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CHINA UNDER THE KUOMINTANG: THE PROBLEM OF UNIFICATION, 1928-1937

by

Jiu-Hwa Lo Upshur

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(History)
in The University of Michigan
1972

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CHINESE TERMS

The following abbreviations are used in the text:

CCP: Chinese Communist Party.

C.E.C.: Central Executive Committee.

C.E.R.: Chinese Eastern Railway.

C.P.C.: Central Political Council.

C.S.C.: Central Supervisory Committee.

KMT: Kuomintang.

N.E.C.: National Economic Council.

SMR: South Manchurian Railway.

The following Chinese terms are used in the text:

Tangpu: KMT Organization.

Tungpei: Northeastern (Manchurian).

The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes:

CFCS: Chiao-fei chan shih (History of Anti-Communist Campaigns)

CHLTTSKTYJ: Chang Hsueh-liang tao ti shih ko tseng yang jen (What Sort of Man is the Real Chang Hsueh-liang)

CHMKSCNNWTSC: Chung-hua min-kuo shih-chiu-nien nei wai ta shih chi (Important Events concerning the Internal and External Affairs of the Republic of China in 1930)

CHMKTSC: Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih-chi (Chronology of Important Events of the Republic of China)

CIPSPS: Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shu (An Account of the September 18 Incident)

CJCCSL: Chung-jih chan-cheng shih lioh (Summary History of the Sino-Japanese War)

CJWCSLHP: Chung-jih wai-chiao shih liao hui pien (Compilation of Source Materials on Sino-Japanese Relations)

CKFHSCC: Ch'en kuo-fu hsien-sheng ch'uan chi (Complete Works of Mr. Ch'en Kuo-fu)

CKJCS: Chahar kang jih chi shih (An Authentic Account of the Chahar Anti-Japanese Campaign)

CKJTMCSCNCNT: Chahah kang jih tung-meng-chun szu chou nien chi nien t'se (Fourth Anniversary Memorial Volume of the Chahar Anti-Japanese Allied Army)

CKKCHCCC: Chung-kuo Kuomintang chih-tao hsia chih cheng-chih ch'eng-chi (Statistics of the Political Achievement of the KMT)

CKKCTSK: Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih kao (Draft History of the Chinese Communist Party)

CKKSTLHC: Chung-kuo Kuomintang-shih tzu-liao hui-chi (Compilation of Source Materials of the History of the Kuomintang)

CNHICL: Kuo-nan hui-i chi lu (Records of the National Emergency Conference)

CTTC: Chiang tsung-tung chi (Collected Works of President Chiang)

CTSLYLC: Chiang tsung-shih-ling yen lun chi (Speeches and Writings of Commander-in-Chief Chiang)

CWWHCKP: Chun-shih wei-yuan-hui wei-yuan ch'ang hsing-ying cheng-chih kung-tso pao-kao (Report on Political Affairs of the Generalissimo's Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission)

FMTHSC: Fu Meng-tseng hsien sheng chi (Works of Mr. Fu Meng-tseng)

GG: Kuo-min cheng-fu kung pao (Government Gazette)

HSTW: Hai shih t'an wang (Reminiscences)

HTLWHC: Hu tang lun-wen hsuan chi (Selected Works on Protecting the Party)

KCICCCJKH: K'ang-chan i-ch'ien chih chung-jih kuan hsi (Pre-war Sino-Japanese Relations)

KMKMCCSCK: Kuo-min ke-ming chun chan shih ch'u kao (Draft History of the National Revolutionary Army)

LSHLSC: Lushan hsun-lien shih chih (Official Account of the Lushan Training Program)

MKENHYCP: Min-kuo erh-shih-san nien hsin-sheng-huo yun-tung chung pao kao (General Report of the New Life Movement for 1934)

KMWH: Ko-ming wen-hsien (Revolutionary Documents)

PCHCCC: Pai Ch'ung-hsi chiang chun chuan (Biography of General Pai Ch'ung-hsi)

SSPCHLCY: Sian shih pien ch'an hui lu che yao (A Penitent's Account of the Sian Incident: Summary)

SSPSI: Sian shih pien san i (Three Reminiscences of the Sian Incident)

TTKTC: Ts'ai Ting-kai tzu-ch'uan (Autobiography of Ts'ai Ting-Kai)

WCWHSTSYLC: Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsui-chin yen lun chi (Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Wang Ching-wei)

WSJSTCCS: Wo so jen-shih ti Chiang Chieh-shih (The Chiang Kai-shek that I Know)

Introduction.

In the history of China a recurrent theme has been alternating periods of unity and fragmentation. Since the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, China has seen progressive decline of central power accompanied by rise of provincial warlordism and civil strife. Breakdown of internal unity accentuated the nation's impotence in foreign affairs and underlined her inability to resist foreign aggression. Conversely reverses suffered in the international arena aroused public anger and sense of humiliation which in turn led to more insistent demand for the reconstruction of a unified and effective central government.

The rise of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the rapid successes it scored during the Northern Expedition must be viewed at least partially in the context that it represented China's renascent nationalism and it sought to end disunity, recover lost rights and reestablish China's dignity. For in spite of the collapse of the imperial government, the tradition of a strong central government remained a powerful one, and in view of the foreign menace it was more apparent than ever that there should be a single unified government capable of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

Two years after its launching in Canton the Northern Expedition had ended in triumph. By the end of June, 1928, all of China inside the Great Wall had formally acceded to the rule of the KMT. In December, 1928, following the accession of the Manchurian provinces, all China on both sides of the Great Wall came under one flag. But a closer look reveals that there was little substance to this surface unity. In his haste to complete the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek had negotiated and compromised with a number of warlords, whereby in return for their nominal adherence to the KMT and recognition of him as commander-in-chief, they

were rewarded with appointments in the new government which in effect confirmed their semi-independent regional status.

Since the "reunification" was accomplished as a military feat, military power continued in the ensuing period to play the key role in China. What was the military situation at the end of the Northern Expedition and who dominated the military and hence the government? Chiang Kai-shek, the most powerful military leader was nominally commander-in-chief. Under his direct command was the First Group Army which had as its nucleus the instructors and cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy. Chiang and his army controlled the capital city Nanking and the wealthy provinces along the lower Yangtze river valley which included the center of modern finance and industry, Shanghai. The Second Group Army was made up of the erstwhile Kuominchun and was led by the mercurial Feng Yu-hsiang, who was at one time known to the West as the "Christian general". Feng's original base was northwest China, but now his domain extended across the heartland of north China and included Honan, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi and part of Shantung and Hopei. The Third Group Army was led by Yen Hsi-shan who since 1912 had been governor of Shansi. Now his troops controlled Peking and Tientsin as well as part of Hopei, Suiyuan and Chahar. The Fourth Group Army belonged to the Kwangsi Clique and was led by Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. It was closely allied to the Fourth Army of Chang Fa-kwei, known as the Ironsides, and the Eighth Army of Li Chi-shen. In 1928, it dominated Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan and Hupei and also had a foothold in Peiping. In addition, there were the Manchurain Army under Chang Hsueh-liang and his allies who controlled Manchuria and Jehol; and other provincial armies in Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Sinkiang, etc. The leaders of the armies also controlled the administration of their areas which fact was recognized in 1928 under the system of Branch Political Councils. Thus Li Chi-shen

became Chairman of the Canton Branch Political Council, Li Tsung-jen was similarly installed in Wuhan, Feng Yu-hsiang in Kaifeng and Yen Hsi-shan in Taiyuan. Within this heterogeneous group continued unity was difficult. Friction and rivalry which had been kept down while the Northern Expedition lasted was soon to erupt.

The question arises then as to the meaning of unification and unity. To all articulate Chinese it meant national independence and territorial integrity. But on other aspects and implications of unification there was less agreement, both within and outside the KMT. Did unification also mean centralization; to what extent was localism to be tolerated; should it mean one-party rule or a democratic type of government? There was no agreement on these and other questions. Furthermore there was disagreement on methods to be used to attain unification and the priority to be assigned to the different goals. Some ideas and aspirations of unification conflicted with others and given the external factor which was beyond China's control and domestic conditions some of the aspirations conflicted with reality. The aim of this work then is to point out the different problems of unification and assess the accomplishments of the KMT on this score.

To Chiang Kai-shek, who always more or less dominated the central government during this era, unification was closely identified with his personal leadership both in the KMT party structure, in the government and armed forces. This for him was both a matter of ego and a patriotic conviction. Chiang also identified his strong personal role with a powerful central government, powerful enough to command obedience from the provinces and represent China as a modern nation in the world. This powerful central government should also have sole control of the national army. Finally, to Chiang unification also meant the elimination of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and one-party rule or political tutelage under the KMT.

As can be expected, since Chiang's position within the KMT was by no means supreme, his interpretation of unification was immediately challenged by his allies and colleagues, both military and civilian. Some opposition was due to resentment of the role that he arrogated to himself as the representative of the central government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Many of the so-called new warlords within the KMT, or the provincial military leaders, saw in centralization not only the ascendency of a rival but also the destruction of their own dearly won and held power bases. Thus this era saw ferocious intra-KMT civil wars which threatened to tear China asunder. Ultimately, both because of the lack of physical means and because of the Japanese threat, Chiang had to settle for a modified concept of unity, and instead of insisting on centralization, to be content with an equilibrium of power between the central and local authorities.

Paralleling the armed conflicts between different KMT generals and Nanking over the issue of regionalism and centralization and often intertwined with it were doctrinal differences between different KMT factions on ideological issues. Specifically this aspect of the dispute on the meaning and degree of unification and the techniques to be employed to realize it centered around Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. But while there were ideological differences between Chiang, Wang and Hu, personality clashes also loomed very large and are really inseparable from differences on issues. Two factors explain the personality problems here. For one, Chinese political thought had always emphasized the personal role and the moral competence of the rulers because of the high importance attached to moral suasion and personal example. Added to this was the factor that since the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, institutional breakdown of the old system had been proceeding apace while a new apparatus had not

evolved, so that now more than ever it was a government of persons rather than offices. With this in view it is apparent why it was personal rather than institutional relations that played the key roles.

Chapter one will deal with conflicts over unification within the KMT, the problem of military unification, division of power between the different levels of government and the problem of party unity and leadership. Two outside groups which challenged the attempts of the KMT to establish a unified state were the Japanese and CCP. Due to her military strength and ambitions, Japan posed the most serious threat to the unity and indeed the very existence of an independent China during this period. China's reactions in the face of this challenge and their consequences is the theme of chapter two. Among Chinese who opposed the establishment of a unified China under the KMT, the CCP was the most important. Their challenge was a combined military, political and social one. Thus while militarily the CCP threat was much less serious to Nanking than that of Japan or the dissident KMT generals, the depth of their differences made them potentially perhaps an even greater threat to Chiang and Nanking. It is small wonder then that Chiang regarded the CCP threat to his government's goal of unification as the disease of the heart while he characterized the Japanese aggressions as disease of the skin. Chapter three will deal with KMT response to the CCP threat to its unification goals and other implications of the struggle between these two groups for power.

The remaining chapters will deal with the KMT's attempt to promote and realize a moral or psychological unity for China. Here the most important segment of the population whose support would enhance the image of any government was the intellectuals and students. As an elite group they had traditionally been and still were held in high regard by the people. Any government that hoped for long term success

obviously had to rally and win the support of this group. The KMT's attempt between 1928-1937 to win or cow the intellectuals and students must be viewed then as part of its striving to attain, intangible as the condition is, some psychological unity for the nation among the elite and articulate segment of the society. Besides trying to win and control the intellectuals and students, the KMT also attempted through press censorship, by legal means, indoctrination and propaganda to weed out what it considered potentially disunifying and disruptive factors throughout the nation. Simultaneously, it also sought to establish a government and party apparatus and institutions during the tutelage period with the purpose of enhancing unification under its auspices.


Taken as a whole then this study seeks to examine the ten KMT years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, to study the problems of unification, how those in power handled them and what accommodations and modifications they had to make. It will examine not only the KMT's ideological justifications for its concepts of a unified state but also its relationships with the most important among the other interested groups to see how and in what way they affected the unity of China.

In the long term perspective nationalism became an ever more vigorous force in twentieth century China. Successful expressions of nationalism demanded a powerful government capable of effective action and effective government cannot be created without national unity. When the government was at its weakest the call for unity was most insistent. In this perspective the rule of the KMT and its quest for unification can be seen as part of a continuing pattern which had its roots in the early twentieth century and continued after the demise of that government.

Although much source material is available for the study of modern China, the special problem remains to

historians that certain information is difficult to document and is included in sources only as hearsay or gossip. Many Chinese sources take certain "gossip" for granted and with the passing of time and the reticence of living informants to resurrect past events, it is often impossible to authenticate them. And for obvious reasons the principals involved will not divulge the truth. In pursuing this study I have come across certain information which falls in the domain of gossip but was widely circulated and often taken for granted as facts by many Chinese. For example, there is much gossip on the rivalry between Chiang Kai-shek and Ho Ying-ch'in and how during the Sian Incident Ho's motives for taking the hard line against the rebels and wish to bomb Sian was really in order "accidentally" to kill Chiang. His true motive can only be guessed at. Another frequent topic of gossip concerned the "silver bullets" that flew back and forth in intra-KMT civil wars. One can be certain that money was a factor in many defections and switches, but here again the exact information will be buried with time. Gossip perhaps adds to the fascination in dealing with modern Chinese history and even today it is often impossible to tell how much emanating from China is gossip and how much is documentable. But, of course, gossip is not history. In the ensuing study there will be occasions when gossip and hearsay will be mentioned, but only as speculation and not as hard facts.

China under the Kuomintang



Chapter I. The Quest for Unity Within the Kuomintang.

The Northern Expedition came to a successful end in early June, 1928, when Chang Tso-lin abandoned Peking and withdrew to Manchuria. The death of Chang on June 4, as a result of a bomb explosion, removed this strong figure from the arena of Chinese politics and his son Chang Hsueh-liang was kept too busy in the following months with the problems associated with the transfer of power in Manchuria to involve himself in overall Chinese politics. In the subsequent months representatives of the KMT government in Nanking initiated negotiations with young Chang to persuade him to accede to the new order, which he, being a nationalist of the newer generation, was receptive to. Thus on December 28, 1928, Chang Hsueh-liang announced the accession of the four Manchurian provinces (Liaoning, formerly Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol) to the KMT National Government and signified this with the raising of the KMT flag and public profession of obedience to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles.

With this act the nominal unification of China both inside and outside the Great Wall was complete. One after another the foreign powers recognized the government at Nanking as the government of China. The KMT flag now flew over all provinces of China, including such outlying areas as Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow, and the rulers of all these provinces at least paid lip service to the ideology and program of the KMT. In reality, however, China was far from unified. Many of the provincial warlords merely declared for the KMT in order to join the bandwagon and also to prevent their territories from being invaded. Even among those generals who had participated in the Northern Expedition, there was a great diversity of interests and allegiances which participation in a common cause did not obscure.

Within the ranks of the party deep divisions had also developed over both personality and doctrine, i.e., the interpretation of Sun's ideology, the execution of programs and the priority to be given to them. Events during the years since the admitting of members of the CCP into the KMT and the later split with and expulsion of the CCP by the KMT, and the split between Nanking and Wuhan during the Northern Expedition, had partly been based on ideological differences and exacerbated by personality conflicts. As of early 1929, these ideological differences had remained unhealed. The left wing led by Wang Ching-wei and associated with the Wuhan government was in disgrace and disaffected, with Wang abroad. The center elements of the party, together with some of the more conservative right-wingers, were rallying around Chiang Kai-shek who dominated the central government at Nanking. The foremost problem facing the KMT then was how to achieve unity within the party, for ultimately its continuation as the ruling party and government of China depended on how successfully it could cope with its internal problems. Above all, the overall problem of unifying China after 1928, with all its ramifications and implications, hinged on whether the KMT could achieve internal unity and cohesion.

On the problem of unity and unification within the KMT, two major areas are involved. One is the problem of military unification, the centralization of the armed forces under the control of the central government and the reduction of the physical size of the provincial armies and the elimination of their independent command. For without the removal of the independent military status of the provincial generals the central government could never feel secure, let alone hope to extend its administrative and financial control into the provinces. The other problem was how to achieve party unity or how to attain agreement within the party between different cliques and factions, be the basis of their

existence ideological differences or personality conflicts, or as is often the case, a combination of both. As can be seen in both cases, this attempt to unify and the consequent problems were between the elite within the party, basically for the spoils of victory and division of power.

Personality and seniority also played important roles in the struggle for unification within the KMT. For one reason, the role of the person and his moral fitness to rule had traditionally been regarded as important in China. For another, since the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty the institutional structure of government had largely broken down. After 1928, the KMT attempted to replace the old and worn with some of its institutions and systems, but this process was only at a rudimentary stage, especially in the early years under discussion here. Thus circumstances also compelled the elevation of personal relationships to great importance in the conduct of public affairs. Related to this is the importance given to seniority--who was the senior disciple of Sun, who had a longer history in the KMT and its predecessor the T'ung meng hui. This basing of claim to power on age and seniority was especially prominent given the cultural emphasis on age of the Chinese.

While loyalty to party made many wish for party unity and loyalty to nation made all wish for national unification, loyalty to province and region was nevertheless strong enough to pull many towards the cause of regionalism and local autonomy. For many, when the showdown came, the concept of national unity proved more abstract and less tangible than the call for the preservation of local power structures and local ways. It is only when one bears this in mind that one can understand the dogged separatism of Kwangsi, the reluctance of Szechwan to enter the central fold except when compelled under the direst circumstances, and the feeling of exile and longing to go home of the Manchurian army after 1931.

Finally, intertwined with all the factors mentioned above was the factor of personality. The one man whose image loomed especially large in China throughout the decade was Chiang Kai-shek. Although at no time between 1928-1937 did Chiang control the whole country, yet among the various KMT leaders he always stood foremost as a contender for command. Partly this was due to his self image as the unifier of the nation. As the commander of the single largest military group, and as the man with most adherents in the central party apparatus, he was certainly in the most favorable position to contend for power. Therefore, as the decade progressed, Chiang's power in the party, military and government also increased, until at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War he stood at the zenith of power as the representative of a unified China fighting a war of resistance to preserve her independence and unity. With Chiang's prominent role in the party, government and military affairs, and with his strong personality and ambitions which engendered either strong loyalty or violent dislike, it is small wonder then that most of the military and ideological and personality conflicts during this era were centered around him. And since Chiang regarded himself as the unifier and central authority as synonymous with his personal power, the triumphs of Chiang and his ascendency within all branches of the party and government can also be interpreted as triumphs for the cause of unification.

The following will not be a chronological examination of the KMT during this era but a topical look at the intra-KMT problems, both military and ideological, purely from the perspective of the issue of unification.

A. Military Unification.

One of the key prerequisites of a modern state is a unified armed forces under a centralized command. Since at the end of the Northern Expedition all generals and

commanders were professed members of the KMT; and since the KMT was the ruling party, the problem of military unification consequently fell within the sphere of the party. As has been pointed out, Chiang had made deals with many generals in order to gain their support for the Northern Expedition. Chiang was commander-in-chief during the expedition and remained in this post after the conclusion of military activities.

But Chiang owed his real power to his command of the First Group Army. Now it controlled Kiangsu, Chekiang, Kiangsi and Anhui, a territory which included the capital city of Nanking and the financial capital Shanghai. In fact, the rich but burdened provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang were almost the sole contributors to the national treasury apart from loans and maritime customs revenues, as Anhui and Kiangsi were relatively poor and collected enough for local expenditure only.[1] Chiang was also able to gain predominance in the Nanking government because of his strength on the Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.) of the KMT which under the Organic Laws of the government during tutelage acted as the supreme authority of the country when the national party congress was not in session. The C.E.C. made all the important appointments, including that of the chairman of the government, councilors of state and presidents and vice-presidents of the five yuans.[2] But as Chiang and the central government had direct control of only some half a million among over two million troops in China, their influence outside the direct garrison areas of their troops was very tenuous.[3] Feng Yu-hsiang with his Second Group Army, Yen Hsi-shan with his Third Group Army and Li Tsung-jen and his allies with the Fourth Group Army ruled much of the rest of China. In addition, there were the peripheral provinces such as Manchuria, Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow and Sinkiang which had been untouched by the Northern Expedition. For almost all intents and purposes,

they were ruled as independent entities and for a long time remained outside the main arena of intra-KMT quarrels. In his domain each general also dominated the civilian administration and collected taxes and made appointments as his wishes dictated.

In this political and military configuration, the Nanking forces were a little stronger and their resources a little better than that of any single one of the other army groups. Nanking's attempts to improve its standing and impose obedience and the mutual fear felt by the various groups concerning each other's motives were the main causes of the intra-KMT civil wars which followed between 1929-1931. Nanking survived the assaults of the dissident generals for a number of reasons. The main one was the lack of unity of purpose among its opponents, and their inability to work and act together. This enabled Chiang to deal with different foes piecemeal and to buy off some of his opponents and thus destroy their internal cohesion. Of course, certain advantages belonged to the central government. As such, it was able to command or negotiate loans and obtain a certain amount of international support, including the securing of arms and ammunitions and military advisors.

Chiang's Attempt to Gain Military Unification by Means of Disbandment.

Chiang began the post-Expedition era with a few very clever manoeuvres. The first was the arrangement of a memorial service at Sun Yat-sen's sarcophagus at Western Hill outside Peiping.[4] On this occasion, all the military and civilian leaders of the KMT gathered and Chiang, as commander-in-chief, delivered the main address, reporting to Sun's departed spirit the fulfillment of his (Sun's) dream of unification.[5] The effect was very dramatic. Another purpose of the ceremony was for all the assembled

military leaders to discuss the problem of disbandment, i.e., how to reduce the army and thereby reduce some of China's financial burdens. On July 11-12, Chiang, Yen, Feng, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi and other generals and such civilian leaders as Wu Ching-heng and Chang Chun conferred.[6] They decided on the following principles. First, the National Government was to be the supreme authority in military affairs, and second, to establish a disbandment conference. The membership of the conference was to consist of the commanders of the KMT armies and group armies, the commander-in-chief of the navy, the chief and deputy chief of staff, and three to five members of the C.E.C. The task of the conference was to select the best existing troops to form fifty to sixty divisions, plus another two hundred thousand men to form the military police force. The commanders of the four group armies (Chiang, Feng, Yen and Li) then jointly presented their proposals to the central government and agreed that each should proceed to demobilize some of his own troops even before details were worked out. They also agreed to attend the forthcoming Fifth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. to be held at Nanking in mid-August, 1928, and there to work out further details.[7] Owing to the state of China's finances, all were agreed that military reduction was imperative.[8] But at this point agreement ended.

Between August 7-16, 1928, the Fifth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. and Central Supervisory Committee (C.S.C.) was held at Nanking. On August 8, the National Government presented its military report.[9] It stated that since the military stage of the KMT program was now successfully over, the government's next aim should be to reduce the size of the military forces. Based on the proposals presented, the Plenary Session decided on the following principles of army reform.

1. In order to eliminate the factor of personal loyalty in the military system, there was to be unified army administration and command under the central government.
2. As quickly as possible, the size of the army should be reduced, so that military expenditure will not exceed fifty per cent of the total budget. The central government was to exercise unified control of military funds.
3. The central government was to be responsible for military education and training. Local authorities are not to establish military schools and institutions.[10]

Here one sees Nanking attempting to impose military unity by centralization of the armed forces. The above resolutions were passed because Nanking at this period controlled the bulk of the membership of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. The left-wing members, though not expelled yet, were not in attendance. Although they were members themselves, Yen and Feng and some other anti-Nanking generals did not have many supporters among the membership, certainly not enough to influence the proceedings. In this way the central government secured a paper victory. But in so doing it did not reckon sufficiently with the practical circumstances of China at the time. The territorial commanders had taken years to build up their bases and armies, and they no less than Chiang had contributed to the winning of the Northern Expedition. Moreover, they did not owe their rise or position to Chiang, and now had their own bases of financial support and recruitment. Thus, even though the concept of a strong centralized and unified government was widely endorsed in the abstract by all, it is difficult to see why men like Yen and Li would willingly see themselves eclipsed by Chiang and have their forces taken from their control. It is true that they were offered high honors and posts at the capital.[11] But in China at the time, a man's influence was measured by the number of battalions he commanded. To be shorn of one's command

and to sit in hostile territory with empty honors was politically a death sentence for the generals.

With this in mind, it is not difficult to understand why one after another the erstwhile allies of Chiang rebelled against Nanking between 1928-1931. In the last analysis, they were fighting for their own political survival. That is why leaders of such vastly different political complexions as Yen and Feng (Yen was very conservative and Feng remained left-leaning despite his break with the Russian Communists) could band together against Nanking. It is true that the separatism they represented can be likened to the behavior of warlords of the pre-KMT era and can therefore be thought of as retrograde. For ultimately a truly strong China had to be a unified one. But considering the prevailing conditions and the already strong fears and jealousies among the generals, it was foolish of Nanking to manoeuvre itself into an empty paper victory. It was unwise for Chiang, whether his motives were selfish or altruistic, to demand something which he could not reasonably enforce.

Nevertheless Nanking proceeded to try to implement the resolutions of the Plenary Session. On November 7, 1928, the government ordered the abolition of the Military Affairs Commission in which generals of the different armies had consulted; and ordered the creation of the Ministry of War, the Chief of Staff Office, the Military Affairs Advisory Board and the Department of Military Training to take over its duties.[12] On December 2, 1928, regulations of the Preparatory Commission of the Disbandment Commission were promulgated, with General Ho Ying-ch'in as its director. Then on January 1, 1929, the Disbandment Commission was inaugurated with nine to eleven commissioners.[13]

The Commission in turn presented the following proposals to the government. The regular army was to be reduced to about 800,000 men and the military budget should

not exceed forty per cent of the national budget (i.e., the total normal and reserve military budget was to be one hundred and ninety-two million yuan).[14] The Commission also recommended the establishment of six Disbandment areas, one each for the First, Second, Third and Fourth Group Armies, with headquarters at Nanking, Kaifeng, Peiping and Hankow respectively. The fifth area would be established at Shenyang (Mukden) and the sixth, for the armies of Szechwan, Sikang, Yunnan and Kweichow, did not have a designated headquarters.[15]

The attempt by Nanking to implement these measures immediately touched off civil war. Outwardly no one opposed the principle of disbandment. In their recriminatory outbursts each side professed obedience to the provisions but accused the others of discrimination or disobedience. For instance, Feng Yu-hsiang contended that even during the time of the Tangshan Conference on disbandment (held immediately after the victory ceremony at Sun's sarcophagus), Chiang, while professing that he wanted the size of the army reduced, was secretly recruiting the former troops of his opponents Chang Tso-lin, Chang Chung-tsang, Wu P'ei-fu, etc. in north China.[16] He added that this fact was already creating dissatisfaction and fear among the generals and that their fear and misgivings were increased at the Nanking Disbandment Conference.[17]

The first to rebel were the Fourth Group Army generals stationed at Wuhan. These contended, correctly, that Chiang's aims were to unify the military in his own hands by means of disbandment and to destroy regional political councils.[18] Feng Yu-hsiang, who later in 1929 also rebelled, also cited the issue of disbandment as one of his grievances. Feng accused Chiang of using the Disbandment Conference as a means to destroy other units while his own lieutenants continued recruiting in secret. He also charged that Chiang's aides did not provide for the disbanded troops of non-Nanking

units and left these soldiers to their own fate.[19] Thus began the era of intra-KMT civil wars.

The rebellion of the Kwangsi group over the issue of disbandment and military unification failed to deter Chiang from his set course. Over much party opposition, he convened the Third Party Congress in March, 1929, and packed it with his supporters.[20] Obediently the Congress passed a military resolution which endorsed his plan of military reorganization and the placing of the entire military machine under the direct control of the central government. It also reaffirmed the principle that the central government was to determine military policy. The purpose of military reform, it continued, was to achieve military unity and prevent the growth of regionalism and local power.[21] On April 8, 1929, Ho Ying-ch'in, one of Chiang's close associates, was appointed Director of the Army Disbandment Committee.[22]

But for all intents and purposes the outbreak of rebellions against Nanking first by the Fourth and then by the Second Group Army in 1929 ended Nanking's attempt to use disbandment as the instrument to achieve military unification. At this stage Chiang had neither the personal stature nor military superiority over his rivals to enforce his ideas of military unification. Thereafter formal disbandment was never revived as the means to centralize the military. Instead, as the years passed, defeats in civil wars resulted in natural attrition of the provincial armies while conversely the central units grew stronger as a result of better training and arms, more funds and a modernization program undertaken with the help of German advisors. So gradually the military balance turned in favor of the central army which in turn asserted greater pressures on the provincial forces, and with funds as an additional leverage, compelled them to partial obedience.

So many rebellions broke out after 1929 that a detailed discussion of all of them would only contribute to confuse the picture. Therefore only the important challenges to Nanking, from the Second, Third and Fourth Group Armies and the Manchurian Army, will be discussed below, with the emphasis on how they affected the issue of military unification. The partial reduction of the peripheral provincial armies of Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow and their integration into the national system will be discussed in connection with the anti-Communist campaign, as this was the occasion for the intrusion of central forces into those provinces.

Problem of Feng Yu-hsiang and the Second Group Army.

Feng rebelled against Nanking in 1929 and in coalition with Yen in 1930. His dissatisfaction with Chiang over disbandment has already been mentioned. An added grievance was Chiang's method of selecting members to the Third KMT Congress.[23] He also charged high living and corruption in Nanking while famine raged in northwest China, in his bailiwick, for which he could secure no relief.[24] But for a balanced perspective, it must be added that merciless taxation by Feng's administration greatly intensified the severity of the famine. He used no local funds for famine relief and went so far as to "borrow" funds deposited in a Kaifeng Bank by the China International Famine Relief Commission for his own purposes.[25] There was another factor he did not mention. This was his territorial ambition. Having secured control of most of north China, Feng was anxious to add Tsingtao in Shantung as his seaport. Tsingtao had been under Japanese occupation since the Chinan Incident in May, 1928, but the rest of Shantung was divided between troops of the central government and Feng. There is evidence to suggest that during the spring of 1929 Feng had been promised by Chiang complete control

of Shantung upon the withdrawal of the Japanese forces. This promise, plus two million yuans cash, was made in order to buy Feng's neutrality in the Wuhan rebellion of the Fourth Group Army.[26]

However, on April 17, 1929, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Japanese authorities to delay their military evacuation of Tsingtao. It claimed that the area was endangered by the presence of the brigand troops of the defeated northern warlord Chang Tsung-chang.[27] Nanking's real target was Feng. It wanted more time to bring in its own troops to replace the departing Japanese and eventually brought in 69,000 troops under Fang Chen-wu. Thus Feng was thwarted from getting Tsingtao. Outflanked and outnumbered, Feng's subordinate general Sun Liang-chen resigned as governor of Shantung on April 25, 1929 and withdrew with his troops to Honan where the bulk of Feng's army was stationed.[28] Simultaneously Feng's adherents in Nanking also resigned their positions and pulled out. On May 16, 1929, Feng was proclaimed commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Route Army of the Party-Safeguarding and National Salvation Forces.[29] On May 24, the government issued a punitive mandate against Feng. The 1929 Chiang-Feng round will be probed as a case study of the method of operation of the Chiang forces.

Fighting did not begin at once; instead, negotiations and manoeuvres filled the air for the next few months. During this time different generals examined their positions and alignments. Two serious defections ended Feng's hopes of success. On May 24, Han Fu-chu, Shih Yu-shan and several lesser of Feng's subordinates announced their allegiance to Nanking. Observers agree that they were bought over by enormous bribes of money and promises of positions. Even though some of the defectors were to turn again as in the case of Shih Yu-shan, temporarily their defection did deprive Feng of some 100,000 out of a total of 300,000 troops.

Not only were they the best and core of the Kuominchun, their defection also shook the morale of the remaining units and made Feng's position more vulnerable. Han Fu-chu, most of whose troops were in Honan, received his reward from Nanking by being immediately appointed its governor.[30]

The turn of events prompted Chiang to make a gesture, and on May 26, he offered Feng a chance to retire and go abroad.[31] It seems that this offer had been made on the assumption that Yen Hsi-shan was still maintaining his friendly stance towards Nanking and that he would continue to hold the balance in favor of Nanking after Feng's departure. This proved to be a miscalculation, as on the same day (May 26, 1929), Yen wired Feng suggesting that they should both go abroad. Feng responded by heading for Yen's domain for protection. He reached Yuncheng in Shansi on June 22, whereupon Yen resigned from his positions.[32] It was very clear from this that the Second and Third Group Armies were now in collusion against Nanking.

Thrown into a desperate position, Chiang decided on a gamble to reassert whatever authority Nanking could muster--on June 25, he arrived at Peiping and summoned Yen and Chang Hsueh-liang to meet him there. On June 30, the first meeting took place between Chiang and Yen. They were joined by Chang Hsueh-liang on July 7, who conferred with them until July 15.[33] The main topics of discussion were what to do with Feng's Kuominchun and the overall power alignment in north China. A partial rapprochement was reached when in consideration of his willingness to go abroad the previous mandate for Feng's arrest was cancelled.[34] It was also agreed that Yen should send his officers to take over areas previously under Feng's command.[35] They were to reorganize some 200,000 of Feng's troops, though it was also agreed that the actual reorganization would be carried out by Feng's own subordinates, Generals Lu Chung-lin and Shih Ching-ting.[36] Thus the Kuominchun remained

intact. Feng's subordinates also retained provincial governorships of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. It is rumored that Chiang also paid three million yuans of back pay to Feng's army and gave Feng two hundred thousand yuans of personal expenses for travel abroad.[37] However, the actual terms of the settlement were never made public. Another element in the settlement was the role of Chang Hsueh-liang, who, it seemed, threw his weight behind a peaceful solution, especially important to him then because serious friction was developing between his authorities and the Russians over the operations of the Chinese Eastern Railway (C.E.R.) in Manchuria.[38]

This spelled the end of another round of Chiang-Feng struggle. In many ways the events here followed a general pattern: military manoeuvres, public manifestoes, defections by key rebel generals, no doubt motivated by money, and ultimately the lowering of the chief rebel's ambitions by a few pegs. Nevertheless the rebel chief, Feng in this case, retained the bulk of his territorial domain intact and continued to be a force to be reckoned with. In this instance, bloodshed was entirely avoided, though later the forces of Chiang and Feng were to cross swords again.

Early in 1930 began the most serious threat to Chiang and Nanking when a coalition was formed which consisted of all the important dissident forces, both military and civilian. Feng joined the anti-Nanking group as the deputy commander-in-chief under the overall command of Yen Hsi-shan.[39] What followed was the bloodiest civil war in republican history to which more than a million troops were committed. As evidence of the seriousness of the challenge a rival government was established in Peiping. But as Wang Ching-wei played the dominant political role and Yen Hsi-shan the most important military role, this episode will be discussed in relationship with those men. Suffice it here to say that by the end of September all was

finished for the rebels. On October 5, Yen, Feng and Wang issued a joint telegram to announce their retirement from public life, with which their coalition came to a permanent end.[40]

For Feng defeat in 1930 spelled the end of his control of the Kuominchun which thereafter split into several segments under Sung Cheh-yuan, Shih Ching-ting and others. While a portion of this army continued down to 1937 to control parts of north China but under much more circumscribed conditions as imposed by Chang Hsueh-liang's Manchurian army and later by the Japanese army, segments of the Kuominchun were marched to Kiangsi to fight in Chiang's anti-CCP campaigns.

For all practical purposes the defeat of the northern coalition in 1930 ended Feng's military career. Formal relations ceased between him and those of his lieutenants who remained in control of the segmented Kuominchun. What contacts that remained were on the personal level between erstwhile patron and subordinates in the general Chinese pattern. None would denounce him publicly, but when the showdown came, as it did again between Feng and Nanking in 1933 in Chahar, Sung Cheh-yuan, Governor of Chahar and former Feng subordinate, sat it out and refused either to join or move against Feng.[41]

After the Mukden Incident Feng went to Nanking briefly in a show of solidarity, but soon left as he found the atmosphere uncongenial and returned to north China to await his moment. The moment came in 1933. China's loss of Jehol, defeat in the campaign along the Great Wall and acceptance of the Tangku Truce had resulted in much criticism of the central government and widespread indignation. While Feng shared the general feeling of humiliation and wanted to resist Japan for patriotic reasons, he also saw in resistance a renewed chance to oppose Chiang and try for a comeback. Thus he went to Kalgan in Chahar, gathered together various

forces that he found there and formed the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army.[42]

Many flocked to Feng's banners, by official account as much as 100,000 men, though other estimates ranged between 60,000-70,000.[43] Despite Nanking's urging that Feng go there for consultations, preparations at Kalgan went apace, and on May 26, 1933, Feng and the army at Kalgan took formal oaths.[44] Feng divided the army into three component parts. The first part was composed of regular army units formerly belonging to the 29th Army, other Northwestern army units and Manchurian Army units. Part two was entirely from guerrilla units, of overwhelming Manchurian and Jehol origin, who had fought resistance movements in those provinces now lost to Japan and also some Mongol units. Part three consisted of local armed people and Mongol banner troops from Chahar and Suiyuan.[45] A School for Cadres was also set up at Kalgan, of which Feng was principal. The aim of the school was to absorb and integrate the youths and students who had flocked to the area into the overall anti-Japanese effort and also to give additional training to the officers.[46]

That the group at Kalgan had more than anti-Japanese aims became clear on May 27 when the anti-Japanese Army issued orders to abolish oppressive and miscellaneous taxes and to release political prisoners in the area of its jurisdiction. The aim of the acts, as stated, was to boost morale and enlarge resistance.[47] Also in order to further the same aims, the First Congress of the People's Anti-Japanese Allied Army was convened in mid-June. Sixty-one representatives of the military and civilians met for six days and elected thirty-five members to the Military Affairs Commission, with Feng as Chairman of the standing committee. It also passed the following measures to co-ordinate the resistance effort of the military and civilians. Arms were issued to the people. A local militia was formed

under the direction of the local government and just gentry which was empowered to draft all males between eighteen and fifty.[48] While it might be argued that the instituting of these reforms and the arming of the people were necessary measures for more effective resistance, it also became clear that by so doing Feng was aiming a two-pronged attack against both Nanking and Japan. For not only was Nanking opposed to what it considered rash measures against Japan, it also regarded the arming of the masses and radical changes in the tax structure with fear and disapproval.

On June 20, Feng's army began its offensive against the Japanese and Japanese supported quislings in Chahar. Success attended its efforts. On July 12, the key city of Dolonor, which had been under Japanese occupation for seventy-two days, was captured by Feng's forces. Thus within a month Feng's army wrested four districts in east Chahar from Japanese control.[49] Buoyed by his successes, Feng issued a general wire stating his intention to continue recovering lost territories. On July 27, he established at Kalgan the Planning Commission for the Recovery of the four Northeastern Provinces. It had a secretariat, political, military and economic bureaus.[50]

Feng's successes were causing consternation in both Tokyo and Nanking. Although Yen Hsi-shan's position remained unclear, the Southwest authorities were loudly acclaiming Feng's successes, and he also enjoyed popular support in north China and Shanghai.[51] It seems natural that Nanking was afraid of further Feng successes as then public opinion might force Chiang to support him. To avert a potentially dangerous situation, Chiang ordered government troops stationed in north China to move towards Chahar.[52] In addition to this Feng was also feeling the pressure of renewed Japanese advances. Succumbing to the joint squeeze, Feng agreed to mediation by Sung Cheh-yuan. On August 12, he met Sung at Changyuan, announced his retirement from

military affairs and left his headquarters two days later.[53] Thence he proceeded to Taishan in Shantung to live in retirement.

This Chahar episode should be looked on as the epilogue to Feng's military career. Had his Chahar campaign gained greater momentum, he would have achieved the twin goals of defending China's unity against Japanese aggression and the re-establishment of himself in a position of regional power. And it was precisely in order to prevent this that Chiang moved so swiftly to squelch Feng's comeback. Feng finally accepted the fact that Chiang was too strong to overthrow and at the end of 1935 accepted the government's invitation to live in Nanking where he was appointed to the honorific post of deputy chairman of the Military Council. Just how titular this post was and how he was still feared and suspected nonetheless was revealed during the Sian Incident in 1936. On the evening of December 12, 1936, the C.E.C. was called into emergency session to decide, among other things, who was to exercise the authority which had up till then been held by Chiang as Chairman of the Military Council. According to Feng's own account, Sun Fo proposed that as deputy chairman of the Military Council Feng should logically become acting Chairman. This proposal so frightened Chiang's supporters that ultimately it had to be shelved. Instead a compromise resolution was adopted which enlarged the executive council of the Military Council from five to seven members and entrusted overall conduct of its affairs to this group, while Minister of War, Ho Ying-ch'in, was given the authority to take charge of the directing and moving of troops.[54] From this episode one can sense that even though he had been stripped of military power, Feng was still regarded as dangerous and "untamed" by Nanking, an illusion which he certainly did nothing to dispel.[55]

Feng's fall from commander of the Second Group Army to having no army at all is one of the most complete in

KMT China. Part of the explanation lies in his mercurial personality. Perhaps a more important explanation is that the Kuominchun was an army without a strong home base. Feng never did consolidate his hold in Honan, Kansu and Shensi. Without a firm territorial hold (and the areas he did hold were very poor), he could not build a solid base for power and identity as for example the Kwangsi generals could. Thus he could not hold the Kuominchun together as a cohesive unit, which allowed his subordinates to fragment it and seek new alignments. However, they found themselves on the first line of defense against Japanese aggression in Hopei and Chahar. The uncertainties and dangers of the international situation were such that they found little room to manoeuvre and were not unhappy to lean somewhat on Nanking for support. Thus was eliminated one of Chiang's serious military rivals.

Yen Hsi-shan and the Third Group Army.

Another major obstacle in Chiang's quest for military unification was the Third Group Army under Yen Hsi-shan. From his long time entrenched base in Shensi, Yen had joined the Northern Expedition and as a reward for his role, his troops had come to control Chahar and part of Hopei, including Peiping and Tientsin. With the failure of disbandment as a means to achieve military unification and with the reduction of local military power bases as Chiang's goal, a showdown between Chiang and Yen became inevitable.

When Feng rebelled in 1929, Yen maintained a benevolent neutrality towards Nanking for which the reward was appointment as deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces in November, 1929.[56] Yen's neutrality contribued to the speedy collapse of the Kuominchun in 1929 and in proportion to the weakening of the Kuominchun the power of Yen became stronger than ever in north China. Yen was afraid that if he allowed

Chiang to crush Feng and his supporters he would become the next target and be forced to give up control of the Peiping-Tientsin area as well as perhaps Shansi. To be absolutely safe in his home base, Yen closed down the KMT organization in Shansi which had contained elements that he could not control.[57] Thus Yen became the center of gravitation of all anti-Nanking forces still anxious to force the issue. Chiang's victories to date also reinforced the fears of his rivals, military and civilian, that he was establishing a personal dictatorship.

By early 1930 it had become clear that an anti-Chiang coalition was coalescing around Yen. Actual hostilities were preceded by the waging of a paper war between Nanking and Yen. On February 10, 1930, the opening salvo came with a telegram from Yen to Chiang in which he suggested that they both resign and go abroad and leave the membership of the KMT to solve the party's problems.[58] Chiang refused the offer, explaining that he was vested with his responsibilities by the party. He called on Yen not to disrupt China's unity and urged him to disband his excessive troops as stipulated by the Disbandment Conference. On his part, Yen advocated the calling of an All-Party Conference to resolve differences within the KMT and urged Chiang to return his power to the party. He accused Chiang of manipulating the Disbandment Conference for self-aggrandisement and of using dishonest tactics to secure a biased membership to the Third KMT Congress. He maintained that the only way to achieve real disbandment was for the four commanders of the Group Armies to resign and hand their commands back to the party.[59]

While the dialogue continued, both sides were lining up troops and supporters. Feng and his men were already on Yen's side. On February 21, 1930, all the leaders of the Fourth Group Army declared their support for Yen and Feng, as commander and deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces (they also named Chang Hsueh-liang as a deputy

commander-in-chief in an effort to woo his support).[60] On April 1, Yen assumed office as commander-in-chief of the coalition forces in Peiping.[61] Serious fighting broke out soon after along wide fronts throughout central and north China.[62] Politically, the civil war became more important with the opening of talks between Yen and Wang Ching-wei. At the Taiyuan Conference, the anti-Nanking leaders decided to organize an Enlarged Plenary Session of the KMT at Peiping and to form a rival government. On July 13, 1930, the Enlarged Session began its session in Peiping, followed by the establishment of a rival government, sworn in in Peiping on September 1.[63]

After fighting broke out, each side redoubled its efforts to get Chang Hsueh-liang's support. On Nanking's side, three prominent members of the KMT and close associates of Chiang were sent to Mukden. On June 21, the government appointed Chang deputy commander-in-chief.[64] Chang held off. His sensitive geographic position between the Russians and Japanese made him anxious for central government support in the foreign policy field. This he could only obtain if there was unity in China and a strong central government.[65] There were other more personal reasons which influenced Chang towards Nanking. Feng was his father's old enemy whom he still resented. It was also rumored that Chiang's emissaries dangled prospects of controlling north China to Chang as well as greater overall influence in government affairs. These offers must have boosted Chang's ego, considering his father's earlier ambition to dominate China. Finally, it seems that Chiang offered more money, ten million yuan versus the much smaller sum offered by Yen.[66] All these factors combined to make Chang lean towards the central government. As summer advanced, Nanking began to gain some clear military advantages. At the same time Chang began to give more indications that he favored Nanking.

On September 18, Chang made the most decisive move of his life. On that date he made a public call for the cessation of hostilities and for the central government to settle all issues. At the same time he ordered his troops under General Yu Hsueh-chung, stationed at Shanhaikwan, to march on Peiping. This blow delivered the coup de grace to the rebel cause, their government collapsed and their leaders fled. On September 22, the Manchurian troops entered Peiping and on September 30, they occupied Tientsin.[67] They then proceeded to clear the Peiping-Hankow and Peiping-Suiyuan lines in addition to occupying the entire Hopei province.[68]

On October 5, Yen, Feng and Wang, after conferring together, issued a circular telegram to announce their retirement from public life. On October 9, Chang Hsueh-liang took office as deputy commander-in-chief.[69] So in its Double Tenth issue of the Government Gazette, Nanking was able to announce that peace had returned once more.[70] The war of 1930 had witnessed the most seriously and savagely fought campaigns in recent Chinese history. Each side (exclusive of the Manchurian Army) had mobilized over half a million troops and suffered extensive casualties--30,000 killed and 60,000 wounded on the government side and 150,000 killed and wounded on the rebel side.[71] The damage to civilian life and the nation's economy was never even calculated.

For Yen the defeat spelled the end of his dream of replacing Chiang as the dominant military leader of China. Temporarily he was to live in exile in Japanese concessions in Tientsin and Dairen. However, his subordinates were allowed to retain control of Shansi and Suiyuan and even obtained loans from the central government to rehabilitate the war-shattered finances in these provinces.[72] Through the summer of 1931 Yen and his subordinates were implicated in various intrigues in north China with the aim of making

some sort of a comeback. In August, 1932, Yen returned to Shansi which he refused to leave in defiance of Chang Hsueh-ling's wishes.[73]

With the outbreak of the Mukden Incident and during its aftermath, Chiang and Chang were too beset with both domestic and external problems to be overly concerned with Yen. Thus he was able to restore himself to power in Shansi. However, he was realistic enough to recognize Chiang's military ascendancy, tailored his ambitions accordingly and was content to limit himself and his subordinates to Shansi and Suiyuan. Conversely, Chiang recognized that he did not possess force enough to eliminate Yen and his group entirely. So he was content to let the chastened and "tamed" Yen remain in control of Shansi and Suiyuan. Yen was even rewarded with titles to confirm his positions in his domain and in the central government establishment in recognition of his regional power. Yen's supreme power in Shansi was, however, impaired in 1936 when as a result of his inability to cope with Communist incursions into his province from Shensi he was compelled to ask for central military aid which was duly given with all that it implied. (discussed in Chapter III)

Several factors accounted for Yen's defeat. Militarily his army was by all accounts poor and no match for the better trained and equipped central units.[74] Utlimately, however, the superiority of the central troops must be attributed to the better financial resources available to the central government. Conversely, north China was too poor and underdeveloped to provide much tax resources for Yen. Furthermore, despite his faults, Chiang and his government represented some ideals of unification and modern nationhood. His criticisms of Chiang's quest for personal dictatorship and corruption under the Nanking controlled KMT notwithstanding, Yen and his cause was not dignified by any ideals beyond the call of regional power and loyalties. This ultimately must also have contributed to the failure of his

challenge. But even in victory Chiang was not able to extend his military power into Shansi until 1936 and then only partially. Yen's retention of regional power, though abridged, meant that up to 1937 there was no complete political or military integration of his domain into a unified central government system.

Fourth Group Army--the Southwest.

A rebellion by the Fourth Group Army early in 1929 inaugurated the era of intra-KMT civil wars, and from Nanking's perspective of military unification this group presented the most persistent and coherent challenge which eluded solution until late 1936. The term Southwest refers to Kwangtung and Kwangsi, which between 1928-1930 often acted at cross purposes with each other, but tended to act in concert after 1931 vis-a-vis Nanking though retaining separate local administrations. At the end of the Northern Expedition the Fourth Group Army had over-extended itself. Part of it was stationed in its base areas, some were in Hunan and Hupei in central China while yet another sector was in the Peiping area.

Chiang felt that the Kwangsi clique had greater than regional ambitions and that the longer he delayed dealing with them the stronger they would grow. Conversely, the Kwangsi generals feared Chiang's political aims and felt that he was out to eliminate them militarily. But even more fundamental was whether centralization was to prevail over the reality of regional differences and power structures. As Liang Sheng-chun, a long time personal secretary of Li Tsung-jen and participant in Kwangsi affairs, observed, the Kwangsi clique represented no distinguishing and unified ideas. It was a group of soldiers and politicians whose alliance was dictated by circumstances, history and contiguous territory. Therefore Liang continued, though this alliance was militarily powerful, it could not create a

national basis of support as it had no clear political ideals or principles.[75]

Early in 1929 Nanking made the first move by issuing an order that the Branch Political Councils would not be allowed to appoint or dismiss local officials and that the Disbandment Conference alone had power to order military moves.[76] To speed disbandment it also ordered that regional headquarters for this purpose were to be established by March 16, 1929.[77] In defiance the Wuhan Branch Political Council under Li Tsung-jen dismissed the governor of Hunan Lu Ti-p'ing, and on February 21 occupied the provincial capital of Changsha.[78] Verbal battles and negotiations ensued, but while they were still dragging on, Chiang began to make secret military preparations. Thus when the government issued its Punitive Mandate on March 26, its troops had already reached their designated positions. The mandate accused the Wuhan Branch Political Council of refusal to disband and rebellion.[79]

The speed with which Nanking acted in this instance prevented the union of the various segments of the Fourth Group Army and prompted waverers to declare for the government. Thus by the middle of April, those units of the Fourth Group Army in Hunan were defeated and military actions there soon came to an end.[80] Internal dissension also weakened the rebel army, specifically between the Kwangtung and Kwangsi units. Kwangtung forces under Ch'en Chi-tang and Ch'en Ming-chu seized on the opportunity to declare for the government and also to clear Kwangsi troops from Kwangtung and then threatened to invade Kwangsi.[81] To add to Li Tsung-jen's woes one of his subordinate generals, Li Ping-hsien, led a group of officers to issue a statement in support of the government.[82] Thus weakened Li and Pai decided to abandon Hunan and withdraw from the Peiping-Tientsin area while their armies were still largely intact to guard the home base of Kwangsi, where government forces did not pursue them.[83]

In the months after being driven home to Kwangsi, Li and Pai not only reorganized their forces but effected a rapprochement with Chang Fa-kwei, commander of the Ironsides.[84] Thus strengthened they renewed their military challenge to Chiang and desultory fighting broke out in the southwest in the last months of 1929 which continued into 1930. This time the rebels added an ideological banner to their cause by declaring adherence to the principles advocated by the Reorganizationists as those of the true KMT.[85] As has been stated earlier, Pai, Li, Chang Fa-kwei and Huang Hsiao-hsiung lent the support of the Fourth Group Army to the cause of the northern coalition in 1930.

Though Li was one of Yen's principal supporters, the Fourth Group Army saw little serious action during the civil war of 1930, which was mainly fought out in central and north China. Thus when the war came to an end, while Yen's and Feng's armies were badly mauled and partly incapacitated, those of Kwangsi remained quite intact and well preserved, which explains in part why they were able to continue effective opposition to Chiang.

Hardly had the civil war of 1930 ended when another crisis broke. This was precipitated by the break between Chiang and Hu Han-min over the supposed issue of the Yueh-fa or provisional constitution, and the placing of Hu, President of the Legislative Yuan, under house arrest by Chiang on February 28, 1931.[86] The dispute between Chiang and Hu will be discussed later. Of interest here is the fact that the Southwest seized on the downfall of Hu as an issue for the next round of their quarrel with Chiang. They maintained that in deposing Hu, Chiang had committed the final act of usurping the party's functions and had arrogated to himself the right of being the sole judge. Of course, the Southwest was to a certain extent but using the Hu issue as a pretext for dissension. But while there was some opportunism in the outcry, some indignation at

the rough treatment accorded Hu, a party elder and fellow southerner, must have been genuine. Many people were upset not only at Hu's downfall but the manner in which it was carried out. It was mainly in protest of this act that Sun Fo and Wang Chung-hui at this time quit the government and left for Canton where they were soon joined by Wang Ching-wei, Eugene Ch'en and others.[87]

On April 26, 1931, the Kwangsi leaders came out publicly in support of Hu. They were joined by Ch'en Chi-tang of Kwangtung on April 28.[88] On May 1 all the dissenters, in the name of the Kwangtung provincial KMT organization, moved to impeach Chiang for usurpation of dictatorial powers as evidenced by his arbitrary imprisonment of Hu. They also invited members of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. to Canton if free discussions were denied them in areas under Chiang's control.[89] On May 27, they convened an extraordinary session of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. in Canton which proceeded to establish a rival military government there under the leadership of Wang Ching-wei and Li Tsung-jen.[90] Nanking attempted to deal with this challenge through conciliation and sent such prominent civilian leaders as Wu Chi-hui, Chang Chi and Li Shih-tseng to Canton to negotiate a peaceful solution.[91]

Canton remained intransigent. On June 13, Ch'en Chi-tang called a military conference at Canton which demanded Chiang's resignation. The stalemate continued through the summer of 1931 until the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. For both sides the emergency created by Japan's conquest of Manchuria placed their differences in a new perspective. During the week following September 18, Nanking made several specific appeals to the Southwest for unity and then dispatched three leading mediators, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Chang Chi and Ch'en Ming-chu to Canton for talks.[92] In a further conciliatory move, Hu Han-min was released from his house detention in Nanking on October 14 and allowed to proceed

to Shanghai. There, on the following day, he sent a wire to leading Canton politicians pleading for unity. The preliminary negotiations resulted in arrangements for a peace conference to be held in Shanghai. On October 21, the Canton delegation, consisting of Wang Ching-wei, Sun Fo, Eugene Ch'en, C. C. Wu and Li Wen-fan arrived at Shanghai. The Nanking side was represented by Li Shih-tseng, Chang Ching-kiang, Chang Chi, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Ch'en Ming-chu.[93]

The aim of the above discussion of Chiang's problems with the Southwest was to point out that even in victory his attempts to find a purely military solution to his goal of centralizing military power had failed. The fact of regionalism and regional power structures and loyalties were just too strong to be eliminated quickly. In his haste to unify the military, his strategy was also to exalt himself as the commander-in-chief and symbol of unification. The problem was that the more Chiang tried to unify the military, the more fear he provoked among his erstwhile allies and rivals that he sought their destruction and aimed at making himself the military dictator of China. And since he could not destroy his enemies' units, his victories were never conclusive and would have to be repeated time and again.

What followed were several months of extremely complicated negotiations aimed at producing some sort of political compromise that could pull together the opposed factions of the KMT. The events of the last months of 1931 proved three important facts. First, Chiang had overreached himself in the past few years and if he wanted to rule successfully from now on he would have to be less overt in his quest for military unification. Second, they showed that he lacked the personal stature and party support to wear the mantle as the sole heir of Sun and henceforth would have to share power with either Wang Ching-wei

or Hu Han-min in order to unite the major groupings of the party. Third, events also showed that despite the great dislike many had for Chiang, yet with his block of supporters in the party and his army no central government of China could function without him.

Thus from 1932 on Chiang began to pursue a different set of strategies in his quest for unification. On the political level, he conceded to sharing power with Wang Ching-wei and his supporters. On the problem of military unification, he abandoned the direct solution and instead concentrated on building up and equipping his central units with the best weaponery and advice that he could buy. In this way slowly but surely the discrepancy between the central and provincial units widened and he was able to exert progressively greater pressure to exact obedience and compliance to his wishes. Parallel to his military program, Chiang also concentrated on the removal of buffers which separated him from the Southwest domain. These were the CCP soviet in Kiangsi and the semi-autonomous provincial government and army of Fukien. These obstacles had physically separated the Southwest from the arms of the central government and enabled them to feel security and immunity from attack.

