, however clearly demonstrated as irrefutable, will move them from doing what they have previously decided to do; the only way of changing their purpose is to demonstrate that they have no advantageous alternative, that what they want to do is not possible.[17]

All this was summarized in an editorial on his death which stated that,

> Acheson articulated a policy and practice that assumed that the Soviet Union was bent on world conquest and, negotiations being virtually useless, could be deterred only by overwhelming countries on the perimeter of Russia.[18]

This hostility and suspicion toward Russia can be easily seen. Although Acheson made only 12.9 per cent of all the statements on Friendship-Hostility toward Russia, he articulated 30.7 per cent of the "very" hostile (number 7) pronouncements toward Russia.[19] That is, of those 12.9 per cent he articulated nearly one-third. Similarly, having made 10.8 per cent of all the pronouncements regarding Trust-Suspicion toward Russia, he delivered 27.1 per cent of the "very" suspicious (number 7) statements. This large over-representation can be ascertained in Table 30.

TABLE 30

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON TOWARD RUSSIA ON THE VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION--COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship 1	2	3	4	5	6	Hostility 7	Total
Acheson	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.4	6.2	84.4	100.0
Total	0.6	0.0	4.3	4.3	20.4	33.0	37.4	100.0

Acheson (N=32); Total (N=230)

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Acheson	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	95.7	100.0
Total	0.5	1.4	3.0	1.4	15.6	39.7	38.4	100.0

Acheson (N=23); Total (N=216)

In the same vein he viewed outcomes with Russia with pessimism and thought that solutions were relatively easy. That is, in terms of the

measure Simple-Complex, Acheson believed that there was a simple solution three-fourths of the time. He also found the "basis of conflict" to be due to ideology.[20]

He perceived Russia to be his nemesis. As Acheson once said: "I got along with everybody who was housebroken. But I was never very close to the Russians. They were abusive. They were rude. I just didn't like them."[21]

Thus, it may be possible that the Korean War, the continuing Russian threat in Europe, and the Cold War atmosphere in the United States and abroad might possibly have interacted with Acheson's basic personality dispositions to make him perceive Russia as very hostile and very suspicious.

D. The Effect of Time in Office on Acheson's Perceptions

Time in office also affected Acheson's views. As Table 31 illustrates, whereas most of the other Secretaries of State made the fewest number of statements in the fourth quartile of tenure, Secretary Acheson articulated the lowest number in Quartile III, but the differences are slight. In addition to this, he made a higher per cent of statements in Quartile IV than any other Secretary of State (see Appendix A-7).

During his tenure five events (in the sample) occurred: (1) NATO was formed, (2) the communist government gained control in China, (3) the USSR detonated an atomic bomb, (4) the Korean War started and continued through the end of Acheson's term, and (5) the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed. All of the events, except the Korean War, occurred in the first three quartiles of Acheson's term.

TABLE 31

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON TENURE IN QUARTILES

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Acheson	26.2	30.9	19.1	23.8	100.0
Total	29.7	28.6	20.1	21.6	100.0

Acheson (N=366); Total (N=2557)

The resumption of negotiations in Korea, Acheson's frequent testimony before Congressional committees, the rise or continuance of problems, and his having taken fewer vacations or leaves from the position of Secretary all might have contributed to the increase in the number of statements in the last quartile.

Acheson did not become more moderate over time. He came to the office with certain specified views toward symbols, audiences, and object nations and maintained them over time. It is possible that this Secretary of State may have interacted with the Cold War milieu in such a way so as to reinforce his pre-existing views. (See Section F of this chapter.)

D. Acheson's Perceptions Concerning Region and Audience

1. Region

As Secretary of State, Acheson allocated his time so that he gave first priority to crises, then he interested himself with problems of continuing concern, and finally he considered peripheral or temporary problems. During his term Acheson was interested in more areas of the world than was Marshall. Whereas Secretary Marshall was exclusively concerned with Russia and Europe, Secretary Acheson devoted

himself to Russia, Europe, China, Rest of Asia (and peripherally) to Latin America and the Middle East.

TABLE 32

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON IN TERMS OF REGION COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	USSR	Europe	China	South East Asia	Rest of Asia	Latin America	Middle East	Africa	Total
Acheson	14.8	16.4	7.2	--	60.8	0.5	0.3	--	100.0
Total	20.9	20.2	6.7	15.6	17.5	9.6	8.0	1.6	100.0

Acheson (N=366); Total (N=2557)

Responsible for 14.3 per cent of all the statements Acheson, because of the Korean War, made 49.2 per cent of the pronouncements mentioning "Rest of Asia."[22] He made a higher per cent of statements toward that region than any other Secretary (see Appendix A-8). The severity and the length of the crisis in Korea accounted for the attention to the "Rest of Asia" and, very likely, to China. The large number of pronouncements directed to Europe might have indicated the ongoing problems of NATO, West German sovereignty and rearmament ("We need German participation in the defense of NATO,"[23] Acheson said), and the Russian threat. For Acheson, then, events focused his attention primarily on Asia.

2. Audience[24]

Dean Acheson spoke about these countries mainly through the Press and Newspapers, Foreign Groups, and Executive Audiences. He made a higher per cent of statements through the Press than any other Secre-

tary (see Appendix A-9). Much of Acheson's frequent Congressional testimony was later given out in Press Statements and Press Releases. In addition, Acheson might have occasionally quoted from, reiterated, or clarified from earlier Congressional testimony in Press Conferences. Having delivered 14.3 per cent of all the statements, Secretary Acheson was responsible for 21.9 per cent of the observations before the Press. This was greater than the expected proportion and on the basis of comparison with others, Acheson deviated on this basis.[25] Acheson met with the Press almost daily and tried to keep the public (and Congress) informed on developments in the Korean War and in Europe. In appearing before the Press he may have been trying to gain support and legitimacy for his and President Trumen's actions. Furthermore, Acheson tried to gain domestic public approval for American actions in the unpopular, limited war in Korea.

TABLE 33

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON AUDIENCES COMPARED WITH THE AGGREGATE

	Press	Foreign	Executive	Civic	Academic	Professional	Audio-Visual Media	Veterans	Total
Acheson	68.7	10.6	9.8	3.7	1.9	0.8	3.7	0.8	100.0
Total	44.9	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.9	3.4	14.2	3.3	100.0

Acheson (N=366); Total (N=2557)

Moreover, he spoke to Executive audiences to try to gain support in implementing the Marshall Plan and to get help from the bureaucracy in expediting efforts toward the limited war in Korea. On the other hand, Acheson did not utilize the audio-visual media very much. Television was still in its childhood and Acheson gave most of his observa-

tions via the Press rather than via the audio-visual media. Lastly, he spoke to Foreign groups, Professional Groups, and Veterans less frequently (percentagewise) than any other man. This may have been related to his utilization of the Press, his not wanting to speak before these groups, his not having been invited, or his not having been able to accept these invitations because of other commitments. (See Table 33 and Appendix A-9.)

E. Acheson's Views of Target Countries

1. Efficacy

Another way of analyzing Acheson's views of a nation's ability to carry out its policy aims is to utilize the concept of efficacy. Acheson tended to envisage object countries as having "high" efficacy more frequently than did other Secretaries of State. Although responsible for 13.6 per cent of all statements coded on efficacy, his allusions to countries having "high" efficacy totaled 21.1 per cent of all the statements of all the Secretaries. This was much greater than the expected proportion.[26]

Moreover, Acheson's thinking that Great Britain had higher efficacy than either France or West Germany possibly could have been an objective appraisal, 1949-1953, or else it might have been a function of Acheson's bias. That is, in several books Acheson tended to point out his pro-British propensities.[27] Acheson and Marshall both also tended to build up certain countries, but Acheson tended to rank countries higher than Marshall and the other Secretaries on the measure of efficacy. (See Table 34 and Appendix A-10.)

TABLE 34

PER CENT AND NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON EFFICACY--BOTH TOTAL AND BROKEN DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY

a. Total

	High	Medium	Low	Total
Acheson	76.6	21.7	1.7	100.0
Total	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

Acheson (N=60); Total (N=442)

b. By Individual Countries (Number of perceptions for Acheson only)

Country	High	Medium	Low	Total
Great Britain	4	0	0	4
France	0	2	0	2
West Germany	1	2	0	3
South Korea	0	1	0	1
Taiwan	1	0	1	1
India	1	3	1	5
China	4	2	0	6
Russia	32	1	0	33
North Korea	3	2	0	5
Total for Acheson	46	13	1	60

2. Basis of Conflict

In a similar way it is possible to evaluate the "basis of conflict" between the United States and the Soviet Union. In many of his writings, Acheson suggested that he believed that he understood the realities of world politics.[28] He believed that the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union were those of ideology but, secondarily, might be due to differences in military and economic power. This can be noted by observing that although Acheson promulgated 17.2 per cent of all the statements on this issue, he articulated 37.1 per cent of all the declarations attributing the conflict to

differences in power. And on this issue he saw the "basis of conflict" as having been due to "spheres of influence" more frequently than did any other Secretary. (See Appendix A-11.)

TABLE 35

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON THE REASONS FOR THE BASIS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION COMPARED WITH THE AGGREGATE

	Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Acheson	44.7	34.2	21.1	100.0
Total	79.6	15.8	4.5	100.0

Acheson (N=38); Total (N=221)

The deviations from the mean possibly could have been related to the very statements mentioning "spheres of influence" as a basis or cause and Acheson's having attributed some weight to "differences in power" as a reason. In spite of this slight tendency to see differences with Russia as coming from two sources, Acheson still saw Russia as the monolithic leader of communism. He further thought that both China and North Korea were dependent upon Russia, that Russia was acting in the United Nations to harass the United States, and that Russia controlled all of Eastern Europe.[29]

F. The Effect of Personality and Situational Variables on Acheson's Views

During his service for the [illegible]ment in the 1930's [illegible] 1940's Acheson developed detailed views about [illegible]ntries [illegible] The second World War seemed to demonstrate [illegible]he [illegible]ates could work with Russia. Yet, Soviet initiatives [illegible]urope and Asia

in 1946-47 in setting up an "iron curtain" may have indicated that it might not be possible to continue doing so. Furthermore, Acheson was Undersecretary of State 1946-1949 and viewed the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, the Civil War in China, and additional Russian provocations in Europe and Asia.

A person is a product of "all that he has met." Dean Acheson, lawyer and diplomat, product of "Munich appeasement," isolationism, World War II, and its shaky aftermath tried to evaluate Russian policies. The early hope of harmonious relations turned to skepticism and wariness. Add to this the pressures on the Secretary of State from Senator Joseph McCarthy and the Congress, along with the general Cold War atmosphere, and it is possible to better understand why Secretary Acheson was not and did not want to appear to be "soft on communism."

One way of measuring the influence of the personality variable is to discern the views of the Secretary of State over time. As Table 36 indicates, Acheson's views changed very little over the four-year period.

TABLE 36

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD OBJECT NATIONS

a. Great Britain

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
Mean Total	(N=8)	2.5	(N=4)	1.0
Quartile I	(N=2)	2.5	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile III	(N=2)	2.5	(N=2)	1.0
Quartile IV	(N=4)	2.5	(N=2)	1.0

TABLE 36--Continued

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
b. West Germany				
Mean Total	(N=6)	1.5	(N=4)	2.0
Quartile I	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile III	(N=4)	1.5	(N=3)	2.0
Quartile IV	(N=2)	1.5	(N=1)	2.0
c. France				
Mean Total	(N=4)	3.0	(N=4)	3.0
Quartile I	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=1)	2.0	(N=1)	2.0
Quartile III	(N=2)	3.0	(N=2)	3.0
Quartile IV	(N=1)	4.0	(N=1)	4.0
d. South Korea				
Mean Total	(N= 8)	7.0	(N= 4)	7.0
Quartile I	(N= 2)	7.0	(N= 1)	7.0
Quartile II	(N= 2)	7.0	(N= 1)	7.0
Quartile III	(N= 3)	7.0	(N= 2)	7.0
Quartile IV	(N= 1)	7.0	(N= 0)	0.0
e. China				
Mean Total	(N= 8)	7.0	(N= 4)	7.0
Quartile I	(N= 3)	7.0	(N= 1)	7.0
Qaurtile II	(N= 1)	7.0	(N= 0)	---
Quartile III	(N= 1)	7.0	(N= 1)	7.0
Quartile IV	(N= 3)	7.0	(N= 2)	7.0
f. Russia				
Mean Total	(N=32)	6.7	(N=23)	6.9
Quartile I	(N= 3)	6.3	(N= 2)	7.0
Quartile II	(N=10)	6.8	(N= 9)	7.0
Quartile III	(N=14)	6.8	(N= 6)	6.8
Quartile IV	(N= 5)	6.8	(N= 6)	7.0
g. North Korea				
Mean Total	(N= 3)	7.0	(N= 3)	7.0
Quartile I	(N= 2)	7.0	(N= 2)	7.0
Quartile II	(N= 0)	---	(N= 0)	---
Quartile III	(N= 0)	---	(N= 0)	---
Quartile IV	(N= 1)	7.0	(N= 1)	7.0

Dean Acheson, in his writings, seemed to be favorably disposed

to West Germany and Great Britain and somewhat friendly toward France, and he maintained these views throughout his term.[30] On the other hand, his hostility and suspicion toward "ally" South Korea might possibly be the result of his contempt for a weak country or it might be an outlet for the country whose war had caused Acheson so much trouble at home and had taken valuable time and money from Europe, Acheson's real interest.[31]

Moreover, by 1949 Dean Acheson was already hostile and suspicious toward Russia and China and the Korean War only reinforced his hawkishness.[32] He was even more hostile to and suspicious of Russia, China, and North Korea than was Dulles. Furthermore, the means of his statements toward Russia ranged from 6.3 to 6.8 with a Standard Deviation of 0.245. This compares with a range of means for Dulles of 5.7 to 6.3 and a Standard Deviation of 1.30, and for Rusk whose means ranged from 5.3 to 6.2 and a Standard Deviation of 0.648. (See Tables 42, 60.) Acheson's hostility and tenacity toward the Soviet Union was demonstrated in his autobiography in which he suggested that

> A combination of illusion and fashion leads to a demand for yearly models in diplomatic design. The pursuit of unity and strength in the face of Soviet aggressive hostility can almost overnight give way to popular demand for a detente style. . . . The simple truth is that perseverance in good policies is the only avenue to success, and that perseverance in poor ones often gives the appearance of being so. . . .[33]

Another way to measure the influence of the personality variable is to scrutinize the Secretary's activity.[34] In my sample, Dean Acheson made 366 statements over a period of four quartiles for a mean of 91.5 statements per quartile. Since his tenure was four years long, he gave a mean of 91.5 statements per year. This would be more statements per quartile and per year than Marshall but fewer statements per

quartile and per year than either Dulles or Rusk. Because of the "special selection" factor, "passive" types are culled out from the kinds of people recruited for the office of Secretary of State. The "passive" types seem to lack the enthusiasm for the job, tend to be withdrawn and dependent, and inflexible.[35] Acheson tended to be the most consistently hostile toward Russia and China over time. Acheson, well-liked by Truman, was also active in advising the President and helping to clarify issues and set the limits of policy initiatives.[36]

In the same way the personality variable can be important in certain kinds of ambiguous, emotional, or new situations.[37] His greatest freedom of action occurred during the outbreak of the Korean War, a new situation. That crisis was also an emotional situation but was not ambiguous. The methods by which Europe was to be rearmed were also new and emotional situations. During his term there were few ambiguous situations. Acheson was Secretary when tight bipolarity was permeating the international arena and the lines of the Cold War had hardened. It seems that Acheson had less freedom of action than did Marshall. It would be difficult to speculate as to whether Secretary Acheson slowed down, moderated, or increased the bitterness of the Cold War. As Secretary he had to respond to the pressures from the domestic public and Congress (Joseph McCarthy) and if he had been less diligent in his anti-communism, he might have been forced to resign. As the war in Korea continued, he seemed to be less belligerent than the American public wanted, and his popularity waned considerably.[38] On the other hand, Acheson did demonstrate initiative, resolve, and stability in gaining approval, support, and legitimacy for NATO. And throughout his term he

continued to implement a policy conducive to American-European co-operation.[39]

Certain events and situations also influenced Acheson. The Korean War and the Civil War in China reinforced an already rigidly hostile perception. The overall influence of the Cold War also markedly affected his perceptions. In addition, enemy situations helped trigger his attention and during 1949 to 1953 the number of enemies had increased. Under Marshall, for instance, Russia was the prime opponent, while during Acheson's term Russia, China, and North Korea became opponents.

Both the personality and situational variables had great influence on Acheson. It is suggested, however, that the personality variable did have somewhat greater impact. His writings in Present at the Creation and in the U.S. Department of State Bulletin seemed to indicate that in spite of the Cold War atmosphere, in spite of the Korean War, and in spite of the dynamic changes taking place in Europe, Secretary Acheson maintained his consistent views throughout the term.[40] That is, his views toward countries on the Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion scales remained nearly the same from one quarter to another throughout his term (see Table 36). The overall situation of the Cold War and the Korean War may have contributed to his perceptual outlook, but more important primarily in reinforcing and buttressing pre-existing positions. That is, it seems probable that Acheson may have had more influence in manipulating situations than in being manipulated by them.

G. Other Considerations

Dean Acheson, like all the other Secretaries of State, found it necessary to simplify the world. He had to deal with his own psyche, had to react to object nations and tried to build political and social solidarity. In analyzing the relationship of this man to his environment, it is possible to wonder whether Acheson during his term was responding more to the Russian threat or more to the McCarthy threat. Unfortunately these data do not provide the answers. Furthermore, under what set of circumstances is the Secretary of State the master of events and under what circumstances is he being manipulated by those events? That is, what kind of variance is permitted in the interaction of man and events? We think that Secretaries of State overreact. Yet we are not positive as to the relationship between the Secretary of State and the American people. Under what circumstances can he lead--how far, in what direction, with what intensity, and for how long?

It is also known that Secretaries of State in many ways reflect some attributes of American personality and in this period, "the image we turned to the world was contaminated by internal distrust, arrogant self-righteousness, and shaky nerves of boasts and threats."[41]

Acheson's writings suggested that he saw the world as threatening, hostile, and suspicious. He was very ethnocentric and considered other countries as very strong and very active (the Power Syndrome). That is, he tended to see others in terms of ingroup-outgroup, stereotype simplification, and dichotomization. (Also see Footnote 29, Chapter III.) Yet the data do not indicate to what extent the war weariness from 1941-1945 influenced public opinion 1949-1953, and,

specifically, what effect did this have with respect to the Korean War. Nor do the data suggest the importance of the "volatility and potential explosiveness of American opinion," and the underlying attitudes of pessimism, impatience, and intolerance that were manifested in the late 1940's and early 1950's.[42]

On a more personal level, how much effect did the extensive experience as a bureaucrat and the training in the law have on Dean Acheson? To what extent did the training make his views stale? Did he have too much experience? Was he too much a part of the World War II foreign policy establishment? Did the legal training make him perceive himself as a lawyer for President Truman against a world of clients and adversaries? In addition, to what extent were his views the result of ego-involvement, the "conventional wisdom," and American self-righteous superiority? Again the data in this study permit only speculation on these questions.

Concomitantly, Secretaries of State selectively perceive and selectively forget. From his writings it seems as though Acheson preferred to deal with European questions and tried to avoid the embarrassment of future "Munichs."[43] Yet the attack on South Korea by North Korea in June 1950 focused his attention on Asia. In that crisis period Secretary Acheson discerned how the United States had handled a similar class of events in the past and attempted to implement a workable policy in 1950. In seems highly likely that he projected the symbol "enemy" on to North Korea and made statements that dramatized the event in such a way as to bring about images of hostility and suspicion toward the perceived "monolithic leader" of communism, Russia.

Moreover, the data seemed to indicate that Acheson spoke in

terms of extremes and absolutes more often than did the other Secretaries of State.[44] The office demands a certain degree of activity and certain decisions have to be made. The Secretary's preconceptions are reinforced by events and the Secretary can be trapped by events. In addition, the interaction of the personality and situational variables inevitably exaggerates symbols, circumstances, and events. In this relationship of man and job to what extent can the man, with all his given overt and covert preconceptions and biases, influence the situation? To what extent can a Secretary of State advance or retard a national direction?[45] How much difference does it make who is in charge? And how much of the variance can be explained with available techniques? Lastly, Acheson was the second Secretary of State during the Cold War period. His freedom of action was more limited than that of Marshall. Should we then measure each Secretary against the same standard, even though conditions are constantly changing? And, if not, how should we compensate in order to make a fair comparison?

H. Conclusions

Acheson, like the other Secretaries of State, made few neutral statements, built up the enemy, tended to see the world in terms of either-or, saw other countries as hostile, suspicious, strong and active. In fact, he saw target countries as more hostile, more suspicious, stronger, and more active than any other Secretary. Besides this, he was pessimistic as to outcome but thought that many problems were amenable to solution. He saw solutions as easier to achieve than any other man analyzed. Moreover, he used the Press more frequently (percentagewise) than did Marshall, Dulles, and Rusk, and through the

use of the Press he expressed his concerns about Korea, China, Russia, and Europe.

Toward the European allies he was friendliest to West Germany and Great Britain. He favored NATO, the metropole on colonial questions, and thought the European allies were friendly, trustful, active, strong and had high efficacy.[46]

On the other hand, Acheson was implacably, rigidly hostile, distrustful, and pessimistic toward Russia and China and believed both of them to be very strong and very active. On most issues he did not change and did not moderate in many of his views. Throughout his term he thought that China might still be overthrown. As an example, McClellan noted,

> In the case of China, Acheson denied that the regime in Peking represented in any real or ultimate sense the will of China and that somehow the stronger affinity of the Chinese people for democratic forms and for America would triumph over the malevolence of their leader.[47]

During his term, Acheson made more speeches and more statements than did Marshall but fewer speeches and statements per quarter and per year than Dulles and Rusk. Among Acheson's accomplishments were: (1) helping to shape atomic policy, (2) developing NATO, (3) negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, (4) helping create and rearm West Germany, (5) developing the concept of nonrecognition of Communist China and aid to Chiang-Kai-Shek on Taiwan, (6) working to implement a bipartisan foreign policy, (7) prosecuting and being involved in the diplomacy and bargaining of the Korean War, and (8) doing the spadework and helping to set the tone for "containment" and other tenets of United States foreign policy in the Cold War.[48]

Acheson was very proud that he had helped to set the tone of the Cold War and that his policies of containment were successful in combating Russian provocations and intimidations.[49] Secretary Acheson was very well satisfied with his performance in office and modestly suggested in his conclusion to his autobiography that, "the test of action is in results. . . . Our efforts for the most part left conditions better than we found them."[50]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Signet Books, 1970), p. 24.