The opportunity to eliminate the Fukien obstacle came in November, 1933, when leaders of the disgruntled 19th Army and certain dissident politicians of the KMT in Fukien seceded from the KMT and republic and established the Federal Revolutionary Government of China.[94] Chiang's reaction to this was swift and massive. Two hundred thousand troops and air force were diverted from the anti-CCP campaign to crush the rebellion.[95] They moved in, in force, at the end of December and within two weeks the rebellion was crushed.[96] The government moved with such speed with one main objective, to occupy all of Fukien, eliminate it as a buffer and thus prevent the Southwest

from gaining part of it. It succeeded. The 19th Army was removed and reorganized under central auspices but even more important, central troops and administration from now on controlled Fukien.[97]

1934 was the turning point in Chiang's anti-CCP campaign. The Fifth Extermination Campaign, the most massive to date, finally achieved the desired objective. In November, 1934, the CCP capital Juichin fell, the Kiangsi soviet was destroyed and the Long March began. This triumph against the CCP also carried important intra-KMT implications. The initial phase of the Long March took pursued and pursuer to the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border. True the Kwangsi leaders were able to seal off all but a corridor of their province and thus prevented central troops from entering its heartland. However, in the wider strategic view the elimination of the Kiangsi soviet also removed the last buffer which had rendered the Southwest physically beyond Nanking's reach. (see Chapter III)

Strategically exposed and militarily inferior, the Southwest for the first time became vulnerable. But in spite of its inferior position, it attempted a last demarche in 1936. The pretext it seized was the recent success of Japanese arms and diplomacy in China. Thus in June, 1936, the Liangkwang leaders formed the National Revolutionary Anti-Japanese Salvation Army, with two branches, one at Canton and the other at Nanning, and led by Ch'en Chi-tang and Li Tsung-jen respectively. Troops were mobilized and Pai Ch'ung-hsi led his contingents to the Hunan border.[98]

Undoubtedly the Southwest move was a two-pronged one. While they genuinely hated and wanted to resist Japan, as their preparations for war, especially in Kwangsi and their post-1937 record amply proved,[99] there was also another motive for the move. They sought to capitalize on the

national anti-Japanese mood and dissatisfaction with Nanking's policy of non-resistance and thereby gain sympathy in a showdown with Nanking. But most people realized that the timing of the move was mainly calculated to embarass Nanking, which for all its faults symbolized unity; and that only through unity was resistance possible. Many of the students also became disenchanted with the Southwest. Wires poured into Canton and Nanning which urged the leaders to desist from civil war and not to betray the nation.[100] Nanking took a firm stand, poised its troops and announced the convening of the Second Plenary Session of the Fifth C.E.C. and C.S.C. on July 10 to resolve the crisis.

The Southwest demarche proved a hollow one. A combination of the above factors and internal dissension among its own forces contributed to its collapse. Perhaps genuine patriotism, silver bullets and promise of promotions played their part too. On July 1, 1936, forty Kwangtung airmen defected bringing the bulk of the Southwest's air force to Nanking. On July 9, Ch'en Chi-tang's right hand man, General Yu Han-mou, left for Nanking and proclaimed his loyalty to the government. Other Ch'en generals followed Yu's suit and Canton's position collapsed, which isolated and also dealt a fatal blow to the ambitions of Kwangsi.[101]

The Second Plenary Session met between July 10-14 to deal with the Southwest situation, which five of its crestfallen leaders attended. Ch'en Chi-tang was dismissed and Yu Han-mou got his reward by succeeding to Ch'en's former posts and commands. The Southwest Executive Committee and Political Council were denounced as the instruments of a semi-independent regime and abolished. The proposal to launch an anti-Japanese expedition was rejected but Chiang undertook to explain his foreign policy stating that China will fight if forced to recognize Manchukuo and if political and diplomatic means to solve the crises and uphold

independence failed.[102] The session also authorized the formation of a National Defence Council of which Chiang was appointed both Chairman and Vice-Chairman. Its membership included important civilian and military leaders of all factions: Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Ch'en Chien, Chu Pei-te, Tang Sheng-chi, Ch'en Tiao-yuan, H. H. Kung, Ho Ying-ch'in, Ch'en Shao-kuan, Chang Chun, Chang Chia-ao, Yu Fei-peng, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi, Ch'en Chi-tang and others.[103]

Later in July, Nanking made another attempt to oust Li and Pai from Kwangsi. On July 25, Nanking announced the cancellation of Li's and Pai's appointments, and instead the appointment of Li as a member of the standing committee of the Military Affairs Commission and Pai as Governor of Chekiang.[104] This meant taking them out of their strongholds and placing them under direct government surveillance either in Nanking or Chekiang. Rightly, they feared for their political lives and rather than submit convened a military conference in Nanning on July 28, mobilized the militia and prepared for war. No blows were struck. The government sent Chu Cheng, Ch'en Chien and Chu Pei-te to Kwangsi in August and negotiations took place. Finally on September 6, Li was appointed Pacification Commissioner of Kwangsi and Pai was named member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Commission. Pai thereupon flew to Nanking, after a parting speech calling on all to rally to Chiang and to fight an all out war for China, and pledging the wholehearted support of Kwangsi for the government in this quest.[105]

Thus almost on the eve of war ended the separatism of the Southwest and began its partial political and military integration into the central system. In his attempt to unify the Second, Third and Fourth Group Armies into the national system, the Fourth Group Army has posed the most difficult problems for Chiang. What made the Southwestern

leaders different from the other KMT "warlords" that made their "taming" more difficult? Strong regional loyalties must be considered the prime factor here. Canton was the birthplace of the Chinese revolution; it had for many years served as the base of the KMT and provided many leaders for its cause. Though eclipsed by Nanking, the Canton branch of the KMT had remained strong and retained the sympathy of the overseas Chinese, most of whom were Cantonese and many of whom were followers of the KMT. Most of those who served in the Southwestern regime were indigenous to the area and difficult as it is to pin down such thoughts it is easy to imagine the chagrin of its older members that the focus of KMT power had shifted to another region.

True Ch'en Chi-tang's demarche had proved a hollow one and that is perhaps due to the corruptness and personal nature of his regime. But unlike Ch'en's administration in Kwangtung, the Kwangsi leaders were popular, their local record had been good and under their rule Kwangsi had achieved a name as a model province. So short of resort to arms, abhorrent to all, there was no way of dislodging them and this prompted Nanking to accept a compromise solution. On the other hand, Kwangsi was now nearly isolated, which compelled its leaders to accept greater central control and to send Pai to Nanking.

From the foregoing it is apparent that of all the military challenges to Chiang's attempt to centralize the army that of the Southwest was the most difficult to deal with. In nature, it was more complex and the fact that it in itself consisted of various divergent components made it even more of a problem. Good government in Kwangsi made Li and Pai locally popular which removed an issue the central government could exploit. In addition, geographic isolation had bred strong parochialism which made the inhabitants of the area unwilling to accept outsiders andloyal to their own leaders. Finally, however, geographic isolation was

breaking down. At the end of 1936 then, though Kwangtung and Kwangsi army units were still under their own commanders, these commanders were no longer able to challenge Nanking and had been reduced to overall obedience to it.

The Manchurian Army and Chang Hsueh-liang.

The nominal adherence Chang declared to Nanking in December, 1928, did not in the least change the fact that Manchuria was administratively and militarily entirely outside the control of Nanking, which merely had the honor to confirm each of the local leaders in his already held post. Thus Chang Hsueh-liang, who had inherited his position from his father, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defence Army, with two of his father's top aides, Chang Tso-hsiang and Wan Fu-lin, as his deputies. Another local potentate, Tang Yu-lin, was confirmed as governor of Jehol. (see Chapter II) In his effort to achieve military unity through disbandment Chiang did have the four northeastern provinces zoned as a disbandment area with Mukden as its headquarters. But that was as far as the attempt to reduce the size of the Manchurian army of over a third of a million men and to bring it under central control went.

Nor did Chang or Manchuria figure much in overall Chinese politics until spring, 1930, when with a major civil war about to erupt with the scales closely balanced, each side began to court Chang in the hope that he would tip the scales in its favor. As has been mentioned before, initially Chang kept aloof. For one reason the nasty little war between his forces and the Russians over control of the China Eastern Railway (C.E.R.) was still unsettled which mitigated against additional military involvement. For another, his counsels were divided, with the older of his advisors set against entanglement in affairs inside the Great Wall.[106]

Finally, however, Chang did swing his weight behind the central government and with this the rebellion of the northern coalition came to an end. But the fact that Chiang needed Chang's intervention to bring the war to a quick end meant that a price had to be paid to Chang for this aid. As it soon became clear, the remnant forces of Yen and Feng were far from finished. On the contrary, for the remainder of 1930 and into 1931 north China was in a state of crisis with the threat of renewed rebellion by various resurgent northern generals.[107]

By both choice (personal and family ambition made Chang anxious to assert a hegemon status in north China) and necessity (because Chiang's forces were preoccupied with the Southwest's forces elsewhere) Chang was left to maintain the peace in north China. These factors compelled Chang to establish his headquarters in Peiping, to spend more time in north China than Manchuria, and despite mounting tension with Japan in Manchuria, to move more Manchurian troops inside the Great Wall. These came to include not only the Fengtien troops directly under Chang but also Heilungkiang troops under its governor, Wan Fu-lin, who in May joined Chang's staff in Peiping.[108] With this addition to his military strength in north China (by summer of 1931 it numbered around 200,000 men) Chang was able to cope with the Shih Yu-san rebellion (Kuominchun). To prevent a resurgence by Yen's restive subordinates, Chang made a statement on August 4 affirming his support of Nanking and his resolution to stay in north China and not withdraw any of his troops to Manchuria.[109] Then in the midst of her domestic turmoil, on the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese garrison in Mukden struck and occupied the city. The episode came to be known as the Mukden or Manchurian Incident.

Depleted of her best troops and leadership, what remained of the Manchurian army outside the Great Wall was

hardly in a position to resist Japan's concerted drive. This and other factors explained China's policy of non-resistance. Thus with a minimum of resistance Japan was able to complete her occupation of Manchuria, excluding Jehol, by early 1932. The loss of Manchuria dealt a severe blow to Chang's prestige but not his power in north China, for his army there had remained intact and in fact was bolstered to over 250,000 strong with the addition of retreating units. The Chiang-Chang alliance remained intact, and as Chiang's man to keep the balance of power unshaken in north China, Chang was appointed Pacification Commissioner of the Peiping Area. This fact became very clear in the summer of 1932 when President of the Executive Yuan Wang Ching-wei, attempted a showdown with Chang and found himself isolated.[110] In chagrin Wang took sick leave and left on an extended European trip in October, 1932, while Chang found himself in the new post as Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission.[111] This episode confirmed not only that the Chiang-Chang alliance was intact but that Chang and his army was still the dominant military block in north China.

From there on the Manchurian army suffered one blow after another until 1937 when it lost its separate identity and came to be integrated into the national army. The major steps whereby the Manchurian army came to be reduced are briefly as follows. After the loss of Jehol early in 1933 for which Chang was again the scapegoat, though Tang Yu-lin ruled Jehol as an independent fief and Chang had hardly any influence there,[112] he felt compelled to resign to appease public opinion. Thus on March 11, 1933, Chang committed the unprecedented act in republican military history of handing over his army of 200,000 men to Chiang (though they remained under their own officers) and going abroad.[113] After this while some units remained in north China, others were deployed south to participate in the anti-CCP campaigns.

Early in 1935 the Manchurian position in north China finally collapsed due to renewed assaults there by the Japanese. On May 29, 1935, the Japanese commander in north China, Umetsu, presented a set of demands on Ho Ying-ch'in, chief delegate of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission. One of the demands was for the resignation of Yu Hsueh-chung as governor of Hopei and the withdrawal of his army from that province. Ho acceded to this and all other conditions in the Ho-Umetsu Agreement on June 10, whereupon Yu and his Manchurian Army marched south and lost their foothold in north China.[114]

With Chang Hsueh-liang's return to China in the fall of 1935, the Manchurian army found another home and task. The home was in northwest China, in Shensi and Kansu, and the task was to fight the CCP which had found a refuge there at the end of the Long March.[115] Why did Chiang send the Manchurian Army to the northwest and maintain it there in the face of evidence that it found its task uncongenial? Circumstancial evidence points to the fact that he was trying to wear down by attrition this force which despite adversities had maintained its independent existence. Of the fact that the Manchurian Army was the victim of this policy of attrition there is no doubt. In 1931, it had stood at approximately 250,000 men which by the end of 1936 had dwindled to some 130,000.[116] In addition, Chang admitted that he had been unsuccessful in his quest to Nanking for permission to recruit and for funds to aid the wounded, widowed and orphaned. No wonder then that the Manchurian army hated its set task to fight the CCP, felt discriminated against and wished instead to fight the Japanese.[117] These grievances paved the way for the Sian Incident, when between December 12-25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was held prisoner in Sian by the mutinuous Manchurian Army under Chang Hsueh-liang and the Northwestern Army of Yang Hu-cheng. (to be discussed in Chapters II and III)

The settlement and aftermath of the Sian Incident put the final capstone on unity between all Chinese parties and factions behind Chiang to resist Japan. But what was its significance for the Manchurian Army? In February, 1937, central troops under General Ku Chu-tung entered Shensi and gradually took over the garrison duties there and in Kansu. Then late in March the Manchurian Army received orders to proceed to Kiangsu, Anhui and Honan for reorganization and retraining. Initially they were put under the overall command of General Liu Chih (Chiang's lieutenant) but otherwise remained under their own officers. Later they were integrated as units of the national army and as such participated in the war.[118] Chang himself was tried for mutiny, sentenced, pardoned but put under the protective custody of Chiang in which capacity he remains to this day. Thus ended the separate existence of the Manchurian Army, begun in the warlord era of the early republic. Because of the external factor it first lost its homeland but maintained a territorial base, hence separate existence inside the Great Wall. Thanks to Japanese pressures, Chiang's policy of discrimination and the process of attrition it found increasing difficulty in maintaining itself. The coup de grace came with the Sian Incident as a result of which its separate existence ceased. Chiang had finally eliminated the Manchurian Army.

Conclusion.

In spite of a chequered history military unification between 1928-1937 was a partial success. This was the result of two separate but often related developments.

1. Although military unification by disbandment as envisaged by the Disbandment Conference was a total failure, there was during this period a gradual reduction of the provincial armies. This was the result of the twin process of defeat and attrition. After successive defeats in civil wars, the

Second, Third and Fourth Group Armies were broken up and reduced so that Feng, Yen and Li were no longer able militarily to challenge the central army. Yen was reduced to Shansi and finally compelled to accept central troops even in his province in order to cope with the Communist incursions. Feng after 1933 no longer had any power base. The subordinates of both retained some power in north China but were too threatened by Japan to retain much leverage with the central government. The Fourth Group Army was first reduced to Liangkwang and after 1936 was compelled to semi-obedience to Nanking. Attrition was another factor at work in the reduction of the provincial armies. Economic underdevelopment and general poverty in most of the areas deprived provincial armies of opportunities to modernize so that they became progressively less able to compete with the central units. Inadequate local resources also compelled some of the provincial armies, e.g., the Manchurian Army after 1931, to rely on the central government for funds and subsidies. This provided the central government with twin weapons, one to compel the provincial army to reduce its size by withholding funds, and two to use the financial leverage to exact some obedience. In the long run these were powerful weapons. Thus there was disbandment of the provincial armies though not in the originally intended way, and in the case of the Manchurian Army after 1937, total integration into the national army.

2. Expansion and better training and equipment of the central army under Chiang's direct command meant that in time it became both bigger and stronger than anything the provincial generals could offer. The hiring of German advisors, the sending of promising young officers abroad for further study and improvement of military academies at home combined to make the central units better fighting forces. The better weapons the central units were given but not distributed to the provincial armies also helped to turn the

scales. This discriminatory treatment had been a source of much bitterness on the part of the provincial generals but was something they could do nothing about.

Up until 1937 Chiang followed a passive policy of non-resistance to Japan and moreover did not always commit the best of his own forces to fight the CCP. The reasons was he deployed them mainly either in wars or as watchdogs against the provincial armies of his rivals. His enemies have charged that even when his own good units were ostensibly engaged in anti-CCP campaigns, their real assignment remained one of surveillance on the units and territories of the dissident KMT generals. For Chiang pursued a policy of domestic pacification before resistance against Japan. The CCP were ostensibly the targets of this domestic pacification program. But the fact was they were militarily not regarded as a lethal threat. More crucial to Chiang then was the reduction of the armies of the dissident KMT generals and the unification of the various KMT armies under his centralized command. This process, though not completed, was well under way by 1937.

B. Party Unity.

Perhaps the KMT had never been a unified party, but as a result of the differences over policy towards the CCP, especially during the Northern Expedition, it had split into major hostile factions. In 1928, the most important dissenting group within the party was the left wing, led by Wang Ching-wei and associated with the Wuhan government of 1927. This group was now out of power and Wang was abroad in Europe. The center group had rallied around Chiang Kai-shek and were now in the ascendency in Nanking. On the periphery was also the right wing group of mostly KMT elders, also known as the Hsi Shan or Western Hill group, who were noted for their opposition to co-operation with the CCP from the beginning. Their nominal leader was Hu Han-min. Chiang, Wang and Hu each had a personal

following and each represented a different approach to the problem of government and interpretation of Sun's ideology. Wang and Hu were more senior in the party and were both civilians. Chiang was both more junior in age and in his association with the party, but as the most important military leader in the post Northern Expedition era was to play the central role in KMT politics.

In the broad perspective, factional struggle within the KMT between 1928-1937 can be seen as the striving of the ruling party to eliminate internal dissension, both personal and ideological. For ultimately the KMT's success in ruling China depended on its ability to maintain internal cohesion and unity. Seen in this context, the quest for party unity paralleled that for military unity in the struggle of the KMT to unify China. However, though there were some rather fundamental ideological differences, an overemphasis on this aspect will obscure the very crucial role of personal rivalry and personality differences that often loomed perhaps even higher than doctrinal disputes. This is not strange when it is remembered that at his death in 1924 Sun had left no political heir to succeed him and the party had resolved upon the principle of collective leadership. For obvious reasons the collegial principle is often an unsatisfactory one for ruling a country or for satisfying personal ambitions. Thus developed a power struggle among Chiang, Wang and Hu. When one adds to the above the factor that traditionally the Chinese tended to be more personality than issue oriented in their concept of political leadership, it is then not surprising that so often policy compromises were easier to reach than personal rapprochements.

The expulsion of the CCP and ouster of the left wing KMT from power was achieved through a coalition between Chiang's center forces and the right wing of the KMT who now shared power in Nanking. Thus in the immediate

aftermath of the successful completion of the Northern Expedition the question was not just how to centralize and unify the party in the abstract but specifically how to deal with the left wing or Reorganizationists.

The Challenge of the Left Wing under Wang Ching-wei.

Chiang's first attempt to unify the party came in a heavy handed try to purge the left wing which was so clumsily executed that more vehement opposition resulted. The instrument he used to forge party unity and determine guidelines of policy for the tutelage period was the Third Party Congress.[119] In order to secure a membership amenable to his wishes his first problem then was how to prevent the election of leftists to the Congress from the branch headquarters outside Nanking's control. This he did through new rules for the selection of party delegates which he had the C.E.C. at Nanking draw up. Published on December 15, 1928, they provided for the appointment of about half of the forthcoming congress.[120] It was stipulated that out of a total of three hundred and fifty-six representatives to the Third KMT Congress, eighty-nine were to be elected, one hundred and sixteen were to be designated by the central party headquarters from a list of candidates submitted by the local party organizations. The above two groups formed 57.5 per cent of the total membership. The remaining one hundred and fifty-one members, or 42.5 per cent, were to be appointed by the central party headquarters.[121]

Chiang defended this method of selecting delegates by citing the precedent of designation set by the First and Second KMT Congresses. However, he neglected to mention that the precedent was set at a time when the KMT did not have even nominal control of much of China. He also justified his method by contending that many rank and file members of the KMT held heterodox and impure ideological views and therefore needed tutelage no less than the bulk

of the people. Logically this stand is difficult to defend, as admittance to the party is supposedly contingent on understanding of and commitment to the principles of Sun Yat-sen.[122]

This method used by Nanking to ensure a majority was deeply resented by the provincial forces and by the left KMT. Many of the elected members were Reorganizationists, some of whom protested by refusing to attend the Congress.[123]

A Reorganizationist organ charged that only twenty per cent of the delegates were truly elected. What upset this group even further was the fact that according to the directives appointed delegates did not even have to be natives of the areas they represented. In this instance, the charge that thereby the local interests that delegates should represent could be perverted was well founded. This was also the main cause which triggered the final break between Nanking and the Reorganizationists.[124] Wang Ching-wei, their leader, accused the Nanking government of having turned reactionary and corrupt, and of setting itself above the masses as a privileged caste. This he stated was a perversion of true party aims, the supremacy of the rank and file.[125] He also accused Chiang of turning the government into a personal dictatorship and of abusing the system of one party government during the tutelage period. Therefore, Wang claimed it was necessary to destroy Nanking in order to realize the aim of the true KMT and to restore the principle of democratic centralism.[126]

When the Congress convened the vacancies created by the refusal of many elected Wang followers to attend were filled by Nanking-appointed substitutes.[127] Enraged, Wang and his followers declared the Congress illegal and refused to recognize its resolutions and the new C.E.C. and C.S.C. it elected (which excluded their ranks). Instead they held themselves as the legal C.E.C. based on the Second Party Congress.[128]

What ideas did Wang Ching-wei and his followers represent and what programs did they wish to introduce? The question is difficult to answer because they were not a homogeneous group and since they were never in a position to implement fully some of the programs they formulated in 1930, it is hazardous to conjecture what they might have done had they been given free reins to do as they wished. In any case they did have the opportunity to express their views in 1930 and these views showed doctrinal differences with Chiang and Nanking over the issues of the provisional constitution, distribution of power between various levels of government and over the organization and control of the party.

Since the Reorganizationists maintained that the Third KMT Congress was illegal, they convened a meeting of their own, called the Enlarged Plenary Session. It included anti-Nanking members of both the First and Second C.E.C. and C.S.C., hence the term "enlarged". It was convened under the auspices of the northern coalition in Peiping in July, 1930, with Wang Ching-wei as chairman. Several documents expounded the aims and platform of the Enlarged Session. On July 30, 1930, it issued a Manifesto which accused Chiang of attempting a personal dictatorship and of packing the Third KMT Congress at Nanking. The aim of the Enlarged Session, it continued, was to restore unity to the party and call a true Third Party Congress and People's Convention.[129] Another document, entitled "The Aim of the Revolution, accused Chiang of perverting the meaning of tutelage and abusing the government for his own ends. It cited as proof Chiang's refusal to convene the People's Convention to draw up a Yueh-fa or provisional constitution. It also accused Chiang of suppressing mass movements, which according to Sun should be given high priority during the tutelage period.[130]

The Enlarged Session therefore appointed a committee, headed by Wang Ching-wei, to draw up a provisional constitution for the tutelage period. They based their stand on Sun's Principles of National Reconstruction, in which he had said that a provisional constitution was necessary for the tutelage period in order to guarantee personal rights and freedom of citizens as well as to determine the election and control of public officials and to spell out relations between citizens and the government. Concluding, it accused Chiang of masking his personal dictatorship behind the facade of one party rule.[131]

On October 27, 1930, a draft provisional constitution was submitted to the Enlarged Session. On the division of power between the different levels of government, it advocated the following principles:

> The distribution of power between the central and provincial governments shall be based on the principle of equilibrium. Both the tendency towards centralization and towards decentralization shall be avoided. All affairs of a national character shall be dealt with by the Central Government, and all affairs of a provincial character by the local governments.[132]

As Wang Ching-wei headed the drafting committee and as he was very prestigeous, it might be assumed that the draft Provisional Constitution represented his political thinking of the period. He seemed to have held a reasonable and pragmatic view on political theories, as exemplified by his statement on the form of the government, made in May, 1930. He said:

> Therefore for the present, we should have the Three People's Principles for the basis of our

> ideology. But we should supplement it with the theories and systems of democracy of the European countries and the United States. This is because the Three People's Principles has only determined on the basic foundations, and because there are many points on particulars and on structures in other governmental systems which furnish us points of reference.[133]

He added that even during tutelage, other political parties should be allowed to exist and contest for power, provided that they did not subvert the social order or the basic form of government.[134]

The foregoing represented the thinking of Wang Ching-wei during this period. On such topics as the division of power between the central and local government it seems that Wang's proposals were realistic and more attuned to the political balance of power in China at that time. Conversely in insisting on a centralized form of government and a monolithic party, Chiang under the circumstances was being impractical for he had neither the military power nor personal stature to carry out such plans. This is not to say that intrinsically he did not have a case. As time wore on China came increasingly under the pressure of Japanese aggression. Any effective resistance against Japan would require the mobilization of all national resources under a unified, powerful central government. Thus Chiang sought to exalt the state, and its symbol the central government, above local interests and individual freedom and here he had both Chinese tradition and concepts of modern nationalism to support his stand. The problem here was that such demands in China at this time were unrealistic and perhaps also he was the wrong person for this sort of leadership at the time. Ultimately, even in victory, he was compelled after 1931 to modify his vision of a

centralized government. But if Chiang failed to qualify as the ideal leader was there anyone else in the KMT who did? Powerful and ambitious though many of the general were, such men as Li Tsung-jen, Yen Hsi-shan or Feng Yu-hsiang really did not qualify for national leadership. Among the civilian leaders, the two most outstanding were Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. Between 1928-1937 Chiang alternately shared power with either Wang or Hu and in each case their co-operation was an uneasy and unstable one. In each case both Wang and Hu, when on the outs with Chiang and because neither had military power of his own, had to resort to alliances with the dissident generals, Wang with Feng and Yen in 1930 and Hu with the Liangkwang generals after 1931. This was the unhappy fate of civilian leaders of China at this time.

Judging by his statements of 1930, Wang appeared much less authoritarian than Chiang. His civilian background, study abroad, wider acquaintance with Western institutions and former association with the leftist cause combined must account for this. And it is in this light that one must look at his foregoing statements endorsing popular organizations, opposing dictatorship and advocating the legalization of other political parties during the tutelage period and supplementing the Three People's Principles with Western experiences of democratic government. But even if the northern coalition had won in 1930, it is very doubtful if Wang's ideas had any chance of being translated into reality. For one thing the Enlarged Session of 1930 was a very motley group of disaffected and out of power KMT members, who had been drawn together by mutual hatred of Chiang and Nanking. To this extent, one must qualify their condemnation of dictatorship in terms of their jealousy of Chiang and concern for their own political survival. But in itself, it is not a sufficient explanation. For since the death of Sun, the KMT had decided to reserve for him

the role of perpetual leader and not to choose a successor. Instead the party adopted the collective principle to install a group of men to run the party and country. Eventually, even in victory, Chiang had to make concessions to this principle and to share power with others. Moreover the government set up in Peiping in August, 1930, was a military dominated one whose survival depended on military victory. Had it won, it is safe to guess that the generals would assume the real power. It is very difficult to envisage lasting co-operation between two such differing personalities as Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan; probably there would have been more falling out and renewed conflicts. But even assuming that the Peiping government would remain intact, it is difficult to see the arch-conservative Yen understanding, let alone sympathize with some of Wang's more liberal views.

However, while one could certainly sympathize with the awful plight of civilian leaders in a situation where the military dominated, one must also exercise caution in assessing their sincerity. Democracy was a catchy term and was freely used by both sides in their propaganda. Neither gave clear definition of what they meant by it. It is simply not know whether given their way Wang and the left KMT would have been willing to accept rivals and implement a more democratic form of government. Take Wang for example. His later record showed a keen dedication to personal aggrandisement, as witness his co-operation with Chiang after 1932 in order to share some power. But his later co-operation with Chiang I think should not obscure the fact that between 1928-1932, he opposed Chiang on genuine principles. He saw in Chiang's personal dictatorship not only a political threat to himself but the flaunting of party organization and violating of the basic teachings of Sun and the function of political tutelage. He was particularly opposed to Chiang's personal control of the army for which he blamed the civil wars.[135] Thus it can be seen that differences

of personality, background as well as policy contributed to conflicts and rivalry between Wang and Chiang. Their differences were rooted in many conflicting and interrelated problems and were exacerbated by the linking of the issue of military unification to that of party unity.

But while not downgrading the importance of issues and doctrinal differences on how best to affect unification, I think personal ambition played an inordinately large role in Chinese affairs during this period. Ego and a sense of duty and patriotism were often impossible to separate. For instance, a man of monumental ego, Chiang regarded himself as the unifier of China and conversely could not envisage unification taking place except under his auspices. It is only with this in mind that one can understand why he sometimes did sudden and complete volte face on issues.

Take the case of the Yueh-fa for example. The Chiang dominated Third KMT Congress had refused to consider the issue. This was later taken up by the Reorganizationists during the Enlarged Session as one of the major ideological sticks to beat Chiang on. Now the Enlarged Session had been dispersed. Instead Chiang came out early in 1931 to endorse the convening of a Kuo-min hui-i or National People's Convention with the explicit task of adopting a Yueh-fa. Chiang and his supporters made all arrangements and regulations for the convening of the convention which opened on May 5, 1931. It consisted of Members of the C.E.C. and C.S.C. and State Council and representatives from the provinces, cities, territories, professional organizations and overseas Chinese.[136] Its primary task was to vote on the Yueh-fa which Chiang and ten others had drafted.[137] Whether this represented a change of view or was merely a measure to conciliate those of the KMT membership and public who sympathized with the Reorganizationists on this point cannot be ascertained. I suspect that with the scant regard he showed and continued to show for

institutional guarantees and constitutions, Chiang's change was mainly tactical and an expediency. After all a Yueh-fa was merely a piece of paper and if its adoption could result in a greater unification within the party and the rallying of public opinion towards more unified China under his leadership, then why not endorse it?

The National People's Convention opened on May 5, 1931, and as was expected, endorsed the draft Yueh-fa. On June 1 the government announced its adoption of the Yueh-fa as the basic statute for the period of political tutelage.[138] The adoption of the Yueh-fa did not really alter the basic substance and nature of the KMT government during the subsequent period. Nevertheless this surface doctrinal conversion on the part of Chiang did pave the way for a rapprochement between Chiang and Wang.

As continued military threats from the Southwest and in north China through 1931 showed, Chiang's earlier victories against his enemies had been inconclusive. Indeed, the very fact of his emphasis on forcing a military unification and party conformity was driving his enemies to desperation and inspiring intransigent resistance. The realization that in 1931 he had neither the military force, personal stature nor party strength to command absolute obedience and unity, plus the fact of serious Japanese aggression, ultimately forced Chiang to adopt less overt measures in his quest for military unification and to seek co-operation with Wang Ching-wei and his supporters in order to forge greater party unity.

In the aftermath of the Manchurian catastrophe the chastened KMT leaders of all factions began to seek means of accommodation to forge a more unified party and government in order to face the unprecedented national crisis. It was in this spirit and in the recognition of their mutual need that Chiang and Wang met in Hangchow during January, 1932. Presumably they reached acceptable terms, as a result of which both returned to Nanking on January 21, 1932, to

resume their public lives, Wang as the President of the Executive Yuan and Chiang as the Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission.[139]

From this date, in spite of their ups and downs, basic co-operation between Chiang and Wang was to last until 1937. With Lin Shen occupying the now honorific post of Chairman of the National government, Wang was to remain head of the civilian government until 1935, while Chiang as Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission concentrated on building up the central army. This was a mutually advantageous arrangement especially during the crises when Wang and Chiang derived support by joint action. But even though some of Wang's supporters were rewarded with high posts in the government and party (e.g, Ch'en Kung-po and Ku Meng-yu with cabinet posts), Wang's real position was that of a very junior partner to Chiang, that besides ego satisfaction, amounted to little more than window dressing. Some specific instances will be discussed later to illustrate this point. For even though during the next few years, Chiang held no civilian posts in the government, with his command of the troops, with the organization of the KMT under the control of Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu who were loyal to him (commonly referred to as the C.C. Clique), and with a large contingent of his supporters in the five yuans, there is not a doubt that he remained the overwhelming figure in the Nanking government. And this applied equally to the lower levels of party government and the military. Chiang throughout remained commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy which ensured the loyalty of its graduates to him. The Central Political Academy which trained middle rank party cadres and government officials was in the hands of the C.C. Clique and as the 1930's progressed the C.C. Clique also began to infiltrate and gain influence in the national universities which turned out many graduates for government service. During the 1930's Chiang's subordinates organized

the Blue Shirts Society and the New Life Movement whose aim in part was to indoctrinate and control youths in schools. So to the extent that youths were won over to the KMT and joined its party ranks and bureaucratic structure, it was under the auspices of groups and cliques loyal to Chiang. Thus Wang Ching-wei found his influence shut out of the party structure and at the local government level. Even within the cabinet Wang was dependent on Chiang's support and that of his adherents, for the key Ministry of Finance was always under H. H. Kung or T. V. Soong, both brothers-in-law to Chiang, and the Ministry of War was consistently under Ho Ying-ch'in, another Chiang stalwart. True, Wang was sometimes his own Minister of Foreign Affairs but with no independent military backing and no ability to command the financial resources of the nation, it is doubtful that he could do anything significant without the consent and support of Chiang. As the years wore on. Wang's personal popularity with the public also began to slip. This was partly due to his prima donna like temperament but mainly because as head of the civilian government the public tended to associate him increasingly with China's reverses vis-a-vis Japan. All these factors combined resulted in the dimunition of Wang's national popularity and influence in the party and government which correspondingly made him more dependent on Chiang's support. Two instances will serve to illustrate how in any showdown it was Chiang's word that counted.

The first test case came in August, 1932, when Wang publicly announced his resignation as President of the Executive Yuan and cited his reason as inability to carry out policies designed to overcome the national crisis in north China due to the obstruction and insubordination of Chang Hsueh-liang.[140] He also called on Chang to resign from his posts as atonement for his sins of non-resistance.[141] Now it is well known that Chang and Wang were old political enemies and it was Chang's intervention in 1930 that had

brought the Peiping government to an end. But as Chang and Chiang were closely allied, Wang, in creating this political crisis, must have planned not only to humiliate Chang but also to test and hurt Chiang. While Yen, Feng and their affiliates and the Southwest all came out for Wang and supported Chang's ouster, pro-Chang generals also rallied and publicly threatened a mass resignation if Chang were ousted from north China.[142] In this state of impasse Chiang's attitude became crucial and it soon became clear that Chang still retained his confidence and support. Chiang wired an order to Chang to remain in Peiping and then requested a meeting with Wang which took place in Kuling on August 18. Realizing that he had failed in his bid to oust Chang, Wang insisted on his own resignation. As a face-saving device, he was granted sick leave and soon afterwards left for a trip to Europe. After that, Chiang had Chang appointed Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission.[143] Thus ended another round of the Wang-Chiang dual and seemingly Wang came out the worse for it.

The second showdown between pro-Chiang forces and Wang came in August, 1935, when Wang again submitted his resignation as President of the Executive Yuan. This was in the wake of the signing of the Ho-Umetsu Agreement which had been the subject of much public criticism and indignation. According to a report in a Japanese newspaper published in Shanghai, the Nichi Nichi, Wang had been upset with certain high tangpu officials for their criticism and demanded that they be curbed and that the Executive Yuan be strengthened vis-a-vis the Central Political Council (C.P.C.) as condition of his staying.[144] Reports from the Southwest were more specific and stated that in particular both the Anglo-American and C.C. Cliques (rival groups in the KMT, both loyal to Chiang) were dissatisfied with Wang in particular over his handling of the recent Hopei-Chahar crisis. Thus, until Chiang openly came out against it, the C.P.C. never

expressed any opinion on Wang's resignation.[145] Wang then was trying to test Chiang's support. Initially Chiang sent a top aide, Chang Chun, to talk him into staying on and on August 19, he personally returned from Szechwan to Nanking to consult with Wang. This had its effect and presumably Chiang acceded to Wang's conditions, for on August 23, he returned to his post.[146] This showdown definitely points to the fact that within the party and government Chiang's supporters far outnumbered and outweighed those of Wang, and unless he could count on Chiang's personal support, he could not stay in power at all. Why did Chiang then wish to continue this lopsided co-operation with Wang? I think the main reason was that Chiang was unready to take up the anti-Japanese mantle, so it served his purposes to maintain Wang and share the onus of non-resistance. For Wang, a man of great personal vanity, staying in power must have been a major factor.

As it turned out, the renewed Chiang-Wang co-operation was short lived. On November 1, 1935, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Fourth C.E.C. was convened. After delivering the inaugural address, an assassination attempt was made on Wang, which while not fatal, was to incapacitate him from office for more than a year.[147] He resigned as President of the Executive Yuan and after the initial recovery went to Europe to convalesce. In December, 1935, the first Plenary Session of the Fifth C.E.C., in an attempt to pull together the major factions of the KMT, elected Wang and Chiang chairman and vice-chairman of the C.P.C. and Hu Han-min and Chiang chairman and vice-chairman of the C.E.C., the two most powerful bodies of the KMT government. But this was for appearance sake only as Hu was both ailing and unreconciled and Wang was on sick leave. Thus the reshuffling actually gave Chiang paramount power. On December 10, the standing committee of the C.E.C. announced the formation of a new executive with Chiang as President

of the Executive Yuan and H. H. Kung as vice-president.[148] With this appointment Chiang came to control every important branch of the party and government. Wang returned to China in the wake of the Sian Incident, resumed his functions in the party but did not regain his government positions.

Two aspects of Chiang-Wang relations should be mentioned here as they have bearing on the issue of party unity. One concerns the division of power between various levels of government and degree of centralization and the other concerns relations with Japan. On the problem of administrative centralization, as has been stated before, Chiang began the post Northern Expedition era with an entirely futile attempt to impose a centralized form of government. Wang and the Reorganizationists in 1930 had proposed instead the concept of equilibrium of power between the center and provinces. They based their theory on Sun's doctrines. But doctrinal justifications aside, considering the political setup and power structures in existence in China at this period, Wang's proposal did seem more pragmatic.

Gradually Chiang was also to endorse this point of view. It came in January, 1934, in the form of a resolution passed by the fourth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. which stipulated that the ideal of equilibrium of power between the center and the provinces be carried out.[149] That the party plenum dominated by Chiang-Wang forces (as seen by the composition of the presidium of Chiang, Wang, Sun Fo, Tai Chi-t'ao, Yu Yu-jen, Chu Cheng and Ku Meng-yu) now accepted the concept of equilibrium or power must be considered a concession by Nanking. Significantly the resolution was in response to a proposal by the Southwest that the party endorse the concept of equilibrium between center and provinces instead of centralization. True it did not alter the reality of the situation at all. But as with all governments the written record is important and here was

the central government committed to a new policy goal. Viewed in this light it was a turning point and perhaps a first step in the rapprochement between Nanking and the Southwest. It represented a realization that a formal recognition of reality would bring more unity to the KMT. On January 31, 1934, at the end of the sessions, Chiang and Wang issued a joint telegram in which they endorsed the resolutions recently passed and mentioned specifically that they would do all they could to further co-operation between the central government and the provinces.[150]

Finally as a definitive gesture of assurance that the central government would not exploit its now greatly superior military to impose centralization, Chiang and Wang issued another joint telegram on November 27, 1934, in which they said in part:

> Examining the Tsungli's Principles of National Reconstruction (we find) that he stipulated the principle of equilibrium in regulating central and local affairs. All affairs with national significance belong to the central government, those of local import appropriately belong to local governments. It is neither (a system of) centralization nor decentralization. This is the highest principle employed in defining the division between central and local authority.[151]

Specifically they elaborated on a five point program, namely:
1. The provincial governments to use their own interpretations on law enforcement.
2. Local governments to recommend and the central government to appoint local officials.
3. On regional administrative and economic planning, the local governments are to submit plans, the central government to approve them but not to interfere in their execution.
4. Demarcation of central and regional finance.

5. Regional armed forces to be under local control but their numbers to be fixed by the central government.[152]
In conclusion the policy statement reaffirmed the principle of non-violence in settling of internal problems.[153]

On the question of policy towards Japan all available evidence suggests basic agreement between Chiang and Wang. Both endorsed the policy of domestic unity before resisting the foreign foe. The only instance when Wang castigated a commander for non-resistance was in 1932 when he had the showdown with Chang Hsueh-liang. But I think the motive here was to settle an old score with Chang and to test Chiang for his support. In the five years after 1932 Wang's persistent theme was to emphasize the need to take systematic long term steps to prepare for resistance. He emphasized the need for military reorganization in order to give the central government effective and complete control of all military units.[154] This was the line he followed when explaining the move of the central government from Nanking to Loyang during the Shanghai Incident in 1932.[155] This was the line he continued to follow in 1933 to justify the signing of the Tangku Agreement.[156] And this was still his explanation when he attempted to justify China's surrender in signing the Ho-Umetsu Agreement in 1935.[157] The fact was, like Chiang, Wang was deeply respectful of Japan's military might and afraid that China would be certainly defeated in a showdown with Japan. For themselves, they must have feared personal disgrace and loss of power if they were to preside over this defeat. In addition, since their reconciliation in 1932, Chiang and Wang had shared the burden of the central administration, and their joint responsibility must have inspired in both a keen desire to promote greater unity for China which they were slowly forging. Certainly this unity would be entirely destroyed by war and conquest. Thus it is not surprising that they were anxious to stave off the final reckoning with Japan.

It was easy for those out of power to demand resistance and prophesize that in resistance China would find unity. Perhaps it is true that on a certain level unity would be enhanced in fighting a war of national salvation. But with the benefit of hindsight one has to agree with Chiang and Wang that China could not withstand Japan's all-out assault and that she had more to lose than gain in a war with Japan.

To conclude, since Chiang was forced to the realization by 1931 that he could not unify the party and government single-handedly, he was compelled to seek an alliance with Wang. Conversely, Wang was aware that without a military force of his own he had no way to realize any of his ambitions or programs on his own and with the defeat of the northern coalition had no choice except to collaborate with Chiang. Thus was forged an alliance which though unstable lasted until 1937. The co-operation between Chiang and Wang resulted in the coalescing of the main ideological groups within the KMT. Gradually but very certainly it also resulted in the emergence of Chiang and his adherents as the dominant partner in every sphere of the government and party. Wang failed to develop rank and file following within the party and bureaucracy. In other words, except for him and his senior aides who retained high positions in party and government, his adherents were swallowed up and absorbed by those of Chiang.

Hu Han-min and the Right Wing KMT Elders.

The original division of the KMT into factions based on ideology occurred during the Canton days over the issue of collaboration with the CCP and the role of the Russian advisors. After the death of Sun, the split widened. Many veteran leaders became increasingly concerned over the radical trend which the social revolution was taking in Kwangtung. Hu Han-min was their leader. On August 20, 1925, Liao Chung-k'ai, a leader of the left wing, was

assassinated. Reputedly Hu's younger brother was implicated. In any event the left wing construed the killing as a right-wing attempt to grab power and reacted by ousting Hu and some of his supporters. Chiang Kai-shek emerged from this shake-up as the dominant military figure and Wang Ching-wei as the political leader in Canton. The right wing which included Tai Chi-t'ao, Lin Shen, Chu Cheng, Chang Chi and Wu Chi-hui either withdrew or were ousted from Canton. Some fifteen of them proceeded to Peking during November-December, 1925, and held a conference at Western Hill or Hsi Shan before the coffin of Sun. They resolved to dismiss the nine members of the C.E.C. who were Communist, to separate the two parties, suspend Wang Ching-wei's membership in the KMT for six months and to call the Second Party Congress in Shanghai in March, 1926. On the last issue they were forestalled by the Canton group who called the party congress in January, 1926, and reaffirmed the alliance with the Communists. This was the origin of the right wing of the KMT, often referred to as the Hsi Shan or Western Hill group. Of its members Hu Han-min was most senior, hence his titular leadership.

After the Nanking-Wuhan split during the Northern Expedition and the purge of the left wing from the KMT, Chiang found himself in alliance with the right wing or Western Hill group. Many of their ranks were rewarded with high party and government positions in the Nanking government. For example, Hu Han-min became President of the Legislative Yuan, Tai Chi-t'ao became President of the Examination Yuan and Chu Cheng headed the Judicial Yuan. Up to 1931 no upheavals marred the smooth relationship between this group and Chiang.

Suddenly on March 2, 1931, the surprising news was announced that on the previous February 28, during a discussion of KMT leaders at Tangshan, Hu had opposed plans for drawing up the Yueh-fa and because of this had resigned

from his posts as State Councillor and President of the Legislative Yuan.[158] It was also learned that Hu was put under house arrest in Nanking and that Chiang and ten others had been appointed to draft the Yueh-fa.[159] Ostensibly Chiang and Hu had collided over the issue of the provisional constitution which Chiang had come to endorse. But from available evidence, it seems that the roots of the Chiang-Hu split went very deep and were much more the result of personality than policy differences.

Hu also contended for leadership of the KMT. He was a veteran member of the party (he joined the T'ung meng hui in Japan in 1905) and was an early trusted lieutenant and friend of Sun. In fact when Sun went to Peking in 1924, he appointed Hu acting head of his revolutionary government in Canton. In addition, Hu had assisted Sun in the preparation and writing of many of the latter's important works. Thus his claim to be Sun's senior disciple with an unparalleled knowledge of Sun's ideas and theories was founded on solid facts. In his eyes Chiang was but an upstart. Stern, moral and hard working, Hu was not a tactful man so when he disliked Chiang's policies and the way he ran the government, he took upon himself sternly to lecture Chiang. Chiang could not brook this for besides being also strong willed and bad tempered he also saw himself as Sun's heir and major disciple.

In any case, in his public statements Chiang justified his removal and detention of Hu on the grounds that Hu had adamantly opposed the convening of the National People's Convention to draw up a provisional constitution. He went so far as to explain that Hu's opposition to a provisional constitution was based on his quest to preserve personal power which he feared would be abridged in the event that it would be adopted.[160] Since at that point Hu was in no position to defend himself, one is compelled to look at his later writings and statements to glean his side of the story. During the last years of his life, living in Canton and Hong Kong, Hu

often wrote articles on his views. He never mentioned the Yueh-fa directly and mainly belabored Chiang on his supine foreign policy and his dictatorial and destructive internal policy. Under certain favorable circumstances, a Yueh-fa could conceivably check dictatorial practices. But a law is only effective if faithfully observed. Perhaps by 1930 Hu had ceased to trust Chiang's intentions and the Yueh-fa only provided the occasion for the split.

Hu was a civilian and Chiang a military man. But deeper than their differences in background and training was a more fundamental difference on the nature of the government, whether it should be under civilian or military control. This perhaps was the most crucial issue. Many of Hu's writings denounced the military control that Chiang represented. On December 16, 1933, in response to Nanking's request that he return to participate in the government, Hu announced eight points as his sine qua non for returning. Point seven insisted that all military forces be put on a systematic basis and point eight that the central government should have direct jurisdiction over military forces.[161] In an article entitled "Military Rule, Party Rule and What Comrades Should Realize About Chinese Politics", Hu blamed China's woes on seven years of so-called tutelage which he claimed had no bearing on what true tutelage should be. The fault? He said it was military rule under Chiang which had replaced party government.[162] In another article entitled "Ideology, Discipline and Ability", Hu equated Chiang's concept of unification with personal dictatorship. He added that under the pretext of anti-CCP campaigns Chiang had created a Generalissimo's Headquarters in Kiangsi which had become the super government and superceded the regular party and government apparatus in Nanking.[163] Thus he turned down several offers for reconciliation initiated by Chiang and never returned to Nanking. Until his death, he continued to attack Chiang's military dominated government.

Chiang's extremely high handed treatment of Hu caused much resentment in the party and inspired fear among many who had hitherto co-operated with him that he was making an all-out bid for personal dictatorship. Take Sun Fo for example. He had been prominent in the Nanking government up to June, 1931, when he slipped out and joined the opposition in Canton. In an interview with a correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung at Canton on July 1, 1931, and later in a speech to the Canton KMT, Sun charged that the Yueh-fa was no issue at all in Hu's ouster. Chiang's real reason, he said, was to remove all possible rivals and opponents to his bid for personal dictatorship.[164] Since the inner story has not been revealed by the principals and probably never will be, it does not seem profitable to speculate on what really happened. Suffice it to say here that Chiang overplayed his hand in this instance. Though Hu had no battalions, as a prestigeous elder he enjoyed much respect throughout the party. The cavalier treatment he was subjected to became the occasion for the showdown between Chiang and the Southwest in 1931-1932.

Thus ended the co-operation between Chiang and Hu. Between 1932 and his death in 1936 Hu lived mostly in Hong Kong and supported the Southwest in opposition to Nanking. Through his mouthpiece, the San-min chu-i yueh k'an, he administered repeated tongue lashings to Chiang on many issues. Repeatedly he castigated Chiang (and Wang) for surrendering to Japanese aggression and for abandoning Sun's ideas of nationalism and for pursuing a divisive domestic policy. Take for example an article he wrote in 1933 entitled "Which is our Road to Salvation". After deriding Chiang for exaggerating the Communist issue as an excuse for not facing Japan he turned to Nanking's insistence that domestic unification must precede resistance of external foe. He continued:

> Only by resisting external aggression can domestic unity be achieved...Because internal unity can best be achieved when all are faced with common threat and a common external foe. Besides, unless it is to resist Japan, what justification is there for unity, what justification for strengthening the central government?[165]

The point in this and many other of Hu's articles is that China needed unity to resist Japan, but that Chiang was the wrong man and his methods were the wrong means to obtain it.

Chiang made several attempts to win Hu back to Nanking with promises of position and influence. They occurred in December, 1933,[166] and during December, 1934--January, 1935, when ranking KMT members including fellow right wingers as Chang Chi and fellow Cantonese as Sun Fo went to Hong Kong to prevail upon him.[167] Finally in December, 1935, the first Plenum of the Fifth C.E.C. even elected him chairman of the standing committee of the C.E.C.[168] But Hu remained unreconciled. He was also ailing and died early in 1936.

In the Chiang-Hu split one sees doctrinal differences over the issue of military dictatorship versus party rule under civilian directions and foreign policy differences over how to unify the nation and how and when to resist Japan. Hu both distrusted Chiang's motives and saw in Chiang's attempts to unify the military as achieving the opposite of his stated aims, i.e., as promoting civil wars and ultimately destructive to China's unity. He saw in Chiang's attempt to unify the party under his control as verging on dictatorship and destructive of true party unity. Above all he demanded changes in policy and leadership so that a truly unified KMT and China would emerge. That he saw as indispensable if China were successfully to resist Japanese assaults to destroy her unity. But Hu had no

battalions. After 1932, the military leaders who dominated the Southwest Political Council (which Hu had helped to found) found his prestigeous presence burdensome, so he lived instead in Hong Kong, where he continued his insistent but futile calls.

Most of the other Western Hill group elders drifted into Chiang's orbit and found the atmosphere and policies of the Nanking government congenial. They were given various positions in the party and government, always high in honor but often without real power. For example, with the reform of the national government at the end of 1931, the position of chairman of the government was made a ceremonial one. Lin Shen became chairman in January, 1932, which post he retained until his death during the war. Chu Cheng became President of the Judicial Yuan and concurrently chief justice of the Supreme Court in 1932, in which posts he remained until the end of World War II. Tai Chi-t'ao was made President of the Examination Yuan in 1928. As a fervent Buddhist he came to espouse many obscurantist practices such as lamaist incantations to alleviate natural disasters. He was one of Chiang's sworn brothers. The only act in Tai's political life which remains an enigma is when he adamantly advocated the bombing of Sian during the Sian Incident, with scant regard for the life and safety of his patron Chiang Kai-shek.[169] But he was also known to have been an emotional and unstable man and herein perhaps lies the answer to his behavior. Finally, Chang Chi held a number of high party posts and was especially useful as emissary on various peace missions to the Southwest.

Thus with the exception of a few who threw their lot in with the Southwest, most of the right-wing leaders gravitated towards Chiang. In rewarding them with high positions, form and decorum were satisfied. Most were quite content with their roles and with neither military nor personal following, were in no position to challenge Chiang. The exception was

Hu Han-min and in this case, after Chiang and Wang beg their co-operation, the main groups of the KMT coalesced behind them so they found it unnecessary to placate Hu, whose continued opposition was an embarrassment but no more.

Conclusion.

The Northern Expedition which had in 1928 brought all of China under the nominal rule of the KMT owed its success to a coalition of military forces each under an independent command. Thus although a national government was established at Nanking, China was still divided into a number of garrison areas, each autonomous militarily and administratively. In some of these areas, even though the ruling general professed adherence to the principles of the KMT, central representatives were barred and KMT organizations were banned.

In this largely decentralized situation Chiang Kai-shek controlled the single largest army and dominated the apparatus of the KMT. As such, he controlled the central government at Nanking. Chiang was the dominating personality during the decade. In him we see an attempt to unify China. Within the context of the ruling party, he attempted unification in two parallel moves. One was military unification and the other was party unification. Since the political situation was very fluid and rule of law and institutional controls had broken down, the last arbiter, force, or threat of force, played an overwhelmingly large role. This is why during this period military disputes were ultimately more crucial than ideological differences, though the two were sometimes interrelated.

Up to September, 1931, Chiang attempted to assert great personal dominance in party affairs and a strict interpretation of military unification. Within the party he attempted to weed out dissent by gerrymandering election regulations to the Third Party Congress so as to pack it with his adherents.

Simultaneously he attempted to unify the military under his control through disbandment and fundamental reforms in the military structure and system. The failure of the Disbandment Conference to achieve any of its set goals demonstrated that the generals would not voluntarily subordinate their personal power and interests to those of an abstract ideal of unification. A series of civil wars ensued and to the military struggle there was sometimes joined the issue of ideological differences between different elements in the party. Due to greater resources available to the central government and not to the provincial generals, the lack of unity among his opponents, and thanks also to the intervention of Chang Hsueh-liang's Manchurian Army, Chiang was able to win superficial victories between 1929-1931. But preoccupation with domestic quarrels had left China's defenses untended which invited Japanese appetite for expansion in Manchuria in 1931.

After September, 1931, as a result of the loss of Manchuria and continued Japanese threats, Chiang was compelled to settle for less in both spheres of military and party unification. Politically, within the party, he conceded to sharing power with Wang Ching-wei but as the dominant partner. Ideologically partnership with Wang led Chiang to accept a Yueh-fa for the tutelage period, which was really a concession of form rather than substance as its existence made no difference to his exercise of power. Administratively Chiang eventually modified his stand and accepted the idea of equilibrium rather than centralization of power. Here again he was only accepting the reality of local autonomy when he was in no position to impose otherwise. Thus on both issues Chiang did not give up anything that he had. But as with all governments, formal commitments are regarded as important and in committing himself on these two issues Chiang was conceding to points made by his rivals. Militarily Chiang abandoned direct coercion as a means to assert

centralized military control. Thus there was no direct attempt to eliminate his military rivals in the KMT. Instead he concentrated on the building up of his army and with a better army he was able to assert more pressure on the dissidents which contributed to their "taming".

Looking at the situation in 1937, one can conclude that in the party, government and army, greater unity existed compared with 1928. In the party the left and right wings had both been reduced to impotence and largely absorbed by the center elements loyal to Chiang. True cliques and groups still existed in the KMT such as the C.C., Political Science Group etc., but they were competing for favor under Chiang. And since the party apparatus dominated the central government and those provincial governments that are under direct central control, it is safe to say also that Chiang was supreme in the government. Militarily there was greater unification than any time since Yuan Shih-kai if not the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, thanks to modernization programs and other factors. Thus it can be concluded that in its government and army, China was emerging for the first time since the republican era as a unified nation in the modern sense. And paradoxically even though so much of the disputes over unification were over Chiang's personality and policies, he emerged at the end of the period as China's undisputed leader in a war of resistance against Japan.

Chapter II. Japanese Pressures and Encroachments on Chinese Unity.

During the years between 1927-1937, China's single most important foreign policy problem was Japan. Resurgent Japanese imperialism proved to be the great obstacle to China's unification. Conversely, Japanese pressures and the mounting pace of Japanese encroachments greatly stimulated the growth of Chinese nationalism which was reflected in student movements, economic boycott campaigns and occasional personal violence against Japanese individuals. The Chinese government reaction to Japanese aggression was to pursue a policy of non-resistance and reliance on the League of Nations and any other international instruments that might come to China's aid and stop Japan. The principle behind this policy was to trade space for time--the space of Manchuria and parts of north China for time to prepare for an eventual reckoning. Such a policy accounted for the surrender of Manchuria and Jehol with hardly a shot fired in resistance, and increasing Japanese dominance over the five provinces of north China in the 1930's with a minimum of serious resistance.

Time was needed to unify China and modernize her army and build up some defense systems. Hence Chiang Kai-shek's dictum "unity before resistance". Chiang's interpretation of this policy of attaining unity was to get rid of all the regional military influence in China, of the generals who though professing loyalty to the Kuomintang posed a challenge to the authority of himself and the Nanking government. Chiang's attempt to impose unity within the KMT under his leadership has been examined in the previous chapter. The other target of Nanking's domestic unification attempt was the Chinese Communist Party which since its split with the KMT had built up its own army and was attempting to establish its own alternate government. This challenge to the Nanking government will be examined in the next chapter.

Unquestionably China was unprepared to face Japan militarily in 1928, 1931, 1935 or even in 1937. Thus during this period China suffered one humiliation and loss after another before Japan. In spite of its other gains on the front of unification, the KMT government was responsible for losing more square miles and millions of Chinese people to Japanese control than its predecessors during many decades of the past, and the more recent losses were approaching nearer to the heartland of Chinese civilization. Compared with such colossal losses, such advances in other areas as increasing control of tariff laws, regaining of some concessions etc. were minor indeed. Small wonder then that Nanking came to be more and more resented for this "unity before resistance" policy. Conversely, it is difficult to see how China could have embarked upon resistance before the attainment of some domestic unity, a policy that some critics of Nanking wanted to see implemented. The crux of the matter, it seems, was the methods and techniques that Nanking employed to gain unity that sometimes turned out to be counterproductive. Thus the government was caught in a vise between domestic indignation if it did not resist Japan (which was seriously undermining its authority), and almost certain defeat if it did. The decision to take up the Japanese challenge in July, 1937, and fight to maintain Chinese sovereignty in remaining parts of north China, however, was to result in an all out Sino-Japanese War and ultimately the undoing of the KMT government.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to search for the hows and whys of Japanese policy towards China, her motive or goals. Nor will it assess the military aspect of Sino-Japanese relations. Rather, the following will examine the reaction of the Chinese government and political leadership to Japanese encroachments and the impact of these on China's strivings for unity.