[2]Ibid., p. 465.

[3]Ibid., pp. 465-468.

[4]Ibid., p. 644.

[5]Ibid., p. 926.

[6]David McClellan, "Dean Acheson and the Korean War," Political Science Quarterly, XXV (March, 1968), 16-17.

[7]Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy: The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson (New York: Odyssey Press, 1969), pp. 1-126.

[8]Acheson made 68.8 per cent of his pronouncements toward enemies (N=666); 8.6 per cent is the ratio of 146/1706; 61.1 per cent of 14.6 equals 90; 35.3 per cent of 1706 equals 602; 90/602=15.0 per cent.

[9]Acheson was Secretary for four years. There was a total of 22 years in the sample (4/22=18.2 per cent).

[10]McClellan, op. cit., p. 33.

[11]Data are available from the author. There are fewer than ten statements on any country, except Russia, so the results should be interpreted with caution.

[12]Is there a difference between Acheson's private views and his public statements? What would be the manifestation of a strain toward consistency of the two? The data do not tell us the answer.

[13]The title of the chapter on Acheson, op. cit., p. 462, is "The Attack of the Primitives."

[14]Ibid., p. 340.

[15]Ibid., p. 493.

[16]Ibid., pp. 362-363.

[17]Ibid., p. 363. Dean Acheson sifted from a speech by Sir William Hayter in The London Observer (October 2, 1960).

[18]New York Times (October 13, 1971), p. 1. Quoted in The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), October 13, 1971, p. 1.

[19]Acheson made 27 statements in number 7 category. There were 88 statements in the number 7 total (27/88 equals 30.7 per cent).

[20]The data are available from the author.

[21]New York Times, op. cit., p. 10.

[22]Acheson made 366 statements. The total number of statements in the sample was 2557; 366/2557 = 14.3 per cent; 17.5 per cent of 2557 equals 447; 60.8 per cent of 366 equals 223; 223/447 equals 49.2 per cent.

[23]Acheson, op. cit., p. 565.

[24]This is an event-dominated factor.

[25]On the basis of "fair share" he was Secretary of State for four years and was expected to deliver about 18 to 20 per cent of the statements and would not deviate on this measurement (366/2557 equals 14.3 per cent; 44.9 per cent of 2557 equals 1148; 68.7 per cent of 366 equals 251; 251/1148 equals 21.9 per cent.

[26]60/442 equals 13.6 per cent; 49.3 per cent of 442 equals 218; 76.6 per cent of 60 equals 46; 46/218 equals 21.1 per cent.

[27]Acheson, op. cit. Also see Dean Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress (New York: Macmillan, 1958); Stupak, op. cit.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Acheson, Present at the Creation. Data are available from the author. Totals do not add up precisely to 100.0 because of rounding.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]The "low" score of 6.3 in Quartile I for Russia might be due to the low number of statements or may be due to coding error, or perhaps Acheson was only moderately hostile on two of the three statements.

[33]Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 924.

[34]James D. Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972).

[35]Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[36]Harry Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959).

[37]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," pp. 82-87, in Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

[38]Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 524-634, 681-693.

[39]John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (4th revised ed.; New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 43-75.

[40]Acheson, Present at the Creation; U.S. Department of State Bulletin, Vols. XX-XXVIII, 1949-1953. Throughout this section the position variable was held constant. Passim.

[41]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. xv.

[42]Ibid., pp. 53-63, 67.

[43]Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit.

[44]See Footnote 17.

[45]James D. Barber, "The Question of Presidential Character," Saturday Review--Society (October, 1972), I, No. 1, 62-67. Throughout short-range and long-range situational factors ought to be considered.

[46]Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit. Data on questions of perception of metropole-colonial relationships are available from the author.

[47]McClellan, op. cit., p. 36.

[48]Ibid.; Spanier, op. cit.; Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit.

[49]Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit.

[50]Ibid., p. 925.

CHAPTER VI

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

I. Introduction

John Foster Dulles, a nephew of a late nineteenth century Secretary of State, John Foster, had trained for and wanted to be Secretary of State since he attended the Hague Conference of 1907. Son of a Presbyterian minister, Dulles became an eminently successful international lawyer, Presbyterian Elder, and political advisor. His religious and legal training tended to give him strong beliefs about morality and the sense of mission of the United States.

In his speeches in the period 1935-1953 a main ingredient was the emphasis on morality (February, 1948). "The moral Quality of our Response, more than any ingredient of the plan, will determine whether this time we will win the peace."[1] And he later suggested that,

> Moral law provides the only proper sanction for man-made laws. Marxian communism is atheistic and materialistic. Its leaders rejected the concept of moral law.[2]

And he observed before the American Political Science Association that,

> We need to recapture the Moral leadership . . . for we are now engaged in a "cold war" with Soviet Communism. It is a war that cannot be won by industrial might alone.[3]

And this outlook stayed with Dulles throughout his tenure as Secretary of State and merged with his antagonism to what he felt was the atheistic, Godless, Soviet communism. An illustration of these attitudes can be found in Dulles' resignation statement in 1959. He then observed:

> I was brought up in the belief that this nation of ours was not merely a self-serving society but was founded with a mission to help build a world where liberty and justice would prevail. Today that concept faces a formidable and ruthless challenge from International Communism.[4]

Dulles' intense dislike of communism may have gotten its start in World War II. He had been working with the World Council of Churches in trying to develop a policy for the post world-war world and his efforts to include Russia were rebuffed by the Russians themselves, and Soviet actions 1945-1953 seemed to further nurture this. Each Soviet action that Dulles interpreted as hostile only reinforced his image of the Russians as virulent. As early as 1948, for instance, in a commencement address at Union College in Schenectady, New York, he brought forth his charges.

> Communism seeks to maneuver the free societies into the position of being defenders of the status quo. . . . The communists seek change in evil ways that are self-defeating.[5]

Five years later, in 1953, in his first speech as Secretary of State, Dulles viewed the communists as pernicious and insidious. He said:

> We are front line defenders of the vital interests of the United States which are being attacked by a political warfare which is as hostile in its purpose and as dangerous in it capabilities as any open war.[6]

Furthermore, Dulles seemed to perceive that the Soviets really were threatening to the United States.[7] So, Dulles, acting as if the United States were his client, attempted to persuade others about the perceived Soviet danger and in 1955 noted that, "the fanatical communists believe that the end justifies the means."[8] By 1958, Dulles hoped that he had inculcated his thought about the perceived Soviet threat to the American public. Still, he continued to preach to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the nuances of Russian policy and the need for persistent vigilence. He claimed that, "The designs of aggressive Communist imperialism pose a continuous threat to every nation of the free world, including our own."[9]

Moreover, in a letter to Bertrand Russell in 1958 he argued that, "It is indeed quite improbable that the Soviet Union should now abjure the use of force and violence to maintain the supremacy of its party."[10]

President Eisenhower suggested that he respected and trusted Dulles and gave him substantial authority over foreign policy.[11] Eisenhower told Dulles in 1959 that the nation owed the Secretary of State a debt of gratitude and that Dulles ". . . [had] been a staunch bulwark of our nation against the machinations of imperialist communism."[12]

The two concepts that provided the benchmarks for most of Dulles' beliefs were thus a very strong sense of morality and a rigid anti-communism.[13] Many of Dulles' slogans such as (1) rollback of captive nations, (2) massive retaliation, (3) liberation, (4) unleashing Chiang Kai-Shek, (5) strong feeling of righteousness in dealing with other nations, emanated from these seminal lines.

Like the other Secretaries of State, however, he did want to try to obtain peaceful change, if possible. He was also cognizant that peace did not come easily and several times he declared that,

> No one can expect to achieve Peace without intense effort. Peace must be worked and fought for just as hard as victory in war. Peace requires clear thinking, strategic decisions, and patience.[14]

He was wise enough to learn about the intricacies and com-

plexities of foreign policy. Yet, most of his beliefs seemed to emanate from his training in the law, his intense views of morality, and his inflexible anti-communism. A strong person with strong views, Dulles in his tenure learned very slowly that statements and actions, declarations and implementation, were two entirely different matters.[15] The countries of the world recognized that the United States had the military and economic power to enforce policy demands. Yet, most may have ascertained that Dulles' "bark" was louder than his "bite."

The Cold War was entering a new stage. The thaw in Russia was beginning. Dulles spoke in at least two different ways. Sometimes he would be the Cold Warrior, aware only of America and Russia. At other times he seemed aware of the growing complexity of the world of nations. That is, Dulles responded to a variety of stimuli in a diversity of ways. And, as will be demonstrated, Dulles sometimes made pronouncements in a fashion reminiscent of the early Cold War era of extreme hostility and sometimes in a more moderate way.

B. Dulles' Views of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals

1. General Relationships

John Foster Dulles, in my sample, made 525 speeches, and 1055 statements in the six years and four months that he was Secretary of State. Because he gave so many speeches and statements Dulles dominates the data, does much to set the norms in this study, and may tend to distort some of the findings.

Dulles, responsible for 61.4 per cent of all the statements on the Friendship-Hostility dimension, and 67.9 per cent of all the state-

ments on the Trust-Suspicion dimension, made more than three-fourths of all the "very friendly" (1 + 2) and "very trustful" (1 + 2) statements and more than two-thirds of all the "very hostile" (6 + 7) and "very suspicious" (6 + 7) statements. He was Secretary for slightly over six years and chance would have dictated that he should have given 28.6 per cent of the statements. This tendency toward sharply dichotomous views can also be seen in Table 37 and Table 38 where the "very friendly" (1 + 2) and "very trustworthy" segments of the two variables received 46.1 per cent and 36.5 per cent respectively and the "very hostile" (6 + 7) and "very suspicious" (6 + 7) sections of the dimensions received 34.1 per cent and 46.1 per cent of Dulles' perceptions. And in this area Dulles saw the target countries as more friendly than any other Secretary of State. In addition, he was less hostile than both Acheson and Rusk.

TABLE 37

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON THE VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX AS COMPARED WITH THE AGGREGATE

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship					Hostility		Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Dulles	20.9	25.3	5.0	5.0	9.6	16.9	17.3	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

Dulles (N=1055); Total (N=1706)

TABLE 37--Continued

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Dulles	9.6	26.9	7.9	2.6	7.0	23.4	22.7	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	8.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

Dulles (N=945); Total (N=1393)

c. Win-Lose

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Dulles	12.0	13.9	4.0	1.1	2.9	25.2	40.9	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

Dulles (N=224); Total (N=568)

d. Strong-Weak

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Dulles	30.7	32.4	13.9	5.9	8.4	7.1	1.6	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Dulles (N=574); Total (N=1255)

e. Active-Passive

	Active 1	2	3	4	5	6	Passive 7	Total
Dulles	41.1	22.9	12.1	17.9	1.0	4.4	0.6	100.0
Total	26.2	54.2	9.5	6.8	0.8	2.1	0.5	100.0

Dulles (N=337); Total (N=866)

f. Simple-Complex

	Simple 1	2	3	4	5	6	Complex 7	Total
Dulles	23.9	20.3	11.3	3.3	8.4	15.2	17.6	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

Dulles (N=696); Total (N=1426)

It can also be seen that Dulles was very suspicious of others and this seemed to have been revealed through his (1) self-righteous perception of morality, (2) his anti-communism, and (3) his dislike of neutrals. The Suez crisis, a situation during which Dulles reprimanded Great Britain, France, Israel, Egypt and Russia also increased his suspicion.[16] That is, Dulles' unhappiness with these countries' perceived actions may have brought about increased hostility and suspicion on his part. In spite of this, Dulles was still more trustworthy and less suspicious of other countries than Acheson. But this may be related more to Acheson's rigid suspicion than to any attribute of Dulles (see Table 27).

John Foster Dulles also was pessimistic regarding outcomes. Having delivered 47.8 per cent of the statements on Win-Lose, he made 66.1 per cent of his pronouncements in the two most pessimistic categories. This over-representation on pessimism may well have given further evidence why Dulles saw things as bipolar and was so hostile to Russia and China. Perhaps these perceptions toward Russia and China may have accounted for Dulles being less optimistic and more pessimistic toward object countries than Acheson and the other Secretaries of State (see Appendix A-3).

The Secretary of State also saw target countries as strong and active and solutions to problems as either simple or complex. Dulles, like other Secretaries of State, built up countries as strong and active because it may have been easier to persuade Congress to allocate funds and easier to convince the public of the dangers of not doing so by portraying the countries as powerful. However, he did view countries

as less strong and less active than either Acheson or Rusk. This, too, may have been related in some way to Acheson's and Rusk's particular responses to the object countries rather than any of Dulles' attributes (see Appendices A-4, A-5). In terms of whether a solution was perceived to be simple or complex, Secretaries sometimes (t_1) viewed problems as amenable to solution and sometime later (t_2) envisaged the problem as having a difficult solution.

Thus, Dulles had tended to envisage the world to be suspicious, strong and active. He was pessimistic as to outcome and thought that solutions to problems would be either easy or complex. And in this case he saw the solutions as more difficult to achieve than did Acheson (see Table 27). In many instances his views also tended to be dichotomized.

2. Specific Relationships

a. Allies

With regard to specific countries, Secretary of State Dulles tended to be friendly, trustful, and optimistic toward Friends and India.[17] Generally, his views remained the same over the entire tenure--but with France and West Germany on the Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion dimensions, Dulles' images became more moderate over time. In this respect Dulles was slightly friendlier and more trustful of Great Britain and France than Acheson. Toward West Germany, Acheson was only very slightly friendlier and more trustful than Dulles. Here the difference in statements or coding may well have accounted for the deviation. Toward South Korea, Dulles was much more

TABLE 38

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON THE VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX BROKEN DOWN INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), EXTREME (6+7)

a. Friendship-Hostility (N=1055)

Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
46.2	19.6	34.2	100.0

b. Trust-Suspicion (N=945)

Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
36.5	17.5	46.1	100.0

c. Win-Lose (N=224)

Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
25.9	8.0	66.1	100.0

d. Strong-Weak (N=574)

Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
63.1	28.2	8.7	100.0

e. Active-Passive (N=337)

Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Passive (6+7)	Total
64.0	31.0	5.0	100.0

f. Simple-Complex (N=696)

Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult (6+7)	Total
44.2	23.0	32.8	100.0

friendly and this was probably related to the fact that the Korean War was nearly over when Dulles took office (see Table 36). The slight upward pattern in the last quartile might possibly have been due to the end of the Algerian War, DeGaulle's rise to power and Dulles' concomitant anxiety in an uncertain situation, or the low number of statements.

In addition, the large number of statements in the second quartile devoted to Great Britain might possibly have been the results of the "agonizing reappraisal," problems in NATO, or the preliminary problems on Suez.[18] Similarly the large number of statements toward South Korea in the first quartile were probably related to the ending of the peace action there (see Table 39).

b. Neutrals

There were no direct confrontations between the United States and India. Furthermore, India had helped in getting the negotiations started in Korea. Therefore, Dulles tended to be friendly, trustful and optimistic toward her.[19]

Egypt, however, was another matter. Duller perceived Egypt to be friendly during the first two quartiles. In the third quartile the Suez Crisis occurred and Dulles believed that Egypt was wrong. In this situation, Dulles' view of morality became very important and he tended to view Egypt with much more hostility and suspicion.[20] The dramatic increase in the number of statements toward Egypt in the third quartile also illustrated the emphasis that Secretary of State Dulles was giving to that country.

TABLE 39

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD ALLIES

a. Great Britain[21]

	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
Mean Total	1.4 (N=41)	1.8 (N=27)
Quartile I	1.4 (N= 8)	1.2 (N= 4)
Quartile II	1.4 (N=25)	1.6 (N=15)
Quartile III	2.0 (N= 3)	3.0 (N= 3)
Quartile IV	1.3 (N= 5)	2.2 (N= 5)

b. France

Mean Total	1.7 (N=47)	1.7 (N=46)
Quartile I	2.2 (N=13)	2.2 (N=13)
Quartile II	1.6 (N=23)	1.6 (N=23)
Quartile III	1.6 (N= 8)	1.6 (N= 8)
Quartile IV	2.0 (N= 3)	2.0 (N= 2)

c. West Germany

Mean Total	1.7 (N=67)	1.7 (N=64)
Quartile I	1.9 (N=20)	1.9 (N=20)
Quartile II	1.6 (N=32)	1.6 (N=29)
Quartile III	1.6 (N= 4)	1.6 (N= 4)
Quartile IV	1.5 (N=11)	1.5 (N=11)

d. South Korea

Mean Total	1.5 (N=22)	1.5 (N=22)
Quartile I	2.0 (N=10)	2.0 (N=10)
Quartile II	2.0 (N= 1)	2.0 (N= 2)
Quartile III	1.0 (N= 4)	1.0 (N= 3)
Quartile IV	1.0 (N= 7)	1.0 (N= 7)

TABLE 40

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY TOWARD EGYPT: (1) BEFORE THE SUEZ CRISIS, (2) DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS, AND (3) AFTER THE SUEZ CRISIS

a. Before Suez	b. During Suez	c. After Suez
(Mean: Quartile I + Quartile II) 2.5 (N=8)	Quartile III 4.5 (N=24)	Quartile IV 5.7 (N=4)

TABLE 41

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD EGYPT BY QUARTILES

	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
Quartile I	2.6 (N= 5)	3.5 (N= 4)
Quartile II	2.3 (N= 3)	3.3 (N= 3)
Quartile III	4.5 (N=24)	5.3 (N=19)
Quartile IV	5.7 (N= 4)	5.2 (N= 4)

It is thus possible to suggest that in the third and fourth quartiles Egypt, a neutral in this study, may have become for Dulles an enemy and was perceived as such. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis seemed to have both short-range and long-range impact on Dulles. Even after the immediate trauma of the crisis had passed, Secretary Dulles continued to perceive Egypt as hostile and even became slightly more hostile toward her in the last quartile.

c. Enemies

Dulles tended to be very hostile and very suspicious

toward perceived enemies of America. More than 90 per cent of the statements toward Russia and more than 95 per cent of the statements toward China, for instance, were in the two most hostile and suspicious (6 + 7) parts of the dimensions.[22] Yet Dulles was less hostile and less suspicious toward Russia and slightly less hostile and suspicious toward China and North Korea than Acheson. These findings seem to indicate not that Dulles was "soft" on communism, but rather that Acheson was extremely hostile and suspicious. That is, whereas the range of means for Dulles toward Russia was from 5.7 to 6.3 with a Standard Deviation of 1.30, for Acheson the range of means was from 6.3 to 6.8 with a Standard Deviation of 0.245. Thus, Acheson was more hostile more consistently (see Table 36). Furthermore, Dulles, many times, may have thought that Russia was trying to outmaneuver the United States. Once in the mid-1950's, for example, when the Soviet Union decided to reduce arms expenditures slightly, Secretary Dulles, rather than believing that the USSR was trying to reduce tensions, thought that the Soviet Union was weak and contemplated when the next play or counter-thrust would come.[23]

It is possible to speculate that the large increase in the number of statements in the last quartile toward Russia and China may have been related to the Quemoy-Matsu shellings, the Lebanon Crisis, the seizure of power in Cuba, problems with Berlin, and Khrushchev's rise to power. Lastly, it seems likely that the fact that the last quartile was four months longer may also have contributed to the greater number of statements in that period.

TABLE 42

MEANS OF THE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON THE VARIABLES FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD RUSSIA, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA

	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
a. Russia		
Mean Total	6.0 (N=179)	6.1 (N=167)
Quartile I	6.3 (N= 47)	6.2 (N= 56)
Quartile II	5.7 (N= 32)	6.0 (N= 33)
Quartile III	5.7 (N= 39)	6.0 (N= 22)
Quartile IV	6.0 (N= 61)	6.1 (N= 56)
b. China		
Mean Total	6.5 (N= 70)	6.4 (N= 66)
Quartile I	6.5 (N= 17)	6.8 (N= 16)
Quartile II	6.7 (N= 9)	6.6 (N= 8)
Quartile III	6.3 (N= 10)	6.7 (N= 7)
Quartile IV	6.6 (N= 34)	6.1 (N= 35)
c. North Korea		
Mean Total	6.9 (N= 19)	6.9 (N= 19)
Quartile I	6.6 (N= 7)	6.6 (N= 7)
Quartile II	---	---
Quartile III	7.0 (N= 6)	7.0 (N= 6)
Quartile IV	7.0 (N= 6)	7.0 (N= 6)

C. The Effect of Time in Office on Dulles' Perceptions

Time in office may have also affected Dulles' world outlook. Dulles, like Marshall, gave more pronouncements in the first quartile than in any other time slice.[24] Not having been in power for twenty years, the Republicans decided to make policy declarations on a variety of issues. Secretary of State Dulles drafted and articulated many of these statements and helped set the tone of the Administration's

foreign policy.[25] Furthermore, during the first quartile the following important events occurred: (1) Stalin died, (2) East German riots occurred, (3) the Soviet Union detonated an H-bomb, (4) the communists tried to take over the government in Guatemala, (5) the Korean War ended, and (6) Dienbienphu occurred and the Indo-China War ended. John Foster Dulles, as Eisenhower's Secretary of State, also traveled widely, speaking here, making declarations there, signing treaties, initiating pacts, and in general learning about the international arena and, in return, having others learn about him and the new administration in Washington.

Dulles made more statements in the last quartile than in the third quartile. He may possibly have done so because (1) Dulles' fourth quartile was slightly longer than the other three and he did not resign until April 15, 1959, (2) Sputnik was launched, (3) Khrushchev ascended to power, (4) DeGaulle came to power, (5) the Common Market was begun, (6) political and military crises occurred in Lebanon, Cuba, and Quemoy-Matsu.

TABLE 43

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON TENURE DIVIDED INTO QUARTILES COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Dulles	32.1	24.2	21.1	22.6	100.0
Total	29.7	28.6	20.1	21.6	100.0

Dulles (N=1055); Total (N=2557)

D. Dulles' Perceptions Concerning Region and Audience

1. Region

When Dulles was Secretary he spoke to all regions. It is possible to speculate whether the United States was very involved and Dulles spoke to all the regions or perhaps Dulles may have created this involvement.

All during Dulles' tenure the Soviet Union was involved in actions with important implications for the United States--in Berlin, Hungary, and Europe, and in threatening to send volunteers to the Suez Canal; and the actions appear to have had an impact on the Secretary's perceptions. Dulles focused on Europe, too. Here NATO, the problems of German rearmament, a growing economic strength, and the difficulties with the Warsaw Pact countries demanded his attention. The majority of the statements to the Middle East occurred during the Suez Crisis and the Lebanon troubles of 1958, while Dulles' interests in Asia were primarily related to Korea, Viet Nam, the Bandung Conference, India and Japan. Dulles made relatively few statements toward China because he

TABLE 44

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON REGION COMPARED WITH THE AGGREGATE

	USSR	Europe	China	Southeast Asia	Rest of Asia	Latin America	Middle East	Africa	Total
Dulles	24.4	21.2	7.9	13.7	8.0	9.7	13.2	1.8	100.0
Total	20.9	20.2	6.7	15.6	17.5	9.6	8.0	1.6	100.0

Dulles (N=1055); Total (N=2557)

may have believed that Russia was pulling the strings of the Chinese puppet. The countries that Dulles talked about in Latin America were Guatemala, Cuba, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Colombia and Venezuela. Because most countries in Africa were not independent, Dulles paid little attention to that continent, and only Algeria received any discussion.

2. Audience

John Foster Dulles spoke about these countries most often to the Press, Foreign Groups, and the Executive, and least often to Professional and Academic Groups. Secretary Dulles traveled extensively abroad, tried to gain support for and attempted to legitimize American foreign policy via the Press and Foreign Groups. He generally spoke when he thought it necessary to explain, clarify and/or get support for a policy to those groups that were entitled to it (i.e., Congress) or were receptive to his positions. On the other hand, it may have been possible that he did not seem to enjoy intellectuals and tended to speak infrequently to Academic and Professional Groups.[22] (He also may not have been invited.)

TABLE 45

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON AUDIENCES COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	Press	Foreign Groups	Executive	Civic	Academic	Professional	Audio Visual	Veterans	Total
Dulles	53.1	15.9	11.3	2.3	2.3	2.5	8.7	3.9	100.0
Total	44.9	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.9	3.4	14.2	3.3	100.0

Dulles (N=1055); Total (N=2557)

Moreover, Secretary Dulles spoke to the audio-visual media more than did either Marshall or Acheson. Press Conferences and Sunday news shows came to play a prominent role on American television. Furthermore, he appeared several times with President Eisenhower on television in an attempt to explain why the United States was acting the way it was on various issues. Television was a growing medium. It thus may have been possible that Dulles saw the potential power of television and sought to harness it to help explain American foreign policy, or else it may have been that television executives initiated the exposure and tried to interest the Secretary of State in appearing more frequently on television.

E. Dulles' Views of Target Countries

1. Efficacy

An additional method of evaluating Dulles' views of a nation's ability to carry out its policy aims is to utilize the concept of efficacy. Dulles tended to build up enemies and viewed them as strong and active. His attitudes toward efficacy, however, reflected a different kind of appraisal. As Table 46 illustrates, Secretary Dulles had images of many countries as having medium or low efficacy. In this respect he saw countries having medium or low efficacy much more often than did Acheson. These views were also reflected on perceptions of Russia, China, and North Korea (see Table 34).

In building up countries as strong and active Dulles may have wanted Congress to allocate more funds to counter target nations. His views of efficacy, however, may have been more of an objective

TABLE 46

PER CENT AND NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON EFFICACY, BOTH TOTAL AND BROKEN DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY

a. Total

	High	Medium	Low	Total
Dulles	52.3	32.3	15.4	100.0
Total	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

Dulles (N=276); Total (N=442)

b. By Individual Country (Number of perceptions for Dulles only)

Great Britain	7	1	0	8
France	1	5	3	9
West Germany	7	4	2	13
South Korea	0	8	8	16
South Viet Nam	0	0	5	5
Taiwan	2	5	14	21
India	0	0	3	3
Egypt	1	5	7	13
China	15	32	3	50
Russia	102	9	1	112
North Korea	3	8	5	16
North Viet Nam	1	9	0	10
	139	86	51	276

appraisal of the countries or else it might have been biased toward the military capability. The findings that illustrated that Russia, Great Britain and West Germany had high efficacy; that France, China, North Korea and North Viet Nam had medium efficacy; while Taiwan, Egypt, South Korea, and South Viet Nam had low efficacy seem to be corroborated by biographers.[28]

2. Basis of Conflict

It may be similarly fruitful to evaluate the "basis of

conflict" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Dulles' views of morality and his strong anti-communism may have tended to make him believe that differences between the United States and Russia were due to ideology. On this issue he saw ideology as the "basis of conflict" much more often than did Marshall, Acheson, or Rusk, "power centers" more frequently than the others, and "spheres of influence" more often than either Marshall or Acheson (see Table 35, Appendix A-11). Responsible for 68.4 per cent of all the statements on the "basis of conflict" between the United States and the USSR, Dulles promulgated 84.1 per cent of the statements attributing the "basis of conflict" to ideology.

TABLE 47

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON THE REASONS FOR THE BASIS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Dulles	98.0	1.3	0.7	100.0
Total	79.6	15.8	4.5	100.0

Dulles (N=151); Total (N=221)

This view seems to be corroborated by Finlay in Enemies in Politics:

> Characteristically, he placed special emphasis on the materialistic and atheistic aspects of the Soviet creed; these attributes insured the absolute ruthlessness of Soviet leaders in their quest for world dominion. By the time Dulles took office as Secretary of State in 1953, he had clearly adopted the theory that Soviet policy was the manifestation of ideology. His six

> years in office appear to have confirmed for him the validity of that view; it changed only in that it became stronger with the passing of time.[29]

F. The Effect of the Personality and Situational Variables on Dulles' Views

John Foster Dulles had wanted to be Secretary of State during most of his life. His activity as an international lawyer, his work with the World Council of Churches, his two books, his role as foreign advisor to the Republican Party in the 1940's, his term as United States Senator from New York, and his experiences in negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty were all designed to give Dulles the background for the job of Secretary of State.[30] On January 20, 1953, he achieved that position.

In this section, "we are concerned with the impact of personal as well as institutional, cultural, social, and economic factors on the conduct of politics,"[31] and wish to evaluate the relative importance of the personality and situational factors vis-a-vis John Foster Dulles.

In many ways the personality factor was very important in helping to shape Dulles' beliefs. For instance,

> He was a man of supreme confidence within himself. . . . He simply did not pay any attention to staff or to experts or anything else. Maybe in a very sub-conscious way he did catalogue some of the information given him but he did not, as was characteristic of Acheson and several others of the Secretaries of State . . . take the very best he could get out of his staff. . . .[32]

Thus, the State Department Policy Planning Staff was allowed to atrophy and ambassadors were less frequently consulted.[33] For example:

> Henry A. Byroade, American Ambassador in Cairo, told the Senate that he was neither consulted about the decision to cancel aid for the Aswan Dam, nor was he informed of the decision once it had been made.[33]

Moreover, this self-confidence, along with Dulles' extensive reading brought additional problems.

> As time went on the participants apparently became rather intimidated by the Secretary's claims to conclusive knowledge and experience. He was able to remember some instance, far back, ten or twenty or thirty years, or some book, or some earlier conviction of his, to cite in support of a present opinion. As time went on, the staff conversations . . . lost their biting edge.[34]

Concomitantly, intensive study of the Marxist-Leninist classics added to his belief that he was uniquely qualified to assess the meaning of Soviet policy. He suggested that, "Soviet communism starts with an atheistic Godless premise. Everything else flows from that premise."[35] Beyond this,

> Dulles was an American Puritan very difficult . . . to understand. This partly led him to a conviction that Bolshevism was a product of the devil and that God would wear out the Bolsheviks in the long run. . . .[36]

He seemed to place almost absolute reliance on his own abilities to conduct foreign relations and once told Assistant Secretary Berding:

> I've done a great deal of reading on communist ideology . . . including The Problems of Leninism and The Short History of the Communist Party. This resulted in my understanding the aim of international communism and produced a steadfast American policy in meeting that threat. The threat, of course, still persists, but we have learned better than before how to meet it.[37]

It therefore seems that central core interests, such as Dulles' views of communism and Russia, may be strongly affected by personality factors. Moreover, his self-reliance and confidence may have reflected ego-defensive adjustment. That is, certain key events

in Dulles' political life--perhaps World War II, the Russian refusal to pay back Czarist debts, his religious upbringing, or an event from his childhood--may have brought forth these traits.

Similarly, Dulles' detailed views of the Soviet Union may have reflected his personality. He found Russia to be despotic, totalitarian, dangerous, and imperialistic.[38] In addition,

> Dulles' view of the USSR, although it was consistent with certain opinions widely held in the United States during his tenure in office, was not solely determined by institutional, cultural, or situational factors. Dulles the man brought personal views and opinions to the Secretaryship and they shaped his behavior in important ways.[39]

For example, Finlay, Holsti, et al., found that Dulles interpreted information concerning the Soviet Union in a manner consistent with his perceptual outlook. He was hostile to the Soviet Union. Thus, they learned that for John Foster Dulles,

1. Perceptions of decreasing Soviet hostility resulted in no significant change in the general evaluation of the Soviet Union.
2. Perceptions of decreasing Soviet hostility resulted in assessments of decreasing success in Soviet foreign policy.
3. Perceptions of decreasing Soviet hostility resulted in assessment of decreasing Soviet capabilities.[40]

That is, Dulles imputed relatively good behavior on the part of Russia to necessity.[41] (His views were thus probably related to his personal outlook.)

In the same vein, Dulles' personality was very important in helping set the boundaries and helped shape the public's images of the conflict. Thus,

> Dulles did not originate the Cold War, but by his persistent selection and skewing of information about the Soviet Union, he did much to structure and perhaps even to intensify United States-Soviet antagonism.[42]

Besides that, most of Dulles' views remained relatively constant over time and this would, most likely, point to the influence of the personality variable.[43] Selective perception is at work here and the degree of selectivity is a personality factor.

Still another way to measure the influence of the personality is through an evaluation of Dulles' activity. In four quartiles or in the equivalent six and one-third years Dulles made 1055 statements. This suggests that the mean was 264 statements per quartile or 167 statements per year. Dulles was really quite active and was not afraid to make statements. He made more statements per year and more statements per quartile than any other Secretary of State. Similarly, he made 525 speeches for a mean of 106 speeches per quartile and 83 speeches per year. This, too, was more speeches than any other Secretary of State. Passive types do not become Secretary of State. Dulles was concerned with the state of the world and wished to communicate with other countries so as to give them clues as to what the United States was thinking on important issues.[44]

In addition, the personality variable can be important in complex, contradictory, emotional, new and ambiguous situations.[45] Here, too, Dulles was instrumental because, "the identification of enemies and the choice of responses to them almost invariably incorporate large areas of ambiguity."[46] The overthrow of Stalin in Russia created a new, complex, and ambiguous situation for the United States and Dulles had much latitude in deciding how to approach and react to the new leadership. Similarly, the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution presented emotional, complex, and ambiguous situations and Dulles'

TABLE 48

MEANS OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, NORTH KOREA, RUSSIA, AND CHINA ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION

	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
a. Great Britain		
Mean Total	1.4 (N= 41)	1.8 (N= 27)
Quartile I	1.4 (N= 8)	1.2 (N= 4)
Quartile II	1.4 (N= 25)	1.6 (N= 15)
Quartile III	2.0 (N= 3)	3.0 (N= 3)
Quartile IV	1.3 (N= 5)	2.2 (N= 5)
b. France		
Mean Total	1.8 (N= 47)	1.8 (N= 46)
Quartile I	2.2 (N= 13)	2.2 (N= 13)
Quartile II	1.6 (N= 23)	1.6 (N= 23)
Quartile III	1.6 (N= 8)	1.6 (N= 8)
Quartile IV	2.0 (N= 3)	2.0 (N= 2)
c. West Germany		
Mean Total	1.7 (N= 67)	1.7 (N= 64)
Quartile I	1.9 (N= 20)	1.9 (N= 20)
Quartile II	1.6 (N= 32)	1.6 (N= 29)
Quartile III	1.6 (N= 4)	1.6 (N= 4)
Quartile IV	1.5 (N= 11)	1.5 (N= 11)
d. North Korea		
Mean Total	6.9 (N= 19)	6.9 (N= 19)
Quartile I	6.6 (N= 7)	6.6 (N= 7)
Quartile II	---	---
Quartile III	7.0 (N= 6)	7.0 (N= 6)
Quartile IV	7.0 (N= 6)	7.0 (N= 6)
e. Russia		
Mean Total	6.0 (N=179)	6.1 (N=167)
Quartile I	6.3 (N= 47)	6.2 (N= 56)
Quartile II	5.7 (N= 32)	6.0 (N= 33)
Quartile III	5.7 (N= 39)	6.0 (N= 22)
Quartile IV	6.0 (N= 61)	6.1 (N= 56)
f. China		
Mean Total	6.5 (N= 70)	6.4 (N= 66)
Quartile I	6.5 (N= 17)	6.8 (N= 16)
Quartile II	6.5 (N= 9)	6.6 (N= 8)
Quartile III	6.3 (N= 10)	6.7 (N= 7)
Quartile IV	6.6 (N= 34)	6.1 (N= 35)

decision to avoid direct conflicts there may have been related to his personal assessment of the situations. By 1953, in contrast, relations with many European countries and Japan had become routinized and the personal influence was less important.

Beyond this, Dulles wholly believed what he said. Andrew Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs during much of Dulles' term, took extensive shorthand notes which revealed "a remarkable similarity between Dulles' public and private views."[47]

In the same vein, Dulles was very active in advising the President. Eisenhower had given Dulles substantial authority over foreign policy and Dulles had assured the President that,

> With my understanding of the intricate relationships between the peoples of the world and your sensitiveness to the political considerations involved, we will make the most successful team in history.[48]

He, therefore, had the consent and support of Eisenhower, and in the frequent crises, the ambiguity of information concerning the Soviet Union, and by his tendency "to make decisions with little consultation provided him with wide latitude in the conduct of foreign policy."[49]

On the other hand, certain situational factors also influenced Dulles. The lines of the Cold War had hardened and this over-all situation certainly had an impact. Moreover, the Suez Crisis was a situation that had significant impact on his perceptions. In that crisis Dulles' perceptions of Friendship-Hostility went from a mean of 2.5 (N = 8) before the crisis, to a mean of 4.5 (N = 24) during the crisis, to a mean of 5.7 (N = 4) after the crisis. Not only did the hostility increase but also the number of pronouncements increased dramatically

from eight to twenty-four and that usually indicates attention to a specific traumatic event.

Usually the personality and situational factors work together to influence a Secretary. Perhaps the greater the change and the shorter the time period the more the influence of the situational factor. Thus, a change from a mean of 1.0 in one quartile to a mean of 7.0 in the next quartile would point to a great influence of the situation. Yet it seems unlikely that the personality factor would not be at work. A Secretary of State has preconceptions and a detailed perceptual outlook and this almost always has an impact. That is, the man and his views are always important in the way the situation is defined and how it is presented and perceived.

In this situation it may have been that Dulles began to see Egypt, a neutral, as an enemy. And enemy situations do tend to trigger attention. For instance, there were 179 pronouncements toward Russia and 70 pronouncements toward China on the Friendship-Hostility dimension while there were 41 pronouncements toward Great Britain, 22 statements toward South Korea, and only three references to India on the same dimension.

In toto, it seems that Dulles had resolve and initiative but was most concerned with the Soviet Union. He was tenacious and may have been determined to outwait and outwit Russia. The evidence also may have illustrated that he did not slow down the Cold War and may have kept tensions at a very high level.[50] During his term, the prime opponents continued to be Russia and China, but during and after the Suez Crisis Dulles may have perceived Egypt to be an enemy. Biograph-

ers and analysts of Dulles thus believe that his personality was more important in shaping his perceptual outlook of the world of the 1950's than were outside situations.[51]

TABLE 49

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN FOSTER DULLES ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION TOWARD EGYPT BY QUARTILES

	Friendship-Hostility	Trust-Suspicion
Quartile I	2.6 (N= 5)	3.5 (N= 4)
Quartile II	2.3 (N= 3)	3.3 (N= 3)
Quartile III	4.5 (N=24)	5.3 (N=14)
Quartile IV	5.7 (N= 4)	5.2 (N= 4)

G. Theoretical Considerations

Dulles had to react to object nations, build his political and social solidarity, and deal with his own psyche. It seemed that he spent most of his time keeping his strong friendship with the President and then attempting to legitimize American foreign policy to domestic and foreign audiences.[52] Secretary Dulles, too, had to simplify all these objects into a meaningful array of targets and audiences. Because he was so well-read and so confident, Dulles paid little attention to others and had his own idea of enemies (bad) and friends (good). Yet we are not certain whether Secretary Dulles' experiences are generalizable. That is,

> We do not know under what conditions Secretaries are relatively free to choose the enemies against which they will do battle and under what conditions the enemies are given by historical and cultural experiences. The same, of course, holds true of friends.[53]

Furthermore, it is suggested that the Secretary of State may be able to dramatize events. But, "how much latitude is there, then, within which a single official's values and attitudes may significantly affect foreign policy decisions? . . . [We know] that it does depend on the nature of the situation and the ambiguity of relevant information."[54] Yet we, as yet, are not cognizant of all the important contributing circumstances and conditions.

Beyond this, we learned that Dulles generally believed what he said and that his private views conformed to his public statements but we are unsure as "to what extent do policy decisions reflect attributes of those who made them?"[55] John Foster Dulles also frequently "preempted traditional sources of information--such as ambassadors and foreign service officers."[56] Yet, because he had trained so long to be Secretary of State, he may have been unique. Usually, decision-makers rely on advice from civil servants with specialized knowledge. That is,

> Secretaries of state are subject to bureaucratic constraints. These range from constitutional and legal requirements to informal, but nevertheless real, limitations rooted in the expectations of his associates. . . . These constraints establish boundaries which restrict to a greater or lesser degree the scope of the incumbent's decisions and the criteria used to make them.[57]

Moreover, Dulles may have seen the instability of moods in the United States, "the propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a monetary passion," and attempted to keep America focused on the continuing contemporary problems.[58] In spite of this, Dulles was a product of the society and tended to manifest a "diffuse

hostile tension and general apprehension and anxiety" toward foreign countries.[59] He, like most other Secretaries of State, simplified, exaggerated symbols and events, and overreacted. In this way, Secretary Dulles tended to incorporate an attitude of "hopeless pessimism, cynicism . . . impatience, and intolerance toward Russia . . . in the 1950's."[60]

Concomitantly, Dulles perceived and acted as if he were the master of his environment. He believed that "man was self-seeking," and that John Foster Dulles was the lawyer for the United States against tough, ruthless adversaries bent on eventual destruction of the United States.[61] He selectively perceived and selectively forgot and tended to dichotomize the world. He may have, in fact, forgotten about nuances and perceived neutrals, such as Egypt, to be enemies. Using the Secretary of State's office as a "bully pulpit" he tended to dramatize events with enemies (Russia) and play down interactions with allies.

In addition, like Acheson, Secretary Dulles may have had too much prior experience and may have been unable to change in the face of new conditions (especially after the thaw in Russia in 1956). Besides this, Eisenhower gave Dulles substantial authority and the Secretary may not have been accountable to the public or to the Congress on many issues. It is possible to consider what Dulles would have done had he been Secretary to President Franklin D. Roosevelt or John Kennedy or if the era of his tenure had been one of tranquility or "low profile." It is also possible to speculate whether he would have resigned or adjusted. Perhaps people who train for and want to hold a

certain job for so long (as did Dulles) have to make headlines, act decisively, and do things in a dramatic way. They may also be so anxious that they are unable to lower the intensity. Thus, Dulles may have had a self-image as the "man of the hour" and the knight fighting the Russian dragon.

During his term Dulles perceived object countries as very powerful (Power Syndrome) but not as powerful as Acheson perceived them and high on the Ethnocentric Factor. That is, on Friendship-Hostility, Trust-Suspicion and somewhat on Win-Lose (optimism-pessimism), Secretary Dulles looked at target countries in terms of a rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction, stereotype simplification, and dichotomization (see Footnote 29, Chapter III). Lastly, the overall effect of the Cold War may have been a crucial determinant of his perceptual outlook. During that period there was little hope of co-existence with the Soviet Union and Europeans were still receiving Marshall Plan aid. Beyond this, Dulles was the third Secretary of State since the formulation of the containment policy. His freedom of action to chart new, less hostile policies may not have been popular. That is, as was mentioned earlier, "We know the end before we consider the beginning, and we can never wholly recapture what it was to know the beginning only."[62]

H. Conclusions

John Foster Dulles perceived object nations as either friendly or hostile (bipolarized), slightly suspicious, moderate to very strong, and moderate to very active. He was very pessimistic about outcomes

and found problems either simple to solve or quite difficult to resolve. Dulles spoke to Russia, Europe, China, Korea, South East Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America frequently via the Press, Foreign Groups, and Executive audiences. On a fair share basis he should have given 41.3 per cent of the statements, but on most issues (Friendship-Hostility) he gave more than this. The Suez Crisis was a crucial outside event and markedly changed his perception of Egypt to a more hostile view. In addition, he was very friendly, optimistic, and trustful to Great Britain, France, and, especially, West Germany.