From the Chinan Incident to September, 1931.

This era of Sino-Japanese relations began and ended with incidents. From its inception the Japanese government regarded the Northern Expedition with jaundiced eyes. They blamed this KMT led movement as the spearhead of nationalism, anti-foreignism and Communist influence. Between May and July, 1927, Japan had sent troops to Kiaochow and Chinan in Shantung province. Both sides of the Chinese civil war announced opposition to this Japanese move. Protests were lodged in Peking on May 31 by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his Foreign Minister Wellington Koo, and in Nanking by Foreign Minister Wu Chao-shu on June 1, [1] and then more formally in July under a proclamation of the National Government.[2] The Chinese people resorted to passive resistance in the form of a nation-wide anti-Japanese boycott during June and July, 1927.[3]

During the spring of 1928, the Northern Expedition resumed its successful march. On May 1, the KMT troops under Chiang's First Group Army captured Chinan, a key city in Shantung. On May 2, Chiang entered Chinan and sent General Fang Chen-wu to call on the Japanese Commander Fukada, requesting withdrawal of Japanese troops from the city and promising that the KMT forces would keep order. However, on May 3, clashes occurred between Japanese and Chinese troops, instigated by the former. Seizing on this opportunity, the Japanese sent for reinforcements, disarmed and interned part of the Chinese garrison and killed Ts'ai Kung-shih, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Representative in Chinan, and his staff members (May 4).[4]

China's response to the Chinan Incident was in many ways to set the tone for future policy. Militarily, it was non-resistance. Chiang ordered the shifting of headquarters from Chinan to Tangchaichuang and ordered the local garrison not to resist, then on the night of May 10 to retreat from Chinan. Meanwhile the main body of KMT troops was ordered to proceed with the Northern Expedition with all due speed,

bypassing Chinan. Diplomatically, negotiations were pursued on several levels. Chiang personally refused to negotiate with the Japanese commander and delegated power to the Chief Commissioner of the War Zone Government, Chiang Tso-pin.[5] On the central government level, a protest was immediately filed on May 4 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Fu to Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka against the unprovoked Japanese attack on Chinan, the bombardment of the city, the killing and imprisonment of Chinese officials and other infringements on Chinese sovereignty. Japan was requested to stop military action, withdraw her troops and resolve the problem peacefully.[6]

The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT went into several emergency sessions and decided that China's main resort in this crisis should be the League of Nations. A draft telegram detailing the facts of the incident was approved by the C.E.C. on May 7 and by the Council of State on the following day. China invoked the League's aid under Article 11, section 2 of the League Covenent and called on the League Council to request Japan to withdraw her troops and added that she would agree to any proper arrangement for an international inquiry or arbitration of the matter. The telegram was sent on May 10 in the name of T'an Yen-k'ai, Chairman of the National Government to Sir J. E. Drummond, Secretary-General of the League. A similar wire was sent on May 12 by Chairman T'an to President Coolidge of the U. S.[7] This reliance on the League of Nations, on mobilizing world opinion, especially the aid of U. S. opinion to restrain Japan, did not net tangible results in this instance. Despite this, the government was to persist in this line of action in the future, most notably in the Mukden Incident.

Meanwhile the aroused public opinion against Japan did reach new heights. It found most concrete expression in the economic boycott movement. Boycott committees and organizations sprang up in Shanghai and Nanking,

spearheaded by students, and spread to such major cities as Canton, Hankow, Kiukiang and others. On the whole they were better and more systematically organized than those of previous attempts.[8] As Shigemitsu, the later Japanese Minister to China, charged, the movement was in every case under KMT direction. It lasted through the second half of 1928.[9]

Altercations and negotiations between Nanking and Tokyo over the Chinan Incident and evacuation of Japanese forces from control of various cities and railways in Shantung were to drag on for almost another year. Finally on March 28, 1929, an agreement was signed by Minister of Foreign Affairs C. T. Wang and the Japanese Minister to China. China agreed to assume full responsibility in protecting Japanese life and property in Shantung in return for full withdrawal of Japanese forces from that province. Withdrawal was to proceed immediately and take up to two months to complete. Each government was to appoint representatives to determine the detailed measures to govern Japanese withdrawal and the transfer of power to Chinese authorities. Each side would also appoint an equal number of representatives to investigate and determine losses sustained by both sides during the Chinan Incident. In a separate memorandum China also agreed to Japan's demands to direct local KMT offices to stop anti-Japanese boycott movements; not to use rolling stock of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway for use on other railways; to use proceeds of that railway to amortize certain debts to the Japanese government and not to direct them to other use; and to employ more Japanese nationals in important positions on that railway. The above Japanese demands were agreed to separately and officially were not part of the package on the Chinan settlement, although in reality they were issues which Japan had regarded as inseparable from the Chinan settlement.[10]

On April 26, 1929, the Chinese government ordered the 3rd, 22nd and 45th Divisions to take over garrisoning of

various sectors of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, and also moved in military police units to guard the Tsingtao and other railway stations.[11] (These were all units loyal to the Nanking government. The exclusion of Feng Yu-hsiang's forces from this Shantung prize which Feng had anticipated was to contribute to the rupture between Feng and Chiang later in 1929, as has been discussed in Chapter I, Part A.) On May 3, Ch'en T'iao-Yuan was appointed special representative for handing over of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and concurrently acting governor of Shantung.[12] Finally on May 21, Ch'en reported the completion without incident of the handing over of Tsingtao, Chinan and Kiaochow-Chinan Railway to his authority by Japan.[13] So ended the Chinan Incident. In spite of the suffering of official and civilian losses and the indignity of foreign occupation, China was fortunate in the ultimate outcome. Japan did step down and restore areas in Shantung which she had for many years coveted. And Japan did this without strong pressure from the League of Nations or any of the signatories of the Nine Power Treaty. China was not going to be so lucky again.

Meanwhile on May 18, 1928, as the Northern Expedition forces were nearing Peking, the Japanese government sent new directives to its Legation in China. On May 19, Minister Yoshizawa personally handed the Japanese note to Chang Tso-lin warning him that should the disorder of China's civil war affect Manchuria, Japan might be forced to take appropriate measures. Yoshizawa also verbally asked Chang to retreat to Manchuria before disorder began and added the threat that should Chang wait for defeat, the Japanese would disarm his troops before letting them pass Shanhaikwan.[14] Japan had always been most anxious that the civil wars and disturbance of China did not spill into Manchuria, where especially in the southern portions she held extensive interests and investments. Therefore she had opposed Chang Tso-lin's move to Peking and his national ambitions, but had

been unable to restrain him. Now Chang was defeated and had to face the displeasure of the Japanese. After conferring with his officers, Chang decided to beat his retreat. On June 4, as the Old Marshal's train was nearing Mukden, it was blown up by a bomb, and he was killed. As established at the Tokyo International Court Trial, that bomb was planted by the Japanese. Chang Hsueh-liang, his eldest son, was at the time in Paoting with some Manchurian units. Fearing that the Japanese might take advantage of the power vacuum in a transition period, young Chang immediately wired an order to keep his father's death a secret, while hurriedly he returned to Mukden with the bulk of the Manchurian army. A secret conclave of Manchurian officers chose young Chang as governor of Fengtien, commander-in-chief of Manchurian Peace Preservation Forces and Chairman of the Peace Preservation Committee. He assumed these posts on June 18, right after the public announcement of his father's death.[15] That young Chang was able to maintain secrecy about his father's death and preside over a relatively smooth transfer of power forestalled the possibility of the Japanese taking advantage of any turmoil to attempt a coup in Manchuria.

One of the points Chang Hsueh-liang stressed at his inaugural speech was his desire to seek an amicable understanding with Japan.[16] On the surface, the status quo seemed to have been maintained. However, on July 1, Chang sent a general telegram to the leaders of the KMT government and armies advocating the calling of a national conference to discuss China's problems. He ordered General Hsing Shih-lien and Wang Shu-han to represent his government in negotiations with the national government.[17] In these moves, Chang was vehemently opposed by two groups. Domestically the Tungpei elders were against moving closer to the KMT, due to their desire to preserve personal power, their feelings of localism and mistrust of the new ideas. This faction was led by two of the Old Marshal's associates,

Generals Yang Yu-ting and Chang Yin-wei. Chang silenced and cowed this group when on January 11, 1929, he had these two men shot on the charge that they were preparing a coup against him on the following day. Chang's advisor, William Donald, backed up this charge and claimed that they had tried to enlist his aid in this quest.[18]

But even more serious was the opposition of Japan. Having become seriously involved in Manchuria since the end of the 19th century, Japan regarded Manchuria as distinct from China proper and marked it out as a sphere where she wished to establish control, whether direct or indirect. Her reasons for this are threefold. One, Manchuria was valuable as potential source of raw materials, food supplies and markets for Japanese exports. Second, Manchuria was strategically important, being adjacent to Korea and possibly could serve as a buffer against Soviet Russia. Third, Japan's claim to a "special position" in Manchuria was based on sentimental as well as practical considerations. Through the South Manchurian Railway, Japan had built up not only a financial empire, but also a separate administration in Manchuria, complete with police force, garrisons, consular jurisdiction etc. Therefore, in the months after June, 1929, Japan put huge pressures on Chang Hsueh-liang, one, to prevent him from declaring allegiance to the KMT government; and two, to extort additional concessions on railway and other economic rights.

Japanese Minister to China, Yoshizawa, wired Chang to warn him not to join the KMT. But most of the representations were made by Japan's Consul-General to Mukden, Hayashi Kyujiro, who saw Chang on June 18, 29, July 18 and again on July 19. On the last of these meetings, Hayashi relayed the following message from Minister of Foreign Affairs Tanaka:

1. The Nanking government was Communist influenced and unstable, therefore Chang should not join it.
2. Japan was willing to come to Chang's aid if Nanking threatened Manchuria with force.

3. The Japanese Shokin Bank was willing to give economic aid to the Manchurian administration.

Baulking at his bullying, Chang informed Nanking of this communication. The result was a Chinese protest on July 21, delivered by the Chinese Minister to Tokyo Wang Yung-pao on this interference in China's internal affairs.[19] But the Japanese warning had its effect. On July 25, a meeting of important officials was held at the Peace Preservation Headquarters at Mukden, when it was decided in principle to raise the KMT flag, but it was also decided to delay the actual move pending further assessment of Japanese attitude.[20]

In August, with Chang Tso-lin's funeral as pretext, Japan sent special envoy Hayashi Gonsuke to Mukden. Between August 4-12 he and Chang held four meetings during which the Japanese government's strong warnings against joining Nanking were reiterated. Without doubt fear of possible Japanese moves delayed Chang's accession to the Nationalist government.[21]

Meanwhile, negotiations were proceeding between representatives of Chang and Chiang in Mukden, Tientsin, Shanghai and Nanking, involving conditions of accession, status of Jehol, financial arrangements etc. Nanking made certain concessions to accommodate Chang, i.e.,Jehol was recognized as part of Manchuria, Nanking agreed to subsidize the Manchurian army to the tune of ten million yuan monthly, and to wait to establish the KMT in Manchuria.[22] As the months went by, Nanking's stature gradually rose, as it won international recognition and concessions from foreign powers on the principle of tariff autonomy. Thus Japan was becoming isolated in her bid to thwart Nanking.

The climax came on December 29, 1928, when Chang Hsueh-liang announced the accession of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol provinces to the central government, and the raising of the KMT flag in the provinces. In return, on December 31, the government issued orders appointing

Chang Commander-in-chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defence Army with Generals Chang Tso-hsiang and Wan Fu-lin as his deputies.[23] Thus on paper the re-unification of China had been completed. The national government's prestige was enhanced. But in reality not much had changed. Nanking had no real control of anything in Manchuria and only confirmed the actual holders of power in their seats, though now under new titles which were more in keeping with KNT terminology. In fact, all the Manchurian appointments made on December 31 by the national government were in accordance with lists submitted by Chang Hsueh-liang and his aides. Japan had been partly responsible for stalling the accession for six months. While ultimately it failed to dissuade Chang from acceding, the reality of Japanese power and influence in Manchuria remained undiminished.

The year 1929 witnessed normalization and improvements in Sino-Japanese relations. During March and April the two governments reached accord in solving the Chinan, Hankow and Nanking incidents, all of which had dated back to the Northern Expedition. On April 27, representatives of the two governments exchanged texts of a new treaty regulating tariff relations.

Manchuria remained a special problem which loomed especially large in Sino-Japanese relations. China wished and demanded the following from Japan:

1. The rendition of Port Arthur and Dairen. (The lease was initially to have expired in 1923 as transferred to Japan by Russia in 1905, but was extended to 1997 as a result of the Twenty-one Demands.)
2. To permit China to redeem the South Manchurian Railway and its subsidiary enterprises, as stipulated by the original treaty agreement. (The SMR included the Antung-Shenyang line which China should have been able to buy back after 1923, and the Dairen-Changchun line which was due after 1939. Each line also had feeder lines. The dates of redemption were extended to 2009 and 2022

respectively under the Twenty-one Demands.)
3. Pending the return of the railways, the S.M.R. Company to be reformed to be under Chinese government jurisdiction and to be purely commercial in nature.
4. Rendition to China of land occupied along the railway lines.
5. Withdrawal of Japanese guards and police force along the railway lines. In addition China desired readjustments regarding Japanese subjects' residency rights in interior areas. These included consular jurisdiction and extraterritorial rights; the right of Japan to maintain consular police force; nationality and naturalization of Japanese subjects of Korean extraction of whom there were over half a million residing in Manchuria; and Japanese interference in local administration and other political activities.[24]

With Japan's extensive interests and ambitions in Manchuria, it is easy to imagine friction and conflicts between Japanese officials and merchants and their Chinese counterparts. This was so in the former days but became sharper after the accession of Chang Hsueh-liang to power. Chang was a nationalist in a newer sense and in his way wished to see China stronger and unified. His vulnerable position between the Japanese and Russian pincers made him more aware of the need for national unity and to strengthen the Chinese element and influence in Manchuria. Thus Chang encouraged increased Chinese immigration into Manchuria, and to speed its opening up, he sponsored pioneering projects and established a Land Reclamation Bureau. In addition, Chang gave ten million yuan from his personal fortunes to the Tungpei University (endowed by his family) and other educational projects; laid out plans to turn the Shenyang Arsenal into a heavy industry factory and began work on Hulutao, a rival port to Dairen.[25] These acts, together with Chinese projects of railway building in Manchuria (begun under Chang Tso-lin) were viewed with extreme hostility and suspicion by Japan. As summarized in 1931

by Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister to China:

> Japan's anxieties are justified if it is remembered that these two lines (Tahushan-Tungliao line begun in 1925 and the Kirin-Hailung line, begun in 1927) are but the forerunner of the more ambitious scheme to build two trunk lines running in a generally north-south direction to the east and west of the SMR, thereby tapping the wealth of the Japanese sphere, and deflecting the traffic from the Japanese artery to the Chinese system with the half-built port of Hulutao as its ultimate terminus. If this scheme should materialize, it is obvious that the whole system of the SMR will be emasculated....The Chinese are building the port of Hulutao obviously to compete with Dairen. On the other hand, China, contrary to the Dairen Customs Agreement of 1907, has discontinued the granting of drawbacks to imported goods transhipped to Manchuria through Dairen from a Chinese Treaty port. This will force the shippers to avoid Dairen and result in economic isolation of the port. The project of the Port of Hulutao and the discrimination against the Port of Dairen are but a manifestation of the Chinese intention to isolate the Leased Territory and the Japanese Railway Interests.[26]

From the foregoingit is clear that Japan feared and resented any economic competition by China to her financial interests in Manchuria.

During 1930 and early 1931, Chang's political star was rising in Chinese politics. His intervention in September, 1930, in the civil war tipped the scales against the Reorganizationist forces in Peiping. As a result, Chang and his Manchurian forces became the hegemon power in north China. Consonant with his waxing influence, Chang called a

series of important conferences in Mukden. One was a military conference, to reorganize his headquarters now that he was vice-commander-in-chief of China's military forces. Another was a conference on finance, attended by delegates offour Manchurian provinces and those of Chahar, Hopei, Shansi, Peiping, Tientsin and Harbin, to bring northeastern finances into accord with general policies of the central government. The third was a railway conference whose aim was to unify all Chinese railways in order to achieve greater strength vis-a-vis Japan and the USSR.[27] Then on March 10, Chang called still another--the Northeastern Communications Conference--for later in the month, with the aim of expanding navigation routes and developing postal, telegraph and telephone communications in north China.[28]

Politically, ties between Chang and Manchuria and the KMT were also getting closer. Between November 12-18, 1930, the Fourth Plenary Session of the Third C.E.C. of the KMT was held in Nanking. As Chiang's new political ally, Chang starred in these meetings. On November 17, he was made officially a member of the KMT and authorized to extend its activities to Manchuria and issue party certificates to military and political leaders there. This was important as in the past old guard Manchurian leaders had resisted the admittance of KMT organization to their provinces. Therefore Chang's heading of the KMT in Manchuria had potential importance in breaking down the semi-independent status of those provinces and speeding their amalgamation into the Chinese structure.[29] Early in 1931, member of the C.E.C. Wu Te-cheng, who in the past had acted as liason between Chiang and Chang, was called to Manchuria to establish KMT branches there.

At the same time as the KMT was extending its activities in Manchuria, more and more of the Manchurian leadership and military strength were diverted to north China. Despite the defeat of the Northern Coalition of Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and their allies in the fall of 1930, their units

were not broken, and through 1931, the balance in north China remained precarious. This had necessitated the dispatching of more Manchurian troops to north China through the summer of 1931. No wonder then that Japan looked at developments in Manchuria as both alarming and presenting new opportunities. The prospect of greater KMT influence and closer relations between Manchuria and the rest of China alarmed Japan. Conversely the preoccupation of Chang and his lieutenants inside the Great Wall, and the depletion of Chinese military strength in Manchuria was viewed by certain Japanese interests as good opportunities not to be lost. Thus as summer progressed in 1931, new tensions and crises were to develop, culminating in the Mukden Incident, September, 1931.

The Wanpaoshan case was indicative of mounting tension in Manchuria. The dispute dated from April, 1931, when a Chinese farmer named Hao Yung-teh leased a tract of land from some group of Chinese villagers. While the contract was under examination by the Changchun municipal authorities, Hao transferred the lease to a group of some one hundred and eight Korean farmers who immediately began working on the land, converting it from dry to irrigated fields by digging a canal some ten miles long, damming and diverting the waters of the Itung River. This canal traversed through fields of neighboring farms and served to cause local indignation and fights. Thereupon the Japanese consul dispatched Consular Police to the scene to protect the Koreans. Several altercations led to casualties among the Chinese, inflicted by the Japanese police. Initially negotiations were held on the local level, between the Japanese consul-general at Changchun and the Changchun Municipal authorities, and after July 22, between the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Legation in Nanking. China's case was based on the invalidity of the initial lease which had never been approved, as required, by the local municipal government; the fact that under the

Chientao Agreement of 1909 Koreans were only allowed to settle and cultivate land in four districts along the Manchurian-Korean border which made Changchun out of bounds for them; and the stationing of police in Japanese consulates and their intervention in local affairs as illegal and against all treaty provisions.[31] The negotiations were protracted, and rather inflammatory reporting in the Japanese press had led to outbreaks of violence against Chinese residents in several Korean cities, which lasted between July 3-13. The riots had results in deaths, expulsions and losses of property.[32] The case was still unsettled when the Mukden Incident occurred.[33]

The Nakamura Case also served to exacerbate Sino-Japanese relations. During June,1931, a Captain Nakamura of the Japanese army, disguised in civilian clothes and posing as an agricultural expert, and accompanied by another Japanese, a white Russian and an Mongol, began wandering in the hinterland of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, areas off limits to foreigners. They were questioned by a Chinese garrison in a small town at Min-an Hsien. A subsequent search found on Nakamura some military maps, notebooks containing military information etc., whereupon they were detained. According to a report submitted by the Northeastern Foreign Affairs Research Commission (headed by Chang Hsueh-liang), Nakamura and his party attempted escape during the night and were shot to death in the ensuing pursuit.[34] This case was still under investigation at the time of the Mukden Incident. In addition, during August, 1931, the Japanese army for several days in succession conducted military maneuvers in Korea and repeatedly crossed into Manchuria. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested to the Japanese Legation, which up to September 18, had not answered.[35]

The three foregoing events are mentioned to indicate that during the summer of 1931 tension in Manchuria had begun to mount. In each case it was the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs at Nanking and not only the local authorities that were involved in the negotiations. This evidence refutes later charges that Chang conducted foreign affairs in Manchuria and negotiated with Japan without reference to the central government. Perhaps Chang was only too happy to shelter behind Nanking's mantle in dealing with the difficult Japanese, but in any case Nanking was beginning to assume responsibility in more international negotiations. Thus they could hardly have been unaware that Manchuria was ripe for Japanese action, and nor were they unaware. For instance, during the summer Minister of Finance T. V. Soong had visited Manchuria in the company of Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister to China. In Dairen they held talks with Count Uchida, President of SMR and in Peiping with Chang Hsueh-liang.[36] During August, 1931, Chang had sent his private secretary, one Tang Erh-ho to Japan to study Japanese attitudes and sound out Japanese leaders on an understanding over Manchuria.[37] Then on September 11, China's representative at the League of Nations, Dr. Alfred Sze, asked the League Assembly meeting the hypothetical question of what it would do if a member nation attacked another.[38] These instances indicate that despite preoccupation with domestic political alignments and power struggle, and also the problems of coping with a disastrous flood of the Yangtze River, both Chang and the Nanking government had premonitions that the Japanese were preparing for some big action in Manchuria. But judging by the subsequent record of confusion, bewilderment and inaction, it is clear that no strategy had been mapped out on how to deal with Japan. Since April, 1931, Chang Hsueh-liang had been in north China, mostly in Peiping, where his headquarters were located. There, his task was to try and keep the local military situation under control for Nanking. He had become ill with typhoid and been hospitalized. On September 18, he left the hospital, went to dinner, then the theater.[39] That was when Japan struck.

The Mukden Incident and Aftermath.

The Mukden Incident was engineered by the Japanese Kwantung Army. Its increasingly truculent stand had caused concern in the Japanese cabinet, whereupon Major-general Tatekawa was dispatched to Mukden by the Minister of War with special injunction from the Emperor that it should exercise caution. Tatekawa arrived in Mukden on September 18, was lavishly plied with food and wine that evening, in the midst of which, on the pretext that a tract of the SMR line had been blown up, Kwantung Army units swung into action. They attacked the northern barracks of Chang's troops with big cannons secretly brought in from Dairen. The Manchurian Incident had started.[40] This was a concerted attack in which the Japanese Kwantung Army and part of the Korean Army moved in unison along the SMR line in the entire area between Changchun and Port Arthur. And its effect was devastating. On September 19, Japanese forces occupied Anshan, Haich'eng, K'aiyuan, T'iehling, Fushun, Changchun, K'uanch'engtzu, Antung, Yingk'ou and others. On that same day Honjo, commander of the Kwantung Army, arrived in Mukden, arrested the governor of Liaoning and on September 21, appointed Colonel Doihara, one of the masterminds of the Kwantung Army, mayor of Mukden. Day after day the Japanese added to their triumphs. By September 25, one week after the incident began, all cities along the railway lines in Liaoning and Kirin had come under Japanese occupation. Heilungkiang held out somewhat longer, but on November 19 its acting governor, Ma Chan-shan, was defeated and the provincial capital Tsitsihar fell to Japanese control.[41]

What was China's reaction to this series of electrifying events? Their concerted and pre-planned nature was immediately apparent and their aim of severing all of Manchuria from Chinese control was clear. To the army units on the scene, the government's order was non-resistance. Whether the idea emenated from Chang Hsueh-liang (as he later was widely

blamed for) or from Chiang and Nanking is immaterial. Had Chang's initial order of non-resistance been unacceptable, why was it never countermanded? The fact is, after looking at all available materials and documents of the period, be they records of government committee meetings, public speeches or interviews, KMT or government orders, directives and manifestoes, no one conceived of resistance. Militarily this was the realistic attitude, for the Chinese army was nowhere near a match for the Japanese. It was equipped with mostly small arms and lacked armor and artillery. The Chinese civil wars of this period were not training grounds for modern warfare. Even in 1937, when the Chinese Army (at least the central units) had much improved as a result of German military techniques etc., it was still much inferior to the Japanese army in training, equipment and command. In addition, as has been discussed previously, some 200,000 of the best Manchurian units and their top commanders were inside the Great Wall, so Manchuria was militarily and politically depleted. Thus for China to declare war against Japan at this juncture would have been suicidal. Local resistance could have and did when it was attempted (eg. by General Ma Chan-shan in northern Heilungkiang) slow down the tempo of Japanese advance. Psychologically, a show of will to resist by the government might have boosted the nation's morale, as witness the number of volunteer groups formed to aid the plucky General Ma.[42]

How did the government then try to handle the problem of Japanese aggression? Its response was to try to shift responsibility to the international community and rely on them for some resolution favorable to China. On September 19, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent telegrams to the League of Nations bringing to its attention the nature and extent of Japanese military operations. On September 21, China made a formal appeal to the League Council under Article 11 of the Covenent, and to the U. S. Government under the Kellogg Pact.[43] On September 19, the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs had also sent wires to its major legations in Europe ordering them to acquaint those governments with conditions in Manchuria and to ascertain their reactions and posture. They were also ordered to try and sway public opinion abroad to sympathize with China.[44]

At 8 pm. September 19, the Standing Committee of the C.E.C. went into emergency session at the Nanking KMT headquarters. The sole issue was how to deal with Japan's actions in Manchuria and they resolved to do the following:
1. The committee to wire Chiang Kai-shek, who was then in his anti-Communist headquarters in Nanchang, to return immediately to Nanking to face the crisis.
2. To continue to lodge protests to Japan on her actions. Also to order Chinese legations and other representatives abroad to do their utmost to rouse international attention to the incident.
3. To issue a directive to all KMT offices on the party's response to Japan and to the members of the C.E.C. in Canton calling for unity. (These wires were sent on September 20. They called on party officers to be vigilant and to rouse the populace to save the nation. To go about this task, three priorities were sent: a, to support the government and to consolidate national strength by totally extirpating the Communists; b, to unite in work to ameliorate the effects of natural disasters and to consolidate defenses; c, KMT members to abandon personal differences and lead the nation to unity.)
4. The Standing Committee to hold daily sessions henceforth. Never was resistance mentioned.[45]

Chiang rushed back to Nanking and on September 22 made a policy speech before the membership meeting of the Nanking KMT at the municipal headquarters. Part of it went as follows:

> It is now five days since Japan began her brutal action. The central government has given the matter detailed study and decidedupon the necessary

> course of action. By now world opinion has unanimously recognized Japan's unreasonableness. Now our citizens must unite and first respond to arbitrariness with reason, to barbarity with peace. We must bear with humiliation and adversity and await the verdict of international justice...This matter is of utmost importance as the survival of the nation is at stake. So we must persuade the people to observe strict orderliness, to obey the government... This forbearance is temporary and absolutely not surrender. Thus, if international law proves ineffective and peaceful solution fails, then when forbearance becomes impossible...the central authorities will have the ultimate will and make the final preparations to lead all the citizenry to make the last sacrifice.[46]

Much the same line was followed when on the next day the National Government issued a proclamation to the nation. It said in part that since the government has brought the case before the League of Nations Council, "therefore we have strictly ordered military units throughout the nation to avoid conflict with the Japanese Army".[47] On September 28, Minister of War Ho Ying-ch'in issued a proclamation to all officers and men of the Chinese army. Besides telling all to bear with humiliation and brace themselves for future sacrifice, not a word was mentioned on resistance.[48] Nor does a survey of the documents from the Southwest KMT dissidents or pronouncements of other leaders of the party produce evidence that they desired active resistance either. So it seems safe to conclude that among the ruling KMT the doctrine of non-resistance was universally endorsed.

In order to study the Japanese problem and help formulate a policy in response, the Central Political Council then created a sub-committee, on September 30. It was

called the Special Foreign Affairs Commission, under the chairmanship to Tai Chi-t'ao. There were thirty-two men on the commission, which included T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung, Lo Wen-kan, Wu Te-chen, Ch'en Li-fu, Wellington Koo, Chang Chun, Ho Ying-ch'in, Chiang Kai-shek and others. It held daily sessions until December 25, 1931. Certain portions of the records of these meetings shed light on both individual attitudes and policy trends.

From the records of these meetings, it seems that the Manchurian authorities and interests were more anxious to make concessions and accommodations with Japan and were less in favor of entire reliance on the League. Whether this approach had a chance or not it seemed more realistic. For instance, at the October 2 meeting one of Chang Hsueh-liang's aides, Li Huang-ying, raised the point that in spite of resolution not to negotiate directly with Japan, it seemed to him unrealistic to rely entirely on the League. Therefore he proposed exploring the possibility of making economic concessions to and co-operation with Japan, especially in southern Manchuria, in order to lessen China's loss of political and military sovereignty. (He justified his proposal on grounds of Sun Yat-sen's plans of international economic co-operation in developing China.) He advocated making informal approaches to Japan with these offers. Li's proposals were passed in principle and further studies were recommended.[49] But records of subsequent meetings show that this subject was never raised again so presumably it was not pursued.

After explorations and discussions, the Special Foreign Affairs Commission passed a series of resolutions of principle at its meeting on October 17. They were:

1. Japanese troop withdrawal must be under League supervision.
2. Future Sino-Japanese negotiations must proceed under League auspices.
3. The location of negotiations must be at Geneva or another place designated by the League.[50]

Then in November Chairman Tai Chi-t'ao submitted a report to the C.P.C. just prior to the convening of the Fourth KMT Congress. In it Tai correctly assessed that Japan's action in Manchuria was aimed at severing it from Chinese control. This explained the Japanese advance towards Chinchow where the remaining Chinese authorities of Manchuria had moved, and Japanese instigated disturbances in Tientsin, Tsingtao and other cities. Should China respond militarily, Japan then would use her military power and other treaty advantages to create disturbances along the Yangtze area and disrupt China's financial foundations and put the capital city under threat. On the League of Nations, the Commission was convinced that Britain and France were anxious to thwart the success of Japan but added that no member nation at this time was ready to declare war against Japan. Nevertheless he urged that China should indicate utter reliance on the League and pointed out the consequences to the League's prestige should it fail to check Japanese aggression. China should follow this line in order to shift its citizens'ire against the government towards the League; in order to maintain international sympathy and good will and in order to cultivate especially the U. S. which though hedging now might eventually invoke the Nine Power Treaty and effectively counter Japan.[51]

The KMT Congress opened its session in Nanking on November 12. The leading domestic issue before it was conciliation between Nanking and Canton and the international issue was Japan. On November 14, the Congress adopted a Declaration to the World. It recounted China's reliance on the League of Nations and acceptance of the League resolutions of September 30 and October 24, which enjoined Japan to withdraw her forces, in compliance of which China has striven to avoid conflicts with Japan. It rejected Japan's demands for holding direct bilateral negotiations and declared that China will not negotiate under duress. Then it invoked the League Covenant, the Washington Treaty,

Kellogg Pact and international morality to come to China's aid and concluded by enjoining the government speedily to make preparations to recover Manchuria and restore China's sovereignty unimpaired.[52] In addition, the Fourth KMT Congress endorsed the report submitted by Chairman Tai Chi-t'ao of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission and resolved to endorse and approve all the domestic and foreign policy acts of the national government from the inception of the Mukden Incident to date.[53] Finally the Congress authorized the convening of a National Emergency Conference on November 22, the details for which were to be worked out by the Fourth C.E.C. Maybe as an afterthought, it authorized the creation of a special commission to study Japanese questions, about which incidentally nothing was heard of again after the Congress closed.[54]

The above was the sum total of what the Fourth KMT Congress resolved to do about Japan's conquest of Manchuria. Besides breast beating and expressions of grief, it was non-resistance and reliance of the international community. Meanwhile, the meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission droned on. There was a lot of talk on how to drum up support of the U. S. and U.S.S.R. They also discussed appointments to various agencies created to accept rendition of Manchuria by Japan, as stipulated by the League resolutions.[55] At the same time Japan pressed on to complete her conquest of Manchuria. By early December Chinchow, the remaining Chinese government headquarters in Manchuria, was hard pressed. This matter was discussed at the December 8 meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission. Chief of Staff Chu P'ei-te reported that according to expert military opinion, the Chinese garrison at Chinchow could hold out a maximum of only one week. He added that there was no possibility of sending reinforcements from inside the Great Wall to aid in the defense of the city.[56] Nonetheless at its third last meeting on December 24, the Commission resolved to wire Chang Hsueh-liang to order the

garrison at Chinchow to do their utmost to defend the city and again to appeal to the League to stop Japanese aggression. Chinchow fell on January 2. It also resolved to appoint a Chinese assessor to participate in the League of Nations Commission on Manchuria.[57] After its last meeting on December 26, 1931, the Commission ceased to function. On January 15, the League of Nations formally established the Lytton Commission to investigate events in Manchuria. On January 17, Pu-yi, the last Manchu emperor entered Shenyang.[58] Japan was well on her way in organizing a puppet government in Manchuria.

As political events in Japan demonstrated at the time, and as revelations of documents later fully proved, Japan's government was undergoing stormy changes during this period. Wide differences were developing between the Ministry of War and the rest of the cabinet under civilian control. Within the Army, there were difficulties, as the Kwantung army became increasingly independent and insubordinate. Could China have benefited if she could have astutely exploited these differences? She could only have attempted this if she were willing to negotiate directly with Japan. And this she adamantly refused to do. Tai Chi-t'ao was an "expert" on Japan and an intimate of Chiang. Yet in the Special Foreign Affairs Commission he (nor for that matter did any of the other "experts" except Li Huang-ying, as indicated earlier) never explored this possibility. And Tai did recognize the divisions among the Japanese government and public. In his November, 1931, report to the C.P.C., Tai listed that the genros led by Prince Saionji, the naval faction, the financiers, the trading interests involved with central and south China, and Europe and the U. S. were all opposed to the army's adventures in Manchuria. He added that temporarily the army's successes have cowed its opponents, and predicted that when the army gets into trouble (how it could with China offering no resistance he did not explain) or if the financial situation deteriorated, the opponents

of the army would re-emerge on top and then and only then will Sino-Japanese relations enter into its proper diplomatic stage.[59] As the world knows, the Japanese army did not have to step down and Tai's predictions proved wrong. Did China then miss a rare opportunity? This question can never be answered.

As the irascible Hu Han-min later recounted, he was under house arrest in Nanking at the time of the Manchurian Incident, and did not have full access to newspapers. On September 21, several C.E.C. members came to ask Hu's opinions. He then had pointed out that the Japanese civilian government did not want war, so China should take advantage of this and work on it, while simultaneously resisting, so he advised. Hu added that of course his advice was ignored and the government, ignorant of other governments' motives and goals, still preferred to place blind reliance on them, hoping for a cheap solution.[60]

In some later writings it became fashionable to blame Chang Hsueh-liang solely for non-resistance. Later circumstances made him peculiarly vulnerable and he was an easy target. But an examination of the materials prove that such accusations do not hold water. Some anti-Chiang writings indicate that it was Chiang who wanted non-resistance, but with a Machiavellian motive--to oust Chang Hsueh-liang's influence in Manchuria and then bargain with Japan for its rendition, after which Manchuria would fall into Chiang's own sphere. This theory seems farfetched. From Chiang's speeches it seems that right from the beginning he was convinced that Japan was in Manchuria to stay and intended to use it as a base of operations for further expansion into China.[61]

As enjoined by the Fourth KMT Congress, a National Emergency Conference was to be called. The aim of calling the conference was to rally all segments of the nation behind the government.[62] A government order was issued on January 18, 1932, which fixed February 1 as the convening

date and the location as Nanking. All patriots were asked to participate in order to save the nation. The Executive Yuan was charged with the organization of the entire conference.[63] On January 23, the government announced the appointment of between 190-200 delegates to the conference. These people were selected from among government and party members, leaders of education, minority leaders and other people of note.[63] Due to the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident and the disruptions that resulted from the fighting and negotiations, the conference did not convene until April 7 in Loyang. And despite later additional appointments, ultimately only one hundred and forty-four delegates attended.[64]

The conference lasted between April 7-12. As President of the Executive Yuan Wang Ching-wei said in his opening statement, the government wished the conference to discuss three main topics:

1. Resistance of foreign aggression.
2. Relief of famine and flood disasters.
3. Pacification of the Communist and other rebellions.[65]

Altogether the conference passed one hundred and ten resolutions which covered a great variety of subjects. Resolution one hundred and ten offered special interest. It reflected a disgust at the disgraceful performance of the Chinese navy during the Shanghai Incident, and called for the scrapping of all present naval schools, arsenals and the auctioning of all the vessels and starting anew.[66] Could even a portion of the resolutions adopted be implemented, China would have been a strong nation indeed. What then did the conference achieve? As the conference chairman Tsang Ch'i-fang said at the closing session, maybe the benefits were more spiritual than actual in nature.[67] In terms of concrete achievements against Japanese aggression, it did not and could not do anything. In attempting to show solidarity, the government included Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and overseas Chinese among its delegates, and even then only the fairly mild and

'tame' critics were included. It is significant that those who were most vociferously for resisting Japan--the students--were not included. Also, as the conference was only a temporary body, it could not put pressure on the government to accept any of its recommendations. So boiled down, it was another piece of window dressing. But though it had no impact on either Chinese or Japanese government policy, it continued to be used by the Chinese government as a perhaps useful technique for boosting morale and to give the appearance of unity.

On the popular level, one effective method adopted that has hurt Japan in the past was the boycott movement. These were spontaneous in origin and were spearheaded by labor unions and student organizations. The merchants selling Japanese goods either complied voluntarily or were sometimes coerced into compliance. In retaliation for the Wanpaoshan Incident, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce on July 13, 1931, decided upon immediate severance of economic relations with Japan.[68] During the summer months, the boycott had spread to Tientsin and the middle Yangtze area. In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident, widespread indignation against Japan made this movement a nationwide one, with student pickets organized to enforce it. Late in September, the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association was changed into the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association; and early in October one hundred and fifty labor unions in that city representing some 800,000 workers formed their own Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association. By the end of October, Japanese trade at Shanghai was almost at a standstill.[69] The movements were spontaneous, and although the KMT was a factor, its role was difficult to determine. In this case the movement petered out during the spring of 1932, partly because of fighting in Shanghai and partly because for various reasons, the government had moved in to suppress boycott associations.[70]

The boycott movement was caused by, and also contributed to, the further deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. In the months after September 18, Japan added to the tension by creating disturbances, landing marines, intervening with consular police in port cities all along the Chinese coast and inland waterways, for example, in Tientsin, Hankow, Amoy and Canton. But it was in Shanghai that full fighting erupted. The feeling of interservice rivalry was such that the Japanese army's successes in conquering Manchuria left the Navy itching for action. Japanese naval officers were dreaming up plans of action for Shanghai and restraint on them by civilian authorities was getting more difficult.[71]

On the Chinese side the end of 1931 and early 1932 was a period of intense chaos. As a result of bargaining between Nanking and Canton, finalized in the Fourth KMT Congress, certain of the Southwest leaders came to power in Nanking. The 19th Route Army was given the task of garrisoning the Nanking-Shanghai area as part of the compromise. It was a good fighting unit, ideologically inspired and under the able direction of Generals Chiang Kwang-nai, Ts'ai Ting-kai and Tai Chi. Towards the end of October they took over their garrison duty. General Ts'ai had little enthusiasm for his new job and instead wanted to go fight in Manchuria with those of his men who would volunteer. According to Ts'ai, Chiang Kai-shek was very against his plans.[72]

Trouble began on January 18, 1932, when five Japanese monks on passing the San Yu Cotton Textile Factory were set upon and beaten by workers in that factory. Thereupon the Japanese consul protested to the Shanghai Municipal government and threatened to intervene with marine units.[73] On September 20, the same factory was several times fire bombed and burned down. On the same day some two thousand odd Japanese residents held an anti-Chinese meeting, after which they paraded the streets and fighting broke out between them and Chinese police and residents.[74] On January 23, the

Japanese Consul-General to Shanghai Murai called on Mayor Wu Te-chen with four demands. They were:

1. The Mayor to apologize to the Japanese Consul-General.
2. Arrest and punishment of the guilty.
3. Compensation to the five monks.
4. Prohibition of Anti-Japanese movements, especially the Shanghai Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association.

Wu replied that Chinese law provided for arrest and punishment of the guilty, that he will consider items 1 and 3, and as for item 4, he could not interfere with legal organizations.[75]

Tension mounted in the following days as Japan was not satisfied with Wu's reply and raised additional demands. Japanese naval reinforcements began arriving and deploying. She further demanded that the Chinese garrison should retreat thirty kilometers to the west of Nanhsiang, which China agreed to do.[76] In further moves of conciliation Mayor Wu on January 27 accepted the four demands of the Japanese Consul-General in toto. The Japanese Consul-General had pronounced himself satisfied. It was decided that the 19th Route Army would begin withdrawal on the morning of the 29th. But during the night of January 28, Japanese armed detachments began to attack Chapei. Faced with an immediate decision, General Ts'ai had ordered his men to resist if attacked, and they did.[77] In the early hours of January 29, soon after the initial contact, leaders of the 19th Army held a conference in which they decided on defense tactics and movements, then wired to the party and government, press and people of China an account of events leading up to the conflict and their determination to resist.[78]

This outbreak caught Nanking in a moment of great confusion. Wang Ching-wei had just assumed office as President of the Executive Yuan and Chiang Kai-shek was still in Fenghua where he had been since the Fourth KMT Congress. In this state, it is doubtful whether the government could have responded to a crisis. Anyway, the 19th Route Army,

which was from Kwangsi and enamored of neither Wang nor Chiang, did not give either a chance to intervene. Thus Nanking was faced with a fait accompli.

On January 29 Wang Ching-wei, as President of the Executive Yuan, issued an order that the government was moving to Loyang. He said that the government did not want its seat of operations to be threatened by proximity to the war zone and therefore had decided to move.[79] In a speech on January 31, in Kaifeng, Wang further elaborated. He said that China would neither break relations with nor declare war against Japan and then reminded the nations of the world on their obligations to intervene to stop Japan, the breaker of treaties.[80] This time the Powers did play an active and effective role in mediating a settlement with Japan.

On the fighting front, Japan failed in her promise to capture Shanghai in four hours. Despite repeated and heavy reinforcements and participation by navy, army and air force units, the Chinese defenders held on. With the public ecstatically in support of the 19th Route Army and demanding reinforcements, and with the Japanese enlarging their units, it was clearly necessary for the Chinese government to respond. On February 1, Chiang Kai-shek convened a military conference at Hsuchow, attended by officers who owed allegiance to him.[81] On February 3 Chiang returned to Loyang to consult with other leaders, and three days later the Military Affairs Commission was established, empowered to direct military affairs. (Chiang was later appointed its chairman.) Chiang decided to reinforce the 19th Route Army with some of his own units. On February 14, the 87th and 88th Divisions of the 5th Army and the Cadet corps were ordered into action. Its commander was General Chang Chih-chung and his orders were to work under the 19th Route Army.[82] These departed from Nanking on February 16 and arrived for action on the following day.[83]

To deal with the Shanghai emergency, the Second Plenary Session of the Fourth C.E.C. was convened early in March, 1932. On March 4, it adopted certain guidelines on military and diplomatic conduct. It resolved that the Chinese military should be used primarily for national defense, and only secondarily to suppress the insurrections.[84] This would seem to indicate that highest priority should be given to reinforcing the Shanghai defenders, and additional troops were sorely needed. With heavy reinforcements, Japan's plans seemingly were to launch a huge offensive and hopefully finish off the situation before the March 3 session of the League of Nations Assembly convened especially to consider China's complaints. By mid-February, Ch'en Ming-chu was in Shanghai and he joined the other leaders of the 19th Route Army in appealing for reinforcements. On February 22, they wired Chiang and Wang pleading against retreat and begging for artillery and infantry units, naming specifically certain units in Hupei and Kwangsi.[85] They were to be disappointed. On February 23, a return wire came from the Chief of Staff saying that no help could possibly come for at least ten days as none had been mobilized.[86] However, on February 24, one regiment of Shang-Kwan Yun-hsiang's troops did manage to cross the Yangtze (where Japanese naval vessels were a threat).[87] But then Shang-Kwan refused to proceed to the front to fight. Another unit, an Independent Brigade under Tai Yo agreed to come to Shanghai, proceeded to Hangchow, but then was refused permission by the governor of Chekiang to proceed any further.[88] From these vignettes, one can piece together a picture of chaos and confusion, a true fiasco. By the end of February the last major Japanese offensive began.[89] Isolated and out flanked, the 5th and 19th Route Armies were compelled to retreat.

The Chinese government in its pronouncements had committed itself to total resistance. Why did its actual record show otherwise? According to a subsequent government report and analysis, two factors prevented the sending

of relief forces. One was the threatening stance of numerous Japanese naval patrol boats along the Yangtze and bombing of areas near the capital by Japanese planes. The other factor it mentioned was the Communist forces in central Kiangsi, who, it was said, were interferring with government troop movements. The report continued that since the League of Nations had passed a resolution against enlargement of the incident, China was acting in obedience to it.[90] It must be added that the government found sloganeering easy and implementation of resolutions difficult. Thus while carried away by rhetoric, it expressed determination to resist but when the time came found the price too high and the task too difficult. In his autobiography, Ts'ai Ting-kai expressed great bitterness over the meager support he got. He castigated Wang Ching-wei as insincere and pro-Japanese and therefore willing to sabotage the 19th Route Army.[91] He also suspected Chiang of ill will towards his army and cited his audience with Chiang on April 24, 1932, in Nanking on the day that Chiang became Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission as evidence. Chiang then had told him sternly in the future always to obey orders, which he construed to imply disapproval for his resistance.[92]

On the international front, the Shanghai Incident resulted in more constructive attention by the Powers. At the special session of the League Assembly on March 3, China invoked Article 15 of the Covenant and requested integral settlement of the Shanghai and Mukden Incidents. Japan disavowed territorial ambition in the Shanghai area and expressed willingness to withdraw her forces once calm is restored. She rejected any suggestion for simultaneous settlement of the two incidents. At a subsequent meeting of the League Assembly on March 11, forty-six nations present (China and Japan abstained) unanimously endorsed a resolution of non-recognition of territorial changes obtained in violation of existing treaties and invoked Article 15, section 9, of the League Covenant to provide

guidelines in solving the Shanghai issue. The assembly also provided for the organization of a Commission of Nineteen Nations to discuss the cease-fire and troop withdrawal questions.[93]

Along the front, a de facto cease-fire had been in effect since early March. Thanks to the mediation of the Ministers of Britain, the U. S., France and Italy in China, and the surveillance of the League Commission, negotiations proceeded between the Chinese and Japanese. The end came on May 5, when the Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement was signed. It provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops to within the International Settlement and Chinese troops to beyond thirty kilometers of Shanghai.[94]

Thus ended the Shanghai Incident. Thanks to the stout resistance of the 19th Route Army which blunted Japan's aggressive impetus; also thanks to the location of Shanghai as a center of Western trade and investment which brought on the active interest and mediation of Britain and the U. S., China came out relatively well in the Ceasefire Agreement. Yes, the withdrawal of Chinese troops to beyond Shanghai was a compromise to her sovereignty but comparatively a minor one. Normalcy soon returned to the Yangtze area.

In the meantime, having completed her conquest of Manchuria, and in order to mask her naked aggression, Japan created a puppet state of Manchukuo on March 9, 1932. The Chief Executive and later Emperor of this state was none other than Pu-yi, the last Ch'ing Emperor of China who had been persuaded to go to Manchuria from Tientsin sometime earlier by the chief of the Kwantung Army Secret Police Doihara Kenji.[95] China replied by a government declaration on March 12 which pointed out Japan as the instigator and controlling force behind the puppet government and protested the violation of her sovereignty.[96] At about the same time, the Lytton Commission was also at work. After spending some time in China, Japan and Manchuria, the Commission issued a report on October 1, 1932. It branded Japan as the aggressor

in Manchuria, refuted its claim that Manchukuo was a spontaneous local movement and advocated its restoration to China under a local regime which enjoyed a high degree of autonomy; the maintenance of the Open Door policy, with special consideration for Japanese and Soviet commercial interests.[97]

After studying its provisions, the Nineteen Nations Commission drafted specific proposals based on recommendations of the Lytton Report. At the League Assembly meeting on February 14, 1933, China signalled her total acceptance of its recommendations. The Report was then accepted by the Assembly with one dissenting vote--that of Japan.[98] Following her diplomatic defeat, Japan, on March 27, announced her resignation from the League. However, the realities remained unchanged. China had lost Manchuria. Whether a combined policy of resistance and direct negotiations might have netted her some advantages no one will know. But the results could hardly have been more disasterous than what she got from following the policy she did.

Loss of Jehol, the Great Wall Campaign and Tangku Peace.

During the summer of 1932, Japanese pressure on Jehol and along the Great Wall quickened. For seven years now Jehol had been governed by Tang Yu-lin, an old Manchurian general. Although on December 29, 1928, he had announced allegiance to the National Government, he had remained aloof and spent his time in trading opium and investing in real estate in Manchuria. He claimed that increased trafficking in opium was necessary since he no longer received the 300,000 yuan per month subsidy from the central government.[99] He controlled a personal army of some thirty thousand ragged and ill-disciplined troops. Since the Mukden Incident, Tang had sat on the fence while secretly intriguing with the Japanese. He let several strategic areas in his province, such as Kailu and Pingch'uan, slip under Japanese control with no resistance. Meanwhile, Japanese agents were also

buying up nearly all the food supply in Jehol resulting in near famine conditions for the inhabitants.[100]

In another of its futile exercises, the government on July 21 ordered Tang to resist Japan with all his force. On the previous day Chiang had also wired Chang Hsueh-liang to send forces to Jehol to aid Tang.[101] Conflicts of authority between Chang and Tang arose. Tang refused to give up supreme command and initially even refused to admit outside troops into his province.[102] Complicating matters still further was the old feud between Chang Hsueh-liang and President of the Executive Yuan Wang Ching-wei. In a speech before the KMT Central Party headquarters on August 29, 1932, Wang stated that in March of that year he had sent Minister Ch'en Kung-po and General Li Chi-shen to Peiping to confer with Chang on the sending of Shansi units into Jehol to aid in its defense. This was followed by a personal visit to Chang in June. Wang charged that on both occasions Chang thwarted his plans so that Jehol was left defenseless.[103] However, towards the end of 1932 and in early 1933, Tang did allow additional forces into his province. These included Manchurian troops under Chang's two top aides, Generals Chang Tso-hsiang and Wan Fu-lin, and Kuominchun forces under General Sun Tien-ying.[104] But it was too late. On February 25, 1933, Japan launched full scale invasion of Jehol. Tang's rag-tag army dissolved and he fled the provincial capital Changteh without resistance on March 5. Although Wan Fu-lin and his units resisted in areas south of Lingyuan, they were forced to retreat to inside the Great Wall.[105] Acting President of the Executive Yuan T. V. Soong, who had visited Jehol in February of that year, had predicted that Japan could take Jehol in between seven to ten days.[106] And it came true. Japan had announced that she considered Jehol part of Manchukuo and with minimal struggle she had obtained it. The usual recriminations followed. On March 8, the government issued a mandate ordering the dismissal and arrest of Tang Yu-lin,

and on March 11 Chang Hsueh-liang wired his retirement from government to atone for his part in the loss of Jehol.[107]

Meanwhile on January 1, 1933, fighting had broken out along the passes of the Great Wall. With concerted air and armored support, Japanese units attacked Shanhaikwan, Yukwan and Chiumenkou, strategic fortresses along the eastern end of the Great Wall. China's reaction was simultaneously to protest to the League of Nations and to order the local forces to resist in self defense.[108] By January 13, the above three points had fallen to Japan, which not only gave Japan a more advantageous position to outflank Jehol, but also exposed east Hopei, including Peiping and Tientsin, to Japanese advances. Japan's intentions became quite clear on January 21 when her Minister of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that Japan regarded the Great Wall as boundary between Mongolia-Manchuria and China and regarded Jehol as part of Manchukuo.[109] Then on February 23, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a set of demands to China that both sides of the Great Wall be made into neutral zones. China refused.[110]

Initially Nanking was hoping that the fighting would not spread and therefore regarded it more as a local matter. Thus in the midst of the mounting crisis in the north, Chiang assumed his post as commander-in-chief of another anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi. So besides exhorting the northern units to defend the soil, nothing very constructive was done about helping them.[111] However, when Japan launched her full scale attack on Jehol and renewed her assault on other passes along the Great Wall, Nanking felt alarmed. On March 3, Minister of War Ho Ying-ch'in was sent north to help Chang Hsueh-liang plan resistance. After Chang's resignation on March 9, Ho was appointed Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission to replace him.[112]

On March 4, Japanese forces launched an all out attack along the Great Wall Passes. The situation was so grave that Chiang rushed to Peiping to direct military affairs. In a series of moves he appointed Yu Hsueh-chung to defend the Tientsin-Tangku area; Wan Fu-lin to garrison Luan Ho; Shang Chen, Sung Cheh-yuan, Hsiao Chih-ch'u and Hsu T'ing-yao to defend Lengk'ou, Hsifengk'ou, Kupeik'ou and other forts along that line. Then he ordered Fu Tso-yi to prepare a second line of defense at the Huaijou, Shunyi area.[113] It should be noted that except for only one, the Second Division under General Huang Chieh, no other central units were deployed in the campaign. Maybe Chiang felt that his presence lent moral support to the cause but under the circumstances his brief stay could hardly have been counted on by anyone to perform miracles. The units and generals ordered to the front were all from the Manchurian, Kuominchun and Shansi armies. Two months of warfare resulted. Some Chinese troups fought well, especially the 29th Army under Sung Cheh-yuan and the 17th Army under Hsu Ting-yao. But by the end of May Japan had broken through China's lines, as one after another the passes fell. Japanese bombing missions were threatening Peiping and the tense city was filling up with sandbags and refugees.[114] Again in the official accounts, the critical nature of the Kiangsi anti-Communist campaign was blamed as the reason why the central government could not spare units for north China. Already on April 4, Chiang had returned to Kiangsi. He also pleaded the Communist menace as excuse. But I think that a deeper and more compelling reason for Chiang to flee the scene was not the extent of the CCP military threat but his fear of a personal defeat by the Japanese. This fear also explains why he would not commit his own central units to the Japanese front. This fear was two fold. For one, he feared that a personal defeat by Japan would wreck his standing and prestige in the government, perhaps irrevocably. Nor did he wish to see his carefully nurtured central units

destroyed by the Japanese, for then what would stand between him and the rival KMT claimants to power?

Having achieved her goal of taking Jehol and the Great Wall passes, the Japanese Minister of War declared on May 27 willingness to negotiate. Already on May 4 China had cleared the way diplomatically for negotiations. On that day the C.P.C. had appointed Huang Fu Chairman of the Peiping Political Affairs Reorganization Commission.[116] Huang and Ho were both persona grata to the Japanese as they had been educated in Japan and had many friends there. On May 29 ceasefire talks opened at Tangku with British Minister Sir Miles Lampson as mediator. Four days later, on May 31, the agreement was signed. It provided for mutual withdrawal of troops. But the Japanese troops did not have to withdraw to Jehol, only to the Great Wall line, which dips well into Hopei. The area south of the Great Wall was to be demilitarized with only Chinese police allowed to remain. Thus Japan controlled the Great Wall passes and not only were thousands of square miles added to Manchukuo but the latter was also relieved of any military threat from China.[117]

But President of the Executive Yuan Wang Ching-wei had the nerve in an official statement for the occasion to say that the Tangku Agreement was purely military in nature and had no political implications.[118] Wang was more truthful in a report to the C.P.C. explaining the agreement. There he voiced the government's fear that dissatisfied erstwhile warlords Shih Yu-shan and Pai Chien-wu were intriguing with Japanese agents and had been secretly funded by them to rebel and worse yet to form a puppet regime in north China. If this were to be realized, Wang added, a disastrous and unmanageable situation would arise. Thus the government was compelled to cut its losses and agree to terms.[119] Whatever the reason the agreement represented another humiliating loss of territory. A sampling of newspaper

editorials from different centers of China showed most of them dissatisfied with the government on this agreement and opposed to its concessions.[120]

A side episode was the Japanese and quisling invasion of Chahar in the spring of 1933 which culminated in the capture of the key city of Dolonor on April 29. By the end of May the whole of Chahar was threatened. Then emerged Feng Yu-hsiang who on May 26, 1933, took oath as Commander of the Chahar Anti-Japanese Allied Army, which he forged out of the units of an erstwhile subordinate Sun Tien-ying, soldiers who had fled from Manchuria and Jehol, local guerrillas and others.[121] In three months they were able to free four hsien in east Chahar from Japanese control. The climax came on July 11 when Feng captured Dolonor.[122] But all this was to no avail. For one thing the revival of Feng's career was a threat to Nanking and Chiang and then also his successes were an irritating blow to Japan. If Feng were to be successful against Japan, public opinion might force Chiang to support him as the Tangku Agreement was unpopular. Chiang, of course, did not wish to upset the applecart with Japan and equally he was opposed to Feng's establishment of himself in north China. Thus for different reasons both Japan and Chiang wanted to eliminate Feng. To pressure Feng, Ho Ying-ch'in began to move troops up from Peiping to near Chahar.[123] Early in August Feng was forced to recognize realities and returned once more to retirement. On August 13, Japanese troops again occupied Dolonor.[124]

From Tangku to the Ho-Umetsu Agreement.