On the other hand, Secretary Dulles was hostile, suspicious, and pessimistic toward the enemies throughout the term. He seemed to perceive Russia as very hostile, having high efficacy and thought that the differences between America and Russia were due to ideology. His moralistic ideas and his personal outlook may have had much to do with his beliefs. Yet,

> . . . during his tenure of office 1953-1959, the Soviet Union did represent a potential threat to the United States; the Cold War was not merely a product of Dulles' imagination, nor can the development of Soviet American relations during the period be explained solely by reference to his belief system.[63]

It could probably have been a combination of factors that contributed to Dulles acting, reacting, and deciding the way he did.

Compared to Acheson, John Foster Dulles perceived the world in a less bipolar way. In these instances Acheson tended to be more optimistic and see solutions as more easily achievable than did Dulles. That is, Dulles made a higher per cent of his statements in the "Moderate and Neutral" sections of the dimensions than did Acheson. Both were anti-communist and had substantial authority and latitude of action.

Yet Dulles viewed object countries as slightly friendlier, less suspicious, less strong, and less active than did Acheson. On the other hand, Dulles was more pessimistic toward outcomes and envisaged solutions to problems as more difficult to achieve than did Acheson. They both focused on enemies more than two-thirds of the time and perceived Russia and China as very hostile, very suspicious, strong and active. But while Acheson emphasized North Korea in his statements, Dulles emphasized Russia. Moreover, while Dulles spoke often to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, Acheson did not.

During his term, Dulles had many accomplishments. He helped stem subversion in Guatemala and Lebanon; ended the Korean War; helped get West Germany into NATO; arranged bilateral and multilateral pacts with countries threatened by subversion and intervention near Russia and China; kept mainland China from overtaking Quemoy-Matsu; kept the United States out of the Suez Crisis; and kept America out of war.[64]

Yet John Foster Dulles did have a very strong personality that saw Russia as "the atheistic, communist devil" and this belief tended to permeate his tenure.[65] This tendency Finlay, Holsti, et al., concluded may have been a very narrow view and one of the big failures of his term. They suggested that,

> By painting a picture of the world in bold strokes of black and white, interlaced with periodic claims of spectacular American triumphs, and calamitous Russian defeats, he contributed to the latent tendency of the public to view the enemy of the moment in one-dimensional terms.[66]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]John Foster Dulles, "Not War, Not Peace," Vital Speeches, XIV, No. 9 (February 15, 1948), 270-73.

[2]John Foster Dulles, "Moral Leadership--Churches Can Prescribe the Broad Strategy," Vital Speeches, XIV, No. 23 (September 15, 1948), 706-09.

[3]John Foster Dulles, "The Blessings of Liberty--The Struggle for the Souls and the Minds of Men," Vital Speeches, XVI, No. 8 (February 1, 1950), 231-36.

[4]John Foster Dulles, "Resignation Letter of April 15," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XL, No. 1036 (May 4, 1959), 619.

[5]John Foster Dulles, "The Meaning of Freedom," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XIX, No. 458 (June 13, 1948), 82-84.

[6]Quoted in John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), p. 7; also see U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 711 (February 13, 1953), 212-16.

[7]Beal, op. cit., pp. xiii, xv.

[8]John Foster Dulles, "The Peace We Seek," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 991 (June 23, 1958), 1035-42.

[9]John Foster Dulles, "The Challenge of Change," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 991 (June 23, 1958), 1035-42.

[10]John Foster Dulles, "U.S. Replies to Letter of Bertrand Russell," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII, No. 974 (February 24, 1958), 290-93.

[11]Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (Garden City: Doubleday, 1963); Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965.

[12]Dwight Eisenhower, "Letter to John Foster Dulles," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XL, No. 1036 (May 4, 1959), 619-20.

[13]David Finlay, Holsti, et al., Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand, McNally, 1967), pp. 25-97.

[14]Quoted in Richard Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles, A Reappraisal (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1960), p. 39.

[15]Ibid.; also see Herman Finer, Duel at the Brink: Dulles Over Suez (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

[16]Ibid.

[17]There were only three statements toward India. Data are available from the author.

[18]Beal, op. cit., pp. 150-250; John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (4th rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 122-141; Peter Calvocoressi, International Politics Since 1945 (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 95-103, 115-131.

[19]Data are available from the author.

[20]Finer, op. cit., pp. 175-400.

[21]There were only seven specific references to Taiwan and that country was not included. There were no references to South Viet Nam.

[22]The results for North Korea are similar.

[23]Finlay, Holsti, op. cit., pp. 110-140.

[24]Because Dulles, in this sample, made so many speeches (525) and statements (1055), it seems very likely that he had much influence on the aggregate totals. His speeches were an important influencer but not a determinant of the mean. This may be one reason why he deviated so little from the mean on tenure, region, audience, efficacy, and "basis of conflict."

[25]Beal, op. cit.; Goold-Adams, op. cit.

[26]This is an event-dominated factor.

[27]Beal, op. cit., pp. 150-218; Goold-Adams, op. cit.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 48.

[30]John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950); John Foster Dulles, War, Peace, and Social Change (New York: Macmillan, 1939).

[31]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 233.

[32]Letter to David Finlay, August 25, 1961, quoted in ibid., p. 45.

[33]Senate, Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Hearing on the President's Proposal on the Middle East, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, pp. 708-714.

[34]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 91.

[35]Dulles, War, Peace, and Social Change, p. 49.

[36]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 15-16.

[37]Andrew Berding, Dulles on Diplomacy (Princeton: Von Nostrand, 1965), pp. 7-8.

[38]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 50.

[39]Ibid., p. 234.

[40]Ibid., pp. 57-69.

[41]Ibid., p. 69.

[42]Ibid., pp. 233-34.

[43]The differences in Table 48 with regard to Great Britain of more than 0.4 per quarter might be due to coding error, or the low number of statements. With France and Russia the differences from Quartile I to Quartile II are 0.6 and might be due to coding errors or to a slight influence of the situation. But the differences in the other three quartiles are so slight as to probably make the personality variable more influential.

[44]Beal, op. cit.; Goold-Adams, op. cit.

[45]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," in Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).

[46]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 243.

[47]Berding, op. cit., quoted in Ibid, p. 29.

[48]Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 89.

[49]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 91.

[50]Ibid., pp. 234-35.

[51]Ibid.; Berding, op. cit., Adams, op. cit; Beal, op. cit.; Goold-Adams, op. cit., Drummond and Coblentz, op. cit.; Spanier, op. cit., pp. 100-173; Calvocoressi, op. cit., pp. 20-51, 95-151, 164-190, 266-278; Finer, op. cit.

[52]See entire section on Personality and Situational Factors.

[53]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 237.

[54]Ibid., p. 88.

[55]Ibid., p. 87.

[56]Ibid., p. 90.

[57]Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[58]Alex De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Knopf, 1945), p. 235.

[59]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 49.

[60]Ibid., pp. 53-63, 67.

[61]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., p. 39.

[62]Quoted in Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Signet Books, 1969), p. 421.

[63]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., pp. 86-87.

[64]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 54-75, 89-173.

[65]Dulles, War or Peace, p. 49.

[66]Finlay, Holsti, et al., op. cit., pp. 92-93.

CHAPTER VII

DEAN RUSK

A. Introduction

Dean Rusk, son of a poor Georgia cotton farmer, a Rhodes scholar, and political science professor at Mills College, helped design the Japanese Peace Treaty, and played a part in bringing NATO and the Marshall Plan to life.[1] In the State Department 1946-1951, Rusk served under and may have been influenced by Acheson. Like Acheson and Dulles, Rusk seemed to have been very concerned with communism. The general Cold War environment and the State Department may have been two factors that molded Rusk's views. This concern came to the fore in 1950-1951 when Rusk served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In that short term, Rusk articulated many of the same kinds of things he was to repeat ten years later as Secretary of State under John F. Kennedy. One of these was implacable hostility to China and Russia. He said that, "The actions of Red China and the Soviet Union in Korea have been criminal and unconscienable. . . . Immediate withdrawal by the U. S. will lead to disaster,"[2] and that "The responsibility of communist imperialism for the aggression in Korea is clear and unequivocable."[3] Lastly he suggested that, "We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not Chinese."[4]

Another may have been the fear of a weak United States ally going communist. Substitute the word "Vietnamese" for "Koreans" and many of Rusk's statements 1961-1969 were in many, many ways similar to those of 1950-1951. For instance, he said that, "We cannot abandon 20 million Koreans to communism. . . . Why don't the communists leave their neighbors alone?"[5]

Furthermore, Rusk's hostility toward mainland China emerged again and again. In this situation he noted that, "The vaunted power of Red China is being unmasked in Korea,"[6] and that, "the peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the communist conspiracy."[7] Also note that in 1951 Rusk recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government of China.[8]

It is very difficult to understand why Dean Rusk was so intensely hostile to mainland China. There seemed to be very little in his early childhood in the south, his education at Davidson College in North Carolina, or his academic career to suggest why Rusk had such feelings toward China.[9] During and after World War II, the general environment and the milieu of the State Department were both anti-communist. Rusk was also in the State Department when China went communist in 1949 and these situations may have contributed to his perceptual outlook. From 1949-1953 Dean Acheson was Secretary of State and very anti-communist and opposed to mainland China. This, too, may have influenced Rusk, an Assistant Secretary under Acheson.

Besides this, Dean Rusk also hoped to work with Asia and have Asians reciprocate. In 1951 he noted that,

The nations of Asia enthusiastically support our actions (through

> the U.N.) in Korea . . . and there is a persistence of an historical sympathy between the American people and their friends across the Pacific.[10]

And there was also his desire for peaceful change, alleviation of poverty, freedom, equal partnership, and security.[11]

Lastly, there is a propensity to feel secure when a decision-maker takes the widest permissible stand when the left and right wings are attacking--and this is a position that may disarm both extremes. That is, Rusk's motivation may in some way have been related to his wanting to be secure and reduce stress. Thus, his anti-communism and pro-foreign aid involvement may have made him somewhat less vulnerable to attack from each side.

By the end of 1951, then, after having served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Rusk had probably developed conceptual outlooks of the world. Thus, it seems likely that the general environment, the milieu of the State Department, the views of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the communist take-over in mainland China, and the Korean War all may have contributed to Rusk's anti-communism.

Between 1950 and 1960, Dean Rusk was the head of the Rockefeller Foundation, where he met and interacted with many leading politicians, diplomats, scientists, and scholars. From them he may have learned much and his views probably began to encompass a wider spectrum of ideas.[12] In 1960 John F. Kennedy decided to choose Dean Rusk as Secretary of State.

During Rusk's tenure as Secretary of State a large number of important events and crises occurred. Among the most important of

these were: (1) the Congo Crisis 1960-1962, (2) the Bay of Pigs, (3) the construction of the Berlin Wall, (4) the Alliance for Progress, (5) the Laotian Crisis, (6) the Cuban Missile Crisis, (7) the overthrow of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, (8) the completion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, (9) the Panamanian Crisis of 1964, (10) the replacement of Khrushchev by Kosygin and Brezhnev in Russia, (11) the overthrow of Sukarno in Indonesia, (12) the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965, (13) the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia, (14) the Six Day War in the Middle East between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, (15) the Viet Nam War, from the Gulf of Tonkin incident to the Tet Offensive of 1968.

Although he was a strong person with a strong set of beliefs, Rusk perceived himself primarily as an advisor to the President. He would therefore nearly always bow to the wishes of President Kennedy and President Johnson. Like Marshall, but unlike Acheson and Dulles, Rusk saw himself as a first lieutenant, ready to carry out the orders of the President (Commander-in-Chief). An episode from the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrated this.

> Criticism over his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis angered Rusk to the point that he heatedly defended it. . . . He said that the responsibility of the Secretary of State was to advise the President. . . .[13]

Rusk also thought of himself as a good administrator and thought that he was developing a State Department that

> . . . was an effective organization for the imaginative and original formulation and proposal of foreign policy. It was tough and energetic. It took a lot of punishment and got through a prodigious amount of work.[14]

Like others in the Kennedy Administration, Rusk may have wanted

to appear to act tough and energetic. Kennedy had come to power in 1960. The President had claimed that there was a "Missile Gap" and that wars of subversion were the primary threat to some of the American allies.[15] To counteract these efforts the Green Berets were formed to fight the guerillas and defense spending was increased to achieve a missile superiority. The tone of the decade of the 1960's was set with Kennedy's inaugural address, in which the President articulated a statement that the United States "would go anywhere, do anything, pay any price, help any friend, fight any foe to help preserve liberty."[16]

Immersed in this atmosphere of perceived omnipotence, the United States set out to try to rectify many of the wrongs of the world. Rusk made many pronouncements to help develop programs to deal with Latin America (Alliance for Progress) and to send military and economic aid to countries perceived as being threatened by communism. In Laos and Viet Nam the United States even sent military advisors. And in Viet Nam Secretary Rusk manifested perceptions toward communism that he had shown in 1950-1951. He observed that,

> Surely we have learned over the past three decades that the acceptance of aggression leads only to sure catastrophe. Surely we have learned that the aggressor must face the consequences of his action,[17]

and suggested that he would use the U.N. charter and S.E.A.T.O. Treaty to justify intervention to protect South Viet Nam.[18]

The euphoria of the early pronouncements of 1961 were quickly shattered with the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and the construction of the Berlin Wall.[19] The idyllic vision of the

world of cooperation clashed with stark reality. The democrats in power, the domestic liberals, became the foreign affairs war hawks. And as Richard Walton noted with respect to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations:

> They demonstrated a tendency to see events in apocalyptic terms, as fateful testings of American resolve that might have terrible consequences unless the U.S. responded with unmistakable but measured firmness.[20]

Finally, Dean Rusk seemed to concur in the widespread activity in which the United States engaged during his tenure.[21] And as Secretary of State, it was his job to defend policies, persuade publics, domestic and foreign, of the validity of a policy, and advise the President of possible alternatives.

B. Dean Rusk's views of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals

1. General Relationships

Dean Rusk was Secretary of State for eight years and, in this sample, made 375 speeches and 976 statements.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tended to perceive countries, in general, as "slightly" hostile and "slightly" suspicious. Although responsible for 18.5 per cent of all the statements on the Friendship-Hostility scale and 14.6 per cent of the statements on the Trust-Suspicion scale, Rusk made 27.0 per cent of the "slightly" hostile and 33.4 per cent of the "slightly" suspicious statements.[21] On a "fair proportion" basis, Dean Rusk was Secretary of State for 38.2 per cent of the time in the sample. Therefore, on that basis, he gave about his "fair share" of statements.

Events analyzed from the data concerning Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Viet Nam all may have tended to heighten the suspicion. The United States was actively involved in a changing world arena and all this created uncertainty. And Rusk, a skeptical person, may have manifested these doubts in terms of hostility and suspicion. The Viet Nam War and the concomitant anger at North Viet Nam, China, and Russia especially may have tended to increase the suspicion. Yet Rusk, except for these areas of the world, tended to be more moderate (less bipolar) than both Acheson and Dulles. This may have occurred because the lines of the Cold War were not so rigid as earlier in the 1950's and the overall impact of this environment may have influenced Rusk.

TABLE 50

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship 1	2	3	4	5	Hostility 6	7	Total
Rusk	8.5	25.3	6.6	4.1	17.7	32.6	5.1	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

Rusk (N=388); Total (N=1706)

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	Suspicion 6	7	Total
Rusk	7.4	25.6	8.4	2.5	26.1	23.6	6.4	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	18.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

Rusk (N=222); Total (N=1393)

TABLE 50--Continued

c. Win-Lose

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Rusk	25.0	23.2	14.2	0.0	3.6	16.1	17.9	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

Rusk (N=83); Total (N=568)

d. Strong-Weak

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Rusk	12.8	63.3	8.2	1.3	11.1	2.9	0.3	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Rusk (N=293); Total (N=1255)

e. Active-Passive

	Active 1	2	3	4	5	6	Passive 7	Total
Rusk	6.4	84.0	7.0	0.6	0.6	1.3	0.0	100.0
Total	26.2	54.2	9.5	6.8	0.8	2.1	0.5	100.0

Rusk (N=313); Total (N=866)

f. Simple-Complex

	Simple 1	2	3	4	5	6	Complex 7	Total
Rusk	4.8	11.7	22.4	0.9	34.3	19.4	6.5	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

Rusk (N=449); Total (N=1426)

Furthermore, he tended to be somewhat optimistic about the eventual outcomes, more optimistic than any other Secretary (see Appendix A-3), thought most countries to be moderately strong and very active, and viewed conflict management as either moderately easy to solve or else moderately difficult to solve.

During the 1960's the United States was active in international

politics and situations did not always turn out the way Rusk had wanted. Trying to reduce anxiety and trying to rationalize why the United States had not been more successful, Rusk in 1965 had noted that,

> Aggression feeds on success. . . . Our foreign policy must work with many unknowns. No one problem in foreign policy can be completely separated from all the other problems,[22]

and later in that year he seemed to believe this as he commented on the Viet Nam situation. "The surreptitious infiltration of arms and trained men across frontiers is no less an aggression because it proceeds gradually over time."[23]

Whereas Acheson and Dulles tended to see the world in terms of "extreme" hostility (6 + 7), Rusk tended to be more moderate.

TABLE 51

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), AND EXTREME (6+7)

a. Friendship-Hostility (N=388)

Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
33.8	28.4	37.7	100.0

b. Trust Suspicion (N=222)

Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
33.0	37.0	30.0	100.0

TABLE 51--Continued

c. Win-Lose (N=83)

Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
48.2	17.8	34.0	100.0

d. Strong-Weak (N=293)

Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
76.1	20.6	3.2	100.0

e. Active Passive (N=313)

Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Passive (6+7)	Total
90.4	8.2	1.3	100.0

f. Simple-Complex (N=449)

Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult (6+7)	Total
16.5	57.6	25.9	100.0

He thus saw the world as moderately trustworthy and found solutions to be moderately difficult to achieve. Only on the Active-Passive and Strong-Weak dimensions were his views congruent to those of Acheson and Dulles. In those instances 63.3 per cent of Rusk's statements on the Strong-Weak dimension and 84.0 per cent on the Active-Passive dimension were on the "moderately" strong (Active) dimension and more than three-fourths of Secretary Rusk's observations were in the extreme (1 + 2) parts of the scale.

2. Specific Relationships

a. Allies

Toward specific countries Secretary Rusk also had important attitudes. For instance, Dean Rusk tended to be friendly toward and trustful of the Western European allies, South Korea, and Taiwan. There were very few crises in these countries. With regard to Great Britain, France, and South Korea he was friendlier than Acheson but more hostile than Dulles, and toward West Germany he was less friendly than either Acheson or Dulles but the differences, except for South Korea, generally are slight (see Tables 36 and 48). Even the French withdrawal from NATO did not seriously affect his statements or public pronouncements toward that country.

On the other hand, the Secretary was very frustrated about South Viet Nam. He may have recognized that the war in South East Asia was a "frontier" war and that the North Vietnamese were "unilaterally trying to alter the frontiers by military action."[24] Moreover, he was cognizant that the war was fought a great distance from the United States and also from the South Vietnamese strength in Saigon.[25] Still, Rusk's perceptions tended to be volatile and may have reflected the success of operations and the ability to which the South Vietnamese followed American advice.

For Great Britain, France, West Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan the total number of statements in each case is five or fewer, and on such a low number it is quite difficult to generalize. Thus, the changes from quartile to quartile may have been due to (1) the low number of statements, (2) the influence of Rusk's perceptual outlook, (3) the over-

TABLE 52

MEANS OF NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION FOR GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, AND SOUTH VIET NAM BY QUARTILE

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
a. Great Britain				
Mean Total	(N = 4)	1.5	(N = 3)	1.7
Quartile I	(N = 2)	1.0	(N = 2)	1.5
Quartile II	(N = 2)	2.0	(N = 1)	2.0
Quartile III	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
Quartile IV	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
b. West Germany				
Mean Total	(N = 4)	2.0	(N = 2)	4.0
Quartile I	(N = 1)	2.0	(N = 0)	---
Quartile II	(N = 2)	2.0	(N = 0)	---
Quartile III	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
Quartile IV	(N = 1)	2.0	(N = 2)	4.0
c. France				
Mean Total	(N = 4)	2.2	(N = 4)	2.2
Quartile I	(N = 0)	---	(N = 1)	3.0
Quartile II	(N = 4)	2.2	(N = 2)	2.0
Quartile III	(N = 0)	---	(N = 1)	2.0
Quartile IV	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
d. South Korea				
Mean Total	(N = 5)	1.6	(N = 2)	1.0
Quartile I	(N = 1)	1.0	(N = 0)	---
Quartile II	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
Quartile III	(N = 2)	1.5	(N = 2)	1.0
Quartile IV	(N = 2)	2.0	(N = 0)	---
e. Taiwan				
Mean Total	(N = 4)	2.0	(N = 2)	2.0
Quartile I	(N = 1)	2.0	(N = 0)	---
Quartile II	(N = 2)	2.0	(N = 0)	---
Quartile III	(N = 1)	2.0	(N = 2)	2.0
Quartile IV	(N = 0)	---	(N = 0)	---
f. South Viet Nam				
Mean Total	(N = 24)	3.3	(N = 22)	3.1
Quartile I	(N = 2)	6.0	(N = 2)	6.0
Quartile II	(N = 3)	4.5	(N = 3)	3.0
Quartile III	(N = 17)	2.7	(N = 17)	2.7
Quartile IV	(N = 2)	3.0	(N = 2)	3.0

all influence of the situational variable. Observations of Taiwan remained constant and may have reflected Rusk's (and America's) support (friendship and trust) of Chiang Kai-Shek.