Returning to the overall north China situation, the Tangku Agreement by no means marked an end to Japanese demands. On July 3, 1933, Japanese Minister to China called a conference in Dairen of Japanese consuls in China and here additional demands to complement the Tangku Agreement were formulated. After Minister Ariyoshi's

return to Nanking on July 7, these began to be pressed on the Chinese government. Wang Ching-wei listed these demands as the re-establishment of communications and postal system between China and Manchukuo, i.e., the normalization of relations between these two countries. Negotiations ensued between representatives of the Japanese Kwantung Army and the Chinese Ministers of Railways and Communications, which worked out the means and details.[125] The results? On June 20, 1934, the Chinese government established customs stations along the Great Wall passes and thirty-six items produced in Manchukuo came into China duty free. The justification was that Manchuria was still part of China.[126] On June 28, an agreement was signed on the restoration of through railway communications between Peiping and Shenyang. This agreement also provided for the resumption of postal, telephone and telegraph services.[127] The above amounted to de facto recognition of Manchukuo. Nor was this all. Japan was now developing a two-pronged attack, one aimed at north China and the other at Inner Mongolia.

More than this Japan was now proclaiming a special status for herself in China as a whole. This came in the form of the Amau Declaration, made on April 17, 1934, by the spokesman of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In it he proclaimed that Japan had a special mission in China, she opposed China's policy of playing off one foreign nation against another and opposed any international group giving technical or financial aid to China.[128] On October 29, 1934, T. V. Soong resigned as Minister of Finance after successfully enlisting U. S. and European aid in loans to China. Was this partly anyway a victory for the Japanese in applying the Amau Declaration?

Chiang was prompted to make a reply, published in October, 1934. It was really composed by Ch'en Pu-lei, Chiang's secretary, and titled "Enemy or Friend? A Review of Sino-Japanese Relations". For convenience sake, it initially bore the authorship of one Hsu Tao-ling.[129]

It was termed a "last sincere warning" to both China and Japan. It analyzed past mistakes and failures on both sides and as for the future stated that China will rely on herself for defense and not rely on treaties and the intervention of the Powers. Finally, it called on Japan to initiate a new era in Sino-Japanese relations by opening direct negotiations for the rendition of Manchuria and Jehol.[130] The meaning of parts of this article is vague, perhaps purposefully so, as I think Chiang was tentatively holding an olive branch to Japan perhaps hinting concessions to her in the hope of making some settlement.

The Kwantung Army and other Japanese interests, however, saw the Tangku Agreement as opening the door for further opportunities in north China. In an effort to disrupt the Chinese monetary and revenue systems, a huge smuggling effort was organized. Ch'inhuangtao and Tangku became centers of armed smuggling trade for boats. On land, quantities of contraband goods passed the Great Wall quite freely in both directions. Chinese customs officials and police were powerless to intervene due to the protection given the smugglers by the Japanese military. The situation turned into a disaster for China in the spring and summer of 1935 as millions of ounces of silver, the basis of the currency, were smuggled out of China. (The impetus was provided by the U. S. government's decision early in 1934 to purchase silver, which led to a rise in its value in the international market.) The result was financial instability in China and huge losses of revenue. For example, between August 1, 1935, and April 30, 1936, Chinese customs revenue losses due to smuggling in north China totalled some 25,506,946 yuan.[131] Such Chinese measures as the government rules against smuggling of June 19, 1934,[132] and the C.P.C. enactment of October 29, 1934, to implement an export tax on silver[133] were all of minimal effect. The reason was they could not be effectively enforced without provoking confrontation with the Japanese.

After the Tangku Agreement, the initially feeble Japanese army in north China gained additional manpower and thus became more overt and active in its interference in Chinese local affairs.[134] On the other hand, hamstrung by many of the conditions of the Agreement, Chinese authorities found it increasingly difficult to discharge their duties. Japan began to advocate the creating of a special status for north China--in particular Hopei and Chahar provinces. Events came to a head in May, 1935, when two pro-Japanese newspaper editors were assassinated in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin.[135] With this as pretext, commander-in-chief of the Japanese garrison of the Peiping-Shenyang Railway garrison force Umetsu served five demands on Ho Ying-ch'in, Chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission, on May 29, 1935. They were as follows:

1. Resignation of General Yu Hsueh-chung as governor of Hopei and the withdrawal of his 51st Army and all the central government's troops (2nd Division) from Hopei.
2. Capital city of Hopei province to be removed from Peiping to Paoting.
3. Immediate removal of Mayor Chang T'ing-ngo and Public Safety Chief Li Chun-hsiang of Tientsin; dismissal of the commander of military police Chiang Hsiao-hsien and director of political training bureau Tseng Kwang-ch'ing. The Hopei provincial and municipal KMT organizations and the political division of the Branch Military Affairs Commission to cease their activities; and the dismantling of anti-Japanese organizations.
4. Strict punishment for the assassins and compensation to the victims' relatives.
5. Prohibition of anti-Japanese books and publications.

China's attempt to reroute the negotiations through diplomatic channels failed. Thus Ho Ying-ch'in was faced with the challenge. Japan backed up her demands by increasing her troop strength in the Peiping-Tientsin area and threatening the use of force. On June 10, 1935, Ho caved in and signed

the Ho-Umetsu Agreement, which was a capitulation to all of the original demands. On the same day and in the same connection, the Nanking government issued a "Goodwill Mandate" in which Chinese citizens were enjoined to be sincere and amicable to friendly nations, and were promised punishment if they acted otherwise.[136] On June 15, Ho left Peiping, followed by Yu Hsueh-chung and the Manchurian units, hitherto in north China. General Sung Cheh-yuan, commander of the 29th Army was left to hold the helm as chairman of the newly created Hopei-Chahar Political Council.[137] As Shigemitsu commented:

> It was a severe blow to the prestige both of the Kuomin troops and to Ho himself....Thereafter the Japanese Army plans to establish a favorable administration in north China came, little by little, to fruition.[138]

Later Wang Ching-wei explained to the press that China was compelled to accept as the alternative was war. He said that it represented merely a change of tactics, i.e. withdrawal of certain units and changing of local executive leaders and as such did not merit the name of diplomacy.[139]

By whatever name the government called it, the Ho-Umetsu Agreement meant the suppression of anti-Japanese students, press and boycotts, the dismantling of KMT machinery in Hopei and Chahar and the emergence of Japanese sponsored and protected traitor movements in north China. On November 11, 1935, a local provincial official (Administrative Commissioner of the Luantung Demilitarized Zone at Tungchow), Yin Ju-keng announced the formation of the East Hopei Anti-Communist Defense Council with himself as chairman. His mentor and protector was Doihara Kenji of the Kwantung Army.[140] This meant another twenty-two hsien taken away from China's sovereignty, ten thousand square miles and a quarter of Hopei province, with a population of four million people.

The area was also strategically important as it controlled part of the Peiping-Liaoning railway system and highway junctions.[141] The only official Chinese reply was an order on November 26 branding Yin traitor and declaring him under arrest.[142] Another order issued on the same day provided for the abolition of the Peiping Branch Military Affairs Commission. Still another appointed Ho Ying-ch'in Special Representative of the Executive Yuan in Peiping, and Sung Cheh-yuan Pacification Commissioner of Hopei-Chahar.[143] Other reshufflings to officials were to take place, all in response to and sometimes in order to avoid Japanese pressure. These delaying tactics bought time and perhaps avoided a frontal clash but solved no fundamental problems. Attempts by the Hopei-Chahar authorities to negotiate with Japan on the abolition of the autonomous movement resulted in Japanese counter demands to clarify the whole north China situation by extending autonomy to all five provinces of north China, i.e. Hopei, Chahar, Shansi, Shensi and Suiyuan.[144]

Japan in Inner Mongolia.

The Japanese were also proceeding with their design to detach Western Inner Mongolia from China. (These included Chahar, Suiyuan and Ninghsia provinces. Jehol in Eastern Inner Mongolia was under Japanese control already.) For strategic reasons, Japan regarded Inner Mongolia as an appendage of Manchuria. The Inner Mongolia problem was complicated by the friction between ethnic Han Chinese and Mongols, and rapid Chinese migration into the area had increased Mongol discontent. Besides resentment over their economic loss, Mongols had also been denied their desired self-government by Nanking and the governors appointed by the central government. These factors made the Mongols more susceptible to Japanese intrigues.

After Feng Yu-hsiang was ousted from Chahar, Japan re-asserted her control of the eastern section of the province.

On December 7, 1933, a "special region" of fifty-six thousand square miles centering on Dolonor was created under Japanese auspices as an appendage of Manchukuo.[145] Japanese agents had considerable success with Prince Teh, leader of the West Sunid Banner in north Chahar, who between August and November, 1933, was working for the creation of an autonomous government for Inner Mongolia. Successive conferences among Mongol leaders were held in Pailingmiao towards that end.[146] This prompted Nanking to send Minister of Interior Huang Shao-hsiung to the spot to try and win back the Mongols. Nanking was now compelled to make concessions and consented to the creation of the Mongolian Local Autonomous Political Council on April 24, 1935, under the control of two Mongol leaders, Princes Yun and Teh.[147]

But Japan continued to push her schemes. During the summer of 1934 she used Jehol as the staging ground to attack Tungch'atzu in Chahar. This time they were repelled by units under General Chang Tzu-chung. (Not the commander of the 5th Army of Shanghai Incident fame but a Kuominchun officer now under Sung Cheh-yuan.) She renewed her efforts in January, 1935, and this time was able to occupy much of east Chahar.[148] China was again compelled to make concessions. At the negotiations at Tat'an which lasted between January 20 and February 2, 1935, China lost some seven hundred square miles of territory in east Chahar to Jehol, so now only ten hsien remained under the Chahar provincial government's control. Supposedly it was a local agreement, and a verbal one at that between General Sung and the local Japanese commander. But Sung was at every step in contact with Nanking and was ordered by Wang Ching-wei and Ho Ying-ch'in to concede.[149] In June, 1935, with some border incidents in Chahar as pretext, Doihara presented the acting governor of Chahar Ch'in Te-shun with a set of demands. Upon requesting the central government for instructions, Ch'in received the following reply: "Authorized to settle affair within the bounds of preserving our territorial

integrity".[150] The result was the Ch'in-Doihara Agreement of June 27, 1935, which provided for the dismissal of Chinese officers involved in the incident; evacuation of four hsien by units of the 29th Army and turning over these areas to local militia control; the Chinese government not to sponsor immigration into Chahar; and removal of KMT organizations in Chahar.[151] Broad indeed was China's interpretation of what did not constitute an infringement of national sovereignty.

Rivalry between various Mongol banners and chiefs (especially a split between the Chahar and Suiyuan Mongols), aggravated by Japanese intrigues, led to the collapse of the Mongol Autonomous Council in February, 1936. On May 2, a new political organization emerged, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Military Administration, established at Chiapuszu headed by Prince Teh. However, in every bureau and at every level of the government, Japanese advisors trained in Manchuria dominated.[152] During the summer months of 1936, there were numerous disturbances along the borders of Suiyuan which were instigated by Japan and which capitalized on the rivalry between various Mongol banners and chieftains. That serious troubles were brewing became evident early in November, 1936, when Japanese military planes reconnoitered in Suiyuan, accompanied by westward movement of Mongol-Japanese troops. On November 16, the attack on Suiyuan began. The Chinese garrison in Suiyuan rose to the occasion and resisted under the direction of Governor Fu Tso-yi.[153] Fu met with great success, recovering Pailingmiao on November 24, which he held despite renewed enemy offensives.[154] This blunting of Japanese advance and Fu's continued success to defend Suiyuan brought elation throughout China and stalled Japan's plan to complete her control of Inner Mongolia and perhaps gain a toe hold in Sinkiang at this time. Demands came to be heard all over China from private individuals and organizations and from certain military quarters to send aid and relief to the Suiyuan defenders. However, Nanking

proclaimed this a local affair and refused to enlarge it by sending in relief columns. Simultaneously it continued to prosecute the anti-Communist campaign in northern Shensi. This policy of Chiang's led to great resentment, especially among the Manchurian troops of Chang Hsueh-liang in Shensi. These were itching to fight the Japanese but instead were ordered to fight the Communists. Resentment over this contributed to the Sian Incident. By the end of 1936, the Suiyuan War had become stalemated and with the Sian Incident it became eclipsed.

To sum up, by the end of 1936, most of the area of eastern Inner Mongolia had passed into direct or indirect Japanese control. For the time being the western most sections, Suiyuan and Ninghsia, were to remain under Chinese hands. The Japanese regarded Mongolia and Manchuria as areas especially earmarked for their control and since their takeover of Manchuria, they were strategically in an advantageous position to penetrate western Inner Mongolia. But with increased immigration since early 20th century, ethnically Inner Mongolia was already predominantly Han Chinese in complexion. Friction between Chinese farmers and Mongol pastoralists and maladroit handling by Nanking led to Mongol resentment and the rise of Mongol nationalism, which the Japanese exploited to their own purpose.

North China from end of 1935 to July 7, 1937.

The key and vital area of contention between China and Japan was north China. The Japanese army in north China had formulated a scheme which proposed converting the five provinces of north China into a second Manchukuo. In 1936, this policy received the approval of the Hirota Cabinet and:

> ...provided that 'a zone, anti-communist and friendly to Japan and Manchukuo, shall be established which shall further the acquisition of resources necessary to national defense, as

> well as perfect communication facilities. Thereby interference by Soviet Russia will be warded off and a basis established for mutual aid and co-operation between the three countries--Japan, Manchukuo and China.' The project took within the scope of its operation the whole of the five provinces that it proposed to detach from China Proper. It indicated means for guidance of the two autonomous provinces into which Hopei had been divided, as well as of the three provinces of Shantung, Shansi and Suiyuan, and in effect it demonstrated how the separate administration of the five provinces was to be carried on and their economy developed.[155]

Japanese schemes on north China were pursued on two levels, with the local leaders and with the central government. On the local level General Ch'in Te-shun (who was the governor of Chahar until November 6, 1935, and the Mayor of Peiping until the outbreak of the war) was entrusted with the task of negotiating and parrying with the Japanese from November on. He said:

> At that time Japanese policy towards us was to use those responsible for military affairs in north China to create a special status for north China under Japanese auspices. As a first step it was not necessary to separate (north China) entirely from the central government so long as (these military leaders) submitted to Japanese directions.[156]

Ch'in continued that the Japanese thought that the five provinces of north China could be detached from the central government without undue difficulty because they were controlled by erstwhile enemies of Chiang who were not necessarily

satisfied with Nanking. Shantung was under Han Fu-chu, a former Feng Yu-hsiang lieutenant whose relationship with Nanking was unstable; Shansi had been under Yen Hsi-shan for over twenty years and was under his firm control; Suiyuan was under a Yen subordinate (Fu Tso-yi) and therefore in Yen's orbit. If Yen could be persuaded to co-operate, then these two provinces could be pocketed by Japan. Finally Hopei and Chahar were under Sung Cheh-yuan and his 29th Army generals who were all former Kuominchun officers. Ch'in went on to say that during these years the Japanese used a combination of enticement and coercion against him in order to make him sell out and make concessions.[157]

On the national level tentative explorations of future possibilities for Sino-Japanese relations were becoming crystallized. On October 28, 1935, Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota called in the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Chiang Tso-pin, and presented to him the outlines of Japan's new policy. This is what came to be know as Hirota's Three Principles and were as follows:

1. China to abandon her policy of relying on the U. S. and European countries for help to check Japan.
2. Co-operation between China, Japan and Manchukuo as prerequisite for improved Sino-Japanese relations. China to recognize Manchukuo and provide for improved economic ties between it and north China.
3. Co-operation between China and Japan against Communism, especially in providing joint measures against its spread in border areas of north China.[158] Ambassador Chiang immediately returned to China to attend and report to the Fifth KMT Congress. China's response came in the foreign policy report made on November 19 by Chiang Kai-shek before the Congress. He summed up the crux of China's stand against Japan as follows: "We shall not forsake peace until there is no hope for peace. We shall not talk lightly of sacrifice until we are driven to the last extremity which makes

sacrifice inevitable."[159] This speech was interpreted by Chinese to represent a significant turning point in Sino-Japanese relations. While it represented a hardening of China's attitude towards further Japanese advances, it also left the door open for negotiation. On November 20 and again on December 19, Japanese Ambassador Ariyoshi had lengthy conversations with Chiang.[160] Chiang's attitude must have had certain ambiguities for Ariyoshi interpreted the talks to mean that Chiang had accepted Hirota's principles. In any case, this was how Hirota chose to interpret Chiang when he formally enunciated his proposals in a speech to the Diet on January 21, 1936. China immediately denied that she had complied and added that Japan had made no specific proposals to China. On January 25, Minister of Foreign Affairs Chang Chun further explained that when Chiang conferred with Ariyoshi, he had merely expressed his personal opinion which could not compromise his official stand now that he was President of the Executive Yuan.[161] Chang further suggested negotiations between China and Japan to adjust their relations.

Between March 16-19 Chang Chun held four exploratory talks with the new Japanese Ambassador Arita. These were followed by a meeting between Chiang and Arita on March 20. Neither side budged. In Japan, Hirota reaffirmed his adherence to the Three Principles in an interview with foreign correspondents on March 26, and this was echoed by Arita when he spoke to the Diet on May 6.[162] On the Chinese side, Chiang clarified his position before the 2nd Plenary Session of the fifth C.E.C. on July 13. He said:

> The central government's minimal foreign policy condition is the preservation of territorial sovereignty. We will not tolerate any nation's attempt to disrupt our territorial sovereignty. We absolutely will not sign any agreement which violates our territorial sovereignty, nor will

> we tolerate any attempt to violate the reality of our territorial integrity. To be even more explicit, when anyone attempts to force us to violate our territorial integrity such as in the recognition of any bogus regimes, that will be the last extremity when we make our last sacrifice.[163]

Here he made quite explicit that China will not recognize Manchukuo and since recognition was a key point of the Hirota principles, negotiations over them came to be deadlocked. On the other hand, Chiang in the same speech emphasized that China will not act rashly and that not only has the last extremity not arrived but compared with an earlier period a "thread of hope" had even appeared in the last half a year.[164] Another point that Chiang belabored here was the appeal to the leaders of the Southwest to understand the government's striving to defend and preserve the nation.[165] In this connection it should be pointed out that public opinion, spearheaded by the students and intellectuals, had become very vocal in demanding a harder and less compromising stand against Japan. The student movement, based in Peiping, had surfaced again. Students stood up against the censorship and repression which kept the nation ignorant of Japan's demands and advances, which had resulted in the practical loss of north China by default. The movement had spread and gained much popular sympathy. In the Southwest, in particular, anti-Chiang leaders seized upon the issue to belabor Nanking for appeasing Japan. Seen in this context, Chaing's speech of July 13 was made primarily for domestic consumption.

Tragically Nanking's more positive stand in foreign affairs coincided with growing intransigence and rampancy in Japan's mainland policy which had resulted from the February 26 revolt of the militant young officers. The situation was reflected in the Chengtu Incident which

occurred on August 24, 1936. Popular resentment had been brewing against Japanese sponsored smuggling and Japan's insistence upon the establishing of a consulate in Chengtu, capital of Szechwan. A mob invaded a hotel and killed two and wounded two more Japanese guests staying there.[166] Japan used the occasion to press for high level negotiations and insist on compliance with a new series of comprehensive demands. They were:

1. Establishment of a buffer zone in north China in the form of an autonomous government for the five north Chinese provinces.
2. Joint Sino-Japanese measures against the Communists.
3. Reduction of import tariffs and Sino-Japanese co-operation in communications ventures.
4. The Chinese government to employ Japanese advisors in numerous categories.
5. Japan to station troops along strategic points of the Yangtze River, in Swatow, Chaochow and on Hainan Island.
6. Dismissal of six members of the C.E.C. who were outspokenly anti-Japanese.

In a rather novel action, China pressed five counter demands as follows:

1. Abrogation of the Tangku Truce Agreement and Shanghai Ceasefire Agreement.
2. Withdrawal of the Japanese military from north Suiynan and east Chahar.
3. Abolition of the East Hopei bogus regime.
4. Cessation of aid and protection to the smuggling movement.
5. Cessation of illegal flights over north China.[167]

In the end though the local issue at Chengtu was settled in December, 1936, the complete deadlock on the broader problem remained.

Between December 12-25, 1936, there occurred the Sian Incident which was triggered by the issue of an united front in resistance to Japan. The understanding reached prior to the release of Chiang was cessation of civil wars against

the Communists and the marshalling of all resources to resist Japan. Chiang emerged from captivity on December 25 with his prestige enhanced as the only leader who could provide unified leadership against Japan. At the third Plenary Session of the 5th C.E.C. held in February, 1937, the KMT declared that China's foreign policy goals remained unchanged and that readjustments in Sino-Japanese relations had to be conducted on the basis of equality.[168] This meeting was followed by secret top level negotiations between the KMT and CCP and important conferences between the KMT leadership. Clearly China was drawing closer towards a united front.

On the other hand, Japan pressed on relentlessly to achieve dominance over China. Most immediately, she pressed on to subordinate north China. The pressure was becoming unbearable on Sung Cheh-yuan, isolated as he was in Peiping with little contact with Nanking and with no troops except his 29th Army to back him. The distance between Sung and Chiang made matters worse.[169] Finally on February 20, Sung could bear the pressure no longer. He went on leave and returned to his ancestral village in Loling in Shantung ostensibly to repair his father's grave. Under the unwritten but commonly understood and honored rules of Chinese political behavior, the return by a political leader to his ancestral village for filial reasons indicated that he wished to lie low for a while and should not be disturbed. Left to shoulder the burden was his lieutenant, Mayor of Peiping, Ch'in Te-shun.[170] As Ch'in recalled:

> The period between February, 1937, and the outbreak of the July 7th Incident was the most depressing and painful one in my life...From the latter part of February I had Japanese visitors on the average of once or twice daily. They included army officers, diplomats, members of

> the House of Peers, journalists and retired generals.[171]

Time for procrastination came to an end on the night of July 7. As was their wont, the Japanese garrison in north China was holding maneuvers. Late that night Japanese troops knocked on the gates of Wanping City (also called Lukouchiao City) demanding entry to search for a soldier they claimed missing. The town's garrison commander Chi Hsin-wen (of the 37th Division of the 29th Army) refused permission.[172] General Ch'in was immediately informed and he backed Chi up. At 2 am. July 8, Ch'in was told that the Japanese regarded his stand as unacceptable and were advancing on the town. He recalled later his reply to Chi:

> To defend the soil is a soldier's duty, to fight foreign aggression is our glory. Please tell your officers and men that Lukouchiao and Wanping are the graveyards of our army. We cannot retreat lightly from one inch or foot of our soil.[173]

He added the order not to fire first but to reply when fired upon. This episode started the Sino-Japanese War.

Initially this looked like another of the long line of incidents which had almost become routine in north China. Local solutions had been found before and on July 10 a local truce was even arranged.[174] But during the following few days and for reasons not yet clear, the decision was made by China's central government leaders assembled in Lushan to make the last stand to resist. There seemed unanimity in the decision. On July 15, Wang Ching-wei spoke to the officers at the Summer Training Camp in Lushan. He said in part:

> This incident was absolutely not unpremeditated but followed pre-determined plans. Thus we are

> compelled to follow our pre-determined principles in reply.[175]

He added that the last ditch for which China had been preparing had arrived.[176] On July 16 Sung Cheh-yuan returned to Peiping to direct the conflict locally. On the following day, in a joint interview (with Wang Ching-wei), Chiang stated China's minimal conditions as:

1. No settlement that infringed on China's territorial integrity.
2. No unlawful changes to the Hopei-Chahar administration.
3. No changes of personnel appointed to the Hopei-Chahar administration on demand.
4. No restriction on the garrison areas of the 29th Army.

This he stated was China's last ditch and if the conditions were not complied with, she would fight.[177]

Summary.

From the foregoing it can be seen that between 1928-1937 the only country that posed any significant threat to China's unity and sovereignty was Japan. From the beginning of the period, and especially after 1931, Japan was bent on a military solution to the China problem, i.e., the use of force to conquer and subjugate progressively larger parts of China. China really found no adequate and effective response to Japan's aggression. At first it was in non-resistance and outwardly anyway utter reliance on the League of Nations, the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact to obtain justice. I suspect that right from the beginning, despite public protestations to the contrary, few leaders in China had faith that the League and the Powers could or would come to China's effective rescue. But what was the alternative. It must have been figured, as resistance would have been suicidal? The strategy adopted and most identified with Chiang Kai-shek was to trade time for space, the space of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and part of north

China for time to prepare, modernize and most significantly to unite all areas under the central government. It was argued that China could not simultaneously face the foreign threat and domestic rebellion by the CCP. It was with this justification that Chiang continued to pursue his relentless wars against the Communists while appeasing Japan.

Notwithstanding repeated assertions of the fact that continued CCP rebellion was preventing Chiang from dealing effectively with Japan, it is doubtful that herein lay the sole answer. Up to 1933 the anti-CCP campaigns were not major military undertakings and were fought largely with provincial and miscellaneous army units at that. True Chiang did commit some of his own crack divisions in the Fifth Annihilation Campaign and during the Long March but after 1935, it was again mainly non central troops that were engaging the Red Army in northern Shensi. The question arises that if Chiang did not use his own good troops against the CCP, why did he not commit them against the Japanese, and since he did not, why?

I think the crucial factors here are fear of Japanese might and the intra-KMT rivalry between Chiang and the provincial generals. Personality also emerges as a factor. Most historians agree that Chiang was a genuine nationalist and patriot. He was deeply humiliated by Japan's continued aggressions and concerned with her threat to the existence of a unified, independent China. But Chiang was afraid of a showdown with Japan. He and many of his associates, both civilian and military, had studied in Japan, and their first-hand acquaintance had inspired admiration and fear of Japan's military and industrial might. Thus they were certain that an armed confrontation would lead to China's defeat, and the disaster of defeat would be two-fold. For one, they feared that then Japan would be even harder to placate and would demand further territorial concessions. For another, Chiang was afraid that defeat of his own units would lead to his political demise. For then his opponents

within the KMT would be given a godsend issue on which to attack and topple him. But even more important, if Chiang had been saving many of his best units from both the anti-CCP campaign and the Japanese, what were they being used for? The answer is, of course, they were used in the intra-KMT civil wars, and when there were no such wars, they were kept in readiness to give him more leverage in the domestic scene.

Believing as he did in his mission as the unifier of China and convinced as he was that united China's destiny was inseparable from his political leadership. Chiang thus believed that he could not afford to suffer the moral humiliation of defeat on the field by Japan and the loss of his army in the game of intra-KMT politics. These personal and political factors must be taken into consideration in seeking a more balanced explanation of why Chiang and Nanking failed to respond positively to the Japanese threat up to 1937. To Chiang personal prestige was a crucial factor in political leadership. But even more important, he held that China needed unity under him before she could resist Japan, and he interpreted unity to mean both the elimination of the CCP and even more critically the extension of the central government's power and the reduction of his provincial military rivals within the KMT. The paradox was that perhaps these several goals could not be reconciled. For in giving priority to domestic unification under his leadership China was acquiescing in a major wave of foreign conquest which was ultimately threatening to end a unified, independent China altogether.

While it is difficult to argue how weak China could resist Japan without domestic unity, conversely the way Nanking pursued the problem in time became a major issue and cause for domestic discontent and disunity. More and more people began to criticize Chiang for his mistaken system of priorities. This dissatisfaction was the root cause of the Sian Incident, as a result of which policy

switches were made. Early in 1937, differences were being ironed out with the CCP, paving the way towards a united front against Japan. China was finally hardening her stand. Coincidentally the Japanese were also becoming more intransigent. Next to their wish to dominate China was their fear of Communism. So when the KMT and CCP began seeking a rapprochement, the Japanese army and government became even more determined to strike and the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge) Incident provided the spark which finally undid both Japan and the KMT government.

In retrospect, even Chiang agreed that it had been an error of policy not to negotiate directly with Japan in the aftermath of the Mukden Incident, as Dr. Hu Shih had at the time advocated. China could not have lost more and perhaps Chinese flexibility could have strengthened the hands of Japan's moderates in their struggle with the impetuous army.[178] No policy could have been more negative than the one adopted of no negotiations, no resistance. To Chiang the corollary of this policy was domestic pacification before resisting the foreign foe. But while in the years after 1931 Nanking did bring more and more domestic dissidents within its fold and increase areas under its control, this gain was perhaps more than offset by losses of territory to Japan and loss of confidence because of its inability to deal effectively with Japan. There perhaps could have been more felicitous solutions and more adroit policy, but basically faced with Japan's ambitions, there seemed no viable alternative. True Chiang was caught in a bind. Perhaps he was right in insisting that without internal unity China could not hope to resist Japan. But without making major adjustments in the political, ideological and social fields which Chiang was unwilling and unable to make given his outlook and goals, there seemed no hope of effective unity under the KMT. Under most circumstances the prospect of alien conquest and domination has offered the best means for arousing the nationalism and patriotism of a populace, and inspiring

them to forget parochialism in the interest of national unity. But between 1931-1936 the KMT did not take advantage of this potential. They did not do so because of their basically conservative background on social issues. They feared the red spectre of social revolution; as for many the memories of the early days of the Northern Expedition were still fresh. Thus they could not and did not seize on the opportunity to further unity under their banner. Conversely there is no telling what might have happened had the KMT taken a firmer stand and then met Japan in heading collision? So until 1937 it was procrastination. By then internal developments had made further surrender impossible. War finally came and in war the fragile fabric of unity created in the past ten years was to be shattered.

Chapter III. The Communist Challenge.

On June 15, 1928, the National Government issued a circular telegram notifying the nation of its domestic policy goals for the post unification era. It included five points: to consolidate the rule of law, to weed out corruption, to abolish unjust taxes, to reduce the military establishment and to eradicate bandits.[1] Although there were miscellaneous brigand groups scattered throughout China, by bandits Nanking was referring to the Communists who, since their split with and purge by the KMT in 1927, had scattered to the hills in central-southern China and were fighting for their lives.

During the next ten years the Communist problem was to persist and loom very large for the Nanking leaders. In spite of their losses in the cities, the failure of the Changsha uprising and the Autumn Harvest uprising in Hunan and Hupei, the Chinese Communist Party continued its political challenge to the KMT. In November, 1927, Mao Tse-tung and his band of followers had entered Kiangsi, occupied Kanghsien and established headquarters at Chingkangshan where Mao was joined by the forces of Chu Teh.[2] They regrouped and in April, 1928, announced the establishment of the Fourth Red Army. Thus both in terms of political ideology, government organization and military establishment the Communists posed an alternative to Nanking.

Up to 1930, Nanking did not expend great efforts against the Communists, partly because initially the Communists were too weak to be a major menace, but mostly because the victorious KMT generals were too busy falling out with and fighting each other. However, after 1930, Nanking did extend increasing energy and manpower on one expedition after another waged to wipe out the Communist rebellion. In time it became Chiang Kai-shek's primary overt occupation, and he was to be found much more often at his Suppression Headquarters at Nanchang than in the capital city. During the initial period these Nanking-organized efforts achieved the

converse of their declared aim, for instead of diminishing the enemy, every campaign saw them waxing stronger numerically and geographically. This state of affairs was mainly due to the corruption in the KMT civilian government and military leadership, bad organization and coordination of the campaigns, unwillingness of the troops to fight and finally the disaffection of the ordinary people who were ground down beyond endurance and thus turned their allegiance to the Communists. So in spite of the perrenial government reports of victory and optimistic accounts of the enemy's impending end, CCP power was in fact spreading.

In response to the challenge, Chiang took personal command of the anti-Communist campaigns after 1931 and brought in with him the crack central units, and his German military advisors who advanced the tactics of blockade. He also instituted the pao-chia system of mutual responsibility in order to control the civilian population in the contested areas, inaugurated the New Life Movement to instill spirit and better morale, established a cadre training school to improve the quality of the political field workers and, probably most important, used the Lushan Training Camp to raise morale and fighting ability of the line officers. The pay-off came in 1934 when the CCP was so reduced that they were compelled to leave Kiangsi and again flee for their lives in the Long March. Chiang chased them all across southwest China to the northwest in this epic campaign, and reaped the additional benefits of bringing outlying provinces as Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow under firmer central control. But at the end of the Long March the CCP found refuge in the remote and inhospitable terrain of northern Shensi and again largely futile campaigns were launched to exterminate them, which only came to an abrupt halt as a result of the Sian Incident.

While the CCP posed an ideological, political and military challenge, the KMT response was basically a

military one which neglected and ignored the other aspects. In the long run, this neglect must account heavily for KMT's failure. Chiang justified his persistence in waging war on the CCP with the dictum "domestic pacification must precede meeting the external foe"--i.e., Japan. This, together with a genuine and deep fear of being defeated by Japan which would result in Japanese control of more areas of China and also the discrediting of Chiang and the weakening of his position in relation with his KMT rivals, accounted for the government's policy of non-resistance and appeasement of Japanese aggression against China, which in turn accounted for the alienation of many Chinese, both inside and outside the KMT, who wanted to see internal unity and reconciliation in order to meet the imminent external danger. Thus in the period between 1928-1937, Nanking and Chiang were caught in a vise--whether to concentrate on eradicating the CCP or to take a more resolute stand against Japan. As Japanese aggression mounted in the 1930's and as the Nanking government felt both psychologically and militarily unready to take on the Japanese invaders, I suspect that Chiang and others even looked on the persisting Communist threat as a refuge. In this sense, and for other reasons, the Japanese and CCP problems were often interrelated for the leaders of the KMT. Finally, though the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war forced a temporary rapprochement between the KMT and CCP in their rivalry for the mastery of China, they could not accommodate each other, thus paving the ground for another showdown.

In this chapter, the focus will be on how the KMT viewed the CCP challenge, how it attempted to deal with it and above all on how the Communist challenge was one of the factors that prevented the unification of China between 1928-1937. There will be brief discussions of the many anti-Communist campaigns launched by Nanking during this period, how difficult it was to achieve a unity of command within the KMT camp and how precisely it was this lack of

unity which enabled the military survival of the CCP in the face of vastly superior manpower and equipment; for much as the great majority of KMT generals hated and feared the CCP, they often hated and feared their rivals in their own party, adjacent territory and the central government even more. Rooted in the provincial military system there was more often antagonism rather than co-operation between the various armies sent after the CCP.

There were charges that Chiang often sent the so-called "miscellaneous units" (i.e., those of his rivals or defeated enemies) to bear the brunt of fighting, with the explicit purpose of wearing them out while his own better treated units performed watchdog duties. Later during the Long March, it was also charged that Chiang deliberately followed a pursue but do not destroy policy, whereby he let the Red Army go into provinces outside his control, waited until the provincial armies were badly mauled and then went into the rescue with his central troops. Then it was charged, while the provincial armies were sent to areas far from their home bases, central troops came in and established themselves in the heart of that province.[3] But the fact that Chiang reaped certain gains from his anti-CCP campaigns does not necessarily prove the charge. In dealing with the inner history of this era of modern China, there is often much hearsay and gossip that are hard to document and substantiate. In many instances the true motives will never be known and in such instances only "gossip" is available, which, of course, would be noted as such.

Broadly this period can be divided into two parts. Between 1928-1933 the anti-CCP campaigns went badly for the KMT, and CCP controlled areas in central China continued to grow in size and the Red Army in strength. From 1934 the tide turned, the CCP was progressively reduced and finally compelled to abandon the Kiangsi Soviet. The rewards for Nanking were two-fold. One, the cancer in its very heartland

was gone, and government control now extended over almost the entire lower Yangtze. Two, the Long March turned out to be a godsend for Nanking to extend, for the first time a presence and some degree of control in such provinces as Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Sikang, Kansu and Shensi, which hitherto had barely paid lip service to the central government. So in 1936, in those parts of China not occupied by Japan, the central government and Chiang had achieved a stature and command and unity not seen since the days of Yuan Shih-kai. But in many ways for the KMT, the CCP problem was intertwined with Japanese policy and actions in China. Seen in the light of an impending crisis with Japan, this achievement of limited unification in 1936 and unique stature of Chiang Kai-shek within the KMT and China were very important indeed.

The Initial Phase, 1928-1930.

Hardly had the Northern Expedition ended when the KMT began to turn some of its attention on the CCP. During the spring of 1928, Nanking ordered eight local government units in Hunan and Kiangsi to take action against the local Communist forces and in addition divided Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien and Anhui into fourteen pacification areas.[4] The first suppression campaign began in June, 1928, when two KMT divisions under divisional commanders Yang Ch'ih-sheng and Yang Ju-hsuan were ordered to proceed to Yunghsin in Kiangsi with the ultimate target of recovering Chingkangshan. They were met by Red units under Chu Teh and Kung Ch'u and defeated. Chu and Kung proceeded to occupy three hsien in Kiangsi. It was widely conceded that the discipline and individual conduct of Red troops were good.[5] Generally speaking, the behavior of the officers and men sent after the Red units was the reverse, with the result that the populace was alienated and so refused to proffer to them any of the needed help. This problem was not recognized and dealt with by the KMT high command until much later.

The ledger for the remainder of 1928 was a mixed one. On the one hand, the KMT forces cleared the key provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang of Communist forces.[6] But this was offset by Communist gains in southern and eastern Hunan which by the end of 1928 totalled twenty-eight districts.[7] A winter offensive by the Hunan and Kiangsi pacification authorities led by Generals Lu Ti-p'ing and Ho Chien culminated in the capture of Chingkangshan in April of 1929 and the scattering of the Red Army units to southern Anhui and border areas of northern Fukien and Kiangsi where the garrison forces were weak. Red forces also often joined up with local outlaw groups, rendering each other mutual aid.[8] Generally speaking the Communists were able to establish themselves in the border areas of various provinces in central and southern China. The difficult topography in each case benefited them. Another factor in their favor was the overlapping of jurisdictions. Most of the provincial units sent after the Red Army were content with chasing them across the provincial border to another garrison area or the bailiwick of another general. Co-ordination and co-operation between various provincial leaders were often nominal and jealousy prevented joint action.

The year 1929 was a busy one for the KMT generals as one civil war erupted after another, continuing into 1930. Erstwhile allies of Chiang successively and sometimes jointly sought to unseat him from power in Nanking. Though Chiang was able to outmanoeuver and outfight his foes, the cost was a heavy one. For 1929 forty-eight per cent of Nanking's total expenditure was on war and for 1930 the percentage was even greater.[9] No wonder then that little time and energy was left to face the Communist problem.

Mao devoted most of 1929 to the consolidation and expansion of his revolutionary bases. His main one was in south Kiangsi centered on Juichin. During the year Mao also acquired three satellite bases in western Fukien. In

addition, other leaders also established guerrilla bases in widely spread border regions of Hupei, Honan, Anhui, Chekiang, Kwangsi, Shensi and Szechwan. In all by early 1930 the CCP claimed fifteen bases or soviet areas scattered throughout China.[10]

The real shock came at the end of July, 1930, when some ten thousand of the Red Army under Ho Lung and P'eng Teh-huai entered Changsha after twenty thousand government troops under Ho Chien retired without giving battle.[11] Ho claimed that five divisions were needed to recover the city, which were not available, as the government's main forces were tied up elsewhere in other civil wars. But Ho did manage to retake Changsha on August 5 with the help of foreign gun boats. He then demanded from the citizenry, already stripped by the Reds, two million yuans by the end of the month and six more million by the end of November. The purpose? To keep his troops from looting and in order to train his army and build forts against the Reds![12] As an editorial pointed out, government oppression had indeed given communism appeal. It said:

> We are not excusing the Communists here, but we do say that our generals and militarists are the best allies of the Communists. The seeds of Communism most easily take root and prosper on a soil of turmoil and disorder. Three years ago, people could have believed that Communism had little chance of success in China. Today we cannot say the same thing, because during the three years of constant war and disorder, China is getting ripe for Communism...Unless there is a change of heart in our militarists, very soon even a government by the militarists, of the militarists, for the militarists, will become impossible.[13]

In September, 1930, the combined forces of P'eng Teh-huai and Chu Teh again attacked Changsha. The attack lasted from September 1 to September 13 and perhaps to Ho Chien's credit it was repulsed.[14] The audacity of the Communist offensives (other Red units assaulted Wuhan and Nanchang) fully revealed the negligent attitude of the provincial authorities. These threats to such key cities as Changsha, Hankow and Nanchang greatly alarmed Chiang Kai-shek and other KMT leaders. With the end of the civil war between Nanking and the Northern Coalition in October, 1930, Chiang began to turn his attention to the Communist problem in central China. The result was the First Encirclement Campaign, begun in October, 1930.

According to government calculations, the Communist forces consisted of twenty-one army units with a combined strength of no more than 120,000 men and less than half that number of rifles. In addition, they also had para-military units and auxiliaries such as Red guards and youth vanguards, which had no combat value and were used for controlling the civilians, intelligence, etc.[15] As these figures show, compared with its rivals within the KMT such as the Liangkwang group, the CCP at this stage was a comparatively minor threat to Nanking both numerically and territorially. However, the nature of the threat posed by these two groups was somewhat different. While the rival KMT groups quarrelled over the nature of unification, the sharing of power and who should lead a unified China, the CCP sought to change the very political and social foundations of the state. Starting in October, 1930, the government side began to make active preparations. Headquarters for the Honan-Hupei-Anhui Border Area Bandit Suppression Army were established at Hankow under the command of Ho Ch'eng-chun; another was established at Nanchang under the command of Lu Ti-ping for the Kiangsi-Hunan area while a third was established for the Honan-Shensi-Shansi Border area.[16] Chiang went in person to Nanchang in early December to

convene a strategy conference of the top commanders. In order to ensure co-operation between the civilian and military authorities in the combat zone, Chiang obtained permission for the Nanchang headquarters to supervise all party work in the area.[17]

Fighting began in the fall of 1930 and continued into April of 1931. With few exceptions the Reds were successful, capturing many towns in Hupei, Kiangsi and other areas. At times whole government units would be captured together with weapons and supplies, even when they were numerically superior and better armed.[18] Why? The reasons are complex and varied. Of course, there was the old story of gross irresponsibility and extortionism among some units. An example of this involved a General Teng, the garrison commander of Kishui, a town in Hupei, who initially did nothing in preparation, then:

> Soon after mid-November, when it became noised about that Chu Teh was going to advance on Kishui, General Teng in conjunction with Magistrate P'eng decided to evacuate the city. Entreated by the local gentry to stay, they said they would need $800,000 with which to 'encourage the troops'---and they compromised on $200,000. Teng then delcared strict martial law, prohibiting people from going out on the streets at night, and ordered that all boats on the river should be tied up at a specified place at night on the river 'so that they might not be stolen by the Reds'. The next morning, General Teng, Magistrate P'eng, the money, the troops, had all disappeared. So, too, it turned out, had the boats. Chu and Mao arrived and took over the city.[19]

There were many other factors. The official Ministry of Defense accounts gave four as follows:

1. Bad weather--in southern Kiangsi area storm weather sets in from July on with much rain, which hindered military movements.
2. Difficult terrain--border areas are mountainous and inaccessible, making troop movements and transportation very difficult.
3. Backward communications--there were only few motor roads near Nanchang and one railway. Water transportation was limited to the Yangtze and small boats along the Kan River. Trails connected villages.
4. Hostile populace--very much under Communist control, who either fled before government troops or remained to spy for the Reds.[20]

In addition, suspicion and ill feeling plagued relations between the KMT units, many of which were those of the recently defeated Feng Yu-hsiang or the so-called "miscellaneous units" whose loyalty Chiang could not trust. These units received different and inferior treatment from that accorded the central units which naturally enough bred resentment.[21] Government orders that army units may not recruit locally to fill their depleted ranks further bred fear among the non-Chiang units that Nanking's real intention was to wear them down by attrition and get them out of the way. No wonder moralewas low and certain units failed to obey orders and refused to move.[22] Finally, as General Tai Yueh, a brigade commander under Lu Ti-p'ing pointed out in his report, the other reasons were:

> 4. The mismanagement and incompetence of the hsien magistrates; the inefficiency of the police who disturbed the people instead of protecting them; the local gentry who fatten themselves on the people by oppressing them, combined to drive the people to the arms of the Communists; 6. (sic) bankrupt condition of the peasantry, unemployment

> among the artisans and workers, and the general economic distress among the people supply inexhaustible fuel to the growth of Communism.[23]

Thus despite numerical superiority, better weapons and air cover, the government campaign was a failure. The foregoing traced many of the basic reasons for government failure at length, for they applied equally to later campaigns.

The Second Encirclement Campaign, February-May, 1931.

Chiang was determined to press on and not give the Communists a chance to recuperate. Minister of War Ho Ying-ch'in was appointed commander-in-chief of the second campaign. On February 2, Ho left the headquarters in Nanchang. Slowly he organized his command, which besides those units which had participated in the first campaign (6th Army under Chu Shao-liang; 9th Army under Lu Ti-p'ing and 19th Army under Chiang Kwang-gnai), had added to it the 5th Army and 26th Army. On March 27, he issued orders for action to begin on April 1. According to two government announcements, it had amassed a total of eleven divisions of over 110,000 men and air force for this campaign. The same source put the Communist forces in the vicinity of 60,000 men with inferior weapons.[24] It should be noted that many of the government troops, as before, belonged to the so-called "miscellaneous units". Meanwhile the Communists did take advantage of the short breathing space to enlarge their territories and resources. They captured three more hsien in Kiangsi in addition to districts in western Fukien, western Hunan and western Anhui.[25]

The government advance began on April 1. Ho's plan was to advance slowly in a semi-circle, consolidating gains at every step, then to destroy the Communist main forces at Hsiaopu and Toup'i. But the Communists avoided the

stronger and seasoned KMT units (19th and 26th Armies), eluded battle and resorted to guerrilla warfare. Familiarity with the terrain and co-operation of the populace aided the Communist forces greatly. Conversely, the newly arrived KMT troops consisted of northerners unfamiliar with the terrain, which, added to their other fears, made them reluctant to fight. Mao added that as with the first campaign only the "miscellaneous units" confronted him. They were varied in calibre and many were greatly afraid of being sent to battle.[26] Furthermore, KMT forces moved slowly, and due to mutual fears, failed to coordinate efforts or to aid each other. The outcome? The Red Army broke through. Between May 16-30, Communist forces swept to victory, winning five battles, covering seven hundred li and capturing twenty thousand prisoners and rifles.[27] Thus with the beginning of June ended the Second Campaign, in ignominy. Ten more hsien were now under Communist control.

Despite this serious setback, the government remained unshaken in its determination to be rid of the Communists. On June 1, 1931, by proclamation, the National Government promulgated the Yueh-fa. It states that since intra-KMT discords had now come to an end, the government forces will henceforth be concentrated against the CCP, to surround them in Kiangsi and Hupei and then wipe them out.[28] On June 15, the fifth Plenary Session of the Third C.E.C. elected Chaing Chairman of the National Government and President of the Executive Yuan. (He was already commander-in-chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force.) This set the stage for the Third Encirclement Campaign.

The Third Encirclement Campaign, July 1 - September, 1931.

One of the basic reasons for the bad showing of the KMT units in the previous campaign was the complete lack of unity in the command and to make it worse none felt he could act on his own judgment as final authority lay with Nanking.[29]

Chiang attempted to remedy this problem when he proceeded in person to Nanchang on June 21 to head the planning for the next round. In addition to sending in reinforcements he also adjusted the organization of the army by regrouping some of the route armies into army corps. Ho Ying-ch'in was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Front Units as well as the Commander-in-chief of the Left Wing Group Army, while Ch'en Ming-chu assumed the post of Commander-in-chief of the Right Wing Group Army. Additional forces were designated as reserve and garrison units and five squadrons of the Air Force were also deployed. In total strength government units numbered some 130,000 men. (This was based only on those units that actually partook in the fighting. But as all government units were ten to thirty per cent short of stated strength, the actual number was proportionally less.) The plan was to concentrate on defeating the Communist main force in southern Kiangsi, to be followed by mopping-up action.[30]

Thus it was hoped that this time the victory that so far had eluded the encirclements would materialize. Besides the reorganization, a vital new element had been introduced into the campaign, in the form of five crack division of Chiang's own units, under Ch'en Cheng, Lo Cho-ying, Chao Kuan-t'ao, Wei Li-huang and Chiang Ting-wen. These units, by all accounts good and reliable, were to bear the brunt of the fighting.[31] Among the divisional commanders, Ch'en Cheng was to distinguish himself most, with future significance. On the negative side, the better treatment accorded the central troops further exacerbated the morale problem among the "miscellaneous units".[32]

Another basic problem which had plagued the second campaign was the intra-KMT civil wars which always seemed on the verge of erupting. For example:

> The Kwangtung declaration of independence of April 30th (1931) left the country in a state of latent warfare, and no general in Kiangsi knew when it would be necessary for him to turn his front toward some other enemy for his own preservation. Among the government troops in Kiangsi there was also considerable doubt as to what exactly was the attitude of Ch'en Ming-shu's (sic) 19th Route Army, even up until the end of the period of the campaign.[33]

This situation was to recur in the midst of the third campaign, in September, 1931, as will be seen later. When intra-KMT civil war threatened, energy inevitably and consistently was deflected from the anti-CCP efforts. Thus not only did warfare between the KMT factions devastate the countryside thereby giving fuel to the Communist movement, their continuation prevented a possible military solution to the Communist insurrection.

Meanwhile, the Communist forces were preparing too. In early June they expanded their control to the lowland counties in Kiangsi, rich in rice production. Their reorganization was a hurried one. According to Mao, total Communist strength was only some thirty thousand men in arms. He put KMT strength at over 300,000. The discrepancies here seem exaggerated. KMT sources estimated CCP troop strength engaged in this campaign to have been around fifty thousand men with approximately forty thousand rifles, which put the effective combatant strength of KMT versus CCP troops at about 2:1.[34]

During the latter part of June KMT troops began to deploy as designated. The order was to be ready by the end of June, so the offensive could begin on July 1. During the first phase of the campaign Chiang was in personal command and was in the front in Nanch'eng and Nanfeng areas.

His strategy was to move his troops with great speed, seek out the enemy and annihilate them in a series of major battles, scheduled for Ningtu and Yutu, along the right bank of the Kan River.

But once again intra-KMT squabbles erupted. In July Shih Yu-san revolted in north China and almost simultaneously the Liangkwang leaders, proclaiming their dissatisfaction with the Yueh-fa, moved their troops towards the Hunan-Kiangsi border in a threatening stance. According to a press release from Chiang's headquarters, Shih, the perrenial rebel, was bought by the Liangkwang leaders. The same release also charged collusion between Liangkwang and the CCP. To support the charge a telegram which they claim was found after the government's troops captured Ningtu (July 19), sent by Mao to P'eng Teh-huai, was released. It went as follows:

> The Liang-Kwang provinces are preparing to invade Hunan and Kiangsi within the current month. The 500,000 bullets which they promised to give us are expected to be delivered from Chiaying immediately. Our troops must make every effort to defend Ningtu for half a month. As soon as the Kwangtung forces have entered Kiangsi, the siege will be raised and we may launch a counterattack.[35]

The same press release added that there were more telegrams intercepted by Governor Yang Shu-chang of Fukien to prove the complicity between the Reds and Canton.[36] Whether these charges were true or not it is certain that locked in their ferocious, continuing dispute with each other, Canton had little wish to see Chiang victorious against the Reds; and conversely, Chiang would not have been sorry to drive the Reds into the bailiwick of the Canton separatists.

But through the summer Canton bided its time and did not move. In north China, by August 11, Shih Yu-san's rebellion had come to an end, taken care of by Chang Hsueh-liang who then proceeded to reorganize the rebel units.[37] So the Third Encirclement Campaign proceeded. By its sheer force, it was sweeping all before it. Between September 7-9, the biggest battle was fought at Kaohsing at the end of which Ch'en Ming-chu was claiming a huge victory.[38] The next step was Juichin, capital of the Chinese Soviet. However, attention had already shifted elsewhere. From September 3 on the Liangkwang authorities began to move in earnest along the Hunan border. Immediately Chiang began to redeploy his forces. The 19th Route Army was shifted to Kanchow and other units were moved to Hunan.[39] War at the Communist front came to a virtual end. Then came the Mukden Incident, September 18, 1931, which put a definite halt to further action. (last contact was on September 20) By the beginning of October the Generalissimo's staff at Nanchang had all returned to Nanking.[40]

According to government claims, the Communists were on their last legs at the beginning of September and had it not been for the Canton move and Mukden Incident, would have been wiped out. Certainly the development of other major problems did give the Communists respite and probably a new lease of life. But government claims undoubtedly were also overly optimistic, and should be taken in conjunction with other government reports which had the Communists scoring significant successes in Kiangsi between September and December, 1931. These included disrupting the traffic along the Kan River and inducing the disaffection in December, 1931, of the 73rd and 74th brigade of the 25th Division of the 26th Army, which added between 16,000-17,000 men and over 20,000 rifles to the Red Army.[41] More than a year intervened between the third and fourth campaigns during which time both sides did considerable rebuilding.

Between the Third and Fourth Encirclements.

Between the end of 1931 and early 1932, the KMT government was in a state of flux. As a result of the Shanghai Conference of October, 1931, Chiang had been forced to resign all his posts. Instead Lin Shen was elected Chairman of the Government, which became an honorific post, while actual power was to be shared between Chiang, Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min. For a while, however, all three boycotted the government at Nanking. In desperation the lesser leaders called on Chiang and Wang to resume leadership. They met in Hangchow and on January 17, 1932, reached terms which were to bring them to a period of co-operation. However, before they could effectively resume power, Japan struck again in Shanghai on January 28, 1932. Taking up arms in defense of their garrison area was the 19th Route Army which won luster by their determined resistance. On February 14, Chiang sent in the 5th Army, his own units, to aid in the defense of Shanghai. There is a charge that they could have been dispatched earlier and the fact that they were not was not an accident. Despite urgent pleas for more reinforcements by leaders of the 19th Army, no further aid came. Why? Anti-Nanking sources charged that the Chiang-Wang coalition had determined to appease Japan which the then Japanese Minister to China Shigemitsu seemed to corroborate.[42]

There was another angle to the situation, and this concerned the Communists, who it was charged, were taking advantage of the international situation to expand their power in Kiangsi. As the commander of the 18th Army (in Kiangsi) Ch'en Cheng said:

> When the January 28 Shanghai warfare broke out, we received orders from our leader (Chiang) to embark for Shanghai. But as we were about to mobilize, we received news that the Red Bandits

> were preparing to attack Kanchow. They were seeking to seize the opportunity provided by the Shanghai warfare and redeployment of the 18th Army boldly to attack Kanchow, link up Hunan and Kiangsi, then seize Wuhan. Upon receiving this intelligence we thought that important though resisting Japan was equally grave was the menacing situation created by the Red Bandits. Thus we asked the leader to reconsider and he ordered us first to relieve Kanchow.[43]

But there was yet another factor which neither Ch'en nor Chiang would acknowledge in public and this concerned the intra-KMT balance of power. The demarche of the Southwest which began in the latter part of 1931 had forced Chiang to make political concessions and had left him militarily and politically more vulnerable to attacks. This threat from within the KMT was much more critical to his overall position as leader of China than either the Communist rebellion or Japanese adventures in Shanghai. It is only when one bears this in mind that one can understand the true significance of Chiang's policy of "pacification before resistance". Explicitly the policy of pacification referred to quelling the Communist rebellion. But implicitly and perhaps even more important it referred to the reduction of Chiang's military rivals within the KMT.

The Fourth Encirclement Campaign, January 1 - April 29, 1933.

Actually the anti-CCP campaign in Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupei and Anhui had resumed in June, 1932.[44] However, for both sides the latter months of 1932 were spent in the strengthening of armies and consolidation of base areas in readiness for the reckoning that began in January, 1933. Figures on military strength varied greatly. According to the Ministry

of War, figures for government troops engaged in this campaign numbered 153,000 men, while the Red Army was 64,000 strong and ill-armed.[45] Other sources put the government strength as high as half a million men.[46] Overall command of the armies was given to Ho Ying-ch'in. But again a lack of unity afflicted the government units for three disparate groups were lumped together in this campaign. Some units belonged to Chiang and were commanded by Ch'en Cheng while others were under Ts'ai Ting-kai of Shanghai fame.[47]

Unpropitiously for the government, the opening of this campaign coincided with renewed Japanese assaults. Between January and March of 1933, Japan captured Chinchow, then all of Jehol and then fell on the Great Wall passes and began to threaten Peiping and Tientsin. Faced by two crises simultaneously Chiang attempted to cope with both, unsuccessfully. After convening a hurried conference in north China on the defense of Shanhaikwan, Chiang rushed back to Nanchang where on January 30 he called a conference of commanders of the encirclement campaign.[48] His stated plan was to win a conclusive victory in Kiangsi after which troops could be redeployed northward. Towards that end he assumed the post of commander-in-chief of the encirclement forces on February 6 and sent Ho north on March 3 to help Chang Hsueh-liang.[49]

Chiang himself commuted between north China and Kiangsi during the spring of 1933, osentsibly attempting to bolster positions or lend moral support on both fronts, to no avail. However, except for the 2nd Division under Huang Chieh no central units were sent north. The official explanation was that the fourth encirclement campaign was then at a vital point and with a Communist offensive at Kiangsi under way, the government could not spare men to send northward.[55] As time went on this did become a stock answer to demands for more positive anti-Japanese policy. On the other hand, the reverse of this explanation was also often heard, i.e., the

government's lack of success in its anti-Communist campaigns was attributed to the continuing Japanese aggression in north China which necessitated the diversion of Chiang's attention and troops from his set task. It is true that the KMT army could not cope with two wars at once and its attention was often divided between the two. Nevertheless, the vicious circle theory was exaggerated in its application. At least in dealing with the CCP, the KMT's problems were far more deeply rooted than the distraction (serious though it was) provided by Japan.