An examination of the data for South Viet Nam showed that the hostility and suspicion in the first quartile may have been related to the low number of statements in that period and/or to the unhappiness of the Secretary at the prospect of a weak ally having difficulty in fighting a war. The increase in friendship and trust of South Viet Nam during the second and third quartiles might be related to several concepts. As the number of American troops in South Viet Nam increased, the influence of the American government in the war increased. The United States and South Viet Nam were also allies in the war against North Viet Nam. The more one becomes involved with an ally, the more one might trust that ally. The beginning of the bombing of North Viet Nam on February 7, 1965 and continuing until 1968, during Quartile III, might have brought confidence and concomitant friendship and trust to the United States. Besides this, military successes and hopes for "victory" during the third quartile might also have brought about an increase in amity between the United States and South Viet Nam. In addition, the South Vietnamese needed the military and economic support of the United States and may well have acted in a manner that was meant to encourage cordial relationships. Certain military defeats could also have added to the friendship. Lastly, it may have been possible that abstract notions of the "domino theory" and "commitment" as well as Rusk's anti-communism may also have contributed to his attitudes. For instance, on August 25, 1966, Dean Rusk noted that, "No would-be

aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, Congressional resolution, or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression."[26] And by the last quartile the Secretary had said and reiterated nearly everything about South Viet Nam.

b. Neutrals

There were only five statements toward neutrals in the sample, and neither the India-Pakistan War of 1965 nor the Six-Day War of 1967 brought forth many speeches from Rusk. It is thus possible that lower level members of the State Department or people at the United States Mission to the United Nations may have handled these problems.[27]

c. Enemies

Rusk, like Acheson and Dulles, tended to focus on enemies more than two-thirds of the time. His attitudes toward communists--Russia, China, and North Viet Nam--can be illustrated by excerpting from Rusk, who observed that,

> The leaders of the other side laid plans for Viet Nam, the Dominican Republic, and the Congo. Their declared doctrine of world revolution ought to be as credible as Mein Kampf. . . . The war in Viet Nam is mean and frustrating, yet peace could be achieved in 48 hours if there were a willingness on the other side. . . .[28]

Furthermore, he did not believe that the communist government legitimately represented the people of China. And he suggested that, "the territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. . . . The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the communist conspiracy."[29] Besides this, he found that "the aggressive policy of China continues to menace the peace and security of Asia."[30] The hostility and suspicion toward China ranged from 5.3 to

6.2 during Rusk's term. Yet this hostility and suspicion was less than those of Acheson and Dulles, most likely, because: (1) Rusk and the United States may have become more moderate in their views generally, and specifically toward China, (2) situational and trade needs may have had an impact, (3) the lack of a Korean War or a Quemoy-Matsu or any really severe crisis between the United States and China may have kept Rusk's perceptions at a somewhat less hostile and suspicious level, (4) the Sino-Soviet split 1963 to 1969 may have played a part, (5) the contacts with China in Warsaw, Poland may have had a mitigating effect. Thus, even though Rusk was hostile and suspicious toward China, he was less hostile and suspicious than were Acheson and Dulles.

TABLE 53

MEANS OF NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION FOR ENEMIES-- CHINA, RUSSIA, AND NORTH VIET NAM BY QUARTILE

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
a. China				
Mean Total	(N = 22)	5.5	(N = 12)	6.0
Quartile I	(N = 2)	6.0	(N = 2)	5.0
Quartile II	(N = 7)	6.0	(N = 3)	6.0
Quartile III	(N = 3)	5.7	(N = 5)	6.2
Quartile IV	(N = 10)	5.3	(N = 2)	6.0
b. Russia				
Mean Total	(N = 38)	5.9	(N = 20)	4.9
Quartile I	(N = 10)	5.9	(N = 10)	5.0
Quartile II	(N = 6)	6.6	(N = 2)	5.0
Quartile III	(N = 12)	5.3	(N = 7)	4.7
Quartile IV	(N = 10)	6.2	(N = 1)	5.0
c. North Viet Nam				
Mean Total	(N = 33)	5.4	(N = 26)	5.4
Quartile I	(N = 2)	6.0	(N = 2)	6.0
Quartile II	(N = 5)	6.0	(N = 1)	6.0
Quartile III	(N = 24)	5.2	(N = 22)	5.3
Quartile IV	(N = 2)	5.5	(N = 1)	6.0

Toward Russia Secretary Rusk was also hostile and moderately suspicious. The range of means on Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion from 4.7 to 6.2 and a standard deviation of 0.648 may have indicated that Rusk wanted an improvement in relations. This compares with a range of means from 6.3 to 6.8 and a standard deviation of 0.245 for Acheson and range of means from 5.7 to 6.3 and a standard deviation of 1.3 for Dulles. This suggests that Rusk's views toward Russia were more dispersed and inconsistent than Acheson but less than Dulles. Moreover, he was less hostile to both Russia and China than either Acheson or Dulles. (See Tables 36 and 48.) The decrease in uranium output, the nuclear test ban treaties in 1963 and 1966, and the beginning of the strategic Arms Limitation talks all occurred despite problems with the Soviet Union over Viet Nam. For instance, on the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 Rusk observed that,

> First, the U.S. and Russia already have enough nuclear power to inflict enormous destruction on each other. Still, the search for bigger, more destructive weapons goes on. . . . Yet greater armament has not demonstrably brought greater security. The treaty, if observed, should slow this spiral, without damage to our relative strength.[31]

Furthermore, it seems as though Rusk did not measurably alter his opinions of Russia after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.

Concomitantly, Secretary Rusk was also quite hostile and suspicious of North Viet Nam. He suggested that, "there will be peace . . . when Hanoi . . . has been taught to leave its neighbor alone."[32] And frequently he would even lecture North Viet Nam on proper conduct. In those instances he pointed out that, "the nations of South East Asia have a right to live in peace, free from aggression directed against

them from outside their borders."[33]

The means on statements toward North Viet Nam ranged from 5.2 to 6.0 and these scores may have been related to the "carrot and stick" philosophy. That is, occasionally Rusk may have said friendly things to try to get negotiations started. He also suggested Mekong River projects and other forms of aid in order to attempt to bring an end to the war.[34] Lastly, he sometimes made amicable gestures and friendly pronouncements to mollify dissenters to American foreign policy toward South East Asia and noted that he was always willing to go more than halfway to end the war.[35]

Moreover, Secretary Rusk envisaged China, Russia, and North Viet Nam to be strong, active, and having problems that were sometimes easy and more often difficult to resolve. In addition, he was pessimistic regarding outcomes involving enemies and believed that it was possible that the United States might lose the conflict, the battle, or the bargaining advantage.[36]

Thus, Philip Geyelin in his book suggested that Rusk, albeit somewhat more moderate in his estimate of enemies than both Acheson and Dulles, "viewed the other side as hell-bent on total victory, and that the only sensible U.S. response under those circumstances had to be total resistance."[37]

C. The Effect of Time in Office on Rusk's Perceptions

In terms of tenure Dean Rusk made the greatest number of statements during the second quartile--more than any other Secretary--and the fewest number in the third quartile. During the second quartile (1963-1964) the nuclear test ban treaty was signed; the Sino-Soviet

split was recognized as real; the Chinese A-bomb was exploded; and Kosygin and Brezhnev overthrew Khrushchev in Russia. But the United States was also active on the world scene pursuing policies in Cuba, Berlin, Indonesia, and Viet Nam. During this period the Viet Nam War was heating up; the number of troops was constantly increasing; Diem was assassinated; the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was approved; and the election campaign in the United States took place. All these events required statements. Perhaps, also, the Secretary of State was still making his positions known or else he just happened to speak more frequently. Or, lastly, the Department of State Bulletin may have carried more of his speeches, an unlikely possibility.

In the third quartile the Viet Nam War increased in intensity and the statements by Rusk during that period indicated that all other issues became secondary to the war. The Dominican Republic Crisis also occurred in the third quartile but lasted only a few months. In 1965-1966, Rusk made 188 statements but fewer than in any other quartile. Whereas in the other quartiles there were many, many issues and Secretary of State Rusk had to propagate positions in many areas, in this quartile he worried mainly about Viet Nam. Thus, although he had many Press Conferences and appeared on television frequently to explain America's Viet Nam position, he made fewer total statements in the third quartile than in any other two-year period.

In the last quartile (1967-1968), the Viet Nam War was still being fought with more than 500,000 American troops participating. The bombing halts, the Tet Offensive, and the beginning of negotiations also occurred during this period. (These events helped dominate the

TABLE 54

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON TENURE IN QUARTILES--COMPARED WITH THE NORM

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Rusk	28.2	32.1	19.2	21.4	100.0
Aggregate	29.7	28.6	20.2	21.6	100.0
		Rusk (N=976);	Total (N=2557)		

frequency of statements in the quartile.) Lastly, the French withdrawal from NATO, the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, the Glassboro Conference, the Greek colonel's putsch, the French students' revolt, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" all may have contributed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk making many declarations.

D. Dean Rusk's Perceptions Concerning Region and Audience

1. Region

Although Dean Rusk was interested in every region of the world, he was especially concerned with South East Asia (Viet Nam). This can be readily ascertained in recognizing that Rusk, responsible for 38.2 per cent of all the statements concerning region, delivered 63.1 per cent of all the statements directed at South East Asia.[38] From 1961-1963 Dean Rusk was concerned with Viet Nam because the United States had military advisors there. But beginning with the overthrow of Diem in November, 1963 the United States became more involved with Viet Nam. From a level of 15,000 troops in 1963, the total rose to 543,000 in early 1969 and Secretary Rusk had to be concerned with the

TABLE 55

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON REGIONS COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	USSR	Europe	China	South East Asia	Rest of Asia	Latin America	Middle East	Africa	Total
Rusk	18.8	11.6	5.8	26.1	14.1	14.4	6.6	2.5	100.0
Total	20.9	20.2	6.7	15.6	17.5	9.6	8.0	1.6	100.0

Rusk (N=976); Total (N=2557)

legitimation of policy toward that country at home and abroad.

In addition, the Secretary devoted particular attention to Russia and Latin America. The United States got involved with Russia over Viet Nam, Cuba, Berlin, the Congo, and the Nuclear Test Ban. Moreover, the Secretary's attention to Latin America concerned Cuba (Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis), Dominican Republic, Brazil, Venezuela, and Panama. During the 1960's, Latin America was in flux and threats to the peace came from Cuba on the left and from authoritarian military groups on the right.

In the same way the large number of statements toward the Middle East concerned the Six-Day War and the continuing problems between Israel and her Arab neighbors, while the references to Africa may have reflected (1) the Congo Crisis, (2) the increasing number of independent countries on that continent, (3) continued metropolitan influence on colonies and ex-colonies, and (4) problems of Rhodesia and South Africa.[39]

2. Audience

Dean Rusk made most of his statements before the Press, Audio-Visual Media, and Academic Groups. In the 1960's there were more

than fifty million television sets and a majority received the news via television. Secretary Rusk frequently appeared on Sunday news programs and "specials" in an attempt to persuade, influence, clarify, explain and legitimate American foreign policy. He wanted to keep the American public informed and used the audio-visual media extensively. In addition, his testimony before Congress, especially with regard to the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, and China, was also televised. His utilization of television may have been, furthermore, a response to the growing domestic dissent to the Viet Nam War. Rusk, a former college professor and foundation executive, frequently spoke before academic gatherings. At those meetings Secretary Rusk hoped to communicate with the professors and thereby try to reduce campus dissent or channel it into more productive areas.

TABLE 56

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON AUDIENCES COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	Press	Foreign	Executive	Civic	Academic	Professional	Audio-Visual Media	Veterans	Total
Rusk	28.7	11.2	9.6	2.8	12.4	5.7	25.4	4.1	100.0
Total	44.9	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.9	3.4	14.2	3.5	100.0

Rusk (N=976); Total (N=2557)

The lower utilization of the Press by Rusk than by the other Secretaries of State was probably related to the shift in emphasis to television. Instead of releasing Press Statements, Secretary Rusk occasionally made the announcements on television. Similarly, the

greater than average number of statements to veterans was probably related to Rusk's hoping to obtain support for American policy in Viet Nam from the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion.

E. Rusk's Views of Target Countries

1. Efficacy

Another method of examining Rusk's views is to evaluate Secretary Rusk's views of efficacy. By this method Dean Rusk differed from both Acheson and Dulles in believing that many countries had only medium efficacy. In these instances, he found countries to have high efficacy less frequently than either Acheson or Dulles and to have medium efficacy more often than any other Secretary (see Appendix A-10).

TABLE 57

NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON EFFICACY--TOTAL AND BROKEN DOWN BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

a. Total (Per Cent)

	High	Medium	Low	Total
Rusk	31.4	48.4	17.5	100.0
Total	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

Rusk (N=91); Total (N=442)

b. Individual Country

	High	Medium	Low	Total
Great Britain	1	1	0	2
France	0	1	0	1
West Germany	2	0	0	2
South Korea	2	1	0	3
South Viet Nam	5	16	13	34
Taiwan	2	0	0	2
India	0	1	0	1
Egypt	0	0	0	0
China	4	3	2	9
Russia	10	3	1	14
North Korea	0	0	0	0
North Viet Nam	5	18	0	23
Total	31	44	16	91

Only West Germany, Taiwan, and Russia were considered to have high efficacy.[40] Rusk was very concerned with South East Asia (57/91 statements) and tended to slight the rest of the world. Because South Viet Nam had a low ability to withstand outside threats, it was discerned to have medium to low efficacy.[41] In addition, the efficacy scores for Taiwan and South Korea may have been related to the low number of statements. Furthermore, Rusk only considered China to have medium efficacy. It is possible to speculate that Rusk's perceptions of efficacy may have been determined on the power of these countries from an earlier period or that Rusk may have been using different criteria in his estimate.

2. Basis of Conflict

An additional way to evaluate Secretary Rusk's attitudes is to ascertain the basis of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. To Secretary Rusk the primary differences between the United States and Russia arose from differences in power centers. Rather than looking to differences in ideology--prominent in the early Cold War era--or to differences in "spheres of influence"--prominent in the late nineteenth century, Rusk looked to power as the way to measure the basis of conflict. Also, much of what the Soviet Union in the 1960's did in Cuba, the Middle East, Viet Nam, and in signing the Nuclear Test Ban treaties may have been actions more akin to those taken by great powers rather than policies pursued by those constrained by ideology. Evidently, Rusk, in viewing Russia with a high GNP, powerful military, and large population, thought that the Soviet Union would act to preserve its power more often than it would act merely

to rationalize Marxist-Leninist guideposts.

TABLE 58

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON THE ISSUE OF THE BASIS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

	Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Rusk	20.8	79.2	0.0	100.0
Total	79.6	15.8	4.5	100.0

Rusk (N=24); Total (N=221)

Rusk's emphasis on "Power Centers" as a cause of conflict can be ascertained by noting that although responsible for 11.0 per cent of all the statements on that topic, the Secretary made 54.3 per cent of the statements in the category, "Power Centers."[42] That is, he both gave the highest per cent of statements emphasizing "power centers" and vastly overrepresented "power centers" as a basis of conflict on the Fair Proportion method.

F. The Effect of Personality and Situational Variables on Rusk's Perceptions

Personality and situational variables also influenced Rusk. He had learned about diplomacy and international relations during his service in the State Department after World War II and as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Secretary of State Acheson in 1950-1951. He was an internationalist and suggested that,

> We made a national decision to involve ourselves in the fate of the world (after World War II) because, among other things, our own fate was deeply involved in what happens everywhere.[43]

That is, his weltanschauung included an international approach to problem solving.

Moreover, toward allies (except South Viet Nam) his views remained relatively constant over time.[44] Neither the problems with Skybolt (1962) nor the Berlin Crises nor the French withdrawal from NATO seemed to have had much influence upon Rusk's attitudes.

TABLE 59

MEANS OF NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, SOUTH KOREA, AND TAIWAN BY QUARTILE

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
a. Great Britain				
Quartile I	(N=2)	1.0	(N=2)	1.5
Quartile II	(N=2)	2.0	(N=1)	2.0
Quartile III	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile IV	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
b. West Germany				
Quartile I	(N=1)	2.0	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=2)	2.0	(N=0)	---
Quartile III	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile IV	(N=1)	2.0	(N=2)	4.0
c. France				
Quartile I	(N=0)	---	(N=1)	3.0
Quartile II	(N=4)	2.2	(N=2)	2.0
Quartile III	(N=0)	---	(N=1)	2.0
Quartile IV	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
d. South Korea				
Quartile I	(N=1)	1.0	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---
Quartile III	(N=2)	1.5	(N=2)	1.0
Quartile IV	(N=2)	2.0	(N=0)	---
e. Taiwan				
Quartile I	(N=1)	2.0	(N=0)	---
Quartile II	(N=2)	2.0	(N=0)	---
Quartile III	(N=1)	2.0	(N=2)	2.0
Quartile IV	(N=0)	---	(N=0)	---

Toward enemies, on the other hand, Rusk was hostile and suspicious--but less hostile and suspicious than were both Acheson and Dulles. Secretary Rusk throughout his term did not want to recognize mainland China and ". . . had a rigidly doctrinaire approach to Peking with which the most fanatical China lobbyist could hardly quarrel."[45] But his views toward Russia were not so rigid as those of Acheson and Dulles. For instance, he believed in "adjusting our policies to the differing behavior of different communist states--or to the changing behavior of the same state."[46]

Furthermore, Rusk liked to avoid "theological debates about words," and was willing to be pragmatic.[47] Frequently Rusk would suggest that, "the entire situation is under consideration from A to Z. The facts and problems and opportunities are being looked at, but I can't speculate about decisions that have not been made or conclusions that haven't been reached."[48]

Another method of viewing the influence of the personality variable is to look at Rusk's activity in making declaratory statements. Rusk in his eight years as Secretary of State made 375 speeches and 976 statements for a mean of 93 speeches per quartile and 244 statements per quartile. Moreover, he made an average of 47 speeches per year and 122 statements per year. Thus, Rusk, on this measure, was more active than Marshall (40 statements per quartile) and Acheson (91.5 statements per quartile) but less active than Dulles (264 statements per quartile). There were important decisions to be made and Rusk made them. (Passive types usually are not appointed Secretary of State.)

On the other hand, the lines of the Cold War were not so rigid as in the 1950's, and the overall situation may have had an important impact. Various situations--such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and the Viet Nam War--may have had a significant impact (0.4 change/quarter) on Rusk.

For instance, Dean Rusk's images of Russia may have been influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Viet Nam War. The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October 1962. The mean on Friendship-Hostility toward Russia for that quartile was 5.9 (N=10). During the next quartile the mean rose to 6.6 (N=6). The mean then returned to 5.3 (N=12) in the third quartile. This influence can be illustrated by excerpting from Dean Rusk who observed that, "these were Soviet weapons. Removing the weapons had to be a Soviet action. . . . The issue is not Castro. It's offensive Soviet weapons."[49]

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in the autumn of 1963. Its effects on Rusk's images probably were not seen in statements toward Russia for a year. The mean on Friendship-Hostility fell from 6.6 (N=6) in the second quartile to 5.3 (N=12) in the third quartile. Not only did the perceptions of hostility decrease but also the number of statements increased from six to twelve. It is also possible that the situation affected Rusk's perceptions in the second quartile but may not have become significant until the third quartile. The effect may also have been diminished because of the other statements in Quartile III.

During the last quartile the United States had wanted the

TABLE 60

MEANS OF NUMBER OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY AND TRUST-SUSPICION ON SOUTH VIET NAM, CHINA, RUSSIA, AND NORTH VIET NAM BY QUARTILE

	Friendship-Hostility		Trust-Suspicion	
a. South Viet Nam				
Quartile I	(N= 2)	6.0	(N= 2)	6.0
Quartile II	(N= 3)	4.5	(N= 1)	3.0
Quartile III	(N=17)	2.7	(N=17)	2.7
Quartile IV	(N= 2)	3.0	(N= 2)	3.0
b. China				
Quartile I	(N= 2)	6.0	(N= 2)	5.0
Quartile II	(N= 7)	6.0	(N= 3)	6.0
Quartile III	(N= 3)	5.7	(N= 5)	6.2
Quartile IV	(N=10)	5.3	(N= 2)	6.0
c. Russia				
Quartile I	(N=10)	5.9	(N=10)	5.0
Quartile II	(N= 6)	6.6	(N= 2)	5.0
Quartile III	(N=12)	5.3	(N= 7)	4.7
Quartile IV	(N=10)	6.2	(N= 1)	5.0
d. North Viet Nam				
Quartile I	(N= 2)	6.0	(N= 2)	6.0
Quartile II	(N= 5)	6.0	(N= 1)	6.0
Quartile III	(N=24)	5.2	(N=22)	5.3
Quartile IV	(N= 2)	5.5	(N= 1)	6.0

Soviet Union to aid in getting negotiations started on the question of Viet Nam and the Russians were not helpful.[50] The mean in the last quarter rose to 6.2 (N=10). In August 1968 the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia. Rusk made only three statements toward Russia August-December 1968 and the hostility mean was the same before the invasion

as after. So the increase in hostility during the last quartile may have been more directly related to the impact of the Viet Nam War than to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In the same vein, Rusk's attitudes toward South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam may have reflected the influence of the situational variable. That is, the perceptions of hostility and suspicion may have been related to success on the battlefields, stability of the government, amount of American economic and military aid, the number and success of American troops, and the "carrot and stick" philosophy. The dramatic increase in the number of statements in the third quartile to both South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam may have indicated increasing attention. Between 1964-1966 the United States vastly increased its troop commitment and this brought about concomitant interest. It is also possible that Rusk's attitudes toward South Viet Nam and North Viet Nam may have been related, in some way, to the effect and impact of American anti-war protests.[51]

Toward China Rusk also changed his views slightly. Until the third quartile Rusk was quite hostile and suspicious of China, and "with considerable emphasis told [President Johnson] of the rising power of China."[52] But by the third and fourth quartiles, Rusk began to be slightly more moderate to China. Perhaps, Rusk may have thought that China could persuade North Viet Nam to come to the conference table. Or else, Rusk may have recognized the potential importance of the talks in Warsaw, Poland with China. Or, possibly, Rusk may have hoped to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. In fact, Rusk stated "that moving Peking to peaceful coexistence [is] the number one

problem in the world. . . ."[53]

Yet the personality variable can be important in new, salient, emotional, complex, contradictory, ambiguous and peripheral situations.[54] Thus, the personality variable may have been significant in the Cuban Missile Crisis (a new, salient, and emotional situation), in the India-Pakistan War (a complex, contradictory, and somewhat ambiguous situation), in the Cyprus Crisis (a complex and initially peripheral situation), and in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War (an emotional, complex and somewhat contradictory situation). In addition, Rusk's personality may also have been important in defining situations and dramatizing certain events. Thus, Rusk believed that,

> . . . the Sino-Soviet split [was] a historical reality, and yet, the principal arguments between them "have to do with how best to get on with the revolution." And this is chiefly an argument of technique. Therefore, under no circumstances should the democratic nations relax their strength and determination to contain communism.[55]

Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis was a crucial, outside situation, Secretary Rusk's personality was also important in helping to define and set the limits of action.[56] Moreover, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was a complex situation and Secretary Rusk had to decide on how to negotiate; how, what, and when to testify; what to say to whom; and how to gain approval. That is, in theoretical terms,

> The greater the number of opportunities for participation, the more the individual can choose. . . . Or . . . the greater the richness and complexity of the stimulus field, the more will internal organizing forces determine individual adaptation.[57]

Similarly, the Viet Nam War was viewed by Rusk and others as a complex, contradictory, and ambiguous situation. Whereas Secretary Rusk may have perceived the way to reduce ambiguity and complexity was

to live up to commitment and assistance to Viet Nam through S.E.A.T.O., dissidents interpreted the situation differently and sought to have the United States withdraw from the conflict. Lastly, peripheral situations do not bring public scrutiny and allow for greater personal influence.

But there is always a mix of the personality and situational variables. The Secretary of State does not operate within a vacuum and usually interacts with the environment. Therefore, how, under what circumstance, and with what intensity a Secretary acts and/or reacts may be of prime importance and the fact that "Rusk . . . [is] always a little bit readier to hit than McNamera," was an important attribute of his personality."[58]

In addition, Rusk's formal position as Secretary of State placed him in an important policy-making office in the foreign policy process.[59] However, his formal position became

> . . . a vital policy-making role in the Johnson Administration because Johnson, unlike Kennedy, was a President who worked predominantly within the formal, executive departmental framework in making and executing foreign policy.[59]

Besides this, Rusk was a member of Johnson's inner circle of confidants and thus "had both the opportunity and the time to 'speak his piece' to the 'decider-in-chief' both on a formal and informal basis."[60]

Therefore, Secretary Rusk helped set boundaries to events and may have used initiative, resolve, and tenacity in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Viet Nam War. He was willing to follow through on American commitments. He thought that the prime opponents were Russia, North Viet Nam, and during much of

his tenure, China. And Rusk continued to suggest that, "aggression in Viet Nam was no different from aggression in Europe by Hitler, and that appeasement in Viet Nam could have the same consequences as appeasement in Munich."[61]

G. Theoretical Considerations

Dean Rusk, like other Secretaries of State, was overwhelmed and trapped by events and had to simplify the world and come to grips with his psyche. He tended to build up his political and social solidarity by testifying before Congress and lobbying before the President. Moreover, he would attempt to legitimate American foreign policy before domestic and foreign audiences.

Furthermore, Dean Rusk in his overt and covert preconceptions may have tried to sublimate aggressions and deal with the insecurities of the office. Yet he may still have been worried. As he once said: "The exercise of power in this country has meant for the U.S. not arrogance but agony."[62] He was similarly concerned about too much or too little action. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance, Rusk observed that, "If we take a strong action the allies and Latin Americans will turn against us and if we take a weak action they will turn away from us. . ."[63] and "If we don't do this we go down with a whimper. Maybe it's better to go down with a bang."[64]

In addition, he tended to exaggerate and overreact. As an illustration, Secretary Rusk probably overreacted greatly during the 1965 crisis on the island of Hispanola and "tended to see the Dominican Republic not in isolation but as part of a global communist conspiracy."[65] He also may have tended to be overoptimistic as to the ending

of the Viet Nam War, the negotiations vis-a-vis China, and the future of Berlin.[66] Concomitantly, situations with enemies cannot be deferred and Rusk may have been overly proud when the Russians withdrew "offensive" missiles from Cuba. In that case, Rusk suggested that, "We looked into the mouth of the cannon; the Russians flinched,"[67] and at about the same time he mentioned to a reporter that, "We're eyeball to eyeball and the other fellow just blinked."[68]

Furthermore, he tended to rely on how the United States, in his perception, has handled past problems. That is, he tended to selectively perceive and selectively forget. He used the bureaucracy more than did Dulles. Still, he believed that, "the heart of the bureaucratic problem is the inclination to avoid responsibility."[69] He therefore saw himself as the "agent of coordination in all the major policies toward other nations,"[70] and tried to use his influence formally and informally vis-a-vis the President.[71]

Beyond this, Rusk believed that "the foreign policy of a democracy must rest upon the support of informed citizens."[72] Yet Rusk may have tried to act in such a way as to take into account Americans' tendency to reduce problems to naively rational terms; tendency to manifest a diffuse hostile tension, general apprehension, and anxiety; and a tendency to have periodic moral and religious enthusiasm.[73] The problem may have been how to utilize these traits to the advantage of American foreign policy without letting them get out of bounds. That is, Secretary Rusk may have wanted support to fight the Russians in Cuba in 1962 but also support to negotiate a treaty with the Soviets on nuclear weapons. The question then became one of juggling and

manipulating. In those two situations the results may have been successful. Yet it is possible to speculate on Rusk's success in maintaining support for action in Viet Nam, a limited war. And here it seems as though the American public, as in the Korean War, became weary of the commitment and public opinion became volatile and explosive.[74] By 1967, then, more Americans wanted to escalate than to reduce the level of violence.[75] And even the newspapers began to question American policy and Rusk noted that "none of your papers are worth a damn unless the U.S. succeeds."[76]

Besides this, Rusk was less bi-polar than both Acheson and Dulles but more bipolar than Marshall on the Ethnocentric scale. And like Acheson and Dulles he was also very high on the power syndrome and somewhat moderate on the Openness of Conflict scale. These attitudes may have been related to the overall impact of the Cold War. That is, a thaw in relations between the United States and Russia may have taken place after the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963.[77] It is possible to speculate that the less hostile and less suspicious attitudes that Rusk generally manifested toward Russia and China may have been related to this thaw, and only the Tet Offensive in any way affected these perceptions.

H. Conclusions

During Dean Rusk's tenure the United States penetrated nearly every continent and may have tended to become the "world policeman." Secretary Rusk looked at these countries as slightly hostile, suspicious, very strong, and very active. He was optimistic regarding outcomes, and thought that solutions would be moderate to difficult to achieve. In

addition, he made these statements through the Press, Audio-Visual, and Academic audiences mainly toward South East Asia, Russia, and Latin America.

In the same way Rusk was very hostile to North Viet Nam and frequently indicated his ideas concerning the nature of commitment. In 1965 at the NATO Conference in Paris, for instance, he asserted that,

> If one commitment is not met in one place, ask yourself what other commitments elsewhere would mean. We will not ask the American people to neglect a commitment in one place and maintain one in another.[78]

Furthermore, Rusk believed in power politics and thought that it was "irrelevant sentimism" to question the assumption that the United States had the responsibility as a great power to help save Viet Nam.[79] It also seems likely that Secretary of State Rusk may have also believed that,

> To suggest that America's role was unnecessary is to forget Moscow's militancy and foreign policy aims; even if it had not been a communist state, Russia would have emerged from World War II as one of the two superpowers and a conflict would have ensued. If, today, the Soviet Union is more cautious and has signed a number of arms control measures, it is in large part because our policy of gendarme left it no alternative. . . . If, in the wake of Viet Nam, the U.S. no longer plays that role in Asia the price of having chosen Viet Nam to make a stand and defend the American "empire" will indeed have been very high. A withdrawal of American power, after the further reduction of British power, cannot but affect the alignment of the nations of South East Asia; they would feel that, in the absence of any sort of balance and facing the advance of Communist power, they must make their peace with Hanoi and Peking. China might, therefore, be tempted to become less restrained, especially after its missile strength grows sufficiently to menace its neighbors. Russia, too, might be tempted by the vacuum left by discredited American power, especially at a time when Russian naval expansion has made it an (important) force.
>
> . . . If America reduces its global commitments in areas of secondary interest, or refuses to honor commitments made in an earlier cold war era because international conditions have changed,

> we should expect China's potential opponents--Japan, Indonesia, India, to acquire their own nuclear arms to defend themselves. . . . (After Viet Nam) our commitments to NATO will seem even less credible. The results of "No More Viet Nams" mood may thus be very serious.[80]

He also took seriously Russian threats to the Western Hemisphere. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, he asserted that,

> These new weapons arriving in Cuba are not only directed against the United States. Let there be no misunderstanding. There are other strategic targets in this hemisphere. . . . No country of this hemisphere can feel secure either from direct attack or from persistent blackmail,[81]

and the Secretary maintained these beliefs about communism, the domino theory, and commitment throughout his term.

Thus, even though political commentators began predicting Rusk's dismissal as Secretary of State almost from the day he took office and explicitly noted that he was a "second stringer" as a Presidential adviser, he became a policy-maker of such magnitude that "one of his critics stated that he 'stood shoulder to shoulder with the President in the overriding determination to assert and uphold all the conventional symbols of American authority and interest.'"[82]

Both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson found Secretary Rusk to be "loyal, honorable, hard-working, and an imaginative man of conviction."[83] Furthermore, he was believed to be "quiet, courtly and cautious, noncommital in his Press Conferences and unaggressive in his excellent relations with congress. Intelligent and well-informed but never patronizing, he chose his words cooly and carefully. . . ."[84]

Neither so cautious as Marshall nor so dogmatic as Acheson and Dulles, Rusk had a more moderate (less bipolar) view of the world than

they had. Viet Nam was a primary concern and his declarations brought forth severe criticism. President Johnson sincerely believed that Rusk was "one of the greatest Secretaries in our history."[85] Yet, because many of the issues of his time still lie unresolved, an overall appraisal of his tenure requires more of a perspective.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VII

[1]Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President (New York: Atheneum Books, 1964), p. 17.

[2]Dean Rusk, "The Choices Confronting the U.S. in Korea," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV, No. 616 (April 23, 1951), 655-60.

[3]Dean Rusk, "Foreign Policy Problems in the Pacific," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 647 (November 19, 1951), 818-24.

[4]Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 32; quoted from a speech by Dean Rusk in Vital Speeches, XVII, No. 17 (June 15, 1951), 515.

[5]Dean Rusk, "Why We Stay in Korea," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV, No. 607 (February 19, 1951), 295-98.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Dean Rusk, "Chinese-American Friendship," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIV, No. 621 (May 28, 1951), 846-48.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ronald J. Stupak, "Dean Rusk on International Relations: An Analysis of His Philosophical Perceptions," Australian Outlook, XXV, No. 1 (April, 1971), 13-28; Ernest K. Lindley (ed.), The Winds of Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963); Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point--Perspectives on the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971).

[10]Dean Rusk, "Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, No. 647 (November 19, 1951), 821-24.

[11]Dean Rusk, "Malayan Program," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XXIII, No. 585 (September 18, 1950), 465-68.

[12]John F. Kennedy learned of Dean Rusk's article about "The President" in Foreign Affairs. Dean Rusk's "The President," Foreign Affairs (April, 1960), pp. 353-369. Also see George H. Quester (ed.), Power, Action, and Interaction--Readings on International Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 33-49.

[13]Quoted in Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 319. The source of this quote is John Hightower, the Associated Press State Department reported (from an August 22, 1965 dispatch).

[14]Excerpted from Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970), p. 936. This was applied to 1946-1953 originally.

[15]Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1965); Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution--The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy (New York: Viking Press, 1972), pp. 1-94.

[16]John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969).

[17]Quoted in Telford Taylor, Nuremburg and Viet Nam--An American Tragedy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 96.

[18]Ibid., p. 103.

[19]Walton, op. cit., pp. 34-60, 75-94.

[20]Ibid., p. 30.

[21]The data are available from the author.

[22]Dean Rusk, "Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LII, No. 1357 (June 28, 1965), 1030-35.

[23]Ibid.

[24]John Spanier, American Foreign Policy (4th rev. ed.; New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 255-99.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Quoted in Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 112.

[27]The data are available from the author.

[28]Quoted in Robert A. Divine, American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 220-24.

[29]Quoted in Robert Blum, The U.S. and China in World Affairs (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 116.

[30]Dean Rusk, "Korean Foreign Minister Holds Talk with Rusk," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LII, No. 1345 (April 5, 1965), 491.

[31]Mary M. Lepper, Foreign Policy Formulation--A Case Study of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), p. 102.

[32]Quoted in Jules Davids, The U.S. in World Affairs, 1964 (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 143; also Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 136.

[33]Dean Rusk, "News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LVIII, No. 1498 (March 11, 1968), 346-56.

[34]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 255-299; Johnson, op. cit.

[35]Ibid.

[36]The data are available from the author.

[37]Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 50.

[38]The data are available from the author.

[39]Some of the reasons for Secretary Rusk's interest in China and Europe were mentioned in Section B. of this chapter.

[40]There were only two observations each for Taiwan and for West Germany. The results should be read with caution.

[41]The data are available from the author. The table on "Ability to Withstand Outside Threats" was included in the coding for every Secretary of State studied.

[42]Rusk made 19 statements in the category, "Power Centers," 24/221 equals 11.0 per cent. There were 35 statements in the category "Power Centers," total: 19/35 equals 54.3 per cent.

[43]James MacGregor Burns (ed.), To Heal and To Build--The Programs of President Lyndon B. Johnson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 70.

[44]With most of these countries there were a very low number of statements.

[45]Philip Geyelin, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

[46]Davids, op. cit., p. 86.

[47]Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point--Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 400. Rusk made no statements toward North Korea and Dulles and Acheson, in this sample, made no speeches to North Viet Nam.

[48]Ibid., p. 403.

[49]Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 143.

[50]Johnson, op. cit., pp. 462-532.

[51]The data base for this study does not provide the kind of information necessary to confirm or disprove this hypothesis.

[52]Johnson, op. cit., p. 120.

[53]Dean Rusk, "The Statement and Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk," The Viet Nam Hearings (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 18; also see Stupak, op. cit., p. 21.

[54]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," in Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 87-88.

[55]Stupak, op. cit., p. 20. The interior quote is from Dean Rusk, "Changing Patterns in World Affairs: Television Interview," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, XLVI, No. 1225 (December 17, 1962), 915.

[56]Greenstein, p. 87. Notice that perceiving here is used in a slightly different way and is not related to personality factors preceding.

[57]Daniel J. Levinson, "The Relevance of Personality for Political Participation," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXII (1958), 9.

[58]Geyelin, op. cit., p. 297.

[59]For purposes of this study, "office" is being held constant.

[60]Stupak, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

[61]Geyelin, op. cit., p. 53.

[62]Burns, op. cit., p. 397.

[63]Graham T. Allison, op. cit., p. 199.

[64]Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days--A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 56; also see Abel, op. cit., pp. 50-60.

[65]Geyelin, op. cit., p. 254.

[66]Johnson, op. cit., pp. 250-400; Burns, op. cit.; Stupak, op. cit, pp. 13-28.

[67]R. F. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 18.

[68]Divine, op. cit., p. 59.

[69]I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 69.

[70]Ibid., p. 2.

[71]Stupak, op. cit., pp. 15-22.

[72]Lepper, op. cit., p. 55.

[73]Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 32, 46-51.

[74]Ibid., pp. 53-63.

[75]"Gallup Polls," New York Times 1967.

[76]Martin Birnbach, American Political Life--An Introduction to U.S. Government (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1971), p. 362.

[77]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 161-299. For comparative tables, see Appendix.

[78]Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, Power and Impotence--The Failure of America's Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 188; quoted from New York Times, December 16, 1965.

[79]Spanier, op. cit., pp. ix, 259-76; also see Dean Rusk, "Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LII, No. 1357 (June 28, 1965), 1030-35. This phrase was also mentioned several times in U.S. Department of State Bulletins, vols. LI-LIII.

[80]Spanier, op. cit., pp. 297-98.

[81]Abel, op. cit., p. 112.

[82]Stupak, op. cit., pp. 13-20. Arthur M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1967), pp. 401-05; Alex Campbell, "The Mild Mr. Rusk," The New Republic, CL, No. 15 (April 11, 1964), 13. Interior quote from Joseph Kraft, "The Enigma of Dean Rusk," Harper's, CCXXXI, No. 1338 (July, 1965), 103.

[83]Johnson, op. cit., p. 20; Sorenson, op. cit., p. 270.

[84]Sorenson, op. cit., pp. 268-74.

[85]Quoted in Joseph Kraft, "The Dean Rusk Show," The New York Times Magazine (March 24, 1968), p. 34; see also, "Franklin Award for Distinguished Service Citation," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LIV, No. 1389 (February 7, 1966), 199.

CHAPTER VIII

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

A. Introduction

William P. Rogers, a prominent New York attorney, had served briefly in the State Department during the 1950's, eventually transferred to the Justice Department, and became Attorney-General of the United States from 1958-1960. From 1961-1969 he returned to New York City and the practice of law. In 1969, Richard Nixon chose Rogers to become Secretary of State.

Many of the same ideas that influenced the other four Secretaries of State also may have had an impact on Rogers. For instance, he seemed to be anti-communist and suggested that,

> The once seemingly irreversible tide of Asian communism is being blocked by the rising will and courage of peoples to maintain their national independence. . . . The United States is a member of the Pacific community, and is a strong supporter of S.E.A.T.O.[1]

At a later session of the same meeting he reiterated the U.S. belief in self-determination and noted that, "We believe in security and regional cooperation. . . . We salute their determination to be responsible masters of their own affairs."[2]

Another aspect that permeated Rogers' statements was great involvement in the world without concomitant freedom of action. With that in mind, he observed that,

> The United States is the world's greatest military and economic and technical power; and there is no way to isolate ourselves from the responsibilities that go with the position.

> Great power does not mean great freedom of action and decision. On the contrary, it often means very narrow choices of action, and what we can do to influence events in a given case may well be small.[3]

This sudden realization that America was not omniscient and omnipotent may have given some indication of the "lower profile" in world affairs that the Nixon Administration was trying to project. Morality and humanitarianism may have also played an integral part in Rogers' views. He seemed to refer back to Woodrow Wilson when he discerned that "only the weak have to pound the desk to make noise,"[4] and to the Marshall Plan and "Point 4" era in suggesting that,

> Americans have the right to be proud of our role in pioneering the lending of a helping hand to nations straining to set themselves on the road to more decent standards of living.[5]

The "lower profile," the setting of priorities, and the necessity of finding a way to reduce arms expenditures can be ascertained in some of Rogers' statements about Russia. In the following three speeches Rogers saw the discussions as being of mutual interest and proclaimed that,

> The United States will live up to its obligations. . . . Still, we intend to negotiate with the USSR, hopefully in a meaningful way, in pursuit of common ground and mutual advantage.[6]
>
> It is encouraging to see the United States and USSR working together in each other's interests.[7]
>
> There may be a mutuality of interests between the United States and the Soviet Union in halting the arms race. . . . In any case, the United States prefers negotiations rather than confrontations.[8]

Lastly, the thaw in United States thinking toward Mainland China may have been presaged by Rogers in mid-1969. At that time the United States thought that it ". . . would like to enter into discussions with China. . . . Their isolation from the rest of the world

is of their own choosing."[9]

Thus, William P. Rogers, the first Secretary of State in the post-war era since Marshall who had not had extensive training in the State Department and who had not worked under Dean Acheson, developed during his first year a policy that continued some of the old ideas but also brought forth new concepts toward disarmament, Russia, and China. These ideas, along with the "lower profile" and the setting of priorities may have created the setting for the (1) S.A.L.T. agreements, (2) recognition of Mainland China, and (3) winding down the American participation in the war in Viet Nam.

Unlike Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk, Rogers had spent very little time in diplomacy and international politics and may have had fewer and/or different preconceptions about the world than any of the other four Secretaries of State studied. In some ways this may have been a handicap. But with respect to Russia, China, and the situation in South East Asia, he was able to move ahead more rapidly and moderate policy than had Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, and Rusk. This may be related to flexibility in role playing and is the personality factor. These changes occurred because of the impact of domestic politics rather then as a result of leadership. Or else, it might have been Rogers and Nixon taking advantage of the situations as the circumstances occurred. That is, Rogers' perceptions may have made the moderation easier; Rogers may have had the support of the President to do these things; or, lastly, the situations may have evolved to a more propitious position. Finally, what Rogers had done with the help of President Nixon, in essence, may have been to take advantage of the climate that Secretary

Rusk had worked to try to create. Toward the goal of trying to make negotiations replace confrontation, then, Secretary of State Rogers in 1969-1970 may have made a substantial start.[10]

B. Rogers' Views of Friends-Enemies-Neutrals (in General)[11]

In the 40 speeches and 71 statements, in my sample, Rogers tended to be less bipolar than Acheson, Dulles and Rusk. Rogers saw countries as more moderate than they on the Friendship-Hostility scale. On Trust-Suspicion, he was more moderate than Acheson and Dulles and less moderate than Rusk (see Appendices A-1, A-2). He was not a man who had received his training and background from World War II. He tended to be moderately friendly and trustful toward object nations. Responsible for 4.5 per cent of the pronouncements on the Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion dimensions, he delivered 9 per cent of the "somewhat" friendly statements and 10 per cent of the "extremely" trustful statements. A fair proportion would have been below 5 per cent.