The fourth encirclement campaign came to an end in the last days of April, 1933. The results? In short, the CCP was stronger than ever in manpower and territory. The reasons? Besides the usual, there is the added factor that by now a central soviet government had been established which provided unity to the Communist cause. The KMT also admitted that morale was poor due to public clamor to fight Japan instead of the CCP, and lack of any local support due to the purely military approach to the Communist problem.[51]

The Fifth Encirclement Campaign, October 26, 1933 - October 14, 1934.

Chiang was beginning to learn his lesson and between the 4th and 5th Encirclements changes and reforms took place. The aim of these was to increase the military effectiveness of the KMT units, to implement a tactically superior approach and to emphasize the political aspects of the anti-CCP campaign. All these factors combined did make the difference, i.e., the 5th Encirclement Campaign succeeded in reducing and breaking the soviet government in central China.

First of all the command was centralized. Chiang established his headquarters as Chairman of the Military Commission in Nanchang and obtained the necessary mandate from the central government to exercise supreme authority in both

military and political affairs connected with the campaign in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Hunan and Hupei provinces.[52] During the next year Nanchang was where Chiang was more often than not to be found personally directing the campaign. He decided that one reason for previous failures was the mediocre leadership and inadequate training exhibited by the middle and lower ranking officers. As a remedy, he established a training camp at Lushan in Kiangsi in the summer of 1933, where front-line units were ordered to send their officers for an intensive course, on a three-shift rotating basis. Ch'en Cheng was appointed commandant of the camp which was set up to handle about three thousand trainees per session.[53] Preparations for the camp began in earnest in July, 1933. The original plan was to inaugurate the camp on July 15 with the first class to begin on the following day, and as it turned out, the planners were only three days behind schedule.[54] Altogether three sessions were held through September, 1933, each lasting two weeks. Chiang was so pleased with the results of the first session that he ordered additional units to be added to the program and furthermore ordered all students and staff of the Army University, customs police, communications corps, the Chekiang Peace Preservation Bureau and Political Training Bureau and hospital units stationed in Kiangsi to participate also. Altogether seven thousand five hundred and ninety-eight officers passed through the training camp.[55]

Chiang attached great importance to the training camp, to underscore which he personally supervised the compiling of three booklets on the principles and goals of the anti-CCP task.[56] He also lectured frequently in person to the trainees. His lectures were mostly on ideology and were aimed at making the officers aware of their mission, which significantly was not just to defeat the Communists but ultimately to defend China against Japan.[57] As one of his

lectures pointed out, their first joint task was to destroy the Communists, then get rid of the warlords so that a unified and effective central government can be established that can face and withstand foreign aggression.[58] Thus to Chiang, China's central problem was domestic disunity and among his domestic challengers he saw the Communists as the most dangerous. To him so long as the domestic rebellions are uncrushed, China will be disunited, weak and unable to meet the foreign challenge to her sovereignty. Conversely, a united China will be strong and able to withstand aggression.

Obviously a two-week stint at Lushan was mainly a morale booster and did not teach the officers many new techniques. But this was only part of Chiang's program. He realized that greater success might be his if he competed with the Communists for the political loyalty of the people. Hence the slogan that he adopted for the 5th Campaign was: "Thirty per cent military, seventy per cent political". On the military side he also reorganized the chain of army command, emphasized road building and communications and above all began to build a ring of block houses around the Communist area. As time went on, the ring began to tighten into progressively smaller circles. Between October, 1933, and October, 1934, land under CCP control shrank from seventy to six hsien. He also instituted a strict economic blockade against the Communists which resulted in great shortages of vital supplies such as food, medicine and salt in the Communist area.[59]

On the political and social level a major effort was made to organize and win over the people. To this end Chiang harkened to one of Tseng Kuo-fan's techniques, the organization of the pao-chia system of joint and mutual responsibility among the people.[60] This was begun in Kiangsi, Hunan and Anhui, with the eventual goal of wider adoption. Under the system each pao-chia was to organize a self defense force for protection.[61] To supervise the system, enforce the blockade

and do general espionage, Chiang organized the Special Movement Corps of some 24,000 men under K'ang Tse as a special branch of the army.[62] Early in 1934 Chiang launched the New Life Movement which aimed at the moral and social rehabilitation of the people. On the basic level, the New Life Movement dealt with such mundane matters as food, clothing, dwelling and conduct; but on the broader ideological basis, it attempted to revitalize some aspects of Confucianism. Here was a try to provide an ideological alternative to Communism by reminding the people of traditional values and virtues.

There were also reforms in the political system. Between July and October, 1934, the provincial administrations of Honan, Hupei, Anhui, Kiangsi and Fukien were simplified, centralized and made more efficient. Each province was subdivided into several districts or chu which in turn supervised the hsien governments. Hsien governments were also reorganized and simplified on the provincial model, with the resultant one-third cut in expenses.[63] To alleviate abuses in the land system a land reorganization law was announced in October, 1932, which put its main emphasis on recognition of the land rights of the owners and on the tenant's right to lease. Rent was fixed and a limit was put on the land tax, and controls were instituted to regulate buying and selling. Although land confiscated by the Communist government was to be returned to the original owners, the various reforms related to the land did provide a more equitable deal for the tiller, in principle, in any case.[64] To encourage rural improvements and to increase the supply of mobile cash the government emphasized the co-operative movement. Here the National Economic Council stepped in and up to 1935 had provided ¥1,600,000 for the establishment of nine hundred and fifty-two co-operatives in Kiangsi. The N.E.C. in addition provided funds to establish some public health and rural welfare centers.[65] The aim of these

political and social reforms is to better the local government and provide for an improved livelihood for the peasantry. While some political changes were implemented and some economic measures were instituted, it is not clear how widely the measures relating to land tenure and taxation were implemented, if at all.

By using all the above tactics Chiang began to achieve tangible military results for the first time. The Fukien rebellion which began in November, 1933, did temporarily halt the anti-CCP campaign as part of the military originally assigned to the encirclement campaign was deflected to take care of the Fukien rebels, which they succeeded in doing before the end of January, 1934. Although the Fukien rebel group had made prior contacts with the CCP in the hope of establishing co-operation between the two, their speedy collapse forestalled the fruition of any such plan.[66] The elimination of a possible ally also meant the further tightening of the noose around the Chinese soviet area.

Through the spring and summer of 1934 the KMT troops advanced relentlessly. By September, the central soviet area had been reduced to six hsien. On October 2 the central soviet government made the decision to abandon Juichin and flee. Already the Second Red Army under Ho Lung had broken out of western Hupei for western Hunan, and the Fourth Red Army under Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien had fled westward towards northern Szechuan. Now on October 14 the main force of the CCP government and First Front Army led by Chu Teh left Juichin.[67] They were able to break through the weak western sector of the cordon because here the commanding Generals Ho Chien (of the West Route Army) and Ch'en Chi-tang (of the South Route Army) had not completed nor connected the line of block houses they were charged with building, whereas in the northern and eastern sectors a tight cordon had been successfully drawn.[68] Here once again is demonstrated the bane of modern China, the fact that "warlord"

generals interpreted orders as they wished and the fact that a supposedly uniform policy had not been uniformly carried out, i.e., there was still no unity in the KMT command. The fact that an army and government of some one hundred thousand men and much bulky equipment, bullion, documents, etc. was able to walk through a blockading army leaves no need to comment further on the supposed defenses!

Nonetheless at long last the encirclements had met with some success. The elimination of the Soviet government in the five provinces that formed the heartland of the Nanking controlled areas was now a fact. It had been a serious challenge and source of embarrassment and now was no more. At last unification had come to central eastern China. Triumphantly the national government issued on November 27 an order for the termination of all anti-Communist campaign headquarters and associated institutions in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Hunan and Hupei provinces.[69] These areas, with the exception of Kwangtung, were now under Nanking control.

The Long March to Northern Shensi.

Thus began the so-called twenty-five thousand li long march which lasted between October 14, 1934, and October 20, 1935, and covered about six thousand miles. The march took a circuitous route and traversed through twelve provinces as follows: Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kueichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Sikang, Kansu, Shensi, Ninghsia and Shansi.[70] Upon discovering that some of the Red Army had broken out the government immediately decreed pursuit. On October 13, Chiang named Ho Chien commander-in-chief in charge of the pursuing forces. Chiang at the same time ordered Governor Wang Chia-lieh of Kweichow and Pacification Commissioner of Kwangsi Pai Ch'ung-hsi to dispatch forces to the Hunan-Kweichow border to intercept the Red Armies.[71]

Despite battles, pursuit, harassment and natural obstacles the Red Army survived and battered though they were

the remnant made it to Shensi a year later. What accounted for this? Part of the credit must be given to the bravery, hardiness and sheer will for survival of the Communists. But that was not all. Two other important factors must be taken into account. One was the continuing factionalism within the KMT and the feeling of mutual fear and estrangement between Chiang and his rival provincial generals. Another was the sheer incompetence and corruption of many provincial administrations and armies whose oppressive actions had made them scourges upon the local people, and therefore bred local insurgency movements which they could not handle let alone outside incursions.

First then will be examined the result of mutual suspicion between Nanking and some provincial authorities. The best example was Kwangsi, whose leaders Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi had long been in bitter contention with Nanking. Until early 1934, the Southwest had Fukien and the Chinese Soviet areas as a buffer between it and the central government, which in fact had allowed it some feeling of security. With the speedy collapse of the Fukien rebellion and the absorption of that province into the central sphere and now with the elimination of the Kiangsi Soviet, the Southwest was beginning to feel uncomfortably exposed. Their discomfiture was intensified with the beginning of the Long March and Nanking's pursuit which threatened invasion of their domain. From their perspective, Chiang's pursuit of the Communists had a much deeper and more sinister purpose, i.e., it was an excuse and golden opportunity for Chiang to extend Nanking's power to hitherto unreached provinces. As an editorial of Chung Hsing Pao the official mouthpiece of the Southwest Political Council expressed it:

> So (Nanking) encouraged the Communist Bandits to flee westward and maintains the 'pursue but do

> not exterminate' policy towards them, so that now they have entered Szechwan. At the same time (Nanking) maintains the policy of 'the great encirclement' against the Southwest. In short, the military dictator (Chiang) has these motives for encouraging the Bandits to flee westward: 1. Internationally to broadcast his achievement in bandit suppression ... 2. The Kiangsi bandit area sat astride the Yangtze, posing an obstacle to military unification ... In sending the Bandits in flight westward, the military dictator undoubtedly sought to kick aside his obstacle along the Yangtze, to enable him to bring his military force against the Southwest. Recent completion on time limit of three highways in Fukien is another step in the fulfillment of the same overall plan. 3. To use the excuse of pursuing the bandits to enter Liangkwang ...[72]

The same editorial continued that luckily for the Liangkwang leaders they were able to maintain peace and security in their province and thus forestall both the Communists and Chiang in their respective quest to conquer and control Liangkwang. This, however, still did not alter the fact that now the Southwest was encircled from Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, Yunnan and Kweichow provinces.[73] And how did they manage to save Kwangsi from both the Reds and Chiang? Pai Ch'ung-hsi let both the pursued and pursuer pass through a corridor in the northeastern Kwangsi but successfully sealed off the rest of the province from them.[74] According to the official KMT account, had the Kwangsi authorities carried out their part in the overall KMT plan, they would have surrounded the Red Army in the border area south of the Hsiang River and east of the Li River and thereby could have brought the campaign to an end.[75]

So the Long March continued past the corners of Kwangtung and then Kwangsi into Kweichow. While it is impossible to prove the charge that Chiang did deliberately set up the Communists for their Long March and then opted not to destroy them but to chase them to areas hitherto not under his control thereby extending his power, this scenario was indeed played out many times. In any event, as a result of the Long March Nanking came to exercise considerable control on Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan and Sikang for the first time, which was an added bonus for Nanking in its quest for unification.

In December, 1934, the First Front Army of the CCP broke into Kweichow. Kweichow had long been suffering under the opium ridden administration of warlord Wang Chia-lieh. Although normally there were five division and three independent brigades in Kweichow, they were of very low caliber, and each garrisoned an area which its commander regarded as a sub-fief. These factors, together with its difficult terrain, made Kweichow easy prey for the Red forces. And it was here that the Tsunyi Conference was held at the turn of the year where the CCP reorganized its forces and mapped out future plans. The inability of the Kweichow provincial government and the fear that the Reds would break into Szechwan to join with their local cohorts there and the inability of the Szechwan army to cope prompted Chiang in January, 1935, to establish a Military Affairs Commission Headquarters in Chungking with himself as commander-in-chief and Ho Kuo-kwang as resident commissioner. Its purpose was to create a unified command to direct anti-Communist activities in Szechwan, Yunnan and Kweichow.[76]

Early in 1935 local Szechwan troops and central units battled the Red Armies, some of whom fled back to Kweichow while others were compelled to evacuate to Yunnan and Sikang. Chiang spent much time in Chungking directing activities and also made trips of inspection to such other

centers as Kweiyang.[77] Eventually Communist troops were expelled from Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow, but affairs there did not revert to the old pattern. Having found themselves inadequate to handle the Communist intruders, the provincial warlords had no alternative but to seek and accept central help. Once there Chiang embarked on the task of cleansing and reorganizing the local governments. Take Szechwan for example. A report prepared by the Generalissimo's Szechwan Headquarters and presented to the central government by Chiang in 1935 stated that under the old system, the province was divided into three garrison areas and numerous sub-areas, each governed by a general. None of these generals used established budgetary procedures. Of the total tax intake approximately ninety per cent was used for military purposes.[78] All this and many other irregular practices now came to an end.

Chiang decreed and his lieutenants saw to the abolition of the garrison system by the end of February, 1935. On March 1, a new provincial government was formed on a unified basis. Liu Hsiang, the old governor and most powerful warlord in Szechwan, was continued as governor and commander of the provincial Peace Preservation Forces. Instead of the old garrison areas the province was now divided into eighteen Supervisory Administrative Districts. The provincial government was required to submit to the central government annually an itemized budget and account closely for expenses. Old local currency issued by provincial banks were recalled and replaced by the national currency, old debts were consolidated and an overall financial reorganization of the province was begun. Training schools were established to update the knowledge of the local government personnel. The New Life Movement was inaugurated.[79] On June 30, 1935, order came from the Szechwan government to disband one third of its troops, to be completed by July 15 of the same year. Thus local military expediture was cut down from ¥4,200,000 to

¥2,760,000 per month. This, together with the reorganization of local taxes, the demarcation between central and local taxes and the establishment of a finance supervisory bureau in the province, resulted in the balancing of the local budget for the first time.[80] Nor did military reorganization here limit itself to disbandment. In August, 1935, Chiang inaugurated a training school for Szechwan officers at Ngomei which was based on the earlier Lushan model. Its first session opened on August 4, 1935, and for the next two months Chiang spent most of his time there supervising and lecturing the officers on a number of topics which included military discipline, the meaning of modern nationhood and the New Life Movement. By the end of September two classes had graduated from this special school.[81]

Also begun in this period was a plan to develop communications and build roads. In 1935, there were some three thousand kilometers of roads in Szechwan, much of which were so bad as to be useless. Besides projects to repair and improve existing roads and build bridges, new plans were laid to connect Szechwan with the outside by inter-provincial highways between Chengtu and Kweiyang (Kweichow) and between Szechwan and Shensi and other provinces.[82]

So a very definite start was made to incorporate Szechwan into the central fold. It was not a complete takeover, as witness the retention of the old governor in the same capacity. But Szechwan was never to revert to its old semi-independent status again. Now there were central government representatives, and more important, central troops in Szechwan, looking over the shoulders of the local officials, introducing new ways and controls, which included the turning over to Nanking of certain tax receipts. Although the road building program was but begun between 1935-1937, a start was made to end the geographic isolation of this rich hinterland province. Concluding his report to the central government Chiang made two points. He stated that in setting

a guide line for his provincial reform program his motto had been "to control, educate, nurture and defend". He continued that since a good start had been made in Szechwan his next step was to institute similar reforms in Kweichow.[83]

Chiang further revealed his motives in a speech he made in Chungking on March 4, 1934, to party cadres. He stressed that the purpose of his coming to Szechwan was not only to rid the province of the Communist menace but to aid in the reorganization of the province's military so that unified they could better protect the nation.[84] Therefore long after the Communists were cleared from the province, through the summer and autumn of 1935, Chiang continued to busy himself in Chengtu and Chungking. Even when events elsewhere finally compelled him to move on he left a trusted lieutenant, General Ku Chu-tung as chief of his headquarters in Chungking.[85]

Although Szechwan was the key province and Chiang concentrated on consolidating government hold there, other provinces in southwest China also saw themselves drawn into the central fold in varying degrees. Kweichow has already been mentioned in this connection. Similarly since early January, 1935, when part of the Red Army entered Yunnan, this province was also compelled to gravitate towards Nanking. Governor of Yunnan, Lung Yun, tried to prevent the Communist forces from entering his province by deploying some of his best troops along the border between Yunnan, Kweichow and Szechwan, but failed. Then Chiang entered and began to reorganize the anti-Communist forces in Hunan, Yunnan and Kweichow. When the task was completed, Lung Yun found himself commander of the Second Route Army with Hsueh Yueh, one of Chiang's own officers, director general of the front line troops. The Second Route Army was divided into four components, the two most powerful in terms of manpower, training and equipment were central troops, compared with whom the Yunnan and Kweichow troops were at best second rate. By the end of May, 1935, the Red units were expelled from both

Yunnan and Kweichow.[86] But by now central influence in these areas had also become a permanent factor.

Even the remote border province of Sikang began to feel the winds of change. In the early part of May the main force of the Red Army, the First Front Army crossed the Gold Sand River and thus escaped Yunnan into Sikang.[87] In Sikang Mao's First Front Army linked up with the Fourth Front Army under Chang Kuo-t'ao. Sikang was then the bailiwick of the Szechwan warlord Liu Wen-hui (nephew and antagonist of Liu Hsiang). Liu commanded the 24th Army which was poor in quality. Besides, he had previously frequently been involved in civil wars in Szechwan where his interests lay, and had no wish to waste his energies fighting the Communists. So in spite of orders from Chiang to fight, Liu made only token if any resistance and retreated to north of Tatu River. Again it was up to the central troops. Hsueh Yueh was commanded to enter Sikang and above all to prevent the Reds from re-entering Szechwan from the Sikang border. Hsueh proceeded to build an air field and a line of forts in Sikang along the Szechwan border. To prevent the Red Armies from leaving Sikang from the north, the First Division under Chiang's favorite, Hu Tsung-nan, was rushed to Sungp'an also on the Szechwan border.[88]

But the Red Armies had no intention of remaining in Sikang. The First and Third Armies under Mao, Lin Piao and P'eng Teh-huai decided to proceed northward and after crossing Kansu, arrived at Pao-an in northern Shensi, in October, 1935, where they joined up with local Communist leaders Wu Ch'i-chen and Liu Chih-tan. Chang Kuo-t'ao attempted to build a soviet in Sikang and northwestern Szechwan and hoped eventually to establish contact with the USSR through Sinkiang.This scheme failed due to his defeat in Chinghai at the hands of the Moslem General Ma Pu-fang and central troops.[89]

When it became apparent that part of the Red Army was making for the northwest Chiang replied by organizing defenses and regrouping armies in that area. By the latter part of October, 1935, new arrangements were completed. A Northwestern Bandit Suppression Headquarters was established at Sian with Chiang himself as commander-in-chief. Chang Hsueh-liang was appointed deputy commander-in-chief and was invested with plenipotentiary powers during Chiang's absence. By the end of 1935 a formidable army was assembled for the task. It included several component groups as follows. The first Route Army was under Chu Shao-liang and consisted of ten crack central divisions and Moslem cavalry units. The Second Route Army consisted of Manchurian troops and had ten infantry and four cavalry divisions under Yu Hsueh-chang (a Manchurian and concurrently governor of Kansu). The Third Route Army was the Shensi or Northwestern Army under Yang Hu-chung. In addition there were some Shansi and other miscellaneous units.[90]

So ended the Long March. Undoubtedly the Communist strength had been severely diminished. But severe as was the attrition suffered by the Communists due to natural and man-made causes, its top echelon survived intact to continue the struggle. As Edgar Snow put it: "While the Red Army's march to the Northwest was unquestionably a strategic retreat, forced upon it by regionally decisive defeats, the army finally reached its objective with its nucleus still intact, and its morale and political will as strong as ever. The Communists rationalized and apparently believed that they were advancing toward an anti-Japanese front, and this was a psychological factor of great importance."[91] This brings events up to another important facet of KMT-CCP relations and the key here was China's relations with Japan. Ultimately the accelerated pace of Japanese aggression was to push the KMT and CCP into each other's reluctant arms in the formation of a second united front.

The Shensi Phase and Background to the Second United Front.

Towards the end of October, 1935, Chang Hsueh-liang's command began the northwestern phase of the government's anti-Communist campaign. In strategy the plan was to follow outlines worked out during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign in Kiangsi, i.e., to use thirty per cent military and seventy per cent political means to combat Communism; to introduce the New Life Movement and pao-chia system; economic blockade; to build roads to facilitate government troop movements; and to ring the CCP held area with a progressively tightening ring of forts and block houses. In addition troop strength along the Shensi-Kansu-Szechwan border area was strengthened to prevent the Communists from retracing their steps.[92]

During the winter of 1935-1936 the KMT units were satisfied with merely preventing the Red Army from breaking out. Nor was economic blockade strictly carried out. As a result the Communists were given some time to recuperate. In February, 1936, the Red Army took to the offensive, crossing the still frozen Yellow River and bursting into Shansi. The chief objective of this mission was to obtain food and supplies for the expanding army, now estimated at over 50,000 men, which could not be locally satisfied due to the poverty of northern Shensi.[93] But the CCP also declared another motive for this expedition. In a manifesto issued by the central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic on February 21, 1936, a call was made to convene in Soviet territory an all-China anti-Japanese national salvation conference with the aim of forming a national defense government and an anti-Japanese army. All patriots were invited to attend.[94] Yen Hsi-shan, the long entrenched governor of Shansi, now found himself unprepared and his army unfit to defend Shansi. Thus on February 22 Yen wired the central government appealing for land and air support. In response Chiang ordered central units into Shansi and between March and April more than four divisions of some of Chiang's best

units began to pour in.[95] By the end of May the Communist incursion of Shansi had come to an end. But the fact that they were able to occupy, albeit briefly, forty-eight hsien of Shansi surely testified to the hollowness of Yen Hsi-shan's strength in his once called "model province". A by-product of this episode was Nanking's gaining for the first time a foothold in Shansi, hitherto Yen's autonomous domain.

Meanwhile fighting had broken out in northern Shensi but government units met with scant success. In battles during the spring and summer of 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang lost two of his best divisions to the Red Army. This and other instances of Communist strength convinced those on the scene that they were very far from a spent force indeed.[96] Many Manchurian soldiers were taken prisoners, indoctrinated with sentiments that Chinese should not kill each other but should unite against Japan, and then released. Rapidly the home-sick Manchurians began to lose heart for their task. As summer wore on fighting between Manchurian and CCP units petered out and by October had come to a de facto halt. Similarly the northwestern troops also felt disaffection. Their leader Yang Hu-cheng regarded the task assigned him as a "life sentence" and so also avoided fighting.[97] Sian gradually became the haven for proponents for an anti-Japanese united front.

In spite of reverses suffered by his own as well as the Manchurian units, and renewed Japanese push in Suiyuan in the latter part of 1936, Chiang persisted with his anti-Communist campaign. To show his personal determination he arrived in Sian on October 22 and remained until November 29 to direct the military operations. Then he flew to Loyang where on November 31, on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday, he reviewed some of the planes bought with private donations to strengthen China's air force.[98] In the early winter months of 1936 visitors found Loyang bristling with arms, for it was serving as the staging ground for another anti-Communist push.

By this time, however, the Manchurian troops had entirely lost heart in the fight. As one of Chang Hsueh-liang's close aides T'ang Chun-yao stated, they had the ability to cope with and defeat the Red Army at this point if they had the will, but they did not. Instead they wanted a united front to fight Japan. Some of the senior officers, Chang included, thought this rash but were unable to restrain the popular feelings.[99] So when Wang Yi-che (commander of the 67th Manchurain army) was ordered to take Wayaopao, the Red capital, he arranged to exchange it for Yenan with his opponent and did not fight. The Red Army moved into Yenan in December and in January, 1937, it became the capital of the Chinese soviet government.[100]

Fearing that the situation was getting beyond his control, Chang had (on November 31) attempted to remonstrate with Chiang for a change of policy while in Loyang attending the latter's birthday celebrations. He wanted to show Chiang the temper of the officers and men of the Manchurian Army. Both by Chang's own and by Yang Hu-cheng's account, Chiang sternly rebuffed Chang and ordered him back to his post.[101] However, on December 3, Chang was back in Loyang again. He requested Chiang's presence in Sian to resolve the crisis situation that had arisen there. On the following day Chiang and Chang flew to Sian. In Sian, on December 7, Chiang issued a stern order to both Chang and Yang to intensify and concentrate all their efforts in the anti-Communist campaign. In two separate audiences Chang importuned Chiang to alter his course but to no avail. Chang's reply was that if the northeastern and northwestern armies were unwilling to fulfill their appointed tasks, his central troops will, and Chang and his army would be sent to Fukien and Yang and his to Anhui. Probably with the realization that the role of these two armies in the anti-Communist campaign had come to an end, Chiang convened two general officers' conferences in Sian, where he excluded both Chang and Yang.[102]

Understandably this sequence of events further frightened the already disgruntled and shaken Chang and Yang. Thus precipitously they decided to use the last resort--to kidnap Chiang in order to force him to change his policy. The result was the Sian Incident, December 12, 1936.

The Sian Incident and its settlement resulted in some important things, notably the cessation of the anti-CCP campaign, a negotiated settlement between the KMT and CCP and the formation of a united front against Japan. But this idea of a united front was long in development and was one in which the CCP played an important part.

Beginning with the Mukden Incident, September, 1931, Japan inaugurated a new phase in her relations with China which ended with her attempt to conquer and totally subjugate China. The Mukden Incident occurred in the midst of the KMT's Third Campaign. An important result for the CCP was that offensive in Kiangsi was halted midstream. Though in the long run continuing Japanese aggression was to benefit the CCP in its power struggle with the KMT, initially the CCP, like the Comintern, took the view that nothing could be done to resist Japan until the KMT, including its dissident elements, was overthrown. Witness for example a directive issued by the CCP on February 2, 1932, on the Shanghai Incident. It called for the overthrow of all imperialisms including that of the KMT, called for strikes and called on soldiers to kill their officers and join the CCP to protect the soviet.[103] One year after the event, on September 22, 1932, the central committee of the CCP issued a statement analyzing the Mukden Incident. According to this analysis, the Incident had two meanings: 1. It was a first step of imperialist aggression against the USSR, and 2. It caused KMT factions to unite and step up their anti-CCP campaigns. In conclusion the resolution called on the masses to unite and overthrow the KMT.[104] Thus it is not surprising that during the period of the Shanghai Incident

the CCP should take advantage of the disarray of the KMT armies to break into Nanking controlled areas and to seek territorial gains.

The first months of 1933 saw the Japanese conquest of Jehol and battles along the Great Wall passes. These events coincided with Nanking's Fourth Encirclement campaign. For the first time the Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet government asked the Nanking government for a cessation of its anti-Communist campaign. In a statement issued on January 17, 1933, it made three demands, that the KMT is:

1. To cease attacking the soviet areas.
2. To guarantee civil rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly.
3. To arm the people, organize volunteers and fight for Chinese independence.[105]

Meeting with no response, the CCP made a unilateral gesture. On April 15, 1933, it declared war on Japan.[106] But situated as they were in the remote areas of Kiangsi, the CCP was thousands of miles away from possible contact with the Japanese army and so for the time being this remained a token gesture. Through the early part of 1934 the CCP continued to espouse a policy of simultaneous resistance to Japan and armed rebellion to overthrow the KMT, as evidenced by Mao's Report to the Second All China Soviet Congress in January, 1934.[107]

The first suggestion for a united front against Japan came on April 10, 1934, in a proclamation issued to the people of China by the Central Committee of the CCP, entitled "The Formation of a United Anti-Imperialist Front Against the Japanese Aggression". It was still a strong anti-KMT document and denounced Nanking in no uncertain terms for its foreign and domestic policies. Addressing itself to the masses, the document said:

> The CCP is calling upon you to be united and arm yourselves so as to prosecute a war of national revolution, to protect North China and all of China and to drive from our fatherland the Japanese aggressors and all other imperialists. Downwith the KMT fascists--the vanguard of foreign imperialism in China...All Chinese who are opposed to imperialism...should be united under the banner of a united anti-imperialist front and fight vigorously against Japanese and all other imperialists.[108]

It continued:

> All the white soldiers of China: Instead of allowing you to fight against the Japanese aggressors, your officers have sent you to oppose your own parents, brothers, and sisters; they have sent you to fight against the only anti-imperialist force China has, namely, the Red Army...The CCP is calling upon you to oppose your traitorous superiors and oppose any attack of the Soviet and the Red Army...It asks you to support the Red Army's declaration of war against Japan and also its program of waging a resistance warfare against the Japanese invaders.[109]

As can be seen the KMT was still viewed by the CCP as an enemy and as traitorous and the appeal for a united front was made to the non-KMT elements.

However in the August 1, 1935, Declaration of the CCP issued from Maoerhkai one began to discern a change of tone, it asked for an end to the civil war but did not specifically call for the overthrow of the KMT. It advocated a coalition of all political parties to form a National Defense Government

and establish an anti-Japanese united military command. It promised CCP co-operation and assistance in such an endeavor.[110]

The next important step came in December, 1935, when CCP leaders met for policy decisions in Wayaopao in Shensi. On December 25, 1935, the conference issued a lengthy document entitled "Resolution on the Present Political Situation and the Mission of the Party". The resolution though still sharply condemned Chiang called for the expansion of relations of the CCP and co-operation between it and other parties and groups in order to establish a national defense government to fight against Japan. In return the CCP promised to stop class warfare and the purging of rich peasants and to co-operate with the petite bourgeoisie.[111] The same line was continued in the February 1936 proclamation made on the occasion of the invasion of Shansi. The justification offered here for the invasion was that the CCP needed grain supplies to enable a struggle against Japan. In conjunction with the above proclamation the CCP also issued a circular telegram calling for the convening of an all China anti-Japanese national salvation conference to be held in soviet territory. Its purpose would be to form a national defense government and an anti-Japanese army.[112]

During spring 1936 the CCP tone and policy began to change very drastically. In the Declaration on the Establishment of an All-China All Parties anti-Japanese People's Front, April 25, 1936, for the first time the CCP called on the KMT as well as other parties and groups to unite.[113] This was followed by a wire from Mao and Chu Teh addressed to the leaders of the Nanking government which appealed for the cessation of civil war and unity to resist Japan. Another appeal was sent to the KMT on August 25, 1936, addressed in courteous and conciliatory tones.[114] Other moves followed, public and private. All this not only indicated a change on the part of the CCP but in a wider

sense reflected the rapidly changing political climate in China during the latter months of 1936. Finally on December 1, 1936, Mao, Chu Teh, Chou En-lai P'eng Teh-huai "and the 200,000 members of the Red Army" addressed a letter to Chiang. After deploring Chiang's pursuit of the civil war and gathering of two hundred and sixty regiments to fight the CCP in north China, it continued:

> In spite of the great hatred of all Chinese against Japanese aggression and enthusiasm for rendering aid to the Suiyuan anti-Japanese troops, you sir persist in concentrating all your might in a cruel civil war. What about the state of mind of your officers and men in the Northwest? We who are situated in the front know very well that their state of mind is no different from ours. They desperately want to stop this fratricidal war so that they can at the earliest date proceed to do battle against Japan. Even your own units sir...could not escape bitter defeat at Shanch'engpae. The reason is not that they could not fight but that they did not wish to see Chinese fighting Chinese and therefore willingly laid down their arms to the Red Army.[115]

Concluding, the letter said:

> If you sir would stop the civil war today, tomorrow the Red Army and your huge anti-Communist army in the Northwest can...proceed to the anti-Japanese front. Thus we will be able to increase the strength of the Suiyuan defenders by tenfold. Sir, if only you will change your mind and heart, we will all be able to avenge our national wrong, defend our soil and recapture our lost land, and

you will become our glorious anti-Japanese hero.[116]

As can be seen from the above letter, on the eve of the Sian Incident the CCP gauged the sentiments of the KMT armies in the Northwest much better than Chiang did. The letter is also important as it showed for the first time willingness on the part of the CCP to join the KMT in a common cause against Japan.

The above represented the most important public pronouncements of the CCP on the Japanese issue. Faced with the grave Japanese problem, many CCP leaders were changing their long held stand against the KMT. These public pronouncements were paralleled by important private negotiations which began in the fall of 1935. The first contact occurred in Hong Kong between Tseng Yang-fu (an agent of the brothers Ch'en Li-fu and Ch'en Kuo-fu, powerful leaders of the so-called CC clique in the KMT who represented the KMT in its secret talks with the CCP) and representatives of Chou En-lai. On September 1, 1935, Chou sent a letter to the Ch'en brothers stating that the CCP's aim was to establish a united front against Japan and that it imposed no pre-conditions for talks. In May, 1936, Chou and his aides began to negotiate with the KMT in earnest, first in Shanghai and then in Nanking. Nanking put forth four conditions for a rapprochement. They were that the CCP should:

1. Obey Sun Yat-sen's three principles.
2. Obey Chiang's directions.
3. Abolish the "Red Army" designation and reorganize its units as part of the national army.
4. Abolish the soviet government, accept designation as local government units of the Republic of China.[117]

But before a definitive agreement was reached, the Sian Incident occurred. Thus it can be seen that even before the Sian Incident put an end to the civil war, considerable

ground work had been done to affect some sort of rapprochement between the two sides, and as an examination of the KMT's four conditions reveals, Nanking was not in a position to impose total obedience but was seeking instead a face saving way of masking the status quo.

The Sian Incident and the Second United Front.

Although in the larger sense the Sian Incident can be put in the context of the CCP's united front effort, both according to Chang Hsueh-liang and to CCP sources the CCP was not privy to plans by Chang and Yang Hu-cheng to kidnap Chiang.[118] In fact, though the long-term causes for the Sian Incident had been brewing for some time, the final decision was precipitously taken. It was only after the event that Chang realized the inability of his and Yang's staff to cope with the crisis, and therefore sent for Chou En-lai to come to Sian to mediate a solution.[119]

Chou and his aides arrived in Sian on December 13.[120] Already Chang and Yang had publicly declared their aims in a joint wire of eight points. Some of these points coincided in part at least with long-held CCP demands, such as those which called for the reform of the Nanking government in order to admit representatives of other political parties, the release of all political prisoners, the legalizing of patriotic movements, the guaranteeing of freedom of speech and other freedoms, the immediate convocation of a national salvation conference, and the stopping of civil wars. But the CCP had no part in the actual drafting of these eight demands.

According to Chang Hsueh-liang, Chou told him of the CCP's surprise upon hearing of the Incident. Chou said that the hierarchy of the CCP was split over how to respond to the Incident. One group led by Yeh Chien-ying was unfavorably disposed towards Chiang whilst another, of whom Chou was one, advocated a peaceful settlement. Chou and

Chang then renewed their pledge of mutual loyalty taken shortly before in Yenan. Chou reiterated that should hopes for a peaceful solution be dashed, the CCP would commit its army to their joint protection under Chang's command. They also agreed to work toward the realization of the eight demands and to retain the leadership of Chiang. Ironically though Chiang was Chang's prisoner and not the CCP's, Chang conceded that with his arrival in Sian Chou took over the key role in the ensuing negotiations.[121]

Fortunately for Chiang, Moscow, for its own reasons, wanted Chiang released and returned to Nanking. One of its considerations was that if Chiang were gone the right wing of the KMT would emerge stronger and these were more likely to knuckle under Japanese dominance and adopt a more anti-Communist policy. There were even rumors that Wang Ching-wei, who had been recuperating in Europe, had been in touch with Hitler. In any case Wang was hurrying back to China after hearing of Chiang's detention, perhaps in another bid for power. So Moscow pressured the CCP to mediate for a peaceful settlement. In addition, unreassuring factional fights in Nanking and the bid of certain right wing KMT groups for power provided the CCP with more impetus to secure Chiang's release. They were beginning to see in him their best prospect for survival and for a united front. On December 19 the CCP issued a circular telegram entitled "Proposal for Peaceful Solution of the Sian Incident". After praising the rebels as patriots it advocated a ceasefire and then the holding of a peace conference in Nanking where the Nanking government, the Sian rebels and all other political parties and groups would discuss the fate of Chiang.[122]

Thus Chou mediated and negotiated most vigorously for the acceptance of a peaceful solution. During the next two weeks he had many sessions with those who were caught in or came to Sian. In a lengthy interview with Mme. Chiang on December 24, Chou not only pressed for a united front but

asserted that he believed Chiang to be the only one to head the nation. He also promised to intercede with Yang Hu-cheng to release Chiang.[123] In his talks with other persons Chou reiterated that the CCP wanted freedom for other political parties, an end to KMT proscriptions, and progress towards democracy. On its part the CCP was willing to abandon its armed rebellion, abolish the soviet, to change the name of the Red Army and to obey KMT leadership.[124]

In return, and despite his later disavowals, Chiang too made promises. All sources agree these were in the nature of verbal understandings and not written statements. According to Kuo Tseng-k'ai (who said he participated in these talks as a member of T.V. Soong's party) Chiang between December 20-21 indicated willingness to abandon his policy of "pacification before resistance". On December 23, he agreed to: 1. reorganize the Nanking government, admit other parties, and 2. stop civil war and negotiate a rapprochement with the CCP once he returns to Nanking. According to this account Mme. Chiang and T.V. Soong acted as witnesses.[125] During his captivity the extreme anti-CCP faction was already waxing stronger in Nanking and the only hope in containing them lay in the reinstatement of Chiang to power.

So with both Chang and the CCP advocating a peaceful solution, the fears and opposition of Yang Hu-cheng were overcome. On December 25, Chiang and his party left Sian and triumphantly returned to Nanking. After a period of recuperation and readjustment negotiations between the two sides resumed. On February 10, the Central Committee of the CCP wired Nanking stating its position before the C.E.C. of the KMT which was about to meet in its third Plenary Session. It demanded that the KMT should:

1. Stop civil wars in order to fight the foreign enemy.
2. Grant freedom of speech, assembly, release political prisoners.

3. Convene a national salvation conference to include all political parties and opinions.
4. Complete quickly preparations for resistance.
5. Improve the people's livelihood.

It continued that if the KMT accepted these five conditions then the CCP will guarantee the following:

1. To stop actions to overthrow the KMT government.
2. To change the status of the CCP government from the present soviet form to that of a special border area government; the Red Army to become part of the national army obedient to Nanking.
3. To hold elections in the special border areas to bring about a democratic government.
4. To stop confiscation of landlords' land.[126]

On February 15, the third Plenary Session of the C.E.C. opened in Nanking. On February 19 Chiang reported to the general session of what had transpired during the Sian Incident. He restated the eight points of Chang and Yang and explained that whilst he had refused to consider them while under captivity, he had promised to present them to the government after his release. He asked the session to debate and consider these points and either to adopt or reject them. His report was coupled with a request to be relieved of his posts and duties.[127]

Outwardly the KMT remained firm. In the reply to Chiang's report (outlined by Wang Ching-wei) Chang and Yang's eight points were rejected out of hand and on principle, and Chiang was finally prevailed on not to resign.[128] On the Communist problem, on February 21, the session adopted the "Resolution to Terminate the Red Menace". It began with the reaffirmation of all the party's past held anti-Communist policies; then it proclaimed that in its magnanimity the KMT always forgave a penitent; and concluded by accepting the principle of reconciliation with the CCP on the basis of the four guarantees it offered in its February 10 telegram.[129] In

conclusion the manifesto stipulated four minimum conditions for any future settlement. They were:

1. Abolition of the Red Army as a separate military organization and its integration into the national army.
2. Abolition of the soviet government in order to affect political integration of the soviet-held area with the rest of the nation.
3. Cessation of Communist propaganda and indocrtination and acceptance of the Three People's Principles as the only ideology for China.
4. Cessation of class warfare.[130]

To confirm his personal as well as the party's commitment to this new policy Chiang held an interview on February 24, 1937. Here he verbally accepted the CCP demands of February 10.[131]

Sometime during the spring of 1937 Chou En-lai arrived in Nanking for the next round of negotiations which were based on preconditions recently set by both sides. What transpired during these sessions in the first half of 1937 remains a mystery. Several interacting factors must have speeded their progress. On the one hand there was the increasing tempo of Japanese aggression against China and the impasse that had been reached in the Sino-Japanese talks. These events must have alarmed and alerted both the KMT and CCP and warned them of the inevitability and imminence of a showdown with Japan. On the other hand Japan saw the impending united front as evidence of the serious threat of the communization of China. She in turn sought to stop this and also saw this as an excuse and vindication for her final move to crush China. On July 7 Japanese military action outside Peking touched off the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

Japan's enlargement of hostilities in north China after July 7 compelled both sides in China to move towards a rapid accord. On July 15, 1937, the CCP issued a declaration on KMT-CCP co-operation. It stated that the goal of co-operation

was to save the nation, achieve democracy and economic reform, to promote which the CCP then pledged to stop its anti-KMT activities, abolish the separate soviet government and the Red Army.[132]

With the Japanese attack on Shanghai on August 13, hope of localizing and isolating the July 7 Incident faded. In response to the need for some policy guidelines for the prosecution of an all-out war, the CCP issued on August 15 its "Ten Great Policies for Anti-Japanese Resistance and National Salvation". Of particular interest here are the following: Under point two titled 'Total mobilization of the nation', it called on the government to "Ensure equal treatment for all military units fighting in the war of resistance. Set up regional military zones over the whole country...". Under point four titled 'Reform of political mechanism' it asked the government to "convene a National Assembly truly representative of the people, enact a truly democratic constitution; draft a programme for fighting against Japan and saving the nation; and elect a national defence government. The national defence government should contain the revolutionary elements of all parties, groups, and popular organization...The national defence government should carry out a revolutionary policy of fighting against Japan and saving the nation, ensure local autonomy...". Finally in point ten which was on the achievement of national solidarity against Japan, it said: "On the corner-stone of all-out co-operation between the KMT and CCP, build an anti-Japanese, national united front of all parties, groups, classes, and armies in the country to lead the fight against Japan and to cope with the national crisis by sincere unity.".[133]

In recognition of the need for a united front and in response to the Communist declaration, and in deference to public sentiments, the Military Affairs Commission on August 22 issued an order to incorporate units of the Red Army in

the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia area into the newly formed 8th Route Army, (three divisions of approximately 20,000 men in all) under Chu Teh and P'eng Teh-huai as commander and deputy. The soviet government of the northwest was changed into the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area Government under Lin Tsu-han and Chang Kuo-t'ao as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The garrison area of the 8th Route Army was designated as part of the Second War Zone under the overall command of Yen Hsi-shan. Communist guerrilla units in the lower Yangtze area were reorganized as the New 4th Army under their own leaders Yeh T'ing and Hsiang Ying. The New 4th Army numbered over 10,000 men and were assigned to the Third War Zone under General Ku Chu-tung. In addition Chu Teh and Chou En-lai were made members of the Military Council.[134]

Between July-September, 1937, amidst the gloom of all-out war China saw great progress towards unity. Nearly all the erstwhile dissident or semi-independent generals, including Li Tsung-jen, Lung Yun, Liu Hsiang and others either sent telegrams or came in person to Nanking to pledge their solidarity with the government in its resistance policy. In a gesture of conciliation Nanking freed the seven National Salvation League leaders who had been in detention since the end of 1936.[135] On September 22-23 terms were finalized between the KMT and CCP. On September 22 the KMT Central News Agency made public the CCP's Public Statement on KMT-CCP Co-operation (drafted by the CCP on July 4 and handed to the KMT on July 15). Conceding that China's most urgent problem was Japanese imperialism:

> Therefore the Central Committee of the CCP again solemnly proclaim to the whole country:
> 1. The San-min chu-i enunciated by Sun Yat-sen are the paramount need of China today. This party is ready to strive for their thorough realization.
> 2. (This party) abandons all its policy of overthrowing the KMT by force and the movement of

> sovietization, and discontinues its policy of forcible confiscation of land from landlords.
> 3. (This party) abolished the present Soviet government and practices democracy based on the people's rights in order to unify the national political power.
> 4. (This party) abolished the designation of the Red Army, reorganizes it into the National Revolutionary Army, places it under the control of the Military Affairs Commission of the National Government, and awaits orders for mobilization to shoulder the responsibility of resisting Japanese aggression at the front.[136]

On the next day Chiang issued his statement entitled "Jointly Facing the National Crisis", in which he accepted the pledges of the CCP and called on all Chinese to give their all to a united China seeking survival and to strive for the triumph of the revolutionary ideology through the repelling of Japanese imperialism.[137]

Summary.

So events have reached a full circle. In ten years between 1928-1937 China saw a decimated CCP rise from practical ruins, re-establish a base in the Kiangsi area and despite repeated campaigns to destroy it, rise to power and strength between 1928-1934. Then the tables turned, the Kiangsi soviet areas were re-taken by KMT armies and the CCP was again reduced to flight. At the end of 1935 when the Long March ended, the CCP held only small areas along the border of Shensi and Kansu and its party membership and army was again reduced to a few tens of thousands. Having reduced their foe to such bleak circumstances, the KMT felt confident that final victory was at hand. But at this juncture an external element intruded which gave the CCP a new lease of life. This was Japan's continued push to master China. Ironically while Japan used her hysterical

phobia against Communism to justify her advances in China, it was precisely her intensified aggression that drove China to unity and the KMT and CCP into each other's reluctant arms. The Communists were able to seize upon the Japanese issue and adroitly to maneuver public opinion to their side. Thus from 1935 on, throughout the country and finally even among some of the KMT, the clamor rose for the cessation of civil wars and the formation of a united front to resist Japan. The climax was the Sian Incident, from which stemmed the second United Front, completed in September, 1937, when war had already broken out with Japan.

It should be noted that its ups and downs of fortune notwithstanding, the CCP remained a vital force and was recognized as a dangerous threat to the KMT and its concept of unification. Even in its bleak days in Shensi, it retained intact its party organization, military machine and government structure. So though in a tattered state, it continued to pose an alternative ideology and form of government to that of the KMT. It is no wonder that Chiang regarded its resiliance and vitality as a threat even more dangerous than that of Japan and spent so much money and manpower to get rid of it. Even though in the later phases Chiang adopted political and economic techniques to combat and compete with the Communist challenge, his basic approach remained a military one, and this proved inadequate. Squeezed between the vise of Japanese aggression and Communist rebellion, Chiang finally was pressured to "unite" with the Communists to fight Japan. But from the beginning each side eyed the other warily and the Japanese war notwithstanding, continued to struggle and vie with each other for territorial control and popular allegiance. But what explicitly was the significance of KMT-CCP relations between 1928-1937 looked at from the perspective of the unification of China? Obviously the CCP rebellion proved a stumbling block against unification under Nanking and Chiang. The seriousness and extent

of the Communist threat varied from period to period. As has been pointed out, perhaps the seriousness of their military threat was deliberately exaggerated to enable Nanking to dodge the issue of active resistance to Japan. Up until the Fifth Encirclement Campaign in 1934, the main force of Chiang's units were not engaged in the anti-CCP effort, and the reason lay with Chiang's relations and problems with his rivals within the KMT. But by 1934 Chiang had partly tamed most of his rivals within the party or at least reduced them to provincial status. This enabled him to use his best units against the CCP without having to fear intra-party repercussions. Thus the CCP was driven out of its stronghold in the lower Yangtze, which must be accounted a significant gain in the battle to achieve physical unification.

Even more crucial to Chiang's quest to unify China and extend the power of the central government was the bringing in of hitherto autonomous provinces under Nanking's orbit in the course of the Long March. In the long-term perspective, the addition of Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Sikang, Shensi and Kansu, especially Szechwan, into the central fold was very significant indeed. Since the days of the early republic these more peripheral areas had been steadily drifting away from the central orbit, they had been untouched by the Northern Expedition and thereafter had remained almost entirely beyond central government influence let alone control. However by 1935, thanks to the anti-CCP campaigns, the picture was beginning to change. Central government control was finally established in these areas, accompanied by central army units, some administrative personnel and significantly but less tangibly the introduction of new ideas of nationhood and unification.

Whether he deliberately set up the escape of the CCP in order to use it as a pretext for extending his power to hitherto autonomous areas as his rivals charged cannot be


proved. A glance at the map will show that under the circumstances there were few good options open to the CCP on which route to take. Even if he did not set them up, Chiang was certainly astute enough to grasp the potential that pursuing the CCP held for him to extend his personal authority and military influence to areas hitherto beyond his reach. Since Chiang was the most powerful man in Nanking and since he regarded the extension of his power as synonymous with furtherance of the cause of unification, the successes he scored during the Long March must certainly be considered a victory for the cause of unification.

Thus the anti-CCP campaigns had a twofold significance. On the one hand the reduction of the CCP in the middle lower Yangtze area meant the extension of Nanking's physical control throughout the entire region. Secondly, they resulted in the inclusion into the central fold the vast areas of the southwest and northwest China. Especially crucial was the extension of Nanking's influence and control into the large, populous and wealthy province of Szechwan which later was to serve as a refuge for Chiang and the Chinese government in the war with Japan. One of China's main advantages in the Sino-Japanese war which enabled her to survive was the depth of her territories into which she could retreat. For the government mere depth would have been meaningless unless she could control this hinterland, and after 1935, for the first time, she was able to do so, incompletely, but at least partially. It is then safe to say that had it not been for the greater unification that resulted from the anti-CCP campaigns and the Long March, the KMT government would not have been able to maintain itself and survive for any period of time after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.

So on the threshold of war, unoccupied China achieved its greatest extent of political and one might also say psychological unification under the KMT. The importance of this in the light of the protracted nature of the

forthcoming war, cannot be emphasized enough. True the CCP continued to exist, but it was reduced and removed to the remote northwest where it was isolated and posed less of a threat to the political unity of China. Finally for Chiang Kai-shek to whom unification was so closely identified with his personal ascendency, the anti-Communist campaigns and related events has resulted in his growing stature and military power. As the Sian Incident and subsequent events made clear, he was becoming the undisputed and indispensable leader of China, to whom all factions conceded leadership in the fight against Japan. The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War saw Chiang reach the pinnacle of personal power which others had tried in the years past to prevent.

Soviet China April 1932
The Long March 1934-1935.



Chapter IV. Kuomintang Ideology in Practice: Attempts to Institutionalize a Political System.

Sun Yat-sen, the father of the Chinese revolution, developed a set of political doctrines and a step by step program to implement them. According to his strategy, the revolutionary process consisted of three stages: military rule, political tutelage and constitutional government. First the monarchy and warlords must be overthrown. But as the Chinese people have been accustomed to autocratic government, a period of training must intervene before the constitutional stage of democracy can be reached. During this transitional period, his party, the KMT, was assigned the pivotal guiding role. His earlier works restricted the tutelage period to six years and further stipulated that a provisional constitution should define relations between the party, government and people during this stage. However, in his Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (1924), he failed to mention either a definite time schedule for the tutelage period. Since he died soon thereafter, it became impossible to ascertain whether this was a deliberate or an accidental omission. These unclarified points were to cause controversies both within the KMT and between the KMT and non-KMT members. They also provided the loophole for Nanking and the KMT to extend the tutelage period to much beyond six years.

Sun's political and social theories were embodied in the San min chu-i or Three Principles of the People. They were given their final form in a series of lectures he delivered to party members in 1924. The Principle of Nationalism or Min-tsu chu-i was designed to arouse national consciousness and had as its main goal the recovery of China's sovereignty and equality among nations, i.e. the recovery of tariff autonomy and rendition of foreign settlements and the end of extraterritoriality. In Min-ch'uan chu-i, or the Principle of Democracy, Sun sought to balance the concept of a strong government and

state with popular sovereignty. He devised a government system of five branches or yuans, the executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control, but sought to check the despotism of the state by vesting in the people the rights of election, referendum, initiative and recall. Min-sheng chu-i, or Principle of the People's Livelihood covered the economic side of his program. He saw China's main problem as poverty and unequal distribution. To alleviate these he wanted to end domination by foreign economic imperialism (tariff autonomy), to develop China's production and industries by the combined means of attracting foreign investment, small private enterprises along with nationalized industries. On the rural side his aim was the equalization of land, i.e., land should be redistributed so that each tiller would own his land but not through expropriation.

How did the KMT perform on its application of the Three Principles? On nationalism it succeeded in recovering tariff autonomy and some foreigh concessions though the key concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin remained in foreign control and extraterritoriality remained until 1943. But these years were characterized by the overwhelming disasters she suffered before Japanese aggression. Huge masses of her territory were lost to her control. As has been discussed before, these severe reverses were great blows to China's unity. On the Principle of the People's Livelihood, certain minor ameliorative measures were adopted, such as the abolition of likin and miscellaneous taxes. To what extent even these reforms were implemented and how much of the benefits passed to the peasants still remain problematical. In any case, China's basic problem of tenancy and rural poverty were not improved as no land reform programs were undertaken. Nor did the people win the right to exercise political democracy for tutelage was extended to beyond the period under examination here.

The aim of this chapter is not, however, to deal with the theory and application of Sun's doctrines but to

examine those aspects of Sun's doctrines that the KMT considered useful aids in its quest for unification, and how they were interpreted, adapted and added to in the party's attempt to unify China. In addition to examining this aspect of the KMT's effort to unify China, this chapter will also assess the success or failure of the KMT in the execution of its selected policies from the viewpoint of its quest for unification. Therefore, this chapter will deal with such topics as the implementation of political tutelage after 1928. Did political tutelage, which meant one party rule, further the cause of national unity? Did it train the people in the exercise of political power and would popular sovereignty necessarily mean continued KMT rule? As will be pointed out, KMT leaders could not see that a unified China could exist outside the framework of KMT rule. In other words, they saw their one party dictatorship as synonymous with the maintenance of unity in China. This attitude could be due to their misunderstanding of such Western concepts as democracy. But in any case it explains why there was no genuine attempt to establish the basic institutions of a democratic government.

The question whether democratic institutions would have made greater unity possible is a moot one. The fact is I do not think that KMT leaders thought so, which explains why the period of tutelage was prolonged and why the KMT sought to censor the press, unify thought and ban political opposition and do anything else it thought necessary to entrench itself as a permanent power of the land. Not all this was due to greed for power. Many genuinely saw one party rule as beneficial to the cause of unity and conversely saw in a democratic multi-party state all the potential dangers for political disintegration which would destroy the cause of national unity. Considering the circumstances of their political socialization, it is by no means strange that they should think this way.

To supplement the development of its governmental apparatus and control during tutelage, the KMT also exploited certain traditional institutions and attitudes in order to rouse a sense of nationalism in the people. Thus one must explain such officially sponsored movements as the New Life Movement and the traditionalist oriented and nationalistic interpretations of the origins of Sun's thoughts. For the KMT saw the potential of appealing to traditional virtues and ideals to awaken a sense of nationalism in the people. And in nationalism the KMT hoped for the arousing of the masses to sacrifice for a common cause. In other words, it hoped that a greater spiritual unification would result from the arousing of a sense of nationalism and with this in view it formulated its cultural policy. From a subjective point of view, the KMT as a group could not envisage unification except under its leadership. Finally, I think it is only when one bears these factors in mind that one can understand some otherwise seemingly very self-serving and arbitrary statements made by leaders of the KMT.

Political Tutelage and One Party Rule as Tools for Unification.

With the end of the Northern Expedition, the period of military unification was considered over and political tutelage was officially begun, under KMT trusteeship. As Chiang declared to students of the KMT cadre school on January 16, 1928, the party must follow exactly the principles and blueprints laid out in Sun's Principles of National Reconstruction.[1] Hu Han-min added later in the same year that the success or failure of the KMT depended on how it discharged its duty and what it could accomplish during the tutelage period.[2] He continued that in order to achieve unification: "Our party must use its powers to assume the responsibility of tutelage, to teach all the people so that everyone would be able to assume his

political power. Then we will have real unity and the future constitutional government will be laid on firm foundations."[3]

But even when KMT leaders allowed that the aim of tutelage was to prepare the people for a constitutional government and democracy, the prospect of a future democratic China outside the KMT ideology and framework was apparently not to be allowed. Thus Hu added:

> The Three Principles of the People is the ideology for saving the nation; the five power constitution is the framework for building the nation...Except through the framework of the five power constitution, the Three People's Principles cannot be realized in their entirety. Therefore in the period of tutelage and in paving the way for the constitutional period, our party's responsibility is to nurture the foundations of the five power constitution in order to ensure its ultimate realization.[4]

The five power principle or the five-fold division of power between the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and Control Yuans was immediately implemented in the structure of the KMT government. But what about some of the other principles stipulated in Sun's Principles of National Reconstruction? Article 9 of this work stated that all citizens were to have the right of election, recall, initiative and referendum. It said: "All citizens irrespective of their sex and property, who believe in the Three People's Principles and have taken an oath, with the exception of those who have been deprived of their political rights, are declared qualified voters, capable to exercise these direct political rights."[5]

How were the people to be prepared for the exercise of these political rights? Sun said in Article 8 of the Principles of National Reconstruction:

> During the period of political tutelage the government should dispatch trained officers qualified in the examinations to the different districts to assist the people in making preparations for local self-government. The attainment of local self-government depends on the completion of the census, the survey of the district, the organization of an efficient police force, the construction of roads throughout the district. Moreover, the people of the district must be able to fulfill their duties as citizens by exercising the four points mentioned above and must pledge themselves to carry out the principles of the Revolution before they are entitled to elect the chief officers of a Hsien for the administration of its affairs and representatives of the Hsien for the formulation of its laws."[6]

As can be seen the hsien was to be the basic unit of local self-government and many requirements would have to be met before a hsien would qualify for self-government. In a declaration of political aims made on October 26, 1928, the government stipulated that it was only when all provinces have completed the task of establishing self-government that the constitutional stage can begin.[7] These were tall orders for China at that time.

Shortly after the announcements on general principles, the Ministry of the Interior was set with the task of formulating rules pertaining to self-government. It proceeded to divide the hsien into sub-entities and devised a number

of rules and regulations on their organization and administration. It also provided for the election of local councils and appointment of the hsien magistrate. But according to the Minister of Interior, Chiang Tso-pin, in 1937, these rulings were soon found to be impractical.[8] Accordingly on February 21, 1934, the C.P.C. passed a measure titled Principles of Local Government, which was divided under three major provisions as follows:

1. The hsien and the city are to be the units of local self-government, townships, municipalities and villages are to be placed under their supervision and direction. However, when special circumstances of population, economics and culture warrant it, the district or chu can be designated as a unit of self-government. (Thus when Chiang Kai-shek was in his anti-CCP headquarters in Nanchang, he divided Kiangsi province into a number of districts or chu, each of which consisted of several hsien. This was done to render administration more effective. The district chief ruled the area under his capacity as chairman of the local Party Administration Commission.)[9]

2. The implementation of local self-government should be divided into three periods. a. Preparation period, when the mayor of the city and hsien magistrate are to be appointed by the government. Part of the membership of the hsien and city councils are to be appointed by the chief magistrate or mayor. (no mention of how the rest are to be chosen) These are to be specialists to prepare for the implementation of local self-government. However, on each of the village and municipal levels, the local populace are to elect three members to their local councils, under a chairman to be appointed by the mayor or hsien magistrate. b. When self-government begins, the mayor and hsien magistrate are to be appointed by the government but members of the city and hsien councils are to be popularly elected.

c. When self-government is completed, there is to be popular elections of mayors, hsien magistrates and village chiefs and councilmen at all levels. The people then begin to exercise the powers of election, recall and veto. The progression from each of the above stages should be by proposal by the provincial and city governments and implemented upon their approval by the Ministry of Interior.
3. As for the procedures and methods in promoting the adoption of self-government, due to differences in localities and timing, the central government will only make basic and flexible rulings. It will be up to the provincial governments to decide on the pace and proceedings for the hsien and cities within its jurisdiction, subject to approval by the Ministry of Interior and the Executive Yuan. In order at the same time to accommodate to local conditions and to promote the process, each province should establish either one district or several hsien in its jurisdiction as promotion and experimental areas. These centers are to serve as pilot areas for experimentation and research.[10]

As early as 1933 some pilot projects had been inaugurated. Kiangning hsien in Kiangsu and Lanch'i hsien in Chekiang were designed as experimental hsien.[11] According to the Minister of the Interior, Chiang Tso-pin, by 1937 more had been added. They were Yu-hsien in Honan, Quanming (sic) in Yunnan, Ting hsien in Hopei, Chu-ping and Ho-che in Shantung, Ping-yang in Kiangsi and Hen-shan in Hunan. He added that in these areas: "experiments in local self-government are carried on with amazing results."[12] As I have been unable to find anywhere what exact progress had been made towards self-government in any of these areas, it is difficult not to regard Chiang's statement without skepticism. Perhaps he meant that an order from the Ministry of Interior to the local governments to establish land banks, co-operatives and schools to promote local

self-government had been acknowledged and that in the above mentioned areas there had been progress in these endeavors. Perhaps that is what he meant by amazing results.[13]

But some preparatory work was done during this period on the administrative level. For example, in February, 1933, the Ministry of Interior sent out questionnaires to all hsien to ascertain local conditions. By November, 1933, twelve hundred or sixty per cent had replied. Based on the information received, the Ministry of Interior had sent suggestions for amendments to local self-government rules to the Executive Yuan.[14] On the local level some provinces, including Fukien, Suiyuan, Yunnan and Kansu, established classes to train administrative personnel on the sub-hsien level on self-government.[15] Some other provinces and municipalities also began to formulate proposals and plans for implementing local self-government at certain levels.[16]

Then in August, 1935, the C.P.C. passed the Eight Principles Regarding the Promotion of Local Self Government. Under the new rules the numerous sub-hsien units of local government were abolished as being too cumbersome and were replaced by the pao-chia system. This system, which had been first applied in the areas of anti-Communist campaigns, had now been endorsed for national application. As it was organized, ten families formed a chia and ten chia a pao. For security purposes, members were mutually responsible, and for local self-government purposes, each was to have an elected chief.[17]

Up to 1937, on the local level this is where matters basically stood. On the national level, the problem of the yueh-fa and duration of tutelage and division of power between different levels of government have already been discussed. Political tutelage, as conceived by Sun, had not been carried out in any meaningful way. Why? One must not underestimate the physical problems encountered. China had few roads or other modern means of transportation;

poverty was widespread and rural illiteracy was almost universal; there was no census and local officials were inadequate and ill-trained. In addition, large areas were hardly under central government control. In many areas political power was often in a state of flux. Some areas saw several changes of power. Even in provinces where there was stability, for example in Shansi under Yen Hsi-shan, government attention was turned more to industrialization and economic development and the checking of corruption. Nowhere did Yen attempt to introduce popular government in his province.[18] The same can be said of the so-called model province of Kwangsi. According to General Pai Ch'ung-hsi in 1935, the three needs of his people were self-protection, self-sufficiency and self-rule, in that order. The people needed protection from Communists and brigands. By organizing a local militia, this had been achieved. Kwangsi was a poor province but according to Pai, under his and Li Tsung-jen's administration, productivity was increased. He mentioned nothing about implementing self-rule but made a very pertinent general point when he said that Chinese political organization emphasized the top layer and not the bottom, so that orders could not be carried out. He cited as example the many orders of the C.P.C. and asked how many were being implemented locally.[19]

So perhaps Yen, Pai, and Nanking were right. Security from Communists, brigands and Japanese, and livelihood were more important to the people than democracy or any other theory of government. If there is validity to this argument, then why did the KMT pay lip service and make some half-hearted attempts to implement local self-government? I think the answer is not merely because Sun stipulated this in his program. There was recognition among party leaders that civic pride and national spirit were essential ingredients in the moulding of a unified state. A citizen

would feel more stake in his society if he had some voice in its decisions and without this sense of citizenship and identity, no truly unified modern state would emerge. But then a conflict arose when it came time to promote this ideal of self-government, the not unnatural desire to perpetuate themselves in power and fear that genuine self-government might bring in other results. Thus the KMT could not bring itself to give self-government a genuine try, even if other factors had allowed it, and in so doing they sacrificed this potential for furthering the cause of real unification.

The Hsing-Sheng-ming (New Life), a monthly published by leading KMT theoreticians, throws much light on the KMT's justifications for its actions and thoughts on how ideology ought to be implemented.[20] An article entitled "I tang chi kuo" (One party rule) by Sa Meng-wu, an important KMT member, asserted why during the tutelage period opposition political activities ought to be suppressed and basic freedoms of citizens abridged. Sa argued in part:

> Since the counter-revolutionary forces are not entirely destroyed, for the success of the revolution, except for those who truly obey the Three People's Principles, the freedom of political participation ought to be denied. In addition, they should be denied the freedoms of speech, publication, assembly and organization. This is because speech, publication, assembly and organization can be used as weapons in political warfare. Therefore if they are not denied, before the revolution can succeed, counter-revolution would again have raised its head.[21]

He continued that this being the case and because the bulk of the people are not counter-revolutionaries, by elimination, only warlords and traitors would oppose such restrictions. Conversely, all good and reasonable elements will find no difficulty about joining the KMT. He concluded:

> So the totalitarianism of the KMT is not directed against the ordinary people, it is the dictatorship of citizens against non-citizens. This is why one-party dictatorship is eminently reasonable.[22]

Other writings by KMT theoreticians reveal both pride in the fact that they were now the ruling power and irritation with criticism. The reasoning used was often arbitrary and rarely good. Frequently one finds assertions to the effect that for a party to assume sole guiding control was eminently reasonable and unless one were the lackey of imperialists or warlords or believed in feudalism or was a new capitalist, one would not resent such one party rule.[23] Thus one finds such unabashed statements as:

> The fact of totalitarianism by the KMT is not a veiled one. In fact, our slogan is a definite "government of the nation by the party, reconstruction under the party, totalitarianism under the party". This is because the KMT had assumed the responsibility of leading the revolution of the Chinese people, so it is its duty to complete its noble task. Thus the tutelage period is one of one party rule and totalitarianism. From the standpoint of the theory of revolution, there is no need to equivocate on this score. Only if the KMT abandons its responsibility of revolution can it stop advocating totalitarian party rule.[24]

Nor was this close and inalienable tie between the KMT and the nation thought to be only applicable during the tutelage period. It is perhaps hazardous to conjecture what many of the KMT theoreticians thought such terms as "democracy" and "constitutional rule" meant. But it is difficult to believe that they understood "democracy" to mean free elections and the possibility of the KMT abdicating power. Perhaps from the very subjective point of view, they were convinced that as a result of tutelage, the Chinese people would become as identified with KMT principles and interpretations as they were, and so the question of an alternate choice would not occur. It would seem that only an implicit conviction of this kind would make possible such utterances as the following:

> During the tutelage period, the party directly rules the nation. During the constitutional period, it will indirectly rule the nation. Therefore though superficially it would seem that the party's rule is a temporary one, in reality its rule will be permanent.[25]

The above sampling of statements made by KMT leaders are cited to underscore the fact that not only did they envisage continued and undisputed one party rule which they were willing to use force to maintain but they interpreted this one party rule by the KMT as synonymous with the continued existance of the nation itself. In other words, there was a very strong sense that unless it were under KMT rule the very foundations of unity would collapse and since a unified state was considered desirable, totalitarian means under the KMT were justified to uphold it.

Nationalism and Cultural Policy as Aids towards Unification.

Another marked characteristic of the KMT was its strong feeling of nationalism which had its roots in Sun and was a reaction against China's continued failures and humiliations in confrontations with the West since the nineteenth century. While seeing the need to adopt many Western techniques and innovations in order to modernize China, many KMT leaders were also horrified with the prospect of abandoning many of China's traditional values. Thus the response to the West was an emotional one. This emotional response to the invasion of the West and a hearkening to the traditional as a source of inspiration was evident in some of Sun's writings. During its years in power, this aspect of Sun's thought was put into prominence.

With its goal of unifying China the KMT sought to promote a nationalistic cultural policy. Here again, the aim was to point out the greatness of Chinese achievements of the past, the uniqueness of her cultural traditions and the superiority of her values. Many among its ranks considered it lamentable that some Chinese, especially the young, admired Western institutions and values and felt their own culture inferior. So the goal then of a cultural policy which emphasized the nationalistic and traditionalist elements was to inculcate pride in being Chinese and to arouse the desire to be great again. The theme of promoting unity through cultural nationalism was implicit in this and often explicitly stated too. It is in this light then that one must interpret Ch'en Li-fu's expositions of his pseudo-philosophy of Vitalism in which he extolled Chinese ethical values and pleaded for their revival.[26]

The elder of the Ch'en brothers, Ch'en Kuo-fu, also gave a very clear indication of his cultural nationalism in an article entitled Chung-kuo Kuomintang chih wen-hua cheng-tse (Cultural Policy of the Kuomintang). This article was the published form of a lecture delivered to the students

at the Central Political Institute on June 21, 1942, but it was based on plans he had made on cultural policy in a memorandum called Wen-hua shih-yeh kang-yao (Principles of a plan on cultural affairs), which was adopted by the standing committee of the C.E.C. on April 2, 1936. This memorandum was the outcome of the work of a Cultural Affairs Planning Committee authorized by the Fifth KMT Congress in 1936 of which Ch'en was chairman.[27]

The memorandum as adopted sought to build Chinese culture on three principles as follows:

1. The aim of China's cultural program should be to preserve the independence of the race, glorify traditional culture and absorb the best from other cultures.
2. To use cultural force to glorify and develop race spirit, self-confidence and patriotism.
3. To foster uniform and overall development in all parts of China.[28]

On the basis of these principles twenty-two guiding articles were drawn up. A glance at these articles will show how the KMT meant its ideology and principles to dominate its cultural program. It will also show the conservative nature of the nationalism which the KMT espoused. For instance, Article one stated that the basis of education was to be Sun's philosophy and the traditional concepts of li, i, lien and ch'ih (to be discussed later in connection with the New Life Movement); that the lives of all citizens should be guided by the same credo which KMT members should abide by. The result, it declared, would be the glorification of China's ancient culture.[29] Article two stated that the aim of education should also be to glorify great men and deeds in Chinese history, that in order to reverse the recent vogue of studying and admiring things foreign.[30] Articles fifteen and sixteen stipulated that philosophy, literature and the social sciences should be based on the Three People's Principles. In order to

encourage this tendency the Fifth KMT Congress had allocated several million yuan to establish prizes and subsidies.[31]

The above articles represented the gist of Ch'en's cultural program which was adopted as the official platform of the KMT. But as with many other things in China, a government policy was one thing and its implementation quite another. Some of these principles were written into school textbooks which became mandatory subjects of study as stipulated by the Ministry of Education. But though there were some works of literature and philosophy which conformed with the cultural policy of the KMT, no significant movement on these lines took place. Ch'en himself admitted as much when he said in 1941 that very little had been accomplished in the five years since the adoption of his platform.[32]

It should be emphasized that the avowed aim of the KMT's cultural policy was to make China a strong and unified state. This wish was shared by every articulate Chinese. The disagreement among the various groups was in the means to achieve the commonly desired end. Whereas intellectuals like Hu Shih argued that the best way to make China strong and unified was by relaxing one party rule, by allowing free expression and creating a democratically elected government obedient to a constitution, the KMT conceived its own strength and hegemony as inseparable from China's unity and welfare.

Furthermore this was a period of crisis when the KMT government was constantly under both internal and external threats, especially the threat of Japan. The sense of national emergency and the very danger that China would cease to exist as a unified sovereign state was keenly felt by all. The problem then was how to respond to this threat, how best to unify the nation so that China could preserve her independence. To leaders of the KMT the answer lay in authoritarian government armed with extraordinary powers to impose emergency rules. Thus expounded Pan Kung-chan, a KMT theoretician:

> At the present stage of China's revolution there is need to check the disturbing influences of the imperialists, militarist, politicians, unprincipled gentry and counter-revolutionary scholars. For this purpose censorship within proper limitations is permissible, even though the liberty of speech is thereby somewhat restricted. For this is necessary in order to hasten the progress of the revolution. During this period we should be willing to make personal sacrifices for the sake of accomplishing the revolution of the whole nation. Such sacrifices are made surely for the common good.[33]

Citizens were asked to make these personal sacrifices, because it was stated the very life of the nation was at stake. The overriding consideration then was the welfare and interest of the group--the nation--to preserve which the citizen had a duty to subordinate his personal freedom and individual rights. As Yang Yu-chiung expressed in his work San-min chu-i chih li lun yu chih tu (Theory and system of the Three People's Principles):

> The Tsungli has expressed that the individual does not have freedoms and rights apart from that of the society...So the new concept of individual rights and duties under the Three Principles of the People is based on their relationship to the community's life, and the survival of the race and nation. Without community, race and nation, there would be no room for any law, much less rights and duties.[34]

In this respect there was not much to choose between the KMT and CCP. Likewise the CCP also showed no interest in such concepts as natural rights or civil liberties. Each group was absolutely convinced on his own right. Based on this premise, then others had better conform. Mao condemned liberalism in his article "Combat Liberalism".[35] The CCP also saw power in totalitarian terms, however, with the class emphasis on goals. Thus Mao advocated the supremacy of the poor and middle peasants, stressed submission of thought and action to the party and praised personal sacrifice for the attainment of the collective good.[36]

As can be seen the constant emphasis in KMT writings concerning relationship between the citizen and the state was that group interests must supercede individual rights. The group was identified as the nation or race, often used interchangeably. The ever present theme was that China was embattled and threatened with the loss of territorial unity and cultural heritage. Under the circumstances, first priority must be the preservation of her territorial unity and sovereignty, to do which the group had the right to place severe restrictions on the freedom of the individual.

The Law and Judiciary as Means to Aid Unity.

One of the necessary components in a unified state is a uniform legal system and administration, for a country cannot really be called unified unless a uniform law code applied to all citizens. Under Sun's system of government the Judicial Yuan was to be entrusted with control of the law courts and judicial administration.[37] During the period of political tutelage the KMT set itself with the task of organizing and administering a judicial system. According to its scheme for unifying China, judicial unification should be pursued under the auspices of KMT principles. This official view was stated by Chu Cheng, President of

the Judicial Yuan in an article he wrote entitled "Shih fa tang hua wen-ti" (The question of the judiciary under KMT principles.).[38] To him there were two guiding rules for the running of the judiciary. Subjectively he said judicial personnel though they do not have to be members of the KMT, should be thoroughly conversant with KMT principles. Objectively, in applying the law, the theory behind KMT principles should be the guiding factor. In this way, he continued: "When the whole society is converted and comes to embrace the same values, then the KMT's subjective legal principles will have become objective legal principles also.".[39]

KMT justification for this attitude towards law was that China was confronted simultaneously by domestic and international crises which threatened to disrupt her unity. Since unity was of paramount importance the government during tutelage period should be endowed with great powers to formulate and execute laws designed to discourage acts which would disrupt the government's program of unification. The argument was that a strong government was one best equipped to preserve and enhance unification. The problem was a government equipped with such extensive powers was liable to abuse it to abridge the right of dissent and prohibit discussions of important national issues where its performance might come up for criticism. Thus, under the guise of enhancing unification, the government proved too prone to use strong legal measures to shut off dissent altogether.

Thus between 1928-1937 all sorts of Emergency Laws and regulations were proclaimed and extended at will by the government. For example, in June, 1928, the government issued a set of directives on domestic policy principles. Item one stipulated strict adherence to the rule of law. Item three proclaimed priority to be given to the annihilation of brigands and bandits (CCP was mainly referred to

here).[40] A set of Temporary Rules for the Punishment of Brigands and Bandits was promulgated by executive order to deal with the problem, but for limited duration only. But the imposition of time limitation was really meaningless, as there was not an independent judicial body which could challenge or restrain the government. Consequently one finds the government at will extending and re-extending the effective date of these emergency laws. Meanwhile a new criminal code was being prepared and July 1, 1935, was set as its beginning effective date, at which time the temporary emergency laws were to cease. However, in August, 1935, Chiang as Chairman of the Supreme Military Council telegrammed the central government that since bandits were still rampant and since the criminal laws were inadequate and not severe enough to deal with them, he and many military commanders were of the opinion that the application of the criminal code would be dangerous. Therefore, they proposed the extension of the Temporary Regulations on dealing with bandits during the bandit suppression period. On August 31, 1935, the central government duly accepted Chiang's suggestion. So much for the criminal code.[41]

In this way a great range of power was given to the government. It was also given great latitude in interpreting such terms and concepts as "counter-revolutionary", "democracy" and "civil rights" which not only allowed it a very free hand in framing regulations and determining laws but also led to much confusion in its pronouncements.

Press Censorship as a Tool to Aid Unification.

Another weapon the government wielded to suppress opposition and ostensibly to prevent the propagating of news detrimental to national unity was press censorship. The modern press was a new phenomenum with only shallow roots in China. Many factors hindered the rapid growth of the newspaper, expense, low literacy, and political

uncertainties among others. By 1929, there were only two large papers in China, the Shun Pao and Sin Wen Pao, each with over 150,000 in circulation, and both in Shanghai.[42] In addition, there were many smaller papers and news-sheets, some of very low caliber. It seems that an enlightened publication law was of great importance in China. If there was to be censorship, specific rules and regulations were necessary.

On September 5, 1929, the Kuo-wen News Agency at Nanking reported the decision of the standing committee of the C.E.C. to abolish censorship of the press. This appeared good, but a reading of the regulations at once dispelled any illusions. The decision read that censorship was to be abolished except in areas where circumstances warranted exceptional treatment, and that it could be reimposed during an emergency.[43] Even in the absence of formal censorship, control remained very real. All papers and journals were required to register with the Publicity Department of the central, local or district KMT. At the registration, the publisher was to sign a bond and submit a file of his paper for the latest month. Later, if a paper published "reactionary comments", registration could be withdrawn and the paper banned by order of the Publicity Department of the Central KMT Headquarters.[44]

These were enormous loopholes. Almost everywhere circumstances of war and disturbances might be used to warrant exceptional treatment. And the emergency laws on crimes endangering the state increased rather than decreased during the period under examination. A report of September 24, 1929, stated that the State Council had ordered mail censorship in important cities during the emergency, and had ordered the Publicity Department of the Central Party Headquarters to appoint a director to each city's censorship committee which consisted of military and KMT representatives.[45] Then on February 17, 1931, the Commander-in-chief's (Chiang's) Headquarters issued identical orders

to the Gendarmerie headquarters for Nanking, Shanghai, Woosung, Nanchang and Hankow which ordered censorship of mail matters during the period of bandit suppression. The following subjects were to be suppressed: disclosure of military plans and number of troops, false reports in favor of the Communists, Communist propaganda, doubtful news and unauthorized military reports.[46]

Nor were these empty orders. A scanning of journals and papers of the period will give many instances of punitive censorship. For example, on December 11, 1931, KMT authorities in Shanghai detained all out-port copies of the Shun Pao, Sin Wen Pao, Eastern Times, China Times and Republican Daily News, for allegedly having printed incorrect news on the students' activities.[47] On May 26, 1934, the Executive Yuan ordered local authorities to suspend publication of the Min Sheng Pao for three days for publishing incorrect news concerning the Executive Yuan and for refusal to submit to censorship.[48] On May 28, 1934, the Hsin Hua Jih Pao and Takung Pao were suspended for three days for publishing the alleged terms of the Sino-Turkish Treaty.[49] On May 31, the Kung Yen Pao was sealed and its managing director Chin Tzu-yin was arrested for criticizing the local administration.[50] On July 13, 1934, the Publicity Department of the KMT Central Headquarters ordered the Chao Pao, a Nanking paper, to be closed for one day for publishing an editorial critical of the C.P.C.[51] On July 23, 1934, the Nanking Garrison Headquarters arrested Cheng Shi-wo, managing-director of Min Sheng Pao and suspended the paper indefinitely on charge of publishing incorrect news.[52] On October 7, 1934, Hsu Chun-wu, chief reporter of Tung-nan Jih Pao in Hangchow was arrested by the local garrison headquarters for having printed an article damaging to the reputation of a Colonel Li Ko-jen, chief of staff of the Chekiang Peace Preservation Corps.[53] These are only a few examples cited to show how

tenuous was any freedom enjoyed by the press and how various official organs were all empowered to arrest editors and close papers, it seems almost at will.

According to Professor Herbert S. Liang of Yenching University, who as a writer had much experience with censors, censorship was haphazard and unintelligent and lacked uniformity from city to city, and censors were not trained or qualified men.[54] He also observed that after 1931 censorship became more rigid and often orders received conflicted with one another.[55] In a way, the KMT government was caught in an impasse. On the one hand, with the increasing pressure of Japanese aggression after 1931, it was to China's interest and the government's to rouse public opinion and rally support. But with its sensitiveness to criticism and with Chiang's firm commitment to domestic pacification first, it could not allow discussion of vital national issues which it feared would show opposition to its policies. What freedom was permitted to the press showed increasing public disfavor with Chiang's priorities. There was much truth to Chiang's contention that China was then not ready to fight Japan. But in view of his pursuit of anti-Communist campaigns, his excuse of time to prepare against the Japanese became less and less acceptable to his critics, both within and outside the KMT. Conversely, the view that China could only unite by facing a common foreign foe gained more support. However, Chiang continued to placate Japan. For instance, a government order issued on June 10, 1935, prohibited acts by individuals or organizations which obstructed amicable relations between China and other friendly governments.[56] In the official jargon of the time, the term "friendly government" generally referred to Japan.[57]

News items on Japanese pressure and infringements were often suppressed. Charges that Chinese censors were acting on Japanese orders were made both by Chinese and foreign

journalists.[58] Whether the censors and their superiors were pro-Japanese or Japanese paid or were merely compelled to act as they did is not the important issue here. The real issue seems to be that Chiang's strong believe in authoritarianism and strong government controls was alienating the vocal segments of the population. Without their support, he found himself caught between two major problems, Japanese aggression and continued Communist rebellion. The imposition of censorship was very detrimental to the formation and expression of intelligent public opinion. There was a marked absence of public discussion of vital issues of national interest. In addition, there was also the danger of official wrath for those who criticized government bodies and ranking dignitaries. All this really points to the danger and difficulty of offering criticism and opposition in a one party state. In addition, such orders as issued by Chiang on February 17, 1931, banning the reporting of news in favor of Communists could and indeed were interpreted to mean that any reverses suffered by government forces could not be reported. The only way newspapers and their publishers could protect themselves from a capricious and heavy-handed censorship was ironically to operate in the foreign concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin. Here, on small pieces of foreign administered territory in China, Chinese could speak more freely and within limits not fear the wrath of their own government.

On the other hand, it must be said that the modern newspapers, a new media in China, were not of a consistently high standard. There are many cases which show lack or breach of journalistic ethics. This, of course, applied more to the small papers or what was called the yellow press. But when such breaches occurred, there did exist the libel laws and since 1929 these have been supplemented by the KMT Declaration on Civil Rights in which individuals and organizations were prohibited from infringing on the

rights of other individuals and bodies, on pain of punishment by law. But as was pointed out by critics of the Declaration, there was no protection afforded to private persons or organizations from capricous acts of the government. The government's case was that with a generally disturbed internal political situation some government control of the news media was justified, and they do have a case here. So the problem seems one of degree and interpretation. Should there be discussions of policy, should criticism of government policies be allowed, and may news, even adverse news, be reported? Where the government was not accountable to the public as was the case in China, it was too easy for those in power to attempt to shut off criticism altogether.

The most important question that follows is did censorship achieve its primary purpose, i.e., weed out heterogeneous thought, enhance the government and promote unity? I think not. For one thing, it was too capricious and not uniformly administered. For another, it was not complete, as Chinese and English language papers operating from the concessions were exempt from some of the strictures, and in areas controlled by opponents of Nanking, criticisms of its policies featured very prominently indeed. Censorship of news concerning Japanese policy and actions in north China (often at Japanese insistence) so as not to stir up indignation also failed and resulted in a tremendous outcry as seen in the student movement and national salvation movement of 1935-1936. In this case the government would have been better served had it not suppressed the news but instead informed the public and attempted to marshal public support behind itself against Japanese demands on China's unity. As it was, this application of censorship only contributed to alienate public opinion. Nor can the inference that there was unity in support of the government's policy be drawn where there was no open criticism of the government. Rather, it most frequently meant that critics have

been cowed into silence. Thus it can be concluded that the clumsy application of press censorship did not contribute to a greater sense of psychological unity in China.

The New Life Movement as a Means to Promote Unity.

It was recognized that the mere suppression of unpleasing thoughts and news was not itself enough. According to Chiang there was a need to revive pride in China's old virtues and traditions. Such a renewal of confidence in the nations past was considered important as it would promote a sense of unity against what were considered the twin evils of Communism and Japanese imperialism. Towards these ends Chiang inaugurated the New Life Movement on February 19, 1934, in Nanchang in Kiangsi province, where his anti-Communist headquarters were located.

As Chiang wrote in his "Outline of the New Life Movement", the movement was in answer to what he considered to be the needs of the people at the time. Its aim was social regeneration and this was to be achieved by applying the ancient Chinese virtues of li, i, lien and ch'ih.[59] These four virtues, according to the ancient philosopher Kuan Tze should be the bastions of every strong and moral state. To Chiang they represented the following. Li meant decorum or regulated attitude and behavior. I meant right conduct and justice. Lien represented clear discrimination and integrity and ch'ih real self-consciousness and honor.[60] In turn, these four principles were to be applied to the four essentials of life, food, shelter, clothing and action.[61]

Chiang made many public speeches about the New Life Movement during this period. He pointed out the deep and manifold malaise affecting Chinese individuals and society and their evil results. He attributed these terrible conditions to the neglect of the four above-mentioned virtues cherished by ancient China.[62] Thus in order to reinvigorate

China and cure her ills, it was necessary to resurrect ancient principles, as interpreted by the New Life Movement.[63] What was this new life to be like? In Chiang's view:

> ...The life of our people will be more refined when we have more artistic training; we will be richer when we are more productive, and we will be much safer when we are more patriotic and better trained and equipped to defend ourselves...If we achieve this, we have revolutionized the daily life of our people, and we have laid the solid foundation of our nation.[64]

In other words Chiang saw in the movement the basic requirement for bettering the people's moral and physical lives. If the people understood and practiced the tenets of the movement, he said, they would become more orderly, prompt, frugal and exact in their habits and lead more productive and moral lives. Thus will strife, hatred, robbery and beggary be eliminated.

The movement was from the beginning an officially sponsored one. Hardly one month after Chiang began the campaign, the Central Committee of Popular Movements (Chung-yang min-chung yun-tung wei-yuan-hui), an organ of the KMT, issued a proclamation urging the formation of organizations to promote the movement all over China.[65] As with most official organizations in China, the list of sponsors of this one was studded with important names. Chiang was the chairman of the movement. Under him were many directors, consisting of major KMT leaders, military and civilian, members of the C.E.C. and C.S.C., governors and generals.[66] The provincial organizations were headed by the leaders of the provincial government, the local KMT, heads of provincial bureaus of Social and Civil affairs, Education, Public Safety and Military Affairs. Sometimes,

as in the case of Hopei province, the local leader was an educator, Chang Po-lin, president of the private Nankai University.[67] New Life Movement organizations were conspicuously absent in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces where Chiang's words were not welcome.[68]

That the movement's leadership consisted of government, party and military men of prominence was deliberate on Chiang's part. He wished it to be accepted by officialdom first and hoped that then it would filter down to the masses.[69] Chiang also thought that it should strive for simple goals first and then progressively expand. As he pointed out, the goal for the first year was to achieve cleanliness and good manners.[70] During the first year, on the vocal official level at least, there was much enthusiasm and on the local level, under the provincial associations, one thousand and three hundred hsien and sub-hsien associations were formed. These promotion associations then mobilized existing public groups such as the boy scouts for action. The exception was in Kiangsi province, where the Special Movement Force of about twenty thousand members took over the organization of the movement.[71]

The initial impetus soon slowed down and after the first year few additional associations were created. A change was also seen in the aim of the organization which abandoned its reliance on mass enthusiasm and switched its attention to training of members of the promotion associations. Its headquarters were moved to Nanking at the end of 1935. Madame Chiang, who had from the beginning been director of the Women's New Life Movement Voluntary Service, began after 1935 to take greater control of the overall movement.[72]

Why did the New Life Movement not gain greater momentum? There are several factors. One important one was that it was officially sponsored and led and did not catch

the imagination of the youth or masses. Everywhere the emphasis was on the appearance, for example, the enlistment of high officials to decorate the rosters. Moreover, these leaders themselves often did not by their own lives and actions set an example for the new life as officially advocated. The movement also failed to attract the support of the intellectuals. Such men as Hu Shih did not just deplore the naive aspects of the movement but also accused the government of indulging in high sounding phrases and programs in a vain attempt to seek instant panacea. He deplored as irrelevant exhortations to the people to be orderly and disciplined when in fact they were hungry and exploited. Instead, he urged the government to abandon sloganeering and get down to a few practical projects based on its economic and technical ability. For example, in an article entitled "Chin jih ko chu ti chien-sheh shih-yeh" (Economic developments that can be accomplished at present), Hu accused the government of having no proper understanding of China's agricultural problems nor the will to find out. Instead, it revelled in such empty and nonsensical phrases as "agricultural improvement and rural revival". He went on that what the government ought to do in this instance was to establish a few good agricultural colleges of which there were only two in China, and train a few specialists in this field.[73] Such criticisms were not directed solely at the New Life Movement but at the whole mentality of the government which avoided painstaking and slow basic reforms and resorted to crash, showy programs, sloganeering and officially inspired mass enthusiasm as panacea for China's problems.[74]

Another factor which helps to explain the lack of enthusiasm over the New Life Movement was the overwhelming concern most felt for the Japanese threat. Many people, especially the students, complained of the irrelevance of many features emphasized in the program. Instead they

demanded active measures and preparations such as military training and mobilization and political unity in order to prepare China to resist Japan. In this the government critics were partly right, but in justice to Chiang it should be pointed out that he saw a deeper purpose in launching this movement. He wanted national unification and rightly saw that military unification, even if possible, was not in itself enough. He wanted the people to be united in will and ideology, as only then will it be possible to defeat the enemy, be they domestic or foreign. To promote unity Chiang's answer was to revive aspects of China's ancient philosophy. As one writer summarized:

> Chiang was involved in a nationalist movement that aimed at unification and independence and that required the people's loyalty and devotion. Surely the people had to be proud of the nation before they would sacrifice themselves for it. Nothing seemed more logical than for a nationalist movement to revive the national spirit; and nothing seemed more natural than for traditional virtues and philosophy to be the constituent elements of that spirit...And Chiang was fighting the Chinese Communists on the one hand and the Japanese aggressor on the other. To oppose the foreign ideology of Communism, traditional philosophy seemed a potent weapon; to oppose the Bushido of Japan, the revival of the Chinese traditional spirit seemed a logical step. That the traditional virtues with their emphasis on loyalty and sincerity could also lead to political stability might well be another reason for their adoption.[75]

But the New Life Movement never did establish grass roots. The example of the past and their piecemeal adaptation were not adequate to solve China's many problems of the present. The basic reason, as Mary Wright analyzed it, was the conservatism of the KMT leaders and their outdated approach to modern problems. She said:

> They pulled from Confucianism, on an ad hoc basis, whatever seemed likely to promote internal order. Reasonably enough, their chief emphasis...was on the principles of social usage (li) and the associated virtues of i, lien and ch'ih...In view of the KMT ideologists, Confucianism was the most effective and cheapest means ever devised by man for this purpose...That the disciplinary effectiveness of the canon was dependent on its whole content seems never to have occurred to them.[76]

Summary.

China was undergoing a period of tremendous turmoil. The ideological stability which had characterized Chinese political thought in the past has by the twentieth century been swept away. To rebuild China as a nation in the modern world there was need for her to focus on an ideology which could explain the past but more importantly provide a framework for the future. Sun Yat-sen sought to answer the need by formulating his Three People's Principles which became the official ideology of the KMT. During its years in power, the KMT in theory was committed to the realization of Sun's ideas in their entirety, but in practice only selected parts of them for application and even those were interpreted so as to suit the predilictions of those then in power. It saw in Sun's ideas the elements needed to constitute a powerful state and central government. But in reality it was unable to resolve some fundamental dilemmas.

For instance, according to Sun's Principle of the People's Livelihood, land reforms and basic rural changes were called for. But the KMT did not implement any land reforms, partly because of the landed origin and wealth of many of its members and partly because of fear that the social forces any major program would unleash might turn against them. Immediate problems, namely the Communist insurgency and Japanese aggression, also served to deflect attention away from domestic reform.

On the issue of the people's rights, it could not resolve the contradiction between its commitment ultimately to adopt democracy and its totalitarian tendencies and wish to hold on to power. In tutelage it saw a temporary refuge and then began to stall for time by refusing to honor its commitment to the six year time period. But Sun had intended the period of political tutelage as a time to train the citizens for the practice and responsibility of democracy. Was anything done between 1928-1937 to introduce democratic practices and machinery to the people? Except for a few high sounding resolutions and half-hearted efforts at their implementation, the answer must be no. Opposition parties were not legalized, a heavy censorship muffled political dissent and even on the very lowest local level there is no evidence of genuine elections. It is true that there was very great practical difficulties which would have made the implementation elective local self-government a herculean if not impossible (and impractical?) task.

But it seems more than that. Democracy, though a popular word in China at that time, represented an alien concept. The Chinese belief was that wise decisions and good government resulted from well trained and properly educated officials, not from head counting. So the KMT stressed training cadres for all levels of government. Thus it can be said that the KMT government had no understanding of the meaning of democracy as understood in the

West, but having proclaimed it as a goal became victim to its commitments, and its half-hearted attempts to discharge this commitment only made it more resented by those segments of the intellectuals who were doctrinally opposed to this form of government and who clamored for participation in a more open society.

A tendency during this period was for KMT ideology to assume an increasingly conservative and authoritarian stance. Partly this was due to external circumstances. Internal rebellion and external aggression seemed to require strong government with unfettered powers. For many it seemed that only a powerful government could unify China and unity was the prerequisite for national salvation. In view of the paramount requirements of the group interest, they asked, what did the individual's civil liberties matter? Would it not, if unchecked, degenerate to licence anyway? Thus the KMT, in the supposed interest of the group, justified many of its repressive measures such as press censorship, emergency laws etc. But in time the KMT also saw itself in more conservative terms as the upholders of traditionalism and legitimacy. Such theoreticians as Tai Chi-t'ao de-emphasized the revolutionary elements of Sun and began to view him as the political heir of the sages Yao, Shun, Confucius and others, and so began to model themselves also in this light. To understand the significance of the New Life Movement one must view it in this light as well as the immediate reasons for its creation.

Finally did the KMT ideology in practice promote unity? In the long term view and with the benefit of hindsight, one would say no. But this is perhaps unfair as so much of what later happened to the KMT resulted from the circumstances of the Sino-Japanese War. In spite of its faults and shortcomings, viewed from July, 1937, the KMT stood at the pinnacle of its power. China was more unified than it had been in more than a decade, and the ideology of Sun Yat-sen had come to be accepted as the program for China even by the KMT's arch-rival for power, the CCP.

Chapter V. Kuomintang Relations With the Intellectuals and the Student Movement.

Many intellectuals and students flocked to the KMT during the Canton period and at the beginning of the Northern Expedition. But the entente was short lived. After the split with the CCP, the dominant faction of the KMT veered to the right and this was followed by the suppression of the mass and student movements. During the Nanking period the failure of the KMT to live up to its professed ideals resulted in the alienation of many of the country's intellectuals and students, whose support had always been sought and cultivated by governments of China. With the high general regard for learning they were prestigeous with the other segments of society. They constituted a self-conscious and elitist group who tended to take themselves seriously and to regard public service in high esteem. In an underdeveloped country where the great majority of the people is illiterate and mass public opinion is largely absent, it is the intelligentsia and students who assume the great burden and responsibility of mirroring and leading public opinion and aspirations. Now with China in the midst of change it was more important than ever for a successful government to acquire the support of this group.

This the KMT failed to do. With the passing years the gap only continued to widen especially between the ruling party and the young students. This breach and the desertion of many of the best young people was ultimately to have serious adverse consequences for the KMT in its quest for unification. Many factors accounted for this failure on the part of the KMT. One reason was the strife and civil wars within the party. Precious time and funds were wasted and real unity did not gain. On the contrary, wars between the KMT factions enabled the CCP to recoup and also prevented the using of energy in defense against steadily increasing Japanese encroachment.

As a group the intellectuals were cosmopolitan. Domestically they advocated party government, the relaxation of censorship, a constitution and the end of the tutelage system. In foreign policy, the demand was for an end of surrender to Japan, cessation of civil wars and unity of all Chinese factions and parties against Japan. However, though they challenged and disputed the KMT on a number of key issues, they as a group were not revolutionaries, but gradualists who believed in salvation through education and foresaw a slow process of modernization and unification. In these goals they did not differ significantly from the KMT. Rather their differences were in approach, technique and priorities.

The differences between the ruling party and students were sharper and often expressed in more violent terms. Although there was student discontent over the imposition of ideological orthodoxy under Sun's principles, the slow pace of modernization, the lack of social reforms, and more mundane issues as job opportunities, the overwhelming issue between the students and the government after 1931 was Japanese policy. Brought up on a diet of nationalistic textbooks which pointed out China's past greatness, the young saw in the present only humiliation and impotence. Thus if any single theme roused the young in China in the twentieth century, it was nationalism and in the Chinese context, nationalism meant anti-imperialism. Both explicitly and implicitly, when demanding the fulfillment of their nationalistic aspirations Chinese in general, but the youth in particular, demanded unity. Thus the theme of nationalism and unification ran side by side and cannot be separated from each other.

As fervent and dedicated nationalists the students first of all saw the KMT as the unifier of China in the Northern Expedition and would have been happy to see Chiang triumph over his KMT rivals and the CCP in the cause of unification.

But after September, 1931, the single most important threat to China's unity and existance was Japan and in their impatience and patriotism, students clamored for immediate resistance to uphold China's unity. Dissatisfaction over Nanking's non-resistance policy resulted in the abortive student uprising in 1931-1932, and the much more forceful student movement in 1935-1936, which triggered a popular movement for a united front against Japan. Significantly, even in their anger and revolt the students in 1931-1932 and to a more limited extent in 1935-1936, were looking to Nanking for leadership. This surely points to their devotion to the ideal of unification and realization that despite its faults Nanking to many still offered the best chance for unification.

The aim of this chapter is not to study exhaustively the areas of confrontation between the intellectuals and the KMT, nor to trace the relations between the KMT and the students, nor the progress and direction of the student movement. Rather, the following will point out some of the areas of difference between the intellectuals and the KMT on such issues as one party government versus democracy, civil rights and censorship, tutelage and constitution. Over the most important goal--unification--there was no dispute. In this light, all the other differences were over how to achieve unification and the content of a unified China. In dealing with the student movement, the overwhelming emphasis will be on student discontent with the KMT over the conduct of foreign policy, or Japanese policy. In their nationalistic fervor the students wanted an uncompromising stand to defend China's unity, and in their youthful impatience, they sought immediate resistance to uphold this unity. So here again, on the ultimate goal of unification, there was no difference between Nanking and the students.

On this issue as on most concerning China between 1928-1937, Chiang Kai-shek looms large. For Chiang regarded himself as the unifier of China and since there was dispute over the priorities, techniques and content of unification, clashes over him and what he represented were inevitable. Chiang's imperiousness which resulted in his disregard for public opinion and his intolerance of criticism ultimately resulted in his loss, to a considerable extent, of the support of the intellectuals and students, to the detriment of the cause of unification under the KMT.

The Intellectuals.

The term "intellectual" is difficult to define. In this context, it refers to the group of people who have had a modern education either entirely in the new schools in China based on the curriculum of the modern schools in Europe or in the U. S., or also have studied abroad, in Japan, the U. S. or Europe, mostly on the graduate level. Thus they were characterized by a more modern and Western and less traditionalist outlook, politically and socially. Many of these came from the new middle class of business and professional families, most heavily concentrated in the costal cities. By profession, many were university professors, writers, professional men and journalists. Most were independents, i.e., did not belong to any political party (though many were on government payroll because they taught in government universities), but felt the obligation to voice criticism and advocate what they felt was right for China. Mostly their opinions were expressed in magazines and newspaper editorials. They were able to express some dissent because censorship under the KMT was by no means uniform or complete, so that with the exercise of care and provided that criticism was not too overt, a certain amount was tolerated. It was also possible to criticize certain old customs and social abuses which the KMT also wished to

attack. Furthermore, it was possible to criticize Nanking for example in areas held by the dissident KMT generals, or alternately to base one's operations in foreign concession areas in the treaty ports. However, they were by no means immune from arrests, confiscation and risks of bodily harm.

Foremost among the intellectuals' demands was for civil rights or jen-chüan and for a provisional constitution or Yueh-fa during the tutelage period. A champion of the above causes was Hu Shih. Hu and his friends expressed their opinions on various issues in the journals they founded such as Hsin Yueh or Crescent Moon and Tu li p'ing lun as well as in other publications.[1]

On April 20, 1929, the Nanking government issued a mandate on civil rights. Hu Shih commented on it in an article entitled "Jen-chüan yu yueh-fa" (civil rights and the provisional constitution).[2] The part of the mandate he took particular issue with went as follows: "During tutelage, no person or organization can illegally infringe on the freedom and property of others. Those disobeying will be severely punished according to law.".[3] Hu found this disappointing for the following reasons. Its definition on the rights to life, liberty and property was not clear. The mandate only prohibited illegal actions by "individuals and organizations" and not those by the government. As he pointed out, of late, all injustices such as the muzzling of the press, confiscations of private property etc. have been committed by the KMT and government organs.[4] The mandate also said that violators will be punished according to law. But what law? He added that the people had no protection when the KMT and government infringed on their rights, that the government has been in the habit of depriving any citizen of his rights by merely accusing him of being "reactionary", "counter-revolutionary" or a "Communist suspect". Similarly any journal or book could be banned and any school closed by

being labelled "reactionary".[5] Hu concluded that what China needed was rule by law and not by men and whims. This would mean that laws have to be obeyed by the government and officials too.

In "When Shall We Have a Constitution", Hu took issue with Sun's idea that a period of political tutelage was necessary. To him this attitude showed distrust of the people's capacity for self-government.[6] He contended that democratic government was itself an education, hence the withholding of political rights from the people was not justified. But since tutelage had been proclaimed he advocated the promulgation of a constitution even during the tutelage period. His reasoning was that the government no less than the people needed training in democracy.[7] He proceeded to cite Sun's own works in order to prove that Sun himself had considered a provisional constitution necessary during the tutelage period. In chapter six of Sun Wen Hsueh-shuo (1919) and also in Chung kuo ke ming shih (1923) Sun had reiterated the need of a provisional constitution during tutelage period in order to determine the rights and duties of the people and government to each other.[8] In the latter work Sun had added that after an initial three year period elections were to be held at the hsien level.[9] It was only in his Principles of Reconstruction of 1924 that Sun only mentioned tutelage and omitted the provisional constitution. He argued that the omission was probably accidental and as Sun died shortly thereafter, this point can never be clarified. Therefore it would be wiser to study Sun's thoughts and works as a whole in order to ascertain what he really wanted.[10]

Besides these Hu wrote many other articles in which he discussed and criticized the KMT's handling of China's problems, its policy decisions and its handling of Sun's philosophy. All this aroused the indignation of many KMT members, and as if to prove Hu's point on the arbitrariness of government actions and the lack of legal guarantees for

citizens, the Training Department of the KMT central headquarters petitioned the State Council to issue a warning to Hu Shih. In response the State Council ordered the Ministry of Education to warn Hu against criticizing the party's principles in his essays and at the same time ordered all university presidents to direct their staffs in the careful study of party principles so that such works as Hu's would not be repeated.[11]

In 1930, as a result of demands within the KMT, a Provisional Constitution was promulgated, which did go further in the definition of rights and guarantees. But it remained unsatisfactory to some. For example, the writer Lo Lung-chi expressed criticism with some of its provisions in an article entitled "Criticisms of the Provisional Constitution of the Tutelage Period".[12] For his pains, the Peiping and Tientsin municipal government authorities raided the Crescent Moon Book Store, confiscated the offending issue of the Hsin Yueh and arrested members of the bookstore staff. The charge was that the article constituted "libel" and was "reactionary".[13] Lo was prompted to remind the authorities that if the Provisional Constitution stood, articles fifteen and sixteen should protect journals from such treatment and forbid such organs as the Peiping-Tientsin Municipal Reorganization Commission from making arrests, confiscations and judgments which properly should be the province of the law courts.[14]

The cases of Hu and Lo are cited to illustrate the fact that under the KMT as well as previous governments there was nothing to prevent the government from infringing on a citizen's supposed rights, and the citizen had no independent judiciary to appeal to. As Lin Yu-tang said:

> The real obstacle to progress along this line (government by law) is not due to the want of any drafted and signed constitution, but to the existence of a system of ideas which is inimical

> to the very notion of civil rights...The kind of civil rights the Chinese people are interested in today are not so much rights of election and participation in the government of the nation, as the essential liberty of protection for personal liberty and property.[15]

The main difference here between the KMT and its critics is far more fundamental than one of degree of government participation to be allowed or the duration of tutelage. The premise of Lin and others was the right of opposition and dissent itself. Men such as Hu and Lo wanted the right to criticize the KMT government and policy and Sun's doctrines; and even if Sun's principles were to be accepted as the basic principles for China, the right of developing and creatively interpreting them. However, as shown in the previous chapter, the theoreticians of the KMT regarded criticism as something by nature hostile and therefore not to be tolerated. One of the means used by the KMT in its attempt to stem dissent was the "thought unification movement", i.e., thought control and encouragement of literature which conformed with party principles. How this was to be carried out in the schools will be discussed later, but as far as the adult intellectuals were concerned, the government was unable to impose systematic or effective thought control, nor to produce any significant literary movement sympathetic to it. The intellectuals balked at and ridiculed such attempts and mentality, as exemplified in an article entitled "On Unifying Thought" by Liang Shih-chiu. Here he pointed out that the Chinese desired unification of the army, finances, etc., not thought, that they wanted a true unity, not a unity of silence imposed by force.[16] He added that if Sun had conformed and not thought for himself, he would not have advocated revolution nor enunciated his principles. Thus Liang said creative thought is good, while a controlled

ideology will soon be a dead one. Even if outward conformity could be achieved through controlled education, propaganda and political and economic pressures, what avail would that be, he asked, as the result will be a majority of stupid and blindly obedient people unfit to exercise freedom, while the indomitable would only be driven to revolution? The author then added that tolerance and diversity and legal guarantee of civil rights would not be inimical to the KMT and that he himself did not want to overthrow anybody.[17]

Liang then commented on the resolution of the Third All-China Propaganda Conference of the KMT to create literature of the Three People's Principles and to prohibit anti-Three People's Principles literature. It defined pro to mean in favor of race spirit, unity, democracy, reconstruction, etc., while anti meant advocating feudalism and class war. He said that he did not know what Three People's Principles literature was and how it could be produced and opined that true literature could not be the tool of any political ideology.[18]

To Hu Shih the KMT's attempt at unifying thought was but a manifestation of its reactionary and zenophobic nature. He asserted that despite Sun's western education and profession of Christianity, he had remained protective on Chinese culture and nationalism, especially as he grew older. Sun contended that the West was superior in material civilization but that China was more virtuous and moral. This Hu said, showed that Sun did not understand the fundamental principles of the new culture movement which was striving to adapt to the new world. Now that Sun's works have been deified, they are used by the reactionary elements of the KMT to foster their own power.[19] Hu went on to say that the KMT's extreme nationalism was an emotional response to the pressures of foreign encroachments and that this interpretation explained why it takes refuge in traditionalism and conservatism. As an example

he cited an article written by the Secretary-General of the KMT Yeh Chu-tsang entitled "The China of Old was a Perfect World Built on Virtue". Yeh's thesis was that until the Ch'ing dynasty Chinese society was governed by virtue, which Hu exposed as fallacious thinking.[20] In another instance, Hu told of a historian who expressed doubt in his work that the Three Emperors and Five Kings were real figures. This had so provoked Tai Chi-t'ao, the President of the Examination Yuan, that he proposed the proscribing of the Commercial Press which printed the book, which was not done, but the book itself was banned.[21]

Hu added that he had cited the above and more in order to make the KMT realize its mistakes, that it was out of tune with the time and should stop formulating policy according to personal whims and biases. He concluded by observing:

> The reason for KMT victories in the past ten years are attributable entirely to its adaptibility to the new, its understanding of the importance of making adaptations in its ideology... The reason that now the KMT has largely lost its public confidence is partly because its government has not satisfied the people's aspirations, partly because of the deadening of its ideology and its inability to win the support of elements in society possessing progressive thought. The day when it (the KMT) entirely loses the sympathy of those of progressive thought will be the day when the KMT will meet its doom.[22]

Although many of the criticisms levelled were very scathing in tone, they were made in sincerity and in an attempt to find ways to make China a stronger and more viable state. Many of the intellectuals felt that despite its faults China still had the best chance under the KMT

government. Indeed, as the period progressed China's sovereignty came under increasingly severe attack from Japan. This pressure produced a sense of urgency for national survival and realization that though a good government was desirable, China at this juncture could not do without a government; and that if the KMT went, China would fall before either the CCP or anarchy of the old warlord era. Such sentiments were increasingly expressed.[23]

The government's handling of crises produced much criticism and advice. Its critics felt its failings were especially acute in the following respects. First of all the KMT pursued an exclusive policy which made it impossible for patriotic citizens to join in the task of construction and national salvation unless they joined the party ranks. Second, they attacked the KMT's handling of the Communist problem, its insistance on pursuing civil war with the Communists, and even more inexcusable, civil wars within the KMT, to the neglect of the Japanese threat. Third, they were dissatisfied with the KMT's weak-kneed policy towards Japan and its unwillingness to co-operate with other parties and elements to resist Japan. Very disquieting to many was the fear that the KMT was putting itself and its interests above those of the nation. Many also feared that the KMT was using tutelage as a mask for imposing a permanent one-party dictatorship on China.

A particularly scathing and coherent attack on one-party rule came from an article written by Lo Lung-chi entitled "My Honest Criticisms on One Party Rule". Again basing his premise on Sun's doctrines the author pointed out that in defining the people's rights, Sun had declared that sovereignty belonged to the people. Since the KMT accepted Sun's doctrines as it guiding principles, how could it justify one party government and such currently popular slogans as "the party's power above all else"?[24]

To Lo the KMT added insult to injury when it then proceeded to lecture the nation on democracy. Thus to him the root of China's recent troubles lay in the contradiction between democracy and dictatorship. Whereas countries like Britain and the U. S. preached and practiced democracy, and Russia and Italy preached and practiced dictatorship, and thus arrived at workable systems, in China, the ideology preached and policy practiced by the KMT were irreconcilable. There were approximately 100,000 members in the KMT, he said, and these demanded democracy in the party's organization and were denied it resulting in great dissatisfaction and civil wars fought on the pretext of overthrowing the dictatorship. Then how can these same KMT members justify the denial of the same rights which they claimed, to the rest of the Chinese people?

He continued that Sun did not want one-party rule. He only wanted his principles to rule China. But what was happening to China now? Exams to civil servants administered by the Examination Yuan emphasized party principles and examiners had to be men of long party membership. What did this mean? Whereas in other countries civil servants' primary duty was loyalty to the state, in China primary loyalty to the party was demanded. This was creating a dangerous precedent, he added, and could be suicidal for the KMT.[25] The situation was especially ironical as China was in great need of experts and talented people. Foreign experts were hired to fill needed posts, yet many qualified Chinese were rejected because they did not belong to the party. To the KMT claim that one-party rule was necessary to prevent the resurgence of warlordism, disunity, imperialist plots and anti-KMT reaction, the author asked: are there any warlords outside the KMT now? Who now makes treaties with foreign powers, and who but KMT leaders have been fighting civil wars and disrupting unity?[26] He added:

"To say with a heavy heart, little people like us who want to help save the nation find that we have no country to save, who want to be patriotic find we have no country to love."[27] What is the result of such despair? In a later article, the same author pointed out that in 1929 when war broke out with Russia in Manchuria over the C.E.R., the populace remained apathetic. Why? Because they regarded it solely as the KMT's business as they had no stake in national affairs anyway.[28]

Dissatisfaction with the Provisional Constitution, both on the nature and function of the government under tutelage and on guarantees of civil rights was strong. It came from both the out of power factions of the KMT and from among the intellectuals. An example of the latter's complaint can be seen in an article called "A Criticism of the Provisional Constitution of the Tutelage Period" by Lo Lung-chi. His main complaint was that the cause of civil liberty and political freedom was not furthered. The Provisional Constitution stated that all citizens were to enjoy the freedom of worship, residence, speech, publication, assembly, organization, mail, etc., except as "stopped or abridged according to law".[29] But as the government had emergency laws which enabled it to make arbitrary arrests, confiscations, etc., the above guarantees were rendered useless. He proceeded to point out that it was superfluous to make an issue of guaranteeing freedom of religion in China. Freedom of religion is guaranteed in many Western countries for historic reasons lacking in China which needed instead political freedom and the freedom to question. Thus while Dr. Sun and other KMT leaders could become Christians and question the doctrines of Confucius, the ordinary Chinese was not allowed to question the KMT.[30] Again, the Provisional Constitution stipulated that the people had the duty to pay taxes but did not give them the right to supervise finance. Article nine said that

civilians could not be subjected to martial law except as stipulated by law. Immediately the government promulgated the Emergency Laws which empowered military tribunals to try so-called "counter-revolutionaries". In this way any freedom granted by one had was taken away by the other.[31] Lo also attacked the lack of checks and balances in the government, the farce of judicial and legislative independence under the five-power system where the presidents of the Judicial and Legislative Yuans were appointed and dismissed by the State Council; and the power given to the Chairman of the State Council to issue laws and orders by executive decree which in effect reduced the role of the Legislative Yuan to that of a drafting bureau.[32]

Lo also pointed out a very serious defect in the Provisional Constitution, i.e., it did not pledge to carry out Sun's commitment to "equalize land ownership and control capital". This ignoring of China's basic economic problem he regarded as the abandonment of Sun's Principle of the People's Livelihood. He dismissed as meaningless article thirty-three which stated that the government should encourage and guarantee the people's production.[33] Lo was right, in the long run the KMT's ignoring of the economic plight of the bulk of the population and refusal to tackle the problem of land reform was to contribute to its downfall.