Furthermore, he tended to be optimistic regarding outcomes--more optimistic than any other Secretary--found opponents to be moderately strong and moderately active--less strong and less active than any other Secretary of State--and thought solutions to be very complex --more difficult to achieve than any other man (see Appendices A-3, A-6). This optimism may have been in some way related to the general world tranquility, the de-escalation of the Viet Nam War, the SALT talks in progress, the Paris Peace talks, the low number of statements (N=21), and Rogers' personal interpretations of the "lower profile" and other policies.

TABLE 61

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE

a. Friendship-Hostility

	Friendship 1	2	3	4	5	6	Hostility 7	Total
Rogers	18.3	26.8	14.1	2.8	16.9	16.9	4.2	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

Rogers (N=71); Total (N=1706)

b. Trust-Suspicion

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Rogers	21.0	25.8	14.5	6.5	9.7	17.7	4.8	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	18.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

Rogers (N=62); Total (N=1393)

c. Win-Lose

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Rogers	61.8	14.3	4.8	0.0	4.8	4.8	9.5	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

Rogers (N=21); Total (N=568)

d. Strong-Weak

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Rogers	21.6	29.7	2.7	5.4	18.9	21.7	0.0	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Rogers (N=37); Total (N=1255)

e. Active-Passive

	Active 1	2	3	4	5	6	Passive 7	Total
Rogers	21.6	29.7	2.7	5.4	18.9	21.7	0.0	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

Rogers (N=37); Total (N=866)

TABLE 61--Continued

f. Simple-Complex

	Simple 1	2	3	4	5	6	Complex 7	Total
Rogers	0.0	10.4	12.1	1.7	17.2	13.8	44.8	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

Rogers (N=58); Total (N=1426)

Moreover, he found countries to be "moderately" strong. The Secretaries of State generally tend to view countries as strong. Rogers, however, delivered a larger per cent of statements denoting weakness than any other Secretary of State. These observations may have been references to Viet Nam, Thailand, and Cambodia at the SEATO Conference in May 1969, on the Foreign Assistance Program in July 1969, or on several television interviews.[12] Lastly, Secretary Rogers may well have been aware of the complexities of world politics and probably recognized that the problems of Viet Nam, Laos, the Middle East, have versus have not nations, and disarmament were not easily mitigated and these may be some of the reasons why he gave 48.6 per cent of his statements in the "Extremely Complex" (number 7) category.

C. Rogers' Utilization of Audiences

Secretary of State Rogers made most of his statements to the Press, Audio-Visual Media, and to Foreign Groups. In so doing, he utilized similar kinds of audiences as did the other Secretaries of State studied. He may have used these specific audiences because it was his first year in office and he wanted to communicate with domestic and foreign publics and may have believed these to be useful for

TABLE 62

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS ON THE DIMENSIONS--FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, WIN-LOSE, STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), AND EXTREME (6+7)

a. Friendship-Hostility (N=71)

Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
45.1	33.8	21.1	100.0

b. Trust Suspicion (N=62)

Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
46.8	30.7	22.5	100.0

c. Win-Lose (N=21)

Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
76.1	9.6	14.3	100.0

d. Strong and Weak (N=37)

Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
51.3	27.0	21.7	100.0

e. Active-Passive (N=37)

Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Passive (6+7)	Total
61.9	38.1	0.0	100.0

f. Simple-Complex (N=58)

Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult (6+7)	Total
10.4	31.0	58.6	100.0

his plans. There were more than sixty million television sets in the United States and that may be one of the reasons why he utilized that medium so extensively. (He may also have been invited to appear and did so.)

TABLE 63

PER CENT OF OBSERVATIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS IN 1969-1970 TO AUDIENCE COMPARED TO THE AGGREGATE[13]

	Press	Foreign	Exe-cutive	Civic	Aca-demic	Profes-sional	Audio-Visual	Veterans	Total
Rogers	44.4	13.4	12.5	4.2	0.0	0.0	23.6	1.4	100.0
Total	44.8	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.9	3.4	14.2	3.5	100.0

Rogers (N=71); Total (N=2557)

D. Conclusions

Secretary of State William P. Rogers thus saw the world in 1969-1970 as friendly, trustworthy, moderately strong, and moderately active. While very optimistic about outcomes, he maintained that solutions to problems would be very difficult to achieve. That is, he was less ethnocentric, less amenable to the power syndrome and more in favor of the Openness of Conflict than the other Secretaries of State.

Furthermore, it seems that Rogers may have tended to simplify the world but did not overreact. On the basis of his first year, it is possible to suggest that Rogers was neither an innovator or an initiator, but was good at carrying out the policies of President Nixon, administering the State Department, and legitimizing American foreign policy to domestic and foreign audiences. Moreover, he had to administer a bureaucracy of 16,000 people and be responsible for foreign

policy for all the nations in the international system.

Henry Kissinger, on the other hand, as President Nixon's national security advisor, did not need to testify before Congress, did not have a large bureaucracy to oversee, and could focus his attention on certain specified areas--Viet Nam and the Middle East. That is, the National Security Advisor has pre-empted some of the power and prestige of the Secretary of State. In the future it is possible to speculate that the Secretary of State may have to confine himself to administering the Department and handling routine assignments or else may try to recoup some of his power. The increased influence of the National Security Advisor is a very recent phenomenon and the circumstances under which the Secretary is powerful and those situations under which the National Security Advisor is powerful have not yet been established. That is, it is not yet possible to determine whether Kissinger's power and prestige vis-a-vis President Nixon is limited to this President and this National Security Advisor and how much of the power will become institutionalized.

Still, the majority of power and influence on most issues still lay with the Secretary of State Rogers--especially during the first year. Roger's statements during 1969-1970 are helpful in telling us about the transition from a Democratic President to a Republican President and about the change to a lower profile. Furthermore, this examination of Rogers may aid in studying Secretaries of State in general and may help put the study into better perspective.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

[1]William P. Rogers, "SEATO Council of Ministers Examine Security Situation in Asia," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LX, No. 1563 (June 6, 1969), 477-83.

[2]William P. Rogers, "Secretary Leaves Bangkok at Close of SEATO Meeting," U.S. Department of State, LX, No. 1563 (June 6, 1969), 483-84.

[3]William P. Rogers, "The Complexity of World Affairs," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LX, No. 1558 (May 5, 1969), 387-88.

[4]William P. Rogers, "Interview on CBS," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXII, No. 1595 (January 19, 1970), 53-58.

[5]William P. Rogers, "The Foreign Assistance Program of Fiscal 1970," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, No. 1571 (August 4, 1969), 81-85.

[6]William P. Rogers, "National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXII, No. 1597 (February 2, 1970), 118-20.

[7]William P. Rogers, "Agreement on a Draft Seabed Treaty," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, No. 1584 (November 3, 1969), 365-369.

[8]William P. Rogers, "News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, No. 1569 (July 21, 1969), 41-49.

[9]William P. Rogers, "News Conference," U.S. Department of State Bulletin, LXI, No. 1576 (September 8, 1969), 201-08.

[10]There are, as yet, no books available on the Rogers' Secretaryship. Much of this rests on the limited evidence of one year and is speculative.

[11]Due to the small number of speeches and statements given by Secretary Rogers in his first year, I did not break down speeches by target nations and did not divide statements into quartiles.

[12]Similar reasoning may hold for the high per cent of references to object nations as having "moderate and neutral" activity.

[13]Region, Efficacy, and Basis of Conflict categories were not computed for Secretary of State Rogers.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

A. Introduction

In this study we have attempted to look at the views of five Secretaries of State on six dimensions toward twelve object countries. In so doing we have tried to see these political actors as:

> Full-bodied individuals living partly in a world of reality and partly in a world of make believe, beset by conflicts and inner contradictions, yet capable of rational thought and action, moved by forces of which he has little knowledge and by aspirations which are beyond his reach, by turn confused, frustrated and satisfied, hopeful and despairing, selfish and altruistic.[1]

That is, we have wanted to investigate the individual Secretary's views and explain some of the possible reasons why or why not a particular attitude or set of attitudes was articulated. We have done some comparison and much speculation and believe that,

> Men find it difficult to accept a world of becoming; they hunger for constants. This leads them to create an illusory world which is then treated as though it were a real basis for action.[2]

Thus, the views and images of the Secretaries of State took on increased importance because, "what is seen in politics is all important."[3] And in this sense,

> The Secretary must never try to formulate policies based on wishful thinking or optimal solutions, such as making the world forever safe for democracy. Every Secretary of State must seek worthwhile solutions to immediate problems and situations, while retaining a long-range strategic outlook for American interests.[4]

B. Substantive Findings

In trying to resolve the issues of their time, the

Secretaries of State have had to simplify the world. They were overwhelmed and trapped by events and tended to exaggerate and overreact. They had selective perception and tended to selectively remember and selectively forget. Furthermore, they have had to deal with their own psyches, have had to react to object nations, and have had to build political and social solidarity. In this view Dean Rusk once noted that,

> The Secretary's job is like a four-engine plane. One engine is relations with the President. The others are relations with Congress, with the Department and with the public--including the Press. The most vital of the four is relations with the President. . . . My job is to see to it that there's never any blue sky showing between the Secretary and the President.[5]

Thus, in dealing with enemies Secretaries may have tended to utilize extreme statements and may have tried to cover the weakness of friends. In this way Dean Rusk, for instance, may have told North Viet Nam "to leave its neighbors alone," yet did not similarly castigate Portugal, South Korea, and Spain (all governed by non-elected leaders). In addition, Secretaries have focused nearly three-fourths of their statements on enemies.[6] This may have occurred because enemy situations usually cannot be deferred and demanded prompt attention. Moreover, Secretaries may have tended to identify the world in terms of self (malevolent-beneficent) and this may have been in some way related to their hostility and suspicion that they manifested toward enemies, Egypt (under Dulles), and some friends.

The overall effect of the Cold War may also have been important in influencing the attitudes of the Secretaries. That is, the generally moderate views of Marshall, the more rigid views under Acheson and Dulles, and the more moderate views again under Rusk may

have been related to the effects and overall impact of the Cold War.

In terms of the Friendship-Hostility and Trust-Suspicion scales, these patterns were reflected in Dean Acheson's having viewed target countries as more hostile and more suspicious than any other Secretary. Moreover, Dulles tended to see object nations as more friendly and more trustworthy than the others, while Marshall tended to be the most moderate (i.e., 65.0 per cent of his statements on Friendship-Hostility scale were in the Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5) section of the scale compared to the mean of 23.8 per cent). Lastly, except for Marshall, these two measures illustrated that there was increasing moderation over time (see Appendices A-1, A-2).

Similarly, the Win-Lose (optimism-pessimism) scale showed that while Dulles tended to be more pessimistic than the others, Dean Rusk tended to be more optimistic than the rest. (This may well have been directly related to the overall Cold War atmosphere or, perhaps, to a personality attribute.) Furthermore, Acheson tended to see object nations in dichotomous terms. Finally, except for Marshall, there was increasing moderation over time.

Thus, the findings for Factor I tended to confirm the importance of this Ethnocentricity Factor for the Secretaries of State. That is, Secretaries did generally believe in

> . . . a pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction involving stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups and stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups.[7]

That is, it is possible to suggest that Secretaries may have responded to the environment in such a way as to be reflected on these scales. (See Appendices A-1, A-3.)

TABLE 64

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES AND RUSK ON THE FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY, TRUST-SUSPICION, AND WIN-LOSE SCALES--DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), AND EXTREME (6+7)

1. Friendship-Hostility

	Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)
Marshall (N= 117)	31.6	65.0	3.4
Acheson (N= 146)	24.7	13.7	61.6
Dulles (N=1055)	46.2	19.6	34.2
Rusk (N= 388)	33.8	28.4	37.7
Total (N=1706)	40.8	23.8	35.3

2. Trust-Suspicion

	Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)
Marshall (N=140)	31.4	63.6	5.0
Acheson (N= 86)	25.6	7.0	66.4
Dulles (N=945)	36.5	17.5	46.1
Rusk (N=222)	33.0	37.0	30.0
Total (N=1393)	35.3	24.8	40.0

3. Win-Lose

	Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)
Marshall (N= 95)	46.3	52.3	1.3
Acheson (N=166)	45.1	0.0	54.8
Dulles (N=224)	25.9	8.0	66.1
Rusk (N= 83)	48.2	17.8	34.0
Total (N=568)	35.9	18.0	46.1

In addition, all Secretaries of State viewed countries as Strong and Active. While Acheson seemed to envisage other nations to be stronger (89.8 per cent versus a mean of 71.5 per cent) and more

active (91.5 per cent versus a mean of 80.4 per cent) than any other decision-maker studied, Dulles perceived them as less strong (63.1 per cent) and less active (64.0 per cent) than Marshall, Acheson, and Rusk. This seems to be related to Dulles' personal outlook. That is, in order to cope with problems Secretary Dulles, perhaps, because of his religious and moral outlook and his beliefs about the strength of the United States, may have seen countries as strong and active--but not to such an extent as did Marshall, Acheson and Rusk.[8] The lack of increasing moderation by the various Secretaries may have been in some way related to the Cold War environment and the propensity of the men to see other nations as both Strong and Active. (Also see Appendices A-4, A-5.)

Moreover, Acheson saw solutions as easy to achieve more often (percentagewise) than any other Secretary. This view may have been related to the beginning of the Cold War. That is, Acheson may have thought that the way to achieve results was to fight communism and be powerful. Rusk, on the other hand, saw solutions as easy to obtain less frequently than did Marshall, Acheson and Dulles. Rusk thus may have become aware of the nuances and complexities of the world. This increasing awareness can also be discerned in learning that, except for Marshall, there was increasing movement toward beliefs that solutions would be more and more difficult to achieve (see Appendix A-6).

Moreover, Marshall, perhaps, because of the requirements of the time, made 37.7 per cent of his statements in the first quartile of tenure, a higher per cent than any other man. On the other hand, Dean Acheson made only 26.2 per cent of his observations during that

TABLE 65

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON THE STRONG-WEAK, ACTIVE-PASSIVE, AND SIMPLE-COMPLEX DIMENSIONS--DIVIDED INTO EXTREME (1+2), MODERATE AND NEUTRAL (3+4+5), AND EXTREME (6+7)

1. Strong-Weak

	Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)
Marshall (N=158)	79.2	18.3	2.6
Acheson (N=234)	89.8	5.5	4.7
Dulles (N=574)	63.1	28.2	8.7
Rusk (N=289)	76.1	20.6	3.2
Total (N=1255)	71.5	22.1	6.4

2. Active Passive

	Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Passive (6+7)
Marshall (N= 59)	91.2	8.7	0.0
Acheson (N=157)	91.5	5.1	3.4
Dulles (N=337)	64.0	30.9	5.0
Rusk (N=313)	90.4	8.2	1.3
Total (N=866)	80.4	17.1	2.6

3. Simple-Complex

	Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult Solution (6+7)
Marshall (N=115)	27.6	68.6	3.9
Acheson (N=166)	64.7	9.1	26.2
Dulles (N=696)	44.2	23.0	32.8
Rusk (N=449)	16.6	57.6	25.8
Total (N=1426)	34.3	37.6	28.1

quartile compared to a mean of 29.7 per cent. During the second and third quartiles all the Secretaries delivered about the same per cent

of observations. During the last quartile Marshall made only 10.7 per cent of his declarations. (This compares with a mean of 21.6 per cent.) Thus, only Marshall deviated by more than 5.0 per cent from the mean during any quartile. (See Appendix A-7.)

In terms of audiences, Secretaries of State utilized the Press, Foreign Groups, and the Audio-Visual Media the most and Civic Groups, Professional Groups, and Veterans the least. Of the Secretaries, Acheson spoke to the Press most frequently (68.7 per cent), and Dean Rusk employed the Press least frequently (28.7 per cent). Because television was newly emergent in the late 1940's and 1950's, Marshall and Acheson used that medium very little. By 1960 there were fifty million televisions in the United States and Dean Rusk delivered 25.4 per cent of his statements through the Audio-Visual media. This increased use of the Audio-Visual media may have accounted for Rusk's less frequent employment of the Press (see Appendix A-9).

In addition, events may well have focused their attention toward certain regions. There was greater attention to a greater number of regions as we move closer to 1970. Yet it is difficult to speculate whether the Secretaries initiated the contact, reacted, or a combination of the two. The data only suggest how many statements they made to each other and do not say for what reasons they spoke to that geographical area at that particular time. That is, it is learned that Marshall spoke only to Russia and Europe and did this a higher per cent of the time than did the others. But it is only possible to conjecture that events focused his attention toward that region. In the late 1940's, many of the regions were still under colonial control and others

were not of interest to the United States. Similarly, Acheson focused more often on the "Rest of Asia" because of the Korean War; Dulles spoke frequently to the Middle East because of the Suez Crisis; and Rusk was concerned with Latin America and South East Asia because of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Viet Nam War. Lastly the Secretaries of States' extensive concern with Russia, Europe, and Asia was demonstrated (see Appendix A-8).

TABLE 66

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK TOWARD REGION

	Russia	Europe	China	Rest of Asia	South East Asia	Middle East	Latin America	Africa
Marshall (N= 160)	26.3	73.7	----	----	----	----	----	----
Acheson (N= 366)	14.8	16.4	7.2	60.8	----	0.5	0.3	----
Dulles (N=1055)	24.4	21.2	7.9	8.0	13.7	13.2	9.7	1.8
Rusk (N= 976)	18.8	11.6	5.8	14.1	26.1	6.6	14.4	2.5
Total (N=2557)	20.9	20.2	6.7	17.5	15.6	8.0	9.6	1.6

Perceptions toward specific countries also suggested how Secretaries viewed Friends and Enemies. For instance, while Dulles tended to be the most friendly toward Great Britain and France, Acheson tended to be the friendliest toward West Germany. (The deviations are slight.) In the same way Acheson tended to be the most hostile toward Russia and China and Dean Rusk the least hostile. These results may have been

related to the Cold War environment and the individual Secretary's personal outlook. Furthermore, the Standard Deviations of the means toward Russia illustrated that Acheson's views were the most consistent. That is, the Standard Deviation for Acheson was 0.245, for Dulles 1.30, and for Rusk 0.648 (see Tables 36, 39, 42, 52, 53).

TABLE 67

MEANS OF PERCEPTIONS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK TOWARD FRIENDS: GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, WEST GERMANY AND ENEMIES: CHINA AND RUSSIA, ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY*

a. Friends

	Great Britain	France	West Germany
Acheson	2.5 (N= 8)	3.0 (N= 4)	1.5 (N= 6)
Dulles	1.4 (N=41)	1.7 (N=47)	1.7 (N=67)
Rusk	1.5 (N= 4)	2.2 (N= 4)	2.0 (N= 4)

b. Enemies

	China	Russia
Acheson	7.0 (N= 8)	6.7 (N= 32)
Dulles	6.5 (N=70)	6.0 (N=179)
Rusk	5.5 (N=22)	5.9 (N= 38)

*Data were unavailable for Secretary Marshall.

Besides this, it was found that certain events such as the Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Nuclear Test Ban had significant impact--greater than 0.4 per quartile--on the Secretary's views.

Another way to look at Secretaries of States' views of object countries is to evaluate efficacy. On that scale Acheson tended to rank the countries higher than any other Secretary. (This correlated

highly with his view of target nations as stronger than any other man.) Furthermore, Rusk's images of countries having medium efficacy converged with his perceptions of other countries as moderately strong and active. Similarly, Marshall's observations of nations having low efficacy generally seemed to fit in with his other declarations.

In the same way, the various Secretaries' images of the "basis of conflict" proved to be fruitful. This scale demonstrated that Dulles found ideology to be the primary "basis of conflict" 98.0 per cent of the time and this confirmed much of what was written about him.[9] Rusk, on the other hand, seemed to believe that Power was a primary measure of strength and found this attribute to be important more often than any other. Lastly, Secretaries attributed the "basis of conflict" to "spheres of influence" in only a very small percentage of cases. This scale thus corroborated the widespread belief that from 1946 to 1970 the major "basis of conflict" was ideology.

Still, the personality of the various Secretaries may also have influenced their views of the world. Most of the attitudes toward most of the countries remained virtually the same over time. Moreover, certain kinds of peripheral, ambiguous, complex, contradictory, emotional, and new issues usually leave room for the influence of the personality variable.[10] These issues may give clues to generalized personal style. That is, if Dulles' rigid views were operative on those issues where the personality variable was manifested, then that might tell us much about his personal style. There is also the possibility that the personality variable operates unconsciously. That is, on most issues Secretaries of State may try to achieve a homeostasis, operate

TABLE 68

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON EFFICACY AND BASIS OF CONFLICT

a. Efficacy

		High	Medium	Low	Total
Marshall	(N= 15)	40.0	26.7	33.3	100.0
Acheson	(N= 60)	76.7	21.7	1.7	100.0
Dulles	(N=276)	52.3	32.3	15.4	100.0
Rusk	(N= 91)	34.1	48.4	17.5	100.0
Total	(N=442)	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

b. Basis of Conflict

		Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Marshall	(N= 8)	75.0	12.5	12.5	100.0
Acheson	(N= 38)	44.7	34.2	21.1	100.0
Dulles	(N=151)	98.0	1.3	0.7	100.0
Rusk	(N= 24)	20.8	79.2	0.0	100.0
Total	(N=221)	79.6	15.8	4.6	100.0

according to the tradition of American foreign policy, or adopt a mirror image. (How others are defined and perceived varies in directions related to underlying personal factors--some of which may be unique.) What we are seeking is to evaluate those relatively small number of instances in which the issues left room for personal influence (or were interpreted in such a way by the Secretary as to give him personal choice).

Furthermore, Secretaries have usually dealt with the issues concerning Enemies and Friends first. After many of the major problems with these countries have been solved, mitigated, or postponed, then the Secretaries may attend to problems dealing with neutrals or with

peripheral issues. Here on non-urgent matters the Secretary usually has greater freedom of action. Even in crisis periods the Secretary may also have personal influence in defining the issue, setting boundaries, dramatizing issues, appointing negotiators, and influencing the President on matters of agenda, troop deployments, and giving cues to the other side.