Nanking's promulgation of the Provisional Constitution became the occasion for a major crisis between the different factions of the KMT. Before it could be resolved Japan launched her bold attacks on Manchuria, then on Shanghai. In response to the calls for unity the government convened the National Emergency Conference at Loyang early in 1932. The delegates attended on invitation and consisted of a majority of KMT members but also many prominent independents. But the government forbade the conference to discuss internal affairs. However, because of many demands to remedy some abuses the government did have passed a "Resolution to

Reform Internal Affairs" which called for the convocation of a People's Representative Assembly before October 10, 1933. Then on April 24, 1932, Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan announced that his formula for national salvation was to have a constitution adopted by 1933.[34]

Some people were skeptical on whether a constitution could save China, but Hu Shih was optimistic as he hoped that a constitution would put Chinese politics on a proper track. He reasoned that so far the KMT government had been unsuccessful in controlling warlordism, so why not let the people try?[35] Hu was idealistic and the possibilities remain academic since the Chinese people never did have this chance. Hu did observe, however, that despite progress made by the Legislative Yuan in passing the constitutional principles, the public remained apathetic. Why? He analyzed that it was partly because the people were more concerned with the Japanese threat. But the basic reason he said was disillusionment with constitutions and with the government's intentions. All constitutions since 1911 had been but scraps of paper, as the Provisional Constitution had turned out to be. To Hu China's foremost trouble was that the officials, civilian and military, only obeyed laws so long as it suited them to. The government had violated many articles of the Provisional Constitution. For example, it had not implemented law codes that it had promulgated and civilians continued to be tried by military courts on all sorts of trumped up charges. He pointed out a blatant case as follows. Article twenty-six of the Provisional Constitution prohibited opium yet in areas under central government control an opium monopoly was in fact instituted and all sorts of taxes and dues were collected from opium.[36] Thus since the government never intended to implement its laws, naturally people lose respect for them. As he pointed out, it was easy to make pious statements but unless they were to be followed up,

statements of constitutional principles were but pious statements. Concluding, Hu added that unless the government could reverse its pattern and obey its own laws, there was no use adopting fancy constitutions.[37]

As the decade of the 1930's progressed Nanking was finding itself under mounting external pressure and losing increasing amounts of territory to Japanese control. Its inability to defend China's sovereignty, to quell the CCP rebellion or to unite all factions of the KMT caused many to search for a system of government that would provide China with the answers. This searching went on both inside and outside the KMT. Some within the KMT came to advocate a dictatorship. This idea also found some support among intellectuals. Partly this was a result of outside influence, i.e., democracy seemed a thing of the past in some European countries in the 1930's. Germany and Italy overthrew democratically oriented but often ineffectual governments and instituted Nazi and Fascist dictatorships which seemed effective. Thus to some a Fascist type dictatorship would offer a new alternative for China. While some toyed with the idea because it was fashionable, others were convinced that it was a historic necessity and represented the wave of the future.

In the journals, the intellectuals carried on a debate on the merits of a dictatorship for China. The proponents of dictatorship were T. F. Tsiang and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, both university professors. The leader of the democratic cause was Hu Shih.

An article entitled "Can China Become Fascist?" by Yen-ying Liu opened the debate. He noted with alarm recent agitations within the KMT to revive the dictator system, especially by the members of the so-called "China Blue Shirt Society" which had been staging mass meetings in the major cities, distributing pamphlets and denouncing Communism and allegedly vowing to make China a Fascist

dictatorship. The author thought that such a movement was dangerous because in the fluid state of socio-political order in China then any novelty could gain ready hearing. But he did not think that any Chinese leader could become a Fascist dictator. The lack of modern national consciousness among the masses, regionalism and the complexity of domestic problems, he said, would prevent the rise of a strongman.[38]

Hu Shih dealt with this problem more extensively in a series of articles in which he recounted the opposition's stand and rebutted them. In "China Has No Need or Use for a Dictatorship" he first retraced the opposition stand that China needed a dictatorship in order to make speedy progress towards industrialization, to solve the warlord problem and achieve unified rule. He said that this was an over-simplified solution because industrialization was a complicated process which needed many factors, not just a dictatorial government; and that in order to make political progress the answer was not totalitarianism but a gradual educational process. Anyway, Hu added, economic and other conditions in China at this time were too backward to allow the successful working of modern sophisticated totalitarianism.[39]

In a later article entitled "The Debate Concerning Democracy and Totalitarianism During the Past Year", Hu further argued the case against a dictatorship. Here he explained why totalitarianism, to him, was not necessary for building China. His reasons were: China then had no figure, party or class capable of establishing a dictatorship, no great issue to rally all people to one leader (he apparently did not think that the Japanese issue could apply here). Moreover, he argued, modern dictatorships needed many experts to run a government and China did not have them.[40] Then he refuted specific arguments for dictatorship. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng had asserted that the replacement of democracy by totalitarianism was a historic inevitability,

citing examples in Russia and Germany as proof, and that the first World War was the last gasp of democracy.[41] To Hu the lesson of history showed quite differently. He saw the first World War as giving the greatest impetus to democracy, in that it resulted in the overthrow of monarchies in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and in the chance it gave to the labor government in Britain. Hu added that Ch'ien's interpretations of the immediate phenomena in Russia, Germany, etc. were narrow, and that even so, the totalitarian party in those countries had a larger membership and thus wider basis than any party in China had.[42] Ch'ien had asserted that a dictatorship would speed up China's industrialization and quest for self sufficiency. Hu replied that in the present world only Russia and the U. S. had resources enough for economic nationalism. China had no industry to speak of, she could not hope for self sufficiency, and also he did not see how a dictatorship could produce the needed capital. Moreover he argued that a planned economy could be achieved under a democratic government too, as had been done in Britain and the U. S.[43] Hu continued that in her present state democracy provided the best way to unify China, because hitherto the administration has attempted centralization which has not worked out well, but if a national assembly could be established, elected local representatives could direct the central government and perhaps do a better job. Finally, Hu argued, while the development of the democratic concept was as yet incomplete in China, she had already shown a dislike of autocracies which had been strong enough to overthrow those of the Manchu and Yuan Shih-kai.[44]

As can be seen both sides drew from the modern West their source of inspiration. Such men as T. F. Tsiang and Ch'ien Tuan-sheng hearkened to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as examples. They saw in a dictatorship possibility for co-operation between the various elements in society,

the halting of civil wars and stemming of the tide of economic decline. There was also admiration for the seeming high standards of efficiency in those countries. From this it seems that their preference for dictatorship did not stem from Chinese philosophical sources but from lessons in the modern world. It seems that they admired more the outward forms of a dictatorship, the discipline, the hard work and the ability of the state to mobilize resources and get results and did not question the moral aspects of that type of government. The debate among the intellectuals on the form of government China should have points out that there was no agreement among them. They were all concerned to find a system which could unify and save China in her deepening crisis. It seems that although some advocated dictatorship, the prevailing opinion among this group was that democracy would offer China the best chances.

As has been mentioned, another reason for discontent was the constant intra-KMT civil wars and the continued anti-CCP campaigns. As many regarded these civil wars as fought for self-aggrandizement of the KMT generals only, criticism and impatience from non-government and even some government sources became very real. But since the bulk of the people were too poor and ignorant to influence policy, it fell to the modernized segment to try to sway opinion against civil war. For this purpose, on May 25, 1932, the Grand Alliance for the Abolition of Civil War was inaugurated in Shanghai. It was sponsored by the business sector, the All China Chamber of Commerce, the Shanghai City Chamber of Commerce, the Union of Banks and Union of Native Banks.[45] The aim of the alliance was to broadcast the evils of civil war and mobilize public opinion against it. When war threatened they sought to persuade the sides to resort to arbitration and if war broke out to boycott the belligerents. Hu Shih supported the goals of the alliance. He believed that as effective boycott by the business classes

would make civil war impossible, this league could apply powerful moral and material sanction against future civil wars. He added that it was imperative that civil wars be stopped or China would by default succumb to Japan.[46]

It is difficult to assess how much if any influence such organizations as the Grand Alliance for the Abolition of Civil War had on government policy. Perhaps it only served to point up once more how tired most people had become of the chronic state of disorder in China. But the civil wars were but a manifestation of the basic problem that had confronted China since 1911, i.e., how to subordinate the military to a single civilian authority. One writer summed up the vital nature of the problem thus:

> We should know that the problem of how to place military force under the control of political rule is synonymous with the problem of whether China can achieve nationhood. When the Japanese accuse China of not being a nation, this is what they are pointing to. Since the 1911 revolution, in spite of numerous political changes, the fact that military power remained the paramount force has not changed. That is why China remained un-unified. If in the future military power continues to play a dominating role in arbitrating political disputes, then China's vitality will continue to be sapped and her future will not be bright. Thus the problem is whether China can achieve political stability. Unless this is achieved, she will not find solution to her external problems.[47]

Although after 1932 intra-KMT civil wars were on the wane and there was an increasing resort to political means to settle disputes, this restraint was not applied to the

government's Communist policy. After numerous unsuccessful annihilation campaigns against the Communists in Kiangsi, government troops were able to put the Red Army to flight in 1934, but then there was the Long March and pursuit and after 1935, continued campaigns in northern Shensi. Nanking's insistance on pursuing its anti-Communist campaigns in the face of mounting Japanese pressures made it very unpopular in most non-government circles. Its critics contended that the Communist problem was not a purely military one, so that the attempt to impose a purely military solution to it must fail. Ting Wen-kiang, a famous geologist, took this line of argument which he expanded in an article named "The So-Called 'Bandit Annihilation' Campaign". He said in part:

> We want to ask the National Government to recognize formally that Communists are not bandits---they are political enemies. Only when this is recognized can responsible government leaders realize the threat to them. Only when this is recognized can they realize that one cannot eliminate political enemies by arms. For in the long run, the existence of a political organization will depend on its political record.[48]

He went on to point out that it was the rotten local government under the KMT, the system which permitted local generals to collect unbearably heavy taxes, that explained the success of the Communists. He ridiculed the idea of calling Communist bandits as they were a political organization, complete with army, government and ideology. Therefore he suggested the removal of abuses as fundamental to solving the Communist menace. He proposed that for a start the government should remove the brigand-like troops now stationed in the battle areas and replace them with

disciplined troops, that before it attempts the military solution it should first clean up the local government of the five provinces where the Communists were a problem; and that regular examinations should be used to recruit a proper civil service for those five provinces, not the type of exams currently used by what he called the phony Examination Yuan under Tai Chi-t'ao. He also suggested reforms in the financial and judicial administrations and the abolition of all illegal and heavy exactions.[49]

In another article entitled "On Communism in China" Lo Lung-chi added that so long as the KMT refused to share political power with anyone else, so long will the CCP draw support for its revolutionary cause. He went on to say:

> In the Communist revolution, the ultimate goal is the destruction of the propertied by the property-less; but the instrument used is the destruction of the power holders by the disenfranchised. In the present poverty-stricken state of China, perhaps there is 'no wealth to share', but in the one-party totalitarian state of China, there is truly 'power to be shared'. This is the mass psychology that the CCP can very well use in its revolutionary strategy. Perhaps this is why the CCP can succeed.[50]

Lo also laid the blame for present Communist troubles on the KMT. He reasoned thus: the KMT nurtured and helped the CCP during the Canton stage and Sun's works contained many references favorable to the Communists. Now these works have been deified and youths have to study them in schools. What were they to think? He added that it was the KMT's bad record, the tyranny of its local organizations, the corruption of its officials, the brutality of its local governments, that served as the best weapons for the CCP.

It was the hatred of the people for the KMT that allowed the CCP to gain support and thrive. Half a million KMT troops have been engaged in suppressing the Communists but even should they succeed militarily, the malaise would remain.[51]

His proposals for solving the Communist problem were as follows. First of all, the KMT should stop party indoctrination in schools as all this has done was to fossilize its ideology and make the banned Communist works more attractive to the youths. Secondly, it should make political reforms and abolish a one-party dictatorship. He explained that when the KMT became a one-party dictatorship it played into the CCP's hands as this is what the latter advocates and are more adept at. Under a one-party dictatorship, people feel they have no stake in the nation so abuses in the ruling party go unchecked. The result in China has been that while many people did not want the CCP to win, yet they resented the KMT and would be happy to see it go.[52] He concluded:

> Political failures, party corruption, these we think are results of one party dictatorship. Under it, people have no freedom of organization or speech and have no chance to supervise the government and party members. A natural result of dictatorship is the decadence of the ruling group. Increasing corruption in politics and increasing alienation of the people gives the Communists its present opportunity to expand. It is worthwhile to notice this point in attempting to find solution to the Communist problem.[53]

The two articles cited above give some feeling on the sort of dissatisfaction many intellectuals felt with the government's methods of dealing with the Communists. For years Chiang's primarily military solution to the CCP problem

entailed huge expenses and netted few returns. By the time the tide finally turned the people were tired of civil wars and attention had been fixed on the alarming rate of Japanese expansion in China. Demands for the cessation of civil war was heard more and more along with the call for the acceleration of defense preparations and unity of all Chinese factions and elements to oppose Japan. Impatience was also voiced with the huge military establishment of over two million troops supported with burdensome taxation, which seemed too ready to fight civil wars but could not or would not defend the nation against external aggression.

Central government troops were not committed against the Japanese as Nanking advocated negotiations and Chiang remained stubbornly committed to his policy of first achieving internal unity and then facing the foreign foe. Such a policy whether ultimately wise or not was not calculated to win popular support and understanding. As the crisis with Japan continued to deepen, the intelligentsia, students and even some elements within the KMT came to feel that all internal issues should be subordinated before the foreign threat. Many works were written urging Nanking to abandon internal feuds, forget bygones and stand up against Japan. In a work called "If I were Chiang Kai-shek", Ting Wen-kiang urged Chiang to conciliate dissenters inside and outside the KMT; to trust and co-operate with Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang and the Southwestern generals for the common cause of defending China; to ignore Japanese inspired rumors and trust Feng with an army to fight in Chahar; to negotiate a truce with the CCP and if that failed to co-operate with the Southwest in ridding them, then to bring the large army now along the Yangtze to north China where the Japanese threat was most immediate.[54]

Many other writers also condemned the government's foreign policy and urged it to more active resistance. The following sampling gives their tenor. In "One Year Has

Passed Since the Mukden Incident", Professor Fu Meng-tseng accused the KMT leaders of fighting predatory civil wars even after the unprecedented disaster of the Mukden Incident and during the Shanghai invasion.[55] In "The Government that Talks Too Much", Fu attacked the government for spending its time in holding conferences and issuing manifestoes which were not matched by deeds. Thus while construction projects lagged corruption in nationalized projects ran rampant.[56] He accused Minister of Foreign Affairs C. T. Wang of ignorance of Japanese affairs and thus missing the opportunity to negotiate with the moderate Shidehara when he was Japan's Foreign Minister. In the same article "On Sleeping and Foreign Affairs", Fu also accused Wang of brashness and sloganeering to which he attributed many lost opportunities in the conduct of foreign affairs.[57]

In 1935 Japan made demands which for all practical purposes would have severed north China from the rest of the nation. Pressure from Japan was strong and both Nanking and the local authorities seemed on the point of knuckling under. Japanese and quisling hooligans were having a heyday in the Peiping-Tientsin area with their "autonomy"demonstrations. Instead of enlisting public opinion and patriotism to aid its cause, strict censorship and police measures were keeping the country largely ignorant and passive. In this atmosphere, it was the intellectuals of the Peiping area who, at considerable risk to themselves both from the Chinese and Japanese authorities, arose, and in manifestoes, articles and speeches exposed the shame of the "autonomy" movement and reaffirmed the principle that China and the Chinese people were one and indivisible. Whereas the students made their feelings known by the more spectacular method of mass demonstrations, strikes and journeys to the countryside to rouse the peasants, the professors took the sometimes also dangerous course of writing articles, issuing statements and sending deputations to see the government leaders to represent their views.

The following articles exemplify the stand taken by many intellectuals. In "The North China Problem", Hu Shih stated that the people of north China had never asked for autonomy. He warned the authorities in north China not to forget their responsibility to the nation by allowing abridgements to China's unity and reminded them of their obligations to the central government.[58] In two articles "The Chinese Race is a United One" and "The People of North China and the National Peril", Fu Meng-tseng reiterated the unity of China and emphasized that graft-ridden warlords and poverty-stricken mobs could not represent the will of the Chinese people.[59] Such was the gist of many articles on the issue which appeared in north China at the time.

It can be seen from the foregoing that during the period under examination the intellectuals were opposed to the government on several fundamental issues. There were sharp differences on the political structure of the state and government, on civil rights, the meaning and length of tutelage, censorship, educational content, the priority given to the anti-CCP campaign, other national priorities, and also significantly on resisting Japan. During the ten years the KMT government structure did undergo some change and towards the end civil wars did stop. But the fact remains that it did not change its fundamental concepts on tutelage and one-party rule. There was some progress on certain industrialization and construction programs, but the basic problem of livelihood remained. Too often the government measured progress by some show-case programs in the costal cities while the countryside remained poverty-stricken. Also the problem of China's unity, sovereignty and international status remained critical. On this issue, the government could not meet the demands and aspirations of the people. Despite the return of numerous small concessions and tariff autonomy, the fact of foreign extra-territoriality in China continued. And as for sovereignty

and unity, never as in this ten-year period did China see so much loss of territory. Here the government's inability to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation despite huge military expenditures became a major source of frustration.

Thus as the years passed early enthusiasm evaporated and disillusionment set in. Excerpts from two articles show this feeling. First is one by Hu Shih named "Confidence and Introspection", written on May 28, 1934. He said in part:

> It is not the greatest shame when a country is militarily inferior, is defeated and loses a large piece of its territory. But for a country of today to permit whole provinces to engage in the cultivation of opium, for a government of today to depend on revenue from opium---monopoly tax, smoking tax, seedling tax, transit tax---to be part of its revenue system, this is the greatest shame. For a modern people of today to permit its highest officials publicly to advocate such movements as 'The Society of the Time Wheel Golden Immortal' and 'Society of the Law of Stopping Disasters and Benefitting the People', (Buddhist societies set up by Tai Chi-t'ao and others) this is the biggest shame...For a country to support three million troops which cannot defend the nation, yet to date has refused to plan any public education system for the citizens, this is the greatest shame.[60]

Another article, written in a more humorous vein, by Lin Yu-tang, pointed to the deep dissatisfaction felt about a

government which failed to fulfill the basic aspirations for unity and nationhood felt by many. It said in part:

> For we are living in a period of complete and unmitigated disillusionment, in a period of lack of faith, not only in the present revolution but in all revolutions...The optimism and cheerful idealism of 1926 have given place to the cynicism and disillusionment of 1935, a rumbling cynicism visible in all newspaper articles and private talk...Slowly and painfully one realizes that we are still being ruled in the provinces by feudal chieftains with vulgar names...Then all of a sudden, one realizes that we have but substituted a dozen disguised monarchies for a genuine one, and that the revolution of 1911 was a success only in the sense of a racial revolution, that it only blew an empire into powder and left some ruins and debris and choking dust behind...For it is apparent that a system of ideas has collapsed, ideas moral and ideas political. Old China had a system of government and a system of moral ideas which were adequate to maintain the national life, but which today are thrown out of their bearings and perhaps do more harm than good.[61]

The question then arises: considering China's internal and external state, could another government have done better? Would a government that implemented civil rights and democracy have been more successful in uniting the country? It is difficult to be optimistic about democracy in a country of mainly illiterate masses, even if the enormous task of creating the machinery could have been overcome. I think that the demand for democracy

itself demonstrates the enormous gap that existed between the Western educated elite and the bulk of their countrymen. These were people of sincere intentions but politically perhaps naive and without genuine program or a mass following; for it remained sadly true that in China from 1911 on it was force that ruled and those who wielded the force and had any program or prospect of ruling in the years following 1928 were the KMT and CCP. Neither understood nor tolerated the concept of liberal democracy as espoused by the intellectuals. This left them in a kind of limbo, hence their disillusionment and frustration. Being Chinese, where traditionally the public held high regard towards the intelligentsia and the intelligentsia towards themselves, their frustration at their impotence was great indeed.

Nor is it difficult to understand the reluctance of the KMT leaders to share power and accept advice, for these were men who had long been in ineffectual opposition and had come to power finally by the success of their arms. Many of the KMT leaders and generals were also traditionally oriented men and could not understand such Western concepts as civil rights and the right of political opposition. They tended to see opposition as sedition and to answer it by suppression. Thus they tended to see the world in a black and white perspective and failed to take suggestions which could have improved their own image as well as the nation's welfare. Also they refused to broaden the basis of government to include those intellectuals who did not want to join the KMT. In this way they not only passed up many talents but alienated and embittered potential allies. For even though public opinion did not play the role it does in the modern West, the alienation of the large and respected group played an important contributing role in the subsequent demise of the KMT.

It was tragic that the views of the moderates and intellectuals could not find acceptance, both because of

the temperament of the rules and external and domestic circumstances. So the ultimate solution had to be a military one. But even then the loss of the confidence and moral support of a vocal and prestigeous group as the intelligentsia was one the KMT in the long run could ill afford.

The Student Movement.

> The young people are the masters of our country of the near future. That they are not deeply committed to the most precious possession of the revolution, the Three People's Principles, is indeed a very dangerous thing...The reason that we must emphasize party indoctrination in education is to enable the unifying of the ideology of the youths, so that they may entirely understand that our principles are those that will bring true happiness to the race and nation...We furthermore want to make the youths understand that the Three People's Principles are indispensable for saving China from her deep perils. Aside from the Three People's Principles, there is nothing which can win freedom, equality and glory for our nation.[62]

The above was taken from a speech by Chiang Kai-shek made in 1930. He also stated here that many schools did not give enough emphasis on teaching KMT doctrines so that there was inadequate understanding by youths of its revolutionary aims. In seeking to remedy the situation he ordered the Ministry of Education to investigate how to improve the teaching of KMT principles in schools but meanwhile required the principals themselves to teach the course on ideology.[63]

This speech was one in a series of exhortations and directives by individual high party leaders to the youths of the nation on their duties and obligations. The emphasis was that the days of demonstrations and manifestoes were over and it was time to settle down and study and prepare for the tasks of the future.[64] Many leaders were also concerned that the KMT had achieved success too quickly, with the result that now there was a shortage of personnel and cadres with true commitment to the party's principles. To them this lack made it even more imperative to train youths with the proper ideology.[65]

On January 1, 1930, the C.E.C. issued a Manifesto to All Youths of the Nation. It said in part:

> It will be a great tragedy, if at the beginning of reconstruction, they (the students) should persist in employing tactics used in the destructive period of struggle against the warlords, to disrupt order and progress of educational pursuits during the period of party rule. It is earnestly hoped that the young students will realize their mistakes! At present, the whole nation is under the rule and direction of our party. Our party will in an orderly way remedy conditions which cause discontent...In future, students should obey the tangpu's directions in concerns outside school; school affairs will be the responsibility of the school authorities, and as the school authorities are members of the party government, students should peacefully present their opinions to them and avoid being too pressing in their demands.[66]

The above statement indicates that the KMT regarded the radical and rather leftist student movement as a threat

to its position. Since it regarded the revolution as over, its aim was to restore order. Under the circumstances continued student strikes and demonstrations could no longer be tolerated. It is also true that many students, having tasted power and freedom, were anxious to continue in the same vein and found the rigors of normal study tiresome. Thus, while their movement was motivated by idealism, some student groups did let elements of rowdyism and indiscipline mar their cause and impede the process of education. The difference was that while the youths considered the revolution had just begun, the KMT believed that the revolutionary period was over and all that remained was consolidation and reconstruction under its guidance. In order to restore discipline, the Central Political Council decided to endorse three measures recommended in 1929 by Hu Han-min, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Chiang Mon-lin on the prohibiting student agitation. They were:

> 1. The Central Party Headquarters to issue a circular order instructing all students to return to their studies and leave the administration of the country's affairs to the officials.
> 2. The State Council to issue a circular order forbidding students to interfere with the administration of any educational institution.
> 3. All educational administrative organs to be instructed to so direct all educational institutions that the students may be given more rigid training and stricter discipline so that they can concentrate on their studies.[67]

While it seems reasonable that violence and rowdyism on the campuses should be curbed and proper academic procedures be restored, this alone could not have cured the youth problem, for their indiscipline was but symptomatic of a much deeper turmoil. These were difficult times and

students were concerned with the nation's affairs. Many also found difficulty adjusting their ideals to present reality.

For its own purposes the government wanted to control not only the conduct but also the minds of the students. So besides instituting rigorous academic programs, students were obliged to study the canonized doctrines of Sun and the rest of KMT dogma. In addition, non-KMT political organizations were prohibited on campuses. All this was part of an attempt to "unify thought" and impose orthodoxy on youths. In a speech he made at the Ministry of Education entitled "Problems of Ideology in Chinese Education", Chiang claimed that Sun had defined the Three People's Principles in the following way. He quoted Sun as saying:

> There is a mainstream in China's moral ideology, as handed down through Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, King Wen, King Wu, the Duke of Chou and Confucius. Then it dried up. My (Sun's) ideology is the heir of this mainstream of Chinese ideology, which I (Sun) have proceeded to develop and glorify.[68]

In this light Chiang defined the task and function of the Ministry of Education as follows:

> Our Ministry of Education must become the central organization for the dissemination of ideology. Educational personnel must carry out the educational procedures, organization and political directives as set down by Dr. Sun and progressively implement them in the provinces.[69]

Order and discipline was increasingly restored in schools after 1929, but the attempt to "unify ideology" never succeeded. For one thing, many youths were disgusted

and alienated by the KMT. They felt that there was too much variance between what was preached and practiced. There was dissatisfaction with the non-implementation of self-government measures during tutelage, with the ignoring of the problems of livelihood and with the continuing civil wars. Youths were also discouraged with the lack of regular civil service examinations and nepotism and personal favors in employment. How could they study quietly, they argued, when politics were not regulated and when there was no peaceful way for citizens to share the government of the country? Under these circumstances, many students felt that the responsibility for bringing about change fell on them.[70]

However, the KMT regarded many of the wishes and aspirations of the students as a threat. Hence the suppression of the youth movement by the Fourth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. in 1930. In commenting on this, Lin Yu-tang hit what seems the crux of the problem, the inability of the government to see that mere discipline would not do and that force could not win youths to its side. He continued:

> They (the officials) forgot to remind themselves that the great force of political enthusiasm of young China was really the spiritual factor which accounted for the success of the Northern Expedition and that such a big force could not be shifted or annihilated even by an order of the Plenary Session. A process of introversion took place. That which was denied outward expression became a dangerous subcurrent and a consuming fire in their souls. They wanted to see a different China, and they were offered something dangerously like the old thing...Young China is profoundly disgusted

> with the things as they are and they want a change. That feeling of profound disgust is not something which can be frightened out of existence by bullets and prison cells, much less by pious professions, hypocritical cant and flowery-worded manifestoes. Banditry, continued unrest, and official obscurantism must in the end prove China's royal road to Russia.[71]

The Student Revolt, 1931-1932.

Pent up frustrations and dissatisfaction finally let loose in the winter of 1931-1932, when a wave of demonstrations was touched off by the Mukden Incident. In the Manifesto to the Nation dated September 23, 1931, the government stated its policy of non-resistance and reliance on the League of Nations to see to the evacuation of Japanese troops. Thus it gave strict orders to Chinese troops to avoid conflict with Japanese forces. These steps were taken, the manifesto said, because China wanted to show that there was civilized way to solve international problems. Therefore, it appealed to all citizens to support its policy.[72]

The students saw the situation differently. They discounted China's inability and saw non-resistance, with some truth, as reflecting a lack of will on the part of the government to resist. In the aftermath of the Mukden Incident various private groups were organized which aimed at resisting Japan in various ways. An example of popular action was the boycott movement against Japanese goods which was very effective in 1931-1932.[73] Among the students, those of Peiping were in the forefront in organizing themselves to pressure the government into a more positive stand. Many reasons account for this. Peiping was an important cultural center with many secondary schools and colleges; these schools had a tradition of taking a stand

on important national affairs which dated back to the May Fourth Movement; geographically it was close to Manchuria, and being far from the seat of the central government, students there felt more freedom of action.

According to one student source, the anti-Japanese student movement was begun by Manchurian students in Peiping, who formed the Northeasterners' Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association. This expanded to become the Federation of Students' Anti-Japanese Association of Peiping, which came to include some eighty schools.[74] Peiping students first staged two demonstrations, sought to see Chang Hsueh-liang but were refused. Then they decided to go to Nanking. From the end of November, 1931, students began to arrive atNanking, often on commandeered trains.[75]

On November 28, 1931, over twelve thousand students waited for over a day in a snowstorm until finally Chiang came to speak to them. They demanded a declaration of war against Japan and asked Chiang to go north to direct the war effort.[76] From this date until December 18, there were almost daily student demonstrations in Nanking. Some ended in fights. For example, on December 15, students went to the KMT headquarters and were met by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and Ch'en Ming-chu (Minister of Education and Garrison Commander of Nanking and Shanghai respectively). An argument ensued. Students claim that they heard a bell ring which they interpreted as the signal for armed guards to come out and disperse them. So they decided to attack first. They beat up Ch'en and snatched Ts'ai as hostage. Then the guards charged, retrieved Ts'ai and fired into the students. More than ten students were arrested. According to the students, those of them that were arrested remained unaccounted for. They also stressed that they did not carry Communist slogans.[77] The government version accused the students of stealing police arms on December 15 but denied making any arrests. The same government account claimed that on

December 17, over one thousand students with arms attacked the KMT headquarters and that some of the attackers wore red arm bands and carried red flags.[78]

As the students continued their demonstrations, government embarrassment and annoyance increased. This is quite apparent in the tone of government statements dealing with the case. In an order issued on December 5, the government first lauded the students' motives in coming to Nanking, though it chided them for requisitioning trains and committing other illegal acts. Then it exhorted them to stay home, study, and if they had any suggestions, to present them to their local officials, as this way officials in Nanking would not be disturbed in their work.[79] The tone had entirely changed by December 19 when the government issued another order which accused the recent student excesses as Communist directed. It directed the students to study and not make themselves menaces to the safety of the nation, and finally ordered them home and ordered local officials not to permit such treks to the capital in the future.[80]

Nanking was the main center of student demonstrations, but many students stayed home and demonstrated in their own cities. Clashes and arrests occurred in many places. Undoubtedly in a movement which involved so many students, a variety of opinion and political beliefs must have existed. Many students went to Nanking initially to petition the government and were quite mild in the beginning. Some became more radical and hostile as time went on partly because of the persuasion of the more radical and anti-government students and also because of the unsympathetic and cowardly behavior of some officials and police which caused much disgust. Demonstration of Force, the publication of the Peiping Students' Association, which voiced highly anti-government views, stated that the students from Peiping who went to Nanking were divided into two groups. It

characterized students from ten schools as "surrenderists" who formed "petition delegations" while those from twelve schools represented the "oppositionist" views and formed "demonstration delegations".[81] The publication explained the purpose of the "demonstration delegation's" trip thus:

> The most significant purpose of our demonstration was to prove to the masses that China's sole future depends on the arousing of all the people to save themselves, and that to depend on such as the 'League of Nations' and 'Government' is to seek destruction...From this it is clear that the ultimate goal of our demonstration was not only a passive one, to expose the selling out and divisionist policy of the ruling class and the greed of the imperialists, but actively, to call up the people to seek self-salvation and establish an all-China organization for resisting Japan.[82]

They denied carrying Communist slogans, etc. as the government accused them of doing.[83]

Editorials in independent journals were generally sympathetic to the student movement. There was praise for the sincerity of the students. Maybe their actions were foolish and accomplished little, but one writer saw in their actions a new China awakening which was not content with passivity.[84] The emphasis in many comments was that though students did commit excesses, they were not on a lark, that they were genuinely patriotic and wanted to help but did not know how. The pity was China lacked a leader with the ability and programs to inspire and unite the students and together unite the nation.[85]

Many writers and intellectuals supported and sympathized with the students because the students represented

the same frustrations and discontent with the government which they also felt. They also admired the students for their bravery and self-sacrifice in forcing the issue to the open.

On December 18, 1931, troops and police in Nanking rounded up the students and sent them home. Prior to that, according to the Peiping Students' Association, they were searched and some arrested.[86] This seems to be born out by a statement by Ch'en Ming-chu that those arrested students proven to have no connection with the CCP would be dealt with leniently. Ch'en did not mention how many students were involved.[87] The problem was how to deal with the student movement as recent outbursts had revealed the failure of past policy. Overall, government policy was to crush the student movement and restore discipline. On January 6, 1932, the Executive Yuan issued an order to students warning them that to disobey their school presidents was to defy the government.[88] This was followed by other orders and mandates of a similar nature. Chiang's explanation of the student movement of 1931-1932 explains why this line was adopted. He said:

> The Chinese Communists and their fellow travelers took advantage of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria by instigating students in Peiping, Shanghai and Nanking to converge on Nanking on the pretext of making petition but actually to embarrass the government in every way possible.[89]

Yes the student demonstrations did embarrass the government. But the government made the fatal mistake of regarding every instance of disagreement and insubordination as of necessity Communist inspired and directed. Not only did this give too much credit to the Communists but with this sort of mentality the government found it very difficult to take advice and make concession. In addition, it had the effect

of alienating potential supporters and by branding every patriotic movement as Communist directed made the Communists seem before the public as the sole upholders of patriotism.

Recent works do suggest that the CCP did play a role in the demonstrations, but they did not initiate nor guide the movement. In the period after 1928, the CCP had persisted in its attempt to promote a united front from below. It concentrated its efforts in the cities and there primarily among workers and trade unionists. Students were also approached and attempts were made to stir them up both on national and purely school grievances. But faced with overwhelming difficulties, little was accomplished.[90] However, once the demonstrations began circumstances began to push the student movement towards the left. The center of leftist strength in Peiping was Peita which in November, 1931, sent over two hundred students to demonstrate in Nanking. Though numerically small, they showed great organizational ability. Consequently this group was singled out for government denunciation as Communist which charge they hotly denied. However, as later revealed, some individual students were affiliated with the Communist youth movement.[91] By the end of 1931 a split developed between the left wing and right wing of the student movement. The left wing was more dynamic and therefore captured more attention. But the left wing was not the Communist party, its physical circumstances simply made it impossible for the CCP to play such a role at this stage. The declaration of the CCP Youth Corps of December 20, 1935 (made in response to the December 9 Student Movement) admitted as much. In recounting the student demonstrations of 1931, it blamed its failure on the fact that the student movement was then not under unified leadership, it failed to act in concert and failed to rally the working masses. Hence its failure.[92] Why did it fail in these ways? Obviously because the CCP was not directing it!

The Interlude, 1932-1935.

The next few years witnessed greater CCP penetration into the schools. They also witnessed government suppression of student opposition and many extracurricular student activities. The following furnish a few examples of government suppression of student activities. In Shanghai, the Students' Society for Resisting Japan planned to hold a meeting on June 18, 1932. It was banned by order of the Shanghai Bureau of Public Safety.[93] On June 30, 1932, the government closed the National Central University and dismissed the faculty and students. This climaxed a controversy that began when President Chu Chia-hua resigned as a result of alleged misappropriation of funds charges, and when the students beat up the acting president Tuan Hsi-peng.[94]

Continued unrest on many campuses led the Ministry of Education to order measures on July 21, 1932, for controlling the finances and administrations of the universities and for stricter disciplinary control of the students.[95] Some reports of subsequent arrests indicate what was meant by "discipline". On December 14, 1932, two well-known professors of Peita, Hsu Teh-heng and Hou Wai-lu, were arrested on secret orders from Nanking. On the same day, seventeen university students were also arrested in Peiping, all on the charge of having participated in Communist agitations. On September 15, 1933, students and police clashed as the students set out from Peita campus to search for Japanese goods. Forty-two men and women students were arrested. Allegedly on orders from Nanking, Nankai University in Tientsin expelled fifty students for being "reactionaries". The angered student body responded by manhandling the president, Chang Po-lin.[96] On March 12, between 5-6 am., police raided the dormitories of two universities in Peiping. Eight men and two women students were arrested at Tsinghua but the two girls who were wanted at Yenching University had fled.

There were no warrants for the arrests or for search. The charge was Communism.[97] On the March 12 arrests of students at Tsinghua, China Weekly Review made the following comment:

> While we have not information regarding the evidence upon which these particular police raids were staged, we know that the charge of 'communism' as now applied to Peiping has nothing whatever to do with the doctrines of Karl Marx, Lenin or Trotsky, or even Joseph Stalin. Based on evidence presented in connection with the previous raids, we imagine that when the facts become known it will be found that the students have been guilty of what is now a serious 'crime' in Peiping---anti-Japanese agitation.[98]

While the above showed a quite common feeling of sympathy for the students, it also over-simplified the issue. Communist agitation and influence was expanding on campuses, especially in Peiping. Students were receptive to Communist influence because of their frustrations and the CCP capitalized on them.[99] The situation varied from city to city and within each city, from school to school. For instance, Nanking was firmly under government control and the CCP admitted that prior to the December 9 Movement, there was no Communist student organization in Nanking.[100] While harsh government measures demoralized the timid, others felt more embittered. Such feelings were vividly described in an article entitled "Some Thoughts on Student Arrests" in which the author asserted that the most unforgetable moments of his four years in college were the waves of student arrests staged by the government, after the Mukden Incident, after the Shanghai ceasefire in 1932, after the Tangku agreement in 1933 and between January and March of 1935. He said the raids on the dormitories always came at

dawn and always caused great panic because students did not know who was marked. The charge always was for being "reactionary", i.e., for having read certain books or made certain statements.[101]

Demoralizing as they were, these arrests and terror measures were self-defeating, nor were they thorough enough to wipe out opposition. The proscription of Communist books only made Soviet successes seem more spectacular and leftist ideology more attractive.[102] They also revealed the moral bankruptcy of the government, which for whatever reason, repressed patriotic movements. The fact that continued arrests were made after 1931 is also evidence that the spirit of the students was not crushed. Many students were cynical and distainful of government professions. An article written on the first anniversary of the Mukden Incident and published in the Tsinghua University students' magazine reflects the depth of this feeling. It said in part:

> As for the government, militarily it makes no resistance, diplomatically it issues a few paper protests and memoranda, while duping the people with worthless statements as 'we will make a significant gesture'...The so-called national emergency has by now become a mere phrase. But when the anniversary of the national emergency arrived, the ruling class, true to form, issued a few bitter manifestoes and ordered the people to make certain prescribed gestures as indication of grief...What value can be attached to such commemorative exercises?[103]

The December 9 Movement, 1935-1936.

1935 witnessed renewed Japanese drive to control north China. It led to the establishment of the East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government under Japanese auspices,

and Japanese backed demands for autonomy for Hopei and Chahar provinces. The deepening crisis and the apparent inability of the Chinese government to resist sharpened the "crisis psychology" among the students. This in turn led to the December 9 Movement, a series of student demonstrations to show that the students at least did not want autonomy for north China and to demand that the government stop its civil wars and unite all parties and factions to resist Japan.

Towards the end of 1935, the student unions of various schools in Peiping were coming to life again. On November 1, the Student Self-Government Association of eleven higher and middle schools in the Peiping-Tientsin area (Peita not included) sent a petition to the Sixth Plenary Session of the C.E.C. then assembled in Nanking. It expressed alarm over the situation in north China and also demanded the freedom of speech, the press, assembly and the stopping of all illegal arrests. This time it was the Yenching student body which was most active in organizing the student revival. It was because this university enjoyed the greatest freedom from official surveillance because it was an American missionary operated institution.[104]

Japanese pressure was such that the Chinese leaders seemed resigned to the fact that north China could not be saved. Many schools were planning to move southward, and since the summer of 1935, it had been proposed that the Northeastern University, target of Japanese interests, should move to Kikungshan in Honan where part of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops were stationed.[105] Then around the end of November, the Commissioner of Social Affairs of Peiping announced changes in the province's educational policy. According to the new rules the teaching of KMT ideology in schools would be ended; materials detrimental to friendly relations with China's neighbors (Japan) would be excluded; and the works smacking of Communism would be

suppressed.[106] This was obviously surrender to Japanese demands.

By now the students were desperate. They wanted freedom to organize, cessation of arrests and above all to save north China. They decided to stage a demonstration and on December 9 over four thousand students in Peiping staged a march. They wanted to see Ho Ying-ch'in and to show the nation that they did not want autonomy for north China but wanted to resist Japan. The students were met by Ho's secretary who said that Ho was out of town (though it was later learned that Ho was in the city on that day). They were also met by the police and a melee resulted. Several students were injured and about twenty from the Northeastern University were arrested. Because of censorship, the news of the Peiping demonstrations were not immediately printed in the Chinese papers. But the foreign correspondents present, who enjoyed special privileges in communications, were able to wire their reports to other cities so that the public did eventually get the news.[107]

As a gesture of general protest, and specifically to protest the arrest of the students, all schools in the Peiping area went on strike on December 10. The Yenching students, in a "Statement to All Students of China", explained why they were striking. It said:

> Fellow students! We are compelled to strike, because our innocent fellow students are arrested, and we have received no reply to our demands! We pledge our very lives in asking the government to resist Japan...We pledge our lives in demanding freedom to seek national salvation. We know that China faces greater peril now than she has ever faced before, and this is no time for us to be 'book worms'... In this difficult and dangerous time, we should

> assume the responsibility of our national liberation, to broaden the student movement and combine its efforts to the movement, rising everywhere in China, to resist Japan. We want to make known the meaning of the glorious December 9, as more thoroughly anti-imperialist than the May 4th Movement.[108]

The signal was set for a series of mass student demonstrations. Another was organized on December 16 when almost eight thousand students in Peiping, representing twenty-five universities and schools, took to the streets.[109] The movement spread like wildfire to every major city in China. For example, on December 16, students in Canton demonstrated, passed out manifestoes; on December 19 there were demonstrations in Nanking where five thousand students took part and in Shanghai where the students asked the mayor to forward their petition to Nanking. And so the list goes on. The students were unanimous in demanding the release of arrested students, the recovery of lost lands, that the government support patriotic movements and wage punitive expeditions against the traitors.[110]

What was the reaction to the student movement? In the press there was widespread sympathy and admiration for the students and anger with police brutality, the arrests and accusations and allegations that the movement was Communist inspired.[111] First of all newsmen were jubilant as students were fighting for freedom of the press also. The brutality of the gendarmes also caused much indignation, mostly against those in power who were too cowardly to face the students. The manifesto of the Association of Cultural Workers of North China had this to say on the Peiping student movement of December 9:

> When the traitors parade, the military and police follow and protect them like running dogs and the

> Minister of War Ho Ying-ch'in extends to them personal audience. But the authority's response to the pure hearted student movement for national salvation, which really represents the will of China, is to apply brutal beatings, arrests and massacres.[112]

Although much milder in tone, Hu Shih was no less indignant about the series of events. In an article entitled "A Word on the Student Movement", he stated that the quiet among students in the past few years despite mounting national dangers was abnormal and the result of extreme suppression. It was China's misfortune that youths were so suppressed as she does not need docile citizens. He urged the government to seek the support of the youths and hailed the December 9 Movement as a happy event and a signal for China's revival.[113]

The momentum caused by the student movement and its apparent alienation from the government must have shaken Nanking. In response it convened a conference and invited school principals and student representatives to come to Nanking to exchange views with government leaders. Of the over two hundred educational delegates who attended, over half were school principals, the remainder were students, some elected by their fellow students, others appointed by the schools. The more radical student bodies in Peking regarded going to Nanking as a waste of time and sign of capitulation. Therefore they had refused to elect delegates. In these schools the authorities were compelled to appoint student representatives to attend.[114] The session began on January 15, 1936, when Chiang addressed the university and school principals and Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan Oong Wen-hao received the students. The students put forth their demands, which were for open diplomacy, that the government should declare to the nation

what it intended to do about the national crisis, and for no changes of textbooks in north China schools. On January 16, Chiang addressed the whole group and announced his determination to defend the nation. Then the meetings were adjourned. If the government wanted the meetings to engender more confidence in its policies and to end the student revolt, it did not achieve the desired ends.[115]

In Peiping and Tientsin the students broadened the scope of their work. Early in January propaganda brigades were sent to the Hopei countryside in an effort to rouse the younger school children and the peasantry. By mid-January, after a harassing trip of two weeks, these were turned back by the local Peace Preservation Forces. But student strikes and demonstrations continued.[116]

In retaliation, the government resorted to several measures. On February 15, 1936, Minister of Education Wang Shih-chieh announced that the government would suspend allowances to universities if the disturbances continued. On February 20, the Emergency Measures for the Preservation of Law and Order were issued which allowed the suppression, by force if necessary, of mob uprisings, disturbances to communications and order. Unlicensed processions and gatherings were also outlawed. On February 21, by order of the Executive Yuan, the Peiping-Tientsin Students' Union was banned.[117]

What followed was a massive campaign of coercion and suppression of the students, especially those of the Peiping area. An article in the North China Star on February 11 stated that secret arrests of student leaders on charges of Communist activities had been going on for over a month. It claimed that though the arrests were made by the Chinese police, they were based on information received from the Japanese police. On February 20, the Commander of the Bureau of Public Safety of Peiping (which had a Japanese advisor) announced that he would carry out measures against

the students. They were to be in the form of a series of raids, searches, beatings and arrests by troops and police at the campus sites.[118] But arrests were not restricted to campus areas, and the crackdown extended to the secondary schools. Nor were the arrests restricted to the Peiping area. For example, in March four high school boys were arrested in Taiyuan and executed on the charge of being Communists. Two more boys were executed in Taiyuan later in the year on the same charge.[119]

The question arises as to who was behind the new outburst of student activity. As can be expected the government charged that the students were inspired, directed and paid by the Communists.[120] Chiang Kai-shek had this to say:

> In Peiping, for instance, professors and students in a number of universities and colleges paraded in the streets in December, 1935, in protest against 'Self Rule for Hopei and Chahar Provinces'. This was started as a patriotic movement but it came to be utilized by the Communists to advance their neutralist tactics. In north China alone, there were more than thirty such organizations. Uniformly, they proclaimed in their publications the 'People's Front' as demanded by the Communist International. This was true not only in Peiping and Tientsin but also in Shanghai and other cities.[121]

Chiang's charges of CCP power in popular movements was probably exaggerated. The same might be said about subsequent CCP assertions of their dominant role during this period. Some works published in China since 1949 make the blanket claim that this movement was inspired and led by the CCP and specifically under the Peiping city branch of the CCP. These works also attribute the ultimate success

of the movement to the leadership of the CCP and the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Specifically they refer to the CCP's direction to the students to broaden the basis of their patriotic movement by going to the countryside and factories and co-operate with the workers and peasants.[122] Other sources and assessments generally refute this broad claim, but rather stress the spontaneous nature of the movement. As one student of this period said: "Given the extreme weakness of the CCP in KMT-controlled regions, it is impossible to imagine a movement of such scope being under Communist control".[123]

Certain contemporary CCP documents also suggest that in the initial period anyway, its role was a secondary one. How else can one explain the fact that the Youth Corps of the CCP did not come out with a manifesto to support the December 9 Movement until twelve days after the event? The text of this manifesto is also interesting reading. Nowhere did it assert leadership nor give directions to the student movement. It instead emphasized that patriots of all persuasions should lay aside their differences and unite to save the nation.[124] Edgar Snow also sheds some light on the role of the CCP. Snow left Peiping for Paoan in northern Shensi in June, 1936. While in the CCP controlled area, he had an interview with Mao Tse-tung on the subject of the student movement. Snow said that though the CCP is generally quick to claim credit for anything, Mao in this instance told him that it knew little about the December 9 Movement at the time and did not lead it.[125]

Most of the educational leaders of north China were agreed on the spontaneity and patriotic motives of the student movement and resented the charges of Communism. The chancellor of Yenching University, C. W. Luh, made a statement to the foreign correspondents in Peiping, which went as follows:

> It is regrettable that circumstances have made the recent demonstrations possible and almost inevitable...So far as I know, they are purely patriotic. I know of no Communists who either instigated or manipulated the movement...I also want to make it clear that the attitude of the students towards the so-called autonomy movement is purely spontaneous and not merely the response to a statement made by a few university presidents and professors. We have no right to claim such far-reaching personal influence on our students.[126]

A Yenching professor, supporter of both the KMT and Chiang, added:

> It is shameful to say that Communists are the only patriots left in China. If every Chinese who agrees with and supports the demands made by the students is a Communist then let us hope that most Chinese are Communists. But it is not true. There are plenty of people left in China who can still love their country and resist its destruction, without being paid by Moscow for doing it.[127]

Yet another Professor, T'ao Hsi-sheng of the social sciences department of Peita commented after attending a student meeting on December 31 that the special feature of this movement was that it was not directed by any political party, which explained its lack of organization, liaison, policy and strategy. He added that it was precisely because of this lack of political direction that it has won the sympathy of all elements in the society.[128]

The persecution of the students continued and the officials continued to justify it by charging that the student

movement was Communist directed. Ironically it was precisely this persecution which enabled the Communists to emerge as the guiding center of the student movement, for they had the organization and experience which the students lacked. It was after March that according to Edgar Snow the "professionals took over".[129] At the same time Nanking continued to press forward its extirpation campaigns against the CCP in northern Shensi. This determination, plus the fact that Nanking refused to take a stand against Japan in Suiyuan further discredited it in the eyes of most students. The government's motives seemed even more dubious when Japan also chimed in with anti-Communist slogans and demands. Those who saw the worst here could see collusion between Nanking and Japan. But many more feared that Nanking was being used by Japan in the pursuit of the latter's goals.[130] Thus student demand for the cessation of the civil wars became more insistent. On April 19, 1936, the Peiping Student Union resolved to send a general telegram in favor of cessation of civil wars. It said in part:

> The stipulations in Hirota's Three Principles that 'China and Japan take joint anti-Communist action' is made in order to permit the Japanese to occupy the whole of China. This is because there are 'Red forces' in over ten provinces of China. So if Chinese and Japanese forces are to take joint action against them, Japanese forces will necessarily first occupy these nineteen (sic) provinces. We fear that in that event, before Communists can be extirpated, Japanese forces will have already occupied China.[131]

Government-student relations continued stalemated. The only major government figures who sympathized with the students were Chang Hsueh-liang and Feng Yu-hsiang. The Northeastern University and Chungsan Middle School in Peiping

were under Chang's direct patronage and students from these had born the brunt of arrests. It was Chang's personal intervention and guarantee that had ensured the release of many of these students in March, 1936. In May, Feng Yu-hsiang also intervened and most remaining students in prison were freed.[132] The students continued their work to rouse the nation. They made speeches, distributed propaganda and increasingly paid attention to junior officers and men of the 29th Army, with success, as the Japanese complained that its lower ranks were being shaken. To counter this the Japanese announced on June 2, 1936, that they were sending ten to fifteen advisors to the 29th Army.[133]

On the organizational front, in spite of the inevitable dissension within its ranks, work was pressed on to form an all China organization. On March 28, 1936, the all China Students' National Salvation Union Preparatory Organization was established, with 200,000 students in sixteen cities participating. They declared their purpose as follows: To oppose Japanese imperialism and demand the speedy formation of an all China anti-Japanese United Front; to end civil wars and mobilize against Japan; to gain freedom to form patriotic organizations; to eradicate traitors within China; and to ally with all oppressed peoples and races of the world for the struggle against imperialism.[134] On May 29-30, student delegates from twenty-one cities met in Shanghai and the Students' National Salvation Union was formed.

From its declaration of purpose one sees the radicalization of the student movement over the past few months and the convergence of student aims with those of the general national salvation movement as well as the stated united front aims of the CCP. Arguments continued as to the degree of Communist dominance of the student movement. CCP emphasis on their leadership is perhaps exaggerated even though they thereby confirmed KMT and Japanese claims on this field. But from the point of view of this study it seems that the question

of direct CCP control is less important than that the KMT had by now destroyed its chances to rally the students because of its foreign policy and its handling of the student movement. For many of the students the only way to go was to the left.

Conclusion.

As can be seen, there was not only no rapprochement between the intellectuals and students and the KMT government between 1928-1937, but in many cases a progressive widening of the gap took place. To Chiang's dismay, neither group accepted his rigid system of priorities for national unification. Instead the intellectuals raised the voice of remonstration and criticism, which an incompetent and incomplete censorship could never muffle. The students, a more numerous and militant group, resorted to mass protest, demonstrations and strikes, which the government attempted to repress but never managed to wipe out.

Because of their cosmopolitanism and the liberal education many had received in the West, many of the intellectuals admired the principles underlying Western democracies. They tended to attribute the progressiveness and deep unity of Western states to their liberal and democratic traditions. In seeking the same for China many naturally sought to introduce these ideals for China's polity. To them Chinese unification would be based on sounder and firmer foundations if it were built on concepts of individual liberty, civil rights and a multi-party political system under constitutional guarantees. Conversely they saw the imposed unification under a one-party dictatorship as ultimately a weaker and shakier one, to which many were unable to pledge their allegiance. They regretted the continuation of civil wars and the lack of many basic social reforms as destructive of the foundations of unity. They also opposed the attempt to impose a purely military solution to the Communist problem; and finally they sought the uniting of all Chinese factions

to resist Japan. Whether their ideals were at all suitable to China or could be implemented remains a matter of conjecture and debate. Probably not, because despite their idealism this Western trained and oriented elite was entirely divorced from the reality of conditions and livelihood of the masses of the population. Given the unwillingness of the KMT and for that matter the CCP too, to share power, their ideals remained just that. Nevertheless these were dedicated people, respected by tradition as leaders. In this context the KMT's often cavalier treatment of them and unwillingness to conciliate and integrate them into the ruling structure did damage the cause of unification.

KMT-student confrontation was often sharp and violent. Nationalistic and impatient, students demanded active and immediate resistance to Japan's encroachments on China's unity. Faced with other problems and convinced that resistance was suicidal, the government opted for appeasement of Japan as the least of evil choices. This policy the students saw as treason. They demanded mobilization and active programs of defense preparations which the government was unwilling or unable to undertake. Thus the students took to the streets to demonstrate and to the countryside to agitate for their cause. In their inexperience they often saw simplistic solutions to China's problems and demanded instant results. Thus to many students the call of their elders to stick to books and prepare to save the nation in the future sounded utterly irrelevant.

Sensing China's deep crisis they wanted to save her now and to many the path of national salvation lay in unifying all Chinese of whatever ideology and complexion to resist Japan. For this all important task many were willing to bow to KMT leadership if the KMT would work towards immediate unity and resistance, and if not, many were willing to transfer their allegiance to the CCP. Thus it was

by default that the largely spontaneous student movements of 1931-1932 and 1935-1936 came to be infiltrated by the CCP in their later stages. With their commitment to domestic pacification first and with Japan's quickening onslaught on Chinese unity, Chiang and the KMT had by 1935 practically worn out the reservoir of good will they had won as unifiers almost a decade earlier. In this context it is hardly surprising that many youths turned to the CCP after 1935 as the advocates of a united front against Japan.

In view of the fact that Chiang also wished to unify China and then to resist Japan, the failure of the KMT to mold a dynamic youth movement and to marshal the energy and patriotism of the young to its cause was especially a pity. Perhaps the failure was partly due to Chiang's personality; partly it was due to the predominantly conservative nature of the leaders of the KMT, Chiang included, which made them distrustful of youth and mass movements, even for patriotic purposes; and partly perhaps under the circumstances and with the multiplicity of problems confronting it on all sides the KMT could not have succeeded. In any case, even though with the outbreak of war in 1937 many youths rallied to the government's cause, for many it was too late. All in all this failure by the KMT to rally the best youths of the nation behind its quest for unification must be counted as another of the reasons for its ultimate failure.

Concluding Remarks and Assessment.

The KMT had ten years between its coming to power and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. What was its record on unification during this period? Some pessimists who had seen the parade of generals on and off the political stage since 1911 predicted that the rise of the KMT really only amounted to a change of flags and the installing of new men in the capital city. They predicted that China would continue to suffer under a largely ineffectual central government while provincial authorities continued to wield the real power as has become a well set pattern. These predictions as it turned out were wrong. They underestimated the growing nationalism of the Chinese and the widespread demand for the recreation of a strong unified central authority which could direct China's energies and end her international impotence. They also underestimated the KMT government, which despite the faults and selfishness of many of its leaders, differed from the warlord regimes of the previous era in that it had an ideology, a program and moreover military and political organization.

On the other hand there were those in the KMT who were flushed with victory and saw in the end of the Northern Expedition the dawning of a new era of national unity. But since 1911 too much of the old fabric of society had been shattered and a decade was perhaps too short a time to effect overwhelming changes. However, despite many missed opportunities, a greal deal was accomplished during this decade which in the light of the KMT's later failure, tends to be obscured. In the first place, the raising of KMT flags in the eighteen provinces of China proper in June, 1928, and in the Manchurian provinces in December, 1928, did not mean real unification. The KMT was but a coalition of generals who often had differing aims and ambitions. Under the circumstances, the bonds of professed ideology served as window dressing and little more. There

was a central government in Nanking under the more or less complete control of Chiang Kai-shek, but that government had little territorial, military or financial control over much of China. During this decade the dominant person in Chinese politics was Chiang Kai-shek. He owed his power to his army and a strong contingent of supporters within the central KMT.