Lastly, the personality variable may be in some way related to his activity. In this we found that Marshall was the least active, Acheson was more active than Marshall, Dulles more active than any other Secretary studied, and Rusk more active than Marshall and Acheson and less active than Dulles[11] (per year and quartile).

Yet here as in many of the other areas, the personality variable probably does not operate independent of the situational variable. Here the level of activity tended to be tied to events. That is, the Secretaries were activist because events activated them. They were active-positive because that was the only role permitted. The "active-positives" had "the enthusiasm for the job, a high self-esteem, flexibility, and an orientation toward productiveness as a value."[12] The others did not. Thus, Barber's characterological analysis cannot be derived from this kind of research and may not fit the Secretary of State. Thus, it seems as though all of Barber's factors (active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive, passive-negative) cannot be substantiated in this kind of action research, and may not be fruitful in action research. Lastly, this data source (i.e., activity based on statements) is inadequate for this kind of research and may be helpful only in the realm of frequency, targeting, and time.

TABLE 69

NUMBER OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK IN TERMS OF ACTIVITY PER QUARTILE AND PER YEAR

		Total	Per Quartile	Per Year
Marshall	1947-1949	160	40	80.0
Acheson	1949-1953	366	91.5	91.5
Dulles	1953-1959	1055	263.75	176
Rusk	1961-1969	976	244	122

We also still do not know under what circumstances the personality variable is pre-eminent and when, and to what extent the situational variable is prominent. We gave some support to Greenstein's speculations that the personality variable was very important in peripheral, ambiguous, new, complex, contradictory, and emotional situations.[13] Yet it is still not certain as to the mix of the two variables and which influences which, when, how, and why. Furthermore, this research has not suggested to what extent Secretaries of State (aggregate and individually) were eventful men (anyone) and which were event-making men.[14] It is believed, however, that "special selection" --the process by which all but the active-positives are eliminated from consideration--and this research have to a small extent illustrated some cases during which the various Secretaries of State did make a difference (Suez Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis).[15]

In addition, it has been learned that Secretaries of State may have responded to feedback.[16] Therefore, there is, most likely, a link between the perception of an event and its interaction with the

personal disposition of the Secretary of State. Because these decision-makers usually have come to the position with detailed cognitive maps, simplify the world, overreact, selectively remember and selectively forget, it is speculated that the personality variable may have had somewhat more influence on the various Secretaries of State than the situational variable. That is, the Secretary is probably more than a reactor to events and more than a cog (eventful man) in the bureaucracy. It is believed that two men may interpret the same situation differently, place emphasis on different issues, have different priorities and styles and thus may, in both the short run and long run, influence how the object nation views the United States. Thus, a Secretary may have slowed down the Cold War, hardened it, or had minimal influence. Furthermore, every Secretary of State can put his individual stamp on the office and help influence American opinion toward foreign policy. Lastly, the Secretary may have influence in the way he communicates with domestic and foreign publics in trying to explain, clarify, and legitimize American foreign policy.

C. Validity of the Data Source

It is important to look at Secretaries of State's views of the world as one constraint of their behavior. Speeches--which tell us something about their personality traits and the events that may have influenced them--are building blocks for analysis. Furthermore, speeches usually represent (1) a tradition of foreign policy, (2) particular characteristics of the individual Secretary, (3) nature of the time.

Beyond this, we do not have many sources of what the various Secretaries think. Marshall and Dulles were dead and Acheson, Rusk, and Rogers did not answer my letters and thus could not be interviewed. Even though declaratory statements and behavior may not be necessarily congruent, the speeches represent a part of the Secretary's map of the world and are frequently a good predictor.

Concomitantly, the speeches, albeit sometimes slanted for certain constituencies, did confirm that Secretaries of State perceive countries as Enemies, Friends, and Neutrals. Beyond this, speeches sometimes illustrated whether they were hostile, trustworthy, or optimistic toward certain issues. Speeches also gave clues and cues to domestic and foreign audiences on what the Secretaries were thinking and were often accurate guides to future American foreign policy.

It is believed that compared to other cabinet members in the United States and compared to foreign ministers in other countries, Secretaries of State in their speeches may tell more about their own personal beliefs and about future United States foreign policy. Therefore, it may be wise to suggest that those who want to understand American foreign policy ought to consider reading selected speeches of the Secretaries of State as one guide into the beliefs of and role played by an important American decision-maker.

Yet, this study has demonstrated that tabulating, reading, and inferring from speeches may be hazardous. This seems to be an inadequate method for generalization and may be unicausal. It is necessary to use other materials (historical works, memoirs, newspapers, books, interviews) to try to get the complete picture of what was occurring.

Speeches, by themselves, only give one perspective. And, of course, speeches illustrate only what was said and not what was done. That is, statements of policy may or may not be implemented in policy initiatives.

D. Caveats

By having chosen the six variables--Friendship-Hostility, Trust-Suspicion, Win-Lose, Strong-Weak, Active-Passive, and Simple-Complex, I have framed this study in a way that seemed to emphasize Friendship, Trust, and Strength. Had I chosen some of the other variables instead--Good-Bad, Confident-Fearful, Satisfaction-Frustration, Permanent-Transitory, Dominant-Submissive, Involvement-Noninvolvement, and Cooperative-Unilateral--I might have had similar results. (They were all part of the same three factors and they correlated at very high levels.) Thus, instead of having emphasized Friendship, Trust, and Strength, I would have probably emphasized the degree of Confidence and Satisfaction, Dominance and Involvement, and Cooperation. It also seems likely that the results on the Ethnocentric Scale, Power Syndrome, and Openness of Conflict Scale would probably have been similar. All these variables in any one factor are to a certain degree interchangeable, yet the choice of a specific variable may point to a certain direction and emphasis.

In addition, there may have been problems of consistency in coding. There were problems in coding of two of the six dimensions chosen--and although a panel decided ambiguous or difficult cases, there was judgment involved and several coders may not have coded every speech thoroughly. Furthermore, even though there was strong agreement

on the pre-test and the Marshall Secretaryship, there may have been problems with respect to Acheson, Dulles, Rusk, and Rogers. Except for Dulles, generally each Secretary's speeches were coded by one person. And that individual may have had biases, priorities, and inconsistencies. It was hoped that the biases would cancel each other out or be minimal. Problems with inferring from content analysis should also be noted. In this study I attempted to classify and categorize Secretaries' speeches and may have omitted reasons where there were some and found justifications and attributed reasons where there were none.

E. Conclusions and Future Studies

In this study, it was found that Secretaries of State tended to focus on enemies, tended to simplify the world, tended to overreact, and tended to maintain their images over time. The overall impact of the Cold War may have also been very important. The Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Viet Nam War were several situations that changed the Secretaries' perceptions. The personality variable seemed to play a more important part in peripheral, ambiguous, emotional, complex, contradictory, and new situations. Except for Marshall (who was moderate in his perceptions), Secretaries have been getting less bipolar in their views and, given similar circumstances, may continue to do so in the future.

Those who study public pronouncements of public officials in the future ought to consider comparing two different decision-makers in two different offices (i.e., State and Defense) or do a similar study comparing similar office holders in two different cultures. The

changing relationship between the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the President should also be probed. Lastly, since the period since World War II may have been a unique period, it is suggested that future studies take into account public pronouncements of Secretaries of State before World War I and before World War II and try to determine if there is consistency and a trend. Much more also needs to be done to try to tie the relationship of statements to events.

Thus, in 1973 the Secretary of State, Chief Foreign Policy Advisor, speaks for the most powerful nation in the world and the head of its international system. This study has tried to demonstrate his importance for the United States and the world. His power and influence may be indeterminate.

> As the President's major advisor on foreign policy his exact influence is largely dependent on his personality and that of his chief, on the problems that arise during his tenure, and on the issues that fall to him to decide.[17]

Still, whether he sees himself as Minister of War, trouble-shooter, pacifier, clerk, figurehead, partner, or statesman, a Secretary can have significant influence. For as Cordell Hull suggested:

> Although a Secretary of State confers with the President on important matters of policy and is the President's agent in the field of foreign affairs, in practice he acts largely on his own initiative and responsibility.[18]

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IX

[1]Calvin Hall and Gardner Lindzy, Theories of Personality (New York: John Wiley, 1957), p. 70.

[2]Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 212, originally from Machiavelli, The Discourses, II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. xxii.

[3]Walter Dean Burnham, "What Started the Landslide," The National Observer, XI, No. 47 (November 18, 1972), 30.

[4]Ronald J. Stupak, The Shaping of Foreign Policy--The Role of the Secretary of State as Seen by Dean Acheson (New York: Odyssey Press, 1969), p. 111.

[5]Dean Rusk, "Mr. Secretary--on the Eve of Emeritus," Life, LXVI, No. 2 (January 17, 1969), 62-b.

[6]Only 50 per cent of sample of countries included enemies, so there is a vast overrepresentation.

[7]Theodor Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 150.

[8]See Finlay, Holsti, et al., Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-97.

[9]Ibid., p. 48.

[10]Fred Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush," in Aaron Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), pp. 74-94.

[11]This is based on Barber's characterological analysis in James D. Barber, The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[12]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

[13]Ibid.; Fred Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 84-87.

[14]Sydney Hook, The Hero in History (New York: New American Library, 1944).

[15]Barber, op. cit., pp. 7-14.

[16]Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1966), pp. 88-89.

[17]Charles O. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1961), p. 64.

[18]Quoted in Alexander DeConde, The American Secretary of State (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 17.

APPENDIX

TABLE A-1

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON FRIENDSHIP-HOSTILITY

	Friendship 1	2	3	4	5	6	Hostility 7	Total
Marshall	3.4	28.2	20.5	19.7	24.8	3.4	0.0	100.0
Acheson	18.5	6.2	4.1	1.4	8.2	4.1	57.5	100.0
Dulles	20.9	25.3	5.0	5.0	9.6	16.9	17.3	100.0
Rusk	8.5	25.3	6.6	4.1	17.7	32.6	5.1	100.0
Total	16.9	23.9	6.4	5.3	12.1	17.7	17.6	100.0

	Very Friendly (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Hostile (6+7)	Total
Marshall	31.6	65.0	3.4	100.0
Acheson	24.7	13.7	61.6	100.0
Dulles	46.2	19.6	34.2	100.0
Rusk	33.8	28.4	37.7	100.0
Total	40.8	23.8	35.3	100.0

Marshall (N= 117)
Acheson (N= 146)
Dulles (N=1055)
Rusk (N= 388)

Total (N=1706)

TABLE A-2

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON TRUST-SUSPICION

	Trust 1	2	3	4	5	6	Suspicion 7	Total
Marshall	2.1	29.3	16.4	17.9	29.3	5.0	0.0	100.0
Acheson	14.0	11.6	2.3	1.2	3.5	7.0	59.4	100.0
Dulles	9.6	26.9	7.9	2.6	7.0	23.4	22.7	100.0
Rusk	7.4	25.6	8.4	2.5	26.1	23.6	6.4	100.0
Total	9.3	26.0	8.8	4.2	11.8	20.5	19.5	100.0

	Very Trustworthy (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Suspicious (6+7)	Total
Marshall	31.4	63.6	5.0	100.0
Acheson	25.6	7.0	66.4	100.0
Dulles	36.5	17.5	46.1	100.0
Rusk	33.0	37.0	30.0	100.0
Total	35.3	24.8	40.0	100.0

Marshall (N= 140)
Acheson (N= 86)
Dulles (N= 945)
Rusk (N= 222)

Total (N=1393)

TABLE A-3

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON WIN-LOSE

	Win 1	2	3	4	5	6	Lose 7	Total
Marshall	6.3	40.0	23.2	24.9	4.2	1.3	0.0	100.0
Acheson	31.3	13.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	50.0	100.0
Dulles	12.0	13.9	4.0	1.1	2.9	25.2	40.9	100.0
Rusk	25.0	23.2	14.2	0.0	3.6	16.1	17.9	100.0
Total	15.6	20.3	9.0	3.4	5.6	17.3	28.8	100.0

	Very Optimistic (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Pessimistic (6+7)	Total
Marshall	46.3	52.3	1.3	100.0
Acheson	45.1	0.0	54.8	100.0
Dulles	25.9	8.0	66.1	100.0
Rusk	48.2	17.8	34.0	100.0
Total	35.9	18.0	46.1	100.0

Marshall (N= 95)
Acheson (N= 166)
Dulles (N= 224)
Rusk (N= 83)

Total (N= 568)

TABLE A-4

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON STRONG-WEAK

	Strong 1	2	3	4	5	6	Weak 7	Total
Marshall	12.7	66.5	16.4	1.3	0.6	2.6	0.0	100.0
Acheson	83.8	6.0	3.8	0.0	1.7	2.1	2.6	100.0
Dulles	30.7	32.4	13.9	5.9	8.4	7.1	1.6	100.0
Rusk	12.8	63.3	8.2	1.3	11.1	2.9	0.3	100.0
Total	35.0	36.5	11.3	3.3	7.5	5.1	1.3	100.0

	Very Strong (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Weak (6+7)	Total
Marshall	79.2	18.3	2.6	100.0
Acheson	89.8	5.5	4.7	100.0
Dulles	63.1	28.2	8.7	100.0
Rusk	76.1	20.6	3.2	100.0
Total	71.5	22.1	6.4	100.0

Marshall (N= 158)
Acheson (N= 234)
Dulles (N= 574)
Rusk (N= 289)

Total (N=1255)

TABLE A-5

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON ACTIVE-PASSIVE

	Active 1	2	3	4	5	6	Passive 7	Total
Marshall	17.6	73.6	7.5	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0	100.0
Acheson	84.7	6.8	3.4	0.0	1.7	0.0	3.4	100.0
Dulles	41.1	22.9	12.1	17.8	1.0	4.4	0.6	100.0
Rusk	6.4	84.0	7.0	0.6	0.6	1.4	0.5	100.0
Total	26.2	54.2	9.5	6.8	0.8	2.1	0.5	100.0

	Very Active (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Passive (6+7)	Total
Marshall	91.2	8.7	0.0	100.0
Acheson	91.5	5.1	3.4	100.0
Dulles	64.0	30.9	5.0	100.0
Rusk	90.4	8.2	1.3	100.0
Total	80.4	17.1	2.6	100.0

Marshall (N= 59)
Acheson (N= 157)
Dulles (N= 337)
Rusk (N= 313)

Total (N= 866)

TABLE A-6

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS OF SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON SIMPLE-COMPLEX

	Simple 1	2	3	4	5	6	Complex 7	Total
Marshall	4.5	23.1	12.3	10.4	45.9	3.9	0.0	100.0
Acheson	54.7	10.0	0.8	1.6	6.7	10.0	16.2	100.0
Dulles	23.9	20.3	11.3	3.3	8.4	15.2	17.6	100.0
Rusk	4.9	11.7	22.4	0.9	34.3	19.3	6.5	100.0
Total	17.7	16.6	13.9	3.2	20.5	14.7	13.4	100.0

	Very Simple Solution (1+2)	Moderate and Neutral (3+4+5)	Very Difficult Solution (6+7)	Total
Marshall	27.6	68.6	3.9	100.0
Acheson	64.7	9.1	26.2	100.0
Dulles	44.2	23.0	32.8	100.0
Rusk	16.6	57.6	25.8	100.0
Total	34.3	37.6	28.1	100.0

Marshall (N= 115)
Acheson (N= 166)
Dulles (N= 696)
Rusk (N= 449)

Total (N=1426)

TABLE A-7

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON TENURE--BY QUARTILES

	Quartile I	Quartile II	Quartile III	Quartile IV	Total
Marshall (N= 160)	37.7	29.6	22.0	10.7	100.0
Acheson (N= 366)	26.2	30.9	19.1	23.8	100.0
Dulles (N=1055)	32.1	24.1	21.1	22.6	100.0
Rusk (N= 976)	28.2	32.1	19.2	21.4	100.0
Total (N=2557)	29.7	28.6	20.2	21.6	100.0

TABLE A-8

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON REGION

	Russia	Europe	China	Rest of Asia	South East Asia	Middle East	Latin America	Africa	Total
Marshall (N= 160)	26.3	73.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	100.0
Acheson (N= 366)	14.8	16.4	7.2	60.8	---	0.5	0.3	---	100.0
Dulles (N=1055)	24.4	21.2	7.9	8.0	13.7	13.2	9.7	1.8	100.0
Rusk (N= 976)	18.8	11.6	5.8	14.1	26.1	6.6	14.4	2.5	100.0
Total (N=2557)	20.9	20.2	6.7	17.5	15.6	8.0	9.6	1.6	100.0

TABLE A-9

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON AUDIENCE

	Press	Foreign	Exe-cutive	Civic	Aca-demic	Profes-sional	Audio-Visual	Veterans	Total
Marshall (N= 160)	32.7	31.4	19.5	6.3	1.9	2.5	3.1	2.5	100.0
Acheson (N= 366)	68.7	10.6	9.8	3.7	1.9	0.8	3.7	0.8	100.0
Dulles (N=1055)	53.1	15.9	11.3	2.3	2.3	2.5	8.7	3.9	100.0
Rusk (N= 976)	28.7	11.2	9.6	2.8	12.4	5.7	25.4	4.1	100.0
Total (N=2557)	44.8	14.3	11.0	3.0	5.8	3.4	14.2	3.5	100.0

TABLE A-10

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON EFFICACY

		High	Medium	Low	Total
Marshall	(N= 15)	40.0	26.7	33.3	100.0
Acheson	(N= 60)	76.7	21.7	1.7	100.0
Dulles	(N=276)	52.3	32.3	15.4	100.0
Rusk	(N= 91)	34.1	48.4	17.5	100.0
Total	(N=442)	49.3	33.9	16.7	100.0

TABLE A-11

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, AND RUSK ON BASIS OF CONFLICT

	Ideology	Power Centers	Spheres of Influence	Total
Marshall (N= 8)	75.0	12.5	12.5	100.0
Acheson (N= 38)	44.7	34.2	21.1	100.0
Dulles (N=151)	98.0	1.3	0.7	100.0
Rusk (N= 24)	20.8	79.2	0.0	100.0
Total (N=221)	79.6	15.8	4.6	100.0

TABLE A-12

PER CENT OF STATEMENTS BY SECRETARIES OF STATE MARSHALL, ACHESON, DULLES, RUSK, AND ROGERS ON ACTIVITY PER QUARTER AND PER YEAR

	Per Quarter	Per Year
Marshall (N = 160)	40	80.0
Acheson (N = 366)	91.5	91.5
Dulles (N = 1055)	263.75	176
Rusk (N = 976)	244	122
Rogers (N = 71)	---	71

These are the fifty-seven events taken from the McClelland, et al., World Event Interaction Survey, New York Times, the United States in World Affairs, and the World Almanac that I have included as systemic events in this study. In three events--(1) Quemoy Matsu shelling, (2) height of decolonization, (3) Chinese Cultural Revolution, I used a judgment on the midpoint as the date of the event. For the Sino-Soviet split, I tried to judge when the New York Times began regularly to acknowledge the split.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Aid to Greece and Turkey began	March 12, 1947
Marshall Plan speech delivered	June 5, 1947
George Kennan article "x" on Soviet conduct published	July, 1947
Overthrow of Czechoslovakia occurred	February 25, 1948
Berlin Blockade begun	June 21, 1948
NATO formed	April 4, 1949
China goes Communist	September 21, 1949
Russian A-bomb detonated	September 23, 1949
Korean War begins	June 25, 1950
Japanese Peace Treaty signed	September 8, 1951
Stalin dies	March 5, 1953
East German riots occur	June 18, 1953
Russian H-bomb detonated	August 20, 1953
Communist takeover in Guatemala attempted	February, 1954
Dienbienphu--Indo China falls	May 7, 1954
Bandung Conference takes place	April, 1955
Vienna Summit--Open Skies occurs	July, 1955
Quemoy-Matsu Shelling (midpoint) continues	November-January 1955-56
Poland riots at Poznan begin	June 28, 1956

Hungarian revolt begins	October 23-30, 1956
Suez Crisis erupts	October 29-30, 1956
Sputnik occurs	October 1957
Common Market comes into existence	January 1, 1958
Khrushchev takes over in Russia	March 27, 1958
DeGaulle comes to power	May, 1958
Lebanon crisis occurs	May, 1958
Castro comes to power in Cuba	January 1, 1959
16 African countries join UN (height of decolonization)	December, 1960
Alliance for Progress announced	March 13, 1961
Bay of Pigs invasion starts	April 16, 1961
Congo crisis (midpoint) continues	June-July, 1961
Berlin Wall erected	August 6, 1961
Trouble in Laos escalates	October, 1961
Cuban Missile Crisis erupts	October 14, 1962
Punta del Este Conference (Cuba voted out of OAS) takes place	December, 1962
India-China border conflict begins	January, 1963
Nuclear test ban treaty signed	August 5, 1963
Sino-soviet split becomes apparent (judgment)	December, 1963
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed	August 7, 1964
Chinese A-bomb detonated	October 15, 1964
Kosygin-Breznev overthrow Khrushchev	October 16, 1964
Pleiku-US starts bombing of North Viet Nam	February 7, 1965
Dominican Republic crisis occurs	May 2, 1965

Cyprus crisis occurs	August, 1965
India-Pakistan War begins	September-October, 1965
Communist takeover attempt--Indonesia (Suharto takes rein)	March 11, 1966
Rhodesia--Unilateral Declaration of Independence	November 11, 1966
Egypt-Yemen-Aden War (midpoint) continues	June, 1966
France withdraws from NATO	April-May, 1967
Arab-Israeli Six Day War takes Place	June, 1967
Johnson-Kosygin meet at Glassboro, N.J.	June 23, 1967
Tet offensive--Viet Nam erupts	February, 1968
Viet Nam negotiations begin in Paris	May, 1968
Greek colonels overthrow King Constantine and take over Greece	May, 1968
French rebellion--Pompidou takes over from DeGaulle	May-June, 1968
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia takes place	August 19-20, 1968
Great cultural revolution (China)--midpoint continues	October, 1968

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