Most articulate Chinese wished political stability and unity, for without these China could not make domestic reforms nor defend herself against foreign aggression. Chiang wished to unify China under his leadership and being a military man, he sought to do so primarily by military and authoritarian means. As Chiang tried to disarm and reduce his provincial rivals and bring their domains under central authority, fear of loss of power and jealousy of his personal rise propelled one general after another to rebel. This is a simplified but basically correct explanation for the intra-KMT civil wars and quarrels which characterized the Chinese scene between 1928-1937. Sometimes civilian KMT leaders also opposed to Chiang lent their support to the military rebellions. Here as always personality was a factor. But personality clashes and struggle for power were often deeply intertwined with genuine policy differences. For example, Hu Han-min was genuinely upset with Chiang's assumption of personal power as contrary to the true spirit of the party, he disagreed with Chiang over the provisional constitution during the tutelage period and later he sharply disapproved of Chiang's foreign policy. Likewise Wang Ching-wei took issue with Chiang over the division of power between the central and local authorities. Wang argued that Dr. Sun had opposed both undue centralization and decentralization and proposed instead the theory of equilibrium of power. Eventually, with the failure of his policy of imposing centralization by force, Chiang was compelled to come around to Wang's views on this issue. As the era drew to a

close there was a closing of differences between the different factions and elements of the KMT. This was achieved through pacification, compromises and the arrival at some working arrangements with the provincial generals.

Another element which disrupted unity was the CCP which proposed an alternate ideology and program and set up a rival government in the lower Yangtze region around Kiangsi and later in northern Shensi. The KMT's neglect of social reforms and waging of civil wars only supplied fuel to the Communist rebellion. Even in waging its extermination campaigns, the lack of unity within the KMT ranks contributed greatly to the survival of the Red Army. To Chiang the destruction of the Communists became an item of the highest priority before which he subordinated the problem of resistance to Japan. Perhaps he was right in insisting that there had to be internal unity before China could face the foreign foe. For without a strong unified government how could a nation effectively mobilize its resources and co-ordinate its efforts? But while Chiang was searching and fighting for this unity Japanese advances were detaching not just outlying territories but threatening the very existence of China itself. In 1931, Japan conquered Manchuria, then it was Jehol, east Hopei and eastern Inner Mongolia. By the end of 1935 the target had become the five provinces of north China.

Critics both within the KMT and outside began to complain that if there must be complete internal unity before China could resist Japan, soon there would be no China left. Since the Japanese threat to China's independence was unparalleled, Chiang's handling of the Japanese issue became the single most important complaint against him. Intellectuals and students were dissatisfied with the KMT and Chiang on many scores. Authoritarian government, censorship, thought control, party indoctrination and prolongation of tutelage were all grievances. But here again the most important point on which all other grievances came to be

focused was the Japanese issue. Student discontent over government's submission to Japan in north China boiled over and led to the December 9th student movement in 1935. Finally, disaffection with the government over its Japanese and Communist policies led to the Sian Incident when the mutinous Manchurian troops under Chang Hsueh-liang kidnapped Chiang in an attempt to force him to reverse his policy. The incident at one stage threatened to embroil China in renewed civil wars. But this was averted as important elements on all sides saw in Chiang the only leader who could unite all China against Japan. Thus on the eve of war and under the shadow of an unprecedented threat to her existence, a united front of all Chinese parties and groups was formed. But the price was war against Japan for which China was not prepared.

Thus it can be seen that there were many dimensions to the problem of unification in China between 1928-1937. Since the KMT was the ruling party and Chiang Kai-shek the dominant power within that party, unification first of all meant the unifying of factions within the party under a central apparatus and organizational machinery under Chiang. It also meant the unifying of the armies of different KMT generals under a centralized command, again under Chiang. Chiang's rationale, and a valid one, was that the ruling party must be unified if it were to have any hope of success in unifying the nation. Unification also meant the setting up of institutions of government at the local level and the establishment of a legal framework. Here the attempt was to utilize certain aspects of Sun's theories, as interpreted by his heirs in power, to provide the ideological framework for a unified China under KMT auspices. Spiritual or psychological unity was another ingredient required of a truly unified people and country. This the KMT tried to achieve by means of ideological indoctrination, propaganda and censorship, and China being a largely illiterate country,

the targets of these measures were the educated elite, the students and intellectuals. In addition, unification meant the elimination of domestic rivals for power, and in this case, it meant the ridding of the CCP rebellion. And finally, unification under Chinese auspices meant success in coping with foreign threats to the territorial integrity of the nation.

All the above were valid if not indispensable goals in a nation's quest for unification. But given China's fragmented state in 1928, was it realistic to pursue all of them? Further, were the techniques and methods employed the correct ones? I think here the KMT was in a bind. On the one hand any government that wished to maintain itself in effective power had to attempt unification in all its dimensions. But under the domestic and international circumstances of the time, contradictions developed over the various goals. Take one example. Could the KMT government confront both the CCP and Japanese threats at once, and if not, which ultimately posed the more lethal threat to unification under the KMT? Given the gargantuan task and difficulties inherent in it, and given the external factor which was outside Chinese control, I think the task of achieving unification between 1928-1937 was a well nigh impossible one.

Seen in the historical perspective, the attempt between 1928-1937 to reconstitute a powerful central government was but one in a continued quest since the end of the nineteenth century. Despite the passing of the dynasty, the imperial tradition of strong central government remained a powerful pull in Chinese politics and for the Chinese people. There was also a positive relationship between the amount of foreign pressure China was under and the demand for strong central government, for modern Chinese nationalism had its roots in humiliations and losses suffered under foreign aggression. And in modern times never had the sheer survival

of independent China been so threatened as during this period by Japan. Under the circumstances all China saw in unity the only chance for survival.

The problem was how to get unity, and given his background, training and supporters, was Chiang the one to do it? Perhaps not. Militarily, Chiang was right when he insisted on a national army under a centralized command, though this galled and frightened his rivals. But how could China hope to resist Japan unless she reformed the military machines of the warlord era? Ideologically, Chiang and the KMT sought to impose uniformity and discourage criticism. To them this was necessary, for the Chinese people needed guidance and discipline to lift them out of their state of demoralization and lethargy. Tradition justified this too as the Chinese culture had always backed the interest of the group above the freedom of the individual. As a nationalist Chiang drew from China's traditional philosophy and virtues as his source of inspiration. Thus in his New Life Movement he sought to revive the traditional philosophy. There was a certain logic in this. He needed to rouse the spirit of the people so that they would work for independence and unity. In arousing nationalism he had to give the people something that they could be proud of. So what could have been more logical than to revive for them virtues and qualities that had made China great in the past? But here as elsewhere Chiang was in a bind. Great as China's traditions were, their partial resurrection could not suffice to meet her present needs. Indeed for many they had become irrelevant. In the long run his views and the methods he used to attempt to impose them alienated more than he converted.

Was China more unified in 1937 than in 1928? Territorially the answer must be yes for those parts of the country not conquered by Japan. By 1937 the erstwhile rivals of Nanking and Chiang within the KMT as Yen Hsi-shan,

Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Tsung-jen and other lesser generals had been reduced to at least semi-obedience and provincial status. Except for pockets of guerrilla activity the CCP had been dislodged from the lower Yangtzee Valley and were now more or less quarantined in the remote northwest. In addition, in chasing the Communists to the northwest, Nanking had netted the bonus of bringing areas hitherto beyond its reach such as Szechwan, Yunnan, Shensi and Kansu to partial subordination and control. Expansion of communications, improvements and expansion of education and currency and financial reforms were also beginning to knit the country together. In foreign relations, the recovery of tariff autonomy and the rendition of some concessions contributed to greater Chinese control within her territory.

Was China more unified in spirit also? This is a much more difficult question to answer. In spite of and probably because of its insistance on ideological uniformity, the KMT was probably less respected by the intellectuals and students in 1937 than in 1928. These groups had become disillusioned with broken promises, with the sterility of many KMT doctrines and programs in view of China's overwhelming needs, and above all with the government's inability to deal effectively with the Japanese threat. And the Japanese threat became the focus of all of China's fears and striving for unity. On the one hand increasing Japanese threats provided the greatest impetus for unity in China. Conversely, given her ambitions a unified China was what Japan could not tolerate. Herein lay the vicious circle. The prospect of a united front in China propelled Japan to make her final move. This in turn compelled the Chinese to put aside differences and forge a united front for resistance. In the resulting war all the progress made in the past ten years towards unity was shattered.

Footnotes for Chapter I.

1. China Weekly Review, Vol. 47, no. 8, January 19, 1929, pp. 336-337.

2. Bureau of History, MND ed., Chung-jih chan-cheng shih lioh (CJCCSL), Vol. I, pp. 5-6.

3. Officially the sizes of the armies were as follows: The First Group Army, over 500,000 men; the Second Group Army, over 420,000 men; the Third Group Army, over 300,000 men; Fourth Group Army, over 300,000 men; Eighth Army of Li Chi-shen, over 200,000 men (allied to the Fourth Group Army); Yunnan Army, six divisions and frontier corps, no figures; Kweichow, over 1800,000 men; Szechwan, over 180,000 men; Manchurian Army, eight armies and other units, number unspecified. These figures were derived from Bureau of History, MND ed., Kuo-min ke-min-chun chan shih ch'u-kao (KMKMCCSCK), Vol. II, part 1, p. 7.

4. Peking was renamed Peiping on June 28, 1928, by order of the C.P.C. Government Gazette (GG), Vol. 29, no. 71, p. 5.

5. Chang Hsin Hai, Chiang Kai-shek Asia's Man of Destiny, p. 199.

6. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 312.

7. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 2. The Central Executive and Supervisory Committees constituted the supreme ruling body of the KMT. As the combined group was rather large, a standing committee was then selected from members of both committees to run the day to day business. Whenever important issues arose, plenary sessions were called, when all members of both committees met.

8. According to the National Economic Conference, China's eighty-four armies and independent divisions needed an annual budget of 642 million yuan. Of this sum only 360 million was disbursed by the national treasury, the rest were derived from local taxes. (Woodhead, H. G. W., ed., China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 629.)

9. GG, Vol. 29, no. 82, pp. 7-10.

10. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, p. 3.

11. For example, Feng Yu-hsiang was made Minister of Interior.

12. GG, Vol. 31, no. 14, November 9, 1928, p. 1.

13. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 4.

14. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 5.

15. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 5.

16. Feng Yu-hsiang, Wo so jen-shih ti Chiang Chieh-shih (WSJSTCCS), p. 10.

17. Feng Yu-hsiang, WSJSTCCS, p. 12.

18. Chang Kuo-ping, Pai Ch'ung-hsi chiang-chun chuan (PCHCCC), p. 37.

19. Feng Yu-hsiang, WSJSTCCS, pp. 12, 15.

20. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1203.

21. GG, Vol. 33, no. 144, April 19, 1929, pp. 9-10.

22. GG, Vol. 33, no. 135, April 9, 1929, p. 1.

23. Feng Yu-hsiang, WSJSTCCS, p. 16.

24. Feng Yu-hsiang, WSJSTCCS, p. 11.

25. Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord, the Career of Feng Yu-hsiang, pp. 248-249.

26. Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord, p. 254.

27. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1207.

28. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1207.

29. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 736.

30. Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord, p. 261.

31. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1212.

32. China Year Book, 1929-1930, pp. 1212-1213.

33. China Year Book, 1931, pp. 549-550.

34. GG, Vol. 34, no. 211, July 8, 1929, p. 1.

35. GG, Vol. 34, no. 211, July 8, 1929, p. 1.

36. China Weekly Review, Vol. 49, no. 7, July 13, 1929, p. 287.

37. Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord, p. 262.

38. China Weekly Review, Vol. 49, no. 7, July 13, 1929, p. 287.

39. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMTMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, pp. 77-80.

40. China Year Book, 1931, p. 566.

41. Gillin, Donald G., Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949, p. 272.

42. Chahar kang jih t'ung-meng-chun szu chou nien chi nien ts'e (CKJTMCSCNCNT), pp. 16-17.

43. Sheridan, James, Chinese Warlord, p. 271.

44. Feng Yu-hsiang, "Thoughts on the Occasion", CKJTMCSCNCNT, p. 1.

45. CKJTMCSCNCNT, pp. 19-23.

46. CKJTMCSCNCNT, p. 24.

47. CKJTMCSCNCNT, p. 25.

48. CKJTMCSCNCNT, pp. 26-28.

49. CKJTMCSCNCNT, pp. 29-35.

50. No author, Chahar kang jih chi shih (CKJCS), p. 8.

51. China Weekly Review, Vol. 65, no. 8, July 22, 1933, p. 306.

52. China Year Book, 1934, p. 368.

53. CKJCS, pp. 8-9.

54. GG, Vol. 76, no. 2228, December 15, 1936, pp. 12-13; Feng Yu-hsiang, WSJSTCCS, pp. 48-49.

55. Feng Yu-hsiang, Feng tsai Nanking pao kao chi, pp. 1, 17, 65-66.

56. China Year Book, 1931, p. 551.

57. Gillin, Donald, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan, p. 112.

58. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, p. 47.

59. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, pp. 46-54. (The Chiang-Yen exchange took place between February 10-28, 1930.)

60. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, pp. 63-64.

61. GG, Vol. 39, no. 437, April 7, 1930, p. 1.

62. For details of campaigns, see Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 3, pp. 561-1212.

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64. China Year Book, 1931, p. 561.

65. Selle, E. A., Donald of China, pp. 262-264.

66. Gillin, Donald, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 114-115.

67. China Year Book, 1931, p. 565.

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70. GG, Vol. 42, no. 595, October 10, 1930, pp. 7-8.

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72. Gillin, Donald, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 119-122.

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74. Gillin, Donald, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 113-115.

75. Liang Sheng-chun, Chiang-Li tou-cheng nei-mu, p. 130.

76. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, p. 13.

77. GG, Vol. 33, no. 125, March 26, 1929, p. 1.

78. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 2, p. 13.

79. GG, Vol. 33, no. 126, March 27, 1929, p. 1.

80. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, pp. 68-69.

81. GG, Vol. 34, no. 174, May 29, 1929, p. 1.

82. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 70.

83. Chang Kuo-ping, PCHCCC, pp. 40-41.

84. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, pp. 96-99.

85. Bureau of History, MND ed., KMKMCCSCK, Vol. II, part 1, p. 102.

86. China Year Book, 1931-1932, p. 528.

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89. Chung-kuo Kuomintang shih tzu-liao hui-chi (CKKSTLHC), Vol. 2, part 6, (Liangkwang anti-Chiang period), telegram by the Kwangtung Provincial Kuomintang supporting resolution of the Fourth C.E.C. impeaching Chiang Kai-shek.

90. Kao Yin-tsu ed., Chung-hua min-kuo ta-shih-chi (CHMKTSC), p. 253.

91. Chinese Affairs, no. 132-133, June 15, 1931, pp. 268-274.

92. Kao Yin-chu ed., CHMKTSC, p. 357; GG, Vol. 46, no. 882, September 20, 1931, p. 1.

93. Chinese Affairs, no. 148-149, October 15, 1931, p. 509 and no. 150-151, October 31, 1931, p. 554; China Year Book, 1931-1932, p. 545.

94. CKKSTLHC, Vol. 3, no. 9, (Fukien People's Government), quoted from Hong Kong Chung-hsing pao, November 21, 1933.

95. China Weekly Review, Vol. 67, no. 10, February 3, 1934, p. 378.

96. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 15, January 15, 1934, p. 231.

97. Chinese Weekly Review, Vol. 67, no. 10, February 3, 1934, p. 378.

98. Chang Kuo-ping, PCHCCC, p. 65.

99. Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi et al., Kwangsi chih chien-she, see entire work.

100. China Year Book, 1936, p. 172.

101. Kao Yin-chu ed., CHMKTSC, p. 421.

102. China Year Book, 1936, p. 173.

103. GG, Vol. 73, no. 2100, July 15, 1936, p. 26.

104. Chang Kuo-ping, PCHCCC, p. 67.

105. Chang Kuo-ping, PCHCCC, pp. 67-70.

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107. GG, Vol. 64, no. 831, July 25, 1931, p. 1.

108. Wang Cho-jan, Chang Hsueh-liang tao-ti shih ko tsen yang jen, p. 11.

109. China Weekly Review, Vol. 57, no. 10, August 8, 1931, p. 375.

110. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 9-10, August 15, 1932, pp. 90-92; China Year Book, 1934, p. 352; GG, Vol. 89, Loyang no. 17, August 20, 1932, pp. 43, 54.

111. China Year Book, 1934, p. 353.

112. China Weekly Review, Vol. 62, no. 2, March 11, 1933, pp. 48, 49-50; Bureau of History, MND ed., Chung-jih chan-cheng shih lioh (CJCCSL), Vol. II, p. 155.

113. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 37-38, March 15, 1933, pp. 47-471; Wang Cho-jan, Chang Hsueh-liang tao-ti shih ko tsen yang jen, pp. 12-13.

114. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 156.

115. Chang Hsueh-liang, "Sian shih pien ch'an hui lu che yao" (SSPCHLCY), Hsi Wang, no. 1, July 1, 1964, p. 12.

116. Snow Edgar, Red Star Over China, p. 397.

117. Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, pp. 12-16.

118. Young, C. Kuangson, "Sian Mutiny Reviewed", China Quarterly, Vol. 2, no. 2, Spring, 1937, p. 223.

119. GG, Vol. 32, no. 85, February 6, 1929, pp. 9-10.

120. China Weekly Review, Vol. 47, no. 4, December 22, 1928, p. 172.

121. China Year Book, 1929-1930, pp. 1199-1200.

122. For fuller exposition, see Chapter IV.

123. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1202.

124. As Ch'en Kung-po explained, all members of the Reorganizationists were leftists but not all leftists were Reorganizationists. He further explained that it was necessary to have periodic reorganizations of the party in order to bring it up-to-date as in 1924. Ch'en Kung-po, "The so-called Left Wing", The Chinese National Revolution, Essays and Documents, pp. 91-92.

125. Wang Ching-wei, "The Twin Enemies of the National Revolution" and "Struggle for Democracy", The Chinese National Revolution, pp. 21-27.

126. Wang Ching-wei, "Democracy and the National Celebrities: A Retrospect", The Chinese National Revolution, p. 52.

127. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1203.

128. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1206.

129. Wang Ching-wei et al., The Chinese National Revolution, part II, Documents, pp. 101-102.

130. Wang Ching-wei et al., The Chinese National Revolution, pp. 103, 105-106, 108.

131. Liaoning tung-san-sheng min pao she ed., Chung-hua min-kuo shih-chiu nien nei wai ta shih chi (CHMKSCNNWTSC), pp. 33-34.

132. Wang Ching-wei et al., The Chinese National Revolution, p. 137.

133. Extraordinary Session of the KMT C.E.C. (Canton), Fu-hsing chung-kuo Kuomintang, p. 3.

134. China Year Book, 1930, p. 564.

135. Wang Ching-wei, Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsui-chin yen lun chi (WCWHSTCYLC), p. 237.

136. GG, Vols. 43 and 44, January 1, 1931 - May 2, 1931. Much space in these two volumes were devoted to provisions for the Convention.

137. GG, Vol. 44, no. 756, April 25, 1931, p. 1; China Year Book, 1931-1932, p. 528.

138. GG, Vol. 45, no. 786, June 1, 1931, pp. 12-13.

139. China Year Book, 1934, p. 348; GG, Vol. 48, Loyang no. 2, March 15, 1932, p. 12 and Loyang no. 3, March 21, 1932, p. 69.

140. China Year Book, 1934, p. 351; Chinese Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 11-12, September 1, 1932, p. 113 and Vol. 4, no. 9-10, August 15, 1932, p. 87.

141. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 9-10, August 15, 1932, pp. 87-89.

142. China Weekly Review, Vol. 61, no. 12, August 20, 1932, p. 425 and Vol. 61, no. 14, August 27, 1932, p. 548.

143. China Year Book, 1934, p. 353.

144. China Weekly Review, Vol. 74, no. 1, September 7, 1935, p. 26.

145. Hsu T'ien-i, "Wang Ching-wei chih tz'u-chih yu fu-chih" (the resignations and re-instatements of Wang Ching-wei), San-min chu-i yuen k'an, Vol. 6, no. 3, September 15, 1935, pp. 11-14.

146. Kao Yin-chu ed., CHMKTSC, pp. 407-408.

147. Wang Ching-wei, Wang Ching-wei hsien-sheng tsui-chin yen lun chi (WCWHSTCYLC), 1932-1937, Vol. 1, pp. 335-336.

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149. China Year Book, 1934, p. 383.

150. China Year Book, 1934, p. 386.

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152. China Year Book, 1935, pp. 102-103.

153. Wang Ching-wei, WCWHSTCYLC, 1932-1937, Vol. 1, p. 198.

154. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 31-32, January 31, 1933, pp. 402-403.

155. GG, Vol. 48, Loyang no. 1, February 29, 1932, pp. 6-7.

156. China Year Book, 1934, pp. 363-364.

157. Wang Ching-wei, a draft statement he made to the press on Japanese policy written in his own hand, no date, preserved in the Historical Academy Archives, Taipei, Taiwan, pp. 5-6 (statement totalled nine pages).

158. China Year Book, 1931-1932, p. 528.

159. Hu Han-min, "Shih-mo shih wo-men ti sheng-lu?" (Which is our road to salvation?), San-min chu-i yueh k'an, Vol. 1, no. 3, March 15, 1933, p. 4.

160. Chinese Affairs, no. 120-121, March, 1931, p. 78.

161. China Critic, Vol. 6, no. 52, December 28, 1933, p. 1261.

162. Hu Han-min, "Chun-ch'ih tang-ch'ih yu t'ung-chih tui chung-kuo cheng-chih ying yu ti tsu chio" (Military rule, party rule and what comrades should realize about Chinese politics), San-min chu-i yueh k'an, Vol. 5, no. 2, February 15, 1933, pp. 11-15.

163. Hu Han-min, "Chun-ch'ih tang-ch'ih yu t'ung-chih tui chung-kuo cheng-chih ying yu ti tsu chio", pp. 11-12.

164. CKKSTLHC, Vol. 2, part 5, no page.

165. Hu Han-min, "Shih-mo shih wo-men ti sheng-lu", San-min chu-i yueh k'an, Vol. 1, no. 3, p. 19.

166. Chinese Affairs, Vol. 5, no. 13, December 15, 1933, p. 200.

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168. China Year Book, 1936, pp. 170-171.

169. Kung, H. H., Kung Yung-chih hsien-sheng yen chiang chi, Vol. 2., Sian shih pien hui-i lu (Reminiscences of the Sian Incident), pp. 161-162.

Footnotes for Chapter II.

1. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 259.

2. GG, no. 9, Nanking, July 21, 1937, pp. 85-86.

3. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Revolutionary Policy of China, p. 138.

4. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 19, pp. 1251-1255.

5. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 19, pp. 1256-1260 and 1273-1280.

6. GG, Vol. 28, no. 55, May, 1928, p. 32.

7. Chung-hua min-kuo shih-ch'i nien kuo-min cheng-fu wei wu-san ts'an-an T'an chu hsi chih kuo-chi lien-men-hui tien (Telegram of May 5, 17th year of the Republic to the League of Nations by Chairman T'an on behalf of the National Government on the May 3 Incident), Document no. 200, foreign affairs, negotiations sub-division no. 02.2; and GG, Vol. 28, no. 57, May, pp. 25-26.

8. Kiangsu sheng tang-pu chih-tao-wei-yuan-hui hsuan-ch'uan pu (Kiangsu Provincial KMT Guidance Commission Propaganda Division) ed., "Wu-san" hsueh chi (The Blood stains of May 3), 1928, pp. 28-90.

9. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Revolutionary Policy of China, p. 138.

10. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen-chiu hui ed., Chung-jih wai-chiao shih liao hui pien (CJWCSLHP), Vol. I, pp. 244-248.

11. GG, Vol. 33, no. 151, April 28, 1929, p. 1.

12. GG, Vol. 33, no. 156, May 4, 1929, p. 1, and GG, Vol. 33, no. 157, May 5, 1929, p. 1.

13. GG, Vol. 34, no. 172, May 23, 1929, p. 13.

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15. Liang Ching-hsiang, Chiu-i-pa shih-pien shih shu (CIPSPSS), p. 221.

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17. China Critic, Vol. 1, no. 7, July 12, 1928, p. 135.

18. Selle, E. A., Donald of China, pp. 257-260.

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20. Liang Ching-hsiang, CIPSPSS, p. 223.

21. Liang Ching-hsiang, CIPSPSS, p. 224.

22. Liang Ching-hsiang, CIPSPSS, p. 227.

23. GG, Vol. 32, no. 59, January 7, 1929, p. 1.

24. Lo Chia-lun ed., KMWS, Vol. 32, pp. 233-251.

25. Jen Cho-jan, Chang Hsueh-liang tao ti shih ko tseng yang jen (CHLTTSKTYJ), p. 9. The author was an old associate of Chang and had been acting-chancellor of Tungpei University.

26. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Revolutionary Policy of China, pp. 71-72.

27. China Weekly Review, Vol. 55, no. 11, February 14, 1931, pp. 381-382.

28. China Weekly Review, Vol. 56, no. 3, March 21, 1931, p. 96.

29. China Weekly Review, Vol. 54, no. 18, November 22, 1930, p. 421.

30. China Weekly Review, Vol. 55, no. 11, February 14, 1931, p. 381.

31. Koo, V. K. Wellington, Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission, Vol. I, 1932, pp. 221-243.

32. Koo, V. K. Wellington, Memoranda, Vol. I, p. 43.

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36. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny, pp. 63-64.

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39. Selle, E. A., Donald of China, p. 267.

40. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny, p. 66.

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42. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 362.

43. Smith, Sara R., The Manchurian Crisis 1931-1932, p. 22.

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45. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 35, pp. 7856-7861.

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48. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 35, pp. 7871-7872.

49. Record of the 3rd Meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission, held on October 2, 1931, between 7-10 a.m.

50. Record of the 16th Meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission, held on October 17, 1931.

51. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWS, Vol. 35, pp. 7893-7895.

52. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWS, Vol. 35, pp. 7903-7906.

53. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWS, Vol. 35, pp. 7917-7918. Transcribed here were the minutes of the November 20 meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission.

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56. Record of the 59th Meeting of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission held on December 8, 1931.

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58. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 364.

59. Ch'en T'ien-hsi, ed., Tai Chi-tao hsien-sheng wen-ts'un, pp. 373-375.

60. Hu Han-min, "Shih-mo shih wo-men ti sheng lu" (which is our road to salvation), San-min chu-i yueh-k'an, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1-9.

61. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 35, pp. 7918-7920. Chiang Kai-shek made a speech to supplement the report of the Special Foreign Affairs Commission in which he dealt with the subject of Japanese intentions.

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63. GG, Vol. 48, no. 985, January 25, 1932, pp. 7-8.

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66. KNHICL, pp. 284-285.

67. KNHICL, pp. 28-29.

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70. Remer, C. F., A Study of Chinese Boycotts, p. 166.

71. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny, pp. 75-76.

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73. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 36, pp. 8088-8089.

74. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 36, pp. 8089-8090. (Based on transcript of report of Garrison Commander of Shanghai General Tai Chi.)

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76. Ts'ai Ting-kai, TTKTC, Vol. 1, pp. 334-335.

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78. Chu Pe-k'ang and Hua Chen-chung, Shih-chiu lu chun k'ang-jih hsueh chan shih liao (SCLCKJHCSL), p. 98.

79. GG, Vol. 48, no. 1, Loyang, January 29, 1932, p. 7.

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81. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 365.

82. Ts'ai Ting-kai, TTKTC, Vol. 1, p. 346.

83. Sung-hu k'ang-jih chan-i ti-wu-chun chan-tou yao pao, (Important report of the 5th Army's participation in the Shanghai anti-Japanese campaign), pp. 1-3. It was compiled as a secret report to the Ministry of Defense, pp. 664 and maps.

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86. Chu Pe-k'ang and Hua Chen-chung, SCLCKJHCSL, p. 273.

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92. Ts'ai Ting-kai, TTKTC, Vol. 1, pp. 360-361.

93. Fu Ch'i-hsueh, Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih, pp. 428-429.

94. Lo Chia-lun, KMWH, Vol. 36, pp. 8366-8369.

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96. GG, Vol. 48, no. 2, Loyang, March 15, 1932, p. 1.

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109. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 154.

110. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 154.

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113. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 155.

114. Yu Yu-shih, Kupeikou hui-i, pp. 28,83.

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116. GG, Vol. 53, no. 1123, May 6, 1933, p. 6.

117. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 155.

118. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 38, p. 8899.

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120. Lo Chia-lun, ed., KMWH, Vol. 38, pp. 8998-9010.

121. CKJTMCSCNCNT, pp. 1-2.

122. CKJTMCSCNCNT, pp. 29-35.

123. China Weekly Review, Vol. 65, no. 7, July 15, 1933, p. 266.

124. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 384.

125. Wang Chao-ming kuan-yu tui jih wai-chiao kung-k'ai yu chi-che t'an hua kao. This is a document written in Wang's own hand, some time in January, 1936, though no actual date is given. Specifically he was answering an article by Hu Shih demanding open diplomacy.

126. Bisson, T. A., Japan in China, p. 52.

127. Liu Pe-min, Chung-jih kuan-hsi t'iao-yueh hui shih, pp. 997-1003.

128. Fu Ch'i-hsueh, Chung-kuo wai chiao shih, pp. 458-459.

129. Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Tsung t'ung chi (CTTC), Vol. 2, pp. 2057-2069.

130. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 2, pp. 2066-2068.

131. Chou Kai-ch'ing, K'ang-chan i-ch'ien chih chung-jih kuan-hsi (KCICCCJKH), p. 161.

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133. GG, Vol. 62, no. 78, October 31, 1934, p. 4.

134. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan's Destiny, pp. 118-119.

135. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen-chiu hui ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 3, p. 257.

136. GG, Vol. 66, no. 1764, June 11, 1935, p. 1.

137. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 156.

138. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan's Destiny, p. 120.

139. Wang Chao-ming kuan-yu tui jih wai-chiao kung-k'ai yu chi che t'an hua kao, p. 9.

140. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 156.

141. Information Bulletin, Vol. III, no. 8, March 21, 1937, p. 159.

142. GG, Vol. 66, no. 1906, November 27, 1935, p. 19.

143. GG, Vol. 66, no. 1906, November 27, 1935, pp. 19-20.

144. Chou Kai-ch'ing, KCICCCJKH, pp. 115-116.

145. Bisson, T.A., Japan in China, p. 64.

146. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, pp. 386-387.

147. Chou Kai-ch'ing, KCICCCJKH, pp. 136-137.

148. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 400.

149. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen-chiu hui ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 3, pp. 245-254. The full exchange of telegrams between Wang Ching-wei, Ho Ying-ch'in and Sung Cheh-yuan are reproduced here.

150. Ch'in te-shun, Hai shih t'an wang (HSTW), p. 63.

151. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 64.

152. Chou Kai-ch'ing, KCICCCJKH, pp. 138-140.

153. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 157.

154. Chou Kai-ch'ing, KCICCCJKH, p. 142.

155. Shigemitsu, M., Japan and Her Destiny, p. 121.

156. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 66.

157. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, pp. 66-67.

158. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen-chiu hui ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 4, pp. 17-18.

159. Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang tsung t'ung chi, Vol. I, p. 921.

160. Information Bulletin, Vol. 1, no. 7, July 11, 1936, pp. 6-7.

161. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen chiu hui, ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 4, pp. 27-29.

162. Information Bulletin, Vol. 1, no. 7, July 11, 1936, pp. 14-15.

163. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. I, p. 952.

164. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. I, p. 952.

165. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. I, pp. 951-952.

166. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen chiu hui, ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 4, pp. 265-266. Extracted from telegram from General Ho Kuo-k'uan, Chief of Staff of Generalissimo's Headquarters in Szechwan, to Minister of War Ho Ying-ch'in on August 25, 1936.

167. Chung-hua min-kuo wai-chiao wen-t'i yen chiu hui, ed., CJWCSLHP, Vol. 4, p. 2.

168. China Year Book, 1938, p. 533.

169. Liu Chien-chun, "wo yu Sung chiang -chun t'i chi tz'u lai wang", (The several exchanges that I had with General Sung), Ch'uan chi wen hsueh, Vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 31-32. Liu was sent by Chiang Kai-shek on a number of occasions to deal with Sung Cheh-yuan.

170. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 86.

171. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 86.

172. Li Keng, "Fang Chi Hsin-wen chiang chun", (an interview with General Chi Hsin-wen), Central Daily News, July 7, 1950, Taipei.

173. Ch'in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 88.

174. Ch-in Te-shun, HSTW, p. 88.

175. Wang Chao-ming tsai Lushan shu-ch'i hsun-lien-t'uan chiang tsui-hou kuan-t'ou, p. 1.

176. Wang Chao-ming tsai Lushan shu-ch'i hsun-lien-t'uan chiang tsui-hou kuan-t'ou, p. 8.

177. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 1, pp. 962-963.

178. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 2, p. 2060.

Footnotes for Chapter III.

1. GG, no. 67, June 17, 1928, pp. 1-3.

2. Wang Chien-min, Chung-kuo kung-ch'an-tang shih kao, (CKKCTSK), Vol. 2, p. 179.

3. Kapp, Robert A., Szechwan Provincial Militarism and Central Power in Republican China, pp. 251, 254.

4. Bureau of History, MND ed., Chiao-fei chan shih (CFCS), Vol. I, p. 80.

5. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 184-185.

6. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 80.

7. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 10; Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 185.

8. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 185-186.

9. China Year Book, 1938, p. 471.

10. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 152-154; Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 328.

11. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Articles in Chinese Press, new series, no. 4, September 10, 1930, pp. 1-2 (From Ta Kung Pao, July 31, 1930); Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 15.

12. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 15; China Critic, Vol. 3, no. 35, August 28, 1930, p. 828.

13. China Critic. Vol. 3, no. 34, August 21, 1930, p. 793.

14. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, pp. 16-17.

15. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 93.

16. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, pp. 93-94; Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 200.

17. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 17; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 94.

18. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, p. 166.

19. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 18 (Taken from Ta Kung Pao, January 17, 1931).

20. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, pp. 94-95.

21. China Year Book, 1929-1930, p. 1210. Chiang admitted as much in a telegram to Feng Yü-hsiang quoted here. The term "miscellaneous units" referred to military units taken over by Chiang in the course of intra KMT civil wars. Upon their surrender they were generally marched from their home ground and re-deployed, but under their original officers. They were as a rule much inferior to the central troops. Many of these were used alongside the central troops in the anti-Communist campaigns. It was widely known and accepted that the "miscellaneous units" received inferior treatment compared with and were watched by the central units. There is no hard evidence that Chiang used them as first-line troops in order to eliminate them, but then why not?

22. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 570-571; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, pp. 113-116.

23. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 24. (Quote originally came from an article entitled "Communist Menace in China" by Yang Chien, published on July 20, 1931, in Central China Post.)

24. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 571-573. The exact number of government units participating varied from source to source. The Ministry of Defense account stated that over twenty divisions of government troops were deployed for this campaign. (Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 145.)

25. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. 1, p. 117.

26. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 575.

27. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 574-575; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, pp. 139-144.

28. GG, Vol. 45, no. 786, June 1, 1931, pp. 12-14.

29. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China pp. 41-42.

30. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 145 and Charts 11 and 12 of part 2 of Chapter 3.

31. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 580.

32. A statement by Kao Shu-hsün (a former Feng Yü-hsiang officer who defected to Chiang in 1929) told of Chiang giving varying sums of money to some officers. He added that once his units reached the front they had their money and food allocations cut in half and even then had to give thirty per cent of the promised amount as kick back to Ho Ying-ch'in on pain of having the total sum withheld. But central units also participating in the compaign continued to receive full pay and supplies and moreover these constantly maintained surveillance over his units. Kao continued that eventually morale among his troops became so bad that they defected en masse to the Communists while he escaped. (CKKSTLHC, Vol. 2, part 7, no page)

33. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 42.

34. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 580; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, Ch. III, part II, Tables 10 and 12.

35. Chinese Affairs, no. 138-9, July 31, 1931, p. 390.

36. Chinese Affairs, no. 138-9, July 31, 1931, p. 391.

37. GG, Vol. 46, no. 846, August 12, 1931, p. 1.

38. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 53.

39. Clubb, O. E., Communism in China, p. 53; Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 579.

40. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, pp. 160-161.

41. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. I, p. 163; Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 852.

42. Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japan and Her Destiny, p. 165.

43. Lushan hsun-lien shih chih (LSHLSC), Vol. 2, part 2, Ch'en tuan ch'ang chiang yen lu (Speeches of Commandant Ch'en), p. 481 (speech made on August 21, 1933).

44. Tong, Hollington K., Chiang Kai-shek, Vol. 2, pp. 520-521.

45. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. II, Ch. 4, Part 2, chart 16.

46. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, p. 176.

47. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. II, Ch. 4, Part 1, chart 15.

48. Tong, Hollington H., Chiang Kai-shek, Vol. 2, p. 521.

49. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, pp. 377-378.

50. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. II, p. 155.

51. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 591-592; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. II, pp. 245-250.

52. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. II, p. 251.

53. LSHLSC, Vol. 1, p. 1.

54. LSHLSC, Vol. 1, pp. 3-12.

55. LSHLSC, Vol. 1, pp. 73-75.

56. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 1, pp. 184-193. (In these pages is reprinted one of the handbooks in its entirety.)

57. LSSLSC, Vol. 2, part 1, pp. 276-277.

58. LSSLSC, Vol. 2, part 1, p. 277.

59. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. II, pp. 257-262.

60. Tong, Hollington K., Chiang Kai-shek, Vol. 2, p. 524.

61. Chün-shih wei-yuan-hui wei-yüan-ch'ang hsing-ying cheng-ch'ih kung-tso pao-kao (CWWHCKP), pp. 17-18.

62. Young, C. W. H. (pseud), New Life for Kiangsi, p. 29; Chen, Jerome, Mao, p. 179. This group was sometimes referred to as Chiang's OGPU.

63. CWWHCKP, pp. 2-14.

64. CWWHCKP, pp. 43-57.

65. Young, C. W. H., New Life for Kiangsi, pp. 9-15.

66. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 600-601.

67. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 632.

68. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 624-625. Since March, 1934, Ch'en Cheng had predicted and warned that the CCP would attempt to break out from the western sector and had made several suggestions at strategy meetings aimed at foiling this. They had not been acted upon.

69. GG, Vol. 64, no. 1601, November 28, 1934, p. 1. In a follow-up it was reported to the government that by the end of January, 1935, the Generalissimo's Headquarters at Nanchang had been totally dismantled. (GG, Vol. 64, no. 1667, February 16, 1935, p. 6.)

70. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 632, 636 and map facing p. 632.

71. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 636.

72. Chung Hsing Pao, Hu-tang lun-wen hsüan-chi, 1934-1935 (HTLWHC), pp. 94-95.

73. Chung Hsing Pao, HTLWHC 1934-1935, p. 95.

74. Chang Kuo-p'ing, PCHCCC, pp. 62-63.

75. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. V, p. 972.

76. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 641; Tong, Hollington, Chiang Kai-shek, Vol. 2, p. 537.

77. Wang Chine-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 644.

78. CWWHCKP, Appendix, pp. 115-116, 119.

79. CWWHCKP, Appendix, pp. 116-118.

80. CWWHCKP, Appendix, pp. 119-120.

81. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 1, pp. 895-917.

82. CWWHCKP, Appendix, pp. 120-121.

83. CWWHCKP, Appendix, p. 121; Kapp, Robert A., Szechwan Provincial Militarism, p. 281.

84. Chiang Kai-shek, CTTC, Vol. 1, p. 876.

85. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, pp. 408-409.

86. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 641-645 and chart facing p. 642.

87. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, p. 191. The author suggests that this crossing was made possible because of Lung Yun's troops did not stop it and this was due to Lung's equivocal attitude towards the CCP.

88. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 646-648.

89. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 650-656.

90. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, p. 657 and chart facing 658; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, pp. 977-978.

91. Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China, p. 205.

92. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. V., pp. 978-980.

93. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. V, pp. 981, 983.

94. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 53-54.

95. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, pp. 984-986; Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 2, pp. 659-660.

96. Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, p. 13.

97. Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, pp. 13-14.

98. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 423.

99. Yu Chün, "Sian shih pien i lai ts'ung wei kung k'ai kuo ti chen shih" (Important historical facts never before revealed since the Sian Incident), Chun Chiu, September 1, 1959, p. 3. The account was based on the oral statement by General Tang Chun-yao.

100. Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, p. 203. According to official KMT accounts Manchurian units under General Wang I-che captured Wayaopao on June 23 and sent the Reds in flight westward. This was considered an important victory similar in impact to the capture of Juichin in Kiangsi. (Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, p. 994.)

101. Kuo Tseng-k'ai, Sian shih pien san i (SSPSI), Part II, I ko wen-t'i ti chiao tai (Clarifying a Problem), p. 50.

102. Kuo Tseng-k'ai, SSPSI, p. 51; Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, p. 426; Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, p. 14.

103. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 16-17.

104. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 12-16. Wang cites eleven documents now available in Taiwan dating between March 30, 1932 to April 23, 1934. These were first published as CCP and Red Army directives; they all denounced Japanese and all imperialisms and called for the overthrow of the KMT and defense of the soviets. (p. 18).

105. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 31-32.

106. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 24-25.

107. Brandt, C. et al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, pp. 227-229.

108. Li Dun J., ed., The Road to Communism China Since 1912, p. 152. The proclamation first appeared in Struggle (Tou-cheng), no. 71, April 23, 1934.

109. Li Dun J., ed., The Road to Communism, p. 154.

110. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 42-45.

111. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 49-53.

112. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 53-54.

113. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 55-56.

114. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 56-62.

115. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, p. 65.

116. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, p. 65.

117. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 83-84; Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China, pp. 72-73; Van Slyke, L. P., Friends and Enemies, p. 61.

118. According to Kao Tseng-k'ai Chang Hsueh-liang called a staff conference on December 12 during which he gave a three point order as follows: 1. Support Chiang against Japan. 2. Alert on the Communist front and retaliate if the Red Army attacks. 3. Officers to see that Red propaganda does not disrupt troops. Kuo took these directives to mean that Chang had no understanding with the CCP on the kidnapping. (Kuo Tseng-k'ai, SSPSI, p. 103.)

119. Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, p. 14.

120. According to Chang's personal pilot who undertook these missions: "We made several trips to Fuschi in this manner. Each time we took presents, guns, bullets, food and other articles, and each time we brought back more of the bearded Communist leaders with their bodyguards." (Leonard, Royal, I Flew for China, 1942, p. 99.)

121. Chang Hsueh-liang, SSPCHLCY, p. 15.

122. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 101-102.

123. Selle, Earl A., Donald of China, pp. 333-334.

124. K'ang jih ti ti pa-lu-chun, p. 7.

125. Kuo Tseng-k'ai, SSPSI, pp. 86-92.

126. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 102-103.

127. Sian shih-pien hou Chiang wei-yüan-chang hsiang san-chiai wu chung ch'uan hui ch'ing tz'u pen chien kuo chih an.

128. Sian shih-pien hou Chiang wei-yüan-chang hsiang san-chiai wu chung ch'uan hui ch'ing tz'u pen chien kuo chih an.

129. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, p. 140; The China Year Book, 1938, p. 532.

130. Bureau of History, MND, ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, pp. 1025-1026.

131. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, pp. 105-106.

132. Wang Chien-min, CKKCTSK, Vol. 3, p. 113; Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, p. 1027.

133. Brandt, C. et al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, pp. 242-245.

134. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, p. 1028; Ch'en, Jerome, Mao, p. 227.

135. Kao Yin-chu, ed., CHMKTSC, pp. 435-437.

136. Brandt, C. et al., A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, p. 264.

137. Bureau of History, MND ed., CFCS, Vol. VI, pp. 1029-1030.

Footnotes for Chapter IV.

1. Chiang Kai-shek, "Chin-jih ching-nien ti ti-wei chi chi chien-tu" (The youth of today, their position and future--speech of July 10, 1929), Chiang tsung-shih-ling yen lun chi, Vol. 1, p. 56.

2. Lo Chia-lun, Ke-ming wen-hsien, Vol. 22, 1960, pp. 4341-4343.

3. Lo Chia-lun, KMWH, p. 4343.

4. Lo Chia-lun, KMWH, p. 4344.

5. Chiang Tso-pin, "Local Self-Government in China", Twenty-Five Years of the Chinese Republic (Twenty-Five Years), pp. 124-125.

6. Chiang Tso-pin, Twenty-Five Years, pp. 126-127.

7. Lo Chia-lun, KMWH, p. 4381.

8. Chiang Tso-pin, Twenty-Five Years, p. 122.

9. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, Vol. I, pp. 20-21.

10. Lo Chia Lun, KMWH, Vol. 28, pp. 6104-6105.

11. Bureau of History, MND ed., CJCCSL, pp. 21-22.

12. Chiang Tso-pin, Twenty-Five Years, p. 131.

13. Chiang Tso-pin, Twenty-Five Years, p. 131.

14. Chung yang t'ung chi ch'u, Chung kuo kuomintang chih-tao hsia chih cheng-chih ch'eng-chi t'ung-chi (CKKCHCCC), January, 1934, pp. 6-11, 24.

15. Chung yang t'ung chi ch'u, CKKCHCCC, March, 1934, pp. 22-23 and January, 1934, p. 25.

16. Chung yang t'ung chi ch'u, CKKCHCCC, March, 1934, p. 23; May, 1934, pp. 16-17; July, 1934, pp.22-23; September, 1934, p. 18.

17. Chiang Tso-pin, Twenty-Five Years, pp. 127-129.

18. Gillen, Donald G., Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 118-256.

19. Li Tsung-jen, Pai Ch'ung-hsi et al., Kwangsi ti chien-she, pp. 50-63.

20. Ch'en Pu-lei, Ch'en Pu'lei hsien sheng hui i lu, pp. 75-77. Ch'en was the leader of the New Life Monthly group which included also Ch'en Kuo-fu, Chou Fu-hai, Tai Chi-t'ao, Pan Kung-chan and Shao Li-tze. The journal was founded in 1928.

21. Sa Meng-su, "I tang chi kuo" (One party rule), Hsin Sheng Min, Vol. 1, no. 4, April, 1928, p. 3.

22. Sa Meng-wu, "I tang chi juo", p. 5.

23. Wu Jen, "Yu hsien-fa tsai nung hsun-chen ma?" (Is tutelage possible only under a constitution?), Chang Chen chih et al., Ping Hu Shih fan tang, pp. 137-142.

24. Wu Jen, "Yu hsien-fa tsai nung hsun-chen ma?", pp. 138-139.

25. Hsiao Ning, "Hsun chen shih chi yu hsien-chen shih chi tang chen-fu ming chun tuan-ti san che tse kuan hsi" (relationship between the party, government and popular organizations during tutelage and constitutional periods), Hsin Sheng Min, Vol. 2, no. 4, 1929, p. 3.

26. Ch'en Li-fu, Wei sheng lun, Vol. 1, p. 129.

27. Ch'en Kuo-fu, Ch'en kuo-fu hsien-sheng chuan chi (CKFHHCC), Vol. 1, p. 185.

28. Ch'en Kuo-fu, CKFHHCC, Vol. 1, p. 186.

29. Ch'en Kuo-fu, CKFHHCC, Vol. 1, p. 186.

30. Ch'en Kuo-fu, CKFHHCC, Vol. 1, pp. 186-187.

31. Ch'en Kuo-fu, CKFHHCC, Vol. 1, pp. 190-191.

32. Ch'en Kuo-fu, CKFHHCC, Vol. 1, p. 192.

33. Pan Kung-chan, "Kuomintang and Liberty", Pacific Affairs, Vol. 4, no. 1, January, 1931, pp. 51-52.

34. Yang Yu-chiung, San-min chu-i chih li-lun yu chi-tu, p. 79.

35. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Vol. 2, pp. 74-77.

36. Hsiung, James Chieh, Ideology in Practice, The Evolution of Chinese Communism, pp. 95-6, 137.

37. Yang Yu-chiung, San-min chu-i chih li-lun yu chi-tu, p. 91.

38. Chu Cheng, "Shih-fa tang hua wen ti" (The question of the judiciary under KMT principles), Eastern Miscellaney, Vol. 32, no. 10, May 16, 1935, p. 6.

39. Chu Cheng, "Shih-fa tang hua wen ti", p. 9.

40. GG, Vol. 29, no. 67, June, 1928, pp. 1-3.

41. GG, Vol. 66, no. 1835, September 3, 1935, pp. 4-5.

42. China Weekly Review, Vol. 48, no. 3, March 16, 1929, p. 86.

43. China Weekly Review, Vol. 50, no. 2, September 14, 1929, p. 108.

44. China Weekly Review, Vol. 50, no. 2, September 14, 1929, p. 108.

45. China Weekly Review, Vol. 50, no. 4, September 28, 1929, p. 161.

46. China Critic, Vol. 4, no. 10, March 5, 1931, p. 231.

47. China Critic, Vol. 4, no. 52, December 24, 1931, p. 1254.

48. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 23, June 7, 1934, p. 548.

49. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 23, June 7, 1934, p. 548.

50. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 23, June 7, 1934, p. 549.

51. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 30, July 26, 1934, p. 739.

52. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 31, August 2, 1934, p. 763.

53. China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 42, October 18, 1934, p. 1029.

54. China Critic, Vol. 11, no. 2, October 2, 1935, p. 36.

55. China Critic, Vol. 11, no. 2, October 2, 1935, p. 36.

56. GG, Vol. 66, no. 1764, June 11, 1935, p. 1.

57. China Weekly Review, Vol. 73, no. 9, July 27, 1935, pp. 280-281.

58. Abend, Hallett, My Life in China, 1926-1941, p. 141; China Weekly Review, Vol. 74, no. 9, November 2, 1935, p. 289.

59. Chiang Kai-shek, Outline of the New Life Movement, p. 2.

60. Chiang Kai-shek, New Life Movement, p. 7.

61. Chiang Kai-shek, New Life Movement, p. 9.

62. Chiang Kai-shek, "Hsin sheng huo yun tung kang yao" (Principles of the New Life Movement), Chung-tung yen lun hsuan chi (CTYLHC), Vol. 3, pp. 24-25.

63. Chiang Kai-shek, CTYLHC, Vol. 3, p. 25.

64. Chiang Kai-shek, New Life Movement, p. 14.

65. Chu, Samuel C., "The New Life Movement, 1934-1937", Research on Social Sciences on China, ed. John E. Lane, p. 3.

66. Min kuo erh-shih-san nien hsin-sheng-huo yun-tung chung pao-kao (MKENHYCP), p. 1.

67. MKENHYCP, pp. 7-25.

68. There are some discrepancies as to whether there were New Life Movement organizations in Chinghai, Suiyuan and Chahar provinces. (See Chu, Samuel C., p. 5; MKENHYCP, pp. 16, 20 and 24.)

69. Chiang Kai-shek, New Life Movement, p. 11.

70. Chiang Kai-shek, New Life Movement, pp. 11-12.

71. Chu, Samuel C., "New Life Movement, 1934-1937", pp. 5-6,8.

72. Chu, Samuel C., "New Life Movement, 1934-1937", pp. 8-9.

73. Hu Shih, "Chin jih kuo chu ti chien she shih yeh" (Economic developments that can be accomplished at present), Tu li p'ing lun, no. 95, April 8, 1934, pp. 2-3.

74. Chiang launched several movements in his campaign to uplift China. The New Life Movement was conceived of to take care of the people's spiritual needs. There was also the Kuo-min ching-chi yun-tung (citizens' economic movement) which was for material improvements and the lao-tung fu-wu yun-tung (volunteer labor movement). They were all to be inter-related

but there is little material to demonstrate what the latter two movements accomplished. (Chang chi, Chang Pu-chuan hsien-sheng chuan chi, pp. 81-82.)

75. Tan, Chester C., Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century, pp. 172-173.

76. Wright, Mary C., "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology", Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 14, no. 4, August, 1955, pp. 515, 524.

Footnotes for Chapter V.

1. Hsin Yueh or Crescent Moon was founded in 1929 and lasted until the end of 1930 or early 1931. Hu Shih, Lo Lung-chih and Liang Shih-chiu were its regular contributors. Tu li p'ing lun was a weekly which began on May 22, 1932 and continued to 1937. Hu Shih was its editor.

2. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa" (Civil rights and the provisional constitution), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 2, no. 2, April 10, 1929.

3. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", p. 1.

4. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", pp. 1-2; Hu Shih and Lin Yu-tang, China's Own Critic, pp. 24-27.

5. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", p. 2.

6. Hu Shih and Lin Yu-tang, "When Shall We have a Constitution", China's Own Critic, pp. 31-33.

7. Hu Shih and Lin Yu-tang, China's Own Critic, pp. 33, 35-37.

8. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", p. 6.

9. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", p. 6.

10. Hu Shih, "Jen-ch'uan yu Yueh-fa", p. 7.

11. China Weekly Review, Vol. 50, no. 4, September 28, 1929, p. 181.

12. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih-ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun" (Criticisms of the Provisional Constitution of the tutelage period), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 3, no. 8, (no date), pp. 1-18.

13. Lo Lung-chi, "Shih mo shih fa chih" (What is rule by law), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 3, no. 11, (no date), pp. 2-5.

14. In November, 1930, Lo was put in jail for having criticized the government in his articles. But upon representation by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei and T. V. Soong and others, he was quickly released. (China Critic, Vol. 3, no. 46, November 13, 1930.)

15. China Christian Year Book, 1931, Chapter 5, "The Struggle for Civil Rights" by Lin Yu-tang, p. 54.

16. Liang Shih-chiu, "Lun shih hsiang tung i", (On unifying thought), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 2, no. 3, May 10, 1929. pp. 2-3.

17. Liang Shih-chiu, "Lun shih hsiang tung i", pp. 2, 5-6, 8.

18. Liang Shih-chiu, "Lun shih hsiang tung i", p. 9.

19. Hu Shih, "Hsin wen hua yung-tung yu Kuomintang" (The new culture movement and the Kuomintang), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 2, combined nos. 6-7, September 10, 1929, pp. 7-8.

20. Hu Shih, "Hsin wen hua yung-tung yu Kuomintang", pp. 1-2.

21. Hu Shih, "Hsin wen hua yung-tung yu Kuomintang", pp. 4-5.

22. Hu Shih, "Hsin wen hua yung-tung yu Kuomintang", p. 14.

23. Fu Meng-tseng, "Chung-kuo hsien tsai yao yu cheng-fu" (China must have a government now), Tu li p'ing lun, no. 5, June 19, 1932, pp. 7-9.

24. Lo Lung-chi, "Wo tui yu tang wu shang ti ying ch'ing p'i p'ing" (My honest criticisms on party rule), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 2, no. 8, October 10, 1929, pp. 2-4.

25. Lo Lung-chi, "Wo tui yu tang wu shang ti ying ch'ing p'i p'ing", pp. 11-13.

26. Lo Lung-chi, "Wo tui yu tang wu shang ti ying ch'ing p'i p'ing", pp. 10, 13-14.

27. Lo Lung-chi, "Wo tui yu tang wu shang ti ying ch'ing p'i p'ing", p. 9.

28. Lo Lung-chi, "Wo men yao shih mo yang ti cheng-chih chih-tu" (What sort of political system do we want), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 2, no. 2, June 5, 1930, p. 8.

29. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun" (Criticism of the Provisional Constitution of the tutelage period), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 3, no. 8, (no date), p. 5.

30. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun", pp. 7-8.

31. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun", pp. 8-9.

32. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun", pp. 12-14, 15.

33. Lo Lung-chi, "Tui hsun cheng shih ch'i Yueh-fa ti p'ing lun", pp. 16-17.

34. Hu Shih, "Hsien-cheng wen-ti" (Question of constitutional rule), Tu li p'ing lun, no. 1, May 22, 1932, p. 5.

35. Hu Shih, "Hsien-cheng wen-ti", p. 7.

36. Hu Shih, "Chih hsien pu jo shou fa" (Better to abide by existing laws than to make a new constitution), Tu li p'ing lun, no. 50, May 14, 1933, pp. 2-3.

37. Hu Shih, "Chih hsien pu jo shou fa", pp. 3-4.

38. Lu Yen-ying, "Can China become Fascist", China Critic, Vol. 7, no. 24, June 14, 1932, pp. 560-562.

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41. Hu Shih, "I nien lai kuan yu min-chih yu tu-tsai ti t'ao-lun", pp. 18-19.

42. Hu Shih, "I nien lai kuan yu min-chih yu tu-tsai ti t'ao-lun", pp. 18-19.

43. Hu Shih, "I nien lai kuan yu min-chih yu tu-tsai ti t'ao-lun", pp. 19-20.

44. Hu Shih, "I nien lai kuan yu min-chih yu tu-tsai ti t'ao-lun", pp. 21-22.

45. Hu Shih, "Fei chih nei-chan ta t'ung-meng" (Grand alliance for the abolition of civil war), Tu li p'ing lun, no. 3, June 5, 1932, pp. 2-4.

46. Hu Shih, "Fei chih nei-chan ta t'ung-meng", pp. 2-3.

47. Chang Tung-sheng, "Tang ti wen-ti" (Party problem), Tsai Sheng, Vol. 1, no. 3, July 20, 1932, p. 19. (This journal was the spokesman for the National Socialist Party of China of which Carsun Chang was leader.)

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50. Lo Lung-chi, "Lun chung-kuo ti kung-ch'an" (On Communism in China), Hsin Yueh, Vol. 3, no. 10, p. 3.

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81. Shih Wei, p. 14.

